Filed: May 20, 1998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-4284

(CR-96-335-CCB)

United States of America,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

Vaughn Monroe Sligh,

Defendant - Appellant.

ORDER

The Court amends its opinion filed April 29, 1998, as follows:

On page 2, first paragraph of opinion, line 1 -- a comma is

added in "$7,000."

On page 4, first full paragraph, line 4 -- a comma is added

after the phrase "in Sligh's mind."

On page 10, first full paragraph, line 2 -- a comma is added

after the word "overtures."

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4284

VAUGHN MONROE SLIGH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.

(CR-96-335-CCB)

Argued: January 26, 1998

Decided: April 29, 1998

Before LUTTIG, Circuit Judge, PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge,

and MORGAN, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Luttig wrote the

majority opinion, in which Judge Morgan joined. Senior Judge Phillips wrote a dissenting opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Harry Levy, SCHULMAN, TREEM, KAMINKOW &

GILDEN, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. William Warren

Hamel, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kenneth W. Ravenell, Andrew H. Levine,
SCHULMAN, TREEM, KAMINKOW & GILDEN, P.A., Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Vaughn M. Sligh paid a $7,000 bribe to an IRS agent to

change his tax debt to "uncollectible" status, and was thereafter

indicted for bribery, payment of an illegal gratuity, and interference

with the administration of the Internal Revenue Laws. At trial, Sligh

admitted to paying the bribe to the IRS employee, but offered the

defense of entrapment in his opening statement. After the close of the

government's evidence and after most of the defense case (but prior

to the defendant's testimony), the defense sought a ruling as to

whether the court intended to instruct the jury on entrapment. The

court ruled that Sligh was not entitled to an entrapment defense

because there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could find

government inducement. J.A. at 327-28.

Sligh then entered into a plea agreement, which preserved his right

to appeal the district court's ruling on entrapment and the court's

related evidentiary ruling, which barred the defense from presenting

evidence about the IRS agent's attendance at a bribery awareness

seminar and her training and experience in bribery. The court sentenced Sligh to five months imprisonment.

Because a jury could reasonably conclude that Sligh was entrapped

by the IRS agent with whom he dealt, Sligh was entitled to the entrapment instruction he requested. Accordingly, we vacate Sligh's convictions and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

An entrapment defense has two elements: government inducement

and the defendant's lack of predisposition to commit the crime. See

United States v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1993). Entrapment

 2
is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the initial burden to

"produce more than a scintilla of evidence that the government

induced him to commit the charged offense," id., before the burden

shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, United States v.

Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that once a defendant has met "his initial burden of presenting evidence that the government induced him to commit the crime, the government has the

burden of proving `beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was

disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by

Government agents'" (quoting Jacobsen v. United States, 503 U.S.

540, 549 (1992)) (other citations omitted)); see also United States v.

Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he defendant must

produce `sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find'

that the government induced him to commit the charged offense."

(citation omitted)). A defendant is not entitled to an entrapment

instruction unless he can meet this initial burden of producing some

evidence of government inducement. See United States v. Osborne,

935 F.2d 32, 38 (4th Cir. 1991).

"`Inducement' is a term of art: it involves elements of governmental overreaching and conduct sufficiently excessive to implant a criminal design in the mind of an otherwise innocent party. Solicitation,

by contrast, is the provision of an opportunity to commit a criminal

act." Daniel, 3 F.3d at 778 (citation omitted). A showing of mere government solicitation is insufficient to merit an entrapment instruction

"because solicitation by itself is not the kind of conduct that would

persuade an otherwise innocent person to commit a crime, or that

would be `so inducive to a reasonably firm person as likely to displace mens rea.'" Osborne, 935 F.2d at 38 (citations omitted).

Applying these principles, we believe a jury could readily conclude

that the IRS crossed the line between solicitation and inducement in

its interactions with the defendant. From the telephone conversations

discussed below, a jury could find that the IRS agent first refused to

provide Sligh with even rudimentary information concerning the

agency's guidelines on debt reduction which would have enabled him

to evaluate whether he was entitled to relief, thus forcing him to play

a guessing game with her as to whether his circumstances would entitle him to relief under the agency's rules. It could find that, despite

 3
the IRS agent's efforts to characterize Sligh's necessarily uninformed

questions as offers of wrongdoing, it was not Sligh, but the agent herself, who actually initiated the suggestion of wrongdoing. It could further find that Sligh repeatedly ignored the agent's invitations to

wrongdoing, but that the agent nevertheless persisted in her baiting of

Sligh. It could also reasonably find that when Sligh still did not accept

the agent's overtures to wrongdoing, the agent introduced, as well, the

specific idea of a bribe. And, finally, the jury could find that Sligh

continued to ignore even these official invitations to bribery until the

moment the bribe was offered.

Based upon these findings, the jury in turn could reasonably conclude that the IRS did much more than provide Sligh with an opportunity for criminal conduct to which he was predisposed. It could

conclude that the IRS implanted the criminal design in Sligh's mind,

and, in a deliberate effort to realize the design it implanted, the

agency overreached in a manner and to a degree that it must be said

that Sligh was the victim of government entrapment.

II.

Sligh had numerous contacts and conversations with the IRS before

the day on which he offered the bribe which is the subject of this

appeal. After initial conversations with two other IRS agents, Sligh's

primary contacts were with Nancy O'Neill, manager of the Automated Collection group in Baltimore. Between May 16 and June 13,

1996, Sligh spoke with O'Neill five times, sometimes for as long as

an hour.

During these conversations, Sligh told O'Neill that he intended to

complete and file his tax returns, and O'Neill established a deadline

for him to do so. J.A. at 57-59, 96. Sligh and O'Neill discussed a levy

the IRS had placed on Sligh's bank account, numerous letters Sligh

had sent to the IRS requesting that the IRS explain why he was obligated to pay taxes, and the possibility of payment of outstanding taxes

through a home equity loan. J.A. at 57-59, 95-96. They also discussed

the possibility that Sligh might not owe money or might be entitled

to a refund, and O'Neill stated that, under those circumstances, she

would consider removing the levy from Sligh's bank account. J.A. at

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98-99. O'Neill advised Sligh that she had the power to remove the

levy on his account. J.A. at 99.

Sligh initiated several of these conversations, calling to update

O'Neill on his progress in completing his tax returns. On June 4,

1996, Sligh called O'Neill to request some additional forms in order

to file his return. J.A. at 61. On June 6, 1996, Sligh contacted O'Neill

and spoke with her briefly to inform her that he had completed his

1995 tax return and that he owed several thousand dollars in 1995

taxes. J.A. at 102-03. On June 13, 1996, Sligh spoke with O'Neill for

a fifth time and requested additional time to file his returns. O'Neill

granted him a short extension to June 24, 1996. J.A. at 63, 104-06.

O'Neill admits that during these many conversations, Sligh did not

offer a bribe, suggest that he was willing to offer a bribe, or in any

way allude to a bribe. J.A. at 105. Nor did Sligh allude to any other

form of wrongdoing. In fact, O'Neill testified that, during this time,

she believed Sligh was endeavoring to complete his tax returns. J.A.

at 99. And, indeed, all evidence indicated that Sligh intended to file

his missing returns and arrange for payment.

Then, on June 14, 1996, O'Neill attended an IRS bribery awareness course. J.A. at 106.*

Ten days later, Sligh telephoned O'Neill again. And, again, in this

sixth conversation, Sligh did not even allude to, much less offer, a

bribe to O'Neill. In fact, in this conversation, Sligh informed O'Neill

that he had gone to the IRS office in Baltimore; that he had obtained

assistance in preparing his tax returns; that he wanted to provide

O'Neill with information from the completed forms for 1990, 1991,

and 1994; that he owed taxes for all three of those years; and that he

was mailing the tax returns. J.A. at 63-64, 155-57.

_________________________________________________________________

* The district court excluded evidence regarding O'Neill's attendance

at the bribery awareness seminar and her training and experience in identifying bribery attempts. Because, apart from its relevance to the IRS

agent's subjective state of mind, this evidence is of obvious relevance to

an objective evaluation of the government's interaction with Sligh, the

exclusion of this evidence was in error.

 5
Three days later, Sligh again called O'Neill and requested a short

extension of time for filing his 1994 return so that he could investigate a possible moving expenses deduction. J.A. at 163-64. During

this call, O'Neill reviewed Sligh's financial statement and calculated

a monthly payment figure for Sligh to pay off his tax debt. J.A. at 64-

68. The conversation lasted approximately an hour. J.A. at 68, 163-

64. At the end of the conversation, O'Neill asked Sligh if he had any

questions. J.A. at 68. According to O'Neill, Sligh "lowered his voice

and asked me how much power do I have." Id. O'Neill replied,

"[W]hat do you mean?", J.A. at 69, and Sligh asked, "[C]an you take

care of part of it?" Id.

At this, although Sligh had said nothing at all that would prompt

a reasonable person to conclude that he was offering or about to offer

O'Neill a bribe, O'Neill later testified: "a chill went down my spine

because I knew at that point he was going to try to bribe me or do

something." Id.

Based only upon Sligh's question whether O'Neill had the power

to take care of part of his existing debt, O'Neill asked if she could call

Sligh back. She then immediately contacted the IRS Internal Investigation Office, which placed a listening device on O'Neill's telephone

and arranged for her to make a recorded call to Sligh later that day.

J.A. at 70-71.

During the later, recorded conversation that same day, O'Neill confirmed to Sligh that she did have the power to take care of part of the

debt under certain circumstances: "I have the uh, power to adjust your

balance due under certain criteria, but I need a reason." J.A. at 482.

Upon this confirmation of O'Neill's power, Sligh did not offer a bribe

as O'Neill had apparently expected he would. Rather, in an attempt

to offer reasons that would bring him within the agency's guidelines

for debt reduction, Sligh explained that he had not received a timely

response to his letters to the IRS and that he wanted to pay about half

of what he owed. J.A. at 482-83. O'Neill then explained two legal

options for reducing what Sligh owed the IRS -- offer and compromise or penalty abatement requests -- and that she would need a "reasonable cause" to pursue either option. J.A. at 483. Sligh offered a

variety of reasons that his debt should be reduced, including work

stress, white racism, and his lack of information about how the system

 6
worked. J.A. at 483-85. O'Neill responded that she understood his situation and wanted to help, and stated "I just need some way or reason"; she also explained that reasons like racism were not going to

"cut it" as the "official reason." J.A. at 485.

Throughout this conversation, and indeed throughout all of her

conversations with Sligh, O'Neill withheld from Sligh the information that would permit him to make an informed decision as to

whether he had a reason for reduction of his debt that would fit within

the guidelines. Indeed, O'Neill refused to give Sligh any guidance

about what sort of reasons were legitimate or sufficient under the

guidelines. Sligh, thus, continued to offer a variety of reasons for

reducing his tax debt, none of which apparently fit within the IRS

guidelines, including the fact that the IRS had not answered his letters

asking why he had to pay taxes, that he had a daughter he needed to

put through college, and that he was hard-working. J.A. at 486-88.

Eventually, as Sligh continued to offer reason after reason that

might possibly justify reduction or waiver of his debt, O'Neill initiated a suggestion that Sligh might ask her to engage in wrongdoing

by departing from what the guidelines required:

O'Neill: I need a legitimate reason to cut [your] balance

 in half.

Sligh: Yes, ma'am.

O'Neill: Unless, you're asking me to [do] something

otherwise. Is that what you're asking?

J.A. at 496 (emphasis added). In response to what O'Neill presumably

believed was a direct solicitation of the bribe she had concluded Sligh

intended to offer her, Sligh said only the following:

Sligh: Well, I don't know what you're able to do.

 Really, I don't, I don't know what you're able to

 do. You know?

O'Neill: I can do anything within reason.

 7
Sligh: Yes ma'am.

Id.

Then almost as if she had been urged to do so to avoid a suggestion

of improper inducement, O'Neill corrected herself to say not that she

could do anything within reason, but that she needed a reason, in

order to reduce Sligh's debt: "Oh, and I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I misspoke, I mean, I need a reason." Id. Still, Sligh never even as much

as suggested wrongdoing, much less a bribe. He simply repeated his

request that O'Neill tell him what the guidelines were: "Well, see I

can't, I can give you my reason, you know, but my reason just might

not fit within your guidelines. So, I guess what I'm saying to you, you

give me the guidelines and I can work out a reason within those

guidelines." Id.

Despite O'Neill's initiation of the suggestion that Sligh ask her to

depart from the guidelines, Sligh did not do so, and merely continued

to offer reasons that might satisfy the guidelines which O'Neill

refused even to describe to him. And, although Sligh had done nothing other than ask O'Neill to exercise whatever power she possessed

to reduce his tax debt and attempt, not knowing what the IRS' guidelines were, to provide her with legitimate reasons for doing so,

O'Neill persisted in her suggestion that Sligh might (or should) ask

her to do something unauthorized:

O'Neill: . . . unfortunately, based on what you've told me,

 there's not really anything I can do.

Sligh: (Sighs) You're saying there's nothing you can do.

O'Neill: Not, not for those reasons.

Sligh: Hum. So you're saying the reasons that I gave

 you are not within the guidelines that you have

 before you?

O'Neill: Right.

Sligh: That's what you're saying.

 8
O'Neill: Yes.

Sligh: Okay. But you're not at liberty to tell me what

 the guidelines are?

O'Neill: No, I mean I have to do it based on what you tell

 me, not me giving you the guidelines, unless you

 wanted me to deviate.

J.A. at 501 (emphasis added).

Still, rather than take the agent's bait, Sligh simply replied, "Well,

you know, for, you know, if it's a matter, (Laughter) if it deviates, I

don't you know, I don't care, you know," id . -- an answer that

appears to reflect no more than Sligh's understandable indifference as

to whether, in his case, the IRS followed the technical guidelines,

which the agent refused even to explain to him, or made an exception

for him.

Obviously aware at this point that Sligh had no apparent intention

to offer a bribe and that she was having no success in steering him

toward the offer of a bribe, O'Neill then invited a bribe more explicitly by asking Sligh, in essence, "What's in it for me?":

O'Neill: But why would I take that risk?

Sligh: Cause you love me? (Laughter) You know, I

 don't know. I mean, you know what --

O'Neill: I'd be risking my job.

Id. (emphasis added).

At this point, Sligh had still never suggested that O'Neill engage

in any sort of wrongdoing, much less suggested that he would offer

a bribe. Nevertheless, O'Neill continued to act as though Sligh had,

in fact, already suggested as much, and stated that what Sligh was

asking her to do "[wa]sn't really right." J.A. at 503. Despite O'Neill's

explicit recharacterization of Sligh's entirely appropriate request for

 9
guidance as a request that she engage in wrongdoing or that she

accept a proffered bribe, Sligh yet again resisted O'Neill's overtures

and continued to try to convince her to reduce his balance by citing

other reasons he believed might be legitimate, like the fact that the

house he grew up in was lost to taxes. Id.

O'Neill, seemingly frustrated that Sligh had not responded to any

of her overtures, then resorted to even more explicit invitations:

O'Neill: Okay. Um, you know, what you were saying

 before, I mean, I'd like to help you out, um,

 you're asking me to do a favor that I have to fal-

 sify for some reason why I need a reason to take

 such a, take a risk in that kind of situation.

[Sligh said that he could be suicidal if it made her feel better

and that he wished God would give him the words to say to

her.]

O'Neill: Oh. Um, Do you want me to make up a reason?

Sligh: (Sighs)

O'Neill: Is that what you're asking?

Sligh: Ma'am, I don't want to go to jail okay? And um,

 you know, I don't know, who, is this recorded?

O'Neill: No, uh uh.

Sligh: Um, then um, yeah. (Laughter.) And I would say

 that I would be forever in your debt and I would,

 uh --

O'Neill: Well, I could go to jail, too.

Sligh: Ma'am, anything you would say I would agree

 with.

O'Neill: Uh huhn.

 10
Sligh: So, you know, only thing I have is me, and you

 and God right now. That's all I have. That's it.

O'Neill: Yeah, I mean I, I just can't take that kind of risk.

J.A. at 506-07 (emphasis added).

Sligh, at this point, finally appears to have assented at least to

O'Neill's suggestion that she make up a reason to justify reducing his

tax debt, but he still had not given any indication whatsoever that he

intended to offer her a bribe. Indeed, when O'Neill continued to state

that she did not think taking the "risk" was worth it for her, rather

than offer her a bribe to make it "worth" her while, Sligh instead only

attempted to appeal to her sympathies by urging her to meet with him

and his family. J.A. at 507-10.

O'Neill then took the extraordinary step of agreeing to meet with

Sligh, and the further extraordinary step of refusing to allow Sligh's

wife to be present, explaining, despite any predicate from Sligh, that

she did not want Sligh's wife to know that he was "doing something

that's not legal, necessarily." J.A. at 510. Thus, O'Neill once again

reintroduced the idea of a bribe into her conversation with Sligh, even

though Sligh had never made such an overture and in fact had ignored

O'Neill's multiple suggestions of wrongdoing and her initial suggestions of a bribe.

Even so, Sligh yet again explicitly and categorically resisted

O'Neill's attempt to solicit a bribe, responding: "No ma'am, that's not

what I'm saying. . . . I just want to, to comfort you. To let you know

that, you know, I'm not, you know, I'm a genuine person." Id.

Finally, even during the lunch meeting at which Sligh eventually did

offer to make O'Neill a bribe, he initially continued to offer other reasons why O'Neill should reduce his tax debt, J.A. at 529-533, before

eventually offering to make the bribe for which he now stands convicted. And, of course, Sligh did not even have with him at this meeting the money that he ultimately promised O'Neill in return for her

reduction of his tax debt.

We are convinced that a jury quite well could conclude, and reasonably so on the strength of these facts, that Sligh's bribe of O'Neill

 11
was, in reality, the crime of an overzealous bureaucrat who, because

of her recent "training," if not for other reasons also, was bent upon

finding the nefarious in the wholly innocent; that this employee not

only implanted the bribery scheme in a mind that had never contemplated bribery, but then overreached in her zeal to have that design

acted upon. That is, we are satisfied that a jury could reasonably conclude that the IRS, far from merely creating the opportunity for illegality, conceived and inspired the illegality in the face of the

defendant's demonstrated lack of predisposition to any crime at all.

The defendant therefore was entitled to an instruction that would

enable a jury to find that he was a victim of government entrapment,

and it was error for the court not to have agreed to give such an

instruction.

III.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case

remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I think the district court properly ruled that the evidence did not

suffice to require submission of an issue of entrapment to the jury.

Though Agent O'Neill's endeavors leading up to Sligh's offer of a

bribe were persistent, possibly deceitful in some respects, and surely

intended to invite the end result, they fell well short of the kind of

overreaching government conduct that we have considered necessary

to support an entrapment defense. I therefore dissent and would

affirm the conviction for the conceded bribe offer.

The majority correctly states the controlling legal principles of

entrapment, both substantive and procedural. Under those principles,

the only issue before us is whether there was evidence "more than a

scintilla" from which a jury properly could find that O'Neill's conduct crossed the line between permissible "solicitation" of the bribe--

merely providing an opportunity for its offer--and possibly exculpating "inducement" of the offer--actually causing a criminal intent in

 12
Sligh's mind that would not otherwise have existed. See United States

v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1993) (differentiating the two).

While the weight or quantity of the required evidence of inducement

is slight, the content requirement is rigorous. The conduct evidenced

must be so severe and pervasive that it can legitimately be viewed as

sufficient to overcome the will of a reasonable person. See Crisp v.

United States, 262 F.2d 68, 69 (4th Cir. 1958). As we have characterized it more recently, it must involve "governmental overreaching"

sufficient "to implant a criminal design in the mind of an innocent

party," United States v. Phan, 121 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 1038 (1998) (footnote omitted), and as conduct

"likely to displace mens rea." United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d

1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1970). And it is insufficient to meet this inducement requirement merely to establish that the government was the

first to suggest the illegal conduct. See United States v. El-Gawli, 837

F.2d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 1988).

Short of conduct actually calculated to "implant a criminal design"

in an innocent mind--no inconsiderable feat--federal law has long

permitted, out of perceived necessity, law-enforcement endeavors that

invite criminal conduct, or make it convenient, or that employ

"[a]rtifice and stratagem" in order to "catch those engaged in criminal

enterprises." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992)

(citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932); Sherman

v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); United States v. Russell,

411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973)). In deference to this recognized necessity, the federal courts have in general found a basis for allowing an

entrapment issue to go to the jury only in unique and compelling situations. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961-62 (1st Cir.

1992) (collecting cases). Examples include physical threat, see United

States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 1993) (physical threats

to defendant's family); and falsely-based appeals to sympathy, see

United States v. Nations, 764 F.2d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1985) (false

claims of cancer to induce aid in selling stolen cars).

The evidence here, though it surely could be thought to demonstrate a relentlessly pursued "artifice or stratagem" by O'Neill to

"catch" Sligh, shows no such overreaching. No threats were ever

made. Compare United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir.

1992) (finding threats of impaling the defendant and harming her son

 13
sufficient to constitute inducement). Requests to violate the law (even

if made) were not consistent and overwhelming. Compare United

States v. Joost, 92 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding evidence of

inducement where government created a dependent relationship

between agent and known felon and where governmental contacts

were repeatedly made over an extended period of time); United States

v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding inducement

where government agent called defendant every day for over a month

and then threatened her when she appeared to be backing out of drug

sale). Nor was Sligh "wined and dined" in a manner that could have

implanted any previously unheld criminal design in his mind.

Compare United States v. Fedroff, 874 F.2d 178, 184-85 (3d Cir.

1989) (finding inducement where government agents paid for defendant's expensive meals and gambling trips in an effort to get him

accustomed to the lifestyle). No fraudulent misrepresentations were

put forth and there was never an attempt to play on the feelings or

personal weaknesses of Sligh. Compare United States v. Martinez,

122 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding inducement where

government agent repeatedly promised friendship and wealth); United

States v. Montanez, 105 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1997) (reversing drug

distribution conviction because jury was not instructed on appeals to

sympathy as a basis for inducement). In short, my reading of the evidence is that up to the very end of the obviously wary negotiations

being conducted with O'Neill, had Sligh not wanted all along to offer

O'Neill a bribe "all he had to do was say no and walk away." United

States v. Wilson, 129 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 1997). Consider the final

exchange leading up to the fatal offer. It opens with O'Neill's legitimately closing off the several routes of a possible legal fix that had

been intimated over the course of the protracted conversations--

prolonged as much by Sligh as by O'Neill,

O'Neill: So, based on that particular route, there's nothing

 I can do.

Sligh: Right. But you know, that something can be

 done.

O'Neill: Uh huhn.

Sligh: Because that's what you do.

 14
O'Neill: Yeah.

Sligh: And I'm sure you seen many different types of

 case changes, where they were able to be han-

 dled. So, if that's something that's possible, and

 uh, only thing I need to know--

O'Neill: Okay--

Sligh: --is what I need to do to make that uh, transpire.

O'Neill: Okay. I guess I need to know from you, what

 exactly are you asking me to do (Laughter).

Sligh: Uh, oh boy, oh boy, oh boy. Is it just you and

 me?

O'Neill: Yeah, just you and me.

Sligh: You drove a car?

O'Neill: Yup. I have my own car, yup, they gave me a

 license . . . .

Sligh: So, how much you owe on it?

O'Neill: Twenty-three hundred . . . .

Sligh: All right. So, uh, as a, as a, kind and giving per-

 son, I can help you own it.

These are not the words of an overwhelmed wary innocent whose

will to obey the law has been overborne by the implanting of a criminal design not his own. A jury should not be permitted to speculate

on that possibility as the district court quite properly concluded.

In conclusion, I venture that the majority has been led astray from

the proper entrapment analysis by an undue absorption with and

apparent outrage at the objective nature of O'Neill's conduct--to the

 15
point of suggesting that it amounted to the "crime of an overzealous

bureaucrat." Slip op. 12. The Supreme Court long ago in Sorrells specifically rejected, as decisive of the entrapment issue, the objective

purity or impurity of the Government's conduct. See Sorrells, 287

U.S. at 441. The specific motivation for O'Neill's conduct, whether

prompted by her attendance at a bribery seminar, or by innate zeal,

or vigor, or whatever, is irrelevant under federal-entrapment doctrine

as I understand it. Accordingly, I think that the district court, properly

recognizing this, rightly declined to allow in the proffered evidence

of O'Neill's attendance at the seminar.

I would affirm the conviction for this conceded violation of the

federal bribery statute.

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