D 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

WARNING NOTICE 

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED 

(WNINTEL) 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 

CLASSIFIED BY:BYE-l 

DCLL: OADR 

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS 

NOFORN - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS 

ORCON - DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION CONTROLLED 

BY ORIGINATOR 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Contents 

Section 

~RN-ORCON 

~ 

Page 

Preface ..................................................................................................... vii 

1 Surprise Attack: A Haunting Concern ....................................... 1 

Early Responses to the Concern .......................................... 3 

Aircraft Dashes-Too Shallow and Too Seldom ................ 3 

'Open Skies' -Too Altruistic ................................................. 3 

Balloon Reconnaissance-Too Random .............................. .4 

The U-2-0nce Too Often .................................................. .4 

Discoverer/CORONA-In Place in Space ........................... 5 

Samos and the National Reconnaissance Office ................ 6 

NRO Security ........................................................................ 14 

A New Satellite Reconnaissance Need .............................. 14 

2 Origins of GAMBIT ..................................................................... 15 

Blanket and Sunset Strip ..................................................... 15 

US Intelligence Board Requirements .................................. 16 

Search For A Home: WADD to SSD to SAFSP ............... 17 

Sunset Strip Goes 'Black' .................................................... 18 

GAMBIT Varietals: Program 307, Exemplar, Cue Ball ...... 22 

GAMBIT System Characteristics .......................................... 25 

Land Recovery Versus Aerial Recovery ............................. 29 

Payload Development at Eastman Kodak .......................... 30 

Orbital-Control Vehicle Development at 

General Electric ................................................................. 32 

GAMBIT's Final Home-SAFSP ........................................... 34 

Hitch-Up, Roll-Joint, and Lifeboat ...................................... 37 

3 GAMBIT Operations: The Early Flight Program ..................... .41 

The Hard Times of 1964 ..................................................... 42 

Changing the Guard ............................................................ 44 

The Philadelphia Story ......................................................... 45 

On Schedule or Over-Target? ............................................ 49 

Out of the Valley ................................................................. 52 

4 Origins of GAMBIT-3 ................................................................. 55 

Kodak Proposals for an Advanced GAMBIT ..................... 55 

The NRO Selects GAMBIT-3 ............................................... 58 

GAMBIT -3 Developments at Lockheed and Kodak ......... 61 

5 GAMBIT -3 Flight Program ......................................................... 69 

GAMBIT-1 or GAMBIT-3? How Many? ............................. .70 

GAMBIT -3 and the Needs of the Intelligence 

Community ........................................................................ 71 

GAMBIT-3 and the GAMBIT-1 Heritage ........................... 72 

GAMBIT -3 Operations-The Flight Program ..................... 74 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ 

Handle via 

BYEMAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
s~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Contents (continued) 

Exercising Program Priorities ............................................... 77 

The Block-II Series ............................................................... 77 

The Dual-Platen Camera ..................................................... 84 

GAMBIT Films ....................................................................... 85 

Film-Read-Out GAMBIT (FROG) ......................................... 86 

The GAMBIT Award Program ............................................. 93 

The NASA 'Gambit' .............................................................. 94 

Responding to the Unexpected .......................................... 96 

life-Extension Changes ......................................................... 97 

Dual-Mode GAMBIT ............................................................ 97 

GAMBIT Reaches Full Potential .......................................... 99 

6 GAMBIT Program Costs ........................................................... 103 

GAMBIT-1/KH-7 .................................................................. 103 

GAMBIT-3/KH-8 .................................................................. 103 

GAMBIT in Retrospect ....................................................... 1 04 

7 Development Management: Styles in Program Control ...... 1 07 

On-Time Delivery: A look at the Record ...................... 107 

The On-Time Delivery Problem: 

Contributing Factors ....................................................... 108 

AFBMD: High-level Response No. 1 ............................... 110 

CORONA: A Second High-level Response .................... 11 0 

SAFSP: The Third High-level Response ........................... 112 

A Summing-Up ................................................................... 113 

8 From 'Haunting Concern' to Informed Response ................ 115 

Presidential Commendation ............................................... 117 

Commendation to the GAMBIT Program .................... 117 

Appendix A ............................................................................... 119 

GAMBIT-Key Contributor to National Security 

Intelligence ...................................................................... 119 

National Intelligence Requirements Management ...... 119 

GAMBIT Imagery Security Policy .................................. 122 

Anticipation of Success .................................................. 123 

Requirements Definition Challenge .............................. 123 

COMIREX Automated Management System 

(CAMS) ......................................................................... 126 

National Imagery Exploitation Responsibilities ............ 128 

Film-Dissemination Responsibilities ............................... 128 

National Photographic Interpretation Center 

(NPIC) ........................................................................... 128 

Development of the National Imagery 

Interpretability Rating Scale ....................................... 130 

Weather Support ............................................................ 132 

GAMBIT Intelligence Utility ........................................... 136 

Satisfaction of Major Intelligence Requirements ........ 138 

Scientific and Technical Intelligence ............................ 154 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 ii 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Contents (continued) 

Appendix B ................................................................................ 177 

A CORONA Summary ....................................................... 177 

Appendix C ............................................................................... 179 

Leningrad and LANYARD: Search for 

the GRIFFON .................................................................. 179 

Bigger Spacecraft, New Booster, Roll-Joint 

Needed ........................................................................ 180 

The P-Camera Experiment.. ........................................... 181 

References ................................................................................. 183 

Index .... ·· .......... · .................................................................... " ... 190 

iii 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

110...... ____________ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~ON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Illustrations 

Page 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower .................................................................. 5 

James R. Killian, Jr .......................................................................................... 5 

Gillette Management Procedures for Atlas, Titan, Thor ............................ 7 

Pied Piper (Samos) Management Channels-1956 ..................................... 8 

CORONA Management Channels ................................................................ 9 

George B. Kistiakowsky ............................................................................... 11 

Edwin H. Land .............................................................................................. 11 

NRO Director joseph V. Charyk ................................................................ 12 

USAF MGen john L. Martin, Jr .................................................................. 12 

Final Samos Organization-1960 ................................................................ 13 

USAF BGen Robert E. Greer ...................................................................... 18 

USAF Col Paul j. Heran .............................................................................. 18 

GAMBIT Orbital-Control Vehicle (OCV)-1961 (Artist's Concept) ......... 24 

Numerical Summary of GAMBIT-1 Payload33 ........................................... 26 

Details of Egg-Crate Mirror Construction ................................................. 31 

SAFSP Organization in 1963 ....................................................................... 37 

NRO Director Brockway McMillan ............................................................. 39 

USAF Col Quentin A. Riepe ....................................................................... 39 

GAMBIT-1 Flight Summary-1963 .............................................................. 42 

GAMBIT-1 Flight Summary-1964 .............................................................. 43 

GAMBIT-1 Flight Summary-Jan-Jun 1965 ................................................ 44 

NRO Director Alexander H. Flax .............................................................. .44 

USAF Col William G. King .......................................................................... 44 

SAFSP Organization in 1965 ....................................................................... 46 

NRO Organization in 1965 ......................................................................... 46 

GAMBIT -1 Flight Summary-1965-67 ........................................................ 52 

GAMBIT -3 Pointing and Stereo Capability ................................................ 56 

GAMBIT -3 Roll-joint (Payload Adapter Section) ....................................... 57 

Numerical Summary of GAMBIT-3 Payload .............................................. 62 

Lockheed GAMBIT -3 Program Office Organization ................................. 65 

GAMBIT-3 Agena Vehicle ............................................................................ 66 

GAMBIT -3 Launch Vehicle at Liftoff .......................................................... 68 

GAMBIT-3 'Factory-To-Pad' Concept ......................................................... 73 

GAMBIT -3 Flight Summary-1966-67 ........................................................ 74 

GAMBIT -3 Flight Summary-1967 -69 ........................................................ 75 

Dual-Recovery Module ................................................................................ 76 

Air-Recovery of GAMBIT Capsule by C-130 ............................................ 77 

GAMBIT -3 Flight Summary-1969-72 ........................................................ 78 

USAF Col John Schmitt ............................................................................... 79 

USAF Col Lee Roberts ................................................................................. 79 

GAMBIT -3 Ascent and Orbital Events ....................................................... 80 

GAMBIT-3 Flight Summary-1972-76 ........................................................ 81 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 iv 

----------------.Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 ____________ _ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

NOFORN-ORCON 

~ 

Illustrations (continued) 

Photograph of Forward Section of GAMBIT Spacecraft. ......................... 82 

Schematic of GAMBIT Spacecraft.. ............................................................. 82 

Photograph of Aft Section of GAMBIT Spacecraft .................................. 82 

GAMBIT Reconnaissance System ................................................................ 83 

NRO Director John L. Mclucas .................................................................. 84 

USAF BGen David D. Bradburn ................................................................. 84 

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard ................................................. 87 

ZAMAN Director leslie Dirks ..................................................................... 87 

DDS& T Carl Duckett. ................................................................................... 89 

DCI Richard Helms ...................................................................................... 89 

Assistant Defense Secretary Gardner Tucker ............................................ 89 

Eugene Fubini ................................................................................................ 89 

COMIREX Chairman Roland Inlow ............................................................ 91 

Presidential Science Adviser lee DuBridge ............................................... 91 

President Richard M. Nixon ........................................................................ 92 

National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger ................................................ 92 

[ .................. 95 

GAMBIT Governmen:~:ntractor Relationsbios .................. 93 

f .... · ........ · .... 95 L,-Un;cS~A-.--F ---,C~o=I---,["'e=st=e=r "MCX=c .....-,;;-;r;:-;:Is:.:tl~an~ .. -... -.. -... -.. -... -.. -.. -... -.. -... -.. -... -.. -.. ... - -.. -... -.. -....................... 99 

USAF Col larry Cress .................................................................................. 99 

GAMBIT-3 Flight Summary-1977-84 ...................................................... 101 

GAMBIT -3 Mission life Growth ............................................................... 105 

GAMBIT -3 Resolution Improvement.. ....................................................... 105 

The Discoverer Program Office, Spring 1960 ......................................... 111 

Commendation to the GAMBIT Program ................................................ 117 

COMIREX Organization Chart .................................................................. 120 

Surveillance Target Requirements by Intelligence Problem Category 

& Geographic Area ............................................................................ 125 

Elements of the COMIREX Requirements Structure ............................... 126 

CAMS National Imagery Community Network ....................................... 127 

CAMS Environment .................................................................................... 127 

Arthur C. lundahl Director, NPIC, 1961-1980 ....................................... 129 

Program 417 Weather Satellites ............................................................... 133 

Mean Cloud-Free Areas of the World in January ................................. 134 

Mean Cloud-Free Areas of the World in July ....................................... 135 

GAMBIT Surveillance Coverage-Mission No. 4354, 17 Aug 84 ......... 137 

(A) Delta-Class Hull-Staging Area at Severodvinsk-20 May 1973 ...... 139 

(B) Y-Class Submarine at Komsomolsk Shipyard-6 Sep 1969 ............ 140 

(C) HEXAGON/KH-9 Imagery of Submarines at Severodvinsk19 Sep 1976 ........................................................................................ 141 

(D) GAMBIT /KH-8 Imagery of Submarines at Severodvinsk19 Sep 1976 ..................................................................... , .................. 141 

(E) Inflatable Dummy Y-Class Decoys at SeverodvinskJun-Jul 1974 ......................................................................................... 142 

v 

:::;5ielff'f - Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
NOFORN-ORCON ~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Illustrations (continued) 

(A) Tyuratam Missile Test Center, Complex A-16 Mar 1968 ............. 143 

(B) Space Booster at Tyuratam Missile Test Center, Complex j19 Sep 1968 ........................................................................................ 144 

(C) Tyuratam Missile Test Center, Complex 11 and j2 Showing 

Blast Damage-3 Jul 1969 ................................................................ 145 

(D) Shuanchengtzu Missile Test Center, PRC, Complex A29 May 1967 ....................................................................................... 146 

(E) Shuanchengtzu Missile Test Center, PRC, Complex B13 Nov 1968 ....................................................................................... 147 

(A) Itatka ICBM SS-7 Soft Site-18 Apr 1968 ........................................ 148 

(B) Yoshkar Ola SS-13 ICBM Complex-13 Aug 1968 ......................... 149 

(C) Kozelsk SS-8 Missile in Silo-27 jun 70 .......................................... 150 

(D) Camouflage Attempts at Kartaly ICBM Complex-26 Aug 1969 .. 151 

(E) Dummy Type-IIID Launch Sites at Plesetsk MSC-30 Aug 1969 ... 152 

Borisov Army Barracks-15 Aug 1968 ..................................................... 1 53 

Abalakovo Phased-Array Radar ................................................................. 1 54 

Plesetsk ICBM Silos .................................................................................... 1 55 

Soviet Aircraft Carrier Construction at Nikolayev Shipyard .................. 156 

Delta-Class Submarine With Missile Tubes Open at Severodvinsk ..... 157 

Yevpatoriyo Deep-Space Radar-Tracking Facility .................................... 158 

New Soviet AWACS Aircraft ..................................................................... 159 

Typhoon Submarine at Severodvinsk ....................................................... 160 

Type SO-209 Film ....................................................................... · .... ··· .. · .. ···161 

Type SO-112 Film ....................................................................................... 1 61 

Kaz-A BLACKJACK Bomber at Kazan Airframe Plant ............................ 162 

A Tower of Golden Gate Bridge as Imaged by GAMBIT .................... 163 

(A) 'Caspian Sea Monster'-19 Mar 1968 .......................................... ·· .. · 164 

(B) Drawing of 'Monster' from GAMBIT Imagery .................................. 165 

(C) Last GAMBIT Photo of 'Monster'-11 Aug 1984 ............................ 165 

(A) Comparison of Operational and Dummy Sites at Kartaly8 jun 1968 ........................................................... · ........................ ··· .... 166 

(B) Infrared Netting at SS-20 Mobile Base at Gresk-12 Apr 1981.. .. 167 

Model of a Soviet Type-IIIC ICBM Site .................................................. 168 

(A) Sinai Battle lines on 10 Oct 1973 .................................................... 169 

(B) Soviet SCUD Missiles at Cairo Airfield-17 Oct 1973 .................... 170 

(A) 

(B) 

(C 

.. 171 

.. 172 

.. 172 

Berenzniki Chemical Combine .................................................................. 173 

Yurya Rail-to-Rail Transfer Point With Infrared-Reflectant Netting ..... 174 

AMM/SAM Launch Complex at Tallinn ................................................... 182 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 vi 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 4;;~ 

NoFORN~O~CON 

Preface 

This is the second volume in the history of the National Reconnaissance 

Program. The first volume related the story of CORONA-the first successful 

program in ng space vehicles to overflight reconnaissance 0 ions. In 

its several utionary versions, CORONA steadily improved its p otographic 

surveys of denied areas (with final resolutions of six to ten feet), operating in 

what the Intelligence Community calls "search mode." 

This volume is the story of a companion photographic satellite called 

GAMBIT, which was developed to perform at even better resolutions than 

CORONA and work against specified targets-an operation usually referred to 

as "surveillance mode." GAMBIT fulfilled this surveillance function from july 

1963 to April 1984. 

In preparing this account, we appreciated the availability of an earlier 

volume prepared by Robert Perry and published in 1974. We have made 

liberal use of Perry's material, his documentary references, and his analysis of 

influences and events at the National Reconnaissance Office's Special Projects 

Office during the first half of the GAMBIT "era." 

We are also grateful to Maj. Gen. David Bradburn, Dr. jose h V. Charyk, 

Capt. frank Gorman, USN, Col. james l. Hane, Brig. Gen. m G. King, 

Maj. Gen. John l. Martin, Jr., Col. Lester McChristian, and Col. Lee Robertsall military principals in the GAMBIT program-for extended personal interviews; to Rudi Buschmann, Robert Powell, and Peter Ragusa, Lockheed 

Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) principals; to Tom Diosy and Leslie 

Mitchell. Eastman Kodak (EK) principals, for data on EK participation; to 

---=c--c-----,-c-~~Iand his associates at the National Photographic Interpretation 

Center (NPIC) for support in selecting and interpreting historic examples of 

GAMBIT product; to Lt. Col. David Anderson, SAfSS, Capt. Randall Cohen, 

SAfSP, and Donald E. Welzenbach, CIA, for essential assistance with sources 

and editing; to Roland Inlow, former chairman of COMIREX, for an overview 

of intelligence requirements; to John J. Schade former chairman of the 

Imagery Collection Requirements Subc r his contribution regarding the role of the Inte ce Community in GAMBIT operations; and to the 

legendary Arthur C. Lun ahl for recollections presented in the final chapter. 

The need for this series of histories was first envisioned by Jimmie D. Hill, 

Deputy Director, NRO. This volume, like the one on CORONA, was prepared 

under his sponsorship and constructive guidance. 

August 1988 

Sunnyvale, California 

vii 

frederic C.E. Oder 

James c. fitzpatrick 

Paul E. Worthman 

Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Section 1 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS0993~ _ 

J::lQfO~~J alLuN 

Surprise Attack: A Haunting Concern 

The year was 1955. The President of the United States, dictating a letter to 

an old warrior-friend, was speaking with special intensity about a deep 

concern: 

Dear Winston: 

.... Your paper seems to me to under-emphasize a 

point of such moment that it constitutes almost a new 

element in warfare. I refer to the extraordinary increase 

in the value of tactical and strategic surprise, brought 

about by the enormous destructive power of the new 

weapons and the probability that they could be delivered over targets with little or no warning. Surprise has 

always been one of the most important factors in achieving victory. And now, even as we contemplate the grim 

picture described in your memorandum, we gain only 

the glimmering of the paralysis that could be inflicted on 

an unready fighti force, or indeed upon a whole 

nation, by some en foray that would place a dozen 

or more of these terrible weapons accurately on target,1 

The President's closest associates were well-acquainted with this concern: 

they had heard it expressed in various forms on numerous occasions. james R. 

Killian, Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech (MIT) and 

first science adviser to a US President, was a man given to y, measured 

prose; he referred, in his memoir, to "this fear [which] haunted Eisenhower 

throughout his presidency."2 

Apprehension over surprise attack was a novel presidential reaction, even 

for a former Supreme Commander. In spite of a lifetime spent in military 

service-where the expression "surprise attack" was an instructional and 

tactical commonplace-previous experiences had suggested the merest glimmering of what Eisenhower now felt. West Point and wartime days had taught 

a catalog of defenses against attack, but nothing could have prepared him for 

the realities of nuclear surprise. 

In the years since Eisenhower had graduated from the US Military 

Academy, even geography had changed-and c almost as dramatically 

as the tools of warfare. In 1919, the European b of the old Russian 

Em 're was a line stretching from the eastern Baltic to the Black Sea, with 

Fin , Estonia, latvia, lithuania, Poland, and the Balkans bufferin Germany, 

Austria, Italy, and France. This steady-state picture of Europe the fall 

of 1939, when Soviet incursions into eastern Poland were followed by similar 

actions against Estonia, latvia, and lithuania. 

World War II experiences gave Eisenhower a duple view of the Soviets. 

Initially, he had seen them as mortal enemies allied with Nazi Germany and 

Fascist Italy. Then, abruptly, the Soviets and Hitler par any and the 

Red Army was transformed into an ally-helpful and reaso nctual in 

supporting the West. Eisenhower even developed a special confi ence in his 

Soviet counterpart, Marshall Georgiy K. Zhukov. 3 

-1-

SECR~ ~~ia BYE MAN· T ALENT·KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002·90 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~ON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

At the conclusion of the war, Eisenhower observed with sadness the pellmell demobilization of Allied forces, contrasting so strongly with Soviet 

determination to hold to a strength of 5-6 million men, 50,000 tanks, and 

20,000 aircraft. He saw how easily the Soviets shifted their European presence 

to a new boundary-11 0 miles west of Berlin. With feelings of d concern, 

he watched the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, the use of the Army to 

rt communist 'mes in eastern Europe, the communist pressures on 

and Finland, and e shooting down of transport planes over Yugoslavia. 

The Soviets conquered eastern Europe with almost magical swiftness. As 

for western Europe-it lay helpless. Eisenhower voiced regret that lithe Soviet 

Union had no intention of continuing its [wartime] policy of friendship, even 

on the surface .... "4 

In 1948, he left his postwar position as chief of staff of the US Army to 

become president of Columbia University. But the realities of the Soviet 

"threat" followed him into academia. It was an ominous event, in 1949, when 

the Soviets detonated their first nuclear weapon and the Central Intelligence 

Agency wrote its first "estimate" of the possibility of surprise attack against the 

United States. 

War began in Korea in 1950, with a surprise attack which awakened 

smoldering memories of a Sunday morning at Pearl Harbor. More shocking 

surprise came with the information that Soviet technology had been able to 

parallel US efforts: the US test of a hyd n bomb in November 1952 was 

echoed by a similar Soviet test in 1953. By s time, Eisenhower had returned 

to public life as President of the United States. He described the view from the 

White House: 

Two wars, with the United States deeply engaged in 

one and vitally concerned in the other, were raging in 

Eastern Asia; Iran seemed to be almost ready to fall into 

Communist hands; the NATO Alliance had yet found no 

positive way to mobilize into its defenses the latent 

strength of West Germany; Red China seemed increasingly bent on using force to advance its boundaries; 

Austria was still an occupied country, and Soviet intransigence was keeping it so .... Communism was striving 

to establish its first beachhead in the Americas by 

gaining control of Guatemala.s 

Worst of all, in 1955 the Soviets compounded the "threat" by building an 

operational bomber, the Myacheslav M-4, or BISON, which was equivalent in 

capacity and range to the US Air Force's B-52. Every day thenceforth, 

American cities and installations would be under threat of nuclear surprise 

attack. 

Winston Churchill had eloquently described an Iron Curtain which, as it 

descended around the USSR and its satellites, effectively hid Soviet activities 

from the eyes of former wartime partners. It appeared that as Soviet expansionism became increasingly aggressive, Soviet homeland activities were 

becoming increasingly secretive. The reassurance which a nation normally 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -2-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 __________________ ...... 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 S~ 

~N~ORCON 

obtained from knowing, on a day-to-day basis, what another nation was doing 

was no longer available. And the "balance of knowing" tilted alarmingly as the 

Soviets continued to enjoy access to worldwide current events, even as they 

concealed their own activities. The Soviet security apparatus grew each year, 

rivalled only by China's in size and effectiveness. 

Early Responses to the Concern 

The "haunting concern" began to magnify as intelligence sources picked 

up tantalizing hints of a Soviet ballistic missile program. A contemporary 

witness, Walter W. Rostow, writes that it was 

... a time when responsible American officials were 

authentically frustrated and alarmed by our inability to 

penetrate the closed society of the U.s.s.R. and establish 

with reasonable precision the scale and momentum of 

the Soviet program to develop nuclear delivery capabilities that could mortally threaten Western Europe, Japan, 

and the United States.6 

In the midst of almost suffocatin uncertainty, one major American 

counter action appeared in 1954, as began on the Atlas ICBM. But there 

were more specific actions addressed to the central problem: how to open 

windows into a closed society. In chronological order, these efforts utilized 

available aircraft, diplomatic ventures, lighter-than-air devices, specialized aircraft, and satellites. 

Aircraft Dashes-Too Shallow and Too Seldom 

During and after 1949, there was a definite step-up in "peripherals" flown 

against the Soviet Union. These were flights in which standard or speciallyequipped aircraft made brief incursions into or along Soviet territory for 

purposes of visual/photographic observation or electronic surveillance. Even 

at their best, these sorties had inherent range and altitude limitations; as 

shallow ventures into denied areas, they were inf nt and very dangerous. 

When one compared the enormous dimensions of e "problem-area" to the 

coverage achieved by sporadic flights, the productive capacity seemed almost 

inconsequential. 

'Open Skies'-Too Altruistic 

In 1955, President Eisenhower decided to use the occasion of a Summit 

Conference, scheduled for Geneva in July, to make a pr sal to the Soviets 

for a peaceful and perhaps enduring resolution to the aunting concern." 

The proposal, called "Open Skies," suggested that the United States and the 

Soviet Union should: 

• exchange comprehensive military "blueprints," describing every military installation, and 

-3-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

NOH1IfN-ORCON 

• permit each other to make aerial photographs of these installations on a 

regular basis. 

Eisenhower was keenly disappointed when Soviet Premier Bulganin and 

Party First Secretary Khrushchev rejected his plan. His reaction was reflected in 

two important conclusions: first, he believed that truly definitive evidence of 

Soviet intention was finally at hand: "Khrushchev's own pu se was evident-at all costs to keep the USSR a closed society"7i second, felt a call to 

action: "When the Soviets rejected Open Skies ... I conceded that more 

intelligence about their war-making capabilities was a necessity."B 

Balloon Reconnaissance-Too Random 

The RAN D Corporation had anticipated the concerns of the early 1950s in 

1946, when it began studying the military intelligence problems which might 

be posed by a closed society. One of RAND's su uent conclusions was that 

camera-carrying balloons . ht be used to 0 e USSR. The fact that the 

balloons could be produ quickly and inexpensively, could fly very high 

(above fighter aircraft ceilings), and would be unmanned made them a 

possible reconnaissance option. 

With the commercial availability of polyethylene film, the RAND proposal 

received serious consideration, since the non-extensible characteristic of the 

film made it possible to fly balloons at pre-selected constant-pressure altitudes. Operationally, one could launch in western Europe, fly at very high 

altitudes (say, 60,000 to 90,000 feet), drift across the USSR in photographing 

mode, and recover in mid-air over the ocean, somewhere between Taiwan 

and Alaska. After Soviet rejection of the "Open Skies" proposal, Eisenhower, 

on 27 December 1955, authorized such a balloon project (called GENETRIX) to 

become operational. Flights began on 22 January 1956 and were continued 

until 24 February with 516 releases. The operation was discontinued because 

of vigorous Soviet objection. (The GENETRIX camera and aerial recovery 

system became important contributors to the satellite reconnaissance technology of the 1960s.) 

The U-2-0nce Too Often 

Another reason for discontinuin the GENETRIX flights was the advent of 

the U-2 aircraft designed by lock s Clarence l. "Kelly" Johnson, which 

began flight tests in August 1955 and first overflew Soviet territory on 4 July 

1956. This aircraft's flight schedule and performance were followed closely by 

the President, since the U-2 could go directly to points of interest and 

photograph priority targets, such as strategic airfields, radar installations, and 

missile test sites and launching facilities. The U-2 was used sparingly, discreetly, and successfully until May Day, 1960, when Francis Gary Powers failed to 

complete the only attempted border-to-border flight from Pakistan to Norway. When the President decided to cancel additional aircraft overflights, the 

United States was, once again, "blind." 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -4-

Approved for Release: 20 18_,-IO=-:9-,--/1-,-1,--=-C-=--OS-,-0,,--,9=-:9---,,3-,-1 =2 ______________ -----" 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
S~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

• Thor, the first high-thrust US space booster, had made its maiden flight in 

September 1957 and was now available to furnish 165,000 pounds of 

thrust-sufficient to lift a photographic payload into orbit; 

• The Agena spacecraft, which was to be joined to the Thor and would 

house and operate the photographic payload, had been in development 

since July 1956; 

• Re-entry vehicles, capable of protecting a payload from very high temperature as it passed through the earth's atmosphere, had been developed successfully for the Atlas, Titan, and Thor ballistic missile programs; 

• A global network for controlling orbiting satellites was under construction 

and would be in operation in 1958; 

• A camera capable of operating in a space environment had been built in 

1955 for GENETRIX; a more complex camera, called HYAC, had been 

built for the follow-on WS-461l balloon program in 1956. An improved 

HYAC model could be constructed on short notice for use in a satellite; 

• The ipment and techniques for in-flight retrieval of photographic 

payloa had been tested in GENETRIX operations and were available for 

use in CORONA. 

The first attempt to launch CORONA was made in January 1959, one year 

after inception of the program. All early test flights were entirely rimental; 

they were ventures into a new world where critical environment ata were 

not only unavailable but frequently beyond reasonable conjecture. The first 

completely successful flight did not occur until 18 August 1960, when 

Discoverer-XIV, also known as CORONA mission No. 9009, returned with 

3,000 feet of film showing 1,650,000 square miles of Soviet countryside and 

identifying ground objects with resolutions ranging upward from 35 feet. 

Over the next 12 years, CORONA spacecraft made 145 flights, and the 

system's reliability, versatility, and photographic resolution were im ed 

steadily and CORONA became the "search workhorse" of the US Intel igence 

Community.9 

Samos and the National Reconnaissance Office 

The Discoverer/CORONA program had not come into being independently; actually, it had evolved from a much larger reconnaissance program 

called, variously, WS-117l, FEEDBACK, Pied Piper, and Sentry, which had 

been proposed to the Army Air Force, in 1946, by Project RAND (of the 

as Aircraft Corporation). In 1951, RAND, continuing its ori 'nal study, 

e technical characteristics of a reconnaissance satellite, 'ed for 

television transmission of photography from space to ground stations. In 

October 1955, the Air Force made Wright Air Development Center (WADC) 

the manager for such a system; the first development plan was prepared in 

April 1956. 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -6-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 SE~ 

NOR1IfN-ORCON 

The concept of a satellite-borne observation platform performing worldwide reconnaissance was certainly the most revolutionary idea circulating 

within the Air Force in the early post-World War II period. The booster 

required to place such a platform in orbit was not even under study, let alone 

development. But nine years later, in 1955, with the first stirrings of intercontinental ballistic missile development, it became credible to consider space 

ventures: Atlas, Titan, and Thor, once satisfactorily tested, would each be 

capable of having their warheads replaced by space payloads. Thus, in 1955, 

RAND's revolutionary idea began to materialize as an on-going project. 

Project activity at WADC was generally limited to studies and some 

experiments with components. limitations would continue until there was a 

possibility of diverting one of the early missiles from its mandatory test 

program or from its swift progress to the Strategic Air Command's operational 

inventory. The highest priority in the United States had been given to the 

creation of an initial operational capability (lOC) with ICBMs; by comparison, 

the priority of WS-117L was much lower. But, by 1956, it did seem sensible to 

move the WS-117L study and planning activity closer to the booster program; 

soon the two became neighbors at the USAF's Western Development Division 

(WDD) in Inglewood, California. 

There was a second, equally important, reason for the transfer: to place 

WS-117L near the quick-reaction management environment which enhanced 

the Atlas, Titan, and Thor developments. In September 1955, a unique 

man ment structure had been created by a committee advising the Secretary 0 the Air Force on the best way to streamline decision machinery for the 

ballistic missile program. The committee's recommendations were called 

"Gillette Procedures," after Hyde Gillette, the Air Force Deputy for Budget 

and Program Management. The radical nature of Gillette channels is contrasted with normal Air Force arrangements. 

Secretary of the 

Air Force 

USAf Guided Missile 

Secretariat 

Ballistic 

Gillette Management Procedures 

for Atlas, Titan, Thor 

-7-

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE J 40002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ ~-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Pied Piper (Samos) Management Channels-1956 

Oespite the assignment of WS-1171 to WOO, which placed it near the 

Gillette management process, the project was not legally within the ballistic 

missile ambit. The Air Force's intermediate military review echelons, smarting 

from exclusion by Gillette, were quick to point to this fact and to insist on their 

traditional mandate. In fact, the proximity of the ballistic missile program 

affected WS-1171 adversely: it was hard for a budding enterprise to find a 

patch of sunshine amid towering ballistic giants. The WOO commander and 

his staff could not help comparing the priorities of the two programs: missile 

work was clearly of supreme importance and the bulk should be 

devoted to it. Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, WOO's comma r, knew that 

if he paused for even a second on his missile mandate he would hear 

footsteps; his preoccupation with missiles was so exclusive that his public 

utterances did not even mention space systems until February 1957. 

But changes were on the way. The strong national reaction to the Soviet's 

Sputnik flight, in October 1957, easily overshadowed the first successful Thor 

test flight the previous month. But both events combined to encourage the Air 

Force and the Central Intelligence Agency to break out a piece of WS-117l 

(Sentry was renamed Samos10 in 1958) for a special purpose: the development 

of a quick-fix interim satellite reconnaissance program known as CORONA 

(treated earlier in this chapter). 

The priority of CORONA was reflected in the fact that its management 

scheme out-Gilletted Gillette and was the ultimate any hardware development could hope to enjoy. All program management would be the responsibility of one person in the (entire) Air Force and one person in the CIA. Also, 

SEr~ 

~:ia BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -8-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 _____________ _ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS0993~2 H 

ORN-ORCON 

Discoverer-CORONA would have the advantage of proximity to the Thor 

Office (for its booster), to the Agena Office (for its spacecraft), and to the Air 

Force's Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD) satellite launching, tracking, control, 

and recovery facilities (for its operation). 

Photographs produced on 18 August 1960, by the first successful CORONA flight, were impressive beyond hope and generated a surge of enthusiasm 

which spilled back into the Samos program. CORONA had never been 

intended as more than an interim quick-fix; now that success had been 

demonstrated, it was time to push Samos hard and achieve a truly sophisticated real-time-readout reconnaissance capability. Even the traditional limitation-availability of Atlas boosters for the heavier Samos payload-was 

becoming less of a problem. 

White Appearance 

R&D Centers 

ATLAS 

SPO 

TITAN 

SPO 

Air Force Ballistic 

Missile Division 

(AFBMD) 

THOR 

SPO 

Other System 

Program Offices 

·Organizational responsibility exercised solely by one 

individual: Richard M. Bissel, Jr. lor the CIA, B/Gen 

Osmond J. Rilland lor the Air Force. 

Black Reality 

Dep Cmdr 

lor Space 

Directorate 

01 Space 

Systems 

SAMOS 

Program 

Office 

DiSCOVERER 

Program 

Office 

CORONA Management Channels 

What would be the best means of encouraging and accelerating Samos? 

George B. Kistiakowsky, who had succeeded James Killian as science adviser 

to President Eisenhower, had been directed by the National Security Council 

-9-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SF~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~~ORCON 

to produce a "best means" plan. He had surveyed military space programs for 

some months and was not too impressed with what he found. In conversations 

with the USAF Air Research and Development Command's leadership, he had 

noted a strong aversion to "sacred cow" organizations like Schriever's Ballistic 

Missile Division (the new name for the Western Development Division) or for 

Gillette-type management channels. The threat to "command integrity" was 

abhorrent, said the "normal" Air Force, and once the ballistic program was 

"normalized," there should never again be any AFBMDs. Old-line research 

and development bureaucrats vowed that what had happened in ballistic 

missile management would not be permitted in the new field of space 

technology. 

Kistiakowsky had also found that almost all ARDC Centers were viewing 

space projects-present and proposed-as plums to be coveted for that 

Center's future wth. Each Center dreamed of becoming the focus of Air 

Force space tec encouraged in this brashness by popular anxiety over 

the Sputnik "space vantage" and rumors of new money to be poured into 

US programs. In the Air Staff itself, Kistiakowsky noted a preemptory announcement of the birth of an Astronautics Directorate (which the Air Force 

was forced to retract immediately). There was incessant, ill-advised discussion 

among newborn space enthusiasts about the value of as a "high 

ground" and of the imperative need for a "cis-Iunar d nse capability." 

Kistiakowsky summed it up: "Frankly, it overwhelmed me. I still recall 

becoming indignant on discovering that the cost of exclusively paper studies in 

industrial establishments on 'Strategic Defense of Cis-Lunar Space' and similar 

topics amounted to more dollars than all the funds available to the National 

Science Foundation for the support of research in chemistry."11 

Even in the more introspective and settled environment of the AFBMD, 

Kistiakowsky found a corporate opinion "te at odds with his own analysis of 

the present space reconnaissance need: ]hey believe that 'readout' Samos 

is much more promising than 'recovery' Samos."12 In February 1960, he had 

taken a position on this subject: "[T]echnically the readout satellite is 

quite far in e future and, moreover, it has the inherent weakness of not 

providing sufficient detail of objects on the ground to be a useful instrument 

for our national security."B (Kistiakowsky recognized the desirability of a 

read-out satellite, but knew that existing data-link transmission technology 

was a severely limiting factor in readout capability. In short, this planned 

feature of Samos was ahead of its time; in a few years, however, it would 

become a viable part of reconnaissance technology.) 

The U-2 shoot-down, on 1 May 1960, triggered a series of top-level 

decisions on Samos. The cancellation of aircraft overflight operations equated 

to the total loss of high-resolution observation of the USSR. Even if CORONA 

achieved success-and so far it had not-there would be an immediate need 

for much better resolution than it could provide; a system with the promise of 

Samos would continue to be absolutely essential. 

On 26 May 1960, the President directed Kistiakowsky to set up a group to 

advise, as quickly as possible, on the best way to expand satellite reconnaissance options. Kistiakowsky chose some old friends to help frame the 

response: Killian now at MIT but still chairman of the President's Board of 

Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA); Edwin H. Land of 

Polaroid, Carl Overhage, head of Lincoln Labs; and Richard M. Bissell, Jr., of 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -10-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

NRO v. 

new Samos 

as new 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 S~ 

UNDER SECRETARY 

OF THE AIR FORCE' 

DIRECTOR, NRO' 

'One individual held Ihes 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

-I 

...NOFORN-ORCON 

ASSISTANT FOR 

RECONNAISSANCE 

TO SECRETARY 

DEFENSE" 

Final Samos Organization-1960 

Space Systems Division. It would have direct access to all Air Force resources: 

Atlas boosters; Agena spacecraft; launching services at Vandenberg AFB; 

tracking and control services at Sunnyvale, California, and recovery services at 

Oahu. 

In September 1961, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency joined formally to create a National Reconnaissance Program 

(NRP) ("all satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects, whether overt or 

covert"). An office to manage the NRP, known overtly as the Office of Space 

Systems and covertly as the National Reconnaissance Office, was established 

in June 1962. The under secretary of the Air Force (then Charyk) was given 

additional duty as lithe Special Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary 

of Defense." Under this arrangement, the NRP would have easy access to Air 

Force space facilities and assets, while operating at the highest level of the 

Department of Defense. 

For security purposes, the NRO was structured to look like "just another 

office" in the Air Force-possibly established to emphasize parochial interests 

in space. In reality, the NRO, from its earliest days, was an ecumenical, 

national effort, with representation from the entire intelligence community, 

including the three military services, the CIA, and the National Security 

Agency (NSA). Henceforth, the national reconnaissance needs for acquiring 

information over denied areas would be served by: 

• a national requirements agency: the US Intelligence Board (USIB); 

• a national reconnaissance agency: the National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO); and 

• a national interpretation agency: the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). 

-13-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~-ORCON 

NRO Security 

The NRO and its Program were concealed within and controlled by a 

special security system, de' ed by the CIA, known as BYEMAN. The 

existence of the NRO and I of the projects within the NRP were, and 

continue to be, highly protected, sensitive information. 

