FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ULY 19, 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble L loy d D. Geor g e, United States District Judge f or the District of N evada , * sitti ngby desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1652 4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00179 CR-H -S UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us ALONZO HOUSTON, D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r t h e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 19 , 200 6) TJO FL AT and COX , C ircuit Judg es, and GE ORG E , D istrict Judg e. * COX , C ircuit Judg e:2

W e con sid er

in thi s a ppe al the iss ue of

r ac ia l di sc ri m ina tio n inj ur y se le ct ion , ap ply ing Batson v. K

entucky , 4 7 6 U
. S
. 7 9 , 1 0 6 S
. C t . 1 7 1 2 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , a n di t s p r o g e n y. W e also consider whether there w as constitu tional or statut ory err or under Un ited S t a t es v. Bo o ker , 543 U
. S. 220 , 125 S
. Ct
. 738 ( 2005 ). W e af fi rm the c onvi ct ion s,
va cate the se nte nc es , a nd r em an d f or r es en te nc ing
. I. B ack ground A lon zo H oust on ( “ H oust on” ) w as c harg ed w itha rm ed

r obbe ry of ac re dit unio n, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2113 (a) and (d) (“ Count I”), brandishin g a fire arm dur ing the c om

m iss ionof

ac ri m e, in vio la tio n of 18 U
. S. C. § 94 4( c) ( “ Co unt I I” ), a nd poss es sio n of

af ir earm by ac onvi ct ed

f el on , i n vi ola tio n of

18 U
. S. C. § 92 2( g) (1 ) (“ Co un t II I”). During j ury

selection, both the prosecutio n and t h e d ef ense exerc ised perem pto ry s trikes to rem ove prospective jurors. T he procedure the district court fo llo w ed in se le ct ing the j ur

y w as as fo llo w s. F ir st, the 32- pe rs on v en ir e w as se at ed ; the tw el ve -p er son j ur

y w as ult im at el y

se le ct ed f ro m the f ir st 2 8. ( R. 1- 68 a t 30
. ) T he pr ose cu tio n w as giv en six pe re m pto ry str ike s, an d th e de fe nse w as giv ente n. ( R. 1- 68 at 30.) Of the venire m em bers rem aining af

ter the exercise of all s t ri k es , t h e ju ry
w oul d cons ist of the fi rs t tw el ve . (R
. 1- 68 at 30. ) T w o alt er na te s we re se le ct ed

f ro m the r em ai nin g f

our j ur or s, w ithe ac h party

be ing giv enone pe re m

pto ry str ike
. ( R. 1- 68One a dditional white venire me mber, a Ms. Steele, also answe red the question in the 1 aff irmative, but she wa s not part of the 28- person ve nire fr om which the twelve -per son jury was selec ted. The G overnme nt ultim ately struck her

when a lternate s were beingselec ted. 3 at 3 0 .) Of the first 28 venire m em bers from

which the tw elve-person j ury wa s
se le ct ed , te n w er e bla ck
. Appe lle e’ s B r. a t 8- 9, 8 n. 1. T he m em be rs of the ve nir e w er e que sti one d as a grou p, an d they

r es pond ed

by
ra isi ng the ir hands. ( R. 1- 68 a t 2- 11, 13- 29. ) T he a tto rn ey s w er e the n pe rm itt ed to as k que sti ons an d f

oll owup w itha ny

ve nir e m em

be r w hose a nsw er

to a ge ne ra l qu es tio n piqu ed their interest. (R. 1-68 at 13-29.) O ne of the general questions asked was

“ D oe s any

body ha ve af am ily m em be r w ho has be en co nvi ct ed of a cr im e?” ( R. 1- 68 at 24-29.) E ight o f the 2 8 venire m em bers answe red this questio n in the affirm ative. (R .1 -6 8 at 2 4 -2 9 .) Of t h o s e ei g h t , f o u r w er e w h i t e, an dfo u r w er e b l ac k . Ap p el l an t ’s Br
. a t 6; Appe lle e’ s B r. a t 3. 1 A ft er the que sti oni ng c onc lud ed , both th e pr ose cutio n and the de fe nse sim ultaneous ly

subm itted their “ strike sheets,” which indicated the jurors w hom each attor ne y w ish ed to str ike thr oughape re m pto ry c ha lle nge . A m azingly , non e of the pr opos ed str ike s ov er la

ppe d. T he pr ose cu tio n wi she d to str ike six ve nir e m em be rs , fiv e o f who m

–S m al l, Tay lo r, O’ Neal , S m it h, an d Ju lk s– were bl ack . (R .1-6 8 a t 3 1.) T he de fe nse w ish ed

to str ike te n ve nir e m em

be rs , a ll of

w hom w er e w hit e. ( R. 1- 68 at 31. ) Whe n e ac h si de w as m ad e aw ar e of the oth er sid e’ s pr opos ed str ike s, H oust onBatson holds that basing a pere mptory

strike on the ra ce of

the potential juror violates 2 the Equal Protec tion Cl ause of the Four teenth Amendme nt. 4 as se rt ed a n ob j ec tio n ba se d on Batson v. K entu cky , 476 U
. S. 79, 106 S
. Ct
. 171 2 (1986). W e set out in its e ntirety the colloqu y betwee n the co u rt an d counsel

2 dis cu ssi ng this obj ec tio n: TH E C O U R T: An y B ats on c ha lle nge s f or the gov er

nm en t? MR. SA LT ER : No, sir. T H E CO U RT : A ny

f ro m the de fe ndant? MR
. CO Y L E : Y e s , s i r . T h a t b e i n g t h a t 5 o u t o f t h e 6 s t r i k e s o f the gove rn m en t w er e bla ck
. T H E CO U RT : I m igh t say pare nth et ic al ly al l of y our str ike s w er e w hit e. Jus t pare nth et ic al ly , a nd I m ean th at f or w ha t i t’ s w orth. MR
. CO Y L E : Y ou’ re c or re ct . T H E CO U RT : A nd I ne ed to sta te , fo r the r ec or d, the de fe ndant i s bl ac k, a nd tha t the U
. S. A tto rn ey

is bla ck , a nd that the de fe ndant’ s a tto rn ey is white. MR
. CO Y L E : M s. L ola

