[Cite as State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PARIAG, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010.] 

Criminal law—R.C. 2953.61—Sealing of records—A trial court is precluded, 

pursuant to R.C. 2953.61, from sealing the record of a dismissed charge if 

the dismissed charge arises “as the result of or in connection with the 

same act” that supports a conviction, when the records of the conviction 

are not sealable under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of whether the charges 

are filed under separate case numbers. 

(No. 2012-0819—Submitted April 9, 2013—Decided September 19, 2013.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 11AP-569. 

____________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

A trial court is precluded, pursuant to R.C. 2953.61, from sealing the record of a 

dismissed charge if the dismissed charge arises “as the result of or in 

connection with the same act” that supports a conviction when the records 

of the conviction are not sealable under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of 

whether the charges are filed under separate case numbers. 

____________________ 

 LANZINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} We are asked to determine whether records of a dismissed charge 

may be sealed if the offense arises from or is in connection with the same act that 

led to a conviction on an unsealable charge. The Tenth District Court of Appeals 

affirmed the trial court’s decision to seal the record of the dismissed charges in 

this case. Because we conclude that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erred in 
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its analysis, we reverse its judgment and remand this case to the trial court for 

further proceedings. 

I. Introduction 

Background Facts 

{¶ 2} Appellee, Marlon Pariag, was stopped by the Ohio State Highway 

Patrol on December 31, 2010. He was charged with a traffic offense and also 

with possession of drugs of abuse, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(3), a minor 

misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of R.C. 

2925.14(C)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. The traffic offense and the criminal 

drug charges were assigned separate case numbers as required by Sup.R. 

37(A)(4)(c) and 43(B)(2). Both cases were filed in Franklin County Municipal 

Court. The traffic charge was filed in case No. 2011 TRD 100861, while the drug 

charges were filed in case No. 2011 CRB 239. The drug charges were dismissed 

when Pariag entered a plea in the traffic case. 

{¶ 3} On March 10, 2011, Pariag applied to seal the records pertaining to 

the drug charges that had been dismissed. The state objected and argued that 

because the record of a traffic conviction could not be sealed under R.C. 2953.36, 

the record of the companion case—the drug charges—could not be sealed. 

According to the state, because the drug-related charges arose from the same 

incident as the traffic conviction, R.C. 2953.61 permanently precluded Pariag 

from applying for the sealing of the dismissed drug charges. 

{¶ 4} The trial court ordered the records of the dismissed drug charges 

sealed, concluding that the conviction in the traffic case did not prevent the 

sealing of the records in the criminal case involving the dismissed drug offenses. 

{¶ 5} A divided panel of the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that 

R.C. 2953.61 addresses only the timing of an application to seal a record, not the 

applicant’s eligibility to have those records sealed. 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP569, ¶ 2. The court of appeals distinguished Pariag’s case from other cases in 

which applicants were prevented from sealing their convictions by emphasizing 
January Term, 2013 

3

that Pariag’s dismissed drug charges and traffic conviction were filed under 

separate case numbers. Id. at ¶ 14. The court of appeals held that R.C. 2953.61 

does not prohibit courts from sealing records of dismissed charges in one case 

when the record of conviction in another case may not be sealed, even if the 

charges arose out of the same act, because the statute governs merely the timing 

of the application to seal. Id. at ¶ 21. 

Issues Presented 

{¶ 6} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal. 132 Ohio St.3d 

1513, 2012-Ohio-4021, 974 N.E.2d 111. In the first proposition of law, the state 

argues that under R.C. 2953.61, the record of dismissed charges cannot be sealed 

when the charges arise out of the same set of facts as a charge filed in a separate 

case that resulted in an unsealable conviction. In the second proposition of law, 

the state argues that R.C. 2953.61 does not address the timing of an application to 

seal, but instead prevents partial sealing of a record. 

{¶ 7} We now hold that a trial court is precluded, pursuant to R.C. 

2953.61, from sealing the record of a dismissed charge if the dismissed charge 

arises “as a result of or in connection with the same act” that supports a 

conviction when the records are not sealable under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of 

whether the dismissed charge and conviction are filed under separate case 

numbers. 

{¶ 8} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals and remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the dismissed 

drug charges arose as the result of or in connection with the same act that led to 

Pariag’s driving-under-suspension offense. 

