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*********************************************** 
JAMES M. MCNAMARA v. KRISTINE MCNAMARA

(AC 43391)

Alvord, Alexander and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

granting her attorney’s motion to withdraw his appearance, denying

her request for a continuance, and granting the plaintiff’s motion for

modification. The plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion for modification

seeking amendments to the parties’ parenting time, communication practices, and medical and educational final decision-making authority. Subsequently, the defendant’s counsel, C, filed a motion to withdraw his

appearance, in which he represented that communication with the defendant had broken down and that he could not effectively represent her

interests. The trial court granted the motion after a hearing. Subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s request for a continuance of

the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for modification in order to obtain

new counsel. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for modification,

and this appeal followed. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting C’s motion to

withdraw his appearance: the court correctly determined that the defendant did not object to the motion because, after the trial court stated

that it was its understanding that the defendant did not object, the

defendant responded only by stating that she did not want to be selfrepresented, the record revealed that she was afforded ample opportunity to communicate her position, and, although C’s motion was granted

three days before the hearing on the motion for modification, the motion

to withdraw was precipitated by the defendant’s refusal to meet with

C to prepare for the hearing.

2. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the trial

court violated her right to procedural due process in denying her motion

for a continuance; the defendant did not meet her burden of proving

that the denial of the requested continuance of the hearing on the

plaintiff’s motion for modification, a postjudgment motion between two

parents with joint legal and shared physical custody of their children,

was a claim of constitutional magnitude, directly linked to the specific

constitutional right she alleged, namely, a parent’s constitutional right

to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of his or

her child.

3. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying her motion for a continuance; the defendant failed to brief and analyze adequately how she was harmed by the

court’s denial of her request, and, result, in the absence of any such

analysis, this court was unable to conclude that the denial had any

bearing on the outcome of the hearing.

4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff

final decision-making authority on issues concerning the physical and

emotional health of the parties’ children, treatment decisions, and the

selection of therapeutic providers: although the court found that the

parties were capable and loving parents, it also found that they communicated poorly with each other and their inability to agree on important

issues resulted in the children being denied therapeutic services, and,

as a result, a tiebreaker was needed; this court could not conclude, on

the basis of the court’s findings, that the trial court abused its discretion

in concluding that an award of final decision-making authority was

necessary and that it was most appropriate for the plaintiff to be given

that authority.

(One judge dissenting)

Argued April 7—officially released September 28, 2021

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury, where the court, Winslow, J., rendered

judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain

other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation

agreement; thereafter, the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee, granted the motion to withdraw

filed by the defendant’s counsel; subsequently, the

court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee,

denied the defendant’s motion for a continuance and

granted the plaintiff’s motion for modification, and the

defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Olivia M. Eucalitto, with whom, on the brief, was

Janet A. Battey, for the appellant (defendant).

Christopher P. Norris, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this postdissolution matter, the defendant, Kristine McNamara, appeals from the judgment

of the trial court granting her attorney’s motion to withdraw his appearance, denying her motion for a continuance, and granting the motion of the plaintiff, James

M. McNamara, for modification of certain custody

orders. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

(1) abused its discretion in granting her attorney’s

motion to withdraw, (2) violated her right to procedural

due process in denying her motion for a continuance,

(3) abused its discretion in denying her motion for a

continuance, and (4) abused its discretion in awarding

the plaintiff final decision-making authority on issues

concerning the health, treatment, and therapeutic providers of the parties’ children. We affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the defendant’s claims. The court,

Winslow, J., dissolved the parties’ eleven year marriage

on September 27, 2013. The judgment of dissolution

incorporated by reference the parties’ separation agreement and parenting plan agreement (parenting plan

agreement), both dated September 26, 2013. The parenting plan agreement provided, inter alia, that the plaintiff

had sole legal custody of the parties’ two minor children. On January 4, 2016, with the approval of the court,

Eschuk, J., the parties agreed to amend the parenting

plan to provide that the parties would have ‘‘joint legal

and physical custody of the children.’’ On November 6,

2018, with the approval of the court, Eschuk, J., the

parenting plan agreement again was modified to provide

the defendant with additional parenting time.

On January 11, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for

modification. On May 15, 2019, the plaintiff filed a second amended motion for modification (operative

motion for modification), in which he sought amendments to the parties’ parenting time, holiday parenting

time, parental communication practices, and medical

and educational final decision-making authority. A hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for modification was scheduled for August 8 and 9, 2019.

On July 31, 2019, the defendant’s counsel, Attorney

William Chabb, filed a motion to withdraw his appearance. Attorney Chabb represented that effective communication with the defendant had broken down, the

defendant had stated that she did not trust him, and

the defendant did not value or follow his reasonable

advice or acknowledge the risks of an unfavorable

result at trial. As a result, Attorney Chabb represented

that he could not effectively or adequately represent

the defendant’s interests in the matter and that opposing

counsel did not object to the granting of the motion. A

hearing was set on the motion to withdraw for August
5, 2019, at which the parties appeared before the court,

Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee. After the

hearing, and on that same date, the court granted the

motion. The defendant thereafter made an oral request

for a continuance in order to obtain new counsel, which

the court denied.

