United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-1554

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Russell Dean Moore

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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Submitted: March 9, 2020

 Filed: March 24, 2020

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

The district court1 sentenced Russell Dean Moore to 360 months’ 

imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to four federal offenses stemming from his 

1

The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western 

District of Missouri.
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actions during a high-speed chase involving a stolen vehicle. Moore appeals,

arguing his 360-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

On April 6, 2016, officers with the Boone County, Missouri Sheriff’s 

Department were dispatched to a residence in Columbia, Missouri, to investigate a 

report of a stolen vehicle. The resident told the officers that her Jeep had been stolen 

and that it contained multiple firearms and ammunition. Then, in the early morning 

hours of April 7, 2016, another officer who had been notified about the stolen vehicle

observed it parked outside a truck stop in Columbia. As the officer approached the 

vehicle on foot, Moore’s accomplice, Victoria Buol, suddenly sat up from the 

passenger seat, immediately moved to the driver’s seat, and sped off. The officer 

pursued the vehicle, which stopped briefly in the parking lot of the truck stop for

Moore to enter the passenger side. The vehicle again sped off, and the officer 

pursued while calling for additional units to assist.

During the chase, which spilled over into neighboring Callaway County, 

Moore and Buol shot at police officers, drove into oncoming traffic, sped at upwards 

of 100 miles per hour, fired at the passenger cab of a semi-truck with the driver 

inside, and shot at a gasoline tanker truck. Moore and Buol eventually ran out of 

gas and came to a stop, at which time multiple officers surrounded the vehicle and 

ordered Moore and Buol to exit the vehicle. Buol complied and was taken into 

custody, but Moore refused, claiming there was a bomb in the vehicle. Buol denied 

this, and Moore eventually exited the vehicle and also was taken into custody. In a 

post-Miranda interview, Moore admitted to having stolen the vehicle and to being 

primarily responsible for the chase and resulting mayhem. 

Moore was indicted on six counts related to this chase, and he ultimately 

pleaded guilty to four of them: two counts for destruction of a motor vehicle, each 

of which carried a twenty-year statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 33; one 

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, which carried a ten-year statutory 

maximum, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2); and one count of possession of a 

stolen firearm, which also carried a ten-year statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. 
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§§ 922(j), 924(a)(2). The district court calculated a criminal history category of IV 

and a total offense level of 31, resulting in an advisory sentencing guidelines range 

of 151 to 188 months. At sentencing, the Government requested an upward variance 

to 360 months based on, inter alia, the nature of Moore’s offenses and his 

demonstrated lack of remorse. The district court granted this request and varied 

upward, sentencing Moore to concurrent 240-month sentences on each of the 

destruction-of-a-motor-vehicle counts set to run consecutive to concurrent 120-

month sentences on each of the firearm-related counts.

Moore appeals, arguing only that this 360-month sentence is substantively 

unreasonable in light of his mental health and substance abuse issues. We review 

the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Watters, 947 F.3d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 2020). A sentencing court abuses its 

discretion when it: (1) fails to consider a relevant factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an 

improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in 

weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment. United States v. Feemster, 

572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). In reviewing the sentence under this 

“deferential” standard, we “take into account the totality of the circumstances, 

including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. In considering 

the reasonableness of the extent of a variance, we “must give due deference to the 

district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of 

the variance.” Id. at 461-62. 

Here, before imposing the sentence, the district court recognized its obligation 

under § 3553 “to impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary 

to comply with the law.” It “recognize[d] the mental health issues” that Moore 

argued militated in favor of a lesser sentence and noted they “play[] a role” but found 

this factor was outweighed by Moore’s “depraved” behavior as well as his post-plea 

statements and conduct through which he demonstrated no remorse for his actions. 

The district court concluded the upward variance of roughly double the top end of 

the guidelines range was warranted in order to promote respect for the law, protect 
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law enforcement and the public, and deter this sort of “depraved and irresponsible 

behavior.” 

 We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in so concluding. See, 

e.g., United States v. Hess, 742 F. App’x 149, 150-51 (8th Cir. 2018) (affirming an 

upward variance to 360 months from the guidelines range of 151 to 188 months 

based on “the brutality and depravity” of the conduct at issue as well as other § 3553 

factors, notwithstanding “mitigating aspects” such as defendant’s health and 

substance abuse issues); see also United States v. Bacon, 848 F.3d 1150, 1151-53 

(8th Cir. 2017) (affirming an upward variance of twice the upper limit of the 

guidelines range imposed after the district court considered the § 3553 factors). 

“The district court’s choice to assign relatively greater weight to the nature and 

circumstances of the offense” and to Moore’s unrepentant attitude than to his 

“mitigating personal characteristics” was “well within the wide latitude given to 

individual district court judges in weighing relevant factors.” See United States v. 

Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 774 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted). 

Therefore, we affirm. 

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