IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Punxsutawney Area School District :

 :

 :

v. : No. 1209 C.D. 2018

 : Argued: October 3, 2019

Broadwing Timber, LLC, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: October 29, 2019

Broadwing Timber, LLC (Broadwing) appeals from the Order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Jefferson County (common pleas) that granted the tax 

assessment appeal of the Punxsutawney Area School District (District) and 

directed the reassessment of Broadwing’s properties in accordance with the 

District’s appraisal evidence. On appeal, Broadwing argues the District’s process 

of deciding which properties’ tax assessments to appeal violates the Uniformity 

Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution1 and the Supreme Court’s recent decision 

in Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area School District, 

163 A.3d 962, 969 (Pa. 2017). Broadwing asserts that, in contravention of Valley 

 

1

“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits 

of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” PA. 

CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
2

Forge, the District has no formal policy or defined criteria for evaluating what 

properties to appeal and the ad hoc, arbitrary method the District has been using 

results in appeals only of commercial and/or commercially-operated properties. 

This, Broadwing maintains, creates an impermissible sub-classification of 

properties. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Broadwing’s Property and District’s Initial Tax Assessment Appeal

Broadwing owns 18 parcels, totaling 2596.587 acres of land (collectively, 

Property), which are situated entirely in Jefferson County (County) and the 

District.

2

 The Property is used as an investment for Broadwing’s investors, which 

are pension plans. Timberland Investment Resources (Timberland) oversees, on 

Broadwing’s behalf, the planting and harvesting of timber on the Property, and 

leases the Property for recreational and hunting purposes. The District filed an 

appeal of the tax assessment of the Property, asserting the Property was 

underassessed. At the time of the District’s appeal, the Property’s combined 

assessed value was $218,620. (Reproduced Record (R.R) at 287a.) After a 

hearing, the Jefferson County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) issued a 

decision indicating there would be no change to the Property’s assessment. (Id. at 

12a.) On November 10, 2016, the District appealed the Board’s decision.

 

2 The Property is also partially located in Winslow Township, Henderson Township, and 

McCalmont Township. Winslow Township is not participating in this appeal, and McCalmont 

Township is precluded from participating due to its failure to file a brief. Henderson Township 

and the County join in the District’s brief.
3

B. Proceedings Before Common Pleas 

After a lengthy procedural history not relevant to the disposition of the 

issues before the Court, the District’s case moved forward after the Supreme Court 

decided Valley Forge. In Valley Forge, our Supreme Court held that tax 

assessment appeals that deliberately target only commercial properties create an 

impermissible subclass of taxpayers or properties, resulting in an unconstitutional 

non-uniformity of taxes. 163 A.3d at 975. Relying on Valley Forge, Broadwing 

asserted the District “was seeking reassessment based on a policy or practice that 

violated the Uniformity Clause.” (Common Pleas’ Opinion (Op.), Aug. 2, 2018, at 

1.) 

Common pleas held a bench trial, at which the District presented 

documentary evidence and the testimony of Susan Robertson, its business 

administrator and the secretary of the District’s School Board (Business 

Administrator), and Richard J. Drzewiecki, a certified real estate appraiser

(Appraiser). Broadwing presented documentary evidence and the testimony of 

Timberland’s director of real estate, and cross-examined Business Administrator.

Appraiser testified as to the methods he used to determine the Property’s 

value. Based on his review, Appraiser opined the Property should be assessed at 

$1309 per acre, for a total assessment of $3.4 million. Broadwing did not crossexamine Appraiser or offer evidence to rebut his expert opinion. 

Business Administrator testified as follows. She has held her position since 

2007, and she is responsible for all of the District’s financial concerns. (R.R. at 

76a-77a.) As part of her duties, she receives checks from the County on a monthly 

basis for the District’s portion of realty transfer taxes paid for that month. (Id. at 

79a.) Business Administrator also receives a “check detail” listing the individual 
4

transfers, which she reviews shortly after receipt. (Id. at 78a.) Due to the fact that 

most transfers of property within the District result in realty transfer tax revenue of 

less than $1000, she notices when there is an amount larger than the norm. (Id. at 

79a-80a.)

