REF ID:A60944 

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ARMED F'ORCES SECURITY AGENCY 

~F-249 37/51/TOP8EC/AFSA=l4 

Copy No. ~Ji-~ 

Flrtom g AFSA-14 

Tog o u -I 

This document contains intormation 

affecting the national defense ot 

the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, 

u.s.c., Seotions ?93 and 794. Xhe 

transmission or the revelation ot 

its contents in any manner to an 

unauthorized person ia proh1bit.•t 

by iaw,. 

_.-D P.ublle law 5t3,. m. Congress second session-1 

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.. REF ID:A60944 

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DF-249 37/51/TOPSEC/AFSA-14 

!PEAS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ATLANTIC .INTERCEPT SERVICE 

1. Attached is an Armed Forces Security Agency translation 

of a paper by Dr. Wilh~lm FLICKE entitled. 11Gedanken iibef die 

Errichtun.g eHnas atlan'U:Schen Horchdienstes". In and out of' 

uniform the author spent some 30 years in the former Garman 

intercept service and after he had been appointed official 

historian of OKW/Chi by General FELLGIEBEL hao an exceptional 

opportunity to become ramiliar with.virtually all as~ects of ~he work. The story of how ASA finally contacted Flieke is 

interesting; in®ofar as the translator has been able to piece it 

together it is as follows~ 

2. .After the war Flicke composed two books which were intanoed 

prtmal'ily to open the eyes of tha Garman people t·o thing25 not 

commonly knowno Be had already arranged for publication of tha 

one, antitleo "Dia Rota Kapelle" - a fictionali~ed account of one 

of the.major Soviet spy rings, and hao completed the manuscript 

of the second, !1Krisgsgehe1mn1sse im Aether" {War S~crete in the 

Ether), when he met an American officer who became interestea in 

the latter and wished to bring the manuscript home to arrange fo~ 

publication here. Just before tbe officer was to return, he waa 

killao in anaecioant. The 11Historical Section" want ov&r his pap9rs 

ano discovered the Flicka manuscript. It was sent to this country I . . ad wa~ eventually purchssed by this government. It has not yet 

haen published. 

3 o Dr. Flicka was contacted th1 .. ough CI.A ano enterad into 

a contract for the sale of "War Secrets in the Ether" and for 

homework over a period of two years. The papers submitted on 

topics suggested by ASA and AFSA have been translated and 15auad 

in the :OF Se'K'ias. Ultimately the period was extended ana it wss ~uring this extension that the present paper was praparad. It 

appears to merit careful study. 

T~enalataa~ RoWuPo 

June 1951 l0ist1:-ibution~ Normal. 

2 

35 Copies 

75 pages 

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I!., 

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REF ID:A60944 

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CONTENTS 

Present and futurs importance of tha intercept service~ 

Strong and weak points of the intercept service in the 

past and the lessons o be drawn thereform. 

Danger of splitting up the intercept service and the 

Necessity for centralizaa control. 

On the danger of cumbersomeness of the intercept service 

and the necessity for a fast working organ1~ation. 

Focal points of the' intercept c·omm1tment of the future. 

Paga 

5 

10 

12 

13 

V',, On the strategic,, .opel'ational and taetica..l intarcept service •

14 

VI. 

VIII. 

IX. 

Safeguar~ing ths intercept service against espionage, . sa.botsga ·am~ ~·fifth columnf:>". . 

Drawing those· countries which ~o not at present belong to 

the Atlantic Pact into tha framework of a universal western 

intercept ae·rvice. 

The "achievement prineiple, 11 , competition and rivalry in 

the intercept service. 

The intercept Bervice eno militarism. 

The role of c:x'yptanalysis and t.he organ1~st1on of this 

service. 

Contact with the 01•gan1zat1on of one 2 s own radio sar.vice 

and one'$ own cryptographic service~ 

Training, regulations, aida. 

17 

21 

23 

27 

31 

34 

36 

XIII.., The possibility of monitoring short wave and its scientific 3,r 

clarification. 

XIVo Tha diplomatic 1nte~cept sarvice end 1ts·organizat1on. 40 

xv., The· monitoring of foreign facsimile transmissions ano of' 43 camouflage~ rao1o telepbone traffic. 

XV!a The monitoring of foreign internal traffic. ~.!t 

XV!Ia The monitoring of' foreign radio press eno similar traffic. !15 

XVII!o Tha tasks of radio ~efense in peace sno in war~ 

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~:....·" ·rtrr · 
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CONTEN'r~ I 

XIX o The intercept service of the atrat.egic air force. 

XX. The army intercept service and its organization. 

XXI. The navy intercept service and its organization. 

XXIIo The broadcast intercept se7vice and its organization. 

Page 

52 

54 

59 

63 

XXIIl. "Deceptive games" ( raoio ~eeeption). 65 

XXIVo O~ganization of tha central control office of the entire 6

Atlantic 7 Intercept Service. 

XXVo Evaluation. 

XXVI o The Polar- intercept ~fru•v1ce. 

XXVIl~ "Ra.Clio warfare" anc the intercept service. 

XXVllio On tha b•ilcling up of the Atlantic Intercept Service and 

Germany 0 s contribution ther.eto. 

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I6 THE PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPCRTANCE OF THE. lNTERCEPT SERVICE 

STRONG AND WEAK POllfrS OF THE mTERCEPT SERVICE IN 

THE PllST AND LESSONS TO BE DRAWN THEREFRC& · 

"The past provides the lessons tor the present and the futureo" This 

is especially true of the intercept service. It is lm.possible to organize 

an ef.f"ective service of, this kind today without taking into account the 

experiences of the past two deeadeso Nor can one reereate simply by taking 

over into the present the organization of the pasto During and since the 

last war things ha'iTe happened which ouggest important changes in organization and call for shifts of emphasis. 

The basis of these reflections is the assumption that the countries of 

northern, southern., and ~~stern Europe, along. with those or th! J\.merica~ and 

various areas or Africa and the Near East, constitute a comnnm.ity ot interests 

and of action, and opposed to it i..'l the aeth~ stands the entire complex of 

countries and areas under the leadership of Moscow; i.n this connection it 

doas not matter whether individual count1~ies of the waste:rn group are a.t 

this moment members of the Atlantic Pact or are still outside ito Precisely· 

those countria:s which have not yet joined the Atlantic. Pact will have to 

play an important role in the intercept service or the future o 

Both in . the First and Second World War the intercept service had an 

importance which must not ba underestimatedo The f'act that since i945 

many new inventions have been ma.de in the field of communicati0n tecbniques 

should not mislead anyone into believing that now and in the future there 

will not be a wide field open to the intercept service and that its value 

will be less than in the past .. 

The intercept service is of value not merely in time of war~ it is 

always of value, even in times of p1"0t'ound peace.. It is of special valus 

then because it lays the foundation ror its work in case or war and supplies 

information mich will be of the utmost v.alue if· war comeso Between the two 

wor1d wera the German i'ntercept s srvice aueceedGd in gatting surprisingly 

·good insight into the military structure or alloost ali:--tlle countries of 

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. -

E'l.ll"ope o If it had been cont:intied against the East in 1945 # the Western 

World would not face as mar\V' riddles as it does today. The gap will be 

hard to close,, to be sure,, but it can be closed if one does not d.elay 

too long in building up the organizationo 

Wherein lay :in the past the strength of the intercept service and 

wherein ley its weakness? 

For the answer to this questionPI am taking the practical example of 

those European countries which had the oldest and best intercept services 

Germany, France# England and Italy o The strength of the intercept service 

of' these countries rested on long experience .and tradition, and also on 

the fact that these countries nlaintained a smoothzy functioning intercept 

service in the period between tr.a World \'larso 

The weakness lay in the fact that frequently one clug too tenaeiouslf 

to tradition and was hesitant and Vf$l"Y slow in accepting innova.tionso 

Consequently the intercept service was always limping along behind the play 

in the a.ether. Today this dange1• is greater than ever before.., 

A second weakness or the intercept service of the old school was due 

to the fact that the amount of traffic passing through the aethe:r was 

. : . e.oneiderably greater than the best intercept service or any count17 could 

· .. mcmitoro Hence a strictly systemtic:J complete control or the aet.her was 

no longer possibleo It was necessary to limit oneself to certain focal 

p0ints. a.ni this left the way free for tha enentr in many a.rea.e .. 

The probability that this will be repeated is very great today o For 

this reason it is necessary to make a radical bra~ with an old tradition:J 

namely :w.tth the .tradition of the "National Intercept Service"o 

Let us take ·the present situation in Western Europe: it makes :i.t 

neeoasaJ."y (or would make it necessary) for each individual country to 

maintain an organization of its own for all provinces of the intercept 

:service (army, navy$ air force, international traffic» radio. agents, 

radio broadcasts,, etco) o That would mean that even in peacetime each 

country would have to occupy thousands of persons in the intercept service 

without being certain that all traffic was really coveredo No countey' 

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TOf• SEGRE~ 

can do this (merely far financial reasons) o 

The intercept service" however., is on:cy- of va1ue if it is carried. on 

on a large scale so that no radio traffic can escape it in the long run,, 

so £ar as this is humanly possible., If this condition cannot be fulfilled11 

it is batter to dispense wlth it entirelyo 

Dispensing with it., however, moans that the most valuable intelligence 

matei.•ia.l is ignoredo 

There is only ~'?. way out of this dilemma: the West European (or Atlantic) 

1.ntercept Service must be organized on the basis of a supsr-stateo The 

closest conceivable collaboration of all the Western col.ll'!.tries must be so 

thoroughly organized that the ii."!tegrated effort will be just as much a matter 

of' course as if it were the intergrated effort of a single cou.ntcy., 

Such a combination of the inter-cept services of a numbe--.e of countries / 

would result in two notewo~thy advantages: 

l,.. P..n enormous saving or trained personnel:Jt equipment and money; 

2o An inar0ased utilization of the various experiences of the 

individual countries in spacial branches of the intercept service o . . 

For in the course of time almost r!lVery country ha.a been able to gather 

especially valuable experience in certain fields or the interoopt service; 

Garmany in regard to the radio traffic or foreign armies and in regard to 

radio defense, EP..gland in the field of the tiaval i'ntercept service, the 

United States in the construction of cryptana]Jrtic machines, etco 

If' in the future each country concantioa.tas its ef f'ort, 1dthin the 

frainewn•k of a collective progl"am,, on specific areas of the intercept 

service, then tar more can be accomplished tha.ll. with the present systemo 

In this matter the gi-0S.teat resistance is to be expected on the 

part or tha English o For this reason the Engli.'3h must be grai1ted a certain 

independence within the framework of the Atlantic Inte1"cept Organization 

without upsetting ·the principle of tmiversal. collaboration. In this 

matter it would be well to take into account the_ specific advantages or 

the country, eogo by moving to England tha control of the entire Atlantic 

n.:ival intercept service and the West European @entral c1•yptanalytie otficeo * c;;:;Jl::B:rt:>e , .. :C-::t!CZOK3 • J :=•wa~::z ~ ............ bcz. ii»WWW•-JoS -- ••NP.WWW * For Naval. systems., 

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!n these two fields tha English have shown remarkable achievementso By 

sending a number or outstand:ing German0 !trench and Italian specialists in 

naval intercept service and cryptanalysia; to England, a first class central 

office for these two branches of the work could be created in England ai&d 

this should be in the closest possible caitact with the main center 

{son:ewhere in France~ probabiy in the Paris ·area) o 

The organization of a unified intercept service of the nations of the 

westwn. bloc would be nmch simpler under present day conditions and much 

clearer than was the organization of' the "national." intercept services 

before and during World War II. The f'ormer German intercept service, for 

instance~ had to work on practically all the countries of Europe o. The 

French intercept service. was directed not merely against Germany, but 

likewise against Italy, Spain, England and Belgium., '!'his complication 

drops out toda.yJ there is only 2!!!, target. at which all efforts are aimed" 

This condition results in a great simplification and saving and makes it 

possible to devote oneself with gi-eater emphasis to the monitoring of all. 

important radio traffico The difficulty resulting from the different 

languages and spacial interests of the several countries is not so gr•eat 

aa to be insuperablso 

These reflections show that the problem of creating a truly effective 

intercept service for the countries or the Wllstem bloc is b;r no means 

incapable or solution despite the multiplicity of tasks and the terril'ic 

:increase in radio traffic; it is not even difficulto It merely calls far 

clear decisions suited to the situationo In this respect the adherence 

to old national traditions must be set aside radically o 

The aari.ouaneas of the present situation,, which can hardly be expected 

to improve in the f'orseeabla future~ permits or no half' maasurea, not e-.ren 

in tbs field of the intercept ser-vi.ca.. An intercept service which is 

defective and inadequate in its orgai-iization could do ma-e harm than goodc 

Either the readiness of the Western Hemisphere to defend itself is to be 

serious:cy a.~swned, in \'fhich case the intercept service must be developed 

as quickly arid comprehens:hely as possible bacaus~ it requires no little 

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warming up tine before it can work at full capacity• or else the entire 

rear.mament Of the i:rest will continue to be mereq on paper, in which case 

it will be well to dispense with an intercept service altogether o 

There :ls already abundant work for the intercept servioe! the air is 

teeming with traf'fic which can be interceptedo However,, an intercept 

service cannot be organized O'lernight; many months are required before it 

can fu.'lction properl3o In this respect one must not indulge in filusionso 

In case of need an infantryman can be trained in six weeks, but a good 

intercept operator cannot, to say nothing of evaluators or cryptanalystso 

In this respect the Russians have a great head start. It is a question 

ot overtaking them as quickly aa possibleo 

Whan the Garman Reichswehr was set up attcr the and oj~ the First World 

~\Tar, General von Seeckt dsclarad: 11 It is more important to reestablish the 

intercept service than to fight to be allowed another infantry regimenta" 

This statement ie still valid today" 

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IIo THE DAt'GER OF SPLITrING UP THE INTERCEPT SERVICE 

AND THE NECE.9SITY FOR CENTRALIZED CONTROL 

There is one other point in past experience which ought never to 

reappear in the future; that is the splitting up of the several bx•anches 

of' the intercept service wi.th all its sorry consequences. It, too, . resulted from the maintenanea of old traditional developr.ents. For 

ifl.stance 11 in Germaey > international diplomatic traffic was monitored, 

copied, decrypted and e~·aluated by three perfectly parallel intercept 

organizations: 

CKW1 

the Foreign Office,, 

the Forschungeamt (Goering9s Research Bureau.)o 

Theoretic~" therefore, every diplomatic radiogram was worked on by three 

organizations. That entail.ad a wastage of intercept operators, cryptanal.ysts,, 

apparatus, administration, paper, etc .. , which might have been reduced by one= 

half with doubled ef£iciencyo 

Within the armed forces the Air rorce maintained an intercept service 

of its own1doing work \mich the Arnrs' intercept service could have done 

without difficulty o Hundreds or operators and instruments could have been 

sparedo It was just the saJm story for radio agents, broadcasts and in 

other field.so 

All this not merely resulted in a splitting up and wasting of energies 

but also in marked distu.rbances in the supply of information to tha top 

co!lliland. An unwholesome rivalry between the individual organizations led 

not to an increase in the total output but to intrigues and sometimes to 

mutual. sabotageo Each out~t rejoiced o~ in the defeats of the others, 

never in ~he successes. In other countries the story was the sameo It is v ? 

