#### Chain Belt Company, Appellant, vs. Von Spreckelsen and others, Respondents.

*December 17,*1902

March *21, 1903.*

*Preliminary injunction: Dissolution: Discretion: Master and, servant: Restraining employee from quitting service.*

1. Although the essential allegations of the complaint are denied hy the answer, it is within the discretionary power of the court to continue in force a preliminary injunctional order and thus *107preserve the *status quo*until the termination of the litigation; and this should *be done, upon such terms as will reasonably protect the defendant’s rights, if otherwise the object of the action may be defeated and the plaintiff suffer irreparable injury.

2. In an action to restrain an expert mechanic and mechanical engineer, under contract of employment with plaintiff, from entering into the service of another company, the complaint alleged that he had, by reason of his employment with plaintiff, acquired peculiar knowledge of all the records, designs, patterns, models, etc., which had been worked out by and for the plaintiff and belonged exclusively to it and were used in its manufacturing business, and had come to know all the secret methods and valuable secrets pertaining to such business, and so was possessed of knowledge and skill in regard to such business which was possessed to the same extent by no other man, the benefit of which he was wrongfully about to give to said other company. His verified answer denied, however, that he knew any secrets or secret methods pertaining to the business or that by reason of his employment with plaintiff he had acquired any peculiar knowledge or skill pertaining to its business or its records, drawings, patterns, models, etc., except such as would be acquired by any person in the same position, and alleged that before he entered plaintiff’s service he had been employed by the company which originated the business and had there acquired his knowledge and skill and had freely given plaintiff the benefit thereof, and that such knowledge and skill were possessed by many other men, some of whom were still in plaintiff’s employ. Upon a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunctional order there was no attempt to dispute such statements of the answer. *Held,*that there was no abuse of discretion in dissolving the order.

Appeal from an order of tbe circuit court for Milwaukee county: WabeeN D. TaeeaNt, Circuit Judge.

*Affirmed.*

Tbe complaint alleges, in effect, tbe incorporation of tbe plaintiff under tbe laws of tbis state, and tbat during tbe last ten years it bad been, and still is, engaged in business at Milwaukee in tbe manufacture and sale of chain belt links and similar products; tbat tbe defendant corporation was organized under tbe laws of tbis state a few weeks prior to tbe commencement of tbis action, for tbe purpose, among other things, of manufacturing chain belt and chain belt *108links; that tbe other defendants were officers of that corporation; that *Von Spreokelsen*bad agreed with tbe other defendants to become tbe manager of that corporation. It then alleges that tbe plaintiff entered upon tbe business of making such' chain belt and chain belt links, of malleable iron, in 1891, in a small way, in Milwaukee; that its business has grown ever since, and during tbe last year has been of tbe value of $200,000, and was very profitable, and that tbe plaintiff has a very large and extensive trade in such business; that such belts are used, among other things, for tbe transmission of power upon and through tbe use of sprocket wheels; that, in order to be practicable and valuable and marketable, such chain belt and links must be designed and manufactured with extreme nicety and accuracy; that many thousand different designs for such belts and links have been worked out by and for the plaintiff, and belong exclusively to it; that complete, accurate, and minute records of the designs, models, arid patterns have been and are preserved in books, drawings, designs, and prints by the plaintiff; that such links can be duplicated from such records, drawings, and models by any one possessing the requisite mechanical skill; ■that *Von Spreokelsen*is, and for many years last past has been, an expert mechanical engineer and an expert mechanic, and ever since 1892 has been, and still is, in the employ of the plaintiff, and as such has had exclusive charge, custody, and control of all such designs, drawings, prints, gauges, patterns, and models, and of the construction of all such patterns and models, and has kept and had custody and control of all the records, and has had and has exclusive control and charge of the pattern department of the plaintiff, and has had cognizance of the manufacture of all the output and product of the plaintiff; that for many years last past the plaintiff has had all the castings of such chain belt and chain belt links made by the Northwestern Malleable Iron Com*109pany, certain of whose stockholders at all times were, ánd still are, largely interested in the plaintiff; that in the manufacture of such eastings the molds therefor were made by the Northwestern Malleable Iron Company from the patterns so belonging to the plaintiff; that, by reason of such employment, *Von Spreckelsen*had prior to July 11, 1900,, acquired, and then had, and ever since has had, and now has, peculiar knowledge of all and singular the said matters of such records, designs, drawings, prints, gauges, patterns, and models, and peculiar skill in the reproduction thereof, and in the manufacture of chain belt and chain belt links therefrom, and came to know, and still knows, all of the secret methods and valuable secrets of and pertaining to the business, and came to know, and now knows, all the matters of detail regarding the manufacture and disposition of such output of the plaintiff from the incipiency of the respective designs up to the completion, and respecting the sale and shipment of the finished product, and so has acquired and has knowledge and skill in regard to said manufacturing business which is possessed to the same extent and completeness by no other man. The complaint then alleges that shortly before July 11, 1900, *Von Spreckelsen*suggested to the plaintiff that he proposed to leave its employ, and thereupon, and in order to continue his service, and to enable the plaintiff to avail itself for a term of years of such services, and to secure to this plaintiff exclusively the services and knowledge and skill of *Von*Spreckelsen, and to preclude him from using any of his knowledge or skill for the benefit of any competitor of the plaintiff, *Von Spreckelsen*made and entered into a written contract as follows:

