Filed 4/8/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

DONALD SIPPLE et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
CITY OF HAYWARD et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B242893
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC462270)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County. William F. Highberger, Judge. Reversed an d remanded with direc tions in part, and affirmed in part.

Morris and Associates, Stephen B. Morri s; Bartimus, Frickleton, Robertson & Gorny, James P. Frickleton, Edward D. R obertson, Jr., for Plai ntiffs and Appellants Donald Sipple, John Simon, Karl Simonsen and Christopher Jacobs.

Doyle Law, Conal F. Doyle for Plain tiff and Appellant New Cingular Wireless
PCS LLC.

Jarvis, Fay, Doporto & Gibson, Benjamin P. Fay, Andrea J. Saltzman, Rick W. Jarvis for Defendants and Respon dents City of Hayward, City of Modesto, City of Palo Alto, City of Redwood City, City of San Luis Obispo and City of Santa Barbara.2 Colantuono & Levin, Michael G. Colantu ono, Holly O. Whatley, Amy C. Sparrow for Defendants and Responde nts Alhambra Coalition.

Richards, Watson & Gersho n, Lisa Bond, Andrew Brady for Defendants and Respondents Cities of Comp ton, Hawthorne, Long Be ach and Redondo Beach.

Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Debor ah J. Fox, Peter S. Hayes, Mary C. Tsai for Defendants and Respondents City of Desert Hot Springs, Downey, El Cerrito, Pasadena, Pinole and San Leandro.

Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney, Doryanna Moreno , Chief Assistant City Attorney, William E. Simmons, Kathleen Sa lem-Boyd, Christopher Kee for Defendant and Respondent City of Oakland.

Dennis J. Herrera, City Atto rney, Julie Van Nostern, Ch ief Tax Attorney, Peter J. Keith, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Responden t City and County of San
Francisco.

Lagerlof, Senecal, Gosney & Kruse, Ja mes D. Ciampa, Jenny Kim for Amici Curiae League of California Cites and Ca lifornia State Association of Counties.

________________ __________________ _________________3 For a number of years, individuals thro ughout California were improperly charged taxes for internet access by their internet service provider, New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC (New Cingular), prom pting various customers to file putative class action lawsuits. The lawsuits eventually settled, with New Cing ular agreeing to seek refunds of the taxes
from the cities and counties to which the taxes were remitted. After refund claims were denied, New Cingular (and variou s individual plaintiffs purpo rting to act on behalf of other customers) brought this action against the cities and counties.
The trial court sustained demurrers with out leave to amend, finding, among other things, that New Cingular lacked standing to pursue refund claims against the defendant
cities and counties. Because we determine that New Cingular ha s adequately alleged standing to bring an action for tax refund, we reverse, in part, the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff and appellant New Cingular, al ong with plaintiffs and appellants Donald Sipple, John Simon, Karl Simonsen, and Ch ristopher Jacobs (the individual plaintiffs), filed suit for tax refunds against 132 Calif ornia cities and two California counties. Following the filing of demurrers, and after settlements were reached with a number of cities, appellants filed a first amended comp laint (FAC) against 115 California cities and two California counties. The FAC alleged ca uses of action for: tax refund, unjust enrichment, money had and recei ved, and violation of due pr ocess. Demurrers to the
FAC were sustained without leave to amend. The underlying class litigation This lawsuit arose out of the class litig ation involving New Cingular. According to the FAC, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 United States Code section 151, imposed a national moratorium on state and local govern ment taxation on internet access. In its monthly bills to customers, New Cingular (an affiliate of AT&T Mobility LLC (AT&T Mobility)) erroneously charged its customers taxes on internet access over a span of several years and remitted those taxes to the defendant cities and counties. Putative class actions were filed agai nst AT&T Mobility and affiliates in California federal district courts by the in dividual plaintiffs on behalf of California4 consumers, alleging that they were improperly charged for internet access taxes that were then remitted to California municipalities. Similar lawsuits were filed in other venues throughout the United States. The cases were ultimately cons olidated in a multi-district litigation proceeding in the Unite d States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. The multi-district litigation was eventua lly settled, and, for purposes of the settlement, a series of subclasses, includin g a California settlement subclass with the individual plaintiffs as representatives, was certified by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In approving the settlement, the district court found that the settlement agreement bound on ly the parties privy to it (i.e., the class members and AT&T Mobility and its affiliat es), and that the agreement did not purport to dictate the effect of any state or local laws. (See In re AT&T Mobility Wire less Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig. (N.D.Ill. 2011) 789 F.Supp.2d 935, 983.) Under the terms of the settlement agre ement, AT&T Mobility , which was defined as including affiliates such as New Cingular, agreed to process and assist in processing refund claims in the many taxing jurisdicti ons in which internet taxes were paid, including in the defendant citie s and counties. On behalf of the class members, AT&T Mobility was to file claims in jurisdictions in which it had st anding to seek refunds of the taxes. The class members expr essly authorized AT&T Mobility to file the refund claims. The settlement agreement furthe r provided that in the event a claim was denied, AT&T Mobility would “cooperate in the appeal” and would “ret ain the right but not the obligation to appeal, otherwise contest, or further prosecute an appeal of any adverse ruling or decision in the even t that Settlement Class Counse l declines to do so for any reason.” Any refunds granted by the taxing entities were to be paid or transferred to escrow accounts, and eventually paid out of the escrow acco unts to individual class members. If taxing entities issued tax cred its to AT&T Mobility in lieu of refunds, AT&T Mobility was to make payments in the amount of the credits to the escrow accounts, again for eventual pa yout to the class members. The settlement agreement imposed no obligation on AT&T Mobility to advance any m onies to class members or to5 make any payments to class members in excess of the refu nds and credits received from the taxing jurisdictions.
The instant lawsuit Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Ne w Cingular filed claims for refunds with
California cities and counties on behalf of ev ery person who paid the subject taxes in California, except for those few who opted out of the class settlement. The refund claims itemized the specific amount of the tax refund allegedly due each individual by each city or county. One claim form was submitted to each taxing jurisdiction; included with the form was a compact disc showing the names of the subclass members who paid the taxes to the specific jurisdiction, how much they each paid, and other relevant information.
The defendant cities and counties all deni ed or failed to respond to the refund claims. New Cingular and the individual plain tiffs then brought this lawsuit, seeking to
obtain the refunds. Fifty-five defendants (respondents) 1 filed demurrers to the FAC. Respondents argued, inter alia, that appellants failed to allege facts show ing compliance with
defendants’ tax refund ordinances and failed to establish that they had standing to bring
the action. The trial court sustained respondents’ demu rrers without leave to amend. It noted that the FAC did not allege that any of the i ndividual plaintiffs paid internet access taxes

