--

VOLUME ONE

AGENA FLIGHT HISTORY

AS OF \

31 DECEMBER 1961 1

:1,1A).- Igo?

HISTORICAL DIVISION

OFFICE OF INFORMATION

SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS ORGANIZATION

AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND

SMEN-100

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DOD DM 5200.10
DRAFT

ACENA ?LIM HISTORY

as of

31 December 1967

Volume 1

Prepared

by

'Sarah A. Grossly Historical Clerk

June 1969

SA40

WPM CF DIFORUATION

HISTORICAL DIVISION

Approved by:

• ROBERT E. PIPER . unier, ulszorical Division

Group 3 Downgrneted at 12 Years intervals

Not automatically declassified

St.2111-100

3 %::•.7rt;"0,,• • •
DRAFT

I:AZLE OF CONVENTS

page

purview& • —4r •••••• -sr •••• ••••" •• r • • r r —r ••• •••••••••••••-"Ir.'1""T"T*T•T"'I'T"'

Introduction

Part I - Agena Flight Performance, Flight Results Subsistem

and Equipment Failures 1

Part II - Description of Agena Flights 31

Appendix A - Agena Success Symmetries by Year and Progrior • 1166

.

.Appendix A-1 - Agena Success Summaxyby Vehicle Type 1t07

Appendix Ap-2 Agena Success Summary by Vehicle Type and Program

Air F3rce Programs 408

Appendix A-3 - Agena Success Summazy by Vehicle Type and Program

NASA Programs • 409•

Appendix B - Program Flight Summaries • • • • 416 -

Appendix B-1 - Program 162 411/412

Appendix B-2 - Progrem 241 .... . 415

Appendix 3•3 - Program 846 416

Appendix B-4 - Program 461 417

'Appendix 13-5 - SAMOS 416

Appendix. S-7 - Vela. program 420

Appendix 3-8 - Snap '2hot . • • • • • • • • • I. ..... • • • • 421

V:.\\*\ NNVeNaxxx\xV.VVVnVVON'ONNS,..\-n•n A.N.N.N.X\NNS.V.\\.\.\\NN -nn•nn.

- - ... ..

....

Appendix 3-12 - 7.1ASIVRanger 427

Appendix 3-13 - NASA/N1:riner 1428

Appendix 3-14 - Ni.ZAAlouette 429

Appendix 2-25 - NASA./Fcho 430
Appendix B-16 - NASA/Nimbus

Appendix B-17 NASA/OGO ............ . . . . • •

Appendix B-18 - NASA/Gemini Target • • • •

431

432

433

Appendix B-19 - NASA/ISIS-X. • ........ . • • • . .. 434

Appendix B-20 - RAS.A,10A0 435

Appendix B-21 - rIASA/Psgeos 436

Appendix B-22 - NASA/Lunar Orbiter ' 437

APPendik 3-23 - NASA/MS 438

Appendix C Agena. Success Sumaary by Vehicle Type and Configuration 439

Appendix D Agena Success Sm•ary•by Venicie Type and Year 440:

Appendix E Agena Success :3urroun.l.es by Vehicle Type and..Year • • . . 441

Appendix Agena A WN7.eSF.: Sur• lary by Year . . . . .. 442

Appendix -2 Agena B k6 -0i) Success surmary by Year 443'

Appendix E-3 - Standard (SS-01A) Success Sum:eery by Year 014

Appendix F -.Booster/Agena Y;uccess Summary 445'

Appendix G - Atlas ' Boost er/..Igena A Suce,cas • Summaries: by. Year . . . 41$

Appendix 0-1 - Atlas BooszerNena A Success Summary by Year 47

Appendix d-2 - Atlas Boos:;er/Agena B (S-01) Success Si meaty by Year 48.

Appendix

Appenaix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

Appendix

0-3 - Atlas Bcosi.e.r/Agena D (SS-01A) Success Summary by Year 449

Thor Dooster aad .18ena Success Summar by Type and Year 450

A

H-1 - Thor Bcosttlr, Avila/Success Summary by Year . . . . . 451

11-2 - Thor Boos B (5-01) Success Stomary by Year 452

H-3 - Boo3e1/Agena D (013-01A) Success Summary by Year 453

an BOste •/kena D (SS-01A) Success Sumlary by Year '454,

Glossary . . . . . . . .110; .completed
/ .

0.:11-ULP .67101=1",

444

DRAFT

FLIGHT SUMMARY OF THE AGM NTECUME•

INTRODUCTION

This Agena Flight History was originally prepared as an Appendix to

the Agena History. Inasmuch as the publication date of the Agena History

remains uncertain, it was decided that a consolidated record of all Mena

flights, along with appropriate technical data imad, as a published document,

constitute a useful source Of Agena technical history and flight information.

The Agena satellite vehicle program, stimulated, in part, by captured

German technical data which the military forces unearthed in the fall of 1945,

•

led to a.1946 study titled, "Project RAND, Satellite Vehicle." The Air Force

continued the study as , an interesting area of research but, for a number of years

the project was either quiescent or without substantial support.

The door to Air Force exploration of this whole new frontier of technology

was opened wider by General H. H. Arnold who was among the first to clearly see

the need for an Army Air Force long range research and development plemiTg

program. General Arnold was the first to propose a way to finance the program,

and the Douglas Aircraft Company, Santa Monica, California, gave a home tdlthe

operation during its early years. Finally, in 1948, with financial support from

the Ford Foundation, The RAND (for research and development) Corporation was
.1.

formed as an independent nonprofit research organizad on.

The Douglas Aircraft Company, inc.-, had published a series of Project

RAND reports on 1 February 1947, and on 1 March 1954, the RAND Corporation,

after studying the project for several years released a report under the nickname "Feed Back." On 14 September 1954, fthe s Air Research and Development Commend (established in January 1950) issued Project Development Directive No. 1115,

Which directed that Wright Air Development Center (WADC), Daytco l Ohio, assume

primary responsibility for development of an advanced reconnaissance system.

The project received the unclassified title of an "Advanced Reconnaissance

System" (ARS) on 8 January 1954 and, as well, the name of Project 14K-2226

which was designated Weapon System No. lITL as set forth in Air Research and.

Development Command (ARDC) System Requirement (SR) No. 5, 29 November 1954.

SR No. 5 also directed ARDC Centers support iniuntry in the conduct of System

design studies on the ARS.

In the meantime, ARDC established Western Development Division

at Los Angeles, California, effective 1 July 1954, with Brigadier General

Bernard A. Schriever, in command. The Air Force had assigned to ARDC the Atlas

.

iv
(WS 107A) development and test / which in turn ARDC assigned to the Western

Development Division. Before June 1952, a requirement had been established

for the concurrent availability of a reconnaissance system to satisfy pre-strike,

strike and post-strike intelligence needs for the Atlas program."

Three contractors, selected by higher headquarters on basis of their • .

' technical competence and other factors which would tend to . qualify them for

follow-on procurement, submitted 117L . proposals and in JUne 1955 were awarded

contracts to. conduct design studies and submit technical reports and a

•

aystem development . plan. The three contractors were:

Glen L. Martin Company - Contract AF 33(616)-3106

LoCkheed Aircraft Corporation, MSD - Contraft Al? 33(616)-3105

Radio Corporation of America - Contract AF 33(616)-3104

A fourth contractor selected . Bell Telephone Labs, declined . a contract..

On 16 March 1955 the Department of the Air Force issued General

Operating Requirement fora Strategic Reconnaissance Satellite Weapon

System. Based on the new requirement, ABDO reissued System Requirement

No. 5 on 17 .October 1955, in-Which the seven ARDC Centers were directed

to participate in preparation of a system development plan with WDD as the

responsible agent for preparation of the plan by 1 April 1956/

V
WDD established an office of _Assistant for Weapon gystem UTL on

6 February 1956 with Colonel Otto J. Glasser as Acting Assistant and Navy

Commander Robert C. Truax as the Acting Deputy Assistant. On 5 March 1956

WDD issued Special Qrder..No. 6 appointing a joint ARDOWDD/WADC/Air Materiel

Command Contractor Evaluation Board to review, before 20 March 1956, the

various design studies and proposals relating to research and development

of WS 117L.

Air Force headquarters Approved WS 117L development plan, submitted on

2 April 1956, and. advised ARDC to announce selection of the contractor but

to withhold contractual action for system development until Fiscal Year 1957

funding questions had been resolved.

WDD notified the winner and losing contractors on 25 May 1956, and on

12 June issued. e. Contract Change Notice (CCN), financed with:43220 245Of Project

.1115 . .ftnds to extend Lockheed Aircraft Corportion's (the winning contractor)

contract to 1 Octdber. The Air Force awarded a WS 117L letter contract,

AP 04(647)-95 to Lockheed on 29 October 1956.

vi
The serious intent of the Department of Defense and the Air Force

to advance the ARS concept to a developed system was also reflected in

the action of the Secretary of Defense Scientific Advisory Committee on

BallistiC Missiles. In its fourth meeting, 16-18 July 1956, at WDD, the

committee recommended approval of the WS 1171, program. The approval did

not include the system's booster because its development would interfere,

at that point in time, with the ICBM development program.

As the satellite surveillance concept gained support Air Force head-

.

quarters issued documentary directives defining program objectives and

asaignivig .responaibillties. On 3 August; 1956 Air Force headquarters issued

•

•

Development Directive No. 85 for a Weapon System 1171, Advanced Reconnaissance

System possessing those qualities defined in General Operational Requirement

(GOB) No. 80 (SA-2c), 16 March 1955. In addition, the directive assigned

a 1A priority to the program. On 17 August 1956, ARDC issued Systems

Development Directive, assigning primary responsibility for implementation

and execution of the 1171. Development Plan to WDD with the seven ABDC Centers

responsible for technical and/or test support.

•

•
Despite approvals and a lA priority rating ) lack of adequate funding

remained a problem. Even after Russia orbited its Sputnik on 4 October 1957,

and program acceleration had been directed) the program was constantly beset

by shortages of fands.

(C,/ap-3) The Secretary of Defense established the Advanced Research

Projects Agency (ARPA) within his department on 7 February 1958. Effective

19 May 1958) the Secretary of Defense transferred responsibility for WS

117L to ARPA, after which ARPA changed the name of the program from WS 11TL

. •

to "Sentry" and.specified•that "neither the name or . thsproject is to

•

receive any publicity without clearance through ARPA." ARPA issued..

Order No..9-58 on 30 June 1958, assuming responsibility for the Advanced

Reconnaissance System, The fUnd situation did not improve) and the Air

Force did not regain responsibility for the program until 1959, more than

one year after ARPA redefined .

. the program into

three different projects: (1) Discoverer-Thor) (2) MIDAS and (3) SAMOS.

CONFIDENTIAL

viii
(C/Gp-3) The original W8 11/L satellite vehicle system included the

following subsystems:

*1.rehi-ae--

Propulsion

Auxiliary Power

Guidance and Control

.E. Visual Reconnaissance

Electronic Reconnaissance

Infrared Reconnaissance

Ground-Space'Communications (Described in Design Study-as

• Subsystem H, Vehicle Electronics and Subsystem Jo Vehicle

Intercept and Control Ground Station)

Data Processing

3. Geophysical Environment Data

K. Personnel Operations

Subsystem L, Biomedical Recatery Capsule, was added

•

for the early

Discoverer launches.

The upper st,age or. orbital vehicle stage of the system, composed

of Subsystems Al B, C, D, and H, .and the Thor booster (modified to function

as the first . stage thrust device for the upper stage), was designated

as a program to use a large satellite vehicle capable of carrying diverse

payloads in either satellite or space probe operations.

The Agena propulsion unit was derived from an engine develoied to

power a pod attaChment originall y conceived as an addition to the Air

Force B-58 Hustler bomber. 'The Air Force dropped the powered pod attachment

•

idea and design and fabrication of the engine, designated XLR-81, covered
by subcontraCt, AF 3.3(038)-21250, between Convair and Bell Aircraft Corporation, was partially terminated in 1957. It was found that most of the term-

.ination inventory that had become surplus to the needs of the government, we::

useable under the MB 117L contract. Consequently the Air Force turned its'

XLR-81 engine inventory over to Lockheed. Aircraft Corporation as Government

Furnidhed Property under terms amendment No. 6 to Letter Contract AP 04(6h7)•::

The Agena acquired its name in June 1959 when ARPA announced that name

designations such as Discoverer Vehicle or Bell Bustler forthe upper stage

or oAital vehicle designed. around the XLR-81 engine were inappropriate.