“.Milwaukee, Wis., July 11, 1900.

“I hereby agree to work for and take charge the1 pattern work of *Chain Belt Go.*and faithfully perform all duties connected with my work, and any other reasonable mechan*110ical duties required of me by said company and keep all gauges and records and models so tbat tbey will be saved as far as witbin my power solely for tbe use of said company. My compensation to be 42J cents per bour for all regular time, and all over time at tbe same rate per bour. Pay every month. Tbis agreement to be and remain in force for tbe term of three years, with tbe understanding tbat said *Chain Belt Co.*may renew tbis agreement for two years more at tbeir option after tbe said three years expire.

“GEORGE VoN SprecicglseN.

“Accepted. *Chain Belt*Co., by O. W. Levalley, President. duly 11, 1900.”

It is then alleged tbat May 13, 1901, owing to some mistakes and misunderstandings, tbe plaintiff and *Von Spreckel-sen*made and executed and entered into a further contract, written upon tbe back of tbe agreement of July 11, 1900, as follows:

“Beferring to contract on opposite side of tbis sheet. It is mutually agreed between *Mr. George Von Spreckelsen*and *Chain Belt*Company, tbe parties to said contract, tbat tbis said contract shall be extended to cover tbe time up to July 1st, 1904, with tbe same rate of payment of 42-^ cent's per hour, but *Mr. George Von Spreckelsen*agrees to recognize tbe authority óf and obey tbe instructions of Mr. Donald Eraser, tbe present superintendent of *Chain Belt Company,*cheerfully and willingly, and will obey any other superintendent who may be appointed by said *Chain Belt Company*or obey tbe orders of tbe constituted officers of said *Chain Belt Company*cheerfully and willingly and do all in tbe power of said *George Von Spreckelsen*to further tbe interest of said *Chain Belt Company*without any turmoil or bad feeling, and do said *Chain Belt Company*no injury and keep safely and inviolate all records and tools, models, gauges, materials and supplies tbat have been intrusted to him and turn them over to said *Chain Belt Company*upon their demand.

“In additional consideration for tbe foregoing at tbe full completion of tbis contract and agreement tbe said *Chain Belt Company*will pay unto the said *George Von Spreckelsen*tbe *111sum of two hundred dollars ($200) as a further bonus for such good conduct and faithfulness on July 1st, 1904.

“Signed this 13th day of May, 1901.

“Geo. YoN Speeceexsen. [Seal.]

“ChaiN Belt Co.

“By C. W. Levaxley, Pres’t.”

It is alleged that the plaintiff performed all the conditions of both such contracts on its part, and *Yon Bpreckelsen*did also until June 11, 1902; that June 5, 1902, *Von Bpreckel-sen*notified the plaintiff in writing that he would cease performance on his part of such contracts July 15, 1902; that the plaintiff denied his right to terminate such contracts, and insisted upon his continuance.

