. , • 

REF ID:A61267 

'FOP SECRE'T • PPOID!D DGC!IEI I J ~ • 

": ~ _ ', .\JSCIB: 2$. l/ 6 

-\ ~ 

.:UltA;I ggg( IHI MMFltAl 

20 - " .... » .. ........... 15 December 1953 

'POP BEeitiS'l" 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Program to Improve the Communications Security of 

NATO Countries. 

USCIB 2$.1/1 of 21 September 1953. 

1. The enclosed papers designed to guide implementation of the 

program outlined in paragraph 6 of the reference are submitted by the 

Chairman of the USCIB Ad Hoc Committee for this problem (Mr. T. A. 

,Polyzoides) in order to obtain the formal approval of USCIB to go ahead 

'With the program. 

2. Attention is invited to paragraph le or enclosure 5 (Brief for 

belegates) wherein it is provided that the cWG be the source of instructions to the U.S. and U.K. delegates during the course or discussion. 

The CWG recommends this procedure as being the most efficient and 

effective manner in which to resolve U.S.-U.K. differences that may 

arise during the course of the discussions. In this connection attention 

also is invited to the following provisions of the reference approved by 

USCIB as guidance to the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee: 

"4. The Combined (US-UK) Working Group. To assure that the 

COMINT aspects and limitations of this program are properly 

coordinated, the Combined Working Group should be tmder the 

direction of USCIB and LSIB. It should serve to: 

a. Coordinate US and UK proposals for the initial approach 

to the French, subsequent technical discussions, preparation of a 

memorandum. to be issued by the NATO Standing Group and f orm.ulation 

of minimum security standards; 

b. Coordinate, between the US and UK, conclusions as to 

the status of the COMSEC of NATO countries as this program 

develops; and 

c. Coordinate US and UK recommendations for further steps, - as envisaged in paragraph 23 of the Conference Report, should this 

program not accomplish the desired response from NATO countries or 

improvement in their COMSEC. 

The US element of this Group should also serve as an ad hoc subcommittee of USCIB to keep this entire program under continuous review for the Board." 

USCIB: 29.1/6 

eclassified and a 
... . 

~SCIB: 2$.1/6 

'!'OP SEC'lm'! 

Subject: 

"6. 

• 

15 December 1953 

Program to Improve the Communications Security of 

NATO Countries. 

c. Phase 3. The COMSEC authorities should then proceed 

to the discussion and implementation of adequate COMSEC practices 

within the three Governments. US participation in this phase 

should be handled by the National Security Agency (NSA). 11 _ 

The Chairman of the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee foresees no difficulty in 

adjusting those matters which would be handled by the CWG during the 

course of the discussions and those that would be handled by the 

National Security Agency inasmuch as problems to be settled by the 

CWG would be received at NSA from the U.S. delegates and tabled 

through the NSA members of the CWG. Likewise problems arising in the 

U.K. delegation would be passed to the U.K. element of the CWG via 

London. 

3. The Chairman of the U.S. Ad Hoc Committee recommends approval 

of the enclosures. Such approval. should be construed to include reaffirmation by USCIB of the fact that policy aspects of the subject 

program will continue to be ref erred to the CWG until the program is 

completed. In order to expedite action and save unnecessary consideration of detail by the Board it is recommended that the U.S. element of 

the CWG be authorized to negotiate any further changes desired by the 

U.K. to the enclosures without reference to the Board provided such 

action involves no change in the essential requirements of the program 

as embodied in the reference and the enclosures hereto. · It is suggested 

that the Board's views onVU · -Mus pointsbe conveyed to LSIB. 

t"e.se. 

ain, • Navy 

Enclosures Ex utive Secretary, USCIB 

1. Ohr.Ad Hoc Cte. Memo -of 15 Dec 1953..,. !fliltl. 6 FIE7.J • .J'V 

2. Brief for Approach to the French on COMSEC. 

3. Aide-memoire for French-dtd 10 Dee-1-9--5--3-. l'N. 3 ~ea."'¥' 

4. Agenda Mtg. Delegates Tripartite Sec.Work Group. .f'I. 

5. Brief for Delegates Technical Discussions, ~O Dec 1957.- Jfkv . .3 Hcd 

6. Memo for Standing Group to Issue of 23 Nov 1953. 

7. Lists of examples of dangerous crypto and comm. practices. 

USCIB: ';J}.1/6 - 2 -

TOP SECRET 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN1 USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference : 

Program to Improve the Communications Security 

ot NATO Countries. 

uoom 29.1/1 of 21 September 1953. 

