T():P ~EP» p:rpA.s~~N ~ ""' ... " .A...A ... ...c::-i ""' '- . 

TENTATIVE DRAFT 

REPORT BY THE 

COMMI?I'EE ON SECURITY 

TO THE 

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

OF THE 

UcK~ ~ UoS, CONFERENCE ON SECUHITY OF FRENCH COM1lUNICATIONS 

THE PROBLg,1 

1 a~ To detennine whether the French Government should be 

approached with a view to improving the security or their ~ommunications and to assess the gains and/or losses therefrom to 

the U,K and the UoSn Governments; 

b. To develop a spec1f1o plan of approach 11 to include 

details as to how and when it should be made, 

.FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSIOU 

2o See Enclosure, 

CONCLUSIONS 

J~ It is concluded that: 

a~ The French Government at present is infiltrated with 

Communists and other disloyal or untrustworthy personnel~ is sub= 

ject to violent intarnal dissensions" and is careless or it·a own 

security to a degree where its classified information is seriously 

in danger ot leakage to unauthorized persons, 

b". Although direct evidence is lacking that Oommunists in 

Frenoh Government positions have actually passed classified information to the U,S,S~Ro~ the passage ot suoh information must be 

assumed to occur 

c~ The following grave risks are involved in any approach 

to the French on the subject of the insecurity of their communi= 

cations: 

c 1 ) I rithout EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

adequate assurance that the U.,S.S R would 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-29-2014 pursuant to E.O. 1352e 

TO·P SE€-RET ACORN . 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 (2)r---___________ ....__,\\\ 

( 3) Disadvantageous poll ti cal repercussions., 

(4) Generation of additional pressure from the 

French forl pollaooratloriu EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

do All the risks inherent in an approach to the French 

on the subject of their communications security arise not from 

the U.,S~/U .. Ko technical plan for improvement but from the lae1k 

of security of French Government departments and agenciese.. Despite the foregoing, the urgency of improving the 

security of French oommun1cat1ons is such tb.A.t a program to this 

end should be undertaken as early as possible, subjeot to the 

oondi tions set forth in Sections V and VI of the Enclosure" 

f ., The facts and disousslon contained in the Enclosure may 

require modification in the light or the report of the Tripartite 

Group now studying the internal security or the French Governl'lent 

Any approach to the French on the subjeot of their oommunioat1ons 

security should be deferred pending consideration of that report. 

Nevertheless~ it is not considered likely that the report will 

artect the validity or the above oonolueions, 

g" Assuming that the report indicates that there are 

prospects of obtaining satisfaotory assurances of meeting the 

conditions specified in Section VI or the En~losure 9 then the 

approach to the French Government should be made along the lines 

indicated in Section VII of the Enolosure" 

2 = 

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

la.o I't 1s recOD111Bncted that: 

aa 'D:le abo~ conclusions be appro..-edo 

bo tBCIB and LSIB appoint representatives who will keep this 

problem under continuous review and make appro:pr1ate recommendations for 

subsequent aot1ono 

c. USCIB and ISIB appoint representatives vho should be sent 

to Paris to brie:f' the U.X. and UoSo Ambassadors prior to their approach 

to the French GoYern:mant., 

- 2a -

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I 0 GENERAL STATEMBNT~ 

be derived from crypto=comm.unications by Intellieence may 

any or all of the following methods: 

80 By obtaining physioal possession of the exact texts or 

{b af't r called Method 1) the substance of the communications~ ere e 

b, By obtaining physical possession of the means for dire~t 

reading of the :i.ntercepted traffic { cryptoroaterial such as key 

11sts 9 etco); ~hereafter called Method 2) 

c,. By int~rception and cryptanalysis of the oommunicati ons 

(hereafter called Method 3.) 

2. With respect to intelligence derlvable from present Frennh 

oommunications, the USSR is in a position to employ all three 

methodsp I 

3 c The U, S , and the U ,K ., Governments have the t eohnic al knowledge for improving tho security of French o.ommunications to a 

degree suffioient and necieasary to deny method 1£ to the USSR" 

They also have knowledge of security praotioes whichf, if enfor¢ed~ 

would provide reasonable assurance of denyine methods la and l~ to 

the USSRo However, the denial of methods l~ and l~ will dapen<l 

ultimately upon the reliability and discretion, as well as p.byaical 

security~ of those who are responsible for handling and sareeuarding 

classified information in the French. Government 0 and espe©ia.lly in 

the French ~ryptographic Bervices0 EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL. 86-36/50 USC 3605 

II., GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AS TO FRENCH INTERNAL INSECURITY~ 

lo a., 

that a number of French Government Departments and Ar;encies 

are at present 9 and to varying degrees" infiltrated with 

French Communists and disloyal or untrustworthy personnel . 

