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VaP-SEeNETtSENSITM

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ANALYSIS OF

"A $1.5 BILLION SECRET IN SKY"

WASHINGTON POST, DEC. 9, 1973

•

401"SE6REW-SENSITML

• •• a... • •••. • .....••••••n••••••,, •••••••••••••••••1/....

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1011-SEeREVSENSVIIVE--

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Article, "A $1.5 Billion Secret in Sky,"

Laurence Stern, Washington Post, December 9, 1973

Analysis of Article.

Extract from "Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over

Intelligence Setup," Benjamin Welles,

New York Times, January 22, 1971

Extract from "H-L-S of the C. I. A.,"

Benjamin Welles, New York Times Magazine,

April 18, 1971

Statement on Total NRP Funding, December 10, 1973 E

Extract from "Questions Related to Secret and

411 Confidential Documents," Senate Special Committee

to Study Questions Related to Secret and

Confidential Documents, 93d Congress, 1st Session,

Report No. 93-466, October 12, 1973

Release from Office of Senator William Proxmire,

Saturday, December 1, 1973

NRP FY-72 and FY-73 Programs

Chart, NRP Net Appropriations FY-63 - FY-74

TAB

A

-TeP-sEeteri-se
.

SUNDAY; DECEMBER 9, 1973

A $1.5 Billion. Secret in Sky

U.S. Spy Unit Surfaces by Accident

By Laurence Stern

Woridastaa hat Nate Irma •

In the arcane and heavily classified

world of "overhead" reconnaisance and

SPY satellite 'intelligence. the existence

of the National Reconnaissance Office has

been one of the best kept trade top

secrets.

The name of the organization. in fact,

is top secret, and, according to intelligence officials. has appeared in nubby

print only once before—by inadvertence.

Yet the \RD. which is funded primarily through Air Force appropriations,

spends an estimated $1.5 billion a year

acquiring and managing the most sophisticated, elusive and expensive force of

spies that has ever been recruited into

the government's service.

Its easterners include the Central Intelligence Agency. National Security

Agency. Defense Intelligence Agency and

the White House. Its operatives bear such

names as SR-71. Samos. Agena. and "the

Big Bird," Its activities are screened off

from all but a relative handful of specialists in the national security bureaucracy

who carry some of the highest and most

specialized clearances issued by the government.

Curiously enough, the only reference

to NRO that has been made in a public

government document was last Oct. 12 in

report of the Special Senate -Committee

to Study Questions Related to Secret and

Confidential Government Documents. The

drafters of the report unwittingly breached security by listing, along with CIA,

DIA and NSA on the concludin g page. the

National Reconnaissance Office.

And, more obliquely. Sen. William Proxmire (D.WIs.) alluded to the XRO's mission in a recent statement challenging

the appointment of Lockheed Aircraft

Corp. reconnaissance satellite expert

James W. Plummer as under secretary

of the Air Forte. •

In questioning Plummer's nomination

on conflict-of-interest grounds. Proxmire

made a pointed observation:

"Normally, the under secretary of the

Air Force has jurisdiction over certain

Intelligence matters and sits on a special

committee that directs manned and unmanned overhead reconnaissance. including spy mellite programs. These critical

projects have run into the billions of

dollars—money that flows to defense contractors such as Lockheed." •

Plummer has been with Lockheed since

1933. The California-based firm is the

Principal corporate contractor in the

so-called "black" reconnaissance satellite

programs earned out by NRO.

Fromthe "skunk works." as specialists

describe the facility, of Lockheed spy

plane developer Kelley Johnson in Nevada also emerged. the 1.:•2 and SI•IL

"The V•2 was -perhaps the only government spy project to have a cost under-

•

. ,„ „w...,..01CMIe".b.40:11:-. A . t • .• • %. • • • , 1. • • %.

. .
run and to exceed the promised performance standards," said one expert on

the program. Lockheed was

also the prime contractor

on the C-5A, which was

plagued by S2 billion in

combined cost overruns.

In addition to the conflictof-interest issue in Plummer's appointment, congressional investigators are looking into the possibilities of

overruns in the supersecret

. reconnaissance satellite Programs under N110's Jurisdiction.

."I've never beard of one

of these programs that

didn't have enormous cost

overruns," said one Defense

Department official who has

worked first-hand with some

of the spy satellite operations. The opportunities for

breaking cost and performance commitments are

greater in spy satellite Pro

-grams, this official said. because of the atmosphere of

secrecy and narrow channels of accountability in

which they operate.

NRO's existence is

shielded from senior congressional intelligence overseers. Former high-ranking

staff members of the National Secunty Council. who

were cleared for some of the

most sensitive intellitence

material to reach the President's desk, acknowledged

'in interviews that they bad

not been informed about it.

"This is a black Premium

and you're not supposed to

know It exists." said one

Pentagon administrator. For

the past several years its supervision has nominally

been In the hands of the under secretary of the Air

Force. Operations and pro-

. cerement have been bandled through the office of

the Secretary of the Air

Force. wording to Defense

Department sources.

Its intelligence products •

labeled ELM"? (for electronic intelligence) and

COM:XT (for communications intelligence) are par

(*led out under special code

,names to the government

'consumers"—such as CIA

or XSA. The users may get

the product of the secret reconnaissapec. such as momtoeing of Chinese nuclear

tests. or radio transmissions

in the Soviet Union, without

being told of the collection

techniques. This is known as

'"compartmentalizing" of intenigencedata.

Since the inception of the

U. S. reconnaissance satellite program in the mid19501 to 1970 some SIO to SI2

billion bad been spent on

the spy birds. according to

an estimate by aviation and

space writer Philip Klass

in his book, "Secret Sentries

in Space." Since then the

outlay may have grown by

about SS billion.

. Overhead reconnaissance

has proven of enormous

value in providing. more realistic assessments of such

things as Soviet ballistic

missile capability. both offensive and defensive. It

beiped,_in fact, to defuse

' public anxieties over the

missile gap in the early

lildes The most publicized

use of the program was to

support President Kennedy's contention that the Soviet Union was installing offensive missiles in Cuba.

