UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-1965

KIMBERLY HOPKINS, individually and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

HORIZON MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INCORPORATED; DEUTSCHE BANK 

NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District 

Judge. (7:06-cv-02935-HMH) 

Argued: October 30, 2008 Decided: December 3, 2008 

Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Richard D. 

BENNETT, United States District Judge for the District of 

Maryland, sitting by designation. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ARGUED: James Mixon Griffin, LAW OFFICES OF JAMES MIXON GRIFFIN, 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Hamlet Sam Mabry, III, 

HAYNSWORTH, SINKLER & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, 

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard A. Harpootlian, RICHARD A. 

HARPOOTLIAN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina; Tucker S. Player, 

PLAYER LAW FIRM, L.L.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. Charles M. Sprinkle, III, Christopher T. Brumback, 
HAYNSWORTH, SINKLER & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, 

for Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

Appellant, Kimberly Hopkins (“Hopkins”), brought suit in 

the District Court of South Carolina alleging a violation of 

Section 9 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

(“RESPA”). 12 U.S.C. § 2608. Hopkins claims that Appellees, 

Deutsche Bank and Horizon Management acting as its agent 

(collectively “Horizon”), violated Section 9, which prohibits 

requiring the purchaser of real estate to buy title insurance 

from a particular title company. Hopkins also sought class 

certification. Horizon moved for summary judgment, claiming 

that the case presented no genuine issue of material fact. The 

district court granted Horizon’s motion for summary judgment and 

denied certification of the class as moot. Because none of 

Hopkins’s claims of statutory violations is supported by any 

evidence in the record giving rise to a genuine issue of 

material fact, we affirm. 

I. 

Horizon acts as a marketing and sales agent for properties 

purchased at foreclosure sales, which are known as Real Estate 

Owned (“REO”) properties. Hopkins signed a contract with 

Horizon to purchase an REO property that had been acquired by 

Deutsche Bank. J.A. at 43, 364-72. This contract included 

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Addendum #1 (“Addendum”), which Hopkins signed, stating that 

Horizon would select the title and closing agent. 

Two title insurance policies were also needed to complete 

the sale. An owner’s title policy protects the new owner of 

record against claims to the title. In the Addendum, Horizon 

contracted to pay the premium for the owner’s title insurance 

policy, regardless of whether the purchaser requested an owner’s 

policy. J.A. at 110, 458. Hopkins’ mortgage lender required 

her to obtain a lender’s title policy and a closing protection 

letter to ensure against mishandling of the closing documents. 

J.A. at 459. 

At closing, Horizon purchased the owner’s policy from 

Fidelity Title, its chosen issuer. The policy was issued by 

Jayhawk Title, an authorized title insurance agent for Fidelity. 

Jayhawk is wholly owned by Robert L. Luce who, in his capacity 

as an attorney, was Horizon’s closing agent. J.A. at 459. 

 Hopkins also initially selected a law firm, the Player Law 

Firm, to represent her at the closing. The Player Firm 

performed a title search on Hopkins’ behalf and issued a 

lender’s commitment. Hopkins was subsequently informed by the 

Luce firm, on behalf of Horizon, that the Addendum required the 

title work to be done by Horizon’s chosen agent. J.A. at 460. 

Significantly, however, no representation was made that this 

undertaking included the issuance of the lender’s title policy. 

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In the end, Hopkins bought her lender’s title policy from 

Fidelity and was not represented by counsel at closing. J.A. at 

460-61. She now claims that Horizon’s practices surrounding the 

sale and closing constituted a violation of her rights under 

Section 9 of the RESPA not to be required to choose a particular 

title insurer. 

II. 

 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the 

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue 

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Meson v. GATX Tech. Servs. Corp., 507 F.3d 

803, 806 (4th Cir. 2007). At the summary judgment stage, once 

the moving party has identified the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact, the non-moving party bears the burden of 

identifying specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a 

genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Temkin v. 

Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991). 

 Hopkins claims that the Addendum she signed resulted in 

Horizon indirectly requiring her to purchase title insurance 

from a particular title company in violation of Section 9. 

There are two title policies at issue, the lender’s and the 

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owner’s, and Hopkins argues that Horizon’s practices associated 

with each were in violation of Section 9. We take them in turn. 

A. 

 Hopkins first claims that because Horizon chose the issuer 

of the owner’s title policy, she was effectively required to 

purchase this policy from the title company selected by Horizon. 

