WO APPROVED FOR 

~RELhAS1z 1 JULY 2015 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EVANS October 4, 1966 

SUBJECT: Garments on MOL SPO Letter on Subject of MOL Flight Test 

Objectives 

The criteria presented in the referenced SPO letter, governing the 

objectives of the first two MOL missions, require two flights of the 

T-IX/ for man-rating the launch configuration, one flight of the Gemini B. 

with recovery and one flight of the Laboratory and Mission Module structure alone, suitably ballasted.: Planning is intended to provide for 

repeating critical tests should failure be experienced. 

fl is expected te.obtain,T-IiiR performance'datai to qualify 

the Gemini B from launch through recovery and to. obtain aeromechanic and 

thermal environmental data on the orbiting vehicle during ascent. The 

profile will approximate the ATI. orbital flight profile through Stage . 

Zero propulsion and will then be lofted to provide re-entry of thee. 

Gemini in a manner that approximates the orbital re-entry profile and .- 

design heating.. It may be questionable whether a re-entry test is 

adequate which does not plan to exceed by a safety factor the environment of the Gemini normal re-entry profile. We need information to, 

demonstrate that the planned test is adequate and that more severe` 

testing through use of a shallow reentry angle or positive velocity: 

increase from propulsion during re-entry is not necessary. Other matters 

are left unanswered in this letter such as mhether'the Easter Island 

recovery capability will be or should be exercised on this flight and 

whether a tracking ship will be:integrated into this sub-orbital flight. 

In general, I recommend that the objectives of Flight #1 be approved 

but that additional,information be presented to clarify the methods to be 

used. 

Flight #2 is justified in the SPO letter as a back-up' to Flight hi, 

with provision to change to a complete Gemini B, if needed. Remaining 

objectives consist of another T-IIIM verification, in the same trajectory 

to be used on the first manned flight' {i.e:, an orbital profile), plus 

acquisition of additional aeromechanic and thermal data on the orbiting 

vehicle during ascent. The strongest justification for Flight #2, other 

than as a back-up to Flight #1, appears tope the need for a second T-IIIM 

flight for man-rating purposes. 

SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED 

0 o SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIEM

CV:1.LO 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RtLEASE 1 JULY 2015. SPECIAL.- ACC'Et) D 

'.:12(71:7A73:MIS , 

The flight could, however, be-employed for primary or secondary 

mission experimentation. There is need to understand the schedule 

problems and costs that reportedly result from adding certain subsystems 

to the Laboratory on Flight a in Order to make the flight more useful.. 

I suggest that.itemization of some of the subsystems with their costs 

and availability problems be.obtained Analysis could then be made of 

what would be involved in provid2xig;'for example, the stabilization 

system for Flight #2, so thatiefnl,orbital flight could be achieved. 

The addition of other subsy#etiii. cOal.a. be evaluated in terms 'of cost 

and schedule versus benefits.Oteimon#rating sustained flight perform7: 

ance prior to the first manned4li4ht• 

It may also be well to Consider demonstrating vehicle burn-up 2 

destruction through the contrOn:re.;.entry of the Laboratory and 

Mission Module prior to the fitst4light which would have the mission 

payload aboard. 

It is a fact that until:Ilight #3 there will be•no demonstration 

Gemini in an unoccupied quieseen.t„configuration for up to 30 days. If 

the-flight were to carry, anether Gemini or Flight 41!„were to be orbital 

this quiescent testing coUidbeaecomplished. ' * 

The cost :of testing nubsysteMs on Flight #2 to enhance the prob-, 

ability of success on Flight #3-elhould be compared with the potentialcost to the overall M41, program of:Possibly losing payload operating 

days on orbit during Flight #31.n the event failure sofa non-payload 

subsystem requires de-orbit of. the•astronauts -Jkl.tbough the urgency of • 

obtaining 30 days of mission payload productive 'operation on Plight #3 .:. 

is not arparent at this'pointlne;At may.well bean.importantdemand 

by the time of this:flightHltmay:not'be possible to presently assess':-: 

in dollars the value per day of. mission payload,operation on Flight 18, 

but the counter analysis of schedule difficulty and program cost'for:.: 

selected Laboratory and Miseion Module subsystem testing on Flight #2L 

to enhance the eonfidence factor on Flight #3 could be done 

In general, I:believe. there is much moreve:ehould. understand and 

analyze relative to the flight,objectiVes of.Flight #2 than. ii presented. 

in the SPO letter,..J:am:concerned*hether optimuM planning has occurred • 

for-this flight.- 

Flight 45 objectives are quite generalized but'appear.adeqUate for 

a first level analysis. I concUr:withmaxiMum planning toward criticalmissionAsbjective accomplishment ip the.first 15 days, or:sooner, of 

time. This is even more important-it.we do not increase the level of 

activity on p.ight.#2.ja order to i0PrOVe hardware",coafidencefor Flight #3.. 

;•, " • • 
• NRQIARWEDFOR ,,,..;.• 

RELEASE 1 :JULY 2015 (Or'LW 

IN,7!

1h 

tiLlmaLitju 0 SPECIAL ACCESS rEQua,., 

In cencrall I am strongly in favor of developing a 7-fliht Mission, 

Requirements or Flight Oblectives. document. I feel such a document is 

cssertial, because the above comments imply that considerably more.work 

should be done toward clearly definin7 Supportable flifjit objectives. 

Such a document should be part of the formal progam planning documentation. It should be as comprehensive as lossible at this point in the • 

rrogam and should be periodically revised as our. program vision improves; 

at control must be maintained by requiring Program Director approval for. 

all changes thereto. - I sun. est: planting attivitylelnittateit as 

soot as possible. •