10-1587-cv 

Hayes v. State of N.Y. Atty. Grievance Committee

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2010

Heard: June 6, 2011 Decided: March 5, 2012

Docket No. 10-1587-cv

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J. MICHAEL HAYES, ESQ.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEW YORK ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE

COMMITTEE OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

and DEANNE M. TRIPI, IN HER CAPACITY

AS CHAIR OF STATE OF NEW YORK ATTORNEY

GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees.*

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Before: NEWMAN and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.**

Appeal from the July 26, 2004, judgment of the United States

District Court for the Western District of New York (John T. Elfvin,

District Judge) and the March 31, 2010, judgment of the United States

District Court for the Western District of New York (H. Kenneth

 Schroeder, Jr., Magistrate Judge), rejecting First Amendment and

void-for-vagueness challenges to Rule 7.4 of the New York Rules of

Professional Conduct concerning attorney specialization. 

*

Pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Deanne M. Tripi, the current chair of the Committee is

substituted for John V. Elmore. The Clerk is directed the amend the

official caption to conform to the caption herein.

**The Honorable Roger J. Miner, originally a member of the panel,

died on February 18, 2012. The two remaining members of the panel,

who are in agreement, have determined the matter. See U.S.C. § 46(d);

2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457 (2d Cir.

1998).
 The Court of Appeals rules that enforcement of part of the

disclaimer required by Rule 7.4 violates the First Amendment and that

the lack of standards for enforcement of Rule 7.4 renders it void for

vagueness as applied to Plaintiff-Appellant Hayes.

Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the

Plaintiff-Appellant.

J. Michael Hayes, Esq., pro se, Buffalo,

N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Simon Heller, Assistant Solicitor General,

Office of the N.Y. State Atty. General,

New York, N.Y. (Eric T. Schneiderman,

N.Y. State Atty. General, Barbara D.

Underwood, Solicitor General, Nancy

Spiegel, Senior Asst. Solicitor

General, Alison J. Nathan, Special

Counsel, New York, N.Y., on the brief),

for Defendants-Appellees.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns a First Amendment challenge to a New York

rule requiring attorneys who identify themselves as certified

specialists to make a prescribed disclosure statement. The statement

must identify the certifying organization, which must have been

approved by the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and must include a

disclaimer concerning certification. Plaintiff-Appellant, J. Michael

Hayes, Esq., appeals from the July 26, 2004, judgment of the United

States District Court for the Western District of New York, John T.

Elfvin, Judge, granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees State

of New York Attorney Grievance Committee of the Eighth Judicial

District (“Grievance Committee”) and Nelson F. Zakia, the thenchairman of the Grievance Committee with respect to Hayes’s First

Amendment claim. Hayes also appeals from the March 31, 2010, judgment

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of the United States District Court for the Western District of New

York, H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr., Magistrate Judge, rejecting, after a

bench trial, Hayes’s claim, based on unconstitutional vagueness,

against the Grievance Committee and John V. Elmore, Esq., the thencurrent chairman. On appeal, the issue is whether Rule 7.4 of the New

York Rules of Professional Conduct, codified at N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &

Regs. tit. 22 § 1200.53(c)(1) (2011) (“Rule 7.4"),1 which requires a

prescribed disclaimer statement to be made by attorneys who state that

they are certified as a specialist in a particular area of the law,

either violates Hayes’s freedom of speech or is unconstitutionally

vague.

Because enforcement of two componentx of the required disclaimer

statement would violate the First Amendment and because the absence of

standards guiding administrators of Rule 7.4 renders it

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiff-Appellants Hayes, we

reverse with directions to enter judgment for the Plaintiff-Appellant.

