TMFsl8 ... d¥ 6s2 

USCIB: 2!!.16/S 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE.MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

kPPl!lffiB1' t>ee'tJltH!fi'fS eoim:EN 

COmi:WOiD :KJt'D:W:.U. 

28 October 1954 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Subject: CCMINT Arrangements witH._ __ __. 

Rei'erences: (a) USCIB z:}.16/5 dated 14 September 1954. 

(b) USCIB 29.18/16 dated 2!t Jul;y" 1954. 

1. The enclosures are circulated for information in connection 

with the references. 

2. The sequence of events is as follows: 

a. On Saturday morning, 16 October 1954, SUKLO contacted the 

Ex.ecuti ve Secretary and conveyed the substance of' enclosure 1. 

b. At about noon Saturday the/Ex:ecutive Secretary as a result 

of enquiries to the CIA informed SUKLOin substance as set forth in 

enclosure 2. 

c. On Thursday, 21 October, enclosure .'.3 was received in the 

office of the Executive Secretary. iA meeting of NSA representatives, 

CIA representatives, the SUKLO and the Executive Secretary was inunediately called. As a result or that/meeting enclosure 4 was provided to 

SUKLO. 

d. On Monday, 25 October, enclosure 5 was received by the 

Executive Secretary from the CIA. 

e. On Tuesday afternoon, 26 October 1954, enclosure 6 was 

received by the Executive Secretary from SUKLO and the latter was informed of the substance of enclosure 5 by the former • 

.'.3. No immediate further action is contemplated. 

Enclosures 

1. App. A to MOP 4246. 

2. App. B to MOP 4246. 

3. MOP 4246 dtd 20 Oct 1954. 

4. Msg. from SUKLO /to GCHQ 

dtd 21 Oc~. 

5. Msg. i'rom.L_Jto Dir. CIA 

dtd 22 Oct 1954. 

6. Encl. with MOP 4255. 

USCIB: 29.16/8 

TO:.a0 SECRET 

con~ M/:'fEIR!AL 

eclassifi ed and a roved or release b NS on 01-26-2015 ursuantt E .0. 1352 

- .. -'~ 
$.o 3.3(h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

.APPENDIX A (MOP 4246) 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~//On 15th Octobe·.· r GC·.· . H· .. \.. Q leamt<vi.·a. Ai···r Ministry. //that Air Attache L_J reported that U .• S. a;.uthorities, had made approach to f I 

in accordance with r.ecentJ I findinA;s. 

2. M. I. 6. sa,y uj.~,. ;r'r.mat1on in Oconfirmed this and moreover have already tol Lt.hat U.S. approach and proposals had U.K. 

knowledge and consent. \ \ " 

3. This was a great shock\.since U.S./had not informed the U.K. 

beforehand of intended timing \.(see para/15(c)(iv) of conference papers). 

Actually latest information\ from SUSLQ/dated 7th October was that U.S. 

approach would be "some time in. November". 

4. Further info;rmed that\l lhas agreed U.S. proposals subject 

t9 I approval. 

authorised to inform in accordance with para. 15 (L). 

5. Since matter ~· so advanced it is urgent that. R.A.F. be 

(DGC 4708 of 16th August to irector NSA and his reply - not with Stn{LO 

refer.) 

through 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.16/8 dtd 28 Oct 1954. 

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APPENDIX B (MOP 4246) 

''EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

1. U.S. representative (CIA) approachedr::7"linformally with 

view to determining whether an agreeme111;. wi~ U.S. would be 

considered by the I I\ / // // • 

2. U.S. representative/ind.i.cated that any-i ---.~lmaterial 

r~c~~::dw:ul~db~e:~c!Pt~~l;n:~r::rble with Gne O.zt.nd asked 

3. I lsaid exchange might be acceptable but he would have 

to obtain approval o:rl I 

4. No mention of direct U.K. or R.A.F •. involvement was made. 

5. Formal approach now planned for December. 

6. U.S. would prefer R.A.F. not to get in at this juncture 

but feel you must be free to act if you feel your position jeopardised. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.16/S dtd 2S Oct 1954. 

