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(Revised 27 March 195.3) 

APPENDIX B 

PRDlCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSFiMINATION 

INTRODUCTION 

1. These principles shall be the basis or all regulations tor the 

security and dissemination or Cmmnunications Intelligence issued by or under 

the authority or USCIB or"CRC and other appropriate authorities of the 

Govemments of the two parties. The scope and phr•sing of such regulations 

may vary in accordance with requirements of the parties, agencies 1 departments, and ministries to whom they are designed to app'.q, but all shall be 

in accord with these basic principles in every respect. and shall observe 

the standards herein as a minimum. As an aid to uniform interpretation, 

each party shall forward all pertinent Board regulations and directives to 

the other for information. 

2. It is recognimed that, while the following principles are in 

general of universal application, changing conditions or emergencies and, 

in particular, the outbreak of general hostilities ms:y require modification 

to ensure that the maximum operational benefit consistent with security is 

derived from communications intelligence. 

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES 

,3. Comrmmications Intelligence (CCMINT) is the name given to all 

processes involved in, and intelligence information and technical material 

resulting :fran, the interception and studT (a) of foreign communications 

passed by wire, radio, and other elect.romagnetic means (except presB", 

propaganda, and public broadcasts) and (bl of selected foreign communications sent by non-electromagnetic means /_see NO!'E 'J]. 

l+. There are two ~l;Pes of CCMINT: Crypt Intelligence and Traffic 

Intelligence /jee NOTE y. They are defined as follows: 

a. Crzpt Intelligence is that CCMINT which results from crypt- ana.4rsis including the solution or speetm. and facsimile security systans. 

b. Traffic l:ntellisence is that CCMINT which results tran traffic 

analysis (e.g. the study of call-signs, message headings, procedure signals, 

volume of traffic, precedences, D/F bearings, and other aids such as RFP) 

and from plain text.a, i.e., information produced b;y all means short of the 

actual crn>tanal.J'sis of intercepted communications. 

5. For purposes of security handling and control CCMINT is divided 

into Categories and Sub-Categories. 

a. CCMINT is divided at the present time into three Categories: 

Category III CCMINT 

Category II CCJU:NT 

Category I CCJ!INT 

b. CCMJNT is placed in appropriate Categories as mutuallT agreed 

b;y USCIB and CRC f'rom time to time. The assignment of' CCMINT to Categories, 

pursuant to this sub-paragraph and other provisions ot this Appendix, shall 

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be made by the party per.forming the analysis and processing involved, except 

that, where these are performed by both parties, assignment to Categories 

shall be as m.ut~ agreed. 

c. As mutually agreed by USCIB and CRC, separate Sub-Categories 

of COMINT ma7 be established within Categories m and II in order to 

permit differentiation in the processing, dissemination, exchange or use of 

material. 

6. Category III COMINT is that COMINT tor which the protection of 

source or content is the overriding consideration and which must, therefore, 

be given the highest degree of security protection. In general, it will 

include: 

a. Crypt Intelligence except that specifically included in other 

Categories. 

b. Special Weather Intelligence. 

c. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message headings 

encrypted in codes or ciphers of high security gradings as specified and 

mutually agreed by USCIB and CRC. 

d. Other Traffic Intelligence as specified and mutually agreed 

by USCIB and CRC. 

7. Category II COKINT is that COMINT tor which the protection of 

source or content is not alWB.JTS the overriding consideration and tor which 

a less rigid standard of security is considered an acceptable risk. In 

general, it will include: 

a. Traffic Intelligence not speciticall:y included in other 

Categories. 

b. Crypt Intelligence involving sol'lrt.ion of codes, ciphers and 

special systans of lower securit7 as specified and mutuall.1' agreed by 

USCIB and CRC. 

8. Category I CCJUllT is that CCMINT which may be subject to the least 

stringent securit7 restrictions and which may require more extensive 

dissemination in order to provide f'or effective utilization. In general, it will include certain types or low level CCJUNT as speci:fied. and mutualq 

agreed by USCIB and CRC. 

ASSI~T OF CCMINT TO CATEOORIES 

9. In assigning CCMJNT to a Category, the following general criteria 

will be considered: 

a. The intelligence value of its content. 

b. The difficulty of solution or intercept to include: 

(1) Sensitivit7 of techniques employed. in solution and 

exploitation. 

(2) Sensitivit7 of source of intercept. 

(3) Inter-relationships between cr,yptographic s79tems. 

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c. Cryptographic sophistication of the country originating the 

traffic :involved. 

d. Security grading given to contents by the country originating the traffic involved. 

e. The advantage to be gained versus the risk of loss by 

utilization under a given Category, including: 

(1) The value of extending the dissemination of certain 

COM.INT to permit essential. use of the operational 

intelligence contained therein. 

(3) The value of providing technical guidance or C<>IINT 

:information to Third Party CCJUNT activities to 

insure receipt from them of unique intercept and 

critical COMlNT information not otherwise available. 

