.. --... 

USCIB: 29.5/6 

~~1417 

e - TM Mlllft elt/dlllli!B EHHil' y 

Al'Pnmm DOCt1m!NT CON rnNs 

Pt:JBHIORf> Ml\TERIAL 

19 January 1955 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

24 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

U.S. ...__~~~~~~~~~~---~~~~~~~---' 

(a) USCIB 29.5/2 of 7 October 1954. 

(b) USCIB 29.5/3 of 27 October 1954. 

(_c) USCIB '29. 5/5 of 15 November 1954. 

1 Re:r::ce <: ~ se~+,ing forth certain recommendations regarding I .. _ _. was considered by USCIBEC on 22 October 1954 

and with ce ain additiona recommendations forwarded by reference (b) to 

USCIB for final approval under the interregnum procedure. Reference (c) 

was the notification of USCIB approval of the action proposed in ref erences (a) and (b). 

' 2. In accordance with the references the Amry member has subnitted 

the enclosed plan for consideratioh prior to taking any further action. 

3. It is considered that vote sheet action on the enclosures would 

be helpful in arriving at a decision. Therefore, it is requested that 

the members indicate on the attached vote sheet their views with regard 

to the enclosures and return the vote sheets to this office by the close 

of business Monday, 31 January 1955. 

Enclosure 

A.C. of S. Serial 22262 

dtd 18 Jan 1955 

USCIB: 29.5/6 

Jdl'.Pmm!:D DOOUMEN t CON'!'AINS 

OOfiEh-Oim MATmIA11 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-18-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

TOP SECRET 
/iE;o 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

aL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DEP.AR'fMmT OF THE AHMY 

OFFICE OF THE .ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,>G..-2, .lNTEI.LIGENCE 

WASHINGTON 25, D~/ c.,· . . . . . 

G2-ASA JAN .18\ 1955 

'l'6P fmeftE'l' Emmt 22262 

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE SECR.m.'ARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Proposed (TS) ....____,---.~~-----~~~---~~---~------~~---~---' 

1. In accordance with the USCIBEC recommendations .set forth in USCIB 

29.5/3, 27 October 1954,/and as approved by- USCIB (USCIB 29.5/5, 15 Nov 

1954), it is Dodothat the present informal arrangements Which exist 

be+we,n variou OMINT units and U.S. military CCMINT activities in 

lare unsatis aOtory and that it is now desirable to. formalize these 

arrangements at a government-to-government level in the .:t'onn. or a third 

party agreement within the limit.ations prescribed in paragraphs 4\ and 5 

or Appendix P to the UKUSA Agreement. 

2. Ina memorandum from/the Chairman, USCIB, ror the Chairman LSIB 

(CIB 00049, 30 April 1953), subject, 11u.s. CCMINT Arrangements withr--===i 

units or/Personnel inl 111 LSlB was informed of t.}~e principles a~- cedures goveming U.S. COMINT arrangements withl bnits or personnel in 

I ~· and advised that Director, NSA, would consult with Director, GCHQ, 

on technical problems involved. The principles and procedures agreed\ upon 

were cont.ained in USCIB 13/331, 16 Apr~3· One feature ... or these arran· .. ge- ments was that all equipment issued to units was to be on a loan, except that equipment which had been issue up to that time · •. on other than a 

loan basis which was exempted from this requirement. In other respects 

the provision or assistance and limits or operational support were not to 

exceed the provisions or paragraphs 4 and 5 or Appendix P .UKUSA Agreement. 

Accordingly, it is felt that the proposed Third Party Agreement can be 

negotiated without LSIB approval provided that prior to implementation 

GCHQ is consulted on the technical problems involved, such as sterilization of. raw traffic. However, in view of previous notice to LSIB of 

the existing arrangements, it is considered advisable that.prior tonegotiation or the proposed agreement, D,;rector. NSA. inform GCHO in general 

tezms or the U.S. intention to effect s! 

and the extent or the U.S. assistance and support contemplated, 

3. Coordination between the Arary and NSA has resulted in the understanding that after the initial approach by General Hull tq has been effected, the technical guidance to be provided bi"""t ... h.-e-D"'"'i-r-ec....,t.-o-r-,___, 

Enclosure with USCIB '2!}.5/6 dtd 19 Jan 1955. 