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!0P 8Beftli:.I:' PftOTM BRITISH JOINT SERVICES MISSION 

MAIN NAVY BUIIDING 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 WASH~'GTON .l..'1 25 , D • c • 

MOP 4246 20th October 1954 

~o 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCI:B Jl?.L s 6- 3 6 / 5 o us c 3 6 o 5 

Subject: .... J ______ _.,........_ _ __, 

I have been askeci/T.6 communicate to you, £or information of' the 

U.S • .authorities ~Qncerned, tile following 1Il~sage :i:-eceived.by me on 

20 Oct~ f:rom D;Lrector, GCHQ: · 

<'' ',. .'' ',,_ / i ,' ,; 

11 We/( the U.K.~) have f'elt/obli~ed -to anthnr:i se\fhe CJ, to make .a limited disclosure /to thJ 

UKUSA intentions. The rea.sons are as/ follaws: 

rr \A. 

rr B. 

OncJ * ~efers u.s. /proposals to Mihaer~I ·. ·. I will 

almost cer.t .. ·~k· 1:.®'aslfed··· for····· re····a···ctio .. ns ..• ·· .•.. Wi·e .. · ~ .... ;re· .. ·a·· ..dvised that, unless ~ :_ Jis/forewarned and. convinced of the 

need ta accep ~hepropos•als,f he may well line. up fo~idable I I oppositio .· · .. · tility.betweenl I andl I 

is well knownand . . 1¥ to oppose\ acceptance or 

proposals seeming to favour· 

Tbe ILA·~· wi.11 be placed •in a very dit'ficult position :=:if~Wo.lii__, 

!learn thro Mindef that the U.S. has offered 

L--.,..,....---::=--:--=~~--::-::--' which is substantially more than anything 

the Il..A.F • .. /has off.·eryd (.or :i..·s r.·· ow by.· Co. nference·. Agr .. eem.en·. t 

allowed to off er) to l • • .• It is therefore essential that 

---~-I be advi ... ·.sed mc •. /+hf R.A.F. of··· ul. timate····.ID. KUSA··· ... inte··· ... ntions in respect of th~ _ Jas soon as possible • 

. " The foll;nna brief/has been provided to the Air Atta.che for limited 

disclosure to! ~ 

'A. 

'B. 

An understanding h~..J:.1~m:l:i.LY...J2!a.e.tLI~.QllJaa.....12S:Jai1~:n U .s. and 

U.K. for providin By this the 

U.S. will provid on behalf of both itself 

and the U.K. has been informed of this arrangement and 

technical assistan.ce from the U.S. will be provided to his 

organisation. 

arran ements 

Enclosure 3 with USCIB 29.16/8 dtd 28 Oct 1954. 

1 OP SECRET FROTH 
'fOP !fri~E¥'~'#P2 

e ~E:0}-:3(h) (2) e 

PL 86':':36/SOJJSC 3605 

'!OP SEieB:M' FBO'!II MOP 4246 (cont.) 

' C. The R. A. F. has . agreed .this change ori the clear unders.y.ca.:u.i.i..w.1.1;..;;;;;;...., 

'D. 

· t ovid b he U S to the 

L----------------:. (probably through s organ1sa ion 

but otherwise directly) will be at least as complete as that 

hitherto p:t.•ovided by the mA.F. 

___ __.until such time as the. U.S. is in a position to provide 

adequate assistance. ' 

• 

11 We (the U.K.) '.much regret having to take.the action as above, 

but the unexpectedness and speed of events il1\. J over which we 

had no control, forced our hand. We would emphasise that our main 

purpose was not only to facilitate dealings of the R.A.F. with the 

I I but also to ensure success of UKUSA plans circumstances 

of the U.S. approach we felt bound to ensure early knowledge 

0£ and adherence to Conferep..CLA....A.CUM:LGllZILAZ:l.:c....:1:..1::1.1c:i.:.....z:.i::LA...L.&...L-....L.o1::1:....111....1:i;.......JL....111c:L.L..1, 

withdraw in due course from " 

My Director also asks me to request the U.S. authorities to 

ensure that the U.K. are advised well in advance of future stages in the 

U.S. -I I approach, as otherwise similar crises and possible 

misunderstandings may well recur. 

/s/ .. . ...... . 

