APPDDIX 

• 

GUIDE LINES FOR SECURITY CIASSIFICATION 

-~--

:ection ~ 

°1J'.il.iERAL I 1 

I'JP SECRET CODEWORD II 5 

q '! "'!~E!T CODE.'WORD III 5 

'ml-' SECRET IV 6 

31!.l!aET v 6 

COllFIDEUTIAL VI 7 

i l!Y CIASSIPTI:D VII 8 

S~CTIOIT I - GE!·!E!t'\. T, 

1. The cla.io-::i:t'ying of information and material withir, tr.~ cr:.rptologic 

field is an in·ml--e--1. and complex problem Every docur1iL11t ~o i.:~ classified 

must be considered as belng unique and one whose cl.assif'ica.+i'J~ .i.::. 'lependent 

on factors existin5 within that document alone. The dech:·'_c:: a!l to the 

proper classification ot' a docur.Jent cannot arbitrarily be .~,.-:crm:.ned by 

referra.l to other documents or to specific rules and regah.ti,:ns. :::a.ch item 

of information or material r.tu.st be ad.judged solely on ics ov.1 1ierits a.nd 

classified accordinB to its content There are, however, ~~~'""'..~;, basic principles of classi.fication which will be of assistance to ir.ri._:viduals within 

the Cr<JPtologic i'ield in the solution of their classifi-:::a.tjc~ problet:is .. a..'1d 

it is proposed to set forth these basic principles in t!: :.s r:ocu-:ient 

2. As a basis for classification, it is necessary that all personnel 

be thoroughly conversant with the security classifications e~ ;;a.blished by 

Executive Order 10501: 'roP SECRfil', SECRE:'J' and COH;."IDEilTIAL. 'l'nese security 

classifications can be stated as follows: 

a.. Top Secret: Except as may be expressly provided by statute, 

the use o'f the classification Top Secret snall be authort~i:.d. b~' appropriate 

authority, only :for defense ini'orma.tian or t'IB.tertal which !'f-~uires the 

highest degree of protection The Top Secret classificatior. s~~ll be applied 

only to tha.t inf'orme.tion or material the defense aspect of ,."e.i.~h is paramount. 

and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in ~xc~ptionally grave 

damage to the nation such as l.ca.dinB to a definite bree...~ i :-_ n :tp .... omatic relativ-ns 

a.:ffecting the defense of the United States, an armed at:..ack against the United 

States or its allies, a war. or the compromise of militar:· •.10.· defense plans, 

or intel.ligence operations, or scientific or teclmologkal ~-=velopments vital 

to the national defense. 

b. St-cret: Except as may be expressly provided ·i'.' / statute, the use 

of the clas.-.1.'!'~on Secret shall be authorized, by app1,.p,..i1.:i:te authority, 

only for defe~ae information or material the unauthorized ~.~closure of which 

could result in serious damage to the Nation. such as by .~e?pO.rdizing the ;7.f 

international relations of the United States, endangering ~he effectiveness 

of a program or policy of: vital importance to the national lefense, or compromising important military or defense plans, scientific 0x t~~~nological 

Appendix to ~ Regulation 

SECRE"'f'..,.r lS>- dated 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-07-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
• 

GUIDE LINES ror: ~.?CURITY CIASSI!'ICATIONS (Sect I2b Cont'd) 

developnents ilt.por-c.: ... ~~t to national defense, or information revealing 

important intellipence operations. 

c. r.o~~i~~ot1al: Except as may be e;c:rressl.y provided by 

statute, the ~!-the ~lassi!ication Ccntidential shall be authori~ed 

by appropriate <i.ut: ... .'J"t"ity, only for defense information or material the 

unauthorized ~iR~i-~\...~e or which could be prcjudi~ial to the defense 

interests or t.ht: •iation. 

d. ~·::~tial - Modified Handling Authori~ed: :·L.:..~ toes r.ot 

constitute a se • ..:s.•:e::~c 1:1 •• ad distinct classit'ication category. · r!'::.t"illr.'ltion 

must meet -t.rw ,·~qv..:. "t"f:'.!'"11.:;nts set dovn :i.bo·re tor Confidential l.""J:l. .... f'ri~l. 'l'he 

ad.di tion o! the notation "modified handling authorized' onJ .i :J•- ,~;_ts 

modification or the storage e..~d transmission procedures. c·f..~.t ... ,,.r u sc ., .... t::s -'? 