1 Respondents are the Cities of Alhambra , Berkeley, Burbank, Calabasas, Chico, Chula Vista, Compton, Culver City, Cupertin o, Daly City, Desert Hot Springs, Downey, East Palo Alto, El Cerrito, El Monte, Ex eter, Gardena, Gilroy, Glendale, Guadalupe, Hawthorne, Hayward, Huntington Beach, Hun tington Park, Long Be ach, Los Altos, Los Angeles, Modesto, Montclair, Monterey, Moreno Valley, Mountai n View, Oakland, Pacific Grove, Palo Alto, Pasadena, Pinol e, Pomona, Porterville, Redondo Beach, Redwood City, Richmond, San Bernardino, Sa n Jose, San Leandro, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, Sierra Madre, Stockton, Torrance, Tu lare, Waterford, and Winters, and the City and County of San Fran cisco. Most respondents have attorneys in common with other respondents, and a total of six separate respondents ’ briefs were filed in this appeal. The largest group of respondents’ is the “Alhambra Coalition,” which is made up of 37 cities.6 to any particular taxing jurisdiction, or that any individual plaintiff filed a claim for tax refund. The court found that appellants were “trying to press a de facto class action,” and it queried: “Can plaintiffs state a claim to obtain municipal refunds via the litigation efforts of (a) the vendor whic h collected and remitted the ta x and (b) the four sub-class representatives appointed throu gh a separate litigation process in federal court in Chicago
to seek refunds for the benefit of the consumer settlement class certified by that court?” The court answered the question, “No,” fi nding “[t]he vendor which collected and remitted the tax . . . does not have standing to seek a refund when it has not incurred any financial loss because it has not yet ref unded the amounts in question to its own customers before making the refund claim. At present, [New Cingular] is not out any money for the taxes in question as all am ounts remitted to the several municipal jurisdictions were paid in full by the vendo r’s customers. [Citation.] [New Cingular] simply passed those moneys al ong to the governments after including such items in error on periodic billings.” The trial court also based its decision on its finding that local ordinances which prohibited cla ss claims or required individual claimants to file their
own individual claims were effective and not preempted by any state laws. New Cingular and the individual plain tiffs timely appealed the judgment entered in favor of respondents.
DISCUSSION We review the ruling sustaining the de murrers de novo, exercising independent judgment as to whether the co mplaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. ( Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1110, 11 15.) We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, assuming all properly pleaded material facts are true, but not assuming the truth of contentions, dedu ctions or conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) We ma y consider matters that are properly judicially noticed. ( Four Star Electric, Inc. v. F & H Construction (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1379.) A demurrer tests the legal suffi ciency of the complaint. ( Hernandez v. City of
Pomona (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1497.) As such, we are not concerned with the7 difficulties a plaintiff may have in proving the claims ma de in the complaint. ( Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
, supra , 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.) We are also unconcerned with the trial court’s reasons for sustaining the demurrers, as it is the ruling, not the rationale, that is reviewable. ( Mendoza v. Town of Ross (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 625, 631; Sackett v. Wyatt (1973) 32 Cal. App.3d 592, 598, fn. 2.)
I. The Government Claims Act Code of Civil Procedure section 313 prov ides that the “general procedure for the presentation of claims as a prerequisite to commencement of actions for money or damages” against a local government entity is prescribed by the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq. 2 ). The Government Claims Ac t “established a standardized procedure for bringing cl aims against local government entities.” ( Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 241, 246 ( Ardon ).) The purpose of the Government Claims Act “is to provide the public entity sufficien t information to enab le it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455.) Section 910 provides the basic framework fo r presenting a claim. It states: “A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her behalf and shall show all of the following: [¶] (a) The name and post o ffice address of the claimant. [¶] (b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. [¶] (c) The date, place and other ci rcumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. [¶] (d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. [¶] (e) The na me or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, dama ge, or loss, if known. [¶] ( f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim . . . together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed

2 All further statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise noted.8 exceeds ten thousand dollars ( $10,000), no dollar amount shall be included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim wo uld be a limited civil case.” Section 910 applies to claims against governmental entitie s generally, including certain claims for tax refunds. (§ 905, subd. (a); Ardon
, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 247.)
II. The effect of local ordinances The trial court sustained respondents’ demu rrers, in part, becaus e it found that the claims filed by New Cingular were improper. New Cingular filed a single claim form with each respondent city a nd county that—along with the compact disc listing the names of subclass members and how much they paid in internet access taxes—contained the general information required by section 910. The trial court found that the claims were invalid because they violated local ordinances that prohi bited class claims and that required individual claimants to sepa rately file individual claims. In April 2013, after the trial court ma de its ruling, our Supreme Court decided McWilliams v. City of Long Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613 ( McWilliams ). Earlier, in Ardon, the Supreme Court held that the Govern ment Claims Act permitted a class action claim against a local government entity for refund of an unlaw ful tax “in the absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth in an applicable governing claims statute.” (52 Cal.4th at p. 251.) The defendant city in McWilliams argued that its municipal code contained an “‘applicable governing claims statute’ barring class action claims for a tax refund.” ( McWilliams
, at p. 616.) The McWilliams court disagreed, holding that the city’s ordinance was not a “statute” and th erefore was subject to the general claim requirements of section 910, which permit cl ass claims against a government entity. ( Id. at pp. 616-617, 619.) The taxpay er plaintiff was thus entitled to present a claim on behalf of the entire class, and each member of the putative class was not required to make an individual claim prior to the filing of the lawsuit, despite what the ordinances purported to prohibit. ( Id. at pp. 619-620.)9 On appeal, respondents do no t dispute the applicability of McWilliams , and acknowledge that class claims are permissible. 3 They argue, however, that the claims at issue here were barred by local ordinances that allow a service supplier, such as New Cingular, to file a claim only in the event that the service supplier has already refunded disputed taxes from its own funds to its customers.
To the extent that these “refund first” ordinances establish a precondition to filing a claim, they are preempted by the Government Claims Act. Section 910 provides that a claim may be presented by “the claimant or by a person acting on his or her behalf.” It establishes no requirement that the claim be presented only by an entity that has repaid taxes to its customers. As explained by McWilliams , the Legislature mandated that the Government Claims Act apply in matters such as this one involving a claim for refund of a local tax. (56 Cal.4th at pp. 628-629.) Respondents seek to lim it the scope of section 910 by allowing a “person” such as New Cingu lar to file a claim on another’s behalf only if it has first complied with an ordinance’s “refund first” requirements. Just as the defendant city in McWilliams could not impose a limitation barring class claims, respondents here may not impose a “refund firs t” requirement that circumscribes the class of persons that may bring a claim on another’s behalf. 4 Under section 910, New Cingular had standing to present claims to respo ndents on behalf of its customers who were

3 Actually, the assertion that New Cingular made a class claim was never quite correct. This case does not involve a “class re presentative” making a claim on behalf of unnamed similarly situated individuals. Inst ead, New Cingular filed refund claims on behalf of all the specifically named customer s in each defendant city and county, and the information provided with the claims forms detailed pertinent information for each customer, including how much in in ternet access taxes each paid.

