IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

KATELIN NEWMAN, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CORNERSTONE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY dba FREEDOM 

NATIONAL INSURANCE SERVICES, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV13-0082

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2011-099023

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Warnock, MacKinlay, & Carman, PLLC, Phoenix

By Brian R. Warnock and Krista M. Carman

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Elardo, Bragg, Appell & Rossi, P.C. , Phoenix

By John A. Elardo and Amanda Nelson

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Margaret H. Downie 

joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 This opinion addresses whether a premium price is required 

on a written offer of underinsured (UIM) motorist coverage pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 20-259.01(B) (Supp. 2012).1 Plaintiff 

Katelin Newman (Newman) appeals from the trial court’s judgment in 

favor of Cornerstone National Insurance Company (Cornerstone). We 

affirm, holding no premium price is required for a written offer of UIM 

coverage to be valid.

 1 Section 20-259.01(B), regulating offers of UIM, reads in pertinent part:

Every insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle 

liability policies shall also make available to the named 

insured thereunder and shall by written notice offer the 

insured and at the request of the insured shall include 

within the policy underinsured motorist coverage which 

extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy, 

in limits not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or 

death contained within the policy. The selection of limits or 

rejection of coverage by a named insured or applicant on a 

form approved by the director shall be valid for all insureds 

under the policy.

The background and legislative history of uninsured motorist (UM) and 

underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in Arizona can be found in 

Ballesteros v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 226 Ariz. 345, 346, ¶ 8, 

248 P.3d 193, 194 (2011). 
NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE

Opinion of the Court

3

¶2 In May 2011, Newman was seriously injured in an 

automobile accident. The policy limits of both her own insurance and the 

adverse party’s insurance were insufficient to cover the loss. Newman 

sought payment of UIM benefits from her insurer Cornerstone. 

Cornerstone rejected the UIM claim, relying on a waiver form declining 

UIM coverage Newman had signed in 2010. Newman filed suit against 

Cornerstone and sought partial summary judgment asserting 

Cornerstone’s UIM coverage “offer” was deficient under A.R.S. § 20-

259.01(B) in that it lacked a premium price. Cornerstone filed a crossmotion for summary judgment on the basis that Newman had waived 

UIM benefits. The trial court, relying primarily on Garcia v. Farmers Ins. 

Co. of Arizona, found for Cornerstone and against Newman. See 191 Ariz. 

410, 956 P.2d 537 (App. 1998). Final judgment was entered and Newman 

timely appealed. 

¶3 Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) allows a trial court to 

enter summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” We review a summary judgment determination de novo, viewing 

the facts and inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable 

to the party against whom judgment was entered. Brookover v. Roberts 

Enters., Inc., 215 Ariz. 52, 55, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d 1157, 1160 (App. 2007). We will 

affirm summary judgment if it is correct for any reason. City of Tempe v. 

Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 111, ¶ 14, 32 P.3d 31, 36 (App. 2001). 

¶4 Newman asserts that the trial court erred in entering 

summary judgment for Cornerstone. She argues that to comply with 

A.R.S. § 20-259.01 the insurer must “make available” and “offer” UIM 

coverage, which she argues must necessarily include providing definite 

terms such as a premium quote in the blank space provided on the form 

approved by the Arizona Department of Insurance. To this end, Newman 

cites, generally, to Tallent v. National Gen. Ins. Co., 185 Ariz. 266, 915 P.2d 

665 (1996) and Ballesteros, 226 Ariz. 345, 248 P.3d 193, and, more 

specifically, to Melendez v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 232 Ariz. 327, 305 P.3d 392 

(App. 2013) (holding insurer’s UIM offer was ineffectual when it offered 

no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with 

Department of Insurance guidelines) (depublished by order of the 

Arizona Supreme Court August 27, 2013).

¶5 Cornerstone, in response, asserts that no Arizona statute or 

case law requires the insurer to include the premium price in the offer. It 

further notes that while A.R.S. § 20–259.01 does not require insurers to use 

forms approved by the Department of Insurance, its use of an approved 
NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE

Opinion of the Court

4

form is considered conclusive evidence it complied with the statute. See

Ballesteros, 226 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 21, 248 P.3d at 198. For these reasons, 

Cornerstone asserts that the trial court correctly granted it judgment. We 

agree. 

¶6 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review 

de novo. People's Choice TV Corp. v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 401, 403, ¶ 7, 

46 P.3d 412, 414 (2002). Where the statutory language is clear, we hold to 

the plain meaning of its terms. Rineer v. Leonardo, 194 Ariz. 45, 46, ¶ 7, 977 

P.2d 767, 768 (1999). As “[o]ur goal in interpreting statutes is to fulfill the 

intent and purpose of the legislature” we look first to the plain language 

of the statute “as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” Garden Lakes 

Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 204 Ariz. 238, 241, ¶ 14, 62 P.3d 983, 986 (App.

