'.4 

USCIB: 29.18/8 

MEMQRANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

I 

UKUSA Conference onl 

Reference: USCIB 29.18/7 dated 8 June 1954. 

A1''.Pl!:NDED DCCUMinS CON'l'XIN 

SG:mwlOOB lfldEffiAD 

9 June 1954 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

PL S6~36/50 USC 3605 

\ 

l. Further to the reference, the s:ix Enclosures hermvith· contain 

reconunendations of the Ad Hoc Conmittee, Chaired by Mr. Raven, with regard to 

Items le, 2e, .3e, lf, 2f, and .3f, respectively, of the agenda for the subject Conference. 

2. These papers are forwarded for study in connection with the reference 

with a view to consideration at the 104th Meeting of USCIB. 

Enclosures 

a/s 

USCIB: 29.18/8 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-25-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

TO.P SECRET 
)Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

'i'OP SBSRii'i' FRQ'!!II g,g, EH8 OHi.¥ f PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

e. Desirability of Extension 

(1) Advantages 

(a) Critical UKUSA requirements r.6r 

would be satisfied. Listed below are the specific advantages which 

could be expected from such an extens;i.on, together nth a statement of 

the UKUSA contribution believed neceesary to realize each advantage: 

(2) I .... ____ ___,.,. __ .,.___ ___ _.I could p;rove of considerable value because of I f s concentrated and timely attack on nearby 

an attack wh:i.ch is often assisted by 

Such traffic 

analytic and cryptanalytic results could be applied immediately by the 

us to other I r (To realize this ad'V5i.ntage, the I 

would require in exchange UKUSAI pn the probl._em_s_b_e_i-ng___, 

work8d). 

Enclosure 1 with USCIB 29.lB/B dtd 9 June 1954. 

TOP SECRET FROTH 
'l'QP s:serm~ FR9'i'II 'f:J. s. Erll!iS ONL'f j~O 3.3(h) (2) 

!\EL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(3) It would be possible to obtain 

(To realize this . ' ' ' ' ' . . ' ' ' ' ' . 

advantage, it would be necessary to underwrite .an• approximate doubling . . . . ' ' . 

Ori b

/ .·· .·· .. · .. · .. . ....• -· -------. : .·.·.· .· .: ....------------.: .· .· .· . . . (4) The could be directed. to 

and \.undesirable 

duplication eliminated. (To realize this advantage, Ii.--.-----------' 

would have to be provided to thel ~· 

( 5) Additional high qualityJ .... ____ __.lror research 

would become available. 

(6) UKUSA would be able to obtain more accurate, complete, 

and timely information anal .... ________ _. (To r.ealize this 

advantage, the gaps inJ .... __ __, ____________________ ,.......I 

being worked would have to be/ filled, up to the general level of 

The rapidity and completeness or 

.__ _______ .... lhas been/limited by their lack or access to the\ overal~._ _________ .... rpicture~ Thus,~ _____ .,._ ___ _ 

____ _,could be improved if certain ._I -------..... 1 information 

developed by UKUSA could be provided to thel I who have already 

recovered the essentials or the system.) 

(7) funique capabilities to 

on a regular basis would be 

L.-a_d_va_n_c-ed_a_p_p_r_e_c-ia_b_ly_.-_(_T_o_r_e_a_l_i_z_e-th_i_s advantage, the I I would 

have to be supplied with the necessary equipment, training, and detailed 

technical support). 

- 2 -

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
~~Eif:~~ ;;-!£0 3.3(h)(2) 

• ~... ~~~ - --- - -- !:..'"'---1 ~ ~ J.. ·- ;J?,L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

':POP ffi!i8RBi' FRO'fH - l:J.~. EHS ONLY 

( g) 'Ih~._ _____ ___.rtfort could be improved,\ and UKUSA 

would profit directly through receipt of .rnore accurate bearings. (To 

realize this advantage the I .... ___ __.lwould require/ instructions on 

better methods and techniques and pr.ovisions of technical :i.nformation.) 

(b) The UKUSA .... l __ _,___.lcClUNT relationship would be improved. 

Al.though there seems to be no :immediate danger /that th~.__...,..__...,..._ .... lwill 

terminate the present a.greement, it must be recognized that this 

termination could be accomplished readily by/ the I I if they are 

dependent upon. UKUSA only for cash and equipment. In the case of\ the 

UK,c=Jaiscontinued the provision of traffic on the basis that\ the UK 

would not furnish I t Under an arrangement wher.e 

UKUSAI lwere provided, a more perms.-

nent agreement on a long-range basis could be negotiated. 

