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Subject: Agreed Portion ot Brier for Approach to the French 

on Communications Security by US and UK Ambassadors. 

1. The briers tor the US and UK Ambassadors shall 

both include the following 1temst 

PL B6=36/so use 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

(a) The Report or the BRUSA Conference on the 

Communications Security ot NATO countries, 

held in June J.953. 

(b) The a.1de-memo1re prepared tor the approach 

to the French by the Combined Working Group. 

(c) Paragraphs 5 and 6 of USCIB paper 29.1/1 - attached as Appendix A to this memorandum. 

(d) Instructions on how to respond in the event 

the French bring up the de Vosjol1 approach 

on cipher machines at the meeting with the 

ambassadors - attached as Appendix B to this 

memorandum. 

2. The briefs may also include whatever additional 

matters are considered necessary for the individual ambaasadors 3 

as determined I'espeotively by the Foreign Office and the 

Depa.:t•tment of State . 

'!OP SBGRiii'! PRO!!J 

SBEftlfllft Dfl'E>RMH'!E>If 

·1 U~ 8EGRtI FROTH 

SECURITY INF9RM4J!qN 

23 J. 79 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-26-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
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tu~on · 

2 December 1953 

AIDE-~OIRE FOR THE FRENCH 

l. The US and UK Governments have reaohed the 

conclusion that the national communications practices 

ot many NATO governments may be suoh as to create a 

potential source or highly valuable information to the 

USSR. The US and UK Governments also are of the opinion 

that the French Government may have reached a somewhat; 

similar oonolusion independently. The US and UK Governments 

believe that the security of NATO as a whole depends on 

the security ot each individual member government and,, 

consequently, that it is ·in the common interest to take 

action immediately to review the national communications 

practices of all NATO governments. 

2. The problem is twofold,, involving not only the. 

security of ciphers but also the security or transmisEiion 

practices. It is important to emphasize that technical 

experts have proven again and again that the enemy can 

obtain ~nportant information from the external appear2'.nce 

or messages, from the study or organization and procedures 

or wireless networks, from wireless d1rect1on-t1nd1ng, 

from a study of messages sent in plain language and fX"om a 

variety or other observations not related at all to the 

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complexity or simplicity ot given ciphers, but rather to 

the manner 1n which even the most secure ciphers are 

handled. Therefore, even if all NATO government ciphers 

and equipment were theoretically unbreakable, the 

protection attorded by this tact could be lost through 

improper procedures; and.mere cip~r security is useless 

it it is not complemented by transmission security. 

3. The US and UK Governments together believe that 

it is essential tor the US, France and the UK to assure 

themselves that their own standards are the best currently 

attainable it steps are to be taken with respect to the 

communications security practices of the other member 

governments ot NATO. The UK and US Governments are 

conscious or a number of weaknesses in their own national 

canmunications practices. The French Government may also 

have noted similar weaknesses 1n their own practices. The 

Governments ot the US and UK propose, therefore~ that 

technical discussions among the communications ·security 

experts of the three Standing Group powers be held forthwith 

with the object not only of ensuring that the national 

conanunications practices or the three powers are of a level 

that is mutually agreed to be satisfactory but also af, an 
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indispensable step in the development of similar standards 

for their colleagues in NATO. 

4. If the French Government agrees to this proposal, 

the US and UK Governments will designate respectively 

one or their representatives on the Tripartite Security 

Working Group who has previously participated 1n the work 

of that Group to make the necessary arrangements in their 

behalf for the conduct of such discussions; and they suggest 

that the French Goverrunent similarly designate one of 

its experienced members or the Tripartite Security Working 

Group to join his US and UK colleagues in making these 

arrangements. These arrangements would include the 

selection of the technical personnel, the location for the 

discussions and the establishment of proper conditions 

of security. This procedure takes advantage ot an existing 

and very successful liaison channel in the field of security; 

an~ for added privacy it is proposed further. that the 

necessary arrangements be worked out by our representatives 

without adding this matter to the tormal terms of reference 

of the Tr1partitie Security Working Group and without making 

it subject to plenary ooneideration by that body. 
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5. It is the view of the US and UK Governments that 

the problem ot the commun1cat1ons security practices or the 

remaining NATO governments should then be handled through 

the Standing Group 1n somewhat the aalile manner as -- and as 

an extension to -- the previous activities of this Group 

in establishing the communications security practices 

or NATO. It is realized that the Standing Group was created 

to issue directives only on the military affairs of NATO. 

It is lmown., however, that some NATO governments currently 

desire advice on their commun1oat1ons security problems; 

the Govermnents of Belgium and Italy already have written 

to the Stand.ing Group on the subject. It seems p110per, 

therefore, to use the Standing Group, which is conveniently 

available, in an advisory capaoity on a matter which 

ultimately does i~late to the security of NATO. 

6. On the assumption that the French Government 

agrees to the techn:tcal discussion as arranged by the 

Tripartite Security Working_Qroup. representatives, it is 

further invited to agree that, shortly after these 

d.lscusaions have been initiated, the Standing Group will 

issue a memorandum to all member governments of NATO 

which wills 

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(a) Re-emphasize that the security ot NATO as 

a whole depends upon the security of each 

individual nation and that, consequently, 

secure national connunications practices 

form a vital part ot NATO security. 

(b) Contain a prel1mina1~y list ot examples ot 

d.8.ngerous cryptographic and transmission 

practices and procedures. 

{c) Request each government to examine this 

11.at to ensure that its own communicationa a.re free from such practices and 

procedures and invite additions to or 

comme11ta on this list. 

(d) Requeat each NATO government to desigriate 

or establish communications security 

agencies and to authorize those agencies 

to cormuunicate directly with the Standing 

Group Communicationa Security and Evaluation Agency, Washington (SECAN) and the 

European Security and Evaluation Agency 

of the Standing Group (EU~. ~ 

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(e) Invite any government that desires advice 

and technical assistance 1n auoh matters 

to applJ'~ 1n the first instance, through 

their national communications securit~ 

agencies direotl1 to SEOAN. Subsequent 

discussions or correspondence might be 

conducted, it more convenient, w1·th EUSEC. 

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