ADMINISTRATION 

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ASSIST ANT SECRET ARY Of DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301 

July 29, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of Defense 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense 

SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Report -- Final 

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On July 11, I submitted my tentative report on Defense intelligence 

to you. At the same time I distributed copies to interested parties in th~ 

intelligence community. Those individuals receiving copies were informed 

that they had until July 21 to comment ori the tentative report. Most of the 

recipients have communicated with me. 

As could be expected, the reactions to my tentative report varied 

greatly. (One individual commented: "It is inconceivable that such a 

shallow effort with major limitations of authority and responsibility would 

be proposed .... 11 Modesty forbids me to quote equally forthright commendatory comments. ) 

Attached to this memo are all of the written communications I have 

received. (I am not sending these to others receiving a copy of my report 

because I think. it would be inappropriate. ) 

I have revised my report and am submitting it with this memo. The 

basic recommendations remain unchanged. However, I have attempted to 

clarify where my tentative report obviously proved to be unclear. Substantive changes have also been made where the proponents convinced me 

of the need. 

Other approaches could be suggested and could very well prove workable. I prefer mine because: 

1) There is great concern throughout government with 

Defense intelligence. The primary cause of this uneasiness is the feeling that we are paying too much for what 

we are getting and that better management would result 

in a better operation. I recognize this reaction and 

generally concur with it. 

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Nevertheless, I do not think this is the time for a 

radical change. I think the first step should be of a 

more evolutionary nature; one that all .agree is heading 

in the right direction and will provide the management 

and climate which will allow people to do a better job. 

2) Within the intelligence community we have any number 

of diverse individuals and interests. It is crucial that 

there be coordination and cooperation among them. 

Based on the comments that I have received on my 

tentative report, I think my final recommendations will 

be received with a general spirit of coordination and 

cooperation. 

To go further down the road towards a highly centralized 

Defense Intelligence Director would inevitably lead to much 

internal and external strife. To stay closer to status quo 

would not correct the problems. 

3) Defense intelligence must be organized to ope rate under 

both peace and war time conditions. My approach will accom-

•modate either situation. I seriously question whether other 

suggested approaches would. 

The report will be sent to all who received the earlier report. 

******-************** 

It is impossible for me to adequately and accurately sum up each 

individual's reaction to my report. Nevertheless, I think I must attempt 

in this memo to give you and those receiving a copy of this report a "flavor" 

of the reactions of the community. At the same time I will indicate how I 

treated the comments in my final report. 

The vast majority of those that commented indicated that they could 

live with my recommendations. As a matter of fact, the majority indicated they favored the recommendations. (Some have stated that this 

merely indicates that the recommendations don 1t gore enough oxen. If this 

is the motivation for the majority view, I predict some surprised people in 

the intelligence community. My recommendations are based on the assumption 

that our intelligence is presently not performing adequately and that substantial 

changes will be made in the months ahead!) 

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No one commented that Defense intelligence 

perfect and the status quo should be maintained. 

the more significant reactions to the report. 

as now constituted is 

Perhaps this is one of 

******************** 

The closest anyone came to recommending status quo was one recommendation that the only immediate action should be a major study. This 

was based on the fact that there is no assurance that the basic problems 

have been identified. If true, there is no assurance that my recommendations will solve the unidentified problems. 

It is always difficult not to be in favor of a study. Nevertheless, I 

don't think we can sit back and wait for the results of a major study. Our 

friends outside the Defense intelligence community, including Congress, 

would very likely take a very unfriendly steely-eyed look at Defense maintaining status quo under the guise of still another study. 

I also think that the Department of Defense will not settle for status quo 

in our present intelligence set-up. We all recognize our house is not in order 

and some immediate steps must be taken. There is no unanimity that my 

recommendations go too far or not far enough. However, there seems to 

be a consensus that my recommendations are going down the right road. 