The complaint then alleges that the defendant the president of the defendant corporation had been for many years a confidential clerk of the Northwestern Malleable Iron Company, and while thus engaged learned of the profitable character of the plaintiff’s business and the fact that *Yon Spreck-elsen*had acquired and possessed peculiar knowledge of the plaintiff’s business aforesaid; that the several defendants, knowing the facts and circumstances mentioned, combined, confederated, ánd conspired together to organize a corporation, and through it to fraudulently secure the trade of the plaintiff, and supplant it in the market, by making goods that should be in appearance identical with the 'product of the plaintiff, and by suggesting, by means of the name of such new corporation and otherwise, that the goods of such new corporation were the goods which had theretofore been known as the goods of the plaintiff, and which had, by reason of their superior excellence, acquired and now have a high reputation in the market, and did combine, confederate, and conspire together, and with other persons unknown to the plaintiff, to impede, hamper, and impair the plaintiff in the conduct of its business, and cripple it and destroy its efficiency, and, to that end, conspired and confederated together *112to wrongfully and unlawfully seduce from its employment *Von Bpreclcelsen,*and to wrongfully and unlawfully induce *Von Bpreclcelsen*to refuse to fulfill and carry out said contracts on bis part, and to leave tbe service of tbe plaintiff and enter upon a similar service for tbe defendants and tbe defendant corporation; that in furtherance of sucb conspiracy tbe defendant corporation was, May 17, 1902, incorporated by tbe individual defendants, wbo were officers thereof, and thereupon wrongfully and unlawfully induced *Von Bpreclcel-sen*to enter into an agreement with that corporation to serve as its superintendent and manager, and to give it tbe benefit of bis peculiar knowledge and skill, and of tbe secrets of the plaintiff, and of its records, drawings, prints, designs, patterns, and models aforesaid; that tbe defendants threaten and give out that on and after July 15, 1902, they will enter upon sucb business, and that *Von Bpreclcelsen*will then leave tbe employ of tbe plaintiff and enter tbe employment of tbe defendant corporation, and give to it tbe benefit of labor, time, knowledge, and skill, and tbe secrets of tbe plaintiff’s business" so obtained; that *“Von Bpreclcelsen*has not sufficient pecuniary resources to respond to any judgment for damages for breach of sucb contract,” and that unless tbe court intervened with an order of injunction, restraining tbe carrying out and consummation of sucb conspiracy, tbe plaintiff would be remediless and would suffer great and irreparable damage ; that tbe plaintiff bad notified tbe individual defendants, before bringing this action, of its claim in tbe premises, but they refused to desist.

Upon sucb complaint, verified by tbe president of tbe plaintiff corporation June 13, 1902, a temporary injunction was granted by a court commissioner on tbe same day. To sucb complaint tbe defendants made answer, duly verified by *Von Spreckelsen,*June 20, 1902, wherein they admitted certain formal allegations of' tbe complaint, and denied many other allegations, and especially denied that *Von Spreckelsen**113was to become tbe manager of tbe defendant corporation, or that be was in tbe employ of tbe plaintiff, or bas control or charge of tbe pattern department of tbe plaintiff, or any of its designs, prints, gauges, drawings, patterns, or models, or bas bad cognizance of tbe manufacture of all of tbe output and product of tbe plaintiff. And tbe answer, among other tilings, alleges, in effect, that *Von Spreckelsen*was a stock-bolder and director in tbe defendant corporation, and bad, prior to tbe commencement of this action, agreed witb it to serve it for a term of years as its superintendent and mechanical engineer, and bad entered upon sucb duties; that tbe enormous profits realized by tbe plaintiff in its business, as alleged in tbe complaint, were largely due to an unlawful combination between tbe plaintiff and other manufacturers in restraint of trade, by means of which tbe price of sucb products was greatly enhanced to tbe consumer; that tbe defendant corporation intends to enter into competition witb sucb trade and business; that tbe plaintiff possesses a full and complete equipment of sucb patterns, models, gauges, drawings, prints, and records used by it in its business, and that tbe same are substantially similar to, and practically duplicates of, tbe patterns, models, gauges, drawings, designs, prints, and records used by other manufacturers of chain belt and chain links; that while *Von Spreckelsen*was so in tbe employ of tbe plaintiff tbe duties performed and services rendered related solely to tbe production of tbe patterns from which tbe plaintiff’s goods were manufactured, and that be occupied tbe inferior and subordinate position of foreman of that single department of tbe plaintiff’s extensive manufacturing establishment; that tbe defendant corporation intends to manufacture its own patterns and models and its own castings of chain belt and chain belt links, as well as other malleable iron castings, to supply tbe general market.