, 

still the case in England to~o 

The lessons to be drawn from this are that in the future the entire 

field or the intercept service must be directed and cocrdinated by a single 

central control officeo Moreover this results :in worthwhile potential 

savings and in a rational utilization or qualified personnel and materialo 

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I 

I 

\ 

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Despite the ll'llltiplicity of tasks, the organization as a whole must be kept 

as simple &&d clear cut as possible, only then can rnaxiJwm performance be =-= 

achievedo 

If' it was said above that a concentration of' the entire intercept service 

in a comioon central office is absolutely necessary:> this must not be taken to = 

mean -- that this central o£f'ice must. become overorganized with too m;my 

ramificationso For instance, it \'iould be no:nsense to direct an· intercepted 

message of purely tactical content through channels to the centra1 office 

and from there through channels to the troep unit concerned.. The central 

office need not be very largs; its principfl task is not the performance of 

a multitude 0£ detailed jobs but the coordination or the work or all the 

subordinate formations or stations of the intercept serviceo or course the 

central office must be able to issue binding orders~ 

This laat mentioned factor needs to be emphasized eapecial.ly o Shortly 

before the outbreak of World War ll an experiment VJith a central. office of 

tho intercept service in Germany was tried; tl» cryptologic agency ot <l'W 

{C!GV/Chi) was to have been this main centero When the organization was set 

up, however. it turmd out that CKW/Chi had no power to issue orders but 

merely had the right to express wishes and recommendations o Naturally 

nobody whatsoever pa.id any attention to these "wishes and reeommendationa"o 

In the final analysis there \Vas now one more or~anization but no a.cuta.1. --------- central of'ficeo The original intention had been totally missedo 

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II!o 00 THE DANGER OF CUMBERSOMENESS OF THE INTERCEPr SERVICE 

AND THE NECESSITY FOR A FAST ~':ORKING ORGANIZATIOO 

P..nother thing which was likewise learned from experience of the last 

war was that almost all the for.mer organizations of the intercept sei""Vice 

were cumbersome arid therefore worked too slowly. It must be admit tad that 

~ form of the intEl!'cept se-.evice concealed a certain cwnbersomeness; 

that lies in the nature or the case. The copying of radiograms, their 

treatment by the cr;yptanalysts and evaluators, the forwarding of the 

infornatio.n obtained to one• s om control station and from there to the 

troop command called for t:l.ma o B'J.t these time losses inherent in the 

nature of the \)\')rk can be much reduced by technical and organizational. 

measureso A good teleprinter netJt which connects all stations of the 

intercept service with one another, is abaolutely necessary, likewise a 

radio net, of its CTHD for the transmission of short cipl1er signals to the 

intercept units committed. 

Within the intercept organization the v.ork time 1m1at be so regulatad 

that every avoidable loss of time is actually avoidado Thus there were 

within tha framework 0£ the German intercept sei-vice some stations where 

every !'mteroepted message was entered with its number in long lists which 

were then transfen•ed to reoaipt books and only forwarded against receipto 

There were tirnes at tl1e intercept control station or am (Army) when the 

purely formal proaedura took so much time when large .masses of traffic 

came in that the radiograms often did. not reach the cryptanalytic experts 

for many hours, sometimes not for dayao 

The principle of speed must be developed until it becomes the self'~ 

evident motto of the entire intercept service and this must be done -

without hal'rassing tbs individual workero By periodically r-epeated 

conversations / orientation lectures and courses, the prjnciple of speedT 

reporting (by rational organization) wst ba so instilled .into each 

imividnal that it becomes an a1l pervading concept o 

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7 

D 
TO ~F ~~ :)\qq9A~ r ~EL'KE 

~--

' 

. IV. FOCAL Pon~s OF THE INTl!.'RCEPT CCUMITMENT IN THE FUTURE 

The intercept service must consider the tollowing tacts: a war in the 

future will dif'.f'er very materially from the wars ot the past() There are no 

longer any national wars ?.ihere the enemy only stood on the other side of 

the front line and on this side 0£ the front there was a unified comnmnity o 

The Second World War has already given us a foretaste of the future. The 

i'ronts no longer run solely along the frontiers 01· battle lines but this 

way and that through the populations o:f all the countries of the earth, 

through their souls and through their ideologies o 

The war of the presGllt and the future shifts its focal point to the 

inner fronto The intercept service must also take account. of this facto 

The work of the nfi.:rth colunns" and "Roten Kapellen" * will ass'IJ1l8 

gigantic forms 1n the .futureo The best Army organization and troop 

leadership shr:inks in value when the "Roten Kapellen" carry on their 

treacherous activity in the rear day after dayo 

A realization of this tkct forees one to the.decision to transfer the 

focal point or the intercept seridce in part from the actual front to the 

rear area in order to combat the activity of the radio acenta a.s quickly and 

effectively as possible., This can be done the more easily since the in:t.ercept 

service at the front has lost soma of its value anyway in view of the great 

mobility of modern warfareo 

While in the First \lbrld 'Vlar!I and to some degree in the Second i'brld War 

also, the focal pomt or the intercept service lay in obtaining tactical and· 

2E,erational; i,nf ormation, in the future it ,must shift on the one hand to 

~j°:F,!;tegic ini'orma.tion and on the other to combatting titdio a8~nts and 

Eartisan radi~o 

* 11Dic Rote. Kapelle" ~Red ~h7stra. ?r ·band_) is the i~ ~iven by ~o Germans tO the Soviet spy ring wir,h groups ·in Berlin.o lea. 1936 to 

1942) • Bruasela:7 Paris (cao 191+0 to 1942) and several other cit:i.eso 

Too other major spy ring, which operated in Switzerland,"' was called 

the "Rote Drei" (Red Three) because of its three radio stationso 

Fairly complete information on the activities of the two rings is 

found in TICOM publications DF 116 AH 232, 2.36 and two books by 

Fllcke: "War Secrets in the Aether" f unpublished) and "Die Rote 

Kapelle 11 (a "novel" published in 1949). 

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Vo ON THE STRATEGIC, CPEP..ATION.AL AND TACTICAL INTERCEPT SERVICE 

Just as warfare as a whole is subcJ.ivided ir)to strategic, operational. 

and tactical, so, tootJ is the intercept serviceo 

The intereept service came into being during World War I which was 

f'ought m the main as a war of' positiono The fighting was 1:1.mited to 

single skirmishes 0 battles in a limited area and a. few o.f'fensiveso The 

military radio traffic ref'lectcd this and of necessity forced the intercept 

sarvic@ to follow the same directionso 

S:lnea one was. anxiously endeavoring to maintain one gs own positions, the 

observation of the opposing enenw became the principal goal. ot the intercept 

servieoo Corwequently the results o:f this observation la7 predominantly in 

a purely tactical field., rarely in that of operational v1artarao A strategic 

intercept service was not maintained in Germarw at all and of the other 

countries only England had any aucho 

This reputation o:r the interc~pt service as a means or getting tactical, 

or at most operational.,iritellieence clung to it for a long ti.me and did not 

even disappear during World War IIo In Germany they YJere happy if they 

solved a few Russian divisional ciphers used to encipher tactical radio 

trs..t'fico Ch the other hand the illumination of the enemy's rear by the 

aid of the intercept aervice went bac!G1ardo 

Today in the 1':est we do not need an intercept service which makes it 

possibl.e to conduct skirmishes and small operations successfully~ but an 

intercept service which will contribute to winning the wara And that is 

primarily a ~x;ateg1& intercept serviceo 

A modem war will not be decided solely by operational successes of \. / 

an army but rather by all the mobiliz.ed forces of a country or or a group 

of countrieso The intercopt service must· take this fact into considei"ationo 

At the beginning of Wol"ld r!ar II an attempt in this direction was 

made in Germanyo B-at · thia ·attempt proved abortivao There wore two reasons: 

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lo The two intercept stations or (l(W/Chi had the assignment Of 

copying primarily diplomatic messageso A secondary group was 

occupied \Vith the interception of foreign press reports o But 

diplomatic and press radiograms form only a portion of that 

vast complex of radio transm.i.asions which must be covered to gain 

strategic j.ntelligencs o 

2o The second reason was even more importanto It was due to en 

organizational er:roro The decrypted massages were translated 

faithfully in full and forwarded to a fev1 (very few~ only three 

or :f'om.•) offices.. Often there were more than 100 a dayo Now 

6ven the most competent and industrious officer of the general 

staff does not have time, al.ong with his other work, to read 

a hundred radiograms ( somo of them .filling several typeviritten 

pages) every day and t.o digeat them, no matter how willing he 

may beo Uoreuvel.'" the results of all the otmr branches 0£ the 

intercept service and too reports from other sources or 

intelligence were also coming mo 

Moreover every recipient or these VNQ a ( "VerlAssliche 

Na.chrichten" "" reliable ini'ormatian, as these daciphered 

radiograms were called) was in constant dread and terror I 

because the security regu..l.at.ions were not hand.led rationally 

but in a purely literal mannero 

The only proper course would have been to hav e all deceypted 

radiograms pass through an "evaluation group" where they could be 

<ti.gasted and put out two or three times a day :in short, snappy fl 

clear form aa B'l.lll1In8rieso J.nstead, important messages 'l'.<ere given 

in full while the very great number of ''unimportant" messages 

were simply dropped under the table o 

These "unimportant" messages were those vmose content• taken 

individu~0 offered no extensive in.formationo But that does not 

mean that in connection with other messages they might not have 

yielded very valuable informationo Chly a systematic evaluation 

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.. 

would have been in a position to close the gapo This step was not 

taken and ao approximately two-thirds or 311 the decrypted messages 

went into the waste basket unusedo 

1.n s. modern war all movements are executed with far greater speed than 

formerlyo The intercept service must adjust itself to this facto To some 

extent this can be done by stepping up the apeed of' the •·iorko However a 

limit. is soon reached; the work must never. become a mad race; nothing is 

more dangerous than when those engaged in the intercept service begin to 

get nervous; they must work with perfect composureo 

But how is one to overcome this discrepancy? Well, it is quite 

. simpleo By extending the ear of the intercept service i"arther into the 

enemy0 s rear area. and picking up radio traffic oi" all kinds which is passed 

back thereo 

Nowadays no one would think of spot ting the approach or enemy planes 

by acoustic a.ids,; that was all. right back in 1918., Tod~ 2J times the 

distance is bridged by radar devices and this wins time for countermeasureso 

It is necessary to work in simi 1 ar fashion in the field or the intercept 

serviceo No intercept r_esulta of a tactical na.tureJt no matter how interesting,, 

are of any avail to me if, due to the swift progioess of tha action:> I am 

unable to carry out countermeasures. It is not the task or the intercept 

service to play the role of an historical reporter,· rather it is to inform 

ita own com.rnand '.n time regarding the enemy situation so that countermeasures 

can he takeno And it mus.t gain sufficiently deep insight into the &2ner4, 

situation on the enemy side in order t~t the strategic plans or its own 

side may be formulated correspondinglyo 

CYoviously m a worldwide conr"'l.ict, situa&ions oan arise which bring the 

tactical intercept service into the foreground. in this or that theatero 

However, this will not be the rule, but more or less the exceptiono 

I would sum up by saying that in my opinion the pr:ine.ipaJL target or 

intercept monitoring should be all etrat~rill;y important.t'.['af.f'ic of the 

enemyi7 vhich does not mean that the copying of operatienil traffic need. be 

neglectedo 

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\ 
REF ID:A60944 

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VI o SAFEGUARDING THE INr.ERCEPT SERVICE FR<Jl 

ESPIONAGE:> SABOTAGE and "FIFTH COLUMNS" 

It would be like sticking oneo e head in the sand, if one were to 

assert with conviction that oneus ovm. organization was proof against all 

attacks or the foreign intelligencs service and against penetration by 

a.gents or the "Fiflih Column" after a one-time check of the personnel has 

been ms.deo It should be clear to everyone that in the .future Jloscol.YBs 

agents will not spare a single West. European or Atlan1iic agency or 

organization of any importanceo And it is absolutely certain that a 

western :intercept service will present a particularly attractive 

target for ~astern agents m.erelt because of the large number or people 

engaged in important positions thereino 

From the period of the Second World ilar we have a long series of 

caes whe1 .. e the foreign lntelligence service succeeded in penetrating 

the eystem of the German intercept service and working there.. That wil;L 

be the case much more :frequently and significantly in the future. The 

principal. aim or the foreign intelligence service will be to ascertain 

which of its traffic links we are monitoring successfully and ldl.ich 

cryptographic systems are being resd.o · 

We must regard this <Bnger as !."'Sal and take steps to mset it in 

advance. The National Socialist regime in Germaey clearly recognized 

this da.ngcSl. .. in all its manifestations (resistant:$ -~,,e~nt~· agent and 

espiOM@S service, fifth coJ.umns, etc.) and endeavored to take counter= 

measures. This was done in accoL'dance with the principle or the. well 

known 11Filhre1 .. bafehJ. Nro 1" (Hitleres Order Nr., l) which provided that 

each person should be informed only insofar as is neceosa:ey for his 

spscii'ic task .. T!i..a.t is to say, the question was decided according to . . 

tho principle of the _Russian espionage service VJhere the le~ hand must 

never know mi.at. the right hand is doing. 

