ro rl?c: ~ ie ~~~sc I ::; rr.d.:J 9~o~p ~ ,F ~..- A/:54-S#ii 

{ !S" •nm~,. I JJ6'.,:) . -

~-

eclassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-15-2013 pursuant to 

.0. 13526 
TOP SECRET - II 

U b V 'I 1111 Auth: Commander, USAFSS 

S I C ti I I 'titADQt1X:ftM~ AT I 9 M lnitials .... :-£ .... d.': ... ~ .......... .. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVIC-.. £.~ ... ~ ..... ,, 

Office al the Com111anding General 

Professor Howard P. Robertson 

NSA Scientific Advisory Board 

The Pentagon · 

Washington 25, D. c. 

Dear Profes.sor Robertson: 

BROOKS AiR FORCE BASE 

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 

4 August 1953 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• PL 86-36/50 USC 360: 

The following summary of tl1Etthoughts 1Uld opinions which were 

expressed in the recent collf erence in th,is Headquarters is su\)mitted 

in fulfillment of your yerbal request1 

Any I I military ope~~ti0n of major consequence/must be preceded by preparatory action.s of some sort and thes.e actions must, I: ~~h!f l~~:' ::r::io:~a:~dofby~~=1r:i\:11·::t~ona1 

At least some of these emission.s o-r.changes can be detected by 

intercept operations conducted in locations beyon~ .... -------

The likelihood that sig'nificant electronic e.missions or changes in 

the pattern of emissions will not only be intercepted but will also 

be identified and reported to appropriate agencies in time to be 

operationally useful is dependent on many inter•.related f~ctors, 

such as intercept coverage, analytical effort, communications 

facilities, 'Qackground information., and c·ounter, cover·or deceptive 

measures. 

In so far as intercept coverage·directed againstr---lair targets 

is concerned, there bas been a very great incre~n thh:1t 

few years, - the USAFSS having increased from zero to over 

positions in this period~ver, our best current e .. ·stimates 1-

cate that approximatelL_J>osltions are rer:: r provide adequate intercept coverage of all worthwhile air. communi-

.cations. Our planning is based on this figure an · in the next few 

years it is achieved, the likelihood of intercepting all .significant 

items will be correspondingly increased • 

.. 9 Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-15-2013 pursuant to E .0. 1352a 

J e ... P·- '° r: r ri~e;s~:pies " ~ ~ !'fall]E of _L_Pages 

SICtJRITt ,_INFORMATION 
IllA~--fe '·~ EO 3.3(h)(2) 

1 u r · " &. Ii;} u1 .. PL 86-36/50 USC 

SECURITY:._ IMFOKMATION 

Personal Letter to Professor Howard P. Robertson, 4 August 1953 

Improvement in the quality and timeliness of the analytical effort 

poses perhaps the greatest problems of all for, although/our ability 

in this field is improving, our analysts are faced with an everincreasing amount of raw material.· Our present approach to the 

overall problem -of timely analysis and reporting is to summarize 

the intercept material at the point of ·intercept level and then to 

transmit the results thereof to Group level where/every effort is 

made to ide'.!ltify and report items of significant intelligence value 

soon enough to be operationally useful. This procedure must be 

measured in terms of hours rather than minutes and if a significant 

item is not detected in this. first stage of analysis, the chances are 

it will be a matter of days before it is discovered. Then, too, there 

is the problem of making a collation of a/large number of items .in 

order that the proper infe:rence may be/drawn as to their collective 

significance. Despite the many problems involved in timely analysis 

and reporting, there are many instances where items have been detected and reported quickly and correctly, and it is well to rem.ember 

that if the cost and difficulty of detecting these items by COMJNT 

methods is great so, too, is the/cost and difficulty of preventing 

their detection. 

A considerable amount of communications facilities must be devoted 

exclusively to the COMINT effort; however, the problems involved 

in the operation of a COMINT communications system are essentially 

the same as those invol"Ved in the operation of any communication 

system designed to handle large q~tities of high priority, highly 

classified traffic. 

The ability to· correctly interpret individual electronic emissions or 

electronic emission patterns is largely dependent on an extensive, 

detailed knowledge of past emissions and emission patterns,. In so 

far as !lair communications are concern~d, there has been a 

tremerla:olislhcrease in the amount of available background information during the past few years and, with the ever-increasiJ.g amount 

of intercept coverage, it is anticipated that this type of material will in~rease corre.spondingly. · 

There are many counter.measures available tol I which 

could seriously hamper our COMINT·effort. Some, based on technological improvements, require a considerable time per..iod for implementation, in which case there is some advance ~~ming. Others, 

TOP SEC-REl~~of2_Pages liGURITY B NF e RM AT I 0 '" 

r 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

U"rki '1 &\ ~ I PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SECURITY INFORMATl9N . . Personal Letter to Professor Howard P. Robertson, 4 August 1953 

on the other hand, could be put into effect very suddenly and with 

serious ·consequences; how~eer y such measui:-es would be relatively expensiye from the tandpoint and/they would be 

readily detectable. Resort to em would at least serve to alert 

appropriate U. S. agencies. 

Cover· and deception measures are always a threat; however, they 

become increasingly complex and difficult/of implementation more 

or less in proportion to the scope and complexity of the military 

operation with which th~y are associated. While there can probably 

never be any guarantee that communications cover and deception 

operations-will always be detected, the likelihood that they will be 

goes up more or less in p~nnortio~to the improvement in our ba·. c·. kground in.formation on pas _ _electronic emissions and emission 

patterns. _Since, as indicated above, our store of background in.., 

formation 

in the future, 

has 

it 

inereased 

follows that 

very 

the 

greatly 

likelihood 

and should 

of a successfull_____J 

continue ~ 

communications coverage or deception operation decreases correspondingly. · 

The foregoing thoughts and opinions lead ~ the conclusions that our 

current COMINT effort is capable of producing a considerable amount of 

extremely valuable information and that there is a fair degree· lihood that COMINT' would provide advance warning of a major 

military operation. This likelihood should increase very apprec13. y 

during the next few years, - more or less in proportion to the increas.e 

in intercept coverage, quality and timeliness of analytical effort, and 

increase in our store of background information. 

\ 

- -- - - -------

. . 

H. H. BASSETT 

B.rigadier General, USAF 

Commander 

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REF ID: A66683. fOP !S ------ tCK-t I - .J 

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\'VARN ING_ -THIS D6CUMENf ·. C6NfAINS 

GGDE\N9RD MAf·ER-1-AL 

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TOP11f&tPT 

s 'c "cfs~fc~Mrdlf" BROOKS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 

-t TOP StC~ET 

Auth: CG, USAFSS 

Initials ___ ~--- --· 

3 AUG 1953 Date ... -········-···-···-········-·-·----

BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION OF COMINT CAPABILITY TO 

PROVIDE ADVANCE WARNING· OF ATTACK, 29 JULY 1953 

I. INTRODUCTION 

II. AFSS PRESENTATION 

TAB A - COLONEL GORDON W. WILDES 

AFSS ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 

TAB B - MR. RALPH J • MCCARTNEY 

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 

TAB C - LT. COLONEL LANDON P. HILL 

AFSS ELINT PROGRAM 

TAB D - MAJOR RICHARD H. HINMAN 

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND 

DISSEMINATION 

TAB E - MAJOR GEORGE H. FOGARTY 

COMMUNICATIONS 

I I I . GENERAL H. H. BASSETT - RESUME 

IV. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

. ;· 3425 

USAFSS -TS& No. ···'···:=·-···············-·················--··-

Copy ./. ..•.................... of .. 3........... ............ Copies 

Page ·······-··············· .... of .S..3.. ....... ·-····-· Pages 

iOP SECREl 

SEC:lt:Jll'fV UHl'ORMATIOA 

.i"" __ _ 
Auth: CG, USAFSS 

!l!Ctilt:B"ii'V bitiafs -· ----/11111 .................................................... l : 

Date 3 AUG 1953 ! H•••oh•••••••u •••••••••••••••••u•••• .. •••"'•._,.,.._, ... ,. ...... ,. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On 29 July 1953, a special advisory committee to 

the Director, National Security Agency, visited Headquarters, 

AFSS, in the course of its investigation to determine the 

capability of COMINT to provide advance warning of attack. 

The program was limited to apprpximately four hours 

(0830 - 1230) and included a formal presentation by members 

of the AFSS staff, followed by general discussion with the 

committee. The Commander of the USAF Security Service, 

General Bassett, introduced the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Operations, who served as moderator for the briefing. 

TOP SECRET 

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REF ID:A66683 

5EetHU'f'Y IHF8RMA'fl6t'4 

II. AFSS BRIEFING 

(In order of presentation) 

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9EeURl'f'\".2: U4FOIMATIOM 
REF ID:A66683 

A 
TAB A 5ec11a,1TY u~reft:MA rt OM 

COLONEL GORDON W. WILDES, DC/S, OPERATIONS 

AS YOU ALL OOUBTLESS KNOW, THE SECURITY SERVICE IS 

A COMMAND OF THE AIR FORCE WHOSE COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE 

FACILITIES ARE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL 

SECURITY AGENCY. ORGANIZATION~Y, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF 

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE,. WE HAVE TWO GROUPS DEPLOYED -

ONE I~ LANDSBERG, GERMANY - THE OTHER AT JOHNSON AIR FORCE 

BASE, CLOSE TO TOKYO. ~T THE PRESENT TIME, SIX RADIO 

SQUADRONS, MOBILE, REPORT TO THE 6910TH SECURITY GROUP WHILE 

THREE IN THE FAR EAST REPORT AND ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF 

THE 6920TH SECURITY GROUP • A SEPARATE SQUADRON, THE 3RD 

RADIO SQUADRON, MOBILE, IS DEPLOYED IN ALASKA WITH HEADQUARTERS 

AT ANCHORAGE AND DETACHMENTS ON THE ALEUTIAN CHAIN AND ST. 

LAWRENCE ISLAND. THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE COMMAND TODAY IS 

14,528 OFFICERS, AIRMEN, AND CIVILIANS. 

CONCEPTS 

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE WAS 

ESTABLISHED WITH THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF PROVIDING COMINT 

SUPPORT TO AIR AND AIR DEFENSE OP ER AT IONS • THEREFORE, OUR 

TARGETS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN CONFINED TO THE COMMUNICATIONS 

OF HOSTILE OR POTENTIALLY HOSTILE AIR AND AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS, SINCE THESE FORCES CONSTITUTE THE PRINCIPAL DETERRENT 

TO OUR OWN AIR FORCE OPERATION. 

TOP SECRET~!\ .. \,\ - Sl!CDIRITl;Jk QHFGRMATIOM 
SEGl::IRITY ,_,._ UU'9R:MAT19H 

I SHOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY DISCUSS OUR CURRENT CONCEPT 

OF OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A GENERAL BACKGROUND FOR THE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. FIRST, COMINT BAS 

I ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED AS AN ESSENTIAL WEAPON OF AERIAL 

WARFARE AND THE DEFENSE AGAINST IT. IT IS RELATIVELY 

RELIABLE IN REFLECTING OUR OPPONENT IN HIS OWN TERMS - THE 

PROBLEM REALLY BEING TO PROPERLY INTERPRET AND UNDERSTAND 

THE DATA WE OBTAIN FROM ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS. THERE IS A 

BASIC CONTINUITY IN THIS FIELD IF THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS 

CAN BE SOLVED SINCE COMMUNICATIONS OR ELECTRONIC SIGNALS 

IN SOME FORM ARE NECESSARY AND INEVITABLE IN THE CONDUCT OF 

WAR. FROM COMINT CAN BE OBTAINED A CURRENT PICTURE OF THE 

ENEMY IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO TRANSLATE INTERCEPTED SIGNALS 

REFLECTING THE ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY INTO INTELLIGIBLE 

INFORMATION ON A RAPID BASIS. IT IS OBVIOUS TO ALL OF US, 

I KNOW, THA'.1' WITH THE INCREASE OF ELECTRONICS IN MODERN 

WAR, THE FIELD OF COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC 

INTELLIGENCE IS VAST AND CAN PROVIDE US, IF WE CAN PROPERLY 

EXPLOIT IT, WITH UNIQUE AND ALL IMPORTANT SOURCES OF 

INTELLIGENCE FOR AIR AND AIR DEFENSE OPERATION~ . THE SECOND CONCEPT IS THAT AS A SOURCE OF OPERATIONAL 

{ 

AIR INTELLIGENCE, COMINT CONTRIBUTES TO THE BASIC INTELLIGENCE 

REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING THE OPPONENT. PROPERLY EXPLOITED, 

IT ESTABLISHES WHAT EXISTS - THE STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, AND 

• l .'-' 
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ENEMY - HIS ORDER OF BATTLE • FURTHER , 

IT PROVIDES CONTINUING DATA ABOUT THE ACTIVITY OF THE 

ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE, .THUS 

ENABLING AN ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY CAPABILITY. AND FINALLY, 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORDER OF BATTLE AND OF THE ASSESSMENT 

OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE ENEMY CONSTITUTES THE BASIS FOR A 

SOUND' ESTIMATE OF HIS INTENDED ACTION. 