Therefore ". . . the Lockheed developed orbital stages built around the Bell

em3ine will be designated AGM, repeat, AGM. Agena comprises the basic

•

vehicle configuration and the Bell engine in its single or dual burn versiow.;.''

At about the same time ARPA requested the Commander, Air Force Ballistic

Missile Division (AMMD)--Western-Development Division had been renamed.

effective 1 May 1951--to modify the Dell Hustler engine as Task No. 3,

ARPA Order No. 17. The task was later deleted from ARPA Order No. 17 and

continued as a separate 'project under ARPA Order Ho. 96, dated '1 July 1959.

e Agena Document No. 5
AFRAID then established a separate satellite directorate to manage the

Agana program.

The Discoverer-Thor Project was the continuation of the accelerated.

and augmented. Bio-Medieel/Thor boosted. portion of the redefined. WS 11Th

Program designed to support manned space exploration that had been approved

early in 1958 after the Sputnik achievement.

•

Three live mice were launched and lost in,a biomedical recoverable

capsule, referred to as a "Life Support System," but a. scheduled. and

•

•

• rescheduled. launch of a primate was, abandoned inasmuch as the finally,

. .

Man,InimSpace program bad been transferred to the civilian, egeney, National

Astronautics and ivace Administration (NASA) that bad been established on

10 October 1958. Any remaining bioaatronautical aspects of the program

were eventually transferred to the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program that

was canceled on 10 'Tune 1969.

AR.PA issued. Order No. 48-59 on 16 December 1958 the .directed

that "The study, development, and launch operations associated. with the

Thor program, heretofore included. in AR A Order No. 9-58 for the Sentry

Program" be continued as an independent project identified as the unclassified.

Discoverer-Thor Project.

Xi
After 78 launches including the bianedical launches Under Secretary.

of the Mx Farce directed the Discoverer program (by that time identified

as Program 162, in accordance with Special Security Pro.cedures for Military

Space Programs and Projects) be terminated. effectiie 30 April 1964.

.rmnft.In i ng resources were transferred either to Space Systems Division AMMO)

had become SSD on 1 April 1961) or Secretary of the Air Force Special

Projects organization.

Program 162 was the second, of the threb programs that were trensferred.

IC/Gp.;•.3) SAWS, ccowosed of'thc Agents SUbsyntona-13, r and.

and an Atlas booster 'was the first of two of the redefined projects to be

transferred. frau Mx Force Ballistic Missile ;ABDO) management. The original

WS 117L after being renamed Sentry, later became SAMOS (Satellite and

Missile Observation System). ARPA retained. responsibility for SAMOS and provided

its direction by amendments to ARPA Order No. 9-58 until the Secretary of Defense

transferred the SAMOS development Program to the Secretary of the Mx Force on

17 November 1959. ARPA released responsibility by Amendment 16 to the Order.

•
Before there had been one SAMOS launch, Secretary of the Air Force

Dudley C. Sharp established the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems

in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Effective the same date,

Secretary Sharp designated Brigadier General Robert E. Greer, Assistant

Chief for Guided Missiles, Director of the SAMOS Project, with additional

duty as Vice Commander for Satellite Systems, Air Force Ballistic Missile •

•

Division, ARDC, with duty station at 2400 East El Segundo Boulevard,

El Segundo, California, the préSent.location of Space and Missiles Systems

Organization, and the present designation fbr the organization that was once

. _

•

Western Development Division, AMC. •

The security policy on release of public information pertaining to

SAMOS became very strict. However the the first three SAMOS launches

were unclassified launches, and for that reason (even though. SAMOS.

acquired a program number though not generally known) all SAMOS launches

haVe been shown without the program number.

• ..• ...•

•

(C/Gp -3) The third of the three programs was MIDAS (Missile Defense

Alarm System). On 5 November 1958, AREA issued, ARPA Prier No. 38-59 which

Separated the Infrared Reconnaissance (Subsystem G) from the basic WS 117L.

L.
(C/Gp-3) In accordance with Special Security Procedures for Military

Space Programs and Projects, MIDAS became Program 461. In addition to the

twelve Atlas boosted flights, there were piggy-back experiments carried on

Discoverer flights.

TWo other programs evolved under Space Systems Division management.

One was Snap Shot, as Energy Commission Program, the aftermath

of Nuclear. Auxiliary Power considered in 1956 for Project 1115. One Snap

•

Shot payload was launched on an Agena-boosted by an Atlas on 3 April 1965.

•

The other, a joint ARC/DOD effort, the Vela Rotel Program managed under

Provision of ARRA Order No. 102-60 and amendments, was designed to develop

satellites to detect atmospheric nuclear events. Six spacecrafts, were launched

two at a time aboard Atlas/Agena vehicles.

On 18 October 1967, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force) Research

and Development, directed all Agena activities at Space and Missiles

Systems Organization (SSD became SAMSO effective 1 July 1967) be transferred from SAMS0 to Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects Office.

Except for the programs noted above all other Agena laundOes were either

NASA or Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects Office flights.

xiv
Pert Iiwith the exception of minor Changes was prepared. by combining

Lockheed Missile and Space Company Flight Summary Reports LMSC-B001085-9„

15 September 1967, and. LMSC-B001085-10 15 March 1958.

Part II, with the exception of minor changes was prepared. by combining

and rearranging pages from Lockheed Missile and Space Company Agana. Flight

•

Summary Reports, MSC-8111995-1, 15 December 1956, LMSC-B001085-8, .

15 March 1967, and LMSC-B001085-10, 15 March 1968.

The appendices, with the exception of. Cip, and F, which are much the

same as three tables contained in Lockheed Missile and Space Company Agena

Flight Stnnmary Report: II4SC-B001085-10, were accomplished by Mrs. Sarah A.

Grassly.

SAG

June 1969

XV
PAM I

=ZIA FLIT PERFORMANCE

FLIGHT RESULTS, SUBSYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT FAILURES

Part i. lists Agana flight performance for all launching through 31 December 1967.

The five subsystems have been used for summarizing catastrophic and minor failures

and for describing the equipment malfunctions. These subsystems consist of the

following major elements:

a. Subsystem A: Spaceframe 

Main body

Booster adapter

Destruct

Pyrotechnics

b . Subsystem B: Propulsion

Propellant feed and load

Propellant pressurization equipment

Main rocket engine

tillage rockets

Retarding rockets

Secondary propulsion system

Subsystem C: Electrical Power

Power components

Primary power equipment

Electrical distribution

Solar power equipment

d. Subsystem D: Guidance and Control 

Flight control electronics

Hydraulic equipment

Pneumatic attitude control equipment

Inertial reference package

Horizon sensor

1
Velocity meter

Primary J-box

Secondary J-box

e . Subsystem C and C: Communications and Control

Tracking and command control

Special telemetry

Status telemetry

Data links

Antennas and RF equipment

Formerly Sybsystem H)

The subsystem associated in part i with each ascent or orbit failure is either the

one which was responsible for, or the one which was most affected by,the catastrophic

failure. This ,Platalso indicates the Agena subsystems affected by degradation failures. Catastrophic failures have been defined as events which result in either ascentphase or orbit-phase failure (indicated by an. "F" in Fart I): Degradation failures

are events which do not prevent a successful ascent-phase or orbit-phase operation.

The shorter terms "Electrical" (for Electrical Power), "Guidance" (for Guidance and

Control), and "Communications', (for Communications and Control) have been used in

Part I.

2
AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT 21. No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

Subsystem

Remarks

Subsystems:

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

1 2-28-59 1022 A SLV-2 S (*) Orbit life wasveryshort

due to low injection

Guidance;

Communi-

, angle. No radar or

telemetry signals

were received.

cations

4-13-59 1018 A ELV-2 S S Success because major

objectives were met.

Performance degradation due to engine cutoff prior to integrator

command.

Propulsion;

Communications

3 6-3-59 1020 A SLV-2 F NT Propulsion Ascent failure—engine

performance deficient.

4 6-25-59 1023 A SLV-2 F NT Propulsion Ascent failure—engine

performance deficient.

5 8-13-59 1029 A SLV-2 S S Success because major

objectives were met.

Propulsion;

Guidance

. Improper satellite

attitude. Low engine

impulse.

6 8-19-59 1028 •SLV-2 S F Guidance Orbit failure--horizon

scanner malfunction.

7 11-7-59 1051 A SLV-2 S F Electrical Orbit failure-400-cps

3-phase inverter

failed,

(*) Considered a "no try" because mission objective did not include orbital functions or recovery. Data indicate

orbit attained.
ACENA FLIGTEU Prffil'OPIONCE.(Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

8 11-20-59 1050 A t SLV-2 S F Guidance Orbit failure--control

gas exhaustion and

integratoraccelerometer

malfunction.

9 2-4-60 1052 A SLV-2 NT NT SLV-2 booster failed;

Agena had no opportunity to operate.

10 2-19-60 1054 A SLV-2 NT NT SLV-2 destructed by

Range Safety

11 2-26-60 1008 A LV-3A F NT Electrical Ascent failure--

destruct electrical

system malfunction.

12 4-15-60 1055 A SLV-2 S S

13 5-24-60 1007 A .LV-3A S S Success because major

objectives were met. Satellite unstable in orbit;

lost communications.

Guidance;

Communications

14 6-29-60 /053 A SLV-2 F NT Guidance Ascent failure--horizon

scanner put satellite at

incorrect flight path for

injection.

15 8-10-60 1057 A SLV-2 S S

16 8-18-60 1056 A SLV-2 S S Unstable attitude. Guidance

17 9-13-60 1058 A SLV-2 S F Guidance Orbit failure--control

gas depletion.
AGENA.FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

18 10-11-60 2101 A LV-3A F

•

NT Guidance Ascent fallure--control

gas loss at launch.

19 10-26-60 1061 S-01 SLV-2 F NT Guidance 28 VDC transient caused

D-timer switch-off.

20 11-12-60 1062. 8-01 SLV-2 S S

21 12-7-60 1103 .. 8-01 SLV-2 S S

22 12-20-60 1101 8-01 SLV-2 S F Guidance Orbit failure--loss of

control gas on first

orbit.

23 1-31-61 2102 A - LV-3A S S Success because major Electrical;

•

.

objectives were met.

Inverters and wideband data link

malfunctions.

Communications

24 2-17-61 1104 S-01 SLV-2 S F Communications

Orbit failure--H-timer

malfunction.

25 2-18-61 1102 8-01 SLV-2 S** S

26 3-30-61 1105 8-01 SLV-2 F NT Guidance Ascent failure—

hydraulic system

failure.

27 4-8-61 1106 5-01 SLV-2 S F Guidance Orbit failure--control

gas loss.- .

28 6-8-61 1108 S-01 SLV-2 F NT Propulsion Ascent failure--fuel

line leak.

29 . 6-16-61 11.07 8-01 SLV-2 S S

** Dial Burn
AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

30 7-7-61 1109 3-01 SLV-2 S S

31 7-12-61 1201 S-01 LV-3A s** F Electrical Orbit failure--solar

array malfunction.

32 7-21-61 1110 S-01 SLV-2 NT NT Severe booster oscillations, resulting in

automatic destruct of

the S-01.

33 8-3-61 1111 8-01 SLV-2 F NT guidance Ascent failure--

hydraulic system

failure.

34 8-23-61 6001 3-01 IN-3A F** NTt Propulsion Ascent failure--

pressure switch

malfunction.

35 8-30-61 1112 3-01 SLV-2 S S

36 9-9-61 2120 S-01 LV-3A NT NT Booster engine failure

at liftoff.

:37 9-12-61 1113 8-01 SLV-2 S

38 9-17-61 1114 S-01 SLV-2 S F Electrical Orbit failure--electric

power malfunction.

39 10-13-61 1115 3-01 SLV-2 S S

40 10-21-61 1202 S-01 LV-3A s** F Guidance Orbit failure--control

gas exhaustion.

-41 10-23-61 1116 3-01 SLV-2

-

F NT Guidance Ascent failure--

hydraulic system

failure.

