..... -- . .. SECURITY FICATION Clf•nr) 

DISPOSITION FORM 

FILE NO. I SUBJECT 

TO Ke111be.rs or ISA Clasa1!RDM 

t1cat1cn Advisory Panel 

111riutea ot RSA Claaa!tlcaUon Adv1•~1' 

Panel Kee•1ag - 29 Janua1.91 195' 

AO DATE!i Feb S4: COMMENT N0.1 

Geo.B.Campbell. 602Z5/omJ 

1. Att!lched are aummal'J m!.nutes ot meeting or RSA Clasa1t1oa\! on 

Adv180'l'J fanel. meeting held at OBaO, Fi-tda7,. 29 c1anua:&'J' 1954• in 

Room 19-232B. 

2. Declass1t1ed when 1nclosure la .1.•emoved. 

Incl: 

a/• 

SECl~ET 

Declassified and approved for release bv NSA on 05-13-2014 pursuant to E.O. 1352d 

DD FOfRM 9 6 REPLACES NME FORM 96, I OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED. ·,., ff850 

t f':. - ~- ""'~o: : t • -~T -:.-,.. ~ ,,,._... • 1'- •• .., - - - - "'I: 

111-H&Ol-8 u. L llOYllNMEllT PRINTI•• on1cK 
2 February 1954 

MINUTF.$ OF NSA CLASSiflCATION ADVISOR!' PANEL MEETltll - 29 JANUA!iY 19Jlt 

1. The cecond meeting or the NSA Classitlcation Advisoey Panel waa 

called to order b7 Col. George E. Campbell, Adjutant General., at 08.30, 

29 Januaey 19.54, in Room l9-232B. The following were presents 

Mr. w. F. Friedman 

Col. Geo. E. Campbell 

Mr. D. D. C1"011keey 

Dro A. SinkoT 

Mr. F. E. Densmore 

Maj. w. R. Carson 

Mr. s. w. Reynolds 

Maj. w. T. Connor 

Mr. L. D. Callimahoa 

S/ASST 

AG 

C/SEC 

PROD 

m.a> 

P/P 

SEC 

SEC 

TNG 

2. Colo Campbell noted that inquiries haYe been receiTed tram Yarioua 

contractors in regard to declaes~g wartime contracts tor electronic computing machine deTelopments. It was agreed that it there ie definite proof 

that these contract& are for the identical equi,nenta that. &N now unclassified and which are negotiated. tor aa unclassitied then ia no reaaon why 

the old contracts should not be declaseitiecl at this time • 

.30 The drart._ot proposed guide llMa tor use b,r orig1naton 1n 

detel'llJining the classification ot materials waa 18"eeented tor discussion 

and the re'fil!d.on is attached aa Incloaure l. 

4o Additional suggest.ions made in connection with the paper were thats 

aQ The tinal dratt. be .forwarded to USCIB for consideration and 

the first section hanng to do with Top Secret. Codnord classification be 

examined by tho Securi t;r Conmittee, aleo specific clarification be requested 

in regard to fl'la1d.ng code worda uncla•sitiecl when they are not used in their 

codeword 11emo Q 

b. Paragraph 2 under Top Secret Codeword, as reused (A cryptanalytic process 'Which is 1nd1catiw ot specific euccesa on a part.icular 

foreign system), is unnecessary it the paper is accepted a11 an on~all 

guide. Dr. 51nkoY stated that ffiOO considered the original statement 

(Cryptana~ic and other pl"ocessea peculiar to the production ot Special ln~el.ligences succesa, progress, proceea) much too broad and that the 

question is incapable ot being spelled out. He noted the need tor stressing 

the interrelationships 'betvaen the crypto processes in diacueeing COMINT 

succeesee on foreign commmicationael 

c. Reference to USCIB and I.SIB be deleted 11here portions ot the 

UK/US Agreement (B'.?.USA) are extracted to elaborate upon certain points in 

the guide lines and that the paper be an NSA document. 

