we 8Elff 

MDIOltAllD'W J'C8 ~ Jme:&ms OP AFSA.Cs 

Deport ot the u.:tt./U.s. caamntoatim Becm:1.ty Ccaterence# l9S3· 

JCS l'ol.1.cy lkmlo 39 date4 l. October l.952• 

J.. 4l'lB 1DoloeWea Bl'e t~ tor iDformaUcn. 

2. Attcm:tim ia 11M.te4 to the 41reot1ve c:.cztaiDed 1n the 

ref'_.,.AICG Vbicb aete :torth tbs policy tor the sat~ ot 

Jitc.s. ;pa.pars~ bipq secret mtormaticm.. 

3· ~ to ~ when :tncloew:ea are zremoved.. 

AlfJACs 63/73 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-14-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 

~1 
.. 

. 

--.,. 

'i'OP S:SO BE':P 

J,C.S, 2074/29 

19 January 1954 

Pgees.165 - 173, incl. 

COPY NO. 57 

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION) 

MEMORANDUM BY THE DIRECTOR, NATIONI~L SECURITY AGENCY I I J 

f ::>r the 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

on 

REPORT OF THE U.K.(U,S, COMMUNICATION SECURITY CONFERENCE1 1953 ? I , . I I . I . I . . . 

Serial 000145 11 January 1954 

1. The f~urth U.K./O.S. C~mmunication Security C~nference 

was held in London in N~vember, 1953. 

2. A rep:::>rt -::>f the confe:rence is attached as Encl:)sure "B" 

and the items discussed are indicated in paragraph 2 thereof. 

A similar report is being forwarded to the British Chiefs of 

Staff by the Chairman of the U.K. Delegation. I have forwarded 

a copy of the report to the Direct-::>r, Communications-Electronics, 

for his information. 

3. I recommend that the J-::>int Chiefs of Staff: 

~· Appr~ve the report contained in Enclosure "B" • 

b. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A" to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. 

DISTRIBUTION 

Adm. 

Gen. 

Adm. 

Gen. 

Gen. 

Gen. 

Adm. 

Adm. 

Radford (C/JCS) 

Ridgway (CSA) 

Carney (CNO) 

Twining (CSAF) 

Lemni tzcr (DC /S, P) 

Eddleman (Asst. C/S, 

Gardner (DCNO-Op) Burke (ACNO-Op30) 

JCS ·2074/29 

G-3) 

- 165 -

Gen. Partridge (DC/S-Op, Air) 

Gen. Thatcher (Dir. Plans, Air) 

Gen. Everest (D/JS) 

Gen. Porter (DDI) 

Secy, JCS 

Secy, JSSC 

Secy, JCEC 

f 
I. 

e REF ID: A52303. 

ENC LOS URE If A II 

.D R A F T 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 

THE BRITISH-CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed and 

approved the report to the U.K. Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. 

J8-int Chiefs of Staff on the "UK/US Communication Security 

C::mference, -1953." 

2. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to express 

their satisfaction with the results Qf the 1953 conference, 

espe,cially· the, agreements reac_hed on the problem of replacing 

the existing combined and NATO High Grade off-line cryptosystem. 

Every possible action is being taken to implement the replacement 

of this general cryptosystem. 

3·. F'Jr' the next conference, to · .... e held in Washington, the 

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest _that the opening 

date be as agreed between the Director, NSA, and the'Chairman, 

Cypher Policy Board; 

3:ECRE5? 

JCS 2074/29 - 166 -· Enc lo sure "A" 
TOF SEeRE'! 

ENC.L.OSURE "B" 

LCS(53)/P/R London 

10 November 1953 

UK/US COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY CONFERENCE 1953 1. • 

REPORT 

TO THE U.K. CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. In accordance with the ag~eement reached by the U.K. Chiefs 

of Staff and the U.S. Joint Chi~fs of Staff following the 1952 

UK/US Communications Security Conference, the 1953 UK/US Communications Security Conference has been held in London. It was 

preceded by two weeks of infcrm.al discussions between U.K. and 

U.S. Engineering and Security experts. 

