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SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 13.1/9 

Subject: 

Item 2 of the Agenda for the 116th Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 10 June 1955. 

C()1INT Personnel Security Standards (USCIB 13.1/7). . The ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) informed the members that this 

item is based upoL reconnnendations made by Captain Taylor prior to his 

departure as Executive Secretary. He added his opinion that the Board 

owed Captain Taylor a vote of thanks !or his initiative in this regard, 

apd he asked Captain Taylor, whom he had invited to attend this meeting, 

if he had any comments to make. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR referred to paragraph 'lb of his paper (CIB #000119) 

and asked that it be corrected to read " ••• periodic reinvestigations at 

intervals of not !!IE!:! than three years ••• etc. 11 He then commented that 

his principal reason for recommending interviews with working associates 

and social acquaintances not listed on a subject's personal history 

statement was to reach areas outside the subject's chosen circle of 

references, which could be presumed to be friendly. 

GENERAL CANINE commented at some length on the recommendations in 

Captain Taylor's paper, his main objection being' against the principle 

of investigating one's self. He said that he thought it would be 

difficult for a group representing the member agencies to perform an 

objective investigation and produce an objective report. He recommended 

that a qualified 11outside 11 agency, namely, the Department of Justice, be 

asked to make a study of the status and efficiency of our CCMINT 

personnel security procedures and practices and report its findings. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR referred to the extremely large number (42,000) of 

personnel currently cleared and indoctrinated for Category III CCMINT 

and said that he thought a lack o:r discrimination as to degree of access 

is largely to blame for this high figure. 

MR. ELLIS, referring to General Canine 1s proposal, said that he 

considers the existing Board standards proper, and that the answer to 

the problem lies in tighter control and closer supervision of existing 

procedures by the i..~dividual member agencies rather than in expanded 

investigations. 

MR. GODEL, associating himself with Mr. Ellis' remarks, suggested 

·that we address ourselves to the problem of reducing to a reasonable 

figure the number of people authorized. access to Category III, thereby 

permitting more effective application of existing standards and 

procedures. 

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GENERAL CANINE, reiterating his belief in having such a study performed by someone who does not work for him, pointed out that an important 

-aspect of the personnel security problem is to obtain assurance that an 

employee who is "pure" when first taken on the rolls remains that way 

throughout his employment. 

The CHAIR then 'suggested that a solution to this problem might be 

reached by having t~e senior security representatives of the various 

agencies sit together to compare notes, using the Petersen case as a 

starting point, in an effort to determine what lessons can be learned 

individually and collectively from the procedures and practices now in 

use among the member agencies. 

MR. GODEL, connnenting upon General Canine's desire for study by an 

independent group, stated.° that there is a very high level Presidential 

group, headed by Governor Brucker, which is charged with looking into the 

overall security policy ~d practices of the Department of Defense. He 

said that he could probably arrange for a study to be made by this group 

if the Board so agreed. 

MR. ARMSTRONG recalled Captain Taylor's earlier mention of the fact 

that on two occasions Petersen had been found to meet the standards of 

the Board. He said that this would seem to indicate the possibility that 

the basic criteria applicable to all members are not sufficiently high, 

and that the outside study prepared by General Canine would be most likely 

to produce an impersonal and objective recommendation as to whether 

changes should be made. 

• MR. GODEL, agreeing with General Canine's and Mr. Armstrong's view 

that members of the COMINT conununity would be "prophets without honor" in 

the conduct of an investigation of this kind, pointed out that their 

proposals had the added advantage of recognizing the President's concern 

and interest in overall security practices. 

ADMm.AL CAVENAGH suggested that, in view of the fact that an outside 

committee would require facts to work with, it might be best to have our 

own people study the problem with a view to determining whether advice of 

an outside group will be necessary. 

The MEMBERS engaged in a brief further discussion on the need for a 

commit.tee to study this problem, ultimately agreeing that a committee 

study is desirable. The discussion then turned to a consideration of 

terms of reference for, and composition of, the proposed· committee. 

The CHAIR suggested that terms or reference first be considered, 

commenting that agreement on this point might help simplify the problem 

of composition. He invited comments by Mr. Armstrong. 

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MR. ARMSTRONG recommended that the committee be asked, among other 

things, to review the degree of close supervision, control, and inspection 

maintained by each member agency; to review USCIB Directive Number ; in 

light of our experience in the Petersen case; and to study the feasibility 

of establishing different levels of clearance for different categories of 

access. 

These proposed terms of reference were general~ acceptable; however, 

the members agreed that they would be prepared in draft form by the 

Executive Secretary and circulated for comment prior to final approval. 

The CHAIR observed that the proposed terms of reference indicate a 

need for a rather broad study by knowledgeable representatives. He 

suggested that each member appoint one representative, using his own 

discretion as to whether that person should be his top security officer. 

He suggested, further, that the Chairman of the USCIB Security Committee 

sit as a member of the committee, and informed the mEmbers of his belief 

that the CIA representative would be their senior security officer. 

MR. GODEL stated that OSD representation probably would be appointed 

from the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Governor Brucker). 

GENERAL CANINE again proposed that an outside group be asked to make 

the study. He noted that Attorney General Brownell is fundamentally 

charged with internal security and suggested that he be asked to handle 

the :matter. 

The CHAm asked if the FBI member would be willing to accept the 

chairmanship of this committee. 

MR. ELLIS replied that it would be necessary for him to check with 

his principal before making a commitment. He continued by commenting 

that the discussion seemed to imply some aura of mystery with regard to 

techniques employed by his Bureau. He assured the members that there is 

nothing mysterious about their investigations, stating that their results 

depend primarily upon thoroughness. He repeated his originally-stated 

opinion that the problem before the Board is not so much the standards 

themselves, but continued and effective inspection, supervision and 

control of them. 

The CHAIR stated that there appear to be two possible courses of 

action, namely, (1) to ask the Attomey General to conduct a study of the 

'problem, and (2) to establish a committee of one representative from each 

member agency, plus the Chairman of the USCIB Security Committee, requesting that the FBI member accept the chairmanship of such a committee. 

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A poll of the members revealed t~e Director, NSA in support or (l) 

above and the remaining members in support or proposal ( 2). Subsequently, 

the Director, NSA expressed his willingness to accede to the majority view. 

DECISION: (10 June l955) USCIB agreed: 

a. To establish a committee to study the COMINT personnel security 

standards and practices of the USCIB member agencies with a view to making 

recommendations and/or suggestions to USCIB with respect thereto. 

b. That the conunittee should be chaired by the FBI member, subject 

to FBI concurrence, with membership consisting or one representative 

appointed by each member of the Board, plus the Chairman of the USCIB 

Security Committee. 

c. That the committee would operate under terms of reference 

reflecting the Board's discussion at this meeting. Such terms of reference 

to be prepared by the Executive Secretary and circulated for approval by 

USCIB. 

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