SUBJECT NUMBER 

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Subject: 

Item 1 of the Agenda for the Eighty-sixth (Special) 

Meeting of USCIB, held on 2S May 1953. 

Allied (NATO) Communication Security (USCIB 23/55). 

FINAL 

The Acting CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) opened the meeting by stating 

that the only item on the agenda was the report by Mr. Poly21oides' ad 

hoc committee. He inquired if the members would like Mr. Polyzoides to 

present his report in its entirety or whether they would like to ask 

questions about any particular aspect of the report. 

MR. POLYZOmES said he preferred not to make a presentation of 

his report, explaining that it contained the unanimous views of the 

members associated with his committee. 

The Acting CHAIRMAN then inquired if the members would like to 

comment on the report. 

GENERAL CANINE stated that he was a little confused because on the 

one hand he was pushing a project which would give a considerable number 

of cipher machines to a number of NATO countries at a considerable cost 

to the U.S., which it is hoped will improve the security of their military traffic; and on the other hand we are still undecided on the NATO 

non-military conmrunications complex. He pointed out the previous decision made by the Joint Chief's of' Staff in which t.hey decided to 

bolster the military communication security part of NATO. He said he 

thought he should be consistent and the Board should also be consistent. 

He added that in his opinion the position taken by the U.S. delegates 

to the forthcoming BRUSA Conference on Allied Communications Security 

should be consistent with the previous decision handed down by the 

Joint Chiefs of Sta£.£', or else an attempt should be made to have that 

decision changed • 

.ADMIRAL ESPE inquired if the British paper (USCIB 23/57) which had 

just been received would be considered in conjunction with the Ad Hoc 

Committee report. 

The Acting CHAIRMAN remarked that, even though the U.K. paper wasn't 

received in time to be put on the agenda, the British views are pertinent to the problem at hand. 

There were no objections to including the U .. K. position paper in 

the discussion. 

MR. FRIEDMAN stated that the American delegation had had two meetings. He said they had considered the Ad Hoc Committee report and also 

had time to consider the British position paper, and added that at the 

convenience of the Board, he was prepared to give certain very short 

conclusions on the paper. 

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The Acting CHAIRMAN inquired of Admiral Espe if he would like to 

make further comments. 

ADMIRAL ESPE replied that he would like to reserve further comment 

until he heard Mr. Friedman's conclusions. 

At this point MR. NOYES stated that he did not understand the inconsistency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position. 

GENERAL CANINE said that the JCS decision was to furnish to the 

military organizations of NATO cryptographic machines for first and 

second echelon communications, and that we were about to give them a 

lot more - third echelon communications. He said he interpreted that 

to mean that the JCS had decided to assure themselves that military 

communications of first, second, and third echelon would be secure. He 

added that it was the opinion of the experts that if the NATO countries 

were to use correctly either of the two machine systems they already 

have, their communications would be secure. He said he did not think 

it wise to plug up the military holes and leave the non-military holes 

unplugged, at a considerable cost to the United States. 

MR. .A.Rl~STRONG inquired if the extension of the cryptographic aids 

to the NATO military will cover all of the military communications of 

NATO countries or only the NATO communications originated by the 

military. 

MR. SHELDON said he thought that it would cover the military 

problem but not the diplomatic problem which is the main source of the 

trouble. 

GENERAL CANINE said he was not prepared to say what degree of 

risk would result if military communications were completely sanitized 

and diplomatic communications were not, as there evidently is some degree of risk. He said it seemed inconsistent to take this view with 

one set of communications and not with the other set of communications. 

MR. NOYES inquired if there wasn't a problem involving the cost 

of this program. He said the report indicated that we were not trying 

to read military communications. 

GENERAL CANINE stated that there were two things to consider - economy and scarcity. He added that the USCIB Intelligence Committee 

puts reading military communications on a low priority and even if we 

were out of the econoiey of scarcity, he doubted whether it would be 

economical to go to the expense of monitoring the military traffic 

when we have missions in those countries. 

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MR. NOYES asked if that didn't raise a different problem in closing 

the gap in diplomatic colIDilunications. The problem, he said, involved a 

method of closing the gap without disclosure. 

GENERAL CANINE said that there would be marked improvement in diplomatic traffic if these countries were to be notified of the weaknesses 

of their systems. 

The Acting CHAIRMAN asked whether the members thought further 

surveys were necessary and said he wondered whether or not there was 

adequate information available to this Board to enable it to come up 

with recommendations and action. He added that this is one of the 

features of the Polyzoides report. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

.ADMIRAL ESPE stated that from personal experience this problem has 

been under study for about five years and he thought that now is the 

time for action. He said he had read the British comments and conclusions and thought they were sounder than our own. 

The Acting CHAIRMAN asked if anyone felt contrary-wise as to the 

need for further basic examination of the report. 

MR. ARMSTRONG said he was impressed in reading the British document 

to observe their investigation did not produce much in the way of different or additional evidence. He said that, although the British conclusions were different from ours, it seemed to him that the material 

available in the U.K. paper was quite in step with what was before the 

Board at this time. He said that he doubted that much would be gained 

by additional research. 

The Acting CHAIRMAN inquired if anyone cared to address themselves 

to that problem. 

MR. SHELDON said that from reading the U. S. paper it appeared 

that no real analysis (from a COMINT point of view) had been made of 

the military traffic, and wondered if it might not be useful to assmne 

that none was necessary. In view of the JCS decision to improve the 

security of NATO military communications, such an assumption would 

permit us to go along with the British view. 

GENERAL CANINE stated that there was not enough military traffic 

available to draw any valid conclusions (from a COMINT point of view). 

MR. SHELDON said therefore we would be following along the lines 

of the JCS decision and that he could go along on that line. 

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GENERAL CANINE said he was now talking with his communications 

security hat on. It was therefore his assumption, he said, that we had to 

get out the machines decided upon by the JCS, in order to improve our 

security in NATO. 

MR. SHELDON repeated that the report said that no investigation had 

been made in that field, but said that GIA did not feel that one was 

necessary .. 

GENERAL CANINE repeated that NSA felt very strongly that there is 

not enough traffic available. He added that it would be expensive to have 

to divert facilities from one thing to the other. He said he thought that 

in view: of the decision already made, it would serve no particular purpose. 

He added that he would have to disagree with recommendation # 3. 

MR. SHELDON remarked that CIA concurred with recommendation II 3. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said he would like to make one point clear on recommendation H 3. He said he did not think the reconmendation was being 

read in its proper light and explained that it is merely a recommendation 

to apprise the Board that there would be no real appraisal without a 

study of military communications. He added that his committee did not 

recommend that this be done, but merely wished to point out that the basis 

for such an appraisal did not exist. 

MR. FRIEDMAN said he thought the two papers, the Ad Hoc Committee 

report and the British position paper are not too far apart. He added 

that he thought the U.S. team finds itself in the position that the end 

result of the recommendations of either a er will be the same 

According to 

the British views, he said, we should act very promptly telling the NATO 

countries as many of the cryptanalytic facts or life as we consider 

necessary and get them to do something. He said the Ad Hoc Committee 

report proposes to educate them not by telling them arry or the cryptanalytic facts of life but by setting up teams to instruct them. He 

added that that process was slow to accomplish results. He said it./ is 

now a question of high policy whether we want this end result promptly 

or whether we can afford to take time. He said time would be useful in 

finding out who our friends are and about how long they expect to remain 

our friends. 

The CHAIRMAN entered at 1455 and was briefed on the discussion up to 

this point. 

GENERAL CABELL suggested that recommendation II 3 be am.ended by 

stating I I justify 

conclusions that it is not adequately secure, and that that be used as a 

point of departure for further consideration by the Board. 

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MR. ARMSTRONG stated that General Cabell's statement presupposes 

that there is enough military traffic available and observed that General 

Canine had just pointed out that it was not available. 

ADMIRAL ESPE inquired if it wasn't a fact that such conclusions 

previously resulted in JCS directive to issue more secure cipher machines. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR pointed out that security activities, both Combined 

and NATO have concluded that the cryptographic systems now in use are not 

sufficiently secure to satisfy the military needs and have established 

the requirement for more secure cryptographic principles and systems. 

Based on such an assumption, NSA has undertaken to produce those devices, 

both Combined and NATO, so that the question has been examined from the 

security standpoint without the use of connnunications intelligence. He 

added that the French offered the use of the M-209, the Portuguese 

offered one of their machines but finally agreed that none of them was 

adequate. 

MR. NOYES added that steps were in train to make them secure. 

GENERAL CANINE said that financial arrangements have been laid on. 

The CHAIRMAN inquired if military traffic was being intercepted. 

GENERAL CANINE replied in the negative, explaining that economy 

hampered the operation and that, furthermore, this particular traffic 

had been placed on a low priority. He added that the military people 

felt that they could go to the individual countries themselves, 

direct-wise and mission-wise, and get the same information at less cost. 

ADMIRAL ESPE said he believed from the British report that they have 

evidently done some research in the field of military traffic and make a 

statement that French military traffic is not secure. 

The CHAIRMAN inquired if it was considered that the situation could 

be cured without going into details about how much we know about their 

traffic. 

GENERAL CANINE stated that no cryptanalytic processes and successes 

would be disclosed in the process of sanitizing the military communications of NATO. 

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GENERAL CABELL stated that this appears to be a position where two 

sides of the house are out of step but comparable steps have to be taken 

to close the gaps. 

MR. NOYES inquired if the steps taken by NATO apply only to NATO 

or NATO operations all over the world. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR replied that they applied only to NATO pointing out 

that the Standing Group of NATO has a communications connnittee that 

keeps problems under review with a view to improving connnunications of 

the NATO organization. 

The CHAIIil-rAN asked if that wouldn't eventually reflect down the line. 

GENERAL CANINE replied it would be difficult to say because it 

appears there is little cooperation between the communications security 

and the communications intelligence personnel of the NATO nations. 

He said if we could be sure that, having taught these people the eff'ect 

of secure communications, it would spread to other NATO nations, perhaps 

this Board could come to a decision much sooner. He added that he could 

assure the Board that there is no reason to assume it would occur, 

however. He added that, except for the British, the NATO countries had 

no board comparable to USCIB. He said there is evidence that there are 

good security people in all of these countries as well as good cryptanalysts, but they have no positive coordination. 

At this point the members agreed that paragraph .3 of the report 

was more pertinent to the Conclusions than to the Reconnnendations, but 

it was finally agreed that the paragraph could be omitted altogether. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR explained that NATO communications and national 

military communications of these countries are not necessarily one and 

the same thing. He said that the national military communications are 

the ones being discussed and added that NATO national systems would 

include diplomatic systems. He said that NATO rules require that NATO 

COSMIC not be transmitted in a national system. 

The members agreed to go back to the beginning of the report and 

discuss "Scope and Methods of Investigation". 

The CHAIRMAN inquired whether or not there were any serious violations or compromises except those nations mentioned in paragraph 2. 

GENERAL CANINE replied in the negative adding that the U.S. and 

the British are almost in complete agreement on this point. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the British report had mentioned 

Belgil.Dll and Iceland, in addition to those countries in the U.S~ report. 

The members agreed that no changes were required in paragraphs 2 

through 7. 

The CHAIRMAN inquired if the members were agreed as to the Conclusions regarding security violations of military traffic and non-military 

traffic. 

ADMIRAL ESPE pointed out that in paragraph 6 of the Conclusions\ the 

report stated that the number of security violations detected in nonmilitary traffic is extremely small. He said in his opinion there had. 

been a large number of violations. 

ADMIRAL ESPE inquired if there hadn't been a violation of COSMIC 

rules. 

MR. Po1yzoIDES stated that the Ad Hoc Connnittee had considered 

"violations" in the strictest sense, i.e. as being those instances wherein communications containing COSMIC or NATO information had been enciphered or transmitted in violation of NATO COSMIC regulations. These 

were dealt with in TAB'A of the Report. TABB of the Report dealt with 

leakages that did not constitute a violation of any kind, they merely 

constitute evidence that the U.S. may have been damaged if th~ specific 

messages were read by the USSR. He said his figures represented both of 

the above. 

After suggested changes in phraseology, it was agreed that the 

last line of paragraph 5 on page 7 wou+d be amended to read as follows: 

"••••• insofar as quantity is concerned, is vecy small." 

GENERAL CANINE pointed out that the meaning of a demonstration was 

to show the NATO countries how to use the machines and the representatives would be allowed to ask questions, but it would not be pointed out 

to them that one particular machine is less secure than another. No 

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lnor would the disadvantages of' the 

.__sy-s"""'t .... em_s __ b_e_p_o_in_t_e"""d.....-ou-t-.--n-e-a ... dd"""e-..a that in his opinion/ this was \not a 

demonstration. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said he would like to point O\lt an example of a 

demonstration. He said that paragraph 6 indicated that several of these 

countries use the Hagelin machine and added that./Mr. Ha.gelin is now residing in Switzerland; that he is available and/anxious to sell the 

Hagelin machines which according to the experts are very capable ma.-

chines when properly used. He said he thought a demonstration would be 

very valuable if Hagelin were hired to come and demonstrate. He said 

he did not think it necessary to tell them that such demonstrations were 

being made especia+ly for these five countrieg. 

MR. NOYES asked the meaning of "equated" in paragraph E(l). 

. . 

MR. SHELDON said he would have rated it as having ''moderate value". 

ADMIRAL ESPE agreed. 

The CHAIRMAN stated that the diploma.tic traffic is probably more 

important to the State Department. 

MR. ARMSTRONG agreed and said he would rate it vecy high. 

MR. NOYES inquired i:t' there was any equation as to how much we 

would lose to the Russians-. 

MR. POLYZOIDES said that a piece of intelligence valuable to the 

u .. s. might not necessarily be valuable to the USSR. 

GENERAL CANINE/replied that it could work both ways. 

The CHAIRMAN/said he thought it would be higher over-all if' they 

read all I j the value of it to the Soviets would be higher than 

to us, because presumably the U.S .. knows more about the French than the 

Russians do, so if they- read a message and took it seriously, it would 

be more valuable to them. 

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E03:3(h)(2) 

MR. ARMSTRONG said he was sure that would be true in a great many 

instances and added that we could say that it is high\for the U.S. and 

U.K. as well as for the other side. 

After further dis cusstl.on among the members, it was agreed that paragraph El on page 9 would read as follows: 

MR. NOYES stated that the technical question is whether\ or not, if' 

an emergency occurred, there is any way of immediately improving the 

situation. 

GENERAL CANINE replied in the negative. 

MR. NOYES then inquired if this "potential for damage" were \.not a 

mild statement. 

GENERAL CANINE answered by saying that USCIB would be vested with 

that decision. 

GENERAL CANINE replied that they would not be stopped for a considerable time. He said we could get out cumbersome one-time systems, 

and that much depended upon the time we have. 

ADl~IRAL ESPE stated that a good example took place in World War II 

when the shipping control codes of the British were weak and were being 

read by the Germans. He said that before the codes were changed, a 

number of ships were lost. 

MR. SHELDON said he would like to sul:mit that if we buy para. E.3 as 

now written, there may be no point in meeting with the British. 

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GENERAL CANINE and MR .. KEAY said they didn 1t agree • . MR. SHELDON said that the British had crossed the bridge that we 

are now up against and said he would like to have it explained how a 

practical solution to the problem could be effected. 

MR. PoLyzomES stated that the British apparently agree with this 

position and read the last paragraph of page 1 of the British position 

paper to back up his statement. 

MR. ARMSTRONG suggested inserting the words "very serious" before 

the word "damage" in paragraph E2. 

It was agreed that paragraph E2 would be amended in accordance 

with Mr. Armstrong's suggestion. 

MR. SHELDON said at this point there arose the question of whether 

or not the situation had reached the critical point, and added that in 

his opinion it had. 

MR. SHELDON said he thought each case would have to be very carefully planned with the British. 

At this point, ADMIRAL ESPE said he would like to ask a question of 

Mr. Keay who was on the Tripartite Security Working Group. He asked if 

it had not been determined about two years ago that the situation had 

reached the critical point; that it was taken up with NSC and the President and it was decided that rather than notify the NATO countries of 

their security violations we would first make a study of their internal 

security. He said he believed we are now taking a step backward. He 

said it was agreed that they would be told but not until such time as /fjl ... their internal security was good. J 

t. r t-=-t~ - MR. KEAY said the Committee has decided that the situation is not i -~~-- -

1

.: 

now critical. He added that t.he leakage that occurred in the past six f 

months was not as serious as two years ago. ~ ,. 

~~ I GENERAL CANINE inquired about the n.;,,_-ccxrnfr leakage_. ~' 'i . -~ Mr. Keay said the situation had not changed ma.t~all.jr in France as tar as t t 

-is ~own. He pointed out that when the Tripartite security Group orlgiaall.y sti_._ eel 

its work, the Franch Delegation seemed to be ignorant of seuur.i.ty Systems but eager 1<~to·=1 eam. He added that the Working Group did not go into Communications Security 

while in France, but did visit the Foreign office last December. The French mage issued 

security regulations modeled after those in force in the United States, but. in the Foreign 

Office the French had not even started to institute security measures. The French 

have a number of ha.ddic~ps in getting adequate security, one of 'hich is that a governmentemployee found to be a Comnunist cannot be removed and the only action What acan be 

taken is transfer to a less sensitive job. He st'4,ted it is a fact that there are still 

Cormnunists in key positions inthe French Government. 

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COLONEL TOWNSEND said he Cfidn tt think it could be said \that the 

situation is less critical but.merely not critical enough to warrant 

MR. SHELDON said he 1..rould recommend "which may require sane disclosure" and added that he agreed with Admiral Espe that we are taking 

a step backward. 

MR. NOYES asked if this covered traffic of all NATO countries 

around the world or just European. 

MR. POLYZOIDES replied that it was world-wide and not limited to 

European circuits. 

MR. NOYES inquired about the meaning of "open" on page 10. 

MR. ARMSTRONG pointed out that the British make a distinction 

between "full" disclosure and "limited" disclosure. 

After discussing various possibilities for phraseology of the Conclusions, it was agreed that paragraph E3, page 9, be amended to read 

along the lines suggested by Admiral Espe: 

"The evidence brought out in this investigation does not 

indicate that serious damage has occurred during the period covered 

by this survey. However, ·such damage has occurred in the: past and 

may occur in the future." 

It was agreed to delete the words "iinmediate and" from para. E4, 

page 10. 

It was agreed that the word "open" be changed to "direct", in paragraph 1, page 10, as the result of a request of General Canine. 

At this time MR .. KEAY asked the Chairman if he would have Mr. 

Friedman, Head of the U.S. delegation, read his recommendations. 

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MR. FRIEDMAN read as follows: 

"As a result of discussions during two meetings, the U.S. Delegation to the forthcoming US/UK Conference on French and Allied Communication Security recommends that: 

"l. The Conference be held as scheduled. 

"2. Neither USCIB nor NSC adopt. prior to the Conference a 

fixed position with regard to the steps to be taken to 

improve French and other NATO members COYiSEC. 

113. USCIB accept the Ad Hoc Connnittee Report, as a partial 

basis for discussion with the UK Delegation, sanitize 

the Report, and hand it forthwith to the Senior British 

Liaison Officer (Brig. Tiltm.an). 

"4. USCIB inform LSIB forthwith that the USCIB wishes to 

extend the Agenda to include a review of all the conclusions reached at the 1951 BRUSA Conference on this same 

subject, and that the present UK paper (DGC/3441), together with the US paper (Ad Hoc Committee Report as 

sanitized) will be used as bases for discussion at the 

Conference." 

The members of the Board accepted the recommendations of the U.S. 

Delegation with the exception of a minor revision to paragraph 3 which 

was a.mended to read as follows: 

"3. The U.S. Delegation be directed to use the Ad Hoc Committee Report, as amended, as guidance for discussion II ..... MR. ARMSTRGNG stated that the above recom.'Ilendations substantially 

cleared up his difficulty and added the thought that USCIB should adopt 

the Ad Hoc Committee report and refer it to the U.S. Delegation to the 

forthcoming conference. 

MR. POLYZOIDES pointed out that three points in the report needed 

sanitizing prior to release. 

The CHAIRMAN stated that a sanitized version of the Ad Hoc Committee report would be handed to Brigadier Tiltm.an. 

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It was agreed, after some discussion, to delete paragraphs 1, 3, 

6, 7, and 8 of the Recommendations, and to renumber the remaining paragraphs accordingly. 

GENERAL CABELL suggested rewording the new paragraph\2 of the 

Recommendations to read as follows: 

112. An effort should be undertaken jointly with the British 

to improve the national cryptographic and communications practices 

of the NATO countries by a demonstration of proper techniques, explanation of sources of weakness and other means I 

\\\\\\ 

MR. NOYES asked about the difference in the degree of damage 

between the two. 

\ 

\ ...... \ ..... 

GENERAL CANINE replied there was a great deal of difference by using 

the method pointed out by Mr. Friedman in that the countries couldn't ask 

questions about it. 

MR. FRIEDMAN agreed that it would stop them from proposing that we 

cultivate this field together. 

MR. KEAY said the problem at hand is whether or not to make a direct 

disclosure at this time and, i.f the Hoard decided against JTJ.a.king a disclosure, he thought the recommendations would take care of the delegation. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR then read the decision o.f 11 January 1952 handed down 

by the Board on the subject of disclosure of information. 

MR. FRIEDMAN said that the British position in 1951 will probably 

be the same on 5 June; that position including the premise that no good 

would be accomplished save by an approach that would administer a severe 

shock I I 

ADMIRAL ESPE suggested a change to go after paragraph 4 which read 

as follows: 

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"If it is considered that the above demonstration technique 

will not achieve the desired results in a reasonable.time, plans 

should be developed, in concert with the British, which could invo~ I I 

After discussion of this proposal, it was agreed not to include 

this paragraph in the report. However, the CHAIRMAN asked that the 

statement be made a matter of record as the consensus of \opinion of the 

Board at this time; in order that it might serve as guidance for the 

U.S. Delegation, with the understanding, however, that this would not be 

adopted as the U.S. position without further specific authorization of 

uscm. 

It was further agreed that the U.S. Delegation might reach a point 

of discussion in which they are favorably impressed by the British 

point of view but find themselves at variance with the guidance already 

provided by the Board. If this should happen USCIB will convene a 

special session to provide the necessary guidance. 

The CHAIRMAN observed that in the decision about to be reached today, 

the Board is authorizing the negotiators to work toward agreement. on a 

position with the British! ~ He 

added that he thought the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, and theecretary of State should be apprised of this before the negotiators get over 

a barrel. He said that from conversations with Mr. Steel, he felt quite 

clearly that the British negotiators have been in touch with highest 

British authorities. He also said he thought if he could have a few 

minutes with the President, he could apprise him of USCIB thinking on 

the problem. 

It was agreed that the President and the Special Committee of NSC 

should be apprised of the present state of the communication security 

and n1ea.kage" problem and the recommendations in this report. 

MR. SHELDON referred to the last paragraph on page 2'of the U.K. 

position paper and suggested that the U.S. Delegation might need some 

guidance with reference to including the French with the U.K. and U.S. 

in a tripartite committee to deal with other members of NATO on the improvement of cipher security. 

After some discussion, the CHAIRMAN said that guidance for the committee would be to tell the British that USC'IB will be glad to discuss: 

that proposal when the French cipher system is satisfactory. 

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DECISION: (28 May 1953) USCIB accepted the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 

on Allied (NATO) Communications Security, as a.mended at the meeting, and 

agreed that it would be submitted to the British, not as a U.S. position 

paper but as a basis for discussion at the Conference. 

USCIB accepted the recommendations of the Chairman, U.S. Delegation, 

as amended, as follows: 

"a.. The Conference be held as scheduled. 

11b. Neither USCIB nor NSC adopt prior to the Conference a fixed 

position with regard to the steps to be taken to improve French and 

other NATO members COMSEC. 

nc. The U.S. Delegation be directed to use the Ad Hoc Committee Report, as amended, as guidance for discussion with the UK 

Delegation, sanitize the Report, and hand it forthwith to the 

Senior British Liaison Officer (Brig. Tiltman). 

rrd. USCIB inform LSIB forthwith that the USCIB wishes to extend the Agenda to include a review of all the conclusions reached 

at the 1951 BR.USA Conference on this same subject, and that the 

present UK paper (DGC/34~), together with the US paper (Ad Hoc Committee Report as sanitized) will be used as bases for discussion at 

the Conference.rr 

USCIB agreed that the U.S. Delegation should be guided by the consensus of the Board as expressed at this meeting, as well as by the 

amended Report of the Ad Hoc Committee. It was further agreed that USCIB 

would convene in special session, if necessary, to provide additional 

guidance for the U.S. Delegation. 

USCIB agreed that the President and Special Committee of the 

National Security Council should be app~ised of the present state of 

the communication security and 11lea.kage 11 problem and the recommendations 

of the Ad Hoc Committee Report. 

USCIB: 23/64 - 17 -

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