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'!!OP SiQRS FRG'PH Y. 6 •. EPli!lS ONLY 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL86-36/50 USC 3605 SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 9 • 2/10 

Subject: 

Item 1 Considered at the Tw.entieth (Special) Meeting of USCIBEC, held on 13 October 1954. 

OGA 

COMINT Capability to Provide Early Warning ot Chinese 

Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shore Islands 

Occupied by the Chinese Nationalist.a. 

TheCJ{AIBMAN stated that this meeting is being held at the request 

c>t· ... ·.· .. ··.t .. he CIA lll.em1Jer who oonsi d els the subject problem to be of ·· .. a. pressing nf#.ture. He askedj Jto present the views of his Agency. 

· \\I lsaid that he would first like to distribute a paper for 

use\ln guidance of the discussion (distributed to all members as an 

enclosure with USCIB 9. 2/5). He then infomed the Chaiman that this 

meeting bad been called because officials in his Agency feel that the Fonnos~ and off-shore islands area is the area most likely to present 

us with. a hot war on short notice. He pointed out that statements by 

the Peiping Government cannot be ignored and that they:,.......s.a6..S!.l ........ ·oM....JlaiW........__---, 

borne out shi concentrations and troo movement • 

He said 

that he thoUght this Committee should decide on specific steps to 

alleviate this condition and agree upon positive recommendations which 

can be considered by USCIB at an early date. He then proceeded to read 

the paper just\.distributed to all members, which consisted primarily of 

a seriee ot questions pertinent to the issue. 

The CHAIRMAN\commented that the questions presented amounted to a 

large order !or the Committee, and stated that there are probably still 

other questions whi.ch could be added to the list to insure a complete 

study ot the problem. He suggested that the Committee proceed to discuss 

the points raised byj pne by one to determine the views ot the 

various members, keeping in mind that we are interested only in COMINT. 

The members agreed, then adopted a suggestion by Mr. Patton that 

Point ''K" be considered first. The following comments contain the highlights or the discussion of the points indicated. 

Point 11K11 - Is the Intelligence Community taking full advantage of 

non-CCMINT sources, such as photo-reconnaissance? I I 

CCJ.1MANDER WELDEN, explaining the restrictions on recce flights 

which CINCPAC must observe, stated that efforts have been made to use C~AT facilities. It was his opinion that while in!omation from both 

these sources can be expected to improve, photo-reconnaissance still will 

not serve as a substitute for CCMINT in providing early warning of attack. 

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eclassified and approved for release by 

SA on 11-04-2014 pursuant to E.O. 

3526 
f=O 3.3.(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'fOP SEiOR:ffi' F'RO'fII - tJ.S. EYES ONLY 

USCIB: 9. 2/10 

MR. PATTON said that we are attempting to find an overnight solution 

.to a very difficult problem. He suggested that the possibility of obtaining information from non-C(]rlINT sources other than photo recce be 

discussed. 

The CHAIRMAN agreed, stating his belief that Mr. Patton feels that 

if we can get ad~quate informBtion from non-COMINT sources, then it is 

useless to risk efforts on the COMINT side. 

I ~aid, that he would not be willing to state that information being obtaine.d from non-COMINT sources would provide us with not.ice 

of impending attack~ 

The CHAIR1"1AN explained that as yet there has been made known no 

policy decision as to the status of the off-shore islands in the overall 

picture of U.S. intentions. OGA • 

COMMANDER HOIMES state~ that there is practically no information on 

what the Chinese Communists are doing from a naval viewpoint. 

l-'.i.R. BUFFHAM stated that CHICOM knowledge would not cause us to lose 

much as far as our present success on the problem is concerned. l tsaid that he would not like to convey the impression that 

ef fo ts to Oota n non-COMINT information are slackening. He expressed 

his opinion that a greater effort to obtain all possible information from 

all sources is to be pref erred to concentration upon one aspect. 

Point "A" - Should we attempt a site survey on the off-shore islands? 

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USCIB: 9.2/10 

The question raised by Point 11011 (Is there a possibility of establishing intercept facilities on Special Navy Vessels?) was also discussed 

at some length. In.formation available to, and presented by, Commander 

Welden on this subject indicated that this means would require time and 

expense, and undoubtedly would not be approved at higher Navy levels in 

absence of more concrete evidence of necessity and assurance of success 

than now appears to exist. 

The members accepted Commander Welden 1s offer to look into the 

matter further with a view to providing additional details on the feasibility of a ship-borne operation in this case. 

Discussion of the remaining points raised by the CIA member left the 

majority of the members with the reeling that they had insufficient 

information before them to decide the issues, particularly in view of 

their inability to determine the practical degree of urgency surrounding 

consideration of the whole problem. EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

It was accordingly agreed to recommend that the problem be ref erred 

back to the Intelligence CoilB11.ittee for additional study of those point.s 

not specifically handled by the members of USCIBEC at this meeting. It 

was agreed, further, that the Intelligence Conunittee should submit an 

interim report of as many as possible of its findings in time for consideration at the October 22nd meeting of USCIBEC. 

USCIBEC agreed, further, that the Navy member should review the 

possibility of employing ship-borne intercept and inform the Committee 

more specifically of the feasibility of this approach to the problem. 

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USCIB: 9.2/10 

On the remainder of the questions presented by the CIA member, 

USCIBEC felt that it had before it insufficient information upon which 

to base a decision, in light of their inability to determine the 

practical degree of urgency surrounding the problem. 

This item to be continued on the agenda. 

USCIB: 9.2/10 - 6 -

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