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USCIB: 4.2/16 

Subject: 

Item 2 o~ the Agenda for the Thirteenth }1eeting of 

USCIBEC, held on 26 March 1954. 

Restriction of Travel by Persons having COMINT knowledge (USCIB 4.2/13). 

'Ihe CHAIRMAN introduced the item by rei/ia.r.it_ing that the proposed 

directive (USCIB 4.2/13) constituted azi old propos~of his modified and 

redrafted at the Boards' direction as a naw step in attempting to solve 

this problem, He explained that the Board had instructed him to place 

this matter before the Efcecutive Committee and to be prepared to report 

back the results at the next meeting of the Board, 

MR PACKARD pointed out that the reason a similar proposal had been 

deleted from the draft of what is now USCIB Directive No. 5 is that it 

was considered a complicated problem requiring lengthy study and, 

not being directly pertinent to the subject of Directive No. 5, it 

could and should be considered by SECCO!~ separately from that paper thus 

eliminating delay in acting on otl2er important and necessary procedures, 

He went on to explain that the proposed procedure for restrictions on 

private travel raises questions of both security and ad.minis tra ti on which 

will require further consideration. With regard to security he pointed 

out first that while State can refuse a passport they also may be 

required to publicly justify such refusal, Secondly, he pointed out 

that unusual travel restrictions on a passport renders the bearer 

conspicuous wherever he has to present his passport. Thirdly, he 

drew attention to the fact that in addition to four locations within 

the United States, passports are issued from various Consulates and 

Embassies abroad bringing to about 70 the total number of offices that 

would require copies of the name lists. He suggested that the changes 

that would take place in the required lists plus the fact that 

restrictions would be required for only certain countries might attract 

undesirable attention and constitute a security hazard. He continued 

bv stating that administratively there is some doubt as to the 

effectiveness of ~pplying travel restrictions in the first place, owing 

to the fact that a U.S. Citizen can enter any foreign country without 

a:n.y passport at all if the country concerned is willing to permit it. 

In the second place, he pointed out that the size of the list itself 

may become such a burdensome proposition as to defeat its prupose. He 

closed his remarks by stating that, while tJ1e Department of State 

would not guarantee that it could place in effect proposals such as 

those presented and regretted the negative aspect of the arguments just 

presented, it still felt very urgently the need for some reasonably 

effective controls. Therefore, ~fr. Packa..T"d concluded, further careful 

consideration as a result of working on the instant proposals would be 

required. before State could endorse them as a basis for a Board Directivee 

USCIB: 4,2/16 - 5 -

SRCREr 

pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 
iE@T Y+S • El!raS ONfi~ 

USCIB: 4.2/16 

The CHAIRMAN agreed that Mt'. Packard had presented 5ome cogent 

arguments against the proposal under consideration. He then asked if 

it is not true that Embassies and Cbnsulates refer to Washington before 

issuing passports. 

MR. PACKARD replied that it is not true. 

The CHAIRMAN then pointed out that the proposal at hand does not 

envisage that the lists to be supplied would contain in them the travel 

restrictions to be applied to each individual. He explained that it is 

intended that such restrictions be a matter of decision in each case 

when occurring. He went on to say that he would like to emphasize the 

fact that the purpose of the proposed directive is to minimize the 

likelihood of another Anderson case. He said that he recognized the 

fact that willful violation of travel restrictions would be impossible 

to preclude effectively. 

There followed a brief and inconclusive discussion of what might 

have happened in the Anderson case if the proposed directives had been 

in force. 

In the discussion that followed it was agreed that the objective 

of the proposed directive is acceptable but that modifications to meet 

the practical difficulties involved are required. 

MR. PACKARD said his Department would like to work further on the 

proposals to see if, with the modifications required, it is still worth 

pursuing. 

LT. COLONEL LONG pointed out that the Ar'rrzy' can't police everyone 

that goes through ASA and then becomes a civilian. He said that the Army 

is working on a study to see if arrangements can be made to discharge 

cleared people within the U.S. thus providing a "cooling off" period 

from their foreign enthusiasms. He suggested that the Committee adopt 

a policy amendment to the instant proposals providing that Member 

Agencies will not allow people with COMINT knowledge to accept 

employment outside the continental u.s. 

The Committee consensus was to the effect that such a provision 

might not be enforceable and that no action should be taken on it at 

this time. 

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USCIB: 4.2/16 

The CIIAIBMA.N proposed that he and the State Member collaborate on 

a revision of the proposed directive on the basis of making it practicable 

for use in the majority or cases so as to simply minimize to the 

maximum. feasible extent likelihood. or undesirable foreign travel in a 

private capacity. He said that the objective should be to protect 

against thoughtless or foolish risks in recognition of the fact that 

protection against willful violation of restrictions is a much more 

complicated and difficult proposition. 

This suggestion was generally agreed with the added caution to 

have due regard-for the rights of the individual. 

DECISION: (26 March 1954) 

1. That the Department of State Member, using USCIB 4.2/1.3 as 

a working paper and collaborating with the Ex:ecutive Secretary as 

necessary, would attempt to develope procedures compatible with 

practical considerations of security and administration and report 

back to USCIBEC. 

2. That the Security Committee is relieved or responsibility for 

further action on this subject at present. 

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