USCIB: 9 • 6/1 

12 October 1954 

'f0P 6Ei0Rift 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Planning for Counter-Clandestine CCMINT Coverage in 

Time of Emergency. 

1. The enclosure is circulated for consideration at a suitable 

time. Present intention is to place it on the Agenda of USCIBEC f'or 

recommendations at a future meeting. 

2. The Director, NSA'has offered the following comments in 

connection with a discussion of an advance draft of the enclosure: 

"In the (enclosure), the matter of planning for counterclandestine GOMINT coverage in time of emergency is emphasized. 

It should be noted that the Director would expect the USCIB 

study to have greater utility if its scope were enlarged to 

include consideration of the responsibilities and arrangements 

which have been established, or may be required, for collection, 

production, and use of (a) counter-clandestine COMINT and (b) 

collateral materials. Within this broader scope, USCIB probably 

should concentrate on plans and operations which must be 

developed as coordinated inter-organizational efforts (as distinct from plans and operations which might be developed by a 

single organization pursuant to its unique responsibilities). 

"If, at an early stage of the USCIB study, it could be 

ascertained that the members share a common interpretation of 

existing and required responsibilities pertaining to this subject, the subsequent stages of the study probably would be 

simplified. It would seem advantageous for USCIB to form an ad 

hoc group to consider thts matter of responsibilities, and arry 

related matters which USCIB may refer to the group. 11 

3. THIS DOCUMENT AND ITS ENCLOSURE CONTAIN COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

Enclosure 

Proposal for CounterClandestine CCMINT Planning 

ptain, • Navy 

cutive Secretary, USCIB 

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USCIB: 9. 6/1 eclassifi ed and approved for release by NSA on O 1-23-2015 pursuant 

o E.O. 13526 

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G ~66171 

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Subject: Planning for Counter-Clandestine COMINT Coverage in 

Time of Emergency. 

References: (a) USCIB 8/2 of 28 January 1948 (Item 1, SECT III, 

49th USCICC) • 

(b) USCIB 8/5 of 25 February 1948 (Item 1, SECT III, 

5oth USCICC). 

(c) USCIB 8/9 of 28 April 1948 (Item 1, SECT III, 

52nd USCICC) • 

(d) USCIB 8/14 of 8 October 1948 (Item 2, SECT III, 

.34th USCIB) • 

(e) USCIB 8/16 of 16 November 1948 (Item 6, SECT II, 

.35th USCIB). 

(f) USCIB 8/17 of .30 November ~948. 

(g) USCIB 8/18 of 10 December 1948 (Item 4, SECT II, 

.36th USCIB). 

(h) USCIB 8/28 of 7 February 1951. 

(i) USCIB 8/29 of 9 February 1951. 

(j) USCIB 8/31 of 21 February 1951. 

(k) USCIB 8/34 of 9 March 1951 (Item 4, 6lst USCIB). 

(1) USCIB 3/99 of 8 April 1953, item (d) (TRI 53/4 

Final of 25 March 1953). 

1. Reference (a) records a decision as follows: 

"DECISION: 

USCICC agreed that: 

I 

1) USCIB clearly has the responsibility for the exploitation of domestic telecommunications and related 

activities in the collection of foreign comnrunication 

intelligence. This responsibility is not confined to 

the exploitation of clandestine telecommunications and 

related activities. 

2) Since the responsibility for the surveillance of 

domestic telecommunications and related activities in 

the protection of U.S. internal security is already 

assigned to the Federal Communications Commission and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, no further action 

on the part of USCIB appears necessary respecting this 

field of monitoring activity, and this aspect of the 

field will not be considered further. 11 

Enclosure with USCIB 9.6/1 dtd 12 Oct 1954. 

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Planning for Counter-Clandestine COMINT Coverage in 

Time of Emergency. 

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2. The above recorded decision did not fully dispose of this 

matter as can be readily seen by a glance through the reference. 

A brief resume of subsequent action follows in the succeeding paragraphs. 

3. On 25 February 1948 (see reference (b) for details) the 

Coordinator reported that the FBI (not then, a member of the Board) 

could not assume· the responsibilities implicit in acceptance of the 

above quoted decision~ The Coordinator indicated that the Navy· was 

going ahead with plans for its own Reserve Listening Service. 

Subsequent discussion of the problem indicated that participation by 

the Army's Military Amateur Radio Service (MARS) might require 

legislation. It was agreed that the problem· should be kept under 

consideration. 

4. The next record of interest in connection with this problem 

appears in reference (c) wherein the .questions of Air Force partici-

:tion and the Went to which civilians mieht he 1Jsed jn the 

e decision reached did not go beyond an arrangement to exchange and 

evaluate information. 

