FIFTH DIVISION                                                  March 14, 1997No. 1-95-1353THOMAS A. RUANE and                )KATHLEEN P. RUANE, formerly        )   Appeal from the  KATHLEEN P. DALEY,                 )   Circuit Court of                                          )   Cook County,                                   )   Second District.                                    )            Plaintiffs-Appellants,    )                                   )    v.                             )                                          )DENISE AMORE, ANNETTE S. SMITH,    )SUSAN E. PRICE, BAIRD & WARNER,    )   HonorableINC., RICHARD G. LARSEN and        )   Jerome Orbach,CURTIS EDLUND, doing business      )   Judge Presidingas LARSEN & EDLUND, ATTORNEYS      )AT LAW,                            )                                   )         Defendants-Appellees.     )     JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiffs, Thomas A. Ruane and Kathleen P. Ruane, filed afour-count second amended complaint against defendants, DeniseAmore, Annette S. Smith, Susan E. Price (sellers), Baird &Warner, Inc. (Baird & Warner), Richard G. Larsen and CurtisEdlund (Larsen & Edlund), alleging fraudulent misrepresentation.  Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motions to reopen discoveryand to disclose an expert witness, and the granting ofdefendants' motions for summary judgment.     On March 28, 1990, David A. Mohar (Mohar), entered into areal estate sales contract for the purchase of the residence fromthe sellers.  The listing broker for this transaction was Baird &Warner.  Attorneys, Larsen and Edlund represented the sellers inthe Mohar transaction.     In a letter dated June 12, 1990, to Larsen & Edlund fromMohar's attorney, Mohar claimed that a latent defect existed inthe southwestern rear portion of the foundation at the residenceand declined to complete the purchase.  Larsen & Edlund filed acomplaint against Mohar and Baird & Warner on behalf of thesellers for forfeiture of $14,200 earnest money deposited byMohar with Baird & Warner.      The sellers ordered an inspection of the south basement walland obtained a report dated July 16, 1990, from consultingstructural engineers, Rittweger & Tokay, Inc.  The reportconcluded that "the south wall of the building is structurallysound."  Thereafter, the residence was placed back on the marketfor sale.     On or about October 1, 1990, plaintiffs examined theresidence as prospective purchasers and noticed that there weretwo different colors of brick on the outside of the residence. In response to their questions regarding the brick, plaintiffswere given a copy of the Rittweger & Tokay, Inc. report by Baird& Warner.  After receiving the report and having their questionsregarding the brick answered to their satisfaction, plaintiffstook no further action to investigate the condition of the south basement wall.  Plaintiffs were not informed of the Mohar letterof June 12, 1990, or the pending Mohar litigation.      On November 7, 1990, Mohar filed his answer to the complaintfiled by the sellers for forfeiture of the $14,200 earnest money. Mohar's answer included two affirmative defenses.  The firstaffirmative defense alleged a mutual mistake of fact regardingthe existence of an alleged latent defect in the southwesternrear portion of the residence.  The second affirmative defensealleged fraud and misrepresentation with respect to statementsmade by the sellers, i.e., that the foundation cracking in thesouthwestern rear portion of the residence had been completelyremedied and appropriately repaired.      On November 13, 1990, the closing took place transferringthe title to and possession of the residence from sellers toplaintiffs.  At the closing, the sellers submitted an affidavitof title to plaintiffs that was notarized by Larsen & Edlund.     On November 19, 1991, the circuit court entered an order inthe Mohar action.  The circuit court denied Mohar's secondaffirmative defense alleging fraud and misrepresentation.  Thecircuit court granted Mohar's first affirmative defense alleginga mutual mistake of fact and entered judgment in favor of Moharand against the sellers.       Plaintiffs learned of the Mohar litigation when Thomas Ruanewas called as a witness in that lawsuit.  Thereafter, plaintiffsinstituted this action.        Through the course of discovery, plaintiffs were served withinterrogatories requesting disclosure of expert witnessespursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220 (134 Ill. 2d. R. 220 (Repealedeff. January 1, 1996)).  Plaintiffs responded by stating thatthey had not retained an expert to testify on their behalf.     On September 22, 1994, the circuit court entered an orderproviding that discovery would cut off on December 15, 1994, thata pretrial was set for December 22, 1994, and that the case wasset for trial on January 25, 1995.       During the pretrial, after discovery closed, plaintiffsmotioned to reopen discovery and to disclose an expert witness. The circuit court denied plaintiffs' motions.  Defendants filedsummary judgment motions to dismiss plaintiffs' second amendedcomplaint under section 2-1005(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 1994)).  Following a hearing on themotions, the circuit court of Cook County granted defendants'motions for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' secondamended complaint.  Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motionsto reopen discovery and to disclose an expert witness, and thegranting of defendants' motions for summary judgment.                                     OPINION     Plaintiffs have moved to supplement the record on appealwith a copy of the motion for disclosure of an expert witness. It is requested that this court permit the copy of the writtendisclosure to supplement the record in accordance with SupremeCourt Rule 329 (134 Ill. 2d R. 329).  This motion includes anexhibit of a proposal prepared by the plaintiffs' profferedexpert witness, E.L. Knight, Mason Contractor (Knight).         Rule 329 authorizes supplementation of the record only withdocuments that were actually before the circuit court, andexhibits that were never filed in the circuit court or consideredby the trial judge will not be considered on appeal.  Palmros v.Barcelona, 284 Ill. App. 3d 642, 672 N.E.2d 1245 (1996), citingProchnow v. El Paso Golf Club, Inc.,  253 Ill. App. 3d 387, 625N.E.2d 769 (1994).  A copy of plaintiffs' motion to disclose anexpert witness is already in the record.  In this respect, themotion is moot.  The attached exhibit of the proposal prepared byplaintiffs' proffered expert witness, Knight, was not before thecircuit court.  Since our review is limited to matters of record,the motion to supplement the record with this exhibit is denied.      Plaintiffs contend that the circuit court's denial of theirDecember 22, 1994, motions to reopen discovery and to disclose anexpert witness resulted in a manifest injustice and, therefore,was an abuse of discretion.  Baird & Warner and Larsen & Edlundcontend that plaintiffs have waived this issue because contraryto Supreme Court Rule 303 (134 Ill. 2d R. 303), plaintiffs didnot make reference to or include these orders in their notice ofappeal.     Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 provides that the notice ofappeal "shall specify the judgment or part thereof appealedtherefrom and the relief sought from the reviewing court."  134Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(2).  However, the notice of appeal is to beliberally construed as a whole.  Glassberg v. Warshawsky, 266Ill. App. 3d 585, 638 N.E.2d 749 (1994).  The purpose of a noticeof appeal is to inform the party prevailing in the trial courtthat the opposing party seeks review of the judgment; to thisend, where the notice sufficiently sets forth the judgmentcomplained of and the relief sought, mere formal defects will notdeprive this court of jurisdiction.  Taylor v. Peoples Gas Light& Coke Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d 655, 656 N.E.2d 134 (1995).  Anappeal from a final judgment draws into issue all prior non-finalorders which produced the final judgment.  Burtell v. FirstCharter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433, 394 N.E.2d 380, 382(1979).  Thus, an unspecified judgment is reviewable if it is a"step in the procedural progression leading to the judgmentspecified in the notice of appeal."  Taylor, 275 Ill. App. 3d655, 656 N.E.2d 134, citing Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435, 394N.E.2d at 383.       In the present case, plaintiffs specifically appealed fromthe order of March 15, 1995, granting motions for summaryjudgment as to all defendants.  The December 22, 1994, ordersdenying plaintiffs' motions to reopen discovery and to disclosean expert witness was a step in the procedural progressionculminating in the granting of the motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the notice of appeal fairly apprised defendants ofthe March 15, 1995, order appealed and was sufficient to conferjurisdiction over the December 22, 1994, orders.      In support of plaintiffs' contention that the denial of theDecember 22, 1994, motions was an abuse of the circuit court'sdiscretion, plaintiffs argue that in answering interrogatoriespropounded by defendants and during the deposition testimony ofThomas Ruane, Knight was disclosed by plaintiffs; that theprejudicial effect of the lack of expert testimony is great; thatplaintiffs did not act in bad faith and that since Knight had notbeen retained as an expert witness, his disclosure was notrequired to be divulged 60 days prior to the trial date.     Rule 220(b)(1) provides:            "Where the testimony of experts is reasonably          contemplated, the parties will act in good faith          to seasonably: (i) Ascertain the identity of such          witnesses, and (ii) obtain from them the opinions          upon which they may be requested to testify.  [A]s          to all expert witnesses not previously disclosed,          the trial court, on its own motion, or on the          motion of any party after the first pretrial          conference, shall enter an order scheduling the          dates upon which all expert witnesses, including          rebuttal, shall be disclosed.  [F]ailure to make          the disclosure required by this rule or to comply          with the discovery contemplated herein will result          in disqualification of the expert as a witness."          134 Ill. 2d R. 220(b)(1) (Repealed eff. January 1,          1996).     Initially, we note that a trial court is afforded greatlatitude in ruling on discovery matters.  Maxwell v. HobartCorp., 216 Ill. App. 3d 108, 576 N.E.2d 268 (1991).  The decisionas to whether to reopen discovery rests in the sound discretionof the circuit court and this court will not disturb such rulingson appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.  Cometo v.Foster McGaw Hospital, 167 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 522 N.E.2d 117(1988). Furthermore, the imposition of sanctions for thenoncompliance of discovery rules and court orders rests largelywithin the sound  discretion of the circuit court and will not bedisturbed on review absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Blott v. Hanson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 656, 670 N.E.2d 345 (1996). However, sanction orders are to be imposed only when thenoncompliance is unreasonable and the order entered is just.  Blott, 283 Ill. App. 3d 656, 670 N.E.2d 345.  In determiningwhether noncompliance is unreasonable, the standard is whetherthe offending party's conduct was the result of a deliberate andpronounced disregard for court rules.  Polk v. Cao, 279 Ill. App.3d 101, 664 N.E.2d 276 (1996).  In determining the propriety ofdiscovery sanction, factors to be considered include:  (1) thesurprise to the opposing party; (2) the prejudicial effect of thetestimony; (3) the diligence of the opposing party in seekingdiscovery; (4) timely objection to the testimony; and (5) thegood faith of the party offering the testimony.  Polk, 279 Ill.App. 3d 101, 664 N.E.2d 276.  While the circuit court may imposenecessary sanctions to accomplish discovery, it may not imposesanctions that are intended primarily as punishment.  Blott, 283Ill. App. 3d 656, 670 N.E.2d 345.       Once the trial court has imposed a sanction fornoncompliance with a discovery rule, the sanctioned party bearsthe burden of establishing that the noncompliance was reasonableor justified by extenuating circumstances or events.  H & H Sand& Gravel Haulers Co. v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 235,632 N.E.2d 697 (1994).  Rule 220 allows a court to set its owncutoff dates for the disclosure and discovery of an expert and tobar an expert whose disclosure does not comply with the court-setdeadlines.  Knight v. Haydary, 223 Ill. App. 3d 564, 585 N.E.2d243 (1992).  Here, the discovery cutoff date was set by courtorder September 22, 1994.  Through the course of discovery,plaintiffs were served with interrogatories requesting disclosureof expert witnesses pursuant to Rule 220.  However, plaintiffsdid not disclose Knight as an expert witness and responded thatthey had not retained an expert witness to testify on theirbehalf.       In addition, the prejudicial effect of the lack of Knight'stestimony was slight considering the testimony of an expert wasnot the determining factor in the circuit court's decision ingranting defendants' motions for summary judgment.  Thedetermining factor was that plaintiffs received a copy of theRittweger & Tokay report disclosing the condition of the southbasement wall, prior to plaintiffs purchasing the residence.     The question of whether a witness must be disclosed as anexpert under Rule 220 depends on the expert's relationship to thecase.  Wakeford v. Rodehouse Restaurants of Missouri, Inc., 154Ill. 2d 543, 610 N.E.2d 77 (1992).  If the expert is intimatelyinvolved in the underlying facts giving rise to the litigationand he would reasonably be expected to form an opinion throughthat involvement, then disclosure is not required.  In such acase, the opposing party is unlikely to be surprised by thetestimony.  On the other hand, where the expert's contact withthe case is slight, or where the opinion rendered is unrelated tothe expert's involvement in the case, then disclosure isrequired.  Wakeford, 154 Ill. 2d 543, 610 N.E.2d 77.     We find that because Knight's contact with the case wasslight, Knight was a "retained expert" under Rule 220 and hisdisclosure was required.  Rule 220, requiring disclosure ofexpert witnesses, was designed to eliminate late or surprisedisclosures of expert witnesses by establishing a uniform, butnot inflexible, framework for timely revelation of identity ofexpert witnesses and the subject matter of their testimony. Sohaey v. Van Cura, 240 Ill. App. 3d 266, 607 N.E.2d 253 (1992). Knight was one of several experts who examined the south basementwall at the residence.  Plaintiffs did not disclose whetherKnight, or one or more of the other experts who examined thesouth basement wall, would testify.       Furthermore, notwithstanding whether plaintiffs hadidentified Knight as an expert witness, plaintiffs failed tooffer what Knight's opinion was or what his testimony might be. A party may not resist a motion for summary judgment simply byidentifying potential trial witnesses and then failing todetermine what their opinions are or what their testimony mightbe.  Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill. 2d 287, 529 N.E.2d 552(1988).     Moreover, our supreme court, in Tzystuck v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 124 Ill. 2d 226, 529 N.E.2d 525 (1988), stated thatRule 220 obligates litigants to disclose the identity andopinions of those witnesses who are engaged for the purpose ofgiving an expert opinion at trial.  Therefore, plaintiffs seekingto call experts as witnesses are required to disclose them as"experts," even if plaintiffs did not "retain" them.  Neal v.Nimmagadda, 279 Ill. App. 3d 834, 665 N.E.2d 424 (1996).     Under these circumstances, plaintiffs have not establishedthat their noncompliance with Rule 220 was reasonable orjustified by extenuating circumstances.  Accordingly, the circuitcourt did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motionsto reopen discovery and to disclose an expert witness.          Plaintiffs next contend that a genuine issue of materialfact exists, therefore, the circuit court erred in grantingdefendants' motions for summary judgment.  In support of thiscontention, plaintiffs argue that the November 19, 1991, orderentered in the Mohar case is admissible to show the existence ofa latent defect; that Ruth Amore admitted the existence of adefect in the southwest part of the basement during herdeposition testimony and that Thomas Ruane testified as to theexistence of a defect at the residence during his depositiontestimony.     In Illinois, as a general rule, summary judgment is to beencouraged as an aid to the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit. Bryant v. Glen Oaks Medical Center, 272 Ill. App. 3d 640, 650N.E.2d 622 (1995).  Appellate review of an order granting summaryjudgment is de novo.  Nelson v. Thomas, 282 Ill. App. 3d 818, 668N.E.2d 1109 (1996).  Summary judgment is appropriate where thereis no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitledto judgment as a matter of law.  LaSalle National Bank v.Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 262 Ill. App. 3d 899, 635 N.E.2d 564(1994).  To determine if there is a genuine issue of materialfact, the court examines the pleadings, together with anydepositions admissions, or affidavits on file.  A reviewing courtviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant,and if no facts are in dispute, the court may draw inferences todetermine if respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.  If no fair-minded person could draw inferences from thesefacts, then there is no triable issue and the motion for summaryjudgment should be granted.  Nelson,  282 Ill. App. 3d 818, 668N.E.2d 1109; Estate of Dompke v. Dompke, 186 Ill. App. 3d 930,933, 542 N.E.2d 1222, 1223 (1989).  A reviewing court may sustainthe decision of the circuit court on any grounds called for bythe record, regardless of whether the circuit court made itsdecision on a proper ground. Bryant, 272 Ill. App. 3d 640, 650N.E.2d 622.    Plaintiffs' second amended complaint states asfollows:  In count I, plaintiffs allege that the sellerscommitted fraud in failing to disclose a prior lawsuit and alatent defect that existed at the residence purchased byplaintiffs from the sellers.  Plaintiffs allege that Baird &Warner committed fraud in failing to disclose the prior lawsuitand a latent defect that existed at the residence, and that infailing to disclose the prior lawsuit and this latent defect,they violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business PracticesAct (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1994)).  Plaintiffs also allegethat Larsen & Edlund committed fraud in failing to disclose theprior lawsuit and the latent defect that existed at theresidence.       Plaintiffs contend that the existence of an alleged latentdefect can be shown by the November 19, 1991, order entered inthe Mohar litigation.  Plaintiffs cite as authority 29A Am. Jur.2d Judgments � 1330 (1994), which provides:          "A judgment is generally admissible in evidence in          a subsequent action if it is relevant to an issue          in it.  [H]owever, a judgment is admissible only          to prove the fact that a judgment was rendered,          the time of its rendition, and the terms and          effect of the judgment.  The record of the case          may not be introduced for the purpose of providing          the  facts on which the judgment was based."           (Emphasis added.) 29A Am. Jur. 2d Judgments �1330          (1994).     This authority negates rather than promotes plaintiffs'proposition.  The November 19, 1991, judgment entered in theMohar litigation is admissible only for the limited purpose ofshowing that judgment was entered, the time it was entered andits terms and legal effect.  The judgment may not be introducedfor the purpose of providing facts on which the judgment wasbased.       In addition, notwithstanding the deposition testimony ofRuth Amore and Thomas Ruane as to the existence of a latentdefect, since neither qualify to formulate an expert opinionregarding whether such condition exists, the circuit court didnot err in determining that plaintiffs failed to raise facts tosustain defendants' motions for summary judgment. When the natureof the defect and, its existence is beyond the jury's commonunderstanding and experience, expert testimony is necessary toestablish a defect.  Baltus v. Weaver Division of Kidde & Co.,199 Ill. App. 3d 821, 557 N.E.2d 580 (1990).       In the present case, plaintiffs allege that "the foundationand structure of the residence was defective" and "the defectivepart of the structure was unstable and in danger of collapse." In determining whether conditions exist as alleged by plaintiffs,specialized knowledge or expertise in structural engineering,outside a jury's common understanding and experience, isrequired.  Without expert testimony as to the condition of thefoundation and str