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DISPOSITION PLAN 

FOR 

BYEMAN STUDIES 

30001 & 50006 

MAJOR ASSETS 

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D K A 1" T . 

CONTENTS 

1.0 Purpose 

2.0 Applicability and Scope 

3.0 Project Schedule 

4.0 Background 

).0 Concept 

6.0 Management Organization and Responsibilities 

7.0 Funding and Contracting 

8.0 Security 

9.0 Information 

TABS 

A 

B. 

c. 

D. 

Photo of A-ll Configured with n-21 

(Proposed USAF Huseum Display)' 

President Johnson's 24 Feb 1964 A-1l Press 

Statement 

Copy of A-1l Article from 1964 Air Force and 

Space Hagazine 

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RECORD OF APPROVALS 

AND COORDINATION 

APPROVED 

.~,--" 

Director, National 

Reconnaissance Office 

Chief of Staff, USAF 

COORDINATION 

HA'HH .. f. VIA 

BYEMAN 1).,'I'~.~¢'f POL ::'Y";'TEM 

Comptroller, NRO AF/PR 

Director, NRO Staff AF/PRPL 

SAF/OI 

AF/LGY 

AF/LG 

AF/LGYJ 

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1.0 PURPOSE 

I nn C'r'"or"', uv _iltkt",.~r~ 

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This plan issues policy and guidance required to (a) transfer nine A-II aircraft and seventeen D-2l drones from the 

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) to the USAF, (b) 

declassify the physical assets, and (c) relocate assets to 

permanent storage areas during fiscal year 1977. 

2.0 SCOPE 

2.1 Sufficient detail is contained in this plan to preclude 

the necessity for any other agreements concerning the dis- .. 

position of major assets (airframes and engines) associated, 

with BYEMAN Study 30001 (A-II) or BYEMAN Study 50006 (D-2l). 

2.2 The content and organization of the remainder of this plan 

are summarized as follows: 

SECTION 3.0 Project Schedule - Key Events 

SECTION 4.0 Background - brief discussion'of the A-ll/ 

A-12 and D-2l projects; no current requirement; impact of B-1 production on A-II 

storage area. 

SECTION 5.0 Concept - relocate A-II and D-2l assets to 

MASDC for continued extended storage except 

for those selected assets offered for 

museum display. 

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SECTION 6.0 Management Organization and Responsibilities -

details tasking on NRP and Air Staff elements. 

SECTION 7.0 Funding and Contracting - approximately $1.3M 

and Lockheed support will be required for 

terminal relocation. 

SECTION B.O Security - reviews rationale for, and presents 

a statement of terminal security policy. 

SECTION 9.0 Information - unclassified statement of A-II 

and D-21 history. 

3.0 PROJECT SCHEDULE 

..... r\NDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

Event 

1. Finalize preliminary pIau. 

2. Plan coordination and 

approval .. 

3. AFLC provides: 

a. MASDC information 

and input schedule. 

h. Asset preservation cost. 

c. Museum information 

and input r~quirements., 

4. Finalize contractor's 

statement of work. 

5. Negotiate FY 77 storage 

and disposal contract. 

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OPR 

NRO/SS-4 

NRO!SS-4 

AF/PRPL 

NRO/SS-l~ 

CIA/OD&E 

NLT DATE 

. Mid-Nov 75 

31 Dec 75 

31 Mar 76 

30 Apr 76 

31 May 76 

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6. Relocate D-2l to 

MASDC and museums 

commencing Ju1 76. 

7. Relocate A-II to 

MASDC and museums 

'commencing Oct 76. 

Det 42 

NRO/SS-4 & 

Contractor 

31 Dec 76 

'31 Jun 77 

4.0 BACKGROUND 

4.1 The A-11/A-12 aircraft was operated for the NRP by CIA 

from 1962 thru mid-1968. With its mission assumed by the 

USAF SR-71, the nine ship fleet was placed into non-flyable 

storage at Site 2, Plant 42 (Lockheed), Palmdale, California 

in June 1968. 

4.2 The D-21 drone was developed by the NRP for use in conjunction with the A-11/A-12, as shown in Tab A. Subsequent 

to A-12 deactivation, the D-21 program was relocated to 

Beale AFB, California, and adapted 'to the B-52H launch 

platform. In June 1972, the program was terminated and 

seventeen D-2l drones were relocated to storage atl 

4.3 During May 1975, the Director of Central Intelligence, 

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Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Director, 

National Reconnaissance Office and the Vice Chief of Staff, 

USAF determined that there was no current NRP or USAF 

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requirement for the A-ll/A-12. Since program termination 

no further D-21 requirement has been identified. 

4.4 B-1 production facility planning envisions use of the A-Ill 

A-12 storage area within Plant 42 early in CY 1978. This 

planning dictates the removal of these assets not later 

than 30 June 1977. 

5.0 CONCEPT 

5.1 A-1l/A-12 airframes including engines not Tequired by the 

SR-71 program will be shipped from Plant 42 at a rate 

I 

slightly in excess of one airframe per month commencing 

October 1976. 

a. A minimum of two A-lIs including engines will be 

offered for appropriate museum display as USAF aircraft. 

The D-2l modified A-II will be offered to the USAF museum; 

an operational A-II will be offered to the Smithsonian. 

b. A-II airframes not required for public display 

will be shipped by surface to the Military Storage and 

Disposition Center (MASDC), Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona 

for extended storage andlor operational withdrawal as 

required by. USAF. 

5.2 D-21 drone airframes will be shipped by and from~ 

lat an approximate rate of three per ~--------------------~ 

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Approved for j~!seYc!i ~fit16 COS ~ 15217 HANDLE VIII 

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month commencing July 1976. 

a. One drone wili be ,shipped to the USAF museum 

for mating with an A-II. 

b. Sixteen D-2ls will ,be shipped via C-5 to MASDC., 

5.3 Engines not required by the SR-71 Program, USAF depots 

or museum display air vehicles will be shipped to MASDC. 

5.4 Effective with plan approval, "ownership" of A-U and 

5.5 

D-21 assets will transfer from the NRP to the USAF. 

6.0 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

6.1 The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) staff focal 

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point for dispOsition activity is the Deputy Director 

for Operations (SS-4). He is responsible for: 

NRO COmptroller. 

a. All aspects of relocation and transfer planning. 

h. Submitting project budgetary estimates to the 

c. Directing the activities of D relative to 

D-21 relocatio~ and contracting officer Support relative 

to A-II items. 

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d. Arranging for u.s. Government contracting with 

Lockheed Aircraft Company. 

6.2 The NRO Comptroller is responsible for effecting cost-sharing 

and funds transfer arrangements necessary to support this 

plan. 

6.3 AF/PRPL will serve as the Air Staff focal point for this 

plan and is responsible for: 

a. Acting as the "white" owner of A-II and D-2l 

assets in relocation transactions • 

• 

b. Advising Hq AFLC of disposition planning and, 

(1) obtaining MASDC input schedules and capabilities to 

support arrival off-load operations, 

(2) obtaining indication of interest fran USAF and 

Smithsonian Museums relative to airframe donations. 

Interest will be accompanied by museum groundrules for 

acceptance and reception of donated property. 

6.4. AF/LGYJ is recognized as both the Site 2, Plant 42 facility 

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BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

administrator and logistic focal point for the SR-7l. 

As such, LGYJ will: 

a. Be appraised of A-ll/A-12 relocation planning, 

scheduling and progress. 

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h. Insure A-II museum display does not impact 

unfavorably on SR-7l security. 

