95-255

 No. 97-255

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

DIANA L. WEBB,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

T.D., D.C.; R.K.S., M.D.; and C.H.A., M.D.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone,

 The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 John M. Morrison (argued), Meloy & Morrison, Helena, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Richard F. Cebull (argued) and Lisa A. Rodeghiero; Brown,

 Gerbase, Cebull, Fulton, Harman & Ross; Billings, Montana

 (for R.K.S., M.D.)

 Heard: November 13, 1997

 Submitted: November 20, 1997

 Decided: December 30, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

 The plaintiff, Diana L. Webb, filed a complaint in the District Court for the

Thirteenth Judicial District in Yellowstone County in which she alleged that she was

injured as a result of a negligent orthopedic examination performed by Robert K. 

Snider,

M.D. Dr. Snider had examined her at the request of her employer's workers'

compensation insurance carrier. The District Court granted summary judgment to Dr.

Snider on the basis that he owed claimant no duty because he had no physician-patient

relationship with her. Webb appeals from that order and judgment. We reverse the

judgment of the District Court.

 The issue on appeal is whether a physician who performs a medical examination

of an individual at the request of a third party has a duty of care to the examinee 

and, if

so, what is the scope of that duty. 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 The following facts were before the District Court by deposition or affidavit. 

Because Webb's claim was resolved by summary judgment, we set forth only those facts

most favorable to her claim. 

 Diana Webb suffered a work-related injury to her lower back in 1986. From April

through August of that year, she received treatment on one occasion from a physical

therapist and periodically from a chiropractor for pain relief. The only medical 

doctor

who examined her back was Robert K. Snider, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, to whom

she was referred by the State Compensation Insurance Fund. She saw Dr. Snider on

October 7, 1986. He examined her and had her undergo a CAT scan of her back to help

determine whether she had herniated an intervertebral disc.

 Following Dr. Snider's examination and review of the CAT scan film, he wrote

her the following letter on October 8, 1986:

Mrs. Edward Webb

Box 45

Belfry, MT 59008

Dear Diana:

I have reviewed the CAT scan, and it looks excellent. There is no evidence

of a ruptured disc. I think that the problems that you are having are of a

back sprain, and I don't feel that any surgical treatment will be necessary.

I indicated to workers' compensation that I feel that you can work, and I

gave them an impairment rating of 2 percent applied to the whole person.

If you feel that you cannot return to your original job, then you need to

discuss this with workers' compensation.

Sincerely,

Robert K. Snider, M.D.

 According to Webb's testimony, because Dr. Snider was the only physician who

had actually examined her, she relied on his advice and sought no further treatment 

for

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her back injury. She eventually returned to an occupation in which she performed 

heavy

labor, severely herniated an intervertebral disc in her lower back, and has 

significant

physical limitations as a result of that additional back injury.

 Lawrence Guinney, M.D., is an orthopedic surgeon who, at Webb's request,

reviewed her medical records, including those prepared by Dr. Snider, and the CAT 

scan

done at Dr. Snider's request in 1986. It was his opinion that, contrary to the 

advice of

Dr. Snider, that film showed an abnormal bulging disc at the level between Webb's 

fifth

lumbar vertebra and first sacral vertebra and that Dr. Snider departed from the 

accepted

standard of care for orthopedic surgeons by failing to note the abnormality. It was 

his

opinion that as a result of Dr. Snider's misdiagnosis in 1986 and his failure to 

limit

Webb's work-related activity, she suffered a herniation of the same disc in 1989 from

which she suffered nerve root compression. Dr. Guinney concluded that the pain and

dysesthesia, from which she now suffers, is a result of the prolonged nerve root

compression caused by the 1989 herniation, and that if her condition had been 

accurately

diagnosed in 1986 and her activities limited, it is more likely than not that the 

1989

herniation and nerve root compression would not have occurred.

 Dr. Snider moved for summary judgment. In support of his motion, he stated by

affidavit that he saw Webb on one occasion on October 7, 1986, at the request of the

State Compensation Insurance Fund to evaluate the nature and extent of her disease or

injury and whether she could return to work. He stated that he was not retained to

provide medical treatment and that he provided none. His findings were reported to 

the

State Fund and the fee for his services was paid by the State Fund.

