REF ID:A522714 

-· o P s L c f< t: r - , USClB: 14/119 

CODt. WOHD MATERIAL 

7 February l9Sla 

MEK>RANPtJM FOR THE 11.EllBERS CN USCIBz 

SubJect1 

Reference: 

Encloauress 

LSIB Proposals Re French Security a 

Letter from Chairman, LSIB to Chairman, USCIB, 

on abow subject, dated 12 December 1950. 

A. Report by the Coordinator to USCIB on 

above subjacto 

B. Draft ot letter to Chairman, LSIB. 

l, With regard to paragraph 7(c) of the reference, which 

wae considered at the Fifty-ninth Meeting ot USCIB, the attached 

report (Enclosure A) has been prepared, et the direction of 

DIRAFSA, to serve as a u. So position and plan in discussions 

with Britiab representatives on or about l April 19510 

2. It is requested that the attached report be considered 

in conn.eotion with an agenda itom tor the Sixtieth USCIB U.~eting 0 to be held on 9 February 195.lo. 

3o a. It should ba noted that the attached report ie re~ 

sponsive to the Enclosure to USCIB: 14/112 and is t~arefore con~ 

tined to the French diplomatic cipher sacurity problemo However, 

as pointed out in paragraph l of EnclosUI'e "B" to USCIB: 14/119, 

it is blear that cipher insecurity parmeatee the entire area of 

French communications, including military, a& tJell es diplomatic. Therefor$, even though the U. s. and the Uo K. provide tho 

French military authorities with secure cryptographic machines 

and systems for the transmission of international traffic dealing 

with Western Union and NATO affairs, ~he security of wholly intra~ 

French military communications on related or purel7 national ~ubjecto will remain seriously inadequate and tbua may jeopardize the 

security of Western Union, NATO, purely u. s., purely Uo K., 8 and 

u. s. - u. K. communications. 

b. It is therefore recommended that the agenda for the 

proposed discussions w!th the British on the subject of French 

diplomatic cipher insecurity be broadened to include the question 

ot improving all French cryptographic communicetions, and that a 

. ::. ""'''\ 1n;n 

uscms 14/119 ~uui... v~Lll'\&J MATERIAL 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-05-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
USCIB 1 14/119 

Subjeota 

.-REF ID:A522714 - T01 SECRET 

7 Februar;y 1951 

UIB Proposals Ra l'J'O?lch Security. 

.. - - - - - - - - - '9 ~ - - - • e - • - - W O • _. C9 GI - - - tD ff 

propoaal to this .ttect be 11ade to the Chairman of LSIB. Enm 

Ol08U1'8 "B• u·a draft Of 8 letter embodying such a proposalo 

tJSCIB s 1'/119 

IARL E o STONE 

Rear Admiral, UoSo Nav 

USCIB Coordinator 

2 

TOP c. oECR._, FT 
REF ID:A522714 -- -

S February l.951 

JUORANJ)UM FOR THE DWCTOR .. AFSA: 

Subjects 

Reference: 

EnclOIUJ.'91 

Cooperation with GCHQ in Regard to Action Required 

on Insecurity of French Communicationso 

Me~ranclum for AFSA...OOT~ abo~e subject~ 22 January 19510 

Draft ot Report by the Coordinator to t'SCIB ">n above 

aubject. 

1. The report called for in paragraph 3d of 'Ul3 raferonca 

i• forwarded herewith. 

