[Cite as Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 488, 2009-

Ohio-1525.]

ESTATE OF STEVIC ET AL., APPELLEES, v. BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATION OF 

OHIO, INC., D.B.A. FMC DIALYSIS SERVICES OF RICHLAND COUNTY,

APPELLANT, ET AL. 

[Cite as Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 

 121 Ohio St.3d 488, 2009-Ohio-1525.]

Limitation of actions — R.C. 2305.113(A) — Definition of “medical claim.” 

(No. 2008-0392 — Submitted December 17, 2008 — Decided April 8, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, 

No. 2006 CA 0095, 2008-Ohio-33. 

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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

For the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations, a 

“medical claim” under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both arises out 

of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and is asserted 

against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers. 

__________________ 

 CUPP, J. 

{¶ 1} In this appeal, appellant-defendant contends that it may claim the 

benefit of the one-year “medical claim” statute of limitations contained in R.C. 

2305.113(A) against a claim arising out of the medical diagnosis, care, or 

treatment of a person even though the claim is not asserted against one of the 

medical professionals or facilities (“providers”) specifically listed in R.C. 

2305.113(E)(3). 

{¶ 2} Because R.C. 2305.113(E) defines a “medical claim” for purposes 

of R.C. 2305.113(A) not only as a claim that arises out of the medical diagnosis, 

care, or treatment of a person but also as one that is asserted against one of the 
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enumerated providers, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 

the case to the trial court. 

I 

{¶ 3} In October 2003, Donald Stevic went to the Richland County 

Kidney Dialysis Center for dialysis treatment. Appellant, Bio-Medical 

Application of Ohio, Inc., d.b.a. FMC Dialysis Services of Richland County 

(“Bio-Medical”), owns and operates the Richland County Kidney Dialysis Center. 

According to the complaint, employees of the center either physically dropped 

Stevic or allowed him to fall from a mechanical lift device that was used to move 

him from a wheelchair and into position for dialysis. As a result of the fall, Stevic 

suffered a fractured hip, abrasions, and other injuries. In February 2004, Stevic 

died. 

{¶ 4} Almost two years later, in October 2005, appellee Betty Stevic, as 

widow and executor of appellee the estate of Donald Stevic, filed a complaint for 

personal injuries and other tort damages against appellant, Bio-Medical. 

{¶ 5} Bio-Medical filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. Bio-Medical asserted that notwithstanding Stevic’s styling of the 

claims as claims for personal injury, the claims nevertheless arose in the course of 

medical treatment, were essentially medical claims falling within the R.C. 

2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claims,” and were subject to the R.C. 

2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations. Further, Bio-Medical contended that 

the claims were time-barred because Stevic’s complaint was filed more than one 

year after the date of the injury. In a one-sentence entry without any supporting 

rationale, the trial court granted Bio-Medical’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings and dismissed Stevic’s suit. 

{¶ 6} Upon review, a divided appellate court concluded that it was not 

clear from the face of Stevic’s complaint whether or not claims based on Mr. 

Stevic’s injuries constituted R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) medical claims, which are 
January Term, 2009 

3 

subject to the one-year statute of limitations. Specifically, the court stated that it 

could not unambiguously determine whether the complained-of injuries occurred 

while Stevic was under the care and direction of a medical provider or in a facility 

specified in the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claim.” Estate of 

Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., Richland App. No. 2006 CA 

0095, 2008-Ohio-33, ¶ 20. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial 

court and remanded the case for a determination of whether Stevic’s complaint 

alleged an R.C.2305.113(E)(3) medical claim. Id., ¶ 20, 23. 

{¶ 7} Thereafter, Bio-Medical appealed to this court, and we accepted 

review under our discretionary jurisdiction. Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical 

Application of Ohio, Inc., 118 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2008-Ohio-2595, 887 N.E.2d 

1202. 

II 

{¶ 8} Although an action for bodily injury must generally be brought 

within two years after the cause of action accrues, R.C. 2305.10(A), certain 

medical claims are subject to the shorter one-year statute of limitations set forth at 

R.C. 2305.113.1

 This one-year limitation statute specifically lists and defines the 

types of claims included within its ambit. 

{¶ 9} As pertinent to this appeal, “medical claim” has the following 

specific, defined statutory meaning: 

{¶ 10} “(3) ‘Medical claim’ means any claim that is asserted in any civil 

action against a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or residential facility, 

against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, or 

residential facility, or against a licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, 

advanced practice nurse, physical therapist, physician assistant, emergency 

 

1. Although not pertinent to this appeal, the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations also 

applies to dental, optometric, and chiropractic claims. 
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medical technician-basic, emergency medical technician-intermediate, or 

emergency medical technician-paramedic, and that arises out of the medical 

diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. ‘Medical claim’ includes the 

following: 

{¶ 11} “(a) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical 

diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person; 

{¶ 12} “(b) Claims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or 

treatment of any person and to which either of the following applies:

{¶ 13} “(i) The claim results from acts or omissions in providing medical 

care. 

{¶ 14} “(ii) The claim results from the hiring, training, supervision, 

retention, or termination of caregivers providing medical diagnosis, care, or 

treatment.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). 

{¶ 15} Further, the statute also lists and defines the medical providers 

included within the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition of “medical claim.”2

 

{¶ 16} Both parties in this appeal assert that the definition of “medical 

claim” set forth in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is plain and unambiguous. We agree. 

Therefore, our analysis is limited to applying the legislature’s enactment and 

giving it effect according to its plain meaning. Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 

Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 

III 

{¶ 17} Bio-Medical argues that the R.C. 2305.113(A) limitations period 

applies even if only one portion of the R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) definition is satisfied. 

Specifically, Bio-Medical asserts that Stevic’s claim meets the definition of 

 

2. For instance, the following terms are also defined: physician, podiatrist, hospital, home, 

residential facility, licensed practical nurse, registered nurse, advanced practice nurse, physical 

therapist, physician assistant, emergency medical technician-basic, emergency medical technicianintermediate, and emergency medical technician-paramedic. R.C. 2305.113(E)(1), (2), (4), (8), 

(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19). 
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“medical claim” through the sole application of this clause: “ ‘Medical claim’ 

includes * * * [c]laims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment 

of any person [when the] claim results from acts or omissions in providing 

medical care.” R.C. 2305.113(E)(3)(b). According to Bio-Medical, because Mr. 

Stevic’s injury resulted from the acts or omissions of the dialysis center’s staff in 

connection with his dialysis treatment, Stevic presented a medical claim within 

the purview of R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). 

{¶ 18} Bio-Medical may be correct that Stevic’s claim arises out of the 

diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person. However, Bio-Medical ignores the 

portion of the statute that also requires that the claim be asserted against one or 

more of the specific medical professionals or facilities listed in R.C. 

2305.113(E)(3). The term “medical claim” as defined in R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) has 

two components that the statute states in the conjunctive: (1) the claim is asserted 

against one or more of the specifically enumerated medical providers and (2) the 

claim arises out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment. We must give full 

meaning to all of the express statutory language. See, e.g., In re Estate of Roberts

(2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 311, 314, 762 N.E.2d 1001; Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 

149 Ohio St. 231, 237, 36 O.O. 554, 78 N.E.2d 370. 

{¶ 19} Therefore, based on the plain meaning of the legislature’s 

enactment, we hold that for the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute 

of limitations, a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both (1) 

arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and (2) is 

asserted against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers. 

{¶ 20} Moreover, as the appellate court correctly concluded, because 

Stevic’s complaint did not clearly indicate whether any of her claims were 

asserted against medical providers enumerated in R.C. 2305.113(E), the trial 

court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Bio-Medical was premature. 

Remand is appropriate because further proceedings in the trial court are required 
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to determine whether Stevic’s complaint alleges a medical claim within the 

purview of R.C. 2305.113. 

IV 

{¶ 21} For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals is 

affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment affirmed 

and cause remanded. 

 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Benham & Ream Co., L.P.A., Jeffery S. Ream, and Frank L. Benham, for 

appellees. 

 Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., Jane F. Warner, and Susan M. Audey, for 

appellant. 

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