2. During the Conference the following subjects were discussed: 

a. Replacement of the existipg Combined and NATO High Grade 

off-line general cryptosystem. 

b. Other off-line cypher machines. 

c. On-line teletypewriter cypher machines. 

d. Speech security equipments. 

e. Facsimile security equipments. 

f. Non-mac·hine off-line cryptosystems including special 

purpose crypto.,.devices and syst;.:.-·.:~s. 

g. Transmission security, as distinct from cryptographic 

security. 

h. The security of non-communications transmissions, ineluding navigational a~ds, IFF and data transmissi~n. 

i. Crypto-material pr~duction equipments. 

3. The CQnference included a full and frank exchange of views 

on all the items listed above, demonstrations of ~uch equipments 

'±'OP SBOTIE'i' 

JCS 2074/29 - 167 ... Encl:::>sure "B" 
REFID:AftJ~~ 

as could be made available and a nG11ber "::Jf visits to establish..:. 

ments engaged in research and development of communications 

security equipment. 

4. During the course of the c::mference, there were, as in 

1952, independent discussions regarding the production of 

cryptomaterial required for Combined and NATO communications. 

The allotment of tasks between ·the U.K, and the u.s. was agreed 

and there was a valuable exchang~ of production techniques and 

procedures. There were also useful discussions, outside the 

Conference, of communications p~0cedures having security aspects 

and progress was made towards uniformity ·of practice and improved 

security. 

5. The enclosed Reports* of the various Committees which 

discussed the items lii;;ted in para::~raph 2 above were approved 

by the Conference and have been ~ubmitted to the u.K. Cypher 

Policy Board and the U.S. National Security Agepcy. The highlights and major recommendations of the Conference were as 

follows:-

a. Replacement of the existing Combined and NATO High 

Grade off-li~e general cryptosystem 

The U.K. have accepted the u~s. cryptoprinciple embodied 

in the AFSAM 7, now in production in the U.S.A. The new U.K. 

off-line machine, at present in the development stage, w:l.11 

embody this principle but as the U.K. machine is not expected 

to be in position before 1960, the U.S. will make available 

some 3,500 AFSAM 7 machines to the U.K. until the U.K. 

machine is available, and some 3,000 machines to other NATO 

countries, probably in time to introduce this system for 

Combined and NATO communications by 1st July, 1956. The U.K~ 

and u.s. security experts have agreed that the security provided by the existing LUCIFER system (CCM) is acceptable in 

*Nat recei~ed at J.c.s. Secretariat 

'fOP SEGR:S'*1 

JdS 2074/29 - 168 - Enclosure "B" 

HP SECRET ~TION z,,,_==•ZZ ·r-1,.rr1{'"''"·rrz I": 
REF ID:~~----

the meantime. The Confe:rence recommends that ultimately the 

cryptoprinciple embodie.q i~ the AFSAM 7 should be adopted 

for Combined and NATO third level use. 

b~ On-line teletypewriter cypher machines . ; . 

Opera't;ional demands fo+a equipment :Jf this kind are 

greatly in exces~ ?f its availability. The U.K. and u.s. 

have a very limited number of on-line· equipments in existence 

and others are in course of development. Long-term plans 

will ·aim at the maximum degree of standardisation, thereby 

reducing the lack of flexibility of communications and difficulties of maintenance caused by the present situation! 

c. Spu:i;ious. emissions whic,h ~ndanf?ier communicati::ms securi t;y 

The Conference ae;rees. that radiation, conduction and 

induction from communication and crypto devices are potentially 

grave sources of insecurity~ This subject is receiving 

detailed examination by both countries. 

d. Speech security equipment~ 

No speech security equipm~nts suitable for Combined and 

NATO use are available at present. The U.K~ and u.s. have a 

number of projects under development for strategic· and tactical 

uses but as yet these have not been subjected to field trials. 

e-. Facsimile security eq~ipme.pts (CIFAX) 

' The U.K. a~d the u.s. have specific projects for black/ 

white CIFAX under test but it is as yet too early to consider 

one to meet Combined requirements. 

As the CAN-UK-US JCECs have already agreed that multichannel sub...,carrier frequency m:)dulation is the best method 

of '11nsmission for CIFAX for other than short distance 

ground-wave HF radio links, the Conference recommends that the 

Communications Equipment Panel of the JCECs be invited to agree 

a technical specification f:)r a multi-channel SCFM transmission 

system for CQmbined use with CIFAX. 

TOP SF,C:ai:'l' 

JCS 2074/29 .. 169 - Enclosure "B" 
e. REF ID:1'P.3¥£f ~ 

r. Tra.nsmis.s.iol'.i. secu:l?!.¥Y.. 

The Conference was g~e~tly concerned that in peace time 

unclassif~ed messages are transmitted in plain language by 

insecure means. Such messages not only lea·d to the revelation 

.of intelligence but they tend to nullify the good that can be 

achieved by otherwise sound secu:c>i ty practices. This is true 

for two reasons: because compilations of individual unclassified items often provide intelligence of Secret or even Top 

Secret classification, and becauJe plain language messages, 

related externally to cypher messages, can jeopardise the 

security of the latter and of the address procedures employed 

with them. 

Other aspects of transmission insecurity were also 

examined, e.g., call signs, unchanging frequencies, external 

characteristics of encrypted messages. 

The Conference was aware of the serious operational 

difficulties involved in finding a solution to these problems 

and recommends that small Working Groups of security advisers 

and users should be set up by the U.K. and the u.s. to study 

these problems and propose their solution. The results should 

be exchanged between the U.K. and the u.s. and, on the basis 

of these, Combined plans should be made. 

g. Non-communications transmi:.::.sions 

Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. cryptographic agencies 

were at this stage able to put forward an~ practical solution 

to the problem of providing security for such transmissions. 

It was considered that insufficient effort was as yet available 

for detailed study, even on a theoretical basis. If this 

study is to be undertaken, additional personnel or an alteration in priorities would be necessary. 

On the subject of the use of SIF with IFF Mark X, the 

Conference recommends that the attention of the CAN-UK-US JCECs 

t '*10 P .~rl~C RI!-: r;p 

· JCS 207 4/29 - 170 - "B II 

zz~y~z~i3~ZZZZZZiZZZZ 
REF 

'f'OP SHOREl'i' 

should be directed to the facit that the security agencies of 

both countries agree: 

(1) that the present proposal for using SIF with IFF 

Mark X, with code-changing on Mode I is insecure as an 

identification system; 

(2) furthermore~ that the personal and functional 

identities of Modes II and III could be a valuable source 

of intelligence to an enemy; 

(3) that the CAN-UK-US JCECs be invited to restate the 

security requirements for a system to operate in conjunction 

with IFF Mark x. This specification should contain information about the degree of confidence in the identification 

required, and the am~unt of risk which would be acceptable. 

(4) that when the security requirements have been 

received from the CAN-UK-US JCF.Cs the cryptographic agencies 

of the u.s. and the U.K. should make joint technical proposals for a new and secure IFF system. 

h. Weather cryptosystems 

The Conference agrees that the CCM should be adopted 

as the ::>ff-line machine system requested in the NATO Meteorologicai Plan and recommends that urgent action should be taken 

to secure acceptance through the CECS of the Standing Gr::>up 

with a view to placing the material necessary to implement 

the plan in position by the 1st May, 1954. Very early provision should be made to equip a key circuit with suitable 

teletypewriter security equipment. 

i. Communications Security Development Programme 

The Conference considers substantial ec::inomy of development resources on both sides of the Atlantic could be achieved 

if a directory were compiled showing the Combined and NATO 

communications security requirements and then a combined 

programme f~)r communications security equipment were evolved 

from it. 

The Conference recommends that the c.P.B. and N.S.A. 

should prepare such·a direct::iry and programme. 

t ':E'GP 8ECR.I!:'I1 

JCS 2074/29 
" ·e REF 

j. Exchange of equipments and components 

The Conference recommends that as a regular procedure 

each nation provide to the other on an indefinite loan basis, 

for test and examination, ·engineering and fir~t _production 

models of components and equipments ~f mutual interest; and 

that if exchange is not practicable the equipment should be 

subjected to an agreed series of tests in the parent country. 

k. Effects of advances in electronics 

Advances in electronics and circuitry will have a profound effect upon crypta-operations, supp~y and maintenance 

as they are practised today. For this reason, thought and 

planning by the Services are required now if they are.to be 

in a position t~ enjoy the full benefit of the advantages 

offered by electronic crypto equipments when they become 

available, 

1. Co-ordination 8f Cryptographic and Communications 

Equipment Development · 

The present practice of· a::..rn·.:;st independent development 

of cryptographic equipment and certain forms of communications equipment has at times led to incompatibility of one 

with the other. It is necessary that cryptographic equipment be designed to suit the requirements of the communications system or, where necessary, the communications equipment and practices be adjusted to make possible the utilisation of an acceptable cryptographic system. 

The Conference recommends that the necessary steps be 

taken to ensure that such communications securi-ty as is 

required should be considered at the time when the Staff and 

Operational Specification.s and/or Military Characteristics 

for communications equipment are being formulated. 

m. Operatin~ and Maintenance 

The development authority ~ust maintain close co-ord1~ation with the user Services so that the operating and maintenance requirements are made known at all stages in the 

g:iop g:scR:S'±' 

JCS 2074/29 - 172 - Enclosure "B" 

TOP SECm SWWDN 

zz.~;r.rZZlZtZZ2:ZZZZ.ZZZZ 
. . REF ID:~SECW 

':eOP SBORB':e 

development. Thus, users may weigh the need for the equipment against the maintenance and training requirements and, 

if necessary1 the development authority may adjust the design 

to meet the operating and maintenance" problem. 

The Conference recommends that there be consultation " " . 

between _the development engineers and the engineers and 

communicators of the Services as early as possible in the 

process of development of each equipment in order to achieve 

these ends. 

n. Standards of Security Requirements 

During the Conference the U.K. and U.S. security advisers 

prepared an agreed method for the technical statement of 

security assessments of cryptosystems and the Services have 

adopted a method of expressing their security requirements; 

these will be of mutual assistance in deciding whether a 

proposed cryptosystem affords adequate security. 

o. Future Liais~n 

(1) working Staff. The Conference recommends that there 

should be an exchange, on a semi-permanent basis, of w::>rking 

·cryptanalysts and engineers f~om the research and devel~pment. establishments of the two nati~ns; and that details 

should be worked out between CPB/GCHQ and NSA. 

(2) Visits. The Conference recommends that the visits 

of engineers and security experts, independently of the 

Conferences, as already authorised (1952 Conference Report 

paragraph lle) should continue. 

6. Next Conference 

The Conference recommends that the next Conference should 

be held in Washington in September/October, 1954, the programme 

to be agreed later in the light of developments in the meantime •. 

/s~.......,"'"""""'"'"~~~--­ Ma J'!Jt' aeue1•a::i:, 

for Chairman, 

Cypher folicy_Board. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~Q;p ggcR;g~ 

JCS 2074729 

/s/ W.F. Friedman, 

Chairman, 

U.S •.. Delegation~ 

- 173 - Enclosure 11B11 

JOP SECRET ~N zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz4zzzz 
g;ig;p 8:S0}1E'f 

JiC .s • q074/30 

12-February 1954 

Pages 174 - 177, incl. 

REF 

·~~~--- ···-··---··--·-'---·· 

COPY NO. 40 

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION) 

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S • .A.IB FORCE I 

for the 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

on 

REPORT OF THE U.K~fU.S. COMMUNICATION 

SECURITY C'oNFERENCE,, 1953 , I . 

Reference: J .c.,s. 2074/29 

CSAFM-27-54 

1. I have examined J.c.s. 2074/29 and approve, with certain 

! 

exceptions, the report of the 1953 Communications Security· 

Conference. rt appears to me that, in the interest. of accuracy 

and clarity, the report in Enclosure 11B 11 to J .c' .s. 2074 /29 must 

be changed as fo1lows: 

a. On pages 168 and 169, in subpa~agraph 5 a, lines 2.and 13 

of the text should read "AFSAM-7 /AFSAM 47-B" instead of 

"AFSAM 7" inasmuch as the same cryptographic pri:t:iciple is 

embodied in both of these machines. In line 2 the words 

"now in production in the U .S .A. 11 should be deleted, since the 

AFSAM 47-B will not be in production until late~ this year. 

b. On page 169, in subp~ragraph 5 ~, delete all after 

the third line of the text inasmuch as the CAN-UK-US JCECs 

have not yet reached agreement on adoptin~ multi-channel 

sub-carrier frequency modulation for the transmission of CIFAX. 

DISTRIBUTION 

Adm. Radford (C/JCS) Gen. Ridgway (CSA) 

Adm. Carney (CNO) 

Gen. Twining (CSAF) Gen. Lemnitzer (DC/S,P) 

Gen. Eddleman (Asst. c/s, G-3) Adm. Gardner (DCNO-Op) 

Adm. Burke (ACNO-Op30) Gen. Partridge (DC/S-Op, Air) Gen~ Thatcher (Dir. Plans, Air) 

Gen. Everest (D/JS) Gen. Porter (BBI) Secy, JCS 

Secy, JSSC 

Secy, JCEC 

TOP g&CRE:'±' 

JCS 2074/30 - 174 -

- lOP SECm~4== . ! I I I 

> 7 

I I 

~ 'f 
------------------------

.. 

~·On page 170, in subparagraph 5 f, second line, 

insert the word "military" between the words "unclassified" 

and "messages 11 , in order clearly to isolate this problem 

from the problem of civil communications, which is essentially 

a matter of censorship. 

d. On pages 170-1, in subparagraph 5 ii' delete all after 

the seventh line of the text inasmuch as a discussion of 

the IFF Mark X system with SIF is not considered appropriate 

for inclusion in this report since the IFF Mark X system 

with SIF is neither cryptographic nor communication security 

equipment. 

2. I recommend that: 

a. The above changes to the report in Enclosure "B" 

to J.c.s. 2074/29 be approved and that the enclosed memorandum for the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff be forwarded in lieu of the draft memorandum in 

Enclosure "A" to J .c .S. 2074/29. 

b. Upon receipt of concurrence from the British Chiefs of 

Staff, the changes set forth in paragraph 1 above be made 

to the report in Enclosure 11B11 to J .c .s. 2074/29. 

@OP 8BCRS'3? 

JCS 2074/30 - 175 .,. 

JOP SE£RET 
.. 

'i'OP SEGRE':P 

REF 

ENCLOSURE 

D R 'A .F T 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF 

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approve, with the 

minor exceptions noted below, the report of the U,K.ju.s. Communication Security Conferenc$, 1953. It is recommended that the 

subject report be changed as follows: 

a. Paragraph 5 a; in the first and last ·sentences the 

.- - -

term 11AFSAM-7" should read "AFSAM-7 /AFSAM 47-B", ipasmuch as 

the same cryptographic principle is embodied in both of these 

machines. In line 2 the words 11 now in production in the 

U .s .A. 11 should be deleted, since the AFSAM 47-B will not be 

in _production until later this year. 

b. Parag~aph 5 ~' delete all after the first sentence of 

the text, inasmuch as the CAN-UK-US JCECs have not yet reached 

agreement on adopting multi-channel sub-carrier frequency 

modulation f-or the transmission of CIFAX. 

c~ Paragraph 5 f, fiT~t sentence insert the word 11m1.litary 11 

...,.. - between the words "unclassifiedir and "messages", in order 

clearly to isolate this problem from the problem of civil 

communicattons, which is essentially a matter of censor~hip. 

d. Paragraph 5 g, delete all after the third sentence of 

the text,, inasmuch as a discussion of the IFF Mark X system 

with SIF is not considered appropriate for inclusion in this 

report. 

I 

2. The United States Joint Chief's of Staff wish to·. express 

their satisfaction with the results of the 1953 conference, 

especially the agreements reached on the problem of replacing 

~OJi? Si!CRi:@ 

JCS 2074/30 176 Enclosure 
... 

the existing combined and NATO High Grade off-line crypto-system. 

Every possible action is being taken to implement the replacement 

of this general cryptosystem. 

3. For the next conference, to be held in Washington~ the 

United Sta,tes Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the opening 

date be as agreed between the Director, National Security 

Agency, and the Chairman, Cypher Policy Board. 

'i'OP S:SOREi'i' 

JCS 2074/30 - 177 - Enclosure 

... 
' . 

