TALENT -KEYHOLE CONTROL SYNE

A History of

Satellite Reconnaissance

Volume IIB

PREPARED FOR

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Reproduction in part or total is not authorized

without express approval of the Director. NRO.

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7017-74 r.

A

II
WOIP-SECRE'rA HISTORY OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

VOLUME IIB - SAMOS E-5 AND E-6

by

Robert Perry

Revised October 1973

from earlier drafts

Volume 118 consists of 183 pages. Copy_Vi of 5 copies

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PREFACE TO VOLUME LIB

•

•

This volume is a continuation of Volume ILA of A. History of

Satellite Reconnaissance, separated chiefly because the bulk of pages

makes it impractical to put the whole of the lengthy and complex

history of the Samos program between one set of covers. Volume

includes those chapters concerned with the two major program segments that began in 1960 and 1961 and continued through October 1963:

Samos E-5 (plus Lanyard, which was half of an E-5 camera system

in a different vehicle housing) and Samos E-6 (plus Spartan and

45P-AS-63, the proposed re-engineered successors to E-6).

Early drafts of these chapters were prepared in 1964 and 1965,

while the author was an employee of The Rand Corporation. Correction, editing, expansion, and elaboration of those early drafts began

in 1972 and was completed in 1973 while he was a member of the

staff of Technology Service Corporation. Because documentary

sources have mostly been dispersed or destroyed in the intervening

years, and because most major program participants have long since

left government service, it seems unlikely that further research will

prove fruitful or that these volumes will again be expanded.

The Samos program participants and National Reconnaissance

Office people who provided information for or reviewed these pages

I
'

are too numerous to acknowledge singly here. Most are noted, by

name, in source citations or prefatory sections in other volumes.

For such errors of fact or interpretation as may have survived

review, the author is wholly responsible. ti

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CONTENTS. VOLUME VOLUME UB

Preface 1

1

Illustrations have been separately bound in an Appendix volume.

1

X THE E-5 AND LANYARD PROGRAMS 318

Notes on Sources 392

XI THE E-6 PROGRAM 402

Notes on Sources 487
318

--TOP-sEeRET--

•

-4011-SECRET---

X THE E-5 AND LANYARD PROGRAMS

The technique of using a reentry capsule to return exposed

film from orbit was seriously proposed as early as June 1956.. The

Rand Corporation, which first urged the concept, felt that reliable

methods of recovering film could be developed much earlier than

comparably effective readout techniques. But in 1956 there was no

way to demonstrate that recovery was feasible, no way to finance a

test of the concept, and so little interest in satellite reconnaissance

in general that even the preferred readout concept was indifferently

funded.

Coincident with Sputnik I, Rand in November 1957 suggested

development of a family of recoverable satellites. Although the idea

had been conceived and most of the supporting research performed

much earlier, Sputnik got it a hearing. The perceived need for a

reconnaissance system to be available in the near term caused attention

to be concentrated on Thor-boosted satellites, and Corona was the

only immediate product. But in March 1958 the concept of a recoverable photographic payload hoisted by an Atlas-Hustler (Atlas-Agena)

vehicle was revived. It remained a minor option through July of that

year. receiving no more than passing mention in the development

plans of the period.
--TOP-4SCRET----

A marked change in the Air Force attitude toward recovery

of photographic intelligence was signalled by the 26 September 1958

publication of a new General Operational Requirement covering

satellite reconnaissance. It embodied a "big" camera and film

recovery. By December, the Advanced Research Projects Agency,

then custodian of space program responsibility, had endorsed the

approach. But it appeared that ARPA enthusiasm was not entirely

altruistic. ARPA scientists were less interested in pursuing the

original approach as in adapting the long focal length camera proposed

for the recoverable satellite to use in an electrostatic tape readout

system. And ARPA's interest in recovery was probably as much

motivated by the desire to conduct a military man-in-space program

as by any concern for recovering photographs. Thus the film-recovery

concept embodied in Corona became a film-plus-cameras-recovery

mode in ARPA's plan. And perhaps coincidentally, so large a capsule

could also return a man from orbit. So expanded, the recoverable

capsule proposal had been transformed into a development plan by

January 1959 and by April had received "general approval." One Discoverer capsule had by that time successfully reentered, but none had

been recovered. Enthusiasm for recovery was momentarily high.

319

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Funding difficulties. difficulties, the introduction of new and complicating

proposals (the E-4 mapping satellite and the E-3 electrostatic tape

reconnaissance system), plus a general decline in ARPA fortunes

as NASA gained more influence,. led to virtual cancellation of the

embryonic recoverable camera program in June 1959. Strong protests

from the Air Staff and several air commands followed. It seemed

impossible to satisfy the September 1958 requirement for photographs

having a ground definition of five feet without a big-camera recoverable

system. Largely in response to pressure from the newly established

Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering. ARPA in early

September reinstated what was now designated the Samos E-5 program--

though initially limiting approval to camera development alone, authorizing recovery subsystem development only when further pressure was

brought to bear. By 9 September 1959, one year after publication of

the formal requirement, the E-5 system had formal approval for

development. On 17 November, with the return of satellite reconnaissance

program responsibility to the Air Force, ARPA obstructionism became

moot.

The next difficulty was predictable. The Air Force Ballistic

Missile Division (BMD) wanted to fund an accelerated E-5 program

without reducing the total of funds allocated to the E-1 and E-2 readout

320

TOP-SECRET"

•
systems. That That notion generated little sympathy in the Pentagon.

Both DDR&E and the Air Force Ballistic Missiles Committee (AFBMC)

strongly favored recovery emphasis and were gradually hardening

their objections to continuing expensive readout systems. Cancellation

of the E-3 and an elaborate ferret proposal (the F-4) had not provided

sufficient funds to support E-5 work; DDR&E and AFBMC were cool

to suggestions that an accelerated E-5 program be financed by adding

new funds to the basic satellite reconnaissance program and that E-1

and E-2 be continued at their existing levels. Dr. H. F. York,

DDR&E chief, was particularly outspoken in his disparagement of the

E-1 and E-2. He was equally forceful in his endorsement of the E-5

approach. Through the first four months of 1960 there was no reconciliation of these disparate viewpoints.

When the U-2 incident occurred in May 1960, BMD (with the

firm support of most of the Air Staff) still was holding out for an undiminished readout program plus a co-equal and separately funded

E-5 recovery program. Air Force UndersecretarY J. V. Charyk,

who had helm in that post since the previous August (he had earlier

been Chief Scientist of the Air Force), took the Gordian option of

directing a complete shift of emphasis from readout to recovery.

7ot7.7 321

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E-5, he ordered, was to receive first attention. Two months later,

in July, the United States Intelligence Board realigned . the requirements

for satellite reconnaissance in a fashion that made readout an almost

totally unacceptable solution. For the moment, E-5 was the only

in-progress system that might satisfy needs, and even there it was

coming to be appreciated that E-5 was conceptually deficient in ways

that might make it no more than marginally useful.

In August 1960, the recovery of the first Corona products overcame lingering doubts about the feasibility of film retrieval. Concurrently,

complete reorganization of the reconnaissance satellite program and a

National Security Council decision to sponsor at least one alternative

to E-5 again changed the technical complexion of the Samos program.

Still later, in Os tuber, both the E-6 panoramic camera system (with

lower resolution but appreciably greater area coverage potential than

the E-5)

eceived tentative approval for

development..11Kon contract by January 1961.*

From a scheduling standpoint, the intricate maneuvering

between September 1959 and August 1960 had meant relatively little

This resume is essentially a restatement of a longer narrative which

appeared in earlier chapters. Supporting detail and specific citation

of sources are included in the earlier text.
__21111-SSCRET--

to E-5. A total of seven vehicle flights was programmed throughout

the period, two "diagnostic" vehicles being added in Aizgust 1960.1

The E-5 had also remained relatively stable in terms of design details.