Using this process, Business Administrator noticed a realty transfer tax 

payment in the amount of $25,375.43 in November 2014 from the sale of a

property to Continuum Properties, LLC. (Id. at 80a.) Without considering the type 

of property involved or who the owner of the property was, she performed 

calculations, set forth in a spreadsheet, to determine what potential increase in 

revenue could be realized from the reassessment of this property, the sale price of 

which she calculated to be around $5 million. (Id. at 80a-82a.) Business 

Administrator then presented her work to the District’s superintendent and 

solicitor. (Id. at 81a-82a.) After review, the three of them agreed that the 

monetary benefit of the potential tax increase outweighed the likely costs of the tax 

assessment appeal. (Id.) The issue was presented to the School Board for its 

approval of the District’s filing a tax assessment appeal. Following discussion on 

this potential appeal and other potential appeals at School Board meetings, the 

School Board ultimately approved the retention of outside counsel to prosecute 

such appeals. 

Business Administrator testified that, after her discovery of this

underassessment, she questioned whether other properties within the District might 

be underassessed. In doing so, she remembered that the local Walmart had been 

tax exempt at the time of its last assessment and that the tax exemption had since 

expired, making the property a potential source of increased tax revenue. (Id. at 

83a-84a.) As before, Business Administrator and the District’s superintendent and 
5

solicitor performed the same type of review and concluded that the potential 

increase in revenue would outweigh the costs of proceeding with an appeal. (Id. at 

84a.) 

Business Administrator testified that, in 2016, she became aware of the sale 

of the Property to Broadwing via her review of the realty transfer tax materials 

received from the County. (Id. at 93a.) Using the same method as before, and 

without inquiring into the Property’s zoning, ownership, or type, Business 

Administrator calculated the estimated sale price of the Property as being more 

than $6.7 million using the amount of the realty transfer tax, $33,596.56. (Id. at 

93a-95a.) After comparing the sale price to the Property’s assessed value, she 

believed the Property was underassessed and presented her calculations to the 

District’s superintendent and solicitor. (Id. at 94a.) After they concluded that the 

increase in tax revenue outweighed the cost of an appeal, the matter was presented 

to the School Board, which approved the appeal. (Id.)

Business Administrator explained that other properties came to her attention

using this process, one that sold for over $600,000, and a second that generated a 

realty transfer tax of $11,854.42, which she presented to the District’s 

superintendent and solicitor. (Id. at 86a-91a, 401a, 405a.) After subsequent 

review, she testified, no appeals were filed because, in the first instance, only a 

small portion of the property was located within the District, and in the second, the 

property had been sold to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and would, 

therefore, be tax exempt. (Id. at 88a-91a.) Business Administrator stated she did 

not pay attention to the ownership or zoning information of any property, focusing 

solely on the sale price to initiate her inquiry into whether a potential assessment 

appeal should be filed. (Id. at 86a-87a.) 
6

On cross-examination, Business Administrator indicated she did not use a

specific monetary threshold, but looked at the amount of realty transfer tax 

initially. (Id. at 107a-08a.) She explained the decision to file a tax assessment 

appeal was “strictly based on possibility of revenue versus the expense of 

appealing it” and was “purely a financial decision.” (Id. at 102a-03a, 127a.) 

Business Manager agreed the District had no written policy establishing when it 

would pursue an assessment appeal, but stated it was the District’s practice to 

consider the matters as she, the superintendent, and the solicitor had done over the 

years. (Id. at 112a-13a, 115a, 139a-40a.) She testified regarding the 

“amalgamation of factors”3the District uses to determine whether to appeal a tax 

 

3

In its answer to interrogatories from Broadwing requesting any written materials 

regarding the District’s practice or policy in deciding what assessments to appeal, the District 

stated:

[T]he District neither has nor had a formal policy or practice in place during the 

time frame referenced. Rather, pursuant to [Section 8855 of the Consolidated 

County Assessment Law,] 53 Pa. C.S.[] § 8855[,] and corresponding case law, the 

District chose to challenge the assessment value(s) of the [Property] . . . based 

upon a perception that [it was] under[]assessed. Considered in that decision were 

an amalgamation of factors, including:

a. the initial assessment value for the tax year at issue;

b. varied evidence of market value suggesting that the properties were 

under[]assessed;

c. the potential financial costs of challenging the assessment value for the tax 

year at issue; and

d. the potential tax revenue resulting from said appeal should the assessment 

value be raised to coincide with market value.

