·J. 

/ 

USCIB: 23/51 

m §leftLft' - §EeURift mt?Jllf.1lTmt 

MBXORANDUH POR. THE MEllBB:RS Cl USCIB: 

25 

A~~ B06tNN'i'S eeM-

'fAltf ee~ W6RB Ml\'ffiRIJd:i 

s Hq 1953 

• 

Subject: Report or the Ad Hoc OOlllld.ttee OD Allied 

Comunicat1Clrls Securit.J'. 

The enclosed report. <111 the above subject is torwarded tor inf'ormatim and studj' ldth a view to consideraticn at the Eight7-titth Meeting ot USCIB. 

Enclosure 

Chrm8 Ad Hoc et.e, Ht!ll!D 

dtd 4 11&7 53. with subject report.. 

USCIB: 23/Sl 1tPfl ~lfrll!:t) fle68Ml!lN'f5 60N• 

'tAll~ CO:Dlt tJO:rtt; MJd':liMJd; 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-15-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

TOP SECRET 
• 

REF ID:A58902 

e 

TCJ p :.:;ECRR!'l' SEC t'ftl Ti' Itif~ORMA'i'l ON 

'''!i !c~- ~~~- UMEN'f.' 

U>P4tf'AINS ~ ~ W,.q'!Ji;IHAL 
•• 

nEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Washington 2$, D.Co · 

2)=.123 

L. May 1953 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN• USCIB 

SUBJFA'.:'1'1 .Report ot tb.e Ad Hoc Committee on Allied 

Communications Securit70 

QEFI<.:RENCE 1 UOOIB 23/SO 

l.. Attached hereto ie a report bJ' the Ad Hoc Committee on 

4!.lied Communioa~ione Seeu:r1t70 

2o The Committee in this report adhered strictl.¥ to the initial 

'lierms of reference as set forth 1n the Eight7=second meeting of uscmo 

As a re1aul.ta the instaa"'lt report is tor the moat part confined to 

~onsiderations of securit7 violations against NATO classification and 

lf}ommunlcations pro~edureso That portion ot this report which deals wi~l 

~.nstances or possible damage to U. SD interests as a reeult of "leakage" 

oi valuable information through weak cryptographic aystems is relativel.7 i~cidental to the research conducted on the principal problem as defined 

by the terms ot reterenceo 

3o However, in connection with the above and in response to a 

reouest by the Acting Director,, NSA0 thia Committee ia current4" examining 

the Nleakage" problem as oppoeed to the question ot technical security 

violations and expect.a to forward to N~ the results or that survey tor 

P'->Ssible use by the U. So delegation to the f'orthcoming US=UK conference 

on foreign cryptographic secur1t10 

4o It should be noted that the .membership of this Committee was 

expanded beyond that initially planned by USCIBo ·All USCIB agencies and 

depa.J'tments have participated in aome phase of this research and this 

report haa been approved unanimously by the Commi tteeo 

~~' To Achille/~olyzoides 

Ohail'man, Ad Hoc Committee 

.Enc lo w1-e a 

Report b7 Ad Roe Counittee 

on Allied CoI1V11unications Security~ 

TOP-SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 
. . TOP qg SE8dlfY l~NOE TOP SDJR!T ezc91tTI !RrtmrATml 2)=.124 

e:fdf 91 

30 Ap1'il 19S3 

:RKPC8T OF AD HOC OOMMI'l'TIB Clf SJCURm VIOLATICJIS IH THE 

TFJ.8COllMUNICATIOlf8 or ALLIED JIATI<JiS 

Pro'bl•• - cs 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3.3(h) (2) 

2o At the 82nd m.eeting ot USCIB on lJ rebruar;r 19S3, it was stated 

that soma Allied nations were ua1ag 11uch welk cryptosraph1c e,y-stema or 

were following nch poor com.un1cat1ona praeticea that illportant 

intol'Dlat1on1 especially in respect to llAT01 was being ccapromieedo It. 

was suggested, in ettect, that more intorma.tion was being aade availabl• 

to potential enera.iee ,____~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----' 

