S5EfD:A6101 

USCIB: 29.2/4 

SEeRili'P 

MEMORANDUM FOR 'lllE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

Release of AFSAM.-7 to NATO Nations. 

(a) USCIB 2J1 • 2/3 dated 21 May 19 54. 

(b) USCIB 29.2/l dated 3 May 1954. 

27 May 1954 

1. Reference (a) included a notification of a joint meeting of 

USCIB and USCSB to be held at 1430, 3 June 1954, for the purpose of considering the implications of the enclosure with reference (b). 

2. The enclosure hereto is circulated for information as indicated 

in paragraph 4 of the enclosure with reference (a). 

Enclosure 

NSA Serial 00159-S dtd 27 May 1954. 

USCIB: 29 .2/4 

SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-21-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
SEM!»i-{l61046 e - bttl!I I • 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, O. C. Seriel1 00159...S 

27 Mew 54 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE BOARD .AND THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES 

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD 

SUBJECT: Implications of a Policy Which Would Permit Cryptographic 

Aid to Friendly Foreign Governments for their National 

Purposes 

The following statement repeats and expands the remarks made 

on the subject by the Director, National Security Agency at the l03:rcl 

USCIB meeting. 

1. Once the u. S. embarks on a program which permits aupply 

of cryptographic material or equipment to one friendly foreign 

government it will be impossible to prevent extension of the program 

to all other friendly foreign governments. 

a. The u. s. cannot take the position of showing preferential 

treatment in the cryptographic supply business by providing one friendly 

nation with cryptographic assistance and denying it to another. 

Politically, any attempt to do this would be disastrous. 

b. There is no way in which provision of such aid to one 

country could be kept a lasting secret from others. Requests for 

aid from Brazil, say, favorably considered, would lead to similar 

requests from Chile, and there would be no way of denying the same 

aid to Chile. 

c. The overlapping network of military and political 

al1iances and assistance pacts in which the u. s. participates results 

in putting the U. S. in the position of being an expected source of 

aid to its allies in this field as well as in others. 

d. In summary, it could be stated that our cryptographic 

information and material is kept in a Pandora's Box which once 

opened can never be closed. 

2. It follows that just as there can be no refusal of a request 

of one nation after approval of another's, there can be no discrimination in the type of aid provided. If, for example, a request for 

assistance from one country is met by the provision of machine "X", 

a similar request from another country cannot be filled by anything 

inferior to machine "X". 

SECRET 
• 

~ SE6R:B'f Serjal: 00159-S 

3. In essence, once a start is made, it would become the 

policy of the U. s. to supply all comers, and there would be many. 

a. How much would this amount to? It is difficult to 

estimate but e fairly good guess can be'made. Assuming our friends 

to be all of the non-Communist countries there are about 55 nations, 

excluding NATO and the British Comr.1.onwealth, who might be expected to 

come to us for aid. If their requests could be filled by as little 

as an.~verage of 100 machines, 5500 would be needed, and to this 

we would have to add: at least a minimum of 2000 for NATO nations, bey~d 

those for international military use al.ready planned ~or. Accordingly, at least 1$00 machines would be required. Since cipher machines· 

these days cost a minimum of $2000 each, some 15 million dollars 

would be involved, and this is just the initial cost. 

b. What additional costs are there? Spare parts, rotors 

and associated material. In providing u. S. cryptoaids NSA estimates 

a spare parts usage factor of 30% of the initial cost, with a 10% 

annual expenditure thereafter. For a five year period, then, an 

additional 12 million dollars would be involved. Rotors and other 

associated material would amount to another 10 million dollars. 

c. What about maintenance and other support? In the cryptographic supply business support does not stop with provision of an 

amount of material. Cipher machines are delicate instruments and 

require a considerable amount of maintenance. There would be two 

ways of supplying this: one would require the use of U. s. inaintenance personnel, Service or otherwise, for the purpose of maintaining 

the material; the other way would be the training of maintenance 

personnel of other nations by the U. s. Either of these will be 

costly. Other support is needed also. Nations using the equipment 

would have to be furnished current procedures, doctrine and, when 

necessary, instructions on modifications. Then it would have to be 

seen to that operRtor training, as well as maintenance training, is 

properly carried out. 

d. What do t.hese two types of training amount to? It would 

be necessary to establish schools to which nations could send cadres 

ot maintenance men and operators for training. These men would then 

return to their countries and train others. If we compare this 

requirement to the method which we currently employ in the U. s. we 

can estimate that each nation would have to send about six individuals, 

with the necessary qualifications, for a maintenance training course 

which, if conducted in English, would take a minimum of eight weeks. 

If other languages have to be used the course would be longer and 

infinitely more complicated •. Operator training would take less time, 

probably two weeks. 

2 

SECRET 
• 

Serial: 00159-8 

e. What are the legal implicattons? This is difficult 

to even predict. In some of our crypto-equipments there are patented 

components. In each case of issue, proper legal agreements would 

have to be entered into. 

f. What would be the effect on COMINT? Under such a program 

as this the effect is obvious. For all practical purposes COMINT 

from the non-Communist countries would cease. 

g. What further political implications are there? This is 

a case of something which once done cannot be undone. Suppose that 

a country now classed as a non-Communist, friendly nation changes 

"color11 after material aid has been supplied. We cannot get the 

equipment back, and we will have been placed in a position of having 

helped an enemy or potential enemy. 

4. In summation, once the bars are let down. the u. s. becomes 

the supplier of COMSEC to virtually the whole.world. It is a multimillion-dollar supply business and, like any other multi-milliondollar supply business, all the complexities of logistics, legal 

proceedings and financial arrangements add up to infinitely more than 

the dollars-and-cents involved. 

5. NSA is in no position to undertake such a burden and carry 

out its primary mission. If such a program were authorized, NSA has 

neither the plant, personnel, facilities, or space to even consider 

the task. -

6. If the decision is made that the U. s. is to become the 

world-wide supplier for cryptographic materials, there are probably 

several workable methods of implementing the decision. One such 

method might be the establishment of a separate government corporation, with NSA participating on the "board of directors". This 

corporation would be responsible for all negotiations and the supply 

of all such material. 

.l:U"l..ll••.a. J. CANINE 

Lieutenant eral., US Army 

Director 

3 

SECRET