SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

65 

CA 13-00405 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ. 

 

PLAZA DRIVE GROUP OF CNY, LLC, 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TOWN OF SENNETT, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

CAMARDO LAW FIRM, P.C., AUBURN (KEVIN M. MENDILLO OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

GALBATO LAW FIRM, AUBURN (RICCARDO T. GALBATO OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court,

Cayuga County (Thomas G. Leone, A.J.), entered November 21, 2012 in a

declaratory judgment action. The judgment, insofar as appealed from,

granted that part of the cross motion of defendant seeking to dismiss

the second cause of action. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment insofar as appealed from

is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, that part of the

judgment dismissing the second cause of action is vacated and judgment

is granted thereon in favor of defendant as follows:

It is ADJUDGED and DECLARED that the unsigned February

6, 2012 letter is not a binding contract on defendant and is

unenforceable against it.

Memorandum: As limited by its brief, plaintiff, a local

commercial developer, contends on appeal that Supreme Court erred in

granting that part of defendant’s cross motion seeking dismissal of

the second cause of action. In that cause of action, plaintiff 

sought a declaration of the parties’ rights and legal relations

pursuant to an unsigned letter dated February 6, 2012 from plaintiff

to defendant, which contained terms relating to the installation of a

duplicate water meter and water meter pit at a shopping plaza

developed by plaintiff. Plaintiff attached a check to its letter upon

which it noted “water meter pit final,” and plaintiff set forth in the

letter that the check was payment for the final balance due to

defendant for the cost associated with the duplicate water meter. 

According to plaintiff, defendant’s acceptance of the check and

deposit of it constituted an accord and satisfaction of costs

associated with the duplicate water meter and pit and defendant

thereby accepted the terms of the letter, rendering it a binding
-2- 65 

CA 13-00405 

contract upon defendant.

We note at the outset that “[a] motion to dismiss [a cause of

action seeking a declaration] ‘presents for consideration only the

issue of whether a cause of action for declaratory relief is set

forth, not the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to a

favorable declaration’ ” (DiGiorgio v 1109-1113 Manhattan Ave.

Partners, LLC, 102 AD3d 725, 728). “[W]here a cause of action is

sufficient to invoke the court’s power to ‘render a declaratory

judgment . . . as to the rights and other legal relations of the

parties to a justiciable controversy’ . . . , a motion to dismiss that

cause of action should be denied” (Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town

of Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d 1148, 1150; see St. Lawrence Univ. v Trustees

of Theol. Sch. of St. Lawrence Univ., 20 NY2d 317, 325). Where,

however, no questions of fact are presented, a court may reach the

merits of a properly pleaded cause of action for a declaratory

judgment upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of

action (see Hoffman v City of Syracuse, 2 NY2d 484, 487) and, “[u]nder

such circumstances, the ‘motion [to dismiss for failure to state a

cause of action] should be taken as a motion for a declaration in the

defendant’s favor and treated accordingly’ ” (Tilcon, 87 AD3d at

1150). 

Deeming the material allegations of the complaint to be true, we

conclude that the allegations in the second cause of action presented

a justiciable controversy sufficient to invoke the court’s power to

render a declaratory judgment (see North Shore Towers Apts. Inc. v

Three Towers Assoc., 104 AD3d 825, 827; DiGiorgio, 102 AD3d at 728-

729). Furthermore, we are able to determine, as a matter of law, that

defendant is entitled to a declaration in its favor (see Hoffman, 2

NY2d at 487; DiGiorgio, 102 AD3d at 728). Plaintiff has not alleged

that defendant’s town board considered or approved plaintiff’s

unsigned letter agreement as required by Town Law § 64 (6) so as to

establish a valid contract. The unsigned letter therefore does not

constitute a valid binding agreement and is unenforceable against

defendant. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, defendant did not

ratify the unsigned letter agreement by accepting plaintiff’s check

(see generally JRP Old Riverhead Ltd. v Town of Southampton, 44 AD3d

905, 909).

Plaintiff’s alternative contention, i.e., that the parties could

not be bound by their prior agreement if defendant was not bound by

the letter, is raised for the first time on appeal and thus is not

properly before us (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984,

985). 

Entered: March 21, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court