REF ID:A516907 

THE POTENTIALITIES OF COMINT FOR STRATEGIC WARNING 

(Comments on the Report of the Special Study Group 

of the NBA Scientific Advisory Board) 

1. Pursuant to the instructions of the Director, NSA, those components of the National Security Agency primarily concerned with research 

and development and processing activities in the COMINT field have studied 

the report "The Ptentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warning" prepared 

by the Special Study Group of the NSA Scientific Advisory Boa.rd. The 

resulting comments and recommendations of the Office of Research and 

Development, Production and Personnel Division are included as Tab B, Tab 

C, and Tab D to this study. Tab A is a list of all the recommendations 

and suggestions of the Special Study Group together with the applicable 

comment of the various divisions and Deputy Chiefs of Sta.f'f. 

2. The Special Study Group has presented an excellent study of the 

potentialities of COMINT for advance warning of a direct air attack. The 

findings of the Group indicate a high probability that COMINT could provide 

warning of Soviet intent to mount an attack against the U.S. This invaluable in:forma.tion would be in the hands of U.S. authorities from four 

to twelve weeks in advance of such attack. This has been proven by past 

experience. The reliability of this strategic warning would increase with 

the approach of the attack. Such strategic warning in conjunction with 

the tactical warning provided by the Air Defense Warning System will contribute greatly to our Continental Air Defense System 

3. The Group has also made a thorough study of NSA potentials and 

has indicated ways in which it can be expanded. It is primarily upon this 

aspect of the report that this study is directed. 

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... .. ,.:·~··~ 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-20-2014 pursuantto E_Q_ 1352a 
REF ID:A516907 

~OP 

4. The findings of the Special Study Group indicate that a vast 

majority of the problem areas isolated a.re either directly or indirectly 

related to the problem of employing and retaining competent personnel. 

PROD has forcefully summarized its position in the following remark: 

"The fact that most clearly emerges :from our consideration of 

the Group's recommendations is that our technical planning is under 

mu.ch better control than is our capacity to implement plans developed. 

At every turn we are forced to compromise what is technically desirable with what can be performed with personnel available." 

Personnel problems in a Department of Defense organiza~ion such as NSA 

must be considered from both the military and civilian viewpoints and 

although the cause and effect of such problems may be essentially similar, 

the remedial action in each case will not necessarily be the same. The 

following discussion treats the personnel problem in NSA: 

a. MILITARY 

(1) I am personally convinced that every responsible 

individual in the Agency has made strenuous efforts 

to remedy our Service personnel dilermna.. I am equally 

convinced that, due to circumstances beyond our control, 

little of IJE.terial value has been accomplished in the 

past. Continued efforts in the same direction show 

little promise of improving the situation. I feel that 

if our efforts a.re channeled along lines as recommended 

in 2a and b below, we may eventually accomplish much 

in the way o'f' a solution. Actually, the NSA service 

personnel problem is no different and probably no more 

serious than the personnel problem in every echelon 

within the Department of Defense. Every specialized 

activity needs technicians. The high personnel replacement and attrition rates are wiiversally deplored. Many have attacked the problem unilaterally 

with the view that Headquarters A has a higher priority 

than Headquarters B. We unfortunately have frequently 

been quilty of this kind of logic. 

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(2) I recommend to you that in the case of service personnel we redirect our attack to produce legislation such 

as the following, which will tend to lower attrition: 

(a) Offset the inducement to separate from the Service 

presented by the Servicemen's Readjustment Ac t 

of 1944, as amended (G.I.Bill). This can be 

accomplished by providing similar benefits to the 

serviceman while he is in the service. A system 

for formal education at government expense for 

high level type entrants (10-20%) who are needed 

as technicians throughout the services might be 

established. This could be entered upon prior to 

the commencement of the formal service career with 

the condition thatthe serviceman serve a specified 

tour of duty upon graduation. (Similar to the Navy's 

Holloway Plan). 

(b) Increasing or improving the family security 

guarantees to service personnel, especially in the 

medical, dental, and housing areas. 

(3) Recent actions and pronouncements of the administration 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicate that 

re-awareness of the attrition - retainability problem is 

developing at an accelerated rate. Leadership and 

support from NSA might well be timely and appreciated. 

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(4) If you concur in the abovesumma.ry, I will re-orient 

the efforts of the NSA staff along the lines indicated 

an4 prepare suitable papers for transmission to the 

Secretary of Defense. 

b. CIVILIAN 

(1) The problem of attracting and holding civilian technicians, 

while less critical than the service problem, is still 

serious. As in the military manpower problem, NSA is 

only one of the government activities which has recruiting and retainability problems. To date our attempts 

to improve the situation have been moderately successful, 

and current plans and programs in this field appear to 

_promise additional benefits. 

(2) I recommend thatthese efforts continue. At the same 

time, NSA must appraise and initiate corrective action 

to defend against the conditions set forth below. 

(3) Changing basic economics, as they affect individuals, 

for several years have ma.de the professional public 

servant (civil service) more and more vulnerable to 

the non-government labor market. In industry, personnel 

benefits such as Social Security, Group Medical Insurance, 

Retirement Plans, and educational and self-advancement 

opportunities have all received great attention in the 

past few years . Thus many of the personal security 

features which used to be unique to civil service workers 

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. ..... :~ 

are now widely available in industry. In the past 

.many government workers preferred a moderate salary 

plus security features to high salary and big security 

risk which industry offered. Now private industry can 

and does offer both high salaries and the security 

guarantees. 

(4) The above condition is aggravated by other economic 

factors which, while transient in nature, are currently 

working to our disadvantage, particularly with regard 

to technical personnel. First on this list is full 

employment accompanied by high wages and heavy consumer 

markets. 

(5) Second is the enormous industrial expansion and the 

revolution in technology brought about by nuclear and 

electronic research and development. No one can estimate 

how many technicians this field will ultimately absorb. 

An added complication is the fact that World War II 

created a shortage of science and engineering students 

which has never been filled. 

(6) Finally, the trend toward earlier retirement is removing 

the more elderly technicians from the labor market at an 

earlier average age and in greater numbers each year. 

(7) The remedy for this situation as far as NSA is concerned 

is obviously high salaries for critical scientific and 

technical personnel. Unfortunately, the ceilings imposed 

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-.... ~ ... :;. ~·: 

upon this organization place serious restrictions on 

this kind of solution. There are, however, two alternatives which can in an indirect way alleviate the situation. The first of these is the ultization of contractual services with established institutions of high 

repute. NBA is currently using this device to good 

advantage. There is, however, a possibility that this 

activity could be increased. The second alternative 

is to sponsor a small private enterprise (or definite 

segment of a larger company). This is sometimes called 

a "captive corporation." Examples of this are the Sandia 

Corporation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the 

Rand Corporation as utilized by the Air Force. I conelude that the possiblity of restoring and augmenting 

the professional and technical capacity of' NBA through 

the use of a sponsored enterprise should be carefully 

considered. I therefore suggest you submit this problem 

to your Scientific Advisory Board for further study. 

6 ... ~-'!'l!''f'.• • .. . ~ ~ . ,";'_•·· ·.;.~ , .. = . . , ·. -~· .. •; ~ 

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NSA STUDY 

THE rarEN'I'JAJ,ITIES OF COMINT FOR STRl\TEGIC WARNING 

(Report of the Special Study Group of the NSA Scientific Advisory Boi;ird) 

IfITRODUCTION 

L Pursuant to the instructions of the Direr·lor, National Security 

Agency, those components of the National Security Agency prima.rily concerned with research and development and processing activities in the 

COMINT field have nt.udied the report "The Potentialities of CO.MINT for 

Strategic Warning" prepared by the Special Study Gronp of the NSA Scientific Advisory Boe.rd. The resulting comments and l'Prommendations of the 

Office of Research and Development, Production and Personnel Division are 

in~luded as Tab B, Tab C, and Tab D to this study. 

2. The Special Study Group has presented an excellent study of'the 

potentialities of COMINT for advance warning of a direct air attack. The 

findings of the Group indicate a probability that COMINT, especially 

through Special Intelligence, could provid.e wnrning of Soviet intent to 

mount an attack against the U.S. However, this probability can be 

realized only through an increase in the current level of effort. This 

invaluable inforllic:.tion could be in the hands of U.S. authorities from 

four to twelve weeks in advance of such attack. The reliability of this 

strategic warning would increase with the approach of the attack. Such 

strategic warning in conjunction with the tactical warning provided by 

the Air Defense Warning System will contribute greatly to our Continental 

Air Defense System. 

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3. The Group has also made a thorough study ot llBA Potentials and 

has indicated we.ya in which it can be expanded. It is primarily upon 

this aspect of the report that this study ia directed. 

4. The Special Study Group has also studied the U.S. ELI111T program 

from the early warning point of view and baa indicated certain deficiencies 

in the existing program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at the direction of 

the Secretary of Defense are now reviewing the ELIBT program being conducted within the Department of Defense. In compliance with Secretary 

of Defense Memorandum which required the Director, MSA to advise with 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter, General Canine presented his 

concept of operating principles for EI.INT to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

These principles, however, were not incorporated in the ELINI' paper 

(Enclosure to J.c.s. 2010/7~, 22 Jan 5~) which th~ Joint Chiefs of Staff 

. sent to the Secretary ot Detenae. 

5. l'ollowing 11 a lilt ot the contents ot the Tabs to this study& 

a. 'l'ab A - Recommendations of the Special Stuq Group (Lilting 

ot maJor 1pecific reccmmendation1 together with pertinent NBA comment, 

and action required). 

b. Tab B • PR(I) Ccmmenta on ~eport of Special Study Group. 

a. Tab C • R/D Cozmnent1 on Report of Special Study Group. 

d. Tab D • PERS Comment1 on ~eport ot Special Study Group. 

CONCLUSIONS 

6. The consensus ot NSA opinion ia in agreement vi th that of the 

Special Study Group, namely: that a canplete COM:mT picture (ccmrposed of 

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information resulting from the decryption of enemy high-level cryptographic systems together with that produced trcm traffic analysis, lowlevel cod.es and ciphP.rs, and plain text) is required to maximize the 

p_otentialities of COMINT n.s a source of strategic warning. This. status 

of COMINT processing would increase the probability of but not guarantee 

detection and accurate prediction of a direct attack upon the United 

States. 

7. The primary conclusion concerning the report of the Special Study 

Group, NBA Scientific Advisory Board is that insofar as the NSA COMINT 

effort is concerned, the fundamental NSA problem is personnel. As stated. 

by PROD: 

''The fact that most clearly emerges from our consideration of 

the Group's recommendations is that our technical planning is under . much better control than is our capacity to implement plans developed. 

At every turn we are forced to compromise what is technically desirable with what can be performed with personnel available." 

As stated by R/D: 

"The above analysis shows clearly that an expansion of the scope 

of the research and development program to cope adequately with the 

requirements of the early warning problem is almost totally dependent 

on scientific personnel--the retention of current personnel and the 

hiring of a quantity of new personnel." 

8. Solution of the problem of increasing (a) NSA capabilities, and 

(b) the effectiveness and efficiency of NSA activities is primarily centered 

in the solution of the NSA personnel problem. 

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9. Means must be found to retain experienced personnel and to attract 

additional high calibre personnel to NSA by the establishment of salary 

scales and working conditions more nearly comparable with those in industry. 

10. Considerable improvement in the NSA personnel problem can be 

effected now by the establishment of personnel and management policies 

which will provide sufficient job satisfaction to offset deficiencies in 

terms of salary and job benefits. To this end such policies must insure: 

a. Knowledgeable direction of technical activities by qualified 

supervisors. 

b. Preservation of professional and personal integrity of 

employees. 

11. In general, NSA technical plane and programs provide for practical 

expansion of NSA technical effort within the limits of existing facilities • . There is, however, an urgent requirement for expanded research and development activities in the field of intercept equipment, methods, and techniques. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: 

12. A detailed analysis of the problem of hiring new scientific and 

analytic personnel and of retaining present personnel should be prepared 

by PERS in consultation with PROD and R/D. This analysis should serve 

to establish requirements in terms of salaries, working conditions, and 

job benefits, which must be met if NSA is to effectively compete with 

industry for the services of such personnel. 

13. On the basis of this analysis, NSA objectives in the personnel 

field should be formulated, and an NSA personnel plan with supporting 

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programs (including such legislative programs as may be required) should 

be prepared by PERS. 

14. The COMINT career :field now being :formulated by PERS should be 

eXJ>edited to enable the Director to secure Service approval as soon as 

possible. 

15. The tentative research and development program outlined on 

pages 2 through 9 of Tab C should be formalized by R/D and submitted 

through channels to the Director, NSA, for approval. In view of the long 

term nature of such a program, implementation should begin as soon as 

possible. 

16. The NSA plan for active investigations in the field of VJIF/UfIF/ 

SHF intercept which is now being prepared, should be implemented as soon 

as possible. 

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.EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 

. 1. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 2, paragraph 1) "Top priority should be 

accorded to solution of and to 

their exploitation On/a timely.basis." 

PROD COMMENT: Top priority is now being and has been given to 

the solution o~ I A large proportion of the 

research tale.nt 8"Vailable in NSA is assigned to direct support of high• 

level Russian pt"oblems. Two tea.ms of specialists have completed a technical 

survey of problems to recommend new approaches and anticipate required 

strengths. PROD further notes that the Study Group• •. did not investigate 

the possibility that non-Russian targets could contribute directly or 

indirectly to strategic warnings. FROD suggests tha,t any planning or 

actioniin connection with further investigation of this problem should 

keep .non-Russian targets in mind--particularly the Satellites. 

DCS/P REMARKS: Top priority is being given .to the solution of_ 

Russian high-level systems within NSA. The combined I .... ___ .... I effort 

concentrated on this problem highlights its importance in the eyes of 

both parties. The technical surveys contemplated by Drs. Shaw and 

Leibler are evidence that PROD and R/D are striving to improve their 

methods of attacking the problem. 

....._ ___________ ..... PROD's point in stressing the importance of 

non-Russian traffic (particularly Satellite) is sound. The Director, NSA 

has recently submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense stressing 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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the need for 1065 additional civilian personnel to increase the effectiveness of the attack on the Soviet-Soviet Satellite program. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: PROD and R/D to continue in collaboration 

op the nd to 

expand the efforts of both divisions in this direction. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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2. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 2, paragraph 2) Traf'f'ic analysis activities 

should be expanded and organized to give maximum information available from 

the material intercepted. 

PROD COMMENT: It is agreed that our capability to perform traffic 

analysis must be increased. Thia is being done by training and crosstraining so that technicians will be familiar with all types of cammunications analysis rather than those aimed at specialized aspects. (This view 

of training and utilization of personnel is contrary to recommendations 

of the Group - See specific recommendations tmder Special Intelligence.) 

It is planned that-tenms study the T/A effort and make recommendations on 

new approaches, numbers of personnel required, and kinds of machinery. 

