,-

USCIB: 13.5/107 HAITM VlA SEJEEN'P 0II1'-NNEJ:S 6NLY 

kPPBfBEB :eoeUMEilft' 06N'i'AINS 

CO:QEWGRB M:A:'l'ERD\L 

15 July 1955 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Compromises of COMINT Information. 

Reference: CIBD #9 (Revised) dated 4 February 1954· 

• 

1. The enclosed swmnary of eleven (11) hitherto .unreported 

compromises of COMINT information is circulated for information. 

Eight (S) of the above-mentioned compromises are due to ineffective 

communications security while three (3) are of a physical nature. 

2. A brief study of all compromises due to ineffective communications security occurring during 1954 will be circulated as 

soon as all final reports for that period are received. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 13.5/107 

90BEWOOB MA:'f ERIAL 

USCIB 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 09-05-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 

24 
NATIONAL SECURI'l J. AGENCY 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

COMPROMISES OF COMTN,r INF@~TION 

1. On 16 August 1954, a CO:t.UNT comprdtni"se occurred at Det.acb• 

rnent 2, 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Northea!it Cape, Alask9ic.. On that 

date a CONFIDENTIAL message was transmitted in the clear tb Headquarters, 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska 

over a radio circuit highly susceptible to interception. This compromioe revealed an unevaluated listing of intercepted raw traffic, 

and is not considered a serious disclosure., For the transm:l.\ssion of 

this message Detachment 2 employed simultaneous keying of two radio 

frequencies in conjunction with the PYTHON cryptosystem, one .in the 

low frequency band, and the other in the very high frequency band. 

The cryptographic equipment attached to the low frequency side of the 

circuit va.s in the "cipher" position, resulting in a correctly enciphered transmission. However, the equipment being used on the ver~ 

high frequency side was in the 11 text" position, allowing a "clE:?ar" 

transmission of the message. '!'he Commander, Detachment 2 1 3rd\Radio 

Squadron, Mobile has instituted a. detailed training program designed 

to prevent recurrences of this type of violation. Statements from 

the individuals concerned have been received, and support the fa.cts 

as presented by the Connna.nding Officer. A complete outline of the 

station's current communications security training program has al.so 

been received, and sufficient emphasis is placed on the communications 

procedures violated by this compromise. 

2. On 5 October 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the Arrrr:f 

Security Agency, Austria, due to the loss of two copies of a SECRE~ 

codeword message. A copy o:f the message h n:t aya11able hut has• 

"been described as I \\j 

from the Army Security Agency, Austria. to the910th Security Group.\ 

From the descri.ption of the mat~rlal invo1 ved, this is considered a 

serious brench of COMINT. Once air.a.in ourl \\ 

I The loss was dis- .__ .................... ....,...... .......... ....,...... ......... ...,..........,..........,..........,...... ................ ___,,....,...... ............................................................................. ~ covered on 12 October 1954 while a message center clerk was filing 

messages returned by the communications center. Investigation revealed 

that both copies of the message were receipted for by a communication 

center clerk, and that the message was logged in the outgoing message 

log as having been transmitted on 5 October. There was no evidence, 

however, of the copies ever having been re~urned to the message center 

after transmission. A thorough search of the cormnunication center, 

message center, and operations division failed to uncover either copy 

of the message. A possibility exists that these copies were inadvertently burned with the classified trash. HowPver, sincP. the existence or disposition of the copies could not be definitely determined, 

the message was declared compromised. The Commanding Officer, Army 

Security Agency, Austria reports that all personnel involved in this 

Incl: 
EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

compromise have been reimpressed vith'their responsibility in the 

handling and safeguarding of classified' material. Statements from 

the individuals concerned have been\received, and support the facts 

as presented by the Officer in Charge. A detailed summary of the 

station's training program has also be.en received, and that portion 

dealing with the proper handling of cla..ssitied information is con• 

sidered adequate. 

3. On 24 November 1954, a COMINT conipromise occurred at the 

3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Ala.ska. On 

that date a SECRET codeword message ·was discovered in an unrestricted 

trash area, where it could have been viewed by uncleared pei-sonnel. 

