USCIB: 13.5/102 

REF ID:A59231 

TOP SECRET 9 

Ih\:NBL!i ~."IA 60MIN'f GHAHHBIS ONJ:.¥ 

APPBNBEIB B9Sl::lUBN'l SeN!l\UWS 

eOfJ§lOftB M:A'i'Jefl:Itil 

lS April 1955 

.MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Compromises of COMINT Information. 

Reference: CIBD #9 (Revised) dated 4 February 1954. 

1. The enclosed summaries of eighteen (18) hitherto unreported 

compromises of CCJilINT information due to ineffective communioations 

security is circulated for information. 

2. A brief study of all compromises occurring during 1954 will be 

prepared and circulated as soon as all final reports are received. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 13. 5/102 

ptain, • • Navy """"'~ti ve Secretary, USCIB 

APFiliNBflB BOetJMlfi!' eOM'fAINS 

COBEWORf) M:fr!Eft!l\L 

IWffifl!i YIA GOMINT GI~ ON!.¥ 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-10-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 
COMPROMISES bF com:NT INFORMATION 

1. On 1 June 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the 691oth 

Security Group, Landsberg, Germany, during on-line PYTHON operation. 

On that datP. a portion of a SECRET codeword message was transmitted in 

the clear to the 6961st Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Texas over 

a circuit composed of radio and wire links presumed vulnerable to interception. The compromised information is believed to be chatter on a 

,Satellite link, from which little can be inferred except that information 

from some communications link is being intercepted and reported. This 

clear text transmission resulted from failure of the transmitting operator to switch his equipment to the "cipher" position before beginning 

his transmission. A contributing factor to this occurrence was the 

fact that, on the very morning of the violation:, a modification, 

specifically designed to prevent such plain language transmission, was 

removed from the cryptographic equipmeqt. Remedial action taken by 

the Commander, 691oth Security Group consisted or the immediate rein~ 

stallation of the modification and issue of instructions to the operators 

placing greater emphasis on the use of proper operating procedures by all 

on-line operators. Statements from the individuals concerned were 

included in the report or investigation received from the violating 

station, and support the facts as presented by the Commanding Officer. 

However, a description of the station's training program for conununication 

security as applied to COMINT has not been received, due to the fact that 

the final report was prepared prior to receipt or the National Security 

Agency Circular which requires this information. 

2. On 16 August 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the 50lst 

Communications Heconnaissance Group, Yongsan, Kcfrea, during on-line 

DAPHNE operation. On that date a portion of a CONFIDENTIAL message was 

transmitted in the clear over communication facilities composed of wire 

and underwater cable links vulnt!rable to interception. The compromise 

of this information revealed Ont! unidentified ca.11 .. sign, and its 

association with the National Sucurity Agency. Thi~ clear text transmission resulted from failure 01· the transmitting operator to adhere to 

existing procedures. While transmitting a message to the Army Security 

Agency, Far East, the operator CLt the 50lst CRG va.s informed by the distant operator that he was garbljng1 and was instructed to switch to the 

"text11 position fo;' __ ~l!~ _purpose of a circuit test. Upon resuming transmission, after the test was completed, the 50lst Communications Reconnaissance Group operator neglected to switch back to the"cipher" position, 

and transmitted plain language until stopped by the operator at the Army 

Security Agency, Far East. The Commanding Officer, 50lst Communications 

Reconnaissance Group, in order tc) reduce the likelihood of' a recurrence, 

has taken action to orientate all communications personnel thoroughly in 

the use of proper operating procHdures, and impress upon them the 

possible consequences of becoming lax while performing their duties. 

'fOP BBOflH'f eON'ffl0fi # 550659-B 

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Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and 

support the facts as presented by the Commanding Officer. The 

Comme.ndi!'lg Officer, 50lst Communications Reconnaissance Group, reports 

that an extensive local trainine program has been conducted whereby 

Communication Center personnel have received review instructions from 

the Officer in Charge, concerning the proper handling of COMINT via 

cryptographic communications facilities. 

3. On 2 September 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at Vint Hill 

Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia. On that date a portion of an Internatlono.l Commercial Radio Daily Coverage Report (ICR :rx:;R) was transmitted 

in the clear to the National Security Agency over a landline circuit 

vulnerable to intercep·i;ion. The information compromised reveals our 

knowledge of ICR call signs, frequencies, and schedules. This compromise 

occurred while the Vint Hill Farms operator was utilizing circuit terminal 

equipment to produce additional copies 1of the report for courier delivery 

to the National Security Agency. During the process, the line/local 

switch was inadvertently changed to the line position, placing the equipment on-line with the National Security Agency. The clear text transmission continued until it was broken by the NSA operator. The Commanding Officer, Vint Hill Farms, stated in the final report of the violation that all communications center personnel have been directed not to 

use circuit terminal equipment for any purpose other than authorized 

transmissions. In addition, further training has been given to 

communications personnel i~ the proper UGe of _the ~nstalled equipme~~~~ 

Statements from tTie.individuals concerned have been received, and 

support the facts as presented by the Commanding Officer. The station's 

training 0program has been described as consisting of a scheduled study 

of all publications applicable to the cryptosys~ems held, with written 

tests to determine comprehension. Trainit18 also includes practical 

application of communication principles by such means as practice 

encipherimg and deciphering. 

4. On 12 September 1954, a C0~1INT compromise Qccurred at the 696lst 

·Communications Squadron, San Antonio, ~exas, during on-line GAL~TEA 

operation. On that date a portion or a TOP SECRET codeword message was 

transmitted in the clear to the 6920th Security Group, Shirai Air Base, 

Japan,.over a circuit composed or radio and wire links vulnerable to 

interce tion. 

ie 

e operator responsible 

to adhere to the existing on-line break procedure. The subject message 

was actually being transmitted from the 6920th Security Group to the 

6961st Communications Squadron. The two stations lost cipher contact 

and switched to the "text" position. After cipher contact had been 

Tegained, the receiving operator, not realizing his equipm~nt w~s still 

in the "text" position, transmitted a portion of the message to indicate 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) TOP 

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T<i' SEeF,!!~f59Ei.1£WR ~'QI' .. C:''I ·~· ··;i;i ., EO 3.3(h)(2) 4 :J ·:c ·, ·~ "• PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

to tlw cli:~t:mt. op"1"1t0r from -which point to rcm1me tr:in:;mi:rnlon. The 

Conm.anrlr!r, £;9:; l:;t. Co:.u'lunicn.tionr.· r1quac1ron, reports th: Lt the operator 

invol vru han "l,.-~en cli:,c ipl t ncd umkr Article J 5 of t,he Uniform \Cocl0 or 

Mil it·Lry Su:;tice. Gt:.i.tem··nti~ from thr.· i ncllyidu·1ls conC•!rn~d lmvc: been 

r1~cc>ivc·d, unrl r.uppor-t. thr f:L~tn 11::; pt•i:-ncntccl by the Comr:1anclinc\ or ricer. 

The rer.pon:;iblc op1 ·r:.tor wu::; c:,,;pcrknced a.nQ. ordinarily very co.prible. 

A corr.prc>hminiV·! dc:~cription vf tho Gt:itlon' o trrdnlng prograrr. fc;>r 

communication necurHy an o.ppl kd to crnrrrrr liur. o.lno be,.,.n recdvccl, 

and proviuc~r. nufflci··nt 1.rainin~ in i.hnt phn.ne of C'lrcuit operation 

npplic:.i.blo to thin prLrticllhr type Of V:iOlutiOn. 

5. On 12 Septembl'?r 19'.)h, two COf·IINT compromtr,cs occurred o.t\ the 

3rd Rn.die Squn.clron, r:obil1! 1 ;·:ll":'lenclorf Air Force Dane, Aln.nk11, dur!ne; 

on-line PYTHON operation. In c··ich im;t•Lnce o. portion 01' u mensnac, 

one classified COf.iFIO:·:nTI,\L ·md the: other GF.CR!~l' codeword, wa.~ ·• ... transrni tte::rl in monoo.lpho.l>ctic oub:;ti tut ion cipher" td the Nn.tion'l.r Gecurity 

ABcncy over s. landlin,. circuit vuln,,r:iblc to interception. One 

Both of theoe violations resulted fror.i the one-timt:key -:---...,.....,---.-....,.....-..... tape sticking over the scnsin~ pins of the trunnmitter distributor. 

The torn tape stop mechnnis~, which would quve prevented these 

compromises, had been tPmporo.rily removed from the circuit for re1mir 

and n.dJustmcnt. The Comm.."l.ndcr, 3rd Hudio Squadron, Mobile, reports 

that the'responsible operators have been disciplined under Article.15 

of the Uniform Code of Military Junticc. In udqition, all operntors 

were cautioned to be on tho alert for this type· of occurrence, o.nd 

maintenance personnel ho.ve completed a thorour;h check nnd adjustment 

of the equipment involved. Sto.temcnts from the individur1ls concerned I have been received, o.nd support the facto aD pr,.r.cnted by the Commanding 

Officer. The violating st~tion hus provideo a comf>,lr.:t·.~ outline of the 

training program f'or commuqico.tion occurit¥ o.s applied to COMINT. 

Tho.t phn.sc of circuit operl:J'tion applicable to this particular type o'f 

violation is adequately coycred. 

6. On 17 September 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the 6961s·t 

Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Tcxa~, durinc on-line PYTHON 

operation. On that date a. portion of o. SECRET c1Jdeword mec;sa.gc was 

transmitted in the clear tQ the loth Rndlo Gqu·u1ron, Mobile, Chicksa.nds 

Priory, Englnnd, over a circuit compooed Of radio and wire linka vulnerable to interception. I 

I U J 0 G 

Taken by itself, however, this information is meo.ninelcss, nince it is 

o.n o.rbitrc.ry National Security Ar,ency dcsi(?;n~tion. The nubJect message 

!Of" ::i:CR65:' GOH'f'ROL i' 5 50659-13 

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TOP SECRET EIDER 

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wun nctunlly bdnr, tranmnHtca from the loth Ro.dio Squn.dron, Mobile, 

to the 6961st Conununic·Ltionn Squadron. ThG two stations loot cipher 

contu.ct o.nd switchr:d to thr~ "text" poc;ition. The receiving operator, 

after cipher cont~.i.ct wa::; reea.ined, failed to realize thn.t his equipment wo.G still in the "text" pooition a.nd transmitted a portion of the 

mer.so.ea to indicat; to the diatant operator from which point to resume 

transmission. The Commander, 6961st Communications Squadron, reports 

that the importance of a.dhering to the prescribed on-line break 

procedure has b~cn stressed to all squadron opera.tors. The operator 

responsible has been disciplined under Article 15 of the Uniform Code 

of Milit11ry Juntice. Statements from the individuals concerned have 

been received, and support the facts o.s presented by the Commanding 

Officer. A detailed brnakdown_of the station's training program for 

conununication necurity as ttpplied to COMINT bas,~also been received, 

and indicates that oufficient emphasis is being placed on that phase 

of circuit operation applicable to this particular violation. I 

7. On 20 September 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the Army 

Security Aeency, r~urope 1 located in Frankfurt, Gerrna.ny, during on ... line 

DAPHNE operation. On that do.te o. portion of a. SECRET codeword message 

wo.s transmitted in the clear to the 502nd Communications Reconnaissance 

Group, lleilbronn German over o. landljne circuit vulnerable to interception. 

COMINT in.for;;. 

mation ca.n be inferred from this compromise only by recovery of' our 

system or assianing case notations, but since case notations have been 

so f'requehtly compromised in the past, our aystem of' allocation may be 

at least partially recovered. The subject messa~e was actually being 

transmitted from the 502nd Communications ReconriaissanceGroup to the 

Army Security Agency, Europe. The operator at the Apmy Security Agency, 

Europe, uppn receivine; a e;arblc 1 switched his equ:Lpment to the "standby" 

position and stopped the transmission. Not rea,llzipg that the equipment 

wo.s still in the "standby" position, he proceeded to transmit a. line of ' I the mcssarse to indicate to the distant opcrntor from which point a. 

retransmission wan required. The Chief', Army Security Agency, Europe, 

reports that appropriate disciplinnry action hn.s been taken against 

the operator responsible, and th~i.t all communication center personnel 

have been reapprised of the i111p6rtancc or strict adherence to prescribed 

regulations. St11tements from the individuals concerned ha.ve been 

received, and support the facts as presented by the Cormnanding Officer. 

The operator respons191e was considered fully qualified by his superiors, 

and upon questioni'Ill!stated that he was aware of the proper procedures, 

but wa.s not mentally alert at the time of the occurrence. A comprehensive 

dencription ()f'thc station's training program f'or communication security 

as applied.to COMINT hao also been received, and the trainlne; in that 

phase of'circuit operntion involved is adequate. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 'feP SEeRB'f CON'f'RSL 9 5506.59-B 

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8. On 21i Gcptcr.tbc r 1951~, n cor.rrrrr co1;1p:romiGe occurred o. t the 

Army Security /\ecncy, EuNpe, located in Frankfurt, G·1rmo.ny, during 

on-line DAPlil-TC operatlon. On thn.t do.te a. portion of o. f.i~;cm;T coclcword 

message wo.s transmitted in th~ clco.r to the 502ncl Corrununico.tions 

Rcconno.iosunce Group, Tfoilbronn, Gcrm~my, over o. lo.ndlinc circuit vulnerable to interception. This compromiGe revealed o.nulyi:;is of Rui:;sio.n 

communicationo, o.nd some knowled;:,e of the order-of-po.ttlc of Rusaia.n 

military problemc;. The subject meosu6e wua nctuo.lly .being transmitted 

from the 502nd Communication::; Reconna.isso.nce Group \.to the Army Sucuri ty 

Aaency, Europe, while the cipher component (ASAM 2-1.) or the Army 

Security Acency, Europe, tru.nc;mit side of the circuit wn.G out for repair. 

The Army Security Aeency, !!:urope, operator received fl\(tarble, a.nd not 

realizing that the ASAM 2-1 war; missinG from his send position, tta.nsmi tted n portion of the meoGnge to indico.tc to "the dista.nt operatpr the 

point at which the garble appeared. A contributiDB factor to thi~ 

occurrence wac; the la.ck of proper c;upervision, due to the. fa.ct that a 

shorto.se of communication center personnel necessitated the use of supervisory personnel to operate crypto positions. The Chief, Army Security 

Agency, I~urope, reports that o.pproprio.tc disciplinary action has been 

to.ken ago.inst the personnel responsible, and that in the future supervisory personnel will perform only supervisory duties, and will not be 

used as opera.tors. Statements from the individuals involved have been 

received, and support the fucts as presented by the Comrrm.ndine; \Officer. 

The viola.tine; station hao submitted a copy of the current communication 

security trainill6 proc;rnm. It provides adequate trainine in the\phase 

of circuit operation which is npplicuble to this particular compromise. 

As a restH .. t of this spc>cific occurrence, all communications personnel 

have been tested to redetermine their co.pabilit:bes. 

9. On 24 September 1951~, a COMIN'r compromise occurred at the Army 

Security t~gcncy, T~urope, located in Frankfurt, Germn.ny during on-line 

PY'r.HON operation. On thnt dute a portion of a SECRET codeword message 

was transmitted in monoalphabctic substitution cipher to the National 

Security 1\gency over a circuit com osed of landltne'and underwater cable 

links vulnerable to intcrce tion. 

In this inc;tance the compromise :mny be attributed to negligence 

of the transmitting opera.tor in permittinB the one-time key tape to run 

throueh the last s~gment, and to become stuck over the sensing pins of 

the tro.n~mitter distributor. The circuit op0rator left hio position 

temporarily to perform other duties. Such nbscncc from his position was 

in direct violation of a comrnunicntion center 3tn.ndine; Opr?ro.tiI113 

Procedure", which rrriuires conotri.nt obr.ervntion of the equipment while 

the tra.nomitter distributor ic; operative. The Chief, Army Security Agency, 

Europe, rrports that the opcrntor responsible hri.s been reduced in grade, 

nnd th~1t clooer r.upC'rvision will b~ c;ivE'n to nll opcrntine personnel by 

the Trick Chief n.nd thC' Duty Officer. Since this occurrence the torn tn.pe 

'i'QP GRGHR'.P 99ii'ffiOL 1 ';50659-D 

P!LGE: I) CF 9 Pi\Gl•;:3 

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TOP SECllET EIDER 

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stop mech mimn, which i::; ::;p1:cific:..Llly dc•u:lgncd to prevent violations 

of thii; nature, h.Ls b·1cn indul l<~d on ull cquirmcnt of the type 

involved. Gt:..1.tcm·..:nt:. from thr..? individuals concerned h<wc been 

received, a.nd nupport the fuct::; c.::; presc>nted by the Comm .. mding 

Officer. The opcrq.tor rcnponnible wa.s fully qualiffod, having had 

nine monthr.; cryptocentcr experience. The station's training proarum 

for communication security as applied to COMINT h3s. been submitted, 

and provides ndequute truininlJ in the proper operation of on-line 

circuits. 

10. On 30 September 1954, 11 COMIUT compromfae occurred ut the 

692oth Security Group, Shirai Air BrJ.sc, Jo.pan, durin13 on-line PYTHON 

operation. On thut date a. portion of 11 TOP SECRET codeword.messaBe 

was allegedly transmitted in the clear to the 29th Rudio Squ~dron, 

Mobile, Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islnnds over u. radio circuit 

vulnerable to interception. The inforlJ'\lltion presumed exposed wus a 

portion of an intelligcmce report do.ti'.:!d 2"( Sc tcmber 1 4. 

s o nves gat on a.ve been rece ved rom e 

and the 29th Radio S~uudron, Mobile, and are in 

direct conflict. The report from the 692oth Security Group concludes 

that a clear text transmission did not occur since the one-time key 

tape was ~t all times being fed through the transmitter distributor, 

and was constantly being mixed with the clear text tape. It is the 

opinion of the 692oth Security Group that the opbrator at the 29th 

Radio Squadron, Mobile, while attempting to break the transmission 

after receiving garble, switched to the "ready" position rather tha.n the 

"standby" position, as claimed by the 29th Radio Squ.o.dron, Mobile. By 

switching to the "ready" position, which is a cipher pooition, it 

might appear that the message was being received in-;the clear, while 

actually it was being properly enciphered, and good copy was being · 

received. In the report from the 2~~~~io Squadron, Mobile, however, 

the operator involved and the trick.chief.on duty at the time definitely 

state, in their sworn statements, that the receive equipment was in the 

"standby" position at the time clear text was received, in which case 

the transmission itself would have to have been in the clear. Since 

the true facts surrounding this occurrence could not be resolved, there 

was no recourse but to compromise the information. Statements from the 

individuals concerned at both stations have been received, and support 

the facts as presented by the respective Commanding Officers. A 

complete and comprehensive description of the 692oth Security Group's 

training program for communication security as applied to COMINT has 

also been received, and provides adequate training in the proper operation of on-line circuits. 

TOP B!em!:'f eON'l'ftOL # 550659-B 

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11. On 6 October 1954, o. COMIIrr compromir.c occurr•!d at the 33 1

'th 

Communicn.tionG Reconnaioso.ncc Compo.ny, Fort Brn~g, North Co.rolino.. On 

that date a messo.r;t:? wo.G enciphered in the D1\PIIlJE cryptoRyGtem usin13 a 

mr~osn.c;c rotor o.rro.ntJcmcmt o.nd mcsso.c;e rot.or alignment ident:l.ca.l to 

t.hose u:;c~cl for enciphering a mcsso.ee on the previous day. Ar. a. result, 

two mcusn es co.ch conto.inin 125 were enci hered in\de th. 

The direct cause of this occurr.ence was 

failure of the operator who enciphered the earlier message to cross 

from the key list the rotor arrangement and ~he.: rotor alignment he 

had used, us required by the Sto.ndil18 Operating Procedure of the 

cryptocenter, as well as the opera.ting instructions applicable to the 

DAPHNE cryptosystem. The Commanding Officer, 33'1th Communications 

Reconnaissance Company, reports that u triple check log for Trick Chiefs 

ho.s been established to insure the deletion of all rotor arrangements 

as they arc used, and Trick Chiefs a.re now required to sign for all 

rotor arrangements used during their shift. In addition, a daily 

check is performed by the Communications Chief and the Officer in 

Churge. Statements from the individu~ls concerned have been received, 

o.nd support the facts as presented by the Communding Off leer. A br .. icf 

description of the Communication Center's training program for communication security has also been received, und it sto.tes thut o.11 communications 

personnel receive continuouc; training and inc;truction in cryptographic 

and meGsage-handling procedureo under the supervision of the Communications Chief. As a result of thia specific compromise, renewed emphasis 

has been placed upon the import11nce of protecting COMINT information. 

12. ,On 8 October 1951~, o. COMINT compromise occurred at the loth 

Radio Squadron, Mobile, Chicksands Priory, England, during on-line DAPHNE 

operation. On that date a portion of u GECRET codeword message was 

transmitted in the cleur to the 31th Rudio Squadr'on'Mobile, Kirknewton 

Scotland, over a landlinc circuit vulnerable to interception. 

The direct cnusc of this occurrence was 

non-comp e Radio S !Uadron, Mobile, Gtunding Operating 

Procedure for on-line correction rcqucstc;, which requires reference by 

line number rather than by words contained in the text. In this instance 

the receivine; operator had run out or tape, and stopped the transmission. 

After ch•1nc;ing tupe reels, he proceeded to transmit the l3st correctly 

received line, while in the "text" position, to indicate to the dist:int 

operntor from which point to reowne transmiosion. The Com.•nnnding Officer, 

10th Radio Gqun.dron, Mobilo, rPports th:1t the opc>rutor responsible ha.s 

been relieved from duty in the CryptoF,raphic Section, and nfter receiving 

additional traini~ will be flssir;ncd to th<' TelC'type Sr:-ction. In the 

future more o.ttention will b•.! plri.crd upon nr.oir;runi:.!nt or pc>rr.onncl after 

they h3.Ve complett:.:d the Communications Trulninr, Course. Statements 

'l!OP :d~R~ SQUPRQI, .J 550659-B 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

from the inciividual:; concf'rned h:J.V<' Leen r'(ccivccl, and r;unport. the 

fncl.s u:J prr_.r.,..nted by clv.• Comn.nndine; Officf"'r. Th~ opcr:.ltor rctiponniblc 

for thin viol r;,tion lmd complc•tr·d th•.: cur:ununj catJ om:; cournc, but.\ his 

cxpcr1.cncc ns o.n on-line o:parutor wun limi fa~d to only ti:m dayG. /\. 

vc:ry clc.•t·.dlcd out.] i'nn or the cormnunico.tion center tro.ininc pro.[;r'l.m for cornrnunic~1Uon o~curity bus been rcc••iv0rl, nnrl th:it portion dc!:J.linr, 

with on-line circuit operation iG ndcr1uu.tc. 

13. On 22 October 1954, a COMINT compromise occurrf")d at the Army 

Security A15cncy, Europe, durin6 on-line Dl\Pl!Im opC'rnUon. On that 

date o. portion or o. SECRET codeword mcs::mc~e was tro.nsrni ttcd in mono~ 

o.lpho.betic substitution cipher to the 50?nd Communications Rcconnn.issance 

Group, Heilbronn German over a lundlinc c rcult vulnerable to 

interception. 

e v o a. on, n 

thio instance, may be o.ttributed to,n malfunction of the ASAM 2-1, which 

caused the rotors to stop stepping. Maintennnce personnel at the Army 

Security Agency, Europe, ho.ve determined that screws on the main shaft 

support bracket worked looae from the base of the ASAM 2-1, causing 

the clutch throw-out lever to bind on its cam. Thir, in turn prevented 

the rotor drive bnr assembly from functioninc;. The Chief, Army Sacurity 

Acency, Europe, reports that u new mainten:ince program, which requires 

a daily check of on-line ASAM 2-1 equipment, ha.s been initiated to 

prevent future malfunctions of thia nature. Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and support the facts as presented 

by the Commanding Officer. Since this viob.tion involved an equipment 

malfunction rather thn.n un operator ino.dvert~ncy, a copy of' the station's 

revised mainteno.nce proe;ram was submitted in lieu of the training 

program for communication security o.s applied to'COMINT. This main~ 

teno.nce program is adequate to insure regular checks of on-line equipment. 