A New Satellite Reconnaissance Need 

Traditionally, experts in analyzing reconnaissance phot raphy functionally divide it into two categories. One is called "search," is dedicated to 

answering the question, "ls there somet there?" CORONA's KH-4 panoramic camera was designed to photogra rge contiguous areas in a single 

frame of film in order to provide answers to that question. Even though 

CORONA's resolution improved from its original 35-50 feet to 6-10 feet, its 

basic function remained search. 

A second observation function is "surveillance." Surveillance is required 

after it has been decided that "There IS something of interest there," and says 

"I want to continue to watch that something, learn more about it, identify it, 

and classify it." 

In most cases, bona fide surveillance was beyond CORONA's capability. 

The Intelligence Community soon expressed a need for a new satellite, which 

would sacrifice the extensive coverage capability of CORONA (millions of 

square miles) to acquire very detailed information on specified objects located 

in limited target areas (1-4 sq mi). The first successful satellite surveillance 

system was called GAMBIT, which carried a pointing or "spotting" camera 

with high-resolution capability. 

The remainder of this volume is the story of GAMBIT's development, 

employment, maturation, and contributions to national security. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -14-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099~12 

SE 

RN-OIKON 

Section 2 

Origins of GAMBIT 

The definitive steps which led to the GAMBIT program were taken in early 

1960-before the CORONA photographic reconnaissance satellite had its 

initial success. On 24 March 1960, the Eastman Kodak Company submitted an 

unsolicited proposal to the Air Force's Reconnaissance laboratory at Wright 

Field. This proposal, which suggested development of a high-performance, 77-

inch focal-length, catadioptric-lens camera suitable for satellite reconnaissance, had been developed by the Special Projects Group under Arthur B. 

Simmons, director of Research and Engineering in Kodak's Apparatus and 

Optical Division. At that time Kodak was under contract to the Reconnaissance laboratory for development of a camera system for the OXCART aircraft 

program; the CIA was aware of the proposal because of its role in that 

program. 

Blanket and Sunset Strip 

On 17 June 1960, Kodak submitted another proposal, this time for a filmrecoverable photographic reconnaissance system, which embodied a 36-inch 

lens camera to provide convergent-stereo area coverage of denied areas. 

Kodak called the system "Blanket" and claimed that, because of the planned 

use of existing technology, 'it could be made available in short order. This was 

followed, on 20 July 1960, by an elaboration of the 77-inch system proposed 

earlier, which used certain features of the Blanket concept and a film-handling 

technique proven feasible under the OXCART program. Kodak called the 77-

inch system "Sunset Strip," both because of a then-popular TV program as 

well as the planned use of a strip camera. 

Dr. Edwin H. land, president of the Polaroid Corporation (and a very 

influential advisor to both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy) had, at that 

time, a close business relationship with Kodak as well as a personal and 

professional relationship with its key personnel, including Herman Waggershauser, vice president and general manager of the Apparatus and Optical 

Division, and Arthur Simmons. Simmons and Waggershauser showed the 

Sunset Strip proposal to land, who, in mid-June, enthusiastically discussed the 

concept with Dr. Charyk. later in June, at Charyk's request, Kodak sent him a 

copy of the Blanket proposal and a brief of the Sunset Strip concept. Kodak, 

concerned with keep' these ideas truly secret, used special CIA mail 

channels for correspo h Charyk; few within the Eastman Kodak 

Company were aware of the proposals. On 5 July, Charyk and Simmons met to 

discuss both Blanket and Sunset Strip; this meeting reflected Simmons' 

growing enthusiasm for the 77-inch system's potential. 15 

-15-

SEr~ ~::ia BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SEC~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

N~-ORCON 

US Intelligence Board Requirements 

During the same period of 1959 and 1960, the US Intelli ence Community 

was beginning to establish formal requirements for satellite ion capabilities; these would . e a firm basis for programs within the Samos effort. 

With the advent 0 CORONA satellite program in late 1958, DCI Allen W. 

Dulles, with the concurrence of the US Intelligence Board (USIB) membership, 

established (in January 1959) a Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee 

(SIRC). At a 1 June 1960 meeting, USIB agreed that the SIRC should develop 

an up-to-date statement of satellite intelligence requirements. (This action was 

a direct result of the downing of Gary Powers in a U-2 over the Soviet Union 

on 1 May 1960, which highlighted the need for a satellite-reconnaissance 

capability. The resulting SIRC report was submitted to the USIB in late June 

and was approved, with amendments, on 5 July 1960. The report, titled 

"Intelligence Requirements for Satellite-Reconnaissance Systems of which 

Samos is an Example," was sent to Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy. In a 

letter of transmittal, USIB Chairman Dulles stressed that the fulfillment of 

these requirements was critical to US security.16 

The requirements outlined in the SIRC report called for a satellite 

reconnaissance system capable of obtaining coverage of denied areas at 

object resolutions of approximately 20, 5, and 1 foot on a side. 

According to the SIRC document, the first and most urgent need was for a 

photographic search system capable of locating suspected ICBM launching 

sites in that part of the USSR covered by a railroad network. This would 

require a resolution approaching 20 feet on a side. A second priority 

requirement was to cover the same area with a resolution approaching five 

feet on a side, in order to obtain more descriptive information on the ICBM 

installations. The third priority was fora system which could provide a 

resolution better than five feet on a side, in order to supply, before the end of 

1962, technical characteristics of the highest priority targets. 

At a 5 July 1960 meeting, the USIB also concurred in the suggestion of 

DDCI Charles P. Cabell that the feasibility of consolidating the SIRC and the 

Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) be studiedY The resulting report 

recommended such a consolidation and, on 9 August 1960, the USIB approved DClD No. 2/7 establishing a Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 

(COMOR)-comprising the ARC and the SIRC-to provide a focal point for 

information on, and the coordinated development of, foreign intelligence 

requirements for overhead reconnaissance operations over denied areas. 

In addition to adapting priority objectives and requirements established 

by USIB, its members, or other committees, to the capabilities of existing and 

potential systems, COMOR was to examine and recommend dissemination 

procedures and special security controls required for operational guidance. 

COMOR was to consist of representatives of USIB agencies with a chairman 

designated by the DCI in consultation with, and the concurrence of, the USIB. 

James Q. Reber, who had been chairman of the ARC since December 1955, 

was the first chairman of COMOR; his deputy was Air Force Col. l.E. May. 

~ 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly. 

BYE 140002-90 -16-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 ••••••••••••••• 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~CON 

During the same month that COMOR was established, President Eisenhower, presiding over a special meeting of the National Security Council, 

directed the Air Force h priority to developing a film-return satellite 

system for providing hi ion stereo photography (this became the 

basis for Project GAMBIT). At the same time, Eisenhower directed the Air 

Force to give the remaining Samos program a lower priority. 

Search For A Home: W ADD to SSD to SAFSP 

Although Kodak was endeavoring to limit "need-to-know," Blanket and 

Sunset Strip were becoming known to a few people: some at Wright Field, 

some within the Samos organization of the Space Systems Division (SSD), and 

some within the Air Staff. The Air Staff decision to have Wright Field contract 

with Kodak for an engineering model of the 77-inch system soon became 

entangled in routine Air Force channels. Because of Charyk's interest, Simmons urged his Air Staff contact to handle the study through the Air Force 

space organization, rather than through the Wright Field Reconnaissance 

Laboratory.18 On 13 August, the Air Force Staff rescinded its directive to 

Wright Air Development Division (WADD), redirecting the work to the Samos 

program. In forwarding copies of the earlier studies to the Space System 

Division on 13 August, Kodak proposed a 90-day Phase-I stage (design to 

mock-up) to cost $646,713, and a subsequent Phase-II effort to indude design, 

construction, test, and flight test of devel ent models and prototype 

camera systems. Kodak noted the impossib of projectin development 

costs until completion of the Phase-I activity and ackno he uncertainty of compatibility between the camera system and available boost, orbit, and 

recovery subsystems. Nevertheless, the contractor reaffirmed the feasibility of 

providing 2- to 3-foot ground resolution with a high-acuity, stereo-coverage, 

surveillance camera system placed in a short-lived satellite vehide. 19 

Within 24 hours of receiving the Kodak studies and summary proposal, 

the Space Systems Division began processing a letter contract. About the same 

time, responsibility for the Samos program was transferred from the Space 

Systems Division to the newly-created Secretary of the Air Force Samos 

Project Office, which subsequently became the Secretary of the Air Force 

Special Projects Office (SAFSP). The office's military director, Brig. Gen. Robert 

E. Greer, had been transferred to lewood, California, from a previous 

assil?nment as the USAF's assistant c of staff for guided missiles. 

Under SAFSP direction, a competition was being held for the Samos E-6 

program; proposals were to be submitted in October 1960. The E-6 project 

was a part of Samos (or Air Force Weapon System-1171) that had begun in 

1960, long after the first General Operating Requirement had established WS1171 (in 1954). Samos originally had two planned photographic capabilities-

"Pioneer" and "Advanced"-which were designated E-1 and E-2. These 

involved the on-orbit exposure and processing of film, translation of that 

imagery into an electrical signal by means of a flying-spot scanner, and 

transmission of the signal to earth for subsequent recomposition as a picture. 

The readout photographic versions of Samos were limited by state-of-the-art 

electronics to a 6-Megabit carrier-a limitation which, in 1958, caused priority 

-17-

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Svstems Jointly 

BYE /40002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

E. 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ON 

and financial reporting methods. It was military doctrine that the details of any 

activity involving the expenditures of public funds should be placed in public 

view, to assure practices of good stewardship. To preclude the security 

problems inherent in widespread financial disclosure-particularly to those 

who had no conceivable need-to-know-General Greer sought, and was 

granted on 5 january 1961, a contracting warrant directly from Secretary of the 

Air Force Dudley C. Sharp. With this warrant, Greer acquired authority equal 

to that reserved to the USAF deputy chief of staff for materiel; under such 

authority he could, where necessary, deviate from Armed Forces Procurement 

Regulations. Although Greer's procurement authorization was not particularly 

inhibited, Secretary Sharp advised him that "normal policies, ctices, and 

procedures applicable to the Department of the Air Force" wou wed 

wherever possible. Greer was authorized to appoint contracting officers, to 

assign procurement authority to those officers, to approve time-and-materials 

contracts, to approve contractor overtime, to control government-owned 

industrial property, and to appoint and control property administrators. Such 

delegation of procurement authority to a program manager was unique. 

During the first week of November 1960, a second set of key GAMBIT 

decisions emerged from the Pentagon. Charyk and Greer reconfirmed their 

determination to conduct GAMBIT as a covert reconnaissance operation and 

proposed to use the E-6 program as a cover for development of the system. 

Charyk agreed with Greer's suggestion that Kodak should develop the 77-inch 

camera under Project GAMBIT while General Electric would develop an 

orbital-control vehicle (OCV) and a suitable ballistic reentry vehicle for film 

recovery. By k 'ng the physical and environmental limitations of E-6 and 

GAMBIT compat e, it seemed possible to develop and test GAMBIT without 

any outward indication that such a program existed. The institution of rigid 

security controls over the entire Samos operation would greatly enhance the 

possibility of hiding the scope of the total program. 21 

About the same time, there was an effort by Air Staff elements, together 

with the Air Materiel Command and the Strategic Air Command, to continue 

to plan for normal military operation of Samos, of which GAMBIT was then 

considered to be a part. 22 To forestall such a move and to communicate 

clearly the planned objectives and operating principles of the Samos program, 

Charyk sent the Air Force Chief of Staff two memoranda of clarification. The 

first,23 which was Secret, said that Samos "should be regarded as an R&D 

program aimed at the loitation of various promising reconnaissance 

techniques" but that, until completion of R&D, the nature of the system 

could not be determined and that "effective operational planning cannot be 

accomplished at this time." This action removed Samos from normal program 

documentation requirements, from monitoring by the AF Weapons Board, and 

from analyses by "the various panels, boards, and committees and directed 

that the intercommand Samos Working Group be dissolved." 

In a concurrent but separate GAMBIT classified letter to Gen. Thomas D. 

White, Air Force Chief of Staff, Charyk identified a new philosophy for 

Samos.24 He said it was essential to "maximize the reconnaissance take at the 

earliest possible date and to attempt to obtain such information in as low key a 

fashion as possible." He felt that the greatest chance of success would require 

establishing a "combination research, development, and operational program 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

-19- BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
s~ ¢RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

conducted under cover of research and development" and that there were 

compelling national policy reasons for avoiding any association with a military 

operational command "such as SAC." 

The headquarters staff of the Strategic Air Command was understandably 

disturbed by this pronouncement. As operators of the free world's rimary 

deterrent to foreign aggression, the staff assumed it should and wou ve a 

dominant share in acquiring strategic intell' ce, whether by aircraft or 

satellite. For some years, SAC had worked ha -glove with the ARDC, the 

AFBMD, and the Space Systems Division to prepare for major operational 

responsibility in space reconnaissance. Gen. Thomas S. Power, now SAC's 

commander-in-chief, had watched the birth of Sam os, during his ARDC days, 

and had cooperated in its growth. He had full expectation that a SAC team 

would launch Samos at SAC's Vandenberg AFB; that another SAC team would 

control the "bird" at a SAC Satellite Control Facility, and that a third SAC 

would receive the intelligence product at a readout station. Power 

ed strongly (there was even a four-page telegram to the White House2S) 

to "losing" Samos and urged his former prot General Schriever (now 

commander, Air Force Systems Command) to joi . lling for the dictum 

to be revoked. Since Charyk's order had also cut AFSC out of the Samos 

pattern, unified Air Force opposition to the concept of an NRO developed 

immediately at the organization's inception. 

Before Charyk's plan could become effective, program managers had to 

dispose of widely-dispersed evidence that a 77-inch camera development 

existed. The proposed Sunset Strip development program was so well-known 

that it would be necessary to invent and circulate a lausible motive for 

cancelling an essentially reasonable approach to ite reconnaissance. 

Project personnel achieved this end by having SSD terminate the Kodak study 

contract for Sunset Strip, with the excuse that "review of recent proposals for 

E-6 camera reveals that future study in this area (77-inch camera) is not 

required."26 Simultaneously, the Samos office drew up the first of its "black" 

contracts, authorizing Kodak to continue the devel t as a covert effort. 

Presidental reserve funds ("black" or "classified" in the amount of 

$15.5 million were tentatively identified as the FY-61 program requirement. 

The process of shifting GAMBIT camera development into secure facilities 

resembled that used three years earlier in sequestering CORONA work at 

Lockheed. As the Sunset Strip activity closed and personnel were nominally 

shifted to other Kodak projects, they actually moved into a new facility in a 

different building; there they were briefed on the fact that the project was very 

much alive, and resumed their work. Much the same procedure was followed 

with General Electric, although the fact that the E-6 and GAMBIT orbital 

control and reentry systems were closely akin, at least at first, greatly simplified 

the security problem. 

By the morning of 7 November 1960, General Greer had briefed key 

officials of Aerospace Corporation (the systems-engineering support contractor for SSD), General Electric, and Eastman Kodak on the GAMBIT program, its 

objectives, and its relationship to E-6. He emphasized that the three principal 

contractors, plus the project office, would constitute a task force with the 

objective of developing and testing the GAMBIT system in the shortest 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -20-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

S~ 

~N-ORCON 

possible time. There would be a good security shield: Lockheed, which 

ultimately became involved in the initial GAMBIT effort by virtue of the 

decision to use Agena as a stage in the launching system, supplied an 

essentially semi-standard vehicle; General Electric's cover would be the 

development of an alternate reentry body for the E-6; Kodak would rely chiefly 

on a "proprietary development" explanation; and Aerospace Corporation 

would operate under rigid "need-to-know" ground rules. 

In December, thinking through the implications of several policy papers 

that had emerged since the National Security Council decision of August 1960, 

General Greer concluded that his real job was to "get pictures ... in such a 

manner as not to precipitate a U-2 crisis in which the US might be constrained 

to discontinue Samos, and to insure the availability of systems which could 

covertly obtain needed photographs should even 'low key' reconnaissance 

operations become impossible."27 His immediate task, he felt, was to create a 

real ability to operate a covert program, and his chief difficulty of the moment 

was that "the military system(s) for contracting and for disbursing money are 

very cleverly designed to frustrate a covert program."28 

The elements of general policy under which SAFSP was to operate had 

been defined in February and appropriately circulated by the end of May 

1961. On 29 May, a classified Headquarters USAF Office Instruction formally 

restated, for the benefit of the Air Force at large, the program rationale that 

had been adopted. For practical purposes, it was a formalization of Under 

Secretary Charyk's December 1960 memorandum to General White, neither 

expanding nor enlarging the instructions there defined. Considerably more 

important was a 3 April "Satellite Reconnaissance Plan" which defined in 

detail and in formal fashion the actual "policies, procedures, and actions to be 

applied ... in order to achieve the ... objectives of the national satellite 

reconnaissance program."29 Those objectives were to enhance and protect 

the probability of "adequate and timely data collection" and to create a 

lasting ability to acquire reconnaissance information "in the event that 

circumstances should force limitations, reduction, or even elimination of overt 

flights." 

The situation that prompted the covert effort was essentially that the overt 

ob'ective of creating a US satellite reconnaissance system had been widely 

pu ized, that regular flights ("overt and acknowledged") with military 

objectives were scheduled to begin in the near future, and that any indication 

of program success might provoke both political counteraction and a military 

response from the Soviet Union. The plan specified that: 

As a firm basic policy, there will be no "operational" 

overt satellite reconnaissance or any association of the 

program with an operational command for an indefinite 

time, and the overt satellite reconnaissance program will 

be br ht to a fully operational status under cover of 

and development, and operated indefinitely 

under this cover. The policy expressed in the 6 December 1960 Top Secret memorandum from the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force to the Chief of Staff, titled 

"Basic Policy Concerning Samos," will continue for the 

indefinite future, 

-21-

SEOUl 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ 

~-ORCON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Reflecting the urgency of technical efforts-in light of the political 

environment-the policy document contained a forthright statement of the 

need for more intensive control of project security and for the maintenance of 

"a viable covert effort which has the feasible capability of being sustained 

indefinitely after cancellation of the overt effort."3o 

Significantly, the objective of tightened security was to eliminate virtually 

all public references to military space programs and specifically to prohibit 

public disclosure of the flight test objectives or results of satellite reconnaissance. Within such an environment it seemed possible to culture a covert 

effort " . .. sustainable indefinitely in the wake of a forced public cancellation 

of the overt reconnaissance program, and which can meet all principal 

intelligence objectives of the overt program."31 To that end, it was necessary 

to conduct the satellite reconnaissance aspect of the total Air Force military 

space program so unobtrusively that no indicators of the status of the overt 

program would surface in public. The covert program, of course, would be still 

more obscure-hidden even from those persons nominally cognizant of the 

extent and progress of the overt, but classified, effort. 

While cover was nerally needed in all parts of the GAMBIT program, its 

use to preclude di osure was vital in contractor's plants-particularly in 

those performing unclassified, publicly disclosed, commercial work. The 

presence of the E-6 program effort at GE and Kodak did give local managers a 

means for "explaining" the presence of work in the plant, the movement of 

people, and the appearance of certain visitors. In detail, however, the cover 

did not always "work." At Kodak, for instance, the availability of facilities 

caused the E-6 program to be at one location-the Lincoln Plant-and 

GAMBIT in another, on the opposite side of Rochester at Hawkeye Works. A 

significant number of GAMBIT people were in a guarded closed facility; their 

activity was e ned locally as a company proprietary effort. At GE, E-6 work 

was also at a ifferent location than GAMBIT work. 

GAMBIT Varietals: Program 307, Exemplar, Cue Ball 

By the spring of 1961, the E-6 and GAMBIT configurations were sufficiently different, both internally and externally, that the E-6 cover was wearing thin. 

At the same time, there was a growing probability (if CORONA continued to 

improve its capability) that E-6 would ultimately be cancelled. Greer had been 

concerned over the E-6 cover since its inception and now the problem was no 

longer academic. As early as December 1960, he had considered totally 

dissociating GAMBIT from the Samos effort; for a variety of reasons, it did not 

seem workable to hide GAMBIT as a "scientific satellite." But there was no 

easy or obvious solution. Finally, Greer-who had earlier initiated effective 

covert contracting on the basis that "everyone" knew the Air Force could not 

make significant purchases outside its insecure and involved review and 

approval channels-came up with the concept of a "null" program. A null 

in his definition, was one with no known origin and no published 

go s, a program with a highly classified and unidentified payload could 

purchase many parts of the system (boosters, stages, non-un' 

ground-support equipment, and many services) tough normal chan s. 

Viewed another way, if such "normal" items were procured through covert 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -22-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N 

means it would dilute the cover and increase the possibility of disclosure. To 

further obfuscate the unwitting, Greer, who had been identified with Samos 

and, therefore, satellite reconnaissance, decided to show the "null program" 

as a responsibility of the Space Systems Division; this would indicate that the 

program was something other than reconnaissance. Such misidentification 

was easy, since SSD was, at that time, sponsoring a wide variety of programs, 

such as bombs-on-orbit, satellite interceptors, and communications satellites. 

To rovide "null program" support for GAMBIT, a "Pro ram 307" was 

establis in SSD in July 1961. On direction from the Air S via the Air 

Force Systems Command, four "NASA-type" Agena-Bs were ordered for 

launchings scheduled to commence in January 1963. Subsequently, six Atlas 

boosters, configured to accept the Agena-B, were also ordered and purchased. In neither case was the hardware overtly assigned to a particular space 

project. To tie all this together, General Schriever, commander of AFSC, was 

directed by the Air Force vice chief of staff, in September 1961, to establish 

"Project Exemplar" (the name was classified "Confidential"), the purpose of 

which would be to provide four launchings from the Pacific Missile Range, 

beginning in February 1963. 

The Atlases and Agenas ordered under Program 307 were assigned to 

Exemplar. To further "normalize" this overt effort and support cover, the 

GAMBIT Program Office stated requirements for the usual documentation; to 

do otherwise would have attracted unwanted attention. 

The unclassified codename for Exemplar was "Cue Ball"; Air Force system 

No. 483A was subsequently assigned in December 1961. Not by coincidence, 

the program director was Col. Quentin A. "Q" Riepe who had previously been 

Midas p director (Midas was the infrared-detecting part of Samos). 

Riepe gra ally assumed responsibility for GAMBIT from Col. Paul J. Heran 

who, as E-6 program director, had initially carried responsibility for GAMBIT. 

The transition was completed by February 1962. 

Although it carried an Air Force priority of 1-A and a precedence of 1-1, 

Cue Ball was organized along the lines of a conventional SSD program (even 

though such "normal" channels and reporting lines were for cover purposes 

only); actual relations with higher authority would pass covertly through 

Greer's SAFSP office. It was particularly important, as Greer emphasized 

frequently in the early stages of setting up Cue Ball, that personnel prominently associated with the reconnaissance effort not be seen with Cue Ball 

personnel and that the Cue Ball people avoid any contaminating association 

with satellite reconnaissance. Not all Cue Ball . nees were cognizant of 

GAMBIT, so internal office security was an additiona problem. 

Misdirection continued successfully with Charyk's approval of the Cue 

Ball development plan and his formal authorization of initial funding at a level 

of $16 million. Key individuals in various offices in Headquarters USAF and 

AFSC had been alerted to the scheme and were presumably prepared to see 

that various budget, priority, and precedence authentications emerged 

tly and satisfactorily. Initially, all went well. But, in a few weeks after 

k's directive appeared, some of the carefully-laid cover began to flake 

-23-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS~099312 

S T 

ORN-ORCON 

GAMBIT System Characteristics 

While these management and security evolutions were taking place, the 

GAMBIT development program was proceeding reasonably well. By January 

1961, Kodak was under contract for the camera system. Similarly, General 

Electric's Space Division was under contract for both the orbital-control 

vehicle (OCV) and the recovery vehicle (RV). By mid-1961, GAMBIT had 

evolved into an approximately 15-foot-long, five-foot-diameter space vehicle. 

The GAMBIT payload embodied a Maksutov f/4.0 lens (both reflecting 

and refracting elements) similar to an astronomical telescope with a 77.0 

(±0.5)-inch focal length with a clear aperture of 19.5 inches. Its half-field 

angle, however, was much larger than that of an astronomical telescope, being 

3.20°. This lens, when flown at a nominal 90-mile altitude, was to produce a 

ground resolution, at nadir, of from 2 to 3 feet. The resolution was specified at 

104 line pairs per millimeter at a 2:1 image contrast and an overall optical 

figure of 1/10)". GAMBIT was to carry 3,000 feet of 9.5-inch-wide, thin-base 

film through a strip camera, which would provide image-motion compensation by moving the film across an exposure slit at the same velocity that the 

projected image moved over the earth. When looking vertically, the camera 

would image a strip on the earth 10.6 nm wide. The system was capable of 

oblique pointing (accomplished by rolling the OCV) of ±45°, could take either 

15° or 30° included-angle stereo photographs, and was able to compensate 

for image motion over a slant range of 70 to 127 nm. It could be expected to 

take 300 to 600 stereo pairs, or twice as many monoscopic images. The 

planned weight of the total photographic system was 1,073 pounds. 

The OCV was to be capable of varying the roll attitude from 0° to +45° 

(with nominal roll-slewing rates of 0.25°, 1.50°, and 3.00° per second) and of 

performing 350 roll maneuvers at an average rate of one per second and an 

average amplitude of 30°. To perform pitch, roll, and yaw maneuvers, a freon 

cold-gas system with a total impulse of 8,000 Ib/sec was used. A passive 

system of environmental control, with minimum use of heaters, was employed 

to maintain the lens bay between 65°F and 75°F and the stereo-mirror bay 

between 65°F and 78°F. Across the mirror face there was a 2°F gradient design 

goal with an 0.2°F gradient design goal normal to the mirror. Power for the 

nominal five-day flight was provided by storage batteries in the orbital-control 

vehicle. 

Using S-band beacons, the OCV was to track to a position accuracy of 0.5 

nm in altitude, 4.0 nm in-track, and 2.0 nm cross-track. The command system 

received, accepted or rejected, and executed commands, both real-time or 

stored. Vehicle health data were to be telemetered by two VHF transmitters: 

one for real-time data, the other for recorded data. The transmitters could be 

switched by ground command, which provided a degree of redundancy. 

Because of the relatively low altitude of the orbit (originally set for a 

nominal 95 nm for a five-day life but often flown below that orbital altitude) 

the GAMBIT spacecraft used two, ablatively-cooled, 50- nd-thrust engines 

(employing hypergolic propellants) to provide orbital adj These delivered a 

spacecraft velocity increment (Llv) of 400 feet per second and had a total 

impulse of 60,000 pound seconds. The reentry vehicles were ultimately very 

-25-

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
rr~ ~~~~~CON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

similar to the proven CORONA configuration, although, during the early days 

of the program, a new and somewhat larger configuration of a different shape 

and ballistic coefficient was carried to the early development stage. 

The initial GAMBIT launching vehicle was an Atlas Agena-D. The Atlas 

stage, a direct derivative of the "stage-and-a-half" ballistic missile, used a total 

of 123 tons of liquid oxygen and RP-1 fuel (a refined kerosene) to power two 

booster engines-each generating 154,500 pounds of thrust-and a 57,000-

pound-thrust sustainer engine. The Agena-D upper stage (which became the 

Standard Agena) used 13,234 pounds of hypergolic propellants (unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine and inhibited red-fuming nitric acid) to power its 

16,OOO-pound-thrust engine. 

After exposure, the camera's film was rolled up in the recovery vehicle 

(RV). At the end of the mission, the RV was separated from the OCV, spun up 

on its axis of symmetry by a cold-gas system, and then given appropriate retrovelocity to deboost the RV. Initial parachute deployment occurred at 55,000 

feet, followed by separation of the ablative shield. The final step was aerial 

recovery. 

Numerical Summary of GAMBIT -1 Payload33 

Photographic Output Data 

Ground resolution (vertical photography) 

Lens-film resolution 

Scale of photography 

Width of photographed strip 

(vertical photography, 95 nm alt) 

(vertical photography, 70 nm alt) 

Scene width on payload film 

Scene length on payload film 

Scene length on ground 

Number of photographs 

Payload Package 

Weight 

Camera Payload components in DCV 

Camera Payload components in SRV 

Film 

Total 

Dimensions of Camera Payload 

Maximum diameter 

Length 

Payload Camera 

Camera Type 

Exposure{Nominal) 

Number of slits 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

2 to 3 feet 

104 to 150 lines/mm at 2: 1 contrast 

(95 nm altitude) 1 :90,000 

(70 nm altitude) 1 :66,000 

10.6 nm. 

7.8 nm. 

8.518 inches 

Variable 

Variable 

300-600 stereo pairs or equivalent 

amount of continuous strip 

photography 

1,079.5 Ibs (w/o film) 

22.6 Ibs (w/o film) 

52.0 Ibs (3,000 feet) 

1,154.1 Ibs 

54 inches 

190 inches (front of recovery cassette 

to aft mounting plane) 

Strip 

1/400 sec with 0.0085-inch slit 

1/200 sec with 0.0 169-inch slit 

1/100 sec with 0.0338-inch slit 

3 photographic; 1 orbital test; 

1 ground test 

-26-

-~-----_Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 L.IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII __________ _ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Numerical Summary of GAMBIT -1 Payload 

(continued) 

Lens 

Type 

Focal length 

Aperture 

Half-field angle 

Filter Type 

Spect~al angle film and filter 

Focus Adjust Type 

Focus drive 

Payload film 

Type 

Dimensions (±0.01O) 

Width 

Length 

Thickness 

Base type 

Weight 

Roll dimensions 

Core diameter 

Outer diameter 

Film tension 

Image-Motion Compensation (lMC) 

Film Drive Velocity Range (70 nm alt) 

IMC Tolerances 

Average Velocity 

Smoothness (RMS of velocity transients) 

Velocity Transient (maximum) 

Number of speed steps 

Speed change per step 

IMC Design Parameters 

Obliquity Range 

Stereo Aim Angle 

Altitude Ranges (all obliquity, 0' stereo) 

Camera Payloads 1-6 

Camera Payloads 7-10 

Camera Payloads 11-54 

Optical Aiming 

Stereo Positions 

Positions 

Steps 

Angular Interval 

Obliquity Aiming (by OCV) 

Position Range 

Angular Interval 

Angular Rate 

Roll settling time 

-27-

Maksutov 

SE~ 

~N-ORCON 

77.0 (±0.1) inches 

19.50-inch diameter 

3.2' 

Band-L Type 10 

500-700 millimicrons 

Single grid, single detector, and channel with rotating focus filter. 

Range +0.010 inch 

Platen drive by d.c. motor at 0.00025 

inch/sec (nominal) 

Kodak High-Definition Aerial Film 

(Estar Thin Base) Type 3404 

9.460 (±0.005) inches 

3,000 feet 

0.0030 (±0.0003) inches 

Polyester 

52 (±3) Ibs (3,000 feet) 

4.25 inches 

13.00 inches 

3.00 (±0.25) Ibs 

2.484 inch/sec to 4.650 inch/sec 

+0.2% 

±0.8% 

± 1.2% 

64 + OFF/ON 

1 % of previous step 

-45.4' to +44.7" 

-15',0', + 15' 

95(±12)nm 

72 (± 9) nm 

81 (±11) nm 

-15',0',15' 

Crab 

O' to +3.5' or 0' to -3.5' 

8 

OS 

from +44.667' to -45.376' 

0.759' 

0.25', 1.50', 3.00'/sec 

6 sec (max) 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N 

land Recovery Versus Aerial Recovery 

At the inception of the GAMBIT pro ram, land recovery had been 

directed; it had appeared to those at high Is of government to be more 

straightforward and less of a security risk than the ocean recovery used by 

CORONA. But several factors caused the GAMBIT recovery capsule to grow 

heavier and more complex. First, it had to withstand parachute failure and not 

rupture on land impact. Second, it had to be locatable at considerable in-track 

and cross-track error distances over ru ed terrain and in bad weather, so it 

needed a more sophisticated and beacon than envisaged originally. 

Finally, even though the population density of the chosen recovery site 

(Wendover AFB, Utah) was low, the need to be confident of avoiding even a 

few populated areas demanded better accuracy and certainty of performance 

than had been anticipated initially. 

Although early on, General Greer had favored land recovery, he soon 

came to the view that the essentiality and practicability of land recovery had 

been over-emphasized. As he watched the improving capability of the 

CORONA RV and the good performance of the overwater recovery system, 

the value of land recovery diminished in his mind. On several occasions during 

the first year-and-a-half of GAMBIT's development, he informally discussed 

with Charyk the land-versus-overwater issue and the possible use of the 

CORONA RV on GAMBIT. By July 1962, the GAMBIT RV had grown about 500 

pounds over its specified weight. While the Aerospace Corporation had earlier 

studied aerial recovery for the GAMBIT capsule, the method had been 

considered impractical, since the capsule's forecast weight, even then, exceeded the capability of the C-119 recovery aircraftY Greer believed that the 

basic reason for distrusting aerial recovery-fear of loss or compromise of the 

capsule-had abated substantially since the initial program directive of 1960; 

the overwater aerial recovery capabilities developed for CORONA now 

contained provision for dealing with nearly all foreseeable contingencies. At 

the same time, the possibility had not diminished that a land-recoverable 

capsule (particularly a new and unproven model) might fall in either Mexico or 

Canada, or hit a populated area in the United States. 

In July 1962, Greer again raised these issues with Charyk, who agreed that 

alternatives to land recovery should be studied. At the time, Greer was 

concerned with GE's progress on the GAMBIT RV. He decided that the 

feasibility of using a CORONA-like RV on GAMBIT should be studied and he 

personally directed Hilliard Page, GE's general manager, to do so. He also 

ordered his program director, Colonel Riepe, to study the matter. If the 

overwater alternative should prove feasible for GAMBIT, its recovery problems 

would be resolved. Preliminary results from GE were encoura' and Greer 

reported to Martin and Charyk that use of a slightly CORONA 

capsule would provide "a vastly simpler scheme for recovering recorded data 

for certain special projects." 3S Riepe and members of the GAMBIT Program 

Office were less enthusiastic and found it difficult to fault the current 

approach; moreover, although himself was cognizant of CORONA, his 

were not, and even Riepe not know CORONA's details. Offsetting 

natural reluctance was the attraction of potential savings on weight, cost, 

and schedule. 

-29-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~CON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Finally, the situation began to change. Based upon a briefing by Riepe to 

Charyk on 24 August 1962, a decision was made to conduct the first system 

tests over the Pacific Recovery Area, using aerial retrieval as the primary 

recovery method. In addition, "all development activities on the present landimpact vehicle will be reduced to the minimum expenditure rate," and 

alternatives would be prepared for Charyk's further study.36 On 18 September 

1962, it was decided to terminate the land-recovery program and to change to 

CORONA's H-30 recovery vehicle configuration. 

In retrospect, this partly intuitive action by General Greer was a key-and 

possibly essential-ingredient to the success of the GAMBIT program. The 

overweight land-recovery RV could have jeopardized the entire program; 

further, the probability of timely and within-budget development of a completely new recovery capsule during the early 1960s was not high. To 

underscore this, a major factor in the cancellation of the Samos E-6 programwhich occurred on 31 January 1963-was the continued operational failure of 

its GE-developed recovery capsule. 

Payload Development at Eastman Kodak 

While these major decisions were being made, the payload and OCV 

developments were progressing. At Kodak the challenges were being met. The 

camera subsystem consisted basically of optics, film-handling, and supporting 

mechanisms and electronics. The optics were to be larger and lighter than any 

previously built for space use. The primary mirror and the stereo mirror were 

to be made by novel techniques. The so-called "blanks" (unground and 

unpolished mirrors) were made by the Corning Glass Company for Kodak. 

Using large boules of very pure fused (amorphous) silica glass, face and back 

plates were cut, as were the interior pieces, which were thin, notched, quasirectangular plates joined in an "egg-crate" fashion. The mirrors were assembled with the back plate supporting the egg-crate section, surrounded by side 

plates, with the to-be-finished face plate on top. This assembly was placed in a 

large furnace where it was heated just to the melting point of silica, at which 

point the various pieces fused to each other. The fusion operation was 

delicate: too long a time or too high a temperature would make the intended 

structure artially molten blob, while too Iowa temperature or too short a 

time wo prevent the parts from fusing sufficiently to provide structural 

integrity. After the fusion step, various tests were made to determine the 

percent of intended fusion that had actually taken place and to establish the 

geometry of any voids. Criteria for acceptance or rejection of the fusion 

process for the assembled blank had already been established. 

After some early failures, these large, lightweight blanks were successfully 

manufactured by Corning and shipped to Kodak for figuring and polishing. To 

perform this work, Kodak had prepared a special facility in its Hawkeye Works 

where new, large, grinding and polishing machines had been built. Wellproven techniques were used and success was largely a question of scale, as 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -30-

llllliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii •••••• llApproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 •••••••••••••• 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
S~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N-ORCON 

thermal environment for precluding distortion of the optics, the payload had 

its own thermal-control subsystem, which interfaced with that of the OCV. 

The concept, which worked well when the OCV met the interface requirements, was to open or close the payload bay door to keep the payload just a 

little cooler than its desired ambient condition and then, by adding heat to the 

optical barrel and mirror back plates with strip heaters, bring them to the 

desired temperature and temperature gradient. 

The program at Kodak was directed by Dr. Frank Hicks, whose principal 

team-members were james Mahar, systems engineering; Leslie Mitchell, payload design; John Sewell, test and support equipment; and Don Stevens, 

support and administration. The entire project was located in Kodak's Hawkeye Works and reported to the director of Special Projects-originally, Dr. 

Kenneth MacLeish, who was replaced, in 1961, by Dr. Frederic C.E. Oder. 

Earlier, when Oder was in the Air Force, he was the original WS-117L project 

officer and was witting of the entire CORONA effort. The Special Projects 

organization reported to Arthur Simmons, director of research and engineering of the Apparatus and Optical Division. Because of its national importance, 

the GAMBIT project was given a high priority on a uiring people-not only 

within the A&O Division but company-wide. A s organization was set up 

to handle the program's physical and personnel security needs. 

With the decision to use the CORONA RV in GAMBIT, it became 

apparent to Oder that key people in his GAMBIT program organization had 

the need to know certain aspects of CORONA, so they could make the use of 

that system's technology. He arranged for Lt. Col. John Pietz, of Greer's 

security office, to provide authorizations and CORONA briefings to a few 

GAMBIT pr 'ect people at Rochester. This allowed Kodak to make much 

better u the RV than was otherwise possible. For exa Ie, based on 

earlier Samos experience, Kodak had originally planned the film path 

pressurized, including the film chute and take-up cassette; it now learned, 

from CORONA information, that an unpressurized film path could be used. 

The effect of this information was to simplify the take-up cassette and allow 

the GAMBIT film load to be accommodated within the CORONA RV. 

