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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON VALMARI RENATA,Appellant,

v. 

### FLAGSTAR BANK, F.S.B., a federally chartered savings bank; NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC., a Washington corporation; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC, a Delaware corpora tion and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Respondents. No. 71402-3-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: July 27, 2015

Becker, J. — The holder of a note is entitled to enforce itregardless of whetherthe holder is also the owner. Because respondent Flagstar Bank was the actual holder ofthe note given by the appellant, summaryjudgmentwas appropriate. We affirm. On April 17, 2003, Capital Mortgage Corporation entered into a wholesale lending broker agreement with Flagstar. Underthe agreement, Flagstar agreed to fund loans broughtto it by Capital Mortgage so long as the loan documentation met Flagstar's underwriting standards and Capital Mortgage agreed to immediately indorse and deliver promissory notes to Flagstar.No. 71402-3-1/2 

### OnAugust4, 2006, ValmariRenata executed a note in favor of Capital 

### Mortgage in the amount of $200,800. The note bears an indorsement by Christina Butler—CapitalMortgage's then-President—to Flagstar. On August7, 2006, Renata executed a deed of trust, securing the note against real property located in Everett, Washington. The deed listed Joan 

### Anderson ofFlagstar as the trustee and the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (commonly referred to as "MERS") as the beneficiary. On August 11, 2006, Flagstarreceived Renata's note. From this point on, Flagstarwas the holder of the note. Flagstarindorsed the note in blank. In December 2009, Renata fell into default on the loan. 

### On July 23, 2010, NorthwestTrustee Services Inc., acting as Flagstar's agent, delivered a notice ofdefault to Renata. On August 11, 2010, Flagstar appointed Northwest Trustee the successor
trustee. On August 16, 2010, MERS assigned its interest inthe deed oftrust to 

### Flagstar. MERS acted through its signing officer Sharon Morgan, who was also
a Flagstarofficer. On September 7, 2010, Northwest Trustee recorded a notice oftrustee's sale, setting the sale for December 10, 2010. On December 9, 2010, Renata filed for bankruptcy. The scheduled sale did not occur. On April 26, 2011, Renata's bankruptcy was dismissed.No. 71402-3-1/3 On May 3, 2011, Northwest Trustee recorded an amended notice of trustee's sale, setting a new sale for June 10, 2011. The sale did not occur, and the property has not been sold. On June 1, 2011, Renata filed a complaint against Flagstar, Northwest Trustee, and MERS. Init, Renata alleged wrongful foreclosure and a violation of the Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW. Renata also sought a declaratoryjudgmentthat the deed oftrust is "illegal" and to quiet title. On November 15, 2013, Flagstar and MERS filed a motion for summary judgment. Intheir motion, Flagstar and MERS explained why each cause of action should be dismissed. First, Plaintiff's wrongful foreclosure claim fails because the evidence shows that Flagstar may enforce the Note and Deed of Trust, [Northwest Trustee] is a valid Trustee authorized to carry out the foreclosure, and [Northwest Trustee] has complied with Washington's Deed ofTrustAct. Second, Plaintiff is not entitled to declaratoryjudgment because Flagstar is a holder ofthe Note, and there is no basis for voiding the Deed ofTrust simply because the Deed ofTrust designated MERS as the beneficiary in an agency capacityfor the Note holder. Third, Plaintiffs claim for violation ofthe Consumer Protection Act (CPA) fails because she cannot show an unfair or deceptive act, a public interest impact, injury, or causation. Fourth, Plaintiffs claim for quiettitle fails because she has not paid offher loan, and Defendants are not claiming an ownership or possessory interest in Plaintiff's property. Northwest Trusteejoined this motion. On November 30, 2013, Renata filed a memorandum in opposition to respondents' motion for summaryjudgment. On December 13, 2013, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Renata appeals.No. 71402-3-1/4

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

### We review an ordergranting summaryjudgmentde novo, performing the

same inquiry as the trial court. Owen v. Burlington N. &Santa Fe R.R. Co.. 153 

### Wn.2d 780, 787, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). A motion forsummaryjudgmentwill be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain, or on having its affidavits considered at face value. Wash. Fed. Sav. v. Klein. 177 Wn. App. 22, 311 P.3d 53 (2013). review denied. 179Wn.2d 1019(2014). ANALYSIS Morgan declaration Inthe respondents' motion, they rely primarily on facts provided by the declaration ofSharon Morgan, an employee of Flagstar. Renata asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Morgan's declaration. Because the Morgan declaration provides the facts relied on by the motion and the court, this argument is addressed first. In her declaration, Morgan states, among otherthings, that Flagstar has been in possession ofthe note since August 2006, Northwest Trustee acted as Flagstar's agent intransmitting the notice ofdefault in July 2010, and Flagstar sent Northwest Trustee a beneficiary declaration, stating that Flagstarwas the actual holder ofthe note in August 2010.No. 71402-3-1/5 Normally, we review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse ofdiscretion. Discover Bank v. Bridges, 154 Wn. App. 722, 726, 226 P.3d 191 (2010). However, the de novo standard ofreview is used by an appellate court when reviewing all trial court rulings made in conjunction with a summaryjudgment ruling. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d301 (1998). To be considered on summaryjudgment, a supporting declaration must be made on personal knowledge and the facts setforth must be admissible in evidence. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 

### knowledge, shall setforth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 

### to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of allpapers or parts thereofreferred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 

### CR 56(e). Washington courts considerthe requirement ofpersonal knowledge to be satisfied ifthe proponent ofthe evidence satisfies the business records statute. See Discover Bank, 154 Wn. App. at 726. A business record is 

### admissible as competent evidence under certain, enumerated circumstances. A record of an act, condition or event, shall in so far as relevant, be 

### competentevidence ifthe custodian or otherqualified witness 

### testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if itwas made inthe regular course ofbusiness, at or nearthe time ofthe act, condition orevent, and if, inthe opinion ofthe court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission. RCW 5.45.020. 

### Morgan submitted two declarations in this case: the first on June 20, 2011, and the second on October 15, 2013. In herfirst declaration, Morgan stated thatNo. 71402-3-1/6 

### the informationwas compiled byemployees ofFlagstar. She did not state she had personal knowledge ofthe information therein. The information set forth in this declaration was assembled by 

### employees ofFlagstar, withthe assistance ofcounsel, based on a review of Flagstar's records and from personnel inthe appropriate offices and departments of said entity. The matters stated herein are true and correctto the best of my knowledge and belief, based upon records and information kept inthe normal course ofbusiness available at this time. 

### Inher second declaration, Morgan did state that she had personal knowledge of the information contained in her declaration. Ihave the personal knowledge required to execute this declaration, and can confirm the accuracy ofthe information setforth herein. If sworn as a witness, Icould competently testify to the facts contained herein. 3. Inthe regular and ordinary course ofbusiness, it is Flagstar's practice to make, collect, and maintain business records and documents related to any loan itoriginates, funds, purchases and/or services (collectively, "Business Records"). Ihave continuing access to the Business Records, and Iam familiar with how each document attached to this declaration was retrieved and compiled. Ihave personally reviewed each document attached to this declaration. 4. Iam familiar with Flagstar's record-keeping practices for 

### its physical receipt and possession ofthe original Note forthe Subject Loan, which is tracked by the vault document management system. Renata asserts that Morgan's two declarations provide "contradictory 

### statements regarding her qualifications and the source of information she relies upon." Renata is essentially arguing that because Morgan used different language ineach declaration, her statements were contradictory. That argument fails. The fact that Morgan's second declaration does not use the same wording

as the first is not evidence that the statements are contradictory.No. 71402-3-1/7 

### Morgan demonstrated the requisite personal knowledge by stating that she had personal knowledge ofthe way in which Flagstar's business records are created and maintained and that she reviewed each ofthe records that provided the information in her declaration. See Discover Bank v. Bridges, 154 Wn. App. 722, 226 P.3d 191 (2010). In Discover Bank, debtors appealed from ajudgment requiring them to 

### pay their credit card debt. Relevant here is the debtors' argumentthat the trial court erred inconsidering business records and affidavits fromthree employees of a debt collection entity working on behalfof their creditorbecause "they do not 

### contain sworn testimony bycompetentfact witnesses." Discover Bank. 154Wn. App. at 726. This court rejected the debtors' argument. 

### Here, [the declarants] collectively stated in their affidavits and declarations that (1) they worked for [the collections agency], 

### (2) [two of the declarants] had access to the Bridgeses' account records inthe course of their employment, (3) [the same two] made their statements based on personal knowledge and review ofthose 

### records and under penalty of perjury, and (4) the attached account records were true and correct copies made inthe ordinary course 

### ofbusiness. The trial court properly considered the affidavits and declarations, and it did not abuse its discretion by considering the business records. 

### Discover Bank, 154 Wn. App. at 726 (footnote omitted). 

### Likethe declarants inDiscover Bank, Morgan declared under penalty of 

### perjurythat (1)she was an employee of Flagstar, (2)she had personal knowledge of her company's practice ofmaintaining business records, (3) she had personal knowledge from herown review of records related to Renata's note and deed of trust, and (4) the records she attached were true and correct copiesNo. 71402-3-1/8
ofdocuments made inthe ordinary course ofbusiness at or nearthe time ofthe transaction. Renata does not identify any genuine issue of material fact as to Morgan's qualifications, her statements, or the authenticity ofthe attached documents. Renata asserts that Morgan presents information "this Court cannot reliably verify." But she cites no authority, and we have found none, suggesting that a declaration is inadmissible unless a court can independently verify the information it contains. We conclude thatthe trial court did not err by considering the declaration and attached business records. Declaratory judgment Renata asserted a claim for declaratoryjudgment, asking the courtto find 

### (1) thatthe subject deed oftrustwas void because itnamed MERS the beneficiary, (2) MERS' assignment of its beneficial interest inthe deed oftrust
was void as a matter of law, and (3) Flagstarwas not the holder or the owner of the note. Renata asked that the nonjudicial foreclosure process be "declared unlawful and permanently enjoined." Intheir motion for summaryjudgment, the respondents argued thatthe trial court should dismiss Renata's claim for declaratoryjudgment because (1) no court has declared a deed oftrust "void" for naming MERS as a beneficiary, (2) 

### MERS had authority to assign its interest in the note to Flagstar, and (3) Flagstar

was a valid holder ofthe note.

8No. 71402-3-1/9
Renata fails to cite any authority, and we have found none, to support an argument that deeds oftrustthat name MERS as the beneficiary are void. Similarly, no authority supports Renata's assertion that an invalid assignmentfrom MERS supports a declaratoryjudgment and permanent injunction prohibiting a trustee's sale. On appeal, Renata adds that the deed oftrust is "deficient" because no evidence inthe record supports a finding thatthe original trustee named inthe deed—Joan Anderson of Flagstar—metthe qualifications of RCW 61.24.010. Renata appears to believe that this too renders the deed void. Renata cites no authority, and we have found none, that supports a finding that an attempted 

### foreclosure is doomed by the designation of an unqualified original trustee inthe deed oftrust. Also, to the extent Renata suggests that Joan Anderson was 

### unqualified because she was an employee ofthe beneficiary, that is no longer the law. Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383, 390, 693 P.2d 683 (1985), citing Laws 

### of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 129, §2 (amending the deed oftrust actto allow an employee agent or subsidiary of a beneficiary to serve as trustee). This court has persuasively and comprehensively rejected Renata's argument that an entity must be both the note holder and the ownerto enforce it. In Truiillo, we held that "it is the status ofholder ofthe note that entitles the entity to enforce the obligation. Ownership ofthe note is not dispositive." Truiillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 181 Wn. App. 484, 498, 326 P.3d 768 (2014), review granted, 182 Wn.2d 1020 (2015). In a related argument that Flagstar did not 

### have "legal possession" ofthe note, Renata relies on article 9 ofthe UniformNo. 71402-3-1/10
Commercial Code, which controls security interests in notes. As we also held in Truiillo, nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings are not subjectto article 9. Truiillo, 181 Wn. App. at 502-04; RCW 62A.9A-109(11); RCW 62A.9A-109, cmt. 7 (security interest in obligation secured by nonarticle 9 transaction). We adhere to
our opinion in Truiillo. Renata argues that Flagstarwas not the holder ofthe note because Capital Mortgage's indorsementto Flagstarwas forged and therefore ineffective. A declaration from the apparent indorser states that "the signature that appears in the endorsement is not mine." This is not proofthat the indorsementwas ineffective. This is only evidence that the signature was not that ofthe apparent indorser. Underthe Uniform Commercial Code, unauthorized signatures are ineffective unless ratified. Unless otherwise provided inthis Article or Article 4, an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as the signature ofthe unauthorized signer infavor of a person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value. An unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes ofthis Article. RCW 62A.3-403(a). For a principal to be charged with the unauthorized act of its 

### agent by ratification, itmust act withfull knowledge ofthe facts or acceptthe benefits ofthe act or intentionally assume the obligation imposed without inquiry. Swiss Baco Skyline Logging, Inc. v. Haliewicz, 18 Wn. App. 21, 32, 567 P.2d 1141 (1977). Butler's declaration fails to create a genuine issue ofmaterial fact because she does not state that she did not authorize another person to indorse the note

10No. 71402-3-1/11

on her behalf, a common practice. But even ifshe had stated she did not authorize another person to indorse on her behalf, Capital Mortgage ratified the indorsementwhen itcomplied with its contractual duty owed to Flagstar by 

### intentionally delivering the indorsed note to Flagstar and accepting payment. Renata asserts that a material issue offact remains as to whether the 

### indorsementwas forged. "Indeed, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that where the endorsement states that it is the signature of Ms. Butler, but she 

### refutes its authenticity, the signature is a forgery under RCW 62A.1-201(43)." ButifCapital Mortgage ratified the signature, the indorsementwas effective even 

### if Butler's signature was forged. We conclude that the indorsementwas ratified by Capital Mortgage and Flagstarwas the holder of the note. UnderTruiillo, Flagstarwas entitled to enforce the note. 

### The trial court properly dismissed Renata's claim fordeclaratoryjudgment. Wrongful foreclosure The deed oftrust act does not create an independent cause ofaction for 

### monetary damages based on alleged violations of its provisions where, as here,
no foreclosure sale has been completed. Frias v. Asset Foreclosure Servs., Inc., 181 Wn.2d 412, 417, 334 P.3d 529 (2014). But, under appropriate factual circumstances, violations ofthe deed oftrust act may be actionable underthe Consumer Protection Act, even where no foreclosure sale has been completed. Frias, 181 Wn.2d at417. We considerthe alleged violations inthat context.

11No. 71402-3-1/12

Consumer Protection Act 

### To prevail on an action fordamages underthe Consumer Protection Act, the plaintiffmust establish (1) unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her 

### business or property; and (5) causation. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc.

v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 780, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). Whether a 

### particular action gives rise to a ConsumerProtection Act violation is reviewable
as a question of law. Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc.. 131 Wn.2d 133, 150, 930 P.2d 288 (1997). MERS' involvement 

### Renata asserts that an unfair or deceptive act or practice is presumed 

### where MERS is involved, citing Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Group. Inc.. 175 Wn.2d 83, 115-20, 285 P.3d 34(2012). That is notthe law. In Bain, our Supreme Court 

### explicitly held that "the mere fact MERS is listed on the deed of trust as a beneficiary is not itself an actionable injury." Bain. 175 Wn.2d at 120. Renata 

### points to the mere fact that MERS was listed as a beneficiary, which under Bain is not enough. Trustee's violation of its duty ofgood faith 

### Atrustee's violation of its duty ofgood faith may be actionable as a violation ofthe Consumer Protection Act. See Frias, 181 Wn.2d at 417. While lenders, servicers, and their affiliates appoint trustees, a trustee is 

### not their agent. "Thetrustee orsuccessortrustee has a duty of goodfaith to the borrower, beneficiary, and grantor." RCW 61.24.010(4). In ajudicial foreclosure

12No. 71402-3-1/13 

### action, an impartialjudge ofthe superior court acts as the trustee and the debtor has a one-year redemption period. RCW61.12.040; RCW4.12.010; RCW 6.23.020(1). In a nonjudicial foreclosure, by contrast, the trustee undertakes the role of the judge as an impartial third party who owes a duty to both parties to


### ensure that the rights of both the beneficiary and the debtor are protected. Cox, 103Wn.2dat389. 

### First, Renata argues that NorthwestTrustee breached the duty of good 

### faith byfailing to investigate Sharon Morgan's "conflictof interest," allegedly arising out of Morgan's assignment of MERS'interestin the deed to Flagstar 

### while acting as both a signing officerofMERS and an officerof Flagstar. MERS has no employees and takes all action through its signing officers who are also officers of its memberentities. Bain, 175 Wn.2d 83. Renata cites no authority for 

### her assertion that Morgan had a conflict of interest. We reject Renata's 

### conclusoryassertion that NorthwestTrustee had a duty to investigate under these circumstances. 

### Second, Renata argues NorthwestTrustee breached the duty of good 

### faith byrelying on Flagstar'sbeneficiarydeclaration withoutinvestigating whether Morgan truly hadauthorityto execute the assignment on behalfofMERS. This argument lacksmerit and isunsupported by anyrelevant authority. Third, Renata asserts that NorthwestTrustee violated the duty of good 

### faith by engagingin a "systematic disregard" of statutorynotarization 

### requirements found in chapter42.44 RCW. Sherefers to thenotice oftrustee's sale, which has an effective date ofApril 29, 2011, but was not notarized until

13No. 71402-3-1/14 May 2, 2011. Renata argues that these facts give rise to a reasonable inference that the document was not signed inthe presence ofthe notary, in violation of Washington law. In support of this assertion, Renata relies on Klem v. Washington Mutual Bank, 176 Wn.2d 771, 295 P.3d 1179(2013). Klem does not support her assertion. Inthat case, Klem presented evidence thatthe trustee falsely predated notarizations oftrustee signatures on notices of sale in orderto expedite foreclosures unfairly. Klem, 176 Wn.2d at 777-78. Northwest Trustee persuasively explains thatthe effective date on a 

### notice ofsale is not the same as the signing date. Rather, itrefers to the effective date ofthe amount due to reinstate, identified on that portion ofthe 

### notice totaling the monthly payments inarrears along with late charges and the lender's and trustee's fees and costs. The effective date is unrelated to the date 

### ofsignature and notarization. The fact thatthe notice listed an effective date that

was earlierthan the date ofthe notarization ofthe signature does not suggest 

### that NorthwestTrustee disregarded statutory notarization requirements in this case, let alone systematically as occurred in Klem. Fourth, Renata asserts Northwest Trustee violated the duty ofgood faith 

### by serving two notices of foreclosure that failed to identify the beneficiary of the deed oftrust and owner ofthe obligation. RCW 61.24.040(2) requires trustees to send a notice offoreclosure with the notice oftrustee's sale and includes a form. 

### The firstparagraph of the form notice asks the trustee to list the name of the beneficiary and owner ofthe obligation.

14No. 71402-3-1/15
As we noted inTruiillo, RCW 61.24.040 directs only that a notice of 

### foreclosure must be in "substantially" the statutory form. RCW 61.24.040(1)(f), (2). Therefore, contrary to Renata's assertion, a trustee does not fail to strictly comply with the terms ofthe act by not strictly following the statutory form language inthe notice offoreclosure. The accompanying notices oftrustee's sale informed Renata ofthe date ofthe sale, the title ofthe entity enforcing the obligation, the amount needed to cure the default, the entity she should contact to cure her default, and her right to contest default. The notices oftrustee's sale identified Flagstar as the beneficiary ofthe deed oftrust. We conclude thattaken together, the notices substantially complied with the statutory form. And in any event, Renata has not shown that she was harmed. Fifth, Renata argues that Northwest Trustee violated the duty ofgood faith by misleadingly describing the original deed oftrust. Trustees are statutorily required to include a description ofthe original deed oftrust inthe notice of trustee's sale. RCW 61.24.040(1 )(f). NorthwestTrustee's description identified MERS as the original beneficiary, succeeded by Flagstar. Renata claims that this reference to MERS made itimpossible for her to identify the true and lawful holder of her loan. We disagree. The Notice ofTrustee's Sale did not disguise 

### the fact clearly stated inthe notice ofdefaultthat Flagstarwas the beneficiary. We conclude that Northwest Trustee did not violate its duty ofgood faith. Because Renata has failed to establish an unfair or deceptive act or practice, we need not considerwhether she has established the remaining elements of a Consumer Protection Act claim.

15No. 71402-3-1/16
Renata's claim underthe Consumer Protection Act was properly dismissed. Quiet title Through the same complaint, Renata seeks to quiet title inthe property subjectto the deed oftrust. "Plaintiffs ownership interest may be subjectto other liens, howeverfor the reasons setforth above the subject deed oftrust was irreparably severed from any underlying obligation." As a result, Renata asserts that "any security interest on the property arising from the deed of trust" is "null and void." The respondents asserted no claim ofownership in Renata's property. Since quiettitle actions are designed to resolve competing claims ofownership


### orthe right to possess property, a quiettitle action cannot survive where, as here, there is no competing claim. Kobza v. Tripp, 105 Wn. App. 90, 95, 18 P.3d 621 (2001). 

### We conclude the trial court properly dismissed Renata's action to quiet
title. Additional discovery Renata claims that the trial court erred by denying her request to continue discovery under CR 56(f). We review a trial court's denial of a CR 56(f) motion for abuse of discretion. Qwest Corp. v. City of Bellevue, 161 Wn.2d 353, 369, 166 P.3d 667 (2007).

16No. 71402-3-1/17
Where the party opposing summaryjudgmentcannot, for reasons stated, present essential facts tojustify his or her opposition, courts may order a continuance to permit additional discovery. Should itappearfrom the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for summaryjudgment] that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application forjudgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as isjust. CR 56(f). A party seeking such a continuance must provide an affidavit stating what evidence it seeks and how this evidence will raise an issue ofmaterial fact 

### precluding summaryjudgment. Durand v. HIMC Corp., 151 Wn. App. 818, 214 P.3d 189(2009), review denied, 168Wn.2d 1020(2010). The trial court may 

### deny a motion for a continuance when (1) the requesting party does not have a good reason forthe delay in obtaining the evidence; (2) the requesting party does not indicate what evidence would be established by further discovery; or (3) the new evidence would not raise a genuine issue of fact. Qwest. 161 Wn.2d at 

### 369, quoting Butler v. Joy. 116 Wn. App. 291, 299, 65 P.3d 671, reviewdenied. 150Wn.2d 1017 (2003). Renata did notfile an affidavit. She made her requestfor a continuance at 

### the end ofher response to the respondents' motion for summaryjudgment. There, she stated that she needed a continuance to conductdepositions under 

### CR 30(b)(6) to address "the issue of authorization" and "the issues surrounding 

### the forgedendorsement." Renata does notspecifically identifythe evidence she believes would be uncovered. And Renata does not provide a good reason for her delay in obtaining this evidence.
17No. 71402-3-1/18
Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

### discretion by denying Renata's request for a CR 56(f) continuance. Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

18