B,

21 Ape 64

22 Apr 64
23 Apr 64

24 Apr 64
28 Apr 64
26 Apr 64

27 Ape 64
SECOND STAGE.
11 Mar 64

12 Mar 64

19 Mar 64

20 Mar 64
23 Mar 64
24 Mar 64

25 Mar 64
26 Mar 64
27 Mar 64
30 Mar 64

Booster 395 was Successfully launched.

Vehicle arrived at VAFB and the reosiving ins

Veh: ° Ving inspection
SS/B checks guidance module clean and installation,
and SS/D validations were performcl, ,

Telemetry functional checks were begun the pitch
actuator was » and the Brayco and hydraulics

Magnetometer wag t to magnetometer range Poeunatic
cleanliness verifloation wes perferesi Discoverer
Research Payload (DRP) fit checks (aft panel only),
booster adapter fit check, destruct checks, and D-timer
Sequence settings were performed,
Alignments were performed,

Payload monitor capability checks were parforned,
Sequence timer functions leak checks vere performed,

Wegetometer range checks ware performed and the vehicle
returned to the MAB, .

16


and post-caliiretions thas nee oa error. fhe inetrmentation®
ground and §-volt absolute were not adjusted during the flight. ,
be Me conetal ings shen present, was garbled on all itens
(first stage engine section), which waployed verge Tieng Al patina
timing appeared to be IRIG-B. Other problems encountered were:
(1) ‘Timing absent (items 11.7, 11,8A, 11.26).
(2) Time to frame references absent items 11.5 and 11,20).

(3) Time to frame reference poor or unusable (item 11.8A,
11.23, and 11.25),

(Cc) Ignition not photographed (item 11.18),
(5) Dirty aperture (item 22.3, 11.24, 12.1),
(6) Poor focus (items 11.10 and 11.17),

is



wth Che aa aPe TK dolce converter rendered the flight control syste,

weenie @reption of the Datiner, ineffective, reaultitg in the toot
attitude control of the vehicle” 1 Temulting

and .

: She ground fdas sites SoTL, MME me Dot abled by a
command fiom ground guidance since the vehicle not achieve
required spatial position and velocity, Engine shutdown occurred prematurely
Detiner, °F *002 starvation and a backup signal is provided bythe

(b) The gas valve current monitor indicated that valves.
fay comracicr Seperated continuously between 160.5 and 2197 ecsries
‘ing during this period
vehicle. Although the data

Re

Ff
!
og
i
:

i



DISTRIBUTION

query pecrenan

18
1
1

1o

lo

1
1
1
z
4

LYSC/VAFB

TWOE Office, SIC, 659uth AIW, Sunnyvale, Calif,

NASA (Test Support Office) P.O, Box 435, Lompoc, Calif,
Douglas Aircraft Corp, VAFB, Calif,

DOC, Arlington Hall Station, 4000 Arlington Blvd
arlington 12, Va. , ,

SSD (SSZAE~1) AF Unit Post Office, Los Angeles 45, Calif.
SSD (SSZAE~2/LTC

TWOCE Office, STC, sso¥th ATW, Sunnyvale, Calif,

595th ATW, VWZD, VAFB

6595th ATW, VWZE, VAFB

20


(2) No. 3 Bat Te ture (17-01-23); This transducer
was reading high so su ohne epreianaly 2 Bed maine
flight, ‘The problem appears to be a t malfunction,

(3) Hydraulic Power Package Temperature (12=01-27): The range
Pampas ee auf calibrated from <26 deg F to sir aero) Since the
Below $0 dog Fah sage oF te UB tt 208 dog and unuly tae
transducer should displaced upwards
approximately 50 Fr, Presently the T/M readout for this measurement
sprchee 0x8 v and caliretions basen ent for

ow Gyro Block Temperature (17-01-14); This transducer was
calig nigh and out of band at approxinataly 6-15, The range is
Sreated from -54 deg F to +137 deg F. Data from previous vehicles show
read

Measurement tely 145 Fe The T/M voltage monitor
to St deg Fa ce betieen 3.7" and 0" ¥ ( :
to -54 deg F and + F respectively), Data appears valid however the
transducer renge should be corrected, : ,

a Aerospace Ground Equipment - The aerospace ground equipment
dng fit Second stage (LMSC) performed satiafenten ‘to support checkout
an lanch of the vehicle with the following ace elor)y

malfunctioned and was replaced,

. iS) A leak occurred at a fitting on the guidance pre-
Pressurization supply trailer but it ‘to be insufficient
to delay the countdomn for repai


i paeeniie Sti
The wee Uh {

d
‘a) “The ‘failure on the part of the project ¢ eT, as
¢ approval authority tor EO 2796676, (Ex 28) to

. : Properly designate change accompli. asa
{ Roniaterchangesble change acd the felis cota
. part of DAC supervisory engineers to establish sich
“procedure. See letter RWRXQ dated 12. December 1961
, ‘Bx Douglas Memo of the Chief Engineers :
i - Office Mss /DEO-M-1 (Bx 24) ana DAC Vandenberg Field
"” Station-Memo A31-260-M-N69 (Ex 25),

i . {b) Patlure ‘on the part of DAC management engineering
personnel to provide a procedure for recording of
1: values shown on nieter readings in order to demand
t . Cm 2 attention of the technicians in-P TI9TTT9
. Ex . . .

! >. 7 Ye) Failure on the part of DAC management to provide
. for the painting or marking ‘of noninterchangeable

parts at VAFB Test Site in spite of the fact that

was required at the Santa Monica Plant. Dac

such € : .
-*Memo’ from the Chief Drefteman's Office. CDOM-692 (Ex 27).

i (@) Fatiure on the part of Douglas operating engineer
o to review the engineering paper or to further consider

&
B

. Memo dated 18 August 1961 from YQE (lx 28 and
; Douglas Memo A268-GH~61014 (Bx 29). (this’ information
Was relayed by word of mouth to AF persomel and ,
it is presently being ‘verified. ) .

: a. The concept of lack of good faith is slippery one, mich as
that of grosa negligence, although it cannot be equated to it. Although

man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercising in *
making purchases is, in judgment of law, & want of good -
faith." Pringle v. Phillips, 7 NY Super (5sanéf.) 157,165;
Murrey. v. Wiley, 127°P. (24) 112, 121, 169 or.3613 Stano
v. Helvering, :(D.c., NJ.) 13 F. Supp. 776, po. :
an | . .
It also appears that good faith’ may be equated to honest ‘intent
and as such may be left to the. finders of fact to determine ‘from the .
facts and circumstances. . .
. ; . moet
FOR Sr ORY

en i: - fo
7 | |



ELWOOD R. QUESADA entered the ‘Amy Air
Service Primary Flying Schoot in 1924 to
‘Start © brilliant Air Force career. When be
fetired in 1851 he was commander of Jolat
Task Force Three, Sibce then he hes been
associated with private industries in varioes
executive capacities. He became Special
‘Assistantto the President on avistion matters
in 1957, and on November 1, 1958 was ap-
pointed Administrator of the new Federal
Aviation Agency, Thils organization ts the
‘Successor te both the Civil Asronastics Ad-
‘winistration and the Airways Modernization
Board, It is responsible for allocating the
Saflon's alt space by developing and operat-
Ing a sational ait navigation and traffic con-
trol system.

)
os “4
The speaker The program
Elwood R. Quesada .

Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency

Presiding... 2.2.00 seeees te eeeeeee B.D.Clattey, President, Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce
Star Spangled Banser............ te eweeses + - Selo: William Rapp; accompanist: Ray Deerwester
seeeeee Rabbi Joseph S. Weizenbeum

vesee+es. Major General 0.L.Ritland, USAF
Commander, Ballistic Missile Division

Major General Troup Miller, Jr., USAF
~ Vice Commander, Air University

; Presentation of Discoverer 14 Space Capsule . ..

Acceptance of Discoverer 14 Space Capsule-. .

Presentation of Plaque . . seeeeee «Colonel R. Mi Cram, USAF

Commander, Orieatation Group
Acceptance Of PiAQU0 ee seeeeeeceeeeee sreeeseees -GsE.Mleiler, Chairman, Aviation Commition
om “ Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce



4

ATR FORCE BALLISTIO MISSILE DIVISION (ARDO)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
_ Alp Farce Unit Post Office, Los Angeles 45, California
WOEC/Maj Harris/2705

Presentation of Discoverer XIV capsule 29 Woy 1960

1. ‘The following information concerning the presentation of the
Discoverer XIV capsule at the Wright Day dinner ceremonies were

received by, telecon from Major Sloan, Air Force Museum, ‘The. AMC a
Information Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is in charge

of the program and ig making detailed arrangements.

W. E. Todd or his Deputy, Maj Gen Troup Miller, dv. The dinner will
be held at 12 Noon, iber at the Biltmore Hotel, Dayton, Ohio.
—_—_— ~~

3. A confirmed pro, is being forwarded by AMC Office of Information

eC

| rd he 1.
wo 0 ue
a we

w
ft



- _ 2

THE FACT THAT WE sue nation To COPE WITH THE

CHALLENGES OF SPACE IS, 1FEEL, WELL DEMONSTRATED

BY THE OCCASION WHICH BRINGS US TOGETHER HERE TODAY.

| THIS PIECE OF MAN-MADE HARDWARE HAS BEEN SENT WHIRLING
4 AROUND THE GLOBE BEYOND THE ATMOSPHERE, AND, THEN
y SNATCHED OUT OF THIN AIR TO BECOME THE FIRST ORBITING

\ i) VEHICLE EVER AERIALLY RETRIEVED FROM ORBIT.