On August 6, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for

continuance, seeking to have the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for modification continued to September

6, 2019. She asserted, as her reason for requesting a

continuance: ‘‘I need more time because my lawyer

withdrew yesterday. I have no legal professional representation for my hearing.’’ The motion stated that the

plaintiff had not consented to the continuance. The

court, Eschuk, J., denied the motion on the same day

it was filed.

The plaintiff’s operative motion for modification was

heard by the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial

referee, on August 8 and 9, 2019. On August 9, 2019,

the court made findings on the record and, on August

12, 2019, the court issued a written order, providing,

inter alia, that: ‘‘The parties shall have joint legal custody of the minor children. The parties shall be equally

involved in all major decisions affecting the children.

The party with whom the children are staying at the

time will have the right to make emergency decisions

affecting the children. All other important decisions affecting the health, welfare, education, religious upbringing,

guidance, discipline or other aspect of the upbringing

of the children shall be made with the participation,

involvement and agreement of both parents. Neither

party shall be entitled to act unilaterally as to important

decisions affecting the children until there has been a

bona fide attempt to reach agreement. If, however, the

parties are unable to agree on a physical health, emotional health, or therapeutic treatment decision or selection of the providers of such services, the plaintiff shall

have the final say. Physical and emotional health care

appointments, as well as therapeutic services, shall be

scheduled to occur on some of the parenting time of

each parent.’’ On August 26, 2019, the defendant filed

a motion to reargue the court’s August 12, 2019 custody

orders, which was denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the court

abused its discretion in granting Attorney Chabb’s

motion to withdraw his appearance. Specifically, she

argues that it was improper to permit Attorney Chabb

to withdraw seventy-two hours before the hearing on

the plaintiff’s motion for modification was scheduled

to begin and that the court’s determination that she did

not object to Attorney Chabb’s withdrawal is contradicted by the transcript. The plaintiff responds that the

defendant was clear as to her desire to hire new counsel
and she did not object to Attorney Chabb’s withdrawal.

We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

in granting the motion to withdraw.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At the beginning of the August 5, 2019 hearing on Attorney Chabb’s

motion to withdraw his appearance, the court recessed

briefly to give the defendant and Attorney Chabb time

to speak with each other. The court then heard argument from Attorney Chabb before turning to the defendant for her position on the motion. The defendant

explained: ‘‘I feel that [Attorney] Chabb is not informing

me and protecting my legal rights by guiding me in the

direction that I need to be guided in.’’ The defendant

stated that Attorney Chabb had e-mailed her on May 29,

2019, to inform her that she could ask for a deposition

of the plaintiff if she wanted to do so. She explained

that he had sent her a letter on August 1, 2019, in which

he indicated that he had e-mailed her regarding the ‘‘use

and necessity of a deposition.’’ The defendant stated

that Attorney Chabb had falsely said that she was under

stress and pressure and that she had virtually no contact

with him during July, 2019. She represented that ‘‘[I]t’s

been all along where I’ve gone to court and he hasn’t

reviewed to me what is actually coming up onto to be

discussed. And I go into court and, [for] example, the

November 6, whatever happened that day, it was the

day before that I saw that the opposing side wanted to

change something in the parenting plan. But I had met

with [Attorney] Chabb the day before and we discussed

an entirely different motion. So, I walked into court the

next day and I was basically blindsided by a proposal

handed to the judge that I didn’t even read.’’ The defendant further represented that, on another occasion,

Attorney Chabb again had not informed her of the subject matter of an upcoming hearing.

The defendant then explained to the court that she

was very busy because of her parenting time with the

parties’ children. She stated that she had not filed any

objection to the plaintiff’s request for medical and educational decision-making authority because she had not

been told that she was supposed to be filing an objection. She concluded her argument by stating: ‘‘[U]nfortunately I can’t seem to, for whatever reason, the relationship is—I can’t seem to get good counsel. And I’m just

looking for a fair and honest . . . process with good

legal counsel so that I can put on a case to show the

court the good, dedicated mother that I am. Thank you,

Your Honor.’’

After sharing her position, the court followed up by

asking the defendant how she responded to Attorney

Chabb’s May 29, 2019 e-mail regarding the deposition,

and whether she let Attorney Chabb know whether she

wanted to have the plaintiff deposed. After this line of

inquiry, the court stated: ‘‘[W]ell, what I think I’m hear-
ing from you is that you’re agreeing that your relationship with [Attorney] Chabb has broken down.’’ The

defendant responded: ‘‘I—you know, I spent $30,000

and I—if there’s some way that we can work it out. My

problem is that if I go to try and get another lawyer,

you know—I’ve called and sort of inquired, you know,

it would be a $30,000 retainer. So I, you know, I’ve tried

to—to—.’’ The court then interjected: ‘‘And really short

notice since your hearing is later this week.’’