But congressional investigators in yet unpublicised

inquiries are raising questions about relationships between corporate contractors

and the super-secret programs being carried out under the aegis of SRO and

other military intelligence

agencies.

- Proxmire's concern about

the Plummer appointment is

one example of this. Air

Force Secretary John .L

Lucas came to the government from the Air Force

think tank, MITRE. Assistant Air Force Secretary for

procurement Frank

Schrantz comes from Boeing.

"There has been a tendency, stronger than ever in

recent months, to put /seen-•

tives of contractor agencies

in these key positions." said

one veteran Defense Department official. "Not that

there Is anything personally

wrong with these men. But

all their attitudes have been

shaped be their experience

working for contractors."

The late Allen Ellender

(DUI former chairman of

the Senate Appropriations

Committee, was one of the

few members of Congress

privy to some of government's best-kept intelligence

secrets, and rhubarbs.

"if you knew how much.

money we spend and how

much money we waste in

this area." Enender said in a

1971 interview, -It would

knock you off your chair.

It's criminal."

Whatever that • amount

might be will probably

never appear in the public

domain.

- • • •

.

• •

•
Analysis of

"A $1.5 Billion Secret in Sky"

Washington Post, Dec. 9, 1973

•

.•

ALLEGATION: In the arcane and heavily classified world

of overhead" reconnaissance and spy satellite intelligence,

the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office has

been one of the best kept trade top secrets.

COMMENT: Essentially correct.

ALLEGATION: The name of the organization, in fact, is

top secret, and, according to intelligence officials, has

appeared in public print only once before--by inadvertence.

COMMENT: The NRO is SECRET; the NRP is TOP SECRET, and

in addition both terms are compartmented. The inadvertent

disclosure referred to occurred in the Congressional Record

on October 12, 1973 (See Tab F). Also, reference to the

NRO appeared in the New York Times, January 22, 1971;

reference to the NRP appeared in the New York Times

IT" Magazine, April 18, 1971 (See Tabs C and D). Until now

the Executive Branch has not acknowledged the existence

of the NRP or the NRO.

ALLEGATION: Yet the NRO, which is funded primarily through

Air Force appropriations, spends an estimated $1.5 billion

a year.

COMMENT: It is true that the NRP is funded through Air

Force appropriations. The NRP total, however, has not

exceeded the speak of FY 1968 (See Tab E).

ALLEGATION: Its customers include the Central Intelligence

Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence

Agency and the White House.

COMMENT: Essentially correct, although it directly provides information to ai.alyzers of raw data, sue. as NSA

and the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

Final intelligence product flows to all intelligence

agencies.

-TOP—SECRET-MEM-HIVE-

•
•

-4 411

5. ALLEGATION: Its operatives bear such names as SR-71,

SAMOS, AGENA, and "the Big Bird."

COMMENT: The SR-71 was developed and procured by the NRO for

the Air Force. It is occasionally tasked for NRO missions;

not owned by the NRO. The satellite names which appear

here are in general not those used by the NRO. The SAMOS

was a forerunner of the' ,photora hic reconnai • uates to the

The

n uppe s ag s er an• on vehicle,

not a reconnaissance payload. All NRO programs are not

identified.

ALLEGATION: Its activities are screened off from all but

a relative handful of specialists in the national security

bureaucracy who carry some of the highest and most specialized clearances issued by the government.

COMMENT: 86,000 people have access to one or more compartments.

ALLEGATION: Curiously enough, the only reference to NRO

that has been made in a public government document was

last Oct. 12 in a report of the Special Senate Committee

to Study Questions Related to Secret and Confidential

Government Documents. The drafters of the report unwittingly

breached security by listing, along with CIA, DIA and NSA

on the concluding page, the National Reconnaissance Office.

COMMENT: True (See Tab F).

8. ALLEGATION: And, more obliquely, Sen. William Proxmire

(D-Wis.) alluded to the NRO's mission in a recent statement

challenging the appointment of Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

reconnaissance satellite expert James W. Plummer as under

secretary of the Air Force.

COMMENT: True (See Tab G).

9. ALLEGATION: "Normally, the under secretary of the Air

Force has jurisdiction over certain intelligence matters

and sits on a special committee that directs manned and

unmanned overhead reconnaissance, including spy satellite

programs."

2

-TOP—SECRETI-SENSITTVE.
a

•

COMMENT: True. True. Reference is to the • Executive Committee.

BUt it does not divulge other members, or relationships

between them.

ALLEGATION: The California-based firm is the principal

corporate contractor in the so-called "black" reconnaissance

satellite programs carried out by NRO.

COMMENT: True. Lockheed Missile and Space Company has

generally received approximately ioaa, of the NRP funds

(See Tab H).

ALLEGATION: "The U-2 was perhaps the only government spy

project to have a cost under-run and to exceed the promised

performance standards," said one expert on the program.

COMMENT: The SR-71 under NRP management also under-ran

initial cost estimates. Also, several satellite programs

have under-run from a total program period standpoint.

12. ALLEGATION: "I've never heard of one of these programs

that didn t have enormous cost overruns," said one Defense

Department official who has worked first-hand with some

of the spy satellite operations.

COMMENT: This is an erroneous statement. The NRP programs

have generally been subject to an average 8% cost growth

against contracts which includes economic inflationary

trends. There have been several instances where this

percentage was significantly exceeded in terms of unit

costs, but not generally for a total program period. It

would have been imposSible to accommodate "enormous cost

over-runs" and still be able to reduce appropriations from

FY 1968 to 1972. The NRO is now producing more and better

intelligence information than ever before, and doing so

despite ever decreasing real purchasing power of budgeted

dollars (See Tab I).

13. ALLEGATION: The opportunities for breaking cost and perrnorm mecommitments are greater in spy satellite programs,

this official said v because of the atmosphere of secrecy

and narrow channels of accountability in which they operate.

COMMENT: Not true. Streamline management provides inforr-N

nation to top level management more directly, with less

chance for obscuring facts. Some of the best engineering

3

TOP—SEGRETISENSITIVE
and financial managers, procurement specialists, accountants and auditors are assigned to the program. Also,

many contracts are processed through regular channels,

and are given penetrating review. All major contractors

are regularly audited.

ALLEGATION: NRO's existence is shielded from senior

congressional intelligence overseers.

COMMENT: Not true. Chairmen of Senate and House Armed

Services and Appropriations Committees are fully apprised

at their pleasure. Committee members are briefed at the

Chairman's desire.

ALLEGATION: Former high-ranking, staff members of the

National Security Council, who were cleared for some of

the most sensitive intelligence material to reach the

President's desk, acknowledged in interviews that they

had not been informed about it.

COMMENT: There are numerous . cleared people on the NSC

Staff. As elsewhere, clearance here is based on a needto-know determination, not on the basis of position alone.

ALLEGATION: "This is a black program and you're not

supposed to know it exists," said one Pentagon administrator.

COMMENT: No way of knowing if the statement was made. If

so it was an unauthorized statement.

ALLEGATION: For the past several years its supervision

has nominally been in the hands of the Under Secretary of

the Air Force.

COMMENT: Partially true. Dr. Flax, the Assistant Secretary

for R&D was the exception.

18. ALLEGATION: Operations and procurement have been handled

through the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,

according to Defense Department sources.

COMMENT: Operations and procurement are actually handled

by field activities of the NRO, under the overall control

of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.

4

-TOP-SEeRaiSENSITIVE.

4 • - --•.---.-.....-"'''''' ''''."':-77-.• ' .. • . - ..• .: ',44,;• ;440511••11•••

• . •

.. • • 44.4

. • •••
• • •

ALLEGATION: ALLEGATION: its intelligence products labeled ELINT

(for electronic intelligence) and CCMINT (for communica.:

tions intelligence) are parceled out under special code

names to the government "consumers"--such as CIA or NSA.

ALLEGATION: The users may get the product of the secret

reconnaissance, such as monitoring of Chinese nuclear

tests, or radio transmissions in the Soviet Union, without

being told of the collection techniques. This is known

as "compartmentalizing" of intelligence data.

COMMENT: True.

21. ALLEGATION: Since the inception of the U.S. reconnaissance

satellite program in the mid 1950s to 1970 some $10 to $12

billion had been spent on the spy birds, according to an

estimate by aviation and space writer Philip J. Klass in

his book, "Secret Sentries in Space." Since then the

outlay may have grown by about $5 billion.

. •

. •

• COMMENT: This information is correct. It is curious,

however, in that it omits reference to photography which

is the NRP's major effort.

COMMENT: See Tabs E and I for financia ,'

summary: FY 63-70 FY 71-74

ALLEGATION: Overhead reconnaissance has proven of enormous

value in providing more realistic assessments of such

things as Soviet ballistic missile capability, both offensive and defensive. It helped, in fact, to defuse public

anxieties over the missile gap in the early 1960s.

COMMENT: True. It is the single most important espionage

program of the United States Government.

ALLEGATION: The most publicized use of the program was

to support President Kennedy's contention that the Soviet

Union was installing offensive missiles in Cuba.

COMMENT: Reference here is to the U-2.

5

-TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE

••••. ••n•• • ••• ••n •• •n• • •••• • ••••• ••••

. .

. .
24. ALLEGATION: The late Allen Ellender (D-La.), former

chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, was one

of the few members of Congress privy to some of government's best-kept intelligence secrets, and rhubards.

COMMENT: Senator Ellender was fully briefed on the NRO.
ONO

km has swung.

lbs Presideat and his aide

are said to suspect side.

spread morlappmg. dig:sca

Sion and toessderabis 'boom

doggish" in the secret,

shrouded intelligens "cons

sneaky"

Is oddities to the CI A.

they include the inteStgenci

arms of the Defense. SUP

and Justin Departments am

the Atomic I neryy Commis AL Together Iasi spend 13 3

Mikan a year an Erstegse one

Win about the Stew Union

Communist China and aches

countries that raszht harm tat

satens secusity When unseat intellogeare

is Vietnam and Germany sac

recoonstssanse by overseas

commands is ..41.1.1-d. no ass

seal Muse cured. Li taboos.

repro: say. The Deka., Department trends awe tun PO

per coat of Xi. ...cal. or shawl

S•:sok about S2 St..::aon of

It to the strategic irat.l.gtme

and the rest on tactical I: ech•

esthetes at ka.t 1:p1Cv2 n els

hers of the tate.

•enci. 4:ALL

which are esumnsi a: 2C.1.1•00

Pee*.

sources ana

of it takated

—ea fonsmating

pone,-

Two Caws in Paint Admossuration use—mined.

tardy 1.w

—of B am remise* in

spy L.-

whirs and crewman.

NOW f hP46 pollee the

Arafolsraeb c-:•• •:.-: of lam

Aiioult In COnt..ieted a ease ta

wn. Another was poor Mai.

Pr

ate coordawa* before the

aerobic Sontay yr:saner-of

war raid Of xo. 21. at witch

t.Me the CIA. ems sirtuato

shut oat of Penta

gon p.annmt

By contras:. tne spec:slots =

out. taaely ite.elterace

ix decosoemakati. •

It sat Mr. Close woo wag.

fed ire V-2 phatomphs a

men of a Soviet nuclear subnanne buildup at Ceid.teros.

Caba. last Septentoer. Has

summates. bawd on the ems*

a inc. er Om. plus two an

troasheutsus barges of a tym

owl may (Cr seer:* a nue.

tear s.masarine's ragmen,

effluent. sler.ed the Wrote

Hawse That led to Intense

behind-the-scenes negotiate.

and the Presidents retest

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

• Mewkg i Ilse fifth so is wee of omelet exploring Ow

Viso Ad

•inisfrufiwis .:yle in foreign polsry.

• By 11ENSJUID4 Vit1.1.13

*anal Intlw SAN t slit

WASHINGTON. Jan. 21 —

President Numis bas become

dissatisfied with the size. cost

and loose coatemation of the

Government's worldwide sis

leidgence spentlms.

Mcording to washers of

his oak he behests that the

iatelhgenre mei led to help

bun formula* forego policy.

*Mk ocsasmnally 'scene*.

is oat tend enough. day after

day. to wady as share of

the lauded.

Mr. Nswo. it is sad. has he.

Deis tO decide lm Mosel( whet

the intelli

Altte Plant= must he and where the army motad he spent. instead of kr.me

largely to the ontellgem ono

inanity. Ile has instructed ho

staff w swvey the situation

and resat lock uselen a year.

k is Ir•

I•rd—stels terommes.

dabwo I., budzrc cum of as

much as *snot hundred million dollars. •

Not sway seas ;go the

trona! Istellsgesse Aims'

and lise other eitelhgence

sure** were p•rlea

Yr3 as an

losiiststo empire

s controlhay

forcipt rebel, 

bvarad a is

of secrecy. Now the perdu

Overseeing ad the activities

is the United States Wells

Once hoard. set op by secret

order by Prestos.* Dwight D.

Essenbower o 1436 to coonk•

sate intelheeste musses.

Secede Mecum priontses.

er collection tasks and hell

More moat are known as as.

tonal comblence enemies.

The chairman of the board

who is the President's tepee

tentative. is the Director

Lenual Intelligence. at presets

&chard Helms. The other meat

has are 

LIM Gen. Donald V

ennett. bead of the Deigns

Intellmesce Agency. lay S

Cline. director of ueuizescs

and awards at the State Denser:era; Vice Adm. Me

Gas!er. head of the National

Semite, Ameer. Howard C

Moss Jr.. an assistant genera

mammy at the Atonic mores

Commune. and Witham 

C

ludo an. a de

puty director oi

the Federal bursa of linens.

saloon

Intenheare own ate aware

at the Precedent's d.ramet

but they 1•4, that ulna how

—.hallw ay tvelven lea term

—he has never ter Rawly

sought to comprehend the

%ask apravrimg cosiestanna.

ton of species Me. they

say. has Iv decided how bon

to use then ter

•ascal re.

--

%ming to Moscow not to

serves nuclear snort ships

••us or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the inert.

:hence comm

ies)

, resist talls .ng with repeaters. bat Inter.

sews tow SeVer31 months

edit Federal officials see

leal daily with aneniarnee %mem with men reared

tuns Intelligence careers and

with some on active ecty

kale that President Arlan

tad his chief advisers aware.

late the need for hoh•graoe

"ellipse, and 'comma"

newly.

The communit

y, for onto*,

sac been pro. lame the Pre*

dent with react statistics or

sunthers. deployment and

haracteretes of &wet mos

ales. nuclear subsume' ant

mower for tt

• talks with the

ttnotans on the limitation at

araterac arms.

We couldn't pet off the

naiad at use ono wakes*

his extremely sophisticated in

Mmation bast." an off nut

cammenicd. We don't see

Our negotiators round. figures

—shout MO of this weapon.

We get it down to the '234

here, here and here. Wiser

our people sit down to netts.

Il•te with the Russians the

n

n

►w all Malt the Russian

strategic three' to the ti S.—

that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence hat

Its drawbacks. some sources

say, for it whets the Adam.

istration's appetite. Speaking

of Henry A. Kissinger. the

President's adviser on national-security elfin% a Cabinet

official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New rosin

Is the last tear Mr. Klux

and Mr. Kisrnger have or•

dared a revision in the national

intelligence estimates, which

are prepared by the C.I.A. after

consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on

future Soviet strategy have

been ordered radically revised

by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present

Soviet capabilities allows

Henry and others to criticize

as for some sponginess about'

predicting future Soviet ritcy." an informed source conceded. -It's pretty hard to look

down the road with the same

certainty."
.

•

Part of the Administration's dissatisfaction with the out- L% and organization of the

community gents

flealliige1J: President's tidy

mental habits and pressing

budget Problems: part comes from the intellectual acuity of

Mr. Kissinger. a countenntel-

%Me sergeant in Work

War II and a specialist or

aram

Soviet ent.tegy and strategy cm disOn the other hand, the

Administration recognizes that

It must share the blame lot

ot having come to grim

with intelligence problems until now.

The President is said to have

had difficulty aecertaining predsely what all the Federal Intelbgenre agencies de — am

with how much money ant

manpower.

'Trying to draw up an oresizatam chart is a nightmare.'

a senior aide remarked. "No ore

person seems tu be in chere

That's part of In prcbtem

Whoever winds up runnier

this thing is clearly going to

have to be someone non the

President's continence."

The intelligence units have

'their own problems in fitutont

out the White House's moic

of operation. Recentl y an intelligence unit in the Pentarer

spent a goad deal of time anc

effort inyestizating. then chart.

lox what functions each winber of Mr. Kissineer's 110-man staff was suppoced to perform

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White

House say that Mr. Nixon

and his foreign-policy adviser, —Mr. Kissinger and Secretars of State William P. Rogers

and Secretary of Defense

Melvin R. Laird—respect the

professional competence of

Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is

the first career head of the

Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President

Lyndon B. Johnson in June. 1966. Mr. Helms has been

essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the

agency. tiehtesung discipline

and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criumsm in Congress

aid among the public. His

standing with Congress and

among the professionals is

high.

According to White House

sources, President Nixon.

backed by the Congressional

leadership, recently offered

Mr. Helms added authority to

coordinate the activities of

the other bean! members. He

is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according

to those who know the situation. is that while Mr. Helms

is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board,

his agency spends onl y about

10 per cent—S500-million to

S600-million—of the annual

intelligence budget. It employs

about 130.000 Americans. plus a few thousand foremners.

"When you have the mailerity but you don't control the

resources." a senior Pentagon

official explained, "you tend to walk very softly." • As for the State Department, which has constitutional responsihility for conducting

foreign policy, it has seen its

intelligence arm gradually

whittled away: in 1P45 It had

!mut 1.200 Intelligence officers and now it has 300. Its

mutat intelligence budget is

16-million. or 0.23 per cent of

spending on intelligence. Recently Mr. Rogers has directed Mr. Cline to lake a more vie*.

rous part at Intent:mice Board

meetings. asserting the deeartrnent's "primacy" in (mien policy. and specifically in intelligence collection and evalu- ation.

Mr. Nixon Ls said to feel

the need to settle the ques- tion of ultimate leadership

but to be willing to wait until the study. he ordered is completed.