~ Within t!~ cryJ)tologic field we mu.st provide eve~ n:.~-e saregU:Lrd3 

tor our activiti~~ tht:i:i are provided !or under the standard ~:~UJ"ity classi-

!'ications. Bero::•· 2'.~iy orr1ci3.l cr,tptologic :tnrorma.tion is L._, oe dissem:l.!13.ted, 

it must be deter .. •ined that the recipient has a need.-to-ln~ow !ntormation or 

an uncl:lss:;.ried n·, r,ucc pertinent to the misaion or CJ. cryptolc•e.ic activity 

should not be discussP.d with a.1.1.yone except for o!'t"icia.1 1J\.i.. •• '.... c;-.1 :purposes. 

4. Beyond '!:"le basic cla.ssi:f'ications established by ···<•"r>uti·re Order. it is 

recogn1zed.tb.a.t trPre are special considerations which must c& r.onsidered 

separately bf.:C&use or their inherently sensitive nature. These specid.l ·~onsiderations pertain to specific categories or cornnrunicatioLs intelligence 

(COMIYI') and ~re identified by the assign_~ent or a distinctive ccxle"~ord. The 

classification or C0MINT involves two disti~ct consid.erati0~s: the security 

ot' the intorma.tion anti the sensitivity or the source rrorr. -• .'."'··:fr the information was deriYed. Either or both considerations rray a!!ert the classification, dependent l...'Pon whether the information or the sou.o.:- is the more 

sensitive. 

5. lnitially, COMINT material comes to this Agency as r·,..v traffic which 

bas been intercepted by field station activities throughout the world. 'rhis 

tra.ttic is classitied no lover than cor~IDENTIAI. until such time as an 

analytical. processing is begun. l"rom the analysis o:r thi·~ ~ .i.W traffic, we 

derive three types ot intelligence. 

a. Cryptintelligence is that COMINT which rest:l t;f • .,. ~'llll cryptanalysis 

of the systems utilized by message originators to prote~t T:ie tratt'ic during 

its transmission. This inclules speech and facsimile sec· .. .-:.· "v;f systems. 

b. Traffic intelligence is that COMD.'T which reR\~l i..a !rom tra.t'fic 

analysis of' intercepted. electrical cOlllllUD.ications. Tb.is i..r-: '::udea <XJMINT 

produced by all means short ot crypta.ns.lysis ot messag~ tf?'xtfl._ 

c. Intelligence derived from the ana.lysis o:t' pla:::text traffic. 

SECRET=- Appendix to BSA Begul.at1on :lumber 120- dated 

2 . 

........... llii--ITl'-'lll·1m•·;•.•'r•n_. ...... .--·~r•rllllilli'Mr•s•· .... ·•·1~,--~----~<~~ 

............ _ 
• 

GUIDE LilllES !'OR 3~Cu~7Y CLASSIFICATIONS (Section l 6 Cont 1 d) 

6. Intorma~i~n .~~~ived from these three a.na.lyti~al ~rocesses 

(cryptanalysis, t:~Z:ti~ a.nal.ysis and pl.aintext analysis) is divided 

into three securi~~ ~ategories. 

a. Cat·:~· •L"y ..:II COMINT (Top Secret Codevorn) is the mo-;t 

sensitive category .;.nd contains information or the highest. c1.~~·:;ification 

whose source mus· -.... protected at all costs. In general, thi"- ·rlJl include 

information derived. tran cryptanalysis (except for designatec. t~1.1es or 

COO'NT) certai:r. :lE:5 :g:lllted types or pl.aintext and special ·:~a.t-ner .'ryptana.lyeis and Tra.f r~ . ..- Analys:i s or certain high level aystems es specified by 

existing e.uthori ··1i::s. "l'or additional items in this category. ~=e"! Section 

II. . .. , .... ,vet) (~l!~ft'E"Y .w 

b. Ca1,el~'>ry II 00.MINTAis l.ess sensitive than the prt!!!.!eding category 

and is one whose material can by acceptance or a calculated. r~sk be disseminated without o':""r-riding concern tor the security or the so-w-ce. In general, 

this vill inc~:oo.e "' !'a.!'!ic intelligence which has net been spec H'ically placed 

into other ca~ .. et,rir;~~ ':l.Ild cryptanalytic intelligence result:!.r:.-. t'rom the 

solution or cer: .. \in lov level codes i;md other security system:-.; a.s specified 

by existing authr. -i. t tes. l"or ad.di tional items in this Categr- 7, see Section 

III. 

