Filed 7/21/21 In re I.E. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re I.E. et al., Persons 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B310507

(Super. Ct. Nos. 20JV00051, 

20JV00053, 20JV00054)

(Santa Barbara County)

SANTA BARBARA COUNTY 

CHILD WELFARE 

SERVICES,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.P.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

C.P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court order 

terminating her parental rights as to I.E. and S.P. She contends 

the court erred in concluding that the Indian Child Welfare Act 

(ICWA) did not apply. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. 
2

Code, § 224 et seq.)1 We affirm.2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother had two children, I.E. and S.P., with their

biological father, C.E. (Father). The dependency petition alleged 

that I.E. and S.P. received inadequate medical care, I.E. was 

behind academically, and they were at substantial risk of abuse 

or neglect because parental rights had been terminated for abuse 

and neglect of two half-siblings. It alleged that Mother had a 

chronic substance abuse problem, gave birth to two previous 

drug-positive children, and had a substantial criminal history. It 

further alleged that Father was in state prison and left the 

children without provision for support. (§ 300, subds. (b)(1), (g), 

(j).)

Mother stated in court, and on a form provided by the 

Santa Barbara County Department of Social Services (the 

department), that she had no Native American ancestry.

The department was unable to contact Father in 

prison. It sent him an ICWA questionnaire by certified mail but 

he did not respond. In court, Father said he was not enrolled in a 

tribe but had Navajo and Mescalero ancestors. He said his 

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 The current appeal is from the order of February 11, 2021, 

which involved only I.E. and S.P. The notice of appeal also 

purports to appeal regarding a third child, A.P. Mother’s 

parental rights as to A.P. were terminated on October 8, 2020. 

We dismissed Mother’s appeal of that order after she filed a brief 

that raised no issues. (In re A.P. (May 24, 2021, B308511) 

[nonpub. opn.].) Accordingly, we dismiss the current appeal 

regarding A.P.
3

mother knew more about their ancestry. He believed her 

great-grandmother was Indian, perhaps Navajo. He had not 

heard that his father had any Indian ancestry.

The paternal grandmother told the department she 

believed both sides of Father’s family had Native American 

heritage, but she could not “prove it” because she and Father 

were not enrolled members. She said that Father’s 

great-grandmother, whom she named, said she was a Navajo

Indian from New Mexico, but her nephew said they were 

Mescalero.

The department obtained additional ancestry 

information from databases and provided the court with

information for Father and 13 of his ancestors. Tribal affiliations 

of Navajo or Mescalero were listed for Father, his mother, and his 

grandfather, all based on tribal affiliation of his

great-grandmother.

In August 2020, the department sent Notices of Child 

Custody Proceeding for Indian Child (Judicial Council Forms, 

form ICWA-030) by certified return receipt mail to the parents, 

the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and 11 tribal organizations:

the Mescalero Apache Tribe, seven other Apache tribes, the 

Navajo Nation, the Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc., and the 

Colorado River Indian Tribes (Navajo). Because the department 

did not receive return receipts, it remailed the ICWA-030 forms

in September.

The Mescalero Apache Tribe responded by letter that 

neither Father nor the children were members or met the 

requirements for enrollment. It stated that enrollment is needed 

for membership, and requires proof of one-quarter or more 

Mescalero Apache blood. Five other Apache tribes responded 
4

that the children were not enrolled or eligible for enrollment. 

The other two Apache tribes received the notice but sent no 

substantive response.

The Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. stated that it 

did not have access to the entire Navajo census records and 

deferred to the Navajo Nation, where those records were located. 

A letter from the Navajo Nation dated October 19, 2020, stated it 

was in the process of verifying the children’s enrollment or 

eligibility for enrollment and needed time to complete it. The 

Colorado River Indian Tribes sent a return receipt but no 

substantive response.

On January 12, 2021, without objection, the court 

found the ICWA did not apply. The court subsequently found the 

children were likely to be adopted and terminated Mother and 

Father’s parental rights. (§ 366.26.)

DISCUSSION

The ICWA serves “to protect the best interests of 

Indian children and to promote the stability and security of 

Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum 

Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their 

families.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.) When 

the facts are undisputed, we independently review compliance 

with the ICWA. (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) We 

review the juvenile court’s determination that the ICWA does not 

apply for substantial evidence. (Ibid.; § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

“‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person who is 

under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe 

or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 

biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).) Whether or not 
5

a child is a member or eligible for membership is conclusively 

determined by the tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (h).)

Required inquiries

In dependency cases, the court and the department 

have “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a 

child . . . is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The

process is divided into three phases: an initial duty to inquire in 

all cases, a duty of further inquiry when there is reason to believe

the child may be a tribal member or eligible for membership, and 

a duty to provide formal notice when there is reason to know the 

child is a member or eligible for membership. (In re D.F. (2020) 

55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)

“There is reason to know a child . . . is an Indian 

child” when: (1) “[a] person having an interest in the child . . . 

informs the court that the child is an Indian child,” (2) the child, 

parent, or Indian custodian lives on a reservation, (3) a 

designated person “informs the court that it has discovered 

information indicating that the child is an Indian child,” (4) “[t]he 

child . . . gives the court reason to know that the child is an 

Indian child,” (5) the child has been a ward of a tribal court, or (6) 

the parent or child has a tribal membership identification card. 

(§ 224.2, subd. (d), italics added.) This definition of “reason to 

know,” effective January 1, 2019, superseded the previous 

definition, which included a “‘person having an interest in the 

child . . . provid[ing] information suggesting the child is a member 

of a tribe or eligible for membership.’” (In re A.M., supra, 47 

Cal.App.5th at p. 316.) Cases relying on the superseded language 

“‘are no longer controlling or persuasive on this point.’” (In re

D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.)

None of the circumstances constituting “reason to 
6

know” apply here where the only information was that some of 

the children’s ancestors were possibly Navajo or Mescalero. 

Although the court and department did “not have sufficient 

information to determine that there [was] reason to know that 

the child[ren] [were] Indian child[ren],” there was “reason to 

believe” they might be Indian children based on “information 

suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a 

member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (e), (e)(1), italics added.)3 Accordingly, the court or 

department was required to “make further inquiry” into the 

children’s status “as soon as practicable,” including interviewing 

family members, contacting the BIA, and contacting tribes that

may have information. (§ 224.2, subd. (e), (e)(2); Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).)

This is not a case where vague assertions of Indian 

heritage without specifics as to family members or tribes make

further inquiry unnecessary. (See In re A.M., supra, 47 

Cal.App.5th at p. 322.) Further inquiry was required because the 

paternal grandmother provided the names of Father’s ancestors 

whom she believed were Navajo or Mescalero Indians. (In re T.G.

(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 295.)

Navajo Nation

Mother contends it was unreasonable for the court to 

3 The language regarding “reason to believe” was added by 

legislation effective January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018, ch. 833, § 5) 

and September 18, 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 104, § 15), before the 

court here found the ICWA inapplicable or terminated parental 

rights. The amendments apply because the juvenile court had a 

continuing duty throughout the proceedings to inquire whether a 

child was an Indian child. (In re A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 321.)
7

proceed to a finding that the ICWA did not apply because the 

Navajo Nation requested more time to process its inquiry. We 

disagree.

The court was not required to continue the case to 

allow the Navajo Nation to complete its verification process. “A 

proceeding shall not be held until at least 10 days after receipt of 

notice by . . . the tribe.” (§ 224.3, subd. (d); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) 

On request, the court shall grant the tribe up to 20 additional 

days to prepare for the hearing. (Ibid.) After the Navajo Nation 

stated it needed more time, the court waited 85 days before 

determining the ICWA did not apply. Proceeding without further

delay was reasonable given the compelling need for prompt 

permanency determinations in dependency cases. (In re Marilyn 

H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308.)

Incomplete information

Mother contends the inquiry was incomplete because 

information regarding some ancestors did not include their 

current or former addresses or place of death. (§ 224.3, subd. 

(a)(5)(C); 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d) (2020).) She is incorrect. This 

information, “if known,” must be provided only when there is 

reason to know the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(c).) Formal notice was not 

required for the inquiry here, which was based on a reason to 

believe the children were Indian children. (In re A.M., supra, 47 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 321-322; In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 568-571.) Instead, the further inquiry required “informal 

contact with the tribe.” (In re T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p.

290.)

When it conducted its further inquiry, the 

department was required to “shar[e] information identified by the 
8

tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or 

eligibility determination, as well as information on the current 

status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) The

department provided sufficient information to constitute a 

“meaningful inquiry” of the tribes, including names, dates of 

birth, and other information regarding the children and 

ancestors. (In re S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 303, 317.)

Required filings

Mother contends remand is necessary because the 

department failed to file copies of the ICWA-030 forms mailed in 

September or return receipts for those forms. Again, we disagree.

The record includes a Notice of Hearing on Selection 

of a Permanent Plan (§ 366.26) with proofs of service on the 

tribes. This notice did not provide or request information 

regarding tribal membership. But the department also filed 

court reports stating that it sent a second set of ICWA-030 forms 

to the tribes in September. It filed for each tribe a signed receipt, 

United States Postal Service (USPS) tracking information 

showing delivery, and/or responsive letter.

