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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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11 February 1976 .

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE OSD GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Draft Executive Order on Intelligence

I have reviewed the National Reconnaissance Office charter

and other available portions proposed for inclusion in the

President's Omnibus Executive Order and offer the following

comments.

The most important issue in this proposal is the de facto

admission that the U.S. Government conducts satellite reconnaissance operations. While there is obviously considerable public

knowledge of the program, my view is that formal acknowledgment

of the fact of" would inevitably lead to erosion of the security

of the program. Further, once the program is publicly admitted,

the Soviet leadership could be subjected to different, largely

unforeseeable, and possibly unfavorable pressures from our viewpoint. And, it is likely that declassification would lead to

considerations of national sovereignty and U.N. discussions that

could be harmful to our interests. The subject has been deliberated at length in the Executive Branch without reaching a '

consensus and I believe it unwise to subject ourselves to the

added risks and public discussion which could affect this vital

program., I urge against declassification.

An alternative to acknowledging the national reconnaissance

function in the unclassified Executive Order would' e to include

in the responsibilities for the Secretary of Defense a short

statement such as "Provide for the direction, supervision,

funding, maintenance, and operation of national reconnaissance

activities and respond to the intelligence requirements and

priorities of all elements of the intelligence community as

identified and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The charter itself is sufficiently broad to permit considerable latitude in the management of the program. I strongly

support continuation of the management structure in its present

form--the Executive Committee concept, responsiveness to USIB

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'requirements and streamlined, very direct lines of authority--

and there does not appear to be any conflict with the charter as

proposed. This observation is, however, made without benefit of

reviewing all other organizations' charters under the Omnibus

package.

Attached are point papers which further elaborate on my

concerns. I regard these subjects as being of the highest

importance to the Nation and strongly request that I be permitted

to elaborate on my views should changes still be desired.

Attachments

Security of the NRP Including

"Facts Of"/Facts About

NRO Charter Considerations

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SECURITY OF THE NR? INCLUDING "FACTS OF"/FACTS ABOUT

Extraordinary security has been employed regarding U.S.

satellite reconnaissance since its inception. One reason for

the security measures has been to prevent the disclosure of

"facts about" our high quality and quantity reconnaissance

capabilities to our adversaries.

It is security policy that there shall be no public,

official acknowledgment of the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance. Keeping the "fact of" classified precludes discussions which could result in possible international reactions

or repercussions by adversaries, or even allies or friendly

nations. The exact potential consequences of open acknowledgment are unknown but they could seriously affect continued

conduct of the program. And, satellite systems are vulnerable

to a variety of attacks or countermeasures.

The present space reconnaissance environment consists of

a tacit agreement by the U.S. and USSR to engage in space

reconnaissance activities. Since satellites are such prolific

intelligence collectors, it is essential for the U.S. to maintain an atmosphere that will permit continued operations.

The U.S. has acknowledged several space reconnaissancerelated roles, such as the declassification and acknowledgment

of weather satellites and warning satellites. While the hardware and operational details of photographic and SIGINT

satellites are still protected by compartmented security

controls, acknowledgment of photographic space reconnaissance

as an activity is currently classified SECRET. A substantial

amount of the current SIGINT and photographic satellite product

is decompartmented and distributed at the SECRET level. Further,

the Director of Central Intelligence has chartered a national

group which is currently meeting to look at the overall issue

of decompartmentation. The group's objective is to recommend

ways to make more data available to intelligence users and we

have made recommendations to them.

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The proponents for retaining the present classification

make the arguments than'

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1. Create new avenues for initiating actions where

there is no basis for action now. For instance, the Soviets

or Chinese could conceivably feel compelled to react to official •

acknowledgment of overflight of their country by U.S. espionage

satellites.

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Encourage allies or friendly nations to request

removal of ground-based intelligence collection space systems.

The removal of ground sites would relieve certain political

pressures.

