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~ 'l'Hli ;QOCUMiN'l' GONT..\INS GODE 'YlOFID Mfrt'ERHU:, ~ ~ 

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-07-2014 pursuantto E .0. 13520 ~ 

~ ~ 

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• 

~~DrA51.~ tJGP SE1U:J. v.ru.~'--'ra ~In MFORMAllON • 

USCIB": 23/68 

3 July 1953 

!OP SJ§eilE'l' • SEffi:JRI'fi INPOHM:A:!ION 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE M»mERS OF uscm: 

Subject: Allied (NATO) Communications Security. 

Pursuant to USCIB decision reached at the Eighty-sixth 

(Special) Meeting, 28 May 1953, (see USCIB 23/64) the 

enclosure was forwarded to the Special Committee of NSC to 

apprise its members, and 'lbe President, of "the present 

sta~e of the conununications security and 'leakage' problem 

and the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee Reportn. 

Enclosure 

l copy of MEMO 

OF INFO for NSC 

dated 9 June 1953. 

USCIB: 23/68 

Deputy Ex~c~~g~~retar.v, ~~ USCIB 

TOP SECRET C14\NOE 

24 
" ' 

GmTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

9 June 1953 

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL 

SECURI'F.t' COUNCIL FOR COMINT: 

Subject: Allied (NATO) Communication Security 

'J?.L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Eo 3.3(h) (2) 

1. During the spring and summer of 1948 as a result of 

ies propose a s eps e 

ty of our allies. As a first 

inf orm.ed 

tJI{ authoriUSCIB reported this matter to the NSC and it was decided \.by NSC 

"""a-c"""'t,..,i .... o_n ... on 2' September 1948 that the proposed action should not be 

taken. 

2. The matter was again raised by the British in the summer 0£ 

1950. USCIB again considered the roblem and on 3 November 1950 concluded that any steps involving or other 

actions to im rove French communication securit ....__ ____________ _,must await a satisfactory improvement in 

over-all French security. 

3. In December 1950, the London Signal Intelligence Bbard (LSm) 

proposed a US/UK conference early in 1951 to prepare a Combined policy 

in this matter. USCIB agreed and the conference was held in May 1951. 

The report of this conference, in which UK authorities concurl!'ed, w.a.s 

approved by USCIB on 24 May 1951 and by the President on 11 January 

1952, on the recommendation of a special cononittee of the NSC. This 

decision provided, in essence, as followe: 

a. An effort should be made to improve the security of French 

diplomatic communications. 

c. Specific prior US/UK agreement as to the nature and 

phasing of an approach to the F?rench would be a requirement. 

d. Over-all security conditions satisfactory to bot.h .the 

USCIB and the LSIB would be a prerequisite to taking acti.on. 

Enclosure with USCIB 23/6S dated 3 July 1953. 

TOP SECRET Gl\NOE 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
. ' • 

I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E:o 3.3(h) (2) 

4. Since the above-mentioned conference, two specifier proposals 

for an approach to the French have been received from UK authorities. 

In both instances USCIB has stated that the prereGJ.Uisite seeurity\ conditions did not yet exist and that, therefore, the U.S. coul.d n<:>t yet 

agree to any stepsl I 

5. In Feb:cmary of this year LSIB proposed another US/UK Conference 

to consider the tactics to be employed in a direct /approach to the 

French and to consider in addition the entire problem of the security 

of the diplomatic and military communications of other NATO nations. 

Such a conference opened in Washington on 5 June. 

6. While these events have been transpiring users· has continued 

to study the entire problem of/allied communications securit 

A stu 

in.formation about U.S • .__ ___ ......... ...-~--.,....-.....-~---.""'T"""T"'"" ................ ~~~----::--:~-:-:' 

po icies an p ns which it is assumed is thereby available to the 

Russianso The extent of the damage to the U.S. caused by this leakage 

is difficult to determine. However, serious damage has occured in the 

past and may occur again in the future. 

7. The entire matter is being reviewed in collaboration with representat;ves of the LSIB and a report of/ facts, conclusions and :recommendations in the premises will be presented to the Special Committee of 

the National Security Council as soon as possible after the termination 

of the conference. 

S. USCIB has instructed its delegation to this conference to undertake jointly with the British to recommend means of improving the .national cryptographic and communications practices of the NATO countries by a 

demonstration of proper techniques,/ explanation of sources of weakness 

and other means at 

this timeo Such demonstrations and explanations must be considerably 

detailed even to a point that might be expected to permit reasonable 

I I Further, USCIB has instructed its 

delegation to achieve a Combined recoJIDnendation for machiner.r to continue exa.minat.ion of the traffic of NATO countries and for the analysis 

of their communications practices in order to supplement this survey, to 

judge the effect of the efforts to improve their security and to provide 

a basis for future act.ion. 

Allen W. Dulles 

Chairman, United States 

Communications Intelligence Board 

Enclosure with USCIB' 23/6S dated 3 July 1953. 

TOP SECRET CANOE