1

Pe lac he v . S

tate , 294 S.W .3d 248, 252 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2009). 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
NO. P D-1277-09

ERIC SIMON P ELACHE, Ap pellant

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS
ON STA TE’ S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE THI RT EEN TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

CA M ER ON CO UN TY
H ERV EY , J. , de liv e r e d t he opi nio n of t he Co ur t i n whic h K ELLER , P .J., P RI CE , W OM ACK , J OHN S ON , K EASLER , H O L C O MB , and C OCH RAN , JJ., jo ine d. M E YE RS , J., dissented . O P I N I O N
I n this case, the c ourt of appe als decided that the State’s Apr il 23, 2008 post-guilt, prepunis hme nt- ph a se no tic e to a pp e lla nt o f the State ’s int e nt to e nh anc e a pp e lla nt’ s punis hme nt w ith

an a g g ra vate d- ro bb e ry c on vic tio n viol a te d ap pe lla nt’ s fe de ra l con sti tut ion a l du e -p ro c e ss r ig hts “ to know the natur e of the char g es he is acc used of and the conse quence s of a c onviction before jeopar dy attache s.” We decide that appellant’ s fede ral c onstitut ional due-pr ocess r ights we re not violated.

1Pelache --2

2 See § 29.02(a) (2) & (b), T EX . P EN AL C ODE
. 3 The re cord r efle cts that appe llant was convic ted of this ag g ravated-robbe ry offe nse on September 5, 2000, a

nd that the judg ment was sig ned on September 7, 2000.
4 See § 12.42(b), T EX . P EN AL C ODE
. 5 See § 12.32, T EX . P EN AL C ODE
. 6 See § 31.03(e) (4)( B) , T EX . P EN AL C ODE
. 7 The re cord r efle cts that appe llant rejec ted this of fer even a fter his attorney

advised him that he fa c e d a

po ssi ble lif

e se nte nc e if con vi cte d of th e ro bb e ry of fe ns e wi th a

fi nd ingthat he a lso committed t

h e a g g r a v a te d

- r o b b e r

y o f f e n s e th a t w a s a ll e g e d

in th e e n h an c e me n t “ c o u n t” in the indictment. A p p e l l an t w a s c h ar g e d i nani n d i c t m e n tw i t h t h e s e c o n d

- d e g r e e f e l o n y o f f e n s e o f r o b b e r y. 2 The indictment contai n ed an enha nceme nt “count” a lleg ing that appellant had pr eviously been convicted of an ag g ravated robber y on September 7, 2000. This made appe llant, if convicted of the 3

ro bb e ry of fe ns e , s ub jec t to a fi rs t- de g re e -f

e lony punis hme nt r ang e of

fi ve to 9 9 y e ars or

lif e wi th 4 a possible fine not to excee d $10,000. Appellant re jected the State’s plea- bargai n offe r to plead 5
g uilty to a re duced state-jail felony char g e of theft from a per son in exchang e for a re commended 6

se nte nc e of

tw o- y e ars ’ c on fi ne me nt i n a state ja il. 7 On April 15, 2008, appellant went to tr ial on the robber y indictment. A convenie nce- store cler k identified appe llant as the per son who came into the convenie nce store wher e she was wor king and dema nded the money

that was in the c ash re g i s t er . T h e clerk testified that a ppellant had one hand in his pocket which made her t hink that appellant had a weapon causing her to fear for he r life. On April 18, 2008, a jury

convicted a

ppellant of the le sser-inc luded, state-ja il felony offe nse of thef tPelache --3

8 At this ti me, with the enha ncemen t “c o unt” in the indictment having alleg ed a pr ior September 5, 2000 a g g ravated-robbe ry conviction, ap p el l ant was subjec t to a third-deg ree -fe lony punishment r ang e of two to te n y ear s and a possible f ine not to exceed $10,000. See § 3 1. 03 (e)(4 )(B) (providing that theft fr om a per son is a state-jail fe lony ); § 1 2

. 3 5 (c)(2)( A), T EX . P EN AL C ODE (providing that a per son convicted of a st ate- jail felony shall be punished for a third-de g ree felony if the person has previously been convicted of a § 3g (a) (1) of fense under A rticle 42.12 of the Code of C riminal Procedur e); Article 42.12, § 3g (a) (1)( F) , T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . (making ag g ravated robber y a § 3g (a) (1) of

fense ).
9 The re cord r efle cts that the state-j ai l felony conviction for posse ssion of a controlled su bs tanc e wa s u lti mate ly

no t us e d to e nh anc e a

pp e lla nt’ s p un ish me nt. fr om a pe rs on . App e lla

nt’ s p un ishme nt h e ari ngwa s se t f or Ma y 2, 20 08 , w he n th e tr ia l court wo uld

a sse ss a pp e lla nt’ s p un ish me nt. 8 On April 23, 2008, the S tate, in the form of a motion for e nhance ment and re quest for le ave of cour t to amend the indictment, not i fi ed appellant of its intent to use two more prior f elony convictions for e nhanc ement purpose s, both also occur ring on September 5, 2000 ( another
ag g ravated-robbe ry

conviction and a st ate-

jail felony

conviction for posse ssion of a controlled substance)