1. Under the terms of the reference document, an Ad Hoc 

Committee representing UOOm has been working as the U. S. element 

of a Combined (US/UK) Working Group (CWG) to coordinate u. s. and 

U. K. proposals for the initial approach to the French and for other 

matters connected with the program to improve communications i:iecurity 

ot NATO countries. 

2. The deliberations of the UOOIB Ad Hoc Committee and the 

CWG resulted in early agreement that the task at band required a mutually agreed sequence of' f'our major steps which in turn would require 

a ce1·c.ain number of agreed documents of instruction and guidanco. It 

was also agreed that UOOIB and LSIB should reach ~reement on the entire aerie~ of these documents before an approach to the French was 

made. · 

3. The attached documents comprise the series deemed to be 

the necessary preparation for the initial approach to the French 

and for subsequent conferences ~s required. The Ad Hoc Committee ( I 

has approved this series unanimously. The British element of' the CWG / 

has participated throughout in the preparation of these documents and 

has approved them subject to fiDB.l approval from London. 

4. The Committee recommends that the Board (a) approve the 

attached series of papers as the formal u. s. position f'or initiating 

the approach to the general program; (b) direct the Ad Hoc Committee 

to complete the necessary negotiations and adjustments with the Brit~sh 

element in the CWG without further reference to the Board, unless di~ 

agreements over matters 0£ policy cannot be resolved within the CWG; 

and (c) reaffirm that policy aspects of the subject program will continue to be referred to CWG until the·program is completed. 

(Signed) 

T. Achilles Polyzoides 

Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.l/6 (Revised as of 3 February 1954) 

T0 ... 0 SBGRBf' 
,. / - REF ID:A61267 

'i'ef SBSRB'i' PR9l'H 

SBetlRl'fY lNPeRMtc!?Olf 

Subjeot i Agreed Portion ot Brief tor Approach to the l'rench 

on Canun1oat1ons Security by US and UK Ambassadors. 

1. The briefs tor the US and Ult Ambassadors shall 

both include the following 1temsr 

(a) 

(b) 

(o) 

(d) 

(e) 

'l'be Report or the BRtJSA Conference on the 

Camrrun1cat1ona Security ot NATO countries, 

held in June 1953· 

The aide-memo1re prepared tor the approach 

to the Prench b7 the Combined Working Group. 

Paragraphs 5 and 6 ot USCIB paper 29.1/1 - attached as Appendix A to this memorandum. 

Inatruotiona on how to respond in the event 

the French bring up the de VosJol1 approach 

on cipher machines at the meeting with the 

ambassadors - attached as Appendix B to this 

memorandum. 

'1'he us 81¥' : ·:~· :bat :r revelation or us and/or UK!__ will be made to 

the Prench a ~am aasaorial level. 

Revelation within the limits set forth 1n the 

conterenoe report (See paragraph (a) above) will be reserved tor the technical d1aouss1ons 

themselves. 

2. The br1ef's •J' also include whatever additional 

matters are considered necessary tor the individual ambassadors,, 

aa determined respectively b7 the Poreign Office and the 

Department of State . 

TOP SBCftBT J'll6Tn 

SBtJURili Dfl'CftMA'!!OK 

ENCL. 2 .\ USCJB 2~. j Io 

' 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
. 

,, 

REF ID:A61267 ........... 

'!'OP SBeRB'f PRcml EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Security !nto1mt1on PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

APPBNDIX A 

Paragraphs 5 and 6 ot USCIB 29.1/l 

5. Oona1derat1ons atteotig tbe initial app~oh to 

the Preneh. 

\ improvement b¥ the l'renoh will have ...._~~~~~~~~~----J 

to be aohieved indirectly, 1.e. 1 by inducing them to agree 

tirat to a program tor the improvement ot the OCllSEC ot 

NATO countries through the existing COllSBO mechan1am of the 

NATO Standing Group and then to agree to pre11m1nar, US·T""'-

Prench technical d1scuas1ona to assure adequate CCMSBC 

praatioes within the three governments. 

'feP Wftift J'.RO'lff &eoUPltv·late~ien 
REF ID:A61267 

!OP SBCRB'f fROlH 

8eeHrit7 lntormatlon 

c. It w111 be imperative that all contacts mde 

within the Prench Government are secure and are given 

adequate authority. 

d. The Tr1part1te Security Working Group (US-UKPrencn), which has been in existence since 1950, would 

appear to otter the beet means ot achieving an orderlJ' and 

secure arrangement ror direct discussion between the proper 

COMSBC authorities ot the three governments. Although the 

work or this Group baa not heretotore included CCllSIC 

Jnattera, tbe 01•oup has developed cooperative and secure 

contacts among responsible French authorities 1n general 

security matters. 

6. The 1n1t 1al approach to the Prench. To aaaure 

wholehearted cooperation by the lPrench in sponsoring JointlJ" 

with the US and UK the overall program ror other NA'l'O 

countries and in making ettective improvements 1n Prenoh 

CCl4SBC, the l'renoh Government should be approached f'1rst 

at the cabinet level. 'l'l'1e project should then be assigned 

to the Tripartite Security Working Group to establish proper 

contact between CCllSEC authorities ot the three governments. 

As a practical matter, and as a means or achieving the 

greatest possible compulsion, this approach should be undertaken Jo1ntly by US and UK representatives. 

-2-

'MP SBSM'!' PftOCfll See~riey lnforna~ion 
REF ID:A61267 

See11rity !nt~ttor1 

a. Phase 1. At the cabinet level the l'rench 

Government should be requested b)' the US and tJlC ambaasadora 

to agree 1n pr1no1ple that the overall security ot NATO 

requ1ree that a broad program be undertaken to improve 

the security of the national comnnm1oat1ons ot NA'l'O countries, 

and that this program should be 1n1t1ated through the 

Standing Group as a logical extension ot the existing CCllSBC 

program or the NATO organization itself. The French 

Government should be requested to agree further that auah 

a program should be preceded by US-UK-French discussions to 

aaaure adequate CCl4SBC practice• within the three Standing 

Group countries, and that, to this end, the terms ot 

reference ot the ~r1part1te Secur1t7 Working Oroup should 

be extended to include the establ1ahment of arrangements tor 

technical discussions and the selection ot competent and 

proper CCllSBC authorities to undertake these technical 

discuseiona and implement their :results within the three 

govarments. This phase should be handled b7 the Department 

ot Sta18 and the Poreign Of"t1ce. 

b. Phase 2. The Tripartite Securit7 Working Group 

should then select the CCIJSBC authorities who will repreaent 

their Oovernmenta and make suitable arrangements tor their 

-3-

'feP 81988'1 PRQIJH 

Secu:oitf' lll£!oniatlo11 
REF ID :A61267 _ 

SecW"1t1 !nto.1Wt1on 

tecbn1cal dlecuaaiona. 'lbia phase should be handled bJ' 

selected membel'll or the US and Ult Tripartite SecuritJ' 

'leams aa agreed between the participating ageno1ee. 

c. Phase ..3.· The CatsBC authorities should then 

proceed to the d1scusa1on and implementation ot adequate 

OCl4SBC practices w1th1n the three Governments. US participation 1n this phase should be handled bJ' the National 

Secur1t7 Ageno~ (MBA) • 

-4-

TOP SBeftB'f' 1'116'1'11 Secttr~,. lfttemat1eR 
. . . 

. , . _,,--. 

:',,,,.,--. 

REF ID:A61267 

·-. 

TOP WRB! • SBCURI'! l !Ml'OftMT:tOH 

APPENDIX B 

Instruotlons on Response to ~ rrenoh Reference 

to C 1pher Machine Approach to US 

l. It 18 considered unl1kelJ' that during oonvereatlone 

with the US and me Ambassadors the rrench will mention the 

tact that the)' have approached the US with a request tor 

o1pher machines. It the7 should do so, no indication 

should be given that the US haa told the UK ot the request. 

2. The US Ambassador should aa7 (a) that he was 

1ntormed ot the l'rench app~oh; (b) that it is under 

consideration 1n Washington; and (o) that he believes the 

matter would be taken up at acme point in the-proposed 

technical talks, it the7 are agreed to. 