DCS/P REMl\RKS: PROD considers that NSA capabilities in the field 

of T/A can be increased by continued specialized training of T/A personnel . and by cross-training between T/A and C/A to produce technicians familiar 

with all the tools of communications analysis. PROD considers that this 

approach will result in an increase in NSA capabilities without an increase in numbers. A survey of the T/A effort is now underway in PROD. 

This will be completed early in 1954. It is anticipated that recommend.ations will be forthcoming outlining new approaches toward improvement of 

T/A activities in NSA. New promotion policies adopted subsequent to 

the report of the Special Study Group appear to be working well. It is 

felt that improvement also could be gained by better supervision. Ma.ny 

persons in supervisory positions cannot complete all their assigned work 

and at the same time closely supervise on-the-job training of novices. 

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Implementation of a COMINT career plan for the military services would 

improve this situation by retaining personnel who have become skilled. 

The military career problem, particularly in the officer category, is 

P!Obably the most difficult aspect of the personnel problem. The objective of offering an attractive officer career program providing reasonable promotion rates from junior to senior grades appears at this time 

nearly impossible to attain. Such a program is probably not needed so 

urgently in the lower grades where promotion is fairly routine and 

reasonably certain. This is not the case however in the higher grades. 

Due to the difficulty of securing personnel legislation for NSA which 

would be acceptable to all three services, consideration might well be 

given to seeking authority which would permit the Director, NSA to make 

temporary "spot" promotions in the field grades independent of the normal 

. promotion process. This system is currently being used with excellent results 1n the USAF Strategic Air Connnand. Spot promotion authority, if 

applied to the top enlisted grades might well improve the enlistment 

and reMenlistment rate. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: PROD to continue training activities and studies 

to improve T/A methods and procedures. These activities should include 

management training for supervisors. R/D to initiate a program of 

investigation aimed at producing new T/A techniques and at expediting 

T/A methods. PERS to examine feasibility and/or desirability of securing 

NSA authority to effect temporary "spot" promotions. 

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3. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 21 paragraph 3) Personnel policiP.s should 

be revised to improve the selection, training, and retention ot skilled 

personnel, both civilian and military, tor COMINT activities. Strong 

recommendations should be made to Services and Civil Service Commission. 

PROD COMMENTS: (General) Our main problem is a need for more and 

better personnel. An over-all study of personnel requirements ot PR>D 

is being conducted. Recommendations vill be submitted to the General 

Priorities Committee; this report should be finished by the end of the 

year. Further statedz " ••• we are forced to compromise what is technically 

desirable with what can be perfonned with personnel available." We have 

not achieved a balance between work to be done and number of personnel to 

do it and we can most effectively use those personnel we have only if we 

are authorized more. Career possibilities for specialists (military) are 

not sufficiently attractive to draw and bold qualified personnel. '!'his 

would require personnel action ot the type to be achieved only with legal 

action. 

R/D COMMENTS: (General) The expansion ot scope o! research and 

development to cope with early warning problems is totally dependent upon 

retention of current personnel and hiring of qualified new personnel. NSA 

cannot compete with industry for scientists in either pay or working 

conditions. 

- PERS COMMENTS: A psychometric testing program is being set up. Continual study is made ot the reasons and causes tor separation of civilian 

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employees in order to hold separations to the minimum. Three Service~ 

must be encouraged by NSA in their efforts to develop and maintain a 

high percentage or repeaters in COMINT assignments. 

~S/A REMARKS: The Special Study Group has noted that in their discussions and briefings concerning the COMINT effort the most universally 

mentioned problem is that of expanding the number and improving the quality 

and proficiency of NSA civilian and military personnel. See DCS/P's 

comments on temporary promotions. (Para 2, Page 4) 

a. Civilian - The problems of morale, career development, salary 

standards and working conditions have been the subject ot considerable 

study and applied effort within NSA. There has been an upward trend in 

the NSA civilian salary scale and a continuing general improvement in NSA 

civilian career possibilities within the limits of the U.S. Civil Service 

System. The basic problem is that of hiring and retaining highly qualified 

technical personnel, since NSA cannot compete with industry in terms of 

salaries, working conditions and job benefits. In this respect NSA is 

suffering from inherent inadequacies in the Civil Service System. While 

these inadequacies of salary and job benefits are more strongly emphasized 

by the inability of NSA to hire and retain scientific and engineering 

personnel, they are also detrimental to hiring and retention of linguists 

and analysts. The only obvious correction for such inadequacies lies in 

special legislation. In view of the importance of NSA's contribution to 

the security of the U.S., it is felt that special legislation by the Congress 

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(perhaps of a secret category) resulting in changes in Civil Service 

Regulations which would enable NSA to compete with indμstry on an equal 

footing is justified. Negotiations are underway with Psychological Research 

Association (a civilian concern) to establish a psychometric testing program for all civilian job applicants. This program. will not only improve 

recruitment and placement of personnel, but will also provide a valuable 

tool in the evaluation of performance. PERS also conducts a continual 

study of the causes for separations of civilian employees. While many of 

these are due to pregnancy, movement of domicile to other areas, etc. a 

large number are due to lov morale and better employment opportunities 

outside the Agency. 

b. Military - Career possibilities in the field of COMINT are 

not sUfficiently attractive to draw and hold qualified technical personnel. 

Much t:Une is required to obtain background clearance and to properly train 

these personnel. As a result, at the time when a technician 1s fully 

trained' and NSA is capitalizing on its investment in him, he is lost to 

the Service and there is little incentive for him to reenlist in the COMINT 

field. PERS is presently drawing up career ladders for both officers and 

enlisted men which will furnish greater opportunity for advancement and enhance the attractiveness of the COMINT field as a career. Thie action if 

approved, should contribute materially to the solution of the m1~1tary personnel problem in NSA and the Cryptologic Services. PERS is, in addition, conducting a job survey which has as it~ objective the establishment of Job 

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descriptions common to MOS, AFSC, and SUJCO designations. The effect ot 

this will be to properly place military personnel in positions commensurate 

with their abilities. This action would improve morale and efficiency 

greatly. The concept of preferential legislation providing for promotions 

in excess of the service quotas on a permanent basis solely for the benefit 

of military personnel engaged in COMINT activities would prob~bly not ba 

Acceptable to any military service. However, authority ta etf@ot t~mporary 

pr~motionn (officer and onliated) as long as th~ ittdiYidus.1 cottes:rned 2'19tt1Aihd 

with the Agency might well provide the incentive for re-enlistments (in 

the case of enlisted personnel) and repeat tours in the case of officers. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: a. PEPS to conduct a detailed study of the NSA 

personnel problem and to prepare a personnel plan and suppor~ing programs 

based upon NSA objectives. The purpose of this study would be to point 

up personnel deficiencies and illustrate how these deficiencies impede the 

NSA effort. This would provide the basis for a request by the Director 

for special legislation to change Civil Service Codes. 

b. PERS to expedite the preparation of the COMmT career ladder 

so that the Director can secure Service approval as soon as possible. 

c. PERS to continue preparation of uniform job descriptions. 

d. PERS to investigate feasibility of securing authority for 

the Director, NSA, to effect temporary promotions. 

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:-rAr SECRET FReTII """""'TAOF~B~~~~~l\iffl~~~.....,.~~...,~ 

SPECIFIC RF.X::OMMENDATIONS 

INTERCEPTION 

4. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 10, Line 4) National Security Agency 

"should augment its scientific and engineering staff with a. view to 

aeoisting the Services" in regard to technical matters relative to 

propagation phenomena in mo.king detennination as to antenna fields 

and placement of intercept positions. 

PROD COMMENTS: Concur, but not at the expense of any existing 

functions of NSA until a complete study of all NSA !unctions can be 

made to weigh the relative value of this function with others. 

R/D COw.IENTSz R/D has retained an eminent consultant for advice 

about propagation m&tters. 

PE:RS COMMENTS: None. 

DCS/P mtARKS: The new NSA Intercept Deployment Plan (JCS 2010/68) 

takes these matters into consideration. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: Future deployment planners should take into 

account the recommendations contained in this document and avail themselves of the advice of R/D's consultant. 

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OOMMUNICATIONS 

5. RECOMMENDATIONS (i:nge 11, line 5) Improvements are needed 

i~ the training and instruction of coJIUm.lnications personnel and in 

operations of communications networks to insure against personnel 

failures. 

R/D CO}~!SNTS: R/D has ~e available on a full-time basis a 

high level engineer to assist COM on various technical matters. 

DCS/P REMARKS: Here again the solution of the communication 

problem is dependent upon the personnel problem. Time is required 

to train personnel, thus decreasing the usable portion of the enlistee's 

term of service. Soon after they have attained sufficient skill to 

be valuable to NSA, their tour of duty expires and they are lost to 

the Service. An effective COl{[NT career plan would offer much greater 

inducement to re-enlist than exists at present. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: Office of Communications to continue intensive 

/ training and instruction of co:nirunice.t.ions personnel in operating 

procedures. 

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TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 1 LO-I -LEVEL CODES AND CIPHERS, AND PLAIN TEX!_ 

6. REC<J.1MENDATION: (Page 13, paragraph 1) Traffic analysis 

furnished Air Defense Connnand should be quantified by development of 

indices and measures of activity of Soviet Air Force with graphic 

presentations thereof. 

PROD COMMEN'l'St The quantification of T/A.will be an aspect 

of our technical survey. 

R/D COMMENTS: The question of the presentation of traffic 

analysis findings is a statistical one and is now being considered by 

the Mathematical Research Division of R/D. 

DCS/P REMARKS: None 

ACTION RECOMMENDEDs PROD to continue Technical Survey toward 

quantification of T/A indices. R/D (Mathematical Research Division), to 

continue etudy of statistical aspects of quantification problem. 

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7 •. RECOMMI;;NDATION: (Page 13, paragraph 2) Studies (intensive 

and comprehensive) should .be made of activities of the Soviet Air 

. 

Force during laree scale exercises. 

PROD COMMl.~NTS: Concur 

R/D COMMENTS: None 

DCS/P REMARKS: It is the opinion of DCS/P that this is being 

done as the occasion arises. 

ACTION RECOMMENDJ~D: PHOD to continue intensive and comprehensive 

studies of Soviet Air Force large scale maneuvers. 

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TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, LCM-LEVEL CODES AND CIPHERS, AND PLAIN TEKT 

8. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 13, paragraph 3) Traffic analysis fusion 

effort in NSA should be decentralized to some extent by having traffic 

a~alysis units in operational areas and traffic analysis support at intercept stations (along lines established by the Air Force Security Service). 

PROD COMMENT: Serious efforts must be made to increase basic reporting as close to source of traffic as possible. Competence of intercept 

operators must be improved by furnishing them basic traffic analysis 

techniques. 

DCS/P REMARKS: The problem of basic T/A reporting and T/A fusion 

reporting has been under study for several years within NSA. Under 

existing NSA policy, the NSA reporting program requires the decentralization and the placing of the responsibility for first instance report~ng 

upon those U.S. CO.MINT units nearest to and preferably at the points of 

interception of foreign communications. Full implementation of this 

program requires that the capabilities of intercept stations be improved, 

both by improving the background and training of operators and analysts, 

and by insuring the provision of adequate technical support to such 

activities. While considerable improvement is being made in the latter 

aspect, the inability to retain experienced service personnel greatly 

inhibits any programs to increase the background and training of service 

intercept operators and analysts. While it is unlikely to become a 

problem for some time, it should be noted that over-emphasis of decentralization may result in damage to the COMINT effort. Too great a concentration 

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in forward stations could dilute and diffuse the traffic analysis product. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: PROD, in conjunction with NSA School, to expand 

cross-training program to provide T/A techniques to intercept operators. 

NSA decentralization program to continue. 

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THAFFIC 1\NALYSIS, ww-12;vt!J, COU.t!;S Alm CIPH.t;fl5, AJJD PLAIN TEXT 

9. RECOJ•IlfilNDA 'I' ION: (Pare 13, parafraph 1~) A small research 

group should be established to carry out research and development on 

new methods of analysis. 

R/D COMH1~NTS: An investie;ation of new methods of analysis and 

machine applicability is being undertaken. As stuciy develops, additional personnel will be required. "If thi3 effort is to continue 

without a decrease in the effort on the Russinn problem, the Ma.the1Da.tical 

Division (R/D) will need three additional personnel at GS-11/12/13 level. 11 

PROD COMMENTS: PROD does not recognize this as an R/D function. 

This action, already in effect within PROD, is clearly stated in the 

organizational JJBnual as a responsibility of PH.OD (06l~l). 

PERS COMMENTS: None 

DCS/P REMARKS: As part of the survey of the entire technical 

effort in PROD, a survey of the T/A effort is being undertaken by teams 

of competent technicians. A::; in the case of the cryptanalytic effort, 

it is anticipated that recommendations will be forthcoming as to new 

approaches and the resources r.!o,u:ired to implement them. These surveys 

will be completed early in 1954. 

ACTION RECOMMJ<::NDED: PROD to continue the efforts of the resea.rch 

teams to discover new methods of nnalysis,. both T/A and C/A. 

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TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, IDW-LEVEL CODES AND CIPHERS, AND PLAIN TEXT 

10. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 13, Line 20) NSA should re-examine 

its selection, training, proficiency evaluation, and promotional 

procedures for T/A civilian personnel. Possible application of modern 

psychometric methods should be explored in connection with personnel 

selection. 

PROD COMHENTS: Concur 

R/D COl·Il·lENTS: None 

PERS COMMENTS: . Request has been submitted to LOG for contract with 

Psychological Research Associates to embark on psychometric testing 

program. Results will not only improve recruitment and placement, but 

also develop yardsticks with which perfonna.nce can be evaluated. 

DCS/A REMARKS: See remarks under 3, page 4. Psychometric testing 

program is expected to be in operation this year. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: PERS to continue efforts to build and put into 

use a psychometric testing program. 

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11. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 14, line 1) Similar procedures (as in 

10) should be employed for the evaluation of uniformed service personnel 

and consideration should be given to the establishment of a COMINT career 

field in the Army and Air Force. 

PIDD COMMENTS: None. 

R/D COMMENTS: None. 

PERS COMMENTS: Pre-survey classification program now underway in 

Offices ot Analysis and Exploitation is establishing career ladders for 

both civilian and military personnel. Program has been prepared to 

accomplish '!MB Project No. 3 (to develop uniform job descriptions applicable to members of cryptologic agencies). These two programs are expected 

to provide needed career fields. 

DCS/A REMARKS: See remarks under 3, page 5. 

ACTION REJ:O)ti!ENDEDz PERS to apply psychometric testing procedures, 

vhen developed, to all new personnel to insure better initial placement 

ot individuals. 

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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE 

12. REI:OMMENDATION: (Page 16, Paragraph 1) A firm policy should 

be established to control and regulate transfer of personnel familiar 

with high-level problems to other activities. High level effort requires 

augmentation by top-flight analysts. 