. Thi s m o tion cited to “TEX. PENAL CODE 12.42 and 12.35,” and it reque sted that 9 appellant’ s “punishment be incr ease d to refle ct the enha nceme nts.” On May 9, 2008, the t rial court conducte d a punishment hea ring . At this hearing , the par ties discussed whe ther a

ppellant’s prior c onvictions could be used to enha nce appellant’ s sentenc e to a

se c on d- de g re e fe lony

ra ng e . We fin d it ne c e ssa

ry to se t out the se dis c us sio ns in s ome de ta il. Just befor e the punishment hea ring beg an, the f

ollowing pr ocee dings took plac e. [THE STATE] : Furthe r, I ’d ask the Court to take judicial notice of the state’s motion to e nh anc e punis hme nt that wa s f ile d b a c k o n Apr il 2 3 of 20 08 . T hat w a s a lso rd g iven to [t he def

ense], serve d on [t he def

ense]. I n reg ards to that state’ s motion for enhanc ement, we are alleg ing thr ee differ ent priors, more specific ally , in Ca use No.Pelache --4

10 Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that the c a us e numbe r fo r t

his a g g ra vate d- ro bb e ry

c on vic tio n w a s 0 0- CR523-D. This wa s also the ca use number of

the conviction allege d in the enhanceme nt “count” in the indictment and re alleg ed in the State’s Apr il 23, 2008 enhance ment notice.

11 See § 12.35(c) (2)( A).
12 Thus, the State’s theory was that one of appellant’ s September 5, 2000 § 3g( a) a g g ravated00-CR-528-D. The de fenda nt was convicted of t he offense of ag g ravated robbe ry 10 back on Septe mber the 5 of 2000. th [THE COURT] : And that was in the e nhance ment para g raph. [THE STATE] : And that also was in the e nhance ment para g raph i n t h e actual indictment, but we also gave them notice aga in in reg ards to–we filed anothe r motion fo r e nh anc e me nt. I n addition to that moti on for e nhance ment, we a lso alleg e anothe r count whe re [appellant] was also c onvicted for the of fense of ag g ravated robbe ry , which is a (3) (g ) off ense in 00-CR-522-D . That con v i ct i o n als o occur red ba ck on or a

bout Se p te mb e r

th e 5 o f 2 0 0 7 [s ic ]. th
I n addi t i o n t o that, we a

re a lleg ing that in 95-CR-1523-D, the same de fenda nt was also convict ed for the offense of possession of contr olled substance ba ck on September the 5 of 2007–or 2000. I ’m sorry , J udg e. th Now, in re g ards to that, Judge, ba sically , Ido have some case law. W hat I believe is applicable w ould be Sec. 12.35 of the Penal Code, spec ifically subsection (c ). Ba sicall y what happe ns in reg ards to–we have a state-jail convic tion with the pending a g g ra vate d ro bb e ry , on e of the a g g ra vate d ro bb e ri e s. Th a t wo uld the n e nh anc e it t o a third-de g ree felony , using that logic in 12.35 ( c). 11 And how we g et there , J udg e, is basically , the prior of fense , the ag g ravated robbe ry is a (3) ( g ) off

ense. Tha

t (3) (g ) off

ense, o n ce it’s proven, will then enha nce [appellant] t o a third deg ree . I n reg ards to that, ther e’s al s o

– I would believe that 12.42 is also applicable unde r subsection (a ) (3)

. At t h is point i n time, once you enhanc e them once with the a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y, yo ue n h an c e t h e m a g a i nw i t h t h e s e c o n d a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y. Be cause y ou have a

n ag g ravated state-ja il felony , which I h av e ca se law that talks a b o u tt h a t , – a tt h a tp o i n ti nt i m e yo uw o u l d b e l o o k i n g a ta

s e c o n d

- d e g r e e f

e l o n y. 12Pelache --5

robber y convictions could be used to e nhance appellant’ s sentenc e for his state -jail felony conviction for thef t from a pe rson to a third-de g ree felony rang e u n d er S ec t i o n 12.35(c) (2)( A). See § 12.35(c) (2)( A) (pr oviding that individual convicted of state-jail felony shall be punished fora thirddeg ree felony

if it is shown that the individual has previously been f inally convicted of

, among other thi ng s, a § 3g (a ) fe lony

). Ap pe lla

nt’ s o the r S e pte mbe r 5 , 2 00 0 a g g ra vate d- ro bb e ry

c on vic tio n c ou ld then be use d to enhanc e appe llant’s sentenc e to a s ec o n d -d eg ree felony rang e under