Background

Hayes has been licensed to practice law in the State of New York

since 1977, limiting his practice to representing plaintiffs in civil

litigation. He has taught at the Buffalo Law School, lectured at New

York State Bar Association programs, and published articles on civil

litigation. In 1995 he was awarded Board Certification in Civi1 Trial

Advocacy by the National Board of Trial Advocacy (“NBTA”),2

 an

1

Before 2009, the rule at issue was Disciplinary Rule 2-105(c)(1)

in the Code of Professional Responsibility, codified at N.Y. Comp.

Codes R. & Regs. tit 22, § 1200.10(c)(1) (“DR 2-105"). The text of

the rule has remained unchanged since a 1999 amendment to DR 2-105. 

2

The NBTA is now known as the National Board of Legal Specialty

Certification.

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organization accredited by the American Bar Association. Thereafter

Hayes began to refer to himself as a “Board Certified Civil Trial

Specialist” in various advertisements, including his letterhead. 

See Hayes v. Zakia, 327 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). In

August 1996, and again on November 1996, the Grievance Committee,

which is appointed by the Appellate Division (Fourth Department) and

which is empowered to investigate allegations of professional

misconduct, including complaints of improper advertising, wrote to

Hayes and took issue with his use of the term “specialist.” Hayes

agreed to include the name of the NBTA on his letterhead and in future

telephone directory advertisements. See id.

On June 30, 1999, Disciplinary Rule 2-105(C)(1) of New York’s

Code of Professional Responsibility, N.Y. Comp. Cpdes R. & Regs. tit.

22 § 1200.10(c)(1), went into effect. DR 2-105(C)(1) is the

predecessor of current Rule 7.4, which carries forward the same text. 

Rule 7.4 permits a lawyer certified as a specialist by an ABA-approved

organization to state that fact provided the lawyer also makes a

prescribed statement that includes a disclaimer about certification of

40 words plus the name of the certifying organization. Rule 7.4

states: 

A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular

area of law or law practice by a private organization

approved for that purpose by the American Bar Association

may state the fact of certification if, in conjunction

therewith, the certifying organization is identified and the

following statement is prominently made: “[1] The [name of

the private certifying organization] is not affiliated with

any governmental authority[,] [2] Certification is not a

requirement for the practice of law in the State of New York

and [3] does not necessarily indicate greater competence

than other attorneys experienced in this field of law.”

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We will refer to the three components of the statement, which we have

numbered, as the “Disclaimer.” Rule 7.4 provides no details for

determining what will satisfy the requirement that the required

statement is “prominently made.”

In the second half of 1999, Hayes placed ads on two billboards in

Buffalo. Although the billboards contained the Disclaimer, the

Grievance Committee wrote to Hayes questioning whether the print size

of the Disclaimer on one of the billboards complied with the

“prominently made” requirement. Hayes responded that he had attempted

to satisfy DR 2-105(C)(1) by using six-inch letters, which was oneinch larger than what was required for federal cigarette warnings on

billboards. The Grievance Committee closed its investigation.

In May 2000, the Grievance Committee twice contacted Hayes, first

about the Disclaimer included on the second billboard, and then to

indicate that it was beginning an investigation into his letterhead,

which did not contain the Disclaimer. Hayes responded that he did not

believe that the Disclaimer was necessary because the letterhead

indicated that he was “Board Certified,” rather than a “specialist.” 

The Grievance Committee responded that a claim of certification

implies specialization, so as to require the Disclaimer, and indicated

that it would recommend that formal disciplinary action be instituted

unless Hayes modified his letterhead. Hayes then commenced a

declaratory judgment action in the Western District of New York. The

Grievance Committee requested Judge Elfvin to abstain from the case

due to the pending state disciplinary action. The Court granted that

request and dismissed the case. See Hayes v. N.Y. Attorney Grievance

Committee, No. 01-CV-0545E, 2001 WL 1388325 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2001). 

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Shortly thereafter Hayes informed the Grievance Committee that he

would comply with DR 2-105(C)(1), as directed, and the Grievance

Committee closed its investigation.

In December 2001, Hayes commenced the current action, seeking a

declaration that DR 2-105(C)(1) is unconstitutional both facially and

as applied to his advertising. The complaint also sought to

permanently enjoin the Defendant from enforcing DR 2-105(C)(1) against

the Plaintiff. The District Court denied the motion for a preliminary

injunction, see Hayes v. Zakia, No. 01-CV-0907E, 2002 WL 31207463

(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002), and both parties moved for summary

judgment. The District Court, relying on the Supreme Court’s

decisions in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary

Commission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), and Central Hudson Gas & Electric

Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), found that

the State had a substantial interest in protecting consumers from

potentially misleading attorney advertisements; that DR 2-105(C)(1)

advanced that interest; and that the rule was narrowly drawn. See

Hayes, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 230. With respect to vagueness, the

District Court rejected the Plaintiff’s claim that the rule was

unconstitutionally vague on its face, but determined that the

Plaintiff had raised issues of fact regarding his as-applied vagueness

challenge. See id. at 232 n.14, 233.

The parties consented to a bench trial on the vagueness question

before Magistrate Judge Schroeder, who ruled that DR 2-105(C)(1) was

not constitutionally vague as applied. Specifically, the Magistrate

Judge stated that the language “prominently made” signaled that the

Disclaimer must be noticeable or conspicuous and permitted a “single

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standard throughout the spectrum of advertising media.” In addition,

he stated that this language was sufficient to enable a person “of

ordinary intelligence” to understand what the regulation required and

that it also provided sufficiently explicit standards to guide the

Grievance Committee in the enforcement of the regulation. 

Discussion

This Court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, see Owens

v. New York City Housing Authority, 934 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1991),

the standards for which are well established, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Certification of attorney specialists. Rule 7.4(d) of the ABA’s

Model Rules of Professional Responsibility permits a lawyer to be

identified as a specialist in a particular field of law provided that

(1) the lawyer has been certified by an organization approved by a

state or accredited by the ABA and (2) the name of the certifying

organization is clearly identified. See Model Rules of Professional

Conduct R. 7.4(d) (2009). 48 states have rules that permit lawyers to

identify themselves as specialists. The rules of 32 of these states

are similar to the ABA’s model rule,3

 although some of these require

3

See Ala. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 7.4(c) (2011); Alas. R.

Prof. Conduct 7.4(b) (2011); Ariz. Rules of Prof’l Conduct, R.

7.4(a)(3) (2011); Ark. Rules of Prof. Conduct 7.4(d) (2011); Cal.

Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 1-400(D)(6) (2011); Conn. Rules of

Prof’l Conduct 7.4A (2011); Del. Prof. Cond. R. 7.4(d) (2011); Fla.

Bar Reg. R. 4-7.2(c)(6) (2011); Ga. R. & Regs. St. Bar 7.4 (2011);

Idaho Rules of Prof’l Conduct, R. 7.4(c) (2011); Ind. Rules of Prof’l

Conduct 7.4(d) (2011); Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:7.4(d) (2011);

Kan. Rules of Prof. Conduct 7.4(d) (2011); Ky. SCR Rules 7.40 (2011);

La. St. Bar Ass’n Art. XVI § 7.2(c)(5) (2011); Me. Rules of Prof’l

Conduct 7.4(d) (2010); Mont. Prof. Conduct R. 7.4 (2010); Neb. Ct. R.

of Prof. Cond. § 3-507.4 (2011); Nev. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 7.4(d)

(2011); N.H. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 7.4(c) (2011); N.J. Court

Rules, RPC 7.4 (2011); N.M. R. Prof. Conduct, 16-704 (2011); N.C.

