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DEPARTMENT OF THE MR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 20330• 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 5 1968 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX. 

SUBJECT: NPIC T Astronauts 

On Mond e.following astronauts are scheduled 

to begin the tation and training. courSe at NPIC: 

Lt Col R. T. Herres 

Major D. H. Peterson 

Major J. A. Abrahamson 

In addition to these astronauts, selected individuals from the 

Program and Systems Offices and AFNIN will attend the course on 

apart or full time basis as their duties permit. . 

This program, you will remember, was initiated with your 

approval last summer. Two classes have been conducted and those 

who have attended the course, have been most favorably impress'ed 

with the caliber of the instruction and utility of the curriculum. 

Attached for your review is the Security Plan for this 

action (Tab A), and the Training Course Outline (Tab B), both 

of which you have previously approved. 

Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall proceed, 

together with Mr. Mazza, with the actions necessary for the 

July 15 class. 

t 

JAMES T. STEWART 

Major General, USAF 

Vice Director, MOL Program 

2 Atchs: 

a/s 

a 
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SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR MOL ASTRONAUTS 

TRAINING AT NPIC 

Astronaut identification at NPIC facility by uncleared personnel 

would reveal the intelligence nature of the MOL Program. With this 

underlying postulate in mind, the building access procedure and 

general milieu at NPIC was surveyed by an NRO security representative. 

NPIC building access procedures are conducive to covert access 

by persons where specific identities in relation to NPIC would be 

sensitive. The building environment is similarly satisfactory. 

Recognition of astronauts at NPIC is considered extremely remote. All 

personnel given access to NPIC have SI and TKH clearances. 

According to NPIC officials, up to 50 visitors come to NPIC 

daily -- some in small groups. The appearance of a amall number 

(4 or 5) of strange faces for building access is not unusual and will 

not draw any special attention. 

Special security arrangements are set forth below: 

1. The fact of astronaut-NPIC association will be DORIAN. 

2. Astronauts will visit and/or participate in activity at 

NPIC in civilian attire only. 

3. To preclude inadvertent identification to unwitting persons 

of astronauts, now or in the future, as having visited NPIC, arrangements will be made to preclude astronauts' names from appearing in the 

building access register. 

4. The tentative plan is to schedule astronauts for the NPIC 

orientation in groups of 4 or 5. 

5. For directing transportation conveyances, NPIC will be 

identified as "Navy Yard, Building 213, corner of M and 1st Street, 

S.E." 

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5 July 1968 

"D" %TRAINING COUPSE PROGRAM 

.15 through 25 July 1968 

First Week 

Mondc7 - 15 July 

0S00-080 Introduction to Course 

0830-1030 Modern History of.Photo Intell 

' 1030-1220 Suez, the Congo, Cyprus 

1220-1320 Lunch 

1320-1420 Filmt "How Israel Won the War" 

1430-1515 Film: "Inside North Vietnam" 

1520-1630 Photo Intell on Vietnam 

Tuesday - 16 July 

0800-0930 ' Target Positioning in Photographic 

Analysis 

0930-1100 Mensuration of Photographic Analysis 

1100-1200 Climatology of the Eurasian Land Mass 

1200-1300 Lunch 

1300-1450 Geography of the Soviet Union 

1500-1630 Geography of China 

Wednesday - 17 July 

0800-1230. Soviet Rocket Forces 

1230-1330 Lunch 

1330-1630 Plesetsk, Tyuratam, KY/Vlai3 Missile 

gest Centers 

Thursday - 18 July 

0800-1230 Sary Shagan, SA-5, AM /ABM 

.1230-1330 Lunch 

1330-1430 Film: "True Sons of the People" 

1430-1630 Shuang-Chen;-Tzu Test Center and SARF 

Fri6ny - 19 July 

0800-0830 Introduction to Atomic Energy 

0830-0920 Mzteriais Production & Nuclear 

Research 

. .0930-1200 Weapons Fabrication & Testing 

1200-1300 Lunch 

1300-1420 Semipalatinsk Proving Ground 

1430-1520 Novaya Zemlya Proving Ground 

1530-1630 Lop Nor Test.Site 

11. 
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Socon,-;, 

0833-0c:53 

1030-00 

1100-1200 

1203-1300 

1300-1350 

1400-1450 

1500-1600 

1600-1630. 

Tuesay - 23 July 

JIircraf'. Production -

Soviet Lone Rance Air Capabilities 

Soviet & Chinese Tactical Air . 

Capabilities 

Lunch 

Naval Facilities & Vessels. 

Naval Produotion - Shipyards 

Naval Missile Storage 

Film "Great Thoughts of Mao •Tse Tung". 

080070850Ground Forces Order of Battle .. 

0900-0950 Tactical Missile Storage .(SSM's) 

1000-1130 Sensitive Operations Complexes 

1130-1230 Lun& . 

----12 .-SOviet Nuclear Weapons Storage 

'1420-1630 - Missile Production 

July 

0803-1023 

1030-1230 

1200-1300 

1300-1420 

143071630 

Biological/Chemical Warfare 

Cuba/Near ;Real-Time Reporting 

Lunch 

Camouflage & Deception 

Soviet & Chinese Electronics 

Thursday -.25 July 

0830-0930 

0940-1040 

1050,4200 . 

;our/Briefing of instrumentation 

Sino-Soviet Border Activity 

Course Wrap-up. 
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DOD/MOL ASTRONAUT ORIENTATION 

AT 

NPIC 

PURPOSE: 

The purpose of this plan is to set forth security arrangements including cover and contingency procedures for MOL astronaut orientation at NPIC. 

GENERAL: 

Arrangements have been made for DOD/MOL astronauts to 

receive intelligence orientation at NPIC (see attached). 

Special security considerations are required because astronaut 

identification at NPIC facility by uncleared individuals would 

reveal the intelligence nature of the MOL Program. With this 

underlying postulate in mind, the building access procedure 

and general milieu at NPIC was surveyed by an NRO security 

representative. 

NPIC building access procedures are conducive to covert 

access by persons where specific identities in relation to 

NPIC would be sensitive. The building environment is 

similarly satisfactory. Recognition of astronauts at NPIC is 

considered extremely remote. All personnel given access to 

NPIC have SI and T/KH clearances. 

According to NPIC officials, up to 50 visitors come to 

NPIC daily -- some in small groups. The appearance of a small 

number (4 or 5) of strange faces for building access is not 

unusual and will not draw any special attention. 

COVER AND CONTINGENCY ASPECTS: 

The presence of MOL astronauts in Washington, D.C. will 

be "low key" in order not to provoke interest on the part of 

the news media. Whereas the identities of MOL astronauts have 

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been made public, their exposure to the press has been extremely 

modest in keeping with the strict security requirements of the 

program. Therefore under carefully controlled conditions, the 

possibility of their presence provoking news inquiry is 

extremely small. This is particularly true in the Washington,. 

D.C. area as their presence here is commonplace because the 

office of the Director of the MOL Program is located in the 

Pentagon. 

Security arrangements have been keyed to the theme of 

"apparent normalcy" under the theory that any elaborate clandestine or covert arrangements, if exposed for any reason, 

would only result in additional compromise and embarrassment 

to the program. Astronauts therefore, will identify themselves 

according to their true names, service affiliation and rank, 

but will wear civilian dress and will not volunteer their 

occupation as MOL astronauts. 

The following cover story may be used only under circumstances prescribed by the MOL Program Office and is not to be 

used at NPIC: 

"Several DOD MOL astronauts are presently in 

Washington, D.C. participating in consultations and 

briefings under the auspices of the MOL Program Office." 

For the purpose of receiving contacts from friends, 

relatives, etc., the astronauts will use the MOL Program Office 

as a cut-out. While at NPIC, astronauts will be at all times 

under the personal control of DORIAN approved NPIC personnel. 

Consultation between the Security Officer/NPIC and the Assistant for Security/NRO Staff will occur in the event of any compromise of the fact of a MOL astronaut's presence at NPIC to 

non-DORIAN approved NPIC personnel and appropriate corrective 

security action will be prescribed in each instance. 

All press inquiries regarding the presence of MOL astronaUts in Washington, D.C. will immediately be communicated via 

NRO Staff Assistant for Security, Mr. Mazza, to the D/NRO. 

Following consultation with responsible CIA and DOD officials, 

a response will be made by the OSAF/Office of Information. 

Unless circumstances indicate the necessity of responding 

cp7r 

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SAM Ctntralipalia-W • 
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otherwise, the response will be worded in accordance with the 

above quoted cover story with the possible addition of: 

H... which are oriented toward familiarizing them with program 

experimental objectives." Under no circumstances, will an 

attempt be made to publicly explain or justify the specific 

presence of MOL astronauts at NPIC. The NPIC and CIA, in the 

event that inquiry is addressed to them, should refer to the 

USAF. 

PROCEDURES: 

1. The fact of astronaut-NPIC association will be DORIAN. 

2. Astronauts will visit and/or participate in activity 

at NPIC in civilian attire only. 

3. To preclude inadvertent identification to unwitting 

persons of astronauts, now or in the future, as having visited 

NPIC, arrangements will be made to preclude astronauts' names 

from appearing in the building access register. 

4. Astronauts will be scheduled for the NPIC orientation 

in groups of 3 or 4. 

5. Astronauts will use private auto rent-a-car to convey 

themselves to NPIC. One or two astronauts to a car. Under no 

circumstance will they approach NPIC in either government or 

public transportation vehicles. 

6. Astronauts will lunch at the NPIC cafeteria and will 

have no association with NPIC personnel outside of NPIC. 

7. Astronauts will not be billeted in close proximity 

to NPIC. 

8. SAFSL will be used as cut-out. Anyone inquiring as 

to astronaut location will be referred to MOL Program Office, 

X50961. Secretary will indicate (name) is not immediately 

available -- will take message and have astronaut call back. 

(Press inquiry will be handled in consideration of discussion 

under "Cover and Contingency Aspects"). 

Dailad 

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DORIAN 

PURPOSE: 

DOD/MOL ASTRONAUT ORIENTATION 

AT 

NPIC 

The purpose of this plan is to set forth security arrangements including cover and contingency procedures for MOL astronaut orientation at NPIC. 

GENERAL: 

Arrangements have been made for DOD/MOL astronauts to 

receive intelligence orientation at NPIC (see attached). Special 

security considerations are required because astronaut identification at NPIC facility by uncleared individuals would reveal the 

intelligence nature of the MOL Program. With this underlying 

postulate in mind, the building access procedure and general 

milieu at NPIC was surveyed by an NRO security representative. 

NPIC building access procedures are conducive to covert 

access by persons where specific identities in relation to NPIC 

would be sensitive. The building environment is similarly satisfactoky. Recognition of astronauts at NPIC is considered extremely 

remote. All personnel given access to NPIC have SI and T/KH 

clearances. 

According to NPIC officials, up to 50 visitors come to NPIC 

daily -- some in,small groups. The appearance of a small number 

(4 or 5) of strange faces for building access is not unusual and 

will not draw any special attention. 

COVER AND CONTINGENCY ASPECTS: 

. The presence of MOL astronauts in Washington, D.C. will be 

"low key" in order not to provoke interest on the part of the 

news media. Whereas the identities of MOL astronauts have been 

made public, their exposure to the press has been extremely 

.modest in keepiAg with the strict security requirements of the 

program. Therefore under carefully controlled conditions, the 

possibility of their presence provoking news inquiry is.extremely 

small. This is particularly true in the Washington, D.C. area 

as their presence here is commonplace because the office of the 

Director of the MOL Program is located ' .ii the Pentagon. 

DORI• AN 

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DORI& 

Security arrangements have been keyed to the theme of 

"apparent normalcy" under the theory that any elaborate clandestine or covert arrangements, if exposed for any reason, would 

only result in additional compromise and embarrassment to the 

program. Astronauts therefore, will identify themselves according to their true names, service affiliation and rank, but will 

wear civilian dress and will not volunteer their occupation as 

MOL astronauts. 

The following cover story may be used only under circumstances 

prescribed by the MOL Program Office and is not to be used at NPIC: 

"Several DOD MOL astronauts are presently in Washington, 

D.C. participating in consultations and briefings under the 

auspices of the MOL Program Office." 

For the purpose of receiving contacts from friends, relatives, 

etc., the astronauts will use the MOL Program Office as a cut-out. 

While at NPIC, astronauts will be at all times under the personal 

control of DORIAN approved NPIC personnel. Consultation between 

the Security Officer/NPIC and the Assistant for Security/NRO Staff 

will occur in the event of any compromise of the fact of a MOL 

astronaut's presence at NPIC to non-DORIAN approved NPIC personnel 

and appropriate corrective security action will be prescribed in 

each instance. 

All press inquiries regarding the presence of MOL astronauts 

in Washington, D.C. will immediately be communicated via NRO Staff 

Assistants for Security, Mr. Mazza and/or Maj Cohen to the D/NRO. 

Following consultation with responsible CIA and DOD officials, a 

response will be made by the OSAF/Office of Information. Unless 

circumstances indicate the necessity of responding otherwise, the 

response will be worded in accordance with the above quoted cover 

story with the possible addition of: "... which are oriented 

toward familiarizing them with program experimental objectives." 

Under no circumstances, will an attempt be made to publicly 

explain or justify the specific presence of MOL astronauts at 

NPIC. The NPIC and CIA, in the event that inquiry is addressed 

to them, should refer to the USAF. 

PROCEDURES: 

1. The fact of astronaut-NPIC association will be DORIAN. 

2. Astronauts will visit and/or participate in activity 

at NPIC in civilian attire only. 

DORM 

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3. To preclude inadvertent identification to unwitting 

persons of astronauts, now or in the future, as having visited 

NPIC, arrangements will be made to preclude astronauts' names 

from appearing in the building access register. 

4. Astronauts will be scheduled for the NPIC orientation 

in groups of 3 or 4. 

5. Astronauts will use private auto rent-a-car to convey 

themselves to NPIC. One or two astronauts to a car. Under no 

circumstance will they approach NPIC in either government or 

public transportation vehicles. 

6. Astronauts will lunch at the NPIC cafeteria and will 

have no association with NPIC personnel outside of NPIC. 

7. Astronauts will not be billeted in close proximity to 

NPIC. 

8. SAFSL will be used as cut-out. Anyone inquiring as 

to astronaut location will be referred to MOL Program Office, 

X50961. Secretary will indicate (name) is not immediately 

available -- will take message and have astronaut call back. 

(Press inquiry will be handled in consideration of discussion 

under "Cover and Contingency Aspects"). 

3 

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DORIAN 

-WI- NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, O.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

March 13, 1967 

Dear Ed: 

Reference is made to our recent phone conversation 

NPIC, the MOL Program Office, and the Special Projects 

concerning conduct of a Photographic Intelligence Indocpurpose of this letter is to confirm arrangements and 

program content as agreed to last week by personnel of 

trination Program for our MOL Astronauts by NPIC. The 

Office. 

The arrangements are for the program to commence on 

March 20, 1967, for ten working days for four astronauts, 

followed by a second session starting April 3 for three 

additional astronauts. Additional Air Force personnel 

will attend some of the sessions, their, number to be 

limited under diiect control of Major General Evans, the 

 Vice Director, MOL. Program content is as indicated in 

the attachment. 

',Amour VIA 

BYEMAN 

COIM1101. 

At the request of the Director of NPIC we have been. 

working with his Technical Director, He 

proposed that it would be appropriate for a MOL Program 

representative to make some brief introductory remarks 

at"the opening session. We agree and are making arrangements for General Evans to be present and perform this 

task on March 20. 

and other NPIC personnel who have worked 

with MOL Program Office representatives have been very 

helpful in formulating an excellent program. We are 

certain that the NPIC indoctrination will make a very 

significant contribution in preparing the astronauts for , 

the vital role they'will play in the DORIAN Program. 
HANDLE VIA 

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vry 

We are advised that the program schedule and content 

are satisfactory from an NPIC viewpoint. With your 

approval we would like to make arrangements now for the 

astronauts to be present at NPIC starting March 20, and 

we will continue to work closely with Mr. Lundahl or his 

designee on administrative details. 

Attachment 

NPIC Program Agenda I. 

