J-S20001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: V.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 438 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2023,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001079-2022.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

In this matter, R.B. (Mother) appeals the decision of the Philadelphia 

Court of Common Peas (the juvenile court), which determined that her 12-

year-old daughter V.B. (the Child) was dependent under the Juvenile Act. See 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341. Mother claims that the decision was based on insufficient 

evidence, as well as improper hearsay testimony. In addition to the 

substantive dependency adjudication, Mother appeals the dispositional portion 

of the adjudicatory order, which removed the Child from Mother’s home. After 

careful review, we conclude inter alia that the court’s admission of 

impermissible hearsay testimony constituted a harmless error, and we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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By way of factual background, the record indicates that the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with the family in 

early 2022. DHS had received a general protective services report, which 

referenced the parents’ drug use and alleged there was domestic violence in 

the home. Although DHS ultimately determined these reports were 

“validated” in May 2022, DHS did not seek an order for protective custody or 

file a dependency petition.

In November 2022, DHS received another report alleging drug use and 

domestic violence in the home. This time, DHS filed a dependency petition

and sought and obtained an order for protective custody. Pursuant to a safety 

plan, the Child went to live with a family friend. On January 20, 2023, the 

juvenile court held a hearing on the dependency petition. The court heard 

testimony from the DHS social worker who investigated the allegations, the 

caseworker from the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA), and the CEO of the

Child’s school. Neither parent appeared for the hearing. The testimony was 

the subject of frequent objections, mostly for hearsay. The court largely 

overruled the objections. At the end of the hearing, the court adjudicated the 

Child dependent and committed the Child to the custody of DHS. Mother 

timely filed this appeal.1 The juvenile court authored a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion, which largely directs this Court to its reasoning set forth on the 

record.

____________________________________________

1 Father did not appeal the juvenile court’s decision.
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Mother raises the following issues for our review, which we reorder for 

ease of disposition:

1. Did the juvenile court err as a matter of law and abuse 

its discretion by adjudicating [the Child] to be a 

“dependent child” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 on 

hearsay statements in violation of the Juvenile Act, 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, and Appellant’s 

right to due process?

2. Did the juvenile court err as a matter of law and abuse 

its discretion by adjudicating the Child to be a 

“dependent child” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 in 

the absence of clear and convincing evidence that [the 

Child] was presently “without proper parental care 

and control...as required by law”?

3. Did the juvenile court err as a matter of law and abuse 

its discretion by committing the Child to the legal 

custody of [DHS] in the absences of clear and 

convincing evidence that removal from Mother was 

clearly necessary?

Mother’s Brief at 3 (style adjusted).

Our discussion begins with Mother’s claim that the juvenile court 

committed evidentiary errors. The admission of evidence is within the 

discretion of the trial court and such decisions will be reversed only if the trial 

court has abused its discretion. Interest of I.R.-R., 208 A.3d 514, 519 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). The Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure 

provide that in adjudications, each party shall have an opportunity to present 

evidence subject to the Rules of Evidence. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 1406.

“Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, hearsay evidence is 

incompetent and inadmissible unless it meets an exception set forth in the 
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Rules or one prescribed by this Court or statute.” In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 

1157, 1167 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Pa.R.E. 801(c)). “‘Hearsay’ is ‘a statement 

that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or 

hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted in the statement.’” Id. Hearsay within hearsay – or “double 

hearsay” as it is sometimes referred – is not excluded by the rule against 

hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception

to the rule. See Pa.R.E. 805.

In her first appellate issue, Mother alleges several instances where the 

juvenile court improperly admitted hearsay evidence:

• The DHS social worker’s testimony about what the 

neighbor told her about the parents’ drug use and the 

existence of domestic violence in the home (see N.T. 

at 16-18);

• The DHS social worker’s testimony that the police 

department said there were several calls concerning 

domestic violence in the home (see N.T. at 28);

• The DHS social worker’s testimony about how the 

Child said Father “held her hostage in the home once” 

(see N.T. at 21); and

• The CUA caseworker’s testimony that, according to 

the Child, Mother said the Child should not speak to 

the caseworkers (see N.T. at 47-48).

