• 

SE~C; m~~2/1¥lfq I no~RN 7 May 1951 

to the 

EXECUTIVE COMMli'J:EE 

of the 

U.IC.-u.s. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY OF FRENCH COMMtrtfICATIONS 

l. 'lo eY.amine present French cryptographic systems and procedures, and 

to formulate a u.s~ ... u.K. plan for improvement of the security thereof. 

FAC'l'S BEARING ON 'l'RE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION 

2. See Enclosure "B". 

pONCWSIONS EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

3. It is concluded that: 

]!. The present French Clji;rtogra.phic organizations do not possess thf.3 

necessary Cl'l'J:)·t;analytic app!'eciation to insm"'e provision of systems afford .. 

1ng adequate cryptographic security, or, if' they do possess the requisite 

knowledge, the :tnf'ormation is not being applied. or properly employed. 

£• This situation can be improved only by a relatively complete over ... 

haul of the F:re!l.eh cryptographic systems and practices. The present in"· 

secure French cryptographic syetems and practices should be replaced by 

secure systeJ:r...s and p~aetices, and n specific plan for sucb replacement 

should be eateblished. 

d. Positive measures to etteet such a plan ahould be introduced to - the extent of providing, a.t least il.1 part, the er;,rptographic devices and 

associated. techniques essential to security. A survey is required to 

establish the number of machines that can be loaned and the do.tea when 

they emi be me.de available. 

TOP SECRET ACORN 

----Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-29-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

\\\· .. 
e. This will materlally reduce the amunt of intelligence now available - ' 

to Russia frca COMim' sources p:"Obabl.)' exploitable by thaa; / 

t. R"fP)tiat1on8 vitb the French should be so conducted and the pl.on - BO &wised 

.I• Aa a prel1m1Mr7 to enteriDg u;pon f1D7 negotiations with the P'renf:h 

there abc>ul.4 be reaaonable aaaurance that the effects of :1Jlrp:rov1ng their 

cmmmfcat1on security Vill not be nullf:fied or d1glnlshed b;r plQ&ical 

anc1 :personnel insecurity in t.he 1PreDch Govermaent. It ia obvious that 

VltbOut auch assurance J 

h. MaJor advazrtages V1l.1 accrue if' t.be tecbzaf cal cUscloeures to the.· .. • - P'rench are made on a combined basis. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

4. It 1e ~4 the.ti 

a. lncl.ollure "A" be approved as the apecitic pl.au tor tqnoov ! a at ot -

b. 'l'be u.s. and u.a:. detera:lDe tbe m""'4r ot •chines that can be - loane4 and the elates when the;y can be m4e available. 

2 

TO·P SECRET i\CORN 
) 

EUCLOSURE n A" 

\ ~~1' /.4.~'T\ "--

IIC SECURITI 

A.,~ 

i. Uie proposal presented herein .for QnSU1"ine the securl.ty of F1'0nCh 

diplomatic eamuntcations conaidarB that the various French diplocatic posts 

should be subdivided into th1'98 co.togorios 1 

a. category Is A group of locations l1hich handle the rJOGt critic.-'11 

- into:mation ·and 1n considerable vol\11191 such as Paris, London, and 

b• categ017 II1 All capital.a not included 1n a. plus a selected - - nroup ot important citd.oa whoso coa:nmications include intormat:Lon Tihich 

should have complete protection. 

c. Cateeo1"JT III: All other d1plomt1c posts. 

-

Iile>tes 7'• tppard11~A list ot 32 o! the Frencll posts mich ohould 

be included in categories I and II~~ ._ r~ I~ 

2. The systems reccnaonded,, reapectivo:q, for the three categories 

l1stod above ares 

a. For categorr I: The COJ:lbjned Cipher uachine With Siq>lex 

- settines• '.lhe word Simplex is usod to moan n procedure moreby eo.ch 

message has its mm rotor a.t'l."an&acent and aJJ.cm,ent provided bT conns 

ol a special lcqy list. 1he lists are prepared for point-to-point use 

so that each station can decipher OJi4" those messaces specificaUy 

addressed to it·. For the transmission o! rJUltiple-address messacea, a 

multi.pl& holder S:laplex key list is also provided. A one-Ume pad 

8,18tm should be provided as an ·mergency stnnd-ey in this ca~. 

