United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VOTER VERIFIED, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE LLC,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-1930

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Florida in No. 1:16-cv-00267-MWGRJ, Judge Mark E. Walker.

______________________ 

Decided: April 20, 2018

______________________ 

 ANTHONY ITALO PROVITOLA, DeLand, FL, argued for 

plaintiff-appellant. 

 ROBERT M. EVANS, JR., Senniger Powers LLP, St. 

Louis, MO, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by KYLE G. GOTTUSO. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
2 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

Voter Verified, Inc. (“Voter Verified”) appeals from the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Florida’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of its 

claim for patent infringement, holding that the claims of 

U.S. Reissue Patent RE40,449 (“the ’449 patent”) are 

directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and are thus 

invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Voter Verified, Inc. v. 

Election Sys. & Software LLC, No. 1:16-cv-267, 2017 WL 

3688148, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2017) (“Voter Verified 

NDFL”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The ’449 patent, assigned to Voter Verified, was reissued on August 5, 2008 from U.S. Patent 6,769,613, and is 

directed to voting methods and systems that provide for 

“auto-verification” of a voter’s ballot. See ’449 patent 

Abstract. Generally, the patent discloses a process in 

which a voter enters a vote into a voting system; the 

system generates a corresponding printed ballot; and the 

voter verifies the printed ballot for accuracy and submits 

it for tabulation. See id. col. 1 l. 64–col. 2 l. 40, col. 2 l. 

53–col. 3 l. 11.

Before we address the issues in the current appeal, an 

overview of relevant events from a prior litigation is 

necessary. In November 2009, Voter Verified sued the 

predecessors of Election Systems & Software LLC (“Election Systems”)1 in the Middle District of Florida alleging 

infringement of the ’449 patent. Election Systems, which 

produces and markets automated voting systems, counterclaimed that the claims of the ’449 patent were invalid 

under §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112. In a series of summary 

judgment orders, the district court made various validity 

and infringement decisions. The court determined that 

1 The parties do not dispute that this means Election Systems was a party to the prior litigation.

 
VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 3

claims 1–93 were not infringed and claim 94 was invalid 

as indefinite under § 112. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of Voter Verified concluding that 

all the claims of the ’449 patent, except for claim 94, were 

not invalid under §§ 101 and 112, because Election Systems failed to present any arguments or evidence regarding invalidity of these claims. See Summ. J. Order at 18–

19, Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., No. 

6:09-cv-1968 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2010), ECF No. 155; 

Summ. J. Order at 20, Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. 

& Software, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1969 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 

2010), ECF No. 114; J.A. 239. No further analysis of 

§ 101 was provided. Finally, the court dismissed without 

prejudice the claim of invalidity of claims 85 and 93 under 

§ 102, having already determined that they were not 

infringed, but held that claim 49 was invalid under § 103, 

even though the court had also already determined that it 

was not infringed. The court additionally held that the 

remaining claims 1–48, 50–84, and 86–92 were not invalid under §§ 102 and 103.

Voter Verified appealed the holding of invalidity of 

claim 49, but not of claim 94. See Voter Verified, Inc. v. 

Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012). Election Systems cross-appealed the upholding of the validity of the remaining claims 1–48, 50–84, 

and 86–92. Id. 

After briefing and oral argument, we affirmed the district court’s invalidity judgment of claim 49 under § 103. 

Id. at 1379–81. We also determined that the district court 

did not err in holding that claims 1–48, 50–84, and 86–92 

were not proven invalid because, in failing to respond to 

these arguments in its summary judgment briefing, 

Election Systems had not met its burden to prove its 

invalidity counterclaims by clear and convincing evidence. 

Id. at 1381–82. Therefore, only claims 49 and 94 remain 

invalid. 
4 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

This brings us to the present case on appeal. In July 

2016, Voter Verified again sued Election Systems, this 

time in the Northern District of Florida, alleging that 

certain voting systems and equipment made or operated 

by Election Systems infringed the ’449 patent. Election 

Systems filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under 

Rule 12(b)(6) arguing that Voter Verified failed to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted because all the

claims of the ’449 patent are invalid under § 101. In 

response, Voter Verified argued that issue preclusion, or 

collateral estoppel, precludes Election Systems from 

relitigating the § 101 issue, which it argues had already 

been decided in the prior litigation. Election Systems 

countered that issue preclusion should not apply in this 

case because there was an intervening change in the law. 

