•• 

•I '• 

SECRET 

REF ID:A68196·· 

DEPARTMB:NT or THI ARM! 

OFF~~:. OF THI ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, ~IGENC~ 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. · 

iBGIUi'l 

26 May 1954 

MEMllWIDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRET.ARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Security Cla~sif'ication or "The Signal Corps: The Bmergency. 11 

Reference:. 'USCIB 1.3.5/51 

l. The Array has drafted for publication a h;i.story of the Signal 

Corps entitled "The Signal Corps: The Emergency". A review or the 

history revealed that it contains information which is essentially 

the same as that contained' in "The Final Secrets or Pearl Harbor" 

and other articles made available to the pubJic in unclassified 

form as referred to in the reference. 

2. Pages 205-214 and 769-798 of the Signal Corps history have 

been extracted and are inclosed herewith. In view or the information 

contained in USCIB 13.5/51, it is requested that the inclosure be 

placed before USCIBSECCOM tor consideration. 

FOR THli: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2: 

• 

l Incl 

pp. 205-214 SigC Hist 

PP• 769-798 Sig C Hist 

(10 copies) 

Enclosure with SECCOM 13.8/6 

(signed) 

THOMAS M. LARNER 

Colonel, GS 

Chier, Plans and 

Policy O.ffice 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-08-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

SECRET 
• 

I 

,, '•: .J . -. 

r.,... ---4IOCOM: ]J.8/6 , REF~EfI6819B 

29 J~ 1954 

,•· 

SJleRE'f • U .8. E'.[§8 org 

MEM»WIDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBSECCOM 

Subject: Security Classification of "The Signal Corps: 

The Emergency" 

References: {a)./Enclosure 2 wi~h USClB 13.5/69 dated 25 May. 1954 

\ {b) USCIB 1.3.5/51 dated 7 April 1954 

1. Attached herewith is a memorandum from the Assistant Chief 

or Staff, G-2, Department or the Arr.rl:y, enclosing certain extracts 

{containing COMINT information) from a draft Department of the Arm;y 

publication "The Signal Corps: The Emergency". 

2. As requested by the Array, and in line with tBClB policy as 

stated in paragraph 5, reference {a), this document has been referred 

to the Security Committee by the Executive Secretary, USCIB", for 

study and recommendation in regard to its classification and hand.ling. 

3. In comparing "The Signal Corps: The Emergency" with Rear 

Admiral Theobald's book "The Final Secretsof Pearl Harbor", (see 

reference (b)), consideration should be given to the fact that the 

former document is an official. publication while the latter is not. 

It is the opinion of the Chairman that a history of U.S. COMINT 

operations, bearing official sanction, would be far more likely to 

find its wrq to foreign COMINT or COM3EC authorities than would an . unofficial publication regarding Pearl Harbor, even though the latter 

might contain similar information. Once in the hands of foreign 

COMINT authorities, the information contained in the Department of 

the Array document would certainly be 9onsidered more reliable than 

that contained in Admiral Theobald's book. 

4. The Chairman believes that any history of COMINT ope:retions 

should remain in COMINT channels. Even though all portions of the document in question ~ have appeared separately in the public press, the 

aggregate contains information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 

would endanger the effectiveness of a program of vital importance to 

the national defense. The document should therefore be classified 

"SECRET". 

5. It is planned to place this item on the agenda for the July 

meeting of the Security Committee. 

Enclosure -

a/s 

SECCOM: 13.8/6 

SECRET 

~-.. .,. f2 £11. .,.1 

WILLIAM R. CULMER 

Major, Arty., USA 

Chairman, SECCOM 

5 
.. ·. 

' • 68196 

EXTRACTS FRQ.f PUBLICATIOfT 

11 THE SIGNAL CORPS: 'DIE B!IRGENCY" 

3. Commnicationa Obacurij;z 

tJ.A::r ' D (..,I , 

e .I"'" I f7J 

1187 

C17Ptic COllllDUDicatlon bad aa few. Die whole ra~ ot ai~.C:U int~­

ligence tDcludH monitoring. pniometrlc location, BZ1cl procedural security 

ucl extenclecl to al.moat. ~ aspect. o! tactical operationa. :Bu.t tbe Cl7PtO-

~Jil1c-c17Ptanalytlc 37 portion of 

'YI l'or the a!Jke of convenience. thia book uses the word cmtocrapb.y 

to lndtca.tA thl! process 1n general of 'Plltting mes!;ageB int.o aecret i·orma 

or ayni>ols for the sake of security. At a routine level, this la the work 

ot code clerka in message centers. At the OJl1'lOB1te extrem, where It means 

the actual buildl• of Crn>tographic systems, it ia the crr.B.tive task of 

err-erta. Cmtoana.gsia lnciicA.tes thP. reverse process of bringing secret 

matter into the cle;-;.r. Accomplishinr. this ree·1lt with a ke1 provia.ed is 

t.be work, sg.::in. of mesRage center clerks, and whether thq decode or 

deci}:her or deceypt such meseages this book refers to their task under 

the genP:tal··term cryptanalysis. The same word is also applied t.o. the 

work of the prof e~sional cryptanaJ.ysts who endeavor to break ci.o~n secret 

a,ystema whosE key is unkr.own. 

Page~ 

signal intelligence was as small a dut.7 as motion-picture photogra~ was 0 

and Ir.finitely more esoterico It wa.s such secret work tha.t whoever entered 

it was !iUtoma.tic-'llly a. man ~.art. It was e.n tn-sg~l.in-out-egain, setm-wiseen, 

now here-now ther function, so hifhlv specialized th~t its product was 

manuf~cture.d almost exclusivel,v for the GenF"ral Staff's lf.ilit~ry Intelli€:·eno::e 

Divbiono Indeed, the wo k Md been co!·dtlcted in Mm until the principle 

of se-pa.r:J.tion of po¥-ers w ich SEOOiF-tff d co:r-RAnd distinct removed it 
·. SECRET • REF ID: 8196 • ._ ____ , 

and lodged it with the Chief Signal Office~, an opPrating ect.1vlty 

with an· operating ag~nQ" o Within his sphere, ho\l'f'Ver, 1 t bB.d. a plsice 

Bep!!rate from his othtr responriibili ties, v.nllf!'d off from them by'. thP 

aensitiv., Staff purpose it sp,rved. 

Biii.sic CJ'1Ptograph8 lvld b~en a pirt of the Chief Sign.9.l Officer•a 

m1ns1on a1ncea the Corps bad 1:een aasil!'lled thfl duty of preparing the War 

Departm,.nt tel~graph code. ;u Field Codes, 

38 Begaj.a.tions .!!!!: !ffi !!ml .e! ~ Unitttd. Stat~s. 1913. Art. LXXVII· 

Signal Corps, parao 1556. The code NB almost immediatfal,y compromised 

af\,.r th,. n.~t.ion went to f1.l.ro Capt Garland C. :Black, "'lhe G-2 Signals 

TeP..111," Signal Corps Bul:.1:tin No. 90 (Ma.Y-Jun 36) 0 24.A2. 

Peg~ 206 

staff cod.-s, Military Int.elli,!f'DCf Division codes and others were also 

compiled, this being the sor·t. of work for which the Signal Corps mao.e 1 ts 

ori@:inal contract, in 1921, 11ith w. F. FriPdman, the man who became a 

prime mover in i to Some of the •1ork WBS not for mill tary use at allo 

Among thP outsiue duti~E fo? which the s1.ibs~~uPnt Signal Int~lligence 

Section \,•as so!.l,-ht was thr l\ ~vising of a crypto~ra.phic syat. .. m for the 

Crop BP.porti~ Board of th .. ler1e.rtrn .. nt of Agricult11re., bP.c--".lusto gamt.U.ng 

in crop futurPs madp it vitLl for th~ GovPrnmP.nt to k~ep the statistics 

inviolatP. until they could ·," given a general and sirro1ltaneous rele~seo 

Occasional servictt to businr•;s houses, at the re"uPet of thP. Department 

of Comm,.rce, and to the ~r,:..~st Gw~.r·d, ma.de other tangents to the main 

circlP of intt"l'"f'Sto 39 

In distinction from .rypt§iH#&J: c tanalysis made a gradual 
·. 

. r • RE§.fr&:f A6 Ji_ 9 6 • 

appearanceo Befor~ t~ First World War, code and cipher solut,a.tion bac.i 

been •almost entirely unknovm to t.he t\'a.r Depa.:·tmPnt or to the Govf!mment 

of the United Sta.tesas a wholeo" '<> Under 

I 

40 WI> Annual Rpta. 1919. BJ;t of CofS, Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. )29. 

f.Me 2CTl .(con• t) 

th~ preaaure of w11.r, the "8k ci solving codes bad been charged to MI-8, 

a newly-c:rP.Bted section of theMilital')' Intelligence Division ~hich bad. 

brou.:.atit tog-~th,.r a co~an.v of university scholars typifi,.d. by the- Chaucer 

111.uthority, John MatthevJ& t.~n:i.v., AftP.r thP. tri.aaty of peace Md dispe-rsed 

this section, a distill~tion of it had moved ~uietly to New York City0 

th~l'P to continue tl1e wa.rtill)! work in p~ac .. time. A formt-r Stat~ De~rtment 

cler, Herb,.rt O. 1a.rdl.,7, hai ma.de himself expP-rt in cryptanalysis 0 and 

accordin(dy beoamP. hP.ad of tilP. sup.-rsec~t activity'> StatP- and War 

maintainfl!d Ud' work jointly 0 but 'll'MD Prttsident Hoover and Secretary 

Stimson, ccming into office :.n 1929, det•nnin~d to witndi:aw the Department 

of State f1mds from it, and the War Depa.rtm,.nt prttff-JTed to carry it on 

entinly within its own aciministra.tion11 th~ :N.ew York "Bladt Chamber" 41 

41 The sensational niclcrame given to it by analogy from the 

similar French organizatbna Herbert Oo :ardley, .21!!, American 131B.Ck 

Chsmber ( lt.dianapolir, 10.)l)o 

closed and Mra Yarllty we.a lPi't to assume th.at C"':'de-11reak:i~ b."td been 

diacontin·1f"d al togeth\l:ro 

Page 208 

It had not been.. Bereft of StsJ.te Der.ai·tm~nt ~o-sponsorship for the 

aecr«"t N!w York a.ct:i,,ity, the War Depart~nt co11ld ha.VP c:mtinued it, 

but did not, partly beca vc been a UPce~sity for making 

up tvo .. thirds of t:1~ exp nse i.fJH~late · borne, and partly because 
• • ne1t~r the officer-in-charge nor the civilian-in-charge of the Signal 

Corps work C?..red to 1ntP.rc~de or to recoumcmd. 9le former, Major Owen 

S. Albright, had Ede a tour of inspection f!arlier in 1929 which bad not 

impress.cl him tavo:rP-b]7. 1.2 !he latter wa.s Friedman. 

