1 

Filed 8/20/14 Marriage of Sample CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(El Dorado) 

---- 

In re the Marriage of MIA K. and GREGORY A. 

SAMPLE. 

C071542 

MIA K. SAMPLE, 

 Appellant, 

 v. 

GREGORY A. SAMPLE, 

 Respondent. 

(Super. Ct. No. PFL20050789)

 Mother Mia K. Sample appeals from a court order wherein the trial court denied 

mother’s motion to modify child support, refused her request for attorney fees, and 

ordered mother to pay attorney fees and sanctions to father Gregory A. Sample. 

Representing herself on appeal, mother raises numerous claims of error, none of which 

have merit. Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the trial court. 
2 

BACKGROUND 

 In June 2010, father filed a motion in the trial court addressing numerous issues, 

including overpayment of child support, implementing recommendations made in a 

Family Code section 3111 evaluation, and requesting attorney fees. Mother opposed the 

motion and filed her own motion seeking a modification of child support and attorney 

fees. On August 19, 2010, the trial court ruled on each of the issues raised in father’s 

motion except his request for fees and the overpayment of child support. Those 

remaining issues were set for further hearing and the parties were ordered to return in 

December to review progress on coparenting counseling. 

 After several continuances, on November 4, 2010, the trial court again continued 

mother’s motion to modify child support at mother’s request, but noted “the Court will 

not look favorably upon another request for a continuance without good cause.” The trial 

court also clarified the issues set for hearing: (1) mother’s motion to modify child 

support; (2) father’s motion to determine the over payment of child support; (3) father’s 

request for sanctions; (4) review of coparenting counseling; and (5) the parties’ request 

for attorney fees. Father also asked mother, who was no longer working, to agree to 

submit five job applications every two weeks. Mother agreed. The court then ordered 

father to pay to mother the previously ordered $63 a month in child support and set the 

continued hearing for February 18, 2011. 

 On January 20, 2011, the parties appeared before the trial court on mother’s ex 

parte application for an order shortening time on discovery of third party financial 

information. Following argument, the court denied mother’s application and denied her 

request for attorney fees; however, the court agreed to continue the February 18, 2011 

hearing to March 4, 2011. The court also agreed to hear mother’s request for evidentiary 

sanctions at that hearing. Father asked whether the matter was being set for law and 

motion “or a trial,” but the court did not respond to his question. 
3 

 On April 11, 2011, the parties appeared before the trial court to resolve the issues 

previously set to be heard on February 18, 2011. Soon after the hearing began, the trial 

court interrupted mother’s counsel, Sharon Huddle, to say, “[W]hat we’re dealing with is 

your opening statement. And so I just want to know what the issues are. We’re here 

today for an evidentiary hearing on --” Ms. Huddle objected: “Oh, no, we’re not, your 

Honor. This is only a motion. They objected to setting any evidentiary hearing. Oh, I 

have not prepared any exhibits or anything. This is the motion. They objected to any 

evidentiary hearing.” 

 Father’s counsel, Mark Cudney, responded: “I don’t know what counsel is 

representing, but we’re here for trial. I mean, we came here in October or November 4th, 

and they requested a continuance of the trial, and we opposed. So we’re here for a trial. 

We want this over with. I strenuously object to just submitting this on a declaration.” 

 After further discussion, Ms. Huddle restated her objection: “I would have -- I’m 

going to get the last transcript because he objected to any evidentiary hearing. It was 

never set for trial. He absolutely objected, and we are here on a motion today not a trial. 

I will order every single transcript. You will see in there not a moment was this ever set 

for trial. This was set to come back on a hearing, because I was not getting my 

discovery, not -- for a motion, not for an evidentiary hearing. It was never set for that. 

They objected to it. I left two boxes of my stuff back at the office. This was only a 

hearing today. This was not a trial. 

 “So he’s saying this because he’s, ‘Okay. She’s not prepared. Let’s go.’ That’s 

why he’s saying that. But the transcript will tell different. When I order the transcript 

from the court reporter, you will see that this was never set for trial, never. And to force 

me to do a trial today when I’m totally not prepared -- I don’t even have all my records 

here.” Ms. Huddle then argued with the trial court about whether she or Mr. Cudney was 

responsible for the repeated requests to continue the hearing. 
4 

 “THE COURT: Well, Miss Huddle, the only thing the Court can go on is what’s 

before the Court in its file. What’s in the file is a request from your client for a 

continuance. At any rate, we’re here today. Let’s move forward. What’s the evidence 

that -- if you want to present any evidence other than what’s in the declaration, then go 

ahead and provide it. 

 “MS. HUDDLE: Your Honor, I’m not prepared. This was not set for a trial -- 

evidentiary hearing, and it’s not fair to my client. It is totally unfair to her to go forward 

with an evidentiary hearing when it was not set for an evidentiary hearing, and they 

objected to it. 

 “MR. CUDNEY: We never objected. I filed a timely response. They have 

requested the continuances. The only reason there was a continuance last time is because 

they sent me a fax saying she had a new job, and they would provide income information 

to me. That was why it was continued. It wasn’t because we were stalling. This is all 

fabricated by counsel. Not giving them documents, I don’t even know where she gets 

this information from. 

 “THE COURT: Well, we’re moving forward today, Miss Huddle. Now any 

evidence you want to put before this Court, I’m glad to entertain. And if you tell me that 

what you’ve got is what’s in the declaration, then -- 

 “MS. HUDDLE: You know, I’m going to have to have my secretary drive to this 

office two boxes full of documents because that’s what I have. 

 “THE COURT: Okay. 

 “MS. HUDDLE: I don’t have -- I have the documents from Bank of America, the 

documents that show his false taxes. I don’t have any copies. I have no exhibits. I have 

nothing. 

 “THE COURT: Okay. 

 “MS. HUDDLE: I can’t give you anything. I’ll just say for the record, I highly 

object to being forced to go to an evidentiary hearing when it was not set for one. And 
5 

the prior record will reflect that Mr. Cudney objected to an evidentiary hearing more than 

once and very loudly. His statement that it was set for trial, and we just continued this for 

trial is completely false. There is absolutely nothing in the record setting this for a trial, 

nothing. 

 “THE COURT: Okay. Well, what we will do, I will accept the declaration that 

has been submitted. If you want to have someone from your office bring other items 

here, we’ll take a short continuance for you to do that. But what I would recommend that 

you do is to get in touch with your office, get them to get the stuff here, and we’ll have 

Mr. Cudney put on his witnesses while we’re waiting for you to get your evidence here. 

 “MR. CUDNEY: That’s fine, your Honor. 

 “MS. HUDDLE: Okay. I’m objecting. You’re forcing me to do it, so I will do it. 

 “THE COURT: Okay. 

 “MS. HUDDLE: I want the record to reflect I’m being forced to do this 

evidentiary hearing when it was objected to. And I will get the records. 

 “THE COURT: Well, let’s take a five, ten-minute recess while Miss Huddle 

contacts her office. And let me know when she’s back here in the courtroom. 

 “Thanks.” 

 The evidentiary hearing proceeded with father putting his witnesses on first, 

allowing Ms. Huddle to cross-examine them before mother testified. The trial court then 

continued the hearing to May 9, 2011. The hearing did not renew, however, until 

September 23, 2011. In the interim, Ms. Huddle filed a motion to disqualify the trial 

judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. Ms. Huddle argued the judge 

and Mr. Cudney engaged in ex parte communication either directly or indirectly because 

she was the only one in the courtroom on April 11, 2011, who did not know the matter 

was set for an evidentiary hearing. This, she claimed, was evidence the court was biased 

against her or mother, her client. The court denied the motion as untimely. 
6 

 Immediately following the denial of counsel’s motion, the evidentiary hearing 

continued; both parties were still represented by counsel. Father was again called to 

testify and Ms. Huddle cross-examined him. Additional documentary evidence was 

admitted. The evidentiary hearing was again continued to October 17, 2011. In the 

interim and on its own motion, the court twice ordered the evidentiary hearing continued 

further, ultimately setting it for January 27, 2012. 

