N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT

TYR ONE L. W HITE,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt,
v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Ac ting C om m issione r of Soc i a l Se c urity , De fe nda n t-Appe l le e . No. 23-15341 D.C . No. 2:19-c v-01498-AC
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia Allison C la ire , M a gistra

te Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

Nove m b e r 17, 2023 ** Sa n Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : SC HR OEDER , W . FLETC HER , a nd M ILLER , C irc uit Judge s. Disse n t by

Judge M ILLER
. Following our de c ision in W hite v . K ijak a z i , 44 F.4th 828 (9th C ir. 2022), Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt Ty rone W hite sought a

ttorne y s’ fe e s in the distric t c ourt unde r



# F IL ED
NOV 21 2023 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).the E qua l Ac c e ss to Justic e Ac t (“ EAJA” ), 28 U.S.C . § 2412(d). Unde r the EAJA,

“ a pre va iling pa

rty i n a suit a ga inst the gove rnm e nt is e ntitle d to fe e s in c e rta in
c irc um s ta nc e s unle ss the gove rnm e nt’ s position wa s ‘ substa ntia lly justifie d.’ ” Le

v . Astrue , 529 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th C ir. 2008) (quoting Unite d State s v . Marolf

, 277 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th C ir. 2002)). To m e e t this sta nda rd, the gove rnm e nt m

ust show tha t its position ha

d a “ re a sona ble ba sis both in la

w a nd fa c t.” Me i e r v . C olv in , 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th C ir. 2013) (quoting Pie rc e v . Unde r

w ood , 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). The distric t c ourt de nie d the m otion for fe e s. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re v ie w the de c ision be low for a n a buse of disc re tion, whic h

“ oc c urs if the distric t

c ourt ba se d its de c ision on a n e rrone ous le g a l c onc lusion or a
c le arly e rrone ous finding of fa c t.” Gonzale s v . Fre e Spe e c h C

oal. , 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th C i r. 2005) (quoting Or. Env ’t C o unc i l v . K

unzman , 817 F.2d 484, 496 (9th C ir. 1987)). W e re ve rse . The gove rnm e n t a

rgue d in W

hite tha t the Appe a ls C ounc il c o uld prope rly
a ffirm the Adm inistra

tive La w Judge ’ s de c ision without a ddre ssing or re solving the s ubsta ntia l disc re p a

nc y be twe e n W hite ’ s e stim ate s of the num b e r of jobs
a va ila ble to him

in the na tiona l e c onom

y and the e s tim at e s m a de by the gove rnm e nt’ s voc a t iona l e xpe rt. The gove rnm e nt c la im e d it wa s a ppropria t e for
2the a ge nc y to re l y sole ly on the voc a tiona l e xpe rt’ s e stim ate s be c a use the y we re not “ so unre a sona

b le the y c o u ld not pa ss the low substa ntia l e vide nc e ba

r” and be c a use , in the gove rnm e nt’ s vie w, W h ite ’ s e stim a te s “ a ppe ar[e d] to be
unre a s ona

ble .” As we e x pla ine d in our opinion, this position wa s fore c lose d by our de c ision in Buc k

v . Be r ry hill , 869 F.3d 1040 (9th C ir. 2017), whic h he ld tha t the a ge nc y “ viola

te [s] the ge ne ra l duty

to c la rify an d de ve lop the re c ord” whe n it ignore s a “ va st disc re pa

nc y be twe e n the [voc a tiona l e xpe rt’ s] job num be rs a nd those te nde re d by ” the c la im ant. W hite , 44 F.4th a

t 836 (quoting Buc k , 869 F.3d a t 1052). The distric t c ourt found tha t the gove rnm e nt’ s position wa s none the le ss substa ntia lly justifie d be c a

use our opinion in W

hite involve d “ an e xte nsion of Buc k to the c irc um sta

nc e s of this c a se ,” sinc e W hite pre se nte d his e stim a te s for the first tim e be fore the Appe a ls C ounc il inste a d of the Adm inistra tive La w Judge . B ut whe the r our de c i sion e x t e nde d prior pre c e de nts is not the c orre c t inquiry . W e look inste a d to the gove rnm e n t ’ s litiga tion c o nduc t to de t e rm i ne whe the r its a c tions
we re substa

ntia lly justifie d, c onside ring whe the r its “position ‘ a s a whole ’ ha [d] ‘ a
re a s ona ble ba sis in both la

w a nd fa c t.’ ” Ibrahim v . U.S. De p’t of Home land Se c . , 912 F.3d 1147, 1168 (9th C ir. 2019) (e n ba nc ) (quoting Gutie rre

z v . Barnhart , 274 F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th C ir. 2001)).
3The gra v a m e n of the gove rnm e nt’ s position wa s tha t the a ge nc y

c ould re ly
e xc lusive ly

on the voc a tiona l e xpe rt’ s e stim a te s be c a use the gove rnm e nt c la im e d those e stim a te s we re m ore re lia ble tha n W hite ’ s. Tha

t position wa s inc om

pa tible with Buc k . The gove rnm e nt’ s a rgum e nt tha

t Buc k wa s distinguishe d by

W hite ’ s subm ission of e vide nc e to the Appe a ls C ounc il c onsiste d of a single se nte nc e without c ita

tion in brie fing tha

t , e xc e pt for tha

t se nte nc e , e ntire ly

re lie d on a

n
argum e nt tha

t wa s fore c l ose d by

our holding in Buc k . Tha t single se nte nc e is not
e nough to e sc a

pe the c o nc lusion tha

t the gove rnm e nt’ s position a s a whole la c ke d substa ntia l justific a tion. Se e id. a t 1171 (“ That som e of the argum e nts m a de a long the w ay by the gove rnm e nt a

ttorne y s pa sse d the stra ight fa c e te st . . . doe s not pe rsua de us tha

t the gove rnm e nt’ s position wa s substa ntia lly justifie d .” ). M ore ove r, “ [t] he gove rnm e nt’ s position is not substa ntia lly justifie d sim

ply be c a use our pre c e d e nts ha

ve not squa

re ly fore c lose d the position.” De c k e r v . Be rry h ill , 856 F.3d 659, 664 (9th C ir. 2017). Soc ia l Se c urity Adm inistra

tion
re gula tions a nd our prior c a se s c le arly e s ta blish tha t “ a c la im ant ha s a

right to subm it a dditiona l e vide nc e to the Appe a ls C ounc il” upon a showing of good c a

use . W hite , 44 F.4th a

t 836–37 (c iting 20 C .F.R . § 404.970(b); Bre w e s v . C omm’r of Soc . Se c . Admin. , 682 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th C i r. 2012)). The Appe a l s C ounc il
a c c e pte d W hite ’ s e v ide nc e and m a de it “pa rt of the re c o rd.” Id. a t 836. W e hold
4that

our pre c e de nts m a de it suffic ie ntly c le ar be fore W hite tha t the tim ing of W hite ’ s subm ission of e vide nc e did not distinguish his c a se from the rule we
announc e d in Buc k
. W e the re fore c onc lude that the distric t c ourt a buse d its disc re tion in finding the g ove rnm e nt’ s position substa ntia lly justifie d. Se e Le , 529 F.3d a t 1201. RE V E RSE D and

RE M A NDE D.

51

White v. Kijakazi , No. 23
- 15341 MILLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The district court did not abuse its discretion when it deemed the government’s position substantially justified and denied White’s motion for attorney’s fees under the E qual Access to Justice Act
. Abuse of discretion is a “highly deferential standard” under which we may not “substitute [ our ] ‘ view of what constitutes substantial justification for that of the district court
. ’ ” Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition , 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States , 914 F.2d 1224, 1230 (9th Cir. 1990) ) . Instead, our “ review

‘ is limited to assuring that the district court’s determination ha [ d ] a basis in
reason . ’ ” Id. (quoting Bay Area Peace Navy , 914 F.2d at 1230). The government’s position is substantially justified if it “has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood , 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988) ; id. at 565 (defining “substantial” as “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person”). I join ed Judge W. Fletcher’s opinion setting aside the agency’s denial of benefits, and I continue to believe that it was correct. But , ex ante , it was not so obviously correct as to deprive the government’s contrary position of a reasonable basis. Until our decision in this case , we had never set aside the agency’s denial of benefit s on the basis of evidence presented for the first time to the Appeals 

# FILED
NOV 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Council. To be sure, the agency’s regulations permit a claimant to submit additional evidence to the Appeals Council
. 20 C.F.R. § 404. 970 (a)(5) . But where, as here, the Appeals Council denies review, the decision of the ALJ remains the final decision of the agency
. I d. § 404.981. And it is not obvious from the regulations how new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council can cause the ALJ’s earlier decision to cease to be supported by substantial evidence. Our de cision in Buck v. Berryhill does not answer that question because it involve d evidence submitted in the first instance to an ALJ, not the Appeals Council
. 869 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2017). A lthough we ultimately concluded that the timing of the submission did not matter , our decision to publish an opinion in this case implicit ly recogni zed that applying Buck in this context represents at least a modest extension of its holding
. It was not unreasonable for the government to attempt to distinguish Buck , even if it did so without a lengthy exposition of the issue
. ( I see no basis for tying the justification of the government’s position to the length of its briefing in support of that position , lest we incentivize parties to write even longer briefs than they already do .) M ore to the point, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that the government’s position had a reasonable basis
. I would affirm the district court’s decision to deny fees.