J .• 

~mxf8>Jt~~?t4i ~ tliU"fY XNJ!.l'ORND\Jt!ON 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY /J1 j A 

Washington 25, D. C. ~f/l;"t_,,,. 

SflCt::JIU'fY INPORMh'i'I9W 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT:. Implementation of National Security Council Directive ~ ~ ~~ on Communications Security ~ l uv--

References: (a) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Representative 

US Communications Security Board subject as above, 

dated 18 November 1953 

(b) National Security Counctl Directive on Communications 

Security (NSC 168) 

L In co11t9liance with :the provisions of reference (a), there is 

submitted herewith a tentative draft of a directive implementing within 

the Department of Defense the provisions of reference (b). 

2. The working group designated by the referenced memorandum is 

in substantial agreement except on one important point of principle. 

This point is raised in the final sentence of paragraph 3 of the draft, 

which reeds as follows: "With respect to the military departments, the 

Director, NSA, will perform his COMSEC functions under the immediate 

direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." This quotation is pursuant to 

the provisions of paragraph 2d of reference (b). The Director, NSA, 

disagrees with the other members of the Committee on the ground that this 

statement does not reflect the proper mission end function of the Joint 

Chiefs of Steff with respect to NSA operations in the field of COMSEC. 

For the reasons set forth in ~etail in Incl i/:2 he recommends that the 

controversial sentence in the draft be replaced by the following: "With 

respect to the Military departments, the Director, NSA, in performance of 

hie COMSEC functions, will be under the immediate direction of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff for joint doctrine end for matters relating to joint 

strategic end operational planning." 

3. The Navy representative is unable to agree with the wording of 

the draft adopted by the ma,1ority in paragraphs 6g and k. The wording 

preferred by the Navy representative and the reasons therefor are set 

forth iri Incl #3. The representative of the Director, Communications. 

Electronics, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports the Navy 

position with respect to paragraph 6k. 

4. The committee unanimously recommends that th:f.s paper be referred 

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

5. Upon receipt of your instructions concerning the proper function 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the other non-agreed itmes) the Coll'llllittee 

will draft a final directive for your signature. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-04-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

CON FKDIENT KAl 
14 December 1953 

6. A list of directives, orders, or instructions relating to 

COMSEC matters issued by any authorities within the Department or 

Defense inconsistent or at variance with the provisions of NSC 168 

or with the proposed implementing directive inclosed herewith will be 

forwarded as soon as compiled. 

RA~ J. CANINE 

Lieutenant General, US Army 

Director, National Security Agency 

Chairman 

JOHN H. HINDS 

Brigadier General, USA 

Representing the Secretary of 

the Army 

ALVIN L. PACHYNSKI 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Representing the Secretary of 

the Air Force 

3 Incle: 

RANDOLPH V. ZANDER 

Representing 

the Assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense-Special Operations 

L. S. HOWETH 

Captain, USN 

Representing the Secretary of 

the Navy 

W. B. GOULETT 

Representing the Director, 

Communications-Electronics, Office of 

the Joint Chiefs of 'Staff 

l. Draft of' NSC 168 Implementing Directive 

2. Dissenting Views of Director, NSA 

3. Dissenting Views of' Dept of the Navy 

2 

CON FIDE NT Kfn:lL 
'. 

DRAFT 

11 December, 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF· 

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

SUBJECT: Implementation of NSC Directive on Communications Security 

(NSC 168) ' · 

References: (a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

NSC Directive on Communications Security, (NSC 168) 

dtd 20 Oct 53 

SecDef Memorandum: Interim Responsibility for COMSEC, 

dtd 5 Dec 52 

NSCID No. 9 Revised, dtd 24 Oct 52 

Secretary of Defense Directive: Implementation of NSCID 

No. 9 Revised, dtd 5 Dec 52 

· 1. This Directive is iss~ed for the purpose of implementing within 

the Department of Defense the provisions of reference (a) and supersedes 

reference (b). All directives, orders, or instructions relating to COMSEC 

matters issued by any authorities within the Department of Defense which 

are inconsistent or at variance with the provisions of this Directive 

will be rescinded or revised in consonance therewith. 

2. The Department of Defense has been designated by reference (a) 

as Executive Agent of the Government for all COMSEC matters. 