 Dr. Snider contended that he was entitled to summary judgment for two reasons:

(1) Webb's claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) he owed Webb no 

duty

because he had no doctor-patient relationship with her.

 On February 3, 1995, the District Court granted summary judgment to Dr. Snider

based on the statute of repose found at õ 27-2-205, MCA. That order was appealed to

this Court, which reversed the District Court on February 20, 1996, and remanded to 

the

District Court for further proceedings. See Webb v. R.K.S., M.D. (1996), 275 Mont.

243, 912 P.2d 202. On January 21, 1997, the District Court granted a second motion

for summary judgment in favor of Dr. Snider based on its conclusion that an 

independent

medical exam (i.e., an exam performed at the request of a third party) does not give 

rise

to a doctor-patient relationship, and that absent such a relationship an examining 

physician

has no duty to the examinee to exercise reasonable care.

 DISCUSSION

 Does a physician who performs a medical examination of an individual at the

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request of a third party have a duty of care to the examinee and, if so, what is the 

scope

of that duty?

 This is an appeal from an order dismissing Webb's claim by summary judgment. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), M.R.

Civ.P. 

Our review of district court orders granting summary judgment is plenary. See State

Farm v. Powell (1995), 274 Mont. 92, 95, 906 P.2d 198, 200.

 The District Court granted Dr. Snider's motion for summary judgment based on

its conclusion that he owed no duty to Webb because she was not his patient. The

question of whether a legal duty is owed by one person to another, as well as the 

scope

of any such duty, are questions of law. See Nautilus Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Ins., 

Inc.

(1992), 254 Mont. 296, 299, 837 P.2d 409, 411.

 On appeal, Webb contends that doctors in Montana have a duty to exercise that

degree of skill and learning ordinarily exercised by other doctors in the same 

speciality

under like circumstances, and failure to do so is negligence. She cites our 

decision in

Aasheim v. Humberger (1985), 215 Mont. 127, 695 P.2d 824. She contends that she

submitted evidence that Dr. Snider negligently failed to diagnose her condition and 

that

she suffered further damage as a result of his negligence and, therefore, that the 

District

Court erred by dismissing her claim by summary judgment.

 Dr. Snider responds that although he has a duty to exercise reasonable care, 

based

on the standards of his profession, when examining, diagnosing, or treating a 

patient, that

duty is based on, and limited to, the doctor-patient relationship. He contends that 

because

he had no doctor-patient relationship with Webb, he owed her no duty as a matter of 

law. 

Although Dr. Snider concedes that there are no prior decisions to that effect in 

Montana,

he relies on the following decisions from other jurisdictions: Hafner v. Beck (Ariz. 

App.

1995), 916 P.2d 1105; Keene v. Wiggins (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) 138 Cal. Rptr. 3; Peace

v. Weisman (Ga. App. 1988), 368 S.E.2d 319; Rogers v. Horvath (Mich. 1975), 237

N.W.2d 595; Henkemeyer v. Boxall (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), 465 N.W.2d 437; LoDico

v. Caputi (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) 517 N.Y.S.2d 640; Promubol v. Hackett (Pa. Super.

1996), 686 A.2d 417; Tomko v. Marks (Pa. App. 1992), 602 A.2d 890; Craddock v.

Gross (Pa. Super. 1986), 504 A.2d 1300; Wilson v. Winsett (Tex. App. 1992), 828

S.W.2d 231; Johnston v. Sibley (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), 558 S.W.2d 135. The District

Court agreed, and on that basis, granted Dr. Snider's motion for summary judgment.

 Webb replies that this case is distinguishable from the authorities cited by Dr.