.Although there is no positive evidence of penetration by 

Soviet agents~ the U ,,K and the U. s Govermnents cannot 

afford to disregard this probability 

- 3 - Enclosure 
b .. 

that the violent internal dissensions,~ personal~ departITJ,ental 

and inter-~departmental feuds within and among some French 

Government Departments and Agenci.es have led to the disclosure 

E03.~(h)(2) 

of cla9sified information" PL 86-36/SOUSC 3605 

that although the French Government has regulations for the 

protection of classified information, they are not enforced 

and that in at least some French Government Departments and 

Agencies there has been gross carelessness in the storage 

and handling of classified documents . 

.d, A tripartite group (U .. K" ~ Uc.So~ and French) is now 

surveying and studying the internal security of the ~ranch 

Government,, especially in regard to the nature and adequacy 

of French regulations and facilities for the protection of 

classified information,, as compared to those of the U .. S, and 

the U .. K,. Governments .. 

e, Some improvements in French internal security have 

recently been made and a certain degree of elimination ot 

disloyal elements has been effected~ As a result of the 

work of the tripartite group referred to in d ., above» steps 

toward further improvements in internal security may be 

expected. 

f ,. Although neither the U,K. nor th.e U s, Government has 

positive evidence that native Comrnunistn or Soviet agents in 

French Government offices have actually passed classified information to the USSH, the U~K. and the U.S. Governments oannot 

afford to disregard the valid assumpti.on that it occurs not 

only sporadically but continuously, 

§,, Available evidence suggests that insecurity prevails 

in the following French Departments and Agencies: 

( l) Air Ministry'· Evidence suggests that this De'=" 

partment is a particularly bad offender,, both as regards 

penetration and lack or discipline in the application of 

security procedures 

=4= · Enclosure 

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( 2) Armed Forces, In the Army and tho Air Force" 

probably less than 5 percent of the officers are 

Communists, but the percentage in the ranks is con= 

siderably higher,, possibly 15<~20 percent,_ In the Navy 5 

these percentages are considerably less .. 

(J) PTT (Posts and Telegraphs)" It is believed that 

this administration is seriously penetrated by Communists. 

(4) There has been evidence in the past of insecurity 

in the Ministries of .Defansep Armaments[. Industrial Pro= 

duction and Labor, in the ·Atomic Energy Commission. and 

in various nationalized 1nduetr1eso 

{5} The SDECE (Frenah Secret Service) and the Surete 

do not meet the security requirements of high=grade in= 

telligence and security services, 

(6) There is little verifiable evidence or insecurity 

in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs although there are 

grounds for suspicion, 

IIL. PERSONNEL AND l:>HYSICAL SJ1CURITY OF FRENCH CRYPTOGRAl)HIO SERVICES 

l., Disloyalty on the part of cryptographic personnel or pene= 

tration by enemy agents into cryptographic offices is reoognized as 

the greatest hazard to the security of cryptographic communications 

and the one most diffioult to eliminate 

2,, Both the U ,K, and the U ,S Governments have adopted special 

screening procedures for the seleot.ion of oryptographic personnel r· 

and have established special provisions for the physioal security of 

the premises on which cryptographic activities are conduoted.;. 

J, Neither the U,,K .. nor the Uc S.:· Government has direct evidence 

of Communist penetration of the French Cryptographic Serviceag but 

they cannot afford to disregard the valid assumption that such pene= 

tration exists" (There is some evidence to indicate insecurity 

arising from carelessness of individual members of these Services 

and inadeq11ate physical security.·) 

-- '5 -_, Enclosure 

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4., Neither the U,,K., nor the U.,s Government has information 

bearing on the physical security procedures of the French Crypto= 

graphic Services or the methods employed for soreening their 

personnel_, 

5, Until there is assurance of personnel and physical 

security in the French Cryptographic Services to a degree sufficient 

to meet standards acceptable to the U.,K, and the u s Go t " , vernmen s ~ 

there oan be no assurance that the USSR would be denied intelligence 

b7 means of Methods 1 and 2a 

IVu AD1TANTAGES AND DISADV.ANTAGI!!S INHERENT IN THE U,.S,/UvKo PROPOSAL 

FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF FRENCH COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY. 

1 o If the U. s -/U,. K plan for improving French communications 

security is .successf'ul,, then .. subject to the conditions noted 1n 

Sections V and VI below, the following advantages would result: 

a,, Assuming that the Russians are reading a significant 

proportion of the French diplomatic traffic~ the soviets 

would be denied {l) their speediestJ most reliable~ and, 

possibly" most prolific sour~e of information. on Frencih 

foreign poli1~y ~ { 2) a speedy and reliable source of infor= 

ma.tion on Waster.n policy in all matters calling for eff'ec= 

tive Franch participation~ and (J) a valuable source on 

conditions in countries other than France 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

b, Denial to the Soviets of lnformation from COMINT 

sources would be seriously detrimental to the efficiency 

of Russian field intelligence organizations and thereby 

diminish the value o'f Information derived from penetration 

by means of agent a, (The U !:. and the U, S._ members agree 

that an extensive and continuous flow of communications 

intelligence is a more rapid and a more reliable sour©e 

of information than are the covert operations of any 

field organization of agents9 it is largely prerequisite 

to opti.mum f1.e]d r•peratlons ) 

TOP SECllET ACORN~nclosure 
c,, U"S"' anu U.)K, officials would 9 theL,f'ore~ be able to 

negotiate more freely in direct dealings with the French. 

d, The indirect 

described in Section VE para. 2u~ is to some degree counterbalanced by denial of the same sources to the Russians~ 

2,., The following are disadvantages inherent in any/approach 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

to the French~ PL.86-36/50 use 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL\.86-36/50 l ~s c 3605 

TOP SECRET ACORN/l':;~·:;: .... ;· 
EO 5.3(h)(2) 

PUl 6-36/50 u SC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 I U SC 3605 

EO 3.3(h (2) 

PL 86-36 50 u SC 3605 

Political disadvantage through revelation otj 

I The political impact o~ the -

( EO 3.3(h)(2) disadvantage deacri bed in 2]2., 2) above would be greatly/PL 8.

6_36150 usc 3605 

compounded if such a revelation ware to include the fa.ct 

e., The creation or a false sense of security on the 

part of U~K~ and u,.s" officials~- The remov.al of evidence 

of insecurity in French communications mayp due to the 

__________________ ___.llead to the unwarranted 

assumption that other French security weaknesses have also 

been corrected'·· 

3. It is felt that,, by reeognj.z1ng certain conditions and establishing certain means of obtaining satisfac·tory assurances with rega?'d to 

them,, the l:Lkel1hood am extent or the risks involved can be so reduced 

as to permit an approach to the French. The sections which follow deal 

with t)lese conditions and means .. 

TOP SECftET ACOim1°sure 
Yo CONDITIONS GOVERNING ATTAINMENT OF ADVANTAGE8 SOUGHT~ 

L, The instability of the Frenoh Government at political 

levels warrants doubts as to the permanence or continuity of 

remedial measures which may now be applied to French insecurity,. 

However, these doubts are not sufficiently serious to preclude 

consideration of an approach to the French Government~ 

I It is oonceivable that this L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~-' 

might even be a condition imposed by the French ror their 

acceptance Of U~K,,/U~S., standards or seourity,. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

:L Even if all three methods Of obtaining intel~igenoe from 

French commun1oat1ona ware denied to the UoSoSr..Rc v it is considered 

.__ _____________ ___.lrs~otion IV~ Para" 2b above) would 

I 

be sufficiently dama.gine in their effects on the U,.s, and U.,K ... to 

constitute a serious risk which must be weighed 

in any consideration of conditions governing an approaoh to the 

Frenoho This risk is not inherent in the U,S,/UuK_. technical 

plan proposed for improvement of French communication security\ 

but rather in the lack of reasonable assurance that the Fren~h 

will effectively safeguard the information\ EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

4, It must be emphasized that the advantages enumerated in 

Section IV are largely contingent upon sufficient improvement in 

French internal security to deny the U,S"S.Ro intelligence derived 

tram Methods 1 and 2. Pol' ii' a U .x. -u. s. plan tor improving the~ 

aeour1t7 of French cammun1cat1ons is adopted and made effective, 

thus elimtnating t}Je thil'dmethOO. by which the u. So So R. is 

obta1J2'ng intelligence f'l'OJD French communications vithout eliminat:lllg the second. then the u. s. s. R. will still have the benefit 

ot the tint and second method with vh1ch to obtain intelligence . • J • , ... , .... • • - .• ~ • 

t:rom Prenoh CClllDDm:Joations. It both the second and third methods 

are dttn1ed the U. S. s. R. there would still be a s1gn1f'1ca.nt direct 

TOP SECR~T ACOR~losure 
I 

I 

. . lea.kaGe of intelligence to the u.s.s.R. through the Soviet field organization and French Communist Party channels. I 

/ 

VI. CCIIDITICDS GOVERNDlG AN J\P.PRQ\CJ[ TO THE FRENCH 

1. In order to in4uce the French to undertake tbe thoroughgoing 

overhaul required for real. .improvement in their communicaticDs security, 

&n1" U.K./u.s. approach should be calculated to shock them into making a 

maJor e'ffort. It is considered that the only effective and practicable 

abock would be the revelation ot I .... _________________ .......... 

2. Revelation of I .... __ ..... lentailsmsuchugt:i'V'E!UUI"i&ks that it should be subEO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 ject to the fol.loving conditions: 

a. There must be indications that there is in French Governmental 

Departments and Agencies e. serious apprecia.tionot the necessity of 

introducing and ll!B.intaining satisfactory security standards. A sine 

qua non for the I lttmst be ..... prlordemonstration ot 

good intent and capacity ot the French Government to institute and to 

execute corrective measures ot the degree required tor signif'icant 

ilqpl'OVement in the French Cryptographic · Services. 

b,, Unqual.if'ied acceptance and promulgation ot U.K./u.s. security 

stamards in each phase and aspect ot the progrem for improvement. 

c. Direct U.K. and/or U.S. participation throughout the program .. 

U.S. or U.K. participation should include qualified representatives in 

the fields ot general security and commmications security, the latter 

to include cryptographic, transmission, and special. physical. and 

personnel security. 

d. That there is an initial point ot contact which is discreet, 

reliable and at a. level of sufficient authority,; there are also available appropriate f'acilities and individuals of discretion and reliability through 'Whom a program tor ~rovement can be undertaken and 

maintained. 

- lO - Enclosure 

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REF ID:A522602 W 6 ~ l'"V. ........ ,,..,. .__ ........ .... .. € fi.D ~ 

.i ~ ~~t:K~·1· A o-,,~ 

3. As there 1s at present no aclequate assurance that tbeae coDd1t1one 

could be met, the only 1.mmed1ate approach Which could be made to the French 

would be one without I I This enroech1 which w 1.tld be 

restricted to ottering the French cryptographic. mate!'ial, 1Dclu41ng zreeb1nee, 

ls deemed 1naclvisable tor the follawing reasons: 

a. The impact on the i'rench is likely t.o be too feeble to ettect 

tbe desired result. A coau;>lete overhaul ot the Frenell Cryptographic 

Services is neec1ec1 and this woul.cl require the allocation .of' ad41t1onal. 

tU1l4s vhich wuld probably not be forthcoming unleas tb.e Freuch receive 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 a major sbock. 

b. Even 1t tbe French acqU1esced, there 1;lt>1.lld; in the absence ot 

assurances of 1~ security, rema.1athe poeaibility of the Soviets 

acqu1ring the cecessary cryptographic materials through aetb.od l!• 

c. Arq balthea.rted. approach might prejudice a later approach based 

uponl leolisideratiom. Aey approach by stages might lay the U.K. 

and the u.s. open to French accusations at inalneerity. 

d. Part1ctpat1on by U.K./u.s. experts in the neces-.ey co~lete 

overhaul o£ the French Cryptographic Services would not be likely to 

toll.ow t.bis approach. 

e. 'l'.be neces8817 number at nmchinea tor this purpose is not available to ID!et French needs. Even 1f' they vere available, it could be 

anticipated tba.t other MATO countries WOUl.d demand stud 1 ar machines 

leading to ed>arra.ssment ot the U.K./u.s.. Governments • 

• VII. MF.ANS CF APPROA.Cll 

l. Insecurity in French Government is so v1clespread that en approach 

through mre than one chamiel muld entail greater hazards. tllan a. sinSle 

approach. The initial approach should, therefore, be confined to the Ministry 

or Foreign Attatrs. 

2,. An approach to the Ministry at Foreign Attaira at a level. of euf'ficient 

authOrlty otters a choice between the Minister and the Secretar7-Genel'&l.. It 

is consitlered that the latter 1lpUl4 be the more suitable point ot approach tor 

tbe tollowtng reasons: 

- ll .. Encloaure 

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·• . . , qE;n~26.tl~ TOP SEun:at I· ii:u~RN 

a. The Secretary-General is a. permanent official, While the 

M1nister is liable to replacement; 

b. As a Departmental o:fticial, the Secretary-General is more 

likely than the Minister to take a co111>rehenaive a.ml continuous 

view ot the problem; 

c. '!'he outstanding personality ot the SecretRy-General, M .. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) Parodi, is believed to be such as to otter good prospect or PL 86-36/50 usc 3605 

e:ttect:lve implementation ot u.s./u.K. proposals. 

3. All subsequent Videni1'g oZ the circle ~ discussion would require 

precise definition am. prior U.K./u.s. agreemnt. 

4. The various risks arising :tromi------------1 and 

particularly tbe revelation ot require 

that 

The logical. nominee wuld be tbat party concerning qaet1,,-1tY 

the French be to know t EO 3.3(h)(2) may assume mos • PL 86-36/50 usc 3605 

5. There wuld appear to be distinct advan~ t6 a Joint O .. K./U .. s. 

approach based on Joint consultation and Joj.nt recommendations iD the light 

ot the I I h vieW of the tact that a considerable ettort on the part Cit tbe French is required it is felt that the 

maximum available pressure should 'be exerted. 

.. 12 .. Enclosure 

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