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~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

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BYEMAN 1 CONTROL SVST£M 

TALENTKJ;~<t!~~b ik-~ )~ 

February 20, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SMART, NASA 

SUBJEC.T: Broadening the Availability of Satellite Reconnaissance 

-, Policy Information 

In our day-to-day operations, we frequently find it useful to 

exhibit and discuss the actual document describing the national 

policy applicable to NASA earth-sensing activities {NSAM 156 

Committee Report of July 1966). Occasionally we are inhibited 

by the fact that the document is in the BYEMAN security system 

and the person with whom we are dealing is only TALENT-KEYHOLE 

cleared. · 

Recently we discussed this problem with the BYEMAN Control 

Officer at the State Department, pointing out that the deletion of 

two words, superfluous in themselves, would convert the policy 

paper from BYEMAN to TALENT-KEYHOLE and considerably 

broaden its usefulness to NASA and the DOD. We now have State's 

concurrence in taking this action and have prepared a certified 

TALENT-KEYHOLE version of the document. I have attached a 

copy for whatever use you may wish to make of it. 

Attachment 

G~2~~~ PAULE. WORTHMAN 

Colonel, USAF 

Deputy Director 

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Political and Security Aspects of NonMilitary Applications of Satellite Earth-Sensing 

1. The NSAM 156 Committee has reviewed the issues raised 

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in the letter of April 4 from Mr. Charles L. Schultze and Dr. Donald 

F. Hornig to Secretary of State Dean Rusk (Appendix A), and submits 

the following report of its conclusions. 

2. We believe that the "Report on Political and Informational 

Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy" prepared pursuant to 

NSAM 156 and approved on June 30, 1962, for transmittal to the 

President remains basically valid. The objective of avoiding open 

challenges to satellite observation activity has been generally met, 

and the Soviet Union has muted -- though not retracted -- its challenge 

to the principle of military space reconnaissance. Agreement has been 

reached on fundamental legal principles which do not ban (though they 

also do not explicitly sanction) space observation. Also, since 1962 the 

Soviets have developed a major operational satellite reconnaissance program of their own. Developments over the past four years have,· therefore, led to a shift of emphasis from a need for actions that will build 

world acceptance of space observations, then a generally novel idea, to 

actions which will preserve the present wide tacit acceptance of such 

activities. Accordingly, there does not seem to be any imperative to 

launch disclosure initiatives for the purpose of furthering the general 

principle of space observation. On the other hand, it remains necessary 

to consider the possibly adverse effects of new public disclosures or 

other initiatives which could upset the present satisfactory situation. 

3. Our chief concern over a challenge to the legitimacy and 

propriety of satellite reconnaissance has been the Soviet position. Over 

the past several years, the Russians have withdrawn insistence on 

branding such activity as illegal in the cases of international space agreements that they desired, and they do not press such arguments in the UN, 

but they have not stopped referring to such activities as espionage. 

Moreover, the statements by Khrushchev and his son-in-law, Adzhubei, 

admitting such Soviet activities have never been printed in the Soviet 

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ment referring implicitly to Soviet satellite reconnaissance, Brezhnev 

on July 1 dismissed as untrue "fables" alleging that the US has "allseeing spy satellitesn, larger numbers of missiles, and invulnerable 

submarines. These fables, he said, are intended for simpletons who 

do not know "what missiles, what satellites, what submarines 11 the 

USSR hc!-s. Notwithstanding this implied admission of Soviet satellite 

reconnaissance, we see continuing pertinence of the NSAM 156 Report 

conclusion that: 111t is extremely important that the US avoid public 

statements about our satellite operations that would pose a direct 

political challenge to the Soviet Union on the sensitive issue of reconnaissance. 11 

4. It is now necessary to give more attention than heretofore to 

the reactions of other countries. To date, increasing public awareness of the existence of US and Soviet military space reconnaissance 

has not prompted concern in other countries for their own political or 

military security interests, but such concern is likely to develop as 

others become more aware of the nature and scope of satellite surveillance. Disclosure of surveillance capabilities, even indirectly in nonmilitary contexts, will awaken new interest and in some cases concern. 

Accordingly, any such disclosure should be carefully considered and 

planned so as to prevent or reduce adverse reactions by other states 

that would be undesirable in their own right and could also be manipulated to our detriment by the Soviet Union. 

5. Direct disclosure of satellite reconnaissance for the purpose 

of gaining world acceptance of the principle of space surveillance is 

both unnecessary and liable to provoke adverse reactions from the 

USSR .and other states. On the other hand, in the long run the security 

of our reconnaissance program can be served by encouraging the 

present natural, gradual growing world recognition of the potentialities 

of satellite earth-sensing in the context of scientific progress and economic betterment. Such recognition will grow whether we stimulate it 

or not. We can influence and channel, and if we wish retard, such a 

development -- but we cannot prevent it. We should recognize that 

any apparent US efforts to suppress or hobble peaceful applications 

because of presumed (and rightly presumed) sensitivity over protecting 

military reconnaissance would not serve our objective of retaining or 

improving tacit acceptance of unrestricted earth observation and sensing. 

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tions of satellite earth-sensing will not involve the same risks of provoking a confrontation with the Soviet Union as would direct disclosure 

of reconnaissance. We should insure, insofar as possible, that these 

initiatives are not construed by the Soviets as likely to result in general 

disclosure of information about her military capabilities which the 

USSR wishes to protect. 

6. As noted above, non-military uses of space which require surveillance of the earth by various sensors would as a side effect inevitably stimulate wider awareness of the capabilities of reconnaissance, 

but in a more favorable context than would direct disclosure. We should 

recognize that different uses of any technology will continue to evoke 

different reactions. The familiar home, travel and hobby uses of ordinary cameras do not lessen objections to their use for intelligence collection. The same will be true of satellite cameras, and the Soviets 

have already shifted their position several years ago to objecting to the 

use of satellite intelligence collection, rather than objecting to satellite 

observation per se. (If in the future the Russians tacitly admit to having 

reconnaissance satellites of their own, along the lines of Brezhnev's 

statement referred to above, they would probably still claim that intelligence collection by the United States served different and nefarious 

purposes.) This does not, however, seem to be a valid basis for opposing development of concurrent non-military and continued military 

reconnaissance programs. 

7. NASA's and other proposals for developing earth-sensing programs which might overlap, be derived in sanitized form from, or 

stimulate public interest in, classified reconnaissance programs should 

be judged on the basis of criteria such as feasibility, preference to nonspace alternatives, cost, problems in protecting classified technology, 

and risks of security compromise of the classified reconnaissance program. It should usually be possible by careful planning to mitigate possible adverse political repercussions of the incidental disclosure of 

surveillance capabilities and hence to give political and national security 

clearance to such programs. The best justification for such programs, 

and the best general basis for calming any alarm over their effects will 

be valid scientific or economic payoff in which other countries can expect to share. 

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8. The primary area of competition in space between the United 

States and the Soviet Union has been and will for the next few years 

continue to be the race to the moon. This is, however, largely a 

short term competition for the 1960' s. In the longer run, there may 

develop a competition in space applications developing the resources 

of the world, particularly of the underdeveloped world. Communications satellites and meteorological satellites have already contributed 

to this end, but their benefits do not exhaust the potential value of 

earth-sensing satellites for developing and using natural resources. 

9. In the deliberations of this Committee, differences of view 

arose over the relative merits of using satellites or aircraft for 

natural resource surveys and other earth-sensing activities in the 

"reconnaissance range" of satellite sensing (that is, roughly below 

20 meters in precision of ground resolution). This Committee has 

not attempted to resolve such differences; they clearly reflect an important question, but our present focus is on political and security 

guidelines for use of such satellite programs in this range as may be 

determined to be economically and scientifically justified. In addition, 

there would appear to be unresolved questions with respect to the alternatives of using unmanned or manned satellites for these purposes. 

