I N T H E

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 18S-JD-466

In the Matter of the Honorable 

Geoff L. Robison, Judge of the 

New Haven City Court,

Respondent.

Decided: February 4, 2019

Judicial Discipline Action

Per Curiam Opinion

All Justices concur.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JD-466 | February 4, 2019 Page 2 of 6

Per Curiam. 

On September 21, 2018, the Indiana Commission on Judicial 

Qualifications filed a “Notice of the Institution of Formal Proceedings and 

Statement of Charges” (“Complaint”) against the Respondent, Geoff L. 

Robison. Respondent timely filed an Answer, and a panel of Masters was 

appointed on November 1, with a hearing scheduled to commence on 

January 24, 2019. 

On December 31, 2018, the parties tendered a “Conditional Agreement 

and Petition to Dismiss Matter as Moot.” On January 15, 2019, the Court 

issued an order accepting the conditional agreement, dismissing this 

matter as moot, and discharging the appointed Masters. We now write to 

further explain this disposition.

Stipulated Facts 

Respondent, at all times pertinent to the charges, was the judge of the 

New Haven City Court. Respondent is not an attorney. 

Respondent resigned as judge of the New Haven City Court effective 

December 26, 2018. That same day, the New Haven City Council 

unanimously voted to close the New Haven City Court, effective 

December 31. The parties’ Conditional Agreement, which this Court 

accepted on January 15, 2019, prohibits Respondent from future judicial 

service. 

Discussion

When Respondent took office in 2000, only circuit court, superior court, 

and appellate judges were required to be Indiana-licensed attorneys. Ind. 

Const. Art. 7, §§ 7, 10; Ind. Code § 33-29-1-3. In 2015, Indiana Code section

3-8-1-1.5 was amended to require judicial candidates of all town courts 

and certain city courts to be Indiana attorneys in good standing. Nonattorney judges, like attorney judges, are ethically bound by the Rules of 

the Code of Judicial Conduct. See Ind. Code of Judicial Conduct, 

Application 1(A).
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The Complaint alleges, and Respondent admits, that in 2003, the New 

Haven City Court and the Allen County prosecutor entered into a written 

Agreement by which the Prosecutor’s Diversion Fund would pay the City 

of New Haven up to $25 for each infraction deferral contract the New 

Haven City Court executed. In April 2015, the prosecutor informed 

Respondent that he and his staff were no longer authorized to use the 

prosecutor’s signature stamp to execute infraction deferral agreements

and that infraction cases would no longer be filed in New Haven City 

Court.

After this conversation, Respondent and his staff continued to use the 

prosecutor’s signature stamp to execute infraction deferral agreements

pursuant to the 2003 Agreement. In his Answer, Respondent claims that 

the prosecutor’s unilateral change in filing policies breached this 

Agreement, and argues that it was the prosecutor’s responsibility, not the 

court’s, to ensure that local law enforcement agencies were made aware of 

this policy change and amended their filing practices accordingly. 

Indiana Code section 34-28-5-1(f) provides that individuals who were 

under 18 at the time of an offense are not eligible for an infraction deferral 

program if the alleged violation falls under certain categories, including 

traffic regulations, driver’s license violations, and open alcoholic beverage 

violations. Respondent admits that he placed juveniles in the infraction 

deferral program, thereby violating section 34-28-5-1(f), and explains he 

was unaware of the change in Indiana law that made minors ineligible for 

infraction deferrals.

Finally, the Complaint alleges that during the course of the prosecutor’s 

investigation into juvenile infraction deferral agreements, she discovered 

that Respondent had accepted payments on 10 or more infraction cases 

without adjudicating the cases. In September 2017, while dismissing 

juvenile infraction cases, Respondent also dismissed some of these partialpayment cases. Such dismissals prevented the prosecutor from refiling 

these infractions in Allen Superior Court. 

The Commission charged Respondent with violating five provisions of 

the Code of Judicial Conduct:
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• Rule 1.1, requiring judges to comply with the law;

• Rule 1.2, requiring judges to avoid impropriety and act at all times in 

a manner promoting public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity;

• Rule 2.2, requiring judges to uphold and apply the law and to 

perform all judicial duties fairly and impartially; 

• Rule 2.9(A), prohibiting judges from initiating, permitting, or 

considering ex parte communications; and

• Rule 2.12(A), requiring judges to ensure that court staff, court 

officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control act in 

a manner consistent with the judge’s obligations under the Code. 

Respondent, who admits many of the Commission’s factual assertions 

but denies that he committed judicial misconduct, is not an attorney and is 

no longer a judge. The court over which he presided no longer exists, and 

he has consented to a prohibition on future judicial service. In the order 

dismissing this matter, we explained that continued litigation would be an 

inefficient use of limited judicial resources. See In re Chapala, 902 N.E.2d 

218, 219 (Ind. 2009). 

But we write to clarify municipal courts’ power to administer infraction 

cases and infraction deferral agreements and to caution judicial officers on 

the impropriety of assuming the prosecutor’s duties. 

Infraction proceedings are civil, as opposed to criminal, in nature. State 

ex rel. City of New Haven v. Allen Superior Court, 699 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ind. 

1998). The prosecuting attorney is empowered to enforce infraction 

statutes on behalf of the State. Ind. Code § 34-28-5-1(a). Pursuant to this 

authority, prosecuting attorneys and attorneys for municipal corporations

can establish infraction deferral programs by which defendants may seek 

dismissal of an infraction by paying certain fees and fulfilling other 

conditions. Ind. Code § 34-28-5-1(g). When a defendant complies with the 

terms of an infraction deferral agreement, “the prosecuting attorney or the 

attorney for the municipal corporation shall request the court to dismiss 

the action.” Id. 

Put simply, trial courts may neither dismiss these deferral cases sua 

sponte nor use the prosecutor’s signature stamp to administer or execute 

infraction deferral agreements. Either action is an improper assumption of 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-JD-466 | February 4, 2019 Page 5 of 6

the prosecutor’s distinct role and flouts the Code of Judicial Conduct’s 

overarching goal of an independent, fair, and impartial judiciary.

Respondent is not the first Indiana judge to face such allegations. See

Public Admonition of the Honorable Martha C. Hagerty, Fremont Town 

Court (Feb. 9, 2015) (admonishing non-attorney judge for repeatedly 

engaging, or allowing staff to engage, in ex parte conversations with a 

traffic infraction litigant and his attorney); Public Admonition of the 

Honorable Martha C. Hagerty, Fremont Town Court (Nov. 19, 2012) 

(admonishing non-attorney judge for repeatedly engaging in ex parte

conversations with the prosecutor and traffic infraction litigants); Public 

Admonition of the Honorable Roger L. Huizenga, Walkerton Town Court 

(June 22, 2009) (admonishing non-attorney judge for participating in an ex 

parte conversation with a defendant about the status of her traffic 

infractions and for assuming the role of the prosecutor when negotiating a 

resolution to the defendant’s case). See also In re Harkin, 958 N.E.2d 788 

(Ind. 2011) (attorney judge suspended without pay for 60 days for 

establishing unauthorized deferral program for traffic offenses). 

While municipal courts are created by statute and empowered to 

decide only certain cases, their status as “special courts” does not absolve

them of the duties of a separate but co-equal branch of government. 

Municipal court judges, like all judges, must endeavor to maintain, 

preserve, and protect the independence of Indiana’s judiciary, even when 

administering the lowest-level civil and criminal offenses. 

With this opinion, we terminate the disciplinary proceedings relating to 

the circumstances giving rise to this case. Because this action was 

dismissed without a hearing and without a finding of misconduct by the 

panel of Masters, Respondent will not be assessed costs. See Ind. Admis. 

Disc. R. 25(IV). 

All Justices concur. 
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A T T O R N E Y F O R R E S P O N D E N T

J. Michael Loomis

Loomis Law Office

Fort Wayne, Indiana

A T T O R N E Y S F O R I N D I A N A C O M M I S S I O N O N J U D I C I A L 

Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S

Adrienne L. Meiring, Counsel to the Commission

Marcus A. McGhee, Staff Attorney to the Commission

Indianapolis, Indiana