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SIGEO 

Colonel I. I. Bowman 

Colonel J. B .. Enapp 

Dr. A. 11.nlcov 

lajor John c. Liggett 

Colonel Frank T. Ostenberg 

Colonel R. H. Booth 

•. . t __ Lf 

7 ¥17 1947. 

4•Jl .. lOSJ Pentagon Building 

.3-E-llS Pentagon Building 

Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va. 

3•D•B23 Pentagon Building 

3•E-768 Pentagon Building 

J.rtq- Ground Forces, Fort Monroe, Va. 

l. Herewith i• drott ot report or our subcommittee.. Plea•• • 

telephone ,.-our. concurrence or comments •• soon aa poas1bl.e. 

2. Should the dratt be general17 conourrad in, I bel.1~• it 

will not be necessary tor the co:rJDittee to meat again. 

/•/ I. o .. Reedd 

w. o.· REWm 

Brigadier General 

Deputy Chief Signal Officer 

l Incl. 

Drett. - Report ot ~ubcomrnittee on Eetebliahment 

ot a Unii'ied Glo1:181 or Strategio Co~­

l!UJlicationa Network 

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@'pp roved for Release bv NSA on 01-31-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352\3 
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7liq1947 ' . . 

ll~port. ot Subcomitt••l ~t..~ent. or a Unified GlObo1 

o;- St:rategic Comunicatione .Network 

l. · fi9»11M mpuggg>. a. The aubcO!l!mittee appointed to oomider the 

-.l»re aubj.ot,, concerned itael! with the tollowing germano excerpts from 

Dr. Bowles'• memorandum and its at.tacl:lecl paper1 

• In the interest. .ot nati<mal aecurit7 ve ahould woi-k 

toward the realisation o! a uni!ied global net110rk 

deaignerl to •aU.t1 the ada1n1atrat1Y• needs ot Arrq 1 

NaV,, ea Ur.• 

• !t. .Ould also b8 the tunotion ot this network to make 

available along its roiites cbannela tor global weather_, air;~U-.naJ!Ort control, interaomand, am other ooIDmuni• 

cations •eniees. The Ulll" would haTe complete control 

ot the terainala ot t.heae •1ena.,_" channel.a. Thia atcrv1ee by th• alobal net would not be a bu to th• inatal• 

lation bJ' the '18fl1" ot CO?l!llltmieatlon& facilit1M where 

tbe p.obel network d.oee not a.tend. Theae atrategic networke .would be exempt rro.i tb.&ater cont'l"Ol." 

.• ln tixed. polnt-to•point commmicat1ons, ot •hi.ch th1a . global network 11 illustrative, ,. abould make th., ut ... lllQlt wee or our cot11m&roial communications reaourcee, 

wh1ob an •cbowledged experts 1n t.h1a tiel.4. Th9,1' 

.ould llr"f• not 11.mpl7 •• purY.,ora of equipment, in• 

d1viclual talent, and manpower but a• organic entities. 

Pt.rt1cularq in th• event ot cergen07, °b1' contract thq 'iiOU1d. take over the technical planning, engineer- . ~l 1nat!lllat1on, uintenance, and. operation or th1a 

tac l1t-J',.1t 

" Th• operation of tbia global oommunioation a79tem should 

be under an 1D11•1dual ra\ber than commit.tee command •u.~o:H t71 ar.uswer&bl• d1reotl7 to the Searetaq of 

letional l)etenae or to tbe Joint Chief• or Sta.tr. Con• ~u~bl.1"1 tb1a network i:~uld be mad• up or ihtearat.ci comp()n~ operated. by the 1Miv14ual 1enicea.• 

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t Reapona1bil1ti to~ the ope"itation ot the '1n~ Con:munioaUons Senice - what 1a logioal.17 .xpamed into a component 

ot the global net.erk (duCJ"ibtd under I) - ia not a logical 

tunot1on ot !uppq. 'I'be com.inander or this net llbould be aaeo ... 

· --a.tat.eel With • ZlOl'Siill opera tins orgen11at1on. • 

• Alt.hough the ind.id.dual tactical commardera S'Uftt have control '.::::..-:7.~.:,.-·, ___ ot their local or tactical oolTJll\Ul1oe.t1ona, allo•anca ll!USt be 

":1~fr , i1:! £~~~:~1!;aJ~~~=~::;.;~1~- ft One ot the pt>erequiaitea in the field O! CCllJllUJ\iORt1ons 1rill. 

