NRO APPJROVE,D FOR 

(LEASE 1 JULY 2015 

Lt Col Quiggins / me 

October 15, 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE` 

FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

SUBJECT: Review • An Offer of Inspection of MOL 

In your memorandum dated 9 October 1965, you requested my 

views concerning a State Department draft position paper entitled 

An Offer of Inspection of MOL. " As you are aware, Dr. Flax's staff 

has been working with Mr. Friedman to produce a draft Department of 

Defense position paper (BYE-36894-65) on this subject. ,I agree with 

the conclusions stated in that draft. 

The State Department paper emphasizes the psychological 

advantages to be gained by a U. S. initiated pre-launching inspection 

proposal, but neglects the potential impact of such action on national 

security. I do not agree that "Our main concern is public and official 

opinion in other countries" (see page 3 of the State paper). Our primary concern in all of these discussions is the preservation of our 

national security; in this particular case, I rate the value to national 

security of preserving our reconnaissance capability above that of 

public and official opinion in other countries. 

On page 5, the State paper says that "We are virtually certain 

that the Soviet Union would turn down such a proposal. " I do not find 

support for this statement within the paper or within the record of 

previous negotiations with the USSR. Rather, it appears to me that 

once the United States makes the proposal one can only surmise the 

Soviet reaction. The DOD draft lists_ some of the more obvious 

responses which the Soviet* could make to this U. S. initiative. I 

would emphasize my belief that the initiative could well be accepted 

and, once accepted, (1) would result in the U. S. deliberately revealing 

a sophisticated operational satellite reconnaissance program, and 

(2) could result in Soviet responses designed to interfere with the 

success of that program. The responses could range from political/ 

propaganda attacks to the use of Soviet anti-satellite systems. 

Distribution: 

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We have no assurance that a U. S. initiative for pre-launching 

inspection can be restricted to manned vehicles; as a consequence we 

bare ourselves to the possibility of a USSR acceptance, based upon a 

completely unacceptable exchange -- that of unmanned satellites. 

Such an event in certain to jeopardise our national satellite reconnaissance program. The continuation of this program is vital to our 

national security; the benefits of a pre-launching inspection initiative 

are trivial by comparison. 

In summary, the State Department draft does not present a convincing argument in favor of a U. S. Initiative. I recommend that the 

Department of Defense maintain a strong opposition to satellite prelaunching inspection at this time. 

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