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The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-1779

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Vincent Sharnee Johnson, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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Submitted: April 10, 2008

Filed: May 13, 2008

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Before BENTON, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges

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PER CURIAM.

The Appellant, Vincent Sharnee Johnson, appeals the district court’s1

 denial of

his motion that his appointed counsel be relieved and that substitute counsel be

appointed. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Johnson was indicted on charges of armed bank robbery in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d) and using, carrying, and brandishing a handgun during and in
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relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and is awaiting trial.

Johnson was found to be indigent, and the Federal Public Defender was originally

appointed to represent him. Subsequently, the Federal Public Defender was permitted

to withdraw, and a private attorney was substituted. On January 30, 2007, Johnson

filed a motion asking that his appointed counsel be relieved and that substitute counsel

be appointed. The motion was denied. Johnson filed a second motion seeking

substitution of counsel. The district court also denied this motion, and Johnson now

appeals that dismissal. 

Our jurisdiction is restricted to appeals from “final decisions of the district

courts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In order to be immediately appealable, a collateral

order “must conclusively determine the disputed question; . . . resolve an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action; . . . [and] be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S.

259, 265 (1984) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978));

Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (“[T]he collateral order doctrine

accommodates a small class of rulings, not concluding the litigation, but conclusively

resolving claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the

action,” and which are “too important to be denied review and too independent of the

cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is

adjudicated.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). As the order denying

substitution of appointed counsel is subject to reconsideration by the district court as

the prosecution proceeds, and is effectively reviewable on appeal after final judgment,

at least two of the three requirements for appealability are not satisfied. See United

States v. Celani, 748 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1984) (“An order denying the

appointment of counsel fails both the first and third prongs of the Coopers test.”); but

cf. Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588-89 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding

that an order denying appointment of counsel in a Civil Rights Act case is

immediately appealable). Accordingly, an order denying the appointment or

substitution of counsel in the criminal context is not immediately appealable.

In view of the foregoing, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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