2. Disadvantages 

- 3 -

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
~P stea¥¥W8rrt e 

'fOP ffi30RS'f PFl:O'fH = l:J. S • El'lES ONLY 

"i/Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

f~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

3. Conclusions 

(a) An appraisal of the 13.dvanUl.ges arid dislld.V!tntages of 

extension with thel lcoMINT service/clearly demonstrates that it 

is in the best interests of the UKUSA Cc.MINT effort to. \eJC:pand our CCMINT 

relationships wit~._ __ __, 

(b) This extension will involve /inherent security \.risks. The 

precise level of I ~ecurity cannot be detierrnined.. Available 

evidence indicates that the CCMINT security standa.td.s of the!._ ____ ..... 

are high, but there can be no guarantee that an expanded relat:i.onship 

with the .... I ____ ..... land the material exchanged within this relationship 

would not be compromised. It is /evident, however, that.b;V limiting the 

...._ ______________________ __,--alling within the 

demonstrated C<lUNT capability/ of the .... l __ - ____ I and pertinent to the 

problems in question, the extension will not endanger any significant 

CCMINT secrets that cannot/ already be compromised .by the I I even 

without an extension. 

(c) Further, this extension and our resulting continuous 

dependence onl !probably will raise acl.ditional security.problems in 

the future in order to maintain the desired level o~ ] 

capability to cope with I f For example, in the event 

of seriously arr ectingl Is 

effort, it might be necessary to furnis~ I obtainable 

(only at the time on the basis of the overall UKUSA technical effort) in 

orf!er to perm.it 

- 4 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
r'P sH.,~_!:lf=~~1"Pi It 

TOP SECltET !"ROTH - T1.S. EYES ONLY 

tasks. Providing such information (beyond the established level of 

.__ ___ ..... !competence) in order to satisfy UKUSA requirements would raise 

security considerations which would have to be examined in each instance 

by USCIB and LSIB. 

(d) An integral part of an expanded relationship with! ___ _. 

must be an effort to secur1 !adherence to appropriate security 

standards. 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 5 -

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
fEO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

/PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

e. Desirability of Extension 

1. Advantages 

(a) Important UKUSA requirements for /obtaining ·1 .... ___ __.l OCMINT 

reports and technical results, expanding theJ !effort \to match 

its unique potential, and improving thel f ef'f ort in order to 

obtain more timely, accurate, and complete materials and information, 

would be satisfied. Listed below are the $pecific ad.vantages which 

could be expected from such an extension, together with a stateme:nt of 

the UKUSA contribution believed necessary/ to realize each advantage.: 

(2) .__ _____ ___,___,fresul ts could prove of considerable 

value because ofl ts concentrated and timely attack on.nearby 

______________ ____.r an attack which is often assisted by 

excellent collateral such as_I ------------'~ Such traffic 

analytic and cryptanalytic re.sul ts could be applied immediately by 

UKUSA to other! (To realize this advantage, thel '"""--;;::::::=======--~~~~~~~~~~~~--=====::::::!...~~--. 

would require in 

Enclosure 2 with USCIB 29.18/8 dtd 10 June 1954. 

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
~{) 3.3(h) (2) .OP SECM!f lll!R~-4~ Ji;L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

-•'f.f'leJl~3i-'l:l!:H'O"l!ftE~!'""'lf•?t 910""Tl,.r;ft---,....,.,p-. 5e-,--'IJ!iM!l"llJ!i0e!S~QNll'l"Ll'""lll""'"" 

(3) It would be possible to obtain intercE!I tie of and 

timely reports on, additional important 

(To rea.J.ize 

this advantage, it would be/necessary to underwrite an incre.ase in 

.... I _______________ l/or possibly to/insure that •t]ie total present 

.... I _______ I is obtained). 

(4) The coulttbe directed to 

....__ _______ __, not being oovered adequately by other.so't,lrces, and 

undesirable duplication eliminated. (To r.ealize this ad.vantage, 

..._~~~~--J 

would have to be provided to the • .._ __ .... 

(5) .Additional high quality raw mat.aria! for research 

would become available. 

( 6) UKUSA would be able to obtain more accurs. te, complete, 

and timely information and reports fromj f. (To realize this advantage, 

the gaps ~ .... _______________ _,_ __ _,__ _ __.lbeing worked. 

would have to be filled, up to the general level of 

The rapidity/and completeness of' I I results has -=====::::::...... ___ .,........ __ been limited by their lack of /access to• the overal~._ _________ .... l 

picture. Thus,I f c~ be improved if 

certainr-1--------.....,..----.,.td'"""e-v_e_l_o_p ..... ed by UKUSA could be provided 

to the • 

(7) I !unique capabilities to 

a regular basis would be 

advanced appreciably. (To realize this advantage, the._I __ _.lwould have 

to be supplied with the necessary equipment, training, and detailed 

technical support). 

-2-

TOP SECRET FROTI-t 
?E;o 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

~IF ~RE!m c~~'/ (8) The l .... ____ ..... leri.'ort cOtild be improyed, and UKUSA 

would profit directly through receipt of more accurate beaI"ings. (To 

realize this advantage the I .... __ .... lwould require instruction\\on better 

methods and techniques and provision of technical information). 

(9) In an extension of the /present a.r:ra.ng~ents \to include a 

technical exchange, it is possible thatthe[I]):nrl.,ght make available to 

UKUSA the results o~ ~hich px-oduce\ information 

of COMINT interest. Such contributions, pa.rticularl.y o1l 

cOUld be of great importance to the US/UK research effort • 

....._ ____ (_b_) _Th_e_UKU_, -sA-DCOMINT relationship would be improved. 

It appears that both the US and the UK.have a potential.to negotiate for 

expansion of arrangements with I .... __ _, The advantages listed in\ (a) 

above could be realized through the efforts of either tl:le US or UK. The 

specific advantages attaching to each are listed below: 

(1) For the UK - The UK has indicated that the ! .... __ ___, 

are insistent that the UK contribute significant .... I __, _ __,_,__ _ _,___ __ __, _ _, 

in order to maintain a satisfactory CCMINT arrangement. Unde.r an 

arrangement where UKUsAI ~ere provided, 

a more permanent agreement on a long-range basis could be negotiated 

without undue delay. 

(2) For the US - The US contact ~ lis with the Director 

of the Intelligence Staff, who controls theD•the UK arrangement is 

presumably between the British Admiralty and th~ INavy, and is 

described by the UK as delicate and .... I ____ _. It is considered probable, 

therefore, that the US has a greater capability than the UK to obtain an 

agreemnt which will provide maximum assurances of continuity. 

2. Disadvantages 
iEo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

~FR.~ir~~-/ PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'l'OP ~EC~'±' FR9'i'fI = 'B".S. m~ OMIT 

(d) In addition to the disadvantages listed above, which would 

apply equally to the US and UK, .the following apply to an extension by 

the US: 

(1) Unless prior LSIB concurrence could be obtained, 

serious damage to UK.USA relations might result. 

(2) A considerable period of time would be required for 

the US/to negotiate and implement a satisfactory agreement, since only a preliminary contact has been made 

to date. 

3. Conclusions 

(a) An appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of extension 

with th~ lcCMINT service clearly demonstrates that it is in the 

best interests of the UKUSA GCl·ITl~T effort to expand CCMINT relationships 

wit~,__ __ _. 

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TOP SECRET FROTH 
?'Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

.·· · J;L 8 6- 3 6 I 5 o us c 3 6 o 5 

(b) This extension wilLinvol ve inherent /secUI':i. t~ :ri{3ks. The 

precise level ofl I s~~uri ty cannot be det.exmned. Atailable evidence 

indicates that the CO.MINT security standards .. of/thel ~e\high, but 

there can be no guarantee that an expanded>relationship with\thel ... __ _ 

and the material exchanged within this/relationship would.not\be ~___... ___ __, 

compromised. It is evident, however1/thatby limiting the 

falling within the demonstrated L-~~~~~~--p=====;-~~ 

CClUNT capability of th~---- and pertinent to the probl8l1ls in 

question, the Gxtension will not endanger any significant COMINT 'aecrets 

that cannot already be compromised/by the LJ even without• an 

extension. 

