NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCl' 

WASHINGTON 25, O. C. 2_ 4 

/EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'f6P SEeRB'l' 2 September 1951.i. 

MEMORANDUM. FOR THE Ml!J.mEBS OF USCIB 

SUBJECT: Terms of Refer.Ance tor Negotiating a New CQ.UNT 

Agreement wi ti[ // I 

In accordance with the decis.ion reached by USCIB at its 

l05th meeting on 13August 1954, ana.d hoc committee was convened 

to draw up terms of reference for negotiating a new CCMINT agreement 

wit~ I:/ The conmittee was composed of representatives of 

STATE 1 CIA 1 NSA, Army, Navy:, and Air Force; the NSA member was 

Chairman. 

2. In its deliberations, the committee was guided by the 

provisions of paragraph 15 of the Final Report of the UKUSA 

L-----' (1954)/and. paragraph 3 of inclosure 4 with USCIB 29.18/8. 

3·. At its final meeting on 1 September 1954, the Committee 

unanimously/approved the inclosed draft entitled "Terms of Reference 

for the Negotiation and Implementation of a New C<MINT Agreement with c=J 11 and agreed to forward it to USCIB with a recommendation for 

approval. 

Inclt 

a/a 

cJ~4~LP~ Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-18-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

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'\)i:O 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

fL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

1 Septemb~r 195~ 

TF~ OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATION 

AND IMPniiENTATION OF A NEW ctRmT 

AGREEMENT WITHI I 

PHASE I - INITIAL/APPROACH 

1. An 1n1 tial approach will be me.de by a repre~eutative ot the 

Director ot Central Intelligence/to the Chiet ot the 

L---------to obtain/his concurrence to certaj.n general 

pr 1nc1 p le• and to make arrangements tor a .conference to··~ up an 

expanded u.s •. J ~a.tmT Agreement. The CIA representative vill 

make statements to the following effect: 

a. That the u.s. Ca.u:NT aut~rities have approved. l)Olicy 

which perm:1 ts a new and exi>anded relationship vi th the I .... _.,.,..,......,...._ ..... ~n 

. the C<Jmfr field. 

b. That through this new relationship the ! .... ________ I cOQJ.d 

expect the answers to the technica.l questions previously po8ltd by them 

and a good deal more as well, as the U.S. is now willing to. qter into 

an extensive technical exchange on tbe .... l ________ _.ll>l'oblems 

being worked by thej._ ____ t 

prin~iple, the U.S. suggests that a conference be planned far tbe_ drawing 

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REF ID:A60684 -~ ~op ~ --IS b --K --JS ~ __ ,

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PL 86~36/50 USC 3605 

up of an agreement. That tm U.S. would welcome I,....-____ .... I suggestions 

as to the exact form such an agreement should take and on the timing of 

such a conference. For the conference, the U.S. would\ send qualified 

CCMINT technicians to participate and to elaborate on• .• the technical 

details of exchange. 

e. That the U.S. places such high hopep 011 thi!S. teclmical 

exchange thatit is willing to assign a fUlly qUalified CaaNT technician 

tq._ _ ___.~o carry on liaison w1 th members/ ot the!""""• ____ I Ca.llNT Service; 

provided a mutually acceptable arrangement can be agreed. 

f. That, since this new relationship_, as envisaged by the U.S., 

will involve the exchange of unusually sensitive inf'orma~ion, there will 

ot course have to be certain mutual. limitations and safeguards for the 

protection of both the information exchanged and the fact of the 

relationship itself'. In this connection, as a prelude to the conference, 

the U.S. CaaNT authorities would like assurances that-thej._ ___ ___, 

CCMINT Service and other users/ of CCMINT in .,...I __ .... I will conform to certain 

minimum standards, already practiced by the U.S., which are herewith being 

provided (Attached as Tab B). 

2. In addition to the above, the CIA representative will endeavor to 

elicit information as to the decision on the relative roles 1n C<RINT that 

the may have. 

PHASE II - NEGOTIATION 

3. The following specific principles will govern the negotiation 

w1 th th~._ ____ ..... ff a new C<MINT agreement: 

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':X'QP ~0 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

'feP BEeKl!lT ~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 :·.·.:' .· 

a. As approved by USCIB . 29 .18/S, t~ Director of Central 

Intelligenc~ will be responsible for the .negotiaf;f..on\.of a new COMINT 

agreement with the I .... ___ __.ltn accordance with p&ra.\15 of the UKUSA. 