The compromised message contained organizatioIU1.l information 1:onnecting the Nat;Lonal Security Agency and certain U. S. Militar and 

Nava.l stations with intercept activity. 

were a so ncluded. This compromise occurred as a\.result of the 

failure of' an airman to thoroughly check supposedly\empty boxes for 

classified material before removing them from the communications center. The Commander, 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile reports that the responsible airman has been appropriately disciplined under Article 15 

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and that renewed emphasis 

is being placed on the reorientation of connnunications personnel in 

the proper handling and saf'eguarding of classified information. 

Statements f'rom the individuals concerned have been received, and 

support the facts as presented by the Commanding Officer. A\ comprehensive description of' the station's COMSEC training program has 

also been received, and it adequately stresses the importance Of 

secure storage and proper destruction of classified material • . , 

4. On 10 December 19541 a COMINT compromise occurred at the 

3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Elmendorf' Air Force Base, Alaska. On 

that date a copy of' a TOP SECRET codeword message was discovered in 

an unrestricted area by an airman who was olici the rounds. This 

compromise revealed our 

xact y how e message was remove rom e opera ons area o e unrestricted area in which it was found could not 

be definitely established. However, it is believed to have occurred 

while trash was being carried to an alternate burn area located in 

the unrestricted zone. The alternate site was being used because 

the incinerator located in the operations area was temporarily inoperative. Th~ Commander, 3rd Rad~o Squadron, Mobile rf"ports that 

if' it again be~omes necessary to r~move classified matter from the 

operations area for burning, a commissioned officer will be designated I to examine the condition of' each container prior to removal. In 

addition, permission to burn classified ll!&terial outside the operations 

area must be obtained from the Squadron Security Officer in all cases. 

Statements from the individuals concerned have been received, and support the. tacts as presented by the Commanding Off'icer. A complete 

description of' the station's security training program has also been 

'!0P GBe:Ml'.P SeN'l'RQL # 551444-B 

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~r.JJ>~2ul19FR ::::; '--'.A. '-.LI ..I.. .LJ z, EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 

received, and 1 t provides sufficient training in the pt"oper h:inclling 

of clasaified material. 

5. On 16 December 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the 

8610th Administrative Area Unit, Kyoto, Japan during on-line D,\t>IJNE 

operation. On that date a portion or a.CONF'IDENTIAt. messnc;c wrts t:-ansmitted -t.r.·the c1ear to the Army SecurityAsency, 'Far 'East ovcl." a. landline c:i,tcuit esumed vulnerable to :interception. This compromise 

and is not considered --se=r=i""'o""'u""'s""'~,...-_.,...,.,..,,e""'r,.....,,,...,.,,,.e...,m=e.,,..a"""s""a."""g""e--..,..,....,.........,..,.e..,.e""'n......,,.c""'om"""p,,....._e...,.....ely transmitted fr()m the 

86loth Administrative Area Unit to the Army' Security A~ency, Far East, 

the receiving operator requested a correction. This correction request was received partially Barbled, and both stations s1.ri.tchcd to 

the "text" position for a circuit check. Upon being informed that the 

test was being properly'receivcii, the 8Gloth Administrative Area Unit 

operator transmitted a tape containing the correction without switching 

his equipment back to the "cipher" position. The Commanding Officer, 

86loth Administrative Area. Unit rep6rts that a mo.dification, designed 

to prevent transmissions throUBh the transmitter distributor while the 

equipment is in "text11 , has been installed. In adaition, operators 

are now receiving more frequent tests to determine their knC>Wledge and 

understanding of proper security procedures. Statements from the individuals involved have been received, and support the\facts as pre .. 

sented by the Commanding Officer. A brief summary or the station's 

COMSEC training program ha.a also been received, and appears to provide 

adequate training in the proper operation of on-line circuits. 

6. On 21 December 1954, a COMINT compromise occurred at the 

Army Security Agency, 'Far East, Tokyo, Japan during ORCUS cryptographic 

operation. On tha.t da.te portions of two CONFIDENTIAL messages\were 

enciphered in depth a.s a. result or the use of a.n incorrect message 

rotor alignment. The messages were subsequently transmitted over a 

circuit composed of radio and wire links vu.lnera'ble to interce tion. 

