Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

A HISTOR Y OF SA TELL,ITE RECONNAISSANCE 

VOL UME IlA - SAMOS 

by 

Robert Perry 

IIII ~ I (Tfllllllllllllllllllill 

Revised October 1973 

from earlier drafts 

of 1963-1965. 1972 

Volume IrA consists of 322 pages. 

(lilSS>fted bv BYE MAN· 1 

E. ,e'"':;t "om gef'eral declassoi,clltl()r1 

Schea"l", 01 becutave Order 11652 

E .emotlon c<ltegor y iss 5B (2 J I 

AutomatICally oeclllss,t,ed 00 

IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE 

ADDSY PROCESSEO 

Date Initials 

TOP SEeRE'!' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

Copy 

-........ _- ..... 

D 

of 5 copi~ 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP SERIrE 

PREFACE TO VOLUME UA 

This volume of A History of Satellite Reconnaissance includes 

two parts, separated mostly because of bulk. It covers the origins, 

progress, and eventual demise of the satellite reconnaissance system 

generally known as Samos over a period extending from initial program 

acceleration in 1957 (following nearly 10 years of studies and very 

modest technical development activity, the whole costing rather less 

than $10 million) to the cancellation of the last photographic system in 

the Samos series in October 1963. Actually. work on the last of the 

"real" Samos systems was terminated in July of that year, but a halfbreed survivor. Lanyard, lingered on for another three months. 

Samos and its close relatives Were distinguished from other 

photographic reconnaissance satellites in several respects. Notably. 

the six numbered systems in the E-l through E-6 series were under 

high but ordinary security controls. Lanyard was an exception, and 

Spartan might have become a second had it survived; but Lanyard 

represented an attempt to transfer the better parts of one Samos 

system, the E-5, to the technical and operational environment of the 

highly successful Corona. It was attractive mostly in the absence of 

any alternative system with resolution better than that of Corona--

about 17 feet at the time. Once a better system emerged -(and even 

BYE 17017-74 ii 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Corona shortly managed to surpass Lanyard performance. while Gambll 

made it totally inconsequentiall. Lanyard was an anachronism. As lor 

the others, that they were given no special security protection said 

something of their reconnaissance programs. 

The Samos family of photo reconnaissance satellites included 

three with readout antecedents {E-I, E-2. and E-3l. four with film 

recovery capability (E-4, E-- 5. E-6. and Lanyard, a stereo-configured 

E-5 camera redesigned to fit a Corona payload and recovery package). 

and the spin-stabilized P-35 weather reconnaissance system. P-35 

probabl y should not be counted as a Samos program because it was 

strikingly different in both technology and management. And the P-35 

program had another distinction: success. It is included here partly 

for convenience, but mostly because it did not fit elsewhere. 

The Samos program cannot be addressed in perspective without 

including consideration of Gambit, the covert (more properly, clandestine) 

photo satellite program established concurrently with the E-6 program 

but conducted in quite another environment--and with very different 

results. The background and antecedents of Gambit are. therefore, 

discussed in terms of their relationship to the original Samos effort 

as that becomes appropriate. However, Gambit and Hexagon, the 

two major photo reconnaissance satellite programs to emerge succeSSfully 

iii BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

from the 19605. are separately the subjects of Volume III in this 

series. 

Matters of variant nomenclature were of sufficient concern 

for Volume I to warrant a prefatory discussion in that volume. They 

do not represent cOInparably troublesome items here. Samos titles 

and designators changed from time to time. Glften enough to insure 

the confusion of later researchers, but such changes are treated as 

they occur. References to program segments have been made consistent 

by adhering to the original E-series designators throughout. 

BYE 17017-14 iv 

TO~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOPS 

CONTENTS, VOLUME rIA 

P reface ~ .... 10 •• ., ••• 10 •• 10 ........................... ,. .. ,. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ii 

IV SAMOS: FROM SPUTNIK TO POWERS (1957-1960) ••• I 

Notes on Sources •• ""." ••• "........................ 47 

V SAMOS: REALIGNMENT CONTROVERSY (1960) '."".'" 52 

Notes on Sources ........................... II> .................................. It .. 91 

VI NEW DIRECTIONS IN SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

(August 1960-May 19(1) .......... ,................. 96 

Notes on Sources ......... ,. .. ,. ... ,........................................ 147 

VII PHOTO-READOUT 1960-1963 (E-l. E-2. Subsystem I, 

and Tape) ............... ,............................... 151 

Notes on Sources ........... 10 ........................................... II • .. .. .. 197 

VllI THE P-35 WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM •••••• 203 

Notes on Sources ............................................. e ...... 10 .... .. 297 

IX THE E-4 MAPPING SATELLITE (PROGRAM IA) ,.... 305 

Notes on Sources ................................ ,. . ., ...... e................ 316 

Illustrations have been separately bound in an Appendix volume, 

v 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 TO/" CO~~i:8i~ __ 

BYE 17017-74 

-,.>." =.~~e-I-'.-· .... -:~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

IV SAMOS: FROM SPUTNIK TO POWERS (1957-1960) 

Note: The pre-1958 background of the Samos program has been treated 

in considerable detail in Chapter I, Volume I, of this series. It is 

only casually relevant to later events in the basic Samos program, 

which was influenced more by Sputnik and by the rapid pace of photosatellite technology than by plans laid in the 1954-1957 period. Directly 

causitive factors are noted in the first pages of this chapter; for additional detail the reader should refer to Volume I and to other and mor .. 

extensive narratives there cited. 

Characteristically, the United States reacted to Sputnik and the 

threat it appeared to represent by dumping money and manpower into a 

hodgepodge of space and satellite programs. For practical purposes, 

the initial reaction was channeled into three general areas. "First and 

foremost, there began a frantic effort to "restore the national image" 

by some sort of flamboyant feat that would demonstrate the excellence 

of American technology and prove the essential soundness of pre-1958 

space program management. Predictably, the effort was a flat failure. 

The early beneficiary was Vanguard, the American "scientific satellite. " 

Vanguard launches, starting in December 1957, probably represented 

the most widely publicized set of failures in modern history. Although 

1 BYE 1701,. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP S E-;;;<,, __ _ 

some Vanguards eventually went into orbit--and the program consumed 

vastly greater sums than ever contemplated--the effort chlefly served 

to prove that the "space program" of 1955-1958 had been distinguished 

by strikingly bad judgment at the secretarial level. The Army's 

Explorer satellite, rescued from ignominious storage in a warehouse 

where it had been hidden for months, finally junketed into orbit four 

months after Sputnik 1. It was the petulant contention of Major General 

J. B. Medaris, chief of the Army's rocket research program, that the 

feat could have been performed many months earlier had it not been 

for the intransigent obstructionism of the Secretary of Defense. For 

the remainder of 1958, a succession of discounted failures and overpublicized successes in space probe and satellite projects chased across 

the front pages of the nation' 5 newspapers. 

A second response to the Sputnik scare was the creation of new 

agencies, czars, committees, and study groups--each supposed to 

perform some magic that would suddenly compensate for five years of 

misjudgment and maladministration. Most were of transitory importance. 

Only two endured: the Advanced Research Projects Agency, named 

custodian of all military-purpose space activities, and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, charged with conducting a 

peaceful-purposes scientific space program. 

BYE 17017-74 

-,-:-.,,:.,-?-/-,,"' >',. 

2 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

The third pattern of response to Sputnik was the acceleration, 

expansion, and modification of established space developments. With 

minor exceptions, these were based on the WS 117L reconnais sance 

satellite program, a starveling which until late 1957 had been carefull y 

hidden from public view because it could not be easily accommodated 

to the "peaceful uses of space" image prized by the Eisenhower administration 

Conducted by a scant handful of imaginative scientists and engine"rs, 

WS ll7L had been allotted sparse resources since its 1954 inception. 

Stunted thougb it was, it nonetheless represented the only well-grounded 

United States space program when space suddenly became respectable, 

-in October 1957. As might have been anticipated, pres sure for acceleration and for the creation of interim satellites focused on the project 

office immediately thereafter. Roles and assignments for the booster 

and second stage prOliferated. A serendipitous compatibility of the 

WS U7L upper stage with the Thor missile permitted creation of a 

deviant program, later named Discoverer, which had some prospect 

of early success. But Discoverer was actually a cover program cloaking 

the quiet development of the Corona reconnaissance payload. For practi2al purposes, Discoverer-Corona went its own way. independent of the 

:nain course of WS 117L development and ignored by most WS 117L 

narticipants. They concerned themselves with the continuing effort to 

BYE 17017-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

provide photographic reconnaissance from a system elTlbodying the 

Atlas booster and the Lockheed second stage that ultilTlatel y became 

Agena. 

Thor and Atlas becalTle first-stage boosters for a variety of 

probe and satellite payloads, and the upper stage of the original WS U 7L 

(Agena) was called upon to support several newly conceived satellite 

programs, both military and scientific in objective. 

What remained in the 117L effort after the propaganda projects 

had been peeled away. after sc ientific satellites and comlTlunication 

satellites and navigation satellites and weather satellites had been 

shaped and separated •. was a military reconnaissance satellite progralTl 

that had rather surprisingly survlVed the first year after Sputnik. 

Through most of 1958 the concept of 117L satellite reconna~ssance 

involved an Atlas that would boost into orbit a camera-carrying Agena. 

Rather than detaching a reentry capsule to return exposed film (as 

did Corona). the orbiting Agena would rely on a scanner-transmitter 

to transform photographs mto electronic Signals and relay them to 

ground stations for reconstruction. Two alternative techniques involving 

infrared-sensitive detel tOT::> (subsequently the Midas program) and 

electronic signal recorders (later the individual ferret subsystems) 

'*' still were embryonic at that time. 

;('Midas. which was completel)t st!parated from the balance of the WS 117L 

effort during 1959. is not conSidered part of that effort for the purpose 

of thiS account. Elet:tronlc sensor subsystems and their development 

ar~ treated separately, 

BYE 1701'7-'74 4 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C.9~.§I9~8~C 

Originally, WS 117L had been conceived around a television 

transmission system and magnetic tape as the mode of returnmg 

reconnaissance information from orbit. By 1956, however, the 

television-magnetic tape technique had been relegated to secondary 

consideration and primary emphasis shifted to a conventional filmcamera'combination with on-board film pr.ocessing and electronic 

transmission. 1 The future use of either magnetic or electrostatic 

tape was not excluded from consideration, but for the moment technological difficulties made them less than feasible. 

As late as March 1958, WS 117L embodied concepts refined 

in 1956. A "pioneer" system built around a six-inch (focal length) 

lens, and an "advanced visual" system embodying a 36-inch lens were 

conceived as the basic data gathering devices. Both infrared and 

electronic collectors were being considered by that time, but the 

chief emphasis remained with visual modes. ;:, 

Although "readout" remained the accepted data retrieval method, 

suggestions that physical recovery of a film capsule would be a preferable alternative had been heard at intervals since mid-l956. In June of 

that year, Rand researchers published an unassuming classified paper 

which suggested the feasibility of recovering satellite payloads, briefly 

noted reasons for considering that option, and defined the technical 

5 BYE 17017-

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283RET ~ 

;,;;;;---

requirements of a recovery system. Two of the "justifications" 

were basic to the Corona program, adopted early in 1958: photographic coverage of closed areas in advance of the availability of 

a readout system, and the accumulation of knowledge concerning 

recovery techmques. A third Justification was implicit in the subsequent conflict between recovery and readout: the amount of information 

a satellite could gather and return in a given period was considerably 

larger by way of capsule recovery methods than by readout. The study 

affirITled the technical feasibility of recovery, categorized it as an 

"inherently simple method, " and included calculations indicating that 

a 50-pound payload could be returned in a capsule weighing only 

3 

228 pounds. 

Slight consideration was given the suggestion over the following 

year, partly because of funding difficulties that hobbled the entire 

reconnaissance satellite effort during that time but more immediately 

because there still was no proof that an encapsulated payload could be 

retrieved from orbit. Not untill957, when the first ballistic missile 

nose cones were recovered, did scientists have empirical proof that 

any object re-entering the atmosphere from orbital altitudes could 

survive. Under the circumstances, it seemed sounder to hinge a reconnaissance satellite program on known and demons trated image transmission 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 -Jrult" 3.". ____ _ 

techniques than on the considerable uncertainties of atmospheric 

re-entry. Moreover, satellite reconnaissance requirements as 

then understood tended to emphasize the need for attack warning 

rather than for targeting, search, or surveillance. The objective 

of obtaining prompt intelligence on ·specific activities of a prospective 

enemy made readout, with a quickly avaUable product, seem much 

more attractive than recovery, with its indeterminate delay for 

retrieval and processing of film that might have been exposed days 

4 

earlier. 

Interest in recovery revived in October and November 1957, 

partly because of a new Rand study which urged the substitution of 

a deboost and water recovery mode for the readout technique embodied 

in the current 117L program. Although paying particular attention to 

the feasibility of early systems based on Thor boosters, Rand also 

3uggested development of a family of satellites that included vehicles 

5 lofted by Atlas boosters. 

Such proposals were generally submerged in the enthusiasm 

for the Discoverer-Corona programs that evolved during the early 

months of 1958. Nevertheless, as early as March 1958 the prospect 

of employing recovery techniques in the Atlas-boosted WS ll7L began 

to receive renewed consideration. Indeed, one of the secondary 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Justifications openly volunteered for the Discoverer at the time of 

its inception was that it might prove the value of recovery "as a data 

acquisition method. ,,6 Brief suggestwns that such an option deserved 

investigation appeared 10 development plaus that the Ballistic MIS sile s 

Dlvislon submitted to Air Force headquarters on 15 March and on 

7 1 July 1958. 

If it had not other importance. the mention of recovery as aI; 

alternative to the accepted readout mode hinted that some question of 

readout adequacy had been ralsed. On the surface, there was as yet 

no indication that the question might become a controversy. 

The "pioneer" readout system; later the E-l. * was intended to 

provide in-camera definition approachmg 100 lines per millimeter. 

based on an f/ 2..8 lens in combination with a very fine-grain film. 

Orbital operation was predicated on the assumption that the camera 

system would function for five nllnutes during each pass over the "area 

of interest" and that on subsequent orbits three receiving stations within 

the continental United States would "read outll the intelligence thus 

acquired. (The stations were to be located at Fort Stevens. Oregon, 

The letter designators assigned individual WS 117L subsystems had the 

fulluwing basis: Subsystem A - Airframe; B - Propulsion; C - Auxiliary 

Puwer; D - Guidance and Contrul; E - Visual Reconnaissance; F - ElectromagnetIc Recunnais sam e (Fe rret); G - Infrared Reconna~s sance (later 

MIdas). H - Commumcations; I - Data Processing; J - Geophysical 

Envlronrnent; K - Pf'Tsonnei; L - Biomedical Recovery. The E-deslgnators 

ultimatei\ ran from E-1 thrOugh E-6. the F-designators through F-4. 

BYE 17017-74 8 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

Ottumwa, Iowa, and New Boston, New Hampshire; Offutt Air Force 

Base was to be the satellite operations control center.) It seemed 

probable that an efficient processing and dissemination complex would 

permit at least 10 percent of the derived intelligence to reach the 

central analysis station within one hour of its receipt and the remainder 

within eight hours. The Strategic Air Command wanted an eventual 

"near real time" system, of course, hoping to use it for attack warning 

as well as general intelligence. Each of several vehicles to be aloft 

simultaneously was to have a useful time on orbit of 10 to 30 days, 

limited principally by battery life. The initial system (E-l) was 

designed to permit identification of ground objects measuring 100 feet 

on a side. The "advanced" E-2 was to produce images that would 

permit "visual resolution" of objects 20 feet on a side and was to have 

a potentially long orbital operating life--assuming the availability of 

either solar or nuclear power sources. 

One key to a useful readout system was a data processing subsystem which would include the equipment, techniques, and procedures 

to transform recorded raw data into intelligence--and to disseminate 

it to using agencies. Ground receiving stations, therefore, would 

identify, record and retransm~t. information to an "Advanced Reeonnaissanee System Intelligence Center" (predictably dubbed "ARSIC"). ' The 

BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Intelligence Data Processing Subsystem ("IDPS"--later Subsystem Il 

was to be capable of performmg aU functions needed to transform the 

raw data into useful intelligence: proc. ssing, screening, mterpretation, collation, evaluation, indexing, storage and retrieval, analysis, 

8 

display, dissemination. and presentatione 

The orbital vehlcle--the upper stage and payload sectlOns--was 

to be 19 feet long and ~ feet in diameter, was to carry a 2080-pound 

payload, and including ~080 pounds of propellants would weigh 9300 

pounds at launch. The somewhat loosely defined operational concept 

of March 1958 anticipated that ultimately each of several £-2 satellites 

s'imultaneousl y on orbit would have a useful life of one year and be 

capable of providing 17-{00t ground resolution. 9 

Spot survelllance of selected targets rather than general reconnaissance was the objective of the development program. Surveillance 

of thiS nature was lntended to provide advance warning of an imminent 

attack, a concept emphasized by application of the name Sentry to 

WS 117L in June 1958. Unhappily, concept had little relevance to reality. 

Although a camera and readout system that could actually resolve 

objects 17 feet on each side would be capable of locating and identifymg 

intercontinental miss1le sltes, th" total system was incapable of such 

prec lsion. Moreover. within th" "xlstlng state of the art, the capacity 

BYE 17017-74 

: S '_ ~ • 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

of the system to scan and transmit lmages to ground staUons was 

severely limlted. 

Even though electronic transmission of photographs to ground 

receivers degraded definition, the chief objection to readout was that 

relatively little area coverage could be provided each day. Exposing 

the film, transportlng it, and processing lt presented few diff,cult,es 

compared to the enormously complex and tirne-consummg tasks of 

electronically scanning each negative frame, transforming lts photographic content into analog signals, transmitting those signals to 

ground stations, and reforming the images in those stations. 

The readout tecnnique that had evolved by 1958, and which was 

refined but not radically changed during the next two years, embraced 

a strip camera subsystem loaded with 4500 feet of 70-millimeter film. 

(Corona would carry about 15000 feet of three-inch film in its payload.) 

The film moved past a slit aperture, which served as a shutter, ·at a 

rate determined by ,mage motion compensation settings. (The "slit" 

was actually a line scribed through the alurnmum coating on a glass plate.) 

Once exposed, the film was pressed against a chemically impregnilted web at intervals over a period of approximately 16 minutes. The 

pre- soaked web contained all the necessary developing and fixing ingred-

,ents. After, ompletlng the processing stage, the developed film went 

to a storage section--a series of loops which held it lD readiness for 

later scanning and transrnisslon. 

BYE 1701~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 CO:09;::.s.::~ 

TO~ .. T 

The readout mechanism consisted of a revolvmg drum Itn" 

scan tube, a scanner lens system, a light collecter lens systenl, a 

photo multiplier tube and a video amplifier. An electron bean, WhICh 

focused on the phosphor-coated inner surface of the revolving drum 

was emitted through an optically flat wmdow, the light beam going 

through a scanning lens that was moved vertically by a motor-orivel1 

< am. The lens moved a spot of light across the width of the processed 

film as the film moved laterally through a readout gate. The beam 

mutton had the shape of a square wave, permitting continuous top-tobuttul11, bottom-tn-top travel rather than returning, to a zero point for 

each scan operatlOn. That portion of the beam which passed through 

the film was collected by another lens system capable of relaying 75 

percent of the transmltted light to a photomultiplier tube which transformed the light energy into electroniL signals. After passage through 

a v1.deo amplifier, those signals were relayed to the satelL.te '::; CtllllrnUnlcation equipment section for transmission to ground stations. 

IITlage Inotion conlpensation, exposure C'vntroi, and focus factors 

were set by corn.mand from a ground station. Attitude recording, a key 

factur for interpretation, was provided through inscription of a binary 

code on the edges of the fUm. 

The- process, though complicated, could be performed by 

eXlstl'lL:, or available technIques and equiprnents .. Limiting technical 

BYE 17017-74 12 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

factors were the speed and width of the scanning beam. governed 

by bandwidth (megacycles per second) considerations. Unless 

reliable traveling wave tubes could be incorporated in the system--

and nothing suitable was available either in 1958 or three years later--

the usable bandwidth was but six megacycles per second. Even though 

the E-l and E-Z systems were designed to limit their coding to white, 

black and one gray scale. the scanning beam could travel across the 

widtb of film only once each second. The beam spanned only one-tenth 

of an incb of film during each transit. A complete scanner-beam pass--

bottom-to-top-to-bottom--required two seconds. The transmission. 

readout. and reconstruction process transformed the signals from 

each such path into an l8-inch strip of 35-milUmeter film in the ground 

station. Seven such strips. halved and realigned to conform to the 

pattern of the original film. could be reassembled into a single print 

measuring nine inches along each edge. 

The basic time limitation was imposed by a requirement that 

the scanning beam travel slowly enough to read and translate the 

analog trace contained on the film. The analog information was transformed into electronic impulses which conformed to the black. white, 

and gray elements contained in that small portion of the film then being 

read. Provision for better film definition (more lines per millimeter) 

BYE 17017-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

or a greater variety of tonal md,cators (multiple-scale readout 

representing three, four, or as many as 15 gray-scale varieties 

and hence providing a wider ranf?,e of contrasts on the processed 

"take") required slower scan or a wider bandwidth. The first was 

unacceptable and the second unobtainable. 

Long before flight trlal s ,uuld be atteHlpted, the limitations 

of the readout technlque were well appreciated. Appreciation of the 

scan-readout time limitations was not difficult. From an altitude 

of lOO nautical miles, adequate for 30-90 day orbits, resolution of 

14-foot objects would involve a scale factor of 1:400, 000, so that the 

70-millimeter film in the satellite would provide an image covermg 

270 square nautical miles on the ground for each frame of film. 

Assuming six-megacycle-second bandwidths and a square curve path 

for thp scan beam. readout time requirements could be expressed as 

a simple equation. To read out ~ square inches at ~ '.ines per millimeter using a one-gray-tone scale, the time requirement waS expressed 

as: l580 R2A = (2580)'(100)2'9 

bandwidth 6.106 

= 38 seconds. At one exposure per 

second for five minutes. readout time for the product of each pass 

WOI ld be 11,400 seconds: thr"e hours I (The figure 2580 was derived 

from a ' omputation of tht> nurnb"r ui sample points or bits to be read 

BYE 17017-74 14 

-,-:c. 0 5"~O-/T3~-· ~,.-:~ 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

out in each square inch of film glven the assumed definition and gray 

scale standards.) On the opttmlstic assurnptlOn that a ground station 

could receive fully useful, "'formatlOn for eight minutes during each 

of five daily passes of the satelhte within its reception range, 1t was 

apparent that each station could accept no more than 62. individual 

10 frames representing 16, 140 square miles of target area each day. 

(An early Corona system could scan 1. 5 rrlillion square miles each day.) 

Such consideratlOns unquestionably influenced the transformation 

of basic requirerrlents in the period between March and September 1958. 

By that latter date, An Force headquarters had clearly indicated its 

desire that" onsideration ... be given to the use of a recoverable 

satellite In order to achieve maxirrlum accuracy, information content, 

reliability of receipt of collected data, and reuse where econorrlically 

11 

feasible. " Nevertheles s, the stated objectives of the prograrrl were 

focused on early warning of attack, tHe collection of general intelligence, and support of the nahon's emergency war plan. Use of satellite 

reconnaissance to assist In deterrrlining the war potential of the Soviet 

Union remained a secondary goal. Readout, even with its aCknowledged 

limitations, still seemed the best means of satisfying the requirements. 

Indeed, It was quite logical to conclude that a technique of readout 

which overcame image definition and transmission time objections would 

15 BYE 1701' 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

more satisfactorily satisfy program objectives than any recovery 

tt!chmque. 

Administration of Sentry through the closing months of 1958 

was complicated by the fact that the Advanced Research Projects Agency 

had custody of program funds and exercised a directive authority over 

the technical content of the effort. Convinced that an alternative to the 

available readout techniques deserved careful consideration, the Air 

Force t autiously moved toward a program reorientation that would 

permlt investigation of recovery techniques. But the realignment was 

complicated by an infusion of ARPA philosophy. Although ARPA 

Director R. W. Johnson in mid-December 1958 approved a new threephase approach that included film recovery as well as ferret and readout 

payloads, the research agency continued to press for the inclusion of an 

electrostatir tape readout system (later the E-3). Indeed, ARPA came 

to advocate cancellation of all other visual programs in favor of reliance 

12 

on electrostatic tape methods. 

Although BMD had reservations about the adequacy of the readout 

systems under development, the division was strenuously opposed to 

dIscarding all previous work in favor of a technique which still had not 

been laboratory-proven. Sentry project officers pointed out that an 

electrostatic tape payload could not possibly become available for use 

BYE 17011-74 16 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOPS_~_ 

before November 1961, that at best it would provide the equivalent of 

20 lines per millimeter resolution as against the nominal 100 lmes 

per millimeter of the film system. that adoption of the electrostatlc 

tape device would require complete vehicle redesign, and that the 

specific proposal supported by ARPA (the CBS "Reconotron Proposal") 

seemed Ii-able to require more nearly 10 years of development than the 

13 

two or three being promised. 

BMD's sharp objections to the electrostatic tape scheme advanced 

by ARPA found support within the air secretariat. Assistant Secretary 

(Research and Development) R. E. Horner carried the issue to higher 

departmental echelons, insisting that even though the proposal seemed 

theoretically feasible it would be dangerously premature to schedule 

development of such a technique, much less to make the success of 

Sentry program totally dependent on it. Horner pointed out to Air Force 

Undersecretary M. A. MacIntyre that the ARPA -endorsed proposal 

would not satisfy established requirements, and he urged renewed 

attention to the development of a recoverable capsule for Sentry, one 

adaptable to a variety of payloads. 

Although the combined weight of objections beat down the more 

radical aspects of Johnson's recommendations for realigning Sentry. 

ARPA did not surrender. In a 17 December 1958 memorandum which 

17 BYE 17017-7 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

served as the basis for program redirection, Johnson clearly ,ndicated 

that ARPA considered the proposed recoverable capsule to be no mure 

than a test-bed development for possible aoplication to both ferret and 

surveillan. e systems. It also appeared that Johnsen and hIS advlsors 

had either misunderstood the Objectives of Sentry or were misinterpr<'ting 

the Horner viewpoint. Johnson's incorrect asswnption that point survelllane .. was a relatively new requirement probably was based on an 

erruneous interpretation of September 1958 requirements docun\ents. 

In any event, It tended to cloud both the issue and the objectives of 

program realignment. 

The entae question of program management from ARPA ofhces 

In the Pentagon had become an irritant during the late months of 1958. 

Not only had ARPA begun to "adjust" funding allocations, production 

schedules, and technical objectives at frequent intervals, but the 

agency had unilaterally overruled Air Force desires concerning placement of missile assembly buildings on Air Force bases, had cancelled 

Air Force plans for early construction of readout stations, and had 

attempted to create a high-level review committee to overhaul requirements for the system. Although some of the rulings proved more 

acceptable. and seemed W1SE'r, in retrospect, it was the implication 

of the activity that bee am" uf must conCern to Sentry program managers. 

BYE 11017-74 

~,->. ;=."_~_/7,o_. Ve.-:" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Because of the coniuslOn that surrounded space matters through much 

of 1958, because of the uncertain authority of the many surviving 

boards and panels, and because of the apparent administration desire 

to keep program control concentrated in the Pentagon, it had become 

most difficult to secure timely rulings and program decisions. More 

pertinent, many of those decision, when they did appear, seemed 

completely at variance with the stated objectives of the Sentry program. 14 

The program reorientation of December had a direct influence 

on the immediate future of Sentry. One of Johnson's chief measures 

was to reduce effort on the E-l "pioneer" system. based On a 6-inch 

focal length camera, and emphasize the E-2, embodying a 36-inch 

camera. That 'guidance" was faithfully reflected in the revised development plan published at BM]) on 30 January 1959. Perhaps more important 

however. the new development plan significantly expanded the earlier 

stated requirement for a recoverable reconnaissance satellite, calling 

for development of recoverable ca aBules concur.rent with the last half 

of the readout program flight test. 

The January proposal described a recovery capsule of 60 inches 

diameter, weighing 1200 pounds, and built around a bOO-pound payload. 

A heat shield which might be either ablative or a sublimation type was 

intended to separate from the payload package at an altitude of 55.000 feet--

19 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

after decelerahon from orb.tal velocities during passage through the 

upper atmosphere. A,r recove Ty over the ocean In the fashion of the 

D1SCQVerer capsul" was the preferred mode of retrieval. The stated 

obJectlve of the effort was to demonstrate a technique for recovering 

photugraphic payloads. Cunslderation of actual "take" dunng research 

IS 

and development was s11gh!. 

Two weeks later, ARPA approved "in general" the 30 January 

development plan but reduced the funding total irom $148.2 mUllon to 

$96. I> million for fiscal 1959. After further discussion of the details 

during March, the research pruject agency in April gave specific 

approval to the individual readout (E-l, E-2, E-3) recovery (E-5) and 

ferret proposals (F-l, F-2. F-3) but by lmplication withheld authorizatlOn for a mapptng and charting photographic subsystem (E-4) which had 

earlier been grafted to the basic Sef'try program. Unwittingly, the 

Ballistic Missiles Dlvision had created a rival to an Army proposal 

for a covert mapping satellite program (known sequentially as Salaam, 

Vedas. and fin all y Argon) and had also begun to tread on the toes of an 

ARPA group which favored USing a Thor booster to orbit an Army-Navy 

geodesy satellite. Inasmuch as each of these options was considered 

to be as sensitive as the closely held CD rona program, relatively few 

at BMD knew of their existence. Nevertheless, arguments 'over BMD'e 

BYE 17017-74 

"~ .. : .: -' - . 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP5~ __ 

"right" to develop a mapping satellite with or without ARPA's approval 

extended well into June, with the result that concern for the mapping 

satellite program (E-4) affected prospects for the recoverable reconnaissance satellite proposal (E_5).l6 

One of the basic difficulties in dealing with ARPA through the 

whole of 1959 was that agency's persistent effo~t to redirect the seyeral 

military space programs toward objectives their military managers had 

not contemplated. ARPA still had not foresworn the goal of securing a 

manned satellite program for tm militaryestablishment--presumably 

to be under ARPA's immediate management control--even though 

Congress in activating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration the previous year had given a near monopoly in that field to the 

new civilian organization. In many respects, the military services, 

and particularly the Air Force, were in philosophical agreement with 

ARPA on the need for a broader military space program. Nevertheless, 

funds available through ARPA were scarcely adequate to support approved 

military space programs, and new efforts tended to divert attention from 

basic tasks. The budding E-5 recoverable satellite effort, for instance, 

was to some degree shaped by ARPA hopes that the capsule might be 

adaptable to housing a man. Although the Air Force at large was quite 

willing to gloss over peculiarities in size and environmental conditioning 

of the recovery capsule, being thoroughly in agreement with the ultimate 

21 BYE 170r 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

objective of such mlsduection. there was little doubt that the mterests 

of satelhte reconnaissanre would have been better served by anuther 

17 

course. 

Funding difficulties> largely caused by the proliferation and 

mounting costs of ARPA -sponsored space efforts, were principall y 

responsible for a 25 May 1 <;159 cancellation of the mappmg and charting 

satellite (E-4) and the 23 June cancellation of the Sentry E- '; program. 

Such at' least was the official explanation. The fact that the E- 3 was 

continued. indeed that it was refined and submitted for development 

approval during the same period, tended to cast some doubt on the 

"umplete candor of the ufficlal Justification for E-5 cancellation. By 

the same token, it was apparent that conflict and overlap betwt:'en the 

E-4 and the Army-ARPA sponsored Argon mapping and charhng 

satellite program was a factor in E-4 cancellation. Thf' statement 

that funds originally scheduled for Sentry were to be diverted to "other 

ARPA programs II identified the cause of the action but did not fully 

explain its motivation. 

Although ARPA directed only that the development of the E-5 

. :$ 

recovery capsule be deferred pending a complete program reVlew. 

Interestinglyenought the ARPA order to halt work on a recoverable 

E - 5 capsule followed short! y after NASA responsibility fo~ initial 

ITlan-in-space experiITlents had been confirmed. 

BYE 17017-74 l2 

P"-'I::;, .... '"l':- ;:. HI t:."TIa r I ....... ,_-'~ .... / 1":;:1 .... ,;:. 

_ ... ~ 

TOP SEtRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

the effect of the order and a concurrent $25 million reduction in the 

level of Sentry funding was to halt all development activity. Work had 

actually started only after the 3 April approval of BMD's development 

d plan an stl '11 was m . a pre 1"' d' t 18 lmlnary eSlgn s atus. 

Objections from BMD, the Air Research and Development 

Command, and the Air Staff were both prompt and vigorous. By mid~ 

July, BMD's commander. Major General O. J. Ritland, had personally 

taken his objections to General T. D. White, Chief of Staff, asking 

that the Air Force fund E-5 capsule development if ARPA continued to 

refuse. On 1 August, Lieutenant General B. A. Schriever (newly 

installed as ARDC com'mander) also appealed to General White to 

19 

reinstate the E- 5 program. 

The issue, somewhat oversimplified. was essentially whether 

readout or recovery techniques should be employed to satisfy' the fivefoot resolution requirement defined by the intelligence community the 

previous September. ARPA by effectively halting work On the E-5 

capsule was ruling in favor of the E-3 (electrostatic tape system). 

Theoretically, the E-2 could, with substantial improvements in focal 

length and aperture. provide five-foot resolution, but all the objections 

to the basic E-2 technique remained in force. Unless very significant 

advances in readout technology were introduced. an "advanced" E-2 

would be limited to taking and transmitting no more than 50 exposures 

23 BYE 1701~ 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

per day for each available readout station. Each would cover, on the 

~ round, an area of about five square miles. Requirements for extreme 

precision in satellite attitude, Camera pointing. and basic targeting. 

straddled the bounds of currently achievable technology, making practical (as opposed to theoretical) feasibility rather questionable. Against 

the only remaining alternative. reliance on the E-3. the Air Force could 

bring to bear all its contentions of unreasonable ARPA optimism. a high 

probability of program failure and the virtual assurance of very substantial program slippages. and a near certainty of inadequate image 

~~ 

definition • 

... 

',' 

As for the question of whether five-foot resolution was a 

Lockheed stated the case for the E-l in a proposal dated 29 July 1959. 

Apparently proceeding on the reasonable premise that ARPA's predeliction for readout would prevail over Air Force preferences. Lockheed 

painted the theoretical advantages of the E-3 in highly attractive colors. 

The contractor noted that E-2 technology was based on pre-1959 concepts 

and that the "recent addition II vf a requirement for five-foot visual reconnais sanee had prmnpted attention to state-of .. the-art improvements. In 

Lockheed's opinion (at least, in its 29 July 1959 opinion!). "an all-electronic 

approach would "provide the highest possible performance in the earliest 

time period at minimum co,;t. II Noting that the "technical feasibility" of 

electronic tape systems had been proven under Aeronautical Research 

Laboratory (Wright Au Development Center) contracts I Lockhe ed cited 

the availability of 100-lines-per-millimeter definition (I2, 200 television 

lines for a 6l-millimeter-square format!), an equivalent sensitivity of 

ASA-l45 (standard reconnaissance film had an ASA sensitivity rating of 

!. to 5), and a 'readout system substantially simpler than that of the E-2. 

The image was to be recorded on photoelectric-sensitive electrostatic 

tape. 'read out by deflecting the modulation of an electron beam to scan 

a portion of the tape, and the video signal amplified and then applied as 

a modulating signal for transmission to ground station. f.. bandwidth of 

12 megacycles per ::.econd was required (tubes had to be developed also) 

tu provide a readout time of 8.7 seconds per frame. In such terms, 

ARPA I::; interest was entirely understandable. 

BYE 17017-74 24 

TOP SECJRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

valid requirement, the Air Force based its caSe on a re - statement of 

intelligence needs furnished by the assistant chief of staff for inteUi20 

gence. The bones of the dispute were thus laid quite bare. 

As it happened. Air Force views, stood a better chance of 

acceptance in the August-September period of 1959 than at any tlme 

over the previous 18 months. For a variety of reasons--stemming 

mostly from widespread dissatisfaction with ARPA's management of 

spac e programs for which the indlvidual services had technical res pons ibility--ARPA's influence was gradually declining. Virtually the final 

chapter in the orgy of special-agency generation that began in October 

1957 was the 1959 creation of a Directorate of Defense Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E) and its placement One 'echelon above ARPA in the 

Department of Defense heirarchy. Air Force Assistant Secretary. 

J. V. Charyk, who had recently replaced Horner in the research and 

development assistantship. cannily chose to present the case for the 

E-5 to DDR&E rather than to appeal again to Johnson and his associates. 

(Dr. H. F. York. who was named director of the research and engineering agency, bad formerly been Johnson's deputy but had also been at odds 

with the "official" ARPA position on several key is sues.) Charyk in a 

26 August memorandum pOinted out that adding E-S development to the 

fisca11960 Samos * program would raise program cost by only $17 million, 

~, 

ARPA renanled Sentry on 6 August. specifying Sanlos because it was a 

nanle without I'nlission association. II Although Samos was the name of 

25 BYE 1701~ 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'l'OP SECRET 

a pnce that seemed entirely reasonable for the product. 

Whether Johnson moved on his own initiative or was prodded 

remained uncertain. but ARPA on 4 September 1959 finally authoriz.ed 

the a ward of an E-5 Camera development contract lito prutect schedules. " 

(Notably, development of a recovery capsule was ~ simultaneous l y 

appr oved. and the E- 5 can:era was in some quarters cons idered adaptable to a readout system if that proved necessary.) Concurrently, 

however. ARPA directed that the earlier $143 million figure for fiscal 

1960 Samos program expenditures be scaled down to a maximum of 

$135 million. Protests were again prompt. and again effective. Five 

days later. on 9 September. ARPA formally authorized reinstatement 

of E- 5 subsystem development. including the capsule. and added $12 

million to the earlier authoriz.ation total. The approved funds. however, 

amounted to $17 million less than the BMD IIr::linimurn requirement" and 

fell $12 million short of Charyk '5 estimate of minimum needs for fiscal 

21 

1960. 

Even though approval of the E-5 was a major victory for the 

supporters of capsule recovery tech~iques; the net effect of the maneuvering which had extended from December 1958 to September 1959 had 

a Greek island in the Adriatic Sea, it was promptly interpreted as tht· 

acronym for !,.atellite ~nd ~issHe observation !.ystem--an absurd 

misnomer which nonetheless was later used in a variety of official 

directives. 

BYE 17017-74 26 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'I'OP SEtRE'!! 

begun to confuse program status so thuToughly that little real 

progress in E-5 development was possible. Although General Schriever 

protested to General White that Pentagon-instigated funding and program 

fluctuations had been chiefl y responsible for that situation,2.2 the explanation was not that simple. In point of fact, the Air Force had devoted 

nearly as much attention to :-ecuring approval of the E-4 proposal as 

to furthering the E- 5 program, and disapproval or partial approval of 

Air Force development plans had been in large part conditioned by 

strong defens e department objections to Air Force operational concepts 

which the junior service stubbornly supported. 

Although the Strategic Air Command had originally been highly 

skeptical of claims that satellite reconnais sance could produce operationaU y 

~. 

useful results, .," once Sputnik 1 made it clear that the Soviets had a highly 

* 

Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Genez, who had been associated with 

overflight reconnaissance programs since 1953, waS fond of telling 

how his first presentation of WS 117L proposals to the Strategic Air 

Command staff had been received in 1954. Highly enthusiastic about 

the program, he had gone over its technical aspects. then based On 

television techniques. and had summed up with a fairly optimistic 

appraisal of its prospects.. He finished. The audience turned its 

eyes on General LeMay, in the front row. LeMay clamped down on 

his cigar, glared at Genez, and growled, nWho in the hell authorized 

you to spend good travel money to bring this horse shit up here? 11 

27 BYE 1701-

'POP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

potent rocket and missile program SAC developed an intense interest 

both in early flights and in acquiring early operational control of an 

eventual system. As in the ballistic missile program. where "initial 

operational capability at the earliest possible date" became more a 

fixation than an objective. development goals immediately became 

involved with operational readiness dates. operational sites, and plans 

for strategic command control of operational systems. The Ballistic 

Missile Division, which had responded to similar pressures on ballistic 

missile developments by "inventing" concurrency, a concept of interlocked development-production-deployment that actually was not applied 

to pre-l959 missile development efiorts, unprotestingly applied the 

philosophy to the reconnaissance satellite effort. The effects On program 

Size and cost projections were enormous. Readout, the dominant technical approach. implied that each satellite would require a minimum of 

three ground stations. Handling of multiple ground station products 

would necessitate the creation of a huge processing. analysis, and 

dissemination station (or several such stations), so concurrency actually 

implied the early development and construction of substantial numbers 

of elaborate and costly facilities. 

Quite apart from the cost of such a program, concurrency and 

the prospect that the Strategic Air Command would operate Samos roused 

BYE 17017-74 2.8 

~:~:-: s ,-, ... , 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

disquieting emotions in several quarters. Although both the developing 

and the prospective operating command proceeded on the premise that 

SAC operational responsibility for Samos was inevitable, it was not 

until August 1959 that Air Force headquarters formally designated SAC 

as the command responsible for operational planning for Samos and 

for processing "initial take." Shortly thereafter, all concerned were 

carefully advised that no specific planning date for transfer of Samos 

responsibility to an operating command was to be entertained for the 

moment. Nevertheless, concurrency remained an ingredient of BMD 

23 planning for Samos. 

One of the chief obstacles to acceptance of the basic thesis was 

President Eisenhower's clear directive that all United States satellites 

"must be advertised as being solely for peaceful purposes." Although 

the intent of the order had been diluted by a succession of Sentry-Samos 

publicity releases during 1958 and 1959, the Air Force nonetheless was 

obliged to make the pattern of Samos development conform to that ideal. 

At one point, Pentagon planners had proposed coupling all Air Force 

satellite launchings to such "peaceful systems" as Discoverer and Midas. 

The plan was thoroughly unsettling to Corona managers who had devoted 

months to the task of disassociating Discoverer from specific or implied 

military objectives. Samos had been so clearly identified with reconnaissance 

29 BYE 1701" 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

objectiv~s that relating it to Discoverer seemed certain to compromise 

the covert Corona program. The prospect sent tremors down the 

teletype lines that connected the Central Intelligence Agency to the 

obscure Corona office in Los Angeles. 

In December 1958, Au Force headquarters had devised a 

"cover plan" fur Samus based on "advertising ARDC as both developer 

and operator." The scheme of making SAC operationally responsible 

for Samus \iVaS to be handled as Top Secret. Planning and programming 

for initial operational capability were to be similarly treated. In 

theury, this would satisfy the Presidentls directive. 

Accurately, If uncharitably, amused Corona managers concluded 

that the "AF cover operation" was so leaky that it would divert !ia good 

deal of curiosity dnd attention" away from Discoverer-Corona and toward 

the acknowh·dged reconnaissance effort. And that was preCisely what 

happened. The attempt to hide Samos under a Top Secret label after 

its reconnaissance potential had been openly disc- ussed for months proved 

futile. The abundance of Top Secret clearances and normal human 

curiosity made almost every eligible staff officer m the Pentagon. in 

ARDe headquarters. and in SAC headquarters cognizant of the objective. 

In Apnl 1959, a Pentagon presentations group took a revised draft of 

the IISentry Cover Plan" to Undersecretary M. A. Maclnkye for his 

reVlew. BefuTI:! they had gotten well into their script, he interrupted 

BYE 17017-74 30 

'I'OP SEERE,. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Thus when Air Force headquarters formally abandoned the attempt to 

deny that Samos existed and announced that the Strategic Air Command 

would ultimately be made operationally responsible for satdlite reconnaissance. the problem remained quite as large as it had been eight 

months earlier. Nor were propose~ solutions any more feasible. 

ARPA, in a particularly ill-timed maneuver, chose August 1'959 to 

urge that all Samos sbots be announced as Discoverers. a prospect 

that sent the Corona office lnto new tremors of despair. Like the 

earlier Air Staff suggestion of the same tenor, it was quietly deflated 

24 

without harm to Corona security. 

Through all these petty twistings and turnings. SAC and the 

Air Staff persisted in their determination to make SAC operationally 

responsible for Samos. and particularly to give SAC both the ability 

and the authority to process and dissemlnate initial Itlake. ,,* There 

and asked, rather impatiently. if they were familiar with the Corona 

actlvlty. "When they said INo, I" a Corona offi<;:er later reported. "he 

threw them out of the office." When one of the presentations group 

complained that the Sentr y plan was "being interferred with 11 and was 

"butting blank walls" becaus e of a nCOl:'ona program, r1 it proved neces sar y 

to close him down without teUing him any of the rea.l circumstance. 

Colonel W. A. Sheppard, then Corona qirector, descl:'ibed the entire 

activity as a nuisance. 

* 

Air FOrce headquarters also responded to pressures from operating 

commands by. at one point. proposing that the Air Rescue Service be 

as signed total responsibility for all retrieval operations. arising from 

satellite reentry. 

31 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

was in Alt Staff intelligence quarters a peculiar reluctance to concede 

the necessity for proving out a res .. arch and development capacity in 

advance of turning over the system to an operating command; and 

there were some indications that intelligence chiefs in the Pentagon 

suspected ARDe of deviously maneuvering to retain custody of the 

entire system for an indefinite future. As had happened before; the 

using command and its Air Staff counterpart expres sed resentment at 

the "refusal'! of the research .qnd development agency to be 'limmedlatel y 

respons lve" to operating command statements of requirements. A 

curious lack of appreCIation of the fact that Samos was at hest a high 

risk development and that it was still far removed from operational 

l~ 

readiness was ..:ommon to much of the Air Staff through early 1959. 

On the other hand, ARDC (and the higher levels of Ballistic 

System Division management) continued to support application of 

concurrency concepts to Samos development. There was no basic 

disagreement with SAC and Air Staff objectives, merely a difference 

m approach and in estimates of an operational utility date. Concurrency 

st:!emed the best posSlble compromise between the desires of the prospt'"r-tlve opt::ratmg command fur early system availability and the i11-

("one ealed convlction of sume program managers that reconnaissance 

satellites were a new breed of weapons that could not be parceled out 

in the fashion of B-29's and KC-97 Is. 

BYE 17017-74 32 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 

In the ballistic missile program, concurrency had meant 

conducting a broad front development and procurement program 

with the objective of deploying operationally usefcl missiles at the 

same time that launch sites and trained Air Force crews were 

available. Supporters of concurrency argued that no other technique 

could have carried the Atlas and Thor missiles so rapidly through 

the development and initial deployment phases. ( In fact, Thor and 

Atlas were developed sequentially and the concurrency thesis was 

largely an after-the-event invention--but that too was irrelevant.) 

In any case, the applicability of concurrency concepts to programs 

other than ballistic missile development was not universally conceded. 

The question of whether concurrency was more costly than alternate 

processes could not be resolved to the satisfaction of all partles 

because there was no comparable "conventional" effort against which 

to measure costs. One effect of concurrency, however, was to 

compress expenses into a few fiscal years, and in those years the 

costs were unquestionably greater than in other broad-scope programs 

which continued Over longer periods. Arguments that concurrency 

eventually brought lower expenditures in years after initial deployment were handicapped by the fact that all programs were funded On 

33 BYE 17f 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

a y"ar-by-year basis and that the long-term effect was of slight 

consequence to the current budget. The ballistic missile program 

was absolutely essential to national survival, a circumstance that 

no responsible official denied. But supporting a satellite reconnaissance 

program which might be quite as costly as a major missile development 

was another matter; many officials were quite skeptical of claims that 

such an effort was equally vital to survival. 

Concurrency and its funding also entered the readout versus 

recovery dispute. Given the limitations of a readout system, relatively 

large numbers of both satellites and ground stations would be required 

.to provide the reconnaissance coverage that intelligence authorities 

demanded. A successful recovery program would be much less costly. 

Fewer satellites would be required, and recovery satellite effectiveness 

was not at all dependent on the existence of expensive ground stations. 

In such terms, a recovery system, such as the E-5, had fiscal attractions independent of its technical promise. 

Many program managers had reservations about the applicability 

of concurrency concepts to any reconnaissance satellite development. 

Those officers immediately responsible for the conduct of the effort 

at BMD felt that technology still was too uncertain to support anything 

resembling a concurrent development-procurement effort intended to 

BYE 17017-74 34 

..... ":~'J,;...:. ::.e"'T",a .... /;~"?~· ye,~>~; 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TO",~~,_ 

result in the early availability of large numbers of satellite or ground 

stations in any given configuration. A breakthrough in traveling wave 

tubes. recovery techniques. camera optics. electrostatic tape technology. or any of several other areas might set the entire effort on a new 

course and make obsolete both the satellites and the expensive fixedfacility ground stations built to support them. Nevertheless, the 

official BMD policy endorsed concurrency. 

There were additional considerations of some importance--the 

I 

reluctance of other agencies to concede to the Strategic Air ComITland 

anything reseITlbling a monopoly in satellite reconnaissance operations 

and a counterpart reluctance on the part of national policy makers to 

assign ITlilitary space systeITls to a command with SAC's "militant image." 

The "peaceful uses of space" policy lurked behind almost all consideration of the subject. 

Whatever the tnerits of the various arguments, there was' general 

agreement that real progress toward a useful reconnaissance satellite 

system had been disappointingly slight in the 20 months during which 

ARPA had controlled both the policy and the technical aspects of the 

program. The Air Force rejoiced, therefore. when Secretary of 

Defense Neil McElroy, on 18 September 1959. authorized the reassignment of Samos to the Air Force. The date of transfer, however, was 

35 BYE 17 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

T ECRET 

made conditional on the submission of acceptable development and 

Z6 

opel' ational plans. 

Hopes that McElroy's decision might resolve all of the outstanding uncertainties of the Samos program_were quickly dispelled. ARPA 

influence declined promptly, and there were clear indications that the 

fiscal 1960 program would be funded at or about the "minimum requirement 

level" earlier specified by BMD, but in other areas confusion seemed to 

be compounded rather than eliminated. A revival of plans to quickly 

transform Samos into an operational system under SAC was immediate. 

Air Force headquarters issued instructions that the procurement of 

equipment which would permit operating cornrnands to assume.control 

of reconnaissance take was to be an early order of business. The Air 

Staff defined a role for the Air Photographic and Charting Service. In 

October, there was a careful discussion of SAC requests that research 

and development equipment required for the support of both ferret and 

photographic reconnaissance for Sarnos be transferred immediatel y to 

Offutt A ' F' Z7 1 ' lr orce Base. A 1 in all, 1t was apparent that much of the 

Air Force viewed the removal of the ARPA yoke as a signal for return 

to air staff control and vi gorous operational command participation in 

management of the development effort. 

Such expectations proved ill-advised. DDR&tE stepped into the 

void left by ARPA's removal and damped hopes of a large-scale 

BYE 17017-74 36 

: -,- . ~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T ECRET 

development program built around concurrency concepts. The Air 

Force was advised that "internal reprogramming" would be required 

to provide funds for Samos development. Meaningful program control 

did not return to the Air Staff. Neither did either the division or the 

command level regain full authority. Instead, effective management 

authority passed upward one echelon, from Johnson of ARPA to his 

new superior, York of DDR&E. 

Moreover, where ARPA had discouraged E-5 development and 

urged acceleration of the readout program. DDR&E swung to the 

opposite track and endorsed complete redirection of the program 

toward recovery and away from readout. BMD. which for the.first 

eight months of 1959 had contended mightily for approval of an E-5 

program, now found itself protesting against an apparent desire to 

abandon all other options. By early November, DDR&E had formally 

instructed the Air Force to emphasize and accelerate recovery subsystem 

development and to devote increased attention to problems of improved 

reliability and extended on-orbit life. BMD and Air Staff protests met 

a solid wall of resistance. Bowing to the inevitable, recognizing that 

formal transfer of Samos to custody of the Air Force was contingent 

on acceptance of the DDR&E viewpOint, the air secretariat on /) November 

agreed to incorporate the revised policy into its Samos plans. Eleven 

37 BYE 17 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

da ys later. the Secretary of Defense offi ci all y transferred Samos 

management responsibility from ARPA to the Air Force. 28 

Although the transfer agreement of November 1959 included 

a policy statement emphasizing that recovery should be pursued more 

diligently than readout, BMD continued to balk. The division protested 

that the near abandonment of readout mode development implied by 

Pentagon directions would delay availability of an early operational 

satellite reconnaissance' system by 14 to 20 months--until sometime 

during the first half of 1963. In lieu of reducing the readout effort to 

provide funds needed for acceleration of the E-5 program, BMD urged 

continuation of both the' ferret and photographic readout systems at 

their previously established rates and the provision of about $50 million 

additional in fiscal 1961 funds to support an accelerated E-5 effort. 

The Strategic Air Command, the Air Defense Command. and the 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence attempted to reinforce the BMD 

stand by insisting on the urgency of early readout system operation, 

but both the strategic and the defense commands professed inability 

to recommend program reductions in their own areas which would 

. release the required funds. At that point, the Air Force Ballistic 

Missile Committee took a hand, instructing BMD to submit a program 

that emphasized pohtography rather than ferret subsystems and which 

BYE 17017-74 38 

..... .,~". _.;;:::l -,.,.."",,/r"''''' ............. ___ •. , __ ~ • :.. _.,:" '.... ..J- • 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

clearly concentrated on recovery rather than readout data retrieval 

('9 

methods. 

One immediate consequence of the redirection was to eliminate 

some effort covered by existing contracts. Included in the termination 

package that BMD and Lockheed worked out early in December were all 

of the very advanced reado~t programs--E-3 and F-4 (a ferret package 

development comparable to the E-3 in complexity and technical uncertainty). 

Other items deleted from the basic Samos effort. though not necessarily 

from the total Air Force space technology program. included the 

development of high-energy batteries and a solar-power-source backup 

to the auxiliary electrical power system, the nuclear auxiliary power 

development (SNAP), orbit adjust subsystems for Agena. an Advanced 

Photographic Readout (APR) project (the five-foot-definition "advanced 

E-2") and the development of auxiliary retro-rockets for the E-5 capsule. 

Formal training of Air Force personnel for operational duties in Samos 

30 "squadrons" was another casualty. 

Insofar as elimination of the E-3 and continuation of the E-5 

resolved the long festering question of whether reconnaissance (as 

opposed to spot surveillance) should be based on a readout or a 

recovery mode, the redirection of November 1959 gave the total Samos 

program greater stability and solidity than it had possessed for nearly 

39 BYE 17 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

two years. But though the technological objectives of research and 

development could now be more clearly defined. as much could not 

be said for the end goal of the program. 

More than recovery versus readout was involved. though the 

apportionment of effort still was subject to change. By December 1959 

there were clear signs that the SAC-dominated planning for early 

operation of Samos would meet with strong opposition from DDR&E. 

In the view of that agency, the entire course of Sentry-Samos develupment since April 1958 had been unrealistically oriented toward an 

attempt to create an early operational capability. The Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering. Dr. York, openly cautioned the 

air secretariat in early December 1959 that "such efforts would 

inevitably interfere with the research and development program and 

have the effect of delaying the overall program." York said frankly 

that in his opinion Samos had been "confused and slowed down" by 

concentration on operational requirements well before the actual 

capabilityof the system had been established in a development form. 

He urged that. funds ~cheduled for operational aspects of the Samos 

program be withheld. that the Air Force cancel its plans to train 

operational personnel, to acquire land and facilities, to construct 

expensive data links, to build operational launch sites, and to provide 

BYE 17017-74 40 

H"'~" c_ ~ -.... ;:.'1"a'" /-,~;:.,... -- . . _. - ,~ -

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

"equipment" required to process the Research and Development outputs 

in an attempt to provide operational warning. 

It was also clear that York entertained strong doubts about the 

technical validity and the emphasis on the readout approach then supported 

by the Ballistic Missile Division and the Air Staff in general. He favored 

increasing effort on the E- 5 because of its probable edge in feasibilityand reliability over the E-2.. and he urged that the development of 

Subsystem I (the ground processing and dissemination system) be 

curtailed because of its alignment with systems and products that did 

not then exist--and which might well prove impossible to develop. 31 

If the Air Research and Dt.:velopment Command, the major 

operating commands, and most of the Air Staff seemed little impressed 

with arguments against either readout or the concurrency-early operation 

thesis, it was also evident that Assistant Secretary Charyk was sympathetil. to the DDR&zE viewpoint. Moreover. by early December it was 

apparent that return of Samos to Air Force management channels did 

not by any means imply a reversion to IIconventional" proce s ses of 

review and approval at successive echelons. induding the air staff. 

before programs were scrutinized at the secretarial level. On 

2. December. Charyk countermanded instructions that would have 

sent the pending Samos development plan directly through the air staff 

41 BYE 17f 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 

and the ballistic missile committee on its way to "final approval" by 

DDR&E. He specified his intention of reviewing preliminary plans 

and of issuing specific instructions concerning their content before 

" " 32 they were submitted for flnal approval. 

Taking cognizance of negotiations. presentations. and policy 

guidance statements that continued through much of December 1959 

and January 1960, BMD on 30 January submitted a revised development 

plan that nominally conformed to the general outline of DDR&E instruchons but which somewhat surprisingly retained major elements of the 

earlier approach. In essence, BMD had grafted a 7-flight E-5 program 

to the earlier is-flight readout and ferret program. Eleven of the lS 

flights were programmed for E-l and E-2 subsystems. Moreover. 

concurrency, early operation, and Subsystem I were prominent in the 

operational annex. 

Notwithstanding the content and implication of the 30 January 

plan. Air Staff confidence in the probability of securing funds to continue 

support of the readout "and concurrency aspects of Samos had been shaken. 

Events of February tended to confirm doubts that the plan would be 

approved. Although the Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee on 

15 February approved both the research and development program and 

the development-operation program proposal, defense secretariat 

BYE 17017-14 42 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

SECRET 

reviewers withheld authority to proceed with anything more than the 

minimum research and development effort. For the moment, BMD 

was authorized to continue along the lines of the proposed research 

and development schedules, but a final and formal funds authorization 

did not etnerge from the Pentagon dl,lring February. 

Marshalling arguments to support its stand, the air staff in 

mid-March concluded that unwarranted confidence in Corona was 

partly to blame for the failure of DDR&E to endorse the "early operational" 

Samos program. Some $60 million was needed in fiscal 1960 to proceed 

with plans for a readout complex that presumably would, in conjunction 

with the E-Z, fill the gap between the U-Z program, with its range limitations, and the actual need. In the light of the current uncertainty 

concerning Corona prospects, it seemed to the air staff that a case 

might be made for substituting the Samos readout system for an extended 

Corona effort. An analytical comparison between Corona and Samos 

might aid Air Force objectives, although the air staff conceded th,at by 

all available indicators York and his deputies would continue to oppose 

the authorization of "initial operational capability funds. ,,33 

Dr. Charyk, who had escorted the 30 January plan through most 

of its Pentagon review, on 18 February asked York to approve its research 

and development elements. York's response, delayed until mid-March, 

expressed the conviction that expanding the program by stacking on 

43 

~ BYE 17' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

recovery subsystem flights was an insufficient reorientation. Not until 

ZO April did he issue a formal ruling, and then it consisted of another 

of the familiar "in principle" approvals that had marked Samos progress 

for more than two years. 

Even more firmly than had been the case in December, Dr. York 

brought -into focus the anti-concurrency, anti-readout arguments that 

had begun to appear more than a year earlier. He insisted that answers 

to questions of technical feasibility might well have been available by 

early 1960 if program managers had not channeled their attention toward 

considerations of operational facilities and hardware procurement. He 

wanted a halt to the expenditure of funds on "operational aspects"--and 

by the phrase he meant personnel training, technical operations centers, 

multiple readout stations, operational launching facilities, and virtually 

all of Subs ystem I. The difference between this and earlier statements 

of the same tenor was that Dr. York was now in a position to enforce 

his desires; DDR&E held the purse strings! The program was approved 

at a research and development funds level of $159.5 million for fiscal 

1960 (the fiscal year had only 10 weeks to run, but it had been operating 

since December 1959 on a "programmed" but unapproved level identical 

to that approved in April) and $189.9 million for fiscal 1961. The 1961 

total represented a reduction of $10.1 million in the amount requested 

44 

~ BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

ECRET 

through the 30 January development plan, with the reduction to be 

concentrated in visual and ferret readout developments. Funds needed 

to support "concurrency concepts" had been detailed ln the operational 

34 

annex; they were not approved. 

Less than two weeks after Dr. York had in effect denounced the 

previous conduct of the Samos program, Soviet anti-aircraft rockets 

shot down Francis Gary Powers, his U-2, and the only existent overflight program that was actually returning intelligence information. 

Samos was completely overhauled in the succeeding six months. By 

November of 1960 it bore virtually no resemblance to the approved 

program of April. In many respects, that reorganization was rightly 

attributed to the effects of the 1 May incident, the U-Z affair. But it 

was impos sible to escape the conclusion that Samos would have taken 

something of its later direction as a consequence of the York directive 

of 20 April, whatever the course of international events. 

Certain facts and conditions were clear in April. [he BMO 

viewpoint--continued emphasis on readout and continuation of lfconcurrencyll 

principles in program management--had remained the most prominent 

element of each development plan presented to the Pentagon even though 

clear instructions to reorient the development toward a recoverY-Inode 

effort had been issued as early as November 1959. York and Char.yk 

45 BYE 17 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

could quite honestly complain that program management had not been 

responsive to guidance from air secretariat-defense secretariat 

level. Whether justified or not, York was convinced that an Au 

R"search and Development Command fixation with concurrency _-oncepts 

was responsible for much of the programming difficulty uf the preceding 

two years. 

It was also apparent by April that Charyk, who had succeeded 

to the' post of Air Force Undersecretary in February, was disillusioned 

with the "conventional" processes of program managemellt. Starting 

In December 1959, he had personally shepherded progrdTn proposals 

'In which he had les s than full confidence through the "routine" revi,.w 

and approval echelons--only to discover at the end of the long road 

that his efforts had been barren. 

In such an environment, both concurrency and readou~ were 

certain to be the targets of a major program reorientation. U the 

U -2 incident was immediately responsible for a significant program 

acceleration and expansion. experience of the preceding 18 months 

had to share responsibility for the direction of program reorientation 

and for the fact that the management structure as well as the technical 

objective was reshaped. 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. WDD Dev Plan. WS 117L Advanced Reconnaissance System, 

2. Apr 56. 

2. Presn, "New Horizon, " Summary of dev concepts and status of 

117L progm, prep by LMSD, 1 Mar 58, cy in SP Samos files. 

3. RAND Rpt RM-1811, "Physical Recovery of Satellite Payloads--

A Preliminary Investigation, " 26 Jun 56, in SP' Samos files. 

4. Interviews, Col W. G. King, 19 Dec 62, and Col R.A. Berg, 

16 Apr 63, by R. L. Perry. 

5. RAND Rpt RM-Z012. An Early Reconnaissance Satellite System. 

12 Nov 57 and a revision, A Family of Recoverable Reconnaissance 

Satellites, same code and date. 

6. Memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, Asst for WS 117L. to Col C.H. Terhune, 

D/Cmdr Weap Sys, BMD, 3 Mar 58, subj: Differences between 

117L Thor and Atlas Launched Programs. in Terhune files, 

ARS 57-58, SSD Hist Div. 

7. The "suggestions" were contained in single sentences of thick 

volumes. In the I Jul 58 plan. the sentence read: "To obtain 

intelligence earlier than previousl y scheduled, provide an 

interim system containing a detachable capsule which may be 

commanded (or programmed) to return with stored inteLligence 

to an area from where it may be physically recovered." See 

BMD Dev Plan, ARS (WS 117LI. I Jul 58, in SP Samos files. 

B. Ibid. 

9. Rpt, "New Horizons, " prep by LMSD for WDD, 1 Mar 58, in 

Samos files. 

10. The explanation and illustration are drawn from a composite of 

sources including discussions involving MajGen R.E. Greer. 

Cols J. W. Ruebel and R.A. Berg, LtCol V.M. Genez, and 

Capt L.G. Neuner; an undated paper in Gen Greer's files titled 

47 

~T BYE I" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

"Anatomy of Readout" (probably prepared Dec (2); an unclassified Rand study by A. H. Katz. Observation Satellites ..•• 

25 May 59; and Utility Tech Manual, "Samos Agena B Satellites 

and Reconnaissance" on the worth of readout as well as on the 

worth and real significance of the variously noted technical 

obstacles to readout. The arithmetical factors, happil V, were 

subject to fewer varieties of interpretation than were the philosophical advantages and disadvantages. 

11. GOR 80, revised 26 Sep 58. 

12. Folder, ARPA Briefing, 16 Dec 58, in SP Samos files. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Memo, W.A. Tidwell (CIA), Chm, 'IAC Ad Hoc Comm on Commun, 

to Chm, Intel Advisory Comm. 29 Apr 58. subj: Report of Ad Hoc 

Committee on Communications, in Samos files, R&tD-l Hist Docum; 

memo, CaptR.C. Truax, USN. Mil Asst to Dir/ARPA. toR.W. 

Johnson. Dir/ARPA. 15 Sep 58, subj: WS U7L Requirements Review. 

in Corona files; ARPA Order 41-59. 7 Nov 58; memo, R. E. Horner, 

Asst SAF(R&tD), to SAFUS, 3 Dec 58, subj: 117L Program Content 

Problems, same file; memo, R. W. lohnson, Dir/ARPA, to SAFUS, 

4 Dec 58, subj: WS-1l7L Program, Sheppard files; memo, Johnson 

to SAFUS, 17 Dec 58, subj: Reorientation of SENTR Y Program, in 

Samos file, Hist Docm '58. 

15. Memo, Johnson to SAFUS, 17 Dec 58; Dev Plan, Sentry Space 

System. 30 Jan 59, prep by BMD. in Samos files. 

16. Amend 10 to ARPA Order 9-58, 3 Apr 59; Amend 1 to ARPA Order 

48-59, Amend 8 to ARPA Order 9-59, Amend 1 to ARPA Order 38-59, 

aUt6 Feb 59; msg 0432, Col W.A. Sheppard, Dir/Corona progm, 

to R. M. Bissell, CIA. 30 Mar 59. in Corona files; TWX WDZW-5-31-' 

AFBMD to ARDC 28 May 59, in SSD Hist Div files, Sentry, '59. 

17. Lockheed officials admitted to MajOen R.E. Greer in 1901 that both 

the spaciousness and the pressurization features of the E-5 capsule 

had been influenced as much by the notion of adapting it to a man-inspace mission as by basic camera environment requirements. 

BYE 17017-74 

Col W.O. King, program director at the time the E-5 configuration 

was approved, had doubts that capsule habitation had been a major 

48 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
factor in the design. Neither viewpoint is reflected in contemporary documentation, but there is general agreement that both 

ARPA and high Air Force officials favored a man-in-space program 

under Air Force auspices. Presumably by Air Force direction, 

Lockheed submitted a ''Sentry MIS" configuration for consideration 

tate in 1958, and it bore a remarkable resemblance to the later 

(1959) E-5 design. As early as October 1958, "special" ARPA 

technical groups were reviewing and redirecting the details of 

Sentry ''Hardware, " and were in some instances dealing directly 

with the contractor. Lockheed, in its turn, regularly exercised 

its precedent-endorsed privilege of making independent approaches 

to various offices in the Pentagon. On balance, therefore, motive, 

opportunity, and outcome support the conclusion that the E-5 design 

was indeed influenced, if not dominated, by man-in-space considerations that had little relevance to satellite reconnaissance requirements. 

Interviews. MajGen R.E. Greer, 4 Mar 63, Col W.G. King, 11 Mar 63, 

and LtC01 John Piet:r., 11 Mar 63, by R. L. Perry. Hist Div; projection slides. Oct, Dec 1958, prep by LAC, in SP Samos files, 

slide box Ill. 

18. Memo, R. W. Johnson, Dir/ARPA, to SAF. Z5 May 59, subj: 

ARPA Order No 9- 58. SENTRY Project, in USAF Mis and Sat 

Die files, Samos 59; TWX WDZW-S-'31. BMD to USAF, 28 May 59; 

TWX AFSAT 5;Wn. USAF to ARDC and BMD. 5 Jun 59 and WDZW 

6-6-E, BMD to USAF, 8 Jun 59, same file; TWX DEF 961412, 

ARPA to ARDC. 24 Jun 59, in SSD Hist Div files, ARS 59; TWX 

RDGZWC-31-7-38E, ARDC to BMD, 31 Jul 59, in SP Samos files. 

Hist Docum. 59; ltr. LtGen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr ARDC. to 

C IS USAF. 1 Aug 59. no subj. in USAF Mis and Sat Sys Ofe files. 

19. Ltr, Maj Gen O. J. Ritland, Cmdr BMD. to CIS USAF, 18 Jul 59. 

subj: Transmittal of Development Plans, in USAF Mis and Sat Sys 

Ofc files; ltr, Schriever to CIS USAF, 1 Aug 59. 

20. Ltr, MajGen H.A. Watson. D/Asst CS/lntel, to Dir/Adv Tech, 

USAF, 7 Aug, 59. subj: Intelligence Requirements for High Resolution Photography. in US AF Mis and Sat Sys Ofc files; presn. 

LMSD,to BMD, 27 Jan 60, slides in SP Samos files, Box 113; 

LMSD Rpt, Sentry Program E-3 Reconnaissance, 29 Jul 59, 

in Samos files. 

49 

BYE 1" 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
21. 

2Z. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP ET 

Memo, J. V. Charyk, Asst SAF (R&D), to DDR&E, 26 Aug 59. 

subj: FY 1960 ARPA Program; TWX DEF 964914, ARPA to SAF, 

4 Sep 59; TWX DEF 965117, ARPA to SAF, 9 Sep 59, all in 

USAF Samos files. 

Ltr, LtGen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr ARDC. to Gen T. D. White, 

C!S USAF, 15 Sep 59. no subj. in USAF Samos files. 

Ltr, Gen C. E. LeMay, VCS USAF. to CinC SAC, 5 Aug 59, 

subj: Assignment of Operational Planning Responsibility. in 

SSD Hist Div files; Dev Plan, Samos R&D Program, 11 Aug 60; 

TWX AFDAT 89855.' USAF to ARDe, 11 Nov 59, in SP Samos files. 

Memo, Col W.A. Sheppard, Spec Asst. to MajGen B.A. Schriever, 

Cmdr AFBMD, 20 Jan 59. subj: Corona Program Report. in 

Corona files; TWX AFCGM TS 3665. USAF to ARDC, 5 Feb 59, 

in SP Samos files, Hist Docmn 59; msg 0267, Sheppard, Dir! 

Corona, to R.M. Bissell, CIA. 30 Dec 58. Corona files; msg 

0394 Sheppard to CIA, 21 Mar 59; 0455, Sheppard to G. Kucera, 

CIA, 3 Apr 59; 0738, Col F. C. E. Oder, BMD. to Bissell, 

6 Aug 59, all in'Corona files. 

Ltr, Col R. J. Quinn, Dir lIntel and Electronic Warfare, ARDC, 

to Col H.L. Evans, DirlSentry Proj Ok, 11 Feb 59, no subj. 

and incls (notes on conf with AFCIN staff); TWX RDZAA-26-5-Z-E, 

ARDC to BMD. 26 May 59, both in SP Samos files, Hist Docmn 59. 

Memo, Neil McElroy. SoD, to Chm JCS, 18 Sep 59, subj: 

Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations, in USAF 

Samos files. 

TWX ASDA 85267. USAF to BMD, 23 Oct 59; Itr, MajGen M.A. 

Preston, Dir!Ops, DCS/Ops. USAF to Air Photographic and 

Charting Serv, 21 Oct 59, subj: ACrC Participation in SAMOS, 

in SP Samos files, Hist Docrnn 59. 

TWX AFC 78900, USAF to AFBMD, Z Oct 59; Itr, Col J. L. 

Martin, D/Dir Adv Tech, to DCS/D USAF, 2 Nov 59. subj: 

Samos memo for Record, Maj H.C. Howard, Ofc of Dir/Adv 

Tech, 6 Nov 59, subj: SAMOS. MIDAS. and DISCOVERER Programs; 

TWX AFC 1328/59, USAF to all maj cmds. 12 Nov 59; memo, 

50 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T ECRET 

J .H. Douglas. SAF. to SoD. 6 Nov 59, subj: Transfer of the 

SAMOS Development Program to the Department of the Air 

Force; memo, T .S. Gates, SoD, to SAF, 17 Nov 59, same 

subj; all in Hq USAF Samos file. 

Z9. TWX WDZF-1l-6-E, BMD to USAF. 17 Nov 59; Draft Dev Plan, 

Samos. prep by BMD, 1 Dec 59; Min of 4Znd AFBMC Mtg. 

14 Dec 59; TWX VC 5540, D/Cmdr SAC to VCS USAF. 16 Dec 59: 

ltr. MajGen J .H. Walsh, ACS/I. to DeS/D. USAF, Zl Dec 59, 

subj: SAMOS; TWX 98Z19, ves USAF to CinC SAC, Z1 Dec 59; 

TWX ADLPD-D-l •. ADC to USAF. 4 Jan 60; TWX AFC 61416, 

USAF to ADC. 7 Jan 60; TWX VC OZ06. SAC to VCS USAF. 

9 Jan 60. all in USAF Samos files. 

30. TWX LBZJ-1l-15-E, BMC to LAC, 19 Nov 59; Itr, LtCol R. W. 

. 31. 

3Z. 

Yundt, DI Dir Samos, to BMC, 6 Jan 60, subj: Letter Contract 

AF AF 04(647)-347, Direction of Samos Effort; ltr, C.A. Devine, 

LAC, to BMG (E.S. Silberman). 3 Dec 59. same subj. all in 

SP Sarnos files. Redirection, '60. 

Memo. H. F. York. DDRI!.tE. to SAF. 7 Dec 59. subj: Intelligence 

System SAMOS. in SP Samos file. Hist Docmn 59. 

Memo. J. V. Charyk. SAFUS, to DeS/D, Z Dec 59, subj; 

DISCOVERER. SAMOS. and MIDAS; TWX AFDAT 95614. 

USAF to BMD. 7 Dec 59, both in USAF Sat Pr9gm files. 

33. Draft memo for SAF dispatch to SoD, prep by DCSID USAF, 

11 Mar 60. in Corona files. 

34. Memo. H. F. York, DDRI!.tE. to SAF. ZO Apr 60. subj; SAMOS, 

MIDAS and DISCOVERER Research and Development Programs 

and Development/Operational Plans for SAMOS and MIDAS 

Programs; draft memo, York to SAF, undated [approx 17 Apr 601. 

subj: Intelligence System SAMOS, both in OSAF file; Sat Progms; 

draft memo, York to SAF, undated, [approx 17 Mar 601. subj: 

SAMOS. MIDAS and DISCOVERER Research and Development 

and Development/Operational Plans for SAMOS and MIDAS 

Programs. same file. 

51 BYE 17' 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

V SAMOS: REALIGNMENT CONTROVERSY (1960) 

The U-2 that on 1 May 1960 failed to complete an overilight 

from Pakistan to Norway was one of many vehicles of several kinds 

that had passed over some part of the Soviet Union, cameras and 

recorders operating, since the beginning of the cold war. It was, 

however, the first manned aircraft to come down so intact and so 

far iniand that cover stories became incredible. Within three days, 

after various spokesmen for the United States had issued a succession 

of contradictory statements about the aircraft and its purported 

mission, it became known that both the U-G and its surprisingly 

communicative pilot, neither much damaged, had fallen into Russian 

hands. 

Although the President did not cancel the overflight program 

.=E. ~. he ruled that the U-G overflights of Soviet territ;'ry were to 

be suspended until further notice. He also as surned unqualified 

personal responsibility for the overflight decision and acknowledged 

that covert reconnaissance was a cornerstone of United States security 

policy. The counterplay of motives was impossibly intricate. ranging 

from a Presidential election campaign that was rapidly becoming more 

intense to an impending summit meeting and possible rapproachement 

with the Soviet Union. 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Reaction in the United States ranged from Vice President 

Richard Nixon1s l'hard linell statement that the flights would be 

resumed later, to the unpreceptive comments of several politicians 

and many newspapers that overflight was an inherent threat to world 

peace. Nikolai Khrushchev, the head of Soviet government, used 

the incident as an excuse to wreck the summit meeting. The British, 

French. and West Germans maintained an embarrassed official silence 

but let it be known that they thought it both naive and gauche of a head 

of state to acknowledge his role in espionage. Communist bloc nations 

made enormous propaganda capital of the epis ode, with telling effect 

on neutrals. The hostility of world opinion. the nervousnes s of NATO 

allies (who appeared considerably less worried about the fact of over· 

flight than by United States' handling of the consequences), the violence 

of Soviet reaction, and the domestic sensitivity of the question during 

an election campaign combined to insure against resumption of U-2 

flights over Russia. * 

In many respects. the timing of the U-2 affair was even more 

unfortunate for the satellite reconnaissance program than for either 

They had not been resumed 10 years later, mostly because the August 

1960 success of Corona and the 196~ success of Gambit made resumption 

11t' moot question. 

53 BYE 1701 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

domestic or international politics. Corona had as yet produced no 

photography. In tht:: face of a solidifying secretariat-level judgment 

that the Air Force was mismanaging Samos, that S8 rvice stubbornly 

persisted in attempts to seCure funds for an extremely costly and 

technically weak program that was unwisely based On the prernis(' of 

cone urrent development and .deployment. Moreover. the Air Force 

had so completely relaxed earlier strictures on Samos publicity that 

the objectives. general time scale. and broad capabilities of the 

developmental systems were widely known. Tensions could not be 

relaxed by publicizing a new overflight technique to replace a discredited covert methodology. 

Even before the U-2 affair worked its effect in mid-1960. 

mas sive disem.:hantITlent with the Air Force viewpoint was common to 

the paneled offices along the Potomac face of the Pentagon. In March, 

the Air Staff had ur ged the Secretary of the Air Force to advise the 

Secretary of Defense that "the change of emphasis in development of 

resolution from 100 feet to 2. 0 feet to 5 feet and from recover y to 

readout then back to recovery ••. has resulted in an indefinite 

postponement of a target date for operational readines s of an electronic:: 

readout system. 11 and that the continued failure of the Coro~ prograITl 

Justified a vastly expand~d Samos effort. But again the empha~is was 

BYE 17017-74 54 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 

on a "conventional" effort aimed at early employment of the satellite 

by the Strategic Air Command. The implication that the Air Staff 

was attempting to exploit recurrent failures of Corona rnisslOns to 

. J the advantage of Samos wa. unmlstakable. 

Even before the U-2 incident brought reconnaissance needs 

into sharper focus, DDR&E and Undersecretary Charyk had explicitly 

rejected the Air Staff viewpoint. Continued Air Force advocacy of 

a politically dangerous. technically risky, and very costly approach 

chiefly served to convince pollcy level DoD officials that the Air Staff 

was incapable of appreciating the realities of the situation. 

At the working level- -in the Samos project office--there was 

keen awareness of the impossible situation into whiCh the Air Force 

was edging itself. Through the early months of 1960, the project 

offic e chief (Colonel W. G. King) frequent! y protested that attempts 

to build concurrency into the program and to construct an elaborate 

logistiC complex in support of the satellite effort were unwise. King 

at one point told his chief, Colonel F. C. E. Oder, that he believed 

the Air Force had been deliberately obstructionist in failing to comply 

with clearly stated secretarial guidance on Samos. 2 

Senior members of the Air Staff and chiefs of the major air 

commands were gravely concerned by the decision to end U-2 

55 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
overflights and by the apparenUy slight prospect of obtaining an early 

substitute. Views on Corona ranged from troubled uncertainty to 

frank hostility. In more than a year of trying, the program had yet 

failed to return a single capsule safely, much less to provide reconnaissance information. Both those who knew of Corona and doubted, 

and those innocent of Corona knowledge. concluded that it was vital 

"to expedite and to develop fully the pre-operational photographic 

potential of Project SAMOS." On 9 May 1960, a week after the U-2 

incident surfaced, that became at least a semi-official Air Staff 

position. One week later. following a lengthy meeting that involved 

Dr. Charyk, General Schriever, and Lieutenant General R. C. Wilson 

(Deputy Chief of Staff, Development), a formal directive embodying 

3 

that philosophy went to ARDC. 

The implications of that stand, and its rationale. were both 

clear. All concerned unquestioningly accepted the premise that overflight was essential to U.S. security. A principal object of the U-2 

operations of 1959 and 1960 had been to determine the extent of 

deployment of Soviet intercontinental missiles and, if possible, their 

locations. Khrushchev and other Russian spokesmen had been boasting 

of a Soviet intercontinental mis sile capability for many months. The 

evidence of Russian missile test operations and satellite sUCCesses 

BYE 17017-74 56 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

appeared to support those claims. The United States. in early 1960, 

had deployed small numbers of Atlas missiles and somewhat larger 

numbers of Thor and Jupiter intermediate·range missiles (in Britain, 

Italy and Turkey). The Atlas, however highly touted in press releases. 

was at the time a singularly unreliable weapon of uncertain accuracy_ 

Atlas missiles could not be. quickly launched. the odds were against 

their functioning correctly if launched. and until launch they were 

susceptible to damage from virtually any nearby nuclear explosion. 

Thor and Jupiter were not much better technically. and were in 

exposed sites witbin easy range of Soviet bombers. Intelligence e8timates credited the Russians with baving more and better intercontinental 

ballistic missiles deployed over a broad expanse of Soviet territory. 

precise locations unknown. Nine succes sive attempts to obtain relevant 

information by using Corona had failed. The only other existent capability. U -2. had been negated by the effects of the Powers affair. 

Completion of the extremely elaborate Samos plan adopted in 1959 

could not be anticipated before 1961 or 1962 at the earliest. Immediate 

and effective action of some sort therefore seem.ed essential. * 

* It is extremely important to view these events in the perspective of 

the time. The existence of a real Soviet intercontinental missile 

capability was generally accepted. as was Soviet willingness to . 

resort to nuclear attack. 

57 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

BYE 1701" 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

In many respects, the 

~ reaction of May 1960 resembled the 

furor of activity that followed the first Sputnik of October 1957. The 

emphasis lay on "maximum acceleration" of the program. with 

particular attention to "those aspects which offer a pre-operational 

intelligence return. ,,4 There was no apparent change of heart concerning operational concepts or concurrency, however, merely a suggestion 

that more money might be forthcoming. Since virtually all of the funds 

requested for research and development had been earlier approved, 

the implied goal of the p,!,ogram acceleration was to obtain previously 

denied funds for operational installations. 

Colonel King. who had been connected with the Samos program 

in some role virtually since its inception. had strong reservations 

about the wisdom of any sudden spending splurge. whatever its motivation. In a thoughtful resume of program achievements and prospects. 

he noted that after four years of effort and the expenditure of nearly 

$750 million it seemed somewhat unrealistic to consider that establishing 

new programs would insure early reconnaissance coverage of the Soviet 

Union. He held that the rapid solution of fundamental technical problems 

was the real key to "obtaining intelligence at an early date." Increased 

depth and flexibility in existing programs seemed to offer the best 

prospect for program success. Having experienced the frenz.y of the 

BYE 17017-74 58 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

1957 period. King was cautlUus about "substituting the gross optimism 

that accompanies new programs for the cold realism of eXisting 

programs." He was particularly disturbed about the widening gap 

between the Air Force and DDR&E viewpolnts, particularly as they 

concerned operational plans. concurrency, and Subsystem 1. 

King urged several specific measures to improve the situation 

of the Samos program: (1) divorce the "classical operation. logistic, 

and similar considerations from the program now" (Le •• forget concurrency, cancel S'lbsystem I, eliminate operational-base programs); 

(2) remove the administrative handicaps which had inhibited program 

progress (i.e., create'a clear and direct decision-action channel); 

(3) add a "back-up" recovery system and a new camera to the total 

program; (4) consider let ting a new contract with some firm other 

than Lockheed: (5) expand ground testing activity; (6) examine alternate 

teChniques of data retrieval, both for readout and recovery; (7) -expand 

the test program by addmg more launches to the schedule; (8) provide 

some means of determining Soviet weather in advance of photo missions; 

(9) re-examine both the basic Thor and the thrust-augmented Thor in 

combination with Agena stages as avenues to improved reliability and 

lower costs; and (lO) increase the emphasis on land recovery techniques" 5 

59 

~ BYE 1701" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Precisely the same problems were disturbing Undersecretary 

Charyk. who wrote General White late in May that the entire matter 

of operational command responsibilities. operational facilities. and 

the relationship between the operator of Samos and the data-using 

agencies still was a subject of "considerable discussion" in the defense 

secretariat. Charyk suggested that there was "some reason to believe 

that recovery rather thaI'. readout may well turn out to be the primary 

means for satisfying the bulk of the operational requirements." He 

noted that ground facility requirements would be "enormously simpler 

than if complete reliance is placed on readout." In Charyk's opinion, 

Subsystem I had been "greatly overengineered •• lIb On 2.7 May he 

acted on those views. instructing ARDC to provide for parallel testing 

of recovery and readout modes and explicitly directing that ARDC reevaluate the USe of off-the-shelf photographic equipment, or items in 

an advanced stage of development, as a means of acceleratlng recoverymode flight schedules. Probably most significant, he directed that the 

E-5 recovery system get first priority in flight test. rather than the 

E-l and E-2 readout systems, and that the F-subsystems (ferret) be 

further de-emphasized. Finally, he ordered that no more than a 

lninimum capability for processing operational take be provided, with 

construction or purchase of ground equipment and facilities to be 

7 reduced to the lowest possible level. 

BYE 17017-74 60 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

Early in June it began to appear that the resolution of Samos 

program uncertainties might be taken entirely out of AH Force hands. 

On the 6th of that month, Dr. H. F. York (Director of Defense Research 

and Engineering) instructed Charyk to submit Air Force recommendations 

on Sam<Js program revision to DDR&.E by the first week of July. York 

had been asked by the National Security Coucil how to accelerate the 

11 < < 8 sate lte reconnalssance program. 

On 10 June, President Eisenhower formally instructed Secretary 

of Defense Gates to conduct an intensive analysis of the "scope, basis 

and feasibility of our reconnaissance satellite projects." The National 

Security Council, Eisenhower added, would be concerned not merely 

with the technical aspects of the program but also with the proces$ for 

establishing reqllirements, the requirements themselves, the "effectiveness of control over the scope and characteristics of the operational 

system, " and related topics. I Eisenhower's anxiety about the implicahons of assigning operational responsibility for overflight reconnaissance 

was obvious. He, and '>y implication the other members of the National 

Security Council, were gravely concerned about the international 

repercussions. ) 

The President's lnstructions eventually involved Charyk, Dr. 

John Rubel (York's deputy), and Dr. George Kistiakowsky (the President', 

61 BYE 170 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRE'I' 

special assistant for science and technology) in preparing a joint 

response to the National Security Council. But before they could 

so much as open their inquiry, the Senate Appropriations Committee 

added $83 million to the fiscal 1961 Samos budget and publicly characterized the program as "a matter of national emergency!! which 

should Hmove forward as rapidly as possible." Lyndon B. Johnson, 

Senate majority leader and a strong contender for the Democratic 

9 

pres idential nomination, began to urge a "crash programll for S amos. 

Most of the proposals thus far presented irnplied program 

acceleration by funding expansion. even though modification of Samos 

technical objectives had been suggested. Beginning in early June, 

increasingly frequent alternative proposals were voiced. all stemming 

from the premis e that the existent Air Force program structure was 

incapable of carrying the Samos project to a succes stu! conclusion in 

a reasonable time. Mistrust of Air Force motives and ability was 

particularly pronounced in discussions involving the Army and the Navy. 

The most forthright statement of opposition to Air Force 

concepts was contained in a special study prepared under DDR&E 

auspices early in June. Its author, Dr. B. H. Billings, * having 

Various presentations of the Billings study continued through July. but 

the core of the recommendations was available as early:as 6 June 1960 

in the Pentagon, and had reached the West Coast by 13 June. 

BYE 17017-74 62 

, ' p TOP SEGRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

examined the current status, the past history, and the prospects 

of the Samos program, recommended radical changes. He flatly 

urged cancellation of the entire readout program, carrying the E-2 

only to the stage of a technical feasibility demonstration. Billings 

maintained that the E- 2 was not competitive with other conceivable 

reconnaissance systems because of its data link limitations, the 

impossibility of uSing it for oblique shots, and its inherent shortcomings when used at high latitudes and in a region of heavy cloud 

cover. He also carne down hard on the E-5 recovery system, pointing 

out that it was too complex and that a simpler technique would probably 

give a better prospect 01 reliable operation. 

Billings concluded that the Air Force concept of Samos operation 

was entirely wron~. He argued that it would be a grave error to make 

the Strategic Air Command the proprietor of the system. In Billings 1 

view, Samos was essentially a pre-strike reconnaissance device and 

as such should be assigned to a joint intelligence center of some sort. 

The need, Billings pointed out, was for a national intelligence capability, not for another SAC system. The Strategic Air Command 

needed targeting information, not raw, unevaluated data. Moreover, 

Dr. Billings could see no need for the construction of special processing 

facilities, noting that the existent structure was expandable at considerably 

63 BYE 170' 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

less cost, and with a promise of being substantially more flexible. 

In Billings I opinion. Samos was headed down the wrong path. 

He was convinced that a recoverable surveiUance system. one that 

provided. broad area coverage with ground definition of 50-foot objects I 

was needed to supplement the reconnaissance potential of the E-S. 

He also made the point that system operating costs would be very 

s ubstantiall y reduced. perhaps by several hundred million dollars a 

year, through the substitution of a recoverable satellite for the readout 

system of the E-Z. * And by implication he expressed doubt that the 

existent Air Force structure was capable of managing the necessary 

't' f t ll' . 10 t1'an51 10n to a new concept 0 sa e lte 1'ecOnnalSsance. 

The philosophy implicit in the Billings I study represented 

little that was novel or unique. For weeks, York and Charyk had 

been increasingl y critical of Air Force management of Samos. The 

continued emphasis on concurrency and on early turnover to the 

Strategic Air Conunand was contrary 'to Department of Defense 

:(: 

In the opinion of Colonel W. G. King. then Samos Project Director, 

Billings was more influential than any other individual in prompting 

the demise of the readout mode. It is worthy of note. howeve r. that 

Colonel King and certain of his project officers had been dubious about 

the long ... term worth of available readout systems for some time and 

had made themselves quite unpopular in some quarters by insisting 

that Corona represented the proper approach to satellite reconnais sance. 

BYE 1'701'7-74 64 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

policies stated in late 1959 and frequently reiterated thereafter. In 

six months of directed reprogramming activity, the Air Force had 

yet to produce a development plan acceptable to secretariat-level 

policy makers. 

Even the most radical of the Billings suggestions, that Samos 

develop=ent be assigned to some "super agency" for management, 

was in many respects no more than a logical extension of established 

trends. The development of virtually all high-risk systems of the 

previous two decades had been "managed by exception" to some degree. 

The B-29 program of 1940-1944 had set a pattern in having special 

priorities and access to the highest decision levels. The Manhattan 

Engineering District of World War II had carried that process to its 

greatest limits. "Invention" of the "single prime contractor concept" 

in 1951, and its quick evolution into the "weapon system concept, " 

together with the creation of "weapon system project offices" after 

1951, had been motivated by a desire to cut through several review 

and approval layers in the existent decision process. General Schriever's 

Western Development Division of 1954-1955 had been created with a 

single system objective as its goal and with provisions for abbreviating 

the decision process in order to insure early success. The more recent 

example of the Polaris missile was at hand. Indeed. in some ways 

Schriever had attempted to build the "management by exception" theology 

65 BYE 17011 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

~T into the whole of the Air Research and Development Com:mand structure 

during a 1959 reorganization, though he channeled the communication 

and decision lines through his own headquarters rather than the Pentagon. 

Strong suggestions that the methodology of Samos development 

might undergo a change were paraUeled by a significant shift in the 

basic objective of the satellite reconnaissance program. On 5 July 

1960, the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) issued a revised set 

of requirements based on the premise that national interest required 

the development of "an operational satellite reconnaissance system 

with a wide range of capabilities." USIB considered the "first and 

most urgent priority requiretnent" to be "a photographic reconnaissance 

system capable of locating suspect ICBM sites." Recommending a 

system with a ZO-foot ground resolution potential, the board urged 

that the development program be oriented toward completion of 

11 

development by the end of 196Z. 

The new requirements statement was considerably more 

meaningful than it seemed at first glance. It completely reversed 

1955 and 1958 policy statements on the prime goal of satellite reconnaissance, and in so doing virtually doomed the readout program. There 

was no feasible way of exploiting current readout systems to provide 

both the resolution and the area coverage implied in the new requirements. 

BYE 17017-74 

ha-:: ~ J.a 5;rernan/73:er<· Kev"':Jie 

-::': - " -: ;:, (,"" 

66 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Reconnaissance. which differed from tlsurveillance" in that it involved 

scanning broad land areas, could not in practice rely on a readout 

system capable of returning only 50 or 60 individual photographs 

each day. Gross coverage. in relatively fine detail, was an obvious 

essential. and gross coverage was quite beyond the potential of the 

E-Z. For that matter. the E·5's ground-scan potential was too slight 

to satisfy the reconnaissance requirements of July 1960. What was 

needed, it appeared, was a new moderately high resolution system 

with panoramic-scan capability_ * And unless a significant"breakthrough 

in readout technology came at once, the new system would of neceSSity 

have to embody film recovery techniques. 

~. 

-,-

Although the bald statement seems preposterous. it is nonetheless 

true that the chief of Air Force intelligence. Major General J. H. 

Walsh. either could not see or would not admit that the new r-equirements statement com.plete! y changed the status of the satellite reconnaissance effort. To a query from Charyk concerning the differences 

between the 5 July USIB statement a.nd previous requirements statements. 

Walsh replied, "There is no change in the intelligence requirem.ent. tI 

General Walsh. who represented the most extreme of the SAC-oriented 

viewpoints in the 1960 Pentagon struggle over Samos. also tended to 

approach the Corona versus Samos problem with something less than 

complete objectivity; he seemed to view Air Force of!ice~s who looked 

sympathetically on Corona as guilty of some sort of organizational 

treason. To single out General Walsh as a horrible example of what 

may be ta.ken as an outlook typical of much of the Air Staff is perhaps 

unfair--but General Walsh took special pains to insure that his prejudices 

stood out prominently. 

67 BYE 17017 

TOP SEeR!:'!' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

Additionally, by emphasizing classical reconnaissance rather 

than either surveillance or early warning, the new requirements 

degraded the importance of the concepts that had governed Samos 

technology virtually since program inception. If reconnaissance akin 

to that of the U-2 was to be the program goal. neither concurrency 

nor operational control by a combat command would be needed. In 

many respects the July 1960 requirements statement seemed to have 

been more influenced by the philosophy of the Corona approach. with 

its special management and technical character, than by any established 

ground rules of the existent Samos program. 

Among factors that could not be ignored in program reorientation 

were considerations of contractor performance. In this instance. the 

continued failure of the Discoverer-Corona system to return photographs, a feeling that Lockheed was at least partly at fault. and the 

fact that the Aerospace Corporation was then coming into being as a 

not-for-profit successor to Space Technology Laboratories all contributed 

to what w:as, in the main. a subjective judgment. In the extant Samos 

structure. Lockheed was the only major "system contractor"--as 

opposed to the "associate contractor" arrangement common to the 

ballistic missile program. In comparison to the relatively successful 

missile development efforts, Samos could scarcely be characterized 

BYE 17017-74 68 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

as a flourishing program, and it was not difficult to ascribe some of 

the fault to the fact that Lockheed had both hardware and system 

engineering responsibilities. If an "independent" systems engineering 

contractor (Space Technology Laboratories) had done so well for 

missiles, might it not be worthwhile to try a similar approach for 

Samos? If, at the same time. Aerospace Corporation got a chance 

to display its talents and to establish its reputation, so much the better. 

Whether justified or not, the frequency of suggestions that 

another contractor be brought into the Samos program seemed to 

confirm the existence of a general anti-Lockheed feeling. 

The turning· point came on 29 June with General White's advice 

to General T. S. Powers. Strategic Air Command chief, that plans for 

-an elaborate Samos complex at Omaha were being dropped and that SAC 

could expect to receive Samos data as it did other intelligence information. Samos, said White, would be an Air Force rather than a Strategic 

12 Air Command system. 

On 12 July, the Ballistic Missile Division submitted for Pentagon 

review and approval a revised development plan which incorporated 

much of the York-Charyk philosophy, the Billings recommendations 

(modified), and the USIB requirements statement. 13 Among the major 

innovations were a proposal for a new recovery system and camera, a 

BYE 1701 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

recommendation that the contractor structure be expanded, plans for 

more frequent launchings (and the use of boosters other than Atlas). 

deletion or transfer of Subsystem 1 development. curtailment of the 

ferret program, simplification of photographic equipment, and similar 

modifications earlier suggested by Charyk, York. Billings, and Colonel 

King. BMD also proposed expanding the scheduled test program to 

30 orbital launches (from 25), with 19 of the total to be film recovery 

operations. The funds requirement was estimated at $275 million for 

fiscal 1961. or the total of the administrations' budget request plus the 

14 

funds added by Congress. 

First to review the BMD-proposed plan was the Air Force 

Ballistic Missile Committee. which further increased the proportion 

of recovery-mode tests and approved the addition of a three-pad Samos 

15 

launch complex at Point Arguello. Directorate of Defense Research 

and Engineering, the next key review point, authorized the start of work 

on the new launch complex following an 18-19 July appraisal. but withheld full approval of the plan. Processing and dissemination uncertainties remained to be resolved. 16 Immediately thereafter, Undersecretary 

Charyk directed BMD to revise its 12 July development plan to provide 

for eight tests of the readout-mode satellites (photo and ferret combined), 

a total of seven E-5 tests (including two diagnostic flights. if required), and 

BYE 17017-74 70 

-'a"'c ~ , .:: 5 .. emar / TaI2 .... ~ 

',:0 C,... , 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

seven in the "new recoverable photo payload ..• " configuration. Additionally, 

Charyk authorized the inclusion of five unassigned Atlas-Agena vehicles In 

the total, to be used for diagnostic flights of the "new payload" satellite 

if needed. 

The "new program" was to incorporate a new recovery system 

(differing from both the E- 5 and the Discoverer-Corona) and a camera 

designed for gross coverage at the "best ground resolution that state-ofthe-art will support." Moreover, the new system was to be sufficiently 

flexible to permit payload switching if that later seemed advisable. 

Air Force headquarters promptly passed along Charyk's directions to ARDC and authorized the immediate start of a source selections 

17 

process for the "new payload. " The Air Staff instructions that authorized BMD to act on such guidance also included specific directions to 

exclude all Subsyst;'m I and all processing facility provisions from the 

18 revised development plan (due by 8 August). 

General Schriever interpreted the Charyk dictate to mean that 

the creat~on of a reliable recovery system was the "single most important 

development" for the nation. USAF, and ARDC. He concluded that the 

overhauled satellite reconnaissance program would have four discrete 

but correlated facets: Corona. Samos E-5, Samos with the new payload, 

and a separate recovery system. He also believed that the elimination 

71 BYE 170 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

of operational-logistic complications and the proposal for a new payloadrecovery system which satisfied USIB requirements had counteracted 

suggestions that Samos management be reassigned outside the Air Force. 19 

But even as General Schriever was realigning the Samos approach 

within ARDC, another DDR&E panel was in the process of submitting a 

highly critical appraisal of Air Force management of Samos. On 19 July 

a special advisory group headed by Dr. W. O. Baker of Bell Telephone 

Laboratories, reporting to Dr. York, harshly rebuked the earlier 

emphasis On readout over recovery, the role of the ferret effort, the 

prematurity and complexity of Subsystem I, the concurrency approach, 

and several technical facets of the program. The Baker group's proposed 

solution was to assign all Samos program responsibility to an organization attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense while permitting 

the Air Force to continue its technical management functions --but with 

the addition of personnel particularly well qualified in satellite reCOn-

°C nais sance technology. ~ 

While the question of Samos management continued under examination in the Pentagon, BMD rapidly completed a draft technical work 

statement covering the "new payload" defined by Charyk. Requiring 

ground resolution of "lO feet or better, " land recovery within five miles 

of a target point, and high system reliability, the work statement 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRST 

specified a high acuity camera subsystem combined with a "new 

reliable re-entry and recovery subsystem, " the whole to be capable 

of providing * large area coverage throughout an eight-day orbital life. 

The subsystem thus defined had by late July acquired E-6 

nomenclature. A revision of the basic development plan was in 

proces s. incorporating the technical guidance provided by DDR&E, 

Charyk, and the Air Staff. But there continued to be uncertainty at 

all levels concerning the final management Inode. USAF headquarters 

consistently described Samos as a national program conducted by the 

Air Force. although it was readily apparent that this adroitly phrased 

euphemism was not being accepted at face value by the other services 

or by DDR&E. Discussions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure 

and between the Air Force and DDR&E never managed to quiet fears 

that the Strategic Air Command would secure the authority to control 

21 

both Samos operations and the dissemination of any intelligence product. 

Nor could it be denied that a vocal segment of the Air Staif continued to 

support SAC's sturdy claims that the command was rightfully entitled 

to such authority. 

Although the work statement was in reality nothing more than an estimate 

of intentions, its details were: more than casually related to the Baker 

group report of 14 July. The new proposal specifically provided a 

counter-balance to each of the major criticisms contain.ed in the Baker 

73 BYE 170' 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

While the political cauldron bubbled, BMD attempted to put 

the technical aspects of the "new approachtl in pr0per perspecuve. 

On 30 July 1960, General Ritland named a soun-e selectlOn board fur 

the E-6. defined its task as determining the best contra("tors ior 

camera and recovery subsystems, and expressly stated that tlw 

objective of the effort was to develop a photo- recovery VerSlOl1 of 

Samos with broad area search capabilities and the highest attaina ble 

2.2 

resolution. It was ARDe I s intention to exclude Lockheed from an) 

aspect of the ('ornpetition. partly to in .. ure the creation of an alternate 

contractor approach. but also because of earlier criticism of both 

Lockheed and BMD management. Unlike the original WS 117L program 

and its subsequent subdivisions. the E-6 effort was to be conducted 

under the technical direction of Aerospace Corporation rather than 

with Lockheed as systems integrating contractor. The precis~ scope 

of the technical direction and systems engineering responsLbihty' was, 

hON ever, somewhat obscure late in July. General Schriever i3vured 

giving Aerospace less responsibility than Ramo-Woolridgt; had exe n is~d 

during the early days of the ballistic missile program while otht:!r~. 

report. That paper had specifically characterized the E-2 as obsu!ek, 

had objected to limitations in swath width and readout that made lts 

orbital operation "economLcall y and politically unacceptable. " and hd d 

s cored the E-2 On grounds of exce.ssive complexity, too great Sens Ittv l t \ 

to precision requirements in photography, and entirely u~realistic 

expectations fur ground resolution. 

BYE 17017-74 74 

-,... ... :: '- - . !J'OP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T ECRET 

including Trevor Gardner, urged a full return to the opE'ratinl;! prwo"l,," 

of the original Atlas program. Eventually it was agreed that the be'st 

approach would be to review the total Air Force reconnaissance satell1te 

effort, to re-appraise Department of Defense requlrements, and to 

present the results of the study to a succession of higher authoriti",. 

In essence, the process was to be akin to the creation of another "Teapot 

Committee" like that which had prompted acceleration of the balll.ti, 

Z3 

missile program in 1954. 

Part of the impulse for the creation of a "committe" of se.enuii" 

advisors" certainly derived from the increasingly forthright statements 

,of a group of highly influential industry spokesmen, including some who 

then were serving in the Department of Defense. The "tong"--a term 

widely employed--had become convinced that the existent program structure would never support an aggressive, effective development effort. 

Memories of the confusion that had characterized the ARPA period of 

program control were fresh, and to many it appeared that restorin~ 

Samos management responsibility to the Air Force had brought n'l rt'al 

improvement. The convictions of this group carried w"ight with both 

Charyk and York, and as expressed in the Baker Committee rt!port 

were familiar to Schriever and the Air Staff. Many members of the! 

"tong, " which mcluded offic ials from a variety of firms but was dom.natvd 

75 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

by the photo-oriented companies, were particularly distressed by th<.: 

failure of the Samos program to mOve away from the "conventional 

channels" characteristic of less pressing development efforts. They 

generally favored "management by exception" as a means of overcoming 

inertia in the <existent multi-review program office structurt!. 

General Schriever, then engaged in transformin!( several major 

ARDC programs into smaller replicas of the Atlas-Thor-Titan effort. 

had similar conceptions, though he naturally favored keeping Samos 

within the ARDC management structure. He suggested to the Air Force 

Chief of Staff, General White, that it would be advisable to name an Air 

Force general officer to head a new "management by exception" Samos 

program. Except for the question of what agency would have direct 

control of the Samos effort, there was by late July a high degree of 

24 general agreement on the need for a new management approach. 

Such parallel tendencies came together on Wednesday, 3 August 

1960, when General White called Brigadier General R. E. Greer into 

his office and abruptly asked how he would like to become "Mr. Samos." 

Greer, who was then the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles, 

a post slated for early abolishment, said mildly that Samos had always 

been One of his favorite projects and awaited developments. White told 

him to get in touch with General Schriever and to work out the 

BYE 17017-74 76 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

organizatlOnal details of his new assignment. At the close of the 

brief conversation, th" Chief of Staff casually asked the newly d"~l;:-

natted Samos chief if he had heard anything about "Eastman's bi~ nc'" 

camera." Greer, who was familiar with the background of Sarnus and 

who was one of the staff officers briefed on the covert Corona prugr<1l11, 

shook his head negatively and stored the information away for future' 

reference. 

Greer immediately contacted General Schriever, who was at 

Patrick Air Force Base participating in an ARDC Commanders I Cunference, and on the following day (Thursday) flew down to the nussil" 

base for a personal meeting. He, General Schriever, and GC'J\eral 

Ritland briefly discussed possible organizational arrangements that 

afternoon, and Greer continued the dlScussion while flying back to 

Washington with Schriever that evening. 

On the basis of the instructions Greer had received from White 

and In the context of the situation as it was then known, Greer, Sl"hriever t 

and R1tland concluded that a structure resembling in general outhne 

the Western Development Division of 1954-1955 should be created to 

housl' the Samos project. They tentatively agreed that General Greer 

should be named Vice Commander for Reconnaissance Satellites at 

AFBMD. General Rit1and and General Schriever, 1n subsequent dis("us51Ons, the following Friday and Saturday, concluded that" som .. direct 

77 BYE 17017 

~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 CO:0:9~~~ 

TOP~ET 

command line from the Samos office to the Pentagon was lnevitabl", 

but they agreed that it would be best to have that line run through I h .. 

BMD commander rather than the ARDC commander. (General Schrlev,'r, 

when named to head the original ballistic missile program, had operated 

as a deputy commander of ARDC but with direct access to the cllr 

secretariat level.) 

The nomination of General Greer as Samos chief and the subHequent propusals for alignment of the Samos office within the ,'xisting 

command staff structure were obviously intended to create an envirollment which would insure that Samos program responsibility remained 

under an Air Force aegis. Both Schriever and Greer were fully awar" 

of the still-viable proposals to install the Samos program in sum" 

secretarial-level agency, either within the Department of Defense ur 

25 the Department of the Air Force. The matter was scheduled for ii 

decision by the time of the 25 August National Security Council meetmg. 

during which the Kistiakowsky-Ruble-Charyk team was to submit its 

recommendations. Inevitabl" the team recommendations would b,' 

influenced by the revised Samos development plan, which reached 

final draft stage only On 6 August. Additionally, the E-6 source 

selection board process was then accelerating, and complications 

2.6 might well arise from its products. 

BYE 17017-74 78 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Attempting to precipltate a decision favorable to the AIr Fur, ,. 

vlewpuint on managing the Samos program, Schriever on b A\ll!lI~t 

propused the public release of a statement covennf! Greer's appointment and his assignment as BMD Vice Commander for R"connRis,;all, , 

Satellites. The draft statement in~luded a policy summary whIch s,'no 

unequivocally that the A,r Force was the executive agent for all concerned government agencies--including the Central Intelli~ence Ag<'llc y 

and the National Security Agency--in the development of reconnaissance 

satellites. (One effect of the proclamation, upon lts approval at the 

Department of Defense level, would presumably have been to brmg the 

entin, Corona activity under ARDC control.) The proposed releas" 

also emphasized the fact of Samos program acceleration and included 

an annuuncement that th" reorlented effort was aimed toward the ea rl \ 

. 2.7 development of recove ry systems and as sociated came ra techmque,;. 

The statement proposed by Schriever had enormous potential, 

"xt"odmg well past the questlOn of who would have organizational 

r"sponsibility for Samos. If approved and published with a Pentagon 

impnmatur, it would have the e£fect of formally committmg the Uotted 

States to a policy of overfhght reconnaissance. and of implementing 

that policy. It would allocate to General Schriever all effective authunty 

over all American military satellite programs, ITlaking hin, respunsIbl...: 

79 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

~,-> . c " .•.. --,-;- . 
Approved for Release: 

only to the Air Force Chief of Staff. Because operational authority 

would repose in the Samos program office, which would report 

through Schriever to the Chief of Staff, it would give Schnever's Atr 

Research and Development Command ultimate control of development, 

operations, and (actually if not formally) dissemination of th" returns 

of all satellite overflight intelligence. 

While the policy implications of Greer's appointment were 

being explored and while the effort to fix Samos authority firmly 

within the existent Air Force command structure continued, new 

technical and £inane ial aspects of the program moved toward appr<>val. 

On 8 August, AFBMD released the official work statement requirement 

for the E-6 source selection and two days later notified Lockheed of 

the decision to exclude that firm from the prospect list. The revised 

development plan was published on 11 August. Based on a fiscal 1961 

requirement of $295 million and subsequent-year estimates of $242 

million and $75 million, respectively, it incorporated all of the 

Charyk-York guidance of June and July. 28 

Ballistic Missile Committee review of the revised development 

plan was scheduled for 15 August and National Security Council review--

on the presumption of committee approval--for 10 days later. Until 

12 August, the White-Schriever policy of assuming that the Air Force 

would continue control of the Samos program seemed su·r" of confirmation. 

BYE 17017-74 80 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

but on that day cracks appeared. The official announcement of Greer's 

appointment said merely that he had been named BMD Vice Commander 

for Satellite Systems in order to increase the emphasis being act "rded 

those satellites assigned to the Air Force by the Department of Dden~". 

None of the proposed statements covenng Air Force control of til<" 

reconnaissance satellite program were included, there was no mentLOn 

of major policy decisions to emphasize recovery techniques rather than 

readout systems, and- -most significant- - reconnais sance satellites 

were not mentioned at all. At the least, the Defense Department had 

decided that a relatively minor press release was not the appropnate 

vehicle for announcing a major Change in U.S. military and diplomatic 

1"" 29 po lCles. 

By 15 August, the decision to withdraw control of Samos from 

the Air Force had been made. At the conclusion of the Ballistic 

Missiles Committee meeting of that day, following the committee's 

"ndorsement of the 11 August Samos development plan, Dr. Charyk 

privately told Greer that ARDC would not retain program management 

authonty. For several days, however, Greer did not know which of 

the various defense department or air secretariat agencies would have 

custody. Complete misconceptions of the true situation persisted at 

ARDC headquarters and in theWest Coast BMD complex. General 

81 

~ BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 ---~,. TOP 5E T 

Schriever and the ARDC group remained steadfast in their conviction 

that the program would somehow continue under ARDC control. In 

Los Angeles the prevalent belief was that Greer would becom" a sort 

of general director for what had originally been WS 117L--Samos. Mldas. 

and Discoverer--while Colonel W. G. King, Samos program chief. 

exercised direct control of the main Samos program. The lmplication 

that Corona would enter conventional Air Force development channels 

as part of the "Greer reorganization" was not widely discussed in Los 

Angeles. but that outcome was anticipated by those aware of Air Staff 

vlews on Corona and of the major crisis in Corona technolog y. 30 

In Washington the inevitability of Samos managem"nt by some 

special agency was being privately conceded by midsummer. Major 

General R.C. Wilson. AlT Force R&D chief, who worked closely with 

Charyk and who was well attuneC! to Pentagon trends, refused to 

surrender his faith in an eventual Air Force triumph until late July, 

even though he knew of Charyk's conviction that program control would 

be taken away from the military. 

The three most promi~ent candidates to replace the uniformed 

Air Force as Samos managers were DDR&E. CIA, and the Office of 

the Secretary of the Air Force--in that order of probability. By 

conducting the Corona program so circumspectly that nu hmt of its 

BYE 17017-74 82 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

"xlstcnce had leaked out, CIA had made itself most eligiblt: on the 

grounds of political discretion. But the conduct of such a broad 

scope program as Sarnos would be entirely foreign to CIA habits. 

That factor probably weighed against the intelligence agenn· ~s much 

as any other. DDR&E had the requisite position and authority, .;ud 

had demonstrated a consistent! y better grasp of program realitles 

than the current program proprietors. Indeed. for nearl y SiX months 

DDR&E had been the de facto program manager, even though normal 

channels continued to flow with directives and responses. The Offte" 

of the Secretary of the Air Force had Charyk, whose personal inter"~l 

in and knowledge of the"program were certainly more profound than 

those of any other official in Washington, while Charyk's office could 

be represented to be an element of the Air Force, thus making it in 

Some ways more acceptable to the Air Staff than any alternate agency. 

But so long as Charyk remained solely an Air Force official, wi-despread objections to Air Force control of operational aspects of 

satelhte reconnaissance probably would be effective. 

Charyk mad" the Samos presentation to the National Security 

Council on 25 August. He told the President quite frankly that 

satellite photographs would not for years provide the quality obtainable 

through U-2 overflights. but he outlined a reasonable approach to that 

83 BYE 17017-

~ "e">. ,=.c~c··/-·"~-· 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

objectlve through realignment and revitalization of the Sam,",s effort. 

The presentation was perfectly tlmed to have the proper effect; withlll 

the previous week the first Corona photographs had been recovered 

and the physical proof that satellite reconnaissance could actually 

be effective was at hand. 

A portion of the presentatlOn was a recommendation from 

Charyk, Kistiakowsky, and Ruble that Samos be managed by an Air 

Force general officer reportlng directly to the Secretary of the An 

Force. (DDR&E had flatly refused to accept any arrangement that 

included intervening military echelons--and particularl y ARDC.) 

The Samos management scheme outlined on 25 August also proposecJ 

that boards of technical experts be appointed to serve as program 

advisors while existent military organizations provided administrative, 

31 loglstic, and technical support. 

The security counnl resolved virtually all known program uncertainties, reviewlllg and generally approving the II August d .. velopment plan (with modifications made through direct contact betwe.en 

Charyk and the program office during mid-August), directing that the 

new recovery-mode subsystem (E-6) be developed under a high 

nation"l prlOrlty, and endorSing a program objective based on the 

<.!arllest possible accumulation of definitive information on th" lucation 

BYE 17017-74 84 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

and status uf Soviet ICBM sitt!s. Sea recovery was specified for 

witlal systems, with land recuvery to be provid"d later. R,·adout 

development was to continue unl y on a reduced scale, the ferret 

program was to be cut back. and Subsystem I was to be all but 

eliminated. Additionally, the President approved the programmed 

launch of the first expenmental Samos E-l, then scheduled for 

lO September. Specific approval of the flight had been wlthheld 

\inti! that time, chiefly in honor of the "space for peace" theSiS, 

and th., Air Force had entertained grave fears that the political 

pres sures of the time might induce a decision to postpone or even 

('ancel 32 actual launches. 

Although the Security Council ruling assigned program rt·sponsibillty to the Secretary of the Air Force, it was obvious that the 

secretary, as an lndivldual, could scarcely exercise direct controL 

The responsible offiCial was to be Undersecretary Charyk. whu as 

chalrman of the Ballistic Missiles Committee was the admll1istration 

ufficial most thoroughly famihar with the Samos program. Not for 

another month, however, were suggestlOns of assignment to DDR&E 

ilnally disposed uf. 

On the day followlng the 25 August Security Cuunnl medmg. 

Charyk and Greer met to d,SCUSS the tenor and scope of reqUlred 

85 BYE 17017 

~ r~~:_.:: =,':;'"f'"f:.~/-;~r. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'l"OP SIiCRET 

directives. That afternoon, General Greer drafted a S l'quence of 

33 

papers for the signature of tht::: Secretary. They were i:,;sut!d as 

Secretary of the Air Force Orders on 31 August. One established 

an Office of Missile and Satellite Syst~tnS at the Secretarial level tv 

handle administrative and liaison responsibilities with the Pentagon. 

A second named General Greer as Director of the Samos Project 

with additi (Ina1 duty as BMD Vice Commander for Satellite Systems. 

Greer was empowered to organize a project office by drawing manpowt'r 

and support from BMD. but his establishment was clearly identified 

as a held extension of the Office of the Secretary of the Au Force. 

In separate actions. Air Force Secretary D. C. Sharp created 

two advisory bodies--a Satelhte Reconnaissance Advisory Group to be 

composed of technical experts and industry representatives; and a 

Satdlite Reconnalssance Advisory Council to be composed of the four 

assistant secretaries of the Air Force, the Undersecretary, and All' 

Staff representatives. 

,'. 

'" Sharp additionally had the Air Staff assign 

!!;<J :.. 

Brigadit!r General R. D. Curtin (former BMD satellite program chief) 

as Director. Office of Missile and Sa~ellite Systems, and transfer lO 

specified officers, airmen. and civilians to Curtinls staff. The 

The advisory group never met. , The advisory council held one mt"eting, 

formally approved several brief presentations, and neve.r reconvel,ed. 

BYE 11017-74 86 

TOP SECRE'I" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'fOP SECRET 

secretary's office. frorn its uwn resources, authoTlzed LO oifict!rs 

and 10 civilians for General Greer's group while BMD transferred 

39 officers and 15 Civilians to Greer's new West Coast organization. 34 

Although in some respects the events of 25-31 August appeared 

to eliminate any confusion concerning Samos program respon:::;iblhties, a faint aura of uncertainty persIsted. For instance, whtm acting 

Sec reta ry of Defense] • H. Douglas formally approved the modified 

11 August development plan, he added a note indicating that "technical 

revisions II earher discus sed and any changes to the n August plan 

would reqUlre the final approval of DDR&E before the Air Force could 

act on them. Nevertheless. Douglas authorized the Air Furce to 

start work on the $2.73.7 milllon program for fiscal 1961--a vast 

:i! 

llnproveme nl Over any earlIer funding authorization. Again. the 

operations plan earlier submitted was specificaUy exempted from 

35 

approval • 

. ', .,. 

Through fiscal 1960, Samos development had cost between $353.2 

million and $360.2 milhon (both figures were cited in various 

sources in mid-1960). of which $1. 5 million had been spent on 

ft:al:Hbility studiel> (Rand), $8.9 million for evaluation and program 

activation, $l41. 96 million for work by Lockheed (which paid subcuntractors from that sum also), $29.6 million to buy Atlas boosters, 

and the remainder for various les ser expenses. Some $207 million 

was scheduled to go to Lockheed and about $71 million to Convair 

(General Dynamics) during fiscal years L961. 1962, and 1963. 

87 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 .......... 

~RET 

Further clarification of the intent of the 31 August orders and 

of the pro,·edures that would be followed in program management 

came on 13 September. Secretary Sharp identified the authoritydecision link between his office and Greer's with the explicit statement 

that "there will be no review or. approval channels between the Director 

of the Samos Project and the Secretary of the Air Force, " although 

"need to know" briefings could be scheduled at the discretion of the 

secretary. Additionally, both Generals Greer and Curtin were authorized direct con tart with major commands. Air Staff agencies, and 

36 

"other staffs and agencies ... as requlred." A final and explicit 

statement of the DDR&E role appeared two days later, when Douglas 

issued instructions that On Samos matters the Secretary of the Air 

F<Jrce would report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense--

Douglas himself! DDR&E, Douglas explained, would serve as a 

"staff agency to assist th" Deputy ::,t:cretary of Defense, " and Air 

Force project managers would keep DDR&E informed of Samos events--

but there was no provision for DDR&E review or approval in the basic 

dir"ctive. Greer would report directly to the Secretary of the Air 

Force (actually, in practice, to the Undersecretary--Dr. Charyk), 

37 and he to the deputy secretary of defense. 

On the same day, 15 September, the new Secretary of the Air 

Force Samos Project Office ..,fi" 1 all y came into being on:the W"st Coast. 31:\ 

BYE 11017-74 88 

_:~··-5i....ln., - -

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP lIi.,..-~,_ 

Notwithstandmg all that, General Schriever and ARDC steadfast! y refused to cuncede that Sam as had been entirely withdrawn 

frum the command's custody_ As lat" as 19 September, Gen"ral 

Schrtever proposed measures that would "reaffirm ARDC's charter 

fur the program." He urged On General White a modification of his 

earlier proposal for the creation of a Samos-equivalent to the Teapot 

Cummittee, a group to reinforce the scientific prestige of the Air 

Furce viewpoint and to counteract such groups as the Baker Committee. 

Schnever also renewe;;t his advocacy of a vigorous public release 

program, recalling to life a 1956-1957 proposal conceived by Richard 

S _ Leghorn which had been instrumental in the generation of Corona. 

He suggested to General White that it might be advisable to confront 

the Soviet Union with a fait accompli by publicly sponsoring active 

satellite reconnaissance operations and proclaiming to the world that 

39 

Samos was a device for insuring world peace. 

But even though ARDe was not yet ready to acknowledge the 

C lIn-lplete, revolutton in Samos management, the decisions had been 

ll1ade. A major consideration in the decision to exclude Samus management from any cuntrol by military elements of the Air Force was the 

PreSident's insistence that the program be conducted most circumspectly. The natlOnal admmistration could not overlook the prospect 

that the Soviets might react to an "open" Samos program- by making 

89 BYE 17017--

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

dde rITlined efforts to destroy reconnais sance satellites - -or all 

satellites--and thus precipitate a new mternational crisis. A key 

to the rationale of the new Samos policy was the August 1960 success 

of Curona. which returned abundant and excellent reconnaissance 

photographs from orbit and vividly demonstrated the value of the 

product. United States' adherence to the "space for peace" theme 

was thus reinforced rather than weakened by establishment of 

Gretr's organization. Nevertheless. within such limits Samos policy 

remamed relatively flexible. Corona had proved that satellite reconnaissance was feasible. The real task of the new Samos program, 

then, was to expand, improve, and domesticate that feasibility. 

BYE 17017-74 90 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
I 

I 

I 1. 

I 2. 

I 

I 

I 

I 4. 

I 5. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

6. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP SECRET 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

Draft memo, prep for SAF to SOD, 11 Mar 60, subj: 

DISCOVERER, SAMOS, MIDAS Programs, in Corona files. 

Memo, Col W. G. King, Dir, Samos Proj Ofc, to Col 

F. C. E. Oder, D/Cmdr Sat Sys, BMD, 13 May 60, subj: 

SAMOS & Logistics, in SP Samos files, Redirection, '60. 

Ltr, LtGen R.C. Wilson, DCS/D, to Dir/Adv Tech, 9 May 60, 

subj: SAMOS; ltr, MajGen Vo R. Haugen, Asst DCS/D, to 

Cmdr ARDC, 16 May 60, subj: SAMOS Development Plan; 

ltr BrigGen M. F. McNickle, Asst DCS/R&E, ARDC, to 

CIS, USAF, 27 May 60, subj: SAMOS Development Plan, 

all in Air Staff files,· TWX, RDRB-19-5-35-E, ARDC to BMD, 

19 Ma y 60, in SP Samos files, Hist Docmn Jun-Jul 60; draft 

memo, SAF to SOD, 11 Mar 600 

ARDC to BMD, 19 May 60, TWX RDRB-19-5-35-Eo 

Although the King memo, "Thoughts on Obtaining Satellite 

Photo Coverage of Areas of Interest at the Earliest Tinle, " 

is undated, its placen:lent in the Pentagon files (Office of 

Mis sile and Satellite Systems) and its general content identify 

it as from the period 9 May-25 May 60. It is a most remarkable document, containing in at least SOme general form the 

germ of the SAFSP structure and progranl that emerged 

five months later. Every suggestion Col King made was 

ultirnately adopted--though sonle, such as land recovery, 

were later dropped as well. There is no indication in 

Pentagon files that the document was widely circulated, and 

its contents are not incorporated in any contemporary document that did receive wide circulation. Nevertheless, it 

seems highly probable that the King n:lemorandum went at 

least to Undersecretary Charyk, since Charyk's proposals 

of late May so nearly parallel it. 

Memo, J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to cis USAF, 25 May 60, 

subj: Exploitation of Initial SAMOS Data, in Ofc Mis sand 

Sat Sys files, Sarnos Gen, 60. 

91 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-74 

Handle via Bveman/ Talent· Keyhole 

Coritluis Only 
7. 

8. 

10. 

11. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T~RET 

Ltr, LtGen R. C. Wilson, DCS I D, to ARDC, 1 Jun 60, subj: 

Exploitation of Initial SAMOS Data, in SP Samos files, 

R&D-I, Jan-Ju160. 

Memo, H. F. York, DDR&E, to SAFUS, 6 Jun 60, subj: 

SAMOS R&D Operational Plans, in SP files, R&D-l, 

Jan-Jul 60. 

Ltr, D. D. Eisenhower, Pres US, to T. S. Gates, SOD, 

10 Jun 60, no subj, in Ofc Miss and Space Sys files. 

TWX RDRB 62784, USAF to ARDC, 17 Jun 60, mins, Jt 

Mtg of Recon Panel and Samos Working Grp, 1 Jul 60, in 

Air Staff files; N. Y. Herald-Tribune, 13 Jun 60; N. Y. Times, 

13 Jun 60. 

MelTIO, York to SAFUS, 6 Jun 60, transmitted an advance copy 

of the Billings study; ltr, Capt H. Mitchell, ofc DCS/I, ARDC, 

to BMD, 13 Jun 60, subj: SAMOS R&D Operational Plans, in 

SP Samos files, R&D-l Jan- Jul 60, included an updated, 

unsigned paper titled SAMOS which was actually a "bootleg" 

copy of the preliminary Billings study; the formal Billings 

rpt was presented to the WS ll7L Special Study Committee on 

21 Jul 60, cy in Evans files, interview, Col W.G. King, 

Dir/Prog 206, by R. L. Perry, 19 Dec 62, 17 Jun 63. 

120 Rpt, USIB-D-33.6/8, Intelligence Requirements for Satellite 

Reconnais sance Systems of which Sarnos is an Exarnple, 

13. 

BYE 17017-74 

5 Jul 60, in SP Samos files. 

Ltr, Gen T.S. Power, CinC SAC, to Gen T. D. White, Cis 

USAF, 16 Jun 60, no subj, restated the tired arguments for 

siting operational control at Offutt AFB and for early transfer 

to SAC of an operational Samos system. Power frankly said 

one of his objectives was to establish a precedent that would 

keep "external agencies" from interfering with any Air For ce 

space progralTI. Ltr, White to Power, 29 Jun 60, no subj, 

was the first firm indicator that the Air Staff had abandoned 

its earlier fixation with the concept of SAC operation and had 

adopted the Billings outlook. Ltr, MajGen J .H. Walsh, Acs/I 

to SAFUS, [Jul 601, subj: Intelligence Requirements for Samos, 

in Charyk files, clearly states the peculiar concepts Gen Walsh 

treasured. 

92 

Handle via Byeman/Talent· Keyrwle 

Contro!s Only T~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

14. Presn, SAMOS, by BMD, 6 Jul 60, in Air Staff files; Itr 

Col May, Chm, Sat Intell Reqmts Cmte to Secy USIB 29 

Jun 60, subj: Transmittal of Intelligence Requirements for 

Satellite Reconnaissance System of which SAMOS is an 

Example, in Ote Miss and Sat Sys files; Samos, May-Jun 60; 

Dev Plan, Samos 12 Jul 60. 

IS. Presn, SAMOS, 6 Jul 60: D"v Plan, Samos, 12 Jul 60. 

16. Memo for Record, Maj H.C. Howard, Ofc Asst/Adv Tech, 

13 Jul 60, subj: SAMOS, in Ofc Miss and Sat Sys, Jul-Aug 60: 

Mins of 54th AFBMC Mtg, 15 Jul 60, in Air Staff illes; TWX 

70836, USAF to ARDC, 19 Jul 60, in Ofe Miss and Sat Sys files. 

17. Memo, H.F. York, DDR&E, to SAF, 21 Jul 60, subj: Additional ATLAS/AGENA Launch Facility, in Ofc Miss and Sat 

Sys files, Jul-Aug 60. 

18. TWX AFDSD-AT 7l953, USAF tu ARDC 23 Jul 60, in SP 

Samos files, R&D-t, Hist Docmn, J an-Jul 60. 

19. TWX RDRB-26-7-102, ARDC to AFBMD, 26 Jul 60, in 

Ritland files. 

2-0. TWX RDG-l5-7-27-E. ARDC (LtGen B.A. SChriever) to BMD 

(MajGen O. J. Rotland). 25 Jul 60, Ritland files, 

21. Extran from Rpt, Review and RecommendatlOns of USAF 

Satellite Reconnaissance Project SAMOS. prep by DDR&E 

COMINT / COMSECI ELINT Advisory Group, 14 Jul 60, in 

Ofe Miss and Sat Sys files, Samos, Jul-Aug 60. 

l2. Memo for Record. MajGen O.J. Ritland, Cmdr BMD, 26 Jul 

60, subj: Telephone Call from Gen Cooper to Gen Ritland, 

in Ritland files. 

Z 3. Ltr, MajGen O. J. R itland. Cmdr. BMD. to Col Po J 0 Heran, 

Chm £-6 Source Sel Bd, 30 Jul 60, subj: Letter of Instruction, 

in Ritlarid files. 

24. Memu, Col FoC • .!:.:. Oder, Asst D/Cmdr Space Progs, BMD, 

to Gen H. W 0 Powell, V ICmdr, et ai, l Aug 60, .$ubj: Meeting -- . 

93 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP.-. __ 

with Aerospace on New SAMOS Program; memo, 1. A. Gettin~, 

Aerospace Corp, to MajGen O.J. Ritland. Cmdr BMD, 3 Aug 

60, subj: Reconnaissance Satellites, both in Ritland files. 

25. Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, DirISAFSP. by R. L. Perry, 

Hist Ofc, 6 lun 63; ltr, LtGen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr ARDC, 

to Gen T. D. White, CIS USAF, 19 Sep 60. subj: SAMOS Program, 

in Ofe Miss and Sat Sys files, Samos Gen. '60. 

26. Presn Sum by Lt Col J. L. Jochim. Samos Ofc, AFMBD, 

6 Aug 60, subj: SAMOS, Revised Dev Plan, in Ritland files. 

27. TWX RDG-6-8-14, LtGen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr ARDC, to 

Maj Gen O. J. Ritland. Cmdr AFBMD. 6 Aug 60; TWX WDG6-8-20, Ritland to Schriever, 7 Aug 60, both in Ritland files. 

2H. Presn Sum, Jochim, 6 Aug 60; Tech Work Stmts, 8 Aug 60, 

subj: Samos. E'-6 Pa yload; hr, MajGen O. J. Ritland, CITldr 

AFBMD. to J. H. Brown, LMSD, 10 Aug 60, subj: Soliciting 

for SAMOS £-6 SysteITl. all in Ritland fHes. 

29. M"mo, initialed by MajGen O. J. Ritland, CITldr BMD, I Aug 60, 

subj: Release dictated by Col Gilman, USAF, in Ritland files. 

30. Interview. Greer by Perry, 12 Dec 62; memo, LtCol D. L. 

Phelps. Admin Ofc, to Spec Asst to DirlSAFSP (Col J. W. 

Ruebel), approx 1 Sep 61, subj: Documentation of San-lOs Program Office Personnel. , • , in Phelps file; interview, 

BrigGen J, L. Martin, SAFSS, by Perry, 8 Nov 63. 

31. Memo, T. S. Gates, SOD, to SAF, 10 Oct 60, subj: Reconnaissance Satellite Program, in Ofc Miss and Sat Syo files: Sat 

Progs, 37-60, Vol n, 

32. Ibid, ltr, J .S. Lay, Exec Secy, NSC, to SOD, I Sep 60, subj: 

Reconnaissance Satelht,. Program, in Air Staff files .. 

33. Interviews, Gr"er by Perry, 9 Oct and 12 Dec 62. 

34. SAF Order 115.1, 31 Aug 60, sUbj: Orgamzation and Functwns 

of the Ofc of Missile and Satellite Systems; SAF Order 116.1, 

31 Aug 60, sub): The Dtrector of the SAMOS Proje:"t; ARDC 

BYE 17017-74 94 

~::::-:!,':;.:1 5 ... 1?!'T'.ar/7~,=-. 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

ECRET 

Ops Order 60-1, Sept bO, subj: "Operational Order for 

Satellite and Missile Observations System (SAMOS); M"mo, 

D. C. Sharp, SAF, to CIS USAF, 31 Aug 60, no sub); all in 

SAFSP files. 

35. Memo, J.H. Douglas, Actg SOD, to SAF, 6 Sep 60, subj: 

Revised SAMOS Development Plan, dated 11 Aug 60, in SP 

Samos files, R&D-I, Aug-Dec 60; Dev Plan, Sarnos, 

n Aug 60; presn slide, "Funds," approx Dec 59, in Phelps file. 

36. Memo and incls, D. C. Sharp, SAF, to CiS USAF, 13 Sep 60. 

no subj; in Ritland files. (A draft of the memo in Oie Miss 

and Sat Sys files indicates that it was actually prepared by 

Col J. L. Martin, Gen Curtin's deputy, presumably on Under. 

secretary Charyk's instructions.) 

37. Memo. J .H. Douglas. Actg SOD. to SAF. 15 Sep 60, subj: 

Reco:maissance Satellite Program, in SP Samos files, 

R&D-I, Aug-Dec 60. 

3B. Ltr, BrigGen R: E. Greer, Da/Samos Proj, to Cmdr BMD, 

15 Sep 60, sub): Estabhshment of Samos Project Office, in 

Rltland riles. 

39. Ltr, Schriever to White, 19 Sep 60; White replied, by ltr 

2.9 Sep 60, that he appreciated the suggestions, that technical 

committees had been established. and that an information 

plan keyed to R&D was being constructed. 

95 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 1701, 
Approved for Release: 2018/09~ ~C~5~ 

~I>CRET 

VI NEW DIRECTIONS IN SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

(August 1900 - May 196!) 

Technological consideratlOns played an mcidental role in the 

August decisinn to shift Samos project -responsibility from the middle 

echelons of the Air Force to the Office of the Secretary. The implications of the U-2. affair, high-level disenchantment with the tortuous 

processes of conventionai Air Force program management, the resistance of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDe) and the 

Air Staff to Samos policy decisions made at the secretariat level, and 

the shift in program obJectives from surveillance to reconnaissance 

were largely innocent of technical motivation. Although the s·immenng 

readout-versus-recovery controversy of 1959-1960 had a basis in 

technical uncertainty, financial factors were more important than 

technic al factors in the eventual shift of emphasis to reCOver y modes. 

The dichotoITlY in vieWpOints on concurrency and on who should operate 

reconnaissance satellites was unaffected by specific program achievemel1ts--or their absenceo 

Nevertheless, technology helped reshape the Samos program In 

the late months of 1960 even though management and organizational 

matters held the spotlight. The decision to develop a new surveillance 

sysl<!m was the most obVious facet of Samos realignment during that 

BYE 17017-74 

~,.>. 0 :: • .,-e-/-'"-· -., 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

pc:nuj, Thereafter. the fact that technical and policy decisions were 

handled as one tended tu obscure the fact that technical prugram matters 

were recelving lncreasing attention. Once indecision on ~ the program 

should be conducted had been eliminated. 1t became pos sible to concentrate on what should b", done. Insulated from the inputs of multt-Iayers 

of command-level and Pentagon officials, Brigadier General Robert E. 

Greer and Undersecretary J. V. Charyk could devote attention to 

selecting the best possible course of program development and to seemg 

that II was pursued to a meaningful conclusion. In itself, that circumstance ~ubstantiaHy reduced the confusion and uncertainty which had 

characterlzed the enttre Samos effort until late 1960. 

Those whuse views were influential i'n charting a new course for 

Samos were relatively few in numbers. The shift in e,nfhasis from 

r"adoul to recovery had been urged late in 1959 by Harold Br·own and 

John Rubel of the DIrectorate of Defense Research and Engineering. 

As he b"came increaslllgly familiar with the details of Samos, Charyk 

gradually changed his views on concurrency, operational responsibility, 

and readout (particularly on the need for elaborate ground stations) in 

the penod between March and June 1960. The emergence of new reConnlHSSallU, requlrements, early in July 1960, and their basic shape, 

certainly were lnfluemed by the abrupt termination of the U-2 program 

;,s well as the cuntinUlng d,s appointments of the Corona·program. 

97 

~ BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP 51 

With allowances for dllterences in detail and intensity. the 

paths laid uut by ARDC and Air Staff officials generally included 

con,currency "nd placement of prime development emphasis on readout 

modes of satclhte reconnaissance. Strategic Air Command control of 

the reconnaissance process was generally assumed, though there was 

nu n)mmon agreement on the timing of such a move. Concurrency. 

readout, and SAC operatiOnal responsibility for Samos were interdependent: nune made sense without both of the others. 

At the program ofiLce level, concurrency, readout, and SAC 

cuntrul of operatlOns were not highl y regarded theses. Colonel William 

G. Kmg, Jr. had been Samos project director since July 1959. HiS 

immedlatel y previous experience had involved repairing and mlnistering 

to " ~rlevously mismanaged Snark missile program. He had not been 

lon~ with Samos before concludlng that the pre gram was badly overextended, and llke virtually all space-program specialists in BMD he 

quie kly decided that Concurren, y was wholly inappropriate for satellite 

develupment. During the spring of 1960 he had consistently urged the 

adv.;:,ntages 01 recovery over readout,. had argued to a hostile Air. Staff 

that the Corur::: management approach was more appropriate for Samos 

than the then-accepted program philosophy, and had persistently urgl'd 

prugralll Simplification. His views almost certainly influenced Charyk'" 

BYE 17017-74 98 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

27 May 1960 instructions to employ "off the shelf" and t1current 

state-of-the-art" technlques as a means of Samos program acceleration. 

~. -,. 

The matter of how greatl y Colonel Kmg's views mfluenced Undersecretary Charyk cannot be entlrely resolved. Surviving documents 

clearly indicate, however. that Colonel King was well ahead of hlS 

contemporaries in urging canl. dla tion of Subs ystem I, termination 

(or complete redlrect!on) of th~ readout program. creation of a new 

recoverable -capsule photu-satelhte, and ~stablishment of "managem eot 

by t!xceptlon" channels for the Samos program. His recommendations 

met with a tepid reception in BMD headquarters, a cool response in 

ARDe.headquarters, and icy blasts from most of the Air Staff. (The 

ASslstant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. considered King's views on 

readout and Corona mdicative of disloyalty to the Air Force, which 

suggested both the int~ns ity of the Samos controvers y and the obJectlVity displayed by some participants.) 

The DDR&E vlewpomt, particularly as expressed in reports 

prepared under Dr. W. O. Baker and Dr. B. H. Billings. was much 

• l lo::>o;;!r to tht: rteal world than anything that emerged from Air Staff 

dehberatluns dUTlng the first haH of 1960. It is worth noting, however. 

that the most ::>we~ptng DDR&E recommendations for program reform 

did not appear until after the U -2. affair; Baker and Billings took their 

final stands In .1 une. King and Charyk had resolved their res.pective 

doubts by Ma y. The frequency of bnefings. presentations, discuss ions. 

and "think paper s" during the February-June 1960 period, and the high 

rnurtaltty rate of documents 1n that period. make it quite difficult to 

trac l' ~lther the ongins 01' the fates of most proposals. Nevertheless. 

thlS much is clear: by mid-May 1960, King and Charyk were in general 

agreement on w hat should be done to improve the status of the Samos 

prog ram; King had arrived at such conclusions first; at least one 

careful analysis prepared by King reached Charyk without going 

thrvugh chain-oi-command sanitl!l.ers; and the several echelons 

... 

~ 

between King and Charyk were not at all in sympathy with their viewpoints. 

99 BYE 1701' 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

It is also clear that various 

~ technical developments entirel y 

independ"nt of the background Samos controversy began to influence 

the program in the spring of 1960. On 24 March, more than a month 

before the U-l affair and two months before Charyk's policy pronouncement, Eastman Kodak had informally submitted to the Reconnaissance 

Laboratory at Wright Air Development Division (WADD) a proposal 

to develop a high-acuity 77 -inch-focal-length camera for satellite 

reconnaissance purposes. On 17 June, Eastman followed up the original 

submission with a relatively detailed proposal for yet another reCOverable reconnaissance system, this embodying a 36-inch camera to 

provide convergent stereo coverage of Soviet territories. The contractor 

estimated that the system could be made available in a relatively bne! 

time because the technology was well within the current state-of-the-art. 

Providing six- to eight-foot ground resolution and covering 97 per cent 

of the vital target areas, having a five-day orbital life. the proposed 

reconnaissance system generally conforITled to the ground rules specified 

by Charyk. It considerably surpassed in promised performance the 

requirements subsequently detailed by USIB. Eastman called the 

system "BlankeL 11 

Still later, on lO July, Eastm.an disclosed to WADD a second 

valum" of the t",hm,al proposal, this covering the 77-inch camel's 

BYE 17017-74 100 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP~. __ 

mentioned original! y in March. Suggesting the -arne technical 

approach and many of the components defined in "BLanket, " Kodak 

proposed a system capable of pruvldlng two- to three-foot resolution 

for 51-'0t coverage of selected ground targets. Alluding to the 77-inch 

focal length and a currently popular teleVision program, Eastman 

called the proposed system "Sunset Stnp." 

In a fashion that was not unique With Eastman Kodak, the firm 

circulated the essentials uf its proposal through other than the "!lurmal" 

channels at WADD. In a mid- J un .. conversation with Charyk, Dr. E. H. 

Land described the proposed system m highly favorable terms. It is 

probable that Eastman also submitted the proposal to the CIA; that 

agency certalnly was familiar with the technical details as soon as 

was Charyk. 

Later that month, at Charyk's request, the company forwarded 

to th<! Undersecretary a copy of the technical proposal for "Blanket" 

plus a general resume of the still embryonic "Sunset Strip" idea. 

Eastman was "xtr"mel y concerned about keeping details of the proposals 

within a small circle of knowledgeable individuals, so much so that the 

subsequent correspondence with Charyk went through special CIA 

channels, employmg buth a pseudonym and a "letter drop" address. 

Very iew within Eastman }o.".dak's nrganization knew of the proposed 

a ppr t)ac h. 

101 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

On 5 Jul y, afte r haVlng digested the "Blanket" proposal, Dr. 

Charyk met with A. B. Simmons of Eastman Kodak to discus s both 

"Blanket" and "Sunset Strip." Slmmons, who was growing more 

enthusiastic about the potential of the later proposal as time passed, 

assured Charyk that estimatt!s of the worth of the 77-inch camera 

were quite conservative. At Charyk's request, Eastman also forwardt'd 

simulation photographs based on anticipated E-l and E-Z products. The 

contrast was startling. 

Although Eastman was gravely concerned with keeping knowledge 

of its two proposed approaches closely confined, that was particularly 

difficult in the existent environment. By late July. details were 

generally known throughout the Samos structure, within the R .. connaissance Laboratory at WADD, and 1n several elements of the Air Staff. 

It was "Sunset Strip" that General White mentioned to General Greer 

dunng their meeting on j August. what he apparent! y did not mention 

was that one day earlier, on l. August, the Air Staff had decided to 

have WADD contract With Eastman Kodak for a laboratory test model 

of the 77-inch camera. Imtlaily, $250.000 in fiscal 1961 funds were 

I 

made available to support thoe program. 

What followed, fur nearly a week, was a small comedy of 

errors. Pentagon instructions to WADD to act at once on the Eastman 

BYE 17017-74 102 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

proposal brought an anguished response from Wright Field that the 

proposal had never been formaU y subrrntted there, having been 

vriginaUy prepared for a ,ompetltion that Perkin-Elmer Corporation 

had won. No copy was avallabk at Wnght Field. Reconnaissance 

Laboratory ofill'lals qUleti y ,untacted the local Eastman Kodak 

representative who was entlrely wnocent of information about anything 

called "Sunset Strip" and finally, in desperation, called the Pentagon 

for aid in identifying the proposal. He was lold that it had originally 

been left with "a high USAF afflcia!.· T nat advice, transmitted to 

Eastman's home office at 9 p. m. on 5 August, brought a 10 p. m. 

call from Slmmons, asking 1f Charyk was the ''high official" meant. 

The Kudak represe ,tive tn DaytLln told Simmons that the Air Force 

WdS "sincerely 111terestedl! In startlng a research sequence leading 

tu operatlOnal hardware. Simmons remarked, tartly, that Eastman 

had origlnaU y proposed nothing more than a breadboard model and 

that the sudden upsurge of interest was rather startling. 

In the meantime, the Pentagon instructed WADD to proceed 

a5 far with "Sunset Stnp" as $250,000 would permit and that more 

monel wuuld 't'nalnly be approved later. Further conversatlOns 

lJ<:tween Wright Fl Id and Rochester caused SiITlffions to <"treat to 

the local CIA offtc<', from whence he could privately phone the responsible 

lO3 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 1701 

~":- ., 5.e~'- /',_-" 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Air Staff office. Eastman. he remarked, felt that WADDls partil ipation implied "rather routine handling." On the contrary. he was advlsed. 

WADD was in the process of gl;:thng increased authority. Somewhat 

(.'ynicaHy. Simmons said that "his bosses" were certainly interested 

In working On a I1bigger program, II but that they would prefer to work 

with the people building the vehicles--BMD. Simmons also expres sed 

concern at the widening circle of knowledge. mentioning that he had 

2 

Charyk f s agreement to limit the number of I twitting 10 individuals. 

As it happened. Eastman Kodak's obvious reluctance to undertake the Sunset Strip program under !1 normal" Air Force operating 

procedures coincided In time with the decision to shift Samos management to the Air Secretariat level. On 13 August, complying with 

instructions from Char yk, the Alr Staff rescinded that portion of the 

* original directive which passed responsibility to WADD. 

The attern pt to bring Wright Air Development Division's Reconnais. 

sanc~ Laboratory more immediately into the Samos program was part 

of a long-term effort to find a broade r mis sion for the entire Wright 

Field complex. It was also, almost certainly. part of General 

Schriever's wide-front ~ttempt to fix Samos responsibihty firmly 

withIn the An Research £1110 Lh!\.·..:loprnent Command. While theReconnalSSann! Laboratory C"tnployed ITlany highly qualified scientists and 

enginee rs and would sure' 1 y ( ontinue to make major contributions to 

the advan( t'!ment of the photo- reconnaissance arts, there was an 

ubvwus reluctance on the pa rt of many In industry and in the An 

Secretariat to entrust <'Iny new major program management responsibliltles to WADD. The", t>urdlnated program approach 11 then being 

BYE 17017-74 !04 

TOP 6li:CRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'lOP SECRET 

Procurement of Sunset Strip work was to be undertaken through BMD 

channels and was to be managed as part of the total Samos program 

3 

rathe r than as a separate came ra development project. 

The Shlft of responsibilLty to BMD meant, in practice, that 

the existent Samos program office became the Air Force focal point 

for SUnset Stnp activity. Eastman readily accommodated the notion 

of opt:ratlonal ha rdware development rather than an experimental 

camera program. In forwarding copies of the earlier studies to BMD 

on 13 August, Eastman proposed a 90-day Phase 1 stage (design to 

mock-up) to cost $646. 713. and a subsequent Phase II effort to include 

design, construction, test, and flight test of development models and 

prototype camera systems. Eastman noted the impossibility of 

projecting development costs until completion of the Phase I activity 

and acknowledged the uncertainty of compatibility between the camera 

syst.em and available boost. orbit, and recovery subsystems. Nevertheless. the contractor reaffirmed the feasibility of providing two- to 

three-foot ground resolution in a high-acuity, stereo coverage 

surveillance camera system placed in a short-life satellite vehicle. 

urged by ARDC promised to involve semi-autonomous elements of 

5 e ve r al dl V1S ions in a single te chnical effort. thus diluting the 

cfit!ctlveness of the decision process and making major elements 

of the S'amos project dependent on actions that could not readily be 

C Qntrl.liled by program managers. Distrust of WADD co.mpetence 

was inherently part of the wider-based effort to make Samos a 

spe~' ial agenc y assignment. 

105 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

BYE 170' 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

Within l4 hours of receiving 

~ the Eastman studies and the 

4 

summary proposal, BMD was processing a letter contract. 

Functional transfer of responsibility from WADD and authorization 

for 5"le source procurement (without competition) were part of the 

5 

process. 

At that point, yet another factor was introduced into the 

equation. Space Technology Laboratories (STL) in August had 

responded to an earlier BMD mquiry mto the feasibility of covert! y 

launching and operating an orbital reconnaissance system. STL had 

attempted to specify means of satisfying three basic criteria: 

deflnition of an orbital life a od vehicle attitude adequate for the 

collection of useful photographs of Sovlet ground installations; an 

acceptable comprUITllse between guod photographic resolution and 

system simplicity: and covert launch from within the continental 

Umted States. For purposes of study and analysis, STL projected 

a deslred first-launch deadline of July 1961, 

The scheme that STL proposed in August 1960 was based on 

inserting an Atlas D nose cone into a polar orbit. Fired suuth from 

Point Arguello, the reentry vehicle theoretically could make 16 passes 

before reentermg. (The orbit was arbitrarily established to provide 

90-lTIlnut" 'lrcuits, so Ii:> passes would require 24 hours.l The vehicle 

BYE 17011-74 106 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

was to be spin stabilized, was to include a 24-1nch focal length 

panoramlc camera, and was to employ five-inch film exposed 1n 

40-lncn strips during alternate axial rotations. Alignment of the 

spin axis to insure that it would be parallel to the earth during the 

cntical period of each pass wuuld provlde good camera orientation. 

R"covery of the film caps ule ( comparable to the instrumentation 

capsule in a test ICBM warhead) was predicated on use of the wellf" oved AVCO Shape 52 reentry vehicle and a parachute. In many 

of its technical details, the STL proposal of August 1960 was stron!,(l y 

reminiscent of the March 1958 Lockheed-Fairchild approach which 

had led ultimately to Corona. 

The "covert launch and operation" requirement was .to be 

satisfied by a public explanauon that repeated passes of a warhead 

in a polar orbit were being used to measure the effectiveness of the 

ballistic mlsslle early warning system. After the ground stations 

had taken "sufficient" instrument readings, the nose cone would be 

"directed" to assume a reentry trajectory, thus simulating the actual 

penetration of a ballistic mlS sile warhead. 

Althuugh plaus ible ln a general sense, the cove r S tory had one 

major conceptual flaw. In order to obtain useful photographs, the 

, amera would have to remain in a relatively low orbit. But meaningful 

107 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

tests of the early warmng system required a good simulation of 

o 

actual warhead track: hIgh orbit and steep reentry. 

Introduction of the covert operation proposal. known as 

"Study 7," further complicated the task of reshapIng the total Samos 

effort. Apart from the E-l/ E-l and F-I/F-2 readout programs. 

which stiU existed in deprecIated form. Samos project activity 

included the E-5. the E-o evaluation, and Eastman's "Sunset Strip" 

system. Additionally. the receipt of the first Corona photographs 

on 24 August had thoroughly upset earlier notions about the feasibility 

of a "cheap and simple" approach to satellite reconnaissance. 

On 20 Septerrtber. less than a week after General Greer's 

office acquired a legal existence, Dr. Charyk, General Greer, Colonel 

Paul Beran (chairrrtan of the E-o evaluation board), and Lieutenant 

Colonel James Seay (the chlef procurement specialist in Greer's 

organizatlon) met in the LJnoersecretaryls office to consider an 

lrrtmediate course of action. After discussing both "Study 7" and 

fiSunset Strip, II reVIewing the status of the readout and recovery 

approaches, and considenng other current uncertainties, they agreed 

to pursue a two-phase approach whIch would include both E-o and 

"S unset Strip. II More important, they agreed that the 77-inch system 

would be covertly develooed for eventual clandestine operation. 

BYE 17017-74 Ioe 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

DecisIons on what techniques to pursue and how long to continue each 

had to be: put off until the results of the Phase I ItSunset StrIp" design 

effort had been completed, but $4.3 million was to be made available 

to fund the covert activity through the remainder of calendar year lQ60. 

Additionally, the meet ing produced a formal policy of conducting the 

enure S<UTIOS effort under a significantly more dense secunty blanket 

than had been the case in the unmediate past. 7 

The decision to proceed with a covert program was neither 

sudden nor startling. Charyk had discussed the idea with Drs. John 

Rubel and George Kistiakowsky at least once during the week before 

tht:> NatlOnal Security Council meeting of 1.5 August, and there apparently 

Wd S sume discus sian of the propOSItion during that meetlng, thvugh it 

cbd lIut find its way into the minutes. 8 It was almost an obvious course, 

in any event. The Air Force had widely publicized Samos as· a reconnaissance satellite. being .at least partly responsible for the Soviet 

U own's gradually hardening contention that reconnaissance from spac e 

was military activity which should be forbidden by international agreelllt> nt. It was entirely conceivable that political necessity might someday 

r~qulrc the United States to sign a IIno space reconnaissance" agreement 

wlth the Soviets. Should the "official" Samos program have to be 

tam dlcd, for any reason, a covert effort would rem.ain the oni y Jeasible 

109 B"I"E 1701 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

source for vltal mtelligen( e information on heartland activity. Corona, 

in it~ 0 nglnal conhguTrttlon, was inadequate insurance because of ltS 

resolution hml.tations and generally shaky performance record. Havlnl;;!, 

an alternilte rt:H onnaissanLe pru~ram with greater promise of providln/l 

the required lnformal1on on Soviet installations thus became an inevitable 

element uf national polle y. 

The re was a second aspt;;'C"t to covert development 1,)£ a Tee O:l.na 1.Ssance'subsystem. Should the political climate remain relatively stable 

and the several known Samos systems survive the uncertamties of 

development. it would be highly profitable to have a concealed technical 

. capability for very hH(h resolution sateU Ite reconnaissance. The general 

spel ifications of th", 1:..-0 WE're t'lrnung the most ill-kept of secret- . 

Te~ (lUll a1 detalls had 3ctuati., been pubhshed in one widely circulated 

aero ·space magazine. Although the Soviets might wen be suspicious 

of such a disclosure, reasom,ng that no great power could unwittin!l.lv 

bt: su lndis creet. it was also pussible that the tragicomic record of 

lax Air Force sel unty and that service's notorious fondness for 

pubht. it y would induce SOvlet intelllgence experts to accept the spec ificattons as valid. In that case, the ability to fly a camera capable of 

.!. ;-foot resolution in a satel lite ostenSibly designed for cameras of 

.. , ~. 

A'\latlOn Week. 

BYE 17017-74 110 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

10- to 15-foot resolution would constitute a highly useful reserve. It 

would. in effect. invoke the classical doctrine of technological surprise 

with the additional advantage that initial employment of the superior 

device need not become known to the prospective enemy. * 

General Greer. whose responsibility it would be to see that 

the various aspects of the newly approved Samos effort were carried 

to fruition. found himself with two basic objectives that were not 

necessaril y compatible. The first. derived from all of the studies 

and suggestions of mid-1960, was to accelerate and improve the reconnais sance satellite effort- - "a periodic phenomena IS inc e the fall of 1957, " 

as he charact~r1zed it: In a note to 01'. Charyk early in October he 

remarked of the "'money IS no object' exercises It: nAs a minor participant 1n these [rt::current] ..• flaps, I gradually learned the rules of 

the game and at the same time gained some perspective which I believe 

is relevant to the current s ltuation. 11 

.'. ',. 

The point of origin of the "technological surprise'1 philosophy remains 

unce rtaln. Unlike the notlon of developing a reconnais sance system 

which would remain avallable 1n case the official Samos program had 

tu be cancelled for some pulttical reason, "technological surprise" was 

little discussed in contemporary documents. Nevertheles s. it was 

"lmost certainly cons ide red 1n the October -December 1960 period when 

the uutlines of SAFSP "rgamloation and objectives were taking shape. 

[t cL'rtamly was a factor in the lTIore gradual program evolution of 

..:arly 1961. It depended, of lourse. on the premise that operation of 

som~ reconnaissance satellite would be accepted--or n~t oPfosed--

by the Soviet Union, but that ~ apability would be concealed. 

111 

BYE 1701 

, 

~:;. ....... ... ,...- ~ :..;::.. .... --I ~ ·'O'TC--/ _ ..... ;· • - _. 

TOP S;SCRIiT 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

Realistically, Greer concluded that the simplest, most direct way 

to get results was to "pwnp more money into the system. " although 

that technique invoked the inherent risk that "one may pay a high 

price for a small gain. II Greer added. "The commodity that makes 

Sammy run at my end of the business is money. The effect of all 

the words I use to contractors 1S dwarfed into insignificance when 

compared to the effect on them of cutting off money or adding money. 

This gets their attention and is the fundamental yardstick the contractor 

uses to determine how serious one is on a given issue. 1/ 

His solution was to try for the least expensive program that 

could be based against approved schedules, or the best schedules 

that could be arranged in the face of a fixed and limited budget. His 

preference, he told Dr. Charyk. was to "loosen the purse strings by 

a significant amount [and] ... put more emphasis on early performance 

'0 and less on economYe 11.1. 

The second major objective. apart from straightforward prugram 

acceleration. was to conduct a covert program. The Air Force WaS 

accustomed to rapid changes of direction in programs and could cope 

with them but had little expertise in covert research and development. 

The real difference between a "covert" and a highly classified program 

was not at all well understood. largely because the Air Force had in 

BYE 17017-74 liZ 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T ECRET 

the past remained on the periphery of covert activity. "Black" aspects 

of Genetrix. the U-Z, Corona and similar programs in which the Air 

Force had to some degree been mvolved had been entirely managed 

by the Central Intelligence Agtmcy--although CIA drew freel y on such 

Air Force technical talent, resources, equipment, and skilled personnel 

as were available. Locating and extracting information on how to 

conduct a covert program was a delicate operation. A minor blunder, 

a slightly indiscreet query, would compromise the effort because the 

mere expression of interest suggested that the questioner might be 

trying to set up a covert activity in his own area. 

Some of the trappings of undercover work seemed unnecessarily 

melodramatic. The Air Force security system tended to operate much 

like an exclusive club, rights of admission being determined by possession of a top secret clearance, sufficiently high rank, and generous 

interpretation of the classic "need to know" rule. The original Atlas 

program was a caSe in point. The most that could be expected of 

security within the Air Force was to obscure details of progress or 

program status; "normal" Air Force security had never succeeded in 

concealing the existence of a program or its goals. Although the "club" 

outlook and the irrepressible habit of making presentations at every 

opportunity contributed to the general laxness of security within the 

113 BYE 1701 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Air Force, the chief offender was the system of required reports--

chiefly financial. Generations of military leaders had grown up in 

the conviction that an attempt to conceal or obscure the details of 

financial transactions and contracts was irnmoral. It was standard 

practice to focus a harsh white light on every activity that featured 

the exchange of government money. Safeguards were so elaborate 

that there seemed no concl:!lvable way of letting contracts without 

becoming enmeshed in the intricate formalities of Air Materiel Command 

procedures--in which hundreds of people were necessarily involved. 

General Greer early concluded that the most difficult task he 

faced was keeping his {inane ial dealings out of foreordained channels. 

If it became known that his or ganization had quietly sponsored multimillion-doUar work on cameras and satellites, the implications would 

at once be obvious to every clerk and junior officer who proces sed 

financial records. But after considering the prospect; Greer concluded, 

perhaps cymcaU y. that the Samos program director could do quite a 

lot of covert purchasing and contracting without alerting the materiel 

command, simply because to lithe entire purchasing and contracting 

An Force" it would seem inconceivable that an isolated program 

director could possess the necessary authority. An absurclly simple 

approach, General Greer reasoned, would be to get a contract warrant 

BYE 17017-74 114 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

directly from the Secretary of the Air Force. Because such an action 

was unprecedented--not to say unthinkable--his posses sion of such 

authority might well go forever unsuspected. 

Many problems of operating a covert program were familiar to 

the original Corona team but new to Samos. A complete break with 

tradition, custom, and established habit certainly would be needed if 

Samos was to include a covert aspect. It had been General Greer1s 

obser'vation that in the conventional military organization every officer 

exposed to a closely held piece of information immediately experienced 

an overwhelming compulsion to inform his im.mediate superior. while 

. all commanders reacted by deciding that it was absolutely essential 

>:: to brief certain like y members" of their staffs. The inevitable re sult 

was early and complete loss of security, followed by powerful pressure 

to maneuver the entire system back into IInormal channels. II Greer 

was particularly concerned by the reflex tendency of military personnel 

to retreat into ordalned procurement channels. noting ruefully that 

"when your C ontractlng. financlng. and comptrolling are Inormall it 

Undersecretary Charyk ultimdtely had to forbid both General Anderson 

and General Schriever to pass knowledge of covert Samos programs 

downward in their headquarters, General Greer had to flatly forbid one 

pro~urement officer to brief an unknowing superior; and early in 1961 

sev~ral members of the ARDC staff had to be IIdebriefedlt of information 

they had acquired rather casually. The whole had overtpnes of Poe's 

"Imp of the Ferver se, II the tale of a perfect and unsuspected murder. 

Put:.' imbued the murderer wlth a compelling need to confide in somebody--

anybody. H~ could not resist. General Greer hoped for a happier ending. 

115 BYE 1701 

-~-:-. 05,,,,...,.';:-/-:--' 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09111 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

~T 

matters little that your command and communications are direct. 

Su"ner ur later the powerful pull of the financial management process 

11 

will allgn the rest of th" management machmery with itself. " 

Appreciating that "dev<,lopin!,! a capability for certam programs 

is d tt!chnlque and alm\.Jst an t> nd ln itself, II 1.2 Greer set out to 

obtaw th" basic mgredients, "f authority needed to perform his assignm"n!. The diff" ulty was that nobody knew precisely what was required 

In tl' procurement realm. First steps. therefore. were in the direction 

of simplifying contracting procedures so that the basic Samos effort 

,ould b" more expeditiously handled. In October, General Greer 

succeeded 111 having Major General T. P. Gerrity. the Ballistic Missile 

Center commander, invested with authurity to approve reconnaissance 

siHellite contrac-ts tu a limit of $50 million, subject only to secretariallevel d"terminatlUns and findings. "Open" procurement of such items 

as boosters and launch stand modifications received concurrent 

13 authurizatiun~ 

In the matter of Lovert contracting it was early apparent that 

the ,mly way tu circumvent all the requirements for reports and 

iinanl ial 5U"1l.n1arl~S was tu :,!t::"t d delegation of complete authority 

irom the S~, retary of the' Air F"rce, and a great quantity of entrenched 

precedent had to be pushed aside before so great a break witb established 

BYE 17017-74 116 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'fOP SECRET 

procedures could be favorably considered. Initially, because of hi::; 

general familiarity with C~ntral Intelligence Agency practices. Greer 

planned to go 50 far as to use pseudonyms in signlng contracts, but 

Undt:!l"secretary Charyk found the idea distasteful and by early January 

~­~-

1961 it had been dropped. As it happened, the fi r5t covert contract was 

not finally required until January, and by that time the vltal arrangements had been made. On the fifth of that month, Air Force Secretary 

D. C. Sharp approved a formal delegatwn of contracting authority to 

General Greer. who thus acqulrt::d the full authority of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Materiel, to approve deviations from armed fore es 

procurement regulatlUns. Although the authorlzation was not studded 

wnh inhibiting !.:lauses. Secretary Sharp nevertheless cautioned that 

"nonnal policil;::::;, practices, and procedures applicable to the Department of the Au Force" were tu be employed wherever possible. 

~everthele5s, the permissive authority to depart from sacrosanct 

contracting procedures invested General Greer with almost unprecedented 

The gene ral rlanned to use the name "Lt. Col. Roger E. Green. USAF," 

in signing covert contracts but bt:cause of Charyk's disapproval used his 

",-... n name. Brigadier Gene ral R. D. Curtin and Colonel J. R. Martin 

autographed the signature authentication cards which oppnly associated 

dollar amounts with contracts that, even though identified only by a 

5et of numbers. would have indicated the existence of a "ubstantiallyfunded satellite reconnais sance effort. 

117 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

BYE 1701 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SIiCRET 

powers. Any questlOn as tu their scope was removed early in February, 

when thi;! Air Force Gt::neral Counsel confirmed that the absence of 

deta 11 m the origmal authOrlZatlOn had been deliberatel y designed to 

*-

confer the broadest possible authority. The only significant limitation 

l4 

was a proviso that any redelegation had to be approved by the sec retar y. 

Once the matter of proper authorization had been resolved, 

covert contracts became feasible. They neve I' became routine, and 

the problems arising from security and cover difficulties generally had 

to be solved individually rather than by reference to the rote of a set 

procedure, but a satisfactory general pattern did emerge. In the case 

of the original cove rt L ontTncts, with Eastman Kodak and General Electric, 

fuur copies of the formal agreements and the work statements were 

prepared. Gel1eral Greer1s establishment retained one, the "USAF 

comptI' oller for covert prog rams" ~,-----______ f on the staff of the 

All' Force Asslstant Sec retary for Financial Management) another, 

the cuntractor one more. a fourth was kept on 'file for a future audit 

(or a General Accounting Ofhce team. should it ev~r be needed). A 

General Greer was allthorlzed to appoint contracting officers, to 

as sign procurement authorit y to such officers, to approve cost-plusfixed-fee contracts. to approve time and materials contracts. to 

approve contractor ov~rt1me, to control government-owned industnal 

propert y, and to appolnt and control property administrators. 

BYE 17017-74 U8 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

different and "sterilized" contract, without the work statement, went 

to the official who wrote checks for Meyer. It showed the correct 

contractor and contract number, but identified ARDC rather than 

SAFSP as the program agency. This permitted reasonably standard 

proceS-lng of ("ontracts and checks which had to go into the established 

channels for funding citation. A "sterilized" voucher preceded each 

check. The checks were mailed or personally delivered to a "neutral 

drop" somewhere in the contractor's organization and were there enter"d 

in the contractor's "black" accounting system. (Each contractor had 

two funding and accounting systems, one enfolded within the other and 

completely hidden from new, In that it was necessary to hide incoming 

money and to conceal huge sales of time and materials, the system had 

the appearance of a huge t!mbezzlement in reverse! lOne officer, 

strategically located withtn headquarters of the Air Researc·h and 

Development Cummand. was briefed on the true facts and authorized 

to answer embarrassing questions that might arise because the dollar 

amounts on the "sanitlzed" contracts and vouchers were considerably 

larger than was customary f<lr a command headquarters contract. 

W,th variations to suit 8peClai Clrcumstances, that much of the covert 

,·untractin!', procedure subsequently became "standard. " 

Since une of the major goals of the Samos reorganization had 

been to accelerate the entire process of satellite reconnaissance, it 

BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

was in sum" respects as important to remove obstacles to rapid 

l1open" cuntracting as to invent techniques for covert procurements. 

Moreover, the National Security Council decision to segregate Samos 

from the remainder of Air Furce research and development, together 

with subseq11ent directives that cut across established channels of 

command and communication, provided an excellent means of occluding 

the whole of the Samos pruject. The October 1900 action that gave 

General Gerrity the authority to act on contracts of $50 million or 

less without command or air staff review put into practice the rules 

of "no Intermediate reView" earlier promulgated. On 14 October, all 

maJur commands were formally notified of these new facts of life and 

of the spe( lal status to be accorded Samos thereafter. The notiflcation 

boldl y stated tha t neither review and approval authority nOr the right 

to program brlefin~s was Implicit at any level between the program 

director (Greer) and the secretary's office (Charyk). At the same 

tim", General Greer was formally assigned to the secretary's office 

With additional duty as BMD vic"" (omITlander. For nearly two ITlonths, 

since the time of his oTlf(lnal selection, Greer had legally been a 

"prun"ry duty" VIce commander and thus subject to the orders of both 

l5 

the BMD and the ARDC commanders. 

Basic policy questwns involvin~ what aspects of the program 

should be emphasized, how the covert activities were to be approached, 

BYE 17017-74 l20 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

and how the new tec:hnl'"jUeS lif iJrogram security were to be activated 

were largely resolved In O,tober, November, and December 1960. A 

key indicator was Dr. Charykfs ruling that no public announcement of 

the pending E-6 source selection would be made either by the Air Force 

... .,-

or by the selected contractor. 

A new public information plan being constructed for Samos was 

to be based on the thesis that llit is no longer in the national interest 

to release detailed information on the SAMOS project. 11 Basics of the 

arrangement were made known to BMD on 4 November--including the 

caution that there was to be no public announcement of the new policy. 

If necessary, howeve.r. BMD was authorized to answer questions about 

the E-6 competition by stating that Eastman had been given a contract 

tQ develop If 'photographic I components 11 and Martin a contract to develop 

"a recovery capsule. " 16 

In point of fact. the skeletal information that reached the 

Ballistic Missile Divlsion contained little more than instructions 

to award contracts to Eastman (photographic subsystem) and Martin 

{applied research in the area of maneuverable, lifting body reentry 

". ',' 

Queries concerning the outcome of the source selection process were 

to be directed to the secretary and answers were to be based on the 

proposltion that anythlng which could be successfully denied woulq. be. 

Thus, since the fact that an E-6 11competition" was in pr,?cess had been 

widely circulated wlthin the aerospace industry, the question "Has an 

E-6 award been made'>" was to be answered merely, "Yes. II 

121 

aYE 17017 

TOP SECR5~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

vehu::les) and to expand existent Aerospace Corporation contracts to 

cover systems engineermg and technical direction of the E-6 development. 17 

During the flrst week of November 1960 a second set of key 

decisions emerged from a 5 eTles of Pentagon meetings. Undersecretary 

Charyk and General Greer dlsc us sed the available technical options in 

greater detail and agreed to drop further consideration of the "Study 7" 

spm-stabillzed camera appr",H'h. They reconfirmed their determination 

to conduct a covert reCOnnall:i sance operation, nonetheless. Charyk 

approved further study, of the cone ept of encasing a camera in an orbiting 

missile nose cone and using the "warning system test program" * as a 

18 

cover for reconnaissance fllghts. 

A new and highl Y slgmficant innovation of the earl y November 

meetings was thl::' propu::;al tI.;> us I::' the E- 6 program as a cover for 

devdopment of th.· "Sunset Stnp" system. Charyk agreed with General 

Greer1s .;;uggestion that Eastn an develop the 77-inch camera under the 

code name Project Goimbll--d term that Greer chose, and which was 

C onsiderabl y more lTI~aningf!J...I tha n most code designatlons - -while 

Gene ra 1 Eiectric deve luped " ::-. ultable ballistic reentry vehicle. By 

keepinL! tht> physical and envlrunm~ntal limitations of E-6 and Gambit 

cornpaullle with one anuth ... r, It loeemed possible to develop and test 

_ .. -, 

"Study 7" had bl::en naml:!d Bule ro,) and the nOSe-cone decoy plan was 

ca J ted DSEP, for Defense System Evaluation Project. 

BYE 17017-74 il2 

'!'oP SEtRE'!' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Gambit without any outward indicatlon that such a program exuted. 

The lnStitutlOn of rigid security controls over the whole of the Samos 

operation would greatly enhance the possibility that the scope of the 

total program could be entirel y hidden. Thus "technological surprise II 

became a goal of the new Samos program. 

Before the plan could become effective, however, program 

managers had to dispose of the widel y dispersed evidence that a 77 -inch 

camera development existed. As had been true of lIProject 11" in early 

~ . .... 

1958, and of Caro,lsel in 1959, the proposed "Sunset Strip" development 

program was so widely known that it would be necessary to invent and 

circulate a palatable rt!ason for cancelling an essentially reasonable 

approach to satelhte reconnalS sanee. Project personnel achieved 

that end by havlng BMD terminate the Eastman study contract for "Sunset 

Strip, II wlth the excUSe that "review of recent proposals for E-6 camera 

reveals that future study in this area (77-inch camera) is not r.equired." 

Simultaneously, the Samos office drew up the first of its rlblack ll contracts, 

authorizlng Eastrnt'ln to contlnue the development as a covert effort. 

Presidential reServe funds ("black" or Ijclassifiedll funds) in the amount 

of $i5. 5 million were tentatively identified as the fiscal 1961 program 

requirement. 

',' -. 

See Volume 1 for details. 

123 

TOP SECRET 

BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 

The .physical process of shifting the Gambit camera develop. 

ment into a totally secure buddmg resembled the process of sequestering Corona work at Luckheed, three years earlier. As the "Sunset 

Strip" activity, losed out and personnel-were nominally shifted to 

other Eastman projects, they actually moved into a new building, were 

briefed on the fae t that the project was very much alive, and resumed 

their work. Much the same procedure was followed with General 

Electric, although the fact that the E-6 and Gambit orbital and reentry 

systems were closely akin, at least at hrst, greatly simplified the 

19 

project security problem. 

By the murning of 7 November 1960, General Greer had briefed 

key officials of At'rospace Corporation, General Electric, and Eastman 

Kodak on the Gilntb,t program, its objectives, and its relationship 

to E-6. He emphaSized that the three pnnnpal contractors plus the 

project office w"uld constHute a task force with the objective of developlng, testing, and pruofing the Gambit system in the shortest possible 

tlme compatible with attamment of the desired objectives. Lockheed, 

WhlCh ultllnately became lnvolved by virtue of the decision to use Agena 

as a stage in the total system, essentially did no more than supply a 

s emi~standard vehicle. General Eleo..tric's cover would be the development of an alternate reentry body for the E-6; Eastman chiefly relied 

BYE 17017-74 124 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'l"6P SECRET 

on a "proprietar y development /I explanation like that earlier devised 

to cover Lockheed' s Corona activitie s~ and Aerospace Curporation 

upt;;rated under the same extremely rigid "need to know" ground rules 

2.0 

as the Samos office. 

The Gambit decisions of November 1960 when taken in context 

with E-5 and E-6 actions of the same period generally established a 

philosophy for SAFSP activity but fell short of constituting a policy. 

In surn.e respects. specifications of the program office transformed 

philosophy into policy, *' but in other regimes more formal action 

sedmed required. 

Although the changed Clrcumstances of the Samos program 

should have been ObVlOUS to all of the All" Force by October, there 

sUll were mdications that in some quarters the passing of the old 

order either was not understood or was not accepted. Late. that month, 

An Force headquarters advised tht:: Air Materiel Command that it 

would be well to plan for operatlOnal-use logistic support of ',amos 

usmg th\! operational dates bsted in the 1I1a testl! program guides. 

Some three weeks later, the Strategic Air Command inform.'d I\.RDC 

,'. ",. 

The lssuance of blanket travel orders to General Greer. Brigadier 

General H. L. Evans (his deputy). and Colonels Heran and J. W. 

Rue bel, permitted those key officials to travel as necessary without 

gl ving awa y to travel-office personnel their destinations or purposes. 

Surreptitious travel thus made a gradual transition from practice to 

I· 21 PUtll:Y. 

125 BYE 17017 

TOP SECRE'J!-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

that th" "requirement" to turn both Samos and Midas over to oper,,-

tlOnal commands at the earl,,,st possibJe moment was "st111 valid 

and mllst be' recognized." Shortly ther"after, ARDC issued an 

Opt'TntllJn:-. order (which had been in preparation since late Septt.~mber·) 

that at least implied, if 1t did not specifically define, a considerabl,· 

role for the research and development command in the conduct of the 

22 

Samus prugram. 

"-",neral Greer's office, foHowing a post-publicatlOn review of 

the operations order, decided that it was generally in concert wIth 

earher expressions of project objectives. Less charitably, Sam,' of 

thl:' IJr"Jef"! staff ITlelnbers characterized it as "harmless, 11 even 

thOll~ll it implied an unwarranted element of ARDe proje:n authortl,. l3 

The Air Staff and Strat"gic Air Command viewpoints were another 

matkr, so on 6 December Undersecretary Charyk sent a pair of 

111CJ11"rClncia to the Alr Force Chief of Statf which restated the obJ!~~·{"tlVt.'5 

:lnd operat,ng prinCiples of th" Samos effort. 

fhe first of the papers was classified secret but was 1!white" 

"no ",,; ubviously intend"d for general circulation among those who"e 

s\·~ qr~t~ clearances and posltions made them members of the Hcluu. l! 

it St"\ furth several key theorems: (1) Samos "should be regarded as 

an R&D program aimed at the exploitation of various promising recon1:;I1,",~;1n("t:.' technique~'!; (~) the program would nonetheless be oriented 

BYE 17017-74 126 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP~ __ 

toward obtainmg operationally useful intelligence; and (3) the "nature 

and character" of the eventual operational system were "completely 

conditioned upon the success of the methods which will be exploited 

in the R&D program." "Accordingly," added Charyk, "effective 

operational planning can not be accomplished at this time. " 

Dr. Charyk observed that major resources were still being 

expended in efforts having "little or no connection with the new direction of the R&D program" (a certain reference to continued attempts to 

retain Subsystem 1) and that there was a "startling lack of knowledge 

and familiarity with the reoriented program." He noted with some 

-asperity that many "unfortunate remarks" in public. repeated in the 

press, were serving to make achievement of program goals most 

difficult and procet:ded to specify policies that would reduce the incidence 

of such occurrences: (1) Samos was not to be included in the' "normal" 

program docuITlentation published under 375-series regulations; (Z) as 

necessary. General Curtin's office (SAFMS) would provide entries for 

the Chief of Staff's Policy Book for legislative matters; (3) the Weapons 

Board was not to IImonitor lt the Samos program and "no reviews or 

analyses should be undertaken by the various panels, boards, and 

committees"; (4) operating-command reconnalssance requirements 

lZ7 BYE 17017-

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

would be reviewed as received; and (5) the Samos Working Group 

f,: 

should be dissolved. 

In a separate note to Ge neral White (sent the same da y, but 

mark~d "Speclal Handlin gil to lnsure that it would reach onl y Gambitcleared personnel), Charyk set forth for the first time the basic 

phllosophy behind the new Samos program. He called attention to 

the fact that "very sel" 10us pressures ff would be directed toward a 

fully operational reconnatssance system and that it was essential. 

therefore, to "maximize the reconnaissance take at the earliest 

pas sible date and to attempt to obtain such information in as low key 

rt fashlOn as possible." Since the greatest chance of program success 

::>I;!t:!mt:!cl to lie in conducting Samos as a long-term research and developI1Tent effort and there were compelling national policy reasons for 

avoidlng any associatlon wtth a military operational command "such as 

SAC, " it was desirable 1v estaOlish a IIcombination research. development, and operatlOnai program conducted under cover of research and 

development .••• " 

Said Dr. Charyk. " ..• 11 1S not contemplated that there will be 

an acknowledged or normal operatLOnal phase within the near future. " 

Dr. Char}k's use l)f th~ h'nn "wasted effort" in connection with -the 

:1boli.sh .. d r<:p·'-t;, ~,allds. t)():lrdF, and "working groups:-fI clearly 

Ut'fll1t.!d hl$ opJ.nwn~ or, the worth of such actlvlty to the pro~ram. 

BYE 17017-74 128 

,.....::1 ....... _ .:::.,;:: .;;. ....... ;:;-/ .... -;.~ ..... ""' __ -,-'_-_- ~... . .... -,. _.... ... -

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

He added, "the policies, actions, and procedures necessary 

to support this confi.guration of the project are completely different 

from normal policies, actions and procedures and will ce rtainl y tend 

to produce misunderstanding and criticism within nurmal organiza t lI.Jnal 

channels." He conceded also that the problem was further complicakd 

by the fact that the "full story" could not be given to all who wert' 

affected. a.dding, "In fact, it must be held most closely if it is to be 

effective at all. II When progres s was sufficient and national polic-.., 

permitted a change, a transition to tla normal operational program" 

would be scheduled. the undersecretary suggested. But. "in the 

ITleantime, the program will include aU essential elements to meet 

h . - d l' h db' 1 L4 t e reconnalS s<\ nee reqUlrements an to exp olt t e ata so 0 talned. ' 

Though phrased With considerable fines se and in terms that 

probably would not cause the "in channelS" Air Force to rise in revolt, 

Charyk IS pohcy statement nonetheles s represented a total rejectlOn 

uf :111 operatlOnal command claims to deployable systems and of all 

r e st::arch and development command claims to management authority. 

There was no real doubt that he intended to streamline the management 

process by eliminating ARDe influence (and procedures). to give the 

Samos program the nominal character of an extended research and 

d!;:velopment effort, and to make the Sarnos project an operational 

129 BYE 17017 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

organization which would essentially treat the Strategic Air Command 

as merely another user of acquired data. An uninhibited conversation 

between Greer and Charyk later in December made those propositwns 

l5 

explicit. 

Thinking through the implications of the several policy papers 

that had emerged since the National Security Council decislOn of 

Au;(ust, General Greer concluded in December that his real job was 

to "get pictures ..• in such a manner as not to preCipitate a U-2 

crisis in whlch the U.S. might be constrained to discontinu" SAMUS." 

and to lnsure the availability of systems which could covertly obtain 

needed photographs should ev"n "low key" reconnaissance operations 

become impusslbl". His immediate task, then, was to create a real 

ability to operate' a covert program, and his chief difficulty of the 

moment was that "the military system for contracting and for dispersing 

2.6 

1110ney are very (, ieverly designed to frustrate a c~'vert program. II 

The elements of general policy under which SAFSP was to 

operate had been defined in February and appropriately circulated by 

the cnd of May 1961. On 29 May, a classified Headquarters USAF 

Office InstructlOn formally restated, for the benefit of the Air Force 

at large, the program ratlOnale that had been adopted. For practical 

purposes, 1t was a formahzation of Undersecretary Charyk's December 

BYE 17017-74 130 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

1960 memorandum to General White. neither expanding nor enlarging 

- h d f- d Z 7 the lnstructlons t ere e lne . Considerabl y more important was a 

3 April "Satelhte Reconnaissance Plan" which, though closely held, 

defined in cons1derable detail and in formal fashion the actual" policies, 

procedures, and actions to be appUed ••. in order to achieve the ••. 

objectives of the national satellite reconnaissanee program. " 

Those objectives were to enhance and protect the probability 

of "adequate and timel y data collection" without "inviting pos sible 

political counteraction, " and to create a lasting ability to acquir .. 

reconnaissance information" in the event that circumstances shuuld 

force limitations, reduction, or even elimination of overt flights." 

The situation that prompted the covert effort was essentially 

that the overt obJ"ctive of creating an American satellite reconnaissance 

system had been widely publicized, that regular flights ("overt and 

acknowledged") with military objectives were scheduled to begin in 

the near future, and that any indication of prog-ram success mlght 

provoke both political counteraction and a military response h ,m the 

.50\·H~t Union. Neither was wanted~ 

The plan specified that: 

As a firm basic policy, there will be no "operational" 

overt satellite reconnaissance Or any association of the 

program with an operational command for an indefinite 

t1me, and the overt satellite reconnaissance program will 

be brought to a full y operational status under cover of 

131 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 

research and development, and operated indefinitely 

under this cover. The policy expressed in the 6 December 1960 Top Secret memorandum from the 

Undersecretary of the Air Force to the Chief of 

Staff, entitled "Basic Policy Concerning Samos, " 

will continue for the indefinite future. 

Reflecting the urgency of technical efforts based on the political 

environ,ment, the policy document contained a forthright statement of 

the need for more intensive control of project security and f;'r the 

maintenance of "a viable covert effort which has the feasible capability 

of being sustained indefinitely after cancellation of the overt effort. " 

Significantly, the objective of tightened security was to eliminate 

virtuall y all public references to military space programs and specifically to prohibit public disclosure of the flight test objectives or results 

of satellite reconnaissance. Within such an environment it seemed 

possible to culture a covert effort " .•• sustainable indefinitely in 

the wake of a forced public cancellation of the overt reconnaissance 

program, and which can meet all principal intelligence objectives of 

the overt program." To that end, it was necessary to conduct the 

satellite reconnaissance aspect of the total Air Force military space 

program so effectively that no indicators of the status of the overt 

program would surface in public. The covert program, of course, 

would be still more obscure--hidden even from many of those nominally 

_28 cognizant of the extent and progress of the overt eifort., 

BYE 17017-74 

-,->., :;'''-'-/-'0'' "0 ~32 ... 

TOP~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

SECRET 

Within six months of the decision to shift Samos management 

to a higher level and to accelerate the pace of technical development, 

the basi, program had been completely overhauled. Quite apart {rum 

the important new directions technology was taking, program objectives had altered so significantly that the new program bore no 

resemblance to anything that had preceded it in Air Force experience. 

The mass of detailed changes somewhat obscured but could not conceal 

the fact that what had been created was a highly specialized project 

organization with unprecedented authority, a capability to respond 

rapidly both to new requirements and to direction from higher authority, 

and a set of goals that would have been technologically infeasible in a 

pre-l960 environment. The concentration in a single relatively small 

o~~ganization of very sweeping engineering and procurement responsibility, exemplary technical and managerial talents, and adequate financial 

resources constituted a remarkable concession to the urgency of the 

satellite reconnaissance effort. The assignment to such an organization of responsibility for clandestine development of reconnaissance 

systems was highly unusual; to make that organization ultimately 

responsible for the operation as well as the development of a major 

weapon marked a radical break with the past. Yet in a period of 

about six months all of these innovations had been conceived, approved, 

a nd applied. 

BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

ECRET 

The generation of a policy did not immediately solve all polley 

problems, nor did the defimtwn of program goals eliminate alJ 

program uncertainties. The relationship between the ciand"stine 

Corona effort and the part-concealed, part-clandestine activity bCln~ 

conducted by General Greer's establishment remain, d somewhat 

uncertain, even though on 20 September lQ60 Charyk had directed that 

Air Force participation in Corona should be handled within the San-lOS 

managernt!nt structure. (Argon, the Army-originated covert mappmg 

satelhte program, wa.s the subject of an identical order.) Colonel 

Paul E. Worthman, Air Force Corona chief, found himself in a somewhat 

awkward position. Like his predecessor, Colonel Sheppard, Worthman 

had in nlan) respects occupied a special-category management pu:ntion, 

exercismg virtually all important Air Force authority in Corona but 

having no real Air Force chain of connmand either above or below him. 

HIS contact point in the Pentagon had been the Advanced Technology 

Office of the Air Staff, an organization absorbed by General Curtin 

in September 1960, but fur practical purposes he had originated prugram 

proposals (Including proposed schedules, payloads, and launch dates, 

fur l.nstance) without much concern for courdination with or concurrenCe 

b\' other Air Force echelons. Corona requirements had dominated the 

!'Discuvcrer" pro~rarn and pretense to the contrary was specious. 

BYE 1,017-74 134 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

The new arrangement brought about fewer immediate changes 

than might have been anticipated. Greer and Worthman f. rst dlscussed 

the essentials of their relationship on 20 October, shortly after Colonel 

Worthman learned that the general was to be the West Coast "focal 

poi.nt" for Corona matters. Typically, Greer told Worthman he wanted 

no changes in the existent operational and organizational arranl!ements, 

that Worthman would contmue as the Air Force Corona (and Argon) 

director, and that there was no need to depart from established cOTnmunication channels. (Thus Worthman continued to deal with the CIA and 

Corona contractors by means of a special crypto teletype network 

created for that purpo~e. Such communication channels were not open 

to the Ai.r Force, nor were copies of Corona correspondence normally 

2,9 furmshed to memb"rs of Greer's staff.) 

Although an entirely comfortable working arrangement resulted 

on the Wt!st Coast, there was for the moment virtually no integration 

of activity or personnel there. No open antagonism was apparent, but 

the dlver~ence of interest between Sarnos and Corona suggested that 

dangerous friction could have developed had the personalities of Greer 

and Worthman been different. At the policy level, particularly as it 

concerned security, differences in viewpoint resulted as much from the 

exp<!rience of the Corona people and the relative inexperience of the 

S;l!1lOS ~roup In covert activity as from any other factor". With 

135 BYE 1701. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Justification, Worthman's group took considerable pr,de in Corona 

program achievements and in the fact that notwithstanding aU the 

uiscouragements oi early years, Corona had returned and was continuing to return useful ,ntelligence. Corona was perforITling precisely 

as the SaITl.os program was not intended to perform, and the Corona 

people tended to resist innovations that might change their circuITlstances 

U nfa vorabl y. 

Members of the Sarnos organization, engaged in an enterprise 

tenfold larger and more costly than Corona, and convinced that the 

highly sophisticated E-6 wuuld shortly displace the theoretically less 

c apa bie Corona 5 ys tern, tended to be a bit superior about the older 

program. Ther~ was also the fact that relatively few of the SaITlOS 

peuple were cogmzant of Corona achievements, while most of the 

local Corona team members knew of Gambit and were familiar with 

E-S and E-6 details. (Even though they were aware of Gambit and of 

the principles of con,rt operation, Gambit-cleared personnel who 

w"re subsequently ~iven access to Corona program details frequently 

expressed astonlshment at the existence of Corona.) Most of the 

Curuna people were hearty supporters of a stereo version (Mural) 

then beginning development and were enthusiastic about the prospects 

uf the £.::.:.. (pronounced cec-tnple-prime) version of Corona nearing 

BYE 17017-74 136 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

flight test. U the Samos people were confident that E-6 would make 

C0Tona obsolde. the Corona team was equally certain that improveITlCnts like CIII and Mural had a d; ance of equaling or surpassing 

anticipated Samos achievements--and at lesser cost and sooner than 

the Samos development schedule would permit. 

In the light of such circumstances. it was remarkable that the 

Corona and SalTlos groups on the West Coast got along as well as the y 

did. It was not that each group had uncritical confidence in the other I s 

good intentions, or good faitl. In some instances a consequent lack of 

full and free communication of ideas. both technical and proct:"dural, 

undoubtedl y hampered one or both vf the still separate efforts: But 

on the whole the relationship was effective; damage was slight. )~~ 

ThIS asst;!::>sment is based un a series of discussions with individuals 

who W<::lre engaged in buth Coruna and Samos programs J at all levels, 

during. the period August 1960-December 1961. Although the hallowed 

tri-lditions of hlsturiography r~quire a full statement of sources. I 

feel no compulsion to specify who said precisely what about the early 

rclationshlps between the "Greer groupt! and the ItWorthman group. " 

Th~ terms themselves are misleading, since General Greer and 

Culonel Worthman had hi~h regard for one another's talents, and the 

rn..;:mbe 1"5 of the two "groups" were not so much divided by different 

iuvaltie 5 as convinced of the super iority of their own pTOg rams. It 

i1as bet::n suggested that a notation of latent or blatant conflict between 

two groups of' Air Force p~ople is inappropriate to an account of this 

nature. For my part, [think it remarkable that two groups with 

putt!ntially catastrophlc differences worked so effectively together 

and, in time, quietly blended. The viciousnes s of some intra-Air Foret: 

'tdiff~rences of opinion'! is iegendary, and the conseque~ces of such 

t37 BIT 17017 

TOP SECRJ;T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Contacts at the next higher level of organization were not 

always so peaceable. Dr. Charyk early assumed that Corona should 

come under his control. as part of the total satdhte reconnaissanct: 

"disputes" have occasionally been de ,Uy. There is no bt:.>tter indication 

of the dedication, intelligence, and gene ral good sense of Samos and 

Corona program partiClpants than the overall eifectivene::>s of their 

rdationship during 1961. It improved later. when organizational 

differences were re solved. but that was inevitable in the nature of 

things. 

One aspect of Corona-Samos program relationships that has not 

Lt:!en tr~ated here is the role of Central Intelligence Agency participants in Corona. It was not, in factt a significant problem in 1960 

and 1961, and it remained a relatively high-level problem, with little 

impact on the West Coast program office structures. ulltll 1963. 

Agaln. that rna. y have bet!n largely a matter of pI:! rsonailtlcs. Richard 

Bissell, CIA 1 S deputy director, and J. V. Charyk, head of the Departn1ent of Defense satellite reconnaissance program as Undersecretary 

of the An Force, had an effe<.'tive working relationship that more than 

offset the or:t-!dni zatianal imperatl ves their subordinates usuall > 

experienced. Pt'rhaps as important. m 1960 and 1961 the Samos and 

the Coroni'!. working groups were comparatively small and were 

mostly cumposed of indiViduals with long and generally happy E'xperie nee 111 lnteractive Air Force-CIA affairs. Greer. Ritland, Wurthman. 

and Sheppard were veterans of earlier cooperative enterprises ranging 

from G('netrix to the U-2; Bissell and his closest associates (Eugene 

K icfer. for instance) weI' e similarly experienced. FinaU y, Bis sell 

? nd Chi'! ryk looked on satellite reconnaissance as a national activity 

rather than as the unique province of one agency or another. The 

iu::>t of CIA and Air Force program participants for one another I S 

assigned programs did not become an important consideration in the 

naticmal reconnaissance effort until Charyk and Bissell had left office. 

(RP) 

BY!: 1'";017-74 

138 

TOP SECRE'P 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

effuJ·t, and began by exercising as much authority as he could summun. 

He did su wlth the implled approval uf the CrA's deputy director, Btssell. 

Th~ pecuhar chain of cutnrnand for DiSt l)Verer -CuTvna progr;un decisions 

u~caslOned the first frictlOn. Habitually, Corona launch schedules--and 

thus DisLoverer schedules and payload allocations--were determined by 

the Curona group at BMD basc·d on advice from CrA. Intelligence requirements were the basic justification for establishment and alteratlOn of such 

schedules. During the long drought, when the first 12 Discuverer £lights 

had constituted one continuing disappointment, decisions Lad been ,dmost 

automatlc . They were originated within the Corona program, surfaced 

. as recommendatiuns from the D,scoverer program office, and forwarded 

irum BMD to ARDe headquarters for rubber-stamp approval. Theoretlcally, ARDe headquarters was the deciding authority, with the Air Staff 

..:xerC1Sln~ a Vt:!to. Once the Corona flights began returning "take. II 

automatic schedultng disappeared and the question of whu actually was 

the deClding authority assumed some lmportance. In October 1960, 

General Schriever decided that the long-delayed biomedical capsule for 

DlScoverer ("the monkey capsule") should finally be flown. He instructed 

G~n"ral Rttland, at BMD, to construct an appropriate schedule and 

G~nt'ral Rltland, with some trepidation, complied. When the altered 

scl",duJe reached Undersecretary Charyk, he reacted strongly. He 

BYE 1701~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

• 

believed that biomedlcal experiments leading to manned orbital f11ght 

were the r"sponsibility of the National Aeronautics and Space Admmistration (0:ASA), the Air Force had been told to get out of the "man-lnspace" business. He promptly ordered that no future schedule or 

program modificatlons be introduced without his prior and expres~ 

approval. 

Although Charyk's dictum was actually prompted by a new A,r 

Force attempt to inflate its man-in-space role, it had the effect of 

serving nutice on the CIA that henceforth Charyk's organization proposed to decide what Corona payloads flew, and when. By implication, 

it also sUf(gested that Dr. Charyk's organization had a decidIng VOlce 

in technical qut'stions, a prerogative that CIA treasured. To resulve 

such questions, though without a specific preliminary statement of 

155ues, a meeting was called in Charyk's office for 3 November 1960. 

Richard Bissell, CIA godfather and patron saint <If th" Corona 

prugram, was actually the only CIA official competent to establlsh his 

agency's position. He was unable to attend the meeting, leavmg the 

discussion to middle-management representatives from the West Coast 

Curuna office, CIA headquarters, and Charyk's staff. 

[n the discussions that followed, Dr. Charyk made lt clear that 

he ,onsidcred h,S charter to include a considerable authority over 

Bn 17017-74 

- :; -' 

140 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Corona as well as Samu,. H .. conceded the need for conunued direct 

cuntacts between the CIA and the Corona office at BMD but insisted 

that henceforth all change" in schedules, dollars, payloads, and techmcal features b.., coordinakd with him. The discussions also made it 

apparent that the CIA mddle management had no intention of abdicating 

Its authOrlty for Corona actiVlty, in which th" agency had invested 

nearly four years and tens of millions of dollars, although Bissell's 

absence prevented any direct confrontation on such issues. 

Such conversations continued through November and into Dect'mbe r WIthout producing any ground for general agreement. Charyk 

indlcated, in Dt'cernber, that he favored an integrated cuver plan for 

Curona and Sarnos (partlcuiarly for Gambit, although that effort still 

was in its infancy\. He questioned whether a cover based on the expressed 

ll1tention of eventually firtng ~ biomedical capsule into orbit was 

adequate for all of Corona. What he failed to recognize--perhaps because 

~ven the Corona people still had no more than an instinctive feel for the 

;ltuatlOll--was that after 12 less-than-successful firings the program 

was its own excuse for continuance. Each program failure justified a 

whole sue-cession of later trials for which no payload speCifications need 

The d'SLussions of ~ovember and December 1960 made it 

reasonably dear that Charyl-., and in some degree Vlrtually all of 

141 BYE 17017-

~ "":.0-,-/-. _ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

the Samos -oriented group, adhered to the earher unchallenged 

as:::;umptl.on that Corona was a gap-fill reconnaissance system 

with a limited future. Confidently expecting the E-5 and E-6 programs 

to produce results far surpassing the capacity of Corona, Charyk per-

. sistently asked CIA representatives to specify a completlOn date for 

the Corona "ffort. No answers were forthcoming--which induced 

some members of the Samos group to conclude that the Curona people 

were erecting a rival effort which they intended to operate mdependent 

of the "unified" satellit" reconnaissance program. 30 

The cross flow of proposals and anti-proposals e,;tablished "n 

atmosphere for conttnued operation of both the Samos and Corona 

programs but dId nothing to resolve the matter of baslc Atr Force 

authonty in Curona. Although he received verbal adVice from time 

to tln"le, General Greer never was given a definition of his authorit) 

over Corona. So long as Richard Bissell remained the chief CIA 

authority on that program and Colonel Paul Worthrr>an remained its 

pru~ram dlrector, that circun1stance was not importanL For a tiInc, 

certainly through all of 1961. the basic problems of the Thor, the Agena. 

ur the payload independent!) remained important enough to obsl ure 

concern fur problems anstn~ through the interfaces of those element~. 

LMter, when the basic elements of the total system were working 

rt"asunablv well, tt bt"c'ame apparent that faulty interactwn between the 

BYE 17017-74 

142 

-,-:-.: =.7-:-/-'"-' "":.-> 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283.~._~ 

payload and thuse syskm portions obtained through Air Furce channels 

was ~ervlng tu inhibtt the op"rational ut,lit)' of the total system. In 

such an environnlent, a centred authority was needed to resolve issues 

affecting various of the integrals of Corona--and none ",,,sted. 31 

The impulse whlch had led, through devious channels, to the 

creation of an SAFSP organizatiun ,n August 1960, had by early 1961 

caused that organization to have a shape and content lar/!ely undrt:amed 

uf six months earlier. In early 19&1, the reconnaissance satellite 

program consisted of Corona, with various pending improvements 

which would make it a rival uf some aspects of Samos, and a basic 

Sarnos program winch had tak"n on unique characteristic ti of its 0,,"". 

Both r"adout photography and readout ferret programs still surVlved, 

il,; the £-1, E-2, and F-l, F-2. The E-5 of 1959 vintage continu"d 

development, an E-6 mure nf'arly responsive to current intelligence 

r"quirements had begun development, lnd Gambit was progressing 

tuward fllght test at a somewhat slower pace. Additionally, in the 

early 111onths' of 19bi, Under::iecr~lary Charyk lTIoved the ferret prograzns 

irunl Atlas to Thor buosters, essentially creating one new program in 

th" prucess, and over a span of months he directed the revitalization 

vi" mapping satellite project (E-4) which, though it had ancient 

antt;,( t.'dcnts, vvat> essc-ntlally a rival to the existent Argon mapping 

143 BYE 17017-7 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

satellite program. * 

Of these various actions and their consequences. the estab. 

lishnlent of a c overt satellite program, Gambit, clearl y was more 

important than mas t others. With Gambit there carne into being a 

tightly contained procurem<:llt and program management capability 

that had no real precedent in the Air Force. Security requirements 

originating m the President's desire to avoid any implication of 

military operations in space became so tight that the transition from 

"extremely secure" to Itclandestine tl and thence to "covert'; was in 

5 orne sense inevitable. The political vulnerability of thE: widely 

publicized liE" programs n1ade Gambit even mOre important than 

would normally have been true, though the very remarkable performance promise oi the Gambit system was in some respects a sufficient 

Justification for emphasizing that program. 

The SAFSP organization possessed some unlque advantages 

that were obvious only to those familiar with its workings. First 

and foremost, by virtue;:: of Dr. Charykls insistence on directly 

managing program activity, it had short, quick-reaction Lines of 

communication and decision. Exclusion from repurting requirements 

These individual programs are treated separately. in following chapters. 

BYE 17017-74 144 

TOP SECRE'I' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

imposed on other Air Force projects meant relief from some of the 

most frustrating and time-consuming aspects of technical development. 

Security was sufficiently tight to permit complete exclusion of most 

"auditors" and "reviewers" who. in other programs. had the authority 

to require review, and to require revision. but who had no authority 

to approve. Additionally, because it possessed mission unity. the 

Samos project could reprogram funds to considerable advantage without 

the difficulties that att<'nd"d such a process in the "norIT1al" Air Force. 

Although the ultimate span of Charyk's authority had yet to be clearly 

defined- -and was to be an is sue 0f some proportions for another two 

years--for practlcal purposes the Samos project was able to submit 

recommendations dire ctl y to an agent with authority to act. 

Certain problems remained. The relationship of Corona and 

its variants to SalTIUS and to the balance of the satellite reconnaissance 

program had to be defined and, having been defined, had to be reduced 

to management essentials. In the same sense, it seeITled inevitable 

that the abundance of individual approaches within the complete satellite 

reconnaissance program wOclld lead, in time. to a more compact total 

prug ram. (Counting Corona and Mural separately, as was then the 

practice by early 1961, there were two readout and five recoverablecapsule reconnaissanc" satellites In development. plus tw< mappi.ng 

145 BYE 17017-

~ '""'\:;:~: __ -;=.~'TC~/-:-'~- ,-J 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP 

systems and two ferr~t sVRtems. \ Pro2ress--or its abspnce--lf" 

lndivhlll.al programs see'ned tne mOHt oOV:Ous '.:rlterlon J.,)r (.et.t:'r:·.·.l· -

.. Alg wlllCh shoulci be abcrttd and wi:iCh c"lntlnUeQ. l:...\·":~1 tv t-;' -J \" ll..;'nl 

it was apparent tnat avallabit: iund.; w',:uld lOt supuort t::v\!r·'tning t~ . t, 

~rogrammed, thoue:n ~ht: l.uLal of resources available tor satellitt" 

reconnaissance hac: increased substantially in the precedlng year. 

BYE 17017-74 146 

-'">. ~ :: .• -,"j-,," "e.":~ 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

CRET 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. Ltr, A.B. Simmons, EK, to J.V. Charyk, SAFUS, "pprox 

20 Jun 60, no subj; Itr, Simmons to Charyk, 22 Jul 60, no 

sub), both in Charyk files (in SAFSS); (both letters bear 

CIA cover-nddress indicators); memo for record, BrigG .. n 

R. D. Curtin, 10 Aug 60, subj: Eastman Proposal for 77" 

HIgh Resolution Camera, in SAFSS files, Gambit; Techmc,,] 

Proposal for Recoverable Reconnaissance Systell)s, Vol I, 

17 Tun 60, and Preliminary Technical Proposal for R,.coverablc 

Reconnaissance System, Vol II, 20 Jul 60, both prep by EK, 

both in SAFSP (SP-3) files; TWX AFDRT 74550, USAF to 

ARDC, 3 Aug 60, in SP-3 files. 

2. Memo for record, Curtin, 10 Aug 60. 

3. TWX AFDSD 76820, USAF to ARDC, 13 Aug 60, In SAFSP files. 

4. Ltr, F.G. Foster, EKCo, to CG BMD (sic), attn Maj E • .T. 

Cunway, 13 Aug 60, no subj; TWX WDRSP-16-8-I, BMD to 

ARDC, 16 Aug 60, both in SAFSP-3 files. 

S. /"1,,, rna , LtCol L. C. Jochim, Samus Dir, for the R, cord, 

12 Aug 60, no subj; Ltr, Col W.G. King, Dir/Samos, to 

AMC-BMC, 15 Aug 60, subj: Sale Source JustificatlOn, both 

in SAFSP - 3 files. 

6. De" Plan, "Recoverable Photographic Reconnaissance Satellite," 

prep by STL for BMD, Aug 60, in SAFSP files; interview, 

LtCol John Pietz, SAFSP, by R. L. Perry, 29 Oct 6l. 

I. M"rno for record, BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 20 Sep 60, 

suuJ: SAMOS Program Meeting with SAFUS, in SP-3 files; 

draft memo, Greer to BrigGen 1;<. D. Curtin, SAFMS, 

b 0, t 60, no subj, same file. Though the 6 Oct memo was 

not sent to Curtin, it was used as a basis for SAFSP policy 

dctermlnatlOns for the next several months (mterview, Col 

]. W. Ruebel, SP-3, by R. L. Perry, Hist Div, 12 Dec 62..) 

147 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-' 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

8. Interview, BrigGen J. W. Martin, SAFSS, by R. L. Perry, 

HiSt Div, 8 Nov 63; presentation notes dtd Aug 60, m 

Charyk files, SAFSS. 

9. Interview, LtCol John Pietz. SP-3, by R. L. Perry, 23 Jul b3; 

intervi"w, Col 1. W. Ruebel, SP-3, by Perry, 6 June 63. 

10. Ltr, BngGt'n R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to SAFUS, 4 Od 60, subj: 

Acceleration of Reconnaissance Program, in Ofc Miss and Sat 

Sys files: Gen. 

11. Memo, Greer for Curtin (not sentI. 6 Oct 60; interview, Greer 

by Perry, 12 Dec 62. 

12. Greer notebooks, entry for 20 Oct 60. 

13. Ltr, Brl>,Gen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to OLe Miss and Sat Sys, 

2.4 Jan 61, subj: Cuntract Administration, inclosing memo for 

record, prep by Greer and witnessed by Col J. W. Ruebel, 

Spec Asst to Dir/SP, 16 Jan 01, subj: Contract Di~bursmg, m 

SAFSP fil"s: TWX, SAFSP-TS-oO-3. SAFSP to SAFMS. 

2 Oct 60; TWX SAFMS-Sys Eng-60-0; SAFMS to SAFSP, 

17 Oct 60; Warrant of Contracting Cfcr. 5 Oct 60, approved 

by LtGen W. F. McKee. V/Cmdr AMC, all in SAFSP (SP-3) files. 

14. Memo, D.C. Sharp, SAF, to Dir/Samos Proj, 5 Jan 61, subj: 

DelegatlOn of Authority; memo for record, prep by BrigGen 

R. E. Greer, Dlr/Samos Proj, 14 Feb 61, no subj (also signed 

by Col J. L. Martin, D/ Dir/Ofe M,ss and Sat Sys)'; Itr. Max 

Golden, DAF Gen CDun.el. to Greer, 15 Feb 61, no subj, all 

in SP-3 files, Pollcy. 

15. DAF SO A-1790, 27 5ep 60, confirming verbal orders of 5AF 

of 0 Sep 60; DAF SO A-1832. 6 Oct 60; itr. Col R. R. Rowland, 

Secy/ Air Staff, to an Maj Crnds, 14 Oct 60, subj: Missile and 

Satelllte Systems, all in SAFSP files. 

10. Memu for record, prep by Col P.A. Beran, Dir/E-6 proi. 

BYE 17017-74 

n Nuv 60. subj: Trip Report to Bq USAF (2-4 Nov 60), in 

SAFSP files. TWX. SAFMS-991S3, SAFUS to BMD, 4 Nov 60, 

in Rltland files; interview, Col P.A. Beran, SA~SP, by 

R. L. Perry. 20 Dec 62.. 

~:8~ __ TOP"'~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

17. TWX, SAFMS 99153, 4 Nov 60. 

18. M"mo fur recurd. Heran. 8 Nov 00; notes taken by BrigGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir /SAMOS Proj, 3 & 4 Nov 00, in personal 

notebook (heroeafter cited as Greer Notebook); H"ran inkrvlew, 

20 Dec 62; Greer interview, 20 Dec 62; T v.'X SAFMS-S,·s Eng 

60-6, 17 Oct 60. 

19. Memo for record, Heran, 8 Nov 60; Greer ~otebook, 2, 3, & 5 

Nov 60; TWX SAFMS 99533, SAFMS to BMD and WADD, 

7 Nov 60; Pietz interView, 12 Dec 62; memo for record. 

LtCol J. S. Sea y. SAFSP, 7 Dec 60. subj: Visit to SAF (US) 

on 10 Nov 1960, all in SAFSP files. 

lO. Greer Notebook. 0-9 Nov 60; Pietz interview. 12 Dec 62; 

mterview, Col 1. W. Ruebel, Spec AS5t to Dir/SAFSP. by 

R. L. Perry. 5 Dec 62; Greer interview, 20 Dec 62. 

21. DAF SO E-2356, 23 Nov 60; Pietz interview, 26 Dec 62. 

22. TWX AFMPP-WS-2-96055, USAF to AMC, 24 Oct 60,in 

S'l.FMS files, Samos Gen '60; TWX DPL 3416, SAC to ARDC/BMD, 

17 Nuv 60, in SAFMS Telecon files, bet-Nov 60; ARDC Ops 

Order 60-1, 23 Nov 00, and ltr. Col R. E. Soper. Asst DCS/P&O. 

to MajGl'!1 O. J. Ritland, Cmdr BMD, 7 Dec 60, subj: SAMOS 

Operation, Order, m Ritland files. Although General Greer 

reviewed the OperatlOns Order with Col Soper in advance of 

its submisswn to ARDC headquarters, final revision apparently 

was completed in that headquarters without further reference 

eith"r to BMD or to SAFSP. Cui Soper who headed the 

"preparation team" was unaware of SAFSP's real (i .e., covert) 

program objectives. 

2.3. TWX SAFSP-DP-o-1Z-3, SAFSP to SAFMS. 8 Dec 60. In SAFMS 

filt:!s, Sanl0S Gen. 

~.j. Memos (.!). J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to CIs USAF, 6 Dec 60. 

"ubj: BaSiC Policy Cunc"rning SAMOS in SAFSP files. One 

rnem<> is Secret, the other Top Secret - Special Handling. 

The S"cret memo receIved relatively WIde circulation; the 

utht:!r, vlrtually none. 

149 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

'l'OP SE£RET 

l5. Greer Notebook, 27 Dec 60. 

2b. Mt:mo (not sent), Bng Gen R. E. Greer. Oil" ISamos Proj, 

to SAFUS, approx l8 Dec bO, subj: Progress Report SAMOS. 

in SAFSP file, Gen. 

2. 7. Hq USAF 01 2.5- 5, 29 Ma y 61, sUbj: Management, Bas lC 

Policy Concerning Samos, signed by MajGen R. M. Mont!:!omcry. 

Asst VCS. Although routinely filed in SAFMS, the 01 somehow 

escaped dispatch to SAFSP, no copy could be located in the 

West Coast offices. 

28. Rpt, Satellite Reconnais sanee Plan. 3 Apr 61, prt-'p in Hq USAF 

(SAFMS?), inSP-3 files. NRO. 

29. Memo, J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to BrigGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, 

20 Sep bO, no subj. in SAFSS files; (there are two near~identical 

memos, one concerning Corona and the other Argon); memO 

for record, Col P. E. Worthman, 26 Oct 60. subj: CORONAARGON Foe a1 Point, in Corona corresp. 158-60; inte rview, 

Worthman by R. L. Perry, Hist Div, 29 Apr, 3 May 63; interview, 

LtCol R. J. Ford, SP-3, by Perry, 9 Dec 63; interView, MajGen 

R. E. Greer. Dil" /SP, by Perry, q Dec 63. 

30. Memo for record, LtCol R. J. Ford, Corona Ofc, 30 Nov 60, 

sub]: C&A Meetmg. 3 I\uv 60, in Dr. Charykfs Office, in 

Corona files: Meetings; memo for record, Ford, 13 Dec 60, 

subj: Telephone 'Conver sation with Mr. John Parangosky .• 

Corona files. cor res p 158- bO; TWX SAFUS 97384, pe r.s unal 

J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to MajGen O. J. Ritland, Cmdr BMD. 

28 Oct 60, and msg 1461, Col P. E. Worthman. BMD, to R. M. 

BIssell, CIA, 2.8 Oct 60. both in Corona files. 

31. InterView, MajGen R. E. Creer and LtCol R. J. Ford. SAFSP. 

by Perry, 9 De-c 63. 

B\"E 17017-74 150 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

ViI PHOTO-READOUT 1960-1963 

(E-l, E-2, Subsystem I, and_Tape) 

When the Samos project final! y became the direct responsibility 

of the Secretary of the Air Force, it included three photographic subsystems and one ground-based subsystem that stemmed direct! y from 

the origin-al WS 117L program. Others were pending approyal, but 

only the £-1 and £-2 readout systems and the £-5 recovery system 

were funded and in a hardware stage. Associated with the E-I and E-2 

was the ground-site complex of receiving, processing, storage and 

diss"mmation equipment that was known as Subsystem I (as J, K, I, ... ) . 

. Under the terms of the pre-lo60 requirements, Subsystem I was also 

to be the key to the E- 5 film handling and dissemination network, as 

then foreseen. B"cause 1t had originally been designed to complement 

E-l and £-2, however, Subs\'stem I was generally considered to be 

associated with readout ln the recovery-versus-readout controversy, 

and the system was also a focal point of the arguments over assigning 

')perational responsibillty for satellite reconnaissance to the Strategic 

Air Command. Subsystem I, operated by SAC, would give that command 

" dominant role in operating and controlling satellite reconnaissance. 

A" it happened, the period of Samos reorientation during the 

spring and summer of 1960 coincided with the climax of E-l development, 

151 BYE 17017-

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

which had begun in 1956. Eastman delivered the first CalTIera payload 

to Lockheed on 15 April and Lockheed completed its system test of 

the Agena-plus payload on 3 June. The payload lncluded both an £-1 

and an F-I ferret subsystem. By September. the Agena-payload 

complex was lTIated with an Atlas booster at Point Arguello. and on 

11 October it was launched to a considerable fanfare that included 

elaborate press conferences and a large audience of cameramen. 

The launching went well enough to please photographers. but 

program people were less than happy. The satellite umblllcal connection failed to release at launch and the hefty push of the Atlas booster 

tore away the nitrOgen fill line--complete with couplings to the Agena--

when the hoses reached their physical stretch limits. Although the 

A-nas operated p"rfectly and the separation of the Agena from the 

first-stage booster occurred as programmed. nitrogen had been 

builing freely into the atmosphere through the entire boost period and 

the tanks were for practical purposes empty. Attitude stabilization 

depended on gas stabilization--and there was no gas. The Agena's 

engines ignited while the vehicle was improperly aligned for injection 

into orbit--and the flight was over. Investigation revealed that test 

base personnel had failed to install a half-inch assembly that should 

have Joined the umbilical to the quick-disconnect fittings and that "the 

BYE 1,017-14 152 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

nitrogen hoses were shorter than the lanyards which were supposed 

to pull away the quick-disconnect fittings. It was a deslJ.'n vverslght 

that Dr. Charyk, for one, cl)nsidered to be an incredible blund.:r. 1 

He was not alone. 

Quite apart frum the fact that the absence of a tiny connector 

had meant the fruitless expenditure of at least $4.!lS mLlllon for thee 

. 2 booster, payload, and launch serVlces, the failure cost one of the 

three avadable E-l/ F -1 vehicles and postponed, at least until J anuar). 

receipt of the first readout data from orbit. Between January and 

August 1960, redirectLOn of the Samos program had caused elimination 

oi five of th" vriglnal 11 scheduled readout flights; only three E-l/ F-l 

and three E-2. pa yloads had been authorized. 3 Even thes.> were eliminated in early \lovember, leaving only five readout payloads in the 

4 launch schedule. 

The rapid abstracttvn of readout tests was syrnptomatlc of a 

wid"spread deternllnatLOJ, tu get on with recovery programs that 

seemed much more promising. General Greer, who had urged and 

sccur"d approval of the cancellation of the "extra" E-2's in a 

2. !\ovclll be r L onv~ r satiotl Wi til Under Sec retary Char yk, COns ide red 

tht.: tcrrnincttlun to be part of hlS "overall efforts!! to bring technlcal 

"oals lIlto reah.stic alignment wlth available financial reouurces. 

153 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 

Lockheed was entirely in sympathy with his general goal-. One officer 

from the Pentagon who visited the contractor's plant in November 

characterized the Lockheed ctttitude as "let's hurry ;md ilnish E-l 

and E-Z and spend all our effort on recovery systems. ,,5 Those 

vit!wpoints, when added to the openly expressed conviction of the 

responsible project manager--Colonel W. G. King--that readout 

techniques were not trul y practical, pUlnted toward a brief existence 

for the entire readout program. 

If there were to be, at most, only five more camera-readout 

flights, any eXCuse for continuation of Subsystem I had vanished. The 

declining fortunes of that portion of the total Samos program were not 

entirely based on such factors, however. Nor was cost the chief 

motlve, though the high price of development had been disturbing 

program managers for many months and the astronomical costs of 

install1ng operational subsystems had been a factor in anti-readout 

sentiment for more than a year 0 

Subsystem I had been the c ore of a proposed installation called 

the lnt"lli~ence Data Processing Center, planned for construction at 

Strategic Air Command headquarters virtually since the acceleration 

uf the satellite reconnaissance program in early 1958. As was apparent 

'-'ven befure the end of that year, however, there existed a considerable 

BYE 17017-74 

~4 

TOP5~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

difference of opinion concerning the timing of that construction, the 

phasmg of the turn-over to SAC, and the quality and quantity of the 

equipment to be installed. For the most part, p"hcy officials in 

th" Department of Defense were extremely sensitive to the implicatlons of entrusting a satellite reconnaissance system entirely to a 

command with SAC's public image and private outlook. They favored, 

at most, c reahon of a research and devdopment type installation that 

could, if technical and political considerations eVer permitted, SOme 

day be turned over to SAC. 

On the other hand, intelligence elexnents of the Au Staff, the 

Stratet(ic Air Cummand, and lnfluential members of the Air Force 

headquarters cadre argued heatedly for accelerated development of 

Subsystem 1 and for early creation of an "operational capability" 

Untll 1959, there was widespread opposition to the proposal that the 

prututype Subsystem I complex being built at Denver by ThompsonRamo-Wouldridge be substituted for the desired "standard" installatlOn. But when it became apparent that the slow pace 01 Subsystem I 

development would prevent the completion of an Omaha lllstallation 

bdore the first Samus £-1 launch, SAC and the Air Force Assistant 

ChId uf Staff for lntt'lli;:ence (Major General J. H. Walsh) began 

strt.:l1UUUS efforts to have the Denver equipment moved to Offutt f<,r 

155 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-
Approved for Release: 

TOP~ __ 

"blue suit" manning. In part, this insistence deriv"d frum their 

mutual mistrust of ARDC's understanding of and abIlity to satisfy 

"intdlig"nce community requirements." Efforts ~o explain ARDe' 5 

viewpoint, that the vast difference between experiITlental equipment 

and operational equipment would inevitably prevent any "operational" 

use of th" prototype Subsystem I, were fruitless. An Offutt installatlOn would establish a ITleaningful precedent for complete Air Force 

control of military space systeITls. and against that urge no such 

. 6 "quIbbles" could prevall. 

In Dt'cember 1959, ARDC virtually surrendered. Command 

h"adquarters instructed BMD to provide for early installation of the 

prototype devices at Offutt as soon as a degree of reliability had been 

established by tests. That qualification provided a substantial obstacle. 

however. From a technical standpoint, the development was not 

proceeding at all well, a Clrcumstance which made plans for an 

elabor"te Offutt complex largely academic. It was clear that th" 

StrateC:lc Air Command saw Sarnos as an attack warning device that 

n1i~;ht make SOITle contributions to general and technical lPtelligence, 

while higher authorities 1n the Pentagon had the view that Sarnos wa, 

all intdltgence system with a lirnlted capacity for attack warning. 

BYE 17017-74 56 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Although such policy considerations were paramount, technical shortcomings in the system were by early 1960 becoming quite 

important to the debate. ltek Corporation and Thompson-RamoWooldridge (TRW) had jomtly evolved the design of Subsystem L 

TRW had subs. 'Iuently become the sole source subcontractor to 

Lockheed for the total subsystem. Itek, under subcontract to TRW, 

had acquired development responsibility for a key element, the center 

format processor. Both ltek and TRW were comparatively new 

companies, ltek being particularly lacking in relevant experience. 

In the course of their relationship, TRW directed multiple engineering 

changes which ltek personnel failed to consider properly when revising 

cost estimates. Itek also made a basic major error in calculating 

overhead costs, originally weighting them at 85 percent of engineering 

costs. The correct figure. as proved by experience, was 165 percent. 

Finally, both Itek and TRW had sadly underrated the technical 

difficulty of the development. In consequence, ltek reported a mounting 

succession of oVerrun costs on its contract during 1959; from an initial 

overrun estimate of $36,000 in February 1959 the total mounted to 

$2..1 million over the next 10 months. Concurrently, the delivery dates 

specified in the contracts slipped by nearly a year, the performance of 

the prototype equipment failed to satisfy specificatio!ls, and both TR W 

157 BYE 1701, 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

and ltek encountered new and major technical obstacles to project 

7 

success. A further difficulty was that Rome Air Develo).lment Center 

had been made responsible for technical management of that aspect 

';f the total Samos program, so that the Samos project office was 

several echelons distant from the scene of the developments. In 

the opinion of one experienced officer, the chief responsibility lay 

with Itek and TR W, but Rome and BMD were partly to blame because 

8 

of their ineffective management of development. 

Had the development been relatively flourishing, the basic 

equipment would have been delivered and installed by July 1960, in 

sufficient time to meet the E-I flight schedules. A successful program 

might have overcome all criticism and lent weight to arguments for 

continuing a substantial readout program. But the fact that Subsystem I 

was in grave technic,,1 difficulty, that it was badly managed, and that 

1t was running out of funds tended to mcrease the probability that the 

whole readout undertaking mIght be cancelled. 

In the course of the August 1960 program reviews, an "Ad Hoc 

Group on Samos Ground Handling Data" recommended continuing Subsystem I development through" full system test and moving the 

completed equipment to WashIngton for eventual use there. A certain 

vagueness concermng the techmcal capability of the system and 

BYE 17017-74 58 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

unsupported optimisITl concerning project costs doomed the reo ommenda ~ 

9 tions. however. Almost concurrently, ARDC proposed transfernng 

responsibility for Subsystem I from Efv1D to the Air Force Command 

and Control Development Division, at Cambridge, Mas sachusetts. 

The suggestion, which originated with General Schnever. assumed 

the elimination of all requirements for proces sing oper'atwnal intel11-

gence information during the remainder of the research and development 

period. (Two years and '$2.4.2. million were sU88ested as appropriate 

resources. The project had Cost some $37.5 mUllon to that time--

10 

August 1960.) 

