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USCIB: 13.7/42 mtm:OLE 17'IA CaliJ:INT OtttmmLS ONLY 

19 May 1955 

SESRER' 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Implementation of Categorization. 

1. A cursory review of the reports of indoctrination totals as of 

1 April 1955 indicates that further consideration of implementing procedures for categorization of COM.INT may be in order. In brief, the 

reports of indoctrination totals suanitted to this office contain no 

record of a Category II clearance, either in the case of consumer or 

producer personnel. In this connection, however, it should be noted that 

the report submitted by CIA indicates that an over-all re-examination of 

its cleared personnel is now in progress. A not inconsiderable difficulty 

arising from this situation is that it does not permit a satisfactory 

report "by category or sub-category, where applicable" to be made to U.K. 

and Canadian authorities pursuant to paragraph 26 of Appendix "B" to the 

UKUSA and CANUSA Agreements. 

2! It is to be expected at Ghis time that there would be few 

Category II clearances amongst the consumers. This office did, however, 

anticipate that the producers might have an appreciable number of 

Category II clearances owing to the number of personnel engaged in low 

grade intercept and processing tasks. It was also thought that the 

consumers might be able to follow the producers in limiting access to 

at least some of the material available. 

3. It may be that the fact thaG the personnel security clearance 

requirements are identical for Category III and Category II indoctrination 

has led to the assumption that there is no practical difference between 

Category III and Category II access. If so, it should be remembered that 

one of the objectives of the Categorization scheme was to assist in 

restricting access to that high grade CD.MINT for which source protection 

is an overriding consideration. We have made the initial steps to single 

out such material. If we make no effort to build an access barrier 

between that material with which we can take no risk and that for which 

some risk is acceptable, we jeopardize the former (from the access viewpoint) to the extent that there is jeopardy to the latter. 

4. We have now approximately forty-two thousand persons cleared 

for Category III COMINT. Approximately five thousand of these are 

consumers. It seems almost incredible that all of these persons have 

even a potential need for access to our highest grade COMINT. No doubt 

they all don 1t. Yet it is difficult to understand how the "need-to-know" 

USCIB: 13.7/42 

eclassifi ed and a ursuantto E .0. 1352 

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USCIB: 13. 7/42 

~~RE'f 

Subject: Implementation of Categorization. 

for that ma.ny persons can be administered effectively unless such 

administration is decentralized on the basis of a well understood 

standard. Nor can this office tell the Board what the real situation is 

under present circumstances. 

5. It may also be that sufficiently rigid discrimination has not 

been exercised in circumscribing the material to be placed in Category 

III and that, in fact, much of what we have in Category III should be in 

Category II. If this is so, it is not difficult to account for the need 

for so extensive Category III access. 

6. It is therefore reconunended that the USCIB Security Committee 

examine the problem of administering clearances on the basis of the 

Category of access, reporting its findings and reconnnendations to USCIB 

through the Executive Committee. 

USCIB: 13.7/42 - 2 -

tain, U. Navy 

cutive Secretary, USCIB 

SECRET