USCIB: 9.6/7 H:ANBLEl 7

JIA 80MIN'1' Ol~S ON±.¥ 

8 July 1955 

TOP iiQ~ YaSa E¥ES ON±.¥ 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: 

References: 

Counter Clandestine CCJUNT. 

(a) USCIB 9.6/3 dated 18 April 1955. 

(b) USCIB 9.6/5 dated 10 May 1955. 

1. USCIB approval of the conclusions and recommendations set forth 

in reference (a) established a concept of planning :for Counter Clandestine 

COMINT operations. 

2. In addition, USCIB empowered USCIBEC to approve for the Board and 

forward directly to the Director, NSA, the resultant INTCOM papers and 

recommendations concerning establishment of procedures and designation of 

action agencies in connection with this problem. 

3. Resultant INTCOM papers and recommendations primarily concerned 

with the domestic portion o:f the problem are accordingly enclosed for 

USCIBEC consideration. 

4. Members are requested to execute the attached vote sheet and return it to this office by close of business 19 July 1955. 

Acting he~, USCIB 

Enclosure 

INT #0005 dtd 8 July 1~55. 

USCIB! 9. 6/7 

24 

rOP SECRET eclassified and approved for release by 

SA on 09-03-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 
~661. 

'!OP fBiRBi' - e.s. EYES eNLY 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB: 

Subject: Counter Clandestine COMINT. 

Reference: USCIB 9.6/3 dated 18 April 1955. 

INT # 0005 

8 July 1955 

1. Pursuant to the reference,, subsequently approved by USCIB 9.6/5 

of 10 May 1955, INTCOM recommends approval of the following enclosures: 

a. Enclosure #1, with the understanding that the FBI member, as 

executive agent for USCIB in this matter, shall attempt, without bringing 

the FCC into the C<lUNT business, to obtain all pertinent information, 

including, if possible, the frequencies routine]Jr monitored by that 

Commission. This information is needed to help avoid duplication of 

facilities. 

b. Enclosure #2, setting forth a procedure that will insure 

appropriate notification of all members before any action is taken to 

either shut off or continue a source of Counter Clandestine COMINT inf ormation. 

c. Enclosure #3, containing guidance requested by the Director, 

NSA relative to the priority of the Counter Clandestine COMINT effort in 

relation to other tasks. It is noted that appropriate consideration with 

respect to a priority change for this subject is being taken in connection 

with revision of the present Master CClUNT Requirements List (MRL). 

2. INTCCM further recommends approval of the following procedures: 

a. That the Department of the Navy make provisions for prompt 

passing to NSA of information relevant to COMINT production acquired as a 

result of wartime civil censorship. The Navy member of INTCOM reported 

Departmental approval of such a procedure. As the NSA member concurred 

with the Navy member's proposed method of providing such information, 

INTCOM recommends that the detailed arrangements be left in the hands ·of 

the Department of the Navy and National Security Agency and that a copy of 

this final agreement be forwarded to the Executive Secretary, USCIB for 

file and reference purposes. 

b.. That the FBI and NSA members "oint determine the extent to 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

TOP SECRET 
REF ID:A66162 

TOf" SECRET 

'tOP SEcimT - tJ. S. EfSS ONH INT # 0005 

Subject: Counter Clandestine CCMINT. 

- --- ----- -- - - - - --- -- --- - - ~ - ~ ~ - - - - -- - - 3, Recommendations with respect to the phase 2 portion (all areas 

other tha.fl the North American or domestic area) o! the matter are be:ing 

prepared by the CIA and NSA members of INTCOM with a view to circulation 

and study in connection with the next meeting of the Intelligence Committee. 

Enclosureq 

a/s 

~.~,~,. .... ----~ /H. C. SIMMONS 

- 2 -

Lt. Colonel, USAF 

Chairman, INTCOM 

TOP SECRET 

------------------------
TOP SECimT - lf. S. EI!S eNB! 

COUNTER CLANDESTINE CCMINT ARRANGJ!MDlTS BErWEEN THE FBI AND FCC 

Pursuant to the informal arrangement already exi11ting between the 

FFC and the FBI whe~eby' the FCC furnishes all information it encounters 

regarding unidentified or unlicensed transmissions to the FBI, the FBI 

will act as the Executive Agent of USCIB by furnishing such information 

prom.pt:cy- to the NSA. 

Enclosure l with INT # 0005 dtd S July 1955. 

TOP SECRET 
'f~ES~~6169 

'feP SEefti! - U.S. EIES ONLY 

I ' 

.. 

I 

D<JmSTIC CLANDESTINE TRANSMISSIONS 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E:p 3.31hl 121 

In the event that a domestic clandestinetransmission tis 

uncover~, the FBI and the NSA will be immediately notified b!' the 

USCIB member who first becomes aware of/such a transmission. T:he 

other USCIB members will also be promptly advised. If the trans~ 

mitter is operated outsid~ .... ----------------

USCIB will keep the FBI continuousq intormed o:t the value ot the 

•terial transmi.tted. If the transmitter._! _________ ____, 

,__ _________ __.juscIB will similarly be advised and will 

keep the Department of State and th., FBI continuously informed ot 

the value of the material. 

F.nclosure 2 with INT # 0005 dtd 8 Jul.7 1955. 

TOP SECRET 
• 

REF ID:A66162 

TOFSECRET 9 

!E>P BBtlRB'? - l:J. S. EYES 6Nfi¥ 

Eo 3. 3 I h I I 2 I 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

PRIORITY OF THE COUNTER CLANDESTINE COMM EFFORT I 

information that an 11 Illegal Directorate" was created in Moscow in 

1947 for the purpose o:t establishing illegal intelligence operations 

throughout the world. there are 

many ad.vantages to illegal intelligence operations in peaceti.Jne as 

well as in wa:r, and that the primary/method of communi,cation is 

through the use or clandestine radio. 

officials ot the Illegal Operations branch o.:r .__~~~~~~~---I 

the *Kanitet Gosudarstvennaya/Bezopastnosti (KGB) have travelled 

extensively during 1954-1955 in the United States, Canada and Mexico 

for the purported purpose/of establishing illegal transmitters. 

Furth~ reliable in!orma.tion available to the FBI indicates tha,t -·--... -- Soviet intelligence o~tio?i";-~-;;·t~ be increased in the United 

States, L..-~~~'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J 

*COllllllittee of State Security. 

Enclosure 3 with INT # 0005 dtd 8 July 1955 • 

.XOP SECRET 

.· .·· / .· .· .· .·· 

/ 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

OGA