1 Attachment

Proposed Paper

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F. Robert Naka

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1SP NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. INIENIVENIN

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR May 23, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BENINGTON

SUBJECT: Joint Paper on Disclosure

As agreed yesterday, we have developed a short

paper which presents the background, issues and cases

for and against disclosure of the "fact of" satellite

reconnaissance. The paper is furnished for your

review. Please apprise us of your thoughts as you

pass the paper on to Gardiner Tucker. I propose that

we meet again Thursday afternoon in order to allow

Gardiner, Johnny, and John McLucas to present a

representative paper to Secretary Laird on Friday

as planned.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Admission of the "Fact Of" Satellite

Reconnaissance

INTRODUCTION 

This paper presents to you the issues associated

with a question presently being considered by the

Verification Panel on whether or not to officially

disclose the "fact of" United States reliance on

satellite reconnaissance in connection with SALT

verification means. The current policy, estahlished by the

National Security Council, decrees that no official admission be made; the President has the sole authority to

disclose satellite reconnaissance activities.

Last Fall, fearing an inadvertent official disclosure in connection with SALT, John McLucas asked

Ambassador Johnson's NSAM 156 Committee to consider

the disclosure question. Unable to resolve the issue

without placing it in the larger SALT context, the

question was referred to the Verification Panel.

Although the "fact of" issue appears on the surface

to be a superficial one, because the U.S. public and

others are generally aware of such a reconnaissance

program, in reality there are many complexities.' We

believe that you should be made aware of the favorable

and unfavorable implications of officially admitting

to the "fact of" and that you should make your feelings

known directly to the President based upon your assessment of the implications.

BACKGROUND 

Over the years, the present national policy has

been reviewed and reaffirmed. In spite of pressures,

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from time to time, to disclose, it has been decided that

the national interest is best served by maintenance of

silence, notwithstanding the inherent frustrations. As

you are well aware, this nation has become extraordinarily

dependent on satellite reconnaissance for intelligence

data. No viable alternative exists to employment of

satellites in spite of their expense, fragility and

operation within a tacitly permissive environment.

Although the public is generally aware, we believe

that special controls have been successful in protecting

the true extent and quality of the covert satellite

reconnaissance program.

SALT IMPLICATIONS 

With the advent of SALT, the dependence on "national

means" for verification in lieu of on-site inspection

has added to the reliance on reconnaissance satellites.

With the "fact of" issue, several uncertainties become

evident. It is uncertain how much information about

the extent and quality of the reconnaissance program

would be required to allay fears of uncleared members

of Congress and the public during the ratification process

or whether the cleared members would be able to prevail.

It is uncertain what the Soviet Government reaction would

be if it was informed that the U.E. was planning on disclosing the "fact of." It is uncertain what the reaction

of third countries, such as China, France and others would

be if the U.S. declared the "fact of." It is uncertain

what the effect on the NASA. Earth Resources, SKYLAB and

the Space Transportation System programs would be with

the disclosure of the "fact of." It is uncertain what

the Soviet citizens' reactions would be if the U.S.

admitted to satellite reconnaissance. It is not clear

whether detection of violations of the agreements will

require the Standing Consultative Commission to present

hard evidence to the Congress and the Soviets. Finally,

It is uncertain what the overall impact on intelligence

collection operations, especially the high altitude missions,

would be if the "fact of" were announced in connection with

SALT. .

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It becomes clear that the limits to the issue are

on the one hand to maintain the present policy of silence

and on the other hand to admit to the "fact of" photographic satellites. Alternatives between these limits

are difficult to establish, however, the present State

Department draft paper for the Verification Panel contains

two additional alternatives. The first is one which

expresses confidence levels in verifying SALT Agreements,

and the second, one which discloses in full our capabilities.

The interagency views seem to be universally adverse to

the latter two as either unwise or impractical. The

following, then, states the cases for and against disclosure.

CASE FOR DISCLOSURE 

Disclosure would confirm public speculation here and

abroad that satellites will be employed for verification.

It would provide a less awkward posture for Government

spokesmen, and contrasted with silence, might add somewhat to the credibility of our verification means in

the eyes of the Congress and the public. Official disclosure may foster a greater national and global acceptability of space reconnaissance as an openly conducted

legitimate activity. Further details might more easily

be discussed with cleared members of Congress in Executive

Session without pressures from uncleared members for

equal information. It might also divert the spotlight

from other critical "national means."

In sum, disclosure of the "fact of" may be a more

satisfactory alternative in the tactical view. In the

immediate sense, it is more comfortable than maintenance

of silence. In the longer-term, it would force out into.

the open the question of legality of satellites used for

reconnaissance and confirm what is already generally in

the public domain. If the uncertainties cited in the

previous section are discounted, disclosure could be

accomplished without harm to the reconnaissance program.

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CASE AGAINST DISCLOSURE 

Disclosure of the "fact of" likely would not provide

alleviation from Congressional and public pressures to

disclose the extent and capability--and perhaps even more

important, the limitations--of the reconnaissance program.

This, in turn, would draw the discussions toward the actual

capability to verify SALT Agreements and toward the total

satellite intelligence collection effort. Disclosure to

a set limit would be difficult to maintain and an erosion

of overall security probably would take place.- Those who

are. skeptical on either the validity of SALT Agreements

or the U.S. capability to verify compliance likely would

remain skeptical in spite of added information. Official

silence is an easily understood policy and there is little

confusion attendant to its implementation. Press speculation unofficially is accomplishing what an official disclosure is said to be able to accomplish. The Soviets and

others would not be made aware of the extent and capability--

and the limitations--of the program. Finally, acknowledgement is an irreversible decision--once stated it cannot be

retracted.

In sum, official disclosure of the "fact of" accomplishes

very little in either the short-run or long-run. The uncertainties cited in the previous section in relation to

the non-disclosure case are more basic in nature and cannot

be discounted by subjective analysis. It would be possible

that much more information would be disclosed in the longrun than would be planned on in a limited disclosure policy.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

On balance, we believe that the best course to follow

is the retention of the present policy of no official disclosure. Tactically, disclosure appears to be an easier

and more practical course of action. In examining the issue

beyond the simple question of the "fact of," it is seen that

for the longer-term no utility is gained from an irreversible

disclosure unless the U.S. is willing to go well beyond a

simple admission. The range of uncertainties inherent in
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dismiss. Unless the agreements become seriously and

permanently in danger of not being ratified, it appears

unwise to accept a pro forma change in policy. It is

recommended that you strongly urge the President to

retain the present policy.

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