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USCIB: 4.2/43 HMJBI:.B ff A 00Hilfl' BHMftfl!:LS eNLY 

18 April 1955 

'f OP SEem!:'f 

MEMORANDlM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (Hazardous Activities). 

USCIB 4.2/42 (Item 2 of the Agenda for the 27th Meeting of 

USCIBEC). 

l. Pursuant to the decision reached at the Twenty-seventh Meeting of 

USCIBEC on 25 March 1955 the Security Committee has reached unanimous 

agreement regarding a complete draft directive on "Hazardous Activities" • . The complete draft and a forwarding report by the Chairman,, SECCCM are 

enclosed herewith. 

2. It is requested that the members execute the attached vote sheet 

and return it to this office by the close of business 2~ April 1955. 

Enclosures 

a/s 

USCIB: 4. 2/43 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-10-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

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24 
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SEC # 0003 

15 April 1955 

'i'6P SBORm 

MEMJRANDUM FOR THE EXECUI'IVE SECRETARY, USCIB 

. Subject: 

References: 

Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 

(a) USCIB 4o2/40 dated 15 March 1955 

(b) USCIB 4.2/41 dated 18 March 1955 

(c) U3CIB 4.2/42 (Item 2 of the Agenda for the 27th 

Msleting of USCIBEC, 25 March 1955) 

1. Pursuant to the decision reached at the Twenty-seventh Meeting 

of USCIBEC on 25 March 1955, the Security Committee, after thorough 

study, has reached unanimous agreement on the attached draft directive 

on "Hazardous Activities" including Annexures A and B. 

2. The attached draft includes changes formally agreed upon by USCIBEC and, in addition, includes changes obtained from individual 

IBCIBEC members by their SECCOM counterparts. 

3. The following major changes were made by SECCOM: 

a. In order to allow more flexibility in placing restrictions 

on individuals assigned to Group C, the flat six months restriction has 

been amended to read "six months or longer" (page 4, paragraph 2b). 

This change is also reflected in Annex B. 

b. A provision has been added to the directive in recognition 

of the need for standing exceptions (to restrictions on hazardous activities) to be granted in specific situations requiring an individual to 

engage in hazardous activities on a routine basis. This provision is 

intended to cover such individuals as the Commanding General, USFA, who, 

for example, must, in the best interests of the nation, attend periodic 

official meetings in the Soviet Sector of Vienna (an area of unacceptable risk) {page 5, paragraph 5). 

c. Annex A has been rewritten to include specific areas deemed 

to involve unacceptable risk as well as those involving an undue risk. 

d. Annex B now includes a general guide for assignment of 

individuals (consumers as well as producers) to Groups B and C, and 

a more speci:f'ic guide for Group D. The need f'or uniformity in the 

evaluation of situations requiring longer than normal periods of 

restriction for Groups B and C individuals was realized. Under the 

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SEC # 000.3 

15 April 1955 

provisions 0£ the Annex, such uniform action will be accomplished, in 

part, through the establishment of a central file and reference point 

within the office of the Executive Secretary. USCIB members making 

such restrictions will be required to file a report with that office 

describing the circumstances involved and the action taken. Such 

reports will be catalogued and will be available as a ready reference 

to allY' USCIB member. Uniformity will be accomplished also through 

coordination among tSCIB members concerned in cases involving joint 

commands, Service personnel assigned to NSA, CIA, etc. 

4. The Security Committee recommends approval of the attached 

directive. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

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tJ~(i!. £.f2.., .. ) 

WILLIAM R. CULMER 

Major, Arty., IBA 

Chairman, SECCOM 

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.... us .... c .... IB........,D...,.IRE....,...<Jr .... r:v.....,E .... NUMB......,.... ER.....__-.i< .. c... m .... D_.11 __ ) 

(Approved by USCIB on ______ ), 

HAp.ROOUS ACl'IVITms 

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 

The purpose of this Directive is to describe activities consider~d 

I 

to be hazardous, to delineate geographic areas considered to be exposed 

and to prescribe policy with respect to the following three categories 

of situations,,each of which is covered in a separate section as ind!~ 

cated: 

Section II - Engagement in hazardous activities by individuals 

having knowledge of current value about OOMINT. (Page ... !J 

Section III - CDMINT collection and/or product!on in e:xposeq areas. 