Section 12.42 (a)(3). See § 1 2. 42 (a )( 3) (p ro vid ingthat a state -j a il f

e lony punis ha ble un de r § 12 .3 5( c ) s ha ll be enhanc ed to a sec ond-deg ree felony rang e if it is shown that the defe ndant has onc e bef ore be en convicted of

a fe lony). Se e ge ne ra lly

Go wan v . S

tat e , 18 S.W .3d 305 (Tex.App.–Be aumont 2000, p et. re f’d) . I t appea

rs from the Cler

k’s Recor d that a copy

of the Gowan c a s e w a s a tt a c hed to the State’s April 23, 2008 enha nceme nt notice. The State a lso cited Gowan at t h e p u n i s h m en th ea ri n g. Appellant see med to take the positi o n t hat none of his prior convictions (including the September 5, 2000 a g g ravated-robbe ry conviction alleg ed in the enha nceme nt “count” of

the ind ic tme nt) c ou ld b e us e d f or e nh anc e me nt p urpos es and that he sh ou ld b e su

bje c t to a state -j a ilfe lony punis hme nt r ang e be c a

us e the S tat e di d not p ro vid e him wi th n oti c e that it

wo uld se e k to enhanc e his sentenc e if he was convicted of a lesser-included, state-jail felony offe nse of thef

t from
a per son. Appellant see med to claim that the enha nceme nt “cou n t ” in the indictment put him on

no tic e that th e State int e nd e d to e nh anc e his sen tenc e on ly un de r § 12 .4 2 w hic h, a c c or din g to appellant, beca

me inapplicable when the jury convicted him of the state-jail fe lony offe nse of thef

t fr om a pe rs on . App e lla

nt t he n c la ime d, in t

he a lte rn a tiv e , th a t a mor e a pp ro pr ia te se nte nc e wo uld be within a third-de g ree felony rang e appa

rently under state law. [TH E D EF EN SE]: Now, my ar gum ent is that no notice was p ro v i d ed wi th re g a r ds t o e nh a nc in g [ a pp ellant’s] stat e-j ail f elony f rom a non-aggravated state
ja il fe lon y t o a n ag gr av at e d st at e -j ailfel ony . An d if the Court wi ll not e , the ir c on tin uo us arg ume nt i s, the y

c a ll i t an e nh anc e me nt. They provid e m e a n o tice of e nhance ment enhanc ing his state- jail felony , the theft fr om a pe rs on , to an a g g ra

vate d s ta te -j a il f

e lony , mak ingno te of

the e nh anc e me nt. Well, in a state-jail felony , the only way that y o u ca n enhanc e is under A rt. 12.42, and that is not applicable in this case. It’s m y position th a t he is not sub jec t to having hi s state- jail felon y enhancedPelache --6

13 Thus , it app ears tha

t th e State may

have un de rs too d a

pp e lla nt t o h a ve ma de a

du e -p ro c e ss ob je c tio n b a se d o n a

pp e lla nt’ s r ig ht t o k

no w the natur e of

the e nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio ns in o rd e r t o pr e pa re a de fe ns e to t

he m. from a non-aggravated to an aggravate d b ecause the notice that has been provided by the state had b een in the form of an enhancem ent, and that notice was done pu rsuant to 12.42, wh ich is not appl icable. And it’s our position that th e onl y o ffens e and r ang e of puni shm e nt th atyo u c an c ons ide r in th is c as e is bas ic all y a st at e -j ailfel ony , be twe e n six to two m ont hs– be twe e n six m ont hs a nd two ye ar s. In the alternative, if the Court shou ld not agree wi th us, n ot that I’m agree ing, but th e one th atwould fit m or e th an wha t t he st at e is a r gui ng, th atit ’s a s e c ond, wou ld b e a third-degre e, not a second-degre e felon y. We wou ld objec t to that. (Emphasis supplied). The State re sponded that appe llant had suffic ient notice of its enha nceme nt alleg ations be c a us e c a se law “ say s y ou jus t have to g ive it to the m pr ior to punis hme nt, wh ic h it h a s b e e n in thi s

case .” 13 [TH E ST AT E]: I f I c ou ld j us t h ave a chan c e to r e bu t th a t argume nt. I n r e g ard s to no tic e , Jud g e , o n th e fa c e of the ind ictm ent th ere w a s an e nh anc e me nt c ount i n re g ard s to 00 -C R- 52 3- D, the a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . In a dd iti on , n oti c e wa s g ive n a g a in on state’s motion to enhanc e punis hment that was filed back on April 23 of 2008, rd that alleg ed not only

just that enhance ment count, but the additional enhanc ement–the two other additional enhanc ement counts, a g ain, in 00-CR-522-D and 95-CR-1523-D

. I n reg ards to that, [t he def

ense] say s that there is no notice that, basica lly , we’ re f iling under 12.42, but he re, Judge , if I may approa ch, it’s under

12.45 [si c] and 12.42, wh ic h is c le a

rl y mark e d in

the mot ion . B ut t

he re is n o b ri g ht- lin e ru le , Jud g e , in re g ard s to g ivi ng

[the de fe ns e ] no tic e in re g ard s to a mo tio n to e nh anc e punis hme nt. Ihave c ase la

w that has said that y ou just have to g ive i t prior to punishment. Here , that’s April 23 , which is prior to punishment. There fore , he’s be en ser ved with a rd copy . Ican g ive y ou the ca se law. The re’ s no–ag ain, no brig ht-line rule. The re ’s a c tua lly c a se law that r e

je c ts a te n- da y ru le , a nd it s ay s y ou

jus t ha ve to g ive it t o them prior to punishmen t , wh i ch it has been in this case . Ithink [ the def ense] a c kn ow le dg e s th a t.Pelache --7

