' 

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTO?l 

'iQP SjjGMT G+'~fOE Sl!l0T:JRI'f¥ Ilf'O!MA!IGN 17 August 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO 

Countries 

REFERENCE: USCIB 23/70 

1. The proposals presented in this memorandum are submitted in 

response to the decision of USCIB, at its Eighty-eighth Meeting on 

10 July 1953, that the Department of State should be the cognizant 

US authority with respect to certain preliminary steps contained in 

the Report of the recent US-UK Conference on the Communications 

Security (CO.MSEC) of NATO Countries. These proposals have been 

approved by the Secretary of State. The specific preliminary steps 

which they concern are the determination of (a) the nature of the 

initial a:9proach to the French and (b) the terms of reference and 

composition of the Combined (US-UIC) Working Group to be set up in 

Washington tc facilitate coordination of this program. 

2. Considerations affecting the initial approagh to th~ French. 

a. Despite existing covert contacts with French 

intelligence authorities, who have already indicated that 

they are aware of the vulnerability of the communications 

of certain other NATO countries and are concerned that 

corrective steps be undertaken, it would be best not to use 

intelligence channels for this approach so as to avoid the 

difficulty of discussi forei n COMSEC ractices on an 

intelli ence basis or 

b. Since it will not be possible to demonstl"ate 

Enclosure with USCIB: 14/313. 

prepare 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-30-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

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prepare jointly with the US and UK a set of minimum COMSEC 

standards and procedures to be applied throughout the NATO 

countries and then to assure that these standards and 

procedures can be met within the French Government before 

proposing them to others. 

c. It will be imperative that all contacts made within 

the French Government are secure and are given adequate 

authority. 

d. The Tripartite Security Working Group (US-UK-French),, 

which has been in existence since 1950, would appear to 

off er the best means of achieving an orderly and secure 

arrangement for direct discussion between the proper COMSEC 

authorities of the three governments. Although the work of 

this Group has not heretofore included CCMSEC matters, the 

Group has developed cooperative and secure contacts among 

responsible French authorities in general security matters. 

3. The initial a;pproach to the French. To assure wholehearted 

cooperation by the French in sponsoring jointly with the US and UK the 

overall program for other NATO countries and in making effective 

improvements in French COMSEC, the French Government should be approached 

first at the cabinet level. The project should then be assigned to the 

Tripartite Security Survey Group to establish proper contact between 

COMSEC authorities of the three governments. As a practical matter, 

and as a means of achieving the greatest possible compulsion, this 

approach should be undertaken jointly by US and UK representatives. 

a. Phase 1. At the cabinet level the French 

Government should be requested by the US and UK ambassadors 

to agree in principle that the overall security of NATO 

requires that a broad program be undertaken to improve 

the security of the national communications of NATO 

countries, and that this program should be initiated 

through the Standing Group as a logical extension of the 

existing COMSEC program of the NATO organization itself. 

This improvement should be accomplished by the promulgation 

of minimum COMSEC standards to be adopted on a NATO-wide 

basis. To this end the terms of reference of the Tripartite 

Security Survey should be extended to include the preliminary 

development and application of these standards on a 

tripartite basi.s. This phase should be handled by the 

Department of State and the Foreign Office. 

b. Phase 2. The Tripartite Security Working Group 

should then set up a technical sub-group to be composed of 

appropriate CCMSEC authorities selected by the Tripartite 

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Security Working Group and authorized by their respective 

governments to represent all COMSEC activities of these 

governments. This phase should be handled by selected 

members of the US and UK Tripartite Security Teams as 

agreed between the participating agencies. 

c. Phase 3. The COMSEC authorities should then proceed 

to develop minimUir COMSEC standards and to apply them 

within the three governments. US participation in this 

phase should be handled by the National Security Agency (NSA). 

4. The Combined (US-UK) Working Group. To assure that the 

COMINT aspects and limitations of this program are properly coordinated, the Combined Working Group should be under the direction 

of USCIB and LSIB. It should serve to: 

a. coordinate US and UK proposals :for the initial 

approach to the French, subsequent technical discussions, 

preparation of a memorandum to be issued by the NATO 

Standing Group and fornrulation of minimum security 

standards; 

b. coordinate between the US and UK conclusions as 

to the status of the COMSEC of NATO countries as this 

program develops; and 

c. coordinate US and UK recommendations :for further 

steps, as envisaged in paragraph 23 of the Conference Report, 

should this program not accomplish the desired response from 

NATO countries or improvement in their COMSEC. 

The US element of this Group should also serve as an ad hoc subcommittee of USCIB to keep this entire program under continuous review 

for the Board. To this end, US participation should include 

appropriate representatives of the Department of State, NSA, CIA, 

FBI and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The overriding 

political character of the initial phases of this program indicates 

that the US element of this Group should be headed by its Department 

of State member. 

5. It is recommended that the plan described in paragraphs 3 and 

4 above be referred by USCIBEC and USCIB for approval and implementation, 

including presentation to appropriate UK authorities. 

(Signed) 

W. PARK ARMSTRONG, JR. 

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