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state board or state court approval of the certifying body.4

 Many of

the states that have not adopted the Model Rule require any claim of

specialization to be accompanied by various forms of disclaimers,

such as a statement that the state does not certify lawyers as

specialists.5 Two of the 48 states, Minnesota and Missouri, permit

identification of a lawyer as a specialist even in the absence of

certification, but require disclosure that there has been no

certification by an organization accredited by a state board or court.6

One state, West Virginia, prohibits lawyers from identifying

themselves as specialists except for patent attorneys and proctors in

admiralty.7

 One state, Maryland, prohibits identification as a

specialist with no exceptions.8 Michigan and Mississippi have no rules

concerning communications about lawyer specialization.

Efforts by states or bar associations to restrict lawyer

Prof. Cond. Rule 7.4(b) (2011); Ohio Prof. Cond. Rule 7.4(e) (2011);

Or. Rules Prof’l Conduct 7.1(4) (2009); Pa. RPC 7.4(a) (2011); S.C.

Rule 7.4(a), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR (2010); S.D. Codified Laws § 16-18-

appx.-7.4(d) (2011); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule 7.4 (2011); Tex. R.

Prof. Conduct 7.4(b) (2011); Utah Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 7.4(d)

(2011); Wis. SCR 20:7.4(d) (2011); Wyo. Prof. Conduct Rule 7.4(d)

(2010).

4

See Ala. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 7.4(c) (state bar

approval); Ariz. Rules of Prof’l Conduct, R. 7.4(a)(3) (state board

approval); Conn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 7.4A (state court committee

approval); Pa. RPC 7.4(a) (state court approval); S.C. Rule 7.4(a),

RPC, Rule 407 SCACR (state court approval); Tex. R. Prof. Conduct

7.4(b) (state board approval).

5

See, e.g., Colo. RPC 7.4(d) (2011); Ill. Sup. Ct. R. Prof’l

Conduct, R. 7.4 (2011); Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt. 6, sec. II, 7.4 (2011).

6

See Minn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 7.4(d) (2011); Mo. Sup. Ct. R.

4-7.4 (2010).

7

See W. Va. Prof. Cond. Rule 7.4 (2011).

8

Md. Lawyer’s R. Prof’l Conduct 7.4(a) (2011).

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advertising, particularly ads asserting accreditation in specialized

areas of law, inevitably create some tension between legitimate

concerns to protect the public from misleading claims and guild

mentality maneuvers to stifle legitimate competition in the market for

legal services. The ABA has endeavored to steer a course between

these competing concerns by establishing standards for accreditation

of specialty certification programs. These standards permit a

certifying organization to certify lawyers in a field of

specialization only if a lawyer has practiced in the specialty for at

least three years, spent at least one-fourth of that time in the

specialty area, passed a written exam, obtained five recommendations

a majority of which are from judges or lawyers, taken at least 36

hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) in the specialty area in

the preceding three years, and be in good standing. See ABA Standards

for Special Certification Programs for Lawyers, § 4.06,

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commit

tees_commissions/specialization/resources/resources_for_programs/acc

reditation_standards.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). Pursuant to

these criteria, the ABA has accredited the NBTA to certify lawyers as

a specialist in the areas of trial, criminal, and family law. See

http://www.nblsc.us (last visited Jan. 18 2012). The standards of the

NBTA for attorney certification as a specialist include at least 30

percent concentration in the field for at least the preceding three

years, at least 45 hours of CLE in the preceding three years, ten to

twelve references, including at least three judges and three

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attorneys, being lead counsel in at least five jury trials, and

successful completion of a six-hour NBTA examination. See

http://www.nblsc.us/certification_standards_civil/. A certified

attorney is required to apply for recertification after five years.

See id. The NBTA certified Hayes in civil trial advocacy in 1995 and

recertified him in 2000.

Constitutional standards for restrictions on lawyer advertising.

Both parties agree that attorney advertising is commercial speech,

which may be subjected to restrictions so long as they satisfy the

standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson. The fourpart test is as follows:

First, for commercial speech to merit any First Amendment

protection, it “must concern lawful activity and not be

misleading.” Next, the government must assert a substantial

interest to be achieved by the restriction. If both these

conditions are met, the third and fourth parts of the test

are “whether the regulation directly advances the

governmental interest asserted” and whether the regulation

“is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that

interest.”

Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 2002)(quoting

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-66). In some contexts, a less

rigorous First Amendment test applies to governmental requirements

that compel rather than prohibit speech. See Milavetz, Gallop &

Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339-40 (2010);

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,

471 U.S. 626, 651-52 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202-03

(1982); National Electrical Manufacturers Assn. v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d

104, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2001). But see Riley v. National Federation of

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Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988); Milavetz, 130 S. Ct.

at 1343 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment); Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,

480-81 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).

In two decisions the Supreme Court has considered the

constitutional validity of state restrictions on professionals holding

themselves out as specialists. See Peel and Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of

Business and Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994). The

teaching of these two cases is not entirely clear.

In Peel, the Supreme Court considered a prohibition against an

attorney’s advertisement that stated that he was a civil trial

specialist certified by the NBTA. The Court held, 5 to 4, that 

absolute prohibition of the certification statement violated the First

Amendment. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 99-111 (Stevens, J., with whom

Brennan, Blackmun, and Kennedy, JJ., join); id. at 111-17 (Marshall,

J., with whom Brennan, J. joins, concurring in the judgment). The

plurality opinion was willing to assume, however, that the specialist

certification was “potentially misleading,” id. at 109, and observed

that, “[t]o the extent that potentially misleading statements of

private certification or specialization could confuse consumers, a

State might consider . . . requiring a disclaimer about the certifying

organization or the standards of a specialty,” id. at 110. Justice

Marshall’s concurring opinion noted that the certification statement

was “potentially misleading,” id. at 111, and also suggested that a

state “could require a lawyer claiming certification by the NBTA as a

civil trial specialist to provide additional information in order to

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prevent that claim from being misleading,” id. at 117.

The opinions in Peel differed as to the respect in which a

certification might be misleading. For the plurality, it could be

misleading “if the certification had been issued by an organization

that had made no inquiry into [the lawyer’s] fitness, or by one that

issued certificates indiscriminately for a price.” Id. at 102. For

Justices Marshall and Brennan, “[t]he name ‘National Board of Trial

Advocacy’ could create the misimpression that the NBTA is an agency of

the Federal Government,” id. at 112, and they stated that a state

could require “a disclaimer stating that the NBTA is a private

organization not affiliated with, or sanctioned by, the State or

Federal Government,” id. at 117. Justice White also considered the

certification statement “potentially misleading” for the reasons

stated by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. at 118 (White, J.,

dissenting). The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and O’Connor

considered the certification statement “inherently likely to deceive,”

id. at 121 (O’Connor, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.,

join, dissenting), in that it “lead[s] the consumer to believe that

this lawyer is better than those lawyers lacking such certification,”

id. at 123, and “to conclude that the State has sanctioned the

certification,” id.

Thus, although the absolute prohibition of a certification

statement was rejected 5 to 4, at least six members of the Court (the

Chief Justice and Justices Brennan, Marshall, O’Connor, Scalia, and

White) considered the statement at least potentially misleading,

believing that it could be understood to imply state sanctioned

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certification. And Justice Stevens’s opinion for the plurality also

indicated that a state “could require a disclaimer stating that the

NBTA is a private organization not affiliated with, or sanctioned by,

the State or Federal Government.” Id. at 117.

Four years later in Ibanez, the Court, considering a state’s

censure of a lawyer for truthfully listing herself as a CPA (Certified

Public Accountant) and a CFP (Certified Financial Planner), sent a

rather different message. Invalidating by a vote of 7 to 2 the

censure as violative of the First Amendment, Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 143-

49, the Court began by emphasizing the requirement from Central Hudson

that “[c]ommercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading

can be restricted, but only if the State shows that the restriction

directly and materially advances a substantial state interest in a

manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.” Id.

at 142 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566) (footnote omitted);

see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1995). 

