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-tS-1- NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D,C. 

BYEMAN 

A?A.e-A J 

~~ t'.~ r(.'' /3.,. {t: 

THE NRO STAf'F 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR,_ Mc LUCAS 

SUBJECT: Replacement of U-2s with SR-71s for Cuban Overflight 

Problem; 

To examine, in the light of DNRO responsibilities, JCS/CINCSAC 

actions on Cuban overflight. 

Background: 

The Director, National Reconnaissance Office is unequivocally 

responsible for all overflight of denied areas. DOD Directive 5105. 23 

{see Tab A} states that the DNRO is responsible for "consolidation 

of all DOD satellite and air vehicle overflight projects ... into a 

single prpgram ... and for the complete management and conduct of 

this Program .... 11 The DOD/CIA Agreement makes a similar 

assignment. 

In spite of these clear statements, the Directors of the National 

Reconnaissance Office have never taken a strong position to invoke 

the authority that goes with their responsibility. In the Cuban Crisis, 

Dr. Charyk found it simple to "delegate" the function to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff {and specifically, General Steakley' s Joint Reconnaissance 

Center) because (1) it appeared we were headed toward a wartime 

situation, (2) the NRO was in an early formative stage, and {3) the 

JRC had easy access to the unified and specified commands. (This 

delegation was never legitimatized.) 

Dr. McMillan was very much interested in setting up a strong 

aircraft overflight organization but abandoned an excellent plan when 

he and Under Secretary Gilpatric ran into unexpected opposition from 

BYEMt!+! TBP SECRET £XCUJOEO fF!OM AUTOMATIC IH'.GRI\O!NG 

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the DCI {Mr. McCone). Dr. Flax often spoke of the need for sorting 

out his relationship with the JCS on this matter .. 

Recently, your staff has worked with the JRC, and General 

Steakley in particular, in preliminary discussions directed toward 

formalizing roles for the NRO and JCS. The most reasonable and 

acceptable solution ;:i.ppears to be one in which the DNRO clearly 

exercises total management responsibility for aircraft overflight and 

the JCS exercises operational responsibility delegated by the DNRO. 

Present Status: 

BYEMAN 

We have received a memorandum from General Steakley (see Tab B) 

in which he states that CINCSAC has recommended that SR-71s replace 

U-2s for Cuban overflight and that our GLASS LAMP missions are stood 

down pending investigation by the JCS. This recommendation is within 

JCS's recognized functions; however, (1) the decision to stand down 

GLASS LAMP and (2) the final decision on the JCS' s recommendations 

are your. responsibility. 

Alternatives: 

Several options are open. 

1. lg ore the roblem. This has the advantage of "making no 

waves" and of tacitly continuing the pattern of nolo contendere followed 

by your predecessor·s. Disadvantages: (1) the tacit acceptance is illegal 

at best, Le., the DNRO is not empowered to "delegate '

1 management 

control of GLASS LAMP; (2) the JCS activity is, in this instance, 

managerial, not operational; (3) the USIB holds you, not the JCS, responsible for GLASS LAMP collection. 

2. Blast the JCS. Advantages: (1) this establishes the DNRO as 

being strongly interested in aircraft overflight (rather than preoccupien 

by satellites); (2) it forces recognition of the functional problem; and 

(3) it stands down further functional incursions until the main issue is 

resolved. Disadvantages: (1) the JCS action may be well-intended 

(after all, they did tell us what they were doing); (2) it's really our fault 

CONTROl., NO _____ _ 

BYEMAN iOP SEGREL UCLUOtO rflt''OIIIII .a.OTOIIIU.nt AEGRAOIH"-

COP¥ ___ oF ___ {.Of'1"'S 

PAC:E ___ or ___ PAGO 

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I tit' 5L6Ht.l BYEMAN 

that the JCS are this deeply in our business, and (3) there should be a 

gentleman's solution to this problem. 

3 •. Ne otiate with General Steakle . This option (1) gives you 

COfltntm. 5YSf£M 

an opportunity to meet General Steakley, (2) lets you explore the JCS's 

motives and intentions, (3) permits you to register your concern informally, and {4) keeps your follow-on actions flexible. Disadvantages: 

none that I can see. 

Recommendation: 

I recommend that you follow Option 3. We are not prepared to open 

the main issue at this time but preliminary discussions should not hurt 

our case (we have had an "NRO aircraft package II under preparation and 

will forward it to you by next week). The key points to establish with 

General Steakley -- and perhaps to obtain his willing concurrence on --

are these: 

1. The DNRO has total management responsibility for GLASS LAMP. 

2. The DNRO proposes, in the near future, to legalize the JCS as 

having total operational responsibility for GLASS LAMP. 

3. A GLASS LAMP stand down is a managerial decision. 

4. It would be useful for General Steakley to coordinate the JCS 

study recommendations with you prior to sending them lo the JCS or 

Secretary of. Defense. 

~~ ~ . 

PAULE. WORTHMAN~ 

Colonel, USAF 

CONTROl NO _____ _ 

BYEMAN TBP SEeRET <:OPY ___ o, ___ cOPi(S 

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

WA$HiNGTON, D,(, :1!0301 

J-3M 834-69 

26 April 1~69 

MEMORANDUM FOR DirectorJ (~ National Reconnaissance Office 

Director, 'Defense Intelligence Agency 

SUBJECT: Replacement of the U-2 with the SR-71 for 

Cuban Overflight yB1 

1. On 18 April 1969, the Cornmander-in-Chief, Strategic 

Air Command (CINCSAC), recommended th.at consideration be 

given to replacing the U-2 with the SR-71 for the reconnaissance effort over Cuba. 'I'be basis for his concern was 

the recent shoot-down of the EC-121 in tbe Sea of Japan. 

'2. A JCS paper is being prepared that will provide a 

response to CINCSAC. It is expected that the paper will 

be approved by 2 May 1969. Pending the results of this 

investigation, GLASS LAMP U-2 missions are not being flown over Cuba. 

A Copy d.. / of_~ __ Copies 

TOP SECRET 

~ 

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1

R)iLPH O. STEAKLEY 

Brig General, USAF 

Deputy Director , for Reconna1ssa:nce 

Operations Directorate 

BYE-780fl4-69 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

SYSJ'EM ONLY ,-x& c01.:< 

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