Tbe answer specially denies that *Von*Spreckelsen, while in tbe plaintiff’s employ, acquired any peculiar knowledge of any *114matters of its business, or records, designs, drawings, prints, gauges, patterns, or models except snob as would ordinarily be acquired by any person in the same position, and alleges that the same knowledge is possessed by other persons still in the employ of the plaintiff; and the answer further denies that, by reason of such employment with the plaintiff, *Von Spreck-elsen*acquired or possessed any peculiar skill in the reproduction of such records, drawings, designs, prints, patterns, gauges, and models, or in the manufacture of chain belt and chain belt links therefrom, or that he knows any secrets or secret methods of the plaintiff, valuable or otherwise, or that there are any such appertaining to the business, or that *Von Spreckelsen*came to know or knows the details of the plaintiff’s business, or has acquired or has knowledge or skill in regard to said business or such business superior to that of all other men.

The answer further alleges, in effect, that *Von*Spreckelsen, for a long time prior to entering into the plaintiff’s employ, was employed as foreman of the pattern and machine department of the Ewart Manufacturing Company of Indianapolis, Indiana, which company was the originator and first manufacturer of chain belt and chain links such as the plaintiff now makes, and which company was the founder of the chain belt business, and is now the largest manufacturer of such products in the world, and that while he was so employed he acquired his knowledge, experience, and skill in the making of all records, drawings, designs, gauges, prints, patterns, and models appertaining to the manufacture of chain belt and chain links, and the reproduction thereof, and of the methods of such manufacture, and the disposition, sale, and shipment of such products, which knowledge *Von Spreckelsen*brought with him when he entered the employ of the plaintiff, and has freely and fully given to the plaintiff the benefit and advantage thereof, which knowledge and skill are possessed by many other men engaged in the same line of business, and *115that the assistant of *Von Spreckelsen*while in the employ of the plaintiff, and who is now employed by it, and is now performing for the plaintiff the services formerly rendered by *Von Spreckelsen,*is capable of discharging the duties of that position, with the aid of the records, designs, drawings, prints, gauges, patterns, and models prepared by or under the direction of *Von Spreckelsen,*and now in the possession of the plaintiff; that in pursuance of a demand of the plaintiff, made June 11, 1902, *Von Spreckelsen*surrendered and delivered up to it all records, designs, drawings, prints, gauges, patterns, and models in his possession, and the same were taken from him by the plaintiff, and *Von Spreckelsen.*thereupon permanently quit the service of the plaintiff, and réfused longer to continue in such employment.

Upon such verified answer and the complaint the plaintiff was ordered to show cause why such injunctional order should not be wholly vacated and set aside, or at least modified. In resisting such motion an affidavit of the plaintiff’s president was presented to the court, in effect denying such unlawful combination to enhance prices, or that the plaintiff was ever connected with such combination to prevent competition, and especially denying that *Von Spreckelsen*was ever required to work on Sunday, or anything more than the usual and ordinary number of hours a day, and that whatever extra and unusual work he performed was voluntarily performed by him, and for which he received extra pay.

Upon the hearing of such motion, and upon the complaint and verified answer and' such affidavits, the court on July 7, 1902, ordered that such temporary injunction be, and the same was thereby, wholly dissolved, vacated, and set aside, with costs of motion. Erom that order the plaintiff brings this appeal.

Eor the appellant there was a brief by *Quarles,, Spence &*Quarles, and oral argument by *George Lines.*