Regardless, Election Systems contended that under 

Eleventh Circuit law, issue preclusion would still not 

apply because two of the four required elements of issue 

preclusion were not met. Specifically, Election Systems 

argued that the § 101 issue was not “actually litigated” 

and it was not “a critical and necessary part of the judgment” in the first litigation. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. 

Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 327 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th 

Cir. 2003).

The district court granted Election Systems’s motion 

to dismiss. See Voter Verified NDFL, 2017 WL 3688148, 

at *2. The court concluded that the “two-step analysis” 

recited in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. 

Ct. 2347 (2014), constituted a “substantial change” in the 

law such that “the issue of patent validity is not precluded 

from further litigation.” Voter Verified NDFL, 2017 WL 

3688148, at *1–2. The district court therefore did not 

reach an issue preclusion analysis under Eleventh Circuit 

law. The court then proceeded to analyze the claims of 

the ’449 patent under the two-step § 101 framework. 

First, the court determined that the patent was based on 

the abstract idea of “vote collection and verification.” Id.
VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 5

at *2. Second, the court determined that the voting 

system was made up of “generic computer components

performing generic computer functions,” and that this was 

insufficient to transform the abstract idea into patenteligible subject matter. Id. As a result, the court held 

that all the claims of the ’449 patent were directed to 

patent-ineligible subject matter and thus invalid under 

§ 101. Id.

Voter Verified timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) under the law of the regional circuit. Content 

Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The 

Eleventh Circuit reviews the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion de novo, accepting as true the complaint’s factual 

allegations and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 

Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 

F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Before we reach the merits of the § 101 issue, we must 

first determine whether the district court properly concluded that the § 101 judgment from the prior litigation 

does not have preclusive effect in this case for the reason 

that Alice was an intervening change in the law. See

Wright et al., 18 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4425 (3d ed.) 

(“Preclusion is most readily defeated by specific Supreme 

Court overruling of precedent relied upon in reaching the 

first decision.”); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chems. 

Corp. (Can.), 803 F.3d 620, 628–29 (Fed. Cir. 2015); 

Wilson v. Turnage, 791 F.2d 151, 157 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 

(determining that issue preclusion was inapplicable when 

there was an “intervening change in the legal atmosphere”). If there were a change in the law, then issue 

preclusion would not apply, which would allow us to reach 
6 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

the merits of the § 101 issue. If, however, there were not 

a change in the law, then issue preclusion would still be a 

viable issue that we need to evaluate.

I. Intervening Change in the Law

The district court held that Alice was a “substantial 

change” in the law such that issue preclusion does not 

apply here. See Voter Verified NDFL, 2017 WL 3688148, 

at *1. On appeal, Voter Verified argues that issue preclusion should apply because there was no change in the law, 

and Alice merely applied a rule from Bilski v. Kappos, 561 

U.S. 593 (2010), which it states was the controlling law at 

the time the district court in the prior litigation entered 

summary judgment on the § 101 issue. Election Systems 

counters that there was a change in the law, because “the 

two-step analysis [was] established in Mayo and further 

refined in Alice.” Appellee’s Br. 23; see also Oral Arg. at 

23:34–25:25, Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software LLC, No. 17-1930 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2018),

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

17-1930.mp3. 

We agree with Voter Verified to the extent that it argues that Alice was not an intervening change in the law, 

so that it does not exempt a potential application of issue 

preclusion. However, we ultimately conclude for the 

reasons that follow that issue preclusion does not apply in 

this case.

For the change of law exception to issue preclusion to 

apply, three conditions must be satisfied. First, “the 

governing law must have been altered.” Dow Chem., 803 

F.3d at 629 (citations omitted). Second, “the decision 

sought to be reopened must have applied the old law.” Id.

(citations omitted). Third, the change in the law “must 

compel a different result under the facts of the particular 

case.” Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, in order to be 

intervening, the change in the law must have occurred 

after the first case was finally decided. See Wilson, 791 
VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 7

F.2d at 157 (“[A] judicial declaration intervening between 

the two proceedings may so change the legal atmosphere 

as to render the rule of collateral estoppel inapplicable.” 

(quoting Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 

591, 600 (1948))).

Turning to the first condition, we conclude that Alice, 

which was decided after the first litigation ended, did not 

alter the governing law of § 101. In Alice, the Court 

applied the same two-step framework it created in Mayo

in its § 101 analysis. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing 

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 

U.S. 66, 77–79 (2012)). The Court stated, “[f]irst, we 

determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one 

of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. (citing Mayo, 566 

U.S. at 77–78). If so, it stated, one must then determine 

“what else is there in the claims before us?” Id. (quoting

Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78). Just as it did in Mayo, the Court 

characterized the second inquiry “as a search for an 

inventive concept,” id. at 2355 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted), that is “sufficient to transform the 

claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application,” 

id. at 2357 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is thus evident from the Court’s reliance on Mayo

that it was merely applying the same test as it set out in 

Mayo, and did not materially change it. See id. at 2355, 

2357 (citing Mayo for the rule of law). We therefore hold 

that Alice did not alter the governing law under § 101. 

Moreover, to the extent that Election Systems argues 

that Mayo was an intervening change in the law, we 

disagree because Mayo was not intervening. Mayo was 

decided while the first appeal was still pending before this 

court. After that, the only controlling decision that could 

be considered to have intervened is Alice, which issued 

after the first litigation. And, as we have discussed above, 

Alice did not cause a change in the law.
8 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

Because the first condition for avoiding issue preclusion has not been satisfied, we need not review the second 

and third conditions. Accordingly, the intervening change 

in the law exception does not preclude application of issue 

preclusion in this case. 

II. Issue Preclusion

We continue our analysis by applying the doctrine of 

issue preclusion. Issue preclusion serves to “preclude 

parties from contesting matters that they have had a full 

and fair opportunity to litigate,” which “protects their 

adversaries from the expense and vexation attending 

multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and 

fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the 

possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Mont. v. United 

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979). We review a district 

court’s application of issue preclusion under the law of the 

regional circuit. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Zenni Optical Inc., 

713 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “However, for any 

aspects that may have special or unique application to 

patent cases, Federal Circuit precedent is applicable.” Id.

(citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit reviews de novo a 

district court’s determination of issue preclusion, EEOC v. 

Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 

2004), and requires a showing of all four of the following 

elements: 

(1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one 

involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must 

have been actually litigated in the prior suit; 

(3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary 

part of the judgment in that action; and (4) the 

party against whom the earlier decision is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding.

CSX Transp., 327 F.3d at 1317 (emphases added). 
VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 9

Voter Verified does not specifically argue that issue 

preclusion applies under the Eleventh Circuit’s test. But 

Election Systems argues that issue preclusion should not 

apply because at least two of the required elements have

not been met. First, Election Systems contends that by 

choosing not to respond to Voter Verified’s arguments 

against its § 101 invalidity counterclaim, the issue was 

never “actually litigated.” See Oral Arg. at 20:30–22:35. 

Second, Election Systems asserts that a determination of

invalidity under § 101 was not critical or necessary to the

ultimate judgment of noninfringement. See id. at 22:35–

22:45.

We agree with Election Systems on both points. First, 

the § 101 issue was not actually litigated. It was in fact 

barely considered. The district court disposed of the § 101 

issue when Election Systems chose not to respond. From 

the court’s opinion, it appears, as Election Systems has 

argued, that the § 101 issue was never “actually litigated,” because the court did not evaluate that question. See 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. e (1982) 

(“A judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as 

to issues which might have been but were not litigated 

and determined in the prior action.”).

Second, the § 101 issue of invalidity was not necessary 

to the judgment in the first district court action. Whether 

issues of invalidity are critical or necessary to a judgment 

holding that a defendant is not liable for infringement is 

an aspect that is “special or unique” to patent cases. 

Aspex Eyewear, 713 F.3d at 1380. Validity and infringement are separate concepts. In Cardinal Chemical, the 

Supreme Court noted that invalidity and infringement 

were independent issues. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. 

Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993) (stating that a 

party seeking a judgment of invalidity “presents a claim 

independent of the patentee’s charge of infringement”). 

Consequently, either an invalidity or a noninfringement 
10 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

determination is sufficient for a final judgment holding 

that a party is not liable for infringement.

In the first litigation, the Middle District of Florida

held that Election Systems was not liable for infringement of the ’449 patent. In so holding, the district court 

reached the conclusions that (1) claims 1–93 were not 

infringed; (2) claim 94 was invalid under § 112; (3) claims 

1–93 were not invalid under §§ 101 and 112; (4) claim 49 

was invalid under § 103; and (5) claims 1–48, 50–84, and 

86–92 were not invalid under §§ 102 and 103. The court 

did not specify which of these determinations were critical 

or necessary to the final judgment. See Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. i (1982) (“If a judgment 

of a court of first instance is based on determinations of 

two issues, either of which standing independently would 

be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not 

conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone.”); 

cf. id. § 27, cmt. h, illus. 14 (illustrating that in a suit for 

trademark infringement, a determination that the trademark is both valid and not infringed does not preclude the 

same defendant from the defense of invalidity in a subsequent action between the parties). Moreover, as we 

previously observed, the § 101 issue was not actually 

litigated. As a result, it is clear that the § 101 issue was 

not critical or necessary to the final judgment. 

We therefore conclude that issue preclusion does not 

apply in this case, not because there was a change in law

as the district court held, but because the issue of patent 

eligibility under § 101 was not actually litigated and it 

was not necessary to the judgment rendered.

III. Patent Eligibility under § 101

Because issue preclusion does not apply here, we turn 

to the merits of the § 101 issue. Patent eligibility under 

§ 101 “is ultimately an issue of law we review de novo.” 

Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 

2018) (italics added). Patent eligibility can be determined 
VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 11

at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage “when there are no factual 

allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the 

eligibility question as a matter of law.” Aatrix Software, 

Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 

(Fed. Cir. 2018).

Under § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 

and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 

of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 

may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 

and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Under 

the two-step framework, we first “determine whether the 

claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” 

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If so, then we “examine the 

elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 

‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed 

abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 

2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 78).

Voter Verified argues that the claims of the ’449 patent are directed to patent-eligible subject matter because 

the specification and claims describe “physical” and 

“human cognitive actions,” which are not abstract ideas. 

Appellant’s Br. 11. And at step two of the framework, 

Voter Verified contends that the district court incorrectly 

found that only generic computer components were required because a voter performs some of the claimed steps

as well. 

In response, Election Systems argues that the claims 

are directed to the abstract idea of “voting and checking 

the accuracy of a paper election ballot.” Appellee’s Br. 30. 

Furthermore, Election Systems contends that this represents only a well-established human activity. Because the 

patent only discloses use of general purpose computers, 

Election Systems argues that this is nothing more than 

automating a fundamental human activity, which is 

insufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into 

patent-eligible subject matter under step two. Election 
12 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

Systems additionally argues that all of the claims recite

nothing more than additional abstract ideas or generic 

computer components.

The claims before us are claims 1–48 and 50–93 (the 

“remaining claims”); this excludes claims 49 and 94, 

which were previously finally held to be invalid. Of the 

remaining independent claims, claims 85 and 93 recite 

“self-verification” voting methods, and claims 1, 25, and 

56 recite closely related self-verifying voting systems. 

Method claim 85 and system claim 56 are exemplary of 

the method and system claims and read as follows:

85. A method for voting providing for selfverification of a ballot comprising the steps of: 

(a) voting by a voter using a computer voting station programmed to present an election ballot, 

accept input of votes from the voter according 

to the election ballot, 

temporarily store the votes of the voter; 

(b) printing of the votes of the voter from the votes 

temporarily stored in the computer for the voting 

station; 

(c) comparison by the voter of the printed votes 

with the votes temporarily stored in the computer 

for the voting station; 

(d) decision by the voter as to whether a printed 

ballot is acceptable or unacceptable; and 

(e) submission of an acceptable printed ballot for 

tabulation.

’449 patent col. 11 ll. 53–68.

56. A self-verifying voting system comprising: 

one or more voting stations comprising: 
VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 13

(a) one or more computer programs which operate in a computer to display general voting 

instructions, at least one election ballot showing the candidates and/or issues to be voted 

on, and directions to the voter for operation of 

the system; 

present the election ballot for voting and 

input of votes by the voter; 

accept input of the votes from the voter; 

print out the election ballot according to 

which the voter voted with the votes of the 

voter printed thereon, so that the votes of 

the voter are readable on said election ballot by the voter and readable by a ballot 

scanning machine; and 

record the votes in the computer; 

(b) at least one computer with at least one 

display device, at least one device to accept 

voting input from a voter, and sufficient 

memory to provide for the operation of said 

computer program; 

(c) a printer connected to said computer for 

printing the election according to which the 

voter voted; 

(d) a ballot scanning machine for reading the 

votes on the printed ballot printed according 

to the election ballot which the voter voted 

and 

a means for tabulating the printed ballots generated by said one or more voting stations.

Id. col. 10, ll. 7–33.

We agree with Election Systems that these claims are 

directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The factual 
14 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

allegations here, taken as true, do not prevent a § 101 

determination at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. While these 

claims encompass both methods and systems, we find 

there to be no distinction between them for § 101 purposes, as they simply recite the same concept. See Alice, 134 

S. Ct. at 2360 (“[T]he system claims are no different from 

the method claims in substance. The method claims 

recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same 

idea.”). 

First, the claims as a whole are drawn to the concept 

of voting, verifying the vote, and submitting the vote for 

tabulation. Humans have performed this fundamental 

activity that forms the basis of our democracy for hundreds of years. See ’449 patent col. 2 ll. 62–66 (stating 

that the “voting process is ultimately founded upon the 

law which governs elections”); see also U.S. Const. art. I, 

§ 1, cl. 1 (1789) (conveying a right in the “People of the 

several States” to vote). Even Voter Verified characterized these steps as “human cognitive actions.” Appellant’s 

Br. 11. These steps are therefore nothing more than 

abstract ideas. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, 

Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[M]ethods 

which can be performed entirely in the human mind are 

the types of methods that embody the ‘basic tools of 

scientific and technological work’ that are free to all men 

and reserved exclusively to none.” (quoting Gottschalk v. 

Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972))).

Second, there is no inventive concept in the claims 

sufficient to transform them into patent-eligible subject 

matter. Neither party disputes that the claims recite the 

use of general purpose computers that carry out the 

abstract idea. See ’449 patent col. 6 l. 18–col. 12 l. 24 

(reciting, inter alia, “a standard personal computer,” “a 

visual display device,” and “a keyboard”); see also id. col. 3 

l. 12–col. 4 l. 28 (disclosing use of, inter alia, “data storage 
VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE 15

devices,” “a laser printer,” and a scanner “from the wellknown art”). The case law has consistently held that 

these standard components are not sufficient to transform 

abstract claims into patent-eligible subject matter.2 Voter 

Verified’s argument that these steps are not only performed by generic computer components, but also performed by a voter, was addressed under step one when 

they were determined to be an abstract idea. Because all 

of the remaining claims only recite different variations of 

the same abstract idea being performed with other generic computer components, we therefore conclude that the 

district court properly determined that the claims of the 

’449 patent are invalid under § 101.

2 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60 (holding that 

“implement[ing] the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer” was not sufficient “to transform an abstract idea 

into a patent-eligible invention”); Intellectual Ventures I 

LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1341–42 

(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that “using generic computer 

components and conventional computer data processing 

activities” was not sufficient to find an “inventive concept”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 

607, 613–14 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“These steps fall squarely 

within our precedent finding generic computer components insufficient to add an inventive concept to an otherwise abstract idea.”); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice 

Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(holding that generic computer components such as an 

“interface,” “network,” and “database” fail to satisfy the 

“inventive concept requirement” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347–48 

(“There is no ‘inventive concept’ in [Content Extraction’s]

use of a generic scanner and computer to perform wellunderstood, routine, and conventional activities commonly used in industry.”). 

 
16 VOTER VERIFIED, INC. v. ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

We have considered Voter Verified’s remaining arguments, but find them unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)

because all of the remaining claims of the ’449 patent are 

invalid under § 101. 

AFFIRMED