The court then inquired of the defendant regarding

her willingness to share with Attorney Chabb certain

e-mails. The defendant stated: ‘‘[I]f [the plaintiff’s] entire

motion is gonna be heard on the 8th and 9th, he has

not asked, sat down with me, and asked me for any

e-mails to discuss anything. And so he’s telling me now,

the other day, that in three to four hours he can prepare

me for this hearing but he’s spent no time and he’s

asked for no e-mails of what it is that could support

my case against these false allegations that the other

side is making.’’ The court and the defendant then

engaged in a colloquy regarding whether the defendant

should have provided certain e-mails to Attorney

Chabb, with the defendant explaining, inter alia, that

she wanted to sit down with Attorney Chabb and go

through each of the plaintiff’s allegations and discuss

what types of e-mails would be most responsive to the

plaintiff’s allegations.

The following colloquy then occurred:

‘‘The Court: I see why [Attorney] Chabb is asking

to be released and you’re not objecting to his being

released.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Well—

‘‘The Court: You get the e-mails together that you

need and come and put on your hearing on Thursday.

I mean, you either have [Attorney] Chabb representing

you Thursday and Friday or you don’t.

‘‘[The Defendant]: But I don’t want to be—

‘‘The Court: And it sounds as though your relationship

has broken down and that you haven’t given him the

documents that you feel are necessary for—for the

motion to be heard. You know—

‘‘[The Defendant]: But I don’t want—

‘‘The Court: —I don’t know what you expect him to

do when he hasn’t been given anything from you.

‘‘[The Defendant]: But I don’t want—I don’t want to

represent myself. I would like some time to find counsel

that I can find counsel that can help me.

‘‘The Court: This case has been scheduled for three

months, two and a half, at this point.

‘‘[The Defendant]: And—and—

‘‘The Court: And, you know, at this point you’re either
ready to proceed with [Attorney] Chabb or you’re not.’’

The defendant then stated that she and Attorney

Chabb had not had any contact for the month of July,

2019. Attorney Chabb responded: ‘‘For the record . . .

[the defendant] is right. I had not contacted her for

three weeks. Largely because my policy is to wait for

preparation as close to a hearing as possible in order,

number one, to save money, number two, i[n] case

there’s amended motions or anything else that comes

along. However, prior to May 29th and that e-mail about

the deposition as I forwarded per [the defendant’s]

instructions, formal objections drafted to the allegations made by [the plaintiff’s counsel] in the normal

course. I also drafted motions for modifications per

[the defendant’s] directions. I sent them to her, I looked

for her direction as to actually filing them. [The defendant] stated to me that she had answers to all the allegations for [the plaintiff’s counsel’s] motion and I never

received them. So, there comes a point where I can’t

obviously command, I can only try to persuade my

clients. And I tried to persuade her to deal with these

issues and deal with them in a timely fashion, I heard

nothing. So, at one point, you just have to stop. I’ve

done everything she directed me to do, she’s been successful in terms of her parenting and an additional time

in November, the last time we were in court. So, the

problem becomes is . . . not that I take [the defendant’s] criticisms personally, I don’t, but professional[ly] I have to decide whether I can actually work

with her when her attitude is somewhat in opposition

depending on the day. So when she called me last week

and asked me about preparation I did say, and I invited

her to come to my office last Wednesday or Thursday

to sit down, I have a complete file, I have what I believe

would be some objections, might have merit, but she

proceeded to simply not take me up on my offer and

kind of personally harangue me. Again, it’s not personal

but professionally how can I recover from that? So, how

can I sit down now with [the defendant] and pretend

it all didn’t happen and now deal with all the documents

she’s had, no deposition and it is her option, it’s always

the client’s options, as to whether they want to spend

any money on any legal procedures. So unfortunately,

I don’t believe that I can represent [the defendant]. I

think too much water under the bridge in this relationship.

‘‘The Court: I’ll hear from you again, Ms. McNamara.

[Attorney] Chabb has said that you were invited to his

office last week. Do you recall something of that sort?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Over the phone he told me that on

Thursday and Friday that the only things are gonna be

discussed are [the plaintiff’s] issue wanting sole medical

and educational decision making.

‘‘The Court: Did he invite you to his office—
‘‘[The Defendant]: He—

‘‘The Court:—to sit down and talk?

‘‘[The Defendant]: He did. He—

‘‘The Court: And—and—

‘‘[The Defendant]:—over the phone he—Yeah.

‘‘The Court: And what was your response to that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: That . . . last minute to go there

and sit down and talk to him when he never even told

me what type of e-mails or anything that I would prepare. He said I can see you either tomorrow or the next

day and I’ll prepare you in three to four hours. But I

said, I don’t want you to prepare me when . . . you

haven’t even told me what to bring or we haven’t even

discussed. How can, it’s not that I don’t want him to,

it’s that how could we possibly prepare effectively in

three to four hours for just sole medical and educational

decision making as if those are just the only issues

when we have had no contact and we’ve not sat down

for him to guide me on what it is that I could bring that

would be most worthy for a hearing.

‘‘The Court: So you declined to sit down with him?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I said to him how can we prepare,

you know, in three to four hours and that be it when

we haven’t—

‘‘The Court: So, did you decline to sit down with him

last week?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Ah—no. I would like—I’m still willing to sit down and prepare effectively.