. ,' : " : 

Conference Report (Attached as Tab C) and /the tecbnlcal EJpecifications 

determined by the Director, NSA. 

b. NSA representatives/Will participate with the CIA representatives at the negotiations and,/ within the limitat!.on$ \of Tabs \J) and E, will 

determine the pr~cise technical nature of the collaboration ·Wit~ .... --___. 

c. The negotiators wi.11 at~ to ascer;tELin that, under this 

new agreeme~t; the Octually represen~a alll ]ca-iINT act:tv:l.tiea. 

_ d. Wh~ 'thel Fe invited to join .the SHAPE 'Y' organization, the Director, NSA, will be identified. Thertlfore,the BSA representatives at the negotiations will be introduced as representing the head of 

the C<l!DT collection EUld production Agency in the o.s. 

e. The negotiators 111.11 endeavor to fulfill all the objectives 

and requirements set forth in Tabs F and D. 

f. The negotiators will endeavor to obtai~-· ____ l agreement 

that the RSA Liaison Officer to be stationed inLJmay' have--41.rect and . 

frequent (at least twice a week) contacts vi~ l CCMD'r \teclmici-. • 

. such contacts./ will be a pre-requisite tor the new CCMINT agreement with the 

______ !but the requirement will be satisfied provided theJ .... ___,, ___ __, 

· can make the contacts in some secure place,· _not necessarily actua~._ ___ ___, 

CCMIRT installations_, where tull discussions,· papers, and exchange of 

materials and idea& may take .place. 

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•.x• Q p fEO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

[PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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g. The negotiations should take place in lZZJon ~ date mutually 

acceptable to th~ fld the U.S., preferably in October 1954. 

h. Obtaining or l .... ___ __.lapproval to /paasing copies of their 

material to the U.K. and revelation of UKUSA collaboration will be in 

accordance with para. 15c of the UKUSA Conference Rep(>rt {See Tab C). 

1. For the guidance of the negotiators, detailed minimum security 

standards·will be prepared at a later date and' willl>e as agreed by the 

Ad Hoc Carmnittee. They will be attached as Tab G. 

PHASE III - lMPLEMENTATlON 

4. It is considered that, at the outset, I .... .......,. __ __, author1 ties 

will consider the new CCl4INT agreement aS/ an unusually delicate matter 

and will desire that it be implemented on as inconspicuous a basis as 

possible. It is considered.further that, iil thed.evelopnent ot this 

collaboration, tbel._ ____ _.lwill, ot necessitt, handle it in a manner . 

similar to existing! ~u.s. intelligence relations. The 

program for implementing this new agreement may, therefore; have to 

acconmodate both (1) this situation inj __ __.f and· (2) the U.S. desire 

that it be he.ndled ape.rt fran. other intelligence relations, but without 

detriment to vital non-CCMINT intelligence• relations. Accordingly, the 

new agreement will be implemented as foll()WS: .·1 

a. The Director, RSA, will be responsible for the conduct of 

CCMIBT collaboration with the I .... ___ ___,f in accordance vi th the terms of 

this new agreement. Present CIA camnitments for the provision of cash and 

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EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

equipnent to thej._ ____ __,fiii be. met under arrangements . approved 

specif'icallyby the Director of' Central Intelligence. 

b. The Director of Central Intelligence/will assist\ the Director, 

RSA, in the development of' this CCMINT collaboration. The Director of 

Central Intelligence will be responsible for a&suring that O<J4INT arrangements are separate from non-CCMINT arrangements, insofar as· •. practicable. 

c. The Director of' Central Intelli.gence and the Director, NSA, 

will resolve any conflicts between C<J.1INT and non-C<J.1INT arrangements. 

d. The foregoing responsibilities will be discharged inl .... __ _. 

by the NSA Liaison Of'f'icer and the Senior CIA Representative respectively 

and as follows: 

(1) Each will keep the /other fully informed as• t() the 

·development of the CCMINT arrangements on the one hand and, on.the other, 

. i .•. ··• I 

as to those problems which may arise in connection with the inter-relationship 

of' CCMINT and non-CCMINT arrangeinents. (In Washington the Director, NSA, 

and the Director of Central Intelligence will keep each other.similarly 

informed. ) 

(2) In assisting the NSA Liaison Officer, the Senior CIA 

Representative will establish the pattern for NSA contact wit~ "---;::::::==~ ..... 

authorities on a basis mutually acceptable to the:nselves and the I ____ ___. 