S m al l. T H E CO U RT : P ar don? MR. CO YL E: Ms. Lola S m all, w e w ould challenge her. T H E CO U RT : L et

m e fi nd h er

f ir st. MR
. CO Y L E : N um

be r 2. TH E C O U R T: Ok a y. MR. CO YL E: I shoul d have given y ou a num ber. TH E C OU RT : Mr. Salter ? MR. SA LT ER : Ye s, sir, Your H onor. W e struck h er because she re spon ded t h a ts h e h a d a r e l a t i v e c o n v i c t e d o f a c r i me . A n d t h a t ’s o n a l l o f t h e m. W e’ ll go through them one by one but th at w as the prim ary rea son th at we struck her. TH E C OU RT : All right. What’ s the next one? MR. CO YL E: T he next o n e is Caroly n O’ Ne al, the back row. 14, I believe. Y es . T H E CO U RT : A nythi ng o n th at oth er than th e dr

ug c onvi ct ion ? MR. SA LT ER : Nothing ot her than that, Judge.5

MR. CO YL E: A ls o , on that rowa little further over Belinda Sm ith, N um ber 17. TH E C OU RT : Anything other than the m anslaugh ter conviction th ere? MR
. S A L T E R: A nd tha t–wel l tha t’ s it
. S he r es pond ed that the re w as a m an sla ught er co nvi ct ion
. A lso tha t she w as a j ur or w he re the y f ound a pe rs on n ot g uil ty . T ha t w as ac onsi de ratio n a s w el l. MR
. CO Y L E : A nd D av id Julk s, N um be r 18. MR
. SA L T E R: T ha t on e, Y our H onor , is one w he re I r ec ei ve d a ssi stanc e fr om the a ge nt who t old

m e tha t M r. Jul ks w as oc ca sio na lly sle ep ing
. T H E CO U RT : A nythi ng e lse on Julk s? MR. SA LT ER : No, sir. MR
. CO Y L E : A nd K im

br ough er y T ay lor
. S he be ing on the f ro nt r owin the m iddle of the other side. TH E C OU RT : Anything other than the drugs th ere? MR. SA LT ER : No, sir. Nothing else. TH E C O U R T: An yth i n g e l s e e i t h e r o f yo uwa n tt o s a y? MR. SA LT ER : Ye s, sir. I w ould like to say , Jud ge, that in no case did I even not e tha t the se j ur or s I str uc k w er e bla ck
. I t w as str ic tly the m aj or ity

of m y strikes cam e fr om

the “ C” in m

y n otes here. T hat they

we re co nvi ct ed –th at the y re spon de d they

ha d r el at ive s th at

w er e co nvi ct ed

of cr im es , and I ’ ve got

“ Cs ” do tt in g myr ea sons he re a nd tha t’ s th e onl y re as on. TH E C OU RT : Anything else, Mr. Coy le? MR
. CO Y L E : I t j ust

appe ar s they w er e cho se n for c olo r uponf

ir st b lus h. T he fact that they knew som ebody or had som eone in their fam ily who had been arr ested wa s that the-- MR
. S A L T E R: N o, sir
. C onvi ct ed
. MR
. CO Y L E : C onvi ct ed
. THE COURT: Eve ry on e were d ru g c on vi ct io ns ex cep t t he m an sl au gh te r, I believe. MR. SA LT ER : Ye s, sir. MR. COY LE : That particular criteria in place and the fact that m ore m inorities ha v e , a s a r

u l e , m o r e p e o p l e c o n v i c t e d i n t h e i r f a m i l i e s t h a n d oe s th e ma j o r i t y o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . I t ’s j u s ta n o t h e r r o u t e t o g e tt o t h e s a me place.6

MR
. SA L T E R: I ce rt ai nly w as not thi nki ng o f tha t, Jud ge . I w oul d li ke to put in evi de nc e m ay

be m y not es he re . I t sh ow s th e br eakdown sh ow ing a ll of the “ Cs” and alm ost no thing else in m y notes if that would-- TH E C OU RT : W ell, why don’t y ou loo k over y our shou lder and see if y ou can confirm that, Mr . C oy le. (M r. Co y le loo kin g ov er

gov er nm en t’ s no te s) MR. CO YL E: T hat’ s correc t, Y our Honor. T H E CO U RT : A ll ri ght
. G ive n th e fa ct s and c ir cu m stanc es in lig ht o f the c as e that we will be try ing next we ek, and the stated reasons for the challenges, as w ell as the voi r dir e tha t w as c ondu ct ed by the a tto rn ey s, both f

or the gove rn m en t and the de fe ndant– an d I m igh t say pare nth et ic al ly tha t wh ile not sig nif ic an t, dur ing the str ike s of th e de fen dant, too , the Co urt f ind s th at the challenges of the j urors by the defendant we re no t shown or have not been shown to be the r es ult

of pur poseful di sc rim ina tio n and a ve ry le git im at e re as on h as be ena rt ic ula te d. I re co gni ze , a s th e de fe ndant p oin ts o ut, that the re is a t en de nc y in certa in areas a t least, where there are m ore, a higher perc entage of the black popu lation m ay

have crim inal records. But the Court also notes that we started out w ith a hig he r pe rc en ta ge of j ur or s th at

w er e bla ck , 35%
. S lig htl y ove r 35% of the ve nir e tha t w e’ re str iki ng f ro m –I ’ m not ta lki ng a bout –I ’ m ta lki ng a

bout j ust of the 28, not

the r es t of

the m , the re w er e 9 bl ac ks o ut o f the 28. In an y ev en t, I do n ot f

ind that i t i s ar es ult

of pur pose fu l di sc ri m ina tio n. So the m oti on i s de nie d. L et ’ s go o n and r ec es s th em unt il T ue sday

m or nin g at 9 o’ cl oc k. I w ill r em ind y ou I ’ m not goi ng t o swe ar them

so the j eo pardy doe s no t a tta ch
. S o le t’ s go . (S ide -b ar c onc lud ed ) (R.1 -6 8 a t 3 1- 35 .) T he c as e w en t t o tr ia l w ithaj ur y c onsi sti ng o f se ve n w hi tes and f ive bla ck s. T he j ur y c onvi ct ed H oust on on C ount s I a nd I I an d a cquit te d hi m on C ount I II
. T he j udge se nte nc ed