(c) Further, this extension and the resulting continuous • 

dependence o~ lprobabl;rwill raise additional security problGmS! 

in the future /in order to maintain the desired level of I I technical capability to cope with I .... _________ __.J For example, in the 

event 04 .... ___ --------------_.f seriously '3.'f'f'ecting 

.__ __ .... ~s effort, it might be necessary to f'ur.nish I .... _________ .... } 

obtainable only on/the basis of the overall UKUSA technical effort in order 

to permi~ .... --___,~o resume"-------------------------' 

The provision of information beyond the established level of I ... ___ _ competence would raise security considerations which would have to be 

examined in each instance by USCIB and LISB. 

(d) An integral part of an eXpandcd relationship withe=] 

must be an effort to secure ~erence to appropriate security 

standards. 

- 5 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
fEo 3.3(h) (2) 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

c. Desirability of Extension. 

1. Advantages: 

(a) UKUSA requirements for obtaining 

..__ ______ ___, expanding and improving thel .................... __.feffort\\ in order iD 

obtain more timely, accurate, and complete materials and information, would 

be satisfied. Listed below are the specific/advantages which\could be 

expected from such an extension, together with;ia statement of .the UKUSA 

contribution believed necessary to realiz.e each advantage; 

(1) At present, timely 

L----------__,(To realize this advantage, th~._ __ .... lwould have to 

be advised on the method of integrating technical results into a useful 

COMINT product). 

(2) _______ .... ~results would prove of value, especially 

in view of !;heir integration with physical sighting reports. Traf.:f'ic 

9-nalytic results could be/ applied immediately by the U.S. to otherJ .... ____ ___, 

areas. (To realize this advantage, theOwould require in exchange 

UKUSAI bn the problems being worked.) 

Fnclosure 3 with USCIB 29.18/8 dtd 9 June 1954. 

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
~F ID:A60459 

tJOP ~EGRET PFtOTI I 

'fQP SBOR!jl'l' PRO'f'H = T::J.S, EYfiS ONLY 

c.l. (a) (Cont 1d} 

Zto3.3(hl (2) 

~-L86~J6/50 USC 3605 

(4) The I ~o~d be divex.:fea td 

.__ ______ _J not being covered adequately by other sources, and undesirable duplication eliminated. (To carry out this d,l.versdion, 

would have to be provided to th 

'-------' ,__ _ ___, 

(5) Additional high-quality ! .... _____ For research would 

become available. 

(6) UKIBA would be able to obtain .lllOre accurate, coznplete, 

r timely ._I ______________ .,..,..._.l (To.realize th;is\\advantage, 

the gaps in being worke.d \would 

have to be filled, up to the general level/of 

The rapidity and completeness or ..... l __ .... lresults has\.be.en 

limited by their lack of access to the overall! 

picture. Thus J ~ould be improved if certain 

limited I .... ___________ ___.~eveloped by UKUSA could be provided to tbel 

~ I 

(7) 

on a regular basis would be advanced appreciably. (To '-------...J 

realize this advantage, the Owould have to be supplied with the 

necessary equipment, training, and detailed technical support,.) 

-2-

TOP SECRET FROTH 
EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

c.l. (Cont'd) 

(b) The UKUSA~._ __ .... lcoMINT relatiom,1hip w.otlld be improved. 

Although there seems to be no imminent danger. that theDill 

terminate the present agreement, it must be :t"ecoenfzed\that no agreement based solely upon the provision of equipment can be. entertained 

indefinitely, partictllarly when the other party presses for technical 

information and refuses to accept cash. Under an arrangement where 

UKIBA I ~ere provided, a more perm.a-

- nent agreement on a long-range basis could be negotiated. 

2. Disadvantages: 

- .3 -

TOP SECRET FROTH 
.. " . ;~o 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

FL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

.3. Conclusions: 

(a) The advantages to be .gained by an e.xtensidn of arrangements 

with I .... __ ___,~t t~is time ~e ljmi ted./ While/the I lcoMrNT service 

is now providing unique material of value to the .UinSA GOM!NT \effort and 

while the I .... __ ..... lhave an inherent capaci tr to provide • additional\\ material 

or high value, it seems clear that current UKUSA COltt?n' requireD1ents can 

be satisfied largeJ.y by a continuation of the present basic arrangement 

with I .... __ ___. 

(b) It is believed that in the near future the UKOSA COMINT effort 

will be able to .minimize that portion or/th~ fproduct which :U1 now 

....--....!:::::::::::::::;----' 

unique. At the same time,/because of' th~ f capacity to provide\\unique, 

high value material by/making full use of the presumed potentialities\of' 

the the u.s. should maintain a 

position which permits ready expansion if required. 