c. Ca""·i?>Ol"'Y I CCMINT (Non-Codeword) is subject to the least 

restrictive regulations ot the three categories and will. include certain 

types or low level ceta.~JT as specitied by existing authorities. Material in 

this category will be classified no lower than CONFIDENTIAL without the 

assignment o:r any codeword. Extreme care must be utilized in placing OOMI~'l' 

in this category. (See paragraph 7, Section VI - CO~:FIDEN'J'l.r.: .• ) 

7. In e.dd .... ·i:1..-·n to these categories, there are certait;. ..... ther basic 

statements that ~1P acceptable as guide lines in determining classifications. 

a. C0}'1~'1' Yill norma1ly be considered as tailing v ... t.hin Category 

III except tor 11~.·n specific systems as have been mutually t'I.. -:~e-..! upon by tJ .. K. 

and the U.S. 1:0 oc 111 other categories. Tb.is list is avail.a:oie in PROD 

( NSA-0621) • 

b. Standing operating procedures, personnel report-:;, organizational 

charts and instruction manuals governing respective COMIN'l' ~·rganizations 

will be cl.ass·:..tied according to the intorms.tion contained -1:·~-:-·ein; those 

indicating operational capacity or success will be clasei~ied at least SEcnET. 

Clasaitication problems vhich cannot be resolved by the origi!'lator vill be 

referred to NBA Cl.assitice.tion Ad:visory ranel. 

c. ln re!'erence to type or cryptosystems .• the ter..lS "low grade", 

"medium grade" ~:1 ''high grade'' a.re otten used. De!initiom \)f these categories are a.a •"oll~we: 

SECRET AppendiY ~o 1'SA Regulation 

!lumber 1...~ .... - dated 
~ REF ID:A57417 ~ECRET 

(l~ lc•-grade1 Iertains to ~ cryptosystem which 

ott~rs only slight resicta.nce to ~rypta..~sis; 

tor t:: • .!n:ple: (l.) !'layf'3.i" ~irl:ers, (;;"'Single 

ti .:L..·:lt:osit1on, { 3.l Unencii:~r~a. or.e-pn.rt cC>1.es. 

( 2) !!'i:h • .:. grade 1 Pertains to a cryptosystem which 

orf~-s considerabl.e resistance to crypta.D!ll.ysis; 

t,1 =~i4Ple: ,1) Strip ciphers, ~2) Polyphase 

tr-·.:;l-"'"'itiQr,, I 3J U?:enciphered two-p"L::-t coC.c-:. 

~ : : },if!".-p,ra.ie, r ertains t.CJ a l' _·;pto. :ys tf".Jr. '.r!'".ir~r 

"r~:=-~s o. maximUl':l c-t resis1.rJ.!lce to ,..rypt'\"llLl.;,'.:;-1 ·: 

1'<.>'" P,-;:m1ple: (11 ~ampl.eJr cipher Jllll.ch!.r..es, , : ·~ .• Ji..:i.11h. "'ystems, ( 3) Unkno·m t\.:o-p:irt cuies enc::.r~-··i.:·ae 

""''l. .!· '\"l ad.di ti ve book. 

=:3. a. It must ne pointed out tlki.t 1 although the cr-nt ,cLll"""Lic tech..111q,ues 

=...1:1aociatec' v:th a snP"!U'ic operational cryptoaystem taJ.l i:rt.o ::t..tt:.;c.ries II!, 

II or I, neverthe!es~ a detailed description ot the ~rocedures ano general 

principle::; ".~'lderl.y1.:;-! the solution o~ a type cryptos:ystem may be of lower 

clasaitication er r.~!~ 1mcl.aasitied., e.g., the sclutio~ of tt..e ~~~:1c 

Pl.a:y1'air system. ';'l""V -::"Or.sideratio~ applies alsu to princi:rJ P.:. r :::..• techni.:ru.es 

involved in tl1e .. ::c.: .:.it en U.S. &rri NATO cryptosy.:items. 

b. Likevu e, d.lthough 1 t must be poin1.ed out tbat tra.:rric ~nal.ytic 

techniques and d.'\1.r. &1.3sociated with specific targets tall into (!ategories 

III, II or I, n~~er~ el~~~ a detailed description ot the seneral prir.ciples 

and techniques 1£'•rn1.,red in }\ypothetical tr:J.tt'ic anal,ysia ~ be or lower 

cl.assitication. 

c. The cJ.:JS~..i.tica.tion or an item ot' cryptanalytic or cryptog:-aphic 

equipnent is detem'!.::.ed. solely on its O\i"D. merits, based on the "'°.:<tent to 

which protection or new principles and techni.ques must be attor~ed. The 

degree or cJ.assiric~~~on does not necessarily concern only the tield ot 

cryptology (or crypto.i..u~ic aspects) but also ta.lees into account enginee:-ing 

sophistication. 

