[Cite as S tate ex rel. Associated Builders & Contrs. of Cent. Ohio v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 125 Ohio St.3d 112, 2010-Ohio-1199.]

T HE S TATE EX REL . A SSOCIATED B UILDERS & C ONTRACTORS OF C ENTRAL O HIO ET AL ., A PPELLANTS , v. F RANKLIN C OUNTY B OARD OF C OMMISSIONERS ET AL ., A PPELLEES . [Cite as S tate ex rel. Associated Builders & Contrs. of Cent. Ohio v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 125 Ohio St.3d 112, 2010-Ohio-1199.] Labor — Prevailing wage — R.C. Chapter 4115 — Policy of board of county commissioners is not equivalent to municipal ordinance or similar provision having force of law — Pr eemption analysis does not apply — Board abused its discretion in applyi ng bid-evaluation criterion to bidder for public works contract. (No. 2008-1478

— Submitted June 2, 2009

— Decided March 25, 2010.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-301,
2008-Ohio-2870.

__________________ S YLLABUS OF THE C OURT 1. A policy of a board of county commissioners for evaluating bids on public contracts is not the equivalent of a municipal ordinance or similar provision having the force of law. Thus, the policy is not a local law within the meaning of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and a preemption analysis does not apply. 2. When a public authority adopts a policy establishing criteria for evaluating the eligibility of bidders on public works projects, the public authority must apply its evaluation criteria in a manner consistent with the exercise of
sound discretion.

__________________S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 C UPP , J. {¶ 1} This appeal concerns the process used by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners to determine that appellant The Painting Company was not the best bidder for a public works cont ract despite being the lowest bidder. We hold that preemption under R.C. Chapter 4115, the framework providing rights and remedies for private contr actors and subcontractors engaged in the construction of public improvements in this state, is not applicable to the policy the board established for evaluating bids on public contracts. Therefore, no preemption analysis is required. {¶ 2} We also hold that a public authority, although it may create a policy establishing criteria by which it will evaluate bids for public works
contracts to determine the lo west and best bidder, is obligated to apply its bid evaluation criteria by exercising its sound di scretion. In this case, we find that the public authority failed to exercise sound di scretion with respect to the manner in which it applied its bid eval uation criteria to evaluate a bid submitted for a public works contract. Therefore, we reverse th e court of appeals’ judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background {¶ 3} In October 2007, the Franklin County Board of Commissioners solicited bids for painting work in connection with the construction of the new county-owned Huntington Park baseball stadium in Franklin County, Ohio. The board received two bids for painting work in the new facility. The lowest and best bid would receive the contract for the Huntington Park project. {¶ 4} In 2002, the board had adopted by resolution a set of criteria for evaluating bids for a public works cont ract. According to the resolution, the purpose of these criteria was to “ensure that the County’s contractors are compliant with the law[,] financially stable and capable of executing constructionJanuary Term, 2010

3 contracts in a competent and professional manner.” 1 These criteria are referred to as the Qualitative Contracting Standards by the board. The board reaffirmed its
commitment to these criteria in 2006 when it announced that the criteria would be incorporated into the invitation to bid for the Huntington Park project. {¶ 5} The lowest bidder for the contract was The Painting Company. The Painting Company is a nonunion shop. The one other bidder was a union shop contractor whose bid was $46,000 more than The Painting Company’s bid. After reviewing the submitted bids, the board formally rejected The Painting Company’s bid for the Huntington Park project. Specifically, the board stated that “The Painting Company does not satisfy Section 8.2.4.15 of the [invitation to bid] documents.” The board went on to state that “[t]he attached information demonstrates that The Painting Company has been found by the State of Ohio tohave violated the State’s prevailing wage laws more than three times in a twoyear period within the last ten years; therefore, The Painting Company is not eligible for award of this contract.” {¶ 6} The board’s supporting materials in cluded copies of 14 complaints filed with the Ohio Department of Commerce alleging prevailing-wage violations against The Painting Company during the specified time period of Section 8.2.4.15. All of the complaints had been investigated by the department, and several investigations concluded that any prevailing-wage violation either was not

1. {¶ a} These criteria included such considerations as: { ¶ b} “3. Bidder certifies that Bidder will employ supervisory personnel on this project that have three (3) or more years in the specific trade and/or maintain the appropriate state license, if any. { ¶ c} “* * * { ¶ d} “6. Bidder certifies that Bidder has implemented an OSHA compliant Safety Program and will provide evidence of such upon request. { ¶ e} “* * * { ¶ f} “10. Bidder certifies that Bidder’s construction license has not been revoked in any state. { ¶ g} “* * * { ¶ h} “15. Bidder certifies that Bidder does not have an Experience Modification Rating of greater than 3.0 (a penalty rated employer) with respect to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation risk assessment rating.”S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 intentional or resulted in no liability. Another group of investigations were resolved through a settlement agreement between The Painting Company and the director of the department. In that agreement, The Painting Company was permitted to expressly discla im, without any qualificati on by the department, any liability or wrongdoing in connecti on with the prevailing-wage laws. {¶ 7} Subsequent to the board’s acti on, The Painting Company requested and received a formal bid-protest meeting, at which the board affirmed its rejection of The Painting Company’s bid. {¶ 8} Thereafter, The Painting Company appealed from the board’s decision. Although questioning the board’s wisdom of disqualifying contractors who may have superficial and unintentional violations of the prevailing-wage laws, both the trial and appellate courts determined that the board had the authority to set relevant criteria to eval uate bids on county public works projects.
Both courts also held that the board di d not abuse its discretion in rejecting The Painting Company’s bid because the company failed to meet the county’s criterion of compliance with the state’s prevailing-wage laws. {¶ 9} Subsequently, The Painting Comp any, joined by appellant Associated Builders & Contractors of Central Ohio trade association (collectively, appellants), appealed to this court. 2 We accepted review under our discretionary jurisdiction. 120 Ohio St.3d 1415, 2008-Ohio-6166, 897 N.E.2d 651.
II. Statutory Provisions {¶ 10} Ohio’s prevailing-wage laws are contained in R.C. Chapter 4115. In general, these provisions require c ontractors and subcontractors for public works projects to pay laborers and mechanics the “prevailing wage” in the locality where the project is to be perform ed. See generally R.C. 4115.03 through

2. Associated Builders & Contractors of Central Ohio is a not-for-profit trade association made up of contractors, subcontractors, material supplie rs, and related entities that provide construction services within Ohio.January Term, 2010

5 4115.21; J.A. Croson Co. v. J.A. Guy, Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 346, 349
, 691 N.E.2d 655. "‘[T]he primary purpose of the prevailing wage law is to support the integrity of the collective bargaining process by preventing the undercutting of employee wages in the private construction sector.’" Id. at 349
, 691 N.E.2d 655, citing State ex rel. Evans v. Moore (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 88, 91, 23 O.O.3d 145,
431 N.E.2d 311. {¶ 11} The prevailing rate of wages for a particular class of work is determined by the director of the Ohio Department of Commerce. R.C. 4115.04(A)(1). The director is also charged with enforcing the prevailing-wage laws. R.C. 4115.10(E). When a complaint is filed with the director alleging that
a contractor or subcontractor has violated prevailing-wage laws, an investigation ensues. R.C. 4115.13(A). At the conclusi on of the investigation, the director
makes a recommendation as to whether a violation occurred and whether that
violation was intenti onal. R.C. 4115.13(B). {¶ 12} If the director recommends that a violation was intentional, the director gives written notice of that recommendation to the violator and advises that person or entity that an appeal of the recommendation may be filed. R.C. 4115.13(B). The notice and hearing procedures are set forth in R.C. 4115.13. A
recommendation that a contractor or subc ontractor intentionally violated the prevailing-wage laws becomes a formal findi ng of fact only if the contractor or subcontractor does not appeal the recommenda tion or, if after a hearing before an examiner, the director adopts the examin er’s findings of fact and recommendation
that the violation was intentional. R.C. 4115.13(B). A contractor or subcontractor intentionally violates prevailing-wage laws when it intentionally fails to submit payroll records to the contracting public authority, knowingly submits false payroll records, intentionally misclassifies employees for the purpose of reducing wages, intentionally fails to comply with the apprentice-to-S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 skilled-worker ratio, or intentionally allows a barred contractor to perform work on a public works project. R.C. 4115.13(H)(1) through (6). {¶ 13} In certain situations, a failure to comply with prevailing-wage laws
can be excused. If the director makes a finding that an underpayment was the
result of a contractor or subcontractor’s misinterpretation of the statutes or an erroneous preparation of the payroll documents, no further enforcement proceedings take place provided restitu tion of the underpaid amount is made. R.C. 4115.13(C). {¶ 14} However, if no such situation is presented, once the director’s initial recommendation is reduced to a finding, the director has the power to collect underpayments from the contractor or subcontractor in the form of restitution, along with a penalty. R.C. 4115.10(A) and (B). The director files with the secretary of state the name of the contractor or subcontractor who has been prosecuted for and convicted of inte ntionally violating the prevailing-wage laws. R.C 4115.133(A). The name shall not be filed until the applicable appeal period has expired or the court makes an en try of final judgment in favor of the director in any appeal. Id. {¶ 15} The consequence of the filing with the secretary of state is that the
contractor or subcontractor is barred fro m contracting with any public authority for any public works project for a one-year period. R.C. 4115.13(D) and 4115.133(B). After the first violation, if a contractor or subcontractor again intentionally violates the prevailing-wa ge laws within a five-year period, the debarment period is extended to thr ee years. R.C. 4115.133(B). A public authority may not award a contract for any public works project to any contractor or subcontractor whose name appears on the list. R.C. 4115.133(C). Criminal penalties also apply if the director determines that there was a violation of certain provisions of the prevailing-wage laws. R.C. 4115.99(B).
III. Preemption AnalysisJanuary Term, 2010

7 {¶ 16} In support of the proposition of law accepted by this court, appellants assert that the manner in which the board interpreted and applied its
bid-evaluation criterion contained in Section 8.2.4.15 imposes a “de facto” debarment and does so in a more expansive manner than the prevailing-wage laws. Appellants claim that the board’s evaluation criterion is invalid because it conflicts with, and is therefore preempted by, the state’s prevailing-wage statutes. {¶ 17} We find that preemption does not apply to this matter. The starting point for a preemption analysis is the language of the Home Rule Amendment, Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution: “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” The test for whether a conflict exists between an ordinance and a statute “is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute prohibits and vice versa.” In re Decertification of Eastlake (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 363, 368, 20 O.O.3d 327, 422 N.E.2d 598. {¶ 18} This concept of home rule, howev er, applies expressly only to municipalities, not to county governments. A county government possesses only those powers that are authorized by statute, and it generally otherwise lacks the authority to exercise powers of local self-government, except for those limited instances in which county home rule has been adopted pursuant to R.C. Chapter 302. See Section 1, Article X, Ohio Constitution; Schaffer v. Franklin Cty.
Veterans Memorial Bd. of Trustees (1960), 171 Ohio St. 228, 230-231, 12 O.O.2d 343, 168 N.E.2d 547; Blacker v. Wiethe (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 65, 45 O.O.2d 367,
242 N.E.2d 655. {¶ 19} Moreover, the evaluation criterion appellants claim conflicts with the prevailing-wage statutes is not a municipal ordinance or similar municipal provision having the force of law. Ra ther, Section 8.2.4.15 is a part of a policy adopted by a county board for its use in evaluating the eligibility of a bidS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 submitted for a public works contract. As a result, there is no local law conflicting with the state prevailing-wage statutes within the meaning of Section 3, Article XVIII, and no preemption anal ysis is required or applicable. {¶ 20} Because there is no preemption question presented, we decline the invitation to engage in such an analysis.
IV. Exercise-of-Discretion Analysis {¶ 21} Although we reject appellants’ char acterization of this issue as a matter of preemption, a ppellants’ position is supported by an alternate rationale. On the record, we find that the board failed to exercise sound discretion with respect to the manner in which it applied its evaluation criteria to the bid submitted by The Painting Company. Not only did the board misapply one of its evaluation criteria to determine that The Painting Company was not the lowest and best bidder for the Huntington Park contract, but it relied on its misapplication of that criterion to exclude consideration of all other evaluation criteria contained in its policy, thereby improperly disqualifying The Painting Company’s bid from consideration for the Huntington Park contract. {¶ 22} In determining the best bidder for a local public works contract, a public authority has considerable latitude in making its decision. Cedar Bay Constr., Inc. v. Fremont (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 19, 21-22, 552 N.E.2d 202. As a part of this broad discreti on, a public authority may consid er all relevant factors in its evaluation of which submitted bid is best. See R.C. 9.312(A); Rein Constr. Co. v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 622, 629, 741 N.E.2d 979; Prime Contrs., Inc. v. Girard (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 249, 258, 655
N.E.2d 411. This discretion is not vested in the courts, and the courts cannot interfere unless it clearly appears that the public authority is abusing the discretion
so vested in it. Cedar Bay, 50 Ohio St.3d at 21, 552 N.E.2d 202. {¶ 23} To aid in the evaluation process, a public authority may establish evaluation criteria that supplement the st atutory criteria for reviewing a bid. AJanuary Term, 2010

9 bidder’s history of compliance with prevailing-wage laws could be among the criteria for a public authority to consider. In fact, to the extent a public authority is required to comply with the prevailing-wage laws, it may be error for a public authority to fail to consider a bidder’s record in this regard. See, e.g., R.C. 4115.133(C) (no public authority shall aw ard a public works contract to a contractor whose name appears on the secretary of state’s list of contractors who have violated certain prevailing-wage laws). {¶ 24} Nevertheless, once a public aut hority has adopted supplemental evaluation criteria, it is then obligated to follow and apply those criteria within its permitted zone of discretion. The presum ption in contract-bidding litigation is that the public authority performed its duties in a regular and lawful manner. Cedar Bay, 50 Ohio St.3d at 21, 552 N.E.2d 202. The wide discretion vested in the public authority is not abused when the public authority exercises will, judgment, or reason in its award of a cont ract to a bidder, but this discretion is
neither “unlimited nor unbridled.” Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v. McGee (1981)
, 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 360, 21 O.O.3d 225, 423 N.E.2d 1095. Accordingly, a disappointed bidder must present clear an d convincing evidence to demonstrate that the public authority abused its discretion in awarding a contract. State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 590, 50 O.O. 465, 113 N.E.2d 14; Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Servs., Gen. Servs. Adm. (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 372, 384, 700 N.E.2d 54. {¶ 25} In this case, The Painting Company has demonstrated with clear and convincing evidence that the board a bused its discretion by misapplying one of its evaluation criteria, Section 8.2.4.15, to determine that the bid submitted by The Painting Company was not the lowest and best bid for the Huntington Park contract. Section 8.2.4.15 requires the lo west responsive bidder to provide all information that “the Project Representative deems appropriate to theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 consideration of factors showing that such Bidder’s bid is best, including without limitation the following: {¶ 26} “* * * {¶ 27} “8.2.4.15. Information that the Bidder has not been debarred from public contracts or found by the state (a fter all appeals) to have violated prevailing wage laws more than three times in a two-year period in the last ten years.” {¶ 28} The question is whether The Painting Company has been “debarred from public contracts or found by the state (after all appeals) to have violated prevailing wage laws” within the specified time period. {¶ 29} Our analysis begins with the observation that the term “violated” as contained in Section 8.2.4.15 is impreci se. Neither the board’s contractingstandards criteria nor the Pr oject Manual provides a defin ition of “violation.” Nor
is there a definition of “violation” in the prevailing-wage statutes of R.C. Chapter 4115, or any indication of whether “violation” refers only to intentional violations or to any violation no matter how unintende d or inconsequential. Even the chief of the Wage and Hour Bureau opined that th e “quest for a definition of ‘violation’ cannot be secured through a review of [R.C . Chapter 4115] in and of itself. Some would argue that the mere fact that back wages are owed constitutes a violation. However, under Section 4115.13(C), that is not necessarily accurate.” Although
there is no formal definition of the term “violation” in either the county policy or state statutes, we conclude that the plain se nse of the term “violat[ion],” as used in Section 8.2.4.15, refers to the situation in which the director makes a formalfinding that a contractor or subcontractor intentionally violated the prevailingwage laws, and all appeals are exhausted. {¶ 30} The process for ascertaining whethe r a contractor or subcontractor has violated prevailing-wage laws supports this meaning of the term. For instance, when the director completes an investigation, a recommendation isJanuary Term, 2010

11 issued. R.C. 4115.13(B). This recommendation is the first step in prosecuting potential violations; a recommendation alone does not give rise to penalties or equate to a finding of in tentional misconduct. That recommendation may lead, in various ways, to a decision by the director that a violation has occurred, either intentional or unintentional. R.C. 4115.13(B) , (C), (D), and (G). The director
will then determine whether a sancti on is appropriate. R.C. 4115.13(D) and 4115.133. A finding that a wage underpayment has occurred does not automatically equate to a finding of an intentional prevailing-wage violation. For instance, the wage underpayment could be excused upon restitution under R.C. 4115.13(C). {¶ 31} Nor do settlement agreements that resolve prevailing-wage disputes between a contractor and the director constitute evidence of a violation. The settlement agreement represents a negotiated conclusion to a dispute. Because the dispute was resolved throug h negotiation and c onsequently removed from the statutory decision-making process, no administrative or judicial authority ever made a final determination that any prevailing-wage laws were violated, as contemplated in Section 8.2.4.15 by the ph rase “found by the state (after all appeals).” Cf. State ex rel. Dillard Dept. Stores v. Ryan , 122 Ohio St.3d 241, 2009-Ohio-2683, 910 N.E.2d 438, syllabus (a vol untary dismissal with prejudice is not a judicial determination that workers’ compensation payments were made to an employee in error, when no court has entered a judgment to that effect). {¶ 32} In this case, the board applied Section 8.2.4.15 to mean that any noncompliance with prevailing-wage laws by the bidder during the applicable time period was the equivalent of a prev ailing-wage violation. The board never considered that under R.C. 4115.13(C), wa ge underpayments resulting from mere mistake are excused from pr osecution as a violation. {¶ 33} The board’s rejection of The Painting Company’s bid is not
consistent with the term “violated” as used in Section 8.2.4.15. Section 8.2.4.15,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 for instance, does not require disclosure of information pertaining to instances of noncompliance with the prevailing-wage la ws. Rather, it requires disclosure of
information when the bidder “violated” those laws. Moreover, the disclosure requirement is further limited to violations found by the st ate “after all appeals.” There is no evidence that The Painting Company has violated the prevailing-wage laws within the meaning of Section 8.2.4.15 or the prevailing-wage statutes
because after all appeals , the director never found under R.C. 4115.13 that The Painting Company violated the prevailing-wage laws. The Painting Company is not included on the secretary of state’s listing of contractors and subcontractors who are debarred from public works projects, as set forth in R.C. 4115.13 and
4115.133. {¶ 34} Moreover, in the settlement agreement, The Painting Company was permitted to expressly di sclaim, without any contradi ction by the department, any liability or wrongdoing in c onnection with wage underpayments. 3 This situation is analogous to that in Dillard , because without debarment or a finding by the state (after all appeals) of a prevailing-wage viola tion, the settlement agreement cannot evidence any such viol ations within the meaning of the

3. { ¶ a} The settlement agreement provides: { ¶ b} “WHEREAS, The Painting Company disputes any liability for the underpayment of prevailing wages * * *; and { ¶ c} “*** { ¶ d} “WHEREAS, [the Department of] Commerce and The Painting Company have successfully negotiated a settlement of the dispute without any acknowledgement of liability by The Painting Company; { ¶ e} “NOW THEREFORE, * * * the Department of Commerce, on behalf of the State of Ohio, hereby releases and forever discharges The Painting Company * * * from any and all * * * penalties * * * arising out of or in any way concerning, directly or indirectly, claims against The Painting Company for the alleged underpayment of prevailing wages by The Painting Company [on specified projects]. { ¶ f} “*** { ¶ g} “It is understood and agreed by [the Department of] Commerce that this release constitutes a compromise settlement of the disputed claim or claims, and that payment by The Painting Company of the above-stated settlement is not to be construed as and does not constitute an admission of liability or wrongdoing on the part of The Painting Company.”January Term, 2010

13 prevailing-wage statutes for purposes of Section 8.2.4.15. See id., 122 Ohio St.3d 241, 2009-Ohio-2683, 910 N.E.2d 438. {¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, the board misapplied Section 8.2.4.15 of the evaluation criteria to the bid submitted by The Painting Company. {¶ 36} The Painting Company has also demonstrated with clear and convincing evidence that the board failed to exercise sound discretion because in erroneously disqualifying The Paintin g Company’s bid, it relied on a mistaken application of a single criterion without c onsidering any of the remaining criteria. {¶ 37} The Painting Company was the lowest bidder on the project by a significant amount. The Painting Company also has a record of successful performance in projects similar to the Huntington Park project. And the Huntington Park construction manager and the board’s own representative recommended that The Painting Company receive the contract. {¶ 38} Nevertheless, these recommendations were apparently dismissed by the board in determining that The Painting Company was ineligible to bid on the Huntington Park project. There is no indication that the board relied on any of the other evaluation criteria to find that The Painting Company was not the best bidder for the Huntington Park project. The trial court also found it notable that the board failed to provide any evidence justifying its decision to reject the
recommendations of its own construc tion manager and representative. {¶ 39} From all appearances, the board relied on its misapplication of Section 8.2.4.15 as a sole gate-keeping criterion rather than considering its
evaluation criteria as a whole when it disqualified the bid submitted by The Painting Company for the Huntington Park project. This departure constituted an
abuse of discretion.
V. Conclusion {¶ 40} Upon review of the matter at issue herein, we hold that a policy of a board of county commissioners for evalua ting bids on public contracts is not theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 equivalent of a municipal ordinance or other municipal provision having the force of law. Thus, the policy is not a local law within the meaning of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, a nd a preemption analysis does not apply. {¶ 41} Moreover, we hold that when a public authority adopts a policy establishing criteria for evaluating the eligibility of bidders on public works projects, the public authority must apply its evaluation criteria in a manner
consistent with the exer cise of sound discretion. {¶ 42} Based on the foregoing, the judgme nt of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
M OYER , C.J., and L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’C ONNOR , and O’D ONNELL , JJ.,

concur. P FEIFER and L ANZINGER , JJ., dissent.

__________________ P FEIFER , J., dissenting.
I. The Merits {¶ 43} The majority opinion correctly explains that public authorities have broad discretion in evaluating submitted bids and that we "cannot interfere unless it clearly appears that the public authority is abusing [its] discretion." Maj. op. at ¶ 22, citing Cedar Bay Constr., Inc. v. Fremont (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 552 N.E.2d 202. But when the majority opinion discusses how the Franklin County
Board of Commissioners wielded its disc retion, it does not a ddress the widely known abuse-of-discretion standard, which states that "[t]he term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." State v. AdamsJanuary Term, 2010

15 (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 404 N.E.2d 144, citing Steiner v.
Custer (1940), 137 Ohio St. 448, 451, 19 O.O. 148, 31 N.E.2d 855.