See generally Mother’s Brief at 20-23:

We address each instance in turn. In the first instance, the DHS social 

worker testified that she spoke with Mother’s neighbor as part of her 
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investigation. Over Mother’s objection, the caseworker testified about what 

the neighbor told her:

DHS social worker: The neighbor stated that there are 

major drug and alcohol concerns for 

Mother and Father. She stated that 

there are domestic violence concerns 

for Mother and Father. [The neighbor] 

stated that Father has been seen 

laying in the street apparent to be dead 

[sic] and they have ran to get [Mother] 

because he looked dead. And [Mother] 

basically came out and said, “Oh, I’m 

going to Narcan you.”[2] And he 

jumped up.

N.T. at 17-18 (footnoted added).

This excerpt contains hearsay within hearsay – that is, the caseworker’s 

testimony concerns what the neighbor said that Mother had stated to Father. 

As such, each component (Mother’s statement and the neighbor’s statement)

required an exception to the hearsay rule. See Pa.R.E. 805 (Hearsay Within 

Hearsay).

Mother’s statement (“I’m going to Narcan you”) meets an exception to 

the hearsay rule. See Pa.R.E. 803(25)(A) (“The statement is offered against 

an opposing party and: (A) was made by the party in an individual or 

representative capacity”). However, Mother’s statement was alleged by the 

neighbor. As the neighbor did not testify, her statement must fit within its 

own exception under either Pa.R.E. 803 (Exceptions to the Rule Against 

____________________________________________

2 Narcan refers to the trademark name for Naloxone, which when administered

can reverse the effects of an opioid overdose.
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Hearsay – Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available as a Witness) or 

Pa.R.E. 804 (Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay – when the Declarant is 

Unavailable as a Witness).

Neither of the proponents of the neighbor’s statement (DHS or the 

Child’s GAL), nor the juvenile court addressed whether the neighbor’s 

statement fit within a hearsay exception. In apparent agreement that the 

neighbor’s statement constituted impermissible hearsay, the juvenile court 

said it would only consider the statement for dispositional purposes and not

for the initial question of whether the Child should be adjudicated dependent. 

See N.T. at 17.

Under the Juvenile Act, an adjudicatory hearing has two distinct phases. 

First, the juvenile court must ascertain, after hearing the evidence on the 

dependency petition, whether the child is dependent – i.e., without proper 

parental care or control. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(a). Second, if the court 

finds from clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent, the court 

shall proceed to make a proper disposition of the case. See § 6341(c).3 

Importantly, the Juvenile Act provides for a relaxed evidentiary standard when 

it comes to the dispositional phase:

(d) Evidence on issue of disposition. –

(1)(i) In disposition hearings under subsections 

(b) and (c)[relating to dependency] all evidence helpful 

____________________________________________

3 The “disposition” of a dependent child refers to where the child will live, 

under what conditions, and who will assume physical and/or legal custody. 

See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.
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in determining the questions presented, including oral 

and written reports, may be received by the court and 

relied upon to the extent of its probative value even 

though not otherwise competent in the hearing on 

the petition.

[...]

(2) The parties or their counsel shall be afforded an 

opportunity to examine and controvert written reports so 

received and to cross-examine individuals making the 

reports. Sources of information given in confidence need 

not be disclosed.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d) (emphasis added).

 When the juvenile court explained that it would admit the hearsay 

testimony for dispositional purposes only, the parties’ respective counsel 

sought clarification:

[Father’s] counsel:

[4]

I just want to complete the 

record, Your Honor. I 

understand that it’s for the 

dispositional purposes, but we 

are not at disposition. We are 

not at adjudication and if that 

information comes in you are 

Judge and jury. That is 

prejudicial.

The court: Understood. I’ll use it for 

dispositional purposes as you 

know we do both adjudication 

and disposition in the same 

hearing. I will be able to [parse] 

out the information that’s 

received.

____________________________________________

4 According to Mother’s Brief, the transcript of this exchange mistakenly refers 

to Mother’s counsel, when it should have referred to Father’s counsel. See 

Mother’s Brief at 21, n.5 (citing N.T. at 17, lines 11-15).
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N.T. at 17 (footnoted added).