'f'OP SECRET' Etm!ft 
G2-ASA 

SUBJECT: Proposed ('PS) 

NSA, as agreed by USCIBEC and approved by USCIB, will include the responsibility to determirle that the Agreement is: 

a. in consonance with the Terms of Reference, and 

b. appropriate for implementation. 

This understanding was based on the assumption that implementation of the 

Agreement, coordination of Service participation, and direct .conta.~ 

the provision of technical assistance, liaison and guidance t.o theL__J 

CCMINT Authority will be the responsibility of the Director, /NSA. 

4. In consonance with the above, the following papers/are/inclosed 

for consideration and approval by USCIB: 

a. Statement of broad ob.1ectives and general terms of U.S. position 

on U.S. collaboration with thel l 

General Hull in his a roach to 

c. Minimum Security Standards for theclassi;tication, dissemination, 

transmission and physical security of CCMINT. 

d. Suggested organiz.ation of theDCOMM effort. 

e. Terms of Reference for use by U.S. negotiating team. 

5 Incl 

1. Statement of Objectives 

and Terms 

2. Aide Memoire 

3. Minimum Scty Stan~ 

4. Suggested Orgn ofL_J 

COMINT Effort 

5. Terms of Reference 

2 

(SIGNED) 

ROBERT A •. SCHOW 

Major General, GS 

Deputy.G-2 (Fgn Opns) 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'TOP SECRE'f' EIDER 
General Bull will attempt to obtsin approval in prin~iple from authoritative 

representatives ot the I lf'or a formal and stable mD amvr 

.Agreeoen"t. 'rhe u.s position will be sta.ted along the following I.in.es: 

a. Relations between the U.S. and the various 

have been quite eatisf'actory and, it is L------------------' 

bel.ieved, mutually beneficial to all parties concerned. 

b. With the new situation arisi!)g from the I ... ____ .,.--__,. __ __,. __ __. 

the u.s. believes it des.t.rabl.e that th0 several arrqements and uuderstaudings which 

have d.ev~loped a1rer the past several ;rears with each of' thel .... __ ..... P~ activities 

be plaeed on a stable a.DI. authorita~ive basis. 

Co In the intereats of max1111Udl benefit to both countries, it iB requested 

that th~ la.esigoa.te a. a:i.:ngl.e C<llllfl' authority Ts."ith whom effective 

arrangementa and proc£duret1\can be developed. 

d. With a ?J11J.tual agreement on basic standards of security, the u.s. is 

prepared to .furnish certain equipment and intormation inP.1ud;l.ng advisora, to enable 

t.he establishment and maintenance of an efficient I ~OIUNT /service. 

e. '?he U.S. would expect to receive the product ot tb.~ ~OON'l! 

activities to satisfy its need.a for intelligence.-• In certain/aases where the U.So 

bad specific requirements ~01· inf~i.tion which could be satie:ti~ by the! .... ___ .... 

Cc.t4DT service, it would be expecte4 that f!Nery P-ttort! ~be made to provide the 

da.'ts.o 

f. These arrangements are s1Jpplementar1 to thoaJe concerning u.s. COMm'f 

,__ _____ __.lwhicb are easential to \the secur:tt7 o'f UoS• f'orces and the proVision 

or certaill immedia:te and high priority material •. Of'. u.s/ n.'J.tionaJ. interest. 

g. There will be no disclosure\ of thee-e al'rl).ngeme:ats or resul:ting 

agreements by the I I to an_y other pQ'f.y, axld o.J.l materi&.ls will. be 

excba.Dgecl only with 'the U.S .. 

h. The above pr:Lneiples ar~ re:rleeted in t.be A.i.de Melnoire for General. Hull 

and the term..n ot reterence for the negotiating ~eam. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET EIDER 
AIDE ME.'IDIRE 

ON 

UNITJ!D STATES -I !RELATIONS Irl THE FIEW OF 

COMMUIUCATIONS INTELLIGE."EE 

lo During the I ~ close cooperation and teamwork 

was developed between the communications iQ.tercept units ot thej land 

American t.filitary- Services 

----------.----.-------..-------- ...__ _____ __,I\ This spirit ot cooperation has .continued into.th1 .... __ ___. 

