USCIB: 4.2/41 

APPENDED DOOUMENTS CONTAIN 

CODEWORD MATERIAL 

18 March 1955 

MEMORANDUM FCR THE MEMBERS OF USCIU'§iC: 

Subject: 

. Reference: 

Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14. 

USCIB 4.2/40 of 15 March 1955. 

1. The enclosure is submitted for consideration in connection with 

item 2 0£ the agenda for the 27th Meeting of USCIBEC. 

2. In this connection, attention is invited to the parenthetical 

mention of an Appendix "B" near the top of page 3 of the enclosure with 

the reference. The enclosure herewith is intended to form. the basis for 

that Appendix "B". (It now occurs to me that we would have done better 

to use the word "Annex" in the enclosure with the reference thus avoiding 

the possibility of confusion with the UKUSA Appendices. The members 

might add that point to their consideration.) 

Enclosure 

DRAFT APPENDIX,, 

NSA TSC NO. 550636-B 

USCIB: 4.2/41 

a tain, • • Navy 

""""""~ .... tive Secretary, USCIB 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-10-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

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DRAFT APPIDIDIX 

GUIDE TO UNIFORH INTERPRETATION 

OF SECTION III OF CIBD # 

Appendix B to the UKUSA Agreement; provides for the assignment ot 

personnel to four groups (A, B, c, D), depending upon their degree of 

COMINT familiarity, and provides safeguards to· govern their assignmmt 

to hazardous dut7 - duty where they 'WOuld be exposed to capture and 

interrogation. The definitions provided. for groups A, B, c, D, being 

exliremely broad and general in nature, the u.s. ca-mr.r ccmma1t7 helll 

derived the following expansions for purposes of providing ready and uniform decisions. 

l. Group A. 

No expansion is considered necessary. 

2. Group B. 

No expansion is considered necessary, but for the sake of clarit7 

it is stated that the term. "knowledge of current v~ue" is to be interpreted, 

in each case where any doubt arises, in favor of a strict safeguarding of 

security. It is probable that a majority of COMINT cleared and indoctrinated 

persons would tall in this group or a higher group. It would app~, tor 

example, to large numbers of field processing personnel as well as to most 

of those who have been assigned to NSA or the Service Cryptologic Agency 

head.quarters. 

;3. Group C, which is defined as "personnel having lmowledge ot current 

value about Category III cmU:NT, II requires .t'urther elaboration. Any ot the 

Incl 

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following types of lmowledge would be sufficient to cause assignment to 

this or the next. higher group: 

a. Our present state of progress in terms of degree of 

readability with respect to a:ny Communist nation but without detailed 

knowledge of the means or methods employed or the mechanics of the cryptosystems involved. 

b. As in a. above with respect to any major non-Communist target, 

but with the added requirement that some potentially useful knowledge or 

the means or methods employed or the mechanics of the crypto-systems involved is present. (This distinction would omit certain persons who had 

knowledge that substantial success was being obtained against, for example, 

Itacy through knowledge ot the nature or existence of current end-product, 

but who could tell nothing as to the reasons for success. It is a frank 

liberalization of the strict letter of UKUSA Appendix B.) 

c. The degree of success attained by the technique of synthesis 

of large volumes of T/A and Plain Language (P/L) data to yield vital information against Russia. (This means intimate lmowledge of the scope and 

nature of Russian T/ A published as Category- III or of the Russian PL reporting and the dependence placed upon it.) 

d. Knowledge ot the overall distribution ot the u.s.-u.K. COMINT 

effort including the size~ location and purpose or advanced processing 

units and intercept establishments. (The intent here is that the 

knowledge should be both broad and deep and include not only the present 

moment but the historic aspects and future plans as well.) 

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e. Programming techniques of general purpose computer equipments 

!or crypt~ic problems. 

t. Capability to intercept radio transmissions where the equipments 

and techniques required go significantl1' beyond equipments and techniques in 

general use in the a.rt.. This mq include for example,, special equipments and 

techniques necessitated by very high or low frequencies encountered, new 

multiplex transmissions, ciphony, cif'ax, ultra-speed, noise tJPe conmunications, 

etc. 

These criteria will inevitably lead to the assignment of large' numbers of 

personnel to Group c. 

4. Group D also requires elaboration it any real distinction from 

Group C is to be established. Any of the following would be sufficient 

for assignment to Group D. 

a. Knowledge of the nature or the methods and means of' attack 

employed against Communist Categor,y III systems or knowledge of projected 

new methods. 

b. Broad overall knowledge of our success or failure against our 

various non-Communist targets together with the reasons therefore, the 

techniques developed, and the ke7 personalities involved. {In general 

this would apply o~ to persons who had held senior posta in NSA proper 

on a career basis. It is aimed at the person who is dangerous through 

sheer bulk of accumulated knowledge and experience.) 

c. Knowledge of the status of one or more of the higb.q sensitive 

"compartmented" problems during the time that such problem. may remain compartmented. (Compartmented problems are few in number and usually small. 

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The end-product, if' any, is usual]¥ distributed in a very limited fashion.) 

d. Knowledge or the performance and employment or special purpose 

high speed cryptanalytic equipments aimed primaril.1' at Conmunist problan.s. 

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