MEMORANDUM

COPY

Cy -

This was drafted before today's news

about Raborn. It may however be relevant.

8/ Brock

COPY

(Handcarried to Mr. Vance's office by

Major Skantze, 12 April, 1600 hours)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

OFF/CU or Thi UMW. SECRETARY

April 12, 1965

CY

I feel very strongly that responsibility for the Satellite

Operations Center is an essential element of any properly

constituted amassment structure for the NB?. Iasi not sure

that I expressed the arguments well during our recast discussion.

I would note in passing that the CIA. clearly recogoises the

essentiality of the Op Center • they made an lama of it in

1963 and are doing so again.

The NIP, as defined, is a single program athracing operations and R&D. The IMO was established to manage it • to amimise

the "take" from operations pressed by urgency and faced by severe

limitations, and to improve the operations and overcome Unita- .

tions by making best use of R&D resources. A Li• •

The President's Board, in its report of last-Nay,t in affect .

stated the two premises: that the underlying problems still.

exist, and that they merit extraordinary attention. The Board

concluded that a single NIP under central mat‘ggamest is still

a valid and necessary approach to a solution. Secretary Neammemeer:

has accepted the recommendations of that report. The CIA has

not, but is 'fairly well an record as accepting the premises.

With agreement on the premises, the main issue is the

substance of the solution to the problems described in the

premises. I don't believe that the administrative issue can ,.•'

be completely ignored, however. The President's Board is on

record favoring a strong centralised management, and as evident

departure from this standard mill evoke a reaction. To wi mind,•

the same arguments apply to both issues - which is to say that
the President's Board is right, and that a departure from

good management practice does indeed weaken one's approach

to the basic problems. The aripmets as they relate to the

Operations Center can be expressed by talking in terms of

satellite photographic intelligence.

The basic concept of the DM is that one office • or one .

individual, the DIMO • is responsible for delivering pictures

to the intelligence community, with related identifying data,

pictures of targets and areas as specified to him, having a

timeliness and quality that is limited only by natural causes,

by pre-given policies and priorities, and by budgetary

constraints that have been agreed upon.

One can certainly ask, whether this is a valid or4Neful

separation of responsibilities. MW. MIComelp words knot

accurately diatinguish!t among responsibilities, functions, and

resourcis, butt is clear fromIdAgobart that(bOdoes not -'

VOcrosa toJ separate out the specific responsibility just identified.'

Presumably he subsumes it under his owe statutory responsibility

for delivering estimates. It might be interesting for the DeD

to press for a clarification of this point, since is fast the

military community uses pigtures direct! and the related data, -1

for detailed measurement,4targettimg, andZeida . The :' delivery to the military of primary data for these

appears to as to be a function wits distinct from that of .,4

delivering estimates. Does CIA recognise this function? If so, 1;

how does Mr. Means plan to insure its proper acoomplishment? -

From the point of viol of menagmeent, the particulaesepers•

tics of responsibilities which the MID represents is a valid ome:.

On the output side, the interface is very clear: the product 

is a definite thing, pictures and closely related data, homily' 

qualities and properties that are relatively easy to judge

against standards that can be objective and fairly complete. In other words, performance can be defined and evaluated.

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 ;:.:; as laterfu . e at dr lasel et tats:Ins revairennts priorities, or La 11111Vertbstan simply midi* saiplialt asissin.1.,;;.:A: aary leashes. lira rosposis. is tons'ot 'dolt solution ad own doeision, to reqpitteunts and priaritios*tu t

...:y: be mode by people sbe 4114 are thonebres AM; esteblieb times 1:::::•- reseirements and pristine.. If the ouratian units at all, *sap the ea* variables are tin thmain vitta Ada gelds solutions sawed emu iesisisas ems =WM slums lilts=1;-:

sumes..9r. 1104114140a .fla...*4X-0/11AW• 11 sibel• _

i i pripatielle Aissuissill awasaL abstaidie•

ender a separatism of vespses0431Uss, to sobleviatt the best

is tionliness awl ssesitivity dot is passible seder any ausajp.,

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The sepereties of respeesiblittiss *lab the 1110 migainistik is also a labsable awe. it flans atteetias as a dofinito .- proton, pleuras mei related data, a probe* sbieb Is LOWS awe~*

dosiderita•, bateau it is mei by ray all Ike my • •

parp0111111. Jes setae, tit mien Is of fairly ftp

'minutiae against stradards, and indeed avian sOodueb tbael;

aro reassembly appropriate ee its Steal was. establishies.,4

this pavane as a whd.ds resposibility, see sets vp lira base:.

amobesise people Mos fee settles seed reselts

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claws motlee d 

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og. is is iattaltely wait se esulosts

den at evaluate estimates. . it is outdid/ geed

" '.; Thessagirlib 2141" Vie woe of the estlestisi roses., to ask Zoe wed .;

purfoanasse of !list part of tbs pewees' tin erne be boar ent":'

and evaluated, provided time tita staminets of evaluatlom au

&preordain to the ski 

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result. Is tile mesa* ease,

zetee ea4:113 .