At no time did or does the District consider the zoning or classification of the 

property . . . , the ownership of the property . . . , or the locality of said ownership 

. . . .

(R.R. at 243a.)
7

assessment, reiterating her process for deciding what to present to the District’s 

superintendent and solicitor. (Id. at 116a-22a.) The following exchange also took 

place:

Q Would it be fair to say . . . that you’ve never recommend[ed] to 

the [D]istrict that the [D]istrict file one of these appeals for a 

residential property?

A I haven’t seen a realty transfer tax that would need that 

discussion.

Q So is it fair to say that you never recommend that they pursue 

one of these appeals for a residential property?

A Not yet, no.

Q Okay. Is it fair to say that under the amalgamation of factors 

that you’re looking at, it’s highly unlikely that you’re going to 

recommend that the [D]istrict pursue a residential appeal from 

one of these matters?

A It could happen if a residential property transferred at a high 

enough sale to provide that type of realty transfer tax.

Q Based on your knowledge of this school district, do you think 

that’s going to happen?

A There are a few properties it could happen [sic], yes.

Q Okay. What are those properties?

A I don’t know. I know there’s just a few residential properties 

that could sell for a large sum of money.

Q Well, you said there are a few. Presumably, you had some in 

mind. What are they?

. . . 

A General properties that you hear of what people have built. I 

mean, you know some of the larger names in the community 

that would have properties of that value.
8

(Id. at 109a-11a.)

In addition to cross-examining Business Administrator, Broadwing 

introduced minutes from School Board meetings, which revealed that, at an April 

2015 meeting, the School Board granted the District’s “administration” with 

“ongoing discretion to determine which appeals to pursue, the prosecution of the 

appeals, and the expenditures . . . needed in the appeals.” (Id. at 236a.) When 

questioned about this direct authorization, Business Administrator testified that, 

notwithstanding this authorization, specific approval from the School Board was 

always obtained prior to moving forward with any tax assessment appeal.4 (Id. at 

136a-37a.)

C. Common Pleas’ Opinions

Reviewing the evidence before it and the Supreme Court’s decision in Valley 

Forge, common pleas held the District’s practice for deciding what properties to 

appeal, as credibly described by Business Administrator, did not violate the 

Uniformity Clause. Common pleas explained Valley Forge clarified that “a taxing 

authority is not permitted to implement a program of only appealing the 

assessments of one sub-classification of properties, where that sub-classification is 

drawn according to property type,” whether commercial, apartment complex, 

single-family residential, industrial, or otherwise. (Common Pleas’ Op. at 4 

(quoting Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 978).) Citing Valley Forge’s statement that 

nothing therein was to “‘be construed as suggesting the use of a monetary 

 

4 Broadwing also presented the testimony of Timberland’s director of real estate to 

describe: the relationship between Timberland and Broadwing; how Broadwing owns the 

Property as an investment for its owners, which are pension plans; the timbering that is taking 

place on the Property; and the lease of the Property for recreational and hunting purposes. (R.R. 

at 153a-55a.)
9

threshold . . . or some other selection criteria would violate uniformity if it were

[sic] implemented without regard to the type of property in question or the 

residency of the owner,’” common pleas concluded the District’s practice did “not 

run afoul of th[e]se dictates.” (Id. at 5 (quoting Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 979).) 

Applying these principles, common pleas rejected Broadwing’s more expansive 

reading of Valley Forge within the context of the District’s practice. (Id. at 4.)

Common pleas held that Business Administrator “initiates all tax assessment 

appeals by highlighting atypically lucrative property sales,” without consideration 

of the type or ownership of property being sold, and presents those financial 

findings to the School District’s superintendent and solicitor. (Id.) According to 

common pleas, Business Administrator looked only for a sales price that could 

indicate an underassessed property and a potential increase in tax revenue for the 

District. Common pleas recognized that, due to the rural and less affluent nature of 

the District, this process had resulted in appeals related only to commercial or 

commercially-used properties. (Id.) Common pleas held, however, that this 

month-by-month, “numbers only” practice of determining whether a “‘qualifying’ 

property sale” occurs was “neither designed nor intended to treat one subclassification different from any other” and did “not favor or discriminate against 

any particular group of properties.” (Id. at 5-6.) Common pleas found that the 

credibility of Business Administrator’s testimony that the practice “was blind to all 

but the potential tax revenue suggested by a high sales price,” was bolstered by the 

non-appeal of two properties, whose real estate transfer tax triggered her review, 

but which, upon further review, would not provide a sufficient (or any) increase in 

tax revenue to justify the filing of a tax appeal. (Id. at 6.) Thus, common pleas 

held, Broadwing had not presented a sustainable challenge based on Valley Forge. 
10