2003); New Sun Bus. Park, LLC v. Yuma Cnty., 221 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 12, 209 

P.3d 179, 182 (App. 2009). The plain language of A.R.S. § 20-259.01 does 

not require insurers to provide a UIM premium quote as part of the offer 

of coverage to insureds. The statute merely requires insurers to “make 

available” by “written offer” UIM coverage in an amount not less than the 

liability limits for bodily injury or death. See A.R.S. § 20-259.01(B); Tallent, 

185 Ariz. at 266, 915 P.2d at 666. 

¶7 Courts are “not at liberty to rewrite [a] statute under the 

guise of judicial interpretation.” State v. Patchin, 125 Ariz. 501, 502, 610 

P.2d 1062, 1063 (App. 1980). Rather, “[t]he choice of appropriate wording 

rests with the Legislature.” City of Phoenix v. Butler, 110 Ariz. 160, 162, 515 

P.2d 1180, 1182 (1973). The statute is very specific regarding what the 

offer must contain and we will not substitute our judgment by imposing

any additional statutory requirements. See Tallent, 185 Ariz. at 268, 915 

P.2d at 667 (“[w]e find nothing in [A.R.S. § 20–259.01] justifying the 

imposition of this additional requirement. If the legislature desires such an 

addition, it may create one.”); Ballesteros, 226 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 17, 248 P.3d at 

197 (“[i]f the legislature desires to add such a requirement, it may do so . . 

. but it is not our place to rewrite the statute”).

¶8 Likewise, the case law cited by Newman interpreting A.R.S. 

§ 20-259.01 does not require the inclusion of a premium quote to satisfy 

the “offer” requirement of the statute. Our supreme court in Tallent used 

the plain meaning of “offer”: “[t]o bring to or before; to present for 

acceptance or rejection; to hold out or proffer; to make a proposal to; to 

exhibit something that may be taken or received or not” after finding the 

word “offer” in A.R.S. § 20-259.01 to be so unambiguous that there was no 

“need to determine what the legislature intended by using that term.” 

185 Ariz. at 267-68, 915 P.2d at 666-67 (citations omitted). The supreme
NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE

Opinion of the Court

5

court held that the insurer’s written notice to the insured was a sufficient 

offer of UIM coverage despite the notice’s lack of explanation of the 

benefit because:

The imposition of a requirement for an explanation of 

coverage is, we believe, both unwarranted by the statute and 

unwise . . . The statute requires an offer of UIM coveragenot a treatise on UIM coverage. National's form certainly 

seems sufficient to cause any insured or potential insured 

who has questions about the meaning of UM or UIM 

coverages to ask for an explanation. 

Id. at 268, 915 P.2d at 667.

¶9 The Ballesteros case similarly provides no basis for holding 

an insurer's offer must list the premium to be charged for UIM coverage. 

See 226 Ariz. at 346–47, ¶¶ 1, 6, 248 P.3d at 194–95. In Ballesteros, the 

supreme court examined whether UM coverage offered by way of an 

English language form to a Spanish speaker constituted a valid offer to 

make such coverage available. Id. The court concluded the notice was 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable reader would understand that coverage 

was being offered that, “if accepted, would bind the insurer to provide the 

offered coverage.” Id. at 349, ¶ 11, 248 P.3d at 196.

¶10 As noted by the trial court, this court has also examined the 

“offer” component of A.R.S. § 20-259.01.2 In Garcia, we held that Farmers 

made a valid UIM offer where there was no premium quote and Farmers 

 2 Given this result, we need not expound at length as to how contracts 

may be entered even without enumerated price terms. See, e.g., Goodman 

v. Physical Res. Eng'g, Inc., 229 Ariz. 25, 27, ¶ 7, 270 P.3d 852, 854 (App.

2011); Banner Health v. Medical Sav. Ins. Co., 216 Ariz. 146, 163 P.3d 1096 

(App. 2007) (price terms were supplied by the hospitals' rates filed with 

Department of Health Services). Premium amounts are presumably 

ascertainable by reference to the Underwriting Rules and Rate Manual 

once the coverage limits are selected. In the course of this litigation, 

Cornerstone disclosed its rate manual and the rate of UIM/UM coverage 

to Newman. 

 
NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE

Opinion of the Court

6

had pre-selected the coverage amount for the insureds.3 191 Ariz. at 412, 

¶ 19, 956 P.2d at 539. We found: “Farmers adequately offered UIM 

coverage. The election form did ‘bring before’ and ‘hold out’ to the 

Garcias that UIM coverage was available. The form referred to the 

applicable limits and indicated how the Garcias could change their policy. 

Nothing more is required under Tallent.” Id. Garcia did not require a 

premium quote to fulfill the statutory requirements, and we similarly find 

no basis for requiring it here. Cornerstone’s offer of UIM coverage to 

Newman satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 20-259.01.4

 3 That the notice did not contain a premium quote was an issue made 

clear in the dissent by Judge Fidel. See Garcia, 191 Ariz. 412, ¶ 29, 956 P.2d 

539.

4 Although we have reached the merits of the offer, we note that it is 

undisputed that Newman signed the UIM waiver form on December 16, 

2010, and that the form used by Cornerstone was approved by the 

Department of Insurance in 2007. The Ballesteros court held:

After passage of the 1992 amendment, if an insurer provides 

and the insured signs a DOI–approved UM/UIM selection 

form, the insurer has satisfied the statutory requirement to 

“make available” and “by written notice offer” UM/UIM 

coverage. Senate Committee Minutes 9 (“[T]he insurance 

agent can use a form approved by the Director of the 

Department of Insurance to satisfy [§ 20–259.01].”); Fact 

Sheet (noting that § 20–259.01 “is satisfied if the insured 

signs a form approved by the Department of Insurance 

stating the amount of coverage desired”).

226 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 21, 248 P.3d at 198.
NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE

Opinion of the Court

7

¶11 For the above stated reasons, we decline to extend the 

“offer” requirements of A.R.S. § 20-259.01 beyond the statutory language 

enacted by our legislature and beyond the bounds laid out by our case

law. A premium quote is not a required term for a valid offer of UIM 

coverage. 

¶12 The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.