¢ . RTHERMORE, I THINK IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE RAPID

ABILITY TO ORBIT AND RECOVER VEHICLES IN THIS MANNER,

eo)

OTHING COULD BE NEWER, OR MORE EXCITING TO OUR
. 4 IMAGINATIONS, THAN SPACE. TRUE, SPACE HAS ALWAYS BEEN

THERE, BUT JT HAS NEVER BEEN SO CLOSE TO OUR GRASP,

ae ; 3  ——
nae eri &


“REPSRENCES ¢ fa) cJatmscniny

ne 7 DOL. S— we.
TABRAT BOMPYNY, Loo,

em enatcorrice ||
sawta momieca, Cativonana

“Tannery 29, 2 oa
, aeLagnl-77 7
SUBIEGRr | MEABELIIY £02 053 OP THOR BOOSLER NIL-Dad dee

Off 4ear's. letcar tg
wogind,. seis R#RKA 2350,

Donald. .° 0:
sated 27 5 eenber 196)

Ab) Latter cavca Jasuazy Jo, 1s62, tron

‘ - -  ° Damald <. Douglas, Ir., ta ALP Pores
: Plans Rorszsentaslve a
TOs “Aly Hooda Mont Rapovaentativs .

dnitad Stages Ate Force. i
Pes zlas 2iverats.- pany, od]
2003 Taczn Pare Demis ma ~
. - Sata coniea, Callfomia ;
ATTENTIONs | Albert aL Fiteratricnk
. Capt. USAF
: Sontrsoting OPfLusy

1, | AS tha degcese of your offles, Centrastor :3g

.  Delnvastigated the less of to SeoJoot besater, Following
“28 @ report of suck rolovestigetion, ss

| SS ScalDLE "A" ts a datelisd Alatosy

oo, a0
. 3 Saor ‘Booster bat 382 eaten dadieates thas prodverion,

Belifleation. tastin: aug ivspection.ef ths xiaziis SONS:

aasonplignsd in aecanlasoe with rovsel Contractur BPscada sag,

3. Tw, precise cause of tha Soumts. Art
Sever ba conclusivel; decerained., a. chore. :
vords.slin pespoas 25 the prodvetioa gag: >
Sablon of ste missile coder Comsragtea AF ue
04 (u87)-522, Wspectively, disclogss oe eve:
“.tianeles or defeats whicn ewe have, eonsrlies.
‘+ Queskion, The work Parlormed py Contrustor ance,
Contract was Lnapyeted and accepted

“ius exception,

fre

ee


For several months Air Force officer-scientists md Lockheed tech-
nicians sasisted by other contractors and USAF research facilities buckled
dovn to pinpointing the problem. Finally their sleuthing paid dividends.
The trouble vas located, not in any one of the major systens or sub-systems,
but in the small solid propellant rockets used to spin and de-spin the
re-entry vehicle during the firing of the retro rocket. The amall rockets
were used to spin-stabilize the re-entry vehicle at the right angle while
the retro rocket established the proper re-entry trajectory.

External jets through vhich gas under high pressure is metered were
substituted for the solid propellant spin and de-spin rockets.

Also, the close scrutizy to which the entire Discoverer had been
subjected, disclosed other areas where refinements would preclude the
development of future trouble spots.

The stage now vas set for complete success. Discoverer project
‘eople vere deternined to go all the way and with Discoverer XIII they did.
AU. 8. Navy helicopter Plucked the gold-plated capsule from the surface
Of'the Ficitic Ocean near Haveli marking the first recovery of @ man-nade
vehicle from orfit around the earth. The fact thét the waiting Air Force
recovery crews had to heve an assist from their sister service Qian't dim
their elation, nor that of the free world, one bit.

On the heels of "Lucky Thirteen", the next Discoverer roared into
space from Vandenberg Aix Force Base, California. This time the “pi11"
wee delivered right into the hands of the C-119 recovery fleet. Capt.

(more)
-6-




Ae

FIRST STAGE.
7-15-63

7-18-63
86-63

8-16~63
8-20-63
8-21-63
8~30~63
9~9—63

9=14-63

9-18-63

9-30-63
10-3-63
10=4=63
10-9-63

10~10-63

10-11-63
10-1463
10-17-63
11-1-63

APPENDICES
PREPARATION AND HISTORY

Booster 396 arrived, and was placed in position No. 1 at
the RIM.

Receiving inspections were completed,
Modifications to booster subsystem were started.

Booster hydraulic checks were completed.

Booster electrical and instrumentation checks were completed.
An all-systems test was completed.

The booster was weighed and secured,

Booster 396 was transported to PALC 1 pad 1; booster mating
was completed, ~

Solid motor mating tests were completed.

Booster simulator checks were started.

Booster simulator checks were completed.

Booster leak checks were completed,
Hydraulic checks were completed,

Electrical checks and an all-systems test were completed,
he main engine yaw actuator was replaced, and portions of
An all-systems test and a dry countdown were completed,

A dry countdown was completed,

4 single and dual propellant loading exercise was completed,

Because of a change in schédule, booster 396 was demated
and returned to MAB V for storage.

16


the wiring error accomplished during TP 7797779. ‘This requires’ a
consideration of the Government Property Clause. 1

. oa. Even though DAC 322 is at no place designated on a .
contractual sc as Government Property, 1t appears inescapable
that it was accepted by the Government from DAC on lt February 1961.
. and then turned back to DAG as GFE and so receipted by them on
13 April 1961. there Sppears however, to have been some understandable
confusion on‘the part of the property administrators and auditors as

Contract 582 would have covered all such work, but, as we have seen,
DAC 322 was en unusual case And the greater part of the work was

BIL g
described in ‘the schedule as Grp in’ Item 9.

G. -A finding of liebility under the Government Property Clause
- requires (a) a determination of willful misconduct or lack of good ~
fedth and (b) thet thig be on the part of management or supervisory
Personnel of the contractor, . !

subsequent to the Discoverer XxyrT Failure, we discover four (k) areas,
of some degree of malfeasance, which are attributable to DAC. management,

. . . t

|



TO,
a,

SECTION II
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS,

s
1. A vehicle consisting of LV-2A booster stage (S.N. 396) and SS-O1A
orbital stage (S.N. 1604) was launched on the first attempt from Vandenberg
AFB, Complex 75-3, Pad 4, at 1623:43.55 PDT on 27 Apr 1964, The primary -
launch objective, to place the SS-01A satellite with payload into a
specified orbit was achieved.

2. The SS-01A electrical pyro system incurred a short circuit at
Junction box ansenbiy, it topes isolated to the Lifeboat control
junction input or edroui or C1S1 research
payload (RP) lockout’ suites one =

3. The telemetry system instrumentation schedule, LMSC DWG No.
1359017, dated 3 Feb 1964 and the final vehicle 1604 calibration book,
dated 20 Mar 1964, were in error as to pyro current instrumentation, The
confusion caused by this error resulted in delays and application of :
unnecessary man-hours to isolate and determine the nature of the electrical
system malfunction,

4, Vehicle telemetry was left in the calibrate position during
countdown due to an operator error, - i

5. The hydraulic power package temperature. transducers and the gyro
inertial reference -(IRP) block temperature transducer: exceeded. the

calibrated band ‘t8, although the tures were most likely well
within the desired. operating limits. . co

a


(oe a enemies ton eee edie anette

thy ior nan ¢
AROSE OTE, .

It is recouménded that:

A. DAG be required to take into consideration ithe loss‘ ocassioned
by the Air Force as‘ to DAC Booster 322 in negotiations for definiti zation
of letter Contract 582. .

co. ‘In the latter case, it is recomended that a case be prepared
based primarily on IV G. 2 (a) recognizing that, although a possible
case for liability-on the part of DAC exists, it is not a strong one,

cme
‘

JCHN R.
Major, USAF .
Staff Judge Advoca; . .
Space Systems Division’ (asc)

,

Exhibits Listed on Separate sheet



a Of good reise’ °F C8805 An viich the BCA has made findings’ of
'" | lack of good faith.

V. CONCLUSIONS:

A. A Jaunch couttrement for the Discoverer XXVIT shot was
contained in both Contract 759 - Support (CP#F) and Tetter .
Contract 582 thor Modification (FPI}. Although it was the
intent of the Air Force to’ consider Contract 759 the applicable contract,
it is possible under these circumstances .to negotiate it into letter

' Contract 582 prior to definitization, The latter procedure effords the
. best Opportunity for Obtaining some Consideration from DAC for the . -

action as leverage to obtain favorable settlement .of the other Points
of dispute in the Present negotiations. . .

By" Ghe basio Mabtlity br nic 49 for the loss of the thor booster,
. Howevei, it must be vemembered that ab DDS setablicheds
:for the loss of the -boostexY

CZ Yeeseesteeteeertteesrerrany,
KALLE

D. DAC 322 46 Government Property under Letter Contract 582 ana |
Contract 759, In orfer to hold DAC liable for loss or damage to ap
ket be established (1) wit1eut misconduct or lack of ‘good faith

the part‘or management or Supervisory personnel of Contractor
only. The best case which could be made out under (1) above is that
cited in Tyg 2 (4) where atrect :



Meter Readings - © TISTTTS

DAC Memo cDoM-692

Bouglas ‘Ltr A31~260-AN-99
‘Removal. cara 7

“Memo fr VE ata 18 Aug 1961
- Douglas Memo :A268-G¥-61014

Douglas Standard Practice Memo - SPM-A45-100L

_ (Douglas procedure at Miss:

ile Test Site AS Sacramento -

similar to procedures authorized at ‘A-31 Vandenberg AFB

not presently available.)



aaey
38


31 Mar 64

1 Apr 64

3 Apr 6H,

8 Apr 64
9 Ape 64
10.Apr 64
1 Apr 64
13 Apr 64

14 Apr 64+”

15 Apr 64
17 Apr 64

20, Apr 64

21 Apr 64

22 Apr 64

23 Apr 64
24 Apr 64

26 Apr 64
27 Apr 64

Seriuence tiner leak checks and battery fit checks ware
performed,

DRP fit checks booster adapter fit cheoks and
destruct checks were performed, :

es meng te

fit checks’ were were performed and the DC/DC
converter tae dares .

Douglas all-eystene run wan performed,

© SEzSTPE_FU Biase 2 and 2, and Douglas flow checks

were performed,
Evaluation, qrgine servicing, prenate were pertened cs, ane

Douglas dry countdown and flush and purge BIL phas:
perfeetty checks, and Douglas all systems rupees
performed .
deste: fications, Peeoate Pyrotechnics, and
Aavncad payload ya nated an th Digan ait-eytene
vun was performed

The solid motors ware mated,
The vehicle was successfully launched,

17


“SECTION I
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS,

1. A vehicle consisting of LV-2A booster stage: (S.N. 396) and
SS-O1A orbital stage (S.N. 1175) was launched from Point Arguello launch
complex 1, Pad 1, on 24 Mar 1964, This was the first launch of a vehicle
Shag Combination from this complex. The primary launch objective, te
place the SS-O1A satellite with payload into a specified orbit ses cit
achieved. This was caused by a failure of the S$-01A. All first stage
booster systems performed satisfactorily,

2. The leak indicators (sniffers) have erroneously indicated leaks
om several occasions, thereby holding up the countdown at critical: tines,

3. Data indicates that a short circuit occurred in the
"Ch e: system, This first short circuit has been traced to the
Type IX do/de converter. The probably caused further

ae


DECLASSIFIED IAW E.O. 12958

i) ee)
DATE_4 Y



Because the initial short circuit in the IX converter apparently
Caused the subsequent degeneration of the out cireuitry, this .
should be investigated thoroughly, Possible causes of the short circuit

ql) Physical failure of the type IX do/de output transitors or
circuitry,

(2) Water & partial short circuit in the converter components
we a Se

Pe shar Strang ee erizen sensor fairing pin pusher with 20
of Pusher striking the de converter case .or output cab’ :
and causing damage that resulted an a roc eer



A

FIRST STAGE,
20 Jun 63
24 Jun 63

2 Jul 63

8 Jul 63
18 Jul 63
29 Jul 63

30 Jul 63

1 Aug 63
6 Aug 63
8 Aug 63
1S Aug 63

9 Oct 63
11 oct 63
16 Oct 63

21 Oct 63
28 Dec 63

2 Jan 64

APPENDICES
PREPARATION AND HISTORY

Booster 395 arrived.

Receiving inspections were completed,

Booster subsystems modifications vere started.

Primacord installation was completed,

Booster subsystems modifications were completed,

Booster continuity checks ware completed and hydraulic
were started,

Booster 395 was weighed, Secured, and transported to
MAB 5 for post-checkout' storage.”

Booster 395 was transported to LE-2,

Booster indexing was completed and launcher checks with

the booster ware started,

Reoause of @ change in launch schedule, booster 395 was

Srelted, 2nd wae placed in tenporery stoiage in the ‘pad
er,

Booster 395 was retumed to MAB § for storage.

Telemetry and electrical subsystem modifications were
completed,

14


B RCE Bowe 3 Aw ew DP

so grt og

TUse ONETT

- HQ USAF Request for Discoverer xXvIT Failure Information oa
4 Informal ‘Report (Sreviously Furnished) :
~, Directional letter from Commander, SSD for Tavestigation '
~ > APPR letter’ to Douglas ‘Ref: Liebility
“= Questions of Fact :
‘s) Contract aF ob (647) -ho7 ~(SEGRET ~ Tranemitted under separate cover)
- Letter Contract AF ok (647)/-582
“| 9/A 13 to AF Ob (647) -407 . .
- Package Telly (recetpted) ‘
. Statement of Mr. NoFadden , j
= DD Form 1249 ©
- AF Form 1005
14 = Chronological history DAG 32
15° ih gininrtantien to accept boosters 298 & 300 without checkout

16 - Contract AF 04(647)-759 (ener Trensmitted under separate cover)

1 - BOTTI . _

& 17A,, - ; 4 Lt
18 =! BO 2796676 : . i

& 18A pos _

“hag - ‘AG letter regarding Costs

19h - Responsibilities, Procedures & Organization for AFBMD
', Aetivities at Vandenberg AFB - u7L Progrem. oe

20 - Basic Agreement No. AF 33(600)~7273

al - ~ punta arog Ho. ay 30(80) 138 74 7 a

25 = DAC Vandenberg Field stat

22 - DAC review of proposed contract AF 04 (695) ~24-

23 ~ RWRXQ Letter 1363 . j
2k - ‘Douglas Memo. Mis/TB0-M-1



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THAT COMPARISON, ISUSPECT, Is
APPARENT HERE TODAY, _ WE ARE GREATLY ENCOURAGED
BY THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE. WE ARE CONFIDENT
OF MUCH GREATER PROGRESS ALONG THE VAST BROAD
SPECTRUM OF SPACE IN THE DAYS AND YEARS AHEAD,

| NOW IT GIVES ME A GREAT DEAL OF PLEASURE TO

PRESENT TO THE AIR FORCE MUSEUM, ON BEHALF OF THE

_ AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, THIS CAPSULE

gt! oie
f " y Me

iN

vl,

a nt


he

162 System Facilities
Ql) Monitor vehicle

(2) Produce

(3) Properly transmit and
verify

(4) Determine an orbit
ephemeris,

Partial

N/A

_ Secondary Test Objectives

5. The 162 personnel must demon-

strate the capability to:

Calibrate and operate
syapem checkout equip

‘Achieved

Pyro Powar Problem



¢@. Transport, check- Yes

.d@. Communicate within Yes

e. Accomplish checkout Partial

6. Determine temperature of Partial

7. Bwecute specialized tests Yes
2. Einst Stage.

a. Airframe - Performance of the airframe was satisfactory;
however, the inherent oscillations of 17 to 20 cps occurred from T0120
until T+1U4 seconds respectively, The maximum peak~ amplitude
was. 3,8 g's at T¥138 ‘seconds, Maximum loading of 7.1 g's occurred at .

T+138 seconds due to the combination of the steady state acceleration
. and the oscillations present.

b. Instrumentation - Strain gage #2 Rail #2 on FM Chan #13.
failed to return. any data.

ce Aerospace Ground Equipment - At liftoff the umbilical
Seeociated with the prengs Pacey at “preventing the actin
asi ted with the uprange oy: va=
tion of the mast uprange "B" cylinder lock-tinlock switch,
3. Second Stage.

a& Spaceframe - Accelerations = After the loss of control: at 1227

_ 5 7


lease Aupy
DHL,

the conditions encountered in flight.

A review of the engineering documentation affecting changes to
the CEA has revealed that the main engine rate shaping network
was probably open Pricr to launch. the final RIM building checkout

A subsequent laboratory check which vould indicate this: error was
Performed but, since the technician had to read! three netérs at once,
{41¢ was possible that this error was not noticed,

The polarity check Performed at the launch emplacenent was not
designed to check this particular network. ot : \

The best engineering estimate is thet the pitch rate loop was. Open:
Prior to littore because of a Wiring error,
t

III: conrracruar, PROVISIONS '

A. DAC Space systems Vehicle S/N 320 was originally procured under
Contract AP ok (647) hor. (Ex 6) ‘the Missile Booster and Allocation
Schedule reve; that it was originally to be configured for Courier: and

definitixing cox 3 Tretiion (oo Gn fication of boosters 320, 322 ana 323
to Discoverer configuration Ex 8). Apparently the only modification
" accomplished under letter Contract 562 was the installation of BIT,

Wes accepted by the Air Force on February 1h. 1961 on the pac Tally
(Ex 9) at Santa Monica. On the same é-4¢ was marked as agony
wes shipped to @& AFB on 13 Orit 196)... Theweythe Package Tally



(to such loss or di “that ‘the Contractor shall be ‘
| reponse for any sac att or damage (including expenses

to. the Government Property or for expenses incidental a
9 . :

ctars or Officers or on the 7, Of any of ittg
i . tendants or other equivalent representatives
who has supervision or direction of:

(y ai or substantially all of the Contractor's
‘ bpsiness, or -

(IZ) au or substentially all of the Contractor's

. Operations at any one plant or Sepexute location
in which thig contract ig being Performed, or

(TTI) A seperate and couplete major industrial
Operation in connection with the performance

t: or. :

ae | (8) Which results trom & failure on the part of the

| . “Contractor due to the wilful. misconduct or Jack

a of good faith on the part or any of it's Girectars,
other

maintenance, repair, protection and Preservation’
it Property ag required by Paragraph
(e) herear,.,¥ : oo

"oie Fe Contract 759 ‘ncorporates by Paragraph D? of Basic Agreement
“T361 the following Provisions . m

¢ ; in the "

Property Clause inearparated ta Ser Contract 562 Basic Agrecueneet .

* 7273 and in Contract T59 by Basic 7361, 4 vould appear Profitable
to search for a Jegal basis for liability elsewhere, « Bode, .



ts (CLASSIFIED) set forth in the Flight Test Directive

Cc. Unfortunately, this isa very complex confrectual situation —
t was revealed that
the Air Force bas been in the process of a ting to definitize letter
2 under Contrac i AR for the past three (3).
months; He states that DAC negotiators informally raised the point as

“and vere Bssured ‘verbally by’Atr Force Regotiators that it vas not.
The success of ‘the launches -has not been included in the incentive
aspects; of the negotiations. The buyer also states it was never the

Ti 3
Contract 582, 14 Sppears possible that negotiations for the definiti zation
of this contract éould still take into Consideration the failure of
DAC 322. of course the fact ‘that the work contemplated by this contract
” appears to have been substantially completed makes any bargaining on, 1
ult. :

has been well ote yined that failures are to be expected and that,

. Percentage-wise iti ‘sccess with Thor type vehicles ig outstandingly high,

attempt to imply a warranty on the ground that in this type: of effort it

Launch Systeng Department under Contract APO! (647)-558; .
ont Bane) esfol


a:

Objective : __Results

Primary Test Objectives
1. Place Payload in desired No
orbit wt.
2. Secure telemetered data ; Yes
for evaluation

3, Primary onsen
Primary o| jectives it
that the 162

G1) Attain comrect Yes

(2) Attain correct _ Yes
(3) Attain correct Yes

(4) ‘The BIL guidance Yes

_ db SS-O1A Airframe and Adapter

(1) Withetand guidance No
maneuvers and f1:
environment ‘ght
(2) Provide ibility Yes
ea booster
Satellite stages

was.


~_FFOR-OFFIGHI-USE-ONEF

7. Was! ov anyone notified at the time of the
ne ation of tho new ronremer that
Fy eS Wi not correc ie previous o| o

ace she 20. 2 80 no ed
. an action was en °
a eteton war taken?