,__ ______ .... land serV"es to keep both our•. nations alerted against the 

possibility ot tutlire acts ot aggression by pot~nt1al enemies. 

2o In the p"IJent period or relative calm, - have been Ible to i-evi.ew 

JDan1' ot our wartime \arrangements, including this cooperation in the field of 

Ccmnunicationa rnt.el.U.gence, wl th a view to improving such $'rangements .and 

ei"tecting economies whel"OVer possible. Since tho success ot the Conmunications 

Intelligence e.ttort is ot vital importance to. the future security ot both t.he 

United States and thel I ~ :improvements which can be made in 

our joirxt effort in this field should receive· •• the carehl. .attention /ot both 

3., The continuing success 0£ mv communications intelligence effort;, howwer, is predicated or based iri\a large part on keeping all lmowledge ot mvsuccess gained awq from the enEllJIT o Otherwise• •. tbe enomT; might take measures to 

change his codes or ciphers and c0mmunications security• procedures. Such measures 

coul.d result in the loss o.: cancellation ot gains which bad been achieved prior to 

initiation of these measures by the enav. Thesensitivit7 o£ the communications 

intelligence ettort and the necessity <tor the utmbst se<:uriiyr in all aspects of 

this ettort is therefore evident. The importance ot security- 1s such that the 

U.S. looks upon its ccmmunications intelligence e.t'tort a.a,: something which normalq 

must be kept strictly within its own national treillewo~ controlled by one central 

author:Lt7, to the exclusion of collaboration ev. w.tth triendq foreign govemmente, and as something which must be established,, • guicted, and operated separatel-1' 

from other or seneral intelligence activities~\ However,, in view or the unique and 

triendl.Jr :relations which edst between thel )and the u .. sD and taking 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SE€RET 
into account the historical. association and conman objectives of our two govern~ 

ments, I have been authorized to suggest a closer liaison between thQ and the 

U.S. in this important tield ot intelligence activity. In this respect the UoS• 

reco5nizes the valu.able contribution which the variouO COM:INT activities have 

ma.de to our com..."'lOn et.tort as the result •ot the L..-~~~~~~~~~~--

arrangements and understandings which have developed.over the past several yea.rs 

with each ot th~eD CX>MINT activities. In order to foster, develop, and promote this relationship atd thereb7 achieve the maximum possible benefits to both 

countries, it is suggested that collaboration in thEI! CO!U~T .fie.lei be established 

on an authoritative basie in the form ot an agre~nt which would set torth the 

extent of the collaboration and the technical detai,ls t.hereof'o To this end1 _the 

U.S. is prepared to furnish certain equipment, logtstic support, inf'ormation8 and 

advisors to bring about the establishment or an ettective,, integrate<}, and centrally 

controll~,_ __ ..... lcOMIHT serviceo 

4o It must be. emphasized that the United states is unwilling to invest its 

resources in separate agreements with 70ur individual i:4il:itary Services which 

would bind us to provide a pre-determined. amountUof assistance but would not 

guarantee a pro.f'itable\returno In retum the UoSo w.lul<l desire the product or 

tra.I ~I:i'l' activ~\ie• , in certain -r wllerr the u. s. has specific 

requirements tor information whi.ch could be satisfied by aLJcoMirlT service,, 

it wuld be expected that every effort w:>uld be made to provide the datao The 

matter o£ security,, as mentioned before,, is or paratnl)unt/ i.'1lport.ance; it would 

therefore be expected that mutual aareement on the 'basic standards of security 

necessa17 would be an\ integral part of the agreement. In addition, it would be 

expected that there be no disclosure or the arrangements or resulting agreements 

b7 thel ~o any\other part;y or government and that all materials 

and products will be exch&tged only With the U .. So It "is the intention ot the U.So 

that these proposed arrangements be su.pplementar.r/to any arrangements or agree111ents which now exist or which might be prol)Osed concerning the establishment or 

operation ot UoSo OOMI;iI'l' bases in:\._l _ __.land which are essential to t.he security 

ot UoSo j'orc:es and the provision ot\certain :tn,mediate and high priority material 

or UoSo national interesto If this pl'Qposa].i/is acceptable, the U .. s .. 1.s ::-::-epared 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

T0P SE€RET 
.. • 

to discuss the details and specific t.erms of the agreement which it is hoped can 

be achieved.. Discussion of these details would be handled, on the U.S. side, by 

rEipresentatives speaking for the organization which maintains the central control 

ot the entire US.S CXMI:JT et.fort. It would be expected that the• counterpart. 

representatives oF theD presumab4" the Minister of Defense, would also speak 

for thQgoverna"llent as a \whole or for the central authority within the/D 

government which is established or can be established to maintain overall control 

of th~ ~ML"fr\eftort. I would appreciate your consideration of this proposal 

and an indication of your approval to proceed with the subject in rnore detailed 

discussions between. personnel or theQovernment who will represent a central 

authority within the Oovernment and U.\S. personnel representing the U.So 

central authority in this field. 

5o I will leave -dth you for consideration two papers, one containing the 

minimum security standards for the bandli,ng ()f OOMINT materials, which.as I 

mentioned, must be an integral pa.rt ot<the agreement~ and the other cont-aining 

suggestions on what we believe would resU].t in the most effective and efficient 

organization o.r tha ~I~ et.fort. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

3 

T()P SECRET 
-. • 

!eP S:eaRBl -- MIND.((JM SECUllI'l'Y S'l'ANDAIU>S FOR THE CLASSIFICATION_. DISSE'UNA'l'IOtl, 

TRA!tS:-llSSION1 AW ?HYSICAL SF..CURITI OF COMINT 

lo COMir~T, as used herein, refers to all information derived from. the 

processing of trattic procured by listening to foreign communications, including 

voice transmissions, tor the purpose of producing intelligence. It includes 

raw tra.tfic, end-products, technical material, methods and techniques,, working 

docwnents, and other special material used in its production. It also includes 

intelligence report;.s and summaries based on COMINT unless the information is so 

generalized that it cannot be traced back to a particular it.ei11 of COMiffr or to 

00.UtJT in general. 

2o ~ch Government will designate a national authority to deal with all 

questions of COMIN't' security and to enforce these principles. 

J. Be.fore an individual in any capacity has access to CO~JII~, he must be 

screeined in p.ccordance with standards and procedures established by the na~ional 

autho1•ity aI¥i cleared. as being ot unquestioned loyalty. The screening must be 

as tllorough as possible and at least as thorough as that given to individuals 

having access to 'l'OP SI~CR.El' information of similar sensitivity. In addition 

to suc~h clearance, these individuals must be specifically nominated by the 

national authority to have access to 001.f!NT information. 

4a Prior to being given access to <XH.UNT, each individual will be indoctrinated tor CO:i!IN'r by a special warning on the sensitivity to compromises of 

OOMINT sources and will be required to sign a document drawing attention to his 

special responsibility tor sateguardi~ COMINT intormation and to the consequences provided if, either by intent or negligence, he allows CO~INT information 

or material to come to the notice of W1authorized persons.. It must be stressed 

that there is no time limit for protect.ing OO~I:fr information, in that the 

information must be safeguarded indetinitel.7. 

5o Distribution of COiUNT mst be based on the need-to-know principle, 

i.e., each item. ot COMINT information or material shall be made known only to 

those 00.MINT-imoctrina.ted individuals who require it in the performance or their 

duties. Control lists o£ individuals indoctrinated for COMI;.JT will be maintained 

by each governmento The number ot indoctrinated individuals will be ke?t to the 

D1inimum. consistent with essential intelligence and operational needs. 

TOP SE<JRET 
e T6PFSCEetrE2

Je • > 

6. All possible steps will be taken to prevent the risk of capture or 

interrogati.on of COMINT indoct.rinees by enemiea or potential ene.nies. ·In 

general:. no risks should. be taken by COMINT indoctrinees other than those 

necessary- tor the efficient performance of their duties. 

7. The greatest care must be taken not to betrq oo;UNr success by 

actions based on it. The source should on no account be needlessly risked. 

8. All COMINT i:esulting from this A.1reem.ent will be classitied as agreed 

between the OOiUN i.' aut.horities ot both nations and will be distributed only 

to those OOl.UNT-indoctrinated individuals who require it in the performance of 

their duties. 

a. The US will classify OOMIN'l' ma.t.e.L'"ials provided to the.O as 

SECRl!.'T or TO., SECRET,, according to content. 

b. The US will accept CO:.fL'llT materials trom the.D classified in 

accordance withD- US agreement onLJpplication of. paragraph 8,, above. 

9. The OOMINT au:t.horities or each nation will insure against revelation 

ot the source or C01W~'l' resulting ~rom this Agreement by caretull.y' controlled 

handling procedures tor\Wer'3' sheet. of paper containing results from, or disclosing the existence or~ this Agreement;. It deemed desirable, special codewords 

al.so will be used. 

10. The US and theDn use agreecl. exchange designators (code\10rds) to 

cover the following aspects ot COMiilr lia11SC>n under the terms or the Agreement: 

a. OOMLfl' materials\ (including results derived therefrom) provided b7 

the US to theD (regardless ot source) which can be integrated intoO COMII'lT 

products. 

b. ccmi~ mat;.erials (including results derived. therefrom) provided by 

the US to the Dl(hich\lllUst be g11ren special hand.Ung and which cannot be 

passed to other than D personnel\without prior. specific consent of th13 US. 

c. OOMINT materials\provided by the.Oto the US. (If theQrees 

to use special codewords aS\in paragraph 9, •.above,, such .codewords.may be used 

to cover, insofar as practicable1 \thes• aspects .of COM!NT liaisono) 

11,, It the DdE!sires to use sor11e\device or special.handling procedure for 

the protection ot the OO~!rfr source inst6ad •. ot co.dewords and does not want. indi-

... 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

T0P SE€RET 
... . 

REF ID:A61417 

eTOP SE€RE' 

TOP SEetl!I 

permissable to use the designator on the Cover sheet(s) onl.T tor each shipment 

of materialo In this event, the US must be assured that all such material will 

receive limited and controlled. handling and dist.ribution within t.UC?MI:fr 

. activit.70 

120 Documents containing OOMirlT intorma.tion mst be double-wrapped and 

addressed to a OOMINT-indoctrinated o£ticer by name, not by tunctiono The 

inner evelope will bear the appropriate security classi!icationo As a minimum 

security requirement, such docwnents must be sent by hand or otfiQer or by a 

secure courier serviceo There shall be a senior US COMINT advisor~ ..... __ __, 

who shall be a representative or the Director, !lational Security Agencyo 'l'his 

officer will be responsible tor all US COMil-lr liaison with the D 

a.. Documents from the US to ttiLJnu be addressed to a desi!JX18.ted 

Oco1UNT recipient and will be transmitted to such recipient through the US 

Liaison.Officer~ !\mentioned aboveo He will receive from theQecipient 

properq executed. r"ceipts\ tor all materials deliveredo 

bo\\Docum.ents trom\thOto the US will be addressed to .and. delivered 

to the US Liaison Officer i~._....,....__.~ He will recelpt tor all materials so received. 

1.3. If 00..U:NT material· is transmitted wi.t.hin \either nation by electrical 

means or by any p}\ysical means not completely secure, it must be encrypted in a 

secure cryptographic system reserved exclusively for this requirelllenta 

ao Elect.rical communications between the us and D cot.INT organizations 

will be effected through the\lJS Liaison Officer i~ land will be so arranged 

that it will not be possible to identify\su~h\ conmun$cati.ons •as• being b~t1'..-een the 

respect.ive COM.INT organizationso 

b. The US will establish aprivatecryptosystemf"or•direct comiUUllications bet wen t.he US Liaison 0£ficer ~\US ~~ Hborit.ies in 

Washingtono This system will be the exclu.sive Qh4nnel .for p~sing communications 

which must be handled in cmu:J'.l' channels only 0 \ .. 

Co Meseagss trom thOo:ulJT organtzation to tbe! US Liaison Otticer 

will be passed via channels specii'ically agreed u;xm\'between the us and thO 

140 The highest standard of pJ.vsical security must\\be •. •t>plled to the custodyot CO:.UNT by all persons authorized to receive ito rlo~llf, except when in 

transit under conditions prescribed herein, COIUNT mate.N.~f .and communications 

relating thereto must at all times be: EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

a. under the direct surveillance or a cmmn-indoctrinated ~erson 

responsible for 16heir saf'ekeeping. 

b. locked in a three-combination sate accessible onq to COMINTind.octrinated personnel, or 

c. stored in a locked ~ompartment which is under constant surveillance 

by an armed sent17 and which is accessible only to COMINT-indoctrinated personnel. 

