• T 0 ~" ..z~rlii6¥s29 . ::> C: t ~ L I · ·-· . 

APPQIDW DOO UMENTS COie. 

T!!l\l CODEWORD IUTERll..14. 

The a'tt&cha4 report9 prepared SD MCOl'ClaDce wltll 

SIB 4eo1sioD at. the 65th llaet.1Dg8 22 JUDB 195~, 18 

tonarde4 tor com:Sden:t~1cmo 

Jmloeure 1 Report 'b7 the Coord1Dator to CSD,, 

dated U Ju11.J l95lo 

II.JC D a 2J/lB 

TOP SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-13-2014 pursuant to E.O. 1352e 

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,. ·~-:,,. 

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.··.~"( 

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. . ~"!:' 

•:<: ..... 
REPORT OF THE USCIB OOCJlDDIAT<ll 

TO THI 

UNITED STATF.9 CO!:mJIICATICllS DmttmCE BOARD 

(B 

POl?NJUF.SE C<l.!1!UHICATIClf SECURM 

THE PROBIBl! 

1. .To atud1' and nalu&te Port;ugu._ comnun1.cationa eecurit;r am ite bearh>g on t.he aecurit;r ot North Atlantic 'b'eaty Organization (NA.TO) and u,..s .. 

claas1f1ed intOl"lDation. 

. PACTS BEARDIJ OH '!HE PROBI.F.1! AL'D DISCUSSIOM 

2. See Enclosure. 

CONCLUSIONS EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

3. It is conol.uded that.: 
.. 

'rQP 8ISRR SUBBB U.S. F.i!l9 eNLY PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

!!· The Portugueae authorities respomd.ble tor ~ prcduction and uae 

ot ita crn>toayetema ahcft'1 great ignorance aid na1Tete in ti. mole field 

ot cryptology. In tact, they &PJ*ll'.' to be not onl¥' who~ unmrare that 

their ccmmunicat.1.ona are open to rather may reading by ~c 

proceaaea, but also there la reaaon to believe that certain high\of'ticial.8 

are cmpleteq unaware ot the ex:latence ot such a acienee aa c~sis. 

!· Portugueee COl!lllWd.cationa !nsecur:l v IDB.1' soon became a matter or 

serious eoncem aa NATO develops mid the Portuguese beccne more involved 

in t~ATO attaira, becauae of (1) their failure to take adequate ·cot~ 

precautiona to aateguard J!ATO intOl'lllation in their national conmunications, 

(2) their insecure practice& in connection with the use ot the TYPEX 

machines turniehed. them b7 the U. K., thua jeopardizing not oAl7 their own 

T!PEI NATO conmmications but also the TYPEX ccmmmn:l.ca\iom ot other NATO 

members, and (3) their auap:l.ciom with regard to British issuance ~ 

TYPEX and ke7B thereto, which suspicions lead them to transmit cert.a1n 

NATO :lntonnaticn in their arm insecure nat.ional 878tem. 

&• The R>rtugueae people and the Portugueae Goverment so lack an 

underatarding ot the need tor pby'aical mid personnel sacurit.Jr measures 

neces8&17 tor safeguarding clasaif'ied intormat1on that. even U techni~ 

TOP SECRET-~M~too 
aomd C01Sl!C •terial.a nre provicled th•, there would be no aaaarance 

that the u.s.s.1. could not. obtain tboae •t.er1ale by clalllest.im ---~ 

· thus obdatiag their need tor CJ7Ptanalpia ot Portugueee ccmmmicatiom. 