(3) In any/ instance when, in the judgment of the CIA 

Representative inLJ an action on the part of' the NSA Liaison Officer 

in the conduct of' CCMINT collaboration would adversely affect vital non-Ca.o:NT 

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arrangements, such action Vi•ll be suspended. or held in abeyance pending 

resolution of the matter by the Director of Central Intellig~nce and 

the Director / NBA, 

(4) The NSA Liaison Officer Will have a private crypto• 

channel tor direct communication with the Director, '.NSA. This channel 

will be the exclusive channel for passing communications which must be 

handled in CCJ4INT channels· only. 

! ___ ______,_.....______. 

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

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~op SECRET' EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Sl.MMARY OF MAJOR u.s~ C<NmT REQunm.mNTS WHIC~ 1couw BE EXPECTED TO FULFILL 

1. A limited intercept search and developnent progr$D to determine 

the extent of 

....__~~~~~~~___, 

above and beyond their normal coverage assignments • 

2. 

3. It is estimated t~t approximately 100 additional I .... ____ ___, 

intercept operators vill eventually be required to accomplish 1 and2 

above, in addition to maintaining present intercept coverage. 

4. Improved D/F support. 

5. Increased speed in forwarding of material, together vith complete 

copy of traffic now forwarded in skeletonized form. 

6. Spot reports of significant developments noted in 

daily intelligence sunnaries (Intsum) to 

supplement the point-of-intercept reports of' comnunication activity now 

provided (Tecsum), and a modification of the point-of-intercept reports 

to include more technical material. 

Tab A 

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/ 

t 

/" 

I 

I 

j 

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REF ID:A60684 

,...,EP SEGRE~ 

MINIMtM ~ :'QR THE SECURI'fi AND DISSEMINATION OF COUNT - . 

.. 1. Ca.n:NT, e.8 use~, herein, refers to all information derived from 

the processing of traf'fit procured by listening to foreign canmunications, 

including voice tranaaias:.ons 1 for the purpose of prQducing intelligence• 

It includes raw traf':f'ic, ~nd-products 1 technical ma.terie.l.1 methods and 

techniques, working docunents, and other special material used in its 

production. It also includes intelligence reports and summaries based 

on CCMINT unless the infonnation is so generalized that it cannot be 

traced back to a particular item of CCMINT or to CCMINT in general. ,.., . . r'. . 

2. ~vernmen;t will designate a national authority to deal 

. .l 

with all questiona.o_!)bac:NT security and enforce these principles. r -

3. · B~ore an 1nd1.vidua.l in any capacity has access to CCMINT 1 be 

must be screened in accordano• vith standards and procedures established 

by the national authOrit>, and cleared as being of unquestioned loyalty • . ~ .. 

The screening must be aa thorough as possible and at least as thorough as 

that given to ind!Yidmlll having access to TOP SECRET information of 

similar sensitivity. ID 8idition to such clearance, these individuals 

JllUSt be specifically nomina·'".ed by the national authority to have access 

-~ c~<t~rmation. ~ I: -

, It.. •Prior to being given ~ccesa to CCMD'l',, each individual will be 

1nd~~tef .. tor C<MDT by a s>;,ecial warning on the sensitivity to compromise of CCMDT sources and v:lll bet required to sign a document drawing 

'l'ab B 

' . .. 

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attention to his special res"ponsibility for safeguarding CQ.fINT information 

' and to the consequences provided if, either by intent or negligence, he 

allows C~IN'l' information or material to come to the notice of unauthorized 

persons. It must be stressed that there is no time limit, in that the 

.information must be safeguarded indefinitely. 

5. Distri~ution or C<J.IINT must be on the need-to-know principle, 

i~e., each item of CQ.fINT information or material shall be made known 

only to those COMINT indoctrinated individuals who require it in the 

performance of their duties. Control lists of individuals indoctrinated 

for CCMINT Will be maintained by ea.ch government. The number or indoctrinated individuals will be kept to the minimum consistent with essential 

intelligence and operational needs. 

6. All .possible steps will be taken to prevent. the risk or capture 

or interrogation of CQ.fINT indoctrinees by enemies or·,potential eriemies. 