(c) In/order to insure continuing cooperation .froml l to 

obtain a diversion of intercept /to more important targets, and to improve. 

thel !potential against targets not adequately covered by the UKUS.A.. 

ef'f'ort, it may be necessary t'o provide certain 

(d) The provisioniof' technical assistance would involve inherent 

security risks, but in view of the strict selection of material that would 

be released t~._ ___ ..... lsuch risks would be minimal. --~~~~~~~~~~~---, 

(e) If it becomes necessary to release 

the security consideration should be reexamined at that time. 

-4-

TOP SECRET FROTI I 
d. /120 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

E(L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOf B:t:e~ ~O'Mt - tT. ~. Erl!:~ om::r 

I. f. Recommendations oq._ ___ _. 

It is recommended that USCIB approve the fol1.ow:trig! 

1. US Policy Objectives: 

a. The objectives of US policy with respect t~._ ______ __, 

COMINT relations are: 

( 1) To obtain a COMINT agreement with I ... ____ .... ruthori ties which will proy~_d.e maximum assurance of contirmi ty. · 

(2) To agree that one of the lJKUSAparties will have 

main responsibility for the conduct of the UKUSA COMINT arrangements with 

e.__I _ __.... 

(3) To obtain ...._ ______________________ ___, 

to fill existing gaps. 

(4) To obtain ~the~ .... ---------------' 

promptly enough to be of .maximum intelligence value. 

(5) To assure to the maximum degree the continuing 

availability of these I ... ________ ~ __ __, 

(6) To expand the Oeffort to permit its tul.f:l.11.ment 

e of UKUSA requirements for COMINT information on targets not otherwise 

accessible. 

(7) To improve the l .... ____ ___,~ffort so as to obtain 

for UKUSA the best quality COMINr results possible. 

( 8) To enable UKUSA to guide the efforts of the D to 

those tasks whose performance by them is of maximum advantage td UKUSA. 

(9) To compartment the COMINr relationship insofar as 

feasible from all other intelligence relationship. 

Inclosure 4 with 

USCIB ~9.18/8 

NSA Form 781-ClOS l Jul 52 TOP SEC~ET FROTII 

-. 4 
. 

eR.·1~~6(),4~.'fll n 1 rtt 

WQP SESM'f' FflO'f'U U. S. EYES OPH:i¥ 

minimum 

(10) To achieve the objectives set; forl;h above witb/rist. 

to the UKU8A COMIUI' effort. 

b. Any actions disadvantageous to UKUSA on the COMINT and 

national levels must be avoided; that is, any actions which might: 

(1) Disturb US/UK CO:~UNT relations, or UKUSA relations with 

Oe.nad.a or Australia. 

(2) Reveal the extent of UKUSA collaboration beyond the 

~sks involved ih this agreement. 

(3) Reveal US/UK COMINT capabilities beyond the level of our 

.ED 3.3(h) (2) 

