NOTE BY THE SECRETAfiIAT. 

This paper is the f'irst to bear the 

nusCIB 29.20/" file designation. 

The subject of this f'ile is: 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
~A6030. 

USCIB: 29.20/l 

17 February 1955 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF usr~: 

Subject: 

1. The enclosed proposal by the Deputy Assistant Chie.f o.f Sta.ff, 

G-2, D/A, which contains detailed background in.formation, is .forwarded 

herewith for consideration by vote sheet. 

2. It is requested that vote sheet replies be returned/to this 

office not later than 1200 Wednesday, 2 Mareh 1955. 

Enclosure 

G-2, D/A memo dtd 9 Feb 55, 

control # 546290. 

USCIB: 29.20/l 

SECRET 

pt:I!,'(Ktive Secretary, USCIB 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

24 
, 

. . 546290 

SECHE'I' PIVOT 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

9 February 1955 

MEMORANllJM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB 

SUBJECT: Continuation of DActi.,,.:i.ti~s fl!lo ~.)(h) (2) 

FL .S~c..36/SOUSC 3605 

2. 

The actual intercept is performed by specially selected....__..,..__..,..__ _ ___.., __ .... who are cleared to handle material classified Conriaentialj under the 

supervision of U. s. Army officers and De:::-n .. t of the Army·. civ·. ilian 

personnel.. The products or I _ !constitute a vit.al contribution to the securit or u.s. forces in · o and as a reliable and 

.3. Although the unit was activated by the u.s. Army on the basis of 

an assumed! I the continued success of 

the o ration has been lar el due to t e coo t on f 

s coopera on muat 

be maintained if the operation is to continue in such a manner as to be of 

facilities or personnel necessary to conduct these activities as long as 

the operation is under u.s. control. Without the use of either, continuation of the operation would be most dif ficu1t if not impossible. 

SECRET PIVOT 

\\\\ 
c • 

. 

. REF ID:A60303 

9SECRET PI'/~ 546290 

y~O 3.3(h) (2) 

/{PL S6.;::36/50 USC 3605 

SUBJECT: Continuation of_I _ _.IActi•ities( (Continued) 

4. In discussi9n$ to date concerning the continuation otl · .. !activities, thel !authorities/have JJtaintain~d a reasonably cooperati,ve I attitude. There is no assuraricei ~~· tllat thio attitude will Con~ 

type material,, by one means or/another,, for their O'll?l purposes. Such 

being the case, any one of the following situations may develop to the 

detriment of u.s. interests: 

a. Thel / lmay at;tempt,, i.n spite ot the obviousdifficulties 

involved, to pass legislation permitting sUl'".veillance of post and telecommunications. Passage of ~ch legii;Jl.ation wotil.d satisfy the provisions I I but would not,/ per se, aut.hor:l.ze u. $. participation in the 

project. With the operation/under I ... I control,\ both the volume and 

timeliness of the material. receiv84 by• the ·.u,.s. woW.d be greatly reduced. 

Moreover, any attempt /to pass such legislat.i()n, whe.ther successful or not. 

would probably receive publ.icity which would.be detrimental. to futur~ activities and might/ well be used as a. Conununist propaganda weapon. ___ .... 

b. The I I/may make an -unsucQess.ful attempt. to pass legislation which l«>uld permit surv • of post and telecanmunications. In 

such a case, the/fact that the Ba.sic Law prohibits examination of 

communications could be/ used• by the . . as a bas.is for \insistence upon 

discontinuance l f activities, regardless .of the\ provisions or the 

treaty and regardless of the fact that they might be\ planning to implement 

a similar operation, themselves, without the participation or lmowledge of 

o.rl }operation in light of the overall ··. u.s. relationship to 

the u.s. Such a situation··· would ne····cess .. itate c· ··.. - l.uation o.f all aspects 

determine the feasibility of enforcing •the provis ons I I 

c. The I L concluding that it wuld be politically unwise 

to attempt passage of enabling legislation, may decide to\implem.ent a preconceived parallel operation without legislation. In most\ cases,\ a 

parallel operation would duplicate the u.s. effort and would greatly increase the possibility that the U.S. operation might be conipranised. In 

any case, the present good will and cooperation• .. on the pa.rt\ of the I I 

could be expected to be supplanted by passive resistance by( I officials 

and the indigenous intercept oper-a.tors. 

5. In order to insure the continuation of I ~ctivities in the 

manner most beneficial to the u.s. and to minimize the possibility of post1 fit is considered necessary that the u.s~ 

initiate action designed to encburage continued cooperation byl I 

officials. A comprehensive study of the problem has resulted in the 
.. ~ , ,, 

r,. ,. . - s REF,_lD:A603~ e ECREt PiVCW?- 546290 

.~Q:)'.3 (h) (2) 

. PL 86"'36/ 50 USC 3605 

SUBJECT: Continuation ofOcti~~~es (continued) 

o. oW'ing reasons: 

a. This action might we11·w:eclude the necessity for invo~ 

I 

b. This traffic 'W9ul.d saf isfy thJ .... ___ I security\ requirements 

at little or no cost to the[ /.government. 

c. It would preclude/any necessity for thef \Ito rely upon 

legislation as a means ·to effect the procurement of this material 

his arran ement there would be.no need for the 

to plan a parallel operation. 

--- e. Thel !authorities, fully aware of the above factors, 

could be expected to accept u.s. control of the exmnination of communications as a politically expedient .and mutually bene.f'icial arrangement. 

6. In view of the above, it is recommended that: 

ization be anted for release of 

goverrnnent prior to ratification of the treaty. 

b. De ent for the 

(1) The most propitious time to release the traffic. 

(2) The procedure to be followed in releasing the traffic. 

(3) The amount and types of traffic to be released. 

(4) Coordination to be effected with other u.s. agencies. 

/s/ Robert A. Schow 

/t/ ROBERT A. SCHOW 

Major General, USA 

Deputy ACofS1 G-2 

SECRET PIVOT