3. 'l'he UK Ambaaaador should remain silent or it neceaaaey 

should (a) NN that he was not aware auch an approach bad 

oocurred; (b) ask to be 1ntormed or pertinent details of 

the request; and (c) it the l'renoh approach 1s described,, 

agree that the matter appears to tit into the proposed 

technical talks. 
.;- . . 

REF ID:A61267 

TO'PSEeRET 

1. The U~ and UK Gover.pments have reached the conclusion that 

the national ccamnm1 cations practice a of Jll8JJ1' NATO govermnents JD&7 be 

such as to create a potential source of highly Valuable information to 

the USSR. The US and UK Governments also are or the opinion that the 

French Govermnent :may have reached a samewhat similar conclusion independently. The US and UK Governments believe that the security or 

NATO as a whole depends on the security of each individual member govern. 

:ment and, consequently, that it is in the COllB>D interest to take action 

immediately to bring this situation to the attention of all NATO governments. 

2. It is therefore, necessary to take steps to ensure that no 

NATO country uses, for its national camnun:2 cations, inadequateli secure 

cryptographic and tranl!lllission practices. 

3. It is the view of the US and Ult Governments that the problem of 

the c.onmnn1cations security practices of the NATO governments should be 

handled through the Standing Group in samewhat the same manner as - and 

as an extension to - the previous activities of this Group in establisl:r 

ing the c01!!!!lmications security practices ot NATO. It is realized that 

the Standing Group was created to issue directives onl.y on the military 

affairs of NATO. It is known, however, that same NATO goverments CUI\-

rentl.y desire advice OD their ConmunicatiQDS security problems; the 

Governments of Belgium and Italy alread;y have written to the Standing 

Enclosure 3 with US:IB 29.l/6 (revised as of .3 February 1954) 

TOPSEORB'F 
REF ID:A61267 

TCh" SEeR-ET 

Group on the subject. It seems proper, therefore, to use the Standing 

Grotip, which is conveniently available, in an advisory capacity on a 

matter which ult:lmtely does relate to the security ot NATO •. 

4. The US and UK Govermnents together believe that the US, · FranQe 

and the UK should join in preparing a memorandum tor the Standing Group 

to issue to all ll81Bber governments and that this memorandum should: 

a. R&-empbasize that the security of NATO as a whole depends 

upon the securit7 of each individual nation and that, consequentq, secure 

national ccmvnn1cations practices farm a vital part ot NATO securit7. 

b. Contain a pre11m1nar;y list of examples of dangerous cr,yp~ 

graphic and transmission practices and procedures. 

c. Request each government to examine this list to ensure that 

its own comnnm1cations are tree tram such practices and procedures and !JP 

vita additions to or ccmnents on this list. 

d• Request each NATO government to designate or establish 

oommnn1cations security agencies and to authorize those agencies to COJDD'llr 

nicate directly with the stand1ng Group C0111mmications Security and Evaluation Agency, Washington (SPCA?,f) and the European Security and Evaluation 

Agency of the Standing Group (BUS.IC). 

e. Invite any government that desires advice and technical 

assistance in such matters to apply, in the first instance, through their 

national communications security agencies directly to Sl!DAN. Subsequent 

discussions or correspondence might be conducted, it more convenient, · 

with l!JJSJ!C. 

- 2-

TOPSBGRBT 
.. 

TOP SlliU!lf 

REF ID:A61267 

TO·.P SECR"ET 

5. The Governments ot the US and UK propose, therefore, that technical discussions among the Cm•nn1cations Security experts or the three 

Standing Group powers be held forthwith with the object of agreeing 

upon a memorandum for issue by the StarvUng Group to all NATO govermaents ... 

The UK and US Governments are, however, conscious of a number of shortcomings in their own national comunications practices: The French 

Govermnent may also have noted similar shortcomings in its own practices. 

The US and UK Governments believe that as a further objective of the 

technical discussions the US, UK and France should assure themselves 

that their respective communications security practices are satisfactory 

from the standpoint of the Standing Group Memorandum. 

6. It the French Goverment agrees to these proposals, the US and 

UK Govermnents will designate respectively one ot their representatives 

on the Tripartite Security Working G1"0Up who has previously participated 

in the work of that Group to make the necessary arrangements in their behalf' for the conduct of such discussionsJ and they suggest that the French 

Government similarly designate o~ ot its experienced members of the 

Tripartite Secl.U"ity Working Group .to join his US and UK colleagues in 

mak1 ng these arrangements. These arrangements would include agreement 

on the selection of the technical personnel, the location for the discu&-

sions and the establishment of proper conditions of security. This 

procedure takes advantage of an existing and very successful liaison 

channel in the field of secl.U"ityJ.and for added privacy it is proposed 

further that the necessary arrangemen~s be worked out by our representatives without adding this matter to the formal terms of the Tripartite 

- .3 -

TOPSBCRBT 

! : 

-
REF ID:A61267 

TOP SECBET 

Security Working Group and without making it subject to plenary consideration by that body. 

·- 4-

ro.a SECRET 
REF ID:A61267 

AOBMJ>A AND BRIEP FOR '1'BE MBBTINO 

OP DELBGATES PRCll THB TRIPARTITE 

SBCURITY WORKING OROUP 

(1) A designated representative or each country on the Tripartite 

Security Working Group who has previously participated 1n 

the work or that group will meet in Paris as soon ae is 

practical and possible after agreement has been reached 

among the three governments relative to taking the action 

proposed on communications security. (Holding ot the 

meetings in Paris will facilitate action or the group 

inasmuch as it is anticipated the Prench delegate will 

have to refer to other governmental agencies prior to 

consummation of the arrangements for a meeting or the 

technical group, whereas the British and U.S. delegates 

should be thoroughly prepared to enter into any necessa17 

commitments. Also, the security checking relative to the 

Prench delegates will be facilitated it the meetings are 

in Paris.) 

(2) The action to be proposed at the meeting or the Tripartite 

Security Working Group representatives will be as tollowss 

(A) There should be a discussion of the problem involved 

with security emphasis (this is to insure that the Prench 

representative is properly briefed inasmuch as he may 

have had scanty information up to this time). 

ENCL. 4 usc:e 29.1/6 
-~-

.. .-. 

REF ID:A61267 

'1 vt SICRIT - SBCURrI'! INFUMka.'ION 

, ,. (B) Discussion will be initiated as to the security aapecta 

or the meeting or the technical delegates which would 

cover security protection, physical security, and any 

other security problems. 

(0) Each ot the delegates will table the names ot their 

technical representatives proposed tor the technical 

meeting tor acl'Ut1ny, checking and d1scuas1on with 

the other two delegates. 

(3) It 1a proposed that two competent technical repreaentat1vea 

be designated from each country to participate in the 

technical meetings. Thia would permit additional representatives it it proved necessary atter the 1n1t1al·meet1ng. The 

technical coanittee would hold their meetings in Paris (it 

this proves not to be feasible, then in London) as soon aa 

is possible and practical after the Tripartite Security 

Worldng Oroup representatives conclude their work. In 8llJ' 

event, it would be prq>osed that the meeting of the technical 

representatives start within thirty days (this would aeem to 

be chiefly a problem for the French inasmuch aa the U.S. and 

Br1t1ah technical teams will be ready to meet at any time). 

-2-
REF ID:A61267 

TOP SECRET 

BRIEF FOR US-UK DELmATES TO T!CHNICAL DIOOUSSIOHS 

1. GeneraJ.. 

a. It is essential that the UK and US delegations meet and 

consult in the UK before the discussions vi th the French begin. 

b. In parti.cipating in the French discussions, the US and UK 

delegates are bound by the report of the June Conference, a copy of_ which 

is attached hereto as Appendix A. 

c. It is impossible to cover every eventuality in advance; the 

best way of eliciting and developing certain points 1111st be left to the 

discretion of the delegates within _the agreed limits of disclosure (in 

particular paragraphs lOb and c of Appendix A. Techniques employed in 

cryptosecurity evaluations are cryptanalytic techniques within the meaning of paragraph lOc of Appendix A.) In addition, care 1111St be taken to 

guard against disclosure of the extent of UK/uS COM.Sm collaboration. 

