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PL<86~36/50USC 3605 

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Enclosure l 

OUTLlJ'IB OF Tli.LK GN Groru..L STRUCTURE IN '\Vll.R 

11! Mr~ I !.t .. T JX•F~S.A. - W.AY I 1921.: 

These views t.ook shEl,.pe atl I oniy th~ day before I 

left. They have n0t boendiscu~sed with the Services a:nariu.st not be 

roe,arded as the off':i.cial v:i.ews o:rl···... I, ouch less those of'I I 

They deal only rr.i. th Sl'ne tundar.lental p):'J.nciples as a basis frcn 'Which 

:Uri t:i.sh thinlo.nG will n.ow proceed • 

2. . Whether we likt:.\it orlunp.it N.J...T.O.,nakes sa:ie co-operation 

in Sig.nt m.. th othor N • .A. T.O, powers l.nescapable~ Indeed, sane such 

co-operation oa.y well be Elssentialfor th.e.effective.funct:i.oning of tho 

N • .t .. -T.O. COT'lI'lands. Furthemore~ecur:L,ty risks cc..uld be reduced 

by 1ns1st1ng on the adoption oft_____jfll.I11f.1UI:i security preca~t10ns. For the 

purgoses cf this co-ope1at1on Sigint should be.sharply dJ.vided into 

two lm.r.grade and h131l-grade. In sorie WclYS this <hvision mlLbe 

expensive and in sane Yiays J.net'f':i.cient but we believe it to be uno.v.qidable. 

It will .. bo 00.s:i.c to this co-operation WJ.th N.4.T.G. ~owe.rs that u.s. i I 

relations should continue to be founded on thel _Agreenent. 

3. Dy low-srade and hi[;11-zrade we nean respectively those ta~ks 

VTlUch can be successfully explo:i. tcd by the resources of' field organisations 

and those whose successful exploitation requ:i.rcs the nuch greater ... an_d __ _ 

nore higlly qualified resources uf a National Centre (1 ... F.S.JL. orl t• 

Xt is not necossnry to be oore precise o. t this sta.Go• In the event, 

this rather Va[;Ue dJ.vifu.ng ll.ne will not be fu.f'ficult to draw generally 

speaking fielC. orc;a.m.sat1ons WJ.11 not fn.tter away their resources on taslcs 

wh:r.ch can offer thElM. no return, nnd J.f', exceptionally, they a.o, corr(,ctive 

1 neo.surE:.s •.can be found• For convenience in this context let us call 

lm.-graa.e, •y• and hi£~crade1 'SiBJ.nt• • 

4. In 'Y' th.ere should be whatever co-operetion with other N.1 ... T.O. 

powers the ruli to.ry situation denandse In S:i.gin~ co-operc ticn should be 

l:initcd to disscmnation according to strict need in sone disguised forri.. 

Let us ta~e 'Y' first. 

5. For sJ.nplicity in illustration I propose to take a purely 

an:iy conoand structure cf three levels and of three nationalities - one 

U.S., o~ ja.rny \11th the apprcpriate international 

Hi3h Ca ~a; l'hG p!'!Onciple! wJuld apply to obh.ar ani.ed forces, to ~ore or fC\vor levels. and to nore nationalities. 

6. Ea.ch Corps would have a 'Y' Unit under its co"lI'la.nd,intercept:i.ng 

and procossin£; for and dl.ssern.nating to the Corps H.~. Ea.ch .Amy would 

SJ.rll.larly have a larger 'Y 1 Unit under its coT!II'land, perf orrnng tho sane 

service fur t11c Amy H. r.... but o.le.o Getting back '1.S necessnry traffic ancl 

natcrial fron the Corps Units, cu-ordinating and studying the wholEl, and 

feeding back to these latter Units technical hel~ such as callsign and 

crypt recuvcries etc. .l.t both levels thE..se units "AJUld be national and 

ncno-servico. 

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7. With the !hejl Connand th.ere woulc be a 1Y1 Centre, interceptinG 

arrd processing for and fu.sseninating tc the H.(.. but also, at;a,in, and. 

probably D s J. ts prJ.r'l..a.ry function getting bo.ck as necessary traffic anJ. 

natcrial frcin 1Jl.c forwerd Um.ts, co-ordJ.no.tint; and studyinG the whole, 

a~d foecb.ng forward technical h~lp. In certain ciTcUJ'lstances the 'Y' Centre 

m__ht .ccly entirely on tho fo!"W'>rd um. ts fo.c the interception of traffic. 

There w1ulU. be provision for co-0peration between 'Y1 Centres in 

dJ..fferent theatres, either direct or thr0ugh National Centres. The 'Y1 

Ct..ntrc i. culd be international and I:li:;h.t be intE-r-service (including 

navt-1 and o.:i.r force elerients as well as amy). It wt.uld be suborc.b.note 

to the Hi[h Cocna.nd in the area (not to ~.F.S.A. or~ p. At 

this level there "VLuld probably also be a 1Y1 COMMJ. tee, international 

ana intcr-sorv:L.ce, and including representatives of the Nationa.l Si31nt 

authorities concerned., for the purpose of qo-ord.J.no.ting 'Y' a9tivities 

in the area • • - c 

B. Behind these 'Y1 Centres there wuuld be the National Centres -

.L. .• F. s.11.. j I I count.erpart. / Their function townrds 

these 'Y' centI"es w .... mu oe tr!Ut 01 ~technical help fro:r.t the:i.r wider 

reco~ces and studies, like the help fed fonvn.rd by tlj.e 1Y1 Centres 

thenselves to 'Y' Urits. For this purpose the National Centres should 

have the rijlt to h~ve sent back :f'rm all theatres whatever rmf traffic 

anc other naterial they require. 

9. There reriains one possible link in the 'Y1 oha~n - a N.~.T.O. 1Y1 Dua.rd for the cc-ordl.no.tion of 'Y' in all theatres, presunably 

loco.ted ·with the Sto.ndl.nc Gr:up 1ti Uash1ngton (to becu::ie Cco.b1ned Chiefs 

of Staff)• r 

"' 

10. In Si~int, full u.s. ~1 lcollaboration as at present is 

assuned. In regard to other N.14ir.L1. poWers, hmrever, it is proposed, 

as has been said, thai collabo.cation should be b.rn.ted to chsseI:1.ination 

a.ccordinG to strict need in a. da.sguise(i fom,and that the processes of 

procluction shculc! rcnsin .national secrets. ad.ditionally, there would 

be ar~nts for supplying unfu.si:;u1sed. S:i.gint .. to the N.l'-• T. O. Conna.nds 

on a eyes only" basis. •.So vast are the resources likely to be 

necessary or successful explo:itotion of Sigint that the cor.ipo.ratively 

puny rosotirces of 0ther N.L.T.O. powers are unlikely to have a quid pro quo 

tu offer for u.s. -1 I secrets, and pressure for such an exchan[;e 

shc.ulu be resisted. t::1• owever, to be borne in ru.nd thet the 

res ure o. behalf of • / s o. oenber of the Sta.ndine; Group ( t<i becone 

rtL.[Jl.t\ cunceiva y •.· e beyond successful resistance. \~'here 

.......,Ju"'"'s=i,,..,..,i,..,e...,,..., ... the. re ni. [}:it be l.:i.n .. ·.1te.d co-o.peration with other National Centres 

in the collcc.tion \Of raw traffic ( (.• g.[ D • \\ 

11. It is\.to be hoped that in/the interests of the best overo.11 

effort, -U.S. andl lagonc::i.es will cut out unnecessary aupl1co.t1on 

both in production ancl clJ.ssern,natJ.on that, as last tine, ..... F. s.1 ..... vn.11 

concentmte on certa.ir1 ta..sk:S and! I on others, and that U.S. o.nd I lac,,ioncies will in ceHaJ.:O. cases do the d.J..ssemnation to tho forces 

of the other. Sii;int woulqibe>dJ.sseninated to intelligence staffs through 

GCU' s er SSO' e: on sJ.nJ.la.r ·· .. Jb.nes to la.st tl.I'le. It is hoped that there 

would be a f'roe cxcha,nge .of//personnel bdvrec.n "'""• :F'·~~k.. andl I in this 

schone cf things. 

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12. There I"lJ.eht be a need for forward S~hint processing centres 

for certain tasks • for exanple if there were a task sin1l~r to the old 

Lon&f'ellc.w, -which would present an l.I'lpossible prcblco if all traffic 

had tc. be tr~nsID..ttcd back to the N~tional Oentr~. Such a forward 

centre vtould be a subc.rd.J.m.te a:ency of the National Centre {.L ... F.S A. or 

I D nnd be directed by its pa.cent, 

13. It is to be e:x:-~ectea tha.t info.r:na.tion of technical vnlue to 

'Y' Centres would. bocOM.e available f'ron Sigint, e.g. callsign rotas, 

keys etc,.WJ.thin l:uuts and subJect to sat1sf1ctory safeguards, this should 

be sent tc, tho 'Y' Centres nthcut disclosure of the source by tho 

National Centre conccmed or possibly by its forward suborchnete agency. 

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TC>P SECRET 
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~IGH 

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'y'aoARD 

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ENCLDSUICE Z 

NATIONAL AND 

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N4.T/ONAL. 

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PL86;,,36/50 USC 3605 • 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/1763 

Enclosure 1 

QUTtINE OF TALK CN GLOl3J;!L STRUOTUl<E IN \"1/11.R ml I ;~T 4.F.S9lt... - W..H.Y, 195111 

Thcse\.views took sha,p~ atJ I. only the (lf3.Y before I 

le··. ft. \\·· .. They have n0t·· .. bo·c· .. n di·· .. scus.sed wi· .. th thc···i Sernces and f'l\lS~ not be rcgarderl as the off'.icial views of I ··..... ~ I"'Uoh less those of! I 

They deal only "\n. th sr ..ne . fundanental principles as a basis frcn which 

,____,_ _ ___.I thinkini; will now proceed.. 

2. Whether we like it or lunp it N.1... T. o. :cakes sor.ie co-opera ti on 

in SiGJ.nt with other N .~t. T9 o. powers inescapable. lJ1deed, sono such 

co-operation nay "ell be essentialfor the effective f'unct;t.onlng of tho 

N.i~. T. o. COI1J""lands. Furthemor.e, tho secu~ty nslrs cuuld. be reduced 

by insistinG on the adoption oft Jmru.r.iUD security preoa\l.tions. For the 

purposes cf this co-upeiation Sig:i.nt sho\11d be sharply dl.vided into 

two ·•··.. lm,.grade vnd hi&i-grade. In sOMe :ways th:i,.s division 11.r.i.ll "}:)e 

expensive and. in sane "\iays inefficient but we believe it to be unavo:LCla.ble. 

It -..r.i.11 bo bo.sic to thJ.s co-operation vr.1:ch N."'" ... T.O. pOVlers that u.s. '"'0 

rel .. ,tions should continue to be founded• on the! LA.greenent. 

3. Dy lovr- ~rade and hir;h-erade 1tte nean respectively those tar.ks 

which.can be successfully exploited by the resources of i'1eld.ori;anisat1ons 

and those whose successful exploito.tion requires the nuch greater,...a ... n .... d......__....., 

nore hi&hly qua.lifl.cd resources uf a National Centre (~.F.S.b.. ori D• 

It 1s not necosspry to be oore precise o.t this sta.Ge• ln the event, 

this rather VaQle d1v1dJ.nc llne ~~11 not be difficult to draw eenerally 

spenkinr:. f'ielC. ort;a.m.sat:.i.ons VJJ.11 not fritter away their resources on tasks 

which can offer then no return• o.nd if', exceptionally, they do, corrc.ctive 

ncasur€ls co.n be found, For convem.el'lce in this c0ntext let us call 

lo-i, ... gra.de 'Y' and hirh-grade 1Sii:;:tnt 1 • 

4. In tyt there should. be wha.tcver co-operation with other N.i ... T.O. 

powers thG nilito.ry situation deno.nas. In Sigint co-operction should be 

lJ.ni tcd to dJ.sscnina ti on accordJ ng to .str:i.ct .need in sone d:LsguisE.d forn. 

Let us take 'Y' first. 

5. • For s1.0plic1ty in J.llustra.tion I propose. to take a purely 

axny co~I~d structure ofwvels and of three nationalities - one 

~.s., oncl land one a:n-w with the appr~priate international 

HiGli Co"l"1M!l.na:; '!'he pn.nci ld apply to otlier amed forces, to :r.iore 

or fewer levels, and to nore nationalities. 

6. Eo.ch Corps wuuld have a 'Y' Unit under its connand,intercepting 

and proccssinG for and dJ.ssernmtJ.n£ to the CoIJ?s H.~. &.ch Amy would 

SJ.I1J.larly have a la.c[,er 'Y' Unit under its cornnana.,perform..ng tho sa.ne 

sel'VJ..ce fur tho .£.1.rrly H. ' .... but also Getting be.ck as necessary traffic ancl 

Material frOf'I tho Corps Units, co-ordJ.natin& and studying the ~hole, and 

feeding back to these latter Units technical help such as callsign and 

crypt recoveries etc. i~t both levels these units ~~uld be naticn~l and 

n-no-servicc. 

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···•··pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

7. \ \vi th the I:IJ.[)J. 0oI1I'la.nd th.ere •'{(..uld. be a tyt C en.tre, interceptinr; 

and processing fo.c and dJ.ssonina.ting tc the H.< .... //but also, again, and 

probll.bly D s its pr:i.n.a..cy function getting back a.s• necessary traffic anJ. 

nat.orittl f'rcn tho fo:n'1r'rd Um.ts, co-ordinutine. and study.:i.ni; the whole, 

and \.feeding fo.cwn.rd technical help. In certain .ci:rouristances the 'Y' Centro 

ru.Jrt; rely entirely on the foI'\m.rd un.its f :Jr the/ interception of traff:i.c. 

There \Woult'\be provision for co-upera ti.on betwccm 'Y 1 Centres in 

chf'fer(.nt theatres, either director thruugb. N~tiona.l Centres. The 1y1 

Centro ..,culd h.e international and. I!lis}lt he/inter-service (:i..ncluding 

naval·· .. and. 1:11!' for ..c .. e elenents .·as well a .. ·s······/a····my·)·· .. ·.·.•.··• .. ··:tt···tuia. beruborib.rnte to the Hi(h Conna.nd. in the area (not to lii.F.S.Ii.. or •. ). l-1-t 

this\levelthere u-1.:uld. probably also/be/a. 1-y;t COMMJ. ee) in ernatioral 

ana. inter-scrnce, and includl.nt; repres.ent8 t;t vcs of the Na tioml Sig:i.nt 

authonties \.concerned, f.ur the purpose/of co-ordinating 'Y' activities 

in the\area. 

s. \\ Q·. \ /ese 'Y' Centres thereMuuld be the National Centres -

1 .. F. S.li.., \ and thel /counterpart. Their function to"Wttrds 

those 'Y'\ entres wwulc be time Oii technical help fron their wider 

recources\and stucht.s, like the help fed fonv'lrd by the 'Y' Centres 

the.nselves\ to 1Y1 Uri.ts. For th:J.s pux:Pose the Nab.anal Centres should 

have the rii:ht to h.11ve sent /back frm /a,ll that> tres whatever mv1 traffic 

and other nateria.l they require. 

9. There rcnainsionc possible link 1n the 'Y' oha.:tn - a N 1 ... T.o. 

1Y1 Duard for the co-ord:Lnat.1on of i'Y!' in all theatres, presW"ID.bly 

~~c~!~~f ~th the Sto.ndi.pt; Gr-up J.n/\lashington (to becc..oe •Oci:ib1ned Chiefs 

10. In S1r;1nt, full u.s. -J f collaboration a1:1 at present is 

assuned. In rega;rd to other N.11'. T. o. powers, hm~ever, it is proposed., 

as bas been said, th.at /collabo.ca ti on should be lim ted to dJ.sse.nina tion 

acco:rchns to str:i.pt m~ed in a disguised f om,anr that the processes of 

production shoull'\ rcu:nn nati°:nal secrets. additionally, there wou1a 

be afrepP'cn,nt···Si for·· ... ·· supply:i.ne.· i'Jm···· .. i disguised Sigi····· nt to the N~ .. 1 ... T. o. Coonands 

c.-n a_ _eyes only" basis. ,So vast are the resources likely to be 

neces.sary for/ succ~ssful explo1 tc.tion of S1g:i.nt that the oar.ipara.tively 

ptmy resources of/vther N • .t _ _.T.O. \powers a.re unlikely to have a quid pro quo 

to offer for u.s.,i -1\ I secrets, and pressure for such an exchanr;e 

shoulu be iresistec. \It has, /however, to bo borne in I'lJ.nd that the 

pressure on behalf 0£1 !a.a o. neobcr of th.e Standing Group (to becone I D, m@;lt conceivably 'be beyond successful resistance., \fuere 

Justified, th.ere niblJ.t be b.ni tea co•. opera ti.on with other National Centreb 

in the collection of ra~ traffic (e.g~ p. 

11. I.t is to be h.~cd that in the interests of the best overall 

effort, U.S. ana.laecncics will cut out unnecessary duplication 

both in production and clissGI'"'1nation that, as last tJ.J'le, li..F. S.l .... nll 

concentr~te on certa.in tasks and I l on others, and that U.S. o.nd I la,_encies will in certain cases ad the disseru.nation to the forces 

of the other. Sigint would be chssen:i.nated to intelligence staffs through 

GCU' s or SSO' e: on sJ.nJ.lar lines to last tme. It is hoped th!l.t there 

would be a. free exchance of personnel bf::twecn .1. .... F.S.k.. anal lin this 

sch.one of things. 

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l2. There ru.[;11.t be ~ rieed for form.rd Sip.nt processing centros 

for certo.in tasks .. f9rexa.n.ple if there were a task smilnr to the old 

Longfellow, 11vh1ch 'WClild present an J..M.possible problen if all traffic 

had tG be tran~ttcd back to the National Centre. Such a forward 

~.I:.e .... Jap.iJ.d be a suborfu.m.te a:::ency of the National Centre (.t ... F. S.A. or 

L__________J) and be directed by its parent. 

13. It is to be eXJ,1ected tMt :i..nfom.a.tion of technical V'llue to 

'Y' Centres ~ould bccOI'le available frcn Sigint 1 e.g. callsign rotas, 

keys etc, Within lJJU.ts and subJect to satisfactory safeguards, t~is should 

bo sent tv the 'Y' Centres withcut cb.sclosuro of the source by the 

National Centre concerned or possibly by 1ts forw-ard subordJ.rwtc agency. 

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