DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

OPINCE OF INS ASSISTANT SIONICTARY 2NOVS65

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WORTHMAN

SUBJECT: Review of NRP Directive No. GUS-1 (Draft), dated

20 October 1965

I have reviewed the NRP Directive No. GUS-i. In my opinion,

this document fulfills the intent implied in the "Summary:" to

describe a program and management concept for the National Reconnaissance Program. Even so, the following comments are submitted

in critique of the document.

In general, I do not believe the directive offers a workable

system. The document is not consistent within itself nor is it

consistent with the 11 August 1965 DOD/CIA "Agreement for Reorganization of the NRP." Those sections which describe aircraft

and drone programs are particularly argumentative and will lead

to complex command and control situations, if followed. Further,

I do not believe the NRP/NRO or any organization can long endure

without a specified Table of Organization. Good management

practice dictates periodic reviews of the organizational structure for appropriateness, but a basic, workable organizational

system is required.

Tor ease of comparison, the following specific comments are

numbered to correspond to the numbering in GUS-1:

There are not sufficient parameters defined. As a

minimum, this section should be expanded to include: NRP, denied

territory, overflight, cold war, general hostilities, and peacetime.

An introductory sentence should preface the listed docUments.

"Overflights" is not sufficiently descriptive. Friendly

territories must be excluded.

The word "normally" is not consistent with the wording

of the 11 August 1965 agreement. I know of no documents which

transfer the NRP assets to the Sec Def upon a declaration of a

state of general hostilities.

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3,c. This paragraph is undul' restri t

cats oriel of •ro ects

The NRP is not necessarily so restrictive as to

U.S. oals Man• U-2 fli hts are presently conterritory.

Compliance with this paragraph could cause fluxuations

in command and control. The 147. drone in S.B. Asia is an example.

This program could be under the control of JCS for operations

over Vietnam and the NRO for operations over South China. The

local commander would have to serve two organizations and mission

priorities would change as often as the local weather.

6.a.(1) I believe the NRO to be larger than the DINRO, DDINRO,

NRO Staff, and NRO Comptroller. The entire organization responsible for the NRP should be a part of the NRO.

6.a.(4)t(5),(6) These three paragraphs split aircraft

programs three ways giving each office. operational responsibilities. If the aircraft programs are to be efficiently managed

in the NRP, they should be under one program office.

6.b. The NRP organization--should be changed to NRO.

6.e. I do not believe an organization can be run properly

without a table of organization and manpower billet structure.

Such an organization would be subject to constant personnel

changes depending on "parent" organilation needs.

6,f, Since 6.e. does not give management structure and 6.c.

has each Program Office as an entity, I do not understand what

joint reviews would take place or who would arbitrate differences

of opinion.

7.c. Provision should be made to include NSA, NPIC, and/or

NASA representatives, as required, on the NRO Staff.

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7.c,(2) This paragraph places the NRO Staff in the command

and control channel of the NRO/NRP. I believe that such functions

rightly belong with the system operator and Project Directors.

7.c.(6) The Air Staff, Navy Staff, and/or Army Staff, as

appropriate, should be included.

7.c.(7) No previous mention has been made of the relationship between the NRO and NPIC. Such a determination is required.

This paragraph also makes a portion of the staff operators rather

than staff. members.

7.e.(4) ' Too specific for this paper. This item is included

in 7.e.(3) above.

7.f., 7.g., 7.h. Splits the aircraft responsibilities into

three programs. In addition, 7.f.(3) does not allow for any

command other than SAC to conduct NRP programs. I believe this

is unduly restrictive for undefined programs.

7.g.(1) This paragraph conflicts with the 11 August 1965

agreement. Paragraph D.1.d. of the agreement assigns only

"engineering development of sensor subsystems" to CIA. All other

development is the responsibility of DOD.

9.d. I do not believe such a restrictive communications

channel possible or desirable. Even on NRP matters, the JRC must

have direct communication with the JCS and the Sec &of.

In summary, I do not believe the NRP Directive No. GUS-i to

be sufficiently consistent within itself or with previous agreements to provide the foundation for NRP/NRO organizational structure and management. The aircraft programs should be consolidated

under a single Program Director. The NRO Staff should function as

a staff or as operators, not split according to programs. A table

of organization and billeting structure is required for continuous

management planning. Finally, the NRO should encompass the entire

structure for accomplishing the NRP, not an office of limited

staff functions.

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