USCIB: 4.2/39 

• ~A584'Jj. 

• 

24 February 1955 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (HaBardous Activities). 

USCIB 4.2/38 (Item 3 of the Agenda. for the 24th 

Meeting of USCIBEC). 

1. In the course of reviewing USCIB policy on the questions of 

(a) engagement in hazardous activities by indiYiduals having knowledge of 

current value about COMINT, (b) conduct ot COMINT activities in exposed 

areas, and (c) COMINT dissemi.~ation to recipients in critical areas, the 

the USCIB Security Committee was asked by the Executive Secretary to 

consolidate existing policy statements (particularly CIBD #7, CIBD #14 

and Annexure B2 to Appendix B, UKUSA) into one coherent directive. 

2. Meanwhile minor modifications to CIBD #14 to provide uniform 

criteria for its application were taken under consideration. As 

indicated in the reference, these modifications were referred to the 

SECCO.M for incorporation in the consolidated directive upon which they 

were working. --

3. A report by the Chairman, SECCOM forwarding a consolidated draft 

directive in accordance with the intent outlined above and in the 

reference is enclosed herewith for consideration. 

4. Attention is invited to several editorial (and one substantive) 

points in the enclosed direct~ve which it is believed would be improved 

by the emendations indicated below: 

Page Para.graph Line 

2 4 1 

2 4 (new 5) 3 

4 5 All 

2 5 (new 6) 3 

2 6 All 

USCIB: 4. 2/39 

Emendation 

aenumber and relocate as para 5. Insert at 

"t;he beginning the words: 11Activities such as 

those described in paras 1 through 4 above 

and". 

Underline the word "unacceptable". 

Renumber and relocate as para 6. 

Underline the word "undue". 

Renumber and relocate as para 4. 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 03-11-2014 pursuant to E. 0. 1352B 

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USCIB: 4.2/39 

'fOP ~efl!T 

TOnfiCli.fi'f ASa 4~ 

• 

Subject: Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (Hazardous Activities). 

Page Paragraph Line 

2 6 (new 4) Last 

6 5b. All 

7 2a.. 4 

10 2a. 9 

10 2b. (1) All 

:Emendation 

Add: "(This does not preclude personnel 

stationed in Berlin or Vienna from proceeding 

on leave from or returning to their duty 

stations provided that only those transportation 

means and routes approved herein are utilized .• )" 

Rewrite the entire paragraph as follows: 

"In situations involving unacceptable risk 

an exception in the case of Group B or C 

personnel shall be approved by the USCIB member 

of the department or agency concerned. All 

such exceptions granted will be reported to 

USCIB. In situations involving an undue risk, 

authority to grant exceptions to permit 

temporary official visits, other than for 

leave, to 'undue risk' areas by Group B or C 

individuals may be delegated to the senior 

field representative of the USCIB member 

concerned, provided a record is maintained of 

the purpose and authorization of all such 

visits. (See Note 2: to Appendix A. ) 11 

Delete the word 11so11 • 

Delete the word "so". 

Change to read: ''Determine whether the task 

to be perf'omed can be, in fact, performed 

satisfactorily only in that area under consideration." 

App. A Note 2 Last line Add: 11 (See page 6, SECTION III, paragraph 5b.)" 

5. It will be noted that the change recommended for paragraph 5b. on 

page 6 is, in part, substantive whereas the rest of the changes are 

editorial in effect. In the opinion of the Executive Secretary the granting of an exception to permit the taking C"f what is considered to be 

normally an unacceptable risk is (if the risk is indeed normally unacceptable) likely to be a rare occurrence not to be taken lightly. Such action 

may affect the security of all and should, therefore, be reported to USCIB 

as provided in the existing directive on the subject (CIBD #14, SECTION III, 

paragraph c .1. ) • 

USCIB: 4.2/39 - 2 -

( ' 

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' 

USCIB: 4.2/39 

'l'OP SE8Rm 

Subject: 

TOPJMiClt.Ji;T: ASB 4ji 

~ 

Consolidation of CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 (Hazardous Activities). 