They contended, *.inter alia,*that where a contract'stipulates for per*116sonal services wbicb involve skill, knowledge, or ability, an injunction will be granted at tbe request of tbe employer to restrain tbe employee from rendering services elsewhere, when irreparable injury will be caused tbe employer by such violation of contract. Pomeroy, Spec. Perf. §§ 24, 25; *Singer 8. M. Go. v. Union B. H.*& *E. Go.*1 Holmes, 253, Fed. Oas. No. 12,904; High, Injunctions, § 1164; *Gort v. Lassard,*18 Oreg. 221, 6 L. R. A. 653. Thus, injunctions have been granted to restrain a singer or actor under contract from violating tbe contract and performing elsewhere. *Lum-ley v. Wagner,*1 De Gex, M. & G. 604; *Daly v. Smith,*49 How. Pr. 150 — 7, 6 Jones *&*S. 166; *Mc-Gaull v. Braham,*16-Fed. 37, and cases in note; *Hayes v. Willio,*11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 167; *Duff v. Bussell,*14 N. T. Supp. 134, affirmed, 133 N. Y. 678; *Pratt v. Monfegriffo,*10 N. Y. Supp. 903, 25 Abb. N. O. 334; *Hoyt v. Fuller,*19 N. Y. Supp. 962; *Ganary v. Bussell,*9 N. Y. Mise. 558, 30 N. Y. Supp. 122. So baseball players have been enjoined from contracting with rival employers. *Metropolitan E. Go. v. Ward,*9 N. Y. Supp. 779; *Columbus B. B. Glub v. Beiley,*25 Law Pull. 385, 11 Ohio Dec. R. 272. So it is held that a painter employed by photographers may be enjoined from violating bis contract and engaging with competitors. *Fredriclcs v. Mayer,*13 How. Pr. 566. Where plaintiff contracted with a theater manager for the use of his theater and for his services in the production of a play, plaintiff may enjoin him from assisting, advertising, or managing any other play or putting the theater to any other use during the period covered by the contract. *Lacey v. Heuch,*9 Ohio Dec. R. 347. The limitation seems to be that when the services to be rendered are such as any one can render, injunction will not lie, but will when the services are peculiar or individual. *Wm. Bogers Mfg. Go. v. Bogers,*58 Conn. 356, 7 L. R. A. 779. Some authorities distinguish between a contract which merely calls for the service of the employee, and *a,n*agreement in which the em*117ployee still further stipulates that be will not serve any other person during the term; but the best authorities with reason hold that where a contract does not contain such negative clause, such a clause will be presumed or implied. *Montague v. Flocldon,*16 L. R. Eq. Cas. 189, 28 L. T. (N. S.) 580; *Fechter v. Montgomery,*33 Beav. 22; *Daly v. Smith,*6 Jones & S. 166, 49 How. Pr. 157; *Butler v. Galletti,*21 How. Pr. 465; *De Pol v. Sohllce,*7 Robt. 280, 30 N. Y. Sup. Ot. 280. This must follow as a matter of logic where the contract stipulates for the entire time of the employee; and *a fortiori*where the contract, like the one in the case at bar, shows on its face that the purpose and consideration of the agreement was to secure the exclusive services of the employee.

*Edgar L. Flood,*for the respondents,

argued, among other things, that courts of equity have assumed jurisdiction to enforce contracts for personal services only to the extent of enjoining one who has specifically agreed not to engage or render his services in the same capacity during a limited period of time to any other person, from violating such agreement. *Lurnley v. Wagner,*1 De Gex, M. & G. 604; *Duff v. Bussell,*14 N. Y. Supp. 134, 133 N. Y. 678, 31 N. E. 622; *Hoyt v. Fuller,*19 N. Y. Supp. 962; *Whitwood G. Go. v. Hardman*(1891) 2 Ch. 416; *Hahn v. Concordia Soc.*42 Md. 460; *Hayes v. Willio,*11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 175; *Daly v. Smith,*49 How. Pr. 150; *Qanwry v. Russell,*30 N. Y. Supp. 122; *Jaccard J. Go. v. O’Brien,*70 Mo. App. 432; *Paragon Oil Go. v. Familton,*5 Ohio N. P. 23. The contract in suit contains no negative stipulation on the part of the defendant *Von Spreckelsen,*not to engage in the service of any one other than the plaintiff during the continuance of the contract. *Wm. Rogers Mfg. Go. v. Rogers,*58 Oonn. 356, 20 Atl. 467, 7 L. R. A. 779; *Burney v. Ryle,*91 Ga. 701, 17 S. E. 986; *Sternberg v. O’Brien,*48 N. J. Eq. 370, 22 Atl. 348; *Metropolitan E. Go. v. Eiuing,*42 Eed. 198, 7 L. R. A. 381; *Strobridge L. Go. v. Grane,*12 N. Y. Supp. 898, 58 Hun, *118611; *W. J. Johnson Go. v. Hunt,*21 N. T. Supp. 814, 66 Hun, 504; *Butler v. Galletii,*21 How. Pr. 465; *Delevan v. Macarte,*1 Obio Dec. R. 226, 4 West. Law *J.*555; *Ehrmann v. Bartholomew,*67 Law J. Cb. 319, (1898) 1 Ob. 671; *Mut. B. F. L. Asso. v. New York L. Ins. Go.*75 Law T. (N. S.) 528. In a contract like tbe one set forth in tbe complaint, requiring ordinary mechanical service as a pattern shop foreman, tbe services required are not unique or extraordinary. *Strohridge L. Go. v. Grane,*12 N. T. Supp. 898; *Oort v. Las-sard,*18 Oreg.-221, 6 L. R. A. 653; *American B. B. & A. E. Go. v. Harper,*54 Cent. Law *J.*449; *Wm. Rogers Mfg. Go. v. Rogers,*58 Conn. 356, 7 L. R. A. 779; *Roosen v. Garlson,*62 N. T. Supp. 157.

