USCIB: 13.5/85 

REF ID:A59338. 'I'OP SECRET 

21 October 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

Compromises of COMINT Due to Ineffective Communications 

Security. 

(a) USCIB 13.5/68 of 24 May 1954. 

(b) USCIB 13.5/Sl of 15 June 1954. 

1. The enclosures herewith are circulated for information. 

LSIB/119/54 was circulated under cover of reference (a). 

2. Particular attention is invited to paragraph 5 of enclosure 1. 

3. With regard to paragraph 3 of enclosure 1, the Executive 

Secretary has prepared a memorandum for the Secretary, LSIB setting 

forth in general tenns action taken and contemplated by USCIB in this 

matter. It is included herewith as enclosure 2. 

4. If there is no objection by any member prior to the close 

of business, Friday, 29 October 1954, enclosure 2 will be forwarded to 

the Secretary, LSIB. 

Enclosures 

1. LSIB/338/54 dtd 7 Oct 1954. 

2. Memo for Secy., LSIB. 

USCIB: 13.5/85 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-20-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 

24 
• 

Executive Secretary, u.s.c.r.B. 

GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS • HEADQUARTERS, 

OAKLEY, CHELTENHAM, GLOS. 

LSIB/338/54 

7th October, 1954. 

ca~PRCMISE OF SIGINT CODEWORDS AND/OR MATERIAL. 

Reference :my LSIB/119/54+ of 6th May 1954, L.S.I.B. has 

again considered the compromise of Sigint information arising 

from the misuse of Sigint telecommunications. 

2. In accordance with the provisions of the UKUSA agreement 

the Directors of N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q. have exchanged reports on 

the compromises committed by their respective nationals. 

3. L.S.I.B. is deeply concerned at the continued breaches of 

security by both parties, and would be grateful to know of any 

action your Board may have in mind to reduce this danger to 

our common effort. L.S.I.B. will inform you of any further 

action it intends to take to the same end. 

4. L.S.I.B. suggests that an ex.change of views on this 

question would be valuable so that each party may be aware of 

any special precautions which have been instituted by the 

other to improve security. 

5. At the same time, L.S.I.B. would like to suggest that 

the reports exchanged between the two Agencies should contain 

details of the cause of the compromise, whether mechanical 

or human. It would then be possible to effect a more 

detailed analysis of' the reasons for this threat to our 

common interests and subsequently to introduce more 

effective remedial measures. 

P[86c36/50 USC 3605 

/s/ 

oecx e c1;111;y , 

London Signal Int~ligence Board. 

"Memorandum forwarded to Executive Secretary U.S.C.I.B. 

as approved by the Senior Board at LSIB(54)7th Meeting. 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 13.5/S5 dtd 21 Oct 1954. 

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• 

REF ID:A59338 

TO?SECREf' • 

GIB #000273 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, LSIB: 

Subject: Compromises of COMINT Codewords and/or Materials. 

Reference: LSIB/338/54 of 7 October 1954. 

1. USCIB has for some time been deeply concemed by the 

matter you mention in the reference and regards this source of 

leakage a most dangerous security weakness capable of rendering 

all other security efforts impotent. 

2. Accordingly, in August of 1953 USCIB directed corrective 

action which, as an initial step, resulted in USCIB Directive 

Number 9, at the same time USCIB commented as follows: 

"Experience has demonstrated that even if cryptographic systems and procedures are sound, good 

communications security can be achieved only through 

elimination of poor practices and personnel failures." 

3. Subsequently the Director, NSA was asked by USCIB to 

submit a status report on action taken to improve communications 

security in the C()[INT elements under his operational and technical 

control together with any recommendations he might deem appropriate. 

4. In responding to this request the Director, NSA reviewed 

the various actions which have been taken to eliminate plain 

language transmission in on-line operations, the status of crypto 

systems employed for Co.MINT transmission, communications security 

surveillance and compromise reporting procedures, and then listed 

certain additional action as set forth in enclosure 1 hereto. 

5. In his general comment the Director, NSA incl.uded the 

following remarks: 

"Of the total compromises to date of COMINT information due 

to communications insecurities, a small number have been traceable 

to faulty equipment. A somewhat larger number have resulted from 

cryptographic violations, - either failure of the cryptographers to 

comply with the operating instructions for the cryptosystem concerned, 

or failure to perform properly and completely the check-decryption 

process. Errors in this category are ordinarily due to partial 

ignorance of the rules or insufficient training and experience in 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 13.5/85 dtd 21 Oct 1954. 

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• MFs~Tetfif 338 9 

CIB #000273 

Subject: Compromises of COMINT Codewords and/or Materials. 

their application, and less frequently to inattention or carelessness. Additional training and experience, therefore, can be 

expected to result in a degree of technical competence that could 

virtually eliminate this type of error. 

"Technical competence in the operation of crypto-aids, 

however, is not enough. It is an alarming fact that more than half 

of all compromises of COMINT information continue to involve transmission in the clear on interceptible wire or radio circuits; and 

it is ail additional cause for concern to note the high percentages 

of these clear text transmissions that are due directly to inattention or carelessness on the part of the operators. It will be noted 

that, in the corrective action outlined in the inclosed report, 

attention has in the past been focused on equipments and procedures, 

and the main effort has been expended in improving both. It is the 

Director's opinion that, in improving the tools, and issuing the 

instructions, too little attention perhaps has been given to the 

fallible hum.an beings who must use the tools and follow the 

instructions. For this reason, preventive and corrective action in 

the future should place increased and continued emphasis on specific 

guides and criteria for the training and indoctrination or personnel, 

and on the basic responsibility of command to develop in subordinates 

a deep sense of personal responsibility for the maintenance of 

communications security." 

6. USCIB approved the above mentioned report of the Director, 

NSA and directed that all member departments and agencies cooperate 

in carrying out the program outlined therein (see enclosures 

herewith). 

7. USCIB is hopeful that this campaign will result in the 

desired improvement. 

8. With regard to paragraph 5 of the reference it is suggested 

that the Directors, GCHQ and NSA collaborate as necessary to exchange 

the information desired. 

Enclosures 

1. Part III of NSA Serial 

000407, 3 Sep 1954. 

2. Encl. with USCIB 13.5/42. 

RUFUS L. TAYLOR 

Captain, U. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

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• • 

PART III 

Additional Action Contemplated 

1. Issue to the Service Cryptologic Agencies for further issue 

to the elements under the operational or technical control of the 

Director, NSA, of detailed check-off lists covering general, cryptographic and transmission security and the physical security of cryptographic material, with separate detailed check items for each cryptosystem authorized for use by the field stations. It is intended that 

these check-off lists be used on receipt by the Commanding Officer or 

Officer in Charge of each COMINT activity in the conduct of an immediate 

inspection of his activity, and that the completed. check-off list be 

returned to NSA and a copy furnished the Headquarters of the Service 

Cryptologic Agency concerned. A statement of any corrective action 

indicated and contemplated as a result of this inspection should 

accompany the completed check-off list. These inspections should be 

repeated at least every six months. It is intended also that these 

inspections by local command authorities are to be conducted in 

addition to, and not in lieu of, any scheduled or periodic inspections 

now conducted by higher authorities within the Service concerned. 

2. An additional plan, utilizing the sam.J check-off list as above, 

is also under consideration. The extent to which this plan would be 

developed would be dependent on the availability in NSA of qualified 

personnel who could be spared for the purpose. Under this plan, the 

Service Field Activities would be notified of the availability of 

Training Visit Teams provided by NSA. An officer fully qualified in 

all phases of CCJ1SEC as applied to COMINT would, on request, conduct 

an informal instructional visit to the field station. In order to 

preserve the unofficial nature of the visit, it would be mnphasized 

that its purpose primarily was instruction, not inspection. The checkoff list would be covered in detail, the reasons behind the various 

rules would be discussed and explained, and specific recommendations 

for improvement of COMSEC at the station would be made to the 

Commanding Officer or Officer in Charge. The check-off list, after 

explanation and discussion, would be left at the station for future 

guidance and reference. Requests for training visits would be 

addressed to the Director, NSA, via the Head of the Service Cryptologic Agency concerned. 

3. Specific COMSEC training criteria for the guidance of 

Commanding Officers and Officers in Charge of COM.INT activities will 

be established and forwarded to the Service Cryptologic Agencies for 

implementation in all activities under their administrative control. 

Enclosure 1 with CIB #000273. 

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4. The approved minimwn standards as outlined in USCIB 13.5/42 

dated 8 March 1954 will be summarized in an NSA Circular for the 

information and guidance of COMINT field activities. In addition to 

the listing of the standards themselves, specific recommendations 

and suggestions will be included to facilitate conformance with these 

standards. 

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'/'OP SEORET 
Rtict6TAS933a • 

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANS~lISSION 

OF COMINT BY ELECTRICAL MEANS 

l. Because of the great number of different operational situations, 

it is not possible to establish a firm set of detailed rules for handling 

CCMINT information by electrical means which will be applicable in all 

circumstances or which will always guarantee security. It is possible, 

However, to state certain precepts and objectives which must be diligently pursued in order to maintain security and upon which detailed 

rules, promulgated as circumstances require, must be based. The following paragraphs surmnarize the principles and describe briefly the method 

of achieving the objectives. 

2. Cryptographic and communications plans must be considered in the 

early stages of' planning for any new activity in the COMINT field in 

order to insure adequate cryptographic and transmission security. 

Experience shows that when plans for the establishment of a new unit have 

been finalized without any consideration having been given to communication requirements and their security aspects, resultant insecurities are 

often irreparable. Departments and agencies are therefore urged to 

submit communication portions of plans for new COMINT activities to 

Director, NSA, for approval of the communication security aspects thereof 

before placing them in effect. During the preparation of these plans, 

the Director, NSA, will provide such assistance as may be requested. 

3. It is desirable to avoid to the maximum practicable extent all 

external message characteristics which facilitate traffic analysis 

identification of traffic as a CCMINT end product inasmuch as the transmission characteristics of traffic so identified is indicative of the 

effort expended or the success achieved by COM.INT producers. Where 

possible, all evidences of direct communications between and direct 

cryptographic association of dissemination-consumer activities and 

collection-forwarding activities should be avoided. Where direct electrical communications are essential, appropriate steps should be taken 

to dis~uise the linkage. Cryptosystems identified exclusively with the 

collection-forwarding activities should not be held by disseminationconsumer activities. The Director, NSA, should be consulted in the 

selection of specific cryptosystems and the formulation of special cover 

procedures to be employed for direct electrical communications between 

collection-forwarding activities and dissemination-consumer activities. 

4. COMINT communication operating methods and procedures will conform with those normally employed by the department or agency concerned. 

Enclosure 2 with CIB #000273. 

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• ~9338-

Where military facilities are employed for transmission, approved military 

procedures will be employed. Wherever exceptions or modifications to 

operating procedures are required because of the nature of COMINT connnunications, they will be authorized by Director, NSA, or by appeal to USCIB 

if necessary. 

5 • . CCMINT activities of an especially covert nature (e.g., those 

whose existence is considered sensitive because of geographical location 

or for political reasons) must not be issued cryptographj.c systems which 

are identified with other COMINT activities of a less covert nature, 

unless adequate provision is made for disguising traffic in such systems 

while in transmission. A special purpose system not identifiable by 

traffic analysis as an exclusively COM.INT cryptosystem should be used and 

the external routing of messages should avoid overt association with other 

COMINT activities. Special systems and procedures will be provided by the 

Director, NSA, as necessary to meet requirements expressed by other 

agencies and departments. 

6. Access to COMINT information in encrypted form can be effectively 

controlled only if COMINT information is transmitted in cryptosystems 

specifically authorized for such use. This authorization will be provided 

by the Director, NSA, upon request from agencies and departments. 

7. Keying material used for CC!UNT information will be issued only 

to those persons and activities authorized access to COMINT. Keying 

material used for COMINT will not be used for non-COMINT information 

except in unusual conditions. It should be noted that logistical and 

administrative messages pertaining directly to the support of a CCMINT 

activity may be considered CCMINT information. 

8. Only those operating instructions, keying materials, and other 

crypto-aids prepared or approved by the Director, NSA, are authorized for 

use in encrypting COMINT information. 

9. Programs and facilities for training personnel in cryptographic 

operations, maintenance, and other COMSEC specialties, adequate to insure · maximum possible proficiency must be maintained and kept under continuing 

review by agencies and departments. Procedures must be established to 

insure that only those individuals with proper training are permitted to 

operate cryptosystems or maintain cryptosecurity equipment. Technical 

guidance and support for COMSEC training will be provided by the Director, 

NSA. 

10. Training editions of cryptosystems of a type used exclusively for 

COM.INT operations will be made available only to authorized training 

activities; training in such systems must be restricted to personnel to be 

assigned to COM.INT activities. 

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• ~TA5933a. 

11. One of the principal sources of compromise in COMINT communications is the inadvertent transmission of plain language or the transmission of improperly encrypted messages in on-line cryptographic 

operation. It is essential that operators be thoroughly trained in the 

operating procedures and use of the equipment and that full use be made 

of equipment and devices designed to guard against the occurrences of 

insecure transmissions. 

12. Cryptographic syetems for use in CCJilINT collaboration with 

foreign countries are to be made effective only by the Director, NSA. 

13. Electronic and electromechanical equipment must not be used in 

such a manner as to jeopardize COMINT information due to intelligencebearing radiations. Policies governing this aspect of the use of 

security equipment for transmitting COMINT will be established by the 

Director, NSA. 

14. COMINT information shall not be transmitted in plain language 

by electrical means except in accordance with USCIB-approved policies. 

15. Wherever feasible, the encryption and decryption of COMINT 

information should be carried out in an area devoted exclusively to 

these purposes. 

16. All personnel engaged in the handling of COMINT information 

shall be subject to the security investigations, clearances, and indoctrination as are prescribed in USCIB Directive No. 5. 

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