Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Hecktman v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 2016 IL App (1st) 151459

Appellate Court 

Caption

JEROLD HECKTMAN and RUTH HECKTMAN, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PACIFIC INDEMNITY COMPANY, a 

Wisconsin Corporation; OPTIMA OLD ORCHARD WOODS, 

L.L.C., an Illinois Limited Liability Company; OPTIMA INC., an 

Illinois Corporation; CONCRETE STRUCTURES OF THE 

MIDWEST, INC., an Illinois Corporation; EDWARDS 

ENGINGEERING INC., an Illinois Corporation; HURON VALLEY 

GLASS COMPANY, L.L.C., an Indiana Limited Liability Company; 

RWDI, d/b/a Rowan Williams Davies and Irwin, Inc., a Canadian 

Corporation; HEITMAN AND ASSOCIATES, a Missouri 

Corporation; JEK ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING 

SERVICES, INC., f/k/a JEK Engineering Services, Inc., an Illinois 

Corporation; CS ASSOCIATES, INC., f/k/a Chris P. Stefanos 

Associates, Inc., an Illinois Corporation; J.P. LARSEN, INC., an 

Illinois Corporation; AMERICAN ENCLOSURES INC., an Illinois 

Corporation; HAYES MECHANICAL L.L.C., a Delaware 

Corporation; C.A. HAYES MECHANICAL, INC., an Illinois 

Corporation; and ROBERTS HEATING AND AIR 

CONDITIONING, INC., an Illinois Corporation, DefendantsAppellees.

District & No. First District, Third Division

Docket No. 1-15-1459

Filed July 20, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 12-L-6474, 

14-L-11460 cons.; the Hon. Brigid Mary McGrath, Judge, presiding.
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Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Leonard S. Shifflett, of Quarles & Brady, LLP, of Chicago, for 

appellants.

Brian J. Hunt and Brian H. Myers, both of Hunt Law Group, LLC, of 

Chicago, for appellee J.P. Larsen, Inc.

Timothy J. Young, Michael H. Carter, and Leena Soni, all of Lewis 

Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, of Chicago, for appellee American 

Enclosures, Inc.

Lawrence S. Gosewisch and Thomas S. Flanigon, both of Adler, 

Murphy & McQuillen, LLP, of Chicago, for appellee CS Associates, 

Inc.

Panel JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Presiding Justice Mason and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment 

and opinion. 

 OPINION 

¶ 1 In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court properly dismissed the 

plaintiffs’ negligence claims on the basis they were barred by the economic loss doctrine 

articulated by our supreme court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 

2d 69 (1982). The plaintiffs argue that the Moorman doctrine does not apply to claims for 

injury to “other property,” such as theirs, but is limited to barring damages for economic loss 

stemming solely from the “defective property” itself. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 The record below reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The 

plaintiffs, husband and wife, Jerold and Ruth Hecktman (the Hecktmans), own three combined 

condominium units located on the 19th floor of 9725 Woods Drive, Skokie, Illinois, 

commonly referred to as “Optima Old Orchard Woods” (hereinafter the building). The units 

were purchased in 2008 from the defendant Optima Old Orchard Woods, L.L.C. (Optima Old 

Orchard). The units were purchased as “vanilla-box” shell units with no interior finishes. After 

the plaintiffs purchased the units, they contracted with a third party (not a defendant in the third 
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amended complaint, nor a party to this appeal) to construct interior walls and to install 

hardwood floors through their units. The hardwood floors were installed in 2009. 

¶ 4 After the plaintiffs moved into their home in June 2009, portions of the hardwood flooring 

began to bow upward preventing closet and other doors from opening and causing them to 

scrape the floors. In some areas, the hardwood flooring has “cupped,” i.e., the edges of the 

floor planks have raised up so that the surface of what was once flat wood planks are now 

concave. 