14 See § 12.42(a) (3). After clar ify ing the State’s statutory theory for e nhancingappellant’ s sentence to aseconddeg ree felony

rang e ( see footnote 12), the t rial court indicated that it would m ake a ruling afte r the State p r e s e n te d it s p u n is h me n t e v id e n c e an d a f te r it r e v ie w e d c a s e la

w p r o v id e d b y th e State. I mmediately

afte r this, more discussion occur red on whether appellant’s sentence could be e nhance d
to a se c on d- de g re e fe lony

ra ng e un de r t

he a pp lic a ble state statut e s. [TH E D EF EN SE]: I f I mig ht jus t add on that exac t poin t, Judg e , if You r Ho no r w ill examine 12.42, there a

re c erta in points i n 12.42 wher e a se quential-- [THE COURT] : I s require d. [THE DEFEN SE] : –is required, but in this particular subsection, i t’s not require d. 14 So I wo uld jus t a lso po int

that out. [TH E CO UR T]: We ll, it d oe sn ’t re a lly c lari fy it. Th a t’ s w hy

I ’m a sk ingif the c a se law does, b e c a

u s e it ju s t s ay s “ I f

it is s h o w no nth e tr ia l o f a s tate

- ja il f e lo ny punishable under

Sec. 12.35 (c ) . . . that the de fendan t has bee n once be fore convicted of

a fe lony , on conviction, he s h al l b e punis hed for a sec ond-deg ree felony .” N o w , w h a tm a d e i ta g g r a v a t e d w a s t h e f a c t t h a th e h a d

a p r i o r a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y, which wa s on the indictment. But I need to make sure t hat t hat enhanceme nt making it an ag g ravated fe lony

-- [THE STATE] : I t would be ag g ravated state-ja il felony , J udg e. [THE COURT] : An ag g ravated state-ja il felony can b e used with another enhanc ement whe re he was sente nced on the same da y to that jail tim e. * * * A n d y o u ’ r e s ay i n g t h a tt h i s [ c a s e l aw ] c l ar i f i e s t h a t , an d

t h a t ’ s w h a tI’ m s ay i n g . If this clarifies that, then I

don’t have a proble m with the c oncept, but Iwant to make sure that it is clarif

ied. At the close o f the punishment hea ring , the par

ties ag ain addr essed whe ther a ppellant’s
sentenc e could be enha

nced to a second- deg ree felony

rang e. Appe llant ag ain see med to claim thatPelache --8

non e of his prior convictions (including the September 5, 2000 ag g ravated-robbe ry conviction alleg ed in the enhanc ement “count” of the indictment) could be used for e nhance ment purposes a nd that he should be subjec t to a state-jail-f elony punishment rang e bec ause the State did not provide him with noti ce that it would seek to e nhance his sentence if he wa s convicted of a lesser -included, state-jail fe lony

offe nse of theft from a person. Appellant also ag ain claimed in the a lternative that

a more appropr iate sente nce w ould be within a third-deg ree felony rang e “base d on Art. 12.35(c ).” [TH E D EF EN SE]: Y our H on or , I wo uld lik e to fi rs t a dd re ss the ra ng e of punis hme nt. * * * I t is our posi ti on that [a

pp e lla nt] w a s c on vic te d n ot o f r ob be ry , b ut t he ft fr om a person,- - [TH E CO UR T]: R ig ht. [ T H E D E F E N S E ] : –

w h i c h i s a

n o n - a g g r a v a t e d

s t a t e - j a i l f e l o n y. [ T H E C O U R T ] : W h i c h i s a s t a t e - j a i l f e l o n y; o k ay. [THE DEFEN SE] : Non-ag g ravated. [TH E CO UR T]: R ig ht. [TH E D EF EN SE]: T hat’ s im po rt ant. An d the no tic e that w a s g ive n to [ap pe lla nt] i n the indictment, and also in the subseque nt motions that have be en filed,-

- [THE COURT] : Ba sed on the fac t that he was indicte d for r obbery , and that the jury c a me ba c k w itha

le sse r- inc lud e d. Al l r ig ht. [THE DEFEN SE] : But my point is t hat the notice provided to him was that it was an enhanc ement, and it’s-

- [ T H E C O U R T ] : T o a

r o b b e r y. [TH E D EF EN SE]: R ig ht. [THE COURT] : Not to the theft of [sic] person. [THE DEFEN SE] : Not to the theft from a person.Pelache --9

