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'f OP BEJ9REa' 

REF ID:A59222 

TOP SECRET 9 

29 April 1955 

MEMORANDtM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Possible Compromise of COM.INT Information. 

1. FACTS. 

a. On 17 January 1955 U.S. Navy R7V aircraft BUNO 131639 outbound from Ernest Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland to U.S. Naval Air 

Station, Patux.ent, Maryland crashed in Cabot Straits about fifteen (15) 

miles from Cape Anguilla, Newfoundland. Apparently the aircraft was 

broken up on impact. Its main portion is now under 250 fathoms of water. 

The depth and temperature of the water and the ruggedness of the ocean 

floor at the point of crash makes salvage operations infeasible. 

b. This aircraft was carrying thirteen (13) pieces of officer 

courier material, nine (9) of which are known to have contained COM.INT. 

The location of this material within the aircraft is not definitely 

known. It can be assumed, however, that the majority of the material 

was located in the belly compartment which is accessible only from the 

outside ot the aircraft. 

c. Currents from the crash site flow in a southerly direction 

into the Newfoundland fishing areas. French fishing vessels were sighted 

on 16 March in the general area of the crash. In addition to French and 

Newfoundland fishermen; Spanish, Portuguese and Russians are expected to 

fish in the area during the sununer. The fishing season commences in 

early spring and lasts through July or August. 

d. Search and rescue operations were carried out from 17-21 

January utilizing both air and surface craft. The vicinity of the crash 

and areas of possible drift were covered. On 21 January these operations 

were discontinued except for incidental search by surface vessels and 

aircraft in normal transit through the area. The Flying Safety Officer, 

Harmon AFB, personally reconnoitered the Newfoundland coast line by air 

on 4, 7 and 17 February. Royal Canadian Mounted Police headquarters in 

Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia have been alerted to 

be on lookout for mail bags which may wash ashore or be recovered by 

natives. The RCMP have been asked to continue this surveillance at least 

until the end of the fishing season. 

e. During the time of the crash and for several days thereafter 

numerous storms passed through the crash area. Marginal weather existed 

in the area during the entire search and rescue operations. The best 

USCIB: 13.5/103 IIANB!iE VIA 0EMIN'f' 6If:A:NfimiS ONLY 

..:::. '""4 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-21-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 
USCIB: 13.5/103 

TOP SEQREP 

29 April 1955 

Subject: Possible Compromise of COM.INT Information. 

weather conditions occurred on 21 January with a ceiling of 1500 feet; 

visibility 10 miles. Even so nothing was sighted although under more 

adverse conditions on the first day of search debris sightings were made. 

£. Five officer courier pieces (pouches) were recovered intact 

on the day of the crash within a six mile radius of the crash site. 

These pouches (the heaviest of which weighed 6B pounds) were found floating on the surface of the water. CO.MINT material was included in two ( 2) 

of these pouches and was not subject to compromise before it was picked 

up. (The material was watersoaked, but readable.) No significant debris 

has been recovered since the day of the crash. 

g. There are eight (B) officer courier pieces presumed to be 

still at the scene of the crash. Six (6) of these pieces are cardboard 

boxes from Port Lyautey addressed to the National Security Agency. These 

boxes contain raw traffic and other COMINT including TOP SECRET codeword 

material are fully packed and weigh an average of 32 pounds. The other 

two (2) pieces are courier pouches addressed to the Department of State. 

At least one of these pouches contains COM.INT ( inc;Luding TOP SECREI' 

codeword) from the 34th RSM in Turkey. One of these pouches weighs 46 

pounds; the other 28 pounds. These pouches are of the same construction 

as those recovered. 

2. CONCLUSIONS. 

a. The six (6) cardboard boxes containing COMINT, if thrown 

free of the aircraft at the time of the crash, would, due to the density 

of the contents, probably float only for a few hours. If these boxes 

did, in fact, initially float free, they would probably have sunk 

shortly. Where they might be rolled by currents is a matter of conjecture. However, it seems likely they would disintegrate in a few days. 

If the boxes are still in the aircraft it can be presumed that they will 

not now float free. 

b. The two (2) pouches, if thrown free 0£ the aircraft at the 

time of the crash would float judging from the pouches recovered. If 

these pouches did, in fact, initially float free there is no telling what 

may have happened to them. If the pouches are still in the aircraft it 

seems likely that they will not now float free. 

3. RECOMMENDATIONS. 

a. That the CG.MINT from Port Lyautey contained in the sjx ( 6) 

cardboard boxes be considered as not compromised. 

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TOP SECRET 
USCIB: 13. 5 /103 

'fOP S!:ell'!T 

29 April 1955 

Subject: Possible Compromise of' COMINT Information. 

b. That the COMINT from the 34th RSM, Turkey contained in the 

Department of State courier pouches be considered compromised within the 

meaning of the definition contained in USCIB Directive No. 9. 

c. That NSA determine exactly what COMINT was included in the 

two pouches and that foreign COMINT authorities be notified. 

d. That NSA maintain surveillance of the type of traffic 

involved with a view toward determining what effect, if any, this compromise may have ~ad on COMINT sources, furnishing a report to USCIB only 

if positive results are obtained. 

e. That the results of this investigation be considered by the 

Security Committee during their forthcoming discussion on air transport 

of' COMINT. 

4. The above report is a sUIIDIJ.ary of facts acquired from the 

National Security Agency, Navy Air Force and the Armed Forces Courier 

Service. The majority of the information was obtained by Captain 

Laddie Marin, Air Force Special Security Officer, Pepperrell AFB, 

Newfoundland. Captain Marin was sent to the scene of the crash on 

10 February at the suggestion of the Executive Secretary and the Air 

Force member of USCIBEC. Three· spot reports and a detailed report of 

investigation have been received from Captain Marin to date. His 

reports have been invaluable in determining the nature ~nd extent of 

this compromise. It should be noted that, as in the Keflavik incident, 

a report of' investigation from official sources has not yet been received. 

The complete files on this investigation are too voluminous to warrant 

reproduction and circulation to the members. They are therefore being 

kept in the Office of' the Executive S~cretary, USCIB, available to any 

member who wishes to examine them. 

5. The above facts and reconunendations are submitted in accordance 

with Section V, CIBD #9, dated 4 February 1954. 

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'fOP SECRET