19 Juq 1951 

Minutes of Fourth Meeting ot Ad Hoc CoDID!ttee on Portuguese Comnnication 

Securit7 

HEID : Pentagon, 18 Juq 1951 at 1030 hours 

PRl!iSBft: 

ABSm: 

:ur. wn Ji am F. FRDDKAN, AFSA, Chairman 

Colonel Gordon E. DAWSON, USA, m 

Kr. Winston SCOTT, CIA 

a>R llark T. LITTIB, USN, NATO 

Kr. Robert PACKARD, state 

llr. FRIEDMAN opened the meeting by stating that Lt. General SllITH, 

Chairman ot USCIB, had asked. him at the last USCIB 14aeting (13 J~) haw 

soon the .Ad Hoc Committee could ettect the recamendation contained in 

paragraph 4.b. ot the Report ot the USCIB Coordinator to the USCIB on 

Portuguese Cammmication Securit7, viz., that the !!!, ~ bocQ" ascertain 

the uact extent to which present BATO practices JDa1' provide secure wqa 

and means, within the framework ot these practices, to solve the 

Portuguese problem. Ml'. FRDDllAN had estimated. one month as a feasible 

period ot time needed tor this task, am had therefore oaJled this .meeting 

ot the !S, l!gg, bod1' to consider the problem. 

CDR LITTIB remarked that at the present tiJlle the Council ot Deputies 

ot NATO is considering a revision of the basic aecurit7 regulations. In 

regard to electrical transmission, he read frail D.C.2/7 "Proposed Revision 

ot the North Atlantic 'lrea't7 Organization Securit7 s,.stem•, paragraph 17: 

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eclassified and approved for release 

y NSA on 11-17-2014 pursuant to 

.0. 13526 
REF ID:A6722. 

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1117. Electrical Transmission 

'!be special cryptographic arrangements which have been 

provided will enable national delegates or their national. diplo- •tic representatives at the seat ot all NATO bodies to commu.-

rd.cate with their Governments aid will allClll' inter-cammmication 

between all HATO Secretariats. st mi 1 ar arrangements will. be 

made to allow supreme Conmanders to conminicate with Naval, 

Military, 8lld .Air Commanders and Service Mlnistriea. The ~ 

cr,n>tographic 978tem to be used tor the present time at these 

levels for OOSMIC camaunications of all securit7 classifications 

and NATO ccmmmicationa classif'ied TOP SECRET or SJXmBT is 

'1)pex lrfark II with simplex settings. n 

CDR LITTm pointed out that copies of these security regulations had been 

distributed to all NATO countries, although it bad become clear that not 

al1 were observing th•. 

Ml". FRIEDKAN said that in regard to Portuguese ocnmnn1catiOll8 it had 

been detiniteq ascertained tbat the Portuguese were 11827 ot using TJ'pex 

tor certain comm1ntcations because of their tear that the British, who 

were preparing the ker lists, were keeping copies of than. CDR LITTIE 

concurred in this observation and said that it had been stated to him 

peraonal.q that there were compunctions among the Portuguese concerning 

the honesty ot the Iondon CJpher Board in promulgating the settings tor 

use b.r NATO countries, since it •s teared that the British had kept duplicate sets. 

llr. FRDDllAR then raised the question 1lh7, since he understood that 

permission had been given the NATO countries to compile their awn settings 

tar '.l)pex, the NATO countries d1d not avail themselves ot this opportunity 

to make their own natiOIJ&l. books of settings. CDR LIT'l'IE pointed out that, 

to the best ot his knowledge, such permission had never been given the 

MATO countries, the Security Coordinating CCXllllittee•s recamnendation tor 

such a measure having been rejected by' the Starld1ng Group. Inasmuch as 

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this statement was quite contraey to the impression of Mr. FRil!DKAN and 

other manbers ot the ~ !!22, bocf1', CDR LITTIE ottered to obtain the paper 

in which the measure •a recommended. by the Securit7 Coordinating 

Conmittee and that in which the recommendation Rs rejected by the 

standing Group. The !!!_ !!!!!!. committee ap.ressed. interest in both papers, 

am it was pointed out by Mr. FRDDMAN that this re:f'uaal by the standing 

Group to allow NATO co1Ultriea to cmpile their awn settings threw an 

entireq different light upon NA'l'O COlfmOO problems. :ur. SCOTT noted that 

this refusal ottered some justification tor the Portuguese distrust of 

'l)pex. CDR LITTIE,, in reJ>lT to a qμer.r from Jlr. FRIEDIWl, aaid that he 

believed that u.s. a.Di U.K. members of the St.anding Group had made this 

decision on the grounds that the machine itself ottered autticient 

securit7 tor the present time, am that permission to compile their awn 

settings should be given to the various nations onl.7 when they had shown 

that their practices confOl'Dled with the securit7 requirements ot HATO. 

Colonel DAWSON suggested to CDR LITl'IE that he discuss this matter 

with the British member of the Group with a view to hav.ing the rejected 

proposal rerived. He al.so suggested that the Securit7 Coordinating 

Committee,, accan.panied by technical persomel, visit the various nations 

and convince them ot the securit7 of 'I)pex tor national cammmi.c-ations 

when used properl.7 with nationalJ.1-prepared settings. Jlembers of the 

!!!!!22 committee agreed that such an approach should be made frail a NATO 

level am through NATO chamela. 

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Kr. FRll!DJWl then directed the attention or the camnittee to paragraph ,3.h. ot the report ot the USCIB Coordinator, and particularq to 

that portion (2) concerning the practices which app'.q "to the various 

types ot categories ot NATO or national classified information which mq 

be encr;ypted b,r 'l)pex''. Mr. FRD!DllAN asked whether there was clarit7 in 

regard to what sort of communications should. be encrypted by 'l)pex. 

CDR LlTTIE replied that he believed the regulations were clear on this 

subject, although they were, or course, subject to interpretation by the 

various countries. Generally speald.ng, 'l)'pex was to be used tor NATO 

matters and tor national. comment on NATO matters, but not tor pirelJ' 

national matters. Kl". FRil!DMAH pointed out that it the nations were. permitted. to make their own settings they would not hesitate to encrypt in 

'l)pex the fringe COSMIC traffic which is now carried. on the nationa1 

878tems, thereb,r end.angering NATO coamunications am the 'l)pex traffic 

ot other NATO countries. lfembers of the camnittee agreed with this 

observation. 

The qμestionwas then raised by the CHAIRMAN concerning the regulations in regard to the use bJ" the NATO-eountries ot courier service, aDi 

particularq whether the suggestion made in a recent. uscm meeting could 

be effected, vis., that special.17 sensitive material not be handed over 

to these countries unless a pranise was obJ;ained that it W>ul.d be handled .. 

onlJ' by courier service. In regard to this, Colonel DAWSON referred to 

paragraph l4 ot D.C.2/7 in which courier service is expresslJ' required 

tor the transmission of all COSMIC intomation and documents, unless time 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

does not permit the use of accanpanied. bag. Onl.7 then :l.s e1ectrical 

transmission authorized, 'l)pex being the oricy' 117Stem authorized tor transmission ot such material. Since there are definite indications that the 

Portuguese, at least, are violating this regulation, the question was 

raised by lfr. FRDDllAN how such violation could. be brought to their attenti on The suggestion 

was made by CDR LITTIE that an approach be made through the NATO Standing 

Group, and apecifica.111' through General LINDSAY, the internatiOJJal 

representative a.rd liaison officer in London between the standing Group 

am the NATO Council of Deputies. In reJ>lT to Ur. FRIEDMAN•a question 

whether the United states and United Kingdom could do arJTthing to facilitate the use of the courier service b.v the NATO countries, Colonel DAWSON 

pointed out that the availability of the U.S. Air Force, Arlq, and State 

Depart.ment courier service had been reiterated to the NATO countries 

during the pa.at month. CDR LITTIE confirmed Colon.el. DAWSON1s remark and 

also stated that a manoraldum had been put out b.v NATO outlining the 

courier service available to NATO nations. Kr. FlμEDllAR offered the 

suggestion that a stud7 of the frequency with which NATO countries made 

use of the courier service would be ot interest 1 and Colonel DA'1SON stated 

that it would not be difficult to cmpile a report cmnparing the percentage 

of volume of traffic by courier ard by electrical transmission. CDR 

trrTIE pointed out that it •s his belief that most ot the violations of 

security were to be foUJld in transmissions of representatives in tom.on 

and 'Washington, rather than trm the capitals of the countries themselves, 
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REF ID:A672. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

a vier somnhat confirmed. b.r llr. FRimllAN atter a brief surve;r of the 

crypl;ographic violations in Portuguese canmunications. irr. FRil!.DllA.ll suggested. that the !S, ~ cammi ttee recommend that additicmal instruction 

{ in the use of securit7 procedures be given to the NATO countries, and 

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pointed out that this could be done easil.¥ l ___________ _.J 

DAWSON noted that essentiallJ' the same basic arrangements must be made 

with Portugal. as had been made with NATO countries with regard to securit;r 

outside the COSMIC and NATO spheres. He pointed out that verr few NATO 

countries had security regulatiOJll!I tor their .Armed Forces, and that even 

Norw&J' had no standardized security document or procedure. a>R LITTIE 

remarked that in regard to security consciousness &Dd morale., however,, 

Norway stood relative]T high., whereas Portugal was outstandintlT insecure 

f at ever,y level. llr. FRIEDKAH indicated that consideration should be given 

I to the mechanics of an approach to the Portuguese in regard to internal 

, securit;r., 

Im addition, the --~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

Portuguese had appeared. very agreeable to dismissing undesirable persons 

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i'ran the Gonrment, a matter entailing less effort than in France, for 

in Portugal the CCM1111Dinist Part.7 was illegal, whereas in France it was not. 

Ur. FRil!DMAN' s suggestion "1hat the !9, ~ comittee recomm.end that a team 

be sent i'ran the Securit7 Coordimting Committee ot NATO to inspect the 

securit7 arrangements of Portugal on a non-reciprocal basis was .f'avorabl.7 

received. CDR LITT1E pointed out that a Bl"itish team had alread1' visited 

Lisbon before Portugal had been permitted access to COSMIC inf'ormation . ard that certain agreements bad been effected at that time in regard to 

securit;r. He beliried. that more cc:nild be gained from a visit by a U.S. 

\ team from the services rather than from the Treaty' ad.Visors.; 

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question •s raised bJ" the CHAIRVAN whether such training could best be 

carried out in the United states or in Europe under the auspices ot SHAPE; 

from. the point of view of expense a.Iii feasibility it 'WB.S agreed that such 

a school could well be set up ulJd.er SHAPE. It lias pointed out by Mr. 

SCOTT that an approach must be made at the top level in order to gain 

results, and that once top level approval has been gained, training on a 

working level is effective. Without top level cooperation, however, the 

training ot the workers is ineffective, as has been recently eJEperienced 

in the Dutcp Arrq where the Chief of Statf is opposed to the tightening 

of security measures am therefore the Arlq' Chief of Intelligence is virtual:q powerless to bring about a tightening ot security within the ArfllT. 
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Colonel DAWBON remarked that the standardization of security was bu.t 

another facet ot the general trend within SHAPE to standardize, and that I 

there therefore should be no trouble in eff ecti!Jg such a standardization 

of security regulations. SU.ch regulationa 1'8re also neceaa&17 to protect 

classified 1.ntormation presentq being given to NATO countries outside the 

realms of COSMIC, as in the field of ordnaDce, sappq, etc. CDR LITTLE 

stated that a NATO War College was being established under SHAPE, and Mr. 

FRDDMAN remarked. that this would constitute a good precedent or basis for 

setting up a training school in Paris or its vicinity, for students fran 

the various NATO countries, such a school to conduct courses in security, 

including cryptograpbJ' and cammu.nication securit7. CDR Ll'.l'Tm pointed. out 

that even now pl.ans were being drawn tor a working group within SHAPE to 

report on clandestine am subversive activity. He indicated that, in his 

opinion, U.S. standards of securit7 and U.S. instructors rather than U.K. 

should be used since U.S. standards were higher than those of the U.K. 

Uembers of the committee agreed, and it •s also agreed that the first 

step should be the pramlgation of a document setting forth mini111un co•Wl~rcah.. 

security standards tor NATO countries, the second step being the settiJJg 

up of a school tor training in security method.a and practices. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN closed the meeting by stating that these thoughts might 

form the basis for the next meeting ot the !!!, !!,22, cmmittee, and asked 

CDR LI':r.l'IE to obtain tor IUm as soon as possible the documents perta1.ning 

to the canpilation by the various KATO nations ot their own settings tor 

'l)pelt am the rejection of this by the Standing Group. These CDR LrmE