We share Mother’s concern that acceptance of inadmissible hearsay 

during the adjudicatory phase is problematic, even if the same testimony may 

be considered during the dispositional phase. Still, we must recognize that

our trial judges are perfectly capable of entertaining a thought for one 

purpose, without accepting it for another. Our Rules of Evidence require 

triers-of-fact to do just that: “There are many situations in which evidence of 

a statement is offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted.” See Pa.R.E. 801 – Comment. Although it cannot be the case that 

the disposition exception swallows the entirety of the Rules of Evidence, here,

Mother’s challenge is unavailing. For one, Mother does not raise the issue of 

where this line must be drawn. She only alleges that this testimony 

constituted impermissible hearsay for adjudicatory purposes. Evidently, no 

one disagreed, and the court did not consider it for that reason. More 

importantly, to remove all doubt as to whether the court considered the 

hearsay for improper reasons, we note that the court’s dependency 

adjudication is supported by independent, competent evidence concerning 

Mother’s drug use, as we explain infra. Accordingly, Mother’s claim merits no 

relief on this point.

Mother’s next example of the juvenile court’s admission of impermissible 

hearsay concerns the allegation that there was domestic violence in the home. 

During Mother’s cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
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Mother’s counsel: So in the previous investigation there 

was information about some 

arguments in the home. Is that 

accurate?

DHS social worker: Some domestic violence. And I also 

called the police district that stated 

there were several calls –

Father’s counsel: Objection. Hearsay.

The court: Overruled. She opened the door.

DHS social worker: I called the police –

Father’s counsel: I didn’t open the door.

The court: Overruled.

DHS social worker: I called the police district and they 

stated there were several calls in 

reference to domestic violence and a 

protection order.

N.T. at 28 (emphasis added).

In its Brief, DHS argues that Mother failed to preserve this claim when 

she did not object at trial; DHS further argues that Father’s objection does not 

preserve Mother’s claim. See DHS’s Brief at 16-17, n.1. We agree. 

With respect to evidentiary rulings, “[e]rror may not be predicated upon 

a ruling that admits evidence unless a timely objection, motion to strike, or 

motion in limine appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if 

the specific ground was not apparent from the context.” Commonwealth v. 

Parker, 104 A.3d 17, 28 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)); see 

also Amato v. Bell & Gossett, 116 A.3d 607, 625 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding 

that the appellant failed to preserve hearsay objection where only counsel for 
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the co-defendant objected). Issues not raised in the lower court are waived 

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Instantly, Mother did not object to the DHS social worker’s testimony, 

nor did she object elsewhere in her cross-examination of the social worker, 

who proceeded to testify that there were at least six calls made over the 

course of 2022. See generally N.T. at 29-31. We need not address whether

this admission of testimony constituted impermissible hearsay, as Mother 

waives her claim on this point.

The final two claims of impermissible hearsay concern the Child’s 

statements. The Child did not testify at the hearing, nor did the juvenile court 

conducted an in camera interview of the Child. At the hearing, the Child’s 

counsel elicited testimony that it was the Child’s desire to return to her 

parents’ care. Although the DHS social worker testified that this was indeed 

the Child’s preference, she couched the Child’s preference by alleging that the 

Child also said somewhat contradictory statements:

Child’s counsel: So [the Child] doesn’t have any 

concerns for safety in the home. Is that 

correct?

DHS social worker: No, but she did mention that dad held 

her hostage in the home once.

Child’s counsel: Okay.

Mother’s counsel: Objection.

Child’s counsel: [The Child] does still wish to return?

Mother’s counsel: Objection.

DHS social worker: Yes.
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The court: Overruled.

N.T. at 21-22.

Similarly, the CUA caseworker testified that the Child preferred to return 

home, but she also cast doubt on the Child’s preference:

Child’s counsel: And what does she say?

CUA caseworker: [The Child] says she wants to go home.

Child’s counsel: Okay. And have you asked her if she 

has any concerns about returning 

home?

CUA caseworker: I have.

Child’s counsel: Okay. And what does she state?

CUA caseworker: [The Child] said she doesn’t have any 

concerns, but [the Child] also stated 

that her Mother told her not to trust me 

and [the DHS social worker].

Mother’s counsel: Objection.

The court: Overruled.

CUA caseworker: She told me that her Mother said not 

to address me and [the DHS social 

worker] and that we wanted to keep 

her out of the home. And she said that 

her Mother told her not to tell us 

anything.

Mother’s counsel: Objection.

The court: Overruled.

Id. at 47-48.

