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MINUTES OF MEETING 66-2 

AIR FORCE MOL POLICY COMMITTEE 

Friday, April 29, 1966 

Room 4E871, Pentagon 

Attendance: 

Committee: 

Hon. Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, Chairman 

Hon. Norman S. Paul, Under Secretary of the Air Force 

Hon. Alexander H. Flax, Asst. Secretary of the Air Force 

(R&D) 

Hon. Leonard Marks, Jr., Asst. Secretary of the Air Force 

(FM) 

*General William H. Blanchard, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF 

General B. A. Schriever, Commander, AFSC 

Lt General James Ferguson, DCS/R&D 

Secretariat: 

Colonel Richard L. Dennen, SAF-SL, Asst to Executive Secretary 

Proceedings: 

1. The meeting was called to order at 0930 hours. It was agreed 

that the major item on the agenda, MOL Costs and Schedules, should be 

considered last. 

2. General Evans presented a status report on the Wholly Unmanned 

Dorian System Study being conducted by SAFSP. This study was generated 

in response to a BOB request for comparative development and operational 

costs, and differences in effectiveness of the MOL mission, manned 

and unmanned. The study, being conducted both in-house by SAFSP and 

under contract with Lockheed and General Electric, covers the following 

points: 

a. Wholly unmanned system to provide the same quality and 

quantity of reconnaissance - intelligence information as MOL 

*Alternate for General McConnell 

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b. Assess difficulties and risks, determine costs of 

obtaining this information wholly unmanned 

c. Compare wholly unmanned performance with unmanned version 

of MOL 

d. Compare operating effectiveness on basis of equal target 

coverage, and ability to select or discriminate between target systems 

e. Assess ability to circumvent weather 

The study is being managed apart from the MOL Program Office except 

for required technical inputs and compatibility with MOL planning 

projections. Preliminary results are expected the third week in May, 

and the report is due to Dr. Foster June 6, 1966. 

3. Secretary Brown noted that BOB is continuing its interest in this 

subject, but has not acquired much sympathy from either DOD or Dr. Hornig. 

He stated that he and Dr. Flax had discussed with Secretary McNamara 3 

the BOB request, and the cost effectiveness of MOL compared with Gambit . 

Secretary Brown stated that while an unmanned photographic system to 

operate for 30 days may be feasible, it would be costly. Secretary 

Flax supported the possibility of an unmanned system to do certain tasks, 

and agreed a 30 day capability would be much later in time. He stated 

that as the subject is investigated, it becomes more evident that man is 

a neatly packaged system to do many tasks. General Schriever stated that 

the desired capability can be attained sooner with the present approach. 

He also noted that while an unmanned system may be shown as cost effective 

for periods up to 30 days, man can perform for longer periods. Secretary 

Brown stated his belief that neither Secretary McNamara nor Dr. Hornig 

are against a manned system. He stated that Secretary McNamara wants the 

data, and only questions the best way to get it. Secretary Brown noted 

that cost increases or schedule slips could change the current bias 

favoring man. 

4. Dr. Yarymovych presented the results of an in-house study on the 

potential use by NASA of Gemini B/MOL/Titan III hardware or the substitution 

of Titan III for Saturn IB to meet the objectives of the Apollo Applications Program (AAP). The subject was raised in a BOB letter requesting 

NASA to include certain items in the NASA program memorandum for budget 

preview. The specific study was requested by Dr. Foster in anticipation 

of a NASA request for DOD inputs. Conclusions reached are as follows: 

a. MOLT-III hardware is capable of conducting AAP experiments 

(1) 5-segment T-IIIM from ETR could perform low inclination 

missions 

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(2) 7-segment T-IIIM from WTR could perform high 

inclination missions. 

b. AAP hardware atop T-III creates costly facility and 

spacecraft AGE modifications for 7-segment at ETR, and costly spacecraft 

AGE at WTR. 

c. Unknown problems of bulbous payloads on Titan, plus 

technical interface problems and facility modification costs, are not 

favorable to AAP hardware on Titan. 

5. Dr. Brown noted that most countries of interest to NASA, 

for photographing economic conditions such as crops, are at low latitudes 

and hence can be overflown by launching from ETR. He stated that such 

downward-looking missions could be construed to support administration 

programs and should be retained in NASA's program. Secretary Flax 

stated that the only way such missions in space are justified is to have 

multi-sensors, or if the territory is denied to us. He stated that 

aircraft are more cost effective, if we have overflight rights. 

6. Dr. Yarymovych presented a short report on NASA's proposal for 

their S-IV-B Workshop Experiment. This proposal involves the use of a 

spent S-IV-B stage for shirtsleeve experimentation for a period of 

14 to 30 days. The configuration would include an airlock with existing 

life support and power subsystems, such as Gemini spares, in the LEM 

adapter. It would provide a large free volume (20 X 30 feet) in the 

hydrogen tank. An early date, mid-1968, may provide an attractive 

possibility for MDL support experimentation. An Air Force Ad Hoc working 

group has been formed to define specific AF experiment objectives. It 

is planned to submit an AF expression of interest to the newly constituted 

Manned Space Flight Experiments Board (MSFEB) on May 24, 1966. Dr. 

Yarymovych stated that Dr. Mueller considers the NASA proposal a high 

priority effort. 

