" 

USCIB: 13.5/96 

~~925. 

HA:HBY!i VIA 90MIN'f' 0HlcHNEm5 ONIH 

Af'PENB!ffi BOOt:JMl!llff OOMH:EMS 

OOl)EWO!m M1t'fmt!AL 

24 January 1955 

!OP 8Ei0RB! • l:J.S. EFf!S OlUX 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

references: 

~ 

Compromises or CCMINT Information. 

(a) CIBD 119 (Revised) dated 4 February 1954. 

(b) USCIB 13.5/BS dated 8 November 1954. 

1. Enclosed herewith are (a) final reports on compromises of COMINT 

information due to ineffective communications security initially reported 

in reference (b), (b) initial reports or twelve U.S. (and one British) 

compromises hitherto unreported, and (c) final reports on the last 

mentioned compromises. Inclusion of both initial and final reports were 

deemed necessary inasmuch as the final reports are not complete in themselves. 

2. In order to prevent apparent duplicate reporting and lack of 

continuity, subsequent reports of compromise will be distributed only in 

complete final form except in cases when the nature of the compromise or 

other circumstances indicate that a USCIB member or the Executive 

Secretary needs the information immediately in order to take action 

thereon. 

24 

3. The twelve initial reports enclosed bring the total of this type · compromise since May 1953 to 94. 

Enclosures 

1. Summaries of Compromises Reported in 

NSA Serial 0004168 (USCIB 13.5/SS). 

2. Compromises of CCMINT Information 

-(NSA Serial 0005198). 

3. Summaries of Compromises Reported 

in NSA Serial 0005195. 

USCIB: 1.3.5/96 

-~lrl) :CGCl:JllDIT QG:N¥..'.:EN8 

OOBfORB M-A'fBRIAli 

HANBLEi VIA SCIUN'! 9I~Nmi5 ONY 

TOP SECRET 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-21-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 
• 

• 

NATIONAL mx;urnTY AGErICY 

Sumrn::i.ries of Compromises Fe-ported in l'JSJ\. Serial ooo:i16s -- -- The following sUllll1Ulries complete action on the occurrences of 

compromises of COMINT information reported in NSA Serial OOOln6s, 

dated 15 September 1951~: 

a. Reference is made to the compromise of COMINT information 

which occurred at the 6910th Security Group, Landsberg, Germany, on 

25 June 1954. In this i~stance the radio tranGmission of classified 

information in monoalphabetic substitution cip~er resulted from use 

of a. defective one-time key tape·. I!~stablished procedures do not 

require an examination of tapes for defects by the user. The key 

tape used for this transmission was manufactured during the period 

24 July 1951 through 12 May 1953· Prior to 10 June 1954, facilities 

were not available for effecting a lOafo electronic counter check of 

one-time key tapes. H~¥ever, on 10 June 1954, 100% electronic counter -l }' 

check of all three inch one:tiiiielt"ey tapes was begun by this Agency. 

-Statements have -been-received irom the individuals concerned and 

support the facts as reported by the officer in charge. However, a 

, description of the trainine prosram for communication security as 

applied to COMINT material was not included in the report received 

from the violating station. 

b. Reference is :made to the compromise of COMINT information which occurred at the 696lst Communications Squadron, San . Antonio, Texas, on 23 July 1954. In this instance the teletype 

wire transmission of classified information in monoalphabetic 

substitution cipher resulted from mechanical malfunctionill5 of 

equipment. An inspection of the faulty equipment revealed that 

the operating cam on the main shaft had slipped, allowing the 

sensina pins to remain above the level of the tape guide. This · preventec the tape from advancing properly to the next combination. 