********************* 

I continue to recommend assigning the focal point responsibilities to an 

existing Assistant Secretary of Defense. I do refer to him as the Special 

Assistant for Intelligence. Technically, however, he should be an ASD 

with the added intelligence responsibilities. 

********************** 

There is no unanimity as to the scope of the Special Assistant. The 

recommendations range from wanting him to be strictly advisory to wanting 

him to be a Presidential Appointee with complete line responsibility for all 

Defense intelligence. 

Very few rallied round either of those extreme positions. Most agreed 

that the Special Assistant should have direct line authority for resource 

management, but only staff responsibility for the rest. 

I agree with the majority view. I think resource management needs the 

most immediate management attention. The Special Assistant must have line 

authority for resources. 

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Many wanted the Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies to 

hq:ire a direct line to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for substantive 

intelligence. I think they make a good point and have revised the report 

to give the Special Assistant two hats. A line hat for resource management and a staff hat for the rest. 

This should not imply that the Special Assistant will not become involved with day-to-day activities. It does mean, however, that he will not 

become involved very often. (A good rule of thumb is that he will become 

involved to the same extent as the Secretary and Deputy Secretary have in 

the past. ) When he does become involved, he will be acting for the Secretary/ 

Deputy Secretary. As long as the Special Assistant has good rapport and the 

confidence of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, I frankly think it makes 

relatively little difference whether he is designated line or staff. 

********************** 

Many commented that the Special Assistant should be a full-time job. 

Almost all based this on the fact that the importance of intelligence and the 

magnitude of the effort demands a full-time effort. 

I hear what they are saying. Nevertheless, I believe that if the Special 

Assistant can remain out of the day-to-day activities, resource management 

and policy matters will not require his undivided attention. 

Obviously I could be wrong. If I am, the Special Assistant and you two 

should be the first to know. At that time an appropriate change can be made. 

*********************** 

There seemed to be a consensus that there is an excellent chance that 

the recommended staff will be too small. At the same time, however, there 

also was agreement that a medium size staff would be a logical place to start. 

************************ 

My comments in the tentative report concerning the DoD Intelligence 

Board were obviously not clear. I was not necessarily recommending the 

creation of a formal board. Rather, I was trying to recommend a management technique of having the leaders in the Defense intelligence community 

frequently meet to discuss mutual problems. This has been lacking in the 

past and appears to be one of the major reasons for a lack of coordination. 

Many recommended that the Chiefs of the Service intelligence agencies should 

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sit on the Defense Intelligence Board. Becau.se of the importance of 

military intelligence, I think this makes sense and the Special Assistant 

should consider it. 

A number of people assume the formal creation of a DoD Intelligence 

Board. Whether or not this should be done I leave to the Special Assistant's 

managerial judgment. 

********************** 

Some had rather strong views that we should not do away with the 

various intelligence programs (CCP, CIP, and others). At the same time 

there were questions whether the recommended Consolidated Defense Intelligen·ce Program (CDIP) would, in effect, be an unintelligible and unmanageable paper mill. 

I recognize and agree with this concern. I do not know whether we can 

or should come up with a specific CDIP. I do know that we must have each 

intelligence agency develop its program with full knowledge of the others 

and in~ far less complicated manner. 

It could very well be that the CDIP would be nothing more than the 

present intelligence programs with three major changes: 

1) More intelligible and less complicated; 

2) Prepared with full knowledge of what the other 

intelligence agencies are including in their programs; 

3) Provide the opportunity for resource trade-offs. 

********************** 

The creation of an Executive Council caused varying reactions. No 

one out and out opposed it. Many had concerns. One concern was how this 

Council would replace a similar committee on which the DCI, the President's 

Scientific Advisor and the Deputy Secretary of Defense serve. Specifically, 

when that committee was formed it involved a charter and a written agreement 

among various agencies in the intelligence community. What happens to the 

charter and the agreement now? 

