SUBJECT NUMBER 

USCIB: 23/70 

lEMlAll¥t 

Subject: 

Item 2 of the Agenda for the Eighty-eighth Meeting 

of USCIB, held on 10 July 1953. 

Final Report and Papers of the U.K.-U.S. Conference 

on the Communications Security of the NATO Countries 

(USCIB 23/65). 

The CHAI.filolAN opened discussion on this item by inviting comments 

by the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, Mr. Friedman. 

MR. FRIEDMAN expressed his opinion that the conference report 

spoke pretty well for itself,. and added that he thought the report 

should be approved as rendered. At a meeting on 6 July he said the 

Executive Committee approved the conclusions and recommendations of the 

report with exception of the CIA member who reserved his position on 

one or two points. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR replied that the CIA position had been circulated 

to the Members of the Board as USCIB 23/69. 

MR. FRJ:Eilltf...AN went on to say that there are some loose ends 

remaining to be tied up by a sub-committee or an ad hoc committee. He 

suggested that an ad hoc committee composed of some members of the 

U.S. delegation constitute such a group. He added that specific points 

to be worked out are the preparation of certain appendices and schedules of the communications security technical details, for which a 

small group should be set up in Washington. Also he said there were 

certain other matters to be considered, such as what might be done with 

regard to :improvements in commercial machines which might interfere 

with our future work. He further stated that he was prepared to try to 

answer questions that might be raised by Members of the Board. 

The CHAIRMAN suggested that USCIB 23/69 be taken up since some 

guestion had been raised by the CIA representative, and asked Mr. I luifm hemWOuldm likem tomspeakmonmthat 0 

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eclassifi ed and a roved for release b NSA on 11-20-2014 ursuant to E .0. 1352 

DGA 
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The CHAIRMAN said he thought there was some strength in.the CIA 

position and that until negotiations have been concluded with the 

Fr~nch it will be difficult to tell just what the best procedure 

would be. He inquired if it would be agreeable to approve the report 

and to have another look at the question of the bestmethod 0£ proceeding with the other NATO powers, after we conclude with the French. 

He asked Mr. Friedman if he had any comment on that point. 

MR. FRIEDMAN said he thought the important thing to do is to 

start and see how the French react, and if the French react favorably 

we could then consider the other countries one by one. 

The CHAIRMAN said that CIA would not be estopped by this action 

from raising the question of other possible means of procedure. 

MR· I rgreed~ OGA 

MR. KEAY said he thought that was inherent in the report and he 

believed that the approach to the French was on the basis of further 

NATO approaches. 

.__~~~..-....................... ...-........ -with the statement that they were very mucil 

concerned about the insecurity 0£ the communications of certain NATO 

countries. EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

The CHAIRMAN said he thought the report is approved unless 

there was any other comment. 

CAPTAIN ROEDER said that the Navy approved the report. He added 

that they felt that since five years have elapsed since the problem 

was first presented that it might be desirable to agree at this time 

to vote a deadline on when the problem would be re-examined rather 

than let it go on for another few years. H~ suggested the time limit 

of one year if that was agreeable and added that the problem could 

then be re-examined to see what progress has been made. 

The CHAIRMAN inquired of Captain Taylor i£ there was any objection to Captain Roeder 1s proposal. 

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CAPTAIN TAYLOR replied in the negative. 

The CHAIRMAN then stated the proposal was approved. 

The CHAIRMAN stated that the first matter for implementation was 

the appointment of the cognizant U.S. authority. He asked for suggestions. 

MR. FRIEDMAN stated that in the deliberations of the conference, 

the conferees had originally definitely suggested that the Department 

of State and the Foreign Office be made cognizant authorities for 

ma.king an approach to the French. He added that the specific reference was taken out at the suggestion of the CIA delegate who thought 

it was presmnptuous of the conference to try to tell LSIB and USCIB 

whom to appoint. OGA 

MR.I !suggested the Department of State. 

MR. ARMSTRONG said that the State Department was perfectly 

willing to undertake it on the part of USCIB. He added that he 

assumed that LSIB would appoint the Foreign Office. He added that 

he understood this to be the case and that the actual person to 

approach in the Foreign Office had been agreed in the early stages. 

MR. FRIEDMAN agreed and added that it was J[r. Parodi. 

The CHAIRMAN inquired if there were any other nominations and 

added that the job requires a high degree of diplomacy and skill. 

He said he would look to the State Department for that diplomacy. He 

added that he hoped Mr. Armstrong would take a personal interest in 

the matter. 

MR. ARMSTRONG said he would indeed.. He said he would see that 

the Ambassador, upon whom we would have to rely very heavily, would 

be fully briefed on the matter as to how and when, etc. 

The CHAIRMAN inquired if the matter would be handled in Paris or 

London. 

MR. ARMSTRONG replied that Paris would be best because it would 

prevent the French from having to connnunicate and it could be done 

with less attention drawn to it in Paris than London. 

The CH!IRMAN stated that that would mean getting into higher 

diplomatic circles. 

MR. ARMSTRONG said he thought we should start at the top. The 

first approach, he said, presumably would be to the Minister who 

would raise it in the inner-Cabinet level forthwith for approval 

per se. 

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The CHAIRMAN stated that if there were no other nominations, the 

designation of the State Department as the Cognizant U.S. Authority is 

approved. He pointed out to Mr. Friedman that he thought the U.S. 

element of the Combined Working Group would be the State Department and 

technicians from NSA. 

MR. ARMSTRONG stated that with respect to paragraph 32b, the State 

Department would have to rely very heavily upon NSA and the-others. 

The CHAIRMAN noted that paragraph 32e stated that "Agreement on 

the terms and composition of the Combined-Working Group to be set up in 

Washington to facilitate coordination of this actionrr is required. 

MR. FRIEDMAN said that was referred to in the last sentence of 

paragraph 24. He then proceeded to read this sentence, and added that 

he assumed that the Group would assist the State Department and the 

U.S. members of' this Combined Working Group. 

The CHAIRMAN said it could be left up to the Cognizant U.S. 

Authorities to see that the Combined Working Group is set up. 

MR. FRIEDMAN said he thought that many of these details could be 

worked out by the Executive Connnittee. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR asked if it was the sense of the Board that the 

initial action on the Combined Working Group will be referred to the 

Executive Committee by the Cognizant U.S. Authorities. 

MR. ARMSTRONG replied that it was his understanding that it 

would be. 

The CHAIRMAN stated that the above action was approved. 

The CHATIW'.iAN suggested that the Executive Secretary advise the 

British of the action ta.ken at this meeting. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR said he would prepare a suitable document. 

DECISION: (10 July 1953) USCIB approved the final report and papers 

of the US/UK conference on Allied (NATO) communications security as a 

basis for negotiations with the U.K. and agreed that U.K. authorities 

would be so notified. 

It was agreed, further, that: 

(1) The Department of State would be the "Cognizant U.S. 

Authority11 • 

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(2) As "Cognizant U.S. Authority" the Department of State 

would take action as necessary and appropriate to 

refer to the Executive Connnittee the problem of initial 

action in the establishment of the Combined Working 

Group in Washington. 

(3) No member would be estopped from raising the question 

of desirability of using other than NATO channels after 

negotiations with the French have been undertaken. 

(4) That this problem will be reviewed by the Board at 

approximately one year from date. 

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