Since the tape did not advance through the tape guide, the feed 

wheel stripped the feed holes in the tape. _The_ followiug remedia.l 

measures have been effected by Cominander, 6961st Communications 

Squadron to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of a similar 

incident; maintenance personnel have been cautioned to ensure that 

the operating cam on the main shaft is properly adjusted and setscrews ti~htened to prevent the cam from shifting, and cryptographic 

operators have been cautioned to mainta.i11 an alert surveillance of 

key ta.pe when operating PYTHON circuits. Statements have been 

received from the individuals concerned and support the facts as 

reported by the officer in charge. However, a description of 

the training program for communication security as applied to 

COMINT material Wa.s not included in the report received from the 

violating station. · 

'f6P SEeREl'f CON'fROL Nl:JMBER 550019-B' 

COPY 2 Cf OF 50 COPIES 

PAGE 1 OF --y- PAGES 

TOP SECRET 
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• I 

'f6P B:SCREl'f PRO'ffI 

NATIONAL SECURI'l'Y AGENCY 

Washington 25, D. c. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

Rt. 86-36/50 USC 3605 

COllPROI-ITSP.S or COi.·DJiT IllFOTIHJ" .. T!OIT 

l. On l June 1954, n cono1runico.tions security violation occurred at 

the lat Radio Squadron Hobile, Hismro. _'\ir Bnsc, Jo.pan.. On tha.t date 

portions of fourteen SECRET CODEWORD messo.ses ucre enciphered in depth 

and transmitted over communications circuits composed o.t' ro.dio o.nd wire 

links. Successful interception nnlst be presumed and the\ ini'or:ma.tion, 

including the SECRET CODEWORD, must be considered comprornisecl. The 

probability of locatinc; the depth is 95 per cent. Once the depth is 

located, plain text recovery is not difficult. The compromise represents 

a serious breach of' COI•ID1T. The followi.ng information has\been revealed: 

2. on 7 June 1954, a communicatiomi security violation occurred a.t 

the First Weather Wing, Tolcyo, Japan. On that date portions of\ two 

TOP SECRET CODEWORD messages 1'1ere inadvertently transmitted in the cl.ear 

to the FJ.eet Weather Central, Yokosuka., Japan. Since the transmisBions 

utilized a wire circuit vulnerable to interception, the ini'ormati.on. must 

be considered compromised. The subject vio1ation, if intercepted, l"eveaJ.s 

our a.bilityl I 

3. On 8 June 1954, a coitmlunications security violation occurred\ at 

the 15th RSM, osan, Korea. On that d.ate portions of two TOP SECRET CODEWORD 

messages were enciphered in depth an~ transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and wire links vulnerable to interception. Al.though 

this transmission is considered compromised, it is highly improbable ~t 

the depths can be located since they are very short in relation to the 

number of comparisons for the crypto period. The compromise involves a I portion of a I I 

'l'6P BEemft' eeN'fReL NUMBBR 54-3242 

COPY OF 61 COPIES 

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES 

NSA Form 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET FROTII 

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'Fii 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 8.6-36/50 USC 3605 

4. On 9 J'une 1951~, a. comnrunico.tiono security Violation occurred at 

the lst Hadio Squadron Mobile, lliso.wa r~:tr\ Baae Jo.po.n. On tho.t do.te 

t>Ortions of nineteen Sl!:CR!!:T CODI!.'WOH.D messo.geo were enciphcre(1 in depth 

and transmitted over communications circuits compose<l of ro.clio o.nd wire 

links vul.nerable to interception. The informn.tion in depth must be 

considered compromised. The possibility of locatin~ the tlcpth is 

approximately 95 per cent. The compromiM, very serious in nature, 

reveals the following crn.mJT: 

5. On 21 July 1954, a communications security violo.t:ion occurred at 

the Arm:y' Security Agency, Europe. On th.o.t date a SECRET CODE\lORD and a 

CONFIDENTil\J_, message were inadvertently transmitted \.in mono...:.alpha.betic substitution cipher to the 86o6th Administrative .'\reo. Unit, Herz.a Bo.se, 

Germany. Since the circuit, composed oi' o. 11ire circuit with relay points 

at Frankfurt, Ginnheim and Uurnbera, io vulnerable to\ interception, and 

since mono-alphabetic substitution cipher is vulnerable to cryptanalytic 

attack, the transmissions must be conoidered compromised. l\.lthou(5h the 

CONFIDENTIAL message did not reveal COI·InlT, the SZCRET\CODIDTCRD message 

reveals our ability to I I Further,\ the 

message disclosed, in technical terms, our difficulty in recording this 

type signal. 

