J. S21039/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

WILLIAM JONES, : No. 1495 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 21, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0006579-2014

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 31, 2019

William Jones appeals from the September 21, 2015 judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after 

he entered open guilty pleas to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, 

carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on public streets 

or property in Philadelphia. The trial court imposed a sentence of 5 to 10 years 

of incarceration for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, followed 

by consecutive probationary terms of 7 years for carrying a firearm without a 

license and 5 years for carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia. We 

affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual history:

On May 21, 2014, [appellant] was arrested on the 

1600 block of South 54th Street in the city and county 

of Philadelphia, after Philadelphia Police Officers 
J. S21039/19

- 2 -

stopped a vehicle traveling on the 1600 block of 

South 54th Street. Officers took everyone out of the 

vehicle and searched both them and the car. Upon 

search of [appellant’s] person, officers found an 

empty firearm holster. Officers checked the floor of 

the vehicle and found a .45 caliber pistol with brown 

wood grip, loaded with eight (8) live rounds in the 

magazine, and one live round in the chamber, in the 

front of the seat where [appellant] was sitting. 

Several of the other men in the vehicle were also 

armed. [Appellant] was arrested and charged with 

one (1) count Violation of the Uniform Firearm Act 

(“VUFA”) – Possession of a Firearm by Persons 

Prohibited, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105; one (1) count VUFA 

– Firearm Not to Be Carried Without a License, 18 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 6106; and one (1) count VUFA – Carrying 

Firearms on Public Streets or Public Property in 

Philadelphia, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6108.

Trial court opinion, 7/19/18 at 1-2 (citations to record omitted).

The trial court set forth the following procedural history:

On September 29, 2015, [appellant] filed a timely 

Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence. On March 3, 

2016, the motion to reconsider was heard and then 

continued without a ruling.[

1] [Appellant] filed a 

pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”)[2] on March 6, 2017. Counsel was 

appointed on March 16, 2017. On August 27, 2017, 

counsel filed an amended PCRA petition. On May 14, 

2018, this Court granted [appellant’s] motion to 

re-instate his appellate rights. On May 18, 2018, 

[appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior 

Court of Pennsylvania. On May 31, 2018, this Court 

issued an Order directing [a]ppellant to file a Concise 

Statement of [Errors] Complained of on Appeal 

 

1 We note that the motion would have been deemed denied by operation of 

law on July 1, 2016. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (deeming a post-sentence motion 

denied where trial court fails to decide the motion within 120 days or grant an 

extension). 

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J. S21039/19

- 3 -

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 15, 2018, 

[appellant] filed a Concise Statement.

Id. at 2-3. Thereafter, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

With respect to the sentence imposed upon 

[a]ppellant by the lower court, did that court abuse its 

discretion by imposing an aggregate sentence of not 

less than 5, nor more than 10 years of incarceration 

followed by 12 years of probation?

Appellant’s brief at 5.

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

[T]he proper standard of review when considering 

whether to affirm the sentencing court’s 

determination is an abuse of discretion. . . . [A]n 

abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of 

judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have 

abused its discretion unless the record discloses that 

the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, 

or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In 

more expansive terms, our Court recently offered: An 

abuse of discretion may not be found merely because 

an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, but requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly 

erroneous.

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the 

concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review 

is that the sentencing court is in the best position to 

determine the proper penalty for a particular offense 

based upon an evaluation of the individual 

circumstances before it.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-170 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted; brackets in original).
J. S21039/19

- 4 -

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing 

do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. 

Commonwealth v. Sierra, [752 A.2d 910, 912 

(Pa.Super. 2000)]. An appellant challenging the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this 

Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has 

filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a 

fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted; brackets in original).

Here, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and appellant’s brief 

includes a Rule 2119(f) statement. Appellant also filed a timely motion to 

reconsider sentence which preserved the following issue:

It is believed and averred the sentence imposed was 

unfairly and unreasonably severe upon consideration 

of [appellant’s] entering a non-negotiated guilty plea 

to all charges, and the characteristics of [appellant]. 

[Appellant] pled guilty and accepted responsibility for 

the crimes alleged against him. His actions saved the 

Court and the Commonwealth both time and 

resources.

Appellant’s “motion to reconsider sentence pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720,”

9/29/15 at 2. In his brief to this court, however, appellant attempts to 

advance the following three discretionary sentencing challenges: (1) the 
J. S21039/19

- 5 -

sentencing court abused its discretion because it “indicated that the sentence 

given [a]ppellant was in the bottom of the mitigated portion of the guidelines”

but was within the standard range; (2) “the sentencing court did not 

adequately set forth its reasons on the record for [a]ppellant’s sentence”; and 

(3) the sentence imposed was “clearly unreasonable and excessive” because

it “shows a lack of any mitigation.” (Appellant’s brief at 13-14.) Because 

appellant failed to preserve his first and second challenges in his motion for 

reconsideration, appellant fails to invoke our jurisdiction to entertain those 

challenges. We must now determine whether appellant’s third complaint 

raises a substantial question for our review.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 

1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). A substantial question exists 

“only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie 

the sentencing process.” Sierra, 752 A.2d at 912-13. “Generally, if the

sentence imposed falls within the sentencing guidelines, no substantial 

question exists.” Commonwealth v. Maneval, 688 A.2d 1198, 1199-2000

(Pa.Super. 1997) (citation omitted).

Here, appellant received a standard range sentence but complains that 

his sentence was excessive because the trial court failed to consider mitigating 
J. S21039/19

- 6 -

factors; specifically, appellant’s acceptance of responsibility as demonstrated 

by his guilty plea, appellant’s difficult upbringing, and the fact that appellant

“was active in prison trying to do positive things to better himself.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 14-15.) Appellant fails to explain how his sentence was 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or how his

sentence was contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process. Therefore, appellant has failed to raise a substantial question.3

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/19

 

3 We note that notwithstanding appellant’s failure to raise a substantial 

question for our review, the record belies appellant’s claims. At the sentencing 

hearing, appellant’s counsel requested leniency in light of appellant’s guilty 

plea. (Notes of testimony, 9/21/15 at 5-8.) Appellant’s counsel also informed 

the trial court of the positive strides appellant has made while in prison, as 

did appellant. (Id. at 7-8. 16.) Additionally, appellant’s grandmother testified 

as to appellant’s difficult upbringing. (Id. at 8-9.)