‘‘The Court: So why did you not go when he suggested

that you go and sit down with him last week?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Well, I was—I was with my kids

that day so I couldn’t go that day. And it wasn’t kind

of like, I couldn’t go that day. . . . It was so last minute.

It wasn’t even something that was scheduled in

advance, like this is when we’re gonna sit down. There

was no, it wasn’t even that there was an appointment

scheduled to say, okay, in two weeks I want, since

we’ve had this discussion, we’re gonna have another

sit down where we’re gonna discuss in three to four

hours everything that I told you to bring. So then we’re

gonna sit down at this time . . . and really go prepare

properly with what I’ve asked you to bring. It’s almost

like there’s nothing and then . . . we had a conversation and he said come and in three to four hours, tomorrow or the next day, I’m gonna prepare you with nothing. And we—I mean, pretty much the whole month of

. . . July, we—there’s been no contact. There’s been

no professional guidance and I just feel that that’s detrimental to my interests for . . . having a fair trial, a fair

hearing for medical and educational decision making

when I’m the one that—that makes very good decisions
medically and educationally for my children. So, I’m

going—If I don’t have good counsel helping me advance

my interests to me that’s, I don’t—

‘‘The Court: Well, it seems to me that there’s a definite

rift between [the defendant] and [Attorney] Chabb. Ms.

McNamara, I don’t really understand your reasoning

that says I needed to sit down with him but I couldn’t

make myself available on either of the days that he

suggested last week for several hours. And it doesn’t

make sense to me and I think that [Attorney] Chabb

has the same difficulty with a hearing coming up shortly

for you to not make yourself available to sit down with

him is a problem. So, I’m going to grant his motion

releasing him from further representation in this matter.

You just made it very clear that you have no confidence

in his ability to represent you.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I don’t want to be self-represented

though.’’

We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘Decisions

regarding the withdrawal of counsel are evaluated

under an abuse of discretion standard.’’ Tolman v.

Banach, 82 Conn. App. 263, 265, 843 A.2d 650 (2004);

see also State v. Fernandez, 254 Conn. 637, 647, 758

A.2d 842 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 913, 121 S. Ct.

1247, 149 L. Ed. 2d 153 (2001).

The defendant first contends that the court incorrectly concluded that she did not object to Attorney

Chabb’s motion to withdraw. Our review of the transcript reveals that the court asked the defendant

whether she wanted to be heard on Attorney Chabb’s

motion to withdraw. The defendant responded in detail

by chronicling the ways in which she perceived her

counsel to have failed to inform her, to protect her

rights, and to guide her. Specifically, she stated that he

had failed to inform her of the substance of prior court

hearings, miscommunicated with her as to the importance of a deposition, and said false things about her

stress level. She did not include in her remarks any

statement that she objected to the motion or that she

wanted Attorney Chabb to continue to represent her.

At the conclusion of the defendant’s remarks, the court

followed up with questions for the defendant. Following

that colloquy, the court stated that it was its understanding that the defendant was not objecting to her counsel

being permitted to withdraw, to which the defendant

responded that she did not want to be self-represented.

It was not until the discussion turned to whether the

defendant had failed to accept her counsel’s invitation

to meet to prepare for the upcoming hearing that the

defendant stated that she was still willing to meet with

Attorney Chabb. Moreover, after the court stated that

it was granting Attorney Chabb’s motion, the defendant

responded only by stating that she did not want to

be self-represented. On the basis of this record, we

conclude that the court did not incorrectly determine
that the defendant did not object to Attorney Chabb’s

motion to withdraw.

Although the defendant points to instances in which

she contends the court ‘‘cut her off’’ when she tried to

clarify whether she was objecting to Attorney Chabb’s

motion to withdraw, the record reveals that she was

afforded ample opportunity to communicate her position on the motion. The colloquies cited by the defendant as evidencing the court’s ‘‘cut[ting] her off’’

occurred after both the defendant’s full opportunity to

state her position and the additional colloquy between

the court and the defendant, in which the defendant

provided indirect responses to the court’s question as

to why she had declined to meet with her counsel.

The defendant’s second argument is that the time

frame of the court’s granting of her counsel’s motion

to withdraw, seventy-two hours before the hearing on

the plaintiff’s motion for modification was scheduled to

begin, further reflects an abuse of discretion. Although

Attorney Chabb’s motion to withdraw was granted three

days before the hearing on the motion for modification,

the motion to withdraw, which had been filed on July

31, 2019, was precipitated, at least in part, by the defendant’s refusal to accept Attorney Chabb’s invitation that

they meet to prepare for the hearing. Moreover, the

defendant, prior to the hearing on Attorney Chabb’s

motion to withdraw, had consulted with another attorney and was told she would have to provide a $30,000

retainer. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion in granting Attorney Chabb’s

motion to withdraw his appearance.

II

The defendant’s second claim on appeal is that the

court violated her right to procedural due process when

it denied her motion for a continuance. We disagree.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to this claim. After the court orally granted Attorney Chabb’s motion to withdraw his appearance, the

defendant requested that the hearing on the plaintiff’s

motion for modification be continued to allow her time

to find new counsel. The following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Defendant]: I don’t want to be self-represented

though. I’d like a month then to—

‘‘The Court: That’s your option.

‘‘[The Defendant]:—find counsel.

‘‘The Court: You may go and seek counsel or you may

come up and represent yourself in two—three days, I

guess it is.

‘‘[The Defendant]: So I—

‘‘The Court: See you on the eighth.

‘‘[Attorney Chabb]: Thank[s], Your Honor.
‘‘[The Defendant]: So I need to find, so I need to find

counsel for the case—

‘‘The Court: Or represent yourself, whichever.

‘‘[The Defendant]:—on Friday or—for that. So, it can’t

be—it can’t be—

‘‘The Court: It’s the eighth, not Friday.

‘‘[The Defendant]: So it can’t be continued so I can

find legal counsel?

‘‘The Court: No. This matter’s been pending since

May.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Okay.

‘‘The Court: You will show up and have your hearing

on Thursday and Friday.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Thank you.’’

The following day, August 6, 2019, the defendant filed

a motion for a continuance, in which she represented:

‘‘I need more time because my lawyer withdrew yesterday. I have no legal professional representation for my

hearing.’’ She requested that the hearing be continued

to September 6, 2019. The defendant indicated on the

motion that the plaintiff did not consent to the request

for continuance. The court, Eschuk, J., denied the

motion.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the court’s

denial of her motion for a continuance deprived her of

due process, and she seeks review of her claim under

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823

(1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,

781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), because her claim was not

presented to the trial court as constitutional in nature.

Assuming the first prong of Golding is met, we turn to

whether, under the facts of this case, the defendant

has met her burden of proving that the denial of the

requested continuance is a claim of constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., Foster v. Foster, 84 Conn. App. 311,

316–17, 853 A.2d 588 (2004). ‘‘In general, a claim that

a court improperly denied a motion for a continuance

is not a constitutional claim, but rather one that rests

in the discretion of the trial court. . . . If the denial

of the continuance is directly linked, however, to a

constitutional right, then due process rights are implicated, and the claim is of constitutional magnitude.’’

(Citation omitted.) Id., 317.

We are not persuaded that the defendant has satisfied

her burden of demonstrating that the denial of the

requested continuance is directly linked to the specific

constitutional right she alleges, namely, a parent’s constitutional right to make decisions concerning the care,

custody and control of his or her child. The defendant

relies on In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592, 767

A.2d 155 (2001), and Foster v. Foster, supra, 84 Conn.
App. 311, both of which are distinguishable from the

present case.

In re Shaquanna M., supra, 61 Conn. App. 605–608,

involved a denial of a continuance in a proceeding to

terminate parental rights. This court determined that

the respondent’s due process rights were violated when

the court denied her a continuance to obtain new counsel for her children after the individual who had been

serving as their attorney and guardian ad litem had died.

Id., 593–94, 608. Because the proceeding to terminate

parental rights implicated the respondent’s constitutional right to maintain a relationship with her children,

this court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the continuance pursuant to a procedural due process standard,

rather than the general abuse of discretion standard.

Id., 604–605. Foster v. Foster, supra, 84 Conn. App.

313–14, involved motions filed by the paternal grandparents to modify custody or, in the alternative, to enforce

their visitation rights. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed

that the court violated her right to procedural due process when it denied her motion for a continuance. Id.,

315. This court determined that, ‘‘because the hearing

involved a request by grandparents for visitation, the

plaintiff’s motion for a continuance was sufficiently

linked to a constitutional right to accord Golding review

to the court’s denial of her motion for a continuance.’’

Id., 318. This court, citing Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn.

202, 229, 789 A.2d 431 (2002), stated that our Supreme

Court has held that a motion by a grandparent or a

third party for visitation affects a parent’s fundamental

right to make decisions regarding her child’s care, control, education, health, religion, and association. Foster

v. Foster, supra, 317–18.

The present case does not involve the irrevocable

severance of a parent’s rights; see, e.g.,In re Shaquanna

M., supra, 61 Conn. App. 605; or the ‘‘forced intervention

by a third party seeking visitation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foster v. Foster, supra, 84 Conn.

App. 318. Rather, the motion filed by the plaintiff sought

modifications both to parenting time and holiday parenting time, modifications to the method and frequency

of communications between the parents, and an order

that the plaintiff be awarded final decision-making

authority with respect to the medical, dental, orthodontic, and educational needs of the parties’ children. The

defendant has provided this court with no authority

that the denial of her requested continuance of the

postjudgment hearing between two parents who have

joint legal and shared physical custody of their children,

is directly linked to her constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody, and control of her children.

Consequently, we conclude that the defendant has

failed to satisfy the second prong of Golding, in that

she has not met her burden of proving that the denial

of the requested continuance is a claim of constitutional
magnitude.

III

The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that the

court abused its discretion in denying her motion for

a continuance. We decline to review this claim.