Snider and relied on by the District Court because in this case Dr. Snider 

undertook to

advise Webb regarding her condition, and thereby, assumed a duty to her to exercise

reasonable care. She contends that the authorities cited by Dr. Snider and relied 

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on by

the District Court are inapplicable to the facts in this case because in none of 

those cases

was advice directly provided by the examining physician to the person who had been

examined. Webb contends that the more persuasive authorities are the following: Daly

v. United States (9th Cir. 1991), 946 F.2d 1467; Green v. Walker (5th Cir. 1990), 910

F.2d 291; Betesh v. United States (1974), 400 F. Supp. 238; Hoover v. Williamson (Md.

1964), 203 A.2d 861; Cleghorn v. Hess (Nev. 1993), 853 P.2d 1260; Edwards v. Lamb

(N.H. 1899), 45 A. 480; Baer v. Regents of Univ. of California (N.M. App. 1994), 844

P.2d 841; Ferguson v. Wolkin (N.Y. 1986), 499 N.Y.S.2d 356; Twitchell v. MacKay

(N.Y. App. Div. 1980), 434 N.Y.S.2d 516; Armstrong v. Morgan (Tex. App. 1977), 545

S.W.2d 45.

 We agree that the authorities cited by Dr. Snider and relied on by the District

Court are not applicable to the facts in this case. All of them involve independent

medical examinations at the request of a workers' compensation insurance carrier, 

state

agency, or employer, and all involve allegations that the examination was done

negligently, causing some damage to the plaintiff. However, none involved a 

situation

in which the defendant physician was accused of negligently diagnosing a plaintiff's

condition and communicating his erroneous conclusions directly to the patient. The

closest to a case on point is Promubol where the defendant physician interpreted the

plaintiff's x-ray film, sent a report to the plaintiff's insurance company, and sent 

a copy

to the plaintiff. However, critical to that court's decision in favor of the 

defendant doctor

was its conclusion that he had not, in fact, given advice to the plaintiff. That 

court gave

the following explanation for its decision:

 It is clear that the report does not advise appellant. It was neither

prepared for appellant nor directed to appellant, and it did not provide

recommendations for follow-up. There were no personal notations,

whatsoever on the report. Clearly, it represented a gratuitous notification

that the information contained therein was being sent to the insurance

carrier. Since the exam was reported as normal, sending a copy of the

report doubled as notification that appellant Promubol's sought-after

insurance increase would likely be granted. 

Promubol v. Hackett (Pa. Super. 1996), 686 A.2d 417, 420.

 On the other hand, in Hoover, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered a

physician's duty under circumstances similar to those in this case. In that case, 

General

Electric Company required annual x-ray examinations of the chests of certain 

employees

due to the effects of silica dust to which they were exposed. One of the employees 

was

the plaintiff, Willard Hoover. The examinations were performed under the direction 

of

the defendant, Dr. C. Vernon Williamson. The plaintiff alleged that following his 

annual

examination, Dr. Williamson advised him that he had "a little infection in the 

lungs,"

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when, in fact, the examination clearly revealed that he had silicosis. However, his

complaint was dismissed based on lack of a physician-patient relationship since Dr.

Williamson had been retained and paid by his employer. The trial court held that

Williamson's duty was to the company and not to Hoover. The Maryland Appellate

Court acknowledged that ordinarily recovery for malpractice is limited to situations 

which

involve the relationship of a doctor and patient, but reversed the defendant's 

dismissal

based on the following exception:

 There is, however, a broader, a more fundamental rule of long

standing under which a physician may incur a tort obligation which is

nonconsensual and independent of contract. This is the general rule that

one who assumes to act even though gratuitously, may thereby become

subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all. Restatement, Torts,

Sec. 325, says the law is that one who gratuitously undertakes to render

services which he should recognize as necessary to another's bodily safety,

and leads the other in reasonable reliance on the services to refrain from

taking other protective steps, or to enter on a dangerous course of conduct,

'. . . is subject to liability to the other for bodily harm resulting from the

actor's failure to exercise reasonable care to carry out his undertaking.' See

also 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Sect. 18.6.

Hoover v. Williamson (Md. 1964), 203 A.2d 861, 863.

 That court held that even if the defendant had no duty to the plaintiff to 

begin with,

he assumed a duty when he made affirmative representations to the plaintiff 

regarding his

condition. Hoover is also relied on in Betesh v. United States (1974), 400 F. Supp. 

238,

245-46, for the principle that a physician performing an independent medical 

examination

can mislead a patient and, therefore, breach a duty to that patient by withholding

information, as well as by affirmatively misrepresenting a patient's condition.

 Dr. Snider contends that if we adopt the plaintiff's theory and allow an 

exception

to the physician-patient requirement in only those situations where a physician makes

affirmative representations to the examinee, then in those situations where the 

examinee

does in fact suffer from some physical ailment about which he or she should be 

notified,

i.e., the presence of a potentially fatal tumor, then it would be in the physician's 

best

interest not to notify the examinee, and that that would not be in the public's best 

interest. 

We agree. Therefore, while we agree with the decision of the Maryland Court of

Appeals in Hoover that a physician who performs an independent medical examination

has a duty to exercise reasonable care when he or she communicates the results of 

that

examination to the examinee, we conclude that the scope of the duty to the examinee 

is

not limited to those situations in which diagnoses are negligently made and 

communicated

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to the person being examined. 

 Based on the statutory scheme which defines the duty of every person in Montana

to exercise ordinary care and skill to avoid injury to others (õ 27-1-701, MCA), we 

find

the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Green v. Walker, M.D. (5th 

Cir.

1990), 910 F.2d 291, persuasive. In Green, the decedent's employer required its

employees to undergo an annual physical examination and contracted with the defendant

physician to conduct those examinations. The defendant reported that all of Green's 

test

results were normal and that he was employable without restriction. Approximately 

one

year later, he was diagnosed with lung cancer from which he ultimately died. Prior 

to

his death, he brought an action against the examining physician based on his 

contention

that the physician negligently failed to diagnose his condition and that if he had, 

his

chances of survival would have been greater. The district court, however, granted

summary judgment in favor of the physician on the basis that no physician-patient

relationship existed and, therefore, that the defendant had no duty to Green. The 

issue on

appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court was whether, under Louisiana law, the defendant 

had

a duty to the examinee to perform the examination with due care, and to report his

findings, particularly any finding which appeared to pose a threat to the physical or

mental health of the examinee. The Fifth Circuit Court held that the defendant had 

such

a duty. That court acknowledged that the traditional principle of law regarding 

liability

for malpractice depends on a physician-patient relationship. See Green, 910 F.2d at 

296. 

That court based its decision on Louisiana statutory law, in spite of a decision from

Louisiana's Court of Appeals which seemed to require the opposite result. See Thomas

v. Kenton (La. App. 1982), 425 So. 2d 396. It noted that in Louisiana "the Erie

obligation is to the [Civil] Code, the 'solemn expression of legislative will.'" 

Green, 910

F.2d at 294 (quoting Shelp v. National Surety Corp. (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 

(1964),

379 U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 439, 13 L. Ed. 2d 543). The statutory provision it relied on

provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by

whose fault it happened to repair it." La. Civ. Code art. 2315. That court 

concluded

that Louisiana's Civil Code "permits the articulation of a duty of care that would 

protect

physical examinees, if they are to be deemed other than 'patients,' a position we 

do not

here concede." Green, 910 F.2d at 295. It provided the following rationale and

conclusion:

 We live in an age in which the drive for an increasingly productive

workforce has led employers increasingly to require that employees subject

their bodies (and minds) to inspection in order to obtain or maintain

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employment. See Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to

Occupational Illness, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1379 (1983) (common procedures

include blood tests, urinalysis, pulmonary function tests, and x-rays). In

placing oneself in the hands of a person held out to the world as skilled in

a medical profession, albeit at the request of one's employer, one justifiably

has the reasonable expectation that the expert will warn of "any incidental

dangers of which he is cognizant due to his peculiar knowledge of his

specialization." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Gas Corp., 159

So. 2d 592, 595 (La. App. 1964).

 We therefore now hold that when an individual is required, as a

condition of future or continued employment, to submit to a medical

examination, that examination creates a relationship between the examining

physician and the examinee, at least to the extent of the tests conducted. 

This relationship imposes upon the examining physician a duty to conduct

the requested tests and diagnose the results thereof, exercising the level of

care consistent with the doctor's professional training and expertise, and to

take reasonable steps to make information available timely to the examinee

of any findings that pose an imminent danger to the examinee's physical or

mental well-being. To impose a duty upon the doctor who performs such

tests to do so in accordance with the degree of care expected of his/her

profession for the benefit of the employee-examinee, as well as the

employer, is fully consistent with the very essence of Civil Code article

2315.

Green, 910 F.2d at 295-96 (footnote omitted).

 Green has been followed or cited with approval in Daly v. United States (9th 

Cir.

1991), 946 F.2d 1467; Cleghorn v. Hess (Nev. 1993), 853 P.2d 1260, and Baer v.

Regents of Univ. of California (N.M. App. 1994), 884 P.2d 841.

 Similarly, the Montana Code Annotated provides as follows:

 Except as otherwise provided by law, everyone is responsible not

only for the results of his willful acts but also for an injury occasioned to

another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his

property or person except so far as the latter has willfully or by want of

ordinary care brought the injury upon himself.

Section 27-1-701, MCA. 

 Based on õ 27-1-701, MCA, we likewise conclude that it is consistent with

statutory law in Montana to impose a duty on physicians who perform examinations of

an employee, insured, or other person at the request of a third party to exercise 

the level

of care required by the examiner's professional training and experience and to make

information regarding the results of that examination available to the examinee if 

the

physician's findings disclose an imminent danger to the examinee's physical or mental

well-being.

 We do not, by this opinion, conclude that physicians retained by third parties 

who

perform independent medical examinations have the same duty of care that a physician

has to his or her own patient. The scope of the duty attendant to an independent 

medical

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examination must necessarily be developed on a case-by-case basis. We agree with the

observation of the California Court of Appeals in Keene v. Wiggins (Cal. Ct. App. 

1977),

138 Cal. Rptr. 3, when it stated that:

This does not suggest, however, a doctor is required to exercise the same

degree of skill toward every person he sees. The duty he owes to each

varies with the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of injury or

harm that may be expected to flow from his conduct, and the reliance which

the person may reasonably be expected to place on the opinion received. 

A case-by-case approach is required. 

Keene, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 6.

 What we do hold, in this case, is that a health care provider in Montana who is

retained by a third party to do an independent medical examination has the following

duties:

 1. To exercise ordinary care to discover those conditions which pose an

imminent danger to the examinee's physical or mental well-being and take reasonable

steps to communicate to the examinee the presence of any such condition; and

 2. To exercise ordinary care to assure that when he or she advises an examinee

about her condition following an independent examination, the advice comports with 

the

standard of care for that health care provider's profession.

 For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court erred when it held that 

the

defendant, Robert K. Snider, M.D., had no duty to the plaintiff, Diana L. Webb, to

exercise ordinary care under the circumstances alleged in this case. We reverse the 

order

and judgment of the District Court and remand to the District Court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

Justice W. William Leaphart, specially concurring.

 I concur in the result reached by the Court, however, I would have only answered

the question posed by the appellant Webb. Webb phrased the issue on appeal as 

follows:

"Does a physician who undertakes to advise a patient about her condition following an

independent medical examination have an obligation to exercise reasonable care in 

doing

so?"

 In responding to the issue framed by Webb, I would hold that an IME doctor who

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 undertakes to advise a patient about her condition following an independent medical

examination has an obligation to exercise reasonable care in so advising her. 

 Unlike the majority, I would not have addressed the broader questions of whether

an IME doctor who examines a person must exercise ordinary care to discover mental or

physical conditions and to take reasonable steps to communicate the presence of such

conditions to the examinee. Those are questions which were not posed by the 

appellant

and are outside the scope of the facts of this appeal. While I do not necessarily 

disagree

with the Courtþs analysis of those issues, they are issues for another day, another 

appeal. 

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

Justice Karla M. Gray joins in the foregoing special concurrence.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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