· be a eirigle global or· atrategic conmnm1cat1oma net. Th• 

least that tho merger ot Army, Haq, and Air abould •chine 

iii th• over-all direction ot alectri<ml COJ!:!l?Unications, wbic~ 

fill inaure a iilngle global :aet at the disposal of the ~-­

lliilMer in Chier, his Secretar1ea, and his Chie.ta ot 8tatt 

tor th• adll1nietrat1on of worl.d·wid• m.ilitaey operations. 

forewarned •• we ar• or tbe t~ ot •!13' :future •l', it 1a 

inoonoeiveble that this nation could tolerate as a part or 

ita · oYer-au · aecurit7 etructure 1nd.1Yidual corrJIUl'11cat1ona 

neta tor the thr$e priury branches o! tha armtd rorces. 

Coordination 1• no iUbst1tuta ror ~nd, particularly when 

immecU.ate action is Tital." · 

• At the e••e tiaa aucll a global net •uat bo planned to aerYe 

not 01117 the o'Yer-all oomm!md, bu-t aleo th• .llifllV apeoialiaed 

operat.ton:s which depend on global coordination.. Su!'tioient 

•apart" or "pri•ate• lines lill8t be ayailabl• tor use by the 

ilr Tranaport. Command tor tra!!io control, b7 the weather 

•.n1oea tor ilobal weather reporting, bT ~. !ia17, and 

.Ai.Jo wmmand.• t'or atena1Te operatiom like those ot the 20tb 

Air rorce during the laat. ar • by the intellis;ence eenices 

and th• Stat• l>epsrtaent tor the rapid tramu111aa1on ot apecW 

into.mation, and b1" otbar agenoieu which operate on • global 

aeope. These channel.a would be lea•cd to the using agencies, 

thus Nking unneceaaary lerge acal• itldepandent installations 

or lor.g diatance oowra1\1cations tacilit1ea. 11th full operational 

control ot the channel aid its teminsl equipment, the using · agtUto1ee Ylll, 1n ett'eot, have their own commun!Mtions ayataa." 

• Such • awategic net involYes tix.ed po1nt-"to-po1nt ooirJnunications 

in which •neral ot our commercial organisation• are expert. 

Comp1.1ni•• like Bell, RCA, llcka7, Tropical Radio, •nd others are 

in taot 11ore expert than we oan ever b.op• to be. To neglect 

theae o1Tll1an reao~cu and their possible eontributioDB to th• 

tield of military communications •• organic elements would lead 

to umiecessar;r duplioetion am r•tard progreaa.• 

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· • '.I'bere..t'ore, not onJ¥ JIU.St bath tn>ea ot col!lDIUD.ieetiona nets be 

independent. am ~c:aipleaenteq at the same t1ae, but the7 must 

be interconneotahl••" -

b. Summ:!tH*Pi'• Dr. Bowles propo1Hs •• obJeot1ves tor the Jar 

D•partaent, a uni.tied global co~.ir:.unioation network ldrl.ch •hould 8 leaae• 

channels to other ueen when 1ta routes coincided with •uch users 1 routes, 

"Yte a7atesa t.o operate umer an indi"fidual rather them una..- • comm1t,tae1 

the opera\or not to 'be under control ot the aupJ>lT runction or th_e War 

Departmert, and the •f8teJD to be 1nterconnectable •here possible to 

tactical 11a\esa. A further objective proposed i• the operation ot the 

global a1etem b,r contract with commercial colliliuniaation co~paniea. 

2. J'USQPS5IOM. •· IAI &J,obs} eetwqa. Tho War Department developed during World War II the greatest global communication :network the world _ ha4: ff'¢ lmQ\Vi\1 ~bl.e or handling more than !'Uti .S.llion WQrda a dat• 

Thi& network ha• 1hrunk •1th the terminatioD ot the war and the de• 

mobilisation. Bo•e'fer, it •till exiete, and the Qiiet' Signal Ottica ia 

clluged :1n Circular lOS-; ... 11 1947 tJith the operation or this network. 