Mr. ilehns's control over intelligence activities is indirect

and his powers are arum- teribed. He is an adviser on

intelligence, roc on policy. He

points out the likely conclusions from policy acts but he

does not recommend pot ties

unless specifically asked to by the President.

Moreover, the director, like other intelligence chiefs in the Federa l bureaucracy, must "sell" his product to Cabinet-level consumers and get decisions.

"Helms has been trying awfully hard to stay out of

trouble," remarked a former

agency official with White

House contacts. "He's had

the feeling that the C.I.A.

. .

war a place that might be- came a focal port of trouble

in this Administration and

his policy has been very

cauHtlia associates "ssociates also fear

that his usefulness as an impartial intelligence adviser

may be jeopardized . if the wrangling between Secretary.

Laird and Senator J. W. Fut.

bneht continues. Each has

taken to citing Mr. Helms's secret testimony to bur ress his

case.

Bearer of Bad Tidings

In addition the C.I.A. must sometimes report facts that

the Administration is loath to hear—as happened .last May

when it told the Whit.. lieu....

Stale Department and Pentagon that Vietnamese Communists had infiltrated more

than 30.000 atoms into the

South Vietnamese Government. endangering its ability to last after an American

troor. withdrawal.

The slack use of the intelligenre community's resources during the Middie

East crisis last year illustra:es

a problem bothering the White

!louse.

On June 19 Mr. Rogers urged a cease-fire: it was accepted by the Egyptians on

July 22 and by the Israelis on

Aug. I. All parties agreed

that it would take effect at

midnight Israeli time on the

•

sevi7cor thding to sources in

and out of the intelligence community. Mr. Rogers and

his principal deputy on the

matter, Joseph J. Sisco. Assistant Secretary for Near

Eastern and South Asian Af- fairs. were unwilling to consider the possibility of violations. It was not until Aug.

10 or 11 that the first U-2's began flying from British

bases on Cyprus. Even then

there were problems. Weather delayed the first photographic

runs: - Israel resisted air a:•

en States--overhee

byteetehit nited

territory.

The delays permitted the

Egyptians to continue intro-

(Wring missile batteries intc

the standstill area after the

ieedime. infuriating Israel. threatening the cease-fire and

embarrassing the White House.

• •••• •• • -....-•-•-•••••••••-• • 5••••n• ••• --yr,----77-••••••••.•fftw!

• . . •
Administration Fatbarrassed

Faulty coordination prior to the abortive Sonhy raid alse embarrassed the Administra- don. 'there is evidence that the C.I.A.. at Mr. Helms's di. action. furnished the Pentagon with what mine/nation 1. bad en North virus• dunng „he early planning stares law summer. However. the Penta

gon took over the planning

What went wrong Is still a

mystery.

Rapid intelligence. specialists Insist. can afford protection to policy interests.

Mom dawn on Jan. 23. 1966. President Johnsen , was

awakened to learn that the

U.S.S. Pueblo. an •acron*.

intethgence ship famine vital

code-breaking de. ices. had been

sewed be North Korean gunboats. His immediate mecums

was to order SO attack on North Korea in Inci the Oki.

C.I.A. analysts .n the White

House situation nom warned

him that the Norm Knceans

had 450 lets and 15 surface4nair missile batten's. Thoy also

reported that a North Korean

broadcast just intercepted ins,.

rated that the Pueblos had been

seised 23 metes off the rust.

With that information Mr. Johnson decided arainst th• risk of a second war on tee Asian mainland and tank the

issue of **piracy on the high

seas" to the. United Nations.

'In the miss:* are tor ars* Sangerous enemy of the limed

States Is an uninformed President.' Bromley South. a for

 White Home aide. wrote

not km2 ago.

A President. of course. may

choose to use the intellieence

resources at his command. or

ot. Whatever the choke, they

an substantial.

The C.I.A. le the "central"

arm. created under the Na- tional Security Mt rf 1447

to coordmate all overseas intelligence activities and to

winnow for the President

intelligence. front whatever

source. affecting national se. curtly. As its bead Mr. Hems Is the senior intern:ewe ad. riser to the President and

Cittfes l asge

•

ncy can conduct es- pionage anywh•re outside the United States. It kas no Powers of arrest and in:erre:ago,: but erioperates with the Federal Bureau of invesuga•

goo.

Centres, has emooweett

the agency to perform sem.

ices of "common conceal"

to other branches of nevemmem as ordered by the Na.

tonal Security Council. Thai

IS its charter for "covert acdons": !Wine ti•Ts over thc

Soviet Union from 1956 to

MO; ferrying agents its and out of enemy-held areas of

Southeast Asia; bream:Me.

ashen and supplytne 35.000

anti-Communist Meo Noesmen in Laos. where President

John F. Kennedy ordered it

in 1952. Dean Rusk. former Secretary

of State. on.-. mil "Dirty tricks form about 5 pet

cent of the C.I.A.'s work--and

we have full control over dirty

tricks." •

ProPoSals for covert actions come from the White House.

the State. Defense or Justice Department and from arnsis•

seders and military commanders overseas. All must men. •

tually be approved by a Milo

known White fictive panel

whose desinnation is periodic- ally switched for cm er perKnown at present as the

Forty Committee, for tne number of the memo const:tutmg it. it consists of Mr. flans.

Attorney Gcr.eral John N.

Mitchell. Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard. air. Xis.

singer and U. Alexis Johrson.

Under Secretar; of State Ice

Political Affairs. If all aetee

on a proposal it goes forward:

if not the President decides. On the overt side the C.I.A employs several thousand social and physical scientists tc study the flood of I:43MS•

pan pouring in daily—half from

openmum:5. a third from satellites and telemetry and 10 to

15 per cent from spies. The other agencies. notably

those at the Pentagoe. have less developed evaluation fa- cilities but far greater collection tools. The Pentagon is

authorized to run its own

agents abroad after clearance from the C.I.A. Mr. Heinle is said to have little control

over its activities.

The Administration has also been embarrassed by recent

dc.-losurn that Army bothgenre. assigned by the Johnson

AdMIniStrat:oR to spy on CirJ•

sans during cavil dsturbances

starting in the summer of 1967.

virtually ran wild and by late

1969 had fed 111.000 names Into

its computers. dossiers and

files.

Neither Mr. Helms nor the

intelligence Board had any con•

nation with this domestic counterespionage. It was an

Nom* of overlarge staffs using excessive facilities under too little civilian control.

The Pentagon's Defense In-

.tei3 liAence Agency has a staff of and spends S500•million yearty—as much as the C.I.A.— to collect and evaluate strategic

intelligence. It uses Air Force planes to

monitor foreign nuclear tests

and collect air samples. Its National Security Aeeney at

Fort Meade. near Baltimore. spends SI-billion yearly and

employs nearly 100.000 crypt- analysts and supporting staff to crack codes and eavesdrop on world comerriicatmoc Us

National •Reconnatesanoe Office soother SI-linott yearly irecomiakiblielFairplanes

enty-fttereits-s-whb.-- acennterkeM130 miles up. -

The results of the President's

coming management survey rm.

main to be seen of coarse. but Secretary Laird has already ordered General Bennett to report to him instead ef to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover.

an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Robert F. f rcelinte. is expected in time to take

the Pentagon's massive intelligence machinery under his

COMMA and to sit in as the

Pentagon's main representative at Mr. Helens's weekly meeting of the intelheence

Board. Many intelligence men cow cede tre need for "trimmtre

the fat." tightening up co.ordi. nation. • making intelkzeoes more responsive to the for- mulation of foreign policy.

Sane. citing successive studies since World war It see

lutle charge beyond "Linke". ing and tampering."

Others feel that an "in house" reorganization. as dis- tinct from an outside parel

studded with politically prominent but substantively ineffective people. may do gad

and may strengthen Mr. Helens's guidance of ,the tellinnee community. Whatever the outcome. many career experts regard the Muted State: system as still markedly superior to its princi- pal rivals in the Soviet Union. One official. asked his re. action to the canine study. clawed Cardinal Maury. an

18th-century Trench prelate

who was elected to the Academy hut then refused

certain dignities he considered

his due. "When I look at myself I am nothing." the Cardinal re.

marked. "but when I look at the others 1 am great."
•

of 'N

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ili 1

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. Nev.. York Times. Magazine ** 18 April 1971* :::-.1:2,..e;:i

: • -1=...._—..n : .---:::.. 1_.4.- 1

1 ...1 0 ,. . k i. • -.1 07.1 ' i 1 1 )1

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rr,-, l', • .'"'"• fa li rl 0-'1 1-1 .

5:-J •.-...1 ..-1 • f...a ..i..:.:.*14-..-as ':„....;b L.= L3 -:3

•

•

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WASIUM703.

gs27. CAN tell when be vans to the

&or w•at Sort cf a day it's

IL' Woo.. cps his Vie. Cr4htl.

vont &TS is 2:23 on N7:•2t I c:1 his

'Ogental laelf —totally ID.1:ri::::•10.

I knot better than to nth w:mt's

hajpenei I:01 tali: when b.* resey,

net bahnus but even when, h3 tails

he's tordhly areraat."

The Di:actor oZ Central Intel:Iwo Aszsmr, r.leac-.1. Zeus, r.,.-"areat:, biazz h is patisisas ilen28

cf:.ce ir• c.•.y cllter kushnelaag. to hear C:,•:.•his 1:ems VA it.

And the.es drys 71:.tms's j- is delinit ttione o: Cs: raeslp:::-.:ens-rieden

in Wes:tin:ton.

SC.2:=1:3 bt:k.Li CUL% b21.2nC3 Of

invoices re:tag:ion; LTG:Ina:Ile

dm-Irks rail pram disalcs...r.- :I Cant

have htrt th3 kuags

have ati. redc:c1 hs c; :rations etar:d..vatb.. :anon has recostly orziarrd a fireal

meat invo..11::,:tba int.) than int•e•

Bence "surynte:V." a t• r:: s:Nith

may tie lenzar ar.1 prove mem

didleadt than e'en :7=3 sct;tets

boansa of C cc7adty c: the

pence e3accls: to Ede in the br:cauantic thieztts. 3M5 :J: ea and his

prinei; _1 fOreLa orf:1:3 cf.viter,

. • •

top since the C.I.A. sr= created in

IC47. his :cal l,i3 been to v.-air-den-

.r.M.3 the cr;m:y and name it to raspec:ability. in fact, one of Ns wor

pracmmations has bleu to eters the

Lune of the Metter as a min

soh* moves fa 1 •Msh rny:t.ry, jatl:tu

inactively :re- the wo::d to mete

policy WM prime minbtars, generals

and i•h‘n, and brethiag azida, on the

pretext of "sacurit,-," the pithlkes

14.113 CO•1Z4e33'S proldr3

cznest:ans. 1•12:cti rr2cs ra "invisible

=vi.-t," as Ca C.I.A. bas gtrAitiM23

hum called, he is a vary vislhio

casyarer.

While he trial to hap his lunch=

frso for Ivory far nvie, he cocasiosally sim-xs up at a tuts:rant

with a friend for Jonah: a 11 :t tem

a cold plate. 'ne css eirmys on -the

clorh. Ito t1:3 C.:: -24..21, a

tor.9.::-freet anted real:we:A neer the

WA% House nhera, is Its ba22:sts to

be :221% th'2:3 13 Ir.:21y to L3 lass

gonip than if he were obrarvad onto:-

lug a private home. •

He 11:ms the con any of snractiva

wonsea—youn2 or olai—and they

him a charmla: dinner partner and

a ;cad dancer.

"ibis inmestia3—arsl tatarested

in yolera .tryitr, " said Lydia

Katsenhath.171:3 o: da format Dam- i

o=tic Attorney Canral. wc3-

resd and be doesn't try to r-hatitute

111rth..3 for conversation, Oct oh!

Prix on '43 tontine that sasce of

the cchmsnists around to..7n tse."

OZ ids critics comytain that

be is too cies: to the ire-m—evan

thoug:: most ap-ml that Its uses it,

with rare Mane, for kb awn and

hs azerry's ants. Some CbrOs the

frecrzat mention of Hilma and Ws

han..strne wife b the Dirs12 columns

and society Fazes of the cellars

ca hale

Yet, U he gluts the appearance of

insonclanee—ha Is witty, Lin•Woos,

id:di—the roam Is that.

a bt.h- voltage el:c:rle birder, just'

beassth the scrface. Halms is a mats

of at.: arant COOL••=4:r.tIons: kr.•=re.4

r-sd e• twsrZly rera.ted.

absorl::.1 In the easealhd in/ bud- •

naiad by the trivial. A firmar foreip •

co:vsktcr.Zent, he observe:. much ar.1

can rasei pracinly what few American I....LC:ants ever r.ote i.t Cie first

pace— :'at gown earl v.-omen wee

to a dinner cad 'AIM shoulder strap

0.

vrs orl of piaci. 14everezdess, •no

one is more conscious than Um:,

v.120 a:so has the brondar role c'

Director of Ceatr+1 intafliamme, nt

the strict security laws that &Agnate

him the diielai rm;.-murale for settine and caforcin3 security ster_dary

thretchout the int:1113mm comm.

ally.

Tnese ramarro

•

 ilities often erects

tuts: sucatents fcr him, as ridra3

achcc.f.attas is a story he ttlb

about hiattalk He hod taloa his sc•:3

to ea altunal fund-micin3 cveo1z

his almamaw, T: liras Colt:sa.

After cactlaile and (-inner the alumni

and theb• ladies crowded tonetl.m. on

small vioc.len rests for s; cartes by

John Sawyer, th3 Wiliknas cresidact,

and elks? luminaries. Kehus and his'

wits smrS seated in the nest of tha

altrative &cox ia:Itne. to their ha,-

lb •

. • - •

. •

P.o,Sart E. Cr.I.S:oon

D;=sty Disactor of dr. C.M.

I

1:11:13 cevus asS•azt

neva" Otiirs es • centspaiest ia WaskbAs Isamu of its limn.

Henry Itissinpr, art said to reztard

Gran comrateV as a raksi blater.3:

IntrbsicsEy int• adant to the Untel

States but tar tea b.:3 cad too ;roue

to akar* a:sten:es of egalon--

or, somttintsr, no c;ialch—resind a

wean of v.erds.

Coraidered a cold- !ceded seassit, in the Cold days, Cm :gem

now seems to many students, liberal

inteleCtC211 Canvass:nen. to he

trr:4:atccz. le, carzyir-tc:tti, sinister.

The rev:dal:ens In reseat years that

have /nada the r.-zranysa:pact Indute

Its activitias In Snr.t.erst Asia, the

Congo, Guatemala, the My of I1 A.

the U.• its sec:3 funny:

thrcich ";:cat" foundations ot the

atationd Ssodant Alsocitan plus

prkate ct:turd„ cronsen's cad

ye' :r0:::%; ant, findly„ two years

ago, the Crean gnats :Rein

The 5111,-ear•cld nalms insows

this, bat:: than matt. Ls tha first ca.

nor inteDi3eace °::im to mach the
,•••••nn••••• •••n• •n•••,.n•••••••••••••• • • •••• .

••

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•

)

•• .4\

..•••n•••••••••=/

•!...

.0 it

\

.'t

••:1.;

it

1

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t.

the Padasat on ci 3w:op/sem

abroad. holably bscasss of its

oracis sandfira posifion; he lies

to stoat to plain fads without matemending paw in that um son

soiree says. Helms 'lands to healer

down." Honk la is sue, far Ink

at a nesting with Hwy Kissinger,

Secretary of Slats gem, AL. Hison,

Scandal of Wenn Laird. and Adm.

Thomas Moors,. Ma daimon of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff..

' VI r"1"" • T.: -""'""""1.1':

it/ r

•

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•

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•

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6.

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t ..„ .. •••• • •• •••T• ft •

•

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Intelligence and Research

PLR); the Atomic Energy

Commission (A.E.C.); the Federal Bureau a InvestizttiOn

(F.B.I.) and the Natiostzl Security Agency whirl

eavesdrops electronically on

foreign government broadcast

communications.

and the Rational P:!tte

terpr•tatien Center in Washington. which studies the reels

C P r.isefr.r ergot f11'41' Mt Lamed

overboard periodically by the

orbiting monsters and colleted to mid-air by highlytrrined Air Fens crews. .

The lattlii2ence community's she and *Nunn DM of

course, secrets. but competent

*elite:ides say the C.I.A. employs about IS,C10 Americans,

plus several thousand foreign

agents, and spends slightly

lass than $:C3-million yearly.

By contrast, according to

Robert F. Froehlke. Assistant

Seeto:ary of Rafe= for Adminiatrataon, the Da:ents Intent :pace Itzczy scenes 52.9-

bn:ion yc-..rly. Its code-erachbe N.S.A. at Fort I.trade near

Baltimore spends more than

Si-billion o this and employs

IIOICCO persons. The satellite

prove's, In which the C.I.A.

has a voice but nag control,

is raid to spend at least SM.

million a year.

In his rote as Dt..—etor of

Central Intelligence. Helms

wrist be constantly prepared

to give the Fresider.t. on short

notice. the btest infennation

on what's really happening in

scch matters as Soviet•Chinese tensimts, Sov:rt naval

activities in the Caribbean

and arms phipmeats to the

militant Arab stabs, Arab

moves against brad. Chile's
10 Dec 73

Statement on Total NRP Funding (Million $)

Since FY 1966, the NRP has not only stayed within appropriated funds

each fiscal year, but has volunteered or accepted significant reductions

in relation to the President's Budget. This is shown by the following

tabulation:

President's Net

Reduct4on itamodetion

FT 1967

Fr 1968

Fr 1969

FY 1970

FY 1971

PT 1972

FY 1973

FY 1974

Totals

This also indicates that from a peak41011111111NeW Obligation

Authority in FT 1968, NAP totals successively re wed thru Fr 1972, and

thru FY 1974 are still below the peak year. Thit has occurred even

though there has been continued economic escalation and the introduction

of funding follillinew satellites, as well as changes and improvements

to existing programs. During this period anaseglinimmumpt

satellite programs have been terminated.

This is the total funding for the NRP, and supports both the DOD

and CIA activities under the NRP. The NAP total as such has not exceeded

031011111110peak in F1 1968.

-T01'-9B3NET/SENSITIVB`
SENATE RrroIrr

No. 93-466

D3D CONGRESS I

lag Swim

AME=NI=01811116111111•=.

•

QUESTIONS RELATED TO SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENTS

••

°maim 12, 1973.—Ordered to be printed

REPORT

of tbo

•

SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY QUESTIONS RELATED TO sEcn ET

AND CON FIliENTIAL GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

In *mordant* with the prmisions of S. Res. 13. tho Special Committee to Study Questions Related to Secret and Confidential Documents submits the following report and recommendations.

The Committee was aided in its work by the Legislative Reference

Service of :110 Library of Congress and wishes to conunend Mr.

Robert block and Mr. 1)avad Sale of that benice for their

rout ribs: t ions.

This report rovers que4tionA relating to (I) fleeces to classified

information by Members of Congre.s, (2) legal rights of an individual

Senator with respect to classified documents tit his possession, (3) legal

rights of a Senate Unaunit tee with respect to classified documents in

its possession. (4) legal rights of individual memben with respect to

documents on information received from foreign emissaries. (5) the

declassification of documents in the posses.ston of an individual

member, (G) pending bills and proposals for Congressional ntachinery

to oversee eht.sified information matters and (7) reconuncndations by

the Conunit tee.

I. ACCE43 TO CLAMMED INFORMATION BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

The Freedom of Information Act (FOR), Pub. L. 89-487, SO Stat.

250, 5 U.S.C. 552, amending the Achninistnitive Procedure Act,

(5 U.S.C. 551, el .eq.), enunciates a policy of public disclosure and

access to information generated by Federal agencies.

Beginning with the arce•• problem in the context of the Freedom

of Information Act, the first two questions are: (I) What limitations

are provided by the Act on public disclosure of classified information?

and (2) do t=hese limitations apply to Members and committees of

Comma!

e0-1110

•

•

. . .
•

16

that decision might have been." The Committee swab; that the

machinery be set up for questioning in an orderly manner these

executive decisions to classify for reasons of National security, and

we urge the Government Operations Committee to give priority consideratmn to bills now pending before it and discussed herein designed

to accomplish this objective. %tie make no detailed evaluation of these bilk, leaving that to the judgment of the substantive committee but

urge that a complete overhaul of the classification system be undertaken at the earliest possible time.

H. The question of procedures to be followed b y a member who •

I •

has classified documents in his possession, prior to his disclosure of

those documents, was discussed b y the Committee.

The Committee recommends that individual members who have •

such documents and with to disclose them, consult with the Senate

Ethics Onntnittee prior to such disclosure.

The Committee wishes to make it clear that although, it recommends consultation with the Ethics Committee, any determination

by the Ethics Committee would not be binding on the member. The

reason for the recommendation of consultation as to permit a member

the opportunity of getting the additional thinking and precedents

available to him before making a final decision regarding disclosure.

III. At the request of Senator Cranston, the Committee discussed

providing the Senate the overall sums requested for each separate

intelligence agrnev. The release of such sums would provide members

with the minimal information they should have about our intelligence

operations. Such information would also end the practice of inflating

certain budget figures so 05 ou hide intelligence costs, and would insure that all members will know the true cost of each budget item

they tau-t vote upon.

Accordingly. the Committee recommends that the Appropriations

Committee itemize in the Defense Department Appropriations bill

the total sums proposed to be sppnriuted fur intelligence activities

by each of the following agencies: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense intelligence Agency, Milhaud Securit y Agency, liatiOnil • 000nsismsos Oliemand any separate intelligence units within Tie

Army. Navy, and Air Force.Vhe Committee does not request that any

line items be revealed.

The Committee also recommends that the committee reports indicam the total number of personnel to be employed by each of the

above agencies. The Committee does not request any information

about their duties.

•

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•

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.:4:A

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FF14100P

SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE

WISCONSIN

pp NELMS AFTER 6:30 P.M. SAMMY DEMMER 1. 1973 FOR surmy Alts

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) in a statement from his Washington office

Saturday said he had written the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee suggesting

that "a ',stable conflict of interest makes it essential that the Committee

conduct an in depth examination of James W. Plummer before accepting his nomination

as Under Secretary of the Air Force.

1.

"As Under Secretary of the Air Force, Ht. Pldmmer.will be managing many

Programs he previously worked on at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation," the Senator

d.

"Aecause of his unique background, his responsibilities as Under Secretary

mould ba examined in great detail. There is a strong possibility . of a substantial

conflictof interest in this nomination.

"Without prejudging the case or the information to be developed in the

&Intimation hearing, extreme care must be taken in reviewing the official

responsibilities of Hr. Plummer as Under Secretary. Normally, the Under Secretary

of the Air Force has jurisdiction over certain intelligence matters and sits an

..•

special committee that directs manned and unmanned overhead reconnaissance

including spy satellite programs. These critical projects have run into the

•

billions If dollars --- money that flows to defense contractors such as Lockheed.'

"The Under Secretary-designate is one of the foremost experts on satellite

etWenology in the country. Since his first employment with Lockheed Aircraft •

1-%:47

C?rporationin 1955, he has provided managerial and technical support to a series

Of satellite programs that havi'been used by the intelligence community.

" • *"'. •••••., • •••••• • .• •••••• :7•71-7.:. • .•:. IF

. •
"As Vice President of Lockheed Aircraft Corporatich4 and General Manager

.40 the space Systems Division, and as a laticheed an for over twenty years

right o7 until his appointment as head of the very agency that would buy from

•

•

L;eklubad there is a serimus possibility of a conflict of interest. Based on

• r •:••4

et experience, arrangenants to insulate Mr. Plumber from procurement decisions

Involving Lockheed are unlikely to work.

. am writing to Senator John Stennis, the Chairman of the Armed Services

Conmsittee„ to ask that terefulcensidevetion siren co this nomination In view

mf the apparent hoterleektna retattinsharli."

I•••n•• • •• •

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-'.nT•--•"^':7^r^"r"""tra :

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Pages 28 - 29

are

Denied in full
Page 32

is

Denied in full