7. General Schriever noted the difficulty in making such a 

configuration suitable for manned operations. Secretary Flax emphasized 

the possibility that NASA has underestimated the complexity and cost of the 

proposal. General Evans stated the proposal was presented to the MOL 

Policy Committee because of its possible impact on the MOL Program. 

8. The proposed briefing on MOL priorities was cancelled. Secretary 

Brown stated he had earlier agreed to support a DX priority for MOL, 

replacing Program 437 on the DX list. He concurred in the procedure of 

sending a memorandum from the DNRO to Secretary Vance on this subject, 

and stated that some specific examples of need for priority will likely 

be required for approval. 

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9. The status report of MOL cost and schedule problems was 

presented by General Evans. Contract Definition Phase studies have 

pointed up two major factors affecting the MOL Program: 

a. Development and production of the camera optical system 

is the critical pacing item. The first flight model system is not 

expected to be available before April 1970. It has been established 

by study with Eastman Kodak that a minimum of 37 months from approval of 

facilities to completion of the first flight model optics is required. 

An additional 11 months is required before launch of the first MOL 

vehicle for integration and systems testing. 

b. Fiscal year 1967 funding constraints appear to dictate 

rescheduling to minimize FY 67 fund requirements. 

The results of an in-house task force study were presented in the form 

of alternative schedules and cost comparisons. The past progression of 

MOL schedules was put into perspective as follows: 

a. The original program of August 1965 called for the first 

manned flight in October 1968, and the first flight with mission optics 

in February 1969. This schedule was optimistic in that the Titan III 

up-rating and optical system development had not been critically 

analyzed. 

b. The current schedule and addition of two flights in December 

1965 after determination of the feasibility of an unmanned configuration 

to achieve photo resolution. This schedule option which calls for 

the first manned flight in June 1969 and first all-up system flight in 

October 1969 is the current baseline schedule that is being costed 

by the contractors. 

Four other schedule options were presented, two which retained 9 

flights, and two which were designed to save money by deleting 1 and 

2 flights respectively. Arguments were presented in favor of a 7 shot 

program with 2 unmanned flights in April and August of 1969 and the 

first manned flight in April of 1970. Although this option would increase 

program risk by eliminating a manned flight prior to the all-up flight, 

it would result in lower total program costs than other alternatives. 

10. The Committee discussion covered the following: 

a. Secretary Flax cited some of the reasons for the Eastman 

Kodak schedule slip from that originally proposed: non-availability of 

facilities, oversight in the time to check out these facilities, and slip 

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associated with factory-to-pad flow. He stated that, on the other 

hand, the E-K manpower burden had been eased by the assignment of certain responsibilities to General Electric. He expressed concern that 

E-K may be planning for contingencies. It was the consensus of the 

Committee that it would be desirable to move the April 1970 date to at 

least December 1969. Secretary Flax and General Schriever indicated 

their plan to meet with E-K management to discuss overall program 

implications. Secretary Brown concurred that, because of the interim 

nature of the cost and schedule estimates, a decision on program 

schedules was not appropriate at this meeting. 

b. In the discussion on costs associated with the options, 

General Evans emphasized the variance between contractor estimates and 

the lower SF0 estimates. He stated that the suggested option would 

be affordable, but that the increase in FY 1968 fund requirements would 

pose a major problem. He noted that firm program costs will not .be 

known until completion of contractor negotiations in August 1966. 

Secretary Brown and General Schriever suggested that a close look at 

contractor estimates for FY 1967 would be in order. General Schriever 

stated that the SPO and contractors have established excellent contractor 

interfaces for testing and factory-to-pad flow. This has resulted in 

relatively firm cost estimates for these phases. General Schriever 

noted that Martin and McDonnell contracts could be fixed price; Eastman 

Kodak cost-plus-fixed-fee; and General Electric and Douglas should be 

whatever type contract is best for the government. In response to a 

question by Secretary Brown, Secretary Flax stated that Eastman Kodak would 

have a legitimate problem with a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract 

because they do not control vendors for items such as blanks. 

c. With regard to the issue of a public posture to explain 

a schedule slip, Secretary Brown noted that a slip of the first manned 

flight to mid 1969 has already been indicated to Congress. He stated 

that he, Secretary McNamara and Secretary Flax have testified before 

Congress that the slip is a slip in the payload. He averred that they 

have not and will not give public briefings on this subject. The 

Committee agreed that no unclassified announcement will be made of possible 

schedule adjustments at this time. If queries are received on possible 

MOL schedule changes, the response should indicate that during contract 

definition various alternative schedules are examined, and that no decision has been reached on a firm MOD flight schedule. 

11. The Committee concurred in the following actions: 

a. A briefing will be presented to the MOL Policy Committee 

on approximately May 20, 1966 which contains the program recommendations 

of the Director, MOL, for their approval. 

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b. Secretary Flax and General Schriever will meet with 

Eastman Kodak management prior to May 20 to discuss the feasibility 

of meeting the Committee's desire that the first manned flight occur 

late in CY 1969. 

The meeting adjourned at 1045 hours. 

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APPENDIX 

MOL POLICY COMMITTEE 

April 29, 1966 

Other Attendees: 1=1.1911111111•MIM 

Brigadier General Harry L. Evans, Vice Director, 

}4)L Program 

Michael I. Yarymavych, Technical Director, MOL Program 

Colonel Paul J. Heran, Assistant Deputy Director 

for MOL 

William Sampson, Aerospace Corporation 

Major David C. May, Jr., MOL Program Office 

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