* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not

precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-20475

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GUIDO MARCELO MORENO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(USDC No. H-97-0172-3)

April 19, 1999

Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Guido Marcelo M o reno (“Moreno”) appeals his jury trial conviction and sentence for two

substantive counts of laun dering mo ney in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A). Moreno was

indicted for conspiracy to launder money and on four counts of laundering money. Moreno pled not

guilty and was tried by a jury. Moreno was acquitted of the conspiracy count and of two of the four

money laundering counts. He was convicted on the remaining money laundering counts.

At sentencing, the district cou r t overruled Moreno’s objection that he was improperly

awarded a three-level sentence adjustment because he knew that the proceeds being laundered were

drug-related. Moreno was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment on each count, with the sentences2

to be served concurrently. Moreno was also sentenced to three years’ supervised release, a $5,000

fine, and a $200 special assessment. Moreno filed a timely notice of appeal.

The evidence adduced at trial shows that Moreno was involved in a series of transactions with

undercover agents of the United States Customs Service to send money from the United States to

Colombia at r at es higher than those charged by legitimate money transfer operations. He made

numerous comments suggesting that he did not know or care from whence the money delivered to

him by a succession of mysterious strangers came, and he conducted many of his transactions with

the undercover agents in hushed t ones or using code words commonly associated with drug

trafficking and money laundering. Many of these conversations were recorded covertly and played

for the jury. Moreno contends that this evidence was insufficient to convict him of money laundering

and that his sentence should not have been enhanced because the evidence does not support a finding

that he had actual knowledge that the money was drug-related a s required under the sentencing

guidelines. We will address each of these arguments in turn.

Moreno’s init

ial argument is that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The

standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether any reasonable trier of fact could have

found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. S ee United States v. Martinez

,

975 F.2d 159, 160-61 (5 th Cir. 1992). The evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is viewed in the

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. S ee United States v. Resio-Trejo

, 45 F.3d 907, 910 (5 th Cir.

1995). All credibility determinations and reasonable inferences are t o be resolved in favor of the

verdict. S ee id. at 911. In an appeal challenging the evidence’s sufficiency, we may determine only

whether the jury made a rational decision, not whether the jury's verdict was correct on the issue of

guilt or innocence. S ee United States v. Jaramillo

, 42 F.3d 920, 922-23 (5 t h Cir. 1995). “The

evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with

every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions

of the evidence.” U nited States v. Lopez

, 74 F.3d 575, 577 (5 th Cir. 1996). However, if the evidence

tends to give “equal or nearly equal circumstantial support” to gui lt and t o innocence, reversal is3

required since “a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a rea sonable doubt.” I d. (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Moreno was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A), which “crimi nalizes the

transportation, transmission, or transfer of a mo netary instrument or funds from a place inside the

United States to a place outside the United States with the intent to prom ote the carry i ng on of a

specified unlawful activity.” U nited States v. Garcia Abrego

, 141 F. 3d 142, 162 (5 t h Cir. 1998).

Moreno now argues that the Government failed to prove that he intended to promote an unlawful

activity because it never showed at trial that the money involved in the transactions was actually drugrelated. Moreno also asserts that the undercover agents continuously stressed that their operations

were legal and observes that the transfer of money outside the United States is not illegal.

We ackno wledge that the evidence showing that Moreno knew that the funds were drug

proceeds is circumstantial, but this fact does not mandate acquittal. “Mental state is almost always

proved by circumstantial evidence from which the jury must infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Giraldi

, 86 F.3d 1368, 1374 (5 th Cir. 1996). In the instant case, abundant evidence

was introduced from which a reasonable jury could have inferred guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Specifically, the evidence showed that Moreno accepted large sums of cash from unknown persons

who did not request receipts. Additionally, he did not require that the persons giving him the cash

provide identification, despite the fact that he knew that legitimate money transfer companies required

that he receive identification when a transfer involved more than $3,000. Moreno then transferred

the cash to the undercover agents withou t receiving receipts and conducted these transactions in

whispered tones, despite the fact that he was in a private office. On each occasion, the cash was

largely in $20 denominations and was packaged in a way consistent wit h drug transactions;

furthermore, the cash was always sent to Cali, Colombia, a center of drug activity. Moreno charged

high fees for each transaction, and Government witnesses testified that such fees were generally paid

in connection with illegal money-laundering transactions.4

Finally, a videotape showed Moreno agreeing with one of the agents that the money’s origin

“doesn’t interest us.” Moreno testified at trial that he did not ask the strangers where the money

came from because he “never ask[ed] anybody where they get their money.” Moreno admitted that

he did not “want to know” where the money came from. The district court gave an instruction that

deliberate ignorance could support a finding that Moreno knew that the proceeds being transferred

were illegal. In United States v. Hull , 160 F.3d 265 (5 th Cir. 1998), a panel of this court approved

the use of a deliberate ignorance instruction in a money laundering case where the other criteria for

conviction had been met. S ee id. at 272. In the instant case, we find that, given Moreno’s videotaped

statements and trial testimony, a rational jury could have found that Moreno deliberately remained

ignorant of the source of the money that he was transferring, and found him guil t y beyond a

reasonable doubt on this basis.

II

Moreno’s second argument is that the district court erre d in increasing his offense level

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1). This court reviews the application of the sentencing guidelines

de novo and the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Wimbish , 980

F.2d 312, 313 (5 th Cir. 1992).

A defendant’s base offense level for money laundering should be increased by three levels “[i]f

the defendant knew or believed that the funds were the proceeds of an unlawful activity invo lving the

manufacture, importation, or distribution of narcotics or other controlled substances.” U.S.S.G. §

2S1.1(b)(1). Moreno makes substantially the same arguments to support his contention that the

three-level increase should not have been applied as he did to support his argument that the evidence

was insuf ficient to support conviction. The district court ruled that the jury’s verdict “adequately

supports the applicatio n of that enhancement.” Given the factors discussed above, such a factual

finding was not clear error.

C ONCLUSION5

We find that the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, viewed in the light most favorable

to the jury’s verdict, is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found Moreno guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. S ee Martinez

, 975 F.2d at 160-61. We further find that the district court did not

commit clear error in making a three-level upward adjustment, as the evidence adduced at trial

supports t he co urt’s finding that Moreno “knew or believed” that the money being laundered was

drug trafficking proceeds. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1).

AFFIRMED.