NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 22-2743

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WELLINGTON GONCALVES DE OLIVEIRA,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

On Petition for Review of

Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(A201-245-547)

Immigration Judge: Jason Pope

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a):

June 12, 2023

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Before: PORTER, FREEMAN, and FISHER,

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 14, 2023)

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OPINION∗

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∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not 

binding precedent.
2

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Wellington Goncalves de Oliveira petitions for review of the denial of his motion 

to reopen removal proceedings. Because the Immigration Judge (IJ) properly found that 

Goncalves de Oliveira did not show prima facie eligibility for humanitarian asylum, we 

will affirm. 

I

Goncalves de Oliveira is a native and citizen of Brazil. He entered the United 

States in 2000 on a B2 Tourist Visa but voluntarily departed in 2016 after he was placed 

in removal proceedings for overstaying his visa. While Goncalves de Oliveira was in 

Brazil, a police officer who had previously assaulted Goncalves de Oliveira’s father for 

“playing his music too loud in his vehicle while parked” threatened to kill Goncalves de 

Oliveira. A.R. 436. Goncalves de Oliveira believes that the police officer wanted to kill 

him because he is afraid that Goncalves de Oliveira has been planning to avenge his 

father. Goncalves de Oliveira illegally returned to the United States five months after his 

departure by crossing the Mexican border. 

Three years later, Goncalves de Oliveira was arrested in New Jersey and placed in 

removal proceedings for illegally entering the United States. Claiming fear of the 

Brazilian police officer, Goncalves de Oliveira requested asylum and withholding of 

removal based on membership in a particular social group. He marked “no” when asked 

if he or his family belonged to any groups or organizations. He also requested 

cancellation of removal because it would “result in exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship” to his American daughter, who was born in 2014. 
3

An immigration judge denied Goncalves de Oliveira’s requests for relief and 

ordered him removed to Brazil on February 14, 2020. Goncalves de Oliveira neither 

appealed this decision nor petitioned for review. But he was granted an administrative 

stay of removal for 180 days and released from custody. His son was born that March

with a “congenital heart disease” that “will require life-long care by a pediatric 

cardiologist.” A.R. 139. 

Goncalves de Oliveira moved to reopen his removal proceedings on November 2, 

2020, based on changed country conditions and “other serious harm” that he and his son 

would allegedly experience in Brazil due to a lack of medical care during the COVID-19 

pandemic. In support of his motion, Goncalves de Oliveira submitted evidence of his 

asthma, his son’s severe heart condition, and reports related to COVID-19. The IJ denied 

his motion to reopen, finding that Goncalves de Oliveira failed to show that he was prima 

facie eligible for humanitarian asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

affirmed the IJ’s decision and added that Goncalves de Oliveira did not present evidence 

of changed country conditions or demonstrate how he would suffer “other serious harm” 

upon return to Brazil. 

II

The BIA had jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.1(b)(3) & 1003.2(a). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).

We review a denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and findings of 

fact for substantial evidence. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2002). We 

give the BIA’s decision “broad deference and generally do not disturb it unless it is 
4

arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Lin v. Att’y Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 

2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Motions to reopen removal proceedings are 

generally “disfavored” because “every delay works to the advantage of the deportable 

alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 

323 (1992).

III

Goncalves de Oliveira asserts that the BIA abused its discretion by rejecting his 

evidence of changed country conditions and by finding that he failed to prove “other 

serious harm.” We need not decide these questions. Goncalves de Oliveira failed to show 

prima facie eligibility for humanitarian asylum when he did not provide evidence of “past 

persecution.” See Darby v. Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining that 

the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for at least three reasons: “failure to establish a 

prima facie case for the relief sought, failure to introduce previously unavailable, material 

evidence, and a determination that even if those requirements were satisfied, the movant 

would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief which he sought”) (quoting INS 

v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988)). For that reason, we will affirm the BIA’s removal 

order.1

1 Goncalves de Oliveira also asserts that the BIA erred by not considering his request for

withholding of removal. The standard for withholding of removal “is higher than the 

asylum standard; thus, an alien who fails to establish asylum eligibility necessarily fails 

to demonstrate a ‘clear probability’ of persecution, as required for withholding of 

removal.” Blanco v. Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Toure v. Att’y 

Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
5

Goncalves de Oliveira is exempt from the 90-day filing deadline for motions to 

reopen because he requested humanitarian asylum based on changed country conditions 

that were unavailable at his previous removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), 

(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because he claimed past persecution in his asylum 

request, we proceed under the framework of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). 

First, Goncalves de Oliveira must “establish that he . . . has suffered persecution in 

the past . . . on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). We presume that such asylees

have a “well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.” Id. The 

government can rebut this presumption by showing that “[t]here has been a fundamental 

change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of 

persecution” in his home country, or that “[t]he applicant could avoid future persecution 

by relocating to another part of” his home country. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i). If the 

government rebuts the presumption, the alien can re-establish a well-founded fear of 

persecution by “demonstrat[ing] compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to 

return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution” or showing “that 

there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon 

removal to that country.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).

By requesting asylum for “other serious harm,” without first establishing past 

persecution, Goncalves de Oliveira is attempting to take an unauthorized shortcut. We 

only consider whether an alien has a well-founded fear of persecution based on “other 

serious harm” if he has already established past persecution. In re L-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
6

705, 710 (BIA 2012) (“We emphasize that every asylum applicant who arrives at this 

stage of the analysis has demonstrated past persecution and thus has proven he or she is a 

‘refugee.’” ).

Goncalves de Oliveira failed to establish past persecution in his initial removal 

proceedings. On his application for asylum, Goncalves de Oliveira alleged membership 

in a particular social group and past harm to him and his father. His request was denied, 

and he never appealed. 

Goncalves de Oliveira abandoned his argument of past persecution in reopening 

proceedings. In his motion to reopen, he asserted that he and his son faced “other serious 

harm” in Brazil because of the COVID-19 pandemic. In his appeal, Goncalves de 

Oliveira claimed that it was legal error for the IJ to require a showing of past persecution 

because he could show “other serious harm” instead. In his petition for review, 

Goncalves de Oliveira acknowledges the BIA’s finding that he failed to prove past 

persecution. But rather than explain how his past harm rises to the level of persecution or 

how his particular social group has been targeted for abuse, he simply directs our 

attention to the evidence he presented in his asylum application and then returns to the

argument that he and his son’s medical issues were sufficient evidence of “other serious 

harm.” 

The government asserts that we lack jurisdiction to consider whether Goncalves de 

Oliveira established past persecution because he failed to exhaust this issue before the 

agency. Respondent’s Br. 19–20 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). But “§ 1252(d)(1)’s 

exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 
7

1103, 1116 (U.S. 2023). Even so, we need not decide whether Goncalves de Oliveira 

exhausted his past persecution argument, or the impact of his failure to exhaust, because 

he cannot prevail on the merits. 

The record supports the findings by the IJ and BIA that Goncalves de Oliveira 

failed to show past persecution. First, Goncalves de Oliveira did not show that he was 

“targeted for mistreatment on account of a protected ground.” Hernandez Garmendia v. 

Att’y Gen., 28 F.4th 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2022). In his initial asylum application, he claimed 

persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group, but he did not 

identify one. In his petition, he claims to be a member of two social groups: “family 

members of individuals subjected to police brutality” and “individuals who received 

death threats based on participation in proceedings against police officers in Brazil.”

Pet’r’s Br. 16. These are not cognizable social groups. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. 

Dec. 227, 242 (BIA 2014) (“[A] social group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact 

that its members have been subjected to harm.” (citation omitted)).

Second, Goncalves de Oliveira did not show that “the mistreatment rose to the 

level of persecution.” Hernandez Garmendia, 28 F.4th at 482. Goncalves de Oliveira 

claimed that he was persecuted in the past when a police officer assaulted his father and 

when that same police officer threatened to kill him. “Persecution is an extreme concept 

that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Jarbough 

v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“[W]e have limited the type of threats constituting persecution to only a small category of 

cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering 
8

or harm.” Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). And “we have refused to extend asylum protection for threats 

that, while sinister and credible in nature, were not highly imminent or concrete or failed 

to result in any physical violence or harm to the alien.” Id. 

Finally, Goncalves de Oliveira did not show, or even attempt to argue, that the 

harm “was committed by the government or forces the government is unable or unwilling 

to control.” Hernandez Garmendia, 28 F.4th at 482. By his own testimony, the police 

officer was “off-duty” when he assaulted Goncalves de Oliveira’s father. And there is no 

indication that the government would be unable or unwilling to control the police officer. 

Neither the assault nor the threat was reported to government officials, and Goncalves de 

Oliveira did not present any evidence that a report would have been ineffectual. See Doe 

v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 146 (2020).

Goncalves de Oliveira is correct that, “in extreme circumstances, harm resulting 

from the unavailability of necessary medical care could constitute ‘other serious harm.’” 

Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 2011). But we need not consider 

Goncalves de Oliveira’s arguments based on the availability of medical care because he 

failed to demonstrate past persecution under step one of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).

IV

For the reasons stated above, we will deny the petition for review.