****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service andinthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************

### THOMAS ARRAS ET AL. v. REGIONAL SCHOOL

DISTRICT NUMBER 14 ET AL.

(SC 19442)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js. Argued May 19—officially released October 20, 2015 

### Deborah G. Stevenson, forthe appellants (plaintiffs).
Mark J. Sommaruga, with whom were William Stevens,AnthonyF. DiPentimaand, onthe brief, Zachary D. Schurin, for the appellees (defendants).
PatriceA. McCarthy filed abriefforthe Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as amicus curiae.Opinion 

### VERTEFEUILLE, J. The primary question that we must answer in this appeal is whether the failure to comply with the provisions of General Statutes §§ 10- 56,1 

### 10-47c2 

### and 9-2263 

### requiring towns to publish warning of a referendum in the same manner as provided for the election of town officials is prejudicial per se, automatically requiring the invalidation of the referendum results. The plaintiffs4 

### brought this action against the defendants5 

### alleging that the defendant towns of Woodbury and Bethlehem had held a referendum on the question of whether to approve a resolution by the defendant Board of Education for Regional School DistrictNumber 14 (boardofeducation) authorizingthe issuance of bonds and notes to finance certain school construction expenses, without issuing the statutorily required warning. The plaintiffs contended, among other things, that this failure rendered the referendum null and void ab initio. The defendants filed motions to strike certain ofthe plaintiffs’ claims, which the trial court granted in part. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants then filed motions for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whetherthedefendantshadsubstantiallycompliedwith the statutory notice provisions and that there was no evidence thattheirfailure to properlywarn ofthe referendum had affected the vote. Accordingly, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal6 

### from the judgment of the trial court claiming that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment because the failure to comply with the statutory notice provisions was inherently prejudicial. We affirm the judgment ofthe trial court, albeit on the basis ofsomewhat different reasoning.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts. On May 16, 2013, the board ofeducation held a special meetingatwhichitapprovedaresolutionappropriating $63,820,605 for the renovation ofand additions to Nonnewaug High School and authorized the issuance of bonds and notes in the same amount to finance the appropriation. The board of education also approved resolutions recommending to the towns within the defendantRegionalSchoolDistrictNumber14(regional school district), namely, the towns of Woodbury and Bethlehem, thattheysubjectthebondandnote authorization to a referendum vote, to be held on June 18, 2013, on the following question: ‘‘Shall [the regional school district] appropriate $63,820,605 forrenovations ofandadditionsto NonnewaugHigh School, andauthorize the issu[ance] of bonds and notes in the same amount to finance the appropriation?’’

### On May 17, 2013, Debra W. Carlton, the executive assistant to the superintendent of the regional school district, forwarded the draft minutes of the May 16, 2013 special meeting of the board of education and a document entitled ‘‘Voting Machine Information’’ setting forth the approved ballot question to the town clerks of Woodbury and Bethlehem.7 

### The town clerks
never arranged for any notice of the referendum to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the towns, as required by §§ 10-56, 10-47c and 9-226.8


### On June 4, 2013, however, the Woodbury registrar of votersissuedanewsreleaseregardingthereferendum.9 

### Anewspaper, Voices, whichhas acirculation of 1360 in Bethlehem and 3338 in Woodbury, published an article about the referendum on June 12, 2013. The article provided the information that had been set forth in the
news release and provided contact information for the town clerks and registrars ofvoters in both Bethlehem and Woodbury. Voices also had published an article aboutthe school renovations and referring to the referendum on May 22, 2013. In addition, the Waterbury Republican American published articles on May 27, 2013, and on June 10, 2013. Another newspaper, the Sunday Republican, published an article on June 16, 2013, inwhichitdescribedtherenovations andreferred to the June 18, 2013 referendum. On June 17, 2013, an online news service known as the Woodbury-Middlebury Patch also published an item describing the renovations and stating that the referendum would be held the following day.
Theregionalschooldistrictalsomadeeffortstopublicize the referendum. Specifically, at some point before June 18, 2013,theregionalschooldistrictmailednotices aboutthe schoolrenovations andproposedreferendum to all residents of the towns of Woodbury and Bethlehem and posted information about the referendum on its website. The regional school district also used a ‘‘robocalling’’ system to call voters by telephone to notify them of the date, time and voting places for the referendum.10


### The referendum was held on June 18, 2013, and the voters approved the referendum question by a vote of 1269 to 1265. Thereafter, the Woodbury and Bethlehem town clerks refused to certify the referendum results to the Commissioner of Education because there had been no proper legal warning ofthe referendum pursuant to §§ 10-56, 10-47c and 9-226. This uncertainty regarding the validity of the referendum results spawned two separate actions. Specifically, the towns ofBethlehem and Woodbury brought an action against the regionalschool districtinthe SuperiorCourtforthe judicial district ofLitchfield (Litchfield action) seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment as to whether the results of the referendum were valid. The regional school district filed a counterclaim in the Litchfield

### action seeking a declaratoryjudgment that the referendum results were valid and the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering the respective town clerks to certify the results of the referendum. In addition to the Litchfield action, the plaintiffs filed the present action in the judicial district of Waterbury alleging that the defendants had failed to provide proper legal notice of the referendum and seeking the invalidation of the referendum results.11 

### The trial court in the present actionstayedtheproceedingspendingresolution ofthe Litchfield action.
The plaintiffs in the present case filed an appearance in the Litchfield action for the limited purpose ofseeking to consolidate the two cases. They refused, however, tobe madepartiesto the Litchfieldaction, despite their claim to the trial court in the present case that the Litchfield action was void ab initio,12 

### and despite thewarnings ofthetrialcourtthat, iftheplaintiffsfailed to raise that claim in the Litchfield action, the claim mightbe ‘‘lost.’’ OnDecember 10, 2013, thetrial courtin the Litchfieldactionrenderedjudgmentforthe regional school district. The court concluded that ‘‘there [was]
no evidence that the failure to strictly comply with the [statutory] notice requirement, bypublishing an official ‘warning’ in the newspapers, was substantial or caused the results ofthe referendum to be seriously in doubt.’’ Meanwhile, in the present case, the plaintiffs had filed a motion for summary judgment. After the trial court in the Litchfield action rendered its decision, the defendants in the present case filed cross motions for summary judgment.13 

### Relying on the reasoning of the trial court’s decision in the Litchfield action, the trial court in the present case concluded that there was
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendantshadsubstantiallycompliedwiththewarning provisions of §§ 10-56, 10-47c and 9-226 by publicizing the referendum in various ways and there was also no evidence that the defendants’ failure to strictly comply withthe statutes had affected the outcome ofthe referendum vote. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants.
This appeal followed.14 

### The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the trial court improperly rendered summaryjudgment forthe defendants15 

### because the failure to strictly comply with the warning provisions of §§ 10-56, 10- 47c and 9-226 was prejudicial per se.16 

### The defendants respond that the trial court properly granted their motions for summary judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether there had been substantial compliance with the statutory notice provisions and there was no evidence that the failure to comply strictly with the statutes caused the results of the referendum to be seriously in doubt. For the
reasons that follow, we agree with the defendants that

### the trial court properly granted their motions for summary judgment because there was no evidence that the referendum results were affected by the lack of a proper warning.
Theprinciplesthatgovernourreviewofatrialcourt’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment are well established. ‘‘Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summaryjudgment shallbe renderedforthwith ifthe pleadings, affidavits andanyotherproofsubmittedshowthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and thatthemovingpartyis entitledtojudgmentas amatter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

. . . The party moving for summaryjudgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.