Indiscreet release of data gives the Soviets and

Chinese a greater appreciation of our collection and its utility,

especially in the SIGINT area, pergaps inspiring them to counter

our efforts through increased efforts to deny us information.

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5. The initial "fact of" release mould tell the public

little that it does not already know. The initial step, however, would remove the keystone from the policy that inhibits legic discussion. Once disclosed, the declaration is an

versible step.

: 6. "Fact of" disclosure could be the opening wedge

that leads to more and more pressure for additional information

and a general erosion of the security structure. Normal

security rules have rarely been able to preserve secrets for

any extended periods of time.

7. Disrupt a present policy that works well. There

are no external pressures to admit U.S. space reconnaissance.

The present status quo with the Soviets maintains the tacit

agreement, enforced by the "national means of verification"

language in the SALT agreements, to allow each side to conduct

space reconnaissance.

The proponents for declassifying the "fact of" argue:

1. The "fact of" secret is a non-secret already.

U.S. space reconnaissance activities have been reported in the

--Z. Result in adverse worldwide reaction of U.N. or

other international bodies or third world nations making

entreaties to the U.S. to curtail or cease space reconnaissance

activities.

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world press and on U.S. television. Keeping the "fact of"

classified is an example of over-classification.

The declassification would gain credibility for

the government in general and enhance the intelligence

community's image in particular.

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Intuitively there would be positive and beneficial overall consequences, such as popular endorsement and

perhaps even financial support for continuation of some of the

activities.

. In summary, the minimum adverse impact of this release of

the "fact of" does not tell the public any more than it already

knows. The maximum adverse impact of release could pose an

increasing threat to U.S. ability to conduct effective space

. reconnaissance. Our space intelligence collection efforts are,

in many cases, the only source of valued information. Release

—of-the. "fact of" could jeopardize our present unhampered access

to space and in the-process eliminate our ability to collect

intelligence vital to our national defense.

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NRO CHARTER CONSIDERATIONS

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The Role of the NRP ExCom.

The NRP ExCom was established, and composition of its

membership determined, by Presidential direction in 1964. The

ExCom acts for the Secretary of Defense and is established to:

a. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense the overall

appropriate level of effort for the NRP in responding to requirements in light of technical capabilities and fiscal limitations.

budget. 

b. Approve or modify the consolidated NRP and its

c. Approve the allocation.of responsibility and the

associated funds for R&D for new systems.

The ExCom has 'recently been compoSed of the DCI, acting as

Chairman, andthe Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

who represents the Secretary of Defense. In years past, the

committee included the President's Scientific Advisor until that

position was abolished. The Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Intelligence) replaced the Deputy Secretary of Defense who was

Chairman until 1971. Recently, consideration has been given

to a member representing the National Security Council.

The Role of the DNRO.

By a DOD/CIA Agreement and DOD Directive, the DNRO is

responsible for the day-to-day • management and conduct of the

NRP. The pp is based upon a single charter which makes its

mission unambiguous. The NRO is a separate operating agency

of the DOD and can make use of DOD services. The DNRO's role

in the NRP can be considered analogous to that of a corporate

president of a company.

External to the NRO: Developing the corporation analogy,

the DEMErTaWara1"board of directors level" composed of

three parts. In the first part, the DNRO looks to the

Secretary of Defense for policy guidance and decisions since

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the Secretary of Defense is the NRP executive agent. In the

second part, the DCI, through the USIB mechanism, provides

to the DNRO national requirements which NRP space systems

should fulfill. And third, the DNRO receives program resource

allocation directives from the ExCom, as well as direction as

=moo the pace to be maintained regarding various projects within

the NRP. •

Internal to the NRO: The DNRO has an interagency staff

and liTToifirand three Program Offices to aid him.

His line organizations (in the corporation analogy--and military

sense--too) report directly to him. The variety of managerial

tools that he has to fulfill his responsibilities are unique

and essential (streamlined management) in order for the NRP to

continue to fulfill its role effectively and efficiently.

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