USCIB: 9.3/26 

Sli:QRBPSEC-H'f ID:~325 

• 

11-AfiBJ:d!i VIA 60MIN'f 8H:ANN:l!lfB 0Nfi¥ 

18 February 1955 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCISEC: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

USCIB Master Requirements List. 

USCIB 9.3/24 0£ 7 January 1955 (item 1 0£ the agenda 

0£ the 23rd (Special) Meeting of USCIBEC). 

1. The Ad Hoc Committee established by the decision set forth 

in the ref erEmce has completed its report which is submitted herewith 

as an enclosure (consisting of a cover memorandum, an inclosure and 

three tabs mB.rked A, B and C. However, Tab C was not quite ready for 

consideration at this writing. It will be distributed 'separatel.7 as 

soon as possible.) 

2. The enclosed report is being placed on the agenda £or consideration at the next regular meeting 0£ USCIBEC. 

Enclosure 

a/s. 

USC~B: 9.3/26 

ta.in, Navy 

ecutive Secretary, USCIB 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-01-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

SECRET 
NATIO~AL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

Serial: 

15 FEB 1955 

MEMORANDUM l"OR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIBEC 

SUBJECT: Draft Report, Master Requirements List 

Reference: USCIB 9.3/19 of 13 Dec 54 

Appendt!d as an inclosure is a report dratted by the 

ad hoc cOJllD1.ttee appointed at the 1 January meeting. The 

cOllllli ttee rt!conmends that this report be approved by USCIBEC 

and forwarded to USCIB as an answer to the referenced paper. 

Incl: 

a/s 

~~yJ. S. HOLTWICK1 Jr. 

Captain, US Navy 

Chairman 

~~'~ STEPHEN J. noNcsz -r 

Member 

FP~ F. J. HARROLD 

Lt. Col. USAF 

Member 

SE€RE'f 
SECfirj:D:~325 '-D .I. W 

SEC!\!'£ 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Requirements of u. S. Intelligence Agencies for Information 

from COMINT Sources 

1. The Executive Committee has considered the subject matter in 

its various facets, as directed in the 10 December meeting of the Board, 

and recommends that the problem be resolved as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs of' this document, and the tabs thereto. 

2. Underlying the entire problem is the basic question of how to 

use most efficiently and effectively a "common-user" collection facility 

with a broad, but sttll not unlimited, potential for obtaining information of relatively high intelligence value. 

3. The Executive Committee feels that this problem can best be 

solved by establishing a means whereby USCIB provides the Director, NSA, 

with authoritative guidance in carrying out his function as a collector 

of intelligence information from COMINT sources. It feels that this 

guidance should be il1 two forms: basic guidance in the form of a 

USCIB approved list of the information required by the national intelligence community for which COMINT has been assi{'}led the responsibility 

of producing (hereinafter re~erred to as the COMINT REQUIREMENTS LIST); 

and supplemental guidance whereby interpretation or ampljfication of the 

basic guidance, and periodic shifts of emphasis or interest therein, 

can be provided in a manner which will insure accurate communication 

of consumer desires to the producers of COMiffr •. 

4. The CCMINT Requirements List must meet certain criteria. These 

a.re outlined in TAB A, as are the successive steps which this connn:Lttee 

feels are the logical ones in order that a list meeting these criteria 

can be developed. 

5. It is recOllDllended that the Board approve the recommendations 

listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of TAB A, and request or direct, as appropriate, the organizations designated therein to implement them. 

6. After USCIB has approved and delivered to the Director, NSA, 

its guidance in the form of the before-mentioned list, it is necessary 

that an implementing plan be developed. The Executive Committee feels 

that preparation of this plan is properly the responsibility of the 

Director, NSA. We therefore recommend that after preparation of the 

COMINT Requirements List, USCIB forward it to the Director{ NSA, together with a request that he (1) Prepare an Implementing Plan (2J Forward it 

to the USCIB for review and approval (3) Advise the USCIB of what proviS.Lons he has made to carry out paragraph 2 h. of NSCID No. 9. 

SE<;RErr 
7. It is apparent that any·increase of emphasis on any requirement or imposition of any new requirement, 0

will normally require a 

correspondinB decrease in the effort committed against some other 

requirement since it would be obviously impractical, inefficient, and 

wasteful for the Director, NSA to hold in reserve any of his C<J.UN'l' 

resources for such contingencies. This Committee has therefore provided, 

in TAB A, for such changes in USCIB's basic guidance. In TABB, the 

Connnittee proposes a mechanism for providing the SUpplemental Guidance 

mentioned in paragraph 3 above, and recommends that the USCIB approve . and implement this plan. 