Orbital-Control Vehicle Development at General Electric 

The OCV development by General Electric, in its Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, facility, was not an easy assignment. The effect of failures in such varied 

components as harnesses, power supplies, batteries, command systems, 

horizon sensors, rate gyros, environmental doors, and pyro devices, multiplied 

the tasks originally envisioned for the OCV, jeopardi' attainment of the 

original cost and schedule goals. GE decided that it coul most likely locate 

potential failures in flight hardware by doing comprehensive thermal-vacuum 

and vibration testing at a complete OCV level-of-assembly, and routinely 

checked out all vehicle components at that stage. While box-level testing may 

have been done, the official GE 206 Program Report made no mention of a 

comprehensive test program of that type. OCV problems were not unexpected, as seen from this quotation from a GE 206 Program Report: 

SEawr-

~dlevia B YEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -32-

• ____________ mrpproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 ••••••••••••••• 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ON 

Some indication of the scope of the task can be seen 

from the fact that the vehicle, less camera payload, 

contained 206 components and 80 black boxes, including 4,000 mechanical piece parts, 39,000 electronic 

piece parts, 575 harness connectors, and 5,000 harness 

wires. These totaled approximately 160,000 potential 

defect sources that had to be screened out in every 

vehicle, often in the face of tight launch schedulesY 

later industrial experience showed that it was less costly, in terms of labor 

(dollars) and schedule, to test rigorously at the lowest level-of-assembly, 

rather than to locate failures when the complete flight vehicle had been 

assembled. 

The nature of the OCV problem was to be dramatically characterized later 

in a 29 August 1967 letter from Brig. Gen. John Martin, SAFSP, to Dr. 

Alexander Flax, DNRO, summarizin the initial GAMBIT program: "[Wjith the 

exception of one Agena failure one Atlas failure ... all of the mission 

catastrophic failures and most of the other serious failures were in GE 

equipment."38 

As stated earlier, many of the roblems that arose with the OCV during its 

development phase were fou uring vehicle-level tests and were resolved 

by redesign and rework. An example of a component requiring extra work was 

the horizon sensor, which sensed the earth-sky boundary, which was essential 

for the vehicle to achieve orientation. When GE's horizon-scanner 

development got into trou e in 1962, the GAMBIT Program Office started 

two other efforts toward a solution: one at Eastman Kodak, the other at Barnes 

Engineering Co. All three were carried until September 1962, when SAFSP, 

receiving results from the three approaches, decided in favor of Barnes. Both 

the GE and Kodak developments had, by then, proved their utility; however, 

neither was better than the Barnes instrument and both were more expensive. 

Further, the Barnes sensor operated over the widest target-temperature range, 

which made it more effective in a winter environment. On 17 September 1964, 

GE was advised contractually that Barnes sensors would be governmentfurnished for GAMBIT. 

Not to be outdone, about this time EK also had problems in two areas. 

One involved the means by which the large silica mirrors were attached 

(cemented) to their metal cases; the other resulted from using incorrect fluid in 

a dash-pot in the platen-drive, causing the film to move irregularly over the 

exposure slit. These problems were resolved but they did add to existing 

pressure on hardware delivery and flight schedules. 

Prompted in part by hard questioning during an October 1962 meeting 

with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and the 

Special Group of the National Security Council, Charyk characterized GAMBIT 

as "imperative" and urged that it be developed with a "maximum sense of 

urgency," noting that the "extreme political sensitivity of any other method of 

obtaining such photography"-to wit, overflights by U-2 or OXCART aircraft-made it essential that "no reasonable steps should be omitted to 

guarantee GAMBIT's success at the earliest possible time." Discoura the 

rate of GAMBIT progress, Charyk requested an exhaustive review to ocate any 

-33-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ 

NOK1RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

problems remaining in the program. He emphasized that resolution better 

than the two-foot requirement of 1960 was desirable. He also cautioned that 

money was not unlimited and that greater management talent, rather than 

more funds, should be applied to the program. 39 

In all probability, the prevalence of cost over-runs (particularly at General 

Electric), the threat of new schedule slippages, and the increasing cost of the 

GAMBIT progr prompted Charyk's concern over the future of the development. He was isturbed by the possibility of additional schedule slippages, 

. since only GAMBIT offered hope for discovering whether the Soviets were 

actively preparing military forces for use. The coincidence of Charyk's anxiety 

with the start of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 should also be noted; even 

though the United States did not have clear evidence that Soviet nuclear 

missiles were being installed in Cuba until the second week of October, 

concern over that possibility had been mounting since August. 

General Greer was fully aware of circumstances that had moved Charyk 

to his exhortation and possessed no convincing evidence on which to base a 

rebuttal. The Samos E-6 program was in grave technical trouble in October 

1962, having experienced four recovery-vehicle failures in as many flight 

a Because of a succession of misfortunes, it had been necessary to 

c each of the major photo-reconnaissance programs assigned to SAFSP 

in the original Samos program, except for E-640 and GAMBIT. True, the most 

obvious defect in GAMBIT design had been eliminated with the decision to 

adopt aerial-recovery techniques and to use the CORONA recovery vehicle. 

But the prospect of continued GAMBIT slippage was still very real and there 

was no strong confidence that the complex camera system would function 

properly during its early flight trials. 

GAMBIT's Final Home-SAFSP 

On 5 October 1962, Greer, with some reluctance, told Charyk that the 

most certain way to strengthen GAMBIT management would be to transfer 

custody of the program from the Space Systems Division to SAFSP. The 

desirability of this transfer had been examined in detail as early as July 1962. By 

October, Col. j. W. Ruebel, Greer's special assistant, had worked out the basic 

details of a transfer plan and had composed a rationale for public consumption. Greer expressed a desire to keep Colonel Riepe in charge of the 

program. 

Greer told Charyk that moving the program into SAFSP would give 

GAMBIT th ge of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, although it 

did seem that identification of GAMBIT with reconnaissance objectives might follow. In Greer's eyes, that possibility was not a disqualifying 

handicap. He reminded the under secretary that the United States had 

constantly maintained the basic legality, under international law, of satellite 

reconnaissance and that the nation had never denied the existence or 

employment of orbiting camera systems. The chief purpose of concealment 

now, he ted, was to cloak the scope and success of such operations. 

That much uld be done within SAFSP. In the remote possibility that national 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -34-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ ~~ORCON 

policy shifted, it would be difficult to continue any effort even indirectly 

associated with reconnaissance objectives. 

Greer was not optimistic about the prospect of improving the quality of 

GAMBIT photo phy, at least in the first several flights. He told Charyk that 

the original ion requirement-two to three feet-would very probably 

qe satisfied, although he knew that not all experts agreed with him on that 

score. Greer cautioned that results from the first few flights might not bear out 

his conviction that GAMBIT would indeed prove itself; past experience with 

new space vehicles (into which category the General Electric orbital-control 

vehicle fell) did not encou e strong optimism. As for priorities and emphasis, 

Greer noted that it was cult to convince either contractors or military 

personnel involved in administration of this p am that it enjoyed any 

special priority or importance, since the one inf Ie indicator of statustimely and adequate funding-had been consistently absent. 

Early in November 1962, General Greer repeated his suggestion of 

transferring the entire 206 Program to SAFSP. Answering earlier objections, he 

explained to Charyk that such a move did not imply "surfacing" the development or acknowledging its reconnaissance objectives: the payload would 

remain covert and procurement would be "black." Moreover, the cover plan 

devised in SAFSP promised to perpetuate the legend that Program 206 (Cue 

Ball) was in some way related to a bombs-in-orbit pro The explanation 

for project transfer from SSD to SAFSP did not need t be either complex or 

particularly sophisticated; a straightforward statement that program priority 

placed it under the direct control of the Secretary of the Air Force would 

satisfy those who did not know that covert programs were being conducted 

within the Air Force. Greer reasoned that those aware of the existence of 

clandestine activities would deem it unthinkable to move a concealed reconnaissance program into a reconnaissance organization and would be more 

firmly convinced than ever that Program 206 had some mission other than 

satellite reconnaissance. 

"Children or half-wits, if they care, will most likely reason directly to the 

correct deduction, i.e., if it's assigned to SAFSP, it's reconnaissance. Inasmuch 

as we will do nothing to confirm this, and we will insure that some actions are 

apparently inconsistent with the hypothesis, I think there is a good chance of 

fooling-or at least confusing-the professional espionage agent, who is 

presumably neither a child nor a half-wit."41 

There was another consideration which influenced GAMBIT's transfer to 

SAFSP. The implementation of Raincoat (discussed earlier) by Department of 

Defense Directive 5200.13 had placed all military space programs in a " no 

publicity on payloads" and "special access, must-know" category. Individual 

access lists were being maintained for each program and program information 

was being confined to those having an approved need-to-know. Random 

numbers were substituted for previously-used popular names and launching 

announcements were restricted to a bare statement of the type of booster and 

the date of the operation. In such circumstances, it was no longer possible to 

identify a Samos payload solely from the fact of launching security; all military 

space launchings were being conducted under tight security provisions. Thus 

-35-

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT·KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ N.Pf(5RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

It was increasingly difficult for someone who did not have program security 

access to acquire information about most Air Force space programs; to a 

degree all cover stories were now somewhat redundant. 

Greer's arguments were effective. By 20 November 1962, Charyk concurred in the "desirability" of transferring 206 to SAFSP. Maj. Gen. O.J. 

Ritland, who was now part of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) 

headquarters staff, was called in to brief Maj. Gen. Ben I. Funk, now 

commander of SSD, on the realities of the situation. 

The loss of the 206 Program was resisted and resented by the Air Force 

Systems Command. General Schriever, now commander of AFSC, had been a 

major force in establishing the Air Force space program. To him, the fact that 

any Air Force space activity was not under AFSC's management was /lnot 

right," and, in 1962, under his leadership, AFSC made determined but 

unsuccessful efforts to regain "ownership" of all Air Force space programs. 

Ironically, the streamlined "Gillette" management concept that Schriever had 

enjoyed as commander of AFBMD, had lost its attractiveness to him, now that 

high-priority space programs were reporting directly to the Office of the 

Secretary of the Air Force. 

While transferring Program 206 to SAFSP, Charyk also considered 

strengthening the program's leadership. He had been strongly impressed by 

Col. William G. King, Greer's technical planning officer, who was conducting 

forward-looking studies (including the VALLEY program-an early effort at 

devel ' a 1.5-foot-resolution search system). He knew that King had been 

assoc with satellite reconnaissance for nearly 10 years, beginning with 

early Wright Air Development Center days and culminating in assignment to 

the AFBMD as Samos Pro 'rector (1959-60). Charyk knew King as a 

consistent pragmatist, who ad been one of the first to call for a film-recovery 

Samos (accepting the reality of then-current read-out rate limitations). As this 

series of favorable impressions were recalled, Charyk proposed King to Greer 

as a clear best-choice to direct GAMBIT. Fortuitously, when General Funk 

heard of this possible change, he informed Greer that he would like to assign 

Riepe to a new SSD development program. King became the GAMBIT 

manager on 30 October 1962. 

One of Colonel King's first actions, after assuming GAMBIT management, 

was to advise General Greer that the current design of the adapted recovery 

capsule represented much more of a change than Greer had intended. Greer 

had ordered "minimal cha only" to the CORONA capsule; now he 

emphatically endorsed Col King's recommendation that the original 

intent of the modification be reinstated and that the General Electric development effort be redirected accordingly. King carried out the order: meeting 

with key GE officials, two days later, he defined the objective of the capsule 

change. Cross-briefing GAMBIT people on CORONA-a continuation of the 

process earlier begun at Eastman Kodak-helped restrict GE's engineering 

approach to one of (only) limited modification of the recovery vehicle. 

Colonel King had also made it clear to EK that system changes were to be 

minimal and that any changes in configuration of the CORONA capsule would 

need his personal approval. By all indications, King expected external changes 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -36-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

.. _ S~ ~N-ORCON 

SIGINT Programs CORONA Program GAMBIT Program WS-417L 

Maj. David Bradburn Col. Paul Heran Col. William King LCol. Thomas Haig 

SAFSP Organization in 1%3 

to be slight. The general I icy, he added, was to use flight-proven components wherever possible, ping all changes to a minimum, but altering the 

details of payload configuration as essential to the requirement for limiting 

external change. 

Hitch-Up, Roll-Joint, and lifeboat 

At this time, the GAMBIT Program Office was still concerned over the 

OCV's attitude-control subsystem. As a conservative measure for improving 

the probability of early fight success, it was planned that the Agena, for the 

first three flights, would remain connected to the OCV for most of its orbital 

life. In this "Hitch-Up" configuration, the Agena would provide attitudecontrol for the spacecraft. later, the OCV would be separated, to demonstrate 

its own attitude-control capability. It was anticipated that the mature Agena 

was more likely to perform correctly than was the new OCV. It was important 

to General Greer and his team that early flights obtain good quality photographic imagery, even though flying in the Hitch-Up mode did not allow 

demonstration of full-system capability of the OCV (and permitted only nearnadir photography). 

There was more to Hitch-Up than met the eye. An elaboration of the 

scheme involved use of a roll-joint coupling (invented for an interim highresolution satellite known as Project lANYARD and its KH-6 camera)42 

between the stable spacecraft (Agena) and the camera. Should the orbitalcontrol vehicle enerally unreliable, it might be possible to introduce 

the lANYARD between the Agena and the payload end of GAMBIT, 

eliminating reliance on the stability and control elements of General Electric's 

orbital-control vehicle. 

On 29 November, General Greer presented the results of a preliminary 

analysis of the Hitch-Up and roll-joint ideas in a meeting with Charyk, who 

showed interest. Greer then drafted an authorization for continued study of 

these options and sent it to Washington for endorsement. On 30 November, 

the second major change (in two months) to GAMBIT was tentatively 

proved. Colonel King took the view that uncertainty over a succe 

demonstration of the OCV stabilization system mandated proceeding with 

-37-

Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

development-at LMSC-of a roll-joint for GAMBIT and, in a January 1963 

policy paper, authorized GE and LMSC to prepare for roll-joint use, should 

that become necessary. The plan called for LMSC to deliver three roll-joint 

modules before the end of the year.43 

Bringing the roll-joint into the GAMBIT program raised a security problem. The roll-joint was quite unknown to most GAMBIT people and it seemed 

unwise to disclose the existence of the LANYARD effort to large numbers of 

GAMBIT workers. So Charyk's message of 30 November (actually written by 

General Greer) contained the liS n" that Greer contact Lockheed 

about the roll-joint because Cha believed "a similar idea was once 

proposed and possibly designed in connection with another space program."44 The kernel of a cover story was outlined: Lockheed would be 

empowered to "develop" the earlier "idea," delivering finished roll-joints to 

GAMBIT as though they were new items with no relationship to any other 

reconnaissance program. 

As the result of a full-scale technical review held by King, a further 

measure for insuring the success of GAMBIT flights was proposed to Charyk 

on 14 December 1962: a recommendation to incorporate a backup vehicle 

stabilization system and limited command capability in GAMBIT. Named 

"Lifeboat," or "BUSS" (Back-up Stabilization System), this was another design 

approach originated in the CORONA program. It included a separate magnetometer, a separate cold- abilization system (including gas supply and 

controls), and an indepe t reentry-command receiver and associated 

circuitry. All of these were completely independent of the main OCV subsystems and could be activated if the primary reentry systems failed. The 

magnetometer referenced the vehicle's spatial orientation to local lines of 

magnetic force; with this information, the vehicle could use Lifeboat's gasstabilization capability to orient itself properly for separation and de-boost of 

the RV. The roll-joint provided added assurance of proper attitude control. 

With these changes, GAMBIT, in December 1962, was a much more realistic 

development than it had been four months earlier. 

Finally, although he a reed that the most vital initial objective of GAMBIT 

was to return "one picture" (Greer's frequently-stated goal), Charyk 

nevertheless insisted that all flights subsequent to the first should be programmed to return useful pictures of pre-selected intelligence targets. He 

specifically rejected the concept of a step-by-step approach to an operational 

configuration through research and development improvements. His philosophy was key to the reason for incorporating a roll-joint development: if it were 

necessary to rely on the roll-joint-because of failure of the GE orbital-control 

vehicle-the GE effort could be discontinued. Degradation of picture quality 

was a probable co nce, but the degree of degradation could not be 

accurately estimated. OCV was being built to have more precision and 

greater granularity of roll-position than that available from the existing rolljoint. The LANYARD roll-joint system could provide only 100 stereo pairs of 

pictures of selected targets during a single mission-about one-third to onefourth of the current e tation for the GE vehide and one-sixth of the 

original requirement. Th roll-joint was designed to permit shooting at angles 

as great as 30° from vertical, with intermediate settings every 5°. In late 1962, 

BYEMAN-

~ TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -38-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
s~ N,9R1RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

On 1 March 1963, Dr. Charyk resigned to become president of the newlyformed Communications Satellite (Comsat) C oration. He was replaced as 

DNRO (and as under secretary of the Air Force) y Dr. Brockway McMillan, of 

Bell Telephone Laboratories. 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -40-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 ~ 

SE 

N RN-OI~CON 

Section 3 

GAMBIT Operations: The Early Flight Program 

GAMBIT flight vehicle No. 146 lifted from its Vandenberg Air Force Base 

launching pad on 12 July 1963, thrusting its way toward a position 110 nm 

deep in outer space. General Greer, Colonel King, and their associates knew it 

would be 90 minutes before they would have proof that the bird was in a 

proper polar orbit. After that positioning, they would feel limited initial 

assurance; then five orbits would be counted off before the payload began an 

inquisitive search of the USSR. After nine "working" passes, the satellite would 

be called back to earth, after ejecting the RV carrying a cargo of engineering 

data and overflight photography. The shortened flight plan was in deference 

to the fact that GAMBIT No.1 was a new bird; at this stage, demonstration of 

flight skills was more important than performance as an intelligence-gatherer. 

On the 18th orbit, a ground station commanded GAMBIT back toward 

earth and a C-119 aircraft, waiting near Oahu, swept the parachuting reentry 

capsule out of the sky. 

The first GAMBIT "try" was a success; although only 198 feet of film was 

exposed, the average photographic resolution was 10 feet and some of the 

best was close to 3.5 feet. Greer's mandate to King had been "One good 

picture," with emphasis on "good"; the GAMBIT team had more than met 

that goal. 

The second flight took place on 6 September 1963. Although purposely 

limited to two-plus days on orbit, it still delivered 1,930 feet of exposed film 

and covered 10 of the targets specified by USIB's Committee on Overhead 

Reconnaissance (COMOR). The best ground resolution-2.5 feet-met the 

basic design specification, greatly reassuring GAMBIT's optical engineers. This 

particular resolution value, translated into lay terms, meant that photointerpreters could distinguish such items as aircraft nacelles and small vehicles. For 

the first time, a satellite-reconnaissance system had produced pictures at 

resolutions previously obtained only by reconnaissance aircraft. 

On the debit side, a member of the intelligence " user community" could 

grouse, with reason, that 1,930 feet of film and coverage of 10 COMORassigned targets hardly called for a festival. And engineers were distressed by 

the fact that the orbital-control vehicle had not functioned well enough to 

demonstrate pointing accuracy. 

The third flight, launched on 25 October 1963, was disarmingly smooth in 

all respects. In general, the photo quality was excellent: this was the first 

satellite mission to identify people on the ground (from a distance of 90 miles), 

the scene being a football game. This flight was also the first to use color film. 

The return was generally degraded by improper exposure, and, like the 

previous GAMBIT returns, a very limited amount of true intelligence information was produced. Emphasis still lay on engineering validation of the satellite. 

On the next flight, the lifeboat back-up stabilization system was installed 

(its control gas and command circuitry independent of the orbital-control 

-41-

Handle via 

BYEMAN· T ALENT·KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002·90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
'iE.PItFT Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N~ORCON 

vehicle's primary stabilization system). GAMBIT No.4 was launched on 18 

December 1963. The al of increased emphasis on actual intelligencegathering was not reali an unstable "rate gyro" triggered massive instability in the OCV and there was no point in even attempting photographic 

operations. Lifeboat did its best to correct the situation; although overwhelmed by the severity of the problem, it performed well enough to become 

a standard item on the next 32 flights. 

GAMBIT-l Flight Summary-1963 

C-l Targets Best Days on 

No. Date Covered R.esolution Orbit R.emarks 

1 12 Jul 63 3 3.5 ft. 1.1 

2 6 Sep 63 10 2.5 2.1 

3 25 Oct 63 4 3.0 2.1 

4 18 Dec 63 0 1.1 Loss of orbital-control gas 

The fifth flight, on 25 February 1964, was as unproductive as the fourth. A 

series of strange command faults and errors exposed serious flaws in the OCV 

and in controller communication procedures: 

• Telemetry indicated that the roll and itch gyros had not uncaged. 

Actually they were functionioning very I, but 

• The ground controllers, misled by the telemetry, sent a new "uncage" 

command. This forced a serious yaw problem; however, 

• The yaw problem was corrected on revolution 18, but-

• A film "cut-and-Ioad" signal had already been sent on revolution 16. 

GAMBIT No.6, launched on 11 March 1964, also had roll-joint malfunctions but redeemed itself with 209 targets acquired (a new record, by far) and 

generally excellent photography. The Intelligence Community was still dissatisfied: its members had become accustomed, rather quickly, to the idea that 

resolutions of two to three feet were obtainable by GAMBIT and naturally 

wanted this best ca ability exercised against all targets. An interesting sidelight 

to the flight was , after capsule ejection, a low-altitude experiment was 

conducted for seven revolutions at 70 miles, with no apparent spacecraft 

problems. It was hoped that some low-level passes could be made on 

subsequent flights to push best resolution beyond the excellent then-current 

values. 

GAMBIT No.7, launched on 23 April 1964, performed better than No.6, 

particularly during its two days at low orbit. 

The Hard Times of 1964 

The eighth GAMBIT, launched on 19 May 1964, showed more control 

problems: attitude reference was lost mysteriously on the 15th revolution and 

restored on the 25th. Resultant photography was good in quality but disap-

. ing in quantity. There were similar control problems with GAMBIT No.9, 

aunched on 6 july 1964, which returned no useful photography. It was finally 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems lointly 

BYE 140002-90 -42-

----.Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ 

noted, however, that control problems occurred only when the satellite was 

over the Antarctic; a possibility existed that the control's sensor could not 

distinguish between the temperatures of Antarctica and outer space, du . 

winter months. Since red' of the sensor would be both difficult 

expensive, a quick-fix was fo nd in allowing the spacecraft to coast over the 

South Pole in any attitude it chose (after all, there were no targets in 

Antarctica) and its proper attitude was restored as it entered warmer latitudes. 

From May through October 1964, six GAMBIT flights produced coverage 

on only 397 targets. Half of the flights produced no coverage whatever. On 

345 of the 397 coverages delivered, the best resolution was seven feet. The 

users of intelligence had seen enough 2.5-foot resolution to regard poorer 

performance with barely-concealed contempt; they clamored for an end to 

uncertainties in product quality. 

The first faint sign of relief appeared in December 1964, with the flight of 

GAMBIT No. 14. Although battery overheating had shortened the spacecraft's 

lifetime to one day and only 37 targets were covered, the 2.1-foot (best) 

resolution gave promise for the future. 

GAMBIT -1 Flight Summary-19M 

G-l Targets Best Days on 

No. Date Covered Resolution Orbit Remarks 

5 25 Feb 64 0 2.1 Profound yaw after rev 2 

6 11 Mar 64 143 3.0 ft. 3.1 First flight of the stellarindex camera; first truly 

successful flight re target 

coverage 

7 23 Apr 64 209 2.5 4.1 Two days at low orbit 

8 19 May 64 52 2.0 1.0 Attitude control problems 

9 6 Jul 64 0 50.0 0 Attitude control problems 

10 14 Aug 64 105 7.0 1.0 Electrical/programmer 

problems 

11 23 Sep 64 240 7.0 4.1 Focus error; gas leak 

12 8 Oct 64 0 Agena failure; no orbit 

13 23 Oct 64 0 4.1 Retrofire/re-entry problem; 

No recovery 

14 4 Dec 64 37 2.1 1.0 Power supply problem; 

aborted on Rev 18 

GAMBIT No. 15, launched in January 1965, improved the resolution value, 

once again, to 2.0 feet; the coverage of 688 targets also set a record (although 

the majority of these coverages were not at the best resolution). Flight No. 16 

in March 1965 set a fresh record for coverage (823 ta ); in April, this 

number increased to 992 on flight No. 17; in May it pe at 1,037. Both 

flights achieved best resolutions of 2.0 feet and set record on-orbit times of 5.1 

days. 

When flight No. 18 in May 1965 turned in a performance equal to its 

predecessor, one could have thought that GAMBIT had finally moved from 

adolescence to maturity. But the 25 June flight of GAMBIT No. 19 dashed such 

hope: a massive short circuit cut the target coverage to zero. 

-43-

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

FLAX KING 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

S~ 

~N-ORCON 

The most serious immediate roblem facing Martin was whether GAMBIT 

No. 20 should continue to hold fl date of 9 July. After considerable 

study, he opted to follow the schedule i erited from Greer. Actua the date 

slipped to 12 July, at which time Martin witnessed a comprehensi lure: the 

Atlas booster shut down prematurely and GAMBIT flew a 680-mile arc into the 

Pacific Ocean. Martin realized that the GAMBIT program, during those few 

minutes, had retreated to square one; his main task, as a new commander, was 

to diagnose and cure a seriously ailing satellite system, 

The Philadelphia Story 

As General Greer's deputy, Martin had absorbed a detailed knowledge of 

GAMBIT. His personal assessment of the record of 20 flights was that very 

dramatic failures-such as the one he had just witnessed-were usually the 

most easily corrected. The chronic, ing failures seemed to be those based 

on strange little events which occu quietly and just outside the reach of 

on-board telemetry. He also concluded that most of these subtle aberrations 

were clustered in what he termed lithe trouble-plagued OCV.//48 Reviewing 

OCV performance, Martin grouped troubles under two headings: (1) unexpected loss of control gas, and (2) unexpected loss of programmer control. 

These losses, separately or in combination, transformed a healthy-looking 

GAMBIT into a zombie-a stupid creature circling the earth in unauthorized 

orbits, totally disinterested in attending to its assigned duties. 

Years later, Martin could still recall the emotion of "watching a bird go 

dead" or "go gypsy." "You simply cannot imagine," he said, lithe frustration 

you feel when, after establishing a clean orbit, and grind' out a few good 

operational revs, the bird reappears over the horizon w all control gas 

mysteriously expended, or with a deaf programmer."49 He reminisced, further, 

that his experience with such frustration dated to the very beginnings of 

GAMBIT flight history: he had witnessed the agonies of early GAMBIT 

operations while visiting Vandenberg Air Force Base and the Satellite Test 

Center at Sunnyvale in 1963, 

Martin recalled that when he and Colonel King had pressed General 

Electric representatives, at Flight Program Review meetings, for answers to 

OCV problems, the "answers" were often evasive and diversionary.5o GAMBIT's control-gas valves were made at GE's Utica Plant and integrated into the 

OCV at GE's Philadelphia facility (later at GE Valley Forge). GE representatives 

attending Program Review meetings were (properly) GE Philadelphia people 

who (improperly) did not seem to be well-acquainted with the production and 

qualification-testing history of GE Utica valves. They maintained a certain 

aloofness and serenity in the face of adversity, occasionally observing that 

"Valves will be valves: sometimes they fail to close .... /1 or "Isn't this possibly 

the kind of problem one has to expect in a novel technological venture like 

space flight?//51 

Keenly dissatisfied with such responses, Kin asked the GE Philadelphia 

representatives to accompany him to Utica, w they might observe, firsthand, the manufacture, assembly, and qualification testing of "new venture" 

-45-

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

N.J)f6RN-ORCON 

CORONA Pro!lram 

Col P .J. Heran 

SP-7 

Pro!lram A 

Director 

Brig/Gen 

John L. 

Marlin 

Director 

Bri!l/Gen J. L. Martin 

SP-1 

Deputy Director 

Col R. A. Berg 

SP-2 

SIGINT Programs 

Col R.W. Yundt 

c::=J 

GAMBIT Program coL::!" 

SAFSP Organization in 1965 

Program B 

Director" 

Huntington D. 

Sheldon 

Program C 

(SIGlNT) 

Director 

Adm Rufus Taylor 

'''Program B"temporarily dropped from tille in 1965-76 period. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

NRO Organization in 1965 

-46-

Advanced Research 

Pro!lrams 

Coil. Allen 

SP-6 

Program 0 

(Aircrall) 

Director 

Col Leo Geary 

___ ,Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931,~2 _______________ ...... 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~RN-ORCON ~ 

valves. It took less than a day to learn that the fault did not lie in design, 

manufacture, or assembly; the damage was occurring in the testing program 

itself-a process which, as applied by Utica personnel, was inherently capable 

of randomly damaging valves and making them liable to failure on orbit. As 

soon as the "lethal" elements were dropped from the testing procedure, the 

GAMBIT's control-gas problem subsided. 

The second miscreant-the temperamental GAMBIT programmer-more 

than filled the anxiety gap previously occupied by faulty gas valves. The 

GAMBIT programmer was designed to be the first truly sophisticated "brain" 

on a reconnaissance satellite; without perfect performance by the p mmer, GAMBIT capability was reduced severely-sometimes to the of 

helplessness. In visits to GE Philadelphia, Martin and King had been faced by 

an attitudinal setting similar to that at gas-valve conferences. There was deja 

vu in knowledge that the programmer was made by GE Utica and accepted for 

integration into the OCV by GE Philadelphia. 

Shortly after assuming command, Martin traveled to Philadelphia and 

uested an occasion to address all employees working on the OCV. He gave 

speech, specifying the problem dearly and describing, in some detail, 

the probable consequences of continued programmer failure. A few days after 

his return to los Angeles, he was telephoned for an appointment by a GE 

Philadelphia employee, calling from the los Angeles airport. Martin invited the 

gentleman to his office and learned, to his surprise and amusement, that he 

was the "company psychologist" for GE Philadelphia. 

"I was present for your speech, General, and I think you should know 

about a serious misunderstanding as to exactly what you were saying to us, or, 

perhaps, by what you meant to say to us. Some of our people came away from 

the meeting with the impression-I hope we can clarify it-that unless work 

performance improved, they would be fired!" 

The psychologist paused to let the full horror of this thought take effect. 

Martin's reply was cheerful: "Exactly! Go back and tell them that they have the 

message."52 It was a short meeting. From the earliest days of satellite 

reconnaissance operations, it was commonplace for customers to remark on 

the sharp divergence in response style of different contractors attending 

Program Review meetings. CORONA's flight operation had begun with 12 

consecutive failures, providing a pportunity for forming opinions and 

conclusions in this regard. GE Phi ia's position at these meetings, absent 

specific data, was often that lilt really couldn't have been our equipment that 

caused the problem." And that was that. The lMSC approach was somewhat 

different. After the routine and obligatory initial announcement that lithe Thor 

was undoubtedly out of spec," lMSC's engineers would concede their own 

problem and settle down to solving it. Hard-driving Fred O/Green would open 

this part of the discussion with a standard exhortation, "let's have no shyness 

here. Don't tell me how perfect your equipment is; tell me how it could have 

caused this failure!" 

Different styles in confronting adversity seemed to be more a reflection of 

organizational arrangement than personnel bias. lockheed, for example, 

-47-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ 

~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

habitually organized on a project basis-automatically selecting one responsible person and having him collect an engineering, administrative, and procurement staff, wholly responsible to himself. GE, on the other hand, was in 

the habit of organizing functionally. The GE project leader stood almost alone, 

channeling his needs to already-exi' engineering, manufacturing, quality, 

test, administrative, and ment ·sions. As a result, persons working 

on his program in those were not under his direct control; therefore, 

his daily modus called for diplomatic cajolery, rather than command. The 

contrast between the GE and lockheed approaches to project organization 

could not have been more diverse. 

Aware of the GE management style, and the extreme difficulty that would 

be encountered in amending it, Martin and King concluded that friendly 

persuasion would not work in contacts with Philadelphia. The conclusion may 

have become definitive on the day they heard, "We are trying our best," and 

"You' have to expect some problems," capped by "If you'll tell us what 

to do, II be glad to do it" -all symptoms of a contractor reaching the end 

of his tether. Martin and King's preferred reaction would have been to cancel 

the GE Philadelphia contract, but this would have been self-defeating: it was 

far too late in the GAMBIT pro to begin competitive work with a new 

contractor-such an action wo lay the flight program for several years. 

Clearly GE and the NRO were "stuck" with each other and desperate 

measures were needed to deal with a desperate situation. 

By September 1965, King was outlining a suitably desperate measure to 

General Martin. Shortly thereafter, they both proceeded to GE Philadelphia, 

where they mystified mana ent by requesting exclusive use of a dining 

room, ten tables, ten white t lecloths, and ten completed GAMBIT electronic 

boxes. When everything was in place, Martin produced his own screwdriver 

and removed the cover- from a box. He then raised the box above the 

cloth-covered table and it as hard as he could. He paused to inventory 

the native and foreign items which had fallen to the cloth, identifying them in 

a disturbingly quiet tone. The chant continued as he and King moved from 

table to table, repeating the operation with each box, the findings confirming 

King's estimate of the quality integrity of this equipment. 

Concluding the exercise, Martin observed to his hosts that someone (or 

"someones") had to be responsible for the debris on the ten tables. He 

repeated his view that although the boxes had been fabricated at GE Utica, GE 

Philadelphia had final responsibility for their condition and performance. 

By late afternoon, GE Philadelpha management had identified a group of 

"someones" and announced a list of dramatic personnel actions. At GE Utica, 

both organization and procedures were revamped. A more experienced 

program manager was appointed, who reported to General Martin, in person, 

in los Angeles, once each week for several months, explaining progress on a 

"get-well-Utica" plan. Utica made substantial changes in several components, 

in most of its production methodology, and-most important of all-in testing 

procedures. System-level tests would no longer be the screening point for 

faulty components or workmanship; checking would henceforth take place 

when components were built. System-level testing was to serve only as 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -48-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ ~N-ORCON 

confirmation that all components had been manufactured and assembled 

properly. This was the first important step in moving GE hardware toward 

respectability in the GAMBIT components family. 

Several other forceful actions were taken solus by King, who disciplined 

errant contractors fearlessly, whenever he judged hardware quality to be at 

risk. At Lockheed, for example, he noted a tendency to "cover" the fact that 

an was "a little off schedule" by shipping it to Vandenberg on 

sc trusting that with a little more time (and perhaps some luck) the 

engineers would have a chance to complete their work in Vandenberg's 

Missile Assembly Building (MAB). In a program like GAMBIT, with its complicated technology and demanding flight schedule, such a maneuver was bound 

to be attempted: the pressures on the development team would force it to 

search im . atively for every minute it could find, wherever it could find it. 

On the ot hand, once such a habit (reliance on MAB-time) was formed, it 

could quickly develop into a regular procedure and a contractor's "right." 

Recognizing the strategem and the danger, King expressed himself explicitly in sing-and forbidding...,-.it. He became even more concerned when 

he foun a second major contractor-Eastman Kodak-tending toward the 

practice. When he confronted EK, stating openly that "unready" optical 

systems were being shipped to the MAB, Messrs Waggerhauser and Simmons 

protested formally to Martin, urging that King be censured for an "unacceptable attitude" toward their optics and their engineers. King countered with a 

draconian solution: he advised General Ritland, SSD commander, that he 

would, if necessary, close the MAB, forcing all contractors to deliver flightready hardware to the launching site. 

This was the ultimate move King could have employed to convince 

everyone, once and for all, of his unswerving determination to guarantee 

hardware integrity. As for the criticism of his "unacceptable attitude," he 

shrugged it off with a characteristic twinkle. He had made his point. 

On-Schedule or Over-TargeH 

For most of its lifetime-even in its Army Air Corps days-the US Air 

Force's main development and procurement experience had centered on 

aircraft acquisition. The management headquarters for this work was Wright 

Field-later known as the Wright Air Development Center and then renamed 

the Aeronautical Systems Division. At this installation, near Dayton, Ohio, the 

aircraft acquisition task was assigned to program offices; each office managing 

the research, development, and testing phases of an individual aircraft. 

There were three conditions under which an aircraft program office could 

fall from grace in the eyes of the Air Force (and the US Congress): (1) the 

program's development cost could grow to more than had been appropriated 

to it (a "cost overrun"), (2) the program could fail to meet its advertised 

delivery-date ("schedule overrun"), or (3) it could fail to meet its performance 

specifications. 

-49-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~N~'O'RCON ~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Cost overruns were a painful experience: they triggered serious criticism 

of the Air Force (and the Department of Defense) by Congress; they often led 

to very unpopular dollar "raids" on contemporary Air Force projects; they 

could even cause cancellation of the offending development. The Air Force 

had in-depth experience with each of these responses and tried to prevent 

them, insofar as possible, by supervising contractors closely and offering 

incentives for "coming in under cost." 

"On-time delivery" was not as sacrosanct as "under-cost," but, over the 

long run, schedule slippages could destroy a project, particularly in areas 

where technology was evolving rapidly. In this regard, one of the most 

disturbing analyses produced duri the mid-1950s was Thomas G. Belden's 

survey of 100 key projects at eld, showing that 85 slipped 0.45 year or 

more per year, 22 (of that 85) slipped one year or more per year, and median 

sli 0.7 year per year. 53 The Air Force was properly alarmed by these 

nu rs and began to reward contractors for "coming in ahead of schedule," 

in addition to showing good cost-control performance. 

The third problem-that of meeting performance specifications-was not 

nearly as open to public view as money and schedule problems. In fact, one 

way to "ameliorate" a schedule slippage on an aircraft development was to 

accept the aircraft from the contractor well before it had demonstrated 

specified performance and then to identify the inadequacies as part of the inhouse flight test program at Edwards Air Force Base. Brig. Gen. Charles Yeager 

describes this process: 

By definition, a prototype [aircraft] was an unproven, imperfect machine. It was usually underpowered, 

had controls that were too light or too heavy, new 

hydraulic or electrical systems that were bound to fail, 

and more than a few idiosyncracies .... Some defects 

were obvious: Convair's Delta Dagger was completely 

redesigned following the poor performance of its prototype. But other problems, like an unexpected vicious 

pitch up at high speeds or a dangerous yawing tendency, might be discovered late in a program, only after 

hundreds of hours of flying time. The test pilot's job was 

to discover all the flaws, all the potential killers .... 

Testing was lengthy and complicated, resulting in hundreds of major and minor changes before an airplane 

was accepted into the Air Force's inventory. 54 

It was natural for General Greer's original GAMBIT staff-particulary his 

procurement officers-to follow the incentive patterns developed at Wright 

Field. As a result, the earliest arrangement with SAFSP contractors was 

weighted heavily toward rewarding cost underruns: the incentive for good 

performance on-orbit was only one-half the possible bonus for lowered cost. 

Unfortunately, experience soon showed that the conjectured parallel 

between aircraft and spacecraft development programs was false. The programs were fundamentally different with the difference stemming from one 

hard fact: satellite reconnaissance systems had no Edwards Air Force Base. 

~ 

Handle via 

BYEMAN· T ALENT·KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -50-

______________ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 "'" ______________ .. 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 Sl=~ 

~~O~CON 

There was no way to provide to GAMBIT the "hundreds of major and minor 

changes" that Yeager's flight-test program provided to aircraft prototypes. In 

addition, the Intelligence Community had great expectations for every GAMBIT flight-even the first one. Finally, GAMBIT, like any spacecraft, could not 

be taxied back into a hangar for modification or refurbishing. The intelligence 

environment made every GAMBIT flight a mission; the aircraft parallel would 

have been to move a newly-developed fighter directly from factory to combat. 

It was clear that the Intelligence Community-the customer-thought the 

news of a GAMBIT being under-cost was interesting; the announcement that 

it was ahead of schedule was praiseworthy; but the fact that it was performing 

correctly over target was mandatory. 

During his service as General Greer's deputy, Martin had made an 

exhaustive study of incentive contracting and had arrived at conclusions which 

paralleled closely the views of the Intelligence Community. He believed that 

the problems that arose in the GAMBIT flight program were not being 

considered properly in incentive payments to contractors. He could not agree 

with a system of rewards in which the bonus for good performance on orbit 

was only one-half that paid for delivery under-cost. He observed, for example, 

that such a set of values placed General Electric in position to collect a healthy 

bonus (thanks to being under-cost) on a system which might fail to produce 

anything useful on orbit. The incentive system unintentionally hinted to the 

contractor that de-emphasis on quality control and testing procedures could 

actually increase the award for delivery under-cost. 

Martin's "fix" was to de-emphasize the cost underrun bonus ("an inexpensive system that doesn't work is too expensive for us"), leave the delivery 

time bonus about where it was ("I do have customer pressures on scheduling"), but place extraordinary emphasis on orbital performance. His shift in 

emphasis was measured by a comparison of bonus maxima for good on-orbit 

performance: $1 million under the old system versus $3.64 million under the 

Martin plan. In fact, even with a cost overrun of 25 ent, perfect GAMBIT 

performance on orbit could win a bonus of $2.4 mill for the contractor. 55 

The final novelty in Martin's plan was a touch of true genius: he decided 

to pay the maximum performance bonus to the contractor in advance of the 

flight; post-flight the contractor would write a check of his own, returning any 

of the on-orbit performance bonus he had failed to earn. Writing checks to 

the US Air Force was a disciplinary experience no contractor liked to envision, 

or, even worse, have cause to remember. In General Martin's words: 

My dominant concern about incentive contracts 

was that the contract's structure and elements did not 

penetrate to the level where success or failure is formed: 

it was simply a set of details known to the contra . 

office, not a concern of the engineers, technicians, a 

fabricators. I wanted an incentive structure that would 

result in people at these latter levels willingly doing 

something that they wouldn't have done without it. 

Payment in advance, with repayment required if not fully 

earned, was my approach to (a) getting the word to 

-51-

Handle via 

BYE MAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems JOintly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
S~ jS.Qt(1RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

these levels, as well as (b) insuring that high management levels would be personally concerned with what 

their engineers, technicians, and fabricators were 

doing. 56 

Out of the Valley 

The Martin-King drive for im rovement in the GAMBIT program was 

unrelenti reparation for t No. 21, the entire system was tested 

exhau inspection procedures were upgraded impressively. All GE 

Philadelphia OCV components underwent X-ray examination, together with 

strong vibrational tests. Faulty components were discovered-and replaced. 

The flight of No. 21, launched on 3 August 1965, hardly reflected the level 

of detailed attention this GAMBIT had received: the satellite lost stability 

almost immediately, as a power converter failed, making the satellite useless 

on orbit. After three bad flights in a row, the Intelligence Community now 

became very restless: an intensive ICBM buildup was going on in the Soviet 

Union and there had been no high-resolution coverage since May. Intelligence needs had previously been geared to one successful GAMBIT flight 

every 40 days. 

GAMBIT -1 Flight Summary-1965-67 

C-l Targets Best Days on 

No. Date Covered Resolution Orbit Remarks 

20 12 Jul65 0 0 Atlas failure. No orbit. 

21 3 Aug 65 0 4.1 Power converter failure. 

No stability. 

22 30 Sep 65 963 1.8 ft 4.1 

23 8 Nov 65 76 1.1 Loss of stabilization gas. 

24 19 Jan 66 1.067 2.0 5.1 First successful use 

of color 

25 15 Feb 66 1.051 2.0 5.2 Stereo mirror servomotor problem 

26 18 Mar 66 1.185 2.0 6.1 

27 19Apr66 2.010 2.0 6.1 

28 14 May 66 1.999 2.0 6.1 First successful night 

photography. Street light 

patterns detected. 

29 3 Jun 66 1.233 2.3 6.1 

30 12 Jul66 1.636 2.5 8.1 

31 16 Aug 66 1.605 2.0 8.1 

32 16 Sep 66 1.545 2.0 7.1 

33 12 Oct 66 1.722 1.9 8.1 

34 2 Nov 66 0 7.1 Pyrotechnic/door 

problem; no 

camera operation 

35 5 Dec 66 1.629 2.5 8.1 

36 2 Feb 67 1.631 2.2 8.1 

37 22 May 67 1.826 1.6 8.1 

38 4 Jun 67 2.015 1.6 8.1 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -52-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 s~ ~RN-ORCON 

fortunately, CORONA had been reasonably successful during the summer, but its photographic resolution capability, even at best, was not detailed 

enough to meet the expectations, or many of the needs, of the analysts. 

Martin, characteristically, stood steady amidst this flurry. He and King 

found themselves, as usual, going against the flow, even proposing a onemonth slip in the launching date of GAMBIT No. 22, to accommodate 

increasing comprehensiveness in testing and qualifying the components used 

by GE, where all modified components were now going through mandatory 

tests. Thermal vacuum tests and vibration tests were still uncovering faulty 

parts and assemblies. Contamination and workmanship problems were still 

surfacing, even though GE inspection teams were "bird-dogging" over 25 

critical components in each OCV. Through it all, or perhaps because of it all, 

Martin was feeling an increased assurance that nothing was wrong with 

GAMBIT's basic design; he believed, based on detailed study, that the OCV 

could be, and was being, reformed into a "good bird." 

GAMBIT No. 23 was the first satellite to have full benefit of the new test 

and inspection regimen at Philadelphia. It was also the first to have sufficient 

electrical power, as well as enough control gas, for a six-day on-orbit 

capability. Launched on 8 November, it quickly succumbed to the familiar, 

fatal flaw: excessive use of stabilization gas. During its 18-revolution lifetime it 

photographed only 76 targets. 

But the sun would soon shine: 14 of the 15 remainin GAMBIT -1 flights 

were rated "very successful" -even by the stringent sta ds of the Intellice Community-averaging 6.6 days on orbit, 1,470 targets covered per 

ht, and best resolutions clustered around 2.0 feet. flight No. 30 was the first 

to spend more than eight working days on orbit. flight No. 38 ended the 

GAMBIT -1 program, celebrating 2,015 targets covered and a best resolution of 

1.6 feet. 

Reviewing the GAMBIT situation of 1965, it is clear that redemption of the 

OCV-and its contractor-was the critical step in moving the pro am out of 

shadow into the sunlight. The new management team at GE w d hardvery hard-to cure a faltering OCV. The "Martin Specialized Incentive 

Contract Structure for Satellite Projects" continued to guide GAMBIT procurement practices and, together with corporate pride, furnished basic motivation 

for on-orbit success. The "Martin Motivator" earned the highest regard of 

both governmental and industrial officials; even today, it is frequently cited as 

the major positive influence in creating an extraordinarily successful (post1965) GAMBIT program. 

Reverse side blank 

-53-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Section 4 

Origins of GAMBIT-3 

SE~ ~-ORCON 

In mid-1963, about the time of the first GAMBIT launching, several 

reasons developed for SAFSP and the NRO seriously to consider improving 

GAMBIT's photographic capability. A basic motivation was the ever-increasing 

importance of -resolution photography to the InteJr Community 

and, concomit , the realization by intelligence analys importance 

of even better resolution than that expected from the original GAMBIT. The 

pressures for better quality and greater quantity also resulted from engineering considerations: from a photographic payload point-of-view, the current 

GAMBIT configuration was non-optimal. It was non-optimal in a number of 

ways: redundant structural elements, thermal-management subsystems, and 

power-distribution gear consumed more than their fair share of allowable 

space and weight. These unnecessary duplications were crowding out possible 

growth elements: larger optics, more film, and more life-extending 

expendables. 

In SAFSP-6, Navy Capt. Frank B. Gorman and his Advanced Developments 

Section had studied various improved payload and spacecraft configurations, 

working in concert with Eastman Kodak. Kodak also received strong encouragement to perform these studies from Col. Donald J. Yockey, who was in 

charge of GAMBIT procurement for SAFSP, and who believed that a more 

optimal des' would be a major contribution to improved intelli e 

collection. study goal was to determine the best resolution obta e 

from an Atlas-Agena-Iaunched system (the Titan-IllS was later substituted for 

the Atlas). From studies such as these came the conclusion that an Agena-like 

stage, with a roll-joint, plus a more capable payload (larger optics and film 

load), could do the job without the then-current redundancy of the GE OCV 

and the Kodak payload. Roll-joint development had been kept alive at 

lockheed by SAFSP and its technology was ready for lication to an 

advanced version of GAMBIT. The roll-joint would allow t e camera to be 

rotated to various positions in a ane perpendicular to the line-of-flight, 

permitting photography to the t and left of the ground track of the 

satellite. In addition to allowing the camera line-of-sight to be rotated, the 

roll-joint, by means of a carefully balanced internal flywheel, moved at a 

predetermined rate to offset precisely the inertia forces generated by rotating 

the forward tographic payload) section of the craft. It ultimately 

became a so isticated device, with effective redund gh reliability. It 

was even ab to compensate for a payload section whose mass (and thus its 

rotational inertia) would differ with, first, two recovery vehicles, and then one, 

the first having received its film-load and returned to earth. 

Kodak Proposals for an Advanced GAMBIT 

Beginning in 1961, several contractors were participating in studies of 

larger optics for reconnaissance purposes. Among them, Eastman Kodak had 

two advantages: first, it had designed and built the original GAMBIT system 

-55-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

-=:::-=:::-=::: ___ ~~ ___ - __ iApproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 ? ____ ---------1IIIIIIiI 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ON 

PAYLOAD ADAPTER SECTION 

(ROLL JOINT) 

® PHOTOGRAPHIC PAYLOAD 

SECTION (PPS) 

® HARMONIC DRIVE 

(51:1 GEAR BOX) 

© PAYLOAD ADAPTER SECTION 

@ SATELLITE CONTROL 

SECTION 

® ROLL JOINT FL YWHEEL 

* Iw OF PPS: Iw OF FLYWHEEL 

HARMONIC 

PRIMARY DRIVE 

INERTIA CHANGER 

ROLL PLANE CASTERS 

(TYPICAL 3 PLACES) 

FLYWHEEL 

MOTOR ACTUATOR 

(TYPICAL 2 PLACES) 

GAMBIT -3 Roll-Joint (Payload Adapter Section) 

obviating the significant assembly and test problems experienced at Vandenberg AFB thro the initial GAMBIT program. In developing this approach, Kodak ploited use of the Lockheed roll-joint, which it planned to 

locate between the forward photographic payload/recovery vehicle section 

and the rearward satellite-control section. 

Various degrees of improvement were studied. In each case it was 

assumed necessary to achieve the desired resolution 95 percent of the time, at 

a 2:1 contrast ratio, from an altitude of 90 nm. In these terms, a Kodakconceived GOWOUld deliver an 18-inch resolution; i1 G8~BI:-: would have a capability; and its GAMBIT -4 would go tq I 

In each case, Ie was the aperture and focal length of t e optics a 

being catadioptric Maksutov-type lenses). Use of a special, very-Iow-coefficient-of-thermal-expansion Invar (an iron-nickel alloy) for both the optical 

barrel and related assemblies was planned, along with a new thin-base (1.5 

mil) h~h-r:solution filTc' with an aerial exposure index of 6.0 (roughly a factor 

I over the film then in use on GAMBIT). These technologies ad een proven and effectively used in the improved GAMBIT program. 

In evaluating the possible advanced GAMBITs (GAMBIT-2, -3, and -4), 

SAFSP ruled out GAMBIT-2, since its promised 18-inch resolution was not a 

significant advance over GAMBIT -1. As to GAMBIT -4, SAFSP thought the 

optics were so large as to create manufacturing uncertainties, long development times, and rather large costs. The NRO's view was that GAMBIT-3 

should be favored, since it would provide significant improvements in resolution and target quantity at acceptable estimated costs and lead times. 

-57-

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
S~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N-ORCON 

DNRO McMillan was concerned that the program might have ma'or 

problems if the lar optics and the im ved film did not become av ' 

on schedule. As a ge, he sponsored tive optical materials developments. One was a material called Pyrocer ietary low-coefficientof-expansion, glass-like material made by Corn Co.; another was ULE 

(ultra-low-expansion) glass, also made by Corning; a third was an OwensIllinois Co. proprietary formulation called Cer-Vit-a low-coefficient-of-expansion glass. Even Invar metal was studied as possible mirror material but it 

was found that Invar had sufficient microcreep to make it unstable for large, 

high-precision optics. In addition, Kodak was authorized to work on various 

means of replicating and selectively "tuning" la ge optical surfaces, as alternatives to conventional grinding d polishing tec . ues. Despite these alternative technological endeavors, final GAMBIT -3 mirrors were made to the 

baseline design: fused silica egg-crate with fused silica bottom and surface 

plates. Early mirrors were "tuned," using vacuum deposition of silica in 

selective areas. In later production, the necessary quality was obtained by 

conventional polishi This final choice was not formalized, however, until 

late in 1965. New t nologies did contribute to the improvement of large 

optics manufacturing with laser-interferometric testing, which ultimately became machine-readable and, with mini-computer support, provided quick 

turnaround from testing to polishing. Using these procedures, GAMBIT-3 

optics consistently met or bettered the error-design goal (less than AjSO 

peak-to-peak). 

The NRO Selects GAMBIT-3 

By 13 December 1963, Colonel King had red an initial development 

proposal based on the technical content of k's GAMBIT -3 briefing. He 

incorporated Greer's instructions that general cleanup of the GAMBIT-1 

system would continue until GAMBIT-3 became operational. 58 King's plan 

provided that the entire GAMBIT program (both GAMBIT-1 and GAMBIT-3) 

woul rate under the purview of the exis . SAFSP GAMBIT office. The 

initial of the new system was scheduled the second quarter of 1966, 

with the operational transition from old to new GAMBIT planned for later that 

year. Contractors for the new system would begin "controlled entry" into 

development toward the end of FY -64. 

King saw only two acceptable options for GAMBIT -3 orbital control. He 

conceded that an OCV could be developed with a capability similar to that of 

GAMBIT -1, but he favored using a flight-control stage-such as the Agenawith a roll-joint the phot phic payload. The roll-joint, invented 

for LANYARD a for the few GAMBIT -1 flights, had operated 

perfectly, while General Electric's orbital-control vehicle, a new and complex 

system, had, as noted earlier, experienced many difficulties. To rely on the 

Agena for orbital control would offer advantages of lowered technological 

and financial risk. 

King's tentative schedule called for receipt of proposals in mid-April 1964 

and contract award by June. As 1963 ended, DNRO McMillan informalh 

authorized Greer to proceed with the GAMBIT -3 program outlined in King' 

- SECAHHandle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -58-

pproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ 

N.oK1IfN-ORCON 

development plan; formal approval arrived at SAFSP on 3 January 1964. 

Although King and Greer were p ward the space booster combination of Atlas and Agena, Mc felt that the option of using a Titan-III 

should be retained (a judgment which later proved to be fortuitous), provided 

scheduling difficulties would not result. This consideration represented the 

only significant alteration of King's initial GAMBIT -3 plan. 59 

King and Greer worked out the remaining major elements of the GAMBIT -3 concept early in January 1964. The major subsystems of the satellite 

were to include a photographic-payload section (PPS), a satellite-control 

section (SCS), and the booster vehicle. The payload section would contain a 

camera module and a satellite recovery-vehicle (SRV). The control section was 

to include the command system, the orbit-adjust module, an attitude-control 

subsystem, a back-up stabilization system (BUSS), and the power supply. 

Alt the option of using a GAMBIT -1-style orbital-control vehicle had not 

yet n formally discarded, as early as january 1964 the Greer-King concept 

leaned heavily toward Kodak's proposed approach.GO 

By 3 February 1964, the Program Office had p epa red a General Systems 

Specification, a Satellite-Control Section (SCS) Statement, and a Preliminary Development Plan, together with a determination of sources to be 

solicited for the new program. By the next day, it had completed the SCS 

Request for Proposal, which was approved on 5 February. The competition 

was, of course, for the SCS job and the two bidders were the "incumbent" GE, 

which had built the GAMBIT -1 OCV, and Lockheed, which had built the 

Agena and the roll-joint. Kodak would be the PPS contractor. 

It was at this time that the Program Office's documentation began to call 

this advanced GAMBIT by the name G3 or GAMBIT -Cubed instead of 

GAMBIT -3; for reasons of consistency, this history will refer to the program 

only as GAMBIT -3. In the Preliminary Development Plan the objectives of 

program were: 

• High reliability; 

• Flight capability commencing 1 july 1966; 

• Ground resolution o~ ~t 2:1 contrast, as presented to the 

front aperture of the camera in black-and-white film for vertical daylight 

photography at a payload altitude of 90 nm; 

• Day or night photographic coverage of targets. Exposure commandable 

on orbit from a selection of exposure steps; 

• Use of black-and-white film, color film, and/or other special recording 

materials; 

• Stereo, strip, and lateral pair photography; 

• Dual-camera subsystem cont' . n; 

• Minimum mission life of eight ays; 

• Utilization of Atla na-D launching vehicle, or equivalent; 

• Direct factory-to- e; 

• Air recovery over water (primary) or water recovery (emergency). 

The development plan emphasized maximum usefulness of the final 

photographic product by including user aids, such as optimized time-track 

format and a means of recording altitude data. It reduced operational 

-59-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SF~ ~~ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

constraints, such as environmental-door operation and film-drive transients. It 

described problems with the GAMBIT -1 design in "that testing and maintenance were greatly hampered by the integrated nature of the subsystem such 

that a great deal of connecting and disconnecting of wiring harnesses was 

necessary. Components were very difficult to remove and replace." In the 

GAMBIT -3 system, lithe emphasis on modular construction will increase the 

ease of maintainability."61 The plan stressed that reliability should be enhanced "th rough use of previously qualified subsystems" and took the 

position that "the command-and-control subsystem developed under the Gprogram has been shown to be a superior system, and it is anticipated that it 

and associated software may be included in the G3 System."62 (That anticipation was realized and all command programmers for GAMBIT-3 were produced by GE Utica on a sole-source basis.) 

In approaching GAMB1T-3, the Program Office took the view that the 

government would allow contractors to enter "system development under 

carefully controlled conditions with funds utilized only as necessary to further 

define the system, provide system analysis, demonstrate feasibility of critical 

components, and protect long-lead-time development of specified components and/or subsystems."63 This cautious approach on a high-priority system 

was established so that lithe System Program Office can judge progress and 

feasibility for continuing into co te system development."64 Despite such 

conservatism (for a system to fly in less than two and one-half 

years), the program proceeded apace. 

Eastman Kodak was placed under contract prior to the selection of the 

SCS contractor. By mid-May 1964, lockheed had been selected as the primary 

SCS contractor; GE was given a backup SCS study. As previously noted, the GE 

command programmer had been selected and GE established as an associate 

contractor, providing equipment to lockheed as government-furnished equipment (GFE). 

Kodak chose GE as the source for the GAMBIT-3 recovery vehicle (RV) 

and chose lockheed for external PPS structure and certain components (such 

as a cutter-sealer to be installed on the film-path between camera and RV). 

Because of DNRO McMillan's strong interest in the Titan as a possible 

booster for GAMBIT-3, lockheed was tasked, in July 1964, to study Agena 

compatibility with the Titan-III(X). GE was asked to study the simplification of 

its GAMBIT-3 proposal, inc possibility of using a separate ascent 

stage with the orbital-contr to provide the SCS capability. Before 

long, progress at lockheed was sufficient to permit SAFSP to fund lockheed's 

SCS work only, ending the GE backup study. 

In October 1964, the SAFSP staff prepared cost estimates pertaining to the 

switch from an Atlas-Agena to a Titan-III{X)-Agena, based upon the lockheed 

study. There were several reasons for consideri uch a change. One was the 

desire to use the Titan-III family of boosters for r Air Force space missions, 

thus providing a more efficient production base and commonality of groundsupport equipment; further, the Titan had potential versatility and on-orbit 

weight-growth capability; finally, although the Atlas was considered to be an 

Air Force standard launching vehicle, technical control and production 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -60-

_________________ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 L ___________ 1111 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ON 

contracts for the Atlas were seen as shifting to NASA. A final in'fluence on 

Greer was the likelihood that, in the not-too-distant future, the CORONA 

program would be replaced by a larger, longer-lived search system, which 

would require a Titan-III booster. Just before the end of 1964, Dr. McMillan 

approved the GAMBIT change from Atlas to Titan and the Titan-III(X) was 

officially designated as the Titan-IIIB. 

GAMBIT -3 Developments at lockheed and Kodak 

lockheed's work on Agena modifications and the roll-joint proceeded 

without major difficulty and never was a threat to achieving a successful 

launching on the planned date (July 1966) at close to budgeted cost. 

By the fall of 1964, Kodak and its subcontractors had pro ressed to where 

engineering specifications of the overall design had been rele preliminary 

design reviews held, some engineering drawings released, and some critical 

long-lead-time components ordered. Payload development, however, was 

behind schedule. 65 

The major problem at Kodak was the manufacture and mounting of the 

two large mirrors of GAMBIT -3 optics. The primary mirror (aspherical figure) 

was 44-inches in diameter and the stereo mirror (flat) was a 58-inch by 46-inch 

ellipse. These optics were lar than those of many terrestrial telescopes, but 

were required to be much ter, with optical figure accuracy at least as 

demanding. Kodak experienced several failures caused by collapsed and 

fractured substrates of the mirror blanks. In addition, the figuring and 

polishing processes in the development phase we . 'ng much more time 

(to get the desired accuracy) than had been expect Kodak had originally 

estimated that each of the two mirrors would require about 800 hours of 

grinding, polishing, testing, and coating from raw blank to finished product. 

The manufacturing time for the early mirrors ran as high as 3,000 hours per 

mirror, although this number was substantially reduced in later production. 

These difficulties led both the ment and Kodak to continue alternative 

material and processing meth developments, as mentioned earlier. 

During the last quarter of 1964, Kodak remained behind schedule, while 

all other parts of the program were on, or ahead of, schedule. To the GAMBIT3 ma rs at SAFSP, this was a tolerable situation; they had expected more 

probl during the critical first year of the program. They were pleased that 

most of GAMBIT-3's technical problems had been identified and resolved, the 

only exception being the optics, At the end of 1964, the GAMBIT Program 

Office was able to return nearly $1.25 million in uncommitted funds to NRO 

budgeteers. 

By late 1964, Eastman Kodak had progressed to where it had developed 

sound techniques for manufacturing the large optics. Despite the promise of 

unconventional techniques-such as the selective ition of silica used in 

the first few GAMBIT-3 mirrors to improve optical gure-the large optics 

were to be manufactured by conventional means of polishing, but with 

-61-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems JOintly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~CON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Numerical Summary of GAMBIT -3 Payload 

Photographic Output Data 

Ground Resolution (R-5 lens) 

(vertical photography) 

lens-film resolution 

(dynamic) 

Scale of photography 

Width of photographed 

strip (90 nm-vertical) 

Scene width on payload film 1 

Scene length on payload film 

Scene length on ground 

Number of photographs 

Payload Dimensions 

Weight (at launching) 

Photographic Payload Section 

Film 

Primary Camera 

APTC' 

Terrain Camera 

Astro Camera 

Dimensions of PPS 

Maximum diameter 

90 nm, 2: 1 contrast 

65 nm, 5: 1 contrast 

174 lines/mm at 2: 1 contrast 

(90 nm altitude) 

(65 nm altitude) 

10,000 ft of UTB 9.5-in wide 

1,080 ft of 5-in 

780 ft of 35-mm 

Length (nose to interface bolt circle) 

Camera Optics Module (included in PPS) 

Dimensions 

Length 

Diameter 

Weight 

Primary Camera Lens 

(R-5 model) Focal length 

Type 

Clear aperture diameter 

(primary mirror) 

f/number 

Catadioptric aspheric reflector with four-element Ross corrector 

Configuration line-of-sight passes through stereo mirror 

Semi-field angle 

Nominal Obstruction (depends upon stereo position) 

Nominal transmission 

Nominal T-stop 

Depth of Focus (Rayleigh Criterion) 

Lens tube of Invar w/coeff of thermal expansion 

Production Mirrors 

Material UlE glass w/coeff of thermal expansion 

Primary (Asphere) 

Figure: peak-to-valley 

RMS 

Weight (mounted) 

Size (round) 

Stereo (flat) 

figure: peak-to-valley 

RMS 

Weight (mounted) 

Size (elliptical) 

Ross Corrector Elements 

'On 9-inch film 

Figure: peak-to-valley 

Weight 

Size 

1:37,600 

1:27,100 

4.54 nm 

8.81 inches 

variable 

variable 

2,000' to 

30,0003 frames 

4,130.0Ibs 

112.01bs 

8.81bs 

3.11bs 

60.00 in 

343.45 in 

210.75in 

60.00 in 

2A351bs 

175.00 (±0.032) in 

43.50 in 

4.09 

1.43" 

8.5 to 17.5% 

79.4% 

4.70 

±O.OO072 in 

0.7 X 10· in/in(F 

0.3 x 10' in/intC 

0.10h 

0.05h 

374.21bs 

44-i'1 diam 

0.160;" 

0.056;" 

498.91bs 

58 X 46 in 

0.125;" 

84.81bs 

17X10in 

'Based on looper film capacity of 60 inches maximum 

3Effective flight No. 48 using dual-platen (9- and 5-inch) camera with 12,241 feet of 9-inch film 

and 3,874 inches of 5-inch film 

• Astro Position Terrain Camera Table 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -62-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~CON 

Numerical Summary of GAMBII-3 Payload (continued) 

Strip Camera 

Exposure time (nominal) 

Slit width for nominal film drive rate 

No. of slits (for daylight) 

Range of slit widths 

Supplemental slits 

Spectral band pass 

Night slit 

Test slit 

Film-drive speed 

Nominal 

Range 

(90 mi, 0" stereo, 0" obliquity) 

No. of steps 

Tolerances 

Film Type 

(equiv to 65-152 nm altitude at nadir) 

Astro-Position Terrain Camera (APTC) 

Components 

Astro-position Camera (APC) 

1/1 AOO sec 

(6.72 millisecond) 

0.0061 inch 

6 

0.0036 to 0.032 Inch 

0.300 inch 

tapered from 0.004 to 

0176 inch 

480-720 millimicrons 

7.98 in/sec 

4.6 to 11.5 in/sec 

601 

±0.3% 

U~6.0 

APC Line-of-sight-two Summicron 90 mm, f/2.0 lenses, 6" 

above plane parallel to XY plane, one in I Yother in -Y direction 

Semi-field angle 12.8" 

Format on film 29 mm x 29 mm 

Film Type-3401 

Shutter Intra-lens, electrically 

Nominal Exposure Time 

Performance 

Terrain Camera (TC) 

TC Line-of-slght-one Aptagon 75 mm f/5.0 lens parallel to Z 

aXIs 

Semi-field angle 

Format on film 

Film 

Ground Format (90 nm vert) 

Stereo Overlap 

Shutter 

Exposure time 

Performance 

Static 

Dynamic 

Satellite Recovery Vehicle 

Number of SRVs: 

Vehicle Nos. 1 through 22 

Vehicle Nos. 22 through end of program 

Weight (at ejection w /film) 

SRV No 1 

SRV No.2 

Length 

Base Diameter 

Dispersion 

Nominal Re·entry Angle 

Recovered Weight 

SRV No.1 

SRV No.2 

Parachute Deployment Altitude 

Time from Separation to 

Parachute Deployment 

Time from Separation to Recovery 

'Area Weighted Average Resolution 

-63-

actuated and timed 

OA second 

Static 100 lines/mm 

AWAW @ 1001 

contrast 

4T 

4.5 x 4.5 in 

Type-3400 or Type 

50-205 

137x137nm 

nominal 67% 

Intra-lens elec-operat 

ed and mechanically 

controlled 

1/500, 1/300, or 

1/200 

85 lines/mm AWAR, 

2: 1 Contrast 

65lines/mm 

AWAR 

1 SRV 

2 SRVs 

3760lbs 

394.91bs 

42 in 

33 in 

100 x 15 nm 

1.98· 

180.01bs 

200.01bs 

35,000-40,000 ft 

10 min 

23 min 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ 

N~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

controllable figuring and polishing machines. There would be more rapid 

turnaround because of the speed and accuracy of laser-interferometry 

testing. 66 

Only one major change to the preliminary specifications occurred in the 

early stages of development. After consideration of risks, General Greer 

decided it would be imprudent to anticipate full development of a dual-platen 

camera configuration in time to meet flight schedules. DNRO McMillan 

agreed. (It should be noted that a dual-platen camera with both a nine-inch 

and a five-inch platen flew with great success in GAMBIT -3 flights 48 through 

54.) Some changes in the photographic payload section occurred because of 

refined requirements. One of its components, the astro-position terrain 

camera (which was to determine the precise location of terrestrial features 

with respect to fixed stars) had been completed early by Kodak, with some 

redesign to enhance its performance. 

Kodak had progressed in refining mounting methods for large optics so 

that on-orbit distortion would be avoided and, yet, heavy loads (during the 

flight's powered-ascent phase) could be withstood without consequential 

movement of the optics. The optics had to be held tightly, but not too tightly. 

In another major area of concern, Kodak continued to refine thermal-control 

techniques to preclude distortion of the large optics barrel by variations in 

solar energy input. As a result of these preventive measures, neither problem 

occurred in actual flight. 

GE, under its Kodak subcontract, completed design of the GAMBIT-3 

recovery vehicle (RV) in November 1964. Greer and King had insured, through 

Kodak, that the GAMBIT -3 RV would differ from the GAMBIT -1 RV only where 

absolutely essential. Kodak responded with an extremely stringent qualitycontrol process. 

At Lockheed, the GAMBIT -3 program was assigned to the Space Systems 

Division, under the direction of Program Manager Harold Huntley. In turn, 

Huntley reported to James W. Plummer, assistant general manager for Special 

Programs, and was supported by Robert M. Powell, chief systems engineer; 

John Harley, Design E ineering manager; and Robert Kueper, Controls 

(business) manager. At time GAMBIT -3 work began, Agenas were produced by contract with the Air Force's Space Systems Division, using "white" 

contracts, as Standard Agenas (Agena-Ds). The Standard Agenas were then 

turned over to the "using pro ' to be "customized." In the case of 

GAMBIT -3, that process entail removing standard Agena components not 

needed for the mission and adding those peculiar to the mission. In the front 

rack of the Agena (ahead of the large propellant tank), the principal added 

components were the attitude-control subsystem (which allowed the Agena to 

act as a precise and stable tripod for the GAMBIT -3 camera, as well as 

providing ascent guidance), the extended and minimum command subsystems 

(GFE from GE), many components of the tracking, telemetry, and command 

subsystem, the flight batteries (carried in both the roll-joint and forward rack) 

and power-distribution components, together with some parts of the back-up 

stabilization system, known more familiarly as BUSS or Lifeboat. The principal 

addition to the aft rack of the A na was the secondary-propulsion subsystem 

used for orbital adjustment. Li at components were also on the aft rack. 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -64-

L.i~iiii~iiii~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiApproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312111------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS0993~12 

ET 

ORN-ORCON 

General Manager 

Special Division 

Fl. Kierton 

Asst. General Manaller 

for 

Special Projects 

J. Plummer 

GAMBIT 

Program Mana!ler 

H. Huntley 

..r::::::::-; :::-;:::::l 

Pro!lram Ass!. Pro!l. Manager 

Chief System Enllineer Manaller Payload Manager Manager 

En!lineer Mana!ler Controls Adapter Section AGE Manufacturin!l 

Fl. Powell J. Harley Fl. Kueper (Floll JOint) J. Crlsty H. Davidson 

D. Feak 

Lockheed GAMBIT-3 Program Office Organization 

On a cost basis, some 35 percent of the components that went into the 

Agena were subcontractor-provided and, although there were some problems 

in development and manufacture, none was ever of a magnitude to pace the 

program. 

The only SCS area where trouble developed was GPs GFE command 

programmer which, in March of 1965, was six weeks behind schedule. This 

slippage was offset by a schedule h" at the Martin-Marietta Co., where 

the earliest possible date for a laun able Titan-IIIB booster turned out to be 

28 July 1966-almost a month later than dates scheduled for the PPS and SCS 

contractors. As there appeared no way to protect the planned launching date 

of 1 July 1966, Greer proposed rescheduling to 28 July; DNRO MacMillan 

approved the change. 

Experience with GAMBIT -1 had convinced the program office to incorporate a redundant viewport door actuator and backup film cutter on GAMBIT3. At inception, GAMBIT -1 actuators were primarily pneumatic; these had 

failed in flight and were gradually replaced by electromechanical devices. 

Lessons learned were applied to GAMBIT -3 and most of its primary actuators 

were electromechanical. 

-65-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-T ALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SEC~ ~-ORCON 

During the summer of 1965, problems on GAMBIT-1 were tri 

other federal trauma: three successive failures had stopped the flow 

resolution photography to intel ce users. General concerns prompted an 

intensification of quality cont by all GAMBIT contractors. One component-the GE command programmer-used by Lockheed in the GAMBIT-3 

SCS, received the most attention, followed by other elements of the command 

subsystem. Lockheed agreed (1) to acceptance test and inspect all commandsystem components, beginning with the hardware for GAMBIT -3 flight vehicle 

No.6 and, (2) to accept the GE hardware within its performance incentive. 

Because of the PPS schedule problem, a decision was made in early 1966 

to reorganize the remaini schedule for both the PPS and the SCS. If 

these new schedules could intained, GAMBIT -3 would make its planned 

28 July 1966 launching date. They were and it did. A remaining concern was 

whether the new thin-base photographic film, with an aerial exposure index of 

6, would be available for the first flight (it actually became available for the 

third flight). 

Development test models of both the SCS and PPS were on schedule at 

Lockheed in April 1966, with completely satisfactory results. One feature of 

the GAMBIT -3 testing method that contributed to success of the spacecraft 

program was the use of computer-based testing, which sent test stimuli to the 

command subsystem, compa' the obtained response to the correct response. A similar testing re was used on the SCS and PPS at the 

Lockheed and Kodak factories, respectively. Computer-based testing of the 

SCS was unusually demanding. The entire SCS, the Agena and roll-joint, were 

put in a thermal vacuum chamber and run thro all the phases of a 

simulated flight. These int rated tests were p by rigorous component-level acceptan the components were assembled into the 

SCS. The complete SCS vehicle tests, called "Programmed Integrated Acceptance Tests" (PlAT), were very thor h and fully automatic. The PlAT was run 

again at the launching base and nitely contributed to the subsequently 

successful flight program. The importance of the this concept is exemplified by 

the following quotation from SAFSP's GAMBIT -3 Status Book: 

The entire PlAT series of tests consist of a carefully 

programmed group of test sequences that thoroughly 

evaluate the health of each vehicle system as well as the 

interactions between the systems. The individual PlAT 

tests differ only in the areas where different environments (horizontal versus vertical, vacuum versus ambient, and mated versus unmated) preclude identical tests. 

The basic premise of concentrating the talents of the 

contractor and customer personnel in the development 

of a single comprehensive automated test (with variations) is believed better than a series of somewhat 

unrelated tests not conducive to automatic checkout. 68 

If a change was made in the flight vehicle anytime during the prelaunching 

sequence, the entire PlAT could be rerun to assure vehicle integrity. 

-67-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-T ALENT-KEYHOI.E 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII1IIIiiiII __ IIIIiiiIIj/-\pproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 L ______________ _ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS0993~12 

ET 

FOIN-OICON 

Section 5 

GAMBIT -3 Flight Program 

By end of June 1966, it eared likely that the planned launching date 

could be met. The Titan arrived at Vandenber AFB Space Launch 

Complex Four on 7 May; three days later it was to the SCS development test vehicle, with no interface anomalies. Preparations for the 28 july 

1966 launching continued to go according to plan right up to the terminal 

countdown, but the attempt aborted at T -7 seconds, due to a groundguidance equipment malfunction. Following necessary repairs, the count was 

resumed the next morning and, at 1130 PDT on 29 July, the first GAMBIT-3 

mission, No. 4301, was successfully launched into orbit. The satellite achieved 

a near-nominal orbit and subsequent operations during the five-day mission 

went exactly as programmed. Compared to the PPS acceptance test results, 

which predicted a best-system-resolution capability of 12.2 inches, the KH-8 

camera's demonstrated in-flight ground resolution of 17 inches was more than 

gratifying and was about as much as could be expected from initial optical 

system flight hardware, according to the Performance Evaluation Team (PET) 

report. The report went on to state that for the first GAMBIT -3 flight "the 

intelligence content of this mission was the highest of any satellite mission to 

date, due primarily to the larger scale and better resolution of the camera 

system" and that "the main camera operated throughout the mission and the 

system acquired all targets as programmed."69 This amounted to a total of 717 

targets, of which 463 were successfully "read OUt."70 

There were some PPS anomalies during the flight. Due to a slight main 

camera film misalignment, the time-track on the edge of the film was missing. 

The time-track was very important in the mensuration of strip film; its lack 

"caused considerable work in producing intelligence measurements from this 

system."71 Another PPS problem resulted from an apparent shutter malfunction in the stellar camera part of the astro-position terrain camera (APTC) 

system so that lithe Stellar Camera failed in almost every respect except on the 

dark side of the earth."72 The terrain camera part of the APTC performed well 

with a nadir resolution of approximately 120 feet. The PET report noted that 

"the (terrain) camera provided some intelligence information to the community (this is the first extraction of intelligence information from an index-type 

camera)" and lithe Terrain Camera provides an excellent mapping base to the 

mapping community with its improved resoluton over previous systems and 

with the increased scale and format."73 

The photographic satellite vehicle (PSV) (including both the SCS and PPS) 

performed exceptionally well, as did the Titan booster. The satellite achieved a 

near-nominal orbit as follows: 74 

Inclination (degrees) 

Period (minutes) 

Apogee (nm) 

Perigee (nm) 

Eccentricity 

-69-

Nominal 

94.01 

88.85 

160.00 

83.20 

0.0097 

Actual 

94.14 

88.73 

152.00 

83.00 

0.0090 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~RN-ORCON 

On-orbit operations were nominal during the photographic portion of the 

mission. As this was the first flight, some operational constraints were 

imposed. One involved the allowed duration of operation of the roll-joint. The 

problem, which had surfaced at LMSC as a result of roll-joint qualification 

testing, involved the thermal margin of the roll-joint tachometer. The night 

before the Air Force's flight readiness meeting at Vandenberg AFB, James 

Plummer, Robert Powell, and Frederic Oder had hovered over a critical test 

that was being conducted at LMSC's roll-joint test laboratory in Sunnyvale, by 

Peter Ragusa, engineering manager for the roll-joint. The results of the test 

convinced them that a problem existed and, the following day, in a meeting 

with Martin and King at VAFB, they took the position that the PPS was not 

launch-ready without a constraint on the operating time of the roll-joint. After 

some discussion, General Martin agreed to restrict the roll-joint operations as 

follows: 

Constraint 

180 sec ON during a 5,400-sec period 

300 sec ON during a 5,400-sec period 

180 sec ON during a 5,400-sec period 

300 sec continuous ON and 450 sec 

total ON in 4,OOO-sec period 

450 sec continuous ON and 450 sec 

total ON in 1,450-sec period 

450 sec continuous ON and power OFF 

twice as long as ON 

Mission Segment 

Rev 1 through 5 

Rev 6 through 10 

Rev 11 through 18 

Rev 19 through 33 

Rev 34 through 52 

Rev 52 through recovery 

The roll-joint did fail in the the post-photographic ("solo") phase during 

the 90th revolution; LMSC used an improved tachometer in subsequent 

missions. But for a first flight, the results were surprisingly good; even where 

problems appeared, the engineers were confident that ~hey could supply 

definitive corrective action. 

GAMBIT-lor GAMBIT-3? How Many? 

The initial flight success of GAMBIT -3 created a procurement problem for 

NRP planners. With two systems in being, each essentially capable of doing 

the surveillance mission, what should be the makeup of future procurements? 

Should GAMBIT -1 production be curtailed (or terminated) in light of this first 

mission? Or should it be maintained at some prudent level until GAMBIT-3 

had fully demonstrated its development objectives? The problem was complicated further by the anticipation of a new search system named HEXAGON. 

The US Intelligence Board's endorsement of the HEXAGON/KH-9 system, in 

April 1966, made it appear advisable to begin near-term conversion of the 

GAMBIT-1 launching pad for later use by HEXAGON. 

These concerns were overshadowed by a more immediate issue: should 

the NRO purchase all, or just a portion of, the 16 additional GAMBIT-1 

systems originally scheduled! If one assumed a moderately successful GAMBIT -3, the 16 additional vehicles were redundant and their heavy cost an 

unnecessary burden. On the other hand, if GAMBIT -3 had serious problems in 

early usage, the availability of more GAMBIT -1 systems would be providential. 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -70-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931~ S T 

RN-ORCON 

DNRO Alexander Flax stood on the conservative side of this issue, 

reluctant to cancel any GAMBIT -1 launchings until GAMBIT -3 had clearly 

proved itself as a viable follow-on system. By contrast, DCI Richard Helms 

argued that the total combined number of 20 GAMBITs (GAMBIT-1 and -3) in 

the FY -67 budget was excessive. He pointed out that the FY -67 schedule had 

been developed in the dark days of January 1966, reflecting a series of failures 

in late-1965. But there had been no recent GAMBIT failures; rather, impressive 

advances had been made in orbital lifetime and photo-coverage. It was Helms' 

opinion that the initial success of GAMBIT -3 was sufficiently compelling to 

warrant an optimistic outlook. 

Hearing both sides of the issue on 17 August 1966, the NRP Executive 

Committee decided to delete four GAMBIT-1s from the buy-program. In 

addition, USIB's Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) proposed, in September 1966, an FY-67 flight schedule of nine GAMBIT-1s and 

eight GAMBIT -3s. USIB agreed with this proposal, members observing that 

even a moderate level of success, coupled with this scaled-down schedule, 

would result in saturating the user community with high-resolution photography. For the moment, then, the decision to proceed with a mix of GAMBIT-1 

and -3 systems, during the 12 months starting in July 1966, was permitted to 

stand unchangedJ5 

GAMBIT-3 and the Needs of the Intelligence Community 

By this time, the statement of Intelligence Community requirements for 

surveillance photography had become more detailed than reviously and 

could be grouped under convenient headings of (1) better r ion, (2) more 

targets covered, (3) emergency response, and (4) timeliness. The GAMBIT-3 

development team proposed to achieve "better resolution" by using newly 

improved optics and film. "More targets covered" was to result from extending orbital lifetime (which, from an engineering point of view, meant creating 

the capability to lift more expendables into orbit). 

"Emergency response" was a more difficult problem, with some unrealistically expensive (possible) solutions; however, one could move in the direction 

of shortening response times. In August 1966, the NRP Executive Committee 

authorized extending the orbital life of GAMBIT-3 and modifying the satellite 

to carry two recovery vehicles. A longer-lived system could return its photographic "take" -upon demand-in recovery vehicle A, while additional 

"take" would feed into vehicle B for later delivery. (This GAMBIT capability 

was exercised for the first time in August 1969.) A second approach toward 

emergency response would have been to have a reconnaissance satellite on 

orbit at all times, that is, to have no "down-time" in the flight program. A third 

tactic might use a backu and PSV maintained in as near-to-Iaunching 

condition as economica feasible. It was found that the cost of maintaining 

such a backup GAMBIT-3 system at a seven-days-from-ready-to-Iaunch condition was not prohibitive. For most of the GAMBIT -3 program the capability 

was· maintained, but never truly demonstrated. Although there were flight 

failures that caused the next-scheduled hardware delivery to be accelerated, 

the seven-day backup was never needed, as such. 

-71-

BYEMAN-

~ TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099312 
s~ N.,9fd'RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

The requirement for timeliness could only be fully satisfied by real-time 

readout. GAMBIT -3 could not move very far toward such a revolutionary goal; 

real-time readout, at the data rate desired, would require unique technology 

which was still under development in the 1960s, and would not be available 

for operational systems until the mid-1970s. 

GAMBIT -3 and the GAMBIT -1 Heritage 

The first GAMBIT -1 flight was launched in an atmosphere of tentativeness 

and speculation; by contrast, the first GAMBIT -3 launching was made with 

reasonable assurance. To the credit of the older system, three years of 

GAMBIT-1 experience had provided a technological heritage directly applicable to accomplishing GAMBIT -3 objectives. 

High among GAMBIT -1 contributions was e rience with orbital-control 

problems. Greer and Martin had seen eno of those episodes to be 

convinced that GE's orbital-control vehicle was, at best, generically tempermental. Prudence called for a fresh start in orbital control and Lockheed's 

Agena was the logical alternative, particularly since Agena was performing 

well on companion space programs and was being "standardized" by the AF 

Space Systems Division. The more King looked at Agena, the more he came to 

favor it (with roll-joint coupling to the photographic payload) as a preferred 

spacecraft. 

Early GAMBIT -1 experience had demonstrated the need for a backup 

stabilization system on the spacecraft and one could be sure that the welltested BUSS/Lifeboat would appear on all GAMBIT -3 vehicles. GAMBIT -3's 

horizon sensor would have s files for winter and summer, thanks to 

experience over the Antarct MBIT -1. After years of proven performance in both CORONA and GAMBIT -1, the General Electric recovery vehicle 

would be a sound selection for GAMBIT -3. 

Experience with GAMBIT-1 checkout procedures had shown, une uivocally, that a launching pad was not the optimal location for system kout. 

Early in the GAMBIT -3 game, Greer, Martin, and ided to require that 

checkout be done at Eastman Kodak and L . GAMBIT-3 would 

certainly be designed for automated checkout, d final assembly at those 

plants; then it would go directly to the launching , in accordance with the 

innovative factory-to-pad concept. Integrated subsystems had been used on 

GAMBIT-1; on GAMBIT-3 they would be modular. 

Experience with quality control on GAMBIT-1, especially at GE Philadelphia, was fresh in the minds of SAFSP Project Officers; there would be special 

watchfulness on their part, particularly on a new program. 

Finally, General Martin's incentive contract structure was in full effect and, 

accordingly, contractors' exertions and rewards would continue to be biased 

heavily toward excellent performance on orbit. 

This I cy of experience in equipment, procedure, and methodology was 

unique in t e history of satellite reconnaissance. It provided a solid basis for 

producing a new system capable of acquiring intelligence information on its 

- SliCIUf -

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -72-

roved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~ON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

first flight. Later history showed that when defects did appear in GAMBIT -3, 

they were usually the product of oversight or accident, rather than a failure of 

process. 

GAMBIT -3 Operations-The Flight Program 

The GAMBIT -3 development flight program was limited to six vehicles, 

with these results: 

GAMBIT -3 Flight Summary-1966-67 

G-3 launching Photographic 8est 

No. Date Days Resolution Remarks 

1 29 Jul 66 5 17 inches 

2 28 Sep 66 7 36 Command System failed 

3 14 Dec 66 8 21 Ultra-thin-base film 

introduced (5,000 ftl 

4 24 Feb 67 8 27 

5 26 Apr 67 0 Titan failed; no orbit 

6 20 Jun 67 10 24 End of development 

flight program 

The very success of GAMBIT -3 created a new, but welcome, problem: the 

routine return of huge quantities of surveillance-quality photography placed a 

heavy burden on US photointerpretation capabilities. The US Intelligence 

Board found it necessary to constrain surveillance operations to a manageable 

level; in january 1967 it scheduled GAMBIT-3 for six FY-67 launchings, with 10 

for FY -68, nine for FY -69, and seven for each subsequent year.77 

In September 1966, Colonel King, who had seen GAMBIT-3 through 

successful development, was transferred to command the Air Force Satellite 

Control Facility (he was subsequently promoted to the rank of brigadier 

general). During the first two GAMBIT -3 flights King was "dual hatted," in that 

he retained responsibility for the direction of those flights in addition to his 

duties in the AFSCF. He was replaced as director of the GAMBIT System 

Program Office by Col. Roy A. Smith. 

In August 1966, the NRP Executive Committee decided that, effective with 

GAMBIT-3 vehicle No. 23, certain configuration improvements should be 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -74-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

S~ 

/S.9I'1JRN-ORCO N 

made. One of the major innovations in what would eventually be called BlockII of GAMBIT -3 was the change from one recovery capsule to two (CORONA 

had demonstrated the feasibility and utility of using two RVs). In addition, the 

roll-joint for Block-II would be capable of a minimum of 7,000 position 

changes, would have redundant mechanisms, and would be able to compensate for the change in PPS inertia which occurred when the first RV was 

separated. Block-II ultimately included the Air Force's standard space-ground 

link subsystem (SGlS) for command and telemetry, a completely redundant 

on-orbit attitude-control system (introduced on vehicle No. 16), and an 

improved memory in the command processor. 

GAMBIT-3 Flight Summary-1967-69 

G-3 launching Photographic Best 

No. Date Days Resolution Remarks 

7 16 Aug 67 10 18 inches 2,091 targets covered 

8 19 Sep 67 10 17 

9 25 Oct 67 10 15 

10 5 Dec 67 11 15 

11 18 Jan 68 10 Parachute failed to deploy 

12 13 Mar 68 10 14 2,250-capacity roll-joint 

installed 

13 17 Apr 68 10 12 2,658 targets covered 

14 5 Jun 68 10 12 Shortened photographic 

"burst" times 

15 6 Aug 68 10 12 3,058 targets covered 

16 10 Sep68 10 12 Redundant attitude-control 

system installed, Color 

photographs taken 

17 6 Nov 68 10 12 

18 4 Dec 68 7 13 

19 22 Jan 69 10 14 

20 4 Mar 69 10 

21 15 Apr 69 10 

22 3 Jun 69 10 4,032 targets covered 

Colonel Smith retired from the Air Force in June 1968 and was replaced 

by Col. John J. Schmitt, Jr., who, while conducting the GAMBIT flight program 

with a launching about every two months, brought to fruition the important 

but difficult Block-II improvements. In mid-June 1969, Brig. Gen. William A. 

King, Jr., returned to SAFSP as its Director, replacing Maj. Gen. John Martin, Jr. 

GAMBIT -3 was performing to the satisfaction of its "customers" during 

this period. In fact, a very close dialogue evolved between the Intelligence 

Community and the NRO on how to optimize GAMBIT's capabilities. Joint 

investigations into priority weighting, weather operating thresholds, orbital 

case development, and optimum launching times were undertaken and closer 

working relationships resulted in improved satisfaction of intelligence needs. 

Occasionally, the Intelligence Community had to be reminded that 

GAMBIT -3 was specifically a surveillance instrument, unsuited to certain 

-75-

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

30 

-77-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
S~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

remote tracking stations had some difficulty locking on to the vehicle 

transponder; this resulted in delayed command loading and some loss of 

photography. 

GAMBIT -3 Flight Summary-1969-72 

C-3 launching Photographic Best 

No. Date Days Resolution Remarks 

23 23 Aug 69 15 First dual-recovery capability. 

First Block-II vehicle 

24 24 Oct 69 14 

25 14 Jan 70 14 Second RV failed 

26 15 Apr 70 14 U 27 25 Jun 70 18 Command System failed; no 

recovery of second RV 

28 18 Aug 70 18 12 Suez cease-fire zone 

photography 

29 23 Oct 70 18 

30 21 Jan 71 18 

31 22 Apr 71 19 

32 12 Aug 71 22 

33 230ct71 24 

34 17 Mar 72 24 

35 20 May 72 0 Pneumatic regulator failure 

during ascent. Total loss. 

Debris located in England. 

36 1 Sep 72 27 Last Block-II vehicle 

On the 25th and next flight, the parachute in the second RV failed and the 

capsule sank before it would be reached by the recovery team. While vehicle 

No. 26 had no major problems, its photo phic quality achieved a best 

resolution of only 13.5 inches, the poorest in t preceding 18 months. 

Problems did persist. On vehicle No. 27, everything appeared normal up 

to recovery of the first RV. The recovery crew discovered that an ablative 

shield had failed to separate; however, the parachute and the air-recovery 

equipment were able to support the extra load successfully. Shortly after 

commencing the second half of this mission, the heater in the clock circuit of 

the command programmer malfunctioned. This made it impossible to plan a 

precise recovery of the second RV. An emergency recovery was attempted but 

it failed and the second RV was lost. I n spite of these disappointments, Colonel 

Schmitt and his staff soon gained confidence, as the next seven flights (vehicle 

Nos. 28 thru 34) performed as expected, with gradually improved photogra-

')hy and increased lifetimes on orbit. These satellites had been scheduled for 

an orbital mission life of 18 days and they all achieved it (other than vehicle 

;-.Jo. 28, which was given orbital adjustments to provide special Middle East 

l w and was called down after 16 days, with photography of the Suez 

zone).80 

Several important personnel transfers occurred during the spring of 1971. 

Colonel Schmitt was transferred from his GAMBIT post to become commander of the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF). He was replaced at SAFSP 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -78-

~~ __ ~ ____ =-iiiiiiij====Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 ?-----------..... 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

... ____________ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 _____________ _ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312~ 

S T 

ORN-ORCON 

satellite into the deep Pacific Ocean. There had always been a question in the 

minds of intelligence specialists as to whether surviving bits and pieces 

existed-debris which might compromise the security of spacecraft design or 

reveal US technology to other nations. At the conclusion of vehicle No. 30's 

operation-as well as on vehicle Nos. 31, 32, and 34-atmospheric survivability tests, called VAST, were conducted to learn the extent and nature of such 

debris. The results of these tests were negative and reassuring, until the next 

flight-No. 35. 

On 20 May 1976, ground stations lost contact with GAMBIT -3 No. 35 

(which showed pneumatic- ulator failure) during ascent. As usual, an 

attempt was made to predict t impact point and a zone over South Africa 

was indicated. Five months later, Dr. Walter f. Leverton, an Aerospace 

Corporation employee who had worked on GAMBIT-3, was visiting the 

London office of his company, where he heard that some "space material" 

had been found on a farm 75 miles to the north. He arranged a visit to the 

Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, where debris was displayed on a 

laboratory bench. He found three classes of objects: a spherical titanium 

pressure vessel, some circuit boards of US manufacture, and several chunks of 

glass which could be arranged into a pie-shape. The glass had the characteristic egg-crate structure used by Eastman Kodak on GAMBIT optics and 

Leverton was convinced he was looking at GAMBIT debris. Eyewitness 

accounts also strengthened his belief: the objects had been seen falling to 

earth on 20 May.83 Discreet arrangements were made for the transfer of these 

materials to the United States, where they could take their place with the 

debris from CORONA No. 77-another "errant bird"-which had landed in 

Venezuela in 1964. 

Block-III GAMBIT -3 vehicles had, as their most significant change, a new 

roll-joint capable of handling 18,000 maneuvers per mission (on GAMBIT-3 

No. 12, in 1968, a 2,250-roll capability had been considered "high"). 

GAMBIT -3 flight Summary-1972-76 

G-3 

No. 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

launching Photographic 

Date Days 

21 Dec 72 31 

16 May 73 28 

26 Jun 73 0 

27 Sep 73 30 

13 Feb 74 30 

6 Jun 74 45 

14 Aug 74 45 

18 Apr 75 46 

9 Oct 75 50 

22 Mar 76 56 

15 Sep 76 51 

-81-

Best 

Resolution Remarks 

First Block-III vehicles 

I 

!:Sell engine tuel valve 

failure 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ ~-ORCON 

is the device which carries the film behind an exposure slit). At the time, 5AF5P 

Director General Greer considered the dual platen too complex for high 

confidence in the development schedule and recommended to DNRO McMillan that only a single-platen camera be developed. McMillan agreed. In 1972, 

the dual-platen concept was revived by both Kodak and Colonel Roberts; its 

development was started in early 1973, after approval by General Allen and 

DNRO John l. Mclucas, (Dr. Mclucas came to the Pentagon from the 

presidency of Mitre Corporation and replaced Dr. Flax as DNRO in March 

1969. While DNRO, he also served as Under 5ecretary of the Air Force.) The 

dual-platen camera exposed, independently, both 9-inch and 5-inch film. It 

provided added versatility to the photogra subsystem by permitting 

. ci Y for the 5-inch film) use of other thigh-resolution black-ande , including experimental films, color film, and false-color infrared. It 

also provided for adding over 3,800 feet of film for the 5-inch camera. While 

the use of a riveted assembly was originally planned, problems in the 

necessary precise alignment of the two platens encouraged ch to a 

welded structure (in some places). The dual-platen camera was fir n in 

vehicle No 48] in March 1977, and achieved a best geometric mean resolution 

All in all, the photographic performance of GAMBIT -3 continued to meet, 

or exceed, expectations, with only a few minor problems. One that pia ued a 

number of missions in the 1968-72 era was the effect of minute . n 

particles in the exposure slit, causing negative density lines in the negative. 

This problem was resolved by significantly increasing film-roll cleaning efforts 

to remove minute film fragments produced when Kodak sliced 56-inch-wide 

production rolls into operational widths. These fragments were difficult to 

remove because of their electrostatic charge. 

GAMBIT Films 

The use of ever-improved hotographic films was a positive factor in the 

evolution of the GAMBIT pr Developed by Kodak (on its own), these 

films evolved (for black-and-white) from the original Type-3404 film th h 

Type-1414 hi definition film, 50-217 high-definition fine-grain film, a 

series of film lied "mono-cubic dispersed" or "monodispersed," on which 

the silver-halide crystals were very uniform in size and shape, providing 

significantly improved film speed and resolution. 50-315 contained silverhalide crystals of the order of 1,550 angstrom units in dimension; in 50-312 

the size was reduced to 1,200, and in 50-409 to 900 angstrom units. In 

addition to these ever-impro' black-and-white films, Kodak produced a 

line of color and other special s which were flown in lesser quantities than 

black-and-white, either for special targets or for experimental 

Included were 50-121 color film, 50-255 color film, and 50-130 f 

infrared film.85 

The makeup of the actual film load (how many feet, of what emulsion, 

loaded where in the roll) was determined by the Intelligence Community in 

conjunction with the selection of mission-target sequences. As the 'ng 

situation was usually very dynamic, it was common for the program to 

be "down to the wire" in advising Kodak of the desired composition (in terms 

of the various films) of the flight roll of film. With the advent of the dual-platen 

camera the problem of film selection and sequencing became even more 

complex. 

-85-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
s~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Film-Read-Out GAMBIT (FROG) 

From the inception of the reconnaissance-satellite development effort, 

read-out concepts for imaging systems were considered in the hope of 

providing new systems with a very quick response time. In fact, this capability 

had been considered of sufficient importance that three different read-out 

approaches (E-1, E-2, E-3) were in rated in the burgeoning Samos 

program . the late 1950s. Even ugh the E-1 development finally 

demonst bility of the film-read-out concept,* the rather disappointing results (from one successful flight) in terms of resolution (1 DO-foot) and 

data-transmission rates were certainly a factor in the decision to cancel further 

development effort. This experience, coupled with the lack of a strong, 

definitive statement of requirement from the Intelligence Community, discouraged further serious consideration of developing a GAMBIT read-out system 

until the late 1960s (well into the GAMBIT -3 program). Nevertheless, interest 

in the read-out idea was kept alive through low-level R&D efforts, which 

produced steady advancement of the state-of-the-art in key technological 

areas. 

As world tensions mounted during the 1960s, there were periods (such as 

during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the 

Egyptian-Israeli Six-Day War) which stimulated new concern regarding ability 

to respond adequately to a crisis, which, in turn, revived the question, "Should 

we have read-out systems?" But once the crisis passed and anxieties quieted, 

the interest soon disappeared. Typical of this mercurial state-of-mind, a 

January 1966 COMOR evaluation of the need for quick-response satellite 

imagery concluded that lithe development of a read-out mode for GAMSIT-3 

would be worthwhile,"86 but was followed in few months by a USIS position 

paper that considered crisis reconnaissance not an urgent requirementY In 

1968 and early 1969, however, Dr. Edwin Land, a long-time Presidential 

adviser on photographic reconnaissance, began to press for near-real-time 

read-out of reconnaissance photo y, supporting the concept of electro-

. I imagi EOI}-in which t e system focuses "images" upon a focal 

ane that di Iy converts these images into electric signals-as deserving 

more study.** 

• The E-1/E-2 systems used the bi-mat technique of processing exposed film by pressing it 

against a series of web sections containing developer and fixing chemicals. The readout 

subsystem consisted of a revolving drum associated with a line-scan lens system, a photomultiplier tube, and a video signal amplifier. The exposed film, once developed on orbit, was 

optically scanned and the resultant modulated light beam converted into electronic analog 

signals. Amplified, these signals were then transmitted to the ground station where the 

process was, in essence, reversed and the image reconstructed. 

Unlike film-read-out systems, electro-optical imaging satellites are film less. In place of film is 

an array of light-sensing diodes that convert photons of light, collected by a large mirror and 

focused through a lens, into electric current. The technological challenge of EOI was to make 

these light-sensing diodes small enough so they could be packed tightly together-hundreds 

to the inch-in order to provide resolution at least as good as that obtained from the 

CORONA system. Each diode is discrete and contributes the equivalent of a pixel or dot to 

the complete image, much like the dots in a newspaper photograph merge to create a 

recognizable picture. The electrical data produced by the diode array, called a digital data 

stream, is transmitted in near-real-time to a ground station where it is used to drive a laser 

beam to recreate the image on film. Where a film-read-out system is limited by its supply of 

film, the EOI system is limited only by its electrical supply which is used to point the satellite's 

camera and operate its diode array and transmitters. EOI is, in effect, an instant camera in 

space. 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -86-

....:=~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII_IIIIIIIIIIIII __ .,l.\pproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 L _____________ _ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SEem Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

NOf.e1l"N-ORCON 

calling for a flexible system that can carry out the warning/indications role and 

at the same time possess a capability to assist in satisfying routine, current 

intelligence, and special reconnaissance tasks." 

COMIREX also concluded (correctly) that it was the res nsibility of the 

NRO to determine the feasibility of performing a warni ications mission, 

from the standpoint of the current and projected state-of-the-art of critical 

technologies, assessing cost and schedule implications. 

After a lengthy evaluation of the various methods of read-out, DNRO Flax, 

in a March 1969 report,90 concluded that several promising technical concepts 

were available, but urged caution in fully embracing those which called for 

considerable advances in the state-of-the-art, such as electro-optical imagO 

(EOI). In effect, he reiterated a previous position that "if it were d 

imperative to go for expedited development of a read-out system at this time it 

would have to be film read-ouL" 

In the summer of 1969, the read-out decision process was complicated 

further by uncertainties relating to the US position on, and the outcome of, 

the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT); it was not clear which might be of 

more importance to the verification process-hi resolution (better than 

GAMBIT) or timeliness (read-out). As an additiona plication, the NRO was 

sponsoring some high-resolution work at EK, based upon Project DORIAN 

(the covert part of what had been the Manned Orbiting laboratory program 

for developing the KH-10 camera, now cancelled); this work competed with 

read-out efforts for NRO funds. It was against this setting that the USIB, on 29 

July 1969, approved the requirement for a near-real-time system. 

At the 1S August 1969 meeting of the NRP Executive Committee, DNRO 

Mclucas favored a read-out technology development program but recommended delay in choosing a specific read-out approach until the technology 

would be better in hand. The CIA position, presented by Carl Duckett, CIA's 

Deputy Director for Science and Technology and Director of the NRO's 

Program B, was that it was essential to start a read-out program by January 

1970, with substantial funds committed immediately to system definition. 

Duckett's position was supported by DC! Richard Helms. Deputy Defense 

Secretary Packard proposed a compromise: a more rapid technology and 

analysis program than that suggested by DNRO Mclucas, plus the establishment of a special task force to report to the ExCom on the status of film-readout technology, electro-optical imag' and tape-storage systems. The latter 

item-tape storage-had been studi sively by Program A as an R&D 

venture and there was pessimism regarding its readiness for system use. But 

Dr. John Foster, the DDR&E, wanted tape kept in consideration because, if 

available, it might prove less expensive and require smaller optics than EOI, 

and yet give equivalent results. Packard's compromise was accepted.91 

Dr. land clearly favored EOI,92 while the study group set up by Packardand cha ntly by Gardner Tucker, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Systems is, and Dr. Eugene Fubini, a senior advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense-held that the EOI approach represented a very difficult technology, 

characterized by the need for very large optics, a large and complex ground 

station complement, very-wide-bandwidth data-relay equipment for which 

Handle via 

BYEMAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -88-

proved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
s~ ~RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

components still were unproven, and an integrating skill that 'f0llid tax 

available resources. The Tucker-Fubini Committee noted that aL 

diameter mirror andl ~ctive electronic circuits were basic~re~q=u~l=r=e-----" f ' . . 

W IC e ectlve y em an e w 0 y new ransmltters, antennas, an speClaized components that certainly had to be classified as "beyond the state-ofthe-art." Tucker told Packard that in his judgment EOI was too difficult to 

attempt, as yet, and that instead of ing a system start, the NRO should 

invest additionally in research and t logy improvement. If immediate or 

near-term results were desired, film-read-out (FROG) was the only feasible 

route. 93 

In March 1970, after Packard received the report of the Tucker-Fubini 

Committee, land reported to Presidential Science Adviser lee DUBridge that 

either feasibility experiments or demonstration trials had validated four 

principal aspects of EOI technology which had been treated previously as 

high-risk elements. A 73-inch diameter mirror with acceptable surface distortion ~abricated during the DORIAN program for the KH-10 camera 

and irror with a somewhat poorer surface contour seemed readily 

achieva e. Tests of image reconstruction rates had Jhown that fl rames 

containingl lof data could be reassembled withil1 ~ ~ . of the 

time the data were relayed to a ground station, and data-transmission time 

appeared to be aboutl I per frame. laboratory-scale experiments 

had indicated that mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) rates for individual 

sensor chi s in the solid-state array would approach two years. The Panel had 

condu that electro-mechanical devices similar to those used in long-life 

I Isatellites would adequately serve other EOI functions and that system 

MTBFs should therefore a roach two years. Finally, although the necessary 

driver still had to be classified as a high-risk 

Lc=o=m=p=o=n.--e=n=----cl~s~p=e=o=r=m--a=n.--c=ec-cn=o~havi ng been demonstrated-the remai nder 

of the data-relay system had, in land" n ce 10 -ri 

cate or . land assured DuBrid e that a 

was w 0 y ac leva e, an t at t e antennas constitute no pro em. 

Given that situation, land maintained it was entirely feasible to schedule a 

1974-750 tional date-"if we get on with the development."94 The points 

land sel for emphasis were those aspects of the Tucker-Fubini report 

that had reached Packard and DuBridge about three weeks earlier; dearly the 

two groups differed strongly on the issue of EOI technical risk. 

Two months later, shortly before the next scheduled ExCom meeting, 

land and his associates advised Dr. DUBridge that although both the FROG 

and EOI approaches to read-out had "reached the stage of demonstrated 

feasibility and reasonable maturity," the FROG read-out laser-scan system was 

so complex and limited in growth potential that FROG should be dropped and 

EOI should be started through the system development process as quickly as 

possible. 95 

In his 1970 annual report to the ExCom, which arrived two days before 

the 17 July 1970 ExCom meeting, DNRO Mclucas recommended that "essentially all new system effort be focused in ... the development of a near-realtime read-out system." He also supported a backup effort for the development 

SEC~ 

~~-:ia BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -90-

1iaa _____________ aApproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 ___________ _ 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ 

~-ORCON 

development of the EOI (ZAMAN) System, with a 1976 operational date, 

"under a realistic funding program." In addition, there should be no further 

development of the film-read-out-GAMBIT (FROG) system. 101 With this decision, FROG was dead; Lt. Col. Ralph Jacobson, who had managed Program A's 

FROG project, asked Col. Lee Roberts for some other assignment in the 

GAMBIT program and soon became Robert's deputy for payload development. Project ZAMAN, later renamed KENNAN, produced the KH-11 system. 

The GAMBIT Award Program 

Colonel Roberts worked assiduously and imaginatively to motivate his 

government-contractor team. As part of his effort to highlight program 

accomplishments, he visited all of his supporting groups t ive informational 

briefings on intelligence results obtained by GAMBIT, inc g, where security permitted, copies of actual imagery. He also highlighted GAMBIT problem 

areas, or "goofs," by 0 .. ating liThe Golden Fi er Award." In one typical 

instance, he presented award to Eastman ak. EK had purchased an 

expensive and ul vacuum cleaner to clean GAMBIT fli t hardware. 

Subsequently, cleaner was used in another area of the t where, to 

make it function for another purpose, its three-phase electrical wiring was 

changed. When the cleaner was returned to its original work site, the wiring 

was not restored to its original condition and, when next used, it blew dirt into 

GAMBIT flight hardware. Colonel Roberts, with appropriate ceremony, presented a small gold-plated vacuum cleaner to EK to commemorate a classic 

example of Murphy's Law at work. 

I 

ODorations 

I 

TRW 

Operational 

Software 

Support 

Salellile 

Control Section 

(SCS) 

lMSC 

I 

lEaslman 

Kodak 

GAMBIT SPO 

c::::::::J 

lMSC 

(Salellite Vehicle 

Integration) 

Salellile 

Recovery 

Vehicle 

(SRV) 

General 

Electric 

(RESO) 

-

Command 

System 

General 

Electric 

(ASO) 

Titan SPO 

I 

Martin 

(Tilan III·B) 

Command &. 

Conlrol 

Software 

General 

Eleclric 

(Space Div) 

GAMBIT Government-Contractor Relationships 

-93-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE('~ N~~ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Similarly, after a GAMBIT -3 Agena arrived at VAFB from Lockheed, 

supposedly flight-ready, but missing two metal nuts in the aft section, Roberts 

devised another suitable trophy. He sent one of his people to the ship 

construction area of Los Angeles harbor, to obtain two very large steel nuts. 

After having them covered with gold-colored paint, Roberts ceremoniously 

presented the nuts to Lockheed GAMBIT Program Manager Bob Koche, who 

had considerable trouble persuading an airline to accept 150 pounds of extra 

carry-on luggage. 102 

The NASA 'Gambit' 

At the conclusion of the GAMBIT -1 fli rogram, several"extra" camera 

systems remained. Appropriately c1ea ials at NASA headquarters 

considered using these in the Lunar Reconnaissance Program (an essential 

precursor to the newly-assigned Lunar Landing Program). Since the total 

NASA program was unclassified ("in the white"), it would be necessary to 

conceal the source and previous purpose of GAMBIT cameras and to midwife 

them into the "white" world of civilian space flight. In addition, some means 

of protecting their unique performance characteristics was needed in the 

(likely) event that lunar photo phs were made public. It was hoped that 

security cover could be pro . by the simple e of not disclosing 

t altitude around the moon, since the lack of such formation would frustrate 

lation of scale and definition capabilities. Actually, the cameras were 

never put to use; NASA's own Lunar Orbiter and Lunar Surveyor satellites, 

already under development, were the only ones to explore the lunar surface. 

Their resolutions, although quite inferior to GAMBIT values, turned out to be 

adequate for landing-site selection. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -94-

~====== ••••••• IA~,proved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312-------------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Responding to the Unexpected 

The GAMBIT -3 program was not without its "thrills." The success of 

remedial efforts on GAMBIT flights was due, in large part, to the skill and 

dedication of the GAMBIT -3 contractor team supporting the program. On the 

47th flight, for example, the Titan-IIIB booster, having put the GAMBIT 

spacecraft on the proper flight vector, failed to back away from the Agena 

(owing to the failure of Titan's propulsion to terminate y). uently, 

the aft part of the Agena-its engine programm rema in the 

booster adapter (the interface between the Titan ) with a residual 

Titan thrust of 1,200 pounds. When t a engi ut of the a 

the flame destroyed much of the therm blanket insulation installed 

Agena's aft rack. The principal purpose of this insulation was to shield 

propellant lines of the secondary propulsion system (SPS) from the extreme 

cold of outer space. Without the protection of thermal blankets, the hydrazine 

in the SPS fuel lines froze solidly by the fourth orbit, resulting in loss of attitude 

control. Without such control, the GAMBIT spacecraft was unable to maintain 

its orientation and, within a few days, would have been deorbited by normal 

atmospheric drag. 

Peter Ragusa's lockheed team assessed the situation quickly and correctly. The vehicle was recaptured in tail-first attitude during orbits six and seven. 

A reduced mission was accomplished by flying the satellite tail-first, rolled 

__ ~~~[~E~R~~~i--------- - Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -96-

roved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N 

toward the sun to heat the now-exposed plumbing, and then, as needed, 

reoriented to a nose-first attitude for photography. A test, during the 15th 

orbit, "indicated that only a maximum of one revolution could be flown nosefirst, without the benefit of solar heating of the hydrazin ·pment."105 The 

need for frequent reorientation of the spacecraft to keep hydrazine in a 

fluid state caused a 30-percent reduction in planned photographic coverage. 

Despite this, the mission ran for 51 days (versus a planned 45 days). 

During the 48th GAMBIT flight, two of the spacecraft's five batteries 

failed; one with sufficient explosive force to cause the vehicle to lose stability 

on its 45th revolution and to automatically switch over to the redundant 

attitude-control system. The most probable cause of the failures was "expulsion of zinc-saturated electrolyte solution from battery cells and collection of 

this solution within the battery case, thus providing a current path to the case. 

This continuous load raised the battery temperature, causing more electrolyte 

expulsion so that the failure, once started, is self-perpetuating."106 The 

Lockheed support team took steps to reduce vehicle power consumption by: 

• Using the redundant attitude-control system starting with revolution 95 

to 727; 

• lizing on solar-array output, which performed better than predictand 

• Using standard power-conservation techniques, such as, sending decoder-OFF commands early in the pass. 

The mission was completed without electrical power limitations. 

Life-Extension Changes 

A number of life-extension changes to the GAMBIT program were 

undertaken during Colonel Roberts' term as program director. Among these 

were the addition of batteries and, ultimately, a supplementary solar array 

which could be extended from the SCS aft rack. To help with the added 

weight, Colonel Roberts agreed to a change-proposed for all Agenas-to 

use a high-density acid (HDA) oxidizer to increase the propulsion specific 

impulse. HDA did work, but caused significant problems because of the effect 

of the highly corrosive oxidizer on pumps and valves. Even a "simple" cha 

like adding a solar array to GAMBIT -3 was not without problems, since s 

required welded solar cells; attaching these to the carrying substrate was 

surprisingly difficult. 107 

Dual-Mode GAMBIT 

In 1966, the HEXAGON/KH-9 program (designed to replace CORONA/KH-4 as a broad-area search system) started its acquisition phase. At the 

end of the 1960s, concern as to when HEXAGON would be ready and how 

well it would perform in its flights prompted a number of backup actions. One 

of these involved the GAMBIT program and was called variously "H " 

"Higherboy," and, ultimately, "Dual-Mode." Its purpose was to al he 

GAMBIT vehicle to fly and operate for 90 days at much higher altitudes-

-97-

'---________ ........................... _Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
~T ~RN-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

perigees on the order of 300-350 miles (high model-and then to be brought 

to a lower-more norma . of 78 miles for the balance of the mission. 

In high mode, the system wo capable of a coverage comparable to 

HEXAGON. In the Dual-Mode configuration, changes were necessary to both 

the photographic-payload section (PPS) and the satellite-control section (SCS). 

Changes to the PPS included: 

• High-altitude photographic capability, including modification of 9-inch 

and 5-inch frequency-phase-Iock-Ioop electronics to provide slower film 

drive capabilities; a redesigned film-velocity sensor; modifications to the 

focus-sensin system; and suitable thermal-paint patterns for both high 

and low I ,,'UU'''', 

• Camera automatic-off circuitry and sensor; 

• Added smear slits to both 5- and 9-inch cameras; 

• Several SRV changes, including increasing total retrorocket impulse by 20 

percent, addition of a redundant pyrogen ignition, and increasing the 

recovery mmer back-up timer interval to 2,808 seconds, allowing 

high-m recovery. 

Changes to the SCS included: 

• Modifications of the main propulsion system (MPS) to provide capability 

for two additional restarts as a back-up to the integral secondary 

propulsion system (ISPS), which would nominally be used for all orbit 

changes; 

• Positive ISPS isolation by use of pyro-operated positive-seal isolation 

valves, in order to maintain the back-up side isolated from contact with 

the highly corrosive oxidizer until the second side was used; 

• Adding a restraint device capable of operating between the roll-joint and 

the Agena during MPS burns after the initial burns (during the MPS 

ascent burn the separative joint was held rigid by breakstrips which were 

separated after injection into orbit); 

• Modifications to the attitude-control system (ACS) to change the lookdown geometry of the horizon sensor and add a second (high-altitude) 

commanded pitch-rate. 

Dual-Mode was only flown once, on GAMBIT -3 vehicle No. 52. A 

problem arose: durin recovery of the first SRV an electro-explosive-operated 

flight disconnect fai precluding recovery of SRV-1. Although the SRV-2 

inflight-disconnect-pyro also failed to function, a backup/recovery deboost 

was effected, using the satellite-control section's ISPS to reenter the entire 

vehicle, whereupon SRV-2 separated and was recovered. Quality of the 

imagery from flight No. 52 was degraded nearly 50 percent. Despite many 

months of investigation by a team from many elements of the p Ius 

in dent outside he the exact cause of the degraded pe rmance on 

this ight could not be i entified. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -98-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ON 

however, that, because of uncertainties in atmospheric conditions, actual 

resolution obtained did not equate to that predicted mathematically. Therefore the operational strategy was changed to one of flying at a somewhat 

higher altitude, with a resultant increase in the area covered in each frame 

(producing higher target coverage in high-t t-density areas) without serious compromise of image quality. This proc ure, coupled with the practice 

of making only positive adjustments to the argument of perigee, further 

improved total mission statistics.109 

Operational planning with respect to the dual-platen camera changed 

extensively as a consequence of im quality obtained during the first several 

missions. As originally conceived platens were to be used simultaneously 

against the same target, with the 9-inch-film camera exposing black-and-white 

film and the 5-inch-film camera using special-emulsion film (color, infrared 

[IR], and so forth). It soon became ent that because of the more than 

acceptable performance of the 5-in camera-particularly when used 

with h-resolution SO-312 black-and-white film-each camera could be 

used ependently against different targets, thus increasing the total number 

of targets collected on a given mission. 110 

In January 1983, Colonel McChristian was reassi ned as vice director, 

SAFSP, and replaced by Col. larry Cress as direct mbined GAMBIT 

and HEXAGON rams. This combined ram management concept had 

been conceiv initiated during Co McChristian's tenure as SPO 

Director. It merged the management, engineer' ,and test functions of two 

mature programs, both at SAFSP and at lockh Missile and Space Company-the principal contractor-resulting in significant reductions in manpower 

and building space, which, in turn, translated into substantial dollar savings. 

Under Colonel Cress' direction, the last two GAMBIT missions were 

conducted with distinction. Mission No. 4353, for example, surpassed all 

previous missions in terms of duration (129 days); n m r f fr me 7 652 

and ross number of tar ets (49,372). In addition, 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -100-

= •••• ________ IIIApproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

GAMBIT -3 Flight Summary-1977 -84 

G-3 launching Photographic Best 

No. Date Days Resolution 

48 13 Mar 77 69 

49 23 Sep 77 73 

50 28 May 78 90 

51 28 Feb 81 110 

52 21 Jan 82 119 

53 15 Apr 83 126 

54 17 Apr 84 116 

SE~ ~-ORCON 

Remarks 

First dual-platen camera 

Only Dual-Mode mission 

flown 

longest duration ever129 days (including 

3 days "Solo") 

During these 12 years, GAMBIT -3 improved steadily in time-C't 

eventually lasting three to four months on each flight. Resolutions of 

I ~ept the system preeminent as one of the foremost ec mca I~telhgence collectors in the r.econnaissance-satell,/-,· =-.:'-"-'lI.<::l'-Li.Ll'i!J<::li'L!..LL-"----'-'-"---'-'-'=__ 

Reverse side blank 

-101-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 C[:~ 

~~~~CON 

Section 6 

GAMBIT Program Costs and Highlights 

GAMBIl-l/KH-7 

The total cost of the 38-flight GAMBIT-1/KH-7 program, covering fiscal 

years 1963 through 1967, was $651.4 million in 1963 dollars. Of that amount, 

$396 million or 60.8 percent was incurred in SAFSP contracts and the 

remaining 39.2 percent in SSD/ AFSC and CIA contracts. The $651.4 million 

includes a $16.5 million cost of hardware purchased for GAMBIT-1 but 

reallocated by DNRO to other NRO projects; it does not include the cost of 

five GAMBIT-1 payloads sold to NASA.111 

"Non-recurring costs for development, industrial facilities, and one-time 

support totalled $158.4 million or 24.3 percent of the total program cost. Twothirds of the development cost was for development of the satellite vehicle by 

GE, and 18 percent for development of the payload by Eastman Kodak."112 

An analysis of recurring costs only gives average unit costs per GAMBIT1/KH-7 flight: $13.14 million for the first ten flights and $11.33 million for the 

last 28. lumping all costs, both recurring and non-recurring, into a total: 

Average cost per flight 

Average cost per day in orbit 

Average cost per target photographed 

$17,140,000 

$ 3,830,000 

$ 24,000 

It should be noted that cost per target photographed fell to $8,000 in FY66 and to $6,000 in FY-67. 

The principal contractors were General Electric for the spacecraft, costing 

$293.6 million ($258.1 million in "white" contracts, $35.5 million in "black"); 

General Dynamics for the Atlas missiles, hardware, and launching expenses, 

totalling $161.6 million; lockheed Missiles and Space Company for Agena 

second-stage vehicle, Agena-peculiars, and launching, amounting to $98.6 

million; and Eastman Kodak for the camera payloads, costing $66.0 million. 

The remaining $31.6 million was for satellite control, command-generation 

software, mission planning, Aerospace Corporation support, and industrial 

facilities. 

GAMBIl-3/KH-8113 

The total cost of the 54-flight GAMBIT -3/KH-8 program (fiscal years 1964 

through 1985) was $2.3 billion, in respective year dollars. 

Non-recur' costs for development, industrial facilities, and so forth, 

totalled $439 mi on or 18 percent of the total program cost. Twentyfour 

percent of the development cost was for the satellite-control section (SCS) and 

-103-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~ON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Agena-related hardware by LMSC, whereas 43 percent was for development 

of the photographic-payload section (PPS) by EKC and recovery vehicle (RV) 

by GE. Costs (in millions) for the GAMBIT -3/KH-8 program were: 

Average per flight 

Average per day in orbit 

Average per target photographed 

Recurring Costs Only 

$36,135,000 

$ 1,247,000 

$ 2,790 

All Costs 

$44,255,000 

$ 1,527,000 

$ 3,410 

Principal contractors were Lockheed Missiles and S ace Company for the 

satellite-control system $863 million; Eastman Kodak the photographicpayload section $562 million; Martin-Marietta for the Titan-IIIB booster and 

launch, $425 million; General Electric for the command subsystem and reentry 

vehicles, $247 million. 

GAMBIT in Retrospect 

From the first GAMBIT -1/KH-7 flights in 1963 to the final GAMBIT -3/KH-8 

series in the 1974-84 period, the record of reconnaissance performance was 

remarkable, certainly meeting President Eisenhower's directive of 1960 that 

the Air Force should develop a film-return, high-resolution imaging satellite 

system. 

• Resolution: Initial results of two to three feet, in GAMBIT-1/KH-7, 

improved to one to two feet early in the GAMBIT -3/KH-8 phase, and, in 

the last 10 years of the program resolutions ofl fere 

consistently achieved. 114 

• Coverage: The number of targets covered by the early GAMBIT-1/KH-7 

missions amounted to hundreds per mission, reaching 1,000 by the 18th 

flight; the remaining GAMBIT -1 missions covered between 1,000 and 

2,000 targets each. Early GAMBIT -3/KH-8 flights acquired over 2,000 

photographic frames (often containing more than one target). By the 23rd 

GAMBIT-3 flight, the number of photographic frames exceeded 6,000 

and, by the 41st flight, was more than 10,000. The penultimate GAMBIT3 flight, No. 53, acquired 27,652 frames, which contained 49,372 targets. 

By way of comparison, all 38 of the GAMBIT -1 missions photographed 

only 27,534 targets. 115 

• Duration: Early GAMBIT-1 flights flew one- to two-day missions, gradually improving to six and eight days. Early GAMBIT -3 flights were of the 

order of one week in duration; flight Nos. 6 to 22 generally lasted 10 

days. Duration increased, by flight No. 27, to 18 days and by flight No. 32 

to 22 days. Flight Nos. 36 thro 41 had durations of 27 to 31 days; the 

number increased to 45 days ing flight No.42 and to 69 days by flight 

No. 48. The last four flights were in the four-month class. 

The 54 GAMBIT -3/KH-8 flights achieved a reliability of over 94 percent; 

only three failed to reach orbit (two Agenas and one Titan failed). Once the 

GAMBIT -3 spacecraft got on orbit, it never failed to perform, in spite of a 

"few" problems. The significant contributor to this remarkable record was the 

management environment created for GAMBIT. This feature is discussed in 

detail in the following Section. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN· TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -104-

ill" •••••• _______ ... Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Section 7 

s~ ~N-ORCON 

Development Management: Styles in Program Control 

Without uestion, the most important US military weapon systems developed during 1955-65 decade were intercontinental missiles and reconnaissance satellites. Although these systems were produced by Air Force 

rs, using Air Force facilities, none of them was developed in any of the 

existing Air Force research and development centers! There are 

reasons for this fact-reasons which are a somewhat mordant comment on 

the status of military development program management. 

After establishment as a separate service in 1947, the US Air Force 

acquired a plethora of technological installations: Wright Air Development 

Center (ADC) in Ohio dedicated to all elements of aircraft and missile work; 

Rome ADC in New York for electronic studies and gear; Cambridge Research 

Center in Massachusetts for research in electronics and geophysics; Holloman 

Air Force Base (AFB) in New Mexico for missile testing and human factors 

studies; Eglin AFB in Florida for proving ground tests; and Edwards AFB in 

California for aircraft It soon added Tullahoma AFB in Tennessee for 

wind tunnel work; a Sped eapons Center at Kirtland AFB in New Mexico 

to support nuclear testing; and a missile-testing range at Patrick AFB in Florida. 

All of these organizations enjo rowth beyond anything anticipated in 

the early postwar years. Places Ii oman, Cambridge, and Rome, which 

had originally existed as small "stations" subservient to Wright Field, suddenly 

became full-scale ADCs, laying claim to technological preserves of their own 

and lobbying for manpower and dollars to support the claims. 

On-Time Delivery: A look at the Record 

It is a truism that "bigger" does not necessarily lead to "better." The 

growing centers of the new Air Research and Development Command 

(ARDC), established in 1951, exemplified this saying. The facilities of ARDC's 

centers were improved, the rosters of pro' assigned and undertaken grew 

to impressive lengths, more d, and more dollars were spent; 

however, the capability of t Command to deliver new or improved hardware to the 0 rational Air Force on schedule remained rather stagnant. On 

the Comma seventh birthday, in 1958, it could dte only one case where a 

system had been delivered on its original schedule: the anomaly had occurred 

in 1955, at the Cambridge Research Center. Hq, ARDC, then under the 

salutary command of Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Power, had inquired into the 

reasons for this unusual event: 

It would be of value to this Headquarters to receive 

from the ARDC member of the WSPO [Weapon System 

Project Office] an informally written description of those 

operating principles which his experience has indicated 

contribute to the successful and on-time production of a 

system. To be most useful, the comments should be 

completely frank and candid. 116 

-107-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
s~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

It was ironic that the addressee, Cambridge, had only one assigned 

system, being largely what its name implied: a research center. On the basis 

of a perfect batting average, the response to the request must have been a 

pleasure. 

The major player, by far, in weapon system development, was Wright 

Field and practically all of ARDC's system development was assigned there. 

Consequently, Wright Field had the major concentration of ARDC manpower and money. WADC managers, knowing that they had a serious problem 

with on-time delivery, had sponsored several studies in searching for possible 

solutions. The Belden Study117 (previously mentioned in this volume) was the 

best known of these. WADC's Thomas C. Belden had carefully examined the 

history of 100 key developments under WADC's aegis and had found that 

• 85 slipped 0.45 year or more per year, and 

• 22 (of that 85) slipped one year or more per year. 

Air Force "customers"-the rating commands-learned of this analysis and were understandably ed by its implications. Strategic Air 

Command planners, for example, could see that if they placed an "order" with 

WADC for development-delivery of an item of new hardware, and it happened to fall within the first of the Belden-categories, an originally agreed-to 

delivery forecast of, say, four years, could slip, on the average, to seven-and-ahalf years, eight years, or longer. If the order fell into the second category, 

SAC could assume, in advance, that it would never be delivered! 

The WADC situation was not unique. Throughout ARDC, "in-spec, 

below-cost, on-time" delivery appeared to be a coveted but unattainable 

goal. When challenged on the matter, Centers became irritated and defensive, 

usually countering with references to people and dollar-shortages ("If we were 

just given the tools to do the job," and so forth). But the ARDC's annual 

budget and population f actually increasing each year; sadly, the 

delivery slippages thems devoured much of the Command's resources, 

and their costs were increasing annually. 

The On-Time Delivery Problem: Contributing factors 

It was a sad fact that ARDC Centers had little experience in, little 

motivation toward, and little inclination for, working in what industry called "a 

short-leashed environment"-one where missions and careers would rise or 

fall on the basis of production rmance. Center concerns and motivation 

lay elsewhere: the primary goa was organizational (and, therefore, personal) 

stability and security. 

Center staffs and laboratory people were preoccupied with establishing 

and policing territorial franchises for very broad areas of technical activity. This 

reflected in program budgets, where many tasks never actually ended and 

additional work was continually proposed. Residual time was spent in "monitoring" contractors' work results-essentially reading reports-and examining 

expenditures (in-house technical laboratory work usually proceeded with a 

~ 

Handle via 

BYEMAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -108-

proved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

S~ 

~N-ORCON 

minimum rvision). Center-staff members, one hierarchic step above 

laboratory w rs, did not monitor-they "maintained cognizance." Further 

up, at the summit, the leadership of the Center "exercised broad staff 

surveillance."118 Responsibility for meeting deadlines was usually shared, 

blurred, or unassigned-the classic bureaucratic stance. In this environment, a 

Center's activities culminate inevitably in a program which, by commercial 

contractor standards, would be classed as leisurely, undisciplined, and 

expensive. 

Although any Center could have an on-time delivery problem, only 

Wright Field was in the system development business to a major extent. The 

delivery problem, like other problems, was caused by people-both military 

and civilian. The bulk of Center manpower was, of course, civilian and the 

rules composed by the Civil Service Commission to govern the hiring, 

promotion, and firing of civil servants applied to the Center. As years passed, 

these rules seemed to augment their (natural) bias in favor of the employee. 

Indolence in matters technological or sangfroid regarding failure in on-time 

delivery were not listed as grounds for replacement or dismissal of a civilian. In 

fact, acceptable grounds for disciplinary action, on any basis, grew more and 

more narrow, with heavy burden of proof on the supervisor. Bringing such 

actions uired the "accuser" to show a detailed journal, often for as much 

as two or tree years, cataloging explicit deficiencies, citing extensive counseling efforts, and actually proving that the employee had shown very little or no 

positive response. The most persistent and exhaustive disciplinary efforts, at 

Center levels, would be followed by long-drawn-out reviews at Command 

and Headquarters, Air Force levels, where reversals were commonplace. And, 

since the action had to pass initially through the Center's headquarters, which 

was staffed mainly by military people, the process triggered considerable 

schism between the military and civilian "households." 

As years passed, and examples of disciplinary action failed to accumulate, 

there developed a apevine consensus that "getting rid of" a civilian was 

essentially II , In addition, it was potentially career-threatening to the 

Center commander and staff. Inevitably, strong disciplinary action became a 

rarity in ARDC and its Centers were considered havens of "locked-in" security 

for civilian employees. There developed a world in which there could be 

rewards, but very few punishments; a world in which promotion tended to be 

based on how many persons one supervised, rather than on how many "ontime" deliveries he had made. 

The other group of Center employees-the military-brought their own 

e problems. Primary among these was the brief tenure of research and 

pment officer-specialists. Even the best-trained officer would need a 

least a year to learn the technical program to which he was assigned. Then he 

would probably have, at most, two remaining years to contribute to the work 

at hand. During his "productive" period, he would have frequent outside 

demands: special military assignments (courts and boards), military training 

seminars, flying-time requirements, and assistance to the commander's staff in 

many base activities. Then he would be transferred out of the Center (the 

civilians could say, "Just as he became useful to the program") to a service 

school, or a career-enhancing next assignment. All in all, the military engineer 

was a limited asset, as fleeting and evanescent in his impact on the Center as 

the civilian's was fixed and stolid. 

-109-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
S~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

AFBMD: High-level Response No. 1 

This picture of the Air Force's research and development household in the 

1950s was fairly well understood at the highest governmental levels, largely 

because all really "big" on-time delivery problems automatically come to the 

attention of top Air Force and Defense officials. With the introduction of a 

Presidential Science Adviser, during the second Eisenhower administration, 

this kind of bad news was also known, rather swiftly, at the White House. 

In 1954 and 1955, when the requirement for on-time delivery of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles became a primary governmental urgency, it was agreed in Washington offices that routine assignment 

of such a task to an existing ARDC Center would not even be discussed. So a 

new organization-the Western Development Division (WDD)-was created 

to undertake the responsibility. WDD was to be part of the Headquarters, 

ARDC commander's office and would by-pass the Air Staff, in its command 

line, reporting directly to an Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee (chaired by 

the Secretary of the Air Force) and, subsequently, to an Office of the Secretary 

of Defense Ballistic Missile Committee. Bernard A. Schriever, then a brigadier 

general, was appointed to command the new division. Schriever had sufficient 

experience with "normal" research and development processes to press for 

the privilege of requesting his officer-staff by name, to insist that he control 

their tenure, and to state, very discreetly, that he would probably not appoint 

civilians to his staff.119 It also became evident that he did not intend to draw 

upon existing ARDC Centers for technical support; rather, he would hire a 

contractor (Ramo-Wooldridge) to furnish essential technical direction and 

system engineering. He would, of necessity, use ARDC's test centersparticularly thE: AF Missile Test Center (and range) at Patrick AFB. 

CORONA: A Second High-level Response 

When the need for a reconnaissance satellite became an acute emergency, President Eisenhower, in February 1958, placed the CORONA program 

jointly within the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD), the new name 

for the WDD, and the Central Intelligence Agency, permitting no intermediate 

review or approval channels between the project and himself. In this arrangement, one person each, from the Air Force and the CIA, would report directly 

to him. This revolutionary management arran nt was the ultimate in 

establishing direct lines of authority and responsi ility for on-time delivery of a 

major system. 

AFBMD's responsibility for engineering and operating the CORONA 

system was "covered"-in a security sense-by its organizational designator: 

"Discoverer Office." Lt. Col. lee Battle, a specialist in propulsion engineering, 

headed this office. His professional experience had been acquired in ARDC, 

where he had been a keen observer of mana styles and processes and 

where he had privately developed his own ed "Battle-model" for how 

things should be done. In his Discoverer-CORONA post, he saw an opportunity to finally put his ideas into effect on a major scale and he welcomed the 

Handle via 

BYEMAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems joinlly 

BYE 140002-90 -110-

_______________ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 ?-------------" 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

S~ ~N-ORCON 

occasion. Battle listed his management principles (in order of importance) and 

his subordinates soon knew them by heart. 120 

1. Keep the program office small and quick-reacting. The Discoverer 

Office, in 1958-59, consisted of Battle plus three others; in 1960, with 

the program in full operation, the total manpower was five. Each 

individual had absolute responsibility for an explicitly defined area. 

Battle insisted on people who could be "short-leashed," energized, 

and, if necessary, replaced in 30 seconds-in other words, he wanted 

military people. 

2. Select your people with great care and then rely on them. Fortunately, 

the AFBMD's work had a high priority which made such personnel 

selections possible. "Relying" meant assigning entire responsibility for a 

technical area to one person and then holding him (not the contractor) 

primarily responsible for success. 

3. Control the contractor by direct personal contact. The responsible 

officer was to know what the contractor was doing, in his assigned area, 

every day. He was to assess the contractor's key people and their work 

continually, remembering that personnel errors are much more frequent than design errors. 

4. Make as much use as you can of (external) supportin rganizations. 

This was a device for keeping one's own staff small. e would add, 

sotto voce, "To insure adequate support always make unreasonable 

demands.'1 

5. "Hit" hard on checkout and flight failures. "Unfixed" roblems will rise 

to bite you again. Reject the expression "random fa "; there is no 

such thing. 

6. Cut out as much paperwork as you can. Comply promptly with 

mandatory ring requirements-in the most meager fashion that 

will be 

7. Do not over-communicate with higher echelons. 

8. Avoid committees. There is always an individual to whom you should 

have given responsibility for what the committee thinks it is doing. 

9. Rely on your contractor's technical recommendations, once you are 

sure he has given the problem sufficient study. 

10. Have very close ties between your office and your representatives in 

the field (at the launching site or satellite control center, for example). 

Engineering 

UCo!. Roy Worthington 

Control & Test 

Maj. frank Buzard 

Maj. Richard Moore 

The Discoverer Program Office, Spring 1960 

~ 

-111-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
S~APproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Np.RfRN-ORCON 

The success of Battle's spartan group was enhanced, of course, by some 

outside factors. His work was recognized at the highest governmental levels as 

absolutely essential to the national welfare; therefore, he had strong support 

from above: a top priority and assured funding. He could name-request and 

"freeze" his engineers; he could get instant reactions from supporting organizations; and he could insist on contractor-colleagues who shared his management views and sense of urgency. When the program hesitated or faltered, in 

the early flight series, his great and good CIA friend Richard Bissell served as 

proxy in Washington, D.C.-even for "woodshedding" at the White House. 

SAFSP: The Third High-level Response 

The reasons for establishing a Secretary of the Air Force Special Projects 

Office (SAFSP) in Los Angeles and, finally a National Reconnaissance Office, 

with a Program A at SAFSP, have been covered in this volume. Significantly, 

while it had seemed per and feasible to place CORONA development in 

the context of the (re ely new) AFBMD organization, when the time came 

to accelerate satellite reconnaissance follow-on systems, a new organization 

was created. GAMBIT was the first full-scale venture of the National Reconnaissance Office, and, while it was to proceed independently of CIA "godfathering," it would enjoy some similarities: an equally high national priority, the 

license to name-request and retain its people, and a determination to achieve 

on-time successful operation. The SAFSP part of the NRO was staffed with Air 

Force officers, most of whom had professional backgrounds very similar to 

Battle's and some of whom were aware of, and very much impressed by, the 

CORONA record of achievement. SAFSP, and its GAMBIT program office, 

acknowledged a debt to CORONA as pathfinder and proposed to do as well, 

or better, in its own developments. 

In addition, Generals Greer and Martin, together with Colonel King, were 

veterans of the Air Force research and development community and deeply 

interested in achieving the best possible management style and procedures. 

The principles SAFSP followed reflect much of Battle's philosophy, with several 

extensions of theme. 

1. Keep the program office small-not in order to save manpower but in 

order to encourage strongly personal interactions. 

2. Hand-pick your people; stick to known military "winners," use namerequests and control tenure. 

3. Control contractors by direct personal contact, rather than by paperwork. Place top-notch officer-engineers at the key contractor plantsparticularly those where technical problems are the most severe (GE 

Philadelphia; Eastman Kodak). The officer's function is not the classical 

rocurement role: checking contract compliance. Rather, he is to (a) 

exactly what the SAFSP GAMBIT Program Office wants and 

needs, (b) what the contractor plans to do, or is doing, to satisfy those 

needs, and (c) develop such a strong rapport with the actual "doers" at 

the plant that they will voluntarily tell him their problems and proposed 

"fixes," in advance, or at the latest, as soon as they become known, and 

(d) stay in daily communication with the GAMBIT (home) office. (This 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -112-

___________ ...."I-'proved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312, ______________ ....... 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ 

~-()RCON 

guidance was followed so successfully that King's representatives were 

usually invited to most contractors' meetings.) 

4. Stress that program success is the raison d'etre for the SAFSP and 

GAMBIT Program Office. leadership in stressing this fact was furnished 

by Generals Greer and Martin as they built a tradition of personally and 

faithfully participating in every GAMBIT fI t operation: at Vandenberg 

AFB (launching) and at the Sunnyvale Sat Control Facility (on-orbit 

operations). In establishing this "presence," the generals were very 

careful to k the at here familial, rather than hierarchical. They 

wanted it u rstood they were present because successful flight 

operation was the sole purpose, and a culmination, of their organization. They also wanted it understood that the ram Director, for 

example, Colonel was in complete charge. e wished to have 

consultation on a problem, the generals were available to help 

him ponder. But they were not there to take command, or to cast a 

shadow on the operation. The process worked superbly; the generals 

gauged its success by the fact that the contractors scarcely seemed 

aware of their presence. 

S. "Keep It Simple." As frequently illustrated by example in this volume, 

"Keep It Simple" was Colonel King's by-line, extending to everything he 

directed. He exemplified this by: 

a. Using proven components whenever possible (CORONA's capsule, 

lifeboat, the roll-joint). 

b. Trimming non-essential engineering. 

c. Buying fewer spares. 

d. Sticking to a single check-out. 

e. Abbreviating documentation. 

f. Simplifying tests. 

Applying this maxim strictly allowed King to return $6.3 million in FY-63 

and $9.2 million in FY-64. 

A Summing-Up 

The ballistic missile and satellite reconnaissance development experiences 

show strong parallels in (a) what must be avoided and (b) what must be done, 

when on-time delivery is a 'mar factor. There was a remarkable similarity in 

the basic management of rograms and positive evolution in that 

style as improvements were add with each program iteration. It was 

exhilarating to prove that "in-spec, below cost, on-time" delivery is possible in 

an Air Force environment. 

-113-

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N-ORCON 

But there was also a sobering element in the knowledge that, just as 

ballistic missiles could not be produced-on-time-in the WADe environment, satellite reconnaissance systems could not be assigned to the AFBMD. 

Absent constant, stern watchfulness and periodic "purging," it appears inescapable that all governmental research and development organizations eventually follow a well-worn path towar ness, security, inertia, and incompetence. This unpleasant knowl been expressed in three maxims, 

generally acknowledged and rare heeded: 

s Once an organization achieves a certain-apparently rather modestsize, it can never again have enough people to carry out its mission. 

s Once the members of an 0 ization achieve the level of "tenured" 

security that they think they esire, they can never again carry out their 

mission. 

s Every time a truly urgent technological achievement is required by our 

nation, a new organization must be assembled. 

SEC~ 

~Ievia BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -114-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ON 

Section 8 

From 'Haunting Concern' to Informed Response 

In recalling the busy days of 1955, Dwight D. Eisenhower would surely 

have given primacy to two events. The first was international in character: the 

"Open Skies" proposal which he had made to the Soviets at Geneva on 21 

July, . g mutual consent for aircraft overflight of each other's territories as a 

mea alia "the fears and angers of surprise attack."121 He had been 

disappointed distressed when his offering was rejected-in an off-hand 

and casual manner-and had summarized the event in a trenchant comment: 

"Khrushchev's own purpose was evident-at all costs to keep the USSR a 

closed society."122 

The other focus of his recollection would be personal in nature (if 

anything in a President's term is truly personal): in September of that year he 

had experienced a very serious heart attack. Fortunately, his recovery had 

been so swift and complete that he was able to run for a second term of office. 

He enjoyed five years of peaceful retirement before the cardiac problem 

recurred, in 1965. Once again, his recovery was swift and reassuring. The third 

attack, in April 1968, was a different matter: he entered Walter Reed Army 

Hospital at once, staying there until the end of his life, in 1969. 

One February day, in 1969, Eisenhower mused to a friend that he missed 

the excellent intelligence briefings which he had received during his White 

House days. He went on to wonder, in particular, what improvements might 

have occurred in the technology of overflight photographic reconnaissance. 

His friend promised to arrange a "state-of-the-art" briefing. 123 His request was 

relayed across the city to the National Phot Interpretation Center, 

which was ided over by Arthur C. Lunda haracteristically, Lundahl 

welcomed request; he had briefed Eisenhower several times previously 

and found him an excellent audience. 

Lundahl was respected and honored in the US Intelligence Community as 

the nation's most knowledgeable and articulate briefer. He was a su rb 

photo interpreter in his own right, and combined his technical skill h a 

warm enthusiasm for the subject and strong athy with the audience. He 

had recognized, early in his career, that usual audiences-whether 

military or civilian-should not be expected to have a photointerpreter's 

insight into what was on the briefing boards, so he had become a master at 

tailoring presentations to that human condition, helping lay audiences transcend their inherent limitations. Lundahl knew, for instance, that a professional who had studied the USSR's Tyuratam missile launching facility in detail for 

five years could exclaim enthusiastically over a minor, new construction 

element, while, to a layman, the object might ap r, at most, as a vague blob 

or blur. The ubiquitous character of this pro was well-illustrated by 

Robert F. Kennedy's remarks on a momentous briefing, given at the White 

House on 16 October 1962: 

At 11 :45 that same morning, in the Cabinet Room, a 

formal presentation was made by the Central Intelligence Agency to a number of high officials of the 

-115-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN- TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
s~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

government. Photographs were shown to us. Experts 

arrived with their charts and their pointers and told us 

that if we looked carefully, we could see there was a 

missile base being constructed in a field near San Cristobal, Cuba. I, for one, had to take their word for it. I 

examined the pictures carefully, and what I saw appeared to be no more than the clearing of a field for a 

farm or the basement of a house. I was relieved to hear 

later that this was the same reaction of virtually everyone at the meeting, including President Kennedy. Even a 

few days later, when more work had taken place on the 

site, he remarked that it looked like a football field. 124 

Now it had been absolutely clear to Lundahl that the Soviets had, at this 

location and as of this date, introduced intermediate-range ballistic missiles 

into Cuba; to his audience, none of whom rose to dispute his analysis, the 

San Cristobal missile site, as seen from the U-2, looked like a fuzzy farm, a 

basement, or vaguely like a "football field."125 

There was also another version of the audience's response, reported to 

Lundahl later that day, which he (understandably) cherished. This version 

illustrates his point about photo interpreters and laymen: 

RFK to JFK: 

JFK: 

RFK: 

JFK: 

Did you see the missiles site? 

Did you? 

Frankly, no! 

Neither did I, but he was certainly convincing, 

wasn't he? 

Lundahl ranked Eisenhower as one of his best audiences. He knew from 

experience that the President would follow a briefer's words intently; he had 

continued the habit, from White House days, of closing in on the photography, from time to time, with a huge magnifying glass and a firm, "Now show 

me exactly where that is and why you call it what you did."126 

Lundahl selected photographs for the Walter Reed briefing, using two 

criteria: he wanted to update Eisenhower on the most important developments at denied foreign locations and he wanted to vignette technological 

improvement in the intelligence enterprise which Eisenhower had boldly 

godfathered during his White House years. Lundahl had no qualms about 

including U-2 photography in his briefing; he wanted to reassure Eisenhower 

that-in spite of one distasteful episode-the U-2 had been, and continued 

to be, a primary intelligence collector. Its more sophisticated offspring-the 

A-12 OXCART (predecessor of the SR-71}-had also overflown vast areas, 

even monitoring the captive USS Pueblo in North Korea's Wonson Harbor. 

He chose photos obtained by the Ryan-147 drone to show that not all 

collection had to be done at high altitudes, particularly when one was 

supporting ground forces. Finally, he selected CORONA/KH-4, GAMBIT1/KH-7, and GAMBIT-3/KH-8 photography to show the steady technological 

growth in satellite reconnaissance capability. 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -116-

for Release: 2018/09111 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 S~ 

~N-ORCON 

On 13 February 1969, Lundahl, his assistant Frank Beck, and DC! Richard 

Helms were welcomed by Eisenhower in his suite at Walter Reed hospital. 

Eisenhower, dear-eyed, and ruddy-faced, was as sharp of mind as ever. Beck 

held briefing boards at the foot of the bed, moving them nearer whenever 

the President requested a dose look (and an opportunity to wield his 

. ying glass). Eisenhower shared in the presentation with his old 

e usiasm, . many questions, and remarking his "great satisfaction" 

over the fine res s obtained by the new reconnaissance systems. 127 

Eisenhower must have been equally satisfied with another consideration, 

not specifically mentioned in the briefing, but implicit in every sentence and 

pho ph. Thanks to the reconnaissance systems which his fo had 

nu into being, his large vision of "Open Skies"-waved so 

cavalierly by the USSR at Geneva 14 years before-had become a positive 

reality. Day after day, orbiting satellites were holding denied areas in a steady 

gaze. 

The "haunting concern" of the 1950s had been replaced by the 

informed response of the 1960s. 

Presidential Commendation 

Fifteen years later, in August 1984, another Republican President, Ronald 

Reagan, commented eloquently on GAMBIT's contribution to US intelligence 

in the following message sent to the National Reconnaissance Office: 

Commendation to the GAMBIT Program 

When the GAMBIT Program commenced we were 

in the dawn of the space age. Technologies we now take 

for granted had to be invented, adapted, and refined to 

meet the Nation's highest intelligence information needs 

while exploiting the unknown and hostile medium of 

space. Through the years you and your team have 

systematically produced improved satellites providing 

major increases in both quantity and quality of space 

photography. 

The technology of acquiring high quality pictures 

from space was perfected by the GAMBIT Program 

engineers; GAMBIT photographic clarity has yet to be 

surpassed. Through the years, intelligence gained from 

these photographs has been essential to myself, my 

predecessors, and others involved with international 

policy decisions. These photographs have greatly assisted our arms monitoring initiatives. They have also provided vital kno about Soviet and Communist Bloc 

scientific and ological military developments, 

which is of paramount importance in determining our 

defense posture. 

-SECIUi 

-117-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Handle via 

B YEMAN -TALE NT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
~ON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

A generation of this Nation's youth has grown up 

unaware that, in large measure, their security was ensured by the dedicated work of your employees. National security interests prohibit me from rewarding you with 

the public recognition which you so richly deserve. 

However, rest assured that your accomplishments and 

contributions are well known and appreciated at the 

highest levels of our Nation's government. 

SE~ 

~dfevia BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -118-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Appendix A 

GAMBIT-Key Contributor to National Security Intelligence 

National Intelligence Requirements Management 

Prior to examining some of the significant contributions the GAMBIT 

pro am made to US national security because of its ability to resolve 

. gence questions or problems, it is useful to understand the management 

structure that provided intelligence requirements guidance over the almost 

21-year life span of this remarkably successful program. 

In 1963, the Intelligence Community's overhead intelligence requirements 

were managed by the US Intelligence Board (USIB) through its Committee on 

Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR). COMOR was created in August 1960 

"for the purpose of providing a focal point for information on, and for the 

coordinated development of, foreign intelligence requirements for overhead 

reconnaissance projects and activities of the Government over denied areas."128 This or ization came into being several weeks before the first 

successful COR A mission. CIA's James Q. Reber was appointed the first 

chairman of COMOR. 

Prior to 1960, the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC), which was 

initially established in 1955 to provide collection guidance for the U-2 

program and which subsequently provided requirements guidance for the 

early CORONA missions, was responsible for national imagery requirements. 

Reber had been chairman of the ARC from its inception. There also existed, 

prior to the establishment of COM OR, a USIB Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (SIRC) charged with defining required system performance 

capabilities so that USIB could provide useful guidance to the satellite 

dev nt agencies. In 1959, the SIRC called for imagery satellite system 

capa ities of 20-, 5-, and 1-foot ground resolution. Although this stated 

resolution requirement did not directly influence the development of any US 

reconnaissance satellite system, it was the first time that a national intelligence 

entity had attempted to define such a system's capabilities for meeting 

national intelligence needs. 

The responsibilities of the ARC and the SIRC were subsumed into 

COMOR, when it was established in 1960. The membership of COMOR was 

comprised of designated officials of the departments and agencies which 

constituted the Intelligence Community as represented on the USIB: CIA, DIA, 

NSA, State, Army, Navy, Air Force. 

Consultants were appointed from agencies engaged in system development and imagery exploitation-the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 

and the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). 

-119-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

_ ~I!CRErHandle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
s~ N~N-ORCON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

In July 1967, the Intelligence Community responsibilities for SIGINT and 

PHOTINT were separated and a new committee, the Committee on Imagery 

Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), under the chairmanship of CIA's 

Roland S. Inlow, was established to manage expanded responsibilities for 

overhead imagery collection and exploitation. 129 (See chart below). 

Then, in 1975, the Civil Applications Committee (CAC) was established 

with representatives from the Departments of Commerce, Interior, and 

Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Agency for 

International Development (AID) to exploit satellite imagery for unique civil 

requirements. COMIREX was charged with overseeing the activities of the 

CAC to insure national imagery security policies were adhered to in the use of 

any authorized imagery. Only domestic imagery was eligible for use by CAC 

a' for AID, where imagery of national disasters such as drought, 

famine, and fl d, was provided to assist the US Government in determining 

humanitarian aid requirements. 

The day-to-day management of the Intelligence Community's collection 

and exploitation requirements was handled by two COMOR working groups; 

the Photo Working Group (PWG) was responsible for managing collection 

requirements and the Exploitation Subcommittee (ExSubCom) was responsible 

for providing exploitation guidance to the national exploitation centers. With 

the establishment of COMIREX in 1967, the PWG was changed in name to the 

Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee (lCRS), with its primary 

functions remaining unchanged. 

A major factor that affected the Intelligence Community's interface with 

GAMBIT Operations was the formal establishment of the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) in 1961. All nationally-approved collection requirements were provided to the satellite operator through the NRO's newlyformed Satellite Operations Center (SOC), located in the basement of the 

. Thus, by the time of the first scheduled GAMBIT mission, a 

etely different satellite operations management concept from that 

existing during the early CORONA pr ram was in place, albeit its formation 

was preceded by considerable pol infighting between the CIA and the 

NRO on roles and missions, authorities, and management responsibilities. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

ICRS Subcommittee 

John Schadegg 

Exploitation 

COMIREX Organization Chart 

-120-

Membership 

Air force, Navy, DlA, 

DMA, Army, 

CIA, NSA, Siale 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 S~ 

~N-ORCON 

In 197:, at SOC respons;b;H!;es for GAMBIT operat;ons were transferred 

tq he Air Force Special Projects Office at the Satellite Test Center 

in 5unnyva e, alifornia. This created an even more cohesive bond between 

the i ' uirements er (COMIREX) and the system operatorNRO In rec 'tion its broad responsibilities and authorities, 

as esigna 1981, an Operating Division (OD-4) under the 

the Air Force Special Projects (SAFSP) Office in los Angeles. 

OD-4 played a significant role in the success of the GAMBIT program. Its 

primary goal was to satisfy intelligence requirements to the maximum extent 

possible without "breaking" the satellite. To accomplish this it continuously 

instituted new operational procedures and changes to improve collection 

capabilities. The basic philosophy was to take any actions possible that would 

improve requirements-satisfaction without adversely affecting the "health" of 

the satellite or precluding it from accomplishing its total mission. OD-4, for 

example, was instrumental in greatly increasing the number of operations 

GAMBIT could achieve by demonstrating that roll-rates could be increased 

safely and the time period for each operation significantly reduced. The close 

working relationship between the COMIREX staff and OD-4, existing throughout the program, also contributed to GAMBIT's success. The following is 

quoted from a letter to the Director, NRO, from Harry E. Eisenbeiss, Chairman 

COMIREX, expressing his appreciation for the outstanding efforts of the OD-4 

team in responding to national intelligence tasking. 

I would like to extend my appreciation to you for 

the outstanding performance of 00-4 KH-8 [GAMBIT -3] 

system operators in their operation of the final KH-8 

Mission recently completed. 

This KH-8 team was essential to the successful 

acquisition and satisfaction of various Intelligence Community collection problems. Additionally, the operators 

were often requested to provide studies and assistance 

on unique and/or sensitive requirements within a very 

short time frame, Their never-flagging spirit, flexibility, 

and "can do" attitude resulted in a high requirement 

satisfaction record and the appreciation of the entire 

Intelligence Community for their efforts. 

Again, in keeping with the superior standards established by the National Reconnaissance Office, the KH-8 

system team deserves special recognition from all who 

benefited from their professionalism and expertise,no 

COMIREX and the NRO (OD-4) constituted two nationally chartered 

organizations necessary to assure imagery requirements; they were controlled 

and managed in the best possible national interest: (1) COMIREX to define and 

prioritize imagery collection, exploitation, and distribution requirements and 

(2) the NRO to translate collection requirements into command instructions 

and content and accomplish on-orbit collection, utilizing sophisticated targeting software, weather forecasting, and verification capabilities. 

-121-

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ ~-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

GAMBIT Imagery Security Policy 

GAMBIT imagery and imagery products were controlled within the 

TALENT -KEYHOLE (TK) security system. This special system was developed to 

protect the imagery and imagery-derived products obtained from overhead 

reconnaissance systems. The TK security system was used primarily by the 

Inteli' nce Community for those persons who required certain knowledge 

abou hysical characteristics and performance capabilities of the imaging 

system but did not ire all the system technical and planning data (which 

was controlled u e BYEMAN security system). Each program also had a 

TK identifier: for GAMBIT it was KH-7 for the original configuration and KH-8 

for GAMBIT -3. 

Photointerpreters could be assisted in their analyses by knowing the 

physical characteristics and performance capabilities of the reconnaissance 

satellite itself, as well as the operational parameters of each mission. To help 

the photoint eters, a special booklet was prepared on the GAMBIT system; 

this was cal the "KH-7 (later KH-8) System Manual" and was securitycontrolled in the TK system. In addition, operational data unique to each 

mission were provided to the interpreters, usually covering such matters as 

vehicle attitude and altitude, solar elevation, and similar matters. Most 

Intelligence Community members were briefed at the TK level only, rather 

than at the more comprehensive BYEMAN level; consequently, reference to 

satellite reconnaissance systems was usually made by using TK designators. 

Thus GAMBIT was known as KH-7/KH-8 in intelligence circles. 

Early in the GAMBIT program, TK clearances were severely restricted, 

which limited the number of Intel' nce Community users who had access to 

GAMBIT imagery or imagery-d products. These tight restrictions prevented GAMBIT -derived intelligence from being made available to organizations and activities that had clearly demonstrated a requirement for such 

intelligence-particularly DoD field elements. 

As GAMBIT's collection capabilities steadily improved, it became apparent that the depth reat value of the satellite-derived information made it 

essential to also ma the data available to lower-echelon military and 

Intelligence Community users outside the TK compartment. Accordingly, in 

November 1973, President Richard Nixon approved DC! William Colby's 

recommendation to modify some of the strict security controls on the satellite 

program imagery. S ically, the DC! was authorized to remove from TK 

control (after consu ation with the Secretary of Defense) such photographic 

products as he deemed appropriate, provided that the products so removed 

were appropriately classified and did not reveal the sensitive technical 

capabilities of current or future intelligence satellite systems. This authorization resulted in having most of the product (except original format film and 

almost all of the information derived from it) eligible to meet the requirements 

of US intelligence users at the Secret level-outside the TK security control 

system. This action significantly increased the use of intelligence derived from 

the GAMBIT program. The chairman of COMIREX managed, and continues to 

manage, the TK security system for the DCI. 

S~ 

~~/~-:ia BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -122-

_____________ ..Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ 

~N-ORCON 

The BYEMAN Control System, which manages access to operational and 

program data on NRP programs, is managed by the NROi it was unaffected by 

the DO's modifications to the TK security system. 

Anticipation of Success 

As the launching date of the first GAMBIT mission drew near, a sense of 

excitement and anticipation was rent throughout the Intelligence Community. Although the NRO had simulated GAMBIT imagery to COMOR and other Community organizations, it was difficult for some Community members to actually accept the fact that imagery satellite technology could 

progress so far and so fast. To improve imagery resolution from as poor as 50-

foot ground-resolved-distance (GRD), or worse, on the earliest CORONAs to 

a projected two feet on GAMBIT, in the space of less than three years, was a 

spectacular technical achievement and the potential for satisfying priority 

intelligence requirements was tremendous. The scientific and technical (S& T) 

organizations of the military services eagerly awaited the high-resolution 

satellite imagery which would allow them-for the first time-to perform true 

S& T analysis. Could the im ery really be as good as predicted? The Intelligence Community was not ppointed. With the successful recovery of the 

first GAMBIT-I/KH-7 mission on 14 July 1963 (GMT), the system's potentialin terms of high-resolution capability-was clearly demonstrated, despite the 

fact that only three high priority national targets were acquired. 

GAMBIT enabled the photointerpreter/analyst to do precise order-ofbattle identification and true technical intelligence reporting for the first time 

using satellite imagery. The capability to enlarge the original negative 100 

times-or as much as 2,000 times later in the program-greatly assisted in 

exploitation of the imagery for technical details. It could be said that the 

CORONA program removed blinders from the Intelligence Community, with 

respect to worldwide denied territories, and now GAMBIT provided the 

required image quality to allow unambiguous intelligence ju ents concerning foreign weapons developments, weapons deployment, r of battle, and 

command-and-control and CC&D information, among other areas of intelligence need where high-resolution imagery was essential. For the first time, the 

non-photointerpreter would find it easier to believe what he was being told; 

he could actually identify targets in the imagery. 

Requirements Definition Challenge 

of GAMBIT and its relatively small footprint (5-nm 

swath, variabl ngth) as compared to CORONA's broad coverage (140-nm 

swath) presented new cha r the Community in defining its collection 

requirements. Whereas C was capable of covering huge areas of 

denied territory and large numbers of targets in a single operation, GAMBIT 

would normally be programmed against single gets. Thus GAMBIT was 

characterized as a "surveillance" system as op to CORONA, which was 

-123-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

- ---..,.~~- SECRET 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
~ON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

a "search" system. (Surveillance is defined as periodic coverage of known 

installations, including intelligence on equipment and activity associated with 

both.) 

For early GAMBIT missions, requirements were prioritized on a target-bytarget basis. Thus, if there were two important targets in close proximity, a 

decision had to be made as to which had the higher priority, so that the 

targeting software algorithm could make a proper selection. This led to very 

vigorous debates among the PWG/COMOR members as to which ta s 

were of highest national importance. Such debate was critical, especially rly 

in the program, when there was usually only a single access to many of the 

important t areas. A typical early method for resolving priority conflicts 

was to plot satellite revolution and its access swath on a large-scale map 

that also contained all the priority targets. Every revolution was then reviewed 

by the PWG and, in cases of conflict, the problem was resolved by arbitrary 

"fine tuning" of target . rities. This was sometimes a long-drawn-out 

acrimonious process that eft all parties dissatisfied. Sometimes it was also an 

exercise in futility, as the actual orbit achieved after launching often varied 

significantly from the planned orbit, and a special meeting would be needed 

to repeat the entire "tunin rocess. It was obvious that this procedure could 

not be used effectively an extended period, since both the mission 

duration grew and the number of requirements increased rapidly-from a few 

hundred targets in 1963 to more than 32,000 by 1984. (See the Surveillance 

Target Requirements Table for an illustration of numbers of unique targets and 

requirements for FY-84.) 

In solving the requirements-management problem a requirements structure was developed in which sets of like requirements-such as Soviet 55-11 

ICBM complexes-were grouped into unique "problem-oriented sets" (PaS) 

and assigned a collection priority based on substantiated intelligence need. 

Within these pass, individual requirements that had a h current interest, 

such as on-going modifications at an ICBM site, could aced in a special 

high-current-interest pas with a suitable priority for improving chances of 

successful collection. NRO simulations conclusively demonstrated to the 

h MB in or' f 

on, cou se ectlon muc more 

c IV y could the manual method of t PWG. This improved 

methodology for managing target requirements evolved into what became 

known as the COMIREX Requirements Structure (CRS). The CRS has four 

principal structural elements: The intelligence problem (lP), collection problem 

sets (CPS), exploitation problem sets (EPS), and reporting requirements. 

Together, these structural elements served to integrate imagery collection, 

exploitation, and reporting requirements, thus making imagery intelligence 

more responsive to user needs, while, at the same time, facilitating the 

management of imagery requirements and the evaluation of the imagery 

intelligence process. 

Handle 

~ via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -124-

......... _______________ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
I 

.... 

N 

VI 

, 

0:> 

n;;;; 

§ s:: O:>~).. 

-<3Z 

.,.,- ' 

... 

.... --..:: "'~ r- a~r-r, 

crcz 

~~7"' 

CO"" ~--~ 

proved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 

5· i ~O~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 

--..:: ..... 

.,., 

d for Release: 2018/09/11 
SE~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~N-ORCON 

Elements of the COMIREX Requirements Structure 

COMIREX Autom.::lted Management System (CAMS) 

As the definition of intelligence requirements grew more complex and 

GAMBIT and other NRO imagery satellite programs delivered increasing 

amounts of imagery, the need for an automated, interactive requirements 

management system became imperative. Although some computer support to 

the management of imagery satellite inte . ments was available 

to the community from the earliest days the CORONA p , all such 

support was in the form of off-line programs that were u 

planning and requirements analysis, but had little utility for near real-time 

management of requirements durin the course of a mission. In addition, the 

Community members could not tly access the national data base to 

retrieve data on target requirements, imaging attempts, and past coverage. 

This shortfall was eliminated in 1976, when the COMIREX Automated Management System (CAMS) became operational. For the first time, Intelligence 

Community members could use a CAMS computer terminal located in their 

own facility to nominate a collection or exploitation requirement. If the 

requirement was of a time-sensitive nature, for example, a SIGINT tip-off 

indicating an on-going ICBM loading exercise at an operational ICBM complex, the COMIREX Staff could take immediate action by directly tasking the 

NRO to attempt coverage of this requirement on a priority basis. Provided an 

imagery satellite was on orbit, it could be tasked against such a requirement in 

a matter of minutes, rather than hours or days. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -126-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

CtA. 

U &1 S 

COMMANDS - DIA 

ARMY 

NAVY 

AIR FORCEN'IC 

NSA 

STATE 

DMA 

COMIREX MEMBERS 

AND CONSULT ANTS 

COMIREX 

STAFF 

COMIREX 

STAFF 

CAMS/Nationallmagery Community Networks* 

CAMS National Imagery Community Network131 

USER/FUNCTION 

INTERFACES • Collection Nominations 

• Exploitation Nominations 

• Film Distribution 

Nominations 

• Imagery Processing 

Nominations PROCESSING 

COMIREX 

MEMBERS 

Accomplishments 

Status 

Target Data 

COMIREX 

STAFF 

• Nominations! 

Requirements 

F=i1es 

• Tasking J=lles 

• Monitoring Files 

• Accomplishments 

Files 

• Entry &: Review 

• Tasking 

• Monitoring 

• Accomplishments 

• Target Analysis CAMS ENVIRONMENT" &. Management 

• Requirements 

• Tasking &. 

Cuidance 

• Monitoring 

• Support 

·Comirex automated management system functional 

overview, TCS-5240-77, lune 1977. 

CAMS Environment132 

-127-

SYSTEM TO SYSTEM 

INTERFACES 

~ 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SEC~ N~ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

National Imagery Exploitation Responsibilities 

In 1961, National Security Council Directive (NSClD) No.8 established 

responsibility and procedures for the efficient conduct of image loitation 

in response to national foreign intelligence questions. It tional 

Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)-for national priority exploitation 

of satellite imagery-and cha it with providing support services to imagery 

exploitation organizations in t Washington, D.C., area. The NPIC was also 

charged with maintaining an up-to-date, consolidated file on imagery-derived 

target data to serve national and departmental needs. The NSCID directed 

that imagery exploitation requirements uniquely departmental in nature, for 

example, DoD studies, were not the direct responsibility of the NPIC; they 

were to be undertaken by the departments concerned. Those agencies 

without photointerpretation capabilities, such as the State Department, could 

call on NPIC to meet its unique readout requirements. 

Consistent with NSCID No.8, a National Tasking Plan for the Exploitation 

of Multi-Sensor Imagery was promulgated in January 1967. This plan defined 

the specific roles and responsibilities of Intelligence Community imagery 

exploitation organizations, which included NPIC, CIA, DIA, Army, Navy, and 

Air Force, in response to national requirements. National re . ements for 

imagery exploitation by the Intelligence Community were to e developed 

and managed by COMIREX. 

Film-Dissemination Responsibilities 

Requirements for overhead imagery dissemination are prescribed by the 

Exploitation Subcommittee of COMIREX in response to Community needs. 

Imagery products to be disseminated include film, exploitation data, and 

printed matter. Additional imagery-related material which must be included 

with the product are such things as target coverage data, film indexing, camera 

performance evaluation, mapping, cloud coverage/general weather, requirements satisfaction, and evaluation of overall system performance. The dissemination process is dynamic, continuously supplying data, whether it be on film 

products, on operational control data and management of a mission underway, on future mission planning data, or on the exploitation of end-products. 

National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) 

NPIC plays a very important role in the success of overhead imagery 

programs. The collection of la volumes of high-resolution imagery would 

serve little purpose without a d icated and responsive organization to exploit 

and report on key intelligence information derived from each mission as well 

as on routine information, such as order-of-battle, on which continuing and 

long-range intelligence decisions are based. NPIC provided outstanding 

readout re 'ng to meet national intelligence exploitation requirements 

through e GAMBIT program. GAMBIT exploitation was divided into 

three phases: 

rr~ ~:~:ia BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -128-

_______________ lApproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312----------.......J 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
S~ 

~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Development of the National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale 

As GAMBIT matured, in terms of both quality and quantity of imagery, 

and as national collection and exploitation . ements rapidly expanded 

and became more complex, it became appa the Community needed a 

better measure for rating the quality of imagery in terms of satisfying stated 

requirements. The measure that had been in use since the first successful 

satellite mission consisted of a' ures as Good, Fair, or Poor. This 

scale did not give the user or r sufficient information on the 

probability that the imagery would answer a specific intelligence need, such as 

being able to differentiate between aT-54 and aT-55 tank. 

The word "quality" has a different meaning for photoscientists than it 

does for collection-system engineers. To avoid misunderstanding, a National 

Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (known more familiarly by its abbreviation NIIRS, and pronounced "nears") was developed. NIIRS substitutes the 

phrase "information potential for intelligence purposes" for the word "quality." The purpose of this scale is stated concisely: "to obtain from the 

photointe a judgment as to the interpretability of an acquired image." 

As a resul of adopting the NIIRS concept in 1972, the Community users 

acquired a quick, accurate method for assessing whether or not a requirement 

had been met and, in turn, the collection manager (COMIREX) had a reliable 

system for continuing tasking of the collector (NRO) and cancelling tasking 

once the required NIIRS quality had been achieved. The NIIRS rating scale 

ranged from 0 (which meant that interpretabili f the imagery precluded its 

use for photointerpretation) to 9 (which pr' the hi interpretation 

capability). The following summary includes typical examp es for the ten NIIRS 

categories. 

Interpretability Criteria 

Rating Category 0 

Interpretability of the imagery precludes its use for photointerpretation 

due to obscuration, degradation, or very poor resolution. 

Rating Category 1 

Detect the presence of large aircraft at an airfield. 

Detect a launching complex at a known missile-test range. 

Detect armored/artillery ground forces training areas. 

Rating Category 2 

Count accurately all large straight-wing aircraft and all-large sweptjdeltawing aircraft at an airfield. 

~[€RH 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems lointly 

BYE 140002-90 -130-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 SF~ 

~~ORCON 

Identify a completed T III-C launching area, within a known ICBM 

complex, by road pattern/ha dstand configuration. 

Rating Category 3 

Count accurately all straight-wing aircraft; count accurately all sweptwing aircraft; and count accurately all delta-wing aircraft at an airfield. 

Detect vehicles/pieces of equipment at a SAM, SSM, or ABM fixed-missile 

site. 

Rating Category 4 

Identify a fighter aircraft by type, when singly deployed. 

Identify an SA-2 or CSA-I missile by the presence and relative positions of 

wings and control fins. 

Identify trucks at a ground forces installation as cargo, flatbed, or van. 

Rating Category 5 

Detect the presence of call letters/numbers and alphabetical country 

designator on the wings of large commercial/cargo aircraft (where alphanumerics are three feet high or greater). 

Identify an SA-1 transporter by overall configuration and details of chassis 

construction. 

Identify a singly deployed tank at a ground forces installation as light or 

medium/heavy. 

Rating Category 6 

Identify a FAGOT* or MIDGET* ter aircraft by canopy configuration 

when si deployed. Identify the f owing missile ground support equipment at a own strategic missile site: warhead/checkout van and fuel/oxidizer transporter. 

Rating Category 7 

Identify the pitot boom on a FLAGON* fighter aircraft. 

Identify a strategic missile transporter/erector (fixed or mobile system) 

when not in a known missile activity area. 

Rating Category 8 

Identify on a FISHBED-j* fighter aircraft, the dielectric patch outboard on 

each wing leading edge and the horizontal tail-plane tip spikes . 

• NATO designators for Soviet aircraft. 

-131-

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Identify the VHf antenna on the forward transit support assembly of an 

SA-4 transporter/launcher. 

Rating Category 9 

Identify on the appropriate model fiSH BED fighter aircraft: wing flap 

actuator fairings; fairings in after-burner area above horizontal tail plane; pitot 

boom pitch-and-yaw vanes (when uncovered), and air dump port forward of 

canopy. 

Identify a Mod-3 SA-2 missile by the canards (just aft of nose), 

~ 

The fully develo GAMBIT -3 was the only overhead imagery system 

of consistent y acquiring imageryl I 

Weather Support 

Weather support to GAMBIT was provided by a special pr 

element of the Air force's Global Weather Central (GWe) located at 

Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. GWC used inputs 

from US weather satellites, weather station reports (including those of the 

Soviet Union), and pilot reports to provide support to US imagery reconnaissance satellite operations. 

GWC personnel were also attached to the NRO to provide dose interaction in areas of mission scheduling, planning, and on-orbit operations. 

Weather support did not playa key role in early GAMBIT rations, 

since the missions were not film-limited (due to their short 0 it times). 

Access to priority targets was limited and the number of target requirements 

was initially small; however, as mission length extended, weather su 

played an increasingly important role in contributing to optimum film u ization and, in turn, mission success. Weather support was utilized both in the 

mission-planning stage (climatological influence on mission scheduling and 

orbit selection) and on-orbit operations (target weather forecasts to influence 

ion and target verification to determine probability that a target 

aged successfully). As the GAMBIT pro matured and became 

more sophisticated, GWe's weather support deve similarly. A measure 

of the importance of weather support to GAMBIT was the amount of doudfree i ery returned using actual weather su rt versus that which could be 

when using statistical clima or example, in the case of 

intel' nce interest in t Eurasian land mass, climatology 

showed 65% of earth's surface as normally cloud-covered. Therefore, if requirements were p d disre he weather factor, one 

could expect returns of only rcent imagery; however, as 

missions were extended and weather forecast capabilities were routinely 

utilized, the cloud-free return averaged 70 percent with a high of approximately 80 percent cloud-free. In effect, weather support to the mature 

GAMBIT program made it possible to double the amount of cloud-free 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -132-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
E E I E 

--- THOR/BURNER 

ORBIT CONTROL SPIN 

VIDEO SYSTEM 

/BARNES IR SENSOR 

VIDEO 

CLOUD TOPS "'''''''UK.'' TO ±1000' 

DATA READOUT 

R ITAL 

INCLINATION 

ORBIT 450 NM CIRCULAR 

LIFETIME 9 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
s~ ~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

imagery and, in turn, significantly increased the level of intelli~ence requirement satisfaction. On the preceding pages are colored charts dlustra the 

weather problem: the first chart shows the mean cloud-"freeness" the 

month of January, the second shows the same data for the mo~th of July. F?r 

both months, there is less than a 40-percent chance of observmg a target m 

the primary areas of interest on a given day. 

A weather satellite was developed and managed in the "white" world by 

the Air Force and treated initially as a classified S 'al Access Required (SAR) 

Program (Air Force Program 417), In reality, the was funded by 

the NRO and was used primarily to support NRO photographic programs, 

although other military users (including tactical commands) routinely used the 

data. The program goal was to have a morning satellite, called a "Scout," for 

forecast pu es with an afternoon Scout for verification. Due to unanticipated mission res, it was not always possible to have the desired morningafternoon satellite combination continuously on orbit. Data as current as 

about three hours old could be applied to GAMBIT weather forecasts when 

the morning weather satellite was operational. 

GAMBIT Intelligence Utility 

The CORONA pro ram provided, for the first time in US history, a 

capability to monitor ary and industrial developments over vast areas of 

the Soviet Union and other denied areas of the world. Although CORONA 

provided immeasurable contributions to national security, its resolution was 

not good enough to answer numerous critical intelligence questions, such as 

those regarding weapons development, that the United States needed to 

guide counter weapons development. Nor could it provide the image quality 

the scientific and technical (S& T) intelligence anizations r 'red to do true 

S& T analysis. GAMBIT aptly filled this high- ution need a by the end of 

the program, was routinely collecting imagery of round resolved 

distance (GRD), or better. The following Table illustrates t e wide range of 

target categories an raphic areas that GAMBIT was able to photograph 

routinely. Although the ta shown are for a single GAMBIT mission, the 

numbers and distribution are typical for the mature GAMBIT system. 

It has been asserted by individuals responsible for major weapon system 

developments that one of the greatest contributions of GAMBIT was the 

billions of dollars it helped to save in US weapons development. For the first 

time, US personnel had enough detailed information and accurate mensuration data to develop engineering drawings on foreign weapons capabilities. 

This facilitated the design of cost-effective counter weapons systems; it was no 

longer necessary to design against a "worst case" possibility, 

_SEeItElHandle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -136-

11117 .................. ---------Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312------
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

-137-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

s~ ~N-ORCON 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
SE~ 

N~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

In 1981, the NPIC identified a number of key historical events for which 

GAMBIT provided significant intelligence information.133 They were: 

a. The Soviet strategic submarine story with emphasis on the Y - and D-class 

submarines (1969-75). 

b. The Soviet Union vs. United States race to the moon, with emphasis on 

launching Complex J at Tyuratam Missile Test Center (1965-72). 

c. The Soviet ground order-of-battle story to include: 

(1) Unit reporting (1973-present). 

(2) The Sino-Soviet border (1965-present). 

d. The Soviet strategic missile story, with emphasis on SS-9 developments 

(1964-71). 

e. Variations in aircraft (a number of examples exist although the Bear-F 

variants were cited) (1969-present). 

f. Communication vehicles/equipment first identified by GAMBIT. This may 

ultimately include big radars like DOG HOUSE, HEN HOUSE, and overhorizon detectors (1963-present). 

g. The Anti-Ballistic-Missile vs. long-Range SAM (SA-5) Controversy 

(1963-69). 

h. The development of large solid-propellant motors for strategic missiles at 

Pavlograd (1969-present). 

i. The SS-16/20 mobile-missile story from birth to deployment 

(1972-present). 

j. The Caspian Sea Monster story (1967 -present). 

k. The evaluation of Soviet reconnaissance programs, based on the sighting 

of Seiman Stars (1974-77). 

L The development of Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception 

techniques (1963-present). 

m. The construction of suspect advanced weapons-related facilities in 

China (1967-72). 

n.· . n f 

o. 

p.~--,-----------------~----------------------------

Satisfaction of Major Intelligence Requirements 

The following photographs are examples of GAMBIT's continuous contribution to satisfying major intelligence requirements during the 1963-84 

timeframe. 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -138-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

pproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
I 

.... 

proved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 

d for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C05099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

44-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for "",'",a~"" 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

..... ------------Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

-1 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Soviet 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

-161 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

-162-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Tower 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS09931 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
proved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 

d for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Sinai Lines on 10 Oct 

69-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

pproved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C0509931 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

s~ ~N-ORCON 

• Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Contributions. Some mention of GAMBIT's ability to satisfy MC&G requirements is worth noting. Although accorded 

little publicity throughout the program, GAMBIT did satisfy Defense Mapping 

Agency (DMA) requirements for high-resolution imagery of foreign urban 

areas, airfields, d harbors; accurate updated 000 maps could be 

compiled. Litera ds of such specific requirements were satisfied by 

GAMBIT. The "satisfaction level" was high because the requirement existed 

worldwide and was usually not in conflict with priority intelligence requirements. Also, in dense Sino-Soviet target areas, MC&G requirements could 

frequently "piggy-back" on higher priority intelligence requirements. The final 

GAMBIT mission provided an illustration of the extensiveness of DMA's 

MC&G requirements. Of the 47,162 requirements tasked to this GAMBIT 

mission, 7,960 or 17 percent were MC&G requirements. 

Reverse side blank 

-175-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

s~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Appendix B 

A CORONA Summary* 

SE~ ~~ORCON 

The CORONA Program was approved for development by President 

Eisenhower on 7 February 1958. At White House direction, the program was 

organized under the joint leadership of CIA's Richard M. Bissell, Jr., and US 

Air Force Brig. Gen. Osmund J. Ritland. CORONA was a breakout from a 

larger satellite reconnaissance development called WS-117L, which was 

being conducted at the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD) in 

Inglewood, California. A portion of WS-117L, called Discoverer, was the 

precursor of, and cover for, CORONA. 

The AFBMD was res onsible for all hardware 

except the camera-and ditionally, for providin ng, tracking, and 

recovery facilities to the program. The CIA funded the camera development 

and reentry vehicle procurement, provided security supervision for the 

"black" aspects of the program, and defined its covert objectives, 

The Lockheed Missile and e Division (under contract to both the 

CIA and BMD) was to integrate equipment, develop the upper (spacecraft) 

stage, and furnish leadership in testing, launching, and on-orbit control 

operations, Itek developed the camera, General Electric built the recovery 

capsule, and Douglas furnished the Thor boosters. 

CORONA security kept the program "black." This was not hard to do, 

since, to the uncleared world, CORONA could be presented as the old 

Discoverer-a technological program for exploring the space environment 

and for pioneeri 'stance to later satellites. The CORONA launching site 

would be Vande AFB; its control station would be at Sunnyvale, and 

recovery ships and aircraft would work out of Oahu. 

CORONA No.1 was launched on 28 February 1957, purely as a testflight. In a subsequent series of eleven flights, extending to August 1960, 

there were no successes. Flight No. 13, a d' ostic flight, carrying only test 

instrumentation, was recovered by water-p n 12 August 1960. But the 

first actual success-with "success" measured in terms of exposed film 

delivered-was flight No. 14, air-recovered on 18 August 1960. 

In the first two years of operation, dating from 18 August 1960, 48 

photographic missions were attempted with 19 "true" successes. The original 

camera, retrospectively called KH-1, produced nominal resolutions of 40 

feet; with improvement in cameras, models known as KH-2 and KH-3, as well 

as film, resolutions began to move below 10 feet. There was continual 

improvement in the CORONA system. Aster . arrangement, called 

CORONA-M and also known as KH-4, was int in 1962. In 1963, the 

CORONA-j, also known as KH-4A, entered the inventory. It was capable of 

carrying 15,000 feet of film in each of two re-entry capsules. The final 

improvement was the constant-rotator camera, the KH-4B, which achieved 

resolutions as small as six feet at nadir. 

'See also F.C.E. Oder, James C. Fitzpatrick, Paul E. Worthman, The CORONA Story, December 

1988, BYE 140001-88. 

-177-

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~ON Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

CORONA's life span, as a program, was 12 years and covered 145 

launchings. Ground resolutions of 6-10 feet were eventually achieved. By 

1970, CORONA could remain in orbit for 19 days, make operational 

responses to cloud-cover, provide accurate mapping information, and return 

coverages as large as 8,400,000 nm2 • The final cost of an average mission was 

$7-8 million. 

The Intelligence Community described CORONA's contribution to its 

resources as "virtually immeasurable." 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -178-

for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Appendix C 

S~ 

~N-ORCON 

Leningrad and LANYARD: Search for the GRIFFON134 

During the late summer of 1961, NPIC photointerpreters, examining 

imagery obtained by a CORONA satellite (mission No. 9017, launched in 

June 1961), discovered clearing and site preparation work near . ad. 

This construction resembled prototype structures photographed in 

1960 during a U-2 overflight of Saryshagan Missile Test Center, where the 

Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) effort was headquartered. Work on this 

Leningrad system continued throughout 1962 and eventually involved three 

sites with nearly 30 launchers. A similar installation was seen in CORONA 

imagery of Tallinn, Estonia. The Intelligence Community debated the mission 

of this Leningrad system (assigned the NATO designator GRIFFON) but had 

precious lit h-resolution imagery on which to base its estimates. The Air 

Force believed to be an ABM system, CIA and the Army thought it was 

designed to interdict high-flying US bombers such as the B-52 and 8-58. 

In 1961, CORONA's KH-2 imagery could resolve no objects smaller than 

10-15 feet on a side at nadir; consequently, photo-interpreters could not 

distinguish between the GRIFFON SA-S missile and the air-to-air GUIDELINE 

SA-2, which were approximately the same length. Meanwhile, a new Hconfiguration was seen for the radars at GRIFFON sites around Leningrad. 

Again, CORONA imagery was such that interpreters could not determine the 

type of radar antennas being installed at these H-sites, information that would 

be important in determining the EliNT parameters of the radar. 

8y early 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, already 

confronted with a worsening situation in Southeast Asia, now had to 

countenance the possibility of undertaking the expensive'development of an 

I~BM system. Before taking such a step, McNamara urged DCI John A. 

McCone to get better pictures so that NPIC's photointerpreters could be 

more positive in their identification of the Leningrad weapon system. In his 

turn, McCone urged DNRO Joseph Charyk to do everything possible to 

obtain high-resolution photographs of the Leningrad system, including 

speeding up the launching of the GAMBIT satellite (with its 77-inch focallength camera). Charyk, however, realized that it would not be possible to 

launch the GAMBIT system before mid-1963. Consequently, in April 1962, he 

signed an agreement with CIA's Deputy Director for Research, Herbert 

"Pete" Scoville, Jr., for a joint Air Force-CIA "crash" effort to provide an 

interim spotting satellite using part of the. CORONA system and a 

high-resolution E-S camera which had bee developed by Itek Corporation 

for the moribund Samos program. 

This hybrid effort was known as Project LANYARD and its camera was 

designated the KH-6. LANYARD was to be overseen by CIA's West Coast 

Contract Office and, like the ARGON mapping-camera (KH-S) effort for the 

Army Map Service, was to come under the CORONA security cloak. 

Consequently, the contractors working for the "black" Air Force were not 

witting of the project. 

-179-

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems JOintly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
s~ 

~N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

that the LANYARD effort could adapt existing and proven 

launching recovery systems to accommodate the E-5/KH-6 camera. This 

device, with its 66-inch focal length and f/6.0 optics, was expected to provide 

a resolution of 5 to 6 feet while photogr ing a swath about 40 miles wide. 

The LANYARD camera not only had a al length 42 inches longer than 

CORONA, it also used r film, 127-mm (5-inch) compared with CORONA's 70-mm (2.75-inch) fi m. 

Bigger Spacecraft, New Booster, Roll-Joint Needed 

Although the Itek E-5 camera had already been built and the CORONA/ Agena spacecraft and film-return system were fully operational, there 

remained a considerable problem in mating the camera to the existing 

system. In August 1962, LMSC undertook to enlarge CORONA's 9-foot-long 

spacecraft so it could accommodate the E-5/KH-6 camera. The new enclosure was 14 feet long. 

The heavier LANYARD payload also required more thrust to put it into a 

polar orbit and Douglas Aircraft Company began work in late 1962 to 

devel a more powerful Thor rocket for launching this interim "spotting" 

sate The new booster was known as the thrust-augmented Thor, or TAT, 

and consisted of a standard Thor missile to which were strapped three solidpropellant rockets (manufactured by Thiokol Corporation) which could be 

jettisoned after firing. The new TAT configuration was first tested on 28 

February 1963, when it was used to launch CORONA mission No. 9052. 

Unfortunately, one of the strap-on boosters failed to separate and the entire 

mission was destroyed 100 seconds after launching. 

In developing LANYARD, LMSC designed and built a "roll-joint" which 

permitted the camera segment of the spacecraft to rotate up to 30 degrees 

from the vertical while attached to the Agena-B. The roll-joint, a planetary 

gear arrangement, made it possible to point the E-5/KH-6 camera at off-axis 

targets to either side of nadir. During the roll operations, the Agena-B 

maintained X-Y -Z-axis stability for the entire orbiting platform. The limitation 

of the LANYARD roll-joint was that it would provide only 100 stereo pairs of 

pictures of selected targets during a single mission. (This was only 25-30 

percent of the number of stereo-pairs that the GAMBIT system hoped to 

produce with its orbital-control vehicle.) 

The first LANYARD satellite, mission No. 8001, was launched on 18 

March 1963. The TAT worked smoothly but the satellite failed to go into 

orbit, because of a second-stage Agena-B malfunction. A second flight, 

mission No. 8002, on 18 May 1963, went into orbit and its payload was 

successfully returned to earth, but the E-5/KH-6 camera had failed and no 

pictures had been taken. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-T ALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -180-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 c~ 

~~~~CON 

The P-Camera Experiment 

Meanwhile, the pressure from within the Intelli nce Community for 

high-resolution imagery of the Leningrad system had a point where 

the Directors of Programs A and B were literally clutching at straws. On 22 

April 1963, DCI McCone flew to Boston and persuaded Dr. Edward M. 

Purcell of Harvard, an original member of Edwin Land's 1954 TCP Intelligence Panel, to chair a panel to survey the future of reconnaissance satellites 

and consider methods for improving their imagery. 

During this meeting, McCone mentioned to Purcell the problem of 

obtaining imagery of the Leningrad site. The Nobel-prize-winning physicist 

suggested a quick-and-dirty method of obtaining such imagery: put a 

telescope and strip camera in a CORONA satellite and photograph the 

Leningrad target. He thought this might be done with a minimum 

expenditure. 

The suggestion was passed along to the CORONA Program Office, 

which approached Itek Corporation with the idea. Using off-the-shelf parts, 

Itek built a 240-inch Cassegrain telescope, using "folded optics," and 

coupled it with a 127 -mm strip camera. This came to be known as the P-(for 

Purcell}-camera experiment. Meanwhile, in California, modifications were 

made to a standard CORONA-M spacecraft. By using vacant space within the 

film-transport area of the spacecraft, Lockheed engineers were able to install 

a dummy unit, the same size and weight as the P-camera. They also cut an 

optical port which, like the optical ports for the KH-4 camera, was provided 

with a protective door. After launching and orbital insertion, these doors 

were blown off with small pyrotechnic devices. 

On 12 June 1963, CORONA mission No. 9054 was sent aloft with its 

normal MURAL/KH-4 camera payload plus the dummy P-camera. The 

CORONA program managers and engineers ho to determine: (1) if the Pcamera would fit into the payload area witho disrupting the functions of 

the MURAL camera; (2) if the TAT could boost this heavier load into orbit; 

and (3) if the Agena-B's on-orbit control systems could stabilize the spacecraft with this second device inside. The SRV was deorbited on 16 June after 

a normal mission. The KH-4 camera had exposed its full load of film and 

there was no apparent difficulty in maintaining spacecraft stability. 

Then, on 26 June 1963, CORONA mission No. 9056 was orbited, with 

the one-and-only P-camera on board, along with a standard MURAL camera. 

Everyone was anxious to see the results of this experiment and hoped that 

more could be learned about the Leningrad system. On the CORONA 

satellite's first engineerin s over the Satellite Control Facility at Sunnyvale, the spacecraft's elemetry indicated that the door covering the P-camera's optical port had not blown off. Lt. Col. Vernard Webb, 

CIA's chief of satellite operations on the West Coast, was hopeful that this 

was faulty telemetry. He ordered the camera turned on during the next pass 

over Lenin The SRV was deorbited on 30 June and a normal recovery 

was made When the film was developed the P-camera's film was blank, 

proving that the optical-port door had not blown off. 

-181-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

References 

s~ 

~N-ORCON 

1. John S.D. Eisenhower, Strictly Personal, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, NY, 1974, p. 

609. 

2. james R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special 

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 

1977, p. 68. 

3. George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, Harvard University Press, 

Cambridge, MA, 1976, p. xxi. 

4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden 

City, NY, 1963, pp. 77-81. 

5. Ibid., p. 1. 

6. W.W. Rostow, Open Skies, Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955, University of Texas 

University Press, Austin, TX, 1982, p. xiii. 

7. Eisenhower, op.cit., p. 522. 

8. Ibid., p. 483. 

9. For more information on CORONA, see Appendix B. 

10. Named for a Grecian island. Almost instantly (and erroneously) elevated to acronymic 

status by the press, as representing "Satellite and Missile Observation System." 

11. Kistiakowsky, op.cit., p. 141. 

12. Ibid., p. 192. 

13. Ibid., p. 246. 

14. Ibid., p. 397. 

15. Letter, A.B. Simmons to J.V. Charyk, 22 jul 60, no subj. 

16. Memo, Exec. Sec. USIB for USIB, 5 Jul 60, USIB-D-33.6/8, USIB/S files, Secret. 

17. Minutes of USIB Meeting, 9 Aug 60, USIB-M-111 Approving DClD No. 2/7, Based on USIBD41.2/1 (revised) 28 Jul 60. USIB files, Secret. 

18. Memo for Record, BGen R.D. Curtin, 10 Aug 60. 

19. Letter, F.G. Foster, EKe, to BMD attn. Maj. E.J. Conway, 13 Aug 60, no subj. 

20. Memo for Record, BGen R.E. Greer, Dir SIP, 20 Sep 60, subj: "SAM OS Program Meeting 

with SAFUS." 

21. Memo for Record, Col. P.J. Heran, 8 Nov 60, subj: "Trip Report to HQ USAF" (2-4 Nov 60); 

TWX SAFMS-99153, SAFUS to BMD, 4 Nov 60. 

22. TWX AFMPP-WS-2-96055, USAF to AMC 24 Oct 60; TWX DPL3416 SAC to ARDC/BMD 17 

Nov 60; ARDC Ops Order 60-1,23 Nov 60. 

23. Memo (Secret) J.V. Charyk, SAFUS, to CjS USAF, 6 Dec 60; subj: "Basic Policy Concerning 

Samos." 

24. Memo (Secret-Special Handling), J.V. Charyk, SAFUS, to CIS, USAF, 6 Dec 60, subj: "Basic 

Policy Concerning Samos." 

25. Kistiakowsky, op. cit., p. 300. 

26. Memo for Record, Col. P.J. Heran, 8 Nov 60, op. cit. 

27. Memo (not sent), BGen R.E. Greer, Dir/Samos Proj., to SAFUS, approx 28 Dec 60, Subj: 

Progress Report Samos. 

