### The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the rep ort and recommendations of the Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. ___________ No. 95-2897

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Michael Anthony Williams, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: August 20, 1996 Filed: August 28, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

A jury fo und Michael A. Williams guilty of being a felon i n possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C . §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Williams a ppeals, asserting that the district court erred in denying his 1 motion t o suppress the weapons seized at the time of his arrest and i n denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm.

Re viewing de novo, we conclude that the arresting officers had a reasonable, articulab le suspicion justifying an investigatory stop, based
on details supplied by an anonymous caller and corroborated by police. Se e Ornelas v . United States , 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996) (standard o f review). The caller supplied police

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with specific details suggesting firsthand knowl edge--a description of the scene, a description of the car allegedly containing the weapons, and the exact street address- -all of which were corroborated by the officers' own observations upon arrival at the scene. See United States v. Cox , 942 F.2 d 1282, 1284-85 (8th Ci r. 1991) (stop justified where police found specific vehicl e at certain location as relayed by anonymous informant), cert
. denied , 503 U.S. 921 (1992).
We also conclude the subsequent seizure of the weapons from the trunk of the car after Will iams denied ownership of the car and told an officer he could search it was justified. See United States v. Thompkins , 998 F.2 d 629, 632-33 (8th Cir. 1993). Although Williams contended that he did not make such statements, the district court was entitled to credit th e officer's version of the events over Williams's testimony. See Unite d States v. Adipietro , 983 F.2d 1468, 1472 (8th Ci r. 1993) (district court's findings on witness credibility are virtually unassailable on appeal).
We reject Williams's final contentio n that the district court abused its discretion in den ying his motion for a mistrial based on a comment in government counsel's closing argument, regarding how to prove "knowledge" whe n, among other things, there is no confession. We conclude th e state ment in context did not manifest an improper intent to comment o n Williams's failure to testify and that the jury would not necessarily take it to be such a comment. See Parkus v. Delo , 33 F.3d 933, 940-41 (8th Cir

. 1994); United States v. Hale , 1 F.3d 691, 694 (8 th Cir. 1993) (standard of review ). Moreover, the district court instructed the jury, immediatel y foll owing the closing arguments, that the fact that Williams did no t testify must not be considered or even discussed in arriving at a verdict. Cf. United States v. Biondo , 483 F.2d 635, 644-4 5 (8th Cir. 1973) (even if court construed prose cutor's statement to refer in any way to defendant's failure to testify,

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indirectness of comment combined with specific instruction to jury rendere d it harmle ss error), cert. denied , 415 U.S. 947 (1974). Because th e prosecutor's remarks were directed towards explaining how, absent direct evidence, to determine whether a defendant acts with knowledge, and were not an attack on Williams's post-arrest silence, Williams does not advance his position by relying on Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U. S. 610 (1976). See id. at 618 (e xplaining that Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance tha t post-arrest silence will not be penalized).
Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.