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REF ID:A522894 

Copy No. 10 

10s(53)/0R/R(5) (Final) 

9th November, 1953. 

UK-US COMMUNICJ..TIONS SECURITY CONFERENCE 1953 

Report of the Qperational Requirements Sub-Committee 

to the Executive Committee 

Security' devices for I.F.F •. , I'favigational Aids 

and Data Transmission Syst·ems 

1. I.F.F. Security Systems 

a. The present combined UK/US agreements f::.r I.F.F. systems envisage the 

use of S.I.F. with I.F.F. Mk. X as an::i,.dentification system. Both 

U. S. and u. K. have studied these proposals 'from. the s eouri ty point of 

view. 

b. The Sub-C'.Jmrni ttee re commend: -

(1) That the attention of the CAN-UK-US J.C.E.C. 's should be 

directed to the fact that the security agencies of both countries 

agree 

(a) that the present proposal for using S.I.F. with I.F.F. Mk. X, 

with code changing on Mode I, is insecure as an identification system; 

(b) furthermore that the personal and functional identities of 

Modes II and III c0uld be a valuable source of intelligence 

to an · enemy. 

(2) That the CAN~UE-US J.C.'E.C, 's be j.nvited to restate the security 

requirements for a system to operate in conjunction with I.F.F. 

Mk. ~. This specification should contain information about the 

degree of confidence in the identification required, and the 

a.mount 0f risk which would be acceptable. 

(3) That when the security requirements have been received from the 

CAN-UK-US J.C.E.C. 's the cry~tographic agencies of the U.S. and 

the u. K. make: joint technical prop:Jsals f.o:r a new and secure 

I.F.F. system on the following ba~is:-

(a) That if possible it should be compatible with the Mark X 

transp:mder unit 

(b) That if (a) above is founJ to be impossible they should, in 

conjunction with the aprir-:>priatc c:immunica.tions agenci~s, 

recommend devel-Jpment of a new system providing the required 

security. This system might have t-:J be integrated with its 

own transponder if this is d.eemed advisable. 

/2. 

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REF ID:A522894 

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- 2 -

2. Navigational ~·i.i".ls an,1 Data Transmission Systems 

a. It was assumed that security systems for Navigational .1ads and 

.D:l.to. Transmission Systems might be requirccl for tw·fo reasons:-

(1) To deny their use to an onemy in wartime 

an::l (2) To prevent tho enemy gaining any intelligence from their 

d.esignea. use by friendly forces. 

b. No combined requirements for security systems for Navigational ii.ids 

harl been fo:nna.lly submitte,1 to 0i ther the u. S. or U. K. cryptographic 

agencies. Both agencies however, realised that such requirements 

might eventually be formulated, and had :1.evoted some effort to 

theoretical studies of the possibilities of Security ideas for 

particular systems. 

c. 

(1) In the U.S. 

(2) 

(a.) On Navigational /a.ids, some thcor~tical studies had. .been 

undertaken under the General Research and development 

prograrmne in N.S.Ja.. 

(b) On re.ta Transmission technical assistance had been given on 

specific projects under development in Service Laboratories. 

In the u.K. 

A start· had been mad.e by inviting all Services to submit 

details of Navigational Ji.ids in use or projected. This data had 

now been _received and ~om~ amplification of specific items vm.s 

being sought prior to further d~tailc-1 study. 

The Sub-Committee agreed that 

(1) Neither the U.S. or U.K. cryptographic agencies were at this stage 

able to put forward. any prn.cticnl soluti:m to these :;_Jr0blems. 

(2) The Executive/Committee shoulJ take note that in both countries 

it was cor...siicrea that insufficient eff~rt was ~s yet available 

f~r the detailed studies of these problems even on a 

theoretical basis. . -Both Agencies would 1)robably require an 

increase in personnel or nn alterQtion in priorities if this was 

to be rectified. 

(3) The entire field of I.F.F., Navigational .Aids, .Data Transmission, 

etc. re1Jresents a new fi·el.1 for which security must be provi::"!.ed.. 

It appears that corr,pletely new cryptographic techniques will be 

re.quire] for it. Because of this F.tnd the peculiarity of the 

signals, the use of the signals ~nd the stringency of size and 

wei:ght factors, the clovelopm.ent of the transmission portions, 

control portions, nrnl security portions of these equipments will 

probably have to be ·lone together. Therefore the attention 0f 

the J.C. "E. C. 's shoul·l be directed ta the necessity for requirements f'ar these special equi1Jmt:mts -to be stated to the 

appropriate s~curity agencic.:s as s:Jon as they are generatec .• 

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REF ID:A522894 

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IllS(5J)/OR,/R(5) (Final Draft) 

7th November, 1953. 

~ouNo, I 

UK-US COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY CONFERENCE 1953 

Report of the Operational Requirements Sub-Committee 

to the ~xccutive Committee 

Security devices for I.F.F., Navigational Jdds 

and Data Transm:j.ssion Systems 

I. I.F.F. Security Systems 

The present combined UK/US agreement~ for I,F.F. systems envisage the use 

. of S. I.F. with I.F.F. Mk. X as an i4entifica.tion syst_em. Both U. s. a:p-1 U.K. have 

studied these proposals from the security point of view. 

Th! Sub-Cammi ttee rec.ommend:-

1. ·That the attention of the d.A.N-ux-us J,C.E.C.'s should be directed to the 

fact that the security agenoies of both countries agree 

' ' 

(a) that the present proposal for using S,I.F. with I.F.F. Mk. X, with 

(b) 

code changing on Mode I, is insecure as an identification system; 

furthermore that the personal and functional identities of Modes II 

and III coula be a valuable source of intelligence to an en~my, 

2. '. !fhat the 0£N-UX-US J.O.E.C, 1 s be inviteJ. to restn.te the se~ity 

requirements tor a system to operate in.conjun~tion with I.F.F. Mk, X. This 

specltioation should contain infonna.tion·about the degree of confidence in the 

i~ifioa.tion required, and. the amount of risk which w:ould be accepta'ble. 

'· T}Jat when the security requirements have been re·ceived .from the 

CA.NiUK-US J. o. E. O. 's the cryptographic agencies of the u. s. and the u. L make 

joint technical proposals for a new and secure I.F.F. system on the following 

/(a) 

-.. · ·~ 

TOP· SEeRE.I 
REF ID:A522894 

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(a) That if possible it should be compatible !dth the Mark X transponuer 

tmit 

(b) Tha~ if (a) above is fotmd to be impossible they should, in 

conjunction with the appropriate communications agencies, recommend 

developncnt of a new system providing the required s~curity. This 

system might have to be integrated with its own transponder if this 

is deemed advisable. 

_II. Navip:ationnl .ii.ids and Ihta Tronsmission Systems 

1. It was. assumerl that security systems· for Navigational .Aids and :pa.ta 

Transmission Systems might be required for two reasons:-· 

. . 

(a) To deny· their use to an enemy in wartime, 

and (b) To prevent the enerni gaining any intelligence from their Qesigned use 

by frien~ forces. 

2. No combined requirements for security systems for Navigational Aids had 

been formally submitted to either.the u.s. or U.K. cryptographic agencies. 

. . 

Both agencies how~ver, realised that such requirements might eventually be . . 

· formulated, and had devoted same effort to theoretical studies of the 

possibilities of 'Security ideas f'o:r particular systems. 

In the u.s. 

On Navigational Aids 1 some· theoretical studios had been underte.ken unler the 

General Research and development :programme. in "N. S~.A.. . On rat.a. ·Transmissi•:Jn 

toahnioal assistance had been given on specific projects under aevelopment in 

Service LD.boratories. 

In the u.K. 

·A start ha.a been made by inviting all Services to submit details of 

Navigational Aids in use or projectecl.. This data had now been received ancl some 

amplification of specific items m.s being sought ?rior to further ·letailed study • 

/It 

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~ REF ID:A522894 

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-~ lm'· SEeRET 

- 3 -

It was agreed that 

(1) Neither tile u.s. or U.K~ cryptographic agencies were at this stage 

able to put forward an;y practical ~elution to these problems. 

(2) The Executive Committee should take note that in both countries it 

was considered that insufficient efforl was a.s yet available for the 

detailed studies of these problems even on a theoretical basis. Both 

Agencies would probably require an increase in personnel or an 

alteration in· priorities if this was to be rectified. 

(3) The entire field of I.F.F., ·Navigational Aids, Iata Transmission, etc. 

represents. a .. new field :for whicJ:l security mus~ be prov..i..ded. It appears 

that· completely new cryvtographic techniques. will be required for it. 

Because of this and. the peculiarity of the signals, the use of the 

signals and the stringency of size and weight factors, the 

development of the transmission portions, control portions, and 

security pertions of these equipments wi~l ~.)robably have to be done· 

together. Therefore the attention of the J.C.E,O.'s should be 

directed to the necessity for requirements for.these special 

equi1llllents to be stated to the appropriate security a~encies as soon 

as they are gene?'!lted." 

.. · .. 

TOP. SECN.1'