USCIB: 13.5/108 IfMffifiB VIA OCMIN'i' 0HA:NHmB OHL¥ 

A-PP.SNBBB BOOUMBi'f OO!ft'ABfS 

OOBEiWORB MA'FERIAf. 

26 July 1955 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Compromise of COMINT Information (Physical). 

CIBD #9 (Revised) dated 4 February 1955. 

1. In accordance with the reference the Army member of USCIB, on 

14 January 1955, reported to the Director, NSA a situation involving a 

compromise of fourteen (14) COMINT file cards (reproduced and attached 

as enclosure). 

2. The Army report contained the following statements: 

These cards were found by Mr. Earl E. Le Doyn, Alexander 

Park Junior High School, Portsmouth, Virginia, in a desk which 

had been recently acquired from surplus government stocks. 

On 20 July 1954, Mr. Le Doyn advised the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation of his discovery. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation contacted the Office 

of Security, Department of State, who advised that the attached. 

cards had never been the property of the Department of state. 

The Office of Investigations, National Security Agency, on 

20 September 1954, advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

that although they had assisted in gathering the information 

contained on the cards, the cards appeared to be property of the 

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the 

Arrrry. 

Records check within the Office of Assistant Chief of Starr, 

G-2, indicates that the 3 x 5 TOP SECRET cards may have been 

part of the 'Who's Who file of the Military Intelligence Service 

(MIS), War Department. It is further indicated that the TOP 

SECRET-ULTRA cards were apparently part of a reference file of 

subjects of articles published in the DIPSUM during February - April 1946, and could have been prepared by any department or 

agency, including MIS, which received the DIPSUM. 

Due to the long period of time that has since elapsed, it is 

felt that this office cannot justly identify the department, 

agency, or individual responsible for this codeword compromise, 

therefore no further action is contemplated by the Office or the 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Subject cards are forwarded. 

herewith for any action that you may deem appropriate in this case. 

USCIB: 13.5/108 

TOP SECRET 

eclassified and a roved for release b NSA on 02-24-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 

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USCIB: 13.5/108 

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Subject: Compromise of C<lUNT INFORMATION (Physical). 

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3. On 5 April 1955 the Director, NSA reported the incident to the 

Executive Secretary, USCIB as a compromise of codeword material. 

A portion of the comments by the Director, NSA are as follows: 

Cards of this nature during this period were prepared by the 

Army Security Agency and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 

Department of Array. Duplicate copies were made by each and given 

to the other for filing. Since the date of preparation of these 

cards, the Arm:! Security Agency's files have been transferred to 

the Armed Forces Security Agency, and are currently the possession 

of the National Security Agency. A check of the Nationa1 Security 

Agency's files ~eveals duplicate copies of these compromised cards 

still held intact. 

4. Further investigation by this office failed to reveal the person 

responsible for the security inspection of the desk in the first instance. 

;. The investigation did reveal, however, that the cards had been 

circulating outside of COMINT channels, except for one brief interval, 

.tor a period of about three months after Mr. Le Doyn contacted the FBI. 

The cards were finally placed in CCMINT channels by CCMINT cleared CIA 

security personnel who subsequently received the cards as possible OSS 

material. With the exception of Mr. Le Doyn him.self, all persons known 

to have viewed the cards were cleared for TOP SECREI'. 

6. There is no doubt that the incident involved compromise of 

CCMINT information under the terms of the reference. Fortunately no 

technical information was involved. In view of the informational content 

of the cards it is believed likely that no unauthorized person viewing 

them was aware of the true source of the information. 

7. The incident emphasizes two main points: 

a. The need for strict adherence to the security double-check 

system presently in force by each USCIB member department or agency 1 and 

b. The need :for some assurance that COM.INT material once outside COMINT channels will be expeditiously returned. 

The first is considered to be a matter of concern to the individual 

manber agencies of USCIB; the second I plan to refer to the Security 

Committee for study and recommendation. · 

Enclosure 

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USCIB: 13.5/108 

TOP SECRET 

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