9. As a meo.:-6,,. ~'!' turtber :iasistance to personnel the !c:.J.::nnng cl.aasitication guide li.:. t."9 have been established. Remember they a.re only genera1 

in nature and that ... 1a.- classification or any given item must cc established 

solely or its own merits. In addition, an abbreviated cl.assit'~.ca.tion table 

bas been incloaed at the end or this document and is intend.en for reference 

purposes only. It may be detached and used separately. WA..~:~:.ra: ln no 

instance may this T.able be used to solve cl.assjtication p~;;;; Reference 

must always be DIP.A~ to the complete text ot "Guide Lines :ror ::".ccurity Cl.a.ssitication." 

man t D 

Appendix to ~ Regulation 

Jlwaber ].;:)- ated. 

.. :zr-:q ........ --
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

GGII:.!!: LH::E::> :rn~ SEC'..iRIT"f CLASSIFICA':'IC·.: (Section lI - II:, .. 

SE~TlO~ II - TOP SECRE.'T CODEWORD (CATEGO~Y-III) 

The tollowing ty:,)cs of infor:nation are to be classified TOP S:!!:CR.E'I' Codeword: 

1. Cryptana.ly'..:.c intelligence and techniquesderived l'i·ci:n and statements or success :. ::."t.rj.butable to a given C!ate15or'J I!~ ,ystem. 

2. Traffic ; ~Jt·::::!.J.igence based in whole or in part o::-~ "'.:.l"·? ."L"'i~LlyB;i.'3\ 01.· 

use of identifi .. :1-:.1 _: .. :ms and other ea ta derived f'rom ::ategor;,. .!. , : ~·.-~ :: ·•:. 

Such traffic intr!:.. 1.igence might inv-olve a high-grade encrn'' .: ·.·n system or 

message heading::; c.·..:rypted in codes or ciphers of' high sec1;::.::-;: ~railing. 

i. Intell:i.<<:>"lce which can be identified as resultin.a t~i.-::. the strn'lv 

4. Special i.J-:;ather Intelligence, designated by a disti11ct.!.ve cod.eword.. 

Intelli e:~ce "Which can be identified as resu1tin !~om the 

•J ince 1 September ~~--------~----------,,--,,----------..,.........,,....----....,....,,.-.....,.,,.,,..,,...---=-----=~ 1939, except as covered in paragraph 3, Section IV - TOP SECRET, paragraph 

12, Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL, and paragraph 12, Section VII - UNCIASSIFI~. 

6. Traffic :'..ntelligence involving such combinatio!1S o·· ~ryptanal.ysis 

and traffic anaJ.y • .ds whose \"alue is so great that security o:r r:ontents 

becomes the overu.riding consideration. 

7. COMINT l•ased on traffic obtained. rrom sources cla.s~: .. Lied TOP SECRET. 

8. UKUSA ~"r:Y""Ptana~ic short titles or Category III cryptosystems. 

SECTION III - SECRET CODEWORD (CATEGORY 11) 

The folJ.owing types of in:f'orma.tion are to be classified SECREI' Codeword: 

-. 

1. CI'Yi'+.:...~.:.r....1.,vtic intelJ.igence and techniques derived !rom and statements of succe;::;-; attributable to a given Category II cryptosystem. 

2. Traf!ic intelJ.igence derived from the analysis or foreign communications after 2 September 1945. 

3. Texta information. 

4. Intelli ence vhich can be identified as resultin or 

e:x:c::ept as noted in raragraph 5, Section II - TOP SBCRET 

....,,,c.....,,.od __ e!W __ ora...,,.........-____. b t£CRET r 

... 

Append.:!_Y. ·~9 NSA Regulation 

Number 120- dated 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

-·· 

, 

...... -:=, ,, . 
• 

REF ID:A57417 

SECRET e 

GUIDE LINF.s FOR SECURITY' CIASSIF'ICATION (Section III - V) 

5. Traf'f'ic 1r. ~~ligence derived from radio :fingerprinting (RFP) and 

Morse operator analy:..;Ja (r-l)A). 