4 Appellants reason that the “refund first” ordinances can be harmonized with the Government Claims Act by requiring a ref und from the service s upplier only when the taxing jurisdiction has determined that a re fund is due and has set the amount of the refund, after a claim has been presented and considered. Becau se this issue is immaterial to whether appellants properly stated a ca use of action, we need not reach it.10 charged the internet access taxes. Local ordinances may not subvert the authority granted by section 910. Furthermore, we find that New Cingula r’s claims complied with the claims presentation requirements stated in section 910. Only substantial compliance with all requirements of section 910 is necessa ry for a claim to be satisfactory ( Ardon
, supra , 52 Cal.4th at p. 247), and res pondents do not dispute that the claims here contained all pertinent information required by section 910. III. Standing The primary issue that rema ins is whether New Cingular had standing to file suit for tax refund after the claims were rejected by respondents. Respondents contend that, even if New Cingular had standing to file th e claims, it did not ha ve standing to bring
suit. Code of Civil Procedure section 367 prov ides: “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest , except as otherwise provided by statute.” Respondents argue that the real parties in interest here are the customers of New Cingular, who were charged for the internet access taxes and stand to recover any refunds. According to respondents, New Ci ngular suffered no injury because it merely passed through taxes paid by its customers to the respondent cities. Respondents note, and appellants do not dispute, that New Cingul ar’s customers did not make an assignment of claims to New Cingular. Rather, New Cingular characterizes itself as an “agent” authorized by agreement and by federal court or der to prosecute its customers’ claims for refunds. Respondents further assert that Ne w Cingular may not rely on section 910 to confer standing in a lawsuit. Section 910 is found in Part 3 of the Government Claims Act, pertaining to “Claims Against Public Entities,” not in Part 4, which is entitled “Actions Against Public En tities and Public Employees.” Standing is jurisdictional. ( Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 233; Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) “Generally, ‘the pe rson possessing the right sued upon by reason
of the substantive law is the real party in interest.’” ( Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn.11 v. Imperial Contracting Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 898, 906.) “To have standing, a party must be beneficially inte rested in the controversy, a nd have ‘some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protect ed.’ [Citation.] This interest must be concrete and actual, and must not be conjectural or hypothetical. [Citation.]” ( Iglesia Evangelica Latina, Inc. v. Sout hern Pacific Latin American Dist. of the Assemblies of God (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 420, 445.)
A number of cases have examined the issu e of whether a business that remits taxes to a local taxing jurisdiction has standing to seek a refund. Respondents place heavy emphasis on one of these cases, Scol Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 805 ( Scol ). Scol, a retailer of alcoholic beverage s, sought a refund of “tipplers’ tax”
monies it collected from its customers and rem itted to the defendant, claiming that the tax was unconstitutional or otherwise illegal. ( Id. at p. 808.) The court found that Scol had no standing to sue for itself or on behalf of its customers because it was not a “taxpayer” (its customers were), but it was instead a “tax collector.” ( Id. at .pp. 808-809.)
Scol has since been criticized for its sharp distinction between a “taxpayer” and a “tax collector,” and its strict rule denyi ng standing in all circumstances to “tax
collectors.” “To the extent Scol stands for the proposition that a party lacks standing to challenge a tax unless it is the denominated ‘taxpayer’ under the st atutory or regulatory scheme imposing the tax, it is outdated.” ( TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1364 ( TracFone ).) This is because “[t]here
have been some refinements of the rule barri ng suits for refund to persons not technically regarded as ‘taxpayers’ . . . resulting from unusual circumstances which have been subject to judicial review.” ( Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 518, 526 ( Delta ).) The cases presenting these sorts of “unusu al circumstances” have been somewhat
limited. In Delta
, the defendant tax board argued that the plaintiff’s vendors, not the plaintiff, were required by law to pay the ta xes on fuel that the plaintiff purchased, and that because the plaintiff was not the techni cal taxpayer, it lacked st anding to sue for an alleged overpayment of taxes. (214 Cal.A pp.3d at p. 525.) The Court of Appeal12 disagreed, finding that the plaintiff had standi ng to pursue an action for refund because it was legally responsible for the taxes and had actually paid disputed taxes. ( Id. at p. 529.)
In Andal v. City of Stockton (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 86, 88-89 ( Andal ), three cell phone companies, which were re quired to collect from custom ers and remit to the city a fee imposed for the local 911 communication sy stem, sued for declaratory relief, seeking
to have the fee declared unconstitutional. The defendant city argued that the companies lacked standing. Relying on Gowens v. City of Bakersfield (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 282, the appellate court found that the companies ha d standing to file suit because they were required to collect, record, report, and remit th e fee, under threat of various penalties, and they were “engaged in competitiv e businesses that could be a dversely affected by the tax on customers.” ( Andal , at p. 94.)
In TracFone , the plaintiff paid the defendant County of Los Angeles use taxes
from its own funds that it later determined were tax exempt. (163 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1361.) The trial court fo und that the plaintiff lacked sta nding to seek a refund because it was the service provider responsible for co llecting the tax from the consumer, and thus not the “taxpayer” under the rele vant county ordinance. ( Id. at pp. 1361-1362.) The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the plai ntiff alleged that it had itself paid the taxes
and could not recover the taxes from its cust omers, with whom it had no contact. ( Id. at p. 1365.) The plaintiff therefore had standing to pursue a refund. ( Id. at p. 1366.)
The TracFone court held that “concerns of fairne ss require the courts to ensure the taxing authority is not unjustly enriched at th e expense of persons left without a remedy.” (163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365.) These princi ples of fairness and avoidance of unjust enrichment are present in the other decisions finding standing in unusual circumstances. (See Delta
, supra , 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 526 [“there is precedent for judicial intervention in matters involving the [State Board of Eq ualization] to preven t unjust enrichment,
intervention intended to ensure some remedy for persons who have been overtaxed”].) For example, in Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization (1962) 58 Cal.2d 252, 253 ( Decorative Carpets ), the plaintiff erroneously charged its customers and
remitted to the board taxes on sales and insta llation of carpeting. The plaintiff sued the13 board, and the trial court found that the plai ntiff was entitled to re fund because it was the taxpayer under the law. ( Id. at p. 254.) The trial court, however, disregarded the plaintiff’s stated intention to keep the refu nd for itself rather th an pay it back to its customers. ( Id. at p. 254.) The Supreme Court reversed, finding that that the plaintiff had standing and could recover the refund, but only upon submission of proof that it would return the monies to its customers, holdi ng: “It is still left to the courts to adopt appropriate remedies when excessive reimbur sements have been collected by mistake and paid to the state.” ( Id . at p. 256.)
In Javor v. State Board of Equalization (1974) 12 Cal.3d 790 , again under unusual circumstances, the Supreme Court allowed an automobile purchaser and purported class representative to join the State Board of Equa lization as a party to a suit against retailers for recovery of sales taxes paid to the board. ( Id. at p. 802.) Retailers were the only parties that could obtain refu nds under the board’s procedur es, but they had no incentive to seek refunds because they w ould be required to return th e funds to the purchasers. ( Id. at p. 801.) In fashioning the remedy of joi nder, the court held that the State Board of Equalization could not “use th e refund procedure to abdica te its responsi bility to the customer, particularly where the Board stands to unjustly profit under such circumstances.” ( Id. at p. 800.) None of the above cases presents fact s closely resembling those of the instant dispute, and the parties have not pointed to a ny published cases that do. Nevertheless, we believe that the above-expressed concerns of fairness and ensuring that a taxing authority not be unjustly enriched have significant re levance to the appropriate analysis here. Although the issue of standing is a close one, we find that under the unique circumstances presented by this case, New Ci ngular has a beneficial interest and is a proper plaintiff. Respondents characterize New Cingular’s role as one akin to a lawyer representing a client seeking a tax refund. Under the terms of section 910, the lawyer may file a claim with a local government entity on his client’s behalf, but no authority allows the lawyer to then sue for a refund in his own name. This comparison overlooks14 New Cingular’s direct involvem ent in the events underlying the claims in this case and the enforceable contractual relationship New Cingular has with its customers. New Cingular charged im proper internet access taxe s in its monthly bills to customers and then paid those taxes to the de fendant cities and counties. These are the taxes that New Cingular now seeks to recover, for the benefit of its customers. In that respect it is similar to the plaintiff in Decorative Carpets , who was allowed to pursue a
lawsuit for tax refunds on the condition that the monies be returned to the customers. (58 Cal.2d at p. 256.) Further, New Cingular has a direct interest in seeking the refunds. 5 New Cingular was sued for charging the inte rnet access taxes, and settled the case by agreeing to seek refunds. By settling the federal litigation, New Cingular avoided potential liability and attorney fees, and its customers authoriz ed it to seek refund s on their behalf. 6 Under the settlement agreement, which is enforceable by United Stat es District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, New Cingular is contractually obligated to s eek the refunds. 7 Thus, New Cingular has a concre te and actual interest in seeking the refunds. (See Iglesia Evangelica Latina, In c. v. Southern Pacific Latin American Dist. of the

5 Indeed, respondents’ assertion that New Cingular is a disinter ested third party is belied by the fact that many respondents have ordinances specifically allowing a service supporter such as New Cingular to file a claim for refund.

6 Respondents argue that the settlement agreement only authori zed New Cingular to file claims, not a lawsuit. We disagree. The settlement agreem ent generally provides that AT&T Mobility, includ ing New Cingular, shall seek refunds from the taxing jurisdictions and further stipul ates that in the event a taxi ng jurisdiction denies a claim AT&T Mobility shall co operate in the appeal of the denial. Moreover, the agreement provides that AT&T Mo bility retains the right “to appeal, otherwise contest, or further prosecute an appeal of any adverse ruling or decision.” We find this language to be a sufficiently clear authorization for AT&T Mobility to prosecute a lawsuit such as this one contesting the denial of claims.

7 The district court retained jurisdicti on to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. ( In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig.
, supra , 789 F.Supp.2d 935, 978.)15 Assemblies of God
, supra , 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 445 [to ha ve beneficial interest, party’s interest in controversy must be “concrete and actual”].) Moreover, because no refunds obtained ar e to be retained by New Cingular, there is no possibility that New Cingular will be un justly enriched. Th e settlement agreement explicitly provides that New Cing ular will assign all of its “rights, title and interest” in any refunds received to members of the releva nt subclass of customers. On the other hand, if this litigation is not allowed to pr oceed, the defendant cities and counties will likely keep the improper taxe s, leaving them unjustly enri ched at the expense of New Cingular’s customers. This is a resu lt we should strive to avoid. (See Decorative Carpets , supra , 58 Cal.2d at p. 256; TracFone , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365; Delta
, supra , 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 526.) Under the circumstances presented in this case, it is appropriate for the company that collected a nd remitted the taxes, and that made claims for refunds pursuant to section 910, to seek the refunds on behalf of its customers in

court. 8 Therefore, because New Cingular’s allega tions are sufficient to confer standing, the trial court erred by sustaining the demu rrers against New Cin gular. The demurrers were properly sustained against the individua l plaintiffs, however, as the FAC contained no allegations detailing the particular cities or counties to which they paid internet access taxes. “‘[T]o state a cause of action agains t a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity.’” ( Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.) In the trial court and on appeal, the individual plaintiffs made no attempt to correct th is deficiency; thus,

8 Respondents argue that under the te rms of the settlement agreement not all refunded monies will be paid to customers, since some will cover expenses such as attorney and escrow fees. Moreover, respondent s assert that the statute of limitations has expired on many potential claims for refunds; customers who paid internet access taxes more recently have more viable claims than those who paid years ago, but the settlement agreement calls for equal appo rtionment of refunded moni es. Respondents’ apparent concern for the customers is misplaced. These are the term s the customers consented to in the settlement agreement, a nd each customer had the right to opt out of the agreement.16 amendment is not warranted. (See Smith v. State Farm Mut ual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 711 [to be allowe d opportunity to amend, plaintiff must demonstrate how the compla int can be amended].) IV. Remaining causes of action
In addition to the cause of action for tax refund, New Cingular also asserted claims for unjust enrichment, money had and received, and violations of due process. Each of these additional causes of action simply inco rporated the allegations upon which the claim for tax refund was based. Thus, th ese asserted causes of action are merely duplicative. Only a single cause of action for tax refund has actu ally been stated. ( TracFone , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.) Therefore, although these additional causes of action stand, they effectively allege only a single cause of action for tax refund. ( TracFone , supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.)
DISPOSITION The judgment in favor of respondents a nd against New Cingular is reversed and
remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate its order su staining respondents’ demurrers as to New Cingular. In all ot her respects, the judgment is affirmed. New Cingular shall recover its costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

BOREN, P.J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.