# /F·I~I:E" " IN CLERICS OFFICE ' IUPfteMECOURT,STATEOf**Wr~** 

## I..-... DATE 

## FEB 1 lOll

## ~---taAJ\**~v\.<l1dS.4-** ) 

# t..C'J CHifiFJUaTICE 

# l StiSACCARLSON SUPREME COURTCLERK 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEBORAH PERALTA, ) ) Petitioner, ) No. 92675-1 ) v. ) En Bane ) STATE OFWASHINGTON and ) 

## FEB t 

## 62017 WASHINGTON STATE PATROL, ) Filed ) Respondents. ) )
WIGGINS, J.-We are asked to review the trial court's ruling that plaintiff Deborah Peralta's admission during pretrial discovery should be given conclusive effect. Peralta admitted without qualification to being "under the influence of intoxicating liquors" at the time she was struck and injured by a Washington State Patrol car. We hold that her admission in this context was unambiguous and thatthe trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled she was bound by heradmission. Thejury instruction incorporating this ruling was appropriate. Even ifthe meaning of Peralta's admission was ambiguous, the trial court did not abuse its discretion on holding Peraltato a reasonable interpretation oftheadmission. Asa result, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this point. We do not address the other evidentiary errorsPeralta 

### v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 identified by the Court ofAppeals, but instead remand them to the Court ofAppeals for a determination ofprejudice.
FACTS I. Factual History One evening, plaintiff Peraltawas drinking beerwith a neighbor in a downtown Vancouvertavern. Later in the evening, Peralta rode with a friend to a party. Afteran argument atthe party, Peralta left on foot, became lost, and called her brotherJorge Peralta. Shetold him she had been drinking and askedfor a ride home. 1 Afterseveral unsuccessful effortsto meet herbrother, Peralta mistookan approaching
car for her brother's car. She stepped in front of the car, which was driven by Washington State Patrol Sergeant Ryan Tanner. 2 SergeantTannerdid not see Peralta in time to stop and struck herwith his vehicle. Realizing that he had struck someone, Sergeant Tanner called for backup and medical assistance; responding officers indicated Peralta smelled like alcohol when they were giving her assistance at the
scene ofthe accident. Peralta suffered serious injuries and was hospitalized. II. Procedural History To recover damages arising from her injuries after the accident, Peralta sued the State andWashington State Patrol (collectivelyWSP). In its answer, WSP pleaded

1 In a hospital interviewwith an investigator, Peralta indicated she had been drinking and wanted a designated driverto take her home that evening because she did notfeel comfortable driving. 2 SergeantTannerwas on his way to respond to a request for backup at atraffic stop.

2Peralta 

## v. State of

### Wash. and

### Wash. State Patrol, 

### No. 92675-1
an affirmative defense under RCW 5.40.060 (the intoxication defense statute), which provides a complete defense to an action for damages for personal injury when (1) the person injured was "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" at the time of the accident, (2) the person's intoxication was a proximate cause of his or her injuries, and (3) the person injuredwas morethan 50 percentatfault. The statutealso provides that the standard for proving an individual was under the influence is the same standard established by RCW 46.61.502 (the DUI statute3). 

### Under the DUI statute, there are at least two relevant ways of proving intoxication under these facts: subsection (1)(a), a blood alcohol content of 0.08, or subsection (1)(c), driving a vehicle while underthe influence of intoxicating liquors. During discovery, WSP sent Peralta a requestto admitordenythat "atthe time of the collision that is the subject of this lawsuit, Deborah Peralta was under the influence of intoxicating liquors." Peralta responded, "Plaintiff admits." At trial, WSP moved for a ruling that Peralta's admission conclusively established that she was under the influence of intoxicating liquors. Peralta objected to the motion and stated that her admission to being under the influence did not meet the standard for being under the influence under the intoxication defense statute. The trial court ultimately ruled that Peralta was bound by her admission and that the fact that she was intoxicated atthe time ofthe injurywas conclusively established. The trial court incorporated this ruling into jury instruction 20, which stated in relevant part:

