11002 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Transit Administration 

49 CFR Part 674 

[Docket No. FTA–2015–0003] 

RIN 2132–AB19 

State Safety Oversight 

AGENCY: Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; 

request for comments. 

SUMMARY: This notice seeks public 

comment on proposed rules that would 

transform and strengthen State Safety 

Oversight (SSO) of rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems. FTA will 

issue a final rule and response to 

comments following the close of the 

comment period. Once FTA issues a 

final rule, the agency will rescind its 

current regulations. 

DATES: Comments must be received by 

April 28, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Please submit your 

comments by only one of the following 

methods: 

• Online: Use the Federal 

eRulemaking portal at http://

www.regulations.gov and follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• U.S. Mail: Send your comments to 

the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Go to 

Room W12–140 on the ground floor of 

the West Building, U.S. Department of 

Transportation headquarters, 1200 New 

Jersey Avenue SE., between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m. Eastern time, Monday through 

Friday except Federal holidays. 

• Telefax: Send your comments to 

202–493–2251. 

Instructions: All comments must 

include the docket number for this 

rulemaking: FTA–2015–0003. Submit 

two copies of your comments if you 

submit them by mail. For confirmation 

that FTA received your comments, 

include a self-addressed, stamped 

postcard. All comments received will be 

posted without change to 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. Please 

see the Privacy Act heading under 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION below, for 

Privacy Act information pertinent to any 

submitted comments or materials, and 

you may review DOT’s complete 

Privacy Act Statement published in the 

Federal Register on April 11, 2000, at 

65 FR 19477. 

Docket Access: For access to 

background documents and comments 

received in the rulemaking docket, go to 

www.regulations.gov or to the U.S. 

Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12– 

140, Washington, DC 20590 between 

9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday 

through Friday except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

program matters, Lynn Spencer, 

Director, FTA Office of System Safety, 

telephone 202–366–5112 or 

Lynn.Spencer@dot.gov; For legal 

matters, Richard Wong, FTA Office of 

Chief Counsel, telephone 202–366–0675 

or Richard.Wong@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Executive Summary 

This rulemaking would replace the 

regulations for State Safety Oversight 

(SSO) of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems in place for the 

past twenty years, and significantly 

strengthen the program to prevent and 

mitigate accidents and incidents on 

those systems. In the Moving Ahead for 

Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP– 

21; Pub. L. 112–141, July 6, 2012), 

Congress directed FTA to establish a 

comprehensive Public Transportation 

Safety Program (codified at 49 U.S.C. 

5329), one element of which is the State 

Safety Oversight program. The purpose 

of today’s NPRM is to carry out the 

several explicit statutory mandates to 

strengthen the States’ oversight of the 

safety of their rail transit systems, and 

ensure that the States’ regulatory 

agencies have the necessary 

enforcement authority and financial and 

human resources for that purpose. 

In the legislative history of MAP–21, 

Congress took note of several critical 

weaknesses in the State Safety Oversight 

program, including: 

• Lack of adequate and consistent 

safety practices across rail transit 

systems 

• Lack of regulatory, oversight, and 

enforcement authority 

• Limited SSO program funding, staff, 

training, and other resources 

• Lack of SSO financial and legal 

independence from the rail transit 

agencies they oversee. 

See generally, Sen. Rpt. 111–232 (July 

26, 2010). 

Today’s NPRM is the critical first step 

in meeting the MAP–21 requirements 

for State Safety Oversight of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

now set forth at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e). Once 

FTA issues a final rule for State Safety 

Oversight, to be codified at 49 CFR part 

674, the agency will rescind the current 

regulations at 49 CFR part 659. 

Legal Authority 

Section 20021 of MAP–21 amended 

49 U.S.C. 5329 by adding several new 

provisions that required FTA to 

establish a comprehensive public 

transportation safety program, the 

elements of which include a National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan; a 

training and certification program for 

Federal, state, and local transportation 

agency employees with safety 

responsibilities; public transportation 

agency safety plans; and a strengthened 

State Safety Oversight Program, 

consisting of elements at both the state 

and rail transit agency level. 

Summary of Key Provisions 

The NPRM proposes to make the 

following changes to strengthen the 

existing SSO program: 

• States would assume greater 

responsibility for overseeing the safety 

of their rail fixed guideway systems. 

• FTA would review and approve 

each state’s SSO program, including 

certifying whether states are meeting the 

statutory criteria and withholding funds 

from those states that do not. 

• FTA would impose financial 

penalties on those states with nonexistent or non-compliant safety 

oversight programs. 

Costs and Benefits 

As discussed in greater detail below, 

FTA conducted a task-by-task analysis 

to assess recurring and non-recurring 

costs for the proposed regulations to 

SSOs and rail transit agencies against 

the recurring costs for the current SSO 

regulations. Compared to current 

spending levels of State Safety 

Oversight activities, the proposed rule 

would require an incremental $9.5 

million per year on the part of SSOAs 

and $13.1 million for rail transit 

agencies, compared to current spending 

levels. FTA is providing approximately 

$22 million in grant funds each year to 

the States to off-set this NPRM’s annual 

costs, meaning that this rulemaking is 

revenue neutral between the Federal 

government and the States. FTA also 

provides funding that rail transit 

agencies may use for these purposes, but 

is unable to provide an estimate of how 

much FTA funds will be used here. FTA 

conducted a breakeven analysis in order 

to determine what amount of the 

quantified benefits would need to 

accrue to outweigh the costs for this 

rulemaking and the Transit Agency 

Safety Plan by looking at, primarily, the 

safety events reported to FTA and, in a 

more conservative analysis, only the 5 

NTSB-investigated accidents since 2004 

that were related to inadequate safety 

oversight programs. 


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Background 

The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 

21st Century Act (‘‘MAP–21’’; Pub. L. 

112–141), authorizes a comprehensive 

Public Transportation Safety Program at 

49 U.S.C. 5329. Four key components of 

the program are the National Public 

Transportation Safety Plan, authorized 

by Section 5329(b); the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program, authorized by Section 

5329(c); the Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plans, required by 

Section 5329(d); and the State Safety 

Oversight Program, authorized by 

Section 5329(e). FTA will issue rules to 

carry out all of these plans and 

programs under the rulemaking 

authority of 49 U.S.C. 5329(f)(7). 

On October 3, 2013, FTA issued an 

Advance Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (ANPRM) for the National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan 

(‘‘National Plan’’), the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program (‘‘Certification 

Training Program’’), and the Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plans 

(‘‘Transit Agency Safety Plans’’). 78 FR 

61251–73. On April 30, 2014, FTA 

proposed interim provisions for a Safety 

Certification Training Program, as 

authorized by 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(2). 79 

FR 24363. In today’s Federal Register, 

FTA is issuing final interim certification 

safety training program provisions. FTA 

is now reviewing the comments on the 

ANPRM for the National Plan, 

Certification Training Program, and 

Transit Agency Safety Plans. In the near 

future, FTA expects to issue an NPRM 

for the National Plan, Certification 

Training Program, and Transit Agency 

Safety Plans. 

Earlier, on May 13, 2013, the Federal 

Transit Administrator issued a Dear 

Colleague letter to the public 

transportation industry announcing the 

agency’s intention to adopt the 

framework and principles of Safety 

Management Systems (SMS) as the basis 

for all rulemakings and other initiatives 

FTA will undertake to improve the 

safety of public transportation. Both the 

Dear Colleague letter and a set of 

frequently asked questions about SMS 

are available on FTA’s Web site at 

http://www.fta.dot.gov/tso_15177.html. 

This NPRM pertains only to the State 

Safety Oversight (SSO) Program 

authorized by 49 U.S.C. 5329(e). The 

rulemaking for the SSO Program differs 

from the other rulemakings under the 

Public Transportation Safety Program in 

that it will replace a set of regulations 

that have been in place since 1995, 

codified at 49 CFR part 659. The SSO 

regulations pertain only to a limited 

portion of the public transportation 

industry—the recipients of Federal 

funds under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53 that 

operate rail fixed guideway transit 

systems not subject to the jurisdiction of 

the Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA), the States in which those rail 

systems lie, and the State Safety 

Oversight Agencies (SSOAs) required to 

oversee the safety of those rail systems. 

Conversely, the rulemakings for the 

National Plan, the Transit Agency Safety 

Plans, and the Safety Certification 

Training Program all arise under the 

authority of MAP–21, which took effect 

on October 1, 2012; these rulemakings 

will apply to all modes of public 

transportation, both rail and rubber tire; 

and they will apply to the 

manufacturers of public transportation 

vehicles, as well as the operators of 

public transportation. 

To provide some context for this 

NPRM, the following is a brief history 

of FTA’s State Safety Oversight 

Program. 

History of State Safety Oversight 

FTA’s predecessor agency, the Urban 

Mass Transportation Administration 

(UMTA), originated under the Urban 

Mass Transportation Act (UMT Act) of 

1964—a Great Society initiative under 

the Kennedy and Johnson 

Administrations, designed to assist state 

and local governments in financing 

urban mass transportation systems ‘‘to 

be operated by public or private mass 

transportation companies as determined 

by local needs.’’ (Pub. L. 88–365; 

quoting Section 2(b)(3) of the UMT Act, 

49 U.S.C. app. 1602(b)(3)). UMTA’s 

mission, at that time, was strictly 

limited to providing Federal financial 

assistance to develop and maintain 

municipal transit systems. UMTA had 

no regulatory authority whatsoever over 

any of its grant recipients. Deliberately, 

the Congress chose not to give UMTA 

any ability to establish national 

standards for safety in urban mass 

transportation. See, e.g., Amalgamated 

Transit Union v. Skinner, 894 F.2d 

1362, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

Several years thereafter, following a 

series of troubling accidents in the rail 

transit industry, Congress recognized a 

need to provide UMTA with a limited 

authority to investigate accidents and 

hazardous conditions in urban mass 

transportation. Specifically, in Section 

107 of the National Mass Transportation 

Assistance Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93–503), 

Congress instructed the agency to 

‘‘investigate unsafe conditions in any 

facility, equipment, or manner of 

operation financed under this Act 

which the Secretary believes creates a 

serious hazard of death or injury.’’ The 

statute further directed UMTA to 

determine the nature and extent of 

hazardous conditions on transit 

systems; determine the means that 

might best correct or eliminate those 

hazardous conditions; and compel a 

grant recipient to submit a plan for 

correcting or eliminating those 

hazardous conditions. Eight years later, 

however, in the Surface Transportation 

Assistance Act of 1982, the Congress 

weakened this investigatory authority 

by repealing Section 107 of the National 

Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 

1974; moving the authority to Section 

22 of the UMT Act; and amending the 

statute to make the authority 

discretionary—not mandatory—striking 

the word ‘‘shall’’ and inserting the word 

‘‘may.’’ 

This very limited Federal authority 

for safety did not prove satisfactory, in 

the view of the National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB or ‘‘Board’’). In 

August 1991, after a number of 

accidents in the industry—including 

very serious accidents on rapid rail 

systems in Philadelphia, Chicago, and 

New York City—the Board published a 

study titled ‘‘Oversight of Rail Rapid 

Transit Safety’’ (NTSB/SS–91/02) in 

which it urged all States to develop or 

revise safety programs to ensure 

comprehensive and effective oversight 

over rapid rail systems in their 

jurisdictions. The NTSB suggested that 

States have primary authority for 

oversight of rail transit safety, but it 

urged UMTA to evaluate the 

effectiveness of States’ oversight of rail 

transit, develop guidelines, and require 

States and transit operators to use their 

UMTA grant funds to improve the safety 

of rail transit systems. Also, the NTSB 

implored UMTA to withhold its Federal 

financial assistance as necessary 

pending corrective action by the States 

and transit operators. 

Very shortly thereafter, in response to 

the NTSB recommendations, the 

Congress created a State Safety 

Oversight program for rail fixed 

guideway transit safety in Section 3029 

of the Intermodal Surface 

Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 

enacted in December 1991 (Pub. L. 102– 

240). Among the many fundamental 

changes ISTEA made to the Federal-aid 

programs for highways and public 

transportation, ISTEA renamed UMTA 

as the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA), and directed FTA to compel 

States with rail transit systems within 

their borders not otherwise subject to 

the jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA) (e.g., commuter 

rail systems, or light rail systems 

connecting to the ‘‘general railroad 

system’’ of the United States, as 


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described in 49 CFR part 209 Appendix 

A) to establish and carry out safety 

program plans for each of those rail 

transit systems. The statute directed that 

the safety program plans include, at 

minimum, core requirements for safety, 

lines of authority, levels of 

responsibility, and methods of 

documentation for those subjects. 

Further, Section 3029 of ISTEA vested 

FTA with explicit authority to withhold 

funding from any State that did not 

comply with the statutory mandates, 

and directed FTA to promulgate rules 

for that purpose. In enacting Section 

3029, the Congress agreed with NTSB 

that the States, not FTA, should be the 

principal oversight authorities for rail 

transit within their jurisdictions, given 

that public transportation is an 

inherently local activity that, with few 

exceptions, did not cross state 

boundaries. Notably, this new authority 

for FTA, initially codified at Section 28 

of the Federal Transit Act, later recodified at 49 U.S.C. 5330, made no 

provision for oversight of bus 

operations—perhaps because the 1991 

NTSB report had focused on rail transit. 

The First Rulemaking: To meet the 

ISTEA directives, FTA issued an 

Advance Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking for State Safety Oversight 

on June 25, 1992, at 57 FR 28572–5, 

followed by a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (NPRM) on December 9, 

1993, at 58 FR 64856–69. On December 

27, 1995, FTA promulgated a final rule 

for State Safety Oversight at 60 FR 

67034–48. In short, the final rule 

obliged every State with a rail transit 

system not subject to the jurisdiction of 

FRA to establish an oversight agency, 

and obliged that oversight agency to 

develop a ‘‘system safety program 

standard’’ that, at a minimum, adopted 

the uniform guidelines for rail transit 

systems set by the Manual for the 

Development of Rail System Safety 

Program Plans, published by the 

American Public Transit Association 

(APTA). These ‘‘APTA Guidelines’’ 

were incorporated by reference into the 

final rule. Also, the final rule obliged 

the State oversight agencies to review 

safety audit reports from the rail 

systems, conduct on-site safety reviews 

at least once every three years, 

investigate accidents and ‘‘unacceptable 

hazardous conditions’’ as reported by 

the rail transit systems, approve 

‘‘corrective action plans’’ submitted by 

the rail transit systems, make annual 

reports to FTA summarizing its 

oversight activities for the preceding 

twelve months, and make periodic 

reports to FTA summarizing accidents, 

hazardous conditions, and corrective 

action plans. The effective date of the 

final rule was deferred to January 1, 

1997, to give States an opportunity to 

enact state statutes and regulations to 

carry out the ISTEA mandates. 

The FTA SSO rule and the APTA 

Guidelines were widely accepted as the 

baseline for State oversight of the safety 

of rail transit until the summer of 2001. 

In June and August of that year, there 

were two collisions of rapid rail trains 

on the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) 

system—both investigated by the 

NTSB—which called into question the 

effectiveness of the rule and the 

guidelines. In its Special Investigation 

Report issued in September 2002 

(NTSB/SIR–02/01), the Board 

determined the probable cause of both 

accidents to have been the train 

operators’ failure to comply with 

operating rules designed to prevent 

those types of collisions, and the failure 

of CTA management to exercise 

adequate oversight of the operational 

safety of its rapid rail system. 

Additionally, however, the Board 

identified several weaknesses in FTA’s 

SSO program, and noted, specifically, 

that a previous audit of CTA by APTA 

had not identified any deficiencies in 

CTA’s adherence to APTA’s ‘‘System 

Safety Checklist’’—a procedure that 

used only record reviews and 

supplemental spot checks to gauge 

whether operating rules were being 

followed, and which provided little 

guidance on what rules a compliance 

program should entail or how those 

rules should be carried out. Thus, the 

NTSB concluded that the APTA 

Guidelines were not sufficiently specific 

for making assessments of the 

effectiveness of rail transit operators’ 

safety programs, nor were the 

Guidelines an effective tool for State 

oversight of rail transit safety. The 

NTSB called on APTA to revise its 

manual to provide explicit guidance to 

the industry on auditing the 

effectiveness of rail transit safety 

compliance programs, and for FTA to 

amend its SSO regulations at 49 CFR 

part 659, accordingly. 

The Second Rulemaking: In response 

to the 2002 NTSB report on the CTA 

accidents, on March 9, 2004, FTA 

published an NPRM at 69 FR 11218–32 

intended to strengthen the SSO 

regulations. Specifically, FTA proposed 

to remove the incorporation by 

reference of the APTA Guidelines from 

49 CFR part 659, and in lieu thereof, 

establish a set of enhanced, 

performance-based measures for the rail 

transit industry, including, notably, a 

rule making hazard identification and 

resolution a performance-based 

procedure, as opposed to the previous 

practice of allowing a rail transit 

operator or an SSOA to subjectively 

determine and address an 

‘‘unacceptable hazardous condition.’’ 

FTA issued a final rule on April 29, 

2005, at 70 FR 22562–83, which is the 

rule still in place today. In the final rule, 

FTA chose to include a good many of 

the APTA Guidelines as regulatory 

standards. Further, the final rule 

clarified the roles and responsibilities of 

States and their SSOAs; set a new 

definition of ‘‘hazard,’’ and 

requirements for hazard management 

plans; revised the requirements for 

SSOAs to conduct investigations; and 

fleshed out the minimum standards for 

system safety program plans, accident 

notification, and corrective action plans. 

Notwithstanding the amendments to 

the SSO regulations in the 2005 

rulemaking, the regulations were 

criticized for their lack of rigor, and the 

States’ SSO programs were criticized for 

lack of authority, resources, and 

expertise. Most notably, in July 2006, 

the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) criticized the regulations 

and identified some fundamental 

weaknesses in SSOAs in a report titled 

‘‘Rail Transit: Additional Federal 

Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State 

Safety Oversight Program,’’ http://

www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-821. 

The GAO report found that the staffing 

levels and expertise varied greatly 

across the SSOAs, and that by their own 

admission, many of the SSOAs lacked 

enough qualified staff and adequate 

levels of training to meet their 

responsibilities—some of them 

employing as few as 0.1 or 0.2 full-time 

equivalent positions for dedicated rail 

transit safety oversight—and for many of 

them, the lack of funding was a serious 

impediment. The GAO noted that the 

SSO regulations provided no 

enforcement power to the SSOAs, and 

very little enforcement power to FTA, 

with only the option of withholding up 

to five percent of a rail transit system’s 

urbanized area formula funding if FTA 

were to find a State not in compliance 

with the SSO regulations. Additionally, 

the GAO report faulted FTA for having 

failed to set goals and performance 

measures for State Safety Oversight, and 

having failed to audit SSOAs as often as 

originally planned. GAO urged FTA to 

set both short- and long-term goals for 

State Safety Oversight, with measures of 

progress toward each of those goals. 

Further, the GAO recommended that 

FTA audit each of the SSOAs at least 

once every three years, and develop an 

appropriate training curriculum for 

SSOAs that would include courses on 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Proposed Rules 11005 

how to conduct oversight of rail transit 

systems. 

Legislation Leading to Enactment of 

State Safety Oversight Authority in 

MAP–21: Not long after the GAO’s 

criticisms, the rail transit industry 

suffered a string of fatal accidents and 

accidents with multiple personal 

injuries. On November 30, 2006, a 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA) Blue Line train 

struck and killed two employees 

inspecting rapid rail track in 

Alexandria, Virginia. On January 7, 

2007, a WMATA Green Line train 

derailed near the Mt. Vernon station in 

Washington, DC, injuring 23 people and 

causing $3.8 million in damage. On May 

28, 2008, two Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation Authority (MBTA) light 

rail trains collided with one another on 

the Green Line in Newton, 

Massachusetts—a suburb of Boston— 

killing the driver of the second train, 

injuring eight people, and causing $8 

million in damage. On May 8, 2009, the 

MBTA suffered another accident on its 

Green Line light rail system in which 

one train rear-ended another in the 

tunnel near the Government Center 

station in downtown Boston; 68 people 

were injured, with more than $9 million 

in damage. On June 22, 2009, two 

WMATA rapid rail trains collided with 

one another near the Fort Totten station 

on the Red Line, killing the driver of the 

second train and eight passengers, 

injuring another 52 passengers, and 

causing $12 million in damage. On July 

18, 2009, two Municipal Transportation 

Agency light rail trains collided with 

one another at the West Portal station in 

San Francisco, injuring the drivers of 

both trains and 46 people and causing 

$4.5 million in damage. And in August 

and September, 2009, two WMATA 

maintenance employees lost their lives 

while working on the rapid rail system; 

one was struck by a maintenance 

vehicle on the Orange Line, the other by 

a train on the Blue Line. 

In conducting its several 

investigations, the NTSB found a variety 

of probable causes for these accidents. 

Among them, equipment malfunctions; 

equipment in poor or marginal 

condition, including equipment that can 

pose particular risks to safety, such as 

signal systems; lack of vehicle 

crashworthiness; and employee error, 

such as inattentiveness, or failure to 

follow a rail transit system’s operating 

procedure. In the instance of WMATA, 

the NTSB found the lack of a strong 

safety culture to be a contributing factor. 

Also, the NTSB found a lack of adequate 

oversight both by the rail transit 

systems’ State Safety Oversight 

Agencies, and FTA. 

