REF ID:A516891 

SECURITY Cl •<:SIFICATION (If onf) 

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DISPOSITION FORM 

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lla3ar canon, P/P, 6e6i>S 

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REF ID:A516891 

'F~ SE€RET FR~TII 

30 July 1954 

!0P SB~ 

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPCm DmECTOR, PRODUCTION 

DEPU'I'f DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

CHlEF1 PLANS AND POLICY DIVISION 

CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIVISION 

CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION 

CHIEF, TRAINING DIVISION 

SUBJECT: "Robertson Report" 

1. The attached study represents a summary and analysis of the 

salient points covered in the report made by the Special Study Group 

of the NSA Scientific Advisory Board (commonly known as the "Robertson 

Report"). The appendix lists a number of actions which should be taken 

in order to implement various reco111I11endations ma.de by the Group. 

2. The attached study supersedes previous NBA Staff Studies and 

other summaries a.nd lists of recommendstions. Current directives, 

including DC/S memos of 9 April and 20 May 1954, concerning reports of 

implementation of the Group's recomr.i.enda.tions, a.re hereby cancelled. 

3. In order to effect implementing action, addressees will: 

a. Make a. careful. study of the attached Summary and Appendix 

thereto. 

b. Principals meet at 0900 hours, 6 August 1954, at Naval 

Security Station, Building 19, Room 192328, for the purpose of apportioning individual or joint responsibility for each action listed in 

the Appendix to attachment. 

(1) Chief, P/P, wil~ preps.re a consolidated report to the 

Chief of Staff not later than 10 August 1954, on the results of the 

meeting listing which action (use numbers, and letters if applicable, 

appearing in Appendix) each is individually or jointly responsible for. 

(Copies to be furnished addressees and S/Asst.) 

c. In each Monthly Operational Summary, ef'f'ective for the 

month ot August 1954, report details of any significant progress made 

on any action for which responsible; or so state if none. In addition, 

effective with the month of September 1954, a verbal ~eport on the 

preceding months actions wi_ll be 1nade a. pa.rt of the Directors' monthly 

briefing. 

'FOP SECRET FROTII 
TOP SECRET. 

Ji.. Attention is .invited to the possibility that the actions listed 

include some which might, in whole or in part, 'Le appropriate projects 

for the Technical Management Boa.rd. 

Incl: 

Summary with Appendix A, Study 

of the Special Study Group of 

the :NSASAB Submitted on 16 Oct 53 

L. H. FROST 

Rear Admiral, USN · Chief of Staff 

'FOP SE€RET FROTII 

• 
REF ID:A516891 

'fO~ SEtRET FRfflH 

STUDY OF' THE REPOHT 01', THE 

SPECIAL STUDY GROUP OF 'l'HE NSJ\SAB 

SUBMITTED ON 16 OC1'0BER 1953 

SUMMARY 

1. The Report points out that it is widely re~ognized that Russia 

now has, or will shortly reach, the capability of launching a large 

scale, devastatingly effective attack against the United States. This 

might be preceded by, or launched concurrently with, an attack upon 

other nations allied with us, or Upon areas in which the U.S. has military, political, or industrial interests and investment&. 

2. The period of time, after Russian achievement of the capability 

to launch such an offensive, between crystallization of their intent to 

do so, and actual commencement of hostilities, is a critical one. It 

will be difficult to detect with certainty, since, although prepara·tions 

for an attack might continue almost up to the cormnission of an overt act, 

the actual intent to commit that act might still be either lacking or 

conditional upon many factors. 

3. It may be assumed, however, that there is a point in the 

continuum of preparatory steps beyond which intent would be conditioned 

only by factors over which Russia had no control. Among these factors 

would be discovery that we were sufficiently prepared, by adequate advance warning, that the chances of a successful attack would be greatly 

reduced. 

4. It is apparent that forewarning of a potential attack will better 

enable us to resist it and blunt its force, or even to increase our defensive posture to such an extent as to cancel the decision to attack. It 

is also apparent that the longer in advance of attack that warning is 

received the greater are the chances of taking successful defensive measures. 

Tactical warning measures, such as radar screens, aerial patrols, ground 

observer systems, and the like, would give us at best an advance warning 

measured in hours. Our chances would be heightened immeasurably could we 

-obtain strategic early warning. This can best be done by intelligence 

measures. Of the sources of such intelligence, COMINT especially if combine.d with ELINT, has an undoubtedly great potential, and might give us 

advance warning neasured in days or even weeks. 

5. It is important that we capitalize on this potential. To do this, 

a consistent, coordinated, and appropriately oriented plan is needed. Such 

a plan could be well based on the following realistic arguments: 

a. In preparing for a particu.la.r military operation, the Russian 

High Comnand must take certain specific steps. 

TOP SECRET FRO'fll 
~ ID:~168~ 'FOr• SEtRFJ-1· Fttt\TII 

b. For each possible military operation, it is possible to 

postulate 'toThat these Bteps would b~ and the approximate time span 

of each. 

c. Many of these steps will require the concerted action of 

a large number of persons, located at widely separated points • 

. d. Coordination of these steps, spread over space and time, 

will require numerous communications, wttich will cause an increase . over normal for some of the links involved. On other links, the 

initiation of, or completion of, certain steps will result in a 

decrease of traffic to below-normal amounts. 

e. Soviet e.gEmcies concerned will find it necessary to use 

radio over some of the links involved; they will be forced on 

at least some of these links to use frequencies which are interceptable by us; some, if not all, of these interceptable links 

will necessarily reflect changes from their normal traf'fic load 

caused by the steps taken in preparing for the operation concerned. 

f. Even if we are deprived of other methods of obtaining 

in:t'orma.tion from these links,. we can obtain quantitative measures 

of the volumes of traffic passed on each, and detect variations 

from the norm of ea.ch. Compa.ri.son of actual variations with 

predicted variations expected from postulated actions, shou1d 

give us a clue to steps actually in progress. 

