RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 19a0167p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JAMIE LEE PETERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAVID HEYMES, et al.,

Defendants,

DAVID ISRAEL and COUNTY OF KALKASKA (17-2270); 

GREG SOMERS and MARK URIBE (17-2281),

Defendants-Appellants.

┐

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

┘

Nos. 17-2270/2281

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 1:15-cv-00969—Paul Lewis Maloney, District Judge.

Argued: October 4, 2018

Decided and Filed: July 25, 2019

Before: SILER and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; OLIVER, District Judge.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Douglas J. Curlew, CUMMINGS, MCCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, P.L.C., 

Livonia, Michigan, for Appellants David Israel and County of Kalkaska. John G. Fedynsky, 

OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants 

Greg Somers and Mark Uribe. Roshna Bala Keen, LOEVY & LOEVY, Chicago, Illinois, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Douglas J. Curlew, CUMMINGS, MCCLOREY, DAVIS & ACHO, 

P.L.C., Livonia, Michigan, for Appellants David Israel and County of Kalkaska. John G. 

Fedynsky, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for 

 

The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting 

by designation.

>
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 2

Appellants Greg Somers and Mark Uribe. Roshna Bala Keen, Jon Loevy, LOEVY & LOEVY, 

Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

OLIVER, District Judge. In 2014, the Circuit Court for the County of Kalkaska, 

Michigan vacated Plaintiff-Appellee Jamie Lee Peterson’s (“Peterson”) conviction for a 1996 

rape and murder. Thereafter, he commenced this action, asserting federal claims under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state-law claims in the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Michigan against Defendants-Appellants David Israel (a Deputy in the Kalkaska 

County Sheriff’s Department), Gregory Somers and Mark Uribe (officers of the Michigan State 

Police), and the County of Kalkaska (“Defendants”).1 Peterson seeks redress for claims arising 

from an allegedly coerced confession, which was admitted into evidence in Peterson’s criminal 

trial, but was not the basis for Peterson’s relief from judgment. The district court found that 

Peterson was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the voluntariness of his confession and 

thus denied Defendants qualified immunity, absolute witness immunity, and governmental 

immunity. Defendants appeal. 

For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to deny qualified 

immunity and governmental immunity to Defendants Somers and Uribe and to deny their Motion 

to Dismiss on all claims. Additionally, we REVERSE the district court’s decision to deny 

Defendant Israel qualified immunity and governmental immunity. Thus, we find that the district 

court erred in declining to dismiss the federal-law and state-law claims against Israel. Finally, 

we REVERSE the district court’s decision to deny governmental immunity to the County of 

 

1The original Complaint also named the Estate of Brian Donnelly, the prosecutor in Peterson’s criminal 

trial. The Estate of Brian Donnelly has since been dismissed as a party in this case. This court also accepted the 

appeal of Defendants Officer David Heymes and the Village of Kalkaska (Case No. 17-2283). On September 20, 

2018, Peterson and Heymes and the Village of Kalkaska jointly moved the court, pursuant to Rule 12.1 of the 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for a limited remand of this case to the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Michigan for the purpose of considering Plaintiff’s Agreed Motion for Approval of Settlement 

Involving a Legally Incapacitated Individual. The court granted the Joint Motion for Limited Remand that same 

day.
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 3

Kalkaska and to deny the County’s Motion to Dismiss as to the federal-law and state-law claims 

against it. We REMAND to the district court for further action consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1996, Geraldine Montgomery was sexually assaulted and murdered in her home in 

Kalkaska, Michigan. Months later, 22-year-old Jamie Lee Peterson was in the Kalkaska County 

Jail on an unrelated charge, when another inmate informed Officers Heymes, Israel, and Somers 

that Peterson had made an incriminating statement about the Montgomery crime. Peterson 

claims that at the time, he suffered from brain damage, mental illness, and severe depression, and 

was placed on suicide watch. Peterson also claims that Defendants knew of Peterson’s mental 

illness and cognitive disabilities.

Somers met with Peterson to follow up on the lead. Peterson initially denied 

involvement, but after nine interrogations and several polygraph examinations by Heymes, 

Somers, and Uribe, Peterson confessed to committing the crime. Peterson alleges that the 

officers took advantage of his mental state, fed him information to provide in his statements, and 

induced his confession with false promises, including that he would be sent to a psychiatric 

hospital instead of prison. He also claims that the officers continued to mislead him about the 

consequences of his confession in order to pressure him into maintaining his statement even after 

he attempted to recant it. 

