REF ID:A516900 

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··o··· ·o· .,._ 95 Replaaes DA AGO Form11911, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ t FE8 !10 Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used. 

@'pproved for Release by NSA on 03-20-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
.- REF ID:A516900 

- MEl«>RAIDUM FOR· MR • FRIEDMAN 

At 1330 on 10 March 1954, a meeting was held in the NSA sta:f'f 

conference room for the purpose of discussing NSA recommendations 

ma.de on the basis of the "Robertson Report" {"Potentialities of COMINT' 

for Strategic Warning"). 

The following were present: 

Capt . D. M. Agnew -DCS /P 

Col. J. J. Davis -P/P 

Dr. A. Sinkov -PROD 

Dr. s. Ku.llback -R/D 

Dr. H. Campaigne -R/D 

Lt. Col. J. F. Laudig-PERS 

Mr. o. Kirby -P/P {arrived at 1410) 

Lt. I. T. McDonald -S/ASST 

The meeting was presided over by Capt. Agnew and opened with a 

general discussion of the points listed under "NSA Study - The 

Potentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warning." 

Dr. Sink.ov stated that now there are two aspects to the problem: 

(1) There are certain areas covered by the report where action 

taken within NSA itself can alleviate the situation. This Agency must 

be certain that al.l possible interD&l action is ta.ken to satisfy the 

recomaendations DBde in the report. 

(2) There are certain areas covered by the report that require 

action outside of ISA. This Agency should make certain that these areas 

are brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities as soon as 

possible. 

A brief discussion ensued concerning the outcome of the Director's 

request for lo65 additional people. A/G reported that, although a 

request for 375 people had been approved, no answer had yet been 

received on the request for the 1065. 

Dr. Sinkov cited Dr. Einstien's personal plea to President Roosevelt 

as being the initial impetus to the Manhattan District Project of the 

Atomic Energy Commission. He went on to say that the Director, NSA, has, 

in the Robertson Report, a reason and a means for doing a similar thing for 

intelligence and strategic warniJl& and on the basis of that report he could 

go directly to the Secretary of Defense and/or the President. In order to 

take such action NSA must be able to say that we have done all in our power 

to acconplish our mission and to satisfy the recommendations of the 

Robertson Report. 

Dr. Sinkov continued with the proposal that a brief paper be prepared for the Director stating NSA's position on each point of the Robertson 

Report on which NSA could act within itself, and NSA's position on each 

point on which we can do nothing without help. 
REF ID:A516900 

- It was suggested that the Director be verbally briefed on this 

proposal and that, if the Director approved in' spirit, a committee of 

experts be appointed to prepare the written brief. 

Capt. Agnew stressed that NSA should be able to assure the Director 

that a1l possible has been done within NSA before external proposals are 

made. 

It was considered that the Robertson Report highlighted three major 

problems: special intelligence, personnel, and traffic analysis. 

It was suggested that a meioorandum be prepared for the Director 

containing: (1) the major recommendations of the Robertson Report with 

statements on what bas been done in regard to each within the capabilities 

of IfSA; (2) a statement of Dr. Sinkov's plan. 

It was further suggested that exry written paper contain the following 

ideas: 

(1) NSA has carried out the recommendations made to the maximum 

extent possible. 

(2) It is considered that it is within the capability of COMINT 

to provide a considerable increase in intelligence about Russia and the 

Satellites than is presently being realized. 

(3) Thie intelligence ma:y well bear on the whole problem of 

strategic ve.rniDg as well as being extremely valuable in other areas. 

During a general discussion on the proposal, it was recommended that 

this project be submitted as an entity in itself, CO!J!Pletely independent 

of exry previous proposals or requests; and it was decided that the following would be recommended as the basic outline of the proposal: 

I. Special legislation for the United States COMINT effort 

1. Personnel 

a. Increased authorization 

b. Relief from restrictive federal service regulations 

c. More COJZ!Plete control of the COMINT :military career field 

(including the establishment of COMINT career fields) 

d. Control of military personnel rotation. 

2. Funding 

a. From one to two billion dollars programmed over a five 

year period (this would be roughly 150-300 million per year 

conpared to NSA's present 60 million per year) 

-2-

\ .. 
REF ID:A516900 

-

It was decided that CEq>t. Agnew would present the idea verbally to 

the Director and then, i:f' the Director was willing, a subsequent meeting 

would be called for additional discussion. 

