RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3321-19

 A-3394-19

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

T.A.C. and T.M., Sr.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

R.B. and THE BIOLOGICAL 

FATHER OF A-J.D.C., 

WHOMSOEVER HE MAY BE,

Defendants.

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF A-J.D.C. 

and T.M., Jr., minors.

___________________________

Submitted March 10, 2021 – Decided June 3, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-3321-19

Before Judges Ostrer, Accurso, and Vernoia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FG-07-0142-19.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant T.M., Sr. (Sarah L. Monaghan, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant T.A.C. (Lauren Derasmo, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Julie B. Colonna, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel; Rachel E. Seidman, 

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on 

the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants T.A.C. (Teresa) and T.M., Sr. (Thomas) appeal from the 

Family Part's April 6, 2020 judgment that terminated their parental rights to their

son, T.M., Jr. (Tommy), born December 18, 2016, and terminated Teresa's 
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parental rights to her son A.-J.D.C. (Andrew), born January 17, 2016.1 The 

children have been in placement since May 2017. 

Both parents contend the Division failed to present sufficient credible 

evidence to support the trial court's clear and convincing finding that the 

Division met the four prongs of the best interests standard. N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a). Teresa and Thomas also assert procedural and evidentiary errors. The 

Law Guardians for the two children join the Division of Child Protection and 

Permanency in opposing the appeal. We conclude, after reviewing the record in 

light of the parents' arguments, that the trial court correctly applied the 

governing legal principles, and sufficient credible evidence supports the court's 

findings. Therefore, we affirm.

I.

The Division presented its case through the testimony of adoption case 

worker Latoya Nannan, and a psychological expert, Elizabeth Stilwell, Psy.D. 

Nannan recounted reported incidents of domestic violence assault by Thomas 

against Teresa; Teresa's mental health issues; the parents' compliance and noncompliance with visitation and services; the parents' housing instability; the 

1 Andrew's putative father, who resided out-of-state, was never served, despite 

repeated attempts. Also, we use pseudonyms for the parties and the children 

because their names are excluded from public access by Rule 1:38-3(d)(12).
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Division's efforts to explore family placement; and the children's adjustment to 

their resource parents. Dr. Stilwell evaluated Teresa and performed bonding 

evaluations of Andrew with Teresa and his resource parent. But, she was unable 

to evaluate Thomas, because he failed to attend scheduled meetings with Dr. 

Stilwell. Dr. Stilwell testified that Teresa was unable to appropriately parent 

her children. Andrew had bonded with his resource parent. And terminating 

the parties' parental rights would not do more harm than good. The court also 

admitted into evidence voluminous Division records, subject to specific 

redactions requested mainly by Teresa's counsel. Teresa and Thomas did not 

testify, nor did they present any witnesses. 

Based on this record, Judge Wayne J. Forrest found, in a comprehensive 

written opinion, that the Division showed, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child;
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(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide 

services to help the parent correct the circumstances 

which led to the child's placement outside the home and 

the court has considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights; and 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

The court found Nannan and Dr. Stilwell were both credible. 

To support its finding that the children's "safety, health or development 

has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship,"

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1), the court noted that Tommy and Andrew were 

present during at least three domestic violence incidents, and Andrew was 

physically injured during one of them. Teresa obtained two temporary 

restraining orders against Thomas, who failed to complete an ordered batterer's 

intervention program. The court also relied on Dr. Stilwell's opinion that Teresa 

struggled with depression and lacked an understanding of its impact on her 

children, which impaired her ability to parent successfully. The court also noted 

neither parent had been able to achieve stable housing throughout the litigation, 

and Teresa was unable to provide proof of employment. 
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As for prong two, the court found that both parents were "unwilling or 

unable to eliminate the harm facing" Tommy and Andrew; they were "unable or 

unwilling to provide a safe and stable home" for them; and "the delay of 

permanent placement [would] add to the harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). The 

court noted both parents' inability to complete court-ordered and Divisionoffered services. Neither parent was able to provide a stable home for the 

children. Relying on Dr. Stilwell's testimony, Judge Forrest also found the harm 

facing Andrew included "evidence that separating [him] . . . from his resource 

family parents would cause [him] serious and enduring emotional or 

psychological harm." Ibid. 

Applying prong three, the court found the Division "made reasonable 

efforts to provide services to help the parent[s] correct the circumstances which 

led to the child's placement outside the home." The court listed the services

offered: 

psychological evaluations along with 

recommendations; psychiatric referrals; medication 

monitoring; consultations with domestic violence 

liaisons; batterer's intervention programs; individual 

counseling; supervised visitation, both in New Jersey 

and in North Carolina; transportation assistance; 

referrals for parenting, parent-aides, Family 

Preservation Services and Essex County Pregnancy and 

Parenting classes; placement for the two children and 

the payment of the board rate; Medicaid; Early 
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Intervention assessment and recommended services; 

and providing furniture and car seats for the children. 

The court found that Teresa completed some services, but not all, noting she was 

suspended from visiting her children because she arrived late or not at all. 

Teresa also avoided treatment for her depression despite a hospitalization and 

suicidal ideation. As she told Dr. Stilwell, she opted instead to "self-medicate[] 

with alcohol in order to numb herself." 

Although Thomas consistently attended supervised visits with Tommy in 

New Jersey, Thomas then moved to North Carolina. Afterwards, visitation was 

much less frequent. Thomas never completed ordered domestic violence 

programs, in New Jersey or North Carolina, although DCPP arranged for 

Thomas to complete services in both states. He also never obtained stable 

housing to accommodate his son.

The court also found, under prong three, that the Division "considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). The 

court noted that the Division considered placement with several of Thomas's and 

Teresa's family members and friends, but none were qualified before trial. 
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Notably, during trial, the Division was evaluating Teresa's grandparents as a 

possible placement for Tommy.2 

Lastly, the court found, under prong four, that "termination of parental 

rights [would] not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). The 

court found there was "no realistic likelihood that" Teresa or Thomas would "be 

able to safely and appropriately care for their respective children now or in the 

foreseeable future." Teresa lacked stable housing or employment and had 

significant unaddressed mental health issues. The children did not have a strong 

bond with Teresa, but Andrew was firmly bonded to his resource parent. 

Thomas refused to attend a bonding evaluation. Thomas had no stable housing. 

Thomas had never lived with Tommy or been solely responsible for Tommy's 

care. 

Therefore, the court concluded that neither Teresa nor Thomas was "able 

to provide [Andrew and Tommy] with a safe and stable home nor the 

permanency they so desperately need and deserve." In accord with Dr. Stilwell's 

opinion, the court found that Andrew's current placement and potential for 

adoption was his best hope for permanency. 

2 While the appeal was pending, the Division informed us that it approved 

Teresa's grandparents, Tommy was placed with them, and they are willing to 

adopt him.
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II.

We exercise limited review of the trial court's decision. In re 

Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). We defer to the trial court's 

fact-finding because of its "special expertise" in family matters and its "superior 

ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before it[.]" N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). We will not 

"second-guess or substitute our judgment for that of the family court, provided 

that the record contains substantial and credible evidence to support the decision 

to terminate parental rights." Id. at 448-49. We will not alter the trial court's 

findings absent a manifest denial of justice. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. 

v. V.K., 236 N.J. Super. 243, 255 (App. Div. 1989). However, we review de 

novo the trial court's interpretation of the law and its legal conclusions. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014).

Applying this standard, we reject Thomas's and Teresa's contention that 

the Division failed to prove the four prongs of the best interests test. We do so 

substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Forrest's written opinion. We 

limit our comments to the procedural and evidentiary questions the parties 

raised. 
10 A-3321-19

III.

Teresa contends she was deprived of a fair trial because she lacked counsel 

until the guardianship trial began, and because the trial court denied her 

adjournment request. We are unconvinced.

A.

Some background is necessary. At the first status conference after the 

Division filed its guardianship complaint, Teresa appeared telephonically and 

told the judge she hired private counsel, and gave his name, office address, and 

phone number.3 The judge advised Teresa that her attorney needed to file a 

notice of appearance. Evidently, none was filed. At the next conference a month 

later, the judge was informed Teresa had refused to sign a 5-A form, but she did 

not say she wanted to represent herself. The judge discussed the importance of 

having counsel, and urged Teresa to fill out the form. By the end of the 

conference, Teresa said she would. The court announced the next status 

conference date on the record.

Then, Teresa did not appear at the next four status conferences. At the 

first one, the deputy attorney general reported that Teresa received the 5-A form, 

3

Judge Forrest did not preside over the various pre-trial hearings. 
11 A-3321-19

but did not complete it, instead expressing her intention "to talk to her private 

attorney." At the next three court sessions, the court tried unsuccessfully to 

reach Teresa by telephone while on the record. The court left messages about 

the court schedule and the need for her counsel to file an appearance. 

On the day trial was scheduled to begin, January 29, 2020, Teresa 

appeared in court with a signed 5-A form. She said she was absent "[a] lot of 

times . . . because of work or I'm at visitation." The court determined that trial 

could not proceed that day.

In mid-February, Teresa appeared with her appointed counsel at a status 

conference before Judge Forrest. Counsel acknowledged receiving discovery. 

He requested and received eight days to prepare objections. He raised no other 

concern about his ability to prepare for trial. 

After a brief discussion on the status of the Division's efforts to assess 

Teresa's grandparents as a possible placement, Thomas's attorney asked, "Can 

we adjourn the trial and then come back next month and pick new dates?"

4

 

4 Thomas's attorney had previously requested an adjournment in mid-January, 

to permit the Division to explore placement with certain members of Thomas's 

family. But, the court denied the request after noting that the Division had ruled 

out those family members; the children had been in placement since May 2017.
12 A-3321-19

Counsel presented no argument in support of the request, which Judge Forrest

denied. Teresa's attorney stated he would have asked the same question. 

At another pre-trial conference later that month, both counsel appeared 

without their clients. The attorneys did not renew a request to adjourn, or state 

they were unprepared to proceed.

On the first day of trial before Judge Forrest, the deputy attorney general 

announced that Teresa's grandparents "were presumptively approved." She 

stated that the Division "hopefully" would move Tommy there in "the next 

couple weeks," or "up to a month." In the meantime, the Division would 

continue the licensing process. In response to the court's inquiry, the Division 

stated it opposed moving Andrew to his great-grandparents' home because he 

was bonded to his current resource parent, who had cared for him for over two 

years and was "fully committed to adoption." However, Andrew's greatgrandparents were being assessed to take him, too, as a "backup plan." 

Teresa's counsel requested an adjournment until Tommy was placed with 

his great-grandparents, "[b]ecause if the child is placed there . . . that might 

change our position about having the child." Thomas's counsel also asked for 

an adjournment, because Thomas might also be willing to engage in an identified 
13 A-3321-19

surrender of his parental rights to Teresa's grandparents.5 Counsel also noted 

that Thomas would be entitled to three pre-surrender counseling sessions.

The Division opposed an adjournment. The Law Guardian did as well, 

noting that delay would disserve the children's interest in permanency, and that 

placement with their great-grandparents could be derailed by various 

developments, including a lack of licensing, an illness, or another placement. 

Judge Forrest denied the request after confirming that the process to 

license the grandparents could take four to six months. He explained that the 

children's interests in permanency deserved priority. He stated the case had 

already been delayed, noting the case was almost three years old and the 

guardianship complaint was pending for almost a year. Judge Forrest said he 

understood that parents are interested in an identified surrender because it gives 

them some control over their children's future. But, "in fairness" to the parties 

and "in fairness more so to the children, there has to be finality." 

5 Counsel was less than definitive about Thomas's intentions. On one hand, she 

indicated Thomas was only considering identified surrender, stating that 

Thomas was "interested in receiving presurrender counseling" and he "would be 

potentially amenable to doing an identified surrender." On the other hand, 

counsel indicated Thomas's intentions were more concrete, stating "we would 

ask for an adjournment of the trial . . . so that they can be licensed so he can 

perform the identified surrender to them." 
14 A-3321-19

After a break, discussions of identified surrender resumed. Teresa's 

counsel renewed his request for an adjournment, stating she would be willing to

agree to an identified surrender of both boys, and only both boys, to her 

grandparents. Thomas's attorney reiterated that Thomas wanted pre-surrender 

counseling so he could "think about what his final position will be." The deputy 

attorney general reiterated the Division's opposition to moving Andrew to his

great-grandparents' home at that time. The Law Guardian acknowledged the 

value of keeping the siblings together, but continued to object to adjourning the 

trial.

Judge Forrest concluded that trial would proceed, but the Division was 

obliged to provide the parties pre-surrender counseling.6

B.

We first consider Teresa's argument about the lack of counsel. Teresa 

contends that "[a]lthough the judge repeatedly indicated on the record she was 

concerned by Teresa's lack of counsel, she failed to ascertain whether Teresa 

intended to represent herself and did not appoint standby counsel." Teresa relies 

6 At the close of the trial, Thomas's attorney returned to the subject of identified 

surrender, this time expressing Thomas's interest more definitively. She asked 

the court to "postpone judgment so that my client, he would like to do an 

identified surrender of [Tommy] to the maternal great-grandparents, he would 

like to have a say in where [Tommy] goes . . . ."
15 A-3321-19

on New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. A.O.J., 464 N.J. 

Super. 21, 23 (App. Div. 2020), in which we reversed a guardianship judgment 

entered after the trial judge conducted a brief trial at which the defendant was 

neither "present nor represented by counsel." Teresa also argues the trial court 

failed to assure that she wanted to proceed without an attorney as required by 

New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency v R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123 

(2018).

At the outset, we note that Teresa's trial counsel, once appointed, did not 

assert that Teresa was prejudiced by her lack of counsel, let alone seek any 

accommodations or adjustments to remedy any prejudice.7 We are disinclined 

to address an issue not raised below, particularly where a well-founded request 

for relief could have been granted before proceeding to trial. See N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 339 (2010) (stating that "issues 

7 Teresa contends that had she been represented by counsel earlier, she would 

have been able to challenge the adequacy of the services she received and to 

take other steps to protect her interests. However, throughout the FN litigation, 

Teresa was represented by counsel who was in a position to advocate for her 

interests at that time. Also, Teresa does not argue that her appointed counsel in 

the guardianship matter was ineffective for failing to seek remedies for the 

alleged prejudice caused by the delayed appointment of counsel. See Fall & 

Romanowski, N.J. Family Law, Child Custody, Protection & Support § 13:8-2

cmt. c (2019) (noting that "[p]ursuant to R. 5:12-7, claims involving ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel must be raised on direct appeal of a proceeding 

initiated by DCPP") (citing DYFS v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 310-311 (2007)).
16 A-3321-19

not raised below will ordinarily not be considered on appeal unless they are 

jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate the public interest"). 

Furthermore, this case is nothing like A.O.J. In that case, the mother 

"complained to the judge about her inability to communicate with her attorney 

'for months,'" and then the judge allowed that same public defender to be 

relieved of counsel without filing a formal motion or notifying her client. Id. at 

23. At that point, the mother was left with only two options: retain private 

counsel or proceed pro se. But she could not afford to do the former. And the 

trial court mistakenly inferred that A.O.J.'s complaints about her attorney 

constituted a waiver of her right to counsel.

Here, Teresa never asked the court for assistance in securing counsel. The 

court acted reasonably, based on Teresa's statement under oath that she had 

obtained private counsel. When the purported private attorney failed to file a 

notice of appearance, the court tried to get Teresa to sign the 5-A form to obtain 

appointed counsel. The court reasonably relied on her statement, again under 

oath, that she would do so. Then, Teresa simply absented herself from court 

proceedings until the day of trial. Because Teresa never expressed an interest 

in representing herself, there was no reason for the court to engage in the 
17 A-3321-19

searching inquiry that her waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and 

voluntary, as required by R.L.M.

In sum, the delayed appointment of counsel did not deprive Teresa of a 

fair trial, because the delay was Teresa's own doing, and she failed to

demonstrate she suffered any prejudice as a result of her delay in procuring 

counsel.

C.

We also reject Teresa's contention the court erred by declining to adjourn 

the trial. "A court may exercise broad discretion in controlling its calendar." 

State v. Kates, 426 N.J. Super. 32, 45 (App. Div. 2012), aff'd o.b., 216 N.J. 393 

(2014). We review the trial court's decision on an adjournment request for an 

abuse of discretion. Escobar-Barrera v. Kissin, 464 N.J. Super. 224, 233 (App. 

Div. 2020). We consider "the amount of prejudice suffered by the aggrieved 

party" and will reverse only if the adjournment denial works an injustice. Ibid. 

Furthermore, in guardianship cases, "[g]iven the impact of a trial delay or 

interruption on a child awaiting permanency, Family Part judges . . . must be 

mindful of the need for prompt determination of the difficult issues before 

them." R.L.M., 236 N.J. at 146-47. "[C]hildren have an essential and overriding 

interest in stability and permanency." In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 26 
18 A-3321-19

(1992). Therefore, "it is inimical to their welfare that their legal status remain 

unresolved." Ibid.

Applying these principles, we discern no error in the trial court's refusal 

to delay trial. First, continued delay disserved the children's interest in stability 

and permanency. Notably, to vindicate those interests, the statute requires the 

court to hold a guardianship trial within three months after the petition is filed. 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.2. Judge Forrest was asked to adjourn a trial that was already 

scheduled to begin seven months beyond that deadline. 

Second, an adjournment to permit the Division to complete the licensing 

process for Teresa's grandparents would not have obviated the need for a trial. 

Teresa floated the idea of an identified surrender of both children to her 

grandparents. But the Division and the Law Guardian opposed uprooting 

Andrew from his resource parent who wished to adopt him. In addition, Thomas 

was unsure he would also agree to an identified surrender. If he declined, there 

would still need to be a trial to resolve his parental rights to Tommy. Finally, 

there also was no assurance that Teresa's grandparents would obtain licensing 

and Teresa would agree to an identified surrender. 

Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Teresa's 

adjournment request. 
19 A-3321-19

IV.

Thomas contends the judgment should be set aside because the court relied 

solely on hearsay pertaining to the incidents of domestic violence and Thomas's 

participation or lack thereof in services and visitation.

8

 Thomas complains that 

the trial record "is made up almost entirely of [Division] contact sheets and 

investigation reports, without medical records and service provider reports. " 

Thomas cites to New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. J.Y., 352 

N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 2002), in which we criticized how a trial court 

conducted a fact-finding hearing in an abuse or neglect case. The trial court in 

that case wrongly relied on attorneys' factual representations outside their 

personal knowledge, heard from unsworn witnesses not subject to crossexamination, and relied on vague and unsupported stipulations of the parties.

No doubt, the court relied on hearsay that Thomas assaulted Teresa on 

multiple occasions. Teresa alleged that in one altercation over custody at 

Thomas's mother's house, Thomas struck Teresa while she held Tommy in her 

arms. In another incident at Thomas's mother's house, Thomas struck Teresa 

8 Thomas also complains that only hearsay supported the allegation that Teresa 

and Thomas failed to feed Tommy properly when he was an infant, resulting in 

Tommy's failure to thrive. But, because the trial court did not rely on these 

allegations in reaching its conclusions on the four prongs, we need not address 

them.
20 A-3321-19

from behind and caused her to fall on and injure Andrew. Teresa also repeated 

her sister's allegation that she saw Thomas punch and strangle Andrew, leaving 

him with visible injuries that Division staff observed.

However, Teresa's allegations were not the only evidence of domestic 

violence. After the incident in which Teresa fell on Andrew, a caseworker 

observed Andrew's bruise. Thomas was arrested after that incident. Although 

Thomas disputed Teresa's version of events, he admitted a physical altercation, 

and said he "wanted to apologize" to Teresa but she rebuffed him. He denied he 

was a physically violent person, and "[h]e stated that he just needs anger 

management."

In a psychological evaluation, Thomas "admitted he and [Teresa] had 

physical fights." He admitted that when he got angry, "it's at a 10," but he 

asserted it took a lot to make him that way. He also admitted he was placed in 

special classes in school because of "anger and learning." But he insisted he did 

not need to participate in batterer's intervention because his behavior was not as 

bad as others'. The court also relied on hearsay in finding that Thomas never 

completed batterer's intervention; and his visitation became less frequent after 

he moved to North Carolina.
21 A-3321-19

We presume for argument's sake that some of that hearsay, such as 

Teresa's allegations, may have been subject to a well-founded objection.

9

 

However, "hearsay evidence not objected to is evidential." State v. Ingenito, 87 

N.J. 204, 224 n.1 (1981) (Schreiber, J., concurring). "When objectionable 

hearsay is admitted in a bench trial without objection, we presume that the factfinder appreciates the potential weakness of such proofs, and takes that into 

account in weighing the evidence." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. 

J.D., 447 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2018). A defense attorney may, as a 

strategic matter, decide that it is better to permit objectionable hearsay to come 

in, than to object and prompt the proponent to offer more compelling 

unobjectionable evidence. Ibid. 

We are satisfied that the record evidence, even if some of it was subject 

to a well-founded objection that was not made, was sufficient to support the 

9 However, Teresa's statements that Thomas repeatedly committed acts of 

domestic violence against her conceivably could be characterized as statements 

against interest, as she admitted that she repeatedly exposed the children to those 

assaults. She obtained temporary restraining orders, then allowed the cases to 

be dismissed without securing protection against future assaults. To satisfy the 

hearsay exception, the Division would have had to persuade the court that 

Teresa's statements were "so far contrary to . . . [her] pecuniary, proprietary or 

social interest, or so far tended to subject [her] to civil . . . liability . . . that a 

reasonable person in . . . [her] position would not have made the statement unless 

. . . [she] believed it to be true." N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25).
22 A-3321-19

court's findings that Thomas engaged in acts of domestic violence and refused 

to complete ordered batterer's intervention programming.

This court's reversal in J.Y. does not compel a similar result here. The 

trial in that case suffered from multiple failures to abide by the Rules of Court 

and the Rules of Evidence; a level of informality that fell short of the basic 

attributes of a fair trial. Nothing of the sort occurred here. Instead, this case 

presents the often-repeated scenario in which the Division offers its 

documentary file into evidence, and the defendant makes few if any objections, 

apparently preferring that mode of presentation. 

In sum, the court did not deny Thomas a fair trial by considering hearsay

that was admitted without objection.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of guardianship and 

termination of parental rights.