,,! 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

USCIB: 23/57 _'1T'; ·_;,:1.;;;. ·:D DC\.~Ultt:li'l'~; GOH · 

,.~'" .. \-l-~J C(JDS \¥01-3 ... :1 I'..t.\'i'J~~r"~I.,\J. 

27 M&7 1953 

'feP SB0Itiff - ssmB1'1'I DIPO&MATICJ! 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMURS ~ USCil}: 

Subject: Allied (NATO) Commm:fcationa Securit7., 

lo The enoloaedD position paper an the subject. 

ot NATO Cmwmi cations Securit.7 is torwarded tor information and att.ld.T. 

2o The has intormecl 

the Secretariat that 9 although the paper has been ap-

~ed ~ without amendment. it should be caneidered 

aa an inf'ormal statement or the rlewa ot the Director, 

L-_ _.I at this time. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

&!closure 

OOiC/3441 dtd 

20 Mq 1953 .. 

USCIB: 23/57 

24 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-14-2014 pursuantto E_Q_ 1352a 

TOP SECRET 
\. 

... TO» SEGB .. &T:AU:z\NOE 

9 3.3(h)(2) 

\ 86::-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/3441 

20th May, 1953 

Copy No.: ••• ~ __ ·sE __ "c ... UR..,.·I=·-~-·Y_O=F-/T~J""!IE'"ll ..... \ L-...L...------_J~1HE NATO fQWERS .... 

mrmmUC'l'ION 

The presentipo.~el' con.tafns a revif;w of the situation withll 

recoms:lendo.tions on the ebctel\it \of\ the\ :reuodial action required and o~ Lic.:thods to be adopted to cor)vinco the governr.1efl:f;s concerned Of the need 

for action, without dd.sclos:i\ne. sophint:i.cated cryptanalytic techniques. rr-r--7 .. ·--- ::\ \=-·· · ,_,: ••-'":, .. \ ........ \- \,\ · ______ ... · -- -.. 

ThoD vicwf;3 are mllru11ariric(l \i.n\thc fc)Jlmving pa.ragraphs:-

It is thO vidw that\\at\tho.prcsen.t t;i.me<Dthe insecurity of 

the • • • •• ·• is ~f' •con$idcrabJy more va,lue to the Russians 

. rz :l.lul1'. it is to U. K. •qng, lJ. s .. , a.net""" that were this source of· leakage removed 

f"J.] ?\ the RU$sio.ns coulcl not d tnin the same inf'ofl.mtion by ).Jh,Ysical meane. 

''f~~ 1 •. ,. . (, n war eakage of this U ncl wuuli:Cbe-.·eve~ mor.e drunaging\tcj j interests 

'. ., : " · and profitable to the Rtts:.;ians owing \to grcat\\increase in quality and 

, . · ·. · · quantity of the tcllt-cornn~unic;.1.tions Of\ f'ricnd.1Y\ 11owers, and_ the increased 

difficulty of ootaining •• inf'onw1tion by nori~Comint means. lY..JPeridix 1A1 

. . . to this. i.J0:1Jer cont~!-':~ fl: sur~d\~ 1.in\lc ~ti \; \\ f;~it~ anne,s g~vl'fg ~econt OJ.:amplea of infounatwn_, of_ va.r_ ~e to\ __ au_s.·;:L_n_ , \passed b _ iJowera 

in • • • •• ·•. i.ppendix 1 B •\ contains sa;ie examp es, 

tc.ken fromj [Wnr HiGtoriesJ showing \the kind of d.runnge which 

too ;..xis powers cJ..J.ti to one another by use of] I as we_ll as 

, · tho c1mnage suffered by the ·•.l.lies fror•r the insecure .. \ communications of 

<r· thel I 

......____ _ ___.f .TOP SECRET CANOE / 

.... ~ .• . . ,:, .• .. ' . ; . . . . 

· ... : .. ·: ~ ; : 

··: 

.· .. 
REF ID:A517801 

... T08 SECRET GWOE 

~-1 -r 

I 

-/ DGC/3441 : 

I 

1.ppen<Jix 'Ct contains some exm.1ple!=1 t.Ak:en from a lllod.erri.._I __ .......... work on cryfte.~alysis showing that in telling ~·~ I t t their oy-.i.)hers 

a.re in principle USO'lJ!ld We shall be telling \_hpm nothing t at they do not 

e.lre ady know. .......... 2 

:(,: :·.'/~ . ·1 ·-_____ F_ina_· __ lly it is theD view that having taken s~eps to improve 

' .··. • the three powers should fefm a triperbite committee ,-,+i.ich 

c· would deal with other members o~ I on similar lines. 

• 

TOP SECRET CANOE 

• 

11 
REF ID:A517801 

TQ.,_P ,.,. SECRET GA ~OE 

0 3.3(h)(2) 

L 8.6-36/50 USC 3605 

SCOPE Ol4' '.CHE PlROBI..l!lM. 

(a) 

.... . '1 .• 

., 2. · A reservation was mode in respeot\ of thej 

\~ ;; ·.~filf<>i'fi ~t~ '.t'ollowing reasons: -----------

•. ~·H· ;_· 

''A~'!·?'. ; · (i) that no likelihood existed of tJ1e I I extencling its use to 

,:, it:l;, ·: ' radio charme ls; ..._ _ __, 

I 

, (ii) · that our knovded~e qif the existence\ o:f the machine ·was derived 

solely from •.tclm1dQsf: ine" sourc0s, rutd 

, , ·' (iii)° that sophistico.tcc). techniques, ,that \.must not be disclosed to 

, thel L 11erc used in eX!Jloit fog it . 

. ( :1.,;~d~~ / Q :·,~:e, :'' J.. The have mcrmv1hilc begun to us,~ the 111achine on some 

·,·.l~, ~. '·iJndio channels an intend to use it on others. . This disposes of the 

:'YI i:~;, f·in;t objection, and to some extent also ,of' ti"; second, the 11 c1~-

·l· ·l,ine" source referred to was ::ii1.1 1 the monitorin i of a 

·11:; .... ------------ ' .·· f;rom th· 

The apl;)roach described in the 

n~QeBSity. for disclosure of 5~~~-~~ 

considered desirable thntth in any discussions 

with the 

' ;·'''1: ,j (b) L-------------' 

... ;_.•;'"~\;.,"· 4. , The I lconfe:enco of Ma.v 1951.consi.~Fc..,'_r.,.e..,d-=an ... d=-r=-o ... ·..,.je.._c.._t.._o ... ·d=-.... . .' ~.i,. .. a proposal to ti\ke action to :unprovc the nccunty oi[ / 

~ ~'. J ~ ~\h{:~yplwrs for tworrcasons: ----------..J ,,, .• ~:; .... (,\'ii . 

. ;'~~,~~:;,~;;]~~ "(i) theJ I through thLJme rmism ·, t ;1.n, . NAT..-,-m-a ........ -n ..... t"""n .... o_u_t_1-·t:-"V:-.e...,·l ... n"""t .... 1_0_n_o_f' Comint, have: initi 

··.'.°ii! 'l;;;:r\~· action which is expected to corrnct in largt::l mer:•.sure 

:c.,n>·. ·.]./~!'., .·· insecurity of the important cryptocouum.micn.tibns of the 

,~, and ·~ 

ii': ' ~b~. j··•·'.' I 

:~~!;,kl~l'I.':' . 

'1~~. ~~i;' 

(_ii) 

~ I~~,;_,;.;'. ·-If-•. ., • ·~ ,;.,· ·~· ~T~ ~··t·'" l';j~"·~!ic ' 

~ i~: ' . ':. .. . 

.1·.:~.·.·j '. ' i\" 

.. 

·r: 

'.•";. 

; :, '. 

.. . 

any corr('lction of the r(.)mo.ining important arc.ns of 

insecurity of the cryptoconununic.:Ltions of the;.;.l ,;;;,.....;;..;;. ____ ...., 

"' · I would involve disclosure of success in sophisticated 

cryptamflys~ and ~Jo::;sibly lead to o. dei.w.nd for· revelation 

_of techniqu1s, both or which rcvclatiomi must be nvoided. 11 

.•, 

· ... . ·. 
'. 

I ... 

: ' 

FR, ID:A517801 

T0]1>' SEuRET CANOE 

' 

~·q 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl. 86:c36/50 USC 3605 

- 2 -

:: \\ \:··... \\ \\ \ ',\\, ',',,_::::::>;, ''----,,__ : 

5~ •: Although\consideral:U.~ progress has been made since. 19.51 :m the 

pro.visic>~ .. of NATO\o;yphers, (~I I show 

little ~~gn of irl\)X'over.ient. 1 ·. ·· .... 

· i1 !.{ ~ 1(i) i ·· ... ·····.. .\ \ ···\. ······..... ·. inl · .. ········· ... ·. lare wide Ol't'~ fr~m . 

~ t"~;V ••. ~he. highe .... ~st . le.v~l. downvmrds and -.. carry o. lar e vo ~ .. Qf ... ;E:ly.~ll- bi .DP -d i. i~ej£@ . ij ~XAs:Ji6r on"Iy o ·· he 

~ 1 •·but also\the tbei;r allies;Tor~eX'iii.p e, they contain revel-

. ~ ' capable of ruin:μig not only the 

a.gains Viet Minh but also that of ~~~~~~--..~~---' 

ond. they give detnils of t'orthcoming .American Aid. 

'A' , :Anr:tcxurc 3• 

(ii) "Third level'' comrnunicatio!ls o:t' N.ATO forces ar~ sent entirely 

in riationnT\ cy:pher-s. ·. 1

1

he content of rnessages passed at this 

leve.l may be. less immedi~tcly :revenling than that .passed at 

higher levels, but (in·~ ... : ..... cc.: .. :i;ainly :md :Jroba.blJt. n.leo in pence) 

could. be treated by '·.'inferential" and "fusion" methods _and made 

to yield valu.'.'.1,ble int~lligence not avnilable to an enemy by any 

non...;Sigint ;neo.ns. 

(c>.__I ________ ___.l 

7. The general question of :i.mproveinent of' the national cyphers of 

the other NATO powers has nev¢r been disoussed officially between! I 

I 

(i) The U.S. view·on this ~ubject in 1951 was however indionted by 

the f'ollqwin~ stater.1ent\ made by an ad hoc\connnittee of U. s. o. I. B. 

during \lll.Of:f'ioinl disoussions arising from:\use byl lof 

to discuss NJITO matters-. ----- .,_~~~,__~~~~~~~~ 

"Remedial action involving the entir~ body oft,__ ___ __, 

connnunioations is not necessa+y from the point of view of I · .... ·.... I in fact it would be undesirable from 

;: ~:; I of view of conservi'iJor the U.S. this nnd other 

It was ultimately agreed that\ the U.S. Government should make 

a. high leve+ approach designed to 11 shock11 thel I into 

using the I I without \however actually revealing 

that their own cyphGrs were inPecurc. 

{iJJThere appears to be some tendency to in.crease the use of one-time 

pads but vre have no guarantee that the pads are ;,>rO.i_Jerly made or even 

that the usage is truly "one time", 

( ii)Report of U. s. c. I. B. ad hoc Committee onj I communication 

·security, Septehlber, 1951. 

F-78J.Cl3S TOP SECRET C1\NOE 
' 

F-71~C13S 

REF ID:A517801 

TOP' SECRET CA~OE 

(iii) 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

- 3 -

D00/3441 

A demarohe was made by the U.S • .Ambassador to 

in spite of whiohr----=--~~~~~~~~~~......,. ....... ...,....~~---J 

still a Appendi..1-,.........,,..._......,==.,........,......~~~~~~~~~~~--

:· -;-,'0I'!~ 

' ' ' . 

8. · _ Thc=Jview ia,_"shock tactics" of this kind a.re /unlikely -

to be effective especially when they aro accanpanied by a "cover story" 

which is unlikely to be believed; the ..... onl;y w~U5L_Aeh!:~_y_e/ i.mprov~ment _ 

in aecuri ~ babi ts ~~----~1-~ducati!_~ction and __ py illfl.u_enc_c_, __ aj_' __ i_l!e 

"public opi~~on" (if such a term may properly be used of a very 

secret subject} Qf othtir p~s'I 1_9rricer._s_. _ 

9. But the diCt11n cC J:,:iS,C,I.B. ad hoc Canmittee referred 

to "in ~ 7 above ha.s in th • • view another serious/weakness in that 

it is based_ on the asstnnptio • • • it is possible in matters of cypher 

security to "have it both ways". This assurn"ltion has Appeared at 

Various times. in disc.ussion in -~ .• -o diL"feront forms: · 

(d) 

( i) that it is possible to devise cyphers/that a.re just good 

enough ·· .. _to defeat •the Russians but contain weaknesses 

that ca.n be I - • • 2 I /we cannot know 

anythi?l$ of tnc .._.:vel "t canpetence /Of u.s.s.R. 

cryptanalysts. 

(ii) that it.is sufficient to limit imp:rovement of security 

to specified cryptochannels or to/ telegrams on specified 

subjects. Thi.s will not do; it /:is not possible to· 

forecast. in advance which cryptochannels are going to carry · ortant messa.·ea and it is not enough to insist on use 

when documcnts/_o.re .__ ________ ____, 

wih=-ou=i:--::a:""I._ -=a-=o-=a:-1.t.... ng steps to _protect the security- of NATO 

fringe traffic ()r national camnent on NATO discussions 

which may legitJ.mately be sent in.__ ______ ___, 

10. Little is known, fr;..,;om;.::··-=.a-__ ........ souroi;is, iof theJ 1-

of any European pa.ver except and/ if /as/ seems/probable they are no 

better than th t e w i.n€; egreos, 

dangerous to t e securi y · .. _ o nny orces opera ting wi. th them 

( e) Cypher machine develgpment in Eurgpe 

11. r--1-t-,is known that ne'N •cyphcr/tn.'l-chines/are being developed by 

severalL_Jgovernments 3.nd ~y commet·cial firms operating in neutral 

countries. 

(1) 

( i) Th~ lhlive de13i.gnc:d/cypher machines ;vhich they 

int_erid to use. ~or theirl I these; mo.chines 

embO<iy sane filμ'ly .advo.:nced techniques but from infonna.tion 

at present available appear to be most insocure. ( 1 ) 

See memorandum f'rOT:l in 'i.'ashington 

to Secretariat ot the S~~dlne Grou:p, No~ 0927/SRP ~53, 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET C2"".:NOE 
TO~ SJ!tl-n1~AA11A01 "fOE . " KJ!i I ti"\: 

?EO 3.3(h)(2) 

•· PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

.... 4.\-

OOC/'3M4· 

(ii) Thel lore ®ad~ ·\\ rnndorn gonerator fof production of 

one time key ; nothing is known of details. iJ 

(iii) Thd in conjunction with 

al l:f'irm, /is producing a wide range of new cypher 

mo.chines which will 1.llldoubteclly be much better than the 

some fi~'s p:rt::-war models, but may still be not secure 

ag.:-.inst/modern cryptanalytic methods. 

12. This list is probably not exhnU;oit ive, .md these development a 

merit close o.ttention r.roml 'E ··•. I While ·it is entirley ~ossible 

that European :i;>o1mrs mey work ou~ 'Ehoir own snlva:lj,ion, with or without 

the aid of conun.ercin.l./:f'i.rm~it is .. · to be. fea.r(;;;d tho.t they nay only arrive ~t an intcnnediate stage o'f' development when it will become difficult 

to convince them of the:j_r insocurity without revt:aling too much detail 

of currentt / I th.aught on cypher machine d1;,sign. It vt0uld be 

thereforee.tter to ap;ro .ch th~se ~urope.~.n powers before t:beir own 

development ha:;.; gone/ t.oo far, artd i:,)ersuade then to adopt well tried 

(f) Decisions to be taken at the Conference 

(A) Countries to be covered 

13. / A decision has to b~ taken, one Wuy or the other, in the case 

of e.ach NATO nation, wheth6r ·i;ht: interests of Signal Intelligence or. of 

.----'---'--.r.cm~Signal ~ecurity are to prevaii, i~ no hal_.f__wo.y __ house .exist_s.. Either 

vre./ decide to take ste:t>s to put that cryptogra:i.:>hic house in order, and 

.

t. io s:t.cr· fice Sig.·na····· 1 Intelligtmo····e (:t>robnbly·· .. for ever) or we "conserve" 

the co responclence of that goverrunent as a S;igna.l Intelligence target for 

ours" - and f'or the Russians., ·.. .. q ! 

: ,CB) T'iming of action with relation to physical security 

15 While it is ai;recd that we ought to adjust our methods to 

tak •. account of differing physical security conclitions in various 

count~ies it may be said 

~ L- 1 (j) that physical leakages will seldom if ever be so gross 

~· ~.., 1 as to provide a source of intelligencE:; a.s rn::tlid, complete, 

'"-' reliable :md (above .all) authentic as that derived from 

~ tu-· r a md!:\jor bbre,lr.i~tt1..ownllin hconnnunl ic3.btifon security; contdhittionths :...~ ~ ~ nee to e l. era y ope ess e ore one can so.y a ere 

~ -~ ~ Ill(.. is no point in ir11proving cy2hex: security; 

~' . -

,.,..r \) (i)convers ... t:f.on between! landl I Febru'lry 1953. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

TOP SECRET C2"s:NOE 
,..:_:, .. : 

~()3.3(h)(2) - 5 -

PL86.,,36/50 USC 3605 

' DGC/3441 

(~i) OJ-i~should however not dcluy-J.hitiating action on cypher 

s.ecwi ty pendirg expuoted improvements in physical 

security, because neither can be put right overnight. 

16. TllJ I r~comm~n1dation is thcrefore<!?m~there is no case 

f'or any further delay i!) apl?roa.ching thcl ~/o.n~ho.t physical · 

security of other n1tions. might be considered as a valid reason .for 

taking no adtion at \all, \.or foJ;" taking modified action but not for delaying 

action. 

' I 

THE APPaaAcH \To sf I \ 

1 7. Ha.V'ing sett led \the \scope \of action inte~iVd the Conference shoul~ in the U.K. vie~ consider \an approach to thet I with a view to 

first improving their cornmt.mico.t.ions\ s.ccurity anahen inviting them to 

associate themselves with o.ny scheme .that may have been agreed between 

.__ ______ I for approc.ches\ to other Nii:'fO nations. 

18. It is recommended that a \single approach be made to thei 

cov·ering all cyphers of all services\ in r<;;;spoct of which tho confer._e_n_c_e ___. 

has decided -t;hat action must be. taken. 

19. Previous projects for O.ppro:ich to thd ~n the delicate subject of the security c,f I Fvb boen 

based on the assumption th:lt this insecurity is due to ignorance 

of' the art of'··· cryptography which cannot be removed without exposure of 

"sophisticated" cryptanalytic techniques. Yet. after all) the basic principles 

of cryptography are f'ew, simple and\wcll known to all cypher experts 

including the~ I and do not constitute the "secret" upon which 

the success o~. cryptanalysis dopc:nds. \ Thu "secrets" \Of cryptanalysis are 

~ rather thes~y--, 

0

.fJ ~ ~·~~t) that situations ~ise in the use of' cyphers which would 

·,~o · ¥ ~ instantly be condemned as insecure by o.~\pne instructed in 

~ ~ cryptography; 

· ~- (ii) that other situations arise which an instructed person r would admit to offer at lea.st a. theoretical risk of 

insecurity, but which require "sophisticateJ. tl~ohniques" 

to exploit them, and that these techniques have been 

devised. · 

20. Tht: only way in which improvement inl._ ______ __.I can be 

event\Jally obto.ine.1 is by coop~ration on the technical level bctwecnD 

.__ ______ __.I communication security officers. ""'· 

21. The object of the first apprs'."'.ch thercfuro w0ul.J."""'tre·--t-e bring 

about a frank excha.nge of in:f'ormo.ticm that wuuJ.:l serve: as a basis for 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
..,,_. ~ 

JS:Q;;;8-3(h)(2) 

PE$6~~6150 USC 3605 

- 6 - 000/34Ji.1 

~~~~~: ii~~~~On ~ responsible ooomunication security officers, O~e\ of t.hn. points ~~t the Conference must decide is whether this initial 

~'!'.chllllge shQuld be ml3.de: 

(i) :at a tripartl,t~ llleeti.ngj 

. (ii) o.t ~~po.rate bip~l.te 1i1,7c~in~~,1 ... _ ....... __________ ___, 

(iii} nt o. single bii_Ja.rt ite ine~~iifg "W~re..._e_i;..;t_he..;.·_:r ... I ____ .--__. 

would state the whole cnse< ~a;lnst! ~ . .....-----------

22.. .... ·.. · .. ·.. The tripart itc o.rrangem.ent would be>t~e best~ a.part from the 

fo..ot thl".t it would OO\ impossible to conce::.l the fa.Qt tha~ o.nd 

I •. • .. 1 hti.d \discussed tho r.mttet- ~c.1.. exchanged infonuatip?l b~ the meeting · 

~. :)11 .• •·· .. T ... ·.he··.. single bipnrt·· ..itc <r~1··.1...·.··c •. ·.·ting would involve eit,}'l:g-r .. ·. or L.............J in a f'airly cor.1plic::it0d cover story. If for exampl ··... were 

to undertnk.e the whole ta.sk they :w9uld be:: obliged to make t c case on I •. ·.•. \\ \\ lent ircl.y-.<from r.1aterial receive~ froml , I 

1• •. 10 oxpaa: cic.e U8iG1l:tgS seems to make U.ie worst of both v.rorlus, and in aey 

case whctherl !cooperation is er_plicitly o.duittecl or not it will 

uncloubtedly be ;·-ssumed. It is therefore. rccOi:nnended that the ueeting 

be tripnrtite. 

23. 

24. 

qf'i'cct. 

The exchange can b~ initio.ted in t:wt>. wuys only: . 

(i) by inviting c.1ch _t>arty to describe <its own communication 

SE)Curity 1:-icthods', which would then\"be discussed on general 

cryi:>togra:tJhic grounds by the other two• 

{ii) Byl I :mnormcing that th~y are already o.wo.re 

of the existence o:L security weaknesses int· lcommunicntiuns, c.1escribing them ~.::·. inviting thel Ito 

disclose rmy kno{fJdgc that they mo.y have ofl I 

The second a.ppron.ch is recommended, .?..s being more sure of its 

(i) Initially ::i.t least it mny be somewhat Lmbarrassing .but it 

will ho.ve less long term dis.1.UV.'.Ultnges in that it does 

not commit :myl'.ody t..; disclosure of details of their mm 

systems -which they consider irrelev:mt or do not viish to 

mention. 

(ii) Although this approach implies a tacit admission of 

(i)This is something more thm o. polite fiction. We :.-..lrcndy know th'.lt 

! thel lhnvc been monitoring our 1a~oeuvre tr,.._ffic and h[tVC formd that 

!~ rJll· · they c.::i.n exploit traff'ic socurity ·wcnknes:;t:;s, such .~s use oe P/L. 

i . \ 

: . ~-

;~, 

Pn71loC13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
~ ·.:. 

. REF ID:A517801 

T~ SECRET Ch-NOE 

- 7 

cryptlllk~lytic success it uo~s not involve any disclosure 

of. ~thods. The line t rucen is "v~ SC(; that you do this 

or thn.t ll!ld we consider it on principle to be wrong1

' not 

11 1aok how we can break your cy1)lwrs". 

25. . '11.f':l;er t:tK: t'hree parties have m.~de one o.nother a.ware of the 

cle1!lents of the problem they should constitute n. tripartite advisory 

'· · cor.Ji:.id.ttce of conn:lUnioation security experts with tenns of reference: 

(i) to ex'.lIIline any weaknesses in n.."ltiona.l cotn:nunioation 

security systems of the three powers tha.t mn.y come to the 

'knowledge of o.ny one of· them m1•1. may be reg :'rded .".'.S 

affecting the intt:;rcst of' all; 

~o 3.3(h)(2) 

Pt 86-36/50 USC 3605 (ii) to ··m.ruce recommendations for remedies; ··,.,_ 

(iii) to cons"fder joint action in the COf.1!IlOn interest 1(iith regard' 

to the security of other· i'ri~ndly p6wers~ 

26. Once the initial o.pproa.ch ht'l.13 beenmo.de there /ahould be \nothinS 

t . ..; prevent any 11arty from mo.king fur,ther .~isclosures of'°/D .. ny feo.t.ure of 

1'1s own security system on whichhe wo\llcl like advice.. Similo.r1y there 

shoultl. be nothing to prevent )lnY" :party who is in/doubt/ about the\ security 

· of' another party's crypt osystea (but not able 9:r perhaps not willing to 

· prow that the system is insecure) from makinr(,.b. direct enquiry. 

. 27. • In considering the probable outcome of this o:,i?:;,>roach and its 

effect on the)/ lit should be borne in mind that the I I 

ment is lo10WI1 to have· set u;, in 1951, an Intercle:i_?Jartmental donmittee on. 

I lwith a tecl1nica.l sl,lb~committee 1/ although /each MiniStry continues 

· to ,:>reduce its own cyphers and it /is known that I •. • .... ·•··. I 

I I <md a man .vdth considerabl7 .. k(lowleJ.ge of' cryptanalysis) is a member of one of the/se committees.~ l. ) 

· It must. therefore ·be assumed either that the Oommittees are not properly 

infoI'.'lled of the current cypht::r practices of' t.he vo.rious lUnistries, \.o:r: . 

of the pur-,L)oses f'or which certain cyphers are used or that ( thcugh ·• •. inf'onned) 

I 

~ 

~unable f'or one reason or another t.o m.at~e all the .i.m.)r .. ovcme·n .. t· .. s 

that they would wish. i / · . ·•. 

. F-781-Cl3S 

28. It nil certainly not be difficult to convince thq 

re:.,.i:re~entatives that they ought not to use the lower grade ,----- ... ..... 

cy-,i;>hers and no harm would be done if' we were to show them some:; examples. 

This is ·.'i'iJs;ely to oome as a most unpleL;.rnnt "'urprise to. them for it is 

inconceivable t)\at res!>ansiblel Fryj_Jtogrr.t:,hic experts curt alreo.d,y 

kno\"1 of the subjects f'or which the I I that have 

{ i 6o!1versation betweenl.__ _____ ..,..Jhndl._ _________ __,I. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

TOP SECRET C:L'i:NOE 
- 8 -

0 3.3(h)(2) 

L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

7 

no security value who.tever. 

insecur~, 

They nlso 

broken. 

(iii) The I lrna.ch:i.nc/ is ··, ~J4ctty g:,ocl. cy-jpher groS;$ly misused 

by the I by rc.L)er~t1<1 use of messa~c settings t.hroilgh 

operator's carelcss.no.ss.Jc•r /thruue;h use of nn invn.;r'iable 

"engin(;;er' s key", M(l bJt ~li indicator systei·.1$. i>.J.l 

these _!r.r.ctices are/so J:bviously wr4ing that th1 jcould 

not w:mt us to J:1.rove /th4.t we c.''~n toke .o.dvn.ntage of tnem. 

I 

(iv) Finally there is/no/neeJ to show thcf ~'l:UY of our 

actu::..l decrypts~/ /The /¢yphers in thi ... _s_g_r_o_u...,jp ~re obviously 

meant to co.rry /seorot o~rrespondence. 

III 

- ME,tlSURES TO I[V}PROVE I fcYPHERS 

30. The probable U:i:Jshot of tho ex::-111ination :in committee of._I __ __, 

I tw~uld ~be that theb fcxJ.Jerts are all too well 

·':'.wnre of their d0d'ic.1i.::nc1es, that th7 y h!iVD a long term ~JrogrDL'llne 'f:or 

their improvement but that they c.re hcunper<.::cl by h.ck of' ma.terinl reources. 

The C0mmittee will/then h[~Ve/ to proct;..::•'- to ccnsi1::.er ways c.nc. menns of 

improvt:mcnt; I Ii should not dccic1c at the Conference what they 

(i)Th4 lmvc already proi)osed nn improvement orQ (not we think 

adequate) and clearly know it is vulnurubk. There is a sueGestion 

in 1·.!. Charles Eyraud 1 s "Pree is de CrYliL1grC"..:;_Jl1ie Ivioderne ( 1953) 11 · that 

unmoclifiedLJi :..:t least is insecure. 

F-71J.C13S TOP SECRET , C2A.s:NOE 

·~' 
'·\ .. 

~!p p'.3(h)(2) 

Pl86~36750USC 3605 

- 9 -

OOC/3441 

propooo\ to of"':'er i?l the wa,y of' ;l-Si!>:i~t:.u1c..:e ~·.nd be agJ:"e:d on pricrities 

but shou1cl e.:rdeavour. in subseql1Cnt clis()tis~;ion with tool I to apply 

their '.licl (which will certc..in:~y l'l~t ::Uil()Ullt ~o nn i.r.J.rJJedfo.te solution of 

.the wholl; prob.leJ"11) wbc:r~ver:it best.fitsw~thl !needs. 

31. 

oi' the 

It is .. l:~oubtful whether the c.c.M. mac~1e .i.Jroposcd in the :r;-eport 

1951 conference should be o.t'fered nOV{to the._I ___ _, I . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ~ 

Ii..) Thc\seO'UI'ity of tbe n\.n.chinc, oven with sim lex settings, 

hc"cs 1;>e~n seriously challcmgcd by research since 

1951 liJ. \\ It is not<iraprobable that t :c and indeed 

otht:r\meml:>crs of JIJ.'a'O may have guessud this f' roro the 

extraordinary changes i.Bn ·· ... gulations which hz~ve 

been promulgated in the··.. &nd in the circumstances 

it woulcl be w:iscst for ·····... to f'o1·esta.ll· questions 

that might. :tJrOvc u·wkwnr Y< rnnc aduit;ting th..<i.t they 

ha.ve come\ t.o four that the ntMhine is too i;;a.sily compromised 

by oj?era.tor '.s errors. 

(ii) Thu 1951 pro1Josalf,I 0nvisnged issue ,_,f 20 COM irnmediat oiy 

and a. tot:..'..! of\ 80 cventunll,Y!; it is probable tl.iLJ.t ._I ____ _. 

woulcl find it\difficult to nl..::uit this {'rogrnmme todn.y. ; 

(iii) Howev(.;r if the I lthcmselv~s woulcl like a certain 

numb·Jr of CCM:, then th0sG can be supplied within limit~ 

set by availnbility. 

32. One-t;bne pad, proposed i.n 195f, is an excellent sulution, 

whi.:rever i)ractioable. 

(i) 

\ 

(ii) 

\ 

The 1951 conference :1.groc<l thO:t technical instruction 

in manufncture of.' random to.bk~ cuulc.1 be give:i;. to thej .. ---...,1 . without disclosing cryptogrt'.;>pic information( ii) nnd 

that this wns Nl ir•port:lrit nnil ni>)rr :qrment. It is 

still more irnportnnt now that the nnd others ::i.ro 

showing signs of vroducing new nn · i)Cr ~i:>S in!'erior methods 

of one tir.l<; key gc.me::rntion. Rather thon discuss these we 

would .LJrefer to .1.>Crsuo.de th(; I I that our own rn£::thods 

are W(:lll tried and sound, without however .'.lpponring to 

"instruct" them as if thc.:y were coi!1pletc bcginner·s in the 

are of mo.king rand.C)m key. 

The allocation of' one ti.nlc pads is probauly best •Jrgnnised 

by tht: I I thu1:1sclvos. We should not, n.s was proposed 

by the U.K. in 1951, produce n ready ran.de scheme of 

· indi vidu~l and uult ivlc-~ddress .. ,nds, which in our O~)inion 

(i)Thc latest mod.ificatiun, "Lucifer", is n. CClnsiderabk ihlj)rOVC;:J.:e;nt on 

the originul m::i.chin.J, but even so CCl!i r.1ust be rogr·Pdecl .~ s ov<.;rduc for 

rep lo.cement. 

(:li)Enclosure I .. porn. 33 1951 re..,iort. 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
l. 

I 7 

..:. ./1 A( 

iY/' l 

r;\1~ 

' 

' 

• 

REF ID:A517801 

T~ .. SECRET CrNOE· lllo .I 

• 

- 10 -

~:Q.3.3(h.)(4) 

Pl...86 ... 36/50 USC 3605 

I 

DGC/J441 

• . !'ii: \\ \:\ ··· ... · '··· ... ···· ... '· ... would·,~aye\.\them .time :3:114 trouble. However suggestions from 

all part:i:ba\ could be. cop.sid~red in Committee, 

(iii) Tlle .... physical.\security :;_)rovided byf h methods of 

packaging arr {s likely to .be or h1ce1asL and it is 

(iv) 

(v) 

reco1mnen.•~.· ... d t· .. ·. · ..t it\.b·· .... e·· ... • d.es·c·· .. ribed·· ... • ..··· ........ (·.I·· .. t is a.lso possible that the L.___J may wish to t akc into account the 

difficulti•::s of. physical security when considering c.ny 

plan for 1ll11lti-address'·,p~d syf!tems). 

There are undoub"'.>ed:cy ways of mnking the~~ch more 

nearly secure. \ These might well b.c con~ subject 

to tr. s. bei?lg a.ble \.to provider a. substantial number of' !----.! ... 

equipmepts and subject to the I I finding them workablo • 

is now.regarded r"'"~~~.,.._,l"'l'r'"""l"l'l!!~~"l"n'l:n"IO~-..."""'""""'t~-· ....... ......,,._~he b~sic lug 

se chosen :f'ror,1 limitod lists which. can be readily 

cnlcul-.tcd on a lnrgc \computing nutchina..: · - It U.. S. 

are a.bl. e td. m'.'J<e thi. .. s r.i·.nchine c.v:::cil,ble at Ian early date it 

would be ve~· suitable .f;:l.' offer to (or to other 

Ni:.TO j,)owera:} .Jrovided that a clear explanation were given 

of the re:::,sbns for U$ing the limited list of be.sic lug 

settings. These re ·\sons could be convincingly derived from 

first principles (need to c;;nsure ~seven ns possible a 

distribution of key values). Once again any attempt ~o 

dictate would be fn.t'111 le:.~ding to suspicion of motives or 

\vilful refusal to use t.he "good" list. 

3-3. It is hoi:>ed that. enough hes \.been said to disl:)ose of the idea 

tim.t the £Jrocedure advcca.ted would }.(;ad to\eX.1.Josure of "sophisticated 

czr.it ane.lyt ic t eci:ues" • 1 {Apptmdix a \to t1Us ?aper cont a ins examples 

t::Jcen from a recent • work on cryptanalysis with quotations from 

older works showing• a.sic .t;)rinciples which are obviously commonplaces 

to ::my modern technician ancl which should suffice for a criticism of most 

if not all insecure European systems in use today). 

-.. 

.!Y 

EXTENSION TO arHER .POWERS 

34. It is :;_)reposed thl\t other NllTO powers, whose cyphers are held 

to be :1.n need of inzprovement should in turn be invited to send J't.:presentativ~,s to the Tripartite Committee • 

.35. · I J would \undoubt~dl~ all have 

CY.';;>hcr ex."'~-e-rt ....... s_c_a_p_,a.,...b""'l-e-o""'I',...· un-a. ....'e_r_s_t ... o-.n-a-i'""n_g_ana._,..., _a .... cce,Jting the arguments used 

in o.ssessing a cryptosystem. There is little fo.ult to be found with the:ir 

and we have no knowledge of their..._ ________ ___. 

~.i.rnl could only obtain it by .rlroloil6~d '<~bint stl.iily (likely to be most 

•,;,o.~teful of effort) or by siluiJly asxing the .. , f'.yc details. TheiY slloultl 

I -.... ,.,-< ......... . TOP SECRET Ci\.NOE 
proun.l>ly be 

· of' belp. DC {i) 

{ii) 

~9 3.3(h)(2) 

F't8$::-36/50 USC 3605 

. 1. -

000/3441 

left.atone altogether or else.regarded as potential givers 

___ __.. .... I has a \.one-t.ime tape generator, believed secure. 

j might pe.t'h~ps undertake to .edu,ca te I I whose 

is er.ur:i.ly reRdablo. ....__ __ ____, .._ ______________ ......... 

36. I I h in s'imi.lar OD.so toJ I with much lcnowledge of 

crypto theory •,:hich i.l'l no·i\nppliut1 in practice, Their""':"":'""'"""7~=====::::.. are largely insec1u·u ~.. no'lil\ing 'l$ knovm i rom Si;·:int of thcirt,,..._ ........ ___ __, 

cyphers and it would .bo nc:,~1snry\ to elicit inrormation on tEese by 

direct questioning afti:ir \.\·;e ttnd indicntucl that Wd knew the diplom1ti.:> 

syatoms to be insecure. 

37. I too o.ppoars 'l;o be backwn.!'d in crypt matters. It is 

lmown that the I fare helping the I I on Comint and it might 

be poasible aventua.lly for \thu I I to approach them on Comsec, on 

which they are in very.urgent necC\ of advice. ·. ~ 

38. It is dif'ficul'li to ~the level of cr,1pt lcnO'Nledge · in 

I . • ··. I~ m\'Y nll well have quite good · 

oryptan······ alysts. H·. 01~e ngf.1· .... in ·the only a:pproacl! thnt c1~ bo tried ·wi+~li any hope or success is thu cduc&.ti ve ~no. If there is not already in 

·these countries e. crypt oxpcrt capnblc of nppr.uc'lating .the argument 

from first principles then thoy must bogin by sonding a·· m~n for a 

training oourso which should bu based ~n the published 11~er~ture. 

v 

- CONCLUSION 

Strange though it mo.y soom, tha security of a government's 

hers is a most unrel ia.blc inclex of the skill ·pf' that governmci!}t t I 

ptanalysts. If a. nation uses ba.c!_.~.~l~Slrs the •rea.sC'n ma_y be that they 

ow no better, but it is U!Y~ likely to be that their policy" 

\kers fo.il to make use of the advice qf. thtdr own .. technicians (•.:.rhich 

some co.sos mD.¥ be enough to ta •• IJ th ... m most, i!' n\>t a.J.l, of the w~'-Y 

rea.l security} or else th11t they simr~ly lack rosources-matorial, 

-.....-----"'""""1dUstrial or fina.ncia.J.-·to oflz"ry out Whllit they know to be 110CCSSB.ry • 

If I I come r arwnrd n0\11', ins is'M.ng on i' critical exo.mino. ti.on 

?.7 <-

of the situation (bo.sed on a rea.11.stic o.ckm)'.·'lC:ldgement of cortnin facts 

about cryptography th~t-~_Q_Jl.1:r~_a,Cly ... p.rt;;1lli_ ¥ell l;ig_ovm) Md off\~ring help 

:from their own expeWoncc= ana material resources,- they cnn guide thrdr 

nll ins into use of cryptosystems that .•nll stnnd up against the moat 

ad VllnCl3d teom { ques kri0-1m . "tol 1-·rura-m·""dbing.,..so-·Med-,.··· .. : ·.-·:·.:-,···· ·:·'."~' 1-·. ·. l 

F-71J.C13S TOP SECRET C2\:NOE 
E:O 3.3(h)(2) 

Pt86-36/50 USC 36~ 12 

:OOC/W+1 

I 

: l·-· ' ;,~ not dh~close these techniquqs. If hmvever they continue to turn --·-

a blind. eye to the progress iJJ: __ c:ryptanli:~y~_!~ __ I!'~9:~ _aJ]._ov.e:r -~~9_pe ,_---

since /1939,_and to refuse to talk about subjects that are in fa.ct' far 

· Iess i'sccrct than \they would like. them to be, then they must expect 

to see European powers turn els.ewhere fqr advice and a;:;sista.nce, and 

so to lose the opportunity to influence development in the right direction • 

........ ----------. Subsecpently they \.may find that a situation has developed: "\vhich they 

arc unable to correct ,,.J thout mnking really damaging disclpsures of' 

advanced cryp·ta.nalysis in discussion, not onl': with officers of iJ.lied 

Governments but als.o with commercial firms in neutral countries uho 

:manufacture equipment f'or s.'.'.lc ·~o all comors. This danger is real, 

and if I I wish to avoid such a situation they have i:io time 

. to lose. 

40. Finally, I !\must not expect the advice to be all 

one way, at least if' the discussions are extended to .....,.~~~~....,...~...,..,.~~~---

""""':i_ r ___ __, tions. They may well find that although their o\vn cyphers are f'or the 

most part sound, yet nevertheless they are giving away in pe.,~cetime 

,F_,. 7 ... Cl3S 

secret information, not obtainable by any other means, through ~9~_s_~i.Y~--

use of plain lan ua d o~-~2~P..ltfi?ation of si~_ ~oc~~~Z:.~·, 

ore1gn omint org. nisations who have l...._ ______ ==----------' 

may be able 'co help matorially in asRessin.'.< the extent of leakage 

arising in i this v:ay. 

TOP SECRET CANOE 

7? 

r I 
\ 

~· . ·. '• ;1 . ~· .• 

·---·--· .. -.. --.·---RE-F ____ ID : AS·l;-;7::;-:8:;:;::;::0-::-1---------.... ····-·· ··-·· ---

·TC? °P SECRET Ct' NOE 

; : 

llGC/3lt41 

0 3.3(h)(2) Appondix 'A' 

86-36/50 USC 3605 ------·-·-· 

.! 

• 

1. . The I •• koJ.~qWAtllP.\t1.do-that_ no NllTO doc1;11n~nta r;,7 accounts 

oi' H :.TO meetings mr.\y bb • l?ll:~\~1ecl. ~-n. no..t~hmal cyphers ~irly strictly;;' Only 

ono instnnce is knpwn 1;q (;.f)e .. contrary-..····... Over the In.st tV10 yoara they h::l.ve 

bucome :1,ncrenai11$1Y cal'•<'f~.:J. \in the\cohte:nt of tole __ :ro.ma :t>::-..r,H:;ed in th~ir 

highly VUlnerable mec1iU1n iirhdc .. Qyi~hers ,. allthough their concern is to 

,u:·otect s.i:1ecifioa.l~yr • • ·• j~eo~'·i;, r~l;hortl:i-'ln Allied seci:ta. In 

s,.>ite of this trend tovmt''tS\ \n11 :mq>X'Qverarm;J1d\~Ve:r:Jcosoe still occur · 

fair fre uent of eri US\ c;:()n1promises of J..11.i.cd thought :md intention 

in \uomti:tiines in\ the i1teclium grade cyp~ers. 

· E s are a re~o o ~ch,1953. th.u had ·)roinised a.n 

lU1D.Oured division for the lU(lcUe .East and reports 

ot January and Fcbrub. 1 v ewe on the European 

Dotonce Comnunit eiile\ last two in · 

r.1edium gro.ae cyplier • • PA.r f'ro111 ques ... ons ooncen1ingf I o.llies, 

the value of -f;he infonnn.t .. io~ cont111.ne<.l\ fn\thc t.elegra111a onr--1 policy 

~ on areas where thel •. • •. ) Jo.1·0\ ln a. \.fnvo\.U'nble position ~ain 

info:nnation are clcarJ.Y of' £~renter \value to<unfriondly iJow'ers than to I t o.ll.ies, The t,1'}no:i'o.l o.s:scss.iacnt \ .. o ____________ .... 

must therefore be that they pt ill present r.t serious\ danger. 

ma: o r o ues orts. e sen long reports\ fr.;r:..;o~---.. 

t on discuss;i.ons wi'tl'>..-~ 'I~\PE, s QJ'l e -~~-~~ ····--

intere.ats, but with a gr.eat•. d.enl of c6mpromJ.sing aeta~r.- {For anr.:. =--=e=r.~I"':"" 

aec:I • • •. I' . 'fhc cypher ·us.~a· for-'tl1ese\re orts is 

:._.>artiou_larly vulnero.ble when .the telegrnma are long. The 

ere eq40-lly revenling. (Seo for g v 

pl.Bns ~or the de'1elo.pi;:n~ of :he ·.. and o.irf'ields up to 

and including 1955). L ~ ·· _Jt<:Jlcgrnns on t give 

s.way leas dcsta.il than the cor1'Copondi telegrams, 

but con be most unfortunate.··· ·· ... •· .. (Sc:: for cxan1.t>J.0 . showing 

that General Ridgewoy 1 s report. in October to the 1~tlantio Council was 

passod by this means.) The I a - I h..'1.VO shown some improvement over the 

past two years in tht:ir use ofl I 

subjects, but still mnke occaniona.1 ·revealing statements. (See for 

oxOllli:le the s~cstl.on iii ~:hn.t c·f' tho western countrie_s I ·jwere most inclined to be impressed by the\ recent 

RUba QJi oneng-Oi t'notion),. 'l'he oyphen=: of nll these four c.ount1·ios 

are vulnerable, and it must be pmrni.blt: for the RussiMs from\thcir telcgrruns -to arrive at o. clear n.l.Jprocio.tion of Ni.TO plnns and volicies in 

EuroJ:>&, and of the relntiunuhips of thr=· llllics to c::ich other, 

3. I lcyi_.>h(!]:r. '.lrc nlao vuJncrablu but ·are used .withg:-ea'E~e""'r,,....,,,re=""t.,..i"""ce""· n,.,.c""o,...·--r""'nc""'"--w""•_.,,._.1rst example of a compromise is J:.lrobo.bly a 

" 

.. ~-

I 711-CUS 1 .... 51 TOP SECRET CANOE :; . ,,;,. 

'1,' . 

. ·: .. ...... : 

.. ).:~~ : . 

. . ·,. 
~~D ;)\SJ;_ 7~Qa T~iP SECRl!I 1 U 1

• l!'ij. E 

- 2 - . 

DG0/3li41 

"t=o 3.3(h)(2) 

CONTENT OF ~'RMED FORCES COllfMUNIO .. '.l':!QJ.IL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

4. T~ work bei don{: on. ~d forces cy.1.Jhers of .N..:l.TO countries 

by the is restJ:'icted alr1ost entirely tcf \ 

u.1chin.J sy~ er.is l.Il Both [.re vulnerable. • K'l1owrnuge 01 enc 

cuntent of,1 the oossages would be of the vc..,:y greatest va.lue\ t· .. ctically to 

the Viet Minh forces and. thoy would also yield consid.erable \longer-tcrr.i 

intelligence. 'l'.he two sy~ter.1s a::e used f'.or, among Qtber things, do.ily 

situatio~ reports, announct. . .ent o A I plans ,/s ta.tements on allied co .. 

operation with thej 7 I activities. 

m 

DEVELOPMENTS Ill WlJi 

5. The 0.bove ;_Jo.ragra.phs ttr"=' concerned with what is being given 

away /by insecure c .. ·YJ?hers of' nllied :i_.;owers. /in ~rese. nt con4. it ions. \\·· .. The vo.l~ of' similr..r information to nn encr,1 in wartime would of course be much 

gre~ter. The continued use by th.e f insecure ciPhera 

in ~ctive operQtions ·.vould, fore -.aT.1p c/, c a ve y greo: dn.nger not only 

to th~ lthemse;;:lves but to t,,cir o.llies. Si.;.:.ila.r ccnsidcr::i.tiqns o.pply 

to ci:ll otherte / ~in use by '.lllios. \ .. That 

in.n::i.rtir.1e t cy.,for security 01' cnr.:: o.lly L•Uste; t'hc concern of 8..ll 

u:&..:.-erged quite clenrly in the 1939 .. 45 w.'!.r. whj·cc w0 dcri'-O;:d· u ,great .d.t:o.l ,. 

of intelligence on thel I · 

cyphers of all types. 

TOP SECRET CAN·OE 
I· 

REF ID:A517801 

TQ,~ SECRET Ct NOE 

J=O 3.3(h)(2) 

f;'t86:-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/34Zi.1 

Appendix 1.l' 

.Annexure 1 

arfl enerall ex 11.oltable • the 

consist·•. ot "badly-used----------------------------' .__ ___ ........___.I There is l"ittle reference to NATO matters~ the following 

example'1$ a:re\ typica:L of informi.':·ti.on whi.ch does not represent a vital 

leakage~ but \which must he ur.mful. to the Hussians:-

"Cockroft in ·~o meet sou i.n B1i1r.;sels in order to discuss the 

exchange of..._ ____ ___,......-----..------------...-------- technicianr-". gave me <>ral assurance of the fine functioning 

of' 

('LJ) Details of arms shipmen~s from .America:-

(Q) Off-shore purchascs:-

1 

. 2. The aitu.ation would bu atill more unfnvoura.ble\in timo of 

· ·, nr~:l.nlje Buch r•jt• on arum dolivorica in the prooentl I . :·:_i,~~-~~;::~:!'119~nta. vtould give away d.ctnils of 1~tlantic shipping 

,.,,. -·~ . . : 

· .. ·+ r.: ·· ... ; 

· .. 

TOP SECRET CANOE 

·.·J·=·.· . ..... ··1 ... 

,·,. 

. ... 

. ~ .. · 

'-.. 
REF ID:A517801 

T0'1 SECRET Ci' NOE 

DGC/J!ih.! 

EO 3.3(h)(2) Appendix 'A' 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 1.nnexur~ 2 

. ~· 

I 

~ ... . ·.:~ 

,j·· 

•.. . ~ 

; .. ~"J' ,,.:. ·.~ ~., ... , 

::?&:t. ip,·r: ''!. • 

·~ 'h"l'-------------------------------1 I ,)~:! ~ : ~i .. 

. ·:\1··. . . ·'-"ilmi · ~-.,; · ;~.·· '·' ·. · ·. °?.~~·f 1 ..• · I .· • ..•.• 

. 'j'• 

• 

~ti;,.,. TOP SEGRET CANOE . ·.• .. · 

, .. . ~·. ··.' : : .. . .:"": 

.. 

r 

.·,· 
REF ID:A517801 

TO~ SECRET C~OE · 

IEO 3.3(h)(2) DGC/J~1 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Appendix • .A." 1 

Annexure 2 

5. Defence questions. The follo·wini::;I .... __ .... ltcleEl~~-ms wco.•lld 

be of value to Russin. 

• 

- • 

NSA ,_ 781-CUS 1 .1111 51 TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 

TO~ SECRET C~OE 

-3-

EO 3:3(h){?) DGC/3441 

PL 8.6-36/50USG3605 

%n addition · th Jro is a consider·able qus.nti ty of telegrnus on the · 

Europe.."Ul Defonce Community negotintions nnd on the Middle Ef!2,t Defence 

Orgnnisa tion. The intelligence contnined in them is not •Jf vi tnl 

· sign:tf'icnnce to Russin, but it oertninly "?:rovides useful bn.okp,round 

in:f'orrna tion1 · Some exaoplcs nre :-

NSA rw. 781-CUS 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 

. 
TOD SE0R~i©s~OE 

-4-

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL>.86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/~ 

An;)endix 'A' "" .. 

1-..rμlexure 2 

G. FD.r :Er-st: . Th~ follo·;nna telegr~r.is rrould be of w.lue 

to the Russians nnd th~irl lnllies:- . . 

_____ I TOP SECRET CANOE 

• 
--~~1\TOE 

~03:3(h)(2) 

PL 86~36150 USC 3605 

(b) 

DGC/3441 

J .. ppcndix . 'A' 

Anncxure 2 

r;. hc.o to be recognised th.."l. t th.el I ar.c less . sq:riipulous ·when rcportin13 oo~cnts by represeμtn.tives 

of otht:r countries, e~~n though nllied. · See for e~aple: .. _ : '· 

comment ( p.."l.ro 4( i) ?.bovc) in :f!"':'[)HF 

1 

" (pn.ra 4(c) II ) 

" (pnra 6(d) " ) • 

" (pnro. 6(e) II ) 

" (po.ro. 4(h) " ) 

" (paro. 3(b) " ) 

(c) ······1L--___________ __________..,::-::::::========;-' 

(r) It must be remembered that the nnpunt o~ : I 

tb.'l t lms been rend during the per:\od undez z e 1.ew Vfis not 

been ver~ e~cnt. It is n 1a"l.tter ~f speculntion wliither 

tbosel I wi'l.~ch ·vr'e h'1.ve not been able t9:. 

exploJ.-t 1nve in f'aot provided other ~nstnnces of inseqμri ty, 

nncl w:\'l..ethcr the Russio.ns nv.1.y h~ve been nble to cx,loit.\ 

then. 

9.. . Conclusion. 

. . Fror.i tlac t-.bovc n.mlysis, · o~ published! ltoxts\it 

c.; icrgcs thrit the n."?lount of' vi tnl infon!laticn Given tnle.y ~t1¥! ... -----. ·:~') ·:;he RuOiil[n~·~_i-~;._ sr:mll, .but Ui..~:ta. oonsidern.61e quc.ntity of usci'Ul &~ck.ri:r1?W1d j_nfo:rn"'l.tion is p..'1.ssed :i.nsccurcly. 

I TOP SECRET CANOE ....__~~~~~~~ 

• 

" 

II 

II 

" 

II 
/l;O 3.3(h)(2) 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/J441 

. . d. . •.ilf.' Appen ix ~ 

J.nncxure 3 

!MON DIPLOl'vL\'.rIC SYS'f~·· 

1. . i~s used by ·~h cnn provide: the 

~!·1cm1.Y •:.1. th a very complete pict:1..:·.:;: or ~he military situntion, both 

f~1.c;ticn.l ond strategic. l'hc following are but a fe'.'' typic:~ 1 extunpleu 

1of.' the kind of intelligence involved, the majority dated September 195i~ 

/to March 1953:- . 

1 (a) i. daily sitrcp giv•.:~; n. 1l::tail.~d pii.;ture both of the effect 

.... . • :.' .. ~::; .. : ;~. ~ . . . 

ofl lvtew of • 

enemy dispositions, strength etc. 

111 .. ccord.ing to documents contained in the brief case 

belonging to the 

(b) ! !and kno'illedgc of enemy plans, often sont in 

ample time for the enemy to act upon the informn.tion. 

"··· to bring up to/strength the radio teams of Tonkin 

which could be para,dropped, and to• place tvro of them in. 

Cochin China. These elements will have to be ready for 

nAA in nneratjonj/beqinnjnq on ls} November 1952. 11 

I - -

(cJ Inf'ormntion/ concerning French ;.llics • 

~~~.</:·>: .. ·- .. 

..___ _ _____.tTOP SECRET CANOE . , .. .. •., . 

. ~- · .. . .· •' 

.... 

J· ·.· 
- z. - DGC/3441 

lS9~:3(h)(2) 

~I..: 86..:36/50 USC 3605 

;.ppendix 1 A' 

. .:": • .nnexure 3 

(d) Strategic supplies. 

(e) Tactic~l planning. 

-1 ---------------------

2. In addi"Gion,. ther.:; is much evidence or the results of.I._ __ __. Sigint vrhich must be of v~~lue to the enemy £'.lld also detrimenttl to any 

1,llied co-operation •:;ithl I in the Sigint field. For exe.mple :-

_3, appear to be usedfairly indiscriminately 

L1 and in some ck.ses re.Jorts in the. so.me s...:ries arc:J p~-ssed 

e>:i a~w. so.me inks using ei"i:;her mn.chine. 'rhe type of inform,-.tiqn given 

,_._-.:8.y by ·che two systems is thus ver-:,r similr.r. In\ the s.'.".:.mplc e~nrnined 

::'.;_:(~ c:::::::::Jappeers to p-'lss fewer messages of a hig:hcr lcv...:l nature than 

.., .. cCIJ 

'fhc; follo·:;ing · nrc c;ome typicr:.l extr1:.::ts fr0m.D decrypts:-

(a) .L cryptane.lytic Stntu~ !{;::port:-

.____ _ ____.!TOP SECRET CANOE: • 
!EO 3:·3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 lJSG3605 

1 

(b) rrn.ctic11l sitreps :-

"Friendly losses were 3 killed. r.nd. 6 v1ounded"~ 

(c)IL...--------------1 

(d) Report on strategic informa.tion not to ·be released to the\ 

press:-

( e) Knowledge of enemy order of l)attle: -

(f) Training programme:-

C. Miscellaneous 

6, '.I.'he following types of traffic h:.wc been seen:-

___ ____.I TOP SECRET CANOE 

-

===== 

- • 
\ 

I 

I 

EG ~.:3(h)(2) 

PL 86--'36/50 USC 3605 

-4-

DGC/3441 

/Appendix 11 1 

.t~nexure 3 

7. The only other traffic seen here, which appears to be an 

in·telligence producer, is the joint att.:-1che syste~ ~ ;passing economic 

type information, for example:-

·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. 

· . 

. ·. ·. ·. ·. · .. · .. · .. · .. · .. 

NSA Far• 7B1-C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 

- • 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 

===-= 

.. 
DCC/3&..4-1 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Appendix •A• 

Annexure l1. 

NSA Far .. 711-C1 35 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 

ion. 

ith 

2 

I, 

ble. ' 

on 

.·. 
\. 

\ . 

NSA for• 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 8~-36/50 USC 3605· 

(c) 

{e) 

- 2 -

1'iOE 

,DGc/34'4-1 

Apperldix '.l' 

. \ 

. TOP SECRET . Ci\N()E 
' 

NSA Foo• 781-CUS 1 Jul 51 

DGC/34 M 

EO 3.3(h)(2) Appcndi:;{ 'A' 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Ji.nncxurc 5 

TOP SECRET CANOE .. 

. ,._ 

~·. 

__ _..; 

. . .. . 
- 2 -

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605- · 

'\ ( d) Orders and. shipments. 

I 

•. 

• 

DGG/3441 

Appendix 'A' 

Anriexure 5 

t '-:,' 

•. ' t 

.. 

NSA Form 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CAN0E~ l 

• 

/ 

I 

I 

... _ .... 
TO.:? SECWFf-PB~OE · .. ·~ \ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) · !.ppcndix •A' 

PL 86::-36/50 USC 3605 .i.nncxure 6 

4. Some other ex:lJnpks :-

.. ·.·''. 

~AF- 781-CUS 1 Jul 51 - r ' 

TOP SECRET CANOE 

~·. 

··,,. 

·.' .. 

'. 

j . 

·~ 

.. ;~~,~: 

'~. l 

. ·· .. 
~03.3(h)(2) 

RL86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 2 -

(b) .Lirfield construction. 

j, 

' .' 

(c.) · Supply of armaments. 

l 

(.d) Infrastructure. 

(e) 

• 

DGC/34/+.1 

"~ppendix 'A• 

Jumexure 6 

I. 

/ 

\ 

.· l 
DGC/3lt41 

Appendix 'A' 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Annexure 7 

TURKEY 

.__ .. --·-·-· . 

' NSAForm781-CUS.1Jul51 TOP SECRET CJ.As:NOE ..... 

.. ;, 

' 

:·~ 

·'.:' 

···. 

: ::: ~: ... · ·, 

' .. 

h 

.··· 
pO 3.3(h)(2) 

fi?L86-36/50 USC 3605 

(b) Present· strength 

( o) Produc;tion. 

(d)\ Stockpiling 

- 2 -

DGC/344.1 

.Appendix . 'A 1 

/.Jlllexure 7 

·\!..____ ____ _______. 

(e) Cornmunicn.tions 

\ 

I 

(r)\' u. ~. - Spnnish negotintions i 

NSA Form 781-<135 1 Jul 51 TOP SECRET CANOE~ · 

• • ...... -,. ·• ¢ti"• 'M'ritt'trdbtr 'td 1 mm 1 

•• • 

' 
T021 S_EQREFfil-?1£@1'-~ OE 

~o 3.3(h)(2) 

· Pt86-36/50 USC 3605 '·'"'-

'·. 

I 1\\\\\\ 

{b) _N.ATO exercise 

( c) . Intelligen.cei 

-3 

DGC/3441 

Appendix". •A• 

/~neJ1Ure 7. 

NSA .form 781-CUS 1 Jul 51 TOP SECR.ET CAN<>E . -

• 
-... ~ .. 

.. .. TOT) SECR~6-~ 

• 

DGC/3441 

Appendix 'B' 

EXAMPLES OF CCMPUCNISE OF CO-BELLIGERENTS BY 

.. CYPHER C<lrfMUNICATIONS IN Wffir.o WAR II 

A. Italians'oanp:ranise Genna.ns 

..... .,_ 

..... ~ ...... 

1. In. the Italian "Legations in the Balkan capitals •••• 

their Military Attaohes talked so freely to Rema of Germo.n military 

mOY"ements that the Gennans eventually held v.p their tolegr!ll'ns" • 

. (G,0, & O~S. Diplorp...'Lth: . ..ind Cumnorcial Sigint, Vol. I, p.20) 

2.· . As regards Specia.l Intelligence conce~ing the Gennan 

Army in ~hEi Mediterranean area in 1941, "the Italian partner was 

doing muoh'to fill the gap Wltil the end of 1941, when he introduced 

notable im_erovementa ~-n oypller r-ecuri ty", . · {G;.C~ ~ C.S. ,U'my and air Force Sigint, Vol.I, P• 226) 

3~ . Italian "main-line cyphcrr ••• yieldud a.11 through 1941 

a flow of information which threw light not only on Italian 

dispositions nnd intentions but on those of tho Germans as woll wOO 

.iLn example was a signa.1 in 'Tollero.' [cypher] giving the fuil 

tank strongth returns of the two Gcrmnn armoured divisions in 

the Western desert, at a time whon no inl'onno.tion of the sort was 

available t'ran 11ny other sourc1.;". " : . 

(G.C. &. C.S. Anny o.nd l1.ir F'oroo Sigint, Vol. IX, p. 115) · 

4. 111 Z3' , the cypher usod by tho Ccntauro Battle Group in 

Tunisia, for instance, gave on three occasions the ca:i_J>lete 

German-Italian ordor O.L. bn.ttlo for a whole sector". llbid., p. 116) 

5. "Falco", an ltalio.n Air Force "supplementary high-grade 

systom ••• besides giving a good picture of Italian-German ~ir 

Faroe liaison in tho u1.1gc m, c.'.l.rried n good deal of truffio of 

operational importance and provided ndvnnco notice of intonded 

. Gennnn 'reoormaissa.nces in i~si::i Minor, Cyprus and Egypt". 

(Ibid., pp. 231-232) .... -~·-

/ -~ Reoiprooal Oompranise of Germans and Ita!ians 

~ . 

' . 

6. . Throughout tho Wcsturn DF1sort 4nd :forth i~frican campaigns, 

RQJIIlel was deprived of sup~~~cs and the Italians lost most of their 

moro}ijmt-fleot largely as a result of J.llied reading of G1Jnnan anny, 

air force and (fran·1~ugust 1942) Mediterranean Enigma traffic and of 

Italian ~gelin ( fran July 1941 ) and low-grade traffic. So full , 

,, · and. deta.ilqd was thv infonno.tion o:>nccrn.ing .. '>hipping, routos an~ 

cargoes that tho JLllies wore able t;o co ncel'ltro.to their attnck · 

·:; 

. proportionately to tho Axis need of individual canmoditics~ 

(For sto.tistic·s ~-md details s•::c G.C. &: C.S. Naval Sigint, 

Vol. 'IV, pp. 158-163. S also G.C. & C.S. Naval~ 

' ~ . History, Vol. XX o.nd G.C. & C.S. idr and Military, 

'ilistory, Vol. IV.) 

·, ,r, 

;I,;.'·· 

' ~ . ' ~ ' 

'• 

1' ;.._.l .•, • 

TOP SECRET CANOE~ 

; : ' ··.~· .• . . ~ .,• . . ,. 

,;• 

··.· .;·, 

,':·.· 
•.· .· -, -: ~ 

I 

~.,. ... , .. .. ..:. ·=-.:..::;-"-. ---~- ·._ - I -- DGC 34h1 ---:--

ndix. 'B' 

C. Japanese canpranise Germans 

7. Japanese Naval Attaohe CyPher 

Admiral Abe, the extremely efficient Head of the Japanese 

Mission to Berlin, signalled hane all the infonnati~ .. and, 

considering Gern1:0-n caution vis-e.-vis their ally, it wa.s an 

astonishing amount - that he managed to oxtro.ot fran German 

authorities in a machine cypher, known to the Allies as JNA. 20. 

(G.C. & C.S. Naval Sigint, Vol. II, P• 164) 

'"Wo are all most impressed', wrote Dr. R.V. Jones, 

A.D.I. (Science), Air Ministry, 'by the technical statements, which 

contain a wealth and accuracy off etnil regarding German Radar 

surpassing any other Intelligenc source during this war. Jtoreover, they give us a very good i ight into German po~icy of a 

much more direct nature than we . ve hitherto atta.inod by oiher 

methods•.· The Admiral went on t contribute first:-olass~ and 

often det~iled, infonnation on i umerable subjects ot air ~n 

military interest, as well as na 1, including the Gennnn antiinvasion preparations and intent ons in Northern Franoe". 

(G.C. & c.s. Naval Sig nt, Vol. J:V, p. 206. A list 

fol.lows of ten naval ciontific inventions (weapons 

and processes), a des ri~tion of which was first re~ 

ceivcd from this sour e.) 

8. Ja anese Militar i1.ttaohe 

. "In February 1944, the Epanose Military Atte.ohe in Vichy 

sent a report to Tokyo, based up n statements by General. von ~unstedt's Chief of Staff, outli ·ng German defensive strategy 

against the invasion". · · I 

(G.C. &: c.s. Naval History, Vol. XIX, p. 147. -Details follow) 

9. For information on the development of German .jet :ati.roraft 

fran both naval and military attaohe cyphers, see G.c. & C .• :S. lt.ir 

and Milita.ry History Vol XI pp. 19 37, 54-56. 

D. Free lfrench ccmpraniao the Ji.lliea 

10. . "1' captured enemy crJPto.nalyst who had worked at 'N • .t1. • .A. St~4 

· fran 1941 until 1945 gave an aooount or the [Fighting Frengh J sy~tems 

which had been in use in Syria and 1Vest Africa. durina the !eriod · ••• 

Ho said tho.tin Syria tw0 systems had been omployed ••• B th,l:lBd been 

read in their entirety, and had. given a full pict\ire of th. s~:c-ength 

lind organisation of the do Gaullist foroes and political ~inistration 

in the country, o.s well as useful details of British troop, movements -

the latter t:lspecially vuluo.ble sinct; the British cyphers cpuld not 

normally be read. Tho Wost African cyphers•••• were more difficult 

than the Syrian systems, but were usually soluble at leu.st, in po.rt". 

(G.C. & c.s. ~ o.nd Air Faroe Sigint, Vol. Ja.,; .p. 32) 

NSA Form 781-(1 35 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET· CANOE 

• 
NSA For111 781-<1 lS 1 Jul 52 

T~ S~B.1I1€~aNOE ·----

- .3 -

11. "After the North ..:~frioan landings serious ttempts woro 

made to persuade th~ Fighting French to adopt syst of British 

or American devising for high level communioa.tions. Thosv nt~empts 

perhaps naturally, were not specially successful nt first. ThJ · 

proffered systems were acoe'T)ted, :ind omplo;y..;d to san extant, 

but the use of private cyphers - often v0ry insccur ones -

continued, particularly for messages which it wa.s desired tho 

Allies should not see, and which, \"f courso, were for that 

very reason of most value to the enemy. By 19441 · howevel", 

an all-round imprpvement • • • ha.d ta.ken pla~e". \Ibid. , p. 33) 

• 

i/ 

TOP SECRET 6ANOE · 

• 

I 

i 

! 
d . 'Cl ~'..ppen 1x 

--

EJ ... .'.HFJ.J'.:S 'l' .. :J<EH FHOH TllE LI.'J'l.:R '.TURE OF CRYFI' !.NJJ.YSIS 

.'MD c~~JFl'OGR .'J:'lfi SJX.)i<''ING BL.SIC PRINCIFLE:s 'ii'HICll ,·n 

OBVIOUSLY COl-OnQNPL .CES TO .:J~ MOil]:RN TEC.IDUCL:.N 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

i. I has :r~~ently had an opportunity to <?xarnine a c~py or 

''Pr~cis de Cryptographie Moderne" by Charles Eyrauci:· (Paris Editions 

Raoul Tari, 10 Rue de Buci, Paris vre 1953 ). Thit work is not f~ 

sale to the general public, but at the same time it carries no mark of., 

security grading. The preface e-.cknowledges help received by the author 

fro1:i Col. Black; the latter ho••cver has stated that he has had the book 

carefully "purged" of anything that might be prejudical to the '-:ork of 

his department. 

2. It follo·.1·s that the ·opinions expressed in this book do not 

necessarily represent the level of technical krwwledge of the best French 

c:.:xpcrts, e.g. it ;·:ould be i'II'Ong to judge French kno:dedge of cl.rum machines 

from the. f'ollo·.-ring curious pP.s::.t.ge relating to the German Enigma (which 

iu badly and innacurately described): 

~ "Thus one secs that the supplemcntc.ry. plugboard is a very imp. or. t. ant ~ '? security fD.ctor. But e·,·i;m ;.,"ithout it we cannot see how the_.d7.l.un 

ni ~..p> , v1~ could be !'.'.-'..~ovi::r·~~. Orie may therefore state that this 

i. L~~E .... 1 .. mach1nel:S"l5fi~a~1y ~n?ecyph(;'l4~~b1e." · ·--- -

: . .3. - When, ho;.-cvcr, pe;rfcctJy c:~~c:-r•· st:...t~ments are 'made about the 

.·· 

·. 

'l 

b~Gic principles of cryptography ~ne nay assume that these arc regarded 

c:~:.; commonplaces. 

4. The follo·:.:ing extracts gi vc examples of such statements, many of 

::hich are highly relevant to prc:s<;nt French practices. It is note-.-rorthy 

that many of these ci:-ntc.in r~uotations f'rom older. -;mrks. 

(On Cypher :W:achineG in general) 

(i) ''There is no doubt that length (of key s~~eam) on t~ one 

hand, and a large numb~r of alphabets on the other, ·tuid 

f'in~lly the complexity of cyclic mechanisms, (includ;ing 

·factors of irr0gulari ty ·ilhich mak~ reconstruction more 

difficult) are principal.elements for appreciation or the 

cryptographic value of a machine. But they are n')t the 

only ones; one -.;ould be very wrong to believe that they· 

constitui;:J a forinal and absolutt: indication • 

."Jly machine has to be used properly. It must also be adapted 

to its use. ".3ome excellent razors a.re most dangerous in 

the hr..nds of e ~onkey" (says Givierge) "and some=aei1cate 

revolution counters ~·.rculd work badly on the '~'h.<Jel of a 

turf-barre· .. '." 

,Jv,,.·:";.T0P SECRET CANOE ·. ~ . ' ,,:,. 

.. ~· . 

... 

\•.,•. 

. ... ...... 

.. , 

.·,· 
.. 

NSA Form 781-<:135 1 Jul 52 

(ii) 

.. - ~:.JI 

- 2 -

000/3441 

1.ppondix 1 (J 

11'fhu cboieo qf' n.~ruoa. koy~ 11 ncnord ing to Gcnoro.1 So.coo 

11munt not ho l \Jf'I; ~;o tho i.ni·hi11tivo of cyphur opr.ll'fl.tora bi.it 

tmwt b•J mr1dn in n ocnl.rn.1 nff-.1.(_•,,". Often in fa.ct, if. a. 

ohn.ngn of tho CJUtnc· ·koy d.oof.1- not a.ffoct tho sot up of tho 

mn.chino 01• t.ho l<i:Jy norfoa but on:ly tho starting point on tho 

lllttor uno mny hnvo r•o-urrn of n. "portioo or the key ac:rien 

nlruru1y 1wml f'or 1:oriothnr mo1w11,a:o tlnd in conBoquenco long 

ropnnta '"hlch rnvl:n1 l;hn coinc-l.dcnr.o and help the cryptnno.lyoia." 

Pnrt II Pnrn 115 

Jn 1q11m1111Jnμ, 11 m11nl1inn, nric-:riun·t nhould bfJ tn.kan of the fo.ct 

thrit it11 Jn;rm11nnnl; olir1r11r.t"rl.rr~icn crmnot rumri.in ~ecrct, nnd 

ril110 of 111 l po11:dhln iv:oi.rlcrntn. 

IBID 

(On !;ho T-)? Mnnhlnn) 

'(iii) ''Wo hnvo IH'!'J1 Lhnt l'or ori- U.nn l;t;] ctypo cy~)hora 120 single 

"'- lrny11 nhtn tnnrl h.Y p1~rnn1 tid•i•m of the f'i ve impuls~a a.re lesa 

off1.crn:i1111:1 thnn J> lrn,y11 r>bt:dncd by chll.tlgo of polarity. Thie 

in •:nnllf~h l;r, nhrr, I.tin~ th•.: cz-utfo numbor of ainglo keys. u~cc'l 

i.o •.111 l..v n. l'i r:ll_; i.ndJ•::·1ti.on." 

IAID 

( i'v) Giv1nrf.~C l1:i:1 :.1pnlm11 rif' 11111.nlprnctiev:::l thnt theory cnnnot 

prorli.ct U1nu,u:h tlH!l.r uxln1;lmcu 111 nttcntod by oxperienco" 

1:1.ml 11111ro r1 ,r~c11-l.l.v ::;neon hti.11 nrldcd thn.t "cypher opor;; tors 

do u1111ugli tn hr:lp Lh1: onon~y. 11 

IBID Part ~It Porn 36 

(On wld. i. L 'l vr, ny: 1 tc nm) 

( v) •~r., o crypi;np;r1•n111 with tho 1:'nmu rocyphor key cnn i~ theory bo 

dccrypterl" u •••. • in p,..nhld.co 'it hi t1ooeaenry to .hn vc a. t 

1unnt n third toxt ii. 

1BfD Port III Pnro. 30 

(vi) "ht 11n{ rm.oc, rw r.c11 1_:r11J. ;~nccw nr·yG, aocrot codoH aro only 

neou:rn on e11mHti0n thnt thn,y nrc r10t nnd nov..:r h:::rvo beun 

lWod. w ltho11t l~O~,~'ilt, the lnttcr bc'.lnt: V• :ry frcquuntly 

c.lt11.11p;od. " 

te ID .1?11.rt III Pnrn 30 

TOP SECRET CANOE. 

., 

.ci!. 

,. 

~-
• 

·i::o 3.3(h)(2) 

i?L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DG0/.5441\ 

EO 3:3(h)(~) 

PL 86-36/50 USC3605 

20th Mq, 't19SJ 

. • ··.• .... · IZ 

Oopy No .• hi!••••••• 

' INTRODUOTIOH 

'·, 

••••• 

\ 

·. 

The U.K. views are summarised in the following pare.graph&:- \\ ~ 

. i ---- ---- ·---· 

Jvidenoe available t:ran u.s.-u.K. I ~ii 1uftioient, 

in the V K.· view, to show that the tol.J.owifli require nme al action, .V 

\\ 

The U.K. view is that the probl~m is one tor discussion among oor.ununica.tion security of'f'ioers. and that it is essential for U,;K, and U, S, 

NSA Form 781-C1 JS 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
' 

\ 

I 

. , 

I 

t 

TOP SEGillti>'JAsG•~OE 

E03.:?(h)(2) 

PL 86:.36/SOUSC 3605 

- 2 - t PG(;(3441 

·. · .. ·. ·. ·. · .. ·. ·. ·· .. ··.. ··. ··. 

I ·· ... 

. . ' . 

······················ ... 

NSAForm78H13S 1Jul52 TOP. SECRET CANOE 

' 

\. 
TOP-SECREE'E :'511A.aMOE 

I ·120 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86::-36/50 tJsc 3605 · SCOPE OF THE PROBIEM. 

(a) 

(b) .__I _____ __.t 

- 4. The U.K./U. s. Conference o?-'May 195~ considered and rejected 

''(i) 

. 

(ii) 

F_-711-C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
"'~ .. > 

.EQ 3: 3(h)(?) 

PL86-36/50USG 3605 

considerab e 

( i) •.•• 

(ii) 

- 2 -

reas has been made sinc13 9 

''<t~ .. 

' 6. ~····The conclusion\is that i:'.; is d.::.ri.ger;·us t J. leave the! I 

Forces yphers in their present condition e.nd that they should be included 

in any . •·· ture approach to\ the French; with the right sort of approach 

there sh,ould be no need for disclosure of\" sophisticated techniques". 

7. •••The general question of improvi;i1nent of theJ lof 

the other N.~O powers has nev.er been discussed officia11Y between U.It 

and u. a. 

(i) u. s. view ·on this \subject in 1951 was\.however indioa.ted by 

following statenient made by an ad hoc conunittee of U.S.C.I.B. 

I 

... 

\ 

(ii) It was ult:Unately agreed that. the U, S, Government should make 1------· -----. 

(ii)Report of U.S.C,I,B. ud hoc Oommittee onj,__~~~~~~~~~----' Security, September, 1951. 

Form 781·C13S 

TOP SECRET CANOE 

-

Ill 

--

,1,,, 

... 

'.:\j 
· .... 

' 

- 3 -

DGC/~1 

(iii) 

8. The U.K. view is, "shock tactics" of this kind arc unlikely 

to be effective especially 'when they aro acccmpanied by a "cover story" 

which is unlikely to be balieved; the onl,Y. way to achieve improvement 

in security ha.bits is by educativ~ action and by influence of the 

"public opinion" (if such a tenn may_ properly be used of a very 

secret subject) of other powers' Cansec officers. 

9. But the dictum of the u.s.c.I.B. ad hoc Canmittee referred 

to 'in para. 7 above has in the U.K. view a.nether serious weakness in that 

it is based. on the asstunption that it is possible in matters of cypher 

security to "have it both.wa.ys". This assurn"'>tion has appeared at 

various times in discussion in -~ ... o dil'ferent forms: . 

(i) that it is possible to devise cyphers that are just good 

enough to defeat the Russians but contain weaknesses 

that can be exploited by U.K./U.S.; we cannot know 

anything of the :...:vel "'f canpetence of u.s.s.R. 

cryptanalysts. 

(ii) that it is sufficient to limit improvement of security 

to specified cryptochannela or to telegrams on specified 

subjects. This will not do; it is not possible to· 

forecast in advance which cryptochannels are going to carry 

important messages and it is not enough to insist on use ·E,0 3.~(h){2} 

p:~ 8?-36/5QUSC 3605 ~ft~~~m~~~e~=~~n~:::;~t;~:=~t t;e, s:::;ity :;-;;O I 

fringe traffic or national cc:mnent on NATO discussions 

which may legitimately be s~nt in national cyphers. 

·.~·· 

( d) Armed Force Cyphers of thu other NATO Powers 

I 

10· ...•.. Little is knoorJl, t: Sig:r souroes, of the annod faroes o;yphers of any European power excep and if as seems probable they are no 

better than the diplanatio o ers ey would be 1 in varying degrees, 

· dangerous to the security of any forces operating with them in war. 

( e) CJt>l'ler machine development in Europe 

11. It is known that new cypher machines are being developed by 

several NATO governments 3.nd by commercial firms operating in neutral 

oolintries. 

(i) The I I have design<Jd cypher ma.chinos which thoy 

interid to use for their armed forces; these machines 

embody sane finrly advanced techniques but from infonnation 

at present available appear to be most insccure.(1) 

( 1) See me~orandum from Italian Military Mission in Y.'ashington 

to Secretariat ot the Stn.ndina Grour, No. 0927/SRP 

,,,.,.-- ~.53, -~ 

~OP SECRET CANOE 

. ~-·~ 

.. , 
·.-:;. 

,···.: .:-

.. .,_ 

. 'f .. . : : ~ 

~ l,, ·. 

•.' 

~ .. ·-

i':· 

ri~f~ .· ._ '.t~ 

._·,;~i .... ~ 

i) .. 'r .. 71loC13S 

'if: 

~-r-114-\~ 7801 TOPrS ttro; 1 CAIY-OE 

(ii) 

l~Q 3,3(b)(2) 

PL.86c:36/50USC 3605 .. 4_ 

roe;~, 

(iii) Thel I in conjunction with 

a Swiss finn, is producing a wiuc range of new cypher 

mo.chines which will undoubteclly be much better tho.n the 

some firm's prc-war\models, but may still be not secure 

ag£>.inst modern cryptanalytic methods. 

12. This list is probably not exhn.u::5tive, .md these dcyelopment3 

ulerU close attention from U.K. and U.S. While it is entirley ~ossible 

tho.t European potf.Jrs mo.y work out the;ir own salvation, with or without 

the aid of conunerci::i). firms it is to be \feared that they nay only arrive 

of current U.K. U.S. thought on cypher machine de-sign. It would be 

therefore better to ap,Jro _ch these Europcc'.n powers before their own 

development ha:c' gone too 'rar, and ~ersuade then to adopt well tried 

U.K./u. s. methods. 

(f) Decisions to be taken o.t the Conference 

(A) Countries to be covered 

" (B) Timing of action with relation to physical security 

14. The 1951 Conference agreed a limited progrrunme for an approach 

expres:.;e emsc ves/sn is ie 1mprovemen 

15 While it is agreed that we ought to adjust our methods to 

tak~ account of differing physical security conQitions in various 

countties it may be said 

I 

' 

(j) that physical leakages will seltlom if ever be so gross 

as to provide a source of intelligence- 8.S rn.i_Jid, complete, 

reliable and (above .all) authentic as that derived from 

a ffi'.).jor brenkc.1..own in corrununic:ition security; conditions 

need to be literally hopeless before one con say that there 

is no point in iiaproving cy2he~ security; 

(i)convers ... ti.on between 1 .... ____________ ___.I Febru':l.ry 1953. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
I . 

,;;:,I 

... .,. ... ,, 

\. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I ! ; ··; 

l ~ ~ ' 

I 

. '. 

iFO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 5 -

DGC,/3441 \ . 

(ii) One should however not dcl-0.y°"l.hitiating\action on cypher 

security pending exp•.Jcted improvernents _in physical 

security, been.use neither can/be put right overnight. 

16. The U.K. recommendation is thoreforo that t.herc\.is no case 

for any further delay in approaching thol fo.nd tho.t physical 

security of other n'l tions might be considered as a valid\ reason for 

taking no action at a.11, or for taking modified action but not for delaying 

action. 

II 

THE APPROACH TO THC I 

\ 

I 

17. Hn.ving settled the scope of action intened tho Conference should 

in the U.K. view consider an appron.ch to the I I Govermunt with o. view to 

first improving their communicat.ions sccuri ty and then inviting \_thorn to 

associate themselves with any s_chemo. thn.t may have beon i:lgrc~d botween 

U.K. and U.S. for approaches to other Nii.TO nations. 

18. It is rocommended that }i single approach be made to\ the I.__ __ _. covering all cyphers of all •services in r1.;:spcct of which tho conference 

has decided that action mus.t be taken • 

19. · Previous projects for appro::i.ch to the II Goverment· on 

the delicate subject of the: security c-,f th...:ir nn~ cyphers \_have been 

based on the assumption /th'lt /this insecurity is due to ignoranc.e 

of the art of cryptography which cannot be removed without exposure of 

"sophisticated" cryptanalytic techniques. Yet after all the bu.sic principles 

of crY:_'.>togra~hy are f.ew, s .. ·imple and well known to all cyphe .. r oxpe· .. 'rts 

including thi_ t and .do not constitute the "secret" upon which 

the success of cryptanalysis dcpunds. Thu "secrets" of cryptanalysis are 

ro.ther these: 

( i) that situations arise in the use of cyphers which would 

instantly be condemned as insecure by n.ny ,one instructed in 

cryptography; · · 

{ii) that other situations ariso which an instructcJ_ person 

would admit to offer at least a. theoretical risk of 

insecurity, but which require "sophisticatedtechniques 11 

to/exploit them, and that these techniques h-1.vc been 

d~vised. · 

20. The only way in which improvement inl I can be 

eventually obtained is by coopuration on the to~·c""'h""n""'i,...c""a"""1..--1.,..e""'·v""'e,.,..,1.,......,betwecn ·-1--1 .__ _______ _.f communication security ufficers. ~. 

21. The object of the first apprs·-:ch th8rof,_•rc w.:ml·f[)c;· t"'7 bring 

abuut a frank exchange of informn.ticin that 1h1.1l.l st:rvc as a bD.sis for 

TOP SECRET C1Ai:NOE 
~i • 

-~· . •... .. , . 

·.:.· 

'; 

. :. 

. :.~ 

·~:. ·· •. , 1.' 

.' ~· 

'i.-.:.,,' 

. ' '. .. · ~. 

-~~ ~, .. ·~.·· 

I . 

REF ID:A517801 

TOPrSECRET CA~E 

6 - 000/3441· 

subsequent discussion among responsible communication security officers. 

One of the points that the Conference n1Ust decide is whether this initial 

axchonge should be m1:1..de: E03.3(h)(2) 

(i) at a tripartite meeting; PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 

(ii) at scpa.rnte bipartite roeetings,~I ~~~~~..-....~~~~~~--' 

(iii) at 11 single biga.rtite meeting where eitheriU. K. or u.s1 I 

22. The tripartite o.rrangement >rould be the best, apart from the 

fa.ct th::-..t it would 'he im ossible to conce:.tl the fact that U.IC. ond 

uncloubtedly be rs.sumed. 

be trip!l.rlite • 

It is therefore recoumended that the r.1eeti:ng 

23. The exchange can bE:: initio.ted/ in two ways only: 

(i) by inviting e.1ch i.>arly/to describe its own communication 

security mcthuds, which would t·hen be discussed on general 

cryptographic grounds by the other two. 

(ii) 

// 

24. The second nppronch is recommended, as being more sure of its 

qffeot. · 

(i) Initially :it loo.st it mny be somewhat Lmbn.rrassing but it 

will M.ve less long te:nn dis.-ulvantnges in that it does 

not commit :mybody t .... disclosure of details of their ovm 

systC:Li.s which they consider irrclevnnt or do not wish to 

mention. 

(ii) 1\J.though this approach implies a tncit admission of 

(i)This is/something more th~ n. polite fiction. We ::-..lrend.y know th:it 

• 

theJ h hnve been monitoring our 1a~oeuvre tr<>.ff'ic and hnvc f'<.mnd that 

they cnn exploit traffic socurity wca.knes:•t::s, such ::ts use oC F/L. 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
i. 

' I 

REF ID:A517BOi 

TO~ SECRET CA~OE 

- 7 

3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

· .. · 

crypton...~lytic success it tlo~s not involve any disclosure 

of. methods. The line t :::iken is "we;; sec..: that you do this 

or thn.t and we consider it on principle to be wrong11 not 

11 10.ok how we CM break your cy1)hers". 

25. . ·After too" three parties have m.'.l.(le one onothor nwo.re of the 

·c1e1~ents of the problem they should constitute n. tripartite advbory 

~- ·cor.u~ld.ttce of coon:1unication security experts with terms of reference: 

(i) to ex.!lllline any weaknesses in ?l<~tiono.l comnunication 

security systems of the three powers tho.t mn.y come to the 

knowledge of o.ny one of" them m1.1_ may be reg :•rded .:-.s 

affecting the intt.rcst of' all; 

(ii) to'mnke recommendations for remedies; 

(iii) to consider joint action in the cor;unon intere::st with regard· 

to the se.curity of other fri~ndly powers. 

(i 6oiwersation between 

F-78t-C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 

TOPrSECRET CA~OE 

- 8 -

E03.3(h)(2) 

· · PL 86:c36/50 USC 3605 

no security V(llue who.tever. 

29. When it oo~nes to the higher gr::-.ae systems it is how.:.:ver neccs:::.ary 

to consider wheth(:;r tbet lcould be convinccl.'. of the ~tisecurity of 

thoir systems without exposure oi."· solllL 1i1ore; 1;,r loss 11 sophist ica.ted 11 teen-

;,.iques: 

( .' 

1, 

(ii) 

(iii) 

(iv) 

III 

ME.i!SURES TO ThlPROVE I I CYPHERS 

' 

:im¥rovvmcnt; U.K. and U.S. should not decide at the Conference what they 

ir- 711-C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 

""i, ., 
' I. 

r 

! 

1.> .. I ;:; 

! . 

I 

REF ID:A517801 

TOPrSECRET CA~OE 

- 9 - pO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/3441 

p:i:oposo t.o o:f'·~·cr in the vro:y o:f' .:is::;istam.:e .:-.nd be agreed on p?ficritif1B 

but shou:ul erde:1vour in subsequent diecus~;ion with thel / • r to. ap:i_Jly 

their :iicl (which will certQin:i..y not amount to nn ir:u:uedi":tte /Solution of 

the whole problem) wherever it. best fits with French needs .• 

31. 

of the _It is ,.i.~.oubtful whe~lier_ tqc C. C.M. ma.chine 

1

.Jr·o·····po ...... /s .. · .... rd ... ····•· 19~1 conrerence shoula be offered now to the; 

i 

in the report 

(ii) 

(iii) 

Thu 195·1 pruiJOSals ..:.nvisngc'l issue .... f 20 CCM iilll"nediatciy 

o.nd n. tot:.'..l of 80 eventually; it is vro'Qabl.e tbil.t U.K./U. S. 

would f'ind it cliff'icult to Hl.;i;t this l1rogr~nme today, 

Howcv1.;r if the ._I ______ ..___ ... ~,.1ould like a certain 

num.b,~r of CCM, then thes(; cnn be supplied within limit~ 

set by availability. 

32. One-time pad, proposed in 1951, is on excE:llent sulution, 

wh~rever practicable. 

(1) 

\ 

( i)Thc latest mot1ificntiL·n, I ... __ __,....,..,.L is n ccinsiuerabh.: i.r.1j_;.rovu1.JOnt on 

the original lll.'.lChin.J, but even SO Cdi.~ r.lUSt W rog:•rclc.:c. -~· S 0V<;rduc for 

replo.c~ment. 

(ii)Enclosure i. par:1 33 1951 rc ... Jort. 

l'-.. 711-CIH TOP SECRET CANOE 
i 

I 

I 

I 

.·~'· ~­

~~-~ -~ . . • .. A,,~ 

.. 

REF ID :A517a·o1 

TO~ SECRET C~OE, 

(iii) 

(iv) 

(v) 

10 -

OOC/Jq4-1 

would' ·~o.ve them t ilile a,nd trouble. However suggest ions from 

all parties could be considered in Committee. 

T1:le.,."phyaica.l. security :..>rovided byl lmeth~ds of 

packaging OTP ,\s likely to be of' interest ·•• Emd it is 

reco1mnended that it be described. (It is also possible 

that the r----lnav wish to take into account the 

difficult~:PhYs·ical security when con,.c;idcring o.ny 

plan for multi-address''p~d systems). 

There are undoubtedly wa:ys of making the M209 much more 

nearly secure. These might well be considered subject 

to U. s. being. a.ble to pr· .. ovide [ substa~tial ·• •. number of M209 

equipments and subject\ to the_ finding them workablo. 

:f! I~• very ae~ .,rovma 'lllf' J,~ ~:i~ei:"a set ings are chosen f'rom liroitod lists "VThich can be rcadHy 

cnlculr. tod on a largo computing mnchino.; ··~ I1' U.S. . 

are able to m0;:e this r.mchin.e uvl~ilable \at• .. an early date it 

would be vev· suitable f.-:1· ofi'er tel !(or to other 

Nii.TO j?Owers) ..;>rovid.(:d that a clear ex.i.Jla?l·'.1.t.ion were given 

of' the re~tsons f'or using the limited list of. be.sic lug 

settings. These re: sons could be convinciiig1y derived from 

first principles (need to 1:;;nsure \;ts even ~ iDoasible a . 

distribution of' key values). Once again \anY attempt ·to 

dictate vmuld be f,:ttu.l, le,_ding to \susJ;>icion of' motives or 

w·ilf'ul refusal to use the "good" list. 

35. It is hoJ.Jed tho.t enough hLs been sr-1.id to d,is_i?ose of' the iclea 

tdl.t the J?rocedure udvc.co.ted would leo.d to ex1Jos.urc of "sop}listicated 

cry-i:>tanalytic techniques". (Appendix 0 to th-is paper oonta.ii'ts examples 

tti.ken from a recen1 lwork on cryptanalysis with quotations f'rom 

older works showing bo.sic .i;irincipl,es which are obviously con!monplaces 

to ·'lDY modern technician and which should suffice for .a crit.:i.cism of' most 

if· not all insecure European systems in usej;oday). 

.!Y: 

EXTENSION TO OTHER POWERS 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

.34. It is :;;>reposed that other N~'ITO powe:r-.s; whose cy:i_.ihers are heltl 

to be :i.n need of :improvement should in turn be inv:Lted to send :rt:presentativds to the Tripartite Convnittee. 

35. I l'.10uld undoubtedl~ all have cy:i;>~r ex-J?erts capable of'· μnderstanding and acce;iting the arguments used 

in nsses·sing a Cry'j:ltosystem. There is little fa.ult to be found with the:ic I I ana we have no knov.rleage of their ____________ .... 

:.uu.'l could only obtain it by .,,rolon.;ed "-':l.bint stu..::..y (likely to be ffiost 

~·',·!lDteful ot effort) or by silillJlY as~ing the," Lr details. The~ should 

, · NIA Far• 711-<ns 1 Jul 51 TOP SECRET CANOE 

I '. 
I . 

i I . I 

/ ' 

i 

' 

' 

; 

i :·.~~,!~ 

! ~,-:.-+ •:: 

I . :~.J: ~- ~ 

·:·.·.· 

·. .·' 

~i;~.l''. 

·, . 

.. 

1_<: 

"J·;'.·~:: 

:- ·.: 

.· 

(:,. 1~Nk1· I 

REF ID:A517801 

TOP~ECRET CA~E 

,_ 

DGC/3441 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

prOL•.'.l.bly lie lef't alone altogether pr else rew:.rded/as potential givers 

of help. 

(i) ___ .... lmis a one-time tape generatqt, believed secure. 

37. I ltoo appears \t;o be backward in. crypt matters. It is 

kn.mm that the I I are helping the I f on Comir..t and it might 

be possible eventually for the I F to approach them on Comsec, on 

which they are in very urgent neeq of advice. 

38. It is difficult to guago the level of cfypt lmmvledge · in I I; they m~.y a.11 well have quite good · orypi:analysts. Here ngc.in ·the only l1rproacll that Cllfl bo tried ·wi+;h 

any hope of success is the educative ~no. If there is not already in 

ihese countries a crypt expert capnble of ~pprcciating ,the argument 

from :first principles then they must begin by sending a·· man for a 

training course which should bu based ~n the published literature. 

v 

CONCLUSION 

I 

39. Strange though it may seem, the security of a government's 

cyphers is a most unreliable inclex of the skill ·· .of that government 1 s 

cryptanalysts. If a nation uses bad cyphers thc'.reason may be that they 

know no better, but it is much more likely to be that their policy' 

makers fail to make use of the ad.vice of thc~ir o·an .. technicians (·.:rhich 

in some co.ses may be enough to ta..~.J th .. m most, if nbt an, of the w:1y 

to rea.l security) or else that they simply lack resources-material, 

industrial or financial-to corry out >1h°'t -they know to be necessary. 

If I !come for•mrd now, insis't·lng on n. critical examination 

of the situation (based on a. real1.stic n.ckno·.··ledgement of certain f:J.cts 

about cryptography thnt are alreao.y pretty ·well known) ond off\:ring help 

from their own experience and material resources, they can guide thf.:ir 

all fos into use of cryptosystems that ·.rill strmd up against the mos+. 

advanced techniques knovm to N.s •. ;_. :-.nd G.C.H.'.-.• , and in doing so nf~ed 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
- 12 -

:OOC/3JJ...1 

I 

j . ~- ; ! .. 1 

! . 

I 

'; 

''·. 

~;..;. 

.· .,,~· 

. "~ 

. ·~~ : 

,·,, 

·,. 

,·.~· .. -' ~ - - -

\~; 

·~ . 

{.:it-' '711-C13S , ' 

·i 

not disclose these techniques. If however they continue to turn 

a blind eye to the progress in cryptanalysis made all over Europe 

since 1939, and to refuse to talk about subjects that are in fact far · ·less secret than they would like them to be, then they must expect 

to see European powers tUrtl elsewhere for advice and a$sistance, and 

so to lose the opportunity to influence development in the right direction. 

Subsecμently they may find that a situation has developed1which they 

arc unable to correct vd. thout making really damaging disclpsures of 

advanced cryp·tanalysis in discussion, not onl~: with officers of l:..llied 

Governroonts but also with commercial firms in neutral countries who 

manufacture equipment for sr.10 -to nll comers. This do.nger is real, 

and if U.K. E'.nd U.S. wish to avoid such a situation they have no time 

to lose. 

40. Finally, U.K. nnd U.S. must not expect the advice to be all 

one way, at least if the discussions are extended to L.rmed Forces communications. They may ~ell find that although their own cyphers are for the 

most part sound, yet nevertheless they are giving away in pe·:,cetime 

secret information, not obtainable by any other means, through excessive 

use of plain language and over simplification of signal p~ocedure. 

Foreign Comint org .. nisations who have intcrct!pted U.K., U.S. tra.f'fic 

may be able to help mat.:rially in a~rwssin:: the extent of' leakage 

arising in i this •;my. 

• 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
I 

I ) ~ 

i 

' 

f-71J.Cl3S 

OOC/3441 

Appendix 'A' 

E 3.3(h)(2) 

P 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
__ .... ..,=. .......... 

( . 

·· .. :·· 

.:·;··; 

. :. ~ 

· 1 . ~· '.· . :.·.J. 

:r 

, . 

. . ! 

.:·. 

·• ... ,' 

. :; 

;~ 

-~-~~~r . 

REF ID:A517801 

. TO~ SECRET CAr~OE 

- 2 -

DG0/3li41 

l::03,~(h)(2) 

PL 86:36150USC 3605 Ap:._Jendix 'A ' 

.ll 

CONTENT OP ;i.':RMED FORCES COllfMUNIC~".TIONS 

4. Tite W"ork being done on armed fore~~ ~y.1.)hers ()f N.i.TO countries 

. by the U. K. /and the U. s. is restricted alr.1ost en~,truly to.__ ______ _. 

· I ; . . •• Knowledge of tho 

content ofi the oessages would be of the very greatest value t··.ctically to 

the Viet Minh f'orces -and they would also yield considerable longcr-tc~ 

intcdligertce. The two .sy~ter.1s a:.·e used "!:or, anong other things~ daily 

ill 

DEVELOPMENTS m w~·.R 

5. . The above ?nragraphs iu-e concerned with what is being given 

aws.y~by insecure oy.._;hers of nllied j_.)O'Ners in :;resent conditions. The 

val o"f: similc...r information to an\encr.1y in wartime would of course be, much 

gre8i er. The continued use by the I ~ o.f insecure cyphers 

in q:otive operations would, "!:ore J.ru.1ple, be a. vt~ry greO:. dnnger not only 

to "t!he French themse.lves but to ti•t..ir a.llies. Si.i.:.ila.r ccnsiclcrations .'.l.!'1>13 

to rill other an-.cd forces nnd diplo1:-ir>.tic oy1;hcrs in uso by ::illiea. That 

in. nartir.:ie the cy.,,hor \security of enc o.lly l..;ust be: t'he concern of !lll 

o~rged quite cleo.rly\ in the ':I 93~ .. 45 war, where v1~ dcri'<J;d· o. _greaj; .c'J.~o.l ,. 

of intelligence on trui I 

cyphers of all types. 

···l-,_,.,_,,,. ,,,,,. TOP SECRET CANOE 
I 

i 

I f .. 

I 

(c) 

REF.ID:A517801 

TO~ SECRET C~OE 

l!:Q3,3(h)(2) 

PL86.,,36/50 USC 3605 DGC/3414.i 

Append ix 1 A ' 

Annexure 1 

Details of arms ,shipments fr~m America:-

Off-shore purchases:-

2. The situation would be still more unfavourable\in time of 

war: since such reforts on arms deliveries in the present! I I _ _ vrould give away details of I 

mo ments. ..... ----------' 

NSA F.. 711-CUS 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
' j 

I 

I i . 

I 

.-. _:: 

{;; 

··_:'•l' 

.·. ·; . 

. " . -... ~\ 

·.·~ 

'·· .,_ 

,·. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86::-36/50 USC 3605 

-~. : . . . . 

DGC/34&f 

Appendix 'A' 

1.nnexure 2 

.. : ; NsA FGllil 781-CUS 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CA.NOE 
.... . _;i .' . 

._;. ~-

.·; .. 

I 

I 

I 

.. ,. 

" 

_:;~ti~;- . 

;~.r '.:~i~·~; ··.·.•. 

~!"~:,:.. . .. , : 

E 3.3(h)(2) 

D 86-36/50 USC 3605 DGC/3441 

Appendix '.l1 

• 

-

~f .. ~)1t; iaA,_m-<uS 1Jul52 TOP SECRET CANOE ··~:,~·· . 
.... ·· 

RE.J:. ID: ASl 7801 

TOf' SEtRET C~OE 

-3-

EQ 3,3(b)(2) 

PL<86..,36/50USC 3605 

DGC/341+1· 

Ap-pendix 'l 

Armexure 2 

(o) I 

._----------~-----------------J 

%n nddi tion th·Jrc is n considerable quantity of ~elegrnus on the · 

........ .---.,....-...,...,.---.....-........ -------~I nnd on the ~-------,,.----....1 Organisation. The intelligence contni.ned in them is not rJf vitn.l · signi:ricnnce to Russin, but it certninly )Jrovides useful bn.ckground 

inf'orrnn.tiont Some exaoples nre:-

(o.)_ 

(b) 

(o) 

(a) ·································· ... 

{(e) 

(:f') 

(g) 

{h) 

NSA F- 781-C135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
... : ... ,,;· 

.. 

.".J 

'Alf · 

·:::.}·!: . .. . ~ 

.. · ;.·· ·. 

·., ·.~. 

Ep 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86"'.36/50 USC 3605 

Other to >ios. 

·a. : S9me· genornl ,..ouarks. 

(a) 

-4-

DGC/31.t-'M 

Append.ix 'A 1 

J .. nncxure 2 

TOP SECRET C1~s:NOE 
_,_ .. : 

REF ID:A517801 

TOf" SECRET CAt~OE 

3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

9. . Conclusion. 

DGC/344t' 

Appendix . 'A' 

Annexure 2 

- Fror.1 the ~bovc ::..mlysis, of. 1mblishcdlltc:xts\it_....;.... __ _ 

l~i1crgcs th[lt the u."J.ount 01' vito.1 info:mio .. 'vion rI,i~ by thclL. ___ _. 

·:.:r) tho Rm::rsinns is snall, but tmt o. considern.ble quo.nti ty of useful 

back.r;rou.nd inf'orrntion is pn.ssed insecurely. 

NSA For• 781 -C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP· SECRET CANOE 
. '-

•. ·.J 

·'' 

REF ID:A517801 

TO~, SECflET C~OE 

DGC/31#1 

Append ix 1 A' 

J,;mexure 3 

FRENCH NON Dil'LO!Y1' .. 'L'IC SYSTEMS' EO 3.3(h)(2) 

. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

A. 

1. J~s used by the can provide the 

eii.cmy with a very complete pictu:.:·0 of ·(;he military situation.., both 

tactical and strategic. The follow-ing are but a fe'·r typic::l\ exrunples 

of the kind of intelligence involved, the majority dated September 195l:'. 

to March 1953:-

(c) Information concerning! f ;.llies. 

1 J•I 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
~03.3(h)(2) 

'Pl 86..,36/50 USC 3605 - aDGC/344-1 

;,ppendix 1 A' 

~·~nexure 3 

(d.) Strategic supplies. 

(\e) Tac:tical planning. 

l 

2... . . .. ·.. In addition, \there is much evidence of the results of!..,. __ __, 

· · · !Which must be of\vdue to the enemy and also detrimentc.l to any 

1..]Jlie!3, co-operation wi thl I For exe..mple :-

. B. 

3. Thel I appear to be used f'a.irly indiscriminately 

in Indo-China, ana. in some cases re.Jorts in the same s..:ries are pEcssed 

on ·che same links using ei·i:;her rnz..chine. The type of ihforw~ti90 given 

-'J.i";ay by the two systems is thus very similnr. In the s.'.::.mplc e~:-,mined 

·!;hd I appears to pass fewer messages of a highe:t" lcv1..:l naturu than 

thel I 

4. 'l'hc folloi.ving are some typicul extracts fromJL.. _______ __, 

(a) .;.·. cryptane.lytic Status Report:-

NSA Fenn 781-C135 1 Jul 51 TOP SECRET CANOE .. 
• 

REF ID:A517801 

TO~ SECRET C~OE 

)EQ 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl.86-36/50 USC 3605 

(b) Tactical sitreps:-

- 3 -

(d) Report on strategic information not to be released to the\ 

press:- ' 

(e) Knowledge of enemy order.of battle:-

(f) Training programme:-

C. Miscellaneous 

6. The following types of traffic have been seen:-

,J ""''-"'-<'" ,.,,, TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 

TO~. SECRET Cx-NOE 

-4-

DGC/3441 

I 

EO 3.3(h)(2) /Appendix 'A' 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 i~nnexure .3 

7. The only other traffic seen here, which appears to be an 

!-,_,,,_°'' """' TOP SECRET CANOE 
EQ~.3(h)(2) 

PL86"""36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/31+41 

Appendix 'A' 

Annexure 4 

4. The following are some examples of the t;,rpe of information 

still passing:-

TOP SECRET CANOE. 

\\\\\\\ 
REF ID:A517801 

TOP. SECRET CA~OE 

- 2 -

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/34'4.1 

' Appendix 'A' 

Annexure 4 

(c) 

' (( Greek-Yugoslav ry~ations. 

(e) MEDO. 

\ 

\. 

NSA For• 711-C135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 

.TO~, SECRET G1WOE 

~:Q 3.3(h)(2) 

P($'.8E5,:-36/50 USC 3605 DGC/34 41 

Appendix 'A' 

J,nnexure 5 

which as 

used by is qUJ:.te< ~rtsecure ancl>~oul be rea by any organisation 

possessing rapi ana ytical machinery. ·othcrsystems, usually code with 

'.l.dd.i tive, are. occasionally read/.but. do not norJJ1D.lly concern major 

polHicn.1 sub.Jects. There .. is also>.a believed to be 

which is not at 

pres en e. 

2. The...,I ....-......,,-...,,..,,,....---.ii and more pBrticuJarly J hel I 

links pass a considerable number. of reports on N;.To matters, and the 

I hhas mnde a.practice of reporting on 

I jalthough in\ less d.etail than thei .... -----.1 

J I There is some evidence thnt they are.aware of their cypher 

res pons ibil ities in this mat tqr. For example, · . . . 

gives a general report on an i~erican statement m£Be at a. meeting of 

the i~tlantic Council, and conc\Ludcs by saying thnt\the text of the statement 

··rould be sent in Typex. 

3. Nevertheless, readink of this traffic must give the lfossians a 

fairly comprehensive picture of ,:~c.neral N. .TO pln.nning and. e 'Uipment.· 

For example:'- ,,· i 

,(a) i Re:;?orts on N;~TO meetings 

(b) German attitude to EDC 

(c) Equipment policy 

\\\\\ 

NSA fo•m 781-<:13S I Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 

Tor, SECRET CA!>jOE 

,.· ·.··. ·,, ;_ 

- 2 -

DGC/3441 . EO ~.3(h)(2) . 

,.· · PL86-36/50 USC 3605 Appendix 'A' 

.Annexure 5 ',; .· 

I 

1' : 

NsA For"' 781-C13S 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET C1\:NOE 
REF ID:A517801 

• TOr', SECRET CN"jOE 

EO 3.3(h)(2) DGC/3441 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 · 1.ppendix t A.' 

i~nnoxure 6 

P 0 R T U G J·~ L 

4. Some other exrunpll..!s :-

.. ( n.)\ Defence prep.J.redness • 

~ 

NSA Form 781-<:135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 

TOf'' SECRET CiV'jOE 

- 2 -

Fo 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/3lili.1 

J' .. ppendix 'A 1 

lumexure 6 

\I..._____ ______, 

(b) 1:..irf'ield oonstruotion. 

/ (Cl) .--In_r_rn_s_tr_u_ct_u_re_··-------------------. 

' 

( e) Gorm.'m pnrticipntion. 

\ 

NSA F- 781-C135 1 Jul 51 TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 Tor\ SECRET C~OE 

\:03.3(h)(2) 

f?L 86'"36750USC 3605 DGC/341+1 

11.ppend ix 'Ar 

lmnexure 7 

even. thej jin roduce in Oc ober :95 or ~TO matte:t:'s ~an be fully solved on messages of more than 500 groups, and a 

high ptopc)rtion of messages are of consideraole length. The military 

; 

- · ...·.. \ 4 A - • ~ I badly used and quite easily readable, 

SotteLimee WcllouL Lne use :1 i'apJi analytical machinery. Nothing is 

knmm of_ _ _ _ but it must be assumed that they arc 

quite insecure and may be giving away considerable detailed information 

of to.c.tical and strategic value. 

2. J !yields a wealth of information on 

n~.:ro planning, stra-Cegy, equipment, etc .. , which must be of very high 

value t.o the Russians. The folloving exeJnples are typical of the 

in te 11 igence provided: -

(a) ~hel~~~~~lcontribution in case of war. 

. , 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
.. 

.. 

I 

l rf N5A Fonn 781-CUS 1 Jul 52 

3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 2 -

DGC/34-4-1 

.:~ppendix 

/.nnexure 

(b) Present strength 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) Communicn.tions 

./ 

(f) lnegotintions \ 

• ••

TOP SECRET CANOE · 
REF ID:A517801 

.. TO~ SECRET CA~OE ' 

I. 

j::O 3,3(t1)(2) 

PL 86-36/SOUSC 3605 -3 

DGC/3441 

JJ..ppendix 1A 1 

·"""· _,JJ.ne :xu re 7 

····························································· ... 

(a) Details of submarine ,~ad'.'tl's• 

(b} N.i'l.TO exercise 

( c) . Intelligence 

I 

j 

I· 

· NSA Form 781-C135 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
'. ·:-,~ 

...... _ 

' . 

. A. 

'1-. ...... ,. 

··.'.~·""' . 

...... -~-

-----

REF ID:A517801 

TOP'. SECRET C~OE 

DGC/3441 

Appendix 'B' 

EXAMPLES OF COMPR<l.USE OF CO-BELLIGERENTS BY 

CYPHER COMMUNICATIONS IN WORLD WAR II 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~~ B. Re9iprocal Compranise ofl 

l NSAF-m-<ns """ TOP SECRET CANOE 
I . 

·.·:· . 

'• . )· 

..... ~ ... 

. · .~i;:· 

.. 

c. 

D. 

REF ID:A517801 

TOP' SECRET CA~OE 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

rx.:r:/.;.~l.1, 1 

j 

App~nd i. x 'B' 

NSAForml81-C13S 1Jul52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517801 

TO~ SECRET CAJ10E 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 - 3 -

DGC/31.i41 

NSA Form 781-<1 35 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
~ ..... -·-------·· --

,}Jtj;~ 

• !- -~--;~ .. z.-

. ';-

.) 

';._ 

. ,.:., 

·- ... 

... 

. ·, .· . · .. : '. 

•\ ~· .. • . Ji,;;:. 

,'ft~· .-:, · • .-· ·7 ... 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/3441 

'C' l:..ppendix 

--

EX: .. MPLES T.i.JCE!i FROM THE Lr.l'ER'.TUP.E OF CRYPI'i .. NALYSIS 

.. ND GRTITOGR:i:'HY SECJi!;;nrG Bi.SIC FRWCIPLES -,_;;mcH .. ·.RE 

OBVIOUSLY coomNPL..·~-CES TO .. JITY MODERN TECHNICil:.N 

l. · I I has recently had an opportunity to examine a. copy or 

"Precis de Cryptographie Moderne" by Charles Eyra'uck' (Paris Edit1.ons 

Raoul Tari, 10 Rue de Buci, Paris vre 1953). Tl;li~ work is not for 

.sale to the general public, but at the same tirtle it carries no mark o~. 

sqcurity grading. The preface acknowledges help received by the author 

:trom Col. Black; the latter however has stated that he has had tl:)e book 

. carefully "purged" of anything that might be prejudical to the '.'mrk of 

his department. 

· 2. It f'ollo-.fs the.t the ·opinions e:q>ressed in this book do not 

necessarily represent the level of technical knowledge of the best French 

experts, e.g. it 'could be i7I'ong to judge French kno-;"dedge of arum machines 

from the follo·;ring curious pns::.e.ge relating to the German Enigma (which 

is badly and innacurately described): 

''Thus one secs that the supplemente.ry plugboard is a very important 

security factor. But e"lren ·without it we cannot see how· the dEum 

wiring could be r~coverca.· One rray therefore state that this 

machine is practically indecypherable." 

3. When, ho-.rever, perfectly sour,:1 st:..:.te:ments. are made a.bout the 

. b~sic principles of cryptography one may assuma that these arc regarded 

as commonplaces • 

4. The follcr:-:ing extracts give examples .of such statemants, many of 

2hi.ch are highly relevant to present French practices. It is note·.;-orthy 

that many of these ci:-nt<:.in quotat·ions from older .-.rorks. 

{On Cypher Machines in general) 

( i) 

\ . 

"There is no doubt that length (of key stream) on thb one 

hand, and a large number of alphabets on the other, ·and 

finally the complexity of cyclic mechanisms, (including 

·t'actors of irregularity which maki.; reconstruction more 

difficult) are principal,elements for appreciation of the 

cryptographic ve.lue of a machine. But they are not the 

only ones; one ·;;-ould be very wrong to believe the.t they 

constituiio a formal and absolute indication • 

.".ny machine has to be used properly. It must also be adapted ........_ 

to its use. "Borne excellent razors arc most dangerous in -........ 

the hr..nds of e. monkey" {says Givierge) "and some delicate 

revolution cowiters 7rculd vrork badly on the wheel of a 

turf'-barrcr.r." 

' ilisA ·F- 111-<1 JS 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET CANOE 
./ 

I 

l 

I 

i 

,. 

I 

l 

j 

I 

I I 

i 

I 

l· :·~: ( 

V'''· ""' ...... -c .... ,,,, .. 

REF ID:A517801 

TOf.' SECRET C~10E 

~- -· -.-· 11 

- 2 - . IX'..C/3441 

J.ppomlix ' (J 

"'fhu cho-lco or n1t;1•01Jd koyr"' II r:vxmrd ing to Gcnornl Sncco . "mtrnt not he 11if'l; t.o Man -l.ni"l;irrti'vc: of cyphur opcrfl.tors but 

munt bo m1t1fo in n oonl.rn.1 nffl!~'""• orton in fnct, if. 0. 

chnngo of ·l;ho outur• ·ko.v d.onu not affoot tho r~nt up of the 

mnohino or tho trny nurfon but only tho atarting pdint on tho 

11:1.t·tor Cll'HJ muy ht\Vll t•e-UUO of '1 "portion Of tho kdy scrfoo 

nlr1.mdy uuml for nrwi;hc:r fPfJ1.~011p,o 1.md in conaoquendo long 

ropnnt~ drl.oh roVllfll l;hn coinci<tonno Ellld help tha crypto.nalyeis." 

Part II Pnra 115 

(ii) tn :.t1;nu11111tw. 11. 111:1nldrw, nrmntm·~ 11hould bfJ tn.kcn of the fnct 

thi:it U;r-1 pt:rmrinnnl; nlinr11ctnr·.i.nl,i.m1 conno+. rumnin secret, nnd 

nlno nf nll p1m:1lhJo nm.:irlontn. 

(i'v) 

(v) 

mm 

{On 1;t1u T-!i? M1wh'l.nn) 

''We hnvu n•.•1m thnt f'or cm- U.rw l;dctypo cy'.,Jhcrs 120 single 

keyri nhtn Jnnrl h,v 111~r11n 1 l;1,t;is>n of the five impulscrn are lea a 

cfflcrmit•t1!1 thrui :J> lrn,i,r1" r>htnincd by chnngc of polarity. This 

in 1.mou1~h f;,' !:ho.. l.>11t I, thr.: czi.ulf! 11umbor of El ine;lo keys. uacil 

iu 1111 l.Y 11. f' i r:·1 f·, inrlJr~:d;·.l.on. " 

IAlD 

Giv1orp;c lt1u1 t.ipolrnn n1.' 111mt.l.pr11.r:rl;icor1 that theory ennnot 

prucl:l.ct tJ10u.u;h ·th11 h· ox:l.11{;\:ttco i:' ntto~itod by o:xperianco" 

nml 111nt•u r1,cc11U.v Snccm }U\11 ndtlml thnt "cypher oper,: torn 

do ~mnugh tn h'll p U1u <mon~y. 11 

IDlD Purt i[!I Parn 36 

, '"r•.10 crypl;og:t'~•mn w:lth th<:1 t~nmu r1~cyphar key con if!. theory bo 

dccryptud" 11 • • ••• i.n prn.cf;tcc 1t it' ttooessnry to have at 

1m.tat n third tox·~ "• #o.j · J,.: "' .10 D Pnri; III ..,-nro. .30 

(vi) '.':ht nn.r r:m.r.w, _IHI Genu.rnl :~1l.CC1.1 nnyr.1; ll~c1·ot cotlo:} arc:: only 

oer:uro ·on c.-inoltlm t.hnt thr.?y nrc 1rnt nnd ncv1:r. huvo bcun 

UM1.l w"l tho11t l"eO~l"mllllt, thn lntter bd.ne; v• :ry frequently 

c.ho.np;ud. 11 

'.nHJl Pnrt III Pnrn .30 

TOP. SECRET C11\NOEi 

·-