H oust on t o 30 0 m onths’ im pr iso nm en t onCo unt I an d 84 m onths’Houston also contends that he was de nied his Fifth Amendme nt rig ht to the effe ctive 3 assistance of counse l. As this case c omes to us on direct a ppeal, Houston ha s not developed a fac tual rec ord suffic ient for us to re view this claim. See U nited States v. Bende r , 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). Houston' s ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im is t hus more appr opriately broug ht as a 28 U .S.C. § 2255 m otion, and we de cline to addr ess it further
. See id. 7 im pr iso nm en t onCo unt

I I, the se se nte nc es to run c onse cu tiv el y . H oust on a ppe al s both hi s c onvi ct ion s and h is s en te nc es . II. Is su es on A pp ea l T o r es olv e thi s a

ppe al , w e co nsi de r (1 ) w he the r the pr ose c ut o r ’ s e xe rc ise of a ny of his perem

ptory challen ges was m otivated byrac ial prej udice, and theref ore vio la te d H ousto n’s Fi fth A m en dm en t r igh ts, a nd ( 2) w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt, in sentencing H ousto n, com m itted c onsti tutio nal or statutory err or under United States
v. Booker , 543 U. S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (200 5). 3 III. St andards of R eview W e reviewfor cle ar e rror a trial j udge’s f

indin g that a prosecutor has exercised pe rem pt ory st rik es free of d i s c r im in at ory in te nt . U

nit ed Sta tes v . A lston , 895 F
. 2d 1362 , 136 6 ( 11th C ir
. 199 0)
. T he j udge ’ s a sse ssm en t of the pr ose cu tor ’ s c re dib ili ty is entitled to “ great defe rence. ” B ats on , 476 U
. S. a t 98 n. 21, 106 S
. Ct
. a t 17 24 n
. 21. H oust on p re se rv ed

his Booker

c la im s f or r ev i e w b y a p pr opr iate obj ec tio n inthe di st ric t co ur t. T hu s, ou r rev ie w of th os e cl ai m s i s d e n ov o. Se e U nit ed Sta tes v . P az , 40 5 F .3d 94 6, 9 48 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ).At the Batson hear ing, H ouston also contested the pr osecution’s pe remptory strike of 4 venire member Julks (R.1-68 at 32), but the prosec ution’s rea son for strikinghim–that he was sle e pin gduri ngvo ir

dir e –is no t c ha lle ng e d o n a pp e a l. 8 IV . D isc us sio n This discussio n proceeds in tw o parts. First, based on th e fr am ew ork outli ned in B ats on , 4 7 6 U
. S
. 7 9 , 1 0 6 S
. C t . 1 7 1 2 , a n d i t s p r o g e n y , w e c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in fi ndi ng n o di sc ri m ina tor y int en t i n th e pr ose cu tor ’ s ex er ci se of pe re m ptory st rike s. S ec ond, w e co nsi de r w he the r the c as e shou ld b e re m an de d f or resentencing for constituti onal or statuto ry err or under Booker
. A. T he B ats on Challenges Houston cont ends that the pros ecution’s e xercise of f our of its perem

ptory str ike s ( ve nir e m em

be rs S m al l, O ’ N ea l, S m ith , a nd T ay lor ) dur ing j ur y se le ct ion 4 vio la te d th e E qua l Pro te ct ionCl au se of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t. H e ba se s th is cont en ti on on one of

the r ea sons a rt ic ula te d by the pr ose cu tor

f or e xe rc isi ng the str ike s, a rg uin g th at

it is fa ci al ly

inv al id d

ue to its dis parate im

pa ct on b la ck s. Appellant’ s Br. at 16-20. H e also argu es that the stated reason, par ticularly when coupled with the fact that it w as disparately applied t o white and black venire
m em bers, reveals that the prosecutor acted out of purpos eful intent to discrim inate. Ap p el l an t ’s Br . a t2 0 -2 2 . Th e G o v e r n me n tre s p o n d s , c o n t en d i n g t h at Ho u s t o n ’s the or y of the dis parate im

pa ct of the f am ily c ri m ina l hi sto ry

c ri te ri on o n bla ck s is notThe Batson c a se aro se out of a state -c ourt

c onvic tio n, and

the Sup re me Court

ba se d it s 5 ho ldi ng s o n th e Eq

ua l Pr ote c tio n Cl a

us e of the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt, wh ic h a

pp lie s b y its terms only

to the states. SeeU.S. Const. amend I V, § 1. Howe ver, the Supreme Court has e sta bli sh e d th at th e Du e Pr oc e ss C la us e of the F if th A me ndme nt i mpl ie dly imp os e s th e same obligations on the feder al g overnme nt as does the Equa l Protection Clause on the states, a nd any alleg ed violations of those oblig ations are analy zed in the same wa

y as an a lleg ed violation of the Equal Protection Clause by a state a ctor. See Bolling v. Sharpe , 3 47 U. S. 4 97 , 4 99 , 7 4 S. Ct. 693, 694 (1954). We re cog nize that a Batson violation ex ists even if only one per emptory

strike resulted f rom discriminatory

intent. Se e Mc

Nai r v . Ca mp be ll , 416 F.3d 1291, 1311 ( 11th Cir. 2005). 9 cognizable und er B ats on , Appe lle e’ s B r. a t 17, an d that H oust on c an not sho wthat the prosecutor’ s stated reaso n s fo r exer cising hi s perem ptory challenges we re m ere pr et ex t f or dis cr im ina tor

y int en t. Appe lle e’ s B r. a t 20
. T he G ove rn m en t a lso
co nte nds tha t H oust on w ai ve d any a rg um en t base d on dis parate tr eatm en t of sim ilarl y situated white and black venire m em bers because he f

ailed to m ake any

such
ar gum en t i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt. Appe lle e’ s B r. a t 19
. W e ex am ine c la im s of