6. Lastly, attention is invited to the fact that the enclosed draft 

directive constitutes not only a consolidation of existing policy statements, but also some alteration thereof insofar as CIBD #7 and CIBD #14 

are concemed. 

7. It is requested that your views and comment, including your 

reaction to the recommended changes set forth in paragraph 4 above, be 

entered on the attached vote sheet and retumed to this office by the close 

of business, Tuesday, 8 March 1955. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 4.2/39 - 3 -

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SEG fl 0002 

18 February 1955 

'fOP SEBH!'f 

MEl>DRANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRErARY, US OIB 

Subject: .. Draft Directive on Hazardous Activities 

1. The Security Committee, as requested by the Executive 

Secretary, has prepared a draft directive (attached) combining 

the provisions of GIBD #7 (Revised 25 October 1950) and CJJ3D /fl.4 

dated 25 June 1954, with provisions for conduct of COMINI' activities in exposed areas. During discussion of this draft, the 

Committee considered pertinent comments (regarding USCIB 4.2/30 

dated 29 November 1954, subject 11Revision of USOIB Directive No. 1411 ) 

contributed by members of USOIBEO during their 112th Meeting held 

on 28 January 1955. 

2. This proposed directive deals with two main interrelated 

conditions concerning the existing risk to COMINT: that which 

involves a COMINr knowledgeable individual subjecting himself 

(or being subjected) to possible capture or interrogation; and 

that which involves COMINT individuals and COMINI' documents within 

a OOMINI' unit located in an area susceptible to being quickly overrun by hostile forces. 

3. In regard to the first condition, the Committee fully 

realizes that absolute control of the activities of each CDMIN!' 

knowledgeable individual is an :impossible task. The Committee, 

at the same time, recognizes the necessity for each USCIB member 

to take all possible action to control the activities of such an 

individual in order to enhance, to the greatest extent possible, 

the security of his COMINT knowledge. It is in this light that 

the guidanceiand the basis for such action contained in this 

directive has been written. An appendix to this document has been 

added to meet the expressed needs of certain members of current 

guidance regarding specific areas deemed to involve varying 

degrees of risk to individuals. It should be noted that the time 

restrictions regarding assignment of individuals to hazardous 

activities (page 4 of the enclosure) are applicable only to 

assignments involving non-COMINT duties. Considerations involving 

assignment of CDMINT personnel to CX>MINT units are dealt with in 

sections concerning restrictions on personnel composition of such 

units as are located in areas deemed to be exposed, (pages 7-9 

and 11-13 or the enclosure). 

'f'OP SECRET 
~, 

'i'9P SEeRET 

SEC #0002 

Subject: Draft Directive on Hazardous Activities 

--------------------------------~--

4. In regard to the second condition, the Committee feels that 

a determination as to the degree of risk to GOMINT present within a 

COMINT tmit in an exposed area should be based primarily on the 

ability of the local military forces (a) to delay hostile action 

long enough for COMINT personnel to destroy classified docU1DeD.ts 

within that tmit, and (b) to evacuate the COMIN!' personml involved. 

The Security Committee believes, therefore, that the initial determination as to whether a given unit will be in a protected, risky or 

dangerous situation should be made by the senior headquarters charged 

with the defense of that area. The tBCIB member having operational 

control of that COMINT unit, upon examination of the init:ial determination in light of additional facts known to him, may redetermine a 

situation as involving a greater risk. In tha case of a unit which 

cannot operate effectively under pertinent safeguards impd~ed by 

this directive, the tBCIB member concerned may mke such exceptions 

to those safeguards as are approved in advance by tBCIB. That 

member may not, however, determine a situation as involving a 

lesser risk than that reported by the field commander. 

5. The above discussion is submitted in order to outline 

postulates deemed by the Security Connnittee to form the proper 

basis for tBCIB policy in this matter. 

