J. A30033/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

ROBERT DAVID REINHART, : No. 498 WDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 9, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0000724-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2018

This case returns to us from the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 

County. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing relating to 

appellant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 on June 21, 2018, 

pursuant to this court’s May 21, 2018 memorandum. Having received the 

record of the Rule 600 hearing from the trial court, along with its findings, we 

shall now consider appellant’s appeal on its merits.

The trial court made the following factual determination:

[Elizabeth Police Department Officer Garret Kimmel’s] 

initial observation of [appellant] was [appellant] 

driving a quad on a road where quads are not allowed. 

The officer noticed a very distinguishable 

characteristic on the front of the quad—a fishing rod. 

Within minutes of that initial observation, followed by 

losing track of the vehicle, the officer saw that very 

same quad parked alongside a house in a neighboring 

jurisdiction, maybe 15 yards from the road. He 
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approached the quad. He touched it. It was warm. 

The grass between the road and its resting place gave 

every appearance of it having been recently been 

driven over that patch of grass. He then went to the 

front door and knocked. He interacted with Scott 

Johnson. After some dialogue at the door, which 

included Johnson telling the officer that the quad was 

“Bob’s,” home owner Johnson[] allowed the officer to 

enter his house. From that [] vantage point, the 

[o]fficer saw the male that [was riding] on the quad.

Trial court opinion, 8/3/2017 at 5 (internal quotation marks and citations to 

the record omitted).

The procedural history of this case, as stated by our May 21, 2018 

memorandum is as follows:

The Commonwealth charged appellant with the 

following offenses: DUI highest rate of alcohol, DUI 

general impairment, habitual offenders, driving while 

BAC 0.02 or greater while license is suspended, 

driving without a license, operating a snowmobile/ATV 

on streets and highways, unlawful operation, unlawful 

operation of snowmobile/ATV under influence, proof 

of liability insurance required to be produced and 

displayed, driving an unregistered vehicle, improper 

display of registration plate, failure to signal, giving 

false information, investigation by officer/duty of 

operator, fleeing or attempting to elude a police 

officer, and failure to yield to emergency 

vehicle.[Footnote 1] At the preliminary hearing on 

January 26, 2016, the following charges were 

dismissed: driving an unregistered vehicle, failure to

signal, failure to yield to emergency vehicle, fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer, giving false 

information, improper display of registration plate, 

and investigation by officer/duty of operator. All of 

the remaining charges were held over for trial.

[Footnote 1] 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(c), 

3802(a)(1), 6503.1, 1543(b)(1.1)(i), 

1501(a), 7721(a), 7711.1(a), 7726(a)(3), 
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7730(b), 1301(a), 1332(a), 3335(a), 

3748, 6308(a), 3733(a), and 3325(a), 

respectively.

On April 5, 2016, appellant filed an omnibus pretrial 

motion in which he sought to suppress evidence. A 

suppression hearing and trial were originally 

scheduled for June 7, 2016. On May 17, 2016, the 

Commonwealth filed a motion for continuance, which 

the trial court granted. The suppression hearing and 

trial were rescheduled for September 8, 2016.

On September 8, 2016, the trial court denied 

appellant’s omnibus pretrial motion following a 

suppression hearing, and immediately called the case 

for trial. The Commonwealth, having dismissed its 

only witness, Elizabeth Police Department Officer 

Garret Kimmel, at the conclusion of his suppression 

hearing testimony, orally moved for a continuance, 

which the trial court granted. The trial was 

rescheduled for December 12, 2016. On 

November 10, 2016, appellant filed a motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, which the trial 

court denied on December 12, 2016, following a 

hearing immediately preceding trial.

At the conclusion of the bench trial on December 12, 

2016, the trial court convicted appellant of DUI 

highest rate, DUI general impairment, driving while 

BAC 0.02 or greater while license is suspended, 

driving without a license, operating a snowmobile/ATV 

on streets and highways, unlawful operation of 

unregistered snowmobile/ATV, and unlawful operation 

of snowmobile/ATV under influence. The trial court 

acquitted appellant of proof of insurance required to 

be produced and displayed. The Commonwealth 

withdrew the habitual offenders charge. On March 9, 

2017, the trial court sentenced appellant to one year 

less one day to two years less two days’

imprisonment.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this court on 

March 30, 2017. The trial court ordered appellant to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on 
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appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and appellant 

complied. The trial court filed its opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on August 3, 2017.

Commonwealth v. Reinhart, No. 498 WDA 2017, unpublished 

memorandum at *1-3 (Pa.Super. filed May 21, 2018). We filed a 

memorandum remanding the case on May 21, 2018, to provide the trial court 

with an opportunity to conduct a fuller hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. 

See id. at *7. The trial court did so on June 21, 2018.

We may now address the following issues raised on appeal:

I. Did the [trial] court err in refusing to grant 

[appellant’s] Rule 600 motion when all of the 

delay in this case was attributable to the 

Commonwealth and trial was not commenced 

until 62 days beyond the mechanical run date?