2o In the course or its study of the prcblomt the Ad Hoc 

Committee gave due consid~ration t~ the points raised in paragraph 4 

of the reference and submits, with regard therato9 the folloffi..~g 

comment11 

ao (Reterenco subparagraph 4a~) After consideration 

ot tho technical aspects of the comm-.mication' security practices 

of other governments with which tbe u.s.. ia now allied ill .NATO, 

the Committee agreed that the problem, es it concerns the French 9 

was unique and dns~rving of illdividuel and prompt attentiono 

ho (Rof0re.nce subparagraph 4c.) The Committeo con--

sidered the USCIB decieione to date on this matter, and concluded 

that they 1'9re, and atill are, aouncl frcm e teehni~al standpointo 

Ful"thor, it \188 agreed that the USC!B position 0 in agreeing to 

proceed in an effort to cVt9rhaul French security through discuo~ 

sions with the Bri'i:.iah, represents the e.cEt logical approach to 

a solution of the problem. The Committee ie of tho opinion that 

positive action is ir.dicoted under the circumstances and that the 

action recommended in the Enclosure is suitable in the pre~iseeo 

~~~~~ Chairman, 

Ad Hoc Committee 

TOP Sr.:CREl. 
5 Febrom.·;y 1951 

MEJt.ORANPUM FQR THE PWCTOR, AFSAi 

Subjects Cooperation with GCHQ in Regard to Action Required 

on Insecurity of French CollimU1lications. 

Reference: Memorandum for AFSA...OOT~ above aubject~ 22 January 19510 

Enclosures Draft ol Report by the Coordinator to USCIB on above 

subject. 

1. Tho report called for in paragraph 3d of the reference 

is tol'Warded herewith~ 

2o In the course of ita study of the problem, the Ad Hoc 

Committee gave due consideration to the points raised in paragraph 4 

of the reference and submits, ~ith regard thereto, the follo~ing 

comments: 

ao (Reference subperagraph 4a.) After consideration 

of the technical aspects of the communications security practices 

of other governments ~ith which the u.s. is now allied in NATO, 

the Committee agreed that the problem, as it concerns the French, 

was unique and deserving of individual and prompt ettentiono 

b. (Reference subparagraph 4c.) The Committee considered the USCIB decision! to date on this matter, and concluded 

that they were, and atill are, sound from a technical atend1M>into 

Further, it WllS agreed that the USCIB posit.ion., in agreeir.lg to 

proceed 1n an eff Qrt to CV9rhaul French security through discua~ 

aions with the British, representa the most logical appi"Cach to 

a solution of the problem. The CommittGe ia of the opinion that 

positive action ie indicated unaer the circumstances and that the 

action recommended 1n the Enclosure ia suitable in the premisesa 

Cbairman, 

ll.d Hoc Committee 

':· ;;y,\·r ",.., 1 ..__;. \.r.; ..J ~ f ~ 1!

0 

\ ~ l 'J 
_,..,,, - . -

REPORT BY TBE COORDINATOR, 

UNITED STAT.ES OOlofWNIOATIONS INTELLIGENCE BO.ARD 

to the 

UNITED STATES COM«1NIOATIONS INTICLLIGENCE BOARD 

on 

OOOPl;RATION WITH GCJIQ IN RmARD 'ID 

IMPROVliir:''1.1BE SECURITY OF FRiNCB COMMUNICATIONS 

Refereooe: USCIB 14/112 01 8 Janv.a:ry 1951 

TBE PROBLEM 

l. In preparation :f'or a BRUSA oonferenoa on the subject, to examine 

present French oryptogeaphic procedures, and to formulate a U. SD pl.an 

for improvement of the security thereo1'a 

FACTS BEARD1G ON T'BK PR>BLEM AND DISCUSSION 

2. See Enclosure ''!. n 

CONCLUSIONS 

3. It ie concluded that: 

c. This situation can be corrected only by a complete overha:ul. 

and replacement Cff the present insecure cryptosL-aphio systems by ae.cure 

//// 

system.so ,EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86736/50 USC 3605 

~· The importance of den,ying this source Clf COMINT to Russia 

is such that it is in the interest of the United States 

L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~--' 