** Dual Burn

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)
Guidance

Orbit failure--command

prograramer went to

recovery mode on 6th

orbit.

Ascent failure--electrical transient at

separation.

Personnel .error in calculations resulting in

velocity meter incorrect

calibration.

0

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First-

• Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

42 11-5-61 1117 8-01 SLV-2 S F Guidance

43 11-15-61 1118 8-01 SLV-2 S S

44 11-18-61 6002 6-01 LV-3A re* NTt Guidance

45 11-22-61 2202 6-01 Lv-SA NT NT

46 12-12-61 1119 8-01 SLV-2

47 12-22-61 2203 S-01 LV-3A Communications

48 1-13-62 1120 6-01 SLY-2 NT Electrical

49 1-26-62 6003 8-01 LV-3A NT NTt

Remarks

Orbit failure--loss of

control gas by 8th orbit.

Ascent failure--rolling

vehicle at separation.

Booster guidance failure caused attitude

deviation exceeding 5-01

recovery capability.

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

A(ENA FLIGHT -PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)
Agena

Flight

No.

Agena

Date of Serial

Launch No.

Agena

Vehicle

TYPe

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

51 2-27-62 1123 8-01 - SLV-2 S S

52 3-7-62 2204 8-01 .LV-3A S F Guidance

53 4-9-62 1203 8-01 LV-3A F Electrical

54 4-17-62 1124 8-01 SLV-2 S S

55 4-23-62 6004 8-01 LV-3A S** St

56 4-26-62 2401 8-01 LVp3A S S

57 4-28-62 1125 8-01 SLV-2 S S

58 5-15-62 1126 8-01 SLV-2 S S

59 5-29-62 1128 S-01 SLV-2 S S

60 6-1-62 1127 8-01 SLV-2 S S

61 6-17-62 2402 8-01 LV-3A S F Guidance

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

Propulsion;

Guidance

\\\.‘ \\\

Remarks

Orbit failure--control

gas exhaustion on

22nd orbit.

Orbit failure--loss of

stability on 7th orbit.

Success because major

objectives were met.

Retro-rocket engine

thrust misalignment.

Excessive control gas

usage.

Orbit failure--control

gas regulator did not

o ate roe ;-r1 .

AM ENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)
AGENA FLIGHT PERFopwag. (continued)

(S = Success; F = Failitre; NT = No Try).

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No. *

(AD No.)

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

63 6-22-62 1129 S-01 SLV-2 S S

64 6-27-62 1151(1) SS-01A SLV-2 S . S Velocity meter error. Guidance

65 7-i8=62 2403 • S-01 LV-3A S F Propulsion Orbit failure--electrical short in secondary

propulsion system.

66 7-20-62 1130 S-01 SLV-2 S S

67 7-22-62 6901 S-01 LV-3A NT NTt Booster destroyed because of excessive

. deviation from programmed trajectory.

68 7-27-62 1131 5-01 SLV-2 S S

69 8-1-62 1152(2) SS-01A SLV-2 S S

70 8-5-62 2404 13-01 .LV.3A- S S

71 8-27-62 6902 8-01 LV-3A S** St

72 8-28-6Z 1153(3) SS-01A SLV-2 S S Horizon sensor failure

after orbit 45.

Guidance

73 9-1-62 1.132 3-01 SLV-2 S S

74 9-17-6Z 1133 8-01 SLV-2 S S

75 9-28-62 6101 S-01 SLV-2 S** S t

76 9-29-62 1154(4) SS-01A SLV-2 S S Temporary dropout of

de power supply;

horizon sensor failure

between orbits 18 and 19.

Electrical;

Guidance

* Standard Agena vehicle number

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)

** Dual Burn
AC NA FLIM PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S= Success; F = Failure; NT = No T

Agana

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No.)*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

77 10-9-62 1134 5-01 SLV-2 S

78 10-18-62 6005 5-01 LV-3A. a** St

79 10-26-62 1401(8) SS-01A SLV-2 S St

80 11-5-62 1136 S-01 SLV-2

81 11-11-62 2405 S-01 LV-3A S S

82 11-24-62 1135 S-01 SLV-2 S S

83 12-4-62 1155(5) SS-01A SLV-2 S S

84 12-12-62 2351(10) SS-01A SLV-2 S** it

12-14-62 1156(6) . SS-01A SLV-2 S

86 12-17-62 1205 8-01 LV-3A. NT NT

87 1-7-63 1157(7) SS-01A SLV-2 S S

89 2-2 (9) SS-01 A LV-2A. NT NT

* Standard Agena vehicle number

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)

** Dual Burn

it Long mission flight

17)

Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

Velocity meter failure Guidance

and sequence timer

programming error.

Telemetry performance Communidegradations. cations

Capsule recovered Guidance

866 nm from programmed point of

impact because of

horizon sensor

malfunction.

ter des royec(

because one of auxiliary rockets failed.
AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No. )*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

90 3-18-63 1164(20) SS-01A LV-2A F NT Electrical Random foreign material

presumed to have caused

short in aft safe/arm

J-box under zero-g conditions; this triggered

second short which shut

down engine prematurely, thereby causing

failure to achieve orbit.

91 4-1-63 1160(12) SS-01A SLV-2 S S Zener diode failure in

single-phase power

amplifier led to decision

to recover on the third

day.

Electrical

92 4-26-63 1411(17) SS-01A SLV-2 F NT Guidance Wrong.setting of horizon

sensor torque bar resuited in failure to

achieve orbit.

93 5-9-63 1206 8-01 LV-3A s** S It Link 1 inoperative. Communications

* Standard Agena vehicle number

** Dual Burn

It Long mission flight
AGSM FLIT -PEREOIIMAXI (Continued)

(S = Success; F Failure; NT = No T

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No. '

(AD No. )*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

94 5-18-63 .1165(18) SS-01A LV-2A S S

.

•

Electrical system matfunction resulted in

continued BTL operation

and insufficient electrical power to primary

payload. Agena operation assessed as success

because primary flight

objectives were met.

Electrical

95 6-12-63 1204 S-01 LV-3A NT NT Due to booster guidance

malfunction, SLV-3/01

combination was

destroyed.

96 6-12-63 1161(21) SS-01A LV-2A S S

97 6-15-63 2353(11) SS-01A SLV-2 F** NT -Propulsion Ullage rocket ignition

was not achieved preventing attainment of

second burn.

98 6-26-63 1166(19) SS-01A LV-2A S S Horizon sensor had

slow response, probably

due to a motor malfunction which occurred

on pass 16.

Guidance

99 6-29-63 2314 S-01 LV-2A S** ... S

•

* Standard Agena vehicle number

** Dual Burn
= Success;

Agana

Flight

No.

Ascent

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Faihire

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Remarks Failures

A(NA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

7-18-63

7-18-63

7-30-63

8-24-63

8-29-63

9-23-63

10-16-63

10-29-63

Loss of Link II.

Solar array I did not

extend. Link II failed.

Intermittent operation

of Link I. Single-phase

inverter failure.

Electrical power overload during separation.

S-Band beacon and

Link I defective

operation.

1167(22)

1162(23)

LV-2A

LV-2A

1169(27)

LV-2A

SS-01A LV-2A

C ommunications

Electrical;

Communications

COMMW11-

oations;

Electrical

Electrical

Communications

*Standard Agena vehicle number

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)

**Dual Burn
Agena Subsystem

Agena Serial Agena First- Ascent Orbit Affected by

Flight Date of No. Vehicle Stage Phase Phase Catastrophic

No. Launch (AD No.)* Type Booster, Result Result Failure

111 11-9-63 1171(30) 88-01A SLV-2 NT NT

112 11-27-63 1172(32) SS-01A SLV-2 S

114 12-21-63 1168(25) SS-01A LV-2A S

115 1-11-64 2354(31) SS-01A LV-2A S** Sit

116 1-19-64 2303(36) SS-01A • SLV-2 S** st

A booster malfunction at liftoff prevented completion of

boost phase.

A payload separation

malfunction, which

probably was not due

to Agena equipment

operation, prevented

capsule recove

Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

Solar Array drive

motors failed after

primary mission

accomplishment.

Electrical

AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

*Standard Agena vehicle number

**Dual burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)

ItLong mission flight
MENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agana

Serial

No.

(AD No. )*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

FirstStage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

117 1-25-64 6301 8-01 SLV-2 S** • St

•

Part of nose shroud

failed to separate

when programmed.

Shroud

Resulting orbit was

out of tolerance.

118 1-30-64 6008 8-01 LV-3A S** St

119 2-15-64 1174(35) SS-01A LV-2A S S Defective fuel valve

operation during

ascent.

Propulsion

.-

Excessive control

gas expenditure duri . I • • _

Guidance

I

/

•

/

, o

a

:7

/ 4, //7 I n7/ .///./zwz,zeze,z/v/zwz, ./,'/Z/7/ trf

/

*Standard Agena vehicle number

**Dual burn

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)
1

S

st

A( NA man PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena - Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No.)*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

123 3-24-64 1175(43) SS-01A LV-2A

LV-2A

Electrical

125 4-27-64 1604(46) SS-01A Electrical Electrical overload

at Agena-booster

separation and consequent partial loss

of pyro bus power.

Electrical short in

the Type IX DC/DC

converter.

Marks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

r Pz

127 6-4-64 1176(49) SS-01A L -2A

128 6-13-64 1606(51) SS-01A LV-2A

129 6-17-64 2304(40) SS-01.A SLV-2

130 6-19-64 1609(62) S-01B I LV-P.A.

*Standard Agena vehicle number

**Dual burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)
AGM maw PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Agena

Serial Agena

Date of No. Vehicle

Launch (AD No. ) Type 

.

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result 

Orbit

Phase

Result 

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic.

Failure Remarks

. /:-..m.,.......,..-

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

/ ./. e A V.

/Z., Z ' . X f 4

,

, v

. , v

.IV/ ,

v.

„ ,

A

133 7-10-64 1177(50) • Horizon sensor

malfunction.

Guidance

Commutator

malfunction.

Communication

134 7-17-64 1802(42) •

135 7-28-64 6009 •

136 8-5-64 1605(46) • S-band beacon

transmitter

failed after

pass 53.

Communication

138 8-21-64 1603(38) SS-01A LV-2A S S

139 8-28-64 6201 S-01 SLV-2 St Premature termi- Propulsion

nation of second

burn.

*Standard Agena vehicle number

**Dual burn

$Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)

tr Long mission flight
AMA ma= PERFORMANCE (Continued)

= Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

AD No.)

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

140 9-4-64 6501 S-01 LV-3A S** St

141 9-14-64 1178(54) SS-01A LV-2A S S

.

/ " • r / 0- ;0" A

143 10-5-64 1170(28)

,

rim

,Pyro battery short

prevented second

recovery.

Electrical

,

7 .

145 10-17-6 1179(56) S-band beacon

malfunction.

Communications

/1117

Type IX DC/DC

converter •

malfunction.

Electrical

7 V V / /

,

n,7,

% 4

.

147 11-2-64 1173(34) SS-01A LV-2A S S Multicoupler

malfunction.

Communication

*Standard Agena vehicle number

**Dual burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)
AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

= Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

v,

Agena

Serial

No.

AD No. 

r

Agena

Vehicle

Type

fe .

First

Stage

Booster

rz,./...

Subsystem

Ascent• Orbit Affected by

Phase Phase Catastrophic

Result Result Failure

, r

Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

,,, 4

149 11-5-64 6931(68) SS-01B LV-3A ' Possible shroud

honeycomb structure failure.

Shroud

150 11-18-6 1180(60) SS-01A LV-2A Commutator

malfunction.

Communication

151 11-28-6 6932 (69) SS-01B LV-3A .

:

153 12-19-6. 1607(59) SS-01A

.11

Pyro

malfunction

ion caused

by electrolyte

leakage.

Electrical 

Commutator Communication

• malfunction.

r

, 7r / r

1

r r 

*Standard Agena vehicle number

**Dual burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)
Agena

Serial Agena First Ascent Orbit

Date of No. Vehicle Stage Phase Phase

Launch (AD No.) Type Booster Result Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

Agena

Flight

No. . Remarks

155 1-15-65 1608 SS-01A LV-2A

(61-2)

157 2-17-65

158 2-25-65

159 3- 9-65

161 3-21-65

162 3-25-65

163 4- 3-65

165 4-29-65 1614 SS-01B LV-2A , S

(72)

System incompati Guidance

bility - between

orbital programmer and SS-01B

vehicle

t

t

S

St

S

S

ANA FLICEff PEBFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

*Standard Agena vehicle number

**Dual Burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)
(61-6)

AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(3 = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Agana Serial Agena

Flight Date of No. Vehicle

No. Launch (AD No.)* Type

166 5-18-65 1615(73) SS-01B

Subsystem Subsystems

First Ascent Orbit Affected by Affected by

Stage Phase Phase Catastrophic Degradation

Booster Result Result Failure Remarks Failures

LV-2A

- 9-65 161 (70) SS-04 LV-2A Type IX DC-DC Electrical

converter failed

N •

171 7-16-65 2702(86) SS-01B LV-2A

SS-01B LV-2A S S

SS-01A LV-3A S St

Booster malfunction prevented

placing the SS-01B

on the proper

orbit.

Wing No. 3 control Electrical

box failure resulted in array power

reckwed output,.

172 7-19-65 1617(77)

173 7-20-65 1803

175 8-17-65 1618(80) SS-01B LV-2A

* Standard Agena Vehicle number

** Dual Burn

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)

It Long mission flight .
Agena Subsystem

Agena Serial Agena First Ascent Orbit Affected by

Flight Date of No. Vehicle Stage Phase Phase Catastrophic

No. Launch (AD No. )* Type Booster Result Result Failure

176 9- 2-65 1602(41) SS-01A SLV-2 NT

177 9-22-65 1619(81) SS-01B LV-2A S

179 10- 5-65 1616(75) SS-01B LV-2A S

180 10-14-65 6801(74) SS-01B LV-2A St

181 10-25-65 5002(82) S-01C SLV-3 F NT Propulsion

182 10-28-65 1620(90) SS-01B LV-2A S S

184 11-28-65 6102 5-01 SLV -2 5** St

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Remarks Failures

Drift caused by high

winds resulted in command destruct during

boost phase.

Premature engine shutdown resulted in overpressurization and

rupture of main propel

lant tanks.

ANA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE- (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)
Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No.)*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

185 12- 9-65 1621(94) SS-01B LV-2A S F Guidance

186 12-24-65 1610(63) S-01B

knN

LV-2A S S

188 2- 2-66 1623(101) SS-01B LV-2A S

189 9-66 2703(88) SS-01B LV-2A S** Sit

191. 9-66 1622(97) SS-01B LV-2A S

192 3-16-66 5003(108) S-01C SLV-3 S

194 4- 7-66 1627(111) SS-01B LV-2A S

195 4- 8-66 6703(99) SS-01B SLV-3 S** St

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Remarks Failures

Flight control pneumatics did not switch from

high to low pressure,

resulting in control gas

depletion.

ANA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)

it Long mission flight
Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

First

Stage

Booster Remarks

5-15-66

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No.)*

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

Agena.

Vehicle

Type

Primacord failed to

ignite preventing

booster-Agena

separation.

3-66 1625(106) SS-01B LV-2A Propulsion

Atlas Engine No. 2

went bard over at

120.68 seconds after

liftoff, causing the

Atlas/GATV to pitchtumble severely.

Eventually the Atlas/

Agena combination

re-entered the

atmosphere

5004(109)

3-01

S-01C

201 5-23-66 1630(116) SS-01B LV-2A S S

203 6-66 6502 8-01 SLV-3 S** St

5-17-66

Agena

Flight Date of

No. Launch

AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (continued)

= Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)
AGM FLIGHT PBEFORHARIE (Cantinued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No.)*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by. Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

•

204 6- 9-66 1351(91) SS-01B SLV-3i F** NT Propulsion The rocket engine

propellant isolation

valves remained

partially open after

first burn, thus

preventing the

initiation of second

burn.

•

205 6-21-66 1626(107) SS-01B LV-2A S S

206 6-23-66 6311(123) SS-01B LV-2A S** St

208 7-18-66 5005(129) S-01C SLV-3 S S

N

210 8-9-66 1631(117) SS-01B SLV-2G S S Horizon sensor control

output showed anomalous variations

Guidance

S-band beacon showed

signal strength up to

Communications

30 db below nominal.

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

t Short mission flight (includes NASA probes)
Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No. )*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

211 8-10-66 6630(121) SS-01B SLV-3 S** St

213 8-19-66 1352(103) SS-01B SLV-3 S** Stt Increasing disturbance

torque occurred

Guidance

214 9-12-66 5006(130) S-01C SLV-3 S S Horizon sensor

anomaly was observed

Guidance

216 9-20-66 1628(114) SS-01B LV-2A S

A short circuit from Electrical

•

...^^ the bridge wire of a

helium-pressurevalve-OPEN squib to

structure occurred.

Horizon sensor anomalias occurred.

Guidance

218 10-5-66 1353(112) SS-01B SLV-3 r S** Stt Intermittent anomalies

on Link 2 were

observed.

Coinmunications

AMA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)

t t Long mission flight
Agena Subsystem Subsystems

Agena Serial Agena First Ascent Orbit Affected by Affected by

Flight Date of No. Vehicle Stage Phase Phase Catastrophic Degradation

No. Launch (AD No. )* Type Booster Result Result Failure Remarks Failures

6631(122)

1632(118)

5001(71)

SLV-3

SLV-2

SLV-3

SS-01B

SS-01B

S-01C

11-6-66

11-8-66

11-11-66

230 2- 4-6 •

-•1 : SL+- S** St

225 12-6-66

228 1-14-67

IN

221

222

223

ing in several monitors occurred.

MENA FLIGR2 PERFORMANCE Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

tShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)

ttLong mission flight

•
AGENA FLIGHT PERFORMANCE (Continued)

(S = Success; F = Failure; NT = No Try)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD No. )*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystem

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

231 2-22-67 1635(126) SS-01B LV-2A „‘

233 - 0-67 1636(127) SS-01B LV-2A S S

234 4- 5-67 6152(137) • SS-01B SLV-3 F** NT Propulsion The oxidizer propellant

isolation valve remained

partially open after

first burn, thus preventing second burn.

235 4-26-37 4755(151) OS-01D SLY 5D NT NT A malfunction of-the

Booster Stage II prevented the attainment of

the required velocity at

Booster/SS-01B

separation.

236 5- 4-67 6633(131) SS-01B SLV-3 5** St

237 5- 9-67 1634(120) SS-01B SLV-20 S S Velocity meter failure

resulting in high orbital

period.

Guidance

• 239 5-31-67 2704(89) SS-01B SLV-2 S** St N

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

iShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)

it Long mission flight
AGENA nicer PERFORMANCE (Continued)

Agena

Flight

No.

Date of

Launch

Agena

Serial

No.

(AD.No.)*

Agena

Vehicle

Type

First

Stage

Booster

Ascent

Phase

Result

Orbit

Phase

Result

Subsystems

Affected by

Catastrophic

Failure Remarks

Subsystems

Affected by

Degradation

Failures

241 6-14-67 6933(157) SS-01B SLV-3 S** St

242 6-16-67 1633(119) SS-01B SLV-2G S S

245 7-28-67 6802(133) SS-01B LV-2A S St

246 8-1-67 6634(159) SS-01B SLV-3 S** St

247 8-7-67 1637(134) SS-01B SLV-20 S S

249 9-15-67 1641(152) SS-01B SLV-2G S--- S A malfunction occurred

in the pneumatic portion

of the Lifeboat System.

Guidance

252 11-2-67 1639(142) SS-01B SLV-2G S S

253 11-5-67 6153(140 SS SLV-3 S** St

Gas valve No. 5 malfunction.

Guidance

Internal decoder command failed to execute.

Communications

255 12-9-67 1642(156) SS-01B SLV-20 S S

*Standard Agena Vehicle number

**Dual Burn

TShort mission flight (includes NASA probes)

tt Long mission flight
LMSC-B001085-10

(Information on this page is UNCLASSIFIED)

This page is intentionally left blank

ii!L30

--SECRETLOCKHEED MISSILES .& SPACE COMPANY
Section 4

rESCRIPTION OF AGENA FLIGHTS

Agena flight histories are summarized in this report. Wherever

feasible, special emphasis has been given to the corrective action taken and to the

present status of each failure, discrepancy, or other event that created a reliability

problem.

The flight analyses, presented in vehicle launching sequence, are treated in two parts:

Flight Analysis: This lists all major and minor malfunctions,

discrepancies, and other events, with the related corrective action.

Mission Results: This is a brief summary of the overall mission

results; it is concluded by two assessments:

A flight assessment, based on the achievement of mission

objectives

An assessment of vehicle equipment operations in both •

ascent and orbit
Flight 1, Vehicle 1022 (Agena A) — Program 182 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Because of a probable antenna failure, radar and

telemetering signals were not received by ground

stations.

MISSION RESULTS

When the Agena engine was ignited, pitch gyro reference was shifted, probably due to shock environment.

This produced an orbit-injection angle of -2.35 deg, and resulted in an extremely short orbital life.

This flight is assessed as a vehicle loss after successful ascent because mission objectives

did not include orbital functions.

On the basis of equipment performance, this flight was a ilkilure in ascent and a no try in orbit.
Flight 2, Vehicle 1018 (Agena A) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event . Corrective Action

Engine relay failed, probably as a result of environmental

vibrations.

Incorrect adjustment within the orbital timer on orbit 2 resulted in loss of proper contact with the vehicle.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena A engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. The defective operation of

the engine relay resulted in engine cutoff prior to integrator command. Orbital operation was successful until

the orbital timer failure on orbit 2. The capsule was ejected, impacted near Spitzbergen and was not recovered.

Vehicle lifetime was approximately 13 days.

This flightwas a success in both ascent and orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a failure in both ascent and orbit.
Flight 3, Vehicle 1020 (Agena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Propellant exhaustion occurred before proper injection

velocity was attained.

MISSION RESULTS

Liftoff was normal. First-stage boost phase events and vehicle separation were achieved. However, Agena

engine operation was not sufficient to place the satellite into orbit.

This flight was a failure in ascent and a no try in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a no try in orbit.
Flight 4, Vehicle 1023 (Agena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Propellant exhaustion occurred before proper injection

velocity was attained.

MISSION RESULTS

Subnormal second—stage (Agena) performance, combined with the losses resulting from booster performance

variations, resulted in an injection velocity that was insufficient for the attainment of orbital status.

This flight was a failure in ascent and a no try in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a no try in orbit.
Flight 5, Vehicle 1029 (Agena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

No significant Agena malfunctions occurred during this

flight.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital operation was

satisfactory, but the capsule was not recovered because of improper satellite attitude. This was caused by

(.4 the low-temperature effect on a mercury battery, which in turii resulted in improper functioning of the

capsule electrical system.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success In both ascent and orbit.
Flight 6, Vehicle 1028 (Agena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Horizon scanner failed on orbit 17.

Commands to timer were not received.

MISSION RESULTS

Corrective Action

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital operation was normal

until the horizon scanner failed on orbit 17.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 7, Vehicle 1051 (Agana A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The 400-cps, three-phase inverter failed during orbit 1.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Stabilization and control of

vehicle attitude during orbit were not accomplished because of the inverter failure during orbit 1. Control gas

was depleted by Pass 2. Recovery was impossible because of inability to eject capsule. The vehicle remained

co in orbit 19 days.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 8, Vehicle 1050 (Agena A) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

A failure occurred in the accelerometer-integrator circuit

during ascent. Control-gas exhaustion occurred prior to

orbit 15.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. The accelerometer-integrator

failure during ascent resulted. in Agana engine operation to propellant exhaustion. This produced a high injection

velocity with an eccentric orbit, and 103.7 minute period. The period exceeded the capabilities of the vehicle's

orbital timer.

The eccentric orbit took the satellite beyond the range of the horizon scanner.

Control-gas exhaustion occurred prior to orbit 15.

Capsule re-entry sequence was verified although, due to attitude control gas depletion, the re-entry trajectory

was indeterminate and an accurate impact point could not be determined. Capsule was not recovered.

Vehicle life was estimated to be in excess of 90 days.

• (1) This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

(2) On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a failure in ascent and a success in orbit.
Flight 9, Vehicle 1052 (Agena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The SLV -2 booster failed.

MISSION RESULTS

Because the SLV-2 booster failed, the Agena did not have an opportunity to operate.

This flight is assessed as a no try in both ascent and orbit.

The equipment operation is considered a no try in both ascent and orbit.
Flight 10, Vehicle 1054 lAgena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The SLV-2 booster failed.

MISSION RESULTS

The SLV-2 booster failed and was destroyed by Range Safety. The Agena did not have an opportunity to operate.

This flight is assessed as a no try in both ascent and orbit.

The equipment operation is considered a no try in both ascent and orbit.
Flight 11, Vehicle 1008 (Agena A) — 461 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The destruct electrical system malfunctioned.

MISSION RESULTS

After initiation of the Agena separation sequence an explosion occurred. The failure was believed to have

been in the destruct electrical system.

This flight is assessed as a failure in ascent and a no try in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight is assessed as a failure in ascent and a no try in

orbit.
Flight 12, Vehicle 1055 (Agena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

No significant malfunctions occurred during this flight.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital operation was

satisfactory. Initiation of the recovery sequence was verified; however, the capsule was not recovered.

Failure of the capsule to properly reenter and descent into the recovery area was investigated but no

single specific cause was isolated.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.
Flight 13, Vehicle 1007 (Agana A) --- 461 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

FM/FM telemetry was unusable after orbit 4. The loss

of data was probably caused by a multicoupler failure.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. The satellite was unstable in

orbit as a result of the main Agena engine's propellant-venting torques, which were not properly controlled

by the attitude-damping system.

On the basis of mission results, this flight is assessed as a success in both ascent and orbit

because major objectives were achieved.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success is ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 14, Vehicle 1053 (Agena A) — Program. 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

The horizon scanner's pitch channel failed during ascent.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, and Agena engine operation were achieved. Orbit injection would have been achieved had the

Agena velocity gain been horizontally directed as planned. However, the horizon scanner failure caused a

negative satellite attitude (flight-path angle of approximately -8.3 deg at burnout); and the satellite failed to

achieve orbit.

This flight is assessed as a failure in ascent and a no try in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight is assessed as a failure in ascent and a no try in

orbit.
Flight 15, Vehicle 1057 (Agena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

No significant malfunctions occurred during this flight.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital operation was

satisfactory. The recovery, sequence was initiated on orbit 17, and the capsule was recovered from

the water.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.
Flight 16, Vehicle 1056 Nene A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

IRP amplifier failure prevented proper performance

during the recovery pitch phase.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital operation was

satisfactory. Aerial recovery was accomplished on orbit 17.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 17, Vehicle 1058 yt,gena A) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Failure of valve no. 1 channel prevented the valve from

responding properly to the commands of the pitch and

roll sensors. As a result, greater-than-normal angular

deviations were experienced at Thor/Agena separation

and at engine burnout.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Age= engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital performance was

satisfactory except for an abnormally high consumption of control gas during early passes. This led to gas

exhaustion by orbit 16. Postflight investigation showed that the roll limit cycle was high.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a failure in ascent and a success in orbit.
Flight 18i Vehicle 2161 (Agena A) — SAbiOS

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The nitrogen control-gas fitting (GSE) failed.

MISSION RESULTS

Liftoff and boost occurred normally; however, at liftoff ilailure of the umbilical mast prevented proper

retraction of the satellite umbilicals. The nitrogen control-gas fitting on the Agena broke off and caused

control-gas depletion shortly after launch. Orbit was r.Df achieved.

(1) This flight is assessed as a failure in asce .1 and a no try in orbit.

• (2) On the basis of equipment operation, this f: fight is assessed-as a no try in both ascent and orbit.
J

ED

I

I

Flight 19, Vehicle 1061 (S-01) Program 162.

FLIGHT ANALYSIS •

Event Corrective Action

An inoperative D-timer prevented programming

of Ageni Functions.

!a*

• MISSION RESULTS •

_ :booster vernier and main engines cut off nearly simultaneously.

6 Separation and Agena engine ignition did not occur,

- • - 't , . After booster burnout, the Agena followed a

ballistic trajectory and impacted in the ocean

approximately 650 nautical miles down range. •

‘-n

0

'Chid flight was assessed as a failure in ascent and a no try in orbit.

J

•
• Flight 20, Vehicle 1062 1-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS.

. •

Event Corrective Action 

Commutator no. 3 appeared to stop and start intermittently during certain periods early in the flight.

0

MISSION RESULTS

Liftoff and boost occurred normally. Injection into orbitwas successful. After pass 31 on the second day of

orbital life, the reentry and recovery phases occurred nOrrnally. The capsule was r'covered in the air

approximately 56 rim north and 10 nm west of the predicted impact point.

All objectives were accomplished.

This flight was a success in ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failures occurred during the flight.
Flight 21, Vehicle 1103 (8-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

No significant 8-01 equipment malfunctions occurr

MISSION RESULTS

Liftoff and boost were normal. Ejection, retro-sequence, and parachute deployment occurred as programmed

after pass 48. Air recovery of the capsule was accomplished on the first attempt. All objectives were

achieved.

This flight was a success both in ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.
Flight 23, Vehicle 2102 (Agena A) — SAMOS

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Failures were observed in the following equipment:

400-cps, three-phase inverter; 2000-cps, singlephase inverter; and wideband data link.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, Agena engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbit objectives were

accomplished, even though several major pieces of electrical equipment malfunctioned.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 25, Vehicle 1102 (S-01) Protgam 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The 8-01 oxidizer tank relief valve stuck in the

open portion on two 000843i0,113. Consequently, the

oxidizer tank pressure fell to 20 psig for 20 sec.

Failure of the 400-cps inverter resulted in excessive

control-gas usage and loss of stability after pass 5.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, and injection into orbit, followed by satellite engine restart and burning for 1 sec during first orbit,

occurred as programmed. As a consequence of a 400-cps, single-phase inverter failure, satellite stability was

lost after pass 5; and all control gas was used. However, telemetered satellite and payload data were obtained

until normal depletion of electrical power on pass 54. Except for minor performance degradation, all program

objectives were attained.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 27, Vehicle 1106 (S-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Subsequent to pass 6, anomalies appeared in the

operation of the horizon sensor, resulting in the

loss of All the control gas by pass 10.

During pass 28, the satellite was commanded to

initiate separation of the capsule on pass 32.

(The satellite attitude would have been nearly

correct for recovery during pass 32.) The

command was incorrectly entered in the satellite

decoder, and separation was initiated on pass 31.

The capsule was injected into a new and higher orbit.

An investigation has shown that the VERLORT

antenna scan frequency can mix with the

VERLORT command frequencies and present

unwanted command tones to the beacon command

decoder when the null of the beacon antenna is

pointing at the VERLORT antenna. Modifications

have been made to eliminate this problem.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory.

The capsule was separated from the satellite but, due to attitude and transmission difficulties, it was injected

into a higher orbit.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 29, Vehicle 1107 (S-01) - Program 182 

•

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The orbital programmer slowed down 60 to 70 sec

per orbit following pass 18. The timer reset and

period adjustment functions were utilized to keep

the satellite functions under the control of the

.

t.•

ground stations.

••

-..•

AUSSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit proceeded satisfactorily. Except for the orbital

timer, the 8-01 satellite performed satisfactorily in orbit: until after capsule separation. Sea recovery of the

capsule was satisfactorily accomplished.

(1) This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

(2)* No major equipment failures occurred during this flight.
Flight 30, Vehicle 1109 (S-01) -- Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

An error in calibration or scale factor caused a

constant percentage-of-acceleration error that

resulted in an excessive orbital period.

Measurement A-4 (Y-axis acceleration) output reading

was erroneously high during S-01 burn. This was •

- •

• ''possibly caused by a change in gain of the associated

,

. •

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory.

Iq

Orbital performance was satisfactory. The capsule was ejected on pass 32 and was successfully air recovered.

The flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in both ascent and orbit.
Flight 31, Vehicle 1201 (S-01) — 461 •

• -

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Failure of solar array 2 to fully extend reduced the Solar array latch mechanism was removed, and

availability of electrical power. The failure which hinge modification and rate extension redesign

appeared to be mechanical, could have been caused were accomplished.

by hinge jamming, spring failure, etc. Loss of

400-cps power to the attitude control system

resulted in attitude instability.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 5-01 engine first operation, injection into orbit, engine second operation, and final orbital

injection were satisfactory.

•

Failure of thp solar array to extend fully prevented proper payload operation. Howevor, several programmed '

measurements were successfully accomplished.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

a. •

%..

" •
Flight 32, Vehicle 1110 (S-01) — Program 182

:. FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Severe oscillations in the SLV-2 booster, No LMSC action required.

beginning at 59.2 sec after liftoff, resulted

in disintegration and automatic destruction

of the S-01.

MISSION RESULTS

No objectives were achieved.

This flight is' assessed as no try in both ascent and orbit.

The equipment operation is considered no try in both ascent and orbit.

•

;

n

•
Flight 33, Vehicle 1111 (S-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

Approximately 40 sec before planned S-01 engine

cutoff, a failure occurred in the hydraulic system.

This resulted in shorter engine thrust duration

than predicted and a loss of attitude control.

The pressure transducer has been replaced

by a better, fail-safe equivalent.

A suspect hydraulic line has been redesigned.

(3) The same corrective action outlined for

Vehicle 1105 has been applied.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, and separation were normal, as were 5-01 pitchover and engine ignition. However, due to the

abbreviated thrust duration and the loss. of control, orbit was not achieved.

This flight is assessed as a failure in ascent and a no try in orbit.

The equipment operation is considered a failure in ascent and a no try in orbit.
Flight 35, Vehicle 1112 (8-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

A pitch attitude error of +2.5 deg during 8-01 operation caused

excessive orbital eccentricity. This error was programmed

inadvertently into the combustion sequence.

The fuel tank relief valve stuck partly open after its normal

first relieving function on ascent. The resulting reduction

in helium pressure caused a premature blowdown of fuel

and oxidizer tanks.

Measurement B-101 (fuel level indicator) showed questionable

operation after T+330 sec. Oxidizer level indicators (B-141

through B-144) failed to indicate changes of oxidizer level.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 5-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were successful. The capsule was ejected

on pass 33 and was successfully recovered in the ocean.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failures occurred during this flight.
Flight 37, Vehicle 11131S-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Measurements B-141 through B-144 (digital readout

points for the oxidizer level indicator) failed to show

any changes in oxidizer level during S-01 engine

operation.

MISSION RESULTS .:!

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection • into orbit proceeded normally. Capsule recovery

operations, planned for pass 33, proceeded normally; the capsule was air retrieved successfully.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No significant equipment failures occurred during this flight..

Corrective Action •

The manufacturer of this instrument has

checked the S-01 installation with a simulator

to determine the reason for the malfunction.

A method of checkout had been unavailable.

A •

•
- . A

es •

0..

•

Flight 38, Vehicle 1114 (S-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Ullage rocket 1 monitor (B-108) showed no indication

of firing, although the rocket had fired.

On pass 22, S-01 orbital programmer malfunctioned

and failed to turn on the telemetry and S-band beacon

transmitters as programmed. Thereafter, the

programmer operation was intermittent.

Sometime during pass 32 or 33, both the single-phase

and the three-phase 115-vac, 400-cps inverters failed.

Power to the horizon sensor and gyros was therefore

terminated.

Measurements B-141 through B-144 (oxidizer level

indicators) failed to indicate changes in oxidizer level

during ascent. Measukement B-101 (fuel level

indicator) showed no evidence of operation during

main-stage combustion.

The next six flights were instrumented

to provide extra data concerning this

problem. Checkout procedures for the

inverter circuit were modified.

•
Flight 38, Vehicle 1114 (8-01) — Program 162 (Continued) •

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 2-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory.

Because of the cited malfunctIons, capsule separation did not occur. The capsule and vehicle remained in orbit.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

r `•

•

4. •

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•

•

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. .

ulabulatukaa§:sw,a.uu

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

.:

The horizon scanner stalled between passes 33 and 38,

producing a constant pitch and roll output.

The orbital programmer tape incurred a plus or minus

2 percent error during punching.