In July 2009—one month after the 

WMATA Red Line accident near the 

Fort Totten station—Senators and 

Representatives from the Maryland and 

Virginia delegations introduced the 

National Metro Safety Act in both 

houses of Congress (H.R. 3338, S 1506, 

111th Cong. (2009)). The bills would 

have required FTA to establish national 

minimum safety standards for transit 

systems, including several particular 

standards recommended by the NTSB 

pertaining to event recorders, 

emergency access and egress, 

crashworthiness of vehicles, and 

employee hours of service. Neither bill 

was reported out of committee. In 

December 2009, on behalf of the 

President, Secretary of Transportation 

Ray LaHood and Federal Transit 

Administrator Peter Rogoff formally 

submitted a legislative proposal to the 

Congress that contemplated a more 

comprehensive approach to safety in 

public transportation. In testimony 

before both the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure and 

the Senate Committee on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 

Secretary and the Administrator 

presented the details of this proposal, 

which, ultimately, were introduced in 

both houses in February 2010 as the 

Public Transportation Safety Program 

Act of 2010 (H.R. 4643, S 3105, 111th 

Cong. (2010)). Citing the warning signs 

of increasing collisions, derailments, 

and casualties, the Secretary and the 

Administrator emphasized that rail 

transit always carries the potential for 

catastrophic accident and damage— 

notwithstanding its record of being a 

very safe means of travel—and that the 

State Safety Oversight program, as it 

currently exists, suffered from a number 

of fundamental weaknesses: 

• Under the existing SSO framework, 

each rail transit system was free to 

determine its own safety practices. An 

SSOA would simply review those 

practices and report the progress of any 

corrective actions. 

• Each SSOA had only so much 

regulatory, oversight, and enforcement 

authority as had been given by the State 

government. In many instances, the 

SSOA lacked authority to enforce any 

standards or compel compliance by the 

rail transit systems it oversaw. 

• Many States viewed the SSO 

program as an unfunded mandate. Thus, 

many States devoted insufficient 

resources to the program, which 

compromised the abilities of SSOAs to 

recruit staff, provide adequate training 

to their staff, and develop their own 

expertise. 

• In many instances, an SSOA was 

dependent upon financial resources 

from the same entities it was obliged to 

oversee—the rail transit systems—thus 

creating a conflict of interest. 

In pertinent part, the Administration’s 

bill would have required FTA to 

develop uniform, national standards for 

rail transit safety; given FTA authority 

to inspect rail transit systems for 

compliance with those standards; 

established a certification program for 

State Safety Oversight; authorized grants 

of 100 percent Federal funding for SSO 

programs, once certified; and required 

the SSO programs to be financially 

independent from the rail transit 

systems. Further, the Administration’s 

bill would have given States the option 

to decline participation in the SSO 

program, without penalty, in which 

instance, FTA would have been 

required to perform the oversight 

function. Also, the Administration’s bill 

would have given FTA authority to 

issue civil or criminal penalties for 

noncompliance. See generally, 

Examining the Federal Role in 

Overseeing the Safety of Public 

Transportation Systems: Hearing Before 

the Subcomm. On Hous., Transp. & 

Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. On Banking, 

Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 89– 

97 (2009). 

Both the House and Senate versions of 

the Administration’s bill were referred 

to committees. In July 2010, the Senate 

committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs reported a bill sponsored 

by the chairman of the committee, 

Senator Dodd, titled the Public 

Transportation Safety Act of 2010 (S 

3638, 111th Cong. (2010)), which laid 

the foundation for the State Safety 

Oversight provisions eventually enacted 

under MAP–21. The Senate Banking bill 

embraced most of the fundamental 

precepts of the Administration’s 

legislative proposal, but it differed from 

the Administration’s bill in that it did 

not allow a State to decline 

participation in the SSO program; the 

grants of Federal funds for an SSO 

program would require a 20 percent 

match; and States could be allowed as 

much as three years, after the effective 

date of a final rule, to develop an SSO 

program adequate for certification—after 

which, in the event of an inadequate 

SSO program, FTA would be authorized 

to withhold all Federal grant funds from 

all public transportation operators in 

that State, not just the rail transit 

systems. See generally, the Senate 

Banking committee report 

accompanying the Senate bill (S. Rept. 

111–232; (2010)). The 111th Congress 

adjourned before the Senate could act 

on the Senate Banking bill, and the 

House did not consider any similar bill. 


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In the 112th Congress, the Senate 

Banking committee re-introduced its 

Public Transportation Safety Act of 

2010, which became Section 20021 of 

the larger bill for reauthorization of 

surface transportation—the Moving 

Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century 

Act (S 1813, 112th Cong. (2012), ‘‘MAP– 

21’’), shepherded by the Senate 

Committee on Environment and Public 

Works—that passed the Senate on 

March 14, 2012. The House bill for 

reauthorization of surface 

transportation—the American Energy 

and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012 (H.R. 

7, 112th Cong. (2012))—had nothing 

comparable to the Senate bill insofar as 

State Safety Oversight of rail transit 

systems. Ultimately, the conferees from 

the House and Senate chose to adopt 

Section 20021 of the Senate bill, with 

some amendments, and the title of the 

Senate bill, ‘‘MAP–21,’’ as the title of 

the legislation that the president signed 

on July 6, 2012 (Pub. L. 112–141). 

The New Statute and Today’s Proposed 

Rulemaking 

As noted, MAP–21 authorizes a 

comprehensive Public Transportation 

Safety Program, now codified at 49 

U.S.C. 5329. As part of this 

comprehensive program, new Section 

5329(e) significantly revises the existing 

SSO program, creating a program that is 

more demanding of the States and their 

SSO programs, and FTA, as well, in 

several ways. First, with respect to the 

States, the statute requires them to 

submit their SSO programs to FTA for 

its approval. In order to gain this 

approval, the States must assume 

responsibility for overseeing the safety 

of their rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems, adopt and 

enforce Federal and relevant State safety 

laws, determine appropriate staffing 

levels for their SSOAs, and ensure 

proper training and certification of their 

safety oversight personnel. The 

organization designated as an SSOA 

must be financially and legally 

independent of the rail transit systems 

they oversee, i.e., an SSOA cannot be 

reimbursed for its expenses by the rail 

transit agencies they oversee, nor can 

the SSOA be the same agency that 

operates a rail transit agency. An SSOA 

may not employ any individual who is 

also responsible for the administration 

of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems that are subject 

to the State’s oversight. An SSOA must 

have investigative and enforcement 

authority under State law, must audit at 

least triennially the compliance of the 

rail transit systems under its oversight, 

and provide at least annually a status 

report to FTA, the Governor of the State, 

and the board of directors of the rail 

transit system. FTA is then obliged to 

submit an annual evaluation of the State 

Safety Oversight programs to the 

Congress. 

MAP–21 also made considerable 

changes regarding FTA’s role in the SSO 

program. As mentioned previously, FTA 

must now approve each State’s SSO 

program. In addition, FTA must 

establish a grant program to help the 

States develop and carry out their SSO 

functions, and to obtain the necessary 

training and certification for their SSOA 

staff. FTA must certify whether the 

States are meeting the statutory 

requirements, deny certification to those 

that are not, and FTA can withhold 

Federal funds until an SSO program can 

be certified. Congress provided FTA 

with additional authority to conduct 

inspections, investigations, audits, and 

examinations; test the equipment, 

facilities, rolling stock, and operations 

of rail transit systems; make reports and 

issue directives with respect to safety; 

issue subpoenas and take depositions 

from any employee of a rail transit 

system who is responsible for safety; 

require production of documents; and 

issue regulations for State Safety 

Oversight through public notice and 

comment. 

On February 6, 2013, the Federal 

Transit Administrator issued a Dear 

Colleague letter to the States and the 

public transportation industry, outlining 

the steps that each State must take to 

develop an SSO program and establish 

an SSOA in compliance with Section 

5329. This letter is available on FTA’s 

Web site at http://www.fta.dot.gov/

tso.html On May 13, 2013, FTA 

published for public comment an 

illustrative apportionment of the SSO 

grant funds available to eligible States in 

Federal Fiscal Year 2013, at 78 FR 

28014–8. On or before October 1, 2013, 

the Administrator notified each State, 

individually, of his decision whether to 

issue a certification for that State’s SSO 

program, in accordance with the 

statutory deadline set by 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(7). On March 10, 2014, FTA 

announced the final apportionment of 

FY 2013 and FY 2014 grant funds for 

SSO programs, at 79 FR 13380. On 

February, 9, 2015, FTA published the 

apportionment for FY 2015 grant funds 

for SSO programs, at 80 FR 7254. 

Today’s NPRM is a critical step in 

transforming and strengthening the 

regulatory framework for State Safety 

Oversight of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems. Once FTA 

issues a final rule for State Safety 

Oversight, the agency will rescind the 

current regulations at 49 CFR part 659. 

The following is a section-by-section 

analysis of the proposed rule in today’s 

rulemaking: 

Section-by-Section Analysis 

Section 674.1 Purpose 

This section explains that the purpose 

of these regulations is to carry out the 

mandate of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) for States 

to perform oversight of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

within their jurisdictions. This section 

differs only slightly in wording from the 

current rule at 49 CFR 659.1. 

Section 674.3 Applicability 

This section explains that these 

regulations apply to States with rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems, the SSOAs that oversee the 

safety of those systems, and entities that 

own or operate rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems with 

Federal financial assistance from FTA. 

The first two sentences of this section 

are similar in wording to the current 

rule at 49 CFR 659.3, titled ‘‘Scope.’’ 

Section 674.5 Policy 

This section identifies three separate, 

explicit policies that underlie these 

regulations: First, FTA is using the 

principles and methods of Safety 

Management Systems (SMS) as the basis 

for these regulations and all other 

regulations and policies FTA will issue 

under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

Second, the primary responsibility for 

overseeing the safety of rail transit 

systems lies with the States—and a 

State’s SSOA must have sufficient 

authority and resources to oversee the 

number, size, and complexity of rail 

transit systems that operate within that 

State. Third, FTA is obliged to make 

Federal funds available to eligible States 

to help them develop and carry out their 

SSO programs—and certify whether 

those SSO programs are adequate to 

promote the purposes of the public 

transportation safety programs under 49 

U.S.C. 5329. The current rule at 49 CFR 

part 659 does not include a statement of 

policy. 

Section 674.7 Definitions 

This section sets forth a number of 

definitions for terms used repeatedly 

throughout the State Safety Oversight 

program and the other safety programs 

authorized by 49 U.S.C. 5329. Some of 

these defined terms are the same as set 

forth in the current regulations at 49 

CFR part 659, but the wording of the 

definitions has been changed, in today’s 

proposed rulemaking, for sake of clarity; 

readers should refer, specifically, to the 

definitions of ‘‘contractor,’’ ‘‘corrective 

action plan,’’ ‘‘hazard,’’ ‘‘individual,’’ 

‘‘investigation,’’ ‘‘passenger,’’ ‘‘rail fixed 


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guideway public transportation system’’ 

and ‘‘rail transit agency.’’ A few of the 

definitions remain the same as stated in 

the current regulations, or as stated in 

other FTA regulations; we refer, 

specifically, to the definitions of 

‘‘Administrator,’’ ‘‘FRA,’’ ‘‘FTA,’’ and 

‘‘State.’’ 

There are new definitions, however, 

for the terms ‘‘National Public 

Transportation Safety Plan,’’ ‘‘Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program,’’ ‘‘Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan,’’ 

‘‘State Safety Oversight Agency 

(SSOA)’’, and ‘‘State Safety Oversight 

Program (SSOP),’’ all of which are 

strictly consistent with the use of those 

terms in the statutes. And there are new, 

common-sense definitions for the terms 

‘‘Transit Agency Safety Plan,’’ and 

‘‘vehicle.’’ ‘‘Transit Agency Safety Plan’’ 

is a shorthand reference to the Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan; and 

‘‘vehicle’’ means any rolling stock used 

on a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system, including but not 

limited to passenger and maintenance 

vehicles. 

We have also included definitions for 

the terms ‘‘accident,’’ ‘‘event,’’ 

‘‘incident,’’ and ‘‘occurrence.’’ We 

propose amending the definition for 

‘‘accident’’ as it relates to injuries. In 49 

CFR 659.33, the definition includes, 

‘‘injuries requiring immediate medical 

attention away from the scene for two or 

more individuals.’’ We propose 

changing that to ‘‘one or more persons 

suffers a serious injury,’’ and we 

propose adding the NTSB definition of 

‘‘serious injury’’ found in 49 CFR 830.2: 

‘‘any injury which: (1) Requires 

hospitalization for more than 48 hours, 

commencing within 7 days from the 

date of the injury was received; (2) 

results in a fracture of any bone (except 

simple fractures of fingers, toes, or 

nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, 

nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) 

involves any internal organ; or (5) 

involves second- or third-degree burns, 

or any burns affecting more than 5 

percent of the body surface.’’ FTA seeks 

comment on this change. The term 

‘‘event’’ is defined as any accident, 

incident, or occurrence. As stated in our 

January 28, 2015, Federal Register 

notice on updates to the National 

Transit Database (NTD) safety 

information collection, we added the 

term ‘‘event’’ in order to cover all 

planned and unplanned events that are 

required to be reported to the NTD. The 

purpose of the change is to provide 

better alignment with nomenclature 

used in other transportation modes, and 

to provide clarity during data analysis 

conducted to identify safety trends. An 

‘‘incident’’ is an event that exceeds the 

definition of ‘‘occurrence,’’ but does not 

meet the definition of ‘‘accident.’’ 

Examples include but are not limited to 

near misses, close calls, railyard 

derailments, non-serious injuries, and 

violations of safety standards. An 

occurrence is an event with no injuries, 

or where damage occurs to property or 

equipment but does not affect transit 

operations. FTA seeks comment on 

these definitions. In particular, FTA 

seeks comment on whether we should 

include definitions for ‘‘close call’’ and 

‘‘near miss’’ in the final rule. 

Additionally, there are a number of 

new definitions in today’s proposed 

rulemaking that are based on the 

principles and methods of Safety 

Management Systems (SMS). Readers 

should refer, specifically, to the terms 

‘‘accountable executive,’’ ‘‘risk,’’ ‘‘risk 

control,’’ ‘‘safety assurance,’’ ‘‘Safety 

Management System,’’ ‘‘safety policy,’’ 

‘‘safety promotion,’’ and ‘‘safety risk 

management.’’ In the years since the 

rules at 49 CFR part 659 were first 

issued in 1995, SMS has emerged as the 

best practice for enhancing safety in all 

modes of transportation, and the 

Secretary of Transportation instructed 

each of the Department’s operating 

administrations to develop rules, plans, 

and programs to apply SMS to their 

grant recipients and regulated 

communities. See, http://

www.fedeval.net/docs/2012Coplen_

1.pdf. In brief, SMS is a formal, topdown, organization-wide approach to 

managing risks and assuring the 

effectiveness of risk controls. An SMS 

establishes lines of safety accountability 

throughout an organization, starting at 

the executive management level, and 

provides a structure to support a sound 

safety culture. SMS is not a one-sizefits-all approach, however. SMS is 

flexible, and can be scaled to the mode, 

size, and complexity of any transit 

operator, in any environment—urban, 

suburban, or rural. As mentioned, both 

the Administrator’s May 13, 2013, Dear 

Colleague letter and a set of frequently 

asked questions about SMS are available 

on FTA’s Web site at http://

www.fta.dot.gov/tso_15177.html. Also, 

as explained below, the Appendix to 

these proposed rules, titled ‘‘Safety 

Management Systems Framework,’’ will 

give the reader a basic understanding of 

SMS. 

Many of the definitions for applying 

the principles and methods of SMS in 

proposed section 674.7 are very similar 

to those set forth in a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking and a Final Rule on SMS by 

FTA’s sister agency, the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA). The 

NPRM, issued on October 7, 2010, at 75 

FR 62008, titled ‘‘Safety Management 

Systems for Certified Airports,’’ 

proposes to apply the principles and 

methods of SMS to airports that hold 

certificates in accordance with 14 CFR 

part 139. A Final Rule, issued on 

January 8, 2015, at 80 FR 1308, titled 

‘‘Safety Management Systems for 

Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental 

Operations Certificate Holders,’’ applies 

the principles and methods of SMS to 

domestic, international flag, and 

supplemental operations air carriers that 

hold certificates in accordance with 14 

CFR part 121. FTA also anticipates that 

it will be incorporating many if not all 

of these same definitions for applying 

SMS to public transportation in its 

future rulemakings for the National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan, the 

Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program, and the 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans. 

Section 674.9 Transition From 

Previous Requirements for State Safety 

Oversight 

In framing the provisions of MAP–21 

for a much stronger State Safety 

Oversight program—and much higher 

expectations of the States and their 

SSOAs—the Congress recognized that 

the States and the rail transit systems 

they oversee would need a period of 

transition. Also, the Congress 

recognized that FTA would need time to 

conduct rulemakings through public 

notice and comment. Thus, MAP–21 

Section 20030(e) provides that the 

previous authorization statute for State 

Safety Oversight, 49 U.S.C. 5330, will 

remain in effect for three years after 

FTA promulgates a final rule under the 

authority of the new authorization 

statute for State Safety Oversight, 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e). Although nothing in this 

rulemaking precludes a State from 

immediately establishing an oversight 

agency that fully complies with MAP– 

21’s requirements, Congress recognized 

that many States would need time to 

enact enabling legislation during the 

transition from the current program to a 

MAP–21 compliant program, 

particularly in States where the 

legislature meets only part-time or 

biennially. This section in today’s 

proposed rulemaking recognizes that 

transition. (See, specifically, proposed 

49 CFR 674.9(a) in today’s NPRM.) Also, 

this section states that the current SSO 

regulations at 49 CFR part 659 will be 

rescinded upon the effective date of a 

final rule under the new authorization 

statute, 49 U.S.C. 5329(e). 


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Section 674.11 State Safety Oversight 

Program 

Readers should please be mindful of 

the differences between a State Safety 

Oversight Program (SSOP) and the State 

Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) that 

carries out an SSOP. In essence, an 

SSOA is a State agency that is obliged 

to interpret, administer, and enforce the 

State statutes enacted by a State 

legislature and the State regulations and 

program standards developed by a 

Governor and his or her designees in the 

executive branch of State government. 

An SSOP is the collection of law, rules, 

and administrative standards that define 

the minimum requirements for safety of 

rail public transportation in the State; 

the financial, physical, and human 

resources necessary to establish and 

maintain the SSOA; and the system of 

checks and balances, within State 

government, that holds an SSOA 

accountable for its actions. 

In enacting MAP–21, the Congress 

very carefully spelled out the different 

missions and functions of an SSOP and 

an SSOA. The missions and functions of 

an SSOP are specified at 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(3). The missions and functions 

of an SSOA are specified at 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(4). In today’s rulemaking, 

proposed section 674.11 states the 

missions and functions of an SSOP, and 

proposed section 674.13 states the 

missions and functions of an SSOA, as 

directed by the statutes. Most 

importantly, in an SSOP, a State must 

do the following: A State must explicitly 

assume responsibility for overseeing the 

safety of rail transit systems within its 

borders. A State must adopt and enforce 

Federal and relevant State law for that 

purpose. Not only must a State establish 

an SSOA, but it must ensure that the 

SSOA has a staffing level adequate to 

oversee the number, size, and 

complexity of the rail transit systems 

within the State, and that the staff of the 

SSOA are trained and qualified to 

perform their jobs. Further, a State must 

ensure that an SSOA does not receive 

any financial support from the rail 

transit systems the SSOA is obliged to 

oversee. 

In summary, an SSOP is the means by 

which a State ensures that an SSOA is 

sufficiently empowered by law, and 

supported with the resources necessary 

to do its job, without bias toward any 

rail transit system within the SSOA’s 

oversight. Through the requirements for 

an SSOP, the Congress is calling on the 

Governors of all States with rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

to create SSOAs that are agile, 

competent watchdogs for the safety of 

those rail transit systems. Moreover, 

MAP–21 rectifies the previous, 

untenable practice in which a number of 

SSOAs had to rely upon subsidization 

from one or more of the rail transit 

systems they were obliged to oversee; 

through the SSOP, a State must now 

ensure that those previous conflicts of 

interest no longer exist. 

Section 674.13 Designation of 

Oversight Agency 

In MAP–21, the Congress established 

a set of requirements for designation of 

a State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) 

that are more prescriptive than those of 

SAFETEA–LU and the previous 

authorization statutes, including, 

notably, the requirements for financial 

and legal independence, audit, 

investigation and enforcement 

authority, and other safeguards against 

conflicts of interest between an SSOA 

and the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems the SSOA will 

oversee. This section of the NPRM 

simply reiterates the statutory 

requirements for designation and 

establishment of an SSOA now codified 

at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(4)(A). Also, this 

section of the NPRM notes the 

Administrator’s authority to waive the 

requirements for financial and legal 

independence and the prohibitions on 

employee conflict of interest in the 

instance of a State in which the rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems have fewer than one million 

revenue miles per year combined, or 

provide fewer than ten million unlinked 

passenger trips per year, combined. The 

statutory authority for a waiver is 

codified at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(4)(B). 

Additionally, this section reiterates 

the reporting requirements for an SSOA 

now codified at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(4), 

including, notably, the requirements 

that an SSOA make annual reports on 

the status of the safety of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

it oversees to both the Governor and the 

boards of directors of the rail transit 

systems. 

Section 674.15 Designation of 

Oversight Agency for Multi-State System 

In a few instances across the United 

States, there are rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems that 

operate in more than one State. This 

section of the NPRM identifies the same 

option for State Safety Oversight of such 

a multi-state system as now provided by 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(5): The States may 

choose either to apply uniform safety 

standards and procedures to the rail 

transit system through a State Safety 

Oversight Program compliant with 49 

U.S.C. 5329 and approved by the 

Administrator, or to designate a single 

entity that meets the requirements for an 

SSOA to serve as the SSOA for that rail 

transit system, through a program 

approved by the Administrator. 

Section 674.17 Use of Federal 

Financial Assistance 

This section explains that Federal 

financial assistance is now available to 

States to develop and carry out State 

Safety Oversight Programs (SSOPs), and 

may be used, specifically, for both the 

operational and administrative expenses 

of SSOPs and SSOAs and the expenses 

of employee training. Also, this section 

notes that the Federal financial 

assistance to a State will be allocated in 

accordance with a formula applicable to 

all eligible States; a grant of Federal 

funds will be subject to terms and 

conditions as the Administrator deems 

appropriate; the Federal share of eligible 

expenses under a grant will be eighty 

percent; and the non-Federal share of 

the expenses under a grant cannot be 

comprised of Federal funds, funds 

received from a public transportation 

agency, or any revenues earned by a 

public transportation agency. 

Section 674.19 Certification of a State 

Safety Oversight Program 

One of the most important provisions 

of the MAP–21 framework for safety is 

the new mandate for an FTA 

certification of a State Safety Oversight 

Program (SSOP); specifically, the 

mandate that the Administrator make a 

determination not only whether an 

SSOP meets the technical requirements 

of the statute, but whether that same 

SSOP ‘‘is adequate to promote the 

purposes’’ of the National Public 

Transportation Safety Plan and the other 

goals and objectives of 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(7)(A) (emphasis added). The 

Congress recognizes that the weaknesses 

of the State Safety Oversight Agencies 

(SSOAs) cannot be addressed by the 

SSOAs, themselves. Consequently, 

Congress is obliging the States to either 

provide the current SSOAs with 

stronger authority and more resources to 

conduct the necessary oversight of rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems, or to establish and nurture new 

organizations for that purpose. Further, 

Congress is obliging the FTA 

Administrator to determine whether 

each and every State has an adequate 

program through the mechanism of 

issuing or denying the issuance of a 

certification that the program is 

adequate to meet both the letter and the 

purposes of the law. 

This section of the NPRM fleshes out 

the requirements and the process for 

certification of a State’s SSOP. 

Specifically, proposed section 674.17(a) 


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states that the Administrator must 

determine whether an SSOP meets the 

requirements of the statute and is 

adequate to promote the purposes of 49 

U.S.C. 5329, including, but not limited 

to, the National Public Transportation 

Safety Plan, the Public Transportation 

Safety Certification Training Program, 

and the Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Plans (referenced as the ‘‘Transit 

Agency Safety Plans’’ in this 

rulemaking). Proposed section 674.17(b) 

recites the statutory mandate that the 

Administrator must issue either a 

certification or a denial of certification 

for each State’s SSOP. Proposed section 

674.17(c) states that in the event the 

Administrator issues a denial of a 

certification, he or she must provide the 

State a written explanation and an 

opportunity to modify its SSOP to merit 

the issuance of certification, and ask the 

Governor to take all possible steps to 

correct the deficiencies that are 

precluding the issuance of a 

certification. 

Proposed section 674.17(c) states that 

in his or her discretion, the 

Administrator may impose financial 

penalties as authorized by Congress at 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(7)(D). In brief, the 

statute provides the Administrator three 

options in imposing a financial penalty: 

(1) The Administrator can withhold 

SSO grant funds from the State; (2) The 

Administrator can withhold not more 

than five percent of the 49 U.S.C. 5307 

Urbanized Area formula funds 

appropriated for use in the State or 

urbanized area in the State, until such 

time as the SSOP can be certified; or (3) 

The Administrator can require all of the 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems governed by the 

SSOP to spend up to 100 percent of 

their Federal funding under 49 U.S.C. 

Chapter 53 for ‘‘safety-related 

improvements’’ on their systems, only, 

until such time as the SSOP can be 

certified. See, 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(7)(D)(ii)(I)–(III). 

Additionally, proposed section 

674.17(d) states that in deciding 

whether to issue a certification for a 

State’s SSOP, the Administrator will 

evaluate whether the SSOA has 

sufficient authority, resources, and 

expertise to oversee the number, size, 

and complexity of the rail transit 

systems that operate within the State, or 

will attain the necessary authority, 

resources, and expertise in accordance 

with a developmental plan and 

schedule set forth in a sufficient level of 

detail in the State’s SSOP. 

Section 674.21 Withholding of Federal 

Financial Assistance for 

Noncompliance 

Proposed section 674.21(a) explains 

that in those instances in which the 

Administrator has discretion to impose 

financial penalties for noncompliance 

with the SSO requirements, in making 

a decision whether to do so, and 

determining the nature and amount of a 

financial penalty, the Administrator 

must consider the extent and 

circumstances of the noncompliance, 

the operating budgets of both the SSOA 

and the rail transit systems that will be 

affected by the penalty, and such other 

matters as justice may require. 

There is one instance, however, in 

which the Administrator will be unable 

to exercise any discretion to mitigate a 

very harsh financial penalty for 

noncompliance with the SSO 

requirements. If a State fails to establish 

a State Safety Oversight Program 

approved by the Administrator within 

three years of the effective date of the 

final rule that will follow today’s 

NPRM, FTA will be prohibited by law 

from obligating any Federal financial 

assistance to any entity in that State that 

is otherwise eligible to receive funding 

through any of the FTA programs 

authorized by 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53. See, 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(3). In other words: If 

for whatever reason, a State is unable or 

unwilling to come into compliance with 

a final rule for State Safety Oversight 

within three years after that final rule 

takes effect, all FTA grant funds for all 

of the public transportation agencies, 

designated recipients, subrecipients, 

and Metropolitan Planning 

Organizations in that State will be cut 

off. The statute is designed to provide 

every incentive to a State to develop and 

carry out an SSO program compliant 

with the regulations. Proposed section 

674.21(b) reflects the congressional 

mandate of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(3). 

Section 674.23 Confidentiality of 

Information 

When FTA first promulgated a rule 

for State Safety Oversight, the agency 

recognized that rail transit systems often 

face litigation arising from accidents, 

and that the release of accident 

investigation reports can compromise 

both the defense of litigation and the 

abilities of rail transit systems to obtain 

comprehensive, confidential analyses of 

accidents. See, the preamble to the 1995 

rule at 60 FR 67034, 67042 (Dec. 27, 

1995). Thus, the current rule at 49 CFR 

659.11 provides that a State ‘‘may 

withhold an investigation report that 

may have been prepared or adopted by 

the oversight agency from being 

admitted as evidence or used in a civil 

action for damages. . . .’’ Also, the 

current rule makes clear that the Federal 

regulations at 49 CFR part 659 do not 

require a rail transit system to make a 

security plan available to the public, or 

any security procedures referenced in 

that plan. See, 49 CFR 659.11(b). Thus, 

as a practical matter, any questions 

whether to admit investigation reports 

into evidence for litigation are left to the 

courts to determine, in accordance with 

the relevant State law and the courts’ 

rules of evidence. 

Today’s proposed rulemaking would 

clarify, and slightly expand, the current 

rule, by specifying that a ‘‘State, State 

Safety Oversight Agency, or a rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

may withhold an investigation report 

prepared or adopted in accordance with 

the Federal regulations for State Safety 

Oversight from being admitted as 

evidence or used in a civil action for 

damages resulting from a matter 

mentioned in the report.’’ See, proposed 

section 674.21(a). Also, the proposed 

rule would clarify, and slightly expand, 

the current rule, by specifying that 

FTA’s SSO regulations would ‘‘not 

require public availability of any data, 

information, or procedures pertaining to 

the security of a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system or its 

passenger operations.’’ See, proposed 

section 674.21(b). 

Section 674.25 Role of the State Safety 

Oversight Agency 

Ever since 1995, when FTA issued the 

current SSO regulations at 49 CFR part 

659, the SSOA has been required to set 

minimum standards for the safety of all 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation agencies within their 

oversight. Today’s proposed rulemaking 

would continue that requirement. See, 

proposed section 674.25(a). Under 

today’s NPRM, however, those 

minimum standards must be consistent 

with the National Public Transportation 

Safety Plan (the ‘‘National Plan’’), the 

Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program (the 

‘‘Safety Certification Training’’ 

program), and the principles and 

methods of Safety Management Systems 

(SMS), all of which will be the subject 

of future rulemakings separate from 

today’s NPRM. What this may mean, as 

a practical matter, is that any number of 

SSOAs may have to revise and reissue 

their minimum standards for safety of 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation once FTA issues final 

rules for the National Plan, the Safety 

Certification program, and the Transit 

Agency Safety Plan, to ensure that their 

minimum standards are consistent with 


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FTA regulations. As noted above, FTA 

issued an ANPRM for the National Plan, 

the Transit Agency Safety Plans, and the 

Safety Certification Training program on 

October 3, 2013, at 78 FR 61251–73. 

Also, in today’s Federal Register FTA is 

issuing final interim provisions for the 

Safety Certification Training program. 

FTA encourages all SSOAs and 

interested persons to participate in the 

rulemakings. 

Proposed section 674.25(b) notes that 

basic principles and methods of SMS 

are set forth in an Appendix to the rules, 

titled the ‘‘Safety Management Systems 

(SMS) Framework.’’ 

Proposed section 674.25(c) would 

require an SSOA to review and approve 

the Transit Agency Safety Plan, oversee 

the execution of that plan, and enforce 

the execution of that plan through the 

order of a corrective action plan or any 

other means, as necessary or 

appropriate. Proposed sections 

674.25(d) and 674.25(e) recognize that 

an SSOA has primary responsibility for 

investigating the hazards, risks, and 

accidents on a rail transit system, and 

any alleged noncompliance with a 

Transit Agency Safety Plan, but these 

responsibilities do not preclude the 

Federal Transit Administrator from 

exercising his or her independent 

authority to investigate hazards, risks, or 

accidents. 

Proposed section 674.25(f) would 

allow an SSOA to retain the services of 

a contractor for assistance in 

investigating accidents and incidents 

and for expertise the SSOA does not 

have within its own organization. 

Proposed section 674.25(g) makes clear 

that all personnel and contractors 

employed by an SSOA must comply 

with the requirements of the Safety 

Certification Training program—either 

the interim provisions for the program 

or the final rule, once the final rule is 

issued. 

Section 674.27 State Safety Program 

Standards 

Under 49 CFR 659.15—the rule in 

place since 1995—the SSOAs have been 

required to develop a nine-part State 

safety program standard comprised of 

requirements for program management, 

standards development, oversight of the 

internal safety and security reviews by 

rail transit systems, the frequency of 

those reviews, accident notification 

requirements, investigation procedures, 

corrective actions, the 21-point ‘‘system 

safety program plan’’ for rail transit 

systems, and the ‘‘system security plan’’ 

for rail transit systems. The current rule 

sets a regimen that is reactive, highly 

prescriptive, and mechanistic; today’s 

proposed rulemaking will be proactive, 

emphasizing the avoidance and 

mitigation of hazards and risks. 

Today’s NPRM transforms the listspecific, mechanistic approach to State 

safety program standards into one based 

on the more flexible, effective principles 

and methods of SMS. The SMS 

approach to State safety program 

standards at proposed section 674.27 

addresses many of the same elements as 

are called out in the current SSO rule; 

it does so, however, in ways that are 

more comprehensive for preventing 

accidents, afford more latitude to the 

SSOAs, and can be scaled to the 

number, size, and complexity of the rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems within the oversight of an 

SSOA. First, proposed section 674.27(a) 

obliges an SSOA to adopt and distribute 

a program standard that is consistent 

with the National Safety Plan, SMS, and 

the relevant State Safety Oversight 

Program. Next, proposed section 

674.27(a) obliges an SSOA to identify 

the processes and procedures that will 

govern its own activities. Next, 

proposed section 674.27(a) obliges an 

SSOA to identify the processes and 

procedures a Rail Transit Agency must 

have in place to comply with the SSO’s 

program standard. Finally, proposed 

section 674.27(a) sets explicit but 

minimum, flexible standards for 

program management, standards 

development, oversight of a Rail Transit 

Agency’s internal safety reviews, 

triennial audits of Transit Agency Safety 

Plans, accident notification, 

investigations, and corrective actions. 

Readers should note in particular the 

proposed requirements for an 

explanation of an SSOA’s authority; the 

steps an SSOA must take to ensure 

‘‘open, on-going communication’’ with 

the rail transit systems within its 

oversight; the process whereby an SSOA 

will evaluate the material submitted 

under the signatures of a Rail Transit 

Agency’s accountable executives; the 

procedures an SSOA and a Rail Transit 

Agency will follow to manage findings 

and recommendations arising from a 

triennial audit; the coordination of an 

SSOA investigation with a Rail Transit 

Agency’s own internal investigation; the 

role of an SSOA in supporting any 

investigation or findings made by the 

NTSB; and the procedures and SSOA 

and a Rail Transit Agency will follow to 

manage any conflicts over the contents 

or execution of a corrective action plan. 

See, proposed subsections 674.27(a)(1)– 

(7). 

Also, readers should please note the 

new FTA responsibility for reviewing 

the effectiveness of State safety program 

standards. Under proposed section 

674.27(b), FTA will evaluate an SSOA’s 

program standard as part of its 

continuous evaluation of every State 

Safety Oversight Program (SSOP), and 

in preparing FTA’s annual report to 

Congress on the certification status of 

every SSOP, both of which are required 

by 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(8). FTA will certify 

each compliant SSOA within the first 

three years following publication of the 

final rule, and will monitor compliance 

annually thereafter. 

Section 674.29 Transit Agency Safety 

Plans: General Requirements 

One of the most significant changes in 

State Safety Oversight under today’s 

proposed rulemaking is the transition 

from the simple review-and-approval of 

the ‘‘system safety program plan’’ for a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system, now codified at 

49 CFR 659.17, to the more hands-on, 

proactive role for an SSOA in evaluating 

the effectiveness of a Transit Agency 

Safety Plan in proposed section 674.29. 

To reiterate, ‘‘Transit Agency Safety 

Plan’’ is a shorthand reference to the 

new Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Plan now required of all 

operators of public transportation—not 

just rail transit systems—in accordance 

with 49 U.S.C. 5329(d). Although this is 

the subject of a rulemaking separate 

from today’s proposal, Section 5329(d) 

sets forth seven explicit, minimum 

standards for a Transit Agency Safety 

Plan. (See, for example, the standards 

for identifying and evaluating safety 

risks, strategies to minimize exposure to 

hazards, performance targets, 

assignment of an ‘‘adequately trained 

safety officer’’ reporting directly to the 

chief executive, and the 

‘‘comprehensive staff training program,’’ 

codified at 49 U.S.C. 5329(d)(1)). 

Today’s proposed rulemaking makes the 

SSOA responsible for helping ensure 

that the Transit Agency Safety Plan for 

a rail transit system—the most complex 

type of public transportation system—is 

sufficient to protect both the public and 

the Rail Transit Agency’s employees. 

Specifically, under proposed section 

674.29(a), an SSOA must evaluate 

whether a Transit Agency Safety Plan is 

based on an adequate Safety 

Management System (SMS), is 

consistent with the National Safety 

Plan, and is in compliance with the 

seven minimum standards set by the 

statute. Under proposed section 

674.29(b), an SSOA must make a 

number of judgments in determining 

whether the Transit Agency Safety Plan 

is based on an adequate SMS: Most 

notably, the judgments whether a 

Transit Agency Safety Plan sets forth a 

sufficiently explicit safety policy for the 

rail transit system, and whether the plan 


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identifies adequate means for risk 

control, safety assurance, and promotion 

of safety to support the execution of the 

Transit Agency Safety Plan throughout 

the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system—by all employees 

and agents of the system, and its 

contractors. Under proposed section 

674.29(c), in any instance in which an 

SSOA does not approve a Transit 

Agency Safety Plan, the SSOA must 

provide the Rail Transit Agency a 

written explanation, and the Rail 

Transit Agency an opportunity to 

modify and resubmit its plan for the 

SSOA’s approval. 

In short, under proposed section 

674.29, the SSOA becomes a vigorous, 

diligent, ‘‘institutional check’’ on 

whether a Transit Agency Safety Plan 

for a rail transit system is adequate to 

avoid or mitigate hazards and risks to 

everyone who uses, manages, or 

maintains that system. This is a much 

more assertive role for an SSOA than 

has been the case under the regulations 

in place since 1995. 

Section 674.31 Triennial Audits: 

General Requirements 

Under the current regulations, an 

SSOA conducts an ‘‘on-site review’’ of 

the ‘‘system safety program plan’’ for a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system at least once every 

three years. See, 49 CFR 659.29. As a 

practical matter, this sort of review has 

amounted to little more than a checklist 

procedure, and the superficiality of the 

on-site review was a specific point of 

criticism by the National Transportation 

Safety Board following the rapid and 

light rail accidents in 2009, referenced 

above. 

Under today’s NPRM, the three-year 

on-site review would be transformed 

into a more searching analysis of the 

safety of a rail transit system. 

Specifically, under proposed section 

674.31, an SSOA will conduct a 

complete audit of a Rail Transit 

Agency’s compliance with its Transit 

Agency Safety Plan at least once every 

three years, or on an on-going basis over 

a three-year timeframe, if the Rail 

Transit Agency concurs. At the 

conclusion of the three-year audit cycle 

an SSOA will issue a report with 

findings and recommendations that 

include, at minimum, an analysis of the 

effectiveness of the Transit Agency 

Safety Plan, recommendations for 

improvements, and a corrective action 

plan, if necessary or appropriate. The 

Rail Transit Agency must be given an 

opportunity to comment on the findings 

and recommendations arising from the 

audit. Optimally, an SSOA audit, per se, 

will be a more independent, effective 

means of testing the value of a Transit 

Agency Safety Plan and the steps a Rail 

Transit Agency has taken to carry out 

that plan over a three-year cycle. 

Section 674.33 Accident and Incident 

Notification 

Proposed section 674.33 differs very 

little from the two-hour notification 

requirement for certain types of 

accidents in the current rule at 49 CFR 

659.33, with two exceptions. The first 

exception is the addition of the term 

‘‘Incident.’’ The second exception is the 

additional requirement that FTA be 

notified of an Accident or Incident 

together with the SSOA. 

FTA is proposing to require two-hour 

notification for either an ‘‘Accident’’ or 

‘‘Incident.’’ In proposed section 674.7, 

‘‘Incident’’ is characterized as a near 

miss, close call, a violation of a safety 

standard that poses a hazard to a rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system, or equipment or property 

damage in an amount less than $25,000 

that effects transit operations. 

Experience teaches that a near miss or 

close call may be as much or more 

important for detecting hazards and 

mitigating risk as an accident that 

results in personal injury or property 

damage. And logically, a violation of a 

safety standard calls for notification, 

regardless whether the violation led to 

personal injury or property damage. 

To enhance FTA’s own situational 

awareness, a Rail Transit Agency must 

notify FTA of any accident or incident 

at the same time a Rail Transit Agency 

notifies the SSOA. In recent years FTA 

has benefitted from the electronic 

notification process a number of rail 

transit systems are using to inform 

multiple parties of accidents, similar to 

the telephonic notifications that 

railroads subject to 49 CFR part 225 

provide to the Federal Railroad 

Administration via the National 

Response Center. Insofar as the rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems already use an electronic 

notification system, FTA asks that it be 

added to their automated lists of 

addressees, which would require 

minimal effort. 

Section 674.35 Investigations 

In the deliberations leading to the 

enactment of MAP–21, the 

congressional authorization committees 

took a fresh look at whether 

investigation and enforcement authority 

for safety in rail fixed guideway public 

transportation should be vested in FTA 

or retained by the States. Ultimately, the 

Congress decided that FTA and the 

States, through their SSOAs, will have 

concurrent authority to investigate any 

incident involving the safety of a rail 

transit vehicle or taking place on the 

property of a rail transit system, while 

the SSOAs retain the role of primary 

oversight for the safety of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation. See, 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e)(4)(A)(v), 5329(f)(1). 

Consequently, under today’s proposed 

rulemaking, FTA will continue to defer 

to the SSOAs to conduct initial 

inspections and investigations. Should 

an SSOA request FTA’s assistance, 

however, or should the Administrator 

determine that an SSOA lacks the 

ability to conduct an investigation as 

necessary or appropriate, FTA may 

initiate an investigation. 

Under the current regulations, an 

SSOA may request a rail transit system 

to conduct an investigation on behalf of 

the SSOA. See, 49 CFR 659.35(a), (c). In 

some instances, it may benefit a rail 

transit system to investigate an accident 

occurring on its property, but in FTA’s 

view, that practice can trigger a conflict 

of interest, particularly where a rail 

transit system has an ability to influence 

an apportionment of fault and liability. 

Given that 49 U.S.C. 5329 now provides 

SSOAs with resources to conduct their 

own investigations, and requires 

professional training and certification of 

their employees to investigate accidents, 

proposed section 674.35(a) would 

require an SSOA to conduct an 

‘‘independent investigation’’ of any 

accident or incident that a Rail Transit 

Agency reports to the SSOA in 

compliance with proposed section 

674.33(a). Further, proposed section 

674.35(c) would require all personnel 

and contractors conducting 

investigations for an SSOA to be trained 

to conduct investigations in accordance 

with the Safety Certification Training 

program. Obviously, a Rail Transit 

Agency would not be prohibited from 

conducting its own internal 

investigation of an accident. Rather, 

proposed section 674.35(a) states that in 

any instance in which both an SSOA 

and a Rail Transit Agency are 

conducting an investigation, they must 

coordinate their investigations with one 

another in accordance with the State 

safety oversight program standard 

required by proposed section 674.27. 

Under proposed section 674.35(b), an 

SSOA must issue a written report on an 

investigation that identifies the factors 

that caused or contributed to the 

accident or incident, describes the 

SSOA’s investigation activities, and sets 

forth a corrective action plan, as 

necessary or appropriate. The SSOA 

must formally adopt an investigation 

report and transmit that report to the 

Rail Transit Agency for review and 

concurrence. If a Rail Transit Agency 


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does not concur in an SSOA’s 

investigation report, the SSOA may 

allow the Rail Transit Agency to submit 

a written dissent from the report, and 

the SSOA may include the Rail Transit 

Agency’s dissent in the report, if the 

SSOA so chooses. 

Also, readers should note that MAP– 

21 has vested the Federal Transit 

Administrator with broad authority to 

conduct investigations of public 

transportation systems—whether to 

ensure the continuing safety of a system, 

or in response to an accident or 

incident. See, 49 U.S.C. 5329(f)(1) (as 

the Secretary’s designee, the 

Administrator ‘‘may . . . conduct 

inspections, investigations, audits, 

examinations, and testing of the 

equipment, facilities, rolling stock, and 

operations of [a] public transportation 

system . . .’’). To facilitate the 

Administrator’s authority to conduct 

investigations, he or she may make 

reports and issue directives, issue 

subpoenas, take depositions, require 

production of documents by either a 

public transportation system or an 

SSOA, and provide guidance to public 

transportation systems ‘‘regarding 

prevention of accidents and incidents.’’ 

See, 49 U.S.C. 5329(f)(2)–(6). The FTA 

Office of Safety and Oversight will carry 

out the Administrator’s authority to 

conduct investigations, with assistance 

from staff of the ten FTA Regional 

Offices. 

Section 674.37 Corrective Action Plans 

It is most likely an SSOA will order 

a Rail Transit Agency to prepare and 

carry out a corrective action plan as the 

result of an investigation of an accident 

or hazard, an internal safety audit, or an 

SSOA’s triennial audit of a Transit 

Agency Safety Plan. Although it is not 

possible to know what potential 

corrective action plans may call for, 

under proposed section 674.37(a), in 

any instance in which a Rail Transit 

Agency is ordered to develop and carry 

out a corrective action plan, the SSOA 

must review and approve that plan 

before the Rail Transit Agency carries 

out the plan. A corrective action plan 

must specify the actions a Rail Transit 

Agency will take to avoid or mitigate the 

risks and hazards that led to the plan, 

the schedule for taking the corrective 

actions, and the persons who will take 

the corrective actions. The Rail Transit 

Agency will periodically report its 

progress in carrying out the corrective 

action plan, and the SSOA may monitor 

the Rail Transit Agency’s progress 

through unannounced, on-site 

inspections, or any other means the 

SSOA deems necessary or appropriate. 

Also, in any instance in which the 

National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) has conducted an investigation, 

an SSOA must evaluate whether the 

NTSB’s findings and recommendations 

call for a corrective action plan by the 

Rail Transit Agency, and if so, the SSOA 

must order the Rail Transit Agency to 

develop and carry out a corrective 

action plan. 

Section 674.39 State Safety Oversight 

Agency Annual Reporting to FTA 

It is not FTA’s objective to increase 

the reporting burdens on States, their 

SSOAs, or rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems any more than 

absolutely necessary. Moreover, the 

current SSOA reporting requirements at 

49 CFR 659.39 have worked well for the 

limited authority and responsibilities 

given to the SSOAs under the State 

Safety Oversight program in place for 

the past twenty years. As further 

described in the Paperwork Reduction 

Act section of this notice, below, the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) extended the approval for FTA to 

collect information from SSOAs as 

required by 49 U.S.C. 5330 and the rules 

at 49 CFR part 659. 

Today’s rulemaking proposes to keep 

the basic structure of the current 49 CFR 

659.39 insofar as the data and 

information SSOAs must report to FTA 

on an annual basis, with a few additions 

and revisions, as follows. First, under 

proposed subsection 674.39(a)(2), an 

SSOA would be obliged to submit 

evidence once a year that each of its 

employees and contractors are in 

compliance with the applicable Safety 

Training Certification requirements. 

Second, under proposed subsection 

674.39(a)(4), an SSOA would be obliged 

to submit a summary of the triennial 

audits completed during the preceding 

year, and the Rail Transit Agencies’ 

progress in carrying out any corrective 

action plans arising from those audits. 

Third, under proposed subsection 

674.39(a)(5), an SSOA would be obliged 

to submit evidence of its review and 

approval of any changes to Transit 

Agency Safety Plans during the 

preceding year. 

Section 674.41 Conflicts of Interest 

Proposed section 674.41(a) 

incorporates a fundamental change 

enacted by MAP–21: An SSOA must 

now be both financially and legally 

independent from any rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

under the oversight of the SSOA. See, 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(4)(A)(i). The only 

exception to this requirement would be 

an instance in which the Administrator 

has issued a waiver based on the 

relatively small annual fixed guideway 

revenue mileage in a State (less than one 

million actual and projected revenue 

miles, in total), or the relatively small 

number of unlinked passenger trips 

carried by all the rail transit systems in 

a State, on an annual basis (fewer than 

ten million actual and projected 

unlinked passenger trips, in total). See, 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(4)(B). 

Proposed section 674.41(b) would 

change the current rule, 49 CFR 659.41, 

to make it clear that an SSOA may not 

employ any individual who provides 

services to a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system under the 

oversight of the SSOA. Also, the 

proposed rule would delete the 

reference in the current rule to state law 

determinations of conflict of interest. 

Again, however, the Administrator 

could issue a waiver from this 

requirement on the basis of the 

relatively small annual fixed guideway 

revenue mileage (less than one million 

miles) in a State or the relatively small 

number of unlinked passenger trips per 

year (less than 10 million unlinked 

trips) in a State, using the same 

thresholds as specified in proposed 

section 674.41(a). 

Finally, proposed section 674.41(c) 

would make it clear that a contractor 

may not provide its services to both an 

SSOA and a rail transit system under 

the oversight of that SSOA. There is no 

waiver available with respect to this 

particular requirement. 

Appendix: Safety Management Systems 

(SMS) Framework 

For a basic understanding of SMS, 

readers should please consult the 

Appendix that immediately follows the 

text of the proposed rules: The 

document titled ‘‘Safety Management 

Systems (SMS) Framework.’’ This 

document describes at some length each 

of the four key components of a viable 

SMS for any transportation provider: (1) 

The Safety Management Policy for an 

organization, (2) an organization’s Risk 

Management practices, (3) the means for 

Safety Assurance throughout an 

organization, and (4) the practices for 

Safety Promotion within an 

organization, through training, 

education, and communication. This 

document explains that SMS is both 

flexible and scalable to the size of an 

organization and its operating 

environment. This document addresses 

the role of the Accountable Executive— 

the leader at the top of an organization 

who is ultimately responsible for 

safety—and the roles of a chief safety 

officer, an executive leadership team, 

employees who specialize in operations, 

maintenance, and asset management, 

employees with front-line 


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responsibilities for safety, and an 

organization’s board of directors. Also, 

this document speaks to discrete 

activities such as hazard identification 

and analysis, risk assessment and 

mitigation, change management, 

continuous improvement, and the 

integration of an organization’s SMS 

with its public safety and emergency 

preparedness. 

This Appendix is a guidance 

document. Unlike the final rules that 

will follow the public notice and 

comment on the proposed rules in this 

NPRM, this Appendix will not have the 

force of law. FTA is publishing the 

Safety Management Systems (SMS) 

Framework in this Appendix to provide 

practical advice both to the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that will develop and integrate SMS into 

their operations and managerial 

structures, and the States and SSOAs 

that will oversee the rail transit systems’ 

practice of SMS. FTA does not intend to 

set substantive standards for SMS 

through today’s proposed rulemaking 

for State Safety Oversight. Rather, FTA 

intends to propose substantive 

standards for SMS in the upcoming 

Notices of Proposed Rulemaking for the 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan and the Transit Agency Safety 

Plans. Nonetheless, FTA invites readers 

to comment on the material set forth in 

this Appendix, together with your 

comments on the rules proposed in this 

NPRM. Indeed, FTA expects to revise 

this Appendix from time to time, in the 

years ahead, as the practice of SMS 

matures throughout the transit industry. 

Additional Matters of Interest in the 

Proposed Rules 

Security. Persons versed in the 

current State Safety Oversight program 

will notice that today’s proposed 

rulemaking omits any mention of 

system security plans and internal 

security reviews for rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems. In short, 

the 49 CFR part 659 regulations, issued 

in 1995, preceded the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and the creation of 

the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), an agency of the 

United States Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), which now has lead 

responsibility for the Federal 

Government’s activities in the area of 

security in public transportation. This 

lead responsibility for TSA is set forth 

in the Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA) between DHS and DOT executed 

in September 2004 and the Annex to 

that MOA executed by TSA and FTA in 

September 2005. Further, under 

Sections 1405 and 1512 of the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 

110–53; Aug. 3, 2007) (‘‘9/11 

Commission Act’’), TSA is given the 

authority to issue regulations that will 

require public transportation agencies to 

develop and carry out security plans. 

Under Section 1404 of the 9/11 

Commission Act, DHS is carrying out a 

national strategy for public 

transportation security with guidelines 

that minimize security threats and 

maximize the ability of public 

transportation agencies to mitigate 

damage from terrorist attack and other 

major incidents. Also, TSA has issued 

rules that apply to rail transit systems 

insofar as TSA inspection authority, 

appointment of rail security 

coordinators, and reporting significant 

concerns to TSA. See, 49 CFR 1508.5, 

1508.201, and 1508.203. 

In omitting any mention of rail transit 

system security plans and reviews, the 

rules FTA is proposing for State Safety 

Oversight in this NPRM would not 

prohibit rail transit systems from 

continuing to improve their practices to 

prevent and mitigate the threats to the 

security of their systems. To the 

contrary, rail transit systems are 

encouraged to do so—and strictly in 

accordance with the rules and 

guidelines TSA has issued and will 

issue in the future. Both FTA and TSA 

recognize, moreover, that some of the 

steps a public transportation agency 

takes to protect public and employee 

safety are often one and the same as 

those it takes to protect its transit 

system from a terrorist attack; for 

example, the steps an agency takes as 

part of a threat and vulnerability 

assessment. FTA and TSA work to 

ensure that the transit industry is not 

confronted with inconsistent 

government-issued security 

requirements or guidance. 

Plain English. For purposes of plain 

English, and compliance with the Plain 

Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111–274; 

Oct. 13, 2010), FTA has made every 

effort to keep the text of the rules in this 

NPRM short, simple, and clear. 

Admittedly, the current regulation at 49 

CFR part 659 is lengthy, and less than 

a model of clarity, thus, FTA seeks to 

move in the opposite direction. A 

certain level of detail may be sacrificed 

in this rulemaking, but FTA would 

prefer to put a rule in place that is easier 

to understand and to work with. 

Annual Certifications of Compliance. 

Readers should please note that the 

requirement that an SSOA annually 

submit a certification of its compliance 

with the rules, codified at 49 CFR 

659.43, is being moved to proposed 

subsection 674.39(a)(6) with the other 

requirements for annual reporting. 

Estimated Costs and Benefits 

Existing 49 CFR Part 659 Program 

Requirements and Activities 

As stated in the Background section 

above, this NPRM replaces a set of 

regulations that have been in place since 

December 27, 1995, codified at 49 CFR 

part 659. As such, this NPRM applies to 

a discrete subsection of the public 

transportation industry—the recipients 

of Federal funds under 49 U.S.C. 

chapter 53 that operate rail fixed 

guideway transit systems not subject to 

the jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad 

Administration; the States in which 

those rail systems lie; and the SSOAs 

required to oversee the safety of those 

rail systems. 

Through the implementation of 49 

CFR part 659, the States, SSOAs and rail 

transit agencies affected by 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e) already engage in core activities 

that address many of this NPRM’s 

proposed requirements. In practical 

terms, many of the changes required in 

this NPRM serve to increase the 

frequency and/or comprehensiveness of 

activities that are already performed, 

such as reviews, inspections, field 

observations, investigations, safety 

studies, data analysis activities, and 

hazard management. 

Costs to States of Implementing 49 CFR 

Part 659, CY 2011–2013 

Pursuant to 49 CFR part 659, FTA 

collects annual information from the 

SSOAs regarding the hours they expend 

to implement SSO requirements for the 

rail transit agencies in their 

jurisdictions. Based on this information, 

when totals are averaged for the last 

three reporting years (CY 2011–CY 

2013), FTA has determined that the 28 

covered SSOAs expend approximately 

115,396 total hours per year 

implementing part 659 requirements. 

While these hours average out to 

roughly 4,120 per State per year, there 

is wide variation across the States in 

terms of the total level of effort devoted 

to compliance with part 659. Some 

States, such as California, oversee 

multiple rail transit systems with two or 

more full-time equivalents (FTEs) 

devoted to each system. Most States 

covered by part 659, however, have one 

(1) rail fixed guideway system and 

devote between .5 and 1 FTEs per year 

to implementing 49 CFR part 659 

requirements for that system, 

supplemented by contractor resources 

for major activities, such as the ThreeYear Review and accident investigation. 

The table below illustrates the breakdown of activities and labor hours 

currently expended to implement 49 

CFR part 659 by the States and SSOAs. 


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Using the 2013 Bureau of Labor 

Statistics (BLS) average wage rate of 

$42.70 per hour for State and local 

government operations managers, this 

level of effort equates to an annual cost 

of approximately $5 million for States 

and SSOAs to implement 49 CFR part 

659 requirements nationwide. 

The table also identifies one-time, 

non-recurring activities with an asterisk 

(*). These activities, such as establishing 

standards and procedures, are 

performed initially to establish the SSO 

program standard for a State new to 

implementing part 659. By including 

these non-recurring costs, FTA’s table 

reflects the reality that new States and 

rail transit agencies are joining the SSO 

program each year. In fact, since January 

1, 1997, when the December 27, 1995 

rule implementing 49 CFR part 659 

went into effect, the SSO program has 

grown by 40 percent, increasing from 19 

SSOAs and 32 rail transit agencies to 28 

SSOAs and 48 rail transit agencies. 

Annual state activity to implement 49 CFR part 659 requirements Total labor 

hours 

Total labor 

costs 

Develop and adopt program standard * ................................................................................................................. 1,400 $59,780.00 

Develop and adopt program procedures * ............................................................................................................. 1,400 59,780.00 

Review and update program standard and procedures ........................................................................................ 2,912 124,342.40 

Review and approve rail transit agency SSPP ..................................................................................................... 3,840 163,968.00 

Review and approve rail transit agency system security plan .............................................................................. 3,840 163,968.00 

Travel ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5,376 229,555.20 

Review and approve rail transit agency procedures ............................................................................................. 3,072 131,174.40 

Review and approve SSPP modifications and updates ........................................................................................ 3,072 131,174.40 

Review and approve system security plan modifications and updates ................................................................ 3,072 131,174.40 

Perform three-year review of rail transit agency ................................................................................................... 9,216 393,523.20 

Training .................................................................................................................................................................. 3,840 163,968.00 

Review and approve internal safety review report ................................................................................................ 4,224 180,364.80 

Review and approve internal security review report ............................................................................................. 4,224 180,364.80 

Prepare three-year safety and security review report ........................................................................................... 13,440 573,888.00 

Prepare accident investigation report .................................................................................................................... 5,376 229,555.20 

Review and approve rail transit agency accident investigation reports ................................................................ 6,144 262,348.80 

Review, approve and track corrective action plans .............................................................................................. 15,360 655,872.00 

Monitor rail transit agency adherence to hazard management process ............................................................... 19,200 819,840.00 

Designation Submission * ...................................................................................................................................... 30 1,281.00 

Initial Submission * ................................................................................................................................................. 2,270 96,929.00 

Annual Submission ................................................................................................................................................ 3,528 150,645.60 

Periodic Submission .............................................................................................................................................. 560 23,912.00 

Total including non-recurring costs ................................................................................................................ 115,396 4,927,409.20 

* Non-recurring cost. 

Costs to Rail Transit Agencies of 

Implementing 49 CFR Part 659, CY 

2011–2013 

Based on information collected from 

the SSO agencies in annual reports and 

previous assessments conducted by the 

Government Accountability Office and 

the National Transportation Safety 

Board, FTA has also established the 

level of effort required to implement 49 

CFR part 659 requirements for the 48 

rail transit agencies covered by the 

regulation. Based on this data, FTA has 

determined that each year, rail transit 

agencies expend approximately 237,000 

hours implementing 49 CFR part 659 

requirements. 

While these hours average out to 

approximately 5,000 per rail transit 

agency per year, there is variation in the 

rail transit industry based on the size of 

rail fixed guideway systems. The 

nation’s five (5) largest rail transit 

agencies each employ between 6 and 15 

full-time equivalents who work 

exclusively on 49 CFR part 659 

activities. Most of the remaining rail 

transit agencies devote between .5 and 

2 FTEs to implement 49 CFR part 659 

activities. Major activities performed by 

the rail transit agencies to implement 49 

CFR part 659 include developing safety 

and security plans and procedures; 

conducting internal reviews and audits 

to assess the implementation of safety 

and security plans; conducting accident 

and incident investigations; identifying, 

assessing and resolving hazards and 

their consequences; managing safety 

data acquisition and analysis; 

coordinating with emergency response 

planning; and communicating with/

responding to the SSO agency through 

reports, meetings, teleconferences, 

emails, training, submittals and support 

for field observations and reviews. 

Also using the 2013 Bureau of Labor 

Statistics average wage rate of $42.70 

per hour for State and local government 

operations managers, FTA has 

determined that the rail transit industry 

spends about $10 million per year to 

implement the 49 CFR part 659 

requirements nationwide. FTA’s table 

below reflects non-recurring costs 

required for new rail transit agencies 

covered by part 659, and for existing rail 

transit agencies to address new 

extensions and capital projects, once 

they become operational, as averaged 

over the last three years. 

Annual rail transit agency activity to implement 49 CFR part 659 requirements Total labor 

hours 

Total labor 

costs 

Develop system safety program plan * .................................................................................................................. 6,272 $267,814.40 

Review and update system safety program plan .................................................................................................. 7,550 322,385.00 

Develop system security plan * .............................................................................................................................. 4,036 172,337.20 

Review and update system security plan .............................................................................................................. 6,208 265,081.60 

Develop program procedures * .............................................................................................................................. 5,946 253,894.20 

Review and update program procedures .............................................................................................................. 4,142 176,863.40 

Travel ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4,146 177,034.20 


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Annual rail transit agency activity to implement 49 CFR part 659 requirements Total labor 

hours 

Total labor 

costs 

Conduct internal safety and security reviews ........................................................................................................ 15,230 650,321.00 

Prepare internal safety and security review reports .............................................................................................. 8,160 348,432.00 

Prepare annual internal safety and security review report for state oversight ..................................................... 10,708 457,231.60 

Conduct accident investigations ............................................................................................................................ 30,000 1,281,000.00 

Prepare accident investigation reports .................................................................................................................. 19,168 818,473.60 

Investigate unacceptable hazardous conditions .................................................................................................... 14,030 599,081.00 

Prepare unacceptable hazardous condition reports .............................................................................................. 12,032 513,766.40 

Implement hazard management process .............................................................................................................. 32,312 1,379,722.40 

Prepare and submit corrective action plans .......................................................................................................... 19,090 815,143.00 

Coordinate hazard management program activities with state oversight ............................................................. 23,848 1,018,309.60 

Maintain safety data .............................................................................................................................................. 3,570 152,439.00 

Plan and conduct annual emergency preparedness drill ...................................................................................... 3,382 144,411.40 

Prepare and submit after-action report for annual emergency drill ...................................................................... 1,090 46,543.00 

Maintain security data ............................................................................................................................................ 3,570 152,439.00 

Make submissions to state oversight agency ....................................................................................................... 2,618 111,788.60 

Total including non-recurring costs ................................................................................................................ 236,996 10,119,729.20 

* Non-recurring cost. 

Limitations of the Resources Expended 

by States and Rail Transit Agencies 

Based on the assessment provided in 

the two tables above, collectively the 

States, the SSOAs and the rail transit 

agencies expend approximately 352,000 

labor hours or $15 million to implement 

49 CFR part 659 requirements each year. 

While this level of effort helps make the 

transit industry among the safest modes 

of surface transportation, it has not been 

sufficient to prevent major accidents 

with multiple fatalities from occurring. 

As discussed in the preamble to this 

NPRM, over the last decade, the rail 

transit industry remains vulnerable to 

catastrophic occurrences. 

Since 2004, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has 

investigated (or preliminarily 

investigated) 19 major rail transit 

accidents, and has issued 25 safety 

recommendations to FTA, including six 

(6) Urgent Recommendations. In 

conducting these investigations, the 

NTSB found a variety of probable causes 

for these accidents. Among them, 

equipment malfunctions; equipment in 

poor or marginal condition, including 

equipment that can pose particular risks 

to safety, such as signal systems; lack of 

vehicle crashworthiness; employee 

fatigue and fitness for duty issues; and 

employee error, such as inattentiveness 

or failure to follow a rail transit system’s 

operating procedure. The NTSB also 

identified the lack of a strong safety 

culture and a lack of adequate oversight 

both by the rail transit systems’ State 

Safety Oversight Agencies and FTA. 

Deficiencies in oversight—of the kind 

being addressed by this rulemaking— 

were specifically identified as a 

contributing factor for five of the 19 

major accidents. As a result, the NTSB 

has made improving the operational 

safety of the rail transit industry one of 

its Top Ten Most Wanted Items in 2014. 

FTA has also observed that while 

other modes of surface transportation, 

such as highway and commercial motor 

carrier, freight railroad and commercial 

trucking have achieved significant 

improvements in safety performance 

over the last decade, the public 

transportation industry’s safety 

performance has not improved. Over the 

last decade, the rail transit industry 

actually has experienced increases in 

several key categories, including the 

number and severity of collisions, the 

number of worker fatalities and injuries, 

and the number and severity of 

passenger injuries. In this respect, the 

public transportation industry, and the 

nation’s rail transit agencies in 

particular, are outliers to the overall 

U.S. DOT modal safety experience. 

Perhaps coincidentally, FTA also 

notes that the current level of 

expenditure by the States and rail 

transit agencies on safety oversight 

activities falls considerably below one 

(1) percent of the roughly $4 billion that 

FTA awards to rail transit agencies each 

year. A review of safety programs 

administered by other modal 

administrations, such as the Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA), the 

Federal Highway Administration 

(FHWA), the Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration (FMCSA), and 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA), demonstrates that at least one (1) 

percent of the Federal investment is 

typically devoted to safety oversight 

activities and programs in most other 

related modes of transportation. Other 

modes have determined that this level 

of investment in safety returns positive 

dividends in safety performance while 

also addressing tight budget margins in 

the transportation industry. 

Combined with a lack of resources 

devoted to safety oversight, FTA has 

observed that the operating, 

maintenance and service environments 

of the nation’s rail transit agencies 

continue to change. Rail transit 

ridership is at an all-time high, while 

rail transit equipment and infrastructure 

is in a deteriorated condition. The 

heavier service cycles required to meet 

rising demand in some of the nation’s 

largest urbanized areas create challenges 

for aging infrastructure with potential 

safety implications. FTA’s Transit Asset 

Management (TAM) NPRM, authorized 

at 49 U.S.C. 5326, will attempt to 

address some of these challenges 

through the institution of formal asset 

management programs. 

In addition, this NPRM also 

implements an earlier decision made by 

the Federal Transit Administrator to 

adopt the framework and principles of 

Safety Management Systems (SMS). 

This decision was communicated in a 

May 13, 2013 Dear Colleague letter to 

the public transportation industry. 

FTA’s adoption of SMS better positions 

the SSOAs and rail transit agencies to 

address the nexus between safety and 

state of good repair more effectively. 

MAP–21 Requirements To Address 

Known Gaps in Oversight 

MAP–21 creates a new regulatory role 

for FTA and the States that responds to 

known gaps in oversight and safety 

performance. For example, to address 

noted FTA and NTSB concerns 

regarding conflicts of interest and the 

ability of SSO agencies to act 

independently in the interest of public 

safety, 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(4)(i) specifies 

that each SSO agency must have 

financial and legal independence from 

each of the rail fixed guideway public 


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transportation systems in its 

jurisdiction. 

To address the need for an enhanced 

safety regulatory program, 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(2)(A–B) directs States to assume 

oversight responsibility for rail transit 

agencies in engineering and 

construction, as well as in revenue 

service. This requirement increases the 

number of States subject to the State 

Safety Oversight regulations from 28 to 

30, and increases the number of rail 

transit agencies from 48 to 60 

nationwide. 

MAP–21 SSO Grant Program—Costs to 

States 

The statutory changes to State Safety 

Oversight include a new grant program 

to assist with the costs of compliance. 

Federal financial assistance is now 

available to States to help them develop 

and carry out their State Safety 

Oversight Programs (SSOPs), and may 

be used, specifically, for up to eighty 

percent of both the operational and 

administrative expenses of SSOAs, 

including the expenses of employee 

training. 

On March 10, 2014, FTA announced 

its apportionment of $21,945,771 in 

funding to eligible States for their 

SSOPs and SSOAs for Federal Fiscal 

Year 2013, and $22,293,250 for Federal 

Fiscal Year 2014. 46 FR 13380. In 

addition, on February, 9, 2015, FTA 

announced the apportionment of 

$14,841,808 in funding to eligible States 

for SSOPs and SSOAs for Federal Fiscal 

Year 2015 through May 31, 2015. 80 FR 

7254. Thus, for purposes of cost-benefit 

analysis, this rulemaking is revenue 

neutral between the Federal government 

and the States, and this has been 

factored into the analysis. 

Specifically, in determining the 

additional costs that would be imposed 

through this rulemaking, we have 

factored the net transfer from FTA to the 

States and their SSOAs. The table below 

compares and contrasts the specific 

activities performed, the labor hours 

and the total costs expended under the 

existing 49 CFR part 659 requirements 

(as discussed above) with FTA’s 

proposal for the MAP–21 program 

authorized at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) and 

described in this NPRM. Readers should 

note that the 49 CFR part 659 labor 

hours and costs reflect 28 SSOAs and 48 

rail transit agencies, while the 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e) labor hours and costs reflect 30 

SSOAs and 60 rail transit agencies. As 

discussed above, new definitions in 49 

U.S.C. 5329 expand State Safety 

Oversight requirements to include rail 

transit agencies in construction and 

engineering phases of development. 

Labor estimates for the activities in 

this NPRM were derived based on the 

hours required to complete them as 

reported by States already implementing 

the specific activities; the estimates and 

general discussion provided in the 

Senate report to the Public 

Transportation Safety Act of 2010 (S. 

3638, 111th Congress); and the 

experience of FTA’s legal, policy, grant 

making and safety team. 

This table shows a minimum four-fold 

increase in the level of oversight activity 

performed to implement the NPRM. In 

particular, as part of proposed section 

674.27, SSOAs would be required to 

establish a new set of activities unique 

to the oversight of SMS in the rail 

transit industry. The 30 SSOAs would 

be required to identify their 

‘‘accountable executive’’ for the 

implementation of the SSO program, 

and determine their procedures and 

process for overseeing the effective 

functioning of each rail transit agency’s 

SMS, including overseeing elements 

such as organizational accountability, 

safety climate and culture, committee 

structures, safety performance 

monitoring, safety audits and reviews, 

safety risk management, and, perhaps 

most importantly, the implementation 

and monitoring of safety risk 

mitigations. Through the MAP–21 SSO 

grant program, this additional oversight 

activity will be funded at no additional 

cost to the States. FTA welcomes 

comments and observations regarding 

the hours reported for the part 659 

requirements and the estimates 

presented for the proposed activities in 

this NPRM. 

State oversight agency activity in NPRM 

49 CFR 

part 659 

labor hours 

49 CFR 

part 659 

total cost 

Section 5329 

labor hours 

Section 5329 

total cost 

§ 674.11 Develop State Safety Oversight Program: 

• Explicit Acknowledgement of State Responsibility to Oversee Safety 

of Rail Transit Agencies in Engineering, Construction and Operations * ................................................................................................. 0 $0.00 1,200 $51,240.00 

• Demonstrate Authority to Adopt and Enforce State and Federal 

Regulations * ....................................................................................... 0 0.00 1,200 51,240.00 

• Demonstrate Adequate/Appropriate Staffing Level * .......................... 0 0.00 3,000 128,100.00 

• Demonstrate Qualification and Certification of Staff * ........................ 0 0.00 3,000 128,100.00 

• Demonstrate by Law Prohibition against Receiving Funding from 

Rail Transit Agency * ........................................................................... 0 0.00 600 25,620.00 

§ 674.13 Designation of oversight agency: 

• Legal and Financial Independence Procedures and Disclosures * .... 0 0.00 2,400 102,480.00 

• Annual Updates and Legal and Financial Independence Disclosures 0 0.00 600 25,620.00 

• Documentation of No Provision of Transit Service ............................ 0 0.00 60 2,562.00 

• Documentation of No Employment for Personnel Administering Rail 

Transit Programs ................................................................................ 0 0.00 60 2,562.00 

• Establish and Document Authority to Review, Approve, Oversee, 

and Enforce Agency Safety Plan * ...................................................... 0 0.00 30,000 1,281,000.00 

• Establish and Document Investigative and Enforcement Authority * 0 0.00 30,000 1,281,000.00 

§ 674.15 Designation of oversight agency for multi-state system .............. 0 0.00 3,000 128,100.00 

§ 674.17 Use of Federal financial assistance 

• Identifying and Providing Appropriate Match for Grant Program * ..... 0 0.00 6,000 256,200.00 

• SSO Grant Management and Reporting Activities ............................. 0 0.00 3,000 128,100.00 

§ 674.19 Certification of a State Safety Oversight Program: 

• Certification Pre-Submittal Documentation to FTA ............................. 0 0.00 2,400 102,480.00 

• Work Plan and Quarterly Updates to FTA ......................................... 0 0.00 3,000 128,100.00 

• Initial Certification Documentation ...................................................... 2,860 122,122.00 300 12,810.00 

• Final Certification Documentation ....................................................... 0 0.00 600 25,620.00 

• Maintenance of Annual Certification ................................................... 0 0.00 600 25,620.00 

§ 674.21 Withholding of Federal financial assistance for noncompliance .. 0 0.00 0 0.00 


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State oversight agency activity in NPRM 

49 CFR 

part 659 

labor hours 

49 CFR 

part 659 

total cost 

Section 5329 

labor hours 

Section 5329 

total cost 

§ 674.23 Confidentiality of information: 

• Develop and adopt procedures/regulation to withhold an investigation report from being admitted as evidence or used in a civil action * .................................................................................................... 0 0.00 3,000 128,100.00 

§ 674.25 Role of the State safety oversight agency 

• Establish minimum standards for the safety of rail transit agencies * 0 0.00 30,000 1,281,000.00 

• Update minimum standards as needed or required ........................... 0 0.00 6,000 256,200.00 

• Review and approve Agency Safety Plan (§ 674.29 Transit Agency 

Safety Plans: general requirements) .................................................. 3,840 163,968.00 9,600 409,920.00 

• Review and Approve Supporting and Referenced Procedures ......... 3,072 131,174.40 9,600 409,920.00 

• Review and Approve Annual Updates to Agency Safety Plan and 

Supporting and/or Referenced Procedures ........................................ 3,072 131,174.40 4,800 204,960.00 

• Oversee the Rail Transit Agency’s execution of its Transit Agency 

Safety Plan. ......................................................................................... 8,448 360,729.60 60,000 2,562,000.00 

• Enforce the execution of a Transit Agency Safety Plan, through an 

order of a corrective action plan or any other means, as necessary 

or appropriate. ..................................................................................... 0 0.00 1,200 51,240.00 

• Ensure that a Transit Agency Safety Plan meets the requirements 

for Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans at 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) 

and the regulations that are or may be codified at 49 CFR Part 673 0 0.00 1,200 51,240.00 

• Investigate any hazard or risk that threatens the safety of a Rail 

Transit Agency .................................................................................... 19,200 819,840.00 60,000 2,562,000.00 

• Investigate any allegation of noncompliance with a Transit Agency 

Safety Plan .......................................................................................... 0 0.00 0 0.00 

• Exert primary responsibility to investigate each Rail Transit Agency 

accident ............................................................................................... 0 0.00 0 0.00 

• Enter into agreements with contractors .............................................. 0 0.00 6,000 256,200.00 

• Comply with the requirements of the Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Certification Training Program ................................................. 3,840 163,968.00 24,000 1,024,800.00 

§ 674.27 State safety program standards: 

• Develop and adopt program standard * .............................................. 1,400 59,780.00 6,000 256,200.00 

• Develop and adopt program procedures * .......................................... 1,400 59,780.00 6,000 256,200.00 

• Develop and adopt Safety Management Systems oversight principles and oversight methods * ........................................................... 0 0.00 6,000 256,200.00 

• Review and update program standard and procedures ..................... 2,912 124,342.40 600 25,620.00 

§ 674.31 Triennial audits: general requirements: 

• Conduct Three Year Audit .................................................................. 9,216 393,523.20 36,000 1,537,200.00 

• Document Results and Findings ......................................................... 13,440 573,888.00 12,000 512,400.00 

§ 674.33 Notifications: Accidents and other incidents 

• Receive and track notification of accidents ........................................ 0 0.00 1,000 42,700.00 

• Report to FTA ..................................................................................... 0 0.00 1,000 42,700.00 

§ 674.35 Investigations 

• Prepare Accident Investigation Report ............................................... 5,376 229,555.20 60,000 2,562,000.00 

• Review, Approve and/or Adopt Accident Investigation Reports ......... 6,144 262,348.80 6,000 256,200.00 

§ 674.37 Corrective action plans ................................................................. 15,360 655,872.00 18,000 768,600.00 

§ 674.39 State Safety Oversight Agency annual reporting to FTA ............. 3,528 150,645.60 2,400 102,480.00 

§ 674.41 Conflicts of interest ....................................................................... 0 0.00 600 25,620.00 

Travel ............................................................................................................. 5,376 229,555.20 1,200 51,240.00 

Security .......................................................................................................... 6,912 295,142.40 0 0.00 

Total State Oversight Agencies, including non-recurring costs (Year 1) 115,396 4,927,409.20 463,220 19,779,494.00 

Total State Oversight Agencies, including only recurring costs (Future 

Years) .................................................................................................. 112,596 4,807,849.20 366,020 14,348,054.00 

* Non-recurring cost. 

MAP–21 SSO Grant Program—Costs to 

Rail Transit Agencies 

As discussed above, this NPRM 

implements the framework and 

principles of Safety Management 

Systems. The costs included in the table 

below reflect FTA’s estimation 

regarding the likely requirements of 

SMS adoption by the rail transit 

agencies in critical areas overseen by the 

SSO program, such as investigations, 

inspections, and reviews; safety data 

acquisition and analysis; and safety 

performance monitoring. Notably, we 

have not included the costs to develop 

and update safety plans and procedures 

under today’s NPRM. These costs will 

be included in the Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan 

rulemaking. Therefore, while there are 

non-recurring costs under part 659, 

there are no non-recurring costs 

attributable to this NPRM. 

This table depicts general increases 

on the order of 10 to 20 percent for the 

labor hours in most major activities 

currently performed to implement 49 

CFR part 659, indicating enhanced 

activity in the specific area based on the 

more rigorous MAP–21 SSO program, as 

well as the requirements of additional 

collaboration and coordination with a 

significantly expanded SSO function in 

the State. Additional labor is provided 

to augment internal safety audit 

programs, manage corrective action 

plans, and implement hazard 

management programs. Activities 


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related to the review and approval of 

security plans have been removed for 

the MAP–21 program. 

The most significant changes come in 

the ‘‘accident/incident investigation’’ 

and ‘‘maintain safety data’’ categories. 

With the enhanced role of the SSO 

agencies in accident and incident 

investigation, FTA proposes that the 

amount of time required for rail transit 

agencies to develop reports and 

document results will decrease. 

Through FTA’s adoption of SMS 

principles, FTA and the SSO agencies 

ultimately will be working to ensure 

that operations and maintenance data 

and information can be reviewed and 

assessed in as close to real-time as 

possible to identify and address 

potential safety issues and concerns 

before they result in accidents. Safety 

performance monitoring will become a 

critical component of the SSO program. 

FTA appreciates that the majority of 

this activity may be currently managed 

by other departments and personnel 

outside of the rail transit agency’s safety 

department. For example, management 

information systems have already been 

adopted by rail transit agencies to 

support vehicle and infrastructure 

maintenance, control center operations, 

and construction management. 

However, the data collected and 

maintained in these systems may not be 

routinely assessed for safety issues, 

concerns, hazards or potential impacts. 

FTA’s new MAP–21 program addresses 

NTSB and GAO recommendations that 

each rail transit agency evaluate this 

data from a safety perspective in as 

close to real-time as possible. Thus, the 

agency may be overstating the costs to 

rail transit agencies here, but does 

believe that, even for those rail transit 

agencies that already collect and 

maintain much of this data, there may 

be some additional costs associated with 

assessing this data for safety purposes in 

real-time. 

It should be noted that for the MAP– 

21 columns, this table includes 60 rail 

transit agencies, as opposed to the 48 

rail transit agencies covered by the 49 

CFR part 659 requirements. Even if no 

other changes were addressed, 

increasing the number of covered rail 

transit agencies by 25 percent would 

raise the total cost of the SSO program 

considerably. 

Rail transit agency activity 

49 CFR 

part 659 

labor hours 

49 CFR 

part 659 

total cost 

MAP–21 

labor hours 

MAP–21 

total cost 

Develop system safety program plan * .......................................................... 6,272 $267,814.40 ** 0 ** 0 

Review and update system safety program plan .......................................... 7,550 322,385.00 ** 0 ** 0 

Develop system security plan * ...................................................................... 4,036 172,337.20 0 0.00 

Review and update system security plan ...................................................... 6,208 265,081.60 0 0.00 

Develop program procedures * ...................................................................... 5,946 253,894.20 ** 0 ** 0 

Review and update program procedures ...................................................... 4,142 176,863.40 ** 0 ** 0 

Travel ............................................................................................................. 4,146 177,034.20 4,800 204,960.00 

Conduct internal safety and security reviews ................................................ 15,230 650,321.00 30,000 1,281,000.00 

Prepare internal safety and security review reports ...................................... 8,160 348,432.00 14,400 614,880.00 

Prepare annual internal safety and security review report for state oversight ............................................................................................................ 10,708 457,231.60 21,000 896,700.00 

Conduct accident investigations .................................................................... 30,000 1,281,000.00 24,000 1,024,800.00 

Prepare accident investigation reports .......................................................... 19,168 818,473.60 3,000 128,100.00 

Investigate unacceptable hazardous conditions ............................................ 14,030 599,081.00 60,000 2,562,000.00 

Prepare unacceptable hazardous condition reports ...................................... 12,032 513,766.40 0 0.00 

Implement hazard management process ...................................................... 32,312 1,379,722.40 60,000 2,562,000.00 

Prepare and submit corrective action plans .................................................. 19,090 815,143.00 24,000 1,024,800.00 

Coordinate hazard management program activities with state oversight ..... 23,848 1,018,309.60 30,000 1,281,000.00 

Maintain safety data ...................................................................................... 3,570 152,439.00 240,000 10,248,000.00 

Plan and conduct annual emergency preparedness drill .............................. 3,382 144,411.40 4,800 204,960.00 

Prepare and submit after-action report for annual emergency drill .............. 1,090 46,543.00 1,200 51,240.00 

Maintain security data .................................................................................... 3,570 152,439.00 0 0.00 

Make submissions to state oversight agency ................................................ 2,618 111,788.60 9,600 409,920.00 

Total including non-recurring costs (Year 1) .......................................... 237,108 10,124,511.60 526,800 22,494,360.00 

Total including recurring costs only (Future Years) ............................... 220,854 9,430,465.80 526,800 22,494,360.00 

* Non-recurring cost. 

** FTA will include these costs in the upcoming Transit Agency Safety Plan rulemaking. 

Total Estimated Impact of NPRM 

Based on the tables provided above, 

FTA estimates that minimum 

implementation of this NPRM will 

require a total of approximately $20 

million for the 30 States to implement, 

and a total of roughly $22 million for 

the 60 rail transit agencies to 

implement. 

Compared to current spending levels 

of State Safety Oversight activities, the 

proposed rule would require an 

incremental $9.5 million per year on the 

part of SSOAs and $13.1 million for rail 

transit agencies, compared to current 

spending levels. This represents a 

combined increase of roughly $23 

million per year over current levels. 

In terms of the actual costs to the 

States, FTA is providing approximately 

$22 million in grant funds each year to 

the States to off-set this NPRM’s annual 

costs. This funding is treated as a 

transfer for the purposes of benefit-cost 

analysis. In addition, since the States 

already expend approximately $5 

million to implement 49 CFR part 659 

requirements, this existing expenditure 

will more than cover the 20 percent 

local match required in FTA’s grant 

program. FTA therefore finds that that 

the States will bear no new net costs as 

a result of this NPRM. With regard to 

costs to the rail transit agencies, FTA 

currently provides funding that rail 

transit agencies may use for these 

purposes, but, since there is no safetyfocused grant program similar to that for 

SSOs and each rail transit agency 

receives and uses its formula funds 

differently, we are unable to provide an 

estimate of how much FTA funds will 

be used here. We request comment on 

this point and also will revisit in the 

Transit Agency Safety Plan NPRM. 


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1Rogoff, Peter and Thomson, Kathryn, ‘‘Guidance 

on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical 

Life (VSL) in U.S. Department of Transportation 

Analyses.’’ June 13, 2014. The fatality number is 

$9.2 million. Hospitalized injuries are assumed to 

be equivalent to a ‘‘serious’’ injury on the 

Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS–3); this value is 

10.5% of the VSL, or $966,000. 

FTA believes that a significant portion 

of the incremental expenses may 

comprise activities that are already 

performed—and management 

information systems that are already 

maintained—by rail transit departments 

other than the safety department, such 

as operations, maintenance and 

performance monitoring. For instance, 

FTA reviews at rail transit agencies and 

SSO audits confirm that all rail transit 

agencies use and maintain formal 

systems to track rules checks performed 

on operators; inspections and 

preventative/corrective maintenance 

activities for vehicles and infrastructure; 

reports regarding the occurrence and 

cause of events resulting in service 

delays lasting longer than a prescribed 

period of minutes; and unusual 

occurrences reported during revenue 

service. Therefore, the cost estimate 

calculated above may overstate the true 

incremental costs of the changes to the 

SSO program, but is used here to be 

conservative. FTA requests comment on 

this point. 

Doing more to analyze and assess this 

information from a safety perspective is 

at the core of SMS, and FTA anticipates 

that this level of active review of 

operations and maintenance data will 

ultimately result in cost savings for 

many rail transit agencies, as has been 

the case in the aviation and trucking 

industries. See, e.g., Federal Aviation 

Administration, Final Regulatory 

Evaluation: Safety Management System 

for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental 

Operations, Docket No. FAA–2009– 

0671. Initially, however, FTA 

anticipates that the rail transit agencies 

will be required to spend an additional 

$13.1 million per year to implement this 

NPRM, which equates to approximately 

$228,000 per rail transit agency. Larger 

rail transit agencies will be required to 

assume a larger portion of these costs, 

while smaller rail transit agencies likely 

will spend considerably less. 

As the 60 rail transit agencies affected 

by the NPRM gain greater experience 

with proactive safety data analysis 

focused on safety problem identification 

and the development of mitigation 

strategies, as well as enhanced 

verification techniques to assess the 

effectiveness of the implementation of 

these strategies, FTA expects that, as in 

other transportation industries, the rail 

transit agencies will begin receiving 

greater efficiencies on their return in 

this investment, not just related to 

safety. However, based on the newness 

of SMS implementation in the rail 

transit industry and SSO program, FTA 

does not propose including these kinds 

of operational gains as part of the 

benefits from this NPRM. FTA also has 

not yet had the opportunity to conduct 

SMS pilots in the rail transit industry 

which will provide even greater 

clarification regarding the full impacts 

on both the rail transit agencies and 

SSO program, although the agency is 

planning on conducting pilots to assist 

the industry with implementing SMS. 

The safety benefits of the proposed 

changes are difficult to estimate 

quantitatively because they involve 

numerous small but important changes 

to State and agency safety practices, and 

because the overall rate of serious 

injuries on rail transit systems is already 

quite low. These changes to the SSO 

regulations address longstanding 

deficiencies in the current SSO 

structure and improve the ability of 

SSOAs to carry out their mission of 

improving safety on rail fixed guideway 

transit systems. In addition, NTSB has 

advocated for many of these changes 

based on their investigation of rail 

transit accidents, their analysis of the 

current SSO structure, and their 

expertise in ensuring safe operation 

across all modes of transportation. FTA 

likewise believes that the revised SSO 

structure and associated activities will 

enhance the safety of rail fixed 

guideway transit systems, increasing 

accountability and decreasing transitrelated incidents, injuries, and fatalities. 

That said, although this rule would 

not on its own implement SMS, it does 

create the organizational structure 

needed for SMS to be successful. Thus, 

FTA has considered how other 

transportation modes that are in the 

process of implementing SMS or similar 

systematic approaches to safety have 

estimated the benefits of their programs 

in reducing incidents and adverse 

outcomes. For example, although no 

two programs are identical, the Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA) in its 

NPRM implementing its System Safety 

Program (SSP) (77 FR 55372, Sept. 7, 

2012) provided anecdotal evidence that 

the program could lead to meaningful 

reductions in serious crashes. Similarly, 

in its final rule implementing SMS for 

air carriers, the Federal Aviation 

Administration estimated that its SMS 

program could yield a 20% reduction in 

crashes. 80 FR 1308, Jan. 8, 2015. 

Enhancements brought about by SMS 

also have supported transportation and 

oversight agencies in mitigating the 

impacts of those events that do occur. 

FTA has, therefore, considered what 

percentage of potential safety benefits 

this rule would need to achieve in order 

to ‘‘break even’’ with the costs 

(including both the transfer of funds 

from FTA and the costs to the SSOs and 

rail transit agencies themselves) based 

on two different estimates of the 

potential benefit pool. FTA notes that 

this analysis is not intended to be the 

full analysis of the potential benefits of 

SMS for transit safety, which will be 

conducted in our subsequent safety 

rulemakings; rather, it is intended to 

provide some quantified estimate of the 

potential benefits of the changes to the 

SSO program proposed in this rule. 

Further, we note that this analysis may 

understate the potential benefits 

because we did not have information on 

some non-injury related costs associated 

with many incidents, particularly 

regarding property damage and travel 

delays. Also, as mentioned above, we 

did not include an estimate of FTA 

funds provided to transit agencies for 

these activities because, unlike with 

SSO funding, we did not have sufficient 

certainty on this funding level. 

First, over the last six years, as 

reported by the SSO agencies in their 

annual reports to FTA, the rail transit 

industry has averaged approximately 

975 safety events meeting 49 CFR part 

659 accident reporting thresholds per 

year (i.e. what must be reported). In an 

average year, these events result in 135 

fatalities (of which approximately 85 

per year involve suicides and 

trespassers) and 645 injuries requiring 

hospitalization away from the scene. 

Using Departmental guidance regarding 

the valuation of fatalities and injuries,1

these incidents have an economic value 

of $1.865 billion per year. Rail transit 

incidents also entail costs related to 

vehicle and infrastructure damage, 

delays and disruptions to commuters, 

and emergency response costs. For 

example, the May 2008 collision 

between two light-rail vehicles in 

Newton, Massachusetts, caused $8.6 

million in property damage and caused 

significant service delays during the 

evening rush hour. These additional 

incident costs could not be 

comprehensively quantified due to data 

limitations, and FTA requests comment 

on additional data that may assist it in 

quantifying this aspect of the analysis. 

As an illustrative calculation, based 

on the above analysis, in order for the 

benefits of this rule to break even with 

the costs to both SSOs and rail transit 

agencies, this rule would only need to 

prevent 1.21% of these accidents per 

year, which does not include potentially 

significant unquantified costs related to 

property damage and disruption. FTA 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS4
11020 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

2 Id. 

believes that this level of accident 

reduction will likely be attainable based 

on the NPRM’s proposed enhancements 

to the SSO program and the associated 

improvements in rail transit agency 

safety practices that lend themselves to 

greater awareness of risks and hazards. 

This figure also does not account for the 

$22 million FTA provided the SSOs or 

the FTA formula funds provided to the 

rail transit agencies. If only the SSO 

funds were taken into account, this rule 

would only need to prevent 0.007 of 

these accidents per year in order to 

break even with the increased costs 

directly born by the rail transit agencies. 

A lower break even number would exist 

if FTA were able to provide an estimate 

of the FTA funding used by the rail 

transit agencies for these activities. 

Second, as an alternative, we 

performed a more narrow analysis of the 

potential safety benefits of the proposed 

regulation by reviewing the rail transit 

incidents specifically identified by the 

NTSB as related to inadequate safety 

oversight programs. Of the 19 major rail 

transit accidents the NTSB has 

investigated (or preliminarily 

investigated) since 2004, five had 

probable causes that included 

inadequate safety oversight on the part 

of the rail transit agency or FTA. These 

incidents and the corresponding 

damages and costs are detailed below. 

Date Agency Fatalities Minor injuries Moderate 

injuries Severe injuries Cost of property damage 

2/3/2004 ....... Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) ......... 0 42 0 0 $62,000 

7/11/2006 ..... Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) ......... 0 125 21 6 1,004,900 

6/22/2009 ..... Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA).

9 38 12 2 12,000,000 

1/26/2010 ..... Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA).

2 0 0 0 0 

7/20/2010 ..... Miami-Dade Transit (MDT) .................. 0 16 0 0 406,691 

Total ...... .............................................................. 11 221 33 8 13.5 million 

Again using Departmental guidance 

regarding the valuation of fatalities and 

injuries,2 FTA used a value of $9.2 

million per fatality. NTSB’s qualitative 

injury levels were converted to the 

Abbreviated Injury Scale and monetized 

as follows: Minor is assumed to be AIS– 

1 ($27,000), Moderate is assumed to be 

AIS–2 ($432,000), and Severe is 

(conservatively) assumed to be AIS–3 

($955,000). 

As such, the total quantifiable cost for 

the five incidents is approximately 

$142.6 million (fatalities: $101.2 

million, minor injuries: $6.0 million, 

moderate injuries $14.3 million, severe 

injuries: $7.6 million, property damage: 

$13.5 million) or approximately $14.3 

million per year over a ten year period. 

The average cost per incident was $28.5 

million, plus unquantified losses from 

travel delays and emergency response. 

The most costly incident, the 2009 

WMATA crash, had total costs of over 

$100 million, including $91 million in 

monetized injuries and $12 million in 

property damage. While improved 

safety oversight cannot necessarily 

prevent all rail transit accidents, 

preventing even a single incident on the 

scale of the 2009 WMATA crash would 

yield societal benefits that exceed the 

incremental costs of compliance across 

multiple years of implementation, 

especially when considering FTA’s 

funding of this program. Benefits would 

also accrue from the prevention of 

multiple, less severe incidents, 

including those where only property 

damage or travel delays occur. The 

agency requests comment and 

information on any other accidents that 

have been identified as being related to 

inadequate safety oversight programs. 

In conducting a break even analysis, 

as in the above analysis, when 

considering the incremental costs to 

SSOs for this rule and rail transit 

agencies, this rule would need to 

prevent 1.6 of the types of accidents 

significant enough to be investigated by 

NTSB and identified as being caused by 

inadequate safety oversight per year in 

order to break even. Similarly, when 

FTA funding of the SSOs (but not the 

rail transit agencies) is taken into 

account, this rule would need to prevent 

0.91 of these incidents in order to break 

even. However, we believe that 

including all of the costs to the rail 

transit agencies may overstate the costs 

in this illustrative analysis and is 

therefore a very conservative analysis. 

We request comment on this point. 

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 

All comments received on or before 

the close of business on the comment 

closing date indicated above will be 

considered and will be available for 

examination in the docket at the above 

address. Comments received after the 

closing date will be filed in the docket 

and will be considered to the extent 

practicable. A final rule may be 

published at any time after close of the 

comment period. 

Executive Orders 13563 and 12866; U.S. 

DOT Regulatory Policies and 

Procedures 

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

direct Federal agencies to assess all 

costs and benefits of available regulatory 

alternatives and, if regulation is 

necessary, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits— 

including potential economic, 

environmental, public health and safety 

effects, distributive impacts, and equity. 

Also, Executive Order 13563 

emphasizes the importance of 

quantifying both costs and benefits, 

reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and 

promoting flexibility. FTA is also 

required under 49 U.S.C. 5329(h) to 

‘‘take into consideration the costs and 

benefits of each action the Secretary 

proposes to take under’’ section 5329. 

FTA has determined this rulemaking 

is a nonsignificant regulatory action 

within the meaning of Executive Order 

12866 and is nonsignificant within the 

meaning of the U.S. Department of 

Transportation’s regulatory policies and 

procedures. FTA has determined that 

this rulemaking is not economically 

significant. The proposals set forth in 

this NPRM will not result in an effect on 

the economy of $100 million or more. 

The proposals set forth in the NPRM 

will not adversely affect the economy, 

interfere with actions taken or planned 

by other agencies, or generally alter the 

budgetary impact of any entitlements, 

grants, user fees, or loan programs. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

In compliance with the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96–354; 5 U.S.C. 

601–612), FTA has evaluated the likely 

effects of the proposals set forth in this 

NPRM on small entities, and has 

determined that they will not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The recipients of the State Safety 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS4
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Oversight funds are eligible States, and 

the entities that will carry out the 

oversight of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation—the SSOAs—are State 

agencies. For this reason, FTA certifies 

that this action will not have a 

significant economic effect on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

This proposed rulemaking would not 

impose unfunded mandates as defined 

by the Unfunded Mandates Reform act 

of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4; 109 Stat. 48). 

The Federal share for the grants made 

under 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6) is eighty 

percent. This proposed rule will not 

result in the expenditure by State, local, 

and tribal governments, in the aggregate, 

or by the private sector, of $143.1 

million or more in any one year (2 

U.S.C. 1532). 

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism) 

This proposed rulemaking has been 

analyzed in accordance with the 

principles and criteria established by 

Executive Order 13132 (Aug. 4, 1999), 

and FTA has determined that the 

proposed action would not have 

sufficient Federalism implications to 

warrant the preparation of a Federalism 

assessment. FTA has also determined 

that this proposed action would not 

preempt any State law or State 

regulation or affect the States’ abilities 

to discharge traditional State 

governmental functions. Moreover, 

consistent with Executive Order 13132, 

FTA has examined the direct 

compliance costs of the NPRM on State 

and local governments and determined 

that the collection and analysis of the 

data is eligible for Federal funding as 

part of the State Safety Oversight 

program costs. 

Executive Order 12372 

(Intergovernmental Review) 

The regulations effectuating Executive 

Order 12372 regarding 

intergovernmental consultation on 

Federal programs and activities apply to 

this proposed rulemaking. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

In compliance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 

et seq.; ‘‘PRA’’) and the OMB regulation 

at 5 CFR 1320.8(d), FTA is seeking 

approval from OMB for the Information 

Collection Request abstracted below. 

FTA acknowledges that this NPRM 

entails collection of information to 

facilitate State Safety Oversight of rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems, including, specifically, annual 

status reporting on the safety of rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems, triennial auditing of rail transit 

systems’ compliance with their public 

transportation agency safety plans, 

requests for FTA certification of State 

Safety Oversight programs, and 

completion of public transportation 

safety certification training programs— 

all of which are mandated by 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e). Therefore, FTA is seeking 

comment whether the information 

collected will have practical utility; 

whether its estimation of the burden of 

the proposed information collection is 

accurate; whether the burden can be 

minimized through the use of 

automated collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology; 

and for ways in which the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information 

can be enhanced. 

Readers should note that the 

information collection will be specific 

to each State and its State Safety 

Oversight Agency (SSOA), to facilitate 

and record the SSOA’s exercise of its 

oversight responsibilities. The 

paperwork burden for each State and its 

SSOA will be proportionate to the 

number of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems within that State, 

the type of mode of those systems (e.g., 

rapid rail, light rail, or streetcar), and 

the size and complexity of those rail 

transit systems. Moreover, the laborburden of the reporting requirements 

such as annual reporting and triennial 

auditing are largely borne by the SSOA 

staff that will be financed, in the main, 

by the Federal financial assistance 

under 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6). 

Also, readers should note that FTA 

already collects information from States 

and SSOAs in accordance with the 

requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5330 and the 

regulations at 49 CFR part 659. Please 

see FTA’s currently approved 

collection, 2132–0558, available at 

http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/

PRAMain, which describes the SSOAs’ 

development of program standards and 

their review and approval of System 

Safety Program Plans and System 

Security Plans for rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems; the 

triennial, on-site reviews that SSOAs 

conduct of rail transit systems; and 

various other reporting, such as SSOAs’ 

review and approval of accident reports 

and corrective action plans, and 

submittal of annual reports of safety and 

security oversight activities and 

certifications of compliance with 

Section 5330. Most if not all of the 

information collection from States and 

SSOAs under 49 U.S.C. 5330 and 49 

CFR part 659 will carry over into the 

new State Safety Oversight program 

codified at 49 U.S.C. 5329 and the 

specific requirements proposed in 

today’s rulemaking. 

Heretofore, there has been no Federal 

financial assistance available to States 

and their SSOAs to defray the costs of 

information collection under 49 U.S.C. 

5330 and the longstanding regulations at 

49 CFR part 659. The costs of 

information collection associated with 

today’s NPRM would be eligible for 

reimbursement under the SSO grants 

authorized by 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6). 

Type of Collection: Rail Fixed 

Guideway Systems; State Safety 

Oversight. 

Type of Review: OMB Clearance. 

Updated information collection request. 

Summary of the Collection: The 

information collection includes annual 

status reporting on the safety of rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems, triennial auditing of rail transit 

systems’ compliance with their public 

transportation agency safety plans, 

requests for FTA certification of State 

Safety Oversight programs, and 

completion of public transportation 

safety certification training programs. 

Need for and Expected Use of the 

Information to be Collected: Collection 

of information for this program is 

necessary to ensure that state oversight 

agencies can perform their designated 

safety functions. Without 

comprehensive safety information from 

rail transit agencies, State safety 

oversight agencies would be unable to 

monitor safety as directed by 49 U.S.C. 

5326, and without the State safety 

oversight reporting requirements, FTA 

would be unable to determine each 

State’s compliance with 49 U.S.C. 

5326(e). 

Respondents: Currently there are 30 

States with 60 rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems. Twentyeight of these States have already 

established a State Safety Oversight 

program and an SSOA; two more have 

indicated their intention to do so in the 

near future. The PRA estimate is based 

on a total of 30 States deploying SSOAs 

and seeking Federal financial assistance 

under 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6), per year. 

Frequency: Information will be 

collected at least once per year. 

Estimated Total Annual Burden 

Hours: 230,130, estimated as follows: 

Annually, each SSOA would devote 

approximately 3,962 hours to 

information collection activities for each 

of the rail transit systems in the State’s 

jurisdiction. Combined, the SSOAs 

would devote approximately 118,860 

hours on those information collection 

activities that year. The local 

governments affected by 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e) and today’s proposed 

rulemaking, including the 60 rail fixed 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS4
11022 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

guideway public transportation systems, 

would spend an estimated annual total 

of 111,300 hours on information 

collection activities, or approximately 

1,855 hours each. Also, the States and 

SSOAs would spend approximately 50 

hours each in the preparation of 

applications for Federal financial 

assistance for their SSO programs, for a 

combined estimate of 1,500 hours per 

year. FTA will post the supporting 

documentation for this collection in the 

docket for this NPRM. 

National Environmental Policy Act 

The National Environmental Policy 

Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) 

requires Federal agencies to analyze the 

potential environmental effects of their 

proposed actions in the form of a 

categorical exclusion, environmental 

assessment, or environmental impact 

statement. This proposed rulemaking is 

categorically excluded under FTA’s 

environmental impact procedure at 23 

CFR 771.117(c)(20), pertaining to 

planning and administrative activities 

that do not involve or lead directly to 

construction, such as the promulgation 

of rules, regulations, and directives. 

FTA has determined that no unusual 

circumstances exist in this instance, and 

that a categorical exclusion is 

appropriate for this rulemaking. 

Executive Order 12630 (Taking of 

Private Property) 

This rulemaking will not affect a 

taking of private property or otherwise 

have taking implications under 

Executive Order 12630 (March 15, 

1998), Governmental Actions and 

Interference with Constitutionally 

Protected Property Rights. 

Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions 

to Address Environmental Justice in 

Minority Populations and Low-Income 

Populations) 

Executive Order 12898 (Feb. 8, 1994) 

directs every Federal agency to make 

environmental justice part of its mission 

by identifying and addressing the effects 

of all programs, policies, and activities 

on minority populations and lowincome populations. The USDOT 

environmental justice initiatives 

accomplish this goal by involving the 

potentially affected public in 

developing transportation projects that 

fit harmoniously within their 

communities without compromising 

safety or mobility. Additionally, FTA 

has issued a program circular 

addressing environmental justice in 

public transportation, C 4703.1, 

Environmental Justice Policy Guidance 

for Federal Transit Administration 

Recipients. This circular provides a 

framework for FTA grantees as they 

integrate principles of environmental 

justice into their transit decision-making 

processes. The Circular includes 

recommendations for State Departments 

of Transportation, Metropolitan 

Planning Organizations, and public 

transportation systems on (1) How to 

fully engage environmental justice 

populations in the transportation 

decision-making process; (2) How to 

determine whether environmental 

justice populations would be subjected 

to disproportionately high and adverse 

human health or environmental effects 

of a public transportation project, 

policy, or activity; and (3) How to avoid, 

minimize, or mitigate these effects. 

Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice 

Reform) 

This action meets the applicable 

standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of 

Executive Order 12988 (Feb. 5, 1996), 

Civil Justice Reform, to minimize 

litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and 

reduce burden. 

Executive Order 13045 (Protection of 

Children) 

FTA has analyzed this proposed 

rulemaking under Executive Order 

13045 (April 21, 1997), Protection of 

Children from Environmental Health 

Risks and Safety Risks. FTA certifies 

that this proposed rule will not cause an 

environmental risk to health or safety 

that may disproportionately affect 

children. 

Executive Order 13175 (Tribal 

Consultation) 

FTA has analyzed this proposed 

rulemaking under Executive Order 

13175 (Nov. 6, 2000) and finds that the 

action will not have substantial direct 

effects on one or more Indian tribes; will 

not impose substantial direct 

compliance costs on Indian tribal 

governments; will not preempt tribal 

laws; and will not impose any new 

consultation requirements on Indian 

tribal governments. Therefore, a tribal 

summary impact statement is not 

required. 

Executive Order 13211 (Energy Effects) 

FTA has analyzed this proposed 

rulemaking under Executive Order 

13211, Actions Concerning Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). 

FTA has determined that this action is 

not a significant energy action under the 

Executive Order, given that the action is 

not likely to have a significant adverse 

effect on the supply, distribution, or use 

of energy. Therefore, a Statement of 

Energy Effects is not requirement. 

Privacy Act 

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), 

DOT solicits comments from the public 

to better inform its rulemaking process. 

DOT posts these comments, without 

edit, including any personal information 

the commenter provides, to 

www.regulations.gov, as described in 

the system of records notice (DOT/ALL– 

14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 

www.dot.gov/privacy. 

Statutory/Legal Authority for This 

Rulemaking 

This rulemaking is issued under the 

authority of section 20021(a) of the 

Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st 

Century Act (MAP–21), which requires 

the Secretary of Transportation to 

prescribe regulations for State Safety 

Oversight of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems. The authority is 

codified at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(9)(C). Also, 

the Secretary is authorized to issue 

regulations to carry out the general 

provisions of the Public Transportation 

Safety Program pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 

5329(f)(7). 

Regulation Identification Number 

A Regulation Identification Number 

(RIN) is assigned to each regulatory 

action listed in the Unified Agenda of 

Federal Regulations. The Regulatory 

Information Service Center publishes 

the Unified Agenda in April and 

October of each year. The RIN set forth 

in the heading of this document can be 

used to cross-reference this action with 

the Unified Agenda. 

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 674 

Grant Programs—Transportation, 

Mass Transportation, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Safety. 

Issued in Washington, DC under the 

authority delegated at 49 CFR 1.91. 

Therese McMillan, 

Acting Administrator. 

For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble, and under the authority of 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e), 5329(f), and the 

delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.91, 

FTA hereby amends Chapter VI of Title 

49, Code of Federal Regulations, by 

adding Part 674, as set forth below: 

Title 49—Transportation 

PART 674—STATE SAFETY 

OVERSIGHT 

Subpart A—General Provisions 

Sec. 

674.1 Purpose. 

674.3 Applicability. 

674.5 Policy. 

674.7 Definitions. 


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674.9 Transition from previous 

requirements for State safety oversight. 

Subpart B—Role of the State 

674.11 State Safety Oversight Program. 

674.13 Designation of oversight agency. 

674.15 Designation of oversight agency for 

multi-state system. 

674.17 Use of Federal financial assistance. 

674.19 Certification of a State Safety 

Oversight Program. 

674.21 Withholding of Federal financial 

assistance for noncompliance. 

674.23 Confidentiality of information. 

Subpart C—State Safety Oversight 

Agencies 

674.25 Role of the State Safety Oversight 

Agency. 

674.27 State safety program standards. 

674.29 Transit Agency Safety Plans: general 

requirements. 

674.31 Triennial audits: general 

requirements. 

674.33 Notifications: Accidents and 

incidents. 

674.35 Investigations. 

674.37 Corrective action plans. 

674.39 State Safety Oversight Agency 

annual reporting to FTA. 

674.41 Conflicts of interest. 

Appendix A to Part 674—Safety Management 

Systems Framework 

Subpart A—General Provisions 

§ 674.1 Purpose. 

This part carries out the mandate of 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e) for State safety 

oversight of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems. 

§ 674.3 Applicability. 

This part applies to States with rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems; State safety oversight agencies 

that oversee the safety of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems; 

and entities that own or operate rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems with Federal financial 

assistance authorized under 49 U.S.C. 

Chapter 53. 

§ 674.5 Policy. 

(a) The Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA) has adopted the 

principles and methods of Safety 

Management Systems (SMS) as the basis 

for enhancing the safety of public 

transportation in the United States. All 

rules, regulations, policies, guidance, 

best practices, and technical assistance 

administered under the authority of 49 

U.S.C. 5329 will follow the principles 

and methods of SMS. 

(b) In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e), a State that has a rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

has primary responsibility for 

overseeing the safety of that rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system. 

A State safety oversight agency must 

have sufficient authority, resources, and 

qualified personnel to oversee the 

number, size, and complexity of rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems that operate within a State. 

(c) FTA will make Federal financial 

assistance available to help an eligible 

State develop or carry out its State 

safety oversight program. Also, FTA will 

certify whether a State safety oversight 

program meets the requirements of 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e) and is adequate to 

promote the purposes of the public 

transportation safety programs codified 

at 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

§ 674.7 Definitions. 

As used in this part: 

Accident means an Event that 

involves any of the following: A fatality; 

one or more persons suffers a serious 

injury; property or equipment damage 

equal to or greater than $25,000; a 

mainline derailment, occurring at any 

location; an evacuation of equipment or 

a station to prevent injury or loss of life. 

Accountable Executive means a 

single, identifiable person who has 

ultimate responsibility for carrying out 

the Safety Management System of a 

public transportation agency; 

responsibility for carrying out the 

agency’s Transit Asset Management 

Plan; and control or direction over the 

human and capital resources needed to 

develop and maintain both the agency’s 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(d), and the agency’s Transit Asset 

Management Plan in accordance with 49 

U.S.C. 5326. 

Administrator means the Federal 

Transit Administrator or the 

Administrator’s designee. 

Contractor means an entity that 

performs tasks on behalf of FTA, a State 

Safety Oversight Agency, or a Rail 

Transit Agency, through contract or 

other agreement. 

Corrective action plan means a plan 

developed by a Rail Transit Agency that 

describes the actions the Rail Transit 

Agency will take to minimize, control, 

correct, or eliminate risks and hazards, 

and the schedule for taking those 

actions. Either a State Safety Oversight 

Agency or FTA may require a Rail 

Transit Agency to develop and carry out 

a corrective action plan. 

FRA means the Federal Railroad 

Administration, an agency within the 

United States Department of 

Transportation. 

FTA means the Federal Transit 

Administration, an agency within the 

United States Department of 

Transportation. 

Event means any Accident, Incident 

or Occurrence. 

Hazard means any real or potential 

condition that can cause injury, illness, 

or death; damage to or loss of the 

facilities, equipment, or property of a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system; or damage to the 

environment. 

Incident means an Event that exceeds 

the definition of an Occurrence, but 

does not meet the requirements of an 

Accident. Examples include, but are not 

limited to: A near miss or close call, a 

railyard derailment, non-serious 

injuries, a violation of a safety standard, 

or equipment or property damage less 

than $25,000 that affects transit 

operations. 

Individual means a passenger, 

employee, contractor, pedestrian, 

trespasser, or any person on the 

property of a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system. 

Investigation means the process of 

determining the causal and contributing 

factors of an accident, incident, or 

hazard, for the purpose of preventing 

recurrence and mitigating risk. 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan means the plan to improve the 

safety of all public transportation 

systems that receive Federal financial 

assistance under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53; 

authorized by 49 U.S.C. 5329(b). 

Occurrence means an Event with no 

injuries, where damage occurs to 

property or equipment but does not 

affect transit operations. 

Passenger means a person who is on 

board, boarding, or alighting from a 

vehicle on a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system for the purpose of 

travel. 

Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program means 

either the certification training program 

for Federal and State employees, or 

other designated personnel, who 

conduct safety audits and examinations 

of public transportation systems, and 

employees of public transportation 

agencies directly responsible for safety 

oversight, established through interim 

provisions in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(c)(2), or the program authorized by 

49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1). 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan means the comprehensive agency 

safety plan for a transit agency, 

including a Rail Transit Agency, that is 

required by 49 U.S.C. 5329(d); based on 

a Safety Management System. For 

convenience, a Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plan is referred to as a 

‘‘Transit Agency Safety Plan’’ 

throughout these regulations for State 

Safety Oversight. 

Rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system means any fixed 

guideway system that uses rail, is 


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operated for public transportation, is 

within the jurisdiction of a State, and is 

not subject to the jurisdiction of the 

Federal Railroad Administration, or any 

such system in engineering or 

construction. Rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems include 

but are not limited to rapid rail, heavy 

rail, light rail, monorail, trolley, 

inclined plane, funicular, and 

automated guideway. 

Rail Transit Agency means any entity 

that provides services on a rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system. 

Risk means the composite of 

predicted severity and likelihood of the 

potential effect of a hazard. 

Risk control means a method or 

methods to eliminate or reduce the 

effects of hazards. 

Safety assurance means processes 

within a Rail Transit Agency’s Safety 

Management System that function to 

ensure the performance and 

effectiveness of safety risk controls, and 

to ensure that the Rail Transit Agency 

meets or exceeds its safety objectives 

through the collection, analysis, and 

assessment of information. 

Safety Management System (SMS) 

means the formal, top-down, 

organization-wide approach to 

managing safety risk and assuring the 

effectiveness of a Rail Transit Agency’s 

safety risk controls. SMS includes 

systematic procedures, practices, and 

policies for managing risks and hazards. 

Safety policy means a Rail Transit 

Agency’s documented commitment to 

safety, which defines the Rail Transit 

Agency’s safety objectives and the 

accountabilities and responsibilities of 

its employees in regard to safety. 

Safety promotion means a 

combination of training and 

communication of safety information to 

support SMS as applied to the Rail 

Transit Agency’s rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system. 

Safety risk management means a 

process within a Rail Transit Agency’s 

SMS that describes the Rail Transit 

Agency’s practice of SMS, and its means 

for identifying hazards and analyzing, 

assessing, and controlling risk. 

Serious injury means any injury 

which: 

(1) Requires hospitalization for more 

than 48 hours, commencing within 7 

days from the date of the injury was 

received; 

(2) results in a fracture of any bone 

(except simple fractures of fingers, toes, 

or nose); 

(3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, 

muscle, or tendon damage; 

(4) involves any internal organ; or 

(5) involves second- or third-degree 

burns, or any burns affecting more than 

5 percent of the body surface. 

State means a State of the United 

States, the District of Columbia, Puerto 

Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, 

Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin 

Islands. 

State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) 

means an agency established by a State 

that meets the requirements and 

performs the functions specified by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e) and the regulations set 

forth in this part. 

Transit Agency Safety Plan means the 

comprehensive agency safety plan for a 

transit agency, including a Rail Transit 

Agency, that is required by 49 U.S.C. 

5329(d); based on a Safety Management 

System. See also, Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plan. 

Vehicle means any rolling stock used 

on a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system, including but not 

limited to passenger and maintenance 

vehicles. 

§ 674.9 Transition from previous 

requirements for State safety oversight. 

(a) Pursuant to section 20030(e) of the 

Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st 

Century Act (Pub. L. 112–141; July 6, 

2012) (‘‘MAP–21’’), the statute now 

codified at 49 U.S.C. 5330, titled ‘‘State 

safety oversight,’’ will be repealed three 

years after the effective date of the 

regulations set forth in this part. 

(b) Upon the effective date of the 

regulations set forth in this part, the 

regulations now codified at part 659 of 

this chapter will be rescinded. 

Subpart B—Role of the State 

§ 674.11 State Safety Oversight Program. 

Within three years of the effective 

date of this part, every State that has a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system must have a State 

Safety Oversight Program (SSOP) that 

has been approved by the 

Administrator. FTA will audit each 

State’s compliance at least triennially, 

consistent with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(9). At 

minimum, an SSOP must: 

(a) Explicitly acknowledge the State’s 

responsibility for overseeing the safety 

of the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems within the State; 

(b) Demonstrate the State’s ability to 

adopt and enforce Federal and relevant 

State law for safety in rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems; 

(c) Establish a State safety oversight 

agency, by State law, in accordance with 

the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) 

and this part; 

(d) Demonstrate that the State has 

determined an appropriate staffing level 

for the State safety oversight agency 

commensurate with the number, size, 

and complexity of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

in the State, and that the State has 

consulted with the Administrator for 

that purpose; 

(e) Demonstrate that the employees 

and other personnel of the State safety 

oversight agency who are responsible 

for the oversight of rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems are 

qualified to perform their functions, 

based on appropriate training, including 

the successful completion of the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program; and 

(f) Demonstrate that by law, the State 

prohibits any public transportation 

agency in the State from providing 

funds to the State safety oversight 

agency. 

§ 674.13 Designation of oversight agency. 

(a) Every State that must establish a 

State Safety Oversight Program in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) must 

also establish a State Safety Oversight 

Agency (SSOA) for the purpose of 

overseeing the safety of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

within that State. Further, the State 

must ensure that: 

(1) The SSOA is financially and 

legally independent from any public 

transportation agency the SSOA is 

obliged to oversee; 

(2) The SSOA does not directly 

provide public transportation services 

in an area with a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system the SSOA 

is obliged to oversee; 

(3) The SSOA does not employ any 

individual who is also responsible for 

administering a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system the SSOA 

is obliged to oversee; 

(4) The SSOA has authority to review, 

approve, oversee, and enforce the public 

transportation agency safety plan for a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system required by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(d); 

(5) The SSOA has investigative and 

enforcement authority with respect to 

the safety of all rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems within the 

State; 

(6) At least once every three years, the 

SSOA audits every rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system’s 

compliance with the public 

transportation agency safety plan 

required by 49 U.S.C. 5329(d); and 

(7) At least once a year, the SSOA 

reports the status of the safety of each 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system to the Governor, 

the FTA, and the board of directors, or 


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equivalent entity, of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system. 

(b) At the request of the Governor of 

a State, the Administrator may waive 

the requirements for financial and legal 

independence and the prohibitions on 

employee conflict of interest under 

paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3) of this 

section, if the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems in design, 

construction, or revenue operations in 

the State have fewer than one million 

combined actual and projected rail fixed 

guideway revenue miles per year or 

provide fewer than ten million 

combined actual and projected unlinked 

passenger trips per year. However: 

(1) If a State shares jurisdiction over 

one or more rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems with another 

State, and has one or more rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that are not shared with another State, 

the revenue miles and unlinked 

passenger trips of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

under shared jurisdiction will not be 

counted in the Administrator’s decision 

whether to issue a waiver. 

(2) The Administrator will rescind a 

waiver issued under this subsection if 

the number of revenue miles per year or 

unlinked passenger trips per year 

increases beyond the thresholds 

specified in this subsection. 

§ 674.15 Designation of oversight agency 

for multi-state system. 

In an instance of a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system that 

operates in more than one State, all 

States in which that rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system operates 

must either: 

(a) Ensure that uniform safety 

standards and procedures in compliance 

with 49 U.S.C. 5329 are applied to that 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system, through a State 

safety oversight program that has been 

approved by the Administrator; or 

(b) Designate a single entity that meets 

the requirements for an SSOA to serve 

as the SSOA for that rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system, through a 

State safety oversight program that has 

been approved by the Administrator. 

§ 674.17 Use of Federal financial 

assistance. 

(a) In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(6), FTA will make grants of 

Federal financial assistance to eligible 

States to help the States develop and 

carry out their State Safety Oversight 

Programs. This Federal financial 

assistance may be used for 

reimbursement of both the operational 

and administrative expenses of State 

Safety Oversight Programs, consistent 

with the uniform administrative 

requirements for grants to States under 

2 CFR parts 200 and 1201. The expenses 

eligible for reimbursement include, 

specifically, the expense of employee 

training and the expense of establishing 

and maintaining a State Safety 

Oversight Agency in compliance with 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(4). 

(b) The apportionments of available 

Federal financial assistance to eligible 

States will be made in accordance with 

a formula, established by the 

Administrator, following opportunity 

for public notice and comment. The 

formula will take into account fixed 

guideway vehicle revenue miles, fixed 

guideway route miles, and fixed 

guideway vehicle passenger miles 

attributable to all rail fixed guideway 

systems within each eligible State not 

subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 

Railroad Administration. 

(c) The grants of Federal financial 

assistance for State safety oversight shall 

be subject to terms and conditions as the 

Administrator deems appropriate. 

(d) The Federal share of the expenses 

eligible for reimbursement under a grant 

for State safety oversight activities shall 

be eighty percent of the reasonable costs 

incurred under that grant. 

(e) The non-Federal share of the 

expenses eligible for reimbursement 

under a grant for State safety oversight 

activities may not be comprised of 

Federal funds, any funds received from 

a public transportation agency, or any 

revenues earned by a public 

transportation agency. 

§ 674.19 Certification of a State Safety 

Oversight Program. 

(a) The Administrator must determine 

whether a State Safety Oversight 

Program meets the requirements of 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e). Also, the Administrator 

must determine whether a State Safety 

Oversight Program is adequate to 

promote the purposes of 49 U.S.C. 5329, 

including, but not limited to, the 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan, the Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program, and the 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans (‘‘Transit Agency Safety Plans’’). 

(b) The Administrator must issue a 

certification to a State whose State 

Safety Oversight Program meets the 

requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e). The 

Administrator must issue a denial of 

certification to a State whose State 

Safety Oversight Program does not meet 

the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e). 

(c) In an instance in which the 

Administrator issues a denial of 

certification to a State whose State 

Safety Oversight Program does not meet 

the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e), 

the Administrator must provide a 

written explanation, and allow the State 

an opportunity to modify and resubmit 

its State Safety Oversight Program for 

the Administrator’s approval. In the 

event the State is unable to modify its 

State Safety Oversight Program to merit 

the Administrator’s issuance of a 

certification, the Administrator must 

notify the Governor of that fact, and 

must ask the Governor to take all 

possible actions to correct the 

deficiencies that are precluding the 

issuance of a certification for the State 

Safety Oversight Program. In his or her 

discretion, the Administrator may also 

impose financial penalties as authorized 

by 49 U.S.C. 5329(e), which may 

include: 

(1) Withholding SSO grant funds from 

the State; 

(2) Withholding up to five percent of 

the 49 U.S.C. 5307 Urbanized Area 

formula funds appropriated for use in 

the State or urbanized area in the State, 

until such time as the SSOP can be 

certified; or 

(3) Requiring all of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

governed by the SSOP to spend up to 

100 percent of their Federal funding 

under 49 U.S.C. chapter 53 for ‘‘safetyrelated improvements’’ on their systems, 

only, until such time as the SSOP can 

be certified.). 

(d) In making a determination 

whether to issue a certification or a 

denial of certification for a State Safety 

Oversight Program, the Administrator 

must evaluate whether the cognizant 

State Safety Oversight Agency has 

sufficient authority, resources, and 

expertise to oversee the number, size, 

and complexity of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that operate within the State, or will 

attain the necessary authority, 

resources, and expertise in accordance 

with a developmental plan and 

schedule set forth to a sufficient level of 

detail in the State Safety Oversight 

Program. 

§ 674.21 Withholding of Federal financial 

assistance for noncompliance. 

(a) In making a decision to impose 

financial penalties as authorized by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e), and determining the 

nature and amount of the financial 

penalties, the Administrator shall 

consider the extent and circumstances 

of the noncompliance; the operating 

budgets of the State Safety Oversight 

Agency and the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems that will 

be affected by the financial penalties; 

and such other matters as justice may 

require. 


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(b) If a State fails to establish a State 

Safety Oversight Program that has been 

approved by the Administrator within 

three years of the effective date of this 

part, FTA will be prohibited from 

obligating Federal financial assistance 

apportioned under 49 U.S.C. 5338 to 

any entity in the State otherwise eligible 

to receive that Federal financial 

assistance, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(3). 

§ 674.23 Confidentiality of information. 

(a) A State, a State Safety Oversight 

Agency, or a Rail Transit Agency may 

withhold an investigation report 

prepared or adopted in accordance with 

these regulations from being admitted as 

evidence or used in a civil action for 

damages resulting from a matter 

mentioned in the report. 

(b) This part does not require public 

availability of any data, information, or 

procedures pertaining to the security of 

a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system or its passenger 

operations. 

Subpart C—State Safety Oversight 

Agencies 

§ 674.25 Role of the State safety oversight 

agency. 

(a) A State Safety Oversight Agency 

(SSOA) must establish minimum 

standards for the safety of all rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

within its oversight. These minimum 

standards must be consistent with the 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan, the Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program, the 

principles and methods of Safety 

Management Systems, and all 

applicable Federal and State law. 

(b) Basic principles and methods of 

Safety Management Systems are set 

forth in an Appendix to this part, the 

‘‘Safety Management Systems (SMS) 

Framework.’’ 

(c) An SSOA must review and 

approve the Transit Agency Safety Plan 

for every rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system within its 

oversight. An SSOA must oversee a Rail 

Transit Agency’s execution of its Transit 

Agency Safety Plan. An SSOA must 

enforce the execution of a Transit 

Agency Safety Plan, through an order of 

a corrective action plan or any other 

means, as necessary or appropriate. An 

SSOA must ensure that a Transit 

Agency Safety Plan meets the 

requirements for Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plans at 49 U.S.C. 

5329(d). 

(d) An SSOA has primary 

responsibility for the investigation of 

any hazard or risk that threatens the 

safety of a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system within its 

oversight. An SSOA has primary 

responsibility for the investigation of 

any allegation of noncompliance with a 

Transit Agency Safety Plan. These 

responsibilities do not preclude the 

Administrator from exercising his or her 

authority under 49 U.S.C. 5329(f) or 49 

U.S.C. 5330. 

(e) An SSOA has primary 

responsibility for the investigation of an 

accident on a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system. This 

responsibility does not preclude the 

Administrator from exercising his or her 

authority under 49 U.S.C. 5329(f) or 49 

U.S.C. 5330. 

(f) An SSOA may enter into an 

agreement with a contractor for 

assistance in investigating accidents and 

incidents and for expertise the SSOA 

does not have within its own 

organization. 

(g) All personnel and contractors 

employed by an SSOA must comply 

with the requirements of the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program. 

§ 674.27 State safety program standards. 

(a) A State Safety Oversight Agency 

(SSOA) must adopt and distribute a 

written State safety oversight program 

standard, consistent with the State 

Safety Oversight Program, the National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan, and 

the principles and methods of Safety 

Management Systems. This program 

standard must identify the processes 

and procedures that govern the 

activities of the SSOA. Also, this 

program standard must identify the 

processes and procedures a Rail Transit 

Agency must have in place to comply 

with the program standard. At 

minimum, this program standard must 

meet the following requirements: 

(1) Program management. The 

program standard must explain the 

authority of the SSOA to oversee the 

safety of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems; the policies that 

govern the activities of the SSOA; the 

reporting requirements that govern both 

the SSOA and the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems; and the 

steps the SSOA will take to ensure 

open, on-going communication between 

the SSOA and every rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system within its 

oversight. 

(2) Program standard development. 

The program standard must explain the 

SSOA’s process for developing, 

reviewing, adopting, and revising its 

minimum standards for safety, and 

distributing those standards to the rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems. 

(3) Safety Management Systems. The 

program standard must explain how the 

SSOA will apply the principles and 

methods of Safety Management Systems 

(SMS) in conducting oversight of 

Transit Agencies within its jurisdiction. 

The program standard must identify the 

SSOA official who serves as the 

functional equivalent of an accountable 

executive in a Rail Transit Agency, and 

all other officials in positions of 

executive leadership in the State or 

SSOA responsible for carrying out the 

State Safety Oversight Program. The 

program standard must set an explicit 

policy and objectives for safety in rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

throughout the State. The program 

standard must explain the role of the 

SSOA in overseeing a Rail Transit 

Agency’s practice of risk management, 

safety assurance, and safety promotion, 

throughout the Rail Transit Agency’s 

organization. Basic principles and 

methods of SMS are set forth in an 

Appendix to this part, the ‘‘System 

Management Systems (SMS) 

Framework.’’ 

(4) Oversight of Rail Transit Agency 

Safety Plans and Transit Agencies’ 

internal safety reviews. The program 

standard must explain the role of the 

SSOA in overseeing a Rail Transit 

Agency’s execution of its Transit 

Agency Safety Plan and any related 

safety reviews of the Rail Transit 

Agency’s rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system. The program 

standard must describe the process 

whereby the SSOA will receive and 

evaluate all material submitted under 

the signature of a Rail Transit Agency’s 

accountable executive. Also, the 

program standard must establish a 

procedure whereby a Rail Transit 

Agency will notify the SSOA before the 

Rail Transit Agency conducts an 

internal review of any aspect of the 

safety of its rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system. 

(5) Triennial SSOA audits of Rail 

Transit Agency Safety Plans. The 

program standard must explain the 

process the SSOA will follow and the 

criteria the SSOA will apply in 

conducting a complete audit of the Rail 

Transit Agency’s compliance with its 

Transit Agency Safety Plan at least once 

every three years, in accordance with 49 

U.S.C. 5329(d) and 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(4)(iv). Alternatively, the SSOA 

and Rail Transit Agency may agree that 

the SSOA will conduct its audit on an 

on-going basis over the three-year 

timeframe. The program standard must 

establish a procedure the SSOA and a 

Rail Transit Agency will follow to 


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manage findings and recommendations 

arising from the triennial audit. 

(6) Accident and incident notification. 

The program standard must establish 

requirements for a Rail Transit Agency 

to notify the SSOA of accidents and 

incidents on the Rail Transit Agency’s 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system. These 

requirements must address, specifically, 

the time limits for notification, methods 

of notification, and the nature of the 

information the Rail Transit Agency 

must submit to the SSOA. 

(7) Investigations. The program 

standard must identify thresholds for 

incidents and accidents that require a 

Rail Transit Agency to conduct an 

investigation. Also, the program 

standard must address how the SSOA 

will coordinate its investigation with a 

Rail Transit Agency’s own internal 

investigation; the role of the SSOA in 

supporting any investigation conducted 

or findings and recommendations made 

by the National Transportation Safety 

Board; and procedures for protecting the 

confidentiality of the investigation 

reports. 

(8) Corrective actions. The program 

standard must explain the process and 

criteria by which the SSOA may order 

a Rail Transit Agency to develop and 

carry out a corrective action plan, and 

a procedure for the SSOA to review and 

approve a corrective action plan. Also, 

the program standard must explain the 

SSOA’s policy and practice for tracking 

and verifying a Rail Transit Agency’s 

compliance with a corrective action 

plan, and managing any conflicts 

between the SSOA and a Rail Transit 

Agency relating either to the 

development or execution of a 

corrective action plan or the findings of 

an investigation. 

(b) At least once a year an SSOA must 

submit its program standard and any 

referenced program procedures to FTA, 

with an indication of any revisions 

made to the program standard since the 

last annual submittal. FTA will evaluate 

the SSOA’s program standard as part of 

its continuous evaluation of the State 

Safety Oversight Program, and in 

preparing FTA’s report to Congress on 

the certification status of that State 

Safety Oversight Program, in accordance 

with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(8). 

§ 674.29 Transit Agency Safety Plans: 

General requirements. 

(a) In determining whether to approve 

a Transit Agency Safety Plan for a rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system, a State Safety Oversight Agency 

(SSOA) must evaluate whether the 

Transit Agency Safety Plan is based on 

an adequate Safety Management System; 

is consistent with the National Public 

Transportation Safety Plan; is in 

compliance with the requirements of 49 

U.S.C. 5329(d), and the program 

standard set by the SSOA. 

(b) In determining whether a Transit 

Agency Safety Plan is based on an 

adequate Safety Management System, an 

SSOA must determine, specifically, 

whether the Transit Agency Safety Plan 

sets forth a sufficiently explicit safety 

policy for the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system; a sufficiently 

explicit process for safety risk 

management, with adequate means of 

risk control for the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system; adequate 

means of safety assurance for the rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system; and adequate means of safety 

promotion to support the execution of 

the Transit Agency Safety Plan by all 

employees, agents, and contractors for 

the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system. 

(c) In an instance in which an SSOA 

does not approve a Transit Agency 

Safety Plan, the SSOA must provide a 

written explanation, and allow the Rail 

Transit Agency an opportunity to 

modify and resubmit its Transit Agency 

Safety Plan for the SSOA’s approval. 

§ 674.31 Triennial audits: General 

requirements. 

At least once every three years, a State 

Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) must 

conduct a complete audit of a Rail 

Transit Agency’s compliance with its 

Transit Agency Safety Plan. 

Alternatively, an SSOA and a Rail 

Transit Agency may agree that the 

SSOA will conduct the audit on an ongoing basis over the three-year 

timeframe. At the conclusion of the 

three-year audit cycle, the SSOA shall 

issue a report with findings and 

recommendations arising from the 

audit, which must include, at minimum, 

an analysis of the effectiveness of the 

Transit Agency Safety Plan, 

recommendations for improvements, 

and a corrective action plan, if 

necessary or appropriate. The Rail 

Transit Agency must be given an 

opportunity to comment on the findings 

and recommendations. 

§ 674.33 Notifications: Accidents and 

Incidents. 

(a) Two-hour notification. In addition 

to the requirements for accident 

notification set forth in a State Safety 

Oversight Program standard, a Rail 

Transit Agency must notify both the 

State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) 

and the Administrator within two hours 

of any Accident or Incident occurring 

on a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system. The criteria and 

thresholds for Accident or Incident 

notification and reporting are defined in 

a reporting manual developed for the 

electronic reporting system specified by 

FTA as required in § 674.39(b). 

(b) FRA notification. In any instance 

in which a Rail Transit Agency must 

notify the Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA) of an Accident or 

Incident as defined by 49 CFR 225.5 

(i.e., shared use of the general railroad 

system trackage or corridors), the Rail 

Transit Agency must also notify the 

SSOA and the Administrator of the 

Accident or Incident within the same 

time frame as required by the FRA. 

§ 674.35 Investigations. 

(a) A State Safety Oversight Agency 

(SSOA) must conduct an independent 

investigation of any Accident or 

Incident that is reported to the SSOA 

and the Administrator in accordance 

with § 674.33(a). In any instance in 

which a Rail Transit Agency is 

conducting its own internal 

investigation of the Accident or 

Incident, the SSOA and the Rail Transit 

Agency must coordinate their 

investigations in accordance with the 

State safety oversight program standard 

and any agreements in effect. 

(b) Within a reasonable time, an 

SSOA must issue a written report on its 

investigation of an Accident or Incident 

in accordance with established 

reporting requirements. The report must 

describe the investigation activities; 

identify the factors that caused or 

contributed to the Accident or Incident; 

and set forth a corrective action plan, as 

necessary or appropriate. The SSOA 

must formally adopt the report of an 

Accident or Incident and transmit that 

report to the Rail Transit Agency for 

review and concurrence. If a Rail 

Transit Agency does not concur with an 

SSOA’s report, the SSOA may allow the 

Rail Transit Agency to submit a written 

dissent from the report, which may be 

included in the report, in the discretion 

of the SSOA. 

(c) All personnel and contractors that 

conduct investigations on behalf of an 

SSOA must be trained to conduct 

investigations in accordance with the 

Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program. 

§ 674.37 Corrective action plans. 

(a) In any instance in which a Rail 

Transit Agency must develop and carry 

out a corrective action plan, the State 

Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) must 

review and approve the plan before the 

Rail Transit Agency carries out the plan. 

A corrective action plan must describe, 

specifically, the actions the Rail Transit 


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Agency will take to minimize, control, 

correct, or eliminate the risks and 

hazards identified by the plan, the 

schedule for taking those actions, and 

the individuals responsible for taking 

those actions. The Rail Transit Agency 

must periodically report to the SSOA 

the Rail Transit Agency’s progress in 

carrying out the corrective action plan. 

The SSOA may monitor the Rail Transit 

Agency’s progress in carrying out the 

corrective action plan through 

unannounced, on-site inspections, or 

any other means the SSOA deems 

necessary or appropriate. 

(b) In any instance in which a safety 

Event on the Rail Transit Agency’s rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system is the subject of an investigation 

by the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB), the SSOA must evaluate 

whether the findings or 

recommendations by the NTSB require 

a corrective action plan by the Rail 

Transit Agency, and if so, the SSOA 

must order the Rail Transit Agency to 

develop and carry out a corrective 

action plan. 

§ 674.39 State Safety Oversight Agency 

annual reporting to FTA. 

(a) On or before March 15 of each 

year, a State Safety Oversight Agency 

(SSOA) must submit the following 

material to FTA: 

(1) The State safety oversight program 

standard adopted in accordance with 

§ 674.27, with an indication of any 

changes to the program standard during 

the preceding twelve months; 

(2) Evidence that each of its 

employees and contractors is in 

compliance with the requirements of the 

Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program; 

(3) A publicly available report that 

summarizes its oversight activities for 

the preceding twelve months, describes 

the causal factors of accidents or 

incidents identified through 

investigation, and identifies the status of 

corrective actions, changes to Transit 

Agency Safety Plans, and the level of 

effort by the SSOA in carrying out its 

oversight activities; 

(4) A summary of the triennial audits 

completed during the preceding twelve 

months, and the Transit Agencies’ 

progress in carrying out corrective 

action plans arising from triennial 

audits conducted in accordance with 

§ 674.31; 

(5) Evidence that the SSOA has 

reviewed and approved any changes to 

the Transit Agency Safety Plans during 

the preceding twelve months; and 

(6) A certification that the SSOA is in 

compliance with the requirements of 

this part. 

(b) These materials must be submitted 

electronically through a reporting 

system specified by FTA. 

§ 674.41 Conflicts of interest. 

(a) A State Safety Oversight Agency 

(SSOA) must be financially and legally 

independent from any rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

under the oversight of the SSOA, unless 

the Administrator has issued a waiver of 

this requirement in accordance with 

§ 674.13(b). 

(b) An SSOA may not employ any 

individual who provides services to a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system under the 

oversight of the SSOA, unless the 

Administrator has issued a waiver of 

this requirement in accordance with 

§ 674.13(b). 

(c) A contractor may not provide 

services to both an SSOA and a rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system under the oversight of that 

SSOA. 

Appendix A to Part 674 to Part 674— 

Safety Management Systems (SMS) 

Framework 

I. Overview 

The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 

is adopting the principles and methods of 

Safety Management Systems (SMS) as the 

basis for the National Public Transportation 

Safety Program. With a focus on 

organization-wide safety policy, proactive 

hazard management, strong safety 

communication between workers and 

management, targeted safety training, and 

clear accountabilities and responsibilities for 

critical safety activities, SMS provides an 

enhanced structure for addressing the safety 

provisions specified in the Moving Ahead for 

Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP–21). 

SMS is a formal, top-down, organizationwide approach to managing safety risks and 

assuring the effectiveness of safety risk 

mitigations. The specific components and 

sub-components of FTA’s SMS framework 

are discussed in Section V of this Appendix. 

II. Background 

Building on the public transportation 

industry’s four decades of experience with 

system safety, SMS supplements traditional 

engineering processes by integrating 

management systems and organizational 

culture into critical safety risk management 

and assurance functions. As a result, SMS 

ensures that each public transportation 

agency, no matter its size or service 

environment, has the necessary 

organizational structures, accountabilities, 

activities and tools in place to direct and 

control resources to optimally manage safety. 

Focusing on collaboration and information 

sharing, SMS helps management and labor 

work together to control risk better, detect 

and correct safety problems earlier, share and 

analyze safety data more effectively, and 

measure safety performance more clearly. 

The ultimate goal of SMS is to ensure that 

the public transportation agency has an 

inclusive and effective process to direct 

resources to optimally manage safety. 

SMS establishes lines of safety 

accountability throughout an organization, 

starting at the executive management level, 

and provides a structure to support a sound 

safety culture from the front-line to the 

boardroom. SMS enables agencies to address 

organizational deficiencies that may lead to 

safety issues or unidentified safety risks, 

identify system-wide trends in safety, and 

manage the potential consequences of 

hazards before they result in incidents or 

accidents. 

SMS is scalable to organizations of any size 

and flexible enough to be effective in all 

transit environments, from the largest urban 

operator to the smallest rural transit system 

provider. SMS also provides oversight 

agencies with new tools, approaches, and 

opportunities to align safety priorities and 

promote continuous improvement. 

In the public transportation safety 

provisions of the Moving Ahead for Progress 

in the 21st Century Act (MAP–21), FTA, the 

States and the public transportation industry 

have been presented with a rare opportunity 

to implement a modern regulatory framework 

that will help a safe industry become even 

safer. Adopting SMS principles will further 

deepen the industry’s commitment to the 

safety of its passengers, employees, 

equipment and facilities and will strengthen 

its core competencies in hazard 

identification, safety data acquisition and 

analysis, and internal auditing. Most 

significantly, SMS offers the promise of a 

stronger culture for employees and managers 

to work together to solve safety problems. 

III. Scalability and Flexibility 

Service providers within the public 

transportation industry can vary greatly 

based on size, complexity and operating 

characteristics. Transit agency management 

needs processes, activities and tools that 

scale to size, complexity and uniqueness of 

the transit system. SMS provides such an 

approach. SMS is flexible, and can be scaled 

to the mode, size, and complexity of any 

transit operator, in any environment—urban, 

suburban, or rural. The extent to which the 

transit agency’s SMS processes, activities and 

tools are used and documented will vary 

from agency to agency. For a small bus 

operation, that SMS is going to be simple and 

straightforward. For a larger transit agency 

with hundreds or thousands of employees 

and multiple modes, that system is going to 

be more complicated. 

SMS scales itself to reflect the size and 

complexity of the operation, but the 

fundamental accountability remains the 

same. FTA’s SMS Framework establishes the 

accountabilities, processes and activities 

necessary to implement an effective SMS. 

However, the transit agency will determine 

the level of detail necessary to identify and 

evaluate their own unique safety risks and 

target their resources to manage those safety 

risks. 

IV. Executive Management Commitment 

SMS establishes lines of safety 

accountability throughout an organization, 


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particularly at the senior management level, 

and provides a structure to support a sound 

safety culture. Because SMS is a management 

approach, safety accountability must reside 

at the highest levels of management within 

a transit agency. In FTA’s SMS Framework, 

this would be the Accountable Executive. 

Typically, the Accountable Executive will be 

the head of a transit agency, its Chief 

Executive Officer, President, General 

Manager, or Executive Director. Whatever the 

person’s job title, the Accountable Executive 

plays the central role in developing and 

carrying out an SMS. Without the 

Accountable Executive’s active endorsement 

and acceptance of accountability for the 

safety performance of a public transportation 

agency, an SMS cannot be effective. The 

extent to which an Accountable Executive 

will be involved in day-to-day SMS activities 

will depend both on the individual executive 

and the size and complexity of the 

organization. 

SMS does not require an Accountable 

Executive to be an expert in safety. Rather, 

the Accountable Executive must understand 

how the SMS works in his or her 

organization; know the key personnel to call 

upon for evaluating safety information; and 

grasp the significant safety issues that face 

the organization. The Accountable Executive 

should use the reports and analysis 

performed as part of the SMS process to 

support the agency’s decision-making. For an 

Accountable Executive, safety information, 

like financial, schedule and service 

information, is an integral part of how 

resources are allocated, budgets are set, and 

risks are managed. 

V. Key Components and Functional Elements 

of a Safety Management System 

As depicted below, FTA’s SMS Framework 

is comprised of four key components and 

eleven sub-components that work together to 

refine, reinforce, and sustain the 

implementation of an SMS throughout a 

transit agency: 

(1) Safety Management Policy, 

(2) Safety Risk Management, 

(3) Safety Assurance, and 

(4) Safety Promotion. 

The component Safety Management Policy 

provides for the foundations of a public 

transportation agency’s system for the 

management of safety. This component 

encompasses the agency’s commitment to 

achieve explicit safety objectives and safety 

performance targets, as well as the agency’s 

compromise to provide the necessary 

organizational structures to accomplish them. 

Under this component, senior leadership and 

employee responsibilities for the 

management of safety throughout the agency 

are respectively and distinctly established. 

This component also commits senior 

leadership to actively engage in the oversight 

of the agency’s safety performance, by 

requiring regular review of the safety 

management policy statement, budget, and 

program by a designated Accountable 

Executive. 

The sub-components of the Safety 

Management Policy component are: 

Safety management policy statement— 

Clearly, succinctly and unambiguously 

frames the fundamentals upon which the 

transit agency will build and operate its SMS, 

documents management’s commitment to the 

SMS, and inserts the management of safety 

at the same level of the topmost business 

processes of the transit agency. 

Critical to the value of the safety 

management policy statement, and to the 

operation of the SMS overall, is the 

introduction of an unambiguous clause 

reflecting executive level support for an 

effective employee safety reporting program. 

The safety management policy statement 

also documents management’s commitment 

to continuous safety improvement, as well as 

to the continuous improvement of the safety 

management system itself. 

The Accountable Executive signs the safety 

management policy statement, which is 

distributed, with visible support from 

executive management, throughout the 

transit agency. 

Safety accountabilities and 

responsibilities—An explicit definition of the 

lines of accountability and responsibility for 

the management of safety within the transit 

agency, as well as the authorities required to 

deliver accountabilities and discharge 

responsibilities. 

This sub-component provides for the 

identification of an Accountable Executive 

and the definition of the required 

accountabilities, responsibilities and 

authorities of the post holder. The 

Accountable Executive is ultimately 

accountable for the implementation and 

continuous operation of the transit agency’s 

SMS, ensuring that the transit agency has 

allocated resources and implemented 

mechanisms for the efficient and effective 

management of safety through its SMS to an 

extent commensurate to its needs, 

possibilities and constraints. 

The sub-component also provides for the 

appointment of a subject matter expert for the 

implementation and day-to-day operation of 

the SMS, the lines of relationship of the post 

holder with the Accountable Executive and 

the transit agency’s governance structure, and 

the appointment of the staff necessary to 

support the post holder in the day-to-day 

operation of the SMS. 

It lastly provides for the definition of 

accountabilities, responsibilities and 

authorities of executive and senior 

management regarding the effective and 

efficient operation of the SMS. 

While safety management accountabilities, 

responsibilities and their delegation, and 

authorities may vary from agency to agency, 

they must nevertheless be defined and 

implemented. 

Integration with public safety and 

emergency management—All transit agencies 

have some level of emergency plans, 

procedures and/or protocols that direct both 

internal emergency response to transit related 

events, and external emergency response in 

coordination with Local Emergency 

Management for community-wide emergency 

activities. Integration of plans, procedures 

and protocols through specific SMS-related 

activities provides a 360-degree vision of 

how the transit agency meets its overall 

safety emergency management 

responsibilities. 

SMS documentation and records—SMS 

activities must be formally documented and 

available for reference throughout the 

organization. Therefore, a formal system of 

records and documentation control is an 

important element within the operation of 

SMS. 

This sub-component provides for the 

requirements of the agency to document its 

overall approach to the management of 

system, the activities for SMS 

implementation and its subsequent day-today operation, and the activities or 

procedures for the management of new or 

revised safety requirements, regulatory or 

otherwise. 

While the extent and complexity of the 

SMS documentation will be commensurate to 

the agency’s size and complexity, SMS 

documentation and records must be readily 

available to all those with accountabilities for 

SMS performance or responsibilities for SMS 

implementation and operation. 

The component Safety Risk Management 

provides for the activities and tools a transit 

agency needs in order to identify precursors 

of safety concerns that might present during 

service delivery as well as their supporting 

operations. This allows a transit agency to 

anticipate the potential negative 

consequences of safety concerns, by 

evaluating whether it has taken enough 

precautions to control the potential 

consequences of identified safety concerns. 

Safety risk management is an ongoing and 

never-ending process. Safety risk 

management involves activities that allow 

the identification of hazards associated with 

the operation and maintenance of a public 

transportation system. Once hazards are 

identified, the Safety Risk Management 

process provides for the analysis of the 

potential consequences of identified hazards, 

for the evaluation of the safety risk of the 

potential consequences, and lastly for the 

development and implementation safety risk 

mitigations to address the anticipated, 

potential consequences of hazards. 

The sub-components of Safety Risk 

Management component are: 

Hazard identification and analysis— 

Provides for the critical first two steps in the 

SRM process. Under SMS, these steps help 

a transit agency identify and address 

concerns before they escalate into incidents, 

and provide a foundation for the evaluation 

activities that come next. It is important that 

hazard identification and analyses are 

supported agency-wide. Safety concerns and 

issues are an inevitable part of transit 

operations. Only after hazards are identified, 

can they be analyzed. Therefore, an explicit 

hazard identification program is critical. In 

this respect, a transit agency’s employees are 

an irreplaceable asset for hazard 

identification. 

Safety risk evaluation and mitigation— 

Safety risk evaluation provides for the 

evaluation of the magnitude of the potential 

consequence of identified hazards. The term 

safety risk refers to the likelihood that people 

could be harmed or equipment could be 

damaged by the potential consequences of a 

hazard. Therefore, safety risk is expressed 

and measured by the predicted probability 

and severity of the hazard’s potential 


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consequences. Safety risk evaluation must 

include the evaluation of existing mitigations 

to help determine whether the potential 

consequences of the hazard must be further 

mitigated. Safety risk mitigation is an action 

or resource which, when applied to an 

evaluated safety risk, reduces the probability 

and/or severity of the potential consequence 

of a hazard. Safety risk mitigation enables a 

transit agency to actively ‘‘manage’’ safety 

risk in a manner that is aligned with its safety 

performance targets and consists of initial, 

ongoing and revised mitigations. 

The component Safety Assurance ensures 

that chosen mitigations are appropriate and 

effective in addressing the evaluated safety 

risks, and generates confidence that the SMS 

contributes to the agency meeting its safety 

objectives and safety performance targets. 

This is achieved through the collection, 

analysis, and assessment of safety data. 

Safety Assurance is performed through 

inspections, observations, and auditing 

activities to support safety oversight and 

performance monitoring. Safety Assurance 

also helps a transit agency evaluate whether 

or not an anticipated change may impact 

safety. 

The sub-components of the Safety 

Assurance component are: 

Safety performance monitoring and 

measurement—An ongoing activity that 

ensures senior management has the data and 

information it needs to measure whether 

safety risk mitigations and safety-related 

activities are appropriate and effective. Safety 

performance monitoring does not as much 

involve monitoring individuals, but rather 

monitoring the safety performance of the 

organization itself. 

Management of change—SMS places 

emphasis on managing change. There is a 

very simple reason for this. Whenever change 

is introduced within a public transportation 

agency, there is the potential that the change 

may impact safety by impacting existing 

safety risk mitigations. Therefore, the safety 

assurance component of an effective SMS 

will evaluate the anticipated change and, if 

it might impact safety, ensure that it is 

further evaluated through the transit agency’s 

safety risk management process. 

Continuous improvement—Ensures 

constant improvement in the functioning of 

the entire SMS and includes ongoing 

management support to continuously 

monitor SMS implementation. SMS 

evaluation is necessary to ensure that the 

SMS continues to meet its core safety 

objectives; transit agency safety performance 

is monitored against its safety performance 

targets, and identified weaknesses are 

immediately addressed. 

The component Safety Promotion requires 

a combination of training and 

communication of safety information to 

employees to heighten the efficiency and 

effectiveness of the transit agency’s SMS. 

Safety promotion provides visibility and 

knowledge of executive management’s 

commitment to safety performance and an 

effective SMS throughout the transit agency. 

It typically includes formal and informal 

platforms for the communication of safety 

management information throughout the 

organization, safety management training for 

employees, training on employee roles and 

responsibilities within the SMS, and training 

on the mechanism for employees to report 

safety concerns. 

Safety promotion is a critical component of 

an efficient and effective SMS, setting the 

tone for the transit agency’s safety 

management activities and helping to build 

a positive safety culture. 

The two sub-components of the Safety 

Promotion component are: 

Safety communication—Critical to 

maintaining the two-way feedback loop 

between front-line employees and 

management and establishing a safety culture 

that promotes the effective reporting of safety 

concerns or issues. Effective safety 

communication and SMS education will 

ensure that personnel are aware of the SMS 

and their role within it. It also ensures that 

safety critical information is conveyed in a 

timely manner, and effectively explains why 

particular safety actions are taken and why 

safety procedures are introduced or changed. 

Competencies and training—Provides for 

the development, through training, of key 

safety management competencies essential 

for the effective implementation and 

operation of an SMS, including safety 

reporting competencies and safety data 

management competencies. Each competency 

should be primarily aimed at a specific 

employee level. 

At the front-line employee level, safety 

management training should provide for the 

development of safety reporting 

competencies, i.e. employees should receive 

formal training on the expected contents of 

employee safety reporting (what to report; 

what not to report) and the procedures 

established for reporting. At the subject 

matter expert level (key safety management 

staff), formal training should develop safety 

data management competencies, i.e. how to 

analyze safety data, how to extract 

information, and how to turn safety 

information into safety intelligence for senior 

management decision-making. This also 

includes formal training to develop safety 

data collection, storage and retrieval 

competencies. 

[FR Doc. 2015–03841 Filed 2–26–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 


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