Distribution: 

1 Addressee 

2 Mr. Lundahl 

3 Gen. Martin 

4 Gen. Evans 

5 Col. Battle 

6 SS-1 

7 RF 

8 SS-3 

9 SS-5 

10 RD-2 w/attachment. 

11 RD-2 w/attachment: 

Mr. Edward W. Proctor 

Acting Deputy Director 

for Intelligence 

Central Intelligence Agency 

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_401 

20 July 1967 

MEMORANDUM FOR NPIC 

SUBJECT: NPIC Indoctrination for MOL Astronauts 

This is the attendance for the MOL Astronauts and 

associated personnel. 

All personnel listed below are cleared SI, TKH, GAMBIT 

and DORIAN. 

grJuly Class 

BE1aS11wsmell Wes— 

CRIPPEN, Robert Lt (USN) 

OVERMEYR, Robert F. Maj (USMC) 

BOBKO, Karol Maj 

FULLERTON, Charles G. Capt 

HARTSFIELD, Henry W. Maj 

JOHNSON, Lawrence Capt 

LORET, Benjamin J. Lt Col 

25 July Class (A.M. Only) 

STEWART, James T. Maj General 

MacLEAY, Lachlan Maj 

TRULY, Richard H. Lt (USN) 

LOUIS MAZZA 

Assistant for Security 

NRO Staff 

11101121151 i11111 6 111 

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1 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 DEPARTMENT OF THE MR FORCE 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

MEMORANDUM 

2 February 1967 

GENERALS RG/STEWART 

"Policy related to DOD MOL Astronauts" 

has been implemented by Gen Ferguson as MOL 

Directive 67-1. It is in two parts: Part 1 

repeats D/NRO directive, part 2 provides 

implementing instructions. 

Seven astronauts were indoctrinated SI 

and T/KH last week at which time Maj Cohen 

provided the first in a series of security 

instructions and defensive security briefings. 

UI F AZZA 

Assista for Security 

NRO Staff 

INTERNAL,_ 
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ilnE2 Z : : hai. 

el' 

“ 

0 0/ • ,, 

t,4 

Li 6.:: ' C., ::. LI; ',.4 n Laid Sysan DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

2 0 JAN 1967 

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MOL PROGRAM 

SUBJECT: MOL Directive No. 67-1, "Policy Relating to MOL 

Astronauts" 

Attached is MOL Directive No. 67-1, "Policy Relating 

to MOL Astronauts". This directive has been established 

to minimize any possibility of security compromise or 

unfavorable international incident in connection with MOL 

astronauts, with particular emphasis on their selection, 

training, and operational use. I consider this directive 

most important. The eventual overall accomplishment of 

the MOL Program objectives may depend on its carefUl 

implementation. 

e:J4Z2> 

JAMES FERGUSON 

General, USAF 

Director, MOL Program 

2 Atchs 

1. Cy ltr, Dr. Flax to 

Gen Ferguson 

2. MOL Directive No. 67-1 

BYE-21280/66 

11111 I 

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DOMAN 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

28 December 1966 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, MOL 

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts 

Attached is a directive entitled "Policy Relating 

to MOL Astronauts", which is applicable to the selection, 

training, and operational use of Department of Defense 

MOL astronauts. This policy is designed to reduce risk 

to program security and negate the possibility of any 

international incident unfavorable to the United States 

Government. 

I consider this directive to be an important 

interpretation of national policies related to the matter 

-of overhead reconnaissance, as they pertain to the DOD 

MOL Program. It is requested that you effect an early 

and careful implementation of its provisions. 

Alexander H. Flax 

Atch 

Policy Relating to 

MOL Astronauts 

litiorMAG PAPERS 

i r k ; 
—rot-NATIONAL 

NROAFPROVED FOR 

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

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1 rk rT. 7,11: v(-u ns. 

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, Cp,C. 

28, Decepiber 1960- 

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POLICY-RELATING-TO • 

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS.' 

'I. PURPOSE: 

To prescribe policy applicable to thb selection, training,';`. 

and operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory (MOL) astronauts, designed .to reduce the risks of 

security compromise or embarrassment to the U.S. Government . 

to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives.. 

IL' SITUATION: 

The Department of Defense MOL is not a covert or clandestine overflight program, although the primary' mission 'is 

covert. Under national policy applicable . to -the U.S, satellite:- 

reconnaissance program, the reconnaissance mission of MOL is -- 

controlled under policies and procedures consistent with all 

projects of.the National Reconnaissance Program. Security' 

protection is afforded:the reconnaissance mission, within the. 

BYEMAN'system of security as.project MORIAN. Compatible with 

the publicly acknowledged military development objectives of:: 

MOL, MOL astronauts will retain their status in the military 

service. In all probability, a modest public information 

release will be associated with at least the initial fully 

manned MOL launches. 

Department of Defense MOL astronauts, selected to date, 

have been publicly identified. 'The extent of their exposure 

to the public, however; has been controlled in keeping with 

the strict security prescribed . under this program. Those 

selected to date have undergone a careful se1ection.proces6,, 

which included evaluation against selected security criteria ' 

prescribed in Section III, A of this directive. -These 

.security,criteria are'well within the standards preicribed 

for access to EYEMAN,:as well as specially compartmented 

intelligence products 

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The nature of the primary mission of the Department of 

Defense MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such, that the on-board 

presence of man, as an integral part of the intelligence 

collection system, is intended to provide benefits to the 

effective accomplishment of this mission not technically 

possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial 

studies suggest that the inclusion of man will enhance such 

benefits with respect to providing: (1) a manual backup 

for complex automated functions especially in the develop-. 

ment phase; (2) manual repair or adjustment of sensor 

elements, controls and displays during on-orbit operations; 

(3) a greater percentage of cloud-free photography; (4). a 

possible quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; 

and (5) target selectivity. 

The full realization of these benefits will require 

training of MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization with the operation of the space laboratory and associated camera equipment, in addition to intelligence target 

recognition and selected aspects of photographic intelligence 

interpretation. In addition, it is apparent that MOL astronauts will require access to target cue materials -- probably 

during mission -- which currently require security handling 

under special compartmented control systems prescribed ior 

certain intelligence products. The denial .of such training 

and access for MOL astronauts would.severely limit the use 

of man as an integral part of the MOL intelligence 'collection 

system. 

Certain calculated risks are assumed coincidental with 

receipt of this training and access by the MOL astronauts. 

These risks stem from the fact that they, as publicly identified figures, will be more easily targeted by individuals, 

groups of foreign intelligence organizations intending to 

acquire classified information; and from the possibility, 

however remote, of a system malfunction of such nature as 

to place them in peril of hostile interrogation. The prob- 

. ability of a system malfunction of such nature is extremely 

slight, with the greatest incidence of .risk associated with 

.launch activities, wherein through a partial booster failure 

the vehicle might fail to achieve orbit. 

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%At 

In addition, it is believed that under the MOL program, 

the best interests of the United States would be served by 

careful avoidance of circumstances which .could result in the e. 

capture of MOL astronauts with incriminating intelligence 

mission products, with armament which might be construed 

as hostile and with devices designed to bring about their 

voluntary or directed self destruction.. 

. III. POLICY: 

The following stated policies are intended to preclude 

practices in conjunction with selection,'training and operational use of MOL astronauts, which could result in unnecessary 

risk of security compromise or international embarrassment to 

the United States government as highlighted in the aforegoing 

background discussion. 

A. Selection 

Security criteria to be'applied to the selection 

process are those. previously established by D/NRO which are 

restated below: 

"Security criteria for selection of MOL 

,astronauts will be applied as an integral part 

of the selection processes and are so designed 

as to cause an assessment of the, individual in 

terms of the total security risk factor as 

related to the sensitive tasks the individual 

might be required to perform, rather than being 

restricted to evaluation in terms,of suitability 

for access to classified and special access 

information. 

Candidates will meet the personnel security 

criteria prescribed in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP 

SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34 

relating to Ultra Sensitive' Positions. 

A current security background investigation 

consistent with USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and. 

AFR 205;-34 will be initiated and a careful 

comoLoBYE -52948/66 

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psychological and psychiatric examination made 

in the case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological and psychiatric 

examination will be of such detail as to provide 

a basis to assess the candidates' ability and 

compunction to.perform a wide variety of sensitive 

. tasks as might be assigned to the MOL program 

under unusual military security restrictions. All 

facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, 

motivation and personal affairs that might have 

a bearing upon his ability, to so perform should 

be carefully' explored." 

The final decision with respect to'the selection of 

MOL astronauts rests with the Ddrector, MOL Program. As has : 

been prior practice, he may be assisted in this regard'by a 

MOL astronaut selection board upon whose recommendations he 

acts. However, any such selection will. be consistent with 

the security criteria stated above. 

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities against the requirements of USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, 

without waiver and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these 

authorities made a matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria 

stated above go beyond that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the investigative files, security 

certifications, and the, psychiatric assessments must be made 

at no less level of authority than the MOL.astronaui selection 

board constituted. by the Director, MOL Program. A project 

'DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist 

'will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of. 

these materials. 

B. Training and Operational Use 

. . 

Whereas the identities and general background of 

MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their. exposure• • 

to the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in • 

keeping with the security requirements of this program. 

Personal appearances before public .groups and interviews 

with representatives'Of the news media or writings for 

publication, therefore, are not to be. authorized. • 

1#,:itril4, DORM 
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Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified 

and specially compartmented information will be controlled 

on a strict "must-know" basis as required to training and 

the successful and full accomplishment of their mission. 

MOL astronauts will be required at all times to 

maintain a high standard of moral, ethical and.military 

conduct. 

MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on 

the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to 

program security (to include its basis in national policy) 

in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that 

prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all 

MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security and 

psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events 

transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his 

family which might have a bearing on security of the program.. 

Special security arrangements will be invoked at 

such time as the astronaut's training program requires his 

pr6sence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g.:' camera contractors and the National 

Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such 

mission may not be compromised to unauthorized per&onnel 

or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the 

facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided 

if at all possible, and.will in each instance require the 

approval of the D/NRO. 

MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions 

devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their 

personal destruction in the event of incident. 

Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes 

of survival, will undergo careful screening against a standard 

of practical application, to insure that the purpose of such 

equipments can logically be defended as not intended to bring 

about the death or injury of other individuals, or to induce 

such individuals to 'act in a manner contrary to their 

allegiance. 

It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to 

earth in the GEMINI vehicle with a substantial portion of 

the mission. photographic product on-board. .However, the 

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DON 

operational plan will provide for an exception to'the procedure related to the return of film; in the event it would' 

appear, due to some emergency .circumstance, that the impact 

of the GEMINI will occur in an area where U,S. forces cannot 

exercise prompt control. 

MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U.S. personnel, will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise 

U.S. sovereignty over all MOL equipments both'while in space 

.and on the earth's surface. 

All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the 

event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information'other than name; rank, 

serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence 

and the fact of their occupation as'MOL astronauts. Under 

such conditions the astronauts should request to.be placed in 

contact with representatives of the U.S. Embassy or Legation, 

or in the absence of any U.S. representation, the International 

Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U.S. Government 

in.Such event will make every effort to secure their prompt • 

release through•regular diplomatic -channels. 

The instructions contained in this directive, to 

be applicable to MOL:astronauts, are. intended to supplement 

rather than. substitute for Department of Defense directives:_, 

and military service regulations related to the personal- - 

and officialconduct of Military personnel.- • ' 

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MANNED ORBITING 

LABORATORY PMCAMAN DMC1fl 

POLICY RELATING TO MOL ASTRONAUTS 

NO. 67-1 

JANUARY 1967 

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

MOL PROGRAM OFFICE 
.:; 

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3 ViS 131.E:1111 

Gontd Sjstcm 

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=maws 

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'U'..;:■;;A tiy4.4.,vg-ii 

MOL PROGRAM OFFICE 

DIRECTIVE NO. 67-1 

POLICY RELATING TO MOL ASTRONAUTS 

JANUARY 1967 

cl) 

PROGRAM REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT 

THIS DOCUMENT IS AN OFFICIAL RELEASE OF THE 

MOL PROGRAM OFFICE AND ITS REQUIREMENTS ARE 

DIRECTIVE ON ALL COGNIZANT ELEMENTS OF THE MOL PROGRAM 

=mac 

APPROVED 

JAMES FERGUSON 

General, USAF • 

Director, MOL Program gggiig 

•‘ 41

. rs. 

C•1 

4-4 

DORIAN SAF-SL BYE 21277-66 

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This directive sets forth policy relating to MOL astronauts. 

Its purpose is to enhance the achievement of MOL Program objectives by avoiding a security compromise or unfavorable international incident as a result of astronaut activity. 

This directive contains two parts: 

Part I is the policy relating to MOL astronauts as 

established by the D/NRO. 

Part II contains the.implementing instructions. The 

channel for actions which requires the review or approval of the 

D/NRO or the MOL Program Director will be through the MOL Program 

Office, SAF-SL 

DORIAN . Page 1 of 16 pages 

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MOL PROGRAM OFFICE 

DIRECTIVE NO. 66-2 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PART I -- POLICY RELATING TO MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY 

(MOL) ASTRONAUTS 3 

A. PURPOSE 3 

B. SITUATION 3 

C. POLICY 6 

1. Selection 

2. Training and Operational Use 8 

PART II -- IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS 12 

A. ATTENDANCE AT OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES 12 

B. BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS 12 

C. VISITS TO FACILITIES 14 

D. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT 14 

E. CONTINGENCY OPTION(S) FOR 

EMERGENCY FILM RETURN 15 

F. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN EVENT OF 

INCARCERATION OR INTERROGATION 

BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 15 

G. PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CONDUCT 16 

DORIAN Page 2 of 16 pages 

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- rk .• 

PART I 

POLICY RELATING TO 

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL)' ASTRONAUTS 

A. PURPOSE 

To prescribe policy applicable to the selection, training, and 

operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting Laboratory 

(MOL) astronauts, designed to reduce the risks of security compromise or embarrassment to the U. S. Government to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives. 

B. SITUATION 

The Department of Defense MOL is not a covert or clandestine 

overflight program, although the primary mission is covert. Under 

national policy applicable to the U. S. Satellite Reconnaissance 

Program, the reconnaissance mission of MOL is controlled under policies 

and procedures consistent' with all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. Security protection is afforded the reconnaissance 

mission, within the BYEMAN system of security as project DORIAN. 

Compatible with the publicly acknowledged military development objectives of MOL, MOL astronauts will retain their status in the military 

service. In all probability, a modest public information release will 

be associated with at least the initial fully manned MOL launches. 

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Department of Defense MOT, astronauts, selected to date, have 

been publicly identified. The extent of their exposure to the public, 

however, has been controlled in keeping with the strict security prescribed under this program. Those selected to date have undergone a 

careful selection process, which included evaluation against selected 

security criteria prescribed in Section C, 1, of this directive. 

These security criteria are well within the standards prescribed for 

access to BYEMAN, as well as specially compartmented intelligence 

products. 

The nature of the primary mission of the Department of Defense 

MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such that the on-board presence of man, as an 

integral part of the intelligence collection system, is intended to 

provide benefits to the effective accomplishment of thiS mission not 

technically possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial 

studies suggest that the inclusion of man will enhance such benefits 

with respect to providing: (l) a manual backup for complex automated 

functions especially in the development phase; (2) manual repair or 

adjustment of sensor elements, controls and displays during on-orbit 

operations; (3) a greater percentage of cloud-free photography; 

(4) a possible quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; and 

(5) target selectivity. 

DORIAN 

V71 1 EVPMAN t..iV 

L'a gitral StrStC1 h2 

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The full realization of these benefits will require training of 

MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization with the. operation of the space laboratory and associated camera equipment, in 

addition to intelligence target recognition and selected aspects of 

photographic intelligence interpretation. In addition, it is apparent 

that MOL astronauts will require access to target cue materials--

probably during mission- —which currently require security handling 

under special compartmented control systems prescribed for certain 

intelligence products. The denial of such training and access for 

MOL astronauts would severely limit the use of man as an integral 

part of the MOL intelligence collection system. 

Certain calculated risks are assumed coincidental with receipt 

of this training and access by the MOL astronauts. These risks stem 

from the fact that they, as publicly identified figures, will be more 

easily targeted by individuals, groups or foreign intelligence organizations intending to acquire classified information; and from the 

possibility, however remote, of a system malfunction of such nature as to 

place them in peril of hostile interrogation. The probability of a 

system malfunction of such nature is extremely slight, with the greatest incidence of risk associated with launch activities, wherein 

through a partial booster failure the vehicle might fail to achieve 

orbit. 

DORIAN ' 

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In addition, it is believed that under the MOL Program, the best 

interests of the United States would be served by careful avoidance 

of circumstances which could result in the capture of MOL astronauts 

with incriminating intelligence mission products, with armament which 

might be construed as hostile and with devices designed to bring about 

their voluntary or directed self destruction. 

C. POLICY 

The following stated policies are intended to preclude practices 

in conjunction with selection, training and operational use of MOL 

astronauts, which could result in unnecessary risk of security compromise or international embarrassment to the United States Government as 

highlighted in the aforegoing background discussion. 

1. Selection 

Security criteria to be applied to the selection process are 

those previously established by D/NRO which are restated below: 

"Security criteria for selection of MOL astronauts 

will be applied as an integral part of the selection 

processes and are so designed as to cause an assessment 

of the individual in terms of the total security risk 

factor as related to' the sensitive tasks the individual 

might be required to perform, rather than being restricted 

to evaluation in terms of suitability for access to classified and special access information. 

DORIAN 

;•• 0iY 1 

COITITvirl treill''''..7.1" 

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"Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria 

prescribed in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, 

and of AFR 205-34 relating to Ultra-Sensitive Positions. 

"A current security background investigation consistent 

with USAFINTRL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be 

initiated and a careful psychological and psychiatric 

examination made in the case of all candidates. Both the 

investigation and the psychological and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis to 

assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform 

a wide variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to 

the MOL Program under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, 

motivation and personal affairs that might have a bearing 

upon his ability to so perform should be carefully explored." 

The final decision with respect to the selection of MOL astronauts rests with the Director, MOL Program. As has been prior practice, 

he may be assisted in this regard by a MOL astronaut selection board 

upon whose recommendations he acts. However, any such selection will 

be consistent with the security criteria stated above. 

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities 

against the requirements of USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver 

DORIAN Page 7 of 16 pages 

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and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these authorities made a 

matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria stated above go beyond 

that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the 

investigative files security certifications, and the psychiatric 

assessments must be made at no less level of authority than the MOL. 

astronaut selection board constituted by the Director, MOL Program. 

A project DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist 

will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of these 

materials. 

2. Training and Operational Use 

a. Whereas the identities and general background of MOL 

astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to the public 

will otherwise be limited and controlled in keeping with the security 

requirements of this program. Personal appearances before public 

groups and interviews with representatives of the news media or writings 

for publication, therefore, are not to be authorized. 

b. Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified and 

specially compartmented information will be controlled on a strict 

"must-knownbasis as required to training and the successful and full 

accomplishment of their:mission. 

c. MOL astronauts will be required at all times to maintain 

a high standard of moral, ethical and military conduct. 

DORIAN 

trt!P4 CJ (EiTA 

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r. 

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d. MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the 

subject of their responsibilities to the program and to program 

security (to include its basis in national policy) in addition to 

defensive security briefings similar to that prescribed under AYR 

205-21. Periodic debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted 

by program security and psychiatric personnel with particular 

emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut 

and his family which might have a bearing on security of the program. 

e. Special security arrangements will be invoked at such 

time as the astronaut's training program requires his presence at 

facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g., 

camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) 

in order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized 

personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the 

facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all 

possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO. 

f. MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions, 

devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their personal 

destruction in the event of incident. 

g. Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of 

survival will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical 

application to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically 

DORIAN Page 9 of 16 pages 

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F Br Ot1 

be defended as not intended to'bring about the death or injury of 

other individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner 

contrary to their allegiance. 

h. It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth 

in the Gemini vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic product on-board. However, the operational plan will provide 

for an exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in 

the event it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that 

the impact of the Gemini will occur in an area where U. S. forces 

cannot exercise prompt control. 

i. MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U. S. personnel, 

will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise U. S. sovereignty over 

all MOL equipments both while in space and on the earth's surface. 

j. All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event 

of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will 

provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and 

place of birth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation 

as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request 

to be placed in contact with representatives of the U. S. Embassy or 

Legation, or in the absence of any U. S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U. S. 

Government, in such event, will make every effort to secure their 

-prompt release through regular diplomatic channels. 

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k. The instructions contained in this directive, to be 

applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than 

substitute for Department of Defense directives and military service 

regulations related to the personal and official conduct of military 

personnel. 

DORIA1 Page 11 of 16 pages 

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Q,Ir'71.471 

UC . F.; j ittAi 

PART II 

IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS 

This part consists of extracts of Part I with appended implementing 

instructions. 

A. ATTENDANCE AT th.biCIAL ACTIVITIES 

lqhereas the identities and general background of MOL astronauts 

may be released publicly, their exposure to the public will otherwise 

be limited and controlled in keeping with the security requirements of 

this program. Personal appearances before public groups and interviews 

with representatives of the news media or writings for publication, 

therefore, are not to be authorized." 

Attendance of MOL astronauts at official activities where 

they may be subject to pressure for interviews by news media 

representatives is subject to prior approval by the Director 

of the MOL Program. 

B. BRIEYINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS 

"MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on the subject of 

their responsibilities to the program and to program security (to 

include its basis in national policy) in addition to defensive security 

briefings similar to that prescribed under AIR 205-4. Periodic 

debriefings of all MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security 

DORIAN 

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and psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his family which might 

have a bearing on security of the program." 

1. The briefings and debriefings required by this paragraph 

will be administered or arranged by the MOL Program Office (SAF-SL) 

as follows: 

a. An astronaut's first defensive security briefing will 

be given at the time he receives his SI/Tim clearances. Followup defensive security briefings will be given each six months 

thereafter and prior to any foreign travel. 

b. Psychological interviews and security debriefings will 

be conducted at least once each year. The psychological and 

security meetings will be conducted separately. 

2. Records of psychological debriefing interviews will remain 

in the confidential files of the Program Psychiatrist. Records of 

security debriefings will remain in the confidential files of the 

Program Security Officer. The records of all such debriefings 

will be permanently retained in their respective offices and made 

available for program use as approved by the Director of the MOL 

Program. 

3. The security officer and psychiatrist are authorized to 

compare findings after each debriefing. Any information detrimental 

to the objectives or security of the program will be reported to 

the Program Director. 

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717 

C. VISITS TO FACILITIES 

"Special security arrangements will be invoked at such time as 

the astronaut's training program requires his presence at facilities 

indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g., camera contractors and the National Photographic Interpretation Center) in 

order that such mission may not be compromised to unauthorized 

personnel or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the 

facility. In general, such facility visits will be avoided if at all 

possible, and will in each instance require the approval of the D/NRO." 

Requests for approval of visits to the type of locations 

referenced in this subparagraph will be submitted to arrive at 

SAF-SL at least seven (7) working days prior to the intended 

visit(s). The request will include names of astroanut(s), location(s) to be visited, date(s) of visit, reason for visit and 

proposed security arrangements. 

D. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT 

"Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes of survival 

Will undergo careful screening against a standard of practical application to insure that the purpose of such equipments can logically be 

defended as not intended to bring about the death or injury of other 

individuals, or to induce such individuals to act in a manner contrary 

to their allegiance." 

DORIAN 

1M,,4 

/e13 

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The list of the proposed contents of the astronaut's survival 

package will be forwarded to SAT-SL for approval. 

E. CONTINGENCY OPTION(S) FOR EMERGENCY FILM RETURN 

"It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to earth in the 

Gemini vehicle with a substantial portion of the mission photographic 

product on-board. However, the operational plan will provide for an 

exception to the procedure related to the return of film, in the event 

it would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that the impact 

of the Gemini will occur in an area where U. S. forces cannot exercise 

prompt control." 

The MOL mission planning document will set forth contingency 

option(s) to cope with the emergency circumstance described in 

this subparagraph. If necessary, the Gemini B Spacecraft will be 

engineered to accommodate any special requirements to accomplish 

such contingency action. 

F. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN EVENT OF INCARCERATION OR INTERROGATION 

BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 

"All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the event of 

incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, serial number, date and 

place of borth, places of residence and the fact of their occupation 

as MOL astronauts. Under such conditions the astronauts should request 

DORIAN Page 15 of 16 pages 

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to be placed in contact with representatives of the U. S. Embassy or 

Legation, or in the absence of any U. S. representation, the International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that the U. S. Government, in such event, will make every effort to secure their prompt 

release through regular diplomatic channels." 

Instruction required by this subparagraph will be covered as 

part of the defensive security briefings. In addition, the preflight training schedule will provide a block of time to be 

devoted to full review of this topic and to satisfy any related 

briefing requirements of other Government agencies. Provision 

for these briefings will be made by SAF-SL. 

G. PERSONAL AND OMCIAL CONDUCT 

"The instructions contained in this directive, to be applicable 

to-MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement rather than substitute 

for Department of Defense directives and military service regulations 

related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel." 

Review of pertinent military service regulations and directives 

related to the personal and official conduct of military personnel 

will be included in the defensive security briefing program. 

(See Section B.l.a., above). 

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DORTA17 
MEMORANDUM FOR DR, F 

VIA: GENERAL & GENERAL EVANS 

41100' 

Ass -4:dor Security 

NRO Staff 

'NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

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-TOP-SEGRET- BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

THE NRO STAFF 

-46.1- NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

16 December 1966 

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts 

I wish to clarify language in my earlier memorandum to 

you related to this subject, wherein I used the term "tacit 

concurrence" and thereby possibly implied that DCI concurrence 

was required for the full substance of the "Policy Relating 

to MOL Astronauts" directive. 

As you undoubtedly recognize, in this directive we are 

attempting to lay careful ground work for a contingency plan 

for the MOL operation, an element which in the past has been 

important to 303 Committee mission approval and a matter, 

for which you in your capacity as Chairman/ICPC have had 

direct responsibility. The directive is carefully worded 

to be responsive to applicable national and military policies 

and additionally to insure that during the development of the 

program, we take no irreversible steps which might subsequently 

effect mission approval. 

General Evans and I previously considered the matter of 

requesting the DCI's approval of the full substance of the 

directive but concluded that such action might not be appropriate in that the matter was not totally within his competence. 

I also feel that it is premature to bring this matter to the 

attention of the ICPC. You will recall that a copy of your 

memorandum to Mr. Helms requesting T/KH billets, in addition 

to the proposed directive, was provided to Mr. Vance. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you sign TAB B. 

'AA!' 

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9 December 1966 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts 

BACKGROUND 

Attachment A is the DCI approval of T/KH billets 

for MOL astronauts. It is also tacit concurrence of 

the "Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts". 

Attachment B is a letter which forwards the Policy 

as a directive to the Director of the MOL Program for 

implementation. As you are aware, this policy was 

coordinated in depth with the MOL Program Office and 

with the ACS/I USAF. Detailed implementing instructions 

are being prepared for the signature of General 

Ferguson. 

RECOMMENDATION 

Sign TAB B. 

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20305 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

5 December 1966 

The Honorable Alexander Flax 

Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

Department of Defense 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Al: 

I am pleased to approve your request for billets in the 

MOL Program which will enable indoctrination of the MOL 

astronauts into the T-KH Security System. 

Enclosed herewith is a specific billet structure which 

has been negotiated between your Office and the CIA TALENT 

Control and Security Officers. In the event that there is a 

need for an expansion in the numbers sometime in the future, 

please do not hesitate to let us know. 

Sincerely, 

Richard Helms 

Director 

Enclosure 

BYE-57024/66 1 

BYE-57024-66 

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BYE-57026.66 

Copy c.2 of 

5 December 1966 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Security/NRO Staff 

SUBJECT : T/KH Billets for MOL Astronauts 

Pursuant to instruction of the Director of Central Intelligence. 

 20 T/KH billets have been approved for MOL astronauts. They will 

be titled and numbered as follows: 

IIMIIIIMIMEN.11•110111M Title : Crew Members 

40.11111MMINME.M. 

Numbers : 3014-00-303 

through 3014-00-322. 

CIA/TCO 

CIA/TSO 

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Dear Dick: 

Our studies of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (VOL) 

Program have mole it evident that it the on-board presence 

of sea, functioning as an integral part of a photographic 

satellite reconnaissance system is to achieve full realisation of the potential that men can offer to the system, 

VOL astronauts must be provided a familiarity with substantive 

intelligence (such as would currently be subject to TAIMMT/ 

XSTMOLS and possibly COUNT security controls) to a much 

greater degree than has bees the practice in aircraft reconnaissance programs. it is probable that on-board target cue 

material will also be required. 

Because the providing of such access is a departure from 

the usual security practices related to the haadliag of 

overflight reconnaissance personnel, I request your personal 

consideration and approval of a billet structure in the 1104 

Program which will enable urination of VOL astronauts 

into the TALMMT/ENYMOUI security slates*. Requests for 

clearance of the individual astronaats will be submitted 

through normal channels upon approval of the billet structure. 

Conlin' clearances will be obtained through normal us*? 

channels. 

As a matter of interest and as as indication of the 

manner is which the TALINTALEYAOLE clearances will be 

utilised, I as attaching a copy of our draft 'Policy 

Relating to Manned Orbiting Laboratory COOL) Astromaute" 

which is being prepared as directive to the Director/VOL 

Progrem. 

I would be pleased to di 

f you wish. 

Mt. Richard Nelms 

Director 

Central intelligence 

cc: Mr. Vance 

Alexander R. ?lax 

Director 

itor further with 

N 
POLICY RELATING TO 

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) ASTRONAUTS 

I. PURPOSE: 

To prescribe policy applicable to the selection, training, 

and operational use of Department of Defense Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory (MOL) astronauts, designed to reduce the risks of 

security compromise or embarrassment to the U.S. Government 

to an acceptable minimum without impairing mission objectives. 

II. SITUATION: 

The Department of Defense MOL is not a covert or clandestine overflight program, although the primary mission is 

covert. Under national policy applicable to the U.S. 

satellite reconnaissance program, the reconnaissance mission 

of MOL is controlled under policies and procedures consistent 

with all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. 

Security protection is afforded the reconnaissance mission, 

within the BYEMAN system of security as project DORIAN. 

Compatible with the publicly acknowledged military development 

objectives of MOL, MOL astronauts will retain their status 

in the military service. In all probability, a modest public 

information release will be associated with at least the 

initial fully manned MOL launches. 

Department of Defense MOL astronauts, selected to date, 

have been publicly identified. The extent of their exposure 

to the public, however, has been controlled in keeping with 

the strict security prescribed under this program. Those 

selected to date have undergone a careful selection process, 

which included evaluation against selected' security criteria 

prescribed in Section III, A of this directive. These 

security criteria are well within the standards prescribed 

for access to BYEMAN, as well as specially compartmented 

intelligence products. 

The nature of the primary mission of the Department of 

Defense MOL Program, which is the acquisition of high resolution reconnaissance photography, is such, that the on-board 

presence of man, as an integral part of the intelligence 

collection system, is intended to provide benefits to the 

effective accomplishment of this mission not technically 

possible through the use of an unmanned satellite. Initial 

studies suggest that the inclusion of man will 'enhance such 

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benefits with respect to providing: (1) a manual backup for 

complex automated functions especially in the development 

phase; (2) manual repair or adjustment of sensor elements, 

controls and displays during on-orbit operations; (3) a 

greater percentage of cloud-free photography; (4) a possible 

quick reaction intelligence read-out capability; and (5) 

target selectivity. 

The full realization of these benefits will require training of MOL astronauts to include a thorough familiarization 

with the operation of the space laboratory and associated camera 

equipment, in addition to intelligence target recognition and 

selected aspects of photographic intelligence interpretation. 

In addition, it is apparent that MOL astronauts will require 

access to target cue materials -- probably during mission --

which currently require security handling under special 

compartmented control systems prescribed for certain intelligence products. The denial of such training and access for 

MOL astronauts would severely limit the use of man as an 

integral part of the MOL intelligence collection system. 

Certain calculated risks are assumed coincidental with 

receipt of this training and access by the MOL astronauts. 

These risks stem from the fact that they, as publicly identified 

figures, will be more easily targeted by individuals, groups 

or foreign intelligence organizations intending to acquire 

classifiedinformation; and from the possibility, however remote, 

of a system malfunction of such nature as to place them in peril 

of hostile interrogation. The probability of a system malfunction 

of such nature is extremely slight, with the greatest incidence 

of risk associated with launch activities, wherein through a 

partial booster failure the vehicle might fail to achieve orbit. 

In addition, it is believed that under the MOL program, 

the best interests of the United States would be served by 

careful avoidance of circumstances which could result in the 

capture of MOL astronauts withincriminating intelligence 

mission products, with armament which might be construed 

as hostile and with devices designed to bring about their 

voluntary or directed self destruction. 

III. POLICY: 

The following stated policies are intended to preclude 

practices in conjunction with selection, training and operational use of MOL astronauts, which could result in unnecessary 

codes 

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risk of security compromise or international embarrassment 

to the United States government as highlighted in the 

aforegoing background discussion. 

A. Selection 

Security criteria to be applied to the selection 

process are those previously established by D/NRO which are 

restated below. 

"Security criteria for selection of MOL 

astronauts will be applied as an integral 

part of the selection processes and are so 

designed as to cause an assessment of the 

individual in terms of the total security 

risk factor as related to the sensitive 

tasks the individual might be required to 

perform, rather than being restricted to 

evaluation in terms of suitability for 

access to classified and special access 

information. 

Candidates will meet the personnel 

security crj.teria prescribed in USAFINTEL 

201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of 

AFR 205-34 relating to Ultra Sensitive 

Positions. 

A current security background investigation consistent with USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP 

SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated 

and a careful psychological and psychiatric 

examination made in the case of all 

candidates. Both the investigation and the 

psychological and psychiatric examination 

will be of such detail as to proVide a 

basis to assess the candidates' ability 

and compunction to perform a wide variety 

of sensitive tasks as might be assigned 

to the MOL program under unusual military 

security restrictions. All facets of the 

candidates' behavior, conscience, motivation 

and personal affairs that might have a 

bearing upon his ability to so perform 

should be carefully explored." 

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The final decision with respect to the selection of 

MOL astronauts rests with the Director, MOL Program. As has 

been prior practice, he may be assisted in this regard by a 

MOL astronaut selection board upon whose recommendations he 

acts. However, any such selection will be consistent with 

the security criteria stated above. 

Each candidate will be reviewed by competent authorities against the requirements of USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, 

without waiver and AFR 205-34, and the certifications of these 

authorities made a matter of record. Inasmuch as the criteria 

stated above go beyond that included in the cited AF regulations, the final review of the investigative files, security 

certifications, and the psychiatric assessments must be made 

at no less level of authority than the MOL astronaut selection 

board constituted by the Director, MOL Program. A project 

DORIAN cleared professional security officer and psychiatrist 

will be present to assist the board in the interpretation of 

these materials. 

B. Training and Operational Use 

Whereas the identities and general background of 

MOL astronauts may be released publicly, their exposure to 

the public will otherwise be limited and controlled in 

keeping with the security requirements of this program. 

Personal appearances before public groups and interviews 

with representatives of the news media or writings for 

publication, therefore, are not to be authorized. 

Access on the part of MOL astronauts to classified 

and specially compartmented information will be controlled 

on a strict "must-know" basis as required to training and 

the successful and full accomplishment of their mission. 

MOL astronauts will be required at all times to 

maintain a high standard of moral, ethical and military 

conduct. 

MOL astronauts will receive periodic briefings on 

the subject of their responsibilities to the program and to 

program security (to include its basis in national policy) 

in addition to defensive security briefings similar to that 

prescribed under AFR 205-21. Periodic debriefings of all 

MOL astronauts will be conducted by program security and 

psychiatric personnel with particular emphasis upon events 

transpiring in the personal life of the astronaut and his 

family which might have a bearing. on security of, the program. 

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Special security arrangements will be invoked at 

such time as the astronaut's training program requires his 

presence at facilities indicative of the program's intelligence mission (e.g.: camera contractors and the National 

Photographic Interpretation Center) in order that such 

mission may not be compromised to unauthorized personnel 

or the public by virtue of the astronaut's presence at the 

facility. In general, such facility visite will be avoided 

if at all possible, and will in each instance require the 

approval of the D/NRO. 

MOL astronauts will be provided with no instructions, 

devices or equipments for purposes of bringing about their 

personal destruction in the event of incident. 

Any equipments provided to astronauts for purposes 

of survival, will undergo careful screening against a standard 

of practical application, to insure that the purpose of such 

equipments can logically be defended as not intended to bring 

about the death or4njury of other individuals, or to induce 

such individuals tact in a manner contrary to their 

allegiance. 

It is planned that MOL astronauts will return to 

earth in the GEMINI vehicle with a substantial portion of 

the mission photographic product on-board. However, the 

operational plan will provide for an exception to the 

procedure related to the return of film, in the event it 

would appear, due to some emergency circumstance, that 

the impact of the GEMINI will occur in an area where U.S. 

forces cannot exercise prompt control. 

MOL astronauts, in the absence of other U.S. 

personnel, will attempt in a non-violent manner to exercise 

U.S. sovereignty over all MOL equipments both while in space 

and on the earth's surface. 

All MOL astronauts will be instructed that in the 

event of incarceration or interrogation by a foreign government, they will provide no information other than name, rank, 

. serial number, date and place of birth, places of residence 

and the fact of their occupation as MOL astronauts. Under 

such conditions the astronauts should request to be placed 

in contact with representatives of the U.S. Embassy or 

Legation, or in the absence of any U.S. representation, the 

International Red Cross. Astronauts will be advised that 

the US Government in such event will make every effort to 

secure their prompt release through regular, diplomatic 

channels. 

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The instructions contained in this directive, to 

be applicable to MOL astronauts, are intended to supplement 

rather than substitute for Department of Defense directives 

and military service regulations related to the personal 

and official conduct of military personnel. 

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

THRU: GENERAL STEWART 

GENERAL EVANS 

SUBJECT: Policy Relating to MOL Astronauts 

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with 

additional information pertaining to "The Policy Relating 

to MOL Astronauts", a paper now pending. The requirement 

for action on this matter is urgent. I have been informed 

that lack of SI and T/KH clearances is hampering effective 

prosecution of the MOL Program. 

I am advised by SAFSL that there is a need to provide 

SI and T/KH clearances to MOL astronauts at the earliest 

possible time because of two basic program requirements: 

MOL mission equipment system design and.mission training. 

A. MOL Mission Equipment Design: The console 

equipment to be used by the MOL crew depends on the 

formulation of operational procedures and concepts 

which will maximize man's ability to use the MOL 

optics sensor in. achieving photographic take of 

highest possible resolution and intelligence value. 

As an example, inclusion of an Active Target 

Indicator mode of operation,in which the Reconnaissance 

Panel of PSAC has expressed interest, is presently 

under simulation study by the MOL Systems Office. 

The urgent need for MOL astronaut participation in 

this effort was the subject of 2150, dated 

16 August 1966, for General Evans from General Berg, 

copy attached (Atch 1). Participation of astronaut 

personnel as subjects in these simulations. would be 

of extreme value, both in insuring validity of conclusions which may be reached concerning the advisability of incorporating the Active Target Indicator 

mode in the baseline MOL, and in providing the astronaut] 

valuable experience which can subsequently be applied to 

design of the mission equipment, displays, controls, etc. 

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Lack of SI and T/KH clearances to date has required that 

other, SI and T/KH cleared personnel be used instead, as 

subjects in the simulation effort, adversely impacting 

on the validity of the simulation results and the 

conclusions that may be drawn therefrom. Similarly, the 

Elemental Development Simulator effort at G.E., in which 

the astronauts are playing a key role, is of vital 

importance to design of the mission equipment console, 

hence to the overall effectiveness of the manned system. 

