\, 

-1'~294 

e 

USCIB: 29.20/6 

4 May 1955 

E03.3(h) (2) 

PL S6~36/50 USC 3605 

MEl.iDRANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF uscm: 

Subject: 

References: (a) USCIB 8.3/6 of 25 April 1955. 

(b) USCIB 8.3/7 of 3 ~fay 1955. 

1. The problem settled by references (a) and (b) touched off a 

discussion between the National Security Agency and GCHQ on the general 

question of the status of UKUSA CDMINT Units in West Germany. A review 

of that discussion is enclosed herewith for the information of the 

members • 

24 

.2. This office shares the view of the Director, NSA that the 

question of CD~fINT Units in Wast Germany poses no basic problems not 

already provided for within the framework of UKUSA policy. Specifically, 

it is felt that Appendix np11 to the UKUSA Agreement applies to 'West 

Germany in the same fashion that it applies to other Nations within 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Therefore, it is suggested 

that unless some member should perceive in the enclosure a specific 

problem requiring Board consideration, no action be taken on it until 

and unless ISIB should ask for USCIB 1s views on this matter. 

Enclosure 

IJSA serial 297 3 o.r 

3 May 1955. 

usom: .29.20/6 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 05-16-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 
0 m~294• 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASH~NGTON 25, D.C. 

ItMmbE VIA 63Milff e~ ONLY 

Serial: 2973 

3 Hay 1955 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

'i'Ofl SEeftE'f PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

MEI~DRANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRET.ARY, US CIB 

SUBJECT: Status of' UKUSA OOMI1'lT Units in West Germany 

1. Reference is made to USCIB 8.3/6 of 25 April 1955 wbioh\sets 

forth certain conditions govery--~e ISIB annroval yr a USCIB re. qua·. s·t. f'or 

relocation of a U .s. Air Force __ _ These condi tio.ns 

stem from a reluctance on the part or British authorities in Qerma.hy 

to approve the request. 

2. In order to provide the members of' USCIB with more detailed 

background inf'orma.tion, I have prepared a summary of' recent developments 

on this subject, as reflected in an exchange of messages between the 

Director, NSA, and SUSLO, London. 

3. On 23 March 1955, the Chief, l~A, Europe, was requested to make. 

arrangements to have Army Security Agency, Europe conduct a 9~lay I ·.. I 

Coordination with SUSLO was directed in order to secure British .concurrence 

with this proposal. It was emphasized that the proposal was :for test 

purposes only and did not involve a request for permanent relocation; 

consequently USCIB-I.SIB concurrence was not required at this time. 

\\ 

5. In reply, SUSLO \iaS informed that jhe general tenor o£ the 

British views seemed to indicate that UKUSA lwere 

not in a secure status. He was asked whether any change was contemplated 

for existing UK units in the US Zone or vice versa. 

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-p:f)~294 

e 

Serial: 2973 

3 May 1955 

6. In a subsequent message to SUSLO, the following informat:i,on was 

submitted for his guidance: 

a. USCIB is not at present engaged in a study concerning the 

status of non-NATO units on the soil of a sove:reign Germany. 

b. The Department of State member of USCIB has expressed the 

view that final ratification of the status of forces agreement a:ff ecting 

West Germany will not have the effect of forcing the withdrawal of US 

forces from that country pending completion of ?JATO rearrangements. 

c. USAREUR has stated there are no plans to relinquish any bases 

under its control to the West German Republic. 

d. Chief, NS.A.EUR, has requested ODJGEUR and subordinate commands 

to keep hlln apprised of plans and/or programs that might change or affect 

the current or future status of US COMINT units in West Germany. 

e. The Director, NSA, has addressed similar requests to the 

Department of Defense and the Army, Navy and Air Force. 

f. NSA CONINT base requirements are included in the JCS 11Survey 

of Joint US Base Requirements Outside Continental US. n These requirements 

are reviewed annually in November. 'All US units presently based in Germany 

are covered in the most current version of this document. 

