' 1 .. SUBJECT" Ntn.fBER 

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• fN-F oi:E\i:A§-8 53 9 'JI'.& UL.IV.I.I.~ -

SECURI I l 114f'6RMATIQ~I 

Subject: Final Report and Papers of the U.K.-U.s. Conference i., "4rs r. 

on the Communications Security of NATO Countries P.4 tt~9' • 

(USCIB 23/65). '* Nrs f:".li~sk!J 

f "" oil., """''lie • 

The CHAIRMAN opened discussion on the above subject by stating that 

the CIA member had prepared a paper (USCIB 23/67) which set forth CIA 

views and recommendations regarding the conference papers. He inquired 

if there were any objections to the recommendations made by CIA. 

L'.ll.'. COLONEL LONG said that after reading the CIA memorandum. it 

would appear that they wanted to reconvene the Intemational Committee. 

The CHAIRMAN said he did not think that was their intent. 

I luagreed.UUUHeusE1:iciuh.E!u~h()ug11tu that there were several _ aspects of the report which should be looked into further, for E3JCamPle 

~ 

the fact that the conference had not determined who the "Cognizant 'oGA 

U.S.-U.K. Authorities" would be, and the fact that we appear~ci t() be 

committed to use only Standing Group channels of approachwlJ.enthere 

might be other, better, ways of proceeding. 

LT. COLONEL LONG inquired of I .... _____ !whom he visualized the 

Executive Agent would be • 

I .... _____ !replied that it would probably be the Department of 

State. 

At this point CAPTAIN AGNEW said he would like to call on Mr. 

Friedman. 

The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. Friedman to speak. 

MR. FRIEDMAN said that as Chairman of the conference he would pref er to have the representatives on the delegation from the U.S. side 

who were present speak before he did. He added that the CIA memorandum 

took him by surprise in that it contravened what was agreed to at the 

Intemational Conference. 

The CHAIRMAN said he would get the opinions of the members regarding the conclusions and recommendations of the CIA paper as the meeting 

progressed and would like Mr. Friedman• s views first. 

MR. FRIEDMAN discussed the points which he thought CIA used as a 

basis for urging a change in the conclusions and recommendations. 

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Declassified and approved for release bv ~'~SA on 11-17-2014 pursuant to E,O, 13523 
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He pointed out that all of the points raised in the CIA. paper had, :in 

fact, been considered thoroughly at the conference, and added his 

opinion that the CIA paper did not offer sufficient new material to 

warrant new conclusions and recommendations. He pointed out that the 

conference had agreed, first of all, that the Foreign Office and the 

State Department were cognizant UK/US authorities, and it had been 

originally so stated in the conference report. He said that he thought 

the specific reference to these departments had been deleted at the 

suggestion of the CIA member of the delegation. 

MR. KEAY said he would agree with Mr. Friedman that the points 

were well considered by the conferees. He added that he thought it was 

correct to change the language to "appropriate authorities", in the 

event USCIB would want to designate someone else as cognizant authority. 

He added that as a member of the conference and of the Executive 

Committee he would have to stick to the original con.f'erence paper for 

the reason that these are not new issues. 

OGA I then explained that CIA was not taking issue with the 

work of the conference, but thought it advisable to raise these points. 

He added that the important point they wished to raise at this time 

was the question of whether or not the NATO COMSEC organization was the 

only means of approach to the NATO countries. 

MR. GODEL said that with respect to paragraph 7 of subject paper 

he would agree that the diplomatic and the military problem was somewhat different o He added that the conferees at this International 

Conference, with Board representatives present, also agreed that the 

Standing Group was not the only but certainly the most appropriate 

body through which this approach could be made.. Therefore he said he 

non-concurred with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the CIA paper. 

MR. KEAY pointed out that if the Committee accepted paragraph 9 

of the CIA paper it would be contrary to the U.S. position at the 

conference which was a joint approach to the French. He explained 

that the British position had been a country-by-country approach, and 

if the Committee accepted paragraph 9, the U.S. would be walking into 

a British spider web. He added that he thought the minutes of the 

conference would show that a country-by-country approach was not too 

good. 

MR. PACKARD said that later the British had wanted an individual 

approach and the U.S. wanted a collective approach. 

The CHAIRMAN asked for further c01IDD.ent from Mr. Friedman. 

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MR. FRIEDMAN then said he would like to go over indiVidual points 

of' dif'f erence again and at the same time comment on those points of 

difference. He added that he had already covered the point of difference 

conceming how CIA felt about "cognizant..e .. ~ Uthor¥i~'!!_~t!1;.E-::fiE~t, 

he said, was the problem of the specifici".(!15'~r~&~-EOtfief ·. :tCli~s deliberately left out of the conference report. He recalled that at the 

1951 Conference it was felt that the ,v wav ne "'O,,, d n11t 0 ,,." nf int 

acrossl however, 

he pointed out that the 1953 Conference approach was more conservative in 

that we did not want to spell out the steps. 

At this time, the CHAIRMAN said he did not think it was the intent 

of the CIA paper to make the conference account for its activities and 

added that he thought Mr. Friedman had already answered the questions 

raised, and that State Department would no doubt take appropriate steps 

if designated the cognizant U.S. authority. 

I I pointed out that in ef'f'ect CIA recommended that State 

Department take appropriate action. He added, however, that CIA was 

reluctant to approve the recormnendations of the conference report. 

The CHAIRMAN asked that it be made a matter of record that Mr. 

Friedman explained what the conference intended. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said he would like to get a clearer idea from CIA as 

to what they hoped to gain by deferring acceptance of paragraph 30, and 

added that if paragraph 30 were dropped out, no progress would have been 

made .. 

I I explained that CIA disliked paragraphs 30 c and d . 

because they f'elt that a Standing Group might not turn out to be the 

proper channelo 

LT. COLONEL LONG inquired if' paragraph 23 didn't take care of the 

situation in that if the Standing Group failed, other steps could be 

takeno 

MR. POLYZOIDES agreed. 

MRo GODEL remarked that these things were discuss-ed in the conference where the delegates took the easiest and fastest means of trying 

the first step and if this didn't work, they would have to go further, 

but added he did not think we should go further when an organization for 

that purpose already exists. 

I I inquired if this was pre-committing all of our activities through the NATO COMSEC Group. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SEettftl"I" I ll'llFORMA I ION CAN SE 

EO 3.3(h)(2) OGA 

MR. GODEL said this was suggestedEl,s an initiil step • 

.___....,... __ _.I sa:id he "Wanted to be sure this was a step that/would not 

produce embarrassing international ef.f"ects, and added that in.his opinion 

the contact should be someone from State Department who lmew/the French 

people as well as the whole French structure. He pointed out that when 

the representative sits down and starts planning his approach, he might 

find that an approach through NATO might not be the thing, and his hands 

would be tied. 

MR. GODEL said he did not agree that his hands would be tied because 

an additional course of action was open in paragraph./ 23. 

MRo FRIEDMAN said he thought the reason the inte_~lj.,tion~. committee 

preferred the Standing Group method 0£ approach is~p~'-:tin the 

first place, he said, the UaS. won an argument when we got the British 

to back off from their country-to-country approacho He added that there 

had been an approach by the French on the basis of insecurity of the 

I i He pointed out }ha~th !ren~~~.,._co~ to _J.he e cu•• 4 .• 

British through non-OMINT channelsZan~ / rf"W1i'at was more nat~~ .fil.:an ~ 

the US and UK to say to the French, 11Yo i~av s th~~~We t~,_mh-.--~ ~ 

you, that we should do something about it Awe~-th~renc~--, agree. He explained that the basis for tlie · provement on COMSEC NATOwise is more or less a matter of all getting together to improve our 

communica~~.·tJ;y, he said, we do not require t:R:e a..... 

approach - ~1:it!l!d; each nationf<!mie rorth and 

confess its~cryptographic deviations. He added that it is known that 

certain NATO countries have already approached the US and UK for help 

and the record shows what they asked for. He noted that the CIA paper 

also made mention of another representative on the NATO GOMSEC Boards. 

He stated that only the U.S. and the U.K. are represented thereon. 

Regarding the inadequacy of Appendix ''B" of the conference report, he 

said that Appendix nBrr was drawn up by technical experts or both 

countries. He pointed out/ that where this approach to NATO ~t}.9ns does 

not work, the nations may have to be contacted individually ..... f!ll concluding, he summarized his views and said he hoped there would be no delay 

in approving this report as time is pressing. 

The CHAIRMAN inquired if this answered the questions CIA wished to 

bring out. 

I !replied in the affirmative and asked that the Conmdttee 

just take note of his paper. He added that he had been unable to get in 

touch with Mr. Dulles, but he would do so to see how he felt, and added 

that the only point now is in "tying our hands to the NATO COMSEC 

organization.n 

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SEE!t:JRff'Y 1!4P'ORl'lllA:TI014 t:ANC>E 

The CHAIRMAN said that he felt that most of the questions had 

been answered except whether or not the Standing Group is the desirable 

channel. He inquired if the members of USCIBEC wished to make any 

recommendation. 

MR. POLYZOIDF.s inquired if the CIA paper was being withdrawn. 

The CHAIRMAN replied that it was now being presented for infonnation. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said he thought the first proper action would be 

to decide whether or not this Committee accepts the conference report. 

The CHAIRMAN recormnended that the conference report be approved. 

He then asked if the members of USCIBEC wished to call to the attention 

of USCIB the fact that it is USCIBEC 1 s belief that the State Department 

should be the "cognizant U.S. authority11 • 

MR. POLYZOIDES said he did not think it was necessary. 

I I inquired if the Board wouldn 1t have to appoint the 

11cognizant U.S. authority". 

MR. KEAY said he agreed with Mr. Polyzoides that it was not necessary to apprise the Board on this point. 

The CHAIRMAN said it was apparently the-opinion of the Committee 

that it was not necessary to take any specific action to the Boa.rd on 

the CIA paper. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said another reason he felt so strongly is that 

the Board had become more deeply enmeshed in this subject than anything in the past, therefore it had a strong proprietary interest. He 

further stated that he did not think we should try to influence their 

opinion too much in this matter. 

The CHAIRMAN then said it seemed to be the sense of the Committee 

that it approves the report with the exception of the CIA member who 

reserves his comment for the Board. 

It was so agreed. 

MR. FRIEDMAN said he would like to call attention to page S, 

paragraph 10 ~of the conference report. He then proceeded to read 

this paragraph. He said that the future of the communications intelligence business looks pretty bad because Mr. Hagelin has new and 

effective machines that he is ettin rea to ut on the market. He 

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The CHAIRMAN suggested that it be put on the agenda by the NSA 

member for a subsequent meeting. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

It was so agreed. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

DECISION: (6 July 1953) USCIBEC, with the exception of the CIA 

member, approved the conference report and directed that it be forwarded to USCIB for consideration. It was understood that the CIA member 

would reserve his position for presentation at the time the report is 

considered by USCIB. 

The meeting adjourned at 1640. 

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