A week after Peterson confessed, the DNA results came back showing Peterson’s DNA 

was not a match for the semen sample from the victim’s vagina. However, there was a second 

sample from the victim’s shirt, which could not be tested using the technology available at the 

time. Nevertheless, charges were brought against Peterson based on his confession, pursuing a 

multiple assailant theory. 

Before trial, Peterson’s attorney moved to suppress Peterson’s confession, arguing that 

Peterson lacked the capacity to confess, and that the police officers used unlawful tactics that led 

to his false confession. After a suppression hearing regarding the voluntariness of his 
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 4

confession, which under Michigan law is called a Walker hearing,2 a judge found his confession 

admissible. A jury subsequently convicted Peterson of the murder and rape charges, as well as 

the commission of larceny in a building.

In 2013, after improvements in DNA technology, Peterson’s attorneys from the 

University of Michigan Law School Innocence Clinic and Northwestern Law School’s Center on 

Wrongful Convictions obtained new DNA test results that excluded Peterson as a contributor to 

the previously inconclusive DNA sample found on the victim’s shirt. Based on this evidence, 

Peterson’s conviction was vacated in 2014. He was granted a new trial, and the prosecution 

subsequently dismissed the charges.

In 2015, Peterson commenced the instant case in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages from Defendants for the 

following claims: violations of the right against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments (Count I); due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II); 

failure to intervene to prevent the violation of federal constitutional rights (Count III); federal 

malicious prosecution under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count IV); conspiracy to 

deprive federal constitutional rights (Count V); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 

VI); malicious prosecution under state law (Count VII); civil conspiracy under state law (Count 

VIII); respondeat superior (Count IX); and indemnification (Count X). Defendants Somers and 

Uribe, and Israel and the County of Kalkaska, respectively filed motions to dismiss under Rules 

12(b)(6) and 12(c). The officers each raised qualified immunity in regard to the federal-law 

claims, and governmental immunity in regard to the state-law claims, as affirmative defenses.

The County of Kalkaska also moved to dismiss the federal claims against it on the basis of 

Defendant Israel’s qualified immunity and governmental immunity. In support of immunity, 

Defendants claimed Peterson was collaterally estopped from relitigating the voluntariness of his 

confession, which the Michigan trial court had already determined was admissible in Peterson’s 

criminal trial. Absent allegations of a coerced confession, Defendants argued that Peterson could 

not defeat their immunity defenses.

 

2People v. Walker, 132 N.W.2d 87 (Mich. 1965) (establishing the requirement that the constitutionality of a 

confession be determined at a hearing prior to jury trial).
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 5

Because Defendants relied upon transcripts and other evidence from the Walker hearing 

that were not raised in Peterson’s Amended Complaint, the district court converted the motions 

to ones for summary judgment under Rule 12(d), but it is clear from the record that he did so 

only as to the issue of collateral estoppel. The parties do not dispute that the court’s bifurcation 

was proper. On September 29, 2017, the district court denied Defendants’ motions, finding that 

the Michigan trial court’s determination did not have preclusive effect after Peterson’s 

conviction was vacated. After considering Plaintiff’s allegations, the district court rejected the 

defenses of qualified immunity as to each officer and governmental immunity to each defendant.

Defendants now appeal the denial of immunity, arguing that the district court erred in 

rejecting Defendants’ claim that Peterson was collaterally estopped from challenging the legality 

of his confession, and in finding that Peterson met his burden to overcome the immunity 

defenses.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

This court has jurisdiction to review the denial of immunity against Peterson’s federallaw and state-law claims. Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an 

unappealable interlocutory ruling. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 521 (6th 

Cir. 2008). However, it is well-established that an order denying qualified immunity to a public 

official is appealable as of right pursuant to the “collateral order” doctrine. Leary v. Livingston 

Cty., 528 F.3d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 

397, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding the denial of governmental immunity for state-law claims is 

also immediately appealable under Michigan state law). This is a narrow exception, which 

permits appellate jurisdiction only “‘to the extent that a summary judgment order denies 

qualified immunity based on a pure issue of law.’” Leary, 528 F.3d at 448 (quoting Gregory v. 

City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 742 (6th Cir. 2006)). Here, the issues of whether collateral 

estoppel should apply to a determination made in a criminal proceeding whose judgment was 

later vacated, or, in the alternative, whether Plaintiff sufficiently made out the elements to 

overcome qualified immunity or governmental immunity, are pure issues of law appropriate for 
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 6

courts to decide on appeal. Id.; see Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2014). 