FOOD COMMENTS: Training and cross-training is being done so that 

technicians a.re familiar with all tools of communications analysis 

rather than those aimed only at specialized aspects of cryptanalysis and 

traffic analysis. This view of training and utilization of ~ersonnel 

which is applicable to and desirable in the entire field of' COMillT is 

completely opposed to the recommendation by the Study Group that pcrnonnel 

be frozen on specific problems. 

DCS/P REMARKS: PR:>D states that its view of the m~tter is completely 

opposed to the recommendations of the Special Study Group that perso?nel 

be frozen on specific problems. The Group recomm~nded (p~ge 16, p~ra 1) 

"Because of the research character of the high-level problems, there ha.s 

been a tendency to shift personnel to other nreaz promising more im:ncdiate . 

results. The potentials of this source of intell1eence are so great that 

a firm policy should be established to control and re&'lllo.te the transfer 

of personnel familiar with these problems to other activities - - -" . This recommendation, while })ighlighting the necessity for continuity on 

major problems, does not preclude cross training or career development 

programs, wherein there is a realistic and controlled movement of personnel 

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with problems. This recommendation, along with other statements of the 

Special Study Group ind:icates the necessity tor ditterentiating between 

that reassignment ot personnel required to accomplish the objectives ot 

cross training and career development programe, and that routine regularized 

movement ot personnel characteristic ot a rotation program per se. An 

additional factor to consider is that of temporary.transfer tor morale 

purposes from a problem where no success baa been achieved for a long 

time. A defeatist attitude frequently results when personnel are frozen 

on a problem which has yielded no success. 

ACTION RECOMMENDEDz Transfer of personnel to accomplish the objectives of cross training and career development programs should continue. 

Continuity of effort on high-level research problems to be maintained 

within the limits of ett1c1ency ot the peraonnel. 

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SPD:;IAL INTELLIGENCE 

13. RF.COMMENDATION:" (Page 16, paragraph 2) NSA should increase 

its computing facilities and its staff.of personnel skilled in programming. "The lack of programmers ia the most serious deficiency at present 

• and should be increased as promptly as possible." Use of outside 

programmers should be investigated, as vell as increasing internal effort. 

POOD COMMENT: The lack of programmers, cited by the Group as our 

most serious deficiency, is not really so great as our lack of a corps 

,// of technicians familiar both with cryptanalytic problems and machine 

capabilities. A group of specialists of this kind is needed to formulate 

J 

problems and to supervise the work of those performing machine programming. A ratio of one formulator to four programmers, considered ideal, 

is not even approached in present practice. The lack of this type ot 

personnel would be aggravated if our programming were farmed out on 

contract as the Group recommends. Although we are trying by intensive 

training programs to enhance the capabilities our technical personnel, 

the essential need with which we are not coping satisfactorily is an 

increase in the number ot personnel vho can be assigned to the high-level 

Russian problem. 

R/D COMMENT: "Experience indicates that outside help on progrrumning 

in general can be of very little help to NSA." Proposes that M.R. Division add another section whose primary function is to do programming 

research tor existing and high speed computers. 

DCS/P COMMENTS: If the Director's request for an increase of 1065 

civilian personnel is granted, PR>D's expressed shortage of analysts will 

be alleviated. 

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ACTION ~OMMENDED: No further action required at this time 

pending results of the above mentioned request tor personnel ceiling 

increase. 

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14.. RECOHI·~IDATION: . (Page 16, Paragraph 3) The possibilities of 

, carrying out electronic developments outside· the Agency should be investigated. 

RfD CG1MENTS: An increase of the research and development work done 

by contract is not a complete solution. The extent of this outside work 

is limited by the size of the NSA R/D organization which must supervise, 

evaluate, assess the requirements and do the preliminary research. The 

Office of R/D with its present personnel cannot efficiently administer R/D 

by contract exceeding $13 million per year. 

DCS/P REMA.RI($: This possibility has been thoroughly investigated. 

Contract work for R/D has been increased recently from 30 to 100 contracts. 

However, the volume of outside work can be increased only within certain 

limits. These limits are set by the number of R/D personnel available to 

supervise and evaluate the results of these contracts. While an increase 

in outside contracting may not afford a complete solution, it still provides 

tile only possible means of effecting new electronic developments which are 

preeentl,y beyond NSA's capabilities. 

ACTION RECCJ4MENDED: R/D to continue investigation of means to expand 

outside contracts for furthering electronic research and development. 

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15. RECa.1MENDATIClf: (Page 21 1 line 2) "There is need for basic 

research on theory of CCl>UNT and f'or developo.ent of methods and equip-

· ments which will perm! t most efficient exploitation of theoretical 

_potential in field." 

R/D c<J.n.iENT: R/D is aware of' need for research in this field of 

the theory of communications but at present bas no adequately trained 

personnel to perform this research. Attempts to recruit suitable personnel have been unsuccessful to date. 

PROD CQ.1MENTS: None. 

PERS CCM4ENTS : None. 

DCS/P mMARKS: Past failure to recruit suitable personnel can not be 

accepted as the reason for failure to meet the requirements of basic 

research and developnent of' methods and equipment. 

ACTION RECCl1MENDED: R/D and PERS to continue vigorous recruitment 

efforts. 

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RESP.ARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

16. REX::OMMENDATION: (Page 211 Line 6) The entire concept of military, diplomatic and commercial connnunication must be examined to reveal 

those aspects of enemy connnunicatione networks which are most vulnerable 

to COMINT activities. The intelligence gained should be weighed against 

the cost of obtaining it and the cost to the enemy of reducing its 

vulnerability. 

R/D COMMEN'IS: Contractual studies in the fields of noise communications and survey by contract of the existing situation in the fie~d of 

VHF/UifF/SHF are underway. So far as is known, no such complete study has 

been made in the past. Although the value of such a study as a very long 

te:nn program is intuitively clear, the great diversity of intercept on 

the part of the various producing and consuming organizations is such 

as to make the establishment of the relative scale of interest ne~essary 

for such a study extremely difficult. 

PIDD COMMENTS: None. 

PERS COMMENTS: None. 

'DCS/P REMARKS: An NSA plan for active investigation of V'ffF/UIIF/SFIF 

is now underway. It is expected to result in concrete recommendations 

for new equipment and techniques for attacking the problem. This program promises to be a very expensive one. A Special Intercept Problems 

Panel is being established within NSA to consider this type of problem. 

ACTION RfilX>MMENDED: NSA plan to be completed and put into action as 

soon as possible. PJDD to insure consideration of its problems by the· 

Special Intercept Problems Panel. 

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17.. RECCMiENDATION: (Page 21, paragraph ( i)) Developments along 

the following lines should be considered: antenna systems (multiple 

unit) and integral receiving facilities to permit operators to deter-

.mine the direction of arrival ot a signal iJIDnediately without reliance 

on a separate D/F. 

PROD CCMMENW: None. 

R/D CCJ4MENXS: Developnents are now underway with the cooperation 

ot the Services to meet this very need. 

DCS/P REMARKS: None. 

ACTION RECCMMENDED: See 25. 

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18. REC<J.1MENDATION: (Page 21, paragraph (ii)) Develop repeaters, 

receivers, antenna systems and techniques to improve signal reception 

above 30 me. 

R/D CCMMENTS: Contractual studies in the fields of noise communications and a survey by contract of the existing situation in the field of 

VHF/UHF/SHE are underway. 

DCS /P REMARKS: None. 

ACTION RECCl-1MENDED: See 25. 

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19. REC<l1MENDATION: (Page 221 paragraph (iii)) Development should 

be continued on equipments for better utilization of immediate action 

voice communications including better receivers, better recording 

.machinery, autanatic time registering devices, better techniques of 

receiving and copying this traffic, and eventually automatic semantic 

processing equipment for use in traffic analysis and recovery of brevity 

codes. 

R/D Ca.1MENTS: A tentative· program designed to meet the minimum 

requirements of the early warning mission bas been dravn up. This 

program requires a number of skilled scientists and several man years 

of' time. 

'DCS /P REMARKS : None. 

ACTION RECCJv1MENDED: See 25. 

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20. RECG1MENDATIClf: (Page 22, paragraph (iv)) Equipments for 

reception of' noise modulated signals (such as Na.1AC system) should 

' 

receive attention. 

RJD CCMMENTS: Contract stUdy on noise communication underway. 

DCS/P RTMRlm: None. 

ACTIOO RECa.tMENDED: See 25. 

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RESEA.RCH AND DEVEI.OPMENT 

21. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 22, paragraph (v)) ·Development of 

ents for detection and rece tion or 

communications systems should continue. 

R/D COMMENTS: Exten~ion of I .... ____ I equipment to provide 

coverage in all applicable frequency ranges w1ll require seven man 

years of effort. 

pgs/P REMARKS: None. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED: See 25 · 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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22. RECOMMENDATIONt (Page 22, paragraph (vi)) Installation and use 

ot propagation measuring requipment to permit more efficient direction ot 

~tercept effort should be JDB.de. 

R/D COMMENTSs It is R/D'a belief that thia subject is more appropriate 

for PROD comment. R/D activity must be limited to. experimentation with 

the use ot propagation measuring equipment, whereas the installation and 

use of such equipment to.accanplieh more efficient direction of the intercept effort is considered properly a PROD function and one tor which this 

Office would not be appropriately manned. 

PROD COMMENTS& Concur that this should be done. Possibility of 

carrying·. out this activity will be investigated. 

DCS/P REMARKS: Bone. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED& See 25. 

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23. RECCJ.1MENDATION: {Page 22, paragraph (vii)) Inverse LORAN or 

other position measuring devices to produce position data on transmitters 

should be investigated. 

R/D COMMENTS: Basic comment on this recommendation should come from 

PROD, however, investigation of inverse LOOAN and similar position measuring devices will be undertaken when and if it appears to offer premise • 

.---, In view of previous extensive investigations very little optimism is 

presently indicated. 

PROD COMMENTS: PROD agrees that use of this sort of device should 

receive attention. Technical research teams will investigate this matter. 

DCS/P REMARKS: None. 

ACTION RECa.fME:NDED: See 25. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

24 I RECOMMENDATION a (Page 22, paragraph (viii)) Efforts should. 

continue on development of demultiplexing, unscrambling and position 

recording devices. 

R/D cOMMENTs: Development of \ .... ________ _,I equipment to 

yield immediate traffic from ferret and SESP missions would require 

nineteen man years of effort. 

DCS/P REMARKS: R/D "and PROD should determine the relative worth of 

such equipment to permit comparative evaluation with other developmental 

effort. 

ACTION RECa.!MENDEDi PROD and R/D to make an estimate of the relative 

value ot this equipment as canpared to the rest of the developmental program. 

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~o 3.3(h)(2) 

PL<86-36/50 USC 3605 

25. REC<J.!MENDATION: (Page 22i, paragraph (ix)) Ef'f'ort should be 

continued on development oLJdevices for transmitters and operators, 

both voice and morse. 

R/D COMMENTS: Development of' more automatic methods inQoperation will require nine man years of' ef'f'ort. A st~dy of' the use o~.____, 

in the VJIF/UHF range will take approximately eleven man years. 

DCS/P REMARKS: The ·11st of' recaomendations f'rom 17 through 25 constitutes a tentative program tor R/D action. R/D is at present formalizing these recanmendations'into a planned program. 

ACTION RECCNMENDED1 R/D to implement this program as fully as 

possible, consistent with NSA capabilities. 

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

26. RECOMMENDATION: (Page22, line 24) \Studies should be initiated 

to determine possible methods of solution tor interception of USSR use 

or .... f ______ _.lcOJllJIJW11cations. Also studies\ should be initiated on 

.__ _______ ..... I 1n.terception. 

PROD COMMENTS: None, 

R/D COMMENTS: R/D is nOW" prepartng to give increased\.assistance to 

the Services on the RussianQproblem, pa.rticular11J ... ___ ..,...._ ___ _. 

A broad study of thel I problem is now underway. 

PERS COMMENTSs None. 

DCS/P REMARKS: USAFSS with NSA concurrence has proposed a plan for 

the activation of threel ~quadrons. This effort, if 

fully implemented, will provide 57 intercept positions. 

ACTION RECOMMENDEDs R/D to continue the study of the 

pro lem. PROD to insure that the Special Intercept Problems 

Panel gives consideration to this problem. NSA to continue active support 

of the I .... ________ f plan. 

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PERSomfEI. 

27. RECCMMENDATION: (Pase 23, line 15) More high-level positions 

and opportunities tor'advancement ahould be eetabli1hed. 

R/D COMMEN'l'S1 Solution ot the early warning problem is considered 

to be primarily centered in the 1olution ot the peraonnel problem. Under 

present restrictions, NSA cannot oompete for the s.ervices of scientific 

graduates. If this over-all problem is of sUfticient urgency, then means 

must be found whereby NSA can effectively canpete with industry in terms 

of salary, working conditions and Job benefits. The alternatives to 

increasing the local scientific staff are either: 

(a) The subsidization of several industrial research organizations by essentially open-end contracts or 

(b) Establishment of a captive corporation similar to the pro- ., . I 

cedure followed by the Atomic Energy Commission.. Both of these approaches 

would be extremely expensive and of a low degree' of effectiveness in 

comparison to expanding the NSA staff and extending the regular contract 

program. 

PROD COMMENTS: Concur. 

PERS COMMENTS: Previous attempts to secure supergrades have so far 

produced only one GS-18. Budget tor FY-55 includes tunds for fourteen 

additional supergrades. 

DCS/A REMARKS: See remarks under #3. It is felt that the alternatives 

of' subsidizing industrial research organizations and establishing a captive 

canpany like the Sandia Corporation, are impractical for NSA. Notwithstanding 

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the difficulty of competing ~1th industry tor skilled personnel, a vigorous 

recruiting program must be carried on. 

ACTION RECOMMEl'IDEDi That the additional high level p<>sitions, if 

approved, be included in the over-all JfSA personnel program recommended 

in 3 above. PERS and R/D to continue an intensified recruiting program 

and exploit every possibility of obtaining suitable personnel. 

l10P SEERET 

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l10r' SECRET FflCTII 

PERSONNEL 

28. RECCMMENDATIONs (Page 23, line 17) Scientists and engineers 

could be borrowed from industry and universities for limited periods of 

time. 

PROD COMMENTS: Yes, and the existing program through the medium of 

the Scientific Advisory Board for the use of scientists and engineers 

borrowed from industries and universities for limited periods of time is 

adequate to cope with this reconunendation. There is considerable question 

about the real usefulness of such a program if' the periods of time that 

such individuals can be me.de available are relatively short. 

R/D CCMMENTS: R/D has underway a WAE program which in effect is 

carrying out this recOI1DDendation. 

PERS COMMENTS1 None. 

DCS/A REMARKS: It is doubtfUl. that this procedure would solve the 

problem of developing and maintaining a hard core of experienced technical 

personnel familiar with the NSA mission. The major advantage which might 

accrue from this procedure would be to increase the prestige of NSA in the 

eyes of those not familiar with NSA activities. The importance of the work 

of NSA implied by the association of well known scientists and engineers 

might serve to attract high calibre personnel to the Agency. 