collaboration with thel PL.86-36/50 use 3605 

(4) Disrupt vital intelligence contacts now established with 

~~~hl.~~n~objecbiv~ 

iVP~ 

2. The U.S. position for the London Conference: 

a. That, in order to meet critical UKUSA COMINT\ requirements which 

can be satisfied only by the development of thel J potential, it 

~ now desirable to enter into close and continuing technical COMINT working 

rel~tionships bel:;ween NSA and the 

problems, in those areas in which they have COMINT capability, 

up to their established level of competence. In implementation or this reco:mrnend.a.tion it is understood that: 

(l) l.\To will be provided · 

without approval of both USCIB and LSIB in each instance. 

2 

!nclosure 4 with 

:JGCIB 29.18/8 

NSA form 781-ClOS l Jul 52 T()P SECREl1 FROTII 
.. [Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(2) The provision of end-product will 1.lc \.a\toidccl. 

(3) COMUlT materials provided/by .the U •. s. \neeo not be 

st.eriliz9d, but the U.K. must remove Ul\.1JSA notations from any :m.atet"ia.ls vld.clt 

it is later aGreed that they provide to the I ... .._ __ ..._ __ ..._..._ _ ___,___, ........... (4) All material provided will concern or be d-trectly 

related to the problems oeing '\TOrlrnd by the I.__ __________ __, 

( 5) Nol bersonnel can be accepted at NSA or. GCJIQ. 

fJISA. will station a. Senior COMINT representative iJ._ _ ___, .... 

(6) Assurances must be/received from the._I ___ ....,... _ _, 

that they will adhere to personnel and physical security standards at least; 

equivalent to SHAPE Y standards. 

(7) Only one UKlJSll' charnel will Ox:tst rot/ \ 

'L~~~~~~~~~~~---~~~~---- (8) must be placed 

----------------------- in COMINT channels as soon as possible and must be classified on the same 

basis as corresponding UKUSA material. 

W ~ --------------------1 (9) All 

ill be exchangeable immediately within UK.USA. 

(19) At the present time, the U.S. can see no advantages to 

tripartite UJ((J~ ~iscussions. 

(11) Arrangements will be made for the rapid electrical 

transmission of I f and other vital materials 

and information to US and UI< COMINT processing centers and field units as 

required. 

FROTH 
jfEo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'f'OP SBff£lH'f' FHO~l Y, G , Jl:Y:SS Qfll±.¥ 

(12) No cho.n(;es in AppendixP to the UKUSA agreement 

will be required as a result of the implementation o.t" the above 

policies and objectives. 

b. That the US will/be the UKUSA/chan:o.el for technical COMINT 

working relations with theLJ 

c. That the development of thei UK coritact 't-Ti th th1 lbe 

explored by the conference with a view to determining whether it should be 

extended, and, if so, in what manner. 

9 d. That, if it is requirea to achieve a (9) above, it is a.greed 

that UKUSA collaboration u._p_t_o_l _ .............. 7.· .. Y·//b. e rev .... /e• allie· ...• nd/ 

0

the problems concerned 

jn the agreement with thel ra 

e. The Director, NSA will.be responsible for the conduct of the 

COMJ,:NT collaboration with._l __ .... I• If it is d.eemed desirable, the 

.__ ____ .... lwill be inrormed that th.e Director, NS.A. is the US COMINT authority 

responsible for US COMINT activities and tha."ti the Senior NSA representative 

will speak for him. 

~~~ ~ 3. Internal US Relationships: 

a. The DC:I will be responsible for the negotiation of a new 

COMINT agreement wi th!._ __ _....hn accord.a.nee with the provisions of paragraphs · 

1 a.nd 2 above. The Director, NBA.will J?rovide rej;>resentatives to participate 

in these negotiations,! f and will determine the precise technical 

nature of' the COMINT collaboration with_I __ __. 

b. After the London Conference, USCIB will approve terms of 

reference, based upon paragraphs 1 and 2 above and upon the i'lnaJ. conclusions ot 

Inclosure 4 with 

USCIB 29.18/8 

NSA form TSr-cros r Jul 52 TSP SECRET FROTH 
REF ID:A60459 TO SECRET FR•TH 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

the London Conference, for the negotiation of a new COMINT rclationshlp 

with L..l __ ----1 

c. !mmediately upon conclusion of the negotiations with 

L--------lre agreement will be submitted to USCIB £or approval and for 

establishment of the policy for its implementation. 

Inclosure 4 with 

USCIB 29.18/8 

NSA Form 781-CJOS 1 Jul 52 'f()P SECRE'F FROTII 
~.o 3.3(h) (2) 24 

p.];, 86-36/50 USC 3605 

Jr. r. HE>•..:01•m1cnl1aLlons o~._ __ __. 

It is recorrmrena_ed that USCIB a.pprove the following: 

1. UG Policy Objectives. 

a. The objectives or US policy With respect to}.__ __ __. 

COMINT relations o.re: 

(l) To obtain a COMINT agreement withJ .... ___ ... Jauthorities 

which will p"t"ovide maxinrum assurance of continuity. 

(2) To agree that; one of the UKOSA parties will have imin 

-

respons.ibility for the conduct of the UKUSA COMINT arrangements with._l ___ ...,,I 

(3) To obta~~~======================================~I to fill existing gaps. 

(4) To obtain other.__ _________ - ________ _. 

promptly enough to be of maximum intelligence value. 

(5) To assure to the maximum degree the continuing a.vailability of thesel 

------------;:::::::::::::...-----1 

(6) To expand thel leffort to permit its fulfillment 

e of IBillSA requirements of COMINT information on targets not otherwise accessible. 