8. As a final step in the cycle of relations between consumer and 

producer, NSA should prepare, after a suitable period has elapsed since 

approval of its Implementing Plan, a clear and understandable progress 

report to USCIB concerning conformity with, and f'ulfillment of, the 

guidance received; the adequacy, in form and substance, of his basic 

guidance; an appraisal. of the practical working of the procedures 

established for supplemental. guidance; the basic al.location of COMINT 

resources; and an estimate of the additional resources required to 

im;prove the amount and quality of information produced. After study 

of this report, USCIB should advise the National Executive Agent what 

resources it co11siders should be made available i'or COMINT production 

in the coming year. 

9. Subsequently, the USCIB should revise, as necessary, its basic 

guidance, thus initiating the recurrence of the cycle. 

10. The Committee recODD11ends that the USCIB approve the concept 

advanced in para.graphs 8 and 9 above, and so advise the Director, NSA. 

2 

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al:!em:,r 

'l'il.H A 

1. The Exec11ti ·1c CCJnuni t t,cc• j s 0f the opiniCJn l.ho.l. the CONINT 

Heq,uircmcnt:.; Li.st f?h1.111ld J'll".!Ct the fi vc cri t.l:!rio. lir.tec.l below in order 

tc be saLisfnct1..,1ry as 'Ln.sic (,'Uidm1P.f" from the ill.>f.l.rd to the Dir~ctor, 

NSA: 

a. It should l>e l>nsecJ on, a.ml he i.n consonance with, the most 

recent Pxprcssion of Nntiunal Intellir;cncc Objectives. 

b. It shoulcl nrJt inclutl.C' rcquircmenl.G for informoti.on which 

are l1eyond, or inappro1ffiate to, COMINT's potential ca.pability to 

J>roduce. 

c. It shoultl. not include rcqujrpments for information for 

which Intelligence needs can be sntiRficd by other sources. 

d. It should inclurle requirements for info:nnation which 

could be obtain~d from COMINT which is needed to complement, supplement, or corrobori:.ite that .from other sources. 

e. It should indicate the relative importance attached to the 

COMIN'r-produced infon.m.tion pertinent to euch requirement, by division 

of the List into cateeorics of COMINT priority. 

f. It must be q1 d ckly and f'lexi bly responsive to changes in 

Nat. tonal Intelligence Requirements. 

2. To produce a COMINT Requirements List ~hich would meet the 

criteria listed, several operations must be performed. Starting with 

an aul..horitative list of friority National Intelliacncc Objectives, 

these successive steps are involvell: 

a. Producina a list of National Intelli'gence Requiremen&s. 

b. Integratine into this all Departmental Intelligence 

requirements. 

c. Elimino.tina from this list thcJS'? rcqtd remcnts which can be 

fulfilled to the satisfaction of the Intcllic;encc Ac;enci,es by other than 

COMINT sources of informntion. 

d. EvnluatLne; the pol..entio.l of' COMUIT no a source of lnfo:nno.tion 

in catlsfyinG each rem:_l..inins item, n.nrl elil'lino.tinc; those which arc beyond 

the capability of or ino.:riproprinte for CO?-UN'J' to sntisfy or whj ch do not 

serve to complement, supplement, nr corroliora.te other sources of information. 

c, Divldinr; the result..a.nt l l::;t j nl.o cn.tec;ol'le3 of relative 

importo.nce in order to indicate t..he rriority whic'h the Director, WI/\ 

should accord to cu~h. 

SECRET 
3. The Executive Connnittee has consiAered the several ways in 

which the above-listed steps could be accomplished, and makes the 

recommendations indicated after the discussion in the following subparagraphs. 

a. To produce a list of National Intelligence Requirements 

from the current list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives 

. (DCID 4/4 of 14 Dec 5li) requires that some provision be made for requirements in support of non-priority National Intelligence Objectives, which 

are defined implicitly in DCID l~/4 as those which do not "warrant priority 

in relation tn normal coverage." If this can be done without expending 

the time-consuming effort involved in spelling out a list of the nonpriority objectives themselves, it would appear profitable to adopt such 

a course. 

Recommendation: USCIB stipulate, in ttie carrying out of the 

succeeding steps in this process, that any requirement for National or 

Departmental Intelligence which does not clearly and directly relate to 

one of the Priority National. Intelligence Objectives be considered to relate 

to a non-priority objective. 

b. The Committee feels that ideaJ.ly an authoritative translation 

of DCID 4/4 into Priority National Int~lligence Requirements should be made 

by a suitable body at the direction or the Director of CentraJ. Intelligence 

in collaboration with the IAC agencies. However, thiR has not yet been 

done, and, since there are other means of accomplishing the desired end 

result, tho Comrdttce questions the need for delaying implementation of this plan 

until an authoritative list is available. The OIA member of' USCIBEC has 

ma.de available a document in which such a translation has been made. 

Recommendation: USCIB accept the list prepared by the CIA 

member (TAB C) as a base from which a COMINT Requirements List will be 

derived, and seek IAC approvaJ. o~ this action. 

c. As the next steps in the process, it is necessary that 

National Intelligence Requirements in support of non-priority National 

Intelligence Objectives be added to the list adopted in a result of the 

preceding recommendation, and that any requirements for information 

need~d for the production of Departmental Intelligence (NSCID #3 paragraph 

d 1) be integrated with them. 

Reconnnendation: USCIB request each IAC agency, through its 

USCIB member 1 ·to submit a list of 1 ts requirements which fall wi. thin 

these categories; and 

Recommendation: USCIB direct the USCIB INT CCl.f to combine these 

lists into one list to be added to the Priority National Intelligence 

Requirements list in order to obtain an overall all-source Intelligence 

Requirements List. 

SECRET 
d. In order to tailor this list td fit the potential capo.bilitie3 of COf.1INT as a source, a body competent to assess the potentialities 

of all sources of information is needed. The individuals comprising this 

bouy must have in aer,regatP. not only a thorou{3h knowledge of the pecu1iariM 

ties o:f any pa.rticuJ:ar source of information, but also a thorough knowledge 

of the degree to which each suurce may be ~xpected to :fulfill a given 

requirement. The Committee does not feel that it is necessary that this 

body be empowered to assign collection tasks to other sources than COMINI', 

or even to recommend which spccific.Non-COMINT source(s) be utilized in 

fulfillment of any requirement. Their task is· primarily to compare COMINr 

versus all Non-COMINT, and determine those requirements for which COMINT 

is properly the primary, a comi;1emen~ary, a supplementary, or an inappropriate, 

source. 

Rcconnnendation: USCIB designate a conunittee of individuals having the 

specified competence, to review the all-source Intelligence Requirements List 

and (1) eliminate therefrom all requirements which COMINT has not a potential 

capability to satisfy or for which COMINT is not an appropriate information 

source; (2) eliminate therefrom all requirements which potentially are wholly 

within the capability of a Non-COMINT source to satisfy; (3) indicate those 

requirements for which COMINT is not the primary infonnation source, but 

rather is used to complement, supplement, or corroborate information from 

other sources; and for each the dee;ree to which COMINT infonnatlon is needed 

for this purpose. 

e. The end product of the operation discussed in.the preceding 

subparagraphs will be a list of Intelligence Requirements properly assignable to COMIHT as a source of inf'onnation. They will be grouped into four 

categories of intelligence importance, in accordance with the categories 

of priority of the objectives to which they relate. Those for which COMINT 

is not the primary source of information Will be identified, and for each 

of these the degree to which :fulfillment is dependent upon COMINT-produced 

information will be indicated. In order to meet the specified criteria, 

those requiremen~s for which COMINT is not the primary information source 

should be evaluated and compared with the others, in order that each can 

be weighed in terms of the relat~ve amount of COMINT effort which 'is 

warranted on it, and that it can be then assigned if' necessary a new 

category. At this point it may be desirable, or even necessary, to establish 

sub-categories of' CO.MINI' importance within one or more of the four categories 

of intelligence importance. 

Reconnnendation: USCIB designate the State, CIA, FBI, Army, Navy, 

and Air Force members of USCIBEC as a Standing Group to carry out this 

operation. 

f. The final list should be authoritatively reviewed and approved 

before delivery to the Director, NSA, as basic guidance. 

3 

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SECUJb!§B:ASJ...325 J.\..£J _l • 

Recommendation: USCIB direct that USCIBEC review, and deliver 

to the Board for approval, the complet~d COMINT Requirements List. 

4. Provision must be me.de for changes in the COMINT Requirements 

List which are necessitated by changes in the fundamentals :from which this 

basic guidance is derived, and which will probably not occur at the same 

time as the recommended periodic revision. Such changes will be of the 

following types: 

a. Changes in the IAC list of Priority NationaJ. Intelligence 

Objectives, either in substance, such as addition of a new objective or 

deletion of an objective, or both; or in priority. 

b. Similar changes in National Intelligence Requirement~. 

c. "Crash" requiremeni;s - usually of an interim or temporary 

nature, which do not result :from or in changes in Priority NationaJ. 

Intelligence Objectives or in National Intelligence Requirements. 

Recommendation: USCIB approve all changes in the CO.MINT Requirements List necessitated by revision of the Priority National Intelligence 

Objectives or of National Intelligence Requiremenvs 1 of the nature described 

in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above. 

Reco11Dnendation: Each USCIB member (or his alternate) be required 

to approve any "crash" requirement, of the nature described in sub-paragraph 

(c) above, which his agency imposes upon NSA, and concurrently submit this 

requirement to other USCIB members for approval. In stating such a requi~ement its priority in relation to the COMINT Requirements List must be 

indicated, and, if possible, its probable duration. 

4 

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SE€1f1:1D: ~325 

TAB B 

l. The Conunittee recognizes that basic guidance, in the form of 

a COMINT Requirement List, whether it be that described in TAB A or any 

other which it is feasible to produce, will necessarily state requirements more broadJ.y and in more general terms than are usable in daily 

conduct of operations. The basic guidance must, and will, be of such 

a nature as will permit using it as a base upon which to prepare an 

Implementing P:J_an upon which Implementing Programs can be based. Some 

means must, however, be provided to supplement it. 

2. The Executive Conunittee feels that the nature and scope of such 

supplemental guidance must be determined in light of the following factors: 

a. Supplemental guidance must be consistent with the basic 

guidance provided by the COMINT Requirements List. 

b. Supplemental guidance, in the main, will be .:in the form of 

supplemental or amplifying requirements which are originated by the USCIB 

intelligence agencies individually or collectively, or which are prepared 

at the request of the National. Security Agency. 

c. The mechanism designed to provide supplemental guidance must 

be responsive to the daily needs of the USCIB intelligence agency(s) and 

to the requests of the National Security Agency for advice, interpretation, 

and clarification. 

d. Coordination of supplemental requirements among the USCIB 

intelligence agencies is essential. in those cases where two or more 

agencies have a common interest in the information requested, and 

provision must be made to facilitate such coordination. 

e. USCIB intelligence agencies should establish a joint 

intelligence agency facility (hereinafter called The Panel) empowered to 

act authoritatively on matters of supplemental guidance. 

f. The National Security Agency should establish a centralized 

facility (hereinafter referred to as "The NSA Group"), empowered to 

determine authoritatively NSA's action in response to the supplemental 

guidance furnished by, or requested trom, the USCIB intelligence agencies. 

g. Any extensive amplification of a Requirement(s) which necessitates 

reallocation of intercept or processing facilites must be approved by all 

USCIB intelligence agencies before NSA initiates implementing action. 

SE€RET 
3. In light of the .factors outlined above, it is the opinion of 

the Executive Committee that supplemental guidance can be provided 

most effectively by: 

a. Establ:ishing a panel composed of USCIB intelligence aeency 

re1iresentatives, empowered to deal authoritatively with NSA on matters 

of supplemental guidance. 

(1) Requiring that each supplemental requirement be 

prepared in writing and directly related to a 

requirement(s) on the COMINT Requirements List. 

(2) Requtrins that the panel approve each supplemental 

requirement which, thouf91 in conf'ormity with the 

CCXvIINT Requirements List, is an extensive amplification of a requirement(s) on the COMINT Requirements List, and authorizing the NSA Group routinely 

to bring such requirements to the attention of the 

panel for action. 

b. Establishing a central facility composed of NSA representatives knowledgeable in terms o~ established consumer requirements and 

NSA capabilities, which can deal authoritatively with the panel on 

matters of supplemental guidance. 

(1) Establishing a central file at NSA of all supplemental 

requirements originated by the consumer agency(s) and 

accepted by the NSA Group. 

c. Requiring that the panel meet with the NSA Group as frequently 

as necessary, and at least once each month, to solve, and to exchange 

in:f'ormation on, mutual problems, and to review the supplemental requirement file monthly to ensure that both consumer agencies and NSA agree on 

matters of supplemental guidance as reflected by the current file of 

supplemental. requirements. 

(1) Empowering the NSA Group·to remand to the panel. any 

supplemental requirement which, in the opinion of NSA, 

requires coordination, or additional coordination, 

among the consumer agencies. 

d. Ensuring that USCIB make decisions on aJ.l matters of 

supplemental. guidance which are irreconcilable between the panel and the 

NSA Group. 

SECRE'F