¶ 5 As a result, the plaintiffs commenced the instant litigation on June 8, 2012. On March 20, 

2014, they filed their third amended complaint against a multitude of defendants, alleging, 

inter alia, that negligence in the construction of the building caused the damage to their 

hardwood floors. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the hardwood floors were damaged by 

water infiltration that was caused by (1) inadequate construction of the curtain wall (window) 

system of their units, permitting water to enter the units from the outside, and (2) inadequate 

design, installation, and operation of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system 

(HVAC), which failed to properly remove humidity from the ambient air of the building and 

the plaintiffs’ units.

¶ 6 The plaintiffs’ 24-count complaint alleged negligence against the following defendants, all 

of whom stood in some contractual relationship with the builders: Optima Old Orchard (count 

I); Optima Inc. (Optima) (count III); Concrete Structures of the Midwest, Inc. (Concrete) 

(count V); Edwards Engineering Inc. (Edwards) (count VII); Huron Valley Glass Company, 

L.L.C. (Huron Valley) (count VIII); Heitman and Associates, Inc. (Heitman) (count IX); JEK 

Architectural and Engineering Services, Inc., f/k/a JEK Engineering Services, Inc. (JEK) 

(count XIII); CS Associates, Inc., f/k/a Chris P. Stefanos Associates, Inc. (CS Associates) 

(count XV); J.P. Larsen, Inc. (Larsen) (count XVII); American Enclosures Inc. (American 

Enclosures) (count XIX); Hayes Mechanical L.L.C. (Hayes) (count XXI); and Roberts Heating 

and Air Conditioning, Inc. (Roberts) (count XXIII). 

¶ 7 The defendants filed combined motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code 

of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2012)). On September 30, 2014, and December 

12, 2014, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions, dismissing with prejudice the 

plaintiffs’ negligence counts (counts I, III, V, VII, IX, XI, XIII, XV, XVII, XIX, XX, XXIII) 

pursuant to the economic loss doctrine articulated in Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d 69. The plaintiffs 

filed a motion to reconsider, but that motion was denied on March 10, 2015. On April 15, 2015, 

the circuit court entered an order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 

2010), finding that there was no just reason to delay either enforcement or appeal or both of 

these dismissals. The plaintiffs now appeal. 

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs’ contentions, we must first resolve which 

parties remain in this appeal. In that respect, we note that in their notice of appeal, the plaintiffs 

initially named the following parties as defendants-appellees: (1) Optima Old Orchard; (2) 

Optima; (3) Concrete; (4) Edwards; (5) Huron Valley; (6) Heitman; (7) JEK; (8) CS 

Associates; (9) Larsen; (10) American Enclosures; (11) Hayes; (12) Roberts; (13) C.A. Hayes 

Mechanical, Inc. (C.A. Hayes); (14) RWDI, d/b/a Rowan Williams Davies and Irwin, Inc. 

(RWDI); and (15) Pacific Indemnity Company (Pacific Indemnity). 
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¶ 10 On October 3, 2015, upon motion indicating settlement had been reached, this court 

entered an order dismissing the following defendants: (1) Pacific Indemnity; (2) Optima Old 

Orchard; (3) Optima; (4) Concrete; (5) Edwards; (6) Huron Valley; (7) Hayes; and (8) 

Roberts. 1 On May 6, 2016, on the appellants’ motion, this court also entered an order 

dismissing CS Associates from the appeal, noting “[t]his appeal continues as to all other 

remaining defendants-appellants.” 

¶ 11 In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs assert that three defendants “remain in this 

proceeding”: (1) JEK; (2) Larsen; and (3) American Enclosures.2 Only Larsen and American 

Enclosures have chosen to file appearances and briefs before this court.3 Since the plaintiffs 

seek relief only as to JEK, Larsen, and American Enclosures, we shall address their arguments 

in this context. 

¶ 12 Turning to the merits, at the outset we note that our review of a trial court’s order 

dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint is de novo. See Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 

2016 IL 117638, ¶ 53; Snyder v. Heidelberger, 2011 IL 111052, ¶ 8. 

¶ 13 On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly dismissed their negligence 

claims against the defendants pursuant to the Moorman doctrine. In Moorman, our supreme 

court held that a “plaintiff cannot recover for solely economic loss” under a tort theory of 

negligence. Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 91. The Moorman court reiterated that “economic loss” is 

defined as “ ‘damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective 

product, or consequent loss of profits—without any claim of personal injury or damage to 

other property ***’ [citation].” Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 82. In doing so, the Moorman court 

acknowledged that “[t]he demarcation between physical harm or property damage,” which 

would support a claim for economic damages, and purely “economic loss,” which would not, 

depends on “the nature of the defect and the manner in which the damage occurred.” 

Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 82. As the court in Moorman explained: 

“ ‘When the defect causes an accident “involving some violence or collision with 

external objects,” the resulting loss is treated as property damage. On the other hand, 

when the damage to the product results from deterioration, internal breakage, or other 

non-accidental causes, it is treated as economic loss. *** Direct economic loss *** may 

be measured by costs of replacement and repair. Consequential economic loss includes 

 

1We note that by this same order, the following parties were also dismissed from the appeal, even 

though they were not named as parties in the original notice of appeal nor in the third amended 

complaint: (1) Deutsch/Parker Design, Ltd.; (2) Larry N. Deutsch; (3) William F. Parker; (4) Design 

Construction Concepts, Ltd., n/k/a Old Design, Ltd., d/b/a Design Construction Concepts, Ltd. (the 

third-party contractor who constructed the hardwood floors in the plaintiffs’ condominium units); and 

(5) Mosaic Construction, L.L.C. 

2We note that the plaintiffs do not seek recovery against the following three defendants, which were 

initially named in their notice of appeal: RWDI, C.A. Hayes, and Heitman. This is understandable since 

RWDI and C.A. Hayes were not named as defendants in the third amended complaint, nor did any of 

the negligence counts from which the plaintiffs’ now appeal discuss these parties in any way. As to 

Heitman, we note that upon inquiry the clerk of the appellate court has been notified that as a result of a 

settlement, Heitman will not be filing any pleadings in this appeal. 

3We note that upon inquiry from the clerk of the appellate court, JEK has indicated that it will not 

be filing any pleadings in this appeal. 
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all indirect loss, such as loss of profits resulting from inability to make use of the 

defective product.’ [Citation.]” Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 83. 

¶ 14 The rationale behind the Moorman doctrine is that tort law provides a remedy for losses 

from personal injuries or property damage, and contract law and the Uniform Commercial 

Code (UCC) provide remedies for economic losses resulting from diminished commercial 

expectations without personal injury or property damage. See Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 88; see 

also In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 241 (1994). As our 

supreme court explained the policy considerations behind the doctrine: 

“When the defect is of a qualitative nature and the harm relates to the consumer’s 

expectation that a product is of a particular quality so that it is fit for ordinary use, 

contract, rather than tort, law provides the appropriate set of rules for recovery. 

[Citation.] Moreover, *** if a manufacturer were held liable in negligence for the 

commercial loss suffered by a particular purchaser, it would be liable for business 

losses of other purchasers caused by the failure of its product to meet the specific needs 

of their businesses, even though the needs were communicated only to the dealer. 

[Citation.] Thus, a manufacturer could be held liable for damages of unknown and 

unlimited scope, even though the product is not unreasonably dangerous and even 

though there is no damage to person or property. [Citations.]” Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d at 

88.