Without a successful challenge based on Valley Forge, and with Broadwing not 

challenging the “credible and realistic” appraisal of the District’s Appraiser, 

common pleas granted the District’s appeal and adopted Appraiser’s valuation of 

the Property. (Id.; Common Pleas Order.) 

Broadwing appealed, and common pleas directed it to file a Concise 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which it did. Therein, 

Broadwing asserted common pleas erred in holding that the District’s practice does 

not run afoul of Valley Forge and that the practice used results in disparate impact 

on commercial properties. Common pleas issued its opinion in accordance with 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), relying on its prior opinion to 

respond to Broadwing’s first allegation of error. As to the disparate impact claim, 

common pleas observed that this concept “has not been given broad application 

outside the civil rights context” and that Valley Forge gave “no indication that it 

meant to expand its scope to encompass tax assessment appeals.” (Common Pleas 

1925(a) Op. at 1.) Common pleas explained its “duty [was] to apply Valley Forge

to the operative facts, not to speculate that the Justices would have extended the 

reach of ‘disparate impact’ had the issue before [that court] been formulated 

differently.” (Id.) Broadwing’s appeal is now ready for disposition.

5

 

5

 This Court’s review of common pleas’ decision in a property tax assessment appeal is 

limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of 

law, or made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence. Maula v. Northampton Cty. 

Div. of Assessment, 149 A.3d 442, 444 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
11

II. Arguments on Appeal

A. Broadwing’s Arguments

Broadwing argues that in order to establish a violation of the Uniformity 

Clause, it must show that the District’s enactment “results in some form of 

classification” and that the District’s “classification is unreasonable and not 

rationally related to any legitimate state purpose.” (Broadwing’s Brief (Br.) at 14 

(quoting Clifton v. Allegheny County, 969 A.2d 1197, 1211 (Pa. 2009)).) 

According to Broadwing, the District’s practice creates two unlawful 

classifications. First, the District’s use of recent sales prices creates a classification 

for properties that have recently sold and removes those properties from “uniform 

treatment.” (Id. at 15.) Second, the District creates a classification between 

commercial and residential properties because, due to the lack of formal tax 

assessment appeal policy, the determination of what appeal to bring is left to 

Business Administrator, who has brought only appeals of commercial or 

commercially-used properties, and who, according to Broadwing, “concede[d] that 

she will likely never instruct the District to proceed against a residential property.” 

(Id. at 16.) As for the reasonableness of the District’s policy, Broadwing argues 

the practice used by Business Administrator, and by extension the District, to 

determine which property to appeal is arbitrary. That practice, it asserts, does not 

use any set criteria or an established monetary threshold to determine what to 

appeal, it merely relies on Business Administrator’s review of the realty transfer 

tax materials for values that stand out as unusually high. Broadwing contends this 

unstructured process is insufficient to support the District’s arguments that its 

practice complies with the Uniformity Clause.
12

Broadwing also argues that the effect of the District’s sales-based practice 

effectively creates an impermissible sub-classification under Valley Forge. It 

asserts the District, like the school district in Valley Forge, “has systematically 

filed sales-based tax assessment appeals directed only at commercial properties” or 

those in commercial use. (Id. at 25.) According to Broadwing, common pleas 

erred in relying on the lack of formal policy and the fact that the filing of appeals 

only to commercial properties occurred by happenstance to hold that the District’s 

practice does not violate uniformity principles and Valley Forge. Recognizing that 

there has been no direction that appeals only be filed for commercial properties, 

Broadwing maintains the de facto effect of the practice results in the District 

appealing only a sub-classification of properties. If this practice is allowed to 

continue, Broadwing argues, Valley Forge would be rendered meaningless. (Id. at 

26.) As for the District’s attempts to save its practice by connecting it to the 

monetary value, rather than the type, of property, Broadwing notes that Business 

Administrator explained she does not use a specific monetary threshold and, even 

if she had, Broadwing argues it would merely be a disguised attempt at subclassification.