THE THIRD AND ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT CONCEPTS OF 

OPERATION IN THE SECURITY SERVICE IS THAT EFFECTIVE 

EXPLOITATION OF THIS TYPE INTELLIGENCE FOR SUPPORT OF RAPID 

MOVING AIR OPERATION NECESSITATES MAXIMUM SPEED IN THE 

PRODUCTION OF THAT INTELLIGENCE COMPATIBLE WITH TECHNICAL 

CAPABILITIES FOR COMPLETENESS AND ACC~ACY. THIS REQUIRES 

THE REDUCTION TO A VERY MINIMUM OF THE TIME LAG BETWEEN ACTUAL 

INTERCEPT OF THE ENEMY SIGNAL AND THE RECOGNITION AND 

INTERPRETATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT SIGNAL AS INTELLIGENCE 

INFORMATION. THEREFORE, THE ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNAL MUST BE 

ACCOMPLISHED, INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE, CLOSE TO THE POINT OF 

INTERCEPT SO THAT USABLE INFORMATION MAY BE MADE IMMEDIATELY 

AVAILABLE TO FRIENDLY FORCES. THIS MUST BE DONE RAPIDLY 

AND REGULARLY. 

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE ARE CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL PROCESSES 

AND ~CTIONS WHICH MUST BE PERFORMED IN THE COMINT COLLECTION 

AND PRODUCTION OPERATION AND I SHOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE 

-··· 1. I ·!; :i.-

""t'Jtr' I ,':;. ''-) 

3 
SECOkll Y HNU:ORMATION 

VARIOUS SUCCESSIVE PHASES OF THE COMINT CYCLE FROM THE 

STANDPOINT OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED IN 

PROVIDING TIMELY COMINT TO SUPPORT AIR OPERATION. IN THIS 

REGARD, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT HAS BEEN AN ACCEPTED 

DOCTRINE OF THIS COMMAND THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION HERE HAS 

BEEN TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING OF ATTACK AND A CONSIDERABLE 

AMOUNT OF OUR THINKING AND EFFORT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD 

THIS END. 

THE FIRST STEP IN THE COlrUNT CYCLE IS TO ISOLATE THE 

SIGNALS TO BE EXPLOITED FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEETING SPECIFIC 

REQUIREMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE PRIMARY THREAT OF AIR 

ATTACK COMES FROM , IT IS 

NECESSARY THEN TO DETERMINE WHAT TYPE OF COMMUNICATION THIS 

ORGANIZATION UTILIZES AND IN GENERAL, WHERE AND HOW THEY WILL 

BE EMPLOYED IN ORDER THAT APPROPRIATE INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT 

CAN BE PROVIDED. AS THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATIONS TARGETS 

CHANGES, IT IS NECESSARY·TO EFFECT CORRESPONDING CHANGES 

IN THE INTERCEPT PLAN. HAVING DETERMINED THE TARGET, THE 

NEXT STEP IN THE COMINT CYCLE IS THE ACT OF INTERCEPTING THE 

DESIRED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS AND NETWORKS. THERE ARE, 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 U~ 

OF COURSE, THREE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE INTERCEPT OPERATION. 

THESE FACTORS ARE THE EQUIPMENT, THE LOCATION OF THE EQUIPMENT, 

AND THE INDIVIDUAL·PROFICIENCY OF PERSONNEL. 

OF EQUIPMENT, OF COURSE, MUCH CAN BE SAID AND AS YOU 

WELL KNOW, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUALLY STUDY AND TEST NEW 

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SliCYRITY 4: 1UF8RMA'f'l81~ 
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L 86-36/50 U TYPES OF INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT, ANTENNAS AND ASSOCIATED 

EQUIPMENT IN ORDER THAT THE VERY MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY:l{Af BE 

ATTAINED. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT AS THE CHARACTERISTICS .OF 

THE ENEMY'S TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT CHANGES, SQ/MUST WP: 

CHANGE OUR OWN RECEIVING EQUIPMENTS. 

THE MATTER OF THE LOCATIONOFTij;E.EQUIPMENT lS ONE OF 

OUR MOST VEXING PROBLEMS SINCEI rxs THE 

--------------'<WITH/POTENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS 

TARGETS ._I -------..----'V J?0St8/TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS IN• THE 

FIELD OF/LOCATION• AT PRESENT,/WE ARE "";:I ======l:...._T_H_E ___ 

I ~IN TBEDANDEJBUT THERE 1--------

1 IANDI IAND _I _____ ,WHICH WE _I --

1 THE PROBLEMS OF 

1 

rIN THOSE 

......__ _______________ _____. ARE, OF COURSE , 

FORMIDABLE. 

THE VITAL FACTOR OF INDIVIDUAL PROFIC"IENCY IS TRULY 

THE MAJOR PROBLEM AND THE SECURITY SERVICE PURSUES AN ACTIVE 

AND CONTINUING TRAINING COURSE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM 

EFFICIENCY OF ALL OF OUR PERSONNEL. DESPITE OUR VAST 

IMPROVEMENTS IN MACHINES AND DEVICES, THE HUMAN BEING IS 

STILL THE MOST IMPORTANT ASSET IN THE COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE FIELD. 

THE THIRD STEP, AFTER INTERCEPT, IS TO IDENTIFY AND 

COLLATE THE TRAFFIC. THIS IS THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM OF 

TIMELINESS: TO REDUCE THE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE TIME OF 

INTERCEPT AND REC~WliOF ~Gf'ifi1i~T¥IGENCE DATA. 

TO llEET THIS PROsif ~~<t 't!rttELtm ~s JIUCB 

'°'1.' J • J ~ • 

SF c DP e U TY Dl>U9RMAl'let~ 

5 
.. 

SECURITY iMPCL'tMA'TICt~ 

INITIAL PROCESSING AS POSSIBLE IN FORWARD AREAS. THE SUCCESS 

OF FORWARD PROCESSING IS DEPENDENT UPON AVAILABILITY OF 

CURRENT AND COMPLETE RECOGNITION DATA. WE ARE MEETING THIS 

NEED BY SUPPLEMENTING THE MAJOR RESEARCH EFFORT IN THE REAR 

AREA BY CURRENT PROCESSING FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES AT THE 

SECURITY GROUP LEVEL AND BY UTILIZING MACHINE METHODS IN 

THE FIELD, TO MAINTAIN RAPID FLOW.OF CURRENT- SUPPORTING 

TECHNICAL DATA TO ALL UNITS. 

THE FOURTH STEP OF THE CYCLE IS REPORTING THE RESULTS 

OF ANALYSIS ON A TIMELY BASIS FROM THE FORWARD PROCESSING 

CENTERS, ·BOTH SQUADRON AND GROUP • 

FINALLY, TO ACHIEVE THE REQUIRED RAPID DISSEMINATION 

OF INFORMATION, ·IT IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A RAPID MEANS OF 

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR 

TAKING ACTION. THE AIR FORCE HAS A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM -

CENTER~D HERE AT llrtiJJ' A-IR FORCE BASE FOR THIS PURPOSE. 

THERE ARE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE OVERSEAS GROUPS 

TO THIS ·HEADQUARTERS AND FROM HERE TO THE VARIOUS COMMANDS 

SERVED - CHIEFLY, THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND AND THE AIR DEFENSE 

COMMAND. COMPARABLE ARRANGEMENTS EXIST BETWEEN OVERSEAS 

GROUPS - THEIR SUBORDINATE SQUADRONS AND LOCAL AIR COMMANDERS 

IN THE FIELD . 

MY REM.ARKS HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO PROVIDING A GENERAL 

OUTLINE OF THE AFSS ORGANIZATION AND CONCEPTS OF OPERATION. 

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6 
SEeltHHTY 

IN ORDEij TO GIVE YOU A BRIEF BUT MORE DETAILED SUMMARY 

OF WHAT WE ARE DOING AND HOW WE ARE DOING IT, SEVERAL , 

MEMBERS OF THE AFSS STAFF WILL COVER VARIOUS ASPECTS OF 

OUR OPERATION RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION. 

THEY WILL DISCUSS TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, THE AFSS ELINT PROGRAM, 

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND REPORTING AND COMMI!NICATIONS. 

FIRST, MR. MCCARTNEY, OF OUR ANALYSIS OFFICE, WILL 

DISCUS.S TRAFFIC ANALYSIS .• 

,. 

SEEl:JiUTY 

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REF ID:A66683 

B 
TABB 5SCURITY I .,, F Q R M .t. T I 9 •• 

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS - MR. MCCARTNEY 

COLONEL WILDES REFERRED EARLIER THIS MORNING TO THE BASIC 

RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS HEADQUARTERS FOR STUDY OF._! ____ ___, 

..__ __ __,lco:MMUNICATIONS IN ORDER TO ENHANCE PREVENTION OF A 

SURPRISE ATTACK UPON THE UNITED. STATES. THIS STATEMENT, OF 

COURSE, PRESUPPOSES A KNOWLEDGE AND A TECHNIQUE WHICH DOES IN 

FACT EXIST FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF ALL TYPF.8 OF COMMUNICATIONS 

SIGNALS. THE ART OF COLLECTING, RECORDING, ANALYZING AND PRODUCING THIS.INFORMATION IS KNOWN IN COMINT CIRCLES AS TRAFFIC 

ANAJ;.YSIS. 

AS WE ALL ARE AWARE, MILITARY OPERATIONS DICTATE A COORDINATED 

AND TIMELY MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS - THIS REQUIREMENT IS VERY 

PRONOUNCED IN OUR AIR AGE. THESE COMMUNICATIONS ARE ALSO CAREFULLY SCRUTINIZED BY THE COMMUNICATING AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO 

PREVENT PENETRATION FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. THIS ACTION PLUS THE 

ACTION EMBODIED IN THE PREPARATION OF ALL ASSOOIATED COMMUNICATIONS 

INSTRUCTIONS IS REFERRED TO IN MILITARY CIRCLES AS COMMUNICATIONS 

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIOl'S (COI). IN OTHER WORDS, THESE INSTRUCTIONS 

CLEARLY POINT OUT WHO IS GOING TO COMMUNICATE WITHIN SPECIFIC 

MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, WHAT THEY ARE AUTHORIZED TO SAY AND THE 

MANNER IN WHICH THESE STATEMENTS ARE TO BE MADE. NOW NATURALLY, 

,..; ~ 'P'·' ~ ' II .,. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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Mc tJ ft: 1 Ty 11'4 Per.. MAT 1o1'4 . 

THIS COI BY OF ITSELF CLEARLY DEPICTS THE JIJR!SDICTION OF THE 

COMMANDER THAT THE CMIUNICATIONS SYSTEM SERVES. THIS DEPICTION 

IN OUR EFFORTS AGAINST ._I __ ____.I.AIR FORCES COMMUNICATIONS IS 

TITLED AIR ORDER OF BATTLE. 

IT WOULD BE VERY NICE IF WE COULD AVAIL OURSELVES OF THE 

ENEMY COI'S AS WE WOULD THEN HAVE THE BASIC DATA NECESSARY TO 

FOLLOW SELECTED LINKS OR NETS WITHIN ANY GIVEN COMPI.Qf OF COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY. HO~, BEING DENIEp THIS INFORMATION, THE 

FIRST STEP OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS IS THAT OF DETERMINING WHO IS 

COMMUNICATING WITHIN ANY GIVEN NETWORK AND HOW THESE COMMUNICATIONS MAY TIE IN WITH THOOE OF LATERAL, SUBORDINATE OR SUPERIOR 

NETWORKS.. HOW IS THIS PROBING ACTION EXPANDED TO THE POINT WHERE 

WE CAN BE REASONABLY SURE THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED THIS OBJECTIVE? 

ASSUMING THAT WE ARE BEGINNING OUR PROBING EFFORT WITHOUT THE 

BENEFIT OF ANY TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THE TARGET AREA, WE WOULD 

ESTABLISH BASIC UNITS OF INTERCEPT ~O EXPLORE THE FREQUENCY SPECTRUM AND TO PULL OUT FROM THIS EXPLORATION SPEX::IFIC FREQUENCIES. 

