USCIB: 13.5/105 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

IfANBDB 7lIA eOMIN'f e~ ONtY 

.wPEiNBBB BeeUMl!llft eelflJt!MS 

SOEl!iWORB MA'f:f!IRIAL 

17 June 1955 

Subject: Compromises of COMINT Information. 

Reference: CIBD #9 (Revised) dated 4 February 1954. 

1. The enclosed summaries of fourteen (14) hitherto unreported 

compromises of COMINT information due to ineffective communications 

security is circulated for information. 

2. A brief study of all compromises occurring during 1954 will 

be prepared and circulated as soon as all final reports are received. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 13.5/105 

tJ.~~QIA.~ 

~ H. D. JONES 

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB 

M:'f'EMBEB BOetJlaH!IN'f 60N'fAINS 

ee5EWOB.f) Ml\'fmtli:L 

!tA1mLE VIA eeMIN'l' eitA:Nlt.SiB mu.¥ 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-11-2014 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRE/f 

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COMPROMISES OF COMINT INFORMATipN F 

1. On 14 August 1954, a. COMINT compromise occurred. at Detachment 21 

1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, Wakkanai", Japan, during off-1:1.ne·PYTllON op• 

eration. On tha.t <}.a.te a portion of a CONFIDENTIAL message\wa.s transmitted 

in monoalpha.betic substitution cipher to the lat Radio Squadron, Mo'bile1 

Misawa Air Base, Japan, over a land.line circuit presumed vulnerable to 

interception. The compromised information involves 

u is not considered a ser ous .isclosure. 

e e message was e ng enciphered the one~time key tape became torn, 

and stuck over the sensing pins of the transmitter distributor. The operator failed to completely check decrypt the message, and the\ last seven 

lines were subsequently transmitted in monoalphabetic substitution. A 

contributing factor to this occurrence was a shortage of cormmmi.cation 

center personnel which necessitated encryption and check decryption by 

the same operator. The Commander, DetEJ-Chment 21 1st Radio Squadron, 

Mobile reports that the operator responsible bas been reprimanded, and 

has received additional training in proper communications procedures. 

The training program bas been revised wi"t;h particular emphasis on\the 

use of proper procedures, and a formal requisition submitted for. addi• 

tional personnel to alleviate the existing shortage. Statements ~om 

the individuals concerned have been received, and support the facts\ as 

presented by the COmma.nding Officer. A brief description of the station's 

training program for connnunication security as applied to COMINT haS\ also 

been received, and appears to provide adequate training in the cryptographic procedures applicable to this particular type of violation. 

2. On 25 October 19541 a COMINT compromise occur:red at the 69loth 

Security Group, Landsberg, Germany, during on-11De PYTHON operation. 

On that date a portion of a TOP SECRET codeword message was transmitted. 

in the clear to the 6961st Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Texas,, 

over a circuit composed of radio and wire links vulnerable to inter• 

caption. This compromise reveals some 

bu s hot cons dered a ser ous 

sc osure. a o n er erence n errupted the transmission of the 

message. The receiving station, 6g6lst Communications Squadron, then 

requested a circuit test in "open-uppers". The transmitting opera.tor 

switched the cipher switch off 1 and Jannned the 0 tot head" to hold the 

circuit open. At this point he neglected to replace the plain text 

tape with a test tape, and proceeded to switch the cipher switch to the 

"on" position. Before the plain text tape was removed the interference 

was overcome, and since the circuit was being held open, a portion of 

the message was transmitted in the clear before the operator could turn 

off the cipher switch. The Command.er, 6910th Security Group reports 

that the operator responsible has been disciplined under Article 15 ot 

the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and supervisory personnel responsible for establishing operating procedures have received written 

reprimands. In addition, proper circuit testing procedures have been 

ina.de known to all communications ~rsonnel1 and regular checks are ma.de 

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by trick chiefs to insure th,a.t all operators a.d.hf;lre to these procedures. 

Statements from the individuals concernea have been received, and support 

the facts as presented by the Connnanding Officer. 'A sUinlnary of the 

station's training program for communication security as applied to COMim! 

has also been rece:{.ved, and is considered to prbvide adequate training in 

tha.t phase or circuit operation a.pplicable to this partieular type or 

'\"'iola.tio11. 

3- On 30 October 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred \at the 86o6th . Administrative Area Unit, Herzogenaurach, Germany. On that date an operator's note, containing SECRET information, was transmitted in the 

flear to the .Arlrzy' Security Agency, Europe over a wire circuit presumed 

Vulnerable to interception. This co romise indicates our coo eration 

In this instance 

was e ng received in garble.at the 86o6th Ad-

--=..-n-.-s.,..,..-r"""a.......,.V<""'e,---r-e-a---... ... n.,,..,..-.... An informal nqte, asking the transmitting operator to check the tape, was prepared by the supervisor. The\ circuit 

operator, upon receiving the prepared tape from his supervisor, held 

down the transmitter distributor armature in order to transmit the request in the clear. The equipment involved had been modified to prevent 

clear text transmissions via the transmitter distributor, but by holding 

down the armature the operator bypassed this modification, and clear text 

was transmitted. The Commanding Officer, 86o6th Administrative Area 

Unit reports that.appropriate disciplinary action has been taken against 

the operator responsible. In addition, all operators have received further instruction emphasizi~..g the necessity for adhering to prescrioed 

procedures,· a.nd have been cautioned against ma.king clear text transmissions 

of any nature, except those required to establish cipher contact. Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, a.nd support\ the 

facts as presented by the Officer in Charge. A brief" description of\the 

instructions given communications personnel in regard to on-line correction 

requests has also been received, and appears to adequately cover this 

phase or connnunication security. 

4. On 31 October 1954, a. COMINT compromise occurred at the Army 

Security Agency, Europe, during on-line DAPHNE operation. On that da~e 

EOrtions of two SECRET codeword messages were transmitted in monoalpha.-

betic substitution cipher to the Army Security Agency, Austria, over 

a wire circuit presumed vulnerable to interception. This co -... ~ i A 

considered serious since the information involved contained! 

I The violation, in this instance, re- 1....-.......,,........, ........ ...----------.,...,,.....--........ -----,,,.......,. ..... sulted :from a malfunction of the ASAM 2-1, which allowed the rotors to 

stop stepping. It has been determined that this malf'unction was due to 

excessive wear on parts of the ASAM 2-1, which resulted in failure of the 

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ma.in operating shaft to step the·rotors. The Chief, A.rnry Security 

Agency, Europe, has recommended that an in~erlocK mechanism, to detect 

mal:functions of this type, be developed as a mocilfication to the ASAM 

2-1. The fea.sibili ty or such a modification is now under study by this 

Agency. Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, 

and support the facts as presented by the ConmJ.a.nding Officer. Since 

this violation involved an equipment malfunction, a copy of the station's 

maintenance program has been reviewed, and found to ins"llre adequate)3 r~­

gular inspections of cryptographic equipment. 

5. On 20 November 19541 a COMINT compromise occurred at the loth 

Radio Squadron, Mobile, Chicksands Priory, England, during on-line 

DAPHNE operation. On that date a portion of a SECRET codeword mes.sage 

was transmitted in the clear to the 37th Radio Squadron, Mobile, Kirknewton, Scotland, over a landJ.ine circuit preswned vulnerable to interce tion. This co romise reveals a ssible 

u oes no ser ous y a ec e or s. e c ea.r 

ss on, in this instance, resulted from use of an uncontro1led 

power source. The cryptographic equipment involved was wired so that the 

power to the transmitter distributor motor was controlled by the teletype-writer repeater-mixing set (ANjFGQ .. lM). This wiring arrangement 

precluded the possibility of a clear text transmission through the transmitter distributor. Sometime prior to this~compromise, some unknown 

person removed the power cord of' the transmitter distributor from the 

.AN/FGQ-JllI. power source, and connected it to an uncontrolled source of 

power so that a test tape could be run through the transmitter distributor. 

The power cord evidently was not returned to the proper power source after 

the test was completed. The operator on duty at the time or the compromise, 

after receiving a break from the distant operator, switched his equipment 

to the "text" position, which would ordinarily render the transmitter dis• 

tributor inoperative. Since an· uncontrolled source of' power was being 

utilized, however, a portion of the message was transmitted in the clear 

before the operator could manually shut off the transmitter distributor. 

The Commander, loth Radio Squadron, Mobile reports that the power cords 

ot the transmitter distributors have been shortened.' to al1ow access only 

to controlled power ou.tl.ets. In addition, instructions ba.ve been issued 

to the effect that only maintenance personnel will send test tapes. 

Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and support 

the facts as presented by the Commanding Officer. Since the facts indicate that this violation resulted from an error by maintenance personnel, 

the final report re~eived from the violating station did not contain the 

local training program for communication security. The remedial action 

described above appears adequate to prevent a recurrence. 

~. On 10 December 19541 a COMINT compromise occurred at the 327th 

Communications Reconnaissance Compa.ny7 Kyoto, Japan, during on-line 

DAPHNE operation. On that date a portion of a SECRET codeword message 

was transmitted in the clear to the Arrrry- Security Agency, Fa.r East, over 

a la.ndline circuit presumed vulnerable to interception. This compromise 

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does not seriousl af'f'ect COMINT efforts but does reveala 

n th s instance the message •was being trar1smi tted f'rom the Army Securi ~.Z 

Agency, Far East, to the 327th Communications Reconnaissance Company, 

when cipher contact was lost. In an effort to regain cipher contact, the 

receiving opera.tor sent a. test tape with the equipment in the "text" 

position. After being informed by the transmitting station that the test 

was being properly received, •the opera.tor at the 327th Communications 

Reconnaissance Company translllitted a portion of the message, wh~le still 

in the "text" position, to indicate from which,point a retransmission was 

required. The Commanding Officer, 327th Communications Reconnaissance 

Company, reports that the operator responsible has been reprimanded, 

transferred to a less responsible position, and has received adtlitional 

instruction in communica.tion•center operations. In addition, the equipment involved is now modified to prevent clear text transmissions through 

the transmitter distributor w'hile the equipment is in the "text" position. 

Statements from the individua.ls concerned have been received, and support 

the facts as presented by the Commanding Of'ticer. A short s\UllDlary of the 

station's training program for communication security as applied to COM!NT 

has also been received, and appears to include sufficient training in the 

proper operation of on-line circuits. 

7. On 11 December 1954, a COMIMT compromise occurred at the National 

Security Agency Communications Center, during on-line PITHON operation. 

On that date a portion of' a SECRET codeword message was transmitted in the 

c1ear to the 3rd Radio Squadl,'"on, Mobile, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, 

over a la.ndline circuit presumed vulnerable to interception. This compromise revealed the title "Russian Military Technical Summary", which 

in itself is not considered a serious disclosure, During transmission of the 

message by the 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, a garble appeared on the National 

Security Agency receive side of the circuit. The receiving opera.tor, not 

realizing that the send side of the circuit was in the "text" position, 

transmitted four words of the message to indicate to the distant operator 

at which point the garble ha~ occurred. The Chief, Operations Division 

reports that all communications personnel have been eautioned against a 

recurrence, and have been reminded of the proper operating procedures. 

Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and support 

the facts as presented by the Officer in Charge. The Conmrunications 

Center's training program tor communication security as applied to COMI:NT 

bas also been reViewed, and it furnishes operators with adequate instruction 

in the correct procedures for on-line communication. 

8. On 13 December 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the Army 

SeourityAgeney, Europe, during on-line P?THON operation. On that date 

a portion ot a SECRET codeword message was transmitted in the clear to 

the National Security Agency.over a circuit composed of land.line and underwater cable links presumed vulnerable to interception, 'l'hia .co~romise 

reveals our knowledge of the I I 

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and is considered a serious disclosure. 

The violation, n this instance, 

res ted from failure of the transmitting operator to switch to the 

"cipher" position before resum:i.ng transmission. The equipment had previously been switched to the "text" position for the purpose of a circuit 

check. After being in.formed by the receiving eta.ti.on that the circuit 

was f'unctioning properly, the operator at the Arrrr:r S.ecurity Agency, Europe, 

began transmission of the message while still in the\"text" position. The 

Chief, A.rnrJ Security Agency, Europe, reports that the\operator responsible 

has been reprimanded :f'or negligence in the peri'ormance\of' assigned duties, 

and all communication center personnel ,are constantly reminded of the need 

for observing opera.ting procedures and exercising extreme caution in the 

handling of' classified material. In addition, the equipment has been modi· 

fied so that the transmitter distributo1• is inoperative while the equipment is in other than the "cipher" position. Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and support the facts as presented by 

the Commanding O:f'f'icer. A complete cow of the station's training program for connnunication security as applied to COMINT bas also \.been received, and that portion dealing with the operation of on-line\circuits 

provides operators with adequate training in that phase of conun1.Ulication 

security. 

9. On 16 December 1954, a COMINT com;promise occurred at the 84.th 

Radio Squadron, Mobile, Shiroi Air Base, Japan, during on-line PrrHON 

operation. On that date a portion of a TOP SECRET codeword message was 

transmitted in the clear to the 29th Radio Squadron, Mobile, Clark Air 

Force Base, Philippines, over a radio circuit vulnerable to interception. 

Although this compromise is not considered a serious disclosure it does 

reveal the fact that we are 

While transmitting the message to the 29th Radio Squadron, Mobile, cipher contact was lost. Both sta.tions then switched to 

the "~' position in an effort to regain cipher contact. The operator 

at the 84th Radio Squadron, Mobile, upon receiving a request for a 

partial retransmission, transmitted a line of the message without 

switching back to the "cipher" position. The Commander, 84th Radio Squadron, Mobile reports that the operator responsible has been verbally reprimanded, and that a new trick chief notice, emphasizing the proper procedures for handling correction requests, bas been circulated to all 

comrmznications personnel, and added to the on-the-Job training program. 

Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and support 

the facts as presented by the Commanding Officer. A brief description 

ot the station's revised training program ror communication security as 

&pplied to COMINT has also been received, and the instruction given opera.tors in the proper method of requesting on-line corrections appears 

adequate. 

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10. On 22 December 1954, a"COMINTcompJ:'()mise occurred at the 2nd 

Radio Squadron, Mobile, Darmstadt, Germany, duringon-line DAPHNE operation. On that date a portion of' a CONFIDENTIAL messag~was transmitted in the clear to the 6910th Security Gro'1p, I.a.ndsberg1Germany 

over a land.line ci:i:cuit resumed vulnerable to :lnte:rce ,tt.on • 

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not seriously affect COMINT efforts. In this instance the message had 

been completely transmitted from the 69loth Security Group to the 2nd 

Radio Squadron, Mobile. The operator at the 2nd Radio Squadron, Mobile. 

was asked to query the 691oth Security Group in order to verify a portion of the message. To accomplish this he prepared a tape to establish 

contact, a tape giving his rotor set, and a tape containing the classified query. Using the first tape, the operator contacted the 69iot,h 

Security Group. At this point he inadvertently picked up the query tape 

rather than the tape giving his rotor set, and transmitted it in the 

clear. The Cormnander, 2nd Radio Squad~on, Mobile reports that the following 

action has been taken to prevent similar violations: 

a. The operator responsible bas received a written reprimand for negligence. 

b. No classified tapes vlll be prepared at the on-line position, and all classified tapes will be stamped with the proper classif'ication. 

c. All informal on-line conferences will be supervised by 

the trick chief'. 

Statements from the individuals concerned 1\a.ve been received, and 

support the facts as presented by the Connnanding Officer. A brief description or the station's training program for communication security 

as applied to COMINT has also been received, and seems to adequately 

cover the phase of' circuit operation applicable to this particU:la.r type 

of violation. 

11. On 23 Dece1,11ber 1954, a. COMINT compromise occurred at the\696lst 

Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Texas, during on-line PYTHON operation. On that date a portion of a;SECRET codeword message was transmitted in the clear to the 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Elmendorf Air 

Force Base, Alaska, over a land.line circuit resumed vulnerable to interce tion. This co romise 

but does no invo ve the complete notation. This disclosure does ~n~o,....,...-s-e~riously affect COMINT efforts. 'While the message was being transmitted from the 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, a garble appeared on the 

6961st Connnunications Squadron receive side of the circuit, The receiving operator, failing to realize that his send side of the circuit 

was in the "text" position, ·transmitted a portion of the message to indicate to the distant operatc,r at which point the garble had occurred. 

The standing operating procedure for handling on-line correction requests 

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at the 6961st Conununications Squadron requires reference by line number. 

A contributing factor to this occurrence·was a shortage of operating 

and supervisory personnel,·. which necessitated the use of a relativ~ly inexperienced operator on an on-line circuit. The operator responsible, 

although he had no formal crypto training, had completed the minimum 

on-the•job training requirements. If closer supervision had been avail• 

able, this compromise might not.have occurred. The Commander, 696lst 

Communications Squadron reports that a~ditional personnel have been requested, that, whenever possible, formal training will be provided for 

all new operators, and that on~the-job training requirements have been 

revised to extend over a longer period or time. Statements from the individu0.ls concerned have been received, and support the facts as presented by the Connnanding Qfficer •. A copy of the station's training program for collll1'1unication security as applied to CO~f!NT bas also been received and it places particular emphasis on the proper method of making 

on-line correction requests. 

J2. On 29 December i95>1-, related COMINT compromises occurred at 

the 696lst Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Texas, and Headquarters, 

Special Security Office, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, 

Nebraska, dur:J.ng on-line GALATEA operation. On that date portions of 

two TOP SECREI' codeword messages were transmitted in the clear over a 

landline circuit presumed vulnerable to interception. These compromises, 

while not considered serious, reveal our intercept of tactical air 

comnrunicationa and interest in and analysis of airborne and transport 

air activity, but do not identify the nationality or the intercepted 

information. After the first of the messages had been comp1ete1y transmitted from the 6961st Communications Squadron to the Strategic Air 

Command, pperations were temporarily discontinu~d while maintenance 

was being performed at the Strategic Air Command end of the circuit. 

When maintenance had been completed, the operator at the Strategic Air 

Command, while in the "text" position, transmitted a portion of the previous message to indicate to the distant operator which parts of the 

message required correction. The operator at the 696lst Communications 

Squadron, not noticing that his equipment was in th'e "text11 position, 

transmitted the requested correction and the heading of the next message 

before realizin~ his error. Remedial action taken by the Special 

Security Ot~icer1 Strategic Air Command consisted of appropriate disciplinary action and additional training of the operator responsible 

in the correct method of ma.king on-line correction requests. The Commanding Officer, 696lst Cormnunications Squadron has limited corrective 

action to a verbal reprimand, since the operator involved has had three 

years cryptographic experience with no record of having committed a 

previous violation. Statements from the individuals concerned at both 

stations have been received, and support the facts as presented by the 

Officers in Charge. A complete outline of the training program now in 

effect at the 6961st Conununications Squadron has been received, and provides suf'ficient instruction in the proper operation of on-line circuits. 

The Special Security Officer, Strategic Air Command has forwarded a brief 

description of the local training program, and it appears to adequately 

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cover the cormnunicaM.on procedures v:i,olaten by tI1is occurrence. 

13. On 2 January 19551\ a COMINT comp:1:'01l4se occurred at the 3rd Radio 

Squadron, Mobile, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Al8.\5k1:3.1 during on-l.ine PYTHON 

operation. On th13.t date a portion of a. CONFIDENTIAL<111essage was trans• 

mitted in the clear to the National Security Agency, over1:3. landline cir• 

cuit presumed vulnerable to interception. The compromised information 

but '-:;d=o~e=s~n~o~t::--:s~e=r~i=ou~s~l:y;::-~a~f~f~e=ct:L-:tL.h~e:-;=cvo~Mii=i"i\TN11'm.-e~f~f~o~r~t~ • ......,lftl:"'.e::--::v:::r:o~rro=n~,--:.~n:--:1::ocT::!.s instance, resulted from failure of the.torn tape stop mechanism to deactivate the equipment after ~he one-tirne key tape had stopped advancing 

through the transmitter distributor. Maintenance personnel at the 3rd 

Radio Squadron, Mobile have determlned that this malfunction was caused 

by improper adjustment of the torn tape stop mechanism. The Commanding 

Officer, 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile reports that the torn tape stop 

mechanism will be checked periodically 1to insure correct adjustment. 

Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and su;pport 

the facts as presented by the Officer in Charge. Due to the nature of 

this occurrence, the station's training program for communication security 

as applied to COMIN11' was not required. It is felt that regular main .. tenance inspection of the torn tape stop mechanism constitutes satis• 

factory preventive action. 

14. On 4 January 1955, a COMINT compromise occurred a.t the 84th 

Radio Squadron_, Mobile,, Shiro! Air Base,, Japan,, during on-line PYTHON 

operation. On that date a portion ot' a COMINT message\-was transmitted 

in the clear to Detachment 11 29th Radio Squadron, Mobile,, Kadena Air 

Base, Ryukyu Islands over a radio circuit vulnerable to interception. 

While this co romise does not seriousl affect the COMtNT.eff'ort, it 

does This 

viol.8 on res e om a ure o e rece v ng opera or o adhere to 

the existing procedure for requesting message corrections. Upon receiving a garble from Detachment 1 1 29th Radio Squadron, Mobile, the 

operator at the 84t~ Radio Squadron, Mobile interrupted the transmission, and, not realizing that his send side of the circuit was in 

the "text" position, quoted a portion of the message to indicate to 

the distant operator at which point the garble had occurred. The Commanding Officer, 84th Radio Squadron,, Mobile reports that the operator 

responsible has received a written reprimand, and further states tha.t 

the feasibility of installing lights over the cryptographic equipment_ 

to constantly remind the operator of the position of' the "text/cipher" 

switch is being investigated. Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and support the facts as presented by the 

O:t"ficer in Charge. A comprehensive outline of the station's training 

program for communication security as applied to COMINT has also been 

received_, and contains adequate instruction in the proper operation 

of on-1ine circuits. 

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