As compared to the E-2 of the same era, it had the following design

characteristics:

System

Focal length:

Altitude:

Ground resolution:

System resolution:

Strip width

Aperture:

Film size:

E-2

36 inches

260 nautical miles

20 feet

100 lines/millimeter

17 miles

f/4.0

70 mm by 4520 feet

E-5

66 inches

180 nautical miles

5 feet

100 lines /millimeter

60 miles

f/ 5. 0

5 inches by 250-500 feet

Additionally, the E-5 was a stereo system, the E-2 a single

frame system. The camera had been developed by Itek under subcontract 2

to Lockheed, the system contractor.. Each camera consisted of a sunshade

and mirror, a window, an eight-element lens (with a temperature tolerance

of but one degree), a camera body terminating in a five-inch curved film

plane with a three-second pan cycle, and a complex film take-up subsystem.

The 20-degree panoramic arrangement provided coverage of a ground

swath 12 by 65 miles on each side from 180-mile orbits, with the resulting

strip of exposed film measuring 4.5 by 23 inches. (Estimates of image

quality varied but generally ranged from 100 to 115 lines per millimeter

3

at a 2:1 contrast ratio--on SO 13 film. )

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Although the E-5 had been anything but a hastily conceived

undertaking, details of the design had been criticized by one source

or another virtually from the moment it was proposed. In August 1960,

when the Samos program reorientation was in full swing, program

office reservations about Lockheed's conduct of the development began

to assume major proportions. Colonel W. G. King, Jr., the Samos

program office chief, expressed particular concern at the lack of test

data on the system's thermal environment. King believed that uncompensated temperature effects on mirror, lens, platen and supporting

structures might well limit system utility. The camera as then

designed was some 150 pounds overweight, and the inclusion of thermal

protection devices could only make it heavier.

Lockheed did not agree. The contractor seemed convinced that

the strategy of developing various subsystems in parallel--an approach

that had been successful in the ballistic missile program--would provide

adequate safeguards against the failure of any single technical feature.

Though Lockheed's reaction was partly Pavlovian (R&D mores did not

admit of the possibility that a contractor had not foreseen all possible

contingencies), the emergence of E-6 raised the issue of

whether all three major recovery systems should be carried to completion.

They had several overlapping qualities. Lockheed had total responsibility

7017-7.

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for E-5 and for the rapidly withering E-I and E-2 satellite programs,

and had prime responsibility for Corona, but was no more than a

vehicle supplier in the E-6 program. Lockheed, therefore, was

vitally interested in having the E-5 remain attractive. E-5 was then

considered to be a logical successor to Corona--still generally treated

as an interim system with slight growth potential--although in fact

E-6 was a more promising candidate. King, who had custody of the

E-5 and all its predecessors but who had no important role in E-6361

Wdevelopment, was less parochial. As early as 27 September

he suggested that the overlap of E-5 performance with that anticipated

from E-6 could well bring on cancellation of one or the other. Because

E-6 had greater technical promise than E-5, the leading candidate

4

was obvious.

As with thy E-1 and E-2, part of the discontent with E-5 arose

from the fact that it did not represent the latest in satellite reconnaissance concepts and techniques. Even though development had not gotten

well under way until September 1959, the basic proposals embodied in

E-5 dated from 1958, and considerable advances in optics, vehicle

stabilization, and camera mode technologies had marked the ensuing

two years. General Greer and Undersecretary Charyk were agreed

that the E-5 system was unduly complex and that its Itek camera was
1

far too cumbersome and complicated to represent. a sound solution

•

to satellite reconnaissance requirements. 5

Lockheed, aware of waning confidence in the prospects of E-5,

proposed accelerating the program toward an April 1961 diagnostic

flight and a subsequent launch rate of one satellite each month. An

early demonstration could dispel doubts of the system's usefulness.

The contractor estimated in October 1960 that such an acceleration

would cost abo reer and King felt that something between

was more nearly the correct figure. Notwithstanding

their uneasiness about E-S progress, they felt that program acceleration

might be in order. It would, if successful, provide a high-resolution

recoverable system at least a year in advance of the first E-6 and

a consideration

that could not well be ignored in an atmosphere of program urgency.

Further, both King and Greer were realistically aware that E-6 ,131a

might encounter development problems. In that case, E-5

might represent the only insurance against program disaster.

Both E-1 and E-2 were phasing down toward cancellation by

late 1960. Some money to support acceleration of E-S might be found

an those programs. Launch costs were essentially the same for all

three, but an E-5 payload cost abo s than an E-2

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payload. The real issue was not whether ratialatie

might be diverted for each cancelled readout launch, but whether •

E-5 acceleration would serve any useful purpose.

Lockheed had received authorization for a modest acceleration

on 2 September. After three weeks of discussion, the company on

7 October made a formal presentation to Greer and Charyk suggesting

greater effort--at higher costs. Three days later General Greer

created a special task force to analyse the proposal. On 17 October

Lockheed received a non-specific authorization to redirect the E-5

program toward the "most accelerated" effort, called "Tornado",

but no full and explicit approval of that effort followed. On 1 November,

General Greer telephoned H. L. Brown, of Lockheed's top management

group, to ask for more details on "Tornado." Another two weeks were

consumed in obtaining and refining the needed data. General Greer's

doubts about the reliability of Lockheed's cost estimates were not

dissipated by the supplemental information and he expressed little

confidence in Itek's ability to satisfy schedules. There was also

some feeling among Charyk's staff, in Washington, that diagnostic

, n October 1960, Wi

t or lawn d

ts included or the Atlas,

-

or the Agena or n - oa and for

yload, pl 

or management se

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flights could not profitably be slipped into the schedule without adversely

•

affecting the viability of the first programmed operational launch.

On 22 November 1960, Greer's office notified Lockheed that there

would be no "crash program" for E-5. 6

 But that did not entirely dispose

of notions that something might yet be done to get the system into operation earlier than programmed, or that it might be economically adapted

to perform the E-6 mission, thus eliminating need for the latter system

and freeing considerable sums. One member of Charyk's staff co-sponsored,

with Amron Katz (of Rand), the idea that flying the E-5 at a higher altitude

would provide 10-foot definition and coverage comparable to that expected

of the E-6. Nothing came of the discussion, but in December Charyk

authorized early diagnostic flights of degraded E-5 cameras to get telemetry

data, prove out payload operation, and demonstrate the feasibility of

capsule recovery in the E-5 configuration. (It was apparent that Itek

could not accelerate delivery of fully qualified cameras.) So acceleration

of a sort was approved for the E-5 effort before the close of 1960. 7

Any impression that the . E-5 had thus become more highly regarded

than the still embryonic E-6 was dispelled early in February with Charyk's

ruling that the E-6 had priority over any other E-series development.

iln point of fact, Charyk had also accorded the E-4 mapping satellite

payload a higher priority than the basic E-5 payload, but that development

8

was little known.) The February ruling represented a re-interpretation

•
of the National Security Council's 25 August decision on system priorities;

it was a severe blow to the prospects of the E-5.9

The crux of the priority issue was not so much the development

status of E-5 as that E-6 represented a solution to requirements for

gross coverage, which carried higher priority than the specific target

10

coverage mission for which E-5 had been designed. Further, confidence

in E-S success had never been high since SAFSP acquired the program.

The character of the E-5 test program had gradually been changed

by the various program decisions of late 1960 and early 1961. In February

1961, that evolution received formal recognition in the statement of a

test philosophy, essentially a determination that the early flights would

contain very large quantities of instrumentation and would have limited

functional objectives. Particular attention was to be devoted to reentry

phase instrumentation since the sea-recovery-oriented E-5 capsule

represented a considerable departure from the pattern set by Discoverer

capsules--relatively light and designed for air catch. Operations during

flight test would gradually progress from the simple to the complex as

success permitted. (For example, no steering maneuvers were to be

attempted during the initial E-5 flight because a failure in that mode

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probably would prevent test of the reentry system.) In essence, the

E-5 tests were to be cautious research and development investigations

rather than attempts to operate fully functional prototypes. That

approach was in part a reflection of a general philosophy Charyk and

Greer favored and in part was a consequence of experience with the

E-1 and Discoverer programs. It also reflected Colonel King's conviction that reconnaissance satellites would remain one-of-a-kind creations

of some years to come, that the notion of standardizing early on an

11

"operational" vehicle was completely fallacious. Charyk and Greer

agreed early in March 1961 that the best approach to E-5 would be to

start "R&D launches" in September 1961 and continue through a series

of eight, the last coming in May 1963. The 'extent of success with that

12

aspect of the program would determine later plans.