 On January 27, 2012, mother and father appeared before the court. Father 

continued to be represented by counsel, mother was now appearing in propria persona. 

Father again testified and mother cross-examined him; additional documentary evidence 

was submitted. After father completed his testimony and direct examination of mother 

was performed by father’s counsel, the following colloquy took place between mother 

and the court: “[MOTHER]: So I can call myself to the stand; right? 

 “THE COURT: I suppose since you are representing yourself. If Mr. Cudney has 

rested you have the right to call witnesses in rebuttal. You can testify, but the rebuttal 

testimony, again, can’t go beyond the scope of the things Mr. Cudney has asked in his 

cross-examination. Normally, you know, if you have an attorney, the attorney would ask 

a question, the witness would answer a question. Since you are acting as your own 

attorney, I’m not going to make you ask yourself questions, but I would appreciate it if 

you let us -- tell us what subject it is you are going to give testimony on, give the 

testimony on that subject. Before you switch subjects, let us know you are switching 

subjects. And again, keep your statements relevant to the point you have indicated you 

are going to talk about. 

 “[MOTHER]: Can I get down and look at some of my notes? 

 “THE COURT: You can do that. But Mr. Cudney -- if you testify from notes, he 

may ask to see those notes. 

 “[MOTHER]: I don’t care. I have nothing to hide. Do you have an objection, 

Mr. Cudney? 
7 

 “MR. CUDNEY: Start testifying. You will see. 

 “[MOTHER]: Can I ask you a question, Your Honor? We still have closing 

arguments and stuff; right? That’s all part of this? 

 “THE COURT: Yes. 

 “[MOTHER]: I don’t have anything more to say. But I would like to call a 

witness, if I may? 

 “THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.” After presenting testimony from one witness, 

mother called no further witnesses. 

 The court then explained to mother that she would go first in closing argument, 

then would have a second chance to make her argument after Mr. Cudney. After mother 

continued to express confusion about the process, the court invited the parties to submit 

their closing arguments in writing. The trial court ordered the closing arguments to be 

submitted simultaneously on February 10, 2012. Mother then went through her exhibits 

to ensure they were all admitted into evidence. 

 On February 1, 2012, the court extended the deadline for the parties’ closing 

arguments to February 27, 2012. Mother filed her closing argument on February 27, 

2012; father filed his on February 28, 2012. Mother filed a written objection to father’s 

closing statement, arguing it was untimely filed. On May 9, 2012, the trial court issued 

written “findings and [an] order after hearing on child support overpayment.” 

 In the May 9, 2012 order, the trial court denied mother’s motion to modify child 

support and found father overpaid child support to mother in the amount of $4,556. 

Thus, the court ordered mother to reimburse father that same amount. The court further 

ordered mother to pay $1,500 toward father’s attorney fees, interest of $318.92, and 

sanctions totaling $681.08. The balance of $7,056 was to be “satisfied by [mother] 

through a monthly credit from [mother] to [father] in the amount of $63 in satisfaction of 

[father]’s monthly child support obligation, until the $7056 balance is exhausted.” 

 Mother appeals from that order. 
8 

DISCUSSION 

I 

Mother Was Not Denied Due Process 

 Mother contends the trial court denied her due process by proceeding with the 

evidentiary hearing after counsel made it clear that mother was never given notice the 

court would be taking evidence at the hearing. Whether or not Ms. Huddle was notified 

that the April 11, 2011 hearing was an evidentiary hearing, we find mother was given 

ample opportunity to present her case and to cross-examine father. We thus find she was 

given sufficient due process in the trial court proceedings. 