to provide, at least in part, the C1'7J1to~ 

graphic devices essenMal to seourityo 

e. Negotiations with the French should be oonducted in• such a 

f. N@gotiat:lons wi-th the French should, i:f practicable, be 

- l -
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

conducted entirel;r b1 the British\ 

I.• Begot1at1one should not be 1natitute4 prior to the formation 

of a secure group within the French GOYel'DDl8Jlt • 

.a.. It 1e recmmmded "that: 

a. uscre note and apprOYe the above ccmclusion.e. 

b. ApproYe the aryptosraphic plan tor French diplomatic 

communications conta1Ded in Enclosure "A." 

- 2 -
REF ,. ' ID:~2,2714 

··· . ... \ ..... . . ·.., A~OR N 

ENCLOSURE "A II 

FLAB FOR IMPROVDD Tiii CRfi"IOOBAPBIC SECURITY 

OF ri!NCR DIPLOMATlC COMMUNICATIONS 

1. The :proposal presented herein for ensuring the eecuri ty of 

Frenoh diplomatic Oommw:licatioDe considers that the TBrious French 

diplamatic posts should be subdivided into tbreo cat.egoriee: 

!.• Ce.tesO?'J' I: A small sroup of locations vhioh handle 

the most critical information, such ae Paris, Landon, and WaehiDgtono 

b. Cates017 II: All capitals not included in a.a plus a - - selected group of important cities whoso commmicatione frequentq 

include 1ntormation of considerable intelligence value. 

~· Catego27 III: All other diplomatic PoBtso 

2. The systems reoO!D!lllnded, reepeotiveI.YJI for the three catesor1es listed aboT• are: 

!· For Categor.r I: The Combined Cipher Me.chino vith S1mpl.e:A 

k87a. The vcrd Sillpl.Bx ie used to mean a procedure whereb7 each :moeage 

baa its awn rotor arrangement and alignment provided b7 means ot a. 

special 07 list. The lists are prepared tor point-to-point use ao 

tbat ea.eh station can read onl.7 those meeeagea epecifically addressed 

to ito "For the exceptional caef'Js ot multiple-address messages, a 

:multiple holder ke7 list ie pioov1de4. A om-t:lms pad system should 

be provided as an emergency stand·b7 in this cate~ryo 

l • For Categoey II: The M-2()C) vi th special aett:lnga used 

to encipher JDDssages set up in a 11 teral code o The code book used 

should be a new book apecica~ designed 'for this sole purpo13e. Ee.ch 

holder in this category ahould be p.roT1ded with three distinct systems; 

one for uee soleq w1 th Peria, one tor use la:t.eraU.,. on a limited 

regional basis, and cme for use lat.eral.17 on a world wide basis. 

o. For Category- III: Present French ayetems would continue 

to be used. 

3. Th• stationa in eaoh oateso1'7 Yill be included aa holders 1n 

the categories below themo 

'JYlP SZCU'.I' AQQM Enclosure "A" 

- 3 -

ACORN 
REF IP :.~,2 2 7.14 

. . . r~·i'~kN 

4o The merit of these proposals is the provision a£ a fairly higb 

degree ot security 'f'or French diploma.tic communications, together with a 

min1mmn disclosure to the Freneh of systems o.nd ideas with which they are 

not already .famUiaro For the transmission of international traf':fic dealing 

With Western union and NATO a.tf'a1rs1 they have been provided Vith TIPEX 

1J1BA:h1 nea and they are presently using a Silr«>leX procedure with these 

mc.u:binea in the highest echelons ot :NATOi the Conbined Cipher Ma.chine ifl 

also being ottered to tbem1 aa wll as to other llA'1'0 signatori~ for NATO 

cOlllllDlicatioDB; J'rench Arrq ~ l'avy 1 and Air J"orc:e personnel are f'a.m11 iar 

with und ha.ve some copies at the M-2091 so that they have experience in 

the prepm-atton at M..a>9 aettinp am can instruct French diplomatic 

ott1ciala 1n the use at the M-209 .. 

5o !rhe localization introduced by Simplex procedures in C&te(pry I 

and by special. ar area settinp in Category II has a double advantage .. 

P:lnt.:i it ~ t.be crypi;oaecur1.tJ' generally; and secondly, if there 

should be an instance at penetration by the Russi.ans vh1ch grants access 

to ceyptogE"&pbic ill:f'armat1on1 tbe dangeZ'8 resulting :trom such penetration 

a.re ecmf'ine to the single~ involvedo Tb1s resulta in minim:fzing 

the cOl18eqUen't loss of 1D:f'ormationo 

60 Adequate traiDing in the nev systems 'Will be gi-eatly s:Jn;>lif'ied 

as a result ot tbe alrea4y-exiating tamU:lar1ty Vith them.. 

7o ~ establishment or appro}XZ'iate communieations security procedures 

vUl be tacilitated by the issue ot JAJIAP 122(B) {the UoSo Joint Manual 

on COmmmlications security) 1 llb1ch 18 presently under consideration for 

uae 1n connection with NATO cryptographic systems .. 

.,. 4 -

' ' ' ( . ·-

' 
REF.ID:A522714 I 

_..;;;;_;;:;..._ ___ ___,. __ .. ____.. ..... "-----,..~. ·. - .· . . . ·. L 

1\uui\11 

FACTS BF.Alam OW TBB PRIBLIM ADD DISCUSSION 

2. From. an over-all consideration 1t ie concluded that if the 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL\86-36/50 USC 3605 

French diplomatic ern>tographio qetems are to be i:m.pro·Hd it would be 

necess817 to: 

!• Replace the current French diplomatic S1'&tema with secure 

a7etems for use in all important d1plOD!tio postso 

l· ProTide adequate train1ng in the nn systems tor French 

erntoeraphic perBODI18lft 

£.• Establish appropriate c01111t1D1cat1ons security" procedures 

in the J'renoh Foreisn Office. 

!• Maintain careful technical su:peniaion O\'er tba ll'rench 

diplomatic coDllllU1icat1ons. 

Enclosure "B" 

- 5 -
._REF. IP :A5~2714 

3. Ill Nga.rd to tbe CUl'ftBt lPNnch 41.pl.clatic aJll'f;eml, it 1a conclvda4 that ob8ervc4 JTwb ~ pacttcea 1n •JStem de91&D and 

41atrilNt:lo1L prcm.aa cliZ'ec't eri.&mce that tbt preamt ~ 

to SM11re proriaim or QBtes attorl!ng atlapata ~ seeari'Q., err, jf :Li; ar.. llOllll•• 1ille .....,efte ..,.,,..,., tile 111tmstiaa 

sa not llldna ._,,., ar Jlll'OjlW~ ~ n is a1llO ccmclm.t tba1i, 

acer.pt aa ~ i:dfteq_,.tl.1' ..a. ona-t:lme »al. QA , m at t.118 

PNEaah Upio.uc cz:nqragldc .,..._ »0••••11 nttk!ad ~ 

--.dt.7 to pam!'t 1ta iatp;ow 111t to a po:bd ..._.. 1~ 97 h ~ 

acceptabl.eo It is 1illel'WrOR MC•I_,. to d1ec:ar4 t'be ctil'Z'Ct Qllteml 

azu1. npJ.aee t1llll Vitll .um- .,..._ 'bllA4 cm ~ ~ 

--~. 

--~~.1 I ...__ ___ __,\ abov a 1aclt at ~ b.r tJ:la PreDch Po.reign ortice 

ot tba 1Jllp)rtance of even tbe el..emtll'tar7 prim:~~ et:'mmn1eatiol28 

aecuritq. T.beNfon, able technical wiatance from oata:lde the Prench 

41»]Qll\tic ~ ae:rv1ce 18 4M"W'd eaaentia.1. tar tbe llJUCC ... 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

5o In V1ff o£ t.be :f'areaoiD81 it 18 coac111(1ed that a corqpl.ete 

.,._slean1ns" ot tbe l'1'eDCh 41:plostic ~ eervice wuld 

be DeCeSeary'o !'his would ilm>l:ve not ODl7 Df'arm:lng tbe Prenc:ll that 

their p; eaemt diplomatic a,.-tem en cona1&1recl iDseca:re bu:t al8o eatab1 v11,1ng a 'baais on Vb:1ch :tbe :rziench 1IOUl4 be pzoY14e4 V1th &ppwpriate 

tecbD1cal. uailJtatJce to enable tblm to nm'P"'M tbeir ~ 

Hrrice to 1D81ll"e sec:ore JwtOUng or cOl!lllD1~. 

\\\., 

BDcl.o8ure "B" 

-6~ 

0COP SECRE1 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'lef BBeltEI Ae6M 

7. '!'he B:i.-1 tiah 1n the pa.et .baTO had EJ21" con·tacts vi th the French 

017>toloSists. lt appears adve.ntageoua that, if the French are approache.d 

on th1a mtter,, it be done unilate~ and initial.17 b7 the British. 

Such a course of action would present add1 tional adTantagee in that (a) 

1 t would be ll.DD8cee 

L-~~~~~~~~~---

and (b) 1 t would ~1211 t the number of wolm1oia.na 

v ho would contact the French, 8l'ld consequently becoma mown to th&m •. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

8. 1'he poss1b1li t;r of Russian pemtrat1o.u ot the ll'renoh tore1sn 

aerTice cannot be ignored. Penetration ms:r be o1tber complete or part1..a.1, 

and E1" ertena into either the aouraea of mtormation or into the cr7pi:.o~ 

srapbic service. Complete }18netrat1on of either tJ]le would man totalJ~ 

1:aetteotiT• arq plan for imprOt"illg cl7P'tograph1o aeour1v. 

=====------

ation to the lm.111,ians. 'l'here:f"on, before ~ ateps are tabtn, there 

nmat be reasonable assurance that there exist noun groups 1n tm French 

Fore181l Office and "'119 office which ocmtrola the or;nrtologic oerviceo Izl 

addition to thia_, the plan proposed should proTide the maximum possible 

pz'Oteotioa against the effects ot pal""tie.l penetration of e1 th.er VJ19 o 

9. One-time pad s,.atems would provide the necessa1'7 eeeuri t;r but 

it does not ap119ar feasible to recommend auoh a solution. The cumberetae o:peraticmal charaoteristioa of such a7etems and the labor re«}u11"9ii 

to prepare the pads 111 the requind quant1v VOUld probabl.1 mae a 

proposal ot this kind unacceptable to the Frenoh. L1bv1se, the Pl"O'"-

Yieton ot modern aecure maohine qatema in the required numbers vould 

=igp SBeift ACORii Enclosure ":B" 

- 7 -

0COP SEGRE) . 
_ REF ID:A52271·c~-aN tor SECRE) . R V 

...... ne- 1 *"'"-·-' 

0COP SEGRE) ACORN 
\ < r· J r_. c; ;, ~-~ ~ 

·DR AU 

MEMORAlIDUM FOR THE CHAIRMMI 9 LS!Bg 

Subject: The Insecurity of French Diplomatic Ciphers~ 

In accordance with Paragraph ?(c) of SB/783~ the plan 

which AFSA has worked out is embodied in ~nclosure A hereto and 

is forwarded in advance of the conf erenoe to be held early in 

1951, as proposed in the paragraph of referenoec, 

2 .. It should be noted that Enclosure A is responsive 

to SB/783 and is therefore confined to the French diplomatio 

cipher security problamo Howeverp as pointed out in Paragraph l 

ot the Enclosure "B" to Enclosu:re Ae it 1a clear that cipher 

insecurity permeates the entire area of French ool'll11lunicat1onsp 

including m111taryp naval 9 and probably air communications as 

well as diplomatica ThereforeP even thour)l the Uo So and the 

Uo Ko have already provided the French m111trry authorities with 

secure cryptographic machines and systems (TYPEX) and are now 

considering providing them also with the CCJI~ for the trans~ 

mission ot international traffic dealing with Western Union 

and NATO affairs~ the security of wholly intra~French military 

OQilllD.unications on related or pui·ely national subjects will re= 

main seriously inadequate and thus will jeopardize the security 

ot NATO, purely UoSv 9 purely UoKo 0 and U, S6~Uv K~ communioat1onso 

Henoe 9 it is clearly insufficient to overhaul French diplomatic 

cryptographyP and the security problem must be resolved in raspeot to French cryptographic systems in all areaa 0 military 0 
REF ID:A522714 

- ~ . . , TGP SECRET 

DRAFT 

naval 9 a1r 9 etcop as well as in the diplomatic areao 

)o USCm therefore seeks the concurrence of LSIB to 

expand the scope of the conference to be held early in 1951 

to inolude discussions as to the advisability or action re= · 

quired to improve the security of French govern.~ental communications in all areas, including all aspects or communi= 

cation seour1tyc 

4o The plan which AFSA has worked out as regards the 

improvement in ~ranch diplom&tic oommunicationa (Enclosure A) 

is readily susceptible of application to French militaryP navalg 

and air communications of the highest echelons down to and including those of headquarters of Division~ Should the discussions at the forthcoming conference extend .i.nto the field 

of tactical coDlI!lunications or formations below those equivalent 

to division headquarters~ it is probable that the recommendations 

which would be made to the French authorities concerned would have 

to be examined in the lieht or what 

FOR THE UNITED ST.a.TES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIG1£NC~ BOARu: 

2 

Wei P.t1..RK P.. RMSTRONGe Jro 

Chairman 

SFC~:RE.T 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 U$C 3605