The principle ot a a1.ngls g.&.obal netmrk !or command and ada1n1atration __ ia alao atated clear~· in paragraph 6 or UEMORANDUM dated 4 April 1946, 

SubJeot1 •Statement or Approved Polioiea to !f'f'ect Increaeed AutonOJll1' 

ot the Arlrq ilr Poree• wit.bin the lt'ar Department Structure.• .l lar 

Department Bo.rd to r•atate •ignal c0llili!un1cation doctrine haa •ul:1n1tted 

1ta proposed doctrine to the.Chief' or Statr with the concurrence or the 

Arlq ill" Forces and the ~ Ground .forces,. TlUa proposed doctrine re-

• tatea in paragraph 26 th• prinoiple or baying a aiJJgle global communications 

network. It U obyious that continuing War Department pollq aJXi obJeoti•o 

1a a single Wl11'1ed 1lob8l co~unioations network. 

b. th! g\o~ netwpt~ ahoy,1.d •tuae• @anaele to qthg UHft• Thia 

·was done to a liliit ex.tent during World War II, although the aaare1t7 ot .llulti·~el equipAl~t did not encourqe tJl1a practice. Howe'YU', thi8 pr!no!ple_i•_•t.-o~l.T stated~ the proposed signal oomaun1oat1on doctrine 

referred to aboYe. Paragraph ? ot that doeu11ent 111 a .full oxpoa1t1on ot 

the allocation ot channelsa •uch allocation ia applicable generall7 1n 

aip.al eom\lllicaUon •18tems and not 11terU.,- to the glob.,".11 network. Th• 

Chief Signal Officer am the Air Coltlnunioationa Officer prepared a list 

ot Joint que:stiona arid anawers concerning aignal communication under 

un1:t~oa~19lU tJur.se. tuutions and answers embodied a atatement or the 

principle 0£ •leasina" or allocation or communication cbannela. The policy 

-iapl!cit in tbM• agreed joint questions and arunrera •• adopted b;r the 

·Hall Board on unitication and with the approval of, that io«rd '• :report, 

auch policy 1a the War D•partment policq-. Dr • .Bowles'• proposed objeot1Y• 

ot "l••iilgft circuits :la and ha$ been ror •0111.e time the War Department'• _ obJ eot1Te~ 

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_ o;~ Q49bl!l Co.y,ypiuti2n tz•:i!!!! iaMer im!tlca~gn. · Arter agreelni OD 

~~·joint queatione and. anawera·ror the Hall .Board reterrad to aboYo, the 

' · ·chi•? Si(Jnnl Otficer and the .lir Coromunica tiona Ott1cer viai ted the aiiet 

ot ~aYal Coll!llunieations and his Starr to expl~in ta them the principles 

thua •greed to in the War bepa:rtiten.t.. Tho Chie! ot ~aYal Co:mmunicatiorus. . hJl,ll iP41oat~ s•neral. agreemer1t with thoaa principles and a coremittee urxiel' 

tb• .Joint Co1U?1unieationa Board 1a prea~nu1 ongagecl 1n writing 1n explicit 

torm'the pr1ne1plel to iuide the un1tication ot communioatiana among the 

three ae.rvice:s. · 

(l} In the u.nitication procMSa, th• glo'bal •1atem must consist i:dtia~ ot the existing global •1.•tema or the Arm,y and tho 

Ma•.r• Theae baY• .aeh their own. physical tacilities and 

peraonnel at the present time and •uoh tacilitiea cannot be = aba>ld.oned in order to produce unit'ied ayatemi they can be 

operated 10 •• to elininate 8?1T duplication, ucha11ge t:rat.t'io, 

a.nd utUia~ W11f orm metboda and procedurea. Work to this end 

has long been in progreiia.· Peraonnel cannot be combined to 

torm. e •ingle e1atem unleaa th•r• l.a a aingl• covunander or all 

the armed to1•cea. There ia no question but that aignAl CO?lt• 

•unicat1on oparatea ltlOat ett•ctivel.y as a monopol7 but ao long 

•• the aervices axitJt on a coordinate level and without a 

•1nal• con,mander, it appears 1.Jlpracticabla to organize a aingle 

Long Lines Serrlce to operate • completely unified global net• 

work. A:rJy poaaiblo organization u.ust parallel the comma~d ••tup or the tll.ree atrT1ce$ which will head up 1n the Joint Chiet• 

ot Start. It.is, theretore; the objective or the lar Department tQ opernte a s].obul communication •yate~ unde~ unitioation b;r · the principle o! ~oss •ervicil'lg and under the control of the 

Joint Com..~unicationa Board. 