The second of these excerpts regarding the Child also contains hearsay 

within hearsay – although Mother’s statement would meet the party opponent 
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exception. See Pa.R.E. 803(25) (discussed supra). However, as we explained 

above, each part of the combined statement must conform with an exception

to the rule. Pa.R.E. 805. The juvenile court overruled the objections, but this 

time the court did not indicate that it would only consider the hearsay 

testimony for dispositional purposes. In fact, the court held no discussion as 

to whether the Child’s statements even constituted hearsay – i.e., that the 

statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but for some 

other reason – or whether the statement fit under an enumerated hearsay 

exception. See 801; see also Interest of I.R.-R., 208 A.3d at 519 (citations 

omitted).5 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the juvenile court does not explain 

its evidentiary rulings. Thus, we agree with Mother’s claim that these two 

excerpts regarding the Child’s statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. 

However, this does not end our analysis.

Next, we must consider whether the juvenile court’s evidentiary error

necessitates a new hearing or whether the error is harmless.6 How appellate 

courts apply the harmless error doctrine depends on the type of case. See, 

____________________________________________

5 A child’s out-of-court statement may nevertheless be admissible in certain 

situations, none of which are present in this case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5985.1 

(“Admissibility of certain statements”), 5986 (“Hearsay”).

6 Notably, not all errors are subject to the harmless error doctrine. “A 

structural error is defined as one that affects “the framework within which the 

trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” In re 

Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 183 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). 

“Structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id. (Citations 

omitted). Any structural error requires a new trial. Here, the issue is an 

evidentiary ruling, and thus a harmless error analysis is appropriate.
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e.g., Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 796 (Pa. 2017) (holding that

the harmless error analysis in a criminal case requires the following: (1) The 

error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) 

the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted 

evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted 

evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt 

was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant 

by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.); cf.

Interest of J.M.G., 229 A.3d 571, 568 (Pa. 2020) (“In relation to civil cases, 

[our Supreme] Court explained that the harmless error doctrine is subsumed 

in a trial court’s two-step review of motions for new trial.”) (citing Harman 

ex re. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1122 (Pa. 2000)). 7

____________________________________________

7

In J.M.G., the High Court explained the two-step process as follows:

First a [trial] court must review whether an error occurred, 

and secondly whether the error warrants a new 

trial. The harmless error doctrine underlies every decision 

to grant or deny a new trial. A new trial is not warranted 

merely because some irregularity occurred during the trial 

...; the moving party must demonstrate to the trial court 

that he or she has suffered prejudice from the 

mistake. Appellate review of a trial court's decision to grant 

or deny a motion for new trial involves a similar two-stage 

analysis. First, the appellate court must examine the 

decision of the trial court that a mistake occurred. ... If the 

appellate court agrees ... that a mistake occurred, ... [t]he 

appellate court must then determine whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in ruling on the request for a new trial.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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As far as we can discern, our Supreme Court has not addressed how 

the harmless error doctrine is applied to a finding of dependency. However, 

our Supreme Court has address harmless error in termination cases. The High

Court explained that “the standard for finding harmlessness in a termination 

case requires us to conclude that the evidentiary error could not have had any 

impact upon the orphans’ court’s decision.” In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 

1175 (Pa. 2018) (citing In re Sanders Children, 312 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. 

1973)). In a termination proceeding, the harmless error standard is 

seemingly heightened, “because of the serious impact attending the 

termination of parental rights,” and because “it is important that a judicial 

decree extinguishing such rights be based solely on competent evidence.” 

A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1171 (citing In re Sanders Children, 312 A.2d at 

417). Using In re Sanders Children as an example, the High Court in 

A.J.R.-H. explained a single (and relatively small) mistake could still warrant 

a reversal:

Notably, in In re Sanders Children, “the contested 

evidence ... constituted only a minor part of [the agency’s] 

case,” consisting of a testimony regarding a single hearsay 

____________________________________________

J.M.G., 229 A.2d at 586 (citing Harman, 756 A.2d at 1122-23) (internal 

quotations omitted).

It is less clear how the harmless error standard applies to domestic relations 

cases, where there is no post-trial motions procedure. But see J.C. v. K.C., 

179 A.3d 1124, 1129-30 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding that the trial court’s 

misapplication of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 

did not contribute to the court’s decision, and because the moving party was 

not prejudiced) (citing Harman, supra).
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document, but this Court nonetheless vacated the decree 

because of the mere possibility that the evidence could have 

impacted the decision of the orphans’ court.

Id. (citing In re Sanders Children, 312 A.2d at 417).

Unlike a termination decree, a dependency adjudication does not 

extinguish parental rights. Thus, a lesser standard for harmless error may 

apply in dependency cases. However, we need not decide that here, because 

even if we employed the more exacting termination standard, we would still 

conclude that the error was harmless.

In applying that standard to the instant case, we must discern whether

the juvenile court’s evidentiary error – i.e., the admission of the Child’s 

statements – had any impact on its decision. Significantly, we recognize that 

the harmless error standard must not be confused with the sufficiency of 

evidence standard. A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1175 (citing In re Sanders 

Children, 312 A.2d at 417). At this juncture, we are not deciding whether 

there was other properly admitted evidence to support a dependency 

adjudication. Instead, we look to the reasons for the court’s decision, and 

then determine whether the hearsay statements impacted that decision.

The juvenile court determined that the Child was dependent for two 

reasons: the parents’ substance abuse as well as the allegations of domestic 

violence in the home. See N.T. at 63. The record contains competent 

evidence to support each of these two reasons. As noted above, Mother’s 

cross-examination elicited testimony that there had been at least a half dozen 

calls to the local police station regarding domestic violence in the home. See 
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id. at 28-31. As for the evidence of Mother’s drug use, competent evidence 

supports this finding:

DHS counsel: Did you speak with [Mother] at that 

time?

DHS social worker: Yes

DHS counsel: And what did you learn when speaking 

with [Mother]?

DHS social worker: Mother admitted to having a substance 

abuse history. She changed her last 

usage time, like several times. She 

initially stated that she last used ten 

years ago. Then she stated four years 

ago. Then she stated two years ago 

back in May of 2022 when she had the 

prior report.

Mother’s counsel: Objection. Is this something that 

[Mother] said to you or is this 

something that was in the prior report 

because that would – I’m going to 

object to that.

The court: I believe the witness just testified that 

Mother admitted to substance abuse 

use. Kept changing the dates of her 

last use. So these are conversations 

that this investigator had with your 

client.

Id. at 15-16.8

Later in the hearing, Mother’s counsel elicited testimony that Mother had 

last tested positive in May 2022, when DHS had previously investigated the 

____________________________________________

8 Even though the testimony of Mother’s admission to drug use was also 

hearsay, Mother’s admission falls squarely within the party opponent 

exception. See Pa.R.E. 803(25). 
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family. See id. at 27. Mother also elicited testimony that Mother had been 

prescribed suboxone for a decade. See id. at 51.

Thus, the Child’s inadmissible statements did not concern either

Mother’s substance abuse, or the existence of domestic violence in the home. 

To be sure, we must note that when the juvenile court stated its reasons for 

the adjudication and disposition, the court said in the same breath that it was 

concerned for the Child’s mental health. See id. at 63. However, this concern 

does not stem from the Child’s inadmissible hearsay statements, but from the 

testimony of James Rodgers, the CEO of the Child’s school. See generally 

N.T. at 31-40.9 Mr. Rodgers testified the school would like to have the Child 

evaluated for special education services based on “ED,” or “emotional 

disturbance.” See id. at 34, 36.

In short, although we agree with Mother that the juvenile court erred 

when it admitted the Child’s statements, we conclude that the error is 

harmless because the statements had no impact on the court’s decision to find 

the Child dependent. Although it is unclear precisely how the harmless error 

standard should apply to dependency cases, the court’s error would be 

____________________________________________

9 Mr. Rodgers appeared at the hearing “out of concern for [the Child].” See 

N.T. at 32. Although Mother objected to Mr. Rodgers’ testimony for lack of 

notice, Mother does not raise that claim on appeal. In fact, Mother relies on 

Mr. Rodgers’ testimony to argue, in her third issue, that the court abused its 

discretion when it removed the Child from the home. See Mother’s Brief at 

26. The court admitted Mr. Rodgers’ testimony for dispositional purposes

only.
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harmless even under the stringent termination test. Thus, Mother’s first 

appellate issue merits no relief.

In her second appellate issue, Mother argues that the juvenile court’s 

adjudication of the Child was based on insufficient evidence. See generally

Mother’s Brief at 13-19. To adjudicate a child dependent, the court must 

determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child:

is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control 

necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or 

morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper 

parental care or control may be based upon evidence of 

conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that 

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1). 

“Clear and convincing evidence” is defined as testimony that is “so clear, 

direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a 

clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Interest of L.V., 209 A.3d 399, 416 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

In accordance with the overarching purpose of the Juvenile 

Act “[t]o preserve the unity of the family wherever 

possible,” see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1), “a child will only 

be declared dependent when he is presently without proper 

parental care and when such care is not immediately 

available. This Court has defined “proper parental care” as 

“that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of 

the child and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious 

injury to the child.”

L.V., 209 A.3d at 416 (internal citations omitted).
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The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court 

to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the juvenile 

court if they are supported by the record; but it does not require the appellate 

court to accept the juvenile court’s inferences or conclusions of law. I.R.-R., 

208 A.3d at 519 (citing In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)).

On appeal, Mother argues that the three causes for the Child’s 

dependency (housing, substance abuse, and domestic violence) lacked 

evidentiary support in the record. Immediately, we dismiss Mother’s claim 

regarding housing as a strawman argument. By the end of the hearing, all 

agreed that Mother’s housing was appropriate. Although the electric had been 

turned off, it had been quickly restored. Moreover, the DHS caseworker 

testified that the housing was otherwise suitable – the child had a bed, there 

was food in the refrigerator, and there were no structural problems or issues 

with the other utilities. Finally, when the court announced its decision from 

the bench, the court said plainly: “The issues here are far more concerning 

than electricity.” N.T. at 63. 

As for the allegations of substance abuse and domestic violence, the 

essence of Mother’s argument is that nothing really changed between the last 

DHS investigation in May 2022 and the instant investigation in November 

2022, which led to the Child’s adjudication. Although Mother admitted to using 

drugs in May 2022, which was known to DHS during the last investigation, 

Mother maintains that she has since followed her suboxone regiment, and she 

cites the testimony indicated that she has never appeared under the influence. 
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As for the domestic violence concern – specifically, the existence of over a half 

dozen calls to the police station – Mother argues that the caseworker could

not testify with specificity as to the dates of those calls, nor what was said in 

the calls to the police. Mother maintains that there was no new evidence of 

domestic violence either.

After review, we discern no abuse of discretion. We understand Mother’s 

argument that if nothing new occurred since the last investigation, which did 

not result in a dependency adjudication, then the current investigation should

not result in one either. While this argument might undercut DHS’s rationale

that it has grave concerns for the Child’s safety, Mother’s argument does not 

remove those concerns altogether. Whether the calls made to the police 

station occurred before or after the last investigation, the fact remains that 

the police were called over six times.

We certainly do not downplay the seriousness of domestic violence, but 

the more deeply rooted evidence of dependency was Mother’s admission that 

she tested positive in May 2022, during the prior investigation, coupled with 

her evasiveness about her drug history during the current investigation. The 

Child’s GAL accurately explained the concern in her closing argument:

The GAL: My main concern is that [Mother] is refusing to sign 

any kind of releases. If she’s in a suboxone program 

and if she’s active in it that’s because she goes there 

daily or however many times, three times a week, so 

that she can get suboxone. It doesn’t mean that she’s 

getting therapy there or that she’s resolved any of her 

drug and alcohol problems.
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If she had signed the releases and we had the 

paperwork, and it was validating that she was [in] the 

program we wouldn’t be here today. So that’s a 

concern.

N.T. at 58.

We clarify that a parent’s prescribed use of suboxone is not per se 

evidence that a child is without proper care. In fact, a parent’s proper use of 

drug treatment medications could be evidence of the opposite proposition. 

Nevertheless, courts should not have to close their eyes as to fact that

suboxone is prescribed to treat opioid dependence. Whether Mother relapsed 

again or whether she is participating in a proper drug treatment program are

relevant questions to the larger issue of whether a child is without proper 

parental care. The juvenile court heard testimony that Mother would not say 

when she last used or whether she was still enrolled in an opioid treatment 

program.

CUA caseworker: I talked to [the parents] about getting 

records so we can prove that these 

issues did not exist. They refused. 

Both parents refused to sign any ROI’s. 

They refused to sign the safety plan 

with me.

I’ve met them multiple times in their 

home. It is an in-home safety case, so 

I do meet with them weekly.