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7.0 FUNDING AND CONTRACTING 

7.1 Funding 

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a. The relocation of A-II and D-2l major assets will 

require, in very rough-order-of-magnitude, $1.2 million 

to ach:ie ve the 

(1) A-II 

(a) 

, 

(b) 

(c) 

(2) D-21 

(a) 

(b) 

following: 

Relocation 

7 A-lIs to MASDC 

2 A-lIs to Museums 

Plus two C-5 SAAMS 

MAS DC Preservation 

Support 

Subtotal, A-II 

Relocation 

16 D-2ls to MASDC 

via C-5 

1 D-2l to USAF museum 

Subtotal, D-21 

TOTAL COST 

ROM 

COST 

$S60K 

250K 

l40K, 

SOK 

1,OOOK 

l7SK 

2SK 

22SK 

$1,22SK 

b. The NRO Comptroller in coordination with the USAF 

Comptroller will determine applicable cost sharing arrangements and provide for funds transfers as necessary. 

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c. Separate USAF action will be taken to fund periodic 

maintenance actions required for the extended MASDC 

storage of A-II and D-2l assets. 

7.2 Contracting (Preliminary Concepts) 

7.2.1 The A-II storage contract with Lockheed will be modified 

ItANOL ( VlA 

BYEMAN 

eor,trROl SYSTEM 

for FY 1977 to provide the following contractor services 

between 1 Oct 1976 and 31 June 1977. 

a. Rehabilitate the special A-II transport 

trailer. 

I 

b. Minumum disassembly of A-II aircraft for surface.movement. 

c. Surface movement of 7 A-II from Palmdale to 

MASDC. 

d. Reassembly of A-lIs at MASDC. 

e. Disassembly and loading/off-loading of two 

A-lIs relocated to East 'Coast museums. 

f. Arranging and providing local transportation to 

museums. 

g. Setting up USAF museum display of A-II with D-21. 

h •. Preparing A-II storage area, Site 2, Plant 42 

for turn over to AF/LGYJ. 

i. Sanitizing A-II aircraft records. 

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7.2.2 The U.S.Government will provide air transportation for 2 

A-lis and one D-2l destined for East Coast museum displays. 

7.2.3 Prior to contract negotiation, the tasks outlined in 

para 7.2.1 above may be modified in view" of AFLC provided information covering: 

(a) MASDC and museum capabilities to arrange off-loading and surface towing of A-II and D-2l assets. 

(b) Requirements for contractor support assistance 

in final display/parking activities. 

8.0 SECURITY 

8.1 Termination security policy has been developed in conH/.NUl E VIA 

BYEMAN 

"ONTHOL SYSTEM 

sideration of the following: 

a. The A-12 and D-2l materiels and administrative 

documentation have been controlled as BYEMAN Studies 30001 

and 50006 respectively. The reasons for this compartmental 

security control include: 

history. 

(1) NRP/CIA developmental and operational 

(3) Reconnaissance mission capability. 

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b. Original Lockheed proposals and designs for 

the A-12 designated this aircraft the A-II. The A-II 

exists as unclassified due to its: 

(1) Official public disclosure by President 

Lyndon B. Johnson on 24 February 1964. , 

(2) Alleged experimental USAF role. 

(3)"-----1 _______ _ 

c. The D-21, as an unmanned experImental vehicle, 

either alone or in association with the B-S2H existed as 

I 

unclassified information as early as 1968. 

8.2 Security Policy 

a. Actual NRP/CLA history and documentation related to 

the A-ll/A-12 and D-2l will continue to be controlled 

within the BYEMAN system. 

b. The unclassified display of these aircraft assets as 

experimental USAF air vehicles 'is authorized. 

c. Transfer documentation will designate the aircraft 

as the "A-II"; the drone will retain the designation D-21. 

9.0 INFORMATION 

9.1 Unclassified public information releases for museum use 

'lANOL E V I A 

BYEMAN C'HnnUL :,YS'FM 

and/or response to press and public queries will be developed 

in consideration of President Johnson's official press 

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release and a feature article on the A~ll that appeared 

in Air Force and Space Digest, April 1964. (See Tabs C & D). 

Requests for information that is not contained in the 

following paragraph will be referred to theSecretary of the 

Air Force Office of Information (SAFOI) for response. 

9.2 The fo llm.ving information has been approved by SAFOI for 

public release and use with non-BYEK~ cleared support 

activities as necessary subsequent to approval of this plan. 

THE A-II 

The Lockheed A-ll,in March 1962, represented a pioneering 

achievement in the milling, machining and shaping of 

titanium for use in aerodynamic design. Two years later 

President Johnson hailed the A-II for its speed and 

altitude accomplishments and cited this experimental aircraft for its potential contributions to both commercial 

and military aviation. Subsequent developmental effDrts 

on the USAF SR-71, YF-12A, D-2l Mach 3.0 dr.one and ~he 

commercial Super Sonic Transport (SST) bear out this early 

y 

assessment. After deactivation of the A-II, the D-21 

experimental drone received further. development and testing ... 

with SAC's B-52 and was employed during Vietnam War era 

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reconnaissance efforts. 

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SPEED 

ALTITUDE 

RANGE 

WING SPAN 

LENGTH 

GROSS WEIGHT 

ENGINE 

FIRST FLIGHT 

LAST FLIGHT 

EXPERIMENTAL 

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PERFORMANCE DATA 

PAYLOAD 

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MACH 3.0 

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102 FT. 

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J 58 

APRIL 1962 

MAY 1968 

D-21 DRONE 

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TAB C 

PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON'S 24 FEBRUARY 1964 

A-II STATEMENT TO THE PRESS 

"The United States has successfully developed an 

advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-II, which 

has been tested in sustained flight at more than 

2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 

70,000 feet. The performance of the A-II far exceeds 

that of any other aircraft in the world today. The 

deve,lopment of this aircraft has been made possible 

j 

by major advances in aircraft technology of great 

significance for both military and commercial applications. Several A-II aircraft are now being flight 

tested at Edwards Air Force Base in California. The 

existence of this program is being disclosed today 

to permit the orderly exploitation of this advance 

technology in ourmilitar'y and commercial program." 

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The official pictures and statements 

tell very little about the A-ll. But the 

technical literature from open sources, 

when carefully interpreted, tells a good deal 

about what it could and, more importantly, 

what it could ~ be. Here's the story ••• 

~orn in the SI{ont{ cries, Reared in Secret, 

It: B~azes New lieights in Aircraft Performance 

By J. s. Bntz, Jr. 

TECHNICAL EOITOIt, AIR fORCE/SPACE DIGEST 

HE dramatic disclosure last month that the United 

States has manncd airplanes that are secretly 

cruising at speeds above ~vfach 3 was good news to 

the aviation community. . 

President Johnson, in revealing the Lockheed A-ll 

program, showed understandable pride in this important US "first." He said that "several" A-lls were 

being flown "at more than 2,000 mph and at altitudes 

in excess of 70,000 feet," and are "capable of longrange performance of thousands of miles." The President added that the A-ll "has been made possible by 

major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both miiitary and commercial application." 

He mentioned only one specific application. He said 

that the A.-ll was being tested extensively to determine its suitability as a "long-range interceptor." 

Former ·White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger 

and Defense Secretary Hobert S. McNamara stressed 

the interceptor role in their brief expansions of the 

President's remarks. However, Mr. MeN amara, in 

""\ .. response to insistent questioning by reporters, has 

indicated that the A-ll was not designed originally 

as an interceptor but that he has considerable confidence that it can be adapted to that role. 

