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SIMICIRENIVINHE 

9 

DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS INHERENT IN AN 

UNMANNED DORIAN SYSTEM 

CE) INTRODUCTION 

Recent discussions have again called attention to the feasibility ' 

and/or desirability of developing an unmanned DORIAN reconnaissance 

satellite system (i.e., one employing the MOL Program camera system) in a 

program consisting of unmanned launches only. 

The technical feasibility -- albeit, very difficult to achieve in 

several areas associated with the camera/optical system -- of the purely 

unmanned approach to-resolution satellite photography is generally 

accepted. The principal question concerns the length of time to bring such 

a system to an acceptable level of maturity. 

This question has been under consideration since the beginning of the 

MOL Program. In mid-1966, two funded contractor study efforts of an unmanned 

system program were completed, and a similar study was conducted in-house 

for comparison purposes. During the past year, MOL program/contract definition plus engineering analyses and test results have all provided additional 

pertinent information. This paper synthesizes the data and information from 

those sources which are applicable to the time-for-maturity question. 

1-■ MATURITY STANDARDS 

trl 

The point in time and level of performance at which a space system is 

> 1111■11■11.1•••• "mature" is a more or less arbitrary judgment. Further, the standards of 

maturity are different for particular space missions. 

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The current J-1 model of the KB-4 is certainly a mature system --

both in longevity and demonstrated reliability. For example, in 1966, 

in estimating the number of launches required for the KB-4 and in setting 

a production rate, the NRO went through the following process. First, the 

number of "successful" days on orbit necessary to meet USIB requirements 

was calculated (a "successful" day on orbit was considered as all stereo 

photography; resolutions generally within the system potential for the 

conditions encountered; and a proportionate percentage of the available 

film exposed, more than 50 percent of which had to be cloud free). KH-4 

launches were then calculated on the basis of achieving 85 percent 

"successful" days on orbit of the maximum possible (which varied from 10 

to 13 days depending on the inclination flown). 

A mature DORIAN system should meet the expected standards of technology 

(for example, part failure rates) in the missile and space industry projected 

ahead to the 1970 period. It should be essentially free of learning curve 

failures, having reached a point at which it can be said the system is 

properly designed, is manufactured and tested with nearly flawless quality 

control, and is handled in manufacture and operations with tried and proven 

procedures. 

In light of the preceding, the following definition has been developed 

as a DORIAN maturity standard. 

1. A successful DORIAN mission, or any successful portion thereof, 

will deliver the minimum specified quantity of photography (100 or more 

targets attempted per day) at or near specification resolution 

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at 80 nautical miles, 2-1 contrast, etc.). Any substantial degradation 

of photography -- for example, at 80 nautical miles 2-1 contrast, 

etc. -- will be categorized properly as a failure. 

2. The orbital mission duration will be based on the concept of 

aiming at a 60-day lifetime. Sufficient expendables will be carried to 

fly the basic mission profile (90° inclination, 80 x 180 mile orbital 

altitudes) for 60 days, and all components will have wear-out lifetimes 

much in excess of that time. Averaged over a number of launches, a mature 

system of this kind would be expected to give satisfactory results over 

about 70 per cent of the maximum possible duration. 

BASIS OF RELIABILITY ESTIMATES 

The following general principles apply to the discussion of the 

factors which would influence the orbital development period of an 

unmanned DORIAN system: 

1. The estimates are based upon an across-the-board design 

practice or incorporating redundancies wherever possible. 

2. Where applicable, full use is made of derivatives of both 

NASA and DoD technology. 

3. Extensive ground testing is incorporated in the baseline. 

4. The same policies apply to the mission payload, but with a 

recognition that there is a greater extension of the technology, a 

consideration which will be discussed in a separate section which follows. 

5. There is also a recognition that a considerable advancement 

in mean times to failure over current military standards will be achievable. 

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The VELA experience of very high reliability is an example. The following 

table shows the corresponding relation of the figure chosen for DORIAN: 

Parts Failure Rate per 106 Hours 

M1L-217 1970 DORIAN VEGA 

1.0 0.1 0.04 

The funded studies and the earlier Aerospace work have provided some 

foundation for the reliability numbers, which, when combined for the entire 

system will characterize the success-rate of the mature system. Since that 

time, extensive program definition, analyses and tests have provided an 

update of the calculations and increased confidence in their validity. In 

addition, a great amount of information has been generated concerning the 

mission payload, which was treated as a government-furnished item in the 

previous contractor studies. 

