-N/is"IJ'eaH.P941 e 

'i'OP SBBm!l'i' Y. S. lfiBS ONJ:.¥ -:B!Nli~:tE hfJ ~L 

SUBJECT NUMBER , ... , ...... \f. (!,,,,___ 

USCIB: 20. /16 

Subject: 

Item 3 of the Agenda for the 103rd Meeting of USCIB, 

held on 14 May 1954. 

Principles for Use in Intercept and Jamming 

Operations. (USCIB 20./13) 

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (General Cabell) invited cormnent by Captain 

Taylor. 

CAPTAIN TAYLOR stated that most of his comments wera set forth in 

USClB 20./13. He reviewed those comments and stated that if the Board 

approves the substance of the paper it will have expressed its views as 

originally requested. He added that the Navy Member has requested that 

these views not be issued as a directive at this time. 

ADMIRAL ESPE confirmed the Navy position, pointing out that the 

stated views are acceptable; however, it liTOuld seem more appropriate 

that they be issued as guidance to the Director, NSA, and for possible 

incorporation in his reply to the CENSA Group and to the Secretary of 

Defense. 

As a result or a suggestion by General Erskine there was general 

agreement that the substance of the draft directive (enclosure with 

USCIB 20./12) should be prepared in letter form, addressed to the 

Secretary of Defense, and signed by the Board Chairman. The task of 

preparing this letter l11-a.s assigned to the Executive Secretary, who was 

instructed to a.mend all phraseology of a directive nature, permitting 

the resultant letter to reflect USCIB views rather than specific 

direction. 

It was further agreed that the letter being discussed would 

present USCIB views on jamming only, rather than on intercept and 

jamming. 

GENERAL CANINE informed'those present that he has been in an 

awkward position as a result of the length of time it has taken to 

resolve this matter, and urged the service members of the Board to 

assure their communicators that he was not guilty of bad faith. 

DECISION: (14 ~..a.y 1954) USCIB agreed that the substance of the draft 

directive, contained as an enclosure with USCIB 20./12, will be prepared in letter form by the Executive Secretary, addressed to the 

Secretary of Defense for signature by the Chairman, USCIB. It was 

agreed, further, that the letter ·will refer only to jamming and that the 

phraseology of the directive will be am.ended to reflect USCIB viei.-ra, 

rather than specific direction. 

This item to be dropped from the agenda. 

USCIB: 

'· 

NSA on 07-23-2014 ursuantto E.O. 1352 
7 

r USCIB: 20./15 

~C!P SEGRE!F 

REF ID:A58941 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

21 May 1954 

Subject: USCIB Policy on Jamming of Foreign Radio Communications. 

Reference: USCIB 20./13 dated 4 May 1954. 

The enclosure is circulated for information regarding.action taken 

pursuant to the decision rendered at the 103rd Meeting of USCIB with 

regard to subject. 

Enclosure 

CIB # 000158 dated 20 May 1954. 

USOIB: 20./15 

TO-.PSBCRET 
r' 

!OP SESilE'l' 

UNITED STATES CCMMUNICATIONS 'INTELLIGENCE BOARD 

Washington 25, D.c. 

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 

Subject: USCIB Policy on Jamming of Foreign Radio 

Communications. 

GIB # 000158 

20 May 1954 

1. In consequence of a question recently raised in the United 

States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), with regard to 

the conduct of communications jannning operations by military 

commanders, the views set forth below are forwarded for your information. 

2. Except as provided in paragraph 7, below, USCIB takes the 

view that directed jamming of foreign communications should be 

performed only on circuits approved in advance by USCIB. 

3. USCIB approves for jamming, at the discretion of appropriate 

military commanders, all unenciphered military voice transmissions 

passing plain-language conversations exclusively. 

4. The Director, NSA, should keep CCMINT field units informed 

as to what foreign circuits have been approved by USCIB for jamming. 

5. Within the framework of policy established by USCIB, the 

Director, NSA, should establish procedures which will permit prompt 

response to any proposals by military commanders to jam. communications circuits other than those which have been approved by the Board. 

6. The Director, NSA, should provide continuously to COMJNT 

field units the technical circuit information which they require to 

support any jamming which is performed on communications circuits 

approved by USCIB or undertaken as provided below. 

7. Senior component commanders in affected areas should be 

permitted to authorize commu~ications iammirw: without prior USCIB 

approval when, in their considered judgment, such jamming is essential 

in the national interest or for the safety of major military forces 

and time does not permit the obtaining of necessary clearances. 