r ac ia l di sc ri m ina tio n inj ur y se le ct ionund er

the standard s ou tli ne d in Batson v. K entucky
. B ats on e sta

bli she s abur de n- shi ft ing 5 ap pr oa chthat a llo w s atr ia l c ourt t o de te rm ine w he the r pe re m pto ry str ike s w er e the
re sul t of r ac ia l anim

us. Fir st, the de fe ndant m ust es ta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se to ra ise th e in fere nc e o f di sc riminat ory in te nt . B ats on , 476 U
. S. a t 93-9 4, 106 S. Ct
. at 172 1. O nc e the pr im a fa ci e ca se is es ta bli she d, the gove rn m en t m ay re but the inf er en ce by
ar tic ula tin g le git im at e, r ac e- ne utr al r ea sons f or it s exe rc ise of

it s pe re m pto ry str ike s. Id

. at 9 4, 1 06 S. Ct. at 17 21
.10

A ft er the gov er

nm en t art ic ula te s su chr ea sons , the co ur t m ust ev al ua te the
c r e d i b i l it y

of t he st at edjus ti fic at io ns ba se d o n t he ev id en ce p la cedbe fo re i t. Id

. at 98, 106 S. Ct. 1724
. When the prosecutor, in response to a B ats on challenge, state s his r ea sons f

or str iki ng b la ck

j ur or s, he m

us t st an d or f

al l onthe pla

usi bil ity of the
reas on s s ta te d. Miller-E l v. Dretk e , __ U
. S. __, __, 125 S. Ct
. 231 7, 233 2 ( 2005 ). T he court m ust then evaluate th e p lausibil ity of the stated rea sons “ in ligh t of all evidence with a bear ing on [them ] .” Id

. at 23 31. T he de fe ndant m ai nta ins a t a ll tim es , ho wev er, th e ul ti m at e bu rd en of pro vi ng in te nt io na l d is cri m in at io n. B ats on , 476 U. S. at 94 n
. 18, 106 S
. Ct
. a t 17 21 n
. 18. W e note at the outset that the district c ourt did not expl icitly determ ine whether Hou st on m ad e o ut a pr im a fac ie cas e o f di sc riminat io n. Se e id. a t 94 -9 7, 106 S
. Ct
. at 1721-23 (establishing the prim a fa cie ca se as the first step in a B a t s on ch al le nge
an d art ic ula tin g vari ous w ay s in whi ch apr im a fa ci e ca se c anbe e sta bli she d)
. O ur pr ec ed en t c le ar ly

hol ds tha t the e sta

bli shm en t of

apr im a fa ci e ca se is an“ ab sol ute pr ec ondi tio n” to the pr ose cu tio n’ s burd ento ar tic ula te r ac e- ne utr al r ea sons f or the
ex erci se of it s s tri ke s. United States v. O choa-Vasquez , 428 F. 3d 1015, 103 8 ( 11th Ci r. 200 5) ( quot ing Ctrl. A la. F air H ous. A uth

. v. Lo wd

er R ea ltyCo
. , 236 F
. 3d 6 29, 636 (1 1thCi r. 200 0) (i nte rn al quot at ion m ar ks om itt ed ))
. Bu t the j udge in thi s c as e elicited non-dis crim inatory rea sons for the exercise of the prosecution ’ s perem ptory11

s t r i k e s a n dr

u l e do n t h e u l t i ma t e i s s u e o f i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i mi n a t i o n . T h e S up r e me Co urt i nstru ct s that

onc e a tr ia l j udge r

ule s onthi s qu es tio n, the bur de n to e sta bli sh
a pr im a faci e cas e is m oo te d. Se e H ernand ez v . Ne w Yo rk , 500 U.S . 352, 358, 111 S. Ct
. 185 9, 186 6 ( 1991 ) (p lur al ity opi nio n)
. A nd, the Go ve rnm en t do es not c ont en d that Houston’s appeal should fa i l b ec au se he did not establ ish a prim a fa cie ca se. A cc or din gly , w e lim it our re vie w in thi s ca se to the pr ose cu tor ’ s art ic ula tio n, a nd the jud ge ’s acce pt an ce, o f th e st at edjus ti fic at io ns forth e st rik es . H oust on m ak es tw o arg um en ts i n supp ort of his c ont en tio n th at

the pr ose cu tor im perm issib ly

used race as the rea son for the exercise of som e o f h i s perem ptory ch al le nge s. F ir st, he a rg ue s th at the pr ose cu tor ’ s state d re as on fo r dis m iss ing f our of the bla ck ve nir e m em

be rs ( Sm al l, S m ith , O ’ N ea l, a nd T ay lor ), that the y ha d f am ily
m em be rs w ith cr im ina l his tor ie s, is not ra ce -n eu tr al be ca use it statis tic al ly affec ts
m or e bla ck s th anw hit es . W e ne ed onl y re vie wthe dis m iss al s of S m al l, T ay lor , a nd O ’ N ea l be ca

use the pr ose cu tio n art icul at ed a n a ddi tio na l r ea son fo r dis m iss ing Sm ith –th at she ha d pr ev io us lyse rv ed on a j ur y that r et ur ne d ave rd ic t of

not gui lty (R
. 1- 68 a t 32 )– an d th at

r ea son is n ot cha lle nge d on ap pe al , nor doe s H oust on arg ue that Sm ith’s dism issal wa s the result of a “ m ixed m otive.” Se e W allac e v. M

orr iso n , 87 F .3d 1271 , 1274 -75 (11th Cir . 1996). Houston in cludes in his briefs sociological da taind ic at ing that si gnifi can tly m or e bla ck s th anw hit es , a s ape rc en ta ge of the ir12

relative subgroup s, ar e convicted of crim es in the United States. Utilizing these data, Houston argues that requiring the venire m em bers t o indicate whether they have had any fam ily m em

bers con victed of crim es, and then using their positi ve responses as the sol e justification for disqualify ing th em , is a strategy that im pacts blacks m ore he av ily than w hit es . I n c i v i l r i g h t s p a r l a n c e , t h i s a r g u me n ti s kn o w n a s a“d i s p a r a t e i mp a c t ” c l a i m. Se e 4 2 U. S. C. § 200 0e-2(k). In such a claim , the c om plainin g party

