WESTERN

DEVELOPMENT

DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS

AIR

RESEARCH

AND

DEVELOPMENT

COMMAND
Western Development Division

Post Office Box 262

Inglewood, California

HISTORICAL EXPORT 

WEAPONSYTE 117I, 

1 January - 31 December 1956

WESTERN DIVELOPMSET DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS

AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

LIMI9EID DISTRIBUTION ONLY 

Alfred R eller,

WW Historian

15 April 1957 

This material contains information affecting the

netionsi defense of the United States within the

meaning ot the Espionage Laws, This 18, U. S. C.,

Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation ot which in any manner to an unauthorised

person is prohibited W lavt.

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS THIS DOCUMSNT CONSISTS

otaPAGES. COPT

Or_a0PlES.
omit.x.r;

,...,

WEAPON MIME 117L

In October 1955 Lt General Thomas B. Power, Commander, ABDC,

directed that responsibility for managing the development of

Weapon System 117L, the Advanced. Reconnaissance System (nicknamed

PIED. PIPER), be transferred, from WADO to the Western Development

Division.' Brig General B. A. Schriever, Commander, WDD, was

instructed, to prepare a system development plan for the weapon

system. Since the weapon system was then undergoing a critical

phase in design studies, General Schriever and Brig General

Nowell N. Estes agreed that, in orderto prevent possible program

disruption, the transfer of management responsibility for the

system from Dayton to VIDD4 would be carefU114 , phased. The intent

was to effect the transfer smoothly and at a time period

consistent with the workload of the program2

Mader these agreements, Colonel Otto Glasser and Commander

Robert C. Truax, of the Division, aided by former members of the

Dayton WBPO, prepared, a preliminary WDD Development Plan for

WS 117L in January 1956. 3 This preliminary plan was prepared in

response to an urgent request from General Power that a plan be

presented on that portion of the ABS 'which could be used to

demonstrate an orbital capability within the International

Geophysical year and shortly thereafter. It appeared that this

program could insure a "backup" capabilitutoTroject VAIRNMEd4

yit DOH, - 57a4 aim wpGH -57 -4A
I

WEAPON sum 117L WDD development study of the possibility of a "backup" capability

for VANGUARD indicated that this would be feasible providing

impleme

nting_eations were taken at an early date, together with

the necessary funding and priorities.

The Advanced Reconnaissance System has bad a long and interest-

-- ins research and development history. 4

 In 1945 German research in

the field of earth-circling sateLlites came to the attention of

the Armed Forces. As a result, the E r. S. Navy contracted with

the Glenn L. Martin Company to continue studies in this field.

• In 1946, under Air Corps sponsorship, the then newly created

RAND Corp

oration also undertook feasibility studies of earth

satellites. In September 1947, RAND determined that a satellite

was technically feasible. Both the Navy and the Air Corps continued to sp

onsor research in the satellite area during 1947.

Early in 1948 the question arose as to whether the Navy or

.the Air Force should, continue their efforts in the field. The

Research and Development Board approved Air Force 

sponsorship of

the project, after the Navy had withdrawn their claim to sole

rights to earth-circling satellite development. Immediately thereafter the Air Force requested the RAN. Corporation to establish a

program for investigation of possible satellite development. The

Research and Development Board concurred, in Air Force sponsorship

of this p

rogram, and indicated that the RAND Cor

poration should

be the agency utilised. The Navy then 

cancelled. the Glenn L.

Martin satellite p

rogram and withdrew frowthe7field*to-concentrate 11111.111t

=2- Wallas 67-4

WDGH-57-4A
on other upper-atmosphere projects.

In the next few years RAID studied the problem, which was •

given the,4name Project MADAM RAND issued serial reports

on the major aspects and compenearts for a satellite system, and

investigated the utility of a satellite for military purposes.

Their studies indicated that a space vehicle could be placed on,'")

an orbit to the earth by a rocket powered booster. This space

vehicle, with appropriate instrumentation and links with ground

stations, could be. utilized for area reconnaissance and for

geophysical purposes. To perform this reconnaissance fUnction

a television sywtosa toget/xo• with coma/cation links which would

transmit information and pictures to ground Stations would be

utilized.5

RAND personnel recognized the fact that numerous system

component development problems existed. Many of these development

problems were major, but they could be solved by app..% development efforts. Chief among these problems were the development of

power sources to operate the satellite's equipment, the development of television and communication components, and, of an orbital

attitude sensing and control system which would keep the satellite

properly oriented on its orbit, say at 300 miles above the earth,

and would keep its sensors pointed in the right direction for the

transmittal of intelligence to ground stations.

These were only a few of the specific problems which were

uncovered and identified by the rporation studies. There

404! W DClat 871-4

111111111011p _ WDGH -57 -4A

WEAPON arena 117L
elk I

WICAPON sum 117L

were many more; nearly all were problems of first magnitude. Yet

the RAND researchers continued to investigate system needs and, in

1954, published a final Project FKRBRICK gay $eport. 6 Again

in the Thanuarx Re9ort, the reconnaissance utility of the satellite

was emphasized, with the observation that hardare development would

not require radically new technology or enormous coat. Key value

of the system was felt to be for photographic reconnaissance

intelligence, mapping intelligence, and weather

RANI) estimated that complete development : and initial operation

could. be acccaplished in about seven years at a cost of $10 million.

Cost estimate was believed reliable within a factor of two, for a

. • • "minimum pioneer" (visual) reconnaissance system.?

Just prior to the issuance of the final RAID reports, in the

latter half of 1953, the Air Force established a research and

development program on an advanced reconnaissance system. 8

 The

designation Weapon Byitem 1171, was reserved for use in ultimate 5 .

aTatem develoPmant• This Program was doonmented by .WADO under .

ARDC Manual.. 80-4, and as from . the System Planning Office, ..

where it was known as Project 14K-2226, to the Bombardment Missiles

Branch .of the Weapon System Division, as Project 1115. A Weapon.

Bystea Project Office was established, with Lt Colonel (anent= A.

Riepe as Office Chief. Lt Colonel Riepe was succeeded as office

• chief in August 1955 . by Lt Colonel William G. Xing, Jr.

A=1134. 19544. the Project Office initiated tasks to advance

the state of the art in project areas, and, intensive .feasibility

studies were undertaken by contractors. and-by ABDO Centers. For.

..•.. UMW lath -1-7.V.$4A
WEAPON. as= 1171.

example, by No'weigher 1955, "in house" Advanced. Reconnaissance System

tasks within ARM included:

Task No. Task Title 

21010 Design Study Advanced Reconnaissance System

21011 Special Research Studies

15000 Intelligence Parameters Study

15001 Study of Intelligence Ptocessing Methods

15002 Anquisition, Tracking, GrOund

Air - CaMmunicitione and. Command.

Portion of the ABS

Attitude and Guidance Control

Attitude and Guidance Control

Television Techniques

Auxiliary Power Plant

Saar Electrical Energy Converter

Effects of luclear Radiation on

Klectronic!Components

41262 Radiation Reconnaissance . Capability Study

41644 Electronic Component Part Application Criteria for 10,000 Hour

Reliable Operation

44147

50558

41261

30291

70843

41700

Project Engineer, Center

Mr. F. Range, AREC

Capt J. Coolbaugh, ABDC

Mr. R. Johnson, RADC

Mr. R. Johnson, BADC

Mt. F. Fa113k, RADC

Mr. F. K. Guenthner, WADC

Lt W. 0. Covington, WADC

Mr. J. Ruckaby, WADC

Lt Carl Johnson, WADC

Mr. B. C. Reynolds, WADC

Capt X. Griffith, WADC

Mr. Reck, WADC

Mr. S. Sereda, WADC

30205 Liquid Rocket Engine Technology

Flight Control Laboratory

Training Equipment and Ground

&Wart

Capt R. Decker, WADC

Lt H. Malcamson, RAMC

Mai L. Rouen, WADC

• •

Materials Laboratory

Geophysical Program and

Weather Forecast

Mr. L. Belzberg, WADC

Lt Col George Jones, and

Mt. Norman Sissenvine, APORC

Vow "411111111111 -5.1 Wirdh-177--44A
- - -

WEAPON SU= 1171.

As indicated earlier, there were a number of critical component

development areas for the AdmmudReconnaissance System which faced

the new Project Office. Among these were those of providing anxiliar;p

electrical power to operate satellite equipment. For this purpose

nuclear reactors, as well as solar and chemical energy sources, were

investigated. A second problem area was that of achieving component

reliability in a satellite environment in which components would have

to provide trouble-free operation over long periods of time. A third

problem was that of acquisition and tracking of the vehicle as it

passed around the earth on its orbit. A fourth problem, was that of

data acquisition and storage. A single satellite vehicle would be

capable of producing up to a hundred. thousand pictures daily. These

would have to be transmitted and stored, awl then interpreted. These

were only a few of the component problems which faced ABS development.

