10676 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Notices 

1 16 U.S.C. 824e (2012). 

Hays DDRA Fellowship Program, the 

candidate should immediately notify 

the program contact person listed under 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT in 

section VII of this notice. If, after 

consultation with FUSP, we determine 

that FUSP has expended funds on the 

student (e.g., the candidate has attended 

the pre-departure orientation or was 

issued grant funds), the candidate will 

be deemed ineligible for an award under 

the Fulbright-Hays DDRA Fellowship 

Program at that time. 

4. Special Conditions: Under 2 CFR 

3474.10, the Secretary may impose 

special conditions and, in appropriate 

circumstances, high-risk conditions on a 

grant if the applicant or grantee is not 

financially stable; has a history of 

unsatisfactory performance; has a 

financial or other management system 

that does not meet the standards in 2 

CFR part 200, subpart D; has not 

fulfilled the conditions of a prior grant; 

or is otherwise not responsible. 

VI. Award Administration Information 

1. Award Notices: If a student 

application is successful, we notify the 

IHE’s U.S. Representative and U.S. 

Senators and send the IHE a Grant 

Award Notification (GAN); or we may 

send the IHE an email containing a link 

to access an electronic version of the 

GAN. We may notify the IHE informally, 

also. 

If a student application is not 

evaluated or not selected for funding, 

we notify the IHE. 

2. Administrative and National Policy 

Requirements: We identify 

administrative and national policy 

requirements in the application package 

and reference these and other 

requirements in the Applicable 

Regulations section of this notice. 

We reference the regulations outlining 

the terms and conditions of an award in 

the Applicable Regulations section of 

this notice and include these and other 

specific conditions in the GAN. The 

GAN also incorporates the approved 

application as part of the binding 

commitments under the grant. 

3. Reporting: (a) If you apply for a 

grant under this competition, you must 

ensure that you have in place the 

necessary processes and systems to 

comply with the reporting requirements 

in 2 CFR part 170 should you receive 

funding under the competition. This 

does not apply if you have an exception 

under 2 CFR 170.110(b). 

(b) At the end of your project period, 

you must submit a final performance 

report, including financial information, 

as directed by the Secretary. If you 

receive a multi-year award, you must 

submit an annual performance report 

that provides the most current 

performance and financial expenditure 

information as directed by the Secretary 

under 34 CFR 75.118. Grantees are 

required to use the electronic data 

instrument International Resource 

Information System (IRIS) to complete 

the final report. The Secretary may also 

require more frequent performance 

reports under 34 CFR 75.720(c). For 

specific requirements on reporting, 

please go to www.ed.gov/fund/grant/ 

apply/appforms/appforms.html. 

4. Performance Measures: Under the 

Government Performance and Results 

Act of 1993, the objective for the 

Fulbright-Hays DDRA Fellowship 

Program is to provide grants to colleges 

and universities to fund individual 

doctoral students to conduct research in 

other countries in modern foreign 

languages and area studies for periods of 

6 to 12 months. 

The Department will use the 

following measures to evaluate its 

success in meeting this objective: 

DDRA GPRA Measure 1: The 

percentage of DDRA fellows who 

increased their foreign language scores 

in speaking, reading, and/or writing by 

at least one proficiency level. 

DDRA GPRA Measure 2: The 

percentage of DDRA fellows who 

complete their degree in their program 

of study within four years of receipt of 

the fellowship. 

DDRA GPRA Measure 3: The 

percentage of DDRA fellows who found 

employment that utilized their language 

and area studies skills within eight 

years of receiving their award. 

DDRA GPRA Measure 4: Efficiency 

Measure—The cost per DDRA fellow 

who found employment that utilized 

their language and area studies skills 

within eight years. 

The information provided by grantees 

in their performance report submitted 

via IRIS will be the source of data for 

this measure. Reporting screens for 

institutions and fellows may be viewed 

at: http://iris.ed.gov/iris/pdfs/ 

DDRA_director.pdf. http://iris.ed.gov/ 

iris/pdfs/DDRA_fellow.pdf. 

VII. Agency Contact 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Pamela J. Maimer, Ph.D., International 

and Foreign Language Education, U.S. 

Department of Education, 1990 K Street 

NW., Room 6106, Washington, DC 

20006–6078. Telephone: (202) 502–7704 

or by email: ddra@ed.gov. 

If you use a TDD or a TTY, call the 

FRS, toll free, at 1–800–877–8339. 

If you request an application from ED 

Pubs, be sure to identify this program as 

follows: CFDA number 84.022A. 

VIII. Other Information 

Accessible Format: Individuals with 

disabilities can obtain this document 

and a copy of the application package in 

an accessible format (e.g., braille, large 

print, audiotape, or compact disc) on 

request to the program contact person 

listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT in section VII of this notice. 

Electronic Access to This Document: 

The official version of this document is 

the document published in the Federal 

Register. Free Internet access to the 

official edition of the Federal Register 

and the Code of Federal Regulations is 

available via the Federal Digital System 

at: www.gpo.gov/fdsys. At this site you 

can view this document, as well as all 

other documents of this Department 

published in the Federal Register, in 

text or Adobe Portable Document 

Format (PDF). To use PDF you must 

have Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is 

available for free at the site. 

You may also access documents of the 

Department published in the Federal 

Register by using the article search 

feature at: www.federalregister.gov. 

Specifically, through the advanced 

search feature at this site, you can limit 

your search to documents published by 

the Department. 

Dated: February 24, 2015. 

Lynn B. Mahaffie, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, 

Planning, and Innovation, Delegated the 

Authority to Perform the Functions and 

Duties of the Assistant Secretary for 

Postsecondary Education. 

[FR Doc. 2015–04137 Filed 2–26–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4001–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. EL15–37–000] 

Order Instituting Section 206 

Proceeding and Directing Filing To 

Establish Reliability Must Run Tariff 

Provisions: New York Independent 

System Operator, Inc 

Before Commissioners: Cheryl A. LaFleur, 

Chairman; Philip D. Moeller, Tony Clark, 

Norman C. Bay, and Colette D. Honorable. 

1. The Commission, pursuant to 

section 206 of the Federal Power Act 

(FPA),1 takes action through this order 

to address a recurring issue in the 

wholesale markets administered by the 

New York Independent System 

Operator, Inc. (NYISO). NYISO, as the 

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2For purposes of this order, references to 

generator ‘‘deactivation’’ encompass generator 

retirements, mothballing, or any other long-term 

outages or suspension of service. 

3The services are designated as RMR or 

‘‘Reliability Support Services’’ (RSS) in the various 

agreements. We will generally refer to such services 

as RMR services here. 

4Article 2.01 of the ISO/TO Agreement, which 

governs the relationship between NYISO and its 

transmission owners, explains that NYISO has 

operational control over certain transmission 

facilities, while Transmission Owners have 

responsibility for the operation of Local Area 

Transmission System Facilities. It further explains 

that such operation by each Transmission Owner 

shall not compromise the reliable and secure 

operation of the New York State Transmission 

System, and that each Transmission Owner shall 

promptly comply to the extent practicable with a 

request from the NYISO to take action with respect 

to coordination of the operation of its Local Area 

Transmission System Facilities. 

5PJM Interconnection, LLC, 110 FERC ¶ 61,053, at 

P 31 (2005) (‘‘market clearing prices that reflect 

[reliability] costs better support efficient 

consumption and investment decisions’’). See also, 

ISO New England, Inc., 148 FERC ¶ 61,179 (2014), 

order on clarification, 150 FERC ¶ 61,029, at P 10 

(2015) (if future winter reliability program is found 

to be necessary, it must be a market-based, rather 

than out-of-market, solution); ISO New England, 

Inc., 144 FERC ¶ 61,204, at P 42 (2013), reh’g 

denied, 147 FERC ¶ 61,026 (2014) (market-based 

solutions preferable to out-of-market solutions to 

address winter reliability issues); See Midwest 

Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 108 FERC 

¶ 61,163 at n. 226 (‘‘The Commission favors market 

design remedies, where possible, to provide needed 

revenues to support reliability-based generators and 

other needed investments’’), reh’g denied, 109 

FERC ¶ 61,157 (2004); see also Midwest Indep. 

Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 FERC 

¶ 61,237, at P 63 (2012), order on compliance, 148 

FERC ¶ 61,056, at P 42 (2014). 

6See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC 

¶ 61,112, at P 8 (2004); Calif. Indep. Sys. Operator 

Corp., 138 FERC ¶ 61,112 (2012); Calif. Indep. Sys. 

Operator Corp., 134 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2011); ISO New 

England, Inc. 125 FERC 61,102, order on 

clarification, 125 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2008), order 

denying reh’g, 130 FERC ¶ 61,089 (2010); Midwest 

Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 FERC 

¶ 61,237 (2012). 

7See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC 

¶ 61,112, at PP 20–21 (2004); Midwest Indep. 

Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 108 FERC 

¶ 61,163, at P 368, reh’g denied, 109 FERC ¶ 61,157 

(2004) (RMR program is backstop measure designed 

to meet short-term reliability need). 

8See 16 U.S.C. 824(b)(1) (2012) (the FPA gives the 

Commission jurisdiction over ‘‘the transmission of 

electric energy in interstate commerce and . . . the 

sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 

commerce’’). 

9The Commission is acting on two filings 

concerning agreements for RMR service in NYISO 

concurrently with this order in Docket Nos. ER12– 

2237–002 and ER13–405–000. 

10 16 U.S.C. 824d (2012). 

independent system operator, is 

responsible for efficiently and reliably 

administering the resources and 

transmission facilities under its control. 

As with certain other regions of the 

country, NYISO is facing challenges 

with temporarily retaining certain 

generation resources needed to ensure 

reliable transmission service until more 

permanent reliability solutions are in 

place. This has manifested itself in 

proceedings before this Commission 

initiated by generation resources that 

had sought to deactivate 2 but were 

determined to be needed for reliability 

by the New York Public Service 

Commission (New York Commission). 

These generation resources sought this 

Commission’s approval of agreements 

under which the generation resources 

would continue to operate and recover 

costs that would not otherwise be 

recovered through generator sales of 

energy, capacity and ancillary services 

in NYISO’s markets. The services 

provided under these agreements, 

commonly referred to as ‘‘must run’’ or 

‘‘reliability must run’’ (RMR) services,3

provide for the retention of generation 

units wishing to deactivate, often 

because they have become uneconomic, 

but which are needed for transmission 

system reliability. NYISO was not a 

party to any of the agreements or 

applications filed for approval. 

