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REF ID: A72308-

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-06-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

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15 July 1953 

l. The Department of Defense agrees that most of the directive, 

as drafted on 3 July 1953, is practical aDd workable and with some 

minor revisions WJ.11 constitute an adequate foundation for orgam.zing 

the con:lucting the u. S. COMSEC effort, in accordance with the 

Presidential memorandlllD, on a national scale. However, there are a 

few points which lll the interests of conveying the proper sense of 

the NSC and general clarity should be reworded. It is agreed that 

the intent of the President's memorandum of 24 October 1952 is to 

take the steps necessary to establish, within the limits of 

practicabil.J.ty, a single technl.cal agency empowered to act for the 

government in the field of COMSEC and a policy making board to 

guide this technical agency and to ensure the cooperation of the 

executive departments. This draft accomplishes this imtJ.B.1 and 

basic task quite well and needs only some final touching up to 

become a fim.shed and usable instrument. 

2. Specifically, it is recommended that the following word 

changes be made: _ _ .. it. 

- -~: In ~;-~ph 1 e (2) ~ i;,' d~lete "shall make such 

recommendations" and l.Ilsert "will take such action". 

Reason - The Board mst be strong and have the authority 

' 

to take action to ensure compliance with its decisions. 

If the Board is not given this clear and llldisputable 

authonty to dll'ect compliance, all disagreements will 

have to go to the President for resolution. Tlu.s 

obviously is J.JDpractical and not intended by the 

President as expressed by his memorandum of 24 October 1952. 

sEeRET 
... SEeR£'1' = SBeeRI'ff INP0Fa'*'HON 1 ~ I b 15 July 1953 ~ 

b. In paragraph 2 b, il:iize Ji. - after the phrase "departments 

and agencies of the govermnent" add "and to adjudicate disputes 

arising from decisions of the Director, NSA". 

Reason - The departments and agencies must have some 

procedure for appealing a technical decision of the 

Director, NSA. It is not realistic to expect the nontechro.cal Board to settle wisely a disagreement about a 

technical decision. This addition gives the departments 

additional protection by providing a way for such 

disputes to be settled on their technical merits. 1 

P~<i ~ '1....-1-., 

c. In paragraphs 2 c (1) (a) aIXl (b) - d'ttlete the opening 

phrase "SubJect to review by the Board in the event of disagreement". 

Reason - The Boan! is not a technical group and hence is 

not equipped to deal competently with technical questions. 

There is a valid need for an outlet for technical 

disagreements. However, 1llllllla the change given above for 

paragraph 2 b pron.des such a procedure and keeps it in 

the technical area. .Any' disagreements which start as 

techm.cal ones but which cannot be settled by the 

Secretar,y of Defense and persist and grow into policy 

disputes can then be handled by the appeal procedure 

given in paragraph 1 g and h. 

2 
SECRET - S!'.t"Uft'fTY iflfOftMJ\"'fiON 15 July 1953 p~~ i.-\~ 

d. Also in paragraphs 2 o (l) (a) and (b), liilz+'--f- - replace 

the words "review and approve" with the word "prescnbe"• 

Reason - The adequacy of u. s. cryptosystems can be 

ensured as required by the President' a memorandum of 

24 October 1952 ~by centralizing the responsibility 

and authon.ty to determine the fUndamental principles 

used in the specific cryptosystems and the operating 

procedures needed to realize the full potential of 

the principle. This determination, which includes 

reviewing and evaluat:mg existing principles and 

procedures and devising and evaluating new ones, is 

based on cryptanal.ysl.S and utilizes lessons learned 

from study of foreign traffic. Thus, it cannot be 

separated from the nations OOMINT activity. Absolute 

control is essential to prevent the use of a weak 

cryptoprinci.ple by one department which could be 

solved by the enemy and pave the way for solving stronger 

cryptoprinciples. Si.ml.l.arly, weak procedures and poor 

cryptosecunty standards can undermine the strongest 

cryptoprinciples and lead to solution. Thus, the 

establishment of an appropriate authority to assure 

high and umfo:nn standards ot COMSEC as direct~b~ 

the President can be done only by designating ifSA:-as 

prescribing ann 1 'c J cryptoprinciples and procedures. 

/<C.~ 

Tlll.s heaps COMSE:C and COMINT closely bound together and 

guarantees a better product .from each. 

SEG°RE-r 
SBeRHP = SElOUiff fi IHP6RMJ\fi6M 15 JuJy 1953 

- Insert at the r Of ~ 

-...;;~", .. ,Ulgated by th~ 

(3~ <=\ ~4 "t; I 2.. 

e. In paragraph 2 c (1) (d) - Reword paragraph as follows: 

"Under policies promulgated by the Board and subject to the exception 

granted the Director, Central Intelligence Agency un:ier NSCID No. 5, 

comuct and coordl.Ilate the conduct of liaison on technical roMSEC 

arrl related matters with the cryptologic agencies of foreign nations 

and inteniational organizations~. 

Reason - Technical liaison with cooperating foreign 

agencies on COMSEC matters has a direct effect on the 

conduct of OOMINT activitlBs, close liaison on sharing 

production workload. Careful control over the disclosure 

of u. s. cryptoprinciples to foreign nations is absolutely 

essential to avoid inadvertently setting the COMINT 

effort back several years or worse eliminating a fruitful 

source of intelligence. Further close worla.ng level 

liaison is essentl.83. to obtain maximum econoll\Y in the 

provision to and exchange of COMSEC materials needed to 

protect US - UK and NATO communications. Note that it 

is~ proposed to have the Director, NSA conduct liaison 

at diplomatic level nor to conduct!.!! COlf>EC liaJ.SOn 

but for protection of COMINT he must have cognizance over 

the conduct of all of it. The proposal of policy 

determination by the USCSB and cognizance over implementatJ.On 
S!at!T - SECUft:Iff Hfii16IlM:A:'f 10N 15 July 1953 

by the Director, NSA. assures that effective coordination 

of OOH.SEC problems with respect to foreign governments 

as desired by the President J.S achieved nth technical 

soundness. 

f. In paragraph 2 c (1) {g): f~ 1 ~ 

In line 21 delete phrase "Subject to approval by II 5 ?". 

Reason - Approval authority over long range plans for 

COMSEC is given to the Board in paragraph 1 e (3)(b)(4). 

Restating this authority here adds nothing to the 

Directive• 

In line 5, delete phrase "consisting of projects of common 

concem which can be :mre efficiently accomplished centrally" 

and in line 9 delete phrase "and coordination with" alXl 

insert "approval. by"• 

Reason - In order to encourage the generation of ideas 

having potential. OOMSEC value and to assure their orderly, 

early and effective exploitation, authority and responsibility 

for CCMSEC research and developnent should be centralized. 

' 

The orgam.zation responsible tor prescribing cryptoprinciples 

and cryptosecurity procedures should, there£ore be assigned 

cognizance over the national rroMSEC research and development 

program. Thie organization should be empowered to make the 

most technically feasible, economical, and effective use of 

the limi.ted aJOOunt of collDllllll1cations security development 

talent available to the United States. It should be responsible 

:tor the formulation of an overalJ. COMSEC research and develop.. 

ment program, .for the conduct of a major portion of the 
000fF@0011h2tff :ocmJ 

1.5' July 19.5'3 

program, and for effective utilization of the research 

am. development facilities of the various departments aai 

agencies of the government. It should not be restricted 

to "projects of conmon concern" as has been proposed if 

the overal1 CDMSEC program is to be effective in assuring 

a satisfactory state of cryptosecurity. From the technical 

viewpoint, it is essential to national. security that the 

u. s. OOMSEC agency maintain continuously an integrated research and development program, rather than merely "review 

and coordinaten a diversity of COMSEC development programs. 

This authority, in order to be effective m achieving the 

objectives set forth in the Presidential Meioorandum of 

24 October 1952, should l.Ilclude the £unctions and responsibJ.lJ.ties described by the suggested revision of subpara. g. 

The statement as revised, (1) Establish the authority 

necessar,y to insure both economy and high, umi'orm protection_ 

for clasSJ.fied Federal telecomnunications, and (2) ProvJ..de 

the most effective means of promoting initiative in aJ.1 

the departments and agencies interested in OOMSEC research 

and development. 

g. In paragraph 2 c (l)(h): 

In line 2, delete the phrase "insofar as practicable" and 

:in line 3 after the words, "the comptability" add the 

woroa, "and insofar as practicable standardization". 

"Reason - The compatability o1' crypto-equipnents is essential. 

to intel'-conmum.cation while cb...fferent conditions call for 
~-

dl.f f erent shapes and construction,, crypto-equipments designed f'or the same general. eonmnmi cation purpose J1lllst be 

cryptographically compatible, i.e. able to work together. 

Standardization of techniques,, parts, and materials to the 

greatest extent possible consistent m.th the intended 

application of the equipment, will held reduce the cost 

of and will Sl.lllplify manufacturing maintaining, and using 

the equipments. 

h. In paragraph 2 c (l) (i): ~G' t ~ f -j; *" 

In line 3, delete the wolds, "only on a rellllbursable basJ.S" 

and substitute the words non a fiscal arrangement as 

mutually agreed with the departments and agencies". 

Reason - The provision of COMSEC materials and technical 

assistance to the departments and agencies iB a basic service 

of the Director, NSA. In order to be able to provide this 

service in the simplest, most direct, and satis.facto:ey 

manner possible, the specific fmancial aITa.Dgeioonts should 

be 11.exible as far as this directive is concerned.. The 

change proposed opens the way for ditferent but mutu.al:cy 

satisfactory arrangements between the Director, NSA and 

any individual deparbnent or agency. 

hl {;r) l 

In paragraph 2Cl.:Y ~ ~ I 

:J 

Add new paragraphj to read, "Nothing in this directive shall 

be construed as precludmg the Director, NSA of producmg, 

printing, procuring, and modifying cryptomaterJ..als to meet 

the requirements of the departments and agencies or from 

budgeting for the conduct of his activities". 
~!'®OOOOIY B&OOOOl@i~f[OO 

~CREI - SEel:JRIH IlfFOR:MA9:'10N 15 July 1953 

Reason - The President• s memorandum requires the satisfaction 

of legitimate requirements. In order to assure that there 

are operatmg facilities adequate to do thl.s and to be 

better prepared. to meet the demands of a :roo bilization it is 

essential that the Director, NSA be specifically authorized 

to engage in these activ.1.tJ.es. The present cryptomaterial 

production facill.ties including special and wuque machl.nery 

and a staff trained and skll.led in its operation must be 

kept in operation. 

8 

SEGRET