B. District’s Arguments

The District responds by asserting common pleas correctly dismissed 

Broadwing’s uniformity challenge because it maintains a consistent, systematic 

review and selection of properties for tax assessment appeal that does not rely on 

the properties’ type or ownership. First, the District disputes Broadwing’s 

characterization of Business Administrator’s testimony as having conceded that 

she would not ever recommend the appeal of a residential property. (District’s Br. 

at 12-13.) Business Administrator’s testimony, the District argues, was clear that, 
13

although she did not examine the type of property sold when she reviewed the 

realty transfer tax information, if a residential property generated a high realty 

transfer tax, she would recommend an appeal thereof. Second, the District argues 

its practice for selecting properties to appeal is consistent with Valley Forge, which 

must be interpreted within that case’s factual posture of having been decided on a 

demurrer, because its evidence established its “blind monetary analysis [was] 

systematically and consistently applied . . . with the sole purpose of maximizing 

revenue with the minimal amount of expenditure.” (Id. at 15.) The District argues 

that, like the school district in In re Springfield School District, 101 A.3d 835 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014), it pursues only those appeals where, after an analysis performed by 

Business Administrator, superintendent, and solicitor, and approved by the School 

Board, “the potential tax revenue increase merits the estimated cost of pursuit.” 

(Id. at 15.) According to the District, only a financial analysis is made and there is 

no inquiry as to a property’s type or ownership. Such process, the District argues,

is the type approved by Valley Forge.

It further asserts its selection of properties to appeal is consistent with its 

right to appeal property assessments under Section 8855 of the Consolidated 

County Assessment Law. The right to pursue such appeals, the District argues, can 

be asserted following the sale of a property within its jurisdiction, although no 

triggering event is required. Vees v. Carbon Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 867 

A.2d 742, 748-49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Erie Cty. Bd. of 

Assessments, 737 A.2d 335, 338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). The District also argues that 

Broadwing’s “as-applied” challenge to the District’s practice, i.e., that the practice 
14

results in appeals only of commercial or commercially-used properties, is waived 

for failing to raise that issue before common pleas.6

C. Broadwing’s Reply Brief

Broadwing responds, reiterating its position that the District has no policy in 

place to determine what properties’ assessments to appeal but makes such 

determinations on an ad hoc basis. It maintains the District’s reliance on Valley 

Forge’s approval of a neutral selection criteria, such as one based on a monetary 

threshold, is misplaced because the District’s practice contains neither a set 

monetary threshold nor some other selection criteria that is implemented without 

regard of a property’s type or ownership. As there is no established policy, 

Broadwing argues, the District’s ad hoc practice is not saved by these provisions. 

As for the District’s waiver argument, Broadwing asserts it has raised the issue of 

the District’s practice violating the Uniformity Clause since the beginning of the 

litigation so it is not waived.7

 

6 The District also asserts Broadwing did not meet its burden of proof of presenting

evidence of the market or assessed value of any other property in the taxing district, as required 

by Fosko v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 646 A.2d 1275, 1279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Common 

pleas rejected this argument, noting that Fosko involved a taxpayer’s challenge to uniformity 

within a sub-classification, not between sub-classifications, which is the issue here and addressed 

in Valley Forge. (Common Pleas’ Op. at 6 n.2.) We agree with common pleas that Fosko is 

inapplicable.

7 By Order dated September 5, 2019, this Court granted the District’s request to file a 

surreply brief and permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the applicability, or 

not, of this Court’s recent opinions in School District of Philadelphia v. Board of Revision of 

Taxes, __ A.3d __ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1493 C.D. 2017, filed August 22, 2019), and Martel v. 

Allegheny County, __ A.3d __ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 568 C.D. 2018, filed August 14, 2019). The 

District argues, in its supplemental brief, that, in School District of Philadelphia and Martel, this 

Court disavowed the type of broad reading of Valley Forge asserted by Broadwing here. In 

School District of Philadelphia, it maintains, this Court referred to Valley Forge as having 

“explained [that] the ‘use of a monetary threshold’ may be constitutional ‘if it were [sic]

implemented without regard to the type of property or residency status of its owner.’” 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
15

III. Discussion

The Uniformity Clause provides that “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the 

same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, 

_____________________________

(continued...)