(Kie might ba inclined to regard this system as good and purposeful, 

especially since one must proceed on the assumption that there are and 

will be in one o s own ranks many people who are ideologically on the side 

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J 
But Hitlera a 11FIJ.h.rarbef'ehl Nro 111 had ti'X> defeats which converted its 

usefulness into the eontrary o ln the application of the princi.ple of 

this order to the intercept service these two defects appeared a.a foL1..ows: 

la A painfully axact adhe1•ene0 to the crder led to an anxious 

closing off or each office of each field of endeavor from every 

othero The result was an (o.f'ten unconscious) duplication of 

effort and even an an't%."1fJn tstic effort t•1hich lett. open a wide 

front fOi:' the ei'forta ot foreign spies. That could have bean 

avoided had there been at that time a central agency for the 

conduct of the entire intercept service such as has been mentioned 

several times. It would have then been possible to ca.r:ey out 

the irp!').nciple of min:bna.t orientat.ion" without harmful consequencesa 

Since this coordinating agency was lacking, those serious conditions 

aroseo This defect ca.n there.tore be eliminated by the creating of' 

a coordinating central agency o 

2o The second defect was more seriouso With the mere order that no 

parson should know more than is necessary for his or her specific 

task the matter ia not settled; one must avoid tha possibility 

that a person come into a position \·.1here ha knows much and 

consequently betrays much. And precisely in this point the 

greatest mistakes were marl.ea Che example wlll illustrate this: 

OKW issued "priority lists" from tima to time to its intercept 

stations. These were lists 't'~hich v;ere handed to ever.v operator and 

were not even regarded as particularly secreto J.n them were listed 

in alphabetic sequence those messa.·:;as. (arranged according to the 

addresses) which were to be copied with priority I_, II or IIIo 

gaimudaijin toldo II 

amtorg III 

American messages with the indicators 

ntopyk" and "ni!Jwjll ~to be copiedi et.ca 

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REF ID:A60944 

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All messages in ey-stems which were currently read stood under 

Pi"iority Ie Priority II comprised systems which were being worked 

on and where success seemed likely o Priority Ill indicated systems 

on which work had not been begun or where no success was in sighto 

0£ course it did not take an intercept operator long to find this 

out. Consequently, without a single one of them ever coming into 

contact with the cryptanalytic group or being told anything about 

the matter. hundreds or operators knew which systeme had been 

solvedo 

Thia is only g!!!, example; dozens could be given showing how 

the basic idea of security was violated by thoughtless regulationso 

This must be prevented in the f'u.tureo And it can be done 

in the following wa.y: at the central office or the ~aited 

i.ntercopt service there rust be a small working group whose duty 

it ia to protect the entire intercept organization aga.5.nst 

foreign infiltration, to maintain surveillanae and control and to 

seal off the entire operation of the intercept service with an 

A further example: CKW passed on the decrypted diplomatic messases 

with the exact wording and with a statement of the sender and receivez-o 

am and (]{Ji ttsually did the same thing. That is wrongi For it betrays 

at once which aryptographic systems have been solved., It would be much 

more correct to v..iork aver all. the information obtained from a number or 

messages into a short sumnary v1hel"e the text would give no clue to the 

cryptologic sourceso 

'l'oda.y we face the terrifying fact that the nRote Kapelle 11 spans 

t\estern Europe and in particular Wsstem Germany with a denser network 

than during ~'lorld War IIo At that time only a few locally limited groups 

were involvedo Today we £ind old aqq,ue:t,r\1:,1¥,!.C~ of the war days in the 

editorial rooms~ press agencies,, administrative positions" in the univer-=-

sitiee~ in the broadcasting studios and everywhere where it is possible to 

obtain information and exert influenceo Their connections with one 

~other are excellento The network cavers all Western Europeo 

I 

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Where once there were hundreds there are thousands to~ o How . 

·&ranendous their :tnrl.uenee is is shown by countless m.sst German 

neit'Spe.pe1~s which do not tr,y to reflect the opinion of the people but 

to shape opinion and to do so from the point of view ot the Easto 

or course there is no radio traffic with Moscow today o But the 

ideologicaJ. attitude of f'or.ma1• dais remains and it is not difficult to 

imagine what these people are really up to and han things will be in 

the event of waro 

In every labor service company the ColliDUnist Party has a. confident:i.aJ.. 

agento let us look at an example of how this is done: 

In a Nuremberg LabOT Service Company a. young man tro.m Lauf is 

admittedo His father is a Doctor of Engineering and a member of 

the Board or Works~ ioe .. tha boy comes from a very good i"ar.ailyr. 

A few weeks later he has a ttfriand" ~ a simp1e wood :worker from . Laur,, who "happens" to be a Communist fWlctionaeyo Every i'leek 

when the young man comes hane the tvJo 11friendsn sit together 

until late at night chattingo About what? = 

It ie very impcrtant that in setting up inte1"Cept stations /1 D/F 

stations and tha like in the future the security factor be consideredo 

The stations must always be in the vicinity of army 01 .. police quarters 

so that they mny ba protected against aabotageQ 

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Vllo DRAWING THOOE COUNTRIES t'HICH 00 NOT AT PRESENT BELONG TO THE ATLANTIC 

PACT INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNIT.ED WF.sTER?l INTERCEPT SERVICE 

There are a number of countries vihich fo1• various reasons have not 

joined the Atlantic Paet aa yet and perhaps will not do soo From the 

standpo1.nt of the organization of an effective intercept se1"'11'ice, however, 

these countries must not be left out of accounto 

The German intercept service had dra~m into its organizational net a 

number of European countries long before the outbreak of World War II., 

Acco:rding to the situation this was done in a. more ore less officlaJ. VJay'o 

'.fnere t>Jas very close collaboration with Au.stria,, Hungary, and Finl.and• 

a.:nd at times also 1dth Ltthua..niao Later this was extended to include 

Italy and in 1940 to include Roumania and Bulgarll\o In Spai.'1 an· intercept 

organization had been set up which mis tolerated by the Franco .Government 

and there was al&o coll.aboration with Japan. 

Today ths situation is changedo But there a.re severa1 countries which 

for geogi"aphic reasons (and hence for reasons or intercept technique) must 

not be igμoredo Anxmg them~~ is of' prime importance. From Sweden the 

entire Baltic area C81l "be covered by intercept facilities bet tei ... than from 

an.J' other territory~ 

I do not know to wha"t; extent intercept. work is carried on there o · Shortly 

e.ftar World War II a representative of the Swedish General Staf'f approached 

me and manifested great :inlarest in queatior.s of the organization and 

technique of the intercept SGr"Jiceo li'l."Om that I conclude that people in 

Sweden were at least playing with the idea of setting up or perfecting this 

aerviceo ~ ·think I can a.ssum9 that this. country will not be av·ersa to the 

* idea of joining the ~'.~est European intercept network .. 

In the case of. Stt~tzerland things are somewhat differerr'~.. A purely 

military intercept service would he of little value here. There would also 

be no s peeial advanta.ges in the D/F fieldo On the other hand this country 

is of outatanding im,_oortance for the sur•vail.lanc.e of agents (radio de:f ense) o 

'I Since the appoititment"'Of~·ordeneralNi.i.s &"iadiund as Coniiiand"ervand 

Chief of the Swedish forces the pi•ospects for includine Si'faden in the 

unified system of t ha Atlantic intercept service have increased materially o 

Swedlund tal{es a very positive attitude with regard to collaboration with 

the West11 

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Switzerland will be in the future,, as in the past" a major scene or agent 

activity. During :

1

:orld War II steps were taken toward the organization or 

a Swiss radio defense but these steps came very late and were inadequate o 

Meanwhile the importance or this service has been clearly recognized there 

and the Swiss have begun organizing a central radio defense., Its incorporation in the complex of the Atlantic radio defense appears urgently indica.tedo 

At least collaboration on communication techniques would be of great valueo 

The Swiss D/F net should be supplemented by that of the French,, Germans, 

Austrians and Ita.lianBo 

· /Lustria, on the other hand, with its old intercept station in Graz 

would have to be attached organizationally to the West European intercept 

net and hence also to the D/F neto The incorporation of Austria appears 

important because there are in Austria a number or excellent cr,yptan~sts 

whose aid shouJ.d not be dispensed witho 

The incorporation of Yugoslavia appears important~ to be sure~ but will 

not be practicable until some later time o That Yugoslavia attaches great 

importance to the intercept se~~ice is clear from the fact that this country 

is endeavoring to recruit e:xperienced cryptanalystso 

The inclusion of Gre~e and l'J:lrkez should result in the first phase of 

the organization ot the Atlantic intercept serviceo Turkey in part.icular 

could very well serve to eJtpand the intercept and D/F base o 

§pain am !!_ortugC!l. would play no role from the standpoint of the purely 

military intercept service but could_, like· Switzerland, be of great importanee 

for radio defense .. 

Winning CflfffE' all these countries to the idea of collaboration in the 

intercept service will call for much sldll and tact and nrust be m accordance 

with a comprehensive plan.. Here one could very well make use of old tieso 

The interest or these countries might b3 secured if one not only a~ked 

contributions from them but supplied them wit.h materia1 fr9m the mass of 

infoi"mation raaching the certural office of the ·western intercept service 

and worked on the basis of honest cooperationo 

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1 
VIll. THE ACHIEVEMENT PRINCIPLE~ COMPETITION 

AND RIVALRY Il! TB& llfl'ERCEPr SI!l?VICE 

A co1111"6ctly operated intercept service can provide its O\m corrmand 

with information regarding the opponent which will be of inestimable value,; 

the service is especially wall organi~ed and conducted \'lhen the entire 

personnel performs its duties with joy and interest, because in this service 

one is especially dependent on the honest good=will of the operators i_q 

partieul& .. o 

One can compare the intercept service to the work ot a spider; it builds 

its v1eb and must then wait patiently and attentive:cy. to see 'li'ltlat wlll becolll3 

entangled in ito tlaturally there is no possibility of influencing the enefiG" 

to induce hii.11 to tranSillit many and valuable messageso 

HoUG'\l'er by paying strict attention,, by expanding and taking good care 

of the mb it has built· the spider can contribute toward assuring 't.hat as 

much as possible is caught therein. 

It is J.ikB that in the intercept serviceo The interest and zeal of 

the intercspt operators mu.st be arouaed and ltept alivea However here we 

encounter a reaf on which the antire structure of the intercept service 

may easily come to grief o With an excessive spl.D.'ring on of the intercept 

operators, with the introduction of the Stakha.nov principla~ * conditions 

may arise which will undennina all confidence in the reliability or the 

intercept. serviceo 

This observation ia not offered here as something purely theoretical 

and academies instead it is based on bitter experiences t-Jithin the German 

intercept service.It particularly during the course of the last waro I 

should like to :U.lu.strate by a few exampleao 

First o.f all we have the "Laut' Case" o ** Here the nan who functioned 

aa military head was a reserve officer who in private life was a paper 

*'1Trans'iatOrtiS.'note: .. An se'f'"ficlencyfdea similar to-tha Taylor system:'] 

** See DF=ll6 

This j.s by all means tho most interesting cas0 of sabotage in an intercept 

organization of which we have a:ny recordo In addition to the "doctoring" 

of messages nentioned here there waa also tampering with associated 

equi pnento · 

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ma.tmfacturero At the intercept station which had .to intercept diploma.tie 

traffic he introduced gl"adually an achievement principle 0 · vilich •1as ver.r 

similar to the StakhanO\T system o! the Russiaru:Jo He rorced the operators 

to increase their perfol'Wmce constantly and deme.nded that ea.ch of them 

should intercept a definite minimum number of messa&"Sa during the montho 

This number was very high and was constantly increased. If it was not 

atta~.ned by ·t;ha operators, they were threateood with trans.fer to the front; 

if it was exceeded~ then leave and other favors were grantedo 

This system worked very well for a time, namely until the maximum 

achievement had real.:cy been reached. But it could be f'o:resmn that some 

day there would be a aarioue breakdown, ·and it happenedo In order to 

••:impl"OVllJ" thei!' pe1~f'omance record0 a number o:f operators began falsifying 

intercepts o They would copy any messages whatsoever which had aoma out= 

ward s:lmile.rity·to those vt:ich they were supposed to intercept but 

actually belonged to that group ot mssages which were not capable of 

solution and hence were net to be copied:> eogo Russian dipl.anatic messages<> 

Then they would paste the 11heading" of a "genuine" American or English 

measarse on the tape and would thus have improved. the "performance" by 

one message; or one and ·t.he same message muld b3 copied by three or .four 

.. ~eeeivera and provided with different address head~.ngs, etco 

These swindles assumed auch an extent that every month hundreds or 

such false telegrams were .for--tmarded to Berlin \mere they caused horrible 

confusion in th:! CI'YPtall..alytie ssctiono 

There was a similar case on the 1/leste.rn front, this was the "Sehustal" 

Case" concerning T!hich a special report. will followo It extended over a 

full yearo To put it briefly, the casa was _as follows: at one of too 

intercept stations in the west tba ambition of the personnel had been 

tmduly stimulated.o This led an operator named Schuster to hit on the 

idea of distinguishing himself., He concocted too "radio net of the 

i:· 

English co1111nan~intel..Ugence unit rr. (called ·t.he FAV""flet) which ext.ended 

from London via Dublin.; Belfast, Lsice3ter, Rejkjarlk to Murma.nskt1 and 

at intervals turned in fake tele~... .Al.though during the entire year 
he was the only man who 11heard and copied" traffic on this net, this 

did not attract anyone's attention. 0:1 the contrary, Schuster was 

regarded as an outstanding intercept operator and received one commands.= 

tion after anothero When he was unmasked, it was a terrible scandal and 

consequently the case was·killed by absolute sileneao 

Simn a.r episodes appeared on the F.astern Front o Sucp swindles can 

also be continued for a time because an inmediate cheek is difficulto 

They are always the r eault of speed=up msthodso For instance there was 

i'or 7ea.ra a bitter rivalry between the two intercept stations of CKW 

(Iaut and Treuenbraitzen)o Each or these stations was eager to be the 

better,, ioeo to intercept more messages than the othero The result waa 

that more and more links were intercepted which did not need to bs 

intercepted either because the system could not be broken or the 

content was unimportazrt... Thus the output of one of these stations 

.munted to ~ 3000 .messages a mcnth:J of which 85% were sent to the 

incinerator by t..'1.e cr.vpf;anal.ytic section am the evaluation section 

in Berlino "This enormous amount of' paper greatly hindered normal 

operations in the central offiaeo , Such evils resulting .from sheer human vanity must be radically 

suppressed in the fut'W."eo One must incline rather to the principle 

used by the J.:lnglish Secret Service when committing its agents: "Onl;v' 

report wh3l\YOU have something to report.; if' you have noth:ing to report 

f'or two years$ report nothmgi 11 

The German intercept service both be.fore and during \\brld War II 

was always under pressure :llla.smuch as more was demanded or it than cou1d 

be performeda 

Instead of seeking the cause in their om work in cases ltiere the 

reeults fell behind expectations and recognizing that somethmg was 

wrong in the organization and that the man in question or the unit :in 

quasticn might be bette:i• employed in some other fashion, those responsible 

took tha nm.ch easier course of forcing "better par:Cormnce" by censure I 

or other drastic measureso This alvuqs restilted in d$Csption of minor- or 

major extento 

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The following example will show how stupidly people somstimee acted 

in this r11.a.tte:>1 

After tha German .intercept service had won respect by the successful monitoring of foreign trattie,, people in' Germany set out to app:cywha.t had been learned to our own radio operation.so Thay tried to shape 

these so that all the mistakes made by foreign armies in their t.raf'fic 

·would be avoided· and that our own radio system should be so maintained 

that the intercept companies employed at maneuvers and exercises would 

hardly get any usef'u.1 resultso 

That Vf-as a V<!!ll.'Y' sensible and correct measureo But the reverse 

side ~t the medal appeared a.t once: since the inte1•cept co~es 

achieved only slight results when IOOnitoring our own maneuvers,, people 

declared that the entire intercept service was virtually superfluous 

since it was not able to fulfill. its assignments; or else they 

declared that the intercept companies engaged were incompetent o 

Naturally no company comma.ndar and no intercept operator or 

evaluator wanted to let such a rating stick" Consequently there 

began at once a chain of swii1dles which involved obtaining details 

regarding the troe situation on the other si~ by iooans or friendly 

connections and thus "improvi.ngrt the results o:t the monitoringo 

Such deception and self deception naturally results in a very dangerous 

demoralization and can shake the entire intercept service to its very foundations and brirlg it into discredit o ems of the most serious tasks of the 

' future will be to el:tminate these dangers and to emphasize ·i:.he clarification 

of such p1~oblelll5 during train.inge In the intercept service there is so ereat 

an opportunity to strive for good performance that there should be no l"OOm 

left for such manipulationo 

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.. 

IXo THE INTERCEPT SERVICE AND MILrrARISM 

• People often talk a lot about German militarism. and condemn it 

without having a clear idea in the:lr own minds as to ita essence; by 

no means did this consist in unconditional obedience and the precise 

f'ulf:i..llment of duty o Really it was expressed in an entirely different 

way, and precisely within the framewoJ. .. k 0£ the German intercept servioa 

thia "militaristic" spirit had an especially baneful ef'fecto 

There ia i:robably hardly any other branch in a defense organization 

which is as delicate and sensitive as the intercept serviceo Here it is 

impossible to operate with snappy commands and their ·strie~ execution., 

one is absolutely dependent upon the :intelligence and good w:i.ll of all 

cone em ed., 

Those "concerned" do not belong to this service for a brief time but 

fw a rather long ( somtimes for a. very long) period and therefore develop 

into s~cia.liatso In most eases they remain constantly at their special 

place of work which, according to Germ.an concepts, generally rules out any 

regular prcm.otiono As a result the Gel'!llB.n intercept service employed 

persona in the .following cat,egoriest 

Wlitary: 

Civilians: 

Active officers, 

Supplementary o!ficers6 (so-called Ea-Offizier!) 

Non=conmissioned officers and men~ 

0.f f"ic:ials of' tha higher grades, 

Senior officials, 

Plain officials of the medium grades 1 

Employees of all grades. 

To a certain de~ee each of' these groups represented a casteo But whil.e 

there was among the officials and employees a certain sense of belonging 

together, this was usually entirely wanting on the part of officers and 

supplementary officers in r eapect to the other categories o Of' course 

there were exceptions., 

But since the officers changed every l to 3 yaars and new ones 

(unacquainted v.d.th the work) e~ in as section haad.B,, there were tensions 

which aBsumsd an especially serious form when-a man who had formerl;r uorkad 

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\ 
TO~F~:#A9UT r ~EGKCI 

.under an e.mplo;yae or orricial in a totally subordinate position suddenl.3' 

appeared as the superior offiaer by virtue of his military promotion and 

then acted in a presumptuous and domineering fashion~ Thus it happened 

that many competent specialists (employees and officials) with outstanding 

experience in their f'ield would apand 10 years, 15 years or longer at. their 

work and have to put up with seeing a changing throng of young.11 totally 

inexperienced of'fieere placed over them and having to carey out orders and 

suggestions which were frequently senselesso And all this because according 

to German militaristic concepts the head or a section or an agency 

absolute],y had to ba an of"ticero • = • 

Such a system, which often led to curious and even catastrophic 

situations, had a deiressing and embittering af'f'eet on the real expertao 

It killed their joy in their mrk and produced a feeling or reaignat ion 

and pasaivit70 But since passivity is the v-o1•st :form of sabotage (because 

it can rarely be proven), the German intercept service sickened to the cora 

under these conditions which permitted any young lieutenant to become the 

semi=divine sup<3rior of old e~erienced specialists .. 

~ If an intercept service of the :future is to be a living instrumentality,, 

hea.ltl\y ii1 all its members. then this "militarism" must be completely 

eradicated; that this is possible is proven by the conditions in tho American 

A:rlJI3' where the "civilian" does not represent an futia:rior being in contrast 

to the o.fi'icer but can have the same authority and an equally respacted. 

position .. 

One cannot ta.~e this problem of "militarism i11 the intercept service" 

too aeriouslyo It is one or the most essential factors which m..l(e necessary 

the creation of a western intercept service on a supar=state ba.sis4 If 

it were to be resurrected in Germany in its old :form:> it is absolutsly 

certain that all those earlier phewmna would reappaaro This is clea!'ly 

recognized by the former spec:ialistso 'It a nsw i:l!:torcspt aerviee were to 

be orga.'lized again on a purely national basis within the r:ramwork of an 

independent. German military force, the former intercept operators9 cipher 

clarks0 and evaluators = who have to contend with economic difficulties 

28 

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I' ,.. 

at present ... would report in goodly numberso But of the really good old 

experts hardly a one would s.ppoari 

I would lil:B to support this statement with ohort. quotations from a 

large numbt31" or letters which I ha vs received recently: 

n". o o,, I will never work again under t.he COil1lland of our dear former 

aupsriors ot whom I have very unpleasant. meLlorieso" 

"o o o o,, I should prefer to continue in rrq present calling and shape 

the remainder of my lire according to nry mm ideas,,n 

"o.oo oo I can~t possibly take orders f'rom people who are stupid and. 

arrogant, from those chaps who are steep0d in their traditionso" 

" ... .., o DonOt ever let those morusters cross my pa.th againi 11 

11 o o. o '! I hopa I may never have anything to do in t.he future with such 

Sh"° : it really should be possible in the future to throw out such lb " 

17 ,, o •• o In our work in the future only psople or real ability can be 

the leaderso" 

no ••• o It must never again happen that the experienced sxpart fi:rst 

has to train the head of his unit in order to ha va him over hlm giving 

0 o,o•o Rotten, thoroughly rottE>D was the entire intercept set<=Up du.a 

to the introduction of such aoo leaders .. " 

". o... If these '!Leaders" are to reappear on the stage, than = 

without mei6" 

etc. etco etc. 

These eJCPresaions muat not. be misunderatoodi they are not directed against 

a purely milita17 concept but against its exaggeration. In no other rear 

area service is the puracy military concept ot soldiarlinaea so h:tghly 

j 

est~d as among the truo experts or the intercept service~ Only a man 

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I 
ti:"hose whole heart is in the wrk and who is thoroughly acquainted with 

military affairs appears suitable for the intercept serviceo 

There is also a serious danger that in· case of rearmament the intercept 

service ma.,v- beoome a catch basin for all sorts of characters who have onq-

~aim: to dodge military service at the front, but who have little interest 

in too intercept service and in the dafense of their countryo Therefore a 

careful sifting of tm entire personnel appears necessary; and just as 

necessa.?7 ia t'i'K! m.i.J.itary training of these peopleo I have observed that 

in all cases of treason., sabotage, and defeatism which occurred in the 

Ger.man intercept service~ not a single real soldier was involved; the bad 

aetors were without exception types which may be termed collectively 

ncrooked dogs"o The man :in the intercept service of the f'ut.ure must be 

just as ready at heart to fight with weapons as ~th his scientific and 

technical maans,; but he must enjoy the certainty that he will not be 

dGgraded and treated as an inferior by the militaryo 

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Xo THE ROLE OF CR!PTA:.~ALYSIS AWJ1 THE 

ORGA.~IZATION OF THIS SERVICE' 

Czrtp!:.s.."1.alysis is the hem-wt or any good intercept serviceo Special 

attsntio.n must be paid to its organization and its worko In Germany th.e 

impor-tance or the cryptanalytic service was recognized~ to be sm·e, but 

the most ratefl1.l mistakes were ma.de in its organizationo 

The first mistake was that it was decentralized and spJ..it up in a I .---

downright incomprehensible manner a There were cryptologic ag~ncies with~ 

CKVI (High Co1P..mand of the Amed Forces)~ 

CKH (High Conmand of the /r..rmy), 

OOl (High Command of the Navy)~ 

CKL (High Comna.nd of the Ail .. Foi~ce),, 

Foreign Office,, 

Farschungsamti (Research Bui"Gau under Goering), 

SD (Security Servica}~ 

Radio Defense o 

This called for an expenditure of personnel which was simply enormous; 

there were ca.sea whera one and the sa.m.0 cryptographic system i:ias worked 

on at the same time by 3 or 4 of£iceso 

Good eeyptana.1.ysts are rare arlli val.uable; one must employ them as 

retionally ae possible o In that wa;y personnel and time are saved and the 

work is exped~tedo 

The secorrl miatakca made in German.y was to isolate the crypt,analytic 

work .from the evaluation sectiono The cryptanalytic section led a detached 

existence a.'ld basked in the sunshine or its own glory o 

In any good organization there must be the closest possible co.l.laboration 

between cr-yptanalysis a."ld eva1uation. I will even go so tar as to say that 

crypt&'"lalysis represents a pa.rt and an awriliary organ of' evaluationo And 

that all decrypted messages must be passed to the evaluation section .to be 

worked over there in connection with other i .. esults of intercept worko 

How then is the cryptanalytic section of the Atlantm Intercept Service 

to be organized 1n the future? 

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For purely geographic reasons the problem is not a simple one to 

aolveo A careful checking of the circwnstances makes the following set-up 

' appear to be the most favorable: 

? 

1o The entire analytic decryption of a strategic and operationa1 

nature (excepting decrypt.ion o:t naval systems) should be co~ 

centrated at some point in the USA. The United States has the 

best 'l:.echnica1 means an«i cryptana:cytic devices o A number of 

good European eJ1P9rts on analytic decryption should be employed 

hereo 

2o The 'WOrldng group !or the decryption ot naval systems should be 

installed in England with experienced German, American$ French and 

Italian e:.xperts participating, because the best practical experience 

in this field is to be found there,. good cryptanaly~ic machines 

are available and one cannot count on Englandlls willingness to 

surren.der this field of \\:Ork to any other place in El.ll'Opeo A 

p&'a:ilel group should work in Australia, because this continent. 

will present a separate theater of war and very good and extensive 

analytic machineey is already available there o 

3o At the European headquarters of the Atlantic Union there should be 

a fa.il•ly large _worldng __ g~Q11P \'ihich would ca:r.ry out the current 

decqp..llpJ! of intercepted messages within the tram.owork or the 

central control station of the unified intercept service, using the 

ciphers solved by tha Am9rican analytic groupo This decrypting group 

should work in close contact with the evaluation groupo 

For this deer:mtin~'!R Garnan, English~ American and Italian 

experts should be engagedo 

4o To what extent a pai•allel decryption_w.,Y,g for strategic trai"f'ic 

should ba set up,, must be determined in Washingtono 

This arraitgement does to ba sui•e,. involve a certain spatial deeentraliza.= 

tion, but .f'or geographic reasons this cannot be avoided and lhOuld not 

opera~ional.ly signify any splitt.ing up and would avoid any duplication of 

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A rational emplo3DJ.ent of the cryptanalytic personnel would permit 

working on !;:1! cryptographic systems of tr..e enemy.. In World Viar II,, for 

instance, the personnel or the Garman naval unit ms quite inadequate to 

work on all. traffic intercepted.. At first only the major systems were 

wo1•ked on; when these became too di:f'f'icuU., one went over to the minor 

systems and diseoverGd that good information was to be .found in them .. 

In the futm•e ~ no system should re.main un:worked, if all the \wstern 

~ations make comm.on f~ont against the Easto 

The decryption of ~g!:,~~ message!, v.h.ere no. very complicated systen.lS 

m-e employed/) could be undertaken by the decrypting group of the @entra.l 

intercept ©ontrol $tation .. 

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XIo CONTACT :-;ITH THE ORGANIZA'.f!:)N OF oNEas OiVN RADIO 

SERVICE AND QNEOS ONN CRYPTOORAPHIC Sl'1f.VICE 

" 

The observation of foreign radio traffic is important not merely 

fr0i11 the standpo:int of gaining information regarding the opponent am 

com.batting his agentso No less valuable is the significance of a 

different aspect of this worko 

Obtaining inf'ormation regarding the enemy by the intercept service 

is to a great extent possible oitly because of mistakes made by the enemy, 

whether these be in radio operation, or in the type of transmissions, or 

in the use of cryptographic systems., These mistakes are made all the time, 

they are practically,uri..avoidable and represent a constant with which one 

must always reckono This can be calculated quite as exactly as the ever 

constant ratio between killed and v.ounded in a waro 

This "error=eonstant" forms not only a contjnuing source of joy tor 

all those engaged in the :intercept service, but it forms an equally great 

source or concern for those in charge of en.ass own mtercept servicao 

th~Te is a poil'lt ·of con ta.ct to which great a. ttention must be paido 

Here 

One of the most important tasks of the unified control of the :intercept 

service must be to keep clearly before the eyes or those controlling onen s 

01.m radio service all the m.istak~ made by the f:oreigq radio service, in ·~ 

order that from tl"..em may be drawn lesson.a for one! a awn radio service - and these lessons be applied in pPacticeo 

f:or this no large organization is requ:iredo Two or three experienced 

specialists on radio and ciphers W"lll suffice if they are constantly in 

contact with all the experts of the intercept service and with the analytic 

and evaluation woups and get their information from those sources., They 

must have enough authority to present their observations to the head of 

their own radio service in a way which will carry weighto Their contact with 

the office whieh exercises control over onaos own radio saririce must be 

aasuredo 

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Jn this connection everything~ iearned ~out a foreign !nterce5 

seNic..!, must be utilized. This ma.y be illustrated by an example: 

During World War II radio intercept detachments were. assigned 

to Germ.an speed boats and at ti.'JeS to subma"X"ines. Submarines were 

equipped. with direction finders for waves of nedium to high i'requeney 

range in order to monitol* the radiophone trafi'ie or convoys. It was 

even planned to use special D/F boats for locating comroys. In this 

way the submarina packs, which had been driven under water by radar 

and had lost contact with the convoy, could be informed of the convoy•s 

change of route (which was clearly recognized) by such D/F boatso 

The use c>t this means 0£ monitoring on a large scale was rejected by 

the Navy chiefs for reasons concerned with the internal organization. 

