REF ID:A724 

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eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 01-29-2014 

ursuantto E.O. 13526 
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SUB.JECT WJMBER 

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Subject: 

Item 3 o'£ the Agenda '£or the Sixth Meeting o:f 

USCIBEC, held on 20 August 1953, 

Allied (NATO) Communications Security, 

(USCIB 14/313) 

FINAL 

The CHAIRMAN stated that this item also had been referred to the 

Committee by the Board for prompt action, and explained that the paper 

before the Committee contained the recommendations of the Department 

ot State as the "Cognizant U,S, Authority", It appeared, he said, 

that the immediate requirement was for the Committee· to appoint a working group to stand as an ad hoc committee ot USCIB to: 

(1) Coordinate US and UK proposals for the initial approach to 

the French, subsequent technical discussions, preparation of 

a memorandum to be issued by the NATO Standing Group and 

formulation of minimum security standards; 

(2) Coordinate between the US and UK conclusions as to the status 

of the COMSEC of NATO countries as this program develops; 

and, 

(3) Coordinate US and UK recommendations for further· steps, as 

envisaged in paragraph 23 of the Conference Report, should 

this program not accomplish the desired response from NATO 

cOllJltries or improvement in their COMSEC, 

He noted the state Department reconmendation that the committee consist 

of representatives .from State, OSD, NSA, CIA and FBI, and invited camme:a.ts, 

Ml, KEAY said that it was his understanding that a f\lrther group 

would be appointed, permitting the working group representing the Board 

to serve as the U,S, element of the Combined Working Group, and provid- ing another ad'hoc group to do the technical work involved in the 

preparation of m:ln11J11nn standards, 

,• 

After some discussion it was agreed that the purpose of USCIB 

would be served if USCIBEC appointed an ad hoc committee to take cog- . nizance of this matter, Such a committee would then serve both to 

keep USCIB advised, and to serve as the U.S. element or the Combined 

Working Group to insure adherence to USCIB policy, Its members could 

call upon the e:xpert assistance available in their respective depart- me~ts and agencies as necessary, 

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LT. COLONEL LONG noted that paragraph 2d of the enclos'\lre with 

USCIB 14/.31.3 referred to the "Tripartite Security Working Group" while 

paragraph 3 referred to the "Tripartite Security Survey Group". He 

asked if there was a distinction between the two. 

MR. KEAY said that the Groups were one and the same and that the 

proper designation was "Tripartite Security Working Group". 

CAPTAill AGNEW read the following statement for the record: 

"Program to Improve French Communications Security 

111. NSA has one substantive and two procedural recommendations to 

make on this item. These items have been generally discussed with the 

State representative, and, I believe, have his preliminary approval. 

"2. On the substantive side, it is strong~ recommended that the 

participation of the Tripartite Security Working· Group be limited to 

the initial selection and bringing together of the COMSEC authorities. 

In this way, the advantage or making sure the French personnel are 

trustworthy may be retained, but the disadvantages of having physiC"ll 

security personnel monitoring COMSEC activities will be eliminated. 

It is highly desirable that the actual COMSEC discussions and actions 

be undertaken without the interference which would be inevitable under 

the Tripartite Security Working Group sponsorship. 

11.3. Procedure-wise, it was recommended at the Conference that the 

UK and the US agree on a set of minimum security standards and procedures 

for NATO. These minimum standards would be reflected in a list of 

dangerous security practices promulgated by SECAN, and also would serve 

to indicate appropriate action to be taken to improve NATO security. 

This list would be the invitation to the NATO countries to apply to 

SECAN for assistance. 

"4. Thus, the French would not be involved in drawing up minimlDil 

standards as ir1dicated in paragraph 2b. The initial approach to the 

French should: 

a. Obtain French agreement to use of the Standing Group 

Mechanism to impl"ove NATO COMSEC. 

b. Obtain French agreement to have the Tripartite Security 

Working Group bring together appropriate national authorities to enter 

into COMSEC discussions on French security. 

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•5. NSA suggests USCIBEC approve the establishment ot the Combined 

Working Group as outlined in paragraph 4 of USCIB 23/701 and direct the 

working group to undertake a rewording of the reference to reflect the 

changes necessary to con.form to the NSA recommendations." 

The CHAIRMAN noted the changes proposed by NSA and said that in 

view of these, and minor changes suggested by other members, he would 

like to ask if the original drafter of the paper, Mt-. ·Packard, would 

be willing to incorporate the changes into a revised draf't which could 

be forwarded to USCIB f'or approval on a seven-day basis. . . 

MR. PACKARD said that he would undertake to prepare such a redraft. 

The :members discussed the question or membership on the ad hoc 

group, recommended in paragraph 4 of the State paper. It was agreed 

that members from State, NSA and FBI would make up the committee to vorl,t 

on the French problem, and that the committee might not require an FBI 

member in the consideration or subsequent problems. Mentioned as probable 

members of the ad hoc committee were Mr. Polyzoides (State), Mr. Friedman 

and possibly Ml". Austin (NSA), and Mr. Keay (FBI). It vas agreed that CIA 

and OSD representatives would participate in the committee work on a consultant basis. 

:MR, PACKARD asked if the members had agreed that the proposed NSA 

changes, read by Captain Agnew, were acceptable and might be incorporated in his redraft. There was agreement in principle; however, Mr. Keay 

said that he would like to suggest certain modifications. It was therefore agreed that the ad hoc committee named above would be authorized to 

act in behalf of the Executive Committee in the preparation or a revised 

draft which would, when available, be submitted to USCIB on a seven-day 

basis. 

The CHAIRMAN informed the members or Mr. Armstrong's comments at 

the 89th USCIB meeting, with particular reference to his statement that 

the tenuous nature or the French internal situation might possible require a postponement or cancellation of the approach to the French. 

In this regard, MR. PACKARD pointed out that the entire program 

was geared so that it could be broken off at any time. 

DECISION: (20 August 195.3) USCIBEC appointed an ad hoc committee 

consisting of members from the Department of State, NSA and FBI to 

take cognizance or Allied (NATO) Communications Security Problems in 

the manner outlined in the foregoing discussion. 

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USCIBEC agreed, further, that USCIB 14/313 would be revised 

{by Mr. Packard) in light or comments presented by the members, and 

upon revision would be coordinated with the members of the ad hoc 

cormnittee, whose concurrence would constitute USCIBEC approval, 

thereby pennitting distribution of the paper directly to USCIB for 

action. 

This item to be dropped. 

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