!· In tha abaence ot aact.. knOlr1edge of the practices Which DOii' 

app:q (l) to t.he ~ b,r NATP hold~ of "l'IPll and 1te aaaociated crwtomaterial.11 and. (2) to ·the variowa t,pea or categories of NATO or rational 

claaa:lt1ed Wonati~ which _,. be ellCl'J1)ted b.r TYPEX, there 1~ no 

aaaurance that all aw.ilable and authorized W8J'll and .ll8aD8 ha-ve been 

applied t.Oll8l'd a aolution ot t.hia probl.aa. · 

:1. ?n v1w ot h above DBither (l) the Gtant ot the preaent ctqer - - to clae11tiecl information ot IA'l'O and tb9 u.s. which 1e 1nherent in ·the . . . 

in88C11l"11;J' ot :Ebrtug1mae COlllDUllicationa ncr (2) the general 1naacuri\7 of 

th8 Partuglle• Goverrment muld j1J81;1f,r axaeptional, direct actiCln toward 

:1mpranmant of Partupae comn~ationa aecurlt.7 at thia u.. 

BECOJaRDATIORS 

4. ·It 1e reconrended that.: 

:-;!:." 

a. 'lbe cormlueiou ot ttilil atud7 be approved •• the present uscm ·-· "·:'! . 

'11.ew with rep.rd to the prob].aa •. 

b. '!be u.s. Delegation to tbe u.s.-u.K. Cont8Nnce cm Fnncb camma- - . 

nicatione aecuri.t7 be contimecl u ~ ad hoc bod.J' to ascertain the exact -- ex.tent to which present NATO p.ra.ct1oea SJ' pJ'OV1de aecure 1llQ8 and 

mam, within tbe framework ot these practiCea, to aolw t.he Port.ugueae 

Jrobl•. 

£• Further cona1clerat1on of amept1oml, direot ~ticn to 1mpron 

~·· eommurd.oat.iona aecurit7 be deterred peming ~§) canpletion or 

the atuq reoonrmdecl under ·~ abcml aid (' EC and USCIB declalom 

whether au.ch action :la to be taken ~ the French GOvern!mnt. 

3 
fiFO~FfJij -'f8111Aipa..,31B~RIEll!llif~8BEl"'-Fllili!--mwr-'1JH-.~S1-. """'E""il!".S..._.......,,OlllllftM!',,___ 

FAC'l'S BEARDG OI TD PROBL1l4' ARD DISCUSSIOI 

GENERAL STA'lm.IBl'l' 

1. Intell1gence ~ be deriwd f1'll:l ~catiom b.r 8.1\T or all 

ot the following .-tboda: 

a. D7 obta1D1ng phJ'aical poeeeaeion of the exact t.exta or the . . 

substance ot the CClllllUDicatiom (hereafter called. J.fVt,bad lJ; 

b. B7 obta1niDg pbpical poaseaalon of the c~terlal (kqliata, · code booka, ete.) neceaaarr tor direct reading ot the 1nterc~~ 

trattic (hereafter called !flthod 2) 1 

e. By ~terception and~ ot.·th. camm1n1cationa (herealter called Uathod 3). PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO . 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL ~6-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET $(W~~\&. 
4. Die cr,rJ>to8J8tema uaed b.r Portugueee .ad.litary aid naval attaches 

empi07 the Hagel.in C-38 cipher achine. Sime thia •chine aid its uaage 'b7 

other apnclee ot the Portugueea Govvment will be treated belaLr, no 1'urther 

remark• on thia pbue ot the problal will be mde in thia aect.icn. 

5. It is true tbat Pcrtugal baa hrniehecl a cofttinaent ot troopa to the 

U.N. tor service. in Korea but no intonation 1a avaU•bJ.e at t.his. time 

regarding the cCJllllDID1cat1ona ot theae Portugueae farces 1n ~' wbat crnto81'8tems thq are ua!ng, it 8JIT, ml hair the.r are being U88d. 

POR1'UGUFBB DIPUID.TIC CowruNICATIOIS 

6. 'lhezre 1a unqueaticmable technical ev.ldenee that the C17J't,ographic 

QBtema ard practices recentq anl cunerrUT mpl.oJ9cl by the Portuguese 

Gcmmaent 1n 1te cUpl.C11Btic and colonlal carmmicationa are auch tbat practlcalq all . 

ot thoee communicatiom, ' it intercepted, could be read b.r ~ 

ProJJarq •ta.tted ml equipped cnnaunicationa 1ntelllgence . ( COJaNT) organ1.sat.icn. 