ACTION RECOOJENDEDi Borrowing of scientists and engineers be utilized 

so far as is considered practical by NSA activities. In following this 

procedure, account should be taken of' the limitations on the value of 

short term employment of such technicians. 

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REF ID:A516907 

l1C>r SECREl1 FR81'II 

!&P SE~ FR~ 

PERSONNEL; 

29. RECOMMENDATIONS (Page 24, line 6) In order to attract the 

interest of prospective analysts, the present rearuitment policy of NSA 

should be restudied in the light of realistic security limitations. 

n(X) CO~i None. 

yP 0~1 MOM. 

PERS CCH4EN'l'Sa Th1• baa been done. Civilian Personnel has received 

from AG a list of 1te• vh1cb can be used by recruiters. The items are 

much more informative than anything previously available. 

DCS/A REMARKS 1 None. 

ACTION RECOMMENDED1 PERS to continue their efforts with improved 

recruitment tools. 

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TC>r' SECRET FRffill 

PERSONNEL 

31. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 24, line 12) Question of salary and 

promotion policy in NSA should be restudied to determine if it is conducive 

to a sound development of.the T/A effort. 

PROD COMMENTS: If the promotional salary scale which is set forth in 

the last page of the NSA-90 "Organization, Functions and Job Study" is 

adopted, it is probable that much of the present disparity as pertains 

to the T/A field salary-wise will be corrected. However this cannot be 

determined completely until such time a.a the present Job survey is 

completed. 

R/D COMMENTS: None. 

PERS COMMENTS: The same might be said for cryptography and cryptanalysis as well. Current promotion policies (inaugurated subsequen: to 

this special study) are working nicely. Salaries are perpetually under 

observation and are continually adjusted in line with position classification. 

DCS/A REMARKS: See paragraph 3 above. 

RECOMMENDED ACTION: No change is recommended in the newly established 

promotion policy. 

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PERSONNEL 

32. RECOMMENDATION: (Page 25, line 1) Consiieration should be 

given to the establishment of a service career field for military intercept_ operators in·order to avoid the problem of' re-enlistment and 

rotation. 

PROD COMMENTS: None. 

R/D COMMENTS: None. 

PERS COMMENTS: Pre.;survey .classification program, now underway in 

Office of Analysis and Exploitation is establishing career ladders for 

both military and civilian personnel. Program has been prepared to 

accomplish TMB Project No. 3 (to develop uniform job descriptions applicable to members of cryptologic agencies). These two programs are expected 

to provide needed career fields. 

DCS/A REMAR:KB: See remarks under 3. 

RECOMMENDED ACTION: See paragraph 3 above. 

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'fer SECRE'f FRE?fll 

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PERSONNEL 

33. RECCMMENDATIONz (Page 25, line 4) Analytic support should be 

provided at the intercept site, either by indoctrination of intercept 

personnel with the rudiments of C/A and T/A, or by assignment of an 

analyst to the site. 

PROD COMMENTSz Serious efforts must be made to increase basic reporting as close to the source of traffic as possible. This means that 

the competence of intercept stations must be improved both by improving 

the background and training of operators and by furnishing them basic 

T/A techniques. Career possibilities for enlisted specialists are not 

now sufficiently attractive to draw and hold the type of men required by 

the mission. Improvement of this situation will require personnel action 

of a type that can be achieved solely by special legislation. 

DCS/ A REMARKS: See remarks under 8. NSA technical support program 

provides for assignment of skilled NSA analysts to conduct on-the-Job 

training and to provide technical advice at field processing centers. 

ACTION RECOMMENDEDa That the NSA technical support program be continued and expanded as rapidly as poBBible. 

qi OP SEC!HB'l' 60H'fH0L Ne. Pf P 5i. 176 

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REF ID:A516907 

'~OP SEGRE~FROT!·f 

!6P ~ ffi9iH 

SUBJECT; Com111ents on Report of Special Study Group 

TO: P/P FROM: TECHDm/PROD DATE: 25 Nov 53 

Attn1 Mrc O. Ro Kirby 

Retarencea: {a) 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(b) 

The Potentialities of C<»UNT tor Strategic Warnings,, a report 

prepared by Special Stud;y Group of the NSA Scientific Advisory 

8DGrd undated .. 

Memo from the Chief ot Staf'f same subject dtd 26 October 1953. 

l. The apeclal. etucbr by members or the Scientific Advisory Board is concerned 

only with COUNT potentialities for advance warning of a direct air attack.. The 

Study Groupwaa campoeed or people who are ex.ceptiona)J,y well qualified in their 

own special tield•. They have pre•ented an excellent stud,y ot our potential and 

have indicatedvq-a in which it can be expanded. It should be noted though that 

the Group did not.lnve•tigate the possibility that non-Russian targets could 

contribute directly or indirectly to strategic warnings. This possibility is 

considered in 06 to bea quite likely one, particularly as regards COMINT derivable 

from the CCIDDlUllicationa or Satellite countries. Arry planning or action in 

connection with this investigation should ensure that non=Russian targets are 

kept in mind. 

2. Reference b requires that PROD analyze steps l and 2 or the Summary, item 

Traffic An&J3111a ot the Report, and item Special Intelligence ot the Report.o Since 

step 1 is concernecl with special intelligence and step 2 with traffic anaqsis; the 

requirements v:Ul be met if' PROD directs its comments to the Traf'fic Analysis and 

Special Intelligence portions of the Report. 

3. With regard ~o Special Intel.llgence (step 1 or pg. 2 and pp. 15-17), top 

priority is nowbeinlt and has been given to the solution or Russian high-level 

systea.s. A large proporttcm :1f the research talent .availa.ble to the Agency is 

conetant]J assigned to the direct technical su:A>Ort off \ problemso 

Two team ot qualitied speci&lits recentq completed a technical survey of these 

problems in order to recommend new approaches and to anticipate the strength 

required to effect then. The benefits of this survey are already being noted; a 

great deal more benefit is still to be derived. 

Whenever those responsible tor research require computational suppori., the 

need can usu~ be met from our preser.1.t facilities though not al~s aa quickly as 

might be desired. Soma reserve or machine capability is available within the 

Agency, but it can be utilised o~ by going to multi~shift operations tor which 

sutticient, trained personnel are not now avail.ablec Additional equipment 'Nhich 

is required over and above present capability is under research or developruent. 

He.re too additional pereonnel are neededc 

The lack ot progrAllllil9rs 9 cited by the Group as our n:oat seriou deficiency, 

is not near~ so great as our lack of a corps or technicians familiar both with 

cryptanalytic problems and machine capabilities. A group or specialists of this 

kind is needed to tormulate problems and to supervise the wrk of tho• performing 

machine programming. A ratio or one formulator to four progrananers, considered 

ideal, is not even approached in present practice. The lack ot this type or personnel 

TOP SEC~~~'~' PAGE OF~ PAr.F.3 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

REF ID:A516907 

·-: 0 P SEC RE~ FFl,e: 1~_,,,.,_, 

SUBJlA'lT: Comments on Report of Special Stud;y Group 

- = - - ~ = - - - - - - - ~ = = = - - = = ~ = = = = = ~ ~ = = = = - - = = = - - - - -

would be aggravated if our progremn:.ing wre !.'armed out on contract as the Group re~ommendso\ Although w are trying by intensive training programs to enhance the 

capab:\.lities\of our technical personnel9 the essential need with which we are not 

coping• satisfactorily is an increase in the number of paraonnel who can be assigned 

to the\f \ I problem.a Whu.t a.re we doingi> and planning to do i! 

increues 1n auth,oriution are not granted;. is to :reallocate some of our effort 

(at the expense, ot couree11 ot processing 1n other directions) and to make maximum 

use of voluntary ovwtimeo 

4o The second ~ge area in which improvement. is recomn.ended {step 20 pgo 2; 

ppo 12-.14) i• in Trattic Analysie 0 I.ow X.vel Cod•• and Ciphers,!) and Plain Texto 

It is agreed that our capability to pertonn tratt:l.c analysis must be increasedo 

This ia being done by training and by crosa-training so that our technicians will 

be t•mi 11 ar with all of the\ tools of communications analysis rather than those 

aimed at only specialized. upects ot cryptana:cys1s or tl"&f'.fic an&lysiso It is felt 

that onJ¥ in this wavr oan we increase our capabilities without increasing our 

numbers. This view or tr&ining\&nd utilization of pareonnel which is applicable to 

and desirable in the entire field ot COMINT is completely opposed to the recommendation by' the Study Group that personnel be frozen on specific problems., 

The survey ot our attack o~ I cited in 

paragraph J above is a first step toWird surveying our entire technical. efforto It 

is planned that teams con.posed of equal.]¥ high-level people will study our traffic 

anaqtic ettort. We can anticipate recommendations on new approaches and the rnunber 

of people or the kinds of machinery required to implfWlent. them,, These surniys will 

be completed early in 1954 and will point the w.y to wha.t neade. 'to be done in the 

direction or technical improvement., 

Serious efforts must be made to increase basic reporting as close to the 

source or trattic as posaibleo This means that the competence ot intercept stations 

must be improved both by improving the background and training of o~rators and 

fUrniabing then; basic tratfic analytic techniqueso Career possibilities for enlisted 

speciallts are not now sufticient:cy attractive to draw and hold the type of men 

required by the mission.. Improv~ent of this situation 'Will :require personnel action 

of a type that can solely be a~hieved by special leg-lslationa 

5o From the foregoing discussion or th• technical areas of interest it will 

be seen that the reallocation of effort recommended in paragraph 4a of reference b 

is constant:cy under wa.y-. Problems we kept under continuous review by line 

supervisors and start otticera to ensure that the al.location of our strength most 

closely meets intelligence requirements. Surveys, either formal or informal0 maintain 

a balance for technical requirementso 

6. Our main problem is clearly a need for more and better per sonnele In 

consonance v! th the PROD aim to .fulfill its technical and intelligence mission as 

tuI..q ae possible an overall study or the personnel requirE1IDents of PROD iB beine 

conductedo Recommendations basflld <1pon this study will be :made by the General 

TOP 
REF ID:A516907 

SUBJF£T: CODlllenta on Report. of Special Stud.Y Group 

Proce••ing Comitteeo This stuczy v.l.th the aupport of our consumers will point up 

pereonnel detioienciea u required by paragrapi 4b of reference bo It is expected 

that the task v1ll be completed by the end ot tM year,, 

7. The tact that moat clearJ,y--emergee from our consideration of the Grouptra ~tiona 1a t~t our technical planning is under nuch better control than is 

our capability to 1.mp.1-.ent'plarur. de'V9lopldo At every turn ve are forced to 

compranise 1Clat 18 technically desirable vlth what can be peJ>formed with peraonnel 

availableo The turt.her w study the more it become• clear that we have not achieved 

an elt!alent balanoe bet.wen "°"°k to be doM and the number of hands to do it and 

that w can moat ettectively utilize the penonnel we have onl,y if w are authorized 

more. 

Ao SINKOV 

Technical Director 

Production 

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REF ID:A516907 

.f·-r.'\,'~' 

-- ',' ! I 

Comments on Report ot Special StudJ' Group 

P/P TECBDIR/PROD 25 11ov 53 

Attn: Mr. o. R. Kirby 

Ref'erences: (a) The Potentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warnings, a report 

prepared by Special Study Group of the RSA Scientific Advi&01"7 

Board undated. 

(b) Memo from the Chief of Staff' same subject dtd 26 October 1953· 

l. The special study by members of the Scientific Adviaory Board is concerned 

onl7 with CCJilIIT potentialities for advance warning of a direct air attack. 'l'be St~7 

Group was eomposed of people vho a.re exceptionally- well qualified in tbeir own apecial 

fields. They have presented an excellent study of our potential and have indicated 

ways in which it can be expanded. It should be noted though that the Group did not 

investigate the possibility that non-Russian targets could contribute directl.J or indirectly to strategic warnings. This possibility is considered in 06 to be a quite 

likely one, particularly as regards OOMI1'? derivable from the communications of Satellite 

countries. Imy planning or action in connection with this inveatigation should ensure 

that non-Russian targets are kept in mind. 

2. Reference b requires that PROD analyze steps l and 2 of the Summary, 1 tem 

Tratf'ic Analysis of" the Report, and item Special Intelligence of the Report. Since 

step 1 ia concerned with apecial intelligence and step 2 with traffic anal.yais; the 

requirements will be met if PROD directs its comments to the Traf:f'ic .'\nalysis and 

Special Intelligence portions of the Report. 

3. With regard to Special Intelligence (step 1 of pg. 2 and pp. 15-17), top 

priority is now being and has been given to the solution of Jti IJ.•79tems. 

A large proportion or the research talent aTailable to the ~enc;y is constant assigned to the direct technical support ofl ~roblems. Two teams o-r 

qualified specialists recently completed a technical survey of these problems in order 

to recommend new approaches and to anticipate the strength re~uired to effect them. 

The benefits of this survey are already being noted; a great deal more benefit is still 

to be derived. 

Whenever those responsible for research require computational support, the 

need can usually be met from our present facilities though\ not alva;ys aa quiekl.7 u 

might be desired. Some reserve of machine capability is available within the Agency, 

but it can be utilized only by going to .multi-shift operations for which suf'tieient, 

trained personnel are not nov available. Additional equipllent which is required over 

and above present capability is under research or development. Here too additional 

personnel are needed. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~OP 
REF ID:A5169<!J"I 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SUBJECT: Comments on Report of Special Study Group 

-- - -- -- -- - - - - - - - --- -- - - - - ~ - . - - - -- - -- - - The lack of programmers, cited by t}le Group as our moa.t sedous deficiency, 

is not nearly so great as our lack of a corps of technicians f8.!Biliarboth with 

cryptanalytic problems and machine ca];>~bilities. .'\ group of specialists of' this kind 

is needed to formulate problems and to supervise the work of tbOae performing machine 

programming. A ratio of one :forniulator to four programmers, considered ideal, is not 

even approached in present pr~tice. The lack of this type of personnel vou.ld be 

aggravated if our programming were farmed out on contract as the.Group recommends. 

Although we are trying l)yintensive training programs to enhance.the capabilities 

of our technical personnel, the essential need with which we are .not coping s.atisfactorily is an i:nerease in the number of personnel who can be as.signed to the{ ] 

I \problem. What we are doing, and planning to do if increases in 

authorization are not granted, is to reallocate some of our ef'f'ort (at the expense, 

of course, of processing in other directions) and to make maximum.use of voluntary 

overtime. 

4. The second large area in which improvement is recommended. (step 2, pg. 2; 

pp. 12-14) is in Traffic ;..nalysis, I.ow Level Codes and Ciphers, and Plain Text. 

