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COMOR-D-56/13 

(Revised) 

6 August 1963 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 

SUBJECT: Project STOPPER 

Attached is a brief description of the current status 

of Project STOPPER as provided by of CIA. It is 

distributed for information and reference of COMOR. 

was requested to advise the COMOR from time to time of developments in this project of interest to the Committee. 

(-:.' / i ' 

rJ es Q. Reber 

( Chairman 

Comrni -tee on Overhead Reconnaissance 

Attachment: 

Subject paper 

Copies 2, 3 

4 

5, 6, 7, 8 

9 

10, 11 

12- 15 

16, 17 

18, 19 

State TCO 

DIA(Col. Ainsworth) 

DIA TOO 

OACSI TCO 

ONI TCO 

AFNIN TCO 

NSA TCO 

NRO TCO 

N.B. : COMOR -D-56/13, TCS-0337-63-KH, previously distributed, 

should be destroyed inasmuch as the security handling was 

incorrectly indicated. 

BYE-2893-63 

Copy 4:1 of 49 

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COMOR-D-56/13 

(Revised) 

Project STOPPER 

1. Project STOPPER is a simple and inexpensive electronic 

device installed in the DISCOVERER satellite series. To date there have 

been 2 STOPPER flights and others will be programmed. STOPPER's 

primary purpose is the collection of so-called vulnerability data on 

DISCOVERER satellites. To test the vulnerability of the satellite, STOPPER 

is programmed to: 

a. Intercept Soviet attempts to interrogate or otherwise sensitize the satellite's command channel, and 

b. Detect Soviet attempts to track the satellite. 

STOPPER has a secondary ELINT capability for signal pickup on 3 bands 

from 100 - 2500 mc. The first and second flights may possibly have picked 

up signals in the 1000 - 2500 mc band during several passes over the USSR, 

including, on the second flight, a 300 - mile line of sight fly-by over 

Sary Shagan. 

2. The system has some limitations as follows: 

a. Noise problems (e. g. , satellite cameras) can 

cause erroneous ELINT intercepts by STOPPER. 

b. STOPPER's band discrimination is not too good. 

c. At present any STOPPER pick up should be treated 

only as an indicator for correlation with other available data for 

later operational planning purposes. 

3. The organization for analysis and interpretation of STOPPER's 

"take" (both vulnerability data and ELINT) is not set at present. Lockheed 

is now doing the readout. Copies of this report are going to SAFSP 

(Secretary, Air Force Special Projects) in El Segundo. This reporting is 

then transmitted to NRO and thence to CIA. It is planned to establish a data 

transmittal link between Lockheed and CIA for 'quick" readouts of STOPPER 

missions. Copies of this type report would also be transmitted to DIA, 

SAFSP, and NRO. 

BYE-2893-63 

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20 TSO CIA 

21 -29 As st/OPS(NPIC) 

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31 TCO DDI Spe Center 

32, 33 CGS 

34, 35 CIA Member COMOR 

36 CGS/ReqBr/ReconGrp 

37 Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp 

38 AD/SI 

39 DDP TCO 

40 DDS&T 

41 AD/OSA 

42 FA/OSA 

43 Intel/OSA 

44 SO/OSA 

45 SAL/OSA 

46 RB/OSA 

47 -50 SA/DDS&T 

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