COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Annunziata 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

MELVIN BRIGGS, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1443-94-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 DECEMBER 12, 1995 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Jose R. Davila, Jr., Judge 

 David R. Lett for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, 

(Office of the Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Melvin Briggs, Jr. (appellant) appeals the trial court's 

July 11, 1994 decision to revoke his suspended sentence, which 

arose from a November 11, 1981 conviction for heroin possession. 

Appellant asserts (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

revoke his suspended sentence, and (2) the trial court failed to 

credit him with good behavior time earned during the original 

suspension period. Because the trial court committed no error, 

we affirm the judgment. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin on November 

24, 1981. On January 13, 1982, the trial court suspended 

imposition of a sentence, for an unspecified amount of time, 

conditioned on appellant's good behavior and his completion of a 

drug/alcohol treatment program. 
 2 

 On November 10, 1983, the trial court, after hearing 

evidence that appellant's urine tested positive for drugs and 

that appellant was "dealing with drugs," revoked appellant's 

January 13, 1982 suspended imposition of sentence. The trial 

court sentenced appellant to ten years in the state penitentiary, 

with five years suspended based on good behavior. On two prior 

occasions when appellant failed to complete rehabilitation 

programs, the trial court did not revoke its suspension of 

imposition of sentence. 

 On July 11, 1994, the trial court conducted a revocation 

hearing on the original heroin conviction, during which hearing 

the court received evidence of a May 26, 1993 conviction for 

petit larceny and evidence that appellant had stopped reporting 

to his probation officer in October 1993. For these reasons, the 

trial court revoked the remaining five year suspended sentence on 

the original heroin conviction and sentenced appellant to five 

years in a state correctional facility. 

 On July 26, 1994, appellant moved the trial court to vacate 

its July 11, 1994 sentencing order. At the hearing on the 

motion, appellant's counsel conceded that there had been 

probation violations, including the May 26, 1993 petit larceny 

conviction "within the ten year period of time" of the November 

10, 1983 order. However, appellant contended that because the 

trial court provided no specific period of suspension in either 

the January 13, 1982 or November 10, 1983 orders, the statutory 
 3 

period of suspension under Code § 19.2-306 ran from the date of 

the first order. If that contention is correct, the trial court 

would have been without jurisdiction on July 11, 1994. 

 The trial court denied the motion, and appellant now 

appeals to this Court. 

 II. 

 JURISDICTION 

 A plain reading of Code § 19.2-306 reveals the trial court 

had jurisdiction on July 11, 1994, to revoke appellant's five 

year suspended sentence, which was imposed on November 10, 1983. 

 Code § 19.2-306 states: 

 The court may, for any cause deemed by it 

sufficient which occurred at any time within the 

probation period, or if none, within the period of 

suspension fixed by the court, or if neither, within 

the maximum period for which the defendant might 

originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned, revoke 

the suspension of sentence and any probation, if the 

defendant be on probation, and cause the defendant to 

be arrested and brought before the court . . . within 

one year after the maximum period for which the 

defendant might originally have been sentenced to be 

imprisoned, whereupon, in case the imposition of 

sentence has been suspended, the court may pronounce 

whatever sentence might have been originally imposed. 

(Emphasis added). 

 On January 13, 1982, the original sentencing court suspended 

imposition of appellant's sentence for an unspecified time 

period. Because appellant could have received a maximum sentence 

of ten years in prison for his conviction, Code § 19.2-306 

granted the trial court authority to revoke appellant's suspended 
 4 

imposition of sentence and impose a sentence at any time up until 

January 13, 1993.1

 See Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 686, 

292 S.E.2d 348, 351 (1982)(applying Code § 19.2-306); Carbaugh v. 

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 119, 123-24, 449 S.E.2d 264, 266 

(1994)(applying Code § 19.2-306). 

 A careful tracking of the chronology of this case reveals 

that the trial court acted within the time period mandated by 

Code § 19.2-306.2 First, on November 10, 1983 (twenty-one months 

after the original sentencing order), the trial court revoked 

appellant's suspended imposition of sentence. This suspension 

occurred "within the maximum time period for which the defendant 

might originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned," which was 

ten years. The trial court revoked appellant's suspended 

imposition of sentence, ordered him to serve ten years in prison, 

but suspended five years for an unspecified time period. The 

remaining suspension period therefore ended, by operation of Code 

§ 19.2-306, on November 10, 1993. On July 11, 1994, the trial 

court heard evidence that appellant committed a petit larceny on 

May 26, 1993, along with parole violations starting in October 

1993; both of these offenses occurred before November 10, 1993. 

 

 1 The original ten year "maximum" period ended on January 

13, 1992. However, up until one year after the expiration of the 

maximum period, trial courts may revoke a sentence based on 

actions that occurred within the period. Code § 19.2-306. Thus, 

in this case, the ten year period expired on January 13, 1992, 

but to this ten year period was added one additional year. 

 2 Appellant's counsel admitted this numerous times at the 

trial court's July 27, 1994 rehearing on the suspension matter. 
 5 

 The obvious purpose of Code § 19.2-306 is remedial; it 

provides closure and a time limitation when the trial court fails 

to include such a limitation in its order of suspension. Nothing 

in Code § 19.2-306 indicates that the legislature intended to 

limit the trial court's authority under Code § 19.2-303.1 to fix 

a period of suspension for a "reasonable time . . . without 

regard to the maximum period for which the defendant might have 

been sentenced." 

 When the trial court revoked its suspension of imposition of 

sentence on November 10, 1983, it was well within the statutory 

time limitation of Code § 19.2-306. At that time, the trial 

court could have suspended the five-year suspended sentence for a 

period of ten years (or more), being limited only by what would 

be "reasonable." Code § 19.2-303.1. Because the trial court was 

again silent as to the period of suspension, the limitations of 

Code § 19.2-306 applied from that point. 

 If we accepted appellant's argument that because on 

November 10, 1983 the trial court failed to set a specific time 

for the suspension, the statutory time began to run from the date 

imposition of sentence was withheld--January 13, 1982--appellant 

would receive a benefit because of the trial court's indulgence 

and attempts to help appellant overcome his drug dependency. 

Clearly, this was not the legislature's intent and the plain 

language of the statute does not require such a result. 
 6 

 III. 

GOOD BEHAVIOR TIME 

 Assuming without deciding that appellant preserved this 

issue for appeal, see Rule 5A:18, we hold that the trial court 

was under no obligation to credit appellant with good behavior 

time. 

[T]he probation [and suspension] statutes are highly 

remedial and should be liberally construed to provide 

trial courts a valuable tool for rehabilitation of 

criminals. In addition, the power of the courts to 

revoke suspensions and probation for breach of 

conditions must not be restricted beyond the statutory 

limitations. 

Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684, 292 S.E.2d 348, 350 

(1982)(citations omitted); see Carbaugh v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. 

App. 119, 124, 449 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1994)(discussing the 

legislative intent to grant judges broad powers to revoke 

suspended sentences). 

 As discussed in Section II, supra, the trial court had the 

power, pursuant to Code § 19.2-306, to revoke the original 

suspended sentence at any time until January 13, 1992. The trial 

court revoked the suspended sentence on November 10, 1983 and 

imposed the sentence that originally could have been imposed on 

January 13, 1982. All of the trial court's actions followed the 

statutory directives of Code § 19.2-306, and no case law or 

statutory authority restricts the trial court's actions in this 

case. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to credit appellant with "good behavior" 
 7 

time supposedly "earned" between the original sentencing order 

date and the first revocation of suspended sentence date. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 

Affirmed.
 8 

Benton, J., dissenting. 

 On January 13, 1982, the trial judge entered a final order 

containing the following language pertinent to this appeal: 

 The defendant having been on November 24, 

1981, found guilty of Possession of heroin, a 

Schedule I controlled substance, . . . the 

Court doth now suspend the imposition of 

sentence in this case during the defendant's 

good behavior conditioned that he be placed 

on supervised probation; that he enter and 

complete the Willow Oaks Drug/Alcohol 

Treatment Program; and that he pay his costs 

of Court. 

That final conviction order did not specify either the period of 

suspension or the period of probation. 

 In a criminal case, the entry of the final conviction order 

is the event from which various statutory time provisions are 

measured. See Rule 1:1; Coffey v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 760, 

763, 167 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1969); Russnak v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. 

317, 324, 392 S.E.2d 491, 494-95 (1990). The legislature has 

specified that "if neither a probation period nor a period of 

suspension has been prescribed" in the sentencing order, the 

trial judge may revoke the suspension only for cause that 

occurred "within the maximum period for which the defendant might 

originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned." Code 

§ 19.2-306. See also Carbaugh v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 119, 

123-24, 449 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1994). The statute's "purpose to 

limit the period within which the suspension order can be revoked 

is manifest." Richardson v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 802, 811, 109 
 9 

S.E. 460, 463 (1921). Furthermore, the period must be measured 

from the date of entry of the order. See Coffey, 209 Va. at 763, 

167 S.E.2d at 345. 

 The cause in this case for which the trial judge revoked the 

suspension occurred on May 26, 1993, more than ten years (the 

maximum period for which Briggs could have been sentenced for 

heroin possession) beyond the January 13, 1982 sentencing date. 

Thus, the trial judge acted beyond the period authorized by the 

statute. 

 Code § 19.2-303.1 has no bearing on the issue raised by this 

appeal. The trial judge never fixed a period of suspension. 

Thus, a necessary condition for invoking Code § 19.2-303.1 never 

existed. Moreover, I perceive no logical or statutory basis in 

Code § 19.2-303.1 upon which to construct, as does the majority, 

a scheme that would allow the trial judge to add ten year periods 

of suspension ad infinitum each time a revocation occurred. That 

power would exceed the legislature's clear mandate that if 

neither a period of probation nor a period of suspension has been 

fixed, the cause that gives rise to the trial judge's power to 

revoke the suspension must occur "within the maximum period for 

which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be 

imprisoned." Code § 19.2-306. 

 The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that the trial 

judge's authority to revoke suspensions is limited and not 

absolute. "In this State the matter is regulated by statute." 
 10 

Richardson, 131 Va. at 809, 109 S.E. at 462. Moreover, the 

Supreme Court long ago acknowledged that the clear legislative 

"intention was to prescribe and limit the power of the court." 

Id. at 812, 109 S.E. at 463. The holding in this case extends 

the trial judge's authority far beyond the legislatively 

proscribed limits. 

 For these reasons, I would reverse the order as being beyond 

the trial judge's lawful authority to revoke the January 13, 1982 

suspension.