### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 14, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. THOM AS L. GOU GE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty No. S45,987 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge

No. E2003-02492-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Janu ary 10, 2005

The de fenda nt, Thomas L . Goug e, appe als from the tria l court' s revoc ation of probat i o n requiring a six ty -da y j ai l s entence. The order of re vocation provide d that the def endant r eside in a w ork rele ase f acility for a n unspecifie d amount of time afte r ser vice of six ty day s and that his probationary
re le a se wa s c on dit ion e d upo n his re fr a ini ng fr om takin g re sid e nc e " wi th a ny fe ma le to w ho m he is not married." The order of re vocation is aff irmed; the sentenc e, howe ver, is modified by deleting the provision prohibiting the sha ring of the re sidence with an unmarried woman.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which J . C UR WO OD W I TT , J R . and, A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

David Crocke tt, Eliz abethton, Te nnessee (at trial) , and S teve McEwen, Mountain City , Tenne ssee (on appe al), for

the appe llant, Thomas L . Goug e.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge n e r a l an d

R e po rt e r; El iza

be th B . M arn e y , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; H. Gre eley

Wells, J r., District Attorney Gene ral; and Kent Chitwood, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

On Ap ri l 3, 2003 , the de fe nd a nt en te re d a ple a of g uil t to drivi ng un de r the inf lue nc e , f ir st offe nse. The tr ial court imposed a sentenc e of e leven months, twenty -nine da y s. After a four -day jail term, the def

endant wa s relea sed on probation for the re mainder of his sentence

. Approxim ately

thirty -fiv e d ay s la

ter , a violation of probation warra nt was issued alleg ing tha t the def endant ha d driven on two oc casions af ter his license d had bee n revoke d. At the re vocation he aring, the de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d th a t he ha d v iol a te d th e te rm s o f h is p ro ba tio n b y op e ratin g his vehicle. T he def

endant, a manag er of

Service L oan and T ax in Kin gs p o rt , testified that he wa s eng ag ed to be mar

ried, had one child by his f iance e, and wa s expecting a nother c hild. He explainedT he defens e br i ef i ndi cat es t hat t he defendan t ha s s i nce mar r i ed hi s f i anc ee. 1

-2- that since his conviction his fianc ee, w ith whom he resided, had s erve d as hi s driver on all but two

occa sions: first, when he drove to and from a probation meeting in Blountville and, sec ond, when he drove to a meeting with a probation office r in E liz abethton. He asserted that his fiance e, who wa s the on ly oth e r e mpl oy e e a t hi s o ff ic e , w a s w or

kin g a t that ti me a ndthat he c ho se to d ri ve be c a us e he wa s "a fra id of g etting in trouble " f or missing the a

ppointment. The defenda nt claimed that since the issuance of the probation violation wa rr an t , either his fia ncee provided tra nsportation or he utiliz ed taxi cab servic es. The de fenda nt ex p re ssed particular c oncern that if he we re ja iled, he

wo uldbe dis c ha

rg e d f ro m hi s e mpl oy me nt a ndhis fi a nc e e wo uldno t ma rry him

. 1

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court specifica lly found that the testimony

of the defe ndant, who had a

prior DUI conviction, was not "cre dible at all." Observing that the def endant had pled g uiltyto violating p ro bation, the trial court revoke d probation on the ba lance of the sentenc e, pointed out that the def endant c ould rec eive "two for one cre dit" if he beca me a trusty , and determined that the defe ndant was immediately elig ible for f

urloug hs or work r elea se if g rante d by the work r elea se commission. W hen the defe ndant soug ht a rec onsideration of the revoc ation order at a late r hea

ring , the tri al court found that bec ause the defe ndant had a previous convic tion for driving under the influence , he knew or should ha ve known that he wa s not supposed to drive af ter the revoc ation of his lice nse. The trial court also expressed conce rn about the defe ndant' s eig ht-y ear share d-re sidence rela tionship wit h a fianc ee, an illeg itimate child in the house, and a nother c hild "on th e way ." A fter f

urther a rg ument, the trial court modified its order to provide f or six ty day s to be

serve d in jail subject to "g ood time," which would translate to fifteen day s cre dit. Another condition of re lease was that the defe ndant make arr ang ement so that he "is not living with some unmarried woman with her

babies." The trial c ourt direc ted that af ter his term in jail, the defe ndant would be

re qu ir e d to re po rt to th e B ro wn An ne x wor k r e le a se fa c ili ty

fo r " a da y or tw o" un til a

se pa rate residenc e wa s established.

I n this appeal of right, the defe ndant arg ues t hat t he trial court err ed by ordering a

six ty -day jail term and by

requiring him to reside in the B rown Anne x as a c ondition of probation until he

m a d e arr a n g e m e n t s t o l i v e ap ar tf r o mh i s f i a n c e e o r " a n y f e m a l e t o w h o m h e i s n o tm arr i e d

. " In response , the state submits that the six ty -day jail term is appropriate. I t conce des, howe ver, tha t the trial court e rre d by

requiring the def

endant to make living ar

rang ements apa

rt from his fianc ee.