The paragraphs below will discuss the reliability of each of the major 

segments of an unmanned DORIAN system as it would be determined by MOL 

design and test standards and as influenced by the individual nature of 

each segment. 

THE LAUNCH:VEHICLE 

An up-rated Titan III with newly-developed 7-segment solid-propellant 

rocket motors will be needed to provide the lifting capability for a 

60-day system. This booster is currently under development for MOL in a 

man-rated configuration with very high reliability. If it were applied 

to an unmanned development, some of the man-rating features probably 

would be eliminated, but many of the high-reliability characteristics no 

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doubt could be retained. The outlook therefore is that the booster 

employed could be expected to be very reliable from the beginning. 

THE ORBITAL CONTROL VEHICLE 

The studies cited previously provided, from parts analysis, a good 

appraisal of mature reliability for the orbital control portion of the 

system was made, showing that high standards could be met. A further review 

based upon MOL development and test experience to date has reconfirmed that 

the studies were correct. This examination does not, however, give consideration to the errors and failures which occur to a greater or lesser extent 

in the early launch history of missile and satellite programs. A projection from past experience provides a means of exploring this portion of 

the problem. 

A study was made of the launch history of the first portion of the 

GAMBIT program. Tab A is a listing of the results of the first 15 tests 

and the orbital control vehicle performance of the first 19 launches. It 

is interesting to note that 74% of the GAMBIT failures during this period 

were not of the statistical type which are the subject of reliability 

analyses. They all occurred during the first day of the mission and could 

be classified in the following categories: 

1. Design deficiencies. 

2. Errors in procedure. 

3. Faulty quality control. 

The GAMBIT experience is shown here not because it is believed to be 

typical of the expected DORIAN case, but rather to show the risks involved 

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in a completely new and highly advanced segment of a system when it is 

tested in an unmanned configuration. In the GAMBIT case, the orbital 

control vehicle was almost completely untried throughout, and lessons were 

learned through flight failures. This fact is demonstrated by the mature 

GAMBIT record -- 15 of the last 16 missions were completely successful. 

As a further illustration of how launch experience can be applied to 

advantage, the early record of the current GAMBIT 3 system can be cited. 

No orbital control vehicle failures have occurred in the first 8 launches 

(there was one booster failure.) The reason for this success is that the 

OCV is a basic AGENA, fully mature, and which is tested and prepared for 

launch through well-established procedures. There is good reason to 

expect that the DORIAN orbital control vehicle can apply nearly all of this 

past experience to achieve an early reliability which will approach the 

maturity figure. 

THE MISSION PAYLOAD 

In contrast to the OCV success, the GAMBIT 3 mission payload history 

has shown the effects of immaturity associated with the extension of 

technology that is being accomplished. So far, the best of these tests, 

quite predictably, have produced photography averaging about 70 percent 

above the ground resolution which the mature system will achieve. In the 

case of GAMBIT 3, which is fulfilling an operational function, valuable 

intelligence information is being delivered because the performance of the 

system already is exceeding its predecessor. In the DORIAN case, however, 

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a performance 70 percent above specification would not be considered of 

substantially increased value and any launch otherwise satisfactory still 

would have to be classed as a failure. There is a considerable risk that 

initial testing of DORIAN in the unmanned mode would yield degraded photography. The reasons, which are discussed below, are different in 

specifics from the GAMBIT 3 case. 

The MOL camera/optical system is extremely sophisticated in comparison 

to systems such as GAMBIT (KH-7) and Advanced GAMBIT (KH-8). There are 

a multitude of possible contributors to off-nominal performance situations 

which could radically increase the complexities of and time requirements 

for diagnosis and correction over those of previous unmanned development 

programs. Not only must this camera be manufactured with great precision, 

but several technically difficult-to-achieve functions associated with 

its operation must be performed on orbit also with great precision. These 

involve automatic devices many of which either have never before been used 

in orbit or represent large extrapolations in precision, accuracy, or 

other capabilities. 

a. Alignment 

Because of its size and the large mass of the optical 

elements, the MOL optical assembly is not a rigid structure as is the case 

with present (and smaller) unmanned systems. The primary mirror (at the 

aft end of the optical assembly) must be protected by being clamped down 

during the launch and boost phase and released after orbit is achieved. 

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The zero-g alignment of the optical assembly differs sufficiently from the one-g alignment that a means to correct for alignment 

shifts is necessary. For example, on the ground, gravity-induced factors 

contribute to bending of the Ross Barrie, deflection of the mirror support 

structure, stretching or deflection of the Camera Optical Assembly structural shell, etc. On-orbit, cyclic thermal stresses encountered during 

each revolution also induce structural stresses. 

Misalignment from tilt and/or decentering of the primary mirror 

with respect to the optical axis of the Ross corrector assembly results in 

a loss of Optical Quality Factor. This is translatable into lesser static 

resolution capability. For example, an equivalent primary mirror tilt angle 

of 

and approximately the same loss in resolution. (A five percent allowable 

loss in CQF due to misalignment is the maximum permitted in the error budget. 

b. Focus 

Resolution is affected not only by optical qaality, misalignment, smear, etc., but also by noncoincidence of the film emulsion plane and 

the plane of best focus during exposure. The mismatch between these two is 

referred to as the focus error. The allowable tolerance in the MOL camera 

system for this mismatch is Focus errors beyond this limit 

cause a rapid drop in resolution (for example, another out of 

focus system has been incorporated in the MOL camera system which, when 

operating properly, will keep the focus error well within allowable limits, 

but it does involve a technology advancement. 

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c. Pointing Error 

Accurate pointing is essential to the MOL camera system both 

because of the small field of view (approximately a 9000 foot diameter 

circle at nadir and 80 mile altitudes) and the fact that the very best 

resolution occurs in the center of the picture format. 

A small portion of the degradation in resolution outward from 

the center of the frame is caused by diffraction and the lower illumination 

at the edges; however, this is relatively small (about 10 percent worse in 

the outer portions of the frame). The majority of the degradation results 

from the inability to compensate perfectly for image motion across the 

entire format during exposure. In a typical off-axis oblique photograph, 

the resolution near the edge of the format with the IMC operating properly, 

will be approximately 33 percent worse than at the center. If the crossformat image motion compensation device were not operating properly, the 

degradation in resolution from center to edge could be as much as 160 

percent. 

Pointing errors can result from a variety of factors 

(malfunctioning star tracker; errors in precise location of the spacecraft; 

geodetic uncertainties with regard to the targets; misalignment between the 

tracking mirror and the Camera Optical Assembly, etc.) From 01 such sources, 

the MOL expects an average pointing error in the automatic mode of about 

d. Tracking 

Sinde the MOL camera system is a frame rather than a strip camera, 

the tracking mirror must track the target continuously during photographic 

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exposure. To achieve resolution, with sll other essential 

elements of the camera system and spacecraft operating properly, the tracking 

rate error must be controlled to within 

Based on altitude and velocity data estimates provided the 

on-board computer, by ground sources, the tracking mirror rate error can be 

controlled to an average approximatel5 

If the tracking rate 

error were this gross during photography, and all other essential elements 

of the camera system and spacecraft were operating properly, the resolution 

could be as poor as Thus, an on-board automatic Image Velocity 

Sensor is included in the camera system which, when operating properly, will 

provide the vernier adjustments to control tracking rate error to within 

the specified limit. 

The Automatic Image Velocity Sensor, however, is a relatively 

high risk technology development. Three different approaches are being 

investigated -- at least two of which will be carried into prototype 

hardware. 

In the DORIAN case there is an added factor which prohibits a 

complete test of the camera before launch. A valid dynamic test must 

include a realistic driving of the large tracking mirror during photographic 

operations, since the slewing of the mirror is the means of retaining the 

target image on the format, in contrast with the KH-7 and KH-8 strip cameras. 

Any test of the DORIAN mirror drive in the 1-g field would be completely 

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different from the zero-g orbital condition. The validation of dynamic 

camera operation must therefore be performed on orbit, presenting another 

source of uncertainty. 

THE SUPPORT MODULE 

The components of the DORIAN support module generally are of a nature 

similar to those in the OCV and the reliability can be predicted to be about 

the same. The film handling system, however, may be a special case. For 

a 60-day lifetime, 6 or 8 recovery capsules should be included and the film 

path to fill these capsules will be more complicated than any experienced 

previously. The capsules themselves can be considered as mature. They 

will be the same as those in current use and the record shows that no 

failure to recover a capsule has occurred in over 100 of the last attempts. 

The transport of the film in a remote and unattended system will have 

initially some added susceptibility to failure or to a loss of at least 

part of the mission product. The initial system probability of success 

will be affected by this factor. 

THE DORIAN SYSTEM 

The previous analysis has examined the characteristics of each segment 

of an unmanned DORIAN system with the determination that no special difficulty 

would be expected either from the launch vehicle or from the orbital control 

segment. The support module is normal except for a capsule-loading film 

path which is more complicated than any ever tested before. Some loss of 

product during the early launch period may be expected from the film transport. 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 11 

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By far the most important segment from the reliability viewpoint is 

the mission module, primarily because of novel devices and because quality 

of photography is essential to mission success. Any of a number of components can perform out of specification to the extent that the mission 

must be classed as a failure. Regardless of rigidity of specification, 

the extent of ground testing or the number of back-up developments, there 

are unique conditions that can be experienced only on orbit and perhaps 

some surprises that will not be found until the launch program begins. The 

inability to perform dynamic testing, mentioned previously, is a significant contributor to the uncertainty. 

In estimating the time to maturity, the schedule before the decision 

is made to perform the first launch may well be extended if it is thought 

that any of the automatic photography devices is not yet ready for remote 

testing. Beyond this period, the launch intervals have an uncertainty 

based upon the time necessary to diagnose failures and to correct them. 

If the orbital development process were to require about 15 launches, for 

instance, allowing for several delays, as long as five years could pass 

before it could be said that the system had reached maturity. With better 

success the number of launches could be less and the time could be shorter, 

but a ten-launch program seems truly to be the minimum that could be 

expected. 

The course to be followed, then, in reaching maturity must be influenced 

strongly by these two fundamental goals: 

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1. The assurance 

for the program. 

2. The assurance 

early in the program. 

These considerations 

to follow the course upon 

advantages as they relate 

section which follows. 

of meeting the resolution standards established 

of a significant quantity of intelligence product 

were material to the decision which has been made 

which the MOL Program is proceeding. Some of its 

to achieving maturity are listed in the concluding 

THE MOL LAUNCH PROGRAM 

The five-launch orbital test program which has been approved is designed 

to take full advantage of the crew as an integral part of the plan to bring 

the DORIAN system to maturity. An especially important factor is the 

problem referred to above of making a positive diagnosis of the cause of a 

failure, with the shortening or elimination of costly stand-down times or 

perhaps avoiding a repeat failure in a subsequent launch. The system is 

designed so that the crew can enter the loop at any time for this function 

or as operators. 

The crew's role in system development lies in three general areas. 

First, they can keep the manned vehicle operating on orbit for the maximum 

possible duration, thus permitting the obtaining of more operating data and 

more reconnaissance product. This is facilitated by their ability to 

operate the system in a degraded mode (thus circumventing many types of 

failure situations) and/or restore the system to a normal operating configuration often more rapidly than can be done from the ground. Second, 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

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the crew can perform health checks on various subsystems -- primarily in 

the camera/optical system area, but also for the Laboratory segment --

and directly assess performance. Third, in situations of either failures or 

out-of-spec performance, the crew can perform certain diagnostic functions 

to verify and supplement the telemetry provided to the ground. These 

diagnostic actions will, in many instances, permit the identification and 

isolation of the source of off-nominal performance quite rapidly as opposed 

to the eXtended analyses frequently required for unmanned vehicles. 

The presence of the crew in the initial flights of the MOL system will, 

by virtue of their abilities to perform switching, maintenance, manual 

backup, and in particular, diagnostic functions in situations of failures 

or off-nominal performance, significantly contribute to an early maturing 

of the unmanned system. At the same time, the missions will simultaneously 

be gathering high-resolution photography of significant intelligence value. 

Analyses of the kinds which have been summarized in this paper were 

influential in the decision to follow the manned route in the DORIAN system. 

The current reexamination, aided by the experience gained in the MOL 

development program and in other satellite programs, has clarified the 

nature of many of the problems bearing upon the attainment of maturity. 

They serve to reconfirm the validity of the manned system approach. 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

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"OCV PERFORMANCE" 

G-1 "HT Tal UP". Heat loss had depleted 4400 lb-sec of the 

951 6300 lb-sec of stabilization thrust available at 

seoaration from AGENA on Vehicle 18. All gas lost on. 

Rev 34 when valves went to high thrust mode. Command 

decoder inadventently turned off due to noise or 

"switch bounce." 

G-2 "HITCH UP." While "hitched up" to AGENA it was noted 

952 that OCV control gas temperature was decreasing to 

point where solo OCV operation would be marginal. Recovery executed on Rey 34 and OCV "solo-ed." At 

pressurization of the pneumatic System all control gas 

was expended. Probable cause--cover left off a fuel 

valve in the OCV pneumatic system. Spurious real time 

command accepted by vehicle on Rev 14. Attitude control, 

power supply lost on Rev 35. 

G-3 "HITCH UP." Recovered on Rev 33. Solo after recovery. 

953 Some problems in proper roll rates due to switching 

anomalies "Prohibited modes" resulted in excess gas 

usage . 

G-4 Successful recovery Rev 18 on lifeboat. No useful 

954 photographs. Vehicle unstable Rev 4 due to gyro heater 

malfunction over heating rate gyro which exploded. No 

L.B. telemetry due to problem'during countdown. 

G-5 - Successful recovery Rev 34. No pictures. Error in 

955 commanding sequence on Rev 2 caused vehicle to drift 

in yaw. After slewing film forward cause of error 

found and corrected. Lifeboat failed on post-recovery 

test. Rev 65--clock recycle and delay time erase 

(Command System problem). 

G-6 Successful recovery Rev 51. Roll maneuvers o.k. but 

956 impingement of gas on bulkhead gave vehicle thrust 

effect (high thrust only). Lifeboat failed on postrecovery test. Orbit Adjust engines show,erosion 

effects. 

G-7 Successful recovery on Rev 64, fourth day. 

957 1. 40-60 negative pitch error after Rev 41. 

Attributed by GE to short in the H.S. mixer box. 

2. Flew low o.k. 

Successful recovery Rev 34, after bad injection from 

AGENA. 

1. Vehicle unstable Rev 15 due to IR Scanners losing 

horizon reference. Attributed by,GE.,tobad 
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initial orbital environment. 

2. Also thermal blanket tore, bound the TARS platform 

and perhaps reflected into H:S. 

3. No useful photographs after Rev 15. 

4. lOpps time signal failed on Rev 16. 

5. Command readout failure--certain stored program 

commands were not executed after Rev 16. 

6. On Rev 37 the telemetry did not turn on as programmed. 

By BUSS command telemetry revealed store program 

commands were not being executed. Attributed to 

programmer power supply failure due to high temperature. 

G-9 OCV. 

959 

1., Recovered on Rev 34.. No useful photography. 

2. Vehicle lost lock from the beginning in the vicinity 

of the South Pole. Did not re-stabilize away from 

the pole. 

G-10 

960 

a. Causes of the instability: 

(1) Horizon Sensor "spooked'" by cold environment 

at S.P. 

(2) Re-located "Tpll Nozzles" reflected into H.S. 

(3) Thermal blanket at rear of OCV reflected 

into H.S. (if it expanded in vacuum due to 

trapped air). 

b. Fixes: 

(1) Operational procedure--turn off H.S. in 

vicinity of South Pole. 

(2) Re.-locate "Roll Nozzle." 

(3) Restrain thermal blanket and reduce its 

reflectivity 

3. A pressure leak onsec,ondarypropulsion system between 

Rev 32 and 34. 

4. Wrench handle left in the R.V. 

OCV. 

1. Recovered on Lifeboat on Rev 66. (Attempted on 50 

but failed due to Kodi problem). 

2 
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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

No useful photos after Rev 23 due to command 

problems (started Rev 10). 

SI--did not work after Rev 2. 

Command Problem. Could not load stored program 

commands. • Isolated to decoder and associated 

circuitry. Most probable cause--coaxil cable 

problems: 

SuccesSful recovery on Rev 67. Orbit adjust system 

r:_alfunction during mission. Only 1 engine apparently 

burned. Also pressurizing gas leaked. SI worked • 

fine. Soft photos. 

1,To orbit. Agena burned less than one second. Agena 

engine received a„shut down command. No SI on board. 

Recovery capsule did not deorbit. Retro rocket did 

not fire. Destruct system worked 

Lost stability on Rev 9 due to power trouble. 

C--15 Recovery on Rev 84. Mirror stuck in forward position 

on Rev 59 attributed to micro switch failure. 

Recovery on Rev 81. Mirror stuck in vertical position 

on Rev 16. TM anomalies on Rev 63 and 64. Transmitter 

on but no data when first seen. Erroneous readings on 

secure word counter, environmental power turned off and 

Dne=atic control system was in high thrust. Attributed 

to EMI from tape recorder. 

r Cp r L.. [T 

r;1?7•Iit 

V1i4.1 DV:VP 

COritrEi SySt3R1 
Primary door actuator failed Rev 4. • 

Oae 100 second focus tett not e::ecuted due to 

minute timer. Focus control malfunctioned by rev 31. 

photoLl. Taro incidents: (1) mirror servo 

1:echanical intcr2orence.' (2) Elias test not successful 

due to ground .::/z em r;roblem. 

pne•delay line failed. Slightly reduced programming 

flexibility. 

211ort'in:2$ volt poter system during-Agena burn. 

Unstable. Pio payload functions 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015