Respectfu 

0.5). 

Clark M. Clifford 

Chairman 

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THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD 

Mhy 2, 1964 

Dear Mr. President: 

In behalf of the members of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and with their full concurrence, 

I am honored to submit the enclosed report, which 

was prepared by the Board following a review in depth 

of all aspects of the National Reconnaissance Program. 

While we recognize that the recommendations we 

make for strengthening the National Reconnaissance 

Program call for some adjustments within the Executive 

Branch, we believe that earliest possible resolution 

of the problems involved is warranted in the interest 

of national security. 

Enclosure (SC-06513/64) 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D. C. 

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SC-06513/64 

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THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASH I NGTON 

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD 

May 2, 1964 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Program 

The National Reconnaissance Program for the collection 

of photographic and signals intelligence through aircraft 

and satellite overflights is of vital importance to the 

national security and is likely to become increasingly so. 

The Program has produced most of our Government's information on Soviet deployment of land-based nuclear missiles 

and a great deal of highly valuable intelligence on 

other subjects. 

Beginning with a small, closely-knit organization and 

operation concerned with relatively infrequent overflights 

by a few aircraft, the Program now encompasses the following: 

(1) a billion-dollar-a-year activity involving hundreds of 

Government and contractor personnel; (2) the development 

and production of aircraft and their operation on reconnaissance missions, on a scale far in excess of that which 

marked early stages of the Program; (3) the procurement of 

boosters, orbital vehicles and camera payloads, and their 

integration for launching; (4) the launching of complex 

satellite mechanisms and the air-catch recovery by Air Force 

teams of payloads upon re-entry into the atmosphere; and 

(5) the technical processing, interpretation and analysis 

of the quantities of intelligence information obtained. 

A special Panel of the Board, with the Board's Executive 

Secretary, has made an intensive examination of the organization, management and operation of the National Reconnaissance 

Program. The Board and its Panel have had consultations 

with officials of the Department of Defense and the Central 

Intelligence Agency -- the two Government agencies primarily 

engaged in the Program. Representatives of the Board have 

conducted on-the-scene examinations of satellite and aircraft 

reconnaissance installations and activities on the West Coast 

and elsewhere. Conferences have been held with key officers 

of private companies holding Government contracts for the 

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development and production of elements of the reconnaissance 

systems employed -- including boosters, orbital engines, 

aircraft and camera payloads. We have been thoroughly 

briefed on all significant aspects of the Program. 

As a result of its studies the Board has found that 

the National Reconnaissance Program, despite its achievements, has not yet reached its full potential. Basically, 

the problem is one of inadequacies in the present organizational structure and support of the national reconnaissance 

effort. Also, the Program is complicated by the absence of 

a clear, authoritative delineation and understanding of 

pertinent roles and missions of the Department of Defense, 

the Central Intelligence Agency, and of the Director of 

Central Intelligence in his capacity as principal intelligence 

officer and coordinator of the total U. S. intelligence effort. 

In our opinion, action must be directed from the Presidential 

level in order to correct these difficulties, and to assure 

that this vital national asset is preserved and strengthened. 

Based on our review, the Board submits the following 

conclusions and recommendations. 

Conclusions: 

1, The National Reconnaissance Program must be conducted 

as a national effort geared to meet as effectively as possible 

over-riding national intelligence needs in support of the 

President, members of the National Security Council, and 

other officials concerned with matters of national security 

significance. The national character of this vitally-important 

intelligence enterprise must be maintained through a joint 

endeavor on the part of the Department of Defense, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, and the United States Intelligence 

Board -- with a clearly-established delineation of the roles 

and responsibilities which each is to perform in support of 

the Program. It is essential that there be an effective 

mechanism to accomplish close and continuing collaboration 

between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 

Intelligence, and to assure recognition of the intelligence 

needs and capabilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of 

the Unified and Specified Commands. 

2. The Director of Central Intelligence (as Chairman 

of the United States Intelligence Board responsible for 

providing coordination and guidance to the United States 

intelligence effort) has a large and important role in the 

establishment of intelligence collection requirements and 

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priorities to be met through the National Reconnaissance 

Program, and in ensuring effective exploitation of the 

intelligence product. Under his leadership the United 

States Intelligence Board must provide the necessary base 

for the scheduling and targeting of satellite and aircraft 

reconnaissance missions over areas which are virtually 

inaccessible to us through other forms of intelligence 

coverage. Of equal importance is the function of ensuring 

that the intelligence "take" from the National Reconnaissance Program is effectively processed, analyzed and fed 

into the estimating process -- in order that timely 

consideration may be given to the product at highest 

Government levels. (We note an analogy in the National 

Signals Intelligence Program where that complex collection 

activity is conducted by elements of the Department of 

Defense, with guidance as to intelligence requirements 

and exploitation provided by the United States Intelligence 

Board under the leadership of the Director of Central 

Intelligence.) 