Ormatiss, use, tint time IND bee bees aseipmed the spesilii

respowsibility to Mime pictures is sesposse to reirdinissitt

uby should the Satellite Operations Costae be in itessoti t

of the aegaulastios? Weed, lath little &me, thi

just sited foe serseaties out the ND ass ales be red as belt ell
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• a separation Of the Op Coster feistion id.this the MID. This

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ill sot of 4:ours: chat Mr. llsecoarlies proposed, Owe his shorts :.::::::,

.:.. =jest the *obi esasept of the IMO; but OM could Certainly - " : • t :.•

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:Itdasks eallaid trii;e9oaresa andait ptrlrtaaai tbisieithejatabker lgdab c.sterdisbit;""ad" die."'slagd PhYi"Il auo. kftliall .r."1"" airA. ej141113 . 414.14"1" . • 4. . ..dill . .tand ."11111:1"..;:':

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. . • • ...::-....i t. :. 1.,.. Against this assmassunt, theta ire inpOrtast giants ntsof . 71.: ..,

subsumes. Ths argaments relate to the efficient use of -• ••:...:::

. : resources, or alternatively,-.to the sciaplasity, in fast, of the'..._ ..:•.,..:. ,..,

•••;::... :,•.. % interface between the Op Center and the What fuestiosal elements • *.*:

:'• ....,: • and anacuting sissies Plans‘ die tweeter

..,.. :. ribrifiniiiirAt as perform:Mg iteprisery • oftbrirgiffig .'. ei \.-4,..c.4.

under taitherity..:.:

...:..., _,... • debated tram the IIIIIDN'IorisoS tasks—ire odoor- sposialised.ead •.i 1/44

. . AC ... expert elsients of the IUDs tasks *JO result is data being: . .' -•!lal

. .,....:,... returned and hardwore being essiitted. Although to priasiplak.:.7....:.h}

... 1.t.,, • perhaps irrelevant, it is a fact that lost of dies:. tashargs : . :.--1...:

' to Air Force elements* of the SOO. Alliost all of the tasks .* • • -?...1..•

result in the espeoditure of 701) fit. *lest of the tasks go . :!.. .: ! F.

to elements of die MO Adak have hcortent funetions ether thiS,•••.;:i••:•..

direct support of the Op Oestes• The actions of the Op Center .:-'r...i;

therefore mesh quite close]; with, and eau Weed inter** ati,64,?:';•..z.

other direct operettas business of the 110. These actions in ! . ,-.-'::ZS

fact writ and do get eastinning attention irons the Dineetog. 11110..:.:.4

Staff and fro. es.

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There is • eaosiderabla reservoir of espertise is the•

Op Caster, deeLviag fros its reseeded and rassabered saperioese...,:.-;•:,':-

...•-•: ••••••& .• ....„

Ve draw heavily and regularly upon this reservoir is support •';•::.•: :"4

of long terra operational pleasing and planning of resew** aid*, i..-:,;:V:

developosst. (I have not in this essay Attempted to address tbii :. :!:?;

DAD respoasibiLities of die ISO.) Tornallaed stodlei by .dmi-..., - .-.1••":4; Op Canter are an hapartant pert of our planning activity* but : - '=..***2:•-"";

we also regularly use die Op Ouster per asst diseetl ► in othin'•:.•.7:4,

activities of study and coesultation. I rill return to this poiat:•,:.

later. It is perhaps the Rost important. ' ....;.•;.t - • .:- •..b.:.z.
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I believe that It is set preotioable . so toocodify

presort functions of air Op Center 'that' they eau be sepatatal • ••:*:

out as a distinct set of responsibilities assigaidas to a fully

separate nenagesent unit. 3d pelasipleip :one could perhaps • : •;- • ;:leY.

en3Arge the Op Center and alike it aides surly selikPoostained, *--"

simplifying its Interfaces with the rest of the. IMO to those, ••

in the Unit, of receiving reqalraseate•and issuing direeE .. *:•••.'`r•

operational instructions... This would require a duplication of

resources and'espertises. 'Sash dap/Amities is certain/i snot • .. •

efficient, and *probably not possible, since it is difficult**

to duplicate effectively all of die empertise, derived from

direct experience, upon Iblerh the Op Canter draw by its pressat':::.:...,) tasking. • • • . • - • 4

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........ Thus endeth the logical arguments favoring retation •of •••••

the Op Center. 'to 'my mind they are in fact oospalling, but .,

there are nco4ogioal aripasents, variants of the

hominem, which are • of equal or greats* force. the- Op Canter •-

is to work as intimately as it does with the rest of the degmaisistfr:J

tion, physical separation from me and from the 1a0 staff

be • nuisance. Organisational separation would be sore than a'.. •

nuisance. In feat I an sure that, in the present clients, • •• "::%::::2!

physical and organisational removal of the Op Caster *sold hirer

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troy the intimacy and effectiveness of our present relation-•-! f •,

ships. The NRO would be deprived of an important asset to its:.

planning of research and development, to the benefit of 1.1privetse:.:i,,,

.00... interests elsewhere. Compare, •for ample, the penetration of ';:••••::ty,:four studies of maw requirements (sic) with the .:-.•••::v:* planning base an eats. Much of the differanse,-121

my judgment, results from our collective understanding

riots and from the fact that we have direct channels by which te'•...s

draw upon that understanding. .

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Much of the remaining difference, by the way, results

the fact that we are responsible, responsible for the 161).amd

living with its results. this, and the access to expertise jilit•C.•

referred to, constitute two of the three primary' argnents. *xi

assigning 56 responsibilities to the 111V3. This assigns= is

matter not otherwise addressed here.. ••

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Recall the difficulties General Carroll has had to get

military collection requiremests really resognised by OM and

acted on by theNW. Reflect on the perjury committed our

presence the other day favoring requirements f j if

the requirements chennel from the Chaitient, VSIN to satellite

operations is never !canalised, but remains as privets and sa

covert es that between him and IMAM, the whole of the

collection process will be perverted to serve OM mirror set

of ands. The usefulness of satellite photography to the

military will become largely lecidental.

I am convinced that if the Op Center is removed from the

NW, the NW will be destroyed and the DOD will experience

intmominable difficulties in getting its requirements recogeised.

I an further convinced that th4sfundemeetal fact is well

understood by others and that final irrevocable destruction of

the MID is the primary intent behind the proposal to separate

the Op Center.

Brockway *Milian

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