Continuing, the Court in Ibanez noted that “[t]he State’s burden is

not slight,” and that “‘[m]ere speculation or conjecture’ will not

suffice; rather the State ‘must demonstrate that the harms it recites

are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a

material degree.” Id. at 143 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,

770, 771 (1993)). And, said the Court, “we cannot allow rote

incantation of the words ‘potentially misleading’ to supplant the

[regulating body’s] burden.” Id. at 146 (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at

771).

Then, recalling that Peel had indicated some tolerance for a

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disclaimer to avoid potentially misleading statements about

certification, the Court stated that Ibanez “does not fall within the

caveat noted in Peel covering certifications issued by organizations

that ‘had made no inquiry into [the lawyer’s] fitness,’ or had ‘issued

certificates indiscriminately for a price,’” id. at 148 (quoting Peel,

496 U.S. at 102), thereby using the extreme examples of a potentially

misleading certification offered by the plurality opinion in Peel,

rather than a consumer’s possible belief that the certifying

organization was affiliated with the government, which had been noted

by five Justices in Peel. Indeed, the Court in Ibanez invalidated the

requirement that a disclaimer state that the certifying agency is not

affiliated with the state or federal government “[g]iven the state of

the record–the failure of the [regulating agency] to point to any harm

that is potentially real, not purely hypothetical.” Id. at 146. The

Court even observed that the detail required in the disclaimer, which

also included the requirements for certification, was too extensive to

be included on a business card or letterhead or in a yellow pages

listing. See id. at 146-47.

Thus, we are left to wonder whether to follow Peel’s apparent

approval of some sort of disclaimer to avoid at least some potentially

misleading aspects of a certification statement or to insist, as

Ibanez did, on a record demonstrating real harms that will be

alleviated to a material degree by the challenged disclaimer

requirement. Despite this perplexity, we will consider separately the

three components of the Disclaimer at issue in the pending case and

then turn to the vagueness challenge to the requirement that the

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Disclaimer be “prominently made.”

We see no First Amendment infirmity in the required assertion

that the certifying organization, i.e., the NBTA, is not affiliated

with any governmental authority. Absent this assertion, which is

entirely accurate, there would be a risk that some members of the

public would believe that New York State or its judicial branch had

authorized the NBTA to certify lawyers in their field of specialty. 

Such a belief might make some people think that this certification is

more valuable than a certification conferred by a private organization

without official authorization. Avoiding such a possible

misconception furthers a substantial governmental interest in consumer

education and is not more intrusive than necessary to further that

interest. Although the Grievance Committee has not developed a record

in support of the possible misconceptions concerning government

affiliation, we feel obliged to follow what a majority of the Court

said in Peel on this precise subject in a case dealing explicitly with

NBTA specialist certification.

The statement that certification is not a requirement for the

practice of law is more questionable. It is sought to be justified on

the basis that, absent this assertion, there would be a risk that some

members of the public would believe that certification is required to

practice law, thereby leading them to think that they must limit their

choice of state-licensed lawyers to those who have been certified as

specialists. See Appellees’ Br. At 18, 23. This possible belief that

certification is needed to practice law is sufficiently strained to

require some basis in the record to support it. See, e.g., Florida

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Bar, 515 U.S. at 626 (“‘[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a

restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the Harms it

recites are real . . . .’” (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514

U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (emphasis added). Although trial testimony is

not required, the proponents of a restriction must either advance an

interest that is self-evident or put something in the record to make

the required “demonstrat[ion].” No such demonstration is present in

the record before us. And the alleged harm is surely not selfevident. It is difficult to imagine that any significant portion of

the public observing the thousands of lawyers practicing in New York

without certification believe that all of them are acting unlawfully. 

Because ths second statement relies on “mere speculation or

conjecture,” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993), it does not

satisfy the Central Hudson test.