(District’s Suppl. Br. at 1 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Phila., __ A.3d at __, slip op. at 13) (emphasis 

added by the District).) The District then points to the Court’s statement in Martel that the 

Supreme Court in Valley Forge “expressly limited its holding to the conclusion that the 

assessment appeal policy at issue violated the uniformity clause where it classified 

properties by type and/or residency status of their owners.” (Id. (quoting Martel, __ A.3d at 

__, slip op. at 17 n.17) (emphasis added by the District).) In these, and other passages, the 

District maintains, this Court affirmed a taxing authority’s right to appeal where its decision to 

appeal is based on the use of a financial threshold, or other criteria, which is implemented 

without consideration of the property’s type or ownership. This is the type of practice used by 

the District here.

Broadwing argues, in its supplemental brief, that Valley Forge does not form the “crux” 

of its argument; rather, its argument rests on the lack of any policy governing the District’s salebased tax appeals process beyond allowing Business Administrator to “think up properties that 

might be worth pursuing . . . .” (Broadwing’s Suppl. Br. at 1.) Valley Forge, Broadwing asserts, 

merely helps explain why this policy, or lack thereof, violates the Uniformity Clause. Moreover, 

neither School District of Philadelphia nor Martel actually examined the implications of Valley 

Forge but were resolved on procedural grounds, and, therefore, neither impact this appeal, 

according to Broadwing. 

A review of those cases reveals, however, that while the underlying trial court opinions 

addressed uniformity and the applicability of Valley Forge, this Court’s opinions did not address 

the merits of those issues. In Martel, this Court did not consider the uniformity challenge 

addressed by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County instead concluding that the 

preliminary objections in that case were properly sustained because the taxpayers had an 

adequate statutory remedy that had not been exhausted. __ A.3d at __, slip op. at 13-15, 17 n.17. 

In School District of Philadelphia, uniformity and Valley Forge were at issue, and the Court did 

discuss Valley Forge. However, because that challenge involved disputed issues of fact and 

there was no evidentiary record created, we vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing and 

for the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to make findings of fact regarding the 

school district’s assessment appeal selection process upon which it could then decide the 

taxpayers’ motions to quash the school district’s appeals. Sch. Dist. of Phila., __ A.3d at __, slip 

op. at 14-15. This Court did not resolve any legal issue regarding the application of Valley 

Forge other than concluding the need for evidence of a taxing authority’s assessment appeals 

policy where the parameters of that policy are disputed. Id. Therefore, this Court’s opinions are 

of limited, if any, value in resolving the issue before the Court.
16

and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 

This provision ensures that “a taxpayer should pay no more or no less than [the 

taxpayer’s] proportionate share of the cost of government.” In re Sullivan, 37 A.3d 

1250, 1254-55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Deitch Co. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment 

Appeals & Review of Allegheny Cty., 209 A.2d 397, 401 (Pa. 1965)). All real 

property within a taxing district “is a single class.” Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 975. 

“[T]he Uniformity Clause does not permit the government, including taxing 

authorities, to treat different property sub-classifications in a disparate manner.” 

Id. 

Section 8855 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, states, in 

relevant part, that “[a] taxing district shall have the right to appeal any assessment 

within its jurisdiction in the same manner, subject to the same procedure and with 

like effect as if the appeal were [sic] taken by a taxable person with respect to the 

assessment . . . .” 53 Pa. C.S. § 8855. When a taxing authority exercises this 

discretionary power, however, it must do so within “constitutional boundaries.” 

Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 980. Those constitutional boundaries are violated if a 

taxing authority has a policy to appeal only “the assessments of one subclassification of properties, where that sub-classification is drawn according to 

property type.” Id. at 978. 

In Valley Forge, the taxpayers, owners of commercial properties, challenged 

a school district’s policy to appeal the tax assessments of those commercial

properties while not appealing underassessed, single-family homes within the 

school district. The taxpayers alleged that the school district deliberately targeted 

commercial properties to appeal and avoided appealing the assessments of singlefamily residential properties for political purposes. Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 968-
17

69. Alleging that such policy violated the Uniformity Clause, the taxpayers sought 

to enjoin its use. After the local court of common pleas dismissed the taxpayers’ 

claims on demurrers, which this Court affirmed, our Supreme Court reversed. In 

doing so, it held

a taxing authority is not permitted to implement a program of only 

appealing the assessments of one sub-classification of properties, 

where that sub-classification is drawn according to property type –

that is, its use as commercial, apartment complex, single-family 

residential, industrial, or the like.

Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 978. Further, the Court concluded, the “systematic 

disparate enforcement of the tax laws based on property sub-classification, even 

absent wrongful conduct, is constitutionally prohibited.” Id. The Supreme Court 

cautioned, however, that its holding should not be construed as not permitting a 

neutral selection criterion, such as a monetary threshold, so long as the criterion 

was “implemented without regard to the type of property in question or the 

residency status of its owner.” Id. at 979. Accepting the allegations set forth in the

Valley Forge taxpayers’ complaint as true, because of the procedural posture of the 

case, the Supreme Court concluded the taxpayers had stated a valid claim under the 

Uniformity Clause and remanded for further proceedings.

Broadwing argues the District’s practice violates the Uniformity Clause

because the District has no formal or written policy establishing specific criteria or 

a specific monetary threshold, which results in the District’s practice being

arbitrary and impermissibly creating a sub-classification per Business 

Administrator’s concessions regarding residential properties. Broadwing 

maintains this arbitrary and unconstitutional practice is not saved by Valley 
18

Forge’s language approving the use of neutral selection criteria.8 After reviewing 

Valley Forge and the evidence credited by common pleas, we disagree that the 

District’s practice, while not formally memorialized, violates the Uniformity 

Clause.

We begin with Broadwing’s arguments that due to the lack of a formalized 

or written policy and/or specific criteria or a set monetary threshold, the District’s 

practice is arbitrary. We do not read Valley Forge as requiring a formal or written 

policy or criteria. All Valley Forge requires is that the “other selection criteria” 

used by a taxing authority, whether a monetary threshold or other methodology, be

“implemented without regard to the type of property in question or the residency 

status of its owner.” 163 A.3d at 979. Thus, the lack of such formal or written 

policy does not warrant reversal.

As for Broadwing’s contentions that the District’s practice is without any 

criteria and is arbitrary, the credited evidence of that practice establishes otherwise. 

This is not a situation, as in Valley Forge, where the taxpayer’s allegations 

regarding a taxing authority’s motive and policy had to be accepted due to the 

stage of the litigation. Rather, Business Administrator credibly testified regarding 

the financial analysis she performs in order to decide what properties, if any, in a 

given month she will present to the District’s superintendent and solicitor, as

possible underassessed properties. Although no triggering event is required for a 

taxing authority to appeal an assessment, Vees, 867 A.2d at 748-49, Business 

 

8 To the extent the District argues Broadwing has waived any of the uniformity 

arguments it presents here, our review of the record reveals that Broadwing has consistently 

challenged, on uniformity grounds, the District’s practice of choosing what properties to appeal, 

including that this practice has resulted in appeals only of commercial or commercially-used 

properties. Accordingly, Broadwing has not waived any of its arguments.
19

Administrator’s financial analysis commences upon the occurrence of an event, 

such as the sale of a property at a high price as reflected in the realty transfer tax 

documentation, or the recognition that a property’s tax-exempt status has expired,

either of which could suggest that a property may be underassessed. This initial 

financial analysis begets a second financial analysis by Business Administrator, 

who calculates the potential increase in revenue that could result from the 

reassessment of the identified property. This second financial analysis yields a 

third financial analysis, performed by Business Administrator, the superintendent, 

and the solicitor, to determine whether the potential increase in tax revenue 

outweighs the potential cost of filing an assessment appeal for the property. 

Business Administrator testified these financial analyses, and the decision of which

assessments to appeal, are carried out, or implemented,9 without considering a 

property’s type or ownership. Importantly, common pleas credited this testimony. 

Questions of credibility are for the fact finder, here, common pleas, and its 

credibility determinations are binding on this Court. Parview Court Assocs. v. 

Delaware Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 959 A.2d 515, 520-21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2008). 

Further, while the District does not rely on a specific monetary threshold, 

such as that used by the school districts in Springfield, 101 A.3d at 840 ($500,000 

sales price) and East Stroudsburg Area School District v. Meadow Lake Plaza, 

LLC (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 371 C.D. 2018, filed Oct. 17, 2019), slip op. at 3-4

($10,000 potential increase in tax revenue which represented the average cost of an 

 

9

“Implement” means “to carry out.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 

1134-35 (2002).
20

assessment appeal),

10 Business Administrator is familiar with the average realty 

transfer taxes associated with properties within the District, having reviewed those 

amounts monthly since 2007. Using that expertise, Business Administrator knows 

what amount of realty transfer tax suggests that a property, regardless of type or 

ownership, may have sold at a price that could indicate the existing assessment is 

too low. Similar to the school districts in Springfield and East Stroudsburg, the 

District then, through Business Administrator, solicitor, and superintendent, 

determines whether the potential increase in tax revenue of a successful assessment

challenge would outweigh the likely cost of appealing the assessment of that 

property. The difference in this practice and that in Springfield and East 

Stroudsburg, is that, instead of basing its decision on average costs of appeals as in 

those cases, the District performs a property-by-property analysis to determine if it 

makes financial sense to appeal an assessment. And, importantly, this analysis is 

implemented without consideration of a property’s type or owner. The neutral and 

financial nature of this process is borne out by the fact that not all properties with 

higher realty transfer taxes or sales prices were appealed due to the fact that the 

cost of the appeal would have outweighed the minimal, if any, increase in tax 

revenue the District would have realized. Accordingly, the District’s practice is 

not an arbitrary one, but is rationally based on a financial analysis implemented 

without regard to a property’s type or ownership and is of the type approved by 

Valley Forge.

 

10 While not binding, unreported opinions of this Court may be cited for their persuasive 

authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of our Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code 

§ 69.414(a).
21

We next consider Broadwing’s contention that Business Administrator 

conceded that no residential properties would ever be appealed, establishing that 

the District’s practice creates an impermissible subclass of taxpayers. A review of 

Business Administrator’s testimony reveals she made no such concession. She 

explained no residential properties had been appealed “yet” because there had been 

no realty transfer tax associated with a sale of such a property that warranted

review. (R.R. at 109a-10a.) Business Administrator disagreed with the notion that 

there were no residential properties that would be sold for a sufficiently high 

amount to result in a review, noting there could be a few large properties that 

would do so if sold. (Id. at 110a-11a.) She also credibly testified that, when 

reviewing which properties the District should consider appealing, no 

consideration was given to the type of property, and only the financial benefit 

versus the financial cost of any potential appeal was considered. (Id. at 81a-82a, 

86a-87a, 94a, 107a-08a.) Such testimony does not support a conclusion that the 

District will never appeal the assessment of a residential property thereby creating 

an unconstitutional sub-classification of properties within its jurisdiction.

A second basis for Broadwing’s assertion that an unconstitutional subclassification is created is premised on the fact that the District’s practice has 

resulted in appeals only of commercial or commercially-used properties. 

However, that the District’s practice thus far has resulted in appeals of 

commercial or commercially-used properties is not determinative where that 

practice is implemented or carried out without regard to the type or ownership of a 

property. The District relies on the occurrence of a triggering event to bring a 

potentially underassessed property to its attention. So far, no sale of residential 

properties has resulted in a high enough realty transfer tax to warrant review, and 
22

Broadwing has not presented evidence to the contrary. That is not to say that none 

will in the future, and, based on Business Administrator’s credited testimony, if 

one does, the same process will be used to determine whether that property’s 

assessment should be appealed. Such result is consistent with East Stroudsburg, 

wherein we rejected the taxpayers argument that, even if the threshold was facially 

neutral, it resulted in the appeal only of commercial properties based on the 

credited evidence presented by the school district that it would have appealed any 

residential property’s assessment had any met the threshold. Slip op. at 11-12.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the District’s practice of determining what 

property assessments to appeal, which is based on the numbers and implemented 

without regard to a property’s type or ownership, does not violate the Uniformity 

Clause and is not inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s decision in Valley Forge. 

Accordingly, common pleas’ Order granting the District’s tax assessment appeal 

and directing the reassessment of the Property in accordance with the District’s 

appraisal is affirmed.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Punxsutawney Area School District :

 :

 :

v. : No. 1209 C.D. 2018

 : 

Broadwing Timber, LLC, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

NOW, October 29, 2019, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Jefferson County is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge