UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4320

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

OLUGBENGA KAMORU, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:07-cr-00231-AW-1) 

Submitted: March 18, 2009 Decided: April 10, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Christopher M. Davis, Mary E. Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, 

Jonathan C. Su, James A. Crowell, IV, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Olugbenga Kamoru appeals from his convictions for bank 

fraud and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 

and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). On appeal, Kamoru challenges the 

district court’s decision to admit a letter from his attorney 

into evidence and contends the district court’s answer to the 

jury’s question regarding the jury instructions was incomplete. 

 “A district court’s evidentiary rulings are entitled 

to substantial deference and will not be reversed absent a clear 

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 

(4th Cir. 1994). This court “will find that discretion to have 

been abused only when the district court acted ‘arbitrarily or 

irrationally.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 

1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993)). 

 “Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence 

‘may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’” United 

States v. Myers, 280 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2002). “Because 

the evidence sought to be excluded under Rule 403 is concededly 

probative, the balance under Rule 403 should be struck in favor 

of admissibility, and evidence should be excluded only 

sparingly.” United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th 

Cir. 1996). Rule 403 requires excluding evidence “only in those 

instances where the trial judge believes that there is a genuine 

2 
risk that the emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational 

behavior, and that this risk is disproportionate to the 

probative value of the offered evidence.” United States v. Van 

Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 

omitted). 

 In our review, we “must look at the evidence in a 

light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative 

value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” United States v. 

Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

omitted). Applying these standards, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

letter into evidence. 

 Kamoru next argues the district court erred by 

insufficiently answering a question from the jury. He believes 

the district court should have provided further instruction 

regarding the unanimity requirement. We review a district 

court’s decision to respond to a jury’s question, and the form 

of that response, for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995). “[I]n responding to a 

jury’s request for clarification on a charge, the district 

court’s duty is simply to respond to the jury’s apparent source 

of confusion fairly and accurately without creating prejudice.” 

Id. Our review of the jury’s question, the argument of counsel, 

and the court’s response convinces us that the district court 

3 
4 

responded fairly and accurately, and thus did not abuse its 

discretion in answering the jury’s question. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED