CSNR

DEC

2021

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

December 2021

4C-1000 — THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NRO HEADQUARTERS STAFF - 1962-1990

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

DECEMBER 2021

— THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 

NRO HEADQUARTERS STAFF

(1962 - 1990)

 by Col Charles "Phil" Datema, USAF (Ret.)

 with The Honorable Martin Faga

 Gen Thomas Moorman, USAF (Ret.)

Ms. Joanne Isham

 Maj Gen Donald Hard, USAF (Ret.)

Brig Gen James Beale, USAF (Ret.)

 Col Bill Savage, USAF (Ret.)

4C-1000
Center for the Study of National Reconnai

The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) is an independent National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) research body reporting to the Director/Business Plans and Operations 

Directorate, NRO. The CSNR’s primary objective is to advance national reconnaissance and make 

available to NRO leadership the analytic framework and historical context to make effective policy 

and programmatic decisions. The CSNR accomplishes its mission by promoting the study, dialogue, 

and understanding of the discipline, practice, and history of national reconnaissance. The CSNR 

studies the past, analyzes the present, and searches for lessons for the future.

Contact Information: Phone, 703-227-9368; or e-mail, csnr@nro.mil

To Obtain Copies: Government personnel may obtain additional printed copies directly from 

CSNR. Other requesters may purchase printed copies by contacting the Government Publishing Office. 

Selected CSNR publications are available on the Internet at the NRO web site.

Published by

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance

14675 Lee Road

Chantilly, Virginia 20151-1715

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800 D.C. area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC Washington, D.C. 20402-0001

ISBN: 978-1-937219-26-0
iii

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ....................................................................................................................................... v

PREFACE ........................................................................................................................................ vii

JIMMIE D. HILL DEDICATION ........................................................................................................ ix

PROLOGUE ....................................................................................................................................... xi

4C-1000 ....................................................................................................................................... xiv

CHAPTER 1

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2

Themes ....................................................................................................................................... 3

NRO Mission ........................................................................................................................ 4

Special Security ...................................................................................................................... 4

Streamlined Processes ......................................................................................................... 6

CHAPTER 3

People of the NRO Staff ................................................................................................................. 13

CHAPTER 4

External Environment ...................................................................................................................17

The Early Years—Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations (1962-1974) .........18

The Middle Years—Ford and Carter Administrations (1974-1980) ............................... 20

The Later Years—Reagan and Bush Administrations (1980-1990) ............................... 22

CHAPTER 5

Organization of the NRO Staff ....................................................................................................... 23

Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 23

The Early Years (1962-74) ..................................................................................................... 24

The Middle Years (1974-80) .................................................................................................. 26

The Later Years (1980-90) .................................................................................................... 29

CHAPTER 6

Roles and Functions of the NRO Staff .......................................................................................... 31

Roles of the Staff ......................................................................................................... 31

Functions of NRO Staff ......................................................................................................... 34

Security .................................................................................................................................. 34
 iv

1962 - 1990

Personnel ............................................................................................................................... 36

Satellite Operations ............................................................................................................. 38

Policy ....................................................................................................................................... 40

Launch .................................................................................................................................... 45

Budget and Legislative Liaison .......................................................................................... 50

Communications .................................................................................................................. 53

Technology ............................................................................................................................ 57

Program Formulation and Monitoring ........................................................................... 59

Studies, Plans, and Analysis ................................................................................................ 63

CHAPTER 7

End of the Beginning: Laying Foundations for Today’s NRO .................................................. 69

APPENDIX 1

NRO Staff Directors ........................................................................................................................ 72

APPENDIX 2

Office of Missile and Satellite Systems .......................................................................................... 75

APPENDIX 3

List of Interviews ............................................................................................................................. 78

APPENDIX 4

National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation ........................................................................... 80

APPENDIX 5

Contributors ....................................................................................................................................... 83

APPENDIX 6

Glossary ............................................................................................................................................. 85

ENDNOTES .......................................................................................................................................... 89

INDEX ........................................................................................................................................................................... 93
v

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

FOREWORD

The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) regularly receives questions on 

how the National Reconnaissance Office’s executive level activities were conducted in the past. This 

publication will allow insight into NRO executive practices as carried out by the NRO Staff for nearly 

thirty years. The Staff was located in the Pentagon and concentrated in the 4C-1000 suite, directly 

supporting the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

The NRO Staff was always a small organization with significant responsibilities such as security, 

personnel, policy, program formulation and monitoring, congressional affairs, technology, and 

communications support. Today’s NRO has offices for each of those functions carried out previously by 

the much smaller NRO Staff. Consequently, those currently serving in these NRO offices can read this 

publication and better understand the origins of NRO staff functions that are still carried out today.

As missions and responsibilities of organizations evolve, so do the staffs supporting those 

missions and responsibilities. The default assumption of many readers is that bureaucracies grow for 

no specific reason. This narrative is a counter-factual to that assumption. First, the relative size of the 

Staff was always small—beginning with approximately two score of staff members and never growing 

to more than four score. Second, the decisions to expand the Staff or to change its organization were 

taken with care to improve staff effectiveness while minimizing the diversion of resources from core 

mission activities to staffing functions. This publication provides excellent insight into the evolution 

of an organization with an eye toward balanced effectiveness and efficiency. As such, it is a treatise 

that will resonate with those who seek better management practices for their own organizations.

As the NRO has emerged from a highly classified organization to one that now has strong 

relationships with the larger US government and commercial space communities, this history 

will assist readers from those communities to better understand the origins of the NRO. Insight 

into the origins will assist those in both government and commercial space communities in their 

understanding of why and how the NRO carries out its operations. Legacy has profound influence on 

contemporary operations, and the NRO is no different in this regard.

While the NRO has always had a small staffing footprint relative to the resources devoted to 

national reconnaissance programs, many individuals have worked in NRO programs during the 

organization’s sixty-year history. Those individuals—the alumni of the NRO—should also find this 

narrative interesting and relevant. Upon their reflection after reading the history, they will hopefully 

find more insight into why the NRO operated as it did while they served the organization.

Finally, students and scholars of national reconnaissance will have another important resource 

for their own research efforts. This publication was crafted by those who served on the NRO Staff 

and reviewed by individuals who were closely associated with the NRO Staff for a number of years. 

Accordingly, the reflections in this history reliably document the activities of the Staff, why those 

activities were assigned to the Staff, and how those activities helped shape national reconnaissance 

from the early 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s. 

Col Charles P. “Phil” Datema, USAF (Ret.) faithfully and diligently led the effort to document the 

history of the NRO Staff. He did so with grace, humor, and great professionalism. His contributions to 

the study of national reconnaissance will endure and benefit those who seek more understanding 

of national reconnaissance. As Col Datema indicates in his preface, many other hands helped author 

the NRO Staff history. They too have made an important and lasting contribution to the discipline 
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1962 - 1990

of national reconnaissance studies. Mr. Michael J. Suk, NRO Chief of Historical Documentation and 

Research, and former NRO Staff member Brig Gen James R. “Jim” Beale, USAF (Ret.) made substantial 

and commendable contributions to help bring this history to publication.

This history, like all published histories, will cause readers to reflect on their experiences and bring 

to the fore insights that may not have been captured here or before. As is always the case, we invite 

readers of this history to share those insights to assist in the ongoing historical documentation efforts 

of national reconnaissance. 

 James D. Outzen, Ph.D.

Director,

 Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance

 National Reconnaissance Office
vii

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

PREFACE

When I casually suggested to Dr. Bob McDonald, at the time the Director of the Center for the 

Study of National Reconnaissance, in January 2013 that a history of the NRO Staff should be written, 

little did I comprehend the scope of the task, or more to the point, that he would suggest that I 

personally lead the effort. Without giving it much thought, I agreed, confident the volume could be 

completed in nine months, a year at the most. I was fortunate to recruit Joanne Isham* and Col Bill 

Savage (USAF, Ret.).† Soon thereafter, Maj Gen Don Hard (USAF, Ret.),‡ Brig Gen Jim Beale (USAF, Ret.),§

Gen Tom Moorman (USAF, Ret.),¶ and former NRO Director Martin Faga** joined the team, each as 

former NRO Staff members, and now as primary contributors as authors and editors—and yes, all as 

incredible story-tellers.

As a team, we reviewed hundreds of classified and declassified documents and conducted more 

than 50 interviews, often following up with multiple phone calls with former Staff members, NRO 

Directors, program office personnel, intelligence community leaders, and Congressional staffers. 

We even had the privilege of interviewing the first two Directors of the NRO, Joseph Charyk and 

Brockway McMillan; Dr. Charyk was 94 and Dr. McMillan 99 at the times of our interviews. Admittedly 

though, we were not always able to reach back as deeply as we would have preferred into the 1960s 

and early 1970s for much of our research but were able to rely on documentation, which actually is 

quite rich within the CSNR archives. 

The primary question that drove our research, posed by a very senior leader of the intelligence 

community, was ‘Why would anyone write a history of a government staff?’ We set out to answer that 

question and, more specifically, the following additional questions:

1. What were the roles and responsibilities and organization of the NRO Staff, and how 

did the NRO Staff adapt to external events over time?

2. What were the recurring themes and messages offered by the research of the Staff?

3. What were the impacts and lessons learned from the NRO Staff that could be 

applied to future defense and intelligence challenges, particularly as they relate to 

small staffs operating in a highly covert, streamlined environment?

Rather than organizing this history merely as a detailed chronological accounting of events, we 

have also attempted to identify key enduring thematic messages throughout the history of the 

Staff. The time period (bookends) we chose for this accounting are, on the left, in September 1962 

when Dr. Charyk formally established the NRO Staff and, on the right, in January 1990 when the NRO 

Staff Director relocated from the Pentagon, and the Staff began to morph into a new organizational 

construct, which included the 100+ person Plans and Analysis group. Technically, the Staff functions 

continued to exist in the new “INT-based” NRO organization. The declassification of “the fact of” the 

NRO followed in September 1992.

* NRO Staff member, 1987-90, and CIA Director for Science and Technology, 1998-01.

† NRO Staff member, 1986-90, and former member of NRO Plans & Analysis.

‡ NRO Staff member, 1980-82, and NRO Staff Director, 1987-89.

§ NRO Staff member, 1976-82, and former White House National Space Council staff member.

¶ NRO Staff member, 1975-77, NRO Staff Director, 1985-87, Commander, Air Force Space Command, 1990-92, and 

 Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, 1994-97.

** NRO Staff member, 1975-77, HPSCI Permanent Staff, 1977-89, and Director, NRO, 1989-93.
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1962 - 1990

I am most indebted to the team who supported this effort, many of whom have been cited 

earlier but in particular, Brig Gen Jim Beale, who was always asking how he could help, researching, 

challenging, polishing difficult sections, and always asking the right questions. And of course, I 

must recognize General Tom Moorman, who enthusiastically agreed to support this monograph. He 

continually encouraged and challenged us to discover the themes, the messages, hidden amongst all 

the information, providing his keen insight throughout the process. Despite his other commitments, 

he always supported our working sessions and reminded me that he was only a phone call away until 

shortly before his passing on 18 June 2020. He is sorely missed as a visionary, mentor and friend. 

Looking back at the past eight years of this adventure, I find myself reflecting on the same question 

I asked myself after reporting for duty in 1987, sitting at the NRO conference table in “the NRO suite” 

buried in the Pentagon, intimidated and pondering, “how did I get into this mess?” But the answer is 

the same in both circumstances—knowing what I do now, reflecting back, I would not have missed 

either opportunity for anything—opportunities of a lifetime, interacting with General Moorman and 

so many of this nation’s most talented and committed pioneers in this incredible National Security 

Space community.

 Col Charles P. “Phil” Datema, USAF (Ret.)

NRO Staff, 1987-89
ix

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

 THIS HISTORY IS DEDICATED TO HONOR 

THE MEMORY OF 

JIMMIE D. HILL 

This history would not be complete without 

acknowledging the significant influence Jimmie Hill had over 

the decisions that changed the course of events, the careers 

of the people who served, and the capabilities of the systems 

produced by the National Reconnaissance Office.

I worked with and knew Jimmie for over 42 years; when 

he first retired as a major in the Air Force and took over as the 

CFO of the NRO; and in his other capacities as Staff Director, 

Deputy Director, sometimes as acting Director, and later as a 

Trustee of the Aerospace Corporation.

Everyone who encountered Jimmie remembered 

him and had a story to tell. They ranged from serious to 

funny, but all were very complimentary. And they all had 

a common theme: “if you wanted to get something done 

in the NRO, go see Jimmie and get him on your side.” When 

you first met Jimmie, he came across as “very tall, imposing, 

and imperious.” But, he was actually quite the opposite: a 

deep thinker, dedicated to the success of the NRO, and a 

wise counselor. 

Jimmie Hill had an encyclopedic knowledge of “all the NRO programs and their issues, plans and 

budgets.” He would often accompany the Director to the congressional hearings and was well known by 

senators, congressmen, and staffers. He had “instant credibility” and “operated on the highest principles 

at all times.”

Without a doubt, the many successes of the NRO could not have been accomplished without the 

leadership Jimmie Hill provided over the years. He was “the rock” that held it all together over the good 

times and bad. As you read this history, just think of how things would have been very different without 

his strong influence. 

This country owes him a huge debt of gratitude. Our National Security Space Intelligence programs 

were in his hands, and he delivered! 

 

 Lt Gen Donald L. Cromer, USAF (Ret.)

 NRO Staff Director, 1982-1984 

Mr. Jimmie D. Hill

xi

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

PROLOGUE

Serving as Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War II, 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower oversaw the invasion of France in 1944 and subsequently led Allied 

forces to victory over the Axis powers on the Western Front. After being elected President of the United 

States in 1952, upon taking office in January 1953 he directed his attention to ending the Korean War, 

and he secured an armistice in July between United Nations forces and those of Communist China 

and North Korea, which ended hostilities, if not the war itself.

A few years before, in August 1949, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear weapon and followed up 

in August 1953 by exploding a thermonuclear device. With Tu-4 long range bombers that could deliver 

these weapons against America, the need to know with assurance about Soviet economic resources, 

nuclear capabilities, and military preparations had never been greater. Given his wartime experience, 

President Eisenhower knew periodic overflights could collect reliable intelligence of Soviet strategic 

forces and arms facilities, as well as provide indications and warning of impending nuclear surprise 

attack. Moreover, the intelligence product would also permit him to size American military forces 

to meet real, instead of imagined, threats—with a corresponding savings of national finances. In 

early 1954, the president authorized, and a few trusted advisors established, a clandestine project 

in compartmented channels to acquire precisely this kind of strategic intelligence by conducting 

in peacetime periodic, high-altitude aerial overflights of potential foreign adversaries. By doing so, 

however, the United States would be violating the terms of international aerial navigation treaties 

to which it was a High Contracting Party. Because of the international repercussions certain to occur 

should an aircraft be challenged, the president could not have come to his peacetime overflight 

decision lightly. 

The first of these efforts, the “Sensitive Intelligence” program, known as Sensint, contained within it 

a separate Windfall compartment for Air Force-acquired photographic products, products shared with 

the Central Intelligence Agency. Conducted between early 1954 and the end of 1956, Department of 

Defense directors of Sensint missions relied on available Navy and Air Force military reconnaissance 

fighter airplanes or modified versions of them. Deep penetration overflights employed air-refuellable 

reconnaissance bombers of the Strategic Air Command. Air Force and Navy pilots who flew Sensint 

missions and the military and CIA photo-interpreters who analyzed their Windfall product knew only 

that piece of the puzzle with which they were directly associated. The participants directly involved 

did not discuss these missions with anyone, not even with their compatriots.

The second of President Eisenhower’s overflight programs, which he approved in November 1954, 

produced the high-flying U-2 reconnaissance airplane operated by the CIA with Air Force logistical 

assistance, and piloted by Air Force pilots who represented themselves as civilians. Shrouded within 

its own Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) cocoon between 1955 and mid-1960, fewer 

than 350 individuals, including the Lockheed designers, maintenance personnel, and pilots, knew 

about the U-2 and its actual mission. Known to these few as Aquatone, when overflight operations 

approached in 1956, it was subsumed in the Talent access and control system, an SCI compartment 

whose imagery products were separated into two additional access-limited compartments called 

Chess (European Theater) and Churchdoor (Asian Theater). Indeed, the Sensint and Talent programs 

were so closely held that neither ever appeared in the deliberations of the National Security Council—

not at least until the U-2 “tore its britches,” as one participant phrased it, in May 1960 and thereby 

acquired the unwanted international attention that these missions risked.
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1962 - 1990

The President approved each U-2 mission, and the first two flights over the Soviet Union occurred 

on 4 and 5 July 1956, when U–2s flew over Leningrad and Moscow, respectively, among other regions 

of European Russia. The last flight, however, ended rather more dramatically when, on 1 May 1960, 

the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 deep inside its territory. The resulting international furor mightily 

embarrassed the administration. The President at first offered a “plausible denial” (a weather research 

airplane over Turkey had strayed off course)—a cover story that collapsed after the Soviets produced 

the pilot and charged him with espionage. The U-2 shoot down also ended a Summit Conference 

almost before it began, with Soviet leaders demanding a personal apology from Eisenhower, one 

that was not forthcoming. Nevertheless, Eisenhower announced publicly that the United States 

would not, in the future, conduct clandestine aerial overflights of the Soviet Union, a pledge that he 

and his successors would keep. 

Fortunately for the United States, Eisenhower’s earth orbiting strategic reconnaissance satellites 

succeeded aerial overflights a few months later, beginning successful operations on 18 August 1960. 

On 25 August, Eisenhower approved the formation of a new office that would control operations 

of the Air Force satellite Project Samos. Air Force Secretary Dudley C. Sharp issued the requisite 

organizational directives at the end of the month. The new reconnaissance satellite office, called the 

Office of Missile and Satellite Systems, a name later shortened to Office of Space Systems, within 

the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, would be directed by Air Force Under Secretary Joseph 

Charyk, who in this capacity reported directly to Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates. A special 

projects office on the West Coast, headed by an Air Force flag officer and responsible for the Samos 

project, reported directly to Charyk. This action removed the “regular” Air Force from any direct role 

in American reconnaissance satellites for the remainder of the twentieth century. 

With the CIA-Air Force team’s Corona producing images, and with Samos separated from the 

regular Air Force, on 26 August the president sent a memorandum to the secretaries of state and 

defense, the attorney general, the chairman of the atomic energy commission, and the DCI that 

announced a new Talent-Keyhole security control system that strictly limited access to reconnaissance 

satellite products and activities, as well as controlling the flow of that information. “Within your 

agency,” Eisenhower told its recipients, “you shall be personally responsible for the selection of those 

personnel who will have access to the [reconnaissance satellite] information and for determining the 

scope of that access. Access is to be on a ‘Must-know’ basis related to major national security needs.”*

Underscoring his concern for “Must-know” and the strict need to limit access to this new SCI control 

system, the president directed that the addressees and each member of his staff cleared for TalentKeyhole initial the memorandum to signify that they had read it. Corona’s photographic images, or 

“product,” later would be separated into another compartment within Talent-Keyhole, called Ruff, 

which would remain in effect until the Corona program itself concluded in 1972. 

President Eisenhower introduced technical intelligence collection from satellites to the 

Intelligence Community, and in so doing he created for the United States an intelligence revolution. 

The United States established the National Reconnaissance Office in September 1961 to carry out the 

revolutionary program of intelligence collection from space. For nearly thirty years thereafter, a small 

elite staff would assist the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office in building, managing, and 

improving revolutionary national reconnaissance satellites. 

 R. Cargill Hall

 Former NRO Chief Historian

* Eisenhower, Dwight D., Memorandum for the Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General,

 the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence, 26 August 1960.

 xiv

1962 - 1990

4C-1000

During the period addressed in this history, the existence of the NRO was a 

deeply classified fact. When people referred to it at the unclassified level, they 

often substituted the term “4C-1000” for the name. For example, someone might 

say, “You need to coordinate this with 4C-1000,” or someone at a meeting might 

say, “I’m from 4C-1000.” 

4C-1000, also occasionally referred to as "The Suite" by insiders, was actually 

the Pentagon office where the NRO Deputy Director, the Staff Director, and most 

of the Staff members were housed. It was located on the 4th floor, C ring, room 

1000 — or in Pentagon speak, room 4C-1000. In the early years, the C corridor was 

open between the 9th and 10th corridors, and the Staff members were in offices 

along that ring with numbers like 4C-952 or 4C-1026. The Office of the Deputy 

Director and Staff Director was at the bend in the corridor (room 4C-1000). In 

1977, a construction project blocked off the C ring between corridors 9 and 10, 

and the entire area was opened up as a secure compartmented facility. From then 

on, the entire area was labeled room 4C-1000, a euphemism for the NRO Staff.

The Director of the NRO occupied one of the E ring offices between corridors 

8 and 9 overlooking the River Entrance to the Pentagon. The specific office 

depended on whether the DNRO was also the Secretary, Under Secretary, or 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. Thus, his office was essentially around the 

corner from the Staff office space.

In addition to the 4C-1000 area, the Staff also had office spaces in the basement 

of the Pentagon. This area, Pentagon room BD-944 (basement, D ring, room 944), 

was a vault that initially housed the Satellite Operations Center (SOC). After the 

SOC was disestablished in 1977, the space was used by organizations such as NRO 

TENCAP and the Defense Support Program Office staff. There was a five-flight 

stairway that ran from the 4th floor on E Ring to the basement, often referred to by 

Staff members running up and down the stairs as “the heart attack route.” 
1

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

I am honored to write the introductory chapter to this 

history of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Staff. 

I consider my first tour in the NRO, as a field grade officer, 

to be extraordinarily important, as it gave me a breadth of 

unique experience and strong understanding of national 

security space. Later, when I was a brand-new general officer, 

I was privileged to return as leader of the Staff. Moreover, 

the relationships and friendships made during those tours 

continue to the day.

The National Reconnaissance Office was established in 

1961 to manage the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) 

in developing, acquiring, and operating the country’s satellite 

reconnaissance systems. The creation of this organization 

was driven by President Eisenhower’s determination that the 

United States would never again be surprised by “another 

Pearl Harbor.” The mission was of the highest priority. The 

technology, the intelligence collected, and even the existence 

of the organization, were highly classified. The organization was led by a Director (DNRO) and the 

reconnaissance systems were developed and operated by program offices—Program A (Air Force), 

Program B (Central Intelligence Agency), Program C (Navy), and until 1974, there was a Program D, 

a joint effort of the CIA and Air Force that developed strategic reconnaissance aircraft. The NRO was 

supported by a relatively small staff at the outset, growing to about 70, including administrative staff. 

The basic organizational structure of the NRO remained relatively constant for nearly 30 years.

Over time there have been both classified and unclassified histories written about the NRO and 

the extraordinary systems that have been built by the program offices. However, there has not been a 

comprehensive account of the role of the Staff over the organization’s first 30 years. This monograph 

addresses that gap. During the first thirty years of the NRO, the small NRO Staff played an outsized 

role in the success of the NRO’s national reconnaissance programs. 

Understanding the role of the NRO Staff begins with an understanding of staff responsibilities. 

First and foremost, the Staff directly supported the DNRO, a senior political appointee in the Air Force. 

Another major function of the Staff was to represent the institutional interests of the NRO, especially 

in the Washington arena. Said a different way, the Staff did its best to try to insulate the program 

offices from external influences and pressures, so that these offices could concentrate on the mission. 

The Staff provided the interface to its stakeholders in space policy entities, the oversight structure, 

the Intelligence Community (IC), the military services, and the civil and commercial space sectors. 

This does not give a complete picture of the role of the NRO Staff, thus requiring a more complete 

historical account.

General Thomas S. Moorman Jr., 

USAF (Ret.)
 2

1962 - 1990

To my knowledge, this history is a somewhat unique undertaking, as the activities of a staff are 

generally considered strictly a support function whose responsibilities are secondary to the operation 

and execution of the line organization’s mission. In the period covered by this history, there were 

significant technological and environmental changes that affected the NRO:

• New reconnaissance system developments and the associated program office 

competition.

• Significant budget growth.

• Expansion from a strictly strategic orientation to include tactical support to military 

operations.

• Increase in oversight, especially with the creation of the congressional intelligence 

committees.

• Turmoil in the launch area, with the NRO programs changing from expendable rockets 

to the Space Shuttle and back to expendables. 

• The general “whitening”—emergence and awareness—of the NRO.

Reviewing how the Staff dealt with these and other challenges is not only an interesting story 

but also is essential to understanding the evolution of the NRO. Additionally, this history can 

provide lessons-learned that could be useful for managing other very high priority, time-sensitive, 

technology-driven programs.

There is also an important human dimension to this narrative. The Staff’s ability to handle these 

challenges was due in no small part to the streamlined management authorities afforded to the 

NRO because of the criticality of the mission. A critical element of this streamlined management was 

selective manning where each Staff member was handpicked, and the tours of duty were stable. 

Thus, the capabilities of the people were remarkable. The organization had a short decision cycle 

with ready access to leadership. Each individual was considered an expert on his or her program, 

and staffers were empowered to act. It is important to underscore that, given the scope of their 

responsibilities, these individuals were relatively junior compared to other organizations with similar 

responsibilities. As a side note, people who served on the Staff were highly successful in their later 

government assignments and with industry.

This introduction would not be complete without acknowledging the role of Colonel Phil Datema, 

USAF (Ret.) in making this history a reality. He was the one who recognized the need to document this 

story. Without his tireless efforts and dogged persistence over many years, the monograph would not 

have been published. I would also like to thank Dr. Bob McDonald (Director Emeritus of the Center for 

the Study of National Reconnaissance) and his staff for their research and editorial support.

 General Thomas S. Moorman Jr., USAF (Ret.) 

NRO Staff Director, 1985-87

Commander, USAF Space Command, 1990-92

 Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, 1994-97
3

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Chapter 2

THEMES

During the course of researching for this history, a number of recurring themes were found. While 

these themes were not individually unique to the NRO Staff, the collection as a whole distinguishes 

the NRO Staff from most other government staff organizations. These distinguishing themes begin to 

answer the question, “Why would one undertake writing a history some 30 years after the organization 

was assimilated into a much larger, restructured National Reconnaissance Office?” What were the 

unique characteristics of this staff organization, referred to simply as “4C-1000,” the Pentagon office 

of this highly covert staff organization during most of its existence? We will briefly highlight these key 

themes in this chapter, providing supportive detail in the following sections. 

Theme 1: CRITICALITY AND SENSITIVITY — The criticality and sensitivity of the 

NRO mission drove the need for special security, which was enabled by streamlined 

management processes, a hallmark of the NRO.