II. Law and Analysis 

Standard of Review 

{¶ 9} Because the propositions involve the interpretation of a statute, 

which is a question of law, we review the court of appeals’ judgment de novo. 
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Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, 909 

N.E.2d 1237, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 10} When construing a statute, a court’s objective is to determine and 

give effect to the legislative intent. State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s 

Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 

(1995). To determine legislative intent, a court must first consider the words used 

in a statute. State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 

242, ¶ 10. When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, a court must 

apply it as written. Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 

Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 23. Further construction is 

required only when a statute is unclear and ambiguous. State v. Chappell, 127 

Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16. 

The Privilege of Sealing a Record 

{¶ 11} In this case, the words “expungement” and “sealing” have been 

interchanged. “Expungement” is a legislative construct with no universally 

applied definition. Although the word “expungement” was used in R.C. 2953.32, 

Ohio’s first-time-offender statute, “expungement” was described as a courtordered “seal[ing]” of official records and “delet[ing]” of index references 

pertaining to a criminal conviction. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 

70, 70-71. In 1979, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2953.32, changing the 

word “expungement” to “sealing,” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 105, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 

1638; however, “expungement” remains a common colloquialism used1

 to 

describe the process. Pepper Pike v. Doe, 66 Ohio St.2d 374, 378, 421 N.E.2d 

 

1. The term “expungement” continues to appear in R.C. 2151.358 relating to juveniles and, in 

contrast to “sealing” means that no record exists. R.C. 2151.358(F) (“the person who is the 

subject of the expunged records properly may, and the court shall, reply that no record exists with 

respect to the person upon any inquiry in the matter”).
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1303 (1981) (referring to R.C. 2953.32 as “Ohio’s criminal expungement 

statute”); State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, 

¶ 3, fn. 2. 

{¶ 12} Expungement of a criminal record is an “act of grace created by 

the state.” State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639, 665 N.E.2d 669 (1996). It 

should be granted only when all requirements for eligibility are met, because it is 

a “privilege, not a right.” State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 

918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 6. R.C. 2953.32 et seq. set out the limits of the trial court’s 

jurisdiction to grant a request to seal the record of convictions or charges that 

have been dismissed. 

Statutory application 

{¶ 13} Because Pariag did not seek to seal the record of a conviction, R.C. 

2953.52(A)(1), which applies when charges did not result in a conviction, applies. 

It stated: 

Any person who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury 

or a court or who is the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, 

indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to 

seal his official records in the case. Except as provided in section 

2953.61 of the Revised Code, the application may be filed at any 

time after the finding of not guilty or the dismissal of the 

complaint, indictment, or information is entered upon the minutes 

of the court of the journal, whichever entry comes first. 

Former R.C. 2953.52(A)(1), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 17, 149 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8186, 

8192. 

{¶ 14} R.C. 2953.52 allows for application to seal the records of a 

dismissed complaint, indictment, or information “at any time” after dismissal; 

however, the statute expressly states that this timeframe is subject to the 
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mandatory waiting period in R.C. 2953.61, which governs the sealing of records 

in multiple charges with differing dispositions. 

{¶ 15} R.C. 2953.61 states: 

When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a 

result of or in connection with the same act and at least one of the 

charges has a final disposition that is different than the final 

disposition of the other charges, the person may not apply to the 

court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until such 

time as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the 

records in all of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed * * *. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 16} The statute applies when a person is charged with multiple 

offenses that arise “as a result of or in connection with the same act.” Although 

the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 2953.61 was unclear with 

respect to the meaning of the phrase “the same act” and the state misreads these 

words to mean a conviction, we do not agree that the statute is ambiguous. The 

“same act” plainly refers to the “same conduct.” 

{¶ 17} The Tenth District also held that R.C. 2953.61 merely governs the 

time for applying to seal a record. But a person cannot apply to have the record of 

a charge sealed until the records of all the charges can be sealed, and the charge 

must be one for which the record can be sealed. R.C. 2953.61 states, “[T]he 

person may not apply * * * in any of the cases until such time as he would be able 

to apply * * * and have all of the records in all of the cases pertaining to those 

charges sealed.” In other words, when multiple offenses have different 

dispositions, an application to seal a record may be filed only when the applicant 

is able to apply to have the records of all the offenses sealed. Thus, if the record 

of one charge cannot be sealed, any charges filed as a result of or in connection 
January Term, 2013 

7

with the act that resulted in the unsealable charge cannot be sealed. Because R.C. 

2953.61 refers to “all of the records in all of the cases,” our holding is not affected 

by the fact that the different charges were assigned different case numbers. 

Relevance of State v. Futrall

{¶ 18} We have already determined that an applicant with multiple 

convictions in one case may not partially seal his or her record pursuant to R.C. 

2953.32 when one of the convictions is statutorily exempt from being sealed 

under R.C. 2953.36. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 

497, ¶ 21. In Futrall, multiple charges were filed in a single case, but we 

determined that R.C. 2953.61 did not apply. We did, however, recognize the 

inherent difficulty of partially sealing records. Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 19} Pariag’s charges in two separate cases resulted in different 

dispositions—one conviction and two dismissals—and thus R.C. 2953.61 is 

applicable. But because the trial court did not determine whether the charges all 

arose as a result of or in connection with the same act, it is not clear whether his 

traffic conviction prevents him from applying to seal the record of the drug 

charges. Under R.C. 2953.36(B), a traffic conviction cannot be sealed. 

{¶ 20} Pariag is ineligible to have the records of the dismissed drug 

charges that otherwise would be sealable under R.C. 2953.52(A) and 2953.61 

sealed if all charges arose as the result of or in connection with the same act. R.C. 

2953.61 thus focuses not on when separate offenses occurred, but on whether they 

arose from the same conduct of the applicant. Upon remand, the trial court must 

decide whether the dismissed drug charges stemmed from the same act as Pariag’s 

traffic violation. If the court finds that the same conduct generated both charges, 

the conviction for the unsealable traffic offense will prevent records from the 

otherwise sealable dismissed drug charges from being sealed. 

 
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III. Conclusion 

{¶ 21} R.C. 2953.61 is unambiguous. A trial court is precluded from 

sealing the record of a dismissed charge pursuant to R.C. 2953.61 if the dismissed 

charge arises “as the result of or in connection with the same act” that supports a 

conviction that is exempt from sealing under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of whether 

the charges are filed under separate case numbers. 

{¶ 22} Pariag filed an application to seal the records of his drug charges 

that were dismissed in Franklin County Municipal Court case No. 2011 CRB 239. 

The trial court, on remand, must determine whether those charges arose “as the 

result of or in connection with the same act” as his traffic conviction in case No. 

2011 TRD 100861. 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and 

the cause is remanded to the trial court. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 

PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 

____________________ 

PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 24} There were three charges in the underlying cases. One, a traffic 

offense, is not sealable. One of the reasons traffic offenses are not sealable is that 

they do not materially affect a person’s life. The other charges, which were 

dismissed, were possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia and those charges are 

sealable. That makes sense. Drug offenses can materially affect a person’s life, 

and the General Assembly allows them to be sealed. Today this court determines 

that a material offense that was dismissed and that is ordinarily sealable cannot be 

sealed because an immaterial traffic offense cannot be sealed. That doesn’t make 

sense. 
January Term, 2013 

9

{¶ 25} This case does not merit the attention of this court. We should 

never have accepted jurisdiction, and we should now dismiss the case as having 

been improvidently allowed. Barring that, we ought to affirm the not 

unreasonable judgment of the court of appeals. I dissent.

____________________ 

 O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 26} Respectfully, I dissent. 

{¶ 27} The issue in this case is whether R.C. 2953.61, which is referred to 

in R.C. 2953.52, precludes a trial court from sealing the record of dismissed drug 

charges that arose from the same traffic stop that resulted in a conviction for 

driving under suspension, a statutorily unsealable traffic offense. My analysis of 

this case differs from the majority in three respects: determining legislative intent, 

analyzing the elements of the crimes at issue, and interpreting R.C. 2953.36. 

{¶ 28} The role of the judiciary is to interpret statutes and to determine the 

intent of the General Assembly in passing legislation. The intent of the General 

Assembly in enacting R.C. 2953.52 and 2953.61 was to address the time to file an 

application to seal records of dismissed criminal charges. In addition, the 

elements of the offense of driving under suspension differ from and are 

independent of the drug charges, which were dismissed, and therefore, the drug 

charges are not “a result of or in connection with the same act” as required by 

R.C. 2953.61. Hence, a pivotal requirement of R.C. 2953.61 cannot be 

established in this case. And finally, a plain reading of R.C. 2953.36 reveals that 

it does not preclude the sealing of records relating to dismissed charges, because it 

only precludes the sealing of records of certain convictions. Here, the drug 

charges did not result in convictions. For these reasons, I would affirm the 

judgment of the court of appeals, and therefore I dissent from the decision of the 

majority to reverse its judgment in this case. 

 
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Timing Statutes 

{¶ 29} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.52(A)(1), those charged with but not 

convicted of a crime may apply to have records relating to those charges sealed. 

This provision also specifically addresses the time when such applications may be 

filed. It provides: 

Any person, who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury 

or a court or who is the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, 

indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to 

seal the person’s official records in the case. Except as provided in 

section 2953.61 of the Revised Code, the application may be filed 

at any time after the finding of not guilty or the dismissal of the 

complaint, indictment, or information is entered upon the minutes 

of the court or the journal, whichever entry occurs first. 

{¶ 30} Also at issue in this case is R.C. 2953.61, which provides: 

When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a 

result of or in connection with the same act and at least one of the 

charges has a final disposition that is different than the final 

disposition of the other charges, the person may not apply to the 

court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until such 

time as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the 

records in all of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed 

pursuant to divisions (A)(1) and (2) of section 2953.32 and 

divisions (A)(1) and (2) of section 2953.52 of the Revised Code. 

(Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2013 

11

{¶ 31} The role of the judiciary is to interpret legislation, and “[t]he 

primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 

the legislature.” State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 122 Ohio 

St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 15. To determine the General 

Assembly’s intent, “the court first looks to the language in the statute and the 

purpose to be accomplished.” State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 595, 589 N.E.2d 

1319 (1992), citing Henry v. Cent. Natl. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 

(1968), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Where the meaning of the statute is clear 

and definite, it must be applied as written,” but “where the words are ambiguous 

and are subject to varying interpretations, further interpretation is necessary.” 

State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16, 

citing Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 

N.E.2d 121 (2001). 

{¶ 32} Moreover, when two statutes relate to the same subject, such as 

R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) and 2953.61, they should be read in pari materia. See 

generally State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi, 86 Ohio St.3d 620, 622, 716 N.E.2d 204 

(1999). “In reading statutes in pari materia and construing them together, this 

court must give a reasonable construction that provides the proper effect to each 

statute. All provisions of the Revised Code bearing upon the same subject matter 

should be construed harmoniously unless they are irreconcilable.” (Citations 

omitted.) State ex rel. Cordray at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 33} Reading R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) and 2953.61 in pari materia reveals 

that the legislature intended to dictate the time when an application to seal records 

could be filed. They do not preclude the sealing of records. R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) 

specifically provides that “any person” may apply to the court for an order to seal 

the records relating to a dismissed charge and refers to R.C. 2953.61 in specifying 

the time for filing an application to seal the records pertaining to the dismissed 

charge. The language “until such time” contained in R.C. 2953.61 also indicates 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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that R.C. 2953.61 pertains to the waiting period required before applying to seal 

rather than the eligibility to have records sealed. 

{¶ 34} The title of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 175, 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2554, 

the bill amending R.C. 2953.52 and codifying R.C. 2953.61, further clarifies the 

intent of the General Assembly in enacting this legislation: “to require a longer 

waiting period before sealing the records of a person who has multiple charges 

brought as a result of a single act if the charges have different dispositions.” 

(Emphasis added.) See also Legislative Service Commission Bill Analysis of 

Sub.H.B. No. 175 (describing operation of R.C. 2953.61 as an extension of the 

waiting period). Notably, the title contains no language suggesting any intent to 

preclude the sealing of records of dismissed charges associated with convictions 

that cannot be sealed. 

{¶ 35} Moreover, since R.C. 2953.51 et seq. are remedial in nature, they 

“must be liberally construed to promote their purposes.” State ex rel. Gains, 86 

Ohio St.3d at 622, 716 N.E.2d 204, citing R.C. 1.11 and Barker v. State, 62 Ohio 

St.2d 35, 42, 402 N.E.2d 550 (1980). We have previously explained that “R.C. 

2953.51 et seq. was enacted to protect the privacy of those found not guilty of a 

criminal offense.” S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d at 595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, citing State v. 

Grove, 29 Ohio App.3d 318, 320, 505 N.E.2d 297 (1986). Construing an 

analogous statute, the Court of Appeals of New York recognized that the purpose 

of the statute was to ensure that 

one who is charged but not convicted of an offense suffers no 

stigma as a result of his having once been the object of an 

unsustained accusation. That detriment to one’s reputation and 

employment prospects often flows from merely having been 

subjected to criminal process has long been recognized as a serious 

and unfortunate by-product of even unsuccessful criminal 

prosecutions. 
January Term, 2013 

13

In re Hynes v. Karassik, 47 N.Y.2d 659, 662, 419 N.Y.S.2d 942, 393 N.E.2d 1015 

(1979). 

{¶ 36} Interpreting R.C. 2953.61 to preclude the sealing of records of 

dismissed criminal charges because they are associated with an unsealable 

conviction contravenes the intent of R.C. 2953.52, which is to protect the privacy 

of persons who had been charged with an offense but were successful in having 

those charges dismissed and to guard against the harmful and stigmatizing effects 

associated with arrest records. See generally S.R. at 595 and Hynes at 662. 

{¶ 37} Moreover, in this case, R.C. 2953.61 does not preclude the sealing 

of the two dismissed drug charges, because they were not the result of nor were 

they committed in connection with the act of driving under a suspended license. 

Rather, the acts of possession of marihuana and possession of drug paraphernalia 

are separate from and independent of the offense of driving under a suspended 

license. The offenses may have been committed simultaneously, but R.C. 

2953.61 requires that the offenses be “a result of or in connection with the same 

act.” Here, they are not. This case is distinguishable from other circumstances in 

which two offenses are part of the same conduct. For example, the offenses of 

reckless operation or operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent could 

arise out of and in connection with a charge of driving under suspension, because 

it is the act of operating the motor vehicle that results in the commission of the 

other offense. 

{¶ 38} A comparison of the elements of the offenses charged in this case 

demonstrates that operating a motor vehicle is a necessary element for a 

conviction of driving under suspension, but is totally unrelated to the elements for 

a conviction of possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia. In order to establish 

the offense of driving under suspension as defined in R.C. 4510.11(A), the state 

must prove that a person whose license has been suspended operated a motor 

vehicle during the period of suspension. In contrast, in order to establish the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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crime of possession of marihuana, a person must “knowingly obtain, possess, or 

use” marihuana. R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(3). Similarly, to establish possession 

of drug paraphernalia, a person must “knowingly use, or possess with purpose to 

use, drug paraphernalia.” R.C 2925.14(C)(1). Because operating a motor vehicle 

is a different act from possessing an item, these offenses arise out of different acts 

and are not the result of the same conduct, nor are they committed in connection 

with the same act. Therefore, R.C. 2953.61 does not preclude a court from 

sealing these dismissed drug charges. 

Convictions Precluding Sealing 

{¶ 39} R.C. 2953.36 provides: “Sections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the 

Revised Code do not apply to any of the following: * * * (B) Convictions under 

* * * Chapter 4510. * * * of the Revised Code * * *” (emphasis added) 

(addressing sealing of records of convictions). By enacting R.C. 2953.36, the 

General Assembly created various exceptions to the sealing of some records of 

convictions, such as those involving mandatory prison terms and, notably, 

convictions arising under R.C. 4510—which includes convictions for driving 

under suspension. The exceptions to the ability to seal a record pursuant to this 

code section all relate to criminal convictions, and there is no statutory reference 

to, or exclusion for, the sealing of a record of a dismissed charge that does not 

result in a conviction. Had the legislature intended to preclude the sealing of a 

dismissed charge related to a traffic offense, it could have done so, but it chose 

not to include dismissed charges in the exceptions cataloged in R.C. 2953.36. 

{¶ 40} The majority relies on State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-

Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, in support of its holding. Futrall, however, is 

factually distinguishable from this case because it did not consider dismissed

charges. In Futrall, we addressed whether a court could partially seal the records 

of an applicant with multiple convictions in one case when one of the convictions 

was statutorily exempt from sealing pursuant to R.C. 2953.36. Id. at ¶ 15. In 

contrast, this case involves a nonsealable traffic-offense conviction and two 
January Term, 2013 

15

charges that did not result in convictions but rather were dismissed. Thus, our 

holding in Futrall does not control the outcome of this case. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 41} The legislature provided that persons charged with but not 

convicted of offenses may apply to the court for an order to seal the record of 

dismissed charges, and it specifically set forth the time when such applications 

could be filed. 

{¶ 42} In addition, it specified that when a person is charged with two or 

more offenses as a result of or in connection with the same act and different 

dispositions result, an application may be filed to seal the dismissed charges. In 

this case, however, that factual predicate has not been met, because the act of 

possessing the marihuana and possessing the drug paraphernalia did not result 

from the act of driving under suspension nor did it occur in connection with that 

conduct. 

{¶ 43} Finally, because R.C. 2953.36 relates only to precluding the 

sealing of records of offenses that result in convictions and does not refer to 

dismissed charges, this provision does not preclude the sealing of records relating 

to dismissed charges. 

{¶ 44} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 

O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

____________________ 

 Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., Columbus City Attorney, Lara N. Baker-Moorish, 

City Prosecuting Attorney, and Melanie R. Tobias, Assistant City Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellant. 

________________________