Another important modification of earlier practice lay in General

Greer's determination to reduce the role of the missile assembly phase

fat Vandenberg). He wanted flight-ready vehicles delivered to the launch

base. He was particularly insistent that modifications, subsystem tests,

and instrumentation should be complete before the Agena, the Atlas,

and the payload were mated and checked through the missile assembly

building. That departure from earlier habits would, hopefully, reduce

delays, complexities, and potential errors arising from extensive

330 017-7

TOP SECRET --C-er44-84-0as-

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tinkering with the vehicles between their delivery and their erection

on the launch pad. To this end, Greer insisted on comprehensive predelivery checks of critical subsystems, including "hot firings" of the

Agena engines. That practice had for some months been the subject

of a "running debate" between a group which held that repeated pre-flight

operations of the rocket engine increased the chance of flight failure

and a group which held that only through extensive engine tests could

prospective faults be surely identified and corrected. It was not that

SAFSP intended to run every Agena through such a test series, but as

Greer emphasized, the first of each kind of system would be most

extensively tested and about every fourth vehicle thereafter would go

13

Inevitably, as first flight date approached, technical difficulties

began to crowd together. Early plans to convert vehicle 2201 to a

diagnostic system (the term was no longer used but the connotation

remained) proved impractical as early as March 1961. The vehicle

was so far toward completion that modification would be unduly costly

and time consuming. Lockheed proposed instead to upgrade the second

in the series, 2202, and by concentrating attention on that vehicle to

push it to launch readiness by IS September. By early June 1961,

emphasis had shifted entirely to 2202, and 2201 had effectively been

17017.74 331

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11.,,ffe-Sei, ,,.,•,n&wwL,14.4askilailiallialialliaelMariaailaalle ' • ' • •

• • •

through the same checkout process.
--TOP-SECIRZT--

phased out of the E-5 program. Unhappily, Lockheed's optimistic

appraisal of 2202's readiness came unhinged when Itek fell behind

schedule in camera subsystem tests, forcing use of the third Agena

(2203) in some of the work at Lockheed's Sunnyvale plant. In July.

the capsule had to undergo structural modifications because of a

failure in qualification testing, and early in. August Itek was in such

deep trouble that a special management team from Lockheed took up

residence on the east coast to help push the camera through its test

phase. By that time there was no possibility of meeting original

flight schedules. the delivery of the payload having slipped by several

14

weeks.

Similar difficulties were common to most high-priority programs

even though contractors customarily seemed unable to anticipate them.

But some problems were peculiar to the E-5. By July there were

three areas of major content a demonstrated weakness in Itek's

management and in the effectiveness of Itek's engineering approach to

the E-5 camera; shortcomings in the lens itself, principally evidenced

by the inability of the delivered optics to pass specification checks;

and Lockheed's failure to obtain essential computer inputs for the flight

programs. (Colonel King felt that it might be necessary to subcontract

the computer task and to subcontract optical work to some firm that

_tiaticuctuaimp44eyamit 17017-74

Ccouarrenty

• • •

332
Top SECRET

could meet the specifications.) Recognising that schedule pressures

might well induce further technical troubles, particularly if too-rapid.

testing led to oversights and thence to defects that either had to be

corrected after delivery or which, escaping detection, would endanger

mission chances, General Greer secured Undersecretar

acceptance of a "relaxed schedule." although the fact of that relaxtion

was not immediately communicated to Lockheed. 15

Difficulties with the flak-manufactured payload persisted even

after its eventual delivery to Lockheed. Rework and the installation

of replacement parts continued through September. The slippages had

by that time become so substantial that certain of the earlier system

tests had been invalidated (those which had to be conducted within a

specific period during the weeks immediately before the launch) and

had to be performed a second time. 16

As it happened, other factors had intervened to insure a relaxation

of E-5 launch schedules. On 9 September an Atlas-Agena carrying an

E-2 payload exploded 1.5 seconds after ignition, severely damaging

Pad 1 at Point Arguello. Initially there were estimates that the pad

could be readied for an E-5 launching by 1 November. but later evaluation

of both the damage and the status of the E-5 payload caused the program

office to slip the initial launch date to 12 December. (Vehicle 2203

Y Charyk's

333
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slipped from 7 December to 18 January 1962 and 2204 to 22 February

17 1962.) Vibration tests of the 2202 payload a few days later disclosed

faults in the film carriage portion of the camera subsystem, making

the postponement seem particularly well advised. 18

Pressure for an improvement of the revised launch schedule

increased during early October and, as it became clear that the pad

damage would not be the limiting factor in schedules, the pace of

activity stepped up. On li October, General Greer directed Lockheed

to make every effort to launch 2202 by 2 December rather than

12 December. The contractor reacted by shaping a "hard core group

of key personnel" into a task force with a 24-hour, seven-day-per-week

assignment: meet program objectival. Engineers and launch crews

were shifted from the Midas program to provide the necessary work

19

The effort was extraordinarily successful. At 1245 hours on

22 November, 12 days in advance of the most optimistic schedule

proposed in October, 2202 was launched from Pad 1. Every effort

had been made to insure a successful launch, including special provisions of "super clean" propellant tanks and X-ray checks of questionable

transistors. But 247 seconds after lift-off, the Atlas lost pitch

attitude control and shortly thereafter another programming error

force.

334

•
caused premature engine shutdown. That combination of errors

caused the Agena to stabilize in a tail-first attitude after separation.

When the Agena engines were ignited the vehicle promptly decelerated

into the Pacific. 20

Taken together with the record of Itek failings and Lockheed

problems, the launch failure had immediate repercussions. After

hearing presentations on the status of the program and discussing its

prospects with General Greer, Charyk on 4 December directed that

all work on the E-5 program be halted except that in support of 2203

and 2204 launches. Lockheed was instructed to treat the action as a

"partial termination" for the convenience of the government, a

euphemism designed chiefly to prevent speculation by the press and

within the aerospace industry. U questioned, SAFSP was to explain

that the decision represented ". . . part of a continuing process of

review and refinement of the USAF space program." 21

Vehicles 2203 and 2204 differed from their predecessor in having

a more comprehensive (ultra-high frequency) command.and control

system and more intricate telemetry. The camera was somewhat more

refined, as well.

Those vehicles effectively cancelled by Charyk's order were

either like 2203 in most respects or, in the case of 2207, 2208, and

335

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Accumulated program costs would therefore peak

pproximately f the total would be

--Toza-seeitzT--

2209, were slated to be "refined" along lines determined by early

test results. 22 With the cancellation of the final five vehicles in

the original schedule. E-5 funds requirements for fiscal 1962 dropped

needed to complete and launch 2203 and 2204.23

As had been true of earlier terminations, and as was to be

true later, financial considerations apparently played a considerable

role in the decision to halt work on E-5. During meetings with

Lockheed early in December and with Charyk's staff later that month.

Greer's people were particularly concerned by an apparent belief

that the E-S "partial termination" would bring about a considerable

improvement in the financial status of remaining elements of the

satellite reconnaissance program. The net effect would be substantiilly

less than seemed to be anticipated. For instance, if the Atlas boosters

scheduled for E-5 use were not so expended and their "bookkeeping"

costs transferred to the E-6 program, no net reduction in costs

would occur, merely a reallocation. Transferring Agenas from E-5

to E-6 had the same effect. E-5 cameras, capsules, and accessories

were well along toward completion by December 1961. Most costs

and liabilities had been incurred and could not be recovered.

336

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7017-74

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TUP I Mae LT

Certain of the "peculiar items" being bought for the E-5 effort alone

could be cancelled, but in Greer's eyes this amounted to "small

potatoes in the big picture. . ." He also emphasized that two launches

still were on schedules. "This means that everything didn't grind to

a crashing halt on 5 December, " he told L. C. Meyer, de facto

treasurer for the satellite reconnaissance program. Rather than the

M

hat some officials seemed to believe would be shifted

Mimi from E-S to other programs, about s actually recoverable.

