• 

USCIB: 4.2/25 

24 September 1954 

ME!i@ANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS gr USCIB: 

Subject: Revision of USCIB Directive No. 9 of 4 February 1954. 

1. The enclosed correspondence is circulated for information. 

2. In accordance with the views expressed in the enclosures it is 

recommended that the following changes be made in subject directive: 

a. SECTION I, paragraph le.: add the following: n(see SEGTICN 

VI, paragraph 2.)n 

b. SECTION VI: Add the following: "2. In cases of accidental 

unauthorized disclosures of classified CCMINT information or matter to 

persons whose official activities are under the control of the member 

department or agency concerned, such disclosure need not be considered a 

compromise if, in the opinion of the USCIB member performing the 

evaluation of the incident, the person to whom the i:q!ormation has been 

disclosed may reasonably be expected to maintain absolute secrecy 

concerning it." 

3. 'With regard to the above recomm.endation it is requested th.at 

the attached vote sheet be executed and returned to this office by the 

close of business Wednesday, 6 October 1954. 

Enclosures 

1. NSA serial 002300 dtd 7 Sep 54. 

2. CIB :/I 00240 d td 10 Sep 54. 

3. NS.A: serial 002438 dtd 22 Sep 54. 

USCIB: 4.2/25 

aptain, • • Navy .mie.Qll~ive Secretary, USCIB 
8jiSHE'l' 

REF ID:A58505 

SECRET 9 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

Serial: 002308 

7 SEP 1954 

Ml!:MORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Possible Compromises of COMINT 

l. When possible compromises of COMINT are reported to the 

Director, NSA, for evaluation, they occa~ionally include instances 

wherein there has been an inadvertent exposure of COl.uNT to nonind.octrinated U.S. personnel. In these instances, the entire 

occurrence is witnessed by or reported to local indoctrinated 

personnel who immediately insure that corrective action is initiated. 

Typical corrective action would include a prompt security briefing 

for the non-indoctrinated personnel who would then be sworn to secrecy. 

It might also be ascertained that, although there may not be a needto-lmow, the ;p.on-indoctrinated personnel otherwise meet the CCMINT 

clearance criteria. 

2. Because of the close control which TJJey" be exercised in some· 

cases, accountability of the material is not alweys lost. This factor, 

it is believed, should be taken into consideration in the evaluation 

and declaration of compromises. In general, if CCl.[[NT information is 

inadvertently exposed to individuals who may reasonably be expected 

to maintain absolute secrecy, it is believed that the director should 

exercise discretion in the determination of whether a compromise has 

actually occurred. Your comments on this matter are invited. In this 

connection, suitable revision of CIBD #9 might be appropriate. 

(signed) 

D. M. AGNEW 

Captain, US Navy 

NSA Member, USCIBEC 

Enclosure l with USCIB 4.2/25 dtd 24 Se1. 54. 

SECRET 
REF ID:A58505 s.rrt...,....,...,.,._ .a ~GllDl W 

om # 00240 

10 September 1954 

iKSlii'i!? 

~ORAfil?UM FQR TIUii N§A MEI§ OF USC!BEC (CAPI'Ailf D. M. AGli]!iW): 

Subject: Possible Compromises of COMINT. 

Reference: NSA Serial 00230 of 7 September 1954. 

1. In response to the comments set forth in the reference, I am 

bound to agree that there can be end have been many instances of 

inadvertent disclosure which need not be treated as compromises. 

Broadly speaking, when the loyalty and discretion of an individual are 

well established, and his official activities are under the control of 

a uscm member department or agency, the action described in paragraph 

5.e. of USCIB Directive Number 5 should serve to provide the degree of 

accountability required provided, however, that such action has been 

taken in time to prevent further accidental revelation through 

ignorance. 

2. Accordingly, so long as the above-mentioned conditions obtain 

I believe it will be readily agreed tha.t members concerned are justified 

in exercising their own discreti6n regarding declarations of compromise 

in these cases. 

3. Perhaps the solution to the problem you have raised can be 

reached by adding the following statement to paragraph I.l.c. of USCIB 

Directive Number 9: 

0 In. cases of accidental unauthorized disclosures of classii"ied 

COMINT ini'ormation or matter to persons whose official. activities are 

under the control of the member department or agency concerned, such 

disclosure need not be considered a compromise if, in the opinion of the 

USCIB member performing the evaluation of the incident, the person to 

whom. the information has been disclosed may reasonably be expected to 

maintain absolute secrecy concerning it." 

4. If you agree, I will circulate copies of this correspondence 

to the members of USCIBEC suggesting the change mentioned in paragraph 3 

above. 

Very respectfullyt 

(Signed} 

RUFUS L. TAYLOR 

Captain, u. s. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 4.2/25 dtd. 24 Sep 54. 

SECRBT 
REF ID:A58505 

SECRET • 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY . WASHIN'GTON 25, D •. c. • 

Serial: 00243 S 

22 SEP 1954 

MEM~UM :Ji'.OR THE EXECUTIVE SECRE'.1'AR!, USCIB -- -.... - ... ~ 

SUBJECT: Possible Compromises of CCMINT 

1. Reference is made to CIB II 00240, dated 10 September 1954. 

2. I concur in the wording of the statement which is quoted 

in paragraph 3 of the reference. I believe, however, that the 

statement wouJ.d be more suitably placed in some portion of CIBD #9 

other than Section I, paragraph l.c. thereof, because the statement 

does not seem to be a natural part of the definition. The statement, ins~ead, is more in the nature o:f a general instruction. 

3. I suggest, therefore, that you arrange for the following changes to CIBD #9: 

a. Section VI: Add, as paragraph 2, the statement mentioned above. 

b. Section I, paragraph l.c.: Add the following: 

"(See Section VI; paragraph 2:)n 

(~:!gne<t) 

D. M., AGNEW 

Captain, US Navy 

NSA Member, USCIBEC 

Enclosure 3 with USCIB 4.2/25 dtd 24 Sep 54. 

SECRET