REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRET CA'TOE - · 'Ni' Sl'E S.)l!Qi .. MMRJ lffa!*'i'IE¥f 

E03:3(h)(2) - , 

FSC53/EX/R(2) 

010 

// 

'-

PL 86:::36/50 USC3605 l2 Jum 1953 

-, 

- ,-

·rlfil PRORIBH _ \ ~, .... --" _, .. .,,.. ' 0 - ·~(~ ~ •, "-"L _.r,,> 

1. To co ill Jdor the 1neec\&' 1ty ot- li\'l'Q- oommm.io a t.io!ll-~· ~ \~. , · 

i.t,lornl aammmica.tlora <£ N'\TO court.riea, irclUiirg a revlew r£ the oonolut1~ If!~~ 19,Sl US/UK Conterem e on tta Secnr it; orD Carmmniaauoae. 1n Q"dGrl I\ . 

a. To det.erm:lne W\ether the K\TO Gaterrmenta Ehmld be apprcnohed 

c. To develop, if sun an epproa.oh ahould be made, {l) a speoU'1a 

plan tot' impmvirg tb.e ueotri~ of ii\ TO conrnunications ant <£ the mtioral 

oCllllUft1a:~tiorn c£ NATO court.ries am. (2) a speoli"1a plan rcr apiroadliJ8 tbt 

FAC'fS a:·:ti.iijNG ON T.fil!..1.~~.!filt Q~ ... cussw 

I. ASSUMl"l'IOlf> 1~s TO '&HE CCMUll' 

- CJ·~P[!.BILITY OF THE USSR 

2. Thie Report is predicated upon the asSUJllption that: 

· a. ·The capo.bill ties oi' thcs USSR to intercept, and exploit 

radio cormmnications are at least equivalent to t.hoae of the US 

----...r ·-· b. The USSH monit.ora all land.line cOlD11Wlicatione pueing 

through its own _o~- eat;el.Ute territoey. The poseibl.11ty that. it ha• 

acceae to other colmm.anieationa passed solely by l.andline cannot be 

excluded, but there is no evidence to assess the extent or thio 

poaa1'bU1t7. Afl7 traffic obtained b7 the USSR from landlinea can 

be_ exploited to the same ext!Snt aa trarr.ic obtained from radio 

tranllllieaione. 

1 

Form 7B1·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-27-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

.--, 

I 

I 
REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRET CA~.roE 

P0053/EX/R(2) 

010 

II VAWE 'ro TUE lSSR OF COIWll' DERIVED FROM 

TiiB cOiiiONlCAffoftS of DA'fu ootJNliRfES 

(see foo~Jl EO 3.3(h)(2) 

l· I ~~* t1me. PL 86,36/50 USC 3605 

a. Although tbe 00 o.Dd UK views differ a&\ to the CU.."Tezt~ value 

?ootnote 1. 

It should be noted that the security ayatem of NA.'ro ll:rovidea. auf'f'1eient 

!"ir-otect1on ~o~ "COSMIC" ".nd "NA'ro" ca!lllUD1cat1ons pe.saed electricall:.."• 

BOW9ver tbe BA'.ro security system does not provide protect1on\f'o:t" national 

cClllllWlications car!"Y1.ng related 1nf'ormt1on, nor de all the .NA'ro countries 

contine "NATO" and 11C03MIC'' ccmaunicationa to approved channel•. Recent 

Pootnote 2. 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECitET CANOE 
REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRET CAJ'TOE 

FSC53/FJ./R (2) 

010 

Footnote 2 (Continued) 

b. The value to the Russians of the COMINT derived from the 

comnunicat.ions or iooividual NATO c0W1triee will vary directly with 

both (1) their vulnerability and (2) the extent to which they contain 

information, the compromise of which would be damaging to the US or 

the UK. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

(l) 

are on this be.sis alone thought to represent no 

current or predictable source of valuable intelligence 

to the USSR. 

Ci)J.__ _____________ ____. 

volwne or their col!lfJNllications and the relatively 

slight participation of these countries in matters 

which -would involve critical info:rmation, are also 

thought to represent no current or predictable 

source of valuable intelligence to the USSF~G 

3 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 78l·Cl3S TOP SECRET GANOE 
TOP SEfi" n:r; :w;.~iJ.:J-qo~ I Gfi 0E 

f9P S§!!!' ~E sa;Yf'f!'! l!MN'!e! FSC53/EX/R (2) 

Ol.O EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

(3) 

(~) 

(5) 

of v11luabl& 1Dtell1geme to the WSRo 

4. Diplamtic~we.rtimee ~'·~~ 

rt is considered that on rutbreak of active hootilities tbe 

value to the USSR at the 1.nf'ormation cldrived trau tbO camznn:lcat.iona 

ot l!L\ro countries wwld be great~ increased .. 

0i~~li'Y~ . 

5. Armed Poroea !tp1lii! in peace and war. 

Form 781°Cl3S TOP SECRET CANOE 
j 

' ' 

REF ID:A517180 

TOP,_ SECRET CA~ 0E 

ought to be denied to the Coaman19ta. 

FSCSJ/F..X/R (2) 

010 

that 

b.. In general it 1• thought t.hat under peace time ccnditiona 

Armd Forces c:arnnnicatians are unl.1kel7 to be an important .80\lroe 

ot valuable intelligence to the USSR. In C&M8 of llm1ted hoet.1llt1ea, 

----------CA5"¥i--~--_,.,,.,..-,,~--~' however, conaidered that 

vul.nen.ble Armed Forces Ail 11 are a menace to the national intereeta 

ot the UK and the US and in the cue or aeneral hoetiliUe1 woW.d 

beoom a real danger. 

III. VAkUS TO THF. USSR OF Dfl'f;J'.{:IGmCE ON NATO 

CWNTRU.S D£RIVEP FROi-1 NOlf:CQllNT SoUriCES 

6. Clandest,ine Source• 

a. Non-CCJUNT cJ.ans,testine means or obt&in1ng intelligence 

cannot be regarded as :~~~o for CU'1INT as a source or 

intelligence. In particular, in area• wbere\CCMINT is etrective, 

clandestine intelllgence is genera.l.ly leas timely, less com.pl.eta 

em less tAUtbm"itative then COMINT~ I.nformllLtion frcn cl.ande6t1De 

sources needs a 90foet1mes difficult process of eftluati<>n before it 

can be accept,ed; is depende11t on the availability ot COPIDUll1cat1ons; 

and is frequentl.Y subject to considerable delay. before •it is received 

value or intelligence tram clandestine sources can frequently be 

greatl.T increased by correlation with CGtINT. Moi-eover, the C$.pacit;r 

to sustain succesetul cl.a.ndeatine arrangements to obt.ain intelligence 

oft.en depsida upon information derived tl"om CGUNI' .. 

5 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRET CA1'-10E 

F&.~53/13./R (2) 

010 

'b. Altbouab it. must be presume4 that pemtration ot HA'ro 

natioaa b)' spnts ot tbe msR exists an4 '!11.ll continueto exist, tt is cona1c1ered that, at leaat, so far aa 

the W, UK, .1 .... ___ __.la.re coacel"D84, th1a 1• becm!J:Jg 

increuingly 41N'1eult • 

(1) ....._ _______ __.ltbere bu been a definite 

:lr.>l"ovement in the OV9rall HCurity attuation, ~ 

f\lrther improvements are pl&mledo ID tbe Armed FoI"Ces 

and security agencies epsc1tic etepa bo.ve been taken 

to place in effect a Mcur1t7 system which is 

ll- W::,L/ 

of' December, 1952' Bew: ii,,. there rma1D 

significant bandJ.ca:pa--politiceJ. am ndminiatrative--

to 1mpl"Cl'.rement. 'l'be level of CM1ral.l aecur1 ty lD 

In the light of these develo:reents tt cannot be 

aaaumd that clandestine aources of intelltpaatr·tor 

tbe USSR will be atantticantl.)" reduced 1J;D1D 

tbe near future. Hevertheleaa, tbe operation of 

clandestine aourcee ia expected to beccne :lnereu1Dgly 

dif'ticult, and, theref'9re, it 1o felt that the t.ESR 

could not t1D4 adequate cC11DpttDS&t1on for the loss ot 

potential COMDT through increaaed Qlandeatlne activity. 

(2) As ~cards other NAro ce\lll't?'ies tr<:a '4Uch the 

potential value or COMDPl' 11 eatiJated to be 

high there 111 1nsutt1e1ent collated ev1clence 

avaU..eble to this conference to aaaess the 

state of' their security. In particular there is 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 ..6-

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID:A517180 

TOP-SECRET CA:P.1 0E 

F'SCS'J/U./R (I) 

010 

not. aftilable MT report. such as that produc4Kl. by 

• In ti:ne or war, due to the introduction or securit¥ measures 

which are not possible 1n peacetime, clandestine operation• 

become much lOre difficult. The read,y meana of co:mnm1cat1on attorded by diplomatic mias!ona and consulates are 

also no longer available. It is therefore considered that 

the value ot info:nnation tl'"OOl clandestine sources will be 

aubat.ar.tiall¥ dimin1shed at least !nitiall.¥ b,y an out.break 

or hostilltiea. 

7. other Sources 

a. It is d1tf1cult ta aeaeaa to what extent open eouroee 

(newspapers, trade piblice.tions, public documents and 

statements, etc, ) or diplomatic report.age could be a 

sources and that, even during peacetime, this intelligence 

may increase subatantial.ly. in volume and value at arv tiJDa. 

In wartime, censorship and other exti'aoroina17 aecurit7 

meG8Ures, will reduce draetical]Jr the now ot intelligence 

from such sources, and the value to the u:..:sfi ot any 

available C<»IINT will be correspondingly increased. 

b. It should be noted that, aa 1n the case of clandestine 

sources, the value or intelligence from other sources can 

be greatly increased by 1nfonnat.1on derived trom C<JUNT. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 7 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
.. · 

Form 781·C13S 

REF ID :ASl 7180 EO 3.3(h)(2) 

·~§11S4UI c A ~·f?c~ p·· .. L·· .. 86-36/50 USC 3605 'fiP c; . . A =- 'fl ;iC F.x/8(2) 

-

v !Jf!;CURrrr A•W I1.ffti,LLI~C E f;\C'l'QIW AFP'rCTING ACTION TO BE TAKEN 

10. Th9 ratve d any act.ion tamn to reduce tJle pct.ert. al daage 

tl'B ra ti.oral semri ~ of the U3 ant UK created by the vul.nerabilJt.7 

c£ t.he CQtlJllUrd.c3t.iora ~ NATO couzt.rtee ld.ll be detendnld la rgeJ.¥ b7 

tectlnical consid eraU.orw. Fran the p0int. c£ v~w t:£ idiellicence ard 

pner:..l securit.T comidel"ation. ho18"r, ::u:h actJ.on lllll9t: 

a. be d eaigntd to reot.117 etteat.ivel.7 inadeqWlt,e oa-mjc atim 

security practices ot 1'\.TO court.nee ttrou&'I cut.. 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
o. 

REF ID:ASl)..180 

TOP> SECRET tA~OE 

FS053/F.x/R(2) 

QlO 

VI TECHNICAL FAQtCR? AlFl!iQl'IIG ACl'I \.ti TO DE TARN 

11. Ira9'mh as tt, ap~ to be 1lqr ..ot.t.oal t,o att.~ ccrreotiw 

aotl.on tr pr0t1a1cn d naw eqaaipmnt., aotian mculd 1n1t.1al.l1' be a1m4 

at; a. hlr«•mt. c£ avallabla c~oa111te• iinl aamdldoat.Som ,:raot!o• 

wbel"9f91' pmaJble. It. is oomidered u. t. GUah mrr01cment oan be ef'teot4ve. 

Ja. llo • t.ter \Iba t initial ap r.rcam 1a agreed the Jrcp11' astur1tjaa tar 

111.nlllrg .... d t.his mtm-e are the aoaram1o.ntJom ••curlff' as-:11• 

~ t.be NA.TO ratiora concermcl. 'lbia comideration is re-inl'crcecl b7 that. 

-'at-ed :ln Jara.graph 11 abore. It. it theivfcre impcrtant to aasoafate 

tbt aom11n1oat.1o.1a:eeGIJl'i ti' ngmoJ&s "11.tb thl aot.ton prope11ed at • earq 

a akp aa pmd.bl.e. · The oam rea.aanirg applies to the •• ot oamnmd.oat4oa 080\ll'AJ' a1&hcrit iees to c:rialmt.e t.he aatl.on. Furtter tact.on ill 

8'1ppcrt ~ the»• oms ideratiom are thats 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

a. The seouriv and 1rt.ellipme taat-cra emmarated in pU"agraph 10 

&bore (lnke th:fs the adest is-ooedure. 

b. Per reasom or eoonc:.IV' it • detdrabla that. eds t.tng asmD 1ea 

9 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
J 

FSCS3/UIR(2) 

010 

comnamfou.t..1.om semrity dlannala. 'l'\o e.xanples ~ suob 

1mtancea ore emlcaed h9rew1th as APrenU.x A • . . 

13. · T::a irt.orr8lat.iomh1pa between transmission oocuritv and o~iso-

•eGlrS.11' aze suoh that a completely succeastul 12'CBram t-o iqrave 

commdnat.bne aecurit7 mmt deal etfect.ive]¥ •dt.h both. 

]4. It Ja ocnddared that there is no wq to deal etteotl.ve4' ld.th 

clie~ ot "~MIO" ard "NATO" oamm.ud.cationa sec:urit7 regilD.t.1om 

]5. Ttw Contereme Js agreed tha. t. tm ra.ctore enuasrated 1n J:&ragftp!B 

10 thttOQlb l4 abC7le cm beat be mt b.J' 111118 t.he em tizg 001•11ur\1 aUom 

eeC.- m cldmr7 cl 1he Stanl 1r:g O:rcup. lt is realized that the 

OtanUll Olroup cmnat .t.au.e d:lrect1fta about natte!>'ueile t• acope ~ 

tlae ~IU7 aapaota at NA'ltl, but. it would aeam right to•• extat!qs 

stanl!lg Oroap madair817 in an adVi•Ol7 oaiad7, eime the eecur.ltf' ot 

R\TO ~ ~ bl' 1naec.&"e m t1oral coDlll\Udcationl. 

~ to be detellldnlrd and agreed b7 approrrhte lB md UK authcr1ttee, 

wltb •••• 

10 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 

I 

/ 
REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRET CAI'TOE 

FsCS3/EX/R(2) 

OlO 

GroQp ae 1he N\TO mchan1sm to iqrOY• tbe. commm'ca.tims eemrit7 at 

' 

Uae ct.her N\ TO nations am after succeaeful inita t1on or the d1acua1cm 

deecribed in 18b abcve, the Jtani~ Group will ieaue a nmcrandm to 

all m:mber mt.tom which wills 

a. ~rass disquiet at the~ danger to orerall N'~ TO 

a•curJt.7 d the 1nsemr1t)r cl the mmnuntcat.iora, elther diplmat1o er 

fJA·(_,1~ 

,.W.tu,-1 <{ ~ JA,na.,~ 11.\TO 

~~ 

natio.;~· ~· . ~~ ~\~~~~ b. FcrWardaTUst <1 6'aimples danger o.tti:t cgraph1o ant 

OClllllUDicatiora Il"actJ.c es and procedures. Thia Us twill be flrall.1' 

, .. ' 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 781-Cl3S TOP SECRET CANOE 
Form 781·C13S 

(jl~~μ1p°' TOP SE~~ 1 01\: F TOE 

12 

PSC53/D/a(I) 

010 

/ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PSC53/EX/R(2) 

010 

816. r!', approach deacrlbed above 1zr"'c.?~vea cc:apl1cate4 ianea 

-~· ', ... vbicbK 7 -~111pnce am politiclll,1 as well aa oallllWllcaticaa 

)'.• . . . ' 880Uri,.~:pm.i... Tbeae will require apec.tal attention 1.114 . 

NP14 ooord1nat1ca 'betwen tbe tl3 am UK until tbe pteciae 41.reatico 

an4 llllOMal ot tbia program have been assured. AmoDs tbe ..V.ral. 

liailall ~· uhich Uiat DOV 1D tbeee tiel4a there be not ) ~ 

a18' a. llPIOl.fio f.lltGrlllal wllmdmD >da1Gh voul4 attor4 ~~ 

-.-tni• aa4 tluibllit;y requlrod tor tbla put'llOR. I\ ~ 

COICUSIOIS 

eauroe ot bipl7 ·vaiuable tntelllpnoe tor tbe USSR. 

autbOrltatlve 1ntAll1gence of h18h value through other acuroea 

ot 1Atorat1m. 

to ~t tbe vaUdity ot this conclua1m. 

, PL86"36/50 USC 3605 -13-

' 

., ' . ,, 

.. •\,, 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRET CAl--TOE 

FSC53/EX/R(2) 

010 

···-···· ---~----

a8. Aot1CD lboul.4 be taken tmmtateq to rect1t,y ~ ·. , _ 

wl.mnble oawmlcat1cna eeourity practices ot 1fNm countrle~ 

29. Dltellipnce md eecur1ey ccms1c!arat1ona reciu1re that 

·~ Nmltial aotlcn taken, while deaigDed to be etteotlve, 

30. Certain tealm1oal factors an4 aeneraJ. cona1&tratiana 

reca.utre tbat tM acttcm taken ahoulds 

a. Attack violatlcn of NAm ccnmmtcatiCIDI eeaurit)' 

regul.at1ona tbrou;h improvment ot the overall 

ocmunlcatian aecur1t1 attttudea and praotloea 

ot otten41ng BMl> countries. 

bil ___ _ 

a. Utilize tbe macbtneey ot the Stan4iag Oroup or 

BAio aa tbe instrumentality tor improving tba 

HCUrit)t ot the nat10D41 cOlllllUllicatiou of otblr 

rwro countries. 

4. le taken throush CClllDWliaatlona eeauriey abanmla, 

uatng existing ccmnuntcatlons aecurit)t aaencr.t.ea 

wbanrver possible. 

•. Be aimed at the impl•ovement ot available oryptoO)'ltma 

and ca:amunicationa practices ~ rather 

tban at the prov1aion ot new equipneut. 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 14 

' ' ~I•,'~: ' ., 

Form 78J.C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
··~ 

·, 

REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRE~l~ CA'!-TOE 

IIA!tl aountrtea. 

FSC5l/EX/R(2) 

010 

31 • 'l'be course of' action outlined tn paragraphs 18 tbru 2i. 

altov9 .. ta tblt toregot.Dg aonaic!eratiou and 1• teaa1ble. j ' ~,.c,1'y 32. Upon approval of thtsf~ tbe tollovtng preU.11tnar:r 

nepe mn be takens 

4rav1lll al i.a1ons traD it are &aaquate, and no f'urtber liaison 

weoMner, 18 ~. 

~lltl!DA3'JDE 

,i.. ~ le reccmenc184 tb&ta 

15 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID: n.-=;,1 71 RO 

· SE'~...-..~~ _ _...tKJ!I l ~A"10E u . SBfH:JR:Plf mP9BMAi'i9R FSC53/EX/R(2) 

010 

a. The foregoing conclusions be approved and 

supersede those of the 1951 UK-US Conference 

on the Security orl .... _ ___,I Camnunicat1ons. 

b. '!be program/in par881"apha 18 through 24 be undertaken 

in accordance with the conclueions and, 1n 

particular, that the steps enumerated in 

pare.graph 32 obould be undertaken 1mmod1atelyo 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

16 

Form 7Bl·Cl3S TOP SECRET C~i:NOE 
Form 78l-Cl3S 

APPENDIX A 

Examplesor Recent Instanc4!hin which ~TO 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

FSC5J/U/R(2) 

010 

l2 June 1953 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
Form 781°C13S 

// 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

FSCS3/~(2) 

010 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
Form 781·C13S 

REF ID:A517180 

TOP SECRE~f CA""TOE 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

FSCSJ/EX/R(2) 

010 

TOP SECRET CANOE 
··!et WI eA11m • Slem:Hr &OlllAUOB 

APPBBDIX B 

I. UIBElPBIRBD coma 

PSC53/BX/B(2) 

010 

12 J\me 1953 

1. Ummclpbned aoc1n an ~ inacceptable in 41.plmatio 

uae tor tnnw1•1cm ot clu•U'led 1Dtonat1on. Ill Arm4 Paft!ee 

ecmnmtaatS.c:ms ~ a:re aoceptable ~ 1ltla cblmpcl at veq 

tz.cpmt iDtena18 &IDl vbl!m S.t t.a not ocmeidel'94 euent1al to maillta1D 

tb9 aecuriqo ot tile iatozw.tim tor more than two or tbree 4qa 

tnm tbe ~ at tbe coc!e. 