The NRO was created by President Eisenhower in response to his conviction that the United States 

should never experience another Pearl Harbor—this during a time when America’s visibility into 

its dominant threat, the Soviet Union, was at best, limited. This critical national threat called for an 

unconventional organization, with unconventional security and management processes removing 

many of the checks and balances characteristic of conventional programs and organizations. Essential 

to success, this critical and sensitive mission had to be recognized by those at every government level. 
 4

1962 - 1990

NRO Mission

The National Reconnaissance Program was a single program, national in character, to meet the 

intelligence needs of the Government under a strong national leadership, for the development, 

management, control, and cooperation of all the projects, both current and long range, for the 

collection of intelligence and mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights 

(excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations). The potentialities of U.S. technology and 

all operational resources and facilities must be aggressively and imaginatively exploited to 

develop and operate systems for the collection of intelligence which are fully responsive to 

the Government’s intelligence needs and objectives.1 Key words here are “single program, 

national...all projects...for collection of intelligence...through overflights [satellite and airborne].”2

 The sensitivity and criticality of the NRO mission drove the need for special security and streamlined 

processes at every level in executing the National Reconnaissance Program.

Special Security

As unusual as it might be for a President to sign written instructions to Cabinet officers regarding 

the need for secrecy and security practices, President Eisenhower emphasized the importance of 

the content of security “indoctrination” briefings, or initial security instructions, at the time of first 

exposure to this class of information. He directed that every individual be approved and briefed on 

the fragility and sensitivity of the information, as well as their protection obligations. As a result, those 

Presidential instructions were implemented by the NRO and other components of the Intelligence 

Community by policies, practices, and procedures that rigorously applied the requirement to 

diligently ensure individuals were qualified for access, to restrict the need for “Must-know” decision 

authority, to disclose details of the NRP only to the level required for specific operations or required 

support, and to manage carefully the flow of information that would potentially expose the NRP or 

inhibit its operational efficiency and mission effectiveness. The NRO security staff was the Director of 

Central Intelligence (DCI)’s and DNRO’s executive agent for orchestrating and overseeing execution 

of the President’s and DCI’s security direction in the NRO and Executive Branch.

I hereby direct that the products of satellite reconnaissance, and information of the fact 

of such reconnaissance revealed by this product, shall be given strict security handling 

under the provisions of a special security control system approved by me. I hereby approve 

the Talent-Keyhole Security Control System for this purpose...Within your agency, you 

shall be personally responsible for the selection of those personnel who will have access 

to the foregoing information and for determining the scope of that access. Access is to 

be on a “must know” basis related to major national security needs.... When they are 

indoctrinated, they shall be informed of my specific direction to them that the provisions 

of the special Security Control System I have approved be strictly complied with...the 

responsibility for the selection of personnel may be delegated only to the senior intelligence 

chief or chiefs within the agencies serving as members of the U.S. Intelligence Board.3

 —Dwight D. Eisenhower 

 26 August 1960
5

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

This memorandum, signed by the President one year before the creation of the National 

Reconnaissance Office, set the tone, invoking the Talent-Keyhole (TK) security control system 

in limiting the exposure of the “fact of” and details of satellite reconnaissance. The Talent control 

system was created in the mid-1950s for the U-2 and other airborne reconnaissance programs. It 

was expanded in 1960 to the Talent-Keyhole control system to protect the products of satellite 

reconnaissance systems. Incidentally, it can be argued that with President Eisenhower’s 1960 memo 

in which he personally controlled the access approval process, the White House, not the Central 

Intelligence Agency or Department of Defense (DoD), virtually assumed ownership of the TalentKeyhole security control system. 

This fundamental recognition of the importance of overhead reconnaissance and the need 

to maintain the covert nature of the NRO, and the systems it managed, drove everything. Security 

management was the first priority to protect the country’s capabilities so that adversaries could not 

deny or deceive the nation. The need for security permeated everything and dictated how the enterprise 

was organized and staffed, as well as how projects were acquired and operated. For example, the 

enterprise enjoyed the highest defense supply chain priority, called “Brickbat 1.” Exercising this priority 

could demand support from any national security or industrial base entity. Speed and responsiveness 

to needs were judged essential. This led to the highly streamlined decision chain that included a flat 

staff structure and a waiver of much of the staff oversight that would be normal for programs of the 

magnitude and importance of those managed by the NRO. There was a willingness to accept more 

than the normal financial and technical risk to achieve rapid results and security.

Examples of NRO Streamlined Management4

As a national organization, the NRO is integrated and interagency-manned by highly qualified 

personnel motivated by their NRP mission to provide the necessary objectivity to their 

decision makers. Historically, the program has been marked by a high stability of personnel 

manning, which has been beneficial to continuity and effectiveness. This stability stems from 

the high program priority. 

• The DNRO...has resource allocation authority within a fenced budget. This 

provides...budget flexibility.

• The DNRO has direct access to his line organization elements. This short vertical 

up and down chain makes his programs highly responsive and makes him 

directly accessible to his program managers.

• The DNRO controls end-to-end system contracting and procedures which, 

therefore, makes it responsive.

• The NRP enjoys strict internal review by select audit organizations and personnel. 

This limits indiscriminate reviews by any number of agencies that might feel a 

necessity to intervene in NRP matters.

The special security required for collection system protection provides a management spinoff by allowing conduct of NRP system acquisition, conduct, and operations in, essentially, 

a sanctuary environment. This environment prevents unwarranted external intrusion into 

NRP activities.
 6

1962 - 1990

Toward the end of the Staff’s history, however, the mission of the NRO became less critical from a 

standpoint of national survival and less sensitive due to general acceptance of satellite reconnaissance. 

The Iron Curtain was eroding, and the risk of catastrophic surprise was no longer an overriding 

threat. With a number of authorized and unauthorized disclosures, the NRO mission had also lost 

much of its sensitivity, and all of this impacted the Staff. Accordingly, NRO Directors Edward ("Pete") 

Aldridge and Martin Faga each initiated internal studies, initially conducted by the NRO Staff, which 

ultimately led to declassifying the fact of the NRO’s existence and limited details of the Office in 1992.5

The Byeman security system was later replaced to allow for more reasonable processes for balancing 

protection and disclosure of program information.

Streamlined Processes

More than a guiding principle, streamlined management was directed by the early founders of 

the National Reconnaissance Program. In a memo from Roswell L. Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, to Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, Gilpatric directed, “Within the Department 

of Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency for management and 

conduct of the NRP, and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management 

procedures involving direct control from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Reconnaissance 

System Project Directors in the field, without intervening reviews or approval.”6

The following summer, the Director of the NRO Joseph V. Charyk assigned responsibility to the 

NRO Staff in assisting the DNRO in establishing and maintaining effective streamlined management 

procedures appropriate to the mission of the NRO and consistent with the security considerations 

which apply, stating:

The NRO will be kept as small as possible in order to operate with the efficiency and 

quick reaction time required. The Office will consist of carefully selected personnel 

of the highest qualifications and will be confined to the minimum number required 

to accomplish the task under the conditions which apply. By arranging these 

personnel so that other, larger groups may be controlled through overt (additional 

duty) assignments of NRO Program Directors, the actual size of the NRO may be kept 

quite small, and thus more easily concealed, although the size of the personnel and 

resources directly controlled (in industry, for example) is necessarily large.7

The NRO was granted a great deal of flexibility in budget planning and execution. From 

inception, it incrementally funded the satellite programs, avoiding large budget variations 

from year to year. This also enabled it to modify satellites in development to take advantage 

of advancing technologies or address evolving requirements. It also had the authority to carry 

forward any unspent budget from year to year. These authorities provided flexibility to address 

satellite failures in response to urgent requirements without the need to request a “new start” 

authority, supplemental funding or a reprogramming action, or to lose unspent budget due to 

expiring funds. The NRO’s budget was reviewed and approved through a very streamlined process. 
7

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

A four-person NRP Executive Committee (EXCOM)*

had authority to authorize new programs or 

modifications to existing programs without further 

review within the executive branch. Congressional 

review was limited to the Armed Forces Committee 

Chairs and staff directors in each house. 

Beginning in the mid-1970s, the NRO faced its 

greatest challenges to its streamlined practices 

from external sources, including Congress and an 

expanding user base. According to Martin Faga, 

former NRO Staff member and NRO Director, “The 

expanded user base meant more stakeholders 

seeking service from the NRO and the need for more 

requirements setting and active budgeting by the 

DCI. The NRO budget escalated, reaching a peak in 

the mid-80s.”8

Despite external challenges to NRO Staff streamlined practices with adjustments in its management 

process, the NRO continued to function efficiently in comparison to conventional government staff 

organizations during the mid- to late 1970s and early 1980s. For example, the NRO Staff continued 

to practice selective manning and retention of key personnel. Staff members were empowered by 

leadership, often representing the NRO at White House, Congressional, and Intelligence Community 

forums. Special security procedures were quickly developed, relying primarily on accountability and 

best judgment, rather than a set of rules. Staff growth was minimized. 

Finally, in the late 1980s, streamlined processes, long the hallmark of the NRO, began to give way 

to normalization, a necessary response due to the NRO’s changing external environment, which is 

the subject of the following chapter. 

Theme 2: AGILITY AND ADAPTABILITY — The NRO Staff rapidly adapted to the 

changing environment (e.g., threat, technology, oversight, and employment, as well 

as internal demands for decision support).

The NRO, during the years that the Staff existed, was in a nearly continual state of change. It started 

as a highly covert organization with only a few senior leaders aware of its existence, and its systems had 

short lives and served only a few, but very important, intelligences purposes. By 1990, the organization 

managed a large array of highly capable and long-lived satellite systems that served nearly every 

intelligence need and were essential for the conduct of military operations. Throughout that transition, 

the Staff was instrumental to the NRO’s successful adaption to the changing environment. 

* The EXCOM, established in August 1965, ”reduced the authority of the Director [of the NRO], transferring many of 

the rights and responsibilities [to] three voting (and one non-voting) members: the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of 

Central Intelligence, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and (non-voting) the Director, National 

Reconnaissance Office...The functions allocated to the National Reconnaissance Program were in many respects defined more 

clearly than those assigned in earlier [instructions]....It was not all that clear however, whether the National Reconnaissance 

Office had sufficient authority to exercise those functions. [A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Robert L. Perry, p. 73]

“The whole idea was to keep (the NRO) 

streamlined.” It was created in response 

to an urgent crisis. “We didn’t need or 

want to go through many channels to 

achieve our goals. We needed to make 

decisions promptly and not worry 

about the bureaucracy.” 

 — Dr. Joseph Charyk, 

 26 September 2014
 8

1962 - 1990

In that capacity, the Staff had to deal with all the changes that drove increased complexity. The 

chart below provides a visual picture of how this complexity increased over time. TIME

Early Years Middle Years Later Years

1962-1974 1974-1980 1980-1990

COMPLEXITY

•	 Technology push 

•	 Primarily strategic 

users

•	 EXCOM/minimal 

oversight

•	 Single mission, 

space-centric 

architectures

•	 Restricted industrial 

base

•	 More capable systems

•	 Budget constraints 

•	 DoD/DCI priority 

conflicts

•	 Increased oversight 

in both Executive & 

Legislative branches 

•	 Expanding user base

•	 ASAT Threat

•	 Spies & security 

compromises

•	 Increasing use of 

shared infrastructure 

(e.g. STS)

•	 Priority debates

•	 Complex, multi-system 

architectures

•	 Increased support to military 

users

•	 More capable systems

•	 Challenger loss and shuttle 

recovery

•	 Increased oversight

•	 Expanding user base 

•	 DARPA/SDIO space initiatives

•	 Government Continuity and 

Survivability issues

•	 Internal competition

This complexity was driven by a number of factors:

Advances in Technology. In the early years of the NRO, the limitations were technical, the 

acquisition contracts sole-source, the satellites short-lived, and the users important, but few. 

Continual advances in technology led to much more capable and long-lived satellite systems 

which cost more, required longer development timelines, and forced trades among potential 

new capabilities. This also led to more industrial competition and more people with a need to 

know about the NRO and its system capabilities.

Expanding User Community. At the beginning, the user community was small, and the 

focus was on avoiding technological surprise and addressing some key intelligence issues 

for the nuclear planning community. As capabilities improved, the number of users and tasks 

increased. Some of the most consequential missions were treaty monitoring and support to 
9

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

military operations (SMO). These increased uses greatly expanded the number of people 

cleared for and involved with NRO systems. 

Expanding Management and Oversight. Early on, oversight and programmatic decisions 

were held at the principle levels in the national security community. The DNRO took direction 

from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and requirements from the United States Intelligence 

Board (USIB). Other government staff elements were not cleared to know of the existence 

of the NRO, and Congress dealt with the programs at the level of committee chairmen and 

ranking members. As the budget increased and decisions became more consequential, the 

amount of staff involvement, both in the executive and congressional branches, continually 

increased, and DNRO decisions became subject to much broader review. 

Increasing Competition for Collection Resources.

Initially, operational tasking was provided by US 

Intelligence Board committees that met several times a 

month. As system capabilities grew and the number and 

diversity of users increased, more inclusive requirements, 

tasking, and funding mechanisms had to be established. 

Support to Military Operations was a particular challenge 

that resulted in numerous institutionalized outreach 

efforts, new programmatic vehicles, new offices within 

the services, NRO system experimentation, and extensive 

staff interactions.

Increasing Interagency and System Interfaces. When first organized, the NRO relied 

on the United States Air Force (USAF) to provide launch services and satellite control services 

through the Air Force Satellite Control Facility, but was otherwise largely self-sufficient. 

Over time, the number of technical and programmatic interfaces between the NRO and 

other government agencies increased. The collaboration on the Space Shuttle was the most 

significant, but there were other coordinated programs and relationships, all of which required 

intensive coordination and negotiation. 

"This is the personal staff of the 

DNRO where the DNRO over 

time confronted vastly different 

situations. He and his staff had to 

adjust...and they did."

 — Martin Faga,

 Former DNRO
 10

1962 - 1990

The DNRO, supported by the NRO Staff, constituted the “Headquarters NRO.” The individual 

program offices concurrently executed the NRP while also maintaining close relationships with their 

home organizations, the Air Force, the CIA, and the Navy. This often led NRO stakeholders to view 

the NRO as a confederation of semi-independent program offices, each with separate reporting 

channels. Thus, one of the key roles of the NRO Staff was to support and promote an integrated 

National Reconnaissance Program. 

Theme 3: REPRESENTATION AND ADVOCACY — The NRO Staff was a small, 

empowered organization that aggressively engaged across the US government and 

industry to ensure that the NRP could be successfully executed.

With the exception of security, the functions the NRO Staff were similar to those performed by 

any military service staff. The NRO Staff, however, was much smaller by comparison with any other 

such staff, at most about 70 professionals, including administrative support, and the Staff size did 

not appreciably change as the complexity of their responsibilities expanded over time. It was a very 

flat organization. For the most part, it was a young group of professionals—the Staff Director was 

normally a junior Brigadier General, and the office directors were mid-level military or civilian officers. 

Each individual was an empowered action officer with direct and frequent access to the Deputy 

Director (DDNRO) and DNRO.

One of the indicators of continuing streamlined management within the NRO Staff is reflected by 

the relatively small size of the Staff and its small growth over time. In spite of the increasing number 

and complexity of NRO programs and the growth of external oversight, the NRO Staff grew from 44 

to 70 individuals, or 59% over its 28-year history, compared to a six-fold increase in NRO resources 

over the same period, when adjusted for inflation.
11

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

The small Staff consistently “punched above its weight.” It was not at all uncommon for a junior 

action officer to interact with counterparts three or four ranks more senior. Staff members were 

viewed as subject matter experts and were trusted to use their judgment in interactions with other 

institutions. The action officers frequently interacted directly with the DNRO and DDNRO, both to 

get direction and to provide feedback on external interactions. Representative interactions included:

• Participating in the continual Washington-area intelligence community forums, which 

included the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX),* the SIGINT 

Committee,† and the Civil Applications Committee.‡

• Supporting the National Security Council (NSC) and proposing policy language that impacted 

documents subsequently published as Presidential Directives.

• Negotiating interagency agreements with the National Security Agency (NSA), the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and others. 

• Representing the NRO in IC trade studies and program priority debates.

• Providing support and involvement in all key studies leading to the creation of Air Force 

Space Command.

• Providing briefings to key decision makers such as the President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board (PFIAB), military Combatant Commanders and senior service leaders, and in 

several instances, the political leader of an allied country that participated in some aspect of 

satellite reconnaissance.

• Finally, as noted earlier, the Staff provided a single point of contact to the external environment 

for policy, programmatic, budget, security, program capabilities, and administrative matters. 

* COMIREX advised the DCI on collection, processing, and exploitation of imagery, formulated guidance and priorities 

for mission planning and tasking, and provided interface for R&D of imagery processing and interpretation.

† The SIGINT Committee advised the DCI on the establishment of Sigint requirements, priorities, and objectives, 

developed guidance on objectives and priorities of collection and on exploitation requirements for Comint, Elint, foreign 

instrumentation signals, nonimagery infrared, coherent light, and nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse sources. It also monitored 

and evaluated the responsiveness of present and programmed US and cooperating foreign Sigint resources to U.S. needs for 

intelligence information.

‡ The Civil Applications Committee was the interagency committee officially chartered in 1975 by the Office of the 

President to coordinate and provide Federal civil agencies access to National Systems data in support of mission responsibilities.

"The Staff turned the crank very well, knew how to get the information to 

Congress, to get the approval, working with the programs and Congress in the 

allocation process. For example, the increase in warning time study was used in the 

Congressional process and impacted the decision to proceed. The Staff did run 

the photo war studies, almost annually that looked at the impact of adding various 

capabilities that impacted program decisions. They were effective in leading to the 

demise of the current photo systems...to show we have a capable replacement."

 — Col Dave Raspet, USAF (Ret.), 

 former Staff member and Deputy Director, Program A, 

 12 September 2013
 12

1962 - 1990

This staff-led approach served three purposes. It protected the program officers of the NRO from 

being distracted from their acquisition responsibilities by being called to Washington for oversight 

or user briefings. It provided a conduit from the Staff to the program offices to keep them abreast 

of issues and opportunities. It also provided a consistent NRO enterprise voice to the external 

environment. 

The Staff also performed some line responsibilities that cut across the interests of the program 

offices. These included:

• Logistics support for the enterprise.

• Security execution and guidance for the enterprise.

• Management of the communications organization that provided dedicated support 

to the enterprise.

• Managing the NRO Film and Chemistry contract that directed the Eastman Kodak film 

production and processing efforts.*

The Staff also functioned, on occasion, as a special staff to the DNRO in his capacity as either 

Secretary or Under Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). One key example is the Staff’s extensive role 

in recovery efforts following the failure of the Space Shuttle Challenger and two NRO Titan 34D 

launch vehicles in the mid-1980s. In that case, Secretary Aldridge leaned on the NRO Staff, bypassing 

the otherwise cumbersome Pentagon staffing processes, to expedite a return to flight for national 

security payloads. This is chronicled in greater detail in Chapter 6.

* Costs for research and product development of extremely high performance film product were borne by Eastman 

Kodak, allowing the company to market the products to other customers.
13

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Chapter 3

PEOPLE OF THE NRO STAFF

The men and women of the NRO Staff were the foundation of the corporate NRO. 

In an interview with Dr. Charyk, the first Director of the NRO, he emphasized, “We had 

to gather a small but very qualified group that knew where to go for information.”9

Staff members were all hand-picked and nominated to the Staff Director. Once selected, individuals 

typically served two to three years on the Staff before returning to their home offices. For Air Force 

personnel, this pool of highly talented people was facilitated by assignment selection and retention 

processes formally controlled by the Air Force Military Personnel Center Special Assignments 

branch. Other services and government organizations, 

such as CIA, NSA, and the services had similar processes, 

yet in every case Staff members served at the pleasure of 

the Staff Director*. This specialized selection and retention 

process yielded a talented staff with diversity of experience. 

However, virtually all former Staff members interviewed 

stated that the sense of empowerment and allegiance 

to a common national mission was the most compelling 

motivation, creating a sense of esprit de corps transcending 

program and home office allegiances.

The NRO Staff evolved from the Missile and Satellite Office which had been established 

in 1960 to support Dr. Charyk as manager of the Air Force SAMOS program. This pre-NRO 

Staff, led by Brig Gen Richard D. Curtin, chief of the Missiles and Space Systems Office, was 

predominantly an Air Force staff with token Army and Navy representation.10 The Air Force 

continued to provide the majority of personnel to the NRO Staff throughout the Staff’s history. 

* The NRO Staff Director served as the reviewing or endorsing official on all performance reports.

"The NRO staff was comprised of 

technical, highly knowledgeable 

people... otherwise, you just had 

a staff." 

— Dr. Joseph Charyk,

 Former DNRO

Dr. Joseph V. Charyk

Co-Director NRO: 6 Sep 1961 - 28 Feb 1962

DNRO: 1 Mar 1962 - 28 Feb 1963

Dr. Richard M. Bissel, Jr. 

Co-Director NRO: 6 Sep 1961 - 28 Feb 1962
 14

1962 - 1990

The founding co-director of the NRO, Dr. Richard Bissell, Jr., continued to operate with his own 

staff from CIA headquarters and did not believe CIA officers should be assigned to the NRO Staff,11

 although early DNROs, including Charyk and McMillan, urged senior CIA leadership to provide greater 

representation to the NRO Staff.12 From its inception, the NRO Staff was composed of individuals who 

were nominated for the position by a sponsor from within the cleared community and were then 

accepted by the Staff Director, DDNRO, or DNRO. Often there was a negotiation between the program 

offices and the NRO leadership to determine who was assigned and for how long they served. The 

early Staff also recruited from the military services, most notably the Army and Navy to represent 

Army and Navy interests in space. Throughout its history, the NRO Staff included representatives from 

the services’ operational and intelligence communities, as well as defense and national organizations 

such as the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), the National Security Agency, and NASA. Over time, 

the preponderance of Staff personnel came from those already assigned to the NRO program offices. 

Robert Pattishall, former Staff member and Program B Signals Intelligence (Sigint) program 

manager, observed a significant transformation in the priority of CIA resourcing for the NRO Staff 

following the cancelation of a large Sigint program in the late 1970s.

Despite folklore to the contrary, the consensus among Staff members was that their allegiance 

was to the DNRO, and hence the Staff Director, rather than the program office from which they had 

been assigned. Rick Buckley, the Director of Systems and Technology in the late 1980s stated:

The selection process (in my case) was primarily with Julian Caballero, the 

CIA Director of Program B in conjunction with the Staff Director, Brig Gen Tom 

Moorman.... I interviewed with Brig Gen Moorman, and was selected. Both Bob 

Kohler and Julian Caballero said that I would be working for Jimmie Hill, Pete Aldridge, 

and Tom Moorman, (not for Program B), and both said, “If you need anything, let us 

know, and otherwise we won’t bother you.13

That is not to say there were not infractions, individual cases in which people represented 

individual or program biases, but these cases were the exception and were dealt with accordingly. 

One Program Element Monitor (PEM), for example, was replaced on the Staff when he knowingly 

briefed a congressional staffer on a program position that was contrary to the NRO Director’s position. 

According to former DNRO Martin Faga, “It would be inappropriate to frame the incident as typical. 

This was the exception rather than the rule, even though the Staff Program Element Monitors always 

had dual responsibilities...to the program office and to the Staff. They were supposed to get the 

conversation framed for the leadership. They were to keep both sides informed.”14

The characteristic most commonly attributed to NRO Staff 

members was that of empowerment. Martin Faga noted that Staff 

members typically “punched above their weight,” performing 

above their pay grades or position in an organizational chart.15

The following is just one of the many, often personal, examples 

that were cited during the interview process for this project that 

point to the level of trust and confidence enjoyed by members of 

the Staff. Similar stories were repeated by virtually every individual 

interviewed for this history. 

Mr. Martin C. Faga

DNRO: 28 Sep 1989 - 5 Mar 1993
15

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

"As young action officers, we had huge authority and responsibility on the NRO Staff. I got 

a call on Friday that I had to go to the White House Situation Room and brief Carlucci [the 

National Security Advisor] and some guy named Powell [soon to be the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs – APNSA – and eventually Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff]....on [a proposed new] program. It was going to be on Tuesday. I worked all weekend 

[to modify the charts] and then went to Jimmie Hill and asked if he wanted to see the slides. 

His answer to me was, what for? Well, before I go to Mr. Aldridge to show him the slides, he 

[says] he doesn’t want to see them. So, as a young major or lieutenant colonel, I went to the 

Situation Room of the White House to brief Carlucci and Powell on the program without any 

review. It was amazing the amount of trust the senior managers, the senior decision makers 

in the NRO, had in their young staff officers."16

 — Col Gary Dahlen, USAF (Ret.), 

 NRO Staff R&D Manager, 1985-1990

Much of this esprit de corps was derived from being minimally supervised, maximally empowered, 

and imbued with a sense of elitism—yet still accountable.

A down-side of this sense of empowerment was a view held by many outsiders, particularly in the 

Air Force, that NRO officers were “prima donnas,” or part of the “Hollywood Air Force,” rather than the 

mainstream Air Force. Robert Perry, in his account of the early days of the NRO, observed:

Much of the Air Staff...looked on the NRO as a not-quite-respectable collection 

of Air Force dissenters under the thumb of the CIA. Air Force officers who were 

wholly loyal to their NRO responsibilities sometimes felt that the “regular” Air Force 

had cast them out. At least one CIA staffer seconded to the NRO found himself 

effectively frozen out of his parent organization because of his stubborn adherence 

to the spirit as well as the letter of the NRO charter. Some Air Force officers may have 

felt the same way when the time came for them to move from an NRO assignment 

to another in the regular service. For Air Force and Agency personnel, to be assigned 

to the NRO in any capacity, particularly in the troubled days between 1963 and 

1966, was not uniformly looked on as a wholly happy circumstance.17

This negative view declined somewhat over time, but it was exasperated by the “hand-selection” 

process and blanket travel orders and the fact that NRO military officers were generally discouraged, 

and often restricted, from wearing military uniforms. This “uniform issue” was often the source of 

considerable consternation among senior officers in the Pentagon who discovered they were dealing 

with junior officers on a matter, rather than with a mid- or relatively high-level NRO civilian.18

Follow-on career assignments were often “by-name” postings to other organizations that were 

involved with other aspects of the NRO’s activities. Many returned to a home program office. Some 

were posted to high-level staff jobs, including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

the IC Staff, and the White House. Others returned to the Intelligence Community or services as part 

of the user base that they supported, most often as stronger advocates of NRO programs and policies.

17

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Chapter 4

 EXTERNAL 

ENVIRONMENT 

At its inception, the number of people cleared to even know of the existence of the NRO was 

extremely limited. The programs were focused on avoiding technological surprise and supporting 

national strategic planning. The stakeholder community, likewise, was small. Decisions were largely 

made through discussions and letters among principal actors (e.g. the DNRO, SECDEF, CIA Director, 

and the President’s National Security Advisor). These principals had very few staff members cleared to 

support them. Reconnaissance satellite performance was limited in those days more by technology, 

than by financial resources. Congress had a very limited role with respect to the Intelligence 

Community, the National Reconnaissance Office in particular. As described by former NRO historian 

Clayton Laurie:

The history of the NRO’s interaction with Congress is closely intertwined 

with the security demands of the Cold War, the growth and development of the 

Intelligence Community as a whole, and with the American Space program. In that 

setting, the novel relationship between the NRP and Congress has undergone 

significant changes over 50 years, and it continues to evolve as each institution 

addresses the nation’s intelligence demands and post-Cold War security challenges 

of the twenty-first century.19

The early issues the NRO Staff had to deal with were generally internally driven and involved 

supporting the DNRO’s assessment of technical and design risk and his needs relative to the internal 

organizational debates. 