The effect the earlier rewiring change accomplished
under E.0. 2796676, might have on‘the flight programmer
replacement was considered by Nr. D.. KY Frayne, Design
Engineer, at the time of the xeplacemens, Pursuant to
standard Contractor Procedures, Mr. Frayne reviewed the
engineering orders written &sealnev both flight progran-
mers and erroneously conoluced that intovchangeability
was not affected. Hr. W. H, Whatley, Grovo Engineer,
reviewed and approved tho procedure modification, 3.0.
TrST7T9-Variation, dated July 14, 1961, the morning
following the progra:er Zeplacenent., Since this vart-
ation E.0. dealt only with 2 test procedure modification,

Mr. Whatley neither recognized nor had reason to recognize

that interchangeability was affected.

8. Who was the highest approval authority for Tp

The rate gyro polarity checits weve accouplished under
fest Procedure 77: 9, a3 revised by 2.0, T797779~Vari-
ation, dated July 14, 1961 end not under Test Procedure

TI97179. The highest approval authority for Test Procedure
ve

TISTTTS was WY. HL “Whatley, Group Engineer, Vehicle Elec~
tronics Section, VAPD Field Station.

9 Who were the individuals who ran the rate
. polarity checks under tne a bove TPy aaa

The rate gyro volarity checks were accomplished under
Test Procedure 77: 9, as revised by E.0, TTI9TT79-Vari~

atlon, dated duly 14,1961. The rate Byro polarity cheoks
we accomplished by R. L, Burns, Nanufae turing Technician,

and were teil by Junichi Shiromizu, Inspector, on

*‘ duly 21, 1

10. Did each individual see the meter readings? if not,

ee ce

The meter readings were witnessed by R, L. Burns, Nanu~
fapturing Technician. the Inspector, Junichi Shiromizu,
has stated that he does not recall witnessing these
particular meter indications, but that-he normally does
witness meter readings during this type of test.

-3-

-FOR-OFFICHAL-USE-DNEY-


SECTION II
EVALUATION
VEHICLE PREPARATION, -

A

ayer
na ok

a8
ea

Primary Test Objectives
Achieved

1. Place payload in desired
data

orbit.
Secure
for evaluation,

Objective

2.


B. RECOMMENDATIONS,

1, Recamend the function ard design of the lifeboat control, junction
box assembly and the-C1S1 lockout. switch be investigated, .

2. Recommend that instrumentation be added to the SS-O1A electrical
system to further isolate these continuing electrical short circuits that
occur at ‘tion, Suggested points of instrumentation would be as :
current tore at the input to the Lifeboat control junction box assembly
and key. points within the lifeboat junction box.

3+ Recommend that the telenstry system. instrumentation schedule and
final vehicle calibration book. be amended: before launch, .to reflect ‘as
: ; status. -

4 to 100 amperes. £0 gives Lette seal current monitor be increased
from 50 to 100 amperes. to ve a better measurement for analys of
electrical malfunctions.

5. Fecomend that the maocimam trensducer renge of the hydraulic power

package temperature and the gyro IRP block ature be modified to
preclude these transducer readings from ing band limits on nominal.
inasurements,


14 Jan 64
16 Jan 64

22 Jan 64

5 Feb 64
12 Feb 64
26 Feb 64
1 Mar 64

16 Mar 64
17 Mar 64
19 Mar 64
20 Mar 64
23 Mar 64
24 Mar 64

25 Mar 64

3 Apr 64
10 Apr 64
14 Ape 64
15 Apr 64
17 Apr 64
19 Apr 64

20 Apr 64

A rerun of hydraulic checks to verify vernier engine
actuator replacement was completed,

Booster 395 was secured and transported to LE~1,

seorter indexing was completed and launcher checks were

Wimeher checks were completed and booster leak checks
were started.

is


(2)

(3)

(4)

Receive ‘and transmit Achieved


3. Vas this designated as a hon-inserchangzeable
ogitication’ ti nos, way not?

EO 2795676 contained no statement as to the interchange-
ability of the tens after the vewiping change, Since
che change was a Salvage :nodification and the basic
Santa Monlea production configuration was not affected,
tne Fleld Station policy in effeet at that time did not
require the identification of non-laterchangeability,

If production interchangeability had been affected, then
the standard ‘Douglas procedure (Standard Practice femo-
vandum AS-304-1630) would insure review at Santa Monica
in order that the production drawings be changed as
necessary to eliminate the problem on subsequent units,
The cited Standard Dractice Momorandun is attached as

Exhibit “Bi",
4, Was the lack of such gesienaéion in_accordance

with established DAC proc ¥ 80, who was
e highest approval authorivy fr this procedure
and what was & ee?

is ¢

There was no Douglas policy or procedure requiring a
field station change to be designuced as interchangeable
or non-interchangcable, if Santa Honiea production was
not affected,

5. Ehat wag the DAC management and supervisor: structure
or the DAC Micld Statin ae Vandcnserg AS during the
onth of July, ISS?

Attached as Exhibit "BQ", is an organization chart which

sets forth the management and supervisory structure of

the VAFB Field Station during the month of duly, 1961,

6.

Who was the hichest approval authority for the

The highest approval authority for the installation of
the new flight programmer for DAC 322 was D. K. Frayne,
Design Engineer, Vehicle Electronics Section, VAFB Field
Station, In addition it was necessery that a test pro-
cedure change be made in order to assure that the replace-
ment part functioned properly in the system, This test
Procedure change was established by 2.0. No. T7797779~
Variation, dated July 14, 1961. ‘the highest approval
authority for this E.0, was W. H. Whatley, Group Engineer,
Vehicle Electronics Section, VAFB Field Station.

“26



eit eget eee

agen Sat bey
; pews 3

Greet A
ca ee

bial ago
Msi ree

a # ce .

sing tia



_ tie ar typ

‘ity © WWZE so
- 27~P
LAUNCH REPORT

LUCIUS A, PERRY, JR., COL. , USAF
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SPACE SYsT=xs
6898TH AEROSPACE TEST WING
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

13 Apr 1964

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

wee nucleon Seeman seating the Notas! Delano hs UA. within he macnng
of te Replonage Laws [To 28, UAC. , notions 7088704), the eanamdndon er avadencr cr

‘which in any manaee toon unsuthotined posson is pohibited by lav,

| ce ~ii-
—_ ASS Eee CONTROL NO. 6595-54-1494


DECLASSIFIED IAW £.0. 12958





Back in 1946, yre-dating the leunch.of Sputnik by some 10 years,
another earth satellite program had been conceived. ‘This program couldn't
afford the luxury of tine. It was paced by an urgency dictated by the
needs of our national security.

In addition to the element of time there was still ancther pacing
factor -- operational requirements. This satellite would have to possess
certain clearly defined capabilities if it wis to serve as the space plat-
form for military purposes -- communications, early warning, observation,
etc.

dust placing a satellite into orbit would not satisfy the pre-requi-
sites of national security. When this satellite took ite place in space
i would have © job to do.

Tt has takin better than a decade to develop such a satellite, Today,
however, in the Air Force Discoverer jrogray the United States has in —
being a versatile space vehicle which will serve as the besis for a vhole
family cf military space systens. In the Air Force Discoverer this nation
has the world's most successful space system -- perhaps the world's only
complete space system, a space system which will, for instance, provide
the basis for development of Midas (missile defense alarm system) -~ a “*
‘series of satellite borne infra-red sensors capable of detecting aggressor
missiles seconds after launch.

Discoverer had its beginning with a series of stulies performed by
the Rand Corporation in 1946-1947 under contract to the Air Force. ‘These
studies established the feasibility of using earth satellites to perform

(more)

ae



range 80 millinet Of & short circuit in the electrical estes A
sco 60 silicon large current nnge socared erate Fe A
aren trent continued Prete between 20 and 30 amperes until +16 secre



a. Airframe Performance of the was satisfactory;

Secillations of 16:6 to 10a sangettiofect

however, the
T114 until T+139 seconds Tespectively, she mucin peak-to-peak Litude
was 4.6 g's at 14132 seconds, taximm loading of 7 gis occured at Paw
cocillationa pecans neiMtion Of the eteady tate asoel ee at Hel
Oscillations present; : .

be Instrumentation - Turbine Inlet Temperature (Channel E
ft littott te ose . ape to be a cine ie of B ton in’ tre ring
Segnent . a
nagnetin amplifier, .

Gees oe Ag vk : .
— ee


NOW WE SEE IT AS THE FRONTIER WITH THE BUILT-IN FUTURE,
II REPRESENTS THE BROADEST KIND OF CHALLENGE. IT
AFFORDS INFINITE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLORATION,
ADVENTURE, AND ANALYSIS. IT iS THE NEW DIMENSION OF
TREMENDOUS PO} enrrtAL.
ce) THE U.S. AIR FORCE IS TO MAKE CERTAIN
THAT PROSE REGIONS BEYOND OUR EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE
ARE MADE SECURE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IF THE FAR-
REACHING POTENTIALS OF SPACE ARE TO.BE FULLY REALIZED.
THIS iS THE JOB WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN WITH OUR SERIES
OF DISCOVERER SATELLITES, WITH REGARD TO SPACE, I
SUGGEST THAT WE ARE JUST ABOUT IN THE SAME POSITION

TODAY THAT WE WERE WITH RESPECT TO THE AIRPLANE FIFTY


B.

3-20-64

3-5=64

R3 flight procedures completed. A countdown
and BIL, Phosing’and Roussiy ones opted A ey

3-21-64 Problems in the SS-01A Flight controller caused the launch
to be postponed 24 hours.

3-22-64 R-2 day pre-flight procedures were completed. An all-
systems test was completed, -

, 623-64 Rel day pre-flight procedures were completed, The solid

motors were mated,

3=2He 64 Booster 396 was successfully launched.

SECOND STAGE.