28. Ibid. 

29. "Satellite Reconnaissance Plan," 3 Apr 61, SAFMS, in SAFSP-3 files. 

30. Ibid. 

31. Ibid. 

32. 

33. 

Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Vol iliA-GAMBIT, Jan 74, pp. 23-24. 

"Subsystem Engineering Analysis Report," Eastman-Kodak Co. 7th Issue, 12 Aug 65. 

34. Memo, "Air Retrieval for Program 483A," W.F. Sampson, Aerospace Corp to Col. Q.A. 

RiePr:d6 Prog, 19 Jan 62. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

Msg 280, approx 3 Aug 62. 

TWX, AFSS-DIR-M-2082 to Dir/SP, 24 Aug 62. 

"206 Program Report," GE, 1967. 

Memo, BGen J.L. Martin, Jr., Dir/SP to DNRO, 29 Aug 67, Subj: "Summary Analysis of 

Program 206 (GAMBIT)." 

-183 .. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~l 

~RN-ORCON 

References (continued) 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

59. 

60. 

61. 

62. 

63. 

64. 

65. 

66. 

67. 

68. 

69. 

70. 

71. 

72. 

73. 

74. 

75. 

76. 

TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2095, J.V. Charyk, SAFUS, to M/Gen R.E. Greer, Dir/SP, 30 Oct 62. 

As noted earlier, the E-6 program was cancelled on 31 Jan 63. 

Greer interview by R. Perry, 22 Nov 62. 

For background information on LANYARD, see Appendix C. 

Memo for Record, Col. W.G. King, Subj: "Development of Roll-Joint Capability," 28 Jan 63. 

TWX, SAFSS-1-M-2129 to Greer, 30 Nov 62. 

TWX SAFSS-1-M-2138, SAFSS to SAFSP, 19 Dec 62. 

The first GAMBIT hardware on the VAFB launching pad was an engineering model, acting 

as a "stand-in" for rehearsals of (Atlas) booster check-out procedures. On 11 May 1963, 

problems with a faulty booster valve and with the fuel-loading sequence caused the Atlas 

to lose its critically-essential internal pressure and collapse. The episode occurred during 

what was solely a static check-out; no flight phase was intended or possible, in this mode. 

Dr. Flax was the only DNRO who was, in a "white" capacity, Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force (R&D). 

Interview, MGen J.l. Martin, Jr., USAF (Ret.), 26 Mar 86. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

Interview, Col. F.S. Buzard, (USAF-Ret), Jul 86. 

Martin interview, op. cit. 

Thomas G. Belden, "A Study of Project Completion Times," WADC Historical Studies, 

1955. 

Chuck Yeager and Lee Janos, Yeager, An Autobiography, Bantam Books, 1985, pp. 179-80. 

MGen John L. Martin, Jr., "A Specialized Incentive Contract Structure for Satellite Projects," 

Ref. No. SP142866, 18 Apr 69. 

MGen J.L. Martin, Jr., written communication, 13 Mar 87. 

Interview, Capt. Frank B. Gorman (USN-Ret) Nov 86. 

Memo MGen R.E. Greer, Dir/SP to Col. W.G. King, Dir/GAMBIT Ole, 13 Dec 62; Subj: G'. 

"Preliminary Development Plan for G'," Jan 1984, SAFSPc=] 

Memo, MGen R.E. Greer, Dir/SP, to Col. W.G. King, Dir GAMBIT Ole, 2 Jan 64, Subj: 0. 

"Preliminary Development Plan for G'," op. cit. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

Quarterly Progress Report (QPR) to DNRO, 30 Sep 64. 

Interview, Leslie Mitchell, Eastman Kodak Co., Oct 86. 

QPR, 30 Jun 65. 

"Program 110 Status Book" SAFSPII1972 BYE 94162-72. 

PET Report, Mission 4301/6, updat~ "To be read out, a photograph must represent the confluence of several aspects of success. 

The camera must have operated correctly, causing no perturbations which would make the 

negative unreadable. Such perturbations could include uncompensated smear, incorrect 

focus, faulty compensation for thermal effects, solar or terrestrial flare, and (occasionally) 

degraded optics. The film had to be unmarred either by faulty manufacturing or by 

scratches caused by film transport or take up. All of these factors were nominally 

controllable in manufacture and checkout. The major cause for unreadable film, however, 

was natural and uncontrollable-weather. The dominant cause for differences between 

targets programmed and targets read out in the entire GAMBIT-3 program was cloud 

cover. In later years, the output of weather satellites lessened that effect, but it would 

persist as long as cloud cover data were other than instantaneous." Perry, op. cit., pp. 233-

3. 

PET Report, Mission 4301/66. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

Ibid. 

Perry, op. cit., pp. 232-3. 

Ibid., p. 51. 

CO:E{;REf - -

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -184-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
--,-~, ... --.. ----~.-, -~--"-- - ---- Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ON 

References (continued) 

77. Ibid., p. 257. 

78. Ibid., p. 274. 

79. Interview, Col. Lee Roberts (USAF-Ret), Jun 87. 

80. Perry, op. cit., p. 293. 

81. EKC "K" Orientation Briefing, 7 Mar 74; Perry, op. cit., p. 266. 

82. PET Report, Mission 4332, 1971. 

83. Perry, op. cit., pp. 297-98. 

84. Memo, BGen D.D. Bradburn, Dir/SP, to Dr. J. Mclucas, DNRO, 20 Mar 73, Subj. GAMBIT 

Mission Summary (4337). 

85. Conversation with and data from Thomas Diosy, EKC, Jun 87; EKC "K" OrientatiQn Briefing, 

op. cit.; Perry, op. cit. 

86. Report "The Application of Image Forming Satellite Reconnaissance to Crisis Management," COMOR, 24 jan 66. 

87. Perry, Draft NRO History, Chap XVII, BYE 15649-75, p. 39. 

88. Memo, D. Packard, DepSecDef, to R. Helms, DCI, L.A. DuBridge, PresSciAdvsr, and J.L. 

Mclucas, DNRO, 16 May 69, subj: "Real-Time Readout." 

89. Report "Requirements for Image Forming Satellite Reconnaissance Responsive to Warning/Indications Needs," prepared by COMIREX, 5 jan 68. 

90. Memo, A.H. Flax, DNRO, to Chm, USIB, 12 Mar 69, subj: "Study of Requirements for 

Image-Forming Satellite Reconnaissance Responsive to Warning/Indications Needs," in 

NRO policy files. 

91. Minutes of NRP ExCom Mtg, 15 Aug 69. 

92. Memo, E.H. land, et ai, to Dr. L.A. DuBridge, PresSciAdvsr, 12 Aug 69, no subj., in Land 

Panel papers, DNRO files. 

93. Memo, G.T. Tucker, AsstSecDef (SA) to DepSecDef, 14 Feb 70 Subj: "Interim Report of the 

Committee for Immediate Recovery of Imagery (Fubini Committee)"; Report of the 

Committee for Immediate Recovery of Imagery, 16 Feb 70. 

94. Memo, LH. Land, et ai, to Dr. L.A. DuBridge, 13 Mar 70, Subj: "Solid State Real-Time 

Readout System." 

95. Memo LH. Land, et ai, to Dr. L.A. DuBridge, PresSciAdvsr, 13 lui 70, Subj: "Photographic 

Reconnaissance Systems Status." 

96. Director's Report to the NRP Executive Committee on FY-70 Status and FY-71 Program, 15 

Ju170. 

97. Memo, J.L. McLucas, DNRO, to Dir/CIA Recce Prog, 27 lui 70, Subj: "Approval of ElectroOptical Imaging Program System Definition Phase." 

98. Report "Study of Intelligence Requirements for Crisis Response Satellite Imaging" COMIREX, Apr 71. 

99. Perry, op. cit., manuscript Chap. XVII, pp. 90-91. 

100. Senator Allen J. Ellender as Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee took a 

position on the issue which could not be ignored: Choose one of the two systems ... we 

will approve funding for only one development-not both. 

101. Memo, H.A. Kissinger to SecDef., Dir/OMB, DCI, PresSciAdvsr., Chm. PFIAB, 23 Sep 71, 

Subj: "Near-Real-Time Satellite Reconnaissance System." 

102. Interview, Col. Lee Roberts, Jun 87. 

103. Written Communication, MGen David D. Bradburn, (USAF-Ret), 16 Mar 67. 

104. Perry, op. cit., pp. 304-14. 

105. GAMBIT Program Preliminary Flight Evaluation Report for Flight No. 47, Dec 76. 

106. GAMBIT Program Preliminary Flight Evaluation Report for Flight No. 48, p. 135, Jun 77. 

107. Interview, Col. Lee Roberts (USAF-Ret), lun 87. 

108. Interview, Col. lester McChristian (USAF-Ret), Jun 87. 

109. Interview, Col. james Hane (USAF-Ret), Jun 87. 

110. Interview, Col. McChristian, op. cit. 

111. Letter from Col. G.T. Smith, SP-2 to SP-1 (B/Gen John Martin) "Analysis of GAMBIT 

Project," 24 Aug 67. 

112. Ibid. 

-185-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 
s~ Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

N.9fd'RN-ORCON 

References (continued) 

113. Data furnished by Capt. Michael Rhodes, SP-12, Sep 87. 

114. Refer to the best resolution of the mission. Average values generally were twice "the best," 

or more. 

115. "Summary Analysis of Program 206 (GAMBIT)," incl to Itr. to DNRO Dr. Flax from SAFSP, 

B/Gen John Martin, 29 Aug 67. 

116. Letter Hq, ARDC to Commander, AFCRC, Subject, "Request for Information," 9 Dec 55. 

117. Belden, op. cit. 

118. When General Power, arriving from SAC to head the ARDC, first heard these expressions, 

he observed that they were synonyms for "reading newspapers and drinking coffee." He 

described, with vigor, what would have happened, in SAC, to anyone found "goofing off" 

in these categories. Until his departure, their usage at Hq, ARDC was muted. 

119. ltr., BGen B.A. Schriever, Commander WDD, to Commander, ARDC, 30 Mar 55. 

120. later this list was formally requested by Col. Joseph Bleymaier and appeared in Memo, 

subject, "Program Management," Battle to Bleymaier, 5 Sep 61. The italicized sentences 

are by Battle. 

121. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 520. 

122. Ibid, p. 522. 

123. Lundahl interview, 12 Nov 86. 

124. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, a Memoir of the Cuban Missiles Crisis, Norton 

Company Inc., New York, 1969, pp. 23-24. 

125. Lundahl interview, op. cit. 

126. Ibid. 

127. Ibid. 

128. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 2/7, effective 9 Aug 60. 

129. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/13, effective 1 lui 67. 

130. Letter, Subj, "KH-8 Mission 4354 System Operation Performance," dated 27 Aug 84. 

131. COMIREX Automated Management System Functional Overview, TCS-5240-77, Jun 77. 

132. Ibid. 

133. NPIC Message, CITE SPECTRE 4499, dated 4 Sep 81. 

134. Contributed by Donald E. Welzenbach, CIA History Staff. 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 -186-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

GAMBIT Index 

A-12 31,116, 

Abalakovo 154 

Ablative Shield 26 

AAA 

Ad Hoc Requirements Committee 16, 119 

Advance Development Section 55 

Advanced Reconnaissance System 17 

Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(ARPA) 12 

Aerial Recovery 4, 26, 29 

Aeronautical Systems Division 49 

Aerospace Corporation 20,21,29,81,103 

Agena 6, 9, 13, 21, 37, 39, 49, 55, 58-61, 

64-66, iIIus. 67, 72, 77-79, 94, 96, 103, 104, 

180 

Agena-B 106, 180 

Agena-D 26, iIIust. 28, 59, 64 

Agency for International Development 

(AID) 120 

Aircraft Carrier, Soviet 156 

Air Development Center (ADC) 107 

Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee 7, 110 

Air force Ballistic Missile Division 

(AFBMD) 9,10,12,20,36,110-112,114, 

177 

Air Force Missile Test Center 110 

Air force Satellite Control Facility-see Satellite Control facility 

Air force Special Weapons Center 107 

Air Force Systems Command 20,23,36,103 

Air Force Weapons Board 19 

Air Materiel Command 19 

Air Research and Development Command 8,10,12,20,107-110 

Air Staff 10,12,17, 19,23 

Alaska 4 

Allen, lew, Jr. 46, 79, 85, 96 

Anderson, David iii 

Antarctica 43, 72 

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 143, 179 

A:OIIO-11 143 

1 1

168 

A GUN, Project 179 

Armed Forces Procurement Regulations 19 

Army Air Corps 49 

Army Map Service 179 

Astronautics Directorate 10 

Astro-Position Terrain Camera (APTC) 63, 

64, 69, 76 

Atlas 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 23, 26, illust. 28, 45, 52, 

55, 59-61, 105 

Attitude-Control Subsystem 43, 59, 72, 97, 

98 

-187-

Austria 1, 2 

AWACS Aircraft 159 

B-52 2, 179 

B-58 179 

BBB 

Back-Up Stabilization System (BUSS) 38, 59, 

64, 72 

Balkans 1 

Ballistic Missiles 3 

Ballistic Missile Division-see Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AfBMD) 

Balloon Reconnaissance 4, 5 

Baltic Sea 1 

Barnes Engineering Co. 33 

Battle, Lee 110-113 

BEAR-F Aircraft 138 

Beck, Frank 117 

Belden, Thomas G. 50,108 

Belden Study 108 

Bell Telephone Laboratories 40 

Bell Engine 81 

Belorussian Military District 153 

Berezniki Chemical Combine 173 

Berg, Russell 37, 46 

Berlin 2 

Bi-Mat Film Processing 86, 87 

BISON Aircraft 2 

Bissell, Richard M., Jr. 9, 10, 112, 177 

Black Contracting 20, 39, 177 

BLACKJACK Bomber 162 

Blanket 15, 17 

Block-II 75,77-79 

Block-III 81 

Block-IV 84 

Bombs-in-Orbit 23, 35 

Boston, MA 181 

Box-level Testing 32 

Bradburn, David D. iii, 37, 84, 95 

Bulganin, Premier 4 

Bushmann, Rudi iii 

Buzard, Frank 113 

BYEMAN Security System 14, 122, 123 

C-119 29,41 

C-130 illust.77 

CSA-1 Missile 131 

Cabell. Charles P 16 

I I 

California 107, 181 

ccc 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

SE~ 

N~-ORCON 

Cambridge Research Center, MA 107,108 

Camera-Carrying Balloons 4 

Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception 

(CC&D) 166 

Canada 29 

Caspian Sea Monster 164, 165 

Cassegrain Telescope 181 

Catadioptric Lens 15,57,62 

CBS Laboratories 87 

I 1

168 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) iii, 2, 5, 8, 

9,11,13-15,87,88,91,103,105,110,112, 

115,119,120,128,129,177,179 

Cer-vit Glass 58 

Charyk, Joseph V. iii, 11, photo 12, 15, 

17-21,23,24,29,30,33-40,44,179 

Chestnut Street Facility 18 

I liii 

Chief of Naval Operations 77 

C:ina 3 138 143,148,= 

I J 168 

C urchill, Winston 1, 2 

Cis-Lunar Defense/Space 10 

Civil Service Commission 109 

Civil Applications Committee (CAC) 120 

Cohen, Randall iii 

Colby, William 122 

Cold-Gas System 25, 26, 38 

Color Film/Photography 41,85,100,173 

Columbia University 2 

Commander-In-Chief, Pacific 

(ClNCPAC) 77 

Committee on Imagery Requirements and 

Exploitation (COMIREX) iii, 87, 88, 91, 99, 

120-122, 128, 130 

COMIREX Requirements Structure 

(CRS) 124, 126 

COMIREX Automated Management System 

(CAMS) 126, illust. 127 

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 

(COMOR) 16, 17,41,71,86,87,119,123, 

124 

Communications Satellites 23 

Comsat Corporation 40 

Contracting Warrant 19 

Controlled Optical-Range Network 

(CORN) 79 

Convair 50 

Convergent-Stereo Camera 15 

CORONA iii,S, 6, 8-12, 14-16, 18, 20, 22, 

26, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37-39, 46, 47, 53, 56, 61, 

72,75,81,86,97,107,112,113,116,119, 

12~ 12~ 12~ 13~ 177-181 

CORONA H-30 Recovery Vehicle 30 

Corning Glass Co. 30, 58 

Cosmos-264 75, photo 76 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Crateology 138 

Cress, Larry photo 99,100 

. 65 

rogram 101 

u an Issile Crisis 34, 86, 116 

Cue Ball Program 22-24, 35 

Czechoslovakia 2, 86, 138, [] 

Dayton, OH 49 

Davidson, H. 65 

DDD 

Deep-Space Radar Facility 158 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 74, 91, 

119,128 

Defense Mapping Agency 175 

Delta-Class Submarine 157 

Department of Agriculture 120 

Department of Commerce 120 

Department of Defense 13, 50, 77, 122, 128, 

129 

Department of Interior 120 

Department of State 119, 128 

Design & Analysis Division 91 

Delta Dagger 50 

Diodes-see Light-Sensing Diodes 

Diosy, Tom iii 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 16, 

122, 123, 179-181 

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 

(DClD) No. 2/7 16 

Director of NRO 40, 56, 85, 105, 121, 

179-181 

Directorate of Science & Technology 88,91 

Dirks, Leslie 87, photo 91 

Discoverer, Project 5, 6, 9, 110-113, 177 

DoD Directive 5200.13 12, 135 

DOG HOUSE Radar 138 

DORIAN, Project 88, 90, 91 

Double-Recovery Vehicle 76 

Douglas Aircraft Co. 6, 177, 180 

Dual-Mode GAMBIT 97,98,103 

Dual-Platen Camera 64, 84, 85, 100, 101, 

103, illust. 161, 173 

Dual-Recovery Vehicle 75, 76, 78 

DuBridge, Lee 89, 90, photo 91 

Duckett, Carl 88, photo 89 

Dulles, Allen W. 16, 

Dunks, K. 46 

EEE 

E-1 Program 17, 86, 87 

E-2 Program 17,86, 87 

E-3 Program 18,86 

E-4 Program 18 

-188-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
.~- ~.- .. 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

E-5 Program 18, 179-181 

E-6 Program 17-22, 30, 34 

East Germany 153 

Eastern Asia 2 

Eastern Europe 2 

Eastman Kodak Company (EKC) iii, 15, 

17-22,25, 30-33, 36, 49, 55-61, 64, 66, 67, 

7~ 7~ 81, 8~ 8~ 9~ 9~ 105, 10~ 112 

Edwards AFB, CA 50, 107 

Egg-Crate Mirror 30, illust. 31, 58 

Eglin AFB, Fl 107 

Egypt 86,[J 

Eisenbeiss, Harry E. 121 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1-5, photo 5, 9, 10, 

1~ 1~ 10~ 11~ 115-11~ 177 

Electronic Intelligence (ELI NT) 179 

ElectrO-Optical Imaging System 

(EOI) 86-89,91-93,101,103 

Electrostatic-Tape Camera 87 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 120 

Estonia 1 

I 1

168 

Eurasian landmass 132 

Europe 1, 2 

Exemplar, Project 22, 23 

Exploitation Subcommittee (ExSubcom) 120 

FFF 

168 l,..-a~s-e~-~o~o-r ~I n~r-a-re-d.--r.oFi 1m 85 

Farnborough, England 81 

Fascist Italy 1 

Feak, D. 65 

FEEDBACK, Project 6 

Film-Read-Out GAMBIT (FROG) 86-93 

Film-Recovery System 18, 36 

Finland 1, 2, 182 

FISHBED-J Aircraft 131,132 

Fitzpatrick, James C. iii 

FLAGON Aircraft 131 

Flax, Alexander 33, photo 44,46,71,76,85, 

88 

Florida 107 

Flying-Spot Scanner 17 

Ford, Ralph J. 46 

Foster, F.G. 88 

Foster, John 88 

France 1 

Freon Gas 25 

Fubini, Eugene 88, photo 89, 90 

Funk, Ben I. 36 

Fused-Silica Mirror 58 

-189-

s~ ~N-ORCON 

GGG 

GAMBIT-Cubed 59 

GAMBIT Programmer 45, 47, 48 

GAMBIT Program Commendation 117 

GAMBIT -1 26, 27, 42-44, 53, 58, 59, 65-67, 

70-7~ 9~ 103, 10~ 11~ 123 

GAMBIT-2 57 

GAMBIT-3 57-81, 84-86, 94-98, 101, 

103-105,116 

GAMBIT-4 57 

Geary, leo 46 

General Electric Co. (GE) 18-21,25, 29, 30, 

32-38,45,47-49,51-53, 55, 58-60, 64-67, 

72, 93, 105, 106, 112, 177, 182 

GENETRIX, Project 4, 6 

Geneva, Switzerland 115, 117 

Geneva Summit Conference 3 

Germany 1 

East 153 

West 2 

Gillette, Hyde 7 

Gillette Procedures 7, 8, 10, 12, 36 

Global Weather Central (GWC) 132 

Golden-Finger Award 93 

Golden Gate Bridge 163 

Gorman, Frank B. iii, 55 

Greer, Robert E. 17-24, photo 19, 29, 30, 

32,34-39,41,44,45, 50, 51, 56, 58, 59, 64, 

65,72,112,113 

GRIFFON (SA-5) Missile 179 

Guatemala 2 

Cuided Missile Secretariat 7 

GUIDELINE (SA-2) Missile 179 

Gulf of Finland 182 

HHH 

Haig, Thomas 37 

Hane, James l. iii 

Harley, John 64, 65 

Harvard University 181 

Hawaii 96, 99 

Hawkeye Wor~s of EKC 22, 30, 32 

I j 91,92 

Helms, Richard M. 71, 88, photo 89, 117 

HEN HOUSE Radar 138 

Heran, Paul J. photo 18, 23, 37, 46 

HEXAGON, Project 70, 97, 98, 101, 139, 

141,171,172 

Hicks, Frank 32 

High-Density Acid (HDA) 78,97 

Highboy 97 

Higherboy 97 

Hill, Jimmie D. iii 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SEowf 

NO~-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Hitch-Up 37, 39 

Hitler, Adolf 1 

Holloman Air Development Center, 

NM 107 

Horizon Sensor 33, 98 

Huntley, Harold 64, 65 

HYAC (High-Acuity) Camera 6 

Hydrazine 96, 97 

Hydrogen Bomb 2 

Hypergolic Propellants 25, 26 

III 

ICBM 16, 52, 124, 126, 143, 148, 153, 155, 

168 

IRBM 143 

IR Film-see Infra-Red Film 

Image-Motion Compensation 25, 27, 39 

Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee (ICRS) iii, 99, 120 

Incentive Contract Structure 51, 53, 72 

Infra-Red film 100, iIIust. 166,167, 173 

Inglewood, CA 7, 17, 177 

Inlow, Roland iii, photo 91, 120 

Integral Secondary Propulsion System 

(ISPS) 98 

Intelligence Community iii, 6, 13, 14, 16, 42, 

51-53, 55, 71, 75, 86, 87, 91, 95, 99, 115, 

119-123, 12~ 15~ 17~ 181 

Intelligence Community Staff 96 

Invar Metal 31, 57, 58 

Iran 2 

Iron Curtain'r"---,",2_-, 

Israel 86,1 

Italy 1, 2 ~-~ 

Itek Corporation 179-181 

HJ 

Jacobson, Ralph 93 

Johnson, Clarence L. "Kelly" 4 

Johnson, lyndon B. 129 

Johnson, William 113 

KKK 

Kaz-A Aircraft 162 

KH-1 Camera 177 

KH-2 Camera 177, 179 

KH-3 Camera 177 

KH-4 Camera 14,97,116,177,181 

KH-5 Camera 179 

KH-6 Camera 37,179-182 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

KH-7 Camera 25, 103, 104, 116, 122, 123, 

168,182 

KH-8 Camera 69, 103, 104, 116, 121, 122, 

141,168 

KH-9 Camera 70,97,139,141 

KH-10 Camera 88,90,91 

KH-11 Camera 93,101 

Kazan Airframe Plant 162 

Kennedy, John f. 15,116,129 

Kennedy. Robert F. 115,116 

1 project 93, 101 

Khrushchev, Nikita 4, 115, 153 

Kierton, R. 65 

Killer Satellite 76 

Killian, James R., Jr. 1, photo 5, 9, 10 

King, William G. iii, 36-39, 41, 44-49, 52, 

53, 58, 59, 64, 70, 72, 74, 75, 79, 112, 113 

Kirtland AFB, NM 107 

Kissinger, Henry 92 

Kistiakowsky, George B. 9-12, photo 11 

Koche, Robert 94 

Komsomolsk Shipyard 140 

Korea 2 

Krueger, Myron 94, 95 

Kueper, Robert 64, 65 

LLL 

Land, Edwin H. photo 11, 15, 86-89, 92, 

181 

Land-Recovery System 29, 30 

LANYARD, Project 37, 38, 58, 179-182 

Laser-Scan System 90 

Latvia 1 

Leningrad 179-182 

Leverton, Walter F. 81 

Lifeboat 37-39,41,42,64,72,113 

Light-Sensing Diodes 86 

Lincoln Labs 10 

Lincoln Plant EKC 22 

Lithuania 1 

Lockheed Corp. 4,20,21,38,47-49,55,57, 

59-61,64-67,72,94,96,97 

Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc. 

(LMSC) iii, 38, 47, 70, 93, 100, 105, 106, 

177,180,181 

London, England 81 

Los Angeles, CA 12, 47, 48, 94, 112, 121 

lowest-Level-of-Assembly Testing 33 

Lunar Reconnaissance/Landing Program 94 

Lunar Orbiter/Surveyor 66, 94 

lundahl, Arthur iii, 115-117, photo 129 

-190-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved--for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

MMM 

MacLeish, Kenneth 32 

Mahar, James 32, 56 

Maksutov Lens 25, 57 

Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) 88, 91 

Martin, John L., Jr. iii, 11, photo 12, 29, 33, 

44-49,51-53,70,72,75,79,112,113 

Martin-Marietta Co. 65,93,106 

Martin Motivator 53 

Massachusetts 107 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

(MIT) 1,10 

May, l.E. 16 

McChristian, Lester iii, photo 99,100 

McCone, John A. 179,181 

McElroy, Neil 16 

McLucas, John L. 77, photo 84, 85, 87, 88, 

91,96 

McMillan, Brockway photo 39, 44, 56, 

58-61, 64, 65, 85, 182 

McNamara, Robert S. 179 

Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack 5 

Mexico 29 

Midas Project 23 

Middle East Crises 78 

Missile Assembly Building (MAB) 49 

Mitchell, Leslie iii, 32 

Mitre Corporation 85 

Mono-Cubic-Dispersed Film 85 

Moore, Richard 113 

Murphy's Law 93 

MURAL Camera 181 

Myacheslav M-4 Bomber 2 

NNN 

NATO Designator 179 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 23, 61, 66, 95, 96, 105, 171 

National Imagery Interpretation Rating Scale 

(NIIRS) 130,173 

National Intelligence Estimate (ME) 153 

National Photographic Interpretation Center 

(NPIC) iii, 13, 94, 96, 115, 119, 128, 129, 

132 

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) iii, 

6, 13, 14,20,33,44,46,448,55,57,58,61, 

66, 70, 77, 88, 89, 94, 105, 112, 117, 119, 

120,121,123,126,130,132,136,171,182 

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) iii, 

13,14,70,123 

National Reconnaissance Program Executive 

Committee (ExCom) 71,74,87,88,90-92 

National Science Foundation 10 

SE~ ~-ORCON 

National Security Adviser 92 

National Security Agency (NSA) 13, 119 

National Security Council (NSC) 9, 17, 21, 

33 

National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSClD) No.8 128 

National Tasking Plan 128 

Nazi Germany 1 

New Mexico 107 

New York 107 

Nikolayev Shipyard 156 

Nixon, Richard M. photo 92, 122, 129 

NRO Program A 46,87,88,93,99,112,181 

NRO Program B 46,87,88,91,181 

NRO Program C 46 

NRO Program D 46 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) 2 

North Korea 76, 116 

Norway 4 

Nuclear Weapons 2 

"Null" Program 22-24 

000 

Oahu, HI 13,41,177 

Ocean-Recovery Program 29 

Oder, Frederic C.E. iii, 32, 70 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) 91 

Office of Missiles and Space Systems 12 

Office of Space Systems 13 

O'Green, Fred 47 

Omaha, NE 132 

On-Time Delivery 108,109,113 

"Open Skies" 3, 4, 115, 117 

Operating Division-4 (OD-4) 121 

Optical-Figure Error Budget 31 

Orbit-Adjust Module 59 

Orbital-Control Vehicle (OCV) 19, illust. 24, 

25,26,30-33,35,37-39,41,42,45,47,52, 

53, 55, 56, 58-60, 72, 180, 182 

Overhage, Carl 10 

Overhead Reconnaissance 5 

Owens-Illinois Co. 58 

OXCART, Project 15,31,33,116 

ppp 

P-Camera 181 

Pacific Missile Range 23 

Pacific Ocean 45, 77,81 

Pacific Recovery Area 30 

Packard, David 87, photo 88, 89 

Page, Hilliard 29 

Pakistan 4 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems JOintly 

-191 BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
SE~ 

NOKfR'N-ORCON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Panoramic Camera 14 

Patrick AFB, FL 107, 110 

Pavlograd 138 

Payload-Adapter Section 56 

Pearl Harbor, HI 2 

Pentagon 12, 19, 44, 85, 120 

Performance Evaluation Team (PET) 69 

Perry, Robert iii, 24 

Phased-Array Radar 154 

Philadelphia, PA 18, 45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 72, 

112 

Photographic Intelligence (PHOTlNT) 120 

Photographic Payload Section (PPS) 59, 60, 

65-67, 70, 75, 84, 93, 98, 106 

Photographic Satellite Vehicle 69, 71 

Photo-Sensitive Electrostatic Tape 

Camera 18 

Photo Working Group (PWG) 120,124 

Pied Piper Project 6, 8 

Pietz, John 32 

Pioneer Satellite Program 17 

Plesetsk Missile Test Range 155 

Plummer, james W. 64, 65, 70 

Poland 1 

Polaroid Corp. 15 

Powell, Robert M. iii, 64, 65, 70 

Power, Thomas S. 20, 107 

Powers, Francis Gary 4,16 

President's Board of Consultants on Foreign 

Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) 10 

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 

Board (PFIAB) 33 

Presidential Reserve Funds 20 

Presidential Science Adviser 1, 9, 90, 91, 

110 

Programs A, B, C, and D 46,87,88, 91,93, 

99,112,181 

Program 206 32, 35, 36 

Program 307 22, 23 

Program 417, Weather Satellites iIIust. 133, 

136 

Programmed Integrated Acceptance Test 

(PlAT) 67 

Purcell, Edward M. 181 

Pyroceram 58 

RRR 

R-5 Lens 78, 79 

R-361 Optical Design 79 

Ragusa, Peter iii, 70, 96 

Raincoat 11,18,35 

RamO-Wooldridge Company 110 

Rand Corp. 4, 6, 7 

Readout Photography 9, 10, 17, 36, 72, 

86-93 

Reagan,RonaW 117 

Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Reber, james Q. 16, 46, 119 

Reconnaissance Laboratory (Wright 

Field) 15, 17 

Recovery/Reentry Vehicle (RV) 6, 18, 19, 

25,26,29,34,36,41,60,64,72,106 

Red Army 1,2 

Red China 2 

Redundant Attitude-Control System 

(RACS) 75 

Ricks, LtCol 46 

Riepe, Quentin A. 23, 29, 30, 34, 36, photo 

39 

Ritland, Osmond j. 9, 12, 36, 49, 177 

Roberts, Lee iii, photo 79, 93, 94, 97, 99 

Rochester, NY 22, 32 

Roll-joint 37-39, 42, 55, 57-59, 61, 64, 66, 

67,70: 72J 75, 81, 113, 123, 180, 182 

_ J38,168 

L,-.R=o=m~e~l~r rlevelopment Center, NY 107 

Rostow, Walter W. 3 

Royal Aircraft Establishment 81 

Ruebel, John W. 34 

Russian Empire 1 

Ryan-147 Drone 116 

SSS 

SA-1 Missile 131 

SA-2 (GUIDELINE) Missile 131, 132, 179 

SA-4 Missile 132 

SA-5 (GRIFFON) Missile 138, 179, 182 

S-Band Beacon 25 

SLBN 160 

SS-9 Missile 138 

SS-11 Missile 124 

SSBN 139 

SAFSP-Secretary of the Air Force Special 

Programs iii, 7, 17, 21, 23, 24, 33-37, 44, 

46, 50, 55-61, 66, 67, 72, 75, 77-79, 87, 95, 

99,100,105,112,120 

SAFSP-6 55 

SAFSS-Secretary of the Air Force Space 

Systems iii 

Samos Project 6, 8-13, 16, 17, 19-23, 30, 

32,34-36,86,179 

Samos Working Group 19 

San Cristobal, Cuba 116 

San Francisco, CA 163 

Sary Shagan Missile Test Center 179 

Satellite-Control Facility 20, 74, 77, 78, 113, 

181 

Satellite-Control Section (SCS) 59, 60, 65, 

67,69,84,93,97-99,105 

Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee (SIRC) 16,119 

Satellite Interceptor 23 

Satellite Operations Center (SOC) 120, 121 

-192-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

Satellite Reconnaissance 4 

Satellite Recovery Vehicle (SRV) 21, 59, 98, 

181 

1 Satellite T~:: c~:~er 45 79 121 181, 

9j, IOU, I, 

Schmitt, John J. Jr. 75, 78, photo 79 

Schriever, Bernard A. 8, 10, 20, 23, 36, 110 

Schultz, George 92 

Scoville, Herbert, Jr. 179 

SCUD Missile 169,170 

Search Mode iii, 124 

Seay, James 18,46 

Secretary of Defense 7, 9, 13, 16, 88, 92, 

122,179 

Seiman Stars 138 

Senate 92 

Sentry Project 6, 8 

Severodvinsk Shipyard 157, 160 

Sewell, John M. 32 

Shadegg, John J. iii, 120 

Sharp, Dudley C. 19 

Sheldon, Huntington D. 46 

Shuangchungtzu Missile Test Center 147 

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 90,100,120 

SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS) 89 

Silo Hardness 155 

Simmons, Arthur B. 15, 17, 32, 49 

Sinai 169 

Six-Day War 86 

Skylab 81,94-96,171 

Smith, G.T. 46 

Smith, Roy A. 74,75 

Somalia 168 

South Africa 81 

Southeast Asia 77, 179 

South Pole 42 

Soviet Aircraft Carrier 156 

Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarine 

(SSBN) 139 

Soviet-China Border 74,138 

Soviet Union 1-4, 6, 10, 16, 21, 33, 41, 52, 

74,100,115,117,132,136,138,143,148, 

153-155,164,169,171,182 

Soyuz Spacecraft 171, 172 

Space Systems Division (SSD) 12, 13, 17, 20, 

23, 34-36 

Space-Ground link Subsystem (SGlS) 75 

Special Assistant for Reconnaissance 13 

Special Projects Group EKC 15 

Spin Scan 87 

Spoelhof, Charles P. 56 

Spotting Camera 14 

Sputnik 8,10 

SR-71 116 

Standard Agena 64 

-193-

START Talks 155 

SE~ ~-ORCON 

State Department-see Department of State 

Stellar-Index Camera 69 

Stevens, Don 32 

Steward, James T. 46 

Strategic Air Command (SAC) 7, 19, 20, 

108,132 

Strategic Arms limitation Talks (SALT) 88, 

143,148 

Suez Canal 78 

1 1 120 

Sunnyvale, CA iii, 13, 45, 70, 113, 121, 177, 

181 

Sunset Strip 15, 17, 18, 20 

Supplementary Solar Array 97 

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) 143 

Surprise Attack 1, 2 

Surveillance Mode iii, 14, 123 

Sylvester, Arthur 11 

T-54 Tank 130 

T-55 Tank 130 

T-62 Tank 74 

Taiwan 4 

TTT 

TALENT-KEYHOLE Security System 122, 

123 

Tallinn, Estonia 179,182 

Tape-Storage Camera 88, 91 

Taylor, Rufus 46 

Technological Capabilities Panel 4,181 

Telemetry 42,45,75,84,181 

Tennessee 107 

Terrain Camera 69 

Thermal-Control Subsystem 32 

Thiokol Corp. 180 

Thor Booster 6-9,180 

Thrust-Augmented Thor (TAT) 180,181 

Titan ICBM 6, 7, 9 

Titan-III 55,59-61,65,69,74,93,96, 106 

TRW Corp. 93 

Tucker, Gardner 88, photo 89, 90 

Tullahoma AFB, TN 107 

Typhoon Submarine 160 

Tyuratam Missile Test Center 115,138,143 

uuu 

U-2 4,5,10,16,21,23,116,119,179 

Ultra-Thin-Base Film 74 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)-

see Soviet Union 

US Army 2,119,128,179 

US Congress 49, 50, 92 

~ Handle via 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 
~ON 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312 

US Intelligence Board (USIB) 13, 16,41,70, 

71,74,86,88,94,119 

US Military Academy 1 

US Navy 77, 119, 128 

USS Pueblo 116 

Ultra-Low-Expansion (ULE) Glass 58 

Utica, NY 45, 47, 48, 60 

vvv 

Valley Forge, PA 32,45 

VALLEY Program 36, 56 

Vandenberg AFB, CA 13, 20,41,45,49,57, 

70, 94, 113, 177, 182 

Vehicle Atmospheric Survivability Test 

(VAST) 78,81 

Venezuela 81 

Vietnam 168 

www 

Waggershauser, Herman is, 49 

Walter Reed Army Hospital 115, 117 

Warsaw Pact 138 

Washington,D.C. 37,92,96,110,112,128 

Weapon System Project Office 107 

Webb, Vernard 181 

Welzenbach, Donald E. iii 

Wendover AFB, UT 29 

West Coast Contract Office 179 

West Germany 2 

Western Development Division (WOO) 7, 8, 

10, 110 

~ Handle via 

BYE MAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Systems Jointly 

BYE 140002-90 

Western Europe 2-4 

West Point 1 

White House 2,20,110,112,115,116 

White, Thomas D. 19 

Wonsan Harbor, Korea 116 

World War II 91 

Worthington, Roy 113 

Worthman, Paul E. iii 

Wright Air Development Center 

(WADC) 107,108,114 

Wright Air Development Division 17 

Wright Field 50,107-109 

WS-117L 6-8,17,177 

WS-461L 6 

xxx 

X-Ray Examination 52 

yyy 

Y-Class Submarine 139, photo 140 

Yeager, Charles 50 

Yevpatoriyo Radar Facility 158 

Yockey, Donald J. 53 

Yom Kippur War 138,169 

Yurya 173,174 

III 

ZAMAN Project 87,91-93 

Zhukov, Georgi K. 1 

ZOSTER Project 87 

-194-

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 COS099312