I’ve provided bus passes for them to go 

to their program and obtain records 

and also to make it to court today.

[...]

Counsel for DHS: Okay. Alright. So you said you had an 

opportunity to discuss the issues listed 
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in, sorry, the petition, [domestic 

violence] and substance abuse issues. 

When you speak with [Mother] about 

those issues what is typically her 

response?

CUA Caseworker: She denies it. And she says that she 

refuses to sign any releases because 

she does not want CUA or DHS digging 

up her past from twelve years ago. 

And I was adamant that we would be 

looking at the current year. At the time 

it was 2022. And I told her we would 

be looking at, you know, closer to this 

time. And she was adamant that we 

would not. And she stated that 

someone else, she didn’t specify who, 

had already brought up things to keep 

us from her child. Things that 

happened twelve years ago. And she 

just refused. 

So I asked her if she could bring her 

own documents, if she didn’t feel 

comfortable with me obtaining them 

myself maybe she could go and get 

them and present them to me. And 

she said she would, but she has not.

N.T. at 43-44

Mother did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing to refute the 

allegation she was being evasive about her history. The juvenile court had 

the discretion to find the caseworker’s testimony credible, to make a negative 

inference against Mother, and to conclude that the Child’s safety was at risk.

See L.V., 209 A.3d at 411 (“The [juvenile] court is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility 
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determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”) (Citations omitted).

Mother’s second appellate issue merits no relief.

In her third appellate issue, Mother argues that even if sufficient 

evidence existed to adjudicate the Child dependent, the juvenile court abused 

its discretion when it subsequently removed the Child from Mother’s home. 

In In re D.A., A Minor, 801 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc), this 

Court explained:

If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the court 

may make an appropriate disposition of the child to protect 

the child's physical, mental and moral welfare, including 

allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to 

supervision, transferring temporary legal custody to a 

relative or a private or public agency, or transferring 

custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6351(a).

Id. at 617 (citation omitted); see also In re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 850-51 (Pa. 

2000).

However, even after a child has been adjudicated dependent, a court 

may not separate that child from the parent unless it finds that the separation

is clearly necessary. Interest of N.S., 237 A.3d 546, 551 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b) (relating to the Juvenile Act’s purpose to 

keeping families together) (mentioned supra)). Such necessity is implicated 

where the welfare of the child demands that they be taken from their parents’ 

custody. N.S., 237 A.3d at 551 (citation omitted). “Clear necessity” is 

established when the court determines that alternatives are not feasible. Id.

(citing A.N. v. A.N., 38 A.3d 326 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
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In support of her argument, Mother cites testimony: that the home was 

suitable; that she visited the Child and brought her food following the Child’s 

safety plan placement with the family friend; that she made an appointed to 

have the Child tested for ADHD; and that the Child was a good student. 

After review, we discern no abuse of discretion. Although Mr. Rodgers 

testified that the Child was doing well academically, the CEO evidently took it 

upon himself to attend the dependency hearing out of concern for the Child’s 

emotional well-being. Specially, Mr. Rodgers’ concern was that he could not 

obtain parental consent to have the Child evaluated for special education, 

because Mother was unresponsive. See N.T. at 34. Mr. Rodgers testified that 

the school had provided the Child’s temporary placement caregiver with a 

school uniform, toiletries, and a gift card to buy groceries. Id. at 35.

More to the point, the juvenile court simply could not verify that the 

Child would be safe in Mother’s home. As the record stood, however, no one 

could vouch for the Child’s well-being; no one could testify that alternatives 

were feasible. Parents’ distrust of a child protective services agency is not 

uncommon. We do not suggest that a parent must admit to the allegations 

of the child protective services report, or that a mere denial of the allegations 

constitutes grounds to remove a child. But where a child has been adjudicated 

dependent, and the court has no evidence to gauge whether the child would 

be safe in the home or whether alternatives might be feasible (i.e., keeping 

the Child in the home but with additional services), then “clear necessity” is 

established. Mother’s final contention is without merit.
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To conclude: regarding Mother’s cited examples of impermissible 

hearsay testimony, we agree that the admission of testimony regarding the 

Child’s statements constituted an error. However, the error was harmless. 

The record contains sufficient evidence that the Child was dependent. The 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it removed the Child from the 

home, following the adjudication.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

JUDGE DUBOW did not participate in the consideration or decision of 

this case. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023