#### Saveland, Appellant, vs. Connors and another, imp., Respondents.

*February 24*

March *22, 1904.*

*■Jurisdiction: Defendants fraudulently decoyed into state: Dismissal of action: Evidence: Frauds other than that in suit.*

1. Where plaintiff by fraud decoyed the defendants into this state for the purpose of bringing them within the jurisdiction of its courts, the action may, in discretion, be dismissed on that ground; and it is immaterial that plaintiff intended at first merely a criminal prosecution and not a civil action, or that, after service of process in the civil action, .defendants entered appearances therein or otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction.

2. In an action to recover damages for fraud perpetrated In connection with a prize fight, defendants cannot properly be questioned, on cross-examination, as to their knowledge of, or connection with, other fraudulent sporting events.

Appeal from au order of tbe circuit court for Milwaukee •county: LaweeNCe W. Halsey, Circuit Judge.

*Affirmed.*

Appeal from au order setting aside tbe service upon tbe ■defendants and dismissing tbe action. It appeared that tbe plaintiff, in July, 1902, bad bet money upon a prize fight in Springfield, Illinois, apparently with tbe understanding that by collusion between tbe participants tbe one upon whom be bet was to win, but that in fact tbe convention between them was tbe reverse of bis understanding, whereby bis champion lost tbe fight and -plaintiff bis money; that be considered.de*29fendant *Connors,*who was stakeholder, as having been in the conspiracy to delude and defraud him; that in March, 1903, thereafter, he again visited Springfield, and had an interview with *Connors*about joining in drawing some Milwaukee acquaintance of plaintiff into a similar operation to their mutual benefit, and to the partial or complete reimbursement of the plaintiff. The witnesses differ as to who' suggested this plan, but agree that it was then talked over,, and plaintiff admits that when it was suggested he thought he saw opportunity to get Connors, and perhaps some of his-confederates, to Milwaukee, where he thought they might be dealt with in a less friendly spirit than that which shielded them in Springfield. Defendants claim that at that time-plaintiff met defendant McCarren, and arranged to have Min-eóme to Milwaukee to endeavor to put the scheme in operation, though plaintiff denies this. However, late in March,. McCarren, who was a foot racer, and one Henderson, also a foot racer, did come to Milwaukee and call upon plaintiff, whose attorney then notified the police of their presence and purpose, and plaintiff engaged with them in an ostensible scheme to draw" an acquaintance of his into betting considerable sums upon a proposed foot race between them, to be run at Rochester, Hew York. Plaintiff, however, desired to-reach Connors, and therefore got into communication with him by telephone, and insisted on his coming to Milwaukee to aid to “skin up a sucker.” *Connors*responded with celerity, and appeared the next forenoon. He, together with the other two Springfield men, were put in communication with plaintiff’s friend, and opened up their plan of a collusive foot race to him, and were decoyed into the hands of the police, who held them, upon charges of vagrancy of otherwise, in jail, for some time. Immediately after their arrest, however, summons and complaint were served upon them in this action, seeking to recover damages for fraud perpetrated on the plaintiff in the Springfield transaction. They also were *30later arrested upon civil process issued in this action. Tbe defendants entered appearances, served answers, and made certain motions consistent only with tbe existence of personal jurisdiction over them. Tbe court found that they bad botb been decoyed into tbis state for tbe purpose of obtaining .service of process upon them in tbis action, and in tbe exercise of its discretion over its own process dismissed sucb service and tbe action. From sucb order tbe plaintiff appeals.

For tbe appellant tbe cause was submitted on briefs by Doerfler, *McBlroy & Bschweiler.*

For the respondents there was a brief by *Martin J.*Gillen, attorney, and *Leslie A.*Gilmore, of counsel, and oral argument by *Mr. Gilmore.*

Dodge, J.

1. The finding of tbe trial court to tbe effect •that botb *Connors*and *McCarren*were by plaintiff decoyed into tbis state for the purpose of bringing them within tbe jurisdiction of its courts by fraudulently bolding out to them another and different purpose is supported by some affirmative evidence, and is not antagonized by that clear preponderance necessary to its reversal. Upon tbe fact so found was aroused tbe power of tbe court, in its discretion, to refuse its jurisdiction to a case brought within it by trickery, to purge its docket of sucb a disgrace. *Townsend v. Smith,*47 Wis. 623, 3 N. W. 439; *Schrœder v. Laubenheimer,*50 Wis. 480, 7 N. W. 427; *Moletor v.*Sinnen, 76 Wis. 308, 44 N. W. 1099; *Williams v.*Williams, 117 Wis. 125, 94 N. W. 25; *Reed v.*Williams, 29 N. J. Law, 385; *Hill v.*Goodrich, 32 Conn. 588; *Wanzer v.*Bright, 52 Ill. 35. In the last case it is said:

> “Tbe pure fountains of justice can never be so polluted. ' Tbe courts were created for tbe administration of justice, and they and their process can never be used for tbe purpose of oppression and to perpetrate fraud and wrong, or their process fraudulently obtained and employed to enforce • a right, however just and legal.”

*31The power and duty of the courts to refuse jurisdiction in such cases rest not so much on the rights of the defendant as upon a duty to themselves- to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. Though the defendants here be, as suggested, of the vilest, is no reason that a court should lower itself to the attitude of an accessory in working an effective fraud upon them. It matters not that jurisdiction is in fact acquired, whether by service of the summons or by acts of the defendants in submission to such jurisdiction. *Townsend v. Smith, supra.*Neither is it significant that the purpose of plaintiff may not have included the commencement of a civil action, but merely the institution of criminal proceedings. The service of process in this action was made possible only by the fraud, and the court should therefore deny it effect. *Ibid.*

*2.*Error is assigned upon permitting defendants to refuse, as possibly criminating, answers upon cross-examination as to their knowledge of, or connection with, certain described fraudulent sporting events; also as to their connection with that in which plaintiff claimed to have been swindled. In such ruling could be nothing of prejudice to appellant, for such facts had no bearing or relevancy upon the only issue presented by the motion to dismiss, namely, whether they had been fraudulently induced by plaintiff to come into Wisconsin. Further, all of the former class of questions were improper under the rule of *Emery v.*State, 101 Wis. 627, 648, 78 N. W. 145, and *Paulson v. State,*118 Wis. 89, 94 N. W. 771.

We are satisfied that the trial court- rightly exercised its discretion in setting aside the service of process and dismissing the action.

*By the Court.*— Order affirmed.