Externally, by 1990, the number of people cleared to know about the NRO and its programs had 

grown exponentially, numbering in several thousands. The programs were supporting a range of 

technical, strategic, and military operational requirements. They were complex and expensive and 

included space, ground, and user components. There were far more requirements than funds available, 

and that led to numerous trade studies and funding debates. Both the DoD and the Intelligence 

Community had extensive staffs involved in program assessments and oversight functions. The 

decision process also involved staff elements from an expanding number of stakeholders (intelligence 

agencies, military organizations, civil agencies, and Congress). The industrial base included dozens of 

companies and much more competition. By this time, the issues the Staff dealt with were primarily 

externally driven and involved interacting with all the management staff and stakeholder players, as 

well as engaging with and keeping the program offices informed, while shielding them from the dayto-day Washington issues. 

The purpose of this chapter is not to restate history. Rather, it is to provide a quick reference for some 

of the geopolitical factors that most impacted the Staff role as it evolved from its inception through 

1990 when the NRO began transitioning more towards a traditional “three-letter” Defense agency.
 18

1962 - 1990

The Early Years—Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations 

(1962-1974)

External Factors. The dominating national security drivers during this time were strategic—the 

Cold War rivalry, deterrence, intelligence needed for SIOP* planning, and risks posed to the balance 

of power by technological surprise. At the same time, there was an urgent need to replace U-2-

derived intelligence following Francis Gary Powers’ shootdown, coupled with satellites entering 

early operation. An overriding Presidential concern was to avoid any public disclosure of overhead 

reconnaissance that could create a serious national security incident. 

This sense of urgency and security led to establishing the NRO as a deeply covert activity, and that 

urgency drove all the streamlined management aspects of the NRO Staff, including its own small size 

and paucity of intermediate levels, the lack of oversight staffs, and the constraints on the number of 

companies involved. 

Details regarding collection programs, the management organization, contractors, budget, and 

development and acquisition details were separately compartmented from operational employment 

and product information to maintain a strict need-to-know security system. Debates existed over 

whether the NRO should be organized with a strong “CEO” (as favored by the DoD) or with strong 

operating elements and a Director who served as a “Chairman of the Board” (as favored by the CIA). 

The “CEO” model prevailed with a small corporate staff and the Director making major decisions on 

budgets, policy, and program starts.20

National Reconnaissance Program Decision Process. The internal NRO decision and NRP 

budget process was informal and largely accomplished through discussions and letters among the 

principals. The assignment of responsibility for development of a next generation imagery system 

(Hexagon) was controversial, with both the Air Force (Program A) and the CIA (Program B) competing 

to lead the program. The external NRP decision process, on the other hand, was more structured in 

the early years. The Executive Committee was established in 1965 to facilitate NRP decision making. 

At a higher level, the EXCOM met quarterly to review progress and approve the budget. The EXCOM’s 

membership varied over time, but the Deputy Secretary of Defense served as Chairman, and the 

members included the DCI and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology 

(soon replaced by the President’s National Security Advisor). The EXCOM formed sub-committees to 

address specific issues and invited the participation of intelligence agencies, including the National 

Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and others serving on the US Intelligence 

Board. The DNRO served as the Executive Secretary and was responsible for establishing the agenda, 

presenting information, making recommendations, and documenting decisions. 

The EXCOM addressed a number of other NRP issues, such as internal NRO and EXCOM debates 

over the best path to proceed toward near real-time imagery, with Program A and the DNRO 

(Dr. McLucas) proposing a film-based solution (Film Readout Gambit or FROG) and Program B 

proposing a more advanced but higher risk near real-time Electro-Optical Imagery (EOI) solution. 

The EXCOM in this instance took no position, but it approved funding for research for film 

readout systems. The NRO Staff R&D funds for readout systems were managed by the NRO Staff.21

The decision was ultimately made by the President, based upon the recommendation of the Land 

Committee, selecting the higher risk, but more advanced and capable EOI technical solution.22

* Strategic Air Command’s Single Integrated Operational Plan (Initially presented to President Kennedy in 1962).
19

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

In another instance, intelligence uncertainties regarding the  strategic threat posed by  the 

USSR’s development of the SA-5, which at the time was believed to be an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 

system, led to Programs A and B proposing three different technical approaches to better understand 

the threat. The EXCOM, after consideration, chose to fund all three.* Such decisions demonstrated the 

extent to which decision makers at that time prioritized mission success much more than cost. 

International Events. There were a number of international events during the early years that 

impacted the NRO, and hence the NRO Staff. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, only weeks 

after the creation of the NRO Staff, highlighted the need for strategic reconnaissance — in this case 

to monitor events less than 100 miles from the US mainland. Similarly, the Arab-Israeli Six Day War 

in June 1967, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and the Yom Kipper War 

in October 1973, all created increasing pressure for development of near real-time imagery systems. 

Similarly, Soviet deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 1976 generated 

Strategic Air Command (SAC) requirements for responsive NRP capabilities. Finally, a 1968 incident 

involving an airborne overflight of Vietnam contributed to the eventual termination of the NRO’s 

airborne program with assets either retired or transferred to the Air Force in 1974.

Congress. In the early years, only a few Congressional committee chairmen and virtually no 

congressional staff were cleared to know about the NRO and satellite reconnaissance operations. 

According to NRO historian Clayton Laurie, “As long as the NRO’s intelligence product satisfied 

national command authorities, those few in Congress who were witting asked very few questions 

about satellite system architecture, funding, management practices, or day-to-day operations.” 23

Congressional interactions remained at the principals’ level with only Committee Chairmen and 

Ranking Members of oversight and budget committees briefed on the programs. 

Key Policy and Treaties. The Staff included a policy function focused on coordinating internal 

and external policy issues that had implications for the NRO. Its function was to support the DNRO in 

protecting the organization’s interests. One example of this was the Outer Space Treaty that provided 

the basis for development and codification of international space law. Space was considered a sanctuary 

because it was viewed as an element of strategic deterrence. The USSR was aware that any interference 

with space systems would be viewed as an attempt to disable an element of the US strategic deterrent 

and a precursor to a strategic nuclear attack, and the US would respond accordingly. 

Space Transportation System. Development of the Space Shuttle began in the early 1970s, 

and the NRO was involved nearly from the start. The shuttle program had huge implications for the 

NRO, involving everything from the size of NRO satellites to the production rate of launch platforms 

necessary to launch NRO satellites into orbit, not to mention, budgetary impacts. 

* Jimmie Hill recounted to Jim Beale in a 1979 meeting the 1968 decision to address the SA-5 surface-to-air missile 

threat by developing each of the three technology approaches under consideration. No one knew which, if any, would answer 

the intelligence question, but the threat was judged so critical that the decision makers concluded the three technology 

solutions should be pursued in parallel. 
 20

1962 - 1990

The Middle Years—Ford and Carter Administrations (1974-1980)

By the beginning of the Ford Administration, the Cold War and concerns of an imminent strategic 

engagement had been reduced through diplomacy and treaty agreements. Ensuring against strategic 

surprise remained a paramount objective, but treaty monitoring and verification had become a 

driver for the NRO. The Vietnam War and events like the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 

demonstrated the need for timely intelligence that could provide both strategic warning and tactical 

support to military operations. Technology advancements were making such capabilities viable. 

Broader concerns about intelligence abuses investigated by the Church and Pike Committees led to 

expanded Congressional oversight and establishment of the House Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) with charters that 

included oversight of the NRO. The executive branch responded with expanded management 

oversight and staff involvement primarily by the DCI, DoD, and the White House staff. The NRO Staff 

remained the “front door” for the NRO in its interactions with the external community.

Escalating Oversight. Intelligence abuses and reform 

was a major issue. President Ford and later President Reagan 

issued Executive Orders on intelligence oversight that included 

recognition of “special offices for collection of specialized 

intelligence through reconnaissance programs”—a euphemism 

that was intended for the NRP and other “special programs.”24

As previously mentioned, the EXCOM, a streamlined highly 

centralized Executive body for managing community programs 

and resources, was terminated in 1976 and replaced briefly by the 

Committee for Foreign Intelligence. The oversight process became 

much more “decentralized,” seemingly changing to a broader look 

by people at a lower level.25 The Church and Pike Committees 

identified intelligence abuses that led to establishment of the HPSCI 

and SSCI, with budget and program oversight of all intelligence 

activities including the NRO. The DCI created the Intelligence 

Community Staff (IC Staff) which included analysis and budget 

oversight of NRO activities.*

At the same time, DNRO James Plummer agreed to provide written Congressional Budget 

Justification Books (CBJB) to Congress, leading to detailed interactions, which included providing 

briefings, answering written questions, and supporting congressional staff visits to NRO facilities. 

At the DoD, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), or USD (P), and the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (C3I), or ASD/C3I, established staff elements to oversee the NRO. The National Security 

Council established a position focused on space, including DoD and NASA, as well as the NRO. Finally, 

President Carter directed that all of government implement “zero-based budgeting” that required a 

re-justification for every ongoing program or activity. 

Near Real-Time Collection Systems. As near real-time imagery and signals intelligence 

satellite systems entered service, the NRO Staff initiated the development of an experimental van 

to demonstrate real-time Electronics Intelligence (Elint) downlinks directly to military field units. 

Also during this period, Congress established a program for the Tactical Exploitation of National 

Capabilities (TENCAP) that funded experiments leveraging NRO capabilities to support military 

operations. TENCAP offices were established in the NRO and in each of the military services. With the 

* USIB Committees, subordinate to the IC Staff, were responsible for establishing NRO collection requirements.

Mr. James W. Plummer

DNRO: 21 Dec 1973 - 28 Jun 1976
21

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

increasing number of NRO users involved in the requirements process, the NRO began publishing 

program-level details at a lower security classification, thus making the details of NRO systems more 

accessible to military users in particular. 

Arms Control. Following the arms control successes of the Nixon administration, President 

Jimmy Carter wanted to reach a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that reduced 

weapons held by both nations. After more than a half decade of the second round Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks (SALT 2), Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev reached a treaty agreement in the 

summer of 1979. The treaty mandated additional nuclear arms verification requirements, causing 

President Carter to publicly acknowledge for the first time the existence of reconnaissance satellites. 

He did so to assure the American people that the terms of the treaty could be verified. However, the 

treaty was not put into effect because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan six months later and the 

presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. 

1979 Iranian Revolution. The United States established intelligence collection sites in northern 

Iran to collect intelligence on Soviet missile test launches from their Tyuratam test facility in the 

southwest USSR. With the culmination of the Iranian revolution in the winter of 1979, the United 

States closed the sites in response to the anti-American policies of the new Islamic regime in Iran. 

Consequently, satellite collection gained increased priority to compensate for the lost ground-based 

collection capabilities abandoned in Iran.

Security. In the winter of 1977, Christopher Boyce, a TRW employee working on a classified 

program, was arrested for selling to the Soviets classified information on US intelligence collection 

capabilities. William Kampiles, a CIA clerk, obtained a manual on the NRO’s KH-11 imagery satellite. 

He travelled to Greece and sold the highly classified document to the Soviets. Kampiles was arrested 

a year after Boyce. These two espionage cases revealed extensive technical details about NRO 

intelligence collection capabilities. 

Launch Transition. The DCI’s IC Staff initiated a series of requirements and systems studies to 

guide this transition which increased staff oversight and involvement and substantially increased the 

interface role of the NRO Staff. These external studies aimed at choosing what programs were to be 

funded and which would not, and they further exacerbated competition between program offices 

and their proposed solutions.

Difficulties in Developing the National Space Reconnaissance Architecture. Decisions 

whether to proceed with an advanced imaging capability and the appropriate mix of Elint satellites 

generated disagreements between the DCI and SECDEF that required Presidential decisions. Also, 

rivalry between the CIA (DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner) and DoD (particularly the Deputy USD (P), 

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy) impacted NRP architecture and funding decisions. 
 22

1962 - 1990

The Later Years—Reagan and Bush Administrations (1980-1990)

The Reagan defense build-up had many implications for the NRO and its Staff. New initiatives 

were funded, but there was an increase in the use of sub-compartments and “specials” to restrict the 

community of those with knowledge of the new capabilities. The Ballistic Missile Defense Initiative 

that eventually became the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) intersected on many levels with the 

NRO. The Soviet development and testing of anti-satellite weapons led fears that space was no 

longer a sanctuary. This resulted in new investments in the survivability and robustness of satellite 

systems. The continuity of government initiative also had many implications for the NRO, including 

integration with the national command and control architecture and a strong push for survivable 

and enduring reconnaissance. The creation of Air Force Space Command, and later Unified Space 

Command, created additional interactions to be managed by the Staff.

New treaties placed additional demands for treaty monitoring and verification. Technology 

advancements enabled one program to perform the missions that in past years required several 

programs, which fostered increased competition. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) and the military services explored new approaches to performing space intelligence tasks 

based on small satellite approaches that overlapped with the NRO’s responsibilities, thus creating 

policy and internal political issues. 

New Defense Organizations. DNRO Dr. Robert Hermann established the Defense Reconnaissance 

Support Program (DRSP) in 1981 as a budgetary vehicle for DoD to invest in NRO capabilities that 

improved support to military operations. The DRSP, although separate from the NRP and managed by 

the Defense Support Program Office (DSPO), was integrated with the NRP planning process.

The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was created to explore technologies to 

defend against ballistic missiles. Initial efforts focused on space options and technologies underlying 

NRO programs and programs that could be used as anti-satellite weapons. A number of NRO-bred 

technologies were adopted by the SDIO. The initiative also created many security and policy issues 

impacting the NRO.

Launch Systems Recovery. As further detailed in Chapter 6, the Space Shuttle Challenger

failure and subsequent space launch recovery impacted all aspects of the NRO, driving up costs 

and further increasing oversight. The DNRO, Secretary Pete Aldridge, led the recovery and initiated 

the Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) program for the nation. However, transitioning 

back to expendable launch systems necessitated extensive redesign of programs, as well as the 

development and production of new families of Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs).

Stand-up of United States Space Command and the Air Force Space Command. The NRO, 

having previously transitioned a number of officers to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air 

Staff policy and planning staffs, established working relationships associated with the formation of 

Air Force Space Command and subsequently a Unified Command for space, extending and defining 

national interests in space, while protecting NRO interests.
23

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Chapter 5

ORGANIZATION OF THE NRO STAFF

Introduction

The NRO was created on 6 September 1961 with Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, the Under Secretary of the 

Air Force, and Dr. Richard Bissell, a senior CIA policy maker serving as co-Directors. During that time, 

Charyk was served by the staff of the Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (OMSS) [see Appendix 

2], and the CIA staff served Bissell. In 1962 when Dr. Charyk became the single DNRO, the staff was 

reconstituted as the NRO Staff, with the unclassified designation of Office of the Secretary of the Air 

Force, Space Systems (SAFSS). Several, but not all, of the former OMSS staff transitioned to the new 

NRO Staff, including Brig Gen John L. Martin, the former Deputy Director of the OMSS Staff, who 

became the first Director of the NRO Staff.26

Although the roles and basic functions of the NRO Staff remained relatively stable over the course 

of its history, the organization of the elements which carried out those functions was modified by 

DNROs and Staff Directors in response to changing circumstances and their personal styles. In some 

cases, entire functions or missions such as the operational tasking of NRO satellites or management 

of airborne collectors were transferred from the Staff, precipitating substantial organizational 

changes to the Staff. In other instances, organizational changes were made in response to oversight 

changes, such as in the case of legislative liaison, or in response to changes in mission emphasis, such 
 24

1962 - 1990

as support to military operations.

The Early Years (1962-74)

It was not until 23 July 1962, ten months after the creation of the National Reconnaissance Office 

that NRO Director Charyk established Program A (Air Force), Program B (CIA), and Program C (Navy). 

Soon thereafter Program D was established to manage CIA and Air Force airborne assets, such as the 

U-2 and SR-71 programs. Charyk established the NRO Staff with the same directive. The Staff’s offices 

were located in the Pentagon, centered in Suite 4C-1000.

The Assistant for Plans and Policy was responsible for over-all assistance in establishing and 

maintaining NRO management procedures and the interface of such procedures with all Washington 

offices and agencies concerned. He was also responsible for handling State, United Nations, 

Disarmament, and DoD matters affecting the NRO or the NRP. He was assisted in this responsibility 

by a Deputy Assistant of Photo Plans and a Deputy Assistant of Sigint Plans. In order to assure that his 

responsibilities were discharged in critical appreciation of the state of NRP capabilities, limitations, 

and difficulties, the Assistant for Plans and Policy drew upon other members of the NRO Staff and 

members of the Program Directors’ staffs for appropriate part-time assistance. Detailed studies of 

specific projects were assigned to the appropriate Program Director, as well as all studies for which 

contractual action was required. 

1969 NRO STAFF LEADERSHIP

FROM L TO R: CAPT Geiger, Col Worthman, Brig Gen Berg, Col Allen, and Col Sweeney
25

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

The Deputy for Aircraft Projects assisted Program Directors in obtaining necessary support 

for all aircraft and drone projects of the NRP, and for keeping the DNRO currently informed on the 

status and capabilities of such projects. He was also responsible for coordination of US peripheral 

reconnaissance missions with aircraft and drone missions managed by the NRO.

The Deputy for Satellite Projects assisted Program Directors in obtaining necessary support 

for all satellite projects of the NRP, and for keeping the DNRO currently informed on the status and 

capabilities of such projects.

The Deputy for Operations was responsible for all satellite operations tasks assigned to the NRO 

Staff. He was responsible for coordination of US peripheral reconnaissance missions with satellite 

missions of the NRP. In addition, he was responsible for the NRO working interface with the USIB, 

which established overhead target requirements and priorities. 

Dr. Charyk’s NRO Staff of 1962 included several individuals that had served in the earlier Office of 

Missiles and Satellite Systems. Brig Gen Martin, previously Brig Gen Curtin’s deputy in OMSS, was the 

first director of the NRO Staff. Lt Col Thomas Herron, Lt Col Robert A. Van Mater, Maj Henry C. Howard, 

and others transitioned to the newly formed NRO Staff. 

Brig Gen Martin’s 1962 NRO Staff organization had much more of a “staff” focus than the previous 

OMSS organization, judging from the position descriptions of the two organizations. One significant 

exception, however was mission planning, which was performed by the operations group within the 

NRO Staff. The group translated tasking requirements from the intelligence community into specific 

target decks, specifying desired targets to be covered, as well as desired on-orbit target program 

options. Otherwise, the role was that typical of a normal staff. With the exception of on-orbit planning 

discussed above, the program offices were responsible for carrying out the acquisition and execution 

phases for assigned programs. 

The first major modification to the Staff organization 

occurred in December 1963 when the second NRO Director, 

Brockway McMillan, established the Advanced Planning Office, 

reporting to the Staff Director.27

According to Perry’s NRP history, “McMillan created an 

advanced planning office within the NRO Staff to evaluate 

and recommend matters involving future space research and 

development projects. His motivation was to counterbalance 

attractive CIA studies that might quickly be transformed into 

programs.”28

This modification was significant in that it reflected a 

significant change in the Staff’s authorities. However, a review of 

literature, as well as interviews conducted for this book, did not 

reveal any significant contributions of McMillan’s Advanced Plans 

Group. It was dissolved when Dr. Alexander Flax became DNRO. 

Dr. Brockway McMillan 

DNRO: 1 Mar 1963 - 1 Oct 1965
 26

1962 - 1990

The Middle Years (1974-80)

As the stakeholder community grew larger, the Staff organization adjusted to these increased 

user needs. One growing need was to better support military operations. In 1974, Brig Gen Jack 

Kulpa, then serving as NRO Staff Director, established the Concepts and Applications Office to bring 

more focus on user needs, particularly those of the military services.29 The branch initiated military 

support concepts, partnering with the military TENCAPs, and later with the DSPO in prioritizing 

and supporting defense-related initiatives. The branch functioned more as a line organization 

in conjunction with the Program A technology element in demonstrating the value of integrated 

Sigint/Imint tasking and exploitation, as well as the utility of delivering preprocessed signal data 

directly to the military user. This early demonstration of direct downlink of NRO data and integrated 

products set the stage for optimizing the intelligence and operational value of NRO products and 

demonstrated that NRO systems could be operationally relevant. 

The Concepts and Applications Office directly supported the newly 

formed NRO Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities and 

Applications Program (NRO TENCAP), led by COL Ronald Lemanski 

(USA) who reported directly to the DNRO. This DSPO/TENCAP/

NRO Staff partnership extended Brig Gen Kulpa’s vision of focusing 

on support to military operations, making NRO national systems 

relevant to the military operator, as was ultimately and conclusively 

demonstrated during the first Gulf War. 

In November 1977, Dr. Hans Mark proposed at his second Program 

Directors meeting a new “organizational framework” for the NRO 

Staff. He suggested three staff elements: Liaison and Administration, 

Programs and Budget, and Concepts and Applications. After four 

months of staffing with his management team, Mark signed a 

memorandum to 39 Washington seniors announcing his newly 

organized NRO Staff, effective 1 April 1978.30 His new construct 

included three major staff elements as depicted below:

The Directorate of Liaison and Administration, led by Col Nate Lindsay, served as the Staff interface on 

policy and administration matters between the NRO and other members of the Executive Department 

(e.g., NASA, NSC, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), provided administrative support 

for the NRO headquarters, and assisted the DNRO with security policy, procedures, and practices. The 

Directorate oversaw the management of all secure communications for the NRP. The Directorate also 

served as the focal point for the NRO on all public information and was further divided into six elements: 

Staff & Policy Interface, Security Policy, Operational Policy, Administrative Support, Personnel, and 

Communications Management. 

The Directorate of Programs and Budget, led by Lt Col Dave "Bud" Doyle, assisted the DNRO in 

formulating fiscal guidance to the program offices, developing the NRP budget, and implementing 

the fiscal program of the NRP. They maintained interface with the Congress and with programming 

and budgeting elements of the Executive Department. The Directorate was subdivided into four 

elements: Programs and Budget, Financial Administration, Congressional Liaison, and Logistics and 

Procurement. 

The Directorate of Systems and Technology, led by Tom Appleberry, functioned as the technical 

monitor for programs and as the consultant on program status to NRO customers as well as NRO 

program offices. The staff element also provided representation to DCI committees and other technical 

committee functions. The S&T Directorate was further divided into two elements: Satellite Programs 

and Research & Analysis. 

Concurrently, Dr. Mark established the NRO TENCAP office, reporting to the DNRO, and headed by 

COL Ronald Lemanski, USA.

Dr. Hans M. Mark

DNRO: 3 Aug 1977 - 8 Oct 1979
27

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Shortly after announcing the Staff reorganization, Hans Mark announced the appointment of 

Mr. Jimmie Hill as the Director of the NRO Staff and distributed an organizational chart for the new 

organization. It should be noted that the updated organization did not include an operations function, 

as the imagery related functions of the Satellite Operations Center (SOC) had been transferred to 

California the previous year, and the Sigint related functions had been transferred to the NRO/NSA 

jointly-manned Overhead Collection Management Center (OCMC) in Ft. Meade.31
 28

1962 - 1990

BACK ROW: COL Ronald Lemanski (USA), Col Jim Fitzgibbon, Lt Col Phil Bracher, Lt Col Don Hard, Capt Jim Boyle

FRONT ROW: Col Joe Eash, Mr. Jimmie Hill, Col George Mushalko. PHOTO: Early 1981

BACK ROW: Col Charlie Anderson, Chief of Staff, Col Bill Savage, Plans, CAPT Jim Barnet (USN), Budget, COL Charles 

Solohub (USA), Richard Taylor, NSA Rep, Senior Sigint PEM, Lt Col Phil Pounds, Security, Capt Kevin McLaughlin, Launch 

FRONT ROW: Col John Graves, Communications, Mr. John Sharrard, Senior Imint PEM, Brig Gen Don Walker, Staff Director, 

Col Hal Gordon, Policy, Col Jim Kindle PHOTO: 1989-90
29

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

The Later Years (1980-90)

For the years following the 1978 Staff reorganization, a review of a number of various papers 

such as organization charts and phone listings revealed only minor changes to the Staff’s 

organizational structure.

Beginning in 1984, there were a number of changes to the Staff organization. For example, 

“Liaison and Security” was changed to “Policy and Security,” with “Personnel” reporting to the Staff 

Executive, and “Congressional Matters” reporting directly to the Staff Director, rather than to the 

Budget Director, a further strengthening of the Legislative Liaison function. “Long Range Plans” was 

added as a third sub-element of Systems and Technology. Finally, in June 1989, “Plans & Analysis” 

replaced “Plans and Studies.” This 15-person staff element, led initially by Lt Col Phil Datema, who 

was replaced by Col Bill Savage, reported directly to the Staff Director. The addition of this NRO Staff 

element was significant in that it was a precursor for a much more robust, independent Plans and 

Analysis group, reporting directly to the Director of the NRO.

The bottom left photograph captures the last 4C-1000 NRO Staff leadership team, taken in late 

1989 or early 1990.

31

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Chapter 6

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS 

OF THE NRO STAFF

As noted previously, the NRO Staff, as created by Dr. Charyk in September 1962, was a small, 

highly streamlined staff organization with talented and empowered officers supporting the DNRO. 

This chapter will describe the roles and functions of the NRO Staff.

Roles of the Staff

With the exception of Satellite Operations, the roles performed by the NRO Staff were stable 

throughout its existence. However, the environment in which it performed these roles did change in 

terms of stakeholders, oversight, and technology. 

The 4C-1000 Staff performed the following roles:  

• Develop, promote, and defend an integrated National Reconnaissance Program

• Facilitate and support the NRO line organizations

• Represent NRO interests with stakeholders 

• Support the NRO decision processes

• Provide specialized security, communications, and personnel processes

• Operational level command and control (1962–1974)

Interestingly, this statement of the roles of the NRO Staff did not change substantially from 

the formulation of the Staff in 1962 until early 1990, when the NRO Staff as we knew it, small and 

streamlined, centrally located in the Pentagon with a Staff Director reporting to the NRO Director, 

began to be absorbed into a much larger restructured NRO organization. Also, during this period there 

was reasonably few changes in the functions performed by the Staff in the execution of its role. The

organizational changes to the Staff were more numerous, as reflected by changes in organizational 

designations and actual organizational charts, and of course the people or individuals assigned to 

the Staff, who generally rotated every two to three years. 

The following chart compares the basic roles of the original Staff in 1962, as specifically defined by 

Dr. Charyk in 196232 compared to an interpreted description of the Staff’s roles in 1990. This illustrates 

the assertion that the role and basic functions of the Staff changed little over the 28-year course of 

the Staff. 
 32

1962 - 1990

196233 199034

Brig Gen John Martin

–First NRO Staff Director

Brig Gen Don Walker

—Last NRO Staff Director

PROJECT OVERSIGHT

Assist the DNRO to maintain current knowledge 

of the status of each project of the NRP.

Unchanged.