MISSION RESULTS

.•

-

:.:Launch, boost, 5-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory.

Recovery, planned for pass 65, was moved up to pass 39 when transients on the telemetry system were

..• interpreted as an indication of imminent power failure. Recovery proceeded normally, and the cap Mile

was successfully retrieved in the air.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

.The equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 40, Vehicle 1202 (8-01) — 461 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

During ascent (at 185 sec), roll control to the SLV-3

A

vernier engines was lost and the vehicle performed 8-1/2

revolutions before S-01 separation. S-01 control gas

required to correct the roll was excessive.

• '

•

During pass 1, periodic sun inhibition of the pitch

horizon sensor caused attitude perturbations, which in

turn caused the pitch gas valves to fire alternately.

Because of nearly complete gas depletion and uneven

pitch gas valve thresholds, one valve ceased firing; this

resulted in a pitch-plane rotation with a period of 92 sec.

MISSION RESULTS

The horizon sensor head was depressed

and the left head deactivated in the

orbital mode.

;

Launch and boost were normal until approximately 185 sec, when the SLV-3 booster lost roll control. The

5-01 guidance operation compensated for the separation attitude error in achieving circular orbit.

Excessive control-gas usage and the solar array malfunction prevented proper payload operation. Some

partial measurements were obtained.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

. :

• I

,.

•

•• 'a, •

-

.00
Flight 41, Vehicle 1116 (S-01) — Program . 162

FLIGHT ANALYSES

Event

A failure in the 8-01 hydraulic system resulted in loss

of S-01 control, tumbling, and consequent premature

S-01 engine cutoff due to interruption of fuel to the

pump.

Corrective Action 

The corrective action indicated for

Vehicle 1105 has been taken.

MISSION RESULTS

• Launch, boost, separation, coast, and S-01 engine ignition were normal

Because of an excessively high flight-path angle and insufficient velocity (caused by premature engine cutoff),

orbit was not achieved.

The flight is assessed as an ascent-phasc failure, and a no try in orbit.

The equipment operation is considered a no try in orbit owing to the ascent failure.

,4

•

4 4a
Flight 42, Vehicle 1117 (S-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

High fuel and oxidizer flow rates caused fuel depletion

and excessive injection velocity. The resulting high

apogee caused the horizon scanner to operate 26 min

outside its design areas; the result was excessive use

of control gas.

Gas valve 2 was operating before gas valve 1;

complete control gas usage resulted by the

eighth orbit.

Orbital programmer punched tape and reset errors

made station-crossing predictions difficult, although

the operation was not compromised.

MISSION RESULTS

• •1.

Corrective Action

Investigation of this malfunction led

to the development of the model K

valve.

Launch and boost were satisfactory. Since reorientation for the capsule retrophase depends upon attitudecontrol capability, which in turn is dependent on control-gas supply, capsule recovery was not attempted.

The flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

The operation of equipment was a failure in both ascent and orbit.

•

•
Flight 43, Vehicle 1118 (S-01) - Program 162 

:MISSION RESULTS

Corrective Action 

A design review of the gas-supply systems

indicated that certain elements of the plumbing and regulator could leak and then reseal

as the pressure decays. To detect this type

of leak during ground tests, the final propulsion system leak check was expanded to

provide a more comprehensive test of. the

high-pressure system.

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Telemetry data from passes 1 through 7 indicated a

high control-gas expenditure and constant gyro offsets.

Subsequent to pass 7, the gas expenditure was

reduced to normal.

. • •

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit proceeded satisfaótorily.

Recovery, originally plalmed for pass 65, was initiated on pass 18 owing to excessive use of control gas. The

capsule was ejected on pass 18, and a successful aerial retrieval was accomplished.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.
Flight 44, Vehicle 6002 (S-01) — Ranger 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Second engine operation was terminated after 1 sec. The

operation was initiated properly but shut down prematurely

as a result of variations in the satellite attitude. The roll

gyro, which was inoperative from liftoff, caused the S-01

to become unstable after separation from the booster.

Error signals from this failed gyro resulted in complete

exhaustion of the control-gas supply shortly after first

engine operation.

Measurement B-12 (fuel venturi inlet pressure) indicated

about 200 psi higher than nominal after second engine

operation.

.•

MISSION RESULTS

Corrective Action 

Modifications have been performed to allow

monitoring of the position of the spin motor

relays in the three IRP gyros. In addition,

IRP's with spin motor rotation detection

(SMRD) have been incorporated. Positive

checkout of the spin motors has been

accompli-Med.

•

Launch, boost, and S-01 separation from the. booster were successfullAtocomplished. First engine operation

was normal. Afterwards,- the g-01 rolled, due to the S-01 roll gyro malfunction, causing depletion of the control

gas. S-01 engine second burn lasted only 1 sec because of gas ingestion due to the unstable vehicle attitude.

S-01/spacecraft separation occurred, but the S-01 did hot reorient for lack of control gas. The principal

objective of the flight, that of injecting the payload into an elliptical earth orbit extending beyond the orbit of

the moon, was not achieved.

•

-

. .L
Flight 44, Vehicle 6002 (8-01) — Ranger II (Continued) •

On the basis of mission objectives, this flight is assessed as an ascent failure and a no try in

probe injection.

This flight is assessed as a no try in probe injection, due to the ascent failure.

;.•
'Plight 45, Vehicle 2202 (5-01) — SAMOS

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

A failure in the SLV-3 guidance system resulted in a pitch-up

angle of approximately. 145 deg above the normal flightpath angle at 8-01 separation. The 5-01 could not recover

from this excessive attitude deviation and therefore did not

• ...•, attain orbit.

. ,

• MISSION RESULTS

Launch and boost were normal until the failure of the SLV-3 pitch control. The 8-01 engine ignited and operated

satisfactorily. The 5-01 and payload impacted at sea.

(1). This flight is assessed as a no try in both ascent and orbit.

••

(2) The equipment operation is considered a no try in both ascent and orbit:
Flight 46, Vehicle 1119 (8-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

is Event Corrective Action

Link 1 telemetry on two occasions exhibited drops in

signal strength, which precluded the use of automatic

data processing. An investigation of this performance

degradation, performed in the laboratory, indicated

that the cause of signal strength loss was an intermittent

open circuit in the power amplifier plate supply.

MISSION RESULTS

•

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory. Capsule ejection and •

recovery were successful. The capsule was recovered from the water.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No significant equipment failure occurred during this flight.

•

•

•
•

Flight 47, Vehicle 2203 (S-01) —SAMOS

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action'

During pass 6, it was observed that the command

programmer bad erroneously shifted to channel 31

(the recovery command channel); and satellite reorientation for recovery was inadvertently accomplished. Because of the S-01's velocity and attitude f •

A, at retroignition, the capsule and satellite remained

. Z in orbit. This malfunction was attributed to high

noise output from the mixer-filter and synchronous

channels during power turn-.on in absence of an RF

signal, which caused the erroneous shift to channel 31.

MISSION RESULTS

• :

• O.

Launch, boo*st, S-01 operation, and injection into orbit were accomplished. The capsule was inadvertently

ejected and remained in orbit.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
Flight 46.L. Vehicle 1120 (8-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

At separation, an electrical transient, possibly

emanating from the pyrotechnic circuitry, caused

a fuse to blow in the 400-cps, three-phase power

line to the gyro package. The resultant loss of

attitude control caused the vehicle to tumble,

which further resulted in premature engine cutoff

due to fuel starvation. Orbital status was therefore

not achieved.

• MISSION RESULTS

•

Corrective Action

The separation pinpullers and retrorockets

are now supplied from a separate power

source.

Launch, boost, separation, coast, and 8-01 engine ignition were normal. However, due to the primary

failure described above, orbital status was not achieved.

This flight is assessed as an ascent failure and a no try in orbit.

. .

The equipment operation is considered as a no try in orbit, due to the ascent failure.

I 7

• • i •

•

•

•• • I

p
r • •

r • Double-check on calculations and checkout

procedures.

Flight 49, Vehicle 6003 (S-01) Ranger Di

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The SLV -3' pulse beacon failed, preventing the receipt

of steering or discrete commands by the SLV-3 and

resulting in improper inertial velocity.

Due to a personnel error in calculation, an incorrect

calibration was applied to the velocity meter. This

would have prevented the desired lunar impact even

, with the proper SLV-3 performance.

• Measurement B-12 (fuel venturi inlet pressure) showed

..•

• a 190-psi shift in zero level after first engine operation.

(This malfunction also occurred on Vehicle 6002 and e

several flights of other programs.)

•

• •

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, book, S-01 engine operation, and injection into the parking orbit were normal. However, due to the

SLV-3 pulse beacon failure which resulted in improper inertial velocity and the incorrect S-01 velocity meter

calibration, the desired lunar impact was not achieved.

- This flight is assessed as a no try in both ascent and orbit.

The equipment operation is assessed as a success in both ascent and probe injection. •

"1.
•

U

zz-~ 7///7/ZOiiitxfir
•

•

•

./////////z/zzdszzzrzznnnn

// ///7",1 z

is
Flight St Vehicle 1123 (8-01) — Program 162 .

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

Additional operational procedures have been instituted to assure that the antenna is not deformed or

deflected and will extend properly at separation.

Proper coaxial cable connection will be ensured

through careful quality assurance inspection of all

cable connector safety wire installations. r. •

Subsequent to orbital injection (at antenna switchover),

the signal strengths to telenietry links 1 and 2 and the

continuous wave acquisition transmitter (CWAT) beacon

dropped sharply. (A mechanical deformation of orbit

antenna is suspected as the cause of this degradation of

signal strength, as well as a faulty coaxial , cable from

the exit-orbit antenna switch to the orbit antenna.)

z. Measurement B-108 (ullage rocket monitor 2) showed no

.. t.

.-indication that ullage rocket number 2 fired. (An improper

-"mechanical setting of the monitor microswitch assembly

is suspected.)

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, • 8-01 engine, operation, and injection into orbit were normal. The capsule .was ejected on pass 65

and was successfully air 'recovered. • -

• This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in both ascent and orbit.

•

* O
•

r.

•

.

Flight 52, Vehicle 2204 (S-01) — SAHOS

•

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event .

The pitch rate gain failed to switch from ascent mode to

orbital mode. This condition, probably due to a wiring

error, led to excessive control-gas usage and eventually

to control-gas depletion by pass 22. Loss of attitude

control caused slosh-induced fuel starvation at the pump

I inlets, resulting in premature shutdown of the S-01

_engine second operation.

MISSION RESULTS . •

Corrective Action 

The flight control package specification has

been changed to call out a test which verifies

the orbital rate time constants.

The systems test procedure now includes a

special test devised to detect whether proper

'rate switching has taken place.

- Launch, boost, 8-01 engine-first operation, and injection into orbit were normal.

• • Payload recovery, planned for pass 17, was prevented because of a ground command error.

Payload recovery attempted on pass 33 resulted in injection of both the 8-01 and the payload into a new and

higher orbit.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

Equipment operation was a failure in ascent and a success in orbit. •

e

•

at •

••• • • 1

•••

.4
Corrective Action 

5-01 battery voltage limiters have been redesigned to Incorporate battery cell temperature

as a limiting control to charge rates.. Better

battery-to-buscisolation has been provided.

•

-7:•!.

.0 A

•

Iligliz_461... 3 art

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Owing to an SLV-3 pitch program deficiency, pitchover

during the open-loop booster and sustainer phase was

less than nominal; and the orbit was not as planned.

During pass 3, the secondary battery group voltages

. approximated 33 volts, with an ensuing rise in battery 3

temperature to 190°F by pass T. Battery 3 apparently

failed, and an isolating diode failed, causing the battery

•• . Lbus to drop to 22 volts; this resulted in marginal operation

command and communication equipment. Stability

' • was lost due to equipment malfunction caused by the low

bus voltage; and a nutation was established in pitch, roll,

and yaw. Last usable RF contact was on pass 10; but

HEPDEX continued to transmit.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory. However, owing a failure.

in the SLV-3 pitch program, the transfer orbit achieved was not as predicted; consequently, thirflnal orbit was not

as planned. Battery failure and the resulting loss of stability prevented any useful contact with the vehicle after

pass 10.

•
Flight 53, Vehicle 1203 (3-01) —• 461 (Continued)

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

Equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit:

•

•

t

•

•

•

•

• •

•

•

• 0.

4° r
I

.•

3

•

Flisht 54, Vehicle 1124 (8-01) - Profiram 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

• Event Corrective Action 

Link 1 telemetry operated as programmed from launch

through pass 25. Loss of modulation of the link 1 RF

carrier occurred 20 sec prior to programmed turn-off

and continued throughout the remainder of the flight.

Analysis showed that a failure of a capacitor in the •

. do-do converter was the most probable cause.

Measurement B-35 (turbine speed) displayed sporadic

- .

btirsts of invalid data during ascent. Valid data were

-obtained for 92 sec after ignition until engine cutoff,

with invalid data appearing during the turbine coantdown period.

The do-dc converters to be flown in subsequent

8-01 vehicles are assembled with a more reliable

capacitor. Fansteel tantalum capacitor was replaced with Sprague capacitor in dc-dc converter

P/N 1462027.

. MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 5-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactO

was accomplished on pass 33 as planned. •

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.

. Air recovery of the capsule
Flight 55; Vehicle 6004 (S-01) — Ranger IV :11;

. .

• FLIGHT ANALYSIS

.,

Event Corrective Action 

Measurement B-12 (fuel venturi inlet pressure) data

showed a 200-psig shift in the zero level after engine

first cutoff, and a level shift out of band negatively at

second ignition, where' it remained throughout the remainder of engine operation.

1.,

<. MISSION RESULTS

•

A snubber has been provided in the pressure line

to the existing transducer.

Launch, boost, S-01 engine first operation, parking orbit, 8-01 engine second operation, spacecraft injection

- and retromaneuver were normal. All 5-01 objectives were accomplished successfully, and the spacecraft impacted on the far side of the moon.

This flight was a success in both ascent and probe injection.

ND major equipment malfunctions occurred during this flight:.
•

. • •

. •

. .

;.

..

.!

That 56, Vehicle 2401 (8-01) - SAMOS 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event • Doznatbm_

f

:**

During the SLV-3 boost phase, control gas valve 4 showed •

a full ON condition. Firing of this valve began when the

SLV-3 passed through the maximum dynamic pressure

flight condition, at which time the vehicle was being

subjected to vibration. Excessive use of control gas

resulted. Normal operation of this valve was noted

on all subsequent passes.

.poring yaw maneuvers on pass 13, erroneous signets from

- -0ke horizon sensor resulted in additional excessive use

of control gas.

During deboost, impingement of the exhaust plume of the

single ullage rocket on the engine exit nozzle is believed

to have caused the observed pitohup. Engine operation

in an effort to correct the. attitude resulted in a titop-to-stop

oscillation, and a gyro referenoe shift ensued. A boost,

rather than the planned deboost, resulted.

Measurement E-11 (fuel venturi inlet pressure) showed Pressure snubbers have been designed to

a 200-psi zero level shift following second shutdown of correct this type of malfunction. . •

I •

the engine. •

O
Flight 56, Vehicle 2401 (S-01) — SAI4OS montinuecrl

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were successful despite the control gas system

malfunction.

The yaw-wound maneuver on pass 13 was successful despite erroneous signals from the horizon sensor.. The

deboost phase on pass 18 was not successful, and the satellite and payload were injected into a more eccentric

orbit.

In spite of these malfunctions, this flight is assessed as a succee.s* in both ascent and orbit because

most mission objectives were attained.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight is assessed as a success in ascent and a failure in

orbit.

•

•
Measurement D-62 control-sus pressure, low range)

failed at I65 sec.

Parachute cover failed to separate.

Flight 57, Vehicle 1125 (S-01) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Two orbitai timer anomalies occuree* (1) anomalous

reset traces, and Z) toss el 1138 sec between passes 2

1111d 9.

Corrective Action 

Lower autlarole ideattikotina periads base

been programmed.

than :Azalea have been condarted to prover*

extensive less - programmer time.

This rueasuremneut wow unonitored NW a truce-

&teem. produced by aneiner unamdadturer.

/AK remaining lets are set dhedked tfor tad*

squibs. Vueetionable squibs are removed from

stodk. Mechanical release .details are being

redesigned.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory. Recovery operations

proceeded normally, but the capsule was lost when no parachute deployment occurred.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.

• . .
•

Flight 58, Vehicle 1126 (8-01) — Program 162 

* •

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

The telemetry link 2 operation resulted in intermittent

loss of orbital programmer time after pass 62. Lost

programmer time was also experienced on Vehicle 1125.

It is believed that a faulty input capacitor or a mechanical

slippage caused the malfunction.

r, Measurement D-59 (control-gas pressure, high range)

failed during 8-01 operation. An internal potentiometer

is suspected as the cause.

MISSION RESULTS

•

Launch, boost, 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit proceeded satisfactorily. The capsule was air

retrieved on pass 65, 300 nm„downrange from the predicted point (due to the malfunction of the orbital programmer);

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.

Corrective Action 

Tests are being conducted to confirm the mode

of failure. The tape drive mechanism has been

reworked to prevent slack in tape.

The manufacturer of these transducers has

furnished units with improved potentiometers for

the next flight.

A • :

•

•
•

•

Flight 59. Vehicle 1128 (S-01) — Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Excessive control gas consumption, probably due to ullagerocket and turbine-exhaust misalignments, was observed

during this flight.

Corrective Action 

LMSC test and alignment procedures were reviewed to determine whether any improvement •

in tolerance could be achieved.

Measurement B-108 (ullage rocket monitor) failed to The test procedure was revised to include

indicate firing of rocket 1. (This type of failure was also microswitch actuation by movement of the

noted on Vehicle 1127.) rocket carrier assembly.

: ;

-

;;;MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory. The capsule was ejected on

- pass 49 as planned and was successfully air recovered, 150 urn from the predicted point. The cause of the

impact divergence is not known.

(1) This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

(2) Equipment operation was successful in both ascent and orbit.
,

%AS

gist 60,..Vvhjele _1117 (640•) - Prggeon 142

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

Measurement B-108 (ullage rocket monitor) failed to ' The test procedue was revised to include

indicate firing of rocket 1. (This type of failure was microswitch actuation by movement of the rocket

also noted on Vehicle 1128.) carrier assembly.

.1

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit proceeded normally. The capsule was success-

- • fully ejected on pass 65 and descended into the predicted recovery area. However, when the parachute was

damaged during attempted aerial recovery, the capsule fell into the ocean and was lost.

Thii flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.
Flight 61, Vehicle 2402 (8-01) -BANOS. 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

A careful study has been made to ascertain and

correct the source of these torques.

• Because of the effect of undetermined torques on the

satellite during the first four passes, attitude control

gas consumption was excessive.

During the retrograde sequence, a pressure regulator

malfunction caused .the control system to be at effectively

low gas pressuie, thus permitting SPS impingement

torques to overpower the control system and force the

satellite away from the planned attitude.

Horizon sensor perturbations, due to cold-cloud effects,

were noted throughout the flight.

Test procedure revision included a bench test

to determine the slicing level on each sensor.

Adjustments were made to minimize cold-cloud

effects.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory. Following deboost, the

recovery vehicle did not separate.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

The equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
////f , /7 7/-/
•

Flight 63, Vehicle 1129 (S-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS •

Event Corrective Action

No major malfunction or deficiency occurred during

this flight.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and orbital injection were normal. All test objectives were achieved

and air recovery of the capsule occurred after orbit 50.

This flight was ;. success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.
Flight No. 64 Vehicle 1151 (SS-01A) Program 162 (Continued)

Torques caused by propellant dump operation resulted

in excessive control gas usage.

Telemetry channel 16 failed to read out on pass 41.for

HTS and during the first 210 seconds of acquisition by

the KTS. The apparent cause of this malfunction was

the voltage controlled oscillator (VCO) failing to

oscillate.

A propellant venting design change has been incorporated on later vehicles.

Design change of all oscillators was incorporated

on SS-OIA No. 6 and-subsequent vehicles.

Payload adapter temperature monitor malfunctioned.

This malfunction is believed to have been caused by

'• an open thermistor.

FER's were initiated for open thermistors in other

temperature monitors, and it was found that the.

cause of these failures was largely due to assembling and handling techniques. Immediate action

consisted of the use of lower-powered soldering

irons when assembling thermistor-type temperature sensors. An educational program in assembling and handling temperature sensors was

initiated.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, SS-01A engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital parameters were

outside the three-sigma tolerances, because of velocity meter malfunction. Orbital operations were satisfactory.

The capsule was recovered in the air during orbit 63.
Flight No. 64 Vehicle 1151 (SS-01A) Program 162 (Continued)

MISSION RESULTS (Continued)

The Lifeboat system was exercised prematurely on orbit 76, because of a short in the system harness.

Battery depletion occurred on orbit 88.

1. This flight is assessed as a success in both ascent and orbit.

Based on program Standard Agena equipment operation, this flight is assessed as a success in

ascent and a failure in orbit.

There were no major basic Standard Agena equipment failures during this flight. The velocity

meter malfunction is assessed as a system and interface problem; no part in the velocity meter

failed.

141
Flight 65. Vehicle 2403 (S-01) — SAMOS •

An electrical malfunction in the secondary propulsion

system prevented the 8-01 engine from operating to

deboost the satellite out of its orbit. However, first

engine operation was normal, even though controlled

ullage orientation was not provided.

Strain gages A-117, A-119, and A-120 failed during

ascent; A-104 and A-112 failed intermittently; and

A-101, A-109, and A-111 failed before flight.

•

Corrective Action 

Investigations indicate the possiblity of a shorted

solenoid winding or a short between a solenoid

winding and the vehicle. Both circuitry and test

methods have been changed.

Preflight and flight failures of strain gages are

attributed to fatigue or.daxnage of the gages as

the result of repeated handling. Recommendations

have been made for special handling of these devices...

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

a

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 8-01 engine first operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory despite the failure of the

SPS (ullage orientation) system. 8-01 engine operation during the deboost phase was not achieved owing to lack

of ullage orientation; since the velocity of the separated payload was not retarded, it remained in orbit.

This flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

Equipment operation was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.
•

Flight 66, Vehicle 1130 (3-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

•

The type VII orbital programmer operation during this

flight was unsatisfactory. Two major anomalies were

experienced: (1) failure of the orbital programmer

to reset properly upon command, and (2) failure of •

certain orbital programmer events to occur at all or

at the proper time in the second deck of the programmer.

(This type of programmer has also demonstrated

unsatisfactory performance on Vehicles 1125 and 1126. )

Measurement B-6 (combustion chamber pressure

monitor) was inadequate in performance. The

readout indicated an abnormally slow response.

MISSION RESULTS

..

•

.•

Corrective Action 

A design review of the type VII programmer was

scheduled for 13 August 1962 to present the

results of a Fairchild reliability analysis and

detailed review. Immediate action involved

establishing procedures to reduce the number

of tape changes and to assure that the programmers

are serviced only in approved clean areas and by

specially qualified personnel.

Launch, bosst, 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit proceeded normally. Aerial recovery was

successfully accomplished on pass 33, within the predicted recovery area.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.
1!!1O••Ver '1^,reNnenYroo,'

night 67, Vehicle 6901 (8-01) Mariner I 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

The booster was destroyed after it had deviated

considerably from its programmed trajectory.

MISSION RESULTS

The booster deviated from the proper trajectory and was destroyed by Range Safety personnel.

(1) This flight is assessed as a no try in both ascent and probe injection.

• • (2) The equipment operation is considered a no try in both ascen • and in probe injection.

•

•
Flight 68, Vehicle 1131 (8-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action

Measurement C-4 (battery current monitor) was

erroneously high. Data and circuit analysis indicated

that the most probable cause was a malfunction in the

voltage regulation circuitry of the low-level dc

amplifier used with the current shunt.

A loss of output from the type VIII dc-dc converter The use of this power supply for flight requiresupplying power to the research payload occurred. ments is being discontinued. It will be replaced

The type VIII power supply (P/N 1461165) is considered with the type XI unit.

unqualified for primary flight requirements; due to the

unavailability of other power supplies, it was flown only

to meet secondary requirements.

• MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost 8-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were normal. Orbital operations and control

were satisfactory. The recovery capsule was successfully retrieved in the air on pass 65.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

On the basis of equipment operation, this flight was a success in ascent and a failure in orbit.

