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SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 13.5/60 

Subject: 

Item 3 of the Agenda for the Fourteenth Meeting of 

USCIBEC, held on 2f1 April 1954. 

Possible compromise of COMINT Information (USCIB 

13.5/43). . ' 

THE CHAIRMAN (Captain Taylor) asked if there were any objections to 

considering Item 3 before Item 2 in order to permit the technical 

advisors brought to the meeting by the NSA Member to leave the meeting. 

There were no objections. 

THE CHAIRMAN introduced Item 3 by briefly reviewing its background 

and pointing out that Major Culmer who conducted the investigation was 

available to answer any questions which the members might have. He then 

drew attention to Section I of USCIB Directive Number 9 which contains a 

definition of compromise for COMINT purposes. Captain Taylor continued 

by offering his opinion that it was reasonable to assume that some of 

the COMINT material could have found its way into unauthorized hands and 

concluded by inviting comments from the members. 

MR. ZANDER suggested that the conclusions and recommendations 

contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 be approved. 

CAPTAIN AGNEW then recommended approval of a statement, which he 

read, as follows: 

11USCIB considers that there is no firm evidence that a 

compromise of cryptologic material occurred. Reasonably sufficient evidence is at hand to conclude that all COMSEC material 

not recovered was destroyed. However, there exists a bare 

possibility that COMINT material was exposed to unauthorized 

persons and therefore technically it must be considered compromised. We would reconunend that USCIB agree that no further 

direct countermeasures to off-set adverse effects of the possible 

compromise are feasible; that NSA agree that this investigation 

be continued by the office of the Executive Secretary with a view 

to recommending ways and means for providing more efficient 

tracer and casualty control procedures for COMINT material transported by air, and for the prompt dispatch of a COM.INT security 

authority to the scene of any aircraft accident involving CCMINT 

material. " 

THE CHAIRMAN asked the members if they would like to discuss the 

item in terms of the remarks of the NSA Member or would each prefer to 

express individual opinions. 

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USCIB: 13.5/60 

The Members agreed to continue with individual opinions. 

CAPTAIN McCORMICK stated that the Navy concurred with the conclusions and recommendation~ of the Executive Secretary. 

COLONEL TOWNSEND also agreed with the recommendations and conclusions of the Executive Secretary and added that he would like to 

recommend tha~ the Security Committee study the administrative action 

necessary to provide for dispatch of a COMINT security authority to the 

scene of any aircraft accident involving COMINT material. 

The State, CIA and Army Members also agreed with the recommendations and conclusions of USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954. 

In a brief discussion following the Chairman's summary of the 

NSA and Air Force recommendations, it was agreed that the problem of 

formulating proposals for better accountability and security control 

procedures in cases such as this should be left in the hands of the 

Executive Secretariat for the time being with the idea of ultimately 

having the Security Committee consider the substance of the proposals 

that may be expected to be forthcoming. 

CAPTAIN AGNEW continued the discussion by saying that with respect 

to the particular airplane accident, NSA had a dual interest: COMSEC 

material and COMINT material. There were three types of COMSEC material 

involved, he stated: non-burna~le, semi-burnable, and completely 

burnable. He went on to explain that all of the rotors were recovered. 

The 2500 degree fire in the compartment, Captain Agnew pointed out, left 

the rotors recognizable but not identifiable. Remnants of the one-time 

pads were recognizable but individual papers were not. The National 

Security Agency, he concluded, ruled there had been no com.promise of 

COMSEC material, but recognized the technicality of possible compromise 

of COMINT material under the terms of the definition of "Compromise" 

contained in USCIB Directive Number 9. 

. Referring to the NSA Member's discussion of COMSEC material, MR. 

POLIZOIDES sugge~ted that a decision be confined to COMINT material as 

the former is not a matter of USCIB cognizance. 

CAPTAIN AGNEW agreed but pointed out that the evaluation made in 

the use of the COMSEC material is pertinent to the consideration of 

compromise of COMINT material as both were carried in the same compartment of the plane. 

The Members then considered oral reports by Major Astor of NSA and 

Major Culmer, Chairman of the Security Committee. Pictures of the 

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airplane crash taken while the plane was burning and others taken 

afterwards during the salvage operation were examined. Captain Agnew, 

Major Astor, Major Culmer, and Mr. Corry (of NSA) advised the members 

of the condition of the recovered material that each had inspected. 

During the general discussion which followed it developed that: 

(1) A good possibility exists that all COMINT material was destroyed 

during the fire which occurred at the time of the crash, however 

there is no definite proof. (2) If COMINT material survived the fire 

there were several chances for this material to have fallen into 

unauthorized hands. (3) The conclusions and recommendations of the 

Executive Secretary contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 are 

correct and acceptable. (4) The opening remark . of the NSA Member in 

which he recommended approval of the following statement, 11USCIB 

considers that there is no firm evidence that a compromise of cryptologic material occurred. Reasonably sufficient e\ridence ••• 11 , etc., 

is also acceptable but does not alter or change the recommendations 

contained in USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 insofar as COMINT is 

concerned. 

DECISION: (29 April 1954) USCIBEC agreed: 

(1) That the report and recommendations contained in USCIB 

13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 are accepted without change. 

(2) That the NSA Member's statement as follows, 11USCIB considers 

that there is no firm evidence ••• ", etc., is agreed to be a correct 

one but does not alter or change the recommendations contained in 

USCIB 13.5/43 dated 19 March 1954 insofar as COMINT is concerned. 

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