1 

2021 IL App (5th) 210116-U 

NO. 5-21-0116 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________ 

In re BRAXTON S., a Minor ) Appeal from the

) Circuit Court of

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Madison County. 

) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

v. ) No. 19-JA-32 

) 

Jason B., ) Honorable 

) Amy Maher, 

Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.

________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Moore and Wharton concurred in the judgment.

ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s finding that the respondent was an unfit parent was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the circuit court’s 

termination of the respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.

¶ 2 The respondent, Jason B., appeals from the judgment of the circuit court that 

terminated his parental rights to his natural child, Braxton S. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

NOTICE

Decision filed 09/23/21. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Braxton was born in February 2019. The respondent is Braxton’s natural father. 

When Braxton was born, his mother, Amy, had a drug addiction; already had five other 

children removed from her care due to her substance abuse; had used methamphetamine, 

cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana while pregnant with Braxton; and had been previously 

found unfit five times. Tracie and Kenny S., who are Braxton’s relatives, began caring for 

Braxton after he was released from the hospital after his birth. Three days after Braxton’s 

birth, the State filed a petition alleging that Braxton was neglected as defined in section 

2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2018)), in that 

neither the respondent nor Amy was providing Braxton with the proper or necessary 

support, education, and medical or other remedial care necessary for a minor’s well-being, 

including adequate food, clothing, and shelter. In addition, the State alleged that the 

respondent failed to provide any care, support, or concern for Braxton and failed to 

establish his paternity after Braxton’s birth. The circuit court granted the Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) temporary custody of Braxton and ordered a DNA 

test to establish the respondent’s paternity, which later established that the respondent was 

Braxton’s father.

¶ 5 In April 2019, DCFS prepared an adjudication/dispositional report in which a DCFS 

caseworker reported that she had met with the respondent three times since Braxton’s birth, 

but the respondent had not been able to provide an address or proof of residence, appeared 

to be homeless, and had a strong body odor. The caseworker believed that the respondent 

did “not seem to fully understand the issues and why Braxton [was] not able to live with 
3 

him.” The caseworker had requested a residential address and proof of employment, but 

the respondent was “resistant to provide the information” and had given the caseworker 

“inconsistent stories and information.” The respondent reported that he had two other 

children but that he was unable to actively parent those children due to a tumultuous 

relationship with the children’s mother. The respondent admitted to using marijuana 

regularly and using other substances occasionally. The respondent had a “past criminal 

history” but stated that he wanted to be a good father for Braxton. The caseworker reported 

that the respondent had regular visits once a week with Braxton from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. at 

the DCFS office. The caseworker concluded that the respondent did not seem to 

acknowledge any problems and was ready to provide for his son but had not provided an 

address to a home in which he planned to parent Braxton.

¶ 6 DCFS’s service plan for the respondent for reuniting the respondent with Braxton 

included the following tasks: (1) complete an integrated assessment and follow 

recommendations, (2) complete a mental health assessment and follow recommendations, 

(3) complete substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations, (4) complete 

random drug screens, (5) complete parenting education, (6) provide suitable housing and 

stabilization in this residence, (7) obtain and maintain employment, and (8) complete a 

domestic violence assessment and follow recommendations. In April 2019, the caseworker 

rated the respondent’s progress in completing each of these tasks as “unsatisfactory.” 

¶ 7 With respect to mental health and substance abuse tasks and services, the respondent 

reported to the caseworker that he was receiving services through Centerstone and had 

signed a release of that information for the caseworker to review. However, the caseworker 
4 

reported that when she contacted the agency, she was informed that they had no records of 

the respondent receiving services through Centerstone.

¶ 8 On April 23, 2019, the circuit court entered an adjudicatory order finding that 

Braxton was neglected in that he suffered from a lack of support, education, and remedial 

care and that Braxton was in an environment that was injurious to his welfare. The circuit 

court also entered a dispositional order making Braxton a ward of the court and placing 

him in the custody and guardianship of DCFS. The circuit court found that the respondent 

was unfit to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline Braxton. The circuit 

court found that DCFS’s service plan and the services offered in conjunction with the 

service plan were appropriate, but that the respondent had not yet completed the service 

plan tasks. The circuit court’s dispositional order included an admonishment to the 

respondent that he “must cooperate with [DCFS]” and “comply with the terms of the 

service plan and correct the conditions that require[d] [Braxton] to be in care” or he risked 

the termination of his parental rights. The circuit court’s permanency goal was return home 

within 12 months, and the circuit court set a permanency hearing for October 8, 2019. 

¶ 9 In October 2019, prior to the permanency hearing, a caseworker, Gretchen Truax, 

filed a permanency hearing report in which she reported that the respondent had been 

cooperative with her but had “not been consistent in engagement in his services.” Truax 

rated the defendant satisfactory in cooperating with her but rated him unsatisfactory with 

respect to most of the other tasks required by the service plan.

¶ 10 Truax noted in her report that the respondent had been receiving counseling at 

Centerstone to address mental health needs and to develop tools for addressing anger 
5 

issues. However, the respondent left counseling in July 2019 before he had completed his 

goals. He was unsuccessfully discharged from Cornerstone’s care. The respondent was 

referred to another counselor but had not reengaged the prescribed counseling.

¶ 11 In her report Truax also noted that the respondent had not provided paystubs to 

prove his employment because, he claimed, he often worked for cash. In addition, the 

respondent had not provided Truax with a residential address and had not provided any 

information concerning his roommates for purposes of running background checks on the 

other adults in the home. The respondent had attended parenting classes and during his 

visits with Braxton, the respondent demonstrated the parenting skills he learned, but at the 

time of the report, he had not finished all the parenting classes in the program. Truax rated 

the respondent as having made satisfactory progress with the parenting classes task at that 

time. 

¶ 12 Truax reported that the respondent regularly visited with Braxton during the period 

covered by the report, attending 18 out of 20 offered visits. According to Truax, during the 

visits, the respondent parented Braxton in a safe manner and supported bonding by 

practicing healthy parenting techniques. The respondent came to the visits prepared with 

formula and diapers and took suggestions and corrections well. Truax’s recommended 

permanency goal for the respondent remained “return home within 12 months.”

¶ 13 On October 8, 2019, the circuit court entered a permanency order finding that the 

respondent had not made reasonable and substantial progress, nor made reasonable efforts, 

toward returning Braxton home and had not completed all service plan tasks. The circuit 

court’s order kept the permanency goal as “return home within 12 months” and directed 
6 

the respondent to cooperate with DCFS and its service plan, finding that the service plan 

was appropriate and reasonably calculated to facilitate the achievement of the permanency 

goal of reuniting the respondent and Braxton. The court scheduled the next permanency 

hearing for March 10, 2020.

¶ 14 On March 10, 2020, Amy signed a final and irrevocable consent to the adoption of 

Braxton by Tracie and Kenny. On the same day, Truax filed a permanency hearing report 

in which she reported that the respondent was minimally engaged with her and that the 

respondent’s communication with her was inconsistent. The respondent had not reengaged 

in anger management services and mental health services, failed to provide paystubs, and 

had not provided information concerning his roommates for background checks. The 

respondent had completed an assessment for substance abuse at a treatment facility and 

was referred to a counselor, but he had not attended the appointment. The respondent had 

attended some parenting classes, failed to complete the classes, but had reengaged in 

classes as of February 26, 2020. 

¶ 15 With respect to visits with Braxton, Truax reported that the respondent continued to 

visit with Braxton regularly until the end of September 2019, when the respondent 

reengaged his relationship with Amy. The respondent did not visit with Braxton in October 

and November 2019, but the visits resumed after the respondent’s relationship with Amy 

ended. 

¶ 16 On March 10, 2020, the circuit court entered a second permanency order finding 

that the respondent had not made reasonable and substantial progress, nor reasonable 
7 

efforts, toward returning Braxton home and had not completed all service plan tasks. The

circuit court’s permanency goal remained returning Braxton home within 12 months. 

¶ 17 Truax filed another permanency hearing report on July 2, 2020. In this report, Truax 

wrote that the respondent had been consistently engaged with her since the last permanency 

hearing in March 2020. The respondent still had not started anger management services 

but had discussed it with his substance abuse counselor. The respondent reported that he 

had been furloughed from his employment and worked side jobs for cash. The respondent 

had obtained housing, but the home did not pass a safety check due to a lack of fire alarms. 

The home otherwise met minimum standards. At the time of Truax’s report, the respondent 

had been in this home since March 2020, but he had two days to come up with $500 for 

the next month’s rent. Truax noted in her report that the respondent’s service plan required 

him to maintain a home for six months, but the respondent had been unable to maintain a 

home for six months since the case was opened. 

¶ 18 Truax wrote in her report that the respondent completed assessments for substance 

abuse and began attending counseling sessions regularly, and the respondent had also 

completed a mental health assessment. Truax rated the respondent’s progress as 

satisfactory with respect to cooperation, substance abuse assessment, and mental health 

assessment although those tasks remained incomplete. Truax rated the respondent’s 

progress as unsatisfactory with respect to tasks that addressed anger management, 

employment, housing, and parenting education. In her report, Truax recommended a 

permanency goal of “substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental 

rights.” 
8 

¶ 19 The circuit court scheduled a permanency hearing for October 8, 2020. Prior to the 

hearing, on September 28, 2020, Truax filed a best interest report in which she described 

the respondent’s efforts and progress. With respect to cooperation, Truax reported that 

there were times in which the respondent was disengaged and inconsistent, but over the 

life of the case, the respondent had largely cooperated with her. Therefore, she rated the 

respondent as satisfactory with respect to his cooperation. However, Truax rated the 

respondent’s progress as unsatisfactory with respect to substance abuse services, mental 

health treatment, parenting, anger management, housing, and employment. Truax 

recommended that the circuit court change the permanency “goal to adoption provided 

father’s rights have been terminated” because the respondent had “failed to make consistent 

progress in his services throughout the life of the case.” Truax also explained that the

respondent had toxic relationships with the mothers of his children as evidenced by 

multiple times the police and/or DCFS had been called to “intervene in their affairs.”

¶ 20 On October 2, 2020, the State filed a petition requesting the circuit court to enter an 

order terminating the respondent’s parental rights and appointing a guardian with the power 

to consent to Braxton’s adoption. The State alleged that the respondent was an unfit person 

pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). 

Specifically, the State alleged that the respondent was unfit because he (1) failed to 

maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of 

Braxton (id. § 1(D)(b)); (2) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of Braxton 

to his care during any nine-month period beginning April 23, 2019, through the date of 

filing the petition (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)); and (3) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct 
9 

the conditions that were the basis for the removal of Braxton from the parent during any 

nine-month period beginning April 23, 2019, through the date of filing the petition (id.

§ 1(D)(m)(i)). 

¶ 21 On October 20, 2020, the circuit court entered a third permanency order finding that 

the respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts toward returning Braxton home and 

had failed to make reasonable and substantial progress toward returning Braxton home. 

The circuit court kept the permanency goal as “return home within 12 months” and set the 

next permanency hearing date for December 10, 2020. 

¶ 22 On November 30, 2020, prior to the next permanency hearing, Truax filed another 

best interest report. In this report, Truax rated the respondent as “satisfactory” with respect 

to his cooperation and mental health assessment. During the period of the report, the 

respondent properly communicated with Truax, and the respondent had consistently 

attended mental health counseling sessions. However, Truax continued to rate the 

respondent’s progress as unsatisfactory with respect to substance abuse services, parenting, 

anger management, housing, and employment. Truax noted that the respondent was 

consistent in visiting with Braxton one hour per week at DCFS’s office and that the 

respondent was “sweet and interact[ed] with his son in a safe manner during visits.” 

However, the respondent struggled “a bit to connect with Braxton and use[d] his phone to 

watch children’s music videos to try to help entertain [Braxton] during visits.” Truax 

continued to recommend the permanency goal of substitute care pending the termination 

of the respondent’s parental rights.
10 

¶ 23 The circuit court continued the December 10, 2020, permanency hearing to April 

20, 2021. Prior to the April 20, 2021, hearing, Truax filed another best interest report in 

which she rated the respondent as “unsatisfactory” in all tasks except parenting. With 

respect to cooperation, Truax reported that the respondent had withheld his residential 

address from her since July 2020, which prevented her from monitoring his home

environment. 

¶ 24 With respect to drug abuse counseling, Truax reported that in September 2020, the 

respondent had stopped attending counseling sessions for substance abuse and was 

unsuccessfully discharged from that service, although the respondent reengaged with his 

substance abuse counselor in January 2021. Truax also noted that the respondent had failed 

to appear for drug testing five times during the period of June 2019 through December 

2020 and tested positive for “THC and/or creatinine” on seven occasions beginning in June 

2020 through February 2021. 

¶ 25 With respect to mental health services, Truax reported that since June 2020, the 

respondent had been consistent in participating in telehealth sessions with his mental health 

counselor and had addressed some of his past trauma and history. However, the respondent 

remained guarded with Truax and his counselor, particularly when discussing his living 

situation. Truax explained in her report that, because of the respondent’s past toxic 

relationships and his lack of openness and honesty about his living situation, it was unclear 

to Truax whether the respondent had acquired the skills necessary to develop healthy 

relational boundaries to minimize the risk for toxic relationships that could, in turn, create 

risks for Braxton, who was unable to self-protect. 
11 

¶ 26 With respect to anger management, Truax noted that the respondent successfully 

completed an anger management program, but Truax also noted that the respondent had 

openly shared “that in his past that he [had] struggled to control his anger.” Truax reported 

that, at the time of the report, the respondent was maintaining an alcohol-free lifestyle, 

which had helped the respondent regulate his anger, but Truax also reported that “due to 

[the respondent] withholding where he is living [she had] been unable to confirm if there 

[had] been any incidents of violence recently.” Therefore, she rated the respondent’s anger 

management as unsatisfactory.

¶ 27 With respect to parenting, Truax rated the respondent as satisfactory in that the 

respondent had engaged in several services that were interrupted by COVID-19, but at the 

time of the report, the respondent had reengaged with a parenting education course and was 

attempting to complete the program. 

¶ 28 With respect to housing, Truax reported that the respondent had lived in six different 

homes over the 19-month period preceding her report. The respondent was “not always 

forthcoming about where exactly it is that he [was] living” and failed to provide Truax with 

information she needed to determine the safety of the respondent’s home. At the time of 

the report, the respondent had failed to provide Truax with his current address.

¶ 29 Finally, with respect to employment, Truax noted that the respondent had held at 

least three jobs for a period no longer than three to five months and that the respondent 

reported that he completed side projects on vehicles and homes to make ends meet. 

¶ 30 The visitation plan for the respondent called for one hour supervised visits each 

week. Truax reported that, at times, the respondent put other priorities ahead of visits and, 
12 

at one point, stopped visiting Braxton altogether for 16 straight weeks. However, since the 

reinstatement of visits, the respondent had attended all but one of his visits. Truax 

continued to recommend the goal of adoption of Braxton provided that the respondent’s 

parental rights were terminated.

¶ 31 On April 20, 2021, the parties appeared in court for a hearing on the State’s petition 

for the termination of the respondent’s parental rights. The circuit court first conducted a 

hearing on the State’s allegation that the respondent was unfit as defined in the Adoption 

Act. Truax was the only witness to testify at the hearing.

¶ 32 Truax’s testimony at the hearing was consistent with her statements and opinions 

concerning the respondent’s efforts and progress set out in her best interest report described 

above. Truax explained to the circuit court that she was the second caseworker assigned to 

work with the respondent and Braxton and that she had been working with the respondent 

since May 2019. Truax testified about preparing service plans for the respondent and 

reviewing the service plans every six months. 

¶ 33 Truax described the respondent as being respectful, kind, and compassionate but at 

times uncooperative by not returning phone calls or being upfront about things when things 

were not going well for the respondent. Truax testified that she never rated the respondent 

as satisfactory with respect to his service plan at any point during the case. She explained 

that were periods in which she would not hear from the respondent for several months at a 

time, and the respondent was not upfront and honest with her about certain things including 

his employment, changes in his address and phone number, and who he was living with. 
13 

¶ 34 Truax testified that one of the tasks the respondent was assigned involved 

participating in substance abuse counseling. Truax told the court that the respondent 

participated in an assessment in May 2019, but he did not successfully complete the 

recommended counseling sessions and was unsuccessfully discharged after leaving the 

program in July 2019 against staff advice. After the respondent was unsuccessfully 

discharged, Truax arranged for a second assessment in February 2020 at another facility, 

but the respondent missed treatment sessions and was unsuccessfully discharged from this 

second program in March 2020. The respondent participated in a third assessment in May 

2020. The respondent attended sessions consistently for a period following the third 

assessment, but he was again unsuccessfully discharged from the program at the end of 

September 2020. Truax told the court that between April 23, 2019, and October 2, 2020, 

the respondent was never rated as “satisfactory” with respect to the substance abuse aspect 

of the service plan. 

¶ 35 Truax also told the circuit court that the respondent was never rated as “satisfactory” 

with respect to the mental health portion of the service plan at any time between April 23, 

2019, and October 2, 2020. Truax explained that the respondent completed a mental health 

assessment in May 2019, and the assessment resulted in a recommendation of outpatient 

treatment. The respondent attended mental health counseling for a period, but he was 

unsuccessfully discharged from the program in July 2019 for nonattendance. At this time, 

Truax tried to speak with the respondent about mental health counselling, but Truax 

explained that there were times when she had difficulty in getting ahold of the respondent, 

particularly in the fall of 2019. When she did speak to the respondent, she provided him 
14 

with new referrals for additional mental health services and emphasized the need for him 

to “get reengaged” in those services. 

¶ 36 The respondent eventually had a second mental health assessment in April or May 

2020 and began attending counselling sessions again. However, both Truax and the mental 

health counselor had concerns about the respondent being guarded about his housing 

situation and not being forthright about that situation. Truax explained to the court that the 

respondent had a history of anger, aggression, and toxic relationships, particularly with his 

ex-wife. Truax testified: “So, when I don’t know where he’s living, I can’t follow up and 

monitor if there have been any calls to his house, who he’s living with, run background 

checks and see if he’s making safe decisions on who it is that he lives with.” Truax told the 

court that she spoke with the respondent about his need to provide her with information 

relevant to his living situation. She explained that it was difficult to evaluate the 

respondent’s progress when she did not have information about all aspects of his life, 

particularly information relevant to the toxic relationships the respondent had in the past. 

¶ 37 Truax testified that the respondent was referred for parenting classes, and the 

respondent was initially engaged in parenting services in May or June 2019. However, the 

respondent stopped attending the classes in the fall of 2019 when he renewed his 

relationship with Braxton’s mother, Amy. The respondent resumed parenting classes in 

January 2020, but he had to retake the classes he had completed due to the time he was 

away from the program. The program shut down due to COVID-19 concerns when the 

respondent was a few classes short of completing the program. Truax referred the 

respondent to an online parenting education program, but the respondent did not want to 
15 

start a new program and elected to wait until the previous program reopened. During the 

period of April 23, 2019, through October 2, 2020, the respondent failed to successfully 

complete any parenting program. 

¶ 38 Truax told the circuit court that the respondent was to complete anger management 

services that could be included with his mental health services. However, according to 

Truax, the respondent never completed anger management services, although he was 

provided with the opportunity. Truax was concerned with the respondent’s anger and the 

need for anger management services because, according to Truax, the respondent had a 

violent history. During the period from April 23, 2019, through October 2, 2020, the 

respondent did not successfully engage in anger management treatment and was never 

rated as “satisfactory” for this service plan task.

¶ 39 The respondent’s service plan required him to obtain suitable housing, and Truax 

testified that she needed to see at least six months of stability in a home. Truax testified 

that the respondent was inconsistent with his living arrangements, having lived at six 

different households during the case and sometimes lived in locations that he did not 

divulge to Truax. He refused to provide Truax with information concerning any of his 

roommates, which prevented Truax from running background checks on the roommates. 

The respondent’s living arrangements were an ongoing issue during the case, and Truax 

explained that without information to do background checks, she could not know who was 

living in the respondent’s home or what potential safety concerns may be present. As of 

the date of the hearing, the respondent had not provided Truax with current information 

concerning where he was living and who he was living with. Truax offered the respondent 
16 

assistance with his housing, but the respondent was not open to any referrals for housing 

assistance. Between April 23, 2019, and October 2, 2020, the respondent was never rated 

as “satisfactory” with respect to the service plan’s housing requirements. 

¶ 40 Truax testified that the respondent was also never rated as “satisfactory” with 

respect to the employment aspect of the service plan. The respondent reported that he 

performed side jobs for cash, which made it difficult for Truax to determine whether the 

respondent was maintaining sufficient employment. The respondent was inconsistent in 

showing that he could maintain employment at one location for any length of time, having 

had multiple employers throughout the case. Truax explained to the court that she 

repeatedly discussed with the respondent the need for him to have steady employment. For 

the period of April 23, 2019, through October 2, 2020, Truax never rated the respondent as 

“satisfactory” with the employment requirement of the service plan due to the respondent’s

lack of stable employment. 