7. On 18 April 1955, SUSLO (L) received the following informal a,nalysis 

of the problem from Director, GCHQ, who indicated he would be required to 

submit his recommendations to LSIB shortly: 

a. It is legally possible, as concerns West GerIDa.Jzy', to leave 

the OOMINT units there under national control and say nothing, hoping no 

notice need be taken of their purely national function. It would seem 

dangerous and short signted, however, to leave the units in West Germany 

without proper authorization, because it would be discovered sooner or 

later and might cause acute difficulties. 

b. Approval could be requested of tm i'ull NATO Council, including 

West Germany, for units to reamin under national control in West Germany. 

It would be preferable, however, not to go to the N.ATO Council, as approval 

would not be at all certain and would likely involve many other nationalities 

with possible inspection rights. 

c. The uni ts could be placed under SACEUR. This would seem to be 

the best choice because most British units concerned are already performing 

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TOP SECRE'f' 
Serial: 297'3 

3 May 1955 

a mission which in wartime would be a Shape "Y" mission. (It is recognized 

that US units in Europe are not all in a parallel position.) It is a aood 

bet that SACEUR will be either a UK or US officer, with either a. UK or US 

intelligence officer, hence we would be able to do business ef'fectively. 

It is to be hoped that SACEUR would designate eithe:t" a UK or US officer as 

Shape 11Y11 Officer, as his inspection authority could maintain security and 

provide, additionally, a view into French, Italian, etc. nyn units. 

8. SUSLO suggested it would be helpful to the Director, GCHQ, in 

making his case before LSIB, if' he could obtain an indication of US thinking 

on this problem in so far as US units in West Germany are concerned. SUSLO 

also requested our inf orr.ia.l reaction to this analysis and proposed solution. 

It was emphasized that tl~ Director, GCIIQ, intended to have ISIB-USCID 

consultations, in any case, so that each party would be i'ully aware of the 

other's proposed actions and would have an opportunity to comment on them. 

9. In reply, the following comments were prepared by the Director, 

NSA, coordinated with STATE, OSD, CIA and the Executive Secretary, and 

transmitted to SUSLO: 

a. Unilateral action on this matter by either US or UK should be 

avoided. 

b. For the present, the US favors proposal (a) of the Director, 

GCHQ, since the legality of the units is unquestionable (see para 7 above). 

It is not considered likely that the West Germans will raise questions about 

these units in the near future. There a.re no illusions here but that tbe 

West Germans already know of the COHINT units involved a..11d their function. 

c. Director, GCHQ 1s course (b) seems unreasonable in that the 

NATO Council has no responsibility to either object or concur in the 

intrusion of other NATO nation units on the soil of still other UATO nations, 

outside of NATO commitments. We concur in the vicu that the problem should 

not be raised before the NATO Council. Security considerations, as well as 

a question of approval, are involveC.. 

d. Placing the w..its under SACEOR, as recommended in course (c), 

may be desirable but many complications are involved. For example, many 

US units are not of the type planned for inclusion in the Shape 11y11 

activity; Shape 11Y" plans are principally war plans a:nd peacetime implementation is dependent on political, military and technical OOl·IDIT developments. 

Further, it is felt that the security problem and the problem of command 

relationships would make acceptance of this course of uction difficult. At 

best, this alternative would be premature at this time. 

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TOP SECRET 
'IDP Sli!CiJ!E Serial: 2973 

3 }!iay 1955 

e. An additional course or action for consideration is to 

negotiate 'With the West German state for permanent base rights. 

r. The Director, GCHQ, raises this problem specifically with 

regard to UKUSA COMINT units in West Germany. However, it is not clear 

as to how the status of these units differs from that of mrosA OOMINT 

unj ts j n t.he terr:i :tory of other NATO countrie,~ I I ~~~~~ 

EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP 5£CR£T 

/s/ J.s. Holtldck, Jr. 

J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr. 

Captain, US Navy 

:NSA Member, USCIBEC