6 UKUSA Cr:.rr.tanalytic short titles of Category II and I cryptosystems. 

SECTICJii IV - 'IDP SECRET 

The following type$ of information are to be classified 'IDP SECRET: 

1. The det.6. i .:.~ •11ission of' a COMINT af3ency or a ma.~or component thereof'. 

2. Tbe e.x1s~ ~1:..c-a of' peacetime collaboration in COMrnT matters betW"een 

u.s. agencies enc.. .,t.ner foreign governments, except :f'or coll;•.' .. u;:ation vith 

the U.K., Canada1 ,- r A:istralia1 which will be classified SEC:::::-:.: 

3. Intellitiet:~·~ derived from the cryptanalysis of high-grade :foreign 

cryptosystems between 1 September 1939 and 2 September 19451 ~1~v1ded the 

reference cannot .'c:a:.l to inf'erences aa to the specific systeme involved. 

Such intelligence a.erived a:fter 2 September 1945 belongs in ':::.·~e.;ory III. 

(See exceptions, ~ ... .._-a.gra-ph 5, Section II - 'roP SECRET CODEW'OW and paragraph 12, SectiOll .-:;: - UNCIASSIFIED.) 

4. Codevordr. ( _.irrent and obsolete) applicable to Cater, .... ry III COMINT. 

SECTION V - SECRET 

T'~ f'ollOW"ing types of inf'oruation are to be claasif'ied SECRET: 

l Ipterce:;:t assignments (N.B. Thia does not include call signs1 

frequencies or r-.r·- i1otations which are claasif'ied CONFIDEr1TIAL). 

2. Intercept and DF plans and over-all operational ef'fe:.tiveness of 

intercept and D~ or~izations as a Whole. 

3 Details c:. tt"Bftic analysis as applied to enemy comr.r..m ... cations 

during World War .:.r. 

4. Disclosur '!8 of' both the identity and detail• of' the cryptanalysis 

ot lov-grade en.em:• •. ::Uitary cryptosystema during Worl.d War II. 

5. Exist ... ,.:l~~ ::ir peacetime collaboration between the U.S. (NSA.) with 

t.be U.K (GCHQ), CANADA (cmmc) or AUSTRALIA (DSB) in the C~lT field. 

6. Coliz"s~r:!'>= (current and obsolete) applicable to Category II ca.mrr., 

.. ,...=,,. • . ...,,,.-"'_ .. 

6 

SECRET 

. 

I 
• RE~ !D:A57417 

~ECRET 

GUIDE LlJfES FOR SECURITY CIASSIFICATION (Section VI ) 

SECTION VI - CONFIDENTIAL 

The following "t;.'";ie• of' information are to be claasif'ied. CCfiFIDENTIAL: 

l. Association of operational COMmT :f"unctions with specific 

activities and orga.:iizations by name (except as provided under pe.ragra:ph 

l, Section VII - t.:N~IASSIFIED)• 

2. General r-J.:.tementa pertaining to theoper&t.iunal ef:fectiveness o:f 

of individual iut~r~e~~ FUld n/~ stations. 

J. Interce:;.•t.:.: d. ra"M traffic that snows no ev1::le:ncc o."' "frOc"=ssm." for 

C~IN'l' purposes 't>·~1ond sorting by CJ.ear address elen:.E.:nt.s~ e.L1minat.ion or 

unwant.ed ree.::1sar•-;:, anri 'tu€ incJ.usion of case n •.lit.Der and1or an ~:oit.r;:iry t.ra1-

f1c dt::si.r.ua"tor. 

4. Intel.U.:>.!nce relating to D/F mission assignments, bea.::-:1.ng reports 

and :rix reports ', · .e. - target frequencies, call signs, "pi;;.<:1 signals," 

other signal info: ~.n.tion. bearings and fixes), provided. that no complex 

changing call sic,n i.ryetems a.re in.eluded.. 

5. The term.! ":l!1i ted States Coamnmicatiom Intelligence :9oard 11 and 

"U. S • Coomunica ·:"'.-ins Security Board" (abbreviations "USCIB" and "USCSB" and 

the abbreviatior:--: t'or their aubconnittees are unclasaif'ied). 

6. Plaintext tactical or operat:l.onal tra.:f'fic provided \.~::).t; no interpretations of comrlex changing call uign systems, enciphe?'E"f'. r.i~p ..:-:~'ferences, 

or results or advanced tra.:f'f'ic sna.lysis are included. This material shall 

include local procet'l.ural a.nd local grid and zone systems used for artillery 

direction, tact1-:.-.::.~"!.. ::;ontrol and movement of f'ront line units, early warning 

and exercise of ta~tical combat control of aircraft. 