// 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

P.S. 

At Appendix A is gist of first intimation I had from GCHQ on Friday 

15th. As you know we got together on this subject on Saturday morning. 

A meeting on Friday evening thanks to 11Hazel 11 was not possible to arrange. 

At Appendix. B is gist of my reply after consultation with you. 

At Appendix C are further comments to me from GCHQ, received on 

20th October. 

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TOP SE:CRE'f fflOTH 
REF ID:A60652 

1Yh0 SEG-:t7:ET e 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

An initial inf'o:rmal approach to t)JeJ 1was 

made in order to obtain agreement in principle tol ~ erence 

to the re~. security stan··· da:rds, to the placing .··of' an NSA··· represen- tative in L __ J to the general plan of' expansion and cooperation, and 

to set a date for the neg9tiations. No mention was made of the U.K. nor 

of' the I I 

I ls~bsequently agreed in principle and set a date of 

6 December for the \conference. He then raised the question of the UK 

position in this\m· .. a~W:· .. ith his hand thus forc···/ed, the CI .. A representative gave Colonel·. L-J. t.he gist ~a .. ragraph l.· 5c of' the .·July Agree- ment. There was no mention of the L __ J or RAF, and no discussion of 

the extent of' UK-US. collaboration or of \future UKUSA intentions with 

respect to the I I The only points diacussed by the U.S. represen-

=~·:i .. e. the fulfil·lm. e·n .. t of· .. the previo· .. us U.K ... ·•• request f .. or copies of I___ _ _traffic and \the possibility in \return of inco:rporating techa c ents from the U.K. within the materials passed by the U.S. 

tol L Colonel r---1 stated that he thought that he could obtain 

permission from Min~Of\ Defense for the U.S. to pass his material 

to the U.K. · · · 

In a cable to Direct.or, GCHQ, ci.ate.d 25 August 1954 answering 000 

4078 of 16 August 1954, D!RNSA sa:i.d\that initial approach would not 

/ 

be made before late September or early October. It was actually made 

in early October. As of this time t~ has not yet been able to 

determine whether the question\of th{____Jwould be brought up at the 

main conference, or whether it\is preferal;>le to\ leave it until a. later 

date. DIRNSA's cable of 25 A st stated\that he expected the RAF to 

continue its C>~ even :1.ncreaseit if necessary. 

It was understood that paragraph 15 .L o# the\ conference paper/ would 

pertain. 

Revelation to th~ ~of a u .K. /u.~. jgreLent concemin~I .... __ _. and in particular intentions regarding th.e \\ \ ·· ... go far beyond what 

has yet been revealed to I I and w:l.ll\ put the U .s~ in the 

untenable position of withholdinginformationJ:rbm\him if .he should 

hear of it via and the MINDEF.>prior to U~S. briefing 

h:im on the whole problem. 

Because of the knownl ICQllfliot, the>tindng and substance of any discussions is critical andt}le~ri~xoutlined.in your 

MOP 4246 of 20 October might well jeopardize th:e ma~ course of the 

''2' Enclosure 4 with USCIB 29.16/8 dtd 28 Oct 1954. EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOPSEeR£T 
(E{)3.3(h) (2) 

~h~6~36/50 USC 3605 

proposed I l-u .. s •. Co.MINT agreement~ ~q....t.his..,connection, it should 

be emphasized that the COMINT produced by thL_Jis a relatively minor 

portion of that required. by the u~s./u.~. ······... -

In the light of thμbc.:jre, the strongest representation is made that 

nothing be said to theL_J until a specific request to this ef'f ect 

is made to the U.K. by the U.S. 

If the briefing can be withheld froml I who may later 

approach the U.K. Air Attache with questions, the latter, might state 

that accord~g to his in •. •• • .. formation the agreement under discussi.on he+ween 

the U.S. andL • phould ~ot effect the support supplied to thd I 

by the RAF. • • • • 

If th~ f has a.l:t:-ea been briefed according to MOP 4246, it will 

become necessary to inform immediately of the whole situation with the hOJ2~-t~:b. tli1s can e one be ..f ore he is so informed by 

the MINDEF or thel__J so that the adverse .. effect onl land 

the U.S. plans can be minimized. 