6. We should therefore adopt and develop as our basic plan for 

obtaining strategic early warning from COMINT, a system whereby we might 

obtain valid indications of Russian intentions by means of quantitative 

analyses of the conununications on those Soviet* radio links which they 

cannot avoid subjecting to our scrutiny. Denial of other methods of 

obtaining information from Soviet corranunications might well make this 

basic plan our "last ditch" plan. 

7. The amount and quality of information obtainable for strategic 

early warning can be increased above that envisaged for the basic plan 

by ~ing the following steps: 

a. Increase our intercept capability so as to increase the 

number of signs.la that the Soviets cannot avoid subjecting to 

our scrutiny. 

*Including satellite and other Soviet-dominated nations. 

- 2 -

'FOP SE€RE'F FRO'FII 
\.. 

REF ID:A516891 

T0f' SEeRET FR~H 

b. Increase the information obtained from intercept by: 

(1) Increasing the information obtainable from T/A Fusion. 

(2) Increasing the information obtainable from Special 

Intelligence. 

c. Increase the speed of conveying information to intelligence 

channels. 

d. Improve the technological and personnel potential of the 

national COMINT effort by: 

(1) Increasing the scope of NSA's current technological 

research and development. 

(2) Pressing for inprovement of the personnel situation 

within the national COMINT structure. 

e. Improve the intelligence obtainable by fusing ELINT into 

the COMINT effort at all echelons. 

f. Improve the use of the intelligence gained by providing 

a complete and coordinated indicator system for the national 

.~telligence effort. 

8. The Appendix lists various actions, arranged as nearly as 

possible in the sequence inplied in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, which 

are indicated as a means for implementing recommendations ma.de by the 

Special Study Group. 

9. Although certain aspects of some of the recommendations ma.de 

involve considerations beyond the normal scope of internal NSA action, 

the initiation of all of them is considered to be within the over-all 

scope of NSA's current responsibility and authority. Their accomplishment will reflect NSA's position of justifiably agressive leadership in 

all natters directly related to the national COMINT mission. The success 

of the national COMINT and Intelligence efforts will be determined when 

the Russian intent to use Soviet capabilities crystallizes. When 

hostilities cormnence, the peak of the national intelligence effort will 

have. passed. 

- 3 -

'fOP SE€RE'F FR0TII 
r 

APPENDIX. A 

1. Determine, by logical analysis and postulating, the probable 

preparatory steps, which of those Soviet conununication 1inks currently 

1ntercepta:ble by us would show significant variations in traffic volume 

if preparations were underway to attack the U.S. or areas in which the 

·U.S. bas vital interests. 

2. Establish, for various seasons, and for other conditions the 

existence of which is verifiable, normal traffic volumes for these links. 

3. Devise and inaugurate a system for obtaining rapid reports, 

from stations covering these links, of any significant variation from 

normal traffic volume on each. 

~ 4. Develop and install a centralized display and control board, 

where these variations could be plotted against i!.-me; whereby, mechani- f~R-fiCo--. cally or electronically, the probable purport of the sum of reported ,.7 J variations could be predicted; from where checks on other potential 

indicators could be initiated; and from where rapid dissemination of 

evaluated indications could be ma.de to intelligence authorities. 

/ 5. Develop machine (computer, analogue) methods for summing and 

translating quantitative traffic measures into indications; weighting 

these indications according to probability; checking against collateral 

information; and calculating most probable causes of the effects observed. 

6. Expand intercept activities to the extent necessary to monitor 

traffic· volumes on all Soviet links determined (Step 1 above) to be 

significant. 

7. Develop methods and equipment which will iJli:lrove reception on 

frequencies now theoretically interceptable by us: 

a. !nq>rove receivers. 

b. Improve audio and other recording equipment. 

c. !Jli>rove/ I equipments, including means for . demultiplexing, unscrambling, a.nd precision recording. 

d. Install a.nd develop methods for using propagation 

measuring equipment to improve intercept control. 

e. Augment NSA scientific and.engineering staff in order 

t.o assist Services in design and placement of antenna fields 

and intercept positions so as to take\utm.ost advantage of propagation phenomena. 

- 1 - EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SE€RET FR()'fll 
REF ID:A516891 

Tor SECftET FR~II 

8. Develop methods and equipment which will make interceptable 

links not now within our capabilities to monitor: 

a. VHF 

b. SHF 

c. Noise co11111Unicatione EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

d. 

e. Frequency dispersal systems• 

9. Improve facilities for enabling t.he intercept opera.tor to 

determine the identity of transmitters which heheare. 

a. Develop means, such ae multiple unit antennae, whereby 

operator can by himself determine direct:fon of arrival of a signal. 

b. Increase co-location of D/F 0 1 MOA, and intercept 

facilities. 

c. ~rove colllllUDicat.ione between intercept opera.tors and 

D/F, 0 MOA posi tione. // . 

10. ~rove methods of/transmitter identification: 

a. Inq>rovQequipment and analytical methods • 

b. Develop MOA and other operator identification techniques, 

recording and analytical equipments and methods. 

c. Develop better methods of radio position fixing, such as 

Inverse Loran. 

d. Improve field co-ordination of all methods with each other 

and with intercept. 

11. Develop iq>roved methods of intercepting, recording, and utilizing 

·innediate action voice connunications 1 including autonatic time registering 

devices. 