(Signed) 

ALLEN W. DULLES 

Chairman 

Enclosure with USCIB 20./15 dtd 21 May 54. 

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':PQP SEGR:S'i' l:J. 9. EYES ONLY mITNU\l!t 

SUBJECT NUMBER 

USOIB: ·20./14 

Subject: 

~I l\J A,. \.__ 

Item A (Not on Agenda) for the Fourteenth Meeting 0£ 

USCIBEC, held on 29 April 1954. 

Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept 

Operations. 

IBE CHAIRMAN (Captain Taylor) introduced this item by explaining 

that all members except the Navy Member had approved USCIB 20./12 

dated 12 April 1954. The Navy Member, he said, recommends that the 

proposed Directive be issued as a statement to the Director, NSA to 

guide his answer to the Director, Communications-Electronics rather 

than as a Directive. The Chairman continued by reading the Navy's 

proposal that "The statements contained in subject paper are acceptable 

as guidance £or Director, NSA upon which to base his response to the 

CENSA panel; however it is felt that a USCIB Directive on jamming 

principles is premature at this time. 11 

MR. ZANDER pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 

involved in some planning which concerns jamming and he therefore felt 

that there was some urgency in getting USCIB 1 s view. He concluded by 

asking if the guidance in the Navy proposal would be the same as 

USCIB1 s view. 

'IHE CHAIRMAN said that it would answer the original problem and 

read as follows: •t2a.. The Director, NSA obtain the views of USCIB on 

this subject and forward those views to the Director, CommunicationsElectronics. b. The Director Communications-Electronics forward a 

committee report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporating the views 

of USCIB. 3. Pending receipt of USCIB views the Chairman CENSA 

proposes that the report to the JCS be as presented in inclosure. 11 

Procedurally, he concluded, the Navy position is correct even though it 

may not be what the Committee wants. 

CAPTAIN McCORMICK pointed out that the Board might, in a few days, 

have cognizance of both ELINT and COMINT. 

MR. PATTON suggested that if the Committee were in agreement with 

the principles contained in the proposed Directive, it should be 

approved. Anything else, he continued, would be a hollow gesture. 

After a brief discussion in which the other members failed to 

agree with the Navy's view, THE CHAIRMAN stated that he intended to 

place the subject on the agenda for the MB.y meeting of USCIB for 

resolution as it had been in Cormnittee long enough. 

USCIB: 20. /14 - 14 -

TO:PSECRET 
• 

'i'OP SEORB'i' = l:J. S. EYES ONfiY 

USCIB: 20. /14 

DECISION: (29 April 1954) USCIBEC took note of the Chairman's intention to place the subject of Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept 

Operations contained in USCIB 20./12 dated 12 April 1954 on the agenda 

for decision at the May meeting of USCIB. 

USCIB: 20./14 - 15 -

T<h0 SECRET 
USCIB: 20. /13 

4 May 1954 

'fOP SESR:'Sf 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE mMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: 

References: 

Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations. 

(a) USCIB 20./6 dated 12 November 1953. 

(b) USCIB 20./12 dated 12 April 1954. 

24 

1. Reference (a) included a request by the Director, NSA for USCIB1s 

views on subject principles for the purpose of permitting him to forward 

those views to the Director, Communications-Electronics in commenting upon 

recommendations of the Steering Committee for Communications-Electronics - National Security Agency matters ( CENSA). The CENSA recommendations were 

attached to the enclosure to reference (a}. 

2. In acting on the above-mentioned request of the Director, NSA, 

USCIB at its 93rd Meeting on 13 November 1953 ref erred the matter to the 

USCIB Intelligence Committee for study and recommendations to the Boa.rd, 

through the Executive Committee, as to proper Board action. 

3. Vote sheet action completed on 21 December 1953 revealed a 

divergence of opinion amongst the members of USCIBEC with regard to recommendations in the premises submitted. to USCIBEC by the Intelligence 

Committee. 

4. The divergent views of USCIBEC were reconciled. at its subsequent 

(tenth) regular meeting on 27 January 1954, at which time it was agreed 

that the CENSA paper attached to reference (a) could stand as USCIB1 s 

views in this matter if revised by the NSA Member in the light of the 

discussion of this topic at the meeting. 