150 CO~Ut"a documents 'tllllBt be destroy-ed. as soon as they have ceased to be ot 

useo This is part.icula.rq important tmder hazardous conditions. 

16. In order t.hatnecessar.r operational use can be maie ot certain agreed 

types of low-leve1.tactical COMINT (such as direction timer bearings and plain 

text. messages) on which imme4iate action must be taken in combat operations., 

the US orc==Jnational. authorities ~ 'permit the dissemination ot such COMINT 

at a classification not below CO'.'WIDE JTIAL, to •Ulindoctrinated. recipients who 

need to knowo 

17. In except.ional instances where it is essential ror immedia"t;e opera-t;ional 

purposes, information based on COML"fr ?118¥1 as specifically authorized by" the 

• appropriate National COMINT Authority,, be disse:nina.ted to unL"ldoctrinated individuals, provided the source is not disclosedo It possible,, names,, times, 

posi.tions,, and other data identical with t.hat from the original text must be 

omitted. or, if' the·retention or such an item is essential, must be caretull.T 

paraphrasedD Su.ch information must be passed b7 a. socure dispatch service,, b7 

a secure line, or in a cipher system approved by the rtational. COMINT Authority 

tor this 1'"8quirement. It must not be passed in clear by radio (including radiotelephone). 

lS. .Each nation will report inmediately to the other any compromise or 

possible compromise or COMINT materials produced or exchanged under the terms 

ot this ,,greement .. 

19. E'a.Ch nation tdll expand these standards into a set ot regulations 

adapted to local conditions. Copies of the COI-.UNT security regulations so 

developed will be exchanged through COML'n channels. 

TOP SEERET 
.i • 

f..PPENDIX II 

Sugeated 0JWm1zo.tio11 of the I .... - ..... ~OMIBT Ef'for! 

The suggestions which f'ollow on the organization of a .... l __ .... lcOMINT ettort 

are based on the premise that both COMDJ! and the associated COHme are directly 

related to and affect the national security and welfere 1 ~ Accordingly, 

policies, procedures, and operations in these 1.-wo fields Should be established 

and conducted in a manner to permit immediate responsivfeness to national 

requirements and objectives. It is highly desirable, th~f'ore, that the 

various departments, agencies. and services of the~ernment engaged 

in these activities be established under a central contJtol or authority so 

that each individual activity is part of the overa.U effort and so that the 

total ettort can be integrated into nn effective and efficient organization 

which can ma:f.ntain continuity of the effort in accordatl.ce with natione.l requirements and priorities. 

In accordance vitb the concept mentioned above, it is suggested that a 

framework be established to orsamze and oootroQCQml'l! and CQ4SBC 

activities along the following lines: 

a.. The Minister of Defense will control the overall COMID'.r, COMSEC 

effort and shall be the Executive Agent of the Gc>Ve~huient therefor. 

b. For the purpose of' :formula.ting top l.E!V'elpolicies and procedures 

in COMIN.r and COMSEC, provision should be me.de an.d a.•means established vhereby 

the national requirements can be reconciled with the' facilities and resources 

or the present and/or proposed cr;yptologic units. At the sEllTJt.'9 level COMSEC 

policies and procedures should be established to p~otect 1 .... __ .... I cOilll!lU?lications 

against the eff'orts of enenw- COHml' activities. ';l!his /objective could be 

achieved by the establishment of a :rJationa.l policy group with representation 

by the principal producers and consumers of C~ and the communication 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 services .. 

Co Immediately below the national policy level group, it is advisable 

to have an operating agency or service acting for the }tl.nieter of Defense to 

receive, process and evaluate the tota.l COMIN!r product, with dissemination· 

thereof limited to the representatives o~ the govern:DeDt on the af'oremcantioned 

policy group, and in accordance vi th the s eeur1.ty- standards su""imit tc.i. 