- 2 -

TOP SE€RET FROTII 
~ I~~l~~ 'fOf' SEtR~·1· r·nf>WII 

../ 12. Inprove the qi.V.Llity of intercept operations by personnel actions 

to: 

a. Increase incentives for re-enlistment. 

b. lnprove recruitment 1 selection, and proficiency evaluation 

criteria and techniques, including use of psychometric methods. 

c. Pinpoint, intensify 1 and improve training given in intercept 

techniques. 

d. Improve training and development of intercept supervisors. 

e. Train officers in intercept and transmitter identification 

techniques. 

f, Take action to solve problems i~ connection with using 

civilians as intercept operators. 

13· Increase T/A potential at points of intercept by: 

a. Educating and training operators and supervisors in 

rudiments of T/A. 

b. Providing traffic analysts for each point .of intercept. 

c. Decentralizing T/A operations to intercept stations by 

moving T/A units forward. 

· d. Increase exchange of T/A and collateral information between 

forward units and more centralized T/A units. · 

e. Increase authority of forward units to originate messages 

disseminating urgent intelligence information derived by them. 

f. Provide guidance relative to (e) above, on appropriate 

addressees; and provide adequately rapid coJl'IDUnication channels. 

. • 14. Establish a srrall research group to carry out research and 

(guide) development(s) on new methods of traffic analysis, including 

adaptation of certain problems to high speed me.chines. 

15. Use more extensively the existing T/A Fusion sources to con- . struct the pattern of Soviet operations by: 

a. Intensifying our intercept and T/A efforts during Soviet 

- 3 -

'POP SECRE'f FROTII 
REF ID:A516891 

T0f' SECRET FRewII 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

mneuvers in order to build up as complete a picture as possible. 

b. Making special, separate, e.hd intensive studies of all 

T/A Fusion material to construct a.n accurate pattern of' the behavior 

of' the · 

16. Perform additional and more theoretical studies in connection 

With the T/A Fusion effort with a view to: 

a. Finding new approaches in various fields relevant to the 

problems. 

b. Developing new methods of' analysis. 

c. Developing new high speed machine techniques to the problems. 

d. Developing new automatic semntic processing equipment f'or 

use in T/A, voice, brevity codes, etc. 

e. Applying more of' the highly developed :ma.thema.tical 

principles of ma.chine programming to the problems. 

17. Improve the quality of T/ A Fusion by personnel actions to: 

a. Inprove recruitment and selection criteria and techniques, 

including use of psychometric methods. 

b. Pinpoint, intensify, and improve training given in analytic 

techniques. 

c. Improve proi'iciency evaluation of' analysts. 

d. Establish a sound salary and promotion policy and have it 

as favorable to traffic analysts as it is to cryptanalysts. 

e. Inprove the quality and proficiency of the analytic supervisors. 

f. Provide for the rotation of personnel through the C<XmT 

structure to keep it sensitive. Due regard should be given to 

continUi ty. of etf'ort. · · 

- 4 -

TOP SE~RET FROTH 
REF ID:A516891 

T0f' SECRET FR~II EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

18. Improve the computational support ava.ila.bl.e tn NSA by: 

a. Increasing the number of skilled JlrO£f!.1nmer111 on the NSA 

ataf'f' by educating qualified NSA personnel in ~ndustrial and 

educational institutions and by hiring progranQ'ucrs. /:Programmer 11 

includes those educe.tr-id, trained, and experienced in the highly 

complex theory and rrnthema.tics of programming, as opposed to t.hose 

skilled in scheduling ma.chine timP.o, applying fundamental aornputatiorJS.l 

orders, ma.king various plugJr.dng combinations 11 ..... nd perf'ormi·· .. ng ma.lnte .. nance on existing ma.chines~ 

b. Investigatin13 ~~!~6h!l. the possibility of' utilizing 

cleared indoctrinated peruonnel skilled in the art of' programming 

who may be available outs:lclr• NSA. 

c. Developing and applying new types ot high speed analytic 

DBChinery. 

,/ 19. Continue ·l:;o give the h:l.p;heu li possible Jriori ties to the 

solution oft~ _systems. 

20. Maintain a firm and ~ondfltfmt policy to control and regulate 

the transfer of personnel f'arn1.l:I er vi th the I I 

probleJilS to other activities with ~ view to ma.intaining the highest 

possible degree of continu:l.ty of' the several efforts involved. Due regard should be given to the psychological and career development factors 

involved. 

21. Augment the exinting staff on these high-level problems by 

several additional top-flip.ht analysts, utilizing pyschometric methods 

of proficiency evaluation nnd selection. 

22. Increase the speed of conveying information to intelligence 

channels: 

a. Continue detailed time studies of traffic delays With a 

view to: 

(1) Reduction of processing times in message centers at 

all echelons. 

(2) Routing overseas traffic through the best possible routetJ. 

b. Reduce tra1isi t time of high precedence and oth1~r trai':f'ic l•y 

studying and adopting some of the principles now availl1ble (includinn 

those reported by the Programs· Research Orrlt of the Johns Hop1tins 

Uni verai ty) • 

.. 5 -

TOP SE€RET FR()'fll 
23. Seek ways to increase the number of' groups per day being handled 

b1 electrical communications: 

a. Monitor proposed improvements for COMINT c011111unications 

SfStems. 

· b. Monitor contemplated developments such as automtic 

switching and on-line encryption. 

c. Develop better and faster encryption devices. 

d. Achieve higher transmitting speeds. 

24. Provide more efficient utilization of' radio frequencies and 

existing land-line facilities: 

a. Use the back scatter measurement technique to determine 

the most effective radio frequency to use at a given time. (Such 

methods have been published and should be carefully studied.) 

b. Devise a method or pooling all available radio frequencies 

with assignments to individual stations on an immediate basis to 

meet ionospheric conditions. 

c. Provide constant attention and practice in the use of' 

alternate radio links and cable facilities that can be available 

if severe je.mming or radio circuits incident to hostilities should 

render the regular circuits inoperable. 