10. A natural resources program of the kind in which NASA is 

interested can in time provide vast data, using a variety of spaceborne 

sensors. The NASA program as now envisaged does not include operational use of remote-sensing techniques before the 1970s, principally 

because most of the sensors are presently programmed for use in 

sophisticated manned spacecraft as part of the Apollo Applications Program. However, experimental programs might be initiated as early as 

1968. There is no funding as yet of less complex, less expensive unmanned systems. 

11. One current problem which emerges is the question of use of 

certain equipment and photographic materials from the classified reconnaissance program to assist NASA in evaluating the utility of, and 

developing techniques for, satellite photography for exploiting natural 

resources. In order to develop a thorough understanding of observation 

satellite technology, it would seem desirable to consider whether NASA 

can be provided -- on a classified basis, but perhaps under less restrictive classifications controls -- both selected satellite, photographs for 

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evaluation, and selected satellite hardware, including cameras. The 

groundwork would thus be prepared for possible future operational use 

in natural resource survey missions. The equipment to be used need 

not -- and in our view should not -- represent the latest, highest resolution cameras. But considerable useful work could, for example, be 

accomplished with resolutions on the order of 10-15 feet. Some of the 

many applications that might be usefully served with resolutions of this 

level include mapping, surveys of water resources, agricultural and 

forestry surveys, and studies of land use over broad areas. Suitable 

cameras for these purposes already exist in the KH programs, and the 

release to NASA of both selected equipment and photography taken in 

the past might be useful and presumably could be done without raising 

unmanageable security problems. The cameras and photography from 

the KH systems could remain classified; only the products of actual 

NASA missions would probably need to be unclassified. In cases where 

a decision had been made for NASA to proceed with a given program for 

which unclassified cameras or other equipment could be used, NASA 

could let contracts to the NRO industrial contractors, who could then in 

fact adapt on an unclassified basis equipment originally designed for the 

classified program. In the case of classified equipment, the NRO could 

provide such assistance, as it is doing in the Apollo lunar-orbiter program, or classified contracts could be arranged for necessary adaptation of existing classified equipment. NASA would prefer to the greatest 

extent possible to use unclassified equipment. On the other hand, permissible NASA programs would necessarily be more severely limited if 

only unclassified equipment could be used, and for a range of cases 

valuable photographic data could be released while the equipment would 

need to remain classified. 

12. Public .awareness of the quality of some of the lower resolution 

materials released in non-military contexts need not have damaging 

effect on the viability of unilateral reconnaissance programs, provided 

care is exercised in the type of materials released and the manner of 

release. Security of the classified national reconnaissance program 

would also be enhanced by having NASA conduct the actual launch and 

retrieval operations of the non-reconnaissance programs. 

13. The United States, will, in any case, find it increasingly 

difficult to control public disclosure of satellite surveillance capabilities. 

To date the US and the USSR have maintained tacitly acknowledged but 

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unpublicized mutual reconnaissance surveillance. Lately, the USSR 

has shown what may be indications of a slight loosening up of their 

own reticence to discuss satellite sensing capabilities by releasing 

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TV photographs of the earth taken by the Molniya satellite, and by 

publishing in their own press earlier US-released Gemini photographs 

(without attribution of the source). These steps suggest a possible 

Soviet willingness to accustom the world to the idea that non-reconnaissance photography from space is a normal activity, and could 

foreshadow an openly acknowledged future Soviet satellite program for 

earth-sensing and natural resources development. (The USSR may 

also use this knowledge later to attempt to undercut the American 

position on disarmament verification, and as noted earlier this would 

not necesarily imply any softening of Soviet objection to open acknowledgement of reconnaissance.) Other countries, too, may be contemplating similar programs. Recent French studies of the use of 

aerial photography for geographic uses have indicated an interest in 

the use of space platforms as well as aircraft. This interest is not 

surprising; France is only the first of several countries with developing space programs which will be investigating useful economic or 

scientific satellite programs in an area that has not already been preempted by the USA or the USSR. In the likelihood that other countries 

will soon be operating or at least openly discussing the use of observation satellites, it might be to the US· advantage to be prepared to take 

the lead in such discussions and activities. Indeed, at some point we 

may wish to consider cooperative and collaborative programs not only 

with other countries in Western Europe and Japan, but even with the 

USSR, if the political climate were appropriate. 