?. ~ naivete ot the Portuguese with regard to cClllllUd.cationa •curit7 

1e quit.a ev:l.!ient traa. their lazitq in regard to the phJ'aical protection of 

crn>to-mter1al.8; their ignorance ot cryptologic techniques ia eatabl18had 

'b7 ftr7 t_a~lv Ol'J"PtOgraJflic practices 1n connection w.l.th uae of their an 

naticml ciphers u 1rell aa or the TYPE% .machines tandahad them b.r the 

British tor MATO ·ccmmmicaticma. 

8. a. Some almost incredible breaches o£ aecurltf' in the use or hanW.ng 

ot ~ugueae cr,rpt.o.m.ter1ala have been reported b7 Portugueea dipl.mate 

themselvea t&l'ld although these 1nc1denta 1191'9 attemed to by the Foreign 

m.n1atrJ' 1n ·due t1m, th9"8 caaaa indicate onq too cl,earq that Portuguese 

diplamatic personnel are not •ll indoctrinated 1n the bantl 1ng ot claasit1ecl 

TOP SECRET ~UD~@@' 

.. 
b. 'l1le inatructiona 1n the prefaces ot avatll.Ql.e Portugueaa code 

boob contain no general precepte on the mbject ot •aurit7. Although acne. 

ot t~ crntographic apt.ems are fwdamant.alli' am ~enWLJ1,. goocll' t.he8a 

are nade vulnerable either tJlrough m11111• or through canpl'aid.•. Al.mat. 

9"l',F t1Pe ot 'ri.olat.ion in the guut of CO!ISEC insecurit.T practice•.ia t.o be 

~ound in Po~eae crn>to-coaaunicat.iona, \ 

. · d. 'l!le1r attitude t.Oll8l'd the T!PEX mch1ne and ~ 1a f'oatered bJ' 

·an umarranted ta1tb 1n the 1nvialabU1'Q' ot their own national s)'atema and 

1mal."8a a clearJT stated sueplcion that all ?ortuguese meaaapa enciphered 

by 'l'!'PEI will be availab~ to the Britillll. 

e. 'lbe foregoing atatamanta are supported bJ' evidence gi,en bel.otr. 

9. Sam almollt incredible bNacbu ot aecuritr have been reported in . . 

recent J'8U"8 b7 POl'tugue• diplcnata in impoJ"'tant European .poata. The 

Ambaeeadar in IadOD, 1n Januar.r 1950, diacovend a diacrepu1C7 be~ 

1nnntari.e• r6 .1943 and 1946, alld. found no :recDl'd ot the diapoeit.ion of · . . 

mie•il:ig cipher •ter1al. ~o J98l'll elapaed before the Portugue•_ 18.niater 

1n Bern lntcnal Li•bon that cipher .material ... .miasing .. a result ot 

robbez7. Warn of all was the caae ot the Portuguese Mln1eter to COpenbapn, 

who left hill codea with the Brulllan .Ambaaeador ~urbg ·a trip to Lisbon. 

10. It is true that theaa !IJC1denta receiftd official att.entJ.an: the 

l8Jd.ster at Bern waa rrmpt.q relieved; the Copenhagen cedes 1f8l'8 quickl,y 

retr1avecl; ant the Ambassador in 'Umdon ~aed suitable changes 1n procecluN. llaverthelelle, these caaee :lnUcate ~too cl.e.,rq that Portuguese . . 

diplama.ta are JIOt well inloctrinated 1n the bantltng ot claaait1ed. •terial. 