7. Intelli~'l.ce derived from ane.lysis of' radar tracking reports and 

visual observatin:.i :r.ports as found in tactical or operatiorld.. .. traffic, 

provided that e~ci~h£~~ ~ircraf't type designations or interpr':'tations of 

cairplex changing ce~l sign systems are not included. Inclusion of local 

grid or zone re~~~c~~es. local procedural codes used for brevity and plaintext intersper6•".d vi th cover words is penniasible. 

8. COV.Iii'.i' c ... ·ucerning weather derived from the sources described. in 

paragraphs 6 and 7, above. 

9. C<Jml'r i!.t-·i-ived from Naval tactical maneuvering codes and brevity 

codes. 

10. Special cryptologic features of and magnitude or e:f'rort 'With 

computers. 

7 

SECRET 

....... · 

.Appendix t.-: ~ Regulation 

lblber 120- dated 
' 9' REF ID :A5741flt 

SEGR~ EO 3.3(h)(2) · PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

GUIDE LJNES FOR SECURITY CLA.BSIFICATION (Section VI - VII) 

11. Detailed l'.eferences to, and description of, crypto,:,~.tytic success 

ago.inst specific miJ :t tary cryptosystems used by foreign po-w"E~:-s between 11 

November 1918 a.nd !. Selftember J.939, and not used since. 

12. Intellif!:e!1ce 

us 

-1--9--39""'"".-----' 

13. The exten1~ oi" collaboration in CAN/UK/US COMSEC matte~·~. 

14. The exteni.. oi" production of' cryptoma.teria1 for MATC i..:se. 

15 . The fact .. ~hat NSA is assigned specifid 

16. Diagrams f'..nd descriptions of' COMJNT and COMSEC comr.1'..lllication networks or related communication plans including cryptographic arrangements 

except where higher classi:ficatiop is justified by the listing of sensitive 

intercept stations. 

17. Consolidated listings and records of cryptomater:J.ais a..Tld cryptoholdings by short t i.:.1e.-

18. The broad outlines of' o-pera.tional traffic analysis processes. 

19. Relation~l:ip With CIA and other U.S. consumers in the field of 

COMINT. 

SECTION VII - UNCIASSIFIED 

The following tYJT-:o c.!' inf'orma.tion are Uncl.assified~ 

1. Assoc.iatioi:. of" NSA with cryptology, COMmT, CCMSEC, or the service 

cryptologic agencies -- providing ~uch association in no way ~lvcrsely 

&f'fects the missiolls of' the agencies concerned • . -- 2. Associatic;.n of NSA with authors of' technical papers on matters 

already in the publ ::i.c domain. 

3 . The. terms NSA. Field Activity Far East (NSAFE) , NSA Field Activity 

~ (NSAEUR), NSAAI~, NSAUK, NBA-Field Unit 1 (FU/PAC) a.'ld l~2A. Field Unit 

2 (:FU/LANT). 

4. Civil Service Job Titles a.nd NSA "Quali:fica.tion·Stand.?.rdis Manual." 

5. NSA's possession of' or interest in computers or rapid analytical 

me.chinery, except as noted in pa.re.graph 10 under Section VI - CONFIDENTIAL, 

8 

Appemix to EA Regulation 

Humber 120- dated 

SECRE9F 
"' 

"' 

GUIDE LmES roR SECURITY CL4.SSIFICATION (Section VII) 

6. Spec:l.ti~:~~ts of equi:paent under research, ·i.f use of 

canponent is not.revealed. 

7. Report ot inspection trip to uncleared canpany tbat is a prospective contractor, i:t no mention is made ~ actual applications of 

canpcm.ents. 

8. Short titles, cover names, and code vords. (See the following 

exceptiODB: Para.g1-::t:pl\ 4, Section III - TOP SECRET: J:."aragraph 9, Section 

V - SECRET; pa..,.-iw._.r~ph 10, Section V - SECRET, and pa.ra.gra.ph l. 7, Section VI 

- CamDENTIAL). 

9. Cam:mmicA:tions giving a person's e?ecuri ty clearance. 

lO. Projects number and titles used in justification for 'PUI"Chase of 

materials when no .. Geohnice.l usage is specified. 

11. Detailed ?".:::f'erence to, and description of, crypta.'IJ.-q.J;ytio success 

age.inst World Wa.r ! mil.ita.ry cryptosystems. 

12. References to intelligence derived from cryptosystem.<s in which 

successt'ul. cryptanaJ ys1s bas al.re~ been revealed by official U .s. action 

(e.g., the Congresu.1U!l.'il. investigation 'of the Pearl Harbor att..P-.""!k) • 

·13. Arq l:'l.derance to intelligence or cryptanalytic success age.inst 

operational cr,yptosystems as disclosed by foreign publications e.:i;ipea.ring in 

the pu.blic dcrnain. These re:terences should be acccmpanied. -J:c;: ·the purpose 

of clarity by the source end be Without fUrther elaboration or am;pli:f'ication. 