Hov;ever~ one can scarcely doubt that that the Rusaia.ris will make extensive 

use or this system. Such facts - once they have been established ... must 

be brought. to the attention or the head or the radio service of one's own 

navy. 

Another example: 

When German aviators flew to England during World War II the 

Allied convoys were warned; f'or instance, Dover sent out an ail" ala.rm 

over the naval radio and said two minutes later: 11Fighters are 

starting". That neant that there was a convoy in the Dcnrer region. 

Then the same report was sent with definite call signs to naval unite 

by another radio staticn which was not far a.way; in this W8!f the 

Germans could determine where the fighter units involved were stationedo 

Such observations by the intercept service mu~t also reach the head of 

one 1 s own radio service so that the proper deductions may be nnds jn r espoct 

to one's own radio operations. 

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Xllo. TRAilUNG, RIDULATIONS, AIDS 

That intercept service is best where the personnel is most thoroughly 

trainedo That sounds veey reasonable and obvious but, as experience ... 

not .mare]J in Germany but in all countries - teaches us, not enough heed 

has been given to this maxima 

After the First Wol'"ld War it was tul.ly 16 years bef'ore I was able to 

arrange for uniform and systematic training of the people employed in the 

German intercept service., And even then (especially during the war) the 

results were inadequate, due to lack of teachers o In part this had 

serious consequenceso. 

An intercept service or the future will only make sense and have value 

if it starts with a thorough training of the personnelo Consequently one 

or the first things which should be done on setting up a new or a unified 

Atlantic intercept service would be to establish a school for the intercept 

service which should give tm most thorough and comprehensive training 

possible for intercept operators, D/F operators~ evaluators, cryptanalysts 

and deaoderso 

At the head of thia school there should not be a career seeker but a 

man thoroughly familiar with everything in the .field of the intercept service, 

one who knows everythmg by experience o At his s :ide there should be a 

teaching staff recruited from practical workers or wida ex{Brienceo 

Since the Atlantic intercept service will have in its ranks members 

speaking different languages:i training will be somewhat more difficult; 

this can be overcome by setting up separate training courses in the severaJ. 

languageso. Q:i the other hand it is reconmended that all persons engaged 

in the intercept service be gi .. ren lmguistic training, in which case .... 

English and French would have to be considered as basic languageso 

Courses should be set up for: 

Intercept operators 

D/F operators 

Evaluators 

Cryptanalysts 

Decrypt.era 

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The school should be attached to the central control.station of the 

united Atlantic intercept a ervice and work closely with ail sections of 

this agencyo Everything which is learned ahould be brought to the attention 

of the teaching ataf!' of the schoolo 

It would also be a function of this school to work out i:~mJ.ation~ 

for handling the practical intercept work and to create essential aids 

- tor all branches of the service, such as: uniform forms, card files, 

call sign list.a and frequency lists, survey tables etco etc. 

Uniformity in all the basic materials used in the intercept service 

is an essential. prerequisite to auccesso 

37 

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TOP 

XIJ:Io THE POOSIBILITY OF JlONITOO.ING SHffiT WAVES 

AND THEIR ·scIENTIFIC CLARIFICATION 

The succees!ul monitoring or short wave stations ''as a serious 

problem for all branches or the German intercept service throughout 

World War II., Since the. propagation of short waves is. subject to 

different laws frm the propagation of medium a..'l.d long waves, and 

consequently the distance between the transmitter and receiver i:ermits 

no inference as to the possibility of hearing the transmission, endless 

chains ot difficulties resulted, the solution or which was generally 

sought on the basis of empirical knowledge, i...e., one made a series of 

attempts at reception until one fmally hit upon a point from 1.'ihich it 

was possible to hear the transmittero That often took monthso Tba 

following ~xample will illustrate the troblem: m:>nitoring or the 

Swedish transmitter for international tra.t'.f'ie in Karlsborg (in its 

transmissions to England• America. etc .. ) proved difficult in Garm.anyo 

After a number of experiioont,s inside Germany had proven unsuccessful,, 

one began new experiments in northern Denmark and finally groped c:meqs 

wa,y down the entire coast to Bordeaux. Here for the first tima a suitable 

spot was folllldo These experiments lasted far three monthso 

For the intercept service of the present and future this problem should 

be solved in an entirezy different. wtzy and tho1•oughl.y., The propagation of 

the di.f.ferent short waves .trom JmX chosen Se£t on the earth8-s surface 

should be clarified right awq as exactly as possible (by wave length, 

times of day and seasons) and so comprehensively that possibilities 0£ 

reception can be taken into account in the assignment or tasks and or 

waves to the intercept stationo Thia is ve17 import6".nt if one does not 

wish to rJ:.sk confusion in the intercept. servicea 

Due to the want of appropriate scientific data, conditions arose at 

·times in the German intercept service which were really chaotic o or course 

there were the so .. cal1ed {1'Rechliner Erkenntnissett) Rachlin data, 

38 

TOP SECRET 
TOP 

but at none of the Garman intercept, stations were these adapted to the 

spacifie requirements or the work., the tablee were stored in the safes 

without finding proper useo Hence out of an assignment plan set up 

regig1all..z, there developed through countless supplemental orders a 

complet~ new working assignment at the different stations §PCording_ ~2. 

wave le~JM1 but these assignments were so deficient in plan and so 

overlapping that no human being could .make sense out of themo 

Thi5 must be avoided in the .future111 Che of the :first tasks of the 

Atlantic intercept service should be the clarification and regulation of 

this queationo 

39 

TOP SECRET 
TOP 

XIV o THE DIPLCUATIC INTERCEP.l' SERVICE AND ITS ffiGANIZATION 

The diplomatic intercept service is the heart of tie strategic 

iiitercept. service, and since at present and in the future the latter UlWJt 

ho1d a dominant position, a carefu1, thorough=-going organization of this 

branch appears extremely important o 

Ita geographic position causes the block of the Atlantic states to 

be split into two parts by the Atlantic Ocean with the potentially stronger 

portion in America" For the present this cannot be changed essentiallyo 

Ch the other hand, the focal paint. of purely military warfare is in 

Western Europe as the situation stands a.t this manento 

\ 

This dual character or the strategic situation must automatically 

influence the strategic intercept service and hence the .monitoring or 

diplomatic traffic!) Therefore it is iμevitable that the practical. 

carrying out of diploma.tic intercept work shall also be dividedo However. 

this does not iooan that parallel work by two organizations is necessary; 

there can ba a coordination which will ~atisfy all demands for information 

and permit a. rational utilization of enwg o 

During World War. II> CKVl had foreign diplan.atie traffic monitoted by 

its two interoopt station.so From a practlcal point or view all the 

exchange o:f' diplomatic telegrams or all the countries of the earth was 

covered by these two stationso 

The present situation greatly simplifies the iroblem; the number or 

transmitters to te monitored is sharply reduce do Since the countries or 

the Eastern bloc. .. work on an inner line, as it were the diplomatic traffic 

or these countries will pass through the air only to a limited extent; the 

great ma.sa or telegrams will go by v1ireo Qii.y in traffic with diplomatic 

representatives in countries outside the Eastem bloc will extensive use 

be made of radio telegraphy,. 

i'.1hile the two intercept stations of CK\V employed approximately 300 

intercept operators and some 240 receivers, in future a maximum of 100 

operators with 00 to 90 receivers should prove adequate.; 

40 

TOP SECRET 
TOP 

The existence of the widely separated strategical areas or the 

Western bloc . will, of course~ make it necessary to set up one such 

intercept station in the United States and another in Europe o To this 

extent duplication or effort cannot be ent.irely avoided. 

In respact to the cipher slstems to be worked UB>l! a different 

solution would appear to be in. ordero The analyiie deceyit.ion might 

profitably be concentrated at some point in the USA; here the best 

crypt~lyats of the world ahould be engaged~ The systems which are 

solved would then pass to t1'l0 dec;eyption grouE,e 0£ which one should be 

in the USA and the other at the central intercept control station in 

Europea In this way the content of radiograms which can be decrypted 

would become known at the same time in the IBA and at the head.quarters 

in Western Europea 

In respect to personnel the size of the European decry.¢ion center 

could be kept ve1:'1f sma.lla It may be assumed that 20 to 35 decrypters 

would be able to handle the traffic coming m day by dayo 

Whether it will be possible to concentrate the European intercept 

station for diploma.tic traffic at one poil1t remains to be seeno Experience 

in Germany during World 'l."~ar II has shown that this was not possible, because 

many transmitters work \dth directional. antenna and therefore cannot be 

inturcepl:.ed at any given point. It might prove .necessary to move a nwnber 

of receivers with the necessary pe1•sonnel to some more favorable location 

as a secondary stationo Tm answer to this question can only be drawn from 

practical. experience, juat as happened in Germany. However> provisicn must 

be made for direct teleprinter connection to make possible current 

forwarding of intercepted nessages to the cryptan~ic groupe 

On the other hand the treatment of decrypted telegrams in the future 

must differ from the German practiceo It is a mistake to :pass on the 

complete ten of the decrypted mesaageso !)). ~53~ama which are 

decr;ypted.JMld_translateq_must go to the centra1 evaluation section and 

be checkeq,0th,£re .~t othe~resulta of intercept monitoring and then 

condonsed ~-reports of moderate langMio This need not cause · an.y 

41 

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....... ---------~----------------~------------

TOP 

appr~c:Jable dala\f o This sol.ution \10uld, however, result in a reduction 

of the risk of compromise and insure that the appropriate offices would 

actually re.--:id the material which was presented them in an easily 

comprehended tom and utilize it .for the conduct of the war o 

42 

TOP SECRET 
TOP 

XVo THE MctlTIORING OF FOOEIGN FACSIMILE TRANSMISSIONS I 

AND CF CAMOUFLAGED RADIO TELEPHONE TRAFFIC 

This also belongs to the fie~d of the strategic intercept service<i 

It may be assuUEd with certainty that the Soviet Union in its internal 

communica.tiona and in communications with its satellites will make 

extensive use or facsimile (possibly according to the American system 

1

'Ultrs.fax") and or distorted radio telephoey, in fact it is doing this 

already to s Oii)!) extent o 

The problem or intercepting these transmissions is a task for the 

technician,. That it can be solved was proven in Germany during World 

~Var IIo It will be well to tackle this group of problems promptly 1 

because experience has shown that the technical development or eervice-

.able devices for such monitoring calls .for a long period of time., 

Oi."ganizationally this section should be attached to the evaJ.uation 

section or the strategic intercept service where the materials once it 

has been translated and eval.uated, will. be worked up along with the 

results of the decipherment of diplomatic tra.ffica 

TOP SECRET 
TOP 

XVIo THE MWITORIMG OF FOREIGN INTERNAL TRAFFIC 

This includes such things as administrative radio traffic, indust:eial 

traffic, pol.ice trat.fic1 railway traffic, etco Monitoring these is a part 

of the complex of the strategic intercept se:rviceo 

ClnG might be inclined to turn over the monitoring of such traffic to 

the intercept stations for diploma.tic traffico However, this will prove 

im.p1~acticabJ.e because the range of the transmitters will hardly make them 

audible a.t the intercept center in Western Eul"opa o For this reason the 

best solution will probably· be to assign the copying of these tranamisaions 

to the intercept stations charged with monitoring foreign~ traf'fico 

It wil1 be necessary to get as close as possible to the enenw o Which 

points will be most suitable for monitoring such traffic must be learned 

by practical experienceo 

The evalua·&ion or the materia1 should be undertaken at the central 

evaluation section along with the results of the :rest of the strategic 

:intercept serv:tceo 

44 

TOP SECRET 
TOP 

XV'IIo THE MONITORING OF FffiEIGM RADIO PRESS AND SIMILAR TRAFFIC 

This monitoring field, which likewise belongs to the complex assign--

ment of the st1~ategtc intercept service, is so extensive that it calls tor 

special organizationo These transmissions should be intercepted by a 

special .intercept. station in the vicinity of the evaluation section .. 

The translation and a Erel:imina:ry evaluation should be nBde here o 

The subsequent treatment or this matGrial should differ greatly from 

tha German pre>cedure during the last war; this eonaisted in presenting 

the appropriate offices with a whole mountain of typewritten sheets every 

But nothing is so dangerous as vmen the member of the general staff 

charged with preparing the enerey- situation reports ia submerged in a 

flood of paper and drowns therein.. The beet information from the interce¢ 

service is wasted in this mannero 

The bits of information obtained by monitoring foreign radio press 

are in the ma.in quite ~teresting but are not ~pgrtant as intelligence. 

mater:lal. for strategic warfare. Their value lies in another direction: 

a.. Aa orientation material for the staff for "mchologiccμ ~~11 ir 

bo As supp.lenental material .for the gener~evalua.tio,n, 

Co As source of information for the er tan 

and expedite the task of :interpol.o:;at;;;.ii~o·n-o=~;;.;;;._,;~~~ 

The results of the preliminary evaluation nmst be dealt with and 

disseminated on the basis of this knowledgeo The results of monitoring 

foreign radio press can never be treated as in;dei::endent intelligence 

because the content is generally tendentiouao They can only be utilized 

* The term Archives as given here refers to the German collateral files 

used as cryptanalytic aidso A rather complete description of these 

files and how they were used is given in DF 204 entitled 11The Significance or the Archive ae .Aid to Cryptanal.ysis and a Source 

or Inf o:rmationo" 

TOP SECRET 
'FOP 

XVIIIo THE TASKS OF RADIO DEFENSE IN PEACE AND IN WAR 

It has already been stressed that in the future the struggle against 

agent transmitt~ and other illicit stations will be one 0£ the moat 

important. tasks or the intercept serviceo This statement Jllllst not be 

regarded lightl,;v; it is of very serious importancao 

One may be inclined to deny the necessity for a potent radio defense 

bef'ora the outbreak of hostilities because the transmissions of radio 

agents begins only with the outbreak of the war o This assumption is 

erroneous for the following reasons: 

ao The beginning of a war nowadays does not follow the rules which 

were formerly in .t'orce... The outbreak of the war today does not 

represent a sudden transition from a period of absolute peace 

into one or military action.. Between peace and war nowadays 

there is a series o:t transitional stages which hardly allow 

one to tell when peace stopped and war begano Thus one can 

hardly call the present situation a state of peaceo 

bo It is not ·true that the entire net of radio agents or the 

countries of the Eastern bloc is silent today arxl will begin 

operations only after the outbreak of waro This may ba true 

:for part of the stations... However, a large part or them is 

doubtless even now sending traffic .t'rom time to tirreo The 

experiences of the Russians in World War II have shol'i?l them 

how risky it is to rely on the fμnction:ing or a radio connection 

which has not been thoroughly established before the outbreak of 

war o No doubt traf"f'ic :ls now being sent only to a limited e.x'"...ent; 

it probably is limited to making contact and to short enciphered 

messages intended to train the operators in the use of cryptographic 

systems,. But one can hardly asawne that the agent transm~tte:;;os 

are absolute:cy- silent .. 