The makeup of the Executive Council also caused concern. Many opposed 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serving on the Council. (Everyone 

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prefaced his comment with a statement that he has complete confidence 

in the present Chairman. ) The concern was that the cumbersome JCS 

procedures would unduly impede the progress of the Council work. I 

think it is important that the Chairman serve on this Council because of 

hi's status in the community, I also think we can minimize the chances 

of delay actually occurring, 

A number commented that if the DDR&E served on the Council, others 

should also, (For instance, ASD (SA), ASD (C), ASD (I&:L), BoB, and the 

Directors of DIA and NSA), I think it is advisable that he serve. I don't 

recommend further additions because the Council would then tend to be unwieldy. 

I continue to recommend the creation of the Executive Council. What 

a similar committee has done for one of the Defense intelligence agencies 

could be done for all .. However, I do change my recommendation along 

these lines: 

1) The similar organization need not be abolished. It 

could become a subcommittee of the Executive Council. 

In that way we would not have to be concerned about re-

.vising charters and agreements. 

2) My recommendation is that the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, the DCI, the President's Scientific Advisor, 

the Chairman of the JCS and the DDR&E should be 

members of the Council. 

******************** 

Some expressed fear that any centralizing of a portion of intelligence 

management might lead to "managed intelligence". 

I presume this is always a danger. Certainly it is important to make 

sure that our decision makers are exposed to the divergencies of views in 

the intelligence community. 

I believe my recommended approach avoids the pitfalls of managed 

intelligence. 

Robert F. Froehlke 

Attachment 

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July 29, 1969 

Re2ort on Defense In~elligenc e 

Introduction 

In the months ahead it is likely that intelligence products which 

are as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make 

them will be even more critical than they are today. There are serious 

and severe problems within the Defense intelligence com·munity. Many 

of these problems stem from the methods we pr es ently employ to 

allocate intelligence resources against r equir e·ments. Others relate 

to inadequacies in the collection and utilization of intelligence or to 

difficulties in the estimating processes. 

As a resul~ of my investigation, I have concluded that: 

In the area of resource allocation, a new line function 

must be established. 

In the other areas an i·mproved staff element is 

necessary in OSD rather than a line function. 

This report therefore proposes that a Special Assistant be established 

to perform the line resource allocation function and to improve OSD staff 

participation in the other areas. 

Background 

In 1953, the Secretary of Defense established the position of 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations). This 

Assistant recommended policies and provided guidance on planning and 

program development to DoD intelligence agencies and components, 

reviewed plans and programs, developed DoD positions on intelligence 

problems, and made reco·mmendations to the Secretary on the actions 

necessary to provide for more efficient and economical operations. 

In practice the position, was almost exclusively concerned with supervision of NSA. It was seriously handicapped by the lack of a charter 

to function as the focal point for DoD intelligence resource management. 

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In 1960, a Presidential Task Force, chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick, 

was directed to study the organizational and management aspects of the 

intelligence community. The Task Force recommended the establishment 

of a focal point within OSD to exercise broad management review authority 

over military intelligence programs, and to provide overall coordination 

of all foreign intelligence activities conducted by various defense components. The report emphasized the operation and use of intelligence 

rather than resource management. However, it was one input considered 

when DIA was established in 1961. The DoD press release of 2 August 1961, 

announcing the establishment of DIA, stated that a 11more efficient 

allocation of critical intelligence resources, more effective management 

of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of duplicating 

facilities and organizations 11 was expected. The position of Assistant 

for Special Operations was disestablished concurrently with the establishment of DIA. His responsibilities vis-a-vis NSA were assigned to DDR&E. 

Today, under the umbrella of the Consolidated Intelligence 

Program (CIP), the DIA 11manages11 only about 25% of the DoD resources 

devoted to satisfying both 'military and "national" intelligence require,ments. 

The bulk of the resources are found in a number of other progra,ms such 

as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program {CCP), or are treated outside 

any formal program. 

The Seer etary of Defense is faced with the problem that there is 

no review which compares the resources in one program targeted against 

a requirement with the resources committed against the same requirement in ~another progra,m. Similarly, there is no arrangement for 

evaluating information requirements in terms of intelligence objectives. 