See also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351, 418 (2004) (“the policy 

underlying the economic loss rule [is]: that because ‘the economic consequences of any single 

accident are virtually endless,’ a defendant who could be held liable for every economic effect 

of its tortious conduct would face virtually uninsurable risks, far out of proportion to its 

culpability. The economic loss rule operates to prevent such open-ended tort liability.” (citing 

In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 207 (1997))); see also In re Illinois Bell 

Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d at 241 (“The Moorman holding is bottomed upon the 

theory that tort law affords a remedy for losses occasioned by personal injuries or damage to 

one’s property, but contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code offer the appropriate 

remedy for economic losses occasioned by diminished commercial expectations not coupled 

with injury to person or property. The Moorman court concluded that qualitative defects are 

best handled by contract rather than tort law.”); Anderson Electric, Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection 

Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 146, 153 (1986) (“plaintiff seeking to recover purely economic losses due to 

defeated expectations of a commercial bargain cannot recover in tort, regardless of the 

plaintiff’s inability to recover under an action in contract”); American United Logistics, Inc. v. 

Cattelus Development Corp., 319 F.3d 921, 926 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The economic loss doctrine 

denies a tort remedy *** when the loss ‘is rooted in disappointed contractual or commercial 

expectations.’ [Citation.]”).

¶ 15 There are only three recognized exceptions to the Moorman doctrine: (1) where the 

plaintiff sustained damage, i.e., personal injury or property damage, resulting from a sudden or 

dangerous occurrence; (2) where the plaintiff’s damages are proximately caused by a 

defendant’s intentional false representation (i.e., fraud); and (3) where the plaintiff’s damages 

are proximately caused by a negligent misrepresentation by a defendant in the business of 

supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions. See Moorman, 

91 Ill. 2d at 86, 88-89; see also In re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d at 
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240-41; In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 199; 1324 W. Pratt Condominium Ass’n 

v. Platt Construction Group, Inc., 404 Ill. App. 3d 611, 618 (2010). 

¶ 16 In the present case, the plaintiffs acknowledge that only the first exception is at issue in this 

appeal. They argue, however, that to proceed under that exception they need not establish a 

sudden and dangerous occurrence but need only establish damage to other property. In that 

effort, the plaintiffs point out that they have sufficiently alleged damage to “other property” 

because they are seeking to recover costs of repair for their hardwood floors, rather than the 

cost of repair to the allegedly defective curtain wall system and building HVAC. For the 

reasons that follow, we disagree. 

¶ 17 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ position, under the first Moorman doctrine exception, neither a 

sudden, dangerous, or calamitous occurrence standing alone, nor an injury (to person or other 

property), is sufficient to bring a claim within the bounds of tort recovery. See In re Chicago 

Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 200-01. Rather, in order to satisfy the requirements of that 

exception, the plaintiffs must establish both (1) that they sustained damage to property and (2) 

that the damage was caused by a sudden, dangerous, or calamitous event. See In re Chicago 

Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 200-01. As our supreme court clarified in In re Chicago Flood 

Litigation: 

“Courts do not speak of a calamitous, sudden, or dangerous event or occurrence to 

avoid the economic loss rule, but rather to distinguish tort damages from mere 

economic loss. In other words, the event, by itself, does not constitute an exception to 

the economic loss rule. Rather, the exception is composed of a sudden, dangerous, or 

calamitous event coupled with personal injury or property damage. 

 *** [T]he economic loss rule applies even to plaintiffs who have incurred physical 

damage to their property if the damage is caused by disappointed commercial 

expectations, gradual deterioration, internal breakage, or other nonaccidental causes, 

rather than a dangerous event.” (Emphases added.) In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 

176 Ill. 2d at 200-01. 

¶ 18 The plaintiffs here have failed to allege a sudden, dangerous, or calamitous event. Their 

third amended complaint explicitly alleges that their hardwood floors became deformed over 

time due to a failure of the curtain wall system to keep moisture out of their units and the failure 

of the HVAC to remove humidity from them. As such, they cannot avail themselves of this 

exception. See, e.g., NBD Bank v. Krueger Ringier, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 691, 693 (1997) 