(Page _L) 

Section IV - CDMINT dissemination to consumers in exposed areas. 

(Page 10) 

II. ENGAGEMENT IN HAZARDOUS AGrIVITIFS BY DIDIVIDU.AIS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF - . 

PQRRENT VALUE ABOUT COMINT 

A. DEFINITIONS 

Hazardous .Activitl.es - For the purpose of this Directiw, hazardous 

activities are those which place a person in a position wh~re he 

runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected 

to interrogation, e.g.: 

a. Hazardous Activities involving situations of unacceptable 

risk, include: 

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(1) In time of war: 

(a) Du.ties behind eneIJzy" lines, or inshore operations 

off an enemy or Iron Curtain country. 

(b) Flights over enell\V territory. 

(c) Raids, minor formation attacks, underwater 

demolition operations, and in an active theater 

of operations service with a unit or formation 

forward of division headquarters. 

(2) In time of peace: 

(a) Flights over Iron Gu.rtain territory unless on 

recognized corridor routes. 

(b) Transit through the Soviet Zones of Germany and 

Austria unless on official business via air, 

sealed rail transport, or authorized"convoy on 

U.S. approved routes. (This does not preclude 

personnel stationed in Berlin or Vienna from proceeding on leave from or returning to their duty 

stations provided that only those transportation 

means and routes approved herein are utilized.) 

(c) Duty in or visits to Iron Curtain countries, 

Comnnmist dominated zones and other areas \-there, 

from time to time, similar local conditions 

exist. (Set forth in paragraph 1 of Annex A.) 

b. ~azardous Activities involving situations of undue risk 

include, in time of peace, duty assignments and visits, 

other than unavoidable transit stops while traveling on 

official orders, in the areas named in paragraph 2 of 

A:nnex A. 

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B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES 

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has 

knowledge of current value about COMINT, such.that his capture or 

interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINl' 

shall be assigned to or engage in activities of a hazardous nature. 

1. Assignment to Groups 

a. Whenever the duties or any person who has had access to 

COMINT are about to be terminated or he is scheduled !'or 

reassignment and is deemed to have knowledge or current 

value about OOMINT (whether currently_1ndoctrinated or 

not) such that his capture or interrogation could be a 

substant:tal. risk to the security 9!' COMINT, a determination shall be ma.de in accordance with the extent of 

that knowledge, into which of the following groups he 

shall belong: (Guide lines to assist in arriving at 

this determination are listed in Annex B.) 

(1) GROUP A - Producers of Category I OOMINT who have no 

knowledge of other categories. 

(2) GROUP B - Individuals who have knowledge of' current 

value about Category II 001.fiNT. 

(3) GROUP C - Individuals, other than those specified in 

paragraph (4), below, who have knowledge of current 

value about Category III COMI lfr. .. 

(4) GROUP D - Individuals with precise knowledge of OOMII'lr 

processing techniques, competence or potential regarding the more saAsitive Category III COl.fiNT material. 

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b. Responsibility for such assignment and cancellation after 

specific post debriefing intervals (see paragraph 2, below) 

rests with the parent USCIB member. A USCIB member department or agency using indoctrinated persons from another 

member department or agency shall, upon release of such 

individuals to their parent activity, furnish that activitv 

with suitable recommendations regarding the group to which 

those individuals should be assigned. 

2. Assignm.ent of Personnel to Hazardous Activities 

The following restrictions apply to perma.i1ent and temporaiy 

duty assignments involving hazardous activities: 

a. 'GROUP A personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities 

only on the autbln'i~y of senior officers • (NOTE: No . . special restrictions need be applied to•recipients.) 

b. GROUP B personnel may be assigned to hazar~ous activities 

only after a separation of six months or longer from this 

type of information. 

c. GROUP C personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities 

only after a separation of one year or longer from this 

type of information. 

d. GROUP D personnel shaJJ. not be assigned to hazardous 

activities at a:n:y time. 