3. Historically, both the Department of Defense and 

the Central Intelligence Agency have made important contributions toward the achievement of an effective, national 

reconnaissance capability. 

The Central Intelligence Agency in the aircraft 

reconnaissance field has contributed imaginative planning, 

technical competence, security guidance, and flexibility 

in the negotiation of "black" contracts for the production 

of systems components in instances where secrecy is required 

in the contracting process. The value of the Central 

Intelligence Agency's contributions of personnel, skills 

and other resources in this effort is demonstrated by 

previous successes in the development and operation of the 

U-2 Program, and more recently in the Oxcart Program which 

is presently in the flight-test stage. In addition, the 

Central Intelligence Agency has contributed importantly 

to the development and production of some of the camera 

payloads used in the satellite reconnaissance program. 

The Department of Defense has demonstrated competence 

and effectiveness in the management and utilization of the 

vast military resources which are involved in the development, procurement and operation of both satellite reconnaissance 

systems and aircraft reconnaissance programs, including 

extensive support of programs in the latter category which 

have been managed by the Central Intelligence Agency. 

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(We are informed that the Air Force provides over 90% of 

the personnel and resources involved in the satellite 

reconnaissance program, and that it provides over 50% 

of the manpower and 90% of the other resources utilized 

in support of the aircraft reconnaissance program.) 

Notable examples of achievements by the Department of 

Defense are the recent photographic intelligence successes 

in the GAMBIT satellite project, and the successful 

emulation by the Air Force of the Central Intelligence 

Agency's capability for secure handling of *blade covert 

contracting procedures. In our judgment both of these 

successes are directly attributable to the centralized 

management and control practices which are being applied 

by the Department of Defense under the National Reconnaissance 

Office structure. 

It. It is essential that the National Reconnaissance 

Program include the fullest use of science and technology 

in the conduct of long-range, forward-thinking research 

and development leading to the advancement of our reconnaissance intelligence collection techniques, and to more 

efficient means for processing and analyzing the intelligence 

obtained. 

The multi-dimensional growth of the National Reconnaissance 

Program has been accompanied by increasing intelligence 

demands upon the collection systems involved. Under conditions 

of heightened emergency these demands would be intensified. 

Furthermore, should present systems become unavailable to 

us as the result of the defensive capabilities of governments whose territory we are now overflying, or as the 

result of restrictions imposed by national policy considerations, the need for advanced reconnaissance capabilities 

must have been anticipated and provided for within the 

National Reconnaissance Program, 

5. We believe that fuller use should be made of the 

potential of the Central Intelligence Agency in meeting 

the vital need for advance planning and research which 

must be maintained on a high priority basis if our Government 

is to continue to benefit from uniquely valuable intelligence 

returns available from overhead reconnaissance operations. 

The Central Intelligence Agency, in keeping with its 

traditional responsibilities in the broad area of research 

on intelligence methods, should continue to serve as a 

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looking to increased capabilities for information-gathering 

and intelligence exploitation. 

In the reconnaissance intelligence field the Central 

Intelligence Agency has already acquired invaluable experience, 

and has assembled a nucleus of scientific and technological 

talent, all of which can be brought to bear in introducing 

into the National Reconnaissance Program more effective means 

for the collection and processing of intelligence data. 

New methodologies for using and interpreting film, and 

for analyzing the total intelligence meaning of it, must be 

acquired. This latter need, including the application of 

modern information theoretic, exploitation of photographic 

images, and even of new information processing of the intelligence derived from this product, lies in the special domain 

of the Central Intelligence Agency. This subject, unlike the 

large operational projects cited above, fits the extensive 

skills and special interests of the intelligence expert. We 

believe that a brilliant new capability for the handling of 

huge volumes of photographed knowledge could be stimulated by 

a major effort of the Central Intelligence Agency. Also evident 

are obviously wide opportunities for research and development 

regarding the photographic process itself, and the science and 

technology associated with it are now timely since there has 

never really been a planned assault on deep understanding of 

photography on this scale. 