25. Improve the operations of the entire communications networks to: 

a. Insure against personnel failures wherever possible. 

b. Assure the timely delivery of messages to their addressees. 

26. llJ'l)rove trainir:ig and instruction of' communications personnel. 

'Z7. Establish the active policy that, wherever possible, NSA will 

pert:orm initial,, broad,, and high-level research and establish requirements,, 

but that the detailed research,, development,, and construction work will 

be done thr~ contracts with colJlllercial companies. 

28. Study carefully the entire concept of military, diploma.tic, and 

conaercial cODlllUllications to: 

a. Reveal those aspects of the cOJJ111Unications networks which 

- 6 -

TOP SECRE'F FR0'FII I 
REF ID:A516891 

'FOP SECRET .FRfifll 

are most susceptible to conmunications intelligence activities. 

b. Relate the value of the intelligence gained through 

exploitation of these aspects to the cost of exploitation and 

to the cost to the ene~ of security measures which would reduce 

their vulnerability. 

29. Establish a conpetent and versatile research group at NSA 

1tatt level to: 

a. Initiate and carry out basic research c;>!l the theory of 

conmunications intelligence. 

b. Review constantly the current world-wide technical status 

of all COMINT operations. 

c. Perform and guide general theoretical research. 

d. Recognize the need for additional broad research in 

specific areas. 

e. Relate the long range research needs to ·long range intelligence requirements. 

f. Monitor and study all accessible corrmercial technical 

developments having applicability, directly or indirectly, to COMINT 

problems areas. 

g. Relate NBA' s needs to conmercial developments wherever 

possible. 

30. Explore thoroughly all aspects of utilizing a "captive organization." 

31. Improve the research and development potential of the national 

OOMil'l' effort by personnel actions to: 

a. Iq>rove the salary scales to induce good men to enter 

and remain in this field. 

b. Provide recognition for achievements. 

c. Improve working conditions. 

. d. Explore . the extent to which scientists and engineers from 

universities and industrial laboratories could be usefully bonowed 

tor varying period.a of time. 

- 7 -

rf0P SE€RE'f FR0'fll 
~J: ID:A516891 'f()P s~unET FR(>)fll 

e. Augment the existing scientific and engineering staffs at 

NSA with a view to provi"ding direct assistahce to the Services on 

all COMINT technological matters. 

~ 32. Improve the personnel potential of the national COMINT effort: 

a. Establish more high-level civilian positions. 

b. Provide more opportunities for selective advancement of 

well qualified civilian personnel. 

c. Establish a satisfying career COMINT Service for officers 

as well as enlisted men in the Army and Air Force and revive it in 

the Navy. 

d. Assure that supervisors of all COMINT activities have 

eXpert knowledge of the activity they supervi~e by: 

· (1) Training 

(2) Selective assignment procedures. 

e. Re-examine recruitment.policies in the light of realistic 

security limitations. 

33. Educate NSA personnel at all echelons on the general character 

of ELilfT and its applications to the COMINT effort. 

34. On the basis tbBt certain phases of ELINT and COMINT are mutually 

complimentary, establish working ELINT-COMINT liaison between NBA and all 

agencies now conducting ELINT operations. /.Ynese include ANEEG (Arn\Y-Navy 

Electronic Evaluation Group), USAFSS 1 SAC, ATIC1 and CIAJ 

35. Provide direct conmunications between field EI.INT units and the 

nearest field Ca.tINT unit. 

36. Provide adequate coordination and cooperation between ELINT and 

C(J(INT units at all echelons . 

. 37. Include data derived from ELINT in all pertinent COMINT processes, studies, and developments. 

38. Develop postulated, normative eneJey" plans: 

a. S~ existing postulated plans carefully and completely. . . 

- 8 -

'f()P SECRET FR()'fll 
• ~~rl.:Q..:..~ 68 91 'FOP S~tt~it· FReifll 

b. Study pertinent historical documents. 

c. Work all available intelligence data into the plans. 

d. utilize our own operational experience. 

e. Test phases of the plan by experimental operations • 

39. Develop a set of integrated indicators based on the postulated 

e~ plans• 

4o. Quantify all intelligence information (COMINT, ELINT1 collateral) 

underlying the direct indicators of the imminence of war. This is especially 

applicable to the Soviet !Dng Range Air Force and the Soviet Air Defense 

System. 

41. Develop measures or indices of activities, actual or postulated, 

ot various types. 

42. Develop standardized display systems that will show the development of the indices or measures as functions of time. 

43. Measure the iJllllinence of:'hostilitiea against the postulated plans. 

44. Study the possibility of applying analytical mchine methods to · the integrated indicator system. 

- 9 -
REF ID:A516891 

to~ 3E:CR:Effl$i 

STUDY Qi' THE REP<JiT OF 'l'HE 

SPECIAL STUDY GROUP OF THE NSASAB 

SUBMI'J!l'ED ON lLi OC'l'OBlU'i 1J53 

dUMMARY 

1. The Report points out tllat it 1s widely recognized that Russia 

nov ha.a, or will shortly reach, the capability of launching a large 

scale, devastati.IJ6l.y effective attack against the United States. This 

iuight be preceded by, or launctied concurrently with, an attack upon 

•:>ther nations a.llied with us, or upon areas in which the U.S. has mili- tary~ political, or induotrial lz1terests and investments. 