In part, that somewhat discouraging appraisal reflected facts of life

which had not become apparent until December: slippages and cost

increases incurred while 2202 was nearing launch readiness had increased

total program costs by an unprogrammed

Even in financial matters E-5 sometimes seemed a child of misfortune. A case in point was the decision of April 1961 to cancel the

requirement for a secondary propulsion system in all but the first E-5

vehicle, which was then so far toward completion that the deletion

would have cost more than it saved. Bell Aircraft Corporation, which

manufactured the secondary propulsion system, halted work on the

hardware but continued research and development. The equipment

still was scheduled for use on E-6 and Midas vehicles, but in large

part its cost was being charged to E-S. Colonel King was not pleased,
a sentiment he communicated to the purchasing officer of E-5. Ultimately there was an agreement that no post-September charges would

be levied on E-5, that E-6 and Midas would actually provide the funds,

but the payments continued to be made through the E-5 contract. In

King's judgment, the episode confirmed the lack of financial and

management responsibility displayed by Lockheed through the course

of the E-5 effort. 25

Termination of the extended E-5 program also relieved pressure

in other areas. The contentious requirement for a secure command

system in E-5 had been troublesome since early 1961, mostly because

its cost (in excess of iiis 

delayed availability, and probability

of detracting from general system reliability made it seem unattractive

to the program office. But Undersecretary Charyk was extremely

r

,,46466644446446e /59%yyyze zemm# yymozozowAv i

could be serious in either event, a possibility that alarmed senior

officials of both the State and Defense Departments. Not until October 1961

338

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—171P-SECRIET--

reluctantly. 26 With cancellation of plans for extended E-5 launches,

concern diminished.

In the midst of the termination proceedings, and while the program

office was trying to sort out the residue of a complex program, 2203

reached launch readiness. It climbed free of Pad 2 at Point Arguello

at 1145 hours on 22 December, after two days of delay for the correction

of minor defects. Countdown went well, and though there was a fault

in the Atlas propulsion cutoff system the net effect was to put the Agena

in an orbit with a period 4.5 minutes longer than planned.

Once on orbit the payload began its scheduled operation. At

first all seemed well, and there were clear telemetry indications that

the camera had functioned, but either the frame counter failed or the

camera shut itself down earlier than scheduled. That was not too

serious, even if undesirable. But a faulty command actuated the reentry

sequence on the sixth pass and through a combination of errors the

payload, after separating, went into a new and higher orbit. (That

was not an unmitigated misfortune; the payload had "tried to reenter"

over New Boston.) The dead Agena, relieved of its cargo, continued

to circle the earth somewhat below the capsule. Because the reentry

command had activated all systems in the capsule portion, the battery

011-74 339

•

i_.M1111111111.11 • •
was dead dead by the time it was needed to ignite squibs and actuate the

drag parachute. Further, the retro-rockets had been ignited during

the unplanned maneuver sending the capsule into its high orbit, so

any reentry would be entirely ballistic.

The Agena fell back and burned up somewhere south of Borneo

on 31December. Tracking stations calculated that the capsule would

encounter enough atmospheric resistance to bring it down about

9 January. Air recovery would be impossible because of the complete

absence of the retro-rocket and parachute phases, but it was conceivable

that the vehicle might survive reentry forces and impact where the

Z7 payload could be recovered. In the course of Pegasus reentry

experiments during September and October 1961, one reentry test

vehicle had survived a ballistic return from an altitude of nearly

200, 000 feet after its parachute failed to deploy. 28

E-5 program people bled the Spacetrack centers for whatever

information they could obtain on the course and probable decay of the

satellite. During the second week of January 1962 the tracking stations

reported that the capsule had passed over the northernmost tracking

screen but had not been picked up by the radars of the next belt southward.

Lieutenant Colone INIM' immediately contacted the 6594th

Aerospace Test Wing, activating an earlier plan for the contingent

340

7017.7

n •

VOP-SteitIT-- ••

• •
The third and final E-5 vehicle was launched on 7 March 1962 at

1410 hours, after an extended series of aborted countdowns. The Agena

auxiliary power system and the command and control subsystem of 2204

341

•

recovery of decaying capsules that might enter intact. There was every

•

indication that that the payload had come down in northwestern Canada, so a

C-U9 carrying Lieutenant Colone

into Great Falls, Montana, stopping there to get Canadian permission

for a search along a specific path. The Royal Canadian Air Force wanted

to know why. Colon**explained that the USAF hoped to find part

of a satellite. After several hours of delay, a direct phone call from

Washington orderedo. the C-119 back to California. No reason 11111

was given.

It later developed that the area of the proposed search was along

one of the Strategic Air Command's most heavily used polar patrol

routes. Canadian authorities suspected that a B-52 had accidentally

released a nuclear weapon and that the Air Force wanted to recover it

surreptitiously. The issue was not of the sort that promised quick

resolution, so the search party was ordered home.

d a recovery crew flew

•

""404,0vvvyl., ,

7
17017-7

Y

Con:rols

•

TOP SECRET

had been substantially modified to reflect experience with the first two

E-5's.. Nevertheless, problems with the Agana, the Atlas, the guidance

programmer, and various switches had delayed the launch since

22 February. Despite that omen, the launch and orbit injection were

"near nominal." For the first 13 passes, all went reasonably well.

Then the New Hampshire tracking station improperly transmitted reentry

sequence commands. The vehicle assumed and maintained reentry

attitude, however, and over a period of several passes expended most

of its attitude control gas. In part, the sequence of misadventure

resulted from failure of the Fairchild timer. A recovery attempt on

pass 17 failed because of another tracking station error, and by pass 21

all control gas had been exhausted. The only remaining recourse was

to trigger the reentry system while the vehicle was in an appropriate

reentry attitude. But instead of reentering, the capsule went into a

higher orbit, much like its immediate predecessor. 30

More than a year later, in July 1963, the satellite had decayed

to the point of imminent reentry. As the heavy heat shield still was

attached, there seemed a change that it would survive. Greer's staff,

aided by computers and operators of th 411111111111111111110 .

calculated the probable reentry path and impact point. They concluded

that the satellite would impact toward the center of the Arabian Sea.

Since any possibility of parachute deployment had passed months before,

342

—TOP-IIRCRET-
343

--TOP-SECRET17-74

TU• SaCRET

and since the shock of striking cold sea water after, an uninhibited

•

ballistic reentry almost certainly would breach the satellite casing,

there seemed no possibility of retrieval. No recovery was attempted.

All the available data suggested that the capsule had actually come

down in the predicted impact area. Like both its predecessors,

nothing more was heard of it.31

Much the same fate had befallen the E-5. program. After the •

failure of 2203, the program disappeared from organizational charts.

No final report was written. On 1 March 1962, even before the last

E-5 launching, Colonel King had been transferred to a new assignment

and the residue of the program office had been dispersed. 32 As E-5,

the program was thereafter of interest mostly to antiquarians.

But the camera, and the E-5 requirement, tenuously held to life

notwithstanding the lack of program success. Charyk's decision to

cancel the E-5 program had been taken on Monday, 4 December. Two

days later, Jack Carter of Itek proposed to Charyk that tests be run

on Itek and Perkin-Elmer lenses to determine whether an improved

lens might be substituted for the original in the still-pending 2204

flight. A comparison began early in January. 33

While arrangements for that work were in train, Carter suggested

to General Greer that advances in the camera and satellite arts since

•
—70P-1112C127--

the start of E-5 should be adapted to a new reconnaissance system

based on the Itek E-5 camera. After refining the original idea, he

formally submitted it on 19 December 1961.

What Carter proposed was combining a single re-engineered

E-5 camera with the Discoverer-Corona capsule, a Thor booster,

and a modified Agena. He estimated that the resulting orbital system

would have a two- to four-day mission life. Exploiting the lower

altitude of the Discoverer satellite, the modified E-5 promised object

definition on the order of four feet and, in combination with Kodak's

new SO-131 film, a resolution of about 100 lines per millimeter. 34

The idea was not unattractive. On 28 December 1961 General

7

Greer, Colone. (his deputy), and Colonel King met with

Carter to discuss in greater detail both the concept and its application.

