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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

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13 July 19 54 

E03.3(h) (2) 

PL S6~36/50 USC 3605 

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Subject: Security Assessments or I .... __________ ____. 

Reference: USCIB 29.18/7 dated 8 June 1954. 

The enclosed U.K. security assessments o! subject named countries 

are circulated !or information in connection with the reterence. 

Enclosure 

DGC/4508 dtd 29 May 1954. 

USCIBt 29 .18/13 

eclassifi ed and a ursuantto E .0. 1352 

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fiEo 3 . 3 ( • h) ( 2 ) 

/iPL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/4508. 

29th May' 19 54. 

Security Assessments or ~I =,,.------------

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Extract from JIC/2275/53: 

Communist Activity and Influence 

The is a legal organisation but its 

membership is only about 9,000 representing 0.3% ot•the electorate. 

2. Communist influence in /iihe/police and civil service is negligible. 

As regards the armed forces, see below. 

3. In the there are no Communists but 

Communist influence is marked in a number of local unions especiall.y. the 

Forestry a.J.1d Agricultural Union, the Builder's Unions, the Chemical, \.Metal, 

Dockers and Shipbuilding Unions. 

The Armed Forces 

4. Thd !authorities are satisfied that there are no Communists 

in the higher ranks, but assume that among the junior N.C.0. 1 s and :rank and file 

there is a percentage of Communists comparable to.the proportion ot Comm.unists 

in the electorate. It is the practice in the service headquarters to limit 

access to classified material to a very few senior otticers. 

Physical security j.n Government Departments 

5. This is inadequate by British standards. Pass systems and guards 

are used but the appli·cation or the regulations is often perfunctory and 

ineffective. 

Security Organization 

during the last .war and therefore have little tradition or experience. Though 

their own security is fairly good they are still inadequate for their purposes and 

as they have new probably reached their limits in size and bud.get this situation 

is likely to continue. 

General Attitude to Security 

7 The greate~t weakness orl I security lies in the tact that the I Vare, by tradition and character, not security minded. The extreme 

frankness they show to British people rnsy, however be moderated by natural caution 

in their.dealings with people whose friendship they do not take for granted. 

8. A considerable degree of risk must attend the communication or 

classified military information to an.~uthority other than a very 

restricted list of senior officers and~icials. The discretion of these 

senior officials may be generally relied upon. 

Enclosure with USCIB 29.18/13 dtd 13 ~uly 1954. 

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Extract from JIC/(53)41: 

Communist In!luence 

ifEO 3 . 3 ( h ) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DGC/4508. 

security measures have since been ta.ken./and Communist political influence in the 

regular cadres of the Armed Forces may. //be con. sidere~igibl.e. Any\p.enetration 

now is certainly covert but previous .experience and u._____u• s exposed position to 

Soviet espionage must lead to the conclusion that it probably exists. 

33 ~ Communist influence ill the Police is . veey • small and in the Civil 

Service is also negligible except in the Customs Service Trade Union. 

Security Organisation 

35. Thel !security Service is well qualified professionally. It 

has not su!fered any discontinuity in records as have those countries\occupied 

by the Germans, but the tact that its records are not centralized means that there 

is a weakness in the vetting system. 

36. tappears to exercise some control in vetting 

and physical security, over Defence Industry. They have a fair grasp or the 

principles or protective security. On the other hand, the Government have no 

powers to. require a firm to remove a Communist from secret work. 

37. A more favourable impression has been .• gi .• ven by i·jresentatives·· ...o.f' 

the Air Ministry and Ministry o.f' Supply who inspected! _Security in 

February. They concluded that "security inl • lis or a high order" and that 

"it can be assumed that U.K. in.f'ol")Jlation passed to the Government will be 

adequately protected". 

I!I. 

Extract from JIC(53)41: 

Communist Activity 

28. There is some evidence of Communist propaganda activity in the Armed 

Forces. Some attempts have been made to provoke incidents among the Police. 

The Civil Service is swollen hY temporary officials and the Civil Service branch 

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Security Organisation 

29. Though the Security Service is enthusiastic, it lacks eJq>erience 

and is not fully effective. It appeared from th.e 1950 assessment of'i.__ ___ _. handling or N.A.T.O. documents that official security was weak. This was 

partly due to the unusual freedom of access to of!icials\enjoyed by the press, 

and the uninhibited disclosures by officials of .all matters o.t'\alleged public 

interest. There is no evidence that thel lhave system of industrial security. 

Conclusion 

30. We consider that the standard otl I security is low a.n1 that yo information which it is vital to keep secret should be released to the 

,'.31. The risk of loss of information or material given tol lmust, 

unless security is radicaliy improved, be considered a practical certainty. 

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