3. The National Security Agency (NSA) was authorized by reference 

(c) and established by reference (d). Reference (b) assigned to the 

,Director, NSA, on en interim basis, the responsibility for COMSEC 

activities and related matters previously assigned to the Director, 

Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). The Director, NSA, has now been 

designated to act for the Executive Agent in all COMSEC matters set 

forth in paragraphs 2d(l) through 2d(l3) of reference (a) and any others 

which may be specified by the "Special Committee of· the National Security , 

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... ; 

Council for COMSE.C Matters", or the "United States Communications 

Security Board" (hereinafter referred to as the Board). With respect 

to the military departments, the Director, NSA, will perform his COMSEC 

functions under the immediate direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

4. In f'ulfilling his COMSEC responsibilities, the Director, NSA, 

will be governed by the provisions of reference (a), and in the fields 

of cryptosecurity, transmission security, physical· security, and cover and 

deception, it shall be his responsibility: 

a. To obtain from the Joint Chiefs of Stat~ and/or military 

dep~rtments such information as he may require in performing his f'unctione, 

as authorized in this directive. 

b. To prescribe, or review and approve, the cryptoprinciples 

incorporated or to be incorporated in any telecommunications equipments 

and systems and in any COMSEC equipments and systems. 

. c. To prescribe, or review and approve, cryptosecuri ty rules 

regulations, and instructions applicable to the operation and use of any 

crypto-equipments and systems and of any COMSEC equipments and systems. 

d. To perform technical analysis of military telecommunications 

tor the purpose of determining ~e degree of COMSEC being provided by the 

cryptoprinciples, materials and procedures used, as well as the effect on 

COMSEC of the cormnunications procedures and practices being utilized; making 

arrangements with the military departments to obtain the material required 

for such analysis. 

e. To review and evaluate communications procedures developed 

by the military departments to determine whether such procedures will 

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provide and maintain transmission security; and to recommend revisions 

and additional rules and procedures as required. To accomp~ish this, 

the Director, NSA, may perform technical analyses o'f military telecommunications and shall make the necessary arrangements with the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff' and/or mi11tary departments to obtain the material 

required for such analysis. 

f. To prescribe minimum standards for the physical ~ecuri ty 

of cryptomaterial, in collaboration with the military departments as 

appropriate. 

g. To assist in the preparation of or to review the communications 

portions of all non-tactical cover and deceptio~ plans. To formulate and 

promulgate the basic policies used in such portions. 

h. To receive from the military departments their research . 

and development programs and/or requirements for crypto-equipments and 

• 

materials, and provide for review, coordination, and approval of all such 

research and development _Programs. In so doing, he will ascertain from 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff' the extent of joint or common interest in the 

programs and/or requirements. 

I 

i. In ~onsonance with the policies of the Department of Defense 

and the Joint Chiefs of' Staff, to formulate an integrated program for 

cryptosecurity research and development to meet the requirements of the 

military departments in order to ensure the continuing security of their 

telecommunications. 

J • To provide for the conduct of an integrated research and 

development program adequate to achieve a satisfactory state of cryptosecurity. -

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k. To inform any military department which has expressed 

interest in cryptosecurity research and development projects of the 

progress being made. 

' 1. To receive from the military departments their quantitative 

requirements for crypto-equipments and materials, and provide for review, 

coordination, and approval of all crypto-equipment and material production 

and procurement programs. 

m. In consonance with the policies Of the Department of Defense 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to formulate an integrated program for the 

production and procurement of crypto-equipments and materials. 

n. To produce cryptomaterial necessary to meet the requirements 

of the military departments and to ensure that there is adequate capacity 

to meet these requirements. In so doing, the Director, NBA, by mutual 

agreement will authorize the military departments to engage in the . 

production of cryptomaterial. Such production will be conducted in 

accordance with technical cryptologic criteria prescribed by the Director, 

NSA, and he will be kept informed of the production accomplished. 

o. In meeting operational requirements, to ensure the necessary 

compatibility and, insofar as practicable, the standardization of cryptoequipments and material in order to promote a maximum of efficiency and 

economy in their procurement, operation, and maintenance. Determination 

of the acceptability of an equipment in meeting the operational requirements 

is the responsibility of each military department. 

p. To f'urnish services and materials for the COMSEC program 

of the military departments under mutually agreeable fiscal arrangements. 

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q. To provide technical guidance and support for cryptosecurity 

training conducted by the military departments. 

r. To arrange with the authorized rep~esentatives of a 

military department for required liaison with subordinate elements of 

that department. 

s. To refer violations of COMSEC instructions to the authorized 

representatives of the military department concerned for such action as 

may be deemed necessary, and if appropriate corrective action is not taken, 

refer the matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution or referral 

with appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. 

5. The Director, NSA, shall discharge his responsibilities with 

respect to the military departments in accordance with his own judgment, 

subject to the provisions of this directive. 

6. In COMSEC matters, it shall be the responsibility of the 

military departments: 

a. To organize and conduct their COMSEC activities as they see 

fit subject to the provisions of law, the directives of the President, 

the provisions of reference {a), and the provisions ot this directive. 

Nothing in this directive shall relieve the military departments of their I 

responsibi~ities tor executing all measures required to assure the security 

and efficiency of their own telecommunications. 

b. To provide all lawful assistance required by the Board. 

c. T~ provide the Director, NSA, with· such information and 

logistic and other assistance as he may require in the performance of 

his functions, as authorized in this directive. 

5 

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·-· ~9.1! NPJA9sEctTRITY INFORMATION 

CONF'IDENT!A"L - SECtlM'fY IM SflMA'flON 

d. To furnish in a mutually agreeable manner to the Director, 

NSA, the materials necessary for his technical analysis of military 

telecommunications. 

e. To submit all research and development requirements for 

crypto-equipments and material to the Director, NSA, and to keep him 

currently advised of any changes therein. 

f. To accomplish in a mutually agreeable manner such COMSEC 

research and development projects as may be authorized by the Director, 

NSA. Subject to prior notification to and approval by the Director, NSA, 

to initiate and conduct such research and development projects as may be ..-

necessary to support their COMSEC activities. 

g. To determine the acceptability of crypto-equipments in 

meeting their expressed operational requirements. Military departments 

will :furnish the Director, NSA, timely notification of service test. 

findings. When equipment developed to meet joint or common requirements 

is service tested, the.department~ concerned will coordinate their service 

tests in order to achieve maximum results with the procurement of the 

minimum number of service test models. 

h. To submit all quantitative requirements for crypto-equipments 

and materials to the Director, NSA, in accordance with procedures established 

by him. 

i. To organize, train, equip, operate, administer, budget for, 

and provide logistic support to their respective COMSEC activities. This 

will include provision of reserve programs to meet emergency or wartime 

requirements. 

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)~ 

..... 

. ... 

CONF'IDENTIAL - B!!:eUR'ffi :efti'~RH/Vi'IQJ1 

.j. To perform, under mutually agreeable arrangements, such 

COMSEC tasks and functions as may be requested by the Director, NSA. 

k. To provide the neces~ary COMSEC facilities and resources 

for the support of the military effort, in accordance with the reeponsibilities of the military departments. 

7. The Director, NSA, will arrange.with the appropriate authorities 

of departments and agencies of the Government outside the Department ot 

Defense for the exercise of the authority over COMSEC matters granted 

in paragraph 2 of reference (a)~ 

8. In accordance with th~ policies established by the Board, and 

in behalf of the Executive Agent of the Government for all COMSEC matters, 

the Director, NSA, will conduct the liaison on technical COMSEC and related 

matters with the cryptologic authorities of foreign nations and international organizations. The military departments shall be invited~ 

participate in any international conference called for the purpose of 

determining the crypto-equipments, proced-ures, and/or materials to be 

used to provide security to communications between the military forces of · 

the United States and those of other countries. 

9. Appeals from any decision of the Board by the Director. NSA, or 

by the representative of any of the military departments, shell be filed 

only with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. In the event that a 

military department objects to any decision of the Director, NSA, that 

department will call the matter to the attention of the Director, NSA. 

If the matter in question cannot be resolved after consideration by the 

7 

CONFIDENTIAL 
'"' . :· . .-~~,~~. ------------------------------······· iQN tEIERE~I t\:9sscuRRY INFORM>d'ION 

Director,, NSA, and t~~ department concerned, that department will refer 

the matter to the Joint Chiefs of. Staff for resolution or referral with 

appropriate recormnendations to the Secretary of Defense. 

10. If in the implementation of COMSEC directives or requirements 

it becomes apparent that 'the primary mission of a military department 

will be adversely affected or its budgetary authorization :will be exceeded, 

such directives or'requirements will be implemented to the greatest extent 

practicable while the conflict is being resolved. 

11. The military departments shall not be required to disclose to 

the.Director, NSA, the Board, or any of its committees the contents of 

any o:f':f'icial communications concerning its activities, if, in the opinion 

of the head of the department, the disclosure would be contrary to the 

national interest. 

12. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to give the Board 

. or any of its representatives the right to inspect the operation of COMSEC 

in any military department without approval by the head thereof. 