Because the denial of Defendant County of Kalkaska’s motion to dismiss was dependent on the 

district court’s analysis and decision regarding immunity, this court may also exercise pendant 

appellate jurisdiction over the County’s claims. Lane v. City of LaFollette, 490 F.3d 410, 423–

24 (6th Cir. 2007) (permitting jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal by a municipality when 

the municipality’s grounds for dismissal or summary judgment are “inextricably intertwined” 

with the immunity analysis regarding its officer). Although Peterson argues that Israel, Somers, 

and Uribe forfeited the defense of qualified immunity, Defendants adequately raised the defense 

below.

B. Qualified Immunity

The court conducts a de novo review of whether qualified immunity is applicable. See v. 

City of Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2007). Qualified immunity protects an official from 

liability if the official’s conduct does not violate “clearly established” statutory or constitutional 

rights that a reasonable person would have known were in existence. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the Supreme Court held 

that a court must first determine whether there is a violation of a constitutional right before 

addressing the issue of whether the right was clearly established. However, the Supreme Court 

modified this approach in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–42 (2009). Thus, while this 

approach may be appropriate in many cases, it is no longer mandatory. Id. at 236. District and 

circuit court judges are allowed the freedom to determine which prong of the immunity analysis 

to address first. Id.

The Supreme Court has also stressed that the “contours of the right must be sufficiently 

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). This does not mean that “an official action is 

protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held 

unlawful.” Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985)). Rather, it means that, 

“in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. 
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 7

A defendant bears the initial burden of putting forth facts that suggest that he was acting 

within the scope of his discretionary authority. Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092, 

1095 (6th Cir. 1992). However, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof to show that the 

defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 

392 (6th Cir. 1991).

1.

Absent allegations of a coerced confession, Peterson cannot overcome qualified 

immunity. Therefore, we turn first to the question of whether the district court erred in finding 

Peterson was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the voluntariness of his confession.

Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts are required to 

“give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the 

judgments emerged would do so.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 

(1984) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)). The preclusive effect of a state court 

judgment is determined by state law. See id. Michigan law allows “crossover estoppel,” which 

precludes the relitigation of an issue from a criminal proceeding in a subsequent civil 

proceeding, and vice versa. Barrow v. Pritchard, 597 N.W.2d 853, 855–56 (Mich. Ct. App. 

1999). In Michigan, collateral estoppel applies when: (1) an issue has been actually litigated and 

determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the same parties have had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there is mutuality of estoppel. See Monat v. State Farm 

Ins. Co., 677 N.W.2d 843, 845–46 (Mich. 2004). However, mutuality is not required when 

collateral estoppel is being invoked defensively. Id. at 844–45, 850. 

Peterson argues that, because his conviction was vacated in 2014, the trial court’s 

findings at the Walker hearing are not part of a “valid and final judgment.” See id. Defendants 

assert that our decision in Hatchett v. City of Detroit holds that a trial court’s findings at a 

Walker hearing retain their preclusive effect under Michigan law even after the conviction is 

vacated. See 495 F. App’x 567 (6th Cir. 2012). But Hatchett is an unpublished decision in 

which it was not clear that the criminal judgment had actually been vacated. See id. at 569; 
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 8

Hatchett v. City of Detroit, No. 08-CV-11864, 2010 WL 1754426, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 

2010).

Here, the criminal judgment has been vacated. Therefore, the trial court’s interlocutory 

rulings—including those which the court made at the Walker hearing—have merged with the 

final judgment, which means those interlocutory rulings have been vacated too. See People v. 

Torres, 549 N.W.2d 540, 546 & n.14 & n.15 (Mich. 1996). And vacated rulings have no 

preclusive effect under Michigan law. See Fast v. Fast, No. 221994, 2001 WL 637292, at *2 

(Mich. Ct. App. May 25, 2001) (per curiam); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 

cmt. f. (1982); Burton v. Topacz, No. 212627, 2000 WL 33407430, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 

18, 2000) (per curiam). This is also consistent with the approach we have taken in Dodrill v. 

Ludt, a case based on Ohio law, where we clearly held that a vacated judgment “technically 

leav[es] nothing to which we may accord preclusive effect.” 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985). 

In Dodrill, this was the case even though the reversal of Dodrill’s conviction was not based on 

the validity of the fact-findings from his suppression hearing. Id. at 445 (finding that when 

Dodrill’s conviction was overturned, “all such factual determinations were vacated with it, and 

their preclusive effect surrendered”). Thus, there is no “valid and final judgment” that precludes 

Peterson from litigating his claims.

2.

Although Defendants’ argument for qualified immunity rests mainly on the issue of 

collateral estoppel, Defendants also argue that, even accepting Peterson’s allegations as true, 

they are entitled to qualified immunity because Peterson fails to plead clearly established 

constitutional violations with respect to each federal claim. We analyze qualified immunity 

separately for each defendant. See, e.g., Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2014); 

Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011).