2. Given the foregoing, the 

Commission is concerned that NYISO’s 

Market Administration and Control 

Area Services Tariff (NYISO Tariff) is 

unjust and unreasonable. Although 

NYISO is the entity responsible for 

providing open access transmission 

service on the New York transmission 

system and ensuring the reliability and 

efficiency of that transmission service,4

the NYISO Tariff lacks provisions 

governing the rates, terms and 

conditions for RMR service. While the 

Commission has repeatedly stated that 

our jurisdictional markets should utilize 

market mechanisms to ensure that the 

resulting rates are just and reasonable,5

the Commission has also recognized 

that short-term remedies, such as RMR 

agreements, may be appropriate in 

certain circumstances to address an 

immediate problem at hand. Indeed, 

pursuant to our authority under the 

FPA, the Commission has accepted tariff 

provisions filed by other independent 

system operators (ISOs) and regional 

transmission organizations (RTOs) to 

implement and govern RMR service.6 In 

doing so, the Commission has 

emphasized that RMR agreements 

should be of a limited duration so as to 

not perpetuate out-of-market solutions 

that have the potential, if not 

undertaken in an open and transparent 

manner, to undermine price formation.7

3. As further discussed below, the 

provision of RMR services has been an 

ongoing concern in NYISO’s markets. 

Accordingly, to ensure the proper and 

efficient operation of NYISO’s markets, 

we find that NYISO should have on file 

the rates, terms, and conditions for RMR 

service. Without such provisions, there 

is no assurance that generation 

resources will be treated on a not 

unduly discriminatory basis and have 

the opportunity to collect compensatory 

rates without a protracted proceeding. 

The uncertainty created for resources by 

the lack of clear tariff provisions has the 

potential to exacerbate the very 

concerns an RMR service is meant to 

address—ensuring the continued 

reliable and efficient operation of the 

grid, and of NYISO’s markets.8 NYISO 

is uniquely positioned to assess the 

need for RMR service and the 

appropriate entity to assess the potential 

impacts RMR agreements may have on 

its markets in New York. Thus, NYISO 

should be the entity that administers 

RMR service in New York, and should 

do so pursuant to the provisions of its 

Commission-jurisdictional Tariff 

required by this order to be filed with 

the Commission. 

4. As discussed below, NYISO’s Tariff 

is unjust and unreasonable because it 

does not contain provisions governing 

the retention of and compensation to 

generating units needed for reliability. 

The Commission, pursuant to section 

206 of the FPA, will require NYISO to 

submit to the Commission within 120 

days of the date of this order fully 

supported proposed tariff provisions 

governing the retention of and 

compensation to generating units 

required for reliability, including 

procedures for designating such 

resources, the rates, terms and 

conditions for RMR service, provisions 

for the allocation of costs of RMR 

service, and a pro forma service 

agreement for RMR service.9

I. Background 

5. Multiple filings have been made by 

generators that had applied to the New 

York Commission to mothball certain 

facilities but which were determined to 

be needed for transmission system 

reliability. These generators then 

pursued agreements to provide RMRtype service for a limited term until 

permanent solutions to transmission 

system reliability issues are addressed 

by transmission upgrades. The range of 

RMR-type services to be provided by 

these units were substantially similar, 

but involved a number of different 

agreements some of which were filed at 

the Commission and others at the New 

York Commission. 

6. Specifically, on July 12, 2012, 

pursuant to FPA section 205,10 Dunkirk 

Power LLC (Dunkirk) filed in Docket 

No. ER12–2237–000, an unexecuted 

RMR agreement with cost-of-service 

pricing net of revenues, under which 

Dunkirk would provide RMR service to 

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10678 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Notices 

11 Dunkirk Filing, Docket No. ER12–2237–000, at 

1 (filed July 12, 2012). 

12On March 4, 2013, National Grid and Dunkirk 

entered into a second RSSA (2013 Dunkirk RSSA) 

to cover the period following termination of the 

August 2012 RSSA. On May 20, 2013, the New York 

Commission approved the 2013 Dunkirk RSSA. 

Petition of Dunkirk Power LLC and NRG Energy, 

Inc. for Waiver of Generator Retirement 

Requirements—Order Deciding Reliability Need 

Issues and Addressing Cost Allocation and 

Recovery, Case 12–E–0136 (New York Public 

Service Commission, May 20, 2013. 

13New York Independent System Operator, Inc., 

144 FERC ¶ 61,172, at P 39 (2013). 

14New York Independent System Operator, Inc., 

146 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2014). 

15Cayuga Transmittal, Docket No. ER13–405–000, 

at 4 (filed Nov. 16, 2012). 

16Petition of Cayuga Operating Company, LLC to 

Mothball Generating Units 1 and 2, Case 12–E– 

0400, New York Public Service Commission, 

(issued and effective December 17, 2012). 

17Cayuga Expedited Motion to Hold Proceeding 

in Abeyance, Docket No. ER13–405–000, at 2 (filed 

Dec. 31, 2012). 

18Cayuga Expedited Motion to Withdraw Filing, 

Docket No. ER13–405–000, at 3 (filed Feb. 28, 

2013). 

19See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 

20NYISO Eighth Informational Report on Efforts 

to Develop Rules Addressing Compensation to 

Generators that Are Determined to be Needed for 

Reliability, Docket No. ER10–2220–000, at 2 (filed 

Sep. 23, 2014). 

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 

d/b/a National Grid (National Grid) from 

two of Dunkirk’s generation units.11

Concurrently, however, Dunkirk had 

been engaged in negotiations with 

National Grid for the same type of 

services for the same units but with 

different compensation provisions. 

Dunkirk filed a ‘‘Term Sheet’’ 

summarizing the RSS agreement (RSSA) 

with the New York Commission on July 

20, 2012. Accordingly, Dunkirk 

submitted a request on August 1, 2012, 

for the Commission to hold the RMR 

proceeding in abeyance to provide the 

New York Commission time to review 

the Term Sheet for the RSSA. On 

August 16, 2012, the New York 

Commission approved the Dunkirk/ 

National Grid RSSA Term Sheet. On 

August 22, 2012, Dunkirk filed a further 

request that the Commission hold the 

RMR proceeding in abeyance 

indefinitely to provide time for the 

parties to execute a final contract and 

for any subsequent New York 

Commission order to issue.12

7. On March 29, 2013, National Grid 

proposed in Docket No. ER13–1182–000 

to amend certain components of its 

Wholesale Transmission Service Charge 

formula under Attachment H of the 

NYISO Tariff to incorporate the costs it 

incurs pursuant to the above-described 

RSSAs covering the Dunkirk services as 

approved by the New York Commission. 

National Grid proposed to add a new 

item, ‘‘Reliability Support Services 

Expense,’’ that would have included 

expenses incurred pursuant to 

agreements entered into with generators 

or other similar resources for the 

purpose of supporting transmission 

reliability. On August 30, 2013, noting 

protestors’ arguments about the unique 

rate and reliability implications 

inherent in National Grid’s proposed 

revisions, the Commission rejected 

National Grid’s filing, without prejudice 

to National Grid making a new filing 

under FPA section 205 providing 

additional support for recovery of RSS 

costs. The Commission found that the 

proposed formula rate revisions would 

essentially establish a placeholder that 

would allow the future pass-through of 

RSS costs. In order for the Commission 

to approve such a pass-through, the 

Commission explained that National 

Grid would, at a minimum, need to file 

any underlying RSSAs for Commission 

review, and support the proposed 

rates.13 On December 6, 2013, in Docket 

No. ER14–543–000, National Grid filed 

different revised provisions to its 

Wholesale Transmission Service Charge 

formula to pass through RSS costs and 

included the two RSSAs pursuant to the 

Commission’s directive. On February 4, 

2014, the Commission accepted and 

suspended National Grid’s revisions, 

and made them effective subject to 

refund and further order.14

8. Similar to Dunkirk, Cayuga 

Operating Company, LLC (Cayuga) 

sought approval from the New York 

Commission to mothball its generation 

units, but it was determined that its 

units are needed for transmission 

system reliability. On November 16, 

2012, pursuant to FPA section 205, 

Cayuga filed an unexecuted RMR 

agreement with the Commission under 

which Cayuga would provide RMR 

service to New York State Electric & Gas 

Corporation (NYSEG). This agreement 

was based on cost-of-service rates less 

the revenues earned by Cayuga from the 

sale of energy, capacity and ancillary 

services in the NYISO markets. In the 

meantime, similar to Dunkirk, Cayuga 

was in negotiations with NYSEG for an 

RSSA and filed a ‘‘Term Sheet’’ with the 

New York Commission summarizing the 

proposed RSSA, which differed from its 

FPA section 205 RMR agreement only as 

to the rate. Cayuga also requested that 

the Commission hold Cayuga’s RMR 

filing in abeyance until Cayuga notified 

it to do otherwise.15 Following the New 

York Commission’s December 17, 2012 

order approving the RSSA Term Sheet 

and directing the parties to execute and 

subsequently file the RSSA with the 

New York Commission,16 Cayuga 

submitted an expedited motion for the 

Commission to hold the RMR 

proceeding in abeyance until further 

notice.17 On February 28, 2013, Cayuga 

filed a motion to withdraw its FPA 

section 205 RMR filing as moot on the 

grounds that it would never make sales 

to NYSEG under the RMR agreement it 

had filed with the Commission, but, 

rather, any sales would be pursuant to 

the RSSA that NYSEG filed with the 

New York Commission.18

II. Discussion 

9. As noted above,19 NYISO’s having 

on file rates, terms and conditions for 

RMR service is fundamental to the 

proper and efficient operation of 

NYISO’s markets. Without such 

provisions, there is no assurance that 

generation resources will be treated on 

a not unduly discriminatory basis and 

have the opportunity to collect 

compensatory rates without a protracted 

proceeding. Thus, pursuant to FPA 

section 206, the Commission finds that 

the omission of procedures in the 

NYISO Tariff governing the rates, terms, 

and conditions of FERC-jurisdictional 

RMR service needed to ensure reliable 

transmission service renders the NYISO 

Tariff unjust and unreasonable and 

inadequate to prevent undue 

discrimination among similarly-situated 

resources. The uncertainty created for 

resources by the lack of clear tariff 

provisions has the potential to 

exacerbate the very concerns an RMR 

service is meant to address—ensuring 

the continued reliable and efficient 

operation of the grid, and of NYISO’s 

markets. NYISO, as the independent 

system operator in New York, is 

uniquely positioned to assess the need 

for RMR service. Moreover, given its 

role, NYISO is the appropriate entity to 

assess the potential impacts RMR 

agreements may have on its markets in 

New York. Therefore, NYISO should be 

the entity that administers RMR service 

in New York, pursuant to the provisions 

of its Commission-jurisdictional Tariff 

required by this order to be filed with 

the Commission. 

10. NYISO has filed status reports on 

matters concerning RMR service and 

compensation for nearly four years now 

and there has been no consensus 

regarding tariff provisions governing 

compensation for generators needed for 

reliability.20 The Commission thus has 

no expectation of NYISO and its 

stakeholders addressing the matter on 

their own. Yet, the need for RMR service 

remains as evidenced by the 

aforementioned cases, and NYISO, as 

the independent system operator is 

responsible for efficiently and reliably 

administering the resources under its 

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21However, the Commission clarifies that 

NYISO’s RMR proposal will not require Dunkirk to 

enter into new pro forma agreements for the 2012 

and 2013 RSS agreements or for Cayuga to enter 

into new pro forma agreements for the Cayuga 

RSSA–1 and RSSA–2 agreements referenced above. 

The Commission also notes that the costs at issue 

in the Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. filing in 

Docket No. ER14–543–000, related to the 2012 and 

2013 Dunkirk RSSAs, remain pending before the 

Commission in Docket No. ER14–543–000. 

22 In its evaluation of what to include in its 

submission, we encourage NYISO to consider the 

RMR tariff provisions of other RTOs/ISOs. 

However, we recognize that there may be reasons 

to allow variation among RTOs/ISOs, so we will not 

at this time direct NYISO to adopt any particular 

mechanism. See PJM Interconnection, LLC, 112 

FERC ¶ 61,031, at P 21 (2005) (PJM’s procedures 

need not precisely match procedures of another 

ISO). 

23NYISO, however, is not limited to filing 

proposed tariff provisions that meet the general 

guidance provided in this order. NYISO’s 

compliance filing may contain additional 

provisions as long as they are fully supported and 

are shown to be just and reasonable and not unduly 

discriminatory. 

24See, e.g., Midcontinent Independent System 

Operator, Inc. (MISO), FERC Electric Tariff 38.2.7 

(requiring 26 weeks’ notice); PJM Interconnection, 

LLC (PJM), FERC Electric Tariff Part V Section 

113.1 (requiring 90 days’ notice); California 

Independent System Operator Corp. (CAISO) FERC 

Electric Tariff, Section 43 (requiring 180 days’ 

notice). See generally, Calif. Indep. Sys. Operator 

Corp., 138 FERC ¶ 61,112 (2012); Calif. Indep. Sys. 

Operator Corp., 134 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2011); ISO New 

England, Inc. 125 FERC 61,102, order on 

clarification, 125 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2008), order 

denying reh’g, 130 FERC ¶ 61,089 (2010); Midwest 

Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 FERC 

¶ 61,237, at P 18 (2012). 

25See, e.g., Calif. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 134 

FERC ¶ 61,211 (2011); Midwest Indep. 

Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 FERC ¶ 

61,237, at P 18 (2010); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 

112 FERC ¶ 61,031, at P 31 (2005). 

control, particularly including the 

generation resources needed to ensure 

reliable transmission service. 

11. If left unresolved, uncertainty 

regarding NYISO’s RMR procedures and 

compensation policies could undermine 

NYISO’s access to generation units 

needed for reliability. That is, in the 

absence of tariff provisions that would 

allow NYISO to secure RMR services, 

NYISO may not be able to ensure both 

that there is indeed adequate generation, 

and at the appropriate locations, to 

ensure reliable and efficient operations, 

and that such generation is adequately 

compensated so that it will be available 

when needed. NYISO’s inability to 

secure adequate RMR services could 

impede its ability to ensure the reliable 

and efficient operation of the electric 

grid and its markets. Therefore, 

pursuant to FPA section 206, we direct 

NYISO to submit proposed tariff 

provisions setting forth its proposals to 

establish an appropriate RMR process in 

the NYISO tariff. The filing should 

consist of fully supported proposed 

tariff provisions governing the retention 

of and compensation to generating units 

required for reliability, including 

procedures for designating such 

resources, the rates, terms and 

conditions for RMR service, provisions 

for the allocation of costs of RMR 

service, and a pro forma service 

agreement for RMR service.21

12. In order to assist NYISO in the 

development of a compliance proposal, 

the Commission provides general 

guidance on the elements that should be 

addressed by NYISO.22 NYISO’s 

proposal should be consistent with this 

general guidance.23

A. RMR Process 

13. As an initial matter, as part of its 

RMR mechanism, NYISO should 

include Tariff provisions governing the 

schedule by which a generation owner 

must notify NYISO that it intends to 

deactivate.24 These provisions should 

also include a clear timeline by which 

NYISO will notify the generation owner 

that its unit is required for reliability, or, 

alternatively, determine that the 

deactivation will not impact reliability 

and the unit can be deactivated as 

planned.25 Provisions establishing a 

schedule by which a generator must 

notify NYISO of deactivation and clear 

timelines for action will ensure that 

NYISO, generation owners, all relevant 

transmission owners, and other 

concerned parties have sufficient time 

to plan and implement the reliability 

solutions necessary to address any 

identified reliability issue, which may 

ultimately mitigate the need for an RMR 

designation. In this regard, NYISO 

should describe the process for 

conducting the reliability analyses 

necessary to determine that there is a 

reliability need for the unit. NYISO may 

elect to address these requirements by 

expanding upon its OATT Attachment 

Y planning process, or developing 

another process as it deems appropriate 

for inclusion in the NYISO Tariff. We 

believe it is appropriate to require the 

NYISO Tariff to provide transparency 

with respect to such timelines, 

processes, and schedules, not just for 

the practical administration of the 

NYISO Tariff, but also to help ensure 

that there is no undue discrimination or 

preference in the handling of RMR 

service and agreements pursuant to the 

NYISO Tariff. 

14. After considering the necessary 

reliability studies, NYISO must be the 

entity that makes the determination 

whether a specific generator is needed 

to ensure reliable transmission service 

and thus whether the facility is 

designated an RMR unit. As indicated 

earlier, NYISO is uniquely positioned to 

assess the need for RMR service. 

Further, given that it is not only the 

independent system operator in New 

York but also is responsible for 

administering the markets in New York, 

NYISO is the appropriate entity to 

assess the potential impacts RMR 

agreements may have on its markets. To 

avoid requiring NYISO to study steps 

necessary to ensure reliable operation of 

transmission facilities over which 

NYISO does not have direct operational 

control, we require that the NYISO 

Tariff indicate the entity that will 

conduct the study in such cases. In 

order to avoid any potential for bias 

among stakeholders, NYISO may elect 

to conduct the necessary reliability 

studies itself, including any studies 

necessitated by local reliability 

standards, such as those developed by 

the New York State Reliability Council 

(NYSRC). Under that approach, NYISO 

would need to identify in the NYISO 

Tariff how it will coordinate the 

necessary reliability studies with the 

affected transmission owners. 

Alternatively, NYISO may elect to allow 

the relevant transmission owner to 

conduct the necessary reliability 

studies. If an entity other than NYISO is 

to conduct the initial reliability study, 

NYISO must review and verify any local 

or regional reliability studies conducted, 

and notify stakeholders as to whether or 

not it agrees with the outcome of those 

studies, independent of any other 

relevant authority’s determination that a 

particular unit is needed for reliability. 

NYISO’s proposal may also include a 

process for it to take into consideration 

the relevant reliability studies and 

evaluations made by the New York 

Commission and/or NYSRC. 

15. In addition, regardless of the 

approach chosen by NYISO for 

conducting the necessary reliability 

studies, NYISO’s proposal must include 

the requirement that any future 

generation resource-specific RMR filing 

made with the Commission fully 

describe, at a minimum, the 

methodologies and findings in the 

underlying reliability studies and 

clearly state all potential reliability 

criteria violations. NYISO’s including 

such a requirement is important to 

ensuring that, when a resource-specific 

RMR filing is made with the 

Commission, the Commission will be 

able to evaluate NYISO’s assessment of 

the need for operation of the resource in 

judging the reasonableness of the 

agreement including whether there has 

been any undue discrimination or 

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10680 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Notices 

26See, e.g., Calif. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 134 

FERC ¶ 61,211, at P 130 (2011) (directing tariff 

provisions providing that risk of retirement 

designation may be exercised ‘‘only if all other 

available procurement measures fail to procure the 

resources needed for reliable operation’’); ISO New 

England, Inc. 125 FERC 61,102, at P 110, order on 

clarification, 125 FERC ¶ 61,234 (2008), order 

denying reh’g, 130 FERC ¶ 61,089 (2010), Midwest 

Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 FERC 

¶ 61,337, at PP 10, 36 (2012). 

27See, e.g., MISO, FERC Electric FPA Tariff, 

MISO Rate Schedules, MISO Transmission Owner 

Agreement, C., Planning Activities., 1.0.0 

(‘‘planning shall conform to applicable reliability 

requirements of NERC, applicable Regional Entities, 

or any successor organizations, each Owner’s 

specific reliability requirements and operating 

guidelines, and all applicable requirements of 

federal or state laws or regulatory authorities’’); PJM 

Operating Agreement 462 (Jan. 6, 2014), available 

at: http://www.pjm.com/∼/media/documents/

agreements/oa.ashx (addressing Regional 

Transmission Expansion Plan criteria). 

28See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. 

Operator, Inc., 140 FERC ¶ 61,237, at P 36 (2012). 

29See, e.g., Midcontinent Independent System 

Operator, Inc., FERC Electric Tariff, § 38.2.7. 

30See, e.g., Midwest Independent Transmission 

System Operator, Inc., 140 FERC ¶ 61,237, at PP 10, 

106 (2012). 

31With respect to the going-forward costs rate, the 

Commission recognizes that the NYISO Services 

Tariff already defines Going Forward Costs. NYISO 

Services Tariff, Attachment H, 23.2.1. However, for 

purposes of its RMR proposal, NYISO may wish to 

define going-forward costs differently in the context 

of RMR unit compensation. 

32PJM Interconnection, LLC, 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, 

at P 40 (2004). 

33 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 148 

FERC ¶ 61,057, at P 84 (2014) (‘‘While the 

Commission has accepted a range of reasonable 

compensation methodologies for RMR units in 

RTOs/ISOs, we find that it is unjust and 

unreasonable to not allow SSRs to receive 

compensation for the fixed costs of existing plant 

given MISO’s authority under its Tariff to 

unilaterally require a generator that seeks to retire 

or suspend operations to remain online in order to 

address reliability concerns’’). 

34The filing of RMR agreements should be done 

consistent with the requirements of the 

Commission’s eTariff system. 

35 Midwest Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 FERC 

¶ 61,237, at P 10 (2012). 

36For example, a generator should have the 

ability to file to change that rate under section 205 

in the event, among other things, that materially 

adverse unforeseen circumstances affecting the unit 

increase its costs, or, alternatively, if circumstances 

result in a decrease in costs. 

37See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 112 FERC 

¶ 61,031, at PP 18–20 (2005); see also PJM OATT 

119. (‘‘A generator seeking to provide RMR services 

under a non-conforming RMR Agreement must file 

that agreement for Commission review and 

approval, and demonstrate that it is consistent with 

or superior to the pro forma agreement’’); see also 

Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 148 FERC 

¶ 61,057, at P 92 (2014) (‘‘the MISO Tariff should 

allow generation or SCU owners designated as SSRs 

to file their own revenue requirement in order to 

protect that generation or SCU owner’s rights under 

FPA section 205’’). 

preference.26 Where an RMR 

determination is based on local 

planning criteria, any filing also must 

similarly provide, and for the same 

reasons, a full discussion of those local 

criteria, including, for example, 

documentation as to when the criteria 

became effective, how the criteria were 

applied, which regulatory body 

approved the standard, and any other 

supporting information.27

16. Finally, NYISO’s proposal must 

describe the process NYISO will use to 

evaluate alternatives for addressing the 

identified reliability need. The 

evaluation of alternatives to an RMR 

designation is an important step that 

deserves the full consideration of 

NYISO and its stakeholders to ensure 

that RMR agreements are used only as 

a limited, last-resort measure. To this 

end, NYISO, in its proposed tariff 

language, should explain its process for 

identifying RMR alternatives in detail, 

including how the process will ensure 

a thorough consideration of all types of 

RMR alternatives in an open and 

transparent manner.28 For example, 

MISO applies an open and transparent 

process to consider with its stakeholders 

feasible alternatives to an RMR 

designation, including (depending on 

the type of reliability concern 

identified) transmission upgrades, 

demand-side resources, and generator 

alternatives, as well as alternative 

operating procedures (e.g., re-dispatch, 

temporary rating increases, special 

protection systems).29 Our requiring 

that NYISO describe this process 

promotes the transparency needed to 

ensure that the process has indeed not 

been unduly discriminatory or 

preferential. Furthermore, NYISO’s 

proposal must include the requirement 

that any future generation resourcespecific RMR filing made with the 

Commission should detail the 

alternative solutions evaluated and 

justify the term of the proposed RMR 

agreement vis-a`-vis the timing of 

alternative solutions to the identified 

reliability need.30 This last requirement 

reflects our belief that RMR filings 

should be made only to temporarily 

address the need to retain certain 

generation until more permanent 

solutions are in place and that all 

alternatives should be considered to 

ensure that designating a generator for 

RMR service is a last resort option for 

meeting immediate reliability needs. 

B. RMR Compensation 

17. As RMR agreements are for 

Commission jurisdictional services, we 

require NYISO’s RMR proposal to 

include provisions dealing with 

compensation for RMR services. The 

Commission believes that NYISO’s RMR 

compensation provisions should reflect 

the nature of NYISO’s RMR proposal. 

That is, should NYISO choose an 

exclusively voluntary RMR regime, 

under which a generator wishing to 

deactivate could reject the reliability 

needs determination and continue to 

deactivate absent the establishment of 

acceptable compensation, the tariff 

should provide for the parties to agree 

to an appropriate cost-based rate. 

Compensation to an RMR generator 

must at a minimum allow for the 

recovery of the generator’s goingforward costs,31 with parties having the 

flexibility to negotiate a cost-based rate 

up to the generator’s full cost of 

service.32 This ensures that generators 

are appropriately compensated for 

agreeing to provide RMR service. Thus, 

if NYISO chooses an exclusively 

voluntary RMR regime, the tariff must 

include a process by which NYISO and 

the RMR unit may negotiate an 

appropriate cost-based rate, to minimize 

the potential for protracted disputes 

concerning that unit’s compensation. 

The participation of the NYISO 

Independent Market Monitor in 

negotiations with the generator 

regarding the appropriate level of 

charges to include in the negotiated 

RMR rate should also be considered. 

Alternatively, should NYISO choose an 

exclusively mandatory RMR regime, 

under which a generator wishing to 

deactivate but determined by NYISO to 

be needed for reliability is required to 

remain in operation, NYISO’s proposal 

should provide for compensation at a 

full cost-of-service rate.33

18. NYISO’s proposal should also 

contain procedures requiring the filing 

of RMR agreements for review and 

approval by the Commission, including, 

among other provisions, a pro forma 

RMR Agreement; 34 a filing requirement 

for RMR agreements will ensure 

Commission review of the agreements 

and thus ensure that they are just and 

reasonable and not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential.35

Specifically, regardless of whether 

NYISO adopts a voluntary approach or 

an involuntary approach, NYISO’s 

proposal should provide authorization 

for a generator to file, for Commission 

review, an RMR agreement under FPA 

section 205 in the form of the Tariff’s 

pro forma RMR Agreement containing 

cost-based rates (and provisions for 

filings to change such rates) 36 for the 

provision of RMR service in accordance 

with the NYISO Tariff.37 Providing for 

such FPA section 205 filings will ensure 

that generators delaying deactivation for 

transmission system reliability reasons 

will have the authority to seek just and 

reasonable rates when they delay 

deactivation. In the case where a 

generator seeks to file such rates under 

FPA section 205, NYISO should provide 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 39 / Friday, February 27, 2015 / Notices 10681 

38See, e.g., ISO New England, Inc. 125 FERC 

61,102, at PP 82–84, order on clarification, 125 

FERC ¶ 61,234 (2008), order denying reh’g, 130 

FERC ¶ 61,089 (2010). 

39 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 

Inc., 140 FERC ¶ 61,237, at P 138 (2012), order on 

compliance, 148 FERC ¶ 61,056, at P 44 (2014). 

40PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 

61,112, at P 22 (2004). 

41Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 

Inc., 140 FERC ¶ 61,237, at P 154 (2012). 

42See, e.g., PJM OATT 120. 

43See, e.g., PJM OATT 118; ISO–NE, 

Transmission Markets and Services Tariff, 

III.13.2.5.2.5 (18.0.0); MISO, FERC Electric Tariff, 

38.2.7 (4.0.0); CAISO, eTariff, 43.2.6 (1.0.0). 

44See, ISO New England Inc., 125 FERC ¶ 61,102, 

at PP 45–48 (2008). 

the generator the reliability study report 

and NYISO’s RMR proposal should 

address which entity will file the 

reliability report(s) with the 

Commission. 

19. NYISO’s RMR proposal should 

address the circumstance of accelerated 

cost recovery for generators that require 

upgrades, retrofitting, repowering, or 

some other form of additional 

investment required to continue 

operating during the term of the RMR 

agreement, to ensure that in such 

circumstances generators are 

appropriately compensated.38 In 

addition, the proposal should likewise 

address recovery of such investments 

from RMR generators should the RMR 

unit receive compensation for the 

investment during the term of the RMR 

agreement but then continue to operate 

as a merchant unit after the term of the 

RMR agreement.39 Such provisions 

should ensure that generators under 

RMR agreements will not recover more 

than an allocable portion of the cost of 

such investments from providing RMR 

service. 

C. RMR Cost Allocation 

20. NYISO’s RMR compliance filing 

should include tariff provisions 

specifying a methodology for allocating 

the costs of RMR agreements, as 

appropriate cost allocation is essential 

to ensuring that the rates charged are 

just and reasonable and not unduly 

discriminatory or preferential.40

Moreover, disclosing the allocation of 

RMR costs in this manner will enable 

the entities to whom the costs may be 

allocated to better understand their 

potential responsibility for the RMR 

costs.41 Other RTOs and ISOs have 

adopted different approaches to address 

the recovery of the costs associated with 

agreements like the RMR agreements 

discussed in this order. For example, in 

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), RMR 

costs are allocated to the load in the 

zone(s) of the transmission owners that 

will be assigned financial responsibility 

for the reliability upgrades necessary to 

alleviate the reliability impact that 

would result from the unit’s 

deactivation.42 NYISO should ensure 

that any cost allocation regime is 

consistent with the Commission’s cost 

allocation principles and precedents. 

D. Toggling Provisions 

21. NYISO’s proposal should also 

include rules to eliminate, or at least 

minimize, incentives for a generator 

needed for reliability to toggle between 

receiving RMR compensation and 

market-based compensation for the 

same units.43 The Commission 

appreciates that uneconomic units 

could become economic for a number of 

reasons, including changing market 

conditions and the need for and timing 

of capital investments. However, the 

Commission is concerned that any 

proposed provisions not provide an 

incentive for a generation resource to 

propose to deactivate earlier than it 

otherwise would have in expectation of 

being needed for reliability and, 

therefore, be able to receive more 

revenues under an RMR service 

agreement than by remaining in the 

market. As noted above, the tariff 

provisions should not provide an 

incentive for a generation resource to reenter the market after having received 

accelerated recovery of the cost of 

additional investments made under its 

RMR agreement.44 Accordingly, to 

address the Commission’s concerns 

related to toggling, NYISO should craft 

tariff provisions that provide clear 

guidance to generators regarding the 

implications of a deactivation notice. 

The Commission Orders 

(A) Pursuant to the authority 

contained in and subject to the 

jurisdiction conferred upon the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission by 

section 402(a) of the Department of 

Energy Organization Act and by the 

Federal Power Act, particularly section 

206 thereof, and pursuant to the 

Commission’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure and the regulations under the 

Federal Power Act (18 CFR Chapter I), 

the Commission hereby institutes a 

proceeding in Docket No. EL15–37–000 

concerning the justness and 

reasonableness of NYISO’s Tariff with 

regard to RMR issues, as discussed in 

the body of this order. 

(B) Within 120 days of the date of 

issuance of this order, NYISO shall 

submit a compliance filing containing a 

proposed RMR Rate Schedule and pro 

forma RMR agreement, as discussed in 

the body of this order. 

(C) Any interested person desiring to 

be heard in this proceeding must file a 

notice of intervention or motion to 

intervene, as appropriate, with the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 

20426, in accordance with Rule 214 of 

the Commission’s Rules of Practice and 

Procedure (18 CFR 385.214 (2014)) 

within 21 days of the date of this order. 

(D) The Secretary is hereby directed to 

promptly publish this order in the 

Federal Register. 

By the Commission. 

Issued: February 19, 2015. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2015–04119 Filed 2–26–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. EL14–33–000] 

DATC Path 15, LLC; Notice of 

Institution of Section 206 Proceeding 

and Refund Effective Date 

On April 17, 2014, the Commission 

issued an order in Docket No. EL14–33– 

000, pursuant to section 206 of the 

Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 

824e (2012), instituting an investigation 

to determine the justness and 

reasonableness of DATC Path 15, LLC’s 

proposed transmission revenue 

requirement reduction. DATC Path 15, 

LLC, 147 FERC ¶ 61,035 (2014). 

The refund effective date in Docket 

No. EL14–33–000, established pursuant 

to section 206(b) of the FPA, will be the 

date of publication of this notice in the 

Federal Register. 

Dated: February 23, 2015. 

Kimberly D. Bose, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2015–04082 Filed 2–26–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission 

[Docket No. PF15–1–000] 

PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC; 

Notice of Postponement of Public 

Scoping Meeting for the Penneast 

Pipeline Project 

On January 13, 2015, the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC 

or Commission) issued a Notice of 

Intent to Prepare an Environmental 

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