Beyond these minimum remarks, the secrecy lid has 

been clamped on. The Administration opened the door 

on the most tantalizing aviation news since the X-I 

proved t}V'ff' "·!1c,n't a sonic barrier. But the door was ..,l:lh~HH~~i ~.~lui ijl'!}H~tljn.tol'v, 

From the technical viewpoint, the A-11 clearly is the 

most important aircraft since the X-I. It is by far the 

most efficient airplane yet to fly at supersonic speeds. 

It is the first to have adequately high aerodynamic 

efficiency (low drag) and high powerplant efficiency 

to anow it to carry enough fuel to sustain flight above 

Mach 1 for more than thirty minutes or so. In the 

President's words, the A-ll also is extremely important 

because it led to "the mastery of the metallurgy and 

fabrication of titanium metal which is required for the 

high temperatures experienced by aircraft traveling at 

more than three times the speed of sound." 

As reported by Claude vVitze on page 16 of this 

issue, a tight information clamp has forestalled meaningful public discussion of the A-11, its genesis, or its 

proper role in civil an2 military aviation. 

The follo·w·ingquestions are typical of those which 

should be asked, for the answers concern the use of a 

very large sum of the taxpayers' money. Congress and. 

the public have a legitimate right to frank answers. 

• How much did the A-ll and its engines cost? -

Judging from previous pioneering progranis U,at 

fought their technical battles out beyond the "state of 

the art," the A-ll, with its Mach-3-plus performance, 

titanium constmction, and high-temperature engines 

cost at least $500 million and possibly $1 billion. That 

is $100 to $200 million per year for the five years the 

prognm has been active. (President Johnson said the 

_ _ (Cfll1iinued on fnllcHP(rlp; tnl[~(f) 

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\Vindow arrnngcmt'nl of A-I I may indicate a three-man crew. The large ventral fin shown here raises the possihility of 

zero-length launch. This takeoff technique nwy he used for high-pcrfOl'mance aircraft 10 conserve fuei and inc!'{'a'e 

range. Opening's at the rear of the naecHes feed air to convergent-divergent nozzles lIeeded for efficient engine operalioll. 

/.!i -1 '1 . .. ···-· .. -~·-------------------------------_~_=_ .. _._co,oTlN'.)S;:) 

A-ll design work started in 1959. The J58 program 

was initiated several years earlier by the Navy.) This 

kind of money is in the cost range of the much-criticized and now-defunct nuclear airplane, and programs 

of this magnitude should get a thorough working over 

by the Congress. 

.. The "obvious" conclusion to be drawn from the 

infOlmation available is that the A-1.1 was originally 

developed for the CIA as a high-altitude reconnaissance airplane to replace the V-2. 1\105t reporters 

reached this conclusion, supported largely by the 

dose secrecy on the airplane, Mr. McNamara's refusal to divulge the original design objective, and the 

fact that the project was not handled in nonnal management channels. If this co'nclusion is correct, several questions arise immediately concerning 'the past 

and future expenditure of large sums of money: 

( 1) Docs the fact that a given airplane can cruise 

at Mach 3 also mean that it automatically has a multipurpose capability - reconnaissance, interceptor, 

bomber - without a major design change for each 

type of mission? 

(2) If the answer is no, was there coordination between the CIA and the DoD at an early stage to make 

:;ertain that the A-ll \Vas not hopelessly boxed into 

me role? 

(3) Can the A-U development expedite the superonic-transport (SST) program? 

( 4) Have reconnaissance s.atellites eliminated the 

leed for reconnaissance aircraft such as the A-ll, and 

vill it therefore end up only as a high-cost experilcntal aircraft with limited capability? 

Precise answers will require the most candid discusion of the current version of the A-ll and its design 

ad development history. Certainly no one can judge 

1e exact performance or ,nission capability of a super-

)Die-cruise airplane using only the two side-view 

horographs and brief statements currently available 

rl the A-U. 

Estimates of this type are riskier for supersonic-

~uisc airplanes than they are for subsonic aircraft or 

,r those that are capable of only short dashes at 

!personic speed. 

Basically, supersonic-cruise airplanes involve extremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range 

performance is extremely sensitive to engine weight, 

structural weight, fuel consumption, and aerodynamic 

efficiency (lift/drag ratio, ,witfen LID). Small mistakes in predicting these values can lead to large errors 

in payload and range. 

Fortunately, the supply of technical literature concerned with these problems is large. This literature 

points to some general conclusions about the A-ll 

and places some broad limits on the possible performance of this new aircraft. 

The difficulties described in this literature also provide the best tribute to Clarence t. (Kelly) Johnson 

and his "Skonk Works" colleagues at Lockheed, who, 

with the J58 engineers at Pratt & Whitney, led the' . 

team that first achieved supersonic cruise. 

Here is what can be deduced about the A-ll, based 

on this literature: 

.. Size. The airplane is about ninety feet long based 

on scaling of the A-ll pictures; using published data 

on the J58 diameter and estimating the size of the 

pilofs helmet visible in the front window. There is 

room in the slim fuselage and in the wing stub areas 

for more than 70,000 pounds of fuel, with space left 

over for substantial mission equipment. Si'Oce efficient 

supersonic-cruise airplanes have to carry at least fifty 

percent of their weight in fuel, the A-ll takeoff weight 

apparently is more than 150,000 pounds. This is 

roughly the same as that of the B-58 bomber. 

• Wing. Densely loaded aircraft such as the A-ll 

need large wing areas; otherwise their wing loadings 

will quickly rise above 100 pounds per square foot and 

severely reduce both cruise altitude and flight efficiency. 

The side-view photographs obscure most of the 

A-ll wing, and published drawings of the A-ll have 

not indicated a large lifting surface. However, the 

aircraft must have an effective wing area in the neighborhood of 2,000 square feeL This includes not only 

the area outboard of the engine nacelles (see drawing on the front cover) but also the area between the 

engines, and the area of the long, very narrow wings 

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Twist and camber in outboanl wing section is visible in this photo of A-II configuration rigged for con,'cmionai 

takeoff with siandanl.length landing gear lind minus Ihc llll'ge ventral fin shown on model at Jefl, Fligill lest, oi 

thc X-IS rc,'culcd that X·I5 did not need il.s largc YCll1r1l1 fin for adequalc direcliomd slability al supersonic speed. 

on the fuselage, which have been referred to in some 

reports as fairings. The long and narrow wings form 

the forward section of a large double-delta wing similar to that used by Lockheed in its supersonic-transport proposal. A t supersonic speeds these long, narrow 

wings plus the fuselage area between them generate 

much more lift than they do at subsonic speeds, 

This generation of additional lift up forward is 

important in maintaining control over the airplane 

above Mach 1. The controllability problem arises because the rear portion of the double delta acts like a 

conventional lifting surface at supersonic speeds, and 

its center of lift moves abruptly aft, a long distance 

away from the center of gravity. This can make the 

aircraft so stable that it ean't be controlled by a normal-size horizontal tail. In any event, it calls for a large 

deflection of the tail and an unacceptably big trim 

drag, which eats into range. On t1u~ A-ll, lift on the 

long, narrow wings counteracts the shift of center of 

lift on the main surface and keeps the center of lift 

near the center of gravity. On some designs a small 

canard (horizontal) surface near the nose serves this 

purpose. The Swedish Saab Draken, the ~1ach 2 fighter 

operational for several years, was the first of the socalled "tailless" (no conventional horizontal tail and 

no canard) airplanes to lIse the double-delta planform. 