6. On 23 July 1954, a communico.tiono oecurity violation occurred at 

the 1st Wireless Regiment. On that date a. portion of a SECRET CODEWORD 

message was transmitted in the clear over o. land.line circuit to the 

502nd Communications Reconnaisso.nce Company, Heilbi·onn, Germany. Since 

the relevant transmission was vulnerable to ter e · b 

considered c romised. 

'!!OP Si:SRE'! 99N'i'R0fa NUMmlR 54-3242 

COPY OF 61 COPIES 

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES 

NSA Form 781-CIOS I Jul 52 'f0P SECRET FR0'FII 

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• 

T~ SECRE¥J.1\~1,II e:q 3.3(h)(2) 

'i'C:IP E · :·, ;• i ! l'i' l x i(:l'[If PL.86-36/50 USC 3605 

7. On 29 July 1954, a. conmrunico. tion.tt oecm~i ty viola. tion occurr~d 

at the 29th Radio Squadron lf.obilc, Yontan, Ql'd.navra. On tho.t elate portions 

of a TOP GZCRET CODEWDnD mer;s;'l.c;c were enciphcrca.. in depth o.ncl tro.n!Jmi tted over comnrunica tions circui ta composccl\of' ra.d.io and. •Tire links 

vulnerable to interception to the 6920th Sec.ur.i ty .Group. Succcsoful 

interception must be o.ssum.ca. o.ml the subject\-p.ortions considcrecl compromised. 

However, it is improbable tho.t the depth in this mcci;.;o.ec co.n beloco.ted 

and read since the leneth or the depth is snnll\.in compa.ricon to the 

n'Ulllber oi' cho.racters enciphered clurincs this er to eriod. •.rhe in:f'ormation 

compromised contains ca.mrT informntion 

8. On 7 AUo"'tlst 1954, o. communications security violation occurred at 

the Army Security Agency, Pacific. On that a.ate a \portion of a. CO.NFIDENTIAL 

message was inadvertently transmitted in the clco.r over a comnrunications 

circuit composed of ro.clio and wire linlcs to the Uat:i.onai Security Agency, 

Washington 25, D. c. Since the relevant transmi.osion ·wns vulnerable to 

interception, the inrormation mu.st be considered compromised. The subect 

violation discloseo our abil1t to 

9. On 7 August 195h, a cornmunico.tions security viala.tion\occurred a.t 

the 6961st Connnunications Squadron, San Antonio, Texas. \On toot date a. 

'Portion of a. SECRET CODEWORD message wo.s tra.nsmi tted. in mono-alphabetic 

substitution cipher over a land.line circuit to the No.tiona.l Security 

Agency, Washington 25, n.c. Since the circuit was vulnerable to intercept, 

the mono-alphabetic portion of the subject tro.nsmiosion mus.t be considered 

compromised. The inf'orma. tion com.promised isl I 

I u o a: . 10. On 8 .L\.U5Ust 1954, a communications security viola.tion. occurred 

at the 6961.st Communications Squadron, San Antonio, Texa.o. Qn\tha.t date 

a portion of a SECRET CODEWCRD .messo.c;e wo.s ino.dvertently transmitted in 

the cl.ear to the 10th Radio Squo.clron I-tobile, Chicksa.nds Priory, \Enc;land. 

As the cormmmications c:lrcu1t co.rryinc; this transmission wo.s composed ot 

radio a.nd 'Wire links, the information must be considered c rom:i.sed. 