¶ 41 Truax told the circuit court that from April 23, 2019, through October 2, 2020, the 

respondent’s service plan never changed because the services offered addressed the safety 

concerns that were the barrier to unification between the respondent and Braxton. The 

respondent was given one hour of supervised visitation per week, and that visitation 

schedule never changed because the respondent never achieved satisfactory progress with 

his service plan, and in the fall of 2019, the respondent stopped visits and services 

altogether for 16 weeks. Accordingly, Truax believed the respondent to be unfit. According 

to Truax, Braxton needed consistency and stability, which the respondent failed to 

demonstrate for any reasonable amount of time. 
17 

¶ 42 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that the respondent had 

“failed to make reasonable efforts and failed to make reasonable progress for the return of 

the minor during the relevant time period.” The circuit court, therefore, found the 

respondent to be unfit at the conclusion of the fitness hearing.

¶ 43 On the same day as the fitness hearing, the circuit court also conducted a separate 

hearing on whether it was in Braxton’s best interest that the respondent’s parental rights be 

terminated. During this hearing, Truax told the court that Braxton lived in Tracie and 

Kenny’s home, along with Braxton’s older maternal half-brother. Tracie and Kenny’s 

home had been Braxton’s only placement, and the placement began immediately after 

Braxton left the hospital after his birth. Tracie and Kenny’s home was the only home 

Braxton had ever lived in.

¶ 44 At the time of the hearing, Braxton was two years old, and Truax told the court that 

Braxton had bonded with Tracie and Kenny as his caregivers. Tracie and Kenny had cared 

for Braxton, supported him, and met his needs, and Braxton looked to Tracy and Kenny 

for his needs. It appeared to Truax that Braxton felt at home with Tracie and Kenny. In 

addition, Tracie and Kenny had been committed to keeping a sibling connection between 

Braxton and his five older maternal half brothers and sisters by arranging for the siblings

to get together regularly every month. According to Truax, Tracie and Kenny “continually 

put Braxton’s best interest first even when it comes at their cost and an inconvenience to 

them.” Truax told the court that Tracie and Kenny were willing to adopt Braxton should 

the respondent’s parental rights be terminated and were supportive of keeping some 
18 

connection between Braxton and his natural parents as long as they could ensure Braxton’s 

safety. 

¶ 45 Truax believed that termination of the respondent’s parental rights would not be 

detrimental to Braxton because Braxton was “in the place he’s always known as home.” 

Truax believed that it was in Braxton’s best interest for the respondent’s parental rights to 

be terminated and Braxton be made available for adoption. The guardian ad litem agreed 

with Truax’s recommendations. 

¶ 46 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that it was in Braxton’s best 

interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights and make Braxton available for 

adoption. The court stated: “And for this child’s entire life he’s been in the same placement, 

and the father has only very recently indicated by his actions that he’s ready to step up to 

the plate. And for the best interests of the minor I just don’t think we can wait any longer.”

The circuit court entered a judgment terminating the respondent’s parental rights and 

granted DCFS power to consent to Braxton’s adoption. The respondent now appeals from 

the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 47 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 48 The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and the Adoption 

Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)) govern proceedings involving the termination 

of parental rights. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494 (2002). Specifically, the Juvenile Court 

Act provides a two-stage process for the involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 

ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). The State must first establish, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one or more of the grounds of unfitness 
19 

enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). In re 

D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352-53 (2004). When the State alleges more than one ground for a 

finding of unfitness, the State needs to prove only one ground for the circuit court to find

a parent unfit. In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564 (2000). If the circuit court finds the 

parent unfit, the State must then show, in a separate haring, that termination of parental 

rights would serve the child’s best interests. In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, 

¶ 28. 

¶ 49 In the present case, the respondent first argues that the circuit court erred in finding 

him to be an unfit person on the ground that he did not make reasonable progress towards 

the return of the minor children during any nine-month period following the adjudication 

of abuse or neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)). The respondent also argues 

that the circuit court erred in finding that he had not made reasonable efforts to correct the 

conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minor children during any nine-month 

period following the adjudication of abuse or neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)). In addition, the 

respondent challenges the circuit court’s finding that it was in Braxton’s best interest that 

the respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 50 (a) Unfitness 

¶ 51 The State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 

parent is unfit, and we may affirm if the evidence supports a finding of unfitness on any 

one of the alleged statutory grounds. In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, ¶ 28.

Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)) provides 
20 

for finding a parent unfit where the parent has failed to make reasonable progress towards 

the return of the child during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. 

¶ 52 Reasonable progress is an objective standard that focuses upon the amount of 

progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken from the 

parent. In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17. Measuring reasonable progress under 

section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the 

service plans in light of the conditions giving rise to the removal of the minor child, while 

also considering other conditions which may later arise preventing the return of the child 

to the parent. Id. A parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the 

service plan is substantially a parent’s failure to make reasonable progress toward the return 

of the minor child. Id. 

¶ 53 Further, a determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and 

credibility assessments that the circuit court is in the best position to make, and a finding 

of unfitness will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 889-90 (2004). “A factual finding is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the 

determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence.” Id. at 890.

¶ 54 In the present case, the circuit court’s finding that the respondent failed to make 

reasonable progress toward the return of Braxton during any nine-month period following 

the adjudication of neglect is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. The State 

presented sufficient evidence of the respondent’s lack of progress during the period of April 

23, 2019, through October 2, 2020, a period greater than nine months. 
21 

¶ 55 During this period, the respondent was required to cooperate with his caseworkers, 

but there were periods in which he failed to keep Truax informed about important things 

relevant to his service plan, including where he was living, who he was living with, and 

where he was working. There were times in which Truax would not hear from the 

respondent for several months. Truax told the court that the respondent was never rated 

satisfactory with respect to his service plan at any point during this period. 

¶ 56 The respondent attended some substance abuse counseling sessions but was 

unsuccessfully discharged in July 2019 when he left the program against staff advice. 

Truax provided additional referrals to substance abuse programs, but the respondent was 

again unsuccessfully discharged in March 2020 due to missed sessions and failure to follow 

through on counseling recommendations. A third attempt at substance abuse services in 

May 2020 resulted in another unsuccessful discharge in September 2020. The respondent 

never made satisfactory progress in performing this task required by the service plan.

¶ 57 The same is true with respect to mental health services. After a mental health 

assessment, it was recommended that the respondent engage in outpatient treatment to 

address mental health issues. Again, the respondent failed to follow through with 

recommendations and was unsuccessfully discharged from mental health services in July 

2019. Truax made additional referrals, and the respondent reengaged in mental health 

services, but the respondent remained guarded about his housing situation which prevented 

Truax from evaluating the respondent’s progress with respect to addressing toxic 

relationships, which was a significant element of the respondent’s past mental health 
22 

issues. Truax never rated the respondent as “satisfactory” with respect to addressing mental 

health issues. 

¶ 58 The service plan required the respondent to engage in anger management services, 

and Truax gave the respondent the option to address that task along with his mental health 

services. During the relevant period, the respondent never successfully engaged in anger 

management treatment, although he was provided the opportunity to do so. The 

respondent’s service plan required him to engage in parenting classes. Truax referred the 

respondent for such services, but the respondent failed to complete parenting classes during 

the relevant period. From the fall of 2019 through November 2019, the respondent resumed 

his relationship with Braxton’s mother, Amy, and during this time, the respondent stopped 

attending parenting classes and most of the other services required by the service plan as 

well. The respondent never successfully completed parenting education during the relevant 

period. 

¶ 59 The respondent knew that keeping Truax informed of his living arrangements was 

a crucial part of the service plan because Truax needed to know that the respondent’s home 

environment was appropriate and safe for Braxton. Truax explained that this was a crucial 

part of the service plan due to the respondent’s history of toxic relationships and 

aggression. Truax needed to monitor the respondent’s living situations, but the respondent 

prevented her from doing so by failing to provide her with sufficient information for her to 

conduct the necessary home checks. The respondent, therefore, prevented Truax from 

determining whether he was making safe decisions and prevented Truax from running 

background checks of anyone living with the respondent to ensure that Braxton would be 
23 

safe. Truax explained that the respondent’s failure to communicate about his living 

situation was an ongoing issue throughout the life of the case. With respect to the 

respondent’s employment, the respondent was inconsistent in showing that he was able to 

maintain stable employment, although the respondent knew that was a required task of his 

service plan. 

¶ 60 The circuit court had reviewed the service plan and found that the service plan’s 

required tasks were appropriate to address the safety concerns that were the barrier to the 

reunification of the respondent and Braxton. Truax believed, and the circuit court agreed, 

that the respondent was unfit due to his inconsistency for long periods of time with respect 

to completion of the service plan tasks.

¶ 61 As noted above, reasonable progress is an objective standard that focuses upon the 

amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken 

from the parent. In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17. In the present case, the 

respondent had over 17 months to complete his service plan tasks from the time Braxton 

was taken into DCFS’s care shortly after Braxton’s birth. The respondent had the 

opportunity to complete his plan tasks, but he failed to do so. Therefore, based on the record 

before us, we cannot conclude that the circuit court’s finding of unfitness, based on failure 

to make reasonable progress, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, 

we affirm the circuit court’s finding that the respondent was an unfit person as defined in 

section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act based on the respondent’s failure to make 

reasonable progress toward the return of Braxton during any nine-month period following 

the adjudication of neglect. 
24 

¶ 62 As noted above, the State must prove only one count of unfitness for the circuit 

court to find that the respondent was an unfit person. In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 564. 

Because we have affirmed the circuit court’s finding of unfitness pursuant to section 

1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act, we do not need to address the respondent’s argument that 

the circuit court’s finding of unfitness pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(i) of the Adoption Act 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 63 (b) Best Interest 

¶ 64 The respondent also argues that the State failed to prove that the termination of his 

parental rights was in Braxton’s best interests. “At the best-interest stage of termination 

proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination [of parental rights] is in the child’s best interest.” In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 

1063, 1071 (2009). The appellate court will reverse the circuit court’s best-interest 

determination only if it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. A best-interest 

determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly 

establish that the circuit court should have reached the opposite result. Id. 

¶ 65 At the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, “ ‘the parent’s interest in 

maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving 

home life.’ ” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959 (2005) (quoting In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at

364). The circuit court takes into consideration the best-interest factors in section 1-3(4.05) 

of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)). Specifically, pursuant to 

section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act, in determining the best interests of the child, 

the circuit court must consider the following statutory factors in the context of the child’s 
25 

age and developmental needs: (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the 

development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties; (4) the child’s 

sense of attachments, including where the child feels love, attachment, and a sense of being 

valued, the child’s sense of security, the child’s sense of familiarity, the continuity of 

affection for the child, and the least disruptive placement alternative for the child; (5) the 

child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for 

permanence, which includes a need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent 

figures, siblings, and other relatives; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the 

risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for 

the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020). The circuit court is not required to make 

specific findings of fact concerning the best-interests factors as long as there is some 

indication in the record that it considered the enumerated factors when making the bestinterests determination. In re Marriage of Stribling, 219 Ill. App. 3d 105, 107 (1991).

¶ 66 In the present case, after carefully reviewing the record and in light of the bestinterest factors that must be considered, we cannot reverse the circuit court’s determination 

to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. The circuit court heard the testimony 

regarding the bond between Braxton, Tracie, and Kenny. The circuit court also considered 

evidence that Braxton looks to Tracie and Kenny for his parental support and had done so 

since he was placed in their home shortly after his birth. Truax observed Braxton in Tracie 

and Kenny’s home and noted Tracie and Kenny’s commitment to Braxton’s safety and 

welfare as his parental figures. Their home was the only home Braxton ever lived in, and 

Tracie and Kenny expressed their desire to adopt Braxton. Tracie and Kenny were 
26 

committed to fostering Braxton’s relationship with his siblings and were supportive to 

whatever was in Braxton’s best interest. Truax told the court that she did not believe that 

it would be detrimental to Braxton’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental 

rights and believed that it was in Braxton’s best interest that he be made available for 

adoption. The court appointed guardian ad litem agreed with Truax’s recommendations 

and conclusions with respect to Braxton’s best interest. The guardian ad litem told the 

circuit court: “Children cannot wait for their parents to grow up and figure out what to do 

for them. Based on the information that we have today, Braxton’s best interests lie in the 

termination of the [respondent’s] rights so that Braxton can get on with his life ***.”

¶ 67 The record before us establishes that the circuit court’s finding that it was in 

Braxton’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the court’s judgment.

¶ 68 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 69 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 70 Affirmed.