The Fifth Amendment, which protects against self-incrimination, requires confessions to 

be given freely and voluntarily. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (citing Bram v. United 

States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)). This right is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8. A Fifth Amendment violation occurs only if the coerced 
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 9

confession is used against the defendant at trial. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003). 

In determining whether a confession is compelled, the constitutional inquiry is whether 

“a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case,” considering “the totality of all the 

surrounding circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (noting that 

the United States Supreme Court has taken into account the age, education, and intelligence of 

the accused, length of detention, repeated or prolonged nature of questioning, physical 

punishment, and psychological impact on the accused); United States v. Alsante, 812 F.3d 544, 

548 (6th Cir. 2016). Thus, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “coercion can be mental as 

well as physical.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); see also Culombe v. 

Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620 (1961) (finding a cognitively impaired man’s confession was 

coerced and improperly admitted at trial where officers pressured his wife and children to coax 

him into confessing). For Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims, the Sixth Circuit 

considers whether the defendant’s conduct “shocks the conscience.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774.

This is a higher standard for “deprivations of liberty caused by the most egregious conduct.” Id.

Defendants Somers and Uribe argue that there was nothing inherently coercive or 

improper about their interrogation techniques, and that nothing about their conduct would shock 

the conscience. However, Peterson maintains that Defendants Somers and Uribe knew but 

ignored the fact that Peterson was brain-damaged, emotionally unstable, depressed, and suicidal 

at the time of his interrogation. In addition, Peterson, who was twenty-two years old at the time, 

contends that Somers and Uribe fed him information to provide in his statements, and promised 

he would be sent to a psychiatric hospital instead of prison if he confessed. Although the right 

against self-incrimination “does not mandate that the police forgo all questioning,” Schneckloth, 

412 U.S. at 225, considering the totality of the circumstances and taking Peterson’s allegations as 

true at this stage, Peterson’s assertions are enough to show that Somers and Uribe’s conduct 

could have amounted to a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, Peterson has 

met the requirements to overcome Somers and Uribe’s qualified immunity defense with respect 

to his claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I).

The same allegations support the denial of qualified immunity to Somers and Uribe for 

Peterson’s other federal claims. Peterson’s Complaint alleges how Defendants Somers and 
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 10

Uribe fed Peterson information for his confession and withheld this and other exculpatory and 

impeaching evidence from Peterson’s defense counsel, and how those allegations amount to a 

clearly established constitutional violation with respect to malicious prosecution, procedural due

process rights, and failure to intervene. See France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 625–26 (6th Cir. 

2016) (a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment exists when the 

plaintiff was prosecuted without probable cause and the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty 

as a result of the legal proceedings); D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 389–90 (6th Cir. 

2014) (requiring officers to disclose evidence when it is apparent that the evidence “could form a 

basis for exonerating the defendant”) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988));

Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that law enforcement officials 

have an “affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from 

infringement by other law enforcement officers” when there was a realistic opportunity to 

intervene to prevent the harm from occurring) (citing Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 426 

(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983)). In addition to the above statements from 

the Complaint, Peterson’s claim of conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights is 

further supported by assertions that Somers and Uribe consulted one another during Peterson’s 

interrogations. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny qualified immunity 

to Somers and Uribe in regard to each of Peterson’s federal claims (Counts I–V).

However, unlike with Somers and Uribe, Peterson has not asserted sufficient allegations 

that Defendant Israel committed clearly established constitutional violations. The Complaint 

states that an inmate informed Israel about Peterson’s incriminating statements while the inmate 

and Peterson were in jail together for reasons unrelated to this case. The Complaint also 

indicates that Israel and Somers communicated before Somers first interrogated Peterson about 

these incriminating statements. But the Complaint does not specifically state that Israel was 

involved in conducting the interrogations, administering polygraph tests, or any other activities. 

Thus, the allegations are too attenuated to show that a “violation was committed personally” by 

Israel such that Israel violated a clearly established constitutional right. Robertson, 753 F.3d at 

615 (emphasis in original). Therefore, we reverse the district court’s decision to deny qualified 

immunity to Defendant Israel as to Peterson’s federal claims.
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 11

Where a municipality’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the qualified immunity 

analysis before the court, the court may exercise pendant appellate jurisdiction regarding 

municipal liability. Lane v. City of LaFollette, 490 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, having 

found that Israel is entitled to qualified immunity based on Peterson’s failure to establish Israel’s 

commission of a constitutional violation, the County also cannot be liable under these 

circumstances. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (whether the 

municipality had a policy, practice, or custom that authorized the use of unconstitutional conduct 

is irrelevant where the court has not found that the municipal officer’s conduct violated the 

Constitution). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s decision to deny the County’s Motion 

to Dismiss as to the federal-law claims against it.

C. Governmental Immunity

The Officer Defendants also raise governmental immunity with respect to Peterson’s 

state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI), malicious prosecution 

(Count VII), and civil conspiracy (Count VIII). Michigan’s Government Tort Liability Act 

shields government employees with immunity unless the employee’s conduct rises to the level of 

“gross negligence” or their conduct constitutes an “intentional tort.” M.C.L. § 691.1401 et seq.;

Odom v. Wayne Cty., 760 N.W.2d 217, 228 (Mich. 2008) (reaffirming the test in Ross v. 

Consumers Power Co., 363 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1984), as good law even after the passage of the 

Governmental Tort Liability Act). Like its federal counterpart, governmental immunity is an 

affirmative defense. For intentional torts, the Officer Defendants carry the burden to raise and 

establish governmental immunity by showing that: “(1) [T]he employee’s challenged acts were 

undertaken during the course of employment and that the employee was acting, or reasonably 

believed he was acting, within the scope of his authority, (2) the acts were undertaken in good 

faith, and (3) the acts were discretionary, rather than ministerial in nature.” Odom, 760 N.W.2d 

at 218. A governmental employee fails the “good faith” standard under the second prong when 

they act maliciously, recklessly, capriciously, or willfully and corruptly. See id. at 224–25.

We affirm the district court’s order denying governmental immunity to Defendants 

Somers and Uribe, but reverse the district court’s denial as to Defendant Israel. Since Peterson is 

not collaterally estopped from relitigating the voluntariness of his statements, there was no error 
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 12

when the district court determined that Somers and Uribe’s false promises and coaching of 

Peterson, and their awareness of Peterson’s vulnerable mental state, does not amount to “honest 

belief and good-faith conduct.” Id.; see also id. at 229 (noting that an objective analysis is not 

the proper inquiry because the “good faith element . . . is subjective in nature”). However, the 

Complaint limits Defendant Israel’s involvement to being informed by an inmate of Peterson’s 

incriminating statements, and communicating with Somers before Somers’ first interrogation of 

Peterson. We agree with Israel that these statements do not support that Israel acted outside the 

scope of his authority or not in good faith. See, e.g., Walsh v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 506, 517 

(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (granting summary judgment to a defendant based on governmental 

immunity, in part, where the plaintiff presented “no evidence that would give rise to a reasonable 

inference that [the defendant] initiated or maintained” a malicious prosecution). Accordingly, 

we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Somers and Uribe governmental immunity, but 

reverse the district court’s denial of governmental immunity to Israel.

We also disagree with the district court’s decision to deny governmental immunity to the 

County of Kalkaska. First, having determined that Defendant Israel is entitled to governmental 

immunity, the County of Kalkaska is also entitled to governmental immunity as to the derivative 

liability claims against it (Counts IX and X). Further, Michigan law provides that a 

governmental body is immune from suit unless “a plaintiff pleads in avoidance of governmental 

immunity by stating a claim that fits within a statutory exception,” or pleads that the 

governmental body was not engaged in a governmental function when it caused the injury. Mack 

v. City of Detroit, 649 N.W.2d 47, 55–57 (Mich. 2002); see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 

§ 691.1407(1). Accordingly, unlike with the individual defendants, Peterson bears the burden of 

pleading an exception to governmental immunity; otherwise, the County is entitled to it. Here, 

Peterson did not allege that his case fit an exception to immunity or that the County’s alleged 

torts arose from non-governmental activity. Thus, the County is entitled to governmental

immunity as to Peterson’s state-law claims. We reverse the district court’s decision denying the 

County’s Motion to Dismiss the state-law claims against it.
Nos. 17-2270/2281 Peterson v. Heymes, et al. Page 13

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of summary judgment 

on the issue of collateral estoppel. We also AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Defendants 

Somers and Uribe’s Motion to Dismiss the federal-law claims (Counts I-V) on the basis of a 

denial of qualified immunity, and the district court’s denial of Somers and Uribe’s Motions to 

Dismiss the state-law claims (Counts VI-VIII) on the basis of a denial of governmental 

immunity. However, we REVERSE the district court’s decisions to deny Defendant Israel 

qualified immunity and governmental immunity, and to deny Israel’s Motion to Dismiss the 

federal-law and state-law claims (Counts I-VIII). We also REVERSE the district court’s denial 

of governmental immunity to the County of Kalkaska and the district court’s decision to deny the 

County’s Motion to Dismiss the federal-law and state-law claims against it (Counts I-IV, IX-X). 

The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.