8 January 1954 

MEMORANDUM POR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE 

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee tor the 

Improvement ot Allied (NATO) Conmunications 

Security. 

1. The Ad ·Hoc Committee tor the Improve•nt ot 

Allied Conunun1cat1ona Security met on 8 Janua.17 1954 

from 1030 to 1330 to consider mane ot 1mprov1ng French 

CC»'l.SEC during the Berlin Conference ot Pore1gn M1nia,~ere. 

Thia meeting was held at the request or the State repre- sentative because or the suggestion at the USCIB meeting 

or 7 January that the Department or State conaider actio~ 

en thia matter. The meeting waa called to order by it• 

Chairman,- who explained the problem and who then asked 

the Executive Secreta17 or USCIB to aaaume the chair. 

ThQse present were Captain Taylor and Major Culmer of 

USCIB Secretariat; Meeara. Friedman,, Raven,, Corey., Shinn 

and Kerby of NSA; Mesara. Polyzoides, Packard and Walker 

or State; and Mr. Elli• or FBI. Mra.·Farrell.ot State 

acted aa recording secretary. 

2. The meeting was conducted in a·ccordance with terms 

of reference ~rtered by Mr. Polyzoidea, accepted by the 

Committee and attached to this rnemorandwn. The. meeting also considered the recent de VosJol1 request but concluded 

1"'1.nally that 1t did not·arrect the Committee's recommendations. 

3. Initially.- the Committee attempted to detennine 

what alternative method• could ai&n1t1cant17 improve the 

security or French commun1cat1ona between Berlin and Par1e, 

without regard to the poes1b111tJ" or timely implementation 

or these method.a. The rollowing methoda. were suggested: 

(a) To.instruct the French 1n the secure 

uae or the STURGEON machine. · 

(b) To have the US, UK and France agree 

to use only authorized t1ra,•level NATO orypto 

ayatema. 

·111.smr• 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-21-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

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{c) To provide the frenoh with SIG'l'Oi' 

machine& modified with tape al1ttere. 

(d) To provide the Prench w1th US ott-line 

literal eyetema such ae the APSAM-T and the BCM. 

(e) To have the US, UK and Prance agrGe that all conference oommun1cat1ona. after 

enc1pherment in national ayatema, be euper- enciphered and transmitted in an approved UJCVSA system through a oomracn meeease oantor. 

4. The Committee then proceeded to d1acuaa t~e 

technical 1mpl1cations or each method aa well ae the time ~nd administrative d1tt1cult1ea each· would involve. For 

technical reaaona alternative• (a), (c) and (d) were 

eliminated. Alternative (e) waa eliminated aa ~eing a ~ore complicated l'Ditthod or reaching the result achieved 

by alternative (b). It was agreed that alternative (b) ie technically reaaible. [Under this method the US and 

UK ma.~ use any ot their national ayateme which have 

received NATO approval aa t1ret level Ol'J'Pto ayatema. Since the French have no NATO-approved national t1rat 

level ayatem, the7 will have to use TYPEX MK II. Extra 

machines are available 1n tho UK 1r needed.) Add1t1onal 

technical reaeone tor aettl1ng on this alternative are 

(a) French uae or and familiarity with the TYP&X MK II; and (b) the relatively higher proteot1on attorded by 

'l'YPBX MK II aga1nat operator abuse. 

5. The Ccnmittee then cona1dered the errect or euoh 

a proposal to the French with reference to the terms ot 

the US-UK Conf'erence or June 1953 and the US propoeod long• 

range program fer the improvement or French COMSBO. It 

waa agreed that 1r the us. UK and France are included in 

the proposal, and it no extension or TYPEX uao 18 proposed 

except to Berlin. 1t 18 w1th1n the terms of the June 

Conference. 'l'he Committee ia unable at th1• time to 

determine the effect or this proposal on the long-range pi:-og:ram but believee that it may not be harmful and might 

even be helptul. 

6. The Committee aleo considered the etteot ot 'h1a 

propdaal on French lateral communication•. It wae ocncluded 

that in addition to the strong poaa1bil1t7 or 1mp~ov1ng 
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COMSBC between Paris and Berlin, the propo:sal also ottered 

tho poaa1b111ty ot improvement on the 11nka between Par1a 

and London and Washington. The propoaal would n"t otter 

the poaa1b111ty of improvement on the link• bet\:ilen other 

pointa such ae Paria-Moaoow, Par1a-Rome and Par1a-Sa1gon. The Convnittee noted that all extra available 'f!PBX machine• 

are held by the UK and that, aonaequentl1',, the UK will have 

to determine both the ncceaeity to provide additional 

equipment tor thia purpose and the time raquir~d to do ao. 

7. The Committee dld not cone1der the political Teas1b111ty or the proposal in detail. It waa noted, however, that the proposal might be made attractive to the 

French by virtue ot the location or the oonterence. 

Enclosure: 

Terms ot Reterence • .... 

,J, . ~6t.- ~ A~ RtJfTIS L. 'l'AYLCB I~ Captain, 11. B. H&VJ' 

Chairman Pro Tem 
.. ,. . ' .. • 

TOP SECRET PftO'fM - ·-- 8 January- 195'+ 

SECURITY OF FRENCH Ca.1.IMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE 

.BERLIN CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS 

1. Are there any f'easible means b7 which these French conu~unications can be made secure (Plan A, Plan B, etc.)? 

2. If so, are these plans within, or beyond, the 

terms of reference established b7 the US-UK Conference 

on the COMSEC or NATO Countries 1n June 1953? 

a. Those within 

b. Those beyond 

3. What would be the errect of applying any or these 

plans now to the long-range program tor the improvement 

ot French CCXVISEC? 

4. What changes to the terms or reference of the 

US-UK Conference would be required to implement those 

plans which exceed the terms or reference established 

by the Conference? ' 

5. In the light of (a) paragraphs 2-4 above and 

(b) the risks to the success or the Conference and to the 

security of the US which may be expected to arise from the 

insecurity of these French communications, should any of these plans be reconunended to USCIB a.nd LSIB' 

JOP SECRET FROJH 

'!OP SSEJfm'i' F'ftO'fU