In general, no risks should be taken other than those necessary tor the 

efficient performance of their duties. 

1~ The greatest care must be taken not to betray CCMINT success by 

actions based on it. The source should on no account be needlessly risked. 

8. Each govermnent will c;>bserve mutually agreed minimum standards 

with respect to classification, transmission and physical security of 

C<J.llNT. 

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REF ID:A60684 ~ep -- -- -~ - ~ ~ U It~ ";i~o 3.3(h) (2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EXTRACT FRQM RECOMMENDATI()R'S 0FuKu$A 

Ll2-21 fftTLY 1954 

15. S cific agreeme 

arrangements wi 

s ect of future UKUSA'. c.omint he tiations and 

It ia agreef 1n- Jspect of--dev; __ elcping tbe ____ ireq __ u1 __ red exP• __ •..• an ____ \ .. _·\ ____ ded UKUSA Comint 

arrangement with_ _ / / > i • • 

TAB C 

a) The U.S. shall be ___ the __ -_- UKUSA ~---for t ___ he ___ • negot~--a ..•.. tt ____ • ____ on ___ and conduct of arrangements with L___J (See sub-paragraph 

(J) below). __ / _/ / • • • 

'b) The U.S. jffer ____ of technical Com--i-yit aso)"'1""• : '~.--. ___ e I _ shall be made contingent on_ • _ _lagre~nt 

to UKUSA elf!~ ~:s~ll Comint materials provi ed.by\tbe 

c) UlCUSA collaboration will be/revealed/to the l .... _ __,.__,,,_ ..... ra 

follows: 

(i) The U.S. will reques.t permission of th~ I to 

pass the materials _received from them to the U.K. in 

order to fulfill the request/ma.de previously. 

(11) The U.S. will state that, in return for this permission, 

1 

the U.S. will ia'.corporatel · \\ 

(iii) The U.S. will state furtber tbat the above will be done 

with the knowledge and consent of the U.K. 

(iv) The U.D. _Will in:fonn the U.K. beforehand of the. intended 

timing of this move so .that the U.K. can thereafter conf'irm. 

to the appropriate I I authorities that the U.S. approac:h 

was made with U.K. knowledge and approval. 

4j For the conduct of UKUSA oom:i.nt arrangements vi tb thel I 

Director ,i BSA Ell be ~e to station a Senior c._omint-. representative inl fbut no_ _personnel shall be accepted at IfSA or CJCHQ. 

e) The U.S. shall obtain a.u assurance from thel I that they will 

adhere to personnel, physical and Comint security standard• at least 

equivalent to the appropriate UKUSA standards. 

f) Comint materials received by the U.S. troml I shall be placed 

in Comint channels as soon as possible and be classified on the 

same basis as corresponding UKUSA material. 

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~ 0 p rugg1tftt'I~ i!Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) . 

"PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

g) All Comint matertals and information ~ceived by the U.S. 1'rom 

I I sh.all be immediatel.l exchangeable vi thin UKUSA. 

h) In the caurse 01' new negotiations with the I I Comint eervice 

the U .s. s1'.all endeavour to attai11i the objecti -ves stated in 

paragraph 8 above. 

1) The U.S. sh~ll endeavour to com·i·pl.ete. ne·w· UKU. SA arrangements vithL fvitbin a reasonable period of tinte (as. defined in 

paragraph 13): thereafter UKU$A/policy toweral \ I shall, 

u· necessary, be mutually re.;,.examined With• a view to 

determining whether a new approach is required. Until the 

lapse of that period of time the U.K. Will refrain frqm 

attempting to develop any/new Comint arrangements witi[.__ __ .... ~ 

J) The RAF will withdraw fro:m. active participation in the 

development of the Comint aspects of the Early Warning 

arrangements with th~s soon as the U.S. can demonstrate 

to the U.K. that thel___Jwill .receive assHitance from the U.S •. 

at least equi ~it.o that the .. n bein. g .p·· rovi· .. ded by the RAF in " 

all aspects ofl___JComint activities. 

k) The RAF may complete the prov;lsion o."f that training and 

equipment to which/the ~ alread.y c:ommitted as set 

forth in Tab A. I:f' theL__JComint operations should reach 

the stage of Justifying UKUSA technical Cam.:J..nt assistance 

bef'ore the U.S. /is in a position to provide this assistance, the 

u.~., after con.sultation with the u.s., may provide this 

assistance within the exchanges specified in paragraph 5 of' 

Appendix P to/the UKUSA Agreement. 