3. Engagement by Personnel in Hazardous Activities While in ~ficial Non-Duti Status 

Every ef.t'ort shal.l be made to ensure that no person who 

has knowledge of current value about oo:-aNT shall engage in 

activities of a hazardous nature while on leave, liberty or 

other official non-duty status. 

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4. Engagement by Personnel in Ha:zia.rdous Activities in Any 

Unofficial Capacity 

All possible action shall be taken to prevent any person 

who has terminated service with a USCIB member department 

or agency for any reason and who is still deemed to have 

knowledge of current value about OOMINT from engaging in 

hazardous activities at any time. 

5. Exceptions to the policy enrmciated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 

4, above, shall be authorized only after careful consideration in each instance of the advantage to be gained as 

opposed. to the risk involved. Standing exceptions may 

be authorized in specific situations which, in the best 

interests of the nation, require an individual to engage 

in hazardous activities on a routine or periodic basis. 

a. In considering exceptions, the protection offered by 

diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light 

of the particular circumstance involved. 

b. An exception involving an unacceptable risk, in the 

case of Group B or C perso~el, shall be approved by 

the USCIB member or the department or agency concerned. 

All such exceptions granted will be reported to uscm. 

c. An exception involving an undue risk, in the case of 

Group B or C personnel may be granted by the USCIB 

member concerned without reporting to uscm, and 

authority to grant exceptions to permit temporary 

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'fOP ...,______ ~iQAA:A5Bi10 . 

visits to such areas, other than for leave, my be 

delegated to the senior field representative 0£ the 

USCIB member concerned. In each such case, a record 

shall be maintained ot the exception granted. 

d. Any exception in the case or Group D personnel shall 

be approved by USCIB. 

6. ImJ?lementing Instructions 

Instructions implementing the above policy shall be 

issued by each USCIB member department and agency. .A copy 

of these instructions shall be provided the Executive 

Secretary, USCIB, for information. 

III. COMINT COLLECTION AND/OR PRODUCTION IN EXPQSED AREAS 

A. DEFINITIONS 

Eigaosed Aree.s - For the purpose of this Directive, exposed areas 

are those which a.re susceptible of being quickly overrun by eneJl\Y 

forces or those wherein the local political or military situation 

is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT. 

1. Exposed areas at present COll\Prise areas under control 0£ the 

USSR, Soviet Satellite countries, other Communist dominated 

areas, and areas adjacent thereto which are beyond defense 

lines expected to be tenable. 

2. In proportion to the risk of loss of 001.mrr personnel a:nd/or 

classified material located therein, such areas involve two 

situations: 

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a. Dangerous situations, i.e., those in which it is unlikely 

that complete evacuation of OJMINT personnel and/or removal 

or effective destruction of classified material will be 

accomplished. 

b. Risky situations, i.e., those in which it is likely that 

complete evacuation of OJMiln' personnel and/or removal 

or effective destruction of classified material will be 

accomplished. 

B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES 

It is recognized that e££ective intercept 0£ certain communica,. 

tions and effective CDMINT support of field commanders 'JDB.Y require 

the establishment or continuation or OJMINT collecting and/or producin.g activities in exposed areas which may suddenly fall under 

unfriendly control with consequent loss of OJifil.:"T personnel and/or 

OJMlIIT material. 

1. Decision to Locate COMINT Collection and/or Production Activities 

a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into 

a risky or dangerous category will be obtained by the 

Director, NSA, through the appropriate Service USCID 

member from the senior headquarters responsible for the 

dei'ense of' the area. Such determination shall be ma.de 

in the light of the political, military, or other factors 

aff ectin.g the safety of the personnel and material invol ved. Appropriate coordination shall be effected with 

such other members of uscm as may b~ concerned. The 

Director, NSA, will arrange to be notified immediately in 

case o! a change in a previously det.ermined situation. 

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b. Upon obtaining a determination that a given situation 

is risky or dangerous, the Director, NSA, will decide 

whether a COl!J:NT collection or production activity may 

be conducted in that area. In :making this decision, 

the Director, NSA, ·will: 

(1) Determine whether the task to be performed by the 

<DMINT activity meets the criteria set forth in 

paragraphs 2a and Ja, below. 

(2) Weigh the advantages to be gained by the national 

OOMINT effort as against the disadvantages of the 

COMINT losses which may result if the a,rea concerned 

is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of such 

losses upon the conduct of OO~llNT collection or production activities elsewhere. 

2. Safeguards for Dangerous Situations 

a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished 

elsewhere sha.11 be assigned, and only such anaJ.ysis as is 

locally required to support these tasks and permit essent:la.l 

technical reporting shall be performed. 

b. Only COMINT documents or teclmical aids essential and of' 

current application to these tasks shall be held. 

c. No Category III OOMINT or related documents and technical 

material shall be held, 

d. Personnel technically inf'ormed in COMINT of a higher level 

or broader scope than is required for the l:ilnited mission 

of the unit shall not be assigned ii' avoidable, 

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TOP •JREJP:ASa.o 

e. No person in Group C, as del'ined in Section II, paragraph 

B.l.a.(3), above, shall be assigned unless his presence 

is vital for the effective .functioning of the unit. 

f. No person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph 

B.l.a.(4), above, shall be assigned in any circumstance. 

g. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum 

number of persons on duty at any one t:ime can be expecte4 

to destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified CDMINr 

materials within a time limit commensurate with existing 

dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use 

of these facilities. 

b. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate 

arrangements are made for saf'e evacuation of all personnel 

whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question 

is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis. 

J. Safeguards for Risky Situations 

a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot 

be performed satisfactorily in sai'e or more protected 

situations shall be assigned. 

b. No Category III or related documents and tecJ:mjc al material 

shall be held except those essential to the assigned t~sk 

and of current application thereto, and the latter shall 

. . be maintained in such condition as to e~sure immediate 

destruction, if necei;ssa.ry, upon sudden threat of seizure. 

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c. No person in Group D, as dei'ined in Section J:I, paragraph 

B .1.a. (4), above, shall be assigned, unless required by 

considerations involving highly specialized technical 

knowledge. 

d. Facilities shaJ.l be provided with which one third of' the 

complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if' 

necessary, all classified CX>MINT materials within a time 

limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel 

shall be skilled in the use of these facilities. 

e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate 

arrangements ape ma.lie for saf'e evacuation of al.1 perso~nel 

whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question 

is kept inf'ormed of evacuation plans on ~ Clll'rent basis. 

4. The Director, NSA, will submit a semi-annual report to USCm 

containing a list of CDMINT collection and/or production 

activities being conducted in dangerous or risl\Y areas. 

5. Exceptions to paragraphs 2 and 3, above, shall be made only 

with the approval of USGIB. 

IV. COMINT DISSEMINATION TO OOllSUMERS IN EXPOSED AREllS 

A. DEFINITIONS 

The definitions in Section III, above, apply. 

B. POLICY AND PROCEDURES 

The determination oi' tbe "need to know11 of an official, and 

the responsibility for satisfying that need in the case of' any 

particular item or category of OOMINT, are functions or command 

or departmental or agency authority, residing with the appropriate 

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USCIB member either in its own capacity or as the ~xecuti ve agent 

of the Secretary of Defense. Nothing in tlds policy should be 

regarded as abrogating that principle. Never1;.heless, USCIB 

recognizes that, under certain circumstances, the consideration 

of' security in the connnon interest may override. 'I'his policy is 

formulated in the light of' that recognition. 

1. Decision to Locate CX)MINT DissemirE.tion Actiyiti~ 

Exposed Areas 

a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls 

into a rislcy- or dangerous category will be obtained by 

the USCIB member desirous of' locating a unit, through the 

appropriate Service USCIB member, from the senior hea.ciqu.a.rters responsible for the defense of the area. Such 

determination shaJ.l be made in the light of the political, 

milit~, or other factors affecting the safety or the 

personnel or material involved. Appropriate coordination 

shall be effected with such other members of USCIB as may 

be concerned. 

b. Upon obtaining a determination that a given situation is 

ris~ or dangerous, the USCIB member concerned will decide 

whether a (X)M!NT dissemination activity may be conducted 

in that area. In ma.king this decision that member wUl: 

(1) Determine whether the task to be performed can be, 

in fact, satisfactorily performed only in that area 

under consideration. 

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(2) Weigh the advantages to be expected from such d.issem:i, .. 

nation as against the di1;1advantages or the OOMINT 

losses which may result if tbe area concerned is 

suddenly overrun, and the probable effect of' such 

losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhe~. 

2. USCIB members having COMINT dissemin~tion activities located 1n 

exposed areas will establish appropriate procedures whereby 

they will be notified in case of a change in a previously 

determined situation. 

3.. Safeguards £or Dangerous Situations 

a. Only those OOMINT items essential to the operational 

responsibilities or a senior recipient shall be delivered 

into such areas. All Category III and II items 'Will be 

so worded as to minimize disclosure of the source, should 

the material fall into una.uthori;aed hands. 

b. Except in cases of urgency, !.....__ ___________ ..,... 

will not be delivered into such areas. 

(1) Such items delivered shall be transmitted in cryptosystems specifically authorized for such use. 

(2) No physical copies or files of this int'ormation, 

even in extract or gist, shall be r~tained/under 

any circumstance and special ca.re shall be exel'-

cised to maintain the physical security/of the 

cryptosystem involved •.. 

c. No person in Group c, as defined in Sect;Lon II,, paragraph 

B.l.a.(3), above, shall be assigned unless his presence 

is vital for the effective functioning o:f the unit. 

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EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 
d. Mo person in Group D, as defined in Section II, paragraph 

B .1.a. (4) , above, shall be assigned under aey circumstance• 

e. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number 

of persons on duty at any one time can be expected to 

destroy ef'i'ectively, if necessary, all classified anawr 

materials within a time l:lmit commensurate with existing 

dangers, and unit personnel shall be skilled in the use 

or these facilities. 

r. Appropriate steps shall be taken to en~ that adequate 

arrangements are ma.de for saf'e evacuation 9f all personnel 

whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question 

is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current be.sis. 

4. Safeguards for Risky Situations 

a. Only those OOMiln' items having .important and direct bearing 

on the operational responsibilities or a senior recipient 

shall be delivered into such areas. Such material may 

include I .... ___________ __,.I providing special 

care is exercised in maintaining the security thereo.r. 

Files or I .~ or of extracts or 

gists thereof', shall be kept to a mj nimum, ar.d shall be 

maintained apart from files of other types or OOMI?~. 

Procedures shall be instituted to ensure immediate and 

complete destruction of the files in case of emergency. 

b. No person in Group D, as dei'in,ed in Section II, paragraph 

B.1.a.(4), above, shall be assigned under any circumstance. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

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c. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of tlle 

complement can be expected to destroy et£ectivel;y, if' 

necessary, all classified CDMINT material within a time 

limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit 

personnel shall be skilled in the use ot these facilities. 

d. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate 

arrangements are ma.de tor sa.f'e evacuation of all personnel 

whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question 

is kept informed of evacuation plans on'a current basis. 

5. Each USCIB member will submit a semi-annual report to WCIB 

containing a list of CD14INT dissemination act:i,vities being 

conducted by that member in risky or dangerous situations. 

6. Exceptions to paragraphs 3 and 4, above, shall be made only 

with the approval of USCIB. 

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.IQ. 

