------TO THI: llll!CRE'rARY OF STATE 

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REF ID:A521501 

CONFIDENTIAL =tfe!Hffff lflf8RMATl9NDEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

2 March 1953 

MEJ.1:0RAmlJM FOR THE DJRECTOR, NATIONAL S:ECTJRITY AGENCY 

Attentiai: Mr. William Friedman 

SUBJECT: Report of the Tripartite (US-UK-French) Security Working Group 

Herewith three complete copies of the subject Report which have 

reached this office in their final form just recently. 

These copies are forwarded for use and retention by NSA. 

FOR THE DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROJECTS STAFF: 

Encls 3 

As stated above 

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CONFIDEN.TiAt $EeURIR INFBRP!AT!BN 

Oeclassifi ed and approved for release by NSA on 06-11-2014 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 

r' ~ - i.;..J_ 
. 

I I '/ 

Paris 

REF ID:A521501 

ttCVRr.t INf'JftMATIOltCQ Nff DENffALREPORT 

of the 

TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP 

United States - United Kingdom - France 

on the 

Implementation of Agree~l Principle3 

and Standards of Security 

' ' 

December 8, 1952 
Part I 

Part Il: 

Part III 

Part IV 

Part V 

Part VI 

Appendices: 

REF ID-: A521501 

· -- :-fflfHffFY IHfSR.UneN 

CONFIDEN-TJAL 

CONTENTS "" 

Introductidn 

Summary of Presentations ';'°:", 

A. United States 

B. United Kingdom 

c. France 

Implementation by the Three 

Governments of the Principles · 

and Standards or Security 

A. United States 

B. United Kingdom 

c. France 

Review of the Frinciples and 

Standards 

General Consider~tions 

Principles 

Personnel Security 

Physical Security 

Industrial Security 

Commentary on the Implementation 

of the Principles and Standards 

in the Three Countries 

Introduction and Concept 

Cormnentary on Implementation in 

the United States 

Commentary on Implementation in 

the United Kingdom 

Conunentary on Implementation in 

France 

Recommendations 

Ar-pendix A United States Program 

Appendix B United Kingdom Program 

Appendix C French Program 

Appendix D Composition of Working Group 

CONFIDENTIAL 

1 

3 

3 

4 

4 

7 

7 

9 

13 

19 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

25 

25 

26 

27 

29 

31 
"-

REF ID~':A521501 

SfG~RiH UU 9RMAH9N 

~nMrrnrl\J'.flAl PART L 

INTRODUCTJ ON 

On 4 June 195lj the Tripartite·· Security Working Group, composed -~ 

of representatives of the Governmen~s of France, the United Kingdom, 

and the United States, approved a ~port for submission to their ,. 

respective governments for consider~tion. Part IV of this report set 

forth certain fundamental principle~ and standards of seeurity for 

incorporation into the security sys~em of each government. The preparation 

of this report followed a comparative study of the regulations and 

methods of safeguarding classified matter then in use in the three 

countries. 

The Tripartite Report made the following recommendations to 

each of the three GoV'ernments: 

"(a) The acceptance of the Principles and Standal'ds set forth 

in this Report~ 

(b) The notification, as soon as possible, to the other two 

Governments of its views on such Principles and Standards. · 

(c) The implementation of the accepted Principles and Standards 

as rapidly and completely as possible. 

(d) Regular meetings of representatives from the three countries 

to observe the application of accepted Principles and 

Standards. 

(e) The maintenance of the contacts established through these 

meetings for the purpose of exchanging information on 

security systems and problems." 

Recommendations (a) and (b) were implemented when acceptance 

of the Principles and Standards of the Tripartite Report was completed 

through an exchange of notes among the three Governments. 

Fursuant to Recommendation (d), arrangements were made in August 

1952 among the three Govenmients to hold further meetings of the 

Tripartite Group. It was agreed that the following objectives should 

be pursued: 

(a) To hear statements of the implementation of the accepted 

Principles and Standards. 

(b) To report upon progress made in the means employed to 

CONFf fJENf~A f I L 

SECURITY INF8RMUIBN 

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REF ID:A521501 

CONFIDENTIAL -

visi tee:; and 

(c) To ex1;e~d the e:xaminations to include certain other 

establishments in the civilian administration of gove1·nment and in industry not previously visited. 

(d) In the light of (b) above, to review as appropriate the 

Principles and Standards of the Tripartite Report of 

4 June 1951, E~nd to make recommendations with respect 

The 1952 meetings •rere held successively in Washington, London 

and Paris, dt:·ring whid• the three Governments described the systems 

in use for pe~smm.el ~ecurity and protection of classified documents 

in government 81\d reJ@.ted industries, with emphasis given to the 

steps ta.ken by (lach Government since June 1951 to implement the 

agreed Principles and Standards. The United States program was 

presented at Wushington from 27 October through 31 October, the 

British program in London from 12 November through 18 November, and 

the French program '.n Paris from 21 November through 28 November. 

Following the study of the French security system, the Tripartite 

Group met in Paris to prepare this Report. 
REF ID:A521501 

1£etHtlA' 1Nf8RMAH8N 

~oNr:rOENTIAL 

PART II 

An exposition was given of the constitutional and legal basis for 

security practices and their application consistent with the principles 

of democratic govern1nent. The overall organization for security within 

the United States Government was described. The Presidential Executive 

Order No. 10290, which establish-00. uniform standards for the classification, handling and transmission of classified security information, 

was explained. Mention was also made cf a pending Executive Order 

which, when signed, ..rould establish uniform minimum standards for the 

investigation and clearance of civi!i.an a.ld military personnel who 

require access to cla$sified security infonnation. Correlation and 

utilization of subve:-;-s.l.ve information in tha United States Government 

was outlined in detail, and the investigativa techniques and procedures 

involved in background and loyalty investigations demonstrated and 

explained. A detailed briefing was given of t:r.e Loyalty Program 

established under Exu~utive Order No. 9835 with respect to the 

screening of all civilian applicants and incUlllbents employed by the 

Federal Government. Also described were the suspension and removal 

procedures under Executive Order No. 9835 and Public Law No. 733. 

Furthermore, procedures for the removal of military personnel for 

loyalty or security reasons were explained. 

Visits and inspections were made of both a civilian and military 

security agency. Tne programs for the evaluation and protection of 

non-government installations and for port and ship security were outlined. An aircraft ~lant and an electronics plant were visited. 

Explanati.ons were given of the security measures in these plants, 

followed by tours of inspection. A presentation was made concerning 

the physical security of government buildings at home and abroad, 

including an exhibit and description of security equipment and technical 

aids. 

A briefing was offered concerning the history, organization, 

strength and activities of the Communist Farty, U.S.A., and the countervONFfDENrJAL- Measures 

SfeHrurr rNFOftMAf!fJM 
REF ID:A521501 

measures and prosecutive action taken. 

In conclusion, a summation was made of U.S. security practices 

and their relationship to the Principles and Standards agreed to in 

the Tripartite Security Working Group report of 4 J1me 1951. A copy 

of the United States program is attached as Appendix A. 

B. ~NI~D KINGDOM 

The United Kingdom program included presentations by H.M. Treasury, 

Ministry of Defence, War Office, Foreign Office, Security Service, 

Royal Air Force. Visits of inspection were made to the R.A.F. Establishment, Benson, the Gloster Aircraft Company, (G.A.C.), Gloucester, 

the Bristol Aircraft Factory, (B.A.C.), Bristol, and the War Office 

Registry. 

The subjects covered in the presentations included the general 

Principles and Standards of Personnel and Physical Security as applied 

in Government Departments and in industry engaged on classified defence 

work; the implementation of the Royal Air Force security regulations 

at unit level; the use of police dogs as an aid to the protection of 

material within large sensitive areas where suf'ficient man-power or 

perillleter fenaing cannot be applied; the implementation of standing 

security instructions in the methods employed in industry to safeguard 

classified documents and material; security education by films; 

the security of economic information; the security of military personnel 

and control of suspects. A copy of the United Kingdom program is 

attached as Appendix B. 

C. F~CE 

The French Delegation emphasized the considerable scope of two 

inter-ministerial deci.sions made since the first meeting of the Tripartite Committee: 

1. The creation by a decree of January 3, 1952, of a Permanent 

Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security, competent to deal with 

all problems concerning the protection of secrecy in all Ministerial 

Departments. 