15 The trial c ourt later pointed out that the State was not r elying on this portion of § 12.35(c ) to e nh anc e a

pp e lla nt’ s p un ish me nt. [THE COURT] : But the jury found him gu i l t y of the thef t of [si c] a person, w hich was a lesser- included of the indictment. Go ahea d. [TH E D EF EN SE]: A nd

my argume nt i s th a t th a t is no t pr op e r no tic e to [a pp e lla nt] beca use he w as not g iven notice that i n t h e event he was found guiltyof a nona g g ra vate d s tate -j a il f

e lony , th a t th e state wo uld be se e kin g to n ot e nh anc e , b ut t o e nh anc e the le ve l of

the offe ns e fr om a

no n- a g g ra

vate d to an a g g ra

vate d s ta te -j a il felony

. So b e c a

u s e o f th a t la c k o f n o ti c e , it is o u r p o s it io n , Y o u r H o n o r , th a t the ra ng e of punis hme nt that he ’s su bje c te d to is n ot l e ss t

ha n s ix mon ths in a

state -j a il f a c i l i t y an d

n o tm o r e t h ant w o ye ar s i na s t a t e - j a i l f a c i l i t y. I f the Court is not inclined to follow my argument, then it is my

position t hat the nonag g ravated state-ja il felony that he wa s convicted of may be enha nced to athirddeg ree felony , but not more than a third-deg ree felony . That’s ba sed on Art. 12.35 (c) , which states the f

ollowing: “A n individual a djudge d g uilty of a state-jail fe lony sh a ll b e punis he d for

a thi rd de g re e if it i s sh ow n o n th e tr ia l of the of fe ns e that a deadly wea pon, as def

ined by Sec. 107 [sic] , was used or exhibi ted.” 15 Af te r t he tr ia l court state d tha t it wa s “in c lin e d to ag re e wi th the state ,” a pp e lla nt a lte rn a tiv e ly

argue d th a t hi s se nte nc e sh ou ld n ot b e e nh anc e d to mor e tha n a thi rd -d e g re e fe lony

ra ng e un de r s ta te law bec ause there was “only one [ prior] conviction, really ” si nce the convictions “oc curr ed on the same date.” [THE COURT] : Okay . I ’m g oing to–I ’m looking at the case law they ’ve g iven me, and ac cordingto the case law, “T here is no require ment that a prior f elony conviction used to enha

nce punishment for

a state- jail felony

to a sec ond-d egre e fe lony punishment under a statute permitting suc h enhanc ement if de fenda nt has bee n once befor e convic ted of a

felony be final prior to t he commission of the additional prior (3 ) ( g ) f e lony us e d f or ini tia l e nh anc e me nt o f p un ish me nt fo r t he pr ima ry state -j a il felony to the third-deg ree felony punishment, although both the pr ior convictions for the (3) ( g ) fe lony

and the onc e [sic] befor e convicted felony must be final before the commission of the primary state-jail fe lony .” A n d both of these we re f inal felony prior convic tions prior to the commission of t he st ate- jail. So I am inclined to agree with the state that it is a second- deg ree , and that the e nhance ment is good. * * * [TH E DE F EN SE]: We wo uld ob je c t to that f

ind ing . I t is our p os iti on

that th is i s aPelache --10

16 See also Pe lache , 294 S.W .3d at 253-54 (V ela, J., diss enting ) (“ Her e, Pelac he did not object be fo re the tr ia l c ourt

or argue in h is m oti on

fo r n e w tri a l tha t eith e r the no tic e to h im that th e State wa s se e kin g to e nh anc e his se nte nc e , or the pr oc e ss of e nh anc inghis se nte nc e vio la te d h is r ig ht t o due proc ess under

either state or fe dera l constit u t i o nal g rounds. I n the context in which Pelache lodge d his objection, he di d not clea rly convey to the t rial court ‘the pre cise a nd proper application of the lawas we ll as the underlying rationale .’ Thus, Pelache did not put the trial court on notice that it should consider whethe r enha nceme nt of his punishment from a state- jail fe l o n y t o a sec onddeg ree felony

violated his r ight to due proce ss. N othing in the r ecor d sug g ests that the trial cour t was awa re of Pelache ’s ar g ument that enhanc ement of his punishment from a sta t e- j ail felony

to a second- deg ree felony

violated his rig ht to due proce ss.”) (c itation omit ted). matter that s h o u l d be enha nced, if any , to a third-deg ree . The c onvictions that the state is relying upon a

re two c onvictions that occurr ed on the same date, that we re prosec uted on the same date, a nd that wer e sente nced on the same date. Ther efor e, they ar e n o t p r io r

–th e r e ’ s o n ly

o n e c o n v ic ti o n , r e a ll y , th a t t h e r e is b e c a

u s e they occur red a s a result of one criminal transa ction, and he w as sentenc ed pursua nt to one criminal proc eeding . There fore , they are not separate convictions; they are one. Th e tr ia l c ourt

se nte nc e d a

pp e lla nt t o th e ma ximums e c o n d -d e g re e -f e lony se nte nc e of

tw e nty
y ear s in prison. [TH E CO UR T] : I ’m going to f ind that th is i s e nh anc e d to a se c on d- de g re e , tw o to twenty , and I ’m g oing to se ntence y our client at this time to twenty y ear s in the Texas Depa rtment of Criminal J ustice, Institut ional Division. I ’ll g ive him cre dit for any and all jail time he’s a lrea dy serve d. And I

will note y our objec tion. Citi ng to the fore g oing e mphasized portions of ap p el lant’s objections just before the punishment hearingbeg an, the c ourt of appe als, with one justice dis senting , decide d that appellant
prese rved the claim that t he S tate’s April 23, 2008 enhanc ement noti ce was unt imely and violated due proc ess bec ause a

ppellant’s “spe cific g rounds were appare nt from the context.” See P elachev. Sta te , 2 94 S.W. 3d