Greer recommended that Charyk give the proposal a careful hearing.

The general suggested, however, a complete departure from the

contract and management structure that had characterized the original

E-S development. He favored a covert program and an associate

contract arrangement that would put ltek (camera), General Electric

•

Although Itek's record in E-5 development was scarcely faultless,

the failures of the system had all originated in Atlas and Agena subsystems, mostly peculiar to the original E-5 design. Corona had

a much better record by late 1961, and Itek's reputation for camera

development was quite respectable.

344

-—Torstestros017-

ManCif• v.

Cc-:cos On

• •
011-74

TOP-SECREIP--

(capsule), Lockheed (Agena). and Douglas (Thor) at roughly the same

level, with Lockheed providing whatever systems engineering and

integration work might be needed. He felt that the Corona office

should have overall program management responsibility. (Corona

operated partly inside, partly outside the established structure of

Greer's organization, Greer having "focal point" authority but the

CIA still largely directing program affairs.)

The arguments favoring Carter's proposal were few but weighty.

There had been no real relaxation of the original E-5 requirement,

even though enthusiasm for the E-5 as a system had mostly evaporated.

The Carter approach offered a relatively inexpensive way of performing

the basic E-5 assignment, given the proposition that leftover E-5

cameras would serve as the basis of all payloads. The greatest

technical problem was that E-5 camera systems, even if modified as

Itek proposed, would weigh substantially more than Corona cameras.

But offsetting this was the potential of an improved Thor, then called

Thorad, which by utilising the additional thrust of strap-on solid-fuel

Sergeant rockets could orbit such a payload. The near-term availability

of a Thor-boosted E-5 camera promised high detail photographs of

Soviet installations sooner than any other reconnaissance satellite in

development, and at a much lower cost.

345

10P-SEGINST---

• • •

I
Undersecretary Charyk was disposed to favor the idea. On

29 December he told Greer that he wanted some assurance of general

feasibility before committing himself and that he would make a decision

once he had been fully briefed on the status of Thorad, the capsule

problem, and the details of proposed operations. 35

Colonel H. L. Battle, principal Air Force manager in the Corona

program, expressed initial reservations about the soundness of the

approach. He was quite reluctant to assign systems integration responsibilities to Itek. an aspect of the original Carter proposal which General

Greer had dismissed in making his first recommendations to Charyk.

Battle was also apprehensive that the modified E-5 might become a

substitute for Corona rather than an addition to the existing program,

a notion that did not stir up much enthusiasm in the Corona office. 36

After giving the proposal further study, the Corona people

suggested that the Central intelligence Agency contract for the payload

(from Itek) and the recovery vehicle (from General Electric). Such an

arrangement would make the new program in many respects a contractual

counterpart of Corona itself. The Air Force Space Systems Division

'would, in that context, procure Thors and Agenas and Greer's organization would manage a covert systems engineering contract with Lockheed.

Corona experience and refined estimates indicated that the basic

Thor-Agena combination could put the 775-pound payload, including

346 17017-74

nancpe 41114111 lean_ • rter-vw
-11DP-112C1121"---

40 pounds of film into a two-day polar orbit. Average photographic

altitude would be 140 nautical miles, although perigee would be about .

100. Use of Thorad would substantially improve orbital life span.

One premise of development was a joint Itek-Lockheed payload

structure design, Lockheed fabricating the framework and shipping it

to Boston, where [bilk would install the camera system. After inspection and acceptance at lisles plant, the composite structure would be

shipped back to California where Lockheed would mate it with the

recovery capsule before sending it off to Vandenberg.

With immediate program approval, it seemed possible to get

the first payload delivered by 22 August 1962 and later payloads at

one-month intervals thereafter. The first launch could be scheduled

for December 1961. It was generally assumed that problems with

the booster, or for that matter with the Agena, would be slight because

the payload would be essential ly interchangeable with those being built

for Corona operations, which then were going rather well. Thor engines

would be the pacing items unless there was a slippage in payload

fabrication.

Initially it appeared that the cost of development and initial

payload procurement would 

totaling' 

Costs would be somewhat

higher, however, if Thorad were used--an expedient that would give

the system a six-day life. 37

-T011-SECRET--

4_1A1111.111111
—T0119-1112CRET---

Within Greer's organization, the Carter proposal was called

Lanyard, a word known only to about a dozen people during the first

weeks of program consideration.

Not much could be done until Charyk obtained an essential

endorsement of Lanyard from the Secretary of Defense, the general

concurrence of CIA, and final approval from the National Security

Council. By early January 1962, much of the general uncertainty had

dissipated. In response to a request from Defense Secretary R. S.

McNamara, Dr. Charyk prepared a general resume of the status of

and the options open to satellite reconnaissance for the next

year or so. The information was needed for the President's "special

group, " which conducted periodic reviews of general reconnaissance

program status. In his resume, Charyk included a paragraph declaring

the feasibility of the Lanyard approach and a statement that the reconnaissance office was giving serious consideration to funding the program.

Colonel J. R. Martin, head of Charyk's special staff, carried the

proposal directly to McNamara for final review. McNamara went over

the draft in detail, making only one significant suggestion for change..

The word first appears in an 11 January 1962 memorandum written

in the Pentagon but it was earlier used as the code identifier for

"the simplified E-5" in discussions on the West Coast. A special

Lanyard clearance procedure was in effect by late February.

_mafiexe_.iiru5_0_ 017-7 348
Instead off proposing the possibility of Lanyard development, he told

Martin, the resume should state that development was in progress.

So modified, the memorandum went forward for Secretary

McNamara's signature. For practical purposes, it represented

approval of Lanyard development. Nevertheless, it seemed unwise

to do much toward formally starting work until final endorsements

had been received from the presidential review level. 38

The McNamara memorandum did not go forward for National

Security Council review until March 1962. More than a month earlier,

on L2 January, Undersecretary Charyk discussed Lanyard's situation

and prospects with General Greer and the West Coast project group.

He emphasized that Lanyard would be, in at least one sense, competioo//Aer Z/ZZ/Z/ZZ Ar d5:e dOr A/W/WAWA/AI

% ......77777777727-,7

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-er

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349

•

•
1

•

TOP-SECREPT---

By early February, Battle had refined the financial estimates

and had committed Lanyard to the Thorad approach. It was now plain

that payloads would cost at leas

1W

and Thorad development

MI

anotheNI Thors and Agenas for the five proposed launches

would cost another

Although the cost figures were no longer quite as attractive

as they had seemed a month earlier, compensating technical advantages

had appeared. Close study of Lanyard mission potential indicated that

because of the improved thrust of the Thorad the guidance systems in

both the Thor and the Agena could be operated over longer periods than

had been anticipated. A considerably enhanced precision in orbital

injection would result. Additionally, it now appeared that a 15-day life

for the Lanyard system might be achievable.

Convinced of Lanyard's appeal and reassured by McNamara's

previous endorsement of the program, Charyk decided to request

Lanyard approval in a pending presentation to the "special group."

The still embryonic Lanyard project team was developing a

different outlook. Characteristically, those who became intimately

associated with Lanyard tended, in time, to forget or ignore the original

, 7017-7•

350

_TDSLSSCRET--- Contreeremly

• • . 4_mpimin fo
—TOP-SIEGRET---

concept of Lanyard as a transitory, interim program. In the eyes

•

of its managers--and its contractors--it acquired an aura of permanence that Charyk had not intended. More than a year later, when

acknowledgement of Lanyard's transient status. 40

Still undecided in March 1962 was the question of who should

administer the covert contracts with Itek, General Electric. and

Lockheed. The matter was complicated by the nature of the still embryonic

National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), headed by Charyk, which

included both CIA and USAF participants in satellite reconnaissance.