3 Driving underthe influence statute.

3Peralta 

## v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 To establish the defensethatthe person injured was underthe influence, the defendant has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: First, that the person injured was under the influence of alcohol at the time ofthe occurrence causing the injury. Plaintiffadmits this element.
Clerk's Papers at 363 (emphasis added). The jury found that Peralta's intoxication
was a proximate cause ofher injuries and that she was morethan 50 percent atfault. As a result, the trial court dismissed Peralta's personal injury claim with prejudice. Peralta appealed to the Court ofAppeals, Division Two. The Court ofAppeals, Division Two, overturned the trial court's decision on the effect of Peralta's admission. See Peralta 

## v. State, 191 Wn. App. 931, 949, 366 P.3d 45 (2015). The court concluded that Peralta's admission did not satisfy the standard for intoxication under the intoxication defense statute. 

### /d. at 948-49. It further concluded that this error was harmful because the jury was not allowed to consider the testimony of Peralta'sfriend that Peralta did notappear intoxicatedthe night ofthe accident. 

### /d. The Court ofAppeals also concluded that jury instruction 20 was error and harmful for the same reasons. 

### /d. at 949. The Court ofAppeals identified three other evidentiary errors but did not decide whether these errors were prejudicial to Peralta. 

### /d. at 951-54. Both Peralta and WSP appealed the Court of Appeals' decision. Peralta appealed the Court ofAppeals' decision to remand for a newtrial; Peralta argued she should have judgmentfor her proportionate share ofthe damages found by thejury. We denied Peralta's petition for review. WSP cross petitioned to overturn the Court of

4Peralta v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 Appeals' determination that Peralta's admission did not satisfy the required prooffor intoxication underthe intoxicationdefensestatute. This courtgranted reviewofWSP's
cross petition. STANDARD OF REVIEW "The standard of review for evidentiary rulings made by the trial court is abuse ofdiscretion." CityofSpokane 

### v. Neff, 152Wn.2d 85, 91, 93 P.3d 158 (2004).4Wewill
reverse atrial court's evidentiary ruling '"onlywhen no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court."' State v. Ellis, 136Wn.2d 498, 504, 963 P.2d 843 (1998) (quoting State 

### v. Castellanos, 132Wn.2d 94, 97, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997)). We recognize that the trial court's ruling establishing the conclusive effect of Peralta's admission also made its way into the jury instruction. We review jury instructions de novo. See State v. Johnson, 180Wn.2d295, 301, 325 P.3d 135 (2014). ANALYSIS I. Admission Ruling Not an Abuse of Discretion We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Peralta's admission satisfied the standard for intoxication under the intoxication

4We notethatthe CourtofAppeals applied ade novo standard ofreviewtothis case. See Peralta, 191 Wn. App. at 945. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the meaning of Peralta's admissionwas aquestion oflaw or an application ofthe lawto thefacts. See id. Instead, the trial court was interpreting Peralta's admission made during discovery, and thus its decision was a discovery or evidentiary ruling. Since the trial court's ruling treated the fact of Peralta's intoxication as established, we treatthe appeal as one dealing with an evidentiary ruling. Whether we considerthe trial court's action an evidentiary or discovery ruling, the appropriate standard is abuse ofdiscretion. See Cede//v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofWash., 176Wn.2d 686, 694, 295 P.3d 239 (2013) ("We review atrial court's discovery ordersfor abuse ofdiscretion.").

5Peralta 

### v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 defense statute. In context, the meaning of Peralta's admission was not ambiguous. We thus hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Peralta admitted shewas intoxicatedfor purposes ofthe intoxication defensestatute. Norwas it errorto incorporatethis ruling intojury instruction 20. Even ifwe treat Peralta's admission as ambiguous, the trial court still did not abuse its discretion when it gave the admission conclusive effect. CR 36 governs requests for admissions and the answers to them. The rule required Peralta to qualify her answer to reflect her intention to admit that she was under the influence to a degree less than the statutory standard. Otherwise, her admission to being underthe influence was conclusively established unless she moved to amend or withdraw her admission. Peralta neitherqualified nor moved to withdraw oramend her admission. 

### A. The Purpose ofCR 36 CR 36(a) permits parties to serve requests for admissions to opposing parties to establish the truth of "statements or opinions offact or ofthe application of law to fact." The purpose ofCR 36 "is to eliminate from controversy factual matters thatwill not be disputed at trial." Thompson v. King Feed 

### & Nutrition Serv., Inc., 153 Wn.2d 447, 460, 105 P.3d 378 (2005) (plurality opinion). The greatest benefit of CR 36 admissions is trial efficiency: Such admissions "promote both efficiency and economy in resolving disputes. If a point is conceded, litigants need notexpend effort in investigations concerning it nor incurexpense in presenting evidenceto prove it. Judicial administration is also aided. Admissions reduce the time required totryacase. Indeed, theyoften makesummaryjudgment possible. Finally, admissions encourage litigants to evaluate



### 6Peralta 

### v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 realistically the hazards of trial, and thus tend to promote settlements." Lakes 

### v. von der Mehden, 117 Wn. App. 212, 218, 70 P.3d 154 (2003) (quoting SA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE 

### § 2252, at 522 (2d ed. 1994)). CR 36 places relatively few requirements on parties requesting admissions. It requires requesting parties merelyto attach relevant documents to their request, and to separately setforth each matterthey seek admitted. CR 36(a). In contrast, the rule places several requirements on responding parties regarding when and how they must respond to requests. Of particular interest here, the rule states, "[W]hen good faith requires that a party qualify his answerordeny only a part ofthe matterofwhich
an admission is requested, the party shallspecify so much of it as is true and qualify
or denythe remainder." 

### /d. (emphasis added). Under CR 36, matters admitted are "conclusively established unless the court
on motion permits withdrawal or amendment." CR 36(b) (emphasis added); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 471 (2002) (defining "conclusive"
as "putting an end to debate orquestion esp[ecially] by reason of irrefutability"). B. The Standard for Intoxication under RCW 5.40.060, the Intoxication Defense Statute We nowturntothe intoxication defensestatute, theaffirmativedefensepleaded by WSP and to which Peralta's admission was applied. The intoxication defense statute provides a complete defenseto an action for personal injurywhen the person

7Peralta 

### v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, 

### No. 92675-1 injured "was underthe influence ofintoxicating liquor" atthe time ofthe injury.5 RCW 

### 5.40.060. To determine ifan individual was "underthe influenceofintoxicating liquor," the intoxication defense statute incorporates by reference the definition of"underthe influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs" in RCW 

### 46.61.502, the DUI statute. RCW 

### 5.40.060(1). Underthe facts here, the DUI statute defines "underthe influence ofintoxicating liquor" in two ways: subsection (1)(a), a blood alcohol concentration of at least 

### 0.08 within two hours of driving, or subsection 

### (1)(c), driving a vehicle while "underthe influenceoforaffected by intoxicating liquor." RCW

### 46.61.502.The parties focus on the meaning ofthe latterdefinition. On first review, the standard under RCW 

### 46.61.502(1)(c) appears tautological: A person is guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, marijuana, or any drug ifthe person drives a vehicle within this state:

... While the person is under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor, marijuana, or any drug
.... Literally read, the statute says driving underthe influenceofintoxicants means driving underthe influence of intoxicants. Butwe have given substance to subsection (1)(c) through case law. In State 

### v. Hurd, we recognized that "[t]he phrase 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor'
... has been defined as any influence which lessens in any appreciable degree the ability of the accused to handle his automobile."

5The defense also requires the injured person's intoxication to be a proximate cause ofthe injury and the injured person to be more than 50 percent at fault. RCW 5.40.060(1). Neither of those two elements are at issue in this court, but may be at issue on remand to the Court ofAppeals.


### 8Peralta 

## v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 5Wn.2d 308, 315, 105 P.2d 59 (1940). We did not explicitly adopt that definition in Hurd, instead noting that "'so far as this case is concerned [the phrase] means an abnormal mental orphysical condition due to the influence of alcoholic liquors, a visible impairment of the judgment or a derangement, or impairment of mental or physical functions or energies arising therefrom."' 

### /d. at 316. In subsequent case law, we adopted a definition that closely resembled our language in Hurd: "Forthe purposes ofthis case, the defendant may be said to have been either 'under the influence of' or 'affected by' intoxicating liquor, if, at the time ofthe alleged unlawful operation of his automobile, evidence beyond a reasonable doubtestablishesthat intoxicating liquor has so far affected his nervous system, brain, or muscles, so as to impair, to an appreciable degree, his ability to operate his car in the mannerthat an ordinary prudentand cautious man, in thefull possession ofhisfaculties, using reasonable care, would operate ordrive asimilarvehicle underlike circumstances." State

## v. Engstrom, 79 Wn.2d 469, 474, 487 P.2d 205 (1971) (quotingjury instruction). A similar definition of "under the influence" may be found in our Court ofAppeals' jurisprudence. See, e.g., State v. Arndt, 179Wn. App. 373, 386, 320 P.3d 104 (2014) ("In Washington, a person is under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor 'if the person's ability to drive a motor vehicle is lessened in any appreciable degree."' (emphasis added) (quoting 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERNJURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 92.10, at286 (3d ed. 2008) (since withdrawn)). There is also a comparable definition in 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civi/16.04 (6th ed. 2012): "A person is under the influence of [alcohol]

... if, as a result of using [alcohol]

... ,the person's ability

9

### Peralta 

## v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1
to act as a reasonably careful person under the same or similar circumstances is lessened in any appreciable degree." (First and third alteration in original.) In the present case, the trial court instructed thejurywith a definition of"under the influence" resembling the civil pattern instruction. The instruction, proposed by Peralta, stated, "A person is under the influence of alcohol if, as a result of using alcohol, the person's ability to act as a reasonably careful person underthe same or similar circumstances is lessened in any appreciable degree." Thus, the definition of "under the influence" in the present case corresponds to the standard under RCW 46.61.502(1)(c). C. Admission Was NotAmbiguous With this background, we determine ifthe trial court abused its discretion with regard to Peralta's admission. When determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether Peralta's admission to being underthe influence is ambiguous. We conclude that her admission was not ambiguous. In making this determination, it is crucial to considerthe admission's context. See) e.g., 

### HomeStreet} Inc. 

## v. DepYofRevenue, 166Wn.2d 444,457, 210 P.3d 297 (2009) (emphasizing the importance of analyzing the context of a statute when examining the ambiguity of statutory language). When considering the context of Peralta's admission, we conclude the meaning of Peralta's admission was not ambiguousfortwo reasons. First, the request for admission is clearly related to WSP's defense; the language in the requestfor admission mirrorsthe language in the intoxication defense statute. It is also nearly identical to the language of the DUI statute. WSP was not required to use the specific language Peralta insists on, which would have specified
10Peralta 

### v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 the legal ramifications ofthe admission. See State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 695-96, 782 P.2d 552 (1989) (rejecting an argument that a charging document violated due processwhen it listed the offense charged as '"DWI,"' the acronym for "'Driving While Intoxicated,"' instead of listing the charge as "'driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug'"). As the trial court stated, "[W]e've got [a] request for admissions propounded by highly trained counsel, responded to by highly trained counsel[,] and intoxication was pleaded as an affirmative defense

.... I believe that she oughtto be bound by her admission that she's underthe influence." Second, the purpose of WSP's request for admission was for its affirmative defense, notto establish anotherconceptthat had no legal significance. WSP notified Peralta of its intent to use the intoxication defense statute as an affirmative defense in its answerto hercomplaint. Peralta's responsetoWSP's requestforadmissionwas under the direction of highly trained legal counsel who should have known the full legal effect ofthe admission: namely, the effect that her unqualified admission would be conclusively established unless she moved to withdraworamend it. See CR 36(b). When holding other parties' admissions conclusive, other courts have propounded a similar rationale: "[An answer to a request for admission is] a studied response, made under sanctions against easy denials
.... [R]equests for admission
... are normally made underthe direction and supervision ofcounsel, who has full professional realization oftheir significance. Therefore,

... their effect [should not be reduced] from conclusive admissions to merely evidential ones." Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. v. Teamsters Health 

### &Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1036 (3d Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted) (quoting McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F. Supp.



### 11Peralta 

### v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 628, 636-37 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). This result is consistent with the language of CR 36. Because Peralta's admission to being underthe influence was not ambiguous in this context, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that Peralta was bound by her admission. 6 Because we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding Peralta's admission, thetrial courtalso did noterrwhen it gavejury instruction 20 reflecting this fact. Forthese reasons, we reverse the Court ofAppeals.7 D. IfAdmission WasAmbiguous For the reasons stated above, Peralta's admission was not ambiguous in this context. Yet, we recognize that both Peralta and WSP advance reasonable interpretations of the phrase "under the influence." Even if we treat Peralta's admission as ambiguous, we conclude the trial court still did not abuse its discretion when it gave conclusive effectto Peralta's admission.

6 We note without comment that WSP offered substantial evidence supporting its intoxication defense. Thejury agreedthat Peralta's intoxication was a proximate cause ofher injuries and that she was more than 50 percent at fault. No party challenges the admission as completely lacking evidentiary support. 7 Peralta now argues that jury instruction 21, which explained the standard for being under the influence, combined with jury instruction 20, may have misled the jury into believing that Peralta admitted she was negligent. However, Peralta did not objecttojury instruction 21 at trial. Wewill generally consider a claimed error in a jury instruction only if the appellant raised the issue at trial. See Trueauxv. ErnstHome Ctr., Inc., 124Wn.2d 334, 339, 878 P.2d 1208 (1994).Therefore, these arguments are notwell taken and we do not considerthem.

12Peralta v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 1. TwoApproaches to InterpretingAmbiguousAdmissions When applying CR 36, state and federal courts8 are split in their handling of "ambiguous" admissions.9There are two main approaches. Thefirst approach deems all admissions as establishing all possible reasonable interpretations, unless the admitting party successfully moves the court to withdraw or amend the admission. 

### See, e.g., Adventis, Inc. 

### v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., 124 

### F. App'x 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[O]nce a matter that is properly [the] subject of an admission under [Federal RuleofCivil Procedure] 36(b) has been admitted during discovery,thedistrict court is notfree to disregard that admission."); Commonwealth Enters. 

### v. LibertyMut. Ins. Co., 1996 WL 660869, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1996) (unpublished) ("A matter admitted under [Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure] 36 is conclusivelyestablished unless withdrawn
.... Evidence inconsistentwith a Rule 36 admission is properlyexcluded." (citations omitted)); Airco Indus. Gases, 850 F.2d at 1036 ('"A judicial admission, deliberately drafted by counsel for the express purpose of limiting and defining the facts in issue, is traditionally regarded as conclusive, and an admission under[Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure] 36 falls into this category."' (quoting 8CHARLESALAN WRIGHT 

### &ARTHUR 

### R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 

### § 2264, at 742-43 (2d ed. 1982))). The second approach does not consider admissions to be conclusively established when they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. 

### See,

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 is nearly identical to ourstate rule, CR 36. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. Therefore, we find federal case law persuasive on this point.

13Peralta v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 e.g., Driscoll 

### v. Dennis, 513 F. App'x 702, 705 (1Oth Cir. 2013) ("But because these requests for admissions were compound and ambiguous, we 'regard the admission
as limited in practical effect.'

... [W]e cannot conclude the district courtwas required to treat the admissions as conclusively establishing Mrs. Driscoll's ownership." (quoting Dixon 

### v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1303 (10th Cir. 2009})); Johnson v. DeSoto CountyBd. ofComm'rs, 204 F.3d 1335, 1339-41 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the effect ofan admission because "at the very least, ambiguity did exist about whether the admissions were absolute or limited"); Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods. ofSt. Louis, Inc., 64 F.3d 1202, 1210 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The conclusive effect envisioned by the rule may not be appropriate where requests for admissions or the responses to them are subject to more than one interpretation."). Instead, the effect ofthe admission is submitted for decision by thejury. 2. The Trial Court'sApproach In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when ittreated Peralta's admission as establishing all reasonable interpretations of the phrase "under the influence." Peralta admitted without qualification that shewas "underthe influence of intoxicating liquors." Peralta believed thatshe needed to admit influence because she

9 Peralta does not concede that heradmission was ambiguous. SeeWash. Supreme Courtoral argument, Peralta v. State eta/., No. 93506-2 (Nov. 15, 2016), at 20 min., 18 sec. to 20 min., 25 sec., audio recording byTVW, Washington State's PublicAffairs Network, http://www.tvw.org.



### 14Peralta v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 had consumed alcohol. 10 Peralta's counsel argued to the trial court, "So we can't truthfully ethically answer a question, were you under the influence, ifwe have any alcohol in oursystem as no. We haveto sayyes...." However, since Peraltawished to admit influence only to a specific degree, CR 36 required her to qualify her admission to reflect this idea. See CR 36(a) (stating "when good faith requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part ofthe matter ofwhich an admission is requested, the party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder" (emphasis added)). Shefailed to make such a qualification. Without qualification, her admission to being under the influence was "conclusively established" unless she moved to withdraw or amend her admission. CR 36(b) ("Any matter admitted underthis rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment ofthe admission."). Peralta never so moved. Counsel for Peralta offers no reason why, once it was clear that the trial court intended to treat her admission as conclusively establishing the fact of intoxication under the intoxication defense statute, she did not move to amend or withdraw her admission. 11 Since she did not move to withdraw or amend her

10 This contention appearsto be withoutsupport in our case law. See Hurd, 5Wn.2d at316 ('"The law recognizes that a person mayhave drunk liquorandyet notbe under the infiuence ofit."' (quoting court's instruction).

11 At oral argument, Peralta's counsel stated, "Thatoption [to withdraw or amend] wasn't given to us." Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, supra, at 21 min., 33 sec. But the record reflects that counsel rejected the option to amend or withdraw the admission at trial. WSP speculated that Peralta did notwish to payforpotential costs associated with heradmission underCR37(a). See Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, supra, at 5 min., 47 sec. to 6 min., 8 sec. Whatever the



### 15Peralta v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 admission, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Peralta's admission satisfied the standard underthe intoxication defense statute. II. Other Evidentiary Issues While the Court ofAppeals based its reversal ofthe trial court on the request for admissions issue, it also held thatthe trial court made several erroneous rulings12 without deciding their possible prejudicial effect. Peralta, 191 Wn. App. at 948-53. These issues are not adequately briefed to us, nor does our order granting review encompasswhetherthese rulingswere prejudicial.Wegranted reviewofWSP'scross petition. In its cross petition, WSP asked this court to reverse the Court ofAppeals because Peralta's admission satisfied the first element of RCW 5.40.060. WSP did not petition for review ofthe other evidentiary issues, and neither did Peralta. Thus, review ofthese other evidentiary issues is outside the scope of review. We remand the remaining issues back to the Court ofAppeals for a determination of prejudice to Peralta. See RAP 13.7(b) ("Ifthe Supreme Court reverses a decision ofthe Court of Appealsthatdid notconsiderall ofthe issues raised which mightsupportthatdecision, the Supreme Court will either consider and decide those issues or remand the case to the Court ofAppeals to decide those issues.").

reason, Peralta chose notto moveto amend orwithdraw heradmission to reflectthefactthatshe did not intend to admit intoxication underthe intoxication defense statute.
12 These errors included (1) excluding Sergeant Roy Rhine's and Detective David Ortner's deposition testimonies, (2) excluding eyewitness hearsaystatements, and (3) compelling Peralta to disclose the identity of her consulting expert. Peralta, 191 Wn. App. at 951-54.
16Peralta 

## v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 CONCLUSION We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Peralta's admission satisfiedthe standardfor intoxication underthe intoxication defense statute and accordingly reverse the Court ofAppeals. The correspondingjury instruction was not given in error. The meaning of Peralta's admission was not ambiguous in this context. Even ifwe treat Peralta's admission as ambiguous, the trial court still did not abuse its discretion. Under CR 36(a), Peraltawas required to qualify heradmission if she wished to limit its legal effect. Without qualification, CR 36(b) required Peralta to moveto amend orwithdraw heradmission ifshewanted to avoid its conclusive effect. She never made such a motion. We remand to the Court ofAppeals the remaining evidentiary errors identified by the Court ofAppeals for determination ofwhetherthe
errors prejudiced Peralta, as they are outside the scope ofour review, and forfurther proceedings, ifany, consistentwith this opinion.

17Peralta v. State ofWash. and Wash. State Patrol, 

### No. 

### 92675-1

WE CONCUR.



### 18