(holding that the leaking of a petroleum-based substance over time from underground storage 

tanks that resulted in contaminated real estate was not sufficiently sudden, dangerous, or 

calamitous to satisfy the exception); Cloverhill Pastry-Vend Corp. v. Continental Carbonics 

Products, Inc., 214 Ill. App. 3d 526, 527-28 (1991) (holding that emission of small flakes of 

metal over time by a dry ice crusher into dough at a bakery that resulted in contaminated baked 

goods was insufficient to satisfy sudden, dangerous, or calamitous event); Wheeling Trust & 

Savings Bank v. Tremco Inc., 153 Ill. App. 3d 136, 142 (1987) (holding that emission of a gas 

over time from materials used to install the curtain wall of an office building that resulted in 

etching and streaking of the windows was insufficient to satisfy sudden, dangerous, or 

calamitous Moorman doctrine exception); Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. CEI Industries of 

Illinois, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 332, 340 (1986) (holding that the gradual accumulation of water 

that resulted in a sudden roof collapse constituted a calamitous event); Electronics Group, Inc. 

v. Central Roofing Co., 164 Ill. App. 3d 915, 918-19 (1987) (holding that a roof leak that 
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caused a substantial amount of water to pour into a warehouse in single day was a calamitous 

event); Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 112 Ill. 2d 378, 388 (1986) (holding 

that construction activity that resulted in a “sudden and dangerous conflagration” at a 

warehouse was a calamitous event (emphasis omitted)). 

¶ 19 What is more, it is apparent that the other “property damage” alleged by the plaintiffs is 

nothing more than damage incidental to the defective construction of the building, which our 

courts have previously held is damage “consequent to the qualitative defects,” and therefore 

not recoverable in tort. Washington Courte Condominium Ass’n-Four v. Washington-Golf 

Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 681, 686-87 (1986); see also Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171 

(1982). In Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 176, the court held that the plaintiff, a subsequent 

purchaser of a property, was barred from proceeding with his tort action against the builder of 

the property on the basis that the chimney and adjoining brick wall began to pull away from the 

property, causing a crack in the basement wall, which resulted in water leakage in the basement 

and on the roof. The court held that recovery for deterioration alone, caused by latent structural 

defects, was not actionable in tort. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 177. In reaching its decision, the 

Redarowicz court stated: 

“A disappointed consumer *** or a disgruntled purchaser of a certain house cannot 

assert that, due to inferior workmanship that led to eventual deterioration, he can 

recover under a negligence theory in tort.” Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 177. 

In addition, the Redarowicz court distinguished the situation before it from one where 

defective construction caused a brick to fall on someone’s head or a wall to collapse and 

destroy living room furniture. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 178. According to Redarowicz, the 

latter illustrates a sudden, calamitous occurrence, more appropriately remedied by tort law, 

while damage resulting from water leakage constitutes deterioration from a latent defect barred 

by the Moorman doctrine. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 178 

¶ 20 Similarly, in Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of America, Inc., 782 F.2d 723 

(7th Cir. 1986), the court of appeals applied Illinois law and held that tort recovery was 

unavailable for an action that sought compensation for water damage to the ceilings and walls 

of an apartment building, resulting from the defendant’s negligence in supplying and installing 

roofing material. Relying on Moorman and Redarowicz, the court of appeals concluded: 

“Since [the roofing material] was necessarily attached to the structure, its malfunction 

necessarily caused incidental damage to the surrounding parts of the structure. The 

gravamen of the complaint—simply stated—is that the roof did not work. The district 

judge properly viewed such an allegation as a matter of economic loss, the result of a 

qualitative defect ***.” Chicago Heights Venture, 782 F.2d at 729. 

¶ 21 Likewise, in Washington Courte, the condominium association and certain unit owners 

sued in tort the general contractor and several subcontractors involved in the construction of 

their building, alleging, inter alia, improper installation of windows and sliding glass doors, 

which led to damage to insulation, walls, ceilings, and floors. Washington Courte, 150 Ill. App. 

