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DD I ~~~M50 9 4 REPLl\CES NME FORM 94, I FEB 49. WHICH MAY BE USED. 
.. T., P SEC R E'f7 ;Pl'ci.tlcD DO.UMElt8 OOIJAll ·eeE W9RB MAl'ERh\t 

SE6l!RITY INF ORM-AflfJft 

SEP 2 1952 

MEMORANOOM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF 

SUBJECT: Compromise of Codewords 

1. On a Memo Routing Slip dated 20 August 19.52, you asked the following 

questions t "Does COMSEC evaluate codeword violations? If not, who does?" 

2. The reply to these questions is as follows: 

'Ihe Office oi' Communication Security evaluates cryptographic or 

transmission-security compromises of COMINT codewords, reporting 

to the USCIB Coordinator. Other types of codeword compromises 

are not evaluated by the O.fi'ice of Communication Securiw. In 

all cases, the USCIB Coordinator has final determination 0£ . 

whether the reported compromise justifies supersession oi' the 

existing codeword. 

3. The number of reported codeword. compromises is indeed alarming. 

A number of recent actions have been designed to inprove the situation. 

a. USCIB Directive No. 6 has been revised to provide for more rapid 

reporting of codeword corrpromises. 

b. USCIB Directive No. 9 has been approved in an eff'ort to provide 

added prote~tion for COUNT informa. tion (the protection of which 

is more important than the protection of the COMINT codeword). 

c. !FSlG 1210 is being reissued to strengthen procedures £or 

reporting 0£ cryptographic or transmission compromises of codewords. 

d. 'lhe Office of Communication Security has prepared a letter to the 

Service cryptologic agencies designed to set forth in a body 

some broad principles of COMSEC for application to COMINT communications. 

4. As indicated in paragraph ,3. b. above, a realistic approach to the 

problem of COMINT security would be to do everything possible to insure the 

secui'i ty of OOMINT infomation. This does not necesarily extend to the 

protection of the codeword ~ ~· 

5. In many cases of' reported codeword 11 compromise,,n nothing has been 

compromised except the codeword in isolation; in some cases, the meaning 

or use of the word would not be derivable even by inference. 

TeP SECREl* "" -

APPENOEl:I D~:UMENfi 6QN1'A!N 

609i WQAP MAURIAL 
•• REF ID:A59740 

SECREWs!eunnv INFORMATION 

SEP 2 1952 

SUBJECT: Compromise of Codewords 

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6. For BOIJl8 time, it has appeared to some people around AFSA that 

we have had a case of the tail wa.gg:l.ng the dog in the relationship of 

the codeword to the material it is au.pposed to protect. Much thought 

has therefore bean given fl'Olll time to time to developing a :means ot 

making the codeword the servant rather than the master. One ot the results, as JOU JD8l' recall, was the recent recanmendation by this Division 

that codewords be retained tor a fixed period ot time, regardless ot 

codeword "compromises" 'Wbi.ch wuld inevitabl¥ occur during that time. 

The USCIB Coordinator at first agreed, in princip1e, with this recommendation, but suggested a renew ot the subject to determine "•••• the 

best unchanging procedure which might or might not be a codnord. n On 

1 August, a~ to this suggestion was prepared, atating that consideration had been g:Lvan to the use ot SJ111bols, color codes, phrases, 

and other possible replacements for codewords, but that no satisfactory 

replacement was found• However, your discussion with Admiral Wenger revealed that the Admiral. telt "•.. we should not loosen up our securit7 

UV' turther,11 and that it the reason for dropping changes in codewords 

is to solve the printing prob1an., that can be so1ved b7 other means. 

7. The recommendation concerning the retention of codewords tor 

a fixed time was not intended pr1mar.Lq to effect savings at the expense 

ot securit7. Rather, it was a recognition ot the fact that c:odnords 

have been continued in use tor some t:bae after thq have been "comp:romised.11, 

without; UT apparent compromise of the material.s designated b7 the codeword. The Chiet's of the Offices of Communication Secur.l.t7 and Operations 

concurred in this recommendation, but because Admiral. Wenger's v:Lews on 

possible securit7 risks are respected., the proposal has been withdrawn. 

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