14. The fact that NSA. produces and procures cryptoma.teria.l including 

rotors, key lists, o'Jlle-t:Lme tapes, one-time pads, cod.es, discs and other 

broad categories ar keying materials, e.nd employs special equipnent to 

produce sane ot this material. 

15. The f'act t-Jiat the U .s. ~llaborates with other NATO J,>OWers on 

CCMSEC matters. 

Incl. 

table 

9 

Append:Lx to :& Begulation 

Slulber 120- dated 

-SECRET 

-----------....---·---- - ... ___ .. -.·------ -.. ___ .,. ---- ... 

J 

-. 
TOP SECl!i.'1' CODEWOllll 

l. DITELLIG!RCB 'lECHNIQllES ARD SUCCESSES 

ATTKIBU?.ABLE TO CATFOORI nI SISTEllS. 

2, TllAPPIC DlrELLIGEHCE BASm OH DATA 

mmvm FD CATmDRr m COOBr. 

3. 'l'f.Ull'l'm JllCLlDlOO ALL 

RUSSIAlf PLA.IR'l'm, 

I+. SPECIAL WEl.Tllm INTELLIGENCE (SPECIAL 

camllllllD). 

5, CKIP?Am!SIS OFb:: l 

tEED SINCE l SEE' 1'7391 Ei'.CEPI • 

6, TBAmC Dl'l'ELLIGENCE WllERI!: SECUl!ITY C'I 

c:anmlT IS THE DCllINANl' CONSIDERATIOB, 

7, camrr BASED ON TOP SECllET SOlll!CFS. 

8. llKVSA CRrFTANALYTIC SHOBT TITIES OF 

CA'ml<m m SYSTEl!S, 

REF ID:A57417 

- SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REFERENCE TABLE 

(Warning& In no inatano• 118.1' this table be used to llOl.n . • ·· · Q cil.aallifioaticn p1"0blas, bterenc• awst alwa;vs be mcl• to > E 3 . 3 ( h ) ( 2 ) !!:t:n~~et• tm ot "Guide Line• tor S.curit7Jllas1if.t:L,,../ PL B6-36/50 USC 3605 

SECREl' CODElfOBD 

l. Dl'J'EI.I.IGER!S 'l'ECllRIQUES AND SUCCESSES 

A"r,?RIBUl'.ABLE TO CATl!XlORY n SISTEllS. 

2. TBAPl'IC DITBLLIGl!:llCE DEliIVE!l flllJ( 

FOREIGN COllHURICAHOlfS .~ 2 SBPTEllBBR 1945. 

3. TOO.A IBFOlllfATIOK, 

4. r:::JPUmm, EXCEPTl. 

5. TRAFFIC INTELLIGERCE DERIVED FD 

1ilP AND !Ill.• 

6, l1KlJ5A. CRl'.PTANAL?TIC SHORl' TI'l'U:S OF 

CATEGOlll' II Allll I SYS'IEllS, 

COlll'IDBRTIAL 

lii COJIDl'r PUBCTIONS ASSOCIA\'ED WITH 

SPECIFIC ACT~lES AND OllGABIZAT:ro. 

BY NAJB, EtCEPr • 

2, GBllEllAL STATEMEHTS OF Cl'EllA.TIOllAL 

BPn:CTIVEHl!SS r:8 IHDIVIDUAL IBTERCl!:l'T 

.AllD D/F STATIONS, 

3 UllPBOCBSSBD RAW TRAFFIC EmEPT CASE 

NarATIOllS, FREQUENCIES, OR CALL SIGJiJS, 

4, D/F J!ISSION ASSIGNMENTS, 

S, lmCIB ARD USCSB WHEN WRITTEN our, 

6. PUIRTm EXCEPT AS ASSIGNED TO CA'$-

GOll? II Alli> III. 

7. IJBEHCIPHERED !WW! TRACKING AND VISUAL 

OPERATIOllAL moms. 

8. IO:iTllER Gaml'l' FBal 6 ARD 7 ABOVE. 

9, C<JIIBT FROM NAVAL MANEllVERI?D ARD 

BREV1'TY CODES, 

10, FElTIJl!ES ARD mEllT OF USE OF COMPutEBS, 

tlRCLA.SSIFIEI! 

l, HOB-6PECIFIC ASSOCIATION OF NSA WITH 

CR!PTOLOGY, COMINT, CCJm:C OR SERVICE 

CRIPTOLOGIC AG!NCD!S. 