(7) To improve th~._ ______ ___.leffort so as to obtain 

for UlillSA the best quality COMINT results possible. 

( 8) To enable UKUSA to guide the efforts of the I._ ____ _, 

COMINT service to those tasks whose performance by them is of maxinrurn advantage 

to UK.USA. 

Inclosure 5 with 

USCIB 29.18/8 

NSA Form 781- C JOS J Jul 52 'FSP SECRET FROTH 
TOI SE~ JP=rA6

A0 I I ll..U .I.. MU .1..· ..L'-•Tlf 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'!10P ffi!:G:Rl!:'I' FB:O'I'H y. s I E¥Ii:S OW:b¥ 

(9) To compartment the COMINT relationship withLJ 

insofar as f Po.sibJ.e from 0.1J. other :i.ntell 1 gence relat.1.onships. 

(10) To achieve the objectives set/forth above with 

minimum risk to the UK.USA COMINT effort • 

• b. Any actions disadvantageous to UKUSA on the COMlNT and 

national levels must be avoided, that, is, any act.ions which might; •. 

Disturb US/UK COMINT relations, or. UK.USA r.ela.tions 

with Canada or Australia. 

- (2) Reveal the extent of UKUSA collaboration l;ieyon'a the 

tasks involved in this agreement. 

(3) Reveal US/UK C.OMINT capab:i.li ties beyond tbe ·.1evel 

of our collaboration with thq-~~~-

(4) Disrupt vital intelligence contacts now established 

witc=J, ~B'~~tli-tne/rill.~~ 

o~~- . 

2. The US position at the London conference be: 

a. That, in order to meet critical UKUSA COMINT requ:tre,ments 

which can be satisfied only by the development of the_I ~~~~~~-!potential, 

.;i:a-±s R~ d,esjrable to en:ter-into-~close-e.nd~eontinuingj lpubelitiT:!;'.t!oJ 

it is now desirable to enter into close and continuing! rorking 

relationships with the 

problems, in those areas in which they have COMINT capability, up to 

Inclosure 5 with 

USCIB 29.18/8 

NSA Form 781-ClOS l Jul 52 

2 

TOP SE(:RET FROTII 
• 

,, 

T09 SECrtn~=~itilTII f)\EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

WL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'!'Of' BEeftl!l'f f'fl:eJ'!'f I "" tJ. S • 13¥:138 0Iffi¥ 

their es tabU shed level of cOI11petet1ce. In implementation. of/ thilr• recorrnnenelation it is understood tha.t: 

(1) No Willbe J?:t'ovided 

without approval or both USCIB and LSIB in each instance. 

(2) The provision of I .... ____ __.!will be avoided. 

(3) I .... _______ .... lprovided will not need to be sanitized. 

( 4) All material provided will concern or be directly 

related to the problems being worked b;Y the 1 rervice. 

( 5) No I !personnel will be accepted at NSA o.r 

GCHQ. UKUSA t~chnical COMINT personnel may be stationed in I .... __ __.las technical 

working contacts. 

(6) Assurances must be received from the l .... __ __.~hat\•they 

will adhere to personnel and physical security standards at le.a.st equivalent 

to SHAP~ Y standards. 

(7) Only one UKUSA channel will exist for/ \ 

W 

JL--~~~~~~~-=========~ (8) All 

will be exchangeable i:mm.ediately within UK.USA. 

(9) will be placed . ..._ _______________ ___. 

in COMINT channels as soon as possible and will be classified on the same 

basis as corresponding UI<IJSA material. 

Inclosure 5 with 

USCIB 29.18/8 

NSA Farm 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 TOP SECRET FROTII 
.J 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

T'W S~JAli:'P. i!RQ'f'H Y, 8 , 15¥f!l0 OfH:iY 

( 10) Arro.nr:cments will be made for the ro.t:i.id. . elec 1:.i.·:i.cal 

transmission o and other vi ta.1 ·· .. i nf'ormation and 

materials to UK and US COMINT processing center and field units as reqt\lred. 

(11) No changes in Appendix P to the UKUSA a.greement\will 

be required a.s a resul.t of the implementation of the above policies a.ud objectives •. 

b. That the UK will be the UKUSA channel for 

subject to successful outcome of their 

~negotiations. 

c. That, if UK negotiations do not result, within a reasonable 

length of time, in the establishment of a. sto.ble relationship sufficient to 

fulfill. the objectives set forth in a above, UKUSA policy towar~ lshould 

be mutually re-exanti.ned with.a view to determining whether a new approach is 

required. 

3. Other arrangements. 

a. The US should accept the offer of the Director of\ 

materials or information will not be offered by the US. 

b. COMINT information obtained under this arrangement will be 

made available to the UK under th~ provisions of Appendix G to the UICUSA agreement. 

c. In carrying out this arrangement, every effort will be made 

to avoid disrupting the achievement by the UK of a COMINT arrangement as set 

forth in paragraph 2 above. 

Inclosure 5 with 4 

USCIB 29.18/8 

NSAForm78~C10S 1Jul52 'TOP SECRET FROTII 
! 

'!Eo 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TeP OEeM'f F'RB'fft - tt. B. E~ Olf.LY 

III. f. Recommendations on I .... ___ _, 

It is recormnended that: 

l. The Board approve the following U. s. COM!:NT policy 

objectives with ret:Jpect to I .... __ ___, 

a. The objectives of U.S. policy with respect to 

.__ __ ..... I a~e = 

( 1) To insure c~mtintied receipt ot COMIN'!' products 

enow available. 

(2) To dive:l:'t the/intercept! efforts of tho to 

those tasks whose performance by them is of maximum present and potential 

ad.vantage to UKUSA. 

( 3) To expand th~ .... --___,~f.f'ort 1 if necessary, to 

cover targets not otherwise accessible to UKUSA. 

(4) To ina.intain COMINT relations with theLJin 

a state which will pennit of ready eXpansion if desired.. 

2. ·That the U./S. position for the London conference be: 

a. That, /in order to meet UR.USA COMINT requirements which 

can be partially satisfied by maintaining cordial COMINT relations with 

.___ __ .... land by improving I .... __________ __.I against certs.in 

targets not otherwise available to UKUSA, it may be necessary to feed 

back to the 0/a limited qua.nti ty o:rl I pertinent to the 

tasks on which they are or may be engaged. In implementation of this 

recommendation, it is understood that: 

f» 

Inclosure 'lwith 

USCIB 29.18/8 

NSA Farm 781-ClOS 

24 
! 

7

'fi:o 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

( 1) COMINT ma~eriai provided will il:t \%1<) case exceed 

the limits o:r l .... ____ ..... ~/~d will μot include I · l~ 

(2) No s'peci:f:!c type o:f material wilj.\ be released 

. without the prior agreem~nt of' the Director, NSA. 

(3)/ Specific security assurances will be obtained 

from the Dwith regard to each type of .material releas.ed to\ theLJ 

(4) All will 

be exchangeable within.UKUSA. 

(5) ,___ ___ _.._ _ ___.! ptov:f.ded to I .... __ ___,Jwtll. not 

need to be sanitized. 

(6) ,___ _ _...__ ___________ yf.11 be 

classified on the SSJJ!.e basis as corresponding UKUSA material and will 

be placed in COMINT channels as soon as possible. 

b. That the present UKUSA. channels for 

...._ ____________ ____, are desirable end should be continued, i.e., 

that the U .K. will be the channel i'or receipt of' drop copies of all.. 

L / f and that the U. S. will. be the. 

/ ~e1 tor rec)'(~ ot r,--------------------..... 1 

c. That, should it become apparent in the future that 

th~ lare developing poter.tiali ties for intercepting addi t1onal 

unique material., the situation Will be mutuall.y received by the u. s • 

and the U. K. 

Inclos~e l with 

USCIB 29.18/8 

• 
.. 

~ . . .. ·' . ' 

'tained, 

.. T<>I SHe~4PR~TII / EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

Y. S. S¥£l6 6Nfll'. . PL 86-36/50 USC 

a, That the present UKUSAD~rra.."lgements 

subject to the understending that: 

be main3605 

(1) Should it become necessary, in order to fulfill 

the objectives stated in la above, specific information and assistance, 

not to exceed I 1, may be released to the \D 

subject to agreement by the Director, NSA, and the Director, GCHQ. 

• 

(2) It may at that time become necessary to renegotiate the us~ lagreement within the limitations outlined 

above. 

~ l~closure J with 

USCIB 29 .l.8/8 

NSA Farm 781-ClOS 1 Jul 52 'FOP SEERET FR6TII