T0P SE€RET 
. .. . .. 

aeparatel.y.. This agency or service shoulcl al.so have the responaibUity to 

determine the specf.f'ic missions, assigmnenta, or COMll.1T targets and have the 

authority to all.ocate and place these mission assignments on the units 

actually en~ in the intercept oE enemy commun1cations. Integration or 

policies e.nd procedures for both C<»!'SEC and CCMJllrl' in acaordan.ce with 

National policy can be accomplished by this operating ageliCJ' or service and 

:l.t 8hould have authority to issue implementing directives associated. therewith. 

d. The cryptologic a.ctirtty Of the o.Army_. Navy, and Air Force 

should be eatab1iubed belov the Chief' of Staff of e.ach Military Service and 

be under the staf'f' supervision of the Chief ot Intelligence ot each Mil.itary' 

Service. The 11118sione and f'uncticms ot these cryptol.ogic activities will. be 

in accordance with the broad policies developed by the National. poli07 J.evel 

group and with instructions and procedures issue«. by the operating agency or 

service previoual.y mention~. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

• 

T0P SECRET 

.. 
··" 

" 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TERi.fS OF REFtfiErlCE FOR :.zEGOTlJ.T!ON OF ~so CU\I:IT ARRAHGl:ME:ft 

l. There are a nwnber of important US COM!tlJ' requir'E!:llents which th~._ _ __. 

r:rJa3 be expected to .fulfill: 

ao A limited intercept •Jenera.1 search a.nd develoi:ment. prt:•:rr.am. from 

advanced .,i tes in I .... ____ .... I to discover n.e"" , .. r unknown i:.l"'ans.nissicms.. ·rh1s 

search should be particularly direr;t.ea against. C..>nJruunist voke and VHl't COITmtlnications in 1.he I .... __ ..... l.g,rea., 

Cc Intercept and p):'ocessing of the followin.g Chinese Comrwnist \.com~ 

mnioations: 

(1)1~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~------' (2) .. filitar-1 co:ur11U.nlcations in :-tanchuria and possibly East China .. 

( 3) Local merchant sbippiri.g ~ 

2~ In exc:·bange for the above\raw materiAl a.nd the p_¥Oduct.s deri11ed b;y 

t.11eLJr1-om its a.na.4rs1s, t.he US ~ul.d\ f'urnish ass::l.stanue as follows: 

a.. Ownership o.f the equipment now on loan t-o var1.ousiOco1u·.rT unitf& 

will be transferred to theD\ Thereaft.cr t.he total cost to/the JS should not 

exceed 31.50,000 du.ring tne first \year of implemen-~ation; •subsequently the yearly 

cost or contribution to t.he D ccyptologiQ e.ttol"t will be /based on US determination of the value of the cJrodu.:t rece1vedn 

b. l'he U3 will provide technieal advisol'"s totneLJo assist in 

the install a.t1on and maintenanc~ of their interce..>t £acJ.l.ities... This assistance 

will include the necessary t.ra.ining for int.erce!)t st.at.ion personnel., 

c, The US will provide guidance\tO theQ1.um' effort in the form 

or targetsc This will include the provision\ot\ t~chrilcal information to the 

LJ.mere regu.ired, but nor. lo exceed t.he l.itnita.t+ons set forth in pa.r-a~raph !> 

.-.f ipaendi~ ? t.., th~ ;jJ<".rs.r .\'t"""e'?laj'lf'. Further~ t.echnica1 3.-;sista.n··ie wi 11 bP 

' . ,., 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET EIDER 
REF ID:A61417 

- I , .. 

.. -1WP SECRET EI.ER 

limited tol \ 

L, ______________ __,\ The US will provide advisors liO theD 

co:UNT effort to accomplish the necessary technical guidance and monit.or its 

implementation and the exchange in general • 

.30 There are ti«> special considerations which must be fulfilled by the o'!f ~re col.laboration &$ 011tlined above can be establish~ 

a,., TheDmust agree to adhere to the minimum/security regula.t.ions 

outlined in Appendix I a~tachedo 

bo nieLJustdesignate a control authority to control t.heir 

activity and permit effective US support to their elforto A SU/lgested organization of -t;h0ool-{J:rf1' errort. is outlined in Appendix II attachedo 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

2 

TOP SECRET EIDER