REF ID:A60275 

TOP SECRET 

USCIB: 29.20/17 H:A:Nf)f;E VIA eOMIN'f eHANNmB ON:bY 

5 July 195.5 

'fOP SE6m!l! 

KeMORANDUM. FOR THE Ml!MBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: CCMINT Activities Involving Third Parties to UKUSA. 

Reference: USCIB 29.20/16 dated 16 June 1955. 

The enclosed comments and proposed reply to LSIB, prepared by the 

OSD member in coordirJ.8.tion with Department of State and NSA representatives 

pursuant to paragraph 2 of the reference,, are .forwarded with a view to 

consideration at the ll7th meeting of USCIB. 

Enclosure 

.a/s 

USCIB: 29.20/17 

eclassified and a 

USCIB 

24 
REF ID:A60275 

TOt" SECttET 9 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

""MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETU!,, USCIB 

Cc.MINT Activities Dm>lv.l.ngThird Parties to 

UKUSAI I SUBJECT~ 

BEFERENCE1 USCIB:- 29.20/16 

The enclosed draft reply to LSI.B on this subject has been 

prepared by the Departmeht of Defense member, in coordination 

with representatives of the Department of state and the lfational. 

Security" Agency, in response to the request in paragraph 2 of 

the reference. It is submitted for the consideration ot USCIB. 

With respect to the last sentence in sub-}Jaragraph 3(b) of 

the LSIB message ( enc1osure with reference) 1 aJ. thvugh differing 

u.s. and U.K:. solutions could place the Britisli in a sanewhat 

more .tavorable osition wit re ct 

it was fel.t that this possibility was not "-'.su::':":l!ll!IF'c"'.'."'T':e:-:::n~~g:'.".'."re:-:--a t-,toL":""""'warrant a change in the u.s. position or 

any comment by USCIB. Nevertheless, the point is raised tor 

such consideration as the members of USCIB deell! necessa.17. 

Enclosure with USCIB 2!1.20/17 dtd 5 July 1955. 

HMm!.E 'llA 99HllR 61ftcNIBf.8 Olt?iY 

T9P SECRET 
I would be grateful if you would pass the following message 

from USCJ.B to your Board in response to the message contained in 

your MOP 4649 o£ 13 June 1955~ 

Your agreement to defer action on this matter pending further 

consideration o£'resp-:ictive courses 0£ action is appreciated as is 

your recognition of u. s. inabilifU to subject a11 u. s. C<JUNT units 

in Germaey to internat.ionaJ. control and inspection. We woUld prefer 

to guard aga:inst future complexities and embarrassments by agreeing 

upon a single course of action. 

USCIB views on your paragraphs Ja through d f'ollow: 

a. Reference your subparas a and b; USCIB does not think that 

- the considerations noted overbaJ.ance the undesirable aspects of 

placing u. s. units under SACEUR. Geman agreement to the continued 

stationing of forces present in Gennaey at the time of its entry into 

NA.TO weakens considerably any effect on German political integrity. 

Describing these units to the Germans now would seem gratuitously to 

raise doubt on matters covered by that agreement without really 

bettering future cooperation. In any event this aspect could be 

taken care 0£ without placing these units under SACEUB.. 

b. Reference your subpara c, USCJB is informed that paragraph 

4 of the Resolution to Implement Section I.V o! the final Act of Iondon 

Oonf'erence concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

was not intended to cause a review of previous practices and that the 

TOP SECRET 
reference to £orces which NATO "has recognized as suitable to remain 

under national canmand" would be interpreted as meaning that forces 

- not previously listed in NATO's Annual Review of Forces can properq 

continue in that status. Therefore USCIB believes that CClfINT units 

may be covered in the initial report by some such reporting phrase 

as •certain special administrative, line of communications and special 

purpose installations under national command and now in place in 

SACEUR•s areas are not reported herein." 

USOJB has also noted that this situation was anticipated in 

Paragr;;ph 12 ot Anne:x:ure Pl to J.ppendix P wherein it is provided that: 

"Each nation with forces serving under SACEUR may indi.v1duall1' 

arrange with the authorities concerned to operate in the theatre 

national COMINT units not provided specifically or exclusively 

for direct support of the forces under SACEUR. These uni ts will 

not operate as part of the SACEUR Y structure and will not be 

subject to the arrangements for inter-al.lied cooperation." 

c. Re.terence subpara d., all of the above would prevent any 

assertion that the units are being operated covertly against the 

provisions of the NA.TO agreement • 

. 'lie propose to act in accordance with the understanding stated 

in 2b above and to cover these units only under the general. phrase 

described in that subparagraph. 

UBCIB would be grateful if I.SIB could reconsider its position 

with a view to adopting the u. s .. procedure. However, if' this is 

not possibl.e,, USCIB would hope that LSIB could agree that the separate 

TOP SECRET 
. . 

solutions discussed in this &xchange are mutually satistactoey. It 

this is the case, it appears unnecess~ry to have the previously 

suggested discussions on this subject. 

TOP SECRET