46 

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Co In Germany one discovered <furing World War II how f'atef'ul it is 

if the radio defense is organized too late and hence goes into 

action too late. It was a full year (after the beginning of the 

war) before the radio defense came into being; it was another 

year before the' first agent transmitters were seized; and it was 

still another year before the radio defense was so well organized 

and trained that one could speak of any planned combatting or the 

agent transmitterso By that time,, however,, Europe was teeming 

with such stations and the raids could no longer keep pace with 

the increase in their numberso 

d.. The :radio de.tense must be ready to go into action the instant war 

breaks out o That means two things: it must ha.ve been organized 

long :in advance and must have had opportunity to gather a considerable amount or practical experience o There is plenty of' opportunity 

for this; it is provided by the agent transmitters already at work. 

by the active transmitters or the "firth columns"• by the secret 

transmitters or the diplomatic and commercial missiona of the 

countries or the Eastern bloc0 by illicit propaganda transmitters 0 

by illegal amateur transmitters, etca Any tracking down or 

transmitters whose location is unknown within onews own country 

is an opportunity for trainingo ~he practice of raiding "planted" 

agent ttaansmitters,, the perfection or technical aids (D/F sets 

or every kind) and of encirclement methods,, the search for new 

methods of disguise and surprise =all this yields an extensive 

field of practice for the radio defense in time of peace .. 

The reaeona enumerated above show clearly that the creation or an organization for radio defense is not a problem which can be. put of .f' until the 

beginning of the war but is one which must be attacked along with the 

creation of the other branches of the intercept servicea 

Furthermore one must count ~m the probability that in the future 

radio agents will use ultra short wav~t; in fact there ·will probably be 

whole chains of intermediate stations employed (according to the character 

47 

TOP SECRET 
or the terl'>ain). na·t.ecting such stations will be a serious problemo 

Training lllUSt be conducted in good aeasono 

It is obvious that the 2rA<%11J.~a_i!!.2,n or the radio defense beto1"e the 

outbreak or war need not assune the extent which will be mdicated as 

host.ilities get under WCJ1'o It would be adequate to train a cadre which 

can be expanded later according to need. Nevertheless the area of 

Western Europe should be covered by a net of at least 12 to 15 fixed 

radio eurveillance stations with long range D/F; in addition there should 

be two or three motorized radio surveillance companies with the most 

modern equipnsnt o 

In this connection one can JJ¥ike use or the existing organizationso 

Thus Fra..YJ.Ce, tar instance,. baa six fixed stations in its "Police des 

Conrnunications RadiO=Electriquea" (P.C .. Ro). In the West German Federal . 

Republic there are 8 stations of the nFunktechniachen ZentraJ.amtso" 

(Central Radio Technical ~eau). Al.so in other cou..l'ltries there are 

other organizations of this character. But precisely these existing 

organizations show how necessary a unified_ c~n-~ral control iso 

How different the views are regarding the subordinat~on and 

assignment of duties is revealed by a brief glance at the situation now 

existing: 

In France the ttPoliae des Communications Radi<>=Electriques" is 

subordinate to the Jlinistcy £or the Interioro The 6 intercept stations 

watch both radio agents and diplcmatie traffico There is no connection 

with ** the Ministry of Wa.ro 

* Subordinate to the "FunktSciiiliSc'he.ri Zentral.amttt in Frankfurt/Main, 

Gal.las installa.ticn., is the Radio Surv~~~_!.J,t9_m: 

8 intercept stations in Vlestern Germany; ona of them in Mu..ttich_, 

Waisenhansstrasse 4 (in the former office for Research on Wave 

Propagation). 

Duties: 

'**Spotting infractions of the Atlantic City Convention and running 

down unlicensed transm.i.tters. At }:l"esent a D/F net is being 

developed using short wave D/F sets of the Navy (range lOm to lOOm.)o 

In the si:ring of 1951 one such long range D/F is to be set up outsido 

ot Munich. 

Illicit transmitters which are spotted are reported to the occupying 

powero 

** It ia interesting to note that this organization was created by the present 

Minister for far, Jules MOCH, when he was still Minister for the Interioro 

48 

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In West Germa..flt radio surveil:J.ance is subordinate to the Ministry of 

Posts" 

. In Czechoslovakia radio surveillance (diplomatic intercept servwe 

* and radio def'ense) is attached to the Ministey for Propa.gandao 

Any such variations in handlihg radio surveillance v;ould naturally 

have an adverse etfect on the rational and effective development or the 

service within the framework ot the Atlantic Uniono An endeavor should be 

made to achieve a uniform. subordination in all countrieso 

In the int"1'1lal organization or the center £or radio defense and in 

its methods there should be nurn.erous departures .from German practice 

during World War IIo Here the radio defense led a canpletely isolated 

existance as !ar as organization and work were concernedo There was 

virtually no collaboration with the other branches 0£ the intercept 

services of the other armed forceso This explains the senseless duplication or effort on the part ot radio defense and the army intercept service 

in r aspect to the partisan radio, etco Occasional collaboration with a 

crypt.analytic group of CKlV or with ortices of the Air Force Intercept 

Service etc a was always on the basis of pure1y personal relationso Far 

the rest, too Central 6ffice of Radio De.tensa in particular, which was 

tor med from personnel ceded by all branches of the armed forces, constituted 

a mob mich in its structure was· very similar to the twilight organization 

or the cowlte!"'>intelligence agency of Admiral CAN ARIS" There was no inner 

cohesion mateoevero Both individuals and work groups abut themselves otr 

f'rom one ai1othero 

During the course of three decades I have bean in rather close contact 

with practically. all uni.ta of the intercept service o The least agreeable 

impressions were those gathered at the central of'f'ice or the German radio 

defense!> 

b .. ¥4CSQA_ UC •r~ . . lll!!'IWSCW:W J • ., * The Center is located in Pragueo There are two main monitoring stations: 

in Prague and Bratislava; also nine outstations (one of them in Budweis) 

with long range D/F sets (Marconi Type D.F.G.26) o The complete technica1 

equipment was supplied by the British afl;er 19450 In 19Z7 the radio 

sunreiillance se?"V'ice in Czechoslovak~ numbered 225 persons,; this number 

has probably been greatly increased since theno 

49 

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I have nevei" been surprised at the fact that the successes of Ger.man 

Radio Defense were in no \nae in proportion to the activity of· the radio 

agents o The . designation "Rote Drei 11

11 and many others are characteristic 

of the eantraJ. office of radio defenseo On the other hand the work of the 

intercept stations (caJ.led 11Funkilberwachungsstellan"), companies, 

detachments etoo was uniforml.y good.o 

The radio def'ense 0£ the future must not be nade up of people detached 

from all sorts of stations and branches or the service but must be a 

homogeneous, closely knit organizationo 

en the other hand the radio def.'ense must not isolat..e itselfo It is 

necessary for it to woTk very closely: 

ao With the cr.rptan~;ic service, 

b. With the a.rnzy- intercept service, 

c. With the atarr for strategic and operational deceptive actiono 

RegardJng a): 'lhe cryptanalytic work of the German Radio Defense never 

assumed clear form; it consisted or a long series or emergency half csmeasureso 

It is necessary tha. t the radio defense or the future have available a good 

ceyptanalytic group, which will work within the framework of the crypt= 

analytic service of the strategic intercept service, or will work in close 

collaboration with it and with the cryptanalytic group of the army intercept 

serviceo To me a conmon C?Yptan.y.ztJ:c or,&anization for the strateg:t.£ 

~ercept servic~,, ¥&intercept service.1 a .. 11~ .. radio defense appaare most 

suitableo 

Regarding b): Cooperation with the army interceJt, service is requisite 

beca~se there are a great many points of contacto Merely the monitoring 

of partisan transmitters, Baku transmitters (bands and scout groups) am 

the like brings up the problem of collaborationo But even beyond that the 

interchange of :information is exceedingly valuableo The last phase of 

the war in the East ( Cbtober 1944 to April 1945) showed clearly how 

:intimately the operations of the field army are connected with the work 

of the radio agentso 

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TOP SECRET 
Regarding G): The entire matt.er or radio deception (radio g8JIJ3s~ agent playbacks) was handled by the Germans during ·world ·war II in a manner which 

revealed no ·system or organization.. Many suceessful 11radio games 11 were 

*' ·carried on ( '

1

North Pole Case", "Jakushov case" etc.). But ill atl these 

.cases the credit for success belonged exclusively to the individuals \mo 

carried out the deception. · 1n the futu1~e it will. be necessary to aet up 

a special working group for radio deception. (For ·details see the section 

"Radio Deceptionn). · The radio defenso must work in very close collaboration 

· w~th this group. 

c=a:c:====== 

In general it m.ust be admitted that the system of the German radio 

defense wae too cumbersq~o At the central office more time and energy 

was devotad to building up card files and lists and to the composition of 

annual) month.ly" ten day reports3 and special reports than to the actua.;t 

work. 'l:his typically German trend toward intemal over-organization should 

not reappear in the futur:e. 

The thing which must be gv..aranteed under all circumstancea is ·t;he 

·inclusion o.f the radio defense in the framework of the intercept service 

as a whole. This is essential not only for reasons of pe~sonnel and 

technical equ1i¥nent :s but aleo because the . work must be strictly coordinated 

with the work ot the other branches of the intercept service. 

*R_""'··rrrui8r&torf!i'-"ii"otei'"~p~545-"0r~ if?ie"i5gefieimllIS=;;"Im~A.0tii;rit;--

lll1pub1ished::t filed in AFSA-14. .. . 

51 

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XIX.o THE INTERCEPT Sm.VICE OF THE STRATEGIC AIR FORCE 

In Germany dom to the year 19.35 all radio traffic of foreign ah> 

forces was monitored by the same intercept service that monitored .the 

traffic of f'orei@'l arm.ieso The result vas unquestionably goodo With the 

creation of the German Air Force the -idea promptly arose of orgal1..izing 

a separate intercept service for the Air Foi .. ce o 

I protested strongly .against 4this at the time but without successo 

The Air Force set up its om fixed intercept station and several. intercept 

companies .. 

To mat extent my vie1Y had been right \'Ja.S shown during the course of 

the war. Almost all the intercept companies and intercept stations of the 

Air Force were either disbanded or assigned to Radio Defense., The results 

of the; intercept service of the Air Force were meagero It would have been 

quite possible for the intercept stations of the Army to cover this traffico 

I cannot judge with certainty what the situation iB today or whether 

a separate intercept service or the strategic Air Force i~ worth whiJ.eo 

From my experience in the last war I incline to the view that this :is not 

the caseo 

0.f course that does not mean that the ground and airtorne stations 

of the hostile air force are~ to be monitored. However, it is my 

viev1., that purezy in the f"ield of organization a new set,,.,up should be I 

introduced.o This \'fOuld appear somewhat as .follows: 

lo All traf'fic of the ground stations of. the forei~:- air force should 

be covered by the intercept stations which eaver army radio trat'fic 1 · 

or by speciaJ. intercept stations within the framework of the 

strategic int'!I'cept sarviCl!'Jo A special evaluation group vd.thin 

the general evaluation section should pass the information 

obtained to the command of one's own Air Fo:rceo 

2.. In areas where the roca1 point of the conduct or the war lies with 

t.he Air Force• (this would involve primarily the Polar region) a 

special intercept organization should be· set UPo For details see 

the section "T~ Pola.i.. Intercept Service" o 

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3o 'fha monitoring of the radio traffic of hostile flight formations 

(airborne radio) would be assigned to the working group ''Radio 

Warf'a.re" (see this section) o 'l'he reasons which I advance are as 

follows: The movement of £'light f'ormations of the Air Force is 

.carried out today at such great speed that the workin5 methods of 

a normal intercept service cannot keep pace on a purely time basiso 

The approach of air units is spotted much better by radar. and similar 

methods. However, the observation of the radio trai".fic of night. 

formations am or directed beams sent out at night for their guidance 

can be used as the basis £or quick jamming operations to disrupt_ the 

commands or these .formations, to prevent them from getting their 

orientation, or to direct them on some other couraeo This requires, 

however, an organization which would have to be attached to the chief 

ot the intercept service, to be sure~ but would have to work ratter · 

independently and with different neans and different method.so en 

this point air e:xperts should be consultedo 

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XXo T'"tlE ARMY INTERCEPr SERVICE AND TIS CRGANIZATION 

When we study the question or observing Russian ArI!fJ' radio stations 

through the intercept service and the system or intercept stations to be 

set up ror the purpose, we find ourselves confronting a situation which 

dif.fers very materially from that existing in Germany before the outbreak 

or \'brld War IIo At that time the German intercept. service had established 

along the borders of German territory a chain or nine· intercept stations by 

which the arnw radio or the adjacent countries could be watched very wello 

In the case ot Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, France, etco coverage was 

possibl.e down to the last etation, the last message diepatchedo 

But even then there were considerable dif!iculties in respect to the 

Soviet Union, dif£icu1ties which were due to the distance. F.o?J this reason 

one sought the collaboration of Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, and Hungary; 

the results or sueti cooperation varied greatl,yo At most the result made 

possible a coverage or f'.ixed stations and maneu'irer stations in the llilitary 

Districts o! Leningrad,, White Russia and the Ukraine and to a slight 

extent in the Military District or Moscowo 

BUt even here one could not speak or any well planned and comple'!:.!, 

coverage; orw was happy over every station heard and every messa3e copied 

but was quite aware that the traffic copied was only a .fraction or what 

was sento 

TCPC!ay the situation with resptct to the Soviet Union is far less 

.favorableo The ar'Ilf3' tra.ff'ic of the Soviet Union is protected .f'rom observation 

on the pa.rt o:t a foreign intercept. service by an uninterrupted chain ot 

insulating factorso Either there are ocean areas or satellite states,, I 

allied or strictly neutral states intervenin~o Ir one wishes to cover 

Russian Arll\V' traffic, one can at beat get within ~Okm ot the borders 

of the Soviet Uniono In view of the expanse ot Russian territory there 

may be distances running to thousands or ldl.O!lletersQ 

One might conclude that the situation is hopeless and that there is no 

sense in \'.fasting one•e strengt.h trying to cover Russian Army radio stationso 

54 

T.OP SECRET 
Such a deduction 'Wl>uld be false and would allow many opportunities to 

pass unusedo 

When it was said above that the army radio of the Soviet Union could be 

covered only inadequately by Germany down to 1939~ this "inadequately" 

signifies a relative concept; it was based on a comparison with Fbland, 

Czechoslovakia, France, etco A great deal was heard,, it was even possible 

to sone extent to pick up Russian army stations at the German intercept 

stations in Stuttgart and Mtlnster. There was merely no possibility of 

complete coverage. 

