Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

BRENT C. VIAN ROBERT J. HENKE

Nakos & Vian Indiana Department of Child Services

Fort Wayne, Indiana Central Administration

Indianapolis, Indiana

MITCH GERBER

Allen County DCS Office

Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY )

TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD )

RELATIONSHIP OF Cord. L., Cort. L., & Cha. L., )

MINOR CHILDREN, AND THEIR MOTHER, )

C.H., )

)

C.H., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A03-1202-JT-101

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )

SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, Judge

Cause Nos. 02D08-1002-JT-102, 02D08-1002-JT-104, 02D08-1012-JT-484
2

September 12, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge

Appellant-Respondent C.H. (“Mother”) appealsthe juvenile court’s order terminating 

her parental rights to Cord. L., Cort. L., and Cha. L. (collectively, “the children”). Mother

alleges that the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) did not provide sufficient 

evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. Concluding that the evidence was 

sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother has three children, Cord. L., Cort. L., and Cha. L., at issue in this appeal.1 

Cord. L. and Cort. L. were born on December 5, 2008. DCS first became involved with 

Cord. L. and Cort. L. when notified of potential child abuse after Cord. L. was diagnosed as 

having suffered a skull fracture, a fractured rib, a broken femur, and a fracture to his wrist on 

January 22, 2009. That same day, Cord. L. and Cort. L. were removed from Mother’s care. 

On or about January 23, 2009, DCS filed a petition alleging that Cord. L. and Cort. L. were 

children in need of services (“CHINS”). 

On February 10, 2009, DCS filed an amended petition alleging that Cord. L. and Cort. 

L. were CHINS. DCS filed a second amended petition that Cord. L. and Cort. L. were 

CHINS on May 21, 2009. In addition to stating the above-mentioned injuries suffered by 

Cord. L., the second amended CHINS petition alleged that Cord. L.’s and Cort. L.’s 

 

1

 The termination of the parental rights of the children’s father is not at issue in this appeal.
3

“physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the 

inability, refusal, or neglect of [Mother] to supply [Cord. L. and Cort. L.] with necessary 

food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education or supervision.” DCS Exhibit 10. The 

second amended CHINS petition further alleged that Cord. L.’s injuries “would not 

ordinarily be sustained except for the act or omission of a parent, guardian, custodian, or 

caregiver.” DCS Ex. 10. Mother admitted to the allegations contained in the second 

amended CHINS petition. In light of Mother’s admission, the juvenile court determined that 

Cord. L. and Cort. L. were CHINS and ordered Mother to complete certain services. On July 

16, 2009, the juvenile court found that Mother had not demonstrated an ability to benefit 

from services or maintained regular contact with DCS.

Cha. L. was born on December 22, 2009. Cha. L. was removed from Mother’s care 

on December 24, 2009. DCS argued that removal was reasonable in light of the fact that 

Mother was non-compliant with the services ordered in the CHINS proceedings relating to 

Cord. L. and Cort. L. Mother admitted and the juvenile court determined that Cha. L. was a 

CHINS on January 25, 2010. 

On February 18, 2010, DCS filed petitions seeking the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to Cord. L. and Cort. L. On January 3, 2011, DCS filed a petition seeking the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Cha. L. On February 15 and 16, 2011, March 14, 

2011, April 27, 2001, September 27, 2011, and November 15, 2011, the juvenile court 

conducted an evidentiary termination hearing at which Mother appeared and was represented 

by counsel. During the termination hearing, DCS introduced evidence relating to Mother’s 
4

failure to remedy the conditions leading to the children’s removal. DCS also provided 

evidence indicating that the children’s Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) believed that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, and its plan for 

the permanent care and treatment of the children was adoption. On February 14, 2012, the 

juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the children. Mother now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional 

right of a parent to establish a home and raise her children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, we acknowledge that the 

parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships of our culture.” Id. 

However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the 

termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet her responsibility as

a parent. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore, 

parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s interest in 

determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship. Id. 

The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the 

children. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the children’s emotional and 

physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the children 

are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is 

permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

Mother contends that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was 
5

insufficient to support the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights. In reviewing 

termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the 

credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 

N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the 

juvenile court’s decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the 

juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating 

parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether 

the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal 

conclusions. Id. 

In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we set 

aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only 

if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no 

facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if 

the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or 

the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

In order to involuntarily terminate a parent’s parental rights, DCS must establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that: 

(A) one (1) of the following exists:

(i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree;

(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable 

efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, 

including a description of the court’s finding, the date of the finding, 

and the manner in which the finding was made; or

(iii) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the 
6

supervision of a county office of family and children or probation 

department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twentytwo (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the 

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of 

services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2011). Specifically, Mother claims that DCS failed to establish 

that the conditions that resulted in the children’s removal will not be remedied. In making 

this claim, Mother argues that she obtained housing and employment as instructed by the 

juvenile court and a vast majority of her supervised visits with the children were “good 

visits.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. 

A. Conditions Resulting in Removal Not Likely to be Remedied

Initially we note that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in 

the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find either that the conditions resulting in 

removal will not be remedied orthat the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the children. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. 

Therefore, “where, as here, the trial court specifically finds that there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions which resulted in the removal of the child[ren] would not be 

remedied, and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s 
7

conclusion, it is not necessary for [DCS] to prove or for the trial court to find that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child[ren].” In re S.P.H., 

806 N.E.2d at 882. In order to determine that the conditions will not be remedied, the 

juvenile court should first determine what conditions led DCS to place the children outside of 

Mother’s care, and, second, whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions 

will be remedied. Id. 

When assessing whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying 

the children’s removal and continued placement outside Mother’s care will not be remedied, 

the juvenile court must judge the parent’s fitness to care for her children at the time of the 

termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re A.N.J., 

690 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The juvenile court must also evaluate the parent’s 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future 

neglect or deprivation. Id. A juvenile court may properly consider evidence of the parent’s 

prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, 

and lack of adequate employment and housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & 

Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, a juvenile court “‘can 

reasonably consider the services offered by [DCS] to the parent and the parent’s response to 

those services.’” Id. (quoting In re A.C.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

Here, the juvenile court found that DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove that the 

conditions that resulted in the children’s removal from Mother’s care were not likely to be 

remedied, and upon review, we conclude that the juvenile court’s finding to this effect is 
8

supported by the record. The record reveals that Mother did not successfully complete the 

home-based services offered by DCS. Mother’s participation in home-based services was 

placed on hold on four different occasions before being terminated altogether for lack of 

participation. Mother’s individual counseling was also terminated because of Mother’s lack 

of contact with the service provider. In addition, Mother did not successfully complete the 

offered parenting instruction classes and has failed to demonstrate that she has benefited 

from any of the services provided. 

The record further reveals that Mother has not progressed beyond supervised visitation 

and, consequently, has not demonstrated that she could safely parent the children outside of a 

controlled environment. The record indicates that Mother fell asleep during some visitation 

sessions, failed to properly administer medication or therapies to the children, and was not 

attentive to the children’s needs. Notably, none of the service providers who worked with 

Mother in any capacity could recommend that the children be returned to Mother’s care. 

Mother also failed to complete certain tasks as ordered by the juvenile court. 

Specifically, Mother failed to maintain regular contact with DCS and to timely notify DCS of 

changes in her housing and employment as instructed by the juvenile court. Mother failed to 

participate in the children’s doctor’s appointments, attending only one of roughly forty-five 

doctor’s appointments since August of 2009. Mother also failed to provide the children with 

sufficient clothing and to obtain her diploma or GED. In addition, Mother failed to maintain 

independent housing and suitable employment. As of the last date of the termination hearing, 

Mother resided with maternal grandmother. Mother was aware, however, that maternal 
9

grandmother’s home was not a suitable placement for the children because of maternal 

grandmother’s prior contacts with DCS. Further, while Mother testified at the termination 

hearing that she had recently obtained employment as a receptionist, Mother’s employment 

history consisted of short periods of employment at numerous jobs as well as periods of 

unemployment. 

When considered as a whole, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to 

demonstrate a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the children’s 

removal from Mother’s care will not be remedied. It was within the province of the juvenile 

court, as the finder of fact, to minimize any contrary evidence of changed conditions in light 

of its determination that Mother’s failure to provide a safe and stable living environment 

which led to the children’s removal was unlikely to change. See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 

210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. 

Moreover, contrary to Mother’s claim that the evidence showed that she had many 

“good” visits with the children and had finished high school and obtained housing and 

employment as instructed by the juvenile court, Appellant’s Br. p. 8, it is well-established 

that the juvenile court, acting as a trier of fact, was not required to believe or assess the same 

weight to the testimony as Mother. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 

2004); Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 320 (Ind. 1993); Nelson v. State, 525 N.E.2d 296, 

297 (Ind. 1988); A.S.C. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Elwood, 241 Ind. 19, 25, 167 N.E.2d 

460, 463 (1960); Haynes v. Brown, 120 Ind. App. 184, 189, 88 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1949), 

trans. denied. Mother’s claim effectively amounts to an invitation for this court to reassess 
10

witness credibility and reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 

806 N.E.2d at 879.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the juvenile court erred in determining 

that DCS established that it is unlikely that the conditions resulting in the children’s removal 

would be remedied. See In re C.M., 675 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Having 

concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination, and 

finding no error by the juvenile court, we further conclude that DCS has satisfied the 

requirements of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) by clear and convincing evidence. 

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and BAKER, J., concur.