Section 224.3, subdivision (c), provides, “Proof of the 

notice, including copies of notices sent and all return receipts and 

responses received, shall be filed with the court in advance of the 

hearing . . . .” This requirement applies when notice is sent 

because there is “reason to know” an Indian child is involved. 

(§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(a) (2020).) It does not apply 

to the inquiry here, which was based on “reason to believe” 

Indian children might be involved. 

A copy of the August ICWA-030 form was filed. 

Although a copy of the September form and some of the return 

receipts and responsive letters were not filed, the department’s 
9

reports summarizing the mailings and the other filed documents 

were sufficient to show it contacted the potential tribes as part of 

its inquiry.

Improper service

Mother contends that a remand is required because 

some of the notices were sent to addresses or individuals that 

deviated from the most current Federal Register list. 

(85 Fed.Reg. 24004 (Apr. 30, 2020).)4 We do not agree.

The Federal Register gave the address of the 

Colorado River Indian Tribes as: Rebecca Loudbear, Attorney 

General, 26600 Mohave Rd., Parker, AZ 85344. The department 

sent notice to the Attorney General without including her name 

and used a street address from an earlier list (81 Fed.Reg. 10887 

(Mar. 2, 2016)). The tribe returned the certified mail receipt. 

The fact that the notice was addressed to the Attorney General 

shows that notice was sent to “someone trained and authorized to 

make the necessary ICWA determinations” and not “an 

unidentified person at the tribe’s address.” (In re J.T. (2007) 154 

Cal.App.4th 986, 994.) The absence of a substantive response is 

not prejudicial because, as stated in the letter of the Ramah 

Navajo School Board, the complete Navajo census records are 

kept by the Navajo Nation.

The notice to the Mescalero Apache Tribe gave a 

different post office box number and gave the name of the Tribal 

Census Clerk as Crystal Garcia rather than Crystal Lester. The 

tribe’s ICWA Case Manager, Augusta Williams, responded that 

the children were not members or eligible for membership. 

4 The BIA publishes an annual list of names and addresses 

of tribal agents for service of ICWA notice. (25 C.F.R. §§ 23.12, 

23.105(a) (2020).)
10

Notice to the San Carlos Apache Tribe was correctly addressed

and was acknowledged in a return receipt and a letter stating

that there was no evidence the parents or children were enrolled

or eligible for enrollment.

Notice to four other Apache tribes (Apache Tribe of 

Oklahoma, Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, Tonto Apache 

Tribe of Arizona, and Yavapai-Apache Nation) was mailed to

addresses that differed from the Federal Register list or named 

different individuals, but those notices resulted in letters stating 

that the children were not eligible for enrollment or membership.

Notice to the Jicarilla Apache Nation was sent to the ICWA 

Department at an outdated post office box number and omitted

the name of the ICWA Specialist, but USPS tracking shows it 

was delivered. Notice to the ICWA Representative of White 

Mountain Apache Tribe named a different person, but a return 

receipt was received.

Notice to the tribal chairperson or designated agent 

for service is required when there is reason to know that an 

Indian child is involved. (§ 224.3, subd. (a), (a)(2); see 25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.105 (2020) [inquiry “should” be directed to BIA list in 

Federal Register].) Strict compliance was not required here. In 

re J.T., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 986, 994-995, which held that 

notice must be sent to the tribal chairperson or designated agent 

for service, preceded the 2019 and 2020 amendments to section 

224.2. Any discrepancies were harmless here because the notices 

were received by ICWA representatives of the tribes identified by 

Father’s family, and the responses disclosed no reason to know 

the children were Indian children. (In re E.W. (2009) 170 

Cal.App.4th 396, 402-403; In re N.M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 253, 

268.)
11

Substantial evidence

In light of her arguments discussed above, Mother 

contends that the juvenile court’s finding that the ICWA did not 

apply was unsupported by substantial evidence. We conclude 

otherwise.

“If the court makes a finding that proper and 

adequate further inquiry and due diligence as required in this 

section have been conducted and there is no reason to know 

whether the child is an Indian child, the court may make a 

finding that the [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings.” 

(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) Substantial evidence shows the 

department and the court conducted a diligent good faith inquiry. 

(In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 570.) Accordingly, the 

court did not err in concluding the ICWA was inapplicable.

DISPOSITION

The appeal regarding A.P. (20JV00054) is dismissed. 

The order terminating parental rights as to I.E. (20JV00051) and 

S.P. (20JV00053) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J.
Arthur A. Garcia, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Michael C. Ghizzoni, County Counsel, Lisa A. 

Rothstein, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.