However, Hopkins concedes that Horizon “paid for the owner’s 

policy.” J.A. at 92, 101. This admission defeats any claim 

that Hopkins was required to purchase this title insurance “from 

any particular title company.” 12 U.S.C. § 2608(a). Her 

argument that “purchase” in the language of Section 9 should be 

read to mean “obtain possession” rather than “pay for” contrasts 

with the plain meaning of the term and is without merit. The 

owner’s policy was in Hopkins’s name and its insurance covers 

her against claims to title of the property she now owns. 

However, Horizon, not Hopkins, paid for the policy, and thus 

Section 9 of the RESPA does not apply. If Hopkins could show 

that she was required to pay further money to maintain the 

owner’s insurance, she might arguably be “purchasing” a part of 

the policy. The record is, however, devoid of evidence that 

this is the case. 

Hopkins also contends that the costs of the owner’s policy 

were indirectly passed on to her in violation of Section 9 

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because she was required to pay closing fees to the closing and 

title agent, Luce, who was chosen by Horizon. She claims these 

fees were in turn used to purchase the owner’s policy. This 

interpretation of the closing fee finds no support in the 

record. J.A. at 87 (Hopkins testifies that seller paid the 

premium for the owner’s policy); J.A. at 129 (denominating the 

owner’s policy premium as $270 and recording in line 1108 that 

it was paid from seller’s funds at settlement); cf. Supp. J.A. 

at 30 (instructing that lines 1108-1110 of the HUD form are 

those that deal with title insurance). Hopkins’s argument that 

Horizon is passing on the cost of the owner’s title insurance in 

the pricing of the property, separately from the question of the 

closing fee, also cites nothing in the record; and she falls 

short of showing that Horizon required her to purchase owner’s 

title insurance from a particular title company as a condition 

of the sale. 

B. 

 Hopkins also argues that Horizon’s choice of the title 

agent and owner’s policy indirectly required her to use a 

particular title company for the purchase of the lender’s title 

policy. Hopkins initially had title work performed by the 

Player Law Firm. Horizon’s lawyer, Luce, refused to accept this 

work since under South Carolina state law title work is a legal 

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service, Doe Law Firm v. Richardson, 636 S.E.2d 866, 868 (S.C. 

2006), and it is therefore subject to ethical and malpractice 

considerations. However, this refusal by Luce did not 

constitute rejection of any title policy Hopkins may have 

chosen. J.A. at 215-16, 224-227. Once informed that the title 

work must be done by Luce, Hopkins chose Luce to be her title 

agent for the sale; he performed the title search and 

examination. Luce also issued a lender’s title commitment for 

the benefit of Hopkins’s mortgage lender. J.A. at 459. 

However, there is no evidence that Hopkins was required as a 

condition of sale to purchase the lender’s policy from Horizon’s 

title agent or the company providing the owner’s policy. 

Hopkins claims that she was told by her own agent, whom she 

had hired as her mortgage broker, that she was required to 

purchase the lender’s policy from the same issuer as the owner’s 

policy. Whether or not this statement affected the transaction, 

the district court correctly concluded that it cannot be imputed 

to Horizon. J.A. at 471. According to an informal Department 

of Housing and Urban Development opinion, a seller may violate 

Section 9 by choosing a title attorney or agent if that attorney 

or agent requires the buyer to use a particular title insurance 

company. Supp. J.A. at 80; J.A. at 471. However, Hopkins has 

pointed to no evidence in the record which could support a 

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finding that in this case the title agent, Luce, constrained 

Hopkins’s choice of title insurer. See J.A. at 471-72. 

In addition, whatever conditions Hopkins’s lenders may have 

imposed upon her selection of insurer cannot be imputed to 

Horizon. As the district court found in a well-reasoned and 

thorough opinion, Hopkins chose her own mortgage broker, and any 

requirements that her broker imposed are not the responsibility 

of or attributable to Horizon. J.A. at 469, 471. 

Hopkins asserts that the transaction was economically 

coercive because she received a significant discount on the 

lender’s policy when she purchased it from the same title 

insurance company that had issued the owner’s policy to Horizon. 

J.A. at 470. The fact that Hopkins paid less for a lender’s 

policy purchased from the company already providing owner’s 

insurance may be an economic benefit, but it is not a 

“requirement” and thus does not come within the language of 

Section 9. 

Finally, Hopkins claims that Horizon was affirmatively 

required to inform her of her right to choose her own title 

insurance company. No notice requirement appears in the RESPA 

or in the associated regulations. We decline to impose such a 

requirement where, as here, the language of the Congressional 

enactment is clear on its face. 

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III. 

 Hopkins has not met the burden of showing that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists in this case. Accordingly, the 

opinion of the district court granting summary judgment and 

denying the class certification as moot is 

AFFIRMED.