Comment: In 1990 the number of programs grew, yet the role of the Staff technical and budget monitors remained the same, 

focusing on individual programs and maintaining technical and financial status for the DNRO.

EXECUTIVE DECISION SUPPORT

Assist the Program Directors by accomplishing 

all project matters which require action above the 

Program Director’s level in Washington.

Unchanged.

Comment: Consistent with Jimmie Hill’s view that the Staff’s role was to assist, rather than challenge the program offices.

STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT

Establish and maintain the NRO interface with the 

USIB and with the principal users of NRP results.

Establish and maintain the NRO interface with 

Congress, the IC Staff, and the principal users of NRP 

results, including DoD and Service Staffs.

Comment: Although the oversight body and user community changed organizationally, the basic function remained the 

same. There was increased interface with DoD and Service Staffs with key participation in studies from C3II, Air Staff, and Navy.

OPERATIONS

Carry out the operational responsibilities 

described as functions of the NRO Staff, including 

satellite mission planning from the point of view of 

selection of targets and target options, and exercise 

of all on-orbit target options.

Operational responsibilities transitioned from the 

Staff to community managed functions at Ft. Meade 

(SIGINT) (IMINT).

Comment: The Satellite Operation Center which previously carried out operational responsibilities for NRO Systems was 

disbanded in 1978. Although Air Force members of the OCMC reported administratively through the Staff Director, the staff 

had no operational responsibilities.

RECONNAISSANCE COORDINATION

Coordinate all peripheral reconnaissance 

activities of the U. S. with the missions of the NRP.

No staff responsibility.

Comment: The NRO Staff did not engage in reconnaissance coordination activities outside of the NRO contrary to 

expectations in 1962. By 1990, the total breadth of US reconnaissance activities had greatly expanded. 
33

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

196233 199034

PARENT ORGANIZATION LIAISON

Keep designated personnel in each Service and 

specified Agency completely informed on the content 

and status of the NRP in order that they may take 

action necessary to prepare for adequate exploitation 

of the collected intelligence products.

Unchanged.

Comment: The 1990 NRO Staff worked closely with the intelligence and mapping organizations, many of which were 

represented on the NRO Staff.

STUDIES

Conduct studies of the overall NRP to determine the 

most reasonable combination of projects and number 

of missions that should be planned to meet the total 

requirements and priorities established by USIB. 

The extent to which the NRO Staff conducted studies 

and performed analysis on the optimal “combination of 

projects and number of missions” was era dependent. By 

1990 the growth of community requirements and the 

complexity of NRO systems and architectures outgrew 

the Staff’s capability for analytic study support. This led 

to the formation of Plans & Analysis in 1990, a robust, 

independent analytical element reporting directly to the 

DNRO.

OUTSIDE REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT

Monitor and take all necessary staff action 

to handle State Department, UN, DoD, JCS, and 

Congressional matters which affect the NRO or NRP.

Unchanged.

STREAMLINE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Assist the DNRO in establishing and maintaining 

effective streamlined management procedures 

appropriate to the mission of the NRO and consistent 

with the security considerations which apply.

Unchanged.

Comment: Although the size of the NRO Staff grew and the NRO as a whole saw orders-of-magnitude increases in growth, 

much of the expansion can be attributed to comparable increases in mission growth, as well as additional layers of community 

and Congressional oversight. 

DNRO STAFFING SUPPORT

Provide staff support to the DNRO for any matter 

required in connection with his duties, including 

preparation of reports, illustrations, and briefings 

covering any aspect of the NRP.

Unchanged.

INTERNAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Not addressed.

Develop NRO policy as relates to internal NRO 

practices, as well as in its interactions with the 

larger national space, intelligence, and operational 

communities.

SECURITY

Not addressed. Develop and execute NRO security policies and 

practices.

Comment: The growing complexity of users, overlapping of mission domains, and growing organizational 

interdependencies over time required increased focus in Staff policy and security functions. Also, as the systems became more 

“real-time” useful to the military, the service and DoD interfaces grew. The implications of the formation of the DRSP and the 

cancelation of the SR-71 are examples.
 34

1962 - 1990

Functions of NRO Staff

The NRO Staff was organized with functional leads reporting to the Staff Director. The titles of the 

Staff organization were realigned over time, with functional elements occasionally moving from one 

sub-element to another with few exceptions. 

It should also be noted that within the Staff, organizational lines and hence functional 

responsibilities were not rigidly followed. Often the most qualified Staff member was assigned a task, 

regardless of the individual’s “home room.” One of the objectives of this section is to address the 

functions, rather than the organizational entity, which were covered in the preceding chapter.

Security

What led President Eisenhower to require such a high magnitude of secrecy and security in his 

design of a national overhead reconnaissance program? The answer may be found in the experiences 

that shaped his thinking about security and his understanding of “Must-know.” He knew from his 

wartime experience the value of reliable intelligence required for strategic decisions. That confidence 

increased when the intelligence target did not know the capabilities of the collection effort used 

against it. The National Reconnaissance Program and the office that managed that program would 

be covert, hidden from all those without a “Must-know.” The NRP would include aircraft overflight 

with the existing security of the early 1960s.

Execution Authorities

The NRO security staff’s responsibilities and day-to-day activities fulfilled the security-related terms 

of an NRO agreement between the DCI and the SECDEF in May 1962.35 While the implementation 

agreement, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

assigned operational responsibility and control of the NRP to the SECDEF, NRP security responsibility 

was retained by the DCI, consistent with his statutory security authorities as Director of the CIA. Since 

the NRO was a DoD organization, DCI/CIA execution of security responsibilities for the NRP required 

the assignment of a CIA Office of Security officer to the NRO Staff to represent and manage that 

responsibility for the NRP. Administrative supervision of the CIA Office of Security representative (a 

GS-15 position) was jointly managed by the NRO Deputy Director and the Director of the CIA Office 

of Security. An Air Force officer was assigned to the office as deputy to the CIA assignee. Both officers 

executed the assigned CIA and DoD security authorities for the NRP as the security staff Component 

of the NRO Staff. The CIA officer was assigned CIA statutory “Original Classification Authority” and 

Compartmented Security authorities from the DCI. 

This unique arrangement enabled the NRO Security Office to create and integrate DoD and 

CIA statutory security authorities and develop policies as required for the statutory DoD “Original 

Classification Authority,” as well as employ the DCI’s authorities as deputy to the CIA officer protecting 

the NRO and NRP. In addition, the security staff represented and executed the responsibilities for NRP 

security within the NRO, DoD, and across the government without regard to the officers’ organization 

of origin. Initially the office was comprised of only these two officers and a secretary. The security 

staff’s mission provided sufficient secrecy for the NRP to ensure its intelligence mission was successful.

Key Responsibilities and Organizational Interfaces

Achievement of NRO/NRP secrecy required extensive and regular liaison with both operational 

and security staffs from most Executive Branch departments and agencies, including the National 

Security Council staff for NRP Sources and Methods. These Sources and Methods reviews of other 

Departments’ and Agencies’ internal documents, plans, and public releases was a daily routine. For 
35

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

example, CIA National Intelligence Estimates were sent to the security staff in the 1960s and 70s 

for an NRP Sources and Methods exposure review. A frequent performance requirement involved 

coordination and containment of imminent potential public exposures of the NRO or NRP related 

information throughout the Executive Branch.

 General monitoring and oversight of the NRO enterprise and its operations required a broad 

and detailed knowledge of NRO and NRP operations. A working knowledge of details of its activities, 

interfaces, and operations was essential to execution of the daily activities. The security staff 

conducted regular visits to Satellite Program Offices, operational facilities, and industrial facilities. 

These often occurred at the request of program office security staffs and always in coordination with 

them. These visits included comprehensive and detailed reviews and audits of cover, concealment, 

and other secrecy practices and procedures at all prime and sub-contractor facilities. Results of these 

reviews were reported to the program offices’ security staff for their action. 

Byeman Control System

Information revealing the existence and details of the NRO and the NRP, as well as technical details 

about NRO systems, were classified and controlled within the Byeman security control system. Certain 

organizational information and intelligence collected by the NRP were controlled in the Talent-Keyhole 

and other compartments. As a result, most of the security staff’s efforts were related to the Byeman 

security policies. However, the nature of covert overhead reconnaissance secrecy required a very active 

engagement in the establishment and monitoring of IC sources and methods protection policies, 

practices, and procedures. The two security staff officers actively supported IC committees relevant 

to NRO and related sources and methods protection. The NRO authorities to protect the secrecy of 

NRO operations were substantial and recognized by the Congressional intelligence committees. This 

Congressional support was particularly significant since the community committees were responsible 

for the Talent-Keyhole sub-compartments, which enabled intelligence analysts, for example, to train on 

future systems without requiring Byeman access.

Features of the Byeman security system included:

•	 Minimizing the number of accessed personnel with knowledge of critical secrets.

•	 Compartmenting all aspects of NRO activities so that the fewest possible number 

of individuals were knowledgeable of the details of any single program.

•	 Requiring comprehensive background investigations (initial and periodic 

reinvestigations) and subsequent counter-intelligence polygraphs.

•	 Minimizing disclosed technical information 

required to achieve operational or interface needs.

•	 Requiring third-party introductions to verify 

mutual security credentials.

•	 Requiring an indoctrination briefing tailored 

to the functions of the engineer, scientist, 

administrative worker, etc. Each person owned the 

security of his or her respective function.36

“The office will consist of carefully 

selected personnel of the highest 

qualifications, and will be confined 

to the minimum number required 

to accomplish the task under the 

conditions which apply.”

 — Joseph Charyk,

 July 1962
 36

1962 - 1990

The NRO security staff designed and supported a wide array of cover arrangements, as required 

to support or sustain the secrecy of NRO operations and essential interfaces, often requiring 

extensive and direct security staff interaction in DoD and other Executive Branch departments 

and agencies. 

Over the years, the need for security drove, enabled, and protected every element of the NRO 

at every level. The volume of information flowing through the security staff for classification, 

compartmentation, and accuracy verification from other components of the government was 

extremely high. Eventually, the security staff produced compartmentation and classification guides 

for external departments and agencies to assist in reducing the dependency on the NRO Staff for 

the increasing volume caused by the growth of NRP programs and operations. The security staff 

responsibilities that extended into other departments and agencies created a trusted collaborative 

web of relationships across the Executive Branch that enabled the flow of multi-level information, 

while protecting sensitive NRP operations and programmatic information.

During the 28-year span of the NRO Staff, a total of only five rotating Air Force officers were 

assigned to the security staff, four of which typically rotated between the Staff and Program A.37 With 

few exceptions, rotation of the CIA officers was more frequent. Nevertheless, service by this very 

small cadre, which generally never exceeded one Air Force officer and one CIA senior civilian at a 

time, was a major factor in the continuity and success of NRO secrecy for nearly three decades.

Personnel 

The NRO Staff’s personnel management section provided the interface between the other Staff 

elements and the service and agency personnel systems in the selection and retention of Staff 

personnel, as well as managing other personnel actions which included training, performance 

evaluation, and in some cases relocation. Each service and agency had a different process for 

selecting, assigning, and retaining people allocated to NRO duty. The Air Force developed a special 

assignment section within the Air Force Personnel Center specifically to manage NRO assignments. 

It serviced both the Staff and Program A and had the authority to waive many standard personnel 

management policies and regulations. The Army and Navy had no similar process, as their numbers 

were much smaller. Typically, assignments for both services were handled on a case-by-case basis. Of 

note, even within the Navy’s Program C, there were few uniformed Navy personnel, as most of the 

program management and development work was accomplished by the Naval Research Laboratory’s 

civilian workforce. 

The CIA had special hiring authorities and assigned people to the NRO and Program B on a 

case-by-case basis, with assignees largely staying within the agency’s Office of Development and 

Engineering (OD&E) for their entire careers. Relatively few CIA officers served tours on the NRO Staff, 

and these were handled on a case-by-case basis. The NRO was unusual in that people were selected 

without undue concern for their job specialty codes. For example, a Program Element Monitor 

position might be filled with an engineer, a program manager, an intelligence specialist, or a pilot, 

and the job specialty of an incumbent might be different from their replacement in the same NRO 

Staff position. 
37

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Air Force Personnel Management

Selection of the Staff Director was, typically, an Air Force Brigadier General, selected by the DNRO 

and often subsequently assigned to be the Director of Program A. Other key positions reporting 

directly to the Staff Director were typically selected through collaboration between the Staff Director 

and program office directors, in some cases also involving the Director or Deputy Director of the NRO. 

At lower levels, Staff appointments were made with the approval of the Staff Director, in many cases 

the result of a very active vetting process at lower levels. 

In the case of those appointments representing the operations and intelligence communities, 

individuals were nominated by seniors in their home offices and vetted in a similar manner as those 

coming from NRO program offices. This entire selection process was managed by the NRO Staff 

personnel group. With respect to Air Force assignments, which represented the majority of the Staff 

positions, the Staff personnel group worked closely with the “Green Door” at the Air Force Military 

Personnel Center (AFMPC) at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas to facilitate the assignment 

action. It should be noted that the Green Door process was an informal designation of the Air Force 

Special Assignments group activities at AFMPC. Interaction between AFMPC and NRO elements was 

facilitated by secure phones and a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at AFMPC. This 

alliance between AFMPC and the NRO Staff also applied to Air Force staff assigned to Program A, with 

the NRO Staff providing a coordinated response to AFMPC.

The NRO Staff personnel group was able to leverage this process for Air Force assignments, in 

most cases interacting directly with the Special Assignments Group, and including an input from 

Program A for a consolidated NRO response. 

Just as important as selecting the right personnel for Air Force positions in the NRO was retaining 

those individuals, many of whom spent the majority of their careers in the NRO. The process for 

identifying those who should be retained was the Personnel Control List (PCL), which was reviewed 

and updated on an annual basis. The Air Force PCL listed all of the NRO officers with currently approved 

rotation dates. The Staff Director had the discretion to extend each officer’s rotation date with the 

understanding that the individual would be protected from reassignment by the Air Force’s Special 

Assignments Group. Since the Program A input was integrated into the NRO’s Air Force PCL, managed 

by the Staff Director, the NRO had the ability to retain Air Force officers within the NRO for the better 

part of an individual’s career, helping to maintain an NRO space cadre of highly experienced officers, 

to the point that it was not uncommon for senior Air Force officers to aspire to Colonel, but then elect 

to stay in position in the NRO, rather than compete for Brigadier General if it meant leaving the NRO.38

The Air Force Communications Service (AFCS), which later became the Air Force Communications 

Command, provided communications support at NRO facilities world-wide, and also prioritized 

the selection and retention of NRO communicators. The senior communicator at NRO operational 

locations was “dual-hatted,” reporting through NRO as well as AFCS channels, and in this role actively 

engaged in the NRO/AFCS assignment process.39

The Staff personnel group is also credited for creating a career track in the mid-1960s for young 

Air Force officers, colloquially referred to as “Wizards.” In a collaborative effort with the Special 

Assignments Group, the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), the Rochester Institute of Technology 

(RIT), and Eastman Kodak, officers would graduate from RIT with a Master’s degree in Photographic 

Science, followed by a one-year assignment with Eastman Kodak, under sponsorship of the AFIT’s 

Education With Industry (EWI) program. Officers were then typically assigned to Program A program 

offices, or in some instances, the NRO Staff technology group.40
 38

1962 - 1990

CIA Personnel Management 

The Program B director selected and directly hired many of his program’s office staff. The Agency 

had special hiring authorities that allowed the direct hire of technical experts at relatively senior 

levels and at high pay grades. The Staff’s interface for personnel management of CIA people was the 

CIA Office of Development and Engineering personnel group, which among other things managed 

the OD&E Personnel Assignment Group (PAG). The PAG was typically chaired by the director or 

deputy director of OD&E with representation by each of the directors/deputies who would map 

out assignment actions for each of the OD&E officers, including those assigned to the NRO Staff. 

Assignment actions were similarly vetted with the NRO Staff Director, and in some cases, the DNRO.

Navy Personnel Management

The Navy personnel system did not have such a specialized assignment office. Instead, the 

positions were coded for the skills required, and the institutional navy assignment system provided 

regular support. For Program C operation, positions were allocated to the Naval Security Group and 

staffed from within that Command. For systems development, the Navy relied on a large component 

of Navy civilian workers who stayed in place for their careers. The active duty management came 

from within the Program C engineering staff, with senior managers personally selected by the 

Program C Director, a Navy Admiral or Captain, similar to the final selection process for senior officers 

in Programs A and B.

Satellite Operations

The NRO’s role in satellite operations was a contentious issue when the NRO was formed. A CIA 

clandestine Operations Center existed in Palo Alto, California that had its origins in the planning 

and tasking of U-2 overflight missions, and it had become the planning center for early Corona 

missions. Director Charyk argued successfully to have the satellite portion of that Ops Center, along 

with experienced Corona operations personnel, realigned under him as the DNRO and to have the 

activity relocated to the Pentagon. This outcome was of immediate benefit to the objective of a 

consolidated National Reconnaissance Program.41

The Satellite Operations Center was aligned as an NRO Staff element in 1962. The Satellite Ops 

functions were not traditional Staff functions; but at the time, Programs A, B, and C were semiautonomous entities, and the only organization that was wholly responsive to the DNRO was 

what became the NRO Staff that same year. The SOC was located in the basement of the Pentagon 

(Room BD944), leading to its informal designation, “The Mushroom Factory.” 

Under Dr. Charyk’s direction, the NRO Staff was responsible for detailed mission planning, including 

specifying desired targets to be covered and approval of the actual mission target options which were 

programmed into each flight vehicle. The Staff made all on-orbit selections between target coverage 

options based on weather and/or intelligence factors. They also coordinated satellite operations with 

other collection activities, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-managed Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance 

Program (PARPRO).

The SOC was located in the basement of the Pentagon 

 (Room BD944), leading to its informal designation, 

 “The Mushroom Factory.”
39

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Of note, the CIA proposed that the Ops Center be transferred back to CIA. Disagreeing, Director 

McMillan underscored the importance of the NRO maintaining responsibility for mission planning and 

tasking functions stating, “I am convinced that if the Op Center is removed from the NRO, the NRO will be 

destroyed and the DoD will experience interminable difficulties in getting its requirements recognized.” 42

The NRO Staff Deputy Director for Operations, who reported to the Staff Director, headed the SOC. In 

addition to its operations role, SOC personnel represented the NRO to the USIB and its committees, whose 

functions included both short-term collection priorities and future system requirements. As the USIB 

interface, the SOC also represented the NRO in supporting development of community requirements for 

new system capabilities (including participation on system trade studies) and coordinating with other Staff 

elements and program offices. 

Within the SOC there was an Imagery branch, a Sigint branch, a Logistics branch, a weather liaison, 

and other operations support functions. The operations role evolved over time as computer tools were 

introduced, systems got more capable and complex, and requirements grew in scope and detail. The staff 

provided technical assistance and worked with the requirements committees to define specific collection 

requirements and then developed tasking documents that were provided to mission ground stations, 

where they were converted into satellite commands and loaded into the systems. 

The Logistics Branch maintained a depot to support satellite operations and also managed and 

coordinated transportation requirements associated with moving satellites and components among 

factories and launch pads, or as was required. The branch had the authority to exercise the highest national 

security priority, Brickbat 1, to meet program needs. 

A weather liaison element from the Air Force Weather Service supported imagery mission planning and 

also provided space weather support, as required. Similarly, a representative from the Defense Mapping 

Agency was assigned to support operations planning. 

The NRO jealously guarded their responsibilities for tasking systems (translating community priorities 

into specific mission tasking). There was always tension between the roles of the NRO (tasking) and the 

NSA (providing specific Sigint technical guidance). NRO Detachment Ft. Meade (NDF) was established in 

1976 to help address these tensions and also to better deal with systems that were becoming timelier and 

more interactive. At that time, the Sigint branch was split, with four people staying in the Pentagon and 

four moving to Ft. Meade. The NDF was collocated with the Poppy Ops Center (which reported to NRO 

Program C and served a satellite control facility-type function for the Poppy Elint satellite system) and with 

an NSA consolidated center that included representatives from several different NSA directorates. While 

the elements were collocated in the same room, they were not combined or integrated, and each had a 

reporting chain back to their parent organization. The NRO Detachment Commander reported to the Sigint 

Branch Chief at the Pentagon, who in turn worked for the NRO Staff Deputy Director for Operations.    

Staffing of the Ops Center organization was different from the other NRO Staff elements, in that assigned 

personnel were, for the most part, not drawn from nor returned to Programs A, B, or C. The Imagery branch 

members were largely government civilian employees (mostly retired military pilots) who made their 

second career in the SOC. Imagery personnel had very little turnover. The Sigint branch was different in that 

it included primarily active duty combat arms officers. There were Navy surface warfare officers, Air Force 

pilots and Sigint specialists, Army artillery and infantry officers, and government civilians from outside the 

NRO. In Sigint, there was a fair amount of turnover, with most of those leaving for assignments outside the 

NRO. Primarily, Air Force logistics officers staffed the Logistics branch, and the weather and other liaison 

positions were staffed with subject matter experts. 
 40

1962 - 1990

By the mid-1970s, the advent of more timely and interactive satellite systems, coupled with more 

capable computerized requirements systems, was stressing the ability of the NRO Satellite Ops Center to 

do its job. In 1977, the NRO moved the Hexagon mission planning and tasking functions from the SOC to 

the Satellite Control Facility in Sunnyvale, CA and combined them with the command generation function. 

In 1978, the NRO disestablished the SOC. The imaging tasking functions of the community and NRO were 

consolidated at the imagery system site; the Sigint functions were consolidated at Ft. Meade and integrated 

with the NSA technical guidance functions to create the jointly-staffed Overhead Collection Management 

Center. The liaison interfaces that had been aligned to the SOC were realigned, with Logistics going to 

Program A and weather liaison along with a few remaining ops staff personnel remaining on the NRO Staff, 

but transferring to what was then Programs & Budget.

With the demise of the SOC, the NRO interface to the USIB committees and the newly created 

Intelligence Community Staff was divided. Systems and Technology became responsible for new system 

requirements and future system studies, while Liaison and Administration became responsible for related 

policy coordination. The OCMC became a joint organization, but the NRO personnel assigned to that 

organization continued to be rated by the NRO Staff Director, even though the OCMC functions were never 

integrated into the Staff.  

Policy

The NRO Staff included a policy function focused on coordinating internal and external policy 

issues that had implications for the NRO and with protecting the organization’s interests. The scope 

of policies this small team worked on was extensive. 

KEY POLICY FUNCTIONS

• Reviewing and contributing to the development of high-level policy documents 

such as Presidential Directives, Executive Orders, and decision memoranda to ensure 

NRO interests were protected.

• Protecting the authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities assigned to the 

NRO by policy and charter. This included developing NRO internal policies, and 

negotiation of management agreements (or memorandums of agreement) with other 

government departments or agencies.

• Representing the DNRO in high-level policy forums involving space or arms control 

policies, treaties, and legal or legislative actions that had ramifications for the NRO.

• Providing staff support for reviewing technology transfer requests, Freedom of 

Information requests, contingency planning, and other government deliberations 

and decisions that had ramifications for NRO equities.

• Developing, in coordination with the security function,* policies that governed 

compartmentation and personnel access control to protect security and to 

enable and maintain the streamlined organization and management structure. 

* The security function of the NRO Staff was at times combined with the policy function; otherwise it reported 

separately to the Staff Director. Security had a broad mandate for developing, executing, and overseeing security policy. The 

policy element coordinated policy development but was not responsible for its execution. Regardless, the policy team was, in 

all cases, involved in security policy issues of sufficient magnitude to concern the DNRO. 
41

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

The number of policy issues impacting NRO equities increased over time as the utility of space 

systems increased, the community of users expanded, and budgets grew, resulting in an increased 

industrial base and more and broader oversight. Security breaches occurred creating legal and 

security challenges, as technologies underpinning NRO systems proliferated to other countries and 

to private commercial enterprises. 

Due to the streamlined nature of the NRO Staff, the policy team was small, with relatively junior 

officers, generally never exceeding five officers total. Because of security constraints that limited 

access, their counterparts in other organizations were often higher ranking or otherwise more senior. 

There was very little intermediate management in the NRO Staff, so junior policy officers often 

worked directly with the Staff Director or the DDNRO. By the late 1970s, the DNRO often worked 

directly with the policy action officers to decide on policy objectives. He largely trusted them to use 

their judgment and exercise initiative in working policy issues to achieve the desired objectives. 

By the late 1970s, DoD and National Space Policy activity had expanded to include a rapidly 

expanding array of stakeholders—civil government, foreign, and private sector interests that 

previously had no need-to-know about the NRO or details of its programs. To address these issues, 

a new three-person office was established within the Air Force Secretariat (Office of Space Policy, 

SAF/SX). Dr. Charlie Cook moved from his position as DDNRO to lead the office that was staffed by 

officers with significant prior NRO experience, including Col Seb Coglitore, Lt Col Jim Beale and Lt Col 

Ted Mervosh. The office worked closely with the NRO Staff’s policy staff, as well as with the broader 

Air Force, and reported to the DNRO in his Air Force capacity. Initially the office dealt largely with 

NASA, negotiating Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) on shuttle and other shared infrastructure 

agreements, including costs and cost reimbursement rates. It also served as the interface for issues 

involving, foreign space, the United Nations, and the emerging commercial space activities. It also 

served as a cut-out in representing NRO as well as Air Force interests with the White House Economic 

Council, the US Trade Representative, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of 

Commerce/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Finally, the Staff policy function served as Staff lead for various external and expert panel studies 

or advisory groups that supported the DNRO on critical institutional decisions.

The Early Years (1962-74). Many of the policy issues of the early NRO dealt with establishing 

the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the DNRO. During the years when Dr. Charyk and Dr. 

McMillan served as DNRO, policy issues were often worked in principals’ meetings and in exchanges 

of letters. Key players were the senior CIA and DoD leadership, with many decisions going to the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense for resolution. The NRO Staff supported the DNRO in these negotiations 

and decision processes. 

Some of the major activities supported by the policy staff, led by Col Paul Worthman, included 

development of the NRO charter documents in 1963 and 1965, interaction with the President’s Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory Board regarding both oversight and organizational studies, and development 

of contingency plans for serious security disclosures or events that might cause an international 

incident. The policy staff was a key player in the negotiations between the NRO and the Air Force 

regarding the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program, and were essential in the documentation of 

the roles of the Strategic Air Command and the NRO for funding and operation of reconnaissance 

vehicles including the U-2, A-12, and SR-71 aircraft programs, as well as the D-21 drone program.43

By the time Dr. Flax became the DNRO in 1965, the early organizational issues were largely 

resolved. The NRO Executive Committee was formed as the decision authority for resolving conflicts 

and providing program and budget oversight. The policy staff supported the DNRO’s participation in 

EXCOM meetings and drafted the meeting minutes. 
 42

1962 - 1990

Hexagon (KH-9) satellite pre-launch - 15 June 1971
43

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

During this time, technologies were advancing and new satellite programs provided increased 

capability to support a wider range of user needs. The policy staff primarily provided background 

information and staff support for the DNRO’s external meetings, and drafted memos to prepare him 

on the key meeting issues. 