The subject viola.tion, if intercepted, 

ll. On 12 August 1954, a communications security violation occ"Urred 

at the 15th Radio Squadron Mobile, Osan, Korea. On th::l.t date portions 

of two TOP SECRET CODEWORD messages were inadvertently enciphered in 

depth and transmitted over communications circuits composed of radio and 

wire i:lllks vulnerable to interception. Successful inte1·ception nmst be 

-presumed a.nd the information in depth considered compromised. Tbe 

I I 

NSA Farm 78l·Cl0S l Jul 52 

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12. On 19 August 1954, a communications security violation occurred 

at the Special Security Office, U.S. Air France Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany. 

On that date a portion of a TOP SECRET CODEWORD message entitled "USJ\FE 

Weekly Special Intelligence Smrmnry No. 33-51~"·; was in.aclvertently transmitted over a 'Wire circuit, to the Air Force Ha.jor Relo.y Sta.tion Siegelbach, 

Germany. Since the circuit we vulnerable to intercention. the informntion 

in the clear must be considered compromised. I 

I 

13. On 14 September 1954, a communications security Viola tioil, occurred 

at the Arrrzy' Security Agency, Europe. On that date a portion 9f'B. TOP SECRET 

CODEWORD message was transmitted in mono-alphabetic subst~tution cipher 

over a wire circuit to the Special Security Office, H~idelberg, Germany. 

Since the relevant transmission was vulnerable to interce tion the 

information must be considered c romised. 

3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'!'Or' SBeRm eelft'fteL NUMmm 54-3242 

COPY OF 61 COPIES 

PAGE I 4 OF 4 PAGES 

NSA Form 781-ClOS I Jul 52 T0P SE€RET FR0TII 

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NJ\TIOr.Il\L GE:CURrl'Y AGENCY 

Sunnuaries of Com1)romises Rerorted j_n NSA Serial 0005198 rm 

1. The following summaries complete action on the occurrences 

of compromises of COMINT inform:J.tion reported in NGA Serio.l 0005195, 

dated 29 November 1954: 

a. Reference is ma.de to two occurrencea of compromise of 

COMINT information that occurred on 1 June 1954, o.nd 9 June 1954, 

art the 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, Misawo. 1\ir Base, Jo.pan. In each 

instance, encipherment in depth resulted from faulty rotor stepping 

during encryption. An in:Jpection of the faulty equipment revealed 

that a rotor ste"J?ping contact remained open when the periphery failed 

to close the swinger contact. Toe aubsequent ~nvcsti8ation of the 

circumstances surrounding the:Je compromises further revealed that 

respons~~le p~r~nn.cl w~re ne~ligent in the~r duties ~nasmuch as they fai~.ed -to check decrypt the m<:?sso.g(>s in o.ccor<lance wl th prescribed 

procedures. Di~ciplinary action has been taken against the personnel 

concerned for noncompliance wlfJ1Standnrd Operat~ng Procedures, and 

for noncompliance with Communication Operating Instructions for 

COMINT Activities. Sto.temcnts from the individuals concerned, and 

a description of the trainins proGram for communication security 

as applied to COMINT material were not included in the report received from the violating station. 

b. Reference is made to thP compromise of COMINT information which occurred at the Firs"\. ~·:eathcr Wing, Tolr..yo, Japan, on 

7 June 1954. Transmission in the clear of the meosages involved 

resulted from failure of the transmitting operator to comply with 

prescribed procedures upon receipt of a "break" signal from the 

receiving station. Because a shortue;c of personnel existed at 

the First Weather Wing at the t.:.mc of this occurrence, each 

operator was responsible for monitorJnrr_three m~chines'which 

norinaliy run simultaneously. The invcstieatine officer concluded 

that the work load of the cryptographic operator was a contributing factor to this compromise. Appropriate action h~p been 

taken to ensure that crypto~rnphic operators receive comprehensive 

training in the systems in use, and in-focni procedures and 

requirements. The Special \leather IntelliGence Security Officer, 

Headquarters, 1st Weather Wine, has requeated thut higher Air 

Force Headquarters make every effort to expcdit.e Special Weather 

Intelligence clearances of personnel. Statements from the 

individuals concerned, and a description of "\.he training pro- 1 

gram for communication security as applied to COMINT material, \ 

I 

were not included in the report received from the violating I 

station. 

c. Reference is :m...'1.de to two occurrences of compromise 

of COMINT informo.tion that occurred on 8 June 1951~ and 12 

August 1954 at the 15th Radio Squadron, Mobile, Osan, Karee.. 