Cassoday, O. J.

The case is peculiar, and for that reason tbe facts upon which tbe preliminary injunction was dissolved are pretty fully stated. Tbe essential allegations of tbe complaint are flatly denied in tbe answer, but that did not necessarily make it improper for tbe court to continue tbe preliminary injunction. *Valley I. W. M. Co. v. Goodrick, 103*Wis. 436, 78 N. W. 1096. That was an action for tbe specific performance of a contract securing to tbe plaintiff tbe right to manufacture and sell machines embodying tbe defendant’s invention; and in that case it was held, in effect, that tbe plaintiff, having given tbe requisite bond to protect tbe defendant, was entitled to tbe continuance of tbe injunction to preserve tbe *status quo*and prevent irreparable damage during tbe pendency of tbe action. It was there said by my Brother Marshall, that “the whole subject of granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions rests in tbe sound discretion of tbe court.” And in a later case, speaking for tbe court, be said that “it is only where it is clear that temporary relief for tbe purpose indicated is essential, if all tbe equities of tbe complaint are denied under oath, .that judicial discretion is liable to be abused by not granting it on such terms *119as will adequately protect tbe defendant from serious injury or inconvenience if tbe court shall finally decide that tbe plaintiff is not entitled to tbe relief demanded in tbe complaint.” *Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Langlade Co.*104 Wis. 374, 375, 80 N. W. 599. See, also, *Ward v. Sweeney,*106 Wis. 44, 50, 60, 82 N. W. 169; *Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. Bradley,*108 Wis. 468, 486, 84 N. W. 877. In this last case it is said by tbe same justice that:

> “Notwithstanding tbe conflict between complaint and answer as to tbe facts or tbe law, it'is still within tbe discretionary power of tbe court, by a temporary injunction, to preserve tbe *status quo*between tbe parties pending tbe final decree and to prevent tbe doing of tbe acts complained of during such pendency if that be necessary to save tbe plaintiff or tbe defendant from irreparable injury by tbe conduct of bis adversary in tbe meantime. . . . The situation of tbe respective parties should receive careful consideration.”

In another of tbe cases cited it-was said that:

> “If a person, on tbe facts alleged, be clearly entitled to a particular remedy, and there be reasonable ground to apprehend tbe facts may be established by proof, and, without a temporary restraining order preserving tbe *status quo*till the termination of tbe litigation, tbe purpose of the action will be entirely defeated, such temporary restraint should be applied under such circumstances as to reasonably protect all parties to tbe litigation.” *Ward v. Sweeney,*106 Wis. 60, 82 N. W. 174.

These excerpts would seem to be sufficient to indicate the rule which should govern in tbe granting or refusing of a preliminary injunction.