'2. Interview a011rr.es (not cited). 

·whose name b.'1.d alrer-c_, become closeJ.y related to Signal Corps code work 

and was to become ineeparable from it. !Pcause of thPse two rea.sone, 

thel'f!fore, the Military Intelligence Division, which bad subcontracted 

its cryptanalytic work to Yardley, now·transferrf!'d it to the Office of 

the Chiftf S~ Officer, and. tr-uiaferrf!'d the res~ onsibility. too. It 

Jointed the crJPtographic work which had beP.n formalized there, in the 

Personnel or Res~arch Divisions, since 1922. Thi!' assignment f~Ve authority 

for solut ~on of ene~ llll!Beages in time of war onl.7 o I+ 3 

Page 209 (con' t) 

43 (1) OCSigO Office Memo lo. 5.40 30 Sep 22. (2) OCSigO Office 

11.e~.ioa Boso 1.32 and 1.40. 26 lov Slld 26 D@c 29., 

(3) AR 105-5, Chgo 1, 10 M• 290 (4) CSigO Annual Bpt, Fr .30, 10 Oct 

)01 PP• l)...lJ.o 

How~V(l'r, it became api;arent that an anny could not begin ~ading the 

emPm,y' e cod<-s on thP. day a war bf>,a.rlo Oni! must leiarn before that. fl!Ven 

though doing so mf'ant violating the privacy of powers still official.J.y 

frif!'ndl.ya This was thP. inPscapable rPsult of' the gen~ral use of coaes 

by nations, pa.rt of a univel"Sal trPspass recognized ~t1ite apart from 

convr.ntional standards of internation~.il morality~ 

At flnt. tihe new duty meant ve:ey littlE. For some years the Signal 

Corps had encouraged inte est SEORftsol ing of an elementary sort: 

Page 210 
•, 

., 

• 96 

semplP problPms appearttd in the l3ulletin, including a message found in 

tlu- yard of R.11 e~.st"rn peni tPntia:ey, which Junior membf!re of the CodP. 

and Cipher Seoction solved in 50 minutes; an I~l'll\Y ,.xtension course in crypto-

~~ WP..8 offered; and Mr. Friedman went to Mon111outh from time to time 

to giVP. a course of lecturP.s 44; but thes~ were all necessarily inconclLlSiVeo 

?aise 210 (con•t) 

JJ+ (l) Silpal Cozpa Bulletin Roo 56 (Sep..Oct 1930), p. 550 (2) 

CSigO Annual Bpt, Ff 30. pp. 13-1' .. o 

Fri@dm~ did find it possible to hirP. five associate~. Their peculiar 

ta.lf!nts for ID9.th.Pma tics, oripntal anci classi·~al langu.E>.~s. et:itistica. 

mPchanice or philolog laid t~ basis for th'1'! .-met and arcane!' training 

they t"nt.ered upon and ultiJM.t.@'ly bailt up a :~roup ekillP.d Pnough to bnak 

cardinal Japa.nrsP codes bt!'fore- the Second -.roi-ld War broke" UfiOD the United .. StatP.8., 45 

J..5 P~arl R1:1rbor Attack: Hearings before ~ i2!.!~Comrnittee ,2!l .:.!!!,. 

Inveistipttion ~ ~ Pt-arl Harbor Attack, 79th Congo, 1st Sesso. Pt • .340 

Proc. of Clarlcl! Invr.stir,ation, pp. Sl-85, and Pt., 36, Proco of Hewit~ 

ID"!Uiry • Pr.·D 311-.112, '!lashinftOn, Do Co, 19"6,, 

At the outseit of their worlf:D howevPr, tht7 werP new men exploring s. new 

field. During some of th.at -pPriod Colonel Ya.uborgne was sta.tioned as 

signal officer at the Presidio of San Fr::i.ncisco, and,. because his enthusiasm 

let him to keep a "ham" intercept station gd.rll' in h"is office during hours 

off duty, was able to supply thf! crypta.nal.y1:1ta with a problem or twoo 

But such intercepts were wholly inauffici~nt to provide real practice .. 1.6 

SECRET Pagt! 211-212 

---------. 
·. 

• ~ Interview ao11rceos (not cil~edL 

in .the Signal Intelligence Section until f'Vent.s two yean after its 

transfer thereo In the first placl.!, thP heavj.est happening of 1931, and 

a major historical climax between w~rs, was the successful Japanese 

in•alon of Manchuria. This ove·,·turn of the order of thinss ma.de it 

important to th" foreign and mili :.ary policy of the United States to put 

a aecurit4,y check on the Pacific wl1ilr. British expPrte kept track of the 

other side of the wor.ida A much foss significant but much more imn1ediate 

CRUS~ of the tn:msf!>n&-'ltion of the Signal Intulligence Se-ction was .the 

circwnstanc" thr:.t Yardley, h~vin~ fully det•' n.1ined for himsPlf ths-.it the 

GovPrnmt>nt had ('.one with code-bremlcing and f10ttld not rpinstate it, C1ecided 

that. ·he could t.f.·ll about ito The ;,ook which Y'PS•ll ted 111 ~ AmPrican Black 

ChYiber0 wa.!1 such a monumental in<i .scretion that diplo.119.t ic and milit.a:ey 

aec11ri ty ?ta~ered. 47 The Japa.nesr Flnpire learn~d for 1.he first time 

tm-.t all of its mP-ssagea h.~d been understood Ht th.P. ti·ne of the great 

f,isarm;iment Conff'rence of 1921, 11:1blicl.y prot~~stE-d., ani secretly launched 

a yrogram to W..nge all of its se·~nri ty fon1s !'llld dP.viceso Friedman now 

found himslef st;arting ov~r again0 with a tasl;: a. t.und.1·ed times more difHe bad witb him Me-ssN.. Clark. BJJ.rt, Jru1lback0 Eonlett and Sinlcov 0 

the five who ha<l entered upon thP wct•k in 1930; an.d the Signal Intelligence 

Section had been f"iven permission to train of:~icers as well in its techni"f.ue11., 

Li~11t.Pnant Mark Bhoads bec9!De thP- fhst student in 1931 and Lieutenant Wo 

P~·f'ston Corderman the sec nd ~CJifT original plo::.n bad been to 

Fye 213 
·. 

• 

tutor one officer a year, as was done in photogra.r;i\Y, procurement and other 

f'i~ldBi but the work proved to be far mono di!'ficult a.nd eacting than a 

si~le ypar could profitably contribute to; e.nd in arv case, the training 

made a team of two necessary o 48 Rhoad.a was continued when Con..erma.n came 

48 Memo ACofS G--1 for CofS, 2 Oct .35, no Bubo AG )19 .. 12 (8-27-3.5)0 

Cordr.ruan in tum, with his BUCCf'$80rs, bad a similar two-year span of 

tniiningo A reilated projf'!Ct to give f•rel.imini::iry training 

Page 213 (con•t) 

in the Reserve Officers Trainine Corps came to nothing because cryptanalysis 

starts at a fairliY high lP-vel, comparable to that of a bach~lorua ci.egree, 

and continu~s in a climat,. which is basically scholarly'o It is not suited 

to t~ capsulf' ~ua.lity of R.OoT.C. training, ?ith one subj~ct swallowP.Ci 

t"VP.'f'Y Fri~. 

There was a gradual addition of staff in the Signal IntP.lli~nce 

s~ction. !y 1936, th~re were 14, and the Section had an allowance of 176 

for an emergency o 176 persons trould not be found for the work in a hur:ey, 

let alone be made ~xpert oveniight, bat t~ authori1ation was bolstering. 

Anotlu-r smrceo for cryptanalytic work was an officer assigned after an 

"Jltended tour of duty in Tokyo; and an arra.ngPmPnt with the Feweral Bureau 

of In~~$t1gation incr~as"d the facilities for inetructiono 49 

49 CSigO Annual Rpt, FT 3.30 Sup)l. 0 Pa 230 

Captain Rhoa.ds bPcame ill in 1935 and rFtired, but after a long recuperation 

~turned ae a civilian when it t"re•1 apparent that the war re~11ired hi!r.o 

With this group of 
·. 

civilians and young officers the secret, ,:x-:.1t;ptrl3.ting. lonely work \vent ono 

~xpertness increased, 

1.. 'l'ena1on 

CHU'TER XII 

PEARL HA~R 

Page 214 (cont) 

Most of all, those who waited in the cryptanalytic chambers of the 

high D.shington head"iuarters waited ten&f!ly. for they held a great BP-ere to 

Sine~ earq 1939, the Signal Corps• ccyptanaJ..vst1 had bP.en directing their 

best efforts toward solving the Jape.ne-se ultra.-aecret diplomatic code, 

which WA.8 kno11u a.a the purple systPmo H'P.ver before ha..:i the$' been confronted 

with such a difficult problem. an<l at first the-ir progress waa slowa So 

bafflill@' did thfl! purplfo IO'Btem seem to be the.t tl.auborg.:ie a.ekP.d Fr1edman0 

~ chief cryptanalyst, to put aside the administrative du.ties in which 

hP. 11'&8 then priir.B.ril.y engaged.. 1 Twenty months of ~dlous 0 dreary work 

l Jt .. Committee, 79th Congo 0 lat Seaso, Hearin,..oa before lh!, Joint 

Committe~ !m .Y!!. Investigation !1J. ~Pearl Harbor fil~.!£0 (Washo, D .. Co, 

1~) 0 Exhibit Noo 1470 Pto 34. Clarice Investigation, pp. 84-85, and 

Exhibit Hoo 1'·9, Pto 36, Hewitt Inquiry11 ppa 311-3120 Hereafter. referred 

to as JCC Hearings with part and pages cited.,. 