d. Cam.plate agreement between the UK and US delegations is 

essential. If ditterences emerge in the course or the discussions, the 

disputed points should be passed over until the two delegations have privately resolved their differences. 

e. Should unresolvable differences arise between the UK and US 

delegations, or should it became evident to either that for a:ny reason the 

conference has reached a point where further discussions with the French 

would be profitless, the UK or US delegation, (after consultation with 

the other), will.:- using 1=1ame plausible excuse, ask for a recess and get 

further instructions from the Combined Working Group. The delegations 

Enclosure 5 with UOOil:S ~.1/6 (revised as of 3 February 1954) 

TOa.0 SECRET 
1'ef S!IRlf 

REF ID:A61267 

'/Yh' S:ECRET 

are not empowered to terminate the conter~nce, for any reason other than 

that its work bas been completed, without instructions from their governments. 

2. Guide to the Conduct of the Discussions. 

a. The ostensible purposes of the discussions are set forth in 

paragraph 5 or the aide-llellOire which is to be left with the French by the 

Ambassadors. A copy or the aide-memoire is attached hereto as Appendix B. 

b. An agreed UK/US draft or the memorandum referred to in paragraph 5 of the aide-memoire will be introduced at the first session of the 

discussio'."lS. A copy or this draft and its appendix "List of Dangerous 

Practices• ia attached hereto as Appendix: C• 

c. The final report of the conference shall include a memorandum 

agreed by the technical representatives of the three powers and a recommended arrangeDent for introducing the memorandum into the Standing Group. 

d. The real purpose of the discussions, in addition to the objects 

stated in Appendix B, is tO initiate an improvement in French connnnnications 

security practices. For this purpose it is necessary first of all to cause 

the French to realize that their COMSJ!U practices fail to meet a satisfactory standard or security in the eyes or their allies~ This goal will be 

achieved in part in the normal course of preparing the memorandum to be 

i1'5Ued by tbs Standing Group .and in discussion of its Appendix:: List of 

Dangerous Practices. French recmnmendations for nod.U'ications, especially 

amplification, will be encouraged and considered on their own merits. Decisions on these points JIUSt necessarily be unanimous. 

e. Every ef'f'ort D111st be made to induce the French to discuss 

their own ciphers, cODQ!mjcations practices and procedures. The exact 

- 2 -

T0;&0 SBOREf' 

' 

11 
REF ID:A61267 

T<n• S:EO:tcET 

tactics will be agreed between the US and UK delegates, initial.4 at the 

preJ.im:i.DEuj talks in Iondon and, subsequently, as :may be necessary, by 

private consu1tation in the light of the course the discussions take. 

Such tactical. decisions will be governed by the provisions 0£ sub-paragraph l(c) above. 

, I 

f'. The following device ma.7 be used it at 8ZJY stage it appears to ,/ 

both the UK and US delegates that it will further the real purpose of the 

discussions. The US Delegation will have been provided with a suitable 

version or the "Minimm Standards Paper", the f'inal text of' which shall 

have been agreed during the prel1m1nB.1'7 discussions in Iondon. At some 

natural point, for instance when the French Delegation have queried the 

reason f'or some restriction proposed by the UK and the us, or when some 

basis is required f'or a statement in the •List or Dangerous Practices•, 

the US will make available to the other delegates either the whole or this 

d~ument or relevant sections, as i£ it were one of' the US ref'erence papers 

which they- f'eel the others might just as well see and which would in all 

probability- represent a brief, or part o.f a brief', .for the guidance o.f 

Sl!CAN. In arranging the procedure f'or the introduction of this paper 

the UK and US delegates will bear in mind that it must not take on the 

appearance of' a document jointly- prepared and that it is not to be presented as an official action paper. Ii' the whole do~ument is made 

available it must be ensured that the French understand that Sl!CAN would 

not propose to issue such a paper and that it must not be discussed outside these tripartite discussions. 

