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UK-US CONFERENCE ON THE OOMMUNICATION> SECtRITY <F 

NATO COU N'rRIF.S 

Minutes at the Plenary Session held a.t 

FINAL 

. 1000 hours, 5 Jum, 1953 PL 86-36/ 50 use 3605 

In the Chair: Lt.. Gen. R./J. Ganim 

U. K. Delegate~ 

Mr.·l..__ ............ --......___,...___.I 

Brig John H. Tiltman 

~l~-·~~~~~~~ 

. 

u. s. Delegates 

:V.ir. William F. Friedman 

Mr. Victor P. Keay 

Mr. Frank B. RGtle tt 

Mr. Robert F~ Packard 

Mr. William H. Gai el 

Capt. Gifford Grange,, USN , Col. M. L. Sherburn, tB A 

Lt. Col. John M. Amerson~ USAF 

Lt. K. B. Monypeny,, Jr., USN (Secretary) 

Distinguished Guests 

Mr. W. Park Armstro~ 

. . , 

Maj. Gen. Harry Reichelderfer, tBA 

RADM. J. N. Wenger,, USN 

Capt. L. s. Howeth, tBN (.f'cr RADM. W. B • .Anmon) 

Capt. J. A. Mcrrison1 USN 

Col. James Corr, USA (.t'er Maj. Gen. G. ?. Ba.ck) 

Col. John G. Ondrick, USA (tcr Brjg, Gen. E. H. Perter) 

Capt. J. s. Harper, USN 

Col. A. R. Yarcy, l':.A 

Col. Rebert. E. Schukratt., USA' 

Col. George P. Sampson, USA 

Cdr. W. L. Thomas, USN 

Mr. T. Achilles Pol.yzoides 

Mr. F. A. Raven 

l. Opening c£ Oo.nte.reme b:y Directer, N3A 

In welc aning the menbers ar tl'e UK delegation, Lt. General C~ine stated 

that le was becaning an exp'ert on opening these conferemes. He explaired 

that he ha.d been requested by Mr. Dulles, <ln irne. n af the United States 

Camnunications Intelligence Beard to express his regrets that he could not. 

be present. and to extend a :welcone for,..himaelf on 9e.ba.:U: pf the Beard. to 

the United Kingdom Delegation. ... - ·, 

General Canim nolied that1 the p-oblem which this ,conf'er.enoe was to 

'comider was a recurring one. He sail that this was net the tirst tine · the two teams had sat down with th is problem arrl. added that he suspected 

·it would not. be the last tine "{& wcnld do so. He pointed out that it was 

not an easy prcblBm to solve ani that sone i:eople .. bad rather positive 

ideas concernirg it. To reach a sol'lt.ion to sucti"'.a problan, re sa.:ki,, 

.becam s geQlletrically increasi~ly' dii'ficulJ; •· 

Problems that l1ml themselves to exact neasurenent. were usually tail!.y 

·simple to sclve. Pr.d:>lems that evolve into an "educ.ated guass" engendered 

-theii- own "'dir£.:ic ulties in solution. He stated that it the delegates entered 

tm cont)reme with tm idea that mere is aooomp1:5shed. 'by; evolution \than 

revalution the CS6flfi!."'f' wa1 lcil ceme up wibh ss>ne com tructive reconmematiom iio the two n&1NII. · 

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He coreluied by offurirJB the facilities or the Natioml Security Age'f!cy 

a.n::l the Secretary of the Bcnrtl to f..he visit ins delegations. He expressed 

the hope that they -wouJd take advo.nt.ae;e or the ent.erl:.airumnt facilities 

in 1..he Washirg-1:.on area, arrl t.ha t thfa vis1.t \>iould beL ........ an _______ exceedingl.v ... -._ .. _____ pleasant _ one. 

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2. Remarks by He1J.d of British Delegation 

I>i.t;r--1 :replied on behalf of the British delegation arrl expressed 

his l:.ha~t-eral C1J.nim for the .warm arxi hearty welcolre extended .. 

He expressed his apprec:ia tion for the arrangane nts ani acconnnodation ma.de 

avail.able ard said that he hoped t.IE UK delegates could f:i:rrl -tilne a's-ide-·-, 

from the confereme work to enjoy the enl:. ertainment provided by 'Washington. 

He conl:.inuod by explaining that as the UK viewed the situation there 

·were two fn.cets to the problem. First, there was tre question of compellirg 

NATO na.tiom to comply with the regula.t:i.ors on t1Se of NATO ciphers for 

dccuments which are properly graded NATO and CCBMIC. Seconily,, s.aide fran 

canpellir:g then to use NATO ciphers,, it, wns·mcessa:ry to face the .t'act that 

it was not. enough to h'lve just NATO, IB,, ,ard ·UK ciphers secure,; ira ecure 

national ciphers of NA'rO countries constituted a dangerous source ct 

inl:.elligero e to our pol:.ential enemies. 

He stated that if we were to take pcsitive action to im rove the 

cryptographic security of NATO m tiom we sh<llld 

he con!;inood, we could e.:iq:ect ....,..,~-=-~..-~...,.....~....,..........,.~~~...,.....,.......,,,.....,,. ....... ~---,,....._ 

the Rus siara to get tre assent 1al lims of the picture which pe rha.ps 

othar\v:iBe they \/OUld not get at all. If they did ootain it by ot:.mr 

farms or intelligenca, they would not get the infarnntion so quickly, 

so reliably, ar so authentically. 

He said tra t in time of shock arrl. crisis the val~ J lt-iould 

im rease. In tine or war the re would be a greatly .dim.inisfud !'I ow of: 

int ell igem e when otho r agencies had ire reased difficulty get ting in-

:f.' crim. tion out of the country. In wartime, the Russians would no longer 

be able to use their embassies o.s a cloak.tb carr,y- int elligerx: e. 

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Mr.I , li:hen suggest.ad that the UK ard U3 shouJd •plan a tripartite meetirg with the French. He stated that we should tell the 

Freroh that we had certain infonna 1..ion abolt. their no.tiona.l cipmrs,, 

ar:d tln t we should not. .omit to give them an opportunity- to say jf they 

had any infornntion a bQilt our ciphers and communic'at:iom practices. 

Having had these sessions with the French we could then put on the 

table our ideas af' the extent. ·to 1-hich we felt that the security of our 

various communicatiora systems was a natter of conmon com ern. Having 

put the Freroh in a sati.sfactary positi on--which might take sone till'B--

we should then proceed with ~hem to tackle the pro blE111s af' such ct.her 

countries as mey be decided at th is conference. 

On the question or timeliness, he said tmt it was his belief tl:at th~.s problem was om tl:B.t could not wait, not only because it was 

dangerous to continue a.s. we have in th:is dangerous world in wh:lch we 

live but also beca'U'3e the rroblsm could net stard still. He sa:td that 

if the UK arrl. ·s did net··· t.ake the lead in this ne. tter, ir we cort.inued, 

to refuse to di.. cuss COMSEX; with NATO m tiora we should fini tha. t they 

'WOUld get advice ard help from elsewhere ar:d .it m:ight rass out; of our 

hards ent:irely, si me it was knCl'ln that ,c,ommercial f :irms were develop~ 

much more sophistica~eci cr,ypt ographic equipment than befcre. 

He said he'would advocate saying in effect to NATO mtiom,, 11Lodc 

what you are do.ing. Think what you are doirg. If youdon•t like it, 

tbm we will propCB e a renedy." \le could stop the leaks without; al.lad.~ 

the discussion to diverge into ccyptanalytical edmation. 

If on the otre r ha. rd we stood μi. t arxi allcwed them to get help else- , 

where, if we al la-ted them to nake conunitnent s fer large expenditures on 

no.chines,, we wouJrl then. have a more di.ff icult task conviming them that 

t'1eir nachines, with which they wished to renedy the sitm.tion, were 

uhsatisfactor,y. We might then m ve to educate tmm cr,yptam J.ytic ally 

far more than we wcmld have t-o if we set to work to put. natters right new. 

3. Selection of Chai'l"lmlll Cf the Conterenee 

Gemral Canir:e irwi~ed I I to assune chairmanship or the 

fereme. He requested that, with mral Canire 1s permission, he be 

excused from tm of fer. Gere ral Ca ine then iroposed that Mr. Fried.nan, 

Conference. I expressed his warm apprecia t:ion fer the c£ fer 

but stated that he would much pre.t'~to see a tB oha:irman cl: the con-

, Head or the US Delegation, serve as lB inna.n. This p:oposal wa.s accepted 

by the conference. 

4. Remarks by Chairman of the Gonfereme 

Mr. Friedman thanked Gere ral Canine a.rd expressed his appreciation 

I far the honor. He stated that he comidered the Chairmanship represented 

1 a rather hazardous mission ani added tra. t it was also hazardous far tl'e 

'members of the UK delegation as well as for the US delegation. He 

' ·explaired that the hazard exists because all the delegates were going to 

r.~ .the r;tsk or becomirg expcs ed to a very dangerous occupational disease 

,W,~;i.91;1 he' ,te.rJilesi ,l~c~ptol~ic schizophrenia." 

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He noted this conf'lict in aim 'WOUld doubt.less cause psychic 

. cqnflicts and he cautiored that the delegates would have to be veey 

careful to realize on Wiich side they were arguing at any given momert. • 

He stated that the delegates had gatm red to dis cuss two i:s.pe1rs: 

one paper representir:g a f:iXed formal pc:sition o£ the UK; the ether 

paper representing a tentat'ive lB pcsition Wiich the UK delegation might 

help .:t.o f irrn up. The two courses cont.aired the rein,, he pointed out , 

were nob very different;. The aim was the same arrl ti~e ultimate goal 

was the sane • 

The Cha.:irman sa:id that .he interded to do ever,ythill!; pcss.1.ble to 

facilitate the cord uct c£ hls iness ard advised 1:he UK delegates ha had 

alread;y served not. ice to the US delegation to be prepared to work all 

day on Saturday. • 

He concluded by saying 'that he had.received word from the Directer, 

GCHQ,, irrl.icating that the e;x±.emi on pf ttie a'gend.a to incluie a review ; 

of the conclusiom reached 'in the 1951 conference in the present con- ' 

s:ideration or the problem was implied in the coraideration or the pt"OblEIJl 

an~ was agreeable,, based upon the UK ani the W doouments. 1 

s." Time an! place of first mottirn, 

Nr. Friedman inf'o:rmed the .J.jelegates of tre physical arrangements fer 

th9 conferer:ce. He propCBed ':'1at the first reeting or the delegates be 

at 1100 in tm cort'ereme mad~ua.~ters. It was agreed. 

6. There bei~ no further busjmss, Gemral Ganim declared the open~ session cl cs ed. at lO!P. r 

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/s/ K. B. Monypeny, Jr. 

K.B. Monypeny, Jr. 

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