{¶ 44} In this case, the majority opinion is reversing the considered judgments of the Franklin County Boar d of Commissioners, th e trial judge, and the judges of the Tenth Di strict Court of Appeals. In doing so, it invents a definition of "violation" in the prevailin g-wage context without recourse to case law, statutes, administrative codes, or ev en a dictionary. And it substitutes its
definition of "violation" for the definiti on used by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners without explaining how the commissioners abused their discretion. Even if I accept the majority opinion's definition of "violation," and I concede that it is as good a definition as any other, I cannot conclude that in adopting a different definition, the commissi oners acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. {¶ 45} Based on the record and briefs, I c onclude that the Franklin County Board of Commissioners adopted a definition of "violation" that was designed toallow them to reject bids from contractors with a history of prevailing-wagerelated problems. There is nothing un reasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable about a public authority promoting a policy that encourages contractors to comply with the spirit as well as the letter of the prevailing-wage law.
II. Jurisdiction {¶ 46} The appellants' memorandum in s upport of jurisdiction contained five propositions of law, including the following: {¶ 47} "Proposition of Law No. 3: Appellees' de facto debarment rule is preempted by R.C. Chapter 4115, a comprehensive scheme balancing the competing public interests in prevailing wage compliance and competition for public contracts. {¶ 48} "Proposition of Law No. 4: The settlement agreements and court proceedings cannot legally be considered as establishing a violation of law,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 because such [a] finding would be contrary to both the language of the agreements and the public policy favor ing resolution of disputes through
mediation and settlement. {¶ 49} "Proposition of Law No. 5: Because the state has not ‘found’ that [The Painting Company] violated the prevailing wage law within the last ten years, Appellees abused their discretion because either the Standards are void for vagueness or the Commissioners' interp retation constituted an unannounced bid
criterion." {¶ 50} This court accepted jurisdiction over Proposition of Law III only.
State ex rel. Associated Builders & Contrs. of Cent. Ohio v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 1415, 2008-Ohio-6166, 897 N.E.2d 651. I dissented.
Id. {¶ 51} As I have explained in the past, "I disagree with this court's practice of picking and choosing, within a case, the issues that we are willing to review. If a case is worthy of review, in the interests of providing justice to the parties and because, until we see the entire record, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the interplay of various issues, all appealed issues should be before us. Whether we address each issue at that poi nt is, of course, within our considered
discretion." Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 122 Ohio St.3d 104, 2009-Ohio2463, 909 N.E.2d 106, ¶ 60 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). {¶ 52} Apparently a majority of this cour t now agrees with my dissent in Meyer because, even though this court accepted jurisdiction over Proposition of Law III only, the majority opinion also a ddresses Propositions of Law IV and V. I do not disagree with that approach; in f act, I applaud it. But wouldn't it be better for parties and their attorneys if th is court accepted jurisdiction without limitation? The current practice is confusin g. Attorneys don't know whether they should argue issues that aren't before us; based on this case, they should.January Term, 2010

17 Attorneys also don't know whether they can safely ignore issues that we have told them are not before us; based on this case, they shouldn't.
III. Conclusion {¶ 53} I conclude that the Franklin County Board of Commissioners did
not abuse its discretion. I would affirm th e decision of the court of appeals. I
dissent.
L ANZINGER , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

__________________ The Copley Law Firm, L.L.C., Mich ael F. Copley, Mark E. Landers, Douglas M. Beard, and Kenley S. Maddux; and The Mason Law Firm Co., L.P.A., Ronald L. Mason, and Aa ron T. Tulencik, for appellants. Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Nick A. Soulas Jr., First Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony E. Palmer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Arono ff, L.L.P., N. Victor Goodman, and Mark D. Tucker, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio State Building &
Construction Trades Council and Co lumbus/Central Ohio Building &
Construction Trades Council. Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Luther L. Liggett Jr., urging affirmance for
amici curiae National Electri cal Contractors’ Associa tion, Ohio Conference, and
Mechanical Contractors Association of Northwestern Ohio.

______________________