Friedman sufff!'red a nervous collapse and was ill .Dearly five months; 

he returned to the Signal Intellig~nce Service in April 11 19'.lo 

1).ge 769 

pinned down the secret which bad e-lud.Pd both British and German cryptanal.ystao 

In August 0 19.4o, the first complf'tP. tra.nsli::ttion was hancl~d in, a.ad the 

United Statrs governmP.nt hPr~E~d j incalculabl~ advantage. The 

Plige TlO -
·. 

• 196 

conf1dP.nt1al and explosive infomJttion which was being P.xcbanged by the · 

JapanP.aP. envoys in waahington and !'okyo bf'CiJJIUI! a mat.ter of record. in the 

Uni 1iPd Stat.t-1. So l.ar~ a rift did ~ American leaden consiaer the 

breakln, of the Japanflse code that they referncl to it u "tlagic. • 2 

2 (1) Ibid. (2) George Morgenstern, Pearl Barbor: ~ Stoll st_ 

ll!!. ~cret ~ (Rew Torie:, 1947), p. 168. 

In thP poaaeas1on of "Magic,• ~United Sta~ea held a priceleaa 

weapon. lhlt likP 1118.DT secret weapons, it caused lt• poaReaaora lDnDmerable 

headeches ovpr th• 's,ueation of how b~st to UBf' it. 1'hich na to be paramounts gwi.rding the &P.cr.ey of •magic0

11 or usint," it top.in a mllitaq 

advantage? What was important enou,ti to jeopP..rcihe· ita secuz\Q''l !he Arm.r 

poliQ? was clf'ar and well ... defined: it limited the numbP.r of peop!e who 

knew th~ sec~t, and it did not attnd infornBtion ba.sed on intf'rceptt!d meesag1"& to field comman~n. ThPr@ \\BS alW81s the poRaibili t.y that the .l~eae 

would intP.rcept our own messagps, ·or th.~t from tht- very nature of the activ1 

we took thPy would. be able to dttducfo tha. t we must have broken their c•so 

The RaYy, 1'h.1ch had been fumiahP.d full inform11tion as soon as Signal 

Int•lli.gt!nce Service bad brok~n the JiUrple code. on the otber band. did aencl 

some p8.raphra.sPd information baseod on intercepts to their theater command.era. 

at least until thr. middle of Julv, 194lq For the whole of theo vsr, the 

qu~stlon would havr. to be considered and reconsidered each time that the 

military leaders made a decisive moveo It was a grave rPaponsibilltf o 3 

3 JCC Hearin@:•, pto 4 0 TeetimOIJ1' of Bear Admiral T. So Wilkinson, 

PPo 1736-l737a 

'lbe Signal Intellige iM -in- e lqJ.1 refiP.cted the augmentation 1n personnel, apace, ~d ~Qii\Iie~ hich bad be•n granted to it 
·. 

• -ESEmEJma~96 

I 

ahead of almost all other War Department agencies. 

Prom a handful of men it had p-own to a &tl"e!Jf:th of l.Rl officers, enlisted 

men, and civilians in Waahi!Jl'ton, and 150 offir.era and enlisted men in the fieldo 

0perRtionall1', the Signal Intelli~nr.e Senlce 1r1U1 a diYialon of the 

Opeatlona Ere.n.ch of the Office of the Chief Sipal. Officer, with bead.-

~u•rt.en in the llmlltions :Building, It consiate4 of the Signal Intel11.gence School, the 2nd Sign~l Semee CQD1PB11.Y, and tour operating aectionse 

administ.r.ttive; cryptam.J.ytic, '1hich studied ·V<..&riDWI kind.a of traffic; 

C17J'togre.phic, which was rt:sponsible for all A.ft\V Cl'JPtographic vstema, 

for security stud.lea, !llld for monitoring traffic for violations of commmalca.tiona securit)'; vid laboratory. A section which pr£p'1reci. secret 

take, testP.d suspected. documents, ana. perfonned phot~lc services. 

l!a.11! (con• t) 

Colonel Otis k. Sa.cltler was chief of thP Operations Branch within the Office 

of the Chief Slgnal Officer, and Leiutenant Colonel Bex W. V.inckler wa.a officer 

in charge of the Signal Intelligence Service, "ith Ma.1or Barola. Go Ha.Ye:& 

as his executive officer, and William :r .. Friedman as his civilian assistant., 

The 2nd Signal Service Compa.l\Y' furnished military perso~1nel for a varif"d 

U!!ortment of duties, •....nned the intr.rc£pt stat.ions, and servccl as a convenient military unit to which signal intellig~nce personnel could be 

&H i@'.tled. .4 

------ 4 Arrqy Security Agency, "A IerturF on the Orlir,in and Development 

of the Azsqy SeC1lrit7 Agency, 1917-1947," Mar "8. SigC Rist Sect file. 

------ Dt1ring 191.1. by ~reement between the two services, the A1"ll\Y and. Nav 

workfd togethPr int~rcepting, decoding, and translating Japanese diplomatic 

and consular dispr'itchf's, t Pven·· the·-~wor oad and share the credit.. !he 

division of labor was Ar ged ~f~pID me ~ages originating on even dates 
• • wer~ deCl'1PtPd anu tranalet~ by the Al'll\Y: those with old dates the Rav 

procrtu=ecl. In the opinion of the Ano"'• ehlef crntanaqat, th1• arraageMnt wae mo~ aa.t1afacto17 from an administrative than from a c17Ptoana17tic 

atA.ndpotnt.' 

5 .rec Rea.rings, Exhibit lo. 147, Pt. 34, Clarke Inveat.1ga.Uon, 

!estlmo• of William f o :rriedman, pp. 34.36, 8)-84., (2) Ibid ... bhlblt 

lo. 149, ft. 36, Hewitt In"'uir,r, 'lestlm~ of C&ptaiD L., J'. Saftord, 1Bl1 

p. 1A6. (3) 1J!.!!., Pt. 10, !l'eati1DOD¥ of Admiral l107ea, P• 4751. 

J>ncp 712 (con•t) 

lot all messages sent b7 Japan, inteircept~4 by monitoring atat.iona, 

and to~d to Signal Intelli«•nce Spnice .-en band.led with 8'&ual 

:pro111ptnea1. 'lbe high m1lita17 off1c1als·unoP.rstoocl Vw 1'9aSGD9; ae th8 

chief of milital'T intelligelicp said: •I felt su.re thoee clnotecl mera wbo 

epent so mch time on it were doing ever;vthinl; the1 po111bll' could clo •••• · 

The a1tonishing thiDCo•• WA.B not that these messages were dela7ed in tbe 

proceas of translation. from Japanese to Faglieh, but b.t • were able CO 

Clo lt at all. It was a me.rveloua pieC'J.t of.work: on the i:art of the btgbl,y 

tecbnlcal men who handled that ~xtraordina17 Job of bnoaJdnc coclea aa.cl 

ciphers.• 6 Yost of the nmag1c• mes~es were 

6 Ibid... Pto 2. 'l'estimo~ of G@neral Sherm.n IUlee, p. 8650 

in the hands or high in tel~ igence officers wt thin aa h··ur or two fl'Oll 

their time of origin. Others might not be deciphered anci translatecl 

tor a cJa¥. or a week. or even a month. Tiler. was tint of all a ecarcl\.Y 

of ~ual.lfied C17Ptana]Tsts and translators. Secondly, th@ llfl!ss~a had. to 

be piclcecl out of th.- air by int.ercep.Ung iona locat.Pcl at widely seplratecl 

points. Bo one station coul p1oiGQRiii of them; t.hPre ha4 to be atationa 

Page m 
•. 

• 

at lllBD1' points in order to int~rcept &r17 appnciablf' amount of traffica Not 

all stations bad e"'ual faciliti"s for fol'\l·~rd.111€' ~ int~rcepts to 1'1aehingtona 

Some had teletype 1119.chinrs, and could forward mess~s }Jromptly; some 

sent t~m on b7 radio; some used air mailo 

Army'• station 1n Re.waii 0 

S11ch ms the case with the 

Pac• 713 (con• t) 

which sent an ar.ewnula.tP.d P'-Cket of intercepts to •ahingtan once each 

ftek by commercial air ClippPr, or by shin in cas• bad weatbP.r del07ed 

the Cl1pper•s departureo The only messages Hawaii transmitted to W&shington 

by radio were those ~apeciall,y s~lected accordir.t to instl'llCtiona from 

tti.: Office of the ChlP.f Signal Officer. Whf'n messages were received,, 

tbe7 were sortf'd into ce.t .. gories of priority aet up by agreement between 

the Chief Signs 1 Offici-r and the Di rector of Ba.val COJlllllUDicationa.. Ordinarily o 

two thinf• determined the order in •hich messages ,,..ere handled: first, the 

pnceclf'nce of the cl1apatch0 that 111 1 the urgency •ith 'flhich 1t wu sent: 

and a•cond, the particular code used. Aa a rule, meeaagea ln the'! pirple 

e7stem got first pr1orit7 because it ce.rrbd the most important traffic 

and becaua~ shlving it involved complicated electrical machlnr- analJsia, 

whicl• sevP.ral other JapD.nPse codes comprie•d ~sspnti~l]Jr manual c17Ptographic 

analyeia.. From time to time a mpssa,.e of conaia.era.bl• importance woald 

come through in a "low• or 11m.:dium11 grade code, usually becausE t.he place 

of Orlf'ln did not he.ve the hi-f!;her level codP.s. or beca.us~ a code machine or 

transmitting st9:t,ion :Md broken downa After the m!Bsages were sorted into 

priority ~ra~pa, the Signal Intelligence Service m~n firat of all bad to 

~t a •ke7" tc ti1e message in order to decii:her it.. 'lbat could take aDTwhere from 15 minutPa to a we'!ek or a montho In som~ cases, it might never 

bP solved. Once the mess~ "'*• 4ee17P\.e&g or suffici~ntly decrypted to inll1cate BODie 1 .. portance, it rtSU:WOF t~latora. '!beJ ·~ tile - J Page 714 
.. 