6. The enclosure has received extremely thorough consideration 

by this Committee and is forwarded with a unanimous recommendation 

for approval. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

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/)~a2~Q-.~ 

WILLIAMR. CULMER 

Major, Arty. , tBA 

Chairman, SECCOM 

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U3CIB DIRECTIVE NUMBER _ (CIBD II_) 

• 

(Approved by 'CBCIB on ______ _, 

HAZARDotB 49nmm 

I. PURPQ§E ANP SCOPE 

The purpose or this Directive is to describe activities considered to 

be hazardous, to delineate geographic areas considered to be exposed 

and to prescribe policy with respect to: 

A. Engagement in hazardoue activities by individuals having inowledge 

of current value about COMIN'l'. (Page ... l_J 

B. COMINT collection and/or production in exposed areas. (Page ...L) 

c. COMINT dissemination to consmners ·in exp(~sed. area~~ (Page .2) 

II• DEFINITIONS 

A. Hazardous Activities - For the purpose of this Directive, hazardous 

activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a 

substantial risk or being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation, e.g.1 

1. Duties behind ene~ lines, or in shore operations ott an eneJey" 

or Iron Curtain country. 

2. Flights over ene~ or Iron Curtain territor;y unless on recognized corridor routes. 

3. Ra.ids, minor formation attacks, underwater demolition operations, 

and service with a unit or formation forward or division headquarterr;J, 

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jm> S:JilQ:Rjl'f 

4. Duty in or visits :Ho Iron Curtain countries and also other areas 

where from time to time local conditions are r-1nsidered to 

involve an unacceptable risk. (See paragraph :c, below, and 

Appendix A. ) 

5. Duty assignments and visits, other than unavoidable transit stops 

while traveling on official orders, in areas considered currently 

to involve an undue risk. (See paragraph B, below, and Appendix A.) 

6. Transit through the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria unless on 

official business vii:. air, sealed rail transport, or authorized 

convoy on u.s. approved routes. 

B. Exposed Areas - For the purpose or this Directive, exposed areas a.re 

those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun by enemy forces or 

those wherein the local political or military situation is such to poae a 

distinct threat to the security of COMINT. 

1. Exposed areas at present comprise areas under control or the USSR, 

Soviet Satellite countries, other Communist dominated areas, and 

areas adjacent thereto which a.re beyond defense lines expected 

to be tenable. 

2. In proportion to the risk of loss of CCMINT personnel and/or 

classified material located therein, such areas involve three 

situations: 

a. Dangergμs situations, i.e., those in which it is unlikely 

that complete evacuation of CCMINT personnel and/or removal 

or effective destruction of classified material will be 

accomplished. 

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b. F.isky' cituations, i.e., those in whioh it is likely that 

complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and/or removal 

or effective destruction of classified material 'Will be 

accomplished. 

c. Protected situations, i.e., those in which there is no 

reasonable expectation of such a loss. 

III. POLIQY Afill PROCED YBli£S 

A. Engagement in Hazardous Activities by Individuals Having Knowledge 

of Current Value About COHINT 

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has knowledge 

of current value about COMINT, such that his capture or interrogation 

could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT shall be assigned 

to or engage in activities of a hazardous nature. 

l. Assignment to Groups -

a. Whenever the duties of any person who has had access to 

COMINT are about to be terminated or he is scheduled for 

reassignment and is deemed to have lmowledge of current 

value about COMINI' (whether currently indoctrinated or 

not) such that his capture or interrogation could be a 

substantial risk to the security of COMINT, a determination shall be made in accordance with the extent of 

that knowledge, into which of the following groups he 

shall belong: 

(1) GROUP A - Producers of Category I COMINl' who have no 

knowledge of other categories. 

(2) GROUP B - Individuals who have knowledge of current 

value about Category II GOMINT. 

_,_ TOPS£CR£~T~~~~~~~~~~-
(3) GROUP C - Individuals, other than those specified in 

paragraph (4), below, who have lmowledge of current 

value about Category III CCMINT. 

(4) GROUP D - Individuals wi'th precise knowledge of CCMINT 

processing techniques, competence or potential regarding the morse sensitive Category III CGIINT material. 

b. Responsibility £or such assignment and cancellation after 

specific post debriefing intervals (see paragraph 2, below) 

rests with the parent USCIB member. A USCIB member department or agency using indoctrinated persons from another 

member department or agency shall, upon release or. such 

individuals to their parent activity, furnish that activity 

with suitable recommendations regarding the group to which 

those individuals should be assigned. 