‘‘The matter of continuance is traditionally within the

discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial

of a request for more time that violates due process

even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled

to defend without counsel. . . . There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance

is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer

must be found in the circumstances present in every

case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial

judge at the time the request is denied. . . . [I]f the

reasons given for the continuance do not support any

interference with [a] specific constitutional right, the

[reviewing] court’s analysis will revolve around whether

the trial court abused its discretion. . . .

‘‘Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are very

often matters involving judicial economy, docket management or courtroom proceedings and, therefore, are

particularly within the province of a trial court. . . .

Whether to grant or to deny such motions clearly

involves discretion, and a reviewing court should not

disturb those decisions, unless there has been an abuse

of that discretion, absent a showing that a specific constitutional right would be infringed. . . .

‘‘Our Supreme Court has articulated a number of

factors that appropriately may enter into an appellate

court’s review of a trial court’s exercise of its discretion

in denying a motion for a continuance. Although resistant to precise cataloguing, such factors revolve around

the circumstances before the trial court at the time it

rendered its decision, including: the timeliness of the

request for continuance; the likely length of the delay;

the age and complexity of the case; the granting of

other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on

the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court;

the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in

support of the request; [and] the defendant’s personal

responsibility for the timing of the request . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn. App. 813, 827–28, 949

A.2d 557 (2008); see also, e.g., State v. Rivera, 268 Conn.

351, 379, 844 A.2d 191 (2004).

‘‘In the event that the trial court acted unreasonably

in denying a continuance, the reviewing court must also

engage in harmless error analysis.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi, 193 Conn.

App. 137, 169, 219 A.3d 400 (2019), aff’d, 337 Conn. 228,

253 A.3d 1 (2020); see also Mensah v. Mensah, 167 Conn.

App. 219, 223, 143 A.3d 622, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 923,

150 A.3d 1151 (2016). ‘‘[I]n order to establish reversible
error in nonconstitutional claims, the [appellant] must

prove both an abuse of discretion and harm . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunniffe v. Cunniffe, 141 Conn. App. 227, 235, 60 A.3d 1051, cert. denied,

308 Conn. 934, 66 A.3d 497 (2013); see also State v.

Coney, 266 Conn. 787, 803, 835 A.2d 977 (2003) (declining to decide whether court’s denial of request for continuance was improper when defendant failed to sufficiently demonstrate harm flowing from denial); Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi, supra, 170 (concluding that, even if

court abused its discretion in refusing to grant continuance in order to present witness’ testimony, appellant

failed to demonstrate harm as consequence of denial

of motion).

In the present case, the defendant failed to brief adequately how she was harmed by the court’s denial of

her request for a continuance. Notably, her appellate

brief does not recognize or discuss her burden in this

regard. As a result of the defendant’s failure to brief

the issue of harm, the plaintiff did not have the opportunity in his appellate brief to respond to any harm analysis. ‘‘Our practice requires an appellant to raise claims

of error in his original brief . . . so that the issue as

framed by him can be fully responded to by the appellee

in its brief, and so that [the appellate court] can have

the full benefit of that written argument.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jose G., 290 Conn. 331,

341 n.8, 963 A.2d 42 (2009); see, e.g., Scalora v. Scalora,

189 Conn. App. 703, 722 n.20, 209 A.3d 1 (2019); see

also, e.g., State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 815, 162 A.3d

63 (declining to review claim when appellant presented

harmful error analysis for first time in reply brief), cert.

denied, 327 Conn. 905, 170 A.3d 2 (2017).1

In the absence

of any analysis concerning how the defendant was

harmed by the denial of the continuance, we are unable

to conclude that the denial had any bearing on the

outcome of the hearing.

It is well established that ‘‘[w]e are not required to

review claims that are inadequately briefed. . . . We

consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere

abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.

. . . Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we do not review such claims.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holmes,

176 Conn. App. 156, 185, 169 A.3d 264 (2017), aff’d, 334

Conn. 202, 221 A.3d 407 (2019). In the context of the

failure of a party adequately to brief how a challenged

evidentiary ruling was harmful, this court, on multiple

occasions, has declined to review a claim of error

related to such ruling. See, e.g., State v. Lyons, 203

Conn. App. 551, 569, 248 A.3d 727 (2021) (declining

to consider whether court’s admission of challenged

testimony was abuse of its discretion when appellant

failed to brief how it was harmed by court’s evidentiary

ruling); State v. Toro, supra, 172 Conn. App. 818 (declin-
ing to address claim when defendant failed to address

issue of harm adequately in principal brief). As with an

evidentiary claim, the claim of the defendant in the

present case is nonconstitutional in nature, and, therefore, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating

both an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and resulting

harm. See, e.g., Cunniffe v. Cunniffe, supra, 141 Conn.

App. 235. In light of the defendant’s failure to brief and

analyze how she was harmed by the court’s denial of

her request for a continuance, we, accordingly, decline

to consider whether the court’s ruling was an abuse of

discretion.2

IV

The defendant’s final claim on appeal is that the court

abused its discretion in modifying custody orders. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court erred in

awarding the plaintiff final decision-making authority.