The nwnbor of locations that T1ill be included in catecor.r I Tlll1. be 

detemined bJ' the nlJ'.Jbar of equipments that can be made avail a'bloo 

It is not 7et possible to aucertain the ntlilber o£ machines ttiat can bo 

supplied tor this purpose bocause of cm::d.tm.ents al.ready made to UATO . ' 

and the requirer.lent for a surve,r in this reenrd by the serviceao A 

amall number ot mnch1nes can be supplied initiall¥ to cover the most 

important locations. AS the nUDber o.r machines available increases• 

addi t:f.onaJ. locati.ons can be changed .troa catego:ey- II to cateeo:ey" Io 

'1QP SEEIRE! :AeE!tN Enclosure "A" 

TOP SECRET 2\:CORN 
'Iha g:rontar tha number of posts micll coul.d be included in category I, 

the 1:1oro simple TTould bocooa the probleo a.f intQGratcd and multiple 

ona-tioe pad namorks for catacrory II post.a r. 

b. For cateGory II: A nuoorical code book super-encrypted 'Tith 

- one-ti.oh pado It is ~oraoond.Gd that n ll0rJ' code book be issued £or 

this specific purpose. 

Co For category III: Present French syatams could continue to - ba used. 

Bo ARifilD SERVICES; 

3o Authorities concerned with lL\TO conmun.tcntions havo olrGaC\Y 

ostablishod tlu"ee categor-.Les o£ ouch conmun.i.cations s 

a. catee;oi..,- I (!tigh-level) t 'lhis categoey OrJbmcoo the top-lovol 

-

British TYPEX machine, with Sint'lax setti.n[:s is beinc use.do COnsidere,.-'" 

tion is bsi.'lg given to replacing that system by a HA.TO CCU systetlo 

bo category II (Intormodio:tewlave?J.) I l].h:i.s category a:ilil'aCOS 

-

the CCllo It hJ.w boen accepted by France and the proposal is n.o;; to be 

considered by the ot.'1.or UATO CTOVOm:ients. ~is does not h~rovm;.-- rapresant. 

a complete solution to thG lrrenah CO.togory II probleni, becauna it does not 

provide £or 2nd lavol tdli tary headqw.rters1 both in Franc.>e and hor colo..'tlies, 

l'lhich are not included in UATO., Ho entiaate in aw..UD.ble 0£ how oar.iy 

additional machi.ru."S will be requi.t>ed in this i•agardoi rt seems cloo.i• that 

the a.ll.ommco for 2m level. I~ATO nill bo insuf£tcian.t to supply the 

conplota Fre11ch requirem.entl> 

!:,• cntagor.r III: ntis is the coo.bat level in t..he 1'.l"'lr!;f1 Uavy Wld 

Air Poree~ Discussions at present taking plaeo in HATO are oxamininc 

dii'i'erent propoaa.'1.s £w combat s-.vsteuo and t.o that extant may- resolve e. 

po1,,.,.'Jion of this r~enaral problamo It io rocoenizoo that tho ?1-P...Q9 matY' be 

accoptad oo an interim so.1ution £c-r. th:1.s cateeory duo to the quN!titios 

0£ equi~rat &irailabla to the F'L"encho 

TOP SECRET ACORN 
APP:ClIDIX TO FJWLOOURE '

1 A" 

PRCJCIPAL LOCATiotlS TO I3E IUCLUDlID IH CATEf'..mn'.S I AUD II I -.=e 
ENCLOSURE ''B'' 

FAC.l'S BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

2. In regard t.o the current French cliplomtic communications, obse!"'led 

Frencb pracUces 1n c:eyptograpbic a)'Stem design and distribution provide 

41rect evidence that the present crntographic orpnir.ation in the French 

Dtplomtlc Service does not possess the nece&Bm'J" ~c appreciation 

t.o insure provision ot systems affording aclequate crntogre.pld.c security, or, 

U it does J!Qssesa the requisite Jmovledge, the inf'Ol'llation is not being 

applied or proper~ emplo~, either 1n the Foreip Miniatry or in diplomatic 

posts. Exl:ept as reprds certaiD systems, vhich ~ be one-time pad, none 
ot the French cUplomatic cryptographic system& possesses suff ieient inherent 

security to permit its 1mprovement to a point where it might be considered 

acceptable. It would tll&retore be necessary to di:Jcard tbe current systems 

and re»]ace them w:lth other SJBtellls based on sounder cryptographic principles. 

It woul.4 also be neceuar,y to provide teelmical.ly sound associated pTOcedures 

and tra:lning in the proper use of the s79tems and irocednres. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

4. Although a tradition ot sound cnnmmtcation security doctrine d:l.d exist 

in France, the current cr;yptosrapbic practices observed 1n French diplomatic 

trattic 1n41cate tbat tbe French have tall.en far beh1nd tbe u .s. and the U .It. 

1a mtters perta1n1ng to ec-nmtcation security. The situation~ be less 

aeri.oua 1n the M:lq and lav but there, too, there is much room f'or improvement. 
( 

REF ID:A522606 

TC'""° SECRET ACP~N 

'l'heretore, technical assistance f'l"Oll outside the French cryptographic services 

is deemed essential tor the success ot 8D1' eonmmtcation security program. 

5. From an over-all consideration it mq be stated that 1f the securit:r 

ot French diplomatic ~ C0111111Dieat1ons is to be improved it would 

be necesaBl"Y tos . ~· -. t'.) "j y t !-· V j!~ I 

a. Replace the current ~ ~c sys~ with eecm-e BJS'tema - 'l~ A 

l!• Establish teclmi~ sound COlllllDication security proe&lures. 

S• Insure adequate t:ra1n1Dg in the use ot the new 8)'8tems and procedures. 

L~~ !• Insure careful. teehnical supe!'Vision over French;,ColmmmS cations to 

ma1nta1n ccnmm1cat1on security. 

6. In v1ev ot the foreaotng, it is apparent that 1n OZ'4er to o.chieve total 

~itq, a ccmplete overhaul ot the French diplome.tic ~ 111litm7 crnto-

.\/ sraPhic 81BteilE ~practices would be necees&.1'7 •. ru.s would involve not 

/ onl.J' 1Dto1"1111ng the French that their present systemu are insecure but also 

establishing a basis on vh1ch the French would be provided Vith appropriate 

technical asa1stance to enable them to reorpnize their et"JPtograpbic eystems 

8Dd p-actices to inau:re secure conwmtcations. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 

7. It is obv1ous that in assisting the French 1n improving tbe security 

I However, (a) the neeeesity L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~----' 

tor remv1llg those handicaps to proper diplomatic diecuasions and negotiations 

smug the U .s., U .IC. and French Gove!'DDle!lts wbieh arise from present 

insecurity of French diplomatic Co11111micat1ons, and (b) the iJBportance of 

4elQ'1ng to Russia this source ot C<JaN'l' ,, 

L'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-ftmd also 1:o prov14e, at least 1n part, the crntographic cievicea and associated 

techniques eseential to aecuriey. 

~O' J7; 8. If the French/\ are informed of tbe uea.lmesaes or their ceyptographic 

a)'Btem, it is bigbl7 c!ea1rable tbat tae:r be ::gS:w as little in:f'ormti'OD as 

!Wpm-'fOP SECRET ACORN 

Enclosure "B" 8 

J 

I 
9. 9le P>SBf.b1litJ' ot Ruas:l.an penetnUon ot some or allot the French 

aerricea, both 41plmatic and milJ:taey, cmmot be ignored. Penetration mag 

~ eitber ccmr.pJ.et,e or partial, and mrq extend into either the aourcee o~0 3_

3(h)(2

) 

1nf'orm.tton or into the c:ryptograpbic eervices • Complete penetration o~U 86-36/50 use 3605 

either ~ would mice tot~ 1nettective erq pl.en tor :tmprovf.ng crntograpbic aecuriqr. 

Therefore, before 

8ZJJ' steps are taken, tb.eZ'e should be 1"888onable assurance ot a4equate ~ical 

and penonnel secur!ty 1n the French Foreisll Ottiee, the French Armed Services, 

and the offtces Vhlch control the ~logic services. In a441tion to this, ·-.. -- --

1t is inp>rtant that ~plan P,"OP>sed should Pl'OVide the •xl•n posalble 

'\6'Jr "*"" protecUon against the eff'eets ot partial. penetra~ioi;i .. ~ '1ther tJpe. 

10. 'l'he localization introduced~ S!D.Plex procedures has a &>uble advantage. (\ 

Pirsi;, it iDcreases the CJ:'7Pt0sec:urit7 S~· .An operating error wUl 

1Dirolve at S>St the COD1gl'Ullise of one meseap as opposed to that ot all the 

tratttc sent 1n one dq' 1n a general cryptoa78tem. Secon411', 1t there should 

be an !natance of penetration by the Rusaiams at ~ installation, other than 

tbe central Paris ottices 1 which grants access t.o cryptosraphlc: intonation, 

the dangers resulting t:rca such penetrat1on are confined to those cr:,iptonets 

1D whlch that installation 1s involved. ft1s results 1n reducing the consequent 

loss or lnto:rmatiOn. 'l'b1s second advantage applies equal~ to the one-time 

put CQPtoneta. 

9 

Enclo&IUl"e "B" 

TOP SECRET :!1CORN 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

11. ConaicSerable experience on tbe part ot tbe ~tiah (and paoticularl.1' 

ot tbe FOl'eip ottlce) 1n the f'leld ot one-i;i:me pads has sbown that the i 

12. As NfpllZ'Cla proc1uetiorl, 'b7 Y1rta,e ot tbe tact that the British utilize 

l'tic>/a melt greater extent than tbe u.s., the f'Ol"ller 

....__bave __ cw_z_1e4--out--a_,aerlea ot ~t1ons 1n the f'1e14 of' one-time 

PIA lamtacture, 8114 haw nol'\'84 imlt'oftd. processes, both on the &q»Ucatsng 

an4 printing 81&! an4 on the aeeuritq aspects o:t the use o:t llll/Kollerlth 

equlplmlt, 1nclwling such mttera as the preparaUon, size, encl control ot 

tu N1M1ra card. :tne .. -).9 . •••• &ii ,. __ 11 u as caJ m11ueas:r-

,. 9ulJ:'e v1U ' I be !11 1np>rtant and maJol' requirement to instruct tbe 

·· ~11l_.-¥~~~tke\,~~-·• ~~ ,.. ftr7 little versed :ln tbe&e uses ot. tabulating mach1De1'7 anc1 JlalNt at 

J1NMDt veq litue, U' arq, ot the equipment availab~. Adequate detailed 

tecfm1cal :lnatrw:tion can nevertbeleaa be giftll to the French teclm1c1ana 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

13· !be mrit ot the Jll'OP088l8 :ln the Czeapto6NPhlc Plan ls the :prov181on 

ot a bSsh degree ot aecuritq tor ,._. _level Prench d1pl.omt1c 8n4 HA!'O 

01-mtcaUona, together vtth a ntn1aa disclosure to the French of' SJBtema 

- 8114 ideas ¥1th tddcb thq are not alNaq tmatUar. "!here is the turther 

' . " ~Sonal aclvantage of' an el.ec:trlcal •chtne to replace al.over and. mre 

labor1ou JlaD4 918tems. Fm- tbe tranmrrt ••ion ot 1nternat:lonal. diplomatic . or h~level mU1tarJ' tntt1c aea;ung with Western UD1on anc1 BA1'0 attain, 

-tk.-~ ~ bave been prov1c1ec1 v.tth ftPEX mcMnee 8114 t,hey are :presently using a 

Si"lt]ex procedure v.lth these pach1nee 1n the h1ghest echeloDa of HATO; the 

cadb1ne4 Cipher Kacbtne is also being otterecl to them, as well as to other 

1IA9> •l&Datariea, tor~ Ci aamicatlons and th1a baa~ been accepted 

'b7 the Preach. , Adequate tzoa1n1ng 1n the new S1BtelB rill therefore be srea.~ 

. s"91'1t1ecl u a result of the alre~exiating tmd.liarity with thm. 

10 Encloa11re "B" 

TOP SECRET 1'\.CORN 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

15. Witb. the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 14, the plan PJ.*OPOSed in 

Enclosure "A" is a rea.sone.bl.e and econom:lca.l prosram for p..~viding adequat'? 

C'!",Y.PtC>graphic seeuri t-y for the various levels of French diploma.tic and 

militar;y car~cationa. 'lb.a :plan nu, if properly exeeutu.a., effectively 

prevent the :pl'Oduction at a significant enDunt o"f commu.uication intelligence. 

The pl.en is o.ivided into two partsi A ... F01· diplomtic communications~ and 

TOP SECflET 

EneloBUl'e "B" 

P~CORN