In fact, to solve such problems, the development of System components .

requiredeork in nearly every field of science.

However, with the intensive effort applied to the project, by

1955 sufficient data had been obtained from these uin house" ABDO

feasibility studies to insure that the problems were not insurmountable. This allowed the embarkation on design studies for the

systeml and on the study of integration of the various space-borne

and ground components into &workable reconnaissance system. 9

 Moreover, such development effort could be carried out as a coherent

• part of the over-all ARS Preaan6 10

AMOK 5744

WDGH -57 -4A
I

WEAPON =Tam 117L

Consequently, in the spring of 1955, in addition to "in house"

ARDC tasks, the W870 initiated design study contracts with Radio

Corporation of America/ Menai.. Martin Company, and Lockheed. Air-.

craft Corporation. 11

 . . Purpose of these design studies was to determine if a system of this type could be developed within a reasonable

enough time scale to warrant a full scale development effort.

The design studies submittedbyRCAI Vartii, and Lockheed

indicated.that the system could be develOped.. Consequently, upon

transfer12

of responsibility for system development to the Western .

. . 

Development Million early in 1956, action was taken to set up a

WS 117L project office under the Deputy Commander for Technical

Operations. Col Otto J. Glasser was named Assistant for WS 117L,

with Commander gcbert C. Truax as Deputy Assistant. On 13_Anguat

1956 Lt Col Fredric C. E. Oder succeeded. Col Glasser as Assistant

for WS 117L. Other personnel initially assigned to the office

were Copt J. S. Coolbaugh, Ceptill. O. Troetsehel and J. C.

• Herther. These latter were officers who had been associated with

the program at Dayton prior to its transfer.: Organisation and

key personnel of the WS 117L Project Office are shown on the

opposite page.

Initial actions of the new project office included activity

in evaluating and selecting a prime contractor for_141 1171... Early.

in March a Contractor Evaluation Board was established to study the

RCA,Martin,.and Lockheed design studies, and to recommend a

contractor.

13

•

A.4 -7-l"51.1wwwmPon

' IN LAM -57 -4A
MIN I

WEAPON sum 117L

The Contractor Evaluation Board for WO 117L included:

Colonel William. R. Baynes, BED MC, President

Lt Colonel R. C. Holub, HID AlIE

Commander E. C. Truax, WDD'

Lt Colonel W. G. Xing, Jr., REAM

Lt Colonel V. M. Genes, RED ARM

1/LieutenantR. S: Washburn, RID AMC

Mr. R. S. Blocker, RED=

The Board convened at Wright Patterson AFB, from 12 - 20 March

1956 and submitted a report to General Schriever recommending.

Lockheed as the systems contractor. This selection was approved by

General Schriever, General Power, and Headquarbers USAF agencies.

Following approval of the prime contractow

, selection, personnel

from the project office, assisted by other ambers of the WDD staff

and personnel, from the former project office, prepared a Development

Plan for W8 117L. Completed on 2 April, the Plan was presented to

ARDO and USAF Agencies, and, on 10 Mey 1956 to Secretary of the Air

Force, Donald .A. v • n....- 14 ‘mewles. A few months later the President's

Science Advisory Committee was also briefed on the proposed WS 117L

Development. Response an the briefings of May - June 1956 ranged

from " .. .Interested to enthusiastic."15

The WDD Development Plan for WS 117L envisaged a step by step

attainment of objectives leading toward increased utility of the

system. Stages of development embraced (1) an En gineering Prototype Test System to establish the feasibility of orbital operation;

(2) a Pioneer System; (3) an Advanced System; and (4) an Ultimate

System. These were further divided into a total of eight programs.

MOM WDGH 445.74A
11!!!!!!!!!III

1110011 SYS= 117L The Development Plea called for a two stage vehicle which

could be launched from United States territory. The "booster*

or first stage would be an ICBM which would fall away on burnout

approximately.

 3000 n. miles from launch. The second stage would

be the orbiting vehicle, which would have a propulsion system to

supply the necessary power to bring the vehicle to orbiting speed.

It would ascend to an altitude of about 300 nautical miles, where

an orbit would be established, and interne/ controls would orient

the vehicle in the proper attitude. The a ppropriate sensing

equipment (visual "ferret" or infra-red sensing, de

pending on

objectives) would be activated, and the signals received from the

sensing equipment would be stored on film, tape or some other

media. As the vehicle orbited to within the range of a ground

station, this recorded data would be transmitted to the ground

station, p

rocessed, and transmitted to the using agencies.

At the altitude of 300 n. mi., the vehicle would "circle"

the earth in approximately 90 minutes. Because the orbit would

be relatively fixed in space while the earth rotated inside it,

successive p

asses over the earth's surface would be displaced

Approximately 221- degrees. This would permit a. single vehicle

to view the entire earth in successive passes. The total time

required would depend on the width of the view desired. 17

A "p

ioneer" satellite, utilizing a film recording -

electronic read-out, would be capable of 

physiographic mapping.

It could report data with a resolution of 100 feets ' and give

agismiir WDGviDC114

*H

 57•4'

riPtImmomv, -57=4A
num Bram 1171,

some indication of the scope of military operations. This same

"pioneer" utilizing different electronic equipment would be able

to furnish information on the characteristics of high frequency

electronic emissions. This latter mission was considered to be of

great value since high frequency electromegnetic radiations are not

refloated to the sulk but are radiated into space, and consequently

18 cannot be monitored by normal means.

The votes could be improved through development experience.

Advanced versions of the reconnaissance system would provide

physiographic resolution to 20 feet or less, or more detailed

information on the characteristics of electrommonstic signals,

extending to infra-red radiations. Targets could be located vith

an accuracy of 1/10 mile.

Finally, the ultimate system could embrace daily scrutiny of

the world, including detection of long-range missiles after launch,

and detection of aircraft operations.

In addition to what might be considered strictly military

values, the reconnaissance system offered signifidant scientific

values for geophysical investigations. Weather phenomena, upper

atmosphere research, meteor and cosmic ray activity, as well as

solar and stellar spectra, could all be investigated *oath* ewe

platform. Thus the system had Important basic scientific value in

addition to military utility.

. As nv

a result of these briefings, development of the ABS warn

approved. 19

 Three mdllion dollars in FY57 P-600 buds was mode

available for system development. 20 over An initial letter contract

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P.t?;

.61(41

for systemWEAPON SY 117L development was let with the Nissile-Bystems Division

NOW 

of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (24;airemTad:;;i1F.)However,

P-600 funds available for system development were considered,

inadequate, and presentations were made to general Putt and his

staff at DCB/D, Hqtrs. USAF, requesting additional fUnds.21

Authorisation to obligate an additional two million dollars

was received on 7 December 1956. Warky in 1957, authority to

obligate up to a total of ten million dollarsforY157 was received. 23 Receipt of author#y to obligate these funds'in the

P-600 budget category eased the "fund famine," and enabled. Lockheed

Aircraft Corp

oration to begin system development work on a more

effective scale, although of necessity fund Limitations tended to

channel activity into component rather than total system development. Moreover, this funding obligation authority did not solve

fund problems in other areas. No funds were made available in

the P-100 and. P-200 areas, areas in which funds were needed in

order to provide a "...balanced system oriented 

approach to the

development of essential components of WS 117L." At the end of

*One significant difference in the WS 117L WDD management concept for the in comparison with WS 107A and WS 3 fact that Lockheed occupied the 15A programs was the

tractor for the Advanced position of a prime system con- Reconnalisance casee Of the System, whereas in the ICIN and 1E36 the System, Corporation was fulfilling the management role usually assigned the 

c prime systei

o

ontractor. 

wa

S

s

ae cf the Ramo-Wooldridge COrporation t VS 3.171. with respect that of furnishing technical, aid 

on an "as re quested" basis: to the Division

wpcut, 57.4

WDGH-57-4A •
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am 57-4

WDGH-57=4A

I

WEAPON SYSTEM 117L

the year, funding in these areas had not been resolved.

With these funds available, the Division Project Office took

action to initiate a contract with Massachusetts Institute of

Technology on ABS guidance and control. VADC research activities

on nuclear and solar auxiliary power units were continued. In

yet another area, ABC was authorized to continue research in

the geop

hysical environment area for the weapon system. Finally,

subsystem project plans were drafted and project and task number

assignments were established. 24

 The RAND Corporation initiated

studies of preliminary operational concepts for the system.

The approval of funds allowed Lockheed Aircraft Corporation

to undertake work as the system prime contractor. Progress during

the period consisted of activity in system technical management,

project direction, and system researchdevelopment and operation. 25

Development p

lanning for master scheduling of initial R and D

hardware mock-ups was underway. Design studies for the orbital

test vehicle airframe were initiated. Studies designed to utilizi

a propulsion system which had early availability were well advanced.

Sources of auxiliary per were under investigation, as were guidance'

and control, visual and electronic, and data processing studies. //

Lockheed's subcontractors, Eastman Kodak and C B S Laboratories also

report progress in these latter areas. It appeared that the program

was off to an auspicious start.
WEAPON MEEK 117L

Ltr, Maj Gen Albert Boyd, Deputy Ccamander, Weapon Systems, ARDC tR 241aj Gen B. A. Schriever, 7 Nov 55. No definite reason for

the-transfer was given. However, the system was dependent on

the availability of an ICBM for a booster, and thus was closely

tied to the ICBM program.

Uaj Gen B. A. Schriever, Memorandum of Understanding, Subj: "ARS Management," 16 Nov 1955 (Secrwt)

Memorandum of Understanding'betkomaj Gen B. AL. Schriever

and Brig Gen Howell M. Estes Jr., Subj: "Transfer of Responsibility for ABS Functional

program," 13 Jan 1956 (Conf)

WDD(ARDC) Development Plan, Weapon System 1171. Preliminary

Development Plan (Initial Test Phase) Advanced R econnaissance System, (Secret) WDD-56-00088

Ba45comid material for this sketch was taken from Historical

File, WE 117L Office, WDD, publications of the RAND and from an interview with Lt Col QwarbenA. Mope, VS 117L

Corp.g

oject

Office. For an additional account of the genesis of WS-117L,

see History.of ARDC, 1 July - 31 December 1955, Ch VIII, 325-359.

Project RAND, J. E. Lipp and others, Utility of a Satellite 

Vehicle for Reconnaissance, RAND 217, April 1951 (Secret).

The report stated as a general conclusion that "...television

satellites are feasible and that they would be useful if built and operated."

R-262 (Secret), 1 Mar 54, 2V, FEEDBACK was the code name used

for the RAND project during the period. Volume I contains a

full bibliography of all reports issued by RAND.

Ibid.

WADC Project 409-40.

ARDC System Requirement No. 5, 29 Nov 1954 (Secret) Amendment 1

to SR #5, 8 August 1955. These gave' authorization to proceed with Bill design studies by industry.

Ibid.

Bell Telephone Laboratories, though 

a proposal. invited, declined to submit

System Requirement #5, Had ARDC, 17 Oct 1955.

-Ord./ Of24-044A
•

'Al, ' ',. _ larl ill FOOTNOTES

(contd.)

WDD Special Orders #6, 5 March 1956.

Memo to WDTX, Subj "Major Events of CI 1956 for WS 117L." (Secret), 25 January 1957.

Early briefings on the utility of the Advanced Reconnaissance

System contained the thought that today, in the age of "Atomic

plenty,'" with long *range missiles -a thing of the near future,

the strategy of surprise attacks will become more and more

imPortant. This strategy can be Used. most easily by absolutist

governments, One of the chief means of.guarding against this

would be through a • vita 

activities such as like -the ABS which could,'keep military long range missile sites under surveillance. (ComirJR. C. Truax, Briefing on WS 117L, 6 April 1956).

WDD Development Flan, WS 

General Design 

117L, 2 April 1956 (Secret, RD) Specifications.

DD Form 613, WDD Development Plan, WS 117L, Advanced. Reconnaissance System, (Secret, RD) 2 April 1956.

Ibid. •

UsAF Development Directive 85, 3 August 1956 (Secret). ADDC System Development Directive 117L, 17 August 1956 (Secret).

Since no FY56 funds were available for the Lockheed contract,

action was taken by ARDC (TWX 12 May 1956) to authorize repro- gramming and expenditure 

Lockheed of remaining project 1115 fUnds so that cOuld begin engineering* studies on the system.. These •

funds, to the sum of $322,000.000 allowed. Lockheed to begin 

without delay. work

21. Since no ity57 or beyond funds bad been programmed, reprogreumding

action was necessary to obtain this money. Moreover, in view of

fund limitations on the program, the fear vas voiced that this

would force a'progrms of component and sub-system development,

rather than complete system development.

22..TWX, USAF AFDDP-B.

TWX ABDO RESCBC-1-16-E 15 Jan 1957 Indications were that the same amount would be available for 2738.

WS 117L Management Report, 31 Jan 1957 (Secret). .

25. Missile Systems Division Lockheed Aircraft Corp. WS

Semi.Annual Technical Program Report -.Period. 1 04 c 56 (8)..

WWII, WO° 4

-14- WDGI-1 -57 -4A

11111.1111,