Some of the external policy issues effecting NRO equities during the later years of the Johnson 

and Nixon Administrations that the policy staff was involved with included the Outer Space Treaty, 

which bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space, prohibits military 

activities on celestial bodies, and details legally binding rules governing the peaceful exploration and 

use of space; the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, designed to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons 

beyond those countries that already had such weapons; and the SALT 1 interim agreement and AntiBallistic Missile treaty, which was the first agreement that referred to “National Technical Means of 

Verification” and the first public acknowledgement of the “fact of” satellite reconnaissance as a treaty 

verification tool. 

The policy staff was utilized for President Johnson’s public disclosure of the existence of the SR-71 

program, the eventual cancellation of the A-12 and D-21 airborne reconnaissance programs, and the 

closure of NRO’s Program D and the transfer of personnel and technologies to the Air Force. 

Clockwise from Left: SR-71, A-12 and 

D-21B Drone on the wing of a B-52.
 44

1962 - 1990

The Middle Years (1974-80). Several events during the mid- to late 1970s had a profound impact 

on the NRO policy function — dramatically increasing the role, engagement, and influence of the 

NRO policy staff on development of national security and intelligence community management 

policies. These events included an increase in the Soviet threat to national security space systems; 

Congressional concerns regarding the management and oversight of the Intelligence Community, 

highlighted by the Church/Pike Committee hearings and the subsequent reforms; the introduction 

of near real-time systems, coupled with a growing appreciation of the increasing capabilities of space 

systems to support military operations; and the development of the Space Shuttle and the expansion 

of its role as a critical launch system for NRO, as well as other DoD payloads. 

These developments underscored the need for more comprehensive national-level direction from 

the White House and Congress. Accordingly, during this five-year period, there were a heretofore 

unprecedented number of space-related policies and directives issued. The Staff was deeply involved 

in reviewing each of these documents and, in many cases, provided language that was adopted for 

policies that were especially relevant to the NRO interest and equities.*

This period was a very active time in terms of the impact of national and DoD policy on the NRO, 

and the three young officers performing the NRO Staff policy functions were Lt Col Tom Moorman 

and Majors Jimmey Morrell and Dave Messner (often referred to as the 3-M’s). They interfaced 

extensively with OSD, IC, Congressional, and White House staff elements, as well as those of the 

military departments. They explained the implications of various policy options and helped draft and 

coordinate policy documents, while advocating for and protecting NRO management and security 

equities. They also interfaced with NRO program offices and other Staff elements to help manage 

changes. 

These policy deliberations/decisions drove major changes in oversight and priorities for the NRO. 

The recognition that space was not a sanctuary resulted in significant new investments in satellite 

survivability to respond to the increasing Soviet anti-satellite threat. The EXCOM was replaced by 

much more inclusive oversight processes, including both Congressional and Departmental staff 

involvement. The increased priority and funding for support to military operations included new 

funding mechanisms, as well as increases in the cleared requirements and size of the user community. 

Acknowledgement of the fact of overhead reconnaissance for treaty verification (National Technical 

Means of Verification) resulted in substantially increased attention, which strained security measures 

and resources.

The Later Years (1980-90). This period saw the policy team dealing with a technology–driven 

expansion in the capabilities, applications, and utility of space, coupled with a dramatic increase in 

the number of NRO customers and stakeholders. 

The technology underpinning earth sensing was rapidly expanding, and the policy function was 

a critical focal point to define boundaries between the NRO, its customers, and its mission partners. 

This involved the policy team in negotiation of MOAs with other intelligence agencies about their 

relative roles and missions in the operation of near real-time systems. It also involved development of 

agreements delineating the boundary between NRO’s intelligence missions and the roles and activities 

of organizations such as DARPA and the new Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. The policy staff 

also represented and protected NRO interests in supporting continuity of government initiatives.

Some of the key policy issues during this period involved pricing for shuttle launches and later 

the cost of the Space Station Freedom initiative. Those are good examples of how the NRO policy 

staff worked with NRO Staff alumni, now in key positions in other organizations, to help set national 

* A representative list of key events and policy documents is illustrated in the Timeline chart (inside back cover).
45

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

policies. Issues relative to pricing and cost for these NASA programs were worked through the 

National Security Council. Lt Cols Jim Morrell on the NRO Staff, Tom Maultsby in OSD Policy, and 

Dick McCormick, who was then on the IC Staff, worked as a team to get policies favorable to the NRP, 

while also protecting NRO equities, drafted and approved.

Many of the issues involving the NRO Staff policy team related to the boundary between the 

intelligence missions associated with reconnaissance and the military missions of surveillance and 

tactical operations. The CIA and Program B were highly focused on support to the President and 

Cabinet-level policy makers. Program C was highly focused on support to the operational Navy, 

and Program A was increasingly focused on support to military operations. The policy team was a 

critical element in managing the increasing importance and value of space capabilities to support 

military operations. This included support to TENCAP demonstrations and creation of the policy 

underpinnings for creation of the Defense Reconnaissance Support Program. Importantly, the policy 

team was the NRO lead organization in the planning for and the stand-up and development of new 

working relationships associated with the formation of Air Force Space Command and, subsequently, 

a Unified Command for space. 

Launch

Unlike the acquisition, development, and funding of covert satellites, the launch of a satellite 

is a visible event that cannot be hidden. In the very early years after the NRO was established, a 

key issue was maintaining appropriate security, while living with the propensity of launches to fail. 

The Staff had an individual assigned to support the DNRO on launch issues– he tracked failures and 

recovery plans and interfaced with the NRO security team to deal with the security and cover stories 

for launches of NRO reconnaissance satellites. 

In the late 1950s, all three services conducted space launches. However, by the early 1960s the 

Army’s center of expertise, the Redstone Arsenal, was aligned with NASA as part of the Apollo mission 

to land men on the moon. The Navy focused on developing submarine-launched ICBMs, and satellite 

systems launched within DoD had become primarily the responsibility of the Air Force. Thus, the Air 

Force became the Department of Defense launch agent for essentially all NRO space launches. 

In the early years, Program A, the Air Force component of the NRO, became the interface to the 

Air Force launch provider for launch of NRO satellites. Launch systems were tailored to the needs 

of the NRO satellites, and each booster was tagged to a specific satellite. The satellite developer, 

Program A’s System Program Office (SPO), worked NRO launch interfaces and participated in the 

launch operation.

The advent of the Space Transportation System (STS), or Space Shuttle, during the mid-years of 

the NRO Staff, brought big changes to the launch process. The DoD agreed to launch all national 

security satellites on the Space Shuttle rather than on expendable launch vehicles. The NRO Staff 

Program Monitor’s role was expanded to include a technical interface function to work with NASA 

and the Air Force on fielding the Space Shuttle, developing the infrastructure to support it, and 

redesigning the NRO satellites to optimize use of the Space Shuttle’s larger cargo bay. Redesigning 

every satellite drove a very large increase in the NRP budget and increased competition for both 

missions and funding among the program offices.

By the time of the Reagan Administration, there was a National Policy decision to mandate use 

of the Space Shuttle for all US government satellites. Pete Aldridge (at the time both the DNRO and 

the Under Secretary of the Air Force) argued that total dependence on the shuttle before it had 

been proven was high risk and that the Air Force should invest in 10 additional Commercial (later 
 46

1962 - 1990

Complementary) Expendable Launch Vehicles* as an insurance policy in case of a shuttle accident. 

In this, the NRO Staff served as a personal staff to the Secretary/DNRO and interfaced with all 

organizations and agencies participating in launch policy and funding decisions.

The Challenger launch failure proved the wisdom of the back-up approach. The now-Secretary 

of the Air Force/DNRO Aldridge was the DoD leader in driving development of a new fleet of 

expendable launch vehicles to replace the shuttle, and the redesign of satellite missions from shuttleonly configurations to ELV-compatible designs. In this process, he worked with many elements of 

the Air Force and the DoD but relied heavily on the NRO Staff to provide personal staff support for 

development of decision papers and briefings, production of talking papers and guidance memos, 

and for fact finding and providing concise summaries of activities across the DoD.

The Early Years (1962–74). The NRO typically funded all NRO launches as a separate budget 

item from the satellite that was to be launched. In the early years, the Staff involvement included 

both a program monitoring role and a security protection role. The NRO/Air Force partnership for 

launch support was very strong from the beginning of the Thor/ launches of the Discoverer/Corona 

vehicles, and continuing through later Atlas/Agena (Gambit), Titan (Hexagon), and Sigint launches. 

By the time Brockway McMillan ended his tenure as DNRO, these launches had become fairly routine, 

notwithstanding the occasional failure, and thus required little NRO Staff engagement other than 

budget/funding issues. 

At this time, launch failures were not 

uncommon, but since the satellites were 

planned for short operational lifetimes, 

and therefore essentially had production 

lines, a failure did not entail a substantial 

gap in mission coverage.

The NRO launch Program Element 

Monitor function existed from the very 

beginning of the NRO and was initially 

charged to provide security for movement 

of equipment to the launch ranges and 

for cover stories for NRO launches. Once 

the launches became “routine,” and 

rather open secrets, the PEM function 

narrowed. During this period, the launch 

PEM’s primary responsibilities were to 

provide staff support to the DNRO and 

represent the NRO in interactions with 

USAF, OSD, IC, Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB), and Congressional staff 

elements in areas including requirements 

and justification, budgeting, and launch 

schedule coordination.

* Initially CELV was the Commercial Launch Vehicle program but was later changed to the Complementary Launch 

Vehicle program due to political sensitivities.

Corona Launch - 25 May 1972
47

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

During the latter part of this period, the scope of launch system-related activity on the Staff 

declined, and the launch PEM assumed additional responsibilities for representing and defending 

the NRO R&D investment program. 

However, during this period DoD and the Air Force, as DoD Executive Agent for Manned 

Spaceflight, worked with NASA on the early stages of Space Shuttle planning and development. 

An MOA between NASA and the Air Force was signed in 1970 as NRO requirements were driving 

considerations on decisions about the size and capabilities of the shuttle. Preliminary commitments 

were made for DoD use of the shuttle, and DoD committed to reconfigure Space Launch Complex 6 

(SLC-6, the former Dyna-Soar launch pad) at Vandenberg AFB, CA to serve as the west coast shuttle 

launch facility.

The Middle Years (1974–80). By the Carter Administration, the Space Shuttle development had 

reached a point where the DoD and NRO had to begin to take actions to transition from expendable 

launch vehicles to the shuttle. Dr. Hans Mark, as DNRO, reversed earlier guidance that NRO satellites 

had to be designed to be dual compatible with both shuttle* and expendable launch vehicles. His 

direction that all future NRO satellites would be optimized for the shuttle meant that they would no 

longer be compatible for launch on expendables. 

To support the planning for transition to the Space Shuttle, a new position was created on the 

NRO Staff — the Deputy for shuttle planning — within the Policy and Security staff. This function 

had the responsibility to support the DNRO on needed decisions regarding shuttle transition, as well 

as to track progress and evolution of capabilities and procedures for the shuttle. Dr. Mark relied on 

this NRO Staff focal point, not only to advise him on NRO transition to the shuttle, but also broader 

Air Force activities related to launch transition. At this point, the NRO budget experienced a large 

increase because essentially all NRO programs had to be redesigned for the shuttle, and the nonrecurring costs were large. 

Within the redesign, the payloads were “shuttle optimized” – i.e. made wide and short, as the costs 

to the payload program office were based on the length of the shuttle bay. The Air Force also took 

on substantial investments to develop the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) designed primarily for shuttle 

use, and to convert SLC-6 for shuttle launches. In both developments, the NRO had the driving 

requirements. The NRO also had requirements for security accommodations at NASA’s Manned 

Spaceflight Center at Houston. The NRO Staff played a key role in negotiating these requirements 

with the Air Force and NASA.

During this time, Dr. Mark assigned Air Force Brig Gen Ralph Jacobson as a liaison officer at NASA 

Headquarters to coordinate shuttle issues. Brig Gen Jacobson, a former NRO officer, worked closely 

with the NRO Staff launch point of contact, as well as directly with Dr. Mark.

* Interestingly, the sizing of the shuttle cargo bay was based on the NRO’s Hexagon imaging satellite dimensions. The 

Hexagon, however, never flew on the Space Shuttle.
 48

1962 - 1990

The Later Years (1980–90). The Reagan Administration’s first National Space Policy (NSPD 8, 4 July 

1982) endorsed the Carter Administration’s decision that all military satellites would be optimized for 

launch on the shuttle. 

By May 1983, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 94 encouraged development of a 

commercial expendable launch vehicle capability as a complement to the shuttle. This had the effect 

of providing a path to preserve the small and medium US expendable launch vehicle industry for 

commercial launch services. The subsequent policy in May 1984, which was promulgated as NSDD 

144, required full cost recovery pricing for the shuttle, which showed the high cost of using the 

shuttle was non-competitive with commercial expendable launch. The Commercial Space Launch 

Act of October 1984 further encouraged the industry. 

Then Air Force Secretary/DNRO Aldridge, and many senior Air Force officers, were concerned with 

the risks of becoming solely reliant on the Space Shuttle for access to space. They were also very 

concerned about the ballooning cost of shuttle launches, and the dim expectations that the shuttle 

would even be able to meet required NRO launch rates, much less reaching its advertised launch rate. 

DNRO Aldridge became a strong proponent for a change in policy that supported development of a 

commercial expendable capability, at least for long enough to gain experience and confidence in the 

shuttle launch program. It is important to recognize that because of the intense political interest and 

emotion regarding this debate, it required a significant amount of personal and political fortitude for 

the DNRO to take on this complex issue. 

In making his argument, Mr. Aldridge 

relied heavily on the NRO Staff to gather 

information, draft briefings, assess options 

and costs, and perform analysis supporting 

his personal advocacy with the SECDEF, 

senior Administration policy makers, and 

the Congress. The Staff POC worked with 

NRO, NASA, and Air Force elements and, 

taking advantage of the streamlined staff 

structure, frequently worked directly 

with the DNRO. Brig Gen Tom Moorman, 

then the NRO Staff Director, would later 

comment, “During this period, no issue or 

subject had greater impact on the NRO 

Staff from a policy, budget, or technology 

perspective – one cannot over-emphasize 

the unique role the Staff played in the 

Shuttle transition.”44

The Challenger failure in 1986 

and subsequent shuttle stand-down 

of 32 months proved the need for a 

complementary launch capability. Coupled 

with two Titan 34D failures, as well as an 

Atlas and a Delta failure that occurred at 

about the same time, DoD had a serious 

space launch crisis. NASA Space Shuttle Discovery Launch.
49

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Secretary/DNRO Aldridge had taken the lead for DoD 

in shuttle transition issues and was a very hands-on leader 

driving decisions and funding for redesigning satellites for ELV 

compatibility. After Challenger, he also drove funding completion 

of the 10 CELVs that had been authorized but not yet assembled, 

monitoring the Titan 34D accident investigations, and starting 

up production on new medium and heavy-lift boosters. 

In this work, DNRO Aldridge relied on the NRO Staff, working 

along with the Air Force Program Office, to support him as his 

personal staff to work on the range of launch issues that extended 

far beyond the NRO’s normal equities. This approach provided him 

with information and assessments on activities throughout both 

DoD and the contractor community. It quickly provided him with 

cost estimates and risk assessments, bypassing intermediate Air 

Force staffs. The NRO Staff developed briefings and coordinated 

extensively with the launch SPO, the Space and Missile Systems commander, and other senior launch 

decision makers. The NRO Staff Director, Brig Gen Moorman, facilitated and directed many of these 

senior-level deliberations. 

The NRO Staff also worked with other elements of the Air Force who themselves reported to 

Secretary/DNRO Aldridge on space launch recovery issues. Included among these was Major General 

Don Kutyna, Air Force Space and Missile Center (SMC) Deputy Commander for Launch Systems and 

the senior Air Force representative on the Rogers (Challenger) Commission. The Air Force Mission 

Area Director for Space and Air Force legal staffs, who were implementing the Commercial Space 

Launch Act, also participated in discussions. Finally, the SAF/Space Policy Office, representing DoD in 

NSC Space Policy, was also involved. 

"I came in as Under Secretary and DNRO in August 1981 and stayed there until 

December 1988. The NRO Staff played a unique role during this period, performing a much 

more expansive role for the combined activities of the Under Secretary, Secretary, and DNRO. 

Why did the NRO Staff take on this expanded role in 1981?  Except for the launch crews and 

the acquisition expertise in El Segundo... the depth of space expertise in the Air Force was 

“shallow.”  Therefore, the NRO Staff filled this void."45

 — DNRO Pete Aldridge 

Within the larger context of this history, there is no better example of the benefits of the 

streamlined management and selective staffing that characterized the NRO Staff than the advisory 

role that it played to the DNRO on the most important issue in his time in the position. 

Mr. Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

DNRO: 3 Aug 1981 - 16 Dec 1988
 50

1962 - 1990

Budget and Legislative Liaison

The DNRO managed and administrated a single consolidated National Reconnaissance Program 

that funded all NRO activities including studies, development, launch, and operations. The financial 

management function included whatever coordination and justification that was required with the 

Executive and Congressional budget processes. The process established was highly streamlined, 

with waivers granted to many standard oversight and regulatory processes. The NRP was reviewed 

by a small group of cleared personnel and then was incorporated and “fenced” within the Air Force 

budget to protect knowledge of both its size and existence. 

The criticality and sensitivity of the NRP-funded programs led to the decisions to incrementally 

fund activities. Thus, rather than having to precisely define and fully fund a new program before it 

started, the NRP provided only the funds required for that budget year. This provided the flexibility 

to incorporate evolving technology to improve a satellite’s performance and lifetime. This also 

smoothed the NRP budget and avoided the need for peaks and valleys associated with including all 

the funds that would be expended over several years in just one year. They maintained a termination 

reserve that protected against the decision to terminate a program once it was underway. Another 

feature was the use on “no year” money. In most DoD programs, different types of expenditures, 

once appropriated, must either be expended or they expire within a specified period of years and 

are turned back to the Treasurer. The ability to carry forward funds from year-to-year was critical in 

the early years when many satellites/boosters failed. The flexibility provided by funds carried forward 

from prior years allowed quick response without suffering the delays and complexity of getting 

supplemental funds through Congress.

In later years, several other budget programs, designed to provide supplemental funds from 

DoD to fund studies, experiments, and new capabilities, specifically focused on support to military 

operations. These programs (e.g. TENCAP, DRSP) were managed in coordination, but separately from 

the NRP and the NRO Staff.46

"I remember the “rack and stack” budget drill that we did every year in the 4C-1000 

conference room with Jimmie Hill. When we were done, we would call in Pete Aldridge 

and Jimmie would summarize the results for his approval. After that we would produce 

the Congressional Budget Justification Book and send it to the CIA printing office for 

publication and delivery to the Congress.   We would “practice” with the DNRO to 

prepare him for his congressional testimony. We would offer example questions that the 

DNRO might get in the hearings and critique the DNRO response in real-time. We were 

diplomatic in our constructive criticism. I always enjoyed that part of the staff’s function. 

The bottom line for the staff was to “get the money” for the programs."47

 — Brig Gen Donald Walker, 

 NRO Staff Director, 1989-92
51

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

The Early Years (1962–74). When the NRO was established, financial management was one 

of the major points of controversy between the CIA and the NRO. DCI John McCone, for example, 

recommended that all funds necessary for the CIA to execute covert satellite projects be released 

directly to the CIA. Dr. Joseph Charyk countered in a memo to Roswell Gilpatric, Robert McNamara’s 

deputy, that “if the NRO is to function it must be responsible for continuous monitoring of financial 

and technical program status, must control the release of funds to programs, and must be able to 

reallocate [funds] between NRP programs.”48 In an interview with Dr. Charyk in September 2014, 

he recalled insisting that the NRO had to review and control program budgets and key technical 

decisions for a national covert space program to be successful.49

The final result was that the funding to support all NRO programs was consolidated into a single 

budget known as the National Reconnaissance Program which was administrated by the DNRO. 

For the first 14 years after formation of the NRO, budget formulation and monitoring was 

executed by the NRO's chief financial officer. This was a GS-17 position detailed from the CIA that 

reported directly to the Director of the NRO. He was supported by a staff of two Air Force officers plus 

a secretary and worked in parallel and close coordination with the NRO Staff. He attended EXCOM 

meetings and would often represent the DNRO on budget matters which were annually approved in 

December and reviewed quarterly.*

The NRO had only two chief financial officers. John Holleran who served from 1961 until his 

retirement in 1974 was often characterized as carrying everything you would want to know about 

the NRO in his pocket. Jimmie Hill, who replaced him, had an incredible memory and carried it all in 

his head. Hill served as chief financial officer from 1974–1978 and went on to be Staff Director and 

Deputy Director of the NRO. In coordination with the Program Directors and their Service/Agency 

financial elements, the chief financial officer and his small staff integrated the annual budget. They 

coordinated with the few cleared financial management interfaces in OSD and OMB and presented 

the budget to the few cleared members of Congress. They subsequently managed distribution of 

appropriations to the programs. By the late 1970s, the financial staff functions were divided between 

Lt Col Dave Doyle who worked the annual budget allocation and Lt Col Chuck Gyauch who was 

responsible for the five-year projections and TENCAP interfaces, as well as the Congressional and 

OMB interfaces.50

The Middle Years (1974–80). DNRO Hans Mark reorganized the budget process in 1978. By that 

time the budget oversight processes had changed. The EXCOM had been disestablished, and the 

Intelligence Oversight Committees were formed in Congress. The Director of CIA had been given the 

additional duty of Director of Central Intelligence and responsibility for management of the National 

Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), including the NRP. The IC Staff was established, separate and 

apart from the CIA, to support him in exercising his community duties.

Dr. Mark abolished the position of chief financial officer. In its place he established an Office of 

Programs and Budget within the NRO Staff. This office consisted of eight Air Force officers, one CIA 

officer, and three secretaries, a substantial increase from its earlier staffing. 

A major function of this new Staff element was the preparation and justification of the NRP to 

the larger oversight process including the IC Staff and Congress. The IC Staff and both Congressional 

Committees established new oversight processes with program/budget monitors dedicated to 

oversight of the NRP. 

* The chief financial officer (John Holleran) is remembered for his white socks and the notebook that he carried in his 

back pocket. The notebook contained all the details of the NRP budget.
 52

1962 - 1990

The Programs and Budget Office provided the primary liaison between the NRO and the new 

budget oversight functions of the IC Staff and the Congressional Committees. It was the Staff POC 

for developing, coordinating, and publishing an annual Congressional Budget Justification Book. It 

built and monitored the budget for the NRP and later, the DRSP. Within the budget office, individuals 

were assigned from Programs A, B, and C. Each program had a single person responsible for tracking 

the program dollars, overseeing that the technical staff fully justified the funds required for their 

activities, and ensuring that budget requests were accurate, budgets were dispersed to the programs 

accurately, and expenditure schedules stayed on track. There was close coordination and work 

allocation within the NRO Staff, especially among Budget staff and the Program Element Monitors.

With Congress assuming a much larger and more detailed role in overseeing the NRP, a fulltime position for Legislative Affairs was established within the existing NRO Budget Office in 1978, 

reporting to the Director for Programs and Budget. This legislative liaison function increased in 

scope and importance throughout the remainder of the time the NRO Staff existed. This individual 

maintained a close working relationship with the technical staff, as well as the Staff Director and the 

DDNRO, and oversaw the CBJB process. A tremendous esprit de corps existed among the Staff. While 

everyone advocated for their own program office, a deep respect for other Staff members and their 

programs existed. The NRO Legislative Affairs officer also had close relationships with the directors of 

Programs A, B, and C, as well as the directors of the individual system program offices. In many ways, 

the Legislative Affairs function provided the glue between the programs and Capitol Hill.

The Later Years (1980-90). External oversight continued to expand, but the NRO’s financial 

flexibility with incremental funding and the ability to carry forward unspent funds was preserved. 

This flexibility proved crucial in 1986, for example, after an NRO payload exploded at Vandenberg 

(80 days after Challenger) and the debris not only damaged the SLC-4E launch platform, but it also 

damaged the -4W pad downrange. The accident left a gaping hole in West Coast launch capability, 

with the critical launch of an essential new satellite scheduled in six months. The NRO applied the 

Carry Forward funds to repair both launch pads, enabling the autumn launch to proceed on schedule. 

Without this flexibility, the timely launch would not have been possible. 

The leadership of Mr. Jimmie Hill, as both Staff Director and later as DDNRO, was a critical factor 

in the NRO’s success. His phenomenal memory, aptitude for resource management, demonstrated 

integrity, and sense of fairness earned him tremendous respect in the Community. With support from 

the NRO Staff, he was a force to be reckoned with and one from which to learn. He influenced all 

major decisions and Congressional actions related to the NRO. 

The quality of the NRO budget process is reflected in quotes 

from key internal and external leaders of this era. Former SSCI Staff 

Budget Director, and later NRO Director, Keith Hall commented on 

his experiences on the Hill:

The NRO Legislative Liaison staff was at the top of the 

pack. [They] never shaded the truth. Without a doubt 

some of the issues were concluded to the benefit of the 

NRO because of the direct involvement of the NRO Staff. 

The work in the trenches by the Staff, and with Jimmie Hill 

as the final arbiter, served the NRO well. There were always 

big issues with the NRO each year because that was where 

the money was. Other Intelligence Community elements 

never lacked ammunition against the NRO. They tried to 

find issues with the programs. Some were envious of the 

Mr. Keith R. Hall

DNRO: 28 Mar 1997 - 13 Dec 2001
53

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

budget. The NSA Legislative Liaison team was more like cheerleaders than NRO. 

It is said that our government is based on a separation of powers. When there is 

an issue between the two, it is more like a collision of powers. A good legislative 

liaison shop helps "cushion the blow.” In his early days on the Hill, the CIA Legislative 

Liaison often tried to accelerate the collision. NSA and CIA sometimes made issues 

personal. This was not the case with the NRO. Greg [Gilles] and Joanne [Isham] 

helped to explain where the Hill was coming from on an issue and why. Sometimes 

though, the program would burst into flames anyway. Nevertheless, they tried to 

explain the Hill’s position and even if it was unreasonable, they tried to calm people 

down and reduce the friction. They were usually successful at that, no matter how 

hot the issue was.51

Communications

The NRO’s highly covert mission required high performance, tailored communications for 

administrative, and in particular, operational mission support. The origins of the NRO communications 

functions can be traced back to a 1964 declassified memorandum signed by Brig Gen John L. Martin, 

Jr., the NRO Staff Director, in which he described the duties of the NRO Communications Officer to 

include advising the NRO Staff Director of: 

All matters having a significant impact on NRO communications, as well as 

providing staff action [for] all communications matters referred to the DNRO 

for consideration. By 1964 this role had expanded to include... [to] provide 

communications services for the NRO... arrange for: leasing or procurement of 

circuits and equipment; manpower authorizations and properly cleared/trained 

personnel to operate and maintain NRO communications facilities.... Supervise 

communications security for USAF-operated NRO communications facilities and 

develop a high level of security consciousness, knowledge, and discipline at each 

communications center.52

Initially, the NRO relied on messages sent by teletype from communications center to 

communications center. “Comm centers” were established at Byeman facilities, and a dedicated 

Special Operations Communications network or SOCOM was established. As requirements for 

connectivity expanded, the NRO communications support grew to include hundreds of dedicated 

communications personnel, specially managed through the Air Force to provide secure connectivity 

among government, contractor, and user organizations. 