The third required assertion–that certification “does not

necessarily indicate greater competence than other attorneys experienced in this field of law”–is even more problematic. Although the

assertion might be technically accurate, depending on how “competence”

and “experienced in the field” are understood, the assertion has a

capacity to create misconceptions at least as likely and as serious as

that sought to be avoided by the first assertion. Some members of the

public, reading this third assertion, might easily think that a

certified attorney has no greater qualifications than other attorneys

with some (unspecified) degree of experience in the designated area of

practice. In fact, the qualifications of an attorney certified as a

civil trial specialist by the NBTA include having been lead counsel in

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at least 5 trials and having “actively participated” in at least 100

contested matters involving the taking of testimony, passing an

extensive examination, participating in at least 45 hours of CLE, and

devoting at least 30 percent of the lawyer’s practice to the specialized field. See http://www.nblsc.us/certification_standards_civil/. 

These qualifications may reasonably be considered by the certifying

body to provide some assurance of “competence” greater than that of

lawyers meeting only the criterion of having some experience in the

field, and a contrary assertion has a clear potential to mislead. 

Such a requirement does not serve a substantial state interest, is

far more intrusive than necessary, and is entirely unsupported by the

record. As such, it cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny.

Because the first of the three statements in the Disclaimer may

be required, we must consider the Plaintiff’s challenge to the entire

Disciplinary Rule on the ground of vagueness, a challenge based on the

requirement that the Disclaimer is “prominently made” in conjunction

with an attorney’s statement of the fact of certification. To

determine whether a regulation is unconstitutionally vague, we “must

first determine whether the statute gives the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” 

United States v. Strauss, 999 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Although regulations with civil

consequences “receive less exacting vagueness scrutiny” than criminal

statutes, see Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2008),

regulations that limit the exercise of constitutionally protected

rights are subject to an enhanced vagueness test, see Village of

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Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 499

(1982), and the practice of a profession is entitled to some

constitutional protection, see Board of Education v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 572 (1972). In addition to a requirement of adequate notice of

what is prohibited, a regulation must provide at least as much notice

of what is required. See Rock of Ages Corp. V. Secretary of Labor, 170

F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1999); cf. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S.

at 498-502 (finding that a licensing requirement for the sale of items

“designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs” was not

vague as applied because the plaintiff “had ample warning that its

marketing activities required a license”).

After determining whether a regulation affords adequate notice,

we must also determine whether it “provides explicit standards for

those who apply it,” Strauss, 999 F.2d at 297 (internal quotation

marks and alteration omitted), to guard against the risk of

discriminatory or inconsistent enforcement. A regulation will

encounter valid vagueness objection if it accords “unfettered

discretion” to those who enforce it, Chatin v. Combe, 186 F.3d 82, 89

(2d Cir. 1999), and if administrators cannot determine the meaning of

a prohibition, those subject to it “can hardly [be] expect[ed] . . .

to do so,” Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 331 (2d Cir.

2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011) (No. 10-1293).

Several federal statutes that impose disclosure requirements use

generalized terms to indicate an adequate degree of visibility. 

Required warnings in cigarette advertising must be made in

“conspicuous and legible type.” 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1) (2011). 

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Required warning on hazardous substances must be “located prominently

and . . . in conspicuous and legible type.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1261(p)(2)(2008). Required warnings about the dangers of alcohol

must be in a “conspicuous and prominent place” on a beverage

container. 27 U.S.C. § 215(b) (2011). We note, however, that in some

instances, regulations, and sometimes statutes, provide details for

compliance with such terms. This has been done for warnings about

alcohol, see 27 C.F.R. § 16.22 (2011), hazardous substances, see 16

C.F.R. § 1500.121(c) (2011), and cigarettes, see Family Smoking

Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 201, §

4(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1842, 1843 (2009) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §

1333). Specificity may also be provided through the availability of

pre-enforcement advisory opinions. See Mason v. Florida Bar, 208 F.3d

952, 954 n.1 (11th Cir. 2000).