It is agreed that our capability to perform traffic analysis must be increased. This 

is being done by training and by cross-training so that our technic.ians will be 

familiar with all of' the tools of communications analysis rather than those aimed at 

only specialized aspects of cryptanalysis or traffic analysis. It ls felt that only 

in this way can we increase our capa.bili ties without increasing our• •. numbers . This 

view of training and utilization of personnel which is applicable to and desirable 

in the entire field of COMINT is completely opposed to the recommendation by the 

Study Group that personnel be frozen on specific problems. 

The survey of our attack orJ \cited in 

paragraph 3 above is a first step toward surveying our entire technical effort. It 

is planned that teams composed of equally high-level people will study our traffic 

enalystic effort. We can anticipate recommendations on new approaches and the number 

of pe9ple or the i\:inds of machinery required to implement them. These surveys will 

be completed early in 1954 and will point the vay to what needs to be done in the 

direction of technical iL1povement. 

Serious efforts must be made to increase basic reporting as close to the 

source of traffic as possible. This means that the competence of intercept stations 

must be improved both by improvtg the background and training of operators and 

furnishing them basic traffic analytic techniques. Career possibilities for enlisted 

specialists are not now suf'ficiently attractive to draw and hold the type of men 

required by the mission. Improvement of this situation will require personnel action 

of n type that can solely be achieved by special legislation. 

5. l!'rom the foregoing discussion of the tic:chnical areas of interest it will 

be seen that the reallocation of ef:rort recommended in paragraph 4a of reference b 

is constantly under way. Problems are kept under continuous review by line supervisors 

and staff officers to ensure that the allocation of our strength most closely meets 

intelligence requirements. Surveys, either fonna.l or informal, maintain a balance 

for technical requirements. 

2 

b UP SECF:ET.11$) 
REF ID:A5169" 

SUBJECT: Comments on Report of Special Study Group 

- - - - -- ----- - - --- - - - - - -- - --- - ---- - - 6. Our main problem is clearly a need for more and better personnel. In 

consonmice with the PROD aim to ~111 its technical and intelligence mission as 

f'ull.3' as possible an overall study o'f the personnel requirements of PftOD is being 

conducted. Recommendations based upon this study will be made by the General Pro. 

ceasing Committee. This study with the support or our consumm:s will point up 

personnel deficiencies as req_uired by paragraph 4b of reference b. It is expected 

that the task will be completed by the end of the y,ar. 

7. The fact tbat moat clearl;r emerges from our consideration of· t.he Group' a 

recommendations is that our technical planning is under much better control than is 

our capability to implement plans developed. At every turn ve are torced to compromise 

what is technically desirable vith vhat can be performed with personnel available. The 

further ve study the more it becomes clear that ve have not achieved an ef'f1c1ent 

balance between work to be done and the number of hands to do it and that we can most 

effectively utilize the pereonnel ve have only if we are authorized more. 

.. ' 

-

!~~. SINKOV 

Technical Director 

Production 

tn~ 
TOg P/P 

SUBJECT: Additional Comments on Report ot Special stud;y 

Groupt1 NSASAB 

P'I01g DD/PROD DATE: 7 January 1954 

lo PROD does not feel additional coimnents u reqr..i.ested on specific 

recOD1111endationa ia either necessary or deairable. The idea of breaking dolll'l 

general recommendations into "bits and pieces" tor specific C01111lent mq lead 

to Ull80W'ld conclusions aa in many inatancea these specific recommendations can 

on.ly be commented on through inclueion ot the wholeo 

2o Howver, PROD hu endeavored. to provide such comments pending the 

completion ot the atudiea 'lldrl.ch PROD bu previous'.cy indicated it will undertaker. 

Theae comments are listed by fat"& number below: 

I Rec91DD!!nd&tion: Nn.ticnal Security Agency ehould augment its 

scientific and engineering st.arr with a via to assisting the Service• in regard 

to technical mattera relative to propagation phenomena in making deitermination 

aa to antenna fielda and placement of' intercept positionso 

PROD Camnents Yea, but not at the ax:penae of lll1-Y ex:iating f\mction or NSA until 

a cmplete atud1' ot all .NSA 1\mctions can be made to wigh the relative value 

of this function with otherno 

III a. Reoommend.ation: Tratf'lc analysis furnished Air Defense Ccmnand 

should be quantitied by developnent of indicea and meuures of activity ot Soviet 

Air Force "1th graphic preaentationa thereoto 

PROD Ccmnent: The quanti!ication or trattic analysis vUl be an aspect ot our 

technical survey. 

bo Recommendation: studies (intensive and compreherui.ive) should be 

made ot activities ot the Soviet Air Force during large scale exercises., 

PROD Cmmept s Natural.41 o 

do Re99Tendation: A small resoarch group should be established to 

carry out research and developnont on nev methods or ana.JJsi10 

PROD Ccmrnent: PROD does not recognize this u an R/D tunctiono Thia action9 

al.re~ iii effect vi.thin PROD, is clearly stated 1n the organizational. manual u 

a reBpOnsibility or PROD (0641) .. 

eo Recoamendation: NSA ehould re-examine its selection. training• 

proficiency evaluation and promotional procedures tor T/A civilian personnel. Poaa1.ble application or modern pJJychometric methods should be explored in 

connection vi.th peraonnel selection. 

PRQD Comment: By all meanao 
ll)P SB6!i'tif FROfU MllC;.:::o;~.-.i;;~....,i;:-~~..,,._,,_,_~::-

VIX &o Recommen@.t¥?.~.c More high.:..-1.eve.l po&\itions &i."'ld Qppe>rtunities 

for adv&icement should be estatli.ahedo 

f~D C<l!lment: Without de~., 

b., Recarrmend&tion; fJeientists Md engineerfl c.01..G.6 he borrowed from 

:tndustry and univer9ities for limited }X'riod• o! time.., 

FJi()..], ~t: Y•I!~ and the 6'.Xi~~ting progrmn through the medium of the Scientific Advisory Board tor the uee of a~i4Hltiato and $ngineera bo~ from industries 

•nd univeraities tor limited perlode ot time is adequate to c;opa with this 

recommendation., There is c-ons:tderable question about the r·etl 1.USef'ulneae of 

auc:h a program it the peri.oda of time that auch individ\18 ... lll can be made ~v&il.able 

are reL'9.ti vely short o 

e" Rec~..!:~ou.: Question ot 11&1.ary and promoti.on policy in NSA. 

ehould be restricted. to determine it it i• eonelusiw. to a 8(11und developnent 

at the T/A effort. 

fROD COUIDent g It the prcmotional aalary scale which i• eet forth in the lam 

page of the NSA-90, "Orge.n:!~ntionJ> PUnctiona and Job study't io ad.opted, it is 

probable that mu<'h ot the present diDp&rlty ae pertains to the T/A. field u.le.ry= 

wiae9 will be corrected~ However» thi• cannot be determined oomplete~ until 

•uch time u tho pr~aent job survey is ccmpletedo 

2 

ALFRED Rei MARCY 

Cclcn&l0 US ~~ 

Deputy Direct~r 

ProduotiQ!:n 

17t'lf' ~ ecnmot B6Plr ; "1 , 7 t. 

COPY .3 OF JS" COPIES 

PAGE ~ G' 7c PAGF£ 

TOP 'SECRET 
REF ID:A5169er"/ 

0 
REF ID:A51690 

Q 3.3(h)(2) SECURITY IFICATION (Ifanr) 

-·· --~,, _., PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DISPOSITION FORM 

FILE NO. 

, S.UBJECT 

TO 

·•. \ Comments on Re ot Spec1al study Group of NSASAB 

FROM B 

DATE S. Kullback/ ~?~m. NO. 1 

1. 'fbe Repart entiti.d ''The Potentialities ot C001f.r tor strategic WarDing 

(Report ot Special Stud1'. Group 1 BSA ScientU'ic Ad.Viaor7 Bcarcl)" dated 26 Oct 53, 

baa been ~ atudied and the foUoving ~ia, cQli1ili8nta, a.r.d proposed 

actions an baaed prim&Jil.7 on the reaearch and devel~ 8D4 item 3, Electroni. 

J>evelopmnts of t;be Speci.al Intelligence, :por\iona ot tbe B.eport. 

2. We agree in tbe -.tn\ wS:tb the tindinp and ccmcluaions ot tbe Boe.rd. I't 

1• considered tbat present; R&D activities and. division of effort are conaistent 

With tbe reccmaeni.!at:S.ons of the report, and "that under existing personnel and b ....... ~ 

l.1m1te.tions 1ncreaae4 eff°" t.atbe direction of 811¥ one or tbe recC1111emat1ona 

be mde ~ a't tbe cost ot another Qt" of ex1st1Dg act.1vit1ea. It is not 

Ncc:aaeDled that current; activities be curtailed. 

3. Aa recopizecl bT tbe bl'\\ 'the major obstacle to an expansion of the sc 

ot the RliD ef'tan 1e om ot pereODDel.. An 1ncreaae :1D research am devel opnent 

Yar'k done bl' contract la Dot a casplete solution. ~ extent of research and 

Gevelop.-nt; wblch cua be done · ett~iellt,J,y b7 GU'U1611 contract i• definiteq 

_Um1te4 b7 the alse of tbe ISA. n841tareb and devel.cpent arpnization "Wb.lch mu.art 

&"f''."'""V1ae, eval.ua'8, aaMaa tbe requirwAta, and 4o the prel1m1nary research 1D 

OMt:r that the overall prcgr• ot internal and external research and developllll!!nt 

effort accc:apl:l.sh its 111••1•· ~ \ Ottice ot Research and Develoi-ent with 1ta 

present peraozmel cannot etttcientl$ a&dr:dater rewrch and &!velo];aentr b7 

contrac:t exceeding $13 million per J.r exoluaive ot persmmel, travel and 

purc:haae. f\md.a .. 

II.. The maJor detailed aapbaais in the Report is 1D tJae t1elcl ot intercept 

equtpmzta' •thods, am techniques. Contractual studies in the fields ot noise 

ccal'micn1cma and a surv.,. by contrac:t ot "tbe ez1st.1Dg •it.untcm :ln the t1el4 ot 

VRF/UffP /sD are al.reaq Underway. ReccamendatiODB bave been .made to PBOD a.ucl 

baa tarwa.rded to P to ild:tiate active field 

inveat:lp.tions Contract zaegat1atlcms an being undertaken tor e Bowaver, 

expaDde4 aet1v1tiea in this f1e needed. 

~ follow1Dg tentative program shows the scope ot 1Dcreased research and 

4evelo{aent a.ct1VitJ which wouJ.4 be .requ1red W tulfW. the mSniB.ID requireMllta ot the ear~ vandll8 laission. Xt. :la em:,pbaaized that tbla program ts not 

a aoe ~ ~ year atfa1r. Whereas scme result• voul4 develop ear~, tibe entire 

TOP SECRET. 

FLROTI I 

con 9 . OP /s 

PAGB I 0¥ IO 

DD 1 ~~~·60 9 6 llEPLACESftME FORM SS, I OCT"· WHICH MAY BE USED 18--64801-1 u ••• 80Y.EH1•111T nn1T1111e Ol'PICI 
FILE llO. 30-File·l.39 

'.fO: c/s 

SU&JEC'l': Comments on .Report of Special. St~ :Group or 

JllSASAB 

Do\'l'E: 20 Bov 53 c~ RO. l 

TBRU: P/P FROM: R/D S • .Kullback/Jt.h/6o32l. (Cont'd) 

prosram is of tremendous tecl:mical dif:ficulty, requiring marcy aove.l teclmiques, 

GDd. would. require of the order of' five to tf.IU years :for N.tisfactory completion. 

Requirements are sbowD 1n terms o:f ecientista per year. 'll>.eae i'iguree 

can a tnmalated into contract terms at the rate ot $20,000 per scientist. 

Under DO circumstance a can the entire la.bor requirement be met by cant..~t. 

It is necessary to retain a ca1petent st!Lff at BSA for pl.mming, initial cryptologic research and. develo:pnent, am for coo1~roct ccntrol. 

IlfmBCBPl' BQUIPMBJl'l R&D 

Taak Description 

RF Eq,uiJjlll!Dt 

a. Aural Studies: 

(1) Determ1nins noise levels 

in the Aural. Zone 

b. Direction F1re1ne; Equipnent: 

(1) Application of llf to Je I _am 

(2) Extension or DF to 1ncl\lde 

all frequencies of interest 

to BSA 

c. Developa!Dt of Intercept Equip. 

toj I 

(l) Receiver requirements 

(2) Ant«mas 

S~ientific Pera~e.l RequireAeDt 

_!::t.me:a-yeare/year 

3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~f' aa::RET eeft'fROt. 1ftJMl!Bft ~#-19t;; COPY _: OF /._': COPIES 

PAGE !_ OF 10 PAGES 

TOP2 SECRET 
FilE BO. 30-File-139 

TO: c/s 

SUBJDCT: Caments cm. R«=i:iort. or Special Study Group or 

BSA.SAB 

'l'BRU: P/P FROM: R/D 

Task Deecr1~on 

d. Extenaion ot the I 

(l) Provide coverage in ell 

applicable :frequency rangee 

Dl~TS: 20 Nov 5 3 COMHEIT BO • l 

S. Kullback/Jth/6o32l (Cont'd) 

Scientific Pereorm.el Requil."ement 

iA mai-:i .. .re..re/~ 

e. RU I 2 

(l) Modify or develop tecei:v0rs 

t. Exteneioo of the Diverait,r AnUmna 

selector Switch: 

(l) A study of the applicability I or "di vera1 tf ~~p~1on'' at 

8· MulticouR±!r Deve1opnent: 

(l) Interim developnent to meet 

Joint Military Charactertat1ca 

(2) lDDg range developnent of' au 

automatic or semi-automatic 

antenna distribution system 

(l) Five 111&D )'9&!'• of o~n.ting ~ 

the field (l-2 mouths per msn~ 

i. Coordi.Datioo vi th th4! Services in 

1Dvestiptioo and eoJ.ut1on of tecbnical problems "Which nov l1m.1 t the 

e!fect1veoo11 or f1el4 intercept 

ata.t1ona: 

3 

2 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

6 

5 

TOP SECRET FF<CTH 
nLB 10. 30·File·l39 ~: Camnents en Report of Special Study Group of JJSASAB 

'l'O: C/S 

'l'JIRU: p /P FROM: R/D Jl.\TE: 20 Nov 53 COJHJIT 110. l S. Kullback/JtJ>./(()321 (Cant'd) 

Task Deacription 

Scientific PerSODDei Requirement 

in man-1!,ara/year 

(1) It ia belined tbat f'ive engineers wou.14 be required. in 

ma1Dtatn1ng the neceaaa.ey 

liaison w1 th services headquarters UD1 ts BD4 performing on tbe spot atudies iD 

the field uni. ta. It is believed tbat two men coul.d be kept 

on nearly continuous travel duty 

at the field stationa. 'l'he rema.1 n1na three would require travel. 

neceasar.r to coordinate s11trvice 

headquarter a.1'fa1ri1. 