----., 4 - - - - -

' REF 

TO'.P BECRE'f ·, COPY NO• ---- i! .c.s. 2074/31 (LIMITED DISTRIBUTION) 

12 Februar:~ 1954 

:Pages 178 ... 179. incl. ; , I 

NOTE BY T:Hijl S~CRETARIES 

to the 

JOINT OHIIj:FS OF STAFF 

on 

REPORT OF THE U.K./u.s. COMMUNICATION . . , . 1 , . . . ; . . , ; .r 

SECURITY CONW~RENCE, 1223 , ! I_. . I., • :· . .. • .. I.. P 

References::§:. J.c.s. 2074/29 

b. J.c.s. 2014/30 

The enclosed memorandumiby the Representatives of the 

British Chiefs of Staff, ACT 23, dated 9 February 1954, is 

hereby referred to the Armed Forces Security Agency Council 

for consideration in connection with the study directed by .. 

SM-1~8-54, dated 11 February ~95~·.* 

EDWIN H. J. CARNS, 

RICHARD H, PHILLIPS, 

Joint Secretariat. 

*See Note to Holoers of J.c.s. 2074/29, dated 10 February 1954. 

DISTRIBUTION 

Adm. 

Gen. 

Adl!l. 

Gen. 

Gen. 

Gen~ 

Adm. 

Radford (C/JCS) 

Ridgway (CSA) 

Camey (ONO) 

Twin mg ( CSAF) 

Lermitzer (DC/S,P) 

Eddleman (Asst. C/S, 

Gardner (DONO-Op) 

~O~ ~ECHE~ 

JCS ··2074/3.1 

G-3) 

Adm. Burke (ACNO-Op30) Gen. Partridge (DC/S-Op, Air) 

Gen. Tli..atcher (Dir. Plans, A1r) Gen. Everest (D/JS) 

Gen. Porter (DDI) 

Secy, JCS 

Secy, JSSC 

Secy, JCEC 

- 178 ... 

lOP SECRET -lllllM 

JYYWJ,LIU!::!Yb!LlLll1L1L1WJt 'f=l' 'l{!-/HI-#-. 1n11: .t7l:Hiitt: rFtf1rtF.rti'1Mri~J-i, 
,_. REF 

ENCLOSURE 

BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION 

ACT 23 

9th February 1954 

THE SECRET.ARY, 

UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

U.K./u.s. Cornmtinications Security 

Conference. 1953. I. . P 

1. The U.K. Chiefs of Staff have approved the report of the 

U.K./u.s. Conmunications Security Conference 1953 '(LCS(53)/P/R 

of 10th November, 1953*), and welcome the increase in the scope 

of the discussions as revealed therein. 

2. They are aware of the complexity of many of the problems 

involved and of the present lack of a solution to r:1eet some of 

the requireBents. They are convinced however that these conferences arG serving a very useful purpose and that material 

progress :Ls being w.ade towards greater security not only in 

Combined U.K./U.S. but also in NATO Conm1unications .• 

* Enclosure 11 B11 ·bo J .c .s. 2074/29 .• 

TOP .Si:C~ il 

JCS 2071V31 - 179 -

/s/ A. C. TYLER, 

Lieut. Colonel. 

Enclosure 
REF ID:A52Wl 

-

TAB D 

Recommended version of paragraph 5~ of tae Report (TAB A); 

!.· Replacement of the existing Canbined and IATO Hilb Gra4e otf-1.ine 

general emt•.>111stemtt 

The U.K. ha.ve accepted the U.S. cryptoprlnciple 81DbocUed ill 

t.be Alt"'SA.M ., and AFSAM 4'(B, of \lh.1ch the .AFSAH 1 is now ill prod.uctian in the 

U.S.A. Tbe new U.K. off-line machine, at present. in the a.vel.opnent stage, 

w.lll embody this prtncip.le b\.tt as the U.K. machine ia not expected to be in 

_poaitioo 'be.fore J.,6'.), the U.S. wiJ.l make avai.lable aame 31 500 AFSAM 7 116Ch.Lnes 

to the U.K. until the U.K. ma.chine is avai.1.abl.e, end. aome 3,000 ma.chi.Dea to 

otber IA'l'O countries, probably lD time to iDtro<luce t.bia ayatem tor Combined 

and llATO coamunicationa by l•t July, 1956. The U.IC. and U.S. aecurit7 u"'°rts 

have agreed that the security provided b;y tbe ex.ist.ine WCIFER s;yatea (CCM) 

is acceptable in the meantime. The Conference recOlllDeDfla* t..b.at ultimately the 

crypto:principle embodied in the AJ'SAM "l 8Qd.. A1SAM 4 (:B ehou.lCI. be a4opted. for . Combined and NATO third level. use. 

