# United States Court of Appeals **for the Fifth Circuit**

____________ No. 22-20025 Summary Calendar

____________ United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee ,

versus Anurag Dass, Defendant—Appellant

.

______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:17-CR-649-2

______________________________ Before Smith, Southwick, and Douglas, Circuit Judges

. Per Curiam: * Per a written agreement, Anurag Da ss pleaded guilty of aiding and abetting the receipt of a $7,710 healthca re kickback, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b, and money laundering, in vi olation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The district court ordered forfeiture of a $928,621.16 money judgment and $500,000 seized from a bank account. Dass contends that her appeal waiver does not

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* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED February 3, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-20025 Document: 00516635055 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/03/2023No. 22-20025

2 bar review of her challenge to the forfeit ure order, and she challenges the forfeiture of the money judgment while cont ending that the money seized from the bank account was not su bject to forfeiture. The parties dispute whether the appe al waiver in Dass’s plea agreement precludes us from addressing the merits of some of her arguments on appeal. The issue whether a waiver bars an appeal is not jurisdictional. United States v. Story , 439 F.3d 226, 230-31 (5th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Smith , 528 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 2008). Therefore, we pretermit that issue. Because Dass did not challenge the forfeiture of the $500,000 seized from the bank account, we review for plain error. See United States v. Omigie , 977 F.3d 397, 403 (5th Cir. 2020). Fo r plain error, an appellant must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects her substantial rights. Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If the appellant makes such a showing, we have the disc retion to correct the error, but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.For forfeiture of property, “we ‘must determine whether the government has established the requisite nexu s between th[at] property and the [charged] offense’ under the applicable statute.” United States v. Ayika , 837 F.3d 460, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)- (1)(A)). “The Government must establish the requisite nexus between the property and the offense by a pr eponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Juluke , 426 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2005). Dass maintains that the money seized from the bank account was not subject to forfeiture. An individual convicted of money laundering under§ 1957 must “forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any proper ty traceable to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). Despite Dass’s assertions to the contrary, she expliCase: 22-20025 Document: 00516635055 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/03/2023No. 22-20025

3 citly admitted in her plea agreement th at the $500,000 seized from the bank account was involved in her money-laun dering offense. Because a forfeiture determination “may be based on eviden ce already in the record, including any written plea agreement,” the go vernment demonstrated the requisite nexus between the money from the ac count and Dass’s money-laundering offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, the district court did not err in ordering the forfeiture. By contrast, the government concedes that the $928,621.16 money judgment includes proceeds from crimin al activity outside the scope of Dass’s convictions and requests that the judgment of sentence be vacated and remanded for recalculation. For this issue, we need not decide the standard of review because the appellant is entitled to relief even under the plainerror standard. See United States v. Rodriguez , 602 F.3d 346, 361 (5th Cir. 2010).
For an individual convicted of a federal healthcare offense, courts “shall order the person to forfeit proper ty, real or personal, that constitutesor is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7); see 18 U.S.C. § 24. Criminal forfeiture by virtue of the civil-forfei ture statute would have essentially the same limitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C ); 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 24, 1956(c)(7)(F). The government admits, and the record supports, that the imposition of the $928,621.16 money judgment was a clear and obvious error because it included proceeds that were not traceabl e to Dass’s $7,710 healthcare kickback offense. Moreover, but for the e rror, there is a reasonable probability that the money judgment would have been substantially less than $928,621.16. See United States v. Escalante-Reyes , 689 F.3d 415, 424 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Finally, because the e rror resulted in forfeiture of a substanCase: 22-20025 Document: 00516635055 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/03/2023No. 22-20025

4 tial amount of money without statutor y authorization, the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Sanjar , 876 F.3d 725, 750 (5th Ci r. 2017). Therefore, we exercise our discretion to correct this error. Based upon the foregoing, we AFFIRM the forfeiture of the $500,000 seized from the subject bank account, but because part of the $928,621.16 money judgment lacks th e required statutory nexus, we VACATE the forfeiture order and REMAND for recalculation of the money judgment and entry of a corrected order. Case: 22-20025 Document: 00516635055 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/03/2023