2 . The period of time, after Russian achievement oi' the ca.pabili ty 

to launch such an offensive, between cryetallization of their intent to 

do so, and actual cOJ11Dencement of· hostilities, is a c ... · ·deal one. It 

W'ill be difficult to detect with certainty, since, al·t.hough prepga.tions 

for an attack might continue almost up to the commission of an overt act, 

the actual intent to commit that act might Dtill be ~ither J.o.ckiI16 or 

conditional upon many factors. 

3. It may be assumed, however, that there is a point. in the 

continuum of preparatory steps beyond which intent would be conditioned 

only by factors over which Russia had. no control. Among t.hcse factors 

would be discovery that we were sufficiently prepared, by adequate advance warning; that the chances of a successful attack would be greatly 

reduced. 

4. It is apparent that torewarnil18 of' a potential attack vill better 

enable us to resist it and blunt its farce, or even to increase our defensive posture to such an extent a.s to cancel the decision to attack. It 

is also apparent that the longer in advance of a.tta.ck that warning is 

received the greater are the chances of to.king euccess:t'ul def'en&ive UJeasures. 

Tactical warning rieasures, sucll as radar screens, aerial patrols, t,'I'Ound 

observer systems, and tllc like, would give us e.t 'Oest wi advance warning 

measured in hours. Our chances vou1d be heightened immeasurably could we 

obtain strategic early warning. This can best be done ·by intelligence 

xmasures. Of the sources of such intelligence, COMlNT especially it' COlllbined with EI.INT, has an Ul'.ldoubtedly great potenti.eJ., and migt1t ~ive us 

advance warning neasured in ~s or even weeks. 

5. It is important that we capitalize on this pote11tial. To do th.is, 

o. consistent, coord.ir.w.ted, and appropriately oriented plan is Heeded. Such 

a plan could be well based on the follO'W'lng rGalistic arew.:ieuts: 

a. In preparing 1'or a particular mil.ita.ry operation, the RU6sian 

High Collllllalld must take certain specific st<..~s. 
REF ID:A516891 

b. For each possible mil.itary operation, it is possible to 

postulate what these steps would be and the approxinate tine spar1 

of each. 

c. Ma.ey" of these steps vill require the concerted action of 

a. la.rge nuzriber of persons, located at wld.ely separated -points. 

d. Coordino.t1on of' these steps, spread. over space and. time, 

irlll require numerous communications, which will cause an increase 

over nor.IE.l for some of the links involved. On other links, the 

ln~_tiaticn of; or cor..iplcticn of, certain steps will result in a 

dei:-reuse of tra.ff' ic to ·ooiow·-norL'lll. w:x>unts .. 

e. Soviet u.genci.es concerned will find lt necessary to us~'? 

radio over some of the links involved; they vill be forced cm 

at least sc:.-ie of these .LL"lks to use frequencies which are inter-

~ep·tablc by us; some, if ::lOt all, or these :lnterceptable links 

l.rlll ne':!essa.ri~ reflect cba.nges from their 1Dnru traff'i': load 

c:;i,i.lSed by the steps take:1 in preparing .~'or the 01wration concerned. 

i' . Even if we a.re d::?pri vect of other i;et::l.ods of obtainil:l6 

lnforunti.on frorn these links, we can (}bt::i.ln q,uantita.tive .r.Easures 

of the volumes of tra.ftk passed on ea.ch, 0..'10. detect Yariations 

from the norm of each. Con:pa.risou of actual vuriatiom; with 

pred~cted variations expected. from postul.ate0. actjons; should 

give us a clue to steps actually ln p1·oe;reso. 

5. He should therefore adept and develop aa our basic plan for 

·:>btaining strategic early w.rning from CCMINT, a system whereby we might 

:lbtain valid indications of Russian intentions ·by nea.ns oi' quantitative 

::me.J.yaes a! the communications on those Soviet* radio links which they 

cannot avoid subjecting to our scrut1izy. Denial of other ?OOthods of 

obtaining infornation from Soviet cOlllllWli~tions ,,11g:-..t well r.a..~ this 

baaic plan our "last ditch;' plr.u:;. 

7. The a.oount and quality of infornation obtainable for strategic 

early warning can ·be increased above that envisaged for the basic plan 

by taking the f'olloving steps: 

a. Increa.se our intercept capability so as to increase the 

nurriber of signals that the Soviets cannot avoid subjecting to 

our scrutiny. 

*Including satellite and other Soviet--domina. ted na.tions. 

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rFOP ~ECRETHSJ 
REF ID:A516891 

0-0P SECRETU'.H 

b. Increase the inforn:ation obtained from intercept by: 

(1) 

(2) 

Increasing t.he intornation obtairlable from T/A Fusion. 

Increasing the information obtainable from Special. 

Intelligence. 

c. Increase the speed of couveyiIJ6 ini'orm.tion to intelligence ~hannels. 

d.. Improve the technological a;.1d l,)CJ.~zoru1-~J. pr.rtc1:t.~.2l of t.he 

national. ~ effort by: 

(1) Increasing the scope oi' l&' s current technological 

research und WJiielopi:ieut . 

(2) Pressing for il:lpl'OVe~.ut ;,;if th~ perr;.0nnel situation 

within tha national. CCMiliT strL:.<.!tur<!. 

e . Iuprove tne intc:U.igence ut:ta:'i.~bl..:: b~· .-.· ~.du:; BLTI~ into 

t.he Ct:MDlT effort at all echelons. 

f. Improve the use or the iirtell fo·ence <rained b" D.i.. OVidin;• -0 ..- .:1.. .. 

a canplete and coordinated indicator s;{aten i""or the national Intelligence 

cf'f'ort 

8. The Appendix ~Lis·ts nu· ..i.ou.s a.c\:.ioll.s, t~·r::ii.::;ed :.1.s near\:: as 

1>0ssible in the sequence ilq;>lied in para.grap.i1s ( '3.nd 'I ubovt>, w!rlch 

are 1nd1!'.!ated as a means for :WplenJ?nting recor.ll'llC'ndations riade •ly the 

Special ~tudy Group. 