(2) The objective ot a aingle head for the global comi:lun1oat1on 

•eniae does not· now appear p:raetieable and will not be until 

the ®aond aetup of the Joint Chiete o! Starr ia eupereeded 

··by • aingle con:.mander !or all or the armed aenices. In tho 

meanti.lle, the objeotive or the War Depsrtmtnt ia as olosct to 

•i.ngle contz:ol aa is now poaaible. 

d. Qpggt1o; er. glomal;. £2MY»1a110111 ia R?t: 1. 1YtR2Ji;( i'lana.:t.ton. 

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• The •ignal comunieation doctrine proposed b;y the War Dep.s?'tment 

Signal ·co.ltt!IUnication Doctrine Board make" it verr clear that re-

•p0ns1bility- tor signal coi::i::::.unicationa 1a not a auppl:,r runotion. C:OO~ination ot. aignal eoirJJilun1oat1on operations 1a clearly to be 

done 11ith G-J (Director ot Plans and Operat1.:>ns in the tar Department}.• , 

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" As· t8r as the ArtSI¥ eo~:.nun1cmtions Service 1s concerned, the Ch.ie.C 

or that aervtee has a normal operating organ1%8tion. He is resporu1ible t·:> the Chief Sigm;l Officer who in turn is resporsihle 

in this matter to thtt Chief of :.ltaft. n 

• So clearly ie lhltt responsibility of Plans and Operati'.:>ns !or 

operatlon- or siglial communicntion urAieratood th'.lt the responsibility- remained ao in spite or the existence ot a CO!iJnar.d 

channel that denied it. When the Army was reorganized into the 

I.At, the AGF, and tha A3F, the Chier SignAl Officer was placed 

under ASP'. However, tho Chief' or Starr and the OPD continued to 

deal directly with the Cbi~f S1en9l Officer in matters or planning ar~ operation, bypsssing the Commanding General, A'3P'. The latter 

dict not protest. Thia irregular Command sitU-11tion was clo::i.red 

when Circular lJ8, 1.D. 1946 elilr.inAtad the A.SF .. " 

lt i• not the objectiv• o!' the War Dep1rtme1.t to subordinate co.1r1llUl1icnt.ton 

, to the eupply function. 

•• A,.ilO\\&nce 1~.uat ba !;!Sde for interconnegj;ion o.I th! ,gJ.oool CJ~ 

yi'Y.\ ;Wct!9aJ, exati§S!p .. During World War II, meea~ge tra.t.'!ic pe.Jsed to am 

fror.1 tactical systeJl'.s end the gloool network. Direot interconneotion was 

not always possible; equipi:.ent wao not su.ffioientl7 _integrated to p~mi't. it. 

The present SiBnal Corps proiram ot communication equipment developm:?nt aims 

at compl~to intercor,J.1~ctabil1 ty betw•::en ays tett..a or pcrt.3 or syatez::s. The 

1nterconri$Ction or tact1c41 and global n~ts, either directly or indirectlyt 

must alwayJ be possible and is the lonz time objective of the War Department. 

f • Th2 9Petnt~on ot tQe glol(;1l axst~Ji, !?;y QOn!tfapt with OOIJJZ!g_r~ 

QOmpaniea. This proposed objective results in part fror. the beli~f that the _ 

corrmerciel corrmunics.tion aon.pani~s we.rd not fully util11l'ed durine World War II. 

11 It is and baa been the War Department policy to make the .ut.moat 

use o! our CO!tlllercial comxnunicat1-ms resources. The cor..mercial 

companies furnish~ tJ1e csdrea tor atfilieted coc.munication units 

during the war and the lier Departm-:nt propos9s to m~ke ave11 greater 

use or the errlliated ayetei.'Ti 1n the future. All of the key personnel 

which the compan1~a could spare •:ere comissioned end used to ataff 

and operat9 the Arq Co!!:.011·nd Nst and to fill key positions in the 

signal co:: i::unia-~tfons setup.· 'fh<j demands mcdo on tho cor.pnniee wer"l 

oarei'ullf c::>ord1nated with them so that their services would ·not. 

break down. The Bell system not only served the oiv111a.n neoda but 

also turnish~d the entire domestic long lines network tor the ar~ed 

forces. The Sign~l Corps alone l~-8sed 400,000 circuit miles of 

American coifuftunio°'ti-:>n i'ac11itics durine the war. 'Th'1 OVGI'Seas 

t-~,rtiilmla or the A. T .&1'. Co. in No.!w York ond San frnncisco were 

-taken over and integrated into the globi:tl syatt::r:.1 Bell personnel 

continu.:d to oper~te and rnRintain these facilities. The entir~ network of Globe Wirel"'as lnc. was integrr.ted. The Dull Cmr:rr,ittee, 

consisting or twelve top experts of the A.T.~T. ·eo. recor.-...,·erided by 

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llr. ~cHugh, tunationod con:Stantly 1n high planning of s;yatems. 