We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the defendant’s claim. In the plaintiff’s

May 16, 2019 motion, the plaintiff sought amendments

to the parties’ parenting time, holiday parenting time,

parental communication practices, and medical and

educational final decision-making authority. Regarding

final decision-making authority, the plaintiff represented that ‘‘[t]he parties’ minor children have specific

and significant educational and medical needs and the

defendant has wilfully failed and refused to provide her

consent for the plaintiff to pursue various medical and/

or educational needs of the minor children, which have

been recommended by health care and educational providers and experts.’’ He alleged that the defendant’s

refusal to provide consent to the plaintiff to pursue

the recommendations of health care and educational

providers was ‘‘contrary to the well-being of the minor

children.’’

The plaintiff further represented that the defendant

had ‘‘made unilateral health care and/or educational

decisions regarding the minor children and [had] withheld pertinent information from the plaintiff, which is

contrary to the parties’ joint legal and physical custody

and the minor children’s best interests.’’ The plaintiff

acknowledged that it was in the children’s best interests

that ‘‘the parties continue to have joint legal and physical custody . . . .’’ He maintained, however, that on

the basis of the defendant’s unilateral decision making,

withholding of information from the plaintiff, and

unreasonably withholding of consent for the plaintiff to

pursue recommendations of health care and education

providers, he should be granted ‘‘sole, exclusive, final

decision-making abilities with respect to the medical,

dental, orthodontic, and educational needs of the minor

children . . . .’’

The court held a two day hearing on the plaintiff’s
motion on August 8 and 9, 2019. Both parties testified

along with Cynthia Twiss, the interim director of special

services for public schools in Easton and Redding, and

the court heard closing remarks. At the conclusion of

the hearing, the court made findings on the record. The

court first found that ‘‘both parents are capable and

loving parents of their children’’ and stated that it had

no concerns about the well-being of the children when

they are with either parent. The court found that the

parties communicate poorly with each other. Specifically, it found that the plaintiff ‘‘tends to put forward

comprehensive scheduling plans for the future and [the

defendant], for whatever reason, seems reluctant to

commit in writing, by e-mail or text, to specific plans

and this creates problems with scheduling and timing.

So, she has not always made timely responses to

requests that have been made by [the plaintiff], and that

has to do with a number of issues, schedules, activities,

summer plans, therapist suggestions.’’

The court found: ‘‘It’s not really a question of whether

the parties have good things to contribute, because I

think both do as far as the—what’s best for the boys.

Both parties spend a lot of time with the boys. Both

parties are very acutely aware of their needs. There are

. . . two good heads to bring to bear here with regard

to parenting decisions. Both are attuned to the boys’

needs. Both have valid proposals to make and good

ideas as to what might be best for the boys. So, that

kind of joint communication is going to have to be

improved, but it is important that both parties have

input into the decision making with regard to what is

best for the boys, as—particularly with regard to such

areas as medical care, therapeutic care and education.

‘‘Nevertheless, at this point services are being denied

to the boys because of the inability of the parties to

reach mutual agreement on important issues. They have

already had disagreements with regard to the choice

of medical doctor for the boys. They’ve already had

disagreements regarding what and when a therapist

should be applied for in-home services. There are disagreements looming at this point with regard to schooling for the boys and there’s already been disagreement

with regard to the educational plan the school put forward for [the parties’ younger child] in particular . . .

requiring that there actually be a formal hearing at

which the questions arose whether . . . the school

plan should be followed or not. The parties disagreed

with regard to that issue. There’s been a . . . more

recent disagreement regarding the extended school

year that [the parties’ older child] had. A disagreement

in 2018, again in 2019, resolved only by basically its

being implemented by [the plaintiff] over the lukewarm,

perhaps, but otherwise objection of [the defendant].

‘‘So, these are all very important issues that cannot

remain in limbo going into the future. Somehow, there
has to be a . . . tiebreaker and a way to resolve it, and

I recognize that. I am compelled to follow the best

interests of the children as I apply those to the facts that

have been presented, applying the statutory criteria, of

course. But, I do find that the best interests of the boys

do require some changes at this point because of the

fact that there are some serious problems with getting

decisions made and I will be making some changes.’’

On August 12, 2019, the court issued its order on

the plaintiff’s motion for modification. With respect to

custody, the court issued the following order: ‘‘The parties shall have joint legal custody of the minor children.

The parties shall be equally involved in all major decisions affecting the children. The party with whom the

children are staying at the time will have the right to

make emergency decisions affecting the children. All

other important decisions affecting the health, welfare,

education, religious upbringing, guidance, discipline or

other aspect of the upbringing of the children shall be

made with the participation, involvement and agreement of both parents. Neither party shall be entitled to

act unilaterally as to important decisions affecting the

children until there has been a bona fide attempt to

reach agreement. If, however, the parties are unable to

agree on a physical health, emotional health, or therapeutic treatment decision or selection of the providers

of such services, the plaintiff shall have the final say.