14. On 2'( October 1954, a. COMnJT compromise occurred at the 

National Security Agency Communications Center duting on-line PYTHON 

operation. On that date a portion of a. SECRET codeword message was 

tro.nsmitted in the clear to Two Rock Ranch Station, Petaluma, California 

over a landline circuit vulnerable to interce tion. This com romise 

which s not considered serious 

e v o a on, 

ecur y 11.gcncy opera.tor, 

after receiving a. garble and switching to the "text" position, transmitted a portion of the rnessn.ce in the clear to indicate to the distant 

operator at which point the garble appeurcd. The Chief, Operntions 

Division, reports that the operator responsible hao been verbally 

reprimanded and o.dvised of the serlousncss of his error. In addition, 

he has been reindoctrinuted in the use of pr~ on-line brenk procedure. 

Statements from the individu:ils concerned have been received, and aupport 

the facto ns presentr~d by the Officer in Ch·.i.rs"· A comprehensive outline 

of the Communication Center's tr~inin6 proCTram for communication secur~ty 

as applied to COMINT b'l.s a.lno been received, and includes sufficient 

traininG in the proper operation of on-line circuits. 

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15. On 30 October 1951~ 1 a COMINT compromise occurred at the 

8603rμ Administrative Area Unit, Okinuwa. On that date portions of 

two CONF!DENTIJ\.L mcaso.gcs were enciphered in depth as a result of the 

uae or an incorrect message rotor ali~nment during ORCUU-Crypto8raphic 

operation. The length ot' depth involved in each message wns 1'(35 ch~Lracters • 

In this instance, after enciphering a mesaage correctly, 

the operator misread the final message rotor alignment and en~ered it 

incorrectly on the cryptolog. This error was reflected in the following 

messuge since the incorrectly entered alignment was used to derive the 

beginning message rotor alignment of the new message. The Comma.nding 

Officer, 8603rd Administrative Area. Unit, repo:r~s that a. revision to the 

enciphering procedure requires the enciphering operator to carefully 

check, letter for letter, all alignment entries made in the cryptolo6. I In addition, the check-decrypting operr1tor is now requ:f.red to derive 

bis own rotor alignments, not only for the original decipherment, but 

for any subsequent decipherments, regurdlcas of the numbr~r. Statements 

from the individuals concerned have been received, and support the facts 

a.a presented by the Officer in Charge. A summary or the otution's 

training program for communication security us applied to COMINT ha.a 

also been received, and appears to include adequate training in that 

phase .~f ~ryptosecurity applicable to this particular violation. 

16. On 2 November 195~, a COMINT compromise occurred at the 6920th 

Security Group, Shirai ~ir Base, Japan, during on-line PYTHON operation. 

On that a'.a.te a. portion ot• a. SECRET codeword message was trunamit·~ed in 

the clear to the 696lst Ccmununicationa S11undron,• Su.n Antonio, Texas 

over a circuit composed of radio a.nd wire linko'vulnerable to intercep 

tion. This compromise consists only or unrelated call sie;ns. The 

direct cause of this occurrence wo.s non-compliance with the station's 

existing on-line break prc1cedure. While receiving .the subJect message 

from the 6961st Communications Squadron, cipher contact wus lost. The 

operator at the 692oth Security Group, afte1 cipner'contuct wan regained, 

failed to realize that his equipment wr1a in the "text" position, and 

quoted a portion of the messaee to indicate to the transmitting operator from which point a retransmission was required. The Comrruinder, 

6920th Security Group, reports that the operator responoible has been 

severely reprimanded, -~d rea.lizes the serious nature or his error. 

In addition, the proper method or referring to points of correction is 

being constantly emphaaizcd. Statements from the individuo.ls concerned 

have been received, and support the facts us presented by the Commanding 

Officer. A comprehensive description of the station's trninine; program 

for communicntion security as a.pplicd to COMINT hcLs also been received, 

and provides sufficient trn.ining in ttie proper operation or on-line 

circuits. 

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