• 

• 

REF ID:A59829 

TOP-SEC~EJ SEc~·~rTY INFORl~ATION , 

!!! , .. , • P!JPll I!!•• 

IBllWIDJM 1'01 THI aaJIR9• 119CD 81CUUB' OCllliftll 

M3•ts Cocllmld tor ~ lllthod8 

1'heN 1e attaobed a m..,rmdtll ta. t.be Comdmatoia wldah ....... tbat 81CCOJI .. "Mlfne pl'Cl99dure8 m e8't;lbli81dng a~ 'for~ mthocll. 

Prft:Lo• SmooJIJ PaJ*l'8. thl8 nb3•t ... the tollcndn1t 

1. .l wnndm ot JS JA'41m'J' 1952 tzom the 

ao.dinatozt to SJlcOOM vld.ob vu o1roulatec.t to 

8iX100M ...... on 2k Jam17 1'520 

2. A wswndua ot !$ MaJ' 1912 ht.a SJIJOOH to 

the Ooordt.Dator wbiob aontdnal the :lntefta 

:reawndatiom ot BmOOH with Ngard to th19 

prob'J.ea. 

!hie •ttv w:U1 oanatitute the tlpnda tor the SICOOM 

meetm1 to be lleJ.d :l.n a,oa IOIS-B• .bl.:lagton 9a11 St&t!Gn, 

at 0900 CID W.m••• 27 J;apat. 

°" ... , dtd 16 JuJ:y 'S'2 

nbj. u aboft, fla CoorcHnator 

to Cha1rmln1, uscm Seaurit7 

C01D1111 ttee, ._ 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 12-12 2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 
• 

Subj-'Ct; 

REF ID:A59829 

HASHlHGTON 2s, Da c. • 

ua Ii 000263 

16 J'Ul.y 19$2 

1.. Jn uccord2.nc~l with the :rrecommendation conta:lniad in :f'O'Ul' Jllf;DDrm1c·um of S t{lw 1952, tha Director, AFSA, bu baen attorded tho oppo);.\. 

tun~ cy to raviav tho procedures which have bften proposed tor estnbJ.1Hb1ng a SO'pat·ata CO<kmord tor oryptana1'Ytic methods,. As a result Of ·i;.ltis 

rev$i.1w,. e tim AFSla p:>lioy position hns ooen ostablished which is p1'\looo 

am~ iad in the follmrlnc paragraph.so 

2" Tbe AFSA position on this Ir.&tter ran.ams substaitiaJ.ly tho 

saa11111 as t.hat J:orillardod tor your consideration in my memorandum of 1$' 

Jmmary 19)2. In edd1tion, the £ollow1ng comments resulted trtJm 

Diffl.9"SA's stuctr d: yout' m6f.'!orandu111. ot S May 19521 

a. By tne BRUSA Ag:r:eenmit, the msie definition ot COMINT 

and of its t"W.o categories, specUJ. intelligence and 

trat.f'io 1ntellige."'loe1 relates to the snd product. Hi.."!·• 

torically,, this has been the ca.so since tho vel"'J f'irst 

codei!'Ord ws used. Tho intention was to require the 

intelligence 60 classified to b9 J:t.E.ndled in such a. vq 

u to protGct.the source. Jn addition., the BRUSA Agr.Jemsnt stip1lla-Ws that TOP SIDRET codeword protect:f.on shall 

be accorded to teobniquea related to the end product :In 

ordel.'" to mn:ll:d!:EJ the possible interonce diari\ra.ble about 

COMIN 1' successes. However. tha two fields ot cryptana... 

qtic ~tbod aud COI-'!INT results aro, in gp..r1aral,, quite 

sepn.r:atEt, both c.e to materi&l incl.uded and persovJ.1el involved. 'l}iare!'ore,, 't.b:J applioatiDn o:t separa\.e codewords 

to th.am is quite feasible. 1..n the limited area ot ovo1• .. l.ap,, the convention could be that tho product codeword 

alone would be used since 1 to protection :.4.l!1!>lies the 

p1"0tection of the source and thereby the method. 

b. nte respons:S.bil;f.ty of the Director. ii.FSA, to m9.inta.in 

adequate security procedures withil'l the COM.SEC field is 

be:lng ful~ discharged. The des1ro to eutablish a sep.aTOP·SEGRET SEGURITY INFORMATION 
REF ID:A59829 

e oc ti 000263 

16 July 19.$2 

S11bjr.;ct1 Codeword tor Anal.7tic Methodao 

----------------------------------- rate rr.ethodo codeword is meant to reinforce even turthor 

securi'l;y procedUl.•es within a particular segment ot the 

COMSPXJ fieldo lh the light ot this, the implication 

that a danger to the security ot COMJNT would arise if 

cor·:SEO nsthods were to be raised to the same catego17 

does not appear to be wall t01mded. Since there is a 

much stricter limitation ot COMSEO methods to the "need 

to lmoil' principle,, the danger to the sacuriv ot COMntT 

'b7 the est !.lblisluoont ot a separate methods codeword is 

not evidontv ~ts is further substantiated bJ' the taot 

that there are virtuall1' no consumers ot this material. 

outside of AFSA and, consequently• compromise is tDllikel.1' 

since there is li ttl!J or no d:laoemination :l.n mv- form. 

3. At the recent u.s/U.K. Communicat:l.on Securi'l;JJ' Conference, ·this 

subj·.ict was discussed with memers of the London Cypher Poliq Boardo 'l'he 

· opin.1.on,9 that wore oxpreesad on this matter were as tollows1 

a. 'l'he U.K. representatives stated th.at, :In their opinion, 

a single codeword tor doCU11mts containing methods and 

techniques, as distinguished from the codeword for 

doCUll"ients containing only' the end products of cOMINT 

operations,, would result in greater proteotion for 

the conmT end products. ni1s opinion was based on · the .f'aet that. a fair nmber of' people vho would requi:m 

indoct1-ination tor the methods codeword would no longer 

requir.a indoctririu.tion tor the end product codeword. 

l>. The U.S. repreoantatives felt that the proviBion of a 

separate codetmrd would result :In increased security tor 

cryptm1alytic methods and techniques. Ma:t.erial of considerable ceyptm:i.alytic importance, currently- unprotected 

by cod1JWOrd, could, under the proposal,, be distributed 

nth a greater measure o£ security than is now poersibleo 

o. Both the u.s. and U.K. representatives agreed that the 

proposigd division would simplU'y the p:roblmn of indoctrination. In one case, it would be unnecessary to divulge 

the content or nature of the COMINT end product to per3ons 

ccncer11ed CGl1' with methods and techniques. The corollary 

of this would follow with respect to the indoctrinatio11 of 

these conaomed only' with the possession and evaluation ot 

the COI-'IINT end product. 

- 2 -

TOP-SfC3f T ZEGa~JTY lt4FORfv~ATION 
.. . . REF ID:A5~29 • • TOP-SECRET sarmY IMFORt.~ATIDH UC # 00026.3 

16 July 19S2 

Codewrd tor Analytic Methods. 

-•n••••••••••---••••••••-••-••-•-

do It was aloo felt that• once having eclopted a codeword 

for methods documents, there would seldom be necessity 

tor changing the word on account ot its actual or 

suspected compro111iseJ further, it was f'elt that the 

codeword i tsel:l' need not be classified as is the codetlTOrd £01• the end product. 

4. Therefore, the uscm Coordinator requests that you re-examine 

the pi'Ocedures tor establishing a codswrd tor analytic methods, as proposed in your memoitandum of 5 Majy' 19S21 1n the l:fght ot the AFSA policy 

position noted above, md the agreer.Jent reached on this matter between 

the U.S. arid UoKo repressn'latives at the recent Communication Security ConteNll'30o 

/s/ J. ~~. Wenger 

J. u. vn!MGER 

Rear Admiral, u. s. Wavy Daputy u .. s.o.I.B. Coordinator 

_, - TOP-8EbnET StGJnlTY Uif Oiif,iATION