Utilization of SI and T/KH material, with concommitant 

SI and T/KH clearances granted to the astronauts, would • 

insure better validity of system design in the use of 

actual product material and permit more realistic 

simulation of the real-world mission situation. 

B. Mission Training: Manned conduct of photographic 

reconnaissance from earth-orbit is a new task for the NRO. 

Lacking direct experience, we cannot at the present time 

define in detail the exact tasks man is to perform, nor 

can we specify the mission oriented training he will 

require. However, this much is clear: for the astronaut 

to make a maximum contribution to mission accomplishment 

he will have to be completely familiar with the terrain 

over which he is to fly and with the specific targets 

and target complexes which he is to photograph. The large 

number and different types of targets involved makes it 

evident that considerable effort will be required to 

determine what kind and amount of target cueing material 

will be necessary to insure timely identification of 

targets, and the amount of related training that will be 

required. Receipt of SI and T/KH clearances will permit 

the astronauts to- get an early start in familiarizing 

themselves with the multitude of targets involved and in 

participating in optimization of cue content, method of 

cue display, and real-world target identification. The 

training for each specific flight, to be provided in the 

months immediately prior to launch, must be based on 

previous familiarization with product information on 

targets in the DORIAN target deck and timely definition 

of cue content, display and use. Receipt of SI and T/KH 

clearances by the astronauts will enable them to play 

the key roles they must play in conduct of all of the 

required predecessor activity. The scope and importance 

of this effort, in terms of insuring manned mission 

success, cannot be overemphasized. 

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In summary, early indoctrination of the astronauts 

to SI and T/KH target material will provide them a basic 

understanding of the real-world situation that will confront them during conduct of the mission. The exposure 

to SI and T/KH material will provide them a basic framework and a clear focus on the primary mission objective 

which will greatly improve their ability, in the short 

run, to make manned inputs into systems design, and, in 

the long run, to perform their assigned mission in orbit. 

Informal discussions have been held with both Mr. Tidwell 

(TCO/CIA) and the Office of Security/CIA concerning the 

requirement for Talent/Keyhole access on the part of MOL 

astronauts. These are the two principal CIA elements which 

would be involved in staffing the DCI's response to your 

request. Their responses to these informal discussions 

have led me to believe that the request will receive 

favorable consideration by the DCI. 

Assistant fd'r -Security 

NRO Staff 

1. A^-tri:11" 

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FRIORITY WHIG a_g_RD-2 I 

C) FOR GENERAL EVANS FROM GENERAL BERG. 

I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT OUR PRESENTATION TO PSAC WOW) HAVE BEEN comp _ 1 I - 

MUCH MORE CONCLUSIVE HAD WE BEEN ABLE TO SUPPORT THE USEFULNESS OF ligszt 1//1".. c) MAN IN THE INDICATORS MODE, WITH DATA OBTAINED FROM SIMULATION USING __. 

TK PHOTOGRAPHY. THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION HAS DESIGNED STATIC _Aralm. I I . 

AND DYNAMIC SIMULATIONS WHICH WILL ASSIST IN THIS DETERMINATION, PRO- np I '1 

Ci VIDEO THAT PERSONNEL WITH PROPER CLEARANCES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. 

EARL I ER MY REQUEST FOR CLEARANCES FOR THE FLIGHT CREW TO ACCOMPLISH 122 i I 

THIS TASK WAS DEFERRED. AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION, CLEARED OFFICERS FROM 1 I Ci THE PROGRAM OFFICE HAVE DEVOTED AVAILABLE TIME ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS 

TO ASSIST IN THE SIMULATION. THIS ACTION CANNOT POSSIBLY ACHIEVE THE 

DESIRED RESULTS BECAUSE OF CONFLICTS RESULT! NG FROM HIGHER PR I OR IT Y 

c) REOUIREME NT S TO SUPPORT PHASE ' II NEGOTIATIONS. PSAC' S INTEREST DICTATES THAT WE CONTINUE THE SIMULATION ON A PRIORITY BASIS. IN ORDER TO 

DO THIS, I FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO IMMO- , . 

i) IATELY OBTAIN SI /TK CLEARANCES FOR THE SEVEN (7) CREWMEMBERS THAT ARE 

CURRENTLY PRESENT FOR DUTY IN THE PROGRAM OFFICE. I MOST URGENTLY 

SOLICIT YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER. 

C) S C C 11 E T 

6T 

(;) 

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ET 

XXXXX 

NO SIX THREE 

TOPCECRET 0119332 

CITE WHIG 436.3 

EEORET/SECUR 

FOR COL FORD 

THE FoLowitI3 MOL ASTRONAUTS HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED BY 

THEIR PARENT SERVICE AS HAVING MET THE PERSONNEL 

SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ACaL,-SS TO 3YE1AN PROJECTS: 

AIR FORCE: MAJOF flICJ-IAEL J. ADAMS 

MAJOR ALBERT H. CREWS, JR. 

CAPTAIN RICHARD E. LAvIYEP. 

CAPTAIN LACHLAN MACLEAY 

CAPTAIN FRANCIS G. NEUFEcK 

CAPTAIN JAMES :1. TAYLOR 

NAVY: LT JOHN L. FIICEY 

LT RICHARD H. TRULY 

T PgECRET 

CFN: 4363 

/SECUR 

FOR COL FORD 

THE FOLLCVIN3 MOL ASTRONAUTS HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED BY 

THEIR PARENT SERVICE AS ;AV JET TIE PERSONNEL 

SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO .31/E :Vs; PROD CTS: 

AIR FORCE: MAJOR MICHAEL J. ADAMS 

MAJOR ALBERT H. GPEWS, JR. 

CAPTAIN RICHARD E. LAYYER 

CAPTAIN LAO;-U,^1 1,'ACLI,..AY 

CAPTAIN :FRANCIS r. NEUBECK 

CAPTAIN JAMES M. TAYLOR 

IAVY: LT JOHN L. FINLEY 

LT RICHARD H. TRULY 

BT 

di 1 
711-•■■•••■•■••171; 

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Maj Lisciotti/mhr/4 Oct 65 

• 

• 

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF/SSC, CIA 

SUBJECT: MOL Program Astronaut's Security Selection 

Criteria 

Attached for your information are "Security 

Criteria for Selection of MOL Astronauts" directed 

by the DINED and intended for SECRET (non-BYEMAN) 

classification. A copy of AFR 205-34 is also 

attached. 

A special selection board has been established 

by the Chief of Staff, USAF, and it is expected 

that a total of 15 astronauts will be selected. 

A public announcement is expected to be made 

in the near future announcing the identities of 

eight of the selected astronauts. 

••■■••••■••■■•■•. 

• ■••••••••••••••••■■• 

•••••••••••■••••••••, 

•••■•■•••■••••■• 

===== 

Atchs LOUIS F. MAZZA 

f••••••••••••••••10. Security Criteria Chief Security .Officer Z;;;•. - AFR 205-34 NRO Staff 

Distribution 

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Cy #2 - SS-3 

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SECURITY CRITERIA FOR SELECTION 

OF MOL ASTRONAUTS 

Security criteria for selection of MOL astronauts will li12k.b.ed 

as an integral part of the selection processes and are so designed as 

iry to cause an assessment of the individual in terms of the total security-. 

risk factor as related to the sensitive tasks the individual might be 

required to perform, rather than being restricted to evaluation in terms 

of suitability for access to classified and special access information. 

Candidates will meet the personnel security criteria prescribed 

in USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, without waiver, and of AFR 205-34 

• 

relating to Ultra Sensitive Positions. 

A current security background investigation, consistent with 

USAFINTEL 201-1, TOP SECRET, and AFR 205-34, will be initiated 

and a careful psychological and psychiatric examination made in the 

case of all candidates. Both the investigation and the psychological 

and psychiatric examination will be of such detail as to provide a basis 

to assess the candidates' ability and compunction to perform a wide 

variety of sensitive tasks as might be assigned to the MOL program 

under unusual military security restrictions. All facets of the candidates' behavior, conscience, motivation and personal affairs that might 

have a bearing upon his ability to so perform should be carefully. 

explored. 

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