. ' "· ..:_·: 

• llot added, UDderlined iD original text. 
·------------------·---· 

REF ID:A523031 

TOP SECRET 

aecQlllJ10llded ver11on ot ps.ragrapb. 5!. ot tba Re,port ('.WJ A) t 

t.• !eRt!~fFR.t. ot ~· ext!t!Y _9J!!bi~ • .ml. !A!> SE or• ?.tt'.:~ 

l!P!ral. ~mto;az•~ 

l'be u .1: ...... accepted the u .. a. emtopriacipl.o emb.ocli-4 1D 

th$ AJ'SAM 7 fH: ArfA!! 47@1 ,or Si;cb . tb.a ~ I 1• :nov ill production in tho 

u.s.A. fb.C' new u.1. ott•line lliiehiu.- at- pre1ont 1n t'Ae d.ewlopient •tace, 

v1ll ~ t.hie p:r1nc1ple but u tlie tJ ~~· macbille 1• not .x.pe.cted to be 1Q 

p>•1t1on betore 1960, tho u.s. v1U Mite a'Va1labl• 1a110 31'® A1SAM 7 mu.ch.tnea. 

to the u.x. until the U.JC. machine 11 avail.able,, ~acme 3,000 •chines to 

otbe.r :IA'fO countriea,. p:obabl.7 1n ttae to :l.».trocluce tMa ~•t4!111 1'o.r Com))1necl 

am IA'l'O C<X11!1un1cationa b7 lat Jul.71 1956. !'be U11K• ~ U.S. M~ur1t1 4ilQ,10rta 

haft .-.ed. tb&t tb• ilecut'it1' Pl"O,,idecl by the ex1•t1Dc WOIFIR •7•tela (CCH) 

1• acceptablo in the IDBGlltime" P!!. Cont~ce ~!C<a,D;e~* that ul.tma;t.e:q the 

ciwtoprincipl• 4'mbodiod in t2le AfSAM 7 !!!!.t~ 41! lho\ild be adopted tor 

\ 

TC>PSECRET 

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lecomalended ftr81Cll ot ~ 5.! oi' the leport (tu A) i 

!t· "'°•.~1- •~1ti,•a.u1eent• {cl,¥-)* 

the u. x • ..,_ u.s. ha.._ spceitie proJecta ~ 'blac:k/11b.1t4t 

CIP.Al under teat 'but 1 t 1• .. J8t too Ml"q to c(illleider one to aetrt Cea· 

bined. requ.1rement1. 

~ Ccntereace rec~ that ~ ~icat*Ollft 19!!-l!!A!i 

~l ct ~ ,lgE• .. :t?e •. ,invited to we!, a teg!mtc~ •.Jj!~1t1cat1on t~ ·•" 

- tm•i••~on. •ntma tor c~1ned st• ¥.~th CIJ'~. 

A• th• 9Ml·VX·'18 .19111• lMlve ~a.tr .agree& 'Akat·m~•!i .. 

tlwuleli a® .. euJtieie ~..-.e,-1110f.lli:atiea '• 'Ule 1'e•'ft •'1ld. el tl'PDi•sloa 

, • ._ 81PAI &-, •taer '1taa aben tieU..ee IQaal·a• l.r Nik .lbk•, -!!! 

f&Jl.fneaee Ne~ tila~ 4ibe teaaaiea\!eae·BtJ.111•..-• Pu.el e.f "11• j!i19• 

h 1.ll'Witn-•• ..,.. a teU.i•ai .,..1r1l.ea$l• I•• a -1,Ji ... aaatl. ililr'A 

tMUSi.•11.oa ap$a U»...C.ltt.aa u1• .. "1.tll..clJAX. 

·r'GP SECRET _-,·-----~----~~----~--------,--------~--~-------- """"1"----=- ....:..:::.:wa-= ...... --.;._;_ • ..:._~··-·...,..--· =--_~:-····r ... ,;,,.,:?i:. - ·-------~-~-~-=---·~ ,. ·-i"6'". :;-.· :.:=.~.e..:~··~-~-·'.J" -·------ . ·' .. :. ~-_,______ -- - -~---:. -.~~~ - --~""· :~!.-:~._:-~;._ 

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