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~NATlONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFiCE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

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THE NRO STAFf' 

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7 June 1967 

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 

SUBJECT: Disclosure of "the fact of II Sate llite Reconnaiss ance at the 

Secret Level 

On 2 June, General Berg and I approached Dr. Flax regaramg 

impending final USIB action to approve disclosure of lithe fact of II 

satellite reconnaissance at the Secret level. Dr. Flax expressed 

hims elf as follows: 

1. He agrees generally with my memorandum of 13 May, 

addressed to him. If anything, he thinks the situation is worse (at 

least potentially) than I have described it. 

2. The entire intelligence community has voted for this 

action. In the face of that unanimity, what is Dr. Flax to do? He 

cannot take any courage Or comfort from the fact that Mr. Helms 

and General Carroll were absent from the meetings. Certainly, their 

deputies must have sought and obtained the Ilparty-linelion an issue 

of such consequence. As a matter of fact, how can he oppose the 

DOD position, as taken by the DIA representative? 

We asked if he would be willing to talk to Mr. Helms (via KY-9) 

and expres s informal concern. He was not. I pointed out that our 

silence would be accepted as tacit approval and I felt strongly that 

some way, some how, we should register our concern, even if only 

for the record. 

Finally, I asked if General Berg and I might take our problem -

as a staff matter - to Mr. Sheldon and request his advice. Dr. Flax 

agreed to this saying, Ilyou may even tell Ting how concerned I am. II 

Mr. Sheldon visited us on the afternoon of 2 June. He listened 

to our story with sympathy and delivered himself of these comments: 

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l. 'IPeople say" that intelligence publications really need 

3. capability to attribute data to satellite reconnaissance. He is not 

iInpressed. 

2. !IPeople sayl! that Rostow, Keeny, et al are pressing for 

dis closure and we must do something to propitiate them. He is not 

impressed. 

3. Mr. Hughes group, in State, is fronting for ACDA and 

NASA in pressing for disclosure. 

4. Everyone in CIA who knows the territory regarding 

satellite reconnaissance security is being discounted as Iia vested 

interest. II 

5. He would wager that Mr. Helms doesn't even know the 

USIB is acting on this item. (Mr. Helms has been very busy recently 

with Viet Nam, Israel, National Student Association, etc.). 

6. He recommends, at the very least, that Dr. Flax register 

his concern. 

I askeci Mr. Sheldon if he would be willing to telephone Dr. Flax 

and urge item 6. He said that he certainly would. He stated that he 

would see Adm. Taylor (DDCI), in any event, and recount our comi"ersation and our misgivings. 

";T~ .i..\ ..... .L • 

W2..S 

Later in the afternoon, Mr. Sheldon called to tell US that, indeed, 

Helms was unaware of the disclosure action and that Admiral Taylor 

quite willing to have Dr. Flax's comments. 

On 3 June, General Ber g and I again met with Dr. Flax on this 

matter. He was astounded at the news re the DCI. IIWhat has happened? II 

liVery unusual. " "Incredible!" He immediately agreed to send a I'Dear 

Dick ll memorandum to IVlr. Helms. His guidance was: 

1. Donlt challenge the needs of t"le intelligence community. 

2. Point out that the basic role of BYEMAN security has beer: 

to protect "the fact of. II 

3. Say that,if the Board action holds, we must re-rationalize 

-;::.2 entire BYEMAN system. 

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4. The CIA has the mistaken notion that one may separate 

satellite products from satellite operations. This is simply not so. 

Not like h,nnint. Close interlock is easily observed by friend and foe. 

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5. We will have a serious problem with a rapidly-widening 

audience. Many people will feel that they have a right to ask questions. 

On 5 June, I prepared a IIDear Dick" memo along the lines stated 

by Dr. Flax. He read it and said it was "fine J except I want to change 

a few things in it. II 

On 5 June, Mr. Tidwell (COMOR) called General Berg to say he 

had a note from Admiral Taylor placing a stop -order on further disclosure action pending comments from the DNRO. Mr. Tidwell was 

understandably upset ('II thought we had coordinated with Mr. Mazza fI). 

General Berg assured him that there was no problem with Tidwell's 

paper - only with its effect on the BYEMAN system. 

PAU~.~bRTHMAN Colonel, USAF 

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Dear Dick: 

I have re ad with interest the United States Intelligence Board's 

recent decision to "acknowledge under a SECRET classification the 

fact that a satellite photographic reconnaissance program existed. " 

It is my understanding that the Board's action was directed primarily 

at facilitating reference to satellite reconnaissance sources in Secret 

and Top Secret intelligence publications. 