6 

TOP SECRET ~M~@~ 
EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

REF ID:A67152 PL 86-36/50 USC 36 
~E_Ta • 

· ~l1D§[g~ ,.. J ·.O>J'~· .. =- - -! .• -...~ .. --.. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO . 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

13. a. 'ltleN are liound inticatiODB that the Portqueee are 1RL1"T ot Uldng 

'l'!PF..X becauee the7 tear that thmr trattlc Will be readable by tJae Britiab., who 

ful"ld.llhed the ftP.u •c~ea. j 

b. Su.ch a tear is not untomled. men comd.deration 1a taken ot the 

tail.u1"e an~ part of the Partuguese to avail themelvea ot the po8'1bilitiea 

prorid.ed. b7 BA'ro arranaananta for the uae of 'l'!PEX ~ ~ nat.1.caal co.rzaunicati~, by .means ot ke19 and •chine set.tinge canpileci 'b.r ·each nation 

itaalt, rather t.l\an bJ' •ane of tboae pro'fided b7 ,- Britiah. 

8 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
------------· --

c. Failure to compile t.lla1r mm n,. and mch1na aet\iJJp lead• the 

/ .•///. 

I Dd.a practice, U contimed, •11 be moat detrilllantal to the ------

securit.7 ot RA'l'O clallllifted intonation. 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

STATUS OP PalTlDUESE CH!PTOUXJ!' EO 3 •. 3 (h) (2) 

U.. TheN iii no evidence tbat the Pcrt.uguaae .make 81\f concert.eel eitort. t.o 

manitcr their C11V11 eon1n1cations tor the purpoae ot .obaerving or controJU11g 

COMSS:. / 

15. '!here: (lppeare to be no tradition ot COlm.'T in Portugal., and onlJ' one 

book on tll8 mbject 18 ot Portuguese orig:ln, 1'11"itten about 60 1"81"8 ago. 

llthough recent; and uaualq reliable/ 1Jltonnat.1on 1alioatea tb&ti t.bel'e mate 

within the International a.nd state/ Securi\7 ~, Polic1a Internacional •. 

de De.feea do Eat.ado (PmB), ~ section 1lhiCh ia coDC81"Ded. Tlith ccrmmicatiaaa 

aa wall as wit.ta ~ and o~, it certainq cannot ~ active, 

or wl1 into:rmed., or 1n a poaltion to br1ng abau.t imprweinent in Partugaeae 

. ...__I ___ _____. 

16. Em8pto tor tbe tact that •L1atening (s.nt.ercepU.on and .mcnitor:lng)• 

18 1lated as a aource ot :lntarmaticn tor the Portupe• Arflll Intelligance . . 

Section (3&. Repart.:lcao), there is no intonBtion on t.he CJ7Pto].og1c actJ:vit~ 

ot the Portugueae 1l1niatri• ot t.he ArtQ" and mav. 

9 . 

TOP SECRET~ 
3. 3 (h) (2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

CONSRJ.BNCF3 or INSECURlft or POB.TOOUBSB CCllWBICATmNS 

17. !• Fram. the str.l.atll' ndll'tu7 standpo.1Dt, there is little question that 

Porliugmae traf'tic presents the greatest problaa to RA'ltl aecurit.,'. The 
. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 • 3 (_h) (.2) 20. It is true that ourrerrt'.b' the Portuguese are ~made Pl'1V t.o 'Ii.be more 

aansitiTe 'NA'l'O PQllciea,. decidona, and intormaticn. Hawver, the aituaticn 

ml.gilt became mre aeriou as NA10 deftlaps, the Portupeae receiw more axtmaive 

and .more lllllld.t1Te mtonat!on, and became more involved in ?lAm affairs. 

~ 

21. It 111 obvious that 8'811 it technicaJ.lT aounc:l cr,ypto•Btema and associated · ·• . 

proceduree Wl'8 eplqred lv' or tund.8hecl the Port.uguese bT the u.s., it is sliUl 

neceaaa17 to ware tbat another govel'llllant •. am,· eapecrlallT the u.s.s.a., could . . 

not abta1n copies ot the C17P1'.cmateriala eq>l.oa'ed tor those s,rstema, because . 

auch an outside gonimmt is t.hc obvioWJll' in a posit.ion to obtain the claaattied inf'Ozma.tian 1¥ appliiag Method 2 (._ paragraph l;!? · aban).. Therefore, thla 

report; mat ocmaidar the Port.ugueae a1tuat1cn fran thle point of view. 

