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APPENDED DOCUMM'?~ eeN'fABl 

USCIB: 14/.'.31.'.3 

lS August 1953 

'!'GP SJ;GRR SECtmI'!'Y HlFORl~.'!'IGPl 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: Program to Improve the Communications 

Security of NATO Countries. 

The enclosure, prepared by the Department of State 

member of USCIB pursuant to decision by the Board on 

14 August 1953, is forwarded for consideration at the 

Sixth Meeting in connection with Item .'.3. 

Enclosure 

State Department Memo to 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

dtd 17 Aug 53. 

18 

uscrB: 14/313 A-PPENQH> QGC\:IMHffS cetffAlN 

CQQ( WGRB MATERIAt -

TO-I' SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-18-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352ff0 I 
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

i'QP Qf!9HI!lf 9NlOE SijSSJiRI'l'Y IJi'QBKA'l'liOM 17 August 195.3 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECBETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Program to Improve the Communications Security 0£ NATO 

Countries 

REFERENCE: USCIB 2..3/70 

1. The proposals presented in this memorandum are submitted in 

response to the decision of USOIB, at its Eighty-eighth I.iieeting on 

10 July 1953, that the Department of State should be the cognizant 

US authority with respect to certain preliminary steps contained in 

the Report of the recent US-UK Conference on the Communications 

Security (COl.fSEC) of NATO Countries. These Ero:e.C?~als have been 

approved 11.Y.. the Secret~ of State, The specific prel1minary steps 

which they concern are the determination of (a) the nature of the 

initial a:pproach to the French and (b) the terms of reference and 

composition of the Combined (US-UI<:) Working Group to be set up in 

Washington t~ facilitate coordination 0£ this program. 

2. Considerations affecting the initial approach to the Frepch. 

Enclosure with USCIB: 14/31.3. 

prepare 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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.OP~~NOFe 

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c. It will be imperative that all contacts made within 

the French Government are secure and are given adequate 

authority-. 

d. The Tripartite Securit7 Working Group (US-UK-French), -y:;f~.., ---- . which has been in existence since 1950, woul4 appear to > x 

offer the best means of achieving an orderly and secure ... -

arrangement for direct discussion between the proper COMSEC ---- ,.- , \ 

authorities or the three governments. Although the work or (< .. this Group has not heretofore included. CCMSEC matters, the .' \ 

Group has developed cooperat!ve and secure contacts among 

responsible French authorities in general securit7 matters. 

3. The initial approach to the French. To assure wholehearted 

cooperation by the French in sponsoring jointly with the US and UK the 

overall program tor other NATO countries and in making effective 

improvements in French COMSEC, the French Government should be approached 

first at the cabinet level. The project should then be assigned to the 

Tripartite Security Survey Group to establish proper contact between 

COMSEC authorities of' the three governments. As a practical matter, 

and as a means of achieving the greatest possible compulsion, this 

approach should be undertaken jointly by US and UK representatives. 

a. Phase 1. At the cabinet 'level the-French ~ ;, _ .• H,JAI~ · Government should be requested by the US and UK ambassadors l'ld""' ?4'"V' 

to 

requires 

agree 

that 

in principle 

a broad program. 

that the 

be 

overall 

undertaken 

securit7 

to improve 

of NATO 

'!. 

~"' • 

· 

~ 

- ~ 

the 

countries' 

security 

and 

ot 

that 

the 

this 

national 

program 

communications 

should be initiated. 

of' NATO ~ ._ 

e. 

Z, ~ 

1'. '.... 

through the Standing Group as a logical extension of' the _,- ~-, _ 

existing COMSEC program of the NATO organisation itself. ,. ' ~€ r:,1 ;r, v ~') 

This improvement should be accomplished. bf~ 't!he ~~ - ~,. ~. 

Of ~~andards to be adopted-. on aNITO-~ cl' ~ I 

basis. -To this end the terms of ref'9rence of' the Tripartite CJ ~~ 

Security Survey- should be extended to include the prel~--- ___ _ 

development and application or these standards on a _. ~ .$f\. 'fb '''f'>.LL 

tripartite basis. This phase should be handled by t~- ::i·~ S•J< ... / z...._· . .- Department or State and the Foreign . - Of~ge. ____ _,.--- /-: ~ 

,, -~ 

,....-- should 

b. 

then 

Phase 

set 

2. 

up 

-·· The 

a technical 

Tripartite 

sub-group 

Security 

to 

Working 

be composed 

Group 

of 

-*'" :_":'#-~ 

~ --. 

'-" Q.ppropriate CCMSEC authorities selected. by the Tripa~ite 74~- '-~· 

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'f6P SEffitB'f eJdffiE = SEetlftI'f"I Ilffi'ertMtd'IE>N 

- 3 -

Security Working Group and authorized by their respective 

governments to represent all COMSEC activities of these 

governments. This phase should be handled by selected 

members of the US and UK Tripartite Security Teams as 

agreed between the participating agencies. 

c. Phase 3. The COMSEC authorities should then proceed 

to develop minimu.rr COMSEC standards and to apply them 

within the three gover1:1ments. US participation in this 

phase should be handled by the National Security Agency (NSA). 

4. The Combined (US-UK) Working Group. To assure that the 

COMINT aspects and limitations of this program are properly coordinated, the Combined Working Group should be under the direction 

of USCIB and LSIB. It should serve to: 

a. coordinate US and UK proposals for the initial 

approach to the French, subsequent technical discussions, 

preparation of a memorandum to be issued by the NATO 

Standing Group and formulation of minimum security 

standards; 

b. coordinate between the US and UK conclusions as 

to the status of the COMSEC of NATO countries as this 

program develops; and 

c. coordinate US and UK reconnnendations for further 

steps, as envisaged in paragraph 23 of the Conference Report, 

should this program not accomplish the desired response from 

NATO countries or improvement in their COMSEC. 

The US element of this Group should also serve as an ad hoc subcommittee of USCIB to keep this entire program under continuous review 

for the Board. To this end, US participation should include 

appropriate representatives of the Department of State, NSA, -., ""'-. 

FBI and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ·The overriding 

political character of the initial phases of this program indicates 

that the US element of this Group should be headed by its Department 

of State member. 

5. It is recommended that the plan described in paragraphs 3 and 

4 above be referred by USCIBEC and USCIB for approval and implementation, 

including presentation to appropriate UK authorities. 

(Siened) 

W. PARK ARMSTRONG, JR. 

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