?· Although certain aspects of some -.:;f t:1e recclll!Dendations m::.de 

invo~:·e ~o'ls:'.derations beyond t.he normal scc.•pe of t:.rt0r::c.l .NSA act.·i rm, 

the initiation of all ol tilem ,:i.Ej c..~llio.:;.L'.o•2 t . .:.: ",;.e ~:i:thin t'1c 0•:er-aJ.l 

scope of IBA1s current responsibility e.nd authority. Their acCQlJl>lishment will ref.'lect MBA' s poai tion oi' Justif:l.a.bly agress::l.vc :tead.ershlp in 

all. ne.ttera directly re.Jated to t.be na:i;io1:.a:;.. CON.n1~· ;::issiot.:. The ouccese 

at the national COMINT and Intelligence efforts will be determined when 

the Russian intent to use Soviet capabilltfas .::r;/ztal.lizc~. W11ec 

hostilities COJl'lllence, the peak. of the rlS.tiolJal ::.ntell:tuence ef'f'ort will 

have passed. 

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REF ID:A516891 

WOP 3ECRETHSJ 

APPENDIX A 

l. Detei-mine 1 by logical analysis and postulating, the probable 

preparatory steps, which of those Soviet cazrmunica.tion links currently 

interceptable by us would show significant variations in tra.:f:fic vol.ume 

if preparations were underway to attack the U .s. or areas iz1 which the 

u.s. has vital interests. 

2. Establish, for various seasons, and :ror other condit.lons the 

i:!xistencc of which is verifiable, normal tro.tfic volumes for these links. 

3. Devise and inaugurate a system for obtaining rapid reports, 

·f'rom sts.tioDS covering these links, of' ~ a ignif'icant variation :from 

:.:ionml. traffic volune on each. 

4" Develop and install a centralized d.ispla;y and control bee.rd, 

vhere these variations couJ.d be plotted against time; whereby, :mechani"· 

•!ally or electronica.l.cy, the probable purport of the swn of reported 

lf1U"iations could be predicted; from where checks on other poter1tial 

indicators could be initiated; and 1'rom where rapid dissemination of 

evaluated indications could be nade to lntelllgence authorities. 

5. Develop ma.chine ( cou:puter, analogue) methods i'or summing and 

·translating quantitative traffic measures into indications; weighting 

·these indications according to probability; checking against collateral 

infornE.tion; and calculating most probable en.uses of the effects observed • 

... 

1.~. 1".xpand intercept activities to the extent necessary to nxmitor 

·traf'f'ic volumes on all Soviet links determined (Step l. above} to be 

significant. 

7- Develop methods and equipment which will inprove reception on 

.:f'requencies now theoretically intercept.able by us: 

a. IJll)l'OVE! receivers. 

b . Inprove audio and other recording equipment. 

c. lq>rove \ fequipments, including means for 

demultiplexing, unscr&iilbl!iig, and precision recording. 

d. Install and develop method.a for using propagation 

measuring equip!rent to iJJl)rove intercept control. 

e. Augment NBA scientific and engineering eta.fl' ln order 

to assist Services i:n design o.nd place112nt of antenna. fields 

and intercept posit ions so as to take ut.roost advantage of' pro"' 

page.tion phenomena.. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

- l .. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

WOP 3ECRETh'Sl 
REF ID:A516891 

!OP SECRETh'Sl 

8. Develop methods and equipment which w-lll l:IBke interceptable 

links not now within our capabilities to monitor: 

b. SHF 

c. Noise coll'IDUnications 

d . \ / system$ 

e . Frequency dispersal ~ystems. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

:;. lJJ4>rove facilities forem.b11ng tlle intercept operator to 

determine the identity of' transmitters which he hears. 

a. Develop :ues.ns, such a$. multiple unit antennas, whereby 

operator can by himsel:f determine d.:trecti,on of' arrival 01· a s1(7lal. 

b. Increase./co-locatio./n of D/F, o• MOA, e.nd intercept 

facilities. 

c. ;lpprove COlllBUnications between intercept operators and 

D/F, QMOA positions. 

10. lq;>rove nethods of transmitter identification: 

a. lqtroveO/equipment and analytical ~~thods . 

b. Develop MOA and other operator 1dentit1catic;n techniques, 

recording and analytical equipments and methods. 

c. Develop better methods ot radio poaitlon fixing, such a.a 

Inverse Loran. 

d. lq)rove fieJ.d co-ordination of all methods vi th each other 

B.Dd with intercept. 

11. Develop iq>roved methods of interceptiug, recording, and utilizing 

immediate action voice colllllUllications, including automatic til:Je reeiatering 

devices. 

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REF ID:A516891 

~OP l 

12. IJrprove the qual.i t:i-- ._:,f .intercept operations ·by personnel. a.ct ions 

a.. lncrec.se incentives for re-.::mlistnxmt. 

b. Inprovc recruitmeut) selectioi:1 a.nd proi'iciency eva.luatio11 

t..Ti teriv. and techniques, including use of psychometric methods. 

c. Pinpoint, intensify, and l..:.iiprove training give11 i.n int.ercept 

techniques. 

d. ~rove training and developLIEnt ot intercept superv.isors. 

e. '.Ira.in. officere in intercept a.mi transmitter .ident.i.f'icP-tion 

teclmiques. 

f. Take action to solve problems ir.. cormection W"ith using 

civilians as intercept operators. 

13. Increase T/A potentiu..l nt points 01' intercept by: 

a. Educating and training operators und supervisors in 

rudiments of T/A. 

b. Providing traffic e.nalysts far each point of inte1•cept . 

c. Decentralizin,3 T A operations to i;;:J.tcrcept atat"ions by 

moving T/A un:its :forward. 

d. Increase exchan.ge of T/A and collateral i.n:for;int.:i.on between 

forward wiits and nx>re centralized T/A w1its .. 

e. Increase authority of' forward. units to orii;in..-i.t\? nessages 

1ioserninating urgent intelligence :Ln:rorma.tio~ derived b~ them. 

t. Provide euidance relative to (o) above, on appropriate 

addressees; and pravid.e adequately rc.pid cor;im.micattoL ;.;~.a.nnels. 

ll~ . Establish a smll research group to ca:r'r"'J ~)u·t; research and 

(guide) development(s) on new ::icthods of tr!lffic t.uialysis,. iLl..:!ludir.i,g 

e.da.pte.tion of certe.in tiroblems to high speed Im-~ci:.lne1'.:. 

15. Use more extensively the existing T/A F\1s1.on S)urces to construct the pattern of Soviet operations by: 

a. Intensifying our intercept e.nd T/A efforts during Soviet 

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REF ID:A516891 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

~OP rtBileuvers in order to build up as complete a picture as possible. 

b. Malting special, separate, and intensive studies of all 

T/A Fusion material to construct an accurate pattern of the behavior 

of the I I 

16. Perform additional o.nd Illlre tlleoretica.l studies in connection 

with the T/.A Fusion effort with a view to: 

a. Finding new approoches in various fields relevant to the 

problems. 

b. Developing new methods of' analysis. 

c . Developing nev high speed machine techniques to the problems. 

c!. Developing new auto.ma.tic semantic pi~ocessing equ1p1Dl'!nt tor 

use in T/A, voice, brevity codas, etc. 

e. ApplyiDg more of the highly developed mathematical 

principles of' nachine programming to the problelllS. 

17. lq)rove the quality of 'r/A Fusio11 by personnel actions to: 

a. Inprove recruitneut and selection criteria and. techniques, 

including use of psychometric methods. 

b. Pinpoint, intensify, 8.lld :tDqlrove training given in analytic 

techniques . 

c . Improve pro:ficiency evalua.tion of aml~/ats. 

d. Estab.lish a. sound sa.lary o.nd. pr01wtion policy aud ilave it 

as :favorable to tratfic analysts as it is to cryptam.lysts. 

e . Ir.prove the quality and proficiency of t"i:ie analytic supervisors. 

t. Provide for the rotation of personnel through the CCJIIHT 

structure to keep it sensitive . Due regf..i.l'd should be e;i ven ·tc 

continuity of effort. 

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0COP SECRETt/$1 
REF ID:A516891 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

~OP PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

18. Improve the conputationa.l. support available it1 NSA by: 

a. Increasing the number of' skilled p~re on the NBA 

staff by educat1Dg qualified NBA personnel~trial and 

educational institutions and b;y hiring progra.nmers. [ProSTfJaJ'l!r'' 

includes those educated, trained, and expel"ienced in the highly 

coq>lex theory and me.themtics or progra.mmi.06,, as opposed to tb.ose 

skilled in scheduling ll'BChine times, applying :f\mdamenta.l GO.ll'putationa.l 

orders, Jiii.king various pl~ing combinations·.. and per.t'ormi··... ng nninte-

:na.nce on ex1stil:Jg mchioos.:J 

b. Investigating thoro!.!6h.l.X the possibility of ut.il1zin8 

cleared indoctrinated personnel skilled in the a.rt oi: prograani.ug 

llho DBY be available outside HSA.. 

c. Developing and applying new types oi' high speed a.na..cytic 

lJll.chinery. 

19. Continue to give the highest possibl.e priorities to the 

solution of t11£1 I systems. 

20. Maintain a firm and consistent policy to control and regulate 

the transf'er of personnel :famille.:r with the! I 

problems to other activities with a view to naintaining the highest 

possible degree of continuity of the several efforts involved. Due regard should be given to the psychological u.nd career development factors 

involved. 

21. Ausment the exiatiDg statt on these hi.sh-level. problems by 

several additional top-flight analysts, utilizing pyachonetric methods 

ot proficiency eva:Luation and selection. 

22. Increase the speed of conveying infornation to intelligence 

chamlela: 

a.. Continue detailed time atudiee o£ traffic dela.YB with a 

view to: 

(1) Reduction or processing times in nessage centers at 

all echeloDS. 

(2) Routing overseas tra.ttic through the best possible routes. 

b. Reduce transit tine of high precedence and other tre.1'f'1c by 

stueyillg and adopting SOJ:Je of the principles now availabl.e (including 

those reported by tlle Programs Research Unit of the Johns Hopkins 

University). 

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fOP SECRE:T!!S 
REF ID:A516891 

[OP SECREJl/$1 

23. Seek ways to increase the number of groups per day being handled 

by electrical canmunica.tions: 

a. Monitor proposed iq>rovcznent.s :for Catnrr communications 

systems 

b. Monitor conte114>lated developments each as autom.tic 

switching and on-line encryption. 

c. Develop be·tter o.nd faster encryption devices. 

d. Achieve higher transmitting speeds. 

211-. Provide oore efficient utilization of radio frequencies and 

f!Xiating land-line facilities : 

a. Use the back scatter .measurement technique to determine 

the ooat effective radio frequency to use at a given time. (Such 

methods have been published a.nd. should be carefully studied.) 

b. Devise a method of pooling all available radio frequencies 

with assignments to individual stations on an immeo.iate basis tc 

meet ionospheric coDd:ltions. 

c. Provide constant attention and practice in the use of 

alternate radio links and cable facilities that ca.n be available 

if severe Janning of radio circuits incident to hostilities should 

render the regular circuits inoperable. 