Although it seemed inevitable that the NRO would be the actual Lanyard

program custodian, effective control tended to remain with the organization that directly administered the contracts. The CIA had been fully

cognizant of the Lanyard affair virtually since its inception and CIA

management of covert contracts had been one of Colonel Battle's first

suggestions. Yet Carter's proposal had first been made to Greer. E-5

had been a Samos program, and there seemed no compelling reason

for allowing it to drift into-another organization's control.

The evolution of the NRO and its influence on the progress of the

several satellite reconnaissance programs is the subject of a separate

chapter. For the purposes of this portion of the narrative it seems

sufficient to note that the organisation existed and that its functions

and authorities had not been entirely clarified.

017-74

351

• •
On that ambiguous note, General Greer—anxious to get Lanyard •

underway before its value was substantially lessened by the passage of

time--suggested to Brigadier Gener eading Charyk's

NRO staff, that he be authorized to let a "level of effort" contract with

Itek to cover an initial 30 days of work. He also urged the need to start

work on a covert cover plan, since a first launch was planned for

December 1962, only 10 months distant. Acknowledging that he was

uncertain what decision might be made on the matter of contract authority,

Greer suggested that it would be better to have the CIA take such first

steps if it seemed probable that the agency would ultimately get program

management authority. 41

That the program would be totally covert and not, as proposed at

one point, a highly secure "white" effort, became certain during the

third week of February 1962. Stimulated by CIA concern about the rather

large numbers of people who were becoming aware of such "ultra sensitive"

covert programs as Corona and Argon, President J. F. Kennedy directed

that only individuals specifically approved by the CIA could become

involved in the Lanyard effort. By implication, in so ruling, the President

also approved the Lanyard program and made the CIA its custodian.

Charyk planned to recommend to the President's Special Committee on

Reconnaissance that Lanyard be handled as Corona had been.

352

Del

?lam* •.a•

—TOPSECRIET--

7017-

aitri? Kevric

Ccr.::015 Or
Early in April the undersecretary found a way to split the hair,

letting CIA have contract responsibility but keeping the critical technical elements of program management in Greer's hands. He proposed

to Herbert Scoville, CIA's Deputy Director for Research and Richard

Bissell's successor as de facto manager of the CIA's role in satellite

reconnaissance, that Greer be made immediately responsible for all

Lanyard contracts except the covert agreements, that CIA administer

all covert contracts, and that Greer be "completely responsible for

technical management of Lanyard," including the payload and recovery

elements. That line of command would be reinforced by making the

configuration control board responsive only to Greer.

Operations would be patterned after Corona. In effect, CIA

would exercise responsibility for pre-mission planning and on-orbit

operational decisions involving target selection. The CIA would also

manage security aspects of the program. Communication would employ

Corona message circuits.

The solution Charyk proposed was a compromise between the

original concept of management by the Corona office under Greer's

direction, and management along the lines of Corona -- which meant

by the CIA. Charyk reminded Scoville on 2 April that it was urgently

necessary to agree on a division of responsibilities if the NRO was to

—TOP-SECRET---

• 1_.1111111.111111
-TOP-SECRET--

Corot:liseni•

354

-44afee-vellIPW7

017-7

' - ynal

-TIIP-SECRET--

meet. the schedules promised to the President. And he noted that some

project activity had begun even without an agreement on responsibilites. 42

The need for such a communication, in effect a negotiated agreement between the director of the NRO and his nominal deputy, could be

appreciated only in the context of personal and organization animosity

that had developed since the departure of Bissell, Scoville's predecessor.

The evidence would indicate that President Kennedy approved the Lanyard

approach early in March but that differences between NRO and CIA, or

between Charyk and Scoville, delayed further action for at least three

weeks.

Scoville eventually accepted the Charyk proposal of 2 April, though

remarking that giving General Greer the total responsibility for technical

management of all aspects of Lanyard was a departure from Corona

precedents.

Details of the arrangement were somewhat more complex than

could be summarized in the phrase "complete technical management

responsibility, " but that was the essence of the arrangement. The

immediate program director would be Colonel Battle, though he would

be entirely responsible to General Greer rather than, as with Corona,

to CIA for some matters. And although CIA had the authority to make

"on-orbit operations" decisions, Greer would exercise a technical

decision function during the conduct of Lanyard missions. In case of

• •
-111010-3212117------

conflicts, Charyk would decide--if time permitted; otherwise Greer

prevailed. Absolute CIA control of Lanyard security was tempered

by the ruling that General Greer would determine program need-to-know,

only questions involving people not engaged in program management

being subject to a joint agreement between Charyk and the CIA. Finally,

the Corona secure teletype network was to be extended to include Greer's

group, C.haryk's office, and the NRO staff. (Until that time the Corona

managers had passed along to General Greer those messages they

thought would be of interest; there was no arrangement for transmittal

of complete information. )43

Even before Charyk and Scoville reached their understandings

on program responsibilities, Lanyard had begun the transition from

proposal to development. By AS March 1962, Lockheed had been authorized to construct five orbital systems in accordance with technical

instructions originated by Greer's staff. Pending negotiation of a formal

.11111

contract, Lockheed was permitted to spen

4

As in the past, one of the first problems that had to be faced was

getting Lanyard under cover. The program was largely based on the use

of existing E-5 cameras which had been openly developed and procured

V

.de

355

•
Page 44

is

Denied in full
-11010-SECILIET"--

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By early May 1962, Lanyard technical proposals from Itek,

Lockheed, and General Electric had been received and were being

processed. Lockheed and Itek were working under interim authorizetion• totaling 

.*

each. while General Electric had received

advance authorizations totaling 111111111111 Program costs for the

three were then estimated at of which Itek would receive

1

WW1 n d

Lockheed The total still was less than

General Greer's estimate that the payloads would cost all of the IS 1.111 recovered from the E•5 termination. 46

•

•
roe SECRET

The Lanyard panoramic camera system was then expected to

weigh 635 pounds, the cassette 20 pounds, and the stellar-index camera

system another 20 pounds. About 78 pounds of film would be carried

for the main camera plus two pounds for the stellar-index system.

Greer had suggested that six additional cameras be added to the original

Lanyard order for use during calendar 1964, but Undersecretary Charyk

had balked, limiting the total procurement, for the moment, to five

cameras. Charyk agreed to consider buying two additional cameras

for 1963, however. The approved five-vehicle program, including

boosters and launch costs, would run abou 47

Not until October 1962 was that basic schedule modified, and

then by the purchase of three additional Lanyard payloads which would

were tentatively slated, for launch during January, February, and March

48 1964. Total costs for the Lockheed and Itek portions of the program

thus rose, for the eight programmed flights, tcilliinin and

respectively, up a total ofal over the original program estimate.49

The cost of the entire Lanyard effort, it developed, would increase

about o a total o The prospect that

early success in L.inyard flights wo cause a urther extension of

358

7017-

fiance v ale— •Cer0

•
the program appeared later in October. when Itek was, authorized to

buy optical glass needed for nine additional systems. Since the cost

was less tha however, nothing in the way of a significant

commitment to a continuing Lanyard effort could be deduced from the

decision. Lead time for optical glass was the most critical element

in long-term planning, so such a purchase implied no more than

elementary precautions against unanticipated problems.

The immediate responsibility for technical aspects of Lanyard

development was firmly fixed by early July, with the assignment of

Major11101as the officer responsible for the camera system.

Redelegation of contracting officer authority from CIA headquarters t (a CIA officer assigned within the SAFSP

establishment) served to pin down responsibility for the contractual

elements of the program. ll

a

was formally empowered to sign all

covert contracting documents "regardless of amount" provided only

that the proper funding allocations had previously been approved. 51

Such a measure promised additional safeguards for the security of the

basic Corona activity, a matter about which CIA headquarters was

expressing increased concern as the unfolding of Lanyard exposed

more and more people to the facts concerning the origin of the Lanyard 

film recovery technique.

359

50

• L pm.
In thee midst of Lanyard acceleration there developed a new

squabble over the scope of National Reconnaissance Organization

responsibilities, and in consequence the funding authorizations for

Lanyard became embedded in an organizational dispute between Charyk

and Scoville. In September and October 1962, the question of whether

CIA would assume total responsibility for all covert contracting in

satellite reconnaissance became a warm issue. While it went unresolved, funds for Lanyard and other covert programs were withheld.