II. Did the [trial] court err in refusing to suppress 

all evidence, including the identification of 

[appellant] and blood evidence, following 

Officer Kimmel’s illegal search of the curtilage at 

914 15th Street, Elizabeth, Pennsylvania?

Appellant’s brief at 5 (full capitalization omitted).

In his first issue for our review, appellant avers that the Commonwealth 

violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 600.

“In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of 

review of a trial court’s decision is whether the trial 

court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 

736 A.2d 578, 581 (Pa. 1999). See also 

Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401 

(Pa.Super. 2004). “Judicial discretion requires action 

in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances 

judicially before the court, after hearing and due 
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consideration.” Commonwealth v. Krick, 67 A.2d 

746, 749 (Pa.Super. 1949). “An abuse of discretion 

is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching 

a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the 

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown 

by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 826 A.2d 900, 907 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth 

v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696, 699 n.4 (Pa. 1992)).

“The proper scope of review . . . is limited to the 

evidence on the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary 

hearing, and the findings of the [trial] court.” Hill, 

supra at 581; McNear, supra at 404. See also 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 765 A.2d 389 

(Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 793 A.2d 905 (Pa. 

2002). “[A]n appellate court must view the facts in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Id.

at 392.

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238-1239 (Pa.Super. 2004), 

appeal denied, 875 A.2d 1073 (Pa. 2005).

The comment to Rule 600 provides that “delay in the time of trial that 

is attributable to the judiciary may be excluded from the computation of time.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 cmt., citing Commonwealth v. Crowley, 466 A.2d 1009 

(Pa. 1983); see also Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d 323, 325 (Pa. 

2017), citing Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 705 (Pa. 2012) 

(“periods of judicial delay are excludible from calculations under the rule”).

In the instant appeal, the Elizabeth Borough Police Department filed a 

criminal complaint against appellant on October 11, 2015. Pursuant to 

Rule 600, the Commonwealth was required to commence trial on or before 

October 11, 2016. The Commonwealth originally listed this case for trial on 
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June 7, 2016. On May 17, 2016, the Commonwealth requested a continuance 

due to the unavailability of Officer Kimmel. The trial court granted the 

Commonwealth’s request, rescheduling the trial for September 8, 2016.

As noted above, the trial court called the case to trial on September 8, 

2016, immediately upon the conclusion of the suppression hearing. The 

Commonwealth, having dismissed Officer Kimmel at the conclusion of his 

suppression hearing testimony, indicated it would not be able to proceed that 

day with trial, and the trial court responded by stating, “Pick a date, whatever 

you want.” (Notes of testimony, 9/8/16 at 67.)

At the Rule 600 hearing, Kristen Reitmeyer, the trial court’s minute 

clerk, testified that even if the Commonwealth had been prepared to proceed 

to trial immediately after the suppression hearing, the trial court would have 

been unable to proceed due to jury selection taking place in another case. 

(Notes of testimony, 6/21/18 at 8.) Additionally, appellant at that time was 

still seeking a jury trial. Ms. Reitmeyer further testified that the trial would 

be postponed to a date in which there would not be a conflict with other jury 

trials or with either of the attorneys’ calendars. (Id.) Ms. Reitmeyer also 

testified that these postponements could last two to three months. (Id. at 9.) 

When determining a new date for appellant’s trial, Ms. Reitmeyer testified that 

she “wanted to schedule it on a day [she] knew we would be able to proceed 

so we didn’t run into the same issue.” (Id. at 10.) Critically, Ms. Reitmeyer 

stated that the postponement of appellant’s trial on September 8, 2016, was 
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attributable to neither the Commonwealth nor the defense, but rather to 

unavailability of the trial court. (Id. at 9.)

Accordingly, we find that the delay in the trial in this case was 

attributable to the trial court, thus rendering the period of delay excludable 

for Rule 600 purposes.1 Therefore, we find that the trial court ultimately did 

not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s Rule 600 motion.

In his second issue, appellant avers that the trial court erred when it 

refused to suppress evidence, including the identification of appellant and 

blood evidence. 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to 

the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. 

Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence 

of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read 

in the context of the record as a whole. Where the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on 

allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal 

conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, 

whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court 

properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 

 

1 We acknowledge Justice Wecht’s concurring opinion in Mills, in which he 

opines that judicial delay is not a “mechanism or totem” that exempts the 

Commonwealth from demonstrating that it is “ready, able, and willing to 

proceed with the case against the defendant.” Mills, 162 A.3d at 326 

(Wecht, J., concurring). This, however, is not binding authority on this court.
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conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to 

our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783-784 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-362 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 57 A.3d 

68 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

We must first determine whether appellant had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy as a guest at Mr. Johnson’s residence. 

Both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution 

guarantee that individuals shall not be subject to unreasonable searches or 

seizures.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers and possessions from unreasonable searches 

and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or 

to seize any person or things shall issue without 

describing them as nearly as may be, nor without 

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation 

subscribed to by affiant.

Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is, 

under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, presumed to be 
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unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 627 (Pa. 2007), 

citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 n.4 (1990) (citations omitted).

Evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search is subject to the fruit 

of the poisonous tree doctrine. The Supreme Court of the United States has 

stated that any material, tangible, or verbal evidence “obtained either during 

or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion” is inadmissible at trial. Wong 

Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).

Pennsylvania courts have recognized, however, the following exception 

to the warrant requirement:

First, police officers have the authority to enter the 

curtilage for the purpose of conducting an 

investigation. Commonwealth v. Gibson, [] 638 

A.2d 203, 207 ([Pa.] 1994) (“police have the power 

to knock on the doors of the citizens of this 

Commonwealth for investigatory purposes without 

probable cause”) (emphasis added). Second, entry 

onto the curtilage generally is not a Fourth 

Amendment violation when the curtilage is used by 

the public. Cf. [Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 

274, 280 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 3 A.3d 

670 (Pa. 2010),] (“courts which have found that the 

front porch constitutes curtilage have generally found

no Fourth Amendment violation where the porch in 

question is used by the general public”); see 

generally LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise On 

The Fourth Amendment, § 2.3(f) (5th ed.) (database 

updated October 2015) (“when the police come on to 

private property to conduct an investigation . . . and 

restrict their movements to places visitors could be 

expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), 

observations made from such vantage points are not 

covered by the Fourth Amendment”).[Footnote 7]

[Footnote 7] Professor LaFave gathers 

49 cases in support of this precept, 
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including Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 

798, 802 (Ind.2006) (police entry onto 

private property and their observations do 

not violate Fourth Amendment when 

police have legitimate investigatory 

purpose for being on property and limit 

their entry to places visitors would be 

expected to go; the route which any 

visitor to residence would use is not 

private in Fourth Amendment sense, so if 

police take that route for purpose of 

making general inquiry or for some other 

legitimate reason, they are free to keep 

their eyes open), and State v. 

Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d 614, 624 (S.D.

1992) (approving officer’s examination of 

exterior of garden tractor parked in 

driveway, because “even though it is part 

of the curtilage, an officer with legitimate 

business may enter a driveway and, while 

there, may inspect objects in open view”). 

See LaFave, § 2.3(f) at n. 225 and 229.

Commonwealth v. Eichler, 133 A.3d 775, 784 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 161 A.3d 791 (Pa. 2016).

The facts of the instant appeal reflect that Officer Kimmel entered 

Mr. Johnson’s property for the purposes of conducting an investigation. The 

fact that Officer Kimmel entered the side yard of Mr. Johnson’s property to 

determine whether the quad was hot to the touch is inconsequential. 

Officer Kimmel testified that while he was on patrol on Barrett Avenue in 

Elizabeth on October 9, 2015, he observed a red quad traveling in the opposite 

direction. (Notes of testimony, 9/8/16 at 23-24.) Officer Kimmel attempted 

to pursue the quad; however, he lost sight of the vehicle and began searching 

for the quad in the immediate area. (Id.) From his seated position in his 
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patrol car, Officer Kimmel observed the quad in plain view parked on 

Mr. Johnson’s property. (Id. at 25.) Officer Kimmel further testified that the 

quad he observed parked on Mr. Johnson’s property was the same color, 

shape, and had the same number of wheels as the vehicle he observed on 

Barrett Avenue. (Id. at 26.) Additionally, Officer Kimmel testified that the 

quad parked on Mr. Johnson’s property had a fishing rod attached to the front, 

and that the quad he observed on Barrett Avenue also had a fishing rod 

attached to the front. (Id.) Upon his arrival to Mr. Johnson’s property, 

Officer Kimmel observed freshly pressed down grass in the yard, which 

appeared to be from tire tracks. (Id. at 28.)

Upon observing the freshly pressed down grass in the yard, 

Officer Kimmel approached the quad, felt near the exhaust area, and noted 

that it was hot to the touch. (Id.) Officer Kimmel then knocked on the door 

to Mr. Johnson’s house. (Id.) Mr. Johnson answered the door and denied 

owning the quad. (Id. at 29.) Officer Kimmel testified that upon 

Mr. Johnson’s opening the door, Officer Kimmel was able to observe appellant 

sitting at the dining room table. (Id.) Officer Kimmel further testified that he 

recognized appellant as the same person that he observed driving the quad 

on Barrett Avenue. (Id.) 

The trial court determined that Officer Kimmel’s testimony was credible, 

and the record before us supports this conclusion. We therefore find that 

Officer Kimmel’s decision to knock on the door to Mr. Johnson’s house was 
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based on his observation from his patrol car of a quad parked in the side yard 

matching the description of the quad he had previously observed on Barrett 

Avenue. We further find that Officer Kimmel’s entry onto Mr. Johnson’s

property was not in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights against 

unreasonable search and seizure because Officer Kimmel’s decision to knock 

on Mr. Johnson’s door was not based solely on his inspection of the quad, but 

rather his observations from his squad car and his observations of the fresh 

tracks in the grass on Mr. Johnson’s property. (See id. at 40.) 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2018