3d at 685. The court found that incidental moisture damage to the units’ walls, ceilings and 

floors did not provide for an exception to the economic loss doctrine merely because it was 

separate from the defective product (the windows and the glass doors). Washington Courte,

150 Ill. App. 3d at 686-87. Instead, the damage to the units was “consequent to the qualitative 

defects,” not a sudden, calamitous event, and therefore not recoverable in tort. Washington 

Courte, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 687. 
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¶ 22 Applying the aforementioned precedent to the cause at bar, it is apparent that the damage to 

the hardwood floors is consequent to any alleged qualitative defects to the building’s curtain 

wall and HVAC systems and therefore constitutes purely economic loss not recoverable in tort. 

The fact that the hardwood floors were installed after the building was constructed makes no 

difference to this analysis. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ tort 

claims as barred by the Moorman doctrine. See Washington Courte, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 687. 

The plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the humidity in their condominium units is 

“contamination,” for which there is no requirement that the plaintiffs prove a sudden and 

dangerous occurrence so as to avoid the Moorman doctrine. In support, the plaintiffs cite 

Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428 (1989). The plaintiffs, 

however, misconstrue that case. 

¶ 23 In A, C & S, the plaintiffs (a number of school districts) sued various manufacturers and 

distributors of asbestos to recover the costs of removing asbestos from the school district’s 

property, which the school districts were required to remove by law. A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 

436-37. While our supreme court found that the Moorman doctrine did not apply to bar the 

plaintiffs’ cause of action in that case, the ruling was narrow and specifically focused on the 

fact that the “nature of the defect” (i.e., the presence of carcinogenic asbestos fibers on school 

premises) and the “damage” caused by the asbestos was unique and could not easily fit within 

the framework differentiating tort from contract. A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 445-46, 450. The court 

in that case acknowledged that calling asbestos contamination “sudden” would be “artificial” 

and therefore held that recovery for such contamination would not be barred under the sudden 

and dangerous occurrence exception but only if the contamination itself was hazardous or 

unreasonably dangerous. See A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 449-50 (“[T]he critical inquiry in this 

instance is whether the product has an unreasonably dangerous defect and whether the defect 

caused the property damage alleged.”). In so ruling, the court narrowed the scope of its holding 

and explicitly warned that this holding “should not be construed as an invitation to bring 

economic loss contract actions within the sphere of tort law through the use of some fictional 

property damage.” A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 445. 

¶ 24 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, A, C & S “does not represent an [independent] 

exception to [the] Moorman [doctrine].” Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 420. In fact, in Beretta, a case 

decided after A, C & S, our supreme court explained that A, C & S predates our supreme court’s 

decision in In re Chicago Flood Litigation in which “the recognized exceptions to the 

Moorman doctrine were listed.” Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 420. As the court in Beretta explained 

A, C & S “merely stands for the proposition that because contamination is a form of property 

damage, the cost of asbestos removal from a plaintiffs’ property does not constitute a solely 

economic loss subject to the bar of Moorman.” Beretta, 213 Ill. 2d at 420. 

¶ 25 What is more, unlike in A, C & S, in the present case, the plaintiffs have nowhere alleged in 

their third amended complaint that the contamination of their units with excess humidity is 

either hazardous or unreasonably dangerous. In fact, “the only danger to the plaintiff[s] is that 

[they] would be forced to incur additional expenses for living conditions that were less than 

what was bargained for.” Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 178. As such, their negligence cause of 

action does not fit within the scope of any of the exceptions articulated under the Moorman

doctrine, and the trial court properly dismissed their claims. See Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 177 

(“To recover in negligence there must be a showing of harm above and beyond disappointed 

expectations. A buyer’s desire to enjoy the benefit of his bargain is not an interest that tort law 
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traditionally protects.”).

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 27 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 28 Affirmed.