267-64 Vehicle 1175 arrived at VAFB

2= 8-64 Receiving “inspection was performed, Sub-system B checks
were started,

2-10-64  Sub-system B checks were completed,

2-11-64 Alignments were performed. VO0S slipped one day,

2-13-64 Vehicle hydraulic system checkout and electrical modifica+
tion were performed on the forward end, Preparations were
made for guidance and flight control checks, .

2~15=64 Preparations were continuing for guidance and flight control
Checks,

2-17-64 Guidance and flight control checks were performed, 1M
functional checks were begun.

2-19-64 TM functional checks were completed,

2-21-64 Completed DRP (Discoverer research payload) fit checks, |
VOS slipped to 5 Mar 1964,

224-64 Adapter fit and destruct checks were performed,

2=24—a64 VSWR's (voltage standing wave ratio's) were completed,

2-26-64

thru

3464 Open. Paper work was cleaned up,

aH 64 MAB final,

Vehicle. was transported to magnetometer range and checks
were completed, .

18


“FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY-

7. Was! or anvone hotificd at the tims of the

installation of tha new iTight progromncr that

S change would not correc: ie previous oc 2
accomplishe: 20. @ So EET) O_O ed
nim and what action was talten :

The effect the earlion rewiring chanzo accomplished

under E.0, 2796076, might havo on the flight programmer
replacement was considerod by He. D, E. Frayne, Design
Engineer, at the tiwe of the : placcnent. Pursuant to

standard Contractor Broceduy. or. ‘ayue reviewed the
engineering orders written ¢ vinat both flight program-

7:

mers and erroneously concluced shat inter
Was not affected. ir. YW. HL tm
reviewed and approved tha proce
TTI9T779-Variation, daca July 14, 1961, the norning
-Lollewing ‘the pros 2 repiacesent, Sinee thie vari-
ation E.6, dealt oniy With a weat procedure modification,

angeabllity
Engineer,
we modivicution, 8.0.

Mr. Whatley neither reco:mized nor had reason to recognize

that Anterchangeability was effeated,

8. Who was tho hishest approval anthorizy for TP
TSTHTS weed Ls tae RET eS

“The rate syro Polerity caecks. sere acsouplished under
Test Procedure 7797779, a3 revised by 3.0. TP9TT19-Vari~
ation, dated duiy 14,°1961 ard not under Test Procedure
TT9T179. The hist

‘TTSTTTS was 3. FB Ihatley, Group Engineer, Vehicle Elec-
tronics Section, YAEB Fiela Ctation., .

9. Who were wz

individuals who ran the rate
polarity chitits andor tne apove Ly m

The rate gyro polarity checks were accomplished under
Test Frocedure 7797779, as revised by 3.0. TTSTTT9-Vari~

ation, dated July 14,1961. ‘the rote gyro polarity checks
were accomplicned by R. Lb. Burns, Manufacturing Technician,

and were signed-orf by Junichi Shiromizu, Inspector; on
duly 11, 1951. cs

10. = Did each individual sea the Iheter readings? If not
who dig? eS EE nO,

She meter readings were witnessed by R. L. Burns, Manu-
facturing Technician. ‘The Inspector, Junichi Shiromizu,
has stated that he does not recall witnessing these
particular meter indications, but that-he normally does
witness meter readings guring this type of test.

-3-

St approval authority for Test Procedure - ,


(>) hooept and act upon No
&- Aerospace Ground Equipment
(1) Checkout booster and Yes
satellite stages
(2) Control, monitor and Yes

power the 162 satellite
and booster during

countdown
h. 162 System Facilities

(1) Monitor vehicle fune- Yes
tions to insure satis-
factory flight

(2) Produce adequate | Yes
telemetry reoords of
inflight data

(3) Properly transmit and Yes
verify reception of all -

(4) Determine an orbit N/A
ephemeris

(5). Provide interstation Yes
and intrastation
communications

4. N/A”

Secondary Test Objectives

5. The 162 personnel must demon-
, strate the capability to:

a. Calibrate and operate Yes
system checkout equip-

ment


military missions in defense of our freedom.

A year later Gen. Boyt Vandenberg, then chief of staff of the Air
Force, issued a policy letter in which he said:

",.. R& D of a satellite should be pursued as rapidly as the state of
the art permits..."

In 1951 « series of study contracts were let to major U. 8. industrial
firms having the téechnital kaowhow to make specific proposals.

Rand Corporation again éntered the scene in 1954 with additional
developmental recommendatioiis based on evaluation of the industry studies.

‘Taree U. 8. companies were then asked for definitive proposals --- «
RCA, Martin end Lockbeed.

Early in 1956 while these companies put the finishing touches to " *
their proposals, the responsibility for development of such a satellite
systen vas transferred from the Wright Air Development Center to ARDC's
Air Force Ballistic Missile Division. Maj. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, then
AFEMD commander, immediatély created a progrn directorate and set about
staffing it with the most qualified Air Force personnel availeble.

Meanvhile an ARDC contractor evalustion board met and awarded the”
development and production contract to Lockheed.

How the capabilities which hed been verified by slide rule end
computér would have to be proved with hardware.

time and operational requirements still vere the pacing factors. Tine
we didn't have. Certain operational capabilities we had to have.

Discoverer had to achieve a polar orbit -- infinitely more difficult
to attain than the equatorial orbits planned for Sputnik, Explorer or

Vanguard.
(more)

-3-



Objective Comment
¢. SS=01A Propulsion System
(1) Proper retro-rocket Yes
operation .
(2) Obtain impulse for No Vehicle shutdown. 205.5
orbital velocity seconds after ignition,
(3) Demonstrate the capa- No. Same as above,
bility for extended
burn time : ,
dad SS-O1A Electrical Power No A type IX de/de converter
System must demonstrate failed 28 milli seconds
acceptable performance after VECO .
@. SS-01A Guidance and Fli
Control System Fight
(1) Determine the time Yes "This time was invalid,
for orbital boost .
(2) Initiate and terminate No Boost terminated pre-
orbital boost maturely by fuel
starvation,
(3) Provide and maintain No Steering orders were
proper vehicle orien- not effective.
tation
(4) Provide and control the No Steering sequential
Sequence, of operations commands were not accept-
ed by the vehicle,

£,

SS-01A Commmnications System

(1) Trensmit continuous
‘tracking signal

(2) Receive and transmit
radar tracing impulses

(3) Control vehicle

telemetry and S-band -
beacon operation


f mae 27 AAT
Tot Town oon bites

ee
_ eel

recommended by the State J, Advocate, Western Contract ement'
Region: (Bx 4). om addition, boa Was requested to furnish it's version
of questions of fact, the answers to which lie Peculiariy in their
Possession. (Rx 5) Douglas has requested an extension of time in
which to reply and their response along with an analysis of the technical
‘Progr: .

DAC Report SM-38822 ~ Filght Report Discoverer ‘xxyrz Booste~
S/N 320 September 1961 (Attachmens to Ex 2) is the only mown’ complete
technical analysis and report. It Provides in part as follows:

Discoverer xxyry consisted of @ Dougiag Model IM-21 Booster
(S/# 322) ona a Lockheed Mode1 6205 Agena B second stage ang
orbital vehicle (8/x 210). .

The vehicle coubination was launched from Complex T5-3-4 at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California on. 21 July 1961." the
Primary objective (classitiea). ; 0
Flight objectives associated with the booster’

The Discoverer Satellite vag not

2. malfun .



(1) Attain correct
position at MECO,

(2) Attain correct
velocity direc.
tion at MECO,

(3) Attain correct

(4) The BIL guidance

b SS-O1A Airframe and Adapter


;

5 &

=

DISTRIBUTION

RECIPIENT
LMSC/VAFB, Calif
Douglas Aircraft Co., VAFB, Calif,
6595th ATW, CIWOCE) Sunnyvale, Calif,
NASA, (Test Support Office) P.O, Box 435, Lompoc, Calif,
SSD (SSVXE) AF Unit Post Office, Los Angeles 45, Calif,
SSD (SSVAE~1)
SSD (SSVAE~2)
SSD (SSZD)
S595th AIW (VWZD), VAFB, Calif,

Air Force Western Test Range
Attn: WISO, VAFB, Calif,

Naval Missile Facility Point Arguello, Lompoc, Calif,


eS os



4

Sg BONKUTICAL
hd js .
JZ,

an a, J é

(ING
‘7 is LLZE-
i “YC CSE Ma &S MO! HISTORY
s- ONLY 6 STRATE WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE A SALIENT POINT.

amet. e

ver
PIs JUST res} 9 IN THE LIFETIME OF ASINGLE MAN, THE
_ = ae | :

AIRPLANE HAS EVOLVED FROM THE CRUDEST WINGED CONTRAPTION

POSSIBLE, TO A SUPERSONIC, HIGH-FLYING, OCEAN-SPANNING

ELECTRONIC BIRD.| IN T
—_——————D _



Vee

EXHIBIT "pt

1. What was the cause of failure of DAC 3227

‘She cause of the failure of Discoverer Booster 322 can-

not be precisely ascertained. ‘The fullura wes due to an
instability which developed the wain engine pitch rate
loop, and a technical anal of the telemetry records
indicates that this lo daveleped an open
circuit at lift-o2f. 31% may have been
present prior to is omatie launch
equipment did not varify this x0rtien of the clivrcultry.
Earlier check-out records 1né ta that the rate loop

was functioning properly. vor, an examination of the
engineering paps» 3 tha pitch rate, mhin
engine actuator ve been open due to a
Salvage reworic ha Been porformed on this particuler
missile booster, revierk crsated a non-interchanges-
ble situation, ané subsequent zeplacement of the Plicut
programmer withou: sniticn of this fact could have
created the opon’circuit. Zt should be noted, ag set
forth in greater detail in priov reports to the Air Force,
that the failure to vecognizs this non-inverchangeability.
was not due to inadequate procedures, but, rather, was.
due to an error in engincering judgient on the part of a
certain design enginoer, ihe sineeving evaluation of ~
this fallure has indicated thas other malfunetions in the
pitch rate, main engine actustor eircult could have
created the identical flight failure. The circuit in
question cont: components which are subject to mal-
function modes h could have produced the flight
faiiure., For c le, Lt is possible that the flight
failure could have been caused by the failure of a
capacitor in’ the pitch rate, main engine actuator
circuit. ZEscause cf this possibility a redesign was

made which wuncved such cayacitor from the yaw and pitch
rate circuits and deleted the requirement for routing
these circuits throush the connector in question,

