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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 0- e 

WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 

In reply refer to: 

1-26565/65 

8 OCT 1965 

MEEORANDIE FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

SUBJECT: An Offer of Inspection of the MOL 

At a meeting attended by Brock McMillan and Al Friedman on 

September 22, it was agreed that the Department of State would 

nroduce a rough draft on the above subject. The attached is 

that draft. 

Recuest your views and recommendations on the State Department 

proposal by 22 October 1965. The JCS are also being asked to 

review the proposal. A consolidated DOD response to State will 

thereafter be prepared. 

Attachment: 

An Offer of Inspection of 

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DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

October 6, 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEFENSE - Mr. McNaughton 

- Dr. Flax 

ACDA - Mr. Fisher 

CIA - Mr. Cline 

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Keeny 

- Mr. Charles Johnson 

NASA - Mr. Seamans 

NASC - Mr. Welsh 

USIA - Mr. Marks 

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SUBJECT: An Offer'of Inspection of the MOL 

On the basis of our discussion on September 22, my office has prepared 

the attached paper. In view of the fact that this issue might arise at any 

time during the present UNGA, I would appreciate your Agency comments and 

concurrence as promptly as possible. 

Attachment 

1, An Offer of Inspection of the MOL 

Copy To: ACDA - Dr. Scoville 

St= - Mr. Hughes 

- Mr. Rostov 

- Mr. Pollack 

- Mr. Meeker 

Llewellyn E. Thompson 

Acting Deputy Under Secretary 

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Downgcsded at 12 year intervals; 

not automatically declassified, 

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An Offer of Inspection of the MOL 

The Problem 

The United States has come under some adverse criticism for 

allegedly taking new steps to put the military in space, to extend 

the arms race to space,. and even for, preparing to place nuclear 

weapons in space. These charges were mainly. inspired by the 

President's announcement of approval for the Defense Department to 

undertake development and operation of a "Manned Orbiting Laboratory" 

(MOL). Soviet spokesmen have, of course, been the most prominent and 

the most extreme in their charges; but they are not alone, and even 

an editorial in The New„YOrk,Times (August 26 1965), titled "Arms in 

Space," spoke of "a fantastic, terrifying measure of arms prepared» 

ness...manned space vehicles flying around whose capacity for offense 

or defense will be formidable beyond previous imagination...The key 

word for mankind is still armament, not disarmament, and the military. 

manned orbital laboratories represent a frightening new development, 

in that trend." 

Colonel General Tolubko Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet 

Strategic Rocket Forces, was more direct. He charged, in an article 

on September 10, that "The Pentagon now wants to use space laboratories 

GROUP 3 

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; 

not automatically declassified. 

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not only for reconnaissance, but also for direct combat missions... 

Orbital laboratories will make it possible to install nuclear weapons 

on their platforms...." General Tolubko makes explicit acknowledgment 

of President Johnson's promise that the United States. would continue 

to uphold the agreement on not'orbiting weapons of mass destruction, 

but he argues that the US intends to proceed with the development and 

testing of "space Farriers for such weapons," which he contends "actually 

results in an obvious violation of the agreement on the non-orbiting of 

weapons of mass destruction...Everyone has always known that the term 

nuclear weapons includes both the carriers and the warheads themselves," 

and finally that after proceeding to develop space nuclear weapons carriers, 

the United States "will not stop halfway." 

This interpretation of the Obligations of the UN Resolution is not 

correct; the Resolution does not cover potential weapont carriers. (The 

Resolution is also not a legally binding agreement, although we would not 

wish to undercut its effectiveness by challenging that pointi) But so 

long as we do not in fact intend to develop and test space weapons 

delivery systems, we should directly refute such Soviet charges. Such 

interpretations may reflect real Soviet misunderstandings and belief that, 

since space observation is "old hat," there must be something new--relating 

to weapons--to justify a major new program. On the other hand, and more 

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likely, the Russians may mainly be exploiting the issue for propaganda; 

in addition, it is likely that some military men such as General ?olubko 

are interested in having the Soviet Union develop such Weapons. 