13. Special terms used in this directive shall have the meanings 

assigned by reference (a). 

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I 

\ 

eetffi'If3EN'fffi:L - SE6Uftf1'Y IM:FeRM/t:'ff6M 

DISSENTIMG VmPS· OF DmECTOn. NSA. 

1. In the early drafting stages or NSC 168 it was suggested 

that the COMSEC responsibilities of the Director, NSA, with respect 

to the military services should be exercised under the direct 

supervision or the JCS. Since this proposal was in consonance with 

the responsibilities then exercised by the JCS in connection with 

unified commands, I reluctantly agreed to it despite my fear that 

serious practical difficulties would result from placing the JCS 

in the lino of command for COI-ISEC matters. 

2. Subsequently, the proper role of the JCS ws carefully revie~~d in connection with an over-all study of the Defense 

Establishment undertaken by the Rockefeller Committee. ~hat 

Committee found that in practice the JCS had been exercising 

command functions contrary to the provisions or the Natiqnal Security 

Act of 1947, as amended, which constituted the JCS as a planning and 

advisory body 'Without command authority. This finding or the Committee 

was adopted by the President in his message or 30 April 1953, presenting 

to Congress Reorganization Pl.an No. 6. In his message, the President 

carefully delimited the role of tho JCS. The President further indicated 

that the so-called Koy 'West Agreement would be revised to limit the JCS 

to a planning and advisory role in connection with the establishment and di~ection or unified commands. 

J. Immediately following the effective date of Reorganization Plan 

No. 6 of 1953, the Acting Secretary of Defense, on 2 July 1953, in•a 

memorandum to the JCS, requested that certain revisions to the Key 

West Agreement be prepared, including a revision "to clarify the command 

status of the JCS so as to insure that that group does not exercise 

command and to assure its advisory and planning role. 11 Recommended 

revisions, endorsed by the JCS, are contained in JCS 1478/45, and 

eliminate command functions previously assigned to the JCS.· 

4. In my opinion, it would be inconsistent with the role of the 

JCS, as re-defined, to provide that they should exercise "direct 

supervision" over the Director, NSA, in the performance or his COM.SEC 

functions. I am, therefore, unable ~ concur in the language which the 

three services 'Wish to have incorporated in paragraph J or the directive 

which it is proposed that 70u should issue to implement MSC 168 within 

the Department ot Defense. Accordingly, I recommend that the final 

sentence or paragraph 3 be rewritten as followsa "'With respect to the 

military departments, the Director, NSA, in performance or his COMSEC 

functions, will be under the immediate direction of the Joint Chicf s or 

Starr for joint doctrine and for matters relating to joint strategic and 

operational planning." 

Inclosure 2 

CON FI DENT I AL 
eOMfIBENTttL - S!Ctntft! IMP'OftM1tTfOM . 

5." ·r believe that with this change and the other, agreed, provisions, 

the draft directive ~ill correctly describe and adequately provide ror 

the discharge of the planning and advisory function for which the JCS 

is responsible. · 

Inclosure 2 (Continued) 

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-·- :£ .• ~~ NIJ'4Ali SECURITY INFORMA:'l'ION 

DISSENTING VIl!."'WS ·OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NA VY 

1. ·In connection with paragraph 6g of Incl #1, it is recommended 

that the last sentence be reworded as follows: .·"When equipment developed 

to meet joint or common requirements is service teseted, the departments 

concerned will conduct their service tests so es to achieve maximum 

results with the procurement of the minimum number of service test models." 

The present wording requires the departments to "coordinate" their 

service tests. The word""coordinate" is subject to a number of widely 

varying interpretations, one of which is that two or more Services would 

have to conduct service tests jointly; a~other, that one department 

would conduct the service tests for other departments. It is absolutely 

necessary that each department determine independently whether or not 

equipment meets its own operational requirements. Therefore, the word 

"coordinate" confuses the issue and is considered improper in the proposed 

usage. -

2. In connection with paragraph 6k of Incl #1, it is recommended 

that the following wording be used: "To provide within their capabilities 

the necessary COMSEC facilities and resources for the support of-the 

military effort, in accordance with the assigned responsibilities of the 

military departments." The addition of the three underlined words would 

leave responsible authorities free to adopt a desirable balance between 

security and other operational factors within their own Service, should 

circumstances so require, rather than being obliged to satisfy all 

security requirements first. Security is a means to an end, not an end 

in itself. 

Inclosure 3 

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