SECRET 
~ - - ....... 9 s~l!i.~ao9s 9 

do In the tinal paper, particular~ on the Top Secret and 

Contidential. sections, the classitication guides aa promulsated b7 the 

Secretary ot Defense be set. forth. 

s. Col. Campbell asked tbe Panel memera to consider 'Whether intoration stating thaii NSA ia in the CO.MINT field and in the OOMSEC fteld. 

CatJ. ~' made publio. -..· 

6. Incl.owre 2 le a 1.ht or questions relating to problem of 

ctl.us1tioat1on wbic~ haa been aubmittecl by PRODo 

? • It was agreed that IncloauN l and 2 be considered at. the nut 

Panel meeting to be held ~t 08301 Fr1dq1 5 febNa17, in Room 19-232. 

s. The meeting adjourned at 1130. 

2 Inola 

a./a 

SE€RET 
,._,_ .. 

sEem 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET CODEWORD 

Re'riseds 1 FeboS4 

*l. A cryptanalytic proceae which ia indicatiw ot specific success 

on a particular foreign s;ystm. 

2. Traffic Intelligence invol'Ving call-signs or message headings 

encrypted in codee or ciphers or h1HJ1 security grading. Except.ions would be 

listed separatel.1'. 

3o Traffics InLelligenee involving such combj,nation ( 11 tuaion") ot 

separate Traffic Intelligence or other Secret Codeword sources as produces 

intcn-mation "Whose Talue is so great that aecurit7 ot content becomaa the 

o"ferri.ding consideration. 

*Thi• paragraph ie unnecessary it the paper 1a to 11el"Y8 as the owr-all guide. 

**Mr. callihamoe will clal"it,r detiniticn ot phrase 11 separata codeword"., 

~/ SECRET 
I ' .. 

E03,3(b)(2) 

PL 86-36/SOUSG 3605 Reri.seds l Feb.54 

TOP SECRET 

l. The detailed miesio·!'l or a COMINT agency or a najor ccmponent 

thereof. 

2. The existence ot peac9'<otime collaboration in COMINT matters between 

US agencies and Australia and Canada. 

J., Intelli@!tnce deri ftd from the ceyptanalyl!lia of high-grade enmq 

cryptoa19tems during World War II, provided the reterence cannot lead to 

interenc:es as to the specific systems involwd.. 

4. Codewords applicable to Special Intelligence and Special Weather 

Intelligence. 

s. Discloaures of the details ot cryptanaqaia ot specific low-grade 

enenv m1l1 tary cr;ypto918tem8 during and after World War II• 

6. COMINT end product, except such as by- mutual agreement with GCHQ 

11 Secret Codeword, is Top Secret. 

SECRI•:T CODEgD 

l. Trattic Intelligence (including freely available pr111a.ey and bredty 

ayateDll such as comoorcial codes) except. where speciti~ assigned to 

other c~tegorieai 

a. Traffic analysis proceaaea,except. elementaey principles. 

b. SUlllnariee • etco, based on Tratfic Intelllgenceo 

2 

SECRET 
• • . . SE~Rfi:'J5ao9s a E03~h)(2) 

PL 86·36/50 USC 3605 

Revieeds lFeb. 54 

SECRET CODEWORD (CONTINUED) 

except. aa noted in paragraphs 4 and 5 under Top Secret Codeword. 

3. Special Intelligence specifically assigned on the baaia of c~osystema b)" USCIB. 

4o Case notations and texta intomationo 

*l. Standing operating procedures and instruction manual.e go..ernlng 

the respsctiYe OOMINT orgnnizations (except instructions to processiqi 

acti vi.tie• goveming their processing in detail and the handling and aecurit;r 

ot their final product a). 

**20 Intercept aes1gnmentso 

3o Detailed intercept and D/F plans and over-all operational ettectiveness ot intercept. and D/t organization as a whole. 

4. General reference to the tact ot ceyptanal.1tic success against l°""' 

grade enllll'l1' military ceypto-systems during World Wu II end the Korean conruct. ,without &JV' detailed description ot the cryptanel)?tic methods used. 

*Requires clarification and elaboration. Some SOP's are higher or lower 

classification. Thia might be sup1ressed,and merely list subject matter 

ot such SOP'e under approtriate category~ 

**Cannot reconcile this with SECRET ina81J1Uch aa Texta (paragraph 4, under 

St!cret Codeword) is an integral part of intercept assignments and 1s 

classified Secret. Codeword. 

3 

SECRET 
• * . . 

Re'rieeds l Feb. 54 

SECRET {CON'rINUED) 

5. Details ot trai'tic anal)'81a (not ~nwlung high-grade callaign 

tiflcryption) as applied to enemy comnunicatione during World War II. 

6. Description ot equipment peculiar to interce~ stations o 

*'lo The broad out,llnea ot Trattic Analysis proceesee. 

**8. Reference to c!'l'Ptansl.7ei• as a eou~e ot intelligence, but ex.-

cludin& detaila or processes. 

***9. The lieting ot .us Service operated intercept stations designated 

either b;y geographical locaticma ,or by numrical designation (2 or more) o 

lOo Existence ot pencet.ime collaboration between the US and UK (OCHQ) 

in the OOMINT tieldo 

llo All personnel reports, c1Yilian and/or militar,y, ~ indioate 

authorized and/or a etual strength by job designation or by organizational 

element title where such designation or organizational element title would 

indicate detail.e of the cryptologic 1ft1.asiono 

12. Codeword applicable to Traffic Intelligence. 

13. Current inst.ructions tor· forwarding pr>oceaaed RU trattic. 

14. Intorrration relating to an entire system of cryptological (R/D) 

equipment. l.So Cryptanalpic short titles i1!_volving two er more .. ==::tiXJ::SC::LAJL:Z 

*Thie eeema to include 11Elemantar;y pl"inciples ot T/A11 listed under 

Restricted in PJS#'.SM II, as wll r.a "intercept,, D/F.oo as eourca ot 

intelligence" under Confidential. 

** Do we hope to conceal fact that cryptanalysis is a source ot intelligence? 

This ia at least unreallatio .. 

*** Note that numerical designation appears on Confidential rav traffic. 

4 

SECRET 
. . . . e -8-E@~aogs e 

Rev.Lseds 1 Feb. S4 

COOFIDEN'l'IAL 

*lo Association ot broad COMINT func.tiona with specific activitie• 

a.rd. organizations ~ namn (except as. provld.ecl under "~laesifiecl" below)o 

2. Charta and descri!>tions ot the organization ot NSA and eenice 

crypt.ologl.c agencies. 

3o Individual intercept and D/F station products ancl etat.e1!l9Jlt11 of 

opera~ional ertecti•enees. 

4. Association ot specific phases ot COMINT activity with t7J)28 of urd.tso 

5o Intercept.ed rav traffic that showa no eTidence of processing tor 

OOMINT purposee. 

6. Reference, in general terms, to intercept, D/t, RFP, and MOA 

as sources ot intelligence. 

**'/. Adninistratiw records ot indoctrination and execution of securit7 

oaths. 

***8. Cover names assigned to Tarioua sources ot l\rattia, W.n ue4 out 

ot context.o 

***9. NSA •a ~aseesion ot or interest in RAM equii:mct .. 

10, The terms "United States Communications Intelligence Board" and 

•U .. 3o Conmunica.tion• Securit7Board" (abbreviations "USCIB" and "USCSB11 ) 

are unclus11'1edo 

* Requires c1.8.1'1tication. 

** Should th1a be cla.esitied? 

*** Thie should not be classified. 

5 

SECRET 
c • 

Revised1 l Feb. 54 

CONFIDENTIAL (Continued) 

11. Trattio Intelligence relating to D/F mission assigmunte, bearing reports and tix reports (1.e.a target fnq119ncies, call-signs, "piped 

signal.a 1 n other signal information, bearings and fixes)• p.rorided that no 

canplex changing call-a:lgn systems are includeda 

12. Pld.n=text tactical or operational traffic pl'orided that no - I 

. interpretations ot eomplex changing call-algn &JStem , enciphered map 

references, or results ot adTsnced traffic ana1Jw1• .are included. Thia 

material shall include local procedUl"al and local grid and zone systema 

used for artilleey direct-ion, tactical control and mcwement ot front 

line units, early wa.mins and exercise ot tactical. combat control of 

aircrafto 

13. Traffic Intelligence or Special Intelligence from anal.7aia of 

radar tracking reports and usual obsenation reports as tcund in tactical 

or operational tra.ttic, pro'ri.ded that enciphered aircraft type designationa 

or interpretations of C(lllplex changing eall-.d.gn. SJ9te& are not includeclo 

Incluaion ot local grid or zone references, local p~edural cod.ea used 

tor bre'Yi.t.7 and plain text interapersed with cover word• i• parmiesibleo 

14. SpGcial Intelligence from Naval tactical maneUYerlng codee, 

when used as such, and fram jargon codeao 

150 COMINT concerning weather which 13 deriTed from this cate1CH7 

source includes only that OOMINT described in paragrapba 12 and 13 aboveo 

160 All nersonnel reports, ciYilian and/or militaey, 1'111.ch indicate 

aut.horized arid/or actual agenc.r strength in total, by organizati.onal. 

6 

SECRET 
q • • 9 ~~ao9se 

Reviseds 1 Feb. S4 

CONFIDENTIAL (Continued) 

element, short title or synl>ol, by prim81'7 program eln*Jlt, or 'by !unctiono 

17. Special purpose features ot and ext.m~ ot ettort with comput,ers. 

18. Inronna.tion relating to ilxlindual parts ot cryptological equipment 

(R/D) may be in th1e classification. 

19. The terms "task dollar amount•", ".tun.ding i;>rograma", and "total 

year amount•" (R/O). 

20. Terms "key stud7 (when not. related to specitic ayatema), wired 

tr.heel ma chino, Hagelin machine, iaolog » stereolog, depth search, ABNER 

program, ATLAS program, ENIGMA ma.chine ,kQ' generator, intercept tratfic"o 

21.o Table ot AllollBnces ot an opera.ting ottice. 

22. Rosters, telephone lists, etc., lilich ehow namea of all emploJreea 

ot an ottice together with their phone n\&ber, l'001B number, location, and 

aesignmento 

23. Referenoe to the term 11 special code wrd" in ccrmection with 

cryptologlc act1dt1es. 

21+. Detailed. references to, and description of, cr;yptane:cytic success 

against spee1tic m1lltal"1' ceypt,oayat,ema uaed by foreign powera between 

11 Novsrl>er 1918 and 7 December 19Uo 

2.5o Intelligence derived frcrn the crypt,anali'lli• ot the diplomatic 

cr;ypt.oQStems used b7 toreign powora between ~ November 1918 and 7 Decaal' 

194lo 

26. The tact that NSA pertorma security ana.q.ia and nal.~tion ot 

u.s. c17ptosyetem and classitied ·~unicaticns transmittl!td b7 electrical 

7 

SECRET • J 
SE@R$:'¥ao9s e 

Fo 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Rnheds l Feb. 54 

£2.NFI DEN'l'IA..1, {Continued) 

27. The tact that NSA i:roducea cry}:tographic kOJinl materiala including 

rotors, key lists, ono-time tapea, one-time pads, codea, di1es and other 

broad categories of ke7ing material.a, and employa Cl"Jl)tographic kq generating 

28. U5 collaboration with Ult and Canada on C<JfSEC\ matters. 

290 Holding of· annuai contereme t.o discuss ·UK/US COMSEC matter•o 

30. US uae ot UI produced e1'7Pto equipments and UK uso of US }3'0duced 

crypto equipmantse 

.31. Production of c17Pf;cmater1~ to~ ........::==============---~~~~~----. 

32. The tact that. ~A 1• assigned I 

33. Diagrmu and descriptions of COMINT and. COMSEC ccmnunication ne't-

.,rk• or rela.ted cenmunication pls.na including cryptographic anangemant.e 

except mere higher cla•sifieation 1• justified by the listing of aenaitiw 

intercept stationao 

34. Consolidated listings and reco:fde or ~-teri.al• and cqpto 

holdings b7 ehort title. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

1. Non-epecif1e or hypothetical references to Communication Intelligence without af17 association ot tha.t tunctlon with epeoUic activities 

and organizations other than the National Security- Agency as a whole and 

8 

SECRET 
\I .. • • 

ReY.leeds l Febo 54 

UNCLASSIP'Il!D (Continued) 

eerv1C49 cryptologic agencies as a whole, and association of NSA with the 

latter., 

2. Elementary principles of trattic anal7ais, m1llt&l'J' crypta.naqaie 

and c17ptogra~ 1 in production ot instructional material and l6nguap 

training material used. at NSA Schoolo 

3o All canpUaUons and me.teriala in the public domd.n used at NSA. 

Only information which wuld indicate use tor classified purposes lhould be 

claseitiedo 

*40 Identification with NSA ot NSA authors ot technical papen on 

matters alread.Y in the public domain. 

s. Cover names assigned to "Rapid Analytic Machinery" (RAM) when used 

out ot context. 

6. The terms NSA Field Actint.7 Far Eaat (NSAPE)' NSA Field ActidtJ" 

Europe (NSAEt.B), NSAAL and NSAtm. It all are listed together, should be 

class1tied Secreto 

7. CiY.l.l Serri.ce Jab Titles and NSA "Classification Standards Manual" o 

So .Existmce ot and inc11Yidual empl.oTff'I interest 1n computers, except 

as noted umer Confidential<> 

9. Speciftc canponents or equipment. under research, it use ot 

component ia not revealed. (R/D) 

10. Mention ot interest. in cmpute:r "t7P9 circuit•, it no indication 

made ot type ot systems in which thq are to be used.a 

ll. Report of inspection trip to uncleared compar17 that ie a proapectiw 

cont.ractor, it no menti@n is made ot actual applications ot components. 

* Decision requested by d"o§i tfi<i9it !>()int. -
9 -8-B@-RiFfiIB 095 9 

ReTieeds l Feb. 54 

UNCLASSIPIEI> (Continued) 

12. Association of NSA with ceyptograpbf', COlf>EC, Friedman, Hagelln, 

Hebern, ke)"8 ' rotoi>e' etc o 

*13o Short titles (R/D) 

14. Communications gl.ri.ng a person•a secul'it7 clearance as "cl")'Pt.ologic", "cryptographic". 

15. Project number and titles used in justification tor plll"Chaee ot 

matel'iala wen no techrd.O!ll uaage is specitied. 

16. The terms NSA-PWPU (LANT) and NSA-PWPU (PAC). 

17 o Detailed reference to, and description of, cl'l'Ptanal.7t1o euccee• 

against World War I military cryptosyattlll9o 

18. Reteretcea to intelligence derind from ceyptoqatema 1n which 

successful cryptana11'81• has alreac\r been reveL'.ed b7 ot(icial UoS• act.ion 

(&o&o, the Cong:reaaional inYeatiption ot the Pearl Harbor attack). 

19. MT reterence to intelligence er cr;ypt.anal3Uc auece•s againat 

operational Cl'l'Pto57atema as disclosed by toreip publlcationa appearing S.n 

the public domain. These references must be accompanied by the source end 

be without further elaboration or aapu.tication. 

20. Th• tact that NSA pl"Ocures and produces ceypto equipments and 

epare part.a. 

21. AccowiU.ng reports and correspond.ice referring to only one or a 

tev isolated i tema by abort. t1t1e. 

* Requires elaboration. 

10 

SECRET 
. " . ,....~ 

The :f'ollowins queotiono have been snbmi tted by PROD personnel 

as bcinG repreaentative of their problems in clasaif lcation: 

o.. At such times o.s a cha.nae in codewords occur, is a.ny 

overlap permitted - doea material initiated the la.st day of one 

period to be sicned the first day of' the new period bear the old 

or new codeword a·t;runp? Is it poooible to continue working on a. 

problem a.nd pred.a. to it o.nd therefore have it clo.ss:J.fied with the 

old codeword even thouah ocvcro.1 do.ya have elapsed into the new 

period? Io there any bar to oend1.nc; mo.tcrio.l containina both the 

old and new codewords in the so.me package throu6h authorized 

cha.nnel.o ? 

b. When reference is mo.de ·t;o a pht'o.ae such a.a "TOJ? 

SECRET (\\'"ORD) o.nd is ·othertrice l.Ulclnsoified should the document 

be clo.as:i.:f'fod TOP SECRET (WORD), TOP SECRET or is some other lower 

classification permitted? What is the procedure for classifying 

lllD.terio.l that contains a comblnation of classified inf'ornntion 

such as SECRET (W011D) a.rid plain 'l'OP SECRE'l17 Is the phrase TOP 

SECRET (WORD) per1n1 tted or does one use solely the cla.ssif'ico. tion 

TOP SECRET or add the TOP SECnET CODEWORD? Docs the presence of 

an individuo.l paGe o.monG oevcral po.aes within a document of CODEWORD material necesoitate the o.pplicatlon of a CODEWORD to e.11 

paGeB or only the page required? Io not undue emphasis being 

placed upon the cover sheet beo.rinG the legend that the material 

contained therein io of CODEWORD level? Should not some require~ 

mcnt be established that the notation of the exiotence or CODEWORD 

material be included on the cover and the first three or four 

pages of any aiven docUI11ent7 

c. Current practices reoult in documents containing 

CODEWORD information beinc reproduced on CODEWORD paper. Is it 

possible to extract in:f'ormo.tion from theoc documents, and, determining that the extract is not or CODEWORD sensitivity, to reproduce it at some other classification level? The present proposed 

revision to Appendix B in the BRUSL\. Aareement provides for the 

do'Wll{SI'adinc of CODEWORD informo.tion i'rom Categories III through 

II td I. Will obliteration of the old CODEWORD classification be 

sufficient or will it have to be removed from each individual 

paee? Does the utilization of the weather CODEWORD prevent inclusion of information falline in other CODEWORD categories? 

d. Current instructions require tho.I; codeuord :mo.tcrio.l 

not be disseminated 1mless the recipient has been properly indoctrino.ted. How docs an individual determine the status of 

indoctrina·tion of another without disclosure of infornntion, that 

SECRET 
e SE@R:@-:'J5ao9s9 

individual ahould not otherwlae have? In the transm.tasion of 

CODEWORD mo.tcrio.l ia if; oufflcicnt to mtlrk the po.clmc;e "TO BE 

OPENED OHLY BY" (the no.me of the individual) or should the tit1e 

be uaed? 

e. It bn.e been notecl tha.t the Army Security AGcncy is 

now ueinc; the procedtu-c of ato.mpinr; the phrase "THIS PACKAGE CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL" on the inner wro.ppinc; o:f' the po.ckace. 

Thie instruction acemo to be contrary to exiatinG llSA. rec;ulations. 

f. One occo.siono.1ly stlll secs the expression US EYES 

ONLY. Is thio phro.ae lec;a.l or ho.s it been supplanted by US OFFICIALS 

ONLY? What procedurea should be uaed in ho.ndlin6 po.per so mn.rked? 

It ho.a been noted th..'1.t such documcnta a.re left in workina o.rens 

where personnel from authorized f'orci6ll aupport G!'Oups are permitted 

to enter. 

c;. Intercept b.asic;nmcnte c;oinc; out from NSA to the f'ie1d 

a.re cJ.o.ssified SECRE'i' CODEWORD, o.lthouc;h they contain only case 

munbers and aupportinc; noto.t.lons. Similar information corni~ in 

f'rom the field ato.tiono ia cln.ooi.f;i.ecl CO:N'FIDEIJTIAJ ... 

h. Lo.nc;uo.ce tro.ininc; material utilized by the NSJ\. Schoql 

contains no clnooifico.tion but docs c;ive a direct tiein to the lanGUD-c;e a.reo.s of intercot to ITSA. Infor:mo.tion prepared by the school 

is he1d to RESTRICTED level.a o.lthouc;h if similar documents were 

PROD produced they lrould co.rr;}' a. much hie;her ~laasif'ication. 

i. Current inatructions f'or forwn.rdinc; proceosed RU traffic 

are SECRET. Considcrinc the aenoitivity of the information contained 

therein should they not be Given o CODEWORD classif'ico.tion1 

j. The NSI\. "Schedule A Classification Standards Manual." 

is unclassii'ied but refers to CA and TA in connection with certain 

technica.1 skills which would indicate the need of classification. 

k. ShouJ.d not the NS.1\.-GHQ relationship be reviewed in 

lieu of recent British relo.xo.tions on security.of that orga.nization1 

We ship a.11 ms.terio.J. i'or them to SUSLO who in turn distributes it 

to GCBQ. Since the British have o.nnounced the existence of GCHQ, 

at ChcJ.tenham, the tieup between SUSLO o.nd GCRQ ca.n no+. be maintained OGA 

at a hiGhJ.Y clo.ssif'icd J.eveJ.. Therefore, either sufficient protection of' our relo. tionship with GCllQ is not bein6 maintained :or the 

entire :mo.ttcr should be down cra.ded. 

SECRET 
r.i. II3I1 o.nrl HAJ.1 runo o.r11 c:J:r~n cr.:ne:?ro.J. cL'J.r.m1.f lea tiono 

(~.;~. TOP GJ~CnI~'i' C:OJJZWCBD) ra.i;hr.:?r thtJ.n cL'J.or;lfy-ln~ thr;r.t accorrlinc; 

to contcnl;. CtJrtn.tn runs coni;o.J.nlnG prr.:?lim.Ln.".1.ry ::rt·'lG<:!rJ of Ciphor 

S;rntcr.t :Jolutlona which do not rcvi::o.l either aourc~ or pi.irponc 

could be gl"1en o. lcnri::r cl.JJ.oali"ication. Ghould runo ·nhkh o.re 

ntaplcd by ACCO fo.otncra bt:? conalrforcd o.o bounrl volur.t~a 'rlth only 

co·rer cJ..'J.crnif lea tlon o:i;- ohoulrl ca.ch P"-GO be cL".1.crnific1.? 

n. Runo ho.-rc been m,.'J.rlo from uncJ..anoif'iorl Lri..'l.tor:i.o.l ouch 

o.a lJa.cr..mrc:l (llctiono.ric3 of forcic;n lancwieco which bn.-re o. oic;nii'ico.ncc in th'3 'rork within PROD. Should thcoc not be cL'J.ooli'ierl'l 

o. Althou(:;h the nov prO"[loaod rovioion of tht;? accurit;r 

llllln1Jnl FJtipuL'l.teo thllt ccrto.in cn.tt:?~orit?o of liatcrl roteri.ala within 

occurc opero.tlonnl o.reaa noed not be clo.aoified, nothina official 

Ima e·rer been promulc;o.tod wlthin PROD. Thia e::.ccept:f.on ia not clearly 

.unrlcratoorl in thr'lt material vithln o.n;y c;iYon working o.reo. ia aubjoct 

to coordination i-rhlch requires interclmncc of inform'l.tion between 

two or oore vorki.ne area.a. Ia it to bo firr.tl;:r unc:lcratoorl tba t a 

po.per muat be clnoaificd bcforo it io rem'Jved from. a c;i·rcn worltin6 

area. or can a. looacr interpretation be c:;ivcn '\.Therc:l.n it will be 

undcratoo~ th,~t material nt:?ed only be clo.oaified prior to ito official. 

publication or when r.io.tcrio.l ia to ho removed from the confinea of 

Production o.lto~ethcr~ Ghould th.la 00.r.11? exception be appliod to 

rno.teria.l uoed for repro~uction ouch o.o mimco(:7'o.phcd, r.rultilith 

stencila, etc. 'l 

p. There ocerna to be an o.rbitro.ry reanoninc thD.t once 

material is extracted from a elven clo.ao:l.fied oource, that extracted 

I?lEl.terial will retain ita oric;il11.ll cJ....'l.ooifico.tion o.nd, if inserted 

into other ai.terio.l, will oo o.ffect that nmr material. Thus, in 

certain alpbn.betical cornpilo.tiona of ourno.r.ieo, eeo;:;ro.phico.l no.:mcs, 

etc., the intermittent oprinklin~ of lni'orrno.tion which waa derived 

from certo.in ccx.rnT'r oourceo upgro.den the lower compilo. tion to the 

higheot named catceory. The I'!l.Cre preoence in o. ~iven title can in 

no way be attributed to ita former oow::ce and, therefore, ohould it 

not be permitted that the new publication or compilation be clo.saified 

at a. lower ca.tce;ory? 

q. When a panel, worldn13 on o. ~iven highly ocnnitive problem, 

requests information of unclo.oaified nature from numeroUtJ oourcea 

(e.c., Library, etc.) ahould the fa.ct that thic panel ia rcqucotinc; 

the inf'orr~tion be clo.noified or should the requcot be conoidercd 

on the baaia of i ta face value only? Thia Ar:.cnc"J baa 11i th:n i ta 

collo.tero.l courcea num.crouo publico.tiono whlch a.re unclo.ooified (c.c;. 

Mooco'\.T Telephone Director, H.o.nrlbook of Intcrna tiono.l Orr;anizo. tiona, 

etc.) which in themoclveo mean nothinc, but their preocnce in the 

Acency can be inrlico.tlvc of' the dj_rection o:r Ar:,ency intcrcot. Should 

the exiotence of' thoce rlocumcnto within PROD be clo.ooif'ierl anrl/or 

ohould the documcnta tho:r1nelvco be clo.onl:fie~? ---

SECRET 
• ., fl 

.. ~E*8o9se 

't'. Short titlco which ho.vc been UBcd to dcsi{..;110.te CTeoc;rnphico.1 o.rco.a o:r intereat a.a •rcll aa svccii'ic countrica are supposed 

to be non-informo.tivc in nature. It is quite easy however, to piece 

toaether the breakdown of this table in consideration of the seQ'llento 

of ahort titles used .ror certain countrleo ouch o.s RU for Russian. 

t:ithc1• these titlea should be clo.saii'ied conm1ensuro.tc \rlth this 

informo. tion or the digraphs ahoulrl be ro.ndorn selectc(l. 

a. In o.ccordo.nce with current rcc;ula.tiono, BRUSA short 

titlca are to be clasai:Cicd TOP SECRET which suppoaedly includes 

receipts for BRUS.~ publicationo. In consideration o.r the terrific 

volume of TOP SECRET material in this Ac;ency, it ia proposed that 

the short titles be dorm(7'o.ded to SECRET. 

t. Existinc; rcGulo.tions require that information received 

from other c;ovcrruncntal aourcea lTill be Given the so.me classification 

as prescribed by the or ic;ina tor. However, ITSJ\. aecuri ty interpretations Dl.'.ly of'ten require a. hi/Yler cla.aoii'ico.tion, or in some instances 

a. lower cl.o.asifico.tion - ls it necessary to c;o back to the oriainator 

of the publication to secure his o.pvrovo.l for a chance in cL~ssification? 

u. 1'1ho.t ia the over-a.11 and specific classification of 

PROD orcanizo.tional components? 

v. What is the clo.ssifico.tion of o.n item linkin~ IISA 

with the field of COMINT? AccordinG to the BRUS/\. a~eement it would 

seem to be T/S CODh"t'10RD. 

w. v1hn.t is the clossifica.tion of the relation existinG 

between US/\. and the consumer activities, the oervice cryptoloBical. 

agencies, and other field activities? 

x. 'fhat is the criteria to be followed in determinin3 the 

classification of a. document rcferrinG to other hi{)h.ly sensitive 

documents - what will determine whether or not information is being 

imparted by the reference. 

y. When we use the CODEWORD to protect a source, is it to 

be construed as only referrinc; to a. COHUIT source or mo.y we consider 

other hi6hly sensitive intellicence sources to be similarly protected. 

SECRET