Such S,Q,mplete coverage is not possible today and will not be in the 

!utureo Therefore one must be content with partial. results o In this 

connection the question arises as to what goa.\ can be set for an Atlantic 

Intercept Servieo against the Soviet Uniono 

Any hope of obtaining a clear insight into the tota1 constitution of 

the Soviet army by intercept work must be abandoned in advanceo It will 

be necessary to limit the work to a carefulJ.y planned searching of the 

aether in order to cover those garrison stations which can be covered as 

matters stando 

The real purpoia.!, o:t monitoring Russian Army traffic appesrs tt> ma to be 

something quit~ different,. . It- is a question or gaining an exact insight into 

the ·operations and traffic systems or the Russian Army radio as it might 

appear in the field, ioeo of the traffic at maneuvers and exercises which is 

equivalent to the radio system in case of war o Here opportunities are present .. 

In the first place there is a possibility of observing all the radio 

traffic ot the Russian Arrrr:J' 1.lllits stationed in Eastern Germanyo As a result 

much could be accomplished, though by no means everyth:ingo 

So tar as I know, the A-rmy traffic or the satellite states in Europe 

will be handled according to the same systems as the Russian() But no 

matter whether this is always the case or not, the army traffic or all 

these countries must be monitored with painstaking e.xactnesso This can be 

done from Western ~many, Weatem Austria, Italy and Greeceo 

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TOP SECRET 
From the point or view· of intercept technique there are two other points 

of attack against the Soviet Union: from northern Turkey and from Swedeno V' 

Consequent:cy- one should endeavor by all means to establish a number of 

intercept stations in these two countries as quickly as possible,, or to 

incorporate the stations existing there now into the complex of the 

Atlantic !Utereept .serviceo 

Tho Still total of the inter-cept results to be achieved in this fashion 

would be auf'ficient to give adequate insight into the systems of a:rmy' radio 

in the Soviet Uniono 

The ?lest European intercept service r11Ust be pu.t in a position to make 

"contact in the aether" with the enenw as soon as hostilities break outo 

It must be so constituted that it can provide its own command with i.nforma= 

tion from the first day of the war ono This task might be solved in the 

following fashion: 

ao A chain of intercept stations extending from northem Sweden and 

northern Norwq through Denmark, West C'.ermany, Italy, Greece.11 and 

Turkey to the Persian border will provide by current coverage tor 

the production of the basic material required by the operational 

intercept service. 

b. A number o:r moterized intercept con;;:ianiea will receive this material 

currently and use it to train their own peraonnelo 

Che must count oo. the possibility that it \fill not be possible to hold the 

Elbe lir.ae and that the Russian armE s will overrun Western Germany o In order 

to inaure a seasoned intercept service~ it would therefore be necessary to 

motorize even the fixed intercept stations so that they could be withdrallll 

quickly behin,d the second defense line. 

If there were danger that all Western Europe would be occupied by the 

Russian armies, the above-mentioned chain of intercept stations would have to 

be split up, so to speak. The ncrthem half of the stations would then be 

reestablished on ·a lin~ from southern England via Norway to southern SY10den; 

while the southern halt would have to occupy positions along the coast of 

North Afr.ieao The intercept cooif.>B:llies would have to be distributed in like 

TOP 56 SECRET 
The building up ot an intercept service in the Near East appears to me 

especially im.portanto The fa.ct that the greatest oil fields of the world 

ai•e located there makes that area a focal point or strategyo Thus must 

necessarily be rerlected in the radio activity. Prompt recognition o:r Russian 

milita:cy preparations in the area between the Black Sea am the Caspian Sea 

and to the east of the Caspian Sea might be rendered possible by a well 

developed intercept serviceo 

For the momnt I regard the setting up of a taetica1 close range 

intercept service as superfluous; whether in case or war such a service 

would p.rove necessary, will depend entirely on the situation which then 

results a 

In a.iv case a central guidance of the entire army intercept ser·dce 

is indispensible., The central evaluation of the material resulting from 

the coverage is of the greatest importance., Ch the other hand care must be 

taken that the nearest military commands receive the incoming information 

in the speediest wq possibleo 

Russian (and other) army eryptograPiic systems should be worked on 

in the cryptanalytic section of the central ~tercept control stationJ 

difficult systems should .first be solved in Washington. the simpler ones. 

might be worked on hereo Cryptanalysts should be assigned to the intercept 

stations and intercept companies aceording to their needs and they should 

decrypt the trat'fic in the systems already solved" 

In organizing the army intercept service a number or factors must be 

taken into account which distinguish this branch or the intercept service 

from all otherso In the first Pl.ace it is the largest in respect to the 

number of tranamit t~rs to be covered. That makes definite demarxls on· the 

quality of the personnel provided,, in particular the evaluators o Furthermore 

the army intercept service occupies by virtue of its task a more exposed 

position and constantly faces two dangers: 

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First thera is always the possibility that the enemy will carry out 

dece11tive trai'f.!go . It is true that from· the ~riod of the Second World 

War no relatively extensive radio deception on the part or the Russians is 

known to me; however that does not mean that the Russians will not make use 

or such means in the rutureo 

Second there is the risk that the troop command will reject results ot 

the intercept service which are in contradiction to its own views and claim 

that they are decep!:iv;e even though they are correcto The head of 'the army 

intercept service must always be aware of these two dangers and see to it 

that the work of evaluation is exact in every case and that objectivity in 

the presentation or the eneIJ\V radio situation is absolutely assuredo 

During World War n the German intel"Cept compmies of the army were 

combined into battalions and regimentso I was convinced that this was a 

mistake; in this way the entire apparatus of the arzey intercept service 

beca.IOO too i--i.gid and cumbersome. The artay intercept service must be mobile; 

the simpler its organization,, the swifter its work.. No lofty pyramid of 

superior offices is to be erected on the base of' the intercept. companies; 

otherV1ise the !l"actica1 results of the work are stifledo 

~· ..... 

58 

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TeP RE[ ~ 

.. .n ~~Art \.J n::n I 

Xll o THE NAVY INTimCEPl' SERVICE AND ITS <EGANIZATION 

The naval intercept service (called "B-Dienst 11 in Germany) played an 

imparta.nt role in both' the First and Second World Warao This will be the 

case to no less a degree in the future o 

The geographical basis has changed and become roore simple since the 

end or World War II., Consequently the old organization ca.n only be retained 

in parto 

llhgland and GerptanY are the two countries which were able to gather 

the most experience i.ri the field of the naval intercept serviceo Sime in 

the .future Germany will be out of the picture as far as naval \varfa.re is 

concemed, England apI)ears to be the proper country to assume leadership 

in the naval intercept serviceo However, extensive use should be made ot 

the experience or the German "B=-Dienst11 o It seems all the mre natural to 

set up the control center of the Atlantic naval mtercept service in 

England since even the commander-in-chief or all American fleet units' 

in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean (6th U .. So Fleet) has his 

headquarters in Londono 

The activity of Russian naval forces (primarily submarines) will ba 

incomparably greater in a futura war than j.n the ~st~ It will concentratl!I 

primar~ on the interruption of convoy traffic between .Ansrica am Europa 

and in the Yediterraneano Hence, from the point or view of the intercept 

service, there are two main at!!,as ot_QQ..s~r~ation; the one includes the 

Baltic, the Kattegat and the Skagerrak, the North Sea and the Atlantic 

Ocean; the other embraces the Black Sea, the Aegean, the Adriatic and the 

Kediterraneano The intercapt service must be organized accordinglyo 

For the first area of observation (northwest sectot) the old British 

naval intercept organization should serve as a basiso It should be 

supplemented _by: 

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2 observatjon stations in Sweden 

2 II " " Denmark 

4-5 " " " Norway 

2 " fl " Germany 

1 II II tt Holland 

1 " 11 " Belgium 

2 " " " France 

2 tt fl n Northern Spain 

l " n 11 Portugal 

l n " " Island 

1 If fl " Spitzbergen 

2 n It " Greenland 

In settting up the intercept net tor the second area of observation (south 

sector) the following points must be considered: 

Alrea.d;y we .find the greatest concentration of warships of the western 

countries m the Mediterranaanl' to which in event of war the greatest 

strategic :importance will probably be attached as far as naval warfare 

is concerned. The main water artery ot Europe runs through the 

Mediterranean and f"orms the connection between the Atlantic and the Red 

Seao In the Mediterranean and especially in its eastern waters, an enemy, 

whose principal strength is on land but who has to wage naval warfare, will 

do everything in his power to strike a decisive blow hereo By occupying 

the Suez Canal he could threaten the oil fields in the Middle Easto 

Domination of the sea will play a greater role in the next war than 

aver before o And this is especially true of the Mediterrane&to Hence, 

when we set about organizing a naval intercept. service in this area we must 

not proceed in a miserly petty fashion; the intercept network to be set up 

here must be suited to tha importance of this theater of waro 

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~-------------~----~===================~ 

Fo1" the Mediterranean area or observation the following intercept and - A WU ·-~-----

D/F stations should be set up: 

2 in Greece 

1 on Crete 

5 to 6 in Italy (including Sicily and Sardinia) 

2 in France 

3 in Spain 

Eventual.41' severa1 stations should be set up along the north_cop.,,st ~t 

Africa insofar as cable connections With Europe are available o 

Ona must not be alarmed at the large number of intercept stations 

required; they are distributed over a ~r of countries and, in 

proportion to the countries participating, will not call for a heavy 

outlay of perso11nel, materiel,, and money I) It would also be advisable 

to keep the stre~h 0£ the stations west ot the line Cairo ... Kiel = 

North Cape relatively small before the outbreak or hostilities, 

and to detail the rest or the personnel for tr~ing purposes for tours 

or duty at the stations to the ~ of this line, because in peacetime 

Russian radio naval traffic can be n.-onitored more easily from there_o 

Corresponding to the divisions of the western naval :intercept. service 

into two areas of observation would be the organization of the control 

stationo The main control st~tion should be in Engl.ando For the southern 

area or observation a sub=control station should be set up in Southern 

ItaJ.y or on Jl~ta, which should have direct teli!printer connection with all 

intercept stations in the Mediterranean· area as well as with the m.ain 

control station in Londono Tho rna:ln crypt_aq~J1!!c. unit sh2~j..q_ ~--:1.:rl 

England with a subordinate cryptanalytic unit at the Mediterranean control 

stationo The London central offica should have teleprinter connection 

with the over=all control station or the Western European intercept s~rvice 

in France and supply the results or ·this monitorin~ both to its own admiralty 

staff and to the over=a.11 control station of the intercept serviceo 

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This organization is not as complicated as may appear at first glancca 

It results from the geograJiiic situation, however, and ·affords a guarantee 

that all Russian naval radio traffic that can be picked up will be .picked UPo 

The naval ship=borne intercept service merits a separate chaptero It 

can play a noteworthy part especially on subnarineso 

The German naval intercept service early recognized. the significance 

or this branch or the work and at various times equipped submarines with 

intercept detachments and D/F operatorso The results were goodo 

This branch or the Naval intercept service wil1 always be somewhat 

one sided, ioeo it will always be carried on by that country which is using 

its aubDarines to disrupt the convoy tratfic or the eneDJ1'o In the present 

situation,, therefore, it will be expected primarily on the side of the 

Russianso To what extent it can be used by the western countries would --

have to be determined by naval. experteo 

:U::a::xc::=:s::scc 

62 

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xm 0 THE BROADCAST lln'JiRCEPl' SERVICE AND ITS ORGANIZATION 

Monitoring of radio broadcasts of the Soviet Union and its satellites 

within the framework of the ove~all intercept serv:.lce appears to be of 

great value for three reasons: 

lo For the obtaining of information, 

2., As basis for the work or the staff for "l»YchologicaJ. warfare," 

)a Because broadcasts are used to pass information to agentso 

Regarding l): In spite or the sharp censorship in countries with a 

dictatoria1 government• bits of' valuable information slip into the 

broadcasts a.gain and again., For this reason there should be close 

contact with the evaluation center of the strategic intercept serviceo 

furing World ~l!ar II enemy broadcasts often supplied valuable collate1•a1 

for the work of the cryptanalysts and decoderso 

Regard:ing 2): "Psychological warfare" is constantly growing in importance; 

it is only possible if one has exact knowledge of all that the enemy is 

sending out over his broadcast atationso For this rea13on a copy of all 

intercepted broadcasts must be f'orwarded to the staff for 0 peychological 

warfare"rJ 

In England and Germaey much experience has been gathered in thia fieldo 

However, it does not appear adll'iaable to locate the central office for 

monitoring eastern broadcasts in England or in Germany; rather it should be 

located in the vicinity of the ove:r-all control 0£ the western intercept 

serviceo It rems.ins to be seen whether receiving conditions will permit 

thiso 

Regarding .3): Even during \brld War II broadcasts were used by all parties 

.f'or transmitting instructions .to agents or sabotage units and the like; the 

manner with -which this is done varies greatly: by prearranged words or 

sentences, by enciphered texts,, by musical -numbers, etco In the future this 

will be done to an even greate1• extent• hence the work of the broadcast 

monitors must be closely coupled with the radio defenseo 

TOP 

(.;'=t 

V.J 

SECRET 
The three reasons given above force one to recognize that the interception 

of foreign broadcasts must not be handled by a sewate organization but must 

~ incorp;,ra~ed into the framework of the over-all intercept a·ervice.o 

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XXIII. "DECEPTIVE GAMEsn 

[Radio deception] 

Surprise raids on radio agents made it possible frequentl.\y' during 

World War II to carry on deceptive games with the opponent., Yany of them 

were successtul and could be kept going ror a considerable time; most of 

them bogged dom quite soon because the en$ll\.f recognized the deception. 