• m~nsag• for in:forme.tion, ana. those that seemed met important U., tl'IJll9.ii. 

lated. fil""t. !here wu no war of knowing wba.t wu 1n a me1cage, or eYeD 

whl!lt it •• about until it could be cleciphP.red and. 1canned. _, a 'ranslatiOr. 

htel'D9lq the 111PBP11pa abowe4 nothing, e1.cept tor Use priorlv 3114 tile 

tJPe of cocle 111ecl. After beln@' ~c171>t.-d. :mcl tl'Bllalatecl. oae cow of ellCb 

•1rap ~'8.I ret.B.inecl 'b7 the Sien'll Intell11l98Ce Senlce, aaA amaltlonal 

cople• ';'-ent to 0-2 and the otflce of •11.vRl. Intelltt'•nce tor Giatrlb\ltlaa. 7 

7 (1) Jrl' Bearings, Pt. 2 (llllee), p. '799. (2) p!c1.. Pt. 108 

(1183, lobert Sbukraft), p .. .&0 19. (J) Ibld.., lmiblt lo. l'", CJ.aalea 

• Invetitiption, pt. 35 (Col C. A. Powell), p. 82 amt (Col •s Minckler), 

- p. 227. 

" . PaQm 

2. !be 11ac1c Ilea-ea 

tn Japjn~ tbe 'l'Oll01•. Cabt• . ba4 fallen,: to be . replaced • • toQlb 

minded rovernment Meer i-o taa ad.vantap of'the opportun1t¥ to 1111e a 

rich ttmpir. ln tm Jar ·raet. In lraehiqton, a aerleti of 41'1onat.1c talJm 

ba4 be1W1·between Secretar.r of State Co'rdell Hull and Japan•• .-..88dor, 

Admil'll.l kichiaaburo lfOlllU1'l, aaalatecl by a ape~lal. dlplCllB~lc •DY•, S3buro ~ - "': . ~ - . ,. 

KUl'Wlu. Mean~lle, throu&h 1aagic,.• theo .Ameri~ gqverment 1!88 able to , •• I • ,"' ,r • . . -

read most of what ~Japanese Wfl!~ .~av~~ amq~ ~'!l"ee, atri~ of 

diplomatic nic•tiP.e. Within the War DepartmPnt, tbe lnt~1Cepte4 Japmeee a ' "•• ' • 

diplomatic mes~agce were d.1at.r1bute4 to SecrPta.17 of llrJ.r SU•on; Chief 

of Staf'f General George C.. Metrahall; Chir-f of t.hP War Plane 1>1.,1•1~, Cl-3, 

tlaJor OPneoml Leomird T. Gerow; Chief of the Mlll""7 In,elllpnce l>iYlelon, 

G-2, Br1f'.lld1Pr' Oeneral She.r.m..,.~lH-!'-Md-EAhief of the Jar rastern l>lnelon 

SECRET Page '776. 
. . . . 0 !.. 0 ' 0 ,: ' 

0 

I , .... , 0 '• 1: ' ' t" • i• 0 

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... ·. ~ ~. . . . : . ·. . . JSE8:26E . I . .. - i . . 

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: .... · ~ .. ~~i~nt_·~ole~~lt _or_.~~~1:1onaμ, to. hi~ mt;~~'~:··.~~·.;,.·~n!~ ·~~1". ·. · .-t .. · 

· -.-. ~ ·· -~- ~ .. ~:~cii;e_ ,,jjpia tho!_..,."*'-~ ~t~. ~~~~~~~~/#- -~_, . .:': "· ·'::';I::· . .. _ ... J>epart.n~ .dl!tl'llnlt~ ttie· ••aace• to a tiele'C\:. group·-. 1'9te ~' · . · ...... f. •• • • • • - • • .. •• • • • • .'. : • •• ... : ........ •• • ·,· • • • 1• •• ,.,· • ~ i- ·-·~. • .. ·: .. : • • • <: t 

.... ; .:-. :otticlw.·. aen lntemePts .~8'8&e1'.caaie-·:in, .t1'u'-4 oOUl'lel!'l·cari'lf!ll :· ··. ·· .. l" · • ",:•',I .,,;,~ .. • ' • ,I ,= ·,,_"' ;.,:; • ••,··:,I o I'";• ... :.. ··.,·i..;.~'" ~ •._,~, ... , "·,\o·,~~", ":-=.,=,~:~ ...... JJ:-lf.. • ,_ ," ~ • 

: .. t~.m. lri ~1~. ·~e~· 'to. tbe ;NOlpiP.nt~,~· .~l}o. ~ ·~ ~•lilge• •.. aid.. !'Pt~ ... ,..· · ~ · .. ·•· ... _ ..' ... ··~ . ··~ ... ;; ..: ·. :· : :· -~. .. . . . >"'': ··.• .... _:-4 ·~· .• ~ ... • . . ::.-: .. :;: .• • .. • :"·::-·-:'·:-:',. ·-. . ~ ·. 

. :~. ~ -~~- ~.~J'l,r,·~- ~nafte~ bG~--·.ie~-~p~~ ~p~ -~···~~-:. ~;;~- . ._ . .-: J .·· 

Ol'tclntJ.l; tor: t'Jle.. . . .:" . · · · · : . 1' ·... .. . . •· .' . ·· ·· . . " . · . . . . . . . r 

-.· 

. •• • : ' . . .. "' (. . "'-= •• r • & • {l • • • i 

._ .. . . . . :·. . . . .· ... ··< .·.~· ."._ ·.: _:;·. ·~:.:> .:~.-:·:;:_&e·ift .<•••>: .·.. . ·:- I 

, ~ .. · . --~/~::::;:. ,_:1. ~~~-~ -~ ~ o~ir,~ ... :~ ~ :~~~-:~~til~'~ i~., . ....,_, .. I 

·: .. ....,.,.. ·ciaeelfte4 = .. ~ultra. 11•• there ·.,ett.-othi&rs· wl1)were coiatm"4 ill: · '· .:- .· · · f. I ~ ,''C: 0 

... 0 ' 

0 

: 0 • :.: , • ._ :• " 0 

0 

o • • ' 0 •, • ·, : :.. 'II'.~ oe..:_- ·~ r 0

" 0 • • " •.o ;. • , ~ ._ 1 , .. o ""' • :.:; • "• ,,..~, • 0 • ; 

·: Oiaf; ·4~-'0:1'.·.~o\h~r ·1'1~ •magic •. ~. ~~P.~.-Jl~l~i' ~Colonel lioe•· ~ · · · \ · :.. . . . . . _., : . . . . ..... .-.. ·.. .... . . . . .. . . . . .. ~· . . : . . I = 

: ~·· ~.: '~t~_~P.~;._••. ;bis · . .-ze~u·ii~e· .. ~rr~~~r; :~-~~i·on~~- ~tt~••: us;~~,~.·.·. i · 

· ·, ·-.~~ofonei~Gi;_d.,;·Da~i'~bi#~:~:~c~~a~el. w~it~f~:al tsm~tfii1'111. ~M~l-lrf·:t .. ·,tie·· . .· ~ .-· ::~ : .~'· ·, . . ": .: ... :: . - : ... : .. : ..: .,.°I!,,'.'...: ... -:,'. , -~ -.:-. ~ .i .... .;...:.. . :~ ·- .. _. • .u·.~ ,. . ;_ . :....'..~~-- .. :. .1 

· .. ·•~r~~~,~f.¥"•,:!hei· .. )Javy ·gro~p-.fne'l:!lded·~·1ft!eI»tgliJlf'ey.ea;>rtDiHctor-.at. .. :. ·. · ... .- : ~ • •• ;: •·• . : • .: • . • • • • • ~ • l •.•• ~ • . . ·• .. . . ... . : • • • .• .• • •• • · ... -. : . . ;. . 

. : : iiat&I.teo~~~riii• ~"~ni-\i.:.asllts t~t: •· i°-G:a.i>ti.iQ.'!'ilt .' lfc. ::.~ni·teapta;t:ir·~n.; ·:-rt- -· ;, ...... ~:•', ~:.•,I, 0 

":,.. '-: .:: :• ~ .. , .. , •' , • ~ ~ .. • :.· • ·~~ 0° 0 ' I I l" ",,,.••, 

> ..:-_sif:t~~~1~~-!.ctJm~~~1i~o~11;· :s«c~'ttt Divisto~·~~·eaptt~.1il .. ~A~ p~-'K~r •. ~- • .\I, o •,: 0 :• :· ... ·, #' • o • : : • • o I ,0 • • o ,"' '• : I'• ~.I' .: o • o' • • 1, - o 01 • • o ~ • • = • 

, .· _; ,.. · · .. ·!i;tcw•e.~ -r~aisoii~lb'l'fl..''.for·· ~~st.ribat.i(?~i-o;t"~i·~" -me•sat~s· W.jlt~tn·= tn•~::.Javt; : · 

I 

,, 

L 

' .. ·~ ···:-.:--.·::.·.~~W~~- -~~?lr~;:-~~~~;-.dhie'f~~~-~~ .. ~{;yi~ ·Di:'l~s:~~no: .. ~i.~i·~· ~he ~· ·: ' ·.. , . :·_ . ~- .. ·_. ... - , : -~. . . . . , . · .. : . . . '. .;"· : ·. ' .. , ·. . . . . :·. . . . . . . . I 

[.' , , . . . s~~~:~~o_rpa~ wer.~'·Colonel. o·:.· .- .~ •. Sa~~ler(I, ·Chief--_o·r· the Cpera~i~nf.i. B:r&-~~D· ·-~ ·t . t:" • •• "'· •• • • I!.. ..... •,. 0 

• • :· : •• : • :r "• 

0 

' ~ • • ·,~: : • • • '• 1 :, "' ,'• J' • : .i:' - : ,• : , :-

• · ·: .: . ···LlRtenant. Colonel· Rex W..: ~~:h~i."~kl~r • CJi'ie:f of ."SignB:]: Icbll1geri:ce· .Se~i~~~ · · ·· · · ··i . . . . . . . . . ' .. . . . . . . . . " . . . ' 

l .. :~~io~. &,l>f!rt>la~:.9hu.~S:ftl\· ~'<!·!b.ekle~~.'-·ag:~i~-~~~- i~~ ~ar.g~ ,;r· z:adio. iht~~~~p~s: ·. · .. ! 