By October, the reserve of NRO funds had vanished and in General

Greer's words, the contractors were working on trust. 52 The problem

was ultimately resolved by compromise, but not before alarming both

General Greer's establishment and the Lanyard contractors.

Late in 1962 there was some difficulty with schedules for the

stellar-indexing cameras which, in the case of Lanyard, were vital

to the functioning of the total system. Stellar-index records were the

only sources of attitude reference provided in the Lanyard system,

The rather complicated question of authority and responsibility is

discussed in greater detail in a following chapter on the NRO. In

essence, the CIA did not want to assume covert contracting responsibilities for all programs, arguing that exposure was certain if its

re small activities in that area were increased by such programs

as Charyk, as director of the NRO, wanted a rigid definition

of al responsibilities which would effectively confine CIA to

security and covert contracting (plus certain operational functions),

but which would give NRO directors complete technical authority.

Coruna still largely controlled in technical and financial areas by

-7et M, was the real question at stake.

360

•

7017-7,

hams. Token: Keyrc e

—T-0111-SEMET-- CCr:rCtS Cony

•
no horizon camera being incorporated. (Corona systems included a

horizon camera, permitting independent determination of vehicle

attitude and making stellar-index information a highly useful but not

vital accessory.) In October, the configuration control board decided

that the stellar-index cameras in Lanyard should incorporate a

capacity for 500 feet of index film and 250 feet of stellar film--a

substantial increase over the amount originally contemplated. After

some minor quibbling over costs and fees, Itek began working on the

change. Difficulties came in December. when Itek disclosed that the

required supply spools and take-up cassettes could not be made available before mid-March 1963--some two weeks after the currently

scheduled first flight date. The possibility that one or two Lanyards

might have to conform to the older pattern of stellar-index operation

did not vanish until early 1963. when it became apparent that the first

3 system could not be launched before April.5

V

ivv5744~eA,,, ###,z,,,,Azezeze444, 1_ . if

,..-/AA4e7AWAK.Wowiezemed

361

1_11n111ffin
—rer-soustrer---

fizz, em-er-tV, tfizzemm-zz,w,

The chief difficulty encountered in payload development arose

from deficiencies in and shortages of test equipment and related

facilities. By November 1962, a general slippage in several subsystems

had cast doubt on the validity of the very tight delivery schedule. In

September, platten fabrication problems delayed progress. By late

October, difficulties in installing the thermal blanket for the camera

subsystem were becoming critical. Agena completion had slipped a

week by early November, and construction of the joint between the

Agena and the payload section was then two weeks behind. By the time

Itek was ready to ship the first camera subsystem it had become

essential to waive requirements for full qualification of the beryllium

mirror and to provide fur a later retrofit of the data block recording

subsystem, which had operated poorly in preliminary tests. The

stellar-index unit was not yet available and could not be tested in

conjunction with the main camera. More significant, though not

immediately recognized as such, was a notation that a light corona

effect had caused film fogging in some of the early camera system

checks. Si

Notwithstanding such difficulties, each of which briefly seemed

to presage a major crisis., lick managed to push the first Lanyard 

362

Han w Teen!

7017-7

Keyrso
yt

."

7017-74

. 3•••^ • •rv*"..re

363

•

.04

--IMPAHECRICT--

camera system through preliminary acceptance tests by 19 December

1962. Changes to the beryllium mirror still were necessary, however,

and final optical tests could not be run until a critical test facility

had been completed and checked out. Lockheed was still reporting

trouble with thermal shielding and the roll joint structure. with modifications of the command decoder unit, and with facility qualification. 56

One of the problems of the Lanyard schedule was inherent: the

first launch vehicle would be as unique as its payload. The initial

Lanyard was scheduled to be lofted by the first thrust-augmented Thor,

now generally called TAT rather than Thorad. Additionally, the Bell

Telephone Laboratories' guidance system which later was to be made

integral with the Agena stage would, for the first launch, be located

in the Thor. Thus a special set of ascent equations was required.

Additionally, the program office hoped to use Lanyard mission data

in planning for later low-altitude Corona flights and in obtaining precise

information on the prospective life expectancy of the dual-capsule

Corona-J systems scheduled for first use during the spring of 1963.

The abundance of such factors thoroughly compounded the normally

57

hectic environment of any first flight.

Remarkably enough. Lanyard experienced relatively few signifi-

/

cant changes during its early development. The substitution of a
beryllium mirror structure for the aluminum structure originally

planned was one which would have long-term influence, and complexities of the stellar-index camera installation promised to be important,

but on the whole the program had been rather stable. (The beryllium

structure provided better rigidity than aluminum at a 40-pound saving

in weight, but the additional film capacity of the stellar-index camera

unit absorbed much of the difference. ) 58 In that Lanyard was significantly different from its E-5 predecessor, however, it represented

a continuing development problem, one not completely obvious if the

abbreviated system development schedule was used as an indicator

of design novelty.

Apart from being considerably lighter than the E-5, largely a

factor of employing one rather than two cameras, Lanyard principally

differed from the original system in that only the film was recovered

from Lanyard flights. F-5 recovery had included both cameras and

virtually the entire forward structure of the total system. Additionally,

Lanyard employed a unique roll-joint technique, which permitted the

camera to point toward selected ground targets without requiring a

roll maneuver by the Agena. Finally, the new system was based on

single-camera stereo techniques. Its pictures would cover a 50-nauticalmile swath eight miles deep along the flight path, with a 10 percent

364 17017-74

oa Keede

Con:rols Only,
7011,74 365

overlap. Ten of the major E-5 subsystems were incorporated in Lanyard.

Seven others had been completely eliminated (includinia weighty and

complex computer), and the remaining five had been substantially

s implified.

E-5 had been a pressurized system; Lanyard resembled Corona

in operating at ambient pressures. Simplification had its most marked

effect in the film transport and shutter mechanisms, which leaned

heavily on Corona experience. 59 The dynamic operating modes of

Corona and Lanyard cameras were quite similar, which was not

surprising since both were lick developments stemming from 1959

concepts. Nonetheless, in bulk and in many of their physical details

the two systems were more dissimilar than might have been anticipated,

given the fact that the Lanyard approach involved substituting Corona

techniques for those of the original E-5.

The recovery sequence was a real point of difference between

Lanyard and E-5. The original E-5 capsule design had been markedly

influenced by the notion of modifying the payload section to a mannedspace-flight configuration. Although recovery and re-use of an expensive

camera was the customary justification for provisions that would require

reentry of the entire E-5 front end, the remarkable likeness between the

E-5 capsule and that proposed by Lockheed for the abortive Man-InSpace-Soonest system (1958) could not be ignored.
—TOP-SECRET—_

In E-5, once the photo mission was complete, the first of 13

separate recovery events was to increase pressurization of the capsule

by seven to ten pounds, to stiffen it for reentry. The Agena was then

reoriented so that engine ignition would effect capsule ejection, the

mirror was jettisoned and the lens retracted. The covers on the

various apertures for mirrors and lenses were closed to shield interior

umponents against reentry heating effects. Thereafter the entire

camera compartment separated from the Agena. After capsule passage

through the upper atmosphere, the fairing doors were opened, the

drogue gun fired, and the drogue chute released. Drogue and mid-body

fairings were next jettisoned, followed by deployment of the main

parachute, discard of the ablative shield, and inflation of the water

impact bags.

Lanyard's recovery sequence was, by comparison, quite simple.

After Agena reorientation and severance of the film, the film gate was

sealed, the recovery capsule system separated from the camera, the

retro-rockets fired, and reentry commenced. Deployment first of the

drogue chute and subsequently of the main chute completed the seven

major events of reentry.

Adoption of Corona-proven techniques implied several significant

•

advances toward a simpler system. Elimination of pressurization

•

366

—TOP-SEC-11:ET--

017-74

Kertale

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••••n13:41;112Ergi:1121411011116641161

_ .1111111.1111
017-74

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--111010-SEGRE1111--

•

367

f

7

F.