II. ADl>l'J.'IVB SIS'l!JIS 

2. - ad41tlve (or aubtractor 01' maueDd) apt.a 18 clanproms 

un1eaa apeclal pncautiou are telam ill tbe caaatruoticn. ot tbe additive 

1.......ir. lfa"1 p~ tbat mar' be ~ _. tllll pmCMai.._lr 

49 's1 ullnr as "apecSal pncautlaaa" an 4eoept1ve aa to aecurt.v ud 

3. Eacipllement b7 aMitt.ve can ODl¥ be guazoanteecl to be 

acme 1iltaen tbe ad4it1ve 1• uaed ma strict~ "cme•tim" buie, and 

.,..__ tb&t pend.t Upth pin little or no securii;J' trm tbl ed41t1ve. 

4. EDcipbezmnt lJ7 DOD-om-time ac14J.t1ve 1a btgbly 4anproua1 

1Nt oan be acceptable 1n certain ct.rcumtamea for limited trattic 

pl'Of1A94 tbat pncautt.ma are taken to atnt-S ee overlap and to prevent 

IV. ICACllDfB CXPBERS 

6. Maobt• ct.pbera vary grea~ 1D tbe amount ot aecuriqr ~ 

attorll. PaUure to observe 1n fl'l9r'Y detail proper 1natnJCt1ona tar 

-1-

Form 781·C13S TOP SECRET CANOE 
REF ID:A517180 

~r~or~ SJLCRE1~ Ct\' IOE 

'fM' SEeftE'f efdiaE • SBetilftY fliPe:mtfid'!eN FSC53/F3../R(2) 

010 

E0.3.3(h)(2) 12 J\.ar.e 1953 

PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 APPENDIX B( conti.rJ.~) 

operation~ lead to CQ!lPra:Dise even vitb the best machimo .. 

otbers, such as tbe wll-tnm"n 

are 1nHcure UDJ.eaa p:recauttonaare taken aver and. a.bovo thoee 

recc:mended b,y the manufacturer.. O'tbare, ep11ltr are baaic~ 

1DHcure &Dd ahoul4 1D no eircU11Stancea bo ueed~ 

Co With proper prece.ut1ona t.bis machine ce.n give very good 

oecurity for a limited <!!Drunt of tre.f'fic_, but 1n view ot 

the number ot dii"forent dangers that ce.n arise in vaeyiD.g 

cCCld1tions or ~me, for wh.J.ch it 1e impoos1ble to legislate 

V" TRANSHISSIOil SECtBlTY 

Se Ciphers, hO\W&ver good 1Miv1dually_, a.re not @nougb to enaure 

CClllBUDicatione securi'tye 'l'ranamiseion techniques aM lll688~ formats 

can in themselves provide eoruaiderable intelligence to a/traffic ~t .. 

Although there are practical 11.mita.tions, t.he ideal to/be striven 

tor ie that the tra.:ttie Mithor of e:ay- oru:i type (eo(lo naval, e.ir :force"' 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

-2- PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Form 781-Cl35 TOP SECRET CANOE 
, !9P wwwz e*1f)E • 8!Ctlllft mo~·mm FSC53/Ja/R(2) 

010 

12 .rum 1953 

APPENDIX B (cont111U8d} 

ete.), aor ot ut one natioa aboulc1 be 41attngn1abeble b1 external 

abaneteriatlea. Ap!D, tntell.tpnce can be ptned b7 a~ ot 

t.be orpnS•tiOD and procedure of radio mtvorb anl by UM at redio 

41Neticm-ftncS1._. In~ eaaea, •8P90iall¥ in Armd Poree• caDmtcatiom, 

a akillful ......, oen obtain valuable 1.ntell~ W collation ot 

~ un.intol"lll&tive )':h611 hs9 • -~· It tollowe, 

1ibnetore1 that tul.l. C(9lftmtcatioas aecurit7 ~I that epeci&l 

pNOaUtioaa be observed 1D such •ttera as t.he judicious amplcr,yment ot 

'"'Uaaton, tbl eelectian ot c&ll.atgna am ot trequenatee, radio 

procedures, and tbe restriction ot the UM ot plain language. 

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form 781·C13S TOP SECRET C1'\NOE