alleges rac ial dis cr i m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f af a c i a l l y r a c e - n e u t r a l s o rt i n g d e v i c e t h a th a s the effe ctof e xc lu di ng m or e b la ck s t ha n wh it es . See generally Gri g g s v. Duke Powe r Co
. , 401 U
. S. 424, 91 S. Ct
. 849 (1 971)
. T his ty pe of c la im c anbe dis tin gui she d f

ro m
a “ dis parate tr eatm en t” c la im , w hic h dire ct ly a lle ge s th at

bla ck s have be ensin gle d ou t and treated diffe rently

from whites solely because o f their r ace. T he Suprem e Court ha s he ld tha t c la im s of

dis parate im

pa ct a re not co gni za

ble unde r the E qua l P ro te ct ion Cl au se of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t, or by e xte nsi on the D ue Pr oc es s Cl au se of the Fi fth Am en dm en t. Se e W ashi ngt on v . D av is , 426 U
. S. 229 , 239 , 96 S
. Ct
. 204 0, 204 7 (1 976)
. T hus, adis parate im pa ct the or y c an not be use d by

it se lf to inv al ida te the prosecution ’ s stated reasons at step two of the B ats on in qu iry. Inr es pons e to the pr ose cu tor ’ s qu es tio n a t vo ir dir e ab out

f am ily m em be rs w ith
cr im ina l hi sto ri es , Sm al l re spon de d tha t he r son ha d r ec en tly be enc onvi ct ed

on dru gThe c olloquy betwee n court a

nd counsel that we have quote d ref lects that O’N eal’ s 6 nephew had bee n convicted on a

drugchar g e rather than a n arme d robber

y char g e. Since e ither crime suppor

ts a findingthat the re ason wa s rac e-ne utral, we need not a ddress this confusion. 13 ch ar ge s, a nd tha t he w as c ur re ntl y inc ar ce rate d. ( R. 1- 68 a t 25. ) T ay lor , r es pond ing to the sa m e que sti on, stated tha t he r co usi n ha d be enc onvi ct ed of dr ug p oss es sio n ab o u tfi v e yea rs b ef

o re t h e d ay o f H o u s t o n ’s v o i r d i re . ( R
. 1
- 6 8 a t 2 8 .) O’Ne al ’s
re s p o n s e t o the fam ilial crim inal histo ry question wa s that one of her nephews had be enc onvi ct ed

of a rm ed r obbe ry six or se ve n y ears be fo re the da te of H oust on’ s vo ir dir e. ( R. 1- 68 a t 26 -2 7. ) T his c ourt ha s pr ev iou sly he ld tha t pr ior

f am ily inv olv em en t with drug charges is a “ reasonably specific” and “ neutral” explanation for a pr os ecu to r’s ex erci se of p erem pt ory st rik es . Se e U

nit ed Sta tes v . A lston , 895 F
. 2d 1362 , 136 7 (1 1th Ci r. 1990 ). W e se e no r ea son w hy pr ior f am ily inv olv em en t w ith
arm ed robbery

would not be cons idered as neutral an explanation for a strike–particularly

when the ca se to be tried incl u d es an arm ed robbery charge. 6 T hus, the pr ose cu tor

m et his bur de n a t B ats on ’ s second stage to articulate legitim ate,
ra ce -n eu tr al r ea sons f

or e xe rc isi ng h is s tr ike s. H oust on c ont en ds tha t, e ve n if the pr ose cu tor ’ s st at ed

r ea son is l eg iti m at e on it s f ac e, it s di sparate im

pa ct is ev ide nc e of

the pr ose cu tor ’ s un de rl y ing int en t t o dis cr im ina te . T he S upr em e Co urt ha s he ld tha t ev ide nc e tha t the pr ose cu tor use d a
s o rti ng device with a disparate im pact on different r aces m ay be considered as14

ev ide nc e of

pur pose fu l di sc ri m ina tio n a t B ats on ’s th ird st ep . He rnan dez , 5 00 U .S
. at 362, 111 S. Ct
. at

186 8 ( plura lity

opi nio n) ; se e als o id

. at 376, 111 S. Ct
. at

187 5 ( S t e v e n s , J
. , d i s se nti ng) ; cf

. D av is , 4 2 6 U.S . a t2 4 2 , 9 6 S. Ct . a t2 0 4 8 -4 9 . We the re fo re r ec ogni ze that the dis tr ic t cour t had ci rc um stanti al e vid en ce be fo re it a t the thi rd sta ge of it s B ats on inquir

y that c oul d su

ppor t a f ind ing of dis cr im ina tor

y int en t. Bu t He rnan dezdoe s no t re qui re the court to draw that c onclusi on, and the court here did no t. T he court instead viewed the exclusion of t hose whose fam ily m em bers had crim inal histo ries as “ very legitim ate” (R. 1-68 at 34), and found that the strikes wer e
no t t he res ul t o f pu rp os efu l d is cri m in at io n. (R .1-6 8 a t 3 5.) The He rnan dezCourt cited severa l f a c t or s that the j udge could have considered
w he n de ci din g w he the r to b el ie ve the pr ose cu tor ’ s st at ed r ea son de spi te it s di sparate im pa ct . Id

. at 369-70 , 111 S. Ct. at 1871-72
. He re, too, there are other f actors that supp ort the c ourt’ s f

ind ing that the re w as no d isc ri m ina tor y in tent. T he pr ose cu tor
w as of the sa m e ra ce a s th e de fe ndant, he w as f or thc om ing a nd n on- ev as ive in h is state m en t of

his r ea sons f

or e xe rc isi ng h is s tr ike s, a nd he of fe re d c le ar ly

le git im at e
reas on s u nr el at ed to an y al le ge d di sp arat e im pa ct whe n e xp la in in g h is st rik es of t wo of the f ive bla ck pot en tia l j ur or s. Whe n th e j udge que sti one d hi m about his str ike s, he responded that h e had not even kno wn t h e ra ces of the venire m em bers when de ci din g w hic h on es to str ike
. H e cl ai m ed that he ha d take n no not es on the r ac es ofWe have a lrea dy decide d that we ne ed not re view the dismissal of Smith because the 7 prosec utor' s other re ason for dismiss ing he r is not challeng ed on appe al, and Houston make s no “mix ed motive” a