6. Effective development and conduct of the National 

Reconnaissance Program require that it be a streamlined 

operation under strong, centralized management and control 

within the Department of Defense, with ready access to personnel 

and resources of the Department of Defense and of the Central 

Intelligence Agency. The cost, complexity and size of the 

Program, particularly the large scale of satellite operations, 

and even of experiments such as the forthcoming Manned Orbital 

Laboratory, make earlier management schemes archaic. 

7. We consider that, with modifications which we will 

propose, a sound organizational concept for the National 

Reconnaissance Program is set forth in certain parts of the 

March 13, 1963 Agreement between the Secretary of Defense 

and the Director of Central Intelligence which (although sometimes 

honored more in the breach than in its execution) contains 

these basic provisions: 

a. Designation of the Secretary of Defense as 

Executive Agent for the development, management, and 

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conduct of the entire National Reconnaissance Program. 

b. Authorization to the Secretary of Defense to 

establish within the Defense Department a National 

Reconnaissance Office directed by a Defense Department 

official responsible to the Secretary for carrying out 

the Program. 

c. Authorization to the Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office to utilize the personnel and 

other resources of the Department of Defense and of the 

Central Intelligence Agency as required for the conduct 

of the Program. 

d. Provision by the Central Intelligence Agency of 

security guidance for procedures required for protection 

of sensitive National Reconnaissance Program activities. 

e. Assignment to the National Reconnaissance Office 

of responsibility for complying with the intelligence 

collection requirements and priorities established by 

the United States Intelligence Board. 

f. Planning and conduct of research and development 

of future national reconnaissance projects, utilizing 

appropriate resources and capabilities of the Department 

of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency and private 

contractors. 

8. Departures from the basic concepts enumerated above, 

and differing interpretations of the responsibilities involved, 

are illustrated in part by the following: 

a. The opinion of the Director of Central Intelligence 

that vlhe problem is to eliminate the conflicts, misunderstandings, personality differences, and organizational 

ambiguities which continue to plague the program and 

threaten its future. These result largely from poorly 

defined interagency responsibilities." 

b. The Board's study reveals that the use of monitors 

by thZ7 Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 

Intelligence to review the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program has interfered with the direct chain of 

command between the Secretary of Defense and the Director 

of the National Reconnaissance Office, and from the 

National Reconnaissance Office Director to the Central 

Intelligence Agency elements engaged in the Program. 

c. The authority and responsibility of the Director 

of the National Reconnaissance Office are further diluted 

by the operation of an interagency committee which provides 

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technical direction to some aspects of the National 

Reconnaissance Program on the basis of decisions which 

must be unanimous and which are unduly time-consuming. 

d. There is a lack of firm, unified direction of 

the entire National Reconnaissance Program with the 

result that: 

(1) centralized systems engineering and technical 

direction are lacking in the satellite reconnaissance 

program, 

(2) one contractor stated that decisions which 

Once took minutes now require months, 

(3) contracting authority is diffused between 

officers of the Department of Defense and of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, 

(4) the operations of the National Reconnaissance 

Program are badly fragmented and confused, 

(5) progress in the research and development of 

advanced reconnaissance intelligence systems is not 

sufficiently pursued, and 

(6) the economy of the Program is not the subject 

of coherent cost reduction or production gain efforts. 

Recommendations: 

We recommend the issuance of a Presidential directive 

which will provide guidelines for the centralized direction, 

management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program, 

and clarification of the departmental and agency responsibilities 

involved, as follows: 

1. Definition of the National Reconnaissance Program 

as a single program, national in character, for the development, 

management, control and operation of all projects, both current 

and long-range, for the collection of intelligence, mapping 

and geodetic information through overflights (excluding normal 

peripheral reconnaissance operations). 

2. Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive 

Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program, having primary 

responsibility and authority for (a) the management and conduct 

of reconnaissance activities involved in the Program and 

(b) the tasking of personnel, facilities and other resources of 

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the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, 

and other agencies as required to carry out that responsibility. 

3. Establishment within the Department of Defense of a 

National Reconnaissance Office to function as a separate 

operating agency of the Department of Defense, and to be headed 

by a Director responsible solely to the Secretary of Defense 

for discharging the Secretary's responsibility as Executive 

Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program. * 

4, Assignment to the Director of Central Intelligence, 

as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, of the 

function of sharpening and expediting the efforts of the 

United States Intelligence Board with respect to: (a) the 

establishment of realistic intelligence collection requirements to guide the national reconnaissance effort in the 

scheduling and targeting of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions; (b) ensuring prompt processing, analysis and 

reporting to appropriate users of the photographic and signals 

intelligence obtained from the national reconnaissance effort; 

and (c) the fullest utilization of such intelligence in the 

preparation of national intelligence estimates. 

