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From: G.C.H.Q. 

S.L.O., Washington 

l. The ktirs

1

t step iaidthe pre

1 painratiprodon ot

1

an Aiget nd.a. The following points ~-. must be ta en nto cons erat on uc ng 1- ~ 

(a) We cannot hope to cover en17 e·Hntualit7 in advance: the beet wa.7 e'V"'-

ot eliciting and deYelopt.ng certain points must be lett to the 

discretion or the Delegates on the spot within our agreed llld.ta 

ot disclosure. 

(b) We know that the French h&n shown the•elYes 'Willing to seek advice 

on c17PtograJ1h7 troa U.l. and U.S. and that the7 have confidence 

that w are COllpetent and die-interested adrl.Hra. Provided that 

nothing happens to deetZ"07 the French conticlence in us we SA7 

legitimatel7 expect them to be cooperatiYe: it the7 are not, the 

negotiation• as at present planned will tail and onl.7 an entirel7 

different approach, such ae the 'shock tactics' that we abandoned 

at the June Conference, could hope to succeed. 

(c) The French should be encouraged to bring forward &n7 item ot U.I. or 

U.S. inaecurit7 known to them tor incluaion in the diecuaeione. 

(d) It the u.1. and u.s. delegates were able to diacloN all the detailed 

knowledge that the7 possess it would be t&ir17 eas to show that the 

agenda t to includ 

•thods of approach are giYen below. 

2. 'ftlere are two document• &Y&ilable which •7 be put before the French, 

visa the aide •aoire to be lert b7 t~• £11baaeadora and the •List of Dangeroua 

Practices' prepared tor later use with DTO countries outside the Standing 

Group. I sugest that we cannot do bet'ter than use th••• document• as the 

agenda tor the first meeting at which a detailed procra-e will be draw up. 

3. 

(a) 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 Methoclll ot approach to diecuaeion or indiYidual a79teu1 

Starting with the 'Liat ot Dang9roue Practice•' we 1IRld etrin to reach 

a •aeure ot comon agnwnt on e79tem that are tunda•ntall7 

inaecure and F&Cticee tbat lllat be forbidden. Ve would at thie 

etap seek to get the list accepted in princi}U.e or perhaps qplltied 

from.the Prench side. We will not ot courae at thb or &117 other 

etage allow the Meting to diacua the practice• ot 6117 nation not 

represented. 

-t-TOP SECRET F~OTI t 

Declassified and approved for release bv NSA on 07-03-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13529 
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TOP S!CftE'f PR€l'Fll 

(b) In proceeding from this somewhat theoretical discussion to practical 

issues we may hope to elicit from the French at least something 

of whcit we already know by referring to our own experience in 

COMSEC ~nd by mentioning some of the previous occasions on which 

we have discussed COMSEC with them. 

(c) .;.,We must endeavour tactfully to induce the French to discuss at least 

the following:-

I. The machine systems T52, M209 and B211. 

II. Non-one-time additive Hand Systems. 

III. Uncyphered codes, and codes cyphered by substitution. 

IV. Future developnents, T53, Gretaner, etc. 

4. The T52, might be introduced into the agenda by saying that our 

experience ol on-line cyphers had taught us that these were exceptionally 

liable to compromise through the carelessness or the indiscipline of the 

personnel who operate them • .-----------------------------------.PL B 6-36/ 50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

(b) Transmissions must be monitored and a record must be kept of settings 

used. Operators must be made to check one another i.e. a receiving 

operator must be told to refuse to work if offered a setting already 

used, or share in the responsibility for the violation. 

5. M209 can be introduced by an enquiry about the modification demonstrated 

in 1951 and by drawing attention to the paragraph on HAGELIN systems in the 

'List of Dangerous Practices'. 
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!OP SBSRB'f PRO'ff I 

V""'··_..._ 

b;'" ra ~ ='Ql""f I 

(d) In either event we must expect the French to confront us with the 

wartime assessments and we shall be forced to dissent from them. 

7. Additive systems may be discussed in the light of our wartime experience. 

(a) Monitoring, and collection or records or indicators used, showed how 

easily a system could become overloaded. 

(b) Similarly, even if a system was not carrying a greater load than it 

was designed to carry, the perversity of operators would lead to 

local overloading of parts of the recypher table. PL\. 86-36/ 50 use 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

{c) As a result of these experiences we had come to the view that/only 

one-time additive systems were satisfactory; other additive systems 

could be recomnended only if extraordinary precautions were taken 

and the traffic load carefully controlled, and were fi.t only for small 

volumes or traffic. 

,....

1

9: _ __.:""":"""t ..... 11:.......,d ... e .... v..,: ... J_..o:.....,.: ..... t .... 15_a .... t ........ J...,ea .... s ... t ...... ...,c ... a.... n...,...he.._.d .... 1._.e...,c ... u.... s.,.se.,...d.......,:w,ithout any difficulty .... _____ .,.. _______________________________ ____.!but the following points 

s oUld e orne n n :-

(a) 

(b) The following U.K. or U.S. cryptoprinciples may be discussed: 

I. The U.K. method of ma.king one time pads by Hollerith. 

II. The U.K. method of ma.king random tape by Donald Duck, and the 

standards and procedures used for checking. 

III. All one time tape devices. 

IV. Circuit Mercury. This is not to be recommended to the French but 

they may well take the opportunity of the Tripartiiae discussions 

to return to the charge, having not had any answer to their 

earlier questions. 

V. Portex, AFSAM 17 and AFSAM 9. 

VI. Any system already cleared for NATO. 

3 

OGA