-3-

I. T. McDONALD 

LT USAF 
REF ID:A516900 

At 1330 on 10 March 1954, a meeting was held in the NSA staff' 

conference room for the purpose of discussing NSA recommendations 

ma.de on the basis of the "Robertson Report" ("Potentialities of COMINT 

for Strategic Warning"). 

The f'olloving were present: 

Capt. D. M. Agnew -'!X:S/P 

Col. J. J. D!l.vis -P/P 

Dr. A. Sinkov -PROD 

Dr. S. Kullback -R/D 

Dr. H. Caq>a.igne -R/D 

Lt .Col. J. F. laudig-PERS 

Mr. o. Kirby .. p/p (arrived at 1410) 

Lt. I. T. McDonald -S/ ASST 

The meeting vas presided over by Capt. Agnew and opened with a 

gemral discussion of' the points listed under "NSA Study - The 

Potentialities of' COMDT tor Strategic Warning. 11 

Dr. Sinkov stated that now there a.re two aspects to the problem: 

( l) There are certain areas covered by the report where action 

taken vi thin HSA itself' can alleviate the si tuat1on. This Agency must 

be certain that all possible internal. action is taken to satisfy the 

reconmiendations UBde in the report. 

(2) There are certain area.a covered by the report that require 

action outside of NBA. This Agency should nake certain tbat these areas 

are brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities as soon as 

possible. 

A brief discussion ensued concerning the outcome of the Director's 

request for lo65 additional people. A/G reported that, although a 

request for 375 people had been approved, no answer had yet been 

received on the request for the lo65. 

Dr. Sinkov cited Dr. Einstien'e personal plea to President Roosevelt 

as being the initial impetus to the Manhattan District Project oi" the . 

Atomic Energy Commission. He went on to say that the Director, NSA, bas, 

in the Robertson Report, a reason and a means for doing a similar thing for 

intelligence and strategic warning, and on the baeis of that report he could 

go directly to the Secretary of Defense and/or the President. In order to 

take such action NSA must be able to say that we have done all in our power 

to aCCOlJl>lish our mission and to satisf'y the recommendations of the 

Robertson Report. 

Dr. Sinkov continued with the proposal that a brief paper be prepared tor the Director stating EA's position on ea.ch point of the Robertson 

Report on which NSA could act within itself, and NSA's position on each 

point on which we can do nothing without help. 
REF ID:A516900 

It was suggeeted that the Director be verbally briefed on this 

prapoae.1 and that, if the Director approved 1n spirit, a. cOJllnittee of 

experts be appointed to prepare the written brie:f. 

Capt. Agnew stressed that NSA shoul.d. be abJ.e to assure the Director 

that all possible has been done Yithin NSA before external proposa.ls a.re 

ma.de. 

It vaa considered that the Robertson Report highlighted three major 

probl.emst spec1a.l intelligence, peraonnel, and traf'f'ic a.na.13'sis. 

It ve.s ~ated that a memorandum be prepared tor 'the Director 

contain1.ng: (l) the naJor recommendations of the Robertson Report with 

statements on what has been done in regard to each within the capabilities 

ot NBA; (2) a statement ot Dr. Sinkov' a plan. 

It was 1'urther suggested that any written paper contain the following 

ideas: 

(l) BSA has carried out the recOI11Dendations made to the l?BXimum 

extent posaible. 

(2) It is considered that it ia within the capability of COMIN'1' 

to provide a considerable inerease 1n intelligence about Russia and the 

Satellite• than ia presently being realized. 

(3) Thia intelligence any well bear on the whole problem of 

strategic warning as well as being extremely valuable in other areas. 

During a general discussion on the proposal, it was reconmeDded that 

this project be submitted as an entity in itself, conpletely independent 

of any previous propoaals or requeat•J and it was decided that the following would be rec0111Dended as the basic outline of the proposal.: 

I. Special legislation for the United States COMINT etfort 

l. Personnel 

a. Increased authorization 

b. Relief' from restrictive redera.l service regulations 

c. More CODV?lete control or the COMDIT military career field 

{including the establishment or c<>mrr career fiel.ds) 

d. Control of' military personnel rotation. 

2. Funding 

a. From one to two billion dollars programmed over a five 

yee:r period (this voul.d be roL::.ghly 150-300 million per year 

CQq)ared to NSA's present 6o million per year) 
REF ID:A516900 

It was decided that Capt. Agnew would present the idea verbally to 

the Director and then, if the Director was willing, a subsequent ~eting 

would be c:all.ed for additional discussion. 

-3-

I. T. McDONAI.D 

LT USAF