• 

COMSEC: 2-/11 

USCIB: 12./12 

1 8 D.E.C 1954 

-(( 

24 

MEMORANDlM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE: U.S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD 

U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INTEU..IGENCE BOARD 

Subject: 

References: 

Procedures for Dealing with Requests from Foreign 

Governments for COMSEC Assistance. 

(a) COMSEC 2-/6 (USCIB 12./4) of 20 August 1954. 

(b) COMSEC 2-/S (USCIB 12./6) of 17 September 1954. 

(c) COMSEC 2-/9 (USCIB 12./S) of 21 October 1954. 

(d) COMSEC 2-/10 (USCIB 12./11) of 23 November 1954. 

(e) COMSEC 2-15/1 (USCIB 12./9) of 26 October 1954. 

(!) COMSEC 2-lS/l (USCIB 12./10) of 26 October 1954. 

1. Reference (a) is the report of the USCSB-USCIB Ad Hoc Committee 

recommending the establishment of certain procedures for dealing with 

requests from foreign governments for crypto~raphic assistance. 

Reference (b) noted approval of reference (a) with certain changes and it 

also promulgated subject procedures. Reference (c) circulates a copy of 

a memorandum. from USCSB to S-DMICC asking that the latter relinquish to 

the form.er the responsibility for disclosure of classified military 

communication security information to foreign governments. Reference (c) 

also reported an informal discussion between the Executive Secretary, 

USCSB/USCIB and the Deputy Chairman, S-DMICC regarding an attempt to 

resolve what appeared to them to be a procedural problem in implementation 

of the above-mentioned memorandum. Reference (d) reports the failure of 

the Executive Secretary, USCSB/USCIB and the Deputy Chairman, S-DMICC to 

arrive at a mutually acceptable modification to the procedures approved 

and promulgated by reference (b). 

2. As a result of the action described above S-DMICC has now 

formally replied to the USCSB memorandum of 17 September 1954 (see reference (b)). That reply is attached hereto as enclosure 1 and states in 

effect that the final decision on disclosure of classified military 

communication security information is more properly a function of S-DMICC 

to be performed in the light of the views of USCSB and USCIB in each case. 

3. Attention is invited to the allusio~ to page 17 of MIC 206/29 

and MIC 206/86 as contained in the second paragraph of the S-DMICC 

memorandum. (enclosure 1 hereto). The pertj,pent extracts from the above 

two papers are attached hereto for the conyenience of the members as 

enclosures 2 and 3 respectively. 

COMSEC: 2-/11 

USCIB: 12./12 

I 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-01-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

SECR:T 
COM.sEC: 2-/11 

USCIB: 12./12 

aESf1E!' 

Subject: Procedures for Dealing with Requests from Foreign 

Governments for COMSEC Assistance. 

4. In its final paragraph the S-IMICC memorandum refers to two foreign requests recent~ received and asks for the views of USCSB and USCIB 

with regard thereto. These two requests were circulated to the members 

of USCSB/USCIB under cover of references (e) and (f) respectively. 

Enclosures 

1. S-DMICC Memo MIC 75-54 

dtd 8 Dec 1954. 

2. SWNCC 206/10 (page 17 of 

MIC 206/29) and its encl 

SWNCCC 206/9. 

3. Pertinent extracts from 

MIG 206/86. . 

COMSEC: 2-/11 

USCIB: 12. /12 - 2 -

SECRL 'f 
s~eRE'!' 

~:A66066tt 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

MIC-75-54 

December 8, 1954. 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES 

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD 

Through: Captain Rufus L. Taylor, Executive Secretary. 

Subject: 1. Responsibility For Policies Governing 

Disclosures of Communications Security 

Information To Foreign Governments. 

2. Procedures For Handling Requests From 

Foreign Governments For Communications 

Security Assistance. 

Reference is made to CSB memoranda numbers 003 and 

005 dated 17 September 1954 and 8 November 1954, respectively, 

and to intervening and subsequent discussions between the 

Executive Secretary, USCSB, and the Deputy Chairman, StateDefense Military Information Control Committee. 

The S-DMICC has studied carefully the proposals of 

the USCSB concerning the above subject, giving particuiar 

attention to the intent and context of NSC 168 of October 20, 

1953, to the Presidential Directive of February 27, 1946 

(page 17 of MIC 206/29) and to the Statement of Functions 

of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee 

(MIC 206/86). 

With respect to the first subject, the Committee has 

concluded that its responsibility for exercising control of 

the disclosure of classified military information to foreign 

governments from the overall national security viewpoint 

continues to embrace disclosure of communications security 

information to the extent that such information is classified 

military information. 

The Committee 

Enclosure l with COM3EC 2-/ll (USCIB 12./12) dtd 13 Dec 5L~ 

SECftf_T 
!fiflftfBb : A6 6 0 6 6-

MleRffi' 

- 2 -

The Committee appreciates fully the special responsibilities of the United States Communications Security Board 

in the highly significant field of security of Federal 

Communications (COMSEC) and, in fact, welcomes the establishment of an organization charged with effecting interdepartmental coordination at the policy level in the CCMSEC field. 

It is the expectation of the Committee that the particular 

competence of the USCSB will greatly facilitate the obtention 

of the technical policy views which the S-DMICC invariably 

requires prior to taking final action on disclosure proposals 

involving sensitive information. 

In this light, it is the considered view of the S-DMICC 

that the objective and intent of subparagraph lc(e) of NSC 168 

will be met through the furnishing of coordinated technical 

policy guidance by the USCSB to the S-DMICC in connection 

with COMSEC disclosure proposals -- analogous in considerable 

degree to the technical guidance furnished the S-DMICC by 

other interdepartmental coordinating agencies having like 

detailed interest in a segment of the broad field of 

classified military information. 

With respect to the second referenced subject, the 

S-DMICC considers that requests from foreign governments 

(or proposals originating within this Government) for communications security assistance should be handled in 

accordance with the following: 

1. A copy of all such requests (or proposals) 

to be sent immediately upon receipt to the Executive 

Secretary, USCSB; 

2. The Executive Secretary, USCSB, to distribute 

copies of the action paper simultaneously to the Chairman, S-DMICC, and the members of the USCSB and the 

USCIB; 

3. The Chairman, S-DMICC, to advise the USCSB 

and the USCIB in the event the Committee has an 

objection, ~ initio, so as to avoid unnecessary further 

consideration by the USCSB and the USCIB. 

4. In the 

SECRET 
Sfttlfta.n = A66066e 

15'.l!:Ofm' 

- 3 -

4. In the event of unfavorable consideration 

of the case by either the USGSB or the USGIB, the 

Executive Secretary, USGSB, so to advise the Chairman, 

S-DMICC. The Conunitt.ee will take no further action 

in such circumstances. 

5. In the event of favorable consideration of 

the case by the USCSB and the USCIB, the Executive 

Secretary, USCSB, to notify the Chairman, S-DMICC, of 

the position and comments of the Boards. Normally, 

the S-DMICC will schedule such cases for final consideration at the next regular weekly meeting following 

receipt of these comments, with a view to advising 

the Executive Secretary, USCSB, of the decision of 

the Committee by the end of that calendar week. 

In consonance with the above, I should appreciate 

receiving the position and comments of the USCSB and the 

USCIB on the cases contained in GSB memorandum No. 004 

dated 26 October 1954 and in the memorandum. dated 26 October 

1954 (COMSEC: 2-18/1; USCIB:l2./10). 

(SIGNED) 

Robert N. Margrave 

Deputy Chairman, State-Defense 

Military Inf onnation Control Committee 

SECRf!T 
COIWIBEN'FIA:L 

SWNCC 206/10 

28 February 1946 

Pages 29 - 31, incl. 

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE 

DISCLOSURE OF MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 

Reference: SWNCC 206/9 

Note by the Secretaries 

The enclosure, a memorandum by the President to the Secretary of 

State, is circulated for information, guidance and, where appropriate, 

implementation. 

ALEXANDER D. REID 

B. L. AUSTIN 

RAYMOND E. COX 

Secretariat 

SWNCC 206/10 

Enelosure 2 with CClfil:C 2-/11 (USCIB 12./12) dtd 13 Dec 54 

COl\'FIDENTtAL 
e CON~fi'm-M.6606. 

ENCLOSURE 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Washington 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

27 February 1946 

I approve of the statement. of 11Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments" (SWNCC 

206/9) sutmitted to me with your memorandum of February 27, 1946. 

(Appendix) 

I also direct the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy to exercise control o:r the disclosure o:r classified military information as contemplated in the statement of policy. 

/s/ Harry S. Truman 

SWNCC 206/10 Enclosure 
00NFif>ENtD\"L APPENDIX 

27 February 1946 

Ml!MORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

Subject: Disclosure of Militap--Inrormation to 

Foreign Governments. 

The Secretaries of State, War and the Navy have approved the 

attached statement of 11Basic Policy Governing the Disclosure of Classified 

Military Information to Foreign Goverro11ents". The policy is necessary as 

a guide to the three Departments in t~e control of the disclosure of such 

information. 

The policy, in substance, provides that three conditions must be 

met prior to disclosure of classifie{information to foreign governments, 

namely: (1) determination that it is consistent with U.S. foreign policy; 

(2) determination that the military security of the U.S. permits disclosure; 

and (3) determination that it will result in benefits equivalent to the 

value of the information disclosed. You will note that it is specifically 

provided that disclosure must be cons\stent with governmental policy with 

regard to atomic energy and similar or related information for which special 

machinery for release has been or imcy-hereafter be established. 

We request that you authorize disolosure of such military information u...~der your constitutional power/:t0'"7: the conduct of foreign relations 

and tinder your powers as Commander iJ C'nief of the Army and Navy. The 

policy enunciated merely provides for-continuation of the policy followed 

by- the War and Navy Departments since prior to the declaration of the unlimited national emergency. 

It is contemplated that responsibility for the control of the disclosure of classified military information under the policy will be excercised through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Conunittee. 

It is my recommendation, with the concurrence of the Secretaries of 

War and the Navy, that you approve the a§tached policy and direct us to 

exercise control of the disclosure of classified military information to 

foreign countries as contemplated in this statement of policy. 

;-

A memorandum indicating your approval is attached for your signature. 

Enclosure~ 

SWNCC 206/9 

SrJNCG 206/lO 

Respectfully, 

/s/ ~ James F. Byrnes 

Secretary of State 

CONFIDENTIAL 
OONPIBEN'f'IAL 

SWNCC 206/9 

31 January 1946 

Pages 24 - 28, incl. 

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE 

DISCLOSURE OF MILITARY INFORMATION TO 

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 

References: a. SWNCC 206 

b. SWNCC 206/2 

c. SWNCC 206/3 

d. SWNCC 206/8 

.!• Item 4, Minutes 

34th SWNCC Mtg. 

Note by the Secretaries 

1. At its 34th meeting the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved the enclosed basic policy governing the disclosure or 

classified military information to foreign governments subject to the 

approval of the President. 

2. The Committee further agreed to transmit this policy to the 

President for approval prior to implementation. 

ALEXANDER D. REID 

B. L. AUSTIN 

RAYMOND E. COX 

Secretariat 

SWNCC 206/9 

COi\'FID£l\'n"AL 
GONFIBEiN'i'IAL 

ENCLOSURE 

BASIC POLICY GOVERNING '!HE DISCLOSURE 

OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 

1. PURPOSE OF POLICY. This policy, recoonnended by the Joint Chief's 

of Staff, and approved by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, shall 

serve as a guide, from the viewpoint of military security, in determining 

what military information, as defined below, which bears a military security 

classification may be disclosed to foreign governments. This policy supersedes all previous policies in conflict therewith {particularly that contained in Enclosure "A" of J .o.s. Memorandum. of Policy No. 5). 

2. DEFINITION OF TERMS. 

a. ''Military Information" as used herein refers to all information primarily under the control and jurisdiction of the United 

States armed forces, or of primary interest to them. It is subdivided into two principal categories: 

(1) 11 Intelligence 11 , as a category of military information, 

refers to matters alien to the United States. It comprises all 

military information about possible or actual enemies and possible or actual theaters of' operation. 

SWNCC 206/9 

(2) "Information Pertaining to the United States 11 , which 

excludes intelligence, is military information which pertains 

to the United States and to U.S. activities. It may be divided 

into: 

(a) "Technical Information" shall be deemed to include: 

i• Information on weapons and equipment, including instructions on maintenance and operation and a:rry descriptive matter on components. 11. Means of manuf'acture, techniques 

and processes of' weapons and equipment. ~· Scientific 

technical information dealing with the various arts and 

sciences relating to weapons and equipment or having 

potential use in creating new weapons of' war and military 

equipment. It further includes other technical information not directly connected to weapons and equipment 

(material objects) but is applicable to furtherance of 

war such as the art of healing of' gun wounds, preventative sanitation, psychology, etc. Information of a strategic or tactical nature is specifically excluded from the 

meaning of this term. Military training and reference 

publications not primarily concerned with weapons, equipment and materials are not considered to fall under the 

term "technical information n. 

Enclosure 

CO"NfllDEltl'f'IAL 
CO~N:fJ.M66066e 

(b) "Non-Technical Information" which includes all 

military information pertaining to the United States, 

excluding "technical information". It applies generally 

to such matters as composition, distribution, fighting 

quality, organization, tactical and supply methods, and 

operations of United States armed forces, as well as military information on United States manpower, material, conversion statistics, economic and political conditions, 

military geography, topography, climatic conditions and 

other subjects. 

£. "Disclosure to a Foreign Government", as used herein means 

the conveying by approved channels of classified military inf orma.-

tion to authorized representatives of a foreign government, also 

to foreign nationals, corporations, firms, associa.tions or other 

private interests. 

c. "Final Decision" as used herein means the ultimate authority 

short of the President, to make determinations on a given subject, 

and to establish procedures by which such determinations shall be 

made. It does not imply that specific authorization in the case of 

each individual disclosure is required, unless that procedure is 

establ.ished. 

,3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. Classified military information shall not 

be disclosed to foreign governments unless all of the following conditions 

are met: 

a. Disclosure is consistent with the policy of the United 

States government with regard to atomic energy and similar or 

related information for which special machinery for release has 

been or may hereafter be established. 

b. Disclosure is consistent with the foreign policy of the 

United States toward the recipient nation. The final decision in 

this respect rests with the Secretary of State. 

, .£• The military security of the United States permits disclosure. The final decision in this respect rests with the Secretaries of War and the Navy. 

d. Disclosure is limited to the information necessary to 

accoillplish the purpose for which disclosure is made. 

e. Disclosure will result in benefits to the United States 

equivalent to the value of the information disclosed. Typical 

benefits may be one of the following: 

SWNCC 206/9 Enclosure 

COl''IFtDENTtAL 
CO-.Nf"Jij!iNfMko6 o 6. 

CONlf !f}ElffiAL 

(1) The United States obtains information from the recipient nation on a quid pro quo basis. 

(2) Exchange of military information or participation in 

a joint project will be advantageous to the U.S. from a technical or other military viewpoint. 

(3) The U.S. military policy for the defense of the Western Hemisphere will be furthered. 

(4) The development or maintenance of a high level of 

military strength and effectiveness on the part of the government receiving the information will be advantageous to the 

United States. 

The final decision as to the value of military information and the 

relative military benefits to be derived from its disclosure rests 

with the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, in matters 

of interest to his Department alone; with the Secretaries of War 

and the Navy acting jointly, on the advice of the Joint Ch:J.efs of 

Staff, in matters of joint interest, using, when indicat~ , appropriate joint agencies such as the Aeronautical Board. 

4. INFORMATION NOT USUALLY DISCLOSABLE. Classified military information derogatory to the United States Government or any agency thereof, 

or prejudicial to U.S. relations with a foreign government with which the 

United States maintains friendly relations, or containing obvious indications of animosity or prejudice, is not to be disclosed to a foreign government without authorization by the Secretaries of State, War, and the 

Navy. 

Neither the source of intelligence nor its method of acquisition will be disclosed to a foreign government without specific authorization from the department or agency by which the intelligence was obtained. 

5. SECURITY AFFORDED BY RECIPIENT. Disclosure of classified 

military information to a foreign govermnent should ordinarily be contingent upon an agreement by the recipient to afford to the information substantially the same degree of security afforded by the United States. In 

addition military information classified as "Secret" or "Top Secret" 

should not normally be disclosed to a foreign government unless there are 

compelling reasons for disclosure and unless there is satisfactory assurance that the security actually afforded to it will be substantially as 

great as that afforded by the United States. 

6. REVIEW OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Under Army and Navy regulations it is the obligation of all authorities to keep classified matter 

constantly under review and to downgrade or declassify it as soon as 

conditions pennit. 

SWNCC 206/9 Enclosure 
eONFIBEiN'f IAL 

7. INTERSERVICE LIAISON. Close liaison with reference to the d~sclosure of military information to foreign governments shal1 be maintained between the State, War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and among the sub-divisions thereof which have cognizance of 

matters affected by such disclosure or related closely thereto. 

8. CHANNEL FOH. DISCLOSURE AND AVOIDANCE OF INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE. 

The disclosure of military information to a foreign government shall take 

place only through channels approved for that purpose by the Secretaries 

of State, War and the Navy. In making an authorized disclosure the precautions laid down in the applicable security regulations against disclosure or compromise of military information II1Ust so far as practicable be 

1naintained against the inadvertent disclosure in some manner ~f classified 

military information not intended to be disclosed to the nation in question (or to any representative of it). 

9. TIMING OF DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. Because of the extremely 

important nature of warmaking weapons and devices, the practice of exchanging information should follow rather than precede collaborative arrangements and demonstrations of good faith in related fields. 

10. PROTECTION OF PRIVATE RIGHrS. Decisions as to the disclosure 

of classified military information to foreign governme~ts and their nationals 

should be made exclusively on military and political grounds. Classified 

military information should not be withheld for purely commercial reasons. 

1'Jhen private rights, either in patents or in trade secrets, are involved, 

however, consideration should be given to the equitable protect.ion of such 

rights in the countries to which disclosure is to be made. 

S\'tlNCC 206/9 Enclosure 

COi\"-PIDFtN"ftAt 
--~--- eeNflt&~t&606 

STATEMENT OF F.TICNS AND ORGANIZA ION OF THE T.E-DEFENSE 

MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL cag.qT'.IEE 

I. FUUCTIOO OF ca1HITTEE 

A. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretaries of State and 

Defense by the President on 27 February 1946 (SWNCC 206/10) 1 the StateDefense Military In:rormation Control Committee (S-DMICC) functions as the 

agent of the Secretaries of State and Defense for developing, formulating, 

and promulgating policies and procedures governing the disclosure of 

classified United States military information to foreign governments 

consistent with the statement of basic policy approved by the President 

on the same date (S'WNCC 206/9) and for considering specific proposals 

for exceptions to these policies. 

B, RecoDll!lendations involving establishment of, or changes in, 

basic policies are submitted by the Connnittee to the Secretaries of State 

and Defense for their approval or decision, or for such other action 

as they may deem appropriate. 

c. Pursuant to the further authority vested in it by the 

Secretaries of State and Defense on 31 March 1951 (Enclosure "B" hereto), 

the Committee is also responsible for exercising through a permanent 

working Secretariat general supervision of the implementation pf United 

States policy governing the release of classified United States military 

information to North Atlantic Treaty nations and other nations receiving 

United States military aid. 

