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LANA SLOAN, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. SD36261 

 ) 

FARM BUREAU TOWN & ) Filed: May 12, 2020 

COUNTRY INSURANCE ) 

COMPANY OF MISSOURI, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant-Respondent, ) 

 ) 

and ) 

 ) 

JESSE CLARK, JOSEPH E. WEBB, and ) 

BOBBETTE J. WEBB, 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POLK COUNTY 

Honorable James A. Hackett 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

In two points relied on, Lana Sloan (“Plaintiff”) appeals the judgment that denied 

her motion for summary judgment and granted judgment in favor of defendant Farm 

Bureau Town and County Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”) on its motion for 

summary judgment. Plaintiff’s second amended petition sought monetary damages from 

the defendants for injuries she suffered as the result of a dog bite, and it sought payment 
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for those injuries under the medical-payments provision of an insurance policy Farm 

Bureau had issued to its insured, defendant Joseph Webb.1

 The sole issue before the trial 

court in regard to Farm Bureau was whether the dog that bit Plaintiff (“the dog”) 

constituted “a ‘condition’ on the insured premises” under the medical-payments provision 

of its policy.2

 

In its judgment, the trial court found -- as a matter of law -- that the medicalpayments provision did not apply because the dog was “not a condition on the insured 

premises.” Because the parties’ numbered statements of uncontroverted material facts and 

the responses thereto (“the SUMF”) did not entitle Farm Bureau to a judgment in its favor, 

we reverse the judgment in its favor and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

Standard of Review 

Our review is essentially de novo. The criteria on appeal for testing 

the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which 

should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of 

sustaining the motion initially. The propriety of summary judgment is 

purely an issue of law. As the trial court’s judgment is founded on the 

record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial 

court’s order granting summary judgment. 

ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 

(Mo. banc 1993) (internal citations omitted). 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s second amended petition also named as defendants Jesse Clark and Bobbette J. Webb. 2

 While the trial court’s judgment did not resolve all issues as to all parties in the case, it did resolve all of the 

claims brought against Farm Bureau, and we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying 

its judgment in favor of Farm Bureau as final for purposes of appeal under Rule 74.01(b). See Wilson v. City 

of St. Louis, No. SC97544, 2020 WL 203137, at *4-5 (Mo. banc Jan. 14, 2020). All rule references are to 

Missouri Court Rules (2019). 
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Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition 

 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition made the following claims against Farm 

Bureau that are relevant to this appeal: 

25. Upon information [and] belief at the time of the aforesaid incident, 

[Joseph Webb]’s residence was insured under a medical payments 

policy issued by [Farm Bureau] and was in full force and effect on 

August 27, 2017. 

26. The policy provides medical payments coverage with unknown 

limits per person for medical expenses for; a bodily injury arising 

out of a condition on the insured premises[.3

] 

27. [Plaintiff] alleges that: 

(a) she is legally entitled to recover damages from [Farm 

Bureau] because of medical expenses sustained by 

[Plaintiff]. 

(b) her injuries were caused by a condition on the insured 

premises[.] 

28. All conditions precedent in the Policy have been performed or have 

occurred.[4] 

 

Farm Bureau’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment claimed the following facts to be 

material and uncontroverted (“Farm Bureau’s SUMF”):5 

 

3

 Plaintiff initially sought recovery under more than one section of the medical-payments provision. 

However, by the time the motions for summary judgment came before the court for argument, only the 

applicability of section 2.a., concerning whether the bodily injury arose out of a condition on the insured 

premises, was argued to the trial court, and that is the only section at issue in this appeal. For that reason, we 

have omitted all of Farm Bureau’s arguments and statements of uncontroverted material facts that are 

directed to other sections of the medical payments provision. 

4

 Plaintiff also included a claim against Farm Bureau for vexatious refusal to pay under section 375.420, 

RSMo 2000. 

5

 To enhance readability, we have omitted Farm Bureau’s references to supporting pleadings, discovery, 

exhibits, and/or affidavits. 
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1. The dog bite alleged by [Plaintiff] at issue in this lawsuit occurred 

on the public roadway of [Joseph Webb’s street address (“Joseph 

Webb’s address”).] 

2. The Farm Bureau Policy No. PRO0329157 at issue in this lawsuit 

had a policy period that began August 12, 2017 through August 12, 

2018, and the location shown on the Information Page as the insured 

premises is [Joseph Webb’s address.] 

3. The Farm Bureau Policy at issue in this lawsuit contains the 

following language regarding when Medical Payments to other 

applies to a person: 

Coverage G – Medical Payments to Others applies to a person, other 

than an insured, when the person sustains a bodily injury: 

1. On an insured premises with the permission of any 

insured, or 

2. Elsewhere, if the bodily injury: 

a. Arises out of a condition on the insured premises; 

 . . . . 

4. The Farm Bureau Policy at issue in this lawsuit contains the 

following language regarding the definition of “Insured Premises”: 

Insured premises – means: 

1. All locations shown on the Information Pages of 

your policy; 

 . . . . 

5. The insured premises location shown on the 

Information Page of the Farm Bureau Policy at issue 

in this lawsuit is [Joseph Webb’s address.] 

 

 . . . . 

10. [Plaintiff] is not listed on the Information Page(s), 

specifically, but not limited to under any OPTION N 

– Named Person Medical Payments[.] 
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11. Jo[s]e[ph] Webb is the Named Insured shown on 

the Information Page in the Farm Bureau Policy at 

issue in this lawsuit[.] 