DNRO Pete Aldridge invited Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, 

to come to his office for a demonstration. After making a call the SECDEF, 

noticeably irritated, asked the question “Why can’t the regular DoD systems 

have a capability this easy to use and with voice recognition quality?” Shortly 

thereafter, the DoD initiated the RED Switch program that supported DoDwide secure voice for the services and Unified and Specified Commands. 

 

 — Maj Gen Phil Bracher, USAF (Ret.)
 54

1962 - 1990

The staff communicator’s role was to help define and to coordinate requirements and budget and 

to ensure communications operations supported the organization’s needs. The staff POC also held 

a position on the Air Force staff, enabling him to coordinate communications and influence budget, 

development, and resource allocation decisions to support NRO needs. He also had a third job as 

commander of the line organization supporting NRO communications. 

Consistent with the NRO approach, the line organization supporting the NRO was designed to 

manage systems from cradle-to-grave with selective manning similar to that enjoyed by the Air Force 

personnel assigned to the NRO. It drew on the Air Force for standard equipment but also developed, 

as well as operated, new advanced technology systems. The line organization began as a 12-person 

detachment commanded by an Air Force captain but evolved into Squadrons, Groups, and finally 

into a single Air Force Communications Wing of over one thousand military and contractor personnel, 

with an operating budget of nearly $500,000 and supporting assets of $5 Billion.53 It developed and 

fielded leading edge advances in secure voice and message handling, facsimile capabilities, and 

secure tactical dissemination systems. It also enabled the NRO to be the earliest national security 

adopter of commercial long-line services and at the forefront in the secure application of new digital 

applications, internet services, and email. Many of these NRO-led capabilities were subsequently 

adopted by DoD and government agencies, such as the White House Communications Agency, the 

State Department, and other government agencies.

The Early Years (1962–74). The initial 4C-1000 communications team of twelve Air Force 

communicators operated a special communications center, providing classified and unclassified 

communications services. The senior communications officer, Captain Jones, was assigned overtly 

to DCS/Operations, Hq Air Force Communications Service, but covertly and functionally to the 

NRO Staff Executive Officer, Lt Col Van Mater. Day-to-day, the team was responsible for providing 

communications and data transmission services in support of all NRP satellite operations assigned to 

the Satellite Operations Center, as well as to the entire NRO Staff and DNRO.54

Two years later, Brig Gen Martin’s replacement, Brig Gen David Bradburn, issued a similar 

memorandum with more emphasis and detail on the commander’s supervisory line responsibilities 

within the communications center, but at the same time, changing his NRO Staff point of contact 

to that of the Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, continuing to emphasize his staff role, but also 

adding emphasis to his supervisory role in operating the communications center:  

In addition to the NRO Staff functional responsibilities provided to [the DNRO], 

I recognize that the NRO Communications Officer fills a unique role in support of 

the NRO. As in the past, I desire that the NRO Staff point of contact for the NRO 

Communications Officer be the Deputy Director for Plans and Policy....[to] provide 

communications services for the NRO.....arrange for:  leasing or procurement of 

circuits and equipment; manpower authorizations; and properly cleared/trained 

personnel to operate and maintain NRO communications facilities....Supervise 

communications security for USAF-operated NRO communications facilities 

and develop a high level of security consciousness, knowledge, and discipline at 

each communications center....Provide frequent briefings to the Deputy Director 

for Plans and Policy, NRO staff, on the overall status, and plans for, the NRO 

Communications network.55

The key component of the NRO Communications infrastructure during this period was the 

Special Operations Communications network or SOCOM. It was based on the standard Air Force 

hard-copy messaging system but with unique security keying for the NRO. In its early years, the 

network was comprised of a torn-tape relay hub centered in the Pentagon basement, connected 
55

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

via communications lines to key NRO facilities. During this period, the SOCOM system expanded to 

support all elements of the NRO, its ground stations, and contractor base. It was also used to support 

product information flow to some high priority users. SOCOM was not the only communications 

capability of NRO communications. From the outset, NRO provided secure voice communications 

and facsimile transmission capabilities in support of both operational and administrative traffic. In 

the earliest days, secure voice communications were serviced by the DoD’s Automatic Secure Voice 

Communications network (AUTOSEVOCOM). Facsimile was connected through the secure voice line 

to provide very low-rate but secure support, particularly for small facilities not serviced by SOCOM. 

The Middle Years (1974–80). This period saw the continued growth in communications support 

for the NRO with new detachments supporting the growing NRO infrastructure. Close coordination 

between NRO program planning and communications planning were essential. 

There was a strong desire for improved secure voice and facsimile capabilities. The NRO 

communicators worked closely with NSA to help fund and expedite the development of advanced 

technology devices such as the Secure Telephone Unit (STU)-I and STU-II. They also contracted for 

development of new light-weight fax machines to operate with the STU devices to provide improved 

capability. The combination of secure voice and secure facsimile provided essential communications 

capability to smaller contractors and NRO outposts, as well as the ability to establish temporary 

operating sites.
 56

1962 - 1990

One of the major accomplishments was the development and stand-up of the Defense 

Dissemination System (DDS), which enabled near real-time imagery to flow to operational users 

worldwide. A new dedicated squadron that was established to support this effort included operational 

testing, as well as 24-hour-a-day operations. 

During this period, the NRO’s communications support elements began to also support a few 

other very high priority compartmented programs. The NRO staff POC coordinated these efforts with 

support to the NRO to ensure there was no degradation in service to the NRO. 

As an example of not only the quality of the people assigned to the NRO, but also the staffing 

priority given to NRO Communications, Major Phil Bracher was assigned as the multi-hatted NRO 

Staff senior communicator in 1977 as a major. He left the Staff in 1985 as a colonel after coordinating 

a major expansion and modernization of communications capabilities. He led the line organization 

through a Squadron to Group level expansion and led planning for what eventually evolved into an 

Air Force Communications Wing, which all grew from a modest twelve-person NRO communications 

unit in the basement of the Pentagon.*

The Later Years (1980–90). The 1980s was the beginning of a revolution in communications, and 

the NRO was at the forefront in adopting new technologies. NRO communications were early adopters 

of new high-speed long lines and satellite links that were becoming commercially available. They 

pioneered the development and installation of a high speed, totally integrated digital switch. This was 

the first operational CONUS-wide digital switch within the government that integrated both secure 

voice and computer data traffic and served thousands of subscribers. 

They adapted the secure red phone system, then in use by the NRO and based initially on STU-II and 

then STU-III technology, to the much higher bandwidths enabled by the broadband lines and digital 

switches to provide a greatly improved secure voice and facsimile capability for the NRO. 

By the mid-1980s the requirement for NRO secure tactical communications had grown to the point 

that field users wanted more and quicker data services. The NRO communications team developed and 

fielded a highly portable, light-weight satellite terminal that would operate on the Defense Satellite 

Communications System (DSCS). This was a huge success and was adopted for use by the White House 

Communications Agency and also, in different variants, by the services, the Unified and Specified 

commands, and the commercial communication satellites used by news organizations. 

The NRO started beta testing secure email in the mid-1980s. At first it was hosted as an application 

on the SOCOM computers, so it was limited to sites that hosted a SOCOM relay. Users accessed their 

email account via remote computer terminals hard-wired to SOCOM computers. As the commercial 

markets grew, the email applications were ported to desktop computers by 1990.

While secure and responsive communications continued to be a significant feature of NRO 

infrastructure, with the consolidation of NRO program offices in January 1993, the NRO communications 

office became fully integrated into the NRO organizational structure as the Communications Systems 

Directorate (COMM - one of the three original NRO Directorates), created to direct policy and to oversee 

the security and control of all NRO space and ground-based communications systems.

* Maj Gen Bracher retired from the Air Force in 1995.
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Technology

In the aggregate, technology development in the NRO was the product of teamwork between 

the NRO technology offices, program office SPOs, NRO contractors, government laboratories, and the 

NRO Staff technology group. However, during the early days of the NRO, technology development 

was often accomplished with little technology management structure. The Quill satellite program, 

for example, fielded a spaceborne platform from a collection of basic technologies that had 

essentially been developed for airborne systems and adapted to the space environment. The basic 

Quill technologies were developed by a consortium of NRO program offices.

According to Donald Regenhardt, assigned to the Staff in the late 1960s as, at the time, the lone 

technology staff officer who managed what was then referred to as the Applied Research (AR) and 

Advanced Technology (AT) budget lines, there was a minimum of process in centrally managing the 

NRO technologies. He managed the technology lines for the DNRO, working directly with Col Lew 

Allen in Program A and Mr. Les Dirks in Program B, both later to become senior NRO leaders.*This was 

during the period of intense competition between the two program offices for the next generation 

imaging system, the Program A FROG system or the Program B electro-optical imagery system. The 

allocation of AR/AT funds was generally made on a case-by-case basis, the NRO chief financial officer 

managed the financial process with line-in/line-out entries in his pocket notebook. Regenhardt 

recalled the preponderance of Program A funding requests being approved (including at least one 

individual FROG related request). Program B generally self-funded their technology, although openly 

sharing the technology program details with Regenhardt. That changed when Brig Gen Allen came 

to the Staff as Director, encouraging a more equitable distribution of NRO technology funds amongst 

the program offices. The early years in particular, despite program office rivalries, were characterized 

by exceptional cross-program technology sharing.56

The NRO Staff technology group represented the program offices in prioritizing NRO technology 

initiatives across the NRO, eliminating duplication of effort, coordinating cross-program technology 

use, developing the Congressional Budget Justification Book submittal for technology, and as 

appropriate, managing technology transfer functions to external organizations. 

The NRO Staff designed a much more structured R&D process in the early 1980s to encourage 

contractors, government laboratories, and NRO program offices to efficiently develop and mature 

technologies with applications unique to spaceborne NRO reconnaissance systems. 

This new process recognized technology development within the individual program offices and 

external technology centers, distinguishing between more basic and applied technology research, 

as well as advanced system development. This structured process removed much of the personalitydriven aspects of identifying key technologies to more of an NRO-wide, requirements-driven process. 

This structured process began to focus more on the NRO operational requirements than just a 

technology driven set of R&D projects. This new process also helped win Congressional approval of a 

more “requirements driven” process which they preferred.57

At the heart of this NRO Staff-managed technology program were the Reconnaissance Technology 

(RT) program (basic and applied research) and the Advanced Development (AD) program (advanced 

technical development). Both programs resulted from a recognized need for a formal and sustained 

R&D program with a means to flow down technology priorities for development. These two programs 

were administered by the NRO Staff and executed through the technology offices in the three NRO 

program offices. Historically, roughly 80% of the funds were allocated directly to the program offices 

* Mr. Les Dirks became the Director of the Office of Development & Engineering (Program B), and General Lew Allen 

became the Director of the NRO Staff, and later the Air Force Chief of Staff.
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1962 - 1990

for the approved projects, and the remainder was held back by the NRO Staff to be competed for 

best-of-breed program submissions. Although the history of how the percentage of RT/AD funding 

was established and allocated has been remembered differently by various NRO technology chiefs, 

generally Program A received about 40-50%, Program B received 35%, and Program C was allocated 

the remainder.58 It should be noted that this Staff-administered process was one of the few in which 

the NRO Staff had a direct and defined resource management role, adjudicating in this case between 

program office technology solutions. It should be noted that while the Staff had responsibility 

for allocating funds between the Reconnaissance Technology lines, in the later years the DDNRO 

traditionally provided ultimate approval of the annual NRO technology program.

Generally, the Staff promoted effective coordination between program offices on RT—formally at 

the RT/AD reviews and informally at the R&D off-sites hosted by the NRO technology staff. In the early 

years, the program offices were very open, and their technology development efforts were freely 

shared. The Staff Technologists provided guidance and adjudicated any duplication of effort. In later 

years, however, the cross-program reviews became much more adversarial and politically charged, 

just as program offices battled for a greater share of resources. 

In spite of the competitive efforts between the technology groups, there were many positive 

examples of Staff coordination and brokering between program offices to minimize unnecessary 

duplication of effort. Random examples included the Common Data Transmission Study and 

implementation, control moment gyro (CMG) development, image processing and advanced 

media development, advances in laser diodes, focal plane array optimization, solar cell efficiency 

advancements, on-board recorder upgrades, and low noise amplifier upgrades, just to name a few.

Not all NRO R&D was performed under the RT/AD rubric. The Photo Configuration Control Board 

(PCCB), for example, addressed the unique technology requirements of the imagery community. 

The board and budget were managed by the NRO Staff. The board chairman was rotated between 

Programs A and B, and Program A handled the contractual actions. The PCCB became a model for 

cross-program managed projects in the imagery film and digital processing domains. Major successes 

spawned from the PCCB included advanced microdensitometer and Visual Edge Matching machines 

for measuring image  quality, as well as development of  ultra-ultra-thin-base films and chemistry. 

Probably the most significant attribute of the PCCB was that highly competitive NRO representatives 

supported the board-managed programs; consensus was reached on virtually all technology projects. 

Separate but related to the PCCB, the NRO film and chemistry contract covered the operation and 

maintenance of the Eastman Kodak production of NRO film and processing chemistry. Management 

of the contract, a line rather than a traditional staff function, nevertheless was administered by the 

NRO Staff, a perceived neutral entity within the broader NRO organization.59

The Staff technology office, like many other Staff elements, was also a responsive resource for 

the DNRO in directly supporting the Director in his DNRO hat, while at other times supporting him 

in his SECAF hat, which often enabled him to deal with complex national security issues without the 

burdensome bureaucratic coordination requirements inherent in traditional government staffs. For 

example, in the mid-1980s the SECDEF requested DNRO Pete Aldridge to evaluate whether adding 

significant funding could significantly accelerate the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. After 

reviewing operational NRO programs, major block changes, and the technology development 

profiles from the NRO’s robust technology driven program, the Staff quickly produced five slides the 

SECDEF was able to use with the BMD program office (BMDO) and the President to demonstrate 

that large increases in the BMDO budget would do little to accelerate the program because of the 

technology development timelines required. The DNRO input, supported largely by the NRO Staff’s 

assessment, ultimately drove the national security decision.
59

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Program Formulation and Monitoring

Traditionally, the functions of Program Element Monitors are performed by all the military 

departments. These PEMs, assigned to headquarters staffs are responsible for representing the 

acquisition or operational element within the headquarters, while at the same time, representing the 

System Program Office in the field. 

The NRO PEM function was a core element of the NRO Staff. The key differential between NRO PEMs 

and those in the Military Departments, however, was the NRO streamlined management environment 

in which the NRO PEM operated. While a Service PEM had multiple levels of supervision, the NRO 

PEMs were much more empowered to interact directly with senior decision makers, including the 

DNRO, national intelligence agency leaders, and Congress. They were also responsible for keeping 

their program office informed about the Washington community. Each NRO PEM was expected to 

provide a depth of knowledge about “their satellite’s” funding, design, schedule, capability, mission 

objectives, and other programmatic factors. They were also required to exercise judgment in 

balancing the role of program advocate and the role of providing impartial Staff advice to the DNRO. 

PEMs were selected based on an agreement between the Staff Director and the particular Program 

Director, and they derived authority and empowerment from each. From the beginning, Program 

A, which was located 2,500 miles and three time zones from Washington, chose and empowered 

very qualified PEMs who were often officers earmarked for jobs of increased responsibility in the 

future. However, in the early years the CIA and Navy programs, which were both located in the 

Washington area, did not provide the NRO Staff with similarly qualified PEMs. Instead they sought to 

represent programs from their headquarters. Program C filled the PEM role with operations officers, 

while the CIA often assigned officers who had limited specific knowledge of the satellite programs 

they represented. For periods of time, their PEM positions were not filled, and Air Force officers were 

assigned to cover the function. Initially both the Navy and CIA viewed the NRO Staff PEM as nothing 

more than a communications path between the program office and Staff. The CIA perception changed 

in the mid-1980s, and from that time forward they also selected and empowered highly qualified 

and upwardly mobile PEMs.60 In the early years, the airborne reconnaissance programs managed by 

Program D were represented on the Staff as a parallel office, equivalent to but separate from the NRO 

Staff’s space-related activities.

Once assigned, the PEMs generally had little supervision and were expected to develop the 

appropriate relationships, maintain their system knowledge, and to be prepared to address whatever 

program issues that might arise. Characteristic of most other NRO Staff officers, program element 

monitors operated with an extreme level of empowerment, uncharacteristic of individuals in other 

government staffs. 
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1962 - 1990

USAF Captain Jim Hoskins, a SIGINT Program Element Monitor in the late 1980s, 

recalled an incident on a late Friday afternoon while visiting an office in the basement 

of the Pentagon. Mr. Hill’s exec called down and told him that “Jimmie” wanted to see 

him ASAP to discuss his program’s architecture. Jim returned to his office and pulled 

out three vu-graphs from his safe. When he opened the door to Mr. Hill’s office it was 

pitch dark. Around the table was the head of Space Command, a four-star general, 

accompanied by a three-star. There was a vu-graph machine on the table. Mr. Hill 

introduced Jim, who was customarily dressed in civilian clothes, as his expert on the 

program being discussed. He explained they were discussing whether one program 

with slight modification could satisfy an urgent Air Force need. Jim convincingly 

argued that it could. Mr. Hill then said “Gentlemen, the meeting is over “and told the 

Air Force they had gotten the answer. Jim later learned that the four-star wanted an 

immediate decision to de-stack one NRO satellite on the launch pad to accelerate 

the launch of the Air Force system. Obviously, de-stacking would have caused a 

nine-month delay and major expense.61

The Early Years (1962–74). The issues in the early years were primarily technical. Technology, 

rather than budget, was the primary constraint. When several system design options were identified, 

they were often treated as risk mitigation and funded. As previously noted, the stakeholder 

community in the early years was small and limited to only a few advisors to the President and very 

senior members of the OSD and Intelligence Community — virtually no oversight staff was cleared. 

Interactions with the Congress were limited to a few Committee Chairmen, and interactions were 

largely limited to NRO leadership. PEMs typically provided deep technical knowledge and supported 

the DNRO in his interactions with his peers and seniors. When the EXCOM was formed, the PEMs 

drafted status reports and information briefings to the Committee. The PEM function was to support 

the DNRO in his management of the technical aspects of the programs and to prepare him for his 

interactions with those other players. As the number of programs was small and the number of players 

was small, the PEM staff was very small. In some instances, where the technology and missions were 

comparable, one person covered two or more programs. 

Space technology advanced rapidly in the 1960s and early 70s, and it became feasible for NRO 

systems to address a broader array of intelligence needs and users. When the EXCOM established 

sub-committees to assess program options, the PEM role expanded to include participation in 

EXCOM committee deliberations and support to EXCOM-directed studies. 

In addition to normal staffing functions, two key programmatic issues occupied selected PEMs 

during the early years. One particular issue involved assessing and selecting between two competing 

technical solutions for providing time-sensitive imagery. The challenge was to avoid future 

operational surprises, such as the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. A second issue related 

to the new and critical national security intelligence gap concerning the Soviet anti-ballistic missile 

threat. Three technical solutions were offered, each addressing a different aspect of the problem. 

Following internal and community studies, the decision was made to acquire all three systems. These 

studies led to an increase in the number of stakeholders and the expansion of the PEM role from 

predominantly internal to a larger stakeholder support role. This was the last time that technical 

feasibility alone was the key issue. Future system trade studies focused more on cost effectiveness, 

the High-Altitude Sigint study being a case in point. 
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

The Middle Years (1974–80). As noted earlier, the intelligence reorganizations and fallout from 

the Church and Pike Commissions resulted in termination of the EXCOM and creation of congressional 

Select Committees to oversee the Intelligence Community. Coupled with the Carter Administration’s 

establishment of a DCI-led Intelligence Community Staff, this new oversight led to an expanded set 

of NRO PEM responsibilities. The number of individuals performing the PEM role continued to be 

nominally one person for each major program. However, while PEMs were still required to have a solid 

understanding of their program, the selection focus became less on deep technical knowledge and 

more on interpersonal skills and an understanding of the mission requirements, capabilities, and the 

intelligence user community. 

The DNROs in this period, Dr. Hans Mark and his successor, Dr. Bob Hermann, were very handson managers. When they had questions, they would seek out the most knowledgeable person and 

would frequently walk into a PEM’s office with a question or with guidance to be passed on to the 

program office. 

The PEMs continued to be responsible for assisting the DNRO, DDNRO, and Staff Director with 

their decisions and their increasing interactions with the Congress, IC Staff, Intelligence Agency 

seniors, and OSD. PEMs also continued to work with NSA, DIA, DMA, and other agencies. TENCAP, the 

DRSP, and expanded NRO Staff elements dealing with policy, budget, and congressional relations 

all created the need for PEMs to coordinate their activities and their programs more broadly across 

the Staff. For example, during this time a PEM and an NRO Policy staff member jointly represented 

the DNRO in negotiating an MOA with NSA that resolved conflicts between agency charters and 

established lines of responsibility between the two agencies. It also consolidated the NRO and NSA 

operational tasking elements and established a position for an NSA representative detailed to serve 

on the NRO Staff. 

The intelligence community reorganization during this time resulted in an increase in oversight 

by not only the Congress, but also the White House, the Intelligence Community, the Department of 

Defense, and other intelligence agency users. The PEMs interacted extensively with HPSCI and SSCI 

committee staffs to explain and justify programs and funding requirements. As Congressional requests 

expanded, the PEMs became responsible for drafting program sections of the annual Congressional 

Budget Justification Book. The IC Staff, established under the DCI, undertook to lead a number of 

system studies to assess options and costs for transition of NRO programs to the Space Shuttle. 

PEMs often served as the interface between the NRO, the program offices, and the IC study groups, 

providing analysis and developing options for assessment. The PEMs also worked with the OSD staff 

where participation had increased to include a policy team from USD (Policy) and a technical team 

(ASD/C3I). These organizations both participated in IC studies and performed independent analysis 

to counter the IC Staff positions. The people staffing these organizations, including the White House 

and Congressional staff, were often NRO alumni and asked very informed questions. 

The introduction of zero-based budgeting and efforts to reduce defense and intelligence budgets 

led to a number of hard program choices that put pressure on the PEMs to defend programmatic 

elements and to be sufficiently knowledgeable of budget, expenditures, and IC needs to offer 

performance options when fallout funding did become available.
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1962 - 1990

USAF Capt. Jim Beale, a SIGINT Program Element Monitor in the late 1970s, recalled 

his role in the Elint mix decision, “Dr. Hermann tasked me to represent the NRO 

on the DCI's Sigint Mix study. Over several months, I worked with the IC Staff-led/

Community team and served as an interface with the two program offices. At the 

end of the study I briefed Dr. Hermann and NRO Senior Staff on the results which 

led to his decision to include the evolutionary approach in his proposed budget. 

When the decision was eventually passed to the President’s Science Advisor, I was 

tasked to present the DNROs recommended program and rationale. Throughout 

the process, I was probably three ranks junior to the people I was working with.”62

Another event that impacted the PEM function during this period was a DCI decision to cancel a 

Program B satellite program part way through development. The budget action came as a surprise 

to the Director of Program B and led to his decision to view the NRO Staff PEM position as a key 

job. From that time forward with few exceptions, the CIA assigned highly qualified program experts, 

instead of people with less specific program knowledge, to the PEM role. 

Also, in 1978 the NRO Satellite Operations Center was disestablished, and from that time forward 

the PEMs assumed the additional responsibility to represent the NRO on COMIREX and the SIGINT 

Committee and to support the development of long-term guidance. They also became the most 

immediately available person to answer DNRO questions about the operational status of programs.

The Later Years (1980–90). The DNRO during the Reagan Administration, Pete Aldridge, was a 

very engaged leader. At that time, the number of PEMs was still typically one person for each major 

program/activity, but there were more activities and thus a few more PEMs. The NRO continued to be 

very streamlined with the DNRO and DDNRO working directly with junior Staff members. 

By 1981, the community involved with NRO programs had expanded dramatically, and 

throughout this period the number of cleared and involved people continued to grow. The scope 

of PEM responsibilities grew with the number of issues, but as the issues increasingly involved more 

than one NRO activity, users would often find themselves working with several different NRO PEMs. 

Maintaining a common NRO voice became increasingly difficult.

In addition to providing staff support for the DNRO and interacting with the intelligence 

community, the PEMs were the focal point for programmatic details and program options to the 

expanding user community. This included programmatic support and impact analysis for those 

seeking to expand support to military operations, such as the staffs in TENCAP, DRSP, and service 

staffs. They also worked with OSD on elements of the Strategic Defense Initiative, including issues 

regarding potential NRO support and the potential for shared technology.

The PEMs also provided an interface between those working Continuity of Government initiatives 

and the NRO SPO’s assessments of system options, both for supporting the initiative and for enhanced 

satellite system survivability. Often survivability came at a cost to performance, creating tough trades 

between advocates for better performance, or new requirements, and those concerned with the 

availability of systems from a continuity of operations perspective. 
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Internal competition between NRO Programs A, B, and C and their system program offices created 

serious challenges for PEMs in this era. The Challenger disaster, which is discussed elsewhere in this 

monograph, was a major driver in many ways influencing the PEMs’ focus and workload. However, 

maintaining a single NRO voice became increasingly difficult as PEMs for different programs were 

pressured to advocate for their programs' proposed investment options.

These systemic NRO problems, which had been manageable in the early and mid-years of the NRO 

Staff became increasingly difficult to deal with in the later years when a much broader community of 

users, more capable and expensive systems, and more inclusive decision processes became the norm. 

Studies, Plans, and Analysis

Looking across the history of the NRO from 1962-1990, the Staff performed two clear functions. 

First, it supported the DNRO with background, analysis, decision support, and technical advice. 

Second, it assisted the program offices in gathering information, working with the user community 

in defining and documenting intelligence and operational requirements, brokering meetings with 

the Washington community, offering suggestions, and facilitating meetings with NRO leadership. 

Specifically relating to this delicate decision support role, Col Aubry McAlpine, the Deputy 

Director for Systems and Technology in the mid-1980s, offered his view as a consensus that was 

generally echoed by others who had collectively served across the history of the Staff: 

Jimmie Hill made it very clear that whatever came up from the program offices, 

our job was not to question it. He welcomed any explanation we could add. The 

staff was the staff, and we were not in that privileged chain between the Director, 

Mr. Hill, and the Program Directors. Although we did have expert technologists 

on the Staff.... John Capone, Jim Kindle, etc. The role they were used in though, 

especially by Jimmie, was to explain and elaborate but not confront the programs. 

We were not to quarrel with their positions or question them. This included the 

technical approach, as well as the financial approach. The Staff was therefore highly 

supportive of the program offices.63 

On the other hand, nearly every DNRO sought to independently assess risks and choices among 

different program office options and to adjudicate between competing options. He often turned 

to the NRO Staff for analysis-based assistance and independent advice, but it was never sufficiently 

equipped to perform this function.

