Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-2279| April 2, 2020 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Stacy Yuron Hart

Carlisle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana 

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stacy Yuron Hart,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

April 2, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PC-2279

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Circuit Court

The Honorable David D. Kiely, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

82C01-1603-PC-1458

Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PC-2279| April 2, 2020 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] In 2014, Stacy Yuron Hart was convicted of Level 3 felony methamphetamine 

dealing, Level 6 felony narcotic-drug possession, and Class A misdemeanor 

paraphernalia possession and found to be a habitual offender, for which he was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five years of incarceration. We affirmed 

Hart’s convictions on direct appeal, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied 

transfer. 

[2] In 2018, Hart filed his amended petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), 

alleging freestanding claims, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, err by 

the Court of Appeals of Indiana, newly discovered evidence regarding the 

habitual offender enhancement, and that the Public Defender’s Office and 

Court of Appeals of Indiana failed to advise him of the rules and perils of selfrepresentation on appeal. The post-conviction court denied his petition in full 

without a hearing. Hart contends that the post-conviction court erred by 

denying him a hearing and PCR. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The underlying facts leading to Hart’s appeal of the denial of his PCR petition 

are as follows: 

From July 15–19, 2014, C.D., a fourteen-year-old runaway, lived 

with Hart at various locations in Evansville. During this time, 

Hart gave someone methamphetamine in exchange for the use of 

a motel room and sold methamphetamine from his car and at 
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multiple residences. On July 19, police picked up C.D. C.D. 

tested positive for methamphetamine, Xanax, marijuana, and 

synthetic marijuana. Evansville Police Detective Tony Mayhew 

interviewed C.D. regarding her prior whereabouts.

Based on what C.D. told him, Detective Mayhew obtained a 

search warrant for Hart’s vehicle. On July 24, police stopped 

Hart’s vehicle based on Detective Mayhew’s warrant. The officer 

found a digital scale, a cigarette case containing baggie corners 

and tweezers, a glass pipe with residue, and small baggies with 

what he believed were drugs. Testing of the substances in the 

baggies revealed 7.16 grams of methamphetamine, two tablets 

of methadone, three tablets of hydrocodone, and five tablets 

of Tramadol.

The State charged Hart with Level 3 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, 

Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Level 6 

felony possession of a legend drug. It alleged Hart was an 

habitual offender. A jury found Hart guilty of all charges except 

Level 6 felony possession of a legend drug, on which the trial 

court directed a verdict. The jury concluded Hart was an habitual 

offender based on his prior convictions of Class D felony failure 

to return to lawful detention in 2002 and Class C felony 

possession of a controlled substance in 2005.

The trial court entered convictions and sentenced Hart to 

concurrent sentences of fifteen years for Level 3 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, two and a half years for Level 6 felony 

possession of a narcotic, and one year for Class A misdemeanor 

possession of paraphernalia. Based on his adjudication as an 

habitual offender, the trial court enhanced Hart's sentence by 

twenty years for an aggregate sentence of thirty-five years.
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Hart v. State, No. 82A01-1411-CR-472, 2015 WL 6954942, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2015) (footnote omitted), trans. denied. On appeal, Hart argued that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress certain evidence, object 

to his habitual offender adjudication, and object to his enhanced sentence, with

which we disagreed and affirmed his convictions. Id. Hart sought transfer, 

which was denied by the Indiana Supreme Court. Hart v. State, 46 N.E.3d 446 

(Ind. 2016). 

[4] On July 6, 2018, Hart filed an amended PCR petition, alleging freestanding 

claims, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, error by the Court of Appeals 

of Indiana, newly discovered evidence regarding the habitual-offender 

enhancement, and that the Public Defender’s Office and Court of Appeals of 

Indiana failed to advise him of the rules and perils of self-representation on 

appeal. On August 21, 2019, the post-conviction court denied Hart’s petition 

without a hearing.

Discussion and Decision

[5] The standard of review for appeals from the denial of PCR is well-settled. 

Petitioners who have exhausted the direct-appeal process may challenge the 

correctness of their convictions and sentences by filing a post-conviction 

petition. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002). Petitioner bears the 

burden of establishing grounds for PCR by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 

By appealing from a negative judgment, a petitioner faces a rigorous standard of 

review. Wesley v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ind. 2003). Denial of PCR will 
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be affirmed unless, “the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably 

to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Id. We do not 

defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusion but do accept its factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. The postconviction process does not provide a petitioner with a “super-appeal” but, 

rather, a “narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, 

challenges which must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction 

rules.” Rouster v. State, 705 N.E.2d 999, 1003 (Ind. 1999). Issues that were 

known and available but not raised on direct appeal are waived, and issues 

raised but decided adversely are res judicata. Id. 

I. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

[6] Hart raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, all

premised on the notion that Scott Barnhart represented him on direct appeal. 

The record, however, is clear that Hart ultimately chose to proceed pro se and 

file his own brief on direct appeal after Barnhart withdrew. Because Hart chose 

to represent himself on direct appeal, he is precluded from claiming ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel. See Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063, 1067 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1990) (“If the defendant chooses to proceed pro se, he should realize 

he cannot later claim inadequate representation.”), cert. denied.

II. Freestanding Claims 

[7] For the first time in his PCR petition, Hart contends that (1) the trial court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the charging informations lacked 
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probable cause, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the search 

warrant because it was unsupported by probable cause, (3) the trial court was 

not neutral, and (4) the State’s witness was under duress.

1 Because these 

freestanding claims were available but not raised on direct appeal, they are 

waived for post-conviction review. Rouster, 705 N.E.2d at 1003. 

III. Appellate Court Error

[8] Hart contends that we made multiple erroneous decisions in Hart v. State, No. 

82A01-1411-CR-472, 2015 WL 6954942, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (footnote 

omitted), trans. denied, which was his direct appeal. While our decisions are 

subject to review, post-conviction proceedings are not the proper avenue. The 

proper avenue is to seek transfer with the Indiana Supreme Court, which Hart 

attempted to do following our decision in his direct appeal, which was denied.

IV. Failure to Advise 

[9] Hart contends that both the Public Defender’s Office and the Court of Appeals 

of Indiana failed to inform him about the basic rules and perils of proceeding 

pro se on direct appeal. Hart, however, has not directed our attention to—nor do 

we know of any—legal precedent requiring such advisements by either the 

1

In his brief, however, Hart seems to allege these claims under ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

Regardless, this approach still does not get Hart where he needs to go. As previously discussed above, Hart 

may not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he chose to proceed pro se in his direct 

appeal. 
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Public Defender’s Office or us. Hart has failed to establish that his denial of 

PCR relief in this regard was erroneous. 

V. Habitual Offender Enhancement 

[10] Hart contends that the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson v. State, 87 

N.E.3d 471 (Ind. 2017), which was decided after his direct appeal, invalidates 

his habitual offender enhancement. In Johnson, the Court concluded that 

pursuant to Indiana Code subsection 35-50-2-8(d), each prior-unrelated felony 

conviction used to enhance the sentence of an underlying felony conviction 

must meet the ten-year requirement.2 Hart’s Level 3 felony conviction, 

however, was enhanced pursuant to Indiana Code subsection 35-50-2-8(b) and 

therefore is not affected by Johnson. Hart has failed to establish that the postconviction court erred in denying him relief in this regard. 

VI. Denial of Evidentiary Hearing

[11] Hart contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying him an 

evidentiary hearing regarding his PCR petition. Given that there were no 

motions for summary disposition in this matter, it appears that the postconviction court denied Hart relief without a hearing pursuant to Indiana PostConviction Rule 1, section 4(f). Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1, section 4(f) 

2 We also note that in Johnson, the Court was considering a subsequent-amended version of Indiana Code 

section 35-50-2-8 than the version in effect during Hart’s case. 
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provides, in part, that “[i]f the pleadings conclusively show that petitioner is 

entitled to no relief, the court may deny the petition without further 

proceedings.” 

When a court disposes of a petition under subsection f, we 

essentially review the lower court’s decision as we would a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court errs in 

disposing of a petition in this manner unless the pleadings 

conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief. If the 

petition alleges only errors of law, then the court may determine 

without a hearing whether the petitioner is entitled to relief on 

those questions. However, if the facts pled raise an issue of 

possible merit, then the petition should not be disposed of under 

section 4(f). This is true even though the petitioner has only a 

remote chance of establishing his claim. 

Allen v. State, 791 N.E.2d 748, 752–53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (cleaned up), trans. 

denied. Specifically, Hart argues that he should have been afforded a hearing in 

order to examine his former trial counsel to establish that counsel was 

ineffective in failing to allege a possible defense. 

[12] Hart’s contention fails for two reasons. First, the pleadings conclusively showed 

that Hart was entitled to no relief as a matter of law. Second, even if Hart had 

been allowed to examine his trial counsel, he was precluded from arguing 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel because it was previously alleged on direct 

appeal. See Rouster, 705 N.E.2d at 1003 (noting that issues that were raised on 

direct appeal but decided adversely are res judicata). Hart has failed to establish 

that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief without a hearing. 
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[13] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.