REF ID:A52-3121 

TOP SECRET CANO SEetJ·itJi V ihf ORlfrAnJN 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, USCIB 

SUB.mJT: USCIB 23/67 

A \.., 5'; 

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1. Tb3 delegates and technical experts of the UK and the us, 

including the one frail CIA, agreed unanimously to a procedure for 

improving CCMSJ!X: of NATO mElll.ber nations through NATO COMSEC channels. 

The essence of USCIB 23/67 is that the CIA, one of the Ufi agencies 

represented at the Conference, wishes to amend the Report of the 

Conference. 

2. The grrunds on which CIA urges a rescission of certain of the 

Conference conclusions and reoommemations are: 

a. That the Conference report does not specify what US 

authori ti.es are the "cognizant US authoriti.es" for 

the initial approach to the French; 

b. That the Conference failed to set down the specific 

level and means of initial approach to the French; 

c. That no monitory memorandum issued by the Stard.ing 

Group is likely to cause a national COMSIOO organization 

to admit its weaknesses or to volunteer to re~ its 

admitted weaknesses; 

d. That the "NATO COMSID Board" does not include 

representation of authorities responsible for the 

production of diplomatic ciphers, and that these 

authorities might therefore resent and resist its 

recommendations; 

e. That Appendix B to the Ccnference report is technically 

inadequate, providing too much guidance for some 

nations, not enough for others; 

f. That other neans exist far approaching NATO nations 

on this subject. 

J. The grounds set forth in par. 2 above were discussed at length 

during the Conference; USCIB 23/67 introduces no new material to justify 

a reconsideration of the conclusions and recommendations. USCIB 23/67 

is merely an urging upon USCIB of ideas thoroughly discussed and 

rejected by the Conference itself. It might do no harm to irrlicate 

briefly the attitude of the conferees toward the points raised: 

a. The Conference was agreed that the Foreign Office and 

the State Department were the ncognizant UK/US authorities." 

The phrasing was changed at the request of the CIA conferee. 

TOP SEGRH 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-15-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
REF ID:A523121 

b. The problem or determining the specific level and means 

of initial approach to the Fremh was deliberately lett 

out as infringement on diplomatic prerogative and 

restriction of diploma.tic technique. 

c. .As regards the ineff'ecti veness of a Standing Group 

memorandum in causing national organizations to admit 

or correct their weaknesses: 

{l) The issue of a SG memorandum will obviate the 

necessity for any confession of sin; 

(2) Certain NATO nations are already approaching the 

Standing Group for advice on CC!fSEC (see Appendix 

A to Conference report); 

(3) Certain NATO nations can only be effectively 

approached through NATO since they have already 

failed to respond to individual approaches. 

d. Concerning the non-representation of diplomatic cryptographers on the "NATO CCMSro Board11 : 

(1) There is no such board; 

(2) The existing NATO CCMSID organizations (Sl!Xa.N and 

EUS»J) were established as such by NATO action; 

therefore it seems unreasonable to expect NATO 

nations to "resent and resist" their advice; 

(3) NATO is governed by the Council of Ministers, 

exclusively a dtplomatie organization, to which 

the Standing Group is subordinate. 

e. Appendix B was prepared by the acknowledged technical 

experts of the UK am the US, who do not agree with the 

new CIA assessment of the contents of the Appendix. 

It is perhaps necessary to remind oursel.. ves here that 

the ultimate goal is not to do something to every 

nation•s communications for the sake of change, but to 

raise the level of COMSID to an acceptable minimum for 

all NATO nations. 

r. It is obvious that other means exist for approaching 

NA'ID nations on this subject. These other means were 

examined by the Conference, and rejected. 

2 

TOP. SECRET J~~NOE 
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4. The conclusions of USCIB 23/67 imply that "possible alternative 

methods of approach" were not fully investigated by the Conference. 

The report of the Conference, in pars. 12 and 15, contradicts this 

implication. 

5. It is my opinion that USCIB 23/67 presents no groums sufficient 

to warrant what would amount to a vecy drastic revision or action 

recommended by the Conferees of both nations and would certainly require 

a restudy or the whole subject by another Conference. The establishment 

of an "Executive Agent" and the making of detailed recamnendations to 

USCIB by this Executive Agent and by the "cognizant US authoritY'' as 

prerequisites to further action on the Conference report would interpose 

completely unnecessary delays. USClB need only set up the "cognizant US 

authorit;y" and proceed as indicated in the report. 

3 

WILLIAM F. rn:rED?4N 

Chairman, U.S. Delegation 

US/UK Conference