2. Assignment to Hazard,ous Activities 

The following restrictions apply to permanent and temporary 

duty assignments involving hazardous activities. 

a. GROUP A personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities 

onl .. on the authority of senior officers. (NOTE: No 

special restrictions need be applied to recipients or 

non-indocj;rinated producers of Category I GCMINT only.) 

b. GROUP B personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities 

only after six months separation from such material. 

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.. 

c. GROu"P C personnel may be assigned to hazardous activities 

only after a separation of one year or longer from this 

. t~n-;e or information. 

d. GRODI> D personnel shall not be assigned to hazardous 

activities at any time. 

3. ~nt in HaZi§J'dous AG;;t:iv5.ties While in Official Non-Dutv I 

8fo.t11s 

Every effort shall be made to ensure that no perscm uho ha.s 

knouledBe of current value about CCUilJ"T shall engage in 

activities of a hazardous nature while on leave, liberty or 

other official non-duty status. 

4. ~rrement in Hazardous Activ;ties in Any Unofficial 

Canacitz 

All possible action shall be taken to prevent any person uho 

has terminated service with any USCIB member department or 

agency for any reason and who is still deemed to have 

knowledge of current value about CCJI1IllT from engaging in 

hazardous activities at a:ny time. 

5. F.°'Acentions to t~e policy enunciated in para~aphs 2, 3 and 4, 

a.bove, shall be authorized only after careful consideration 

in ca.ch instance of the advantaee to be gained, as opposed to 

the risk involved. 

a. In considering exceptions, the protection offered by 

diplomatic status should not automatically be consieered 

sufficient, but should be assessed in the lieht of the 

particular circumstance involved • 

• - 5 -

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.. -~-432-

b. An exception in the case of GROUP B or C personnel shall 

be approved by the USCIB member or the department or agency 

concerned. Each member department and agency of USCIB 

shall maintain a record of exceptions granted. 

c. An exception in the case of GROUP D personnel shall be 

approved by USCIB. 

6. Im;plementyig Instructions 

Instructions implementing the above policy shall be issued 

by each USCIB member department and agency. A copy of these 

instructions shall be provided the Elcecutive Secretary, USCIB, 

ror information. 

D. CCMINT Collegtion ansi/or Production in Exoosed Areas 

1. Ge:qeral 

It is recognized that effective intercept of certain communica.-· 

tions and effective CCliIINT support of field commanders may 

require the establishment or continuation of CO.MINT collecting 

and/or producing activities in exposed areas which may suddenly 

fall under unfriendly control with consequent loss of GOMINT 

personnel and/or CCMINT material. 

2. Decision to Locate CD.MINT Col1ection and.Lor Production Activities 

a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into 

a protected, risky, or dangerous category will be obtained 

by the Service USCIB member concerned from the Senior 

Headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. 

Such determination shall be made in the light of the 

political, military, or other factors affecting the safetY' 

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'f QP SiilSHl!i'f 

~""432-

of the personnel and material involved. Appropriate 

coordination shall be effected with such other members 

of USCIB as may be concerned. When a situation has been 

so determined the Director, NSA, will be notified 

accordingly. The Director, NSA, will be notified immediately in case of a change in a:ny situation previously 

reported. 

b. Upon notification that a given situation is risky or 

dangerous the Director, NSA, will decide whether a CClillNT 

collection or production activity may be conducted in that 

area. In making this decision the Director, NSA, will: 

(1) Determine whether the task to be performed by the 

CCl~INT activity meets the criteria set forth in 

paragraphs .3a and 4a, below. 