5. Accordingly, the views expressed in the proposed directive 

attached to reference (b) were circulated to the members of USCIBEC for 

vote sheet action. The vote was completed on 28 April 1954 and resulted 

in approval by all members in substance, and by all but one in form, the 

Navy member dissenting as follows: · 

''The statements contained in subject paper are acceptable 

as guidance for Director, National Security Agency, upon which 

to base his response to the CENSA Panel; however, it is felt 

that a USCIB Directive on jamming principles is premature at 

this time." 

USCIB: 20./13 

TOP SECRET 
• 

USCIB: 20. /13 

4 May 1954 

'!'OP SEeRE'f 

Subject: Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations. 

6. At its Fourteenth Meeting on ';JJ April 1954 the members of USCIBEC 

were asked by their Chairman if they could agree with the Navy member to 

withhold issue in directive form or the substance proposed by reference (b) 

and instead issue it as a statement to the Director, NSA or USCIB1s views, 

as was indicated to be the original objective. The other members were 

unaple to agree with this procedure on the grounds that the mere expression 

of USC!B' s views to the NSA Member might not be taken to be sufficiently 

binding. 

7. Paragraph 7 of USCIB Directive Number 2 requires that 11those 

matters upon which the Executive Committee is unable, within a period 

covering two consecutive regular meetings, to agree unanimously, will automatically be referred by the Executive Secretary to USCIB for consideration. rr 

S. Having failed to reach agreement on subject problem and having 

stretched the above quoted provision of USCIB Directive Number 2 perhaps 

farther than it was intended to go, reference (b) will be placed on the 

agenda for consideration at the nexli regular meeting of USCIB, the 

majority view of USCIBEC being that the proposed directive included with 

reference (b) on subject ja.nuning and intercept policy be approved without 

change with the minority view of the Navy Member being as stated in paragraph 5 above. 

9. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATipN AND 

SHAU. BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNELS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

USCIB: 20./13 

ptain, U. • Navy 

ecutive Secretary, USCIB 

- 2 -

TOP SECRET 
_ ....... 

USCIB: 20./12 

12 April 1954 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: Principles for Use in Jamming and Intercept Operations. 

Reference: USCIB 20./6 dated 12 November 1953. 

1. In accordance with the decision reached at the Tenth Meeting 

of USCIBEC on 27 January 1954, the attached revision of the reference 

is circulated for action as ihdicated. 

2. Please execute the attached vote sheet and return it to this 

office by 1200, Wednesday, 28 April 1954. 

3. THE ENCLOSURE TO THIS MEMORANDUM CONTAINS COMMUNICATIONS 

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND SHALL BE HANDLED ONLY IN CHANNEIS EXPRESSLY 

PROVIDED FOR COMINT. 

Enclosure 

RUFUS L T~ .. ~· .. • 

aptain, U. • Navy ~~ ... ti ve Secretary, USCIB 

· Copy of NSA Serial 000164-S dtd 6 Apr 1954. 

USCIB: 20./12 

TO>-" SEORBf! 
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C, 

M&"'\fOH.Al>JDUL'-1: FOR 'rlIE t.fl!MI31!"'.RS OF USClL:l~C 

SUBJECT: Conununications Jammin~ 

References: (a) USCIB 20./6, 12 N'ov 53 

(b) USCIB 20./9, 14 Dec 53 

Serial: 000164-s 

6 April 54 

(c) uscrn 20./11 (Item 5, 10th uscmEc Mtg.), 27 Jan 54 

1. Pursuant to the USCIBEC decision outlined in reference (c), 

NSA prepared a revision of reference (a) to reflect procedures similar 

to those outlined in reference (b). During informal coordination or 

this revision with the USC..ffiEC members most concerned, it became clear 

that agreement could not be reached thereon. 

2. Agreement, however, was re~ched on the consideration set r~rth in Inclosure 1, and on a draft USCIB Directive in implementation 

thereof, Inclosure 2. 

3. It is recormnended that USCIBEC submit to USCIB for approval, 

as a matter of major policy, the attached Draft USCIB Directive. If 

USCIB approves this statement of policy, it is further reconunended 

that the Executive Secretary for~P-rd tho approved directive to the 

Secretary of Defense with a request that he inform the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff of USCIB policy in the premises. 

4. The Director, NSA, will then inform the Director, CommunicationsElectronics, of the action taken by USCIB on the basis of the study 

inclosed with reference (a). 