- 3 -

T9:l' 8BCRE1' 
REF ID:A61267 

TO-? SECRET 

g. The French may volunteer to discuss their recent request 

ot the US for cipher equipments for their P'oreign office. It they do 

not, ~ US delegates may at an early stage seek out the :French delegates 

pr~vatel.y and ask them to introduce the subject, saying that, in the 

interest or ma-king sure that the best practical help is provided in the 

shortest possible time, British participation might be advantageous • 

.3. Limits of Cryptographic Disclosure. 

a. The disclosure ot US or UK cryptoprinciples shall be 

limited to: 

(1) The systems that are used by NATO or have been 

officially proposed tor NATO use; 

(2) The systems and equipments that by the tiDe of the 

conference may have been approved tor release to the 

French as a result o£ their request for assistance for 

their P'oreign ottice; 

(3) The UK method of making one-time pads by HOLLERITH, 

with the procedures and standards or checking; 

(4) The UK method of JMldng one-time tapes by DONALD DUCK 

(With a statement that US methods are similar) and 

the procedures and standards used tor checking. 

b. The disclosure or non-US or UK cryptographic detail shall 

be limited to that which is available only from non-COMINT and avert 

sources./ I \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

- 4-

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

f'OP SBORBT 
'f0P spm 

REF ID:A61267 

TOPSEORE'F 

taken to avoid the use ot &UT words or phrases peculiar to French cOJ1111micationa which are known to us through COMINT tor example "Qmic," "Boite de 

Roulette," "Avec mit," and the like; it must be borne in mind at all times 

that words which -----have become comonplace technical terms can provide diEO 3.3(h)(2) 

rect evidence of CC14INT success or collaboration. PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

4. Predictable Sources o£ lbbarrassment. 

b. COMSm - It the French ask pointblank questions about 

national cipher systems of the US or UK, a frank answer should wherever 

permissible, be given. It the reply to such a question should involve 

revelation of matter not approved for release, the answer should simply _! 

be that each country bas a national security policy vhich prohibits revelation of such information except as explicitly approved. 

- 5 -

TOPSECREF 
.• 

25 November 1953 

MEtg.ANDUM FOR STANDING GROUP TO ISSUE 

1. Regulations at preeient in force· (DC 2/7 (FiDal) and STAND 474 as amended 

by STAS!CS 1508, 1535 and 1588) ensure that all COSMIC telegrams and all NATO 

TOP SJDRE'l' and S!DRE'l' telegrams are encyphered in cr;yptos;ystems authorizedb;y 

the Standing Group. But all nations of NATO are also origim.ting am transmitting in their own :aational crn>tosystems a quantity of telegrams both civil 

and military which, although the;y are the private concern of the :cation in 

question, must be upected to contain into:rma.tion which af'~ect~ NATO as a 

whole and the loss of which to a non-NATO :nation harms the security ot NATO. 

2. Further STAND 474 allows NATO telegrau graded CGmDINTIAL OR RESTRICTED 

to be encrypted in l'l&tional systems., and it is highl.7 undesirable that int'or-

.mation of such gradings should become available to nations outside NATO .. 

3. The Standing Group therefore feels considerable concern at the potential 

danger to the securit;y of NATO which ma;y arise trom the insecur1t7 of the 

national comnnm1cations ot individual nations: the insecurity of one can endanger the security of all. 

4. The Sta.ming Group has bad prepared a paper enumerating examples or cryp-

~graphic and c0nrmn1cationa practices am procedures which e:cdanger security. 

This paper is attached at Appendix A. The StaiKling Group requests that each 

member nation examine this paper and take action to ensure that its own communications are free from the practices and procedures mentioned therein. 

5. Further the Stan:iing Groap requests that each NATO :nation will desig:cate 

or establish a Commnications Security Agency which shall be authorized to 

Enclosure 6 with USCJB 29.1/6 

'FOP SElCRE'f 
comnnmicate on conmnnication securit7 matters both civil and military' direct 

with the Standing Gr~ Cowmn1cations Securit7 and Evaluation Agency Washillgton (SIEAN) am with the l!Dropean·Seourity' am Evaluation Agenc7 (ECJSl!C). 

6. The Staining Group iDvi tes &f1¥ member nation, which requires advice am 

technical assistance towards the improvement ot the security ot its mtional 

017Ptog;raphic am. comnnmications practicee am.· procedures whether civil or 

milita:ey to appl7 through their Comnnmjcations Securit7 AgeJ1C7 direct to the 

Sta!lding Group Comnnm1cations Securit7 and Evaluation Agenc7 Washington. It 

may subsequently" be tound more convenient tor SIEAN to arrange tor discussions 

arising out of this first approach to be held with JJJSJE. 