1) Before the RAF withdra"s, the RAF may, at a time agreed by 

the U.S. an.d U. K. , inform the c:::::::J tha.t, in conform! ty with 

U.S.-U.K. '1Jlderstanding about supply or assistance to the 

I IComint activities, it has be~· luded that the . U.S. should take over assistance to th in Comint matters, 

and that be:f'ore agreeing with thf.a--:t1ile obtained 

satisfactory assurances that.theL..___Jwould receive full 

assistance from the U.S. 

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, T 0 JP1$ i£ =~it~~ 'l!;O 3.3(h) (2) 

·TOP SiCRET PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

UKUSA C01'UNT REC UIREMENTS BASED ON ©t.ISTlNG 

KNOWLZDGE OF 

1. In the absence of detailed information concernin~ I 

potential, it is not possible to list exhaustively the additional UKUSA Comint .__ ___ ___,t might be expected to fulfill. Some addim n s ba e i t"n. kn wed e o 

are listed below. These reguir=ients should b·.e rea·. sse.ss·. ed on the 

asis of analysis of the results of thel _ ~earch and development 

programs indicated as the first requirement i.n the following list.: 

a. Intercept: Additional Targets: 

(1) A limited sea ch and develo to\ determine 

the extent of 

'-----------_....,.... ____ __, above and. beyond normal coverage assignments. 

(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

b. Intercept: Positions Required: 

To accomplish the above and maintain present intercept, it is 

estimated that I f would have to expand from 20 positions to 

total of 46 positions as follows: 

TARGET Number of Positions 

TAB D 

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'f eP OBeMli' 

c. Improved D/F support. 

d. Complete copy of traffic now received in skeletonized 

form. 

e. Spot reports and daily Intsums to supplement the Pointof-intercept Tecsum reporting now provided, and. a modification of the 

Tecsum. to include more material. 

f. Reduction in delay in the receipt of rav material. 

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/EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TZCHNICAL CCMINT ASSISTAfl~ 

TO BE PROVIDED TO I ./ l 

1. Para. 12 d of the UKUSA Conference/Report provides that 

the selection of 

will be co~itrolled by the Director, NSA1 

end the Director / GCHQ, through DIB~hinery to be agreed by them 

and on the basis of agreed apprecJ itions of the t~chnical competence 

or the ..... I __ ___,...._ _______ __, 

2. A list of techn:f,cal CCMINT materials Which may be released 

toLJ is being prepared by the Director, NSA, i'or concurrence .... 

ot the Director, QC~. The ~eed.list will be provided to the 

U.S. representatives prior to :the negotiation of the agreetilent ·vithD · 

Tab E 

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• ' .. ~oP /Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

f PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EXTRACT FROM RECOMMENDATIONS OF UKUSA 

112-21 JULY 1954 

8. Objectives 

rt is agreed that the/UKUSA objectives.· /in e.· x ... /Pan.·/ ded Comint ar·. rangements vi th_ I are as fallows : / ii • \ . 

a) To negotiate Comint arrangements with .these countries that will 

provide maximum assurance·of continuity. 

b) To meet the requirements for .ad.di tiona.1 end improved Comint 

materials and services liste.d in Tab A paragraph 14 and Tab B 

paragraph 13. (It is, however not.ed that the requirement for 

control of a D/F station i~has not yet been formulated 

in detail, and that meeti~~qu:l.rement must be the subject 

of further UKUSA consultation). 

c) To expand I t Com.int efforts to permit t.beir 

fulfilment of UKUSA requirements for information on targets not 

otherwise accessible/to or not fully covered by UKUSA resour~es. 

d) To enable UKUSA where possible to guide the Comint efforts ot 

I Ion tasks whose performance by them is of 

maximum advantage to UKUSA. 

e) To improvJ f comint so as to obtain for UKUSA 

the best quality Comint results from those countries. 

t) To achieve the above objectives with minimum risk to the UKUSA 

Comint effort. 

g) To canpartment UKUSA. Comint arrangements witH 

as far as is feasible, fran other u.s. or u.:t ...... -1 .... n ..... te....._ll ........ lg_en_c_e __ .... 

arrangements with those countries. 

Tab F 

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