2 Incls: 

JOHN' B ACKERMAN 

Brigadier General, US Air Force 

Acting Director 

1. Agreement reached by ad hoc group 

2. Draft USCIB Directive 

TOP 
CONSIDERA'fION CONCERNING A DRAFT USCIB DIImC"rIVE ourLINING 

POLICY IN JAMMING 01" FOREIGi'J COMi-iUNICA'fION CIRCUITS 

1. The januning of foreign radio communications to exploit an 

irmnediate situation may seriously dama~e the national intelligence 

effort. One such damage is the possible permanent loss of sources 

of conununications intelli1~ence. Such losses can occur as the result 

o! greater safeguards which the cmerny may provide for his communications. The enemy may provide these ereater safeguards as a result · of his a\'iareness of our exploitation of his communications which he 

obtains as a result of our jamming. 

2. Some sources of communications intelligence are of vital 

importance to the nation. Their value can be assessed accurately 

only at the national level. USCIB is the national board concerned 

with the formulation of conununications intelligence policy. 

3. There are certain foreign conununications which are recognized as being readily suscept.ible of COMINT exploitation and/or for 

which the enemy cannot provide adequate safeguards. All unenciphered 

military voice transmissions passin3 plain-language conversations 

exclusively, for example, fall in this category. Included are nearly 

all known air-ground, tank-tank, and similar low-level communications 

circuits of immediate concern in a tactical oituation. Field commanders authorized to initiate jamming are primary recipients of the 

communications intelligence derived from these circuits. As such, 

they are fully qualified to weigh the advanta3es and disadvantages 

of jamming, and to render an accurate decision. In recognition of 

the above, USCIB should approve for jamming, at the discretion of 

appropriate military conunanders, all such circuits. 

4. All communication circuits which are found upon implementation of UKUSA Appendix B to be fully exploitable and which pass 

no traffic producing COM.INT of Category II or higher classification 

should be included in the circuits approved for jamming as described 

in paragraph 3, above • 

5. The Director, NS.A, should provide the COMINT support which 

will be essential to effective conununications jamming undertaken in 

accordance with USCIB policies. 

6. The Director, NSA, should keep COMINI' field units infonned 

as to what foreign circuits have been approved by USCID for jamming. 

7. within the framework of policy established by USCIB, the 

Director, NSA, should establish procedures which will permit prompt 

response to any proposals by military commanders to jam communications 

circuits other than those which have been approved by the Board. 

!l'9P ~ 80N'P!lBL NIJMffi!R 54-89~B 

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Incl # l 

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a. In a military situation involving connnunicaliion j3,!Ilnling, 

t"ime is of lien a vital factor. Full use should be made by USCIB of 

NSA and COMIN'r field units resources to expedite performance of its 

communication jamming policy function. 

9. An adequat.e escape clause is necessary to permit senior 

mililia.ry co1run.anders to jam communications circuits in an emergency 

situation without; prior USCIB approval. 

2 

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~. 

'fOP SlSGR:Ei't' 

UNITED JTATJ!:S COMMU1HCA'l'IOl\JS IN'rl!JJLI'}J!:NCE DOARD 

DIRECTIVl!~ NO. 

USCIB t:>OLICY ON J At-1MING 

OF FOREIGN RADIO COMMUNICA'rIONS 

1. Except as provided in paragraph 6, below, directed jamming 

of foreign communications shall be performed only on circuits approved 

in advance by USCIB. 

2. USCIB approves for jamming, at the discretion of appropriate 

military commanders, all unenciphered military voice transmissions 

passi~ plain-language conversations exclusively. 

3. The Director, NSA, shall keep CQliUNT field units informed a.s 

to what foreign circuits have been approved by USCIB for jarmning. 

4. Within the framework of policy established by USCIB, the 

Director, NSA, shall establish procedures which will permit"prompt• 

response to any proposals by military commanders to jam communications 

circuits other than those which have been approved by the Board • 

• 

5. The Director, NSA, is to provide continuously to COMINT 

field units the technical circuit information which they require to 

support a:ny jamming which is performed on communications circuits 

approved by USCIB or underta.ken as provided below. 

6. Senior component commanders in affected areas may authorize 

communications jamming without prior USCIB approval when, in their 

considered judgment, such jamming is essential in the national interest or for the se.f ety of major military forces and time does not 

permit the obtaining of necessary clearances. 

Incl II 2 

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