On the surface, this action might be evaluated as having a sigmricant effect upon exploitation security (TALENT-KEYHOLE) and little 

or no effect on operational security (BYEMAN). Unfortunately, this 

convenient separation of effect, which serves so well in SOme intelligence collection operations, is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, 

to maintain for satellite reconnaissance. 

In satellite operations the "agent II is too obvious: his ongm is 

well-known, his arrivals and departures are general knowledge, his 

capabilities and capacities are widely understood and even his demise 

can be predicted. In the minds of friend and foe equally, satellite 

products are linked uniquely to specific satellite flights. As a result 

of this interlock, practically anything which occurs to, or within, the 

TALENT-KEYHOLE system impinges upon the BYEMAN system. In 

the case of the Board's recent action I believe that there is potentially 

enough such cross-effect to give us serious apprehension and to 

warrant the consideration of remedial policies and procedures. 

Three major problem areas have occurred to me. The first has 

to do with the operation of the existing BYEMAN system. In spite of 

the re ady association of the BYE:MAN system with hardware, it is a 

fact that its major role has been to protect the fact of satellite reconnaissance. Phase I briefings are, by definition, confined to "disclosure 

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that the United States Government is engaged in a highly sensitive program. II Perhaps 80% of our industrial effort is conducted under a 

security system where lithe fact of II is the essential element of compartmentation. Phase II briefings do essentially the same thing as 

Phase I, except that the codeword name of a program is revealed, as 

well as a one -sentence stateme nt of lithe fact of. II Phase III briefings -

the general governmental level of access - consist of a Phase II briefing plus the option to learn details on a need-to-know basis. Very 

frequently this option is hot invoked. unless the application of the 

Board's action is carefully regulated, we will immediately find ourselves in a position where thousands of specially-investigated individuals are under BYEMAN oath regarding sensitive information which 

their colleagues are acquiring under the relatively relaxed standards 

of Secret. It appears to me that if "the fact of" is to become generally 

available at the Secret level, we would do well to examine the under lying rationale for the entire BYE MAN security system. 

Next, I am concerned over the possibility that a wide variety of 

federal agencies might be offered the right to expose lithe fact of" 

without the benefit of a firm set of ground rules for conducting such 

disclosures. Most agencies do not have the security tradition, experience, or background to guide them in handling such a situation 

expertly. I would expect NASA, for example, to experience very 

serious difficulties in controlling the disclosure process; the Departments of Commerce, Interior, Agriculture, among others, would have 

a similar problem. 

Third, I believe formal guidance would be re quired as to who can 

make the disclosure. In the absence of such guidance, we can expect, 

as a commonplace, a situation in which one Secret-cleared person will 

make the disclosure to another. A standard response is predictable; 

the person being briefed will automatically raise more questions: 

Who does the reconnaissance? Where is it done? How is it done? 

What does it look like? Where may I see it? Properly controlling 

the pressure for more information will call for all the skill of a 

security professionaL It should certainly not be left to novices. 

Finally, I see the problem of a widening audience. Unless the 

ground rules of disclosure are drawn up very carefully, the news of 

official confirmation of a satellite reconnaissance program will diffuse 

very rapidly, bringing the existence of the program to the attention of 

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literally thousands of new people. Each of these persons will feel 

strongly the right to know more, the right to ask questions, and the 

right to "contribute. II These individuals, as we all know from experience, readily form groups called committees, which exert irresistible 

pressures to Iinormalize II whatever they touch. Up till now much of 

the vigor of the NRP has derived from its built-in protection against 

such normalization. 

In summary, I anticipate a wide range of impact on the NRP if a 

license to disclose lithe fact of I' were issued without a very careful 

examination of the impact of such an action on the BYE MAN security 

system. Very generally, I would suggest that the TALENT -KEYHOLE 

and BYEMAN security systems be recognized as interlocking; that the 

downstream impact on the security and vitality of the NRP be taken 

into consideration; that the security inexperience of federal agencies 

outside the intelligence community be recognized; and that the phenomenon of the "widening audience" be weighed in terms of gains vs. losses. 

I trust that these comments will be helpful to you. I feel strongly 

that we are at a critical stage and that we can take actions now which 

will probably avert much more formidable problems downstream. 

Alexander H. Flax 

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