REF ID:A61081 

~ 

l. ~ l.O ~ 1953, 1l3CD ~ea. \)lo ftQal N;POl't .a. ~ flt. 

\be W,/f& Ccm.fenG.Co cm. Allied (IA't't.)) ocm:amfcattcae ~~ u a liNaata 

fer JMIS'C)tiat!OM Yi.th tM 1& m..1. ~ t.bat tba 1S authoritJ.09 VQUl4 'be 

ao aot1.t1ec.t. 'fbe ~tor a•to w.a ..m the "OQSAiwmrt u.s • 

.nhority" tar~ atcrpe 1a tM -eot1st1cu vhich incl~ (a) ~ at\1re of tbs iaitW. ~ to tbe l'l'W;)eb,, Gd (b) ~ Mr= ot ...afere:t..~ .ml. ~1tim of -U. Cd11oed Workina Gr:.:ap ((.\JG) to a Mt 

V.- ill Wullington to tacil1 to.te eocrdtmticm all W.. ll:cea:&ca. 

1. in. cwa, ~ tm ~-~P or 1er. ~"t -. been 

vork1nz 

~ 

•taao ~to ooo:nlinaw w ClO. tit~" ro:r 1i.be 1ait1al 

to Ue Freceb. -4 tor othm' mttetts ~ Vith t1'e onu:-ell. '*'°"'"AU to ilp'o:te ca:cam1MtiCGtJ -=rit.¥ ~ llA1'0 C;OU1Xt:d.es. EA r rt"2I'1l 

of the alO an Hr. ~ m4 >tr. Auat.in. 

~ C•8Sll:GA'l'ICll 

v.s. JQaition 

3. ~ .........,. 

tor iaitiatine 

tar oanai.4el:13.ti<11 ~ llijjlr08eb at 1ltd9 

w thl 

...-liiD.$ 

gcexal 

l'flll4W=t 

proaran. 

the 

uwm 

~ 

1a Nked to ~IO tboM ~, u vall • to 41rect tha AA ~ Cc:lsli~ 

to 

~ 

~ t.m ~ DOaQtiatiCQ.D m4 ao.Ja'bmmta nth t.Mir kituh 

1rl t2lio QlG Vitbo.l.t ~ nter==e to tt. lkmrd.1 

~ 

llll.eH 

f:Rer -.ttera at pol1ey -=ct lie ft:IOlved YiWu ~ CWGJ 

~ 

'6li+Jmo.ll.y I 1l3Cm 1- 9llk'4 to mtf l.m tlat policy ~ of tba Wbject 

will oarrt.izue to be roftrrod to t.be afO mtil. tm P'Oel'• ia 

caar;pl.eted. 

a..~ Die A4 Jloo Ccm.1ttee w ~ ~ Mr1ea at JQ;pl!ra -.an~ly. 

~ .-.it.tah a r ' ma ot tae QIG !leW :pa.rt1.c~ted 1n the ~tioc ot 

tm8o ~ t04 belft ciYSl haromal lfl'PZOUU in priD.ci»J..e to tJ:m. 

It 1a ~ tat fiMl tonsal. app:wral ~ t.Mn ~ we noaiyed 

hcc xocwaon m ~ !S ~ 19511-.. .,.,.liJer tb1a t.nromatim wa ~"*1 too laW to~ iX.Cll>ded ill pll'a' ~ ~loeuro l (~) v1t.b 

U3ClB I'] .1/6 f/1:111 \1QOm" 41eeaas1oa. 

,.. ~ Jl*»C'* ro,proacnt a "OM peckee;a- 4eel.11 wbich iDcluOeo :tho 

~· •• Xtsl:J to - jJae)Ddcd 1D the Joint. 'brief tor tbs Ul aZXl tit 

.Ad:u!W.ckma I Who YilJ. llllka Uaair ~ to tt. J'nnch .1oJ.n'tl7 • 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-18-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
REF ID:A61081 

w.mcem 

Item 2 {cont:f.nued) 

"b... An Aid• Manoire to be lett with the French when the approach 

19 ma.de. This document recommends that the Frenoh member of the Tripartite Security Working Group (TSWG) arrange tor a technical conference 

Tdth the US and UK tor a d1acuasion ot communications aecur1t7 problems. 

This will enable the US and. UK members to 1creen the French repreaentati vee 

tram a aecurit7 atandpoint. 

o. A briet' tor the delegates to the tectmical diacusaions which 

restates the limitations agreed upon in the final report o~ the COMSEC 

conference in Jun•• and which establishes a plan ot action tor guidance 

ot the US and UX delegates in bringing the real purpose ot the conference 

into tooua. .A.dclitional.17, the brier outlines predictable d1t!iculties 

that mq ariee during the diecuaaiona and otters auggeations .f'or resolving 

them. (NOTEa Upon the advice ot BSA, the Executive Secretar.r will request that this brief' tor the delegates be clas81t1ed TOP SECRET Codeword 1n 

view ot the Wormation 1n para .3b thereat.) 

d., There 1.11 alao inoluded a dratt memorandum. tor the Standing 

Group to iasue to member NATO nation•• inviting them to review their 

own comnun1cationa to eneure that they are tree from dangerous practices 

and. procedures listed in an appendix to the invitation. 

6. With respect to the collateral inu.e concerning the French reqμeet 

tor aaaist.ance in purchaaing new cipher machines tor their Foreign Ottice, 

the French repre•entative (M. de VosjoU) was intonned on .al January 1954 

that the u.s., while a;ympathetic, was unable to render the aesistance 

d.'eired. owing to the tact that conmitments to meet u.s. requirements are 

quite firm and earmot be diverted to meet the French requirements in less 

th«n 30 to 36 m6l.l.tha. and no aeaurance can be given even ot this. It waa 

1N.ggeated that the French might wish to uplQre the possibility of uaing 

cor:mnerc1al sources• •ev•ral ot which were listed tor th~,· 

7. On :/!l JWJ.UU7 1954, K. d.e Voejoll again brought up the wbject 

ot obtaining ueiatance trom the u.s~ He asked whether it would be 

poaaible to obtain at least 5 machines, pointing out that the commercial. 

IOUl'Cea mentioned ,,_. ot no uae to the French. He said macldnes of the 

t.71>e he desired were manufactured onq in the u. s. and in the Soviet. Zone 

or ~. He remarked that the .French were even considering how thq 

might obtain llOm8 ot the machines manutaotured under Soviet Control. 

8. The U.S. apokeaman told H. de Voejoli that he 1t0u1d look into the 

•tter again but did not otter him aIJ'3' encouragement. The new request 

'Wail then referred to the Ad Hoc Committee. The NSA mam.bera reported that 

th.re were not tive complete •<1.d.pments available. It was recODDnended. that 

• 8\l1table r.pq be mad• nth the idea ot gaining time and yet leaving the 

door open for a favorable reception to the joint approach to the French 

1n Paris. 

~J>!'iI~ ~ It ia recoJJll\ended. that the proposals ot the Ad Hoc Committee be 

appro11ed.