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APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN 

CODE WORD MATERIAL 

APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN 

CODE WORD MATERIAL 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-05-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

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AFSAC: 73/3 

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF .AIJ'SAC; 

'EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

7 December 1950 

S11bJeat. COMINT Collaborationcr. 

22 

lo The question o.· t wheth.·er t.b.··· e .. United Sta.te9r1ntend s 

to collaborate with allied nations··• (other than th~ 

in the oolleution9 procesaing11 and•.•. dissemination o""'t,........,,,.o'""'om==----' 

munication intelligence material e]>pears to warrant serious 

consideration and atudy9 on apr1o~1ty basis 9 in view ot: 

ao The present world Si t11at.iono 

b., The broad aoopeor ou1ttent negotiations in 

connection with NATO planningQ 

e consequent lik:elih.ood that either the U.,.S0 

or the may at any time be approached with offers of 

or req_ collaboration in the 0.0MINT fj eldo 

do The international oomplex1on or any NATO or UN 

t'oroes v1hioh will be engaged in any potential hostilities 

with the Union or Soviet Socialist ~epublioso 

2o A prerequisite to the rasolutton of this question will be a determination ot the extent and meGhanioa of 

world=wide Uo So Qollabora.tion with th.er 1 in t>.rartime 

Combined Headquarters a'ti Theater and lowex 1e11elso Obviouely P this must be based upon a firm UaSo global COMINT 

struoture 9 the planning tor which should be undertaken 

without delay., 

Jo While the reoentf lcoMINT Oonferenoe was 

1n the planning atagas 9 tn~ lpropoaad tha~ certain ~lob= 

al questions ba considered as Items on the agendao The 

OSOIB Coordinator indicated that UoSo authorities were not 

prepared to consider these global matters to:rmally9 but ~ere agreeable to info;rm.a.l disoussions or these and other 

points whioh thel Ponferees proposed to take UPo 

AFSAC: TJ/"J 

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TOP pi1UJE1iGo!A:COR~ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

AFSAC: ?'J/3 PL86-36/50 USC 3605 ? December 1950 

Subject: 0.0MINT Oollaborationo 

... ---c:o - ~ -. - ---- - - - 4 0 These informal.discn1saions were held and brought 

to light <Jertain.\po:J.nts in the British a:pproaoh to the problelll&~ With r$8peot tol Jwartilile collabo- ration~ their thil1ki.pg appeared not to ave progressed beyond the point of ~a1s1ng queationso However, \vith 

respect to wartime\odllaboration with third partiesll the 

I lhad reached\ oe.rtain tentative oonolusions 0 whioh 

are summarized in .Enclosure lQ 

So During the Qour.~ in:rorm.al d1aouas1ons, it 

beoame apparent that the Vlill suggest another oon ... terence to consider these\ an re.ated matters next Springo In order to be sure tha.t UoSo national interests are main= 

tatned in meeting the propQaals whioh the British may advance at that time 9 it is\ considered essential that AFSAC 

sponsor immediately the\consideration and study necessary for the Servioes and .AFSA to\arrive at e. tirm. U.o So po= s1t1on on these problems<> So]]le ot the primary oonsider.., 

a.tions 9 as seen :t'rom the Uc So\ point of view ii are set torth 

in Enolo'sure 2 si wh1 oh seeks meraly to present the p1•oblem 

without ottering e. solutiOJ1o 

6c It is theret"ore reoomm.ended that .All"SAC designate 

an ad hoo oomm.ittee to prepare: 

A plan tor Uo So global COMINT structure in 

wartimeo 

-bo A global plan f'oJ I OOMINT oollabo= 

ration in wartimeo -I L---------1 

1-

- <lo Reoommende.tions regardingf ICOMINT 

oollaborat1on with third parties in wa•r-c-iu~a-¢ _ ___, 

7o That USOIB be kept informed and oonaultedt as 

appropriate concerning these matterso 

t 

A.FSAC: 73/3 

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ENCLOSURE l --- THINKING WITH RESPECT TO 

T ONS tlITHTHIRD P~ 

L. It w'\ 1.1 not be possible for.I .... __ ___,,, ____ I forces to 

fight with forces of a third power under an integrated Head= 

quarters Staff' without making somel I COMINT available 

to of':t"icers of the third powero 

..----2-=-..... In a Theater containingj l (or Combined I) COMINT uni ts as well as COfUNT uni'ts or a third 

""""=po-w=e=r=-l) ....,1...,t... \will be advisable to promote technical cooperation 

among such\unitso 

J,. Before allowing release pf either intelligence or 

technical information" the~ ·· · ; ~should enforce upon the third power satisfactOJ seour1c rues for the handling and use» at all levels» of intelligence and technical infor= 

mation from all sourceso 

4o It theret'ore follows tb.at thel 

prepare agreed \securi t.r regulations gov/ rn!ng 

ters 9 and have them accepted by all countries 

may have COiilNT \.dealings in wartime c 

~should all CUNT mat= 

with whom we 

NOTE It is believed that th,ieseistatements adequat~ly sum00 

marlze the cllrrent opinions o~ JCO?AINT authorities,, It 

is not believed thdt they he!V/ilfil hed exploring the prob= lems 0 nor that these are necessCJ.rily the views which will be 

officially presented to the U.,S'° at the next oonferenceo 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Enclosure (l) 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

ENCLOSURE 2 ....... ....., ............ .___ PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

QQj'SIDER4TIONS W~TING WAR?f.ME q_OMINT COLLAB_j)_fuiTION 

lo In view o:r the olose~ I 0ollaboration sinee 

the early days o~ World War/! 11 it rs not anticipated that the 

beginning ot ruture hostilities would present any fundamental 

polioy problems in this r.espeota However 9 $m.portant deoisions 

mu.st be reached as to./the means of implement~tion of such 

oollaborat1ono For/example 0 plans must be drawn up whioh will 

answer 9 among otlle:rs ,/the following questiona: 

ao .. ··T· o/·w···· na.t extent will processing ,enters (National 9 and Theater and t"ield) be aombined _ _ oentars9 

I J~ii:?what extent will intercept units be combined 

] f'£ut~!~!'I d1saem1ne.tion be etteoted t,~ugh combined 

do In looalities where oombined centers and units 

are not advisable or reasibleu what arrangements oan be made 

tor cross=disaemination~ 

eo Where~ speo1f1oallyg will Tneater oente~s be 

established? 

2o On 1;he oths:r hand 11 it is oons1de:red almost a certainty that oombined oomm.andg with integrated sta:t':f's 9 w111 predominate within the field roroes during any future conflict with the 

Soviet Uniono Theretore 9 it is logical to assume that offioe~s 

ot many nationalities will be serving in capacities that demand 

their access to CO.MINT to enable intalligent and efficient per= 

tormance or their assigned dnt1eso If this assumption is 

acoepted9 it raises a series of questions relating to the method 

ot disseminating COMINT at all levels of oom.bin.ed forces: 

ao Shall each nation disseminate its own COJ-4INT to its 

nationalsD denying it to other allied nationalal · I 

agreements exoluded)~ 

b-0 Shall eaoh nation disseminate its COMINT to author~ 

ized recipients or all allied nat1onalities9 

Oo Shall dissemination be af~eoted through a combined 

summary containing the results ot all allied COMINT Centers 

which is made available to authorized reo!pients ot all allied 

nationalities'? 

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2

) 
TOP pBEmo~OR\ 

30 Due to the present existence ot COMINT :ent;rs ~thin the ter~i tory of some o:f' our probable allies 9 .I 

in partioular, and their knowledge o:r t.he benef'i s o suo 

organizations, it is highly probable that th$ United States will 

at any time bs requested to permit allied co.llaboration in the 

collection and processing ot COMIN'2o The extent an~ldegree ot 

collaboration that would be requested can not be predicted at 

this timeo It is conoeivable that considerable p:ressure could 

be exerted to obtain oomplete teohnioal oollaborat1ono I~ this 

be true 9 1t is quite possible that t.b.a United States author ... ities may not consider complete teohnioal oollaborat1on as the 

moat desirable solutiono It 1e eesentialto consider at this 

time what degree or extent or technical ~ollaboration we shalJ 

permit in the oolleotion and processing Qf OOMil'lT materialo 

This determination should extend to all .ooMinT produoing 

centers tr0JI1 the National Center (AFSA) down to the smallest 

unit so engagedo To wait until the actual outbreak of hostilities on a global basis before establishing adequate saf'aguards and polioies could well be fatal to the OOMINT eftorto 

4o Another aspect ot the probleni is that of seourity standards to be prescribed tor alliednations should oollabo= 

ration be authorizedo Suoh etandarda a.a are determined to be 

essential tor the protection ot this material should be made 

a prerequisite to collaboration to any extento Since any negotiations with allied nations along these lines are likely 

to reveal past suooesses of our COMINT effort it ia considered 

that oare:ful planning and preparati.on are easentialo Therec 

fore 9 it is desirable that the minimum. security standarda that 

would be aooeptable to the United States be determinedti and 

that guidance be furnished as to the most feasible approaoh in conduoting negotiations with the nations involved~ 

5~ It is oonsidered that the problems raised herein 

should b& initially oonsidered by the Department or Defonse 

as the Department with primary interest in military oollabO= 

rationo Resultant racommendati~ns should be referred by 

.AFSAO to USCIB11 as the National. authority dealing with the 

security and foreign exchange of OOM1NTo 

l 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Enclosure (2) 

.,, 2 = 

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