(2) Weigh the advantages to be gained by the national 

CCX.fiNT effort as against the disadvantages of the 

CCl.[[NT losses which may result if the area concerned 

is suddenly overrun, and the probable effect or such 

losses upon the conduct of COMJlfT collection or production activities elsewhere • 

.3. Sa.f'egua.rds for Dangerous Situations 

a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished 

elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is 

locally required to support these tasks and permit essential 

technical reporting shall be performed. ' 

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~4329· 

b. Ooly COMIIfl' documents or technical aids esse!\o~ja 1 and of 

curren:i:. application ~o these tasks shall be held. 

c. Ho Category III OOMINT or·related documents and technical 

material shall be held. 

d. Personnel technically in:f"ormed in COMINT ot a ~gher level 

or broader scope than is required £or ;t;he limited mission 

of the unit shall not be assigned if avoidable. 

e. No person in G'r'Oup c, as defined in paragraph A.l.a(3) 

above, shall be assigned unless his preS'ence is vital for 

the effective functioning of the unit. 

£. Mo person in Group D, as defined in paragraph A.1.a(4) 

above 1 shall be assigned in a:rq circumstance c:. ~ 

g. Facilities shall-be provided with 'Which ~the mif;limum number 

of persons on duty- at arq one time can~be expected to 

destroy effectively, if necessary, all classified COMINT 

:materialo T·r.i..thin a tin1e limit commensurate with .existing 

dangers, a.nd unit personnel shall be skilled in 1(he use 

of these facilities. 

h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure tlfat :tPe unit 

in question is kept informed of e-vacuation plans' on a 

current basis. 

4. Safeguards for Risky Situations 

a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which carlnot 

be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected si'fmati-ons. 

shall be assigned. 

-aTOP SECRET 
TSP aEGm 

b. No Category III or related documents and technical material 

shall be held except those essential to the assigned task 

and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be 

maintained in such condition as to ensure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure. 

c. No person in Group D, as defined in paragraph A.1.a(4), above, 

shall be assigned, unless required by considerations involving 

highly specialized technical knowledge. 

d. Facilities shall be provided with which one third of the complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if necessary, 

all classified CCMINT materials within a time limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel shall be 

skilled in the use of these facilities. 

e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to ensure that adequate 

arrangements a.re made for saf'e evacuation of all personnel 

whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question 

is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis. 

5. The Director, NSA, will submit a semi-annual report to USCIB 

containing a list of CCl>llNT collection and/or production 

activities being conducted in dangerous or risky areas. 

6. Exceptions to paragraphs 3 and 4, above, shall be made only 

with the approval of USCIB. 

c. CQMINT Dissemination to Consumers in Exposed Areas 

l. Genera! 

The determination of the "need to Im.ow" of an official, and 

the responsibility for satisfying that need in the case of 

a:ny particular item or category of COMINT, are functions of 

command or departmental or agency authority, residing with 

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~84321t 

the appropriate USCIB member either in its own capacity or as 

the executive agent of the Secretary of Defense. Nothing in 

' 

this policy should be regarded as abrogating that principle. 

Nevertheless, USCIB recognizes that, under certain circumstances, 

the consideration or security in the common interest may override. This policy is formulated in the light of that recognition. 

2. Decision to Locate CCMINT Dissemination Activities in Exposed A:reas 

a. A determination as to whether a given situation falls into a 

protected, risky or dangerous category will be obtained by 

the appropriate Service USCIB member from the senior headquarters responsible for the defense of the area. Such 

determination sha11 be made in .the light of the politica1, 

military, or other factors affecting the safety of the personnel or material involved. Appropriate coordination shall be 

effected with such other members of USCIB as may be concerned. 

When a situation has been so determined, the USCIB member 

desirous of locating such dissemination facilities will be 

notified accordingly. That USCIB member will be notified 

immediately in case of a change in any situation previously 

reported. 

b. Upon notification that a given situation is risky or dangerous 

that USGIB member will decide whether a CCMINT dissemination 

activity may be conducted in that area. In making this decision 

that member will: 

(1) Determine whether the task to be performed can, in fact, 

only be satisfactorily performed in that area under 

consideration. 

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(2) Weigh the advantages to be expected from such dissemination as against the disadv:antages of the COMINT losses 

which may result if the area concerned is suddenly over·-

rtin, and the proba'J:il.e effect of such losses upon the 

conduct of COMIN'l' activities elsewhere. 

