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USCIB: 13.5/ 43 M'!'EMDE'D :cocm:BNT CONT1t?NS ~Py COIZWO!tl) MtdEitfti:I 

19 March 1954 

'!OP SEEHJ.F 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF uscm: 

Subject: Possible Compromise of COMINT Material. 

Reference: USOIB 13.5/lS of 26 October 1953. 

1. On 22 August 1953 a MATS aircraft carrying cargo and mail 

(including COMINT material) crashed and burned at Keflavik Airport, 

Iceland. 

2. Due to the presence of cryptographic material aboard the aircraft 

NSA received a report of the crash immediately. A report listing officer 

courier pouches involved was received 2 - 3 days later by USCIB agencies 

having such material aboard the aircraft. Initial reports indicated that 

all courier material was completely destroyed. Subsequent reports received by NSA stated that courier material had not been completely burned ... but indicated no possibility of compromise. 

3. On lS September NSA received fifteen (15) boxes of damaged 

material, one (1) of which contained classified documents. This material 

was searched for COMINT but none was found. 

4. During a routine investigation, the Department of State was 

contacted by NSA and on 29 October furnished NSA a report from their 

Legation in Iceland, which stated that security coverage of the crash site 

was not taken until five (5) hours after the crash, that an Icelandic fireman had been seen with classified papers in hand and that classified material 

remained adrift in the crash area for at least three (3) days. 

5. On 22 December NSA received another box of damaged classified 

documents. (It had been assumed that all classified material salvaged had 

been included in the original shipment). This material was searched for 

COMINT but again none was found. 

6. On 11 January 1954 NSA received a report from Iceland, which stated 

that all classified material had been removed from the aircraft and had been 

placed in the Courier Transfer Officer's security room. (The latter statement was obviously erroneous since NSA had received a box of classified 

material which had been held by the CIC Detachment). The report stated ful1-

ther that no possibility of a compromise existed. 

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Subject: Possible Oompromise ot COMINT Material. 

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7. By this time it had become clear that the only way in which the 

conflicting reports available could be reconciled would be to investigate 

them at their source. Accordingly, the Executive Se'Cretary directed 

Major Culmer, his assistant tor security matters, to proceed to Ketlavik 

on 15 January 1954 to determine the true circumstances as best he could 

and to subsequently recommend ways and means of achieving better tracer 

and casualty control of C0~1INT in transit by courier. 

8. Results of Major Culm.er 1s investigation and recommendations, in 

which I concur, follow: 

A. FACTS 

(1) The initial report of the crash was received on the 

day of the crash only because cryptographic material 

was involved. (It is estimated that cryptographic 

material is included in about 90% 0£ the flights carrying officer courier material). 

(2) Had no cryptographic material been aboard the aircraft, 

the detailed report listing officer courier pouches involved (received 2 - 3 days later) would have constituted the first indication that a crash had occurred. 

(3) Approximately twenty (20) pounds of COMINT material 

was involved and was located in Section JJ of the 

Lower Aft Cargo Compartment of the aircraft (a C-97). 

(4) Pictures of the crash show that material contained in 

Section JJ was~ due to the location of the floor, held 

about three (3J feet above the ground permitting a 

considerable draft underneath the material and lending 

credence to a report that the courier material was i.ri 

the hottest portion of the fire (estimated 2000-2500 

degrees). 

(5) No courier material was thrown clear of the aircraft 

during the crash and no explosion occurred. 

(6) A helicopter appeared above the crash scene during the 

time that personnel were searching the debris for 

classified material. The down draft caused by this 

USCIB : 1.3. 5/ 43 

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USCIB: 13. 5/ 4J e 

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Subject: Possible Compromise of OOMINT Material. 

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aircraft scattered documents over an area of 

at least .fifty (.50) feet around the wreckage. 

(7) A security (Air Police) guard arrived at the scene 

shortly after the crash. However, due to an apparent misunderstanding, this guard was relieved 

while classified material was still adrift and for 

an lllldetermined length of time this material was 

fully accessible to any personnel who happened to 

be in the area. 

(8) Air Police and firemen (14 of the firemen on the 

force are Icelandics - the remainder Americans) 

were observed searching through ruble which included classified material. 

(9) Salvage personnel began operations to clear away 

the wreckage while class~ied material was still 

adrift in the area. 

(10) Attempts to gather up all material adrift, to burn 

this material and subsequently to bury the remains 

llllder several feet of dirt were not entirely successful. Unclassified material untouched by fire 

was observed in the area as late as 19 January. 

B •.. CONCLUSIONS 

(1) Even though a good possibility exists that all COMINT 

material was destroyed during the fire occurring at 

the time of the crash, there is no definite proof. 

(2) If COMINT material survived the fire there were many 

chances for this material to fall into unauthorized 

hands. 

(3) Early appearance of' a properly accredited CO~llNT 

security authority at the crash scene would have 

minimized to a considerable degree the chances for 

a compromise of this material. 

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USCIB: 13.5/43 • 

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Possible Compromise of COMINT Material. 

-------------------------------------- C. RECOMMENDATIONS 

(1) That all COMINT material aboard this aircraft be 

considered compromised within the meaning of the 

definition contained in USCIB Directive No. 9. 

(A partial list is attached as Enclosure 1. A 

complete list will be .furnished as soon as available). 

(2) That forei~ COMINT authorities be notified accordingly. 

(3) That NSA examine the type of traffic involved with a 

view toward determining what effect, if a:ny, this 

compromise may have .. had on COMINT sources, furnishing a report to uscm only if positive results are 

obtained. 

(4) That this investigation be continued by the Office of 

the Executive Secretary with a view to recommending 

ways and means for providing more efficient tracer 

and casualty control procedures regarding COMINT 

material transported by air, and i'or the prompt dispatch of a COMINT security authority to the scene of 

any aircraft accident involving COMINT material. 

9. The complete files on this investigation are too voluminous 

to warrant reproduction and circulation to the members. They are therefore being kept in the Office of the Executive Secretary, USCIB, available 

to a:ny member who wishes to examine them. 

10. This matter will be placed on the agenda for ·consideration at the 

next regular meeting of USCIBEC. 

Enclosure 

a/s. 

USCIB: 13.5/ 43 

ptain., U. avy 

ecutive Secretary, USCIB 

i~ml&B ll9SUHl~N'i' SON':FAINS 

OOBSWOR:B HA'±'ERliL 

'/'OP SBGRBT