F

promised to reduce a potential for image degradation arising from

internal air turbulence and to eliminate any need for internal error

control stemming from pressurization factors. Lanyard needed no

counterbalance for the linear motion effects of the image motion

control mechanism, eliminating requirements for the servo-drive

counterweights needed on the E-5 image motion compensator. (In

Lanyard, the Agena could be programmed to ignore rate inputs that

fell below two milliradians per second.) Similarly, Lanyard required

no counterweights for spool actions, as in the E-5, since in Lanyard

film take-up forces were compensated for by counter rotation on the

pitch axis of the orbiting vehicle. 60

The proof of the pudding remained for the future, of course.

f

Most satellite reconnaissance programs of the past had been notably

high on promise and substantially limited in performance--leading to

a notoriously high mortality rate. In December 1962, when the first

Lanyard system was being assembled for transport to Vandenberg, the

last of the original Samos systems, the E-6, was in the process of

cancellation. To that time, only Corona and its siblings had returned

reconnaissance pictures. (Products of the single successful E-1

flight were treated as interesting photographs taken from orbit--curios

with no real potential for utility.) And in the case of Lanyard. a
-TOP-SECRET--

question of requirements had begun to cloud prospects. As early as

August 1962, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)

had registered with NRO Director Charyk a mild disclaimer of belief

in any real need for Lanyard. NPIC expressed doubts, based chiefly

on Corona experience, that the Lanyard vehicle could be programmed

with sufficient precision to provide stereo coverage of vital targets.

NPIC suggested that Lanyard's limited transverse, which would permit

photographs of a 50-mile strip from a 125-mile orbit, was too slight

fur surveillance assignments although the probable photographic

quality of the system indicated that surveillance should be its chief role.

As it happened, NP1C's real interest of the moment was inducing the

NRO to improve the stellar-camera features of Lanyard, a move to

enhance the value of the recovered product by increasing confidence

that the precise location of the photographed area could be determined.

But the inquiry had an ominous ring, nonetheless. 61

•

Perhaps anticipating that the tempo of quibbling would increase

with time, General Greer late in September 1962 approached Undersecretary Charyk with the suggestion that it might be useful to conduct

General Greer emphasized, however, that the primary purpose of the

368

Mande v

—TOP-SECRET—

017-1

Ke vnd

CCI:r0IS 0111

. Lmapain
study should be to uncover any payload technical problems that might

V

- -•-•-o/./Z/ZZZAW//7/..1"

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There were other advantages to the study--and some possible

disadvantages. On the negative side, it was conceivable that a weighted

evaluation would lead to a finding that Lanyard promised considerably

r

/~4441

//z/3.//z/m././////////7/

"7/7/././ ./.1/WZ/Z/ZZIZZIZZZZ'

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that no real need for Lanyard existed; considerable money would be

saved by cancelling the program at an early stage rather than, as with

E-5 and E-6. after development was essentially complete and flight

test well along.

early in its life. Greer was particularly concerned lest it should later

369

• • •
-TO1P-SECRET----

seem that his group was specializing in the development of redundant,

•

expensive, and duplicative systems. •

No formal answer to General Greer's suggestion came back.

Instead, Charyk told the general early in October 1962 that there was

weir Z7M.e∎

,

It was during the late months of 1962 that the Lanyard development process began to encounter a succession of seemingly minor

difficulties which, standing alone, meant little, but when taken together

tended to delay the availability of critical articles. The camera portion

had been mated to the frame of the orbital vehicle by early January 1963

and about a third of the total flight preparation routine had been completed. But delays in availability of the Agena set back the start of

compatibility testing by a week at that point, causing a general slip

in schedules. The program office, fully aware that some such problems

were inevitable, had inserted a small pad of slack time early in the

development. Unhappily, ltek and Lockheed had eroded away most of

that cushion somewhat earlier. By mid-January, Lockheed was conceding to "an extremely tight situation." If any major problems

017-

Talent Keyh

Cant me 0

. __Lralmumm
371 17011-74

, "e r • WI

•

• • •

• •

developed, flight schedules would be jeopardized. Schedules were

then so tight that the last sequence of camera tests had been rescheduled to follow rather than precede system environment checks,

a change required by the delayed availability of a completely suitable

64

calibration facility.

On 31 January, Itek advised Lockheed that the beryllium mirror

originally slated for use with the first Lanyard flight payload was "not

acceptable." The camera firm recommended using one of the aluminum

mirrors already available, since a beryllium replacement could not be

provided before 11 February and the deadline for shipment of the

qualified payload to Vandenberg was 15 February. (An aluminum mirror

had been installed in the first flight system for use through ground

tests, being scheduled for replacement shortly before final subsystem

checks. What Itek was actually proposing, therefore, was retention . of the aluminum mirror for the first flight.) Lockheed, after giving

the matter considerable attention, concluded that a beryllium mirror

was "essential to program objectives" and held out for the original

plan. Itek finally agreed, drawing the needed mirror from another

Lanyard system in final assembly.65

In the meantime, a succession of failures in both the payload

section and in the thermal altitude simulator chamber had effectively
ended hopeope that original flight schedules might be maintained. The

first unit entered the thermal-altitude chamber on 5 February,

roughly a week late. Two days later it had to be removed for failure

analysis and necessary modification. An incorrect command from

the test console had induced roll-joint failure. (The unit overran its

rotation limit of 30 degrees, severing the connecting cable.) Additionally. electromagnetic interference had shorted out the programmer

clock, and it developed that telemetry needs of the stellar-index

camera had not been satisfied before the tests started.

After three shifts worked at rewiring the unit, it started through

the test chamber again un 8 February. The tests were halted the

following day when the roll-joint refused to respond to commands and

the cameras ignored automatic shut-down signals. This time the

roll-joint had failed because of a short circuit in the camera wiring

harness. Quick repair permitted a test resumption by 11 February,

but later that day there was a repetition of the camera mode failure.

Wearily, test personnel pulled the payload section out of the test

chamber and sent it back to assembly. 66

The fourth attempt at a thermal-altitude chamber test began

on 13 February. The stellar-index camera failed the next day, during

a cold chamber exposure. Concurrently, roll-joint difficulties reappeared.

372

7017-

v To:a-: Keel,

--4,- 

• • t"--1111/111M
In this instance, however, the roll-joint problem was traced to a fault

in the Lanyard's command decoder unit. The stellar-index camera

failure was mechanical in origin, while refusal of the main camera

to shut down on command (another problem vihich had reappeared)

was attributed to a faulty transformer. After each of these defects

had been corrected, the system finally completed its thermal-altitude

checks on 18 February. The missing mirror made its-appearance

four days later. After a succession of minor difficulties which further

slowed progress, the subsystem tests were completed on 4 March.

67

The shipment left Sunnyvale the next day.

In one respect, the frustrating delays in completing Lanyard

ground qualification seemed to have been fortunate. While Lanyard

had been stalled in chamber tests, a standard Corona payload had

been substituted in the launch schedule--the first TAT booster launch,

on 28 February. Because of a technician's failure to press hard

enough when inserting an umbilical connector, one of the TAT's solid

rocket units did not ignite and the satellite was lost. But the skein

of misfortune which had accumulated about the first Lanyard was not

yet complete. When the launch finally came, on 18 March, it was

unsuccessful. Because of an electrical system failure, the gas valves

which governed Agena stabilization during injection operated only for

701744 373

_TOP-SECierr-

•
-TOP-freartirthe first second of Agena burn. Lacking attitude control, the Agena

stage began to roll at a rate which built up to 24 degrees per second

at burnout. Burnout came 13 seconds early, probably because centrifugal force generated by the rapid roll rate prevented fuel from reaching

the ignition chamber. The last hope for a miracle vanished when the

Kodiak station failed to report any contact with the satellite at the

time of its first scheduled appearance. 68

Lack of success in the first Lanyard launch was a most untimely

misfortune. Starting with a Corona launch on 7 January and including

the initial TAT failure on Z8 February, three successive attempts to

obtain coverage of key Soