USCIB: 'ZJ/JIJ 

.· 

M!!KORUIDUM FOR THE MllmmS OF USCIB: -

t ... Puftlwmt.·t.@ USCIB cle@idm at the 6Stn Meeting9 the attaehe4 

datailcscl report bas beet pr~ by CIA and Deputaent ct Stat.• 

npn11entatiwa., 

2.. Thie rapori. will be @on•iclonid m @crmeetian witb its :J @t 

the agenda tor the ?0th USCIB ~~ingQ 

USCI!s %J/'JO 

I 

22 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-16-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE , 

_{_ 
·- TOI SEeRRT128UiDE - -

DEPARTMJ!Jtr OF STATE 

uAS.llINtr'TO.N 

4 October 1951 

.M&IDRAMllT.ul FOR TdE CHAIR..l.'U14, U$lB 

SWJB}T; Portu.;uese Communications Security 

1. At its :3ixt7=eighth See'tin{i on 10 A1Jiuat 19519 U~ltf decided 

that the Uepartment ot .:>tate and the CIA should prepare jointly a 

detailed plan tor a direct appro11ch to the Portuguese Government 

based on the prcposal contained in plftl.il'&phs 11 am ll ot the Jld Hoc 

Committee Report to u.:£IB OD this subject (~IB 2J/U db.ted. 7 . ""ust 

1951) 0 'Ihe detailed pl.e.n which has been _prepared nm approved_ by the 

Department. and C lA is presented in the para~phs \Vhioh t0Uat1 in 

terms or its obJoctives, bases, tb.e means available and t.Jle procedures 

to be i'olloi:1ed o ' 

. '2. Objectives 0£ the PlaD• 

a. To obtain assurances that Portuguese r.epresentat.1ves 

in MTO will observe requests ot US re,lll"esentativea 

regardirli the handling 0£ claesitied 1Dtorination 

made availabl9 by tb.e United ~'ta.tea; 

bo Tc reduce the leakago ot C0~.10 and tu\TO TOP ~.l!CRe.'T 

and Sl!CRET intcrmation through the insecurity of 

PortU&;&aese Communications; and 

' 

co To 1!ld uce the PortUiuase Govex·nnutnt to make more U.e 

or the authorized &TO crypto&;raphic system (TY.Pl).) 

and to compile their own books ot crypto~aphic set.,. 

tings for use in connection with tha TIP.All • 

.lo bases tor the plyo The approach must demonst.rate that: 

&o The security of hi&blY clas~if'ied ~ 1.ntormation 

nnd vlans has been Jeopardized 1ihro~h mishnr.idl~ 

by the ~rt~uase; , . - - bo C~IC inf'ormation .bas been involved; 

co l'he mishandling bas included (l.) disre&ard o! tho 

request of a u.i representative ms.ldng -the inf'orma, ... 

tion available and (2) violation or ~~To security 

practices; 

Inclcsurtt wit.Ii USCIB 2)/JO dated 8 October l95lo 

AFSA FORM 781-ClOS , 6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
AFSA FORM 781-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

do· 'Thit US bas .received i!Jd1cat1ons that the Portug1.tese 

do not consider TIP.4 a reliable c:r,yptographic, svst.em• and OJ?L 86-36/50 use 3605 

" 1 • EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

ea The US considers '.l'IPEl to be entirely suitable 

am that its reliability can be demonstratm 

by appropriate U$ or J~A'l'O otticiala., 

4. M'1ans available., 

ao Dii•ect access by the US Ambassador in Lisbon. W 

, the Premier ot PortiJial. 

c. obtai.$1d 

om a eouroe ,.astern .:.IU'Ope 11 o in turn 

obtained the information from a-contact through who• 

ha had had brief access to a copy er the cable from 

Jlrich to his Govemment.o The source and his oriei.Dal 

5 o l£ocedure1. 

ao Tlie matter is to be handled perso~ and ex.clusi,,ely 

bet3een Amb&ssador llacVeagh and Premier ::aala~ar aJld is 

to be known onl.J to the Ambaaeador among U~ Embassy 

porsonno1 in Lisbon. 

bo Ambassador riaacVeagh is to r~ceive hie instruction in 

this matter in nashin"tono 

TOP SECRET. SUEDE 

• ,;J 

r 
E 

do It considered suitable by Ambassador MacVe.igb, his 

approach to Premier .lalazar is to be made alone the 

folloaing lines: 

(1) Establish.the delicacy 8Jld urgency or this 

problem to the US Governmento 

\ 

(2) Pre&ent the ev1derigej pointina O\l~ that the~,"""'o=rlg"""="i&i~ .... 1...,s=o=ur=ce,,,......,,Bild"=""'-h"""ii!i--=--

relia't)il:lty are not known, b11t that most ot t.be 

1nt0rmaticm contained in ~e report J.S .knorlfn to 

'be true b1 the W Government, and that it must 

be assumed, tberetora, that t.hose tacts contained /:Jr~ 

1n the roport to ahich the iJS Government is not 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

directly privy may also be correcto 

(3) Point out. that, it this a::ssumpt.1on is corrcsct, 

AFSA FORM 7Bl-ClOS 

6 JUL 51 

the lJ.i is grea~ concerned overa (a) the leakage 

ot critical US classified inf'ormat.icm; (b) \Jlrich's 

apparent disreprd of the specific request for 

upec1al handli.Dg ot the ~o.rmation contained ill 

para .1 ot the report; and (c) the apparent Portuguese 

disregard tor the authorized tu\TO cryptographic s7~temo 

(4) Require categor.:Sl:al assurance from the Portueueso 

Government that (a) it.s representatives would 

·observe the requests of US repreeento.tivas reprdiDg 

the handling of olaasitied intormation 1119.de available by them am that (b) .NATO security practJ.ces, 

incl'Llii."18 the use of the authorized hATO cryptolJl'phic 

s7stem, would be obaerved at all timeso 

(5) Oi'ter the assurances ot W Government that the 

'J:X~ is a reliable cryptoft.ra.p.bic system am t.hat 

its u.se as requ1.red 'by .L.A.TO security regulations 

is a necessary security ,Precaut\on; pointing out 

that, it the Portuguese require .further assurance 

ot this, they qht request a demonstration ot 

the security features of the m!iC:hine from csither 

the u.; Govemment or the ~cur1ty Goord112a:t:lng - ommittee ot t e a ~tand Grou 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
6 o A copy of ttiej lt.o be used :ln this 

approach is attached heretO as EilCloaure lo It cona1Bts ot a 

translated extract tromJ I 

7o fmbassad.or . .NacVeagh is expected to arrive in •~ashington for 

coneultation. OD/OX' about. 5 Octobero ID order that this mo.t-ter may be 

taken up with h1m while he is here, it 1s req11Boted tbat UOOIB consider 

thia plan at/its •eting on 12 October am that the Views and concurrence 

of the brit119h in the eeneral approach have bean obtained by that Umao 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

&lclosure 

/a/ "• Park Armstrong, Jro 

"• PARK AIWSTRO.ttG, JR. 

Special Assistant, Intelligence 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
.. 

(.l«TRACT = TRAMSIATIOI) 

A usually reliable 1ource, with excellent contacts 1D Hestern 

European diplomatic cirolea, haa prodded the 1ntol'lllB.t1on set, tort.h below 

witho1.1t, ha.waver, ident1t71zla the OODtact from whom ha obtained the report. 

,, 

le Rui Ulrieh, the Portugl.l9se Ambassador to London, ncen~ cabled 

a report to hie Government covering a recent meeting or .NATO repreaenta .... 

tives 1D Lomono The salient pointa were as tol.l.ma s 

ao 'l:he discussion at the meetq centered arouad the question 

ot the admia11on ot Greece alJd Turkey to t.he Atlutia Pact 

organbationo 

bo SWeral members ot the 14ATO group, uota'bl.7 the w'Candinaviane, 

opposed the 1D.olwa10D of Greece am Turkey 1Dto the a"TO and 

proposed that. a lledit.Grranean Pact be established wbioh vrolll.d 

be composed ot the ma~or ponrs, and to which Greece and 

Turke7 would be 1Dviteclo 

Co The president ot t.be meeting did not •ll'•• with this proposal, im11cat1ng that. a lleclit.en"anean io.ct would mereq 

cause duplJ.cat..ioD ot tibe &TO organization and would aause 

unnecessary complications 1n political and m111'tal'J ait.uat.ionao 

do The pres~ent added that the :l.llOorpo:ratiOn of Greece aDll 

Turke7 1DtG the Atlantia fact would not necesaarill' be cause 

tor war, but mi&ht iaorease pol1U.Cal aal eocmomjc preaaurea 

on Greece am T1rke70 

eo ReprcU.ng air bases, the president expaoted tbat TUl'ke7 

vould make tac11:1t1ea available aa bad the other IA.TO 

countries, but stated that the UAited States wou.ld admit 

Turkey to KATO even •1th limited use ot a1rtleldllo / Ulr1ah 

reported that th1• lntoratsaA wu •• il8D&1t1ve that tba 

representativea were asked not to teleppla it to theSr 

pernments, a p-Kat1t1on which ba peraouu7 fel.t waa net 

necesar,o 

Ulrich oonclmed b7 advising that tbe Fact maahine (•io) 

was not auttioien~ secUN tor aene1t.1n information. 

lJa14 Co•Uo Source states that t.he lack oZ 11pao1t1c details in the 

report abould be attributed not only to the tact tbat the Sntormat1on 

waa received seacmd.-bald 1 bu.t to the extnmalJ abort }181"1od ot time the 

iatormation eas made aw.ilable to him b7 hla oontaoto 

We.ahington Commsm1;o It .baa bea 1determined that the d:1acuu10D reported 

above took place at the 'th of JuJ.71 19Sl, ••Uni ot the MUO Counail 

Depu.tieso 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
I:_-.. 

to the 

tlll'.fEO ~ COilmm:CAnOl!iS mm.LIGEllCE JIOABD 
Rll'Olft BJ' Bl mcD AD JIJC 

to .... 

Ul1ftU ftA'B!:8 CClllJIICABQE DJ'II.T.TA1W!lf! 1IOABD 

Beprt, wtdeh ncc1 mane.a tbat: 

"b. tlrit U .s. Dalep'tit.m to tba U .S .... u .. :s:. Ccmbreace m l'l'ach 

e-._m'eat1au aeear1'\7 'be coat1ma4 u aa all Jloc bmb' w· ueartaf.D --. . 

·1111p am -.., YS.~ tlla tr• nark o£ t'bl88 putlcu, to aol.ve 

tbe Pclrtv&Ue• 111'0blm· 

o. Purtb.81' ccmsiclel"attcm flt mepticaal, 41reet &e'Uclll to 

!lp'ove Portva-se ealmm1ostiaDs wuritJ' 'be dd'erred pn01ng 

(1) cmplat1ca of the at-'7 no-aa81de4 ...._. b above &114 (2) EC . -

tb8 l'reDch Guwmwt. n 

2. !tie .Ail :aoe Ccmdttee 11aa coatilme4 1te ~or t11a p."Oblta, 

aa4 lB8 aanl.apel ti. a44S:U.aaal. rac:ta am1 oaaclualcma an ftrtb belaa'. 

3. the Mm aecurity .,....._ 11114 :ngula.tians &aaqaed 1oo protect 

HUi~ive llN1'0 idanatiaD are ~- i'ar t.ha P1D'J0811*.. 'Die c1eftnS:t1aaa 

"Calacit a1l4 "Hl'On '!zltC.,.t:laB an clear all euacept1ble at .be'lng 

amtliel WS.th pnac1•1cm.. 

-:tt 1a Ultie1pa.tec1 tJ1at & lllllf 4onamt, J) .C • 2/T, 1lh1cb ... &JP'OVed . ..,,. 

'ti.be st:eadtng Group 11114 1iba 111.UtuT Bepreaat.a.Uvea cam.t.tee aZ BA!O 

OD 13 Apl'il 19';1., &Dd '111:11cb :la .,., aa1t:l8g 1'im1 anrovai 'b1' t1le 

Council Deputlea1 vill 110C1D. beei.r eft'eet:lve. !.be w 4ocullaat v:l.11 

iil61'8~ ~tt.Y' n4, m ..u measure, claril)' 'tbe evreat aeeurs:v 

Q8tal am4 repla't1CID8. . 

.. 2 -

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
/ 

-------

.. ...-·· 

4 • Some Partuguese ec:ammmicationa vhicb emtain iDfonatim that 

clear~ f'allD vithin the lim:ta Btipulat~ by the definitions are aecure, 

since tbHe -cmnamcatiomi ue beiq 'trrinamitted by the autborised crnto .. 

qltas, via.~ ftPEX nth •ili\Pl.a settiDgs. Rowever 1 even in cues wbere 

the Portuguese have uae4 'l!PEX, their __ lack ~ "lmov-holr" Sn the cQ!Jillmi -

cation secmi.t;r (COMSEC) field am the manilflr in vh1ch the;r use the machiDe 

aka t.hose means.ea posaibq vulnerable to crwtana.11't1c attack and vaak.en 

the DlO ftPElt rqstem as a vbole. 

5. Same RA'.fO comrmm1cat1om:, bo!mver 11 contain informat:J.m which my 

be cbaracterhed by . the des16rJaticm "HA'.r'O fringe tram.c n, and wb1ch 

aoeamenta. At the time tbat t.he dcd'iDitiODS of ccaac and BATO 1Dformation were elabarated, the quest:i.on vhether m.ticmal cCllllleDt vu to be 

conaiderea. cosmc or llWro intormtion vaa d.iecused am1. spec1f1c provision that it be so eou1clered vu excluded. ~s ezcl.uaicm vu at 

·the~ ~the Depa.?"timeDt ot state, vbS.ch, inter alia, cl14 not Viah . . - its own representatives to BN?O h~ 1Jl :regarc1 to this matter. In 

the eue ~ Portuguese CC'l'llPU'., cat10DB, it is both COSDUC ar l\TA'l'O materi&l 

and this ":friJ:lge tra:ff.'ic" which constitute the prizacipil. sources of 1Daecurity oZ mtaO and U.S. ~tion. 

6. Ia t~ttiDg m.ttoml. comment, the PartuguetRt member of the 

Couneil Deputie~ 1D Lon4oD pref'are to use a Portuguese cr,ptoa)-stem rather 

tbim 1'!PEX b~ause he :fears tmt the British might read 'l'!P&X me11sages, 

since the sett:lngs · e.re· provided b7 the British. . The Portuguese ceypto87Btema used for tbis purpose is the Hagel.in c-38 &Chine ritb. au.eh poor 

procedures tbat in all probabilit7 the UoS.S .. Ro ad other countries a.re 

reading the~ Partaguese messages, even though tbfq ~ be trans.mitted 

7. On 25 Apr'l1 l.951 all BA'l'O mml>er :nationll were illf'cirm4 by 

SGM-616-51 that the Signatory Jist1ona at the Bartll Atlantic Treaty 

. . 

OJ!'gammtion ~ authar:i.sed, in &Mition to c~ting their om 

TOP SECRElf SUEDE 
/ 

... ,...;• 

,,-

···-....... 

plug'boa.rd setting key&, to pre.pare individual. mticmal Boob of settiDp 

for ftPEl, -alloul4 this be 4es1rec1, 01.n orie:r' stUl turtlm:r to preserve 

the cliacreet nature of the c:bamael,a provi.ded for Jratianal UM. n ~ 

were al.lo 1nftmle4 at the mme t:lm tbat "the U .IC. have prepared a 

11&1!1Dl"W1mt aescrtbf.ng a~ mthod-for the C<Jllailation of·~­

aettiDp u:til ·a COJ97 vill. be made available to other mber nations 1:t 

desired." Cfba 'tral:u!Dl111aion o~ mtloml. cowt bi ~PEI mach1nea v1tb 

~L 86-36/50 ust 3605 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

8. The A4 lice CCl'lll!.ttee has ascertainad-tha"t- not • a1'2gle me o£ 

tlle BA.'lO COUDV~S :bu 7et availed itaeU' or the ~-\to c_~ 

or to use its am Batioml. 'Books of Se'.ttmp'* 1 or eva m: the\ authorit)' 

grcmted to construet i'ta ovn. nat1onal pl.ugboa.r4 eettiuga. 'l'bei'e $.1"e 1 . . . 

:1D the ~ ot Partugal, no :IDUcat:l.ons . of en intention to 4o so· 111_ the 

l3etU' hture. 

..... . 

whieb JB1gbt be und.erte.ktm ·to can'lh."1i this a1tuaticm.. ~ to its 

del:lberaticms the Ccam1~ee agreed that the protecticm of'I J_ 

~eats_ is still the ovenidillg :f'act(1!' 1D this cue, and that 8D;f 

aolut1cm wbi.cb Yould definitel.1' preJulice them ahou1d be un4ertaken onq 

aa a l&R rel.lOl't. or nven proposal.O_ ~ of serious couideration it 

attat.1~ studiecl tJJree which Wile a~ to otter the best ~· 

of producing ime4Sate or, et l.ea&t pram;pt, nmedtal resul:ts, at tbe 

* Since the last meeting of the/Ad Bae Committee im'an&tion bas arrived 

imlica'ti»g that as ~ l Augue;t Delsiua ,has ~eel m.t1oml. ae'tt1Dp 

rar ftPEX but V1thotlt racour$e to tbe bUic Bl'i:tillh .1DStr1.Jot1mml mtl!O•. 

ramlm.. 

TO-P SECRE'T SUEDE 
.-• 

same time voulci present the leaat dm9ger or security risk to the u.s o; 

the Camd.ttee t~ UJJBD1tnously selected b'Oll IG!O.Dg the three the one 

Viaich it 4eas the moat feasible ana. best un4er the circumstanees • '.l'be 

l2 bel.oa'J &ll ~ me eet farth in Enclomi:re "A 11 , together with 

eammenta. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

c. A pr<m;Jt eml.im-atton ot the p.resen~ 1D£eeure situa:tim can 

be cspeetec1 if' the P~ coulA be: 

(1) ~cu to~ wi'th BA1'0 ·MC11rltJ' replaticma,; 

(2) Given fU.rther 1D4oetrimtion ao that 'the7 1'01l!J.d ac;.mn 

fQll cODfideDce tu t.b.e security of 'f!PEX; 

(3) Im1uced to mm more use of tbe llAi'O au'tharized cr.n-to-

~ ('l'?PEX~ utl 

(4) PersuWtd to take ~ of the pend.ssicm granted 

lfA'1'0 members to compile their oun :natioml. bOcks og 

sett1118S for ';m.>EX. 

12. a. The selected pi.-opoaal., b:a.me4 upon these pre:miea., S.nvol.ves 

a direct, and c.i~ (to t.be Portuguese) UDUatenJ.. (U .s.) approach 

m & Gavermmt-to-G<Nermmnt lev'el• with a vi..efl' to clel.1ver1Dg a. shock 

to the P~ae GoverDment by sllw1ltg tbat: 

- 5 -

TOP SECRET SUEDE. 
'. . . . 

.· · .• :':: ~·· .-:..i.::;= 

. · .. ~ 

... ·' . ·.· . .. {· 

.. ~f.: ... 

e. 

(1) lta representation OD the Co11ncil Dap.d;iea 1a dellber• 

&tel.J' violating not cmq a veU-4e:fimd llM.10 eam.nnicaUon securiv replatio.u to vbich tbe Ponuguese . Goverwt BOJ.esml7 aubaeribed, ~also mm.tens 

llt'tle hes1taaq 1D ~ an a:p.-euq stated 

requut b7 tbe Pree14ent of tbe C:mmcil Deputies that 

certain infonation be tnumittea an:b' bJ' e~,; ad 

(2) The aecurit7 violation ilm>1ve4 the diecl.osure ot ,. 

h:tgb"q 11m11itive u.s 1Dtonmt1ol1 ~a cbaracter clearq 

political. am tYJ ·hisbest ~ to J1NRO am. u.s. 

E03.3(h) (2) 

PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 

directl.7 attecttng its own securi'\T, u veU as tba't or the vhol.e ot 

B.~, that it CQDBiderecl re1'err1ng the matter to the Council Deputies .• 

. . . . llnertheleras it vas reluctant tO ta.D· such action, prOV"idea that prompt 

- . 

steps would be taken to correct ·the situation am. that uaura.nces 

wo"'l:d be given by' the Portvgueae ~ t.bat the action it 9'lll 

take Will prfi'l'Cmt a repetition of such Yiolat1on &Id d1noegard or 

eecur1.t7 procedures in tuture. 

c. 'fheae ~ea must ccq;>rise: 

(l.) Aaeurance tm.t a ;request by a member goverlll!eDt presenting intonation to a BAT<> ~ that such 1Dtonmticm be tn.Damittecl ~ b7 acemp.n1e4 bag Yill be 

etrictly observed; and 

(2) Assurance 'that, vhen. el.ectr1cal ·tram:miss1on must be 

·. emplOJ'E!d, ~ 1ibe authmi.zed BA'l'O crypto~ (m-EX) 

... 6 -

TOP SECRET· SUEDE 
---------

wU1 be uecl far the trutmdaeicm. p'f -~ infOl'ma• 

tion,, u provs.ae4 1n. lWl.'O secnzri't7 regulations. 

e. The apprcach thus far wul4 not go 'be1mJd the poiat ~ 

taking care ot the mecur1tJ" or COSMIC aDCl JIA'1'0 mP SF.CHE! ezd 

SECRET informtion [the ob.1ect of poillt (1) or pa.ra.grapi· ~J• 1t 

would not tab care Of leakage f'ram mt1cmal c01llllellt cm lWl'O •tters 

....._ ______________ ..... lctbe obJect o£.po1Dts (2), 

(3 ), · and (It.) Of paragraph lli/. ~, the approach aJMm14 go 

f'm'ther and attempt to g1ve ·the Partvgueae authorities positive 

as~e tbat tbe ftPEX 18 a secure wa ·ot ctQlllD•1caticm., but 

· 1 'th1s eoul4 be claD8 br pointing 

out 'tbat: 

(1) Unless 11om.e ccmtrf)l ~placed on the crntoa1Btem8 

~L 86-36/so·usc 3605 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

em,ployec1 fer t.l3e tnmamuicm ~ DA'l'O iritOJ'JllBtio.D, 

in. aa· "l!Si:D:f u 12 clittermt fQBWmsJ ail 

(2) A 81Dgl.e ernt<>Qatem, vis., ftPEI• WU selectecl by 

tJie D!lO Council after du aeliberat1cm beca1ISe oZ 

tbe hiab aegree or securltJ' it attar4e 1lh!m pl"011Grl.1' 

Uflled. 

Sbo1ll.B. aoubt raaiD, it -could be suggested tbat the matter be nrterred 

to tbe Btam1ng croup. 

13. 'l!Je A4 Boe CQra1 ttee 1s U'!!Ml.Dimous 111 its op1n1on tbat thia 

]m'OJIOZl sboul.4 be adopted, ~ "the 1'ol.l.ov1Dg reaaau: 

a. It appears to ofter the anq· program for prompt ftlDled1al 

· actiOJl vhieh e.f:rord.s both securtQ" -4 a reuona'bl.e :prospect ~ 

being etteetive. It 18 rec~ tbe.t. to be ettect1ve, 887 approach 

to the Portvgueee on this· nbJeet amt ahock.th&m .. Thia "abock" ·mat 

be cfJ such a m.ture that it vill. 1Da\1re tbeir compliance rith BM!O 

secu:r1v replatiom govern1llg the tra.nmn:lasiaD ~ cluaU'iecl BA'l'O 

1Dtana~~j I · 

T.OP SECRET SUEDE - - - -----------------------------
PL86=36/50 USC 3605 

E03.3(h)(2) 

I I V'lU pr~ -tb.i• "shock", aiDce this 

..__ _ ___.lcont.a.1m1 theae important elalmta: (1) a. vio.latian aZ a 

speeUic nqlle8t 'b7 tbe Preo14ent O'f tlle. Com'1CU Deputiea not to 'truJ.8 .. 

m:t tile iDtcnaticm ezcapt by cotirter; (2) a atatment clear}1' 1DQ 

cliea:t-1.Dg tbat the Protugueme represeat&t1ve &Zoroptea to hil!l8el:t the 

capr.bil1t7 c4 reversiJog a .jWlpent of the Preaident ot the Council . . . . 

DopltieB u to tbe n.ece11att7 tor aeC1"eC7; a.ml (3) a statement re-· 

vn11ug the Portuguese attitvlla oa the use ar ftl'EJC. 

b •. It ahoul4 be noted tmt the anJJr ~ availa~ am 

poaitiw evidmce that tile Portuguese are vioiat111g !lNlO eeem1:ty 

ngulaticm and. "tbat tbeil" cCill'NDicatic:ma cmSttute a grave risk to 

-tbe ascur1'Q' at tba u .s. a.ua. um bu 'b9m I 

c. It &lDo prov14ea aa Geel.lat oppartunitJ' to 1Ddoct:rinate 

the Portuguese at tbe ldgbent. J.eVel Sn tba aetual securitJ' ot the . . 

lnPJ!:X qstem; 1t ·C&D be cmduc1ve to getting tbe Protuguese to 

use it for cosm~, llA'lO '!OP SECIE!' am 8ECRE'l 1Df'armat1onJ am it 

SJ' lead tba t.o compile 'their mm. ftP&t aettmp for "tnma1tt1Dg nat.imml. cOllllUBt 1DV'o1vin8 such :b:ltormation. 

).,\. It will be Dace&S&J.7 to obtain the CODC'l.D:TeDCe of tbe :tomon 

S1pal. IateJUpnce Board (LSIB l :to ttlis propoae.11 vhich shoaaJ.a be can-. 

nam1cated to that Board. without delQ' if it is aceeptecl by tJBCIB. A 

lS. a. The Ad Boe Ccad.ttee 1e of the opinioa that the approach 

to tbs Portuguese· outlined in paragraph l2 em be 1Uldertaklm without 

rei'~ tbe mtter to the l!iatioml Security' Coullcil (DSC) all4 wi:thout 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
tlJe &P,P1"0&Ch1 the Qeeific U.S .. of'fic1&1. or· ott1cial8 to be desipated 

to mke it, alul tbe specU'ic Par'tvguese official. or ott1c~ -to be 

approached, ehou1.4 'be decided bJ' the Depuf;ment of state. A draft 

of a nitable memoramhn to the secret&rJ' of state is a.ti t'Ol"th 1n 

Eneloaure "Dn .. !J?L 86--36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3>3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

1.6. i'he. A4 Boe C:Clilil!:lttee CODaiiers that: 

a.. All tbe Other propoeaJs #et forth in Eneloaure "A" 1 except 

Proposal B are ...._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--

8111 table~ u long-term prograa; 

b. It voul4 be adviable to 1.Ditiate action m one er aare or 

thoale proposals am p.romptq u ~icable so ae to assure and u.-

tend tba bellef'ita which 81' f'low f.toa the AA Hoc Comm:l:ttee 111 seleeted 

propoaal 'fer ~te action, .. c>Ut11Ded tn paragraph 12 .. u that 

propceal. :la opgroved and eneuted; .,. 

c. Buch laug-term action mq also lq tbe ~k 'for P.n>posal. 

B ab.oul4 it become neceSea:rJ' 

•, 

to resort ' to 

. that~. 

17. 'l'he A4 lice Commi"ttee fUrtb.er considers tbat Proposals A, D, E~ 

end. C, which are CN.tl1mcl in Enclo&u:re "A", do not fall lltrietq '.Within the 

cosmmmee t:tr "CSCID, although they are of' interest to USCD;. that they 

shoulj, be 8twliecl in. detail by tbs propar I I secm-1t7 autbol"itiee 

of the ~ ot state am Defense; am. tbat they ahould be re:ferred 

to these rmt:borit!es by' the State and. A7:m7 :members ot USCD. It 'lfB3 be 

· noted tbat several Cf the 1cmg-term ~ are interdepeD!ent in the 

sense tbat they vould rein:force cme another end vould ~ U'OSt e.ttective 

18.. P'imll;y6 with Nfennee to the tirective giinm the Ad licc 

CCEli.ttee 1D USCID: 23/18 to cpl.ore the possibility of inst1tut1Dg 

_,_ 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
·sategmmJs invol~ greater use~ courier aervice aaa. of br:lng'Jng 

this abol!t ~ an apprmcb to .the ~-- Allied CcmaeMer Europe· 

(SACEUB), the M. Boe Camd.ttee visbes to point mt that the preaut 

Pm'tllgUU& imecu:ri:ty 1Dol.vo11 emmmteaticma whieb are on the dipl.oa.t1c lev'e1 &D4 not bfttveea m:llitarJ' ~- Far tb1a Naacm tba 

attar is cme in vhich SACEUR bu ~ 3ur1sclictim. 

19. It is ~ that: 

a. 'l'he action proposed m Paragraph 12, and Ellcl.c>INre& ncn 

·.:·b~ The long-tens proposals outlined 1D Encl.oa1lll"9 ."A 0 be 

ecceptd 1n prtmtple, for rat'enmce to t.lle~t:y . . 

autborities of the Departments of state ad Defense. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

... JP. -

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
PROPaW.S STUDIED Bf THI AD HOC COMllITDE 

TO COHRECT THE 

lllSECURITY OF POaTUGUFSE CCHIUIICATIOWS 

WGEBmJS TO U.S. OR NATO 

l. tROPOSAL-6: That an ettort be made, through the Security Coordinating 

Camlttee of the !l.l'l'O standing Group, to co0rince the mioua KATO maabera requir ... 

1ng 1ndoctrillat1on1 including particularl1" the Portuguese. of the aecurit7 and tohe 

adequaq of the mil crJPto979t• and procedures wh1ch ban bean authorised tor 

the tranam1se1on of senaitive NATO inforinat.ion. 

COMMERT 

Thia proposal might produce either prompt or long-term rsed1al resul.fas 

but the Cmnmittee feels dubious about the attie&CJ' ot such an approae~ alnce it 

has no elaments ot shock neceeaa.17 to j.mprese the derelict NATO .members. Put 

uperience attords no ba.s1a tor a belier 1 or even the hope that such a simple ap·· 

proach would 'be ettectlw.. The fatuous confidence which, as a general rule, those 

ia well known 

and no reliance can be placed ill thill approach t.o the problelll. ot the inaecurit7 

of Portuguese cC11111111D.icat1ons containing COSMIC or N•To TOP sEcRET and SECRET 

1ntormation. PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h){2J 

2. ll!gPQSAldh That a direct. u .. s. or tJ.S./U.K. approach to the Portugue•e 

Governaent be mde, 

,___ __ ___, The objectiw 'llOUld ~e t.o force immediate adherence to COSMIC aecurit;r . . 

regulations,. thus prO\.'ucing PJUDPL rmed.1a1 results• and· to asaure an 8ftlltua.l 

reDJ"ganization and ~t in the security of all Portuguese ccmmnnicatione .. 

au Thill p?Gposal 1s pract1call7 identical with that propoged in 

USCI.B Wl32 1D regard to I t and in'9alYes a direct approach t.o the 

Portupeae at the h1gbe8t gonnaantal lenl, via •• the Secret.&17 of State 

.. ; 

.-·21 - ~ Iii.&• v.l.'b USOII Ad · • Hae Camdtt• leport dated 

6~w1. TOP .SECRET 

"·~ 

~lfrDE 
•. 

·"" 

"through t.he u.s. Ambaaaador 1n Lisbon to. the Portugueae M:lnlate'r. ot· Foreip. 

Affairs (MFA). 

b. Such an approach necessitates bringing the COllSB: situation to 

the attention of the MFA :ln a manner so dramatic u to shock Ida into takiag 

'J?.L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

•P•ed.J and ef't'eotive action. BO 3 .. 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

c. The disadvantages of such 8.n approach in tbe caa•.ot the 

Portuguese are: 

general inaecuritJ""oiilindedness and J.oquacit1 ot the ~uguese peaple ·aa a 

whole make·. this coun.e dangerou.a. 

(2) In the case of I .... ___ __.It.he purpoae ot dellnr1ng \such 

a shock· la to bring a.bOut a drastic overhaul ot the cr;rptoqst.tllll!I .-.\practices J 

________ I 'l'here ie, bowevv, not onq n~ '111118diate or Oftr-riding 

I 

I 

necess1t7, trca the point. ot view of u.s. aecurit7, ot br1ng1ng this about 

in. the · caae of the Portuguese .1 

pl"Ovided that segment of the :lnsecurit.7 which in:valna leakage ot .COSMIC or 

NATO TOP SECRET and SECRE'.l' 1ntormt.1cm can be elim!nated f 

P.RO.PQ9AL C: '!'hat a bigh~level approach to the Po1>tugueae Gcrre~t - . 

be made• disclosing our poaitiw knowledge ot Portuguese dolationa ot the COSMIC 

the 

diaclonre would be made oetena1bl7 rith a . Yiev to inllisting upon Port.ugueae observance Of those :regulations, thus producing prompt. rmedial results. 

COJOfDT 

Thia ia the propoll&l 1manimouq agreed to b7 the Caaaittee· and ie 

discussed in detail in paragraphs 12-15 of the basic paper. 

4., ~AL .R: That there .be eatabllahed a NATO courier senice which 

would be adequate to ullP)JDJ't the present MATO agreamant that all. possible cmuc. 

NATO TOP ·SECRBT and SECRE'l' !ntormation be tra.::umd.t.ted b7 pouch., 

-·---··- -----------
T()j' SE---~ _ 

CUllENT 

The Ad Hoc Ccmnitt~e studied the ·•tter ot;~Creater use ot courier . . 

service b,r NATO memben and turthar a:plored "'the. P6aa1bil1ti ol instituting .. 

safeguards 1n tbe form of a note to recipient~ ot aena1t1w HA'l'O 1ntormtian 

stating that beEore th9 intormati.on i• ·releued then 1118t be assurances that 

it vUl. not be tonrarded 'b7 ~ electrical coJim'.'n1aat1on means; but 1f neceaaarr to torvard. that secure COUrier aerrice wuld be utilized (aee paragraph 

24 o:t reference Report) o The Ccmmd.t·t.ee finds that: 

ao The current regulations* relatiYe to the tranamisaion of. ~C 

1ntormat1on and doc;rumenta (Paragraph 14, Annex ~ to n.c. 2/7) clearq ~ 

that. courier service be giwn first priorit.7 aa the mane ot tranamiaaion; . electrl.ca.J. cr.vpt;ograph1c transnd aaicn •should anq be utilised when time does . ... .·· .......... . 

not permit the use of acc•:apmded bag.• .. • I• 

. b. . u.s. Air Poree, .ArlQ', and State Department air courier aerdcea 

have ban ·placed at the disposal of MATO goTemmenta to the lhd.t.ed eztan~ that 

< 

such services are·aftilable. However, eTeD auch ot these services aa are ·at 

their disposal. are not used bJ' the IA'OO gow~s tor the transmi aaion ot . . 

national comaent, since thq a.re unvllling to req upon the ind.olabllit;r ot 

pouches J10t accompanied 'b7 one ~ their Olllii national couriara. 

c. A NATO courier senlce 1IOUlcl not onq be ext~ coatq but 

also there 1s nothing to indicate tbat t.he NATO goyenmenta wW.d put mch con-

. 11.den.ce even in a NATO courier aen:lce unless natiaaal coariel"S of their own 

selection were proy1ded to ac~ the pouches 111 8a.ch cue ot auch·tranamseian. 'l'be aftilabil1t7 or such couriers 1s questicmabl.e. in ri.ew ot the 

apebsa to each goyerwt, and. nmecmir, there are time when electrical 

tranmn:llleion ~ be used• eo that the door. voulcl still be left open f9r securit.7 riol&tiona 1n such !natancea, since the goT8l"IDllllt cancerned m1gbt. atill 

use its insecure national 87St• tor national. camn.ent cm COSMIC 1ntomat1on111o 

5. PRQPOSAL E: That there be eatabliahad a ,aeaurit7 tra1Ding program., 

. . 

curriculum, and school tor all element~ ot the NATO orpnia.t:lca, both ciTillan 

and militaJ".Y. 

*' See toot.note to para. 3 o'l this Report. 

I 
.. 

. ...... 

See coslllent under Proposal~ .. F am Ge 

6. PROPOSAL!: That a bilateral u.s ... Port.ugueae aecurltT aurl87• ti1m11ar 

to the recmtq cmapleted tripart.ite U~S.-Uela··French 1111"97o be ad.e and that 

this ISU"8J' :lnclude amng ita objectiwa (l) the at+.atDJIKl!ftt ot mtual.q-agNed 

standards tor""peraomel am plvaical aecurit7 am' 

See coaawt under Proposal G. 

. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

. EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

7. PROPOSAL.Ji-: That ID effort be made to obtain adoption tbroughou.t 

l.A.'J,'O ot tbe Tripart.ite Securit7 Standard.a llOll being considered tor adoption . 

IQ' the u.s., U.K. and Prance. 

. . 

a. The basis tor Propoaala E, F, and G is to be f'ound 1n the 

toll.owing extracts traa NA'l'O documeute: 

(l) Parao 3 ot Appendix to D.C. 2/7,, ll April 1951:* 

.. ,. &QtbllalPjst. o~ Appeie! to. cwtrol and CoordiDatt. Securitz. 

a. At th.!. Stpding Gpup Lenl: J'le Saamtz CoOf!Hpnps 

f:._Olllldttee. .l Securit7 Coordimting Comit.tee of the Standing Group 

ie coU.1tuted., composed ot FNnch, United States and United k1nfl.'m 

rapreemt.a.tian, Secur1t7 represantati vea ot other JD8Dlber countriea 

or apokeamm trm Regional Securit7 Committees will be cal.led upon tor 

assistance when necesaa17. The Secur1t7 Ooordlnat5:D& Cammlttee is 

reapons~e ~irectq to the stauding Group tor the eupel"ri.aion or sacuritJ' ~thin the whole of the RATO s)'Sta at all lnels and tor the 

periodic eamrlnat101'1 ot the functioning tbereot. Mil' securit7 pollq 

attacting NATO as a whole vlll require final approftl at the Council 

lnal..• 

• See ~· to para. 3 or tJd.a Report. 

TOP SEC~f'_T &l~P.ihmcmAd • 
(2) Para. s ot s.G.-41/3» 10 April 1951: 

"5• Tbe SecuritJ' Coordinating Ccnmittee Shall: 

a. Be responsible to the Standing Gl"OUP tor reconntmdationa end 

guidance concaming securit;r poliC7• 

b,. Supen:lse and periodicallJ' examine the .functioning of the NATO 

Securit;r S7sf;a including COSMIC registries and tile COSMIC a;yst-. ot communication. The autborit;r of the count17 to be examined vill be obtained 

before the nutnation :ls CUTiad. •t and lt v1ll be condu~ed b7 and tr.I.th 

the asaistance ot the countr,r aoncemed.n 

b. These eztracte are quoted to ahou that periodic Securit;r Coordinating Ccmmittee redws ot the KATO Securit7 Spt• and 1ta actual marmer ot 

functioning haw bean apecitical.q authoriud. 

c. 'l'be .Ad Hoc CClllld.ttee has learned that aaae ot the BATO countries 

do not nen haw a doctrine or doculllant dealing with such •ttara as pb;raical. or 

peraarmel aecurit7» let alone BtaDdarda to llhich their authorities should atriveo 

d. The ~ical. peracmnel.D and industrial standards ot securit7 

recentq elabcrr.ated bJ' the Tripartite Group• 1t appl'Oftd b;r the tbree Govern·"' 

mnta concerned,, vill be applicable onq to those ambers of NATO; lllllllllbers auch 

a.a Portugal will nut. be bound b7 those ·standards. It• howeftr» these atandarda 

wre adopted b,J all NATO countri••• this ·wuld be conduciw tamrd improvemeDt 

in those phases ot rsecurit7 thraughout NATO. The dea1rabilit7 of doing ao 1a 

beccning more cl.ear aa JATO is graar1ng 1n atrangt.b., 

.•• Under the COftJ' ot such periodic l"ll'V1am as those referred. to in 

subparagraph a ab&ma 0 the Seeurit7 Coordinating Ccad.tt.ae. throqh the StancHng 

Group a could inatitutcs enquirie• 'Dll'ith rewpect to the a:iatence ot .aational s.acurit7 standards IUl;d the obaenance of all NA'l'O aecurit7 :regulat:laaa • :including 

those d-.ling vith. t.he use of courier aeni.ce and el.ectrical tranmasiono 

t. lbreftl",, even 11' the Tripartite Securit7 Standards wre adapted. 

throughout NATO, training 1n their practical· appliCQtion and usage wr.Ul be requil'ed. and courses of instl"llction ot aenral web' duration vill be necesaar.r 

as an initial step. Such CGUr88!1 could well .·include not. onl;r the three abon--

mntioned phases of genenJ. aecarit;r but also the basic el.Wilts of ccwmm:S,cation 

... 15 - F.acloSUN •A• with uscm Ad 

.. c..ltt• 18,port elated 

6 Aqast 1951. 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
aecurit7, and the proper usage ot the authorised IA'l'O Cl"JptG8J'8tms. Such 

indoctrination should be provided at all MATO leftls, iacludtng that ot the 

Council Deputies. In order tor thia to be effective, cont:hluau.8· supeniaion 

and rerlw of the Vil' 1n vbich the training 1a being applied in practice will 

be neceB~~ It 18 clear, thenAa, that to be talq etfectiw0 the action 

coattmplated 1n theae last three propoeala 1.a ileceeaariq long-tena ad continuing 1n chai-acter. 

• g. The Cmmdttee is ot the opiDion that, 1D regard to all the 

foregoing proposals, the •tt.er amt be discussed with the u.1. authorities 

before 8117 approach to the Portuguese is made, eapec:lalq if a proposal 

~-

- 16 -

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

:Encloaure •A• with USCIB .ld 

Hoc Camittee Report dated 

6 A11g11at. 1951. 

'l'OP SECRET SUEDE ,. 
E 3.3(h)(2) 

P 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- ""J.7 - .. 

TOP SECRET SlJEDE - _:. -=-· - - -
T(W ~OR~'f 7SlJiPE . . . 'Eo 3. 3 ( h) ( 2) 

• 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 18 --· laol.onN •• 111Ua USClB 

TOP -SECRET~ED!t~ ---- ·- --- -- -- ---
• 

* Underlining suppliado 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

·YL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

ENCIDSU.RE "B" .· . 

- 19 - Encloaul'e •s• with mcm 

Ad hoc Ccanittee Rep~ 

Dated 6 Aupst · 1951 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
ENCLOSUBB ncn 

Memorandum tar Chairman, Lend.on Signal Int~en~. Board 

Subjecta · Inseaur1tq of Portupue CcmmmlcatJ.ons 

Bnclo8111"e: Repo~ on Portugueae camm,,,_s.caUon Seaurity. 

l. The encloaure is a Report approTed by the United Stat.ea 

propoeed to l'Sll8d7 a ait~ dangerous to u.s. and HA'ro seourlt.f', 

arising trOm the 1mecur1:tq of carta1D Portuguese coaummd.cationao 

.. ·· .. ·· .. ·· .. ·· .. ·· .. ·· .. ·· .. ·· .. ·· . 

· 3. larl1' telegraphic re~ Vft>Uld be a.J)pre_ciatedo 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 20 - Enclosure ncn with USCIB 

Ad hoc ·committee Baporl; 

Dated 6 August 1951 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
.. ~ 

·' 

ImCIDSURE nnn 

llemorandum tor: 1'he S8C1'9ta17 of State 

Subject.I Proposed. action 'b7 the U .Sa Govammmt in the matter ot . inaecur:l:tq ot POJ't.upeae ccmmmic_aUane 

Encloeure1 Baport. 0n Po.rliuguese Cammmicat.ion Secur.ltq 

lo The encloSUN 1a a Repo~ approvad 1V' the United state• 

, and ilnol:na ~Um 

pl'OpOaed. to remac\T a Bitmt.ion daDgel'OU8 to U.S. and RA'l'O aecurJ.Q', 

ar1tdng from the 1naecur1.tq ot certain Port.ugueae ccaaunicationao 

2o 'l'be ~ proposed bJ' the United States Cc1111m11rd.oa.tionll 

Intel 11 gmce Board aa outllned in parag.raJia 12 of the &:I.closure hall 

reOeived the concurrence ot the Iond.on Signal ~ Boal"do 

3o It is reqmated that the action proposed. to correct the 

danger to U .so ancl NATO arJ.sing :tran the 1naecur1t.J' ot Portqueae 

ccmmmicat.iona~ be 1mplmented at the aarUeat practicable date. 

- 21 - F.ncloSUN 11D•·with USCIB 

Ad· hoc Committee Report 

Dated 6 Augaat 1951 

'l'OP SECRET SUEDE . -· . - ........ _ !!!l!!!!!!!!l!!o.. 

.. 

~t.··· 

~-

'r . _ _.,. . 

. ·-.c . 
DRAFT AS REVISED 26 JULY 19.51 

t._. . 

REPORT OF THE USCIB AD HOC CCMUITTEE 

to the 

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS Ilfi'EIJ,IGENCE BOARD 

on 

PORTUGUESE. C01~1IDNICATION SECURITY 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
TO 

D-R-A-F-T D-R-A-F-T 

REPORT OF THE USCIB AD HOC COMMITTEE 

to the 

UNITED STATES cmmtJNICATIONS INTFLLIGENCE BOARD 

on 

PORTUGUESE COMMUNICATION SECURrI'Y 

Reference: uscm: 23/lS 

lo At its 66th ]leetine, 13 Jul.y 1951, USCm approved the referenced 

Report, which recommended that: 

11b. The U.S. Delegation to the u.s.-u. K. Conference on French · . 

COOl!llUnications security be continued as an ~ !!2£ bcdy to ascertain 

the ex.act extent to which present NATO practices may provide secure 

ways and means, within the .framework or these p?"actices, to solve 

the Portuguese problem. 

e. Further consideration or exceptional, direct action to 

ir.rprove Portuguese communications security be deferred pending 

(1) completion of the study reco~inended under !?. above and (2) NSC 

and USCIB decisions whether such action is to be taken vis-a-vis 

the French Government." 

2. The Ad Hoe Committee has continued ita study of the problem, and 

has developed the additional facts an:f conclusions set forth below. 

3. The existing NATO regulations designed to protect sensitive NATO. 

lntorma.tion, as set forth in_D.C. 2/7, l.'.3 April 1951, are adequate for the 

purpose, if strictly enforced. The definitions of ''COSMIC" am "NATO" 

information are clear and susceptible or being applied·with precision. 

4. Some Portuguese communications which contain information that 

clearly falls within the liztlts stipulated by the definitions. are secure, 

since such eamrunica.tions are being transmitted by the authorized cryptosirsterns, viz., TYPEX ltl th simplex settings. However, even in cases where 

the Portuguese have used TYPEX, their lack of security and the manner in 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
V. 

which they use the.machine make those messages possi_b4" vulnerable to 

cryptanalytic attack ~d vmaken the NATO 'l'YPEX system as a Whole •. 

5. Some l'!ATO ec.mmunica tions, however, contain infomation which may· 

be characterized by the designation 11NAT0i"ringe traffic", and which 

- consists largely or national comment on COSEIC or NATO matters and documents. At. the time that the definitions .or COSMIC and f.JATO information · 

were elaborated, the question whether national comment ·was to be 

considered COSIHC or NATO information was discussed and specific provision 

that it be so considered was excluded. This. exclusion vras at the request 

of the Department of State, which, ~ alia, did not wish its own repre-

. sentatives to NATO hampered in regard to this matter. It is COSMIC 

material and this "fringe traffic" 'Vlhich constitute the principal sotirces 

of insecurity as regards MATO and u.s. infomation~ am which, in the case · 

of Portuguese communications, are causing serious damage to security. 

6. In transmitting national comment, the Portue\iese member of the 

Council Deputies in London (and diplomats of other NATO governments) 

pref er to use their awn national cryptosystems rather than TYPEX because 

they fear that the British might read T!PEX messages, since the settings 

are provided by the British. In the case of Portugal, the national 

cryptosjrstem used is the Hagelin C-3S machine, with such poor procedures 

that the messages are easily solved-. It may be assumed with aome certainty 

that the u.s.S.R. is reading these Portuguese messages. · 

7., On 25 April 19$1 all NATO member nations.were informed by 

SGM-616-51 that the Signatory Nations of the North.At.lantic Treaty Organization we.re authorized, in addition to constructing ~heir own plugboard 

setting keys, to prepare individual National Books of Settings should this 

be d~sired "in order still further.tO preserve the discreet nature of the 

channels provided for National useo" They were also informed at the same 

3 

TOP SECRE_T SUEDE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

time that 11the U.K., have pri::pared a memorandum describing a secure method 

for the compilation of simplex settings and a copy 17ill be made available 

to other member Nations if desired." 

s. The Ad Hoc Committee-is attempting to a$certain whether any NATO 

country has yet availed itself of the opportunity to compile its own 

"National Books of Settings", or even of the authority granted to com.pile 

its ovm National plueboard settir\gs. It is obvious, however, that Portugal 

has not y:et availed itself of either opportunity and there a.re no indiea. ... 

tiona of an intention to do so in the near future. 

10. The Ad Hoc Committee has studied the matter of greater use of 

coUX'ier service by NATO members. · It has further explored the possibilityof instituting satef!Uard.S in the fC)rm 0£ a note to recipients of sensitiv-e 

:NATO information stating that bef.ore the information is released there must . ) 

be assurances that it will not b.e forwarded by any electrical communication 

means; but if necessary to forward, that secure courier serviee would be 

utilized (see paragraph 24 of reference Report). In this connection the 

Ad Hoe Committee finds that: 

a. The current regulations relative to the transmission or COSl'.lIC 

. information and documents (Paragraplt 14,. Annex "B" to D.C. 2/7) clearly 

require that courier service be given first prior-lty as the means or transmission; electrical cryptographic transmission "should only be utilized 

when time does ·not permit the use or accompanied bag." 

___ ___.r 

4 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
b. A NATO courier service bas been considered. Such a service 

v1ould coat about $100,000 per month. Although the cost of such service 

might not be too great in view of the importance of keeping certain matters 

secure, there is nothing to indicate that the NATO governments would put 

much confidence even in a NATO courier service unless national couriers of 

their mm selection rrere provided to accomparllT the pouches in each case of 

such transmission. '.Ibe availability of such couriers is questionable, in 

view of the expense to each goyernment, and, moreo'l'!er, there are times when 

electrical transmission must be used, so that the door would still be left 

open far security violations in such instances, since the government 

concerned would still use its insecure national system for national comment 

on COSMIC information. 

c. A better and far less expensive answer might be to provide 

iridoctrination and training in the production or national settings and in 

the proper use or the TYPEX machine for COSMIC and NATO material as well 

as ror "fringe traff~c~ o 

ll. '!he physical, persomiel, and industrial standards of seclirity 

recently elaborated by the Tripartite Group, if approved by the three 

Govemments concerned, will be applicable to only those members of NATO; 

members such as. Portugal will not be bound by those standards. I.£, however, 

these standards were adopted by all NA TO countries, · this would be conducive 

tcmard improvement in those phases of eecurlty throughout NATO. The desirability or doing so is becoming more clear as NATO is ~owing in strength. 

l2. Even if those standards v1ere adopted throughout, NATO, training in 

their practical application and usage will be required and courses of 

instruction of approxf.ma.tely three weeks v duration will be necessary. Such 

courses could well includ.~ not only the three above-mentioned phases of. 

general security but also .t~e,. basic· elements of communication security, and 

the proper usage of the authorized ?t~TO cryptosyetems. • - "·. •• > • ~ -•• 

TOP· SECRET SUEDE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID:A67137 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
. ' 

J.7. a. Paragraph 3 of the Appendix to D.C. 2/7 reads as follows: r r13 •. Establishment of A~eneies to Control and Coordinate Securit;y • 

.!· At the Sta.ndi.n& Group.l.evel: l!le Security Coordina.tiv,g 

Committee. A Security Coordinating.Committee of the Stanilng 

Group is· constituted, composSd or French, United Sta.tee and 

United Kingdom representation. Security representatives or 

other membe:." countries or spokesmen from Regional Security ' . 