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LIST OF EIAMPLES OF DANGEROUS 

CR?PTOORAPHIC .AND COMMUNICATIONS 

PRACTICES AND PROCEOOB.!5 

I. UNJmCIPHJ!UD CODES. 

25 November 195.3 

1. Unenciphered_ codes are totally inaccepta~le in diplomatic use for 

transmission of· classified information. They are only acceptable tor Armed 

Forces conmnmications when it is not considered essential to maintain the 

security or the information tor more than two or thr8e days from the introduction of the code. It follows that such codes must be changed at very frequent intervals. 

II. ADDITIVE SYST!MS 

2. Any' additive (or substractor or minuem) system is dangerous 

unless special precautions are taken in the construction of the additive.itself. :ManJ" procedures that....,. be regarded as •special precautions• are 

deceptive as to security and may even in themselves create weaknesses • 

.3. Encipherment by additive can only be guaranteed to be secure when 

the additive is used on a strictly "om-time• basis, and sys~ that permit 

depth gain little ~r no security from the additive. 

4. Fincipherment by non-one-time additive is highly dangerous, but . 

can be acceptable in certain circumstances for l:imited traffic provided that 

precautions are taken to :minimize overlap and to prevent crypt.analysts f'rom 

.f'illdiDg BlJ1'. overlap that may arise. 

5. · In general, polyalphabetic substitution systems whether actually 

additive in nature or not, are like additive systems am are subject to the 

same dangers. 

Enclosure 7 with USCIB 29.1/6 

'XOP SEC:RE T 
,. . 'POP SJf!Rll'l' - SlfJUftf!Y Il!f6RMt!I61. 

III. NON-ADDITIVE HAND SYSTDIS 

6. There are JDmJT hand systems of encipherment that do not employ 

ad.di tive. Very few or these can be guaranteed to be secure, even though 

they may be very complex:, applying both substitution and transposition to 

code or plain language. 

IV. MACHINE SYSTDS 

7. Machine ciphers vary greatly in the 8lllOl2Dt of security they 

af.f'ord. Failure to observe in every detail proper instructions tor operation may lead to compromise even w1 th the best machines. Others, such as the 

wen-known Hagelin •cryptoteknik8 (see para 8 below) are insecure unless pre-. 

cautions are taken over and above those· recommended ·by. the marmtacturer. · 

Others, again, are basically insecure and should in no circumstances be used. 

a. Since the encipherment is essentially by additive, it follows 

that 1£ a message setting is used more than once the key can be recovered on 

the overlap J a siDgle mistake by an operator using a message setting a secoJJd 

time can tlm.s compromise the machine se.tting. 

b. The additive generated by the machine is never truly random 

and there are circumstances in which this tact can be used to recover the 

machine setting, even though no message setting is repeated. 

c. With proper precautions this machine can give very good 

security for a lim1 ted 8lllOlUlt of traffic, wt in view of the number of different dangers that can arise in 'ft1"11Dg conditions ot use, for which it is 

impossible to legislate in advance, member nations who wish to make use or 

the •cryptotelmik11 are especially urged to consult SIC.AN. 

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'fMiE~61267 . - ------~ - -. 

• 

V. TRANSMISSION SlEURITY. 

9. Ciphers, however good individuall7, are not enough to ensure comnnmications securit7. Transmission techniques am message formats can in themselves 

provide considerable intelligence to a tratfic analy'st. Although there are 

practical limitations, the ideal to be striven tor is that the traffic neither 

of &rr1" type ·(e.g., naval, air f'orce, etc.) nor of' &DJ" nation should be dist.in-·· 

guishable by external characteris~ics. Again, intelligence can be gained by 

study of the organization and procedure of' radio networks am by use of radio 

direction-finding. In maJV' cases, especial.17 in Armed Forces crnmnnnications, 

a skillful eneDJi1 can obtain valuable intelligence by- collation of' apparentlyuninformative message texts. It follows, therefore, that tullcCJimnnnications 

securit7 dem&Dds that special precautions be observed in such •ttera as the 

judicious employment ot indicators, the selection ot call signs and o-£ frequencies, radio procedures, am the restriction of' the use of' plaiD language. 

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