U.S. representative D and SUSLO, London\are being fully.· Zformed 

of circumstances with former instructed not to say anything tol~ I 

unless approached in which case he is to be guided. by his own /judgment. 

Enclosure 4 with USCIB 29.16/S - CONT. 

- 2 -

T9P SBGR:Ef' 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 
• 

~-REF ______ ID:A60652 .,,.. a 

.1. vr l.jZOl\1!11 W' 

·Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA P.1 86-36/50 USC 3605 22 OCTOBER 1954 

FROM:: D 

l. REGRET CIRCUYSTANCES REQUIRED MENTIONING CONTENT OF PARA 15-C 

WITHOUT PRI<R NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER1 \.FARRELL AND CARR WERE FULLY AWARE 

or THIS POSSIBILITY WORE THE FACT. PRF,SUMED THEY WOULD HAVE INFORMED 

APPROPRIATE U.K. AIR;/INTERESTS AS ~U!RED. THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE WAS 

PREVIOUSLY UNAWARE.OF THE ROIE OF THE LOOAL\U.K. AIR ATTACHE. 

2. U.K. AlR ATTACHE BRIEF CONTAINED ESSENTIALLY THE FOLLCl'iING: 

THERAFLJ 

NOISE LISmNING ACTIVITY TO.REMAIN AS AT PRESENT BE'lWEEN 

b. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO BE AS CCMPLETE AS\.PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED. 

c. u.K. TO CONTRIBUTE TO u.s. RESPONSE To.._I _,...... "EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

d. RAF TO CONTINUE PRESENT ROLE RE DUNtiL TJ3g u.s. IS 

IN A POSITION TO TAKE OVER THE t:~:~ '.J.'O DA_ TE, ON.·LY_ .. MOST .·GENERAL CRAL STATEMENT HAS BEEN MAJE TO ____ IN ORDERTO INSURE THAT HE 

BE SLIGHTLY KNO\'lLEDGEABLE IF AN D BYl ~/THIS SUBJECT. 

U.K. AIR ATTACHE FEfilS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH I ]WILL NECESSITATE 

GENERAL ~ISCUSSION OF ITEMS IN BRIEF SHORTLY, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO THE 

CCDTRARY. 

· 3. ACCCEDINGLY,llWAs BRIEFED WITH LIGHT REFERENCE TO PARA 

15-K, AS Rl!XlUIRED. RES~D OVERALL SITUATION REI lAR.E COUPiaTELY SATISFACTORY AND UNCHANGED. NO CRITICAL SITUATION DEVELOPED 

AND THE U.S. POSITION IS NOT JEOPARDIZED. 

Enclosure ; with USCIB 29.i6/S dated 28 October 1954. 

• 

TlJ:PSECRBT 
. .. 

TOP SECR-£.if {8QXlio 6~ 

• 

/Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

JpL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Encl. to MOP 4255 

26th October 1954 

1. The f'ollowing are points which emerge in an a,n~wer .f'rom. the Chairman 

of the mars.Al !held 12th July/-/ 21st July 1954 to a 

signal composed in your of!icef on 21st October. 

2. Air Attache, D ~as been signalled asking/(a) whether I . /I 

~:: :~~~~~ b~~ifed 'f~r~~:~S~~~O~::;~~:_t~()lllm~mum(l)mm~~~t~:: :. 

3 ( h) ( 

2 ) 

3. I! by chance R has not been briefed Air/Attache has been asked to 

refrain until further orders. 

4. If R has been briefed and has said nothing to E or Ministry of 

Defence, Air Attaohe will request him to keep information to.himself'. 

5. It is more than possible that all above/is now too late and that 

next action will have to be the informing/of/IS of the whole f!ituation as 

per the penultimate paragraph of' the signal r.eferred to in my paragraph 1 

above. 

6. The Chairman is not surprised at u.s. concern at the turn of events 

but he must point out that the dif'f'icultieshave arisen by reason of the 

unannounced approach and failure to consult with U.K. before it.was made. 