.. ··~a~t:~~~'._:~~~~~;~~:. ~1~-~~: I)~:·_ :k~~- cot~ ~~:.:~i·r~~r· ~~6ti~~ =a~ ft~i~~ ~~ \" . -... · .r .. .tri~~.e.n, :princi~ll ~~~ ::.a~ivtli., t•i t.ii· ·.i~m- the .wh"Oll'· t!:i~ng i~fi :bogJ.n., · 1 · : ~ . 

. .. . · ~~sl!!'.·~~--or ~c~ss~.i~.lril>~~.o-~~~b.1·i;~, ·~t:'not_::~w~:~.:·ttix~g~ ~?~~~;~~~~-co,=-·. ~- , l 

:. =~·: .. and· fitt"'d'j·~nto."thl'> •ir~·ic"'::_;.:'·"?o.,\--'~· "tr:·;~;\•T•~- f.~• .... ~·~\~-it ".l).'lt'l~s~r;;l"'.JoQi:;:rz~.: i4 • \· ·. ·? . . .:.J: ;~;~~ ·.: .. :.-.. ·~~- ... -~-- ~: ·>~--- .... :~~::·< ... --~ => ~_:. ... ~~i·i.:; ·: ~r-::.· :::: ..... ~:· . ~_: . ./. ·; .... ,_·~ :·~:;.: ; .... ';:~~ .. _: ·. " .. :; ·... . . i 

: ! ·:- ~'+: J.~· Hl!'8.rip.f.':1: 2:i.1;;i::..t.:1; .. :;.~. ·srt\R.; r:T· ·~. :· · .... -... _-- . .- . . . . _ ~! .. · ::··. ~ ~ · j: 1..,t:ii~d'".i;:. • ':. L" · '1' :1o' .·-., ... ~ .. -c:ig-~ ... ·' :. ,... · · · .. . r.. . . . '· ., .. 

~~~\ --~ .'·:.n~ij:.~:·.~;~~·.'.{~i·~-~-~.:_::;:~<-:"/· .. ·· ... = <--:·:.<::?.·:::· .. \ .. k_ _.>/:::: ·-~~:· .. ··.=·:;~~~-·-. ~ . · · ... ~.(: 
.. 

• R&&efU'-:-A~ 819 6 --'1 

In November 0 o.ef'initely ominous notps v·ere introduced into the • .ra:v··M·se 

diplom<'lth: messages. On :;2 November0 Tokvo sent a aignificent dis I· tr:h ta 

t-!omure and Kurusu~ stre!;'"i~ thP..t. they .,.ere worki~~ ar'\inst 

~ T!..?. (con'' t) 

a deadline •!.ir-h h:s.u been set for November 25 e.110. later dwrl,t!l'd to Novembe~ 

Tttis time we mean . , that the deadline ~bsolutel.y cannot 

be chaOf-'E'd. .t..ner th..s:i t, thillf'• are automatically goi114< to happen"" 15 

The war Department sent out ia.entic~l warning mes~~..Lgt"·S to all co11111N1as 

l.S JC\ i:tearings, Pt, 1211 E.xhibi ts 0 Record of In tFrcepts 0 p. 16.5 .. 

to report measures ta.keno On November 19, Japqn sent two mE:ssa1~e1 which imlJlieci 

~h:~t a. com,EJl" t.e breakdown in relations wqs impendingo ThetP messages, which 

wer1: trqnshtrd and in the hancis of Am~rican authorities on November 28, set. up 

a code by which Jap.n~se ciiplomtic officiR.ls all ovPr the world ·:ould be 

w~rnP.d of a breRk in diploma.tic relationso They came to be known ea the 8winda8 

In case of emergency (dangE>r of c11tting off our cUplomatic 

rell"tions), and the cuttini? off of intema.tiona..l cammunice.t10.1s, 

the f'ollowint: ''uning will be added in thP. middle of the. daily 

Jap-~nr-!V' lan,u~ge short wave- news broadcasto 

(l) In case Japtn-t!.S. rel1,i.t1ons are in dg,nger: HIGASHI 

NO KAT-: AY'F. (Fast wind rain) .. 

{ 2) Japan - Uo So S,. R.. relations: ICITA NO KAP. KtlMORI 

(North Wind cloud7)o 

()) J3yin-Brirish relationsi NISHI NO KA1."' H~:m:: 

(~est ~ind clear)o 

this signal will be given in the middle 9.nd at the end of a 

we~:ther forO"JBt and ea.ch sentence will be repeated twiceo tr.hen 

this i~ be~rci plP.ase deatory all code papers, etco This ia aa 

;yet to be a completely' secret arr-tngement .. 

Fo1·w!!.rd as urgent intelligence .. • • • • • • • * • • 

'17hf'n our diplomatic relt-.tions u.re becoming d.angeroua, we will add. 

the following at the beginnl~ Slld eond of our general intelligence brQ!::cir.~r.ts: 

(1) If lt 1s Ja 

?!a. !Z! 

•HIGASHI, " 
.. 

(2) Japa.n-lbssia rPl1ttions, "KITAo 11 

(J) Japa.n-!ritieb relations, (including Thai, Malafa, NaEoI.), 

8NISRio• 

The abovp will be r.{'f"ated five times and included. ~t beginninc 

and Pnd.. 

Be!Jq' to Rio de Janeiro, lbenoe AirP.a, llP:xico City, San lnncieco.16 

16 Ib14. , pp. 15'-lSS. 

When t.he •tnu1 code •asap• c~me in, ~ interest of Amr and Bav intelllpnce offir.pra focUHd. on their m~Miri,, and the taar.ort::.nce of lntP.rcept.lng 

their folle11r-u.p ••ttap, tbe eo-cal.lrd 11wirda8 e&PC'1te •••ace, which woulcl 

put Jap9ne1~ war plane into ezttcution. IntPttAt heil#lten~cl when tbe 11•1124111 

_.saps wen followPd by one which contain"4 lnstractiona to the Japan,.se 

diplomatic corps throaghout thP world to bP.gin destroying their codes and 

code mchlnee. 17 Intellipnce 

17 Ibid. Pt. 12, pp. 208-210, 21.S-216. 

offic@re di~e-ed on Just which 11':\S the moat significant intercept, mt 

all agreed tb.11.t thP cumul9.tive effect point.cl to war. At the time, eYer:vonP thou,-ht th•; t Ylh"n an implementing lllf!Bsage came through, 1 t woulcl be 

the eign•1l for which they wer@' wa1 ting. 

Colonel Sadtler direct@'d th'\t ~ve17 Signal Corpe facility •train to 

intrr~ept ~ "winda• ,.xecute meesn.~. Br. coordinate>Ci effort• with the 

Bavy. Major Shilk"ratt alert@'.Cl the monitor stations. S"'.:i.Cltler, Minclcl•r and 

Shukraft decidr.d th."t.t Monitor St.at ion Ro. 2 in San hancieco.would bave 

face 799 (con•t) 

the beRt chlll1ce of getting \he messap. In a teletype conference with that 

st~tion, Slmkl"Pft dir.ct~ that all J&J>IJD~se intell~nc~ broadc~at be 

monitorpd and fo1'¥·ared int • Be wNrt to Port. Rmt, Virr.1.nla, 

jut do"'1 the- Potomac, wtM P. ll~~tati n Bo. 7 waa loCRted., anci alerted. 
.. 

·-· 

the officer in charge thez:~ to watch for e repetition of words, which would 

appear unndat•·IA.bl7 in the JBM.n~~e .lllPS~e that We.ahillf.'ton Y'8Jlted. The 

Bpttcific Japan•ae code words •verei not given to r.ithPr monitoriJ1€ &t!ltiono 

Eec1usp the SignRl Corps monitor at~tions had no JapaDPae lin,;aista, Lieuten.'Ult 

Colon~l ~t•lt-Y T. GtleRt, chipf of thl- Connunications Liaison Division in 

thP OfficP. of thP Chi~f Signal Officer, lllFl.de arra.ngemP.nts with the F~deral 

Communications Commiasion to bP. particuliirly '·atchf'ill of all voice broadicasts from Japan, and g?a.Ve th~ com:niasion thP 11.:ngliah transl~tions of the 

cod~ words. lR Intelligence officers agrP.ed that an 

18 (1) JCC P.e-:..rinf;'B, Pt. 10, Tt!stimoey of Major Robert Silukraft, 

pp • .491.4-4Cll9 ano. Teatimor>T of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, pp. 4628-"659. (2) 

ill.S•o Pt. 290 Exhibit 1.45, APBB Proceedings, Testimony of Colonel Otis K. 

Sadtler, 

_____ 

pp. ,_ 2427-24)3. 

authentic implf'menting "winds" messace when it came would have to conform 

in all respects to the conditions ou.tlined by th~ two intercepted messages; 

1 t ,~·ould not be enough if only part of thP conditions were met. 'Die Japan••• 

w~re meticulou~; it would be out of character for them to 

Pae 780 (cont) 

deviate in 8.1\Y detail from their pre-arranged code. In add! tion0 there 

was the fact th•lt they had sttt up t.he code for 11se in case the ordinary 

me~ns of camrnunication ~ere cut off o i'he embassiPI thlty would be attempting 

to reach in such a case wonld be listening ~t the timP. and under the exact 

conditions spP.cifiedo In the next few dO¥B, several mesRages werP. intercepted 

which bore somtt rPsemblRDCe to the expectPd "•inda" coci.e message, but none 

of them fitt~d the whole pattern~ 

Meanwhile, the new Chief "S'rinal OfficeP, Oener3l Olmstead, was too 

deeply engrossed in matters sur~~~t~I or niv.ation to pay much at l.ention 
.. 

• 6 196 

to the S~ Corps' intelligence :functionsa He was less inter~steci 1n 

c171>tographic activities and the r.nagic• int•rcepta tbRn bis pred.ecPaaor, 

General Mauborgne, who had had cqptO@'n.phic training at Fort Leavenworth in the 

1900'•· 19 Ol1118tea.d ... bave IHD an 

· 19 ~., Emibit ll.70 Pt. 31,, Clarke l'nvestiga.tion (Friedolln), p. 83. 

!he chief of Al'll\Y m111tal7 1ntelligPD.ce, General Sherman Mile• said "geceral 

Mauborgne WRB principally reaponsiblP. for that mRgnificent work of brFakiltg 

those codes.• Ibid. 0 Pt. 20 p. 95Lo 

occasional measagea Colonel Sac:lt.i.er, who was in daily intimate contact with 

11magic 0 1 wa.s deep~ interfstecl ant1. concerned. He belived th.Sit war was coming 

very aoono When he found tba.t ~llPra.l Olme.t"ad was pls.nning onc:e more to 

atl.:.rt on his delqed trip to the Cu.ribbean area. 

Page 781 (con•t) 

Se.dtler tried to dissu~de him. Olmstead was leaving on December 2, taking 

with him ColonPl Bickelhaupt &Md. Major Harold O. Bixby, an officfJf from the 

personnel Division OA•hom OlmstPEd "'as planning to assign in Trinidad. Colonel 

SadtlPr thought positively ~bat war would be dP.clar@d before Ge~eral Olmstead 

,,."' 

returned and that it was the Ch:lef Signal Officer's duty to be in 'lfashin?-"1;014 

Olmstead answered. thlt.-la we.a goir.g a~~ and that that was all there. was to 

ito 20 

_;& 

20 ~o 11 Ei'hibi t 1.47, Ft. 34 ( Sadtlel-:") 0 PPo R?-880 

Colonrl Sr1dtlr-r was in daily con.tact w:i. t.h his Navy counterpart 0 Admiral· 

NOJP&o At aiJout 9:30 on th• morning of December 50 Noyeis called Sadtler and 

told him •the IIHtBB&ge 11. in," or words to that effe-ct 0 and asked him to 

')l inform G-2o ~ Colone1. Sadtler asad Adm5.ral Noyes which 

SECRET 

Page 782 
•. 

• 

meesagp 1 t wH.s, and NoyP.a replied that hp thought it was the Jap-...neaeBri tisho ColonPl Sa.dtlf'r immP.diately went to GenerA.l. Miles• office. just 

down thP. hall from his own in thP Munition.a Bllilding, and reported the informationc ~nPral Miles ce.lled Colonel Bra.tton in, and Bratton after hea.rinc 

the ne11·s, BUg"f1' ~tP.d that this mf'Jasage might be another false alarmo He 

asked Sa.dt.ler to get verification of it from the Admiralo Colonel Sadtler 

therefore returned to his office and called Admiral Noyes ~ the secret 

telf'f..hone connection between the t••o officeso Noyes SR.id 

fa.gr 782 (con•t) 

that he would be unable to verify the mPssap at the moment becau~• he bad 

to atL~nd a meP.ting, but that be Pould do it latero Colonel Sacltler answered 

that later would be too lateo 22 

Sad.tler rPported this latest conversation to General Miles 9 and then returnPd to his office very much dist1trbedo To him thP. winds execate message 

mP.ant war, and ~ had no doubt that this \fB.8 indeed an execute meas&geo 

He felt that a warnifJl' should be srnt to all overse-!ls departmentsa ~· 

mop hP thou~t about it, theo grreteir concf'm he felt,, Sitting down at 

hie typewrit@'r, hP type-d out a drgft of a JnPssgge he interided to recommend 

bf'! ~ent to the oversP~s COJl'lllll:lnders in th! Philipnine Islands, Ha.a11, and 

Reliable infornation indicates vrar with Japan Vfl!IY 

nP.ar future stop ~ P.VP.r"Y precaution to prevent re~etition 

of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy atop °MJl.rshe.llo 2J 

Technically. Sa.dtler bad d a·Ch.--;;:§EdRrf-;:: nsil>ili ties when he had reportrd the original call from iral Noyes t General Milelo Bu.t Sadtler 
• ~BEiro~196 ----1' 

was a man of action, and he was convinced that this u-.easagP. was real, and 

that the overseas coflllllElnden ou¢it t.o be w~medo With this in mind. he 

want to see General Gerow in ftar Pl1m1 Division, General 

Pye 783 (con• t) 

Staff; h .. repP.ated his story~ and sus.~eat.d that a , •. a.ming bf' sent to Panama.0 

the Philippines. and Ba:111ai:i' •. o General ~row said he tbougbt that the commanders 

1nthose areas bad had ample notificatfon, and the matter was droi;,ped. Still 

dissatisfied, Colonel Sadtler made one mor~ attempto He went t.o s .. e the 

aecrPt'3.Jy of the- General Staff, L!auteuant Colone-1 Walter Bo Smith. who he 

knew would havr direct access to l.~ners.l Milrshal :.., and again told. his story o 

Smith a.sked Sad.tier what he had <'Lone, BJ'.'.d upon le~rning that Sadtler baa. already' talked to G-2 and to war f'lans, Smith said he did not wish to discllBs 

it furthero 24 

Sadtler did not show his propo:1ed ';arnin@: message to eitherGerow or Smitho 

Unfortunately, the message was losto Colon pl Sadtler later checked with 

members of hie office staff; n>ne had a.ny recollection of the- message, or 

ind~rd of his having written ito Colonl!'l Sadtl~r typ~d the mes~age himself, 

made no cow of it, and did nr.t J.cnow what hecama of 1 t, althout;h he had 1n-

~-~r1rd to keep ite2S 

2S Ibido, Pto 35, Clauser Inv.-P-tig:;.tionD Affidavit of Col.onel Otis K.1 

Sa.d tl.-r, Po 209., 

Of the IDBIJ1' aspects of thl!' Pr-9.rl Harbor attack, probably none confused 

the subsei'itient im•estig~ting .umr..e~ the conflicting tcstimo~ n-

~rding the 111Vinda" messages Ez-~J thP. Roberts 
.. 

• 

Commission, all investigatons probed into thP DRtt•r, ana all concluded. that 

no tri.ie nwind88 ex"cutP wa.e in fact broA.dc.~st prior to ~cember 80 Aa for 

th~ Sadtler converaetion, Gen~ral ~row testified that h~ did not recall the 

incident, but that it was possible that Sadtl•r had told h1m of nan unveri:l'iecl 

report,• or that h• had rftcetv .. d nsome tentative inforuation that was ~ubJect 

to confirm.~tionn• 26 Nor did Colonel Smith recall Sadtler•s visit to hi• 

26 JCC Hearings, Pto 35, Clausen Investigation, Affidavit of Lieutenant 

Oen•ral Leonard T. Gero•, p. 1625. 

offic•. It •as not a mattPr over which h• would have had 8IJ1' r•sp.>nnibility D 

be eatd, since it was a controversy br.tw~•n the chif'fs of int.lligence a.nci 

war plane, and both w0t1ld have hli.d dinct access to Oerieral Marshal.la Smith 

added that he himself was not an 8 ultra• officer0 ·so that Sadtler could not 

have given him ~ information which would have persl.VidP.d him to take the 

initiative. :l7 Colon~l Bratton r•~mber•d Sadtler•s visit to Gerow'• 

office, and corroborated the essential detailso Bratton added tbat he· did 

not aee Sadtl•r ag~in about thr. matter, but did call the Navy and the Signal . Intelligence Service to ask if SJ'3 winds mes~age bad been receiv•d, and was 

told thr:. t none ha.d come ino 28 Admi!"E"= 1 Noy~s did not 

Pa£e 785 

rf'Call talking to Sadtler, a.lthouf:h he said that be might have done so, 

bftcaua" he did talk to him almost eVe'f7 da.Y.. Noyes was convinced that the 

measag~ was not a tnie •xecuteo 29 

29 ~D 0 :Ptn 100 Po lt'7..~Aht'!-A~ tinu.f'd to mo~itor for an tmplementing message until aftf!r the 0.lW[F On onP exeetite 0 broadcast from 

• 786 
.. 

• 

Tokyo JLG4 a.pd J'l.J on December 8, 1941, end picked up by the :rec monitoring 

at9.tion is acceptPd as compl~tely authentico It conformed to the code in 

all rf:'spects, and apparently was intendtid for the Japa1u~ae emba.ssy in London, 

since it mentionPd on]¥ Britian. American intelligence offir.ere interrogating 

the heed of the Japan Bad.to Broadcasting Corporation aftrr the end of the war 

confirm that no winds execute message was bro~dcast until after the attack bad 

be~, and that this message _mentioned only England.. Blport g! ~ Joint ~ 

mlttl'" .!!,! l!!! Investigation!?!_~ Pearl Harbor AttaE_!0 Appen E, P. 476. 

Follo•ir!8 his second telephon• conversation with Admiral Noye1 about a 

possible •~inds" execute message, Colonel Sad.tler did nothing furth~r to 

ascertain from AdmirA.l Royea or ~on~ else the exact wording·of the intercept~ 

So f:ar as he knew, nothil'lg mor,. was done by the Arll\V to get add.iUonal informatiol'l from NoyPe, but he assume"d that the basis of the infonia.tion he 

~.!!. ~ (conot) 

had received from Royea vas an actual ex•cute lllP.BS8i:e, which according to 

etands.1rd practice wo\1).\. be tranemittt!d witno~.it delay to G-2 of thE' Amyo 30 

30 JCC Hearings, Pt. 35, p. 96. 

Since the next ~. Saturcis_y, DecEmb•r 6, fell on an ev•n-number~d date, the 

Army w· s responsiblr for proc~ssing "magic11 mess~es. Ee.rly thf1.1; morning, 

Tokyo filed a mPssage which ~as interceptPd by a Navy station at about 7:20 

A.M., and which info.nned th~ Ja~..nese amtassadol'B in 1fa.shington that the Japanese 

Govenunent woulQ forward a long memorandum for th• United Statre Government. 

It would b• BPnt in fourtPPn parts, !;\11~ th• envoys ~ould ~ informed by still 

anothermessage when they should deliver it to the Un:i.ted States C~overment • .3l 

The Navy sent this "pilot" message in coce to thP Arn\Y' at five minutes past --·- ---~·-·---. 

31 ~ .• Pt 12, p. 239 

SECRET 
·. m§,fC~bf:A.196 • .__ ____ , 

noon. Signal~tell1gence Service civilian employees ordinarily worked 

only until noono 'By three ov clock. the persons still ~n duty had decoded1 

translEtted, and typed the message. T'.aere \\'aB of course no wey of !mowing 

what would be in the memorandum when it c~e, but Colonel Minckler called 

up YaJor ShukrR.ft, •ho had been ill and off duty that morning, and asked 

him to come ln and ate¥ until the expected message arrived., Shukra.ft did 

come, and stSl'E>d all nigh ta Working with him was a civilian, Frank :a. 

Rowlett, later lieuteneJlt colonel, who at that time was the assistant 

~1!! (con•t) 

chief of the code and cipher sectiono 

llY the middle of the aftP.rnoon, l) pirta of the expected message 

were in, but there was nothing significant in themo 32 :Both services 

sca'lned all incoming messages anxiously, and there was a feelifl@: that some .. 

how they ha4 missed the fourteenth pa.rt. Actually, they had not; it came 

in late that night, filed twelve hours after the first pe.rts, and in a 

different code .. 33 At aey rate, by 9 o'clock SB.turtiay night the first 

thirteen parts, bad been decoded, typed and pa.r.sed along to Colonel Bra.tton•s 

officeo Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury were on ducy that night, and 

Bratt.on strwed until all or ne!!.rly all of the thirteen parts bad been 

received, but decided that there was nothing pe.rticula.rly alarming in them., 

The Navy distributed the thirteen parts of the message that night to the 

White Rouse, and t~ the high-ranking Mav official& on the 11lll.tra11 lis~o 

General Miles happened t be din~ with Admiral Wilkinson, his lavy counter- SEC0 

part, o oth~r than C lonel ~ratton and General Milea 0 and. saw the mes 
• 

it does not appear that the message wa.s delivered to any other Army men 

th."lt night. }4 

E!e ~ (con•t) 

)4 Ibid., Pt. 100 Testimony of Colonel Rufus So Bratton, PPo 45rY1-

At 2s3B A~M. on December 70 there was filPd in Tokyo ~a intercepted 

by a Navy monitoring station between )gO; ann J:lO A.M. the fourteenth 

and final pa.rt o~: the Japanese message. As subsequently decoo.eci. by the 

Navy0 the significant part of the mess~e readg 

The Japanese Government rP.grets to hr"l.ve to noti:f) 

hE·.·eby the American Government that in view of the 

attitude of the American GovernmP.nt it cannot but consider 

taat it is impossible to re~ch an agreement through further 

:1egotiati.insft 35 

35 .JCC Bearings, Pt. 120 l!:xhibits 0 Record of Intercepts 0 p. 2.45a 

The fourteenth part -... as available in the Na"y DapartmPnt for distribution 

e. t som.! time bet.,een 7: 30 and 8 ou clocl< Sund.a¥ morning0 December 7 ft 

The lavy delivered this part to the White House and to Secretary Knox 

sh~rtly before 10 Ao Ma The War Department starte~ deliver,y to ita 

officials and to the State Department at 9 Ao M.o 

Even if the fourteenth part of the~ Japanese memor9.fldum had not clearly 

indicated the imminence of war, two "magic" intercepts •hich followen would 

have removed all doubt. The last one 1::cmtained final instructions to the 

Jap-~n"Be embassy concerning the destru1::tion of' codes a.-nd &Feret papers: 

After deciphering pa.rt ii. of my No. 902 and also l!Tos. 

907, 908, and 9 0 plcA:ee - . at once the remaining cipher 

machine and all chiSEeJftEr· ispose in like manner also 

secret documents 

P e ·790 
., 

• 

'Ibis came in shortly after. another even more significant intercept, 

the •one o•clock" measr..ge. end was distributed at approxim;;..tely the same 

time. The •one o•a:lock:• message aaidl 

Will the .Ambassador please submit to the United 

Stlltea Government (if por,sible t.o the Secretary of State) 

our reply to412~e United St."3.tes at l:OO P.M. on the 7th. 

7our time. "' 

36 Ibid.• Pt. 12, p. 21.8. 

This dispatch was filed b7 the Japanese at 1.:18 A. Y. on December 7, 

and intercepted. bf the Ba'VY monitor!~ station at Biinbricige Island 

in the state of w~ahington at l.a-p A. "· It was decrypted a.nd avaib.ble 

in the :Mavy Department at About 1 o'clock:, but ·there w-as no Navy translator 

on duty at the time, so the Navy sent the disp·-ltch over to the Aruw for 

translation. It was returned at about 9 o•clock. 

'ftlereafter, throughout the morning, the fourteenth pa.rt of the lcmg 

message, the •one o'clock:" d1spn.tch0 and thff codes destNction message 

~·ere distributed to variou.a militaey officials as they ca.ine into their 

offices. In the Ravy Department 0 officers were discussing the implications 

of the l'-pa.rt meanage when the "one o8 clock" message was h=mded to them. 

Aa was routine procedure, the men set up a time zone cha.rt, on which the 

"l:OO PoMD yoar time" was translated into San Francisco., Honolulu, Manila 

and Tokyo timeu In the course of delivery to Secretary BullOs office, a 

naval aide mentioned that l P.M. Washington time 111as about dawn at Honolulu 

E!e, 790 (con• t) · 

and the mi0.<1le of the night in the Far Easto Bllt no one deduced that 

the mes~age meant an attack on Pearl Harbor. 37 

'Y'I Ibid., Pt. 8 (C ptain McCollum, USN) 11 pp. 33CJ3-3396, ~. 

--- SECRET 

3.4)6-:JLJ7 and (CaptainK er, USR), pp. 910-)912. 
.. 

,. 

~A.196 I 

• 

• 

'lhe Ar,v•s chief of Fn.r.Eatem intelli@'ence, Colonel Bratton. came 

down to his office between 7 and R o•clocko ibere he sRw the fourteenth 

p:trt of the long mes a«e, and sent it over to the State Dep'lrtme.nto 

Around nine o•clock1 the "one o•c1oc1cn message W'38 placed in his hancis. 

Colonel Bratton had been waiting for some indication of where or when 

the JapaneBe would launch aggressive action. To him, the "one o'clock" 

mearage spelled. 011t one of the a.nsr-ers, as to timeo '!be next hours were 

confused. !Uld ~ectico l3r-\tton launched a srries of hurried conferPnces and. 

telephone calls. The se~uence of events is not ~ntirely clear, but at 

8.ll1' rate, when he ca.lled Gener-:1.l Marsball9s quarters, the GenP.r-:1.l•s aide 