25. Improve the operatbns of the entire cormrunicutions networks to: 

a. Insure against personnel failures wherever possible • 

b. Assure the timely delivery of messages to their addressees. 

26. ~rove training and instruction of co:mmunicatiollS personnel. 

~. Establish the active policy that, wherever possible, NSA will 

perform initial, broad, a.nd high-level research and establish requirements, 

but that the detailed research; development, and construction work will 

be done through contracts with commercial companies. 

28. St~ ca.ref'ully the entire concept 01· .military, diplomatic, and 

comaercial conmunications to: 

a. Reveal those aspects of the co:nmunications networks which 

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[OP SECREJ11$) 
REF ID:A516891 

are most susceptible to c011rnunica.t.:tons 'i.nt.eJ.11.e;ence activities. 

b. Relate the va.lue of the intelllgence gained through 

exploitation of these aspects to the cost of exploitation and 

to the coat to the eneDzy" of security measures which would reduce 

their vulnerability. 

29. Establish a competent and versatile research group at NSA 

statt level to: 

a. Initiate and cszry out basic research on the theory of 

cODlllWlications intelligenca. 

b. Revicv constantly the C?Urrent world-wide technical status 

of all COMIN'l' operations. 

c. Perform and guide general theoretical research. 

d. Recognize the need for a.dditior.al broad research in 

specific areas. 

e. Relate the lone ra.DL'Pfl research needs to lone range intelligence requirements. 

r. Monitor and st,. all accessible COJllllercia.l technico.l 

developnents having applicability, directly or indirectly, to COMDT 

problems areas. 

g. Relate .NBA' s needs to cOJ11Ercial developments wherever 

possible. 

30. Explore thoro~ all aspects of utilizing a "captive organization." 

31. I:avrove the reaee.rch and devel.opment potential of' the national 

COMil'l e:tf'art by personnel actions to: 

a. ~ the lalary scales to induce good nen to enter 

and remain in this field. 

b. Provide recognition f'or a.chieveJJEnts. 

c. lnfm>ve working conditions. 

d. Explore the extent to which scientists and eDGineers from 

universities and industrial laboratories coul.d be use:f'ull.y borrowed 

far varying periods of time. 

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0 OP SECPE I !!$1 
. i REF ID:A516891 

!OP 3ECRETH3} 

·~. 1~~ugrJe1•t the t~x::st.~tit; St~ icut,.i..fic 1.mrl eJ16l•1ecr ~llL t.·:;a;f;fs .:i.t 

BSA with. a view to providing direct assistance to the Services on 

a.ll. COMINT tec!1nological 1.ntters. 

32. Iq>rove the personnel potential of the mt.t.~nia.l COMINT effort: 

a. Establish roore high-level civilian pos:i.tlons. 

b. Provide more opportunities for selective udvance11cnt of 

well qualified civillan p~rsonnel. 

c. Establis!~ u sa.tiElf'ylng ca.reer COMIN'.r Serv.::i.ce for officers 

a.a well ae enlisted men 111 the Arn'f',/ and Air Force u.nd revive it in 

the IJc.vy. 

d. Assure that supervisors of all COMINT activities have 

expert knowledge o-'.' the activity they supervise by: 

(l) Tra.iuing 

(2) Selective assignm!nt procedures. 

;: . Re-exanline recruit:.J.Cnt poli.-.:isto in the l.!.t,;l:1t 01· realistic 

security limit:ltions. 

33. Educate 1JSA personnel at all cchelon.s on the ge~ra.l. cli.;;.ra.cter 

of ELINT and its c.ppllcations to the COMDI'l' ~f:fort34. On the basis that certain phases of ELIN'.l' and CXJID'T are mu.tually 

<!orrctlilllentary 1 establish vork.lng ELDll'-CCMINT liaison oetween .NSA e.nd all 

agencies now conducting EI.INT operations. /!fuese lnclude ANEJlX} (AI-.q-Navy 

Electronic Evaluation Group), r..EAFSB, SAC, ATIC, and C"IA.J 

35. Pro-dde direct commntcations between fie.ld BLINT units and the 

nearest field Cafilfl' unit. 

36. Provide adequate coordina:tion o.nd cooperation ;;;etw·ecn ELilrr and 

caaHT unita at all echelons. 

3'7. Include data. derived from EI.INT ic. all pert:i.nent COlilli"T pro<..-esses, 

istudies, and developments . 

38. Develop postulated, normative enentY plans: 

a.. ~tudy c.x:;;.sting postu.la.ted pJ..wis C.:J.r:::.fu..lly .:1ud co:npJ.ctcJ.y. 

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!OP SECRET#$} 
REF ID:A516891 

~OP 

b. St~ pertinent historical. documents. 

c. Work all available intelligence data into the plans. 

d. utilize our own operational experience. 

e . Test phases of the plan by experimental operations. 

39. Develop a set of' integrated indicators based on the postulated 

j:melJ\Y plans • 

4o. Quantify all intelligence information (COMDT, ELIHT, collateral) 

underlying the direct indicators of' the imminence of' war. This is especially 

applicable to the Soviet Long Range Air Force and the Soviet Air Defense 

System. 

41. Develop measures or indices of activities,, actual or postulated, 

of various types. 

42. Develop standardized displ.e.y systems that will show the development of the indices or nieasures a.s functions of time. 

4 3. Measure the inminence of hostilities against the postulated plans. 

44. Study the possibility of applying analytical DE.Chine methods to 

the integrated indicator system. 

0COP SECRET#@ 

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