rm.p.~~0295 -------- e 

USCIB: 2!;.20/5 

18 April 1955 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Continuation of CISD Activities. 

Minutes of Item 4 of the Agenda for the 113th USCIB 

Meeting held 11 March 1955 (USCIB 29.20/4). 

1~ The enclosure is circulated for information in connection with 

the understandings recorded in the reference. 

2. It is understood at this writing that discussions between the 

Army representative and .Ambassador Conant are about to take place. 

3. The Army Member of USCIBEC has indicated his desire to dis cuss 

the enclosure together with such additional information as may be 

available at the forthcoming meeting of' USCIBEC if time permits. 

Enclosure 

Dept. o:C State Memo 

dtd 18 Apr 1955. 

USCIB: ')JJ.20/5 

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eclassified and approved for release by NSA 

n 11-20-2014 ursuantto E.O. 13526 
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DEPARTM]}JT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

lS April 1955 

!QMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Continuation of CISD Activities 

REFERENCE: USCIB ~. 20/4 

For the inf orm.ation of USCIB I enclose herewith 

Ambassador Conant's reply to our message informing him 

of the referenced Board decision. We have acknowledged 

this rep4r and have informed the Ambassador that it will 

be presented to USCIB. 

FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE 

• 

(SIGNED) 

T. Achilles Polyzoides 

Director, Special Projects Staff 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.20/5 dtd lS Apr 1955. 

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Rl!F HR: 1027 

T6P SE6Ri91' ARMSTRONG FRCM CONANI' 

m'~CE U81. 

ANALYSIS OF SITUATION SHOULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OF FACTORS 

'!HAT SHOULD MITIGATE ARMY CONCERN. FUTURE STATUS OF INTERCEPT OPERATORS WAS GREATLY IMPROVED DURING PARIS Nl!DOTIATION LAST OCTOBER AND EMERGENCY THAT THREATENED LAST SmtmR 

NO LONGER IMMEDIATE THREAT. CONTINUATION OF T~E ACTIVITIES IS BASED ON AGREEMENT WITH CHANCELLOR OF INTERPRETATION 

OF PARAGRAPH 2 ARTICLE 5 OF RELATIONS CONVENTION. UNLIKE 

FORCF.s CONV»ITION, RELATIONS CONVENTION WILL NOT BE SUPERSEDED BY NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREHMENTS AND THERWORE 

AGREED BASIS FOR CONTINUED INTERCEPT OPERATORS NOT SUBJECT 

TO ABRUPr TERMINATION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE Rl!Ml!XBERED 'lHAT 

GERMANS HAVE NO REALISTIC BA.SIS FOR "EFFORTS BY THEM TO 

OBrAIN THIS TRAFFIC INDEPENDFlfrLY". ANY EFFORTS OF AN 

OFFICIAL AGlllCY WOULD REQUIRE ALTERATION OF BASIC LAW AND 

CONSEQUENTLY A 2/3 MAJORITY IN THE BUNDESTAG. OUR PRESPBT 

ESTIMATE IS 'lHAT SUCH MAJORITY IN THIS QUESTION POLITICALLY 

IMPOSSIBLE AND THEREFORE LITTLE IMMEDIATE LIKELIHOOD CR 

PASSAGE OF J:.AW WHICH WOULD TERMINATE OUR RmERVED POWERS 

AND PUT GERMAN AUTHORITIES IN BUSINESS IN THIS FIELD. WE 

SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE THIS POSITION BY APPEARING ANTICIPATE 

TERMINATION AND OFFERING GRATUITOUS CONCESSIONS. 

IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT ALL ARRANGDIENTS WITH 

GERMANS ON THIS SUBJECT TO DATE HAVE BEEN NEOOTIATED ON 

TRIPARTITE BASIS •. BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH ANY UNILATERAL 

ACTION SERIOUS THOUGHT MUST BE GIVEN TO OUR IMPLIED OBLIGATION TO CONSULT WITH BRITISH AND FR.EMCH OR AT LEAST TO 

INFORM THEM OF OUR PROPOSED ACTION. 

ASIDE FRCM TRIPARTITE ASPECT I FEEL THAT THIS APPARENTLY 

SIMPLE EXCHANGE PROPOSAL OVERLOOKS MANY CGiPLEXITIES CR 

SITUATION. IT SHOUID BE REMmmEREI> THAT THIS AND SIMILAR 

MATTERS HAVE TO DATE BEEJi HANDLED WITH GERMAN AUTHORITIES 

THROUGH 'lHE OCA COORDINATING OFFICE. TOTAL INTELLIGENCE 

REQUnmmNTS AFTER SOVEREIGNTY ARE BEING NIDOTIATFD WITH 

GEBMAHS ON COORDINATED BASIS. IT WOUID BE DANGEROUS 

PRECEDENT TO SEr UP ARMY ONLY DIRECT CONTACT ON ONE SUBJECT 

WHICH MIGHT TEMP'l'·GEBMAIS TO PLAY ONE EL1!MlWr AGAINST 

OTHERS AND EXPLORE OTHER SUBJECTS WITH AIR FORCE ONLY, 

NAVY ONLY, ETC. IT IS MI POSITION THAT ICCG COORDINATION 

SHOULD NOT BE SOOGESTED BU'l' IS REQUIRED. I NOTE IN THIS 

CONNECTION THAT GPBERAL TRUSCOTT IS AWARE OF PROBLEM, BUT 

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I PROPOSE TO OBTAIN HIS STAFF OPINION BEFORE APPROVING 

ANY APPROACH TO GERMAN AUTHORITIES. 

LOOKING AT THE GERMAN SIDE OF THE PROBLEM THIS PROPOSAL SEJ!Jm TO RECCJOmD APPROACH AT WRaiG LEVEL. GERMAB 

SECURITY OR INTELLIGDJCE OFFICERS WHO WOULD PBES'CIWl.Y 

BE MADE aAPPY BI RECEIVING PRODUCT HAVE LITTLE OR NO 

INFLUJ!JiCE ON -BASIC DECISIONS TO BE MADE IN THIS FIELD, 

DECISIONS WHICH INVOLVE GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY AND HIGHLY 

EXPLOSIVE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THm, TOO, THERE 

IS THE PROBLEM THAT THERE IS AS YET NO SPECIFIC RECIPIENT 

OF PRODUCT ON GERMAN SIDE, AND IT IS INDEED QUFSTIONABLE 

WHErHER ANY GEHMAN OFFICE COULD OFFICIALLY RECEIVE IT ·m 

VIEW OF PRCEIBITION IN BASIC LAW. 

I WILL CERTAINLY DISCUSS '!HIS MATmR WITH ARMY REPRESEl'TATIVES, BUT I CAN NOT AGRE&, AT THIS TIME, TO ARY 

DIRECT NmOTIATIOR BETWEEN ARMY REPRESEXTATIVES AND 

FEDERAL REPUBLIC ON THIS QUESTION. I HOLD THAT NO ACTION 

SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME Ol1l'SIDE FRAME.WOIUC OF OURRl!XRJLAR NEDOTIATIONS WITH GERMAN AUTHORITIES AND THAT, 

ON THIS PARTICULAR QUESTION, NEXT MOVE SIOULD CCJ.m FROM 

GERMAN SIDE. 

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