TO 
JJ J~ 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PLflNNIID GROUP, NATIONAL 

S!X:URITI COUNCll 

SUBJECT: Proposed NSC Directive for COMmC 

l. The Presidential Memorandum of 24 October 1952, subject: 

"Comrmmioations Security" directs action to establish effective, 

efficient, and economical means for assur.uig the security of clasSJ.fied 

Federal telecollllllUill.cations. The Department of De.tense takes the 

position that this can only be done by (1) designating a techm.cally 

competent operating organization to act for the entire Government,, 

am (2) a policy malo.ng boa.rd empowered to insure compliance. It 

considers that the draft NSC Directive of 3 July 1953 on COMSEC 

accomplishes oncy the latter. 

2. The secun.ty of Federal telecomnum.cations is of paramount 

importance. It would be contrary to the spJ..rJ..t of the Presl.dential 

mem:>randum to attempt to assure this security by relying upon 

volUDtary coordination and cooperation among the departments or upon 

an unwieldy board. Centralized responsibility for the complete 

technical operation involved is absoluteq necessary and is not 

proVJ.ded lll the proposed NSC directive. Speci.f'ically,, the draft 

version fails in the £ollow.i.ng respects& 

a. Does not assign complete ani clear responsibility for 

the adequacy of cryptoprinciples. 

b. Does not assign complete and clear responsibility for 

the deterno.nation and adequacy o:t general cryptosecurity rules and 

procedures !or operating cryptosyatems. 

c. Does not provide an effective and economical means for 

marsha.lling the research and development effort necessary to ensure 

the continuing adequacy of u. S. COMSEC. 

d. Does not provide adequately for the conduct an:l coordination 

of technical b.aison 'With foreign governments am. international. organizations on CCJ.1SEC matters. 

e. Does not provide .f'or a responaib1e authonty to standardize, 

produce,, and procure COMSEC materials and equipments. 

3. The Department of Defense considers it essential to the 

implementation of the Presidential memorandum that the NSC directive 

assign the specific functions and responsibilities in these areas to 

the Director, NSA. and the authority to insure compliance to the u. s. 

COMSEC Board. It is considered that the National Security Agency is 

SECRET 
13 July 1953 

the only appropriate authority to assure that the u. s. has high am 

um.t'orm staniards of COMSEC and adequate ceyptographic systems and 

that to do this requires the centralization of responsibility in the 

National. SeCUI'l.ty Agency for prescribing cryptopr:i.nciples, minimum 

cryptosecurity stardards, and procedures for operating c:cyptosystems, 

for having cogrn.zance over and conducting techm.cal liaison with the 

cryptologic agencies of foreign nations and international orgaru.zations, 

an.i for progrmmnl.Dg and conducting or supervising the national OJMSEC 

research and development effort. This carries out the President's view 

of communications secun.ty as a national responsibility. It promotes 

econollzy" by opening practical and effective wa;ys for standardization 

of materials and the coordination and resolution of interdepartmental 

problems. 

4. The position stated above derives directly from the experience 

of the Director, NSA over a period of years in deall.ng with the complete 

range of techm.cal activities involved in COMSID on a scale which is so 

broad and constitutes such a major portion of the total u. S. COMSEC 

effort as to be almost national in scope. This has included the 

developuent of the fundamental principles employed in the m&Jor cryptoequipments used by the Government; the evaluation and continuous reevaluation of the strength of these principles and the specific methods 

by which they are applied and used; almost daily contact on technical 

problems nth the representatives of the cryptologic organizations of 

cooperating foreign nations and NATO; the programming and conduct of 

basic research on physical and mathematical phenomena which appear to 

be applicable to COMSEC purposes, and the development and engineering 

of COMSEC equipment. 

5. It is essential that the responsibilities of the Director, NSA. 

acting for the Executive Agent be changed substantially as shown in 

Appeniix "A" for the reasons given briefly above and explained liiore 1'ully 

in Append.ix "B". 

2 Incls: 

1. Appendix A (Rev.i.. Bion of Portion 

of Proposed NSC Directive on 

OOMSEC Covering llespons1bJ..l.J.t1es 

of Executive Agent) 

2. Appendix B (Considerations 

Supporting the Position of the 

Director, NSA.) 

SECRET 
APPENDIX A 

Revision of Portion of Proposed NSC Directive on COMSEC 

Covering Responsibilities of Executive Agent 

l The revision of paragraph 2 c (1) given below is considered. 

essential to cover and clearly assign the functions and responsibilities 

necessary to implement the provisions of the President's Memorandum of 

24 October 1952 The wording has been altered in sub-paragraphs a, b, d, 

e, f, g, and h, sub-paragraph c is kept unchanged, and sub-paragraph i is 

deleted as being premature and inappropriate for a general basic directive 

Also wherever appearing, the phrase "Subject to review by the Board in 

the event of disagreement " has been deleted as a redundancy in 

view of the general, overall, review authority which properly is designated 

in the Board in paragraph 1 e and the appeal procedure set up in paragraph 1 g. 

2. The detailed revision follows. 

Paragraph 2 c (1): 

(a) Devise and prescribe the basic cryptoprinciples 

embodied or to be embodied in telecommunications equipment, 

COMSEC equipment, or cryptosystem., giving :f'ul.1 consideration 

to recommendations received from the departments or agencies 

(b) Devise and prescribe procedures necessary to operate 

in a secure manner the specific embodiments of cryptoprinciples, 

and devise and prescribe genera1 rules and minimum cryptosecurity 

standards applicable to operations common to all cryptosystems, 
REF ID:A72312 

~-~ 

'f>~~~l Sf£ldlfPf ' 

review and approve procedures devised to meet requirements 

unique to any department or agency. 

( c) Perform technical analysis of Federal telecommunications f'or purposes of determ1n1ng the degree of cryptosecurity being provided by the crypto-principlee, materials, 

and procedures utilized by the departments and agencies, as 

well as the effect thereon of communication procedures and 

practices; and make necessary arrangements, as appropriate, 

to obtain the material required for such analysis; (see 

paragraph 3-~) 

(d) under policies promulgated by the 'Board, and subject 

to the exception granted the Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency under NSCID No 5, conduct. or coordinate the conduct of 

liaison on the technical COMSEC and related matters with the 

cryptologic agencies of foreign nations and international 

organizations. 

(e) In consonance with po1ic1es of the Board, provide 

technical guidance and support for ceyptosecurity training 

conducted by the departments and agencies. 

(f) Obtain from the departments and agencies their 

requirements for COMSEC equipments and materials; formulate, 

for consideration by the Board, integrated programs for the 

2 
* production, prorurement, and maintenance thereof; and 

approved implE111.ent the/program by internal action, comnercial 

contract, and delegating to the departments and agencies 

those portions which they desire and which can be perf orDEd. 

m st ef'fecti vely by them. 

(g) Formulate for approval of the Board and maintain 

continuous review of an integrated COMSEx:: research and 

development program which is sufficient to assure the 

continuing security-of Federal telecommunications. F.stablish 

am. conduct (internally and by contract) COM.SEC research and. 

development projects necessary to implement the approved 

program. The departments and agencies are auth:>r.Lzed to 

pursue research and development projects designed to meet 

their special needs providing the Director, NS& reviews 

and approves such projects prior to their l.1U tiation. 

(h) In meeting operational requirements, the 

Director of the National Security Agency will insure, 

insofar gs those requirements w.i.11 pe:rmi.t, the stam.aniization 

of COMSEC materials and equipments in order to promte 

efficiency and econontr in their procurement, operation, and 

maintenance. Detemination of the acceptability of the 

physical embodiments of cryptoprmciples is a function of 

the various departments and agencies. 

* Insofar as the Department of Defense is concerned, these programs will 

include budgeting details which specify, among other items, the funding 

required by the mlitar,y deparbnents and agencies. 

3 

SEGRE=r 
APPENDIX B 

CONSIDmATIONS SUPPORTING THE POSITION OF THE DIRECTOR,, NSA. 

1. Responsibility for prescribing cryptoprinciples. 

a. The responsibility for prescribing, 1"8VJ.ewing, aDi approving 

czn>toprinciples is the heart of the President's desire to insure that 

the u. s. has adequate cryptographic systems and high and um.tom 

standards of communications security. A cryptoprinciple SUJ.table for 

use today 11D1st be so rigorousl,y a~ed mathematically that it requires 

a technically competent organization. In the interests of getting the 

max1lll!D'IJ. concentration of technical ability within a price the nation 

can attord.,, it mu.st be done in one organization and not lJl several. 

It would not matter which organization in the government did this work 

if it were not for this important fact, vizJ COMIN'l' and COMSEC are 

inextricabl,y related and the ettective comuct of each varies directl,y 

with the completeness and intimacy with which the operations of both 

are coordinated. The Brownell Committee in its report on u. s. COMINT 

operations took special note of this relationshl.p and emphasized the 

absolute necessity for keeping the COMSEC and COMINT activities clo~ 

1 tied together. This interrelationship makes it possible for the 

government to utilize in the most ef"fective manner the vecy limited 

number ot competent c~s avai 1 able to the u. s. in the 

analysis of our own cryptosystems, to take direct, immediate, and 

demonstrably effective corrective action when a weakness in one of our 

systems is revealed in cryptanalyzed traffic of a foreign. nation, or 

l. Page 101, Brownell Colllilittee Eeport 
to take preventive action based upon the method by which a c:cyptanal.ytic 

breakthrough has been achieved. 

b. There is a trend today away from separate and d.J.atinct 

crypto-equipnents and towards the integration of cryptosecurity elements 

in telecoDBllUDl.cation equipment. In every respect this is desirable; 

however, it promises to present policy and administrative complications, 

- for there are many distinct organizations within the government having 

responsibility for the development of telecommunication equipment. It 

would be uneconono..cal, inefficient, and ineffective to require th.em to 

assemble competent cryptologic staffs to devise, analyze, am perfect 

ceyptoprinciples for use in telecoJllllUilications equipment. The continued 

existence of a central source to which they can look for a cryptoprinciple WJ.ll keep them free to concentrate on the co1111lDlllications 

portion of the development, WJ.ll provide a coDmX>n point for the exchange 

am coordination or ideas on the integration ot security principles 

into teleconmunication equipment, and will assure effective control 

of the release of czyptopr.i.nciples to usage in equipments destined. to 

have widespread (even cormnereial.) applications in the telecommum..cation 

field. A national COMSF.C organization would serve all COMSEC consumers 

as the source of basic instruction essential for cl.arif'ication of 

procedures arxl establishment of new procedures to meet new situations. 

c. If the responsibility to prescribe cryptoprinciples is 

not centralized~ each department or agency would be permitted aDd 

e21>ected to establish its own en.ten.a and prescribe the cryptoprinciples 

which it desired to use. The demonstrated quality of the prmciples 

2 
could be oncy as good as the mathematical analysis atd cryptanalytic 

effort applied to it. The consequences would be that 8100Dg those 

agencies which realize this there would be a scramble for the limited 

amount ot talent tramed am capable of perform.ng this analysis, am 

as usual the agencies with the most money, though not necess~ 

the greatest. need1 would obtain them a.rd have a relatively high security 

in their systems. The others would have well-intentioned but 

amateurish e!'i'orts at secur1t7. Under such conditions, the nation 

would suffer for there would be no effective means of achieving high 

and um.form standards of security nor of insuring the aiequacy o:r the 

ceyptographic systems used. 

d. It is contended that dispersion of this responsibility 

would 'be a fatal weakness, that cooperation among the several. departments cannot be substituted for a central authority, and that a 

reviewing function would be insufficient to satisfy" the objectives J 

of the President• s directive of 24 October 1952. Witness the experience 

of the last few years in the COMINT field as set forth in the Brownell 

2 Comnittee report. The Brownell Committee found that the authority 

am responsibility established by tbe Secretary ot Defense directive 

of 191'9 (the AFSA Charter) which represented an advance toward 

centralized functions and responsJ..biliUes1 did not central.J.ze 

sutficientlJT to prov.I.de the opportunity for maxi mum or even adequate 

effectiveness in militaiy COONT-caMSF.C operations. An historical 

exsmple of hazard to national security resulting from failure to 

2. Page 121 Brownell Commtttee-Eeport 

3 
SBeRm' - S!LHR1'f! INPSR!Wi'i0N 

centralize COMSEC techru.cal responsibill.ties was provided-by Germany 

during World War II. The story of the German cryptosecurity failures 

3 is well documented and it can be stated unequivocably that the 

German e2:perts ai.tnbuted this failure largely to the fact that tm 

respoil.Sl.bJ.lities and the scientific talent for planniDg, guiding, and 

conducting German cryptologic activities were spread thinly over 6 to 

8 separate agencies. 

e. Thus, it l.B imperative that the 1'esponeib1l1ty of 

prescribing, reviewing, and approving cryptoprinciples be centralized 

and be kept with the responsibility £or conducting u. s. OOMINT 

operations; specificaJlJr, the Director, NSA.. 

2. Prescription of Ceypto..operating Procedures. 

a. After determination of the cryptoprinciple to be employed 

and development of equipments and systems embodying such c:cyptoprinciples, there remains the prescription of general minimum standards 

for all cryptographic operations, and the devising of instructions 

and procedures speci.tical.ly applicable to the operation of a particular 

crypto-equipment or system. General ceyptosecurity rules am regulations 

are those which are concerned Yi.th those aspects of crypto-operations 

conmon to all crypto-equipment and systems. They are the min:unum 

standards ldrl.ch gm.de the conduct of those aspects and must be unl.fom 

to avoid jeopardizing national security interests. To insure that 

insecurities do not exist in one agency which would jeopardize the 

security of another, it is essential that mlmmnn stand.ams connon to 

all agencies and departnents be prescribed by the authority having 

3. e. g., DF 2h9 

/ 
..----------- - - -

primary cognizance of national comrrmnications security. SUpplemental. 

or explanatory rules 1111;,V' be necessitated by requirements peculiar to 

a particular agency. 

b. Instructions and procedures necessal'Y' for the operation 

and use ot a particular crypto-equipment or system aJ.w~s af:f ect the 

degree of protection afforded by that equipnent or system. To insure 

attaillment of maximum security the ioost effective and secure metmd 

and procedure for operation must be used. It is therefore essential 

that the responsibility for prescription of operating rules and 

procedures rest with the authority responsible for the development of 

cryptoprinoiples, since that authority alone woul.d be in a position to 

discharge it. It is recognized that ideas are not exclusive to aeyone individual or group. Therefore,, it is the more important that 

procedures and rules to improve operations and security should be 

devised anywhere,, and that there should be a means for these to become 

available to all. The establishment of a single authority to rev.tew,, 

eval.uate, and promulgate J.deas applicable to the operation of oryptosystans is the only economi.cal, efficient, or effective method of 

realizing this objective. 

c. Moreover, it is essential. that the responsible COMSEC 

authority have immediate and continuing access to the national OOMINT 

e£fort,, since determination of the most effective an:l secure method 

of operation is continually innuenced by knowledge of the mistakes 

and accomplishments of other nations • .Advantage of such information 

can be taken. most expeditiously if the authority to prescribe operating 
procedures is centered in the organization wtn.ch is also respons.ihle 

for the production o:.f CCJONT. 

3. Research and Developmen.t. 

a. The authority responsible for the prescription of cr.yptoprinciples and of cJ:7Ptosecurity operating procedures mu.st have 

cognizance over the national conmunications security research and 

development programe This authority mst be empowered to make the 

most technically feasible, econoDIJ.Cal1 and effective use of the 

limited amormt of cCJl1111!lmications securJ.ty developnent talent available 

to the United States. It must be reepohsible for the formulation of 

an overal1 OOMSEC research and development program1 for the conduct 

of the major portion of such a program, and for the most effective 

utU ization of the research and development facilities of the various 

departments and agencies ot the government. It cailllot be limited to 

"projects of coJJDOOn concem.0 as has been proposed, with any hope of 

ach:Lev:ing an eeonollil.cal, integrated program. ~t that 

comrnmi.cations security is of national concem, the cryptoprinciples 

/ 

,,_,_/ 

and crn>to-equipments developed ~here in-the world £or the potentl.81 

----~-- use of any organizati2n o.r--the government are matters of a national. 

interest, inasmuch as a weak system used by one department or agency .,.,-~ 

,,. is /°roughly capable of nullifying the protection af.f'orded by a sound 

sys\ employed by all the other departments and agencies of the_ 

gove~'!!t•/ Theref'ore1 seen from the techm.cal viewpoint1 it is 

essential to the national security that t.b.e u. s. OOMSEC mthority 

supervise an integrated research and development program rather than 
SftJRf3'f • ~ff INP0RMA'H9H 

merely "review and coord:inate" a diversity of COMSEC development 

programs. 

b. This superviSJ.on, in order to be eff'ective in achieving 

the objective set forth in the PreSJ.dential Memorandum of' 24 October 1952, 

mst include authority and responsibility for establisbing the overall 

program, f'or conducting the major portion thereof, for reviewing the 

program frequen~, and for assigning and supervising those elements 

of the program which can be mo st effectively conducted by the various 

departments and agencies. This is considered. to constitute the 

minimum autb:>rity necessary to provide any' SJ.gnificant assurance of 

high and \J!rl£orm protection for classified Federal telecommunications. 

c. For effective operation, the corditions uDder which COYBC 

research and development projects will be initiated and carried out by 

the various departments and agencies should be clearly specified. 

Also, the CCMSEC authority should be charged with mobilizing all 

appropriate research and development facilities of the government 

in the most effective manner possible. 'Dtl.s can be done am should 

be set down in a manner wbJ.ch will~ stine, nor even suggest the 

stifling of', initiative in any agency or department; rather it should 

positively encourage the submission of ideas for oroer~, expedit:i.ous, 

and effective exploitation m the interest of national secun.ty. 

4. Foreign Technical. Ll.aison. 

a. Because of the ef'f ect that the conduct of foreign liaison 

in the cryptographic field might have on the discharge o:f his assigned 

responSJ.bl.lities for the national COONT e:ffort, it is considered 
e ~7&11AfN ih~SRM.ett 

SEeltE'f' w SHEJf.JRI'ff DB.291H/,i'iQH 

necessary that the Director, NSA have prJJilaI'Y cognizance over the 

m nduct of liaison. The conduct of the national COMSEC effort without 

author.tty to conduct technical haison on OOMSF.C matters with foreign 

and international. activities having simtlar responsibilities would be 

neither efficient,, economical nor effective. 

b. It is not proposed that _!Y: COMSEC liaison be conducted 

by the Director, NSA.. Neither is it intended that liaJ.Son be conducted 

by the Director, NBA at the dJ.ploma.tLc level. However, it is proposed 

that he continue to be responsible for the conduct of the type of 

technical liaison with cryptologic activities of the allied and NA.TO 

nations which is presently being conducted cm an almost d.aily basJ.S. 

This daily liaison is ooismpll.fied by authorized exchanges of evaluations 

of the security of cryptoprinciples with the collllIUilications securiv 

organization of the u. K. 1 to insure that the security stan:lards of 

closely alll.ed nations are sUf'ficient'.cy" lu.gh to protect intormation 

vital to the seCUl"l.ty of this nation. Similar exchanges in research 

engineering and development matters have provided a means of insuring 

that new developments and techniques of other nations mq be qul.Ckly 

am effectively utilized by the United states. 

c. Therefore, it is proper that the cogm.zance over such 

liaison be clearly assigned. to the DJ.rector, NSA. The national policies 

Uirler whl.ch this liaJ.son is carried out should be established and 

promulgated by the u. s. COMBEC Board, but in the interest of effective 

operations the conduct of such ll.aison should not be subjected to 

detailed direction by the Board. 

8 

~g@~~ 
• 

S. The Brownell Comm.ttee in its conclusions and recommendations 

to the President.Ii stated that the conduct of communications secun.cyis a portion of the total cr,yptologic program of the nation, aDi ~s 

such must be integrated with the conduct of the COMINT activities. 

Granting that OOMSEC is a portion of the cryptologic effort of the 

country,, its relation to COMINT activities is closest in the prescription 

of the cryptopl'l.D.Ciples, the engineering by ldu.ch these principles are 

embodied and the procedures by which they are applied in actual usage. 

Therefore,, it is clear that the Brownell Committee,, which reoomnended 

a strengthening of the increased. centralization of this effort and 

the assignment of defl.llite responsibility to and effective authority 

of the Director intended that the total cryptologic effort be so 

placed and so cb.rected.. 

h. Page 9,, Brownell Comnn.ttee Report