THIS IS A NATURAL STARTING POINT, SINCE FREQUENCIES ARE THE BASIC 

ELEMENT OF ANY NETWORK. NOW I AMJURE THAT YOU CAN QUICKLY SEE 

THAT HAVING ISOLATED A FREQUENCY, THE NEXT SERIES OF STEPS WOULD 

BE ORIENTED TOWARD DETERMINING HOW IT WAS USED. FOR EXAMPLE WE 

WOULD OBSERVE WHETHER THE FREQUENCY WAS USED ONLY DURING HOURSOF 

DAYLIGHT, NIGHT TIME HOURS, WHETHER IT WAS USED ONLY ON SPF.CIFIC 

DATES; FINALLY IF OVER A PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS FOUND THAT THIS 

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,_ 

SECtlRI If _ INFORMATION 

SPECIFIC FREQUENCY mfJJE USED WOULD REAPPEAR LATER IT WOULD BE 

POSSIBLE TO F.STABLISH SOME SORT OF PREARRANGED FREQUENCY ROTATION SYSTEM. THIS STEP, IN ~HER WORDS WOULD ENABLE US TO 

--

DETERMINE WHAT SPECIFIC FREQUENCY WE COULD BE REASONABLY SURE 

OF INTERCEPTING THROUGH METHODICAL APPLICATION OF OUR INFORMATION AND RESOURCF.S. 

NOW OF COURSE, CONCURRENT ·WITH THE PROBING ACTION IN SEARCH 

OF SPECIFIC FREQUENCY INFORMATION, OTHER TYPES OF INFORMATION 

WOULD BE COMING TO HAND FOR EVALUATION ALONG WITH THE EVALUATION 

OF THE FREQUENCY. ONE OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF COMMUNICATIONS 

INFORMATION OF THIS TYPE PERTAINS TO WHAT WE SHALL CALL THE 

11 IDENTIFIER11 , OR, AS WE REFER TO IT, THE CALLSIGN OF THE TRANSMITTING STATION. WE WOULD FOR EXAMPLE EQUATE THE CALISIGN 

USAGE, CHANGES THERETO WITH FREQUENCY CHANGES. AS YOU CAN SEE 

A-RELATIONSfilP BETWEEN CALISIGN CHANGE AND FREQUENCY CHANGE WOULD 

BE IMPORTANT, PARTICULARLY IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF OUR.INVESTIGATIONS. 

ANOTHER ITEM OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THE EXPLORATORY 

PHASE IS THAT OF MAINTAINING CAREFULLY DOOUMENTED I~ORMATION AS 

TO WHAT TYPE OF TRAFFIC IS BEING PASSED OVER THE PARTICULAR LINKS 

OR NETS IN WfilCH WE ARE INTERESTED. WE BEAR IN MIND NOW OF COURSE, 

AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT THAT WE ARE STILL BASICALLY INTERESTED 

IN WHO IS COMMUNICATING. HENCE, THE TYPE OF MATERIAL, BY CATEGORY, 

THE TIMES THE MESSAGES ARE FILED AND THE -. .ASSOCIATED PROCEDURES 

SECYRITY I U f e R: W1 A 'f I 0 14 

3 
SEEl:-JRITY IM reRMA'flOI~ 

TO THE SOLillION OF OUR BASIC QUESTION. OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, 

THROUGH THE CAREFUL CODIFICATION OF THIS INFORMATION, WE WOULD 

BE ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE TYPE OF TRAFFIC WAS ALTERED 

.AT THE TIME THE QALESIGNS AND FREQUENCIES CHANGED. IF THIS 

WAS NOT IN FACT ACCOMPLISHED, WE WOULD HAVE A BASIC GROUPING 

TOOL WITH WHICH WE COULD MAINTAIN CONTINUITY. OF SPF.CIFIC 

ASSOCIATIONS OF NETS AND, INDEED IN MANY CASES CONTINUITY OF 

SPECIFIC LINKS WITHIN NETS. THE TYPES OF TRAFFIC IN WHICH WE 

ARE INTERESTED DURING THIS BRIEF DISCUSSION, WE WILL CLASSIFY 

INTO THREE GENERAL CATEGORIES; FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC, 

SECOND, OPE.RATIONAL TRAFFIC, WHICH IS BROKEN DOWN INTO MORSE 

COMMUNICATIONS AND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS AND THIRD, RADIO TELETYPE 

OR NON-MORSE TIPE CCJ.1MUNICATIONS. I HAVE NOT MENTIONED NON-COM-· 

MUNICATIONS TYPES OF SIGNALS, AS THAT SUBJECT WILL BE FURTHER 

DISCUSSED BY A LATER SPEAKER. 

I HAVE NEGLECTED TO MENTION UP TO THIS POINT THE TREMENDOUS 

ASSISTANCE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS ACHIEVES THROUGH CAREFUL AND COORDINATED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTERCEPT OPERATOR. FOR EXAMPLE, 

DURING TIMES OF"CALISIGN CHANGE AND FREQUENCY CHANGE OR BOTH, 

· AN OPERATOR MAY SERVE AS THE MAlJOR EQUATING TOOL BY MERELY 

COMMENTING THAT THE TRANSMITTER FROM WHICH HE SELECTED CERTAIN 

CALL.SIGNS OR FREQUENCIES SOUNDS REMARKABLY SIMILAR TO THAT OF 

A PREVIOUS PERIOD. SECONDLY, HE MAY ASSIST US THROUGH INTERPRETATION AND PERSONAL EQUATION OF THE MAN WHO IS PERFORMING THE 

ACTUAL TRANSMISSION. AS MOST OF YOU ARE AWARE, I AM SURE, 

COMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS HAVE INDIVIDUAL IDIOSY.IES THAT ARE 

S~T ftrlTO ® fin~ ft THIS PARTICUUR 

_, L ~~· ·i . - I . , -~ J • ~.~ ti - - , .• ' .. I ! 

&liGYR:ITY IHFieRMA'flOM . '~J ~ 
I1lA~1tl~$aJ ~A~~ ~ I U r, . ~ b ~ u~ lb ~ 

s I! e ti R I 'f y I u r e R M A T I g ~I 

ASPECT IS INDEED OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE AT ALL STAGES OF 

TRAFFIC ANALYSIS THAT TECHNICAL EQUIPMENTS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED 

AND PROVIDED THE INTERCEPT UNITS IN ORDER THAT WE MAY OBTAIN 

PERMANENT RECOROO OF THE CHARACTERISTICS O~ BOTH THE TRANSIV!ITTER AND THE COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR. 

IN SUMMARY OF THIS PORTION OF OUR INVESTIGATION THEREFORE, 

WE MAY SEE THAT, AS WE EXPAND THE AMO~ OF EFFORT IN TERMS 

OF INTERCEPT AND ANALYSIS AND AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPLOYMENT 

OF OUR RS.MS, WHICH COLONEL WILDES HAS EARLIER DISCUSSED WITH 

YOlf.,. WE COME EVER CLOSER TO A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMUNI--

CATIONS. OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS (COI) IN USE BY THE TARGET 

NET WORKS. IN OTHER WORDS, IN FINDING THE ANSWER TO TH]; 

. . 

QUF.STION: "WHO. IS CO:MMUNICATING" WE ALSO ARRIVE AT AN ®DER 

OF BATTLE. 

· · .iEO 3.3(h)(2) 

,/./ PL 86-36/50 US 

HAVING DETERMINEf WHO IS .COMMUl\lICATING, OUR NEXT AND LOGICAL· 

STEP IS TO DETERMINE WHAT THESE COMM{JNICATO:RS ARE SAYING .IN/BEHALF OF THE MESSAGE ORIGINATORS OR UNlT COMMANDERS. AS./REGARDS 

.__ _____ IMJi'l'ERIAL, WE ARE C,URRENTLY RECEIVING LITTLE IN 

THE WAY OF THIS TYPE OF MATER!AL, SINCE THERE IS ~ I 

WITHIN '!'HAT I lllILL NOT BE 

OF 

OF IN OTHER WORDS, THE 1 .... ____ ___.I/NETWORKS DO 

EXIST AND AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY ~TATEDI f. 

FROM CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THESE NETWORKS. HOWEVER, THE TRAFFIC 

CURRENTLY PASSED IS 

.. ' •• !:-' ·_:_.\. 1 

~~S~E~C~UURLI1~1~YL---U'Nbl-5-S~O~R~~~A~A~THl~8~1~4---

5 
.... • r,,, !! 

-------. -~---~--C--tJ--R 1 ...... --T ...... --'t..____.l .... N..__F .... < > ... a_n_1_.1 .... 1 ..... n.... Q __ _ 

...__ __ __.I or toURsE, Is I I.AS To 

WHAT IS BEING SAID. FOR EXAMPLE, AS YOU ARE AWARE, AIR Ol?ERA:TIONS 

NECESSITATE RAPID COMMUNIQATIONS; PARTICULARLY IS THIS TRUE WITH 

RESPECT TOI IAIRCRAFTANDASA RESULT 

ALL COMMUNICATIONS ARE EXCHANGED BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND/BELA.TED 

STATIONS BY MEANS OF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS •. / Tli~S NECESS!TATES 

THE PROV:ISION OF ADEQUATE LINGUISTS TO .COPE WITH/THE LANGUAGE 

PROBLEM. HOWEVER, VOICE INTERCEPT PROVIDES US./WITH /OUR D .__ ______ ___.I/LET US LOOK, FOR EXAMPLE, A.TA FEW/OF_ 

THE MORE VALUABLE FINDINGS THAT VOICE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE MADE 

POSSIBLE. FIRST WE ARE ABLE TO DETERMim: THEI fND 

SECONDLY, WE ARE ABLE TO DETERMINE 

________ ,AND OVER A PERIOD OF :TIME, THE I .... ___ __. 

THIS MATERIAL, WHEN MULTIPLIED 

AS YOU CAN SEE IS OF EXTREME VALUE TO OUR MILITARY PLANNING 

EFFORT. 

THE ..... I ______ ...... IBEING/Al....__ __ ITYPE OF AN ORGANI-

..... ZA_T_I_O_N_E_N_GA_G_ED_I_N ..... l ____ ____,_,IFL!GHTS PROVIDES US WITH B~H 

l....._ ___________ __.f:iN ADDITION TO WHAT I HAVE 

ENUMERATED AS GROWING OUT OF OUR ANALYSIS . OF INTERC.EPT PERTAINING ~o l ..... ____ ___.IAI!lCRAFT, THE I ..... _____ ___.IPROVIDES US WITH.MORSE COMMUNICATIONS WHICH ARE U'l'ILIZED EXTENSIVELY 

IN REPORTING .A..NJ)DAND IN :VlANY 

CASES I .... ----

::;7EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 U 

SECRET· EO 3.3(h)(2) 

l'.:l ... PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

si:ca'IUTY i ~I F 9 R: M A 'f I 0 14 

6 
-./ ... ·~ .. 

S!CtHUY"Jl 1Mf6ft."'.%A'fl01cl 

WE HAVE THUS NOW COVERED THE TWO BASIC POINTS IN WHICH I 

AM CONCERNED IN THIS BRIEFING, NAMELY THAT OF EXPLAINING TO YOU 

THE BROAD, GENERAL_TECHNIQUES INVOLVED IN DETERMINATION OF WHO 

IS COMMUNICATING AND IN DETERMINING WHAT THEY ARE SAYING. THIS 

OF COURSE IS PREPARATORY TO THE THIRD STEP, THAT OF EXPLOITING 

THE KNOWLEDGE WE GAIN THROUGH THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE FIRST 

TWO. 

MAJOR HINMAN WILL DISCUSS THE MATTER OF EXPLOITATION WITH 

YOU, SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT ONCE WE HAVE ACHIEVED THE TWO 

MAJOR OBJECTIVES, THE SUCCESSFUL EXPLOITATION IS DEPENDENT 

UPON A COeRDINATED UTILIZATION OF OUR INTERCEPT FACILITIES TO 

HARMONIZE WITH THE OVERALL NATIONAL, SERVICE AND SPECIFIC 

THEATER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. IN SUMMARY, I HAVE EXPLAINED 

TO YOU THE FUNCTION OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS·AS BEING THAT OF !>ETERMINING THE NATURE AND ORGANizATION OF COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, 

THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY OPERATE AND THE APPLICATION OF THIS 

INFORMATION TO INTERCEPT AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. 

1 .. • .. _L_• ,• I 

\ ·: .. '':""t 

SECURITY 

7 
REF ID:A66683 

c 

- -- ---- -----------------
!-

S IE El ll:J !iU 'iiY 

TAB C COLOliEL GORDONW. WILDFB, DC/S, OPERATIOBS 

THE IElT SPEAKER, COLOm. HILL, IS GOING TO DISCUSS OUR ELDr1' PROGRAM. 

ELDT IS Al ABBREYIATIOI FOR THE WORDS !Lml'ROKIC IftELLIGEICE. .AS COLONEL 

BILL WILL EXPLADJ TO YOU, THIS FIELD, WHILE RELATJ:Vu.I OLD, HAS BOT BEEN 

EXPLOITED TO THE mm THAT COMMDIICATIONS Dm!LLIGENCE BAS BEEN EXPLOITED. 

WE, ~ IN' 'fBE SECURITY SERVICE, ARE ilTEMPfOO TO DEVJ!LOP NEW .APPROACBF.s 

Ilf THIS FIELl>. OD OF THE COBCEP.rS WHICH WE FIRMLY BELIEVE TO BE SOUID IS 

THAT ELECTRONIC IlflELLIGEHCE .ABD COIHJNICATIOBS IlflELLIGEICE MJST BE 

Co.MPLDSENT.ARI TO OD ANOTHER Am> P.ROP.RRLY COMBIIED THROUGH ANALYSIS WILL 

PROVIDE US WITH A MORE COM!LE'1E ARD ACCURATE INTELLIGEBCE PRODUCT. 

LT COLONEL LANDOR P. HILL 

UP IO BCM, THE B.RIEFIBG HAS BEEB COHFIBED TO COMUll'. I WlLL Dll'RODU,CE 

A NEW '?Jimt - ELll'l OR ELECTBOBIC INTELLIGENCE - - - DEFINED AS THAT INFOBMATION 

RESULTDG FROM THE D1'ERCEP.l'IOl1 AND ANALYSIS OF SIGNALS WHICH 00 10'.r RESULT lt-J! 

A LITER.AL TEXT. COMINT, OF COlJBSE, BAS TO DO wrm THOSE SIGNAtS WHICH m, OR 

!tO]LP, BESULT IR A LITERAL TEXT. THE IBCREASING SOPHISTICATION OF OOMMDNICATIOBS 

SYS'fDtS MAY WELL BESOLT m COBSmmm,"E COBFIJSIOB' AT ~ IlffUlCEPf SITE, ON 

TmSE PODTS OF DEFINITIOBS. 

FLINT, AS SUCH, IS BOT Hml - - 0!1LY. OUR AP.PROA.CB IS Nl\M. BOWEVm, TO TAKE 

THINGS DJ P.ROPER ORDER, Lr?'S E£.ABQBATE ON SOME OF THE .ASPECTS OF T/A, JUST 

DISCUSSED m: MR. MAC CARTNEI. 

? I . ·''Ir Ii. i I ~\fr ji" ~u ~ .. l .. t 

-

·-
v n ~RE~~=~ ~~;a v tuf tjtti~«ti 

.• ?!Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

••Y PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

S E G l:I R IT Y R L>i IF G R. MAT & 0 •Y / / •• > i/ . A. SOMETIME AGO 1 AS A RESULT OF PROCE$SDG THE 'l'B.AFP'IC /lNTER.-CBP-.tED""' ... FROM 

THE CIRCUITS OF THE _____ OUR.mtFF!C /.AIALYSl'S\. INn:RRED ___,... ____ ..... 

THE EXIS'l'EBCE AND LOCATIONS OF SOME THms WHICH WIRE. OBVIOOSLI I I 

WRTHFB.1 FROM MBSSAQll>OQ~ .ZIT/WAS ImlBRED THAT 

THESE "THmas• mm PROBABLY I )suClli/JS ARE IN co»1>1 USE 

THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. 

B. BI SDllLAR-MfiHODS, THE PROCESSDG.OFiCO}ftUlfICllTIOMS PASSEi) OVER \THE 

. CIRCUITS OF THE I ~·· AGAil.ifRlMARILY BY TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, 

RESULTED DJ "BREAKING OUT"I l/UD I 101 WHAT 

WERE TERMED I f ovnt A PIRIOO or/SEVERAL !EA.RS, m couJUNorioN 

WITH COORDINATED OPmATIOB BI COMm mm'S,i.AND/BI l ..... _____ _.I PURELY 

COMINT MUNS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED FUR/ :ruR!'BER BREAK.ING DOWN I ..... _____ ____. 

INTO BTC. 

C. ALTHOUGH THESE PURELY COMINT .RESULTS ARE MOST VALUABLE AND ARE 

OBTAINABLE0mo/THEI I THE/IBPURMATION IS STILL INCOMPLETE, 

IN THATI !ARE BY I !AND ESSDI'IALLY WTHING IS KNOWN OF THE 

...__ ______ __.loF SOMEI rWHICH WE 00 DOW EXIST. 

MJRE OR ~SS COMPLETELY ASIDE FROM THESE T/A EFFORTS, PURELY ELINT 

OPERATIONS WILL PROVIDE US WITH AN ELECTRONICS ORDER OF BATTLE, I.E., THE 

LOCATION OF NAVIGATIONAL Ams, RADAR ms, me. I AT !BAST IN PERIPHERAL .AREAS. 

IT IS PROB.ABLE THAT THE SCOPE OF THIS nm:>RMATION WILL BE EXTENDED WITH TEE 

DBVELOPMlml' OF NEwm mERCEPl' VEHICLES AND TBCHNIQDES. 

A. IN .ADDITION TO ORDER OF BATTLE 1 BLDT OPZRATIONS PROVIDE INl'O.RMATION 

AS TO THE TECHNICAL SIGNAL CHARAarERISTICS OF THESE DEVICES. 

SEClliHTY i L>l F 9 'A M A. 'f I 8 N 

'·' ·1j·--i ,. ,i I I·, 

~.~...,'-'~-! 
,, 

J ~ ~l@rl'=f4Ein§P r o r ~ a: u Mi 1: t eAdwos 

s Ee l:J iti ''f BI~ p 0 ft: MA r n 0 sq 

B. AND FINALLY' ELDT :um:aCEPr PROVlDES §.211. nm>RMATION ON 1 .... ----

____ lnI THE I 'OR AIR WARimll SYSTEM UNDER SCRUTINY. 

OUR NEW .APPROACH TO BLINT INVOLVES THE MARRIAGE OR COLLATION OF BOTH 

COMD1T AND BLINT INFORMATIOB1 f30 ~T l:(OW: 

A. WE BOT ONLY KNOW S01'BTHING l ________ F~F THE _I -----

CONNEO'l'KD WITH AIR WARNING AClIVITIES 1 BUT DETA]J:.S OF THE .DEVICES USED AT 

PARTicpLAR LOCATIONS, .AS WELL. 

B. WE ARB ALSO IN A POSrrION TO DEVELOP I ..... ____ ___.loP. ~ 

loFmTBEmWARNIHGmSYSTEM SUCHmAS: >:.:llcEO 3. 3 ( h) ( 2) .....__ _______ __. PL 86-36/50 USC 

<1> .__I _____ __.~·I.__ ___ ............... (2) ABILrrY TO REPORT! 

<3> THEI l~wARNING SYSTEM! tAN? 

OTBl!R PURMS OF INFORMATION UPON WHim{ TO BASEi ..... --------

ANALYSES •. • 

I WOULD LIKE TO DIVERGE SLIGHTLY 119.<DisctJSS THI IMPORI'ANCE ioF I ..... __ _ ANALYSIS. AS I MEN.rIONED BEF()Jm, coORnDTATED COMIRT OPEATIONS WITH I...__ __ 

FLIGHTS DI SUCH I l.AREA.8 .AS ~ !HAVE PROVIDED 

_______ ___.lor m: I ITHE WARNING sYSTEM, AS 

WELL AS THE I ISYs.mt.__I --- A. ON THE BASIS OF THESE DETAILS 1 '.ffiOSE UR COMM.UI>mS DIRECTLY CONCERM!:D 

WITH SUCH FAClS DlCLUDING SAC AND ITS BO:teER COMMAM>S 1 AND THE TAClICAL Am 

FORCES IN ovmsus AREAS, MAY EFFECTIVELY PLAN FOR AIR. OPERATIONS WITH SOME 

FORE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OVERALL DEJ!BNSE SY9rEM IN THE TARGET AREAS, AS lm.L AS 
S!CtJl!tlTY H I~ II' 0 !t MA TIO l'1 

ALONGI _______ __ 

B. I MIGHT DDICA.TE BiaE THAT PL.QIIBG BI THE STB.mXIIC Ala/ oolfwm 

FOR Bl'ALIATORY ATTACKS! t sHOULD AWAR BEGIR,/IS BASBJ)/-y. ON 

THE RESULTS OF A OOHTmtJ'~ IWLts1s. RE'l'URNING>>>m/ BLINT, 0rr•s 

PROO.ABLY OBVIOUS THAT OUR ECB3 INCLUDES I _____ _ 

c. JlB THis SUBJEar, I Fmi IT1S RELAVAB.l' TO MU.rIOI /'!'HE I .... ---- 0 rilrmagpr IN THE U.K. DURING WORLD WAR/II. PROM THBiBARLY Dus OF THE 

WAR, CONSIDmABLE INTF.RCEP.r Em>RT VAS.DEV0115D TO TBIS/PDRPOSE AND DESPITE 

ALL GERMAN SECORITY M8ASURES, BOMB 90 ODD PERCDl' OF/ALL RAIDS .Oii GimAT 

BRITAIN WERE FORECAST WELL II .AI>VANCE AND, ACTUALLY, ~ PROBABJ:a TARGET - AREA WAS FAIRLY WELL LOOALIZBD LONG BEPURE TIIBiATTACKING FORCE CAME Acaoss 

BRITISH TERRITORY. 

D. THIS HISTORY ... SBBMS TO DDIOATE THAT I ..... ____ ............. fINTFBCEP.1' CAN 

POSSIBLY COlfl'RIBUTB, TO~ DBGRil, TO/lBrBaMINIBG SOMETHIIIJ.ABOUT THE 

IMMINERC8 OF HOSTILITIES. FOR/EXAMPLE, THBRE IS CURRENTLY m 1 .... ____ .....,....... 

A......__ _______ ____,.. __ ..,...... SIMILAR TO I ~ THE MAJOR 

D:rm:mmal IS IN THE I IWHBRZD Tm: I f PROBABLY -1 --

..._____.~Y ABOUT I ~ AS THIS SYSTEM DEVELOPJfs, ARD AS WE 

OBSERVE THE MANNm. IN .WHICH rr, THERE IS A ......__ _________ __, 

POSSIBILITY THAT WE/MAY BE ABLE TO BUILD-UP SOM! METHOD OF PREDia?ING 

IMPDDINGl .... ___ ~m OPllUTIONS. 

E. ImGARDLESS OF THE POTDrIAL WICH MIGHT BE USEFUL Dl PREDICTING 

-r lbl.o uG.H 

AN OlJ'l'BREAK OF HOSTILITIES, ~ STUDY OF I I WILL 

cm:r.AINLY PROVIDE CONSIDER.ABLE BACKGROUBD FOR TACTICAL UTILIZATION. THIS 

• Q. L 

1'.~Q ~o'lt>.1 .4 THf~ 
/ ,.:Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

· · • ~.!. L 86-36/50 USC 31 

~~~\+~;~, 

SHOWS THAT TBEI liotfCoMMUNICATION, mi.ACTUALLtJ 1~ 

___ lmD>s To THE COMMOBI ls!ST!M& IN TACTICAL uS'S 

WHF.REIB ARB/THE/RULE, RATHIR ---------------- THAN THE EXCBPTIO.N. BI RELATIBG THE SISTBM OF 1 .... ----------

TO THE SYSTEM OF ~-------~ WE WILL HAVE MADE DI' ANOTHER STEP ••. IN 

PROVID~G TACTICAL COMMAHDERS WITH FACTUAL IDORMATIOB ABOUT THE POSSIBLB, 

OR A.O'l'UAL, DEMI. 

F. BESIDE THE POBELI 0 B VALUE _OF ELM INPORMA.TION;, WE SHOULD .IOTI 

IN PASSING THAT WE ALSO WILL HAVE PROVIDED nm>RMATIOlf OF VALUE TO THOSE 

ENGAGED Dl ACTUAL ELECrRONICS C0100ERMIASURES • 

. (1) IF, FOR EXAMPU:, rr IS/DECIDED THAT DECEPrIVE MEASURES WOULD 

BE PROFITABI!: 1 THE NBC.SSS.ARY TECRBICAL CHARAamu:STICS WILL 

HAVE BEEN PROVIDED. 

(2) ON THE a.rBER BUD 1 IF TBBSI mERCJSPrED RADIATIONS ARE OF 

NO DIREal' mEBBST TO US'· THE DOWLEDGE FROM DTERCEP'l', OF 

THESE CHW.CTmISTICS IS ADEQUATE FUR Tm! TO BE J.AMMID 

EFEECTIVELI. - -

IF YOU'LL AGREE THAT WE'VE T,ADB CARE 1 TO SOMI ElTDr 1 OF THE . . 

.......__ _________ ____. SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED ~' I-'D LIKE TO 

PODl'l' OUT A10'nmR mrELLIGDCZ AR.BA. FOR THE USEFUL APPLICATION OF THIS 

BO.NUS EF!iECT DERIVED FROM THE COLLATION OF COMlllr AND ELm' THAT Is _I --

:,·. i . ' ~ \ ' . 

\..::. 
.. 

0 3.3(h) (2) 

1 86-36/50 USC 3605 

,_ 

!l!CtJRITi 

THE INDIVIDUALS OF THE STUDY GROUP I wacr FOR mr MOST PART'• tw>. \NEVFA. BEEN 

EXPOSED TO SPECIAL ll'l'ELLIGENCE AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS 1 RA.P~LY \.ARRIVED AT 

THE CONCLUSION TBA.Tl k«>UIJ> PROB.ABLY PRoVIDE ml ___ ·· ___ ___. 

TO THESE OPERATIONS. 

B. THE GROUP PURTHER DETERMlBD THAT SOBSEQ(lm' TO Ti+ _I _.,.........,._ ..... 

mro I loPERATIOHS m/ PAY cous~Llil DlVlDDDs. 

D VlEW OF THE OOMP.LEIITIEs OF 1 r- ~CH 1 1 

COMPLEllTY BEING DEPERDD'1' LARG8LY ON I ~ 

THEE IS OBVIOUSLY A REQJJRIMENT FOR CONS.lDBRABLE IHFDRMATI(>H ABOUT \THE 

METHOD BY WHICH I ..... _______ ..... r IHCLUDIBG TBE ~nm AND 

RECEIVING G.ADCB.l'S INVOLVED. 

c. AS A RESULT OF THE AOTIVl'TIES OF .THIS GROl!P 1 BOTH ~ AND 

NOB-COMim AGENCIES WENT TO WORK. THEIR .EFFURTS PRODUQID L:t'l'TLE, HOWEVER, 

THE CO!eIHATION OF CLASSICAL INTELLIGENCE (COLW'EIUL) PLusl __ ____. 

INTERCEPTS .FROM ~ WE WOULD TERM _I ____,....,.........,. __ ____,..._ ..... ~ Dm •RESULT IN S0M,E 

BACKGROUND ON 'WHICH TO BABE_ 1''0Rl'BER EFFoRr; 

(l) ONE BIG STEP WAS TO LOCALIZE THE ARIA INVOLVED. PROM THE 

DISPOSITION OF OUR I YOU CAN EASILY 

VISUALIZB How NICE 1'1' 1s TO oow THAT WE MUsrl _____ ..........., 

INSTKAD OF I t 

(2) THE COMBINATION AI.So BROUGHT otr.r SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT SEEM 

TO BE TRIVAL - BUT WHEN Dp;AT.DG WITH THEI _______ __, 

SYSTEM IS REALLY COMPLEX -- BUT rr BROUGHT OUT THE FACT THAT 

I !WOULD PRCBABLY Bl THE PRINC~ I 

Ili¥llL'Vlll ml _, . G !Ilf'. ~ oF mm mIVAL tOP S6t.-n-tt. I"' 1. ; UMlfQR:MAYiOB._ ~.-'.)'( .:. • 
2~3(h) (2) 

80.;:c3.6/ 50 USC 3605 

SIECtllUT'f 

SITUATION WAS TOUCHED OB IN SDBSTANCE BY COLONEL WILDES AID 

MR. MAC CAR'l'DI ;,,.., BUT IS WORTHY OF J!t1RTHER MDrIOB. YOU 'LL 

BOT ICE THAT THOSE WHO CAMK BDl>RE ME, Am> MAJOR HIBMAB WHO 

mLLOWS, GDERALLY TALK ABOUT SoME ASPECT OF m 1 .... __ 

AIR FORCE. MOREOVER, YOU WILL ALSO FIND, THAT THE so-cJ.Lim> 

TEX'f.A DATAlrlHIOH I loF TH&LJ A.IR 

PORCS\IS R.ATHER WELL-DEVELOPED ON .AREAS OF INrEREST. HOWEVER' 

~ ouwsou OR .AlCI'HER, TEXTA DATA onl I IN m:, 

SAY,f ISE!MS TO BE SADLY LACKING. 

D. THE\RBSULTS\OF tBI TBlTA DEFICIBNCY IS TH.A.T OUR INTERCEPT OPERATIONS, 

WHICH ARB\JUS'l' BEGIBNilfG\il.A PAIR OF SITESi ~ WILL 

OF \N8CESSM BE\ RATHER BLIIDLY GlJIDSD UNrIL ADEQJ.ATE TEXTA IS DEVELOPED. 

NO OOUBT, OUR GENJ!RIL.SEARCH\OPBRATIORS PROM WHICH.WE' HOPE TO PRODUCE A 

...._ __ ____.Imo THE I j.AarIVr.rI, WILL 001coRRE!frLY PRODUCE TRAFFIC 

FROM\WHICH TmA CAN BE\.DBVBLOPID; HOW!:V!B, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT ADEQUATE 

TElTA\ IS\A PREREQUISITE TO RE.ALLY\DlREC'l'ED SEARCH. 

B. DESPITE THE GLooMY '!ONE OF\.M!' ABOVB REMARKS, THERE IS AT LEAST ONE 

. BRIGHT. LIGHT OB THE SCED -I 11 I A SUBJECT OF 

INTENSE\ IN'lTBFBi TOI I HAS A GREAT\DEAL TO DO WITHI ICAN BE 

I I~.\ ALTHO'tTGH sac !BI'EEUSSTIRGI I INFORMATION 

FROM THBl I.AREA WILL· PROBABLY BE I ~ ~ CONFIDENT THAT 

I !THERE IS sumcmr ro PIRMlT BEADY! I so 

THAT IR THE SAME MANNER IN WHICH THE u.s. STUDY GROUP DW>VERTCNTLY LEW1ED 

OF THE I ~o BE EXPECTED moM ~ ~ 

SO ALSO WE MIGHT. LEARN WHETHER THE AROUND_! ___ __. 

·ARE SUITABLE FOR L----=:ll:::::Jl==F=~-f:-ibrrirl;-r-
}Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

SECOKI It INFOltMATIOM ~L 86-36/50 USC 36 

F • IOU PROBABLY THINK THAT I'VE GO:NE WAI OFF THE ELINT TRACK, BUT .•.• ItD 

LIKE TO THINK THAT IT'S· BEOOMIIG INCREASINGLY OBVI()US THAT ALTHOUGH EL:nll' 1 

AS SUCH CAN HAVE MEANING; WBD IT'S EVALUATED IB THE LIGB'l'/OF /APPLICABLE 

COMDT, THE MEANING IS ENH.INCED MANY FOLD. 

(l) AS A RESULT OF THIS CONCEPT' OUR INITLU. ATTACK ON l'BE I -------=:;----' ,___ __ __,,PROBLEM IS I IWITH I I D.1· 

FAIRLY JUDICIOUSLY DIRECTED I ..... _ __,!SEARCH. 

(2) LUCKILY, THI ELIHT ASPECTS OF TBE 1 ..... _____ jmOBLEM ARE 

'l'ECHNICALL:f SUCH THAT ~ CA:N AIM OUR SIGHTS I ITHEREBY REMOVIBG AT LBAS'l' ONE OF THE PREQJENI'LY INDB'l'ERMilWf1 

FACTORS OF COMINT. 

":- r, ; • )1· •.: I I ~ \ l.." 
REF ID:A66683 
TAB D 

s E@aHH":Y UH' (;ilM :AT II e H 

/EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

COLONEL GORDON w. WILDES PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

THE GUIDING OBJECTIVE OF THE COMIN'l' EFFORT IS TO 

MEET ALL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. THE SECURITY 

SERVICE HAS BEEN CONCERNED PRINCIPALLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS 

OF AIR COMMANDERS - WHICH ARE,, OF COURSE., A PART OF OUR 

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. THE OVERRIDING CONCERN .OF THE PRINCIPAL 

AIR COMMANDS WHICH WE SERVE AND IN P.ARTlCULAR, STRATEGIC 

AIR COMMAND AND AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, IS THE DEFENSE OF 

THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ATTACK - :troR THIS PURPOSE, THE 

PRIME PREREQUl~ITE IS ADVANCE WARNING OF ATTACK. 

THE BASIC FACTOR IN AIR DEFENSE IS THE DEGREE OF EARLY 

WARNING THAT A DEFENSE FORCE OBTAINS FROM WHATEVER MEANS OR 

SOURCE IT HAS AVAILABLE. THE SOURCES THAT MAY BE UTILIZED 

IN DERIVING EARLY WARNING ARE QUITE NUMEROUS, ESPECIALLY 

WHEN ONE CONSIDERS EARLY WARNING FROM A LONG TERM, ALL EMBRACIVE 

VIEWPOINT, I.E., "STRATEGIC EARLY WARNING'." IN THE SITUATION 

THAT CONFRONTS US TODAY, I .... ___ f AGGRESSIVE IN~ENTIONS MUST 

BE MEASURED IN TERMS OFI I TOTAL MILITARY AND 

INDUSTR~AL CAPACITY, SINCE INDICATION OF THE IMMINENCE OF 

AGGRESSIVE ACTION MAY BE FOUND IN THE INFORMATION COLLECTED 

ABOUT ANY OR ALL PHASES OF THIS TOTAL CAPACITY. IT MAY, 

THEREFORE, BE SAID THAT THE TOTAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 

FACl.LITIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE EMPLOYED IN THIS TASK 

I .._ 
•. 

G~IFORMA d DON 

?Jl=O 3.3(h)(2) 

:o~iw1~86-:3~/SO USC 3605 

i~n .·. ·.· .. t 

THE PART THAT THE UNITED STATES.AIR FORCE s:Ec'QR.ITY 

SERVICE CAN PLAY IN AIDING THE AIR DEFENSE/PROGRAM IS., 

THEREFORE, LIMITED IN SCOPE,/FQR THE UNITED STA'l.'ES .• l\IR 

FORCE-SECURITY CONCENTRATES ITS EFFOR.Ti1JPON.THAT SEGMENT 

OF THE TOTAL I I EFFOBT THAT J ..-------=============:::=:;~----' OF AIR ATTACK . . . THIS 

ORGANIZATION IS THE __________________ ___, 

THAT 1sl ______ ---..-_toF 

AGAINST ------------ DURING PEACETIME, 

THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR.Cl..aOSE SURVEILLANCE OVER THE 

--___,...------.----.---.----'TO OBSERVE I __ _____ __,..._ 

ASSESS _I --.,....---'AND_! _______ f AND THEREBY .AID 

IN THE OVERALL TASK OF DETERMINING THE "IMMINENCE OF ATTACK." 

ONCE IT HAS BE.EN DETERMINED THAT AN AT.TACK IS IMMINENT, 

THE REQU~REMENT EXISTS TO IDENTIFY, SPECIFICALLY, THE D __ ___.IUNIT OR UNITS THAT WILL BE INVOLVED It{ su~:e ~ A~TACK, 

FROM WHAT BASES THE ATTACK WiLL BE LAUNCHED, AND WHEN THE 

ATTACK IS TO BEGIN. SPECIFICALLY, IT IS NECESSARY .. TO PERFORM 

THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS: 

(~) MAINTAIN ~NTINUOUS 0SURVEILLANCE/ OVER I .... ____ ___, .-------.~ITS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THEIR STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, 

AND LOCATION. 

(2) RECOGNIZE THE PREPARATION AND LAUNCHING OF AN ACTVAL . OR SIMULATED STRIKE BY ...._I _______ __,f UNIT OR UNITS. 

2 
:i=o 3.3(h)(2) 

:PL 86-36/50 USC : 

! I! C !i11.H 'f Y 

AND RELATED UNITS THROUGH THE IMMEDIATE ANALYSIS AND 

EVALUATION OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS SIGNALS. SINCE ._I __ ___,_ _ ___. 

ACTIVITIES ARE OFTEN RELATED TO AND DEPENDENT UPON THE ACTIVITIES 

~F OTHER ._I ___ ____.I ORGANIZATIONS, /THE TOTAL PLAN MUST PROVIDE 

FOR AN INTEGRATED, COMPREHENSIVE .METHOD OF PROVIDING Til4'.ELY 

·coMINT ON THOSE ORGANIZATIONS, AS WELL AS THE ._I ___ ___,____. 

______ ___.L IN ORDER THAT A COMPLETE PICTURE OF THE 

AIR SITUATION MAY BE MAINTAINED. 

THE AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE PROPOSES TO ACHIEVE THE 

PROPER DEGREE OF TIMELINESS AND INTEGRATION BY PLACING A 

SURVEILLANCE RESPONSIBILITY IMPLEMENTED BY APPROPRIATE 

PROCEDURES ON ALL ECHELONS FROM POINT OF INTERCEPT THROUGH 

THE SPECIAL Z OF I .PROCESSING CENTER. THIS PROCEDURE WILL 

ENTAIL MAINTENANCE/ OF A CONTINUOUS SUMMARY OF THE D ,__ ______ __.IAND RELATED ACTIVITY AT THE POINT OF INTERCEPT 

WITH PROVISION FOR RAPID CORRELATION AND RELAY OF SIGNIFICANT 

INFORMATION TO APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS. THIS PLAN IS NOW 

BEING WORKED OUT IN DETAIL WITH THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND IN 
J 

RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT PLACED ON THE AIR FORCE 

SECURITY SERVICE BY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. 

THE TOTAL COMINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AIR FORCE 

SECURITY SERVICE, 4S ASSIGNED BY THE AIR FORCE, INCLUDES THE 

~ 

COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION, WITHIN THE AIR FORCE, OF ALL 

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE MADE AVAILABLE FROM PRODUCING 

AGENCIE.S. TO INSURE AN EFFECTIVE DISSEMINATION PROGRAM 

RESPONSIVE TO THE ACTUAL NEEDS OF AIR COMMANDERS, WE MAINTAIN 

A CONTINUOUS AND INTIMATE AWARENESS OF THE INTELLIGENCE 

REQUIREMENTS OF EACH OF THE COMMANDS THROUGH THE SSO SYSTEM. 

THE OVERALL PROBLEM OF RELATING THE REPORTING AND 

DISSEMINATING PROGRAM TO THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 

COMINT WITHIN THE AIR FORCE WILL BE DISCUSSED BY MAJOR HINMAN 

OF THE AFSS OFFICE OF DISSEMINATION. 

MAJOR RICHARD H. HINMAN 

GENTLEMEN, YOU HAVE HEARD BRIEF DISCUSSIONS OF OUR 

METHODS SO I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN EQUALLY BRIEF 

TREATMENT OF THE PRODUCT ITSELF - COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, 

ITS DISSEMINATION, ITS VALUE AS AN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT, AND 

LASTLY,· ITS LIMITATIONS. BUT FIRST FOR REVIEW PURPOSE, I 

SHOULD LIKE TO SHOW YOU: 

(1) (DEPLOYMENT, 

STRENGTH) CHARTS 1, 2, AND 3 (CHARTS USED ARE NOT.AVAILABLE.) 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• ,J PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~! t: t; u., a n \r .w di\ nwl£@RMA.T'~H ~ P4I 111 

4 
?, /·i=O 3.3(h)(2) 

8~N6f L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SECORD k f bNIFORMA n ION 

(2) RESPONSIBILITIE.S TO MAJOR AIR COMMANDS - IT .• IS THE 

RESPONSIBILITY O~ BE.ADQUARTERS, USAFSS, TO SUPPLY COMINT ON 

A TIMELY BASIS ON l .... _________ ____.ITO TWENTY-FOUR 

AIR FORC~ COMMANJ?S, TO CIA, TO .THE D.IRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, 

USAF, TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND TO VARIOUS OTSR U.S. 

ASSOCIATED COMINT AGENCIES. THE RESULTS OF/FIELD ANALYSIS 

ARE RECEIVED AT THIS HEADQUARTERS AND THE INFORMATION FROM 

THE 6910TH SECURITY GROUP., THE 6920TH SECURITY GROUP, THE 

3RD RADIO SQUADRON, MOBlLE, ,A.ND 1 .... ______ .... f IS INTEGRATED 

. INTO REPORTS WHICH ARE DISSEMINATED TO/THESE CONSUMERS. THE 

MEDIA FOR SUCH DISSEMINATION ARE: 

(1) THE DAILY DIGES,. 

(2) THE WEEKLY DIGEST 

(3) THE DAILY 

-----------------.----

ANDO ____ tACTIVITY REPORT 

(4) ~YI rREPORTS 

(5) ALERT TYPE OR SPOT REPORTS 

(6) THE MONTHLY I I REPORT 

{7) SPECIAL AIR SUMMARIES 

THE FLOW OF THIS INFORMATION IS SHOWN ON THE CHART 

PRESENTED HERE (SEE ATTACHMENT NO. 1). IT SHOULD BE 

EMPHASIZED THE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS FROM WHICH OUR INFORMATION 

IS DERIVED, EXCEPT FOR DEEP ANALYSIS ON THE ASSIGNED MISSION I 

OF THIS COMMAND, IS PERFORMED ENTIRELY AT GROUP OR SQUADRON 

LEVEL. OUR. JOB HERE AT HEADQUARTERS IS TO INTEGRATE THIS 

f ::r OD 

~ ~ 5 St~REi : U ,f ~. £Aliilale ,~ SGCYlB'fV nureRIYlATION 

5 
If~ ~NIP 3.3(h)(2) ~-v / r. 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SECOiiuUv DIN t"tQllltMA I ION 

INFORMATION INTO AN UNDERSTANDABLE WHOLE PICTlJRE ON. THE 

DAILY ACTIVITY OF I IFoR/otm c.oNsuMERS. 

(3) OUR GUIDES - INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS OF MAJOR 

AIR COMMANDS • MANY OF THESE REPRESENT NOTHING MORE THAN 

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION WHICH, IF/ ANSWERED, HELP 

TO ASSIST THE COMMANDER IN ASSESSING I rcAP.AllILITIES. 

OTHERS, HOWEVER, FALL INTO THE· CATEGORY OF EAR.LY WARNING 

INDICATORS. MOST OF THESE, WHEN TAKEN SEPARATELY, HAVE 

LITTLE MEANING BUT IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT INFORMATION 

. . ON ANY ONE OF THEM MAY BE THE FINAL PIECE IN A JIGSAW 

PUZZLE • 

. A. DAILY QUERIES FROM MOST ZI/ COMMANDS. CLOSE COORDINATION THROUGH SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER. 

B. EXAMPLES OF COMINT REPORTING WHICH HAVE SATISFIED 

SOME OF THE EARLY WARNING INDICATORS. 

(1) COORDINATED AIR _I ______ fEXERCISES 

(ATTACHMENT NO • /2) 

(2) 

(ATTACHMENT NO. 3} 

(3) ASSIGNMENT oFI . · fAIRCRAFT To I 

AIR UNITS (ATTACHMENT NO. 5) ......____,__ _ _____. 

C. LONG RANGE INDICATORS - OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, I 

COMINT HAS FURNISHED INFORMATION WHICH HAS INDICATED A LONG 

RANGE TREND • FOR EXAM;PLE : 

(1) ..,.I __ __.t.;;_o;;...;;N..;....;C;_E..,_NTRATION ON DEVELOPMENT oFI..__ _ __. I ~YSTEM. 

6 
• , r ' . 

~ ~ ~~ttn•eai! I /~o 3.3(h)(2) 

i PL 86-36/50 USC 360t 

SECURITY_ RHFORMATION 

(2) INTEGRATION OFI 

WITBI f 

(3) EXTENSIVE J?ROGRAM OF I _____ ___,__ 

D. NEGATIVE INDICATORS - COMINT BAS/ALSO FURNlSUED 

INFORMATION, WHICH/TENDS TO INDICATE A LAC~ OF I .......... _ ___,. __ _ 

I I/EXAMPLES ARE: 

(1) ABSENCE oFI 

I r IN _I ...,...---

(2) APPARENT LACK OF I CAP .ABILITY. ....__.,,___ ______ ___. 

(4) OUR LIMITATIONS - AS ALL ()F YOU KNOW, THERE ARE 

MANY LIMITATIONS IN COMINT, AND AS YOU ALSO KNOW, THERE ARE 

MANY REASONS FOR THESE LIMITATIONS. OF COURSE, THE I~EAL 

SITUATION WOULD BE TO READ HIGH LEVEL MESSAGES PASSED 

BETWEEN VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL.OR MILITARY ECHELONS. ALSO, .. IDEALLY, WE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP TRACK OF THE DAILY STATUS OF 

___________ ___,}> FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH THE AIR DEFE.NSE 

COMMAND AND THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND HAVE STATED THEY DESI$ 

TO KEEP TRACK oFI JIRCRAFT DAILY • WE HAVE. ATTEMPTED 

TO DO THIS BY PREPARING A DAILY AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY REPORT. 

THESE COMMANDS HAVE ALSO STATED THEY DESIRE NOTIFICATION 

WHEN A _______________________ ____. 

HOURS. A GLANCE AT THIS CHART (ATTACHMENT NO. 6) WILL SHOW 

YOU THAT OFTEN THERE ARE, OF 

COURSE, MANY PO._S_S_I_B-LE_EXP __ L_AN_.tt_T_I_O_N_S_FO-R---;:::I ==:!....------r 

)· ' 

SiC:URITY fl w E o , u .. x " o &v,~me 

7 
'" 

SECOIUTl 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

• ·;··· t}/lu~aof . n.ln ;:1 ,•,. N;riflJ \J 

sucH As _I ______ h/oR _I ________ I. B.UT 

THE FACT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO 1 ..... _________ ___, 

OF ! ..... ________ __.~WITH THE FACILITIES PRESENTLY 

AT OUR DISPOSAL CANNOT BE IGNORED. 

8 
... !!COR:bif uiNIFORMAfloR 

ATTACHME.L~ #1 

REPORTING OF COMINT INFOfilflATION 

THEATRE 

COMMAND 

FIEID UNITS 

Int sums 

I I Missions 

S cial Studie.s 

ems 

NSA 

HEADQUARTERS 

----1111 USAF SS 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

GA~OE I

. b1' S_QflET 

P,uth; l.G, ~SAf SS 

lni::ds ... ~~----.... ... ' I J,:! ,11 ' 

3.3(h)(2) 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

DAIIX DIGEST 

WEEKLY DIGEST 

Daily AIRCRAFT 

ACTIVITY REPORT 

SPOT REPORTS 

SPECIAL 

AIR SUMMARIES 
$lUHl:JRl'TY H«FeRMA:TIOM EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Aft.ACBMENT #2 

COORDllWED ml lmilfI5F4 

COORDIBATED AERIALJ IEJl!aC!SFB DAVE iBEEN/OBs!RVED IN 

BOTHI l:ANDJ ~EASANPml Im m_I __ 

I L I IBAVE BED,FMPLOIED Toi I AIRCRAFr 

IN SIHJLATED AERIAL COMBAT INVOLVIllG JET FIGBTEBS JSi EARLY AS JARIJARY 1953 

AND SEVERAL OTHER ITDS SINCE THElf. SOOl·AR TYPE. EXEB.CISFB HAVE BEEN NOTED 

m I lsmm: 30 JUBE, AFTER WBICH~ISES HAVE BEEN 

INCREASINGLY EvIDm. Bf f HAVE ALSO nmDLGED IN' 

I hmmcrsm, AND I !HA.VE REPORTED THAT SEVERAL 

ATTEMP.rS AT I t OF[J.AIRCRAft DAVE BEEN MADE W.ITH THE AID OF 

_____ lms Ill.FORMATION HAS BEF.N ;R.EPEmDLY REPORTED BY THIS qoMMAND. 

REPORTS OF THE SORT DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE USED BY AIR COMMANDS CONCERNED 

TO DrtEBMIIE THEI I.AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITD:S AT ALL TIMFS. 
INCREASED BY BETWEEN 

APPARENT AFTER 16 FEBRUARY TO PRESENT 

FOLLOW ING A ..... I ____ _.__...,...,....-----,.-----,.----,.~~.....,..,...,..,.......,,. ....... •·· 1 

BETWEEN 1 ..... -------___,...l .. o~ •.... 16······FEBRUARY·, /TIULJ_/ ----...... 

BECAME EXTREMELY I ~·/A/SHARP INCREASJi/IN/THE._I ---

ALONG_I __ ____, __ __.I BETWEEN/_, ------___.f WAS 

BEGUN 17 FEBRUARY. MAJORITY/OF I f/AlRCR.AFT WERE 

__ ___.I FROM _I _ ___.I B.ASED _I ...,....-___,___IAND//CONV]}N'l' IONAL ·-AIRCRAJ'T 

FROM I I- CONVENTIONAL /FIGHTERS -FLEW BETWEE~ 

13,ooo AND ls,ooo FEET w1TH TBEI fFLYtNG covim. AT 

FROM 19,600 TO 27,200 FEET• _____ toF/'l'HESE AIRCRAFT 

------------------/ONLJAIRCRAFT·, AND• •1N 

ONE INCIDENT ON 18 FEBRUARY' VECTORED I I ON 

I I AND I ....... ---------------------------------_,____.I I I/ I !PROBABLY SUSPECTED A 

;:::::~====:::::::-----===== 

TRAP ON PART OF _1 --_ ....... rAND _1 --------____. 

1 

FOLLOWING THESE 1 r THE 1 ";:::::=============------ ;:__..!:::::::;---- I WHEN [JltECEIVED AN_I --

THIS _I _____ jAND APPARENTLY _I __ __.f ATTITUDE CONTINUED 

THROUGH FEBRUARY, AND TO THIS DAY, THE AREA BETWEEN 1 .... _ ___,,,...,..___. 

AND THE SOUTHERN I t Is VERY I NUMEROUS 
OTHER INST ANcEA r. 31~i 2 

JE"i:N a:kti~~iti ·, ~k1 IHAVE 

SHOWN I J:F' NOT A I I ATTITUDE • 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 

• 
SECUAD"il'V H~L'CRMX 8 ION 

ATTACHMENT #4 

ASSIGNMENT wJ IPRCRAF? m _I ___ AIR mTs 

THE RECOBD MADE BI COMINT D THE IDEN'l'D'ICATIOB OFI I AIRCRAFT 

IB I IAIR FORCES rs A GOOD on. THE I J, AS ~ 

AS THE D AID bE BF.GENTLY TBEI I w.m mTIALLY DEi'EC!ED m 

I l<Am> LATERI lsPmmc mtt!S. m T,HE CASE oF 

THE I I rr WAS I LIN mi I l FOLLOWED 

BY ITS ASSOC:tmoN wr.mt Im mEf t AND FWLLY wrm 

...__ ___ ___.IAIR FORcl!'S ANDI ~ FORCE'S. 

DISCLOSURE THATI 14lBCRAF'l'\UE I I TO WSTI:tl} UIITS 

EIABLF.S A m.T1'ER EVALU~QN OF ~ABDI I C»'.FENSIVE AND/OR 

.........;;...:............!===..;,,.,., 

DEmlSIVE POTENTIAL. DETEC$ OF '1IE I I OF .I I 

AIRCRAFT TO UNITS IS ESSENTIAL shlQ~ ?twm._···_<<m __\ _m __ .. \<·t ...... \ _us_T ..... o __ )I ______ __ 

m THE I le>! mun~~ f I AIBcam. 

·.--.<--,,-\::::\-.. -1!11 111, ...... ...... /--

"'>~;v EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
n ·a bk ~ @ \\ ~ -S·.·.A•.·.···~6~ \.;,/ )"EO 3.3(h)(2) 

! I! C Uj it U TV i ·~ Ill C P.. M A. 'f ti 0 ~ •. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

ATTACBMENf #5 / .. / / < 

-~ ltm!PJCfl 

LJANbl IMESs.AGES INDICm:D OB 

20 AND 21 FEBRU!llY Two FLIGHTS Oli''FIVEf !EACH WERE TO ELY FRCJtl .. ,--------

TO I l/TBmE MPaSAGES WERE Im'iRCEPlED BY THE I..__ _____ ___. 

DErACHMENTS AND RELAm) TO THA't GROUP WHO, IN TDml, TRANSMITTED THE IHFO.RMATION 

TO THIS BEADQUAR'l'ERS. THESE FLIGHTS BEPRESERTED\ THE FIRST .._I _ ____.pmICATION OF 

~/ THE lNFOBMATIOB WAS RECEIVED A't THIS HEADQUARTERS IB TWO 

=====~-..-... 

,___ ______ __.IMESSAGFS. THE FIRST MESSAGE CONCERNED THE .20 FEBRUARY 

,___ ___ ___.jnssAGE; THIS WAS RF.cEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS," US.AFSS ~ 

APPROXIMATELY 1300 HOUBS. THE SECO.Rl> MF.SSAGE CONCERNING THE SECOND -1 ----. 

..__ __ ,MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED APPROXDfATELY AT 1600 \llOUBS. FOLLOWING AB INITIAL 

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION WHICH INCLUDED THE I loF THE .AIRClW"l', WIRES 

w.ERE DRAF'.fEP AID DISSEMIBATED TO ALL TBEATFJlS AND ZI \AIR .COMMANI8 Oii 21 FEBRUARY I 

(TIME ELDfEN'l' FOR. DISSEMIBATIOB OF BOTH ~AGFS WERE\ .APPROIIMATELt 4 HOURS 

(2 HOURS FOR EACH EVALUATION). 

THE FIRST REFER.ENGE TO ACTMTY O~ THESE AIRCRAFT \IN o~ IN A 

---,}tESSAGE (FROM I l\WBICH Rll:PORXED tm: DEPARTURE 

OF FIVED(:EJiOBABLE) FD! I lfR>SSIBLE) .\ IN. ADDITION, A 

I I~ PROM I I\ A POINT ON THE FLIGHT 

ROUTE FRoM I H 'FOR FIVE AIRCRAFT 

ON 20 FEBRUARY. !MESSAGES (THE ORIGDmOR AND ADDRESSEE 

ARE NOT KNOWN) SCHEDllLED FIVE ADDITIONAL I I ON 

2l FEBRUARY. Al IME$E;AGE FROMI l!Q····Q ... UNKN'OWNtoell!ON JJUPLICATED 

);- ·-:~~- ,- ~..., -~\»,•, \\ ': : 

·:---\ ~---1 ~· \·· ... t:'i!!!)ri>< ~ "- -:\ ::,, '\':. i· • J • I • l \ ..... l 'k._ .-~!:, h.~ t' \\', ',',,....: L ' '.•. - ' ·. '" . ·.. < ... ;ra '1£,' . :-

w \ t '';";----...,_ _____ ' ~ \ -,.._•-<'.'>;;--_ -~:\ &#Jt' I ;rHP 

,., ) ' , "" i : t•r \ 1 • ·.·.·.··:·:·· .. '.' .. ' ..... '· ~· •• .... /. . ,~·r:_ , ,.., L:=:i 'Q:; u \..:i L:.:::l '••., \~f '~ ~. ;¥ 

I ?~ F (;.a rt Mi z\ T J S,) t~ EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
. 0 3.3(h)(2) 

86-3~/50 USC 36Q5 

···~ Ii.. 

S!Cttli!UV'lf // /:::////[ iii iii!\\ 

THIS MlillSS BY F01!EC.ASTilll ~IV]) I I l~f ~~II\~ FEBRIJ.lllI 

FH)~ fO AN UNIC?fe>WJ D!STINATI<,>H- TllEI . . . . for:fflw ON \21 

FEBBUARY AT I r11amm,1 lm.&.~iFa')NI .. ...... troEJ 

I I 

EIGHT (POSSIBL:t, mm) oF THFSE[ZJtmLIZEDcw:stGNS ASSIGNED TO A 

mar ATI lcm tocATioN e>F THEf_. ------. _· ------. ........ ........ .......· ------___.I 

I I/WHICH HAS m:m oOBBECTED WITal_ .. i_/ ____ I .ammQ 

USED A CALLSIGN ALLOCATED TO/THE _I ....._/ .. / _________ ____.!BASED!_· ------- Ju / / / 

THIS AIRCRAFT PREVIOUSLY·DISP.LlllID PEm'QBMAl{ClCHA¥CTERISTICS•Im>ICATIVE OF 

DTYPE AIRCRm ou 2o.-2l JdUARY CWEm,I /J)lGFS'f 53-5). 

THE I !FLIGHT OF~/THFSE I WAS .. AT LEAST PARTIALLY •REELECTED 

IN _I ___ ____,_ _ ___.t·COMMUNI: A'lIONS•. i/ TWO (l()SSIBLX FOUR). OF•. THE \AIRCRm 

DVOL~ IN TftE/2Q FJBRUARI PLIGHT ilrlPllE./MO'l'ED lB A F.LIGHT. ~rroTO 

I Pit 14 FEBRUARY. Ol 15/FEBlWARY TWO OF THESE AlRC1UFl VERI NOTED 

OPERATIOllAL EASi OF I l.w> ARE ASstJMJm TO HAVE FLOWN TO I I 

- THREE OF THE FIVE AmmuFT DJ THE SECOM> FLIGHT (21 FEBRUARY) WERE OBSERVED 

om 16 FEBRTJARY FLYING ..._I _ ___.tALOs m I ~GHT •ROUTE BErWEEN 

I ON 17 nBRUARY OltE OF THmE AIRCIUFr GAVE A CJ 

DFROM-1 _______ t AND THE/ OTHl!R TWO ABE Jm.IEVED TO HAVE BEEN 

F.LIIBG THE SAME ROUTE. 

THE FLIGHT OFDL....-.....J------tro I tom 20· FEBRU.AR! WAS 4PPARENTLY ;:::::...----===------. RFLATED TO THE ABOVELJAcTIVITI. !WERE ~y 

ASSOCIATED wrm REC!ml tFLIGHTs mrol I 

THE GREA? CARE THil W.AS TAKEN TO _I ________ I OF TBE..._I --

WAS DlDICUED BY THEI fFROM..__ _________ __, 

·~w:u.&A4.~ WAS THE 

~:.ff~~O[ 

Sl:!Cltll:ftTll DF.SU:ORMAalON 
~ ;_ VJ 0~/~ · ~n~at sre~:HUii'Y ..u.. ilMF&RMAVleM 

FOLLOWIJJG_I __ !MESS.AGE FRa.I I 

._____,___,___,___,___,___,___,___,___,___,___,---___,,....;....---""------.-----...,....._...,.....____,___,--""' 

;;;;;U')EO 3.3(h)(2) 

/dPL 86-36/50 US 

. ' ' . 

• THREE 

__ s_m_CE 2.1 FEBiiIJARY SOME OF TBFSCJBAVE/BEEN OBmSRVED 11'1 _ ___,_ 

I IMESSAGJ!S ftILIZIBG CATJ.SIGBS WHICH ARE.--· _Ba.r----=1 ==::::::;-:------:---

! ~/THE TYPE OF OPEBATIOB HAS BED I I/UTILIZING 

APPARENT I IASI ~ 

COMmT IDDTIFIED THIS ACTIVITY AND REPORTED IT PRIOR TO THE COMPLETIOB 

OF THE OPERATIOlf. 

t-ANtJ)$1 ""' 

SECUllU Bf 
Eb3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 36 5 

GENERAL 

PURPOSE 

FORM 

USAFSS 

FORM 72 . I•• Al'• 601 

- ·-· -·--

'.:""'~lf r-ID : A6 6 6fl 3 ·= ,, .. - . 

~ ·· .... 

----7 ---· 

------------------t--+----1~~---e--t-~--~ L 

t >, ' .J , •..•.. \ 

' ' 

'!' .; 

-~ '!' '·'·· -~. 
REF ID:A66683 

············-- L. :· : ": .. • .. :· ~· .. ~~ ~ 

••• 'I ••• )IJ( i',1(1!1~• t1i 1#. ·~{ ~···· •1! !•{'!!,• '!. -~,.,!' ~ ·~~ ~: ~!'.~~ !~·:! ~~·!'·'1''.,.~~~'!'':'' 

S3 -~ ......... - ....... _,.-.. - •. , .... , .... ,, ,,.,,,.w:• ..... , 

•·· }_;.j_· -----

..... 11U-41. .... ... 
REF ID:A66683 
t' 

SIEEti6U"F/ 

TAB E COLONEL GORDON W. WILDES, DC/S, OPERATIONS 

AN mmRAL PART OF THE DISSEMINATION AND AN DfPORTAN'f FACTOR IN ALL 

ASPECTS OF OUR OPEB.ATION IS THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. MAJOR FOGARTY OF 

-- THE COMMAND COMMEJBICATIONS OFFICE WILL GIVE YOU A BRIEF SUMMARY OF AFSS 

COMMUNICATIONS. 

MAJOR GEOBGE H. FOOARTY 

THE TASK OF THE COMMAND coMMuNlC.ATIONS OFFICE - THAT OF PROVIDING A 

RAPID AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED ST~ AIR FORCE 

SECURITY SERVICE - IS THE LEAST COMPLEX OF THOSE YOU'VE HlWm DFBCRIBED 

THIS~G. 

THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM OF SECUBITY SERVICE MUST HlVE THE mrERCEPrED 

TRAFFIC TO ITS POINTS OF ANALYSIS, AND PROVIDE A MEANS FOR DISSD«NATION OF 

THE ANALIZED PRODUCT. 

EACH RADIO SQUADRON, MOBILE AT FULL STR1i11GTH VllLL GENERATE FROM SIXTY 

TO NINETY THOUSAND GROUPS OF TRAFFIC PER DAY. THIS ~C IS COMPOSED 

PRDIARJLY OF THE SUMMARIZED INTERCEP.l'ED TRAFFIC TAKE, WITH A SMALL AMOUNT OF 

THE RESULTS OF mELIMIN.ARY ANALYSIS AND SOME ADMINISTRATIVE mAFFIC. 

THE FIRST LINK IN THE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK IS THE CIRCUITRY PROM THE 

INTEB.CEP.r LOCATIONS - THE SQUADRONS AND DETACBMENTS - TO THE GROUP. 

~ VOLUME OF TRAFFIC, COUPLED WITH THE NEED TO SAFmUARD THE KNOWLEDGE 

OF OUR COMINT SUCCF.SS, MAKES OB-LINE-ENCRYPTED TELETYPE THE ONLY CHOICE AS 

A TRANSMISSION MEDIUM. 

0 . -.3 u~ ~ 

SECURITY D~~Oll•A•inow 
iliCURITY 

AT THE SECURITY GBOUPS, THE PRINCIPAL .ANALYSIS EFFORT FOR AIR FORCE 

PDRFOSES OCCURS. SIMBLT.ABEOUSLY WITH THE DELIVERY OF THE TRAFFIC TO ~ 

GROUPS ANALYSTS, THE SAME TRAFFIC MUST BE REJ',AYED TO THE NATIONAL SECURrrY 

AGENCY FOR THE MORE EUDSIVE .AHAL!SIS WHICH GOF.S ON IN WASHINGTON·''. 

THE RB'SULTS OF THE ANALYSIS AT THE GROUP TADS THE FORM OF SPOT REPORTS, 

ALERT REPORTS AND INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIFS. BY VOLUME, THESE PRODUCTS OF 

ANALYSIS ARE PERHAPS ONE TENTH AS LARGE AS THE IN'l'ERCEPl'ED TRAFFIC, BU'!' 

MUST BE HANDLED IN THE MOST ~ITIOUS POSSIBLE ·MANNER, IF THEIR VALUE IS 

TO BE DPWITED ON A TIMELY BASIS. 

DIRECT TELETYPE CIRCUITS ARE MAIRTAINED FROM THE GBOUPS TO THE AIR 

FORCE COBSUMmS IN THE THEATER, TO ARMY, NAVY AND .ALLIED COMm'l' AGENCIF.s IN 

THE TBEATF.R FOR MUTUAL EXPLOITATION OF DJTELLIGENCE, AND TO HEADQUARTERS, 

SECURITY SERVICE, HERE IN TEXAS, WHmE THE RFSULTS OF ANALYSIS ARE COLLATED 

AND DISSEMIBA!ED. TO THE AIR FORCE COMMANDS. 

