l. AS·20 AS-14 8 Sept 48 

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I' 

The Development ot a Common Communication 

Seourit1 and Intell1genoe 

L..J ..... 

The attached report on above •ubject Ti8.8 prepared by Mr. T. R. Chittanden 

of AS-81 and forwarded through the Chief', AS-00 to the Operational Survey Board. 

Since it deal• with an oYeral.l National De!'ens9 conaol1dat1on or these activitlea, 

it is forwarded for consideration and further diaposition. 

1 Incl 

Rpt WTho Davelopaent or a ff 

Common .Pomm Sec and Intel Aganc7 {in dupJ 

WILLI.All F. tRISDlilf 

Chief, Communioations Research 

Declassified and approved for release 

by NSA on 04-11-2014 pursuant to 

~.O. 13526 
REF ID:A67420 

3ECRET _COIJFITlENTl."'<L_~ICTED_ - ASA STAFF 

:SUCK SLIP 

TO DJ,TE FROH 

=- ~ep~ty. Chief' fj/f/t (fl. bf,~~~< E.xe-cutJ...ve ""/' Lry' J ~Chief, Cor:ur.J.nicati ons_L U>rA · __ _ 

h.esearch v~ A _<;->cl Historical Unit .~-u 

Chief. Personnel Section ~, 

Officer unit IL' ~i-f V\_'- '.tir 

Enlisted Unit l!'"': "/ • " 

Civi..lian Unit -

Chief, Plans and Opns. 

~lans and Policies 

Operations 

fotelligencE. 

Research 

Securit~" 

:.dmln.istr3. tion 

Chief, St::c. Cont. Section 

- ChiEi' 1 Orr, & Tnf Section ~~ hss't Chiaf 

Training lJni t 

Organization Unit 

f1.eservc affairs. Unit 

Publications Unit 

National Guard Unit 

Ext. Training Divjsion 

Officer School D:i vision 

CoordLDator of Training 

Chief, i'1a teriel Sectio.n 

Chief, Fiscal Section ~~ ~djutant 11 == General Files~~ ~r()o-; secretTriat h: /l 

- ..'i /1' . ~- l" (' 

1'-..s r_educsted. i 

====: Commcrlts and ret rn 

Infor:ma ti on and ile 

Inf & f orwa.:i;ding 

Inforwation and return 

Recornmcnda ti on 

See note on reverse 

Signature if approved 

Your action 

See me 

Coordinate with 

Concurrence 

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--

-- Info on v1hich to tasE:.. reply 

Prepare reply for 8i? •f 

hpproval 

CSGAS F'orm Ifo. 107 ~,,;,.c::;?(fl',~@~-- 18 Fob 48 ~u. i.;:;>'"" 
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TAB A 

m DEiEU>PURT OF .\ 001Dl\')li COJllUNICATIOli siCUii:!i AHD 

~IGENCE AGINCY 

1. To consider the necessity tor and benefits from establishing a 

comm1>01 cation ae.c;u--1."it.7 Cl.d .in~el.μgence agene;r co.mm.on to all three aer-

'fi~e10 _the ·~~pe and responsibilities of •Ugh @J. 9rganiaa1;ion, and the 

Means tor achieTing it. _ , _ 

}. fhe Md tor !;~c.ation security and 1ntell1gence la jwst u ·- at during a. cold war a.a during a shooting war but the means ot achinit are tar more diffic'Ul.t d\ll1Jlg the to:nner period.. TM reaaone tor -- fJ a.re not obscure. lloney, personnel, and interest are at ebb 1n peace- time, !>uri.ng an actual pec.ce this condition ia not good but neither 1.e 

it ~ro_us. &it tbia ie a _phoey peace and a.n exceptional.1¥ d.angoroua Qtie, In !~ct,. .trom the stand?oin~ of ol?_~~ intel.Ugence and protect- - ~ o~ own comunicatiorus thi3 present condition is a Yer; reasonable 

fa.etsi.Dlila o! war - with one important exception. We do not have the .110ney • _ or the personnel, or the interest 1'1 th which to conduct adequate and. into-

, -_u11ted intelligence Dr!~. the"! ye r~y_qr~indicntions _t...Mt the -~l:t~ey,. an.a the people which WDuld follow it,, may become m.o:re plent1.tul. 

:-}tu.t - t_here is en_ appallin& lack of real interest in a.trociive conwuni-

~ion intelligence. Thia lack or inte:te~~ ie __ aost ~ outlined in 

the failure ot the thre., mUitlU'Y eervices to develop a common cO!!Clllnica'tlon aecurity and intelligence organization • 

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~-r-~;: -~ ,:~ .. ~~~,~~ ~ , .... a. It i.a awpreciated that the re;nodel.ling of the national 

military structure 1.a lea~ ~h~ a year old. When eonsid.-red alone the 

-·iU."gwnent that the persona on the upper echelons who tU..i-.et the militar:; 

_pollc7 sim.pl,y have not had enough time in which to initiate action on all 

Phases Of the nnifieation :\,Jp Tali_d. lhA.1; ~§mlQt be tae\lOed by those 1f1th-

~ the ~litary •atabll.ahment, and eventually will not be tolerated b,Y 

th" citizenry, in the growing derision and d.on~c~ o! the 1U11.tic~t.1on 

efforts by the .raili ta.ey rank end tile. The citizenry will eventual~ 

l'eact to these di!lint('grating e.laments within the ~~~~ae ~ ~7 do 

to A corrupt palice force._ 

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- bo It is. to rore~teJ.l ~hmes ot uiteaa8.n~e~m. without and diainte~tion from within that this plan for developing a communication 

iMcu.rlti and intelligence organisation common to ~ __ th:re~ ,eJ,"Tj,C~2' ii B,ilr~c;ed. ~t ia ~aliz0d, thl:\t c;o.iml'UIJ.ic;~tiQn rJec~z and ~ell1.lenco 

RESTRICTED 

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are two ainute .functions in the military establi8hment as a whole. Holl'-

ner, they are activities tlhich e.re particularly well adapted to being 

organized tor three service participation. They a:re the vital core of 

co:mnunication.s. They are a nervice to the using .forces; and their gene~al characteristics &re common to all serYicea. In addition, the 

exiating organisations per!onning thie work are, in general, comparativel.J' em.all, et:reetivel;r organized, eo.:npetentl.y sta..f.fed, and familiar with 

oach other•• operations. Because of these facts it ie believed that the 

functions of communication securit; &nd intelligence and the organizations 

pertonai.Iig them otter a situation highly favorable to the develop!:lent of 

a common eervice~ 

'• It should be noted that throughout this study care has been 

taken to use the t_,rm "develop a comm.on service" rather th&l "unify the 

present eervices." This difference is bs.sed upon the beliof that the 

onl.)r chance tor achieving an eftectiTe comm.on organization is to do it 

•lowl.7 - but deliberately. Speed is oecondar;r; intent is primar,y. '!'he 

one reef upon which most reorganizations founder ie the theory that a 

reorganization should be made without consideration of the people inTolTed. To .follow this theory ie •heer folly. An organization is 

.fundamentaU, a COlllbination of people and :tunctions (work). Ir the 

functions are arranged without consideration !or the people, the people 

will soon rearrange th& tanctions among themselves in a manner that is 

·acceptable to them. Few people are so adaptable that they can have the 

reaponaibilit.iea and procedures to which they ha.ve becom.e accustomed 

"1.aahed mray tro::t them and new ones thrust upon them without being p.rofO'andly disturbed. Only by working ~ the people a.nd. througb. the 

pa1n.full;y slow process ot education. substituting new responaibilities 

tor ~ old ones which they themselves discard, can auch a radical re- ~:rganisation aa the unification ot the eerdces be accomplished. Therefore it ia the primaey intent of this plan to recommend a mea'ls tor the 

gradual develoJ19ent or a co1I1Uon service. 

. - 4. The common service proposed in thia study would have the tol.lo1fing responsibilities: 

a. Research and development ot all cryptographic communications 

9q,Uipnent,. key producing equipnent. intercept equipment. and -rapid ana:cytic 

aid equipnent. 

b. Procurement ot all cryptographic comunications equi.P11ent, 

:U,y producing equipment, intercept equipnent, and rapid analytic aid 

oqulpent. 

c. Colupilation, production, distribution,, and accounting for 

cr.yptographic .!natructional and key materials (except those most. etticiently produced in the !'ield by indiTidu~l service field headquarters), 

associated with the cryptographic COll'llllUllications equipments. 

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4. J)eyeJ.t>pn.ent Of }X>lieies1 techniques,, instructions,, and 

training facilities tor the maintenance of cryptographic co.mmwtlcations 

equipo.ents. 

e.. Study, d.evelo:pm.ent. and promulgation of cryptographic operating procedures. 

f. Brlunci&tion or general policy governing physical security practices and require:nents. 

g. Collecting and studying cryptographic tra.ffie volume etatiaties end violations or cryptographic operating procedures. 

h. Declaration and determination of re:uedi~l action on e.11 

com.promises. 

i. Development and utaf! supervision o! general policies and 

procedu..res used in each •ervice tor the allocation, distribution, and 

accounting tor cryptographic material common to all services. 

(l) In order to enable ea.ch 8ervice to supply and utilize 

cryptographic materi&l.8 m.oat efficiently and with due 

&11.olfBllCe fo~ the peculiarities of the CODJlluniCa~iona 

proble.ius con.fronting each service, the distribution 

Of' Cryptographic equipment I key producing equipment, 

and assoeiated keying material.a CO!.MJOn to all services 

and/oi: produced by the cormnon agency would be made in 

bulk from the common agency to the individual distribution organisations .ma1nta.1ne_g_ 'by each 15ervice. 

(2) Accounting for such m.aterial 1r0uld be .in detail only 

to the 11ervice organization ancl in bulk to the co.!IJ!lon 

agency. 

(:3) Field organizations of the service& presently perrorm.-

.in,g this work (i.e. Navy's Registered Publications 

Issuing Offices and District libraries, Army- Security 

Age.nc1 theater units. and Airways and Air Co:nmun1catione 

Seryice Group Begistered .Publications Issuing Offices) 

110uld be kept in existence and utiliz&d tc the fullest 

peas.f.ble extent. A policy of mutual aid wuld be 

followed by all. 

j. study and develo}'.¥llent of general pclicies and procedures 

tor tr8Il5aiBsion security. .Administration would be a command function ~rcised by the individual services. 

k. Research, developnent, and staf.f supervision of an overall 

countermeasures program. 

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(1) l!onitoring practices and countermeasures prograillS 

11pUld be per!orm.ed and controlled by the individual 

eervicea with only stat! .supenision by the co.o:::ion 

.agenri:y. 

l. EatablJA.h!nent 6lld 111Aintenance ot intercept facilities and 

techniquee adequate to meet cryptanalytic demands. 

(l) Existing intercept !acilities of the three se:ryices 

would be utilized run,. 

•· Determination or intercept assignments and stat'! supervision 

over administration of the stations. 

n. Developnent of rapid e!tieient procedures tor handling and 

processing ra intercept material. 

o. 11.eaearcb and developnent. ot eeyptanalytic procedures. 

p. Develo?11ent or procedures for rapidly placing cryptanalyzed 

and translated traffic in the hands o:f intelligence evaluation afencies. 

5. Betore discuss:ine the merits ot the COIW:lon eervice outlined 

above, an answer should be given to the inevitable question, "Cannot the 

aims and effects of a cammcn service be acco.:nplished by the !ull use or 

the present technical collaboration boards and eO!.!lmittees com.poised ot 

representatives of t~e three services?" The an.nrer in NO. 

a. In the first place, the committee approach to the problem 

extends and aggravates the understandable fears ot all but the boldest. 

4 person lfho aitB on a conmrl.ttee is no longer merely a l'Orking .man, he 

1.s a REP.RESEllTATIVE. And if he il!l a good committee member he never !orgets it. The outlook of a representative is considerably different from 

the outlook of a worker. The nagging pressure of the ever-present thought 

·that eveeything he say.s ia being said not as his opinion but as the opinion 

-Of the agency which he represents, affects his tM nki ng. Minor problems 

become major; diffic.ilt problems are .m.3.de to see;n insoluble. To the 

J1omal tensio~ of ~rking• it add.a the hypertensio11 -.hich acco:apanie.s 

a Binding and Otticial Uttera..~ce by & REPRESEiiTATIVE. The actus.l d3J' 

to d8i1 problem~ o! co.:n:nunication security and intelligence are ~ufficiently complex and d.i.!ficult llhen naked. We should not add to their complexity .and encumber their solution by clothing them in the tight fitting 

8Uit ot an OF'1'ICIAJ~ IlEHL~-:SENTA'l'IVi:. 

b. Secondly, because of the fa.ct that the Air Force has not 

been in the buainesa, only the Amy and Havy could contribute personnel 

t.o the committees who are experienced in detailed workings 0£ communication eecurity and intelligence work. However, each service me.:nber of 

-the committee has equal rights and votes. Thus a situation is created 

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REF ID:A6742.0 

-RBliili&lW-

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111. which. because of inexperience, the member from. one service does net 

Jci1ow lt'bether the proposal upon which he !lll8t a.ct is good or bad. He 

16Tl't even sure bow it 'Ifill affect biB agency and thua how its ulti.:aate 

:resilts will renect back upon h.1l!l 1nd1v1dualJ.7. Being in such a position he has to re!uae to agree until he and hie chiefs ha.vo had tia to 

study it. The :result is lost time, a gen.eral alowing ot th• work, and 

an increase in the possibility or misunderstanding. 

c. Third, co.mmittees meet onl.y intl'equentl.y 'by- c~ariaon with ? 

persons llh.o are working side by aide dlq a!ter d.q. llren a. committee . rt 

llhich meets once a week !or two hoUJ'a at a time bringB-~ the Mmbers in J...&?-" -~ contact it they worked in tbe aar.a.o office. Obvi:ows].y,. then, the amount 

ot eommon problems which they can attack with CommDn action 1- only a 

.traction of' what it could be. 

fl. Fourth,. because of the OFFICIAL aspect of eom.itteee, the 8Amin1et~ative procecturea f\ll"Z'Qunding committee eonsiderationa and agreelli!"nfar are JDQre co.m.ple.x and time and energy consuming than t.he procedl.ll'ea 

throu,gh llhich a eingle working group operates. Usul.ly onl;y &bout one 

third. of these procedures are necessary, the rest. a.re outward manli'eatationa ot 1;.b.e !ears which permeate a committee. Fears ~ the ambers that 

they will commit their organization to something which ia not in accordance nth local policy or which is unfavorable to their chiets. Fears or the 

organization chie.ta that their represe.'ltati"fes will comit the organisation to ¢r• 112.rk or will agree to som.ething which will bring pressure 

to bear upon them. Fears that another committee 1fi1l take action on & 

prc>blem which doesn't actuall¥ belong to it and in so doing, gain in 

prestige. Fears that the action taken by the committ..e u a bit radica.l 

and should have the pl"Otective coloration ot a general concurrence b7 

other committees, however unrelated the.1.r respon11ibillti•s ~ be. Theso 

.re the tears which plague committees and lfrbich father auab operational 

wnuehs u coordinating cO!lllllittees and such adm.inistratiYe jlmg].es a.a 

the present procedure !or int.plem.enting a decision of the Join.t Communications Boa.rd. ~..:..::-~.:_'::.... 

•· tinall.y, because the composition ot cor;;aittees ia continually changing_, contin~ty ot action, thought, and policy is lo•t• 

6. The essential elements a:t this plan for eventually achieTin& a 

CClillillOn comnnm.ication security and intelli~nce se:rvico e.rez 

•· !he ereation of a medium tor daily worldng contact. a! the 

three •ervices. 

b. The acceptance by the three services of OQmpulaion tor 

decision and agreement upon .11&tters ot common inten~ 

e. The adoption and p.rosecuUon ot a policy desi,sned. to deTitlop 

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ldJlf __ ID:A67420 

IHiDfJTED ?---

a a:bigle organisation participated in b7 the three 9erdcea tor \heir 

mutual benefit. 

' . 7. 'l'hese three elements form the nuc!'eu.s or the plan. they are 

listed in the chronological order or their maturit7, but they should be 

adopted aimul taneously. Adoption or all three elements will la;r the 

foundation for the common agency. Adoption will not meen unitication. 

It isn't that easy. Let us consider these individually and 1n more 

detail. 

a. !he creation of a mediu'D. tor dai worldn contact of the 

three eertiees. a ia t e first active step to be taken after the 

e:doption or the program. It is not merely a training program. and mu.st 

not be allowed to deteriorate into one. Training is an integral. part 

o! it but its prim.a.ry purpose is to famiiiarize each service with the 

eomim5 cation intelligence and secuiity problems and means or the other 

two servicea. Familiarization differs from training in the aama wq 

that eating ice cream dit!ers from reading abo~ i.t. 'the emphasis .m.wrt 

be upon details and the people involved .must come tram the working level. 

It ie the working people which must shake dolltl thie organization and make 

it operate, consequently it 1e the working people which must initiate the 

first active phase ot the program. In brie!,, the medium which .111UJt bo 

created is a program of long term exchange or perammel.. lot so a&DJ' 

pe.opl.e initi~ that operations or any senice are going to be crippled 

and not so few that the !'Mi11erization phase cannot be aatistactorily ~co.L:tpllehed 1fi thin ~me year. 

b. acce tanee b the three services of ulsion tor 

4ecision and ~reem.ent upon matters or common intere • ia ie e . e:rux q/ the p an. Accepte:ncf.1 o.t it. makes it poiss!ble tor tl"IU7 mutual 

ol561'ations. :&ejection of it guarantees failure. Without this element 

thia plan is akin to a statute without an entorcement clause. It is 

tf!e l.&ck of this Yery provision 1'hich ha.e made the accom.pliah.Glent of 

nen the eiaplest or joint projects through the Tarious Joint couitteea 

itll Herculefll t&*:~{. fbere •imply is no compulsion (other than. the necesaity for continuing tS11sentia1 work) upon any or the joint comitt-eea to 

reach a decision. la.rlier in this study considerable apace is dnoted 

to a diecussion or the fallibilities or CO!Jl.lll1ttees end the peoplo who 

serve on them. Su!fice it to nt:!.t.:' that generally then. 16 no agreement llhere there ie no requirement for agreement. In essence this ei.e. 

ment calls tor the creation or a head llhich will bo required to decide 

1n each instance. This head initially aq talce the tom of a govem1ng 

board composed ot people from. the three services. The ditterence between 

this board and the present joint committees or boa.rde is that this one 

will be required by its chai'ter to decide each iamle tf'&t i.B presented 

to it. .Agreement or compromise ot the factions in an ieaue are acceptable ~t s~agn.ation ~8 not. 

c. The adoption and active pt!aecution ot a J!21i~z des!gr+ed 

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l,o,4eTelop a single organization part~ciP!';ted in bz the three •erviees 

t2r their .mutual benefit. It we consider the first tllO elements as 

thQ fiesh of thie plan then this one is its spirit. Thio policy is a 

charted courne1 subject to and capable at being changed• but with a 

fixed desti.."lation. When actually defined and stated it 111.ll be the 

ha.ndbook by which the common agency will be built. The adoption and 

prosecution ot a workable policy by the three services will be concrete 

evidence of sincerity and will do the most o! any single act to eliminate 

resistance from within and suspicion !;-om without. 

8., It is realized that a Vfif.ry etro~g argument can be made in 

opposition to the develop:ient ot a common service by citing the dangers 

inherent in disrupting the present organizations in the !ace of a grave 

111temational situation. It is reall.zed too that the immediate and usual 

result ot .d.m.plifis:a.tion or unification programs is con.fusion. However, 

the confusion is inevitable only when the structure in which tho people 

h!i.ve developed som.e efficiency, by virtue o! .familiarity, is leveled in 

& aingle stroke to maka •a:r :tor the new, «aimplen one. The very destruction o! the medium causes the first wave ot con!'Usion. In its wake 

comes a period of resentment arising out of the frustration caueed when 

the people tail to adapt rapidly 8lld make mistakes~ This in tum is 

followed by the period in which .moat reorganizations fail; the one in 

tddeh the people conso~idate wha~ ~~~1 liked in the old with what they 

like in the newt 'f~ e1-m.ente which they select .fro.tl each organization 

a!"Q not neeeaaar:tlJ' the simplest ?r best in each case k1U.t rather what 

tbey are able and w~t to salvage from both. I say ilalvage for by thia 

time the e;i.llpl~~cst;on in practice bears little reaem.blance to the virgin 

paper one. In organisations seldom are created auecesstully on the same 

gl."oUnd and from the aame .11.aterials as the old. What aetucμJ.y resultfJ 18 

.n organization which combines• often 1n unsati~ractory proportions, 

aom.e thinga that the director had in mind• some thingn that the people 

lRUltt and eo.rne things that the job (work) requires. Result: a bastard 

_flOJll.Plexity. However; this argument ot the dangers of disruption is 

Tali.d only it an attempt is aade to achieve the common service by an 

!mm.ad.iate action directive. 'iibat is needed is a program ot specific 

action with the aim of developing, let m.e repeat, developing, not 

isnplementing oYernight and by dictum, an organization :tor collective 

eomrn.unication aeeurity and intelligence. The danger lies in the haste 

91, the action not in the action itself. . ( . 

7. On the otheT A.and,. although it would be dangerous to rush ;into 

j,he clnelopment ot a CQ!Dllte>n oervice, thia does not .mean that considerable 

time need elapse between the ti.Ile o! ad.opting the program. given in paragr·aph 6 above and the time benefits are realized. Once the ba.aic agree-

-.ent has been reached, there are several spec1..f'ic actions whi.ch ca.'l. be 

taken .ilmltediately to initiate the services into the practice o~ exert- ~& e~on effo~ to_~y_ereoma a common 8ecurity or int~lligence problem. • .... -;.n ~n!ltiQn in_JIQl'.tl.~- detail is lll&de belo11' or two current _problems ~d 

,~e pract1cal~ be~d.~o ·wh~eh would m.aterialhe fro~ !. · .. ~.q_~ti<?n -~ac-hed 

tbro~ mutual et!ort. 

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•• %lit "iiroduction of one·tiae !!z 2P!8· This requires eonaiderabl.a •Ped.al key producing equipunt and personnel to proceae the 

tapes. Tho .tray Security Agency has the eq'Uipment, but due to a lack 

6f pel"sonnel cannot utilise the eompleto out.put of the equi}lllellt. The 

Air loree is the largest user ot one-time tapes, but hu no facilities 

lor producing them. The time required to establish, organize, and perfect a new production unit and the waste of mney required to finance 

duplicate overhead could be eliminated by the aiaple expedient of joinin,g forces and e.xPanding the exbting facilities. The Navy, althou.gh 

not wdng one-tim.e tape on the scale ot the Array' or the Air Force, ia 

now u~embling the necessary personnel and equipnent to produce it. The 

l&V7 and the .ilr Force cciUld contribute aoney and personnel to t.ho exUting production unit and the tape produced by this common effort. pro-

~ted acco.rd.ing to a ~rcentage breakdown of the circuits in each eerrl.ee 

requiring one-tim.e tapes. Initially a C8l"ef'ul bookkeeping •yetem could 

be naintained 1n order to usu.re each eerviee t.bat it •as getting run 

"Jalue tor money contributed and not p~ing tor tapes used by another 

111en1ce. Holf8ver, it 1a firntly believed that such a procedure would 

-last onlJ' so long u required to prove to the sceptics 1n ea.ch service 

~hat the common production unit was the moat efficient and most economical. A ncurit7 advantage would al.so acc?'lle to thie a.rran,gel!lent,, in th.at 

\he tapes used by all three services 1'0Uld have uniform characteristics. 

b. The 2roduction of short term cqptograpMc ~terlu for 

tagt.ical torcee. Jluch or the cryptographic material used by tactical 

!l'lij",. l&T,f, and Air units must be produced in great quanti tiel!J ( terus of 

thou.sends ot copies per edition) and used only tor a very short period 

or time (24 to 72 houra). The effort and expense ot producing and distributing such quantitiee ot material 1a enormous. For example, t~ 

Joint .Aircraft Code is used by the three aerrlcea. Under war-time condi-

'Uone, 1t requil"es the printing ot 29,000 copies ot a l6 page code book 

tlhich 1a used only tor 48 hours. The lta.vy has printing facilities in 

Washington and in ~arious major luy commands w1 th a greater production 

e@a.city than the .lra.Y'• at the Arm:j Security Agency-; but. it doesn't 

h&Te the personnel to utilise the equipment completely. .Again., contribution& ot personnel and tunde b;r the .Arm.I· and J.il" Poree would result in 

com;plete and efficient employment or t.he equi}:ll.ent. and a completely 

eat1e!acto1'7 •olution to a titanic printing job. 

e. these are but two examples of the imn.ediate 'Nsul.t.s 1'h.1ch 

could be realised b:r an agreement m.ong the services to establish a 

comon. agency. These results could be achieved fairly soon atter the 

adoption of the three point program. liated in paragraph 6 above and 

would not haYe to nit 'Wltil the actual achievement or a common organization. Sim1.lar results with aisilar econoll.iea or effort and money and an 

increase in the quality ot the product could be gained on the coJJllllunication intelligence aide. 

J&>. In order to aetual.17 launch this program. without disrupting 

operations, creat!.ng unnecessary ir.es:tsta.rice to it,, and lowering morale, 

8 

IE8ih1~t1~ 

- .. ip 

~~=----=~ 
an inTeatigatior.i. ahould be conducted ot the present .needs for communication intelligence and aeeurit;r uong the three aerYices, the existing 

or~isatio:ns engaged in the bo,s1nesa, and the best •eans or illplementing 

elements l and 2 of the prograa given in paragraph 6 above. It is bel.ieved that a board ot 1nqllirT is the beat means of conducting a thorough 

and reaaonabl.J 1.apartial inveat1gat1on. 

a. 'f'he aelllbers or this board ahould be appointed troa the 

executive-technical level of the existing eommunicatioll securit)" agencies 

in each service, should be a llixture ot civilian and ailitaq personnel 

f'roa each service, and should be ot coaparable ad•1nlatrat1ve level, it 

dvilian, and equal rank, it ailita.17. 

b. Each aaber should be freed ot auf'ticient present duties to 

.nable hia to devote two !ull days per week to the investigation. 

e. The ooard should be a tree agent with the right to investigate an;r aspect ot communication securit7 and intelligence operations. 

It should haYe the responaibilit;r and authorit7 tos 

(1) lnTeatigate the responsibilities aJ:ld i'acilitiea ot 

exi.ating organizationa, the present diviaion or 

work, and the areas of common interest. 

(2) Consider the desire bilit7 or an organi.sation haYinc 

centralized control with decentralized operatiollS 1u1 

opposed to a completel7 centralized and mdfied organisation. 

(3) Consider the deYelopaent ~ co11D1on procedures, iaatruction, and eq~pa~t. 

{4) Consider the relationships and aethods or eaplo71ng 

the A:rrq Securit;r AgenCT field organisations, the 

la..,-'• Ilegiatered. Publicatiou Issuing Clrf'ices, and 

the .lir Force Airwa;ra and .Air Communications SerYice 

Group •ecurit;r organizations. 

(5) Consider the adainiatration and control of intercept 

probleu. 

(6) Consider the best means ~or projecting cryptanai.,tio 

attacts and utilization of cryptanal)"tie talent. 

(7) Coll8ider the relation ot the common agency to the 

-Departaent o! State, Central .Intelligence 4genCT, and 

ether governaent agencies requiring co:aunicatioll 

•ecurit7 and/or intelligence. 

(8) Deval.op and •upervise the illplementation ot a detailed 
RQNCI:USIOJlS 

.---...... ..... 

-- .:J-

..... -

plan !or the roimding and gru.iual building of an 

organization ~rt.ed by and composed of .members 

of the three services tor the purpose of providing 

CORU!lunication pecurity and intelligence to all 

Jlilitary services. 

(9) Becomm.end the order in llhich the various phases ot 

this plan shall be aplamented. 

ll. ~ere!ore, it is concluded that: 

~ 1 communication eecurity and intelligence agency cOllJl?IDn to 

4l1. th.rt!.. 4',l1t"17 eeniees ia necessary and would beneti t the service a 

in_ pa.rt;1cular arut the gove.rnm.ent in general. 

b. The JI.Ost important action to be ta.ken. and the only one 

requiring cry hute, 1e tor the three military aervicee to agree that 

It is desirable to have a CODIJl.On eomiaunication security and intelligence 

acency end that it 1• their .intent to develop such an agency. 

c. The progrsai to hsplt!llll8nt an agreement to develop a co.a:mon 

lllg6tlcy should pl:'OY1de for and stress the neceeeity for this develop~ent 

to be instituted elmrl:y and along the most natural and least disru~tiYe 

llnea possible. ____ _ 

d. An inveatigation ahould be conducted into the problems inTOlTed in the develoi:-ent or auch an agency by a board o! repreeentatives 

trom. each eerrice. Thia board should be charged not onl.1 to investigate 

b\tt to recommenci in detail the means <..·.! and schedule for building a common 

e.gencr. 

a. fhe details and scheduling of the development o:t a CO.!Ml.On 

ag,eney should be in. the hand.$ o:f the_ ~o~~n:U.91141!d bttard. • _ _.. "E I -.. ... 

12. It 11 recommended that: 

a. 1.'he Secrtttarieis o! Defense, Amy' NaT'J • and Air agree that 

a communication security and intell.igence service cor.:mon to all three 

liilita.r,r eervices is neceasa.r,y and would benefit the services in particular and the government in general. 

b. A board ;;f inquiey (to be known aa the Cr;ypto-agency Board) 

consisting o! ?"epreeentatives fl"Ola the three services, be appointed and 

charged with investigating the probl8!11B involved in developing • coomon 

l\8enc;y and recommending in detail the means ot and schedule for accompllah1.ng it. 

lO 

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REF ID:A67420 

REBTBICTBJ 

'" The Secret.a17 ot Detense direct. that the Cr)"pto-ageno;r -1oara aclopt the tollowing~proiria as lts-f'ounda·Hori on Wlifeh to bnild 

the collDlon a1enq: ~ - , • -· "" _ · " " · 7 

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'1, (1) Create a aediUJI tor the dail1 working contaot or the 

three amlces in eollliUnlcation -.e0urit7 and intellicence activit!es. -

(2) Secure acceptance tro11 the three 11ervicea or the principle ot coapulsion tor decision in all 11atters or co~n .1.nt~re~t-~~1.ng the period ot d9"1elopaent. I - -;r,,.1•. 

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CSGAS-80 

-t\ESTfttMa-1n:A67420 

ttatt, ASA an4 It• Rela~ionship 

;;1th the Operatin1'»iYieion.a 

l4 June 194S 

l1t T"o oo~tder t~~ pr!J~~~ oi:ca1_li1ation ot &taf't. A.SA, and it• r•~ati~nship with the Operating Dlvleion•• - • ==-- ::::- :;_;; --- - ;;. ...::. -=: - - -

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·~ · Tli;~ ~o~l.ex- m!XfW.e -cif"inU&tion, ~'riv••~- P•~;~iiuti~~ rit'h~r­ Ityt re1-ponan1n:i1,~-yacii, neces.i!ty, action and reaction whieh t. inaa.-

qua ely cte8eri T>ecI-l>y lb• wore\ •relationship• is 4iftioulto to analyse and 

a.o~bl( &.fflcUit _t_o _ expresi-. Thws, in a &tuc!J' cf t:r..ie sort any attempt. 

to 1.tsseet a r~~t;o~~li;p-eiisting between such group• as the ASA Staff 

-~n~ _l?~~ui:!t_l _ _D!yfii10~ wlIT-iesl.lf't,-at-best, aerely in c· T"Ting it into 

i~l! __ ~or quan~~~l~.!_~d not. ·-ina-\riii-anal111ia. Howevt.r, it ie r.u 

that lt woull be beneficial u-Do-ih-crciup1-1;0 separate, •mine, and 

dt_~9~ee the.J!!!Jor quantities of this relationship from the •tandpoint 

ot ea~h group. - ------- --- -- 1:- ~~ ~e•~ tor a .i;..r:t -io- .;:.dri i~• Ghbt' ot-"-tt;=-ii;ijfecurit"'J-~_-;_ -·· 

,.lgency ill the active peretiimce e.na-i.caompli•hment af hie many reapon•1-

b~'-!~J~ '--~ --~~di_q_ rec_~P-~~ed_!__lqua.117 se1f•erldent b the nee4 tor 

capable operatliil -d!visiona tO perfona----uii work ariaiag old ot these ~f#pon81bilitiea. Th• 41.tticultiee an4 friction which occur between 

"these two 1roupa·; eaOli puriitiiilgthe same end, occur fol' '\he mod part 

i~ t~Q8~ ~~eaft-!j~Wfi.i?'\~'¥'tn~rltyii.4 reeponeibilit7 have not been 

tharpi1 doflnea. in other worTBUiere- la· oon"?Ui!oi.- o:Y4ir-uii--apecifie 

~ties, authorit;, lll'l.d reupon1ibility or each group. More •peciticall7 

th.erf 11! c9n~'iC?_n ~ Securitr_. Division 11.a to the nature and. extent of 

the control which :H !.&'· iiiteii.de'!"Btall ah.oUICI .. exeroiae over the operating 

~viaio~. 

4. ~· ~!>~~ept which 8P-~_1;1r1~ D~vis~~~ ~~~~ ot it• place iJl the 

j.ge:ncy structure Ii •• l"oTiou a ----~ --

·a. Th• Chi•f, lecurit7 DiTi•ioa i• reepott•l\le far proTiCiiD."&--

••eW'• crjpto-eq,uipaent, •tcriel, an4 4octrin• i:o ueer• at th• proper 

•U.11•1 .Urecting proper usagt 11 •urTeying actual uaag•• aat oerreet1q 

lm.J1roper Wiige ot thi8 equipm.en'\ e4 materialf aa4 Uai•on with o'\her 

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atlitar7 aal aeYonDnent ageneiei--11.ecesiatJ iO a8IUl"e ba•iO communieatio• 

ljCUrt17 aad to deTelop a coordinated, eftectiY8 prograa. 

b. :ta or4er tor the Chiet, Security D1vi•io• to •uceee1tull1 

aee\ these reap0uibilitiee, lie au.at be a\le to 4etendn• baa1o opsraU.n,g 

policiee which will rit the requirement& of the f'unctiolUI inTOlTe4t the 

l.illl1tstione or the •it\18.tioa, and th• aoet appropriate ..... or accompli•h-

•ent. 'rhe approval or reJection of these po1icies •houl4 be 11ade by the 

Chief ot the Agency. 

RESTHIGTED - ........................... - w 
=--

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ae\hod tor •li.minatioa of MJ •1lch ti.ttioul'lJ in the Mure woul' 'be ta 

refer all •·Her• ot polie7 '\o the Operatina UiTieione tor their reoomIP!ldatiou. S11ch aa arrangameat atill permits Staff to Mtill it• 

responsibilities in a••i•tin& the Ohiet, &SA. r 

8. There have been but t.w occasions when Start hae iadicate4 

aon-clnlcurr11tee on the funclaaental idea behia4 various polie7 matter• 

recommended by the DiTi•ion. On the other han41 there are 118!1.J eccaaio.. of ditf erenc•• of opinion between &tart and 8ecuritJ DiTisioa 

on •how" •uch polic7 reconmendations •houl4 be etated, i.e., 41.tterence• 

inTolTin& the woraing, at7le, format, ne. There have been do1ens ot 

pieces ot corre•pondence, eullndtted to ltatt in dratt. fora whiok :ha.Te 

been rephrased, an4 rewritten, and 79\, eo tar •• i• apparent to Securit7 

MTiaion, have remained essentially unchanged. or, ia •om• cases, actu1ly 

preaenting an erroneoua or Tague aubstitute for the original pr•sentatioa. 

Of these eome have been chan&e4 by Statf witho~ referral to the DiTiaioa. 

Bawever. it 1a appreciated that Staff i• attemptin& to aeeure neceseary 

.coordination h. all case•· ID •om• ot this cerreapond.ence it •Y 'be that 

1he fault liea with the DiTieion, ia that it tailed to perform completed 

etatt work. In othen. it has 1ea.ed that there were certain ae~hoa ot 

.xpre111ng the baeio thou&)lt• d.eaired by Statt, wita whieh the Divi&ion 

was not !aailiar. It the first pos&ibilit7 1• true, it would be ad.vi•able 

to point out at the tia• of occurrence all case• ot improper etatt work 

. .....tr.presentatioa. Xf the eecond i• true then th• P~Tiaion ahoul4 be adTi••« 

b.-.JetiiIT d"lJii •nner-_in_ whioll the idey thoultl be e:gresH4. Moat of 

-\he cli.tticultie• •eera to arise troa a conce.,.ratioa b7 Starr on the •how" . -ot C!..~!!'.!.1!Rf>!l4e_~~-!L rather than on •w)la\• the corr .. peAdence ia attempting 

--iQ_ ~~~9J!ll>li•h. fy.ch ~licatioa ot attentioa results ia auch wasted. 

_ --1-ttorl iuul ~g .--eo-liahmenU """"""ihe-·ir.1 lecurit A. enc • Ia tact the 

·; -ld.-.Ui:Aerstan a-wi h 8taft oTer policy mattera appear to be lar&itlr a 

~!£!'.!' :Of~~~~~~!~._ 11oat ot t~e t_!ae ltatt b not talki~. about polic7 - ·Ii'• talking abo1lt procsdu.res with which it ha8 little actual coatact an4 ~Tta leee coatrol. Jlaw•••r• on ttoae occaaioaa where errona in poliey 

laplementatioa or txpreseion occur, AS-80 ~ecta, an4 weloomea, ltatt to 

oall •uoh errors io it• atten1ion. 

_,_9,. A.a a result of the above aUuation, oontusioa oYer the titterence 

betweaa polie7 u4 procedur•, Start baa graduall7 aseumecl more ancl S>re eo~trol oTer recenaended •ctions of Securit7 Di"Yiaioa. Ia errect the J>i~•ioa tvni•hea th• into:rmatioa ucl Start edit•, rebaah• an.4 rnrit .. a lar1• percentaae or the Dlviaioa'a wort. l.ach procedure reeulta ia 

Iffll~aa .. 1~7, uneconomical uaage ot DiTiBion peraonnel aa4 iaefficient 

""i\ilisdioa_ d Starr, ASA. Start ehould be familiar with the project• 

u.4 prograu. •t the Division an4 ehould. take oerrectiT• aeaeuree when 

rtola.tiou ot approve4 policy are e'rl.deut 1 lRR ahoul.4 !!1 ••rY• u a 

proce411ral •upenbor. _ __ _ __ _ 

--~- ===--- ~-- --

- --- - - - - --- ---- -· 1 --·-~- ··-~ _ _.,~---~-.. .. ---------

RESTfilBTED 

-==---=---
COJICLUSIOR8 

10. 4 aeed eci11~1 ror the operating diTitiou to have the authoritJ 

.. a reaponaibili~J to 44""1•• and ••\ait tor approval bJ the Chi•tt ASA, 

'basic operating polici ... 

11. .I. redefinition. of atart•• l"ffpGJlllibilitiea in 10 far .. theJ 

affect Security Di'YieiOJa'• eperatioae and polic7 reeoDl!l1!lndatioDB 11 

aeed.ect. 

UCOJBIENDATIOE 

12. It i• recornm•nded that the tollC11riDC tw propO•al• M eouillere4b 

a. that the Chiet, ASA be provide4 a etaft coasi1ti:n.g of the 

Chief• ot the three Operatbg Di via in• u.4 a •Deputy Chief fer ldlliniatratlon• plws • mna.11 aecr-'ariat or per1onal •tart. The Chi•f• of the 

throe Operatiq I>iviaiou woull °'>• respon•ible to the Chief, ASA. for all 

matters ot an operational natur• concerni»& communicatioaa 1ecurit1, 

comaunication• intellicence aa4 research and d.eTelopa.eDt pertaining 

therei.et ancl tor recomaeading te the Chiet, ASA all policy aat reviaiou 

9f poliOJ in theae tielda. The "Deputy Chief for Admin..i•tratioa• woult 

be responsible tor all mattert1 concern.in& p•reoJUlel, t1acal affair•, 

training and auppl7. 

~. Tha• Start, oraan11stionally, be retaine4, bat that the 

poaitioa ot Start be rede!in••· Th• DiTi•ioa Chief• woul4 have complete r~•pol'18ibilit7 tor all eperational aa4 non•policy matters and fer approval ot all corr .. pon4ae• thereon, u at prnent, u4 •ttert of 

polie7 YOuld be recoJ1111.en4ed. b7 the Dividou Chieta, to the Chief, ASA, 

no 1r0uld utilise hi• &ta.tr to aHur• Ma that no coatlic'l will r•ul'l 

witk exiatiitg policy •hould the polio7 recommended by the Divi•ioa Chief 

be approTe4. tf!l4er auch aa arn.a&•ent, the tena ._tten of polioJ9 

auet be clearlJ defined, 8Jl4 all •ff'orl -.a. "7 Staff to ooaeea'\rai.e 

upon •what• th• DiTision reeommendatio• 18 attemptin& te aecoapli•h• 

l.3• .l •u,gg .. tioa ot a general u.ture ia considered of aerit. It we 

ar-e to haTe a. Start, un.deriati~ t:M im}..lortaat reepo:uibilities ffn' the 

Chief, A.SA, then aa eftorrt llWlt be made to aeaure a penu.aence of tenur• 

ot the iadi'Yidual• who comprise the &tart. Ii i• considered that Start 

officers cannot exercise properly ~heir r•aponaibiliti.. if auch a l.ar&• 

part of their 1enure must be •pent i». learni.q the Job. ASA u4 iw 

Jl!s1ione are technical aal ooaplicat•4 aa• ltatt ASA requir.. a«n. ot 

ability and experience. Thi• abilit7 an4 knowledge i• ut acquire• ia 

a •horl time. It 19 recomraeaded that lta:tt be either liberall7 •priJat.le4 

with career ciTiliau of q;perl.ence aal ability, or that the tenure of 

ailitary penonnel be 1ncrease4. Aa•uai.n& a tenure of four 7ean, 1t is 

further recommended that aa •••i•tall'\ be aaaig:aet each responsible ltaff 

4 

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guarantee at all timea that th• position would be held bJ an of!icer 

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