. 22. Appmd1x 1 to this encloElll1'8 deal.a with the st.atu ot Portuguese .intema1 . . 

aecur.l'1i7. It 1nd1cat• very clear].J' that the Portugueae people and the Portuguese 

Gcmmmeat ao lack m understanding ot the need tor ~al.cal and paratmnal secur1v ·measures necessli.17 tor aateguarding claaaUied !ntomatian that 81'811 it 

tecbrd.cal.q mmd C018BI: •terl~a wre mpl.ored 'Iv' ·.them. or provided them 'bJ" the 

u.s., there presentlT would be no amuranae that the u .s.s.a. would Mt obtain 

thoae mat.er1al.11, tJme obd.at1ng mv need on th.air part to obta1D Ponugueaa 

claaa14ecl 1.ntol'lll&tion b,r Method 3. 

TOP $CRET g)_CVJ~~ra 
·' 

23. Consideration could be gl.van to an approach to· the Portuguese Gcmtrmnmt . . . 

with a 'View toward imp:roving the aecur.l.i;f' ot ita cmnmd cations. just as is now 

balng. considered 1n the cue ot the lrench Oovemmmt. Thia i...,,.., is prematare~ 

since m decd.alan baa Jet been made II" the Rational Secur1tT Council in regard to 

the pr.opoaed approach to the French Government. 

24.. At it.a ldxt.7-f1fth ..ung,, on 22 Jane 1951,, USCIB 11apl.orecl the poaaib114:t.Jr. 

Ot 1nst.1.tut4Dg aategaarda 1D the fOl'ID of a note to recipients of smsitiTe RM.'O 1ntormt1on,, stating that before intomatioD is :released there .must be assurances 

that it 1llll. prdlrab:q not. be fonarded by 8JIT eJsct:r!cal campmfcation meaDBJ 

bit U neces8&17 to ~. that ~ure courler aervice would be utW.zed." Horwer,, Wore ak1ng a recamuiadatlon along th88!• llaea to HA'm gonmmeata 1t· 

would be · nece881117' to &udJ' the praatioaM 11 tf' ot !nst1tul;iq such a safeguard 

·b,r all the RA'IO Dallbera. Such ,. atur:W would require considerable ~by the 

Security Coord!natiag Ccllllll1ttea ot the Sl;ard!ng Groap ot the IA'lt> Council. 

25 • .Detailed. in.tonaatian is ~ldng aa to the pract~ea wtd.ch now awll' (a) . . 

to the. uage being llllde, ·Ir BATO holders, of TIP.BX and its associated czwtoateriala, and (b) to the 'Val"ioua tfpea 01" cateaonea ot If.Am or national c:J.aaaitied intomatim which may be me17Pted b.r mn. There is theret~· no aaaurance that all available and athor.lmed wqs and ma8D8 fat! atta:JnSng OOllSEC 

have been apPlied tOlllZd a aolutlcD ot the problem ot 1Daecur1tf' ot Portuguese 

cmmmd.cat!ona. Such detailed !ntomatian 1IOUl.d probabJ;r be V8l7 uaetal 1n de-

'Vising raaec;l1al maaurea, 111.thiD. the tnDarork ot present authorised procedures,, 

•Id.ch might mat.ar.l.all.7 assist Jn rect1f)':lD& the ~tuat.ion as regards the 1osecur1tr" ot Portu&ueae ccagun1 aatJ.ona, as .U as ot. thQse ·ot cartain. other HAm 

goYel'llilmts. 

· 26. In ccmection· 111.th the subject ot poaaible ranact1al measu-aa~ attentian 

111 inri.ted to the tact that such 11easll1'88 are also being Cll1Telltq stlldied 11" 

the Sacur!:14J Coordinating Ccnd.ttee of the Standing Grou~ ~ RA'm*. It1 ·particular, 

the tollowf ng · act;J.on is be.fllg c:aaaldered by that Ccaad.ttee: 

3. 3 (h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
•s. It is aubrd II;Q~l'~~EM ~~~ \lt.&t neceasar.va-

(a) To ensure that whm TJpmc Marie II machines have been 1ssu8d~ 

tbq ~ b.r~ 1nt.o nae with the least poas!bl.e dalal'· 

(b) Since the rouncU of Depd;ies was set up aft!U" the· allocation 

ot '!)pat llark II machines, (SG"l.i-200-50 ot 20th Jul.J ~ 1950), to 

dr• the Council ot Deputi•' attention to the regulations 

regarding cr.rptograpJic channels .in order to ~e whether 

the allocation is eutticient to m•t their :requirements. 