THE INTERCONTINENTAL CIRCUITS, FROM HEADQUARTERS SmtJRITY SERVICE TO 

THE GROUPS ARE JUSTIFIED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF THE NEED FOR TIMELINF.SS 

IN THE RE1'URN OF THE ANALIZED TO CCHm'NICATIONS INTELLIGENCE TO THE 

DISSEMINATION HEADQUARTERS. TO INSURE THAT THE MAIIMDM USE IS Mil>E OF THESE 

CIRCUITS, ANY CIRCUIT TH AVAU.Am:m BETWEEN PASSING OF THE BESULTS OF 

ANALYSIS IS USED TO SUPPLEMENT THE CIRCUITS WHICH PASS THE BULK OF THE 

INTERCEP.rED TAKE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. RELAY FACILITIFS, .WITH 

~CIENT CIRCUIT CAPABILITY TO HANDLE .ALL SUCH TRAFFIC EXPEDITIOUSLY, 

EXIST BETWEEN SECURITY SERVICE AND NATIONAL SECOBITY AGENCY. 

DISSEMINATION FROM HEADQUARTmS SECURITY SERVICE TO CONSUMERS IN THE 

UNITED STATF.S IS ACCOMH.ISHED BY MEANS OF THE AIRCOMNET 1 AND BY ON-LINE 

COMMERCIAL TELETYPEWRITER EXCHANGE CIRCUITS. 

(,? :1 

SECUQRTY 
REF ID:A66683 

f.'-"J 1 •·"4 ,, ... , -.. CJ c:.;-rJ \\_ ! ~i LJ ·1,: d l•· 

5E6&HllTY 81f<i~@l!U4"TSOW 

I HAVE AVAlliABT.E TRAWIC D~, AND mFSENT AND PROJmTED TRAFFIC 

LOAD FIGURES, WHICH YOU MAY EXAMINE mRING THE GENER.AL DISCUSSION PERIOD. 
J 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SECURITY BM!;ORMAT18t• 

III. RESUME ' 

Following a generai discussion,/General Bassett, AFSS, 

summarized the presentation and the/AFSS views expressed 

on the questions raised by the Special Committee. 

It was emphasized that the principle problem is in 

developing a capability for recognizing significant \developments which m·ight be indicative of attack as they are 

reflected in the communications being intercepted and studied. 

It is in this process that greatest time is consumed and in 

which the greatest problems/of provision of timely warning 

are encountered. The existence of an effective AFSS or 

over-all U.S. communications system in itself is not sufficient 

to provide the warning unless the information which is 

indicative of an attack can be placed in the communications 

system on a timely basis. Therefore, the communications 

problem is, in fact, secondary to the overall problem of 

timely analysis and recognition of significant data. The 

solution to this sec.ond problem can only be found in continuity 

of effort on techni.Cal problems encountered, in the development 

of a high level of/experience among analytic personnel, and 

in compilation of/copious records about the communications 

being studied. 

Admittedly, it is possible for I I to take certain act ionL..s_r_e_g_a_r"""'d'"""i_n_g___,t,...h_e_i.,...· r-c-omm---'uni-

·ca t ions security which can hinder our capability to attack 

them successfully. They may, for example, effect major 

changes in communications procedures or security systems to 

screen impending actions. These changes may be made · drastically and suddenly or may be accomplished over an ' 

extended period of time. Nonetheless, if they are recognized, 

such changes in themselves are considered to constitute 

significant indicators; and if they are followed and reported 

as they occur, they can be used in themselves to reduce the 

element of surprise in hostile actions. Furthermore, we 

believe that it is virtually impossible to accomplish major 

military actions without extensive communications. Under 

such circumstances, and particularly if procedural changes 

have been made, we further believe that the chances are 

very good that mistakes will be made by the communicators 

which will provide us with substantial assistance in performing our task. Past experience would seem to bear out this 

contention. 

SEC:URiTY HIFQRMATl9~~ 
-~ 

S !C tJ It I T"'f UMPO~MATIOM 

Finally, it is acknowledged that communications 

intelligence cannot provide a 100% guarantee against the 

element of surprise in specific hostile actions; however, 

we strongly feel that because of its advantages, as 

.enumerated in the opening remarks, the communications 

intelligence effort greatly reduces such a danger although 

it cannot be represented in any specific percentage figure. 

Likewise, within certain·limitations, the more extensive 

the COMINT effort is, the greater is its chance of intercepting and recognizing significant data which may be indicative 

of impending hostile actions. 

!l!Cll::JltlTY HMFOrtMAllON 

2 
' ' REF ID:A66683 

IV. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
-- ,. 

S!CtlRIJY INFOitliA 4 TION 

QUESTIONS ASKED BY :t-m.. WILKS 

I. WHAT IMPORTANT TRAFFIC ANALYSIS STUDIES, IF ANY, REMAIN 

UNDONE AT GROUP LEVEL OR AT HEADQUARTERS AFSS ON ACCOUNT 

OF LACK OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SPECIALISTS? 

1. THIS QUESTION,TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK, IS DIFFICULT TO 

ANSWER. AS WILL BE RECALLED AT THE BRIEFING PRESENTED 

BY AFSS ON 29 JULY 1953, THE FUNCTIONS OF GROUP OPERATIONS ARE MAINLY CONCENTRATED UPON: 

a. THE PROVISION OF MAXIMUM INTERCEPT FROM ALL 

SQUADRONS ENGAGED IN ALL TYPES OF INTERCEPT OOVER-

\ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

AGE ON AIL TYPES OF ACTIVITY. PL 86-36/50 use 3605 

b. TIMELY REPORTING OF RESULTS OF ANALYSIS. DEPENDENT 

UPON NATURE OF ACTIVITY THIS TYPE REPORT MAY BE 

ORIGINATED IN MINUTES AFTER THJ$ INTERCEPT; OR IT 

MAY BE AND, IN FACT, GENERA.ILY IS ON DAY PLUS ONE 

TO DAY PLUS THREE. 

2. HEADQUARTERS AFSS ON THE OTHER HAND, IN ACCORDANCE WITH 

ITS NSA ASSIGNEDMISSION, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR 

PROCESSING ON A LONG-TERM BASIS/OF ALL 1 ..... ____ ____. 

DANDI ~RAFFIC. THUS, TO 

SPECIFICALLY ANSWER THE QUESTION ABOVE ENUMERATED, THE 

FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND: 

sEtUHllf 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SECURITY I ·~ F e &b~·. A T I e H 

a. THE SCOPE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS IS DIRECTLY RELATED 

TO THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION THAT IS AVAILABLE ON 

1

'WHO IS COMMUNICATING" AND 1'WHAT THEY ARE .SAYING''; 

FURTHER THE AMOUNT OF EFFORT EXPENDED TOWARD THE 

PROVISION OF NECESSARY INTERCEPT (RAW.TRAFFIC) 

WILL HAVE A VERY PRONOUNCED BEARING.UPON THE 

OVERALL TASK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. 

b. THE TIMELY REPORTING MISSION OFiTHE GROUPS IS AND 

WILL CONTINUE TO BE DEPEIWENT ./UPON A WELL DEFINED 

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH THE INTERCEPT 

MAY BE FLASHED. IN THIS REGARD, SINCE NSA AND 

COLLABORATING CENTERS PERFORM THE LONG-TERM 

ANALYSIS ON·ALL INTERCEPT EXCEPTI tAND 

·I I/THE QUESTION SHOULD BE REFERRED TG NSA FOR COMPLETE REPLY. 

c. AS TO THE FACETS OF THE I .... ______ f FOR 

WHICH AFSS IS RESPONSIBLE, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT 

CUBR.ENT MANNING AND PLANNED OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 

WILL PROVIDE NEI:ESSARY SPmIALISTS TO PERFORM THE 

TASKS OF ANALYSIS. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT IN TRAFFie 

ANALYSIS, AS IN OTHER FIELDS OF RESEARCH, EXPLOITATION OF THE RESULTS IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE 

KNOWLEDGE THAT IS AVAILABLE ON THE SUBJECT. 
-- ~ 

>'!Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

IN FOct)\Jt:A'f'IOl't 

II. WHAT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE S'l'UDIES HAVE BEEN MADE OF 

HAS 1 ..... -----------~ IF IN FACT 

THERE HAS BEEN Af5 COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES. 
.. ~ .. -

'EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

III. WHAT SPECIAL AND CONTINUING COONT STUDIES .AREiBEING 

MADE TO KEEP IN DAY-TO-DAY TOUCH WITH.MANEUVER ACTIVITY 

OF !------------.---~ ARE THERE REPOOTS 

.ON THIS SUBJECT? 

1. THIS QUESTION IS CLOSELY A:LLIED TO.THE EIRS'l' ASKED 

BY MR. WI;LKS. HENCE i THE MECHANICS OF A REJ?LY 

WILL NOT BE REPEATED INSOFAR AS./ TECHNICAL ASPECTS 

ARE CONCERNED. .·GIVEN TO TECHNICAL PROFILE. OF 

SPECIFIC COMMUNICATIONS .NETWORKS OF THE I.__ __ __. 

____ _.V THE ACT OF _FOLLOWING EACH INDIVIDUAL 

NETWORK IS LIMITED ONLY .BY THE FACILITIES AVAILABLE 

TO BE APPLIED TO THE TA.SK. .AS GENERAL BASSETT 

POINTED OUT OUR CURRENTLY MANNED POSITIONS APPROXIMATE ONLY ONE THIRD OF OUR F.STIMATED POSITION REQUIREMENTS. THIS FACT/POINTS UP THE IMPOOSI:S~LITY OF BE!NG 

ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT WE ARE GETTING .,_I ____ ___, 

____ __.I NETWORKS 

------------- THE CHARTS OF ACTIVITY DISPLAYED DURING THE BRIEFING 

ON 29 JULY 1953 DEPICT A TECHNIQUE OF FOLLOWING UNIT 

ACTIVITY - ANALYTICALLY AFSS IS MAINTAINING A CAREFUL 

LOG OF THE SP~IFIC ._I _____ ___.! ACTIVITY WITHIN 

.__ _____ r PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE RESULTS OF THIS 

TYPE OF STUDY AS PRESCRIBED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

AGENCY ARE NOW AVAILABLE FOR STUDY IN NSA. THESE 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

SECtt~UT'"l uareaMA1'10M 

REPORT FORMATS ARE NOW UNDER STUDY FOR PURPOSE OF 

REFINEMENT. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT WITH ADDED EFFORT._ \. 

IN TERMS OF FACILITIES AND A CONCURRENTi STRENGTHENING 

OF THE FIELD ANALYSIS CAPABILITY A CORRESPONDING 

IMPROVEMENT IN THE ABILITY TO KEEP DAY-TO-DAY TOUCH 

WITH ACTIVITY IS SURE ------------ TO EMERGE.