NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE .1 JULY 2015 

Itf!a 

centridii s;T7 

1 4 aLati. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 20330 

,OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

.13 December 1967 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL STEWART 

SUBJECT: Response to Secretary of Defense on MOL Program 

Since I consider the implications of Mr. McNamara's memorandum of 9 December to be quite far-reaching and serious, I 

would like to offer a few suggestions on how to possibly salvage some of our space program. 

When the MOL program was approved at the level of 1.5 

billion dollars, it was to be a six-flight program (one un-

'manned test; five manned) which had as its primary purpose 

the optical reconnaissance mission,.but also contained 

secondary military and tertiary objectives. At that time it 

was difficult to conceive of an. automatic mode of conducting 

the reconnaissance task. The entire payload job was estimated 

to cost about $500 million. At the present, we have a program 

whose total price is near $3 billion and which has. only a 

single principal objective. The payload cost now is estimated 

at about $1 billion. The role of man is questionable. Because 

of the sole identification of the,program with the reconnaissance 

mission, there is very 'little actual support from the Air Force. 

Conversely, the price for .achieving very high resolution is 

becoming so high that the reconnaissance community is dubious 

about the worth. Although they presently challenge mostly only 

the added cost caused by man, when man is.removed, they will 

challenge the very basic requirement for very high resolution 

orbital photography. 

When looking'at the- current national financial situation 

we are heading towards a dangerous future since very little 

effort is being devoted to.pteparing ourselves for modern de-. 

fense and offense which undoubtedly has to include the space 

environment. As a matter of fact,.if the manned portion of the 

Fhlre',-.14.1 AtmgffsE 

wa.uzu J u 

ti 
NRO APPROVED.FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

..■46trill7777 

MOL/DORIAN system is terminated in FY 69, there will be hardly 

any viable space program left, other than reconnaissance. To 

recoup' this kind of a loss, the country will require many, more; 

years of new planning, designing and negotiating. Therefore, 

I believe it is of vital interest to our national defense to 

maintain the MOL manned capability, regardless of possible inefficiencies which are inherent in an underfunded budget. I 

would suggest that we pursue a program which publicly, and in 

fact, maintains the option of manned flight even though it may. 

be later than presently dosirable. 

I suggest that in our answer to Mr. McNamara, after having 

discussed and examined a number of detailed alternatives, we 

highlight three courses of action: 

(1) Manned/automatic MOL program as currently conceived with the first manned flight in August 71 with FY 69' 

at $600 million. 

(2) MOL program reshaped to provide for unmanned testing of automatic features including full payload operation prior: 

to the planned introduction of man into the system with a first 

flight of the all-up unmanned system in August 71 and first 

manned flight on #6 with FY 69 at $400 million. 

(3) A wholly unmanned:DORIAN program with a public 

MOL termination, first flight:januarY 71 at a cost inFY.:69 

at $350 million. 

I would recommend that we do all we can to maintain the 

current program, but if the Government's financial situation 

is, indeed, such that we cannot afford the $600 million program 

in FY 69, that we pursue alternative #2. This alternative has 

as its inherent feature the reintroduction of an all manned 

system in FY 70 which could lead to a budget requirement of 

possibly $600 million. It allows, however, the option to postpone the manned system reintroduction for another year at which 

time the total fiscal funding requirement may be less than $600 

million. In the meantime, while having this year's lease on 

life, we could carry out a concentrated, but not necessarily 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

• 

0 • 

expensive, effort of broadening the MOL and making it, indeed, 

Into a useful military tool. The similarity with a single 

minded purpose of the Apollo Program and the necessity of expanding to the Apollo Applications Program to utilize the very 

expensive capability is very apparent. 'I really believe that 

we need this year's Chance to develop a MOL Applications Pro- 

. gram. 

MICHAEL I. YARYMOVYCH 

Technical Director 

MOL Progran 

.I 

1.: • 

• • 

11