informed Bratton that the Chief of Staff was horseback rid11'1€:, ns was 

~·is Sundlq moming custom. Marshall ai:-rarently :t"et~ed. almost immediately 

after t.he telephone call, notified Bratton that he woUld be at his office 

within ~ few minute-BG and. did in fact arrive shortly af'ter 11 o0clock:a In 

the meantime 0 General Gerow and G~nerql Miles ha~ arrived at their offices 

~ 791 (convt) 

and hrul se1=n the messagesa .38 

)8 .!El!· 0 Pt. 10 (Bratton) 0 PPo 46~628 and Pt., 11 (Marshall)" 

PPo 5175ff, and Pt. 2 (Milea) 0 p. 9260 

General Me.rshall agreed th-"lt the "one o"clock" message meant trouble., 

He wrote out a mesPage in longhand to be sent to his field cor.mnR.nners as 

an additional warning to thosp, they bad already receivedo Before sending 

it; he called Admiral StArk to confer .,,.ith him. Stark felt t.hat the Navy 

co~.manders had received sufficient warning and hesitated to s~~ anything 

morP lest he confuse them. However 0 before Marshall bad finished wri t.ing 

the message. Stark got in ... with M:::=: ~l and asked him to acid to the 

SECRET 
• 1RE~EWJ"A.6ll96 • 

dispatch the usual expression to infonn the Naval officerao General Marshall 

added this portion to his l~nd draft. to be sent to thP. Western Defense 

Command, the Panama Command, the Hawaiisn Command and the Philippine Commandc. 

It reads 

ihe Japanese P..re presenting at l P.'Mo E:latem Standard 

time, tod.~, what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are 

unoer orders to destroy their code DBchine immeciiatel.To 

Just wh"i.t ai~ifica.nce the hour set may have we do not 

know, but be· on the alert a.ccord.il'Jl'l.Y. Inform naval authorities 

of this co11111UDic~tion. )9 

39 121!· , Pt. 3 (Marah9.ll) • pp. 1105-11160 

Marshall handed the draft to Colonel Bratton "llh instructions to take 

it to the mes!:!age center to be dispe.tched immedigtel.yo As he left the 

E!:e m (con•t) 

office, !ratton heard. Gerow say, "If there is a ~uestion of priority, 

give the PhilippinP.s precedence." 

In his office at the War Department Signal Center, Lieutenant Colonel 

F.dw~rd F. French was on du'Qr 11 aa he had been every Sun~ morning for several 

reekso 'Dle volume of work in the center was very heav, and. denano.ed. hie 

attention most of the timei besides, he felt it his d.llty to be on hand d.llring 

so critical a period should any nunroreseen cirr.umstancen arisea 40 111en 

J.o_ Ibid., Exhibit 143, Pt. 2.3, Testimony of Colonel Ed.ward. F. French 

pp. 1102-1105. 

Bratton came in, obviously excited, a.nd asked to go into the code roomo 

telling French that the Chief of Ste.ff had a very import~t message to 

41 Ibid., Pt. 9 (B ton), p. 

., 

:• 

. 
• 

• 

set his code men to work a1; once, and left :Br!:!.tton in the code room while 

he went to the operating room to check the Honolulu circut, which had been 

fading out that morning. Tbe Hawaiian Deiartment h.r:i.d regu.la.rly sctiecl:aled 

radio co11111UI1ication with the War Department, but both were on ~he air all 

the time, and suppo7edly W9.sh1ngton could reach Fort Shafter aey timeo 

However, both stat.ion 1'AR in Wa.abi~ton and '1TJ at Fort Shsfter bad only 

10-kllowatt trar.SJDitters, powerful enollgh to maintain contact under good 

atmospheric croditions, but unreliable becalU!e of st~tic interference and 

fadinf if cr.nditiona ~ere poor. Lieuten9.nt Colonel Carroll Ao Pow~ll, 

the Hs.wai'.J.n Department signal officer, bad asked for a more powerful set 0 

such ast1&e 25-kilowa.tt station the Nevy h!\d, but the A1'll\Y hu only recently 

been ."'elea.sed from its previous ag-reement with the Navy to use stat.ions of 

no r.iorf: than 10-kilowatt po\Ver. and lack of funds. couplP.d with length¥ 

p:ocurement procedurPs, power, bA.Cl prevented the remeaying of whrit Powell 

consid.ered a definite mili ta.ry weaknessa 42 At l~.40 in the mom.ing, Hawaii 

had been in direct contact with Wasn i~ton, ·~learlr'l(J correct ionso The 

readability was four, which was very pooro By 4g20 conditions were so bad 

that signals were not clearing, and Hawaii shifted to another fre~uen~ 0 

from 8160 kilocycles 1.0 12240 kilocyclP-s, in an attemi.t to hear. ~ 5 o•clock0 

Hawaii was unable to h13ar Washington on the 1221.o fre'i.uency, and at 7:20 it 

shifred to l2090u and .:i little laterto 12075, hoping to break througho 

At 7f30 it shifted oncH mo!'f 0 this time' to 1600, .43 and h~1·d Washington 

4:; Ibid., pto 22, Po 2l8o Pres11m~bly Colonel Powell was speaking 

of 1600 megacycles, and otM.,fjRfJaid ,ooo kilocycj;eleso 

e 791. 
RESEQRffA6~196 • 

•. 

again, but interference from the San Francisco atation0 '."1VY0 made it impossible 

to get al\Y messages thro~h or to ma.int•,.in unbroken contacto 

l!!! 'J.2!!. (COD I t) 

At five mlrmtea past nine o•clock0 We.shington told Ba.wail it would rEtl.q 

thrQJgh San Francisco., JJ. 

4L Ibid .. --

Colonel French w88 responsible for choosing the melills of transmission 

for the vital message Bratton hP..d banded him. !here weretthree thilJi!;S to 

consideri: apeeci, a.ccuraey0 and secrecy.. Of these, French consiciered accuracy most important; he bad cautioned his operato1'8 in setting up the 

coded mes~¥,e to be sure that there_.-ere no errors in it, bees.use he did 

not want it garbledo The second considera.tion0 speed, he decided would be 

aiost easily met by commericial trnnsmiesion by w:v of San Francisco,. He 

had two circuits avail.able, Postal Telegraph and Western Union-ICA.. If he 

chose Postal 'lelen·aph, the message would bave to go to Rew York, be rel.a.Yed 

through the multiplex machine in Chicago0 and then sent to San Francisco0 

with relS¥ fromtthat point to commereial cable, and transmission to Hawaii 

by cable~ Western Union had a direct wire to San Francisco, and a tube 

across the street thPre to the RCA facilities, a power1·?1l 40-kilowatt 

stationo Be knew also that there was a teletype line direct from the 

Honolulu office of Western Union to the sigll"ll office at Fort Sbaftero ~ 

Wh.9t he did not know was that the teletype would not be in operation on 

Sunday morning, and that the warni~ when it arrived would be delivered by 

hand messengero 4S 

-SECREfi.s Ibid .. 0 Exhibit 145, Pt. Zl, .APHB, o 106, llOo (2) ~o 1 Exhibit 
.. 

·. 

•. 

__ 

RE-i8EiftEFA6 19 6 

, • • 

Bratton had delivered the h.lllld1Fl"itten message into French'• hands 

at ll:SO" Eleven minutes later, thf War Department Signal Center bad 

typed it for clar~ty, had it authenticated by Bratton, encoded 1t, and filed. 

it for transmisdon t1•ith Western Union; aixteen minutes after·• that, the 

teletype transmission bad been~completed And the message was on its •8' 

to Hawaii from San J'rancisco6. RCA in Honolulu J?.CP.ived it at 1:03 P.Mo 

which waa 7:33 A.lln Hawaiian time. It took '6 minutes en route, the mx1lllWll 

of tbe time that Colonel French.bad estimated when he told Colonel Bratton 

that it would re's.uire from thirty to forty-five minutes to reach B"awa11 .. 

Meantime, General Mqrsball had sent Br~tton back to the Center to 

in~uire once more whether the mes~~ooes 11•culd r£!ach field comma.naers before 

the one 011 clock dea.clline mentioned in the Japanese interr.epta Marshal.L 

waited in thP. deeptest concern; no one had told him that. the Ariqy circuit 

to IJawaU could not be usPdo On his desk was a scrambler telephone 0 which 

rendPrs convf!rsation a h-1.sh of me~inglPss ~ouncis. unsc:rs-...mbled at the receiving 

end, but a.s lf!-1.Tsh-'ll.l testified latf>r, it did not occur to him to use the 

he telef,hone, al though· n·Uh it ~/could have reached the field commanders in a 

matter of minuteso The scrambler telephone was conslde~ed "privated but 

' ' not "aecute," which is to sey that it could be ta~ped by eneltlf agents, and 

' 

if the "one o'clock" message had in fact mPant a break in diplomatic relations 

and not an attack, e.n intrrcept of thP. Chief of StaffOs conversation mi~t 

have upsP.t the delice.te balance of international relations, and miftlt. also 

have revesled to the Japanese that the Americans poi;sessed "~ico" /.6 

46 Ibido, Exhibit Noo 143, Pto 2), Roberts Commission (Marshall) 0 Po 1081. 

As for Color.el French, the scrambler tel~phone was not a facility over which 

SECRET 
•. Em'fC~bf:A 8196 • • 

'French would have considered it WlBUi table for the transmission of classified. 

messagP.&o 47 There v:ere otiler f'acil 1 tie11 th.s:i. t French could have used, however 0 

47 Ibido I Exbibi t l~Oo 145, Pto 27 D APBB, PPo 105, 110 and Exhibit Boo 

l!~l. pt. 23, Boberts Cor.amission, pp. 1102-110,o 

either to send the DXISB&ge originally or to re~•.t ito He lmew that the 

NaVJ' bad a much more powerful radio transmitter, and he hlld upon occasion 

sent measagea to tJawaii via the Nav facilities~ .But he assWiled. that since 

the A:nq chsnn':l "aa unusua.lile, the Navy would be having difficult.7 that 

mornintr, too. It would have taken time t.o check "ith the Rav. and in 81\f 

event, tht Navy would have h"-Cl to deliver the mess?lge fromtheir facilities 

at Pea.ri Barl;;·~r to A~ head1t,ll0rters at l"ort Shafter, dela.y~ delivery 

~ 'J:!L (con• t) 

sti 1.i furthPro French did not know tb8t a third radio tr~smitter belonging 

t~ the FedFral :Bureau of Investigation was avail~ble, and waa in fact clear 

that momingo '8 

.l.8 Ibido 

- tihetheir the course of events would have been altered. and in vhat wa.v ~ haci 

another means of transmitting the messagt, been chosen, must remain 1orev"er 

supposition. nzt 'Mis the failure of COIJ'lml.111ications and not the selection 

ofaan improper channel that occasioned the del~ an ~ 

49 Congress of the United States, Heport ~!!!!Joint Committee 

.!!!'.! ,lh! Investig<;tion .!l!, ,!h! Pearl Harbor Attack (Wash.,, D.Co. 19.46) 0 p. 226. 

Lieutecant Colonel Powell 0 
... . , • RE-~-A6~196 --'1 • 

Page 798 (Contd) 

was resting from a trip to the mainland. from which he had ret11meci. on 

December J.D He haci gone to obec?rve radars at work in field training 

maneuvers, JJ.t continental a.ircnft wa.ming sites, and in the laboratories; 

since his assitaUDent to Hawaii in OctobP.r 19.lo, he had been actively pushing 

the development of the Aircr-i:i.ft Warning Service in thP. islands. In traini~ 

exercbPs with the Navy and the Air Corps, his radars had performed well; 

the "a.tt.a.cki~" planes from an aircraft c~rrirc bad been detectea. 80 milea 

a"·D.y, and the "cif'f ending" pursuit aircraft hq,d bePn .. • o o •