REF ID:A72314 

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7 July 1953 

eOm'!MM!Ail - SEffiJitl'!'Y MOftMA'fiON 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT 

SUBJECT: Comments on Mr. Lay's Draft CCJ?mC Directive 

1. As per your request, here'Wl. th the position of R/D on the 

proposed paragraph 2g wh:t.ch covers research and development functions 

and responsibilities of the Director, NSA, acting for the CQ.SEC 

Executive Agent. 

a. The Director has taken the position, in which we concur 

without reservation, that the person assigned responsibility for 

carrying out the administration of the National came program must 

be authorized and empowered to prescribe the crypto-principles used, 

or proposed for use, in securing classified telecommunications of the 

Executive Branch of the u. S. Government, and that he must further be 

authorized and empowered to prescribe rules, regulations and instructions 

controlllng the conditions under which D:lpartments and ~ncies of the 

Executive Branch may and shall use crypto-security equipment. This 

position appears to us to be the only one compatible with the spirit 

of the Presidential Directive to "assure within the various Departments 

and Agencies •••••• high and uniform standards of communication security 

and the adequacy of the cryptographic systems used." We of R&D believe 

that only with these authorities can nCCMIBC policies and procedures .... e 

be integrated" to achieve the purposes of the Presidential Directive. 

b. Prescription of crypto-principle and of crypto-security 

operating procedures 1 in order to be effective 1 efficient or economical, 

implies both logically and practically that the prescribing authority 

mu.st have cognizance over the National CCM>EC development program. Just 

as the achievement and maintenance of an adequate state or cryptosecurity requires a National CGSEC regulatory authority, so continued 

maintenance of crypto-securi ty in the future requires a National CGSEC 

research and development programe Denial to the CClvSEC a:uthori ty of 

the functions of formulating and carrying out the National CCJ.SEC 

research and developnent program would result in indefensible loss or 

effectiveness, efficiency and economy. 

c. The person or Agency responsible for the National Ca.BEC 

research and developn.ent program must be empowred to prevent technically 

inadvisable, econonucally unjustifiable, and/or administratively 

inefficient utilization of the very 1llni ted CCMSEC development talent 

available to the United States. This a:uthori ty must be responsible for 

the formulation and conduct of an overall CCMIBC program, including 

Declassified and approved for r~lease by NSA on 02-06-2014 pursuant to E.O. 1352e 
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REF ID:A72314 

research and developnent, but he must not be denied the use of various 

departmental facilities, nor must he be limited to "projects of connnon 

concern". To the extent that conmnmications security is of national 

concern, the crypto-pnnciples and crypto-equipments developed anywhere 

in the world for the potential use of any organization of the EKecutive 

Branch of the U. s. Government are matters of national interest, inasmuch 

as a weak system used by one Agency is thoraughly capable of nullifying 

the protection afforted by a sound system employed by all the other 

.Agencies of the Govermnent. Therefore, seen from the technical viewpoint, it is essential to the national security that the u. s. C<»BEC 

Authority supervise a single program rather than merely "review and 

coordinate" a diversity or-COMSEC programs of a development nature. 

d. This supervision, in order to be effective in achieving 

the obJectives defined in the Presidential Memorandum, must include 

authority and re sponsi bill. ty for e stabhshing and conduct.Lng the program, 

for reviewing the program frequently, and for assigm.ng and supervising 

elements of the program conducted by the various Departments and .Agencies. 

This appears to us to constitute the minimum authority necessary to 

provide any significant assurance of high and umform protection for 

classified Federal telecommuru.cations. 

e. The authorizing directive should clearly srecify the 

condi ti.ens under wiuch COOEC research and developnent proJects will 

be in:i tiated and earned out by the various Departments and .Agencies 1 

and it should clearly specify that the COOEC authority will mobilize 

all appropriate research and development facilities of the Government 

in the most effective manner possible. !n so doing it should make 

clear requirements for such logistic support and the manner in which 

and the extent to which the COOEC authority may obtain it. 

2. In SUIIDD.al"Yi we feel that the substance of paragraph 2g of the 

draft document prepared by the Department of Defense, 3 March 19531 

must be retained, whereas Mr. Lay's revision thoroughly eliminates all 

its substance. The responsib11J.ties of the CCl£EC authority which must 

be included a.re : 

a. Prior program approval. 

b. Establishment and conduct of an adequate program. 

c. Assigmnent and supervision of CCM3EC research and 

development projects. 

2 
• REF ID:A72314 

July 1953 

00NPIBEilff IAD - 6B0{ffil'fY IlifFO@lk'PIOU 

4. This in no way stifles or suggests stifling initiative and 

the exploitation of ideas, but, on the contrary, should encourage 

the submission of ideas for orderly, expeditious, and effective 

exploitation in the interest of national security. 

3 

WARREN H. TURNER, Jr. 

Assistant to the Chief 

Office of Research and Development