,1, 

3. Sa(egnprds for :Qangerous Situations 

a. only those COMINT items essential to the operational 

responsibilities of ~ senior recipient shall be delivered 

into such areas. All Category III and II items will be 

so worded as to minimize disclosure 0£ the source, should 

the naterial fall into unauthorized hands. 

b. Exe.apt. in cases of ~gency, Russian and Sat&ll.ite COMDlr 

will not be delivered into such areas. 

(1) Such items delivered shall be encrypted with certain 

one-time cipher elements, the possession of which is 

necessary for decryption, and the deceypted versions 

plus the one-time cipher elements- involved shall be 

completely destroyed, normally immediately, but in Bey' 

case within 24 hours after decryption. 

(2) No physical copies or files of this information, even 

in extract or gist, shall be retained under any circumstance and special. care shall be exercised to maintain 

the physical security of the one-time cipher elements. 

c. lb person in Group c, as defined in paragraph A.l.a(.3), above, 

shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effeotive functioning of the unit. 

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d. Uo person in Group D, as defined in-paragraph A.l.a.(4), above, 

shall be assigned under ~ circumstance. 

e. Facilities shall be provided with which the minimum number 

of patisons on diJt;r at any one time can be expected to destroy 

ef'tectivel.7, if necessary, all cl.ass11'1ed COMINT materia.ls 

within a time limit conmensurato with existing dangers, and 

unit personnel shall be skilled in the use of these facilities. 

f. App;t"op:riate steps shall be taken to ensure that the unit in 

question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current 

basis. 

4. Safeguards for Risky Situations 

a. Only those COMINT items having important and direct bearing 

on the operational responsibilities of a senior recipient 

shall be delivered into such areas.·i~Such material may 

include Russian or Satellitt COMINT providing special care 

is exercised in maintaining the security thereof. Filas 

of Russian or Satellite COMINT, or o£ extracts or gists 

thereof, shall be kept to a minin:n:un, and shall be maintained apart from files of other types ot COMINT. Procedures shall be instituted to ensure immediate and complete 

destruction of the files in case of emergency. 

b. No person in Group D, as defined in paragraph A.l.a.(4), · 

above, shall be assigned under a:ny circumstance. 

c. Facilities shall be provided with whi~ one third of the 

complement can be expected to destroy effectively, if 

necessary, all classified COMINT material within a time 

limit commensurate with existing dangers, and unit personnel 

shall be skilled in the use of these facilities. 

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----------------------------------------------------~~~~~~~~~~~--

d. Appropriate steps shall be '\:.a.ken to ensure that ad.equate 

arran3ements are made :r.'or saf o evacuation of all personnel 

whose loss wulci be dmm[i.ging and that the unit in question 

is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis. 

5. Each tBOIB member will submit a semi-annual report to tBCID 

contaioing a list of 001-0:NT dissemiJ:ntion activities being 

conducted by that member in risky or dangerous situations. 

6. Exception.a to paragraphs .3 and 4, above, shall be made only 

with the.approval of USCIB • 

• 

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~32. 

AJ>PENDIX A 

m 

'lECIB DIRECTIVE NO, 

CUR.RENT LIST OF 

AREAS INVOLVING SIJPSTANTIAL RI§K TO INDIVIDTIAIS 

HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF G!JRRENT VALUE ABOUI' COMINTl 

To assist in de·termining areas involving an unacceptable or 

undue risk insofar as individuals are concerned, the following geographic guidance shall apply: 

NOI'ES: 

a. Areas involving unacceptable riiak: 

Areas under control of the l.BSR, Soviet Satellite countries 

and other Communist dominated a!,,as. 

b. Are.as involving undue risk: 

(l) Areas adjacent to those specified in paragraph a, above, 

which are beyond defense lines expected to be tenable. 

(2) Porkkala Area of' Finland. 

(3) Berlin, Vienna, Yugoslavia, Macao, and The Associated 

States (Indo China) 2 

!/ SECCOM sha11 review this list not less than semi-annually with 

a view to recommending appropriate revisions. 

zj In the case of Groups A, B or C individuals, authority to grant 

permission for temporary official visits, other than for leave, 

may be delegated to the senior field representativecof the 

USCIB member concerned, provided a record is maintained of the 

purpose and authorization for all such visits. 

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