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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence 

Washington 25, D. C. 

19273 

WP SECRE':P PRO'!'H 

31 December 1953 

G2-PC 

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIREC'roR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ... 

SUBJECT: Report of the Study Group, NSA Scientific Advisory Board 

(NSA Serial 000565-s) 

1. I have reviewed the subject report and have the following comments 

thereon. 

2. I do not consider that it is realistic to conclude, as the Study 

Group does, that COMINT or any other source of intelligence can guarantee 

four to twelve weeks' warning of a Soviet intention to mount an attack 

against the U.S. In the COMINT field I do consider, however, that the most 

likely source of obtaining such warning is the solution and timely exploitation of Soviet high-level cryptographic systems. I concur, therefore, with 

the recommendation of the Study Group that "top priority should be accorded 

to the solution of high-level Soviet Cryptographic Sources and their exploitation on a timely basis" in order to maximize the potential of COMINT 

for giving strategic warning of hostile attack against the U.S. 

3. I am also of the opinion that the traffic analysis effort against 

Russian traffic should be expanded, particularly those phases of the traffic 

analytic effort essential for the support of the cryptanalytic attack 

against high-level Soviet systems. I am not, however, in full agreement 

with the Study Group in its conclusion that traffic analysis fusion of Russian cormnunications is necessarily our next best source of strategic warning 

of attack against the U.S. I consider that the solution of high-level 

Soviet Orbit communications, particularly Chinese, is as likely to provide 

the U.S. is still faced with the requirement for early warning of the 

outbreak or resumption of localized hostilities against U.S. forces or those 

of its Allies. I consider that solution of high-level Societ Orbit traffic, 

particularly Chinese, is potentially our best source of such warning. Further, in the event hostilities are resumed in Korea, solution of high-level 

Chinese and North Korean traffic will be imperative. 

4. I consider, therefore, that every effort should be ma.de to augment 

NSA effort on Soviet and Soviet Orbit high-level cryptographic systems and 

have instructed my representative on the NSA Priorities Committee to work 

towards that end. 

Copy l of 4 copies 

'fOP SECR:8'f PRO'flf 

Decla-sslfie-d a-nd ap6roved for release by NSA on 01-26-2015 pursuant to E .0. 1352d 
REF ID:A516903 

'±10P S:SGREl'f PRO'i'fI 31 December 1953 

G2-PC 

Memo for DIRNSA, "Report of the Study Group, NSA Scientific Advisory 

Board (NSA Serial 000565-s)" 

5. The report of the Study Group concludes that "personnel policies 

should be revised to improve the selection, training and retention of 

personnel, both civilian and military, for COMINT activities. Strong recommendations should be ma.de to the Services and the Civil Service Commission 

to effect these changes." The procedures for the selection of personnel 

for Army COMINT activities are under continual review and analysis to insure 

that the best qualified Army personnel are ma.de available to the Army Security 

Agency. In conjunction with NSA, every effort is being ma.de by the Department of the Army to improve the training of Army Security Agency personnel 

and an intensive program is underway to re-enlist trained Army Security 

Agency enlisted personnel at the end of their term of service. 

2 

/s/ 

MARK McCLURE 

Brigadier General, GS 

Deputy A.C. of S., G-2