2. ASSOCIATICll OF RSA WITH AlmlOllS OP 

TECHNICAL PAPEBS ALREAllY IN THE PUBLIC 

DClflIN, 

3, NAMl!8 OF RSA FIELD UNITS, 

4. CIVIL SERVICE JOB TITLES AllD !lSA 

"QllALIFICATICll ST.AliDABDS lClRlJAL, • 

S. BSA POSSF.SSICll OF l OR INTERFSr IN 

COHPUrms. EXC!PT • 

6. .NON-DESCRIPTIVE mE!IBNGFB TO :mUIPJli!'.NT llHDER RESEARCH, 

7, REPORTS OP I!iSPECTION TRIPS TO llNCLElRED 

PROSPECTIVE CONTRACTOR O<»IPANI!S, 

8, SHO'Rt TrlIES, COVER NAHl!S, AND COD.!-

WCRDS, EICEfTl • 

--~~~~~~~~~~~~~-+-~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ..... 9. COMMUNICATIONS GIVING A PERSCllS SECtmrrr 

CLEA!IAN'CB. 

TOP SECRET 

l. IE'l'AWm l!ISSICll OF A C<Jm!T AGENCY 

OB MAJOR Cll!PODNT, 

2. 1JS CCllIJIT PEACETIME COLLABOllATIOH Wl'?H 

ramGN GOVEllHIBN'l', EXCEP'l' UK, CAB OB 

All! CLASSIFIED SECRET. 

3. IJITELLIGENCE FRiii ~O SYSTEMS; l 

S!P'l'EllllER 1931 - 2 SEPTEMBER 1945 NO? 

lll!:VEALlllG SPECIFIC SXS'l'!Ml DIVOLVED, 

EICEP'?"'-• 

4. CA'mlORI nI CODEWORDS ( CURllKNT AND 

OBSOLBTK), 

l. FOR ElCEPTIOliS, GES CITED PAllAGRAPHS 

Clf PAGE INDICATED. 

~ 

l, mrERCEPT ASSIGNMENTS, EICEPTl, 

2, IN'l'EllCEPT D/F PLAHS, EFFF.CTIVENl!SS 

Allll OBWIIZATION. 

3, DE.rAILS CF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF E!1E11! 

COl!MUNICATIONS DURl:NG WORLD WAR n. 

4. DE.rAILS OF CRIPTANALISIB flt UM G1!ADB 

EHEMY MILITARY CRIPTOSYSTEMS DIJRilO 

WORLD WAR n. 

S. COJ!INT COLLABORATION BE'l'NEEll us, UK, 

CAN, ANO AUS. 

6, CATl!OORl" II CODEWOllDS (CU!ilmNT ARD 

OBSOLETE). 

ll. CllIPTANALISIS OF MILITARY SYSTEMS, ll 

NOVEMBER 1918 - l SEP'l.'EMBER 1939 AHi> 

Nar USBD SINCE. 

12. C!!D'TAHWBIS OFI I 

ll NCJV!llBER l 918 - I SEPiEMB&k 1939. 

13. CAB/UK/US C<lfSEC COLLABOlilTICll, 

r· ...... - .. ..,.,. '""""'1 

16. Cllllll'r ARD ClllSEC CCJIKIJNICATICllS HETWOllS OB PLANS EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE 

IHTERCEPT STATIONS. 

l 7, CONSOLIDATED LISTINGS OF CB!P'rO Jfl-

'l'ERIALS ARD CRYP'l'O HOLDIMlB Bl SHOR!.' 

:um-. 

J.8, BROAD oun.nms OF OPERATIONAL TRAFPIC 

ANAL?SIB PROCESSES. 

19. Coor.".!' l!EUHONSHIP OP HSI WITH CIA 

AND arHER US. COlfSIJllEllS DI THE PIJW), 

10. BON....!lESCRIPTIVE 1llE OF ~ TITll'.S 

ARD NllllllEll. 

ll. CRYPTANALYTIC SUCCESS AGllNST WORLD WAil 

I J!ILI'l'ARI CRIPTQSYSTEMS. 

cam SUCCESSES IN THE PllBI.tC DOMAIN 

14. NSA PRODUCTION ARD PR0Clllll!1!BlllT CP CR?PTO 

lfA.TE!lllL. 

15, US COllSF.C COIUBOllA.TIOll WITH NA.TO.