24 8, 25 0 n .2 (Tex .Ap p. –Cor pu s Ch ri sti 20 09 ). Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls a lso 16 decide d that appellant’ s due-pr ocess rights were violate d when his sentenc e wa s enhanc ed with the
ag g ravated-robbe ry

conviction (c ause no. 00- CR- 5 2 2 -D ) s et out in the State’s April 23, 2008 enhanc ement notice See P elache , 294 S.W .3d at 252. The c ourt of appe als reve rsed the trial court’ sPelache --11

17 Our re view of the rec ord indicate s that the State filed its enhanc ement notice ( April 23, 2008) six teen da y s befor e the punishment hea ring (May 9, 2008).
18 This seems to be differe nt from the due-pr ocess claim that appellant presented in the court of appe als. Appellant claimed in point of error five in the c ourt of appe als that the trial cour t erre d in sentencinghim as a sec ond-deg ree felon be cause “the notice to appellant t h at t h e S t ate wa s se e kin g to e nh anc e his se nte nc e vio la te d a pp e lla nt’ s r ig ht t o D ue Pr oc e ss. ” Ap pe lla nt c la ime d in po int of e rr or six that th e “ pr oc e ss o f e nh anc inga pp e lla nt’ s se nte nc e vio la te d a

pp e lla nt’ s r ig ht t o Du e Pr oc e ss. ” I n h is b ri e f, a pp e lla nt a rgue d th a t: se nte nc e and

re mand e d th e c a se fo r a new punis hme nt h e ari ngwi th i ns tr uc tio ns “ to a sse ss a p u n i s h m en t without reg ard to the two imprope rly noticed enha

nceme nt alleg ations” set out in the State’s September

23, 2008 enhanc ement notice. See P elache , 294 S.W .3d at 253. We gr anted r eview of

the following two g rounds in the State’s petition for discr etionary revie w: 1. Di d th e a

pp e lla nt p ro pe rl y

pres erve err or

in f a ili ngto o bje c t to the mot ion to e nh anc e punis hme nt o n th e g ro un ds of du e pr oc e ss? 2. Did the cour

t of ap p ea l s correctly

hold that appellant’s due proce ss rig hts were violated when the State filed a motion to enhanc e punishment two day s befor e the punis hme nt p ha se of

tr ia l? 17
We w ill dec line to a ddress the State’s first g round for r eview a nd will assume that appellant
prese rved a claim that it violated due proce ss f or the State to e nhance his se ntence with t he Septem b er 5 , 2 0 00 ag g ravated-robbe ry conviction (c ause no. 00- CR-522-D) set out in the State’s April 23, 2008 motion for enha nceme nt. Addressing what it considere d to be the mer its of the fede ral constitut ional due-pr ocess claims prese nted i n appellant’ s brief, the court of a ppeals de cided that the “ba sic due proc ess violation in this case is of [appellant’s] right to know the nature of the [enhance ment] charg es he is ac cused of and the c onsequenc es of a conviction bef

ore je opardy attache s.” See P elache , 294 S.W .3d at 252. The c ourt of appe als furthe r sug g ested that thi s notice 18Pelache --12

[He] could not have known what a lleg ations he wa s to d ef en d aga inst nor does he kn owno w wh at alle g a tio ns the tr ia l cou rt fo un d to be tr

ue . T he no tic e and

pr oc e ss vio la te d a pp e lla nt’ s r ig ht t o D ue Pr oc e ss.
19 I n support of this stateme nt, the court of appea ls c ited to a Fifth Circuit dec ision in United States v. Stee n , 55 F .3 d 10 22 , 10 27 (5 Cir

. 19 95 ). We n ote , h ow e ve r, that Steen applied a statutory th provision in the Comprehensive Dr ug Abuse Preve ntion and Control Act of 19 7 0 th a t r e q uired notice of pr e vio us c on vic tio ns fo r se nte nc e e nh anc e me nt p ur po se s “ thr ou g h a

n in fo rm a tio n f

ile d p ri or to trial.” Se e id

. Steen , th e re fo re , c ann ot b e re a d f or th e pro po si ti on

that th is n oti c e is a lso constitutionally

require d for pur

poses of fe dera l constituti onal due pr ocess. must be provided “

prior to tr ial .” Se e id . (empha sis in original). I t is well settled, however , that 19 due proc ess does not require pretria l notice “that the t rial on the s ubstantive offe nse wil l be followed b y an h a b it u a l c r im in a l p r ocee ding.” S ee O yler v . Boles , 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962) (“ a def endant
must rece ive re asonable notice and a n opportunity

to be hea rd re lative to the re cidivist charg e eve n if due p r o c e s s d o e s n o t r e qu ir e th a t n o ti c e b e g iv e np r io r to th e tr ia l o nth e s u

b s ta n ti v e o f f e nse”) ; Vi lle sc as v . S tat e , 1 89 S.W. 3d

29 0, 29 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) (“ wh e n a def e nd ant ha s n o d e fe ns e to the enhanc ement alleg ation and has not sug g ested the ne ed for a continuanc e in orde r to prepa re one, notice g iven at the be g inning of the punishment phase satisfies the fede ral c onstitut ion”). I n Oyler v. Boles , the Un ite d State s Su pr e me Court

a dd re sse d th e du e -p ro c e ss r e qu ir e me nts in r e la tion to not ic e of

e nh anc e me nt a lle g a tio ns . In th a t c a se , th e de fe nd ants we re se nte nc e d to mandatory

life sentences p u rs u ant to West Virginia’ s “three strikes” e nhance ment scheme

