, 

USCIB1 10/49 

Ref'ermce: 

24 

22 April 1953 

Proposed. U.Jt./U.S. Cantermce CID the Secu1"1.\7 ot Diplamatic CipheN llllpl.oJ'ed b7 

france and Other NATO Count.rlea. 

USCIB 23/48 dated 31 March 19S3. 

Yote sheet replies to the retereace indicate the approval ot all llllllben. AccordiDgli', tbe clratli ll8DOl'andum 

cantainecl 11\ mol.aeUN 2 with the refe1'81loe has been tor-

'WU"decl to the Cha:l.r.Q1 LSUo 

usm:a: 23/49 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-15-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 
t. . 

~ 

1 be read only by those personnel ollicially indoctrinated i rdance WJth com• • ir;ence •ecurity re1111latio1111 and authonzed to receive the inform -.in reported herein. 

ZiJl SBSBfl (Wl9B ; 819D!ft B!f9B!!;!lWf 

MBKORANDUM FOR 'ltiE MDmEBS OF USCZB: 

31 March 1953 

Subject: Proposed U.E./U.S. Conference on the Security ot 

Diplomatic 01phas Empl07ed b7' France and other 

NA'l'O Countries. l.Jlo There ie attached a cOpJ ot a CODDUrdcation from the 

Chairman of the London Signal Intelligence Board pl'OpOsing a conference, in the near future, betveen representatives ot USCIB and 

LSI~ on t.he toll.owing cpiestions {_ · 

a. '1'o review, in light ot recent devel.opnente, the 

proposed tactics ot the approach to the French regarding 

1nsecurit7 ot their diplT@tic cipherso 

be To consider strateg on the wider question of the 

inseC111"it7 ot the diplomatic ciphers ot other NA'l'O nationso 

In addition, the Chairman, USIBf has proposed that a related au"'9 

ject, viz, the aecurit7 ot the a.pars used by the armed forces or 

Prance ancl other NATO countriea,-be considered. ~v1d.ed such 1«>Uld 

not bold up action on the matten ret~d to 1n (a) and (b) aboveo 

2. The Cbairman, USCIB, "-~ expressed his opinion that the 

tacts cited in the attached mmnorandum trom the Chairman ot LSIB, 

plus other tacts on this subject which have, from time to time. been 

brought to the attention ot the Members of USCIB, juati:t,y having the 

proposed conference 1n the near future • 

.3tt There is appended as &icloaure 2 1 a draft. reply to the 

Chairman• ISIB, 1'or signature b1' the Cbaiman, USCIB. It 111 re ... quested tbat JOUr concurrence or COJ1111enta with reference to this 

repq be returned to the Sec:ret&l'J' on the attached vote sheet at 

JOUr earq convenience, pretenblf not later tban Tu.e11-· • 7 April 

19530 -

Enoloeuree - 2 

1. D00/3242 dtd 26 Feb 53. 

2. Draft ~ to '000/3242 

from Chail'mlll, U8ClBo 

USCIB: Z'J/48 

24 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Fonn1 ft11~0S'6 TOP SECRET CANOE 
be read only by those personnel oflieially 1ndoctnnated In .dance with com- ence security •cgulationa and authonzed to receive the infOl'IDa on repnrted herein. 

OOC/3242 

26th Febr1w7, 19530 

Chairman, ' 

United States CODlllWlicationa Intell.1gence Board. 

l. One of the conclusiOna.ot the U.K .... u.s. Conference on 

the aecurit7 ot French Camnunications held. at Washington in lfq 

1951 was that "the urgenq tor improving the security of French 

diplomatic oommn1oat1cna• was •such that a proarame to this end 

should be undertaken as eoon as possible"•* It was alao reconunded, 

however, that arrr approach to the French M.F .A. should be deterred 

pending consideration ot the report ot the Tripartite Group at that 

time etUCVing the intemal security ot the French Gowmment.~ There 

mat be good evidence, before the initial approach waa made, that 

French authorities having access to HoF .A. cODl!!QD1cat1ona handled 

on a claaaitied basis bJ' the u.1. or u.s. Govermnent "have the intent and capability to esliabliah arrangements to p:rotect this :1.n .... 

formation", and that these arrangmnents abould be nautticient, in 

the agreed opinion ot the u.K. and. the u.s. GovenDllenta, to warrant 

making an irlitial approach"•** 

2. In Decembel" 1951 Chairman L.S.I.B. intormd Cbainnan u.s.c.1.a.H 

that L.S.I.B. had examined the report of the 'l.'ripart;it.e Group and 

had concluded. that the Prmch illtent and capabilit.7 to establish 

security arrangements 'W4tN autt1c1ent to warrant the UeSe and the 

UelCo making an 1111t.1al approach to thm about. their CODllllUlicationa 

11ecur1t7e 

.3• In repl:rx Cha1rman u.s.c.I.B• stated that the rePort. ot the 

Tripartite Group on general securit7 did not in itaelt represent an 

improvement in French secur1't7. arid that it was u.s.c.I.Be•a understanding that an appl'Oach to the French K.F .A. could not be made 

until the report had been approved by each of the participating 

* Para. 3(1) ot Coarerenc• report 

/.. Para. 3(k) ot Oonterence report 

** Ccmtereace report, para. 4?(a) of Enclosure 'B' 

ht UJIB/21JJ51 

z Dated 24th Januar.r. 19520 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Form1 fu1~B&E TOP SECRET CANOE 
. 

.. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

be read only by those peraonnel oftleially indoctrinated in 1genae aeeurity regulations and authonzed to receive the informa 

countries and the French Govemment had undertaken definite :f.m .... 

plementing action on the basis ot its approval. Following these 

d.evelopnenta 11.s.c.I.B. 1f0Uld., ae previousq agreed, be prepared to 

discuss the means tor approach1ng the French .MoF .A. along the 

general lines proposed bJ' L.S.I.B. 

4. It :la now understood bJ' Lis.I.Bo that, in spite ot resel'I=> 

vationa about Civil Hinistries, both the U.S. and UaKa delegations 

to the recent conference of the Tripartite Securit7 Working Group 

have agreed that positive atepe have been taken b7 the French to 

put into ettect the principles and standards laid down 1n the 1951 

Tripart;ite report., an4 L.S.I.B. feels that U.S.C.I.Bts principal 

objection to an earJ.y approach t:o-the French is therefore leas. valid. 

s. There have been t-..o other developnenta since 19Sl which 

attect the situation: 

(b) Daring 1952 there has been a marked 1mprovement 1n the 

behaviour ot the French on evpher securit7 matters. 

B.r and large NA'ro aecurit7 rules 1n this connection 

have been etri ob18"'8d 

6. L.S.I.B. considers that the devel.opnents ouu;n,.d 1rf paragraphs 4 and S(a) and (b) above re.fleet an imprf)vcent in French 

2 EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-3~~ USC 3605 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
. 

" , be read only by those peraonnel oftlcially indoctrinated in ance with comnce security regulations and authonzed to reemve the informa "'J;JJ/(J~· 

securit7 awareness anc:l 1n French security itaelt • and that the risks 

invol.ved 1n the proposed approach to the French K.P oA• :ln 1951 are 

now mch reduced. There is still an urgent need tor such an apaproach1 howevei; both on account. of the continuing (though less 

serious) CJPher securit7 wakneaa ot the French M.F.A. itael.t,, and 

because there 111 a strong case tor putting French C1Phere right 

before proceeding (a• the French themselves wish to proceed) to 

those of other H.A.'l'O nations. 

?o L.S.IoB. teele, howver. that it might be cleairable tor 

UoSoCoI.B. and. LoSoleS. 1 111 the light ot ·recent developments, to 

review the proposed tactics ot the approach to the Franch on their 

diplomatic 01'J)hers, and at the same time to cona1der stratea on 

the v.l.civ C119stion ot the diplomatic C)'Phers of other NATO nationaQ 

A furt.her conterence ot U.S.C.I.B. and L.S.I.B. representatives 

appears the ~ satietactorJ' .ihod ot conducting an adequate aurc: 

V8J" of the current position. A related subject that might appropr1 ... ately be considered at a ccmterence ot u.s.c.I.B. and L.S.I.B. 

representatives ... provided it dOes not hold up action on the diplo-

•tic C1Phers ... 1a the aecurit7 ot the CJPhers used b7 the armed 

forces ot France and other NATO countries. L.S.I.B. feel.a that at 

the pl'esent time valuable data on NATO forces mq be availab1e to , the .Russians trom the exploitation ot the cnhera, and that it 1llOUl.d 

be essential to stop st.1.ch a leak belore the outbreak ot 8lJT war 

between RA'ro powers and. the Soviet bloc. 

Sa L,,S.I.B. therefore urges that a conference on the above 

questions between repruentati,,.s or the two Boards should be convened as earq as possible, either in London or :1D Wasbingt.ono 

While L.S.I.B .. would like an opport1D11t7 to welcome u.s. representatives to London. it 1110ulcl be happJ' to cOJlll)l.1' it tor Bll1' reason 

U.S.OoloB• preferred to holcl the conference in Waahingtono 

. PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

(Simed) 

London Signal Intelligence Board 

3 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
. 

• > bo read only by tha11e personnel oflleially indoctrinated in dance WJ.th eom• 

eoce security regulations and authonzed to receive the ioforma oo reported hereio. 

TOP SEQBBT CAROB - §PRift DIORMATIOR I 

MJ!MORABDUH 10R THE CBAlmfAI• U>ROON SIGNAL DTELUGJ!BCE BOARD: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Proposed Udo/u.s. Conference on the Securit7 of 

Diplomatic CiPhera &Dpl.OJ'94 'b7 France and other 

NA'ro Countries. 

DGC/.32U dated 26 Februaq 19S3• 

1. The propoaals contained 1n the reference have been 

con11d.ered bJ' USOIB mmobera who agree tbat circumstances justifJ' 

earl.¥ u.s .... u.K. diecuaaiona to re'View the proposed •PJ>1"0•ch to 

the French an their diplomatic ciphers• ancl to consider what action 

ehould be taken, it 8ft7 • on the wider question ot the diplomatic 

ciphers ot other NATO nations. 

2o It is alao the op1nion of our Board that further diecue"" 

aions on the sec:ur1t7 ot the cipher qetems used b7 the armed torcea 

ot France and other BA'J.'O countries Dll9' be worthwhile• with the unclez-.i:o 

standing that the queation ot diplomatic cipher Q"Stems would """' 

ce:l.ve initial attention bJ' the conference. 

3. USCIB members 110uld be moat pleaead to ba'Ve the U.K. 

repreHntativea visit Washington tor theae d1scuaa1ona. and 1tOUld 

welcome JOUr suggestion of a suitable date tor the opening ot the 

conference. Fram our riewpoint 8D1' date subsequent to the mic:ldl.e 

ot Mq would be acceptable. 

(Draft) 

ALLER W. DULLES 

Chaiman• United States 

Comm.mications Intelligence Board 

Enolollure 2 with USCIB 23/48 dtd 31 lfal'Ch 1953. 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Form1 fJ;~osc TOP SECRET CANOE