In examining the Staff’s role in planning, studies, and analysis, one must differentiate between 

community studies, in which the Staff participated in broader efforts conducted by intelligence 

community elements, and internal NRO studies directed by the DNRO. In many cases, the NRO Staff 

members directly participated in community studies. In other instances, Staff participation focused 

on supporting and prepping the DNRO for his direct participation in community deliberations. 

Even in the early years there were a number of NRO stakeholders who all advocated for their 

unique interests. Programs A, B, and C each had institutional interests in funding the evolution 

or improvement of the programs they were responsible for developing and operating. The user 

communities had interests. While the US Intelligence Board provided requirements, the NSA, DIA, 

and CIA were also strong independent champions for their needs. 
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1962 - 1990

Developing data to support planning decisions was difficult. Most of the data, along with the 

analytic models and decision aids, resided with the program offices and more specifically with 

the prime contractors developing each program. Thus, the DNRO often had to rely on the analytic 

capabilities nested initially within the contractors supporting the program offices.

Over the years there were different kinds of decisions that required studies and analysis. In many 

cases, the issue was relatively straightforward, such as the value of incremental upgrades to existing 

programs or the mission payload to put on the next passenger Sigint satellite. In some cases, the 

issue was whether or not and when to move to a new technology, such as from a film-based imagery 

system to an electro-optical solution. There were also choices among different phenomenology to 

address high-priority new missions, such as the response to a potential ABM deployment. In later 

years, analytic challenges often revolved around priorities for the allocation of scarce resources. This 

included decisions about support to military operations and whether and how missions might be 

combined to save costs — with consequences that could disproportionately impact or disadvantage 

the participation of the CIA, Air Force, or Navy elements of the NRO. 

Although the designations and detailed responsibilities for plans, studies, and analysis changed 

over time,* there was always a lead planning organization on the Staff which drew from other Staff 

elements. In some cases, the Staff Director turned to an individual outside the primary planning 

organization, PEMs for example, to conduct a particular planning or study effort. Depending on its 

scope, program offices often provided representation, particularly when the effort required modeling 

and simulation support, since the Staff did not have any organic analytical capabilities. 

The Early Years (1962-74). In 1963, shortly after the formation of the NRO and the NRO Staff, 

Brockway McMillan, in response to his frustration with what he perceived as the CIA’s encroachment 

on NRO responsibilities, created the Advanced Planning Office within the Staff to “evaluate and 

recommend matters involving future space research and development projects.”64

McMillan stressed that this Advanced Planning Office did not imply exclusive responsibility 

for such planning; however, this charter was a significant reach beyond what was to become the 

Staff’s normal role in the decision process. According to historian Robert Perry, McMillan “thus 

tried to counterbalance attractive CIA Studies that might quickly be transformed into programs.”65

However, other than publishing the memorandum which created this Advanced Planning Office, 

there is no further accounting of this office within NRO historical records, and it was likely eliminated 

in 1965 when the NRO charter was re-written, McMillan departed, and the EXCOM was formed. 

The late 1960s witnessed two major future planning decisions. The first involved high-altitude 

Sigint, and the second was the development of near real-time imagery. The Staff supported the 

DNROs development of recommendations and his participation in meetings, but the decisions were 

debated at the EXCOM and higher decision bodies.

The Film Read-out Gambit/Electro-Optical Imagery studies and debates are an example of the 

decision process at the time. Programs A and B presented their options, with competing analysis, 

different assessments of technical risk, and conflicting recommendations. The DNRO made a 

recommendation to the EXCOM which heard from both program offices. The decision was ultimately 

elevated to President Nixon, via the PFIAB and Henry Kissinger, for a decision in August 1971. Any 

deliberations by the Staff, or the DNRO for that matter, were overshadowed by the Land Committee 

and personal involvement by the CIA Director, the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, and the 

* Earlier examples of offices responsible for studies, plans, and analysis functions included Plans & Policy (1962-1963), 

Advanced Planning (1963-1974), Concepts and Applications (1974-1978), Research & Analysis (1978-1984), Long Range Plans 

(1984-1987), and Plans & Systems Development (1987-1989).
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Secretary of State, as well as the White House Science Advisor, the Secretary of State, and the Director 

of OMB. The voice of the DNRO and his staff were lost in the cacophony of executive debate. Donald 

Regenhardt, an NRO Staff member at the time, recalled that the Staff’s role was primarily that of an 

observer.66 The decision ultimately favored the Program B recommendation for the EOI technology 

solution, which was the foundation for one of today’s imaging systems. 

It is interesting, in hindsight, that the Program A leadership came to agree with the decision. Maj 

Gen Ralph Jacobson (USAF, Ret.), the former Program A FROG Project Officer commented, “[Col] Lew 

Allen and I were running around trying to sell a program called FROG, which you may recall, and I 

don’t know how the two of us could have been that wrong...but we were.”67

In October 1970, NRO Director John L. McLucas created the Analysis Group.68 This group, led by 

Dr. Robert Kahall, had an expanded role relative to the earlier Advanced Planning Office. In what can 

be surmised as a gesture to strengthen the group’s authority, Director of the Analysis Group reported 

directly to the DNRO, instead of the Staff Director, supported by the assertion that the group would 

be responsible for studies and analyses of greater scope and duration than those of the NRO Staff. 

Unlike the previous Advanced Planning Office, McLucas’ Analysis Group had a full complement of 

analysts in place with the arrival of the Analysis Group Director. In his memo to the group director, Dr. 

McLucas laid out an extremely ambitious list of tasks:

•	 Examine the product of our collection systems to determine whether satisfying the users’ 

stated requirements is an adequate measure of our responsiveness to users’ real needs...

In making this determination it is important to differentiate between requirements 

stated as a result of technical possibilities and requirements expressing real needs. 

•	 Determine whether we have or will have a proper mix of search, surveillance, high 

resolution, and immediate imagery recovery satellites to meet users’ real needs....These 

questions can’t be answered absolutely, but your group can assign costs per target and 

cost per square mile covered as some measure of effectiveness. 

•	 Compare the roles of collection of imagery by satellite 

with collection by aircraft, manned and unmanned. 

Enumerate the proper roles of each type of vehicle 

and attempt to determine proper mixes. 

•	 Attempt to establish better specifications for NRO 

vehicles by reviewing previous work and conducting 

analyses of the meanings, importance, and relevance 

of terms like contrast, ground resolution, ground 

sample distance, obliquity, and signal-to-noise in 

photographic imagery. These terms must be related 

to the users’ functions like detection, recognition, and 

mensuration.69

The Analysis Group supported some EXCOM-sponsored 

studies, but there is no record of its having any effect 

on programmatic decisions. The organizational tug of 

war, primarily between the program offices’ competing 

"I don’t know how the two of us could have been that wrong...

 but we were.”

Dr. John L. McLucas

DNRO: 17 Mar 1969 - 20 Dec 1973
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1962 - 1990

performance/risk assessments and the lack of broadly accepted analytically-based studies and 

analyses, continued. The Analysis Group was disbanded in March 1974. 

The Middle Years (1974–80). Following the dissolution of the Analysis Group, the new Staff 

Director, Brig Gen Jack Kulpa, established a Concepts and Applications Office within the NRO Staff. 

It was headed by widely respected Col Jim Blankenship and was composed of representatives from 

operational elements of each of the three services, as well as representatives of the intelligence 

community. It functioned primarily to assist “all elements of the NRO in developing a better 

understanding of the needs for and the uses of the products.” Brig Gen Kulpa’s motivation for creating 

the new office was to bring more focus on user needs, particularly those of the military services.70 

The Concepts and Applications Office was an early leader in the demonstration of NRP support 

to military operations. It initiated a number of internally-led study and planning efforts with varying 

levels of community and NRO program office participation. It partnered with the military TENCAPs, 

and later the DSPO, in prioritizing and supporting defense-related initiatives.

One of the most notable NRO internal initiatives, conducted in the late 1970s, was the Multipurpose 

Mission Integrator study for the purpose of tasking resources. In that case, the Staff worked with the 

National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and COMIREX’s Sigint Overhead Reconnaissance 

committee (SORS) to integrate near real-time Sigint external signals with photos to evaluate current 

and projected operational activities. Although the study was hindered by NSA’s reluctance to provide 

weapons signals, it was an early precursor in demonstrating the utility of integrating signals and images 

as tipoff for targeting overhead resources. The Staff worked closely with Program A chief technologist, 

Bob Paulson, in integrating this Multipurpose Mission Integrator capability into the NRO Real-time 

Information Processor mobile vans, validating the operational value of real-time Sigint/Imint products 

to the military. This early demonstration of direct downlink of NRO data and of integrated products set 

the stage for optimizing the intelligence and operational value of NRO products and demonstrated that 

NRO systems could be operationally relevant. The Concepts and Applications office directly supported 

the newly formed NRO Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities and Applications Program (NRO 

TENCAP), led by COL Ronald Lemanski (USA). This DSPO/TENCAP/NRO Staff partnership extended Brig 

Gen Kulpa’s vision of making NRO national systems relevant to military operations.

During this period, the Staff also facilitated NRO support to a number of community studies aimed 

at defining architectural decisions. One example was the National Intelligence Plan for Satellites, in 

which the Staff coordinated and facilitated the NRO input for the IC Staff-led study. 

Another example is the IC Staff-led Elint mix study which led the two-phased Elint study in 1979. 

The study was initiated to support decisions on the transition of all NRO satellites to a configuration 

compatible with the Space Shuttle. The first phase defined a composite set of Elint requirements, and 

the second sought to assess various options for future NRP Elint systems. An NRO Staff member, Air 

Force Captain Jim Beale, who was the PEM for the NRO's Elint satellites at the time, participated in all 

phases of the study and served as an interface between the program offices and the IC study lead. 

Program briefings and option requests were all arranged through the NRO Staff, and the staff lead 

reported progress directly to the DNRO. The study lasted through most of the year, and the results 

informed the FY 1980 President’s Budget. The study offered several options, including a revolutionary 

low-orbit system that combined the missions of two legacy systems and an evolutionary option that 

involved existing systems. The DNRO included the evolutionary approach in his budget submission, 

but the DCI reversed his decision and included the revolutionary system in his final budget submission 

to the President. The SECDEF agreed with the DNRO and raised the issue to President Carter. To resolve 

this conflicting advice, the President asked his Science Advisor, Dr. Frank Press, to do an assessment 

and provide his recommendation. The NRO Staff lead was involved throughout the process, briefed 

the DNRO recommended approach to Dr. Press, and participated in deliberations leading to the final 

decision which endorsed the DNRO’s recommended program.
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The Later Years (1980–90). The Reagan-era goal of being able to fight and win a nuclear war 

generated many community studies. Topics ranged from missile defense and advanced technologies, 

to continuity of government and satellite survivability, to treaty verification. The Staff facilitated the 

NRO’s participation and support for these community-led studies. One example was the survivability 

studies of the early 1980s, in response to National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 333, 

Enhanced Survivability of Critical U.S. Military and Intelligence Space Systems. Lt Col Don Walker, 

in his initial assignment to the Staff,* assisted by Maj Mike Kemp, worked closely with other Staff 

elements, program offices, the IC Staff, and military elements in identifying and ranking various 

space and ground-segment initiatives for enhancing the survivability of NRO systems. In the end, 

however, although the NRO response was viewed as a thorough, objective response to the White 

House memorandum, Congress elected to continue funding NRO system performance initiatives, 

rather than investing in enhanced survivability. 

Other examples of community-led efforts were the Arms Control studies and the related Strategic 

Relocatable Studies led by the Intelligence Community. According to Rick Buckley, the Deputy 

Director of Systems & Technology from 1986-89:

Arms Control was another positive area of influence: [The] Staff provided good 

solid briefings of what we could and could not do. In [my] experience, this effort was 

the best coordinated government-wide decision-making process on intelligence 

support to policy of that era. It was one of the greatest contributions of the Staff, 

brokering honest communication that served as glue among very disparate 

problems and organizations.

The Strategic Relocatable Target (SRT) Study was another study that related 

to the mobile missile study and effort. We worked with military elements on the 

ground. There was a good engineering analytic support capability that Program 

A provided. The Staff brought together various IC conversations, weeding out 

erroneous information, keeping the focus on facts that mattered.

The lack of Staff analytic capabilities and a mature IC requirements integration/

prioritization were limitations. There was a good partnership between Systems and 

Technology and the budget team. The major contribution was avoiding having our 

programs get influenced by Pentagon politics for budget resources. We were able 

to protect the programs.71

However, cooperation between the Staff and individual program offices began to rapidly erode 

during the early 1980s. This has been attributed to factors such as an influx of funds during the 

Reagan defense build-up, followed closely by the post-Challenger era in which discretionary funds 

were significantly reduced. Pete Aldridge, the DNRO during this period observed, “The program 

offices wouldn’t take voluntary reductions. It was only the NRO Staff that had the independence to 

recommend an overall budget—they had to take more of a budgetary view of the whole NRO, as 

opposed to leaving those options up to the program offices, which they had been doing before. They 

kind of ran their own shops, and they had their own cost funding allocations...a period where they 

had more technology than money...creating a period of unhealthy competition.”72

An example of an unsuccessful Staff-led study effort was the Future Sigint Capabilities Study (FSCS), 

directed by DNRO Aldridge in the mid-1980s. The objective of the FSCS was to define the future NRO 

* It was not uncommon for Air Force officers to serve multiple assignments on the NRO Staff, first as field-grade staff 

officers, then later as NRO Staff Directors, as general officers. Examples are Major then Brig Gen Thomas Moorman, Lt Col then 

Maj Gen Donald Hard, and Lt Col then Brig Gen Donald Walker, the last three Staff Directors.
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1962 - 1990

Sigint constellations in each of the three orbital regimes. The study went through three iterations with 

major participation by each of the three program offices. Predictably, the major issue surrounding 

each phase of the study was choice of the program office simulator to be used in evaluating each 

of the orbital alternatives. Finally, after much debate with little progress, DNRO Aldridge, frustrated 

with the lack of results, directed the Staff to arbitrate and provide a final report. The program office 

representatives refused to concur with the draft report, and FSCS died a natural death.73

Brig Gen Don Hard, the Staff Director under Pete Aldridge added, “while those battles were going 

on, the Staff was not in a position where we could adjudicate or even credibly comment on the 

relative merit of the various program proposals because we were at the mercy of the program offices, 

who had all the data, and their simulation results that proved their concept was better. Each program 

would come in and say “here’s our data and here’s our simulation, ‘We’re right; they’re wrong.’”74

This competition, particularly between Program A and Program B, reached a new level of 

“unhealthiness” in the mid-1980s when Program B elected to challenge Program A, as well as the 

DNRO position for the upgrade to a Program A high-altitude Sigint program. The CIA challenge 

was only sustained after senior CIA managers took the issue directly to William Casey, the DCI, 

circumventing Pete Aldridge, the DNRO. 

At this point, Aldridge, still influenced by the Air Force argument, and as some believe predisposed 

to maintaining parity between Programs A and B’s share of NRO systems, directed the Staff to prepare 

a briefing for community decision leadership, including DCI Casey. According to Aubry McAlpine, 

Deputy Director for Systems and Technology:

This was a program assigned to Program A, and Pete supported them. Mr. 

Aldridge knew he was going to have some issues with this and enlisted the Staff 

in a process to help validate his decision and to lay out his very orderly decision 

process. The issue was staffed in the IC, including NSA and also in DoD up to Casper 

Weinberger who then sent Maj Gen Colin Powell, his assistant, down to understand 

the issue. Gen Moorman, [McAlpine], and others were there in the meeting with Gen 

Powell. Weinberger signed off on Pete’s decision. Julian Caballero had an alternative 

proposal. He expressed his concern about the way the Staff and Aldridge had made 

the decision. He [and Bob Kohler] went around Pete and went directly to Bill Casey. 

Mr. Casey got the decision thrown into a larger decision arena. The discussions 

ended up in the JCS Tank with the JCS, the SECDEF, and possibly the DCI. I briefed 

the program options. Mr. Aldridge was reversed on that decision, and the proposed 

architecture was built around Julian’s proposal. Our job was to support the boss, 

rather than to conduct an independent assessment.75

This period of time, the mid- to late 1980s, was what DNRO Aldridge characterized as a period 

of “unhealthy competition that had developed between the program offices.”76 Many saw it as a 

period where the intelligence community began to outgrow the NRO’s streamlined structure, 

including that of the NRO Staff, and one that began the call for a major restructuring of the NRO, 

including a more robust, independent studies and analysis capability. Martin Faga, who followed 

Pete Aldridge as DNRO in 1989, summarized, “The NRO Staff...operated as a coordinating office 

between independent programs. I had virtually no ability to analyze what program offices told me 

and had a very limited staff.”77
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Chapter 7

END OF THE BEGINNING:

LAYING FOUNDATIONS FOR 

TODAY’S NRO

Some six weeks after becoming Director 

of the NRO in late September 1989, Martin 

Faga, witnessed the breaching of the Berlin 

Wall which cascaded to the demise of 

communism in Eastern Europe. On Christmas 

Day 1991, he witnessed the disbanding of 

the communist party in the USSR and the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. Mr. 

Faga was responsible for guiding the NRO 

during this historic time and the aftermath 

of the collapse of the foes for which the 

NRO was largely formed. Mr. Faga graciously 

agreed to write the conclusion to this 

history of the NRO Staff. He made the early 

decisions that led to the reorganization of 

the NRO to better position it to meet the 

new realities and challenges of the post-Cold War era. The reorganization brought 

to a close the NRO Staff as it had existed for nearly thirty years—an elite staff that 

laid the solid foundation on which rests the staffing responsibilities carried out by 

successor NRO offices today. 

I became Director of the National Reconnaissance Office in 1989 after 17 years of experience as 

a development engineer at NRO’s Program B, a member of the NRO Staff, and service on the staff of 

the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. With those long-term and close associations 

with the NRO, I arrived with a number of objectives that I hoped to accomplish. These included:

• Establishing a Plans and Analysis function in the NRO Staff to allow analysis in 

detail of proposals from the program offices to include technical, cost, and 

performance analysis. I moved early to do this, and I was rewarded with a high 

performing organization.

• Collocating the program offices. This had been recommended by the Geiger-Kelly 

Panel, commissioned by my predecessor, Pete Aldridge, and strongly pushed 

by the Congress. Like those recommending it, I thought this would improve 

coordination among the program offices and improve utilization of common 

technologies.

Mr. Martin C. Faga, former DNRO
 70

1962 - 1990

• Reducing or eliminating destructive competition between the program offices, 

particularly the Air Force and CIA offices, which I had witnessed during the 

previous 10 years.

• Continuing to provide strong support for the 10-year-old effort to improve 

Support to Military Operations, which had seen major investments by the services.

While these efforts were unfolding, the First Gulf War occurred, and space systems, including NRO 

systems, played a major role—all NRO systems were now near real-time and capable of supporting 

tactical operations. The war has been called by some writers as “the first space war,” given that nearly all 

of the military and intelligence space capabilities were employed in tactical operations. This established 

tactical military forces as a demanding new “customer” for NRO data. While the ground war in Iraq 

ended in days, US military forces have been engaged in tactical operations in the region continuously 

since that time.

The experience of the war caused me to understand that the NRO could not properly serve the 

tactical customer as a “covert” organization. Moreover, at this point the “fact of” the NRO was still 

classified, but it was no secret. I came to view this “open secret” as corrosive to the many legitimate 

needs for security that existed within the NRO by making it difficult to distinguish between what was 

no longer sensitive and what truly remained sensitive. I sought to declassify the existence of the NRO, 

which was accomplished in September 1992.

In early 1992, the recently appointed Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, asked Robert 

Fuhrman, then President of Lockheed, to lead a panel to examine the organization of the NRO. A 

major recommendation of the Panel was to organize the NRO around the intelligence disciplines. 

This would mean the end of structuring the NRO programs around the Air Force, CIA, and Navy 

elements. I had come to a similar conclusion based on observing how the systems began to overlap, 

and how the technologies available for new systems had become numerous. Clearly, we needed an 

overall architecture for national reconnaissance, which was nearly impossible to produce with the 

existing organization.

These tectonic changes in the NRO and its environment meant that the NRO Staff as we had known 

it—a very small group measured in the few dozens—would not be able to cope. We now had a vastly 

larger stakeholder group, new technological opportunities, expanded oversight within the Executive 

and by Congress, and a major reorganization.

The establishment of the NRO “INT-based” organization began in mid-1992 and extended beyond 

my departure in 1993. During this transition, the NRO Staff was absorbed into the appropriate functions 

of the new structure. The NRO has all of the functions that the earlier Staff provided, in some cases 

supplied or led by the same people. Nonetheless, the NRO Staff, about which we have written in this 

monograph, formally came to a close in 1992 when the last Director of the NRO Staff, Brig Gen Don 

Walker, departed.

The NRO Staff was ideal for the challenges of its time—the need to respond to a national security 

threat by developing a high priority program with demanding technology and short timelines. The 

Staff that emerged to deal with the threat was a small team with capable people who were empowered 

and worked within a highly classified environment. In the Staff existed the capacity to understand and 

explain programs, develop their budget and defend it throughout the government, develop supportive 

policy, and help conduct a robust security program.
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Are there lessons to be learned from the 30-year experience with this kind of NRO Staff? Yes. This 

model has been used elsewhere, for example, by programs such as Naval Nuclear Propulsion and stealth 

aircraft programs, and could be used for future programs with similar challenges and circumstances.

With the dramatic world events and significant changes beginning in the 1990s, the “new” NRO 

looks quite different from its earlier form, requiring enhanced, distributed staff. It is much larger, 

integrated, and subject to the demands of a very large range of stakeholders. The NRO continues to 

enjoy strong support from the President and senior national security officials, a well-defined mission, 

a skilled government and contractor workforce and, most importantly, continued program success.78
 72

1962 - 1990

Appendix 1

NRO STAFF DIRECTORS

1962-1978

*Colonel Robert Rosenberg was acting Director intermittently from 1 April 1975 to 1 March 1976 during Colonel Wheeler’s 

frequent medical absences. 

Brig Gen John L. Martin, Jr., USAF

14 June 1962 — 2 August 1964

Brig Gen James T. Stewart, USAF

3 August 1964 – 1 February 1967

Brig Gen Russell A. Berg, USAF

1 February 1967 – 19 June 1969

Brig Gen Lew Allen. Jr., USAF

20 June 1969 – 20 August 1970

Col Edwin F. Sweeney, USAF

21 August 1970 – 31 May 1971

Brig Gen David D. Bradburn, USAF

1 June 1971 – 7 January 1973

Brig Gen John E. Kulpa, Jr., USAF

8 January 1973 – 30 September 1974

Col Harold P. Wheeler, USAF*

1 October 1974 – 18 March 1976

Brig Gen William L. Shields, Jr., USAF

18 March 1976 – 12 June 1978
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

NRO STAFF DIRECTORS

1978-1992

**Responsibilities of the NRO Staff began a physical and organizational transition in early 1990, culminating in a restructured 

NRO organization in 1992.

Mr. Jimmie D. Hill

12 June 1978 – 9 April 1982

Brig Gen Donald D. Cromer, USAF

5 May 1982 – 11 June 1984

Col Paul F. Foley, USAF

15 June 1984 – 31 January 1985

Brig Gen Thomas. S. Moorman, Jr., USAF

5 February 1985 – 18 October 1987

Brig Gen Donald G. Hard, USAF

5 November 1987 – 5 February 1989

Brig Gen Donald R. Walker, USAF**

6 February 1989 – 1 Jan 1992

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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Appendix 2

OFFICE OF MISSILE AND 

SATELLITE SYSTEMS

The Office of Missile and Satellite Systems of the Secretary of the Air Force was the precursor of 

the NRO Staff, established approximately one year before formalization of the NRO, two years before 

the NRO Staff. It had primary responsibility for assisting the Air Force Secretary in discharging his 

responsibility for the direction, supervision, and control of the SAMOS Project. The Director of OMSS 

was responsible for maintaining liaison with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other involved 

governmental agencies. Brigadier General Richard D. Curtin was the Director of this organization, 

located in the Pentagon. 

Seated left to right: Col Charles Ruzeck, US Army; Col John L. Martin, USAF; Staff Director Brig Gen Richard 

D. Curtin, USAF: CAPT Frank B Gorman, US Navy.

Standing left to right: Lt Col Jack Sides, USAF; Lt Col Thomas J. Herron, USAF; Maj Clifton E. James, USAF; 

Capt Francis L. Lisciotti, USAF; Lt Col Edwin J. Istvan, USAF; Lt Col Charles H. Sinex, USAF; Lt Col Robert A. Van 

Mater, USAF; Maj Henry C. Howard, USAF
 76

1962 - 1990

Although this photo has often been captioned as “The First Headquarters NRO Staff, Late 1961” it is 

actually General Curtin’s Office of Missile and Satellite Systems, which later became the nucleus of the 

first NRO Staff, after the NRO Staff and NRO program offices were formerly created in September 1962. 

Two abbreviations were used interchangeably for this same office: OMSS (Office of Missile and 

Satellite Systems) located in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, and also SAFMS (Secretary 

of the Air Force Missiles and Satellites). The following diagram depicts the organization of that early 

OMSS staff. 

The responsibilities of the officers in that initial SAFMS/OMSS staff included:

• Director (Brig Gen Richard D. Curtin): Responsible for conducting all actions of 

SAFMS in accordance with policy and delegated authority from the Secretary.

• Deputy Director (Col John L. Martin, Jr.): Principal assistant to the Director acts 

with full authority of the Director on all affairs of SAFMS. Responsible for overall 

direction, guidance, supervision, and coordination of the activities of the office.

• Executive: Executive Officer and Chief of the Executive Office and responsible for 

the general administration of SAFMS, including mail, security, records, inspections, 

personnel, travel, and overall office management. 

• Asst. for Programs (Lt Col Thomas J. Herron): Responsible for SAFMS duties 

concerning programming, funding, and schedules. Monitors, briefs and reports 

on all SAMOS launches. Maintains an active working SAMOS control room for daily 

use. Responsible for actions incident to revisiting, processing, and maintaining 

the SAMOS development plan. Responsible for general briefs on the entire overall 

SAMOS Project, and for the preparation and maintenance of complete briefing 

material, aids and information on the overall project. 
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

• Asst. for Electronics: Responsible for SAFMS duties concerning electronic 

payloads, Elint, and related matters; weather aspects of the SAMOS Project; 

technical compatibility of the electronic aspects of Subsystem I, Space Ground 

Communications. Responsible for NSA liaison and coordination. Responsible for 

maintaining current knowledge of booster and vehicle capabilities. Alternate to the 

Assistant for Instrumentation.

• Asst. for Photography: (Maj Clifton E. James): Responsible for the SAMOS optical 

payload design and performance.

• Asst. for Instrumentation (Maj Jack Sides): Responsible for SAFMS duties 

concerning Subsystem I, its overall development, schedules, locations, tests, and 

overall technical design, overall data processing and handling of all SAMOS outputs. 