10. In assigning CCMINT to the lower Categories the following 

additional factors will be- considered: 

a. A system or class of COMINT, once downgraded, may not 

effectively be upgraded.. 

b. The distinction between Category I on the one hand and the 

higher Categories on the other is that the former does not require 

codeword protection, whereas the latter do. 

ll. USCIB and CBC shall have prepared and maintained in current 

status mutually agreed lists to indicate CO.MINT placed in the several 

Categories and in such Sub-Categories as may be established. 

CLASSIFICATION AND CODEW"ORDS 

12. Category III COMINT shall be classified TOP SECRET and shall 

be designated by a distinctive codeword agreed between USCIB and CRC 

and replaced. every- two years. In the event that USCIB and CRC agree 

that positive security advantages will be obtained b;y earlier change 

then such change shall be made and a new period of two years shall be 

in effect fran that date. 

l3. Categol'l II COMINT shall be classified SECREr and shall be 

designated by a distinctive codeword agreed between USCIB and CRC and 

replaced every two years. In the event that USCIB and CRC agree that 

positive security ad.vantage will be obtained by earlier change then 

such change shall be made and a new period of two years shall be in 

effect .f'ran that date. 

14. Category I CCMD"T shall be classified not lower than 

CONFIDENTIAL and shall not be designated b;y a codeword. 

15. Sub-Categories. Whenever a Sub-Category- is established within 

Categories III or II COMD"T., it shall be designated by a separate or 

auxiliary codeword agreed from time to time between USCIB and CRC. 

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16. Technical material pertaining to COMINT shall bear the classif'ication and codeword appropriate to the most highly classified and 

sensitive Category or Sub-Category of CCMINT to which it relates and 

shall be handled accordingly. 

17. Documents which reveal actual success,, progress,, or processes 

in the product.ion of COMINT shall bear the classification and codewbrd 

appropriate to the most high~ classified. and sensitive Category or Subcategory of COM.INT to which they relate and shall be handled accordingq,, 

even though such docum~ts may not reveal CCJ(INT as such. 

18. Raw traffic (i.e.,, intercepted. traffic showing no evidence of 

processing for CCJ(INT purposes beyond sorting by clear address elements,, 

elimination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of' a case number 

and/or an arbitrary traffic designator) shall be classified not lower 

than CONFIDENTIAL, need not be designated by a codeword and is understood 

not to be any specific Category of' CCMINT. 

19. Codewords. When used as such, the codewords which designate 

Categories III and II CCIUNT,, and the Sub-Categories which may be 

established within these Categories shall bear the TOP SEGRE!' or SECREr 

classification according to the Categoey. These codewords and their 

implications shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons,, nor 

shall these codewords be used in their codeword sense in the presence of' 

non-indoctrinated persons. 

SECURITY 

20. Conservation of' CCMINT sources is or supreme importance. It 

is essential,, therefore, that the production,, exploitation, and dissemination ot COM.INT,, and of all related or resultant mf'onnation, be 

strictly controlled and the dissemination appropriatel.1' limited. The 

physical security of' related documents is not alone sufficient; it is 

essential that all reference to the existence of' CCMINT, either direct 

or indirect,, be avoided except among those to whan the knowledge is 

necessary for the proper performance of' their duties. These provisions 

shall apply to any intelligence uhich, in whole or in part,, includes 

information which can be traced solely to COMINT sources. 

21. There is no time limit for the safeguarding of' CQr.JNT as 

defined herein. It is of' the utmost importance that complete and absoiute silence on all COMINT matters be maintained. by those who have ever 

been indoctrinated for CCJ.UNT. If, a.t any time, matter referring to 

CGrINT is broadcast or published,, even though by praninent people or 

those in authority, this does not in any way free those other persons 

who are, or ever have been indoctrinated for COMINT from their continuous 

obligation to maintain silence. 

22. Ex:cept as agreed b7 USCIB or CRC, all persons to be assigned. 

to duties involving C~IN'i' shall be the subject or security investigation and clearance. As an aid to the uniformity or investigations and 

clearances,, and to pr01r.ote adequate minimum. standards, each party shall 

:inronn the other of the standards prescribed by it for this purpose. 

23. A11 persons,, including intercept operators, to be assigned to 

duties involving Categories or COMINT other than Categol'T I shall be 

indoctrinated (i.e., instructed as to the nature of CGUNT and the 

security regulations and practices which govern the handling of COMINT 

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material and COMINT activities). Recipients of' Category I COMlNT only 

will not be indoctrinated. Producers of' Categoey I CD4:INT only need 

not necessarily be indoctrinated. 

a. Knowledge of' specific Categories or Sub-Categories of 

CCJfINT shall be made available to indoctrinated persons solely on the 

basis of' their "need to Jmow11 • 

b. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of 

persons indoctrinated for COMINT to the essential m.inimtDD.. 

c. It shall be permissible for persons who have access on4' 

to a less sensitive Category or Sub-Categoey of CCMINT to work within 

Agencies or Centers in which there are located other persons engaged 

in the production or exploitation of' a more sensitive Category or Subcategory Of COMINT, only BO long as due precaution shall be taken 

(by providing segregated, secure areas or otherwise) to ensure that 

the activities and knowledge of' such persons are confined to the COMINT 

material and activities to which they have access. 

24. Under extraordinaey conditions, as determined by USCIB or 

CRC, it may be essential for an individual to take up duties involving 

CCHINT before the requisite investigation can be completed. In such 

cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the 

authority only of senior officers or officials as designated by the 

respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure 

that security investigations and clearances are completed as soon as 

possible after indoctrination. 

25. Fach Party shall ensure that complete lists of indoctrinated 

persons are maintained. 

26. USCIB and CRC shall keep ea.ch other ful~ informed of' the 

approximate ntDD.ber of indoctrinated persons in each or the Departments, 

Ministries, Agencies, and Offices receiving COMINT, by Category or 

Sub-Category where applicable. 

27. No national of one Party shall be permitted access to the 

COMINT agencies or to the Categories III and n CmllNT of the other 

Party, llll.less he has been approved. by his pa.rent agency or Board and 

has been properly indoctrinated. Such access shall be limited to the 

Categories or Sub-Categories of COMINT agreed by his parent agency or 

Board. 

28. Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has 

a Jmowledge of current value about CCJ.tINT, such that his capture or 

interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of CCMINT, 

shall be assigned to or enga~e ll1 activities of' a hazardous nature. 

~. ''Hazardous activities" are those which place a person-in a 

position where he rmis a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation, e.g.: 

a. Duties behind enemy lines, or in-shore operations off 

an enmv or Iron Curtain country. 

b. Flights over enemy or Iron Curtain territory unless on 

recognized corridor routes. 

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c. Raids,, minor formation attacks,, undel'Water demolition 

operations, and service with a unit of formation forward of 

Division HQ. 

d. ]luty in or visits to Iron Curtain countries and also 

other areas where from time to time local conditions are considered 

to involve an miacceptable risk. 

e. Transit through the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria 

unless in authorized military or diplanatic transport on regular 

routes. 

30. In app:cying these principles persons who are or have been 

indoctrinated will be divided into four groups: 

a. Producers of Category I COMINT who have no knowledge 

of other Categories ~re classed as Group A. They may be assigned to 

hazardous activities only on the authority of senior officers. 

(No restrictions are applied to the recipients or non-indoctrinated 

producers of Category I CCMINT only.} 

b. Individuals who have lmowledge of current value about 

Category II CCMINT are classed as Group B. They may be assigned. to 

hazardous activities only after six months separation from such 

material. 

a. Individuals, other than those specified in subparagraph d below, who have lmowledge of current value about Category 

III CCJDNT are classed as Group C. They may be assigned. to hazardous 

activities only after a separation of one year or longer from this 

type or inf orma.tion. 

d. Individuals with precise knowledge of C<JUNT processing 

techniques, competence, or potential, regarding the more sensitive 

Category III COMINT material. are classed as Group D. They shall not 

be assigned to hazardous activities at any time. 

,31. The provisions in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 shall be applied 

only by senior officers and officials at a level to be established by 

USCIB or CRC. EXceptions shall be authorized. only after careful 

consideration in each instance of the advantages to be gained, as 

opposed to the risk involved. In considering exceptions to subparagraph ac]d, the protection offered by diplomatic status should not 

autanatically be considered sufficient 1 but should be assessed in the 

light of' the particular circumstances involved.. Any exception in the 

case of' Group D personnel must receive prior approval by the Board 

concerned. The considerations relevant to COMINT personnel serving 

with CCJ.IINT units iii exposed e.reas are dealt with in Annexure B2. 

All possible action shall be taken to dis courage or prevent any 

individual. with a lmowledge of current value about CGiINT trom. engaging in hazardous activities (as defined in paragraph 2!J above) in 

any unofficial capacity at eriy time • 

.32. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 35, 4l and 42 below, Categories III and II CCMINT shall remain exclusively in the custody of indoctrinated persons, secure f'rom examination 

by non-indoctrinated persons. 

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33. The basic principle governing the dissemination and use of 

CCMINT is the 11need to lmow". F.e.ch item of COMINT shall, therefore, be 

made lmown only to those individuals who require it in the performance of 

their duties and, except as specifically provided in paragraphs 35, 36 

and 37 below, are indoctrinated and authorized to have access to the 

particular Category or Sub-Category of CCMINT to which such item appertains. 

34. Categories of CQ4:INT other than Category I, including a:ey 

intelligence which in whole or in part. can be traced solely to those 

categories, shall be disseminated only to persons who are indoctrinated 

and authorized to have access to such material. No action based on such 

material shall be taken in.the absence of' a suitable cover to which the 

action can be attributed without connection with these CO:MINT sources. 

A suitable cover must include either the existence of similar intelligence 

fran other sources or an actual situation wherein the intelligence itself' 

can be attributed beyond reasonable doubt by non-indoctrinated persons 

(including foreign nationals) to other sources or events, such as appropriate reconnaissance during military hostilities [See NOTE iJ. 

35. There shall be no exceptions to paragraph 34 except as listed 

below. In making these exceptions, a studied effort shall be made to 

ensure that, insofar as possible, information or action cannot be 

attributed to CCJ.!INT sources and a minimum number of non-indoctrinated 

persons is involved. Such persons are to be given only the minimum 

information needed. Save as specifica.I:cy- provided for within mutua.I:cyagreed arrangements affecting third part.ies (see sub-paragraph 35c below) 

CCMINT codewords shall not be used and necessary communications shall be 

so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically to CCMINT, 

names, times, positions, and other data identical with that from origina1 

texts being omitted or carefully disguised wherever possible. If' such 

communications are to be transmitted by means exposed to interception, 

thq shall be encrypted in the most secure cryptographic channel available. 

a. Technical instructions based on COMINT of any Category- ma7 

be issued to non-indoctrinated intercept operators, including D/F, RFP 

operators and the like, without use of' the appropriate cod~rd if in such 

form and of' such nature as neither to give indication nor to permit reasonable deduction of the CCMINT origin, and provided they are essential to the 

tasks of those concerned. 

b. Weather forecasts and conclusions based in whole or in part. 

on the a.na]J'sis of maps, on which Special Weather Intelligence ffiee NOTE g has been plotted, may be issued to non-indoctrinated persons without use 

of' the appropriate codeword, but only in such form as to give no indication 

of CCMINT origin. 

c. In COMINT arranganents with third parties, Category III 

and II CXIUNT ~ be released to these Third Parties in accordance with 

the provisions of' mutually agreed arrangements affecting third parties. 

d. In the case of an ext.reme emergency in which there is an 

irmninent threat to the vital, national interests of either party-, Categoey 

III and II COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons and 

action may be taken. The determination ot a case of extreme emergency 

which justifies making this exception shall be made only at the highest 

level as established by- USCIB or CRC. Whenever action is taken under this 

paragraph both Boards shall be notified. If' Third Parties are involved or 

are likely to be involved, the prior agreanent of' both Boards shall be 

obt.ained whenever time permits. 

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e. In the case of' an emergency involving a matter of' importance 

to the national security of' either party, Category II COMINT mq be 

disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons and action may be taken. The 

determination of a matter of' sufficient importance to justify making this 

exception shall be made on:cy- by senior officers or officials at a level to 

be established by USCIB or CRC. Whenever action is taken under this 

paragraph both Boards shall be notified. If' Third Parties are involved or 

·are likely to be involved., the prior agreement of both Boards shall be 

obtained. whenever time permits. 

f. The exceptions described in sub-paragraphs 35d and 35e above 

shall be made only upon a detemination that the advantages to be gained 

clearly justify the risk of compromise of the CCHINT source and the e.:xtent 

of the loss which would probably follow such a compromise. In making this 

determination, due regard shall be given to: 

(1) The availability of suitable cover. 

(2) The relative val.ue of' the particular COMINT source 

involved. and the possibilit7 that its compromise 

Dla.7 lead to the loss of' other COMlNT sources, 

particularly those which are more valuable. 

(3) The possible repercussions on current and future 

operations and also on other conmands and areas. 

g. When it is essential to operations directly related to the 

national security of either party, action mq be taken based on such 

Category II plain text as agreed by both parties, and such co.MINT may be 

included. in documents and operational directives not carrying a CCJlllNT 

codeword, provided that there is adequate reason why the recipients should 

not be indoctrinated. This exception shall be made only under the following conditions: 

.,. 

(1) All precautions must be taken to ensure that COMINT 

does not thereby come to the knowledge of Third Parties •. 

(2) The advantages to be gained are sufficiently great 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

to justify the risk to the COM.INT source. 

The information could reasonably be attributed by nonindootrinated persons (including foreign nationals), to 

other sources-agent, attache-defector, and the like. 

The COMINT origin of the information is not stated. 

Whenever possible and plausible the information shall 

be specifically attributed. to other sources. 

The determination of a matter of' sufficient importance 

to justify" these exceptions shall be made onl1' by 

senior officers or officials at a level to be established 

by USCIB or CRC. 

USCIB or CRC shall be notified by the Agency concerned 

when action is taken under this sub-paragraph. 

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,36. Category I CCMINT may be disseminated in accordance with the 

normal practice of each Party as regards intelligence materials of' 

similar classifications. However, it may, not be passed to Third Party 

recipients except as provided in paragraph 37 below, and must be handled accord.in~. It is recognized that this dissemination will involve loss 

of control by COMillT authorities . but every ef'f'ort shall be made to 

ensure that the following provisions are enforced to the maximum extent 

possible. 

a. Whenever Category I COMINT is to be transmitted by a means 

exposed to interception, it shall normally be transmitted in an appropriate cryptographic system. It may be transmitted in plain language onl.7 when there is no suitable means of secure communication available 

and when there is an urgent operational need to do so. Whenever possible 

such plain language transmissions shall be in the form of operational 

orders so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically 

to its CCllINT origin. 

b. In taking action based on Category I CCJIINT care shall be 

taken not to risk the COMillT source mmecessari:cy. Whenever possible, 

efforts shall be made to devise a suitable cover. 

37. Category I CCMINT may be disseminated to Third Party recipients 

under the following conditions: 

a. In CO.MINT arrangements with Third Parties, Category I CGDNT 

miq be released to these Third Parties in accordance with the provisions 

of mutually agreed arrangements affecting Third Parties. 

b. During active hostilities or in the case of an emergency 

involving a matter of importance to the national security of either 

Party, Category I CCMINT may be disseminated to nationals of Third Parties 

who are engaged directly with the U.S. orl lin these hostilities or 

are allied directly with the U .s. orl 1 lh dialing with the emergency 

concerned. The determination of a requirement to make this exception and 

the authority to grant this exception shall.lie only with senior officers 

or officials at a level to be established by USCIB or CRC. 

,3S. In the event that either Party produces individual items of 

COMINT which, by reason or the extreme sensitivity of their source or 

content shall be given a more limited dissem.ina.t.ion than would normally be 

given to the Category or Sub-Category or C(Jf.[NT within which they- faJ.1, 

it will be f'or the originating party to indicate the nature of the special 

hand.ling desired and to request that the other Party afford similarly 

limited dissam:l.nation. 

39. Category III and II COMINT shall never under any circumstances 

or in any form be disseminated to 8l1Y' Ministry, •Department 1 Agency, 

Organization, Office, or individual from which or from whom it might 

reasonably be expected to find its way, officially or extra-officially, into the possession of any person or group who could use it for commercial 

competition or commercial gain or advantage. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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PROCEDURES 

40. The appropriate classification and codeword shall: 

a. Appear on every sheet or paper which contains or discloses 

Category III or II CCJUNT or a Sub-Category thereof', technical. material 

pertaining to these Categories and Sub-Categories and docmnents which 

reveal actual success, progress or processes in their production. Except 

as provided in paragraph 35 above, this rule applies to maps and ch.arts 

on which are plotted data and information derived from these categories 

of COMINT. 

b. Be encrypted in the text or eveey encrypted. communication 

conveying Category III and II CCMINT and appear in plain language at the 

head or the decrypted version. This rule shall apply in all instances 

except as provided in paragraph 35 above and 'llllder the following 

conditions: 

., 

fl ,., 

(1) CCJUNT agencies mq, without encrypting the appropriate 

codeword in the encrypted text,, transmit TOP SECRE.r and 

SECREr technical matter over cryptographic channels or 

ciphers expressly and exclusively provided. tor such 

technical matters. 

( 2) CCMlNT agencies and intercept or D/F stations may, 

at the discretion or the officer in charge and after 

full consideration or the risks involved to the source, 

omit the classification and the appropriate codeword 

f'ran its work-sheets and similar documents used 

exclusively within each agency or station. The classi0 fication may be anitted f'rom raw traffic passed between 

agencies or from intercept and D/F stations to agencies. 

41. Category III CCMINT and related technical material shall not be 

transmitted in plain language 1except as follows: 

a. Sealed, by saf'ehand channels, over routes specitical'.cy' 

approved. by USCIB or CRC. Each Board shall inform the other of' all approved 

routes involving transport across territory of a third party, the approval 

ot such routes to be held to the necessary minimum. 

b. Over landlines specif'ically approved. in each instance 'bJ' 

USCIB or CRC. 

c. over completely protected local communication systems exclusively intemal to agencies or offices producing or utilizing CCJ.UNT. 

42. Category II CCMINT and related technical material shall not be 

transmitted. in plain language except as provided in paragraph 41 above, or 

by protected. postal channels internal to, or under exclusive control of 

the US, and Canada or other collaborating British COJJDDonwealth countries. 

43. Category I COMINT and related technical material should be 

transmitted by C~INT channels wherever possible, but may be transmitted 

by conventional channels used tor intelligence materials or similar 

classification. It shall not be transmitted. in plain language by" a means 

exposed to interception, except as provided in sub-paragraph 36a above. 

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44. Raw traffic may be transmitted in plain language as provided in 

paragraphs 41 and 42 above. Raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL may 

also be transmitted in accordance with the normal procedure for this 

classification, except that when transported across the territory of the 

country originating the traffic, it shall be with the express sanction or 

USCIB or CRC. This sanction will be granted only in cases of compelling 

need. 

45. Except as provided in paragraph 35 above: 

a. Category III COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic 

channels expressly provided for these subjects. 

b. Category II COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic 

channels expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in paragraph a 

above, or in the most secure cryptographic channel available. 

c. However, in the case of cryptographic systems mutually 

approved for the purpose, the transmission of COMINT related technical 

matters and raw traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that 

such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively. 

46. In order to facilitate a concerted effort directed toward the 

determination and assessment of the causes and effects of known or presumed 

COMINT compromises or losses, it is agreed that: 

a. Whenever any breach of its COMJNT security regulations or 

any other circumstance which in fact has, or can be presumed to have, 

compromised COMINT or COMINT codewords, or to have revealed COMINT 

successes to unauthorized persons, becomes known to either Party, it shall 

inform the other by means of a report embodying the pertinent f'acts and 

conclusions in each case, except that when the Party concerned concludes 

that there is a good reason to believe that such compromise or revelation 

has not reached and will not, in fact, reach foreign nationals, no report 

need be made to the other Party. 

b. Whenever a significant change occurs in foreign cryptographic or communications security, the Party discovering such change 

shall notify the other. Each Party shall then analyze and assess the 

known and suspected circumstances having a bearing upon the change; these 

analyses and assessments shall be exchanged by the Parties; and each 

Party shall thereafter keep the other fully informed of a:ny additional 

information bearing upon the case. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Top S:mm"l J!B91H PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Note l 

Notes to Appendix B 

Throughout this Appendix 

a. "Foreign communications" are understood to mean those ot the 

Government, or ot arry military, Air or Naval torce, faction, party, department, agency or bureau of a :foreign country, or any- person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor, and shall include commercial and private 

communications originated by nationals of a foreign country which :may contain intormation or military, econcmdc, politic,U, or counter intelligence 

value. 11Foreign country" is understood to include a o t ie whet er 

or not their governments are recognized by the US or 

b. "Technical material" is understood to mean data concerning: 

(1) cryptographic systems, 

(2) communications procedures and methods, 

(3) methods and equipment, as used in or designed f'or 

COMINT processes, 

and information related to arry of the above. 

c. For purposes of this Appendix. "Communications intelligence" does 

not include the interception and study of non-communications transmissions. 

Note 2 In order to facilitate and control the dissemination of CCMINT 

conceming weather to meteorological {met) authorities and to distinguish 

it from other Crypt and Traf'f'ic Intelligence, with which these authorities 

are not concerned, such COMINT is termed Special Weather Intelligence. 

a. "C<JfINT conceming weather" is that CCMINT derived from Communications which contain meteorological data, hydro-meteorological data and/or 

information concerning meteorological organizations and activities. It does 

not include published b1oadcasts of' the World Meteorological Organization 

(WMO) transmitted in unenciphered WMO codes. 

b. "Special Weather Intelligence" is that COMINT conceming weather 

'Which is disseminated to met organizations, except that: 

(1) CCMINT concerning weather which would normally be 

disseminated to met organizations mq, when derived from 

selected communications as specifically agreed between 

USCIB and CRC, be treated as Crypt Intelligence. 

{2) CQtIINT concerning weather which is derived .fran Category I 

CCJ[[NT sources {see paragraphs 5 and 8) and disseminated. - to met organizations may be treated either as Special 

Weather Intelligence or as Category I Crypt or Traffic 

Intelligence as appropriate. 

(3) Co.MINT concerning weather which is dissaninated to both 

met and non-met organizations may, in the latter instance, 

be treated as Crypt or Traffic Intelligence as appropriate. 

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Note 3 Paragraph 34 shall be so interpreted as to allow: 

a. The use of CQIINT by indoctrinated persons in the preparation of 

National Intelligence Estimates, JIC appreciations and similar documents 

issued without COMINT codewords,, as specified by either party, provided. 

the statements contained in them. are so generalised that they cannot be 

traced to a particular item of COMD1T or to their COMD1T origin. Specific 

CQIINT detail must be reat~icted to supporting papers carrying the COMINT 

codeword.. 

·. 

b. Target information derived from COMINT, for which there is suitable cover, to be entered on maps and in target folders issued withouli 

COMM codewords, but only in such f'om. as does not indicate or reveal the 

COMINT origin. 

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APPENPIX B 

ANNl!jAOYRE Bl 

THE J8SIGNMEN% Cl COOtJT 

:ro QATEGmm ANP SPB - CATEGC?RJJiiS 

1. This .Annexure delineates the basis for (a) the establishment of 

Sub-Categories (b) the assignment of CCMINT to Categories and Subcategories, (c~ the classification of' CCMINT assigned to Category I 

and (d) the application of' codewords to designate Sub-Categories, as 

provided in paragraphs So, 5-8, 14 am 15 of Appen.clix B respectively. 

This .Aune:mre is not intended to specify or accomplish the detailed 

oategorizat101'1 of all CGfINT. However, along with the criteria 

described in paragraphs 9 and 10 of' Appendix B, it governs the preparation 

and maintenance of current, mutually agreed lists, which are required 

llDder paragraph 11 of .Appendix B, to indicate the precise assigmnen.t ot 

all CCJaNT to Categories and Sub-Categories. 

2. Cat@gory I shall contain: 

a. Traffic intelligence relating to D/F mission assignments, 

bearing reports and fix reports (i.e.: target !requencies, 

call-signs, Rpiped signal.an, other signal in:f'ormaticm, 

bearings end fixes), provided that no interpretations of' 

canplex changing call-sign system.a are included. This material 

shall normally be classi:f'ied COO'lDENTIAL. 

b. Plain-text tactical or operational traffic provided that no 

interpretations of complex changing call-sign systems, 

enciphered map references, or results of advanced traffic 

analysis are included. This material Bh&ll :Lnclude local 

procedural 8lld local grid 8lld zone systems used for artillery 

direction, tactical control and movement of fr0I1t line units, 

early trarning and exercise of tactical com.bat control of' 

aircraft. This material shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL. 

c. Traffic Intelligence or Crypt Intelligence from analysis 

of radar tracking reports and visual observation reports as 

found in tactical or operationaJ. traffic, provided that 

enciphered aircraft type designations or interpretations 

of' complex ohenging call sign systems are not included. 

Inclusion of' local grid or zone references, local procedural 

codes used for brevity and plain-text interspersed with 

caver words is permissible. This material shall normally 

be classified CONFIDENTIAL. 

d. Crypt Intelligence from naval tactical maneuver lng codes, 

when used as such, and from jargon codes. This material 

shall normally be classified CONFIDENTIAL. 

e. CCMINT concerning weather which is derived from Category. I 

camT sources, as referred to in NOI'E 2b to .Appendix B, 

includes only that CamT described in sub-paragraphs 2b 

and 2c above. 

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W'f genr;r fRem 

3. Qategpa II shall contain 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

a. Traffic Intelligence (including free:cy available privacy 

and brevity systems such as commercie1 codes) except where 

specifically assigned to other Categories. Category II 

plain-text which qualifies for exceptional. handling under 

paragraph 35g of .Appendix B shall include ~ such of the 

following as is not assigned to Category III under subparagrapha 4d am 4e ?°low: 

b. Crypt Intelligence specifically assigned on the basis of 

crypto-systems. USCIB and CRC shall have supplemdtary lists 

of all cryptosystems mutue.J.l.y adjudged suitable for inclusion 

in this Category kept jointly in current status by their 

respective teclmical. groups. These lists shall be based upon 

the criteria in su't>-paragraphs 9a, b, c, and d,\and paragraph 

lO of Appendix B. Either Party JDB:3'i after consideration of 

advantages and risks as provided in subparagraph\9e of 

Appendix B, assign any crypto-system currently so\ listed to 

Category II. The other Party shall then be notified 

immediately through the technical oha?lnel used in maintaining 

the joint lists, and shall similarly assign the cryptosystem involved. 

4. Categorr III shall contain: 

a. Crypt Intelligence except where specifically assigned to 

other Categories. 

b. Traffic Intelligence involving call-signs or message 

headings encrypted in codes or ciphers ot high security 

grading. 

c. Traffic T.ntelligence involving such combination (•fusion•) 

of separate Traf'f'ic Intelligence or other Category II 

sources as produces in:rormation whose value is so great that. 

security of' content becomes the overriding consideration. 

e. Material involving sensitive collectio.n procedures or the 

revelation or success against unusual, sensitive or complex 

transmission procedures and devices. 

S. Sub-Categories shall be established as follows: 

a. Within Category- II - None. 

b. Within Category- III 

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(1) Special Weather Intelligence /.See NarE 2b to 

Appendix I1J. This Sub-Category shall be 

designated by a separate codeword, and shall 

(2) 

be considered less sensitive than the main body 

of Category III. 

3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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,APPENDIX B 

ANNEXURE B2 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

§liCYRITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF COONT ACTiyITIF.s IN 

' 

IDxPCSED AREAS 

l. INTRODUCTION 

It is recognized that effective interception of foreign communications and effective support of field commanders may require th.e establishment of COMINT activities in locations which may suddenly fall under unfriendly control with consequent loss or COMINT personnel and/or associated 

classified materials. It is agreed that, in addition to the pertinent, 

general p:rovisions of Appendix B, the specific provisions which follow 

shall govern the conduct of OQ.UNT activities in such locations. 

2. DEFIN!TIONS 

Exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly 

overrun by enemy forces or those wherein the local political or military 

situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the aeourity of CQ.ITNT 

activities conducted therein • .....__ _________ ____. con ro area Jacen o e e 

lifhich are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable. In proportion to 

the risk of loss of CO!{[NT personnel and/or classified material located 

therein, such areas involve three situations: 

a. Protected situations, i.e.: those in which there is no 

reasonable expectation or such a loss. 

b. Ris1cv situations, i.e.: those in which it is likely that 

complete evacuation or COMINT personnel and removal or 

effective destruction of classified material will be 

accomplished. 

c. Dangerous sitμations, i.e.: those in which it is unlikely 

that complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal 

or effective destruction of classified material will be 

accomplished. 

3. EVAI.UA.TION OF SITUATIONS IN EXPOSED ARE.AS .. 

The decision whether a given situation is protected, risky or 

dangerous shall be made by USCIB or CRC, or by such other authorities as 

are responsible for the security of the COMINT activities concerned, and 

shall be made in the light of the political, military, and other factors 

affecting the safety of the CCMINT personnel and ma~erials involved. 

4. FAQTORS AFfECTING DECISIONS TO CONDUCT COONT AQTIVITIES DJ 

RISKY OR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS 

COMINT activities shall be conducted in risky or dangerous 

situations only after due consideration of the Co.MINT losses which may 

result if the area concerned is suddenly attacked, and of the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of CO!{[NT activities elsewhere. 