The conduct of this radio deception was handled by organs or counter= 

intelligence or of the security service which were located in the vicinity 

of the captured transmittero For this purpose a tew competent parsons were 

selected mo handled the deceptive traffic,, working with the local military 

officialso 

Such a solution of the problem did1 however~ have serious weaknessea 

when long=range agents were involved mo norma.113 were eeeldng strategic 

intelligence o The problem of deceiving the enew is a complex one which can 

only be handled succeae!ully and correctly in its 2Ptiretyo All measures 

in this field must be wei~ed one aga:Jnst the other and directed by one 

- of.ficeo It will not do for one station in Belgium. to manufacture 

deceptive messages as it deems fit while another in France is doing the 

s~ th:ing, because contradictions l'Vi11 inevitably appear which will 

attract the attention or the 0nellzy'o 

Frequently the Germans were running five or six parallel 1?radio games" 

whereby each outfit worked without B...'lY knowledge of the nsssages composed 

and transmitted by the otherso 

Furthermor~ the enemy is not to be misled imrely by l"adio gruoos 

employing captured. agent transmitters but also in as many other wqs as 

possible, let us sa:y by disseminating rumors. by the radio traffic of oneue 

om .military transmitters• by "deserters"• by broadcasts, etco etc~ If 

one wishes to achieve success, the eum total or these individual actions 

must be controlled from a center and the content of the messages eent out 

during the radio game must be edited by a single authorityo This was not 

done in Germany o 

TOP SECRET 
In this respect a new course should be taken in the future o At the 

central control of fica of the over-all interaept service in Wes-tern Euro~ 

a work group should be set up whose tas..lc it would be to mislead the enemy .. 

by means of radioo Thia group should work closely with th~ following of fices: 

Radio Defense 

Staf'f' for Strategic Warfare, 

star£ for Psychological Warfare, 

Genera1 Staff of the Army 1 

General Staff' of the Air Force, 

Admiralty Staff of the Navy 1 

With the Chiefs of the Radio Service 

of all Branches of the Armed Forces 

With the Strategic Intercept Service# 

With the Office of Production, 

With the Transportation Services,, etco 

The work group "Deceptive Ga.Ima"· should have the assignment of coordinating _(

1

./ 

all measures tor misleading the enemy, of working out deceptive radiograms in 

agreement with th:.=; above mentioned of.fices, and ot transmitting them by the 

a.id or a special group of operatorso 

During V.brld War II the Russians built up their intelligence service mainq 

on their netllX>rk of radio agents; they w.tl.1 do so in increased measure in the 

futureo The aim of the "deception group" must be not to send .misleading informa= 

tion but in course of time to undermine the entire structure ot this net or radio 

agentso Tbs confidence of the Russian intelligence service in its various nets 

or radio agents must be eo shattered• that the Russians will not even .believe 

the reports or their moat reliable agentao 

It appears advisable to subordinate this work group to the central control 

station of the overall intercept service not simply for reasons of personnel 

snd technical apparatus but also out or consideration ot the :fact that the 

various branches of the intercept servioo. are in the best position to supply 

the necessary pa.tternmaterial.o 

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:XXIVo THE OOGANIZATIQi OF THE .CENTRAL CONTROL OFFICE 

O.F THE ENTJRE ATLANTIC nrr.ERCEPT SERVICE 

The entire system of_ obtaini..11g intelligence from tm aether will stand 

or .fall depending on the thoroughness of the organization of the eentral 

C'lntrol station of the over-all Atlantic :ii:ntercapt eerviceo The persons 

who are to guide and control this office must be r~cruited from the best 

experts in the field (f'rom all the countries of Western Europe and tBA)o 

Filling tm post with men who have no previous acquaintance with the subject 

matter must be avoided in all c.ircumstanceso 

At the head or tha organization there must be a maer9±_ becaua·e only a 

general. will have the authority necessary to insure the carryi11g out of the 

tasksc 

The ~entral control o t.i'ice must have unconditiof!¥. power or comrnaI!.-S 

with respect to all branche~~the intercept servi~~' and with respect 

to all formations and offices or the intercept se?'.viceo Its. principle task 

lies on the one hand 3n the coordination of all branches ani units or the 

intercept service, on the other· hand in the centralizet;i monitoring:i evaluation 

and dissemination of ·the results of all bra11ches of the intercept serviceo 

It must exercise supervision so that any splitting up and any overlapping 

is avoided and that a rationa1 use is made of personnel and materialo 

This means that the central office must have in addition to its special 

technical wrking sections a small coordinating staff to which both the 

seetiais and the out=stations and formations are subordinateo 

'!'he structure or the central o.f :tice lilllSt theoreticall;r be fixed be.fore 

actual organization but it would be be~ter if this were accomplished 

graduallYo There is always the risk that the setting up of the central 

office will occur in the same .manner as the setting up or the counte~ 

intelligence agency or Admiral Canaris., Here within a few months perfect 

swar'IllS oi' peopl.e were hired, who were all supposed to be. talented in some 

way or other., and tor whom it then became necessarY" to find a job after 

they had been hired, so that countless sections were £ormad for the s.ole 

purpose of giving these people a high sounding titleo The rush of 

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ostensible "speci.a.l.ietsn int~ intercept. service would be great in ease 

of the setting up or a new sS'l'Vice but in the main the people involved 

would be those who recognized but 2.1l! aim: to get a nice comtortable jobo 

Caution in this respect should be the first rulea 

The f':lrst task of the overall control or the Atlantic intercept service 

would be to combine the already existing intercept organizations or the 

~e~tern Powers and to coordinate and unify their effortsa ~then should 

one set about building up and organizing new formations am ot.ficeso The 

housekeeping plan of the . Atlantic intercept servico must therefore ba kept 

flexible and contain no rigid limiting impediment.a to a gradual e.xpansiono 

Organizationalq one of the .first steps would be to insure direct 

teleprinter cor.nection with Washington. London,. and Roma., and later with 

a.11 th3 intercept sta.tionso The forwarding or the intercept results of 

remote intercept stations would have to be by courier plane"' 

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·> 

XXV a EVALUATION 

Important as good, complete interception of all enentr transmissions is; 

important as the ~ecryption of all eneiey" systems appears - nevertheless the 

. . . 

,'. evaluation is the vital spot in the intercept serviceo This is where the 

intercept. results are worked over and the survey of the enemy situation ia 

shaped, and which is supposed1 in connection with all . other available 

intelligence,, to give onett s own command a picture of the situation on the 

other sideo 

Merely this statement of purpose makes it clear that the personnel of 

the evaluation section must be recruited from among the ablest headsa 

Unfortunately too little attention was paid to this matter in Germanyo 

That was a very great mistake which ought not to be repeatedo The training 

or evaluators must be handled with the utmost care and thoroughness o It 

must be as comprehensive as anyone can imagineo 

That is a goal which cannot be attained in a few weeks... As initial 

core, recourse may be had to a nwnber of experienced evaluators from 

World War II. The further training of good workers will be one of the most 

important duties o! the central control station of the intercept ~ervicea 

In the organization of the evaluation section tl'l"O factors must be 

considered since they will vitally affect the work of the office; these 

are speed and thoroughnesso 

en the face of things these two factors stand diametrically opposed, 

since speed does not permit of thoroughness and vice versao However a 

synthesis can be achieved if proper safeguards are taken in setting up the 

system of worko 

Basic in evaluation must be the principle of thoroughnessa The basis 

for exact work on the part of this group, whose principal task is speedy 

reporting, can be provided by the creation of a well organized archive, 

well arranged card files, complete collateral aids and survey tables which 

are constantly corrected and supplementedo Thus it follows tha. t the ev~uation section must consist of two working groups. of which the one supplies. 

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the materials required for the dependable functioning. of the other, while 

the lattt!r carries out the swift processing of radio situation reports on 

the basis of these aids~ 

This calls for a harmonious collaboration or all concerned down to the 

least detailo But since any such collaboration_, which involves a full 

appreciation of the other fellow's effort, is in the last analysis a ouestion 

of character, special attentica must be given to this side or the rroblemo 

In no circumstances is there any roan in the evaluation section for "difficult 

· personalities", obstinate people who go their own way, and f'or ambitious 

climbers o Anyone who cannot cheerfUlly adapt himself completely to the 

total structure of the closely interwoven separate fields or endeavor must 

be eliminated very promptly, otherwise he has the same effect as a grain of 

sand in the works of a watoho 

The evaluation section or the central control office of tbe intercept 

service should receive the results of the work of all branches or this service, - and likewise all decrypted radiogramso Only in this way is it possible tor 

the evaluation section to s~pply the troop collUlland with really clear, 

useful summa.rieso Any splitting up of' eva1uation work must be carefully 

avoided, since otherwise, instead of comprehensive reports·:,, there will be 

on:cy incomplete individual reports which will result not merely in 

u.nnecossar,y additional work for the command in sifting and weighing these 

against one another, but things may even reach a point where the command 

is no longer able to cope with the problemo 

If an Atlantia intercept service is to be set up, then great importance 

must be attached to the precise functioning of the Central Evaluation Unito 

Its organization and. staffing must receive the most careful attentiono 

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XXVIo THE POLAR INTERCEPT SERVICE 

In discussing the organization of the Atlantic intercept service thus 

. far, we have taken into account only the front line in Europe extending 

from the North Cape down to the tip or Italyo However, there is one area 

which will play a no less important role strategically in the coming 

developnents: the Polar region~ and in this case radio telegraphy will 

be extensive'.cy' employeda 

The measures of the enemy will take the form or air force actio!! 

on the one hand and of so-called commando enterp~ises on the othe~o 

In both cases the use of radio telegraphy is unavoidableo 

It is unlikely that any complicated technical innovation vJill be 

employed; even ultra short wave is not likely to appear. Facsimile 

transmissions, higt-speed transmissions, radio telephony and the like 

probabl;v' will hardly cone into account.. Plain. normal short~\vave tele£aphy; 

will be the ruleo In a:ny case it must be monitoredo 

The peculiar character of this Polar Theater, and the special character 

of the radio transmissions to be employed there, make it appear advisable to 

set up a special, independent intercept organization £or this areao A chain 

of 6 or at most 7 relatively small intercept stations should extend from 

Spitzbergen via North Greenland and Grant Land to Alaska and the Aleutian 

Islandso It would be well to have an evaluation station working in Alaska 

which should be provided with directional radio communication with the 

intercept stations and also have conmunication with Washingtono 

It does not appear- advisable to attach this Polar Intercept Organization 

to the Etiropean central intercept cpntrol station, because the tasks and 

aims ara too differento Moreover aey militacy reaction to the information 

obtained would originate exclusively in Am.ericao However, such a service 

appears in0scapabla within the framework of the Atlantic intercept service, 

and should be established very promptlyo 

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~-----------~---~-----·~--~--~----~----·-·----------~---------~ 

• 

So far as I am aware, there are already two such polar intercept 

stations in Northem Canada and probably an.other in Alaska; however, the 

chain should be ext.ended to Spitzbergen in order to give a satisfactory 

D/F base. One can assume 'With a high degree of probability that the 

Russians already have an intercept station in their reservation on 

Spitzbergen; there are many indications of thiso Therefore the Russi.an 

head start must be compensated faro 

Organizationally it would appear desirable to attach this polar 

intercept base with its central office to the headquarters of the American 

strategic air forceo 

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• • .. • 

XXVIIo ''RADIO WARFJ\RE" AND THE INTI.;RCEPI' SERVICE 

In any future war there will be one field of military effort which 

stands in no direct connection with the intercept service~ to be sure, but 

must attach great importance to good collabor~tion with the service; this 

is the staff for so-called "radio war rare" o 

Under the heading "Radio Warfare" come all the possibilities of upsetting the measures or the enemv which are in whole or in part activated~ 

controlled or prepared by radio emanationso 

These include: 

1. Radio broadcasts; these can be made virtually unintelligible by the 

use or jammera 0 

2o Radio navigation beams of the enemy a.ir force; these can be so 

influenced by jamming that aerial navigation at night is 

interfered withe · 

3o Interplane phone traffic of the enemy a.ir fOl'"ce; this can be 

interfered with by cutting in on the same wave lengthQ 

· 4... Radio control or rockets, flying bombs, etco; thes~ can be 

diverted in another direction by radioo 

etc~ etc~ etco 

Collaboration with the intercept service is essential in order to 

learn the wave lengths and freouenciea used by the enemy and to conunit 

oneis own jamm.ers accordingly~ This collaboration must be a two way 

proposition, i .. e? the staff for radio warfare must maintain contact with 

the control stat ion of the intercept service or its own accord, and vice 

versao An exchange ot information is absolutely necessar:yd 

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.. 

XXVIIlo ON THE BUILDmG UP OF THE ATLANTIC INTERCEPr 

SERVICE AND GERMANYos' CON'1'RIBUTION TH:r~BTO 

.. 

Whenever the building up of an Atlantic intercept.service is discussed 

the question inevitab~ arises as to the personnel required, the number of 

intercept stations~ and the time within which it will be possible to set 

up the serviceo 

It would not be a sign of great intelligence, if af\Ybody tried to 

answer these three questions inmediately with precise datao Nothing would 

be roore erroneous than to provide a fixed number of people and intercept 

stations whose commitment might soon turn out to be incorrecto 

This service must G£0W organicallz_o Clle must be prepared already to 

accept the probability that the beginning will be disappointing and that the 

goal can only be re~ched by many experiments, reverses and round-=-about 

methodso It will be necessary to take sane of the experiences of the 

wdsting organizations as the basis .for further worko 

It would also be incorrect to pick out now specific points and set up 

intercept stations as permanent structures as the Germans did formerly" 

It will be well to rely on the .Anerican system or (knock=down) structures 

which can be put up within. a weeko Then if the site does not prove 

suitable it is easy to moveo The factor of uncertainty at this time makes 

this .form necessary and this form also has the advantage that - if' the 

results of the monitoring and the situation warrant - an intercept station 

can 'be quio~ expanded or can be cut dov.no The motto., therefore, should 

be: mobility or the fixed intercept stationso 

The question of personnel also calla for the gr"eatest cautiorio The 

most experienced personnel is to be found in Ger.rr.a.n:r. But precisely here 

it will be impossible to accept without further ado every man who was formerly 

active in the intercept service. In the period since the war there have been 

great changes in the thinking of the peopleo T"hereas three years ago probably 

90% would have been ready to work in a West European intercept service, this 

proportion has decreased since then and is decreasing steadily o The man in 

the intercept service has a clearer insight into the actual situation than 

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the average man outaideo The previous military development in the West 

has undermined his belief in its ability and readiness to resist. Not 

until he recognizes that the West has a serious intention of defending 

itself will he change his attitude again-0 

Care must be taken lest undesirable elemants find their way into this 

ae:rviceo All this suggests that any over great haste in organization 

will be riskyo 

I should also like to warn agair1st setting up "mixed" formations, iaeo 

formations consisting of people from different countrieso The units must be 

hoirogeneous o 

Only at the central control office is it necessary that there be 

representatives o~ all the participating countrieso 

To sum up, I should like to state that if enough technical eouipment 

:•nd temporary buildings are available., an intercept service can be set up 

within six months which would constitute a solid foundation for future 

developmentso 

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