One of the major products of the 2.5 August 1960 NatlOna1 Security 

Council meeting was a decislon to reduce emphasis on the ground data 

processing equipment. Immediately after securing confirmation of his 

authority, Dr. Charyk as signed a special study group to the task of 

making recommendations on disposition of what remained. By that 

tim!.!. it was apparent that the computer chosen as the heart of Subs ystem I 

was unsuited to its assignment, having been outdated by later models. that 

the abihty of the equipment to handle basic inputs was somewhat dubiOUS, 

and that film proces SlOg itself pre sented problems that had not been 

it will be recalled that ARDe headquarters was concurrently involved 

111 ;m effort to cnlarc,t:> th(.;: R~cunnaissance Laboratory' 5 role in camera 

(Il'\·clopme tit fur Samos. 

159 

'fOP SECRST 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

solved. TRW was then 14 months behind schedule and in the throes 

of an overrun that promised to at least double. if not triple. project 

costs . 

Charyk himself apparently had deep misgivings concerning the 

prospects of Subsystem I, but at the same time he remained uncertain 

of its possible importance to the sort of program that might develop. 

On 13 September he told Greer to examine the situation and to submit 

detailed recommendations on the future of the ground data subsystem. 

General Greer, although having no special animus toward the 

subs ystem, was by that time convinced that recovery techniques 

offered much better prospects than readout and that Subsystem 1 

development had been generall y mismanaged. Whether it could be 

saved was not so much the question as whether it should be. 

In mid-October, after several weeks devoted to careful analysis 

of the readout situation, Greer urged Undersecretary Charyk to 

terminate the Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge contract and to begin 

considering something new, a system more completely responsive 

to real Air Force needs. Greer had been particularly upset by some 

of the peculiar compromises made in Subsystem I design in order to 

permit it to accept several varieties of input. "1 object, " he said at 

one point, "to a system that accepts five-mch by 25-inch exposed film 

BYE 17017-74 160 

- -. -: ~ ..,- , 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

(E-5), reduces it, and chops it up .•. to fit an automatic scheme 

along with U-2 photography, World War 1I photography, E-1/E-2 

take, etc." Adding that his VleWS were his own, that most of h,,; 

staff was not in agreement, he urged a work cancellauun. The subsystem was not essential to Samos operations, Greer told Dr. Charyk. 

For the purposes of early photo and ferret readout flights, he said, 

the Satellite Tracking Center at Sunnyvale. California, could handle 

processing requirements. 

In this stand, Greer was almost alone. Charyk's Pentagon 

staff (SAFMS) urged that Subsystem I be continued. withal at a less 

expensive rate and wnh revIsed objectives, while most of the West 

Coast f(roup held the subsystem essential to a technically valid 

11 

program. In eriCh ,aSe, a cautious reluctance to discard readout 

approaches whlch had been pursued for five years probably 'motivated 

the two staffs more than anv innate confidence in Subsystem l's 

technical promise. Neither Charyk nor Greer was disturbed by such 

qualms, however; each was personally and philosophically committed 

tll a ,harp break with the past--if such a break promised to make 

;;"ne ral program goals mure attainable. 

On 4 November 1960, Charyk directed immediate termination 

uf all work on Subsystem 1 except that required to enable ARDe to 

BYE 170'· 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

evaluate the feasibility of employing the equipment elsewhere. 

Processing eqUlpment fur the several remaining readuut satellite 

flights would be provlded from other resources. he told the Air 

12 

Force chief of staff. Within the week, termination notices had 

been issued to TRW, Rome Air Development Center had received 

instructions on funding, and ARDC headquarters had been advised of 

its responsibility for determining the usefulness and fwal disposition 

of the developed equipments. 13 

Shortly before Christmas of 1960, Undersecretary Charyk 

appro,""d a total expenditure of $10.8 million in fiscal 1961 funds to 

close out the project. (Total program cost approximated $48.3 

million. mcluding the 1961 funds.) Roughly $7 million had been 

expended before the November cancellation. $1. 8 million was needed 

to cover work still on the contract, and $2 million was provided to 

.finance contract termination actionse The decision met a final 

anguished protest from the Strategic Air Command, which pleaded 

fur continued development and test of Subsystem 1 as an integral umt. 

but Charyk was adamant. He had concluded that the entire concept 

0; Subsystem I was obsolescent. He ,"ul an end to speculation that 

" lll'''' and ,110re elaborate s ystern mi~ht eventuate by asking ARDC 

tu }Jr\lpoti~· a "good solid reseRt"ch and development program!! to 

BYE 17017-74 162 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

result in equipment capable of processing all Samos film; Charyk 

-

clTIphasized that he wanted not a system proposal. but a program to 

de'-"dop "5 imp1e and practical equipment." When nothing promlsing 

appeared by February, he ordered all Subsystem r activIty tu be 

14 closed out by 21 July 1961. 

Large among the reaSOns for ending the development was cost. 

Fur an input of nearly $50 million, the Air Force had obtained a semiobsolescent lot of partially developed equipment tied to an abandoned 

concept. In the final analysis, Subsystem I had been designf.'d to 

satisfy the pre-l960 requirement for early attack warning; the shift 

. oi emphasis from surveillance to reconnaissance in July 1960 had 

duomed the development, although full appreciation of that circumstance 

was not widespread. 

The factor of technic a1 failure in the development program 

ltsclf was certainly an element In the termination deci:SHH1. But though 

engineering difficulties were substantial, greater obstacb,'", had been 

uvercome elsewhere in the Samos program. and the re::.punsibihty 

fur the wUmate collapst:! of the development program had therefore 

tu be credited as much to improper management as to an ything dse. 

Separated from the conduct of development work by an intervemng 

ARDe center and two 1a yers of contractors I the Samos project office 

163 BYE 170'-

'1;:. ... t"'!..- ,-;;. -,... -,.:..mar j-,';;.- ......... !r"'~. .... J .... 1...,..0 ~ -.- • ~ 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

was never able to maintain sufficiently close control of the engineering 

effort. The unfortunat" fact that both of the principal contractors were 

relatlvel y inexperienced in such work was certainly a contribl1lor, but 

probably not a determinant. Experience in satellite reconnaissance 

was not an abundant commodity, after all. 

One other significant aspect of the t"rmination do'!served notlce. 

Between the time that Charyk received Greer's recommendations and 

the timo'! of an absolute. final cancellation, only two weeks passed. 

The recommendation itself was based on an analysis that took less 

than a month. Both the assurance and the speed with which the new 

Samos management "roup acted showed that more had changed in the 

program than the technical character of some of the subsystems. A 

new impatience with failure lay close to the surface. 

£-1 and E-2 

Doubts about the worth of continuing the still-scheduled readout 

tests were apparent in the wake of the Subs ystem I cancellatlon but 

we're generally subdued by the absence of any flight data that could 

cunfirm Judgments on system feasibility and usefulness. Both Charyk 

and Greer were c"rtain that the readout system would return photo-

~raphs, but whether such photographs would be of a useful quality 

BYE 17017-74 

~4_ ..... 

TOP~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

remained to be seen. They agreed to await results of flight tests 

before deciding thO! program's future. By the end of 1960 there was 

no longer any question of Corona feasibility, and in terms of utility 

for reconnaissance purposes the worst of the Corona returns was 

15 certain to be better than the best of the E-l photographs. 

Nevertheless, empirical evidence remained the best basis for 

judgment on program validity, and in the absence of flight data on 

which to base a findlng the cancellation of the E-l program might 

prove difficult to defend. It was also pertinent that by late 1960 the 

second flight vehicle was ready for launch; cancellatlOn thereafter 

would have saved the cost of launching one Atlas-Agena, but payload 

expenses could not have been recovered and in any case, as yet the 

booster combination had not recorded a success in orbiting a 

reconnaissance payload, so termination would have been costly in 

prestige, as well. All in all, the arguments for attempting the 

,;econd £-1 launch were more compelling than those against. 

By early January the vehicle was on the stand and had been 

checked out._ At that point a new complication arose. Negotiations 

with the Soviets for release of two imprisoned members of an 

llnprudent RB-47 crew were approaching a climax; the newly installed 

Kennedy administration was extremely anxious to establish an early 

165 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP 

record of diplomatic achit!vement by getting agreement--1o the crew's 

return. In mid-January, with the E-l on stand and ready, General 

Greer received urgent encrypted instructlOns to delay the scheduled 

launch by some plausible subterfuge until the freed crew could actually 

be returned to American custody. He explained the situation to 

Colonel H. L. Evans, hlS deputy, and they concocted the scheme of 

having the colonel appear before the general in the company of two 

"unwitting" program office 'pecialists with a suggestion that the E-l 

launch be delayed by a week or so to peronit a final recheck of launch 

readiness provisions. Deliberately unspecific but convinein!, references 

tu difficulties and un("ertainti~s involving the telemetry stations, range 

proc"dures, and checkout processes made up the bulk of Colonel E'ans' 

ren1arks. With t uunterfeit reluctance, General Greer agreed to a 

postponement. Once the released Air Force Crewmen had been returned, 

the occasion for delay vanished--and so did the technical ubstacles 

16 

E,ans had materialized ior his appeal to the general. 

There followed the 31 January 1961 launch 0. the second Samos 

vehide (number 2102). Like the first, in October, it carried a composite 

£-1 (amera. Unlike the October vehicle, however, the second Sam.os 

went into a stable orbit and relayed information to the readout station 

at Sllnnyvale. {The orbital vehicle had a period of 95.2. minutes, a 

BYE 17017-74 166 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

perigee of 260 miles, an apogee of 311. 6 miles, and a nominal life 

expectancy of 1130 days.) 

On 3 February, Colonel King took the first anal ysis of flight 

results to Dr. Charyk. An assembled photograph was available 

which indicated that th" ground resolution of the system was roughly 

what had been anticipated, about 100 feet. Although the hand-processed 

pictures were relatively good in terms of original system requirements, 

the system itself did not promise much in the way of eventual utility. 

There seemed little justification for altering the premise vi the 

previous eight months--that the E-l would be tested only to prove out 

the feasibility of the in-flight processing, transmitting. and readout 

equipment. 

General Greer was closeted with Undersecretary Charyk for 

rrlDst of three da ys starting on 13 February. Among the many Samos 

program matters discussed and decided during that period, one of 

th" chief was the future of the E-1 and E-2 launches. As had been 

~"nerally antiopated, Charyk agreed that the relative SUCCeSs of 

the 2102 vehicle was a sufficient proof of E-l system feasibility; he 

approved General Greer's recommendation that the third of the 

pro~rammed E-1 fli!!,hts be cancelled and the equipment stored for 

some possible future application. They also agreed to let the 

167 BYE 170' 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

scheduled E-2 flights remain in the program for the mon1<'nt, althollgh 

again it was apparent that once a set of returns had b"en received 

there would be no real justification for further continuance of the E-2 

J7 

program. 

In effect, the February decision halted all work on the remalning 

E-l system (vehicle 2103) and caused it to be returned to Lockheed's 

Sunnyvale plant for bonded storage. All of the necessary directives 

were in circulation by 15 February, one day after Charyk's verbal 

. . G 18 InstrucUons to reer ~ 

There was one additional, almost afterthought aspen to the E-l 

program. In April 1961. representatives of the National Aeronautics 

and Spac<, Admmistration (NASA) contacted Dr. Charyk's office to ask 

perrnisSlOn to .,xamme and use E-l technology in thea own programs. 

It seemed possible for a time that the physical products of the E-l 

development might actually find their way into a moon vehicle. One 

stnnulant was the obvious parallel between £-1 equipment and techniques 

and the de vic es used by the Soviets to photograph the back surface of 

the muon in October 1959. 

The Soviet feat had excited admiration from a number of American 

specl.alists in reconnaissance and from astronomers in general. (The 

lunar pictures. inCidentally. represented the first public disclosure of 

BYE 17017-74 168 

- : - ' 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

satellite photography and stimulated considerable conjecture about the 

existence and capability oi a Soviet reconnaissance satellite system. J 

WIthout pving any indication that he knew of the E-l and E-l specificalions, Amrom H. Katz, Rand's i"remost optical physicist, calculated 

the relative ground resolution of the Soviet camera and data link system 

at about 2.50 feet from an altitude of 300 miles. That was a shade less 

effective than the E-l, though in practice the considerable difficulties 

of transmitting photographic data Over distances ranging from 30, 000 

to 2.00,000 miles tended to invalidate any general conclusions on that 

score. (The Soviet system had employed an eight-inch F/5.6lens 

and a ZO-inch F/9. 5 lens to produce simultaneous photographs, each 

on one-half of a single irame of 35 millimeter film. Katz and others 

estimated that transmission of a complete negative required about 

2.0 minutes. The satellite never approached closer than 40, 000 to 

50,000 miles to the moon but nevertheless returned photographs which 

showed a ground resolution on the order of 5-10 miles.) In the realm 

of the theoretical, it seemed that the slightly lTIOre SOphisl1cated--on 

paper, at 1east--E-l or its E-2 successor might permit the United 

States to obtam better pictures. At least NASA seemed (vnvinced--so 

much so that Undersecretary Charyk authorized that agency to deal 

With the E-l contractors through General Greer's office. Charyk 

169 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

1"'1,'>. c. '2.--0'/-'-" 
Approved for Release: 

lnstruct"d Greer to permit access to technical data on the came ra 

and on-board processing equipment, data transmission elements, 

and th" ground processing system. However, he forbade the release 

10 

oi specific satdlite photography or detailed test results. ' 

There was considerable doubt in informed quarters that the 

C-l devices had any useful application to the problem of lunar photography; both Rand and Colonel King freely expressed reservations on 

thaL p'oint. Indeed, as analysis of E-l results continued and as the 

fund of preClS., information on system capability increased, confidence 

11) the "yst"m t"nded to decrease proportionately. Concurrently, 

'there was a growing awareness that it would be most difficult to 

fund all of the assorted Samos systems in the next fiscal year, a 

circumstance thnt caused program managers to give new thought to 

early cancellation of the entire E-2 program. Early in March 1961, 

when th" fiscal 1962 budget for Samos was undergoing final review, 

the question of what could be done with funds that, though substantial, 

were' definitely limited, focused in part on how many E-2 flights should 

be c'arried on the schedule. The issue was complicated by Dr. Charyk's 

d"sire to develop and test a mapping and charting satellite (essentially 

" revived E-4 system) as well as to continue or even expand a basic 

program that now included ferret satellites, the E-5, E-6, Gambit, 

BYE 17011-74 170 .,,_:-,' =,,_,_/-,, __ e"-,, 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

and several variants of Corona. Dr. Charyk was willing to consider 

cancellation of the E-2 program in favor of a new readout-technology 

20 

approach with more promise. should that seem the best course. 

Although in most essential features the E-Z 5 ystem was technicaUy identical to the E-l, differing chiefly in the degree of lens 

magnification, there was evidence that all of the compiexities of 

readout had not been resolved by the relatively successful E-l flight. 

In May 1961, for instance, the program office reported that the 

processing unit in the payload vehicle had repeatedly jammed in the 

course of check-out tests, that the film record was subject to distortion under certain conditions, and that the ground equipment still 

21 

experienced frequent random failures. Even before the program 

review that brought such circumstances to the attention of the undersecretary. he had decided to limit the total of E-2 flights to two. On 

19 April. the third E-2 vehicle-pa yload (vehicle 2122) was cancelled. 

Another significant change came early in July when a succession of 

payload, tracking net, and booster difficulties forced postponement 

of the scheduled launch of the first E-2. Even after the original 

sequence of such difficulties was resolved, a new onset of electronic 

trouble in the Atlas booster again caused postponement of the launch 

22 

date into September. 

171 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

CRET 

On 9 September 1961 the initial attempt to orbit an E-Z payload 

ended in an aweSome launch pad explosion. Luss uf electrical power 

caused the Atlas tu drop back on the pad less than two seconds after 

liftoff. The E-Z payload was destroyed~n the resultin" blast and fire. 

(The Atlas failure was caused by a delay of .2 seconds in disconnecting 

the umbilical that carried the signal to switch from external to internal 

l3 

electric power.) 

The remaining E-Z flight test vehicle (Z121) faced a problem of 

crowded launch pad schedules. After weighing the prospect of a major 

malfunction and the clear evidence that basic subsystem performance 

had been adequatel y demonstrated in the single successful E-I'flight, 

Charyk and Greer decided not to launch the second E-2. vehicle. On 

30 September the contractor was instructed to remove it from flight 

readiness processin!,! and put it in bonded storage. For all practical 

purposes, such action concluded the original readout-oriented Samos 

24 

program. 

Colonel W. G. King, responsible for those aspects of Samos 

which predated the August 1960 reorganization, saw clearly that the 

decision to store rather than launch the remaining E-2 payloads meant 

that rt!adout, lIas presently conceived, II was no longer "an acceptable 

alternative solution to the' "arth recce problems facini! us." On 

BYE 17017-74 

: ..:. -~ . 

172 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

6 Oc tober he issued instructions that all work un readout should halt 

immediately, cautioning the procurem"nt uffice to look carefully to 

be sure ui hnding "a lot of the efforts which are h1dden 10 the 

bushes.. "He wrote a brief epitaph with the phrase, "It is 

presumed the present readout program 1S defunct. " 

Colonel King '5 experience with the £-1 and E-2 had not 

convinct:d hUTl that any of the equipment was applicable to NASA's 

moon reconnaissance program. He remarked mildly that "the gentlemen" with whom he had discussed the NASA proposal "did [notJ seem 

to understand much about the problems of taking pictures from a space 

vehicle, " but then he had earlier concluded (as had The Rand Corporation, independently) that little of the basic eqUlpment could be adapted 

to a lunar re .... -onndissance program. His own draconian preferenc~ 

for dis pos ing of ~ ur vi ving payloads was to offe r one of the £ -I' s to a 

museum and to give the remaining E-2 vehicle to anybody who could 

afford to fl y 1t. 

The residue of the readout program was initiall y concentrated 

at Vandenberg Air Force base, although bits and pieces finally settled 

at other sites over the country. The two remaining E-l flight models 

remained at Vandenberg, together with spare parts sufficient to make 

a third payload. Three assembled Or partly assembled but untested 

173 BYE 17017-

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

CRET 

£-l's were stured at Sunnyvale. One E.-2 flight model and parts [or 

anuther were also in Vandenberg storage. Two other non-flyable test 

modds remained, one at Eastman Kodak's ROChester plant and the 

2.5 other at Sunnyvale. After September 1961, there were no serious 

proposals for Air Force utilization of the equipment, eveh though lunar 

reconnalssance kept bobbin~ up. The flyable payloads went into storage 

at Milpitas, California, and the Agena vehicles not adaptable to other 

programs with them. Contractors converted to other uses most t"st 

items. Readout in lts original form was, as Colonel King had observed, 

!1defunct.1t 

That being the case, King felt himself free to state several Vlewpoints that would have been considered inappropriate in the manager of a 

major readuut development. Although he agreed that many people thought 

readout might be the "ultimate" system, King could see no reason at all 

for developing such a device. A good system, he told Colonel J'. R. 

Ruebel, requlred a reliable long orbital life, an invulnerable long unattended life, boosters capable of lofting large power supplies, and a 

readout network capable of doing a first-rate job. The combination, he 

observed, would be "tough to provide--and costly."" • Why spend 

your time creating a problem so you can work on it? /I he wrote 

Colonel Ruebel. 

BYE 17017-74 174 

- .; - . ~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

It was also apparent, King noted, that no readout system then 

conceivable could provide the clarity or definition of recovered film. 

What could the readout system sense that a srnall-ume differential 

would degrade, he asked? Would a readout system be more ",-"nomical 

thana recovery system if estimates properly welghed the cost of 

amortizi.ng development? King thought not. He was convinced that 

with the possible exception of better response to low levds of illuminati.on •. everything a readout system could do a recovery sytitem could do 

better. The need for long on-orbit life pushed a readoul system su far 

out into space, for example, that a 10-foot recovery system would always 

become a 20-foot readout system. 

As for the future, King felt that development of traveling wave 

tubes would indeed allow much more information to be transmitted, 

quickly and a<'curately, than current six-megacycle systems, but he 

noted acidly that a great deal more would be required to make readout 

compatible with any of the recovery systems then in development. So, 

he asked,. "Why develop something that will take weeks to cover the 

same ground· that you can cover in 5 days?" As for technology, not 

only was a stabilizatlOn and aiming system capable of supporting a 

very high resolution readout system rather reITIote, but it promised 

to be very expensive. Perhaps more important, an electronic data 

175 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP lEtHE'!! 

link was much more vulnerable, both physically and politically, than 

any recovery system.. 

Not even when the proposition was a continui~ research program 

pointed toward possible needs five years hence did it satisfy Colonel 

King's standards. He was convinced, he tol.d Colonel Ruebel, that 

rehable recovt:r y, even reliable recovery of several packages from tne 

same orbiting vehicle, would always prove simpler than providing a 

combination of rdiable long life on orbit with a good data link. Five 

years in the future. sateUites might provide the only source of reconnais sance iniormation, but by then both readout and recovery would be 

difficult and the earlier advantages of recovery would have persisted . * 

. '. -,. 

&Gn1e of the 'rgUll1ents against readout, though not Colonel King's. 

were based on advantages of the £-5 and £-6 over the E-l and E-2 

which were the product of general advances in the state of the reconnai;:; sance arts. The E-l was a fixed camera COVer ing a lOO-mile 

swath on the ground while the £-2 had a stabilized rotatable mount 

to provide 17-mile-wide stnp coverage within a. 300-rnih'-wide strip 

along the ground track. Maximum resolution of the E-2. under ideal 

conditions, was on the order of 20 feet. In practice. a r~solution on 

th~> hIgh s~de of 35 feet could be normally anticipated. Better optics, 

Improvt:d techniques of film transport, improved vehicle stabilization 

on 'orbit, and 'modes of panoramic photography. made both the E-5 and 

F.-6 considerably more attractive in terms of ground resolution, 

g ruund coverage, and general picture quality. But with allowances 

lor the fact that stabilization requirements would be more critical 

:n the case of a camera on 300-mile orbit than for one orbiting below 

i 50 miles, the lens. film transport, and panning advances incorporated 

in the E-6 might well have been built into a readout system, thus. 

BYE 17017-74 176 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

"In ::>un,mary. II wrote Colonel King, "I don!t favor diluting any 

of our efforts [in order] to build a readout gadget. Oesplte the pressure 

to get 10to readout and electrostatic tapes, etc., lid say 11 was a 

wasteful effort. Started nOW it would chug along and we would cancel 

26 

it later anyhow. 11 

reducmg the performance gap. The E-3 design was a <:ase in point. 

Though it had inherent faults it was in many respects a technical 

contemporary of the E-S. The basic defects of readout, from a 

te ch nological standpoint, we re those Col~_mel King COns tantly emphasized: 

wability to provide reliable long life on orbit. and the absence of a sound 

wlde-band data link. When those objections had succumbed to some 

tec:hnological advance that could not be accurately foreseen in 1961. 

~vulutlOns of the potentlal of readout could take a different direction. 

As it happened, 10 years were to pass before the objectives King 

postulated could be overcome--even in theory. 

t77 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

BYE 1701'7 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP~ ...... 

READOUT REVISITED 

The abandonment of the original E-l and E-l readout appro"cht!~ 

by late 19b1 did not start" pogrom of readout advocates, nor did it n.ark 

the extermination of all readout research. There was nutably little 

- enthusiasm for the readout approach within the ruling circles in SAFSP, 

but with considerably more substance than most ghosts, readout kept 

materializing, being exorcised, and then materializing again. 

The chief 1961 alternative to the technique embodied. in the E-l 

and E-2 (automatic processing of standard photographic film and transID1SSlOn of analog data to a ground station) was some form of electronic 

or electrostatic tape recording. The Air Force had first funded such 

technology In 1950 , during the period when the Advanced Research 

PrOjects Agency (ARPA) had controlled the Sentry-Samos effort. 

Obviously inspired by advice that high ARPA officials were wildly 

enthusiastic about electrostatic tape techniques, Lockheed had proposed 

"nd secured approval of a program to develop the E-3, a high-resolution 

tape-readout system. By July 1959, when it briefly seemed that ARPA 

rather than the Air Force might acquire'permanent custody of Sarnos, 

Lockheed was assuring the Pentagon super-agency that an "all-electronic 

approach" (electrostatic tape) would "provide the highest possible 

p~rforn1ance in the earliest time period at minimum cos~. q 

BYE 17017-74 

178 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Such enthusiasm was not limited tf electrostatic tape applications but as the occasion required could be extended to ew..:ompass a 

variety uf interesting technical gadgetry then under cons lderation. 

Lockheed- -and the Wright Air Development Center I s Reconnais sance 

Laboratory--contended that the fea~ibility of an electrostatic tape 

development had been demonstrated under a research contract, that 

there was good reason for optimism concerning an image orthicon 

tube development. and that at least three alternative projects (the 

CBS La boratories I Reconotron, General Electric· s Thermoplastic 

Tape, and the Westinghouse EBICON device) promist!d greater sensi27 tlvlty and less complexity than any conceivable film appruach. 

In electrostatic tape, however, both Lockheed and the Wright Fleld 

laboratory saw rt:al promise. They pointed out that in theory a tape 

sy stem could pruvlde the equivalent of 100 lines per millimeter re50-

1\1tion (12.200 televisiOn lmes for each 61-millirneter-square frame!) 

usmg an F/4. 5 lens and a sLit shutter set for three-millisecond 

* t!xposures. Assuming the availability of a 12-megacycle-per-second 

bandwidth, experimenters calculated that readout time would be but 

8. 7 s~conds per frame - -as opposed to the several-rninut~5 -per -frame 

2.8 

of the E-l system. 

TI1l' readout technique used a sandWICh -type electrostattc tape 

c unt<tllling a very sens itive photo conductor and an accompanying 

l.79 BYE 17017 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRE'!' 

Although the carefull y organized demise of the E- 3 program 

late in 1959. one of the first of Air Forc-e actions 01 regaining fun 

control of Samos, eliminated the possibility that a major portion of 

the satenite reconnais sance effort would be diverted to gadgets that 

could not realistically be readied for initial tests in less than three 

y;.:ars, the investigation of tlE_3 type technology" was continued--at 

a relatively low level of financing. In the fall of 1960, when impatience 

with the Lack of progress in Samos development caused the establishment of General Greer's Di rectorate of Special Projects (SAFSP), 

.... .,. 

at least one member of the DDR&E (Directorate of Defense Research 

and Engineering) staff queried the Ballistic Systems Division concerning 

thl.: "adequacy" of support for electrostatic tape development. Colonel 

H. L. Evans, the Ballistic Missile Divisionis vice commander for 

satellite systems and a veteran of the E-3 episode of 1959. hastily 

;1 5 ::>ured the lnquiring authority that "present support!! was quite adequate. 

lnsulator, the tape recelvmg and storing a high quality image picked 

up throu.gh the lens. Readout itself involved the process of deflecting 

the modulation of an electron beam which was magnetically guided to 

scan tht;! area of the tape on which an image was recorded. The resulting video signal was amplified in transistoriz.ed amplifiers and then 

applied as a modulating signal to a transmitter tuned to a ground station. 

o nginall y, Director of the Samos ProJect. 

BYE 17017-74 

180 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

He added that there was no immediate prospect of transition from an 

advanc"d research program to a system development, th" t""chnolog y 

"d 29 be ing as yet iDa equate. 

After SAFSP's establishment, funds were obtain"d to continue 

research mto the electrostatic tape approach. The AeronautIcal 

Systems Division, whIch had inherited the Reconnaissam, Laburatory 

through a 1961 reorganization, retamed custody of the prugram on a 

"monitored activity" basis. The Wright Field people were honestly 

C onvlnced that they were working toward an early operational camera 

sys"tern based on RCA's electrostatic tape process. West Coast specialists 

b"tter contained their enthusiasm and their expectations. Nevertheless, 

by S~ptember 1961 the proponents of the RCA system were able to prompt 

a formal evaluatwn of their proposal. Unhappily (irom their viewpoint), 

th" SAFSP engme"rs who evaluated the proposed system had to report 

tl1at obtainmg the requisite four-foot resolution "would mean developing 

i1 very cOluplex system" even though lIrnany technical and operational 

Drublems rare] yet unsolved." Power supply l1rnitations promised to 

k"E:p any tape system from remaining active for more than two months 

un urbit, with one-month life being a real pOSSibility. The only approach 

then feasible could be to mate the tape system to one of the eXisting 

readuut-mode reconnaissance systems, thus providing ;:1t relatlve~y 

181 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

slight cost the essentlal optics, vehicle, stabilization, conunand and 

30 

control, and siX-megacycle data link. 

Largely on the basls of that appraisal, SAFSP in November 1961 

advised the Aeronautical Systems Division of its readiness to listen 

to proposals for developing a camera--less optics--suitable for 

environmental and functional testing of the electrostatic tape equlpment. 

Wright Field, in response, estimated a 15-month effort that would cost 

General Greer's organization from $1. 3 to $1.6 million. 

Perhaps the cost, perhaps the awareness of technical uncertainty 

proved sufficiently impressive, but in any event it became clear that no 

. such major program would be carried through on SAFSP money. What 

did result was a proposal that SAFSP (through the Air Force Space Systems 

Division) provide some $300,000 in fiscal 1963 money, with the Aeronautical Systems Division investing a like amount. (In the pr"eceding 

three fiscal years, the Samos project had furnished about $250,000 and 

the Reconnaissance Laboratory another $1.656 million to support the 

electronic readout work.) Since the E-2 system had been cancelled 

before these proposals could be refined, the E-6 became a leading 

candidate to provide optics and stabilization elements. Advocates of 

the E-2 approach still were heard, however, chiefly because the difficulty 

of adapting E-b optics and film transport to the tape devices seemed 

BYE 17017-14 182 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TUI" &lIiliKtiT 

,-onsidt!rably greater than the difficulty of adopting E-2 su.bsystems. 

The reahstic objective for the immediate future, however, wa..;, to 

obtain a ffbreadboard" vers ion which could be usefull y test~d aboard 

an aircraft. No orbital experiments were seriously considered in 

31 

the I trcwnstance IS of the moment. 

There was little doubt of SAFSP interest, but in the mlodlt. 

months of 1962 there arose a substantial question about the technical 

adequacy of the proposed RCA approach. The first test results reported 

to SAFSP proved quite disappointing; in April 1962 Captain Frank Gorman 

(U.S.N.), the chief of advanced planning for General Greer's t!l:itablishment, urg~d the Reconnaissance Laboratory to retest for sensItivity 

(eqUlvalent of film speed). resolution, and dynamic ran~i,;! (equivalent 

vi gray scale In photographs). Subsequently. when few data wert! forthcoming. Aerospace Corporation pel's onnel contacted RCA direct! y--a 

development that brought a pained protest from Wright Fleld. f~arful 

that RCA would become too fond of dealing directly with thl::! customer 

for satellite systems. Gorman reas sured the Da )'ton laboratory that 

he had no intention of letting Aerospace Corporation pirate the develop32 

tnent program. 

A meaningful revlval of interest in readout came In October 1962., 

almost entirely prompted by the Cuban missile cnsis of that fail. A 

183 BYE 1701' 

'fOP SECRE'P 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

major Air Force achievement had been the suce essful relocation dnd 

operation of a cloud-cover satellite system, the "Program 35" satellite and ground complex developed under cover of SAFSP activity. 

.". 

" 

Enormously impressed both by the flexibility of the satellite system 

and by it::> application to a crisis situation, Undersecretary Charyk, 

after brief consideration, asked General Greer to propose a readout 

system l apable of providing surveillance capacity over spedfh' hmited 

areas uf the Soviet heartland. It was in some important respects a 

regression to the requirements of the pre-1960 period. when warning 

rather than reconnais sance was the program objective. (One side 

effect of the episode was a quick inventory of available E-l and E-2 

payloads; three flyable systems were located..) 

General Greer responded by instructing Captain Gorman to 

"develop a plan for a mobile surveillance satellite systern rt based on 

electrostatic tape or some other electro-optical recording method. 

(The P-35 satellite had used a derivation of the Tiros telt:!vision recordIn[:!. 8 ystt.!m.) Gorman's goals were to be a system concept and Ci 

devel.opment plan. Greer did not really care which of several basic 

,ch~cle concepts was employed, aLthough he suggested paying particular 

, h 1 d' "1 33 a tkntlon to w !..'e -type an spln-pan-type vehlc es. 

Dl::;l...ussed 111: Chapter VIII. 

BYE 17017-74 184 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

In point of fact, General Greer found it difficult to bee orne 

particularly enthuslastic at the thought of any new readout development 

prug ram. Thoughtfully, he retrieved Colonel King' 5 unk 1 nd e piloglC 

remarks on readout from the file where they had been restlng tor 

nearly a year and after reading them again he opened an "xtenSlvt: 

personal inquiry into the putential and limitations of readout in general. 

The result was an essay, "Anatomy of Readout," built around a series 

of mathematical calculatlOns of readout's theoretical and probable 

utility. He concluded that the best obtainable readout system would 

r"qune about 700 seconds to transmit the information it could aC<juire 

in one second. Any readout satellite would need 40 days of reliable 

operation to equal the gross product of available recovery sysl<'ms 

that could photograph 100 targets a day for three days in orbit and 

which could make all of its photographs available for examination 

within three days of recovery. (With 10 ground stations to read out 

satellite lniormation. Greer calculated, the readout system might m 

!tve days equal the recovtry system's three-day output.) Apart from 

ObVlOUS disparity in resolutlOn ')otential which made recovery so 

attractive, an operationally useful readout satellite would also have 

to overcome Colonel Klng's basic objections that current technology 

could not provide for long-krm untended reliability on orbit, for 

185 BYE 1701 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

inexpensive ground stations, and for cunsiderable improvements in 

. . 34 data transmlSSlon. 

Anything that promised to satisfy such requirements would 

have to come from work supported by the Reconnais sanee Laboratory 

at Wright Field. When interest suddenly spurted, in October 1962, 

the project could look back. on four independent efforts to develop an 

electrunic camera having significant advantages over a cunventional 

silver halide image device. RCA had devoted considerable effort to 

developing a photo-conductive tape system and Westinghouse to photoemissive tape. General Electric touted the virtues of a thermoplastic 

tape system. Chance-Vought had explored the potential of a modification of the Xerox process. The Navy, which had provided virtually 

all funds for the Chance - Vought investigation, dr opped the project in 

1962. Even earlier, the Reconnaissance Laboratory had glven up on 

the General Electric system and was then in the process of closing 

out the Westinghouse activity~ RCA remained, lion its merits," to 

quote the project officer. All of the other artful techmqu<'s had displayed 

apparently unsurmountable defects in resolution, sensitivity. and handling 

. 35 requlrements. 

The advantages of electronic tape, apart from those ritqally 

urged whenever devotees of readout gathered, lay essentially In a 

BYE 17017-74 186 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

greater sensitivity than film (by a multiple of at least :'0) and in the 

promise that a shutter mechanism might be electronic rather than 

mechanical. (Both vibration effects and reliabihty wer" tnarkedl y 

influenced by shutter design.) As compared to film, tap" had another 

advantage for a period of "hot war"; although exposure to nuclear 

radiation might wipe away any sorted images, it would not so affect 

the reuse potential of the tape. Other advantages, as seen by project 

advocates, tended to hinge on the availability of techniqu"s not yet 

generally proven--such as ZO-megacycle-per-second data links havmg 

a 30-decibel signal-to-noise ratio. or an 80-megacycle link "developed 

and demonstrated by the Communications Laboratory at ASD." Such 

equipment was purported to be "available" in a form that would qualify 

36 

it for satellite installation. 

The option of reactivating the E-Z, and improving its technology 

by half a decade. was not readily available. Captam Gorman investlgated that situation and concluded that a test of E-2 payloads could not 

sensibly be funded; it would be prohibitively expensive, If only because 

system operation depended on the availability of impregnated developing 

. 37 

webs WhlCh had not been manufactured for two years. 

In essence, the non-availability of an E-l system, the cancellation -of three proposed tape systems because of major defects, and the 

187 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

continuation of the requirement posed by Dr. Charyk left Captain 

Gorman with but one option: investigation of the RCA tape system 

for possIble application to the problem. He therefore asked the 

Aeronautical Systems Division to provide definitive performance 

data on the RCA tape system which, he commented, "may have 

progressed in development to the point where it can be senously 

considered for .•. system applications." Late ·in November, 

General Greer assigned a relatively high priority to the necessary 

tests. The investigation had earlier been formalized as "Project 73, " 

a speCIal study entrusted to a select group of SAFSP officers headed 

38 

by Captain Gorman. 

Early in December, Gorman and several speLlahst engineers 

iI'om SAFSP and Aerospace Corporation visited the RCA laboratory 

to "iew the electrostatic tape device and to define test requirements, 

~eneral system requirements, and a method of data analysis that 

would be used. Funding was being provided in part by the Recunnaissallee Laboratory, but the bulk of the money required to finance the 

special performance tests had to corne from SAFSP. The first increment, $l50, ODD, had gone out in October; an equal amount went 

forward in late January. The total $300,000 was intended to finance 

RCA's efforts through the end of the fiscal year. 

BYE 17017-74 i88 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 ~ 

Apparently, however, RCA concluded that a very substantial 

system development contract, On the order of $2.5 milhon, lay at 

the end of the data demonstration process. The contractor thereupon 

proceeded to concentrate on producing ~ impressive pl<"'!lIre with 

the breadboard equipment, without much concern for rnakmg funds 

last until June or t as later became obvious, without too much worry 

about eliminating major shortcomings of the equipment. 

The first series of tests, conducted on 10 Januarv, seen",d 

wadequate in all respects. The Reconnaissance Laboratury's e\'aluahun showed "performance levels appreciably less than had been hoped 

for ... " However the Aerospace Corporation estimated that the 

performance was adequate to the needs of a surveillance reconnaissance 

program. Product improvement requirements were ch~ ractenzed as 

39 

!!modest. II 

Captain Gorman, much less impressed than Aerospace Curporahun reviewers, descrlbed RCA's system performance as !!wQrse" than 

lnltlally thought, but still capable of improvement "with " hed~e for 

unknown technlcal factors and a big hedge for RCA management." On 

the day that Gornnan set that judgment on paper, RCA submitted a 

iormal proposal for lnnmediately accelerating work to a $100, 000 per 

munth level and for orgamzmg the effort on a system ba,is. TillS 

189 BYE 17017-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

although the Reconnaissance Laboratory project engineel had duwngraded the contractor for deficiencies in "feeling of urgt:ncy, II longterm planning, anticipation of prospective problems, and gt>ner,,' 

management& 

Gorman bluntly told the Reconnaissance Laboratory that no 

~dditional SAFSP dollars would be made available for the RCA work 

that fiscal year, that the contractor should be advised to program his 

effort to keep funds available until mid-June, and that the ftscall9b4 

funding level would be largel y dependent on the results (,f the current 

40 

program. Within three days, RCA had been so notlfied. 

Undeterred, gaily optlmistic and lacking essential experienl" 

III reconnaissance and optics, RCA plunged ahead at a $100,000 per 

munth spending rate, gambling on the successful demonstration of 

3ystem performance and the award of a substantial contract by I Apnl. 

Apparently neither SAFSP nor the direct project managers at Wright 

Field were aware of the RCA decision, although visitors to the RCA 

facility must on occaSlOn have COme away shaking then heads In 

wunderment. As late as I March, for example, the contractor had 

41 

not selected a full-time program chief. 

Notwithstanding the sometime Disneyland aspec ts of some RCA 

activlties, results of system tests conducted late in Marc-\) seemed to 

have fully justified the Reconnaissance Laboratory In lIS cunsistent 

BYE 17017-74 

190 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

optimism. The project officer reported that RCA had produced a 

good picture: 40 line pall'S per millimeter, 2: 1 contrast ratio, 

equivalent film speed of 1. 0, and an acceptable slgnal-ta-nOlse ratlO. 

He wrote his SAFSP contact that RCA had satisfied Its promise to 

prove feasibility of the system by I April; further "financial asslstance" 

42 

was warranted, he concluded. 

Although the "good plcture" (which RCA said it could not repeat, 

the only available electron gun having failed!) had not come to th" West 

Coast with the project officer's report, a high degree of optimlsm 

seemed warranted. 

SlX days later, it seemed almost as though another plcture was 

being dlscussed. 

In the intenm, the Wright Field project engineer had taken a 

closer look at the "good picture" and had asked several, olleagues to 

appraise it. Resolution, they agreed, was nearer 18 than 40 line pairs 

per milhrneter. Tht' other parameters were proportlOnately downgraded. The laboratory englneer apologlzed for takmg RCA's word 

for picture quality and concluded, somewhat plaintively, that RCA was 

"still incapable of performing measurements on Photo-Tape which are 

43 

meaningfuL" 

Concurrentl y it became obvious that RCA had spent money at 

," rate of $100, 000 per month and had neglected other elementary program 

191 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-

Hat"d·e" a Bveman/Taie ... · Ke:--

C:· .. rJ ~ ,:.,. 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 . 

TOP RET 

precautions. SAFSP's rejection of the spurious analysis and demand 

for a more meamngful test fell into a financial vacuum. No money 

remained. On 6 May, RCA stopped work entirely. All that remamed 

of the $600,000 allocated for the year was a $10,000 res<'rve to pay 

for the final report--and RCA could not readily use that sum because 

of disag"reements over fees due. The activity simply sputtered into 

silence, due for a relatively low level of funding in the approachlng 

44 

fiscal year. 

Although there seemed little enough reason, sorrte of those who 

had bec orne ",valved with RCA maintained their earlier optimism. One 

Aerospace Curporation SCIentist said cautiously that RCA was makmg 

progress, but added that the contractor had given no real consideration 

to environmental problems and that the laboratory models were far 

removed from fli!-!ht hardware. Concentrating on the electronics of 

the proposed system, RCA had 19nored the mechamcal aspects of tape 

transport, had no real understanding of reconnaissance needs, was out 

of tUnc' with system design trends, and would need close monitoring in 

45 

any continuation of the prut-!rame 

As it happened, RCA was relatively honest m the affair of the 

picture, but the explanati.>n lald open an appalling error In basic 

understandmg. As explained by the contractor's markettng manager, 

BYE 17017-74 192 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

who had experience in putting the best face on unfortunate developments. 

RCA had throu!'h a "regretable mlsunderstandlng" not known until after 

submltting both the plctures and the appraisal that the Air Force standard 

for determimng photographic resolution differed from the televlsion 

standard--by a factur of 100 percent. Photographic "line paas per 

millimeter" standards counted each line and space comb,natlOn as a 

unit; television standards Lounted a line and space as two lines' In a 

thurouj<hly subdued evaluation of its own performance, the contractor 

conc eded to unwarranted optimism and the failure to recognize that the 

. . 46 

system mvolved photographIc as well as electronlc problems. An 

interesting unanswered question was whether RCA had for 16 months 

been diligently trying to build a system capable of reproducing 3S Ime 

paIrs per millimeter whlle Air Force project officers continued to 

believe that 75 line-pairs was the object of the program. 

After the furor Oled GOwn, RCA was modestly financed for 

another year of devdopment. (There was clear understanding, this 

hme, that the technical objectIve was a demonstration of 75 cycles per 

second resolution--C1 !1C'~'cle IT meaning line a.nd space to both the 

telev,sion industry and the Air Force.) The goal of the revised program 

wa, demonstration of the deSired functional utility by March 1964, a 

possibility that the project engineer thought somewhat uncertam \;>ecause 

193 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

h3""~dEh.n-a"l-eo"· ' .. 
Approved for Release: 

of continued poor management at RCA. The contractor was considerably more conservative in his goals--and claims; hi:; immediate 

obJective now was a flyable system that could resolve 50 cycles at 

1. 0 (ASA) film speed by mid-1965. The goal seemed not unrealistic. 

-n 

On the other hand, it had no particular technical appeal. 

In a sense, Project 73 died at bath. Notwithstandll,g a considerable degree ot optimism--always most pronounced amon!.! those who 

knew the least about photographic and electronic problems of readout--

there was nothing to ;ecommend for near-term development. The E-I 

still was the only readout system to have demonstrated any reconnaissance 

capacity in operation, and the £-2 still was the most advanced of those 

wtth any near-tern) availability. None of the various electrostatlc or 

electronic deVlces approached operational feasibility. The CBS 

Reconotron, in development qUlte as long as RCA's elf'ctrostahc tap'> 

crirnera, had developed 100 itnes per rnilliITleter resoiutlon ln system 

dements closest to the optics, but would lose from 50 tu 75 percent in 

focus and readout processing. The Westinghouse tape seemed to have 

4;; 

nu promlse at all. 

In a special staff study completed in May 1963, C"ptall1 Gorman's 

plans office determined that the theoretical maximum rate of readout 

was 4.05 square inche, of film per megacycle per minute at 100 lines 

Bn 17017-74 194 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

millimeter. This, Gorman reported, "can not be exceeded w,th any 

kind of system." In practice, degradation of the signal-to-noise 

ratio, extension of gray scale requirements, and the need for flne 

scan techniques to avoid degradation of resolution would make the 

actual tra.nsmission range between 0.98 and 2.93 square inches per 

magacycle per minute. Digital techniques would permit better transmission than analog readout, although under optimum conditions an 

analog system had resolution advantages over a comparable digital 

49 . system. Other formulae devised by other experts differed in 

specifics, but the general conclusion--that readout limitations were 

very considerable and that substantial advances in technology would 

be necessary before any significant advances could result--seemed 

common to all. 

There was obviously a continuing demand of variable intensity 

for a system that could be put in orbit and turned on and off as C"lrCumstances required--one capable of detecting actions indicative of a 

hostile intent on the part of an observed enemy. In ,ts essentials, 

th" recurrence of demand for a readout system was a symptom, an 

mdication that the formal abolishment of the "surveillance and warning" 

satellite requiretnents of 1957-1960 had not eliminated the sentiment 

195 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

CRET 

that originally prompted them. Technical attractions were less 

cornpelhng. EI"ctrostatic tape, despite Its demunst=ated failings, 

Llffcrcd relative insensitivity to rad,attor. in the Van Pdle" belts 

where a long-life satellite would nave to taKe statlon. somev.·hat 

better spectral sensitivity. and a degree of selective tar~et quicK 

r<o!sponsiveness that "sudden-launch" satellites would never be able 

to match. In other respects it remained inferior to recovered film. 

Data transmission time was the greatest difficulty, even though new 

multiplexing techniques offered some promise for wide-band 

. . 50 transmlSS10n~ 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP~ __ 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. Ltr, Col W.G. KIng, Du/Samos Pro), .to BMD Exec, 23 Sep 60, 

sUbj: ... Chronology ... , in SSD Hist DiV files: Sentry/Samos 

Chronology Mar 59-Dec 60, in Samos files; .. pt, LMSD Preliminary Test Report, 11 Oct 60; mem_o for r. cord, LtCul E. F. Blum, 

Ch Agena Div, BMD. 24 Oct 60, subj: SAMOS GSE AssoClated 

Problems During SAMOS [Launch, 11 Oct 60, both In Samos files. 

<!. TWX SAFSP-DP-25-10-23, SAFSP to SAFMS, 26 Oct 60, in 

SAFMS Telcon files; basic costs were: Atlas - $1. 83 million, 

Agena - $l. 81 million, E-l payload - $.55 million, F-l payload -

$.24 million. launch and management services - $.42 million. 

3. Program Summary, 6 Aug 60, with SAMOS Revlsed Dev Plan, 

11 Aug 60. in SAFMS files. Samos Hist. 

4. TWX SAFSP-3-11-23, BrigGen R. E. Greer. SAFSP, to SAFMS, 

3 Nov 60, citmg telcon with J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, 3 Nov 60, in 

SAFMS files, Telcon, Nov 60. 

5. Memo for record, Maj H. Howard, SAFMS, 30 Nov 60, subj: 

TTlp Report, In SAFMS files; TWX SAFSP-3-11-23, 3 Nov 60. 

o. Ur, Col W. L. Walker, Ofc ACS/r, USAF, to Cmdr BMD, 

11 Aug 58, subj: WS 117L, in SP-Samos files, R&D-I, 58; 

memo R. W. Juhnson, DiT / ARPA, to SAF, 4 Dec 58, subj: 

WS-1l7L Program, In SSD Hist Div files, ARS 58; 

itr, MajGen J.H. Walsh, ACS/r, to Cmdr ARDC, 10 Nov 58, 

subj: Intelligence Requirements for SENTRY, in SP-Samos 

hies, Hist Doem; see also a vanety of letters and memos in 

SP-Samos files, R&D-I, Hist Doem 1959, which clearly 

ddine the trends of ACS/I and SAC thinking on Sub~ystem [, 

readout. concurrency, and early operational assignment of 

S«tnOS to SAC. 

'. TWX RGW 10-5-1-E, RADC to Col W.G. King, Dir!Samos, 

11 May 60. in SP-Samos files, Hlst Docm '60; memo, LtCol 

R. E. Zelenka, Exec, D/Cmdr Space Progs, to Col R. D. Curtin, 

D/Cmdr Space Progs, BMD, [9 Jan 601 subj: Trip Report - Visit 

197 BYE 17017-

~. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
to Itei< Corporation 3-6 January 1960, in Corona corres 

files; interview, Col Kmg by R. L. Perry, 19 Dec 62.; intervi"w, Capt L.G. Neuner, SAFSP, by Perry, 18 Apr 63. 

8. Memo, Zelenka to Curtin, 9 Jan 60 . 

9. Rpt, "Provisional Draft Report of the Ad Huc Group On 

Samos Ground Handling Data, " 8 Aug 60, in SAFMS files, 

Samos Gen '60, and handwritten memo, attached to rpt, 

unsigned, prob by Col R. D. Curtm, 22. Aug 60 .. 

10. Ltr. MajGen K. P. Berquist, Cmdr AFCCDD. to ARDC, 

15 Sep 60, subj: Transfer of Executive Management Responsibility (EMR) of Subsystem I, in SP-Samos files, R&D-5 60-61; 

TWX RDRB 2-8-10, ARDC to BMD and CCDD, 2 Aug 60, same 

file. 

11. Mins of 117M Spec Studies Committee, 21-2.2. Jul and 2.7 Sep 60, 

in SP-Samos files; mins of SAFUS-SAFSP-SAFMS mtg, 

18 Oct 60, quuted tn TWX SAFMS-EXEC-13, SAFMS to BrigGen 

R. E. Grecr, SAFSP, 20 Oct 60, in SAFMS files, Telcon 

Oct-Nov 60; ltr, Greer to SAFUS, 17 Oct 60, subj: Sub-System I, 

in Greer's flIes. 

12.. Memo, J. V. Charyk, Actg SAF, to Dir/Sarnos files, R&D-l 

Hist Docrn Aug-Dec 60. 

13. TWX SAFSP-VT-o-ll-IO, SAFSP to RADC and AFCCDD, 

9 Nav 60; TV/X AFDSD-CS-61150, USAF to ARDC, 14 Nov 60; 

TWX RCKW-17-11-36-E, ARDC to TRW, 17 Nov 60, all in 

SP-Samos files, R&D-5 60-61. 

14. TWX SAFSP-23-12-38, SAFSP to ARDC, 23 Dec 60, in Phelps' 

ftles; TWX SAFMS-DEP-60-69, J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to 

BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/Sarnos Prog, 23 Dec 60, in SAFMS 

file. Msgs Dec 60; TWX Dic 4171, SAC to SAFMS. 13 Jun 61. 

BYE 11011-74 

m SAFMS files; M,sc; TWX SAFMS 62617, SAFMS to EMD. 

18 Nov 60. Ritland files; memo, Charyk to C/S, USAF, 3 Feb 61, 

subj: Subsystem I Test Plan, in Martin files. 

198 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP 

15. TWX (no code line) SAFMS to SAFSP, 8 De~ bO, m SP-3 files; 

TWX SAFMS-Sys-Eng-bl-08, to SAFSP, 19 Jan 61, in SAFMS 

files, Samos-Gen, b1. 

lb. Interview, MajGen R.E. Greer, SAFSP, 1 Nov 63, by R.L. 

Perry, Hist Div. 

17. Samos Hist Chron, J an-Jun bl; rpt. LMSD Prelllninary Test 

Report, SAMOS n, 31 Jan bl, in SP-Samos file; memo for 

record, BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/Samos Proj, 16 Feb 61, 

sub): Trip Report, in SP files, Gen Prog, Feb 61. 

18. TWX SAFSP-VT-IS-2-13, SAFSP to SAFMS, 15 r-lar bl, in 

SP-Samos files: Hist Docm b1. 

19. TWX SAFMS-INS-60-45, to SAFSP, 24 Apr 61, lfl Grimes' 

files; A.H. Katz, "Analysis of Lunik III Photographs," publ 

by RAND, from Proceedings of Lunar and Planetary Exploration, 

Collogium, Mar 60, Vol II, No.2, pp 27-44; interview, MajGen 

R. E. Greer by R. L. Perry, 18 Nov 63. 

2.0. TWX SAFMS DEP 61-12, SAFMS to SAFSP, 24 Jan 61, In Grimes' 

files; TWX SAFMS SEN-bl-29. SAFMS to SAFSP, 9 Mar 61. 

21. Sum of Program Review 10 May bl, in SP-Samos files, 10lAI 

101B 60-61. 

22. SAMOS Hlst Chron, Jan-Jun bl; TWXs to SAFSP from LMSD: 

LMSD 39b8bl, 5 Jun 61, LMSC A097048, 14 Aug 61, and 

LMSC BOOObl3, 6 Sep bl, all in SP-Samos files, R&D 38-5, b1. 

2.3. TWX VWZS-1l-9-134-5, b5b5th Tng Wg to SAFSP, 11 Sep bl; 

Samos H,st Chron, Jul-Dec bl; Samos Project Progress Rpt, 

Sep bl, all In SP -Samos files. 

24. Samos Progm Chron, JuI-Dec b1. 

25. Ltr, Col W.G. King, DIDir Pr06m I, to Col H.L. Evans, 

D/Dir SAFSP, 6 Oct 61, subj: Readout-Disposition of Program 

Elements, and Itr, Evans to BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SAFSP. 

9 Oct 61, same subj, both In SP-Samos files: Readout. 

199 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

-~"'C:"',::; 5.',,·...,.,8:-/:3':''''· v::.' 

:::':r··:,..:. \ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOil """".",. 

26. Memo, Col W.C. Klng, Progm 1, to Col J. W. Ruebel, SP-3, 

Zl Nov 61, no subj, ln Cen Creer's files. 

2.7. Rpt, Sentry Program E-3 Reconnaissance, prep by LAC, 

29 Jul 59, in SP-Samos files. 

28. Ibid. 

29. Ltr, Col H. L. Evans, D/Vice Cmdr Sat Sys, BMD, to SAFMS, 

19 Sep 60, subj: Development of Electrostatic Storage Tape. 

in Mc Elhane y file s . 

30. Rpt, Samos Applied Research Program, prep by WADD, 

9 Nov 60, MCElhaney files; ltr, R. E. McCormick, Actg ch. 

Surveil Br, Recon Lab, ASD, to SAFSP, Sep 61; Itr, E. T. 

Welrners, Dir. Sat Sys. Aerospace Corp, LtCo! R.C. Hoewing. 

SAFSP, 2. Oct 61, subj: Requirement for Evaluation of RCA's 

Electrostatic Imaging and Recording System; rpt, Aerospace 

Corporation Evaluation of the RCA Electrostatic rape, prep by 

Capt L.G. Neuner, SAFSP, 18 Oct 61, all in MCElhaney illes. 

31. Memo, J. M. Nilles. Aerospace Corp, to LtCol R. C. Hoewmg, 

SAFSP, 30 Nov 61, subj: Comparison of Recording Media for 

E-6; TWX SAFSP-X-2-11-6S, SAFSP to ASD, 3 l\;uv 61; ltr, 

Maj D. W. Denby, Sys Br, D/Techn, ASD, to SAFSP, 13 Dec 61, 

subj: Development of a Photo Tape Sensor; memo, Nilles to 

Hoewing, 20 Dec 61, subj: Evaluation of Modifications to E-2; 

rpt. Photoconductive Photo-Tape, prep by SAFSP (SP-61. 

18 Jan 62; TWX SAFSP-OA-16-1-5, SAFSP to AAD. 16 Jan 62 

and SAFSP-)A-S-I-2 to ASD, 8 Jan 62; memo for record, 

Capt J .H. McElhaney, 15 Jan 62, subj: Testing of Electrostatic Tape. all in McElhaney files. 

32. TWX SAFSP-6-23-4-1, SAFSP (Capt Frank Corman, USN) to 

ASD, 23 Apr 62; memo of telephone conversation, 15 Oct 62, 

by Corman, subj: RCA Electrostatic Tape, ASD vs Aerospace 

Efforts, all in McElhaney files. -

33. Ltr, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to Capt F. B. Gorman, 

19 Nov 62, subj: Establishment of Special Study Croup; itr. 

Creer to Gorman, 19 Nov 62, subj: Letter of Instructions' 

BYE 17017-74 200 

'-:~ 

- •• :: .s '-' - "', . 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283, 

·.I'-VII' lIIJIn.. ,I( 

for SpeCial Study Group; Memo, LtCol G. A. Masden, Asst 

D/Dir, SP-9 to Status of E-l and E-2 Payloads and Readout 

EqUlpment, all in Me Elhaney files. 

34. Essay, "Anatomy of Readout," prep by MajGen R. E. Greer, 

DirISP, Nov 62, in Greer files ("copy sent to SAFMS, Dec 62, 

to Col J. L. Martin). 

35. Tech Note, ADC Recon Lab, Program 6263, Task 626302, by 

J. T. Fulton, ASD, Nov 62, in M< Elhaney files. 

36. Ltr and atch, R. E. McCormick, Actg Ch, Optronics Br, 

Recon Lab, ASD, 3 Dec 62, subj: Photo-Tape Annual Report, 

in SP-6 files; interview, Capt LH. McElhaney, SP-6, by 

R. L. Perry, 5 Dec 63. 

37. Memo, Capt F.B. Gorman (USN), D/DirISP-6, to MajGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 9 Nov 62, subj: Proof tests on E-l or 

E-2 Payloads, in McElhaney files. 

3S. Ltr, Greer to Gorman, 19 Nov 62; ltr, Gorman to ASD, 20 Nov 62, 

subj: Evaluation of RCA Electro:::.tatic Tape; TWX SAFSP-6-23-11-2 

to ASD Recon Lab, 23 Nov 62, aU in SP-6 files. 

39. Memo, W. F. Leverton, Aerospace Corp, to Col E. W. Romig, 

SSD, 25 Jan 63, subj: Electrostatic Tape; rpt, Chronology of 

Electrostatic Tape Program, no date, aprox May 63, both in 

SP-6 files; McElhaney interview, 5 Dec 63. 

40. EST Chronology, May 63; rpt, "Photo Tape Reconnaissance 

System, " prep by J. T. Fulton, ASD Recon Lab, I Feb 63; 

TWX SAFSP-6-S-21, Capt F.B. Gorman (USN), D/Dir/SP-6, 

to ASD, S Feb 63, all in sp-6 files. 

4t. EST Chronology, May 63; rpt, Photo Tape Reconnaissance 

System, prep by J. T. Fulton, ASD, 1 Mar 63; memo for record, 

Maj C.D. Ferriby. SP-6, aprox 15 Feb 63, subj: Evaluation of 

December 1962 RCA EST Tests, in SP-b files. 

42. Rpt. Photo-Tape Reconnaissance System, prep by J. T. Fulton, 

ASD Recon Lab, 9 Apr 63, in SP-6 files. 

201 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

43. Amended Mo Rpt, Photo-Tape Reconnaissance System, 

15 Apr 63. 

44. 

45. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

BYE 11Q17-74 

EST Chronology, May 63, MCElhaney interview, 5 Dec 63, 

Memo. T. J. Keene. Aerospace Corp, to A. G. Nash, Aerospace Corp, 24 Apr 63, subj: Trip Report l5-l9 March 1963, 

in SP -6 files. 

Ltr, M. G. Staton, Mgr. Marketing, RCA, to LtCol T. O. Haig, 

Ch 417 Prog Ofc, 5 Jun 63, subj: AFASD Dielectnc Tape 

Came.ra Program, in Prog 417 Ofc files. 

Rpt. Photo-Tape Reconnaissance System, prep by J. T. Fulton, 

ASD Recon Lab, 1 Aug 63, in SP-6 files. 

Rpt, Photo-Tape Ref'OnnalSsance System. Fulton. 1 Aug 63. 

Staff Study, "Limits of Readout, " prep by SP-b, l May 63, 

tn SP-6 files. 

InterVlew, Me Elhaney by Perry. 6 Dec 63. 

202 

----: s ::;- , TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 A ... ..- 'IJI .... '''' 

VIlI THE P-35 WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE PROGRAM 

Prefatory notes: 

At various times the Au Force-DoD weather satellite program 

was known as Program 35, Prograrp. 698BH, and Program 417. After 

1964, it also operated under other names of no concern to this account. 

Program 35, the weather satellite program that functioned under 

]\;ational Reconnaissance Program authority, was successfully represented to be a closely held space program with no covert or clandestine 

associations. Few of the people who operated the program office and 

developed the satellite Were briefed on the existence of such programs 

as Gambit and Corona. even though Corona was until 1964 the only 

satelhte operatiun that conceivably could benefit from knowledge of 

weather over the Soviet Union. The account that follows is based almost 

entlTely on program office sources; that is, the narrative reflects the 

fact that program managers were largely innocent of knowledge about 

the way their system would ultimately be used. It must be recalled. 

however, that until 1963 the original Samos program maintained an 

offlcial existence. and most Air Force people unaware of the Gambit 

and Corona programs assumed that Samos, in one of its several 

Incarnations, was the lntended beneficiary of satellite-based weather 

203 

~ 

BYE 17017 

H:!"~~ I:: B"<:''Tle...,/"j~-:--· "'.; 

: -= \ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

reconnaissance. The pretense that such was the case lasted until 

development of the P-35 system had effectively been completed. 

P-35 was operated under ord,nary but rig,dly enforced security 

controls and was not lnlorporated in the BYEMAN control system 

although access to mfurmation about the program was closely 

controlred. 

In light of the foregoing, this account has been constructed 

without much reference to other aspects of the National Reconnaissance 

Program. A slightly different version, denuded of all allusions to 

covert or clandestine satellite reconnaissance operations, was prepared 

(by this author) and filed with other program office records in 1965. 

Apart from occasional references that relate P-35 events to important 

motivating aspects of satellite reconnaissance program activities, 

this VerSlOn conforms to the pattern of the original. 

Finally, this account extends only to late 1963, by which time 

the original program goals had been wholly satisfied. 

BYE 17017 -74 

-~.,: 5 , .. .r , 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 ........... G .............. ~ 

Like communication satellites. the development and operation 

of ITuhtary weather reConnaIssance satellites was until late 1960 more 

a matter of politics than technology. EXisting weather satellite propasals and embryonlc programs generally were absorbed by the 

National A eranautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the space 

program upheaval of late 1958. Weather observation from satellites 

was plainly the responsibility of civilian agencies under the terms of 

the National Space Act of 1958, but that did not el~minate concern for 

military weather reconnaissance requirements that could not be 

entirel y satisfied by NASA programs. Nevertheless. that a weather 

reconnaissance satelhte dedicated to the military would certainly be 

viewed as redundant and duplicative by Congress was a major factor 

io_ the failure of the defense department to approve any of the early 

Alr Force proposals. 

The reconnaissance program realignment of late 1960 had 

lmplications that did not escape the eyes of major defense contractors. 

If. as seemed probable. the original Samos effort was to be expanded, 

the're might also be room to insert developments earlier turned down. 

On 17 November 1960, while Samos program reorganization was 

l!l progress, but before the unique structure of General Greer1s organizatwn had been clearly established. the Radio Corporation of Am~rica 

205 BYE 17017 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

(RCA) proposed to the Air Force the development of a cloud cover 

reconnaissance satellite system. 

The submis sion, which went to Colonel H. L. Evans. Assistant Deputy Director for Space Programs in the Air Force Ballistic 

~. 

~. 

Missile Division (BMD), envisioned a 300-pound payload of television 

components, two readout stations, a satellite control center. and 

contractor provision of cloud cover analysis services. RCA urged 

that the system would fill a functional gap in the array of military 

satellites by exploiting techniques and equipments. many of which had 

been flight-prOven in the course of NASA I 5 Tiros weather satellite 

program. The use of proven or "off-the-shelf" system elements was 

a particular attraction to both the Directorate of Defense Research 

and Engineering (DDR&E) and the Undersecretary of the Air Force. 

J. V. Charyk, who had recentl y acquired cognizance over the total 

reconnaissance satellite program. Even as early as November 1960, 

it was clear that both of those authorities would have to approve before 

a system c.ould be funded for development. 

Appreciating that more was involved than merely evaluating a 

contractor proposal for a new satellite system. Colonel Evans and 

Colonel Evans was Gene ral Greer IS deputy. 

BYE 17017-74 206 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

h,s lmmedlate staff devoted some two months to ,ts exammation and 

to lunsldering how they might uvercome some ObVlOUS obstacles to 

."curmg system approval. Th" ch,ef technical difficulty was selecting 

a launch ,ehid", the proposed payLoad was too heavy for any of the 

avallable probe rockets and too I1ght to warrant use of the Thor -Agena. 

Pick-a-back modes were considered m detail and then dIscarded because 

of their possible degrading effect on the basic Thor-boosted satellites--

Wh,C h were most! y carryIng Corona payloads. 

The A ir Weather Service (A WS). asked to review and comment 

on the RCA proposal, carped at details of the system as then conceived. 

A WS favored a satelhte that could provide information on night clouds 

as wdl as daytime weather, one capable of operating in poor light, and 

one that would embody a variety of automated functions. What the 

weathe- serVlC<, anually wanted was a mature, highly-sophisticated 

system built around a complex mtercommunication net. There was, 

perhaps, a degree of bitterness in the A WS reaction to BMD's request 

for comments; A WS had been rebuffed in a September 1960 attempt to 

secure acceptance of a system only slightly mare elaborate than that 

proposed by RCA. 

Acceptance of the RCA proposal would involve the Air Farce m 

a development that in some respects was directly competitive With the 

- National Operational Meteorological Satellite System (NOMSS)--a 

207 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

qr, umstancl;:!' uf which Colunel Evans was poignantly aware. A NASA 

pro),!I'an), NOMSS was wtended to serve all using agencies, whether 

(lvil ur mtlitary. The NOMSS program required development of an 

lntncately detailed urblting device and thus invoked a conslderable 

element of risk. For th;'lt reason, it was being brought along in two 

pha:,.;<.:s, the fast belng a satellite called Nlmbus which was, In its own 

1 

r q.:,ht, exceedmgl y complex. 

HavIng weighed aU the available evidence, Colunel Evans in 

February 1961 suggested to the chief of BMDls SC'out booster office, 

Ll('utenant Colonel D. A. 5t me, that it might be feasible to develop 

a \ <'I riant of RCA '5 proposed cloud cover satellite for 1i1 unch via the 

Slout. A successful combinatLOn would be relatively inexpensive. both 

in payload and booster elements. and it wo.uld serve a highly useful 

functlOD 1n supportlng a variety of Air Force mis sions - -including Samos. 

By t::arly March. CulOnei Stint' had gone over the idea with RCA in 

considerable detail. He sent an enthusiastic report to Colonel Evans. 

A 1 Evans! direction, Stine and hlS program office people, with the 

continued asslstance of RCA consultants, put together and formally 

s ubroltted a prelimlnar y development plan. In endorsing lt, Colonel 

Evans dire("t",d that 1t be expanded to mdude provisions for testing 

dirl·ct readout technlques durmg system oper~tion. 

BYE 17017-74 

laS 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283-------------
While such details were being worked over, and m the midst 

of d,scussLOns concerning means of transmitting satellite-obtained 

weather data frum one coast to another, the entire proposal took a 

new turn. The Kennedy Administration had corne into office in January 

pledged to an overhaul of the space and missile program. Although the 

I!mlssile g~p" which had served as a convenient campaign issue subsequently proved to be much less significant than had been feared, 

Defense Secretary R. S. McNamara resolved to carry through a major 

clarification of the military space missions of the services. In March, 

he proposed to give the Au Force virtually all responsibility for military 

space systems. One of the conditlOns he specified was that the Air Force 

immediately reorganize to put proper emphasis on space. Early in 

April, therefore. the Air Research and Development Command was 

massively overhauled to accommodate procurement responsibilities--

and funds--previously entrusted to the Air Materiel Command. The 

reorganization brought the Air Force Systems Command into being and 

on the west coast saw BMD segmented into a Ballistic Systems DivislOn 

and a Space Systems Division (SSD). The latter organization immediately 

began working on the Air Force portion of a national space progratn 

proposal which was intended tu integrate NASA and service interests. 

SSD's initial contribution was to be a "Five Year Space Plan!! which, if 

l09 BYE 17017 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

approved, would give the Air Force the basic authority to establish 

an tnterlocked, mulh-program m111tary space effort. The cloud 

cover satellite, attractive becaus" of 1tS apparent techmcal feasibility 

and because of its low cost, was promptly swallowed up in the larger 

schemeG 

A not-uncommon metamorphos1s occurred at that pomt. As 

laid out tn February and March, the Scout-boosted satellite would have 

been a relatively modest program, both in total cost and in the number 

of vehicles needed for imtial tests. In general, it conformed to the 

real world outlook of Under,ecretary Charyk and DDR&:E. For the 

purposes of the "Five Year Space Plan. "however. it was markedly 

elaborated. By late May, it involved 13 launches and a minimum cost 

of $25.5 million through fiscal 1963. Packaged with seven other development plans (including a lunar expedition. a military communications 

satellite, the Saint interceptor satellite, and an inhabited space station), 

It began a presentation and review process at the division, sub-command, 

command, and Air Staff levels before finally reaching secretariat 

echelons. By that time neither the we~ther satellite nor any other 

element of what had become a multi-billion-dollar proposal had any 

real chance of acceptance. The President had decided that putting a 

man on the moon during the 1960's should be the chief national space 

BYE 17017-74 210 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
goal, and he assigned the task to NASA. Additional funds. in the 

amount of many billions, went into an expanded ballistic missile 

program, and the budget ballooned accordmgl y. Lesser developments. 

whatever their abstract merits. could not be funded at the levels the 

Air Force proposed. Moreover, the Air Force still had not been able 

to demonstrate that a viable space mission existed for anything other 

than reconnaissance satellites. Although hope remained high. and 

reassurances frequent, no action was ever taken On the ItFive-Year 

Space Plan" after it reached the upper echelons in the Pentagon • .2 

Nevertheless, the cloud cover satellite did not die of indiffer-

°ence. as did most other of the May 1961 proposals - -nor was it assigned 

to NASA, as was the fate of the lunar landing project. Instead, it 

attracted the particular attention of Undersecretary Charyk. On 21 June 

in the aftermath of a presentation involving several of the "Five - Year 

Plan" systems, he quietly abstracted the main elements and told General 

Greer's group to put together a "minimum" proposal involving a fourvehicle program. Five days later. Greer approved the Itminimum plan" 

drawn up by his people and sent it forward to Charyk. On 11 July. Charyk 

submitted it to the DDR&E with a request for approval and funding. 3 

Although the method of securing revision of the original llMeteorologlcal Information Satellite System" had been somewhat unorthodox. It 

211 BYE 17017-

TOP SJ;CRET 

---------------Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283---------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

was characteristic of Charyk's method of operation. It apparently 

signified nothing more than impatience with the painfull y long proces ses 

of review and revision that typified normal handling of :> ystem proposals. 

In his initial exchange with DDR&E. Charyk proposed a relatively 

mundane and entirely conventional development I rocess, differing from 

uthers of the time only in that it specified the use of fixed~price cont.racts 

and a guaranteed delivery schedule. Charyk saw in the proposal a means 

for providing global weather information during the 196Z-l963 period 

when the Nimbus would be in pre-flight development. He was attracted 

chiefly by the low cost and ready availability of major components. 

The approach Charyk favored resembled that adopted, with eventual 

success, for the development of Corona three years earher and also 

re-nected philosophies that Charyk and Greer subsequent! y incorporated 

in the Gambit and Lanyard programs. The justification for development 

of a military weather reconnaissance satellite lay not solely in the 

possible delay in Nimbus operations. but in two other factors not 

gene rally recognized outside the National Reconnais sancE' Program. 

First, Corona was in 1961 starting to return regular packages of 

photographs of the Soviet Union, and the quality of the retrieved 

reconnaissance seemed likely to improve if timely weather information 

could be fed into the Corona operations program. There was an excellent possibility that political objections to Nimbus operatlOns might 

limit the quantity and quality of information made available to the U. S. 

military services. Therefore Corona (and other military re connaissanee satellites programmed for later operation) could well be handie apped if they had to depend on data abstra.cted from a weather satellite 

program controlled by individuals who honored the "space for peaceful 

uses" theme NASA continued to proclaim. Second, the timing and. 

quality of weather reconnais sance could not be guaranteed if Nimbus 

BYE 17017-74 212 

TOP SECRE'I' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRE'!' 

On 12 July 1961, after the pr .... posal had gone to DDR&E. the 

unde rsecretary instructed General Greer to change the security of 

the proposal from conventional "secret" to "Mandatory Knowled!i!e" 

and to transmit all program information by a sealed envelope system. 

He further dlrected that the proposal be withdrawn from IInorrnal All" 

Force documentation [processes). and .•. consideration be glVen 

to changing (the] name of [the] project." 

By 15 July Dr. Harold Brown, DDR&E chief, had advlsed Charyk 

that he would support the "minimum program" if It could be clearly 

demonstrated that the system had advantages over an expanded TiT os 

developrnent. The undersec retary convinced Brown duung a conVel"sation on 19 July and later that day telephoned General Greer that DDR&: E 

had approved the proposal--subject to a set of special conditions. ThOse 

conditions. though unusual, were nonetheles s implied by elements of 

the development plan and by the 12 July instructions on program security. 

Essentially. the program was to be based on fixed-price contracts, was 

'lr some successor civil system were the provider; the operators of 

vanous reconnaissance satellite programs were unlikely to have much 

wfluence on the operational control of the satellite or on the disposltion 

of its products. If reconnais sance authorities did intrude. there was 

the danger of public protests that would m effeC't'advise the Soviets 

tn;-it the United States needed weather information (chiefly cloud cover 

data). and hence presumably was operating re connaissance satellites. 

In the early 19605, those operations had gone underground and there 

was no immediate prospect of their surfaCIng in the near~ future. 

213 BYE t7017 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP 5ECR5T 

to be continued only so long as flight schedules remained--valid, had 

to be entrusted to contractors aware of and willing to accept the 

schedule requirements, and was to be given a new name and ':ondu. .... ted 

under special security prOViSions. The purpose and eifel t of tht' 

qualifications were clear: ln no manner was the "normal" Alr F .. rce 

to become aware of the program1s objectives, schedules, ,n° tt"'chnlques. 

Usc of the widely known term "MISS" (Meteorological InformatlUn 

Satellite System) was to cease. 

A speClal security policy statement that achieved the deSired 

ends was prepared on the da y the instructions arrived in Los Angeles. 

Llke the basic Samos under which it now sheltered, the program was 

exempted from customary reVlew and approval channels, from routine 

reporting requirements, and from the halo of publicity routinely erected 

over any military space program that received significant fundmg 

4 

support. 

Although the cloud-cover satellite seemed relatively innocuous 

In its main aspects and differed little in function or purpose from the 

Widely publicized Tiros, it quite probably could not have begun development in normal military channels Wlthout causing Significant controversy. 

"MISS I' was earlier used as the acronym for the abortive IIMan m 

Space Soonest'! proposals of lL!58-1959. 

BYE 17017-74 214 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SEC.ET 

Hav1ng a military objective. employing technique s commun to reConnaissance and surveillance satellites in general (though wah such gross 

ground definition that 1t obviously could supply no significant intelhgence 

on the Sino-Soviet heartland)~ and obviousl y of value to the basic Samos 

systems then in development. the miw program was patently unsuited 

to open management by SSD. Soviet protests against !1m ilitary reconnaissance" from space were becoming more pronounced m mid-196l. 

and no purpose could be served by adding fuel in the shape of an 

acknowledged military weather satellite program. The fact that the 

"MISS" plan had been submitted and presumably was awaltmg approval 

was well known in the Air Force at large. In all probability, it would 

have required no more than an approval signal to loose the publicity 

crews; the Air Force was finrlmg it difficult to outgrow habits acquired 

when pres Ii releases had to substitute for launches and orbits. 

In any event, the deed was done. In the next two weeks the 

program acquired a director, Lieutenant Colonel T. O. Haig; a name. 

Program 35; a cost structure derived from payload (RCA) and vehicle 

(Chance-Vought) contractor data; and a set of accepted procedures. 

In point of fact. full and final approval from DDR &E still had not been 

rece ived. but there seemed little doubt that it would come. 

l15 BYE 1701 

TOP SECRST 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Colonel Haig had been associated with ground station aspects 

of the Disco;"erer program and was admittedly bort!d wlth what had 

~, 

become a mundane assignment. Early In 1961 he had become known 

to Colonel Evans as an officer of energy and ability. Clvt>n tht, task 

of finding a program director for the cloud cover satelhte off\( t"", 

Evans called Haig and asked if he would be interested in takmg un a 

small program with rigidl,; rationed res ources and limitt"d objectives. 

Haig instantly accepted, without knowing any program.details. Imtlally. 

he found himself with four other people to 1'manage"; they became the 

Program 35 Office. 

Program ground rules had been defined, in consldt"rable detail, 

by early August. In order to secure DDR&E approval. Dr. Charyk 

promised to complete the four-vehicle program for no more than 

$10 million--and under the fixed-price contracts earlier propo·sed. 

C oniorming to practices that had grown into away of life in the Samus 

pro),.:ram, he ruled that very rigid "must know" secunty practlces were 

t·) t)~ established and maintained. No public announcement of any nature 

was to be made concerning the program; Its existence was not to be 

publicly acknowledged. Maximum use would be made of available 

Like man yother DIS cove re r participants. he did not know of its 

C urun<l. as peets. 

BYE 1701'7-74 l16 

TOP SEC.ET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

hardware (mostly from the Tiros and Scout actLVihes), O;:'ventual launch 

and operation being entrusted to Au Force uniformed personnel, with 

a bare minimum of contractor support where essential. Charyk's 

established distaste for the spate of l'program documentat LOU It that 

accompanied any new program or project caused a flat prohibition on 

s Ilch paperwork activity- -which was even more potntles s than usual In 

any event, since in this instance there was no place for the docurnentation to go except to Greer--who had no need for it. 

Reassured by such measures, Dr. Brown on 5 Augui-lt approved 

the program Charyk had proposed. Later that day the AlI" Force under5 c:c r etary telephoned -General Greer the authorization to proceed with 

contractual commitments as appropriate. An official document to that 

eild arrived three days later. By that time the Department of Defense 

had obtained a reluctant but binding agreement from NASA I S chIef 

which permitted the Air Force to negotiate directly with booster prOciucers rather than buy through NASA. The principle, wh ich ran 

l ornpletel y counter to NASA 1 S instincts and prejudices. was anathema 

5 

tu NASA field officials. (Also to the Air Force. One of the most 

cdebrated interservice squabbles of the 1950s had originated in 

General Schriever's refusal to let General Medaris contract independ. 

e nth for North American Aircraft Corporation rocket en~lnes. ana 

th .... Air Force had carefully segregated initial NASA contracts for 

l17 

TOP SECRET 

BYE 170' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

A tlas missiles so as to keep NASA's Mercury booster purchasers 

outs ,de the production plant. ) 

The first program difficulty came from the reluctance of NASA 

ufficials to permit the Air Force to deal directly with Chance-Vought 

on matters concerning the basic airframe system. The issue finally 

had tu be resolved in Washington. By 12 August. negotiations were 

complete and the firm had agreed to a 1 March 1962 delivery schedule 

and to a total cost figure of $2.255 million. The price vilas appreCiably 

better than NASA's "fil:m price" offer--a circumstance that did little 

to endear Program 35 to NASA officials. 6 Preliminary arrangements 

fur d,rt!ct contracts covering procurement of the first and second stage 

mutors of the four-stage Scout vehicle were completed by 14 August. It 

became apparent shortly thereafter. however. that the two upper 

st,,~es would probably have to be purchased through NASA channels. 

The production plants involved were working at full capaCity and the 

motors had not yet been flight qualified. A meeting at Vandenberg Air 

Force Base on 15 "ugust disclused the need for additional launch and 

track facilities at the Pactfic Missile Range site. Then the tentative 

agreelTIent with Thiokol coverlng procurement of the second-stage 

mutors was endangered by the Army's refusal to let ThlOkol accept 

a fixed-price contract because the same motors were bein.g sold to 

BYE 17011-74 218 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T ECRET 

th .. Army on a cost-plus basis. (The objection seemed well founded. 

if somewhat Parkinsonian in logic. since Thiokol apparently had no 

intention of renegotiating its pleasantly profitable arrangement with 

the Army agency that owned the manufacturing facilities Thiokol used. ) 

Most of the resulting parleys with the Army were earned on 

from Washington. principally by Brigadier General R. D. CurtIn, 

chief of the Missiles and Space Systems Office (SAFMS) (which ostensibly was the staff element of Undersecretary Charyk's Samos urganization, but actually was the National Reconnaissance Ofhce staff.) In 

a succession of patient but perslstent calls to various Army undersecretaries and finally to Redstone Arsenal ltself, Curtm induced the Army 

to accept a "firm price" military Interdepartmental purchase request 

covering the~n~cessary Thiokol motors. Since Greer had ordered that 

no action on contracts with Chance-Vought and RCA be taken until 

there was absolute assurance that the lower stage motors could be 

acquired precisely as Charyk had dlrected. the resolutlOn of the ThlOkol 

controversy on 18 August also served as a signal for startmg work on 

the alrframe and payload portlOns of th", whole program. 

At the m.ornent. one major unresolved item was becoming 

cntical. As originally planned, the Program 35 effort was to have 

been conducted withm the bounds of a rather conventional systems 

.2.19 BYE 1701' 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

engineering-technical direction agreement with Aerospace Corporation. 

The modus vivendi had been established several months earlier, in 

December 1960, as part of the compact that put the E-6 phase of Samos 

into effect. But by August 1961, negotiations between Program 35 and 

Aerospace Corporation had done little more than highhght sharp differences Over the scope of the contractor's responsibilities and details of 

funds management. Under the terms of the Program 35 charter, 

Colonel Haig had a limited amount of m!lney to invest in systems engineering. Moreover, one of the pre-conditions of Program ,~ appruval had 

been wldespread use of available hardware, and that included the payload. 

The quantity and scope of systems engineering-technical direction 

activity was, therefore, certain to be unlike that of other programs. 

In such circumstances, the Aerospace Corporation was quite hesitant 

abuut undertaking to support Program 35. 

Unable to obtain the concessions that he felt were essential, 

Colonel Haig decided it would be feasible to conduct the program without 

any assistance from Aerospace. With General Greer's approval, he 

c"ulwerted the program office into a de facto systems engmeering-technical 

dlcection agency authorized to call on SSD offices and the wing organizations 

fur any necessary assistance. Both the booster and the spacecraft 

t ontractors would operate under the immediate control of ,the prograITl 

offlee. 

BYE 17017-74 

7 Aerospace CorporatlOn had no role. 

llO 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283, "1" U JI" 3,.,..._._ 

By 31 August, Colonel Haig's embryonic program office had 

pr ... "ared a highly detailed development plan--in three copies orculated 

onh to those with a "mus t know" status. The document defined the 

purpose and approach of Program 35, as_ then understood. and tdenhfied the chief technical and operational characteristics of the satellite 

development. 

The goal of Program 35 was a weather observation satellite 

system that would enhance the effectiveness of Samos operatIons and 

Improve the accuracy of cloud cover predictions for other military 

satellites. The development was necessary~ in large part, because 

the extant NASA program had deficiencies in development tim .. scales 

and orbital placement, as well as inappropriate timing of readout 

signals. politico-security ingredients, and program management 

controls. 

The 100-pound satellite. a 10-sided polyhedron 23.5 inches 

across and 21 inches high, was to be spin stabihzed on an axis perpendlcular to the plane of the orbit. The camera, fixed at 90 degrees 

from the spin axis, would point directly toward the earth once each 

time the satellite rotated. At programmed intervals the television 

camera would take pictures of an BOO-mUe-square area on the earth, 

221 BYE 1701 

~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Ap~roved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

the exposures being made when horizon sensors indicated that the lens 

was vertical to the earth. The images could elther be recorded on 

tape or read out by any suitably equipped ground station withm range. 

S pin axis orientation was to be controlled by a magnetic torque system 

developed by RCA and in the course of work for NASA's Tiros 1. NASA 

had rejected the technique as unfeasible. 

With the satellite in a sun-synchronous 400-rnile polar orbIt, 

the system would provide 100 percent daily coverage at latitudes {bove 

60 degrees and 55 percent coverage at the equator. When readout was 

undertaken during the western hemisphere portion of a pass that included 

photography. video data on eastern hemisphere cloud cover could be 

transmitted to the Global Weather Center at Offutt Aa Force Base within 

one hour of its being observed. In a lea s favorable pas s sequence. 

readout would alwa ys be pas sible within three orbits of sensor actl vity. 

Should it prove desirable. either for test purposes or for an actual 

operation. a direct real-time readout mode could be employed to feed 

cloud pict~res to any ground statlon withm range. 

None of those who designed the: program expected to encounter 

any serious technical problems during development. The Tiros -type 

clU..ld cover senSOr system had been flight proven. The Scout vehicle 

had bt!en little tested but seemed potentially reliable enough {five 

BYE 1'7017-74 222 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 

successes in seven flights). The satellite would rely on proven satellite control and readout systems and statIons, with standard airborne 

command, control, and readout components from such programs as 

Advent and Midas completing th" technical equipment. Although much 

of the equipment was experunental in character, ,t did exist and ,t was 

available from contractors who had experience in Its fabrication. 

Funds were to COrne from SAFSP resourCes through an SSD 

channel, with program management entirely concentrated in the program 

office. The contractor structure included RCA (spacecraft), Chance 

Vuught (prime booster contractor), Minneapolis Honeywell (guidance 

and contrul). and (as solid-fuel rocket fabricators) Aero]et General, 

ThlOkol, and Allegheny Ballistic Laborator,es of Hercules Powder 

Company. Assembly, checkout, and launch were responsibilities of 

the 6565th Test Wing (later the 6595th Aerospace Test Wing), under 

SSD control. Satellite control functions were to be exercised by the 

Satellite Test Center (later the 6594th Aerospace Test Wmg) at Sunnyvale. 

The Air Weather Service would do weather analysis in the Global Weather 

Center located in the SAC underground headquarters at Offutt Air Force 

Base, Nebraska. 

The actual payload, weighing 100 pounds, would consist of a 

videc'on-camera recorder system similar to the wide angle sensor 

223 BYE 170 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

used in Tiros I and li, plus stabilization and control dev" es. RCA 

estiITlated the sensor system would have an orb,tal 11fe of 90 days. 

The ingenious attitude control system depended on torquein~ 

the axis perpendicular to the orbital plane through an electric -current 

loop around the perimeter of the satelhte. The torque was generated 

by a ground command that caused current to flow around the loop in 

the desired direction. 

Spin-up during injection of the fourth stage and payload into 

final orbit was followed by a decrease to 12 revolutions per mmute 

under the impulse provided by a system of "yo-yo" weights. After 

rotation speed decreased to nine per minute. spin-up ruckets could be 

used to re-energize the satellite. 

Pulses generated by the horlzon sensor drove a specialized 

computer which triggered the camera. The recorder component was 

capable of storing 32 frames of mformation. Seven fraITles were 

required to cover the area of interest for each pass, but the probability 

of exposing the first fralTle was only 50 percent, therefore fixed 

sequences of eight frames were planned. 

Changes from the Taos transmitter were mostly ,n the direction 

of transistorizing. Performance was little affected, although both 

weight and power requirements decreased. The transITlitter broad"cast 

BYE 17017-74 224 

. . -:-,,-~,-, ...... T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TU_", .. 

a 6Z. 5 kilocycle bandwldth slgnal at Z50 megacycles per second. 

Frequency modulatiOn w<> ,ld permit a total output bandw,dth of 

':90 kilocycles with two watts of output power. The video data were 

to be collected by exishng oO-foot antennas at Vandenberg and New 

Boston. 

Of-the $9.818 million initially programmed for Prugram 35, 

$4.16 million was to be allocated to satellite vehicles and asso( ,ated 

equipment, $3.81 million to the booster procurement, and $1. 04 million 

to satellite control support. The total would buy one prototype satellite, four flight models, four Scout boosters, separation systems, 

aerospace ground equipment, control and support eqmprnt>nt, techmcal 

8 

assistance, and support services. 

Program schedules projected at the time the development 

proposals first went forward to Undersecretary Charyk had to be 

revised almost immediately, chlefly because General Greer had 

delayed a program go-ahead order until he had absolute assurance 

that all contractors had been committed to the types of contracts 

specified. The delay, prlnClpally occasioned by NASA and Army 

objections to direct Air Force contracts with Chance-Vought and 

Thiokot, cost the program a month of worklng time, but the eventual 

agreements had the effect of stabllizing vlTtually all predlctable 

U5 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 170' 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP _1,;1( 

program costs. By early October, it was possible to reimburse those 

Samos activities from which money had been "borrowed" In order to 

activate Program 35. Provisions for program funding had been 

essentially completed by 21 October. 9 

For practical purposes, the program office had n"t come Into 

existence until August 1961 although the first flight waS hrmly scheduled 

for May 1962. In those 10 months, the program manager~ had to complete all of the steps leading to availability of a flight-ready launch 

system, an orbital payload, readout stations, and the several participating and supporting ground systems. It was ineVitable that the pace 

of program actiVity should be extremely rapid and that prugram 

decisions, when required, should be unusually prompt. Nor. was there 

any squeamishness about bringing pressure to bear where needed. As 

a case in point, it proved necessary to have Undersecretary Charyk 

intervene before arrangements could be Inade for early ksts of the 

third and fourth stage motors in the tunnels at Arnold EngIneering 

Development Center. A briefing to General T. S. Power. Strategic 

Air Command chief. got space for P-35 facilities in the SAC underground 

headquarters complex when "through channels" attempts had failed. 

Issues of this nature were habitually forced to a declsion point for 

action rather than being obliged to struggle through the slower and 

BYE 17017-74 2.26 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

10 less certain "normal channels" of Air Force procedure. By late 

1961, it was apparent that the approach to satellite reconnaissance 

had been rid of most of its earlier organizational constramts. 

An excellent illustration could be found In the handling of 

fourth-stage motor problems that cr'lpped up in October. After 

several earlier danger signs. the first certain lfld,catlOn that the 

development of the ABL-258 fourth-stage motor was nol Drocef'dmg 

satisfactorily reached the program office on 25 October. One day 

later. Colonel Haig met with NASA representatives to prf> ~s for the 

early development of an alternate motor. Six failures in s,x tests. 

he told the "JASA people, had convinced him that someth,ni< more 

reliable was needed. Disconcertmgly, Haig discovered that NASA had 

made no special plans to meet the tight Program 35 schedule and seemed 

rather casual about the prospect that the ABL-258 might not be ready 

when promised. Haig. who considered thf' matter anything but casual, 

immediately began to assemble cost estlmates on a back-up motor 

development. 

Within 10 days, the program office had obtained from the rocket 

test establishment at Edwards Air Force Base (an SSD subsidiary) a 

proposal to accelerate development of a device called the "M" motor 

as an alternate Scout fourth-stage. The propulsion people said they 

2.27 BYE 170' 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283" .aur ............ 

could complete their development and te,;t program and furnish four 

flight articles within five months--at a total cost of $300.000. NASA. 

apprised of the option, figuratively yawned. provmg qUltt' uninterested 

and. on the whole, dis believing. 

Haig postponed action pending another trial of the ABL-l58. 

When that ended in a seventh failure. Haig Immediately told General 

Greer that it would be essential to fund development of the "M" motor 

to insure the validity of Program 35 schedules. Concurrently, the 

prototype "M" motor completed its third successful firmg. 

On 16 November. the day definitive cost proposals reached the 

program office from the 6593rd Test Group at Edwards. Culonel Haig 

requested and received from General Greer permlssion tu proceed 

with development of the "M" motor. A purchase request for $285,000 

was written that afternoon. Major design decisions had been taken by 

8 December, fabrication and initlal tests were completed m January, 

and on 16 February the first flight weight motor was test ftred at 

Edwards. The motor, a Lockheed development now desIgnated the 

MG-18, experienced an insulation failure and operated for only 7.9 of 

the programmed 12.7 seconds, but the faults were prmTlptly identified 

and fixed. On 2 April 1962, five months after the purchase request 

had been signed, an MG-l8 mounted in the vacuum chamber at Arnold 

BYE 17017-74 228 

- .... -- : - , 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SEER ET 

Center operated successfully. Precisely three weeks later a fhght 

motor was mated to vehicle 3501, the second f11ght c raft, for spln 

11 

test and balance checks. 

On1 y five months and one week after Colonel Haig had first 

acquired sure knowledge that the upper stage development was in 

serious trouble, a different rocket motor was being prepared for 

mitial use. The implications were in some respects more important 

for management than for technology. The uns ettling effect of learning 

that NASA had no concept of schedule importance--at least for an Au 

Force program- -was to have long-term consequences. Buried within 

NASA I S genial indifference to program urgency was the conviction 

that smce no publicity had accompanied Program 35 and no bugles were 

sounding important assignments for the Scout booster, the program 

could not be particularly critical. It was a yardstick both the Aa Force 

and NASA often used. 

The ti t-for-tat attitude of some NASA field people was particulad y exasperating. Perhaps because the All' Force had resisted 

NASAls efforts to deal directly with the contractors for Atlas and Thor, 

or perhaps because of youthful exhilaration natural to a. new organizatlOn, 

NASA people openly displayed resentment that Program 35 had somehow 

S u("c eeded in getting authority to negotiate directly with the engine and 

air irame subcontractors. 

229 BYE 170 

'fOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 ...... --------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283~T ~A" 

Within the kernel of ach,evement that represented the first 

MG-IS success was a germ of particular sHmificance. For oractlcal 

purposes, the entire development had been planned and cunducted by 

Air Force personnel, most of them in umform. Quite understandably, 

they had begun to take a considerable pnde In their accom.plishm"nt. 

The Program 35 office, small. ti[O!ht-knit. mostly composed of young 

officers who were completely certam that they either had the answers 

or could get them given half a chance. was developlng an lntense 

esprit de corps. Even if read two years after the fact, program correspondence reflected an assurance not common to young. trans,ent, 

and notably small program offices. Enthusiasm was becoming the 

most prominent characteristtc of Program 35. even this early. and 

it tendeCl to set the program apart from others. And if the public 

relations creatures were right. if motivation was lessened bv an 

ufficer's being assigned a task that was :lever fp.atured on teleV1sior:. 

there was a counterpart compensation 1!1 the sense of dOlng something 

that was so important it had to be hidden irom the herd. The phrase 

"sense of urgency, " even if admittedly trite and overworked, described 

a state of mind that really existed In Program 35. Whether 1t could be 

cultured. kept flourishing. remci.lned to be seen. 

Many other aspects of system development had made progress 

_ :~lg the months when the rviC -;"l) ::.omc.:t:..nlt!::-. s';er:l-:::d to 711onopohze 

BYE 11017-74 l3fo 

-_ .. -::, ~,'~ . 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

attention. It was particularly encouraging that additional Instances 

of administrative obstructionism could generally be squashed as 

they appeared. At about the time the NASA-ABL fourth-stage motor 

experienced its seventh failure. the Pacific Missile Range began 

making officlal noises about priorities. Requests that mllitary personnel be assigned to training slots for Program 35 produced counter 

demands for development plans, normal "through chann"ls" program 

authorization documentation, and priority authenticatiun from Air 

Force headquarters --none of which the program office, uuld furmsh 

under the existing security and management ground rullo's. An elaborate 

Program Requirements Document (PRO) had been c-umpl .. ted and 

delivered to the range On 3 November. That seemed, to the program 

office, quite enough. But range officers were not satisfied. After two 

weeks of formal conversations proved fruitless. Haig again stormed 

the Pentagon. On 16 November 1961 the Department of Defense formally 

instructed the Pacific Missile Range to support Program 3"--development 

plan' r not. 

Another Gordian knot parted with General Greer's decision to 

operate the readout stations under a contract With RCA. That highlighted another difference between Program 35 and most other Air 

Force satellite developments. Early in December. Colonel Haig 

briefed the commander of the Air Weather Service on the" program's 

2. 31 BYE 170 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

objectives and schedules. As Hail'( rememoered the event, the Weather 

Service seemed about as interested. 1.,.} tot: pro::1pec.t u1 a n10re t!laoora.te 

10Uow-on development, samethl.ng InUre Lo:npJ.cx anti. eXlJt:llbl\lC tnan 

Weather Service would not agree to lur.uu~h rf'.lHtdf 'f per~vnnei tv 

Jperate the equipment. 

The period from Decemuer 1<'0:' ,hrougn March 1-10. was Largen· 

taken up with detailed eng1neer .r.ng \VorK ana :s I.lr veiliance of c OTltraCtor 

progress, particularly 10 computers, motors, ana payloaa--the three 

most critical areas. But there were runll'l>ngs of new dlfiicuitles 

w~th NASA early in February, anti tneY I'!rew omlnous as the month 

wore on. Although the first Scout booster scheaulea ior Program 35 

was not accepted until 2 Marco l':lbl. a montn earlier the program office 

had bee )me desperately concernec. WHh tr~e ~l()sslbllltv tnat sufflClent 

c:opare parts might not be avaua:>!.e tv SUOj)O.("{, I..'l.e te~t pro,l:!.rd.nl. Aga"" 

NASA's attitude seemed infunatinEly caSLa!. ine local NASA representative was an Air Force ofhcer wno In tne O~lnlon ')1 sori1.~ Progranl .' __ 

peDDle r.ad lost his perspective on the real worla. He tolu rlalg '5 

:>rincipal assistant, Fritz Runlile, an en~lneer Who naa. oeen involved 

"nth development for 10 yea.:-s and "'lIn sateihte~ for ~, tna, ~ne best 

,,·OV to handle the spares proolem was to allocate $"<;",000 in procurement 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

funds to NASA and stop worrying. Runge's report of the meeting was 

composed of equal parts of irritation and bewilderment. 13 

A partial explanation certainly lay in the fact that within NASA 

only the three senior administrators weIe aware of the real objectives 

of Program 35. That situation, which was controlled less by Alr Force 

desires than by the wishes of NASA's top managers, was a real sourte 

of difficulties in communication. Virtually nobody in NASA understood 

why Program 35 was important, and in the hoary tradition of all those 

intellectuals who for centuries had looked down on the centurion from 

the vantage of scholasticism, most of NASA decided not to be impressed 

by the parochial pretensions of a few relatively junior Air Force officers 

14 who were showing inexplicable signs of premature apoplexy. 

The problem was in two parts. Outside the reconnaissance field, 

from which all casuals were excluded, there was no real Air Force 

space program--a fact that NASA appreciated well in advance of the 

Air Force, victimized by its own propaganda. Most NASA scientists 

honored the tradition of Wernher Von Braun, who admitted to only one 

goal in life--manned space flight. Since it was obvious that no program 

based on use of the Scout vehicle could have either imInediate utility 

or lasting significance--it certainly was not a reconnaissance project, 

233 BYE 1701 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

and the Air Force had nothing else worth mentiomng--and Slnce it 

would lnterfere with other NASA actlVltleS that were leadmg toward 

manned space flight, it could be of no !!reat consequence. Hence 

NASA's pedestrian, almost condescenaing attltud", 

NotwIthstanding such difficuJ.tles, tne prol!ram contmued lts 

pace toward a May launch.· Everythmg gr"w tranuc, The lapse 

between rejection of the ground equipment for the New H~ITlpshlre 

readout station on the grounds of poor workmanshIp and Ih" acceptance 

of rebuilt equipment was eight days; the basIc vehicle. th .. payload. 

and the individual motors arrived at Vandenber!! wIthin tilX days of 

one another, with the ch"ckout van arrivinlZ but six weeks before the 

actual first launch. 

On 25 April the first West Coast Scout launching was attempted. 

It seemed a bad Omen. UnhapollV, tne thud stage functlOned most im· 

properly, to the end that the two upper stages tOl!etner drove mto th .. 

P 'f' 0 15 aCl lC cean. 

Di~appointed but not dlScOuraged. the program people turned 

back to their work on the first vehicle~-the second West Coast Scout. 

By 1 May the initial Program ~:. Scout had been mated with the first 

"operational" payload on the pao at Yandenberl!. There was a dress 

rehearsal on 7 May and a launch attempt on 13 Mav, scrubbed because 

BYE 17017·74 

M3nd1e '1.3 8vemar./Ta1e"· K.ev .... olE: 

::~:.:-,::: c ..... ~ 

;:34 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TUP ~-IIi'-I[;K 

of various technical problems. Ten days later, after mmor holds, 

the first Program 35 vehicle lifted off the launch pad. A catastrophIc 

16 failure during second-stag .. burn ended the test. 

The post-launch investigating committee decided that Improper 

assembly of the basic vehicle was the most probable source of failure, 

although that was never finally established. The launch officer at 

Vandenberg suggested that transporting the assembled Scout to the 

pad over a needlessly rough road might have caused enough misalignment 

of the stages to cause the trouble. General Greer was suffiCiently 

concerned at the poss;,bility to ask the Pacific Missile Range commander 

to fix the road, but he did not completely accept the thesIs. 

The first and second stages of the Scout vehicle were coupled 

by a shallow, threaded inner sleeve, six threads deep. After being 

rotated into place, it was held there by a three-quarter-inch pm 

driven through most of the vehicle skin and intu the threaded sleeve. 

Pad workmen drilled the hole for the pin as part of the assembly 

process, and installed the pm once the vehicle was properly assembled. 

It all seemed simple and rather straightforward. 

Unfortunatel y, NASA had no prime contractor for the Scout. 

At the time, the Scout was delivered to Vandenberg in 17 boxes from 

nine sources. Procedures were NASAls responsibility; neither the 

235 

BYE 17017-

- . - " , '"-' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

CRET 

Air Force nor the airframe contractor had authority to make changes--

or responsibihty for seeing that they were made when nt'. ded. Along 

the line, NASA engineers decided it was advlsable to thlcken the skm 

of the Stage I vehicle at the point where the threaded sleeve was to be 

inserted. Owing to the absence of a central configuration control 

authority, nobody examined the effect of the change on the ass~'nbly 

process. In putting the vehicle together, therefore, pad personnel 

rotated the sleeve as usual, drilled the required hole, and inserted 

the customary three-quarter-inch pin. 

But this time the pin extended into an inch of skin, never touching 

the threads. No positive means of preventing sleeve rotation eXisted. 

lndeed, in some respects, it seemed almost as though Chance-Vought 

and NASA had combined forces to insure that the stages could not remain 

properl y interconnected. Instead of the clean and dry thn:ads required 

by specifications, the Scout used at Vandenberg had a fairly heavy coat 

of grease on the critical threads. The lubricant waS perhaps needed to 

get a proper fit in the first place, but it contributed btU .. to contlnued 

tightnes s. Then the metal g nt left behind by the drill would als 0 settle 

in the threads and under vibration might well serve as a , urt of free 

rachet, permitting the sleeve to unscrew but acting like an irreversible 

cog to prevent tightening. 

BYE 17017-74 

HarCle Via Bveman/Talen~ Kev,",~le 

c::-:~:: S ']'-:'1 

2.36 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Subsequent efforts by the program office to get either ChanceVought or NASA to test vibration effects in a realistic enVIronment 

had no success, so program officers were never to be ~"re that th"y 

had located the chief source of difficulty. Except for the program 

office. nobody seemed to be particularly concerned. E\.-n the fact 

of NASA's unilateral action in changing specifications d,d nothlng to 

alter the situation. 

There were other indications that the relationship between NASA 

and the Air Force was growing strained. One of the ch,ef factors was 

the spare parts problem. For more than five months NASA had been 

ineffectually negotiating a spares contract with Chance-Vought. uniformly rejecting the contractor's proposals on the grounds of unwarranted 

cost or insufficient detail. Air Force people on the scene, though unable 

to take a hand, were convinced that NASA was almost entirely wrong on 

both counts. In any event. with no spare parts. and with no prospect 

of their early availability. the Air Force reverted to the eventual device 

of all supply sergeants, whether for chariots, muskets. B-24's. or 

solid-fuel missiles. Cannibalization began--and continued. And irritation 

with NASA increased. 

Friction arose from other causes too. Launch crews were 

convinced that NASA's quite legal eXerc'se of the right to override 

237 

BYE 1701 

rla'lc,:: Iia Bvemar,/Tal~ ..... t ,..t€: 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP ~"'K 

"hold" commands during Scout launches frum the Pacific MissIle Range 

had actually caused the first Scoul failure there, in April. The "no go" 

item that NASA overruled seemed, by some evidence, the point of 

failure. That circumstance did little to endear NASA people to th" 

Air Force. The launch officer at Vandenberg, however, was more 

than willing to take help where he could get it and was convInced that 

NASA had made highly useful contributions to the program. He, and 

a fair number at both SSD and SAFSP headquarters, felt that weaknesses 

in the Scout (Blue Scout) Program Office were more directl". tu blame 

both for the immediate launch problems and for the long-term difficulties. 17 

Needless to say, that was not the outlook of the Scout program 

director, who had much earlier concluded that "NASA Indians" resented 

the special priority of the Program 35 vehicles and supported that 

18 

program only because such support was mandatory. 

Whatever the validity of the several positions, the Issue of 

Scout responsibility was settled on 21 June 1962 by means of formal 

agreements between NASA and the Air Force. They conceded control 

of VIrtually all Scout matters to NASA, including general configuration, 

rno d 1 " f" t" 1 h d d d 1 d " 19 lea lon, aunc stan proce ures, an most re ate tOpICS. 

There was no prior coordination with the Program 35 people--who 

were concurrently acquiring a 698BH program designator. For the 

ITloment, neither the agreeITlents nor the nomenclature cnange had 

BYE 17017-74 238 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

any detectable effect. Attention was generally concentrated on the 

effort to get the next scheduled launch vehicle on its stand and ready. 20 

Through June and July 1962, a succession of modifications, 

revisions, and overhaul operations were performed with the next 

launch vehicle as the subject. (Vehicle 117 was to be used In heu of 

- 113, which had been mishandled in transport.) August 7th had been 

the original launch goal; optimism caused a shift to 28 Jui y. which 

then slipped successively to 2.9 July. 30 July, 3 August, and 10 August 

(to permit payload modifications directed by Charyk). Modifications 

complete, the vehicle was rescheduled for a 13 August launch. At the 

critical instant, a Union Pacific passenger train crawled out on the 

track that crossed Vandenberg and for the first time in history a 

launching was scrubbed because of train interference. 

On the follOWing day. 14 August, monitors caught signs of 

excessive gyro drift during countdown and rescheduled for the 16th. 

Technical difficulties (problems with the C-section and the hydrogen 

peroxide subsystem) slipped that date to 18 August. and then 21 August 

when the Pacific Missile Range was unable to provide tracking services 

on the 18th. It seemed to many that the vehicle, and perhaps the entire 

program. was jinxed. One last slip carried launch over until 23 August, 

the eleventh official deadline date to be set that month. But on 

239 

BYE 1701' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

23 August the Scout finally climbed away from its pad, all stages 

burned more or less as programmed. and the payload went into a 

near-<>ptimurn orbit. Direct readout was successfully attempted 

over the New Hampshire station on 26 August and on the following 

day the first remote readout data on cloud Cover over the Soviet 

Union was _1. £ h "" b" 21 t ...... en rom t e same pomt 1n or 1t. 

Nowhere in the official reports was there the indication that 

a great deal of luck had settled On the Scout a few seconds before 

launch. as if in restitution for the six weeks of misadventure that 

had gone before. Nor was that fact entirely clear following pre-launch. 

Often a period of several days passed before detailed information on 

booster performance became available. and when a bird went into a 

near-optimum orbit there seemed little enough reason to quibble over 

oddities in the launch process. In Colonel Haig's view, if Scout 

boosted the payload into any sort of orbit it was a near miracle; to 

get it into a near-optimum orbit was incredible. 

Haig was quite right. There had been several peculiarities 

or errors of one sort or another during the launch. but none had 

individuall y done enough damage to cause complete failure. Had 

two combined. catastrophe would have resulted. Instead. in an 

unbelievable chain of coincidence, one fault cancelled out another. 

BYE 17017-74 240 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

At first-stage ignition the lanyards pulled out late, so all 

timers experienced a delayed start. The first-stage motors should, 

therefore, have burned out before the timers could signal second-stage 

ignition to begin. Instead, the first-stage motor inexplicably burned 

longer than it should have and first-stage thrust was near perfect for 

the mis sion. 

Third-stage ignition was also late. by 0.54 seconds, Fourthstage burning began. therefore. when the upper stage was further along 

its rough orbital trajectory than had been planned. But an earlier 

attitude error had caused a pitch down. and the effect of dela yed 

fourth-stage ignition was to postpone the insertion process until the 

vehicle had drifted far enough along its orbital path to be in perfect 

position for fourth-stage burn. 

The fourth stage was pointed some 0.4 degrees left of its 

predicted courSe at the time of spin-up. Spin-up invariably threw 

the vehicle a bit off COurse in an unpredictable direction, a phenomenon 

called tip-off error. In this instance, spin-up provided precisely the 

azimuth correction needed to insure a proper course, The final errol' 

was less than 0.1 degrees, which meant that the vehicle had gone into 

orbit close enough to true sun synchronization so that total drift over 

the next six months would total only 15-20 minutes (in sun time), (The 

241 

BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP!:;..oo" ~ 

next successful Program 35 bird drifted three sun-time hours in six 

22 months as a result of a 0." degree error.) 

Colonel Haig called Colonel R. A. Berg, Greer', deputy, from 

Vandenberg the afternoon the details of the launch were flrst put 

together. He asked Berg to stay a few minutes past usual closing 

time to hear something Haig had to teU him. The C-47 ~huttle from 

Vandenberg landed about two hours later, and at dusk Colonel H~lg was 

verbal! y piecing together the tale of coincidence and happenstance which 

had resulted in so fine an orbit. Berg was fascinated. General Greer's 

reaction was similar~ In a business where the unique was commonplace, 

Haig's tale kept a place of honor. In any comparisons of satellite program 

oddities, citation of the event was almost certain. 

Even though the outcome had been happy, there was little to 

cheer in total booster performance once the truth was known. Nor, in 

the circumstances, did relations with NASA improve over the period of 

the first two launches. NASA contended, apparently quite serious, 

that the launch attempt of 23 May had failed because of the MG-18 upper 

stage (althQugh it was a tortuous trail between the real culprit, the 

second stage, and the MG-IS, which had never been given time to begin 

separation from the third stage). NASA pointed out, correctly, that 

the 'MG-IS had never been flight tested, and that it was not "qualified" 

BYE 17017-74 242 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

in the sense of having completed a demanding flight trial program--

but even at that the MG-IS had certam obvious attractions as compared 

to advantages of NASA's proposed upper stage and its record of complete 

failure. There was a certain rude humor to the news that NASA had 

urged the commander of the Pacific Missile Range to close his iaclilties to the MG-IS because that stage was "not qualifie5i." And the 

final scene, the 23 August launch, became almost ludicrous when NASA 

officials refused to let their people go near the final stage--in effect 

the entire launch site- -claiming that the launch was a dangerous operation. 

In the light of such events, Haig and his people could generate 

little enthusiasm for a. proposed joint operation, a project office structure 

which would put NASA into a sort of Siamese tWl.n relationship with Haig's 

people by means of a NASA link to the Scout program office. The prospect of such an arrangement had begun to alarm Colonel Evans in May; 

his initial inquiry into Colonel Haig's reaction to a proposed NASA-USAF 

agreement on Scout prompted several critical comments. As Haig later 

explained. he felt that a joint project office, in the unhappy tradition of 

past Air Materiel Command-Air Research and Development Command 

joint offices, would be responsible either to no m.aster or to two, that 

each half would have a veto power but no approval authOrity. Candidly, 

Haig estimated that Program 35 would never have progressed to first 

243 

BYE 170 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

launch attempt by that tilne if a joint office had existed. NASA, he 

reminded one listener, had strenuously opposed a great many Program 

35 decisions which later proved perfectly valid and which In any event 

offered the only chance of staying on schedule and getting cntical 

equipment. He did not say MG-l8, or "upper stage, " but his meaning 

was clear. It was Colonel Haig's conviction that the inability of the 

Air Force Scout program office to prOVide entirely satisfactory service 

was the product of faulty second-echelon management. And in so many 

words, Haig said the Air Force Scout office was providing lDsufficient 

support to his project largely because its chief, Colonel Stine, was 

23 forced to do most of the work himself. 

Although Colonel Haig's appraisal of·the problem apparently 

was blunt enough to quash notions of a joint project office. it could not 

prevent a modification of the original arrangement for booster procurement. The Air Staff was afraid that NASA might successfully invoke 

the Scout example to justify independent procurement of boosters 

developed by· the Air Force: Thor and Atlas. It pained the Air Force 

to see a Thor given a new coat of paint, prominent NASA initials three 

feet high, and a name--Delta--which was supposed to indicate NASA 

origins. And unfortunately. that possibility had been overlooked until 

after the Air Force had designated its NASA-developed S,·out boosters 

IIBlue Scout. II 

BYE 11017-74 

Haf"dle 'J'a Bveman/ Talent Keyfloie 

':: .... : .. J 5 C!nLy 

l44 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

In mid-October 1962., Dr. Charyk agreed that NASA would act 

as SAFSP's agent in contracting for additional Scout boosters. He 

specified that price and delivery dates had to be guaranteed and that 

product quality and program administration had to satisfy the requirements of Program 35. Ii these conditions were not acceptable, he 

told NASA, General Greer would contract for follow-on vehicles 

precisely as he had for the first four. 2.4 

In retrospect, that concession was to be recognized as a tactical 

error. Even though Charyk could not have known what NASA's future 

course would be, the small group which had placed the first Project 35 

satellite in orbit had some pronounced--and readily available--opinions 

on the subject. They proved rather sound, on the whole. 

For the moment, however, the matter seemed less vital than 

the burgeoning crisis in Cuban affairs and the possibility that persistent 

rumors of Soviet missiles in Cuba might have a foundation of truth. 

Reconnaissance of Cuba, chiefly by means of U-2. aircraft, began in 

September 1962.. On the 12.th of that month Charyk authorized the 

satellite controllers to activate "Haig's bird" over the Caribbean. 

The data thus obtained was read out during the next following pass over 

a friendly station. About 80 percent effectiveness was recorded in the 

remote readout operation. 

2.45 

BYE 1701' 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

~ __ CRET 

Late in October, the United States thoruclghly venfied Ih,. 

presence of Soviet medlum-range ballistic mlssiles In Cuba. WhIle 

diplomatic tempers frayed, the United States intensified r!;",1 01'111<11 .... - tl, ~ 

flights over Cuba and then lnstltuted a blockade of that .sland. W .. ~th"r 

information of the sort returned by the Program 35 satell'le wa; 

demanded early in the perlOd of preliminary reconnals'sall,-e a '1(1 th. 

requests multiphed as the crisis deepened. 

Because of payload peculiarities, it was necessary to f"r"II" 

exposures Over the Soviet heartland on orbits which had or Wu"ld 

include exposures over the Caribbean. Power drain was too great 

and command circUltrY- was inappropriate for such operatIOns. Dtrect 

readout took less power, and if adroitly conducted during the satellite's 

northward pass would leave time for controllers at New Boston to 

program the b,rd for an over-Russia series of exposures on the other 

leg of the orbit. During early October, therefore. the satelllte.frequently 

was turned on whtle passmg over Cuba for direct readout frum New Boston. 

Early tnals worked reasonably well. But as the Cuban affair 

became more tense and publlc awarenes s more general, long dormant 

military installations up and down the Atlantic Coast began to operate 

their radar devices virtually around the clock. As Haig later phrased 

it, "everything up and down the coast from DEW line to the University 

BYE 17017-74 l46 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

of Florida seoemed to be on the alr.· Because of the curvature of the 

earth, the radar dish at New Boston had to be angled but SlX degre",s 

from the horizontal to read out th" satellite dunng lts passage UVE'r 

Cuban waters. That low angle made the transmission particularly 

susceptible to interference--and the babel of rad,atlOn from reglOl" 

south of Boston contmued to grow louder. 

A return to the remote readout proce.ss ,,,,,med lnevitable. 

But there were new comphcations, qUlte apart (Turn the fact that 

information on both Soviet and Caribbean cloud Lover was mcreasmgly 

n eded as the tension ·mounted. It wa, 'he province of a military 

commander to decide which had the more urgent prtority, If a chOlce 

had to be made. In case both were vitally needed, it would have been 

a military prerogattve--and requtrement--to bleed away all the power 

of the satellite, that being In the supreme national interest. But by 

the time something of the sort seemed Inescapable. there were tentative indications that it might no longer be possible. 

World geography belng what 1t was. the satellite had to be 

commanded to take Caribbean plctures while moving northward tn 

the vicinity of New Boston. The next pass, as it moved over the 

Caribbean on its wa y north again. was the final leg ln One complete 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 

circuit of the earth. But in some instances exposures commanded from 

New Boston had not been made when the bird again ov .. rfl .. w the 

Caribbean. Investigation indicated that as the satellite passed Over 

the pole and began its southward run, down and across the Kamchatka 

Peninsula, signals from an alien source were causing It to rest command 

controls. The question of whether the interference was 01 a random 

nature or represented a successful Soviet ploy in counter-satdllte 

technology remained unanswered for the moment. The r .. qUlrement 

of a reliable means of direct readout became pressing. r"k1ardl .. ,s uf 

the reason .. 

In that envlro.nment, Colonel Haig called Colonel J vSSE' Luw". 

a member of Undersecretary Charyk's Washington staff, \<, ask fur a 

cj:lanc" to propose a new approach. Haig told Lowe only that he thought 

he might have answers to both Kamchatka and Atlantic Coast m!erference 

problems. Lowe, who had been bedeviled for solutions for the previous 

two days, scheduled Haig for a meeting with Charyk. The next afternoon, l3 October, Haig appeared in Charyk's office with a hastlly 

prepared presentation previously exposed only to General Greer. What 

he pruposed was to set up a direct readout station at Eglin Air Force 

Base, Florida. In ·one stroke, such a statton would elimmate rehance 

on remote readout commands that might be countermanded and wQuld 

BYE 17017-74 

Handle Via Bveman/ Talent· Keynole 

ContrOlS urllY 

l48 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 CQ.52?.§I2~E T 

overstep obstacles to direct readout from ~ew Boston. Th .. equlpment 

wa- available. Haig explamed. Th., launch, ht>Lkout van on the West 

Coast, which could be airhfted tv Eghn. would pro"ide all the needed 

command and readout capaCIty, while there happened to be on slte at 

Eghn's Auxiliary F.eld Number 5 a TLM-1R antt'nna wh.ch would 

beautifully serve the direct readout needs uf the Program 35 sateillte. 

(Hall'l's certitude on the matter of the TLM-18 was well fuunded; a 

year "arher, while 1> th .. busmess of settlng up (r.rnmand and, untrol 

stations for another program, he had Occ3SLOn to purlOin" s.nlliar 

unlt for e:rnergency placement in an African site. He was qUltt' famihar 

wlth the instrument's charaC'tenstics.) As it happened. Colonel Ha.g 

had earlier taken informal steps to insure that the TLM-18 would be 

ready if needed; hOo' had phuned Eglin and wlthout saying anyth.ng to 

identify objectives had told officers overseeing tnals of the TLM-18 

that .t mlght be best tn speed up acceptance tests, WhlCh were 

scheduled to take another three weeks, since the antenna might be 

requisitioped and Eglin might never have a chance to complete the 

tests later. The Eghn people took Haig's word and accelerated the,r 

activlty. Haig had also assured himself that the equipment at Vandenberg could be airlifted. 

Charyk approved Haig's proposal on the spot. On his way 

through Charyk's anteroom, Haig telephoned Eglin and Vandenberg. 

249 

~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

He then climbed aboard the first airplane heading south. He was on 

Eglin's Auxiliary Field Number 5 the next morning. A quick conferenCe with the senior officer on the spot (Brigadier General A. T. 

Culbertson), and a phone call to the program office confnmed actual 

departure. He spent the balance of the day writing station security 

and operating procedures. 

The Vandenberg equipment arrived in Florida on 25 October; 

two days later. on Saturday, 27 October 1962, it was put in operation 

for the first time. (The new station was called Site IV--L~da Site.) 

The first attempt at direct readout was only moderately successful, certainly not of the quality the Program 35 people had anticipated. 

They quickly located the trouble: electrical noise originating in the 

brushes of the auxiliary generator that provided power. A switch to 

commercial power drawn through Eglin was completed the following 

morning. and that afternoon, Sunday (28 October), the readout operators 

got extremely good results. 

On the next day, attempts to read out through the bird's 

television eyes were completely unsuccessful. Power fluctuation and 

massive radiation interference frustrated every effort. The operators 

located the source of the radiation almost at once; in order to interrogate the satellite, the dish had to be aimed almost directly across the 

BYE l'lOl1-'74 

Handle ""a Bveman/Talent Keyhole 

Centrols On.y 

250 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 

main housing area of Eglin Air Force Base. and Lowerinl! the scan 

angle shghUy showed that huge quantltles of radiatl"n w ... r .. streammg 

upward from that area mto the path of th .. readout S 19nals. TI,e 

previOUS day's results had been so ,mpressIVe b", aus" ';;u"da\ had 

been a lovely day and many of the Inhab,tants of .he hous",.: ar,'a had 

been absent. Monday was washday, which mean! th .. c .... nllnued US" of 

electrical gadgets rang tnt;.!. from washers and dr ve rs to 1 ei t"Vl::; Lon :5 ets 

and vacuum cleaners. The Lomb,nation readlly <,xpla,n ... d why power 

fluctuated, and where th .. radiation originated. 

Colonel Halg wa~ .n contact with General Culbertson's .. fhc .. 

scarcely mmutes after th ... trouble had been identified. Lulbert,;un, 

a genial, blunt "tilcer who had recently left Wnght Fi"ld after twu 

frustrating years of exposure to the slow and contorted d"clslun 

processes thert:, had come to favor a drc::l.conlan approdch to problems. 

Time being rather short, he informed as many Eglin reSidents as 

possible of his intentlons and of his need for complete us .. of all lucal 

power--and then threw the malO switch to the housmg area. In that 

one stroke he solved the problem of current fluctuatlOn and .. lirnmated 

random electrical nois... Lat .. r that week, when mdtte rs had become 

less hectic, he inserted appropriate notices in the Eghn bulletln. 

advising readers that there would be perLOdic power outages. When he 

251 BYE 1701 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP ET 

heard that automoblles dr ,Vin!!. under the lon" of TLM-lf< radlatlOl1 

might produce interference Lhr"ueh theIr IgmtlUl1 systems, he , aUed 

out the local A,r Pollee. set up ruad blucks, and stupped ,very car 

withIn range of the dish. 

S.gnal clarity was exceptional. So was h,·, "lIs,d, rable d<>grt'e 

, ; of respep that Culbertson and Haig acqulred for "lit' ~n,)tt,,·r.-

As usual, lU(ls~ t·nds rerna·ned. Fur one, lilt' vat. tlu\l.'~ to 

Eglin represented une-th,rd of the apphcable readuut f'ult'ntlal '11 the 

world and. at the moment, all of the launch check-out l "panty avallable to Program 35. Ther" was no crisIs comparable to the Cuban 

imbroglIO, but it was a danglmg end and Haig's people 5,,1 tlut 10 trlfn 

1t off. W,th help from RCA's engmeers, they canmbahz ... d th .. fa' lory 

check-out equipment, assembled a new readout complex, Installed it 

at Site IV, and switched operatlOn to the new eqUipment. On II November 

the onginal van was flown back to Vandenberg. One day li'lter, thle 

manufacture of new equlpment for factory (heck-out sets began. 

Virtually nobody outside the ongmal Circle of cognIzant Prugram 

35 peuple knew of the Egl1n operation. (General Culbertson was never 

fully briefed. for instance.) In terms of the hundreds of thousands of 

uniformed personnel who wer" alerted or shifted abo It late 111 October 

1962, the Program 35 operation seemed inSignificant. Yet General Power 

BYE 17017-74 252 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

later said it had been worth as much as three wings of B-52's. and 

from a bomber man that was a significant compliment, even if there 

was a possibility that it also reflected satisfaction over a parallel 

decision to give operational responsibility for the Program 35 satellites to the Strategic Air Command. In any event, the establishment 

and activation of a direct readout station in the Caribbean had taken 

an unbelievably brief time, had been successfully conducted in an 

atmosphere of extraordinary security, and had required relatively 

few people. Moreover, those people--from Charyk through the least 

senior of the antenna operators--had consistently functioned with a 

directness that seemed quaintly archaic in its vigor and enthusiasm. 

The episode was a thoroughl y refreshing interlude in an otherwise 

stodgy fright contest between nuclear behemoths. 

In retrospect it was clear that the separation of Program 35 

from the ponderous main trunk of research and development had much 

to do with the succes s of the Eglin operation. Colonel Haig. who had 

a Parkinsonian distaste for officiousness. arranged for transportation 

ar:d installation of the equipment by placidly ignoring ordained channels. 

General Culbertson obviously relished his opportunity to take direct, 

effective action. So did most of the junior officers and the RCA technicians who were indispensable to the operation. It was clear that 

253 

BYE 17017 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

p+.:' rs unal e nte rprise had as much to do with the :3 uc. ces s of the I,nd~ rtakmg as dld technical skill. l6 

In parallel with the decision to set up an Eghn rt,:'dduut ::;tat'lln. 

Chdryk had confirmed a set of rulings WhlCh put Program 35 "I, a nt:'w 

(' uur s12. On the cia y following Colonel Halg's proposal of the Eglm 

solutHm. Cha ryk nOhhed General Greer of his appruval, r.ot unl v of 

the Eglin proposal, but also vf suggestions that the StrategIc Alr 

Command be ohered the job of operating the Program V, satdltte", 

under the direction of the program office. and that provlslL.mS be made 

for standbv launr;hes to provide additional cloud cover satt-Une!> as 

l7 

net'ded. In one stroke, the program office had become resj.Jvnslble 

ft)r (reatln~ and manntng (wlth SAC people) two semi-permanent readout 

stations and for ,in t'xtended program. That expansion of the ml::>slun 

had Its own mll!..ralne potential, while there remained the eternally 'IlUTf:" 

diffIcult problem uf deahng successfully with NASA in matters conl ernlng the hooster. The satelilte ltself had proved almost truubh· frt:t;!, 

unhappily, ther...: could he few demonstrations of 1t5 potentlal while tts 

buoster remalned unrellable to a degree that the Air Force could not 

There were some special problems in operatmg a mihta rv 

sateibte over a long period of hme. Oddly enough, they had not been 

accurately foreseen in sume five year;; of planning for the day when 

BYE 17017-74 

Handle JI(j Bveman/Ta1ent· Kevrole 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T ECRET 

the Air Forte would have long-tlme-on-orbit satellites lu Llper~\ .... 

Th" p- 3~ vehlcle was, of course, the first mtlltan' satelhte \" be 

kept functional on a daily basls for so long a penod. and II had. "rtam 

pe('lIhaTltles that set it apart from other orbam!, dences. ",U dld the 

pro"ram ufhce. For one, tile strictures of operatmg wlth d tight 

budget and with military personnel had prevented (reat .. >n "f a sOl'h1stlI..:rlted cOlllmunication system tnterlocking Los Angelt!s Wittl Vt1l1dt"nberg, 

as was the case with other SSD space systems. AU the data acqUlred 

from urbit had to flow through the 6594th Aerospace Test, WIng before 

reachmg the engineers who designed and built the spacec raft and ground 

eqUlpment. There was' no dlrect feedback of operatlOnal data from the 

tracklng stations and the Satellite Tracking Center (Sunnyvale) to the 

program oiilee. Both sItuations resulted from operatlng withuut a 

s ysterns enginee ring/techmcal direction contractor. That novel arrangemen! also meant a shortage of qualified techmcal people to assist and 

advlse the test wing during operations. The test wing, therefore, had 

to as sume more initiative 10 the oper alion, anal ys IS and evaluation of 

the program., In the eyes of the P-35 office, the only real difficulty in 

thiS unique system had been the failure of the test wmg '5 people to 

report on the operation of the ground equipment. The ground eqUipment 

contractor operators were emplov~d by RCA and were responSible to 

l55 BYE 1701 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP ET 

the wing rather than to the program offIce, but the, were under (antracI 

to th", program office, and tne prClilrarn .,fflt e had an obvlous need for 

detatl"d data on .. quipment operatlOn. 

Early In the operation of the bird (which bv October was known 

by lIs fourth new designator' Program 417). an old mliitary pr"hlem 

nosed into the space program for the hrst time. Malntamlng high 

morale and high operating efficiency had always been dlff,,-ul\ In 

rouhne mihtary operations, particularly those WhH h ::;pemed to Ilave 

little of a crisIs nature 1n their character. One of lh .. r .. al rea"oos 

fur a publtc Information office was to make troops dOln~ p ,mdane duty 

think of theITlselves as Important and thelT tasks as gla",.,rous. Untl! 

the 417 hird went into orbit, however, ther,,- had bet'n ""thmg routln" 

or repetitive abollt space operauons--except perhaps r, p~tltion 01 <. rLS1S. 

True, many satellit"s had been orbited, and the recurrence of launch 

and r .. covery operations set"med a similar problem. But even If they 

had outward hkenesses, one laulI( hand r .. ,overy differpd from another, 

and the phySiCal differences sttrnulated participants. As much cuuld nut 

be said for a satellite operatIOn routine that within 30 da ys of Its start 

had become about as excitinl2 as takmg a dally barometer readmg. It 

was scarcely a new problem, even .f new to space operatwns. Thf' 

remedy was classical: lnspe( lion. incentlves, re-tralnlng~ and all 

BYE 17017-74 .256 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

tht.> time-tested means of Hmaintalnlng an alert, competent upt>ratlng 

l8 

forc e. . . " If such problems troubled a research and devdopment 

operation, how nluch more wUldd they prove a source of difficulty to 

an operational unit which would be charged with th .. m not tor a f"w 

weeks, but for many months, perhaps years. The spt;"(trt" uf undormed 

boredom that earlier seers had dubbed' the 5110 Sitter of th .. S,xt, ... 

was sidlin~ mto Program 417. 

Whetht'r foreseen or not, many of the difhc'ult",~ thaI Invartably 

beset any develupmental system making a transition tu ','~lA rdlldnal use 

were nbout to descend for the first tlITle on a space ~y::itt'n). \ (~~ 

was an operational system, of course, so the real dlstlnction was 

operation of a space system by an operating command. ) 

Unders ... , retary Charyk's onginal instructions t .... General Greer 

had specified that a .epar,.te readout system manned by umformed Air 

Force personnel was to be in operation by about I July 1963, operated 

by SAC and the Third Weather Wing of the Air Weather Se rYlee, but he 

explicitly ordered that there were to be no elaborate requirements for 

complete standardlzation, comprehensIve training manuals, and all 

the paraphernalia so beloved by the LOgiStlCS Command. In thiS respect 

he was in a pOSItion to be more Immediately effective than a pr"decessor 

who had faced, recogmzed, and finally won over the same general 

problem. Years earlier, Colonel W. G. King, now headmg one of 

257 BYE 170' 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

General Greer's major program offices, had been in charge of the 

Snark missile program. When Klng took it over, the Snark was 

admlttedly in its declining days; roughly six years behwd sch.·dule, 

and widely conceded to have i!ttle more than nUisance val,,,,. Sndrk 

had nonetheless been pushed d~terminedly through the development 

process, complying With all the multltudinous reqUIrements of the era. 

King's job, lt developed, was to get tho une wing uf Snark, r .. ady iur 

placement on their sole" .. e, tn Maine. That task he performed m"st 

skillful! y and wlth as httle damage to the national exchequ.·r as the 

times would permit. In his efforts to reduce extraneous Snark effort 

he carne across a requrrement that operating manuals for new:"' .-items 

be prepared and furmshed to all major air bases in the Umted States. 

Fur months King pOlnted out that Snark, a one-way missde With a 

sumewhat irresponsIble guidance system, was not an airL raft and not 

subject to established rules, was unlikely to settle down at Tmker AFB 

for emergency repairs, and that in any event it would be rather uneconomical to train repair crews across the country when only 30 ,;narks 

were ever to be available. Kmg' oncluded, reasonably, that launch 

crews might well need manuals, but that these could be wexpenslvely 

prepared in about 50 copies; mass printing and distribution, he Coneluded, was not entirely warranted. Convincing necessary elements 

BYE 17017-74 l58 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

of the Air Force and sec,unng a watver tIn that particular phase of 

- 2. Q 

Snark development took Colonel KIng many. many months_ 

The distinctlOn between the 417 prv~ram and conve ntlOnal 

aircraft systems was obvious; dlfferen{ t'S from established mls::nle 

programs were less obvious but could b~ tdentified by Intelhgent 

ob::>ervation. On the othe r hand, the 417 program also differed 

radically in its objechves and techniques frum thr- "pure S( lence" 

pruject!" of NASA. Progri'lm 417 personnel ret"ogmzed the useful 

distinctions; because ul tht: ught security brackt>\ around prograll 

activities. it often was dlfhcult to communicate tht, full I1'WanlO);! of 

th.,. situation to outsider::;. The 417 program had been sPt'( dlcallv 

exempted from vIrtually all routine reporting requl'"ements, and ln 

Dr. Charyk's latest ruling had been empowered to ( reate hIghly 

unorthodox operatlonal enVIronments for an ope rahng corn mand to man, 

but WhlCh would never be "turned over" in the tracHtwnal sense. The 

existence of firm requirements for meeting schedules, and for staYlng 

within cO,st boundanes. set the 417 program well apart from most NASA 

enterprises at the other end of the spectrum. In order to malntain ltS 

established high level of program success, the 417 program office 

would have to perform more skillfully than most others In comparable 

situations. Charyk's injunctIon that the program office could purchase 

boosters through NASA but would maintain Au Force quality contrul 

259 

TOP SECItET 

BYE 1701' 

Handle "a Bveman/Tal"'~. I-<€-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283--------------
Approved for Release: 

standards. fixed price agreements, and set delivery dates, for lnstan"". 

added new diffIculties to the existing NASA perplex. 

By late November 1962. RCA was at work on the Sf' ond batch 

of satellites (the follow-on vehicles). a contract covenn" ,even ddditlonal 

MG-IS motors had been let to Lockheed (the motor cas" had finally 

failed--at 350 percent of deslgn load!). and the first flYe !StrategIC Air 

Command officers slated to work with the onginal 417 program offi,,, 

crew had arrived. Additionally. program officers had begun an attempt 

to obtam Algol IIA motors for Scout first stage use in lieu of the Algol 

lD'motors originally provided. (The IIA promised to be better in 

thrust and generally ,more reliable.) Unhappily, few IJA's were a,aLiable, 

and most orgamzations with on-hand or on-the-way ITA's were quite 

a.ware of their virtues - -as well as of Algol ID disabilities. The 417 

office had notably little luck in horse trading--but kept trYIng. In 

Dt'cember 1962, Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Istvan, in the Pentagon 

ofhce, briefly thought he had talked the Office of Aeronautical Research 

Into a swap. but that organization reneged when the thrust advantages 

uf,the Algol IIA were defined. Navy's Bureau of Weapons would not 

even consider a trade. Program 417, it seemed, was to continue 

wlth the Algol ID regardless of desires. 30 For the 417 payload. the 

thrust differential would be measured in orbital altitudes: about SOO 

31 nautical miles for the Algol IIA against 375 miles for the Algol ID. 

BYE 17017-74 

Haf"ld:e 'J,a Bveman/Ta1ent Ke"l"~iE 

::r:~.J'S un:v 

260 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T ECRET 

With the potential of the 417 satellite thoroughly proven, It was 

becoming increasingly clear that the greatest danr<er to continued 

program success lay in the lneffectiveness of the S, U.l( buoster. On 

6 December 1961, the program office began a study of altt; rnatlves. 

The field was initially limited to the Thor-Delta (Thor with a Vanguard 

upper sJage) but later expanded to include Thor-AbleStar (Thur wIth 

an Aerobee upper stage) and Thor-Agena (the combination used In 

Program 16l, still known as Discoverer). General Greer had no 

doubts about the importance of the program, then and for the future. 

With the Cuban operation In mind, he wrote One of the test wing 

commanders that, "The output from Program 417 has c ontnbuted 

sigmflcantiy to the sUCCess of recent operations of the greatest natlOnal 

importance. Ea('h successful readout results In strengthemng our 

3l 

military capability." 

The Eglin operatlOn actually stopped a week after General Greer 

made that analysis--the Cuban crisis having slmrnered down--and a 

dispaSSionate evaluation of results began. (The readout station remamed 

in storage, ready for reactlvatlOn on l.4-hour notice.) There was the 

confusing if interesting revelallon, for instance, that readout had 

somehow been better at low than maxlmum elevations. S,m,lariy. 1t 

was becoming obvious that the problem of operator error arismg from 

simple boredom ,~, 19ht be greater than anyon" had foreseen--a conclusion 

l61 BYE 1701 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

drawn from the first five months of experiE'nce w,th operators at New 

Boston. The famillartty- breeds-contempt s) nd.,nne had taken new 

33 

turn. 

More commonplace problems, some in new colors, also 

reappeared. NASA, ,t developed, ,was not prepared to quote a prense 

dollar figure for Scouts, and SAC had no sooner acqu1red an mterest 

m the satelllte than that command began insisting on acceptant t' of 

its uwn notions concermng control centers and the like. But m the 

circumstances, these still were irritants more than obstacles. 

Colonel Haig, who had been with the program almost prensely s1xteen 

months, cho~e early January 1963 to propose an expanded program and 

to reView for Dr. Charyk the past and future of the 417 program. 

The great talking point still was the first satellite, vehicle 3502, 

which after 137 days and 1968 orbits (as of 7 January 1963) was returning better cloud cover information than immediately after lts launch. 

That pecuharity Colonel Haig 'ascribed to improvement In operator 

techniques which exploited the full potential of horizon senSor effic lency 

and readout effectiveness. 

The selection of a contractor to construct and activate two readout stations for SAC had by then been made. The 417 office had let the 

contract at a fixed price of $1,088,096 with a completion deadline of 

BYE 11017-74 262 

'~:~~',~,3 

- '-I' - , ~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

SLX months. Experienced research and development officers in SSD 

had sternly cautlOned Halg and General Greer that the work would 

cost at least three times that much and take three tImes as long. 

Colonel Haig, who had made the origmal estimates and stood by them, 

had convinced Greer he could get t~e work done in the t1me and at the 

34 

cost quoted. RadiatlOn Incorporated had won the contract and was, . 

hard at work preparing two statlons, two 40-foot radar dishes, radomes 

(the dishes were too fraglle for strong winds), and equipment vans. 

Haig had located two abandoned Nike missile sites, on" In,the Northeast 

and the other ln the Northwest sections of the Umted States, had 

acquired th"rn at no cost to the program, had seen to It that full advantage was taken of existing roads and huildings, and was fully confident 

that the contractor would do as he had promised, and In the time allowed. 

In Colonel Ha'g's judgment, the demand for the 417 system was 

more pressm" m early 1963 than at any time in the past. Continual 

slippage in Nimbus schedules and major technical dlfficultles m Its 

development tended to make 417 increasingly attractive. The pointing 

aCCl.\racy of N,mbus prortllsed to be in a six-degree cone, at best, the 

prototype was serwusly overweight, the power source--solar panels--

was in serious trouble, the launch schedule had shpped by nearly a 

year in an elapsed six months, and there was no real possibility of 

263 BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

constructing something to do the same task as Nimbus, ~u, h as an 

!Iope rational" T lros. 

SAC's inte rest In the 417 sate lllte had inC rea sed cons Ide Tabl y 

after exposure to early results. The 417 represented a near perf .. ,! 

training device for space operatlOns, being stable, dependable, and 

relatively uncomplicated. Operation by a field comm.and was not 

partlcularly dangerous for the vehicle on orb,t. (Haig. ailed lh~ 417 

~at .. llite "idiot proof. ") Perhaps most important, the system "as 

inexpensIVe to operate. and m.aintaln. FInally, there was "" reasmio\ 

pres sure from the Navy and the Strike Command for a la('!l' al readout 

system; the A,r Force had a small but signiflcant inve~tm"nt In j,lround 

stations--and one that would not become rapidly obsolete, elther--

which underlined the importance of continuing an Rctive spae e program; 

and there was a substantial opportunity for inexpensive experimentation. Taken together, these represented solid arguments for contmuing, 

indeed for expanding, 417. So long as it retained Its bastc characterishcs of Simplicity. reliablilty, and economy of uperatlOn. It remained 

attractive. 

Colonel Haig seemed convinced, even this early, that the 

eventual salvation for 417 lay in adoption of a new booster. The 

studies begWl the previous month had identified the Block II Thor 

(wIth Bell Telephone Laboratories guidance) and the Age:na D as the 

BYE 17017-74 l64 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

most economical booster combination. The two provided the greatest 

injection accuracy, highest theoretical reliability, and heaviest pa yload potential of all the systems examined. Haig contended that a 

Thor-boosted 417 could be a heavier satellite, one capable of covering 

the entire northern hemisphere and having an average orbital life 

expectancy of eight months. Such a vehicle could easiIy incorporate 

a tactical readout capability, could grow to 700 pounds payload, could 

include three remote cameras and three backup cameras (one for each 

primary), and could operate on a 60-kilocycle bandwidth with one-halfmile resolution. The program office estimated that $51 million would 

buy and launch six such satellites. 

In support of an "advanced 417. " Colonel Haig's office proposed 

two specific developments: a stabilite--a miniature stable platform 

and associated circuitry· -and a new ion detector attitude sensor. He 

asked Charyk to authorize expenditure of $232, 000 for the stabilite and 

$40, 000 for the detector. 

Charyk approved the additional funds but withheld any ruling 

on the need for a new booster. 35 For the rest, Haig and his group 

had to prepare mOre detailed proposals. The stabilite--which had 

actually been conceived in the course of a technical discussion between 

265 BYE 17017-7 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

personnel of the 417 office and RCA representatives--embodied the 

notion of torqueing the mam body of a spacecraft abuut a flywhed 

that was spun up by rockets. The concept promised a useful ( ompromise between the stable platform that was so desirable frum the 

standpoint of photography and the spin-stabilized body whl< h uffen·d 

36 

s a much in s impllc ity of stabilization technique. 

In mid-February there was an interesting meeting 10 WashIngton 

with implications for the far future of the entire 417 effort The !<athe ring included Charyk and Dr. John Ruebel of Directorate "I Defense 

Research and Engineermg, Dr. S. Fred Singer of the Weather Bureau 

. (he was the ongmator vf the MOUSE satellite proposal of 1953 which 

so profoundly influenced the ICY program). plus two representatives 

(named Hoffman and Eaton\ from the Department of Commerce. Nobody 

from NASA was on hand; Haig was there. The crux of the meeting was 

Ruebel's blunt 'statement that he wanted to get Nimbus responsibihty 

transferred from NASA to the An Force. after which the A,r Force 

would support Weather Bureau satellite Objectives. The Department 

of Commerce was m favor. SInger's reaction was not noted, but could 

be gues sed: the Weathe r Bureau wanted an operatin g system. Ruebel, 

whose fiscal and engineermg (onservatism had given hlm the general 

reputation of automatically opposlng all new proposals for space systems, 

BYE 17017-74 266 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

T IECRIET 

said frankly he favored expanding Program 417, wanted the 417 team 

held together, and expected to issue instructlol1s authonz'n~ a 101>.-

37 

c1asslilcation 417 program in support of Weather Bureau ()bJectlves. 

Such an attitude had far reaching LmplicatlOns. That :jAC wuuld 

hav. effective control of satellites Ln orb't was aSBUreQ. and that a 

more elaborate satellite system would be developed for mdnary use 

seemed probable. That Nimbus shortcomings Were becLlmlllg ,'ver 

more apparent and that technical faults promised to dela\ ,ts availabllity further comphcated the situation. Nimbus seemed dt'st1nt'd to 

becomt: an lIinternationalH weather satellite ln concert WIth the sti11-

honored space-for-peace theme. It could never compld<'ly satlsfy 

An Force needs, even If a resounding success, SLnce a- deslgned it 

would provide insuffic-ient north latitude coverage. 

Haigls people had reservations on OLnt:::t' accounts, tuo. .i{easonably familiar with the tecnnical deta,l. o11'.I1m"us, they were convinced 

that it had inherent technical failings, particularly Ln ti,,, PUW"f supply 

system. Finally, Nimbus was dependent un a nt:w concept ()f "'abliLzahon that had never been test flown. All in all, l\J,mous set!med gmte 

unlikely to serve Air Force objectLves. \ rile fact that ,t would rely 

on an electrostatic tape system of undetermined re!Labllity did little 

to endear Nimbus to Air Force people who had recent sad experience 

BYE 17017 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

d 5 3 1 . 38 In tests of similar systems for a propose amos E- app 1<:atlOll. 

For the moment, however, there were other problemb of mure 

immediate concern. On 19 February the second 417 satelhte Went mto 

orbit. It was not placed as accurately as the first, bem!, ';0 -"des luw 

in apug«e and 140 in perigee, as well as haVing a two-degree lnclmatlOn 

39 

error. Initially tt appeared that the fault lay ltl ~ fourth stag" separation which occurred at too great an altitude and too Iowa speed. 

Further analYSis indicated that each of the first three stages had 

performed badly--although the ABL X-l59 third-stage enpne was the 

chlef offender .. In any event, the satellite was in a "les~ than ophmumll 

orbit. 40 Its functlOmng was generally acceptable. even ,nder. such 

handicaps. until late April. when th .. primary tape control CirCUlt 

went bad, ehmmattng the btrd's ability to store primary data. The 

direct readout mode remained operational and 80 percent effect,ve. 

By September 1963, however, the satellite would have gott .. n so thoroughly out of phase With the sun that a l80-degree reonentatlOn would 

be necessary.41 

The February 1963 launch (Operation Ol40) proved the feasibility "f still another innovation in cloud-cover reconnalssance. Nearly 

a year earlier, the program office had undertaken a study uf radlation 

Ineasuring subsystems, devices which by registering background radiatton 

BYE 17017-74 268 

C:r··~.s 

ha~dle .'a 

Ur'l:y 

S .... eman/Taier.t Keyf"lQI€: 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

from the earth's surface could identify night cloud cover. The small 

investigatl<Jn had been stimulated by General Greer's ubst!rvatlon, 

in March 1962, that it was unfortunate that a cheap tnfrar .. d system 

was not feasible. 

In the course of their inquiry, program office people d,S. QYt!red 

that Dr. V. E. Suomi of the University of W,sconsln had produ. "d a 

prototype and one flight-model infrared sensor for the E.xplurer program. 

Because of changes in that NASA activity, the Sensor had never been 

orbited. It had every indication of meeting the requirements tor a 

secondary payload for the 417 spacecraft. 

On 3 September 1962., the program office let a luw-cost contract 

covering rehabilitatior of Suomi's prototype and tentatively scheduled 

it to be flown on the fourth 417 satellite (02.4iJ). By December l'1bZ, 

test results were so promising that contracts "'ere iet CO"tormg tile 

design, development, and test of live aociltiona! suosysl .. ms (une prototype and four flight versions) for use With tne second group 01 tour 

417 spacecraft, then on order. 

All went well and the flrst Suomi rad.atlon measurmg subsystem 

was aboard 02.40 for its February 1'10'; launen. The devlCe functioned 

perfectly; by May 1963 .nfrared Clata were oemg routinely extracted 

and the system still was 95 percent operational. It contmued to 

function until January 1964. 

l69 BYE 1701" 

~ Handle \lla Bveman/Talent Ke. 

Ccr",;':'::; 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

From the data obtained through the Suomi system, the Th,rd 

Weather Wing, usmg computer programs Written entirel~ by All' 

Weather Service personnel, produced daily operatlOnal maps of nighttime cloud cover throughout the entire period from Octube r 1963 

through January 1964--the span of the Cuban crisis and the lmm<>dlate 

aftermath. The techniqu<> was so successful that extenslOn of the 

infrared measurement program was subsequently approved and il 

acquired the role of a semi-permanent element in the total 417 system. 

Reaffirmation of the reliability and operatIOnal pott'lltlal of the 

417 satellite was provided by the secund msertlOn lnto urblt. The 

dubious reliability of the booster was agam underscLlred. Ess<>ntlally, 

of course, both such facts had been generally appreciated earlier. 

The results of the February 1963 "success, "therefore. tended to 

accelerate consideration of an enlarged program, one embodying a 

more sophisticated set of sensors and based on a conSiderably tTI01'e 

trustworthy booster. The general notion, by early March 1963, was 

that use of Thor-Agena as a booster would provlde enough additional 

lifting capaclty to perm,t launching a new satellite based gene rail) 

on 417 technology but also incorporating the best proven features of 

Tuos. Nimbus, Relay, and other satellites wto a system wlth mlnimum 

BYE 17017·74 l70 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

requirements for a long and costly development process. The general 

proposal, known as 417-1, had all the operdtlUr~1 potentla] ul Nimbus 

4l plus circuit redundancy which promlsed ,'nhanl <-'II rellabdll). 

The proposal to develop 417-1 also had aUral huns "ther than 

technical. General B. A. Schriever. A,r Force Systems Command 

chief, heard the 417-1 presentatIon on 15 Mar< h, lOd" "tt'd that he was 

"lOtensdy interested, " and asked that lw b" prov,ded wIth a formal 

devt·lopment plan at once. H .. agreed that the program shuuld rema Ln 

in the SAFSP management tarn.ly, but he suggested that the existmg 

secrecy restrictIOns would have to be relaxed to "resolve the manage-

. ment problem with ~ASA and the Weather Bureau," C .. lonel Hatg 

mildly observed that a program operated through two parallel rnanagemen! channels was "probably impossible and certainly undt'sirable, " 

an opinion in which General Greer concurred. 

The appearance of two viewpoints on how 417-1 should be conducted 

reopened all the past arguments about the need for a Secur" system for 

mlhtary weather reconnais::iance~ Nevertheless, there were sound 

indications that Ruebel of DDR&E seriously planned to substitute 417-1 

43 

for Nimbus. The problem was how. 

In the meantime, while involved questions of national pollcy 

toward weather reconnaissance were thrashed out in Washington, the 

Z71 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

Haodle Via Bveman/ Talent Key; 

Ccr·~r:::.,:, C 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP 

417 office had the more immediate prublem of , "r rYlng out Its orlgmal 

assignment. Initially. the program had, ontemplated a p""tutype and 

four flight satellites, plus ground equipment and spares. In November 

1962., after the passage of the Cuban cnSlS, a new co;1tract had been 

written with RCA to cover modificatlOn (upgradmg) of th" prutotype, 

four additional flight 5 atellites, and the usual ground equipment and 

spares. In May 1963, while a decision on a weather reconnaISsance 

system to fOllow the original 417 still was pending, Colonel Halg 

secured Dr. Charyk's endorsement of a program extenslOn involVing 

six more satellites in the original configuration plus the Scout boosters, 

spares, and ground equipment needed to continue the program from 

December 1963 through September 1964. (The contract With RCA was 

signed in June. The total of dollar investment with RCA reached 

$14.06 million for the basic flight program plus $.25 milhon for a 

prototype and two flight model 5tabilites.) 

Charyk was thinking les s in terms of a substitute for Nimbus 

than of a basic 417, improved, modernized, and mated to an improved 

Scout booster. The details of 417-1 were far from certain, Charyk 

having expressed marked reservations about the cost of using ThorAgena, the redundancy of a stabilized Agena, and the prospectively 

high command and control costs if Agena were employed. 44 

BYE 17017.74 

Hardif' Via Bveman/Taient Kev'1o!e 

Cc:--,:ro<s Only 

272 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Permeating all such proposals and discussions after "arly 1963 

was a general conviction that something radically effectl\''- would have 

to be done to improve the Scout vehicle and to enhance NA-;A', appreClahon of 417'5 real importance. The dissenSlOn which had b. cn apparent 

virtually from the time the program began, certamly from lh,' date 

at which Colonel Haig proposed substituting the MG-18 for NASA's 

upper stage. lessened not at all in the early months of 1963. NASA 

persisted in efforts to extend its virtually complete control of the boost 

vehicle program effort, even insisting at one point on bemg reimbursed 

for "travel in support of 417 vehicles procured partly through ~ASA. " 

The Au Force Scout office- -which sometimes had the bedrag!!,led 

appearance of a bewildered canary that unwittingly new 11110 a badmmton 

court--asked the 417 program office to pay the bill. Indlgllantly, 

Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Smith, Haig's deputy, responded that "at nO 

time has this office requested any support from NASA." Furthermore, 

said Smith, "all 417 vehicles procured until this time have been contracted for directly, and contrary to the desires of several persons 

in the NASA. ,we have endeavored to ..• remain independent of any 

NASA support." (NASA, apparently not at all embarrassed, subsequently 

explained that there had seemed no need to document requests for 

assistance originating in the Scout office and the 6595th test wmg--

l.73 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

Ha"d:e "18 Bveman/ Taler.! Ke'lr 

C:~:~:.".:: l 
Approved for Release: 

and then in the best tradition of one-upmanshlp added. "In the event 

SSD is unable to pay for the support previOusly g.ven, NASA will not 

4':; 

press this point to any extreme." The sum lnvolved was $~. 000.) 

The real source of difficulty lay cluser. On 19 April. In 

response to a 417 "Hice query. the ~cout office cunceded that the 

X-259 thud stage, whlCh had performed so inadequately .r. th .. F,·bruary 

launch, had a dubiOUS performanL" potentiaL But the S. ,,,,t p""ple 

were quick with assurances that the motor gOlng into the twxt scheduled 

launch vehicle was flight-worth y. Pree isel y one week Lat ... r. un 

26 April. the fourth attempt to orbit a 417 satellite ended 111 luss of 

third-st"'ge thrust eight seconds before scheduled burnout, followed 

by violent tumbling and total destruction of the upper stage and payload. 

The failure was bad' enough in its own right. But subsequently 

the program office discovered that the third-stage motor wh1ch had 

caused the failure was one which had been earlier rejected because 

it had been dropped during shipment. NASA hac! inspected the rocket 

stage on its return to the factory, had declared ,t flight-ready, and 

had approved its use on another 417 booster. But nobody had told the 

417 office of the motor's earlier history. 46 

The matter of determining what part mishandling had played 

1n the failure of the fourth 417 vehicle became less urgent when 

BYE 17017-74 274 

Ha .... d1e J'a BvemanjTaient· Kevnole 

TO~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283'"';I;c::1flIET 

,a-yr jI 

detailed analysis indicated that inadvertent actuation of the thtrdstage destruct mechanism was the prime culprit. Through the 

Space Systems Dlvision, the 417 uffice asked for a sp"",,,1 "ffurt 

to insure that destruct mechanism would not be actlvatt'd acc tdentally 

in future launches. NASA brushed aside the query, lss'"ng a nt'w 

47 

proclamation of confidence in the eXlsting Scout. 

The 417 group was less than satisfied. Late m Ma y Colonel 

Haig induced the Scout directorate to ask the commander uf the PaClfic 

Mlssile Range to have the command destruct transmitter' contmue to 

illuminate the vehicle with "the strongest possible carner slgnal" 

until fourth-stage operation had been confirmed. That pree autlOn 

would guard against the posslollity that the destruct mechanism m'!;ht 

respond to some random'signal once the illumination was canl .. !led. 

Additional requests for lmprovement of the destrud mechanisms 

went to NASA, but with an admitted exp .. ctatlOn that the space agency 

would refuse to take effective action. NASA spokesmen in early June 

took the position that if the Air Force Lnslsted on modifying the destruct 

plugs on Scout vehicles the change would be arbitrarily rejected for 

NASA -launched Scouts. 

Captain R. L. Geer, an outspoken member of Colonel Halg's 

417 group, discovered at about the same time that the command destruct 

275 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 1701 

Handle Via Bveman/Taier'l· Ko? 

c:-··: ' 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

receiver in the Scout third stage was extremely susceptible to random 

noise activation--Geer told Colonel Haig that recent tests had proved 

not only that the receiver would react to random noise. but that "it 

was particularly susceptible to Rock and Roll statlOns. EspeCIally 

when male 'smgers' sounded the letter 'P'." A possible sequt'nce of 

events, ,th"n, would have the ground statlOn transmitters shut dowr 

their destruct circuitry illumination onCe the Scout was safely uut 

of the launc-h base danger zone, at which point an opportunely tlm"d 

rock and roll recording broadcast from Santa Monica could touch "f( 

48 

the destruct charge. 

By early May 1963, the generally unsatisfactory characteristics of the Scout booster had received widespread recognitlon. QUlte 

apart from the Impulse to go to a more powerful booster as a means 

of putting a heavier and more sophisticated payload in orbit, there 

was a general determination that either Scout would be Significantly 

improved or the Air Force would go to a more reliable vehicle. 49 

And so slight had been NASA's response to pressure for lTTlpr.overnent 

of critical Scout features that SOme members of the program office 

had become quite olltspoken 1n their cnticism, not only of NASA, but 

also of the Pacific Missile Range. The obvious course of having the 

Air Force sponsor its own Improvement program was polillcally 

inexpedient, so the 417 office was r .. duced to the expedlent of proposing 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
( 

Approved for Release: 

actlons which seemed essential but of bC:'tn~ unable to seCure tht"lr 

adoptlon~ Even when logic and common ~€"l,::)t' Wf:'re translated into 

directlVes carrying the signature of the Au Force underst'crl'tary, 

50 they had no apparent effect. 

In part, the COncern for Scout unreliability was an If'Xprt"ssH.Hl 

of program office resentment at havlng b"en unable to put a new 417 

satellite into orbit at a time when the two earlier vehicles were running 

down. On II June, after nearly 10 months of c lrcling the earth, the 

origir.dl 417 satellite (vehicle 3502.) responded to ground comm"nds 

for the last time. Attempts to recapture control by reorlenting the 

bird were unsuccessful later that month, forCing the ground ('ontrollers 

to postpone further efforts until the satellite assumed a more receptive 

attitude as a result of its gradual change of position in orbit. Concurrently, the program office suspended operations involvlOg' the 

second satellite (vehicle 02.40) for intervals of two or three days at 

a time- -and by that tim .. 02.40 was functiomng onl y in the dl rect readout 

51 

mode. 

Apprehension that unprogrammed actions by the 417 satellites 

might be the consequence of skillful Soviet interference had generally 

subSided by June 1963. After the original flurry of suspicion had 

stilled the previous fall. there had been a recurrence 1n February and 

2.77 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 1701 
Approved for Release: 

March 1963. Examination of tapes of command and response slgnals 

caued the program office to al .. rt Vandenberg early in March and, 

somewhat later, to examine the possibihty of incorporatlng e-ornrrunlcatlOn safeguards--receiver clocks or multi-tone signals, for Install,'"" 

Later analysis indicated that the two satellites had be~r, subject 

to "unintentlonal or at ITlost unintelligent jamITling~ ,,52 In some re::ipects. 

that fact continued to surprise pI ogram office people. Cummand 

channels, and most signals for that matter. were near id"ntH al to 

those used for Tiros. They were not classified and Soviet soure-es 

certainly h~d full knowledge of their characteristics. By the same 

token, the orbits of the 417 satellites were readily determmable. 

, Random sampling by One or more of the abundant antenna-enc rusted 

Soviet "fishing trawlers" could have confirmed the general features 

of the signals. and elther jammmg or transmitting spurious commands 

53 

would thereafter have been a slmple matter. 

Almost unnoticed in the mounting clamor against NASA's handling of the Scout problem, the Strategic Air Command on II July 1963 

began operating the first two mUitary readout stations, one at 

Fairchild AFB. Washington. one at Loring AFB. Maine. RCA manmng 

of the now-discontinued New Hampshire station and ground support for 

satellites in orbit halted slmultaneously. Initially, the two operational 

178 

BYE 11017-74 

·,S u~" 

T~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

SECRET 

stations would handle only satellite Ol40, although Ihere sllll r"mamed 

hope that 3502 might be made to respond to commands al " laler date. 

SinCe neither satellite was fully capable of normal uperaI1,.n, SAC 

could not exerClse all systems, but it was a start. Datil analYSIS 

be~an ;'\ Offutt AFB (Omaha) slmultaneousi y. 

The SAC personnel who had worked so whoh·heartedlv In the 

417 office for the 'previous six months were mostly ~om·. (A ~,de 

effect of statIon activation was a minor manpower <.. rlSl'"i In the prugram 

offl<:e, where Colonel Haig had used "trainees" t" keep 'he program 

moving, even though most were completely Unsophlsticat .. ct about space 

when they arrived.) Much remained to be done, In anh, ipiitlOn of SAC 

op"ratar requirements. the program office had set uut to prepare 

detailed written procedures for dealing with every possIble contingency 

in satellite operation--and they were ready in time for the I.July site 

activation date. Nevertheless. the transition from contractor.to SAC 

operatlOn of the readout stations marked a major turning point in the 

evolution of an Air Force space capability. Unfortunately for the 

legend that a public relations staff had to tout all aspee-ts of the shift. 

but to thll' considerable advantage of program security. the entire 

transition was handled with a discretion and uncommumcatlVll'neSS 

that had come to characterize aU 417 activities. 

279 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

The maJur milestone. 

BYE 1701 

Handle "lILa Bveman/ Taier-t t<,;> 

CO":"", 
Approved for Release: 

54 the first operational Air Force space system, went unneralded. 

Subsequent to transfer of the readout stations, there was some 

consideration of allocatlng a Scout launch facility and total launch 

responsibility for 417 to SAC. The strategic command was defmitely 

interested, bUI only on condition that the launch vehicle be standardized 

and that routine lOgistic support be provided through Air Force channels. 

There lay the difficulty, for NASA was if anything more reluctant than 

before to give the Air Force any significant control over Scout development and fabrication, and was equally insistent on keeping control of 

resupply. There was One other objection: SAC, lacking trained and 

experienced launch personnel, could scarcely be expected to better 

the launch record of the expert technicians who, so far, had managed 

only SO percent successes. In that respect, prospects for early transfer 

of total 417 launch responsibility to SAC seemed dim. 55 

Through the long summer of 1963 the controversy with NASA--

it could not honestly be called by another name--grew more heated. 

In part it was fanned by persistent difficulties in attempts to get 

another satellitE. into orbit. The booster was to be Scout 132. A twotnonth delay extending frotTi 29 July 1963 through 27 Septetnber had 

developed because of faulty trajectory computations, revision of the 

upper stage destruct systetn, discrepancies in the electrical connections 

280 

BYE 17011-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 TOP~ __ 

to and withIn the launch vehicle. major problems with th ... new hrststagl' buoster (Algol IIA), and a host of miscellaneous ItelTIs. 

The original request to NASA asking a change In th ... phYSical 

features of the destruct system's electrical cunnectwns had provoked 

a prompt and strong "No." SSD formally asked "please" a week later 

and got a "Hell no" reply by telephone. (NASA Insisted that modifications would delay delivery and force a launch postpunement. I Not for 

another six weeks was there a change. and then lt came because of 

56 

pres sure frum the Sec retary of the Air Force. 

Scout 132. scheduled to boost the fifth 417 satellite. had 

origlnally been delayed in launch because of concern aTlsmg from 

the failure of a NASA Scout (110) late m July. Englneers had determined 

almost immediately that the nozzles of the Algol IIA first-stage rocket 

had caused the difficulty. Test stand trials disclosed both design and 

fabrication defects. forCing suspenSlon of all Scout operatwns. Use 

of the onginal Algol ID first stage had been scheduled to end In June. 

Culun .. 1 Haig personally wrote the chairman of the board of Aerojet 

General, the Algol rIA fabricator, to ask for emergency speed in 

correcting defects. An Aerojet respondent retreated to phra~es like 

"unparalleled reliability" in describing the stage and ascTlbed the 

fallure of 110 to a change of techmques at a ~ubcontractor's establishment. 

l8i 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 1701' 

Haod'. "a Bveman/Ta.ent r" 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

That bland and misleading generalization caused even General Greer, 

normally quite restrained, to make impohte remarks On the lmes "I 

" .•. we found we were skating on the thm edge uf d,saster "ver~ 

. 57 

time we lighted one of those things, " 

Whatever Aerojet General's op,nion, SAFSP preferred to rely 

on test results, and once these were avallable went immediately back 

to the Algol ID motor. The lesser thrust of the Algol ID as against 

the Algol IIA forced adoption of a more powerful X-258 fourth stage. 

The only one available was at Arnold Engineering Development Center 

for burn tests; the 417 office had it sent immediatel y to Allegheny 

Ballistic Laboratories (the fabricator) for f11ght readiness tests. 

Resort to the X-258 in turn forced a change in the Sptn-Up rockets, 

an unorthodox arrangement of one long-burn and three short-burn 

devices which Chance-Vought initially rejected oul "f hand and ultimately had to be coaxed into adopting. 

The Air Force, which for months had been seekmg means of 

improving the Scout's reliability, discovered in August that NASA had 

not ~cheduled either ultrasonic or X-ray tests of Algol IIA nozzles. 

NASA had refused to apply quality control standards tv them. Captain 

Geer, who looked into the situation, reported hSplritedly that NASA 

was quite content to have the Air Force fly "development" Scout 

BYE 17017-74 

l'ia-d,~ I'e. B~eman/Ta'e",! Kevro1e 

~:" .. -_, (h, 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

282 
Approved for Release: 

boosters since " •.• we are doing as much to supply them wlth 

development data on their vehicle as ... puttlng our payluad lnto 

58 

orbit. I' 

By July 1963, NASA had experienced its first two "operational" 

Scout failures; until that time one of the standard NASA gambIts had 

been to explain the 417 launch problems in terms of gen .. r;.! Alt, Furce 

incompetence. (NASA never entirely gave up that approach, Its own 

problems notwithstanding.) The Air Force viewpoint was that lnadeljuate quality control and slippy configuration contrul wert' baslcall ~ 

at fault. In the case of Scout 132., the Air Force seemed to have the 

better uf the argument. Before it finally reached the launch stand, 

Chance-Vought was obliged to rework more than 13l individual solder conne 

tions--a clear indication of qualitative inadequacies. In the same 

period the Air Force had vast difficulty in getting correct tr'aJectory 

computations from Chance-Vought. Component weights were not 

always entered in the totals, th"re were errors in comp,ling subsystem 

weights. and the contractor seemed immune to suggestions that the 

program was rather urgent. 

In the matter of configuration changes, NASA continued its 

bland courSe of altering components without much COnCern for the 

effect of the change on Air Force launch procedures. The beacon in 

283 

BYE 170' 

~T Handle Via Bveman/Talent y<',i 

C--·" ~ - ,~, 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 20.18/0.9/11 Co.:O~~~3~ 

TOP~ET 

132 was modifi .. d, for lnstance, so that it was incompatible both with 

the Pacific Missile Rang" frequency assignment and with the Sc-out 

antenna system. Antenna changes which thus became mandatory 

contributed to th" launch date shppage. 

An even more slgmficant fault in 132 became apparent when 

the interstage between the first and second stages--the B section--

could not be mated to the castor nozzle of the second stage. C',rsory 

examination disclosed that the shear pins in the B section were longer 

than and misahgned with the reception holes in the castor nozzle. A 

total of five different B sections were tried with five castor motors in 

all possible combmations and none would fit. The jigs were incompatible. 

Such a basic error was lncomprehensible to program office people. By 

all indications, each hole had been drilled by reference to some other 

hole rather than from a standard reference point. 59 

Even before vehicle 132 became something of a cause celebre, 

General Greer had induced Air Force Undersecretary Brockway 

MCMillan to write NASA's Associate AdminIstrator. R. C. Seamans, 

roncerning Scout defects >nd Au Force judgments on their cause. 

M~Mlllan, still hopeful that the Scout might be upgraded and made an 

acceptable launch vehicle, told Seamans that a decision on the continued 

Air Force use of Scout was pendmg, that its current reliability wa.s too 

BYE 17017-74 

"1a"1di~ .'3 Bveman/Talen! Ke~""cle 

--.. ~ ~ C,.., • 

284 

Approved for Release: 20.18/0.9/11 Co.5o.99283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SEtR E'J! 

low to make its use attractive. but that on the whole there were 

obvious benefits to improvlng Scout rehability lnstead of going to 

another booster. To prove his point. he attached a list of "selected 

management problems. ,. Several among those cited had earher been 

called to NASAls attention. Others were relatively new. 

* included in McMillan's summary were these entnes: 

,' . . ,' 

In latc 1962 NASA made major modifications of the jet vane deslgn 

WIthout notifying the Air Force. That service learned upon unpacking 

vehicle l16. The modific ations had never been f11ght tested before 

being incorporated in that booster (a 417 vehicle). Said MI Millan: 

"417 was faced with accepting the honor of flying first" or mdefinite 

delay. 

NASA had completely ignored three requests for clal"lhcatlOn of 

invalid spin-up data. 

No Scout body bending mode mvestigation had ever bt'en conducted: 

NASA treated Scout as a rigid body insofar as control s ystt:'m dynamics 

were concerned--though that seemed a somewhat shortslghted outlook 

In light of the Scout's four-unit configuration. 

NASA insisted on subjecting 417 vehicle s to special t"it"ctronic 

circuitry tests that both the contractor and the local plant representative 

(Navy) considered entirely unnecessary. even harmfuL 

NASA had refused to change pin assignments to reroute current 

awa y from the destruct mechanism so as to insure against short circuits. 

NASA had originally quoted fourth-stage motors at $14.000 each. 

In August 1962 the agency had indicated a January availabihty at $20.000. 

After encountering major technical difficulties and indulglng in several 

contract overruns, NASA was then (June 1963) quoting $30,000 and 

still had not delivered. 

l8S BYE 1701 

Handle Via Byeman/Talent Ke 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Seamans replied on 15 July (after the certainty of a slip in 

the scheduled launch of 132 had become common knowledge) that 

the Scout had lIs atisfactory reliabihty" and an "acce ptable record. II 

He cited an SO-percent success rate in Wallops Island launches by 

NASA crews. (To get the SO-percent figure Seamans had ignored 

three failures in the first eight "developmentlt launches and had considered only the four successes in five "operationalll launches.) 

Seamans also drew an unflattering cOtnparison between the Wallops 

Island record and that at Point Arguello, on the Pacific coast. He 

observed kindly that the Pacific Missile Range launch crew had been 

formed r'late. II thus contributing to the failure of four Launches in 

eight tries. He also suggested that the modifications of Scout to 

NASA had rejec ted flight-ready tnotors on their arrival at :he 

Pacific Missile Range because of the absence of NASA criteria. 

though they fully satisfied Air Force needs. 

Although the Air Force had singled out the need. NASA had never 

conducted torsion or bending tests on the Scout transporter. 

NASA plans for changing the Pomt Arguello launch facility had 

been drawn in December 1962, but the Air Force had not been notified until 12 February 1963. with the result that the line of sight 

from the on-pad payload to the payload van had been interrupted. 

No correction had been made by June. 

286 

BYE 17017-74 

"ia!"1d!e J a Bvema'l/Taiel'" Ke,"cle 

_:-: ':. , > , TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 

conform to 417 requirements and related departures from NASA "spt:cificatlOns and procedures" were the true culprits. He concluded by 

opposmg any change to the e'"stent management structure, the 

NA<:'AI DoD Scout Coordinating Comm,ttee arrangement which, he 

argued. was functiomng effectively. 

Colonel Hai!! 's commentary On the Seamans' letter < unfined 

60 

itself to detaded refutatlOn, but it bristled with unspoken indignation. 

By that time. however, he was more gravely concerned w,th the immediate problem of shaping Scout 132 into a vehicle which could actually be 

used to launch the fifth 417 satellite. He summed up a situation which 

had grown steadily mure difficult in the months since 132 had first 

encountered problems in meeting schedules and performance requirements: 

"The SLV-Ilaunch team, 'havlllg intimate knowledge of all the new and 

different features incorporated into the booster for operation 1610, have 

begun to call it the 'X-132.' Thell" pOint IS well made ... .. bl 

Smce the All' Fun'e st,ll hoped to convert the Scout into a standard 

launch vehicle suitable for aSSignment to operational squadrons. the 

continuation of such a situation wa. mtolerable. tn June 1963, Colonel 

H ail.' had outlined a set of < onditions which he felt would tend to improve 

the reliability of the Sco"t. In August. the SSD Scuut directorate 

proposed them formally to NASA. They were given some apparent 

l!l7 BYE 170' 

~T 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP pr.;;x 

force by being coupled to the pending procurement of six mure Scout 

boosters, but in fact no conditions could be imposed because of the 

earl,er (June 1962) agreement which gave final authority to NASA in 

virtually all Scout matters. The space agency responded to a threat 

not to 'Ise the X258 fourth stage by sayIng that it had been proven 

flight worthy. NASA also r"fused to agree that the Air Force should 

have a veto on proposed vehicle modifications. 

The Scout "ifice was wearily inclined to accept NASA's position 

on modifications. hoplng that the Au Force would be consulted on any 

action which would "drastically affect" tho Scout's ability to perform 

the 417 aSSlgnment. Culonel Haig was markedly less conciliatory. 

appreciating from sad experience that he had to have some control over 

modifications which would change vehicle performance or reliability 

6z 

and not at all certain that NASA would concede so elementary a courtesy. 

His misgivings were confirmed less than two weeks later. when 

he learned that th," X-2.~8 foorth-stage rocket was due for an additiOnal 

change which would reduce its payload potential to the point of being 

but four pounds gre ate r than the MG-18. It developed almost immediately 

that Haig's information was only partly correct. In actuality, NASA had 

totally changed the baslc configuration of the X-2<;S to make it compatible 

with the NASA verSLull of Thor. By virtue of an increased aft diameter, 

l,SS 

BYE 17017-14 

Cc,;:ro:s 0'iiy 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

the X -258 would no longer be adaptable to the 417 configuration. The 

structural integrity uf the X-258's case was weakened In the process. 

Th.., Air Force Scout office promised Haig that all Air Furce purchases 

would be in the former configuration, that if NASA refused to cooperate 

63 the Air For, e would buy directly from Allegheny Ballist" 5 Laboratory. 

[n light of the complete lack of SUCCesS In obtaining like concessian'" from NASA in the past, Haig seemed justified in any reservations 

he might entertain. As it happened, the lssue rapidly becdme inconsequentlal. On 27 September 1963 the fifth 417 launch waS attempted; it 

ended in the third booster failure. The precise cause was somewhat 

obscure; failure occurred because of a malfunction of the third-stage 

control system arising from a premature los8 of hydrogen peroxide. 

The immediate consequence was an explosive failure near the pitch-down 

64 jets of the third stage. 

On 3 October, four days after the launch disaster, Colonel Haig 

briefed Undersecretary McMillan on the launch and on program status. 

McMillan seemed to favor a booster other than Scout. 

Going to Andrews Air Force Base from his Pentagon 

stop. Colonel Hatg found himself in conversation with Colonel Rodney 

Nudenberg, a key member of General Schriever's Air Force Systems 

Command Staff. Nudenberg passed along instructions from General 

289 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

Handle VIa Byeman/ Ta!en~ - Kev 

Ccr:ro,s ( 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283~ ~iET 

Schriever to Haig: the 417 director was to begin an immedLate study 

of Minuteman and Thor as alternates to Scout. Haig told Colonel 

Nudenberg he had received earlier instructions along those hnes from 

Undersecretary Mc·Millan and had completed considerable work 

before coming to Washmgton. (The study had begun almost precis .. ly 

10 months earlier and preliminary results had been in the undersecretary's 

hands fur at least eight munths! )65 

Haig apparently did not pass to Nudenberg the remainder of 

McMillan's lnstructions - -that he was to continue with plans for at least 

one more Scout- boosted program launch, to complete study and planmng 

for a slngle trial launch using the Thor-Agena combination, and to 

complete the study of Mlnuteman potential. McMillan had been rather 

specific in anoth,- r dlrectlOn; Haig had orders to work out an estimate 

of the money that c"uld be recovered by a complete cancellation of Scout 

66 

proc urement. 

And the prosp""! of continuing with Scouts in their current 

configuration apparently was closed. On 7 October, acting on instructions from Colonel Halg. the Scout directorate at SSD formally canc .. lled 

the last two vehicles on the original delivery order and all six of the 

follow-on order. A stop work order was issued to COver all vehicles 

67 

subsequent to number 134--1ater extended to include 134. 

BYE 17017-74 290 

l"1and!€ Via Bveman/Taient Keyhole 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 ~T ~nE 

McMillan had authorized Haig to participate in a scheduled 

Scout reliability Improvement meeting, set for 14 October, in a last 

desperate attempt to convmce NASA that the alternative to mt'anmgful 

actlOn was cancellation. Nothing useful resulted. On II 0, tob" I. 

Haig again report"d on program status to the undersecretary. Three 

days later, on l3 October 1963, McMillan ordered immediate cancellation of all activities connected with the Scout booster, Immediate 

effort to recover every possible dollar from NASA, and assignment 

of a Thor-Agena from "available resources" to support a December 

or January 417 launch. The launch was to be in a dual payload configuration origtnally desc·ribed by Haig during his 3 October presentation. 

Development of the "optimum" payload capability was also authorized 

68 

in the undersecretary's 23 October instructions. 

"Complete and immediate" termination orders went to NASA 

early on 25 October 1963. The instructions were impossible of·misconstruction: everything connecting 417 to Scout was to stop except 

. 69 the final report on the dlsastrous 132 launch. 

Thus ended the Scout phase of Program 417. In five attempts, 

the program office had one unqualified success, one partial success, 

and three catastrophic laune h failures. After -the-fact investigation 

had clearly identified major booster faults in each of the "successful" 

291 BYE 17017-

Handle VIa Byeman/ Talen~ . Kev'" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP 

launches: with a fractional difference in luck, the booster rrught well 

have contributed to five successive fa,lures. The satell,tes had 

uperated marvelously well, consldermg their dlfiicultLes ,n launch 

phases. 

Tu its credit m the Scout phase, the program had "lsu til,· 

record of the brst successful USe of a space vehicle in act""l cumbat 

troop operations (the Cuban crisis of October 1962.), the first ground 

control ~tations to be built for an operational command's use in space 

op. rations, and the first transfer of total space v. '.lele op. rational 

responsibllity to an operational cOInmand. The program office had a 

remarkable record of cost effectiveness, had functioned with ,a combination of fewer inhabitants and larger responsibilities than any other 

space vehicle development in Air Force history, and had progressed 

from concept to satell.te in orbit more rapidly than any earlier organization. A host of techmc al ach, .. vements, some with implications of 

tremendous value for the future, had to be added to the scorecard. 

BYE 17017-74 

Hand''? Via Bveman/ Talent Keynoie 

::::~:~: s On.l' 

292-

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

Epilogue 

The termmation of Scout usage did not in any respect cause a 

break in the frantic pace of program office activity. On 5 October, 

the Saturday following his presentation to McMillan, Haig asked the 

SSD Deputy for Boosters, Colonel R. W. Hoffman, to aid m a special 

study of Minuteman as a 417 booster. He told Hoffman he needed to 

put 150 pounds in a 500-mile orbit at 96 degrees of inclination and 

asked for any additional payload lift capacity that could be ldentified. 

On the following Tuesday the program office began working on the 417 

Mod l program--the Thor-Agena du::.l-payload launch proposal Undersecretary McMillan had initially approved. Still very much m C"ontention was the stabilite development begun much earlier, a program which, 

if successful, would provide a constant rotation rate and vastly improve 

attitude stabilization for later 417 (and other) satellites. 70 

At the time of the Scout cancellation, the 417 office had completed 

or had in being payload and related contracts totaling $14, 568, 520, 

exclusive of boosters. The primary mission of the program was as 

before: to maintain a satellite system in operation .. t aU times to 

provide accurate cluud cover information over various areas. A 

corollary responsibility was to introduce system improvements where 

293 BYE 17011 

~ Handle "a Bveman/ T8ieo,· Key" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP RET 

warranted un a cost-effectiveness basis. Bomb damage assessment 

had become a probable assignment as early as June 1963--at least 

from the viewpoint of the Strategic Air Command chief, General 

71 

T. S. Power. 

Apart from its general advantages, the 417 had ais(O succeeded 

In establiShing a support relationship between space operahons and 

existing logistic agencies. "I ,~ _______________ I. the responsible field organizatlon, proved both cooperative and ,,{hclent in 

obtaIning lngredl .. nts needed to keep the ground stations operatmg and, 

perhaps more important in some crisis situations, proved capable of 

working out paperwork tangles that otherwise might well have stalled 

the program. (After th" order to shift to Thor-Agena, Colonel Haig 

was unable to work out a neat and legal means of getting his hands on 

a b"a ring to inte rconnect the 417 payload to Thor. He solved the difficulty by picking up a bearing--literally--while visiting Chance-Vought, 

telling the people there he would get them paid somehow. He brought 

1t back to Los Angeles as personal baggage, got it to the booster people, 

and having eliminated a technical roadblock gave the paperwork mess to 

his prucurement people. They solved it. Haig was never certain 

how, but h" was grateful.) 

Finally. the 417 operation developed, or displayed, a rare competence in the uniformed Air Force. Not commonly did:a program 

BYE 17017-74 294 

Handle Via 8veman! Talent Keyhole 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509928",3c

_ . .--:. 

TOP RET 

office composed almost entirely of officers have the opportunity and 

occasIOn to exercise both managerial and technical talents to the 

degree of the 417 office. The lack of a systems engineering-techni,·al 

direction lontractor often challenged program officers, but ultimately 

the lack served to prove that under controlled conditions none was 

needed. The pro1'ram operated under security wraps that precluded 

widespread knowledge of program accomplishments, even within the 

Air F:'0n ". and there was none of the publicity that c-haracterized other 

pru>! rams of the time, III effects were nonexistent. 

Prugram 417, as it was known in 1963, was in many respects 

the antithesis of the "ideal" All" Force development program. It was 

rUIi on a tight budget--about one-thad as large as would have been 

required In "nurmal" Circumstances. It functioned without reliance 

on the elaborate cumplex of contractor technical support common to 

space and miSSile programs of the time, and seemed to prosper thereby, 

It was managed by peopl .. who were constantly at odds with other government agenCies nominall y supporting them, and who took great pleasure 

in ignoring established review and approval channels. It was marked 

by a reporting and monitoring system notable chiefly for inconsequence--

and for effectiveness. It met budget and schedule goals, and satisfied 

established program obj""tlves. That it was able to do as much seems 

195 BYE 17017 

~ Handle VIa Bveman/Taie""lt - Ke'," 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

to have been very largely the consequence of its having been managed 

by three extremely capable, strong-minded individuals. Colonel Haig 

in the program office, General Greer at the directorate level, and 

Dr. Charyk at the National Reconnaissance Office. In the first decade 

of the space age, only the early Corona program and the post-1962 

Gambit program, could claim similar records--and both were characterized by the same emphases On program austerity, minimum reporting, 

avoidance of public ity, direct lines of authority, and program management 

that verged on the iconoclastic. That was the decade of the B-70, the 

F·lll, the C-5, and the Skybolt--all marked by enormous technological 

ingenuity, great pUblic acclaim, massive program manning. stnking 

cost overruns, and lengthy program delays (or cancellations). It was 

surprising that more had not been made of the contrast by the end of 

the decade. 

BYE 17017-74 296 

Hanoi. Via Bveman/Talent· Keynole 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP·~", .. 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. Memo, no signature, by LtCol T. O. Haig, D/Dir/Prog 35, 

17 Nov 60, subJ: 698BH Chronological Program History, 

with supplements to cover the period 17 Nov 60 through 

June 1962, in Prog 417 flies. 

2. Ltr, MajGen O.J. Rltland, Cmdr SSD, to LtGen B.A. 

Schriever, Cmdr AFSC, 31 May 61, subj: Development Plans 

inSupport of Five-Year Space Plan, in SSD Hist Div files; 

P- 35 Hist R pt, Aug 61, in Prog 417 files; History of the Deputy 

Commander for Aerospace Systems, 1961, prep by DC AS Hist 

Ofc. Jun 62, in SSD Hist Div files. 

3. P- 35 Hist R pt, Aug 61. 

4. MFR, ColH.L. Evans, V/Dir. SamosProg, 19Ju161. subj: 

Meteorologl< al Satelhte Program, in Haig files; P-3<; H,st Rpt, 

Aug 61. 

5. Memo, J. V. Charyk, SAFt''>. to DDR&E, 4 Aug 61. subJ: 

Meteorological Information Satellite, in Haig files; memo, 

Charyk tv DDR&E. 7 Aug 61. same subj. same file; memo, 

MajGen R. E. Greer, Dn/Samos Prog, to Dir/P-35, 7 Aug 61, 

subj: Project 35, ln Prog 417 files; TWX SAFMS 61-96, Ok 

Miss and Spac .. Sys, SAFUS, to SAFSP, 8 Aug 61, in Haig files; 

p- 35 Hist Rpt, Aug 61. 

6. TWX NBE 74, NASA (Wash) to SAFSP, 11 Aug 61, in Prog 417 

files; P-35 Hist Rpt, Aug 61. 

7. Ltr, LtCol T.O. Haig, DirlP-35, to LtCol E.J. Istvan, SAFMS, 

9 Nov 61, subj: Program Chronology, with inels, in Prog 417 

files; P- 35 Hist Rpt, Aug 61; TWX, SAFMS-DIR-61-107, SAFMS 

to SAFSP, 18 Aug 61, in Prog 417 files. 

8. Program 35 Satelhte System Development Plan, prep by P-35 

Ofc, 31 Aug 61. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-' 

Hand!€:: Via Bveman/Tale"~ Keli"'~ 

':::r:"~,5 Cr 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP 1:'.1' 

9. TWX SAFSP-2S-9-19, SAFSP to SAFUS, 25 Sep 61, in SP-3 

files, Funds; TWX SAFMS-INS-61-136, BrigGeD-R.J. Curtin, 

SAFMS, to MajGen R. E. Greer, SAFSP, 21 Oct 61, in Prog 

417 files. 

10. Ltr, '-Taig to Istvan, 9 Nov 61. 

11. Ibid; P-35 Chronology, 2,5 Oct 61-5 Jan 62, in Prog 417 files; 

P- 35 C .. ronology, 25 Feb-24 May 62, same files. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

lb. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

BYE 11017-74 

Ltr. Haig to Istvan. 9 Nov 61; P-35 Chron, 25 Oct 61-5 Jan 62; 

memo for record. LtCol T. O. Haig, Dir !P- 35, 14 Dt'c 61. 

subj: Report of Trip to Hq AWS and SAFUS from t h ... 6 thru 9 

D... bl, in Prog 417 Trip Rpt file. 

Memv for record, F.C. Runge, Dep Dir/P-35, 21 F .. b 62, 

subj: Scout Spare Parts; P-35 Chron. 25 Oct 61-5 Jan 62. (which 

actually continues mto Feb 62.!). 

See merrlO for record, LtCol T .0. Haig, Dir/P-35, 23 Mar 62.. 

subj: T rtp Report from 16 Mar 62 through 22. Mar 62. in Prog 

417 Trip Rpt file. Judgments on the mental state and outlook 

of NASA people below the top level are those of the author. not 

of program officer personnel--who either stiffled their frustratIOns or ignored them. 

This was Scout vehicle 111. prototype spacecraft F-l; see P-35 

Chron, l5 Feb-Z4 May 62.. 

P- 35 ehron. 2 s Feb-Z4 Ma y 62. 

Ltr. Col B.H. Kucheman, SSD, to Col B.L. Evans, D/Dir 

Sat Sys, 28 May 62., subj: Program 35, in Haig files; P-35 

Chron. 25 Feb-24 May 62 and 2.5 May-30 Jun 62; ltr. Evans 

to Kucheman, 23 May 62, subj: Program 35, in Haig files. 

Ltr. Kucheman to Evans, 28 May 62.. 

NASAl DOD Scout System Organizational Agreement, signed 

by Dr. H. E. Newell, D,r 10fc Space Sys. NASA Hq. and Col 

R. Nudenberg for MajGen O.J. Rltland. Dep to Cmdr AFSC 

198 

Handie Via Sveman/Ta!ent· Keyno!e 

:: .... ~~o,s Only 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
\----

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

'l'UJI" l}JIr'II:; JK 

for Manned Space Fit. 21 Jun 62; Joint Operatmg Agreement 

NASA/DoD Scout Launch Operations at PMR, -Same date, 

saITle signators plus concurrent slgnature of BrigGen Joseph 

Cody, CITldr 6595th ATW, both docs m 417 ofc files. 

20. MeITlo for Record, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SAFSP. l2 Jun 62, 

no subj, in 417 Of, files. 

21. Ltr, LtColT.O. Halg, Oir/417, toLtColE.J. Istvan, SAFSS, 

20 Nov 6l, subJ: Program Chronology, in Haig files. 

22. Interview, LtCol T. O. Haig. Dir/Prog 417, by Perry, 19 Feb 

64, 15 Nov 63; varlOuS launch rpts dtd Sep 62. in Prug 417 files. 

23. Ltr. Kucheman to Evans, 28 May 62, citing Haig; ,nterview, 

LtCol T. O. Hai~ by R. L. Perry. Hist Oic. 10 De, 62, 15 Nov 63. 

24. TWX SAFSS-1-62-1'i6, to SAFSP. 16 Oct 62, in Half<!, files; Itr, 

MajGen R. E. Gr .... r, Oir/SP, to DI Launch Vehs. SSD (Col 

E1chel), 25 Oct ill, subj: Project 417 Follow-o", B""ster Procurement, In Greer hies. 

2.5. Authorization for the Eglin move was contained in TWX SAFSS6-62-159, to MajGen R. E. Greer. Oir/SP. 24 Oct 62., in Haig's 

files; mterviews with Gen Greer (24 Oct 62, 30 Jan 64). Col 

R.A. Berg (l3 Jan 64) and Col Haig (15 Nov 63, 19 Feb 64) 

provided most of the details of the Eglin episode, although a 

copy of the presentation to Undersecretary Charyk still 15 

preserv"d in Haig's files. 

26. Interviews, Haig (11 Dec 62, 15 Nov 63,.19 Feb 64) and Greer 

(l4 Oct 62, 30 Jan 64) by Perry; Itr, Haig to Istvan. 24 Jan 63. 

l7. TWX SAFSS-6-62 -159, to Greer, 2.4 Oct 62. 

2.8. Ltr. LtCol T.O. Haig. OiT/Prog 417, to 6594th ATW (Col 

Villarsl. 6 Oct 62.. subj: Program 417 Analysis and Evaluation, 

in Prog 417 files. 

299 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

Hancle Via Bveman/Taie"'lt Ke.' 

C:r:~'):s C 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 .. AU'" ..,1Id"'. 

29. Interview •. Col W.G. King, Jr, Dir!SP-14. by R.L. Perry, 

20 Nov 62, 20 Feb 64. TWX SAFSS-6-62-159. 24 Oct 62. 

30. TSX SSZH-3-12-Z59. MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. to Col 

W.K. Kincaid, Cmdr 6594thATW, 4Dec 62; Itr, 1.tCoIG.W. 

Adams, D/Dir SLY-I. to Dn/417, 17 Dec 62. sub): SLV-ID 

#126, in 417 Prog Ofe files: FTV 0240; Itr, Haig to Istvan, 

l4 Jan 63. 

31. Ltr, Adams to Dir/417, 17 Dec 62, with handwritten notes 

. appa rentl y by a 417 program officer. 

32. Ltr. Gre"r to Kincaid, 4 Dec 62. 

33. Llr, Ha.g to Istvan. 24 Jan 63; ltr, Col W.K. Kincaid, Cmdr 

65';14th ATW, to Dir/417, 21 Dec 62. subj: 3502 Special Evaluation ... 2-8 November 1962; ltr, LtCol T.O. Halg, Dir/417, 

lu MajGt"n R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. 14 Jan 63. subj: 6594th ATW 

Special EvaluatiOn of FTV 3502, in 417 files. 

34. Interv.t'w, Ha'g, 15 Nov 63; Greer. 23 Jan 64; 417 Briefing, 

preJ.> by Haig for J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, 7 Jan 63, in 417 files: 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

BYE 17017-74 

BnefwI<s. 

417 Bnl'11llg, 7 Jan 63; TWX SAFSS-6-63-04. to SAFSP. 

17 Jan" 3. 1D Ha.g files. 

Rpt; 417-1 Prupusal. prep by RCA, 30 Jan 63, in 417 files: 417-I. 

Memo for record, LtCol T. O. Haig, Dir 1417, 21 Feb 63, subj: 

Report of Trip to RCA-AED and Pentagon 14-15 Feb t.~, in 

417 ofc Trip Rpt file. 

I 

Proposal for Cuntinued Operation of P-35, aprox Feb 63, in 

Haig files. 

Ltr, LtCol J.R. Smith, 417 Dir, to LtCol E.J. Istvan, SAFMS, 

I Apr 63, subj: Program Chronology, in Prog 417 files. 

Ltr, W.M. Memo, Subv, L.A. OfcCVC, toLtColT.O. Haig, 

et ai, Prog 417, Lti Feb 63, subj: Program 417, Scout 5-126 

300 

Handle VIa Bveman/ Talent· Keyhole 

CGI"';~'O,S Only 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C2~ 

Flight Results. Real Time Evaluation of. in Prog 417 files: 

0240; Itr. Haig to LtCol E.J. Istvan, SAFMS. 12 Jul 63. 

subj: Program 417 Chronology; TWX SSZH KNEEDEEP 01-21-2, 

Proj Oie (at VAFB) to MajGen R. E. Greer. Dir/SAFSP. 

21 Feb 63, in Prog 417 files: 0240. 

41. TWX TWOB 01-26, 6594th ATW to 417 Prog Ofc, 26 Apr 63, 

in Prog 417 files: 0240. 

42. Memo, Col J.R. Martin, Dir/Ofc Space Sys, SAF. to DDR&E, 

12 Mar 63, subj: Comparison Between NIMBUS and Proposed 

417-1, in Prog 417 files: 417-1. 

43. Memo for record, LtCol T. O. Haig. Dir /Prog 417. 16 Mar 63, 

sub): Trip to RCAI AED and Pentagon. 11 thru 15 Mar 63, in 

Prog 417 trip rpt files. 

44. TWX SAFSS-6-63-47, DNRO to SAFSP, 28 May 63. in Haig 

files; rpt. Prog 417 Program Direction Plan. 21 Oct 63, in 

Haig files. 

45. Ltr, LtCol M.F. Gregg, Dir/SLV-I, to 417 Dir, 19 Mar 63, 

subj: NASA support of 417; Hr, LtCol J.R. Smith, 417 Dir, 

to SLV-I Dir, 21 Mar 63, same subj; ltr, R.B. Morrison, 

Dir Launch Vehs and Propul Prog, NASA (Washington), to 

SLV-I Dir, 24 May 63, subj: Scout Procurement, all in 417 files. 

46. Ltr, Haig to Istvan. 12 Jul 63; ltr. K. W. Greaves. CVC. to 

LtCol T. O. Haig, 417 Dir. 29 Apr 63, subj: Program 417, 

Scout S-l21 Flight Results, Real Time Evaluation of; TWX 

KNEEDEEP 26-4-04. 417 Dir to SAFSS. 26 Apr 63, in 

Prog 417 files: 1298. 

47. TWX SSVB-17-5-55, SLV-l Dir to NASA Washington. 17 May 63, 

and 5MBOOI. NASA Santa Monica to SSD. 21 May 63, in 

Prog 417 files. 

48. Ltr. LtCol M.F. Gregg, SLV-l Dir, to Cmdr PMR. 23 May 63, 

subj: Range Support for SLV-lD Program; TWX SSVBD-22-5-63, 

SLV-l Dir to NASA Washington, 2:4 May 63; memo for record, 

Capt R. L. Geer, Prog 417. 6 Jun 63, no subj, aU in Prog 417 

files: Booster. 

301 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-

Handle .... la Bveman/Taie!"l+ - Ke,,"" 

Cc;r:,::"s (j, 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283, 

",I:ur ........ 

49. Resume of Program 417 Briefing for Undersecretary B. 

McMillan, 20 May b3, ,n Prog 417 files, indicates that 

McMillan agreed with that viewpoint. 

50. Memo for record, prep by Capt R. L. Geer, 417 Prog OCc, 

7 Jun 63 , subj: SSVB Support of 119-121 InvestigatlOn Buard 

Recommendations, in Prog 417 files; memo for record, prep 

by Col R.A. Berg, V/O,r SAFSP, 10 Jun 63, subj: V,S,t of 

Or. McMillan, 10 June 1963, in SP-3 files: Fundin!'. 

51 TWX TWOP-3/14-6-l, 6594th ATW to SSD, 15 Jun 63, TWX 

SSZH-19-6-l63, 411 Ofc to 6594th ATW, 9 Jun 03; TWX TWOP3-25-6-6, lb Jun 63, all In Prog 417 files: 0243. 

52. Rpt, Preliminary Study of Two Tone Command System versus a 

Receiver Clock, 13 Jun 63. in Prog 417 files; TWX SS7H-5-3-96, 

417 Ofc to SAFMS, 5 Mar 63, and TWX TWRDA-8-3-5, b594th 

ATW to SAFSP, 8 Mar 63, in 417 Ofc files: 0240. 

53. Halg interview, 10 Dec 6Z. 

54. Ltr, LtCol 1'.0. Haig, Oir/Prog 417, to all 417 Pers, 24 Jui 63, 

subj: Letter from Director, 417, in Haig files; itr, Halg to 

SAFSS, 18 Sep 63, subj: Program History, in Haig files; 

notes in 417 ofc files re notable events after 1 Jul 63. 

55. Ltr, Col L.A. Perry, o/Spt Sys, 6594th ATW, to SLV-l Dir, 

SSD, 18 Aug 63, subj: Proposed Scout Facility, in Prog 417 HIes. 

56. Ltr, LtC01 T. O. Haig, Oir 417 Prog, to SAFSS, 23 Sep 63, 

subj: Processing History of Scout 132, in 417 files. 

57. Ltr, Haig to SAFSS, 23 Sep 63; interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir SAFSP, by R. L. Perry, 14 Nov 63; Itr, LtCol T. O. Haig 

to Dan Kimball, Chm Bd Aerojet Gen Crop, 31 Jul 63, no subj, 

in 417 files. 

58. Memo for record, prep by Capt R. L. Geer, 417 Dir, 6 Aug 63, 

subj: Trip Report to Ae rujet Solid Rocket Plant, Sacramento, 

Calif, 5 August 63, in 417 ofe trip rpt files; ltr, Haig to SAFSS, 

23 Sep 63. 

BYE 17017-74 

Ha"Ole Via Bveman/Talent Keyhole 

:::::"": ":),5 Onl) 

302 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
59. Ltr, Haig to SAFSS, 23 Sep 63; TWX VWZC-7-329(322.4I, 

6595th ATW to SLV-l Oil', 22 Jul 63, in 417 ofc files. 

60. Ltr. B. M,Millan, SAFUS, to R.C. S"amans, Assoc Admin, 

NASA, 28 Jun 63, no subj; itr, Seamans to McMlllan, 15 Jul 63. 

no subj; ltr. LtCol T. O. Hal!! to SAFUS. 15 Aug 63, subj: 

Comments on Letter dated 15 July 63 from Dr. Seamans to Under-

;;ecretary McMillan, all in 417 ofc files. 

61. Ltr, Hai,~ to SAFSS, 23 Sep 63, 

62.. Ltr, LtCol T .0. Haig, Dir/Prog 417, to SLV-l Dir, 13 Jun 63, 

subj: Program 417 Additional Booster Procurement; ltr, 

LtCol M.F. Gregg, SLV-l Oil', to NASA Washington, attn 

W. A. Guild, 2. Aug 63, subj: Amendment to Delivery Order 

63-32; itr, R.D. Gmther, Ch, Small Vehs. NASA, to SLV-l 

Dir, 14 Aug 63, subj: Amendment to Delivery Order 63- 32.; 

ltr, Gregg to Halg, 20 Aug 63, subj: Follow-On 3LV-lA procurement; Itr, Hug to SLV-I Dir. 23 Aug 63, same subj, aU in 

417 Ofc file s . 

63. Ltr, LtCol T. O. Haig, Dir/Prog 417. to SLY -1 Oil', 11 Sep 63, 

subj: Performance of X-2S8 Motor; Itr, LtCo! G. W. Adams, 

0/ Dil' SLY -I, to Halg, 13 Sep 63, same .ubj, in 417 ofc files. 

64. Rpt, Program 417 Program Direction Plan, 21 Oct 63, in Halg 

files; undated excerpt from "Minutes of Meeting of S-.132 Flight 

Evaluation Bua rd, " in 417 Ofc files. 

65. M"mo for Record, LtC"l T.O. Haig, Dir/Prog 417, 7 Oct 63, 

subj: Trip Report to Wash D.C. 3 &. 4 October 63, in Prog 417 

tnp rpt files. 

66. TWX SAFSS-6-63-73, SAFSS to SAFSP. 8 Oct 63. in Haig files. 

67. TWX SSVBK-i-lO-17, SLV-l Oir to NASA, 7 Oct 63; TWX 

SSVBK-10-38. SLV-1 D,r to NASA, 10 Oct 63, both in 417 ofc files. 

68. TWX SAFSS-6-63-7B, SAFSS to SAFSP, 23 Oct 63, and TWX 

SAFSP-DIR-21-IO-l, SAFSP to SAFSS, 21 Oct 63, in 417 ofe files. 

303 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

Handle Via Byeman/Talent" Key 

ContrOlS ( 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOPS 'I' 

69. TWX SSVBK-l5-10-44. SLV-l Dir to NASA. 25 Oct 63, in 

417 ofc files. 

70. 

71. 

BYE 17017-74 

Ltr. LtCoi T.O. Haig. Dir/417, to Col R. W. Hoffman, 

D/Space Launch Vehs, SSD. 8 Oct 63. subj: Study of Booster 

Support for Program 417; TWX SAFSS-6-63-78. l3 Oct 63. 

Proj 417 Program Direction Plan. 21 Oct 63, in Haig files; 

memo for record, LtCol T.O. Haig. Dir Prog 417, 17 lun 63, 

subj: Tnp Report 13-14 June 63 to Hqs SAC and to RCAI AED, 

in 417 ofc trip rpt files. 

304 

Har"ld(e lila Bveman/Talent· Keyhole 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TUlI" :'-ji!1;K 

IX THE E-4 MAPPING SATELLITE (PROGRAM tAl 

Development of a mapping and charting satellite had b""n a 

cherished AIr Furce dr ... arn for at least two years before SAFSP 

mherited the mantle of satelhte reconnaissance responslDllity--but 

progress had remained in the dream category. The requIrement had 

been defined In September 1958 (although considered abstractly even 

earlier). By the following January the notion had been translated into 

a proposal for a recoverable capsule system capable of takmg pictures 

with hi!o\h l'(eometTlC" ildelity and correlating them with the products of 

a stellar-image recording camera. Called E-4, the proposed system 

was ("onsldered a companion to the E-5 surveillance system then be1ng 

defined. Although the Ballistic Missiles Division and the Air Research 

and Development Command heartily favored starting development, 

even seeming to prefer the £-4 to the E-5, the Air Staff was never 

more than lukewarm. In part because highly influential mtelligence 

officers withheld firm support, the E-4 took shape as a somewhat 

tenuous development which was in direct competition with a proposed 

ARPA-sponsored interim mapping system and with the Argon system. 

being covertly developed under Army auspices. In May 1959. ARPA 

directed the Air Force to cancel work on the E-4 mapping camera 

305 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

Hand~e 1/18 Byeman/ Tal€!"~ Ke l' 

CentrOlS I 
Approved for Release: 

ET 

program. Most contracts were dropped the following month, although 

the photographic laboratory at Wright Field continued to fund related 

camera developments without calling much attention to the effort. The 

cancellation came, somewhat disconcertingly, on the day that Lockheed 

1 

finished the initial verSion of the development plan. 

Samos program managers were never enthusiastic about Argon. 

The system had serious performance limitations that chiefly arose in 

a policy of making technical compromises to insure early delivery. 

Plans in October 1960, when the question of mapping satelhtes began 

• attracting Unders.·cr .. tar.y Charyk's attention, called for a total of 

four Argon launcb-s b,-tween December 1960 and August 1961. 

On 18 October 1900, Major C. E. James of the newly organized 

Samos Washington "Hiee met with Dr. Charyk to discuss geodetic and 

mapping satelhtt>s. He brought the undersecretary up to date on the 

status and prospens of Argon and then explained that the All" Force 

had a camera known as th" "41l" (actually the "applied research" 

development undertaken upon formal cancellation of the E-4 camera) 

which represented the luglCal foHow-on to Argon. Two were scheduled 

for completlOn by early 19b1 and long-lead-time provislOns had been 

made to purchase seven more. In James' opinion, the system represented the best the e"'~tellt stat" of the art could provide. He adVised 

BYE 17017-74 306 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SECRET 

Dr. Charyk that the camera system could be readied for night in an 

E-Ii capsule by August 1961. (By using the considerabh greater thrust 

of an Atlas booster. the £-4 avoided de~Hgn compromises mherent in 

the Th .. r-boosted Argon.) 

The £-4 had other attractions. It promised new aVenues for 

the futurf'; seeming to be adaptable to evolutlon toward a long-term 

objectlve defined in September 1960 by the NatiOl'ci1 Security CouncIl. 

~. 

~. 

Moreover, an E-4 program under SAFSP auspices would elIminate any 

need for continuing the cumbersome Argon tnanagement complex, 

which then induded the Army Mapping Service. the National Photographic 

Interpretation Centt::r. the Central Intelligence Agency, and the West 

Coast Argon office. Finally. and most itnportant. E-4 promised better 

results than Argon. 

Convinced. Charyk authorized the BMD-WADD (Wright Air 

Development Division) organization to plan for early inclusion of the 

41l camera in the Samos program. For the moment, he withheld any 

authorization to schedule use of the 41l. 

Although Dr. Charyk and his staff were relatively enthusiastic 

about the prospects of the E-4. neither General Greer nol:' Colonel King 

-, . . ,. 

ALthough the evidenct:" 1S not entirely clear. it would appea.r that a 

discussion of mapping satellites during the September ':!leeting of the 

National Security Coun( d touched off Charyk IS interest-. 

307 

~OP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

BYE 17017 

Handle via Byeman/Talent Key 

ContrOlS { 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP S2C.ET 

looked on it so favorably. Conceding the feasibility and ~eneTal 

::: 

des irabihty of an E -4 system. they nevertheless questwned the 

wisdom uf substituting a mapping satellite for any of the E - 5 payloads 

then on schedule. Charyk, who thought less highly of the E-5. 

directed in December that the mapping cam.era be integrated in the 

total Samos effort as soon as possible and that the existing contracts 

be expanded to provide for three flight cameras, two test artlcles. 

and four follow-on models. (That total matched the figure of nine 

that Major James had descnbed as tlavailable" two months earlier. ) 

* The objective of the E-4 development was a system capable of giving 

position dccuracies of 500 feet or less. Based on the usual Atlas .. 

Agena B comblnation, the recovery capsule was nearly identical to 

that of the E-5, having a 72-inch diam.eter and being 84 inches long. 

The mappin~ <:amera had a ::;lX- inch focal length; the stella r - indexing 

camera a focal lCHgth of thr~. inches. The customary gas-real,tion jets 

were to control attitude during a five-day mission with an apogee of 

178 nautlcal miles. Ground Tt-'solution would be. under good conditlons, 

on the order of 150 feet, as is uming a 90-mile perigee over the target 

a rea. The usual near ~polar orbi.t was planned. The f/5. 6 lens of 

the mapping camera was considered by reconnaissance camera experts 

to b~· the "best.. available today for photogrammetic purposes." 

It had an axial resal u.tiun of 60 lines per millimeter with a distortion 

of 10 microns .. -which reduced to two microns upon calibration. Some 

4000 feet of m.ne by mne-inch fUm would be carried and retrieved. Shutter 

speeds could be varied over ~ range from 1/50 to 1/800 seconds. 

Fudlcial and Teseau edge rna rl< ings on the film were to be provided. 

based in part on a timer with an accuracy of .001 seconds. The f/2. 5 

stellar image camera used 4.5 by 4. 5 .. inch film frames, exposing 

each frame for four seconds to provlde an elongated tran."r of star images 

On a tutal of lOOO feet of film. Each mission could theoretically provide 

high quality photographs of about 50 million square miles of Sino-Soviet 

te rritary. 

BYE 17017-74 

Har>dl€ ~Ia Bveman/ Talent Kevhole 

:.:::-:-: 5 O..,,~ 

308 

TOP SEGRE'f 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
, 

\. 

.,/ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283CRET 

~ 

Flight hardware (Agenas and equipment) for three flights was to be 

purchased or transferred from other sub-programs. The booster 

problem was to be sulved by using Atlas boosters made available by 

the decision tu fly F-2 (ferret) subsystems atop Thors, and the 

matter of insertlng E-4'5 mto the ti~ht schedule of E-5 and E-6 

2 flights by shpplng the entire sequence of shots. 

Instructions and guidance along such lines came into General 

Greer's complex gradually, over a period of several weeks. Late In 

December 1960, Greer concluded that the net effect of redirection 

involving the E-4 and the F-2 had been to create two additional Sarno!! 

technical programs. He cautioned Charyk that "nothing comes free 

m this business." Manpower and dollar increases were mevitable if 

the directions Wert, carried' out. The E-4 program promised to be 

particularly costly, he warned, since the implication of earlier 

directives was to give the E-4 precedence over both the E-5 and E-6. 

Greer was certain Charyk had not intended that result, and he was 

also sure that Charyk had not fully analyzed the cost impact of modifying 

3 

Agenas from an F-l to an E-4 configuration. 

After weighing the various considerations, Undersecretary 

Charyk in February 1961 decided that he wanted an E-4 but that it would 

have to be developed and tested within the limits of existing funds. He 

309 BYE 17017-' 

Hand~€ via Bveman/ Talen·· Key!"",:. 

Ccr:rOIS U!'" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 

TOP SEtRE'! 

continued to insist. however. that rescheduling boosters and launches 

would permit th~ E-4 to progress withuut grossly affecting any of the 

search or surveillanc-e payload programs. But partly Ul deference to 

the existence of Argon and the certainty of Army objecttuns should it 

become known that revlVal of the E-4 program was being planned. he 

decided to conceal the program's existence. The term "Program LA" 

was generally substituted for "£_411 as a means of obscunng project 

intentions. That subterfuge was also an element in the more widespread 

effort to remove all reconnaissance satelhte effort from general view. 

By early April 1961, the E-4 had acquired relatively firm configuration characteristics and had made the transition from p~oposed 

effort to funded procurement. An effective working relatlOnship between 

the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) and SAFSP had been created. 

and progress seemed to be qUlte good. Both the techmcal and the 

financial details had received Charyk's specific approval following a 

general presentation of 7-8 March, although the West Coast group 

4 

remained rather tlbearish" on the whole issue. 

Lockheed was the system lntegrating contractor. under letter contract 

AF04(647)-H4l, issued on 6 April 1961. The original work statement 

covered systems englneering and vehicles for three flights plus long 

lead time items for flve mar.'. Fairchild Camera and Instrument 

Corporation had pa yload development responsibility under letter COntract AF33(600)-42926, lssued by the Aeronautical System Divisionis 

(ASD) Reconnais sance La b(.ratory on lS March. (Fairchild actually 

BYE 17017-74 310 

TOP SE£RE'I' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099283 . ..., ................ .. 

The ambitious E-4 program conceived during the Samos reorganization of August-September 1960 began to lose stature the 

folloWlng spring. On 28 March 1961. Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Roswell Gilpatric confirmed Air Force responsibility for development 

and operation of all defense department reconnaissance satellites, but 

also made the Army responsible for establishing and managing "a Single 

geodetic and mapping program II to meet defense department .n·quirements. 

Within two weeks, the Army's chief of staff had contacted his Air Force 

counterpart, General T. D. White. to request nominations to an 

"mtegrated three-service" group to plan for mapping sateUites--under 

Army ('ognizanct'. The first meeting was held early in May. and it was 

lmmediately apparent that the Army saw the Gilpatric directive as a 

m,wciate for establishing a new major research and development effort 

in satellite m..-tpplnl;! and geodesy. The Au Force inevitably disagreed. 

The only product of the meeting was a decision to collect requirements 

statements from an three se rvices. 

The next meeting, on 11 May, was called On short notice but 

found the Air Force more determined than ever that reconnaissance 

accepted six days later.) Funds were initially released to ASD on 

10 March. A total ot $88.5 million was set aside for "Program lAo 11 

the coverage extt'ndmg through four fiscal years until fisc al 1964. 

but the bulk of that amount falling due in fiscal year 1963. Schedul;es 

called for initial launches in March, June; and Septembe.r 1962 with 

the first of the fIve supplemental payloads going into orbit in April 1963. 

5 

311 BYE 17017-

"I'OP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2018109/11 COS099283 

Handle Via Byeman/Tatent Kev"" 

ContrOlS 0, 
Approved for Release: 

satellite research and development should not be parceled out according to camera focal length--which seemed in Some respects to be the 

Army's goal. On inst;ructions from Charyk, the Air Furc-e ""presentative refused to discuss research and development in satellite geodesy, 

characterizing it a matter for secretarial resolution. Typically, the 

tri-service committee was unable to agree on anything slgnihcant, 

adjourning on the note that what was immediately needed was a commonly 

accepted definition of geodesy, Some agreement on targeting require6 

ments, and a standard viewpoint on data processing requirements. 

Nevertheless, the lines had been drawn and under the rules 

outlined by Gllpatric th" E-4 program had become quite vulnerable. 

Yet had the matter remamed one for resolution by a tri-service committee, 

Charyk and Greer might well have flown the E-4 before any decision could 

b" taken. However, m late May 19M, the mapping satellites issue had 

been passed to the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering 

(DDR&EI for resolutlOn, and the E-4 became but one of three proposed 

systems. Early in June, Gilpatric authorized continuation of the procurement of four cameras in the E-4 (Program lAl configuration but 

mstru,ted Charyk to suspend plans for buying and launching boosters 

and space vehicles. 

BYE 11011-74 

Harte.:.: . a Bveman/Ta1ent Kevr,oie 

C::r~-:: s Cf"Ily 

There still was hope. of course. that a decision 

312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 

tu cunfirm proposed flight schedules would follow cornpietlOn of an 

ev" luatlOn- -but the hope was rather famt. Charyk ther .. fur .. directed 

that aU E-4 activity not essenhaJ to completlOn of four ba"" payloads 

(including aCt ,·ssories) should be halted. He subsequently modified 

the "complete stop" order to permit Lockheed to w<'rk on capsule 

englneering f"sst!ntial to creation of an lIappropriate" interface between 

capsule and payluad and to insure compatibility of the payload w,th th" 

"apsule e"vlronment. but even then the Lockheed work was carefully 

limlted. 

For another six months, payload development continued at a 

slow pace and on a luw.key. It appeared to be progressmg remarkably 

well, on the whole, a situation that most observers credited to the 

abiltty and industry of the immediate program officers (Mr. Leonard 

Crouch at ASD and Major Edward J. Conway of General Greer's establishment). No firm decision un the future of the program had y.et 

emerged from DDR&E, and Charyk seemed content not to push the issue. 

In October, he discussed mapping satellites with Dr. E. A. Fubini of 

DDR&E and got approval of a plan to bring the E-4 payloads to a state 

uf flight readiness and hold them there, the objective be'''g to provide 

the least possible delay between a launch decision and an actual launch. 

He told SAFSP to begin putting together engineering and cost details 

313 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017-

Handle Via Byeman/Talent· Key" 

CcnrCIS (; 
Approved for Release: 

for a "hold" program. General Greer's people, though reasonably 

optimistic about the promise of the E-4 carn .. ra and the functional 

effectiveness of th" system, were not particularly encouraging--

estimating that it would cost $42.2 million to orbit all four payloads, 

7 

and $16.4 for one-- not cuunting launch and recovery charges. 

Charyk, who bad preserved the E-4 program through a succession 

of admmistrative mishaps and who had somehow managed to keep it 

alive in th .. face of a formal Gilpatric directive that denied his authority 

tu do so, reacted angrily to the cost and time figures. "It appears that 

SAFSP does not want to do this job, " he told General Curtin. "The 

system is obviously gold plated and fat. It is necessary that the program 

8 

be s( rubbed down to the hard core and re-estimated." 

Though unpalatable, the figures nevertheless proved to be well 

founded. By the end of the year, Charyk was apparently resigned to 

the fact that there was no prospect of early flight for the E-4 payloads 

then approaching completion. Early in January 1962, he advised 

GllpatrLC that as they were completed the E-4 payloads were being 

stored In a readiness-in-nine-rnonths flight condition, and that a 

decision to fly would require the provision of substantial funds for 

9 

launch, booster, and space vehicle costs. And there the E-4's remained. 

The decisiun was nut wholly one of institutional prerogatives, 

how"ver much that seemed to be the case in 1961. [n fact, the E-5 launch, 

BYE 17017-74 

314 

HanC>1? Via Bveman/Taleqt Kevl"1ole 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

TOP-.-, __ 

orbital. and recovery system on which £-4 relied had been progressing 

with notable lack of distinction through 1961. Whether the £-5 camera 

system would work properly remained uncertain (and was not to be 

established until a modified camera was successfully flown in the 

Lanyard prugram, in July 1963: results were rather disappointing). 

But that the Atlas, Agena, and recovery subsystem were marginally 

capable. at best, was apparent early. In consequence of those unhappy 

developments. £-5 was cancelled in December 1961. With it went much 

of the potential of E-4. 

Also significant was the development of a mapping and charting 

capability in Corona. Although the superb capability that would appear 

with the eventual introduction of a dual integrated stellar -indexing 

Camera (DJSIC) as part of the Corona payload was not evident in 

October 1961, when it was decided to add an indexing camera,to Corona. 

Lockheed and the Corona program office could by then confidently 

anticipate that oute orne. The Argon program did not completely run 

down until 1964. but even earlier Argon'S spotty record of success, 

mdex-camera development. and the changing concept of geodesy program 

requirements had obviated any real need for specialized mapping camera 

~ystems • 

315 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 

BYE 17017 

Handle VIa Byeman/Talen~ Key' 

(enrols C 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283, 

Tur B&t.. 

NOTES ON SOURr.ES 

1. USAF GOR 80, 26 Sep 'i8; Sentry S"a("<, System D<'v.-lopment 

Plan, 30 Jan 59; ltr, MajGen J.H. Walsh, ACSI, to OtT ARPA, 

23 Ma r 59, subj: Intelligence Requirements for SENTR y, In 

SP Samos files: R&D-I, TWX, RDZGW-26-<;-43E, ARDC to 

BMD, 26 May 59, in SP Samos files, Hist Doem '5q· TWX, 

AFDA T 52072, USAF to ARDC, 5 Jun 59, same file: l.MSD 

Rpt, Proposed D"v Plan for Sentry Photogramrnetry P rograrn, 

~ Jun '>9, Samos files. 

l. Memo for record, Maj C. E. James, SAFMS. III Oct 60, ~ubj: 

Mt!eting with Dr. Charyk, in SAFMS file, Policy. 'bl. rwx. 

SAFSP-20-1O-13, BrigGen R. E. Greer to BrigGen R. D. Curtin, 

20 Oct 60; TWX SAFMS-DIR-60-14, Curtin to Greer, 21 Oct 60, 

both in SAFMS files: Telcon, '60; ltr, Col W.G. King, V/Dlr. 

Samos Proj Ofc, to SAFSM (sic), 21 Nov 60. subj: Ll'tter uf 

Transmittal, In SAFMS files, Samos Gen: TWX, SAFMS-Photo60-68, SAFMS to SAFSP, 23 Dec 60, in SP Sarnos files. 

3. TWX SAFSP-P-29-12-9, BrigGen R.E. Greer, SAFSP, to 

OSAF, 29 Dec 60, in SAFMS file, messages, Dec 60. 

4. TWX SAFMS-Photo-61-23, SAFMS to SAFSP, 20 Feb 61, in 

SAFMS hie, Sarnos Gen, '61; ltr, BrigGen R.E. Greer. Dirt 

Samos, to Col W.G. King, V/Dir, et ai, 24 Feb 61, subj: 

Security PolIcy, in SP-3 files; draft dev pin: Samos Photogrammetric System (Program !A) Dev Plan, tran~ wIth ltr, 

Maj M. G. Burnette, SAFSP to SAFMS, 6 Apr 61, oIlUJ: LtT 

of Transmittal, in SAFMS files. Samos Gen, '61; TWX SAFSPVT-6-4-20. Col W.G. King, V/Dir, SAFSP to SAFMS (Maj 

H. C. Howard), 6 Apr 61. in SAFMS fUes Samos G"n, '61; 

itT contr AF 33(600)-42926 between ASD and FCIC. Issued 

25 Mar 61, accepted by FClC 30 Mar 61; Itr lontr AF 04(647)-

841 between SAF SSD and LMSD, 6 Apr 61, coverl!l~ sy~tems 

engineering dnd vehIcles for three E-4 payluads, final cuntracts 

Were to be, respectively, AF 33(600)-39469 (FCIC) "nd AF 04 

(647)-563 and -595, covering delivery of E-o; devel0f>"d Items. 

5. DoD Dir 5160.34, Rt:connaissance, Mapping and ~"., ddlC 

Programs, 28 Mar 61, tn E-6 files, Mgt-4. 

BYE 17017-74 316 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283~ 

~ •. 

o. Ltr. Gen G. H. Decker. C IS. USA. to Gen T. D. White, CIS 

USAF. 11 Apr 61, no sub); ltr, White to Decker. II Apr 61; 

memo for record. Col G.H. Chase. Ofc ACS/I. USAF, 8 May 01, 

subj: Department of the Army Mapping and Geodesy Conference; 

memo for record, Chase, 11 May 01. subj: Mappmg and Geodesy 

Ad Hoc Committee Conference, all in SAFMS files: MIs, . 

7. TWX SAFMS-SEN-ol-oO, SAFMS to SAFSP, 6 JW1 61. In SAFMS 

files, Samos Gen. '01; Itr, Col H. L. Evans, D/Dlr. SAFSP to 

V I Dir SAFSP (Tech), 6 Jun 61. subj: Stopwork on Cuntract, Ln 

r.vans files; TWX SAFSP-L-7-6-54, SAFSP to SAFMS, 7 Jun 61; 

TWX SAFMS-SEN-61-61, SAFMS to SAFSP, 8 Jun 61, both in 

SAFMS Samos Gen. '61 files; TWX SAFMS-M-1l89. GrigGen 

R. D. Curtin. SAFMS, to MajGen R. E. Greer. SAFSP, 20 Oct 01 • 

. In SP- 3 files. 

8. TWX SAFMS-DIR-61-141, BrigGen R. D. Curtin to MajGen R. E. 

Greer, SAFSP,. in SP-3 files. 

9. M,'mo, J. V. Charyk. SAFUS, to R. L. Gilpatrick, D/SOD, 

3 Jan ol, subj: Mapping and Geodetic Programs. In Argon files. 

317 BYE 17017-· 

~ Hand~e Via Bveman/Talent Kev .... ' 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283 ~T' ~_llE1 

BYE 17017-74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099283