NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZACK CORYELLBATTLE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

GAYLA CORYELLBATTLE, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CITY OF MARICOPA; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-15362 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01386-DLR-JZB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2022**

Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Zack Coryellbattle appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 24 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-15362 

U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations stemming from his 

arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. 

Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018) (summary 

judgment); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Coryellbattle’s

Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Coryellbattle failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants used excessive force in 

arresting him. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397-98 (1989) (setting forth 

the objective reasonableness standard for excessive force determinations); Mattos 

v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[E]stablishing a lack of probable 

cause to make an arrest does not establish an excessive force claim, and viceversa.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Coryellbattle’s 

state law claims for assault and battery and damage to reputation because 

Coryellbattle failed to comply with the requirements of Arizona Revised Statutes

§ 12-821.01(A) for service of a notice of claim. See Simon v. Maricopa Medical 

Ctr., 234 P.3d 623 629 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (requirements for service of the 

notice of claim); Falcon ex rel. Sandovol v. Maricopa County, 144 P.2d 1254, 

1256 (Ariz. 2006) (strict compliance with notice of claim provisions is required).
3 21-15362 

The district court properly dismissed Coryellbattle’s Fourth Amendment 

claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution because 

probable cause existed to arrest Coryellbattle under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-

2509. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004)

(malicious prosecution claim requires lack of probable cause); Arpin v. Santa 

Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (warrantless 

misdemeanor arrest “must be supported by probable cause to believe that the 

arrestee has committed a crime”). Likewise, the existence of probable cause 

defeats Coryellbattle’s First Amendment claim. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 

1715, 1727-28 (2019) (probable cause is an absolute defense to a First Amendment 

retaliation claim). 

The district court properly dismissed Coryellbattle’s failure-to-train claim 

under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because 

Coryellbattle failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (elements of a 

failure-to-train claim).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 
4 21-15362 

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.