7. At the July Conference there/was no suggestion of' an "i..nitial 

!~~; =~o~~h~.~~r ~f' intendej/first/approach in which no mention 

s. 

a) 

b) 

U.K. had fully expected: 

To ~ lnfono•d be1'~ """ :; ..... rch took place so that th.···.e· .. •y could 

warn i and also consider what, if any, 

action to take about · at that juncture. 

That Conference paragraphs 15(b) and (c) would be implemented by 

U.S. as part of first approach to E. ( (c iv) yery r§lert§Pt.) 

• 9. After conference discussions - which stressed need for U.K 

position with E to be safeguarded right from start of' new approach to 

him - the U.K. had noi expected u.s. hand to have to be forced by E before 

they mentioned the U.K~ 

10. DGC/4078 made clear U.K. particular concern about date or.u.s~ 

approach because, al though fully aware of critical need to wait :n+.; 1 

after that approach, the U.K• urgently needed to say something t~ 

to Raf'eguard R.A.F. interests. ...._~~~-

Enclosure 6 with USOIB 29.16/8 dated 28 October 1954. 

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. ,. 

TOP SECR=FT R:eATw0 6

; .;.,;./\E. o 3. 3 ( h l ( 2 l ~F ~~I ~/PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 ./ ~ 

i'OP SEl9REJ'f' F'R;ffi'fI Encl. to M$ 4255 (cont.) 

ll. Latest inf'ormation U.K. received waE1NO'l'/in/DIRN$,A reply to DGC/4078 

but in later DIRNSA signal (rece;iVi~·· • SU$t0) which began "it has been 

learnt that u.s. pegotiations with .. / cannot/begin "UPtil some time in 

November." (Context SHAPEYapproache;s./· /U.K. ihBd not ·•.peen advised of 

subtle difference between 11approach"/and ."negotiations• ~ were therefore 

totally unprepared f()rnews fromc=:J. 

12. This news placed U.K. ir.vrespect/ of R .precisely ill p.osition in which 

u.s. now find.themselves in respect 'of E. u .• K. could no'!:, take any risk 

and were seriously perturbed that Rwould first hear of 'UKUSA plans for ..__ ___ .... ~ through back door. 

II s w1st annr.ecfete ha. y/.h.e~ ;+. '.JBS at. conferenc. e.·.·· .. f~r R.A.F. to 

agree I / / / _ i •• •.·. •• l There£ ore 

how importrn+ ;+ is that wit.·hdr··· awal shouJ.d.·i be by means fl' .. ~fv eccenf.able to 

R.A.F. and_ I and without detriment to other R.A.F .J._ _relations, 

and therefore U.K. is bound to be guided by Air Attache about best means and 

time to effect delicate negotiations with R. 

13. Had U.S. given U.K./pre-warnin,g of approach to E a,n.ci frankly explained 

limits of what they intended to say in that approach the 'U.le. could have 

discussed situation with Air Attache beforehand and by agreement with u.s. 

fully coordinated action in respect• of E and R. 

Not lmowing/wha.t u.s. had a.a.id to E, the U.K .. felt obliged to take 

urgent aotjon to ensure R did not/get back-door information to prejudice 

R.A.F .I lt-ela.tions. 

14. Chairman adds that paragraph 7 of the signal referI"e,to in 1 

paragraph 1 above representing/"tb.at nothing be said to the until 

a. specific request to this effect is made to the U.K. by the u.s. 0 is in 

any case quite unacceptable. 

In *le now only faintly possible event that nothing ha.s been said 

tolthe U.K. could certainly NOT leave initiative in this matter to 

U.S. Th~ U.K. feel ~ey mu ... ··ist be ffee t:i:e::~ne :~: :im··. e flld method of handling R.A.F. withdrawal i'rom _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ J- even though in normal circumstances they would cons y wi • • 

15. No news froml lyet regarding whether brief' carried out or not, 

but Chairman is inclined to believe penultimate paragraph or signal referred 

to in my paragraph 1 above re necessity of inf'orming E of Yhole situation 

etc., etc. is best solution in any case. All cards will then be on the table. 

16. The Chairman adds finally that U.K. expects notification will in 

advance of any "initial inf'omal" u.s. approach tol I 

a) To ensure complete co-ordination of cover story as in Conf'erenca 

paragraph 17(B)iv. 

b) To avoid episodes such as this. 

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