rgument. 15 the ve nir e m em

be rs a t vo ir

dire. W he n a ske d, H oust on’ s a tto rn ey loo ke d ov er

the pr ose cu tor ’ s sh oul de r at

his j ur y se le ct ionnot es a nd c onf

irm ed thi s sta te m en t. ( R. 1- 68 at 3 4.) At no tim e during the B ats on he ar ing did the pr ose cu tor sho wa ny

sig n of
ev as i v en es s or deception. T he court could have consi dered all of these f actors as
we ighin g heavily

in favor of the prosecutor’ s credibility despite the disparate im pact of the prosecutor’ s stated reason. The B ats on Co u rt ex p l ai n ed t h at t h e t ri al ju d g e’s
as se ssm en t of

the pr ose cu tor ’ s cred ibi lity in of fe ri ng r ac e- ne utr al r ea sons f or exercising his perem

ptory challenges is entitled to “ great defe rence. ” B ats on , 476 U. S. at 98 n.21, 106 S. Ct. at 1724 n.21. T he trial j udge in th is case deter m ined that the prosecutor standin g before him wa s worthy

of his trust. W e find no clear e rror. H oust on’ s othe r co nte nti on r eg ar din g B ats on ’ s th ir d st ep is tha t the pr osec ut io n’s so le state d r ea son fo r ex cl udi ng v en ir e m em be rs S m al l, O ’ N ea l, a nd T ay lor ( an d on e of

tw o r ea sons f

or str iki ng v en ir e m em

be r Sm ith ) fro m the j ur

y is pr et ex tua l be ca

use it appl ie s w ithe qua l f

or ce to fo ur w hit e ve nir e m em be rs w hom

the pr ose cu tio n di d no t stri ke
. W e ha ve a cknow le dge d inthe pa st tha t “ co m pari ng the 7 attr ibu te s of

the bla ck

a nd w hit e ve nir ep er sons w ill a id the tr ie r of f ac t and a
rev ie win g c ou rt i n d et erm in in g wh et he r th e as se rte d re as on s ar e p ret ex tu al or n ot .”16

A lston , 895 F
. 2d a t 13 67 n
. 5. A nd, the S upr em e Co urt ha s r ec en tly he ld tha t i f the prosecutor’ s stated reason for striking black venire m em bers app lies with equ al force to white venire m em

bers, and the sim ilarly situated white m em bers are not struck, that is e vid en ce te ndi ng t o pr ove pur pose fu l di sc ri m ina tio n a t B ats on ’s th ird st ep . M ill er El v . D retke , __ U .S .__, __, 125 S. C t. 2317, 2320 (200 5). He re, the prosecution offer ed as i ts onlyrea son for dism issin g venire m em bers Sm al l, O ’ N ea l, a nd T ay lor tha t the y ha d fam ily m em be rs w ho h ad

be enc onvi ct ed

of
cr im es . I t i s un dis put ed

that f our of the w hit e ve nir e m em be rs that the pr ose cu tio n did no t strike also had fam ily m em bers convicted of crim es. But Houst on never br ough t this fa ct to the atte nti on of the co urt, ev en tho ugh the c ourt gave him a m ple op po rtu ni ty to d o s o. B ats on m akes it clear that the party

contes t i n g a perem

ptory
s t r i k e mai n t a i n s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f t h r o u g h o u t t h e t h r e e s t a g e s o f t h e c o u rt ’s i n qu i ry. 476 U
. S. a t 94 n. 18, 106 S
. Ct
. a t 17 21 n
. 18. O nc e the pr ose cu ti on ha s off er ed a legitim ate, non-dis crim inatory rea son for exercising its strikes, this bu rden requires the party contesting the strike to dem onstrate that the prosecution ’ s stated reasons are pr et ex tu al
. Se e A lston , 895 F. 2d a t 13 74 ( H at ch ett, J. , c onc ur ri ng) ; accord United States v. G uerra-Marez , 928 F. 2d 66 5, 673 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991 ). H er e, H oust on d id n ot s ugge st t o th e tr ia l j udge t ha t ther e w er e sim ilarl y sit ua te d whi te ve nir e m em

be rs w hom the pr ose cu tio n did not str ike
. T hus, w e do n ot17

have the benefit of the prosecutor’ s explanation for w hy he struck the black venire
m em be rs r athe r than th e w hit e ve nir e m em be rs now al le ge d to be sim ilarl y sit ua te d. A nd w e do n ot ha ve the be ne fi t of af ind ing by the tr ia l j udge a s to the c re dib ili ty of
suc h e xpl an at ion s. A s w e ha ve state d inthe pa st: “ ‘ Whe ne ve r a lit igant h as a
m er ito ri o u s p r o p o s i t i o n o f l a ww h i c h h e i s s e r i o u s l y p r e s s i n g up o n t h e a t t e n t i o n of the tr ia l c ourt, he sh ou ld r ai se that po int in suc h c le ar

a nd s im ple langua ge that the t r i a l c ourtm a y

n ot m i sund e r st a nd

i t . ’ ” United States v. R eyes V asqu ez , 905 F
. 2d 1497 , 1500 (1 1th Ci r. 1990 ) (q uot ing Clark v . L ind le y M oto r C o. , 268 P
. 860 , 861 (K an. 1928)). W e generally do not address on a ppeal argum ents not clearly presented to th e di st ric t co ur t. See Smith v. Horner , 839 F. 2d 1 530, 153 4- 35 ( 11th C ir
. 198 8) (declining to reverse the district court on a ppeal based on a disparate im pact theory in a Title V II case when that argum ent wa s not fa irly presented to the court at trial). W e ap pl y th atge ne ral rul e in th is cas e. H oust on’ s a tto rn ey

c o n t e n d ed

a t or al a rg um en t tha t the S upr em e Co urt’ s r ec en t de ci sio n in Mil le r- El

pla ces a duty

on the tr ia l c ourt t o c ondu ct a n in de pe nde nt inquir y int o th e re le vant fa ct s and c ir cu m stanc es be ar ing on the c re dib ili ty of the pr ose cu tio n’ s st at ed