J. ~ of more automatic methods 

J!__ ration: 

(1) Contract to empiasize the aapecte 

or the problem 

(2) Ccmatruction of e~ .. ··.t.··· .... tor···· J>«!r- f'ormiDg autamatic\...__j mat~ 

It. Stg 

ill VD'JUBP of tbe ranp: 

use of ~ 

~ 

{l) Local study of the problem 

(2) Developunt ot.r----1quipme:nt for VBF/lJiiF""iiPpllca.tions 

for fixed.etat1CDS 

(3) Rugedj.sation of VlfF/UJIF 

c:Jequip1m1ts 

)"EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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ll 

~J,5y'_./-r6 

'fef' 58e:R!f 00Mme1; ~ ~eil83 COPY .... OF /. . .«.: COPIES 

PAGE q. OF 10 PAGES 

TOP SECRETFR~.:./TH 
nu: RO. 30-J'ile-139 ~= Comments OD Report Of Special Study Group of Ji8ASAB 

'1'0: C/8 

BRO: P°/P 1ROM: R/D ~: 20 Nov 53 C<»GMaT IO. l 

s. l<ulll».ck/Jth/6'o321 (Cont'd) 

Scienti:tic PerBODDel Requirement 

Taak Deacriptim ill man•Y!!l"SJYear 

1. Ut111zat1oa ot Correlation Tech- 10 

D1Q!!!! 1D RB J?O!i tioD f'ixiDg: 

(1) Stud1' ot requireneDta 

(2) Deftlopmat of Experimental 

llac1al. 

(3) DrMlopnent of bgjneering 

llodal, 5 Service Teat Models 

hl'll1Dal B!iuS.pet 

a. •z::e~rn=~~ Ident1f1-

9lia aould., la CanJUDCtion vi tb. D/F 

anA'C:]pr0v1c1e an indication of the 

mwts ot a tuk force, or 1Ddi· 

cate a lb1tt 1D poracmnel which 

1IOUlcl be a t1p-of:f. For developneDt 

of atatistical tecbniquea of analyaia~ 

'b. Developeit of ef:f'ectiw vire-l!De 

aDcl Yin-carrier interc:ept 5uipnent: 

Local ~ and developnent. Evalua· 

tiOD or curreat techDiquea aad 1Dwat1gat1QD of new teahDiquea. 

c. DeveloJ!!Dt of traffic ac:ti vi t7 

iiidicator tor demultiplex •g.%J!U!Dt•: 

Will prov1c1e immediate 1Dcticat10D of 

auddM cbanp 1D amount of trat:ric 

bandl ad which mipt serve a.a tip-off. 

Local c1evel.opaent aDC1 implemeDt.,.tiOD. 

d. ~~k ~ •i\ii=ctoeld 1.mmedie.te trafi'ic 

1'rGm rret 8114 SE8P miaaiona: 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

6 

8 

l 

19 

~6/-./?( 

'A!QP SICPBR 619Jfi1Bela le. - COPY _fJ OF ~ 5" C 

PAGE 5 OF 10 PAGES 

TOP5 SECRET 
1'DB 110o 30-1'1le•l39 

'fO: c/s 

SUBJECT~ C€111!ments on Report ,,r. Spec1al Study Group of XISASAB 

TBRU: P/P 

Task Description 

Io:&l d.evelopnent and contract guidance. 

Ccatract tor developnent of engineerU:tg and service models. 

e • Jteeearch OD analy!1o method and es for telat:r:: 0pe:rator lcation, te ne equiprn ldeiititication, and multi- Pl!X eq\li- identification: 

I.ocal. at~ and develop!ae~. 

t. DevelopPat or improved versions 

or CUU!pt egui•nt vhicb 1lould 

JJl"0!1de I larpr quantity _2! 

accw;ate traffic: 

e.g. llllprove4 de-odulatm-s, 

d:tvera1t7 cCllllbin1ng units, etc. 

RecordiJla !qu1pent 

a. Aml.yt1cal Recorder: 

Short rnnn1na-t1me, wide-band 

graphic reQQl'der tar first attack 

on nev systems of Vide band 

intelligence ch•,,,,. 1 type • 

DATE: 20 l'iov 53 CCM4D1' BO. l 

~continued) 

S. Kull.back/ jth/6o321 

Scientif'1c Persoonel Requirement 

in mau-~s/.xear 

3 

15 

11 

6 -FRATt:-1 TOP SECRET~~ .. . 

\ 
-TOFFSJ;=tfR6fet-.,··:·_,. 

mr SBeft1!l'l 

Fil.B HO. JO-.File-139 

TO: C/8 

SUBJECT: Comment;' on Report or Special Study Group or NSASAB 

R/D DATE: 20 Nov 53 CCH1ENT NO. l 

THRU: P/P 

tuk Decij.R1:1on 

do §t!!dl ot Application of MyJjetic 

ltpordere: 

•• 

To routine Morse intercept inoluding 

pnl.1minaJ7 model work by adl•ptation 

ot COJ111181"'C1al devices. 

t. on-line Gradd,c Recorder: 

:U~i:n°":r!:i!~:.;:~ dk~ on produot!on buia. 

I• CJooJs t,p mi. tor Recording 

!Hsi 

Include• time atandard0 time in· 

tegrator. correction and calibration qata:n. Alao, read-out 

97at11n tor pJ.a.yback. 

S1m&l. Ana]yais 

a. SJ?!!9b: 

Research, design, developne~,r,, 

oontraot and proceuing 

b. S1mal An&ly!h: 

7 

(continued) 

s. Jtullback/jth/60321 

Scientific Persormel Requirement ¥!. JM!J::X•&ra[vear 

3 

10 

12 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

l4 

4 

TOP SECRET 
PILI no. 30-PU.-139 

'101 c~ 

'lJlllJs P/P 

TuJr. De1cpj.pt1on 

e. Current lntell1pnce etc. 

DIM IOl'thg 

4 o VBP Stu17 Wark 

Mcclel Pl'c4w:tion 

'l'o met inaft 2•ed c1emand• tor model 

pratuettcn. 

:MTE1 20 HoY 53 CXMa!lft NO o l 

so Xu1 Jbe1frJ .1th/&>321 ( Cmt 04) 

Scientific Penoaael Requiftllellt 

1p .... nan1n ... 

5. OD J18P 131 J181'11SN.pha 1 aid i. aa1 :ln Appendix YI,, pagea 4 end 6 ot the 

Report, the Board •tft•~• the need for research 1n T/A to t.aprove graphic 

J1'9Mntat1oD aDll to explore new metbode ot ~ta and high apeed machine• o The 

queaticm of the pre8elltat1cm of T/A i'1D41np is a atatictical one alld 1• now being 

ecaa14eftcl 1t7 B., maun4am aD1 Wc1 Jone• ot the Mathemat1n.l atae&reh D1.S.ioa. AD 

1rfest1gat1oa ot new metbacl• of auJ.79111 and machine appl1cab111 ty to 'r/A 1a 'being 

ua4ertaken b~ Miu V. L. Da'Yil and Do Creecy of the M&them.tie&l Reaeal"Ch D1"11iono 

b th1a 1tul7 4Mel.opl, a441t1onal penoanel will be added aa neceau.ey., If this 

effort ta to continue alll expand without a decrease 1n the effort oo the ttu.1iaD 

prolalell, tlle Matbemtleal ReMU'Ch D1Yi•1on will need three additional people at 

t!le OS•ll/'Ja/13 leftl. On i-ae 168 iwncrapb 2., the Report 1D41catea a need for 

an 1nereaae 1D tlle ;pl'Cp'Um1ng ettart tor high speed ccmputerao Tbe report nec11ren48 ptting out•i4e help u vell u increuina the internal prqp-m1'aa 

ettart. Bl:pel'iellee 1D41catee that outai4e help on ~ng in general cum be 

ot W1'J' little help to BSA. It 1a prcJj)OM4 that the M&tbenatical. Re•eanh J>1na1on 

aM a SeetioD vbo9e pr1mry tunetion vill be to do ~ng reaeerch tor exiat1nc 

a4 propoeec1 b1&h ap!9Cl CC111PUten o There are tour memben ot the Mathem.tic&l. 

IHeareh D1Yh1aa prHentl.7 performing thia f'unct1on who will be loet to the Ace'DC7 4uri.Da the next tvelft 11a11tha 'bee&U9e of their reuaipment 1n the Mllltar.Y 

Serdce. Tb1a 'D8V Section ahoUl.4 be beaded by a GS•l3 vith t1Te othere at the 

08-9/11/12 lawl., On i-ae• 21 and 22 the Report state•: "There ie Deed for buic 

l'MeU"eh cm tbe thea17 ot camunication 1ntelliceDce .... o .. " o B/D 1• avare ot the 

need for ftMdeb 1D th1a f1el4 ot tbe thea17 ot cC111DN111cat1cma 'but hM at pruent 

no lldeqmte~ tra1ne4 :penonnel to perform tb1a reaearcho Attempt• to recruit 

•ld.tabl.e penODDel m'ft 'been: un.eueceHtul to date" 

60 At preSf)Dt tbe Mathem.tical Re1earch Division is conduetiag a cmtnct 

pracraaa VS.th unl"9n1tlea and iDdivid\81 caaaultant11e We are in ~nt VS.th 

8 

TOP SECRET 
ma IO~ 30·7ile·l39 

~02 c/s 

DRth P/P 

~e NF~=.>:¥.~ .. :y --. I ~ r.:I \...A 1'. .r.., -

WQP Simu i'Jl,oG"QR Dl!ORllAmQll 

S0&1ICJ.': Camenta on Report ot Special stuq Group of llSASAB 

l'BON g D./D Mn:: 20 1'ov 53 Cattar BO. L 

S. Ku.llback/ .tth/6o321 (Cont'd) 

'tba Repart that the illternal peraonml at.ruc'ture ot the Matbmatical Research 

D1Yi1110D abau14 be im:prond. To tb!s end a ll10clit1ca:t1cm of the present atructure 

vU1 be proposed vitb a view to increasing the number ot 1'1.lleta above the GS-11 

l.tmtl and 4ecreaa1ng tbe IZlJJlber belov GS-U in keepil3g with t.he Repart, Vbich OD 

,w.ae 23 states, "the 111.1Ccess ~ the llational Security Agency R&D activities meded 

to lmep pace Vi.th tbe COOl9r requirement• VS.ll depend WJr3 largely on the qual.1t7 

ot re11earc:h and developlleut :personnel vhich can be eJ'lS&@t'd in the e.ff'ort." 

7. 'l'be reccmDelldat1cma of the Beard for increased !''~search in matbellatic• &D4 

etatiatS.c• tar application to c~i• alld trattic ana.l;ysia as rev1.ewcl 1D tbe 

prece.Uftl J181"881"&pba will require abaui fif'teen adili:tionaJ. people at the level ot 

ae-u and above. B7 tbe transfer ot eight people who a.re &;, tog predaaimutq 

PRCI> ratber tbaD research work f'rm BSA-3!s. 3 to PROO and b;r cb.a.ng1.ng several b1lleta 

wb1cb are nav beloV tlle CS-11 level to lrlgbar level, the ae"ual increase can be 

hel4 4own to four nev bUlets. 

a. ContiDUOWI efforts are being made 1n line with the COlllDen'tB in the Report 

CID pep 16, pangrapb 31 to f'ollov and aonitor outoide 8C'Qoivit1ee ritber auppal"ted 

bJ' lllA or 'bei.Dg CGT1ed OD by otbera. 'lbe Anaqtic :&!u1}11lellt Division 1a work1Dg 

CID tvo approaches 1D order to solve the camr1' problem, naae~~ 

a. Oemral purpose cm:putere and aaaqtic equ1pment vhich can be used cm 

all prob1- to 8Cll9 extent. 'Iba present program in ·~s area 1• primaril.7 a 

)JU"t ot 'tbe external. prograa and 1s considered adequate. 

b. Special purpose ~1c equipieu\• constructed out ot large basic 

bu21A1ng blocks using serial and parallel c1.rcU1tr;r. An expansion ot tb1a activit7 

to a rate u recaw *UJled 'b7 the Report vould require approximate]\( twent7 engiDeers. 

It 1• fl\188ticmable vbetber tbe tne of acttvit;r in (b) because or its close varklng 

relat1onabip vitb PBCJ> personnel ca.u be caniecl cm b7 outside contract to llJl1' J.arp 

extent. 

9. In order to :blprove the e:N'1ciency ot equiiment, increase the opera.tioml. 

apeeda, reduce tbe maf.Dtenance required on all equii;me:at, and provide maiJlteDaDce 

per80llm1 f'or COD'Ullu84 op1ration, twent7 additional people are ~. lt i• 

nccamDl!e4 that serioue consic!e.rat.1on l;Je given to the poseibil1t7 or contracting 

tar Uail ac1i1T1t7 • 

10. Om' preeent englneer1Dg rele&l'ch progna incl.udes a amall l.ocal ef'f'ort ~o 

c18velap pmral purpoae aml.l logical blocks tar uae :ln the nipid construction ot 

!6P 8ltUf' rnmo.t .... ~ ~,ey:6 COPY .3 r1' I 6 coPii8 

PACm - 9 OP lO PMllS 

TOP SECRET 
····,·-,,., 

, .. -. '( 

FILE BOo 30-File-139 SUBJECT: Ccrmmentn on Report at Special Study Group of BSAS.AB 

'1'0: c/s 

TBRth P/P 

DATE: 20 Nov 53 CCJ.IMEMT UOo l 

So Kullback/Jth/6o321(Cont 8d) 

special purpose equipment and to de·term:tne W'ha.t devices can ·be '..18ed for this purpose 

with sufticient econca;,y and reliability to permit construction ·of large equipment. To achieve a satisfactory group of units to me~t this nffd by the em of FI 55 the 

Engineering Reeearch Division would require two additional people locally and 

$1001000 for contracts. 

llo The above amly11a •hovs clear'J.y that an expansion of th* 11cope o'f the 

reaearch and development program to cope adeqately with the requirement• of the 

eari.,- varn1Dg problem ia almost totally dependent on ac1eratific peraonnel-... the 

retention of current perammel and the hiring of a quantity of new perammel. By 

readjuatmenta in the preeent orr~zation and program, a minor amount ot effort can 

be redirected tovard the aolution of thia problem. The present R/D ata.tt can 

handl.e approximately a 2~ increa1e in it• cozitracting program by a redirection 

ot local ettorta Thia increase 1s not of ef'tective consequence 1n ccms1derat1on 

ot the magnitude of the overall problem and would bri?Jg UXLdesirable preaaure to 

bear on the individual acientiata, Solution of' the problem, therefore, ia 

CODll14ered to be pz-imarily centered in the solution of the per11oonel problem. 