The Bell Telephone Lab~ratoriea devoted its research and development et!orts almost entirely to arir.ed roroe~ work nnd the output 

or the Western El.eotr1c Company- was taken by the armed torcea 

except :for the trickle needed to maintain the civilian ~conom,y. 

The Ball system 'built thousands of miles ot new toll plant to 

meet the needs or the armed torces. It instellOO. and operated the 

poet telephone •Yl'tems in all new oant-or.lllients and in addition t~ok 

over meny post tel&phone ~ystems at the request ot the government. 

Beaidea theae things, the co~$ierc1al companies oonduoted inetruotion 

tor tho armed f'oroes, wrote technic~l manuela and asitisted inrormally in countless waya. Nor should it be torgotten that the 

non-key personnel ot the con::rercinl companies who were dratted 

rather than commissioned, were key personnel .1n the hur..dreds or 

signal commun1e~tion units which served the armed forces. It is 

difficult to know how greater use could have been made of' the 

coremercisl co~munication reeources or the country.n 

n lt is the policy or the War Department to lnBkG full use or the corn- ~ercial compnniea by leasing communication channels from them and 

having them operate JI.any domeatio telephone systerns. It ie not the 

policy of the War Depart1?1ent to contract tor overseas comm.uni• 

cations mystema from the commercial companies. The reasons ror 

this are many. 11rat, no international circuits are owned at 

both enda by the commercial compeniea. tar Department communications 'tlould.t therefore, bo in the hende or rore1gnera at the 

distant end or each circuit. In time or wer, the War Dep8rtment 

has not considered it wiae to entrust the edrnir.istration or 

aignel comnrunication security to c1v111an contl'ol. commanders 

ere very aenaitiYe about·their communications an:i pre!er to have 

the personnel operatihe them directly umer their control end 

not to be dependent upon the e:x.eoution o!' a commerciel.contrnat • . T~ere are seven compan1Ps operating in the overseas tield and it 

would be difricult either to •ingle out some tor contract 

operation or to operate with ae uany as seven simult~neousl;y. 

Any company selected ror contract would need not only all its 

peacetime personnel but much more. To operate suocessrully, 

all its personnel, old and new, would have to be exempt rrom 

tha draf'ts the policy ot deterring all employees of a given 

company was considered and reJeoted 1n World War r, it was .not 

even considered in World War II. Any coromeraial company selected 

tor contract would have to build ite overaeas ayatem just as the 

!rzr:ed forces dos All or its material would have to be secured 

•1th perrr.iaslon of the Armed Forces, transported by the Armed 

Foroea' Its overseas personnel would have to be transported and 

maintained 't>1 the Armed Forces. !'in'1lly, it is ,inconoei"V'able 

that military cou:m.un1cations should be interrupted by labor 

trouble& and there were imstences ot civilian labor atrlking in 

the combat zones." 

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REF_ID:~60947 

The proposed objeotiv• 1• not the objective or the War Department end ahould 

never b9 the ob3ective ot the War Department. 

~ •. !61NpttJS!O§. ':The obJecti~oa .pt°ope~ed b;y Dr. Bowlee are those of 

the War Department except in two casee. While the War Department recoeniaea 

the desirability ot operating global communications under a single heed, it 

aliO recogn11ea the 1.mpracticabilitg of thie at thia time and will resort to 

collimittee control 111 the beet Available sub::!titute. The lar Department doee 

not and should not contract with eotmner1cal co~n1es tor operation of its 

global network in either peace or war. 

4. lff&O~JftiNPATIC H§. That tho objectiv'1ts proposed b1 Dr. &wlea be 

recogniaed an be~.ng the lfar Department•• pre~ent objectives except that 

control or global communication 117atem b,y' • •ingle heed 11 preaentl:y impoaeible ct accomrl:bhment under unif'icat1on and t ht.it operation or the 

global comt'lllnication network 'tt1' oontreot with connner1cal companies 1a 

neither feasible nor desirable. 

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