r easo ns, i nc lud ing the duty to de ve lop the f

ac tua l r ec or d byWe n ote that Miller-El came befor e the Supre me Court in a proc edura l posture ver y 8 differ ent from the posture of this case . The Miller-El Court was aske d to reviewon Batson g rounds a pe tition for writ of habe as cor pus based on a

challeng e pursua

nt to Swain v. Ala. , 380 U.S. 202, 85 S. C t. 824 (1965) to a jury selec tion that had occur

red be fore Batson was de cided. See M iller-El , __ U.S. at __,125 S. Ct . at 2322-23. The Supreme Court has a llowed a Swa in objection made be fore Batson was ha nded down to do ser

vice to pre serve a Batson claim for revie w. See Griffi th v. Ky. , 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. C t. 708 (1987). B ut unlike Batson , which require s a burde n-shifting analy sis, Swa in require d a showingthat a sy stemic pattern of rac ial dis c ri min atio n h a d le d to a dis c ri min ator

y e xer c ise of

pe re mpt or

y str ike s. Thus , th e tr ia l c ourt in Miller-El did no t e ng a g e in a

ny burd e n- sh if

tin gana ly sis , a

nd the pa rt ie s d id n ot m ake argume nts based on a

ny such appr oach. F ace d with this si tuation, the Supreme Court conduc ted its own evidentiar y revie w. See M

iller-El , __ U.S. at __,125 S. Ct . at 2326 n.1. This fac t, however , does not establish that we must do the same whe n direc tly revie winga cha lleng e to a jury selec tion that occur red longafte r Batson was de cided, whe n the par ties and the judg e we re w ell awa re of Batson ’s burd e ns . In fac t, the Court’s decision in Miller-El rec og nizes that there is a diff ere nce be tween the 9 evidenc e that ca

n be conside red by

a cour t review ing a

habea s petition and “theorie s about that evidenc e,” which will only be conside red by

a cour t of appe als if they

wer e off ere d at the trial court leve l. Se e Mi lle r-El , __ _ U .S. at __

_, 12 5 S. Ct. at 23 26 n. 2; se e als o United States v. Rey es Vasquez , 905 F.2d 1497, 1500 ( 11th Cir. 1990). Perhaps if Houston ha d offe red a disparate treatment theory of ra cial discrimination, the cour t would have e x amined the char acte ristics of the white ve nire membe rs not struck, but since this theory of the e vidence was n o to ff er ed , we h av e n o wa y

o f kn o wi n g. At or a l argume nt, the Go ve rnme nt o ff e re d s e ve ra l pl a

us ibl e e xplanatio ns a s to why it 10 chose not to strike the white venire members with fa mily criminal histories. B ut we have no 18 que sti oni ng the a tto rn ey s. W e fi nd n o ba sis f or suc h aduty

in Mil le r- El
. R equir ing 8 9 the c ourt t o de ve lop the de fe ndant’ s arg um en ts t hr oughe xa m ina tio n of

th e p r ose cu tor would m ake the j udge an advocate rather than a neutra l arbiter. Ho u s t o n never al e rt e dt h e c o u rtt o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f w h i t e v e n i r e m e m

b e r s w h o m

h e n o wc o n t e n ds
we re sim ilarly

situated and whom

the prosecution did not strike despite their fam ilial crim inal histo ries. W e find no error in the court’ s failure to drawcom parisons th at
no pa rty ask edit to dra w. 10finding s as to the cr edibility of these e x planations bec ause the cre dibilit y of the prose cutor’s art i c u l at e d

r e a s o nf o r h i s s tr i k e s w a s at t a c k e d

o n l y o na d i s p ar at e i mp a c tth e o r

y. 19 B. Booker

E rr or H oust on c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t j udge vio la te d hi s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts,
as out lin ed

in United States v. B ooker , 54 3 U. S. 220 , 125 S
. Ct
. 738 ( 2005 ), by sentencing h im

pursuant to t h e Unit ed States Se ntencing Guidelin es, tr eating them
as m andatory
. Er

ror under Booker

can m anifest i tself i n two way s. T he constitu tional variety of Booker

e rr or oc curs w he n, unde r a se nte nc ing gui de lin es sy ste m bin din g on the dis tr ic t c ourt, the j udge im pose s a se nte nc e abo ve tha t author iz ed by the f ac ts fo und by the j ur

y or a dm itt ed by the de fe ndant. United S tates v. L ee , 427 F
. 3d 8 81, 8 9 1 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 )
. S t a tu t o ry Booker e rr or , on the oth er

hand, oc curs w he n th e j udge sentences the defendant treating the United St at es Sentencing Guidelines as bi nd in g, re ga rd le ss of t he sen te nc e im po se d. Id

. If the de fe ndant e sta

bli she s c onst itu tio na l Booker e rr or , w e w ill vacate the
se nte nc e unl es s the G ove rn m en t can show , be y ond a re as ona ble doubt, that the e rr or
was ha rm le ss be cau se it di d n ot co nt rib ut e to th e se nt en ce i m po se d. United S tates v. P az , 405 F.3d 94 6, 948 (11th Cir. 2005). A lternatively , if the court com

m itted
s t a tu t o ry Booker

e rr or , w e w ill va cate the se nte nc e unl es s th e G ove rn m en t c ansho w tha t, vie w ing the pr oc ee din gs i n thei r en tir ety , the er ro r ha d li ttl e to n o e ff

ec t onthe20

se nt en ce. See Kotteakos v. Uni t ed States , 328 U
. S. 750 , 762 -6 4, 66 S
. Ct
. 123 9, 1246 -4 8 ( 1946 ); Lee , 42 7 F .3d at 8 91 n.5
. H oust on c ont en ds tha t hi s se nte nc e shou ld b e va cat ed ba se d onboth
c o n s t i tu t i o n a l a n ds t a tu t o ry Booker err or. The Governm ent contends that the district
co urt di d no t c om