The Board then decided tbat an 1nit11l investigation mould be made to 

provide a baaie tor the determination ot nece1&8J7 a(';t1ono 1.'bia Colllllitt.e 

was eatablishad tor that purpoeeo 

)o 'l'he Board directive requested repreeentati'¥'es of the De_partaent 

ot State an1 the Department or the Ar1J¥ to coordinate with the Director, 

BSA, in this inveat.igationo 'lbe Department• ot tbe llav md the Air Porco, 

the Central Intell1gencct Agency 111d the Federal Bureau of Inveatigat:lon 

have alm partioipa tad in the work of the Comitteeo '.l'his report 

'TOP 8Eeft!! SEettft!ft INfeRti!leN ~a . , 

TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION CANOEtX>py 1100~-
. 

' e REF ID:A58902 e 

'1'9P 8ERB'l SEeURHY IHPeftlltT!tlf 

-GMfeit PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

repreemts the unanimous opinion of the representatives. \at ttiese 

Departments and Agencies except where otherwiee indicated., 

4o At the outset ot the investigation it became apparent that the , 

Committee could not complete its task 1n a reasonable time if'. it examined 

all communications ot all f'riendq aat1ona. It wu also .telt tbat the 

continuing etforts of man;r countries to improve their security would 

invalidate tindill'IB in respect to matters occuring eame time \agoo \\ The 

necessity of limiting the scope of. the Collllllittee•e work becaoae\evident 

when it was learned that USCIB wished to have a report which might be 

helpful in the projected conference with the British 1n Jilqo 'l'heretore~ 

which were brought to the attention ot the Committeeo 

The Com.111ittee wishes to emphasize that 

and that the val1dit7 , 

or the Committeeea finding must be evaluated in the light of this eaq>l:lng 

processo 

~o The Connittee•s conclusions must also be qualified by certain 

assumptions which appeared necessU'y to permit the tocus of attention 

'!eP S:SSRlR S!SURITI IRP9RllL'll91 

eta 
·. 

REF ID:A58902 e • - 'lVP S!CD'? SECOM!! !lftPCltilll'ffe!t 

9:Aft(Z PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

E03,3(h)(2) 

.....__ __________ ____.! and to avoid inquiries befond the competence 

ot the Committeeo Thus it was assumed thats 

· ...... ·· .. . 

to the tact that the information could have become available to the 

USSR through landline taps, aeourit7 leaks or compromieea or aq 

other typeo 

(b) The potential en8JD1'' a capabilities are the aa~t equivalent 

of our own ao that he could intercept &IJT radio transmission and 

place it in readable torm as rapidl.7 but no more ao than could be 

done by NSA.o 

6Q It was alao neoe&•arJ" tor the Committee to determine what 

should be considered a security violationo Since the dieouaaio.n in 

USCIB had referred specitical]Jr to IATO comtriea" conpliance with 

NATO security regulations wna clearl1' a factOl'o These regulations 

forbid "electronic transmission" ot COSllIC TOP SECRET* and 

*'fiie word cOSittC has been designed aa a eecuritywarn1ng onlyo 

This designation shall, in addition to the appropriate security claasitioation" 

be placed on all joint and national papers tabled at meetings of any body 

or committee set up under the Horth Atlantic Treat7 Organization which 

contain and reveals (1) Strategic or operational military appreciationaJ 

plans or dec1e1ona,, (2) PolitioaJr.militar7 appreciatione, plans or · deciaioneQ (3) Economic planning based on strategic m.ilital'J' plans and 

decisions which could lead to diecloaure or such plans and decisions,, 

(4) Classified intormation of one comtr,y tabled or circulated by another 

country,p unless the •owner 11 countr;y agrees otherwiseo 

-3= 

i'OP SEUHET S!ICORITI Il'tPOmtAT?Clf 
·, 

• 

REF ID:A58902 e 

TOP szat!! SBCURE?! Blii'eftM'H91 

Sldf 9! 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

HATO SECRET* intorma.t1on in national 87Btemao Therefore, the Committee 

considered' that the appearance ot auoh 1ntormation in a national. qetem. 

constituted a secilrit7 violation without regard to other technical 

mat~ers affecting the particular measageo 

7 o However, the NATO .regulations did not attord a basis tor. 