Committees will be called upon :f'or assistance when necessary. 

The Security Coordinating·Committee is responsible directly to 

the Standing Croup for the supervision of security within the 

. \7hole of the NATO syst~ at all levels and for the periodic 

examination of the .functioning thereof. Any security policy 

affecting NATO as a whole v1ill req'lire final approval at t~e 

·Council level." / 

b. Paragraph 5 of S.G.-41/3, dated 10 April 1951,,. reads as .follows:. 

~~s. The security Coordinating Committee shall: 

a. Be responsible to the Standing Group for reeommendationa · 

and guidance concerning security policy. 

b. Supervise am. period.ical.q examine the'functioning or the 

NATO Security System including COSMIC registries and the COSMIC 

system or communication.. The authority of' the country to be 

EO 3.3(h)(2) . · .. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 examined will be obtained before the examination is carried out 

and it will be conducted by and with the assistance of the 

country concerned." ./ 

e.. These extracts are quoted to shON that periodic Security 

Coordinating Committee examinations of the NATO Security System and its 

functioning have been speellically' authorized. / 

7 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
REPORT OF THE USCIB AD HOC cor,mTTEE 

to the 

t.nUTED STATES cor .. rr:;tJNic ..• TJONS I;:T.E;LLIGBi~CE !30iillD . 

on 

PORTUGUESE COiil!iUNICATl0N Sl:.'CURITY 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
REPORT OF THE uscm AD HOC COMMI'ITEE 

to the 

UNITED STATF1> COllUUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

on 

PORTUGUESE COM?.-!UNICATION SECURITY 

Reference:· USCIB: 23/lS 

lo At ita 66th ?:reeting, 1.3 July 1951, USCIB approved the referenced 

Report, which recommended that: 

"ho The UoSo Delegation to the U.S.-U.K. Conference on French 

coomunicatione security be contirmed as an ad hoc body to ascertain 

·the exact extent.to which present NATO pra~ticee may provide secure 

ways and means, Within the framework of thesa practices, to solve 

the Portuguese problem. 

c. FUl"ther consideration of exceptional,-direct action to 

improve Portuguese communications security be deterred pending 

(1) completion·or the study recormnended tinder_!? above and (2) NSC 

and USCIB decisions whether such action is to be taken vie-a-vis 

the French Government." 

2. The Ad Hoc Committee has continued its study of the problem, and 

has developed· the additional facts and conclusions set forth below. 

,3. The existing NATO regulations designed to protect sensitive NATO 

information, .as set forth in D.C. 2/7, 13 April 1951, are adequate for the 

purpose, if strictly enforced. The definitions of "COSTu~IC" and "NATO" 

information are· clear and susceptible of being applied vdth preeision. 

4. Portugues~·co.mmurrl.cations which contain information that clearly 

talls Vdthin the limits stipulated by the definitions are secure, since 

suqh communications a.re being transmitted by the authorized crY-Ptosystem, 

viz., TYPEX with simplex settings. 

1 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
5. Some NATO communications, however, contain information which may be 

characterized by the designation "NATO fringe traffic", and which consists 

largely of national comment on COSMIC or NATO matters and documents. It is 

this "fringe traffic" which constitutes the principal. source or insecurity as 

regards NATO and U .So information, and which, in the case of Portuguese 

communications, is causing serious damage to security. At the time that the 

definitions or COSMIC and NATO information were elaborated, the question 

whether national comment was to be considered CQS?JIC or NATO inf'orma.tiori was 

discussed and was specifically excluded from the definitions. This exclusion 

was at the request of the Department of State, which did not wish its own 

representatives to NATO hampered in regard to this matter, and at the same 

time did not wish to "cheat" by' having its diploma.tie representatives use 

u.s. aysterllS contrary to the NATO agreement. 

6. Such national comment ie most frequently originated by of fie~ of 

the Foreign Off ice or or the Diplomatic Corps rather than by memb0ra of the 

military departments of the NATO governments. This is particularly true in 

the case of Portugal. 

7. All the TYPEX machines allocated to ~JATO members by the British 

have been distributed and are in us~. However, the holders are all in the 

military departments of those ·NATO countries, and no machines have been 

allocated for use on the diploma.tic level by members of the Foreign Offices 

or Diplomatic Services. However, it appears that·additional allocations of 

TYPEX machines for use on the diplomatic level would not accomplish the 

objective, for the .reason given in the next para.graph. 

8. In transmitting national comment, the Portuguese member or the 

Council of Deputies in u;~on (and diplomats of other tJATO governments) I , 

prefer to use ,their ovm national eryptosystems rather than TYPEX because they 

fear that the British rirl.ght read TYPEX messages, since the settings are pr<P 

vided by the British. In the case of Portugal, the national eryptosystem 

2 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
used is the Hageliil c..;3s machine, with such poor procedures that the messages 

are easily solved. It may be assumed with some certainty that the u.s.S.Ro 

is reading these Portuguese messages. 

90 On 25 April 1951 all NATO member nations were informed by SG!!-616-51 

that the Signatory N8.tions or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were 

authorized, in addition to constructing their own plugboard setting keys, to 

prepa~ individual National Books of Settings should. this be desired "in 

order still further to preserve the discreet nature of the charmels provided 

fo:r National use .n They were also informed at the same time that "the U .Ko. . . 

have prepared a memorandum describing a secure method for the compilation of 

simplex settings and a copy will be made available to other member l'!ations 

it desired." 

10. The Ad Hoc Committee has no information as to whether any MATO 

countey has yet availed itself' or the opportunity to compile its own . 

"National B~lm of Settings", or even of the authority granted to compile its 

own National piugboard settingso It is obvious, however, that Portugal hae 

not yet availed itself of either opportunity and there are no indications of 

an intention to do so in the near futureo 

/ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) 

-TOP SECRET -SUEDE 
120 The Ad Hoc Committee has studied the matter ·or greater use of 

coUi"ier service by NATO members. It has further explored "the possibility 

of instituting safeguards in the form of· a note to recipients of sensitive 

NATO information stating that before the inforJ:'.lation is released there 

mu.st be assurances that it lrl.11 preferabq not be fon1arded· by any eleetrieal cemmunication means; but if nece~eary to forward,.that secure courier 

·service would be utilized" (see paragraph 24 or referencia Report) .. In this 

connection the Ad Hoc Comm.ittee finds that: 

al) The currant regulations relative to the tranSll".ission of COSMIC I 

information am. documents (Paragraph 14, Annex "~" to D.Co 2/7) clearlyrequire that courier service be. given first priority as the means.or tranS... 

mission» electrical cryptographic transmission "should only be utilized 

. . 

"tmen time does not permit the use of accompanied bag. n 

/ b. U.S. Air Fore~, Arnur, and State Dep<irbnent air courier services 

have been placed at the disposal of NA1'0 governments·to tjie limited. extent 

that such services are available. However, even such or these services as 

.. are at their disposal are not used by the NATO governments for t~e trans-

. ' 

mission of national comment, since they are unwilling.~o rely upon the 

invlolabilit;y of pou.ehes not accompanied by one of their cwm national· 

couriers. 

c. A NATO courier eerviea hae· been considered. Such a service . · 

would cost about $100.POOO per ~onth,- a fairly sizable amount vdth.a far-flung 

system which is becoming larger with each add~tional country that enters into 

' 

NATO. Although the cost of such service might not· be too great in view of 

the importance of keeping certain matters secure, there is nothing to 

indicate. that the NATO governments would put much confid~nce in even a NATO 

courier service unless national couriers of their·' own ·selection were provided 

to accompany the pouches in each case of such transmission• ,Ttie availo.bilit;r 

. of such couriers is questionable, in viev1 of the expense to each government, 

and, moreover, there are times ~\'hen electrical transmission must be used, so 

4 

TOP SECRET s·uEDE 
that the door \70Uld . still be left open for sec·uri ty violations in such 

instances, since the government concerned would still use its insecure 

national system for national comment.on COSMIC :inf'orma.tiono 

d. A better and far less ex:pa nsive au.swer might be (1) to furnish 

additional TYPEX .inachl.nes for use on the diploo;;~tic level, and (2) to provide 

indoctrination and training in the production c.•f national settings mid in 

the proper use or the machines for NATO "fringe tra.ffic".and j>urely national 

comment on eo.mmunieationa having a bearing on NATO affairs. 

130 The physical,. personn0l, and indust~dal standards or security 

recently elaborated by the Tripartite Group, if approved by the three· governments concerned, will be applicable to only those'members of NATO; members 

such as Portugal V1ill not be bound by thos.e standards D If, however, these 

standards were- adopted by all. NATO e(Junt1·ies, this would be conducive tov1ard 

improvement in. those phases or securlty throughout NATO. 'l'be desirability 

of doing so is becoming more clear a•~ NATO is grmring in strengtho The 

proposed.integration into a single r:dlitar;y force or the five separate forces 

of France, IWy, Western GenD.al\V, Bel~iwn, and Luxembourg increases the 

importance of a single set of standards· of securityo 

14. Even if' those standards were ad1>pted throughout NATO, training in 

·their practical application-and usage irl.11 be required and courses of 

instruction of approximately three weeks' duration \1'.i.11 be necesearyo Such 

courses could well include not only the th!~ee above-mentioned phases of 

general security but also the basic eleme:1nt.s of communication sec\Jrity and 

cryptography, particularly in regard to t},1e application and usa&e of the 

authorized NATO cr,yptosystema. Such couri:.~es could ba established under the 

authority of the Council .of Deputies wit.h SHAPE desi~ated as exeeutiw 

e.gentr, 

5 

-TOP SECRET SUEDE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i). 

15 o Action such as indicated in paragraphs 13 a.nd · 14 \.is by its nature . 

long-term in character, requiring at least one o::' two years.. The current 

.6 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID:A67137 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
.. TOI 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

with respect ~o the observance of the regulations in regard to the use of 

courier serviee and especially of TYPFX~ In so doing.the enquiries vrould 

lead naturally, and 'tdthout arousing suspicion as to motives, to questions 

regarding the compila~ion of national settings for TYPEX as authorize<,! by 

the Standing Group on 25 April 1951. ·Such queries would be all the more 

innocuous if it were pointed out and if it were true t-hat the U.S. and the 

. U.K. were using their o'\"·111 nationally compiled settings for TYPEX in national ' . . 

comment on ?JATO matters in view of the high security of the TYPEX system and 

its guarantees of privacy for purely national communications. 

21. Should this plan· prove feasible, the first government to .be 

;_~PP;r'~~ched shQUld be Portugal, vrho should be assisted in every.iray··fios111i.ble , .. ' -::.._. . . 

to institute the compilation and use of national settings for TYPEX at the 

earliest practica~~e momento 

22. The foregoing plan should and probabl¥ coUld not be instituted 

without prior agreement. w.i. th the U. Ko authorities, and nagotiatione with 

I.SIB should be initiated inmediately. Drafts of telegrams to the appropriate 

authorities are contained in the EnclosurG. 

TOP SECRifT SUEDE 
ENCLOSURE n A" 

Loinga-term Program for Introduction of Remedial Measures for a General 

Improvement in the Security of NATO Communications 

le Security ~rdinating Committee (SCC) of the Standing Group (SG) 

undertakes a review of NATO security regulo.ti,ons in accordance with 

provisions of paragraph ) of Appendix to DoCo ·2/7 and paragraph S of 

SGa/;1/3 .. 

2. SCC recommends to the SG tho.ti 

a., The physical, personnel, and industrial security standards elabo .. 

rated by the Tripartite Security Group be adopted throughout N.1.TO and 

be applied throughout all NATO levels including that of the Coimcil 

Deputies (CD). 

b. With a vi.en to insuring and facilitating strict compliance with · 

the regulations set forth in paragraphs 14 and 17 of .iumex 11B". to D.,C., · 

2/7~ indoctrination of .NATO authorities in the use of TYPU be provided 

at all evels, including that of the CDJ such indoctrination to include an 

explanation as to why TYPEK was selected, its proper use, compilation of 

National settings, etc. 

30 Follo\'ling approval and acceptance by the CD of step ~, the sec recommends 

to the SG that there-be established under the auspices of the CD, with 

SHAPE as exec:uti ve agent 11 training courses of approxir.;utely three weeks' 

duration, such courses (l) to include not only the elements of physicalp 

personnel and industrial security but also the basic elements of communication 

seeurity and the proper use of the authorized NATO cryptosysterns, and (2) 

.· -

·io be open to military and civilian personnel selected by each NATO government 

on the basis of the need0 to-knowo 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
..... 

. . .&. '" ..&.J .L ...,,, '-' . . . 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

ENCLOSURE "B" 

Program £or Immediate Remedial Measures to Correct the Insecurity of 

Portuguese Communications EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pt 86-36/50 USC 3605 

1. Following approval by the National Security Council of USCIB in regard 

__________ ___.luscm requests concurrence of tsm to the ms.king 

of a direct unilateral (U.S.) approach to the Portuguese Government at the 

highest level with a view.to correcting the current insecurity of Portuguese 

communications dealing with NATO af'tairs. 

2. In presenting the matter to !SIB, the "proposed steps would be indicated 

as being the following: 

a. '!he U .. S. Secretary ot State, through the U.S. Ambassador 1.n Li3bon, 

_notiiiea the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that the U.S. 

Government has a report from a usuall.7 most reliable source that the 

COSMIC or NATO classified information be.transmitted either in TYPEX with 

simplex settings provided·by the British or in TYPF..X with simplex settings 

or national production. 

,3. Upon acceptance by !SIB of the steps outlined in paragraph 2, to make 

the approach to the Portuguese MFA as indicated o 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
AFSA FORM 781-ClJS 

6 JUL 51 

D.r""tAFT AS Rl!~VISED 2 AUGUST l95i 

REPORT OF THE U$C!B AD HOC COMMITTEE 

to the 

UNI'mD STNIBS COMMU!UCATIONS Il~TELLIGEI\fCE BOARD 

on 

PORTUJ.UESE COMMUNICATIOr7 SECURITY 

TOP SEC"RET SUEDE I 
.. TO~ D-R-A-F-T 

SE eREl:f'~18L1j DE 

D- -A-F-T . 

REPORT OF THE users AD HOC COMMITTEE 

to the 

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELL!GEi"'lCE BOARD 

on 

PORTUGUESE COMM'JNICATION SECURITY 

Reference: USCIB: · 23/18 

1. At its 66th Meeting, 13 Jul_y 1951,_ USCIB approved the referenced 

Repo1·t ~ which recommended that: 

11b.. The U.S. Delegation to the tJ fts. -U .. KG Conferenc~ on French 

comro:unications security be continued as an ~ ~~ body to ascertain 

the exact extent to -which present ?JATO pra.ct:t.ces may provide s_ecure 

vays and means, vi.thin the f'ram.evork of these practices, to solve 

tha Portuguese problem. 

c. Further coD.sideration of exc~ptional, direct action to 

_ improve Portuguese colll1?1Uilica.tions security be def' erred :pending 

{l) completion of the study recommended under ~ above and (2) NSC 

and USCD3 decisions whether ~uch action is to be ta.ken vis-a-;ris 

the French Government." 

2. The Ad Hoc Committee has contin".led its study of the probl.em, and 

has developed the additional facts and conclusions set forth below. 

3, The existing NATO regul.atiori.a de~igned to protect sensiti'"e NATO 

information, as set forth in D.C. 2/7, 13 April 1951, are adequate for the 

P1,1TP0se; if strictly followed. The definitions of "CO.SMIC" and "NATO'' 

information a.re clear and susceptible of being applied with precision. 

2 

AFSA FORM 781-C13S 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
4. Some Portuguese communications vhich contain 1n1'orms.tion that 

clearly f'a.lls_vithin the llmits stipulated by the definitionc are secure, 

since these communications are being tran~mitted by the authorized cryptosysteIJS, viz., ~Xvith simplex settings. However, even 111 cases where 

the Portuguese have used TIPEX, their lack or ~MSEC 11 lmov-how" and the 

ll\a.Imer in which they use the machine make those messages possibly vulnerable 

to cryptanalytic at'b&Ck and weaken the NATO T'lPEX system as a vhole. · 

· 5. Some NATO communications, however, contain intol"mation llhi.ch may 

be characterized by the designation "NA'l'O f'ringe traff'ic", and which 

consists largely of national coment on""COSMIC" or "NAT011 matters and 

documents. At the time that the ·definitions ~f' COSMIC and NATO information 

were elaborated, the question whether national comment was to be 

considered COSMIC or NATO inf'ormation'vas discussed and specific provision 

that 1t be so considered vas excluded. This exclusion was at the request 

of the Department of State, vhich; inter,!!!!, did not Wish its own representatives to ·NATO hampered 1n regard to this -matter. :In t_he case of 

Portuguese comnnm.1cat1ona, it is both COSMIC material and this "fringe traffic" 

Which constitute the principal sources of insecurity of NATO and U.S. 

information. 

6. In transmitting national c0mment, the Portuguese membe:r of the 

Council Deputies 1n · London prefers to wse a Portuguese ceyptosyatem rather · 

. . 

than 'l'IPEX because he fears that the British might read.TJPEX messages, 

since the sett1ngs are provided_b7 the British~ In the case of Portugal, the 

Portuguese cryptosyatem used is the llagelin C-38 machine, w1 th such poor 

-procedures that· in all probability the u.s.s.R. and other countries are 

reading these Portuguese messages, even though they may be transmitted by 

lrire systems. 

AFSA FORM 7Bl-C l)S 

6 JUL 51 TOP SEGJRET SUEDE 
.. 

On 25 April 1951 all NATO member nations vere informed by 

SGM-616-51 that the Signatory Netions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza.tion were authorized, in a.dd.it:!.o~·to constructing theil" own plugboard 

setting keys, to prepare individual Na·tione.1 Books of' Settings should· this 

be desi~ed "in order still further to preserve the discreet nature of the 

che.1mels provided for Nation.al use.;, They trere also inf'ormed at the .same 

time that. "the U.K. have :prepared a memore~dU!t!. describing a secure method 

f'or the com,Pilation o'f simplex settings aud a c.ow will 'be ~de a'!ailable 

to other member 1-qations 1f desired." . The t.ransmiseion of National comment 

by TYPEX machines with Nat~.onal settings is not prohibited.. 

~- The Ad Roe Committee has ascertained that not a aingle one of the 

NATO countries has yet availed itself' of the opportunit-y to compile ita oun . ' ' 

"Ne.ti.Dnal Books of Settings", or even of the authority grentecl to coniPile 

its own National plugboa.rd settings. There are, 'i::. th!! cc.!3c of' Portugal, 

no indications of'. an intention to do so in the near f'uture. 

//// 

·, L.....--1 ---- EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

4 

' AFSA FORM 1a'1-c13s 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
E03,3(h)(2) 

PL 88-36/SG USC 3605 

10,. The Ad !he Committee considered a number o.f proposals for action 

which might be· undert.akentocorrect this situa.tiono Preliminary to its 

deliberatio~s the Committee a.greed th.a.ti ... ____________ .... 

interests was almost an over--riding factor in this ease, and that ~ 

solution which nould dafini tely prejudice them should be undertaken au.1,y 

as a laet resorto Of seven proposals vortey of serious. consideration 

it attentively studied three which while appearing to ofter the best 

chance of producing immediate org at least promptp remedial results, at 

the same time vrould present tho least ·danger or security risk to tb.G U.So; 

the Committee then unanimously selected from among the three the one 

nhich it deems the most feasible and best under the circumstanoeso The 

proposal thus selected is described in paragraph 11 below; the remaining 

proposals are set forth in Enclosure "A"J.1 together with eommentso 

llo The selected proposal is based upon these three premises: 

Co A prompt a.melioration o£ the p~esent insecure situation can 

be expected if the Portuguese could be (1) forced to comply with Nl\.TO 

security reeulations& (2) given some indoctrination so that they would 

acquire full confidence in the security of TYPE.X9 (.3) induced to make 

mol"e use of the llATO authorized cryptosystem (TYPi.X.) 9 and (4) take 

advantage of the permission granted NATO members to eompila their own 

national books of settings for TY?~Xo 

120 ao The selected proposal 1nwlvos a directo and apparentl.Y 

unilateral (UoS.,) approach on a govermnent-.to ... eove.rnment level" with a 

view to delivering a shock to the Por1i\1.guese Govemment by showing that: 

(1) Its >representative on the Council Deputies is deliberately 

AFSA FORM 781-CIJS 

6 JUL 51 

; 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
vlolating not otfY a nell~defined folTO cornmunicaticn .scourj.ty 

·regulation to ~hich the Portueuese Government solemnly ·subscribed, 

-but.also me.njfests little hesitancy in disregarding an expressly 

stated request by the President of .. the Council Deputies that certain 

information not be trrinsmitted by telegraph; and 

(2) The security violation i~volved the possible disclosure 

of hiehly sensitive _U~So inforr.lation of a character clearly political 

and of hir .. hest .importance to fo'oTO and Uo3o security., 

e,, The Portuguese ·Government "i?OUld bo info:r."med that the U.-.So 

Government is so incensed and concerned about this- flagro.nt 1r.iolati.on directly 

affecting its O\'.'?'l security,as well as t.h~t of the \·;hole of K,i.TO, ·t.hat it is 

seriously considering referring the matter t.o the Council Deputies; hor.evorp ! -

the· U .. S~ Gove:t'nment is ~eluctant. to tako zuch action9 provided prompt steps are 

tel{en to correct the si tu:ition an:l 'assuI"ances arc given by the .Portuc..icse 

Government that.the action it ~ill take will prevent a repetition of such 

violation and disregard -of security pi:·ocedureso 

do 'l'hese as:sura.riaces mrist cor.ipr~se g 

(1) Asaurance that ·the aut.horized Nii.TO cryptosystem .(TY.I-~) 

vill he.rea..fter be used for ·tho tran~mission of all CO.SlllC9 TOP SECllliT 

and SEC!t~T !'-:ATO ini'ormation:; .:md n.<itiona.l com.raent on such information; and 

(2) Assurance that a request 11 ey u,government tabling information 

bsf'or"'. a t1ATO'-.. body 9 that, such information be transmitted only by. courier 

will be strictiy ~bservedo 

AFSA FORM 7al-Cl)S 

6 JUL 61 

6 

TOP- SECRET SUEDE 
3.3(.h)(2) 

86-36/59 USC 3605 · ~H-+-l!!i::] ~.-~f)fMS@~D E 

e.. 'I'he authorities "ifOUld then be g1 ven posi t,i ve assurance 

secure r:cans of comrnlnic;..~t~.on 

This could be done merely by pointing out that TYi·.i.!;X 

was selected by the NATO Council after due deU.bcrution beco.use of the high 

degree of security it affords wher1 properly uuecl.; 1'hey should then be 

induced_ (1) to direct the cryptographic bureau of the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs (Mr'A) to comriile national settings for Pol°tuguese TYi-~X comn1w'dcaMons 

al!ld (2) to issue a d1recti ve that. when trtlilsmission by accorapanied bag is 

not feasible because of the time factor and eJ.ectI'ical tranBI:1..i.ssion mu.st be 

employed, all Portuguese communicat.ions dealing directly or indirect.ly ~~ith 

r.ostuc oi• TOP s.i:.:cru."'T ANP SBCRET NATO in.formation Will be transmitted ei thei• 

in TYPEX mth simplex setiings prov.tded by tho B:dtish or in TYfBX with 

sin:plex sctt1.ngs of national production. 

1.30 The Ad Hoc Committee is unanimous in its opinion that. this proposal 

should be adoptedp for the following reasonsi 

ae It appears to. offer the only program fox· px'Orapt remedial 

action \vhich affords both security and a roasonable prospect, of being effective~ 

It is reco&rriized that to ba ef:fectj.ve, any approach to tl".a Portuguese 011 this 

·, 

subject must ohock ttie:m,. This nshock11 must oo of such a nature thD.t it will 

i.n.suz·e their compliance v;i th NATO secu.dty regulation~ governing th.e Y'llli.Smission of classified .NATO 1nforir,at1onl' 

rill produce this "shoclt", for these 

x:iassE.Lgas contain. thesia important el0ment~o1: (l) a violation of a specific 

request by the President. of the Cmun.c:l.l D(llput.ies not to tr.ansrnit tho :1.n.fo.r~ 

mation by electrical means; (2) a. statemont cler~rly indicating '/",hat the 

Portuguese representative arrogatos to himself the capability of reversing 

a judgment of the President of the Council Deputies as to t.Jie necessity for 

sel!Tecyj) and (3) a. s·tatcment l"ovealir:e the Por"Cu~ese attit.ude on the use 

) -I,' ,; Y. 

b~ The t.brcotened aetion~ v.i.z .. 6 1;o b'r:i.ng the violation 'w the 

a.t.tention of the Council Deput:i.es:i twuld no doubt greatly alarm the 

AFSA FORM 781-ClJS 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
Fo 3.3(n)(2) · 

PL8(3-36!5pUSC3605 TOI SEORBfl?A*SUiDE 

PoTtUg'Jcse Government and it would probabl~ consent to almos~_a?>¥·reasonable 

:i.'"equest if doing so would avoide such actiopo 

de It also provides an excellent opportunity to indoctrinate the 

~ortucuese ut the hichest level in the actual security of the TY?~ system; 

1.t mll be c:1nducive to getting the Portuc;uese to use it for liv.:.U .. lisi TOP SECRET 

and SECR!!.'T NATO information; and it will probably lead them to compiline their 

own TYf't;! settings for transmitting national comment on such informationo 

140 lt will be necessary to obtain the eon~urrenee of LSIB to this 

proposal 9 which should be communicated to that Board \'Iithout delay· if it is . 

accepted by USCIB.. A draft of a. suitable telegram is contained in Enclosure "C" .. 

l5o ao The Ad Hoc Committee is of the opirdon that the approach to the 

Portuguese outlined in Paragraph 12 ean be undertaken v.iit.hout reteri:-ing the 

matter to the Hati.onnl Security Council (NSC} and without mraiting.the 

NSC decision on USClB g 14/l{ I .______,_____ _____. 

ba The Committee also feels that the exact details of making the 

approacb9 the specific UoSo official or officials to be designated to make the 

!1.pproach, and the specific Portuguese official or officials to be approuched, 

should be dec:!.ded by the Department of Stateo - a draft of a suitable memorandum 

to the secretary of .Stute is set forth in ~closure "D"o 

16> The Ad Uoc Committee. considers· that~ 

ao All the other proi.osals set forth in .iidlclosure "A" 11 except 

Proposal ~ ~ are suitable only 

as long=term programs; 

AFSA FORM 7al-C13S 

6 JUL 51 

. 8 . . 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
bo It would be advisable to ir.J.tiate action on one·or raoz~ of· 

those proposals as promptly as practicable so as to assure and e:J...'i.end the 

benefits ;1hich may flor1 from the execuUon o.f the lld Hoc Committee's selected 

proposal for_ immediate .action, e.s outlined in para.graph l2; and· 

c., Such longa-tom action may also lay the ground ... y1ork for .Proposal 

B should it become necessary to resort to that proposalo 

170 The Ad }ioc Committee further considers that 11 except for Proposal 

B, all the proposals outlined in Enclosure nAn 9 tJhile of interest to USCIB, 

do not.fall strictly Within the cognizance o.f U~ClB 11 and should be studied 

in detail by the proper body or bodies of NATOo It may be noted that se\!ers.l 

- or the lone-term proposals are interdepende;"lt in the sense that they v:ould 

reinforce one.another and nould be mo:::t effective if undertaken together under 

the same authorities. riith this in view the memorandum set forth in Enclosure 

"E" has been preparedo 

18.. F1nany, with reference to tho directive given the Ad Hoc Committee 

in USClB: 23/18 to explore the possibility of instituting sai'cguards involving 

greater· use of courier service and of brlngitig this abOut throueh an approach 

to the Commander o.f SlL·J>.1.~, tho Ad Hoc Committee \'iishes to point out th.D.t the 

present Portuguese insecurity involves communications which are on the diplomatic le~l and not between military personnelq For this reason the matter 

is one in which SlL"U>.c; has no Jurisdiction$) and .an approach t.hruugh Siid.PZ would 

not only be inadvisable but also very probably quite ineffective in bringing 

about the results desiredo 

· 19.. It is recommended thats 

ao The action proposed in Paragraphs 12,l41115P and 179 and mclO<" 

sures 11 cn 11 "D", and 11E11 be approved; 

bo The Ad Hoc Committee be directed to maintain contact ,with this 

problem in order to inform USCIB frorn time to time as. to progress made in its·· 

solution and to notify USCI.B when a satisfactory level of communication sccuri t;·· 

has been attained by the Portuguese in the transmissi_on of classified ini'orma.1;.i'; 

a.ffectine the security of the UoSo and l~;~TO,, 

AFSA FORM 781-Cl)S 

6 JUL 51 

9 

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- -_ Ef.*<Rffi DE 

EMCLOSURE "A" - ~ . 

PROPOSALS STUOIID BY ·THE AD HOC CO?.~!ITTEE 

TO CORRECT THE 

i=o 3.3(h)(2) INSECtffiITY OF PORTUGW.SE COt!1J!HCATIONS 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DANGEROUS TO U.So OR NATO 

lv PROPOSAL A: That a non-intensive ef'fort be JIJ!lda, through the 

Security Coordinating C01!!lllittee or the NATO standing Group, to convince the 

varloue NATO members requiring indoctrination, including parti~ularly the 

Portuguese, of the security and. the adequacy of the TYPEX cryptosrstem and · 

procedures which ha'Ve been authorized tor the.transmission of sensitive 

NATO inf orma.tion. 

COJ.1IliENT 

This proposal might produce either ~rompt or long-term remedial 

results but the Committee feels dubious about the ef'fica.ey of suph an 

approach since it has no elements of shock necessary to impress the derelict 

NATO members. Past ei."perience af.f'ords no basis for a belief, or even the 

hope that\~uch a. simple approach would be effective. '111e fatuous confidence 

which, 

no reliance can be placed in this 

approach to the problem of the insecurity of Portuguese co1nmunieations 

containing COSMIC or TOP SECRET and- SFXRET NATO· information. 

2. .ffi.OPOSAL B: That a direct U.S. or u.s./U-K. approach· to the 

Portuguese Government be ma.de 

The.objective '1ould be to force ll!medie.te 

adherence to COSH!C security-regulations, thus producing prompt remedial 

results, Sl'..d to assure an eventual reorganization and improvement in the 

security of all Portuguese communicationao 

C01'!1ENT 

a. This p?opbsal is practically identieal v.riththat proposed in 

uscm: U/132 in regard! I~ involves a dir~ct appToach. to the 

Portugue-se at the highest governmeniai level, viz., the Secretary of State · 

AFSA FORM 761-Cl)S 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECR1

1LT SUEDE-
~~~-~~~MSU§DE ~through the U.S. J'.mba.ssadozi in Lisbon :to the .Portuguese Minister of Foreign· 

ii.ff airs (rlifi'A). 

b. Such an approach necessitates bringinp, the COMS~ situation·t.o 

the at·!;ention of the ]i\inister of Foreigii Af•fail"GI in a manner so dramatic as I 

·io shoek him into takinp, speedy and effective action. 

e. The diaadvantages of such an approach in the case or the· 

.E03.3(h)(2) 

Portuguese ars: PL 86-36750USC 3605 

·L.___1 -----,----------,-----_______ I 

The general insecurity-mindedness ·and. loquacity ot the Portuguese 

people as a whole makes thia cour&!~ dangerous. 

{2) In the. case of I lithe pul'pose of\\dellvering aueh 

a shoek is to bring about a drastic overhaul of the cr.vptosystems and 

practices of 

There is~ 

I 

or over-riding necessity, from the point or view of u.s. sec:urity,. of 

bringing thio about in the case or, the Portuguese, but filso \it \·1ould 

prov1.ded that aegment of the inseeuri t;r 

which involves leakage of COS1.tIC or Ti!ATO SECRE-r and TOP SECRET 

.ifl..formation can be eliminated without a complet.e overhaul of Portuguese 

C!"JPtosysteras and practices. 

3. .ffi_O?OSAL _g: 'l'ha.t a high-level appx•oach to the Portuguese Gowrnment 

be made, disclosing, our poai ti ve knowledge of Portuguese violations of the 

C~?.fIC security reguJ.ationsL..I ___________________ ___, 

sources; the disclosure would ha made ostensibly with a view to insisting 

upon Portuguese observance of those regulations, thus producing prompt 

:remedial result:;;. 

This is the pToposal unan:L~ously agreed to by the Committee and iG 

discussed in detail in paragraphs 12-15 of the basic pa.per. 

AFSA· FORI< 781-Cl)S 

6 JUL 51 TO·P SECRET SUEDE 
4. PROFDSAL D: That there be established a NJ\'fO courier service which 

would be , adequate to support the prosent JITATO agreement that all possible 

COS.m:c, TOP SEDRET and SE.GRET NATO inrol"iil.ation be transmitted by pouch~ 

· The Ad Hoc Committee studied the matter of greater use of courier 

service by NATO members and .further explored the possibility of instituting 

safeguards in the form of a note to recipients of sensitive NATO information . ' 

stating that before th~ information is releyised there must be assurances 

that it. will not be for.·,'al"ded by any elect.rical cormmmieation means; but if' 

necessary to forward, that secure courier ser,,ice would b::i utilized (see 

paragraph 24 of reference Report). The Committee finds that: 

a •. The eurTerit regulations ,rela:C.ive to the transmission o.f COSMIC 

information and dceuments (Parap:r~ph U., Annex "B" to D·.c. 2/7) clearly 

require that. courier service ba eivan first p:r::'iorit.y as the means of trnns~ 

mission; electrical cryptomraphic transm:lssion "should only be utilized . 

'i'lhen time does not permit the use of aeeompa.riied bag.n 

b. U.S. fl.ir Force, .Arrrry, and State Dep."...rtment air courier services 

have been placed at the disposal of NATO r,overnments to the limlted eJ..'"tent 

that such services are available. Ho'J.rever, even such of thesa a~ces a.s 

are at their disposal are not used by the NATO governraents for the trans~ 

mission of national comment, since they at-e unwilling to re]$ upon t~e 

inViolability or pouches not accompanied by one of their own national. 

couriers. 

c. A NATO courier service would not only be extremely do~rtly but 

also there is nothing to indicat.s that the NATO governments \1Touid put much 

confidence m.ren in a NATO courier servlee unless national couriers ot their 

own selection were provlded to accompany the pouches in each case of such 

ti•ansmission. The availability of such couriers ia que_stionable, in view 

of the expense to each go'inJl"DID,ent, and, rnoreovers there are times when 

electrical transmission must be used, so that the door would still be left 

open for security violations in such instances, ainee the government conce~ned mieht still use, its insecure National syatem for National ca.mnent 

on COSMIC info:rrmation~ 

12 

. ' 

AFSA FORM 781-Cl)S 

6 JUL 51 TOP S·ECRET SU·EDE 
... 

5. PROPOSAL E: Th~t there be established a security training program, 

curriculum., and school f<>r all ~leinents 'Of the NATO organization, both 

ci vilia.n and military. ffeNG-TEllli P.ESULTS J 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

C011lnml' PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

See comment under Proposals F.and Go 

60 PROPOSAL F: 'r}1at a bilateral u.s.-Portugu.ese securitrsurvet, 

sim.i.lar to the recently completed tripartite u.s.-U.Ko-F?"ench ~y, be ma.de 

and that this survey- include among its objectives; (1) the attaimnent\ of 

mutua.l.lT-a.gread standards tor personnel and p~ys:tcal security and (2) the 

COMMENT 

See comment under Proposal Go 

?.. PROPOSAL G: That an et.fort be .made to obtain adoption throughout 

NATO or the Tr:J.partite security· stand.B.l"'ds now being considered for adoption 

by the U.S. , U. K. and Franca. ffeNG-TERM RESUL TS_J' 

COMMENT 

a. The basis for Prop0sa.ls E, F, and G is to be found in the 

f'ollo\"ling extracts from NATO_d.~cuments: 

AFSA FORM 781-Cl)S 

6 JUL 51 

'< l) Par q 3 of Appendix to D. C. 2/'7, 13 Aprll 1951: 

"3o l!:sta.blisrnnent of ~ncies to Cop.tro;t am Coordinate Securitz. 

a. At the Staru:ii.r;g Group Level: The Security Coordinating 

Committee. A Sec~ity Coordi~ting Committee of the Standing 

Group is constituted, composed of French, United Sta.tea and 

United Kingdom representation. Security repre!3entat:ives of 

other member count1•ies or spokesman from Regional Seeurit;r 

Committees·vtlll be called upon for assistance when"necesaaryo 

The Security Coordir.ating Committee-is responsible directly- to 

the Standing Group for the supervision of security within the 

whole of the NA'l'O system at ·a.n levels ap.d for the per·iodic 

TOP SECR1ET SUEDE 
~'lation of the f't.mcticni~ thereof. An:r securlt;:r poliey 

affecting NATO as a whole will require final approval. at the 

Council level." 

(2) Paro 5 of S.G.-41/3, 10 April l.951: 

"5. The security Coordinatirig CoIDmittee shall: 

a. · Be responsible to the Standing Group for recommendations 

and guidance eoneerning security policy. 

b. Supervise and periodically ex:amine the funetioning of the 

rlATO·Securit7 System including COSUIC registries and the COSMIC 

sys~em of communication. Tha authorit,y of the country to be 

examined Viill'he obtail!led.before the e.leamination is carried out 

a.nd_it will be conducted by and with the assistance of the 

country concerned." EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

b. · These extracts ~e quo~ to show that periodic Security 

' . 

Coordinatik'lg Co.mmittee revieWs. of the NATO Security System and its act.ual 

manner of functioning have been speci.f!eally authorized. 

c. The Ad Hoc COrnmittee bas learned that some of the MATO countries 

do not even have a doetrine or document. dealing v.-"ith such matt~rs as 

physical ·or personnel security; let alone standards to which their au:thoritiefi 

should strive a 

d.. The Committee is of the opinion that, in raga.rd· to the a;;ubject· 

of physical and personnel security, a unilateral (U.S.) approach to the 

Portuguese Government wOU.ld offer advantages. J 

I This applies to · ,__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--J 

Proposals B, C, and.F. 

e. The physical, personnel, and industrial standards of security 

recently elaborated by the-Tripartite GroupJ if approved by the three 

.Govel"nmerits concernad, 'L'ri.11 be applicable onl;v to those members of, NATO; 

AFSA FORM 781-Cl)S 

6 JUL 51 

14 

. ' 
.. 

' 

. ___ fFMS~iDE 

members such as Portugal will not be bound by thos~ standard.so If, hQmwer, 

these standards were adopted by all NATO countries, this would be co~ucive 

toVial"d improvemeut in those phases of .security throughout NATO. 'me .des1,rability or doing so le becoming more clear e.s NATO is growing in atrengtho 

t. Under the cover of such pe~odic . reviews as those referred to 

in subparagra.phs !. and ,!!, the Security Coordinating Committee could work 

through the Sta."lding Group to institute enquiries with respect to the 

existence of national security standards and the observance of all NATO 

security .regulations, including those dealing vdth the use of courier ser--

·vice and electrical transmission. 

g. HOV!ever, even if.the Tripartite security standards were adopted 

throughout NATO, training in their imacticai application and usage w.i.ll be 

required and courses of inst.ruction of several weeksv duration will be 

necessary as an initial step~. Such courses eould well include not only the 

-three above-mentioned phases of general security but also the basic elementsof coI!U!JWrl.cation securityj and the proper usage of the authorized NATO 

cryptosystems. Such indo~trina.tlon should be provided at all ~L\TO levels, 

including that of the Couneil Deputieso In order for this to be effective 

continuous supervision and review or the ways in which the training is being 

applied in practice will be necessary. It is clear, therefore, that to be 

fully effective~ the action contemplated. in these last three pg'l)posa.ls is 

necessarily long-term and continuing in charaetero 

h. It is also obvious that.several of the long-term· proposals are 

interdependent.in the sense that they would rein.force one another and would 

be most effective if Undertaken togethero 

~o Following approval of the Council Deputies,, there could be set 

up under SHAPE, in order to afford instruction in the standards of security 

elaborated by the Tripartite Group, a training course of approximately three 

'reeks tor individuals selected by the dif!e~nt NATO countries; sueh n course 

to include not only elements or physical, personnel and industrial security 

but also the basic elements of cOl'!imUi;rl.ea.iion security.and· cryptography, 

particularly in regard to the application ard usage or autho~ized NATO 

cryptographic systams. 

AFSA FORM 781-ClJS 

6 JUL 51 

15 

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.. 

Action such as that contemplated in Proposals A, D, ~, F, and G 

docs not fall strictly within the cognizance ot HSCID but or N/.TQ authorities. 

Hence, stich proposals should be referred to those authorities as beiltg or . . 

interest to USCIB but for the consideration and action by NATO •. 

16 

AFSA FORM 1a1-c13s 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
• 

.MSA FORM 701-C!3S 

6 JUL 51 

DRAFT AS RElJISED2!'/ JULY 1951 

REPORT OF THE uscm AD HOC ca,m:TTEE -

.to the 

UNrm> STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

on 

PORTWUl!SE-COlmtJMICATION sEcuRITY 

1 

.. ; 

·TOP SECRET SUEDE 
REPORT OF THE USCIB AD HOC cma,'.IT'rEE 

.to the 

UNI'l'ED ST_A'l'ES .CO!J/iUNIC!tTICUS IN'I'f:IJ..IGE1\iCE BOARD 

Ol!l 

PORTUGUESE COEHUN!CATION SECffilD'Y 

Re£ere11ce: USCIB: 23/lS 

1. At its 66th f·~eet:l.ne~ 13 July 1951, USCIB approved the r-..7ferenced 

Report, vthich recozmne;:lded that: · 

11 b. 'l'he U.S. Dalegation to ths U.S.-U. K. Confe~ence on Prcr.i.eh 

COOlliluirl.ca:tions security be cont:U!t!ed· as a.n E,d hcc bcdy tc ascfiir-t.ain -- --=-- . . 

the exact e:ir:tent to 1t1hich prese:nt NATO practices may p~~~ovide se~u:re · 

i~he Pm .. tuguesa problem. 

:::; • Fw.-ther cions:i.d<Yi."at.ion of exeepti<m.;11, cH.t·ec:t. action tc . 

(1) coJ.:r:pletion of, the study recommemied under·.!?, abcv¢ and (2) NSC 

arid USCIB decisici.is whet.her sueh aetion ie 'l"..o be t.aken vie-a,~rls 

the French Goverrunent.ri 

·' 2. The Ad Hoc Corilm:i:C.~e~ has corrtinued :1.ts study ui' tb.e problem, and 

haa de'ti~lcpro the additicri.a.l factE! and conclusim1s set forth 'b-~low. 

3 o 'I'he 6jQ.sting HA'l'O regulations deaignsd to pi•ot.ect · as11rdth·e NATO 

in.formation are clear and suoceptible of being applied vrith precision, 

4. ~ma Portugu0se co.iur ..m .. micntions which contain info:nn&tion that 

(,:learly falls within the lii"!its st.ipul~ted by the defil'lit:kna are secure;; 

since t..heso eommmti.cations are being transrnittsd by the authorized c:eyptosyste'.l1!S, viz., TYPE.I with simplex sa~tJ.iigeo Homr'1'el", even· in cases where 

ttie Portuguese hav.e us9d TYPEX,, theii' la.ek of .. seeuri ty and the manner in 

MSA FORM 781-ClJS 

6 JUL 51 

2 

TOP SECRET SUEDE 
IOP s 

w~dch tha;:; use th~ m"'ohine make thos~ messages possibly vulnerable t.o 

con~ieta la.rgEily of m.tiom.1 comment on cos;nc OT NATO ma.tt.ers a!ld docu=-

. mel~t.~o At '£.hr. time th.at the d.efinit::l.ons of COS?.11'.C and N!•_TO infol"maticn 

WEi~-s e~aboratcd; the question whether national comment -uras to be 

conBide?ed COS~UC or NATO i:lli"or.mation 1t1as discussed and .. specific provision 

that lt be so considered was excluded. This tJxelusion vras at th-3 raquest 

of the Depart.raent of State, which; inter alla, di.d not vri.sh its mm repre~ 

s:;:.ntativea to NATO hampered. in regard to this :matter. In the case of 

6, In tr.i:;J-1s1:d.·1~t.ing rotio:nal cor.imcnt, "the Po~->tuguese mer/oer of the 

CrmrH.:dl Deputies in London (and diplomata of o"~he:r:· Nl\TO gover.f'Jntmte;) 

pref er to use their own national Cl"YJ>tosyste.~s rather than TYPEX because 

they fear that th~ British rnir,ht read TYPEX messages, since_ too sat.tings 

arc provldad by the British" In the case of f'c,1"tugal, the national 

tl"'..at the UoSoSoRo is rending these Portuguese mes3agesol e_ven though they 

.ma.y be tl"a.nsril.i t ted by wire sys terns. 

7 o On 25 Apr:n 1951 all NATO member nations were informed qySG¥.t=616=51 that the Signatoey- Nations of the Worth Atlantic Treaty Orgai'liza.tion were nu.thorized, :l.n addition t.o const,ructing their own plugboard 

sett.i!'.g keya~ ·to prepare individual National Books of Settings should this 

be desired "in ortlnr st.ill further to presei--ve the discreet nature of' the 

ehanneJ.~ provided for National useo IV They \"101"$ also in.formed at. the aama 

Af"SA FORM 761-Cl)S 

6 JUL 51 TOP SECRET SUEDE 
iOP .sfi:eR~jBEDE 

tim~ that "the U. K. have pre~ a memm."andum desci .. ibing a aecur·a methoo. 

for the compila.ti~n or simplex. asttings ~ a copy \tlll be .mi:lde available 

to othsr member Natiorts if deai:l'zd."- CJ.'hetransrniea:ion of National comment 

by TYPEX machines with National sattinga is not prohibited·. 

S. The Ad Hoc Committee is a.ttempt:i.ng '~o ascertain whether a.!l.J NJ\.'I'O 

country has yet availed itself of. the opportunity to compile its mm 

"National -Books of Settingsri, \?I' even of the authority granted to c0i11p:U.e 

its own Nat.ional. plur,bcard aettlngi:3. It in obvious, howGver, that Portugal 

hae :not yet ava:ned itself of either opportunity and there are rio indications of an intention to do so in the near future. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86:-36/50 USC 3605 

courier service by NATO members. It has further explo1"ed the-possibility 

of instituting safei:marde in the fo!'m of a note to recipients of sensitive 

NATO inf ormatiort stating that before the inforw.ution is released there must 

be assurances that it will _not be fo~rded by any ele.etrical commuriication 

means; but if necessary to foi'"'t'rard, t..hat. secure courier serviee !'l'ould be 

utilized (see.paragraph 24 or Tei'e:rence Report)o In this connection the 

Ad Hoe Commit.tee finds that: 

a. The cur'rent regu)..9.tiona relative to the transrnisaion or COSl'..';IC 

information and documents (P~ragraph 14, Annex 11B" to D.CQ 2/7) clearly 

require that coi.:trier sernce be given first priority as the means of ~~rains~ 

mission; electl":lcal eryptc:>eraphie t:r&1smiseicn ushould only ba· utilized. 

v1hen time does not per-:mtt the use of accompanied bag. n 

. L---1 _ _____,.,....___! . . 

_TOP SE€RET SUEDE- MSA FORM 781-C lJS 

6 JUL 51 

-~ 
b. A ·Nil.TO courier service ha.a been ccnaidared. Such a service 

would cost about t·l00,000 per month. Although the cost 

might not be too great in view of the importance of keeping certain matters 

secure, there is nothing to indicate that the NATO go~~nrn.ents would put 

cuch ~onfidence even in a NATO courier service unless natioinal couriers of 

their ovm sele.ction were provided to accompany the pouches in -~eh case of 

SU(:ii transmission. The availability of such couriers is questionable, in 

view of the expense to each government, and, moreover, there are times when 

electrical transmission must be used, so that the dcor would still be left 

c.pen for security violations in siJch inatanceo, since the goverment 

croncerned mif,ht still use i~s insecure National system for National CO!!IJllent 

on COSJHC information. 

c. A better and far less· expensive answer would be to instill · 

conf5~dence of NATO members in the security of the TYPEX ·system, and to provid·.e indoctrination and training in the product.ion of National settings and 

in. the proper_ use of the TYPEX ma.chine for COSMIC and NATO material as well 

as to"!: "fringe traffic"~ 

ll. '!he physical~ personnel, and industrial standards of security 

recent~ elaborated by the Tripartite Group, if approved by the three 

r...overnments concerned, will be applicable to only those members of NATO; 

members such as Portugo.l will not be bound by those standards. If, however, 

these standards were adopted by all NATO countries, this Would be conducive 

toward improvement in those phases of security throughout NATOo The desir= 

ability of doi~r, so is becoming "more clear as NATO is growing in strength. 

l2. F.ven_if those standards were adopted throughout NA'fO, training in 

their practical application and uaar,e wi~l be required ar~ courses of 

instruction of approxirlately three weeks 9 duration will be necessary. Such 

courses could well include not only the three above-mento.1.oned phases of 

general security but also the.basic elements of communication security, and 

the proper usa.ge of the authorized NATO cryptosyste.lll.!3. Such ir..do~trination 

shoμld be provided ~t all NATO levels, including that of the Council Deputies~ 

M"SA FORM 781-Cl~S 

6 JUL _51 . ·TOP SECRET ·suEDE 
• 

s~rt;t,ings and to us~ 'I'l'PF.X .fol\" massages contill.ning COS?:IIC, NATO ·roP SF.CHET 

p111y continue but "Will increasH o 

15 o The Ad Hoo Ccunr.litteiB :ts of the op:i.a.ic.n that., in rege..'.<:d to ·(,he f:!Ub·~ 

~j~<:t of. phySical and 1,-er::;o.n:n.19.1. security,., a <i.mi.J.atera.1 {U 650) ::i.ppro.:"1ch to 

the Portuguese Goverinment would off ex- advruiliagee" 

MSA FORM 781-C13S 

6 JUL 51 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

6 

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