USCIB Dm.ECTIVE NO, 

CURRENT EXAMPL1i3 OF 

SPECIFIC AREAS INVOLVING UNACCEPrABLE OR UNDUE RISK 

TO INDIVIDUAIS HAVING KNOWLEOOE OF CURRENr V!LUE ABOUT OOMINT I 

1. Areas involving unacceptable risk: 

a. Iron CUrtain countries -

(1) USSR 

(2) Korean Democratic Peoples Republic (North Korea) 

(3) Chinese Peoples Republic (China) 

(4) Tibet 

(5) Outer Mongolia 

(6) Estonia 

(7) Latvia 

(8) Lithuania 

(9) Poland 

(10) Czechoslovakia 

(ll) German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 

(12) Hungary 

(13) Rumania 

(14) Bulgaria 

(15) Albania 

(16) North Viet Nam 

b. Communist dominated zones -

(1) Porkkala Area o:f Finland 

(2) Soviet Sector of Berlin 

(3) Soviet Sector of Vienna 

(4) Soviet Zone of Austria 

c. Other areas - None 

2. Areas involving undue risk: 

a. U.S., British and French Sectors of Berlin' 

b. u.s., British, French and International Sectors of Vienna 

c. Yugoslavia 

d. Macao 

e. The Associated States (Indo China) 

3. SECCOM sball review this list not less than sem:t.-annually with a 

view to recommending appropriate revisions. 

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ANNEX B 

IQ 

USCIB DIREGrIVE NO. 

GUIDE TO UNIFORM ASSIGNMENT TO GROUPS UNDER SECTION II 

1. It is considered at present that all persons who have been 

indoc~rinated for Category II or III OOMINT and have been exposed to 

the end products of, or processing within these categories, will 

have "knowledge of current value" and should be assigned to at least 

Groups B and C respectively. In addition, possession of the following related information would warrant assignment to Group C: 

a. Knowledge of the overall distribution of the u.s.-u.K. 

CDMINT effort including the size, location and purpose of advanced 

processing units and intercept establishments. (The intent here is 

that the knowledge should be both broad and deep.) 

b. Knowledge of programming techniques of general purpose 

computer equipments for cryptanalytic problems. 

c. Knowledge of U.S. capability to intercept radio transmissions where the equipments and tecJ:miques required go significantly 

beyond equipments and tecJ:miques in general use in the art. This may 

include, for example, special equipments and techniques necessitated 

by very high or low frequencies encountered, new multiplex transmissions, 

ciphony, cii'ax, ultra.-speed, noise type communications, etc. 

2. In anticipation of the assignment of Groups B and C personnel 

to hazardous activities, any USCIB member should, whenever he considers 

advisable, in view of special circumstances a.f'i'ecting the degree of 

Enclosure with SECOOM: 4.2/17 

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knowledge held by an individual or a group of individuals, require 

a longer prior separation from OJMINT than the mini nmm separation 

of six months and one year required for these groups. In such cases 

that USCIB member will {a) if applicable, consult with any other 

USCIB member directly concerned {as in the case of Service personnel 

released to their parent Service upon completion of duty at NSA), and 

(b) inform the Executive Secretary of the circumstances and action 

taken. This consultation and reporting is considered necessary in 

order to assure the greatest possible un:if'ormity in applying these 

restrictions. 

3. Any person indoctrinated for Category III CDMINT whose knowledge includes any of the following should be assigned to Group D: 

a. Intimate knowledge or the nature or the technical. 

methods and means or successful cryptanalytic attack employed 

against Conmunist Category III systems or intimate knowledge of 

projected new technical methods. 

b. Broad overall technical knowledge of our success or 

failure against our various non-Communist targets together with the 

reasons therefor, the techniques developed, and the key personalities 

involved. (In general, this would apply onl:y to persons who had held 

sen~.or posts in NSA proper on a career basis. It is aimed at the 

person who is dangerous through sheer bulk of accumulated knowledge 

and experience.) 

o~ 

c. Knowledge of the technical methods fMi!1i. end products 

resulting therefrom of one or more of the highly sensitive 11compartm:;nted11 problems during the time that such problems may remain compartmented within NSA. (Compartmented problems are few in number 

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and usually small. The end product, if any, is usually distributed 

in a very limited fashion.) 

d. Knowledge of the performance and specific employment 

or special purpose high speed cryptanalytic equipments aimed primarily at Communist problems. 

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