12. On or about August 27, 2017 or at time before or 

after August 27, 2017, Jo[s]e[ph] Webb did not own 

the dog referenced as “the pitbull-type dog” at issue 

and referenced in Plaintiff’s First Amended 

[Petition.] 

13. Jo[s]e[ph] Webb and his relatives did not own, 

care for or harbor any dogs at the property located at 

[Joseph Webb’s address] on August 27, 2017[.] 

 . . . . 

15. Neither Jo[s]e[ph] Webb, his relatives, or any 

employee of his were present at or in the vicinity [of] 

[Joseph Webb’s address] on August 27, 2017[.] 

. . . . 

17. On or about August 27, 2017, the “pitbull-type 

dog” at issue and referenced in Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Petition was not in the care of Jo[s]e[ph] 

Webb or his relatives[.] 

 . . . . 

20. Albert Rinehart and Hailey Clark have claimed 

ownership of the “pitbull- type dog” named “Buck” 

at issue in this lawsuit[.] 

 

Governing Principles of Law 

Rule 74.04 establishes the boundaries of Missouri’s summary judgment practice. 

Under that rule: 

• Facts come into a summary judgment record only via Rule 74.04(c)’s 

numbered-paragraphs-and-responses framework. 
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• Courts determine and review summary judgment based on that Rule 

74.04(c) record, not the whole trial court record. 

• Affidavits, exhibits, discovery, etc. generally play only a secondary role, 

and then only as cited to support Rule 74.04(c) numbered paragraphs or 

responses, since parties cannot cite or rely on facts outside the Rule 

74.04(c) record. 

• To come full circle, summary judgment rarely if ever lies, or can 

withstand appeal, unless it flows as a matter of law from appropriate Rule 

74.04(c) numbered paragraphs and responses alone. 

Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heriford, 518 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017) 

(emphasis in original) (quoting Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 508 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Mo. 

App. S.D. 2016)) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Material facts are facts 

from which the right to judgment flows. Id. at 240. 

Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not 

reviewable on appeal. An exception exists, however, when the merits of 

that motion are inextricably intertwined with the issues in an appealable 

summary judgment granted in favor of another party. 

Kerperian v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., No. SD 36236, 2020 WL 1181751, at *2 (Mo. App. 

S.D. Mar. 12, 2020) (internal citations omitted). For ease of analysis, we address 

Plaintiff’s second point first. 

Analysis 

Point 2

Plaintiff’s second point claims: 

The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment because Farm Bureau’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

failed to make a prima facie showing of a right to judgment in that Farm 

Bureau’s [SUMF] omitted as a material fact that [Plaintiff]’s claim for 

medical expenses is not an insured risk of the Farm Bureau policy. 
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We agree that Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment failed to make a prima 

facie showing of a right to judgment, albeit for different reasons. As asserted by Farm 

Bureau in its SUMF, the medical-payments provision in its policy only provides coverage 

in the event that Plaintiff “sustains a bodily injury” that “[a]rises out of a condition on the 

insured premises[.]”6

 Farm Bureau’s SUMF, however, fails to allege that the dog is not 

“a condition on the insured premises” or that Plaintiff, after an adequate period of 

discovery, would be unable to present evidence that the dog was “a condition on the 

insured premises.” See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp, 854 S.W.2d at 381. As in Columbia, 

Farm Bureau’s SUMF – at best – “categorizes certain selected evidence as material facts, 

which, if specifically referenced for its secondary role, would inferentially[] support” the 

material fact that the dog was not a condition on the insured premises. See 518 S.W.3d at 

242. 

Because Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment never alleged that the dog 

was not “a condition on the insured premises” or that Plaintiff would be unable to prove 

that it was, its SUMF failed to make a prima facie showing of a right to judgment as a 

matter of law, and the trial court’s judgment in favor of Farm Bureau must be reversed. 

See id. at 243; ITT Commercial Fin. Corp, 854 S.W.2d at 381. Point 2 is granted. 

Point 1 

Point 1 claims: 

The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and denying [Plaintiff]’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment by concluding Farm Bureau’s medical payments policy 

provisions do not apply to the dog bite incident at issue by finding as a 

 

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 Because the parties agree that Plaintiff’s injuries did not occur on the insured’s premises, section 1 of the 

medical-payments coverage is not applicable. 
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matter of law that [the dog] is not a “condition on the insured premises” 

because a reasonable interpretation favoring coverage when considering the 

whole insurance contract, giving meaning to every word and giving 

undefined words their plain and ordinary meaning would include dogs 

qualify as the undefined term “condition” in that the dog had been on the 

insured premises for over two years before biting [Plaintiff] and Missouri 

has recognized for over twenty-five years that a dog is a “condition on the 

premises” for purposes of submitting to juries premises liability claims. 

In light of our resolution of Point 2, we need only address Point 1 insofar as it 

claims that the trial court also erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 

As earlier noted, the general rule is that the denial of a motion for summary 

judgment may not be appealed. Kerperian, 2020 WL 1181751, at *2. Although Plaintiff 

states in a conclusory manner that the parties’ motions for summary judgment are 

“inextricably intertwined[,]” her brief makes no attempt to convince us that this is so. In 

the absence of such a showing, the general rule applies, and that the trial court’s denial of 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary is not subject to our review. See id. 

The judgment in favor of Farm Bureau is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR 

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS 

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCURS