REF ID:A517088 

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POP Si:iSRii'i' • 5:..:StjRlff lfff6RttA'fION 

AFSAC 63/68 

2.3 October 1952 

AfOO..D FORCES S!XURITI AG.'.:.NCY CliUNCIL 

DECISION ON AFSAC 63/68 

!U .. roRT OF TH.:<. UK/US C011.t<UNICATION SfCU1tll"l CuN r'~u:NCE 

Note bx th• Secretarg 

22 

l. On 16 October 1952 the Manbere ot AFSAC approved the keport. 

of the UK/US Commwaication Securit7 Cmterence, 19520 

2. This decision now becomes a part or and shall be attached 

as the top sheet or AFSAC 63/68. 

fh. c. f::{~ M. C •. nSHER 

LTJG,, U .s. Navy 

Secretary, Ar'SAC 

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-14-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
AFSACs 63/68 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Report of t.hs UK/US ~oation Secur:l.ty eonf ereooci~ 19S2 

1., At its )8th Maat..1.ngb AFSAC s.,greed to torward to the JSC 

for &d.jwiication, via USCIB,, the que~ticm ,,f wiwther Co~c~:M.·~. 

Secul"i 'J" or Commmcaticn lnt9lligrmco 111 fo1"6l00st to th@ int.El ,~c 8~~ 

ot the UoSo" The Cha..i.rilum9 USGIB• ha. now infoi'J'lad m that th~ 

National Seicuri ty Co-~il dl:>1.H1 not d@sil"e 1;o ei1tabli8h m gmelt'.'31 

polloy on this ll'At~ h\;.tl' inst@il.dtl pro.fern to de<:id@ ®&lilh c&E;; 

on its own meri tao 

2.. The UJpeci.fie ouo whd..oh mcc~tuatt~ ths re ~nt f :t?' 

defining a UoSo pulley on 

'lid. th tho propcned .relaue ~o~""""" 

SJ.nee DO ger..eral. U oS o policy on 

l1191wi at tbie time and sincQ ttmre s now no £ .. , 

requiring pre~e~tion to tbD Nationril Sswnty Counoilp I t.b.G1~ 

1'on ·~ th~t the incl.osed. ~r~ be q>pnwed ~ fef;·~ 

warded to the Joint CW.a.ts of Stm"f .. 

Jo lnclomtN '

19Bia to the ~rendum ME! been praviotu.U.y dl,~= 

tributed to tho &iibsrs u th~ h1cloeure ·w AFS.AC 6)/6Jo 

4.. It 1111 re~ated. tJtat the ~ra 1J.!dic11.~ ~ concu:i?= 

nmco or cam.11ant.s on ·Ule att&lch0ii votA 1h.oot and return ·'{.o the 

AFSNJ Seonl~ prior to 16 October l9S2o 

Incloaure .,.. l 

Memorandum by th~ Chatman. 

AFSAC, for the Jo5.nt Chief's 

~ Staff" subject At.1 tibaveo 

AFSAC1 6)/68 

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REF ID:A517088 

-:~ r:rop SECREY" 

MlMORANl.>UM DI Ttlli CHAIRMAN, AitMclJ FO.H.Cs...S Si!CUlilTY AG~l;Y C04hCjb 

for the 

JOIN'r CHn.FS OF STAFF 

on 

Ri:;PORT OF THI:; uyus COl·i)_UNICATlON 

Sl::CURITY CON~CE l 2 

Refer&lce: J.c.s. 2cY/4 7 

lo In 1950, the British Chiefs or Starr and the U. !i. Chie.f s of Gt.arr 

agreed (J.c.s. 2074/7) to continue for the next four years the series of 

Communication Security (COl'$LC) conferences which was begun in \"iashington 

in September, 1950; the third UK/US Cor.lCl.unication Security Coorerence was 

held in \·:ashington in Mq 1952" 

2. 'nle report of the Ccoterence is contained in mclosure "B"~ An 

identical report is being forwarded to the British Chiefs or Staff by the 

Chairman of the U. Ko Delegatim., '!'he llirector, Armed l"orces Secui·i ty Agency, 

has forA'arded a copy or the report to the Director, Communications-.i:J.ectronics, 

tor his information. 

3d It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs ot Start: 

,!o ApproYe the report. contained in .tnclosure "B", subject to the 

amendment expressed in Ulclosure "A". 

!!o Forward the memorandum in l!llcloaure "A" to the representatives 

of the British Chiera of Start~ 

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i 

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REF ID:A517088 

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DfC1PSUJUi ••An 

DRAJo"'l' 

MOORAMDUM l"O'R TH~ lW>Ri.Sl!llTATIVl'.S OF 'nfo BRITISH CHit.FS o•· STAf'F 

1. The u.s. Chieta ot Statt approve the Report of the 1952 UK/US 

COCllUlication Security Conterence held in ~~ashlngt.on in May 1952. 

20 'l'he U.S. Chiefs of Statt ask that consideration be given to inserting t.he following statement in the Report at paragraph 9J; 

"ln all cases where Cr"JPto-equipments are to be made 

aT&ilable to N.l?O, the revelation of crypto-prmciplea involved 

ehoW.d be restricted to general SUllll&J"ies and descriptions, and 

should not include specific wiring details, drawings, etc •• 

unt.U after the equipact 18 in production. 11 

The u.s. Cbiefe ot Statr belieYe t..b&t disclosure 0£ all det.a.1la ot the 

Cl'JPto-principle prior to it• elllbociia4nt 1n a manufactured vereia:l is a 

practice to be avoided., since such detailed knowledge would allow a nonBrwsa MATO govemment to produce tor ite own national C<JIZllJNnic&tiona an 

equipment embodying excellent Cl7Pto-pr.inciplee wen though th• U.K .. or 

U .. s.. proffered equipment might be of'ticial.ly reject.ad tor IATO uaeo 

..i:.ncloeure "A" 

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