5. Action on the problem of what to do about clandestine transmissions remained virtually suspended for several months when a 

proposal for a joint FCC-FBI intercept activity to monitor and exploit 

clandestine transmissions in the U.S. was considered by the Board 

(see reference (d)). The Board was somewhat concerned over certain 

implications of such a proposal and agreed to have its Department of 

State Member (Mr.·Armstrong) explore the problem with the Chairman, 

FCC. This was done and Mr. Armstrong reported to USCIB at its/35th 

Meeting (see reference (e)) that FCC seemed to have the best of 

intentions and was quite willing to cooperate with USCIB. Itwas 

brought out that the operation was to be confined to work for the FBI 

on transmissions originating Within the U.S. After considerable 

discussion USCIB agreed to have its Chairman consult the Director, FBI 

regardiilg the Bureau's needs. This was done and the report circulated 

under reference (f) was considered by the Board on 10 December 1948 

(see reference (g)). The report, in effect, stated that the FBI's 

purpose was to explore the possibilities of having its needs in this 

field met by some Government agency already equipped to do the job 

with little or no increase in funds. USCIB 1 s decision was to the 

effect that the CO~UNT activities under the cognizance of USCIB should 

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Subject: Planning for Counter-Clandestine CCMINT Coverage in 

Time of Emergency. 

make an effort to meet the Bureau's needs and that in the event such 

an effort proved to be unsuccessful the Director, FBI should arrange 

with USCIB for the coordination of any outside activity established to 

meet his needs. A letter to this effect was sent to the Director, FBI 

who indicated in his response a desire to cooperate with USCIB. 

6. The next time subject question came up it was in the fonn of 

questions from the Department of State Member with regard to the policy 

to be followed in a forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 

American Republics wherein it was anticipated that the question of 

measures to eliminate clandestine telecomnrunications stations might 

come up. The specific questions asked were (see reference (h)): 

111. Whether the US Government should take initiative at 

the forthcoming meeting toward the adoption of a resolution 

which would serve as a basis for establishment of a program 

similar to that undertaken during World War II? 

112. Whether such a resolution should be (a) directed 

specifically toward the identification and control of 

clandestine transmissions or (b) framed so as to cover 

the general field of subversive and clandestine activity 

in such manner as to permit the eventual development of a 

mutual monitoring program, if desired, without committing 

this Government to any immed.ia~e undertaking of this sort? 

"3· Whether the US Government should avoid multilateral 

action in this matter, but should approach selected Latin 

American Governments on a unilateral basis? 

114. Whether the requirements and facilities of this 

Government are now such that cooperation with Latin 

American Governments in this matter should be avoided?" 

7. In commenting on the above questions the Coordinator submitted the long report enclosed with reference (i). This is worth 

reading in full. It reviewed the background of the problem and, in 

effect, recommended. against making any commitment at the forthcoming 

conference. It was suggested, however, that an ad hoc committee be 

appointed to make a thorough study of the entire problem. The report 

of this committee (reference (j)) recommended against any U.S. 

initiative in raising the question of a cooperative anti-clandestine 

monitoring program in Latin America and against any immediate commitment by the U.S. if the question should be otherwise raised. This view 

was approved. by USCIB on 9 March 1951 (see reference (k)) and the matter 

was dropped from the Agenda. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Planning for Counter-Clandestine.COMINT Coverage in 

Time of Emergency. 

8. USCIB again gave this problem.serious consideration at the ...__ ____________ .....,,... _ __.I At that time USCIB undertook to 

"ensure that adequate counter-clandestine COMINT resources are devoted 

to the counter-clandestine COMINT effort (in wartime), including in 

particular, resources for General Search" {see reference (1)). From 

the records available to this office it appears that reference (1) 

constitutes the last occasion of consideration by ~SCIB of specific 

problems involving coverage of clandestine transmissions. 

9. Since all of the above tra.i.~spired, USCIB has been reorganized 

and strengthened and the National Security Agency has been firmly 

established. Many of the factors that have seriously complicated 

previous consideration of subject problem have been eliminated. It 

appears, therefore, that it might now be appropriate for USCIB to again 

consider the status of planning in this important field. 

10. In order to provide adequate coverage of the transmissions of 

clandestine telecommunication stations an extensive, highly developed 

and highly specialized intercept organization is required. It should 

be possible to develop and train such an organization (and perhaps even 

put it to good use) in peacetime. If this is possible it should be 

done. Such an organization would require at a minimum the following 

elements: 

a. Numerous widely scattered intercept positions and reliable 

people to man them. 

b. An intercept control group to coordinate and direct the 

effort of intercept stations. 

c. An analysis group to identify and process intercepted 

traffic. 

d. An extensive long-range D/F net to locate the general area 

of transmissions. 

e. A well dispersed short-range mobile D/F organization with 

equipment of high accuracy and mobility to narrow the area of location. 

f. RFP equipment and files. 

g. Arrangements for guidance from, and for getting the endproduct rapidly into, the hands of those who have the responsibility for 

translating counter-clandestine information into action. 

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Subject: Planning for Counter-Clandestine COMINT Coverage in 

Time of Emergency. 

11. It is recommended, therefore, that the Director, NSA in 

collaboration with the other members of USCIB as necessary undertake 

to prepare a general plan to insure that adequate COMINT resources 

will be available in time of war to cover the counter-clandestine 

COMINT field. 

tain, U. s. Navy """'lli~ti ve Secretary, USCIB 

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