2. Who was the highest approval Suthort ty for 2.0.
B(OboTO wonorizing rewd. DG 9 e pin on
A and what was his titie

or she

The highest 2 sproval authority for £.0. 2796676 was Mr.
W. H. Whatley, Group Engineer, Vehicle Rlectronics
Section, VAPE Field Station,



brveedurea Mave been pected tn Q

Aly Sores. Plant Reprsontativa ~ ‘January 29, 1962
Page Thiwe , ; G-Logal~t7

respect to this one Suspicted cause of failure, tho evatiabdle
evidence would indieate that an ervor in exsinuertng Judguent
Souplad with a peagiki, acditloned howan error on the pars of
a minuleeturing techrietsz- vuther than Inacoquate Contractoy
PRocadires naz hava baun eauee of failure,

6. Subgaghecs. so the booster failum Contrastor
5 ta oflort to eininize further
oO uc of sucha.

tha poseibility Of Mean exrer
fvilure. It ses not sollow frau
Coutractes Tosedurys, lea mare
Booster fatlurs vem: Lesdequaze,
Sviderce indicates thas by carefully
Secldint prcesdury’s ?
pareerege emacs gees ae a Brgedding
SUTASTEph wou! Lh. ds SBeCowNs of who type
Gtestion are neve> Stacie. They are Anhasustiy cvolutionary,
Phis ia partlewlarly tous in exo Savelesconts. costext of

a PIOSEnt problea, 24 ‘@ result of anelysts of the Pussi-
ble eausaa of she bosston f{sllure, 1¢ has baon setemuined
that certain proeaduid vefinerants would furtise riniaiza
tne ehensas of an Oscurpunes of such a boostar fatiues,

Tails 49 but anotnes leuical step in tre avelution of Con~
tractor Srocadums, :

7. i additions. add highty mlerint faavor for
sorsidoration Ls the ‘Thor bocster'a ovesall record of
Sucesss (presentdy 91%) tn she Discovaser procraa, * Mais
factor cannot bs ignored fn evaluating the asequasy of —
prossdures; Indead, it ean be argued wit: considerable

‘forage that if is the ultinate test of tas udequasy of prO~
codures, . . .

&, Attached aa Exbinit “B* ars Contractor's ben
Sponses to. the specific. questions Mbleh your offices requested
Contracter te ansuar, . .

422, 80 dato Contractor has net keen provided with
a statosent of a spacifte reason for the Govarnsant's belict
tat Sontractor ta lable in this saster, G upon Con~ = -
tractcy's reinvastization of this catter, it le Biscerely
Solisved and wuspectAdly submitted that there OX10t3 no
Sound legal basis upon vhich Contractor sould be old liadle


f. Shand boa Comunications - The Prelort radar satisfactorily
tracked the S-band beacon from liftoff 240 seconds. After 240 seconds,
syracand,ie interrupted by periodic losses of the beacon signal Qo
> maintain autem ae ,ans associated beacon, The Prelort radar mas able

vehicle from the er was initiated by command at T+162.71 sec. Very

light steering commenced at T+181.46 and continued until 1+231 sec when

by i vehicle,
steering orders remained light until T+248 sec. ‘Steering then increased to
or anm auplitude but vehicle did not respond to these cuir i loss
Of guidance traek occurred at approximately T+#400 seconds,

b. Trajectory eval: based on a composite of BIL data, FPS-16
retinal tar tabular data and PRELORT vedar ‘tabular date: indies tet
nominal trajectory until T*230 seconds (See Figure 1), Subsequently the

showed a

velocity even with the SS-01A engine . By T+260
trajectory eeaticn of altitude and doxnrange plots was . flight
jectony rapidly verged downward from nominal altitude and
occurred in the and 8 tracks. The

. Jution of the vehicle. ‘The terminal flight phase began okoce
T+360 seconds resulting in separation of the payload due’ to structural
loading at 1372.2 seconds and engine. shutdown at 14376 seconds.

5. Launch Support.
a. PUR Telemetry - Real-time and p back telemetric data was not
fully satisfactory for evaluation of ona
tape recording were satisf: . The last pre-calibrations on real-time

a, °

2



COROFACALUSEONLY

ETBAL REPORT ov missoytaT; sovet rato

. 5 Peteuary 1932
1, ‘The DAC Report on 2isstlttr for Lesa at Thus “sovter Te. DLC apa
tated Jenuary 29, 1962 25 xen 132 ead reviews,

by thia office. It is
remeriably untnforr:
dnvolved were fur
& prelininesy co:
Contre2t whale

2. She anrvror to Question 7 ai Dut Exhibit 3 ;
Rovcver, in view of the fact that the End
is classified a3 a Denton Yaginces and
Ncacgement Structure Chart, this matte:

3. DAG Unibet A eypoers to be Aare: s ty thls dematigatica anions
for mS et,

4. (he inforastion furnished dose nob ech mibgtexulally to thet
proviowly eequixed aml therefare the souslystswe sn, recomendations
contained in ow Interim Roport restdn wekceed. .

5. Ho further eftort te obtain enginesriag a) winteal evaluation
of ths fadiure vill be re felling adviea Go .: sentrary,

JOS 2, DOGHSLEY

Halex, Uaay

Carl Judge Atrocate

Space Syctens Divisden {2363)



SON0D35 MI 4404317 U3LsV ZH
082 092 Ore 022 002 OBI

2%... HE O_ _O0e

Figure
VEHICLE TRAJECTORIES

amg eS Bt eT

*
3.

a

ose 30° FEET

CROSS RANGE
3

B

8 8

g

g &

ET PER SECOND:

(]

im

104 FEET

2
VELOCITY IN 10° FEI
atrifuoe Lf



57TH.
Anniversary

of Flight
Subcommittee

George D. Andrews
Hans Belitz

James W. Jacobs
Earl V. Johnson
William G. Kiefaber
G.E. Leland

John Lombard

R. J. Meflrath
Lewis E. Michae!
Dr JE. Miller
Joba H. Munpley : F

LE. O'Nel : : = ape

Dr. Richard J. Sievers a
57TH ANNIVERSARY

Robert J. Simons
EV. Swenson .

G.E, Welle, Chairman, Aviation Commitioe : OF POWERED FLIGHT
Norvell Clarkson, Staff Director

NOON ... DECEMBER 16, 1960 ... BILTMORE HOTEL ... DAYTON, OHIO
Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce ‘Anaivecsany of Flight Subcommitine Aviation Committee


4, Recommend steps be taken to improve the ‘Iype IX de/de. converter
regulated power supply to prevent permanent loss of regulated voltage
to the guidance module.


/

i REMARKS AT PRESENTATION OF DISCOVERER CAPSULE
TO THE AIR FORCE MUSEUM - 16 DECEMBER 1960

GUESTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN ---. MY PURPOSE IN

Kx
COMING HERE Is TO tebcanie THEJUNITED STATES AIR

y) Aires tye
FORCE MUSEUM/T i COVERED ROM THe Lf
a5 Ong ey
AFoscovenes ay SATELLITE. bak
[

THIS IS INDEED AN HISTO! OCCASION, AND I TAKE PAR

PLT Cr ‘<
ypSrorsssiosas SATISFACTION, FIFTY-SEVEN YEARS AGO

. Sp SOMOR ROW: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS --- FOR WHOM THIS —

MUSEUM AND THIS BASE ARE NAMED ..- MADE THE FIRST

SUCCESSFUL CONTROLLED POWERED AIRPLANE FLIGHT FROM

THE SANDS OF KITTY HAWK, t-
. (e



fae Fores. Plant Ruperse,

2 tive January 29, 1962
Fase Youn / : : : GeLegal<T7

Tow the subject Isae, If, however, additional auforsatbion
18 SeSiced, we will &2 sappy to scoperaty vith your ofzica
La 2fferss to obtain is. .

BOUGLAS AINCAAP? voxeaRY, INC.
_ oe -
/  " Kexuan L. Dotson
ASulstant Counsel

NLDs Jt
Bnels,


al

APPENDICES

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS... .ccsessccseeses
EVALUATION. +s sscessessecsccsssessecvssestceccdee

A
B.
Cc.

B

Vehicle Preparations ssssccscessssesscsscssees

Countdown, History and Path Damages. sesccsscees
Launch SUMUALY.. soc eeserccccssscccgecccesscee

‘1s Launch Objectives versus Results Attained

2. FUrCt Stagesscsssssecsssccssesccsssceees
3. Second Stagesereesscssecsscrsccssenessees

“4. Laumch Support ~ PhOtogrephye.sesscaeeee’s

Preparation and History: Stage Tecvscsccsees

Preparation and History: Stage IIecscsssceee

wo wo me

Few rw w w&


"SOVIET PLACES FIRST EARTH SATELLITE IN ORBIT"

In English, Arabic, Hebrev, Hindustani, and a huntred other languages
and dialects, neyspapers the globe around bannered the report thet the
USER had launched the world's first successful earth satellite.

‘The date was October 4, 1957. ‘To all appearances the Soviets were
well on their way to winning the space race. Russian scientists had
stolen the march on their only competitor -- the United States -- or 60
4 looked to the man on the street.

The space story, however, isn't written in one chapter. True, it
is a matter of record thet some time elapsed after the Soviet triumph
before the United States placed its firet Explorer satellite into orbit.
Tt was even longer before this nation's first earth satellite program --
Vanguard -- bore results in the form of a grapefruit-sized satellite.
ixplorer and Vanguard, and‘even the Soviet's first Sputnik, were scientific
afforts ani relatively primitive in terms of sophistication.

Being purely scientific efforts these projects were paced by the
normal, step-et-a time, walk defore-you-can run research philosophy. In

fundamental research, time -- plenty of time -- is a basic ingredient.

(more)


36-64
3-7-64
3~8~64
39-64

3-11-64
3-12-64
3-13-64
3-14-64
3-15-64
2-18-64

3-19-64
3420-64
3-21-64
3-21-64

3-24-64

Pneumatic leak checks were performed,
Engine functional and battery modification were begun.
Battery modification being worked,

Battery modification still being worked, Engine functional
was completed and compatibilities checks were begun,

Compatibilities were completed,

Battery modification still in work,
Phase I of the system run was performed,
Phase II of the system run was performed,
High pressure checks were started,

Pressure checks were completed. In addition engine ©
seevibing was Checks wer , .

DRP mate was started,
A/P (advance payload) and vehicle mating,
A/P mate was completéd and RF checks were performed.

The: launch was sli one day due to changes in the
electronic partion’ of the iat

A successful countdown was injtiated at 0335 PsT,

1g



AF Form 1005

(

"Sinee ‘there has been no fined acceptance the final turn-over document

DD Form 1149 & 12) and ‘the Accountability Termination Document
(Bx 13. .

B, A chronological history of DA 322 prepared by one of the
Discoverer Latinch Officers confirms that DAC 322 arrived at Vandenberg

* Air Force Base an 13 April+1961 (&x 14) and that the CEA was removed

Ic. the test, Procedure which first indicated the discrepancy in
electrical continuity between the Flight Controller ang the connecting
plug to the Flight Prograpmer was TP 7797779 - "Finctional Test :
Procedure ~ Flight Controller (BTL)" which appears to be a requirement
by DAC: as part of ‘flight’ test: preparation and checkout oo Contract

E which check revealed that ‘DAC had
originally charged this work to Contract 759 but had recently determined
this charge oe yen dn error and properly charged to Letter

9 ” .

leunch support contract ~ 759. The re, onsibility for spares (which

" Were not avatlable at the critical time}

- Item ITTF. ‘the flight test Preparation and conduct ‘is provided for
by Item ITI which incorporates by reference "Systems Supplement Wo. 1 -
Responsibilities '» Procedures and Authorization for AFEMD Activities
St ’Vandenberg AFB" dated 13 August 1959. (mx 193). ;



top dies and Lis) Sammy Ce Ofte,
(item 12.2, 11,2 21.5, 11.9, 12,15 and ll, was garbled,
pulses were nt, and i x times, though the same, were meaningless,
following addi’ were noted:

(a) Item 11.6 (high speed surveillance)
(b) Ttem 11.8 (umbilical ejection)
(ch Item 12.4 (ignition and littort)
. G) Tem 11.25 (tracicing) .
(2) Timing absent ,
(a) Item 11,4 (surveillance)
(b) Item 11.7 (umbilical ejection)
(c) Item 11.11 (ignition and liftofe)
(d). Item 11.13 (ignition and liftofe)
(3) Timing weak
| (@) Ttem 11.15 (ower missile and Jauncher-1iftoff)
(b). Ttem 11.23 (tracking) ,

WE .


emt we

LAUNCHED 18 AUGUST 1960 - RECOVERED 19 AUGUST 1960
PRESENTED TO THE AIR FORCE MUSEUM
cg .
MAJOR GENERAL 0.3. REMAND
COMMANDER, AFEMD
AIR RESEARCH ARD DEVELOPMER? COMMAND




(11) Erratic tracking
(a) Item 11,21 (tracking)

(b) Teen 11,22 (tracking)
(c) Item 11,23 (tracking)

- unusually

13


/? 4 ]
LAUNCH REPORT

LV=2A/395 8S-02A/1604
PMR OPERATION NO. 2921 -

DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SPACE SYsTus
@898TH AEROSPACE TEST WING
‘ Vandenberg Air Force Base, California
15 May. 1964 ;

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS:
DOD DIR $200.10

This material contine information aiecting the Netionsl Delonge ofthe ULB. within the meening
ofthe Keplonage Laws [Tie 18, US. , sections 768764), te tananieon or sevliion o

amma |)
ome Hes —


to saturation of
6 in
indication
The
‘ture
‘ing

output data i

of valves 4 and

due
magnetometer
operation
ve given a similar
have generated a roll
that
uster 1
the ity
engine cutof

f was 15

about 21 lb,

of
ore
of
to

and
T+2.

th

sauideltapeteartades ea!
cine Had i

i
a 3
; infudalait ated

was maintained at a level of approximately 2850

pressure

the thrust interval and permitted
lic actuators up to T#227.6 seconds

hydra

Hydraulic

thrust vector control by thee

12


‘he cause of the failure of Discoverer Booster 322 can~

EXHIBIT “p" .

1. What waste cause of failure of DAG 32eT

not be precisely ascertained. The fallure was due to an
instability which developed in the main engine pitch rate
loop, and a technical analysis of the telemetry records
indicates that this loop probably developad an open
elreuit at lift-off. ‘the oren circuit way have been
present prior to launch since the aucomatic launch
equipment did not verify this dortion of the. clroultry, — .
Earlier check-out records indicate that the rate loop ‘
was functioning properly. fowover, an examination o2 the :
engineering paper indicates that the pltch rate, min

engine actuator circuit may nave been open due to a

Salvage rework having been performed on this particulier

missile booster. This rework created a non-interchangea~

ble situation, and the subsequent zveplacement of the Plight
programmer without recognition of this fact could have

created the open’circuit, It should be noted, as set

forth in greater detail in prior reports to the Air Force,

that the failure to recognize this non~interchangeability.

was not due to inadequate procedures, but, rather, was

due to an error in engineering judgment on the part of a

certain design engineer, The engineering evaluation of

this failure has indicated that other malfunctions in the

pitch rate, main engine actuator circuit could have

oreated the identical flight failure. The circuit in

question contains components which are subject to mal-

funotion modes which could have produced the Plight

failure. For example, it is Possible that the flight

fatlure could have been caused by the failure of 2

capacitor in the pitch rate, main engine actuator

, Clreult. Because of this possibility a redesign was

made which removed such capacitor from the yaw and pitch
vate circuits and deleted the requirement for routing

these circuits through the connector in question,
2.

The highest approval authority for E.0. 2796676 was Mr.

W. H. Whatley, Group Engineer, Vehicle Electronics
Seotion, VAPB Field Station,

-FOR-OFFIGIAL-USE-ONEY- v—


APPENDICES

, LAUNCH SUMMALY.460600scccseessssecescesssecenenes

1. Launch Objectives versus Results Attained...
“4+ Command Guidance and Trajectory Analysis, .. .
Preparation and Histozy: Ts
Preparation and History: Stage IT.....sssese06.

g

“oY Fw www HB

13
13
16
18




From the very first launch Discoverer-would weigh. at least a half a
ton on orbit and it would grow progressively heavier as development pro-
ceeded. . ; ,

The precise orbit required for Discoverer called for injection inte
orbit at a specific point in space and with the vehicle oricuted hori-
sontally vith respect to the surface of the earth. This dictated that the
satellite have not only ite ow rocket engine which could be ignited on ;
ground comand but also required a control system to reorient the satellite
into a horizontal attitude after separation from its booster.

On orbit Discoverer hed “to be stable in all three axes -- pitch, yew
and roll. Tt had to maintain this stability for long periods and a
provision to maneuver the vehicle into various stable attitudes was required.

Tt was necessary to seperate a capsule from Disceverer on orbit and
accomplish safe re-entry of the capsule into the atmosphere. a

T) accommodate the final operational capability -- recovery of the
capsule -- it was necessary to control separation and re-entry with great”
accuracy and to develop a recovery force vith maximm mobility.

In 1956 when the Air Ferce-Locktieed team pitched into the hartware
phase of Discoverer development, these operetional requirements were major
scientific asi technical challenges which would tax to the limit the
knowledge, courage and determination of our scientific community.

Today, five years later, these same operational requirements are "
realities. In the achievemént of each one of them the Discoverer program
established a world first.

With the launch of Discoverer I on February 28, 1959 the precise
polar orbit was achieved. Through the launch of Discoverer XIX in December

(mare)
he


trace:

A At 6372.2 seoands the payload monitor suddenly dropped from
cL fo 00 ont are esa mie say gpd frm
ticn of the forward payload from the vehicle, At. the time of structural
failure the tumble rate was one cps, :

ana fcank presgure showed an abnormal increase immediately Ifore teavees

At T+157,76 seconds, 28 milliseconds after the VECO signal, the missile
inereesated 28 volt de current monitor indicated a moderate alot
Sngreare of bus current from 19 amperes to a value of 28 tape At this
OvOLEe while Era wes oe regula ed voltage showed a drop of about

4 volts while wlt vol to a value
less than 21 volts. This indicates that a feleereee Tope! circuit
Events than ne, {Pe IX do/de converter ar one of ite output cinnits,
gyros, Gt should have occumed.at VECO were uncaging off the siowy ‘RP
gyros, arming of the separation circuit, sending signals for horizon: sensor
Sremgeeiection, and disarming of the Agena destruct backup creas”
Considering the switching at these events, only unregulated 28 volt de

2, °


11-13-63

11-26-63
12-30-63

1-13-64
1-28-64
2-3-64

2-20-64
2-24-64
2-26-64

2-28-64
3=3-64

3-5~64
346-64
37-64
3-10-54
3-19-64
3-16-64
3-17-64
3-18-64
3-19-64

Inspection of the booster revealed rust and corrosion of
the main engine thrust chamber, engine ducting and support
structure and vernier engine No, 2.

Removal of the above mentioned rust and corrosion was
started.

Vernier engine No. 2 actuators were removed for rework of
the servo-valves.

The No. 2 vernier engine was replaced.
Installation of new solid motor ejection rails was started.

The feedback potentiometers on the main and vernier engines
were removed for rework,

A new main engine flame shield was installed.

Actuator feedback potentiometers were replaced.

Booster hydraulic checks were completed. Installation of
the telemetry modifications to monitor the new solid motor
ejection rails was completed.

The yaw actuator on vernier engine No. 1 was leaking and
had to be replaced,

Booster electrical checks and an all-systems test was
completed.

Booster 396 was secured and transported to PALC 1 pad 1.
Booster mating was completed,

Booster leak checks were started.

Leak checks and hydraulic checks were completed.

Booster electrical checks were completed.

An all-systems test and a dry countdown were completed.

A single and dual propellant loading exercise was completed,
RS day pre-flight procedures were ‘completed,

R-4 day pre-flight procedures were completed,

17



SECTION II,
EVALUATION
A. VEHICLE PREPARATION, ;

On 21 Mar 1964, problems in the SS-O1A flight controller’ caused
the launch to be postponed 24 hours. .

B. COUNTDOWN HISTORY’ AND PAD DAMAGE,

l eaded te oan was initiated on schedule at 0335 PST, 24 Mar 1964
Uicch ayro heatere ware neste tecnica Dold, At T-14 minutes the
l-2A gyro ters were not cycling 3 therefore, hold number one
(DAC) was imposed from 1347 to 1400 to increase electiita eee
heaters, provided proper cycling. The second hold (BTL) was
in pase IIT of the terminal count from 1H04 to 106 to resycve tne

loop checks. In Phase V of the terminal coun’ @ third hold: (LMSC) was
imposed from 1417 to 1421 sniffer indicated a leak,

w

{|


At «35 sec
Ghannels returned to

staqadgdveh aged :
UAH ee Ha
Ce ee
3a saeeecetg ges gE Be 48 Bs
PRCA ae Wee i

oa

a

thus pin down


Aly Force Plaot Representative Janusry 29, 1962
Pase Two : O-Legal-77 Lo

4, | AS set forth in sronter Geteil subssquently. in
tht report and also in Erovhous ropurts mada to the Alp:
Force, there ana at feces ( Aad wosskbly more, independance
Possible causes of the fathers. Ih olew Tepgurts subrittred
to tha Aly Forse, Consrnetor 2 ‘Slated BH co She west
Likely caupe of the fatlure; is 3 ecgniged, however,
Shet such Spesulsticn'’ fo. not cone: Tiss Sou.’ sf the cause of
the fatlure, ° .

st

3. Shere hus bean Sune indication thas the Air
Force believes thas. fasity Contractor PMoGedunes enasributag
to tha causa ef tha ?allupe bee Curgractor's tress! asian
elearly nogates that SMLlity, ven Lf ts be
tha falluse was dva ty saa Wirlag ehang? ca ‘tine
Sebsequens flisns Pros T replacement ucder Cun lcact AP ch
{oh “739, and a3 feted abow thera is co eleep cus avlderce

that this was the $8 carat ba eonedrcid ties the fadlose
resulted from irac. 8 or faulby Contracsos Procedures. Pas
Wiring ¢hanre was go Sed by the inavarce of an &>propriate

Raginooping Geci> tn Sscow see Ath existing Conbraeter PR.
cecnreg, Ties Tange? ung a. $norised the subsequent Plight
PYCLPAINED Poplacasans GLa 30 In accordance. with standarc
Contrsetor procaJurse NHiGh Bequimd, amons other sairgs,

Socumentation of the Teplacewent and a review at All previous

tHglnoering. panes on the Cortrel Sleetrorias ably, ine
@ludinzg ths cagingering Odes vader which ta 37iCUa Witting
. Change was sade. “It is iapomteat to exinan ‘082 that the

. >
ensinzer, pursuant te Stardard Contrestar pre. SINS, Ge bUAL2;:
reviewsd the euglscerin., order tr Gursticn., Aas vemlt of
an t2rer in engineering Suidgmsnt, howver, he @enoiuded that
the replacement of the PlIsht prosracase affeotively removed
the previous wiring ctangs and that interchangsaaii ity wag
therefore not affected, ThareaPter, and again. in socordance
Vita Contractor PPoeadures, the Control Aleetronios Assembly
25 subjected to tho necessary Iaboratory Sunetioneal checkout,
LrGliding rate wyrg Solarity chucks. Tha Tecords of the
rufacturing Tachnte ls, RO actually partorned these latter — >e____
chicks, 85-812 as tre inapretion paper, indicate that che
pitch rate, mate engin actuator airoutt WQS operable, It
43, Of courae, Possible, az hae bsen Suegested in previous
ebay that the ehseutt tn Question was fn fact discontinuous

thst the Teéhnician sere in.his reading of the thre:
208 Involved in che vets ByTO polavity cheeks, Care Zu
“papmenee to the existics Contractor procedures, howvar,
vehG neve eliolratad cuts Pessidle veror. Thea, sven with



Lo

3. as this designated as a non-interc! eable
noaificadtion? Tf not, why not? ;

' BO 2796676 contained no statement as to the interchange-

epilsty of the items after the rewiring change. Since
the change was a Salvage modification and the basic
Santa Monica production configuration was not affected,
the Field Station policy in effect at thet time did not
require the identification of non-interchangeability.

If production interchangeability had been affected, then
the standard Douglas procedure (Standard Practice Kemo-

; _Yandum A6-304-1860) would insure review at Santa Monica

in order that the production drawings be changed as
necessary to eliminate the problem on subsequent units.

The cited Standard Practice Memorandvm is attached as
Exhibit “Bl, .

4, mation in accordance

Was the lack of such des
with established DAC rocedure? if So, who was

ie et avproval author ‘or S procedure
and what was his er '
There was no Douglas policy or procedure requiring a

Tield station change to be designated as interchangeabie

or non-interchangeable, if Santa Monica production was
not affected,

_5. What was the DAc management and ervisory structure
of the DAC Fleld Station Bg Vandenbs ARS during the
‘month of duly, 1917 — ——— *

Attached as Exhibit "B2", 4s an organisation ohart which
sets forth the management end supervisory structure of
the VAFB Field Station during the month of July, 1961,

“6. Who was the highest approval authority for the
5 ation ‘or ‘the new rogranmmer for
3 and what was his fe

' The highest approval authority for the installation of

the new flight programmer for DAC 322 was D. K. Frayne,
Design. Engineer, Vehicle Electronics Section, VAFB Field
Station, In addition it was necessary that a test pro-
cedure change be made in order to. assure that the replace-
ment part functioned properly in tne system. This test
Procedure change was established by E.0. No. TI97T779-
Variation, dated July 14, 1961, e@ highest approval
authority for this E.0. was W. H. Whatley, Group Engineer,
Vehicle Electronics Section, VAFB Field Station.

“2.

FOR_OFFICIAL-USE-ONLY-


1960, polar orbit has been accomplished 13 times. Batting sverage -- well
in excess of 600.

On the second flight test, stabilization, reorientation on timer
command, separation and successful re-entry of the capsule all were
accomplished. Due to a malfunction of ground equipment it was not possible
to readjust the airborne timer to trigger separation at the proper point
in space to permit recovery.

The amazing accomplishments of the first two flight tests, however,
were o little like begisnérs lick in a game of cards. With the third
launch, Discoverer began to follow the normal pattern of research and
development -- trial, error and disappointment punctuated by success, achieve-
ment and elation.

The ability to launch, orbit, stabilise and reorient the vehicle was
demonstrated with e high degree of consistency. Successful launch and orbit
were achieved 13 out of 19 attempts. Stabilization and reorientation were
accomplished 10 times -- no attempt was planned for Discoverer I. Capsule
separation also was accomplished 10 times. It was not programmed for
Discoverer I or XIX. :

. During the latter. part of 1959 and early 1960 Discoverer project ©"~
personnel encountered a major problem area. Repeatedly capsule separation ~
occurred on schedule during the vehicle's 17th pass but either the waiting
recovery force heard nothing from the capsule's radio beacon or the signals
received indicated the capsule had not re-entered at the proper angle and
was hurtling overhead out of their reach.

(wore)
-5-



Harold Mitchell executed the world's first aerial recovery of a satellite
capsule. ; ;

Twice sgain in 1960 serial recoveries of Discoverer capsules vere ,
@ccomplished. In both, instances capt. Gene Jones fteldea the globe-
Girdling space hits. ;

In the two years since the first orbit of a Discoverer, satellite,
the Agena -- the orbiting Vehicle -- has grown in size, weight and Compléxity.
The first Agena A messured 19! feet in length,. ‘weighed. 1,300 pounds on
orbit and carried no equipment for stabilization, reorientation or capsule
_Fecovery. Once its 15,000-pound-thrust Bell liquid rocket engine was fired..
to inject 48 into exbit 1% ed mo further motive power. :

Beginning vith Discéverér XVI, ‘the Agena B was substituted for the
earlier model. This vehicle measures 26} feet in length and veighs
Spproximately 2,100 pounds oa orbit. Its Bell rocket engine has a re-start
capability: This capability, hovever, will not be exercised until sometime
“early this year, 1¥ ta-designed to enable the Agena to chaage orbit.

Avshough in Discayerer the Air Force has in being an operational
space systén complete with its own Isunch, tracking, data Scquisition,
contrel, Command and recovery facilities, it does not intend to stop here.

" Discoverer is a researeh and developeent systen. Tt is designed to:
develop and prove the hardware, Procedures and techniques necessary for a”
nny Seziste tyres ant to train the Air Ponce otttoar
end airman necessary to operate then.

AS such, Piscoverer is going to be around for some time, incressing our
technical imovhow, ‘rteiding our beachhead ti space and bolstering ou ~
ability to deter aggression through maintenance of sufficient military
Power to prevail in the event we are. attacked.

-T-


(1) Scratohed
(a) Item 11.4 (surveillance)
(b) Trem 11.23 (tracking)
(©) Item 11.24 (tracking)
(4) Tem 12,1 (tracking)
Ce) Ttem.12.2 (tracking)
(5) Dirty Aperture
(a) Item 11,2 (surveillance)
b) Team 11.5 (high speed eurveitlance)
(o) Ttem 11.28 tracking) ,
(4) Ttem 11.26 (tracking)

(e)- Item 12,2 Cracking)
(6) Broken Perforation; not delivered

(a) Item 11,12 Cignition and liftoff)
(7) Obstruction in Upper comers of frame
(a) Item 11.4 (surveillance)
(8) Spurious circular image
(a) Item 12,3 (tracking)
(9) Over-exposed print
(a) Item 11,9 (umbilical ejection)
Qo) Inage not centered
“(a)” Item 1.16 (blast effects against base mast)

ee,