This co romise 

e orrna on can 

be gleaned from the portions compromised. While encrypting the message the operator properly advanced the rotors from the ending rotor 

alignment of the previous message. However, he misread the resulting 

beginning rotor alignment, and entered it incorrectly in the crypto~ 

log. He then attempted to encrypt the message, but the clear text 

tape was not in a usable condition, necessitating a reencryption of 

the message. For the reencryption, the enciphering operator manually 

set the rotors at the incorrect 'beginning alignment entered in the 

cryptolog, which caused thP. rotors to repeat a rotor alignment reached 

during a previous encipherment. The operator1 pertorming check decryption, after twice attempting to decrypt the message, also used the 

beginning alignment shown in the cryptolog instead or investigating 

the reason for failure of the message to decipher properly. The Commanding Officer, Army Security Agency, Far East reports that the encr)'Pting operator has received further training in ORCUS procedures, 

'J!9P SEEKS'! SON'iBOl:a # 551M4-B 

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TOP SECRET EIDER 
!OP SBJRB! EIBBR 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

and that the check decryption operator has becn..\relicvcd ar; a trick 

chief' and has received. additional traininc;, not \only in procedures 

of each system used by the communications center,\ but also :!.n the 

importance of these procedures to t..he,sccurity of\the system. Statements from the individuals concerned ha.'le been received, and support 

the facts as presented by the Commanding Officer. A description of 

the station's training program for com.'T'unicait;ions security has also 

been received, a:nd appears to sui'ficiently stress the importance of 

strict adherence to existing instructions and procedures. 

7. On 29 December 1954, a COMI~"""T compromise occurred at the 

loth Radio Squadron, Mobile, Chicksands Pripry, England\dUT'ing.online PYTHON operation. On that date a portion of a SECRET codeword 

message was transmitted partially in clear text and partially in 

monoalphabetic substitution cipher to the 6961st Communications 

Squadron, San Antonio, Texas over a circuit composed of radio and wire 

links vulnerable to interce tion. This com romise 

The compromise resulted from the use of a onetime key tape containing a long stretch of "letters" characters followed 

by a shorter stretch of "carriage returns". The key tape involved 

was manufactured at a. time when only limited checking fa.cilitiesvere 

available. Since that time, however, all one-time key tapes receive 

a one-hundred percent electronic check which should preclude future 

shipment of tapes containing such non-random def'ects. Due to the fact 

that this compromise was the result of' a production deficiency,\ a 

statement regarding remedial action and a description of' the training 

program of the loth Radio Squadron, Mobile were not required. 

8. On 15 January 1955, a COMINT comprol\lise occurred at the Naval 

Security Group Detachment, Brem.erhaven, Germany. On that date a TOP ~ECRET codeword message was inadvertently transmitted in the clear\over ~ circuit composed of radio and wire links terminati at a 

It could not be determined at 

which point the transmission terminated since it•was not received at 

either of the receive terminals. It is believed, however, that the 

transmission was patched through Cuxhaven. This compromise is consid~ed 

serious since it revealed the following information: 

\\\ 

'!'OP ~~:Ri:W CQN@R.OL # 55l.A44-B 

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TOP SECRET EIDER . '-
• 

notation. 

EO ~.3(h)(2) 

PL86::.36/50 USC 3605 

d. Our TOP SECRET COM!NT codeWord. 

An operator at the Naval Securit;r.Group Detachment, Bremerhaven, in 

order to obtain 'a good copy of a garbled message he had Just received 

from the Army Security Agency, Europe, used the terminal position which 

was normally kept as a osition.. However the e ui ment ordinaril assi ned to the 

ne. The Commanding Officer, Naval Security Group Detachment, Bremerhaven reports that all terminal positions are now numbered, with no 

single position designated as a spa.re. When a position is mechanically 

inoperative, the position not being used at the time innnediately replaces the inoperative position and remains that circuit's terminal 

until further trouble is encountered. The circuits are identified by 

cards "With large block letters speci'l'ying the distant station, and 

these cards, along with the appropriate keys and rotors, are transferred from position to position by the supervisor when terminal changes 

are necessary. Statements from the individuals concerned have been 

received, and support the facts as presented by the Officer in Charge. 

A brief description of the .station's training program for communications 

security has also been received, and appears to provide gdequate training 

in that phase of circuit operation applicable to this particular type 

of violation. 