Also responsible for SAMOS recovery program, SAMOS command and control 

aspects, including centers and stations. Also responsible for MIDAS and Discoverer 

coordination. Alternative to Assistant for Electronics.

• Asst. for System Engineering (Maj Henry C. Howard): Responsible for overall 

system engineering aspects including interchangeability of payloads, system 

performance capabilities, mission variations, system growth possibilities, and 

relative priorities within the Project. Responsible for necessary coordination with 

related and supporting R&D programs. Also responsible for special projects as 

assigned by the Director. Alternative to the Assistant for Photography.

Reviewing the preceding position descriptions would lead one to believe that the Office of Missile 

and Satellite Systems, located within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force was more of a line, 

rather than a staff organization, yet on the same day that OMSS was established, Secretary of the Air 

Force Order No. 115.1, 31 August 1960, designated Brig Gen Robert E. Greer as Director of the SAMOS 

Project, with duty station at Air Force Ballistic Missile Division in Los Angeles, as a field extension of 

the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. The order specified that the Director of the SAMOS Project 

reported directly to the Secretary of the Air Force.

The total size of the original (pre-NRO) staff was 44 people, which included secretaries and airmen. 

It also included five individuals in Aircraft Projects and 14 in Operations, two functions that initially 

transferred to the NRO, but were eliminated in the mid-1970s. 

Although the OMSS organization had different reporting channels, it was part of the organizational 

evolution that led to the National Reconnaissance Office and the NRO Staff. Several, but not all of the 

OMSS staff transitioned to the NRO Staff that was formally established on 23 July 1962.
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1962 - 1990

Appendix 3

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

LAST NAME FIRST NAME NICKNAME RETIRED RANK INTERVIEW DATE

Aldridge Edward C. Pete Civ 24 September 2013

Bailey John Jack Col, USAF 9 July 2013

Barnett James Jim CAPT, USN 27 June 2013

Beale James Jim Brig Gen, USAF 10 January 2013

Berganini David Dave Col, USAF 4 November 2013

Betterton Thomas Tom RADM, USN 9 October 2013

Blankenship James Jim Col, USAF 5 July 2013

Boehmer Charles Chuck CAPT, USN 9 July 2013

Bracher Phillip Phil Col, USAF 1 April 2014

Bryson Jon Col, USAF 5 November 2013

Buckley Richard Rick Civ 17 October 2013

Charyk Joseph Civ 26 September 2014

Coglitore Sebastian Seb Brig Gen, USAF 26 February 2014

Collier Arthur Art CAPT, USN 3 December 2013

Conroy Thomas Tom Civ 23 October 2013

Cromer Donald Don Lt Gen, USAF 13 September 2013

Dahlen Gary Col, USAF 17 September 2013

Davis Arthur Art Col, USAF 23 September 2013

Delpino Joseph Joe CDR, USN 9 July 2013

Dionne Gene Col, USAF 17 September 2013

Donahue Arnold Arnie Civ 4 November 2013

Eash Joseph Joe Col, USAF 5 November 2013

Faga Martin Marty Civ 20 June 2014

Fennell Edward Ed Civ 29 October 2013

Fitzgibbon James Jim Col, USAF 11 November 2014

Foley Paul Col, USAF 6 March 2014

Geiger Robert Bob Lt Col, USAF 23 September 2013

Gilles Gregory Greg Col, USAF 17 September 2013

Gordon Harold Hal Col, USAF 7 March 2014

Gyauch Charles Chuck Col, USAF 11 December 2013

Haas Donald Don Civ 23 July 2013
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

LAST NAME FIRST NAME NICKNAME RETIRED RANK INTERVIEW DATE

Haas Rich Lt Col, USAF 10 July 2013

Hall Keith Civ 5 August 2013

Hard Donald Don Maj Gen, USAF 23 September 2014

Hermann Robert Bob Civ 22 May 2014

Hineman Richard Evans Civ 20 June 2014

Hodgson William Mark Col, USAF 17 September 2013

Hoskins James Jim Capt, USAF 10 October 2013

Hutchison Daniel Dan Col, USAF 3 March 2014

Jacobson Ralph Jake Maj Gen, USAF 21 October 2013

Kohler Robert Bob Civ 23 September 2013

Kulpa John Jack Maj Gen, USAF 8 September 2013

Larned Robert Rick Brig Gen, USAF 29 July 2013

Lopez Lelio Del CAPT, USN 25 November 2013

McAlpine Aubry Col, USAF 4 February 2014

McMillan Brockway Civ 11 September 2014

Mericsko Robert Bob Civ 3 February 2014

Moorman Thomas Tom Gen, USAF 26 September 2013

Pattishall Robert Bob Civ 29 September 2013

Paulson Robert Bob Col, USAF 3 March 2014

Prochko Robert Bob Lt Col, USAF 25 March 2014

Raspet David Dave Col, USAF 12 September 2013

Regenhardt John Don Col, USAF 7 February 2017

Riccardi Fredrick Fred Col, USAF 23 September 2013

Rosenberg Robert Bob Maj Gen, USAF 26 September 2013

Sharrard John Civ 6 February 2014

Skinner Rick Col, USAF 24 April 2014

Spence Michael Mike Col, USAF 11 July 2013

Taylor Richard Rich Civ 7 March 2014

Walker Donald Don Brig Gen, USAF 26 September 2013

Watts Sherilyn Civ 5 March 2014

Wilhelm Peter Pete Civ 15 November 2013
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1962 - 1990

Appendix 4

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

MERITORIOUS UNIT CITATION

National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation awarded to NRO Staff 1 August 2001 for its 

“collective superior performance for almost 35 years.”
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4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Appendix 5

CONTRIBUTORS

Principal Writers & 

Content Contributors

Col Robert Andrews, USAF (Ret.)

Brig Gen James R. Beale, USAF (Ret.)

Col Charles (Phil) Datema, USAF (Ret.)

The Honorable Mr. Martin C. Faga

Maj Gen Donald G. Hard, USAF (Ret.)

Gen Thomas S. Moorman, USAF (Ret.)

Contributing Writers

Maj Gen Phillip Bracher, USAF (Ret.)

Lt Gen Donald L. Cromer, USAF (Ret.)

Col Gary Dahlen, USAF (Ret.)

Brig Gen Robert E. (Rick) Larned, USAF (Ret.)

Col Fred Riccardi, USAF (Ret.)

Col Rick Skinner, USAF (Ret.)

Senior Review Panel

RADM Thomas C. Betterton, USN (Ret.)

Mr. R. Evans Hineman

Gen Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF (Ret.)

Maj Gen Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF (Ret.)

Ms. Joanne O. Isham

Col Bill Savage, USAF (Ret.)

The Honorable Mr. Martin C. Faga

Col Donald Regenhardt, USAF (Ret.)

Brig Gen Donald Walker, USAF (Ret.)

Design & Layout 

and Editorial Support

Mr. Chuck Glover

Mr. Michael Suk

Security Consultant

Col Bob Andrews, USAF (Ret.)

Interviewers and Researchers

Brig Gen Jim Beale, USAF (Ret.)

Col Phil Datema, USAF (Ret.)

Ms. Joanne O. Isham 

Col Bill Savage, USAF (Ret.)

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Appendix 6

GLOSSARY

4C-1000 Pentagon: 4th Floor, Corridor C, Room 1000

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACDA Arms Control Disarmament Agency

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASAT Anti-Satellite

ASPO Army Space Program Office

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Office

BYEMAN Security codeword for compartmented NRO system information

CBJB Congressional Budget Justification Book

CELV Commercial (later, Complimentary) Expendable Launch Vehicle

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COMINT Communications Intelligence

COMIREX Committee for Imagery Requirements and Exploitation of USIB

CONUS Continental United States

CSNR Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCI Director of Central Intelligence 

DDNRO Deputy Director of the NRO

DDS Defense Dissemination System

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

DNRO Director of the NRO

DoD Department of Defense

DRSP Defense Reconnaissance Support Program

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System

DSPO Defense Support Program Office

Elint Electronic Intelligence (primarily Radar signals)
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1962 - 1990

ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle

EOI Electro Optical Imagery

EXCOM NRO Oversight Committee from 1965 -1974

FISINT Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (e.g., telemetry)

FROG Film Readout Gambit

FSCS Future Sigint Capabilities Study

HPSCI House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

ICRS Imagery Collection Requirements sub-committee of the COMIREX 

IC Intelligence Community

IC Staff The DCI’s Staff supporting him in his community management role

Imint Imagery Intelligence

IMINT NRO Imagery Intelligence Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate

IUS Inertial Upper Stage

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

KH Keyhole (used as designator for different generations of imagery satellites)

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NCP National Cryptologic Program

NIP National Intelligence Program (intelligence budget managed by DCI)

NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NRO Staff Secretary of the Air Force Space Systems (SAFSS)

NRP National Reconnaissance Program (NRO budget)

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum

OCMC Overhead Collection Management Center

OD&E CIA Office of Development and Engineering

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PCCB Photo Configuration Control Board

PEM Program Element Monitor

PFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Program A Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects (SAFSP)
87

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

Program B CIA Office of Development and Engineering (OD&E)

Program C Navy Space Project, Naval Electronics Systems Command

Program D Joint CIA/USAF Aircraft overflight program 

R&D Research & Development

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAF Secretary of the Air Force

SAFSP Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information

SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SI Signals Intelligence

Sigint Signals Intelligence composed of Elint, Comint, and Fisint

SIGINT NRO Signals Intelligence Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate

SIGINT Committee Committee of the USIB dealing with Signals Intelligence 

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan

SLV Space Launch Vehicle

SOC Satellite Operations Center

SOCOM Special Operations Communications network

SORS SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Committee of the SIGINT Committee

SPO System Program Office

SRBM Short Range Ballistic Missile

SSCI Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

STS Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle)

TCP Technological Capabilities Panel

TENCAP Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities

TK Talent-Keyhole (Compartment for NRO-derived product information)

USAF United States Air Force

USD Under Secretary of Defense

USECAF Under Secretary of the Air Force 

USIB United States Intelligence Board 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WS-117L Weapon System 117L

89

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

ENDNOTES

1 Faga, Martin, Prepared paper for the DNI, "National Reconnaissance Views," June 2009.

2 Ibid.

3 Eisenhower, Dwight D., Memorandum for the Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, 

The Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of 

Central Intelligence, 26 August 1960.

4 Wheeler, Harold P., Point paper for DNRO James Plummer, 20 January 1976.

5 Faga, Martin, phone interview by Phil Datema, 18 September 2020.

6 Gilpatric, Roswell L. and Dulles, Allen W., Memorandum, "Management of the National 

Reconnaissance Program," 6 September 1961.

7 Charyk, Joseph V., Memorandum, "Organizations and Functions of the NRO," 23 July 1962.

8 Faga, June 2009.

9 Charyk, Joseph V., Interview by Datema, Isham, and Beale, 26 September 2014.

10 Perry, Robert L., A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, 2012, p 146.

11 Charyk, 26 September 2014.

12 Ibid.

13 Buckley, Richard, Interview by Datema and Isham, 17 October 2013.

14 Ibid.

15 Faga, Martin, Statement at monograph senior review, 20 June 2014.

16 Dahlen, Gary, Interview of Gary Dahlen, Mark Hodgson, Gene Dionne, Greg Gilles by Phil 

Datema, 17 September 2013.

17 Perry, 2012, p 53.

18 Moorman, Thomas, Interview by Phil Datema, 17 January 2019.

19 Laurie, Clayton D., Congress & the National Reconnaissance Office, June 2001.

20 Berkowitz, Bruce, The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 Years, A Brief History, July 2018, 

pp 13-14.

21 Regenhardt, John D., Interview by Datema and Savage, 7 February 2017.

22 Faga, Martin, Interview by Patrick Widlake, 6 May 2006.

23 Laurie, 2001, p 1.

24 Ford, Gerald R., Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," 18 

February 1976.

25 Faga, 6 May 2006.

26 Charyk, 26 September 2014.

27 McMillan, Brockway, Memorandum, "Memorandum to Director, NRO Staff, Advanced 

Planning for the NRP," 10 December 1963.
 90

1962 - 1990

28 Perry, Robert L., Management of the National Reconnaissance Program 1960-1965, Chapter 

Five, Years of Acrimony, 11 September 2018, p 76.

29 Kulpa, John E., Memorandum, "Organizational and Functional Changes to the NRO Staff," 6 

March 1974.

30 Mark, Hans, Memorandum, "NRO Staff Reorganization," 14 April 1978.

31 Mark, Hans, Memorandum, "Functional Reorganization of the NRO Staff," 30 May 1978.

32 Charyk, 23 July 1962.

33 Ibid.

34 Walker, Donald R., Interview by Datema et. al., 26 September 2013.

35 McCone, John A. and Gilpatric, Roswell L., "Agreement Between Secretary of Defense and 

the Director of Central Intelligence on Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance 

Office," 2 May 1962.

36 Swan, Cathy W. and Swan Peter A., Birth of Air Force Satellite Reconnaissance: Facts, 

Recollections and Reflections, Summer 2015, p. 57; and Cohen, Harvey, Interviews by Phil 

Datema, early 2017.

37 Riccardi, Fred, Telephone interview by Phil Datema, 2013.

38 Hard, Donald G., Email to Phil Datema, 21 September 2020.

39 Bracher, Phil, Telephone interview by Phil Datema, September 2020.

40 Moorman, Thomas S., Interview by Phil Datema, 17 January 2019.

41 Perry, 2012, p 42.

42 Ibid, p 70.

43 Worthman, Paul, Memorandum for Record, "SAFSL (MOL Program/SAFSS (NRO Staff) 

Relationships," 9 July 1965.

44 Moorman, Thomas S., Interview by Donald Hard, 16 May 2019.

45 Aldridge, Edward C., Interview by Donald Hard, 16 May 2019.

46 Fitzgibbon, James, Interview by Isham and Savage, 11 March 2015.

47 Walker, Donald R., Email to Phil Datema, 2 March 2014.

48 Perry, 2018.

49 Charyk, 26 September 2014.

50 Gyauch, Chuck, Interview by Datema, Savage, and Isham, 11 December 2013.

51 Hall, Keith R., Interview by Datema and Isham, 5 August 2013.

52 Martin, John L., Memorandum for NRO Staff, Subject: "Responsibilities of the 

NRO Communications Staff Officer and NRO Executive Officer," 27 May 1964.

53 Opfer, James, Interview by Phil Datema, 7 September 2020.

54 Martin, John L., 27 May 1964.

55 Bradburn, David D., Memorandum, "Description of Duties – NRO Communications Officer," 

Undated, circa 1971.

56 Regenhardt, John D., Interview with Datema and Savage, 7 February 2014 and 4 October 2018.
91

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

57 Dahlen, Gary, Email to Phil Datema, 1 November 2015.

58 Ibid.

59 Anderson, David, Telephone and email interviews by Phil Datema, 2020.

60 Pattishall, 27 September 2013.

61 Hoskins, James, Interview by Datema and Isham, 10 October 2013.

62 Ibid.

63 McAlpine, Aubry, Interview with Datema and Isham, 4 February 2014.

64 McMillan, 10 December 1963.

65 Perry, 11 September 2018, p 76.

66 Regenhardt, John D., Interview with Phil Datema, 20 June 2014.

67 Jacobson, Ralph H., Interview with Phil Datema, 21 October 2013.

68 McLucas, John L., Memorandum, "Analysis Group Projects," 30 October 1970.

69 Ibid.

70 Kulpa, 6 March 1974.

71 Buckley, 17 October 2013.

72 Aldridge, Edward C., Interview by Datema, Isham, and Savage, 24 September 2013.

73 Killoran, Lance, Telephone interview by Phil Datema, 7 October 2003.

74 Hard, Donald G., Interview by Phil Datema, 23 September 2014.

75 McAlpine, 4 February 2014.

76 Aldridge, 24 September 2013.

77 Faga, 6 May 2006.

78 Martin C. Faga, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, 28 September 1989 – 5 March 1993.

93

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

INDEX

SYMBOLS

4C-1000 v, xiv, 3, 14, 24, 29, 31, 50, 54, 85

A

A-12 41, 43

Advanced Planning Office 25, 64, 65

Afghanistan 21

Agena 46

Air Force Communications Service 37, 54

Air Force Institute of Technology 13, 37

Air Force Military Personnel Center 37

Air Force Satellite Control Facility 9, 40

Air Force Space and Missile Center 49

Air Force Space Command vii, 11, 22, 45

Aldridge, Pete 6, 12, 14, 15, 22, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 58, 62, 67, 68, 69, 78, 90, 91

Allen, Lew 24, 57, 65, 72

Analysis Group 65, 66, 91

Anti-Ballistic Missile 19, 43, 60, 85

Apollo 45

Appleberry, Tom 26, 27

Aquatone xi

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 26

Atlas 46, 48

B

Ballistic Missile Division 77

Beale, James R. "Jim" vi, vii, viii, 19, 41, 62, 66, 78, 83, 89

Bissell, Richard, Jr. 14, 23

Blankenship, Jim 66, 78

Boyce, Christopher 21

Bracher, Phil 28, 53, 56, 78, 83, 90

Bradburn, David 54, 72, 90

Brickbat 1 5, 39

Buckley, Rick 14, 67, 78, 89, 91

Bush, George H. W. 22

Byeman Control System 6, 35, 53, 85

C

Caballero, Julian 14, 68

Carry Forward 52

Carter, James E. 20, 21, 47, 48, 61, 66

Casey, William 68

Challenger 8, 12, 22, 46, 48, 49, 52, 63, 67

Charyk, Joseph vii, xii, 6, 7, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25, 31, 35, 38, 41, 51, 78, 89, 90

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) vii, xi, xii, 1, 5, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25, 34, 35, 

36, 38, 39, 41, 45, 50, 51, 53, 59, 62, 63, 64, 68, 70, 85, 86, 87

Civil Applications Committee 11
 94

1962 - 1990

Coglitore, Seb 41, 78

Commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) 22, 46, 48, 49, 85

Commercial Space Launch Act 48, 49

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) 11, 62, 66, 85, 86

Concepts and Applications Office 26, 66

Cook, Charlie 41

Corona xii, 38, 46

Cuba 19, 21

Curtin, Richard 13, 25, 75, 76

Czechoslovakia 19, 20, 60

D

D-21 41, 43

Dahlen, Gary 15, 78, 83, 89, 91

Datema, Charles P. "Phil" v, viii, 2, 29, 83, 89, 90, 91

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 8, 22, 44, 85

Defense Dissemination System 56, 85

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 18, 61, 63, 85

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) 14, 39, 61, 85

Defense Reconnaissance Support Program (DRSP) 22, 33, 45, 50, 52, 61, 62, 85

Defense Satellite Communications System 56, 85

Defense Support Program Office (DSPO) xiv, 22, 26, 66, 85

Delta 48

Department of Commerce 41

Department of Defense (DoD) xi, 5, 6, 8, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 36, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46, 

47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 61, 68, 85

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) xii, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 18, 20, 21, 26, 34, 51, 61, 62, 66, 68, 70, 

85, 86, 89, 90

Dirks, Les 14, 57

Discoverer 46, 77

Doyle, Dave 26, 51

Dulles, Allen W. 6, 89

Dyna-Soar 47

E

Eastman Kodak 12, 37, 58

Eisenhower, Dwight D. xi, xii, 1, 3, 4, 5, 34, 89

Electronic Intelligence (Elint) 11, 20, 21, 39, 62, 66, 77, 85, 87

Electro-Optical Imagery (EOI) 18, 57, 64, 65, 86

Executive Committee (EXCOM) 7, 8, 18, 19, 20, 41, 44, 51, 60, 61, 64, 65, 86

Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) 22, 46, 49, 86

F

Faga, Martin vii, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 68, 69, 78, 83, 89, 91

Film Readout Gambit (FROG) 18, 57, 65, 86

Flax, Alexander H. 25, 41

Ford, Gerald R. 20, 89

Fort Meade 27, 32, 39, 40

Freedom of Information 40

Fuhrman, Robert 70

Future Sigint Capabilities Study (FSCS) 67, 68, 86
95

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

G

Gambit 18, 46, 64, 86

Gates, Robert 70

Gilles, Greg 53, 78, 89

Gilpatric, Roswell L. 6, 51, 89, 90

Greer, Robert E. 77

Gyauch, Chuck 51, 78, 90

H

Hall, Keith 52, 79, 90

Hard, Don vii, 28, 67, 68, 73, 79, 83, 90, 91

Hermann, Robert 22, 61, 62, 79

Herron, Thomas 25, 75, 76

Hexagon 18, 40, 42, 46, 47

Hill, Jimmie D. ix, 14, 15, 19, 27, 28, 32, 50, 52, 60, 63, 73

Hoskins, Jim 60, 79, 91

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) vii, 20, 61, 69, 86

Howard, Henry C. 25, 75, 77

I

IC Staff 16, 20, 21, 32, 45, 51, 52, 61, 62, 66, 67, 86

Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) 47, 86

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 19, 45, 86

Iran 21

Isham, Joanne vii, 53, 83, 89, 90, 91

J

Jacobson, Ralph 47, 65, 79, 91

James, Clifford E. 77

Johnson, Lyndon B. 18, 43

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 15, 33, 38, 68, 86

K

Kampiles, William 21

Kemp, Mike 67

Kennedy, John F. 18

KH-11 21

Kissinger, Henry 64

Kohler, Robert "Bob" 14, 68, 79

Kulpa, John "Jack" E. 26, 66, 72, 79, 90, 91

Kutyna, Don 49

L

Land Committee 18, 64

Laurie, Clayton 17, 19, 89

Lemanski, Ronald 26, 28, 66

Liaison and Administration 26, 40

Lindsay, Nate 26
 96

1962 - 1990

M

Manned Orbiting Laboratory 41

Mark, Hans 26, 27, 47, 51, 61, 90

Martin, John L. 23, 25, 32, 53, 54, 72, 75, 76, 90

Maultsby, Tom 45

McAlpine, Aubry 63, 68, 79, 91

McCone, John 51, 90

McCormick, Dick 45

McLucas, John L. 18, 65, 91

McMillan, Brockway vii, 14, 25, 39, 41, 46, 64, 79, 89, 91

McNamara, Robert 51

Mervosh, Ted 41

Messner, Dave 44

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 41, 44, 47, 61

Moorman, Tom vii, viii, 1, 2, 14, 44, 48, 49, 67, 68, 73, 79, 83, 89, 90

Morrell, Jimmey 44, 45

Murphy, Daniel J. 21

Mushroom Factory 38

N

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 11, 14, 20, 26, 41, 45, 47, 48, 86

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) 51

National Intelligence Estimates 35

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 41

National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) 66, 86

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 31, 

32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 50, 51, 52, 54, 66, 86, 89, 90

National Security Agency (NSA) 11, 13, 14, 18, 27, 28, 39, 40, 53, 55, 61, 63, 66, 68, 77, 86

National Security Council (NSC) xi, 11, 20, 26, 34, 45, 49, 86

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 48

National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 67, 86

National Space Policy 41, 48

National Technical Means of Verification 43, 44

Naval Research Laboratory 36

Nixon, Richard M. 18, 21, 43, 64

Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty 43

O

Office of Development and Engineering (OD&E) 36, 38, 86, 87

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 46, 51, 65, 86

Office of Missile and Satellite Systems (OMSS) xii, 23, 25, 75, 76, 77

Office of Space Policy (SAF/SX) 41

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 16, 22, 44, 45, 46, 51, 60, 61, 62, 75, 86

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Missiles and Satellites (SAFMS) 76, 77

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Space Systems (SAFSS) 23, 86, 90

Outer Space Treaty 19, 43

Overhead Collection Management Center (OCMC) 27, 32, 40, 86
97

4C-1000: The Untold Story of the NRO Headquarters Staff 

P

Pattishall, Robert 14, 79, 89, 91

Paulson, Bob 66, 79

Perry, Robert 7, 15, 25, 64, 89, 90, 91

Personnel Control List (PCL) 37

Plans and Analysis vii, 29, 69

Plans and Policy 24, 54

Poppy 39

Powell, Colin 15, 68

Powers, Francis Gary 18

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) 11, 41, 64, 86

Press, Frank 66

Program A 1, 11, 18, 19, 24, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 52, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 86

Program B 1, 14, 18, 19, 24, 36, 38, 39, 45, 52, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 87

Program C 1, 24, 36, 38, 39, 45, 52, 58, 59, 63, 87

Program D 1, 24, 43, 59, 87

Program Director 6, 24, 25, 26, 32, 51, 59, 63

Program Element Monitor (PEM) 15, 28, 36, 46, 47, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 86

Programs & Budget 40

Q

Quill 57

R

Randolph Air Force Base 37

Reagan, Ronald W. 20, 22, 45, 48, 62, 67

Redstone Arsenal 45

Regenhardt, Donald 57, 65, 79, 83, 89, 91

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) 37

S

Samos xii

Satellite Operations Center (SOC) xiv, 27, 38, 39, 40, 54, 62, 87

Savage, Bill vii, 28, 29, 83, 89, 90, 91

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) xii, 6, 7, 9, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 34, 41, 48, 53, 58, 64, 66, 68, 

75, 86, 87, 89, 90

Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) xii, xiv, 6, 12, 23, 45, 46, 58, 75, 76, 77, 86, 87

Secretary of the Air Force, Space Systems 23

Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) 37

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 20, 87

Sensint xi

Sides, Jack 75, 77

SIGINT Committee 11, 62, 87

Signals Intelligence (Sigint) 14, 24, 26, 27, 28, 39, 40, 46, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 86, 87

Soviet Union/USSR xi, xii, 3, 21, 60, 69

Space Launch Complex 6 (SLC-6) 47

Space Shuttle, see Space Transportation System

Space Transportation System (STS) 2, 9, 12, 18, 19, 22, 44, 45, 47, 48, 61, 66, 87

Special Operations Communications network (SOCOM) 53, 54, 55, 56, 87

SR-71 24, 33, 41, 43

Strategic Air Command (SAC) xi, 18, 19, 41, 87
 98

1962 - 1990

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 21, 43, 87

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) 8, 22, 44, 87

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 22, 44, 62, 87

Support to Military Operations 9, 70

System Program Office (SPO) 45, 49, 57, 59, 62, 87

Systems and Technology 14, 26, 29, 40, 63, 67, 68

T

Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) xiv, 20, 26, 45, 50, 51, 61, 62, 66, 87

Talent-Keyhole (TK) xii, 4, 5, 35, 87

Titan 12, 46, 48, 49

Turner, Stansfield 21

Tyuratam test facility 21

U

U-2 xi, xii, 5, 18, 24, 38, 41

United Nations xi, 24, 41

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) 9, 20, 25, 32, 33, 39, 40, 85, 87

V

Vandenberg Air Force Base 47, 52

Van Mater, Robert A. 25, 54, 75

Vietnam War 19, 20

W

Walker, Donald 28, 32, 50, 67, 70, 73, 79, 83, 90

Warsaw Pact 19, 20

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 43

Weinberger, Casper 53, 68

White House Communications Agency 54, 56

White House Economic Council 41

Worthman, Paul 24, 41, 90

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

December 2021