2. The extension, for the benefit of the NATO powers, of the 

articles of the Penal Code concerning crimes and offenses against 

the external security of the State {Decree 'of July 11, 1952). 

CONFIDEN f h;L The first 
REF ID:A521501 

SE9ffRlff' 1Nf6RPMTH,N 

The first regula tPoQ ~l1tt~rtf 'Alr-ministe~ial coordination 

which is indispensable for security matters, and thus permits the 

establishment of security standards common to all the Ministries. 

Consequences on the national level of the January 3~ 1952, decree 

are as follows: 

1. The establishment by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for 

Security, and circulation by the Permanent Secretariat for National 

Defense (SGPDN~ an agency of the Presidency of the Council) of an 

inter-ministerial order concerning the protection of secrecy. This order 

provides for the adoption of common standards which will form the basis 

for the establishment in each Department of special rules adapted 

to the needs of each administration. 

2. Establishment and circulation, under the same conditions~ 

of an order. concerning the protection of secrecy in private firms 

working for the National Defense. 

J, An order concerning the protection of secrecy in State 

establishments is under consideration~ Attention should be called 

to the fact that establishments depending on the Ministry of 

National Defense are already provided with rules issued by this 

Ministry, 

4~ On a much smaller scale'· an inter-ministerial decree was 

signed on November 29, 1952, defining the ~cope.of the missions of 

the Naval Section of the Security Service of the Armed Forces in 

case of siege or war, 

Handling of Classified Material I .. 

No law exists in France authorizing the dismissal because of 

political opinions of a military officer1. a civil servant (governed by 

the Civil Service Statute), an employee or a workman (governed by the 

collective agreements of his profession) .. However,. a letter· from 

the President of the Council (Letter No. 261, January J, 1952) 

prescribed: 

1, That all existing regulations be exploited to eliminate 

anti-national or subversive civil servants or employees. 

2.. That, in any case, such individuals who cannot be eliminated 

should be removed from posts of confidence: i .. e., involv:i.!lg accef3.s 

CONFiDENT'iAL 

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REF ID:A521501 

~ 

CONFIDENTIAL 

The responsibility for maintain:ifg, transferring or dismissing 

an individual rests with the Minister concerned; an opinion, favorable or unfavorable, is given by_ .. the ;security Service of the Armed 

Forces (through the channels of the $GPDN in the case of a civil 

servant)• The French Delegation also explained in detail the ways 

and means employed by the Armed Foroes Security Service (SSFA) 

regarding the screening procedure, as well as its relations with the 

Renseignment Generaux, Surveillance du Territoire, Gendarmerie, etc. 

A visit to the Surete Nationale was arranged, and a lecture was 

given on the French Communist Party. Principles of industrial security 

were discussed in detail, and were demonstrated (a) in organizations 

depending on the State (visit to ONERA, the Bretigny test flight 

field, to DEFA), and (b) in private firms (Hispano factory). 

Educational films on security were shown. 

A copy of the French program is attached as Appendix C. 

GONFIDENTiAL 

SE611RlfY fNf8RMATUtrt-
·f .. . ' 

REF ID:A521501 

.!tt''R~ INF8RMAT18ft 

.CONFf DENTfAL 

PART III 

Jt!f'LEMENTATION BY THE THREE Goy~IFNrS 

OF "PRIHCIPL]S AND STANDARDS"OF SECURITY 

A. UNITED STATES 

The United States has continued to carry out its security and 

loyalty programs in effect as of the date of approval of the Tripartite Report. The Inter-Departmental Committee on Internal Security 

(ICIS) and the Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) of 

the National Security Council (NSC) have continued to study, coordinate, 

and make recommendations covering the many problems affecting the 

internal security of the United States. There are, however, certain 

specific measures taken by the United States Government in implementation of the "Principles and Standards" and these are described below. 

1. Executive Order No. 10290 was signed by the President o.f the 

United States on September 24, 1951, and became effective in all Departments and agencies concerned on October 24, 1951. This Executive Order 

prescribes regulations establishing minimum standards for the classification, transmission and handling by Departments and agencies concerned 

of official information which requires safeguarding in the interest 

of the security of the United States. Such regulations are designed 

to achieve unif'ormity in the safeguarding of official information. 

2. A Presidential directive waa forwarded to all interested 

Departments and agencies, requiring them to coordinate with other 

interested Departments and agencies prior to issuance of releases or 

statements to the press. These instructions provide a safeguard 

against inadvertent disclosures of information by one Department or 

agency consisting of or concerning classified information of another 

Department or agency. 

3. On July 14, 1951, the President required the National Security 

C~uncil to make an investigation of the administration of Federal 

employee security programs. Pursuant to that request, the study and 

report were made by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Internal 

Security, assisted by the Civil Service Commission, and submitted 

April 29, 1952. On August 8, 1952, the President directed all 

Executive Departments and agencies to cooperate fully with the Civil 

Service 

1 
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REF ID.:A521501 

Service Conmrl.ssion in preparing a plru;i to combine the three existing 

programs into one. Each Department and agency having an employee 

security program was requested to give careful study to the report 

of the Inter-Departmental Committee apd to re-examine its own program 

in the light of that report. 

4. The "Magnuson Act", which au'ijlorizes a port and ship security 

program has been enacted by the Congr.ess~ The United States Coast 

Guard is implementing the law which includes the screening and requiring 

of passes for all United States seamen and dock workers. 

5. ~y_est±gations. On April 5, 1952, by law, the responsibility 

for personnel background investigat:lons in certain sensitive agencies 

and Departments was transferred from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Civil Service Commission. The agencies and Departments 

involved may still refer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation such 

investigations involving top sensitive positions. Also in any instance 

where subversive or disloyal data is discovered conce~ng the person 

being investigated, the investigation muet be immediately turned over. 

to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

The relieving of the FBI of these investigations has permitted 

it to utilize additional personnel on investigations of espionage, 

sabotage and subversion. The Civil Service Commission has obtained 

and trained additional investigators to handle its responsibilities, 

thereby adding to the seeurity forces of the United States Government. 

6. ~9Y~ ~f!r_ ;No, 10~~ This Executive Order amends 

Executive Order No., 98.35, entitled "Prescribing Procedures for the 

Administration of an Employees' Loyalty Program in the Executive 

Branch of the Government". It provided that the standard for the 

refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an Executive 

Department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on 

all evidence, there is ~~s2!}..aple doubt as to the l~yalty of the person 

I 

involved to the Government of the United States. Prior thereto the 

standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment· 

in an Executive Department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty 

was that ~n all the evidence reasonable grounds existad for belief th~t 

the person involved was disloyal to the Government of the United 

Sta·i;es .. ~-~.., .... _i::i araardir.'3!'.!:t. .'i.c>.s r h!'Xcf-'9C. the s-ta·102.:1:d for the rc'i.nO:i\'al of' 

bONF1fJEN fiAL 
J 

; 

REF ID:A521501 

persons whose loyalty is in question and has thereby improved the 

• effectiveness of the loyalty progr~ .. 

7. Public Law No, 4J.A. This :public Law includes a restatement 

of United States immigration laws governing admission of aliens to 

the United States, and strengthens the security provisions of those 

laws. 

8. Executi_xe. Order (pending publication). A draft Executive 

Order has been submitted to the Of:fice of the President for approval. 

This Executive Order will prescribe regulations establishing minimum 

standards for security investigation and clearance for acc:ess to 

classified security information in the Executive Departments and agencies 

of the United States Government. The purposes of these minimum stc;:.ndards 

are: (1) to establish the policy and general procedure relating to 

personnel security investigations and the clearance of pe-rsonnel within 

the Executive Departments and agencies of the United States who, by 

reason of their assignment or employment, require ac~ess to classified 

security information; (2) to define and establish minimum standards 

of investigation and criteria upon which clearances may be granted; 

and (3) to effect general uniformity in the field of personnel security 

investigations and clearances throughout the Executive Departments and 

agencies, so that the interchange of infonnation within the Government 

pertaining to completed personnel security investigations and granted 

clearances may be facilitated. 

9. Industrial Securiti. Two industrial security boards have been 

established. The Industrial Evaluation Board selects the vital 

installations and industries which should receive security protection; 

and the Facilities Protection Board is responsible for establishing a 

program to provide security protection to these installations~ The 

two boards are eurrently engaged in carrying out this progrrun. 

B. UNITED KING!l.QM 

Eer~onnel Security 

Screening of Personnel. 

The U.K. Government has, by its acceptance of the first report, 

comr.:.itt0a. itself.' to the 'rct:1:.i:1z agc..ins-1;. Security Service rei:ot'!1S of 

a.::.1 

SEeHHIJY IHI t;siiltiHiilH 
REF ID:A521501 

SEClfltffi 1Nf6fttaf1DN 

CONFIAENTJAl 

all persons whose duties require access to matters classified higher 

than RESTRICTED.. This has greatly extended the area of vetting and 

it is currently taking place at a rate which is approximately onethird greater than that applying at the time of the first meeting of 

the Working Group. 

A "Positive Vetting" procedure has been introduced in the Civil 

Service and three fighting Services as an additional precaution for 

the most vital posts, since the Tripartite Report of 1951.· It is 

complementary to basic security vetting. The persons included in the 

new procedure are those who have acce&s to the whole of a plan, policy, 

project or equipment, or to an important part of a plan, policy, 

project or equipment, the security of which is vital to the national 

defence, 

All departments work to this comm.on formula when decid.Sng which 

persons are to be positively vetted; a common standard is thereby 

achieved, 

This system has set up a new principle in the U.K. by making the 

candidate play a part in his own security clearan~e. Its central 

feature of a questionnaire to be completed by occupants of, and 

candidates for, key posts is part of a procedure which consists of the 

care:f'ul taking up of references on standard forms, departmental 

enquiries a.nd, where considered necessary, field investigations. 

The department concerned writes to the two referees named by the 

incumbent in or candidate for a vital post. In the case of established 

officers, the reports and references available in the Civil Service 

Conmd~sion are consulted. These normally include medical reports, 

school and college reports, at least two and usually several private 

references and testimonials from former employersu All official records 

of a candidate are carefUlly scrutinized; these include the confidential 

reports furnished at regular intervals by superior officers, which are 

now rendered on a more detailed and standardised form~ . Special attention 

is now given to any reference to a weakness in character in a report. 

In a minority of cases ~here requisite information is not obtainable 

by other means, or beeause it is considered necessary for some other 

reason, field enquiries are made, 

The positive 

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REF ID:A521501 

-IESYRIA' llff8RMAH8N 

CONFIDENTIAL 

The "positive vetting" procedure is open and thus may encourage 

members of the public to volunteer information which they would not 

have disclosed in the past. 

Supervision of Staf'f. 

The "positive vetting" instructions issued in March and September, 

1952, have laid a special responsibility on Department heads to know 

about the attitudes and habits of their staff in key posts. 

"Need to Know." 

The Chairman of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security 

wrote to all departments stressing the need for this principle to be 

applied to the distribution of the more highly graded papers; the 

Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defence 1 in which the majority of such 

papers originate, were particularly urged to review their distribution 

of papers. 

Standardis~tion of Reference Qu'?~!!ionnaires. 

The Inter-Departmental Conimittee on Security has standardised 

more comprehensive forms of reference questionnaires. These fonns 

will be sent to personal referees, previous employers, and any su~h 

other persons as are likely to be profitable sources of information.; 

in respect of new intake into Government Departments. 

Records of Personnel Clea~. 

The Inter-Departmental Committee on Security has called upon all 

departments to maintain records of vetting clearances. 

§.ecurity Instructio;>:. of Personnel, 

During the past year an incrreasing ainount of time has been devoted 

to security instruction in departments, including the production of 

films. 

Industrial Secririty 

General C9ncep,. Instructions have been issued to industrial 

undertakin s by the Ministry of Supply in connection ~ith the handling 

of classified material·. 

In addition to the classification of a cohtract, detailed 

guidance as to the secret aspects of the material and (where practicable) 

as to its handling is ·now given to the Gontracto:i- by the Ministry of 

Supply. Efforts by Government Departments are now being made to spotCONFIDE~'TIAI_ light 

II 
REF ID:A521501 

SfCDRJI f JNtiiRMAllOI 

CONJ::fRFNTfAl 

lisht projects of speciAl 6perational importance so that security 

resources cart be dohcentrated ~here they are most required. 

§!c11rity of,,Claesir;M .. Coht~. The ~curity Service has 

extended its advice to include factories engaged on Confidential 

Contracts (in addition to those graded higher), and all main subcontractors are under security supervision. 

The Security Service has extended its advice to Universities~ 

Insurance Agents and Patent Agents, besides other civil ngencies 

indirectly and even remotely concetned with Defence projects. 

Security Training. Security films have been prepared and will 

be sho-wn in factories. 

Security advice continues to be extended to undertakings not 

in receipt of classified contracts but of potential importance in war. 

~.oB;&:. Security advice on sabotage has been extended to publio 

utility services and factories. 

Protection of Inform~tion !?..n ..... K£Y, Feints 

During the period under review, the following additional measures 

have been taken to restrict the publi<C'S.tion of air photographs whioh 

might be of value to an enemy in targetting: 

(a) The ITAdvisory Letter" from the Ministry of Defence, previously 

sent to the Press and to approximately 400 specially selected 

industrial firms engaged on work connected with defence, has now 

been issued to o.11 firms (about 4,000) o.t present so engaged, 

or likely to be in the event of an emergency or wur. 

(b) A circular letter previously sent by Air Ministry to all 

civil aircraft oper~+,ors has been re-issued, with the scope of the 

letter widened to take into account the increased security measure6 

achieved by the re- issue of' the "Advisory Letter" • 

(c) A circular letter has been issued by Air Ministry to all light 

aero clubs, requesting them to ensure that their members cooperate, as regards aerial photography. 

(d) Advertising agents~ building contractors and trade associations 

have been approached, in the sense of the advisory letter. 

During the period under review tho Defence Transition Committee 

has revi.cw8<'t the grail:i_ngs in the l~_st.s of e>:l.st:'.n~ Key P0:i.:-ih~ 

. _.:. 
REF ID:A521501 

SECHIUf\" INf81tMAf16H· 

~ONFf OENTIAL 

added to those lists. Th;e Committee has set up a Working Party 

to review the security of rmps,_ charts, plans, air photographic 

mosaics and air photos. Also, during the period under review a Key 

Points Working Party was formed, whose task was to formulate plans 

for the provision of anti-sabotage guards for key points in an emergency 

or war. 

Sequrity of Econonμ.c and Industrial Information 

The Chiefs of Staff Committee has directed, since the last 

Tripartite Security Working Group meeting, that a Working Party be 

formed to consider the security measures required to safeguard 

information about munitions production. That Working Party's report 

has now been adopted as a policy to be implemented by the Service and 

Supply Departments concerned, 

C. FRANCE 

Organ~zation of Security 

1. Responsibility of the Government. 

The importance of security is such that it is handled at the 

level of the President of the Council of Ministers. General directives 

concerning security originate from the Presidency of the Council 

(SGPDN: i.e., Permanent Secretariat for National Defense). 

The Government, fUlly aware of the interallied nature of 

secret information, has decided that acts committed against any NATO 

country are punishable under the sections of the Penal Code dealing 

with crimes and offenses committed against the international security 

of the State. 

2, Common Standards. 

General regulations were established by an Inter-Ministerial 

General Directive on the safeguarding of classified information, 

dated May 19, 1952, signed by the President of the Council of Ministers 0 

3. Necessity for Inter-Ministerial Coordination on Security. 

This necessity has been recognized~ It wa~ put into practice 

by a January 3, 1952, decree creating an inter-ministerial Permanent 

Commission for Security. (This decree was signed by the President of 

the Council, the Vice-President of the Council, the Minister of 

National Defense, and the Secretary of the Presidency of the Council.) 

Among 

1.3 
REF ID:A521501 

Among the functions of th~s permanent Ministerial Commission 

are those mentioned in the corresponding paragraph of the 1951 Tripartite Report. 

4. Coordination of Security Information. 

·,.t 

This coordination is ens~ed within the framework of the 

Inter-Ministerial Commission, and ~t is implemented through close 

terunwork between the Security Servj.ce of the Armed Forces, the 

Gendarmerie, the Suret~ Nationale,~and the Counter-Espionage Service 

(SDECE). 

5. Departmental Security Officers 

I A decree of January J, 1952, orders the appointment in each 

Ministry of a Security Officer or of n. high-ranking officer responsible 

for security. 

6. Security Regulations. 

By a decree of January J, 1952, the Permanent Inter-Ministerial 

Security Commission issued an Inter-Hinisterial Directive establishing 

general rules concerning the safeguarding of classified information. 

It is also responsible for assuring the implementation of this Directive. 

This Directive (Inter-Ministerial General Instruction on the safeguarding of classified inf'ormation, dated May 19, 1952) states that 

each Ministry must prepare instructions especially adapted to its 

services, according to the general regulations set by the InterMinisterial General Directive. The same decree provides, as stated 

above, that in each Ministry a responsible security representative 

must be designated to be responsible for the strict observance of 

security regulations within his Ministry. 

(Note: Under the title "Industrial Security", reference 

is made to an instruction dated September 10, 1952, relating to 

private enterprises working for National Defense, which has also been 

prepared nnd published by the Permanent Inter-Ministerial Se~uri ty 

Commission.) 

Per~_~el Security 

l, "Need to Know" 

This principle is referred to in Chapter III of the General 

Inter-Ministerial Instruction on the safegnar1.:ng of clae.sH'i e'i 
REF ID:A521501 

Ip..t~;rmation o~ May 19, 1952• ': } ·, ~ ' ::: ' 

2. Scre~ning of Personnel 

The principles for the selection of .~ersonnel qualified to 

bltidle classified dod,uments and material are al.~o referred to in the 

same chapter of the General Inter-Ministerial Instruction,, The 

criteria for the selection of such personnel are those set' forth in 

the corresponding paragraph of the 1951 Report. 

The Security Service of the Armed Forces (SSFA) is responsible 

for the control of all civil and military personnel in any way connected 

with the Ministry of National Defense and the Army, Navy, and Air Force 

Secretariats. It equally ensures the control of personnel in nationalized and private industry working for the National Defense. 

The civilian Ministries, in compliance with the regulations 

to come into effect, must supply the Fermanent Secretariat for National 

Defense (SGPDN, which is part of the Presidency of the Cou.~cil) 

with lists of all persons authorized to handle documents and material 

classified as National Defense secrets in accordance with the definitions 

of the Penal Code. The SGPDN will then request the SSFA to conduct 

the necessary investigations. 

J. Responsibility for Personnel Clearances 

In accordance with Chapter III of the Inter-Ministerial 

General Instruction of May 191 19521 such responsibility is that of 

the Ministry concerned. 

(~ote: In the case of private concerns working for National 

Defense, the clearance of personnel shall be effected by the SSFA. 

If the contractor disregards the recOJlllllendations of the SSFA, the 

contract may be cancelled without the payment of an indemnity. (See 

Instruction on the safeguarding of classified material in private 

concerns working for National Defense, dated September 10, 1952.)) 

4. Removal of Personnel 

Persons not qualified for the handling of classified material 

and documents are transferred to a post where they will not be a 

security risk, or, when possible, their employment is terminated. 

This regulation was referred to in Circular Instruction 261, 

dated January 3, 1952, sent by the President of the Council to all 

Ministers 

15' 
---, 

REF ID:A521501 

S~CURii:V l~r&t\Mitm1M -

r,n~n=1nr~r1 ~' -

Ministers and Secretaries of State:; 

5. Records of Personnel Clearances 

Officers authorized to h~dle classified documents and material ., 

are d.esignated by name b;-r the Min:t?ters concerned (Chapter III of 

i General Inter-Ministerial Regulation, May 19, 1952). 

(Note: In the civilian establishments working for National 

Defense, the Security Service of the Armed _Foroes· is furnished with the 

list of personnel who may have to work in (or enter into) premises 

reserved for secret work, or who have the knowledge of such work and 

are taking part therein. (Chapter II of Regulation on the Protection 

of Secrecy in Civilian Establishments working for National Defense, 

September 10 1 1952.)). 

6. Security I~ie!'t of Personnel 

Under the terms of the General Inter-Hinisterial Regulation 

of May 19, 1952 (Chapter III, Paragraph 7), the training of such 

personnel in the Ministries as have access to classified matter must 

be effected, in each Ministry, by the Security Officer, In the case of 

military units, the Security Officer is responsible for the training 

of all the personnel as far as security is concerned, 

7. Duty of Security Agencies 

The Security Service of the Armed Forces and the Sia-et~ 

call to the attention of the proper authorities all derogatory informa• 

tion concerning personnel authorized access to secret documents. 

s. Supervision of Staff 

General Inter-~iinisterial Regulation of May 19, 1952, did 

not explicitly specify the obligation for Chiefs of Sections to watch 

their personnel in order to detect changes in attitude which would 

endanger security, as such duties are among the normal responsibilities 

of Chiefs of SeQtions. 

Phys!.Q_al Security 

l. General Considerations ) 

) 

2. Necessity for and Proeedure ) 

) 

in Secrecy Protection ) All these points are 

) 

.3. Transmittal of secret ) ruled by General. Inter .. ) 

documents ) Minfste7ial Re~.1lat:i.cr:~. o:r:t 

/~ 
REF ID:A521501 

W:llRl'R' INFORMATUlN 

SONFIOENTIAL 

4. Filing of secret documents ) Secrecy Protection, 

) 

5. Destruction of secret documents ) of 19 May 1952, in 

) 

6. Daily inspection of offices ) the spirit of Report 

) 

7. Security of buildings ) 1951 of the Tripartite 

) 

8. Control of visi tsrs ) Committee. 

) 

9. Specially sensitive points ) 

Special steps are taken for the protection of 

specially sensitive points. Responsibility rests with the 

chiefs or directors of the establishments, assisted by 

SSFA. 

10. Relations with the press 

All the Ministries have a Press and Information Bureau,· 

which is the sole agency to which members of the press 

should apply for information. 

1. Outline 

2. General Ruling 

J. Habilitation of finns 

4. Security of secret contracts 

5. Seclusion of premises containing secret material 

6. Regulations on Security 

7. Sub-Contractors 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ZONFIDENTL~L 

The Permanent InterHinisterial Comnrl.ttee 

for Security has issued 

"Regulations on the 

Protection of Secrets 

in the civilian establishmen ts working for 

National Defense", of 

10 September 1952, signed 

by the Vice President of 

the Council, Minister of 

National Defense. To the 

Regulations is appended 

an.implementation circular 

from the Minister of 

National Defense, also 

dated 10 September 1952 

(The text'of the circular 

is attached 

17 
S. Sabotage 

REF ID:A521501 

SEGllRITY INFQRMATIDN 

CONFIDENTIAL 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

l 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

·- is attached ta the Regulations). 

The points concerned under 1 to 

7 indlusi~e are covered by the 

Regulations aha Circular, in the 

spirit of Report 1951 of the 

Tripartite Co~ttee, 

liowa~&~j tBe security measures 

pro~ided for under 3 (Habii!tation 

of firms) before placing the 

contract are contained in the 

general procedure for grant:tng 

contructs, 

The detection of possible "saboteurs" is conducted in close 

liaison by SSFA and National Security • 

• 

CONFIDENl'L~L 
REF ID:A521501 

S!Cttllifi lMF8RM"li6ft _ 

_ CONFIOENT1Al 

Part IV 

REVIEW OF PRrnr~IPLES AND STANDARDS 

OF T':E TRIP.ARTITE REPORT OF JUlfE 4, 1951. 

General Considerations. 

The 'I'ripartite Security Harking Group has reviewed the agreed Principles 

and Standards of the Report and re-affirms its view that they provide the 

essential framevrnrk for security Trithin the three governments. 

The Group, in recognisi::l.g that the Standards heretofore approved 

constitute minimum Standards only, believes that such standards should be 

reviewed periodically, particularly in the light of national and ii1ternational conditions which might require more i:1tensive neasures for the 

protection of classified matter. 

The review of the agreed Standards, following the recent Security 

presentations of the three governments has resulted in a number of 

suggestions for modification. These modifications would be designed either 

to clarify or to strengthen particular standards. In ad di tio:1, certain nei.rr 

standards have been proposed. After careful consideration it Tras agreed 

that changes in the Standards sl10uld not be presented to the three governments, 

for formal approval at this time. In arrivin~ at this decision tl1e Group 

took into account the fact that certain programs, undertaken in implementation 

of the 1951 Report, had bnly recently been instituted in the three governments 

and further time would be required in order to evaluate properly these 

programs. Under these circumstances the Group is su2mit~ing the following 

proposals affecting the Standards for consideration Viithin each government 

with a view to determining whether they should be adopted. It is contemplated 

that these proposals will be given further consideration at the next Tripartite 

meeting. The paragraphs of Part IV of the Report of June 4, 1951, which are 

affected by the proposaJ_s for amendment are set forth below, vrith the 

deletions lined out and the additions underscored (~~). 

(*) Titles to each section are underscored as in the 19)1 Report. 

Amendments to titles are shown by double underscoring. 

CONFIDENT/At 

1r 
j 

I 

nIB THREE DEL:SGATI ~ms 

REF ID:A521501 

SEtHrun· INPORMA'fl&M 

-~ON r-; OENTI Al 

SONSCICUS of the existing dangers of espj.onc'.ge, sa'ootage and 

subversive activities, 

DESIROUS of putting into force an efficient system oi security 

against these dangers, 

DE©.HNG ti1at this efficiency should be cop1parable in alJ. the 

countries in order to assure the protection of the secrets in 

conu:1on, 

ARE AGREED QI\! Tifil .?OLLCJ\:TITG P2IITCIPLES : 

The measures of security adopted in co.ch country must 

(1) Extend to all perso:1s 1:"mving acce:3s -Go classified matter and to 

all premises contai~1ing classified ;·,:atter (-::-). 

(2) 'l'hrou2;h regulation or other means, bG d-~s:\.gncd to detect. persons 

vrhose or.i.ployment would be harmful to -~he security of classified 

matter ancj provide :':'or t.hei:::· :J2~:::-01rment or rcnov2.l. 

(3) Prevent any unauthorised person :~ron; havin;;; access to classified 

matter. 

Ch) .-Je based on the principle of 11 need to know" which is fundamen t.al 

to all aspects of security. 

IV. A. ORGAi·IlZATI0!.1T OF SECUH!.l'Y. 

2. Cormnon Standards. t::or.ir..on standards of sccuri t:r neasures s'.1ould 

be observed by all Departments in e~~_!:_c_o_y:ytry so that classified matter can 

be passed from one department to anot.he:c~ in thG confidence:; that it will be 

handled vri th equal care. Such sta..11dard3 should inclv.do criteria for person:1ol 

In order to achieve government ·wide standards of security measures, it is 

essential that there should be established a system o..:.· i:~ter-departmen·~al 

co-ordination on a h::i..e;h level, supported by permanent vrorking committees on 

loi:rer levels. Such a systc:Ti. sho11ld provide for the rcprese11tation of sucl1 

departments of the Gove:..·nrn2nt as handle classj_fied matter. H should be one 

(~:-) As us2d herein classified mat·cer pertains to inforraation, oral, 

visual, or documentary, and material in any form or nature -:.rhj.ch 

in the interest of national defense r:mst be safeguarded in the 

1i1anner and to the extent. require cl by its iraportance. 

CONFIDENTlAt 

-&£99Ri'fY tNf6RMMltttt 
REF ID:A521501 

SE69Rl'fY lMJ'.9RMlllOK 

r.O'-IJ:JnrNTIAl 

of the duties of such an Inter-Departmental Committee to assist the departrncnts in framinr, their security instructions on ~rinciplos uniform throughcut 

the Government~ Governmental arrangements should provide f~_E_E_intcgration 

and co-ordination of all po~~_s_ ~nd._pr9cedures affecting __ ~ternal securit:y:. 

4. Co-ordination of Security Information. All information and records 

on subversion and espionage in each government should be so centralised or 

organized that they can readily be applied to arty question related to the 

employment of persons in gover~~ to protcctiori of classified matter. 

In addition, the fact o!. disqualifi£_a~io? of any ind~ vidual for access to 

classified matter should be .readily avai~~_?le t~ any_Gov0rrun9?t department 

concerned. 

B. PERSOIJ' IT!J, SECURITY • 

(2) Scr..!:_ening o~_l'er~-o~ncl. All persons, civilian and service, 1~hose 

duties require access to classified !iIBtter higher than Ri"':S'i'RICTED should be 

cleared oefore recci ving such :matter. This clearance should be based on an 

investigation· conducted by a qualified national i~vcstigative agency or other 

enquiry designed to determine uhether such individuals are of 

(a) Unquestionable loyalty. 

(b) Excellent character and of such habits, associates and discretion 

as to cast no doubt_upon their trustworthiness in tho handling 

of classified matter. Particul~rly close scrutiny in screening 

procedures should be given to : (1) persons to have access to 

matter classified TOP SECRET; (2) any persons •:rho ar'3 of Russian 

or Satellite origin or connection; and Jl2__any other P!Jrsons 

who inay !:'e vulnerable to pressure from ioreign sources. In 

this connection the fullest practicable use should be made of tl1e 

techniq_~e of background i~1yestigation. 

( 4) Removal of Per:=;onnel. Subs ti tu te text : Persons who are considered 

to be security risks such as those i:Fho are members oi~ corm:mnist, Fa~j._?t or 

other subver~~.Ye . ..9F~ti-na~-i~~~-l __ o~_c~1iz_a~_iol_!.~.?E...~hosc concerning vrhose 

loyaltY.~~rustwor~f1~ness there is r~a~onable doubt ~hould be barred or 

/S. Re cords ••• 

CONFIDLNT:AL 

SfttJ:tlf)' /NiSiiA'7tU.IH-

~I 
REF' ID:A521501 

SEeUllff INFORMAJIDI 

r,(l~FfOENTIAl 

(~) Records of ?erson·.1el Clearances. 

~?:ng clas~ified matter should maintain a record of the clearances granted to 

the personnel assigned thereto in order to determine which persons ma;>" be given 

access to classified matter• Ii\1.rthermore, dossiers of all persons previously ---· 

_ .. _ 

All person.riel emplo~ ed in 

positioils where they might have access to c:i.assified matter sh01.ild be -~hcrrJ'.lz~:.ly 

and periodically instructed ia t:1e need for security and the procedures for 

accomplishing it. 

the security regulations relevant to the:j.r en:plo;;T11cnt. . ---· ---·-·· .. --~-· .. -·--·· .... -.. -··-·-·-.,....-.---

(7) Duty of Security .\gencte!_. It s::ould be the ~uty of security 

agencies when a person comes to adverse not:i.cP. ro?.lating to subirersive activity 

or t:ru..stwort.hiness which r:1izht. justif'",r ~:c·me: act-io:1 ;")ei;.1~: t.E'~ken concerning his 

employment, to discover whP-ther s11ch persor. ip, or has LJ(;•.::n c~r:.plc..:red in governm~t 

or industry on classified 110:'..~Jc~ If so, the aut;1orit~r (;Ol'lcerned should be 

informed. 

(8) Super~9ion of Staff. Supervising officials should have the duty 

of observing the attitudes and habits of ea~e~efMt all personnel who are engaged 

on CO!!FIDZ::TIAL1 SECR"P.T and TO? SECRET work. in which case supervisors should 

endeavour to detect al'J'J change in the atti tudo of a-saeera:i:aa:l;e ~:uch _perso~ 

which may indicate the need lor consul"tini:; thE:: security authorities or taki.1.g 

other actio~ concern~ng_~~ployment of sue~ persons. 

C. PH:i:'SICAL SECt'RI'IY. (rTFO!::.:..'.i.7.Iff7 A~:D ;.~ATSRIAL). - ~-- . -· .. ··-·· . ·-·=:::=: ...... 

~·~11 classified matter is oi.' yaJ.ue to enemies 

of the three goverru~ents and ohould therefore require protectio~ to prevent its 

receipt by unauthorized persons. Official matter should be continually examined, 

and if protection is required, should be graded in accordancA vrith the de~ree of 

protection necessary. Within each government there should exist U.'liform 

practices for all departments regarding the classification, including d~v:i.grading 

and de~~assj.fication, custody, transmisoion and disposal of all classified matter. 

(6) Bail~ Insnection. All _:)ersons holding or otherwise having custody 

of classified matter should make a~ ~a;i:;J:y in:::ipection upo;1 ~~~ depar""';t'.rA t-o •,:1:s1.tre 

: ·.~ ... 

St611RlfY INffJMMAli~N 
. ~&'.u~ :A521501 SEt,~illf'c .1n1wn1fuu11-·-

.... 

~ONFJDENTIAL that all such material under their control is securely stored a!1d that all 

locking devices are secure. further independent insp'ections should be carried 

out after working hours. 

(7) ~uilding Security. ~:Uildings which house activities dealing with 

classified matter should be so protected as to eef'ty-ae€ees-:&e-tl:l'ieC";:l;~eP3:iiea 

!3e!'s9Me± prevent unauthorized access to such matter. Such protective measures 

should include barring of vlindo1·,Ts, locks for doors, guards at entrances, security 

inspections, en.6 night guard patrols within the buildings, and police dogs .. 

D. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY-. 

(1) Definition. Industrial sGcurity applies to the security protection 

of clasGified matter entrusted to ind1.i.stries, laboratories, schools, lmi versities 

and o_ther privately-ovmed or managed installations not/ under the jurisdiction of 

the goverrunent (->~) .• In addj_tion) it applies to measures taken to protect 

materials and installations ·against t:1e possibilities of sabotage (::'.J · 

(2) General Concept. Classified matter entrusted to private installation:: 

should be subjected to equivalent security protection, physical and person-_1el, 

as required vn thin the government .• 

safe~~rd in a factory g~es thro2-1§~1- v"'.~·~_'?_ll!? ___ sta.ges of design and manufacture 

classificatirm. 

on tho more vital aspects of ~ projcor'.1 ·cGd· limi tins a lrnorrleclge .of these 

In ord_~~~o recogniZE2_ .!-~~c_importance in ~ndust:ry of these principles, 

/(1) An •..• 

(;le) :Gstablishrilents under the jurisdiction of the Defense Departments are 

rega:i:dcd as coming within the scope of Sections D a~d c. 

(~:-.;:·) :.·or the purposes of t:1esc Stapdards, sabotat:;e is rt:!gardccl as any act, 

falling shor-t of a i11ili tary-opcl..:ation, - or an omissfon, intended to cauE'e 

phy-s16ai-Cfainage and-to--a8Sisf-a-:roreie;n poncror to ftirtT1cr asubversi ve 

aim, or any "Nilful act causing physTca1 damage uf importancct.0t:h8-- national- dofense. -·-·--- --- ---- --·· ---· ·- ..... ·-- ··-·- ·- ---

:ONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A521501 .. 

SEeURffY INFeRMAi!ON 

GONFfOENTIAL 

(1) An appreciation of what ~ potential enemy particular1Y .. R 

needs to find out. 

(2) A clear emphasis by the Eilitary Services or Staffs of the 

operational importance of particular enterprises and projects. 

(3) Direction to the resEonsible se~uri ty au thori ti~ to the 

vital 2ecrets on which s·ecuri ty precaution~ should _be_ f,?_EUrsed 

at the earliest stages of the conception of the requirement. 

(4) Applicatinn of the correct classification at all stages. 

(8) Sabotage. Physical security p~ecautions for the protection of vital 

key points is the best possible safeguard against sabotage and screening ~ 

can be no effective substitute. There should be a thorough knowledge of all 

potential saboteurs, so that in any emergency action can be taken against 

them vri thout delay to rendGr them harnlcss. 

(9) Protection of Information or:. Koy Points. Tho dis~ribution of 

induat.....,_ai. information of military s~gni.f~1-;7hi_9h might be translated 

into bombing or sabotage targets, should be c::mt.ro:led by means of a policy 

which hampers the compilation by potentia: ener.iies o;F2_fi?Y Potnts List. 

It may be expedient for this to be achievcc by co-operat.ion rather than 

_l_e,..g.._i_sl_a_t_i_· o_n_. __ Th'--o_s_c_c_o_n_c_e_r_n_od_ in the implementati5'.n of such a p~}icy_J.~·icludo 

industry, Gove~ent Doparjments - including Civil ~cfense, tho £rCSs, civil 

aircraft operators and light aero clubs, advertising agencies, building 

charts, Ela~s and air Ehotographic mosaics. 
REF ID:A521501 

SESURlff INfOltlMflOlt 

~ONFIBENTIAL PART V 

CO!:Jvffi:NTARY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 

PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS IN THE THREE COUNTRIES 

Introduction and Concept 

This Report has described the 1952 Tripartite meetings held in 

the three countries and the steps taken in each country to date to 

implement the Principles and Standards- It is believed that these 

taken together 'With the account of the three security systems as set 

forth in Appendices A, B, and C of the Basic Report of June 4, 1951, 

provide an adequate factual description of the security systems of the 

three Governments as they exist at the present .... i..ime. 

As stated in Part I of the Basic Report of June 4, 1951, the 

objectives of the work of the Tripartite Group are '.'to arrive at a 

close coordination in the security field, to promote mut~al oonfidence 

in security measures, and thus to facilitate the exchange of information 

on all matters". Obviously, mutual confidence in security must stem 

from a willingness to discuss any and every aspect of the security 

practices of the three oountries. Such willingness and complete 

frankness has characterized both the 1951 and 1952 meetings of the 

Group. Strong points and deficiencies alike in each country's system 

have been the subject of free discussion. 

The purpose of this part of the Report is to incorporate opinions 

generally held by the Delegations on such strong points and deficiencies, 

particularly with respect to the method and adequacy of implementation 

o-R *-• Pz-i.r..e:iJ-:let> ·and Standa.:rda in th~ three ootmtrles. It is 

recognized that one of the common errors in undertaking a critique of 

a governmental system of another country is a tendency to transplant 

the features of one's O'Wn system in the system of the other, ignoring 

historical, political, geographical and sociological problems which 

may be unique in the latter. Consequently, every effort has been made 

to guard against this tendency in the drafting of this commentary 

and to comment only from the standpoint of the comparable effectiveness 

of the security systems. 

The questions raised herein regarding the sufficien::!y 0f' +,he 

ZONFIDENl iAL . n· 
.• 

REF ID:A521501 

S!C!nllff 1Hf8RMAJIM 

'!n ~rrrnr:NTIAL security systems involve a commitment by each Delegation to re-examine 

the question raised and discuss it at the next Tripartite meeting. 

The mutual confidence desired in the security field will be improved 

to the extent that questions raised are resolved by a positive showing 

that there is no sufficient basis for the criticism or that steps 

have been taken to improve security in the matter in question. 

COMMENTARY ON TrlE D1PLEMENTATION OF THE 

TRIPARTITE REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES 

Prepared by 

the Frennh and the United Kingdom Representativeii 

1. We are left with the impression that relations with the press 

are inadequately controlled with respect to classified matter. 

2. In buildings epen to the public there should exist a largor 

number of restricted areas for the protection of classified mutter. 

J. The overall security system--particularly personnel screening~ 

appears to be too comprehensive. This tendency, if not watched, 

might result in important matters not being given the degree of 

attention deserved. 

There is doubt that in the Department of Defense there 

exists unifcrm execution of security policies in the various security 

agencies. Creation of a single security agency in the Department of 

Defense would assure such unifonnity, as well as result in greater 

efficiency. 

4. Public Law No. 414: United States Immigration and Nationality 

Act, 1952 

British Commentary 

While recognizing that this Law or certain sections of it have 

been drawn up as a security measure for the protection of the United 

States, the United Kingdom representatives consider that apart from 

the economic consequences to British shipping that may result when 

this Law becomes effective, certain factors a.f'fecting security are 

involved. 

The section of Public Law No. 414 dealing with passport and visa 

requirements 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF ID:A521501 

SEeHRiff INFBR1Mll811 

~ONFJDENTfAL requirements for foreign merchant·" serunen presents serious practical 

difficulties, details of which haye been given to the United States 

Government. The U.K. representatives are doubtful, from a security 

standpoint, even if the application of this Law extended over a 

period of years, whether the value to be gained outweighs the serious 

practical difficulties involved. FU.rther, they consider that whatever may be accomplished would be achieved at far too high a cost 

in the shape of slowing down and otherwise penalizing extremely 

essential shipping activities. 

In addition, the United f:ingdom representatives a.re of the 

opinion that there may be a real danger of the loss or irregular 

disposal of seamen's identity documents. The revised form of ~he document which is envisaged in order to comply with t.~e new Law would be 

of greater value to an unauthorized holder than the present one held 

by merchant seamen, in that it could be aceepted as conclusive evidence 

of a national status which he did not possess. The same arguments 

apply with equal force in regard to seamen's visas, which would be 

exposed to the same risk of falling into wrong hands. 

French Commentary 

Although the subject of this law in its entirety is not within 

the province of the French Delegation to criticize, in addition to 

which they are not fully apprised of all the details of the law, it 

seems that its introduction might have security repercussions in 

France, such as adverse effect on the morale of seamen. 

CO:MME11JTARY ON THE IMPLEMENTATIOl~ OF THE 

TRIPARTITE REPOHT BY THE UNITED KINGDO:tvi 

Prepared by 

the French and the United States Representatives 

A. .Qrg_anization for Security 

1. Common Standards 

a. While the British Government has distributed a "Handbook 

on Security" which covers the classification, transmission and handling 

of official information, there appears to be a la0k of cen:.-rciJ.:i ?.e:i 

SECURll f INFO!U,~P;mi-
REF ID:A521501 

sreun1n INFDRMHIOlt 

CONFrOENTfAl 

review of the respective ministerial regulations. Consequently there 

is no positive assurance that there are common standards of implementation of the Handbook on Security. 

b. There is no common written standard for selecting cases 

which require a full field investigation. Furthermore, there is no 

common written standard for determining the scope of full field 

investigations. 

c. There are no common standards in the form of written 

criteria for use by the ministries for determining security risks 

other than subversives. 

2. Inter-Departmental Coordination on Security 

a. While there are committees engaged in the internal 

security field, we are not aware of any overall coordinating committees 

to provide for the integration and coordination of all policies and 

procedures affecting investigations and other internal security ma·cters. 

B. fersonnel Secliritx 

l. Too much reliance is placed on screening techniques tha~~onsist 

primarily of checking names against Security Service files and exrunination of departmental records in cases where this procedure results 

in no adverse information. Conversely, there has been insufficient 

recognition of the far-reaching value of background investigations. 

2. Normal vetting is applied to all persons having access to 

classified matter higher than RESTRICTED. In order to provide greater 

protection to classified matter, normal vetting should be applied to 

all civilians who are either applicants or Government employees. 

Personal service contract employees should also be vetted if they 

have access to areas where classified matter is kept. 

3.. a. Positive vetting is confined to relatively few positions, 

but should be extended to all persons having access to TOP SECRET 

information, except in instances involving well-known officials. It 

is the view of the French and the United States representatives that 

there are insufficient field investigations to achieve the best 

security. 

b. The security questionnaire used in positive vetting does 

not contain sufficient information for best results. The questiormaire 

should 

CONFIDENTIAL 
REF;- ID: A521501 

_ SEGURlff tNfDltfM'l\Olt 

CONFIDENTIAL 

should provide for a listing of othet ham.es which have been used by; 

the individual and of his close reliil•~s. It should be subscribed 

to under oath. (u.s. CO?llment) 

c. The British system 1A6~ \he advantage of a centralized 

fingerprint identificatioh system tor use in security work. (U.S. 

Comment) 

4. There are no uniform practices throughout the Government for 

barring or removing from employ'Dlent persons who are security risks 

for reasons other than subversion1 such as character instability. 

C. fhzsic:al Security 

1. It is the belief of the French and the United States representatives 

that the British physical security conforms generally with the Principles 

and Standards. Ho~e'Ver, there is a lack of modern protection equipment. 

D. Industrial Se,curi ty 

On the basis of the information presented and the tours taken in 

British industrial plants, there appears to be a sound realistic 

. approach to security by industry and Government. Of particular 

significance is the apparent attitude of industry in cooperating with 

the Government in carrying out suggested security measures. Physical 

protection is satisfactory and governmental requirements through 

personal contact are apparently followed as closely as possible in 

order to protect classified matter. 

There seems to be, however, a lack of written directives which 

would ensure uniform minimum standards in the physical aspects of 

industrial security. 

The comments made in Section B (Fersonnel Security), paragraphs 

one and three, are applicable to industrial security. 

COMMENTARY ON THE IMPLE?v'.ENTATION OF THE 

TRIPARTITE REPORT BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT 

Prepared by 

the United Kingdom and the United States Representatives 

A. Organization for Security 

1. While tho authority of the Inter--Ministe:rial Connni~8fon ts 

CONFIDENTIAL ,,.· -, . 

Sit&mfry INF9RMATIPN 
1 ' • ~ 

- REF ID:A521501 

sufficiently broad to include all phases of internal security, studies 

have been undertaken only in a limited number of fields at the 

present time, 

2. While the several investigative and information collection 

agencies have amassed important data relating to internal security, 

there does not appear to be sufficiently closely coordinated effort 

to obtain and utilize this information to the greatest advantage. 

It is suggested that in the interest of security generally all infonnation relating to subversive activities and persons should be centralized. 

J. It is suggested that for more effective utilization of the 

security agencies, they should dovetail more closely in inter-departmental affairs. 

B. £...e.,r~onnel Security (Governmental and Industrial) 

1. The French system lacks the advantages of a centralized 

fingerprint identification system for use in secur:ity work. (U.S. 

Comment) 

2. Although there is no legal basis for barring or removing 

Communists, Communist sympathizers, fascists, and other subversive 

elements from positions where they have access to classified matter, 

it is understood that proposed legislation may correct these deficiencies. 

3. It appears that the new security program as it applies to 

civil departments has still to be implemented. 

4. Thera is doubt thc.t standards utilized by the SSFA in barring 

Communists, Communist sympathizers, fascists, subversive elements, 

and other security risks are applied uniformly throughout the French 

Governr.ient by the Ministries involved. (U.S. Comment) 

C. Physical Securit1 (Governmental and Industrial) 

The French physical security system appears to conform generally 

with the standards set forth in the Tripartite Report on this subject. 

It is understood, however, that there is still a deficiency in protection 

equipment. 

D. General Observation 

The United Kingdom and United States representatives are of the 

opinion that the French Security authorities have made considerable 

progress in most fields in implementing the standards Eet forth in 

the Tripartite Report on this subject •. 

CONFIDENT/Al 
REF ID:A521501 

SiCUR*H INPeRMt'l'!eH 

P.ART VI, 

'!he three Delegations have a~eed to recommend that their respective 

Governments t -

A, Give pronpt consideration to the proposed changes set forth 

in Part IV of this Report affectiiw the Principles and 

Standards of the Report of June 4, 19'1; 

B. Consider the criticisns by the other Delegations and the 

practicability of removing the basis for such critioiscJ 

C, Instruct their representatives on the Standing Group of 

N.A.T.O. to etua,- the feasibility of obtaining the 

acceptn.nce by other N.A.T.O, countries of the agreed 

Principles and Standards of Security and to take 

appropriate action pursuant to the resul.ta of such stlldy. 

[At such tioe as other N.A.T.O, countries accept those 

Principles and Standards, close working relationships should 

be established between the liaison oft'icers representing the 

three Delegations (see note to paragraph D below) and the 

representatives of the three countries on N.A.T.O, coI!lI!littees 

dealing with security oattore]; 

D, Agree to reconvening the Tripartite Securit7 Woi-king Group 

not later than October 1, 19531 for the purpose ot 1 

l. Observing i'urther progress 1n the inplemontation of 

the accepted Principles and Standards. 

2, Considering and taki~ action with respect to the 

proposals for amendment of such Principles and 

standards as set forth in Part IV of this Report. 

3. Giving further consideration to the criticisms of 

the three aecuri ty 97stems as set forth in Pe.rt V 

QQllRERftAli 

SECimITY IllFCmlATIOI 

/ot ••• 

3/ 
' " f 1 .. .,'> 

Paris. 

REF ID:A521501 

SECtlRIR INFDRMtTIDN 

CONFlDENTIAL 

of this Report. 

4. Studying other problems in the internal security field. 

(Note: The Tripartite Group has established a permanent 

liaison between the three Delegations to pro~ide for 

co-ordination of problems of mutual interest that 

may arise between meetings of the Group). 

APPROVED ON BEHALF OF THE THR:SE DELEGATIONS ·: 

S.D.30YKIN 

Chairman, United States Delegation. 

Capi tainc do Frog<J.to A .. L~E.Gi:JIIJ.,ERI.IB. 

Chairman, French Delegation. 

G.A• CAREY FOSTER. . Chairman, Un~tod·Ki.ngdom Dclcgo.tion. 

8 December 1952. 

CONFIDENTIAL ., ... : 

i(GllRITY INFBRMAfi6ff 
. ' ' 

REF ID:A521501 

SFCUBJIY IMFORMIIIOI APPENDIX/! 

:ONFJOENTfAL (UNITED STATES) 

TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP 

Program of the United States 

Monday, October 27 

.U.S. Army 

DeFartment of State 

National Security 

Council 

Tuesday, October 28 

October 27-31, 1952 

Introductory talk by 

General Omar Bradley 

Program Outline and Objectives of 

Meetings 

Mr. S.D. Boykin, U.S. Chairman 

Response and Discussion of Objectives 

11Security Practices and Preservation 

of Democratic and Constitutional 

Government 11 

Mr. Ray Whearty, Inter-Departmental 

Connni ttee on Internal Security 

"United States Govern.11ent Orga.11ization 

for Set!urity11 

Col .. Sidney S. Rubenstein, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense 

"Requirements for the Classification 

and Handling of Security Information 

(E.O. 10290) 11 

Mr. Pat Coyne, National Security Council 

Representative on Internal Security 

Department of the Army "Security and Loyalty Practices in 

Government Agencies (Uniform Regulations 

for Security)" 

A. Screening Requirements for 

Applicants nnd Appointees for 

Federal Employment (E~O. 9835 and 

E.O. 1024l) 

B. Security o.nd Loyalty Screening 

Requirements Affecting Incumbents 

(E.Oo 9835 and E.Oo 10241) 

c. Suspension and Removal Procedures 

under Existing Statutes and Executive 

Orders 

(Mr. Leon L. Wheeless, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense) 

D. Military Personnel Loyalty and 

Security Programs 

Department of the Navy "Protection of Installations" 

A. Evaluation and Frotection of 

Important Non-Government Installations 

B. fort and Ship Security 

Visit to Fourth District, Office of Special Investigations, 

Department of the Air Force, Bolling Air Force Base 

Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 

"Investigative Techniques Used in Background and Loyalty Checks in the U .s. 

Government" 

Inspector L.L. Laughlin, F.B.I, 

:ONf/DENffAl Correlation 

~Eef1trtrY INF ORMA r mN 
(Federal Bureau 

of Investigation) 

"!. 

--~· 

REF ID:A521501 

SEe<JRiiV iN~ORM!U\UH 

CONFIDENTIAL 

11 ccirrelation and Utilizati0n of 

Security Data" (Inspection o.f Pile 

System) 

Hr. A.H. Belmont, Assistant Director, 

F.B.I. 

Showing of film, "A Day at the F.B.I" 

Tour of Laboratory of F.B.I. 

Th~_s.dgy, October 30 

Visit to Bendix Aircraft plant, Towson, Maryland. 

Visit to Glenn L. hartin plant, Middle River, Maryland. 

Fri.c:l_aL__Qctober 31 

Department of State 

Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 

, Department of State 

"Fhysical Secur.i.ty in Government 

Buildings" (with fi::i.m showing) 

"Tne Threat of Communism in the 

United S~:i.tes" 

Mr, w.c. Sullivan, F .• B.I. 

"Summary of United States Security 

Practices and the Tripartite 

Report of June 4, 1951" 

. Mr, S.D. Boykin, U .s. Chairman 

Special Talk on Press Relations, 

Col. Joseph Edgerton, U.S.A.F. 

Panel Forum 

CONf IDENllAL 
REF ID:A521501 

SESl'RlfY INfDftMATIOR APPE,NDIX !! 

CONFf BENTfAL (UNITED KINGDOM) 

TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP 

Program of the United Kingdom 

November 12-lB, 1952 

Wednesday, November 12 

Ministry of Defence 

Treasury 

Inter-Departmental. 

Connnittee on Security 

Introductory talk by 

Sir Norman Brook 

"Personnel Security: Principles and 

Standards followed in the U.K. 11 

Mr. Clough 

"General Principles of Security and 

Fhysical Security11 

Mr. Hewison, Secreta...-y 

Visit to War Room, Ministry of Defence 

Security film flashes 

Thursday, November 1.2 

War Office 

Foreign Office 

Security Service 

Friday, Novembe~ 

Introductory talk by Director 

of Establisbinents 

Questions on War Office application 

of Personnel Security rules (!Jivil 

and Military) • 

Physic8.l. Security 

Inspection of Registry 

Introductory talk by Mr. D.P. Reilly. 

"The Work of the Foreign Office 

Security Department", including: 

Departmental duties; 

Review of measures taken to 

strengthen security during the 

past year; 

Personnel security. 

Mr. Carey Foster 

Talk by Mr. DoG~ White, Director, 

Intelligence and Investigation 

Division, on the Security Service 

Visit to Royal Air Force, Benson 

Reception by Group Captain L,J. 

Stickley: "The Role of R.A.F. 

Benson" 

Introductory statement by Group 

Captain Mears, D.D.I.(S), Air 

Ministry 

Demonstration 

GONFiO[NTiAL 
. ~ ' 

Saturday, November 15 

Mond~ November 17 

REF ID A521501 

SECURl?Y INFORt.tATION 

CONF"Jflf~JTfAf_ 

Demonstration of R.A.F. Station 

Security. Squadron Leader Holloway, 

,Station Intelligence Officer Benson 

! 

Introductory statement by Wing Commander 

Parry, P .M.l, Air 1'\:inistry, to demonstration of police dogs by Flight Lt. 

Smith. 

"The Security of Economic and Industrial 

Information" - Mr. E.M.Furnival Jones. 

Meeting to consider progress made by 

the U.K. in implementing the recommendations of the Tripartite Security 

Report. 

Visit to Gloster Aircraft Company (G.A.C.) 1 Gloucester 

Tuesd~ November 18 

IntroductoIJ' talk by Director of G.A.C. 

G.A.C. officials discuss Security 

Instructions 

Tour of factory 

Visit to Bristol Aircraft Company (B.A.c.), Bristol 

Introductory talk by Mr. W.R. Verden 

Smith, Joint Assisting Managing Director 

Tour of Bristol Aircraft and Engine 

Division 

Survey by B.A.C. officials of the 

Security Organisation embracing main 

aspects of physical security. 

Survey by B.A.C. officials of special 

security problems in connection with 

secret weapons; followed by discussion 

and questions. 

Film. 

CONFIOENTiAL 

$fetni1n 11ir 
REF ID:A521501 

SEGYRFFY INFBRMAR811 AiPENDIX C 

GONFrAENTfAt (FRANCE) 

TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP 

Program of France 

November 21-2S, 1952 

Permanent Secretariat 

for National Defense 

(S.G.P.D.N.) 

Security Service 

of the Armed Forces 

(s.s.F.A.) 

Monqay, November 24 

Security Service 

of the Armed Forces 

Visit to Onera 

~day, November ~2 

National Security 

Introductory talk by M. Mons, Secretary 

General of National Defense 

Report on the protection of secrecy at 

French Government levels (Inter-Minister ... 

ial Commission of Security) 

Educational films 

Report on Personnel Security 

Report on Security of Dormmer.ts and 

Instructions on Security o.nj ComrtGrEspionage 

Report of the National Security; 

General Information 

Preservation of secret material 

Visit to the National Security 

Wednesday, November 26 

Ministry of 

External Affairs 

Report on orgo..~ization of security 

at the Ministry of External Affairs 

Report on Communism in France 

Visit to Bretigny Test Flight Field 

Thursday, November 27 

Visit to D.E.F.A. at St. Cloud 

Visit to Hispano Suisa factory 

Frid_§.y, November 28 

Security Service 

of the Armed Forces 

Report on Industrial Security 

Meeting on the French program and organi 

tion of work for drafting of Tripartite 

Report. 
........ 

OGA 

REF ID:A521501 

SEGUAl'f:Y INfORMA'J.1011 

CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX D. 

COl®SITIOlJ 01" HORKI:m GROUP. 

UNI'IED STATES. 

Ur. S.D. BOYKIN, (Chainnan), 

I 

Er. J.C. ELLIOTT 

Er. Victor KEAY 

Mr. Arthur G. PATTON 

Colonel DOYLE REES 

Colonel Sidney S. RUBINSTEIN 

Colonel John F. · SClfo:ELZER 

DepartJD.ent of State. 

Central Intelli~~,, Agency. 

Department of State. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Department of the Navy. 

Department of the Air i·;orce. 

Office of Secretary of Defense. 

Department of the Army. 

UNITED KDlGDOI'i. 

Kr. G.A. GABEY FOSTER (Chairman) 

Group Captain c.v. HEARS 

Mr. R.H. Oll'EN 

Air Commodore N.S. PAYNTER 

Major H.c.M: .. STONE 

FR.Ar CE. 

Foreign Office. 

Air Hinistr.r. 

3ritish Embassy, Paris. 

Security Service .. · 

Security Service. 

Capitaine de Fr~gate A.L.E~ GUILLERUE (Chairman), Permanent 

Secretariat for National Defens8. 

Colonel Andr~ BONNEFOUS Securitw Service of the ArmGd 

Forces. 

Ir.. Max i110ULINS Renseignements Gen~raux. 

CONFIDENTIAL 
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