I n mis de me a no r se nte nc ing , th e c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to pr ov ide the de fe nd a nt w ith a re a so na ble op po rtun ity

to b e he ard a s to the le ng th a ndma nn e r o f the se nte nc e . T he se nte nc e mus t be sp e c if ic and consistent with the purpose s of the Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302( a), (b). Not g reater than 75 perc ent of the sentenc e should be fixed for servic e by a misdemea nor off

ender ; however , a DUI offe nder ma y

be re quired to ser ve the f ull one hundred pe rce nt of his s en t en ce. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302( d); Palmer v. State, 902 S.W.2d 391, 393-9 4 (Tenn. 1995). I n determining the perc entag e of the sentenc e, the c ourt must consider enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors as we ll as the leg islative purposes and principles rela ted to sentenc ing. T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-302(d)

.-3-

Upon servic e of t h e required per centa g e, the a dminist rative a g ency g overning the reha bilitative prog rams dete rmines which a mong the lawful progr ams available is appropria te. The trial court r etains the authority to place the defe ndant on proba tion e ither immediately or af ter a term of periodic or continuous conf inement. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-302( e)

. The leg islature has

encour ag ed courts to consider public or private ag encie s for probation supervision prior to direc ting supervision by

the Depa

rtment of Corre ction. T en n

. Code Ann. § 40-35- 302(f) . The statutory

sc he me is de sig ne d to pr ov ide the tr ia l c ou rt wi th c on tin uin g jurisd ic tio n in the mis de me a no r c a se and a w ide latitude of fle x ibil i t y

. The misdemea nant, unlike the fe lon, is not entit led to the presumption of a minimum sentenc e. State v. Creasy , 885 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. C ri m

. App. 19 94 ). Ap pe lla te re vie w of mis de me a no r s e nte nc ing is d e no vo wi th a pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss. See State v. Troutman, 979 S.W. 2 d 2 7 1 (Tenn. 1998) . I f the trial c ourt' s findings of fac t are ad eq u atelysupported by

the re cord, this court may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if it would have pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. S tate v. F letcher , 805 S.W .2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. Our g ener al law pr ovides that a trial court may revoke a sentenc e of probation upon finding that the def

endant ha s violated the conditi ons of hi s relea se. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311( e). A tr ia l ju dg e ' s d e c isi on to r e vo ke a de fe nd a nt' s re le a se sh ou ld not be dis tur be d unle ss the re is a n a

bu se of dis c re tio n. Sta te v. Ha

rkins , 8 11 S.W. 2d79 , 8 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 1)

. I n o rd e r t o p re va il u nd e r the abu se of discre tion standard, the defe ndant m ust establish that the record contains "no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge that a violation of the c onditions . . . occurre d." I d.
The trial judg e is not require d to find that a violation of the terms of probation has occur red bey ond a re asonable doubt. Stamps v. S tate, 614 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). Rather , the exist ence of a violation of probation need only be supported by

a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-311(e ).

I n this inst ance , the def

endant a cknowledg es that he violate d the t erms of his probation by dr ivi ng on a re vo ke d lic e ns e on tw o se pa rate oc c a sio ns

. I n the app e a l, the de fe nd a nt m e re ly a sse rt s that the term is oner ous g iven the fa cts o f t h e case. Althoug h the re cord e stablishes that the defe ndant was g ainfully employ ed and provided a residenc e and support for his f iance e and c hild, he did , infa c t, h a ve a

pr ior dr ivi ng un de r the inf

lue nc e of fe ns e

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ob se rv e d that so me of his te sti mon y

la c ke d c a nd or . T he re c or d s up po rt s the fa c t that th e de fe nd a nt, wh ile no t ne c e ssa ri ly

un truth fu l, wa s no t e nti re ly fo rthc omi ng in his re sp on se s to qu e sti on ing . U nd e r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, i tc a n n o tb e s a i d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ab u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y r e v o k i n g p r o b a t i o n a n d i m p o s i n g a s i x t yday term of c onfinement.

O n t h e o t h e r

h a n d , t h e t e r m s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o b a t i o n f

o l l o w i n g t h e s e r v i c e o f

s i x t y d a ys must be modified. I n State v. Mathis, 114 S.W .3d 915, 918 (Tenn. 2003), our supreme court rule d that conditions of probation must rea sonably rela te to t h e purpose of

the sentenc e and must ser ve either " the g oal of re habilitation or t h e go al o f deter renc e." I n that case , the trial court was not permitted to requir e the de fenda nt to legitimate his daug hter a s a condition of probation on a conviction of rec kless ag g ravated assault. I d. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 40-35- 303(d)( 9) p er m i t s t ri al c o u rt s t o i m p o s e o n l y "co n d i t i o n s re as o n ab l y

re l at ed t o t h e p u rp o s e o f t h e o ff en d er 's-4-

sentenc e and not undul y re s t ri ct i o n of the off ender ' s liberty ." A s acknow ledg ed by the state, the condition requiring separ ate livi ng arr ang ements from a fiancee is unrela ted t o the offense of driving under the influence and, ther efor e, must be stricke n.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment is modified t o el iminate any restric tion as to alternative living

arr ang ements. Otherw ise, the order of revoc ation and the imposit ion of the six ty -day jail term are aff irmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DI NG JUDGE