judging messages relating to non-KATO atfaira nor did it allow c:oneideration 

ot technical factors affecting the availability ot tratfico Therefore, 

\\\\\\ 

Policies or the United States ware restricted to matters 1n which the 

United States was itself taking direct action, auch as those relating 

to NATO, Korea or Triesteo Policies ot other countries in which the 

United States had a less direct 1n~ereat9 such aa =•rtain matters relating 

to EOO or the military diecua81ons between Greece, Turkey and Yugoalav1a9 

were not· considered to tall within this atandardo 

*<h aii other joiiitO'rnat!onal docum.ente tabled or circulated within 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the word "HA.TO" shall appear, 

together with the appropriate seourit7 classiticationo Thia "NATO" llW"'king, 

however, does not require the spec~l handling or accounting provided 

tor nca>U:IC11 documents, other than as wari·antod b;y the secur1t1' claesitication, 

and no q:>ec:ial screening (aa reQuired tor "COSMIC" personnel) is necessary 

for access to NATO documentao 

TOP S!CMT SP.et:ntft! Bf PeRM:ATJ!elf 

6*IfOB 
REF ID:A58902 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A58902 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A5~02 

TOP S!elt!t' 

eAHEIS 

B!e6ftf!Y ~­

Conolu11cm1 

~L 86-36/50 USC 3605 

i EO 3.3(h) (2) 

13~ The me1aqee li1ted :In lppand1x "C" dlosr th•t. oertatn' 

nations allied to tbe United Stat.el t.ranait .:l.n nat1o11 .. \ sreteme 

information which 1• high~ olaedtied unde11 IJA,TO .r91ula.tiona or wbMlb 

is ot illlportance to United State• interest.II or bot.ho 

_____________ __. Therefore, Allied ce1111micat1on1 ••akn•1eea 

and breaehea ot JIATO regulations are /l'eaultiDg in •c~iV riolat1one 

and leakage ot intormation pre~udiotal to United States intere.atso. 

140 The number ot aeeurit7 W.olationa and the uount end natUJ"e 

c,tf information damaging to Uni te.4 Statee interest.a oalTled in aU 

,___ ___________ ..... ~or a long. period cannot, be detei'ilined 

unleaa full,...time personnel are a11111gned to the taak or un.less a conti:nucua 

ttJC1111nation ha1 bean made in t.he pa Ito. To oomplet. 1 ta work in a 

1 easonable time 

Thie atud7 11 valid 

and onq within the detined atandardao Damaging information 11117 be paeaed 

_______ __.tand-b,y other oount,riaa tban those· ciovered b7 this 

repcrto It may be noted, however, t.bat material damaging to United States 

policies my be reeeived by' Allied nations in suoh a manner that lta 

tranBDlission I .... _______ __.foan hardq be called a 1ecurit7 violation 

... 7 .. 

T"I? SICREl' SiCURU'l ltii''8KA TICll 

rd::•m 
REF ID:A5~02 

TOP 8ECfti'f file'fJRftI Dll'tlUM!Iell • 

CINOI" PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO. 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

....._ __________ ...... lalthough it. •7 constitute a Violation 

or m 1Ddi1cretion by tb.e original eource ot the :in~ion. 

-S.. . .,., .. ---- .. 

:OP SICln ilGYRt'll •eRllL!fe!f 

CA.ieB 
REF ID:A5~02 

• 

SA'tlfJS 

But e1t""GD. it the CoiudttH could hava reached such a .concluaion5 1te 

validity would not have ext.ended be70Rd tbs date or the last •s•age 

a:ainedo 'liieee cCIDEl!micetions mi&ht 'becoa more lnee<:11re, tha comtr1ea 

might be mtruated witb JIQN thtailed :1nformat1on 011 VAit•d States 

policies or these countries 1111ght uso th• 1n11ecUl'a ••tea toz material 

ot a highe1" lava.lo A'lf1 of' tbe" cbqea c;ould ilii)rean the dma•r of 

damage to Uni t.d States Sntereetso 

BeoQGUDOndation11 

v sjv t<-

1.80 The p~oper/\ NATO authorities l!hould b4 tul]¥ informed ot the 

:security violations with reapeo\ t.o NATO utters with the purpose at 

developing a pro1raa ot strict ob1e1'7ance ot the NATO reaulat.ionao 

(Appendix "D• is a etatment. b,y 'NSA on tbe Ol'J'Pt~aystems 118.de available 

ot NATO cowtriea) E0).3(h) (2) 