5. Direction that there be a coordinated, comprehensive 

budget for all elements of the National Reconnaissance Program, 

and that there be established fiscal control and accounting 

procedures to assure appropriate utilization of funds by the 

agencies concerned in support of the Program. (We suggest 

that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central 

Intelligence and the Director of the Budget jointly review 

* Pending the outcome of studies now under way in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, the Board reserves judgment on 

the advisability of (a) designating the Director of the Joint 

Reconnaissance Center as Deputy Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office, in order that the reconnaissance 

resources of the military commands may be made readily 

available to the National Reconnaissance Program, and 

(b) designating the Commander, Air Force Systems Command, 

as a Special Assistant in the National Reconnaissance Office 

to provide immediate coupling of the National Reconnaissance 

Program with the full resources of the Air Force Systems 

Command. 

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this matter with a view to achieving the best formula for 

the accomplishment of these objectives.) 

6. Direction to the heads of the Department of Defense, 

the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies concerned 

that full utilization be made of the resources of each of 

those agencies as required for the conduct of research projects 

looking to the development of new and improved aircraft and 

satellite reconnaissance vehicles, photographic and other 

sensors, and advanced methods for improved processing and 

exploitation of the intelligence obtained therefrom. 

7. Assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of the 

responsibility for providing the Executive Agent with security 

policy guidance required for the maintenance of a uniform 

system of security procedures for the National Reconnaissance 

Program. 

8. In lieu of the monitor and review functions provided 

for in the present National Reconnaissance Program Agreement, 

periodic reporting by the Executive Agent for the Program to 

the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 

and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 

concerning all aspects of the Program, including organization, 

management, funding, programming, security, advance planning, 

research and development, production, and operations. 

9. Authorization to the Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office to establish a Scientific Advisory. 

Board, to include experts in the fields of science and technology 

from outside the Government, to provide the Director with 

technical advice and guidance relating to the achievement of 

national reconnaissance objectives. 

We recommend further that if the President approves a 

directive along the lines proposed above, its implementation 

within the framework of the National Reconnaissance Office 

include the following actions (along with such others as the 

Secretary of Defense may authorize as Executive Agent for 

the Program): 

1. Close and continuing collaboration on the part of 

the Secretary of Defen§e(as Executive Agent for the National 

Reconnaissance Program) and the Director of Central Intern, 

gence(in his capacity as principal intelligence officer and 

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a view to ensuring (a) the most productive possible utilization 

of national resources and skills in meeting the critical 

intelligence objectives involved; (b) opportunities for the 

Director of Central Intelligence to survey periodically progress 

made under the Program; and (c) evaluation of the need for 

proposed reconnaissance systems prior to the undertaking of 

development and testing. 

2. Continued designation of the Under Secretary of the 

Air Force as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. 

3. Contributions by elements of the Department of Defense 

and the Central Intelligence Agency of personnel required to 

provide staff support to the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, in the performance of the mission, functions and 

operations of the National Reconnaissance Program -- such 

personnel to serve solely under the direction and supervision 

of the Director while so assigned. 

it. Delegation by the Secretary.of Defense (as Executive 

Agent of the National Reconnaissanee.Program) to the Director 

of the National Reconnaissance Office, of the authority for 

the issuance of directives to elements of the Department of 

Defense, and for the levying of requests upon the Central 

Intelligence Agency and other agencies involved, as required 

for the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program. 

5. Assignment to the Department of Defense (Air Force) 

of responsibility for the management, over-all systems 

engineering, procurement and operation of all satellite 

reconnaissance systems. 

6. Elimination of the interagency Configuration Control 

Board as a decision-making entity within the satellite 

reconnaissance program. 

7. Continued assignment to the Central Intelligence 

Agency of the OXCART Program. With respect to manned intelligencecollection aircraft of an advanced character, we recommend as 

a general principle that, following the development stage, 

the responsibility for their operational use be determined 

by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group. 

8. Continue for the time being present management 

arrangements with respect to the A-11, the R-12 and the 
CLARK M. CL 

CHAIRMAN 

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TAGBOARD Projects, (We note in this regard that the recent 

surfacing of the A-11 and the initial deliveries of the 

R-12's starting in August 1964 will undoubtedly require 

review and possible adjustment in their management structure.) 

Respectfully, 

FOR THE BOARD