We consider it a close question whether “prominently made”

provides adequate notice to lawyers as to the required placement and

type font of the Disclaimer in writings, which include billboards,

stationery, and business cards, or the speed and duration of its

expression in radio or television ads. Specificity would be helpful,

yet we understand the Grievance Committee’s reluctance to prescribe

details that would apply to advertising that can be communicated in so

many forms. Moreover, we are confident that, because there are

sufficient instances of core application of the rule – for example,

setting the disclaimer in type too small to be legible in the context

of the particular medium, or in a color with insufficient contrast to

be noticeable by the average reader of the particular advertisement –

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in which any lawyer of ordinary intelligence would be on clear notice

that the rule would be violated, the prominence requirement would

likely survive a facial challenge. The record in this case, however,

demonstrates that the Disciplinary Rule is unconstitutional as applied

to Hayes.

 Hayes advertised on billboards that set forth the disclaimer in

lettering six inches high, one inch larger than the lettering required

by the federal government for health warnings on similar cigarette

advertising. It is not our role to assess whether such a disclaimer

does or does not comply with the New York rule, and this case does not

require us to opine on whether a clear and specific rule that required

even larger lettering would comport with the Constitution. We find

ourselves unable to conclude, however, that a lawyer of average

intelligence could anticipate that lettering of that dimension could

be construed as not “prominently made.” Although Hayes was never in

fact disciplined for violation of the rule, the mere existence of

repeated and extended investigations of his conduct created a cloud on

his good standing as a member of the bar that was a meaningful adverse

consequence to him, and that would clearly chill legitimate

advertising by similarly situated lawyers, based on a rule whose

contours that a lawyer of ordinary skill and intelligence could not

reasonably discern.

Our concern is only exacerbated by the inability of the

Committee’s representatives to clarify the content of the rule. A

former principal counsel to the Committee acknowledged that his

successor would likely apply a different standard of “what constitutes

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prominently made.” He also testified that he did not think “there’s an

obligation to set forth an objective standard” as to how long the

Disclaimer would be displayed in a television commercial, and as to

whether his successor would use the same objective standard he used,

answered, “I doubt it. [I]t’s a different person.” He also said he

could not tell if the Disclaimer was prominently made on a billboard

or a TV commercial unless he had seen them. With respect to the size

of lettering of the disclaimer on a Hayes billboard, the attorney for

the Grievance Committee at one time indicated that letters must be six

inches in height, but the Committee apparently accepted four-inch

letters. At trial he could not state whether placing the disclaimer

in a footnote on the last page of a Hayes document would satisfy the

prominence requirement.

Although the uncertainties as to how the prominence requirement

will be enforced could be alleviated if the Grievance Committee would

give pre-enforcement guidance to inquiring attorneys, such guidance

was not available to Hayes. The former principal counsel to the

Grievance Committee was asked at trial, “[I]s there a way that you

would assist the attorney if there were not a grievance file pending?”

He replied, “The short answer is, no.” He added that the Committee

did not provide advisory opinions because, in part, “it would probably

take up most of our work.” Because the prominence requirement is not

clear to those who sought to enforce it against Hayes’s billboards,

let alone to Hayes as a lawyer of ordinary skill and intelligence

attempting to comply with it, it cannot validly be enforced against

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him in this context. See Fox TV Stations, Inc., 613 F.3d at 331. It

is therefore void for vagueness as it has been applied to Hayes.

Conclusion

The judgments of the District Court are reversed, and the case is

remanded with directions to enter judgment for the Plaintiff-Appellant

declaring the second and third components of the Disclaimer invalid

and enjoining enforcement of the first component against Hayes absent

clear advance notice to him from the Committee of specific alleged

defects in his advertising and an opportunity for him either to know

what he must do to comply or to seek judicial review of the

Committee’s elaboration of the requirement.

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