. See Oyler , 368 U.S. at 449. The e n h ancements wer e set out by “information filed ‘immediately upon conviction and be fore sentenc e.’” Se e id . The de fenda nts arg ued that their due -proc ess rig hts were violated by

depriving them of notice suf ficient to af

ford them the oppor

tunity to prepa re f or and defe nd ag ainst the enhanc ement alleg ations. Se e id . T he Sup re me Court re je c te d th e de fe nd a nts ’ claims and a

pproved of

the pra cti ce , ev en t h o ug h notice wa s “first broug ht home to the acc usedPelache --13

wh e n, a ft e r c on vic tio n o n th e su bs tantive of

fe ns e bu t be fo re se nte nc ing , th e [enha nc e me nt] information [was] read to him in open court . . . .” S e e O y le r , 36 8 U .S. a t 45 0- 51 . T he Sup re me Court he ld t hat w hil e so me fo rm

of no tic e wa s r e qu ir e d, the no tic e di d no t have to b e g ive n in advanc e of tria l. See O

yler , 368 U.S. at 452 (“a defe ndant must rece ive re asonable notice and a n opportunity

to be hea rd re lative to the re ci d i v i s t char g e eve n if due proc ess does not re quire that notice be g iven prior to the tria l on the substantive offe nse”)

. I n addition, this C ourt addre ssed the issue of pr oper notice in Villescas , 189 S.W .3d at 290. I n that case , the State gav e n o t i ce of its intent to use enhanc ements six day s befor e trial. See Villescas , 189 S.W .3d at 291. At the punishment he aring , the def endant objec ted that the notice w as untimely

. Se e id . During the hea ring , the State offe red a

set o f t h e d ef

en d ant’s finge rprints to be used t o compar e with those found on the prior felony convictions. Se e id . The de fenda nt expressed confusion about the fing erpr int c omparison and claimed that de fense counsel ha d not expl ained the
proce ss to him. Se e id . The pro ce ed ings w ere postponed for a wee k. Se e id . When the hear ing

commence d, defe nse counse l acknowle dg ed that the de fenda nt now understood the c omparison
proce ss, but neither the defenda nt nor his counsel re quested more time to prepar e a de fense

. See Villescas , 189 S.W .3d at 292. On re view, this Court found that “notice of enhanc ements only

had to satisfy constitutional safeguards” and upheld the tr ial court’s judg ment that notice to the def endant was suff icient. See V

illescas , 189 S.W. 3d a t 295. Thus , for pu rp os e s of co nd

uc tin g a du e -p ro c e ss analy sis, the determina

ti o n o f whe ther prope r notice of enhanc ements wa s g iven does not re quire that notice be g iven within a par ticular pe riod of time befor e trial or befor e the g uilt phase is completed. See V illescas , 189 S.W .3d at 294. The issue of w hether

appellant’ s sentence can be enhanc ed should not turn on whether he wa sPelache --14

20 I n Villescas , the cour

t of appea ls applied the har

m analy sis for non-c onstitut ional err or under T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b) af ter de cidingthat the State’s enhance ment notice filed six day s befor e trial was unti mely

. See V

illescas , 1 8 9 S

. W

. 3 d a t 2 9 2

. R e l y i n g o n s t a tu t e s e n t i t l i n g a p p o i n te d d e fe ns e counsel ten d ay s t o prepa re f or trial and to r espond to an amended indictment or infor mation, the court of appea ls essentially decide d, as a matter of state l aw, that the S tate shoul d have pr ovided the enhanc ement notice te n day s befor e trial. S e e V il lescas , 1 8 9 S

. W.3d at 292 & n.4. This Court de c ide d o n d isc re tio na

ry re vie w that th e so ur c e of th is no tic e re qu ir e me nt i s n ot s ta te law, bu t is “roote d in due proc ess” a nd that the def

endant wa s g iven consti t u t i o n all y adequate notice of

the State’s enha

nceme nt notice. See V

illescas , 189 S.W .3d at 294-95. I n Villescas , this Court st ated: convicted of

the g reater c harg ed off

ense or of a le sser-inc luded offe nse of this cha rg ed off ense. The issue is whether a

ppellant re ceive d sufficie nt notice of the e nhance ments s o that he had a n op po rt un ity to p re pa re a de fe ns e to the m. An d we se e no re a so n wh y a dif fe re nt r ule sh ou ld a

pp ly in case s such as this wher e a de fenda nt is convicted of a

lesser- includ ed o ff

en s e of the char g ed

o f f e n s e . F i n a l l y, t h e p art i e s h a v e n o tc i t e d an y a u t h o r i t i e s o r