. . . Our review ofthe trial court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for summaryjudgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 548–49, 848 A.2d 352 (2004).
Before addressing the merits ofthe plaintiffs’ claims,
wesetforththegeneralprinciplesgoverningourlimited review of claims involving the validity of election results. ‘‘First, under our democratic form of government, an election is the paradigm of the democratic process designed to ascertain and implement the will ofthe people.

. . . The purpose ofthe election statutes is to ensure the true and most accurate count possible of the votes for the candidates in the election [or, as in the present case, for aparticular referendum result].

. . . Those statutes rest on the bedrock principle that the purpose of the voting process is to ascertain the intent of the voters.

. . . In implementing that process, moreover, when an individual ballot is questioned, no voter is to be disfranchised on a doubtful construction, and statutes tending to limit the exercise of the ballot should be liberally construed in his [or her] favor.

. . . Ourelectionlaws, moreover, generallyvesttheprimary responsibility for ascertaining that intent and will on the election officials, subject, of course, to the court’s appropriatescopeofreviewwhentheofficials’ determination is challenged in ajudicial proceeding.

. . . We look, therefore, first and foremost to the election officials to manage the election process so that the will of the people is carried out.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 254, 736 A.2d 104 (1999). ‘‘Second

. . . [t]he delicacy ofjudicial intrusion into the electoral process

. . . strongly suggests caution in undertaking such an intrusion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘An election is essentially—andnecessarily—asnapshot. It is preceded by a particular election campaign,

### for a particular period of time, which culminates on a particular date, namely, the officially designated electionday. Inthatcampaign,thevariouspartiesandcandidates presumably concentrate their resources— financial, political and personal—on producing a victory on that date. When that date comes, the election recordsthevotes ofthose electors, and onlythose electors, who were available to and took the opportunity tovote—whetherbymachinelever,write-inorabsentee ballot—on that particular day. Those electors, moreover, ordinarily are motivated by a complex combination ofpersonal and political factors that may result in particular combinations ofvotes for the various candidates [or, asinthepresentcase, fororagainstareferendum question]

. . . . ‘‘The snapshot captures, therefore, only the results of the election conducted on the officially designated electionday. Itreflectsthewillofthepeopleasrecorded
on that particular day, after that particular campaign, and as expressed by the electors who voted on that day. Those results, however, although in fact reflecting the will ofthe people as expressed on that day and no other, under our democratic electoral system operate nonetheless to vestpower inthe elected candidates for the duration oftheirterms [or, as inthepresent case, to finallydeterminethewill ofthepeople onareferendum question].

. . . No losing candidate [or group of persons interested in a particular referendum result] is entitled to the electoral equivalent of a mulligan. ‘‘Moreover, that snapshot can never be duplicated. The campaign, the resources available forit, thetotality of the electors who voted in it, and their motivations, inevitablywill be different asecond time around. Thus, when a court orders anew election, it is really ordering
a different election. It is substituting a different snapshot of the electoral process from that taken by the voting electorate on the officially designated election day. ‘‘Consequently, all of the electors who voted at the first, officially designated election

. . . have a powerful interest in the stability ofthat election because the ordering of a new and different election would result in their election day disfranchisement. The ordering of
a new and different election in effect disfranchises all of those who voted at the first election because their validly castvotes no longer count, and the second election can never duplicate the complex combination of conditions under which they cast their ballots. ‘‘All ofthese reasons strongly suggest that, although
a court undoubtedly has the power to order a new election

. . . the court should exercise caution and restraintin decidingwhetherto do so. Aproperjudicial respect for the electoral process mandates no less.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotationmarks omitted.) Id., 255–57. Inlight oftheseprinci-

### ples, this court concluded inBortnerthat ‘‘in order for
a court to overturn the results ofan election and order
a new election

. . . the court must be persuaded that: (1)thereweresubstantialviolationsoftherequirements of the [governing statutes]

. . . and (2) as a result of those violations, the reliability ofthe result ofthe election is seriously in doubt.’’ Id., 258.
With this background in mind, we turn to the plaintiffs’ claim in the present case that the trial court improperly determined that the defendants’ failure to strictly comply with the statutory notice provisions by publishing an official warning ofthe referendum in the newspapers didnotrequiretheinvalidationofthereferendum. We begin our analysis with the language ofthe governing statutes. Pursuant to § 10-56 (a), a referendum on a regional school district’s issuance of bonds ‘‘shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure provided in section 10-47c

. . . .’’ Section 10-47c provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he warning ofsuch referenda shall be published

. . . in the same manner as is provided for the election of officers of a town.’’ Pursuant to § 9-226, governing municipal elections, ‘‘[n]otice of an election of a city or borough shall be given by publishing a warning in a newspaper published within the limits of such city or borough, or having a general circulation therein, not more than fifteen nor less than five days previous to holding the election, which warning shall include notice ofthe time and the location of the polling place in such city or borough and, in cities and boroughs divided into voting districts, of the time and the location of the polling place in each district.’’
The plaintiffs contend that these statutes are mandatory and, therefore, the defendants’ failure to strictly comply with them by publishing a warning in the legal notice section of a newspaper of general circulation rendered the referendum invalid. Cf. Santiago v. State, 261 Conn. 533, 543, 804 A.2d 801 (2002) (general rule requires strict compliance with mandatory statutory provisions); State ex rel. Barnard v. Ambrogio, 162 Conn. 491, 502, 294 A.2d 529 (1972) (agency’s failure to comply with mandatory statutory provision renders agency’s action invalid). This court held in Bortner, however, that the mere failure to complywith a statute governing a part ofthe election process does not automatically render the election invalid. See Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 258 (‘‘in orderfor acourt to overturn the results of an election and order a new election

. . . the court must be persuaded that: [1] there were substantial violations of the requirements of the [governing statutes]

. . . and [2] as a result of those violations, the reliability ofthe result ofthe election is seriously in doubt’’ [emphasis added]); see also Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 652, 941 A.2d 266 (2008) (even assuming validity ofplaintiff’s allegations that registrar of voters, poll workers and campaign workers had violated mandatory election statutes gov-

### erning staffing ofpollingplaces, courtwas notrequired to order new election when plaintiff failed to prove that effect ofviolations ‘‘was to place the result of the election seriously in doubt’’ [emphasis in original]); Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 653 (‘‘proof of irregularitiesinthe [election] processisnotsufficientto overturn
an election in the absence of proof that any of the irregularities actually affected the result’’).
We recognize thatBortnerand Caruso involved statutes that are not at issue in the present case. Specifically, Bortner involved General Statutes § 9-328, governing contests in elections for municipal officers, and this court’s conclusion that strict compliance with election statutes was not required was based in part
on the genealogy and legislative history ofthat statute. See Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 260–63. Caruso involved General Statutes § 9-329a, governing contestsinconnectionwithprimaryelections. We note, however, thatthelanguageofGeneralStatutes § 9-371b, governing complaints directed atthe rulings ofelection officials in referenda, closely tracks the language of §§ 9-328 and 9-329a.17 

### Moreover, § 9-371b was enacted in 2004; see Public Acts 2004, No. 04-117, § 4; after this court’s decision in Bortner construing the provisions of § 9-329 was published. ‘‘The legislature is presumed to be aware ofthe interpretation whichthe courts have placed upon one of its legislative enactments

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Gilbert & BennettMfg. Co., 241 Conn. 282, 297–98, 695 A.2d 1051 (1997). Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that, by using language in § 9-371b that is similar to the language of § 9-329, the legislature intended that § 9-371b would be given a similar interpretation.18 

### Indeed, we
can perceive no reason why the ‘‘general principles governing the judiciary’s limited role in elections’’; Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 637; as described inBortner, should not apply equallyto referenda.19 

### We therefore conclude thatthe failure to strictly comply with the statutory notice provisions does not automaticallyinvalidate the result ofareferendum conducted pursuant to § 10-56 (a). Rather, a referendum maybejudiciallyinvalidatedonlywhen: ‘‘(1)therewere substantial violations of the requirements of the [governing statutes]

. . . and (2) as a result ofthose violations, the reliability of the result of the election is seriously in doubt.’’ Bortnerv. Woodbridge, supra, 258.
We recognize that, as the dissent points out, there is authorityfrom otherjurisdictionsto supportthepropositions that statutory notice provisions for special elections are more strictly applied than those for general elections,20

### and, atleastwhenthere hasbeenacomplete failure to comply with a statutory notice provision for
a special election, actual notice cannot cure the noncompliance.21 

### Several cases onwhichthe dissentrelies, however, predate the advent oftelevision, not to mention robocalling, mass public signage, mass mailings,

### the Internet and e-mail. Thus, these cases were decided at a time when it could be safely presumed that the officially prescribed notice was the primary, and perhapsthe only, meansbywhichvoters couldlearn about elections,particularlyspecialelectionsthatarenotheld
on a regularly scheduled basis. While we do not deny that, eventoday, thereisadifferencebetweenareferendum and a regularly scheduled general election with respect to presumed notice, areferendum, no less than
a general election for public officials, is a snapshot in time, and invalidation ofthe results will disenfranchise the voters who contributed to that snapshot by campaigning andvoting for aparticularresult. Accordingly, the general democratic principles militating in favor of limited judicial intervention in elections unless the noncompliance with governing statutes placed the result of the election seriously in doubt should apply equallyto referenda. Moreover, althoughthe difference between special elections and general elections might justify applying different evidentiary standards to the two proceedings,22 

### we can perceive no reason why the difference wouldjustify depriving the relevant governmentofficials ofthepowerto conductaspecialelection when they have failed to comply with statutory notice provisions, which is essentiallywhatthe dissent is contending.
The dissent also contends that a conclusion that actual notice is sufficient to cure atotal failure to comply with the statutory notice provisions usurps the role of the legislature, rewrites the governing statutes and violates fundamental democratic principles. The dissent does not dispute, however, that, when there has been only partial compliance with a statutory notice provision for a referendum, the reliability of a referendum resultis the touchstone bywhichwe should determine its validity, not whether there was technical compliance with governing statutes. Nor does the dissentdisputethatthis standardhasitsbasisinthefundamental democratic principles underlying the election process. See 26 Am. Jur. 2d 82, Elections § 280 (2014) (‘‘courts are reluctant to defeat a fair expression ofthe popular will in either a general or special election’’). Accordingly, we canperceive noreasonwhyautomatic invalidation of a referendum should be required when there was no compliance with the statutory notice provisions, where, as in the present case, the evidence establishesthatthevotershadactualnotice ofthereferendum and strict compliance would not have affected the outcome. Such a conclusion would be hypertechnical, and would exalt form over substance.23 

### Of course,
we strongly encourage public officials to complyfully with all statutes governing elections and referenda, not only because they have a duty to submit to the legislature’s constitutional authority to determine how elections will be conducted, but also to foreclose even the possibilitythattheresults ofthereferendumorelection

### will be judicially invalidated and to avoid the cost and inconvenience of defending actions like the present
one. For the reasons that we have explained, however,
we cannot conclude that the failure to comply fully with statutory notice provisions automatically invalidates the result. If the legislature disagrees with this conclusion, nothing prevents it from making its intention clear. See id., § 277, p. 80 (‘‘[a] failure to comply with statutory-notice requirements will invalidate an election which has already been held only ifit appears that it prevented the electors from obtaining a free and full expression of their will at the election or if the statute contains afurtherprovision voiding an election not held in accordance therewith’’ [emphasis added]).
In support oftheir claim that strict compliance with the statutorynoticeprovisionsforelections is required, the plaintiffs rely on the decision of the United States Supreme Court inBloomfieldv. Charter OakBank, 121 U.S. 121, 7 S. Ct. 865, 30 L. Ed. 923 (1887). Specifically, theplaintiffsrelyonthe court’sstatementthat‘‘[a] town cannot make a contract, or authorize any officer or agent to make one in its behalf, except by vote in a town meeting duly notified or warned; and the notice
or warning must specify the matter to be acted on, in order that all the inhabitants

. . . may know in advance what business is to be transacted at the meeting. If the subject of the vote is not specified in the notice or warning, the vote has no legal effect, and binds neither the town nor the inhabitants. No one can rely upon a vote as giving him any rights against the town, without proving a sufficient notice or warning of the meeting at which the vote was passed.’’ Id., 129–30. The plaintiffs contend that this language supports their position that the failure to provide the statutorily required warning for a referendum automatically renders the referendum results null andvoid. Asthe defendants point out, however, this court has held that a town meeting and a referendum are entirely distinct decision-making mechanisms. Sadlowski v. Manchester, 206 Conn. 579, 590, 538 A.2d 1052 (1988) (‘‘[f]or us to imply such an equivalence [between town meetings and referenda] would fly in the face ofreality’’); id. (‘‘a referendum in which individual voters cast individual ballots in individual voting booths does not constitute
a town meeting’’).24 

### Our limited role in reviewing challenges to the legality of the election process derives in large part from the ‘‘magnitude and complexity’’ of elections; Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 653; and from the important democratic values underlying the essential and necessary nature of an election as a ‘‘snapshot’’ of ‘‘the will of the people as recorded on [a] particular day, after [a] particular campaign, and
as expressed by the electors who voted on that day.’’ Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 256. These
concerns carry far less weight with respect to town

### meetings. Indeed, ifa town meeting is conducted without proper legal notice, it places no great burden on the persons involved to publish proper notice and to conduct anothermeeting. In contrast, when an election
or a referendum is invalidated, all of the enormous effort and expense that went into the official planning andpublic campaignsprecedingthe electionorreferendum are lost, and the persons who voted at the first election or referendum are disenfranchised. Accordingly, the decision ofthe United States Supreme Court in Bloomfield is of little persuasive value here.
Theplaintiffs also relyonthis court’s holdinginState

v. Lenarz, 301 Conn. 417, 436–37, 22 A.3d 536 (2011), cert. denied, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1095, 181 L. Ed. 2d 977 (2012), that, in a criminal case, the disclosure to the prosecutor ofdefense materials containing information subject to the attorney-client privilege is inherently prejudicial.25 

### We observed in Lenarz, however, both that (1) ‘‘[n]o severe definition of prejudice

. . . could accommodate the [broad] sixth amendmentpolicies’’ underlyingthe rightto be representedby counsel; id., 434; and (2) that prejudice should be presumed underthesecircumstancesbecause ‘‘itishighlyunlikely that a court can

. . . arrive at a certain conclusion as to how the government’s knowledge of any part ofthe defense strategy might benefit the government

. . . .’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) Id., 435. Incontrast, in the present case, the democratic values underlying the electionprocess militate in favor oflimitedjudicial intervention in thatprocess, and nothing prevented the plaintiffs from attempting to establish actual prejudice by identifying voters within the regional school district who wouldhavevoted againstthe referendumquestion if the referendum had been properly noticed, and submitting documentation to that effect in support oftheir oppositiontothe defendants’ motionforsummaryjudgment.26 

### Accordingly, Lenarz has little application here. Having rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants’ failure to comply with the notice provisions of thegoverningstatutes automaticallyrequiredtheinvalidation of the June 18, 2013 referendum, we turn to the questions of whether: ‘‘(1) there were substantial violations of the requirements of the [governing statutes]

. . . and (2) as a result of those violations, the reliability of the result of the election is seriously in doubt.’’ Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 258. Because it is dispositive, we first address the question of whether the trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the results of the June 18, 2013 referendum
were seriously in doubt as the result ofthe defendants’ failure to properly warn the referendum pursuant to the applicable statutes. The trial court concluded that, in comparison with the actual efforts to publicize the referendum, as previously described in this opinion, compliance with the statutory notice requirement

### ‘‘would have been merely nominal

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In addition, the court noted that ‘‘the referendum had a greater turnout than those past referenda that took place with proper notice.’’27 

### (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finally, the trial court concluded that there was no evidence that ‘‘a single vote was lost or affected by [the defendants’] failure to publish a notice in strict compliance with the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiffs do not dispute any of these conclusions, but claim onlythatthe defendants’ failure to properlywarn ofthe referenduminstrictcompliancewiththe applicable statuteswasprejudicialperse, aclaimthatwe have already rejected. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing the existence of a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether the defendants’ failure to strictly comply with the warning provisions of §§ 10-56 (a), 10-47c and 9-226 caused the referendum results to be seriously in doubt.28 

### See TuccioDevelopment, Inc. v.Neumann, 114 Conn. App. 123, 126, 968 A.2d 956 (2009) (after party whofiledmotionforsummaryjudgmenthasestablished that there is no genuine issue of material fact, ‘‘the burden shifts to the party opposing such a motion [to] provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 285 Conn. 652–53 (rejectingplaintiff’s claim thatirregularitiesinelectionprocessrequirednewelection when plaintiff failed to established that irregularities ‘‘had resulted in an improper vote, the improper counting of a vote or the improper failure to count a vote’’); Caruso v. Bridgeport, supra, 653 (‘‘[U]nder our system of government, the plaintiff bears the heavy burden ofproving by apreponderance ofthe evidence that any irregularities in the election process actually, and seriously, underminedthe reliability ofthe election results before the courts will overturn an election. Althoughwearemindfulofthedifficultiesthatplaintiffs face inmeetingthisburdeninlight ofthe statutorytime constraints on election contests andthe magnitude and complexityoftheelectionprocess, ourlimitedstatutory role in that process and our need to exercise great caution when carrying out that role compel the conclusion that proof of irregularities in the process is not sufficient to overturn an election in the absence of proofthat any ofthe irregularities actually affected the result.’’ [Emphasis in original.]).
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that the referendum question passed by only four votes. As we have already indicated herein, however, nothing prevented the plaintiffs from attempting to prove actual prejudice byidentifyingpersons who wouldhavevoted against the referendum ifit had been properly noticed. Indeed, unlike in Caruso, time constraints onthe plaintiffs’ ability to investigate the prejudicial effect of the

### defendants’ failure to comply with the applicable statutes were not an issue here. There were approximately eleven months between the date that the plaintiffs filed their original complaint and the dates that the defendants filed their motions for summaryjudgment during which the plaintiffs could have conducted such an investigation. Wetherefore concludethatthetrial court properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
Inthis opinionPALMER, EVELEIGH andESPINOSA, Js., concurred.

1 General Statutes § 10-56 (a) provides in relevantpart: ‘‘Aregional school district shall be abodypolitic and corporate withpowerto sue andbe sued; to purchase, receive, hold and convey real and personal property for school purposes; and to build, equip, purchase, rent, maintain or expand schools. Such district may issue bonds, notes or other obligations in the name and upon the full faith and credit of such district and the member towns to acquire land, prepare sites, purchase or erect buildings and equip the same for school purposes, ifso authorized by referendum. Such referendum shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure provided in section 10- 47c

. . . .’’

2 General Statutes § 10-47c provides: ‘‘With the exception of the terms which pertain to the capital contribution of member towns, the transfer of property to the regional school district, the grades included, the size ofthe board of education and the representation of each town on the board and the towns to be served by the regional school district, the terms ofthe plan approved through referenda pursuant to section 10-45 may be amended as follows: If a regional board of education finds it advisable to amend the plan or if the legislative body of a town served by the regional board of educationrequests amendmentofsuchplan, theregionalboardofeducation shall prepare a report on the proposed amendment, including the question to be presented, file a copy with the Commissioner of Education and the clerk of each member town and make copies of such report available to the public at a district meeting called to present the plan. After such public hearing, the board shall set the date for referenda which shall be held simultaneously in each member town between the hours of six a.m. and eight p.m. At least thirty days before the date ofthe referenda, the regional board of education shall notify the town clerk in each member town to call the referendum on the specified date to vote on the specified question. The warning ofsuch referenda shall be published, the vote taken and the results thereof canvassed and declared in the same manner as is provided for the election of officers ofa town. The town clerk of each town shall certify the vote of the town to the regional board of education and the Commissioner of Education. Ifthe majority vote in each town ofthe district is in favor of the proposed amendment to the plan, such amendment shall take effect immediately.’’

3 General Statutes § 9-226, governing municipal elections, provides inrelevant part: ‘‘The town clerk in each town shall, in the warning for such election, give notice ofthe time and the location ofthe polling place in the town and, intowns divided into voting districts, ofthe time and the location ofthe polling place in each district. The town clerk shall record each such warning. Notice ofan election ofa city orborough shall be given bypublishing a warning in a newspaper published within the limits of such city or borough, or having a general circulation therein, not more than fifteen nor less than five days previous to holding the election, which warning shall include notice ofthe time and the location ofthe polling place in such city

or borough and, in cities and boroughs divided into voting districts, of the time and the location of the polling place in each district.’’

4 The plaintiffs are Thomas Arras, Sean Murphy and Gary Suslavich, who

are residents of the town of Woodbury, and Karen S. Miller and Peter T. Miller, who are residents of the town of Bethlehem.

5 The defendants are Regional School District Number 14 (regional school district); Jody Ian Goeler, the superintendent of schools for the regional school district; the regional school district’s board ofeducation; John Chapman, the chairman of the board of education; George Bauer, the formerchairman of the board of education; the town of Woodbury; the town of Bethlehem; Gerald Stomski, first selectman of the town of Woodbury; and Jeffrey Hamel, first selectman of the town of Bethlehem.

6 The plaintiffs appealed from thejudgment ofthe trial courtto the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.

7 The text of the e-mail from the board of education to the town clerks provided: ‘‘Good morning, Town Clerks, ‘‘The [b]oard of [e]ducation approved the ballot question and date ofthe building referendum at a special meeting last evening. Minutes are attached reflecting their actions and the ballot question is attached in the format you require. ‘‘Please forward the ballot information to the registrars responsible for having ballots printed, and please let us know when absentee ballots will be available. ‘‘Your assistance with this effort is most appreciated, ‘‘Debra W. Carlton’’

8After the failure to notice the referendum was brought to the attention of the Woodbury town clerk, Linda Carlson, she sent an e-mail to various persons involved in the matter stating that she had received no direction to notice and warn the referendum and that the town clerk’s office ‘‘is ‘[a] keeper of [r]ecords,’ we do not interpret [the board ofeducation’s] meeting minutes/motions.’’ The defendant, Jody Ian Goeler, the superintendent of schools for the regional school district, had acknowledged in a previous e-mail that, ‘‘inadvertently, the reminder letter [to publish a warning] was not included with the ballot question and minutes calling for referendum’’ that had been sent to the town clerks.

9 The news release provided: ‘‘NOTICE ‘‘News Release—For Immediate Release—Reminder

‘‘Please Publish ASAP ‘‘Thank You ‘‘The Region[al] 14 School [D]istrict in the town of Woodbury will be holding a referendum on whether the School District shall appropriate $63,820,605 forrenovation ofand additions to Nonnewaug High School, and authorize the issue of bonds and notes in the same amount to finance the appropriation. ‘‘The referendum will be held on Tuesday, June 18, 2003, atthe Woodbury Senior/CommunityCenter, 265MainStreetSouthinWoodbury.Allregistered voters, as well as propertytaxpayers are eligible to vote in this referendum. ‘‘The polls will be open from [6] a.m. until [8] p.m. ‘‘Those seeking additional information may call the Registrar’s office

. . . or the Town Clerk’s office

. . . .’’

10 The defendants also submitted evidence of other attempts to publicize thereferenduminsupportoftheirmotionsforsummaryjudgment, including publicized tours of the high school building, discussion of the renovations and referendum at town board meetings and senior centers, the May 16, 2013 public hearing on the renovations that preceded the special meeting atwhichthereferendumwasapprovedbyresolution, andprominentsignage in the towns.
11 The operative complaint alleged numerous state statutory violations (countone); variousviolations oftheUnited States constitution (counttwo); various violations of the Connecticut constitution (count three); ‘‘[a]buse of [a]uthority’’ (count four); failure to provide proper legal notice of the referendum in violation of various state statutes and in violation of their civilrightsunder42U.S.C. § 1983 (countfive); andviolationsoftheConnecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110b et seq. (count six). The plaintiffs also soughtinjunctive relief(countseven). The trial court grantedthe defendants’motiontostrikethe operative complaintasto counts two, three, four and six, and the portion of count five alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the court granted the motion to strike as to paragraphs thirty-nine through forty-three and forty-eight ofthe first count containing the references to specific statutory violations. As a result, the only surviving portions of the complaint were the allegations in count one that the defendants had failed to provide proper legal notice ofthe referendum, certain paragraphs in count five alleging statutory and constitutional violations, and the request for injunctive reliefin count seven. See footnote 25 of this opinion.

12 The plaintiffs contended that the Litchfield action was void ab initio because the plaintiffs inthat actionhad broughtthe actionwithoutthe prior approval of the boards of selectmen of the respective towns.13 The following defendants; see footnote 5 ofthis opinion; filed a motion for summaryjudgdment on June 10, 2014: the regional school district, Jody Ian Goeler, George Bauer and John Chapman. The remaining defendants, the towns ofWoodbury and Bethlehem, Gerald Stomski, and Jeffrey Hamel filed a motion for summary judgment on June 24, 2014.

14Afterthe appealwasfiled, this courtgrantedpermissiontothe Connecticut Association of Boards of Education to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the defendants’ position.

15 As framed in their brief to this court, the plaintiffs’ claim is that the trialcourtimproperlydeniedtheirmotionforsummaryjudgment. The denial of a motion for summary judgment, however, is not an appealable final judgment. Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 828, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) (‘‘[t]he denial of a motion for summaryjudgment ordinarily is an interlocutoryruling and, accordingly, isnotafinaljudgmentforpurposes ofappeal’’). Nevertheless, because all of the plaintiffs’ claims and arguments apply equally to the trial court’s granting ofthe defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and because the defendants make no claim that the plaintiffs’ claims are not reviewable, we reframe the plaintiffs’ claim as raising a challenge to the court’s granting of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

16 The plaintiffs also contend that: (1) the trial court improperly relied on the reasoning of the trial court’s decision in the Litchfield action because, according to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in the Litchfield action had no authority to bring the action and, therefore, it was ‘‘void ab initio’’; and (2) the defendantsinthepresentcase ‘‘waived’’ anyclaimthattheywere entitled to summary judgment because they conceded that they had not complied with the provision of § 10-47c requiring that ‘‘warning of [a] referenda shall be published, the vote taken andthe results thereofcanvassed and declared in the same manner as is provided for the election of officers of a town.’’ We note that the Appellate Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal from the judgment of the trial court in the Litchfield action, and the plaintiffs have not challenged that ruling. Because the plaintiffs have cited no authority for the proposition that the trial court in the present case was barred from relying on the reasoning ofthe trial court’s decision in the Litchfield action, which is not the subject of any appeal or proper collateral attack, or for the proposition that the defendants in the present case waived all legal claims that could be raised in their motions for summary judgment by conceding an issue of material fact, we reject these claims. See Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 548, 848 A.2d 352 (2004) (‘‘[t]he party moving for summaryjudgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that theparty is, therefore, entitled tojudgment

as a matter oflaw’’ [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, ifthe defendants had disputedthe plaintiffs’ factual claim thatthere had been no proper legal notice ofthe referendum, there would have been

no basis for their claim in their motions for summary judgment that there

was no genuine issue of material fact.

17 The plaintiffs cited § 9-371b in the operative complaint. There is no indication in the record before us, however, that the plaintiffs invoked the notice or expedited hearing provisions of that statute. Rather, it appears that the plaintiffs proceeded in accordance with General Statutes § 9-7b (a) (9), which they also invoked in their complaint. See General Statutes § 9- 7b (a) (9) (authorizing ‘‘a person who claims that he is aggrieved by a violation of any provision of chapter 152 or any other provision of the general statutes relating to referenda [to pursue] injunctive and any other ancillary equitable relief directly from the Superior Court by the filing of a complaint’’). Nevertheless, the fact that the language of § 9-371b closely tracks the language of other statutes governing election contests supports the conclusion that the legislature intended that claims involving referenda would be subject to the same substantive standards as claims involving elections, regardless of the specific procedure by which such claims are brought.

18 The legislative history of § 9-371b sheds no light on this question.
19 Other courts also have held that the failure to strictly comply with the statutory notice requirement for an election or a referendum does not invalidate the election if there is no evidence that the failure to provide proper legal notice affected the result. See Henard v. St. Francis Election Committee, 301 Ark. 459, 461–62, 784 S.W.2d 598 (1990) (‘‘[T]he failure to publish notice of an election is immaterial if the election is actually held and the electors have not been deprived of the opportunity to express themselves. [T]he voice of the people is not to be rejected for a defect or want ofnotice, ifthey have intruth been called upon and spoken.’’ [Internalquotation marks omitted.]); Wurst v. Lowery, 286 Ark. 474, 475, 695 S.W.2d 378 (1985) (‘‘the failure to publish notice ofan election [on whetherto allow the sale of alcohol] is immaterial if the election is actually held and the electors have notbeen deprived ofthe opportunityto express themselves’’); Menlo Park City School District v. Tormey, 218 Cal. App. 2d 76, 84, 32 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1963) (failure of governing board of school district to publish in newspaper notice of election on question of whether maximum tax rate of district should be increased did not invalidate election when county clerk complied with statute requiring that sample ballot be sent to all registered voters); People v. Carlsbad, 128 Cal. App. 2d 77, 84, 274 P.2d 740 (1954) (‘‘[t]he test for determining whether an election is invalidated because of a failureto strictlycomplywiththenoticeprovisionsprescribedbythe statute has frequently been stated to be whether the voters generally have had knowledge of the election and full opportunity to express their will, or whether the variance may have affected the result by depriving a sufficient number ofvoters ofthe opportunity to exercise their franchise’’); People v. Carlsbad, supra, 84 (when election notice failed to provide date of election and information regarding issue to be voted on, failure did not invalidate election when date of election ‘‘was repeatedly and widely publicized with

a cumulative effect far beyond that which would normally follow a mere compliance with the statute’’); Weisgerber v. Nez Perce County, 33 Idaho 670, 675, 197 P. 562 (1921) (special election was valid even though there

was no substantial compliance with notice provision because ‘‘great weight of authority’’ supports rule that ‘‘[s]tatutory directions as to the time and

mannerofgivingnotice ofelectionsaremandatoryuponthe officerscharged with the duty of calling the election, and will be upheld strictly in a direct action instituted before an election; but after an election has been held, such statutory requirements are directory, unless it appears that the failure to give notice forthe fulltime specifiedbythe statute hasprevented electors from giving a full and free express oftheirwill at the election’’); Weisgerber

v. Nez Perce County, supra, 675 (citing cases); Demaree v. Johnson, 150 Ind. 419, 426, 50 N.E. 376 (1898) (defective notice of special election does not invalidate election if voters had actual notice); Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212, 218–19 (1859) (result in election on whether to move county seat
was valid even without notice when ‘‘there was an election and the people of the county voted, and it is not alleged that any portion of them failed in knowledge ofthe pendency ofthe question, orto exercise their franchise’’); Ginn v. Bonita, 62 So. 2d 159, 162 (La. App. 1952) (failure to publish notice of election in newspaper as required by statute did not invalidate election when it was clear from large percentage of electorate who voted ‘‘that publication in the officialjournal would not have had an appreciable effect upon the number voting’’); Ellis v. Karl, 7 Neb. 381, 390 (1878) (stating in dictum that failure to provide proper notice of special election would not invalidate election when there was no evidence that ‘‘any different result would have been obtainedby giving the full statutory notice’’);Albuquerque

v. WaterSupply Co., 24 N.M. 368, 382, 174 P. 217 (1918) (failure to comply withnoticeprovisionforelection onbondissues didnotrequire invalidation of election results); State ex rel. Board ofEducation v. Jones, 131 N.E.2d 704, 708 (Ohio 1955) (whenboard ofeducationfailedto strictly complywith statute requiring publication of notice of election on bond issue, extensive advertising campaign, including distribution of literature, mailings to residents, house to house canvassing, posting ofnotices in public places, newspaper items and public meeting constituted ‘‘substantial compliance as to notice’’); In re License ofWilson-Patton Post 536, Inc., 62 Pa. D. & C. 215, 229–30 (1948) (failure to set forth place where election was to be held did not invalidate referendum); Yonce v. Lybrand, 254 S.C. 14, 17, 173 S.E.2d 148 (1970) (failure to comply strictly with statutory notice provision did not invalidate election when ‘‘[n]o inference maybe drawn from the record that

a single vote was lost or affected by failure to publish a notice’’); Yonce v. Lybrand, supra, 17 (‘‘unless the result ofan election is changed or rendered doubtful, it will not be set aside on account ofmere irregularities or illegalities’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Quarterly County Court, 209 Tenn. 153, 155, 351 S.W.2d 390 (1961) (when voters have actual notice of election and have participated in election to usual extent, election is not invalidated by failure to comply strictly with statutory notice provision); Normanv. Thompson, 96 Tex. 250, 254, 72 S.W. 62 (1903) (failure to strictly comply with notice provision for referendum did not constitute grounds for contesting referendum); Vickers v. Schultz, 195 Wn. 651, 656–57, 81 P.2d 808 (1938) (failure of clerk of election board to post notice of election on formation ofpublic utility districtin eachpollingplace in countyas required by statute did not require invalidation ofelection when election was subject ‘‘of continued public discussion and controversy’’ from time that formation of district was first proposed up to time of election and ‘‘[t]he vote was such, as compared with the votes upon other propositions, as to indicate

an intelligent and well-informed expression of the popular will’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The dissent contends that our reliance on these cases is misplacedbecause, in all buttwo ofthem, ‘‘there was at leastpartial, ifnot substantial, compliance with the applicable statutory notice requirements.’’ See Wurst

v. Lowery, supra, 286 Ark. 475; Dishon v. Smith, supra, 10 Iowa 218; see also Weisgerber v. Nez Perce County, supra, 33 Idaho 675 (special election

was valid even though there was no substantial compliance with notice provision). The question that the court addressed in all of the other cases, however, waswhetherthe defectinthe notice couldhave affectedthe result of the election, not whether there was at least partial compliance with the statutory notice provision. See Henard v. St. Francis Election Committee, supra, 301 Ark. 463 (‘‘[n]one ofthe improprieties alleged by [the] appellants appear to have affected the outcome of this election’’); Menlo Park City SchoolDistrictv. Tormey, supra, 218 Cal. App. 2d 84 (‘‘the substantial rights of the electors were in nowise affected’’); People v. Carlsbad, supra, 128 Cal. App. 2d 84 (where ‘‘a considerable deviation [from notice requirement] appears the burden rests upon the party seeking to uphold the election to show that such variance has not affected the result’’); Demaree v. Johnson, supra, 150 Ind. 426 (‘‘if it were shown that the failure to give the notice in the manner provided for in the statute had resulted in preventing such a number ofelectors fromparticipating inthe election aswouldhave changed the result if they had voted, then the failure to give the notice as required bythestatutewouldbefatal’’); Ginnv.Bonita, supra, 62 So. 2d 162 (‘‘publication in the official journal would not have had an appreciable effect upon the number voting’’); Ellis v. Karl, supra, 7 Neb. 390 (question before court
was whether ‘‘any different result would have been obtained by giving the full statutory notice’’); Albuquerquev. WaterSupply Co., supra, 24 N.M. 382 (when official has failed to comply with notice requirements, result will not be invalidated unless ‘‘it

. . . be shown that, ifthe statute had been strictly complied with, the result would have been different’’); State ex rel. Board ofEducation, Bellefontaine CitySchoolDistrictv. Jones, supra, 131 N.E.2d 708 (‘‘[n]o claims are made that the result of the election might have been different, or that any elector was induced to cast his ballot otherwise than he would have done had the notice fully complied with the statute’’); In re License of Wilson-Patton Post 536, Inc., supra, 62 Pa. D. & C. 230 (when ‘‘failure to set forth in the notice the place where the election was to be held

. . . had no vital influence on the result of the election [and did not] prevent a full and free expression of the popular will’’ election would not be invalidated); Yonce v. Lybrand, supra, 254 S.C. 18 (‘‘where the result of

an election is not made doubtful nor changed, irregularities or illegalities, in the absence of fraud, will not cause the expressed will of the body of the voters to be set aside’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Quarterly County Court, supra, 209 Tenn. 155 (‘‘[w]henno one isprejudiced

or damaged by the failure to comply strictly with the [notice] statute, the election will not be disturbed’’); Norman v. Thompson, supra, 96 Tex. 254 (‘‘ifit appears from the evidence that

. . . irregularities existed as to render the true result of the election impossible to be arrived at, or very doubtful of ascertaining, the court shall adjudge such election to be void’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Vickers v. Schultz, supra, 195 Wn. 657 (‘‘[t]he want ofstatutorynotice, it is clear, did not result in deprivation ofsufficient number of the electors of the opportunity to exercise their franchise to change the result of the election’’).
20 See Bilek v. Chicago, 396 Ill. 445, 461, 71 N.E.2d 789 (1947) (‘‘[t]he election provided for is a special election, since there is no general law providing for it and fixing the time when it shall be held, and in such a case ifnotice is not given as required forthe length oftime and bythe number of notices requiredbythe statute, the election will be void’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); Walker v. Oak Cliff Volunteer Fire Protection District, 807 P.2d 762, 766 (Okla. 1990) (‘‘Notice requirements may be relaxed for general elections, because the public is presumed to know when they are held. However, special elections are not set on a date certain.’’ [Footnote omitted.]); see also 26 Am. Jur. 2d 79–80, Elections § 277 (2014) (‘‘[n]otice requirements may be relaxed for general elections because the public is presumed to know when they are held, but strict compliance with notice requirements for a special election normally is required although some jurisdictions only require substantial compliance’’ [footnotes omitted]); but

see Hill v. Skinner, 169 N.C. 405, 411, 86 S.E. 351 (1915) (‘‘In the case of special elections, when the law does not fix the time and place of holding the same, but they are to be fixed by some authority, failure to give notice
or issue a proclamation of the election will render it a nullity unless the people have actual knowledge and attend, so that the result is not affected. If it appears that the people generally had actual knowledge of a special election, so that the result would not have been different if proper notice had been given, failure to give such notice does not vitiate the election.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); 26 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 277, p. 80 (‘‘[a] failure to comply with statutory-notice requirements will invalidate an election which has already been held only if it appears that it prevented the electors from obtaining a free and full expression of their will at the election or if the statute contains a further provision voiding an electionnot held in accordance therewith’’), citingMoore v. Page, 148 Ariz. 151, 159, 713 P.2d 813 (1986) (stating in dictum that failure to strictly comply with statutes governing special election, therebypotentially disenfranchisingvoters, would not require invalidation ofelection whenplaintifffailed ‘‘to show that [noncompliance] may have affected the result ofthe election’’); 26 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 280, p. 82 (‘‘Even in special elections

. . . following the particular form and manner required by a statute for giving notice is not absolutely essential provided that there has been a substantial compliance with statutory provisions. Further, the courts are reluctant to defeat a fair expression of the popular will in either a general or special election. Thus, any errors or defects claimed to exist in a notice of election generally will not invalidate the election unless there is some showing that the electors

were in fact misled by such defects.’’ [Footnotes omitted.]).
21 See Whittlev. Whitley, 202 Ga. 633, 44 S.E.2d 241 (1947) (partial compliance with notice provision was not sufficient); Chanute v. Davis, 85 Kan. 188, 190, 116 P. 367 (1911) (same); Chumley v. Williams, 639 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Ky. App. 1982) (‘‘where an official makes no effort to comply with the [notice] statute, that failure is fatal and the doctrine of substantial compliance cannot be utilized’’); Neal v. Board ofSupervisors, 217 Miss. 102, 111, 63 So. 2d 540 (1953) (partial compliance with notice provision was not sufficient); State ex rel. Berkeley v. Holmes, 358 Mo. 1237, 1243–44, 219 S.W.2d 650 (1949) (time requirements of statutory notice provisions are mandatory and failure to comply strictly with them invalidates election); Appeal ofFrederick H. Harper, Jr., Inc., 150 Pa. Super. 569, 575, 29 A.2d 236 (1942) (‘‘[t]he entire failure to give the statutory notice rendered the special election invalid’’); Turner v. Lewie, 201 S.W.2d 86, 89–90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (partial compliance with statutory notice provision was not sufficient); see also footnote 23 of this opinion; but see Wurst v. Lowery, 286 Ark. 474, 475, 695 S.W.2d 378 (1985) (‘‘the failure to publish notice of

an election [on whether to allow the sale of alcohol] is immaterial if the election is actually held and the electors have not been deprived of the opportunity to express themselves’’); Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212, 218 (1859) (failure to provide notice ofelection on question ofwhether to move county seat did not invalidate result because ‘‘the people are not to be disfranchised, to be deprived of their voice, by the omission of some duty by an officer, if an election has, in fact, been held at the proper time’’).

22 In other words, because the public is presumed to know when regular elections are held, it is possible that evidence that would be insufficient to establish that the result of a general election was seriously in doubt might be sufficient to establish that the result of a referendum was seriously in doubt. The evidence inthe present case, however, overwhelminglysupports the conclusion that the voters in the regional school district, as a class, received at least as much notice of the referendum as they would have received if the defendants had strictly complied with the statutory notice provisions, andtheplaintiffspresentedno evidencethatanyindividualvoter who otherwise would have voted in the referendum was prevented from doing so by the defendants’ failure to comply with the statutory notice provisions.

23 Accordingly, we are not persuaded bythe cases that have adopted such reasoning. See Chumley v. Williams, 539 S.W.2d 557, 559–60 (Ky. App. 1982) (if official partially complies with notice provision and ‘‘attempted compliance, together with otherpublicity, [is] sufficient to notify the voters of the pending election,’’ election will be validated, but ‘‘where an official makes no effort to comply with the statute, that failure is fatal and the doctrine of substantial compliance cannot be utilized,’’ even if voters had actual notice and strict compliance with notice provision would not have affected result).

24 The dissent relies on this court’s decision in Pollard v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 145, 142 A. 807 (1928), to support its conclusion that this court previously has held that towns must strictly comply with notice provisions for special elections. It is not entirely clear, however, whether that case involved a defective notice for an election or a defective notice for a town meeting. At one point, the opinion refers to a ‘‘city and town election’’ at which voters approved the issuance ofbonds; id., 146; but the opinion then statesthat ‘‘notice ofthemeeting’’ didnot complywiththe noticeprovisions of the city charter. (Emphasis added.) Id. In addition, the court in Pollard relied entirely on case law governing the notice requirements for town meetings. Id. In any event, the decision inPollard is cursory, and the court did not engage in any substantive analysis of the public policy concerns implicatedbythejudicialinvalidationofelections. Accordingly, tothe extent thatPollard supports the dissent’s position, we conclude that it is inconsistent with later case law, namely Bortner and Sadlowski, and, therefore, it must be overruled.25 The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s claim pursuanttoLenarz because Lenarz involved the constitutional right to counsel while, in the present case, the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were stricken from the operative complaint. The plaintiffs contend that, to the contrary, their constitutional due process claim raised in count five of the operative complaint survived the defendants’ motion to strike. See footnote 11 of this opinion. We note, however, thatthetrial courtstruck anidentical constitutional claimin count two ofthe operative complaint. In any event, regardless ofwhether the trial court intended to strike the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process claim, that claim was premised on the alleged violation of the statutory notice provisions. The plaintiffs are essentially asking us to alter the standard that this court applies to a claim that an election must be invalidated because of irregularities in the election process by recharacterizing that claim as a constitutional claim. We decline this invitation. Accordingly, we conclude that, evenassumingthattheplaintiffs’ dueprocess claim survivedthe defendants’ motion to strike, because we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ statutory claims, there is no basis for the constitutional claim.

26 We do not suggest that a plaintiff who has claimed that there was no compliance withastatutorynoticeprovisionforan election orareferendum is always required to identify specific persons who would have voted ifthe officials conducting the proceeding had complied with the statutory notice provision. For example, if there was no statutory or actual notice of the election or referendum, it reasonably could be inferred from that fact alone that a significant number of voters were prevented from voting. Where, as here, the public received actual notice of the referendum that equaled or exceeded the statutorily required notice, however, no such inference can be drawn.

27As we have indicated herein, the vote in the June 18, 2013 referendum

was 1269 to 1265 in favor of approving the referendum question, for a total of 2534 votes cast. The defendants presented an affidavit in support of their motions for summary judgment indicating that, in eight other recent referenda within the regional school district between May 4, 2011, and May 6, 2014, a total of votes cast was 2402, 2132, 2053, 2039, 2090, 2175, 2325, and 2101, respectively. Thus, there were more votes cast in the June 18, 2013 referendum than in any of these other referenda.

28 Because we conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact

as to whether the defendants’ failure to strictly comply with the warning provisions of §§ 10-56 (a), 10-47c and 9-226 caused the referendum results to be seriously in doubt, we need not consider whether the defendants substantially complied with those provisions. See Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 258 (election may bejudicially invalidated only when ‘‘[1] there were substantial violations of the requirements of the [governing statutes]

. . . and [2] as a result of those violations, the reliability of the result ofthe election is seriouslyin doubt’’ [emphasis added]). We also need not address the defendants’ claim, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the plaintiffs’ claim for damages because §§ 9-7b (a) (9) and 9-371b provide the exclusive vehicles for contesting a referendum, and those statutes provide only equitable relief.