PL 8~~3&/50 USC 3605 

19,., Cb the basis of this report alone 11 no e~le 4oun"tr.Y should be 

approached at thi 11 time on •Y plan involving\ J 

IL--___________ __.I The 

effect of ei'forte at mal"e strict. enforcement of lf.A.TO regulation11 lhould 

be determined, end a broader exeml.nation of a\1 current Allied tratn.c 

should be made to determine all the reaeona tor the appearance ot 

• inf'orraation damaging '° the United State•o 

... 9-.... 

TOP 9BeBlfi' seet1H!'I J:NPSlllA?IeN 

l:t\.1191 
REF ID:A5~902 

!fl' SEBRM' SBelllfft IHP6RIM:!!SI • 

Qltf EB 

200 USCIB 8bould e1tablil!h machinery for the continuing l!llcur11;7 

oxam1nat1on of Allied trattic bJ the Departments and Agencies conoemed., 

Thia would provide an investigation ot the ettecta ot the recommded · 

~ efforts to enforce NATO regulation10 It could allow a constant evaluation 

.... / _______________ ..... \and thue permit ID()i'@ effective 

remedial ectiono 

• 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

'IOP 91!.'QRl'l SiGVR1'.TY ~i'l91 

9MlfB 
REF ID:A58902 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A58902 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A58902 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A58902 
REF ID:A58902 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
REF ID:A58902 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

EO 3 . 3 ( h) ( 2 ) 
• I • REF ID:A5~02 

• TOP S!CimT S!.CtllIT'! II! cmtt'l!" 

a:MO:SAPPERDIX .. D• 

8'1'.lTUS OJI' lf!'l'O CR?PTmYSftl&S 

Ao Firet level (hilh military aid djplomtlc)a 

lo '1'Jpex wit.h Sillplmc 1e\ti11g1~ 

2o Some on..,tille pads (approwd b7 at.And-tag grau,) 

Date of apprav&la 20 Jui,- 195oo 

Made etrectiTe appro:x:imatel.7 August 1950 by Fronce and .Ita]J,. 

October ·1-9SO bf Pc>rtugalo 

Jlote a Non·-Bruea countries were turn1ahed full technical 

details tor making up theil" mm national Simplex settings 

but no information ie available as to whether they 

are doing mo 

Bo Second level (militar;y onl,y .... high command to div1e1ona) a 

lo CCI 

Date ot approvals lO lovembar 19~ 

Made ertectivo .France, Italy11 Portugal l February 19S2o 

2o Ifatu (Back up to OOM)o 

Date ot approval& 25 .July 19S2o 

lllade effective by France, ItaJ.71 Portugal September 19520 

On · 'l'h1rd level (low echelon)• 

ln Bates 

Date of approval : 25 July l9S2o 

No systems 7&t proTided~ 

·reP SBeRft seel'JRf'fi IN!i'efiftA.!IeN 

QAlf eB-
. . . • REF ID:A58~02 

·-9 

TOP SBeR!! ~SR:I'fY lNFORMA'f!eN 

emes 

2o French modified 1'=209~ 

Date of approval: Early' l95:i?o 

FffectiYe only by France ao fs:ro 

Do Gireece started to use NATO cr,vptos7stems on or about l June i9)j__ 

' 

on a limited scale and not until the end or the autumn or 19S2 

had th81' expanded the nets to a fairly large scale of distribution 

aid usageo · 

Ea Turkey started to use NATO cryptosystems at about the same time as 

Greeceo By approximatel.7 l January 19sJ they had in operation all 

the cleypto neta tor which llATO crypt@ material was availabl~a 

Fa I11 addition there are miscellaneous tactical and air ..... ground cadea9 

authentication s;ystems, ett: 1 approved but not yet effef!tive., 

•