Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1708-CR-1946 | February 2, 2018 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Kevin L. Govan

Westville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kevin L. Govan,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 2, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1708-CR-1946

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Frances C. Gull, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

02D04-0411-FB-196 

Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1708-CR-1946 | February 2, 2018 Page 2 of 5

Case Summary

[1] Kevin Govan appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2005, Govan was convicted of two counts of Class B felony criminal 

confinement. The trial court sentenced Govan to fifteen years on each count 

and ordered that each sentence be “enhanced by 5 years,” Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 2, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11, which allows for 

sentence enhancements for certain offenses (including Class B felony criminal 

confinement) where a defendant “used a firearm in the commission of the 

offense.” The court ordered the resulting sentences on the two counts (twenty 

years each) to run consecutive to one another, for a total of forty years. In 

August 2017, Govan filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, claiming that 

the trial court erred in imposing the firearm enhancements. The trial court 

denied the motion, and Govan now appeals.1 

 

1 When Govan filed his motion to correct erroneous sentence, he also filed a “Petition for Earned Additional 

Good Time Jail Credit.” He pointed out that his Judgment of Conviction indicates the amount of time he 

spent in jail before sentencing (221 days) but not the amount of “good time” credit he is entitled to as a result 

of having spent that time in jail (an additional 221 days, for a total of 442 days). He argued that this omission 

violates Indiana Code section 35-38-3-2(b)(4), which at the time of his sentencing in 2005 provided that a 

judgment of conviction must include “the amount of credit, including credit time earned, for time spent in 

confinement before sentencing.” Govan asked the trial court to “correct” the judgment accordingly. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 20. The trial court also denied this petition, and Govan raised the issue in his 

opening brief in this appeal. In its appellee’s brief, the State notes that our Supreme Court rejected the same 

claim in Robinson v. State, explaining: “Sentencing judgments that report only days spent in pre-sentence 

confinement and fail to expressly designate credit time earned shall be understood by courts and by the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1708-CR-1946 | February 2, 2018 Page 3 of 5

Discussion and Decision

[3] Govan contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. A trial court can grant a motion to correct erroneous 

sentence only where an error is “clear from the face of the judgment imposing

the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d

783, 787 (Ind. 2004). “Claims that require consideration of the proceedings 

before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct

sentence.” Id.

[4] Govan asserts that the trial court should have granted his motion for three 

reasons, all relating to the firearm enhancements. We disagree. 

[5] First, Govan argues that the trial court erred by stating in the judgment that

each of his fifteen-year sentences for criminal confinement are to be “enhanced 

by 5 years” (thereby incorporating the firearm enhancements into the 

confinement sentences) instead of stating that the five-year enhancements are 

separate terms that are to run “consecutive” to the confinement sentences. He 

relies on Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(f) (formerly subsection (e)), which 

provides: “If the factfinder determines under [Section 35-50-2-11] that a person 

used a firearm in the commission of the offense for which the person was 

 

Department of Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of presentence confinement days.” 805 N.E.2d 783, 792 (Ind. 2004). The Court added that “the omission of 

designation of the statutory credit time entitlement is thus corrected by this presumption[.]” Id. Based on 

Robinson, the State argues that the trial court did not err by denying Govan’s petition to have the judgment 

“corrected.” In his reply brief, Govan did not respond to the State’s argument or otherwise address the 

credit-time issue. We agree with the State and affirm the trial court’s denial of Govan’s petition. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1708-CR-1946 | February 2, 2018 Page 4 of 5

convicted, the term of imprisonment for the underlying offense and the 

additional term of imprisonment imposed under [Section 35-50-2-11] must be 

served consecutively.” (Emphasis added). While Govan is arguably correct 

that Section 35-50-1-2(f) required the trial court to state in the judgment that the 

firearm enhancements are to run consecutive to the sentences for criminal 

confinement, he has not told us how he has been harmed by the trial court’s 

failure to do so, nor has he told us how he would, or could, benefit from the 

judgment being amended. “We will not reverse based on a harmless error.” 

Henriquez v. State, 58 N.E.3d 942, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied; see also

Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A); North v. State, 406 N.E.2d 657, 661 n.11 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1980) (“[W]here the purpose and intent of a statutory mandate are 

satisfied, our courts will not reverse for mere procedural errors unless the 

defendant can demonstrate he was harmed by such errors.”). 

[6] Second, Govan asserts that the trial court erred by ordering the two firearm 

enhancements to run consecutive to one another because there is no “express 

statutory authorization” for such an order. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. We rejected 

this precise argument in Lumbley v. State, 74 N.E.3d 234, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2017), trans. denied, and Govan makes no argument that we got it wrong there 

or that his case is distinguishable. 

[7] Third, Govan contends that the trial court sentenced him to “an additional 

fixed term of 10 years for the use of a firearm,” Appellant’s Br. p. 14, even 

though the version of Section 35-50-2-11 in effect at the time of his offenses 

provided for an additional term of only five years, see Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1708-CR-1946 | February 2, 2018 Page 5 of 5

11 (West 2004). But the trial court did not impose “an additional fixed term of 

10 years.” It imposed two additional fixed terms of five years each—one 

relating to each count of criminal confinement. To the extent that Govan 

argues that Section 35-50-2-11 permits the imposition of only one firearm

enhancement in any given case, regardless of the number of offenses committed 

or the particular facts of the case, we disagreed with that argument the last time 

Govan was before us, and he has not given us any reason to revisit the issue. 

See Govan v. State, No. 02A04-1608-CR-1880 (Ind. Ct. App. May 15, 2017), 

trans. denied. 

[8] Affirmed.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.