In each instance, encipheI'I'l.ent in depth resulted from use of 

incorrect enciphering procedures by the same individual. 

TOP SECRET 

iz. μ,. 00 

H 

·. 

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... 

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• • 

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... •• 

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'i'OP GEG'R'S'i' 

The subsequent invcGtie;ation revealed that the circumstances surroundinG the ~tions resulted from lack of close und or proper 

supervision, failure to cnt~blish oper~tor capn l i ics, improper 

cryptocenter procedur.es, and lack of, or improper, tr::dnine of 

personnel. The investic;ation further revealed that the operator 

was under a severe emotional strain ~i1ich wo.s obviously a contributing factor to his inadvertent enciphermcnt of the subject 

messages. The followitl{5 remedial action has been to.ken to preclude or reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of ::;imilar 

incidents: (a) The cryptosecuri ty officer _"!_i]..~ persoroll.y 

interview each operator to attempt to eGtablish his capabilities 

o.nd experience. This interview will be closely coordiria"tcd wii~h 

supervisory personnel. (b) A conclusive method of_ ins.truction 

will be implemented in the cryptoccnter to ensure the use and 

understandina of proper cryptocenter procedureG at all times. 

( c) Periodic interv-1£.¥-S will be held with personnel to ascertain 

that""tfiey arc not under undue emotional strain. The Conuniinder, 

15th Radio Squadron, Mobile, further reporto th~~strict_ compLiance 

with pr~_P.er cryptographic procedu~es i-SO: subl~£t of speciai 

emphasis and attention with all personnel. No disciplinary 

~aetion bas been taken or is contemplated. Statements have been 

received from the individuals concerned and support the facts as 

reported by the officer in charge. However, a description of 

the training progro.rn for communication security as applied to 

COMINT material was not included in the report received from the 

violating station. 

d. Reference is made to the compromise of' COMil'JT 

informo.tion which occurred at the Army Security Agency, Europe, 

on 21 July 1954. In this instance, transmission of COMINT 

in:f'orl'ffiltion in monoalphab~tic substitution cipher resulted 

from an on-line cryptographic transmission without rotors in 

the ASAM 2-1. The subsequent investigation revealed that the 

operator was negligent in his duties in failine; to properly 

prepare the cipher equipment for on-line operation. Instructions 

were issued to all cryptographic personnel which require that 

on-line ASAM 2-1 cipher equipment be provided with rotors at 

all times, rcBardlcss of circuit conditionG. Supervisory 

personnel are now charged with ~crspnal examin;tion of t"he 

cipher equipment to ens\Jrc adher~ncc to these_ins"tructions. 

The.r~ponsible operator has been given six_d~ys additional 

instructions in cryPtographic procedures, and an official letter 

of reprimand by the Chief, Army Security AGcncy, Europe. A 

description of the training procro.rn for conununication security 

as applied to COMit1T material has been received. However, otatements from the individtt'.11s concerned were not included in the 

report of investi~ation received from the violutina station. 

2 

TOP SECRET 

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-WOP 

'fOP Sfetll"'i' 

e. Reference i.s 11UJ.dc to the comproI'lise o:f GOI·ITNT irlf'0rmation wh'f.ch oc<!urred nt U.e let WirelC'GG Rcc;imcnt on 23 .Tuly 1954. 

A SECRET couew~"d me~sagP., orisino.t~d by the 332nd Communico.tions 

Reconnaissance Compa:Qy. wo.o bcin~ relayed 'Ly the 50211d C~n munico.tions ne~onar.i.issance Group to the lr:;t Wireless Rcc,ime:nt wh~n 

cipher canto.ct was tem.1:loro.ri~-Y lost. Tne rec~j_ving operator, failing to realize be •,ras in the "text" position, tr::msmitter a port:!.on 

of the messa~e i~ the clear to indicate to the transmitting operator 

from which point to rceUine transmission. GCHQ h~G been i~formed 

of this occurrence. Since the violating station ls a Bi:-jtisl'. 

activit.y, this information is forwarded for whatever ac-1;.io~ ITld.Y be 

de~mcd ~dvisable. 

f. Rcf'erence is 111D.tk l.o the com!lr::>mise of' COMINT info,..-

m.ation which occurred at Fli3lit. A, 29t.:h Radio Squo.dron, Mobile, 

'Yontan, Okinawa, 0n 29 July 1954. The comp.L·omiscd information 

wo.& enciphered in depth ns a result of r0tor failure during O~CUS 

c~yptogra~hic operation. In thic irstnncc, the cause of the rotor 

f'ailu:re could not be determ~ncd. The vi0lation was not detected 

due to failure of the operator to comp~etely ch~ck decrypt the 

rr1essage because of a heavy bu.cklog of incoming traffic. Gnly one 

ORCUS po::>i tion was avO.ilci.ble for bvth the breakit16 of incoming 

traffic and the check decryption of outGoing mesoa~es. The 

C~mrnander, FLT A, 29th Radio Squadron, Mobile, i·eport£' thai; 

operators have been in£'truct~d to completely check decr,rpt all 

messar;es reeardless of the amount of' traffic on hand. State1i1ents from the individuals concerned £-nd a description of the 

training program for conununication s~curity 2s a~pliC'd to 

COM1NT material were not included in the rcpo~t r~ceived from 

the violo.tine station. 

g. Reference is made to the comr-romisc:- of C:Gr·ti:NT info1 -

mation whkh occurred at the Army Scc•.irity f\.3'?ncy, Pacific, Tokyo, 

Jnran, on 7 August 1954. In this instG.ncc, the clear text ·transmission resulted rrom failure of the '3.utom'.3.tic tap~ feed alarm 

t_o !'unction wheu the ei:id ol the roll o:L one-time kc.:y tape, used in 

cunjunctinn with 5UCO operation, h:-.d passcJ throt~gh the uutoma.tic 

keying head. Consequently, a po~tion or tl•c rr.cs::;age waL transmitted in clear text be~ore this cor.dition was detected. An 

ins9ection of thr. equipment revealed ex~essive wear of the 

commutator wheel which activates thC' tape feed a.lo.rm. The Chief, 

Army 3ecuri ty Agcn.::y, Pacif'ic, ha.d rcqucst_ed reP.J-Q.cc111cnt pt'_rt.s 

for this equip,11cnt r>rior to thla occurrence. IIoVJever, repJ.o.ce:-

mcnt parts for the corr.rr.utator asser..bly 11cre not ava.il'.l.blc at 

that tir.ie. In view of the circumstances st:rrounding thir. comproCTise, statements from the ~ndividtl!lls concerned, ~nd ~ 

dcc;cription o-r the tra.inin~ pro13ro.m 'fo::- corrJ!lunicr1.-.:.ion sectU"i +,y 

as applied to COHIH'.i' mutcrie.l were not rcquj red from the 

violating station. 

TOP 3SECRET 

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'f'Of' OECffil'f' 

h. Reference is made to the compromise of COMirlT information which occurred at the 6961st Communications Squadron, San 

Antonio, Texas, on '{ August 1954. In this instance transmission , 

in monoalphabetic substitution cipher resulted from mechanical 

malfunctioninc; of the ASAM 2-1. An inspection of th~ faulty 

equipment revealed that malfunctioninc; was caused by _wo:r!LP.arts 

which required replacing. The m~chine had been given a normal 

10 day maintenance inspection on 5 August 1954, and a regular 30 

day maintenance inspection on 15 July i95li. Action has been 

taken by the Commander, 69G1Gt Connnunico.tions Gqua.dron, to fiL_n.sure 

a mo~e_detailed monthly m:iin~e~~nc~_in~ection of th~ e~~ipment. 

Statements have been received from the individuals concerned and support 

the facts as reported by the officer in charge. However, a description of the training program for communication security n.s applied to 

COMINT material was not included in the report received from the 

violating station. 

i. Reference is made to the compromise of COMINT-jnfor-· 

mation which occurred at the 6961st Communications Squadron, San 

Antonio, Texas, on f! Aue;ust 1951+. This clear text transmission 

resulted from failure of the operator, after receiving a garble, 

to adhere to the prescribed on-line break procedure while advising 

the transmitting operator at whjch point to resume transmission. 

The operator, not realizing he was in the "text" position, made 

reference to the point of correction by using actual message text 

rather that the appropriate line number. This compromise occurred 

during the evening meal, at which time an operator who normally 

operates only one full duplex circuit is required to operate two. 

The Commander, 696lst Communications Squ.-:idron, has reported that 

the _2pera-t;ox ;-esponsible has been disciplined ul'!dcr _Article .J..5 .. of 

the Unifor.m Code of Military Justice, and that an o..:p~rator wili 

?lever be assigned ~ore than one fuli duplex circuit. A statement 

has been received from the individual qonccrned and-supports the 

facts as reported by the officer in charge. However, a description of the training program for communicatlon security as applied 

to COMINT material was not included in the report received from 

the violating station. 

j. Reference is made to the compromise or COMINT information which occurred at the Special Security Office, U. S. Air 

Force, Europe, Wiesbaden, Ge~many, on 18 August 1954. In this 

instance, a newly assigned operator was performing on-line 

cryptographic operation under the supervision of a senior operator. 

The violation occurred when the operator bee;an preparation of a tape 

for transmission prior to disestablishing the circuit over which 

a portion of the subject tape was transmitted. The responsibili~y 

for this compromise was assumed by_ the senior operato~_to whom 

the inexperienced oper~tor was assigned for training. Senior 

operators have been given a special training course J:IlOrder-to ----- --- --- -

TOP 4SECRET 

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'POP eECllET 

improve their instructing ability. The portion of the training 

program devoted to esto.blish.mcnt and disestablishment of circuits 

is being emphasized. Further, the patch box lo.mp, which indicates 

the operational status of the circuit involved, has been moved to 

a position directly in ~rant of the teletype operator position. A 

description of the tro.inine:; program for communication security as 

applied to COMINT material has been received. Gtatements have 

also been received from the individuals concerned and support the 

facts as reported by the officer in charge. 

k. Reference is made to the compromise of COMINT information which occurred at the Army Security Agency, Europe, on 

14 September 1954. The transmission in monoo.lphabetic substitution 

cipher resulted from the use of a key tape reel containing an 

undersized hub. This defect prevented the tape reel from rotating 

freely on the axle of the reel holder, and did not allow the key 

tape to step normally throUfih the transmitter distributor. Since 

this created tension on the key tape, the feed holes became torn 

and caused the tape to stjck over the sensing pins or the transmitter distributor. The Chief, Army Security Agency, Europe, has 

reported that all operators have been warned to check the fit of 

tape reels before use in order to ensure free rotation. The 

torn tape stop mechanism, which is specifical:l:Y_ 9-esigμ~d to prevent occurrences of this nature, is now installed on the circuit 

involved. A"description of the training program for communication 

security a.s applied to COMINT :ma.terial has been received. Statements from the individuals concerned were not required. 

NOI'E: In all of the above instances where it is stated that statements have not been received from the individuals concerned 

or that a description of the training program for communication 

security as applied to COMINT material was not included, the 

final report by the violating station was prepared prior to 

receipt of the National Security Agency Circular which requires 

this information. 

"fOP 3EC:tt8"f COM'i'ftOL MtJMBER 550019-C 

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