(c) To iaaue further guidaDce to NATO agenciaa11 making it clear 

that talegaphic tratt1c 111vol.ving not an:Q" •Cosmic• interests 

but ~so other cammmicat!ons nlated to North Atlantic 'l'reat.Y 

interest a nm.st be aent b7' the apprared c,rpher 8,7'atem.. n 

"BEX:ClllJ!HDATIOH 

119. That action should be taken al.mg the lines of paragraph 8 above.• 

~. Until the foregoing poasiblllties tor reEd1al measures ha.Te bean •-

plored, a direct approach to, the Port.ugueae Govermmt is not indicated and 

would be amd.se. 

TOP Sl!CRE I' el9il@~ 
1. '1'be Portugueae GOnrmeat plaoee security emphaa1a on safeguarding 

the Regim u a polit1cal enU.t7. In 110 doing, acb1nm7 tor tbe pr'Otection 

ot claaaitied intomation in the han!J• of polit.ical.q reliable penona 1a 

ri.rtualJT ipored. The instrument used b,r the gayel'IMDt. to check political. 

reliabilit'.7 i• the Intemat.ional and State Securit7 Police ( Policia 

Internacional e de Deteaa do Eatado - ~). Beaidea its rout.1.Da duUea of 

border control and control ot JIONl8bt of toreignen in Portugal, the PmB 

place• intormanta in Government departmenta am into opposition groupe 

including the. Cammmd.ete. 'ftle main emphaai11 in PIDB actirlt7 is pl.aced on 

t.he euppre11aion of internal mbvereiTe elemanta. 

2. 'D1e PlDE report.a that it 1a placing ettectiw curba on the Portuguese 

Coelmm1at. Par't7 (PCP). B7' act.ion taken in late 19SO, the Pml cli.ima to haft 

reduced. the mmberahlp ot the PCP frail 41 500 active .membera and 7,000 

QJllPllthisera 1n 1949 aid 1950 to 2,500 act.iw aaabere and S,000 IQ'llpathizen 

in early 1951. '!here ia no aupportlna evidence to aern aa a check agalnet 

the PIDE claims. 

3.. 'lbe Cclllnunillt Part.7 ot Portugal ia collllidered illegal; therefore· no 

measure ot ite atrellgt.h ia availablia. Ita ettectiftlleaa 1n evading police 

a,c:t.1on •a demonatrated b7 the inabJUt7 ot the PmE to capture the Secretar,r 

General of the PCP, Dr. Al'R!'O CUNHAL.. CUNHAL Ra finalq arrested in 

?.Well 1949 attar having been hunted b7 the Pll>E tor more than three ;pare. 

A comment. b7 a PmE iDspector, in Sept.ember 1948, 

___ __. perhape explaiu CUNHAL'• abilit.J' to elude the PIDE. The Inepector 

said t.hat he was reaaonabq su.re that ~ere wre cCllllllUld.et agents iii the 

ranlal of the PmE. !bre recent suacea11 on the part of the PIDE in neutralls111£ comrmmist. liCU.vitiea in Coimbra and in tbe capture ot a leading Central 

Cm:dttee member cauld 1.IJdicate .that poealble leaka troa t.he PmE to~ PCP 

had been el.!minat.ed.. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 14 

Appencliz to Encloaure. 