a d v an c e d

an y ar g u m e n t s w h y a differ ent rule should apply in these circ umstances. An applicat i o n of the a fore mentioned ca ses leads us to conc lude that the State’s Apr il 23, 2008 e n h an c e me n t n o ti c e w a s s u f f ic ie n t to p u t a

p p e ll an t o n n o ti c e o f “ th e n a tu r e of the [enhance ment] charg es he [was] acc used of.” I n deter mining whether appellant rec eived suff icient notice of the State’s intent to enhanc e punishment, we look to the re cord to identify whether

a pp e lla nt’ s d e fe ns e wa s im

pa ir e d b y the tim ingof

the State ’s no tic e . Simila r t o th e de fe nd a nts in Oyler and Villescas , appellant did not re quest a c ontinuance, a ppear surprised by the alleg ations, or

argue that he wa s unp re pa re d to de fe nd

a g a ins t th e pr ior

c on vic tio n a lle g a tio ns . In f a c t, w e have he ld that “whe n a def

endant ha s no defe nse to the enha nceme nt alleg ation and has not sug g ested the ne ed fo r a c on tin ua nc e in o rd e r t o p re pa

re on e , n oti c e g ive n at th e be g inn ingof t he pun ish me nt p ha se satisfies the fe dera l constituti on.” See V illescas , 189 S.W .3d at 294. 20Pelache --15

I n light of our prior case s and the Supre me Court’s dec ision in Oyler , we c onclude that the notice r equire ment

. . . is of constit utional orig in, and we hold that the Court of Ap pe a l s e r

r e d i ni mp l i e d l y

c o n c l u d i n g o t h e r

w i s e . F o r

t h i s r e a s o n , w e a lso disavow the a

pp el l at e co urt’s attac hment of spec ial signific ance to the time period of t en day s. . . . The ult imate questi on is whether c onstitut ionally adequate notice wa s g ive n. We l ike wi se re

je c t th e a pp e llate c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that th e re levan t ti me period for

deter mining prope r n o t i ce is the period bef ore tria l. Under Oyler , due pr oc e ss d oe s n ot ev e n re qu ir e that the no tic e be g ive n be fo re the g uil t ph a se be g ins , much less that it b e given a number of da

y s befor e trial. And limiting the notice period to “be fore trial” ig nores the possibility that the t rial cour t could take mea sures to cure the notice pr oblem by g ranting a continuanc e–an option Oyler e xpre ssl y c on te mpl a te s. See V illescas , 189 S.W .3d at 294. Th e c o u rt o f a

p p e a ls s e e ms a ls o to h a v e d e c id e d th a t it v io late d d u e p r o c e s s th a t, when appellant r ejec ted the State’s plea -bar g ain of fe r befor e jeopa

rdy attache d to the robber

y offe nse, appellant ha d no notice that his sentenc e could be enhance d with other prior convictions, in addition to the one alleg ed in the enhanceme nt “count” in the indictment, in the e vent that he wa s convicted of the lesse r-include d, state-jail-f elony offe nse of theft fr om a per son. See P elache , 294 S.W .3d at 252 (a ba sic due-pr ocess violation in this case wa s appellant’s r ight to know “the conseque nces of

a c on vic tio n b e fo re je op ard y a tta c he s” ); see also Kolender v . Lawson , 4 6 1 U. S

. 3 5 2, 357 (1983) (pena l statute require d to “ define the criminal offe nse with suf ficient definitene ss that ordinary
pe op le c an und e rs tand

wh a t c on du c t is pr oh ibi te d” ); Cue lla r v . S tate , 7 0 S.W .3 d

8 1 5 , 8 2 2 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( a p e r s o n is e n ti tl e d to b e in f o r me d o f w h a t th e la

w c o mm an d s o r f

o r b id s )

. We note that, when a

ppellant re

jected the State’s plea- barg ain offe r, appe llant had actual not ice that the State would seek to e nhance his sentence with at least one pr ior conviction. We also note that the applicable statutes did inform appellant, befor e he reje cted the State’s plea- barg ain offe r and be fore jeopar dy attache d to the robber

y offe nse, that he w as subj ect to sentenc e enhance ment with any otherPelache --16

21 An d o n th is r e c or d, we mus t pr e su me that a pp e lla nt’ s c ouns el adv ise d a

pp e lla nt o f t his possibili ty

. Cf. Bo ne v . S tat e , 77 S.W .3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). prior convictions under § 12.35(c) (2)( A) a nd under § 12.42( a)( 3) in the eve nt that he was c onvicted of the lesser- included, state-jail-f elony offe nse of theft fr om a per son. Se e Ex pa rteMc Cur

ry , 175 21 S.W. 3d 78 4, 78 5 n.1 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ) (a pp lic a ble statut e s put i nma

te on no tic e that a

pa ro le
pa ne l c ou ld i mpo se a s a

c on dit ion of mand a tor y su pe rv isi on any c on dit ion that a c ourt may imp os e

on a de fe nd ant place d o n c omm un ity su pe rv isi on ). Th e State ’s se c on d g ro un d f or re vie w i s sustained. The judg ment of the c ourt of appe als is reve rsed, a nd the case is r emande d there for f urther
proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion.

H e r v e y , J

.

Deliver ed: Novembe r 3, 2010 Pub lis h