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21 September 1953 

!QP SB9filfl' 9:Mf0E = SE0'BiU'f'Y HWOR:Mti'10N = T:T.S, Ema MY 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MJiiMIDijBR OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO 

Countries. 

(a) USCIB 23/70 dated 10 July 1953. 

(b) USCIB 14/313 dated 18 August 1953. 

1. In response to the decision of USCIB at the 88th Meeting, 10 July 1952, the Department of State Member, as cognizant u.s .. Authority with 

respect to certain preliminary steps contained in the report of the recent 

US-UK Conference on the above subject, prepared recommendations concerning 

(a) the terms or reference and composition or the Combined (US-UK) Working 

Group to be set up in Washington to facilitate coordination of the program 

to improve the communications security of NATO Countries and (b) the 

nature of the initial approach to the French Government (Reference a.). 

2. On. 20 August 1953f USCIBEC considered the recommendations of the 

State Member, (Reference b.J and agreed as follows: 

a,, To appoint an ad hoc committee consisting of members from 

the Department of State (Mr. T,A. Polyzoides),. NSA (M'r. W.F. Friedman, and 

possibly M'r. F.c. Austin), and FBI (M'r. V.P. Keay) to take cognizance of ~ied (NATO) Communications security Problems on behalf of USCIB, 

b. That the Department o! State member would revise reference 

(b) in accordance with views expressed in the meeting, and, upon the 

concurrence of the members of the aforementioned ad hoc committee, would 

!orward the revision to the Executive Secretary for forwarding to USCIB 

as an agreed USCIBEC paper. 

3. Accordingly, the following recommendations, which have the 

approval or USCIBEC, are forwarded in accordance with the procedure set 

!orth in paragraph 11 o! USCIB Directive No. 1. Absence of' objection on 

tpe part of any member prior to 1700, Friday, 2 October 1953, will be 

considered to constitute USCIB approval of the recommendations set !orth ~ the rollowing paragraphs and such actions as USCIBEC has to date taken 

wlth respect thereto. 

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21 September 1953 

'!'OP ffiiORM ctMiOEl = SEl80RI'l'¥ INFORMA'i'ION - a. e. l!lY:I!5 ONLY 

Subject: Program to Improve the Connnunications Security of NATO 

Countries. 

4. The Combined (US-UK) Working Group. To assure that the COMill'T 

aspects and limitations of this program are properly coordinated, the 

Combined Working Group should be under the direction of USCIB and LSIB. 

It should serve to: 

a. Coordinate US and UK proposals for the initial approach to 

the French, subsequent technical discussions, preparation of a memorandum. 

to be issued by the NATO Standing Group and formulation of minimum 

security standards; 

b. Coordinate, between the US and UK, conclusions as t.o the 

status of the CQ!.iSEC of NATO countries as this program develops~ an~ 

c. Coordinate US and UK recommendations for further steps, as 

envisaged in paragraph 23 of the Conference Report, should this program 

not accomplish the desired response from NATO countries or :improvement in 

their COYJ5EC. 

The US element of this Group should also serve as an ad hoc subcommittee 

of USCIB to keep this entire program under continuous review for the 

Board. To this end, the US element of this Group should include representatives of the Department of State, FBI and NSA supported by the 

advice and assistance of representatives of the Office or the Secretary 

of Defense and CIA as needed. The overriding political character or ~he 

initial phases of this program indicates that the US element of this 

Group should be headed by its Department of State member. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL .86-36/50 USC 3605 

Considerations affecting the initial approach to the French. 

improvement by the French will have to be achieved indirectly, i.e. by 

inducing them to agree first to a program for the improvement of the 

COMSEC of NATO countries through the existing COMSEC mechanism of the 

NATO Standing Group and then to agree to preliminary US-UK-French technical discussions to assure adequate COMSEC practices within the three 

governments. 

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Subject: Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO 

Countries. 

c. It will be imperative that all contacts made within the 

French Government are secure and are given adequate authority. 

d. The Tripartite Security Working Group (US-UK-French), which " 

has been in existence since 1950, would appear to o!rer the best means or 

achieving an orderly and secure arrangement !or direct discussion between 

the proper COMSEC authorities or the three governments. Although the 

work or this Group has not heretofore included COMSEC matters, the Group 

has developed cooperative and secure contacts among responsible French 

authorities in general security matters. 

V:- 6. The initial approach to the French. To assure wholehearted 

cooperation by the French in sponsoring jointly with the US and UK the 

overall program !or other NATO countries and in making effective improvements in French COMSEC, the French Government should be approached first 

at the cabinet level. The project should then be assigned to the 

Tripartite Security Working Group to establish proper contact between 

COMSEC authorities or the three governments. As a practical matter, and 

as a means of achieving the greatest possible compulsion, this approach 

should be undertaken jointly by US and UK representatives. 

a. Phase 1. At the cabinet level the French Government should 

be requested by the US and UK ambassadors to agree in principle that the 

overall security or NATO requires that a broad program be undertaken to 

improve the security or the national communications or NATO countries, 

and that this program should be initiated through the Standing Group as a 

logical extension or the existing COMSEC program or the NATO organization 

itself. The French Government should be requested to agree further that 

such a program should be preceded by US-UK-French discussions to assure 

adequate COMSEC practices within the three Standing Group countries, and 

that, to this end, the terms o! reference o! the Tripartite Security 

Working Group should be extended to include the establishment of arrangements for technical discussions and the selection of competent and proper 

COMSEC authorities to undertake these technical discussions and implement 

their results within the three governments. This phase should be handled 

by the Department o! State and the Foreign O!!ice. 

b. Phase 2. The Tripartite Security Working Group should then 

select the COMSEC authorities who will represent their Governments and 

make suitable arrangements !or their technical discussions. This phase 

should be handled by selected members of the US and UK Tripartite Security 

Teams as agreed between the participating agencies. 

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Subject: Program to Improve the Communications Security of NATO 

Countries. 

c. Phase 3. The COMSEC authorities should then proceed to the 

discussion and implementation of adequate C(>.ISEC practices within the 

three Governments. US participation in this phase should be handled by 

the National Security Agency (NSA). 

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE 

OR PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION Of THE ISSUING OFFICE. 

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