TOP SECRET 
4. The P.D>E thoroughl.J' inveatigataa all potential PIDE rec:ruita. After 

recruitment,, the nn member is held on probation tor one J881'. After the em 

ot the probationarJ' period, spot. checlm are .mde on the pananent, mmbera. · 

5·. '1'be PIOE ia lax in the 1il7sical aecurit7 ot its pread.aea. Entrance . . 

put a door guard 18 uaualq eaaiq made. Before entering the interior 

restricted area,.a viaitor haa to .till out a tom at a guard desk indicat.ilJg 

who he ia and the nature ot hie business. However, once he becamea known, a 

visitor, even it a foreigner, can paaa traa t.Jrl guard desk to one of aeveral 

waiting rOClllll unattended. Papers .trequentq are left on dew of elllpt.J' 

o1'ticea in the restricted area. -i1le Portuguese aeer:i to take it for granted. 

that the visitor would not be preamt.mleaa he had a right to be there. 

Identif'1cat1cm paaeea are not required ot mpl.o.yeea. There ia no evidence 

that there le &117 greater emphaaia on aecurlt7 in other gow1 anent depart.meats. 

6. 'lh• Portuguese Foreign ottice ard Portugueae Detenae eatabll&lllent 

ahow an attitude tOllal'd Spa.in that clear]¥ renecta the concept that the. 

daatiniea o1' Portugal and Spain are imllltabq llnked. '.rh18 concept, Isa led,, 

accord111£ to uncmf'bmd reporte, to the submi.aaion at reports acquind 'bJ' 

. . the Portugueae goYel"lmEnt •• a member ot NATO to Spud.ah authoritiea. In an 

August 1950 inteni•, Pri• J!.inister SALAZAR stated that 11 Portugal•a 

cont~bution to Europe'• security binged on the role to be pl&J9d by Spain.• 

·In thia connectian, Datenaa l~iater, Lt. Col. SANTOS COOTA, trequentq 

center• with Spanish authoritiea on the quation ot the defense or the Iberian 

Peninsula. 

7. 1.'he temper ot the Portuguese people, a ganul.oua group in a count.I')" 

when aecurit.7 baa been no prob].•, doee not lend ltaelt to reat.ricticma 

toll.Clll9d 1D countries where the presence or an 019117 is more acuteq felt. 

8. Even when the presence ot an enear ls pointed.out, the Fbrtuguese 

GovernlllSlt appe&l"ll to take a bennolent. rather than a aneN att.1.tucle in 

meeting the threat. '!'his attitude ia indicated 1n the Goverment•a treatment 

ot the PCP. l"l1en etmHAL cama to trial. as a mmber ot a auppo~ outlawed 

political group, the judge heari~ the case gave a comparativeq Ught. aentenoa 

on ground• that. Portuguese law failed clsarl.7 to place the Pa.rtJ' in an Ulegal . . 

status. 

Appendix to Enclosure. 

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.. i': 

9. r.hile the potential ot the PCP to acquire information through intil• 

tration ot the Goverment is great, there ia no evidence to show that the 

Part7 ia ~perl,y organised to make the moat of tbia advantage. 

10. 'lbe relat.icnahip ot Portugal to Spain ia 111ch that there would be 

little moral compunction on the part of the Portuguese to deter them tram 

,1T111g m1lital7 aid political secrete to the Span1ab. Thia is part.1.cularq 

true it tbe Portuguese felt that by 8UCh action the1' 'll01lld further the case ot 

aecarit.J' ot the Iberian Peninsula. 

11. To auma.riu, the Portuguese people and the Portupeae Government ao 

lack an urderetanling of the need tor J>h7rd.cal and pereo:nnel aecuritJ' masuree 

1n repn:I to the aateguard~ ot claaa11'1ed intarmation that a basard aziata 

1n prodding them with such 1nfomation. I.t that Ccwerrmmnt is to tunction 

properly 1n ita role u a member ot the North Atlantic Treaty Ol"pniaation, it 

appears clear that measures rill haw to be taken to indoctrinate the Portuguese . . 

on security practice• required in the handling ot claaaitied intonation which 

ia either alr~ in their poaseaaion or which 118.J' ~ given to th• in the 

tuture. 

. 16 

TOP SECRET Appenl1x to Fm.closure.