14. The United States should consider steps to apply its highly 

developed and developing photographic capabilities for the benefit of 

the underdeveloped countries. In this way the United States can be 

in a position to provide tangible evidence of out interest in helping 

developing countries, while fore stalling or overmatching possible 

Soviet propaganda initiative in that field. This will require consideration of a whole range of political, as well as scientific-technical and 

security, factors. For example, merely advising developing countries 

of new resources and opportunities will not always win us plaudits if we 

are not prepared to assist these countries in realizing these potentialities. 

Nonetheless, in the longer run there would appear to be real political 

opportunities to us in taking a more active role than the Soviet Union in 

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applying satellite earth observation to non-military economic uses. 

This long-run political interest reinforces other reasons for developing the potentialities or non-military uses of earth-sensing by satellites. 

15. From the standpoint of protecting security of the classified 

national reconnaissance program, NASA programs should proceed 

gradually through current aerial experimentation, to unmanned and 

manned satellites, and in general moving from less to more precise 

ground resolution. The technical limits placed on security grounds 

could probably change as the general state of the art of classified 

technological capabilities improves and as public awareness and appreciation of them advances. This process of reducing the security margin 

could not go on indefinitely, but the line of sensitivity probably could recede along the lines indicated above as both technological and political 

security limitations become less acute. At present, it is generally 

agreed that the limiting optical ground resolution should be about 20 

meters from low earth orbit; public discussion of potential future 

economic applications should, however, be less restricted. 

16. At some point, probably after there had been further initial 

exploratory study and if the program proved practicable, it would 

appear that the United States -- perhaps the President himself -- might 

launch a major public program. At that time, experimental NASA aerial 

and space photographs could be released, and NASA program plans and 

expectations described -- all'without mention of the classified program. 

Such an initiative would maximize political gains for the United States. 

It could, of course, also prompt prominent speculation about classified 

reconnaissance activities, but such speculation could probably be fended 

off, and possible hostile Soviet reactions would probably be foreclosed or 

undercut by the wide interest that the program should generate. However, 

the question of whether and how any such initiative should be made should 

probably be deferred at this time, and in any case will require further 

careful consideration. 

17. It should be noted that public recognition, even on an incomplete basis, of satellite observation capabilities would also have reverberations in other fields. For example, public awareness of such capabilities should assist in building a consensus in support of disarmament 

proposals which rely on satellite surveillance. The existence of an 

openly acknowledged photographic satellite system, even with poorer 

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quality products, would under some circumstances give the US government an additional option: to make public use of satellite photography 

to prove a violation of an agreement to a world forum, without disclosure of the classified reconnaissance program. In the absence of 

such a publicly known system, it might be more difficult to make a 

convincing case that a violation had indeed occurred. At the same time, 

it may also be used by others to argue against requirements for other 

verification measures in cases where such requirements remain. By 

and large, however, disclosure of surveillance capabilities within the 

limits we are suggesting would probably facilitate distinguishing between 

what satellite observation can and cannot verify for the purposes of disarmament negotiations. 

18. Recommendations: 

( 1) The classified national reconnaissance program should be 

protected by continuing to consider carefully the political and security 

effects of proposed unclassified earth-sensing activities prior to their 

authorization. Similarly, consideration should continue to be given to 

the political and security effects of public discussion of such activities. 