In addition, this situation has been complicated by excessive classification 

and security compartmentation, which tend to isolate programs and 

thwart comparisons. 

Objectives 

The ultimate objective of a good intelligence program is to 

provide a better intelligence product to the consumers; a product which 

is as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably ,make 

it. The attainment of this overall objective requires improvements in 

(1) collection and utilization of intelligence; {2) the estimating processes; 

and (3) allocation of resources. The functions of a Special Assistant 

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are different with respect to the operational and estimating process es 

.of the intelligence community than they are with resource management. 

Any organization or personnel changes resulting from this 

report should be made to achieve the following objectives listed in 

priority. (You will notice that these objectives are primarily aimed 

--)ti~. at resource management and intelligence policies, and not management 

of intelligence operations of a day-to-day nature. This does not imply 

that the management of the intelligence operations is flawless. On the 

contrary, there is substantial dissatisfaction with certain operations 

of defense intelligence. However, improved management and operations 

can better result through improved personnel and policies rather than a 

radically new organization.) The objectives are: 

Objective l. To establish a resource review and decisionmaking process for major intelligence activities. By 

resource review I mean determining the appropriate level 

and mix of significant resources for the satisfaction of 

intelligence requirements. There are inseparable reinforcing objectives which are essential elements of this 

overall Objective. These inherent objectives are: (1) 

To establish a mechanism for making cffmparisons and 

appropriate trade- offs between major intelligence activities and programs so that DoD decision-makers can select 

the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, 

processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence. 

(What form this mechanism takes is relatively unimportant. 

It should be simple and understandable. I'll refer to it, 

whatever form it takes, as the Consolidated Defense 

Intelligence Program (CDIP)); (2) to improve Defense 

intelligence resources allocation planning for the mid-range 

period by establishing a Five-Year Intelligence Resource 

Plan updated annually; and (3) to focus attention on 

decisive points in this program by developing major issue 

studies on unresolved problems of intelligence resource 

allocation and management. 

Existing DoD intelligence resource programs (CIP, 

CCP, and others) are institutionalized and are not 

evaluated in relation to mutual tar get objectives or in 

terms of mission-oriented information needs. 

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The DoD intelligence community at the present time 

does not know the minimum level of information that 

will satisfy a stated requirement. While there is no 

upper boundary on intelligence requirements, there is 

a limit on resources. Therefore, resource limitations 

make it important to ascertain require·ments as precisely 

as possible. We need to insure that all valid require-

·ments are ·met to some minimum level, without going to 

higher levels on some requirements while ignoring other 

valid requirements. In other words, the risks involved 

in acceptance of reduced or alternate levels of efforts 

must be known. 

The focus of intelligence planning and programming 

activities tends to be in the near term period (one or 

two years ahead). Long lead times for modern technical 

collection syste·ms, auto·mated processing systems and 

automated analytic and production aids create the need 

to develop a long term intelligence resource plan. Withour such planning, intelligence decisions rely on short 

term considerations. Further, there is a tendency to 

develop options made available by rapidly expanding 

· technology simply because they are available. 

In the present programming process, reco·mmendations 

reaching the Secretary and Deputy Secretary show 

fluctuations in manpower and money from previously 

approved levels but more significant issues do not tend 

to surface within DoD. Frequently, past decisions on 

elements or systems having high dollar value or 

significant ramifications in a functional area have been 

reached through the mechanism of ad hoc groups convened by the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense to 

study each problem when it arises - - generally in a time 

frame which does not permit in-depth analysis. 

Objective 2. To improve information flow and policy 

transmission on intelligence matters between the DoD 

and other government agencies concerned with intelligence resources by functioning as DoD focal point for 

interagency relations. 

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Currently, below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary 

of Defense level, no single agency or individual has the 

authority to participate across the board in an effective 

dialogue at the highest levels with non- DoD agencies. 

Representation today is fragmented among a number 

of DoD intelligence officials none of whom possesses 

the necessary responsibility for all DoD programs. 

Since the Special Assistant will not be the sole DoD 

representative in the intelligence community, it is 

indispensable that senior DoD intelligence officials 

do not operate independently of each other. 

Objective 3. To obtain a more efficient distribution 

of th~ functional responsibilities of. the DoD intelligence agencies and organizations through an evaluation 

of their organizational relationships, roles, and missions. 

The U.S. Congress, in the HACIT Report of 1968, 

and other government agencies have been concerned 

that the military Services are performing functions 

specifically delegated to the DIA and vice versa. 

Additionally, the relationship of the National Security 

Agency (NSA) to counterpart agencies in the military 

Services as well as to the Unified and Specified 

Commands, has been questioned. The institutional 

structure of the Defense intelligence community is 

the result of a piecemeal process which seldom 

addressed the interrelationships of the elements in 

the cO'mmunity as a whole. 

Objective 4. To improve intelligence flow by insuring 

that a realistic reappraisal of security policies and 

procedures is undertaken with a view toward modifying 

standards which lead to unnecessary classification 

and over-compartmentation of intelligence information. 

(Obviously any activity along this line would have to 

be coordinated among all elements of the intelligence 

community and with the DCI specifically.) 

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Dialogue between the participants in DoD intelligence programs is restricted. As a result, at times 

officials charged with reviewing existing programs are 

denied information essential to the formulation of 

recom·mendations; 

Organization 

I recommend that you name one individual to act as the Special 

Assistant to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for defense 

intelligence. He would be responsible for intelligence resource 

manage·ment. In addition, he would act as staff advisor to the 

Seer etary / Deputy Seer etary of Defense for all other DoD intelligence 

activities. The solution to our current problems in intelligence 

management will not be found in the panacea of mass reorganization. 

There are no clear cut solutions to the proble·ms we face. The 

Special Assistant will be feeling his way along a path that will require 

the closest cooperation of all members of the intelligence community 

to insure meaningful progress. 

The Special Assistant will make the trade-offs among intelligence 

programs competing for resources. Directors of DoD intelligence 

agencies would of course have the right of reclama to the Secretary 

or Deputy Secretary of Defense. In other matters, the Directors of 

DoD intelligence agencies would report to the Secretary but the Special 

Assistant would act as the Secretary's principal staff element. 

On occasion the Special Assistant would undoubtedly direct 

certain broad management activities other than resources. When 

so doing, he would be acting for the Secretary/Deputy Secretary. 

(It would serve little purpose to attempt to delineate to what extent 

and when the Special Assistant would become involved in day-to-day 

operations. Suffice that he will become involved at the pleasure 

of the Secretary/Deputy Secretary and probably about as often as they 

have in the past.) For substantive intelligence matters this approach 

will allow essential and healthy differences in intelligence judgments 

within the community to continue to exist and to be presented to the 

Secretary/Deputy Secretary. 

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I recommend that the Special Assistant, as a management 

technique, create a forum where the leaders in the Defense intelligence 

community can discuss and communicate items of general interest. 

In time it could become a decision making body. The exact make up 

of the forum and its modus operandi should be left to the Special 

Assistant. (This forum was labeled the DoD Intelligence Board in my 

tentative report.) 

I further recommend the establishment of an Executive Council 

for Defense Intelligence. It can either supersede or serve in addition 

to a similar com·mittee. If it super·sedes, the similar committee 

should continue as a subcommittee of the Executive Council. In that 

way, all the understandings and agreements that were involved in 

setting up the existing committee could be continued. 

The Council should consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

as Chairman, the Director of Central Intelligence, the President's 

Scientific Advisor, the Chairman of the JCS and the Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering. The Special Assistant would sit ex officio. 

' -

The Council would be an advisory body (however with the 

Deputy Secretary as its Chairman, its advice would certainly be 

heeded). The primary purpose of setting the Council up would be 

to have the benefit of this advice. An important fringe benefit would 

be the communication channel it would provide to and from the intelligence community. Ideally, as time goes on, the Council should do 

the following things~ 

I) Guide and participate in the formulation of 

resource programs. 

2) Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an 

appropriate level of effort for resource programs. 

3) Recommend allocations of responsibility and 

corresponding funds for R&D for appropriate 

systems. 

4) Recommend approval or modifications to the 

resource programs. 

5) Periodically review essential features of the 

major programs. 

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Staffing Alternatives 

There are a series of staffing alternatives which provide 

varying levels of capability to achieve the objectives outlined. 

Three alternatives to provide staff support to the Special 

Assistant have been considered: 

Alternative 1. Provide a nucleus of intelligence expertise 

for the Special Assistant, leaving currently assigned 

responsibilities of OSD elements essentially as they are 

now. It is estimated that it would require five professionals 

and two clerical spaces for this staff. 

Alternative 2. Transfer professional positions and the 

necessary clerical support currently dealing with intelligence resource management to the office of the Special 

Assistant. The objective would be to consolidate a 

number of existing intelligence management activities 

in one office. The transfer of positions might be 

accomplished as follows (This does not necessarily 

mean incumbents would transfer with the position.): 

ASD(A) 

DIA 

3 

5 

DDR& E's Office of 

Special Intelligence 4 

ASD(SA) 2 

14 

Alternative 3. Enlarge the proposed intelligence staff to 

a level at which it would be capable of performing, on a 

totally centralized basis, the full range of intelligence 

resource manage·ment functions: develop·ment and ranking 

of requirements, mid-range planning, program and budget 

development, and review of intelligence is sues. While a 

detailed analysis of personnel requirements has not been 

made, it is estimated that it would take about 150-200 

professionals to accomplish these functions. 

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In determing which staffing Alternative to recommend, I 

considered each in light of the objectives listed earlier: 

Objective 1. {Establish a resource review and decision 

making process for intelligence resources management.) 

The Special Assistant and his staff would have to: (1) Establish 

and conduct an objective-oriented Consolidated Defense Intelligence 

Program (CDIP) which would encompass all DoD managed intelligence 

resources. (Tactical intelligence resources -- once defined - - would 

not be managed by the Special Assistant. However, he must be cognizant 

of them to the extent that he can properly evaluate their impact on the 

e:i;nployment of resources allocated to the satisfaction of the highest 

level military and national intelligence requirements); (2) Establish a 

Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan to improve intelligence resource 

allocation planning for the mid-range period; and (3) Formulate major 

issues of intelligence resources allocation and management. 

Initially, it will take a considerable number of man years to 

achieve this objective. I do not think the staff should be set up for 

the initial surge of personnel needs. This initial surge could be met 

on an ad hoc basis from within DoD. 

This is the highest priority Objective. Presently it is not being 

n1et. Decision makers need a framework for selecting alternative 

options and corresponding levels of effort. Establishing a CDIP to 

provide this framework, and conducting an annual review has primary 

claim on manpower assigned to the Special Ass1Stant. An early goal 

should be the reduction of detail that currently characterizes the 

present intelligence reviews (CIP and CCP). There is unanimous 

agreement that excessive detail makes these reviews unwieldy and 

makes it necessary to devote manpower to these efforts to an 

unwarranted level. (The Directors of the DoD intelligence agencies 

will be directly responsible for the development of their respective 

programs.) 

The Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan will strive: (1) to 

permit resource allocation decisions to be made as early as possible, 

especially for long lead-time items; (2) to explore the adequacy of 

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resources to meet future needs; (3) to present the costs and benefits 

of satisfying various levels of intelligence needs, and (4) to understand 

better the resource implications of satisfying various future requirements. 

A major factor in the development of the Plan is the pressing 

need to establish a continuing system for review of intelligence collection 

requirements against collection resources, taking into account costs 

and risks. No ·means exist at pr es ent for accomplishing this, sine e there 

is no measure of value for levels of information. No one knows how 

much information is essential and we have only sketchy estimates of 

what it costs to obtain the information. (There are a number of efforts 

un_derway which, hopefully, will structure a solution to this problem.) 

The formulation of major issues is closely tied to the preceding 

objectives, and much of it can be accomplished in the process of 

gaining those objectives. Formulating major issues has never been 

attempted successfully in the Defense intelligence community. It is, 

however, nee es s ary in order to deter·mine the proper courses to follow. 

In theory Objective l could be accomplished by any of the three 

staffing Alternatives. However, if Alternative l (the minimum staff) 

were selected, the Special Assistant would operate principally as a 

monitor, with the major effort fragmented among DoD agencies .. As a 

practical matter, therefore, it is questionable whether Alternative 1 

could do the job. 

Objective 2. (Improve intelligence communications 

among DoD and other agencies.) 

It is envisioned that the Special Assistant would act as the DoD 

intelligence management contact with DCI, BOB, PFIAB, and other 

non-DoD members of the intelligence community. One of the less 

obvious responsibilities would be to keep communication channels 

open at all times unimpeded by a lack of rapport and understanding. 

Any one of the three staffing Alternatives could satisfy this 

Objective. 

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Objective 3, (Evaluate the intelligence organizational 

relationship, roles and missions.) 

It appears that this could best be accomplished by an Ad Hoc 

study group. (The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel appears to be a likely 

candidate. ) As a result, this could be accomplished under any of the 

Alternatives. 

Objective 4. (Reappraise security policies and eliminate 

unnecessary classification and over- compartmentation in 

the intelligence field. ). 

This Objective would necessitate a review, under the aegis 

of the DCI, of current security policies and procedures, It is a 

continuing effort because of the ever present tendency to over-classify 

and over-do compartmentation. 

There is a distinct feeling in the community that over-classification and over-compartmentation exist. It is a natural tendency and I 

observed evidence of it. If it is present in any significant degree, it 

certainly is bad bee a use over-classification impedes the flow of information and over- compartmentation excludes agencies and individuals who 

may have a legitimate need for the information. 

Both A lternatives 2 and 3 (the middle and maximum staffing 

Alternatives) could accomplish this Objective. Alternative l (the 

minimum staffing Alternative) could not accomplish it unless the 

function was farmed out to other OSD elements.· 

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The primary advantage of Alternative 1 (minimum staff) is 

that it requires a minimum nu·mber of people under the Special Assistant. 

Cosmetically, this is advantageous. 

The primary disadvantage of Alternative 1 is that it would be 

impossible for the Special Assistant to achieve the stated Objectives 

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without relying almost entirely on a number of other elements in DoD. 

This raises the distinct possibility 0£ the Special Assistant having the 

image of responsibility but not the ability to carry it out. 

Alternative 2 (the middle staff) has the advantage of providing 

sufficient staff to meet all of the objectives and establishing the Special 

Assistant as the intelligence manager for the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. All the staffing would be under the supervision 

of the Special Assistant. It also clearly reduces fragmentation of DoD 

responsibilities for intelligence. 

The disadvantage, if it really is one, is that this level of staffing 

wi_ll not allow the Special Assitant to become involved in the day-to-day 

operations of the. intelligence agencies. Another dis advantage, if it is 

one, is that the Special Assistant will spend a good deal of his time 

dealing with DoD agencies and the rest of the intelligence community 

because staff will not be available. 

At this stage, it is impossible to say whether or not the Special 

As sistant1 s duties will require his full-time attention: in other words, 

will the workload prevent assigning the job to an ASD as additional 

duty? From all my observations and conversations, I feel that it will 

not be a full-time job, although getting the new system started will 

certainly require a lot of attention. Once the new organization is. 

started and running, you may perceive that it is indeed a full-time job. 

At that time the billet can be so designated. The same reasoning 

applies to the size of the staff: as more is learned about the workload, 

you will be better able to determine the size of the Special Assistant's 

staff. As of now, about 15 professionals appear to be adequate to get 

the system started. 

Alternative 3 (maximum staff) has the advantage of being able 

to accomplish all objectives -- and then some. It not only allows the 

Special Assistant to be primarily responsible for intelligence 

resource management but could permit him to become deeply in the 

day-to- day intelligence operations. The primary dis advantages of 

Alternatives 3 are the cosmetic one of added manpower and the 

disruption caused by major reorganization. Both Congress and the 

intelligence community would react adversely to this. 

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Alternative 3, because of the co·nsiderable additional OSD 

manpower and disruption, does not make sense at this time. 

Alternative l would be an improvement over the present but 

the lack of sufficient staff supporting the Special Assistant would 

probably leave responsibility diffused. 

I recommend Alternative 2. It is a happy compromise. It 

would accomplish the four stated objectives with a minimum of 

reorganization and personnel. 

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Location of the Special Assistant 

The number of options available for the location of a Special 

Assistant for Intelligence narrows down to five: 

Option 1. "Normalize" pr es ent intelligence resource 

management and allocation with a Five- Year Intelligence 

Resource Plan, Development Concept Papers (DCP1 s) 

from the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, 

and Major Program Memoranda (MPM1 s) from the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), 

with a minimum role being played by the Special 

Assistant. 

Option 2. Assign to an existing Assistant Secretary of 

Defense the responsibilities described in this report 

for the Special Assistant for Intelligence. 

Option 3. Establish the Special Assistant under the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Option 4. Establish a Special Assistant to the Seer etary 

of Defense as a separate office directly subordinate to 

the Secretary. 

Option 5. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Intelligence). 

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Analysis of the ·options 

Option l does not truly integrate the DoD intelligence effort, 

and it puts sizing and development of intelligence forces under officials 

who have an interest in intelligence products for use in developing 

weapons or in setting force levels. It has the effect of placing the 

intelligence resource management responsibilities in the hands of 

officials who are customers for various parts of the intelligence 

product. (This Option actually lends its elf only to staffing Alternative l.) 

Option 2 furnishes the man charged with the job with the prestige 

and authority, both inside DoD and with other government agencies, 

possessed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Further, the intelligence 

m·anagement function envisioned should not require the full-time attention 

of an ASD. How·ever, when required, the authority of his office as an 

ASD is available. 

Option 3. The JCS are oriented primarily toward strategic 

planning and direction and to those activities of the military Services 

w:riich supply these functions. The assignment of intelligence resource 

management to the JCS would short-circuit those responsibilities for 

resource allocation and management charged to the Secretary of 

Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. The JCS 

are also custo·mers for major portions of the intelligence product. 

Their responsibility in intelligence management is more properly 

one of providing views based on the intelligence needs of the JCS and 

the combat forces. 

Option 4 would probably accomplish the objectives but is 

handicapped by the lack of position and authority normally associated 

with an ASD. The Special Assistant in this Option is solely dependent 

on his relationship to the Secretary to accomplish the objectives. As 

a result, there is an aura of the "ad hoc" about a separate Special 

Assistant. 

Option 5 would require redesignation of an existing ASD or 

Congressional action to add an ASD because of the statutory limit 

of seven Assistant Secretaries. The magnitude of the intelligence 

function suggested in staff Alternatives l and 2, in terms of manning 

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levels and percentage of the total DoD budget managed, 1s relatively 

small and therefore militates against Option 5. 

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Recommendations 

I eliminate location Option l (normalize present practice) and 

3 (JCS) because it appears to me th~t either could result in the Special 

Assistant being unable to achieve the stated objectives. 

I recommend Option 2 (assign to an existing ASD). 

If there is some reason that Option 2 is not selected, I would 

recommend Option 4 (Special Assistant) and finally Option 5 (New ASD). 

Respectfully submitted, 

Robert F. Froehlke 

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