REF ID:A522772 

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IDOJW!DUI! FOR THE V1l!llRERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Enoloaurea: 

I.SIB Proposals Re l"rench Security. 

Letter from Chairan, lSIB to Chairman, USCIB, 

on above subject., 12 December 1950. 

A. Report. et.c. 

B. Draft ot letter to Chairman, U3IB. 

1. With regard to paragraph 7 ( c) or the reference, which was 

considered at the Fifty-ninth Meeting or USCIB, the attached. report 

(Enclosure A) baa been prepared, at the direction of DIRAP'S.A, to 

9eJ"V9 as a u. s. position in discueaiona with British representative& 

on or about l April 1951. 

2. It is requested that the attached report be considered in 

connection with Item 5 of the agenda for the Sixtieth USCIB Jleeting, 

to be held on 9 Februar)r 1951. 

J. a. It should be noted that the attached study is t"eaponsiw 

to the enclosure USCIB 14/112 and is therefore confined to the French 

diplomatic cipher eecurit7 problem. However, as pointed out in 

Par. 1 of the Enclosure "Bn to USCIB :U../118, it is clear that. cipher 

i.nsecuri.t;y permeates the entire area or French caraunicationa, including military, naval, and probabl.Jr air oommmdeatione as well as 

diplomatic. '11teret'ore, even though the u. S. arrl the u. K. have 

alread7 provided the French militar,y authorities with secure Cl')'ptoaad 91'!tma graphic machine•/lTrl'EX) and are now considering providing them also 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-10-2014 pursuant to E.O. 1352e 
REF I:P . .: ,A52 2 7 72 

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with the CCM f'or the tranais111ion or int.ernat;ional traffic dealing 

with Western Union and NA'l'O atfaire, the securit)" of wholly intraFrench mil!t&r)r ccmmunicationa on related or purely national subjects 

will remain seriously inadequate and thus will jeopardize the security 

of NATO, purely u. s., pDrely u. K., and u.s.-u.K. conmunieationa. 

ie 

Hence, it/clearly inau.t'ticient to overhaul French diplamatic cr,ypt.ograpbT, am the eecurit7 problem must be resolnd in respect to French 

C!"1Ptographic a79t.ala in all a.re&•, military. n&'fB.l, air, etc., ae 

well as in the diplomatic area. 

b. It is therefore reCOllllended that the agenda for any 

diecusaiona with the Pritiah on the subject of Frenoh diplomatic cipher 

insecurity be broadened to include all French c17Ptograph1c canmunicationa and that a prop<>sal to thia effect be made to the chairman ot 

UJIB. EncloSUl"e B is a draft of a letter embodying such a propoaal. 

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EARL E • STO!m 

Rear Adlnir&l, u.s. Navy USCIB Coordinator 

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REF ID:A522772 

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DRAFT 

SUbjeet: TRE INSECURITY' Cl' FR.EMCH DIPLOMATIC CIPHEHS 

In accordance with Paragraph 7(c) ot SB/78), the plan which APSA 

haa worked out is •bodied in Enclosure ll. her.to and is f orwa.rded in 

advance of the conference to be held early in 19'1, as proposed in 

the paragraph of reference. 

2. a. !t should be noted that Enclosure A is re11poneive to 

SB/783 and ia therefore confined to the P'rench diplomatic cipher 

aecurit.7 probl•. However, as pointed out in Paragraph 1 of the 

Enclosure "B" to Enclosure A, it ie clear that cipher inseourity 

permeates th• entire area ot French coaaunicatione, including milit.aJ71 

naftl, and probablT air oomrm.mications as well a• diplomatic. Therefore' «en though the u. s.. and the u. re. have already pr-ovided the 

French a:Uitar,y authorit.ie• with Hcure Ol'J'PWgraphic machinee and 

syatema (T!'PEX) and are now comider:lng p1'0Yiding them also with the 

CCU for the transmission of international traffic dealing with western 

Union and NATO attain, the security of wholly intra-P'renah mll1t&r7 

conlllWlioationa on related or purely national subjects will remain 

aeriouel.3 inadequate and thu• will jeopardize the security ot NATO, 

pure.l1' u. s., purely u. K., and u. s.-u. K. cOlllll\Ulications. Hence, it 

is cl•arlT inautfioient to overhaul French dipl01D&tic cryptograJ>h71 

and the security problem must be re•olved in respect to P'?-ench oryptog,raphic systems in all areaa, military, naval, air, etc., ss well aa 

in the diplomat.ic area. 

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3. USCIB therefore aeeka the concurrence ot !SIB to expand the 

ecope of the oonterence to be held earl.7 in 1951 to incllld.e diecu.saiona 

regarding action NqUired to improve the security or French governmental comrmmica tione in all areaa. 

4. The plan which ~.Il'SA has worked out as regarde the :iJlpJ"OYemlm\ 

in French d.iplomatic OOllll'mlniaatione (Encl08\U"9 A) is readily euaceptible ot application to PTencb military, na.nl, and air eommunica.tione 

or the highest echelons down t.o and including thoae of headquarter• ot 

Di'Yiaion. Should the discusaiona a.t the forthcoming conference ext.encl 

into the field ot taetietl communications ot formations below thoee 

equivalent to d1rlaion headquarters, it is probable that the recommendation. which would be made to the French authorities concerned 

would have to be eDJ?lined in the light of what diacloaures would be 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605