.. 

24 

USCI:l3: 9 .3/30 H1\1fDLE VIA COM!NT ~ ONLY 

4 March 1955 

'f OP SOOREH' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List. 

Reference: USCIB 9.3/23 of 10 January 1955. 

l. Further to the plan outlined in the reference, the USCIB 

Executive Committee has received, and on 25 February considered a report. 

of the Ad Hoc Conunittee established by the reference. 

2. USCIBEC was unable to recommend the report in its entirety. It 

did, however, agree to several basic aspects or it and is continuing 

consideration of the remainder. In addition, the State Department member 

expressed the view that the general plan now being pursued by USCIBEC may 

not be the best one. The State Department member criticized the type or 

COMINT Requirements List proposed in the report and the stens recommended 

for its preparation, but agreed generally with the other proposals. He 

stressed the need to proceed as quickly as possible to the development of 

NSA's Implementation Plan and the actual allocation of resources, and 

said that basic C<lUNT requirements could be delineated. in a much less 

complicated and more precise manner for this purpose. He offered to 

submit an example of how this might be done !or diplomatic communications. 

He stated that he must abstain from endorsing or participating in those 

proposals of the report which dealt with the preparation of the COMINT 

Requirements List. He also stated that meanwhile he did not desire to 

block a majority of the Committee from proceeding with this preparation, 

if it so desired. 

3. This notice, therefore, constitutes a progress report to USCIB 

by USCIBEC setting forth what has been agreed to date and what remains to 

be done. 

4. Turning to the enclosure herewith, the memorandum for the 

Chairman, USCIB and TAB A thereto are a.greed by USCIBEC. TAB B is not 

agreed. The w.ajority of the Committee favor instead the following change 

to TAB B proposed by the NSA member: 

11Para l: No change. 

Para 2: Delete all after subpara 1d 1 • 

Para 3: Delete entire para.graph and substitute the following: 

13. The Committee is of the opinion that it would be 

impracticable to set forth details of the mechanics or the 

mechanisms by which supplemental guidance is provided until 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-01-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

USCIB: 9 .3/30 ltkNBHil ViA flC:M!M'f elH1tffimA5 OMLY 

'fOP SECRET 
USCIB: 9 .3/30 

'f OP M:en! 

4 March 1955 

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List. 

after the procedures for providing suitable basic guidance 

have been implemented and been found to be satisfactory. 

It therefore recommends that the Director, NSA, submit his 

recommendations in this respect, as soon as possible, but 

not later than sixty days, after he receives the initial 

basic guidance as provided in TAB A. 1 " 

The Navy and Air Force members stated that they cannot accept the above 

quoted NSA proposal as they feel that the mechanism for providing supplemental guidance must be stipulated as part of the whole plan. They would 

accept TABB with a few modifications (not included in this report). 

The Department of Defense member does not share either of the above two 

views on TAB B and has submitted a third proposal which has not yet been 

f orma.lly considered by USCIBEC but which is included herewith as an 

annexure to TAB B for the information and convenience of the members of 

USCIB. 

5. TAB C to the enclosed report is still in draft form and has not 

been fully considered. For that reason TAB C is not included with the 

enclosure although it is rnent1oned therein. It consists of a list of 

priority national intelligence requirements based on the Priority National 

Intelligence Objectives set forth in DCID 4/4. USCIBEC•s intention is 

that when this priority national intelligence requirements list has been 

completed it will be sent to USCIB for approval together with the recommendation that, as approved by USCIB, the list be forwarded to the IAC for 

approval as indeed representing priority national intelligence requirements. It is recognized that approval of the list by the IAC may be a 

time consuming process. It is for this reason that Recommendation 3b. of 

TAB A suggests that USCIB use the list (as approved by itself) as a ~asis 

for indicating which requirements USCIB believes should be assigned as 

COMINT tasks thus avoiding a long hiatus in implementing the plan set 

forth in TAB A. 

6. It should be pointed out that the above described requirements 

list is a key factor in implementing the plan owing to the fact that the 

additional recommendations for the assignment of C~INT tasks and the 

development of an implementing plan for allocation of facilities are 

based on the assumption that an agreed national intelligence requirements 

list will be achieved. 

USCIB: 9.3/30 - 2 -

TOP SECRET 
• T:i@S~~731~ 

USCIB: 9.3/30 4 March 1955 

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List. 

7. USCIBEC therefore recommends that the Board' consider the plan 

set forth in the enclosure in the light of the explanation set forth above 

and indicate (a) that it considers the progress made thus far by USCIBEC 

to be acceptable, (b) that USCIBEC should continue its consideration of 

this problem and (c) such addition~l guidance as it may desire. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 9.3/30 - 3 -

TOP SECRET 
SESmfl' 

-- 25 February 1955 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Requirements of U. S. Intelligence Agencies for Information 

from COMINT Sources 

1. The Executive Committee has considered the subject matter in 

its various facets, as directed in the 10 December meeting of the Board, 

and recommends that the problem be resolved as outlined in the succeeding paragraphs of this document, and the tabs thereto. 

2. Underlying the entire problem is the basic question of how to 

use most efficiently and effectively a 11 common-user 11 collection facility 

with a broad, but still not unlimited, potential for obtaining information of relatively high intelligence value. 

3. The Executive Committee feels that this problem can best be 

solved by establishing a means whereby USCIB provides the Director, NSA, 

with authoritative guidance in carrying out Bis function as a collector 

of intelligence information from COMINT sources. It feels that this 

guidance should be in two forms: basic guidance in the form of a 

USCIB approved list of the information required by the national intelligence community for which COMINT has been assigned the responsibility 

of producing (hereinafter referred to as the CCMINT REQUIREMENTS LIST); 

and supplemental guidance whereby interpretation or amplification of the 

basic guidance, and periodic shifts of emphasis or interest therein, 

can be provided in a manner which will insure accurate communication 

of consumer desires to the producers of COM.INT. 

4. The COMINT Requirements List must meet certain criteria. These 

are outlined in TAB A, as are the successive steps which this committee 

feels are the logical ones in order that a list meeting these criteria 

can be developed. 

5. It is recommended that the Board approve the recommendations 

listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of TAB A, and request or direct, as appropriate, the organizations designated therein to implement them. 

6. After USCIB has approved and delivered to the Director, NSA, 

its guidance in the form of the before-mentioned list, it is necessary 

that an implementing plan be developed. The Executive Committee feels 

that preparation of this plan is properly the responsibility or the 

Director, NSA. We therefore recommend that after preparation of the 

COMINT Requirements List, USCIB forward it to the Director~ NSA, together 

with a request that he (1) prepare an Implementing Plan (2J forward it to 

the USCIB for review and approval. 

EnclosUl'e with USCIB 9.3/30 dtd 4 Mar 1955. 

S£CRE'f 
7o It is apparent that any increase of emphasis on any requirement 

or imposition or any new requirement, will normally require a correspondL~g 

decrease in the effort committed against some other requirement since it 

would be obviously impractical, inefficient, and wasteful for the Director, 

NSA, to hold in reserve arry of his COMINT resources for such contingencies. 

It would likewise be improper to require, except under emergency conditions, 

that the Director, NSA, divert any of the resources which he is employing 

to maintain technical continuity. This Committee has therefore provided, 

in TAB A, for such changes in USGIB's basic guidance. TAB B describes two 

alternatives for a mechanism to provide the Supplemental Guidance mentioned 

in paragraph 3 above. USCIBEC is still considering the several proposals 

in TAB B and includes it ir, this report only to illustrate the nature of the 

problem and the solutions of it that are under consideration. 

S. As a final step in the cycle of relations between consumer and 

producer, NSA should prepare, after a suitable period has elapsed since 

approval of its Implementing Plan, a clear and understandable progress 

report to USCIB concerning conformity with, and fulfillment of, the 

guidance received: the adequacy, in form and substance, of his basic 

guidance; an appraisal of the practical working or the procedures established for supplemental guidance; the basic allocation of COMINT resources; 

and an estimate or any additional resources required to improve the amount 

and quality or information produced. After study of this report, USCIB 

should advise the National Executive Agent as to the extent of the estimated 

additional resources it considers should be made available for COMINT production in the coming year. 

9. Subsequently, the USCIB should revise, as necessary, its basic 

guidance, thus initiating the recurrence of the cycle. 

10. The Committee recommends that the USCIB approve the concept 

advanced in paragraphs 8 and 9 above, and so advise the Director, NSA~ 

• 

2 

SECRET 
~:A573J..g 

• 

TAB A 

1..- The Executive Committee is of the opinion that the COMINT 

Requirements List should meet the five criteria listed below in order 

to be satisfactory as basic guidance from the Board to the Director, 

NSA: 

a. It should be based on, and be in consonance with, the most 

recent exp:z•ession of National Intelligence Objectives. 

b. It should not include requirements for information which 

are beyond, or inappropriate to, COMINT 1 s potential capability to 

produce. 

c. It should not include requirements for information for 

which Intelligence needs can be satisfied by other sources. 

d. It should include requirements for information which 

could be obtained from COMINT which is needed to complement, supplement, or corroborate that from other sources. 

e. It should indicate the relative importance attached to the 

COMINT-produced in.formation pertinent to each requirement, by division 

of the List into categories of COM.INT priority. 

r. It must be quickly and flexibly responsive to changes in 

National Intelligence Requirements. 

2. •ro produce a COMINT Requirements List which would meet the 

criteria listed, several operations nmst be performed. Starting with 

an authoritative list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives, 

these successive steps are involved.. 

a. Producing a list of National Intelligence Requirements. 

b. Integrating into this all Departmental Intelligence 

requirements. 

o. Eliminating from this list those requirements which can be 

fulfilled to the satisfaction of the Intelligence Agencies by other than 

COMINT sources of information. 

d. Evaluating the potential of COMINT as a source of information 

in satisfying each remaining item, anr'I P.1.im.inating those which are beyond 

the capability of or inappropriate for COMINT to satisfy or which do not 

serve to complement, supplement, or corroborate other sources of information. 

e. Dividing the resultant list into categories of relative 

importance in order to indicate the priority which the Director, NSA 

should accord to each. 

SECRET 
~-= A57 3},fJ 

• 

3. The Executive Committee has considered the several ways in which 

the above-listed steps could be accomplished, and makes the recommendations 

indicated after the discussion in the following sub-paragraphs. 

a. To produce a list of National Intelligence Requirements from 

the current list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/4 of 

14 Dec 54) requires that some provision be made for requirements in support 

of non-priority National Intelligence Objectives, which are defined 

implicitly in DCID 4/4 as those which do not "warrant priority in relation 

to normal coverage. 11 If this can be done without expending the timeconsuming effort involved in spelling out a list of the non-priority 

objectives themselves, it would appear profitable to adopt such a course. 

Recommendation: USCIB stipulate, in the carrying out of the 

succeeding steps in this process, that any requirement for National or 

Departmental Intelligence which does not clearly and directly relate to 

one of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives be considered to 

relate to a non-priority objective. 

b. The Committee feels that ideally an authoritative translation 

of DCID 4/4 into Priority National Intelligence Requirements should be made 

by a suitable body at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence 

in collaboration with the IAC agencies. However, this has not yet been 

done,· and, since there are other means of accomplishing the desired end 

result, the Committee questions the need for delaying implementation of 

this plan until an authoritative list is available. The CIA member of 

USCIBEC is preparing a document from which it is hoped such a translation 

can be made. 

~ecozmnendation: USCIB note-that USCIBEC is preparing a draft of 

a National Intelligence Requirements List to be attached as TAB C to this 

report. '!'his draft, when completed, will be forwarded to USCIB for 

approval a~ a base from which a COMINT Requirements List will be derived. 

Concurren·t:.1.y, it would be anticipated that USCIB would seek IAC approva1 

of the USCIB approved draft National Intelligence Requirements List, when 

completed, but not of the COJAINT Requirements List based thereon. 

c. As the next steps in the process, it is necessary- that 

National Intelligence ~equirements in support of non-priority National 

Intelligence Objectives be added to the list adopted as a result of the 

preceding recommendation, and that any requirements for information needed 

for the production of Departmental Intelligence (NSCID #3 paragraph d 1) 

be integrated with them. 

Recommendation: USCIB request each IAC agency, through its USCIB 

member, to submit a list of its requirements which' fall within these 

categories; and 

Recommendation: USCIB direct the USCIBINTCCM to combine these 

lists into one list to be added to the Priority National Intelligence 

Requirements List in order to obtain an overall all-source Intelligence 

Requirements List. 1 

2 

SECRET' 
d. In order to tailor this list to fit the potential capabilities of CCMINT as a source, a body competent to assess the potentialities 

of all sow~ces of information is needed. The individuals comprising this 

body must have in aggregate not only a thorough knowledge of the pec1tl.iarities of any particular source of information, but also a thorough knowledge 

of the degree to which each source may be expected to fulfill a given 

requirement. The Committee does not feel that it is necessary that this 

body be· empowered to assign collection tasks to other sources than COMINT, 

or even to recommend which specific Non-CCMINT source{s) be utilized in 

fulfillment of any requirement. Their task is primarily to compare CCMINT 

versus all Non-OD.MINT, and determine those requirements for which GCMINT 

is properly the primary, a complementary, a supplementary, or an inappropriate, source. 

~commendation: USCIB designate a committee of individuals having 

the specified competence, to review the all-source Intelligence Requirements 

List and {l) eliminate therefrom all requirements which CCMINT has not a 

potential capability to satisfy or for which ca~INT is not an appropriate 

inf'ormation source; {2) eliminate therefrom all requirements which potentially are wholly within the capability of a Non-Cat·ffilT source to satisfy; 

(3) indica·te those requirements for which CCMIUT is not the primary informat,ion source, but rather is used to complement, supplement, or corrobcrate 

i11i'ormation from other sources,; and for each the degree to which COMINT 

information is needed for this purpose. 

e. The end product of' the operation discussed in the preceding 

subparagraphs will be a list of Intelligence Requirements properly assignable to CCMINT as a source of information. They will be grouped into four 

categories of intelligence importance, in accordance with the categories 

or priority of the objectives to which they relate. Those for which Cat.fl:NT 

iu not the primary source of information will be identified, and for each 

of these the degree to which fulfillment is dependent upon CCl.fl:NT-produced 

iuf'ormation will be indicated. In order to meet the specified criteria, 

those requirements for which CCMINT is l1Q! the primary information source 

should be evaluated and compared with the others, in order that each can 

be weigl"~ed in terms of the relative amount of COMINT effort which is 

warranted on it, and that it can be then assigned if necessary a new 

categorj. At this point it may be desirable, or even necessary, to 

establish sub-categories of CCMINT importance within one or more of the 

four categories of' intelligence importance. 

J.k!commend.ation: USCIB designate USCIBEC to carry out this 

operation. 

r. The final list should be authoritatively reviewed and approved 

before delivery to the Director, USA, as basic guidance. 

3 

SECRET 
~-A57316 

Si!l9RE'f 

. Reco:mmP.ndation: USCIB review, and approve the completed COMINT 

Requirements Li.st. 

4. Provision must be made for changes in the CCMINT Requirements 

List which are necessitated by changes in the fundamentals from which this 

basic guidance is derived, and which will probab~ not occur at the same 

time as the recommended periodic revision. Such changes will be of the 

.following types: 

a. Changes in the IAC list of Priority National Intelligence 

Objectives, either in substance, such as addition of a new objective or 

deletion of an objective, or both; or in priority. 

b. Similar changes in National Intelligence Requirements. 

c.. "Crash" requirements - usually of an interim or temporary 

nature, which do not result from or in changes in Priority National 

Intelligence Objectives or in National Int9lligence Requirements. 

,lli;;commendation: USCIB approve all changes in the COMINT Requirements List necessitated by revision of the Priority National Intelligence 

Objectives or of National Intelligence Requirements, of the nature described 

ill sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above. 

].ecgpnnendation: Ea.ch USCIB member (or his alternate) be required 

to approve any "crash" requirement, of the nature described in sub-paragraph 

(c) above, which his agency imposes upon NSA, and concurrently submit this 

r.equirement to other USGIB members :for approval. In stating such a 

requirement its priority in relation to the CCMINT Requirements List must 

be indicated, and, if possible, its probable duration. 

4 

SECRET 
DRAFT 

TAP B 

l. The Committee recognizes that basic guidance, in the form of' 

a CClfiNT Requirement List, whether it be that described in TAB A or 0IJY' 

other·which it is feasible to produce, w,ill necessarily state requirements more broadly and in more general terms than are used in the 

conduct of CCMINT operations. The basic guidance must, and will, be of 

such a nature as "Will permit using it as a base upon which to prepare 

an Implemen.ting Plan upon which Implementing Programs can be based. 

Some means must, however, be provided to supplement it. 

2. The Executive Committee f'eels that the nature and scope of such 

supplemental gUidance must be determined in light of the following factors: 

a. Supplemental guidance must be consistent with the basic 

gl.tidance provided by the GOONT Requirements List. 

b,. Supplemental guidance, in the main, will be in the form of 

supplemental or amplifying requirements which are originated by the USCIB 

intelligence agencies individually or collectively, or which are prepared 

at the z·equest of the National Security Agency. 

c'. The mechanism designed to provide supplemental guidance mu.st 

be responsive to the daily needs of the USCIB intelligence agency(s) and 

to the req'.uests of the National Security Agency for advice, interpretation, 

and clarification. 

d. Coordination of' supplemental requirements among the USCIB 

intelligerl.ce agencies is essential in those cases 'Where two or more 

agencies have a common interest in the information requested, and 

provision must be made to facilitate such coordination. 

1:1. USCIB intelligence agencies should establish a joint 

intelligence agency facility (hereinafter called The Panel) empowered to 

act autho:ritatively on matters of supplemental guidance. 

f. The National Security Agency should establish a centralized 

facility (hereinafter referred to as nnie NSA Group"), empowered to 

determine authoritatively NSA1 s action in response to the supplemental 

guidance furnished by, or requested from, the USCIB intelligence agencies. 

g. Any extensive amplification o.f a Requirement(s) which 

necessitates reallocation of intercept or processing facilites must be 

approved by all USGIB intelligence agencies before NSA initiates 

implementing action. 

SECRET 
S!iEIRiZ'li:n : AS 7 ao 

.._, 

DRAFT 

3. In :Light of the factors outlined above, it is the opinion of 

the ExecutivE~ Committee that supplemental guidance can be provided 

most effectively by: 

. a. Establishing a panel composed 0£ USCIB intelligence agency 

representatives, emp01r1ered to deal authoritatively with NSA on matters 

or supplemental guidance. 

(1) Requiring that each supplemental requirement be 

prepared in writing and directly related to a 

requirement(s) on the CCMrNT Requirements List. 

(2) Requiring that_ the panel approve each supplemental 

requirement which, though in conformity with the 

COONT Requirements List, is an ex.tensive amplification of a requirement(s) on the CCMINT Requirements List, and authorizing the MSA Group routinely 

to bring such requirements to the attention of the 

panel for action. 

b. Establishing a central facility composed of NSA representatives knowledgeable in terms of established consumer requirements and 

NSA capabilities, which can deal authoritatively with the panel on ~tters of supplemental guidance. 

(1) Establishing a central file at NSA of all supplemental 

requirements originated by the consumer agency(s) and 

accepted by the NSA Group. 

c. Requiring that the panel meet with the NSA Group as frequently 

as necessary, and at least once each month, to solve, and to excliange 

information on, mutual problems, and to review the supplemental requirement file monthly to ensure that both consumer agenc:-ies and NS.A agree 

011 matters of supplemental guidance as reflected by the current file of 

supplemental requirements. 

(1) Empowering the NSA Group to remand to the panel any 

supplemental requirement which, in the opinion of NSA, 

requires coordination, or additional coordination, 

among the consumer agencies. 

d. Ensuring that USCIB make decisions on all matters of 

supplemental guidance which are irreconcilable between the panel and the 

NSA Group. 

2 

SECRET 
SEltlf!Trn : AS 7 Mo 

-

aso DRAFT 

A:;:mEXURE TO TAB B (Proposal by Department of Defense Member) 

1. The Committee recognizes that basic guidance, in the form of 

a COMINT Requirement List, whether it be tl:iat described in TAB A or any 

other which it is feasible to produce, will necessarily state requirements more bl·oadly and in more general terms than are used in the conduct of CCMINT operations. The basic guidance must, and will, be of 

such a nature as will permit using it as a base upon which to prepare 

an Implementing Plan involving the allocation to tasks of available 

CClvfINT pl'oduc:tion resources •. Some means must, however~ be provided to 

supplement it. 

2. The Executive Committee feels that the nature and scope of 

such suppleme1ntal guidance must be determined in light of the following factors: 

a. Supplemental guidance must be consistent with the basic 

guidance provided by the CCJ.fl:NT Requirements List. 

b." The purpose of supplemental guidance shall be to affect 

the productie>n of COMINT information within the approved allocation of 

resources. 

c. Supplemental guidance, in the main, will be in the form of 

supplemental or amplifying requirements which are originated by the 

n011-producer members of' USCIB, individually or collectively, or which 

are·prep&red at the request of the National Security Agency. 

d. The mechanism designed to provide supplemental guidance 

must be respc1nsive to the needs of the USCIB agency(s) and to the 

requests of t.he National Security Agency for advice, interpretation, 

and clarification. 

e. Coordination of supplemental requirements among the USCIB 

agencies is essential in those cases where two or more agencies have 

a cOllllllon interest in the.information requested, and provision must be 

ma.de to facilitate such coordination. 

f. USCIB should empower USCIBEC, or a standing group created 

by USCIBEC, t.o act authoritatively on matters of supplemental guidance. 

g. Any amplification of a Requirement(s) which would require 

a reallocation of CCl·fINT production facilities for its fulfillment must 

be appro~ed by USCIB and forwarded to NSA as a change to the basic 

guidance. 

h. In those cases where USCIBEC agrees unanimously to an 

amplification whose fulfillment would require a reallocation of' C(J.{(NT 

production facilities and designates it as being of an emergency nature, 

it may be forwarded to NSA in advance of USOIB consideration, and NSA 

may act on it. in advance of its inclusion in the basic guidance. 

SECRET 
fif.ReB/: AS 7 ~ o 

• 

i. Any NSA reallocation of CCl~INT production facilities 

reflectizig a change to the approved Implementing Plan shall be reported 

to USCIB by NSA, whether the change results from a modification in the ba~ic guidance or results from technical CCl~INT considerations. 

Changes :!.n allocation not reflecting a change in the Implementing Plan 

need not be reported to USCIB by NSA, except in smmna.ry in its annual 

reyort. Any individual member may, of course, raise such changes for 

cousiderE-tion in USCIB as it sees fit. 

' j. The Director, NSA, may carry out changes in the NSA 

Inrplementing Plan in advance of their consideration by USCIB when, in 

his opinion, time does not permit prior consideration by USCIB. 

3. In the light of the factor.R outlined above, it is the opinion 

of the lfu;:ecutive Committee that supplemental guidance can be provided 

most effectively by: 

a. Empowering USCIBEC to formulate authoritative supplemental 

guidance for NSA. 

(1) Requiring that each supplemental requirement be 

prepared in writing and directly related to a requirement(s) 

on the GCMINT Requirements List. 

(2) Requiring that USCIDEC approve each supplemental 

requirement which, though in conformity with t.he COMINT 

H.equirements List, would adversely affect production by NSA 

of some exisitng or planned line of CCI-aNT end-product, and 

J:>equiring NSA routinely to bring such requirements to the 

attention of USCIBEC for action. 

1>. Requiring that USCIBEG meet as frequently as necessary, 

and at least once each month, to solve, and to exchange information on, 

mu:i:.ual prc>blems, and to review the supplemental requirement file monthly 

to ensure agreement on matters of supplemental guidance as reflected by 

the NSA current file of supplemental requirements. 

(1) Requiring NSA to remand to USCIBEC any supplemental 

requirement which, in the opinion of NSA, requires coordination, or additional coordination, among the USCIB agencies. 

c. Ensuring that USCIB makes decisions on all changes to 

basic guidance and all matters of supplemental guidance which cannot 

be unanimously agreed in USCIBEC. 

4. The Committee is of the opinion that it would be improper to 

specify the mechanics or mechanism by which the Director, NS.&., implements the 'basic and supplemental guidance which he receives from USCIB. 

It considers, however. that a description of such mechanics should be 

requested from th6 Director, NSA, to be based on the assumption that 

useful GCMINT guidance will ne formulated and provided to NSA as 

described :in TAB Ao 

2 

SSCR£T 
. ' 

5. USCIBEC recognizes that decisions on the most desirable inter- wo~king of USCIB mettJ.bers, individually and collectively, with NSA 

should not be made until an NSA implementing mechanism has been decided. 

It considers imperative to mutual understanding and cooperation, however, that adequate provision be made to inform NSA in detail of the in·~elligence considerations underlying USCIB gliidance and requirements, 

and to inform USCIBEC authoritatively of the details of implementing 

ac·cion taken by NSA. It therefore rec.ommends that the Director, NSA, 

provide, together 'With an outline of his implementing mechanism, his 

recommendations as to the most desirable working relationship to prevail 

between the requirements structures of USCIB and the individual members 

thereof, on the one hand, and the Director, NSA, and his implementing 

functions on the other.