• .. 

• REF ID:A58908 

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USCIB: 14/185 

'Z'l December 1951 

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MDIORANDUM FOB THE MDmERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: French Cammm1cation Securit;y. 

l. The attached letteJ" en the above subject is torwarded tor intormation• with a Y.l.w to possible diacuasion at the 

73rd Keating ot USCIB. 

Incloaure - 1 

LSIB/241J51 dated 10th December 1951. 

I 

~ 

~!D>{ JONF.S 

J. W. PEARSON 

Secretariat, USCIB 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-15-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

USCIB: 14/JJJS 

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Chairman. 

TOI SEffllE"f°'S~lf DE 

London 

10th December. 1951. 

LSIB/244/51 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

• United States Communications Intelligence Board. 

With reference to your memorandum UC 000227/dated 22nd June 

1951. the London Signal Intelligence Board notes that the United states 

Communications Intelligence Board has approved the report ot the U.S./ 

U.K. Conference on the Security of French Communications. but observes 

that it b.as not yet been advised of the decision ot the National 

Security Council. 

~-\ 2.. In paragraph .3(k) or the Conference report,, it. was concluded 

J. ~that any approach to the French Ministry- or Foreign Affairs should be 

"t"' i:rui,) deterred. pending consideration of the report Ofi the Tripartite Group. 

(.μ\-,91-!'- L.S .. l.B,. has now examined the Tripartite Group• s report and concludes 

?';.\ e.J ;'that the French intent and capability to establish security- arrangements 

,).s.J ~ a.re sufficient to warrant the U.Sa and the U .. K. making an initial (0 approach to them about their communication security. 

-r:\,~,...- 3. L .. S.I.B. proposes that the U .. S .. and U .. K. Ambassadors should 

be briefed according to the document attached d Appendix t A' and that 

the approach should be ma.de at the first opportunity. L .. S.I.Bo also 

proposes that. in order to ~ ••uippearance or nm-<>oaperation 

between the U.K. and the U&S .. _ ~ !the U.Ko Ambassador should 

make the first approach• to be o oWed a few d.a75 later b;y that or 

the U.So Ambassador. 

4. L.S.I.B. further proposes that the U.S.C.I.B. and L .. S.I.B. 

nominees who according to pai-agraph 55 of the Conference Report.. a.re 

to be available in Paris to take part as required in the initial 

discussions with the French should meet in London a day or two in 

advance in order to coordinate f'inal details. For this purpose 

L .. S.I.B. will nominate a senior representative and an expert from 

G.C.H.Q. In anticipation ot u.s.c.I.B. concurrence to this proposal. 

a list of examples of French insecurity suitable tor demonstration is 

in course of preparation at G.C.H.Q. and woul.d be ready for the 

prellminar,y meeting between the u.s .. c.I .. B. and L.s .. I.B. nominees. 

5. U.K. authorities can provide. in two months tim.e,,, 8 CCM 

ma.chines to be of'.f'ered to the French. 

6. L.S.IoB. would welcome u.s.C.I.B.'s comments on these 

proposals at its earliest convenience. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

cnnrman 

London Signal Intelligence Boar<! 

Inclosure with USCIB 23/43 dated 27 December 1951. 

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TOI S~E!1f SU&DE 

LSI~/51 

Appendix 'A' 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

BRIEF TO U .. S .. AND UoK • .AMBASSADORS IN PARIS EO. 3. 3 (h) (2) 

The u.s. and U.K .. Govermnents, having been convinced that the 

cypher communications of' the French MFA are so thorough:q insecure 

as to be inimical to the interests or the Western potirers, have decided 

to approach the French Government on the matter.. They regard the securit7 

ot French diplomatic comimmications as of the greatest importance and are 

therefore prepared to ofter material help towards improving them. 

···························· ... 

.3. The U.S. and U.K .. Governments theref'o~e think it reasonable to 

assume that French diplomatic communications are an invaluable sQUrce of 

intelligence to Russia on Westem diplomacy and strategy-, indeed\that they 

may- well be her most prolitic. most speedy' and most reliable sou!"ce ot allo 

'rhey regard it as imperative that Russia should be deprived or this source, 

not on4r so that she will be denied the intelligence now accessible to her 

trom. it, but also so that officials of the U.S. and U.K. Governments 

mq- more treeq discuss important matters or common concern with otf'icials 

ot the French Government. 

4. So b&d are the cypher s:;rstems and communication prtLCtices\ of the 

French MFA that, 1.n the opinion of' the UoS. and U.K. Govemments, tbe 

s.ituation can onq be satis.tactoriq improved bJ" a drastic and expensive -reorganisation ot the CJ"Pher Service or that Ministr,y and the appropriate 

replacement ~r its s75tems and practices. In order to ensure a reaUsation 

by the French MFA that such a drastic overhaul is necess&l'J'11 it is essential 

that the situation should be brought to notice in a manner so dramatic and 

canv.1.ncing as to shock the Ministry into taking spe~ and effective action. 

5. The U.S. and U .. K. Govermnents have therefore decided to instruct 

their Ambassadors in Paris to inform the Secretaey - General of the 

French ~A, M. Alexander Pa.J"odi that 1''rench diplanatic cyphers are 

c let.e insecure 

an that, as reme~ 

this state or atfairs requires drastic and expensive action,, the u.s. 

and U.K. Governments are willing to help in instituting corrective 

measures provided he v.1.ll give assurances that his Mipistr.r will: 

(a) undertake an energetic programme !or reorganisation ot its 

Cypher Service and appropriate replacement ot its present 

systems and practices; 

(b) accept without qualil'ication and promulgate U.K./U .. s .. essential standards ot security in each phase and aspect or 

the programme; 

(c) accept direct U .. K./U.~ .. participation in executing the 

programme, including participation on a working level b7 

representatives qualified in the field or general 

securit7 as well as all aspects or communication seeuritT. 

/6., Should 

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• 

• F.L'B6-3!'?sc~605SE1eR1£;:'"t3B~tJijDE EO. 3. J(h) {2) 113IB/244/51 

Appendix. 'A' 

7.. Ir M: .. Parodi is willing to accept; these proposals, the u.s. 

and U.K. Governments are for thei:t' part. willing to provide as a minim.tun. 

on long-term loan. 8Uf'ficient Combined Cypher Machines (CCM) t.o equip 

about .30 or the moat important cli.plom.t.ic posts with two ma.chines each, 

a quart.er to a third ot them. at once and the remainder phased. in 

consonance with NATO requirements. (Th:Us machine has already' been 

accepted. by the French Government for high-level NA'rO eonmnni cations.) 

For those posts whieh cannot immediate~ be equipped with CCM Ms.chines. 

and as a standbJ" ror those which can. the u.s. and U.K. Governments 

propos!.__one-time pads and are prepared. to advise on and assist in their 

construction. _M. Parodi can be assured that. as the French would be 

producing their awn settings tor the Cypher Machines and their own onetime pads. their telegrams vou.ld not be readable by the U.S. and British 

Governments.· - ---... 

8. The U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors in Pari.s should be aware that 

two or the problems 'Which their Governments have had to .race in arriving 

at these conclusions have been 

/report 

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.... .. TOI S:rrelt~¥8~lJtpDE 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

ISrB/244/51 

Append.i.x t Al 

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