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5. SAFEOVAIJDS FOR RISKY srrUATIONS 

In the case of Ccm:NT activities established in risky situations, 

the following saf egu.ards shall be applied save as excepticma to them 

are specifically approved by USCIB or CRC: 

a. Oaly intercept, ene.qtic and reporting tasks which cannot 

be performed satisfactorily in saf'e or protected situations 

shall. be assigneci.. 

b. No Category III CCKCNT or related documents and techn:l.cal 

material shall be held except those essential to the 

assigned task and ot current application thereto, and the 

latte1· shall be maintained in such condition as lio insure 

immediate destruction, if necessary, upan.•sudden threat of 

seizure. 

c. No person in Group D, as defined in sup-paragraph 30d of 

Appendix B, Bhall be assigned, unless required by technical 

con.sic':.erations. 

d. Facilities shall be provided \d.th which one-third of the cpmplement can be expected. to destroy e.t'tectiv~, if necessary, all 

classified CGUNT materials within a time limit commensurate with 

existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in 

the use of these facilities. 

e. Appropriate steps shall. be taken to insure that adequate 

arrangements are made tor sate evacuation of all personnel 

whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in questicm 

is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis. 

6. S.AFEQJIARDS FOR DANGEROUS SrrUATICJiS 

In the case of CCMJ:NT units established 1n dangerous situations 

the tallowing saf'egu.ards shall be applied save as exceptions to them are 

spec:lfioa.J.ly approved b,y USCIB or CRC: 

a. Qil.y unique intercept tasks which cannot be a.coamplished 

elsew:t .. ere shall be assigned, and only suah a.naJJ'sis as is 

loca.J.ly required to so.pport these tasks and permit essential 

technical. reporting eh.all be performed. 

b. Only CCMCNT doci.mients or techn:l.cal aids essential and ot 

current application to these tasks shall be held. 

o. No Category III CQ·fINT or related documents and teclm1cal 

material shall be held. 

d. Personnel technically informed in. OamT of a higher level 

or broader scope than is required for the limited mission 

ot the unit shouJ.d not be assigned it avoidable. 

e. No person in Group C as defined in sub-paragraph .30o 

of Appendix B shall be assigned unless his presence is 

vital for the effective functioning ot the unit. 

t. No person in Group D as defined in sub-paragraph 30d 

of Appendix B ah.all be assigned in erry' circumstances. 

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g. Facilities shall be provided. with which the min1nnnn. number 

ot persons on. duty' at fl"7 one time can be e:l'pected to destroy eftective4r1 if necessar.r, all classif'ied OCMCNT 

materials within a time limit commensurate with md.stblg 

dBDgers, and unit persomel shall be skilled 1n the use 

ot these tac:Ui ties. 

h. Appropriate steps sha.ll be taken to insure that the unit 

1n question. is kept il'lf orm.ed of evacuation. plans on. a 

current basis. 

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APPENP:a B 

WAYRE Bl . MINlMUH §TANDgDS [QR INVESTmATmr 

MQ m.EARANQ1S (I' PEBSCliS TO BE INDCX}TRINA.TED FOR COODT AQTimW 

1. With reference to paras 22 mi 23 or Appendix B, it is 

mutually agreed that the mininnmi standards for investigation and 

clearance of each person. who handles or has access to CCMCNT material 

or information will be· as follows: 

a. He shall be of excellent character and discretion, 

end of unquestioned loyalty. There shell be no 

exception to this requirement. 

b. He should be a citizen Qf the U.S., Canada or the UK 

and the members 0£ his immediate f'mn:lly should also 

be citizens thereof. 

c. . He should have no member of his immediate family 

or person to whan. he :mq reascmably be supposed 

to be bound by ties of af'f'ection, kinship, or 

obligation, who is of dubious l.oJal.V• 

d. He should have no member of his :Immediate family 

or person to whom. he ~ reasonab:l:Jr be supposed to 

be bound by ties or affection, kinship, or obligation, 

who is a resident or a citizen at a foreign country 

having basic or critical national interests opposed to 

those at the u.s. and Canada. 

Emeptions to any of the foregoing requirements except the first lllB1' 

be made only in a case of compelling need after every reascmable 

assurBl'lCe has been obtained that, in the circumstances, the security 

risk involved is warranted. 

2. To permit evaluation on. the basis ·or the foregoing requirements, 

a thorough investigation shall be oOJlducted as expeditiousl;r as 

practicable, covering a sufficiently' long period at the subject's life 

as to insure to the complete satisfaction of the clearing Agency that 

no reasonable doubt exists as to the security reliability of the 

SU.bject. 

3. Each person. who is to be cleared for CCMCNT sbaJ.l be 

thoroughly and carefully instructed in the doctrine and principles 

ot CCKCNT protection, and in the regulations which govern. the dissemination and safeguarding of OC!fiNT, and shall be required to 

subscribe to an oath or declaration of secrecy. 

4. When a person• s •need to know" has ceased, he shall be 

debarred fran .t'urtb.er access to OOONT activities or results, end 

be required to subscribe to a final oath or declaration. of' secreey. 

5. Persona cleared f'or O<MCNT and retaining that status over 

a long period of time shall be the subject of such continuing investigative checks and security surveillan.ce as investigative facilities permit. 

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