Tbe complaint alleges that *"Von Spreckelsen*has not sufficient pecuniary resources to respond to any judgftient for damages for breach of such contract” with tbe plaintiff, and that, unless tbe defendants are restrained from carrying out tbe conspiracy, tbe plaintiff will be without remedy, and will suffer great and irreparable damage. In that connection it may be observed that there is no allegation as to the insolv-*120oncy of any of tbe other defendants, and tbe wrongful and unlawful acts alleged as to sucb other defendants may perhaps be sufficient to bring the case within the ruling of the Queen’s Bench in a case cited by the plaintiff’s counsel, wherein it was held that an action at law “lies for maliciously procuring a breach of contract to give exclusive personal services for a time certain, equally whether the employment has commenced or is only *in fieri,*provided the procurement be during the subsistence of the contract and produces damage, and that, to sustain such an action, it is not necessary that the employer and employed should stand in the strict relation of master and servant.” *Lumley v.*Gye, 2 Ellis & Bl. 216; *Walker v. Cronin,*107 Mass. 555. But see *Boyson v. Thorn,*98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492, 21 L. R. A. 233.

The real purpose of this action is to restrain *Von Bpreckel-sen*from quitting the service of the plaintiff, in whose employ he had been for ten years, in violation of his contract; and to restrain the other defendants from employing *Von Spreck*elsen, with the shill, knowledge, and secrets of the plaintiff’s business acquired by him during such ten years’ services, to use the same for the benefit of the defendant corporation, and thus build up a rival business to the injury of the plaintiff. The question as to how far a court of equity may properly go in restraining a person from quitting the employment of one person and entering that of another has been the subject of much controversy. It is conceded by counsel for the plaintiff that courts of equity have always refused to enforce specific performance of contracts for personal services, and that this arises from the inherent weakness and inability of the court to enforce its decrees in such a case. The general rule undoubtedly is that equity will not restrain an employee from quitting the service of his employer in violation of his contract. *Fothergill v.*Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. Cas. 132. Thus is it held by the United States circuit court of appeals for this circuit, in a case cited by counsel for the plaintiff, that *121“equity will not enjoin employees of a receiver of a railroad from quitting bis service, although the effect of such action will be to cripple the property or prevent or hinder the operation of the road.” *Arthur v. Oakes,*25 L. R. A. 414, 425, 63 Fed. 310, reversing *Farmers’ L. T. Co. v. N. P. R. Co.*60 Fed. 803. But there are numerous exceptions to such general rule. In the case last cited it is conceded by Mr. Justice HablaN, speaking for the court, that “courts of equity have sometimes sought to sustain a contract for services requiring special knowledge or peculiar skill, by enjoining acts or conduct that would constitute a breach of such contract. To this class belong the cases of singers, actors, or musicians who, after agreeing for a valuable consideration to give their professional service at a named place and during a specified time for the benefit of certain parties, refused to meet their engagement and undertake to appear during the same period for the benefit of other parties at other places”; citing the leading case of *Lumley v. Wagner,*1 De Gex, M. & G. 604. For numerous cases coming within the general rule or the exceptions, see 27 Cent. Dig. 1706-1710, §§ 117, 113. So it has been held in Massachusetts that the “inventor or discoverer of secret process of manufacture, whether patentable or not, has property therein which equity will protect against one who, in violation of contract and breach of confidence, undertakes to apply it to his own use or to disclose it to third persons, and as against third persons having notice of such relations, although he may not have an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it.” *Peabody v. Norfolk,*98 Mass. 452, 96 Am. Dec. 664. So it has been held in New Jersey that “an injunction may be allowed to restrain defendants, who were lately employed by complainant, from using in their own factory, or divulging to other persons, certain secrets used by complainant in manufacturing, which they, in consideration of their employment by complainant, had agreed not to di*122vulge; and such injunction should be retained until the final hearing, although all the facts alleged in the bill are denied in the answer.” *Salomon v.*Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl. 379. To a similar effect, *Fralich v.*Despar, 165 Pa. St. 24, 30 Atl. 521; *Tabor v. Hoffman,*118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12; *National G.*& *M. Co. v. Braendly,*27 App. Div. (N. Y.) 219, 51 N. Y. Supp. 93; *Harrison v. Glucose S. R. Co.*116 Fed. 304; *Cort v. Lassard,*18 Oreg. 221, 6 L. R. A. 653, and note.

