USCIB: 21. /18 

29 September 1954 

'f e>P 5Eeii:E'f 

Ml!MORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Capture of Enemy Cryptologic Material 

(NATO Aspect). 

Reference: USCIB '2J.../7 of 17 December 1953. 

1. The enclosure herewith is circulated for information. 

It completes implementation of the reference. 

2. The enclosure with this memorandum should be handled in 

CCMINT channels insofar as it is practicable to do so, and its 

contents should be revealed only to those persons who are indoctrinated for COMINT, 

Enclosure 

NSA Serial 000428-S 

dtd 24 Sep 1954 

USCIB: '2J.../18 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-06-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86•36/50 USC 3605 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JO:I:NT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Serial: 000428-S 

24 SEP 1954 

SUBJECT: Organization within NATO !Or Processing Captured Enemy 

Documents 

1. On 17 December 1953, the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) requested the Direc or N t · ··.. · A 

(NSA), to repare in coordination with 

2. It is noted that, on 13 July 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

approved the designation of the Chainnan, Joint Technical Intelligence 

Subcol'ID'llittee (JTIS), as the U.S. member of the NATO Ad Hoc Committee. 

In compliance with the USCIB decision, therefore, the inclosed brief 

is forwarded with the request that it be furnished the Chairman, JTIS, 

for his information and guidance. In this connection, your attention 

is invited to the fact that the U.K. member (and the Canadian member, 

if any) will have received a similar brief. 

3. In the event the Chairman, JTIS, should wish to discuss the 

substance of the brief with a representative of NSA, Mr. Fred Wood.rough 

has been designated for that purpose. He can be reached by telephone 

on code 147, extension 401, and will be pleased to call on the Chairman, 

JTIS, at any time. 

4. In that the inclosed brief contains information of a GCMINT 

nature, it is requested that it be discussed only with those persons 

who are indoctrinated for COM.INT. 

Incl: 

a/s 

FOR THE DIRECTOR: 

Copy furnished: 

(Signed) 

L. H. FROST 

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy 

Chief of Staff 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

En.closure with USGIB 21./8 dtd 29 Sep 1954. 

TOP SECRET 
BRIEF FOR THE U. S. MEMBER 

OF THE 

STANDING GROUP AD HOC COMMITTEE 

ON 

ORGANIZATION WITHIN NATO FOR PROCESSING 

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS 

(8 September 1954) 

Reference: S.G. 223/1 (Final) 

TOP SECRET 
g. Sf&~Ha 911 

BACKGROUND 

1. At its 73rd Meeting on 29 September 1953, the Military Representatives Committee approved S.G. 223/1 as amended. This.paper provides 

for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Connnittee, under the direction of the 

Standing Group Intelligence Committee (SGIC), that will establish policy, 

organization, and procedures for a wartime agency within NATO for processing captured enenzy- documents in time of war. 

2. Captured enemy documents may include, among other things, cryptologic material of tactical or strategic value to the U. S. For the 

purpose of this Brief, cryptologic material is understood to include 

cryptographic documents (including co~ies of signals whether in clear 

or encrypted form, signals logs, etc.) and cryptographic equipment 

including related conmnm.ications equipment, as well as cryptanalytic 

documents and devices. 

3. Experience gained in World War II shows that information vital 

to successful prosecution of the war can be obtained from captured cryptologic material, provided that timely and effective exploitation of the 

material can be achieved by the responsible Agency of the Government. 

4. In the United States, the National Security Agency is responsible 

for the operational and technical control over the exploitation of captured cryptologic material. (No corresponding paragraph in UK brief.) 

CURRENT CONSIDERATION 

5. It is anticipated that the Standing Group ad hoc committee will 

establish NATO policies and procedures for the hand.ling of enenw documents 

captured by national forces operating under a major NATO cormnand in order 

to ensure their efficient collection and adequate exploitation, as well 

as rapid dissemination of a:rry tactical information produced by such exploitation. 

6. It is anticipated that NATO policies and procedures will require 

that national rights to enemy documents captured by forces placed under a 

major NATO command be waived temporarily, that is, for the time required 

to exploit the documents for immediate operational needs, and for further 

expeditious exploitation by a NATO document center or centers designated 

by the Standing Group. 

7. The adequate exploitation of captured cryptologic material is 

highly technical in nature and requires specially trained and skilled 

personnel. Such specialists will probably not be available in sufficient 

numbers as to be assigned to NATO Document Centers. As will be seen from 

the following paragraphs, however, exploitation of certain tactical documents may be possible within SACEUR's command and, in due course, within 

SACLANT 1 s command. 

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•:PEfB~a911 

8. There has been established. in SHAPE a structure to provide 

tactical radio intercept intelligence for SACEUR. (For convenience the 

phrase "tactical radio intercept" is rendered by the abbreviation nyn.) 

The responsibility for formulating and implementing SACEUR1s 11Y11 policy 

lies with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, SHAPE. 

9. The SACEUR "!" structure is composed of the following elements: 

a. A senior 11Y11 officer at SHAPE (SACEUR 11Y11 officer) assisted 

by a "Y" staff. 

b. 11Y11 staff's, where required, at head.quarters of major subordinate Force Commanders under SACEUR. 

c. National armed forces 11Y11 units provided specifically for 

direct support of their own national forces operating under SACEUR. 

10. Participation in the SACEUR 11Y11 structure, including "Y" staff's, 

is open to all nations contributing to SACEUR command, as a normal minimum, combat forces equivalent to a U.S. or British Corps, together with 

"Y" units adequate for their direct support, subject to acceptance of 

certain principles and security measures set forth in pertinent directives. 

11. The functions of the SHAPE 11Y11 Staff under ACofS (I) include 

arranging for material of technical radio intelligence interest, including 

captured documents and equipment to be made immediately available as appropriate to the elements of the SACEUR 11Y11 structure and to national COMINT 

authorities. 

12. The intelligence produced by 11Y11 units is of a highly technical 

nature and necessitates, for purposes of coordination, direction, and 

liaison, the existence of specialist "!" staffs, forming part of the 

Intelligence Staffs at appropriate command levels. Their functions 

include: "the passing to '!' units of material likely to be of assistance 

to them, such as intelligence obtained from prisoner of war interrogation, 

captured enemy documents and equipment." They also are competent to act 

as clearing centers for cryptologic documents which cannot properly be 

utilized by Field 11Y11 units. The foregoing information regarding the 

SACEUR ''!" structure is provided as background only and must not be mentioned in ad hoc committee discussions if nations other than those 

participating in the SACEUR 11! 11 program are represented. For your 

guidance in this matter, the following is a list of nations which are 

participating in SACEUR 11!" or which are officially aware of' its existence 

and will participate in the near future: 

a. United Kingdom 

b. United States 

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J.W t'lf:~11 

'J:OE SECREI' 

c. France 

d. The Netherlands 

e. Belgium 

Canada, although not a participant, is cognizant of the SACEUR 11Y11 

program through UK-US CCMINT sources. However, some of the nations 

listed above are not aware of Canada's knowledge of 11Y" and, accordingly, 

the subject should not be discussed if Canada is represented on the ad 

hoc committee. 

13. From the foregoing it will be seen that it is highly desirable 

to separate captured cryptologic material from other captured material as 

quickly as possible, and to handle it in accordance with the following 

procedures: 

a. Enemy cryptologic material captured by NATO national forces 

of nations participating in the 11Y11 program should be placed directly in 

11Y11 channels as soon as possible. 

b. Enemy cryptologic material captured by NATO national forces of 

nations not participating in the 11Y11 program will be passed to a NATO 

Document Center. 

c. Captured enemy cryptologic material which is received in a 

NATO Document Center .from whatever source should be passed immediately 

to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, SHAPE (SHAPE "Y" Staff), 

for all subsequent handling. 

14. Enemy cryptologic material captured by U.S • .forces as a result 

of a special operation planned with the capture of such material as a 

primary (or secondary) objective will initially be handled on a U.S. EYES 

ONLY basis, in accordance with provisions of the order directing the 

operation. National rights cannot be waived prior to an examination of 

this material by cognizant U.S. intelligence representatives. Any attempt 

to place this category of cryptologic material within the purview of NATO 

directives must be vigorously opposed. However, in those instances where 

the specific planning of such an operation is done under NATO auspices, 

the captured material will be handled in accordance with paragraph 13, 

above, even though the capture has been effected solely by US forces. 

15. These procedures have been coordinated with cognizant U.K. and 

Canadian cryptologic authorities and the U.K. and Canadian members of 

the Ad Hoc Committee will have received a similar brief. 

RECOMMENDATION 

16. It is recommended that the provisions of paragraph 13, above, 

be included in the procedures established within NATO for processing 

captured enemy documents in time of war. 

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REF ID:A58911 

• e 

USCIB: 21../17 

9 April 1954 

M!MORANDllM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

SUbject: Approval of USCIB 21./14 dated 2!J March 1954. 

There having been no objection during the required interregnum., 

the poli07 set forth in paragraphs la. and lb. of the subject document 

stands approved by USCIB as of 7 April 1954. 

USCIB: 21./17 

24 
===============~~=~~~------ - ------

... e 

'POP 61!i6Rl!J'f - HI s. Ei.'ES ElfLY TENTATIVE 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 21./16 

Subject: 

Item 5 of the Agenda for the Thirteenth Meeting of 

USCIBEC, held on 26 March 1954. 

Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Material 

(USCIB 21./12). 

The CHAIRMAN explained that the paper under consideration had been 

submitted by the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee as the action of 

his Connnittee on subject problem. The Chairman went on to explain that 

one Member had asked that final USCIB approval on USCIB 21./10 be held in 

abeyance pending consideration of the instant proposal with a view to 

including it in the draft directive approved with the above mentioned 

USCIB 21./10, 

I !suggested that the last clause of subparagraph la. 0£ 

subject paper be amended to read "involves no undue risk to, and will be 

in the best interests of 1 the U,S, COMINT effort." 

It was so agreed. 

MR. KEAY suggestedthe.insertion of the word "specifically'' between 

"operation" and "£or" in the.first line of subparagraph la. 

It was so agreed. 

CAPTAIN AGNEW offered the opinion that perhaps we would have done 

better to use- the word "cryptologic" instead o:C "cryptographic" in 

USCIB 21./12. 

USCIB: 21./16 - 11 -

OGA 

' 
.-

• 

!OP SE8ffE! - T:f Is I lill'!lS 0Nfl( 

USCIB 21./16 

DECISION: (26 March 1954) USCIBEC accepted the INTCOM recommendation 

submitted with USOIB 21./12 modified to read as set forth below and OGA 

agreed that it should be issued as a policy statement or USCIB as 

follows: 

"The Director, NSA, will provide guidance essential for planning 

and conduct of' these operations as required." 

uscm: 21./16 - 12 -

'/'OP 8ECRE'F 
• 

USCIB: 21./15 

29 March 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Capture of Enell\V Cryptologic Material. 

(a) USCIB 21./S dated 9 February 1954. 

(b) USCIB 21./9 dated 24 February 1954. 

(c) USCIB 21./10 dated S March 1954. 

(d) USCIB 21./12 dated 22 March 1954. 

1. USCIBEC, at its Twelfth Meeting, agreed to recommend approval 

of the draft USCIB directive proposed in reference (a), as modified by 

reference (b). This decision was forwarded to USCIB members on 7-day 

approval as reference (c). 

2. During the 7-day interregnum the Army Member of USCIB 

requested that approval be withheld pending consideration and approval 

of reference (d), on covert aspects of the problem for possible inclusion in the Board directive. 

3. At the Thirteenth Meeting of USCIBEC, reference (d) was 

considered. The Committee agreed that the recommendations therein 

should be issued as a separate policy statement, and should not be 

included in the Board directive. The Army objection to reference (c) 

was thereupon withdrawn, resulting in USCIB approval of the USCIBEC 

decision contained therein. 

4. Accordingly action is being taken to issue reference (a), as 

modified by reference (b), as USCIB Directive Nmnber 13. 

USCIB: 21./15 

T<h"SEGRBT 
" x 

USCIB: 21./14 

po,o OIV FILE&iJtf 

29 March 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Material. 

Reference: USCIB 21./12 dated 22 March 1954. 

1. USCIBEC considered the reference at its Thirteenth Meeting, 

26 March 1954, and agreed to recommend that the proposal therein, 

amended to read as follows, be issued separately as a statement of 

USCIB policy: 

11a. No operation specifically for covert procurement of 

foreign cryptographic and associated materials will be implemented without prior assurance from the Director, NSA, that 

acquisition of the specific categories of materials involves 

no undue risk to, and will be in the best interests of, the 

U.S. COMINT effort. 

"b. The Director, NSA, will provide guidance essential 

for planning and conduct of these operations as required." 

2. The foregoing decision of USCIBEC is forwarded for USCIB 

consideration in accordance with paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive 

Number l. If there is no objection by any member prior to 1500 on 

7 April 1954, this decision will be considered approved. 

USCIB: 21./J.4 
.• I 

REF ID:A58911 n~f"rn. ~~ 15ncnn1 

ffi!i0Rm = l:J. S. ms!lS ON:OY TENTATIVE 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 21./13 

Subject: 

Item 3 Considered at the Twelfth Meeting of USCIBEC, 

held on 4 March 1954 (Item 5 of Agenda for Eleventh 

Meeting). 

Capture of Enemy Cryptologic Material. (USCIB 

21./8, 21./9) 

THE CHAIRMAN stated that a proposed USCIB directive on this subject 

had been circulated for vote sheet action (USCIB 21./8), and that all 

members had concurred with the exception of those representing Defense, 

Arnr:1, Navy, and Air Force, all of whom submitted identical changes which 

are contained in USCIB 21./9. He not.ed that the recommended changes 

involve, primarily, the insertion of the word "guidance" in place of 

"instructions" at several points in paragraphs 10 and ll of the paper. 

He invited comments. 

CAPTAIN AGNEW said that NSA, the originator of the draft directive 

is willing to accept the recommended change in wording as contained in 

USCIB 21. /9 . 

There were no objections. 

DECISION: (4 March 1954) USCIBEC agreed to recommend that the proposed 

directive contai.Jled as an enclosure with USCIB 21./8, as amended by 

USCIB 21./9, be approved. 

USCIB: 21./13 - 6 -

SECRET 
TB T'!ll REF rr T.'I,.., ID:A589' T'!ll T.'I~ Oi ilb02l2!10l P&P D1V Rli OOPY 

USCIB: 21./12 

22 March 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Material. 

(a) USCIB 21./10, dtd S March 1954. 

(b) USCIB 21./11, dtd 10 March 1954. 

1. As indicated in reference (b), an Intelligence Committee 

report on the above subject was in preparation, and, at the request 

of the Army Member, decision on the proposal referred to in reference 

(a) was deferred until such report was issued. 

2. The Intelligence Committee Report is enclosed. It has been 

placed on the agenda for the ThJ..rteenth Meeting of USCIBEC and should 

be considered in light of, and with a view to possible inclusion in 

the over-all policy statement on capture of enem;y- cryptologic material. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 21./12 

tain, u. • Navy 

cutive Secretary, USCIB 

TDPSECRE-T 
.. 

19 March 1954 

TOP SEQRliH Y, B, E¥E6 §M:.¥ 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY USCIB: 

Subject: Covert Procurement of Foreign Cryptographic Materials. 

Reference: USCIB 21./6 dated 27 November 1953. 

1. The USCIB Intelligence Gommittee studied the covert aspect 

of procurement of foreign cryptographic materials and in accordance 

with instructions contained in the above reference forwards the 

following policy proposal: 

a. No operation for covert procurement of foreign cryptographic and associated materials will be implemented without 

prior assurance from the Director, NSA, that acquisition of the 

specific categories of material involved will be in the best 

interests of the u. s. COMINT effort. 

b. The Director, NSA, will provide guidance essential for 

plSlliling and conduct of these operations as required. 

2. INTCOM recommends USCIB approval of, and issuance of a statement concerning, the above policy. 

(Signed) 

H. C. SIMMONS 

Lt. Colonel, USAF 

Chairman, INTCOM 

Enclosure with USCIB 21./12 dtd 22 Mar 1954. 

f'O-P SBCR-Ef' 
• 

• 

• 

REF ID:A58911 

SEC'RET • 

USCIB: 21./11 

lO March 1954 

SEGRE'!" 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE l4F.MBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: Capture of Enenw Cryptologic Material. 

Reference: USCIB 21./10 dtd B March 1954. 

1. The Department of the Arrrry Member of USCJB has requested that 

action on the reference be deferred and that it be reconsidered by 

USCIBEC in the light of an anticipated Intelligence Conanittee report 

on the covert aspects of this subject. 

2. Accordingly, USCIB 21./8 of 9 February 1954 as modified by 

USCIB 21../9 of 24 February will be again considered by USCIBEC at its 

next regular meeting with a view to determining what changes, if any, 

need be made in the light of the anticipated Intelligence Committee 

report on this subject • 

USCIB: 21./11 

S:ECRR'f' 

....._ 

. 

31 
• 

REF ID:A589~ 

COl\'FIBC.'JTIAL "' 

USCIB: 21./10 

8 March 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MENBER.s OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Capture of l!hemy Cryptologic Material. 

(a) USCIB 21./8 of 9 February 1954. 

(b) USCIB 21./9 of 24 February 1954. 

1. Vote sheet action by the Executive Connnittee on reference (a) 

disclosed the divergence of ppinion indicated in reference (b). 

2. At its Twelfth Meeting on Thursday, 4 March 1954, USCIBEC 

again considered this matter and approved reference {a) as modified by 

reference (b). 

3. In accordance with paragraph 11 of USCIB Directive Number 1, 

if there is no objection by any member prior to 1700, Wednesday, 

17 March 1954, the action indicated in paragraph 2 above will be 

considered approved and the Executive Secretary will issue reference 

(a), as modified by reference (b), in the form of a USCIB Directive. 

USCIB: 21./10 

a tain, U. S. Navy EX1~rtive Secretary, USCIB 

:1 

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