9. On 1 February 1955, a COMINT compromise occurred at the 

National Security Agency Connnunications Center during on-line PYTHON 

operation. On that date a portion of a SECRET codeword message was 

transmitted in the clear to the Army Security Agency, Europe over a 

circuit composed of landline and underwater cable links ·presumed vul.-

nerable to interception. This compromise reveals 

r ng rece p o e message 

from the Army ecur y gency, urope, cipher contact was lost on the 

National Security Agency side of the circuit. The operator at the 

National Security Agency, in an effort to regain cipher contact, 

switched his send side of the circu!_"!!_ to the "text" position, and 

stopped the transmission. He then .transmitted a short portion of the 

message, while still in the "text" position, to indicate to the distant operator from which point retransmission was required. The Chief, 

Operations Division, reports that the operator responsible has been 

reindoctrinated in the proper method of making on-line correction requests, and that all operators have been alerted to the seriousness of 

such an occurrence. Statements from the individuals concerned support 

the facts as presented by the Officer in Charge. The Communications 

Center's COMSEC training program provides operators with adequate training 

in correct on-line conmrunications procedures. 

10. On 14 February 1955, a COMINT compromise occurred at Detachment 2, 

'l'QP SEElRB'i' 00H'fHOL # 5514lr.4-B PAGE 5 OF 7 P.,..:AG"""F.""'.s,........ ......... ___ _ 

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TOP SECRET EIDER 
• 

• 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

34th Radio Squadron, Mobile, Iraklion, Crete during on-liue PYTHON 

operation. On that date a portion of' a SECRET codeword message was 

transmitted in the clear to Headquart'er.s, 34th Radio Squadron, Mobile, 

Wheelus Air Force Base, Tripoli over a radio circuit vulnerable to 

interce tion. This co romise 

While the 

message was being transmitted, poor cipher contact\wa.s encountered 

and the ci;rcuit was temporarily shut down. Upon ree.ctivating "the 

circuit approxima.tely "thirty minutes later, the operator at Detachment 2, 31-1-th Radio Squadron, Mobile, thinking he had\previously replaced th~ message tape wi"l;h a test tape, "turned on -the transmitter 

distributor and transmitted the remaining portion of the message in 

the clear .1 The Commander, 34th Radle Squadron, Mobile \reports that 

the opera~or responsible has been g ven precise insl:iructions on all 

pertinent !opera-ting procedures and all techniques ut~ilized by the 

Communications Center. In addition, all plain language tapes are now 

colored r~d to insure positive identification, the teletype page printer 

will be tμrned on whenever a message is being transmitted so that the 

operator can easily check its contents, a11d the connnunications training 

program has been revised with particular emphasis on the importance 

of strict adherence to proper procedures. Statements from the in- dividua~~ concerned have been received, and support the f'acts\a.S presented ~ the Commanding Officer. A complete outline of the r.evised 

communications security training program has also been received, and 

it provides operators with sufficient instruction in the operation of 

on-line c~rcuits. 

11. On 17 March 1955, a COMINT compromise occurred at the National 

Security Agency Communica'tions Center during on-line PYTHON operation. 

On that date a portion of a TOP SECRET codeword message was transmitted 

in m.onoalphabetic substitution cipher to Fort Me~de, Maryland over a 

land.line circuit presumed vulnerable to interception. This compromise 

is considered serious since it revealed the following aopects of the 

COMINT effort: 

During transmission of the message, the one-time key tape stuck over 

WOP SEQ:AE'i' 90!PPROL # 5 51444-B 

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• 

.. " . 

the sensing pins of the transmitter distributor• Ordinarily this would 

activate the torn tape stop mechanism which would shut off the transmitting equipment. A maintenance inspection of the mechanism, however, 

revealed that the end of tape contacts were not functioning properly 

clue to insufficient spring tension. To prev~nt future mechanica.l fail· 

ures, maintenance personnel are required to run operational and visual 

checks of the torn tape stop mechanism each time they a.re asked to check 

a circuit, as well as on a regular weekly basis. Statements from the 

individuals concerned have been received, and support the facts as presented by the Officer in Charge. Since this v:olation resulted from a' 

mechanical failure, no statement ~egarding corr.munications training is 

included. The frequent inspections of the torn tape stop mechanism now 

required greatly reduce the likelihood of a recurrence. 

'FOP SE9RB'f e ON'ffl:ot. # 5 51444-B 

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TOP SECRET EIDER 24