Any party at interest can request the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee to 

review possible politicaLor security issues which might arise from 

particular NASA or other non-military plans, programs, or other 

related activities concerned with spaceborne earth-sensing. 

(2) There is potential great political capital in a US program 

of natural resource surveys and other scientific and economic exploitation of satellite earth observation and sensing, provided the basis has 

been properly laid, and the announcement of such a program is able to 

draw upon and project viable economic promise. Further consideration should therefore be given to a major political initiative advancing 

the concept of economic betterment through space activities. If such 

an initiative is decided upon, it should come at a time when sufficient 

work has been done to demonstrate the potentialities and offer reasonable promise of some early payoff. 

(3) At present, and for the next several years, from the standpoint of political and security considerations there is no objection to 

NASA proceeding with its tentatively planned experimental program, 

complying with the limitation previously established between NASA and 

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(4) In discussion of the use of observation satellites for 

natural resources purposes, NASA should, for the next five years 

subject to future review and possible revision of guidelines -- restrict 

its discussion of future systems to those involving ground resolution of 

10-15 feet. The same restriction should apply to all other interested 

Government agencies. In order to facilitate proper classified control 

to apply the above general guidelines, and additional detailed implementing guidelines developed by NASA with the concurrence of NRO, a 

NSAM should be issued directing all other civilian agencies with an 

interest in satellite earth-sensing for these purposes to make known 

their interests in that field to, and coordinate fully with, NASA. Apart 

from other advantages to be expected from such an articulation of responsibilities, it should enable NASA to apply the agreed classified 

guidelines limitations to other civilian agencies. 

(5) NASA and other appropriate agencies should consider carefully the relative merits and costs of aerial and other possible alternatives to various space-borne earth-sensing programs in terms of practical political interests as well as cost effectiveness. Similarly, the 

respective merits of manned and unmanned satellites will of course require consideration. To assist in deciding these questions, NASA and 

other appropriate Government personnel should be permitted to use 

selected aircraft and KH-4 photography, most of which is now codeword 

classified, to advance its studies of non-military earth-sensing applications. 

*The Committee accepts as a satisfactory present definition of 

the limitation on the study, design, development, fabrication, or test 

of earth sensors by NASA (as proposed in Dr. McMillan's letter to 

Dr. Seamans of August 5, 1965, and accepted by Dr. Seamans in his 

reply to Dr. McMillan of August 24, 1965) as those sensors not exceeding a capability of "an angular resolution of O. 1 milliradian or 

finer, or an optica~ !with a physical 

aperture greater than .5U cm. ana an optical ngure controlled to better 

than 1/4 wave length". This limiting optical resolution is roughly 

equivalent to 20 meters from low earth orbit. 

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(6) With a view to facilitating the above studies noted in 

para (5), USIB should be asked to review: 

(a) The question of removing reference to the fact 

that the US has an operational satellite reconnaissance 

program from codeword control, retaining either a 

SECRET or TOP SECRET classification. This would 

permit explanation of the reason for limitations, on a 

classified basis, to Government personnel concerned 

with non-military satellite earth-sensing programs but 

without a need-to-know the performance capabilities or 

product of the classified program. One of the considerations involved is that at present, uncleared Government 

personnel often voice their speculations about reconnaissance programs and even capabilities on an unclassified and uncontrolled basis. 

(b) Selective removal of appropriate photography 

from codeword control for classified use by selected 

NASA and other cleared personnel studying the potentialities of non-military earth-sensing activities, or, 

alternatively but less desirably, clearance of an increased number of NASA personnel for such use of 

those materials under present codeword control. 

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(7) The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with 

the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, should review and 

establish appropriate security restrictions on cameras and other 

sensing apparatus and equipment which can be made available for 

NASA's program of non-military applications of satellite earth-sensing. 

It is recognized that substantial compartmentalization will probably have 

to remain, but the non-military programs should be enabled to profit 

from relevant achievements of the military program to the extent feasible. 

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