(Incidentally, some of the civilian scientific Soviet reactions to 

Gemini V were entirely complimentary, and even some of the military 

and other press attacks on both Gemini and the MOL criticize only 

reconnaissance, and do not raise the charge of weapons system development.) 

On September 21, at the meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the 

UN Outer Space Committee Soviet delegate Moroiov complained. that 

unrestricted obligations to return any space debris might require 

returning "an unexploded bomb on a silver platter" to the launching 

state. 

Our main concern is public and official opinion in other countries. 

The Soviets are probably less likely to misconstrue our intentions, • 

although more ready to distort them for purposes of propaganda. In 

dealing with such charges, then, it will be important to find effective 

ways to persuade those in the world who have open minds but are susceptible 

to hostile propaganda unless it is countered. 

In fact, the United States does not now plan to develop or test 

weapons carriers. The UN Resolution does not proscribe even the orbiting 

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of weapons which are not "nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 

destruction," (e.g., possible conventional HE shrapnel antisatellite 

weapons), although we should not draw attention to this latent loophole 

in any way. 

The President's statement of August 25 announcing the MOL program 

stressed that, in his words: "We intend to live up to our agreement 

not to orbit weapons of mass destruction...." This position has been 

restated by ;Ambassador Goldberg, and will be by others as necessary. 

Nonetheless, if there is sufficient disquiet'over the nature of the 

American military program in space, it may be desirable to go beyond 

periodic reiterations of our good intentions and draw the stinger from 

the Soviet charges. The present memorandum outlines a possible course 

of action to that end. 

A Proposition 

The United States could meet Soviet allegations that we are 

pursuing a weapons-in-space program by publicly offering, on a basis 

of reciprocity, to permit inspection adequate to demonstrate that there 

were no nuclear weapons aboard any manned (or perhaps, "any large"; or 

even "any") space launchings. At the same time, we should make clear that 

continued observance of the UN Resolution is not conditioned on Soviet 

acceptance of the inspection offer. 

KE1HOLE Mikhail) 

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Discussion 

We are virtually certain that the Soviet Union would turn down 

such a proposition. The Russians have displayed great sensitivity 

and secrecy with respect to their own space program, and especially 

the launching sites and vehicles. The United States would, however, 

have shown clearly that it had nothing to hide, thus buttressing the 

credibility of our policy declarations and undercutting the Soviet 

propaganda charges. 

• 

If the Russians accepted the offer, we would be glad to implement 

it for four reasons: (a) it would dispel.concern about our space 

program; (b) it would dispel any possible future concern on our part 

over Soviet space activities; (c) it would incidentally provide us 

useful intelligence on Soviet rocketry, and additional information on 

the Soviet space program; and (d) it would nail down tacit Soviet 

acceptance, or at least acquiescence, in the permissibility-of space 

observation, photography, navigation, communications, and such other 

military uses of space. 

The Soviets would, very probably, reject the proposal with some 

smokescreen of excuse, in an attempt to cover the fact, that their own 

secrecy policy was the obstacle. It might be nothing more than the 

familiar charge that the United States is seeking intelligence 

information, inspection without disarmament, etc. But we would have . 

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made our point to the world, and could emphasize that any time that 

the Soviets were really concerned, any time Soviet concern over our 

alleged militarization exceeded their own obsessive military secrecy, 

they could reassure themselves by accepting the offer. The Soviet 

parry to our offer might, of course, propose that any inspection must 

be directed against any military uses of space, including observation. 

We would then be forced to argue our inherently sound basis for 

distinguishing between permissible activities, and the one prohibition 

accepted by all relevant parties in the UN Resolution of October, 1963. 

One may, of course, conclude that it would be better not to risk such. 

an open precipitation of this issue. On the other hand, the Soviets 

have open at any time the option of again raising that issue, as they 

did in UN debates in 1962 and 1963. Moreover, the fact that the Soviet 

Union is engaged in a very extensive (and expensive) operational 

reconnaissance Satellite program suggests that the Russians are not likely 

press too hard on reconnaissance. 

Some might argue that the US had some aggressive designs in mind 

for space, and was therefore attempting to clear its way by making an 

obviously unacceptable offer to the Russians. To this, we could reply 

that such was not our intention, that the offer remained open, and that 

there was no reason that the Russians should "obviously" find the offer 

unacceptable—presumably if they had real concerns about our program 

they could accept our offer, now or at any future time. 

CEORET 

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The Soviet response might well take the line that the USSR, 

pursuing exclusively peaceful ends, had no "comparable" system, or 

no "military" system, to offer for inspection. To this we should 

reply that we too have no non-peacefUl space program, and the purpose 

of reciprocal inspection would simply be to cement mutual trust. We 

could consider all manned launchings as one comparable category; or 

all launchings of vehicles above a certain weight; or all launchings. 

We understand the Soviet program is entirely run by the military*, 

while most of ours is run by the civilian agency NASA; but we recognize 

that in order to meet its purposes any such reciprocal inspection would 

obviously have to cover all programs, both military and civilian. 

It should be possible to arrange either reciprocal adversary 

inspection or UN or other multilateral inspection (the latter to 

include US and USSR representatives). We could afford to be rather 

flexible about such arrangements, although we would need to consider 

concrete possibilities carefully from the standpoint of our own 

security interests, as well as in terms of the possible interest of 

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other countries in assurance arrangements. Since we can be flexible, 

we should be able to expose satisfactorily any transparently one-sided 

and unacceptable Soviet counterproposals on inspection modalities. 

We could parry any suggestion for subitituting "observors" by noting 

that while the kind of inspection required Would have to be Worked out 

on a mutually satisfactory basis it is clear that more than mere 

observation of launchings would be needed. 

Summary of Arguments 

Pro 

1. The move would be an initiative dramatizing our peaceful 

aims in space, and should deflate any world concern over 

our military space program stimulated by irresponsible , 

speculation or Soviet propaganda. 

2. It would be a good propaganda ploy if the Soviets reject it; 

a good move in loosening the Russians up on inspection if they 

accept it. 

3. If accepted, inspections would yield valuable intelligence 

on the Soviet space program and missile development--certainly 

much more than we would lose.- 

4. If accepted (and possibly even if rejected, depending on the 

Soviet response), it would be a good way of.nailing down. 

Soviet acquiescence in- other military uses of space, such 

as observation. 

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5. If accepted, it would represent another Soviet-Western 

agreement galling to the Chinese and disruptive in the 

world Communist movement; if not, it would demonstrate 

to those in the world impatient for detente agreements 

that it is the USSR, and not the. US, which is reluctant 

to reach additional accords. 

Con 

1. By compelling the Soviets to "put up or shut up," they 

might be, led to attempt to distract world attention 

from their secrecy-mania by again opening up the 

argument against any military uses of space. 

2. Above all, the Soviets might flatly challenge the idea 

of space reconnaissance and precipitate a wrangle 

upsetting the present relatively smooth situation . 

with respect to that subject. 

3. As a result of such Soviet campaigns, the US might find 

some other nations restricting still more the use of 

facilities on their territory, and it might thus 

embarrass and even inhibit US programs. 

4. The issue of "assurance," once raised, might provoke 

some popular concern in the United States over whether 

the Soviet Union was engaged in developing spaceborne 

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weapons; in particular, the probable Soviet refusal might 

be interpreted by some as indicating that the Soviets "had 

something to hide." Even though the US Government might 

be reasonably confident of what the Russians were up to, 

and the reasons for Soviet refusal to allow inspection, 

it might be difficult to douse the sparks of public 

concern, especially since some would be fanning them. 

5. An inspection offer, particularly if rejected, might 

also generate pressures to "open up" the MOL program 

unilaterally, either by conducting the program on an 

unclassified or at least less completely classified 

basis, or even by admitting outside observors. 

Recommendation 

That the United States be prepared, if apprehensions over the 

MOL program seem to be building up seriously, as a result of 

allegations that the MOL is intended to carry weapons Of mass 

destruction, to offer inspection of such vehicles before launch, 

on a basis of reciprocity. 

State:RLGarthoff:pep 

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