MIC 206/86 

Enclosure 3 with CCMSEC 2-/11 (USCIB 12./12) dtd 13 Dec 54 

COJ.VfltDl!:lvTIAL 
ENCLCSURE "B" 

THE SECRETARY CF DEFENSE 

WASHil1GTON 

March 31, 1951 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, STATE-DEFENSE MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL 

COMMITTEE 

The Secretaries of State and Defense hereby extend the terms of 

reference of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee 

to include general supervision of the implementation of United States 

policy governing the release of classified United States military 

information to North Atlantic Treaty nations and other nations receiving 

Untied States military aid. 

The State-Defense Military Information Contro1 CoI!liidttee is hereby 

authorized to establish a perm.anent working Secretariat, located in 

Washington, responsible for receiving requests for, and authorizing the 

release of, all classified United States military infonaa.tion, other 

than strategic guidance and planning, to North Atlantic Treaty nations a.~d organizations and other nations receiving United States military aid. 

The State-Defense Ivfilitary Information Control Committee is further 

authorized to axtend the Secretariat, if the need arises, to include a 

liaison office or offices outside of Washington. 

/SI Dean Acheson 

Secretary of State 

/S/ /Acting? Robert B. lpyott 

Secretary of Defense 

COi'tlfltDENT1AL 
... ~ 

USCIB: 12./11 

C Cl:JSEC: 2..:/10 

23 November 1954 

24 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS CF THE: U.S. CooruNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

U.S. CCM-:fiJNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD 

Subject: 

References: 

Procedures for Dealing with Requests from Foreign 

Governments for Communication Security Assistance 

(a) USGIB 12./8 (GOOEG 2-/9) of 21 October 1954 

(b) USCIB 12./6 (COMSEC 2-/8) of 17 September 1954 

1. Further to reference (a), the Executive Secretary regrets to 

have to report failure in his attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory arrangement with S-D MICC by means of' procedural changes to 

the enclosure with reference (b). 

2. The following change to paragraph 3 of the enclosure with 

reference (b) was suggested to Mr. Margrave as a solution to the 

problem: 

".3. The Executive Secretary will normally forward copies of 

the request to USGSB, USGIB and S-D MICC. S-D MICC will promptly 

furnish the Eicecutive Secretary with its views and connnent which 

he will then circulate to USCIB and USCSB as follow-up information 

on the original request. Normally action by USCSB, if required, 

will not be taken in the absence of knowledge of the views of 

USCIB and s-n MICC. The Ex:ecutive Secretary will supply USCIB and 

S-D MICC an information copy of decisions of USGSB which approve 

disclosures of classified information to foreign governments." 

3. It is my understanding that the suggestion quoted in par!i.graph 

2 above will not meet all of the objections of S-D MICC which, I was 

given to understand, feels that final decisions on whether or not to 

release classified COMSEC information to foreign. governments is part 

and parcel of the National disclosure policy which, in turn, is a 

function of S-D MICC. 

4. I have, therefore, requested Mr. Margrave to ha.ve his 

Committee forward a formal reply to the USCSB Memorandum. of 17 

September 1954 (CSB 003 copies of which were circulated as an enclosure 

with reference (a)) setting forth the views of S-D MICC with regard 

thereto. 

usam: 12./11 

COOEC: 2-/10 

SECRET 
.... . • 

I 

USCIB: 12./11 

C OOEC: 2.;./10 

Subject: Procedures for Dealing with Requests from Foreign 

Governments for Communication Security Assistance 

---------------------------------- I 

5. While this attempt has not come to the successful 

conclusion which had been hoped for, it may have served some useful 

purpose in isolating the precise nature or the problem. 

6. A copy of the formal reply from S-D MICC will be circulated 

as soon as received and referred to the Chairman, USCSB for such action 

as he may deem appropriate. 

USCIB: 12./11 

COOEC: 2-/10 

Exe cu 

SECRET