It is sought to bring the case within this line of decisions, and if it were to be determined upon the allegations of the complaint and the mere denials in the answer, it would probably be successful. But, as more fully set forth in the statement of facts, *Von Spreokelsen*states on oath that, long prior to the time when he entered the employment of the plaintiff, he was employed as foreman of the pattern and machine department of the Ewart Manufacturing Company of Indianapolis, the originator and founder and first manufacturer of chain belt and chain links, such as the plaintiff now makes, and that the Ewart Manufacturing Company is now the largest manufacturer of such products in the world; that while so employed by the Ewart Company he acquired his knowledge, experience, and skill in the making of all records, drawings, designs, gauges, prints, patterns, and models pertaining to the manufacture of chain belt and chain links, and the reproduction thereof, and of the methods of such manufacture, and the disposition, sale, and shipment of such products, which knowledge he brought with him when he entered the employment of the plaintiff, and that he freely and fully gave to the plaintiff the benefit and advantage thereof, and which knowledge and skill are possessed by many other men engaged in the same line of business; and that his assistant while in the employ of the plaintiff, and who is still in the plaintiff’s employ, and is performing for the plaintiff the services formerly rendered by *Von*Spreokelsen, is capable of discharging the duties of that position, with the aid of the *123records, designs, drawings, prints, gauges, patterns, and models wbicb bad been prepared by *Von Spreckelsen*or under bis directions, all of wbicb are now'in tbe plaintiff’s possession. Sucb statements are emphasized by denials and further allegations in other parts of tbe answer. If they are true, *Von Spreckelsen*has no secrets or secret respecting tbe plaintiff’s business, and no peculiar skill not possessed by others, some of whom are now in tbe employ of tbe plaintiff. If they are not true, it would have been a very easy matter to show it. No attempt has been made to dispute or disprove sucb statements. They must be accepted, therefore, as verities in tbe case. In view of sucb admitted facts, was it an abuse of discretion to dissolve tbe preliminary injunction ?

In *Wm. Rogers Mfg. Co. v.*Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 461, 7 L. R. A. 779, 781, 782, tbe complaint alleged, in effect, that tbe defendant bad agreed to serve tbe company for tbe period of twenty-five years, if be lived so long, at a salary named, as general agent and manager, and to give bis entire time and service to tbe business of tbe company, and not to engage or allow bis name to be employed, in any manner, in any other similar business, but in violation of bis agreement he conspired with others to form a new corporation to enter upon a similar business to tbe injury of tbe plaintiff. Tbe trial court sustained a demurrer to tbe complaint, and rendered judgment thereon, refusing to enjoin tbe defendant from leaving tbe employment of tbe plaintiff or engaging in other business in violation of bis contract; and the same was affirmed by tbe supreme court, where it was held that “contracts for personal services will not be specifically enforced in equity. Tbe negative enforcement of a contract for personal services by an injunction will not be made where tbe services are not purely intellectual, peculiar, or individual in their character.” So in a ease in New York tbe court reversed an order continuing a preliminary injunction “to restrain defendant from working for a certain firm, or for any *124other person or corporation, as a lithographic designer or lithographic sketch artist, in violation of a contract of employment by plaintiff. It appeared that much of the work for which he was employed by the plaintiff was purely mechanical, and that there was nothing uncommon in his qualifications. There was no proof that his place could not be adequately supplied, and none of damage or actual injury.” *Strobridge L. Co. v. Grane,*12 N. Y. Supp. 898. So in another case in the same state a judgment was affirmed which refused to restrain defendant from giving his services to a rival newspaper in violation of his contract with the plaintiff, with which he had long been connected, and was familiar with its methods — particularly in the advertising department — on the ground that the services rendered were not so unique and extraordinary that they could not be performed by a substitute; that, although they had heen performed by a substitute at a loss, yet it was not a proper case for ¿m injunction. *W. J. Johnston Co. v. Hunt,*66 Hun, 504, 21 N. Y. Supp. 314, affirmed in 142 N. Y. 621, 37 N. E. 564. So it is held in Georgia that “unless personal services are individual and peculiar, because of their special merit or unique character, a negative covenant (even when express) not to render them to others than the plaintiff, will not be enforced by injunction.” *Burney v. Ryle & Co.*91 Ga. 701, 17 S. E. 986. See, also, *Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman*[1891] 2 Ch. 416.

Applying the principles of law embodied in these cases to the admitted facts in the case at bar, and it is obvious that the plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction, unless upon the final hearing it produces proof not suggested in the record before us. We are unable to say that there was any abuse of discretion in dissolving the preliminary injunction.

*By the Court.*— The order of the circuit court is affirmed.