• Design Mach Number. The centerbodies of the, 

engine air inlets on the A-lls in the photographs released by the White House appear to have a ramp 

angle suitable for a maximum economical cruise speed 

slightly above Mach 3. ' 

• Cruise Altitude. ~Jost press reports have placed 

the A-ll's maximum cruise altitude between 90,000 

and 125,000 feet. This appears to be a serious error. 

There is a well-established procedure for checking 

maximum cruise altitude. It indicates that the .'\-11 

must cruise between 70,000 and 80,000 feet or its 

range will severely suffer. Thus, the A-ll can be expected to get its maximum range while cruising about 

5,000 to 10,000 feet below the U-2. The U·2's superior 

wing and lower wing loading give it better altitude 

capability in unaccelerated flight. But in a zoom climb 

the A-ll would outperform it. 

(Continued on following page) 

/ 

A-II's modified douhle-delta wing shows in this three-view drawill/:,. The fOl'ward deha extends straight h""k f .... 1ll 

just ahead of the pilot'~ ""'ROl'Y. rearward 10 the engine air inlets (leIter "A"). The rear delta is oUlside of the 

engine nacelles (leHer "U"). A eutout similar 10, Ihat, 8ho1"". at :'C" must b~ IIscd ~o k('(·p !ow-cnergy tOUIl~!HI"Y b:cI' 

air passinI'( along the forwlIrd delta from cnlrr"'K Ine engine ml~t, lowering t'ngmc efficlcncy and crcallllg he:n)' 

unhalancing forces on the compressOl'o Such a cult'n! would be c,riticnl in creating favorahle flow on rear fuselage ralllp • 

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To figure maximum cruise altitude you have to 

know two characteristics of any aircraft-the \ving 

loading (written ,",V/S and equal to the gross weight 

divided by the wing area), and the lift coefficient 

(written C L, a dimensionless number indicating the 

lifting pO\n~r of the wing) generated when the aircraft 

is flying at the proper angle of attack for maximum 

range (maximum aerodynamic efficiency). When the 

W /S is divided by the CL, it equals the dynamic 

pressure required to keep the aircraft in level flight. 

The dynamiC pressure is the term that fixes the altitude of flight for any given speed. 

, There is enough information on the A-ll to put the 

above relationships to work For instance; when the 

A-ll is flying at Mach 3 at 70,000 feet, the dynamic 

pressure is nearly 600 pounds per square foot. The lift 

coefficient for maximum LID is about .1 (this has been 

. confirmed in many NASA reports on aircraft similar 

to the A-ll). So 600 may be multiplied by .1 to give a 

maximum possible wing loading of about 60 pounds 

per square fqot. This is about the wing loading the 

A-U would have if it had a 2,OOO-square-foot wing 

area, weighed 150,000 pounds at takeoff, and burned 

about one-third of its 75,000-pound fuel load during 

its c:Iimb to altitude. 

This procedure can be run through again to show 

that the A-U's wing loading would be a little better 

than thirty pounds per square foo{once it had burned 

all its fuel. I t, therefore, would end its cruise at Mach 

3 at 80,000 feet. 

Speed would not change this picture too much. If 

the A-ll were capable of Mach 4, it would begin its 

cruise at about 82,000 feet and in the lightened condition at the end of cruise would be flying at nearly 

95,000 feet. 

111e press reports of 125,000-foot altitude com~ 

pleteJy fall apart under check. If the A-ll flew at 

that altitude at :Vlach 4it would need a wing loading 

of less than ten pounds per square foot. In other words 

its structure could not be any heavier than that of a 

Piper Cub. 

Or, if .the A-ll tried to fly at 12.5,000 feet at a wing 

loading of about thirty pounds per square foot, corresponding to an end-of-cruise weight, its speed would 

have to be at least l\fach 8 to maintain level Right and 

to keep it from stalling out. 

The same procedures can be used to show that the 

U-2's altitude during maximum range cruise will vary 

from about 75,000 feet to a little more than 90,000 

feet. 

Another check on the operational altitude of the 

A-U can be made by examining the engine air inlets 

which appear to be about six feet in diameter at the 

most. Therefore, the maximum capture area for both 

inlets to take in air is between fifty and sixty square 

Photo shows early model 

)58 turbojel. One of few 

showings of this engine wa! 

al AFA's 1959 Convention 

in Miami. Soon nfterwanl 

project WIlS highly dassified. 

Thrust i~ at least 30,000 

pounds without Ilfterouruf'r. 

Efficient usc of this engine 

ill a Milch 3 c .. ui~c aircraft 

rClluin'8 bOlh yal'inhl .. -

geometry inlet nnd exhaust 

nozzle. A-II seems to hayc 

lIuch systems wilh a movable 

cenierllOdy in the inlet and 

a nozzle that d1anges the 

exit arell. Altitude performance would improve if 

the inlet lips opened 10 

enlarge the "cap lure" area 

and admit more air. 

feet. This is just about enough to fly an airplane like 

the A-ll at 80,000 feet at Mach 3. At 100,000 feet at 

Mach 3 the required capture area goes well over 100 

square feet. At 125,000 feet the inlets would become 

truly gigantic. ' _ 

In recent years, the ability of CenturyJseries fighters 

to zoom higher than 100,000 feet has tended to distortthe picture as far as maximum cruise altitude and 

maximum level flight altitude are concerned. Most .of 

the Century-series fighters cruise best between 35,000 

and 45,000 feet, and their maximum level flight altitude is around 60,000 feet. Therefore, the A-ll's ability to cruise in the 70,000- to 80,000-foot level is certainly not to be disparaged. With the A-ll cruising at 

Mach 3 at those altitudes, on a gentle dog·leg course, 

it would be essentially impossible for any operational 

fighter in the world to intercept it. And it is doubcful 

that any existing ground-based missile system could 

down the airplane. 

., Aerodynamic Efficiency. 111e A-ll came along in 

time to benefit from several years of inspired aerodynamic research during the middle and late 1950s. By 

1960 the unclassified literatllre had made it clear that 

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\.'t:.:l.t.cUU tV l..1lJ 1.\:'_").:' UJdU U\ C' ill i.,"'.;at,,;11 HHUUJCIS auove oJ ~llrlaCC uy t.H~CUglUC au UUt;l UUJ Big J..VJ.i:iClI ....> tTlIlse 

l'lad to be discarded. Ther re ch-rmrl" in,li""t;,mc I·..., ;"",.",,~~ , nrl i"lprove LID. Design techniqne:; 

1 L D f d Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115217 1 . I " . d . t l;lt Iso seven an ~ j'~ an(,' 1"'''''''-''1 '''6'''"' LV1 """'-'''H.· u",-",,".~nce 'lave )ccn 1111 er contlnucould be attained. '.~ ous refinement and are very important in the SST proThese were still weU under the LIDs of eighteen to posals now being evaluated by the FAA. 

twenty-three at which subsonic transports and bomb- On the A-11, the area on the back of the fuselage 

ers operate. However, an L/D of 'eight is enough to betw'ecn the engine ilaeelles is a highly critical Ro~v 

bring the total flight efIiciency (and range) of a super- area in which several strong pressure fields rncet. 

sonic airplane up close to that of the subsonic jet Undoubtedly, the fuselage slopes off eontinllollsly in 

because propulsive efficiency increases rapidly at this area and forms a gentle ramp ending in the sharp 

snpersonie speeds. The idca that an economical super- point visible in the photographs. It would be possible 

sonic transport (SST) was possible grew out of super- to reduce drag, improve L/D, and increase the effccsonic LID H'search in the late 1950s, and the idea of tiveness of the vertical tails by creating favorable presthe A-ll undoubtedly had the same beginning. sure fields along this ramp. The slope and contour of 

The basic rules for obtaining high LID have been the ramp, the spacing and shape of the engine nacelles, 

discussed exhaustively in NASA reports and the publi- the location of the vertical tails, and the Right speed 

cations of the technical societies. The A-ll appears to all would be important in creating a favorablc Bow 

use all of them. First, the wing leading edges are as field and a high LID. This leads to the conclusion that 

sharp as possiblc, even sharper than those of the F-104. the A-ll is a single design point airplane. That is, it 

Second, the fuselage has a fineness ratio (length cli- has a high LID at its ernise ~'!ach number, but its 

vided by diameter) of around eighteen, vl'hieh gives it aerodynamic efficiency falls off at both JO\ver and 

a very high internal volume for carrying fuel and higher speeds. Consequently, the airplane probably 

equipment. Such design ,vas found to be the optimum doesn't have much growth potential in speed and 

means for carrying any given weight at supersonic would be in serious trouble about making its range if 

speeds, and the A-II has the highest fineness ratio yet .one engine were lost. . 

used on any aircraft. e Structure. The extent and the manner in which 

Third, proper distribution of the pressure forces, the titanium is used in the A-ll has not been disclosed. 

lift and drag forces, is a key to getting high LIDs with However, the President's remarks hinted that titanil1m 

any airplane. Several importunt techniques which was the main load-bearing metal. If this is true, the 

bring pressure distributions closer to the ideal were A-Irs airframe must be f61latively light and efficient 

developcd during the 1950s. They primarily involved fOf a high-temperature structure. According to data 

"twisting" and "cambering" the wing. The side-view from the SST program, it would have been possible to 

photographs of the A-H, hoth looking endwise at the design the airframe for ~fneh 4 temperatures with 

. wing, clearly show its "twists» and "cambers." only a slight increase in wcight and proh:lhly the 

Super:mnic vehicles offer designers one unique op- installation of ncw leading edgcs made of Iligher temportullity for reducing drag and improving LID. This perature material. The refractory metal alloys dcvelis to arrange the vchide components (fuselage, wing, oped in the Dyna-Soar program, for example, would 

tail, nacelles, etc.) so that they «interfere. favorably" have a long life on a Maoo 4 airplane. 

with each other. At subsonic speeds interference effects After the heating problems the most important 

are negligible at a distance of more than a few inches structural question about the A-ll is its design load 

away from any surface. factor. If the load factor were low, say two Gs at 

However, at supersonic speeds strong shock waves cruise, the structure would. be extremely light, and 

and pressure fields spread away from all objects. Pres- . amount to only about twenty percent of the 

sure fields spreading from an aircraft's components airplane's total weight, or even less. Consequentlv, 

can combine unfavorably to make the total vehicle maneuverability wovld be sharply limited and the a{rdrag much higher than the drag of the components craft certainly would be marginal as an interceptor 

taken separately. even if its missiles were extremely maneuverable. 

Happily, this situation can be reversed. The com- However, the light structure woul<;l result in a lowponents can be arranged so that their pressure fields wing loading and a high cruise altitude, and it would 

and shock waves "cancel" out each other and reduce allow a greater percentage of the airplane's weight to 

total drag. For instance, an engine nacelle outboard be carried as fuel, which would increase range. 

from a fuselage can throw a high-pressure field on If the de,~ign load factor were high, to allow sevellthe curved aft side of the fuselage to cl'Cate a "thrust" G turns, for instance, the structural weight would go. 

force and reduce fuselage drag. The "ultimate" in up sharply. Such design would make the aircraft very 

favorable inlcrference is a th{'.O~etical supersonic bi- useful as an interceptor or a bomber, hut it would subplane postulated by Adolph Huscmann in the HJ30s. stantially reduce maximum cruise aititudc and range. 

This was an arrangement of two vvings, properly The qll('!;tion of adapting the A·11 to an intcrceptmshaped and spaced apart, which canceicd all of each or a bomber mission depends largely upon the design 

other's wave drag at one particular i'>b.eh number. 

In the 19.')01' :;\\;:;erson1c intcrfcr~l1ce effects were the 

objcd of intl'w.i,·( ... T~(,,;H(;h, notllhly hy Antonio Ferri 

of the l)olylcclil';c institute of Brook!}'r. and A. J. 

Eggers, Jr., of NASA. Their basic infonnation was applied on the D-70, which is arranged so that a powerAii! FORCE M"9"x;"" • Ap,iI 1964 

Non: In orc:i@r If> .Ht" .... ",O';"I<, ,hi. impo"«"! _'OfY in fill!. 

we h,,~., "~p",,d~d I/>& planMd ,jUt of ,hi. i .. u" of All! fOfl.Ct/ 

SPACE DIGEliT. PI ... " .. ttlrn to p.-.ge 50-A for continuation.-

THE EDITORS 

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""":.,t r - - - ~,...~~r~-'_""'~~"""'_""""_''''''' .. l load factor, which, of COIl is a cAppro~ed for Release: 2018/11L1 ~ C05115217 . . 1 

Structural strellgth is ll1or~ i!l1portant 111 tlm case th~lI1 : \\,..... 1 

the probkm of jllcorpomt!~1g l.he nC'cC'ssary electromcs, \\, \. . /~_'" . 

and missiles, for the A-ll IS bIg enough. ~.-__ ...,. . 

4111 Engine. Official reports dating back several years 

describe the Pratt & \Vhitnc\, J.'5S as a simple supersonie tt.rhojct with an aftcr(mnlcr. All early version 

lost the B-70 cOlllpetition to the General Electric JD3. 

If an carlv version is powering the A-ll, the specific 

fuel COIlSI;ll1ptioll (SFC) is high and the range is low. 

Simple turhojets of the middle 19505 all ran on afterburner at l\Iach 3. and their SEC was more than two 

pounds of file! con'sUlllud per pound of throst per hour, 

compared to an SEC of about 0.8 for the best fan 

cngilles on subsonic jet transports. 

howcver, great strides have been made in engine. 

design, and it seems highly unlikely that a 1955 vinta~e 

supersonic ellginc would still be in the A-II. The J;)8 

undoubtedly has heen improved in many ways 

through highcr operating temperatures, the use of 

advanced turhine-coolillg techniques, hetter COIl1-

pressor blading, and possihly the addition of a fan 

and new thrust-augmcntation systems. 

If stich engine improvcll1l'nts have been incorporated in the A-11, the SFC during cruise is down ncar 

1.5 pounds of fllcl per pound of thfllst per hour. Figures almost this low arc hein!J quoted for the SST engines. And, in 1962, three Lockheed engineers-F. S. 

. ~1alvcst\lt(), Jr., P. J. Sullivan, and H. A. Mortzschkyin a most interesting p;'per hefore the Institute of the 

Aeronalltical Sciences gave Lockheed's views of what 

could be done in the way of optimizing supersonic 

aud hvpersonic-cruise configurations in the near future. On the key qllestion of achievnble SFCs they 

said, "Propulsive efficiellcy [l\fach number divided by 

SFC] of 2.0 ... appears to be a reasonable value for 

any chemically-fneled pure-turbojet or dual-cycle propulsivc system now available or projected in the ncar 

future." According to this estimate, the best expected 

SFC is 1.5 in the near future for Mach 3 airplanes. 

One point, coutinually emphasized in the Iite~ature, 

is that the "match" between airframe and engme on 

supersonic-cruise airplanes is ml.lch mO.re critical than 

on any aircraft of the past. Engme weIght becomes a 

large; percent,tge of the total airplane weight, aI:d 

fud consumption rises sharply compared to suhsomc 

powcrplants, so the engine becomes relatively more 

importaut ill iH.:hieving long range, Consequen,tly, 

tailoring the airplane to achieve the best pOSSible 

engine air inlet and exhaust flow conditions has.:1 large 

payoff. This tailoring must be balance~ by airframe 

. consideratiolls, howcver. On the relatIvely narrowspan supcrsonic airplanes the placemen~ of engine 

nacelles, inlets, and exhaust flows can senously affect 

the total flow pattern over an aircraft, which is the 

determining factor in achieving a high LID. 

On the A·ll the fuselage and the forward and aft 

portions of the double-delta wing aJ?parently ride at. an 

angle of attack of about four to five degrees dnnng 

cn~ise. This angle gives maximum L/D for th~ A-I.l 

type configuration. The openings of the engme aIr 

inlets and the inlet spikes are canted forward through 

AIR FORCE Magazine • April 1964 

<. 

I ", i 

Lo ... kheed pl"opo~e,1 a .!o"hle-deh" wing for il< ",personie 

Ir:m~port (a/lOve). Thi" i~ a ;\Iarh' 3 airnaft wci;:hillg 

more than 400,000 pounrb and ('''pahl" of ('urrying 2JIl pa,' 

Bengers more than 3,500 m;le~. A-II call playa vilal 1'"lc 

in development of the SST hy serving as Bysh,ms lest bed. 

the same angle to face directly into the airflow and. 

maximizc inlet efficiency during cfllise. The engine 

exhaust Row, however, 'nearly parallels the fuselage 

and is directed downward at an angle of about four 

degre~s to the Iinc of Right. Therefore, ahollt seven 

percent of the thrust force is realized as Ijf~ to improve L/D and range. • 

In addition, the A-ll powerpJants apparcntly have 

been placed so their thrust line is slightly below the 

airplane's center of gravity during most of the cruise 

flight. Therefore, the engines produce a nose-up pitching moment and reduce the amount of elevator deflection needed to trim the airplane, A'ACA reports 

have estimated that the proper placement of the en-

(fine thrust line to reduce trim drag of the elevator can 

increase range nve to ten percent in aircraft of the 

A-ll type. . . 

., FueL Several years ago there were reports that 

the J58 was being tested with boron fuel. If pentaborane were burned in the J58 afterburner-and research 

has shown this to be possible-then a tl10usand miles 

or more could be added to the A-ll's range. 

US production of borane fuels has heen stopped, 

but Defense Secretary Robert S. ;\'fc:\amara last year 

told the Congress that ehough was stockpiled to satisfy projected needs for the foreseeable future. The 

bo'ranes are now being used in rocket-engine research, 

primarily by th~ Air Force, and conceivably the A-ll 

could draw from this reservoir. . 

Borane fuels are expensive compared to the hydrocarbons, and this is a major reason why the lise of 

pentaborane was dropped from the B-70 plallS. How-

(Continued on follo!cing ]lage) 

".~: ..~. 

t 

! 

~1 

Air F or('e A~soda· 

tion honored the 

de!;igner of the 

A·ll last fall for 

earlier U-2 work. 

Here Lockheed's 

Clarence L. (Kelly) 

Johnson accepts 

VOIl Karman 

Trophy from USAF 

Vice Chief of Slaff, 

Gen. \';'. F. ;\IcKee, 

at AFA Con~·ention. 

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" c"cr, on it rdatively small aIrCI 

\\'ith relatively limited numbers involved, the extra 

cost could be' jmtified by the large performance improvcmCll t. 

o Hangc. ?>.laximum rang;t.~ on the A-It if it is hvdrocarhOl; fueled ancl pO\\'~'red by a J.'5S model only 

slightly hel ter than the original version, prohably is 

around 3,.500 miles. This assllmes an L /1) of six, an 

SFC of 2.0, and fifty percent of the airnaft· weight in 

fucl, with ahout one-third of it being consumed in 

the climh to altitude. Boron fllel would add around 

1,000 miles to the rallgc. 

If it has hccl! possible 10 aehicve the maximum 

L/Ds and SFCs sllgges~cd ill the Lockheed paper Illentioned abo\'e, thc rangc would go over 5,000 miles OIl 

hydrocarbon fuel. This assllmes an L/D of eight and 

an SFC of 1..5. But this level of perfonnance prohably 

will not be achicved for smne time. 

• Development Schedllie. r t ha!' been rej)orted that 

the A-11 was delivered and flown for the first time, in 

1961; that is siightly more than hvo years after design 

r~""""-'~,,:·' 

l~~~:.~~;~..l~.:~'.;. .. ~,..:.... ....... .;.:;..,;~_ ...... .....;;;;.w._....:1 

The · ... orld·~ fir~t np('ralional rtouhi ...... rleitn !lin'raft is the 

S .... c(Jj,h Ai,· Fw-ee's SA_AU J·l5 llrakNl, a :tIlach 2 ,'111-

weullu'r inter('cplor anrl jJ:rQund-atlack air('raft who"e 

prototn.e fi r~t fiew in O ... "j,<t'r 1955. The aireraft, still 

in production, f'nlercd mililary sCr\-i.·c in early 1960. 

work started. The same report also claims that the 

A-ll has been operational for tv..-o years, meaning 196.3 

and most of 1962. That would leave about one year, 

early 1961 to early 1962, for flight testing. 

If this report is true, it \vould have been necessary 

during this one year to move in relatively small speed 

increments tll\vard Mach :3 to make sure that all svstems were responding properly to all speed, tempe~ature, and vibration conditions. The inevitable "fixes" 

would have been made and the modified systems rechecked. Finallv, it \vould have been necessary to 

move slmvly to\~'ard maximum-range flights, by c~'Hising at Mach 3 for longer and longer periods to ensme 

that ali systellls were withstanding the hIgh-,temperature "soaking." . 

Under any conceivable set of circumstances, designing, fabricating, flight testing, and bringing a' pioneering, fir.H-generation, Mach 3 cruise airpJane to operational statns in' three years would be an almost miraculous achievement. True, the CIA-type management 

system is conducive to rapid developments. In effect, 

the CI A simply ~ays to the contractor, "Bring us one 

of 'these: \Ve are making you responsihle for performing all tests and making aU technical l.ecisions." 

.50-8 

first Hight in lillie lllore than olle year. Bllt the U-2 

was a completely straightforward project with a wcl!-

known type of wing, aluminum constrnction, and a 

slightly Illodified version of a w('ll-developed tmhojct. 

The A-11 designcrs were hreaking ncw groulld ill 

every departmcnt, although they die! have ac('('ss to 

development data from the B-70 and J9.'3 projects, 

It seellls reasonahle that design, fahricatioll, and 

grollnd I(~stillg of the A-11 and its systeilis too!.; Ilearly' . 

fOlll' years alld that the first Hight took place ill Hj(j.1. 

LC'ss tllall a year of Hjgbt testing prohahl;,' wOldd have 

allowed Presidcllt Johnson to say lhat the aircraft "!J.~s 

l)eell tested ill sustaillcd flight at !lime than 2.0()() 

mph," and is "capable of , .. long-range performance 

of thousands of miles ... ." He didn't say the range had 

been achieved. . 

But if the shorter developmcllt time reporled is tnw, 

the SST program certainly bears review. If any \Iach 3 

cruise airplanc call be hrought to operational sta~IIS 

frolll scratch in three vears, thell ma\'lw the F .. \:\ is 

correct ill taking the pc;sition that SS'I; costs, technical 

lIIH:ertailltic;;, and development time will 1)(' I11l1ch 

Im~Tr thall industry estimates. 

DCVel0Plllt'lIt or 1111 (,(,OIlOlll!C .mp('I'!\OlIic Irallsport is 

a milch more difficult problem thall th(' A-II, bllt if 

the CIA's hands-off management concept can indeed 

get us a Mach 3 airplane in three yf'ars, this cOllcept 

certainly xlioulJ be considered for the SST. AmI the 

Pentagon could henefit from this example as well. 

• Supersonic Transport. The A-ll probahly can 

spell the difference between success and failure in any 

US i\!ach-2.5-pius supersonic-transport pn)gram. The 

A-ll provides an immediately available means of getting vital flight-test time on all SST systems. It will 

yield data on the performance of titanium structure at 

Mach 3 that could not be obtained Iw aIW other 

means. And, when the SST engines are rcadY, tLe .'\-11 

will allow them to be exhaustively tested il; Right in a 

known vehicle and not an unproven SST airframe. Bv 

allowing sneh testing, the A-ll will fill a gap in th~~ 

government's SST plan that has worried man\' in 

industry. The A-11 experience should make it pos~ihle 

to go ahead in an orderly manner and build the SST, 

which must be a true second-generation, supersoniccruise airplane that has high aerodynamic and propulsive efficiency at all subsonic and superSonic speeds, 

and an extremely mgged titanillm structure which CHn 

last through ten years of airline flying. 

By any standard the A-ll is a magnificent technical 

achievement. Quite obvlomly it can outRy any known 

aircraft in the world by a suhstantial margin. It is a 

natural for reconnaissance. However, if the A-ll is 

from the U-2 mold and built with an extremely light 

airframe, it will not have significant com hat potential 

as a bomher or an interceptor withollt major retl('sign. 

Even if such redesign is Hot forthcoming, the A-II 

will play a key research role in lmildillg the' technology of l\Jach-.1-plus cruise airplanl's of all tvppstransports, fighters, and bombers. III this role its ultimate importance to aviation and the nation mav he 

as great as any aircr"ft ('vel' built.-E'''D . 

AIR FORCE Magozine • April 1964 

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By Claude Witze 

SENIOR EDITOR. AIR FORCE/SPACE DIGEST 

Less Than the Whole Truth 

\V Asm:"CTO:", D.C., MAHCIl 18 

There are substantial reasons why public pressure should 

be maintained ior the revelation of more facts about the 

new Lockheed A-ll .Mach 3 airplane. And none of the 

facts that should be public property in this democracy 

will menace national security if they are disclosed. The 

A-ll, like the TFX, the nS-70, and the Skybolt missile 

before it, is illvolved in arguments about concept and 

policy that arc properly the subjcct of public discussion. 

The gcncral capahilitics of the A-ll and the mission 

for which it was designed can be aircd before Congress 

and the votcrs without disclosing any specific information 

about the technologies involved and the precise threat it 

presents to a potential enemy. If the A-11 is undergoing 

tests to determine how good it is as an interceptor, 

which is what we were told by the \Vl!ite House, the 

threat to the enemy will not be real until the system is 

combat ready. The A-ll is far from that state and may 

never reach it. 

Details of President Johnson's announcement that the 

A-ll exists and an analysis of its technological significance 

appear starting on page 33 of this issue. Of equal importance is the Administration's insistence that the A-ll 

is an interceptor aircraft and that it meets the Air Force 

requirement for an Improved :\Iarll1ed Interceptor (I:\H). 

So long as the news about the A-ll is carefully managed, 

the Administration is not likely to get a serious challenge 

to its assertion, but the atmosphere on Capitol Hill is 

charged with skepticism. When Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, 

USAF Chief of Staff, was testifying a few weeks ago 

before the House Armcd Services Committee, he said, 

"\Ve need a new long-range interceptor and we feel that 

$40 million this year will move us in an orderly program 

toward producing it." Asked at what point we are in the 

1Ml program, he said, "\\'e are doing some work in this 

field, but we are not going fast enough to have an orderly 

program to produce it." He made a further statement that 

W,IS deleted from the published record. 

\ Vhatever the General told the committee in confidence, 

the House included the $40 million ill its version of the 

defense authorization bill. There is no evidence in the 

record that Chairman Carl VinSOll or any of his colleagues 

knew of the A-ll or considered it the prototype of an 

interceptor if they did know about it. Chainnan Melvin 

Price of the Subcommittee on Research and Development 

voted with the majority in favor of. granting the money. 

Three Democratic members of his subcommittee, Representatives Samuel S. Stratton, Jeffrey Cohelan, and Otis 

G. Pike, voted against it and signed a minority report. 

In this, they argued the money had not been requested 

from the subcommittee but indicated they knew of progress 

made toward an 1MI. They then picked up the argument 

of Defense Secretary Robert S. l\IcNmnara that there are 

several airphine5 which could take on the nn mission, 

citing the F-IOG, the F-4, and the TFX or F-l~l. General 

Le:>.1ay already had said he wants somethmg better. 

16 

There was a strange change of attitude in the Senate. 

The $40 million item was droppcu from the hill. After 

the A-ll was uncovered Senator Richard n. Russell, floor 

manager for the bill, bolstered the President's portrayal 

of it as an interceptor. He said he had becn privy to all 

of its history and that what has been learned has applicability to other types of aircraft. The Senator said 

the $40 million was taken Ollt of the bill because the 

A-ll already is past the research-and-devclopment stage 

and is undergoing test and evaluation. lIe said he did 

not know why the Air Force, meaning General Le.\by, 

asked for the mOlley. 

Secretary McNamara was the next witness in. \Vashington. lIe told a press conference, "The A-II is an intere~ptor aircraft, it is being develored as such, and beyond 

that I have nothing further to say on its usc." He said 

the Air Force naturally knew all about the A-ll and that 

there was a misunderstanding aboul what was requested. 

This was not new money, he said, but a request "to have 

the authority within the total funds budgeted to reallocate 

funds to increase the expenditures on the L\lI and to 

reduce expenditures on certain other projects." He said 

there is no doubt that the A-11 is the plane USAF. has 

in mind for the I~H mission. 

One of the more significant sentences in ,\1[. Z'l-IcNamara's 

remarks was his comment that "hopefully, we can have 

multi-lise aircraft evolve from the single-purpose designs." 

It is this conviction of his, first brought to fruition in 

the TFX joint USAF-Navy project, that has not becn 

accepted by experienced airmen in any branch of the 

services. The A-H, it has not been denied, was laid Jown 

in 19.59 as a high-flying and fast reconnaissance airplane 

and the undisclosed amount of money that has gone into 

it would be hard to disguise in USAF's budget. It could 

have been financed by the Ct;!otral Intelligence Agency, 

but that is not as important as the fact that the reconnaissance and interceptor missions cannot be performed 

efficiently by the same airplane. It is obvious that the technologies overlap in such areas as propulsion, maccrials, 

human factors, and aerodynamics, but weapon SystClllS 

differ according to their missions. 

All through the discussion following' the A-ll an· 

noun cement there has been an am" of the half-tmth 

about Administration statements. Asked bluntly whcther 

the A-ll had been designed as an interceptor, Secretary McNamara replied, "I don't think that 1 said 

that, and I would rather !l(>t say." Nobody asked, "\Vhy 

not?" It was brought out in General Le'\fay's testimony 

that all of the Chiefs of Staff favored going .. head with 

an 1MI and that even the Chairman, Gen . .\!axwell Taylor, 

gave it his endorsement. USAF Secretary Eugene Zuckert 

testified that "No formal proposal has gOlle forward from 

the Air Force, that is, from the civilL\rl Secretary ['\Ir. 

Zuckert] to the Secretary of Defense. I did write him a 

letter in which I said it looked as if we were progressing 

to the point where we would need a sizable sum _of money 

such as the one General LeJ\Iay men tioned [for 1 1903.:' 

(Continued on page 19) 

AIR fORCE Magazine • April 1964 

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. ,l:.ater Rep. Porter Hardy quJ .le /'Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C0511521 i eighty Americ:ll1 fly'ers seem to 

• and asked vvhethcr '\Ir. :\!c';\,ullara showed any slgns at llave neen SaeJlhcca 111 ncar silence while tl;c climate of 

"mellowing" 01- beginning to understand the requirement om relations with Hussia shows no material change. It 

for an n.IL Mr. Zuckert acknowledged that his boss was should be pointed out that the \Vashington Post, which 

not "too eneoUl·<lging." He addcd that he favors a larger hesitates to put any blame on the Hussians, is a paper that 

development program than the Defense Secretary, but "I speaks' out loud and clear in favor of avoiding escalation 

have not pers(}I,'llly proposed that we build a force of any in any conflict with the Reds. The response should be 

particular sizc leading toward a fun defense capability nonviolent to most provocation, according to this schoo] 

with an nIl." of thought, and if it must be violent it should be gr"c1llated 

FllI'ther quotations are not needed to display the status to the minutest degree possible. The Communists clis',grce. 

of the J:\1I projL'ct, at lcast as it stood in Fcbnlary. If we Any responsible reporter could learn by asking that 

accept the natal date of the A-II as 19,59, it seems clear USAF pilots have strict orders not to resist challenges in 

that nohody called it an Air Force airplane at least until the air, even if they are armed. The Hussians, in this case, 

sometime in Hi63, by which time the concept probably destroyed an airplane which they could have had ill tact 

had been overtaken hy more esoteric systems operating with its airborne eq llipment if they hDcl told the pilot to 

in space. If the A-ll was designed as an IMI there was land instead of shooting him down. This indicates they 

no reason to blallket its existence with anv more secrecv were more intent on murder than capturing the EB-6G 

thall would have surrounded the F-J 08, in'terceptor COUl;- to see what reconnaissance eqllipment it was carrying. 

terpart of the B-70 and also designed hy North American A responsible reporter. also could have learned that the 

Aviation, if that project had not heen abandoned a few pilot was following a filed flight plan for a navigation 

years ago. It was aftel- cancellation of the F -I 08 that training mission that was to he flown entirely in France 

airmen concerned with the defense mission, most notably and \Vest Germany. An informed reporter would know 

Cen. Laurence S. Kuter, first proclairned the requirement that the RB-66 is an obsolescent airplane and it is not 

for an J:\rI. 1£ they knew the A-11 was being developed likely it would be sent on a sensitive mission so close to 

as an i!lterceptor, which they should have known if it is the Iron Curtain. Even an editorial writer, lacking all 

true, their speeches, ill retrospect, make little sense. these facts, should be able to recall that in late Jamwry· 

Since disclostll'e of the A-11 by President Johnson, most a T-39 jet trainer out of \Viesbaden strayed across the 

of the verbiage has been concerned with its place in the border and was shot down, killing the crew of three USAF 

history of aeronautical pro~l'ess and the fact that the story officers. In this case the Reds merelv s~jd it was our fault 

\vas kept out of the public prints} whether by publicists because we violated their airspae~, and they gave us 

or patriots. The emphasis has been in the wrong places. permission to retrieve the bodies and wreckage. 

The sophisticated observer, be he aeronaut, editor, or It is not generally discussed, but these \;io]ations of 

military officer, kno\vs that USAF does not develop a new airspace have at least one of the characteristics of a 

interceptor by starting with a vehicle that flies higher and cultural-exchange program. The Russians violate airspace 

fnster, with limited maneuverability, and then try to too. They have overflown Alaska and are reported to have 

determine its capability. The interceptor capability would violated 'Western airspace in Europe at least twenty times 

be built in, starting on the design boards. Thei'e is much in 1963. They have been intercepted by our airmen and 

justification for suspecting that the A-11 has been used warned to go back. There is no record that they have bcen 

for m[lnipulation of American public "opinion, possibly to fired upon. On top of this, it is no secret in Europe that 

cast aspersions on Air Force competence in an area of Aeroflot, the Russian airline, and Polshe Linie Lotnicze, 

Air Force specialiwtion. The outlook for national security its Polish counterpart, treat airlanes with disdain. On 

is frightening if this kind of manipulation is allowed to scheduled flights to and from such major points as Paris, 

continue, making it look as if technology escaped the grasp their pilots wander far from their routes as assigned by 

of the men with the mission. traffic controllers. There is a strong conviction on the ConWhy DOesn1t Anybody Get Mad? 

As we write this, the East Germans, who are Communists, are withholding information on the condition of 

three USAF officers \~ho were shot down a few days ago 

when their RB-66 reconnaissance bomber strayed out of 

its flight path. A compilation by the Associated Press 

shows that in the past fourteen years at least eighty 

American mililary flyers have been killed by Russians in 

attacks that ranged from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan. 

The airmen have been from the ranks of the US Navy, 

Marines, and Air Force. 

So far, there has been no sign of official indignation in 

\Vashington other than a demand for the release of our 

men. Our attitude, according to the Washington Post, is 

tempered by our "hopes to avoid having the incident damage the relatively moderate climate of ple!lent AmerieanSoviet relations." Indeed, the Post, which should know 

hetter, peers around the eighty corpses a:1d poses an 

editorial question: "\Vhat is wrong with the Air Foree 

that it c<l!lnot prevent its planes from wandering over 

Communist East Gennany and getting shot down?" Then 

the paper says USAF does not say the airplane strayed 

but suggests it was lured by phony radio signals. 

AIR FORCE Magazine • April 1'764 

tinent that these deviations are not accidental, but are 

part of the Communist reconnaissance effort. 

In view of the record, it is difficult to believe we are 

dealing with reasonable people concerned in any way 

about the climate of our relations. It is even more difficult 

to understand ho-.v an American newspaper, in particular 

the Washington Post, can ignore the Soviet trigger finger, 

the eighty dead, and the nature of the eold war. 

Reading Loud, But Not Clear 

Almost exactly a year ago Lt. Gen. A]fred S. Starbird, 

an Army officer who serves as Director of the Defense 

Communications Agency, told a committee on Capitol Hill 

the Defense Depaltment needs a satellite communications 

system as soon as possible. Testifying hefore Rep. Chet 

Holifield and his Military Operations Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Government Operations, General Starbird 

cited some of the reasons why communication throm;h 

space has beccme essential to militarv operations. Clearly, 

the ballistic missile has changed the threat to existing svstems as much as it has altered national strategy. The missile, the General said, puts a new premium on speed. Service must be almost instantaneous. The communications 

(Continued on following page) 

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