First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Col!lJllittee 

Appointed by DIRAFSA to Consider 

The Problem of French Security 

25 January 1951 - 1400 

Conference Room - NSS 

Mr. William F. Friedman, Chairman 

Members: Captain T. H. Dyer, USN 

Mr. F. B. Rowlett 

Dr. A. Sinkov 

Secretary: Mr. H. D. Jones 

Also Prewent: Mr. H. S. Erskine 

Mr. Frank Raven 

Mr. Sidney Jaffe 

The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting by outlining briefly tte problem 

before the Committee. He referred the members to the papers distributed 

by the Secretary for more detailed inf'ormstion and background meterial. 

1. Meeting at the State Department: 

The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that he bad attended a conference 

on the French Security Problem at the Department of State the previous day. 

Those present included representatives from State, CIA, and the AssistaJtt 

Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army. 

He· reported that the discussion was concerned mainly with the method 

of presenting the security problem to the French, and was based primarily 

on a dispatch from Mr. Blnlce, in Peria. Mr. Bruce was reporting a proposal 

made to him by the British that they, unilaterally, take up the matter 

with the French. 

The CHAIRMAN outlined briefly a plan discussed at the meeting, which 

had the following features& 

eclassifi ed and a ursuantto E .0. 1352 < , •• ~ 

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_REF ID:A52~'Z~~RN1~1 SECRET b~iuU 

a. A Tri-partite working group - 4 members from each country -

which would meet first in Washington or London, and rotate to 

the otcer locations, to study French Security standards, 

regulations and practices. 

b. Should the French, in' these conferences, bring up the matter 

of Communications Security, they would be told that it was 

outside the province of the discussions. 

c. Only if the French gave concrete evidence that they would 

do something to improve personnel and physical security would 

there be a possibility of communications security being considered by this group. 

2. General Comments on Problem Before the Committee: 

The CHAIRMAN explained that USCIB had agreed to a conference with the 

British in late N~rch or early April on the general COMSEC aspects of 

French Security. He stated that the Committee's problem was a technical 

one which involved recommending a plan of action to USCIB to be used as 

a U.S. basis in U.S./U.K. discussions. 

3. Technical Aspects of French Cryptography: 

MR. SIDNEY JAFFE, AFSA-232, was present to brief the Committee with 

a technical evaluation of the cryptographic systems, practices and procedures employed by the French Government. He reviewed briefly, for the 

Committee, the status of French Diplomatic, Army, Navy, Air, Police and 

Agent systems. 

4. Conclusions Reached by the COMMITTEE:: 

From Mr. Jaffe 1s presentation, which included considerable detail 

and which pertained to military, as well as diplomatic cryptography, the 

Committee drew certain conclusions, among which were the following: v ~ '-J ir.:~ .. .' fflP SEGBEf ~; ,, . ',:,: ;· ~ 
a. _ As a result of the place occupied by France in world affairs, 

and the inherent enthusiasm of the French in diplomatic activities, any insecurity in the handling of information available 

to the French leaders· makes this government a prolific and 

valuable source for USSR intelligence operations. 

b. There is concrete evidence that the French have used, and continue to employ, insecure methods in the handling of information. 

c. One of the most significant examples of French insecurity lies 

in the nature of their cryptographic systems and the manner in 

which they are used. 

(1) The majority of their cryptosystems are inherently insecure. 

(2) There appears to be no clear-cut rule for the use of a 

particular system tor particular information. 

(.3) Cryptographic discipline·is poor, there being no evidence 

of a strictly-enforced plan to insure correct cryptographic 

procedure. 

(4) Cryptographic technicians are inadequately trained. 

d. That any well-organized cryptanalytic organizations would have 

little difficulty in obtaining information from French traffic. 

e. The few secure French cryptosystems, if used exclusively, would 

break down under the current volume of French traffic. 

f. The end alternative requires that the French be provided, in 

some manner with adequate cryptographic facilities and training. 

5. Committee Decisions: 

a. That there be prepared by AFSA-02, for forwardiz:g witb the Committee's final report, a brief statement on the technical aspects 

of French cryptography. 

b. 
Arlington Hall Station, at 0900, to consider tbe assigned problem 

further. AFSA-02 representatives agreed to have information available 

on the cryptographic security of other NATO nations. 

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ONES 

retary, 

Ad Hoc Committee 

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