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THE WHITE HO.. 

WASHINGTON 

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THE WHITE HOUSE This document cousisof 

del' 3101 

WASHINGTON 

May 12, 1964 

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY 

SUBJECT: 'The National Reconnaissance Program 

In its May 2, 1964, report to the President, the President's 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board sets forth the results of its intensive review of the organization, management and operation of the 

National Reconnaissance Program. This Program for collecting photographic 

and signals intelligence, through satellite and aircraft overflights, is 

rated as one of the most important elements of our foreign intelligence 

effort. 

The Board, its Executive Secretary, and a special Board Panel have 

gone into the Program thoroughly. They have had consultations with the 

Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence; conferences 

with responsible officials of the Department of Defense and the Central 

Intelligence Agency -- the two agencies principally involved; discussions 

with officers of the several private concerns involved in contracts for the 

development and production of satellite boosters, orbital engines, aircraft, 

camera systems, signals intelligence payloads, and other components of the 

Program; and on-the-scene examinations of reconnaissance operations on the 

West Coast and elsewhere. 

The Board's report focuses attention on the following: 

(1) The size and complexity of this billion-dollar-a-year Program 

involving hundreds of Government and contractor personnel; 

(2) The need for correcting inadequacies in the present organizational 

structure and support of the Program, and for clarifying the management and 

support responsibilities of the agencies involved; 

(3) The large and important role of the Director of Central Intelligence 

as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, responsible for drawing up 

intelligence collection requirements to be satisfied through the National 

Reconnaissance Program, and for the effective processing and utilization of 

the intelligence product obtained; 

(4) The importance of the Central Intelligence Agency's previous contributions in the reconnaissance field, including the security protection of 

sensitive activities; the provision of personnel and skills required for the 

development and operation of reconnaissance aircraft; and the Central 

Intelligence Agency's contribution to the development and production of some 

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of the camera systems used in the satellite program; 

(5) The valuable potential of the Central Intelligence Agency as 

an innovator in the conduct of imaginative planning and research on advanced 

reconnaissance systems, and the devising of improved methods for the processing, 

interpretation and analysis of the great volume of reconnaissance photography 

involved; and 

(6) The demonstrated capability of the Department of Defense for the 

effective management and use of the vast military and contractor resources 

required for the development, procurement, support and operation of satellite 

and aircraft reconnaissance-intelligence systems. 

Significant conclusions reached by the Board include the following: 

(1) In order to meet national intelligence needs of the President and 

other officials, the National Reconnaissance Program must be conducted as a 

national effort, through the joint endeavors of the Department of Defense, 

the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U. S. Intelligence Board under the 

Chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence; 

(2) The cost, size and complexity of the National Reconnaissance 

Program (particularly the large scale of satellite operations) require that 

the Program be conducted as a streamlined activity under strong, centralized 

management within the Department of Defense -- with ready access to personnel 

and resources of both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence 

Agency; 

(3) Despite intelligence successes, the National Reconnaissance Program 

suffers from inadequate organization and support, and from the lack of clear 

delineation and understanding of the missions and responsibilities of the 

Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and of the Director of 

Central Intelligence; and 

(4) The Board believes that the organizational and support problems 

which have been encountered in the National Reconnaissance Program require 

corrective action from the Presidential level in order that this vital 

national asset may be preserved and strengthened. 

Accordingly, the Board recommends the issuance of a Presidential 

directive along lines which will provide for the following: 

(1) Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for 

the National Reconnaissance Program having primary responsibility and authority 

for management of the Program, and for the tasking of the personnel and other 

resources of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and 

other agencies as required. (The Secretary of Defense presently serves as 

Executive Agent pursuant to an agreement negotiated between the Secretary 

and the Director of Central Intelligence.) 

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(2) Establishment within the Department of Defense of a National 

Reconnaissance Office as a separate operating agency of the Defense Department 

headed by a Director responsible solely to the Secretary of Defense for 

discharging the Secretary's responsibilities as Executive Agent for the Program. 

(Such an Office presently exists in the Department of Defense, headed by the 

Under Secretary of the Air Force under a cover arrangement which preserves 

the. secrecy of the intelligence aspects of the Program. The Board's report 

points to the dilution of the Director's management authority resulting from 

the present working agreement under which the Department of Defense and the 

Central Intelligence Agency have been endeavoring to negotiate their respective 

roles and missions.) 

(3) Direction that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central 

Intelligence, and the Director of the Budget work out a formula for achieving 

a coordinated, comprehensive budget for the entire National Reconnaissance 

Program, and the establishment of adequate fiscal control and accounting 

procedures. 

(4) Assignment to the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility 

for sharpening and expediting the efforts of the U. S. Intelligence Board in 

establishing realistic intelligence collection requirements to be met through 

satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions, and in ensuring maximum 

beneficial use of the intelligence collected. 

(5) Direction to the heads of the Department of Defense, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, and other agencies concerned, that full use be made of 

the resources of each of the agencies as required for research projects for 

the development of (a) new reconnaissance systems (b) improved photographic 

and other sensing methods, and (c) advanced means of processing and exploiting 

the intelligence obtained. (The Board believes that fuller use of the research 

skills of the Central Intelligence Agency will improve our national capability 

for anticipating the need for advanced reconnaissance capabilities, should 

our present systems become unavailable because of defensive capabilities of 

foreign governments, or as a result of our national policy considerations.) 

(6) Continued designation of the Under Secretary of the Air Force 

as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. (The Board notes that the 

Air Force provides over 90 per cent of the personnel and resources involved 

in the satellite reconnaissance program, and over 50 per cent of the manpower 

and 90 per cent of other resources used in support of the aircraft reconnaissance 

prograin.) 

(7) Delegation by the Secretary of Defense to the Director of the 

National Reconnaissance Office the authority for issuing directives within 

the Defense Department, and for the levying of requests on the Central 

Intelligence Agency and other agencies as required for the conduct of the 

National Reconnaissance Program. (The Board's report points to the present 

lack of firm, unified direction of the Program under the present agreement which 

the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have endeavored 

to work out.) 

(8) Assignment to the Department of Defense (Air Force) the responsibility 

for the management, overall systems engineering, procurement and operation 

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Of all satellite reconnaissance systems. (The Board's report reflects 

that these responsibilities are presently diffused and dispersed between 

the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.) 

(9) Continued assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of 

responsibility for the OXCART program. (As manned intelligence-collection 

aircraft of an advanced nature are developed, the Board recommends that, 

following the developmental stage, the Special NSC 5412/2 Group determine 

the responsibility for their operational use.) 

The Board anticipates that the issuance of such a Presidential 

directive would (1) preserve the best features of the present organizational 

arrangement within the Department of Defense (2) permit the Secretary of 

Defense to exert effective management control over the largely military 

resources involved (3) emphasize the important roles of the Director of 

Central Intelligence and of the Central Intelligence Agency in the National 

Reconnaissance Program (4) clarify the responsibilities of the Defense 

Department in the satellite field and of the Central Intelligence Agency 

in the aircraft field (5) obtain larger returns from the Central Intelligence 

Agency's capacity for imaginative research and advance planning in the 

reconnaissance intelligence field, and (6) seek cost reductions and production gains through improved management and budgetary practices. 

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J. Patrick Coyne 

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