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USCIB: 9. 2/4 

6 October 1954 

'POP SiQ:REP F&Q'l'H ij Ii I Gi:8 QN:bI 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: COMINT Capability to Provide Early Warning of Chinese 

Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shore Islands 

Occupied by the Chi~ese Nationalists. 

l. The enclosed report of the Chairman, USCIBINTCOM is 

forwarded for information with a view to consideration at the next 

meeting of USCIBEC. 

2. Attention is invited to the recommendation cdntained in 

paragraph 5d of the enclosure. This recommendation is not being 

followed by the Executive Secretary because it is believed that the 

Board might benefit from such additional recommendations as the 

Executive Committee may see fit to submit. This would appear to be 

particularly appropriate in view of the fact that USCIBEC will meet 

on 22 October or sooner and the Board is not expected to meet again 

until 12 November unless a special meeting is called. In addition, 

the INTCCM., whilst stating that the matter is urgent, has not said 

why nor has it made any specific statements as who in the U.S. should 

perform the tasks recommended, by what means and under what limitations, if any. Thus, the effect of the report is to view with alarm 

without making very specific recommendations for solution of the 

problem. In particular: 

a. Who should make the examination indicated in paragraph 

5a and how close in does the INTCOM feel it would be feasible to 

establish intercept facilities "near the China East Coast"? 

b. What specific resources does the INTCCM have in mind in 

paragraph 5b and how snould they be utilized? 

c. Who shall exert the pressure recommended in paragraph 

5c and what limitations should USCIB place on such an effort? 

3. If, however, the above view is considered erroneous and any 

member should desire to have a special meeting of either USCIB or 

USCIBEC to consider the enclosure, please notify this office as soon 

as practicable. 

Enclosure 

INT #0006 dtd 5 Oct 1954. 

'1SCIB: 9.2/4 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-24-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

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INT 7/0006 

5 October 1954 

ME:?-DRANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

Subject: COlUNT Capability to Provide Early Warning of Chinese 

Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shore Islands 

Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists 

1. The USCIB Intelligence Committee convened at a special meeting 

on Friday, 24 September 1954 at the request of the CIA l.Jember to consider 

the apove subject. The Committee reviewed the present USCIB intelligence 

requirements and assessed the National Security Agency's expressed capability to meet the requirements. 

2. The Intelligence Committee agreed that the existin5 intelligence 

guidance provided on this subject is adequate. Under tho second priority 

USCIB Intell~gence Objective, China is at present considered to be the 

number two priority country for CO:MINT effort and is so treated by NSA. 

The Intelligence Requirements under this objective of the USCIB l~aster 

Requirements List outline the COMIN'r information required by the USCil3 

intelligence agencies in order to estimate the Chinese CoIDDlUllist capabilities and intentions. Further, such supplementary detailed guidance 

i'or HSA as is required, is conta.ined in the Information Requirements 

Lists and is provided routinely by consumer representa~ives located at 

NSA. 

J. The NSA representative then outlined the extent und status of 

the current COMI!IT collection and pzoduction effort on the Chinese 

Communist problem. It was concluded that NSA is exploiting current 

Chinese Co:mmu..~ist communications to the maximum extent feasible within 

existing resources, other requirements and technical li.mita~ions. The 

NSA :representative provided the following estimate of current COMilIT 

capabilities: 

a. COI-!INT could probably detect CIIICOM preparations for an 

invasion of Formosa; however, COMINT capabilities of' predict.ing actual 

commencement of hostile air operations would be slight. 

b. COMIU'£ probably cannot detect CHICOH preparations for an 

invasion of Quemoy. 

c. COMINT miaht detect preparations for CHICOU invasion of 

the other off-shore islands. 

Enclosure with USCIB 9.2/4 dtd 6 Oct 1954. 

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~p SBORS'f Ji!.RO'fU = ti .S • E¥ES ONtiY INT • #OOo6 

':""' --- -- ----- - - ---- -- - ----- --- - - - - - - - - 4. In response to questions raised by the various INTCOM members, 

the USA representative listed the following limitations on t:.he current 

GOMINT capability; 

b. The potentially exploi tabl"' tacticaJ. communicat,ions of 

CHICOM Illilitary units deployed in East China. areas such as the Amoy 

area cannot be intercepted from the sites now available. While base 

rights in Formosa will provide additional unique and valuable trai'fic, 

only the establishment or intercept in the immediate area could provid.e 

the bulk or the tactical communications desired. 

//// 

5. INTCOM unanimously recommends that in addition to the action 

now under way to acquire base rights on Formosa: EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Pl 86-36/50 USC 3605 

a. The U.S. examine on an urgent basis the possibility of 

establishing intercept facilities as near the China East Coast as may 

be feasible. 

d. The above recommendations, in view of their llI'6ency, be 

forwarded directly to USCIB. 

"Ji.~,~~# .. '<? 

/H:, C. SIMt·DNS 

Lt. Colonel, US.AF 

Chairman, INTCOM 

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