m it co nst itu tio na l e rr or , an d tha t the statut or y e rr or w as harm le ss. 1. C onst itu tio na l Booker E rr or H oust on c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt vi ola te d Booker ’ s c onst itu tio na l r ule by inc lud ing in the c al cu la tio n of his se nte nc e unde r the U nit ed S ta te s S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, w hic h w er e the n bi ndi ng o n th e j udge , the fa ct tha t tw o of his pr ior f el ony
co nvi ct ion s w er e cr im es of vio lenc e. Hou ston di d no t a dm it thi s f ac t, a nd the prosecution did not prove it to the j ury bey ond a reasonable doubt. The Booker Court
re af fi rm ed the hol din g in Apprendi v. N ew Je rsey , 530 U
. S. 466 , 490 , 120 S
. Ct
. 2348 , 2362-63 (2000 ), that any fac t, other than the fa ct of a p ri o r co n v iction, that inc re as es the de fe ndant’ s se nte nc e be y ond the pr es cr ib ed statu tor y m ax im um m ust be ad m it te d by t he de fen da nt or pr ov ed to th e jury b ey on d a rea so na bl e d ou bt
. See Booker , 543 U
. S. at 244, 125 S. Ct
. at 756 (c iti ng A ppre ndi , 530 U. S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 ). Houston argues that the determ ination that his two prior felonies wer e cr im es of vio le nce un de r U.S. S. G
. § 4B 1. 1 f or the pur pose s of inc re as ing both hi s of

fe nse21

level and his crim inal histo ry category wa s a deter m i n at i o n o f fact. This court has
rece nt ly reject ed th is ex act arg um en t. U nit ed Sta tes v . G ibs on , 434 F. 3d 1 234, 124 7- 48 ( 11th C ir
. 200 6)
. Dete rm ini ng w he the r the de fe ndant’ s pr ior c onvi ct ion s f

al l wit hi n t he cat eg ory

of of fen se s de sc rib ed by U.S.S.G. § 4 B1 .1 i s a q ue st io n o f la w, to be de ci de d b y

th e co ur t, n ot a qu es ti on of f act . G ibs on , 434 F
. 3d a t 12 47. T hus, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t vi ola te H oust on’ s S ixth A m endm en t rig hts w he n it determ ined that Houston ’ s prior convictio ns were crim es of violence. 2
. S t a tu t o ry Booker

E rr or Housto n also contend s that his sent ence m ust be vacated because the district
co ur t s en te nc edhi m

un de r a m an d a t ory

Gui de li ne s s ch em e. See U nited Sta tes v. She lto n , 400 F. 3d 1325, 133 0- 31 ( 11th C ir
. 200 5) ; see also Booker , 543 U
. S. a t 25 9, 125 S. Ct
. a t 76 4 ( ex ci sin g th e portio ns o f the S en te nc ing A ct that m ak e the Guidelines bind ing on the sentencing j udge). The G overnm ent does no t dispu te that the c ourt e rr ed , but

a rg ue s th at

th e er ro r w as harm le ss. T he G ove rn m en t be ar s th e bu rd en of e st ab li sh in g h arm le ss ne ss . United States v. R obles , 408 F. 3d 1 324, 132 7 (11th Cir
. 2005 ), and if on a ppeal this court cannot deter m ine whether the sentence
w oul d have be endif

fe re nt unde r an advis or

y G uid el ine s sche m e, w e w ill not fi nd the
erro r to ha ve be en ha rm le ss . Cf

. id.22

T he j udge ca lc ula te d the re le vant G uid el ine s range fo r Co unt I as 360 m onths to l if e. The 200 3 G uid el ine s m anua l st at es that i f the c al cu la te d G uid el ine s r an ge exceeds the statut o ry m axim um penalty for a particular cr im e, then the statuto ry
m a x i m u m b e c o m e s t h e e f

f e c t i v e G u i d e l i n e s r a n g e . U
. S
. S
. G
. § 5 G 1
. 1 ( a )
. P u r s u a nt to this r ule , the j udge se nte nc ed H oust on t o th e statut or

y m ax im um te rmof

300
m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t onCo unt I. ( R. 1- 61 a t 15 -1 6. ) T he j udge a lso im pose d a
co nse cu tiv e se nte nc e of

84 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t, the statut or

y m ini m um f or Co unt II. (R. 1-61 at 15-16.) See 18 U.S.C. § 9 24 (c). The G overnm ent cites the fac t that the judge sentenced Housto n to the statut ory
m aximum fo r Co unt

I a s e vid en ce that he w oul d no t have im pose d am or e le nie nt
se nte nc e in the abse nc e of abin din g G uid el ine s schem e. H ow ev er , w ha t the j udge im pose d w as ve ry

c le ar ly aG uid el ine s se nte nc e. T hus, r ather than pr ovi ng tha t he
w oul d im pose the sa m e se nte nc e in the ab se nc e of abin din g G uid el ine s sc he m e, the j udge ’ s se nte nc ing de ci sio n j ust a s li ke ly sug ge sts that he sou ght to follo wthe dictates of the Guidelines to the letter. Moreover, the Guidelines required a sentence at le as t eq ua l to th e st atut ory m in im um forCo un t II , See U
. S. S. G
. § 2. K 2. 4( b)
. T he j udge , in fa ct , im

pose d a se nte nc e at

the statut or

y m ini m um , f urthe r co ntr ad ic tin g th e
co n cl u s i o n t h att h e G o v er n m en tas k s u s t o d ra w. I n s h o rt , n ei t h ert h e ju d g e’s statem ents at sentencing nor the ultim ate sentence im posed give this court any clear23

ind ic at ionof

w ha t the dis tr ic t j udge w oul d have done if not bound b y the G uid el ine s. G ive n th is unc er

ta inty , the G ov ernm en t ha s m et not it s burd ento es ta

bli sh harm le ssn es s. V . C on cl us ion B a s e do n t h e f

o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n , w e c o n c l u d e t h a tH o u s t o n ’ s c o n v i c t i o ns shou ld be affir

m ed, but that his sentences sho uld be vacated and the case re m anded fo r re se nte nc ing
. CON V IC T IO N S A F F IRM E D , S E N T E N C E S V A C A T E D , A N D C A SE REMANDED FOR RESENTE NCING
.