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18 April 1955 

'!'OP SEleRE'l' 'ff .S. EYi:S 6NLY 

MEIDRANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USOIBEC: 

Subject: 

References: 

Counter Clandestine COMINT Planning. 

(a) USCIB 9.6/l dated 12 October 1954. 

(b) USCIB 9.6/2 dated 2 December 1954. 

(c) INTCOM 9.6/6 dated 29 Ml.rch 1955. 

1. A review of the files on this subject and a study of the 

progress made by the Intelligence Committee reveal the following 

facts concerning subject problem: 

a. No statement of the specific responsibilities and interrelationships of the governmental elements which might be involved 

in an effective counter-clandestine COMINT program appears to exist. 

b. The Secretaries of' State and Defense ha.ve been constituted as a Special Connnittee of the National Security Council for 

COMINT, which Committee shall, with the assistance of the DC!, establish policies governing COMINT activities. USCIB has been constituted 

as a body acting for and under the Special Committee, while the Department of Defense, with the National Security Agency as its machinery 

for this purpose, has been designated as executive agent of the 

government for the production of COMINT. Thus, tSCIB, acting for 

the Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT, has, in effect, been 

established as the national authority for COMINT policy and clearly 

has the responsibility for coordination of the communications intelligence activities among all departments and agencies authorized by the 

President to engage therein. While USCIB has the responsibility for 

the coordination or policy, including coordination or planning, for 

the peacetime and wartime exploitation of COMINT, the Department of 

Defense and its National Security Agency have the responsibility for 

production, including organization and planning therefor, of such 

COMINT as may be required by member departments and agencies of USCIB. 

In none of these interlocking responsibilities is the matter of COMINT 

from clandestine transmissions specifically included or excluded. 

However, NSCID No. 9 states as follows: 11 ••• that the communications 

intelligence (COMINT)activities of the United States are a national 

responsibility, and that they must be so organized and managed as 

to exploit to the :maximum the available resources in all participating 

departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence 

requirements of all such departments and agencies. 11 

IBCIB: 9.6/3 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-06-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

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18 April 1955 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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c. It is understood that existing NSA plans provide for 

employment of additional search and intercept facilities to be devoted to clandestine coverage in the case of an emergency. Coordination of the many other related responsibilities (such as designation 

of a USCIB member to act as the Board's executive agent in effecting 

a suitable arrangement with the Federal Connnunications Commission) has 

not been tackled. 

d. The Federal Communications Commission has the responsibility for monitoring the necessary communications to detect violations 

of the Connnunications Act. FCC presently has in operation about·· •. 50 

intercept positions. FCC now notifies the FBI of unlicensed tr~nsmissions that appear to have any intelligence implications; the FBI 

then assumes responsibility and control until the intelligence posaibility is resolved. Further, the FCC is, in many respects, a creature 

of the legislative branch of the government and thus not readily susceptible to direct coordination by USCIB. 

e. Attempts by NSA to conclude an agreement with the FCC. to 

provide certain information have evoked unenthusiastic response and 

at the present time arrangements between NSA and the FCC are inf orll!Bl 

in nature and restricted in scope. 

f. USCIBEC is in the process of revising the COMINT Master 

Requirements List which, when approved by USCIB, will include the 

counter-clandestine COMINT requirements, thus providing the Director., 

NSA, with guidance required to allocate resources appropriately to 

fulfill this requirement in relationship to his other assigned tasks. 

"6. The NSA requirements evolved from this study will be 

referred to USCIB for decision on the advisability of 

conducting an expanded program at present in view of 

certain adjustments which would probably be required 

in the over-all COMINT effort of the U.S." 

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EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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ff.S. Ell'B9 Olff:iY 

18 April 1955 

i. The Director, NBA, commAnted in part on the enclosure with 

reference (a) as follows: 

11 If, at an early stage of the USCITI study, it could be 

ascertained that the members share a common interpretation of existing and required responsibilities pertaining to this subject, the subsequent stages of this 

study probably would be simplified." 

2. It is noted that the Intelligence Committee has limited its 

initial study to the domestic or north American portion of the problem 

as Phase 1 and has unanimously agreed that: 

a. The FBI, as executive agent for U3CIP, acting i~ conjunction 

with NSA, should consummate an effective arrangement with the FCC so that 

ma.ximura COMINT benefit will be realized from the activities of the Federal 

Communications Comraission. 

b. The NSA, Ji'BI and CIA Members of the Intelligence Committee 

should prepare a procedure indicating necessary coordination 1.rithin the 

COMINT community that must take place before any action is taken to 

either shut ')ff or continue a som'CO of aounte14-clnndestine COMH1T 

ini'ormation. 

USCID: 9.f../J TOR $&CRE'f 
llSCIB: 9.6/3 

'±'GP S!:SRE'±' Y,S , E¥i@ Pm.I' 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

18 April 1955 

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c. The Department of the Navy should make provisions for 

prompt passing to NSA of information relevant to OOMINT production 

acquired as. a resuJ. t of· wartime civil censorship. · 

d. The FBI and NSA Members of the Intelligence Committee 

should prepare recommendations concerning the extent to which the 

U.S. willl lin counterclandestine COMINT matters. 

e. All members should provide NSA with information available to them on counter-clandestine COMINT activities which would be 

of assistance in the preparation of a counter-clandestine CONINT 

plan. 

f. Based on the foregoing, the Director, NSA, should develop 

a counter-clandestine COMINT plan. 

g. Preparation of appropriate papers for furnishing information and recommending establishment of procedures in implementation of the above area of agreement would be initiated innnediately 

by the Intelligence Committee. 

h. A Phase 2 study to include all other areas should be 

undertaken. 

3. In consideration of the above, this office concludesi 

a. WCIB should be asked to note and approve the program 

being undertaken by the Intelligence Committee with the understanding that the FBI translates counter-clandestine COMINT information into action as far as domestic internal security is concerned. 

b. In line with the suggestion of the Director, NSA, a 

common interpretation of existing and required responsibilities 

should be reached before the Intelligence Committee spends a lot 

of time preparing papers that might later be disapproved owing 

to their not being compatible with basic policy. 

c. The above facts and the program now being pursued by 

the Intelligence Committee appear to this office to provide the 

necessary common interpretation of existing and required responsibilities vithin the domestic portion of the problem. Verification 

by USCIB of the facts listed above and approval of these conclusions 

by tBCIB should be sufficient to dispel any doubts on that point. 

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USCIB: 9.6/3 

'!'Of GECR:E'!' = B.G. E".t."EB OiHl.f 

3. 3 !hi I 2 I 

86-36/50 USC 3605 

18 April 1955 

d. USCIB should direct. that INTCOM proceed with the Phase 

portion of the study with a view to providing the Director, NSA, 

information necessary to prepare for USCIB approval a counter-clandestine COMI.NT plan to detect, locate, intercept and recess clandestine 

transmissions durin both eacetime and wartime. 

In addition, e 

p an s o d provide for getting the end product ~apidly into the hands 

of those who have the responsibility for translating counter~clandestine 

COMINT information into action and should provide for immediate expansion in the event of an emergency. 

e. USCIBEC should be empowered to approve for the Board and 

forward directly to the Director, NSA, the resultant INTCOM papers 

recornmending establishment of procedures and designation of action 

agencies in connection with this problem. 

4. It is accordingly recommended that USCIBEC approve the above 

conclusions and forward same to USCIB recornmending their approval as 

a concept of planning for counter-clandestine C0~1INT operations. 

USCIB: 9.6/3 

Captain, U. ~. Navy 

xecutive Secretary, USCIB 

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