 “[W]here the trial court denies a party his [or her] right to a fair hearing, it exceeds 

its jurisdiction, and the error is reversible per se. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of 

Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 292, italics omitted.) “ ‘One of the elements of a 

fair trial is the right to offer relevant and competent evidence on a material issue. Subject 

to such obvious qualifications as the court’s power to restrict cumulative and rebuttal 

evidence . . . , and to exclude unduly prejudicial matter [citation], denial of this 

fundamental right is almost always considered reversible error. [Citations.]’ (3 Witkin, 

Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Presentation at Trial, § 3, pp. 28-29 . . . .) Ordinarily, 

parties have the right to testify in their own behalf (Guardianship of Waite (1939) 14 

Cal.2d 727, 730), and a party’s opportunity to call witnesses to testify and to proffer 

admissible evidence is central to having his or her day in court. (Kelly v. New West 

Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659, 677; see Spector v. Superior Court (1961) 

55 Cal.2d 839, 843, 844.)” (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357, 

italics omitted.) 

 When mother appeared for the hearing on April 11, 2011, Ms. Huddle made it 

clear to the trial court that she was not prepared to put on evidence and she believed the 

hearing was simply a continued short cause hearing. The trial court noted mother’s 

objection and invited her to go second in the presentation of evidence, even though it was 
9 

her motion. The court also gave mother’s counsel an opportunity to get her files to the 

courthouse. That day, father testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined. 

 The evidentiary hearing was then continued for more than five months, during 

which time mother had ample opportunity to prepare. When the hearing resumed in 

September 2011, mother continued to be represented by counsel who continued to crossexamine father. The trial was not completed that day, and resumed again on January 27, 

2012. 

In January 2012, mother was no longer represented by counsel but she continued 

the cross-examination of father and was given the opportunity to offer her own testimony 

in rebuttal. Mother also presented testimony from an additional rebuttal witness. 1 

Mother later filed a written closing argument. 

 We thus conclude that, on this record, mother was given her “day in court”; she 

was not denied due process. 

II 

Mother's Unsuccessful Motion to Disqualify the Trial Judge Is Not Reviewable on Appeal 

 Mother further contends the trial court erred in denying her Code of Civil 

Procedure section 170.1 motion to disqualify the judge. “[A] petition for writ of mandate 

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) is the exclusive means 

by which a party may seek review of an unsuccessful motion to disqualify a trial judge. 

[Citations.]” (Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474, 487, fn. 

omitted.) Accordingly, the issue is not properly before this court on appeal.2 

 

1 Mother claims the court refused to let her testify. This claim is not supported by 

the record. Indeed, the trial court gave mother clear, specific instructions on how she was 

to offer her rebuttal testimony. Mother told the court: “I don’t have anything more to 

say.” 

2 We further note that the time to file that petition for writ of mandate has long 

passed. Such a petition filed and served “within 10 days after service of written notice of 

entry of the court's order determining the question of disqualification. If the notice of 
10 

III 

Mother’s Claims of Error Regarding Modification and Enforcement of Child Support 

are Forfeited Because They Are Not Supported by Relevant Legal Authority or 

Meaningful Argument

 Mother contends the trial court “erred in failing to grant [her] motion to modify 

child support, attorney’s fees and costs.” Mother also contends the trial court “err[e]d in 

failing to not enforce calculations of child support over payment from previous trial 

November in 2009.” Each of these contentions fail because mother failed to support 

either of them with meaningful argument or citations to relevant legal authority. 

(Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115-1116 [merely setting 

forth general legal principles without specifically demonstrating how they establish error 

is insufficient to raise a cognizable issue on appeal]; Estate of Hoffman (1963) 213 

Cal.App.2d 635, 639 [“It is the duty of counsel to support his claim by argument and 

citation of authority. [A reviewing court is] not obliged to perform the duty resting on 

counsel.”].) That mother is not represented by counsel on appeal does not excuse her 

failure to comply with appellate procedure. (Leslie v. Board of Medical Quality 

Assurance (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 117, 121; see also Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 

Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639; Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 795.) 

 

entry is served by mail, that time shall be extended as provided in subdivision (a) of 

Section 1013.” (Code Civ., Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).) 
11 

DISPOSITION 

 The trial court’s orders are affirmed. Each party shall bear their own costs on 

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).) 

 NICHOLSON , Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 DUARTE , J. 

 HOCH , J.