Under preaent reatr1ct1ona, BSA cannot canpete tor the services of young 

ec1ent1f'1c graduatea. If' thia overall problem is of sufficient urgency then 

meana muat be f'~ whereby BSA c&n ettect1vel:y ccmpete with industry. Similarly, 

it ia or extreme illpartance that RSA retain its senior scient13t~ f'or guidance ot 

the expam111g programa Meana must. be found tor ccmpeting vith industry 1n terms 

of' aalarie• 1 vorldJJg con41t10ll8 &D1 job benefits. It 1• U'Ot considered to be the 

purpoae of this paper to set forth a detailed analysis or recamne:adationa pertailling 

to the peraC11111el problem. Such an analysis will be prepared if the situation ia 

ccma14ered au:tticiently preaeing to warrant the undertaking of the apecial meaaure1 

which voul.d be required. The altel'l!l&tive• to increasing the local ac1enti.t'ic at&ff 

are either (a) the aubaid1&at1on of tieveral industrial research organizations by 

esaential.l.y open-end ccmtracts in a marmer similar to the recent ERA arrangement 

or (b) the eatabllahment ot a captive corporation similar to tbe procedure 

folloncl by the Atomic En•t>e;ll' Camr.ds~icm. Both or these approaches would be 

extremely expensive and of a lov degree or effectiveness in canpariacm to expancBag 

the local ate.ft aD4 subsequent extenaiioo of a :re.gulal" contract programo 

So ~ (Acting) 

Assi•tant Director 

Re•earch II.DC!. Develcpmeut 

T6P SEeftft ewmar. JIOo ~ 5)(.nt 

COPI .3 OF /6 C~ 

PAGE -W- OF 'TO PAGES 

- -
1 

EO 3.3(h)(2) c co~; c ... , •••• ;;J ~•ibt ti Yi I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

30-111•-139 

C/sj 

Comente on Report of Special study Orou~ llSASAB 

R/D 2. 0 NO'J 

TlllU1 P/P s. Kullbe.ck/jth/60321 

1. The Report entitled "The Potentialities ot COMINl' tar Strategic iarniq 

(Report ot Special Study- Group, JtiA. Soientitio Adrlaary Board)" dated 26 Oct 53, 

ha.a been oare1\tl.ly atudied and the tollO'lri.Dg aml.7a1s 1 eo1111ents, and propoaed 

aotiona are baaed prillllrily on the reaearoh and dnalopmnt and item 3, Elect.Tonic 

Dnelop11911ta ot the Special Intell.1gence, partions of the Repci.rt. 

2. We agree\ in the •in with the t'i.DdiDp and concluaions of the Board. It 

ia conaidered that present R.&D aetivitiea and di~iaion of efiort are oonsis1.ent 

with the reoommend.atiom of the repal"t, and that under existing personnel and bmget 

liaitations increas.ed etfort in the direction ot any one or the reeoaaendationa oan 

be made ~ at the cost or another or ~ existing actirttiea. It is not 

reooaanded that ourrent activities be aurtailed. 

3. Aa recognized bJ'" the Bae.rd the major obstacle to an expansion ot the scope 

or the Rid> etrort is OBI ot peraonnel. An increase in research and deYeloJ119nt 

work done by contract u not. a oomplete solution. The extent or research and 

deTelopment which can be done etficientl1 by outside contract is definitely 

limited ~ the site ot the NS! researoh and dnelopment organisation which 11U8t 

supervise, eva.luate, asaeas the requirements, and do the rrelimtrary research in 

order that the onrall program ot internal and external research and development 

etf'art accomplish its 111•-1.on. The Ottice ot Research and °"elopment with its 

present personnel oannot etficient:Qr administer research and dnelopnent by 

contract exceeding $13 Id.Ilion per year exelua1Te ot personnel, tranl and 

purchase tu.ala. 

4. The mj or detailed \em,phaais 1n the Report is in the field of intercept 

equi,PMnta, •thcid8, and teolmiqu••• Contractual studies in the fields ot noise 

communioationa ani a 8UZ"Y97 bJr ocetract or the erlating situation in the field or 

VHl/TJW/slf1 are al~ umerwe,y. Reoomendatiom haTe been DB.de to FR<D and HlCD 

baa forwarded to P/P an iDdioation of requirement. to initiate active field 

inYeatiptiona in Vfff /UHF/sHF intercept. Contract negotiations are being undertaken tar engineering models of equipment. However, 

expanded aotirlties in this tield u indicated by the Repart are needed. 

The following tentative program shows the scope of increased research and 

development activity which would be required to fulfill the minimwa requirements ot the early nrn!ng mission. It is emphasized t.he.t this :rrogram is not 

a one or two year attair. '(;hereas some results would develop early, the entire 

\_'·'If':. 
~ is ~ .,._l'doul techn1on1 Mttioul:v,. ~ mmv 1'0\'S1 t«Shrdqmtt, 

... m would 119qu1re ~ the order or tt98 to ten J'M1'G t'br ·~ OtUPletion. 

~~-- an sbCMl m teroe or ~ ier ..,... hee ~ can bo 

translated into omtiaect te:rma at the ate ot ~,(X)O pe eol.ent.Ut. tl..ser no td.r~a oan tm entire labor ~ be •t 1:f' eontlraot. It is neoeam-y 

to retain a ocmpetent etatt at 8 tor pl&m1'lf;:, WUal ~ R880l"Ch a.'ld dn~loinent, am tor emtrnct oontrol. 

lntefcapt biT!PW MR 

tw P.mdllli1ea 

11Emd1Pm1t 

a. 61CJ11. blUM• 

(1) Dlteas1n,Sng nof.aa laveJ.B 

in tho Aunil zo. 

(2) Detend.ne 1t ~ oan be _,.. ~ the 1nveree ntu.-

embDurgb e!'teot" ('ftda 18 now being~ on a mall 

en"ort bas!a and v. pro1:ta1a4 brDr. l~) 

b. Wneti9B liSIM lmQJ'Elit 

(l) Atpllettt1on ~ !Pto t.hf 

I 1,.m~, and 

(2) lbtAnsion ot Dr to inGltde 

all f'raq1anoiea ot ~ to• 

o. --t ot In_.,pt *KIP· 

(l) Iteae1wr requi:rwmmta 

2 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

301-18~ . I ] ' _,,_,_'"'.;, '"~40.....-_._ .. 

,".) 

,-?. Io 
FIIEM:>.~ 

101 C/8 

StlBJECTt ~ OD ~ of Speo1al ... °"'11> ot BllJ 

THRUc P/P 

FRC::M 1 'R/D m. TE a 2 0 ~u \ .., ,_ OCJIMEft oo. l 

8.IDllba*/,'tb/60321 (Con\'4) ... 

tM); RtflriRllOD 

Scd.ont1t1o 

3p ft:mDlmr iw-1 ~ 

d. ht!pf.191 gt tff[ J emp!p!lrtra "I 

(1) Pt'OYide ~ J.n e.11 

appUeable trequena; 1'8Jl89• 

e. !J./ 2 

(l) Mod1f)' or d.Wlop 1'eqe1Tet:re 

2 t. llB1.:ftli W.JF!d.\T ~ EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(1) J. ft1dT ot the appli•MltV 

ot "cU..,.,.ntT JMeJJt.1.on• at 

9/mf/SHP 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

I• Jul"tl9P1E Plnl:eJam\t 

(1) Interia daNloiaezrt to wt. 

Joint M1litary Clbal'&oteriatioa 

(2) tong ranae dfmlq:aent ot an 

autanat!o Oi! ~t1e 

antenna~ qstm 

h. ftl~!!6ifmma 

(l) Pi• man ~ ot operating in 

the fteld (l-2 JllOfttilie per ma) 

6 

' 

' 

131iilo~,~ ~.,, ~-"t: ~.,.-"',· c~~",t" ... ~.,... !\' .... ':..~~ r-..'"k'{..;;,_<"\.· lrliN.lt,, ·~ 

~ ~. ":; , ,) :J'-''€ ,>· ,,~.' ,,,. ,h-'1~ -~~-o . ~ 

',' 3 ••• > 

.J 

G 

/0 

30:11~ .. ,...,,_.,,·~---· -
FILE r10. 30-11l.e-l39 ll.'EJBCTi 

'1'0 I C/S FJQ.t I 

THRU: P/P 

~ on ~ ot Bpeclal Stud; G1:oup ot &&B 

R/D DlT!h 2 0 NOV 53 CCM!Eft m, l 

s.Mlleel;/j~ (Contf4) 

TSP.~ 

(1) It is believed that t:lw engineers would be required in 

maintaining the neoessm.7 

11e!eon vitJ:i aerrioe• beedqlal'ten un1 ta and performing on ti.lie spot studies in 

the t:l.eld unite. It is bailieTed that tvo L:leJl could be kept 

OD naa.r]3' CJont.im1ous trawl 4u\7 

at the field nations. 'lb .... malning tbne would requ.tJte travel 

neoaassr.r t.o COOl'dinate eeniae 

headquarter attrdra. 

j.~ .. ~~ 

(1) Oontraot to _,,.die the aepeote 

ot the problat 

(2) Ccutraotion et ~nt tC.Z. pa .. ·...... ·.· !"arming e.utarnatiol_JmaWh!ng .. / . 

k. Brifl.:'nt:.°' ~--

(l) I.ooal atu.iy ot t.he pt"Oblan 

(2) Dnelopaent otll!!Jqtd.p.. 

ment :tor YHJ'~pplicat:tcne 

tor t1:led tstationa 

(3) -I _ _____.r "'/WP 

a 

So1euW'1o 

RHJltllaK PeNonr.\el ~ . 

9 

YEO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

11 

' . . ~·· , 'r· . . -~-' e.':.>~.·~'\t.~,.< '.~·'?.(~~~:le.; ~ 

4 ·, ·'' 3011~ -~.:-;.--:-.]---_;_---,(,~_;_---=--·-2··· --.. ··-~ 

'{ Io 
:<' 11.E no. )O-Flle-J.39 SUBJr..CT 2 C<nlents on Report of Special stuitr croup of N&S&B 

TC: C/S F101: R/D lll\TJ:~: 2 O NOV 5.3 CQ·:;rJirr ~J.>. l 

THRU: P/P s.Kul.lbe.ck/jth/60321 (Cont•d) 

Task Dg!<p1ption 

(1) Study of requirements 

(2) Drnelo}.1llent ot I~rinental 

Model 

(3) Dew.loμJent of Engineering 

Model, 5 Service Test Modols 

Iw?.4¥ fAuipuent 

a. 

oa 

Igm:pytd tis iguiment. Mom ~W ~ 

Thia could, i.'l conjunction with D/F 

nndr--1 nrovide an 1:nd.1oa t:ton of the mov~~ Crl" a ta.Bk force, or ~ 

cate a shift in personnel 'Whieh 

vdUJ.d be o. tip.oft. For develo]nmt 

of statistical techniques of analysis. 

Local study and develop--~nt. E.Valuation Of C"Ul'reilt techniqUBG end i."lVOstigntion of' ~ tochniquaa. 

Will p"Ovide i..':'!lladiate indication of' 

sudden change in amount of traf'f'ic 

handled "1ich might serve ns tip.off'. 

looal devolop-nent and mplementri.tion. 

d.~LWffeWr 

5 

tt"o~ 3ECRETHS} 

Scientific Personnel .Requirement 

1B~ 

10 

6 

1

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

s 

l 

19 

30118~ 

s 10 
REF ID: 

FIIE rm. JO-File•lJ9 

TOI C/.3 

SUBJ.lXT 1 Coaenta on Repal"t of s~tal Study Qroup or NSA.SAB 

FROf4a R/D DA1'E1 'Q NO\/ 53 COlllEta' NO. 1 

TBRth r/P 

I11k &(esgt.l,gj;~gn 

Local daveloppant and oontract guidance. 

Contra.ct tor dnalos-nt of engineering and serYioe udela, 

•• Reuvy 91 u;mt.1 RUhld tM 

eguirmgt hf tel•\m mntar 

U@ntitip\iRlh ttl«\m IQii\R: •nt Wl*AQ&tip, w 1uu1~ 

ply •siaiwnt Uutir1.i1a• 

Local study and development. 

e,g. Iraprcwed demodullltars, 

diYertlit7 combining units, etc, 

a. N@1xtiml RtA2t"&r• 

Short running-time, wide•b&nd 

graphic recorder for first attack 

on new aystems or wid• b&nd 

inte111pnce channel t7J>9. 

6 

(continued) 

s. Kullbaok/ jth/6032.l 

Sc1entitio Peraonnel Requirement 

in •u.,rAAr•/.nv 

1, 

11 

2 

10 

----··71:: -. \."'i""'l'. ~- --3:-------{-----.301.18:; 

(~ /() 
FILE NO. 30.Pile•l39 

TOt C/S 

SUBJJia?a Conmente on Repart or Speoial Stuc11' Group ot NSASAB 

THRU1 P/P 

FRCM1 R/D D.ATlU 2 \J NO\i Sl COJIUElJT NO. l 

d. ;jt.udy or Apwlication of it+gwt;q 

P&aomvs1 

•• 

To routine i.!orse intercept including 

preliminary Jl'lodel work by adaptation 

Of OOJDmeroial devices. 

f. 9Ja·line Gra!Jbd.c t;epgrdg1 

Non-photographic dn'ioe rarlland 

collection or other intercePt-"alta 

on pr"aduction basis. 

Includes time :sta?ldard1 tim integrator, carreot1on e.nd aallbration systet·1. Alao, read-out 

system tor playbe.ck. 

Research, design, develDpment, 

contract and processing 

b. ~Um!l Amlnia 

(continued) 

s.lullbaclr/Jth/60321 

Soientillc Personnel Requirement 

~n •n=rwo/wr 

; \)' 

J 

10 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

12 

8 

4 

.30tiS:.: 
- REF ID:Ji0cF?~3ECRET 

FIIB NO. ~ile-1.39 

T01 C/S 

SUBJF.CT: CcG:ments on Report of Sf;ecial study Group of USASA.B 

FROMs R/D .M'.J.'1'~-2 0 NOV ~rl'r Ii:>. 1 

THRU: P/P s.Kullbaak/jt.b/60321 {Cont f d) 

c. 11 &SAAMUC· 

d. V'dl" Smtr Yark 

~fl fmh5tiOJl 

To meet inoree.sed demmde tor mcdel 

production. 

Scd.entin.o Personnel Heqtdrement 

aa map:mnJmr 

4 

4 

s. On page 13, ~a 1 and 4 and 1.~ !flPG!ldb: VI, pagea 4 M4 6 or the 

Report, the Board at.Nsues tho ne~d. ror rei::earch in T/A to 1:1rrove graphic 

present.a.ti.on and to nplo1"'9 new methcds ot anaJ.Tds and high speed machines. The 

question ot th9 presentation ot T/A f1ndinga 11 a atatiatioel. one and 1e now being 

considered by H. EdmundDOn and W. Jones of the !SthfEle.tioal Be881lrch D1viaion. An 

investigat.ton or new methoda of ~s and machine appl!oabillty to T/A 18 being 

undertaken ey Miss V. L. Daill Nll1 D. Creeoy of the Mathematioal Reaee.rch Division. 

'ls this study devalopa, additio!ial personnel will lJ& added o.s neoeeaa.r,-. It this 

effort ie to continue and 8Xp.1.nd without a decrease in the effort on the Ruaaian 

probl.Eln, the Mathematical Reaee.rch Division v.U1 need three additioml people et t.~e OS-i.l/l2/l.3 l.8'ftl. On rage 16, ~ 2, the ReIX>rt indicates a need ror 

a.,"1 increase in the programing etrort for high .speed ocnputen. The Repo:rt 

effort. 

reooromends 

Experienae 

getting outside 

1ndice.te• 

help 

that 

as well 

autaido 

a.a 

help 

incr-easi.'1g 

on progr&."11:'.'ing 

tho int..el"'Dal 

in general 

~ 

~'ll be 

of vor.1 little help to NSA. It 1• J'4'0PONd that the Matbematiaal Reeeerch Division 

add a Section vhoee pri;;moy tunction will be to do ~ aeee.roh for exietinc 

and propoeed hi~ IJ*'d oanputers. There are f'our members ot the Mathematical 

Research llirlsion :presently ~rfo:ming thl.e f\m.ctio.'1 'Who vU1 be lost to the 

Agency during the nert tvelve months because or their reascigmuent 1n the Mlli:tary 

Service. 'l'hie new Section should be headed by a cs-i.; with ti.ft others at the 

GS-9/ll/l2 lewl. On ~gee 21 end 22 the Report &tat.es: "There 1a need tor bnoic 

research on the theoey of OOl'llatmioation 1ntel.ligenoe •••• •. MD is &\al.re or the 

need for research in this tield ot the theory of oamrun.ioationa bat bas at present 

no adequately trained personnel to perforr..:: this research. Attaupts to recruit 

suitable personnel have bean unsuccessful to date. 

6. At present th& Mathematical Research Division is condllOting a contract 

prograrn with un1wrsities end individtal corumltants. We e.re in agre«nont vith 

TOP SECRET ----------~30118:: 

s 3 

c6. 

b 

/0 
FILE UO. 30-File-l.39 

'1'01 c/s 

TI11U: P"/f' 

- REF ID:Ai5'G1t;l~~ECRE'"T 'i'6f tfi6iG'i - ~'ClJi·.m INFQ~li\TlCJ;I 

SUBJSCTs CCF..r.'.lents on Repcrt ot 3pec1al Stmy Grotq) or I&\SAB 

FRC.M: R/D DA.TE2 20 NOV 53 Ctl-1M::NT NO. 1 

S.Rul.l~ck/jth/60321 (Conttd) 

the Report that the internal peraon.""lel tstruoture or the Mathematical Reeearob 

Diviaion should be i.~. To this end a moditioation or the preeent structure 

will be propoead v.ith a view to increaehg the nu:nber of billet.a above the Gs.J.l 

lcrrel and decreasing the nunber below QS..11 in keeping tdth the ruJport, "'1icb on 

J'.8..gfl 23 ate.tea "the auccess ot the Netional Security Agenay R&D activitiaa needed 

to keep pace dth the CC!-HN! requirauents will depend -very largel;p' on the qualltu 

of resetirch and developnent personnel 'Which oan be engaged in the ettort". 

7. The rooanmamation• ot t,~ Beard for increased rese.e.rch i.."l naths:latics and 

stnt1etica f'or aprlication to ~sis and traffic anslysis as reviewed in the 

preceedini~ paragraphs will require about tiftoon addi tioMl peor.J.e at the level or 

GB-ll &nd above. By the transrer or eight people who a.re doing prrominantJ.y 

ffiOD rather than research wol1t f'ran NSA-343 to PROD am by changing aawnl b1J.lets 

which ere nov bolov the GB-11 18'101 to higber lsvel, the actual incroaee can be 

held down to tour new billets. 

8. Continuous efforts are bci."lg made in line w1 th the ~nts 1n the Report 

on page 16 parag:re..Jil 3, to i'ollow and monitor outside activities either ll'UJ'.!'°rted 

by- NSt,. or being GllUTied on b.7 others. The Anazytio Ecp.dp!letlt Divieion ia \i!Olidng 

on tw approaches in order to aolve the CC?·'Dl'l' problsa, nemely1 

a. General pu:l:TOse computers and anrJ.yt1c equiynent lihich Cl".n he used on 

all problems to some extent. ~e present program in this area is ~ a ~ or the external pn>gram and is oonaidered adeqUJ.te. 

b. srecial purpose ana1yt1c equip:nents constructed out or large be.sic 

bu.UdL1c blocks using oeriDl lllnd para1.lel oirouitry. An expansion of thia actirl.ty 

to a rate na reoommended by the Report would ~ awroximatel1' tllent7 engineers. 

It is questionable "1ether the ~ ot acti'Vity in (b) beoauae or 1te cloee wl'king 

relationship vi.th PROD personnel oe.n be carried on by outside contract t.o arq largG 

extent. 

9. In order to improve the ei'ti~ or aqu1pnent, incree.se the operntional 

speedc, reduce the ?:Jfl.intenanoe required on all equ1pnent, and provide m.eintenanae 

personnel tor oontinued opernt1on, twnty additional people are needed. It is 

recam:iendoo that serious oonsiderntion be zj.ven to the raasibility of contracti..'lg 

for thia activity. 

10. Our present e.ngiMering reoenrch progrart includes a trlBll locel eftort to 

develop general purpose l!IYJ8l1 logioal. blocks for uee in the n.pid construction ot 

IOPSECRET 

9 

b 

!O 
REF 

FIIE NO. 30-Flle-lJ9 SmJIJ;CT: Canments on Hnport or ~'peeie.l ;.,'tooy Group of !lSASAIJ 

2 0 \lOV 53 

ro: c/s 

THRUs Pfr 

FR~: U/D IYiTE: Ctl'1'E'.1r NO. 1 

s.Kullbnck/Jth/60321 (Cont'd) 

ai:ecial purpose oquiμ:tEmt and to determine what devices can be used ror this purpose 

vit.h autticiont econan;y rind reliability to permit construct.ion or large equipnent. 

To achine a •tiahctor;y group of units to meet thia m"'d by the end of FI 55 the 

Engine"J?'ing ResMrch D:l.vision wuld 1'9quire t\10 additional peoJ;il.e looa11y end 

«i.oo,CXX> for contra.eta. 

ll. The aboYe anal1'sie 8how cl.8erl.7 that an exi:anaion of the acope or the 

research end develqnent program to OOPJ adequately with the requ1reJ*1t8 of tho 

early warning problem is al.moat totally depe?Jdent on acient.1.tio porsom:el-the 

retention ot current personnel and the hiring or a quantity ct nev peJ"Sonnal. By 

read.Juat.mente in tho present organization and rro~ a minor Bllount of ettort con 

be 1'9dinoted to\erd the aolution or this problem. TOO present R/D at.aft can 

handle appt'OJdmately a 2,,C inol'eaae in 5. ta oontrnct:lne prop&m ~- a redirect '_on 

or loce.l ettort. This 1.no:-eese is not or effective conaequenoe in conaidemtion 

or the magnitude of the OYerall problan. and uould bring undesirable pressure to 

bear on the imlividual aeientietrs. Bolution of tho rroblee, tborei"ore, ia 

conaidered to be pr:lmarilr oentet'ed in the aolution or the penonnel problem. 

trader preennt raetrictiona, JfSA oanot ocnpate for the serri.cea or young 

scientitic gradiates. It tbia overall probls ia of su.ttioient u:rgenay then 

lll6nnS muat 'be tound \thereby 'ffSt\ oe.n etteotively ecnpete vitb induLtt17. S:hn1l •rly, 

it is of atreme importenoe t.hat NSA. retain ite senior 11Cientist1 tor guidanoe of 

t.he expalldinr program. Means 1llU8t be touJJd tor ocapeting with 1DdU8t17 1n tel'!"..s 

ot aalaries, wot'fd.ng conditions and Job benefits. It is not oonaiderod to be the 

purpoee of tb1a paper to aet forth a. det.ailed anal.7e1s er reOCX111Sndat:!ons pertaird.ng 

to the pereonnel probla. SUch an analy-ais vil1 be prepared 11' the aittation is 

oomddored eruf':f1cient~ pressing to w.n-ant the undertaking ot the special measures 

vhioh 'WOUld be required. 'l'he alternatives to increasing the 10081 aoientitic &ta.ff 

are either (a) the subeidi•t1on or llfter&l industrj&]. :reaesrch organisations by 

essentially open.end contracts in a manner aj.!"J.la.r to the recent ERA arre.ngament 

or (b) the eeta.bl.islll'!!ent of a captive corpor~~tion si."".!ilnr to the procedure 

followed by the Atcmic Energy Camission. Both of tbeae apn-oaohoa would be 

extreme~ e:r·ensive and of a low degree or ei"foctivemse in corn~son to e:xpe.ndj.ng 

the locn1 ot~f.f' nnd subsequent 0xt.ension of a rer,ular contract program. 

S. IU!..IJY•,CK (Acting) 

Aaeistant Direotor 

Reaean:h and Developaent 

TOP SECR_E_--~--..........-----3011J~~= 10 

3 

I c 

6 

(0 
'l'OP Wftil • ftte!B 

P/P 

R/D 

R/D Ccmn«nts on ISA.SAH Recommendations 

As requested. 1D your ornce Memorandum o:r 30 Dae 53, th• folloviD8 CC1111eDta 

are submitted: 

I . Bo caamat. 

II. MD ia attemptiDg, vi th the help o:r PROD, to ini tie.te a program or 

iD"Veatigaticm a1 Md at producing DOW teclm1quea or at exped1 t1Dg present mat.hocia 

iD traffic analy81s. 

III. llo further COIJID'IDt. 

t' 

I. R&D ha8 retained an eminent cOIUNltult for advice about propaaatioD mattera. 

II. B&D has made available on a full time basis a high level engineer to assist 

C<IC OD various 'tec!m1cal matters• 

III. a. Bo turtAer co•a•aent o 

b. Jlo comment. 

c. llo coamn,t. 

d. Bo :further camnent.. 

•• Bo comment • 

f. ·Bo comment. 

IV. a. Bo cament. 

b. Bo :rurtllor C01UH«Qt. 

c. Bo f'urt.bar ao11••t. 

V. a. ID the R&I> comment t.he "Ord "tba" before "field" 8bould be menpt to 

~ "~1•"· 
E03.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-::36/50 USC 3605 

c. So far u 1• Jmova DO such cmplete atudy has been mada in the past. Al~ t.be value of such a study u a very long tem program 1e intui ti "V9l7 

clear, t.he great 41wra1t7 of intercept cm the part of the varioua produciDg 

8Dd. conauming orpnisatiallll ia such u t.o ake the establialaeDt of relative 

scale ot interest neceuary tor aucb a ·~ extreme.ly clifticult. 

cl. (l) Deftlopnente are now under '1118.l' vitb the iDcorporation of the 

8ervicee to Met this very need. 

(2) Bo furt.ber Col!!MQt. 

(3) .• lo furt.ber cQDl!leDt. 

(4) Bo .further camnmt. 

(5) Bo f'urtber CQlllDeJlt. 

(6) It 1e Rld>~s belief' that this subject is more appropriate tor 

PROD caJmeDt than R&D. 

(7) IJ!le baa1c coament cm this recarpnende.ticm ahoul.cl com tram PROD .. 

(6) llo turt.her ccamnent. 

(9) llo further camnent. 

VI • llo caaaant. 

VII. a. So f'urther cOlllllMmt. 

b. B&D baa under way a WAE 8Dd. cOD11ult1.Ds pl'011'81l which in effect 1a 

C&l"1'1in8 out t.his reccmneDdation. 

c, cl, e, f, g. lo comaaamt. 

/a/ Joma J. CourtMy, Jr. 

JOBll J. COURL111H, JR. 

Lt. Col.. , USAF 

Deputy Chier 

Office of Research a. Developnent 

~= P/P Office Memo dtd. 30 Dec 53, SubJ: 'feP S'asilE QOl!JRQI., JrOf, ~ 17b 

"CGllllMlDta on Rpt of Spec Study Op I BSA COPY 3 OF * l.S- c 

Sclellti:fic AAVl.801'7 ~ 2SECRE'T •\-:: .+ P~ ~ ,"', _ . ...._ 
REF ID:A!ft-6907 
P/P 

PERS 

7 Jan 54 

Coamumta on Report of Special Study Group, ISA Scientific A4v1ao17 Board. 

l. Comments OD GElfERAL RD!~TIOBS ~ 

III. Fa)"Chometric testing program is be-ing eet-up (see para VII4 below). 

CoutiDual stud,y ia made 0£ reasons and cauaea foz separation of' civilian emplo199a 

in order to hold separations to the mininmm. 'l'b.ree military services must be encouraged by BSA in their e.f:f'orte to develop and maintain a high percentage ot 

repeaters in COMDT assignments. 

2. CCl!lllellta OD SPEX:IFIC ~OMMEBDt\TIO?fS. 

Illa. See paragraphs VII d and f' below. 

lllf'. Pre-survey classification pl'Ogr&m now UDdeI"WQ' in Otticea of 

Analyaia 8Dd. Exploitation are establ.iahing career ladders for both civilian and. 

military peraQDD81. Program has been prepe.recl to accanpliab TMB ProJect Bo. 3. 

(to develop uniform Job descriptions applicable tel members of tbe crn>tologic 

asenciea.) These two program.a are expected to provide needed career fields. 

VIIa. Prev1oua attempts to secure aupergradea bave ao far produced ODly 

one GB-18. Budget for FY-55 includes funds ror taurteen additicmal eupergraclea. 

VIIc. Thie has been clone. CIVPERS bas received from AIJ llat of i teu 

vhich cen be used by recruiters. The 1 tema are mu.ch more infol'!ll&ti ve tban anything 

which has previously 'beeD available. 

VIId. Requeat bu been submitted to 100 for contract vit.b Pa7chol.og1cal 

Re&MrCh Aaaociates to embark on paychametric teatina program. Results vill uot 

onlJ improve recruitment and pl.a.cement but alao dflvelop J&l'd8ticka with which 

performance can be evaluated. 

VIIe. 1!ie aame m1gbt be said :tor cryptogra~ and crypt.NJalyaia aa veil .. 

Current promotion policies (inaugurated subsequent to thia special et~) are 

vorld.Dg nicely. SeJ.ariea are perpetually under observation a1Qd are contiWouaq 

adJuated in line with poaition cla8a1t1cat1on. 

VIIt. Bee paragraph Ill! above. 

I 

'!eP tBeRft ecmmm. 110 .ptm -r '" 

PAGE COPY 3 t 

°" OF . .!.5-- I =1-t~op PAGB 

/•/ Duncan Sinclair 

OOICAR SillCIAIR 

Colonel, USA m;f C1m!f v1aicm