Physical and emotional health care appointments, as

well as therapeutic services, shall be scheduled to occur

on some of the parenting time of each parent.’’

‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision

regarding custody, visitation and relocation orders is

one of abuse of discretion. . . . [I]n a dissolution proceeding the trial court’s decision on the matter of custody is committed to the exercise of its sound discretion

and its decision cannot be overridden unless an abuse

of that discretion is clear. . . . The controlling principle in a determination respecting custody is that the

court shall be guided by the best interests of the child.

. . . In determining what is in the best interests of the

child, the court is vested with a broad discretion. . . .

[T]he authority to exercise the judicial discretion under

the circumstances revealed by the finding is not conferred upon this court, but upon the trial court, and

. . . we are not privileged to usurp that authority or

to substitute ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere

difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our

intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the

action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear

abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baker-Grenier v.

Grenier, 147 Conn. App. 516, 519, 83 A.3d 698 (2014).

The defendant’s sole contention with respect to the

custody orders is that the court’s favorable findings as

to the defendant’s decision-making abilities are incon-
sistent with the court’s order providing the plaintiff

with final decision-making authority with respect to the

children’s physical health, emotional health, or therapeutic treatment decisions or selection of the providers

of such services. We disagree with the defendant.

The defendant emphasizes the court’s findings that

she is ‘‘very acutely aware’’ of the children’s needs, that

she has a ‘‘good [head] to bring to bear . . . with regard

to parenting decisions,’’ and that she has ‘‘valid proposals to make and good ideas as to what might be best

for the boys.’’ The court made these findings applicable

to both parents.

Significantly, the court expressly found that, although

the parties were both capable and loving parents, they

communicated poorly with each other and their inability to agree on important issues resulted in the children

being denied therapeutic services. Specifically, the

court heard evidence that the children had not received

in-home therapy for approximately one year due to

the parties’ inability to agree on a provider. The court

additionally referenced disagreements with respect to

the children’s pediatrician. The court heard evidence

that the defendant unilaterally terminated the children’s

relationship with their pediatrician. Further, the court

referenced the defendant’s disagreement with the

school’s educational plan for the parties’ younger child,

and her objection to the continued participation of the

parties’ older child in an extended school year program.

The court found that there were ‘‘serious problems with

getting decisions made’’ and that a ‘‘tiebreaker’’ was

needed. On the basis of these findings, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in determining

that an award of final decision-making authority was

necessary and that it was most appropriate that the

plaintiff be given final decision-making authority.3

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion ALEXANDER, J., concurred.

1 The defendant did not file a reply brief.

2 Although we decline to respond to the dissent on a point by point basis,

we are compelled to note the following. The dissent, despite acknowledging

that the defendant has the burden of demonstrating harm, fails to identify

any meaningful analysis of harm contained in the defendant’s appellate brief.

Instead, it points to the defendant’s ‘‘statement of facts’’ section of her brief,

in which she states that she was not familiar with the rules of evidence,

and that she did not enter any exhibits into evidence or call any witnesses

other than herself to testify during her case-in-chief. The only other reference

that the dissent identifies in the defendant’s appellate brief as demonstrating

an analysis of harm is the defendant’s statement in the ‘‘conclusion and

statement of relief requested’’ portion of her brief, in which she stated that

she ‘‘stood to lose the ability to make important medical and educational

decisions’’ for her children if the court granted the plaintiff’s motion.

In the absence of any briefing or analysis of harm, the dissent identifies

three ways in which the defendant may have been harmed by the court’s

ruling. First, the dissent goes beyond the defendant’s recitation of the facts

that she did not introduce any exhibits or call any additional witnesses, to

add that she also did not raise any objections. Second, the dissent states

that ‘‘given that the trial judge questioned the defendant extensively during

the hearing, an attorney surely would have raised an objection on her behalf.’’

The defendant does not make this argument in her brief. Third, the dissent
states that harm is demonstrated by the fact that the court granted the

plaintiff’s motion for modification. It is unclear how the dissent, in the

absence of any analysis regarding harm, could conclude that the denial of

the continuance had any bearing on the outcome of the plaintiff’s motion.

See, e.g., State v. Coyne, 118 Conn. App. 818, 824, 985 A.2d 1091 (2010)

(‘‘[a]bsent any analysis regarding harm, we cannot conclude that the admission of the subject evidence had any bearing on the trial’s outcome’’). In

sum, we do not agree with the dissent’s approach of deciding the case on

the basis of speculative arguments that the defendant never made.

3 The defendant maintains that ‘‘[t]o allow the plaintiff to ultimately make

the final decisions concerning the children is, in effect, sole custody . . . .’’

We conclude that this argument lacks merit. As this court has previously

held, ‘‘[f]inal [decision-making] authority in one parent is distinct from sole

legal custody.’’ Lopes v. Ferrari, 188 Conn. App. 387, 397, 204 A.3d 1254

(2019); see also Desai v. Desai, 119 Conn. App. 224, 230, 987 A.2d 362 (2010)

(rejecting argument that grant of ultimate decision-making authority to one

parent is in effect order of sole custody).