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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 13 May 1963

SUBJECT: 4.6)-NRO Planning

1. General Schriever met with Dr. McMillan on 11 May 1963 to discuss

the plan that the DNRO proposed to implement (Guidelines for the (CS)

NRP) and its relationship to Mr Force responsibilities for planning for

wartime reconnaissance. As a result of this meeting, he directed that:

A revised version of the proposed "Guidelines for the (7.5) NRP"

be prepared together with a covering memorandum to Dr. McMillan

outlining Air Force philosophy on this planning.

General R. N. Smith of SAC be called and informed of the outcome

of the meeting.

,The details of General Schriever is direction are contained in the following paragraphs:

2. General Schriever requested that General Smith be informed essentially

as follows. (Since General Smith was completely familiar with the

subject, this was accomplished by phone on 11 May.)

No definite agreement resulted from General Schriever ts meeting

with Dr. McMillan. General Schriever is somewhat skeptical that a

satisfactory agreement can be reached solely with Dr. McMillan.

They did agree that General Schriever would submit revised

version of the proposed DNRO plan which would place the responsibility

for planning for war reconnaissance under the Air Force.

We would appreciate SAC ts reaction to this approach and also

would welcome a participant from SAC to finalize our plan. (I pointed

out that General Ritland and I would be working on this Monday and

suggested that General Smith might want to defer sending specific people

in until General Ritland had a chance to review this task and to call

General Smith. General Smith agreed and indicated that he and a couple

of other properly cleared people could come in Monday afternoon.)

General Power should simply be kept informed at this time.

General Schriever feels that his personal support and participation will

probably be required before this matter is settled.

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3. The following is General Schriever's direction with regard to the

revised plan:

The responsibility for planning for strategic wartime reconnaissance should be that of the Air Force no matter what vehicles,

sensors, etc. are used. In particular planning for page 9, item f

(retargeting and reconstituting forces) and page 10, item g (BDA and

post strike) must be done by the Air Force. A group of those people

properly cleared within the Air Force should be set up to accomplish

this task. Personnel from SAC should participate. This group would

be part of Forecast but would be "in the black" i.e., their relationship

to Forecast would be considered as highly sensitive and would not be

known by the "white" portion of Forecast or anyone not properly

cleared. Special emphasis will be placed on proper security. In

order to assure proper security as well as the appearance thereof,

and to properly interface with the NRO planning, this study should be

conducted in Washington.

The interlocking membership on the Study Management Council

for the NRO plan should continue. The Forecast wartime reconnaissance

study group should establish an interface with the NRO planning and, in

fact, should use data coming out of the NRO planning activity to assist

in their planning. This group would adapt and integrate NRO technology

and capabilities to develop the capability for wartime reconnaissance.

If appropriate, this group should act as the channel through which

information and studies required by the NRO would flow.

The specific studies which are now proposed in the DNRO plan

should be carefully reviewed. The Air Force should be made responsible

for those dealing with operations and those development studies not

requiring specialized, closely held information dealing with reconnaissance

payloads. If properly handled, most of these can be done "in the white."

Planning for non-satellite tactical reconnaissance can and should

be conducted in the white as part of Forecast.

e. Several additional words and phrases proposed in the NRO plan

were marked by General Schriever as requiring change.

4. In addition, General Schriever requested that a covering memorandum

to Dr. McMillan be prepared. The following points should be included

as well as any others which are appropriate.
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The proposed plan by DNRO is not acceptable. It, in effect,

prohibits the Air Force from planning with the operational commands

for the capabilities required to successfully prosecute a war.

Our present combat capability will deteriorate and our future

capability will be incomplete and ineffective if required wartime

reconnaissance capabilities are not included.

The NRO is at a level of government not appropriate for the

planning or conduct of operational wartime reconnaissance. Such

planning is not the assigned responsibility of the NRO. Planning for

the capabilities required by CINCSAC must be accomplished by the

Air Force, AFSC, and SAC.

The thoughts in the VCS paper of 2 May regarding the Operational Aspects of the National Reconnaissance Office.

c. A "security curtain" must not be used to inhibit proper planning

for and development of wartime reconnaissance capabilities. Conversely,

the Air Force must agree to and completely support the special security

aspects of such activity to the letter.

DAVID L. CARTER

Colonel, USAF