•

•

•

•

le • •

•

•
Flight No. 69 Vehicle 1152. (93-01A) • Program 162 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Excessive control gas usage was observed during

the first three orbits. Torques transmitted to the

vehicle during propellant dump are suspected as

causing this excessive consumption. (This same

condition was noted on 1151.)

The Barnes Type ILA horizon sensor exhibited

anomalous behavior during almost every pass for

which there was acquisition. These perturbations,

in general, were not severe enough to degrade the satellite attitude control beyond acceptable limits, except

during pass 2. During pass 2, relatively large attitude

errors, estimated between 5

o

and 30o

 in yaw and roll,

were observed. No such errors were observed before

or subsequent to pass 2.. These perturbations are believed to have been caused by cold cloud effects on the

sensor.

Corrective Action 

A propellant venting design change was

incorporated in later vehicles.

(1) Horizon sensors have been modified for reduced sensitivity to earth gradients. (2) Horizon sensor telemetry data has been included on

the satellite borne tape recorder to provide additional data between contacts with stations.

(3) On a long-term basis, an investigation in

conjunction with the Infra-red Radiation Transmission Experiment (MATE) was already under

way to determine the optimum spectrum for the

horizon sensor; immediate action was to modify

the sensitivity of the electronics on 1154.

The VCO for channel 14 failed during orbit 28 but

operated normally during all other phases of the flight.

This equipment was known to have a starting problem,

but a modified replacement was not avai able for l

installation.

All units of this type have been modified.

(See comment on vehicle 1151.)
11 ;

:4

Flight No. 69 Vehicle 1152 (33-01A)

Loss of measurement D-59 (control gas, high-range

pressure transducer) after launch. This transducer

operated erratically prior to launch and remained so

until orbit 15, when it became unusable. After

orbit 15 the operation of the transducer returned to

normal and remained so for the duration of the flight.

The malfunction was probably caused by over-torquing

of the transducer during installation. This type of

malfunction has been duplicated in laboratory tests

• conducted separately by LlNISC and the manufacturer.

' 1 ' Temperature monitors were lost prior to launch, for :7..

the battery rack, programmer, and exhaust duct shield.

The S-band beacon return pulse became extremely weak

during orbit 32, with a constant low amplitude. This

malfunction hampered tracking operations but did not

affect command functions. Tests have shown that

premature beacon interrogation will cause cavity cathode

damage an(that rapid start-up will reduce cavity life.

The type of failure observed in this flight could be

attributed to either cause.

Program 162 (Continued)

A redesigned transducer has been incorporated

on later vehicles.

Caused by open circuit. No corrective action

required.

None. Long-range effort includes plans for a

redesigned "light-weight" beacon.
•

4

4

Flight No. 69 Vehicle 1152 (SS-01A) Prokram 162 (Continued) 

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, SS-01A engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital parameters were

within three-sigma tolerances. Orbital operations were satisfactory, except for large attitude perturbations

.1

during the early orbits.

Air recovery of the capsule occurred on orbit 65.

Lifeboat was succressfully exercised.

„

- Battery depletion occurred on orbit 87.

I. This flight is considered an ascent and of bit success.

2. There were no major equipment failiires during this flight.

•

•

p.

•
. (1.1.. Since alb mission objectives were achieved, this flight is assessed ai a success in both ascent

. •

and orlic:

Flight 70, Vehicle 2404 (S-01) — SAMOS 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

Disturbing torques were noted during the early orbits The source of these torques was investigated,

of this flight. and a comparison made with flights of other

programs where disturbing torques have been.

noted during the early orbits.

Measurement A-I0 (Z-axis vibration) displayed an

erratic saw-tooth signal instead of the normal

sinusoidal response; this made frequency determinetion impossible and amplitude determination invalid.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 5-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were normal.

•

(2) No major equipment malfunctions occurred during this flight.'
Flight 71, Vehicle 6902 (8-01) — Mariner II 

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

Measurement B-90 (ullage rocket 3) failed during engine

second operation. An Incorrect microswitch adjustment

is suspected as the cause.

Measurement C-11 (battery case temperature) failed at

64.8 sec. The sensor apparently became shorted.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, S-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were successful. The spacecraft was success-

.• ,

fully injected into a satisfactory interplanetary intercept trajectory.

..

This flight was a success in both ascent and probe injection.

No significant equipment operation failure occurred during this flight.

••• •

.1

7 • '•

•

. •
r t

0:4

Aarmcs TyiUA tiorizun nentlor failed during

orbit 47. •

Corrreiire A awn 

Design change effective on 1155. Extended

temperature range heads, better sealing,

higher torque motor with larger bearings and

improved lubricants were incorporated.

Perigee altitude problem due to Barnes horizon The horizon sensor has been modified on all

sensor sensitivity to cold-cloud and other earth subsequent satellites to provide less sensitivity

infrared gradients. to earth infrared gradients. This modification

, includes reducing the booster limiter amplifier

gain and deCreasing the threshold or slicing

level of each head assembly. The downrange

telemetry tracking aircraft and the weather

reconnaissance will be retained to observe the

effect of sensor modification. The sensor

.•

telemetry outputs will be recorded on the

satellite's 200-minute recorder to derive

further information on the sensor performance'

between orbit acquisitions.

Inadvertent Lifeboat exercise. A design error The design error has been.corrected for future

resulting in a sneak circuit caused this malfunction. vehicles.

• , e
A propellant venting design change was

incorporated begiSning with 1154.

A modified oscillator was not available for

installation on this particular channel. (See

comment on Vehicle 1151.)

Vendor performed tests to simulate this problem. (See cal:nment =I Vehicle 11524

Open circuit. No action practical.

Flight No. 72 Vehicle 1153 (SS-01A) Program 162 (Continued)

Torques caused by propellant dump operation caused

exoessive *antra gas usage during the early passes.

(This was also observed on 1151 and 1152.)

Telemetry channel 14 failed to read out on pass 15.

(This is the same type of malfunction noted on ini

and 1152.)

Measurement D-59 (control gas high-range pressure)

inadequate during passes 15, IS, and 1?.

- . Measurement A-458 (upper bulkhead fuel. tank strain

sensor) failed at 252 seconds. Failure characteristics

indicate an open circuit or gage failure.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost , SS-01A engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital parameters were

outside the three-sigma tolerances, because of the horizon sensor sensitivity to ':.old-cloud. Orbital operations

were normal until pass 47 when the horizon sensor failed. Cipsule separation, planned for orbit 65, was initiated inadvertently by Lifeboat (the result of a wiring change). Recovery proceeded normally and the capsule

was recovered in air during orbit 65.

This flight is-considered an ascent and orbit success.

Based on equipment operation, this flight is assessed as a success in ascent and a failure in orbit

for both program and basic Standard Agena.
Flight 73, Vehicle 1132_0-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

The following actions have been taken; (1) pinning

the reset stop upo9. disengagement of the cams;

(2) inspedting the timer prior to shipment by the

vendor, and (3) allowing sufficient time to analyze

thoroughly telemetry data prior to launch to assure

.proper setting.

Orbital programmer operation was not normal

because of erratic resets, although command

capabilities were not impaired. Instead of the

normal reset time of approximately 0.5 sec,

resets were delayed 8 to 12 sec after commands

were transmitted. The following anomalies

were observed: (1) When the resets were late,

the SCID were normal. (2) When the resets were

normal, the SCID were approximately 4 sec

longer than when the resets were late. (3) The

tape was pulled back when there was a late reset,

but not always when there was a normal reset..

(4) Several normal resets occurred late in the

flight. •

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 5-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit proceeded normally. The capsule was ejected

properly on orbit 62. However, the parachute was torn from the capsule during the attempted aerial pickup,

and the capsule was lost.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

There were no major equipment failures during this flight.
Flight 74, Vehicle 1133 (8-01) — Program 162

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event

Perturbations in the horizon scanner output were

observed on several south-to-north passes. This was

caused by sun interference during the normal orbital

pass. These perturbations, observed on all 8-01's,

have been caused by both sun and cold-cloud interference.

Because of an integrator error, the engine did not cut

off when the required velocity was reached. The

integrator flight data indicate that the correct velocityto-be gained was set into the integrator, that the

Integrator responded properly to the adjust command

(D-1), and that there was no integrator drift.

An orbital timer reset monitor error occurred during the

orbital flight phase. Reset occurred 12.8 sec late on

pass 6 over NHS. Another late reset (8.4 sec) was

observed on pass 10 over KTS. No other late resets

were noted. As in Vehicle 1132, this anomaly did not

affect other programmer or command capabilities.

Investigation by the vendor representative disclosed

that the reset cams were not properly adjusted.

(This same type of malfunction occurred in Vehicle 1132.)

Corrective Action

The sensor heads have been modified.

Subsequent unite, have beei calibrated at LMSCSunnyvale and at the launch base. Checkout

procedures have been changed to prevent the

possibility of degradation to the summing circuit

due to overvoltage during calibration.

Further ground testing and inspection has been

initiated to ensure that proper adjustments have

been accomplished.

•
Flight 74, .Vehicle 1133 (S-O) — Program 162 /Continued) 

Measurement A-4 (Y-axis acceleration) displayed abnormal

activity during the 5-sec period following thrust attainment.

The voltage trace dropped rapidly from 2.5 volts to a •

negative out-of-band condition, then slowly returned to

2.5 volts. This malfunction was attributed to a faulty

capacitor in the output circuitry of the carrier amplifier

associated with the transducer.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 5-01 engine operation, and injection into orbit were satisfactory. However, owing to the delay

in the velocity integrator engine cutoff command, the S-01 engine produced excessive velocity and the orbit was

not as predicted.

Recovery proceeded normally, and the capsule was ejected on pass 17 and successfully air retrieved.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment failure occurred during this flight.

1; ••••

. •

•
Flight 75, Vehicle 6101 (S-01) Canadian Satellite (I)

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event Corrective Action 

Noisy turbine-speed data precluded an accurate

determination of flow rates.

The control-gas regulator indicated irregular behavior.

Horizon sensor anomalies were observed after engine

first operation.

MISSION RESULTS • •,

.

Launch, boost, S-01 first and second operation, and injecdon of the spacecraft into the . required orbit were

satisfactorily attained.

This flight was a success in both ascent and orbit.

No major equipment malfunctions occurred during this flight.

•
Flight No. 76 Vehicle 1154 (SS-01A) Program 162 

Corrective Action 

Improved sensor head assemblies incorporating

a higher torque motor, improved lubricant, and

rotation assembly were installed beginning on

1155.

FLIGHT ANALYSIS

Event :

The right head of the Barnes Type IIA horizon sensor

became inoperative during pass 19 and remained

inoperative. A loss of proper yaw control ensued. •

This malfunction is attributed to motor seizure. (The

observed failure characteristie is similar to that observed on 1153.)

The + and -28 vdc voltages dropped to zero during

pass 1 and returned to normal during pass 2.

•

Loss of channel 14 on pass 17. No subcarrier on

pass 24. Returned to normal operation during

pass 24 and operated normally throughout the

rest of the flight. (Similar VCO losses have occurred

on 1151, 1152, and 1153.) These failures are the

result of unreliable starting characteristics of the

VCO's in use.

After a thorough failure mode analysis, part by

part failure simulation test, and ascent through

orbit environment testing; the malfunction could

not be duplicated. No corrective action

appropriate. •

Reliable replacements were not yet available

for all the telemetry channels employed in this

flight. Unmodified VCO's were used on channels

8, 9, 11, 15, and 16. •
Flight No. 76 Vehicle 1154 (SS-01A) Program 162 (Continued)

Measurement B-35 (turbine speed) displayed random A low-pass filter has been installed.

losses of output during early part of engine operation.

MISSION RESULTS

Launch, boost, 5S-01A engine operation, and injection into orbit were achieved. Orbital parameters were

within the three-sigma tolerances. Orbital operations were normal until orbit 19 when the horizon sensor

failed. Recovery was initiated by the Lifeboat system on orbit 49 and the capsule was retrieved in the air.

This flight is considered an ascent and orbit success.

Based on equipment operation, this flight is assessed as a success in ascent and a failure in

orbit for both program and basic Standard Agena.