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24 

USCIB: 5.2/55 

3 September 1954 

'i'OP 6Ei0B:Bll' = 9. 6 • l!iffiS ONfiY 

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

AGENDA FCR 

One hundred sixth Meeting at 1430, on Friday, 

10 September 1954, in the Projection Room, 

Administration Building, CIA, Washington, D.C. 

Mr. 

Date of Initial Subject 

Consideration Numbers 

10 Sep 1954 5.2/ 

10 Sep 1954 ~.18/ 

10 Sep 1954 ~-19/ 

10 Sep 1954 13~5/ 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

Allen.w. Dulles, Chairman· 

PAR'l' I - .Agenda Items 

Subject 

1. Approval of Final Minutes 

of the 105th Meeting. 

2. 

.)J COOWT Arranmn..,ts with ~ 

·4. Repo~f Corrective 

Measures for Control of 

COMINT C~promises D11e to 

Inef f ec~e Communications 

Security.* 

/ 

* Papers in Preparation. 

Subnitted by 

Exec. Secy. 

Chairman, 

Ad Hoc 

Committee 

(NSA Member) 

CIA Member 

Director, NSA 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-01-2014 pursua~tto E.O. 1352a 

USCIB: 5.2/55 

TOP SECRET 
..... • 

USCIB: 5.2/55 

'!'OF SE6Rm' = H • S • 1i'.fE!S ONI:1Y 

ItEm No. 

l. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

. . 

PART II - Background Inf onnation on Agenda Items 

Subject and Smmnary EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Final Minutes of the 105th Meeting. Comm~ts on the 

tentative minutes of the subject meeting are now being 

received, and a final version of the minutes will be 

distributed in advance of the 106th Meeting. 

Report of Corrective Measures for Control of COMINT 

Com romises Due to Ineffective Communications Securit • 

In his Annual Report USCIB 5 .4 12 the Executive Secret·ary 

noted that in reports available since May of 1953 ineffective 

communications have been producing CCMINT compromises at the 

average rate of slightly more than five per month. He pointed 

out that approximately one-half of these compromises involved 

inadvertent plain text transmissions, many cases of which have 

revealed. TOP SECRET codeword information on readily interceptable radio circuits. He observed that the provisions of USCIB 

Directive Number 9 are expected to assist ma:terially·iil the 

amelioration of this situation but that much depended upon.the 

corrective '1easures taken by the Director, NSA, since all but 

one of the electrical compromises noted have occurred in 

elements under his technical or operational control. 

He commented, further, that "Leakage of COMINT information due to ineffective communications is considered to be our 

most dangerous security weakness. If not corrected, this 

weakness can ren~er all other security efforts null and void.", 

USCIB: 5.2/55 - 2 -

TOP SECRET 
-.. ;:...--~. ? ,. 

USCIB: 5.2/55 

TOP SEC'!t'.!T - tf .S. ElE5 ONLY 

and recommended that "The Director, NSA be asked to prepare and forward in time for USCIB consideration at its 

September meeting a status report on action taken to improve 

CCMSEC in the CCMINT elements under his operational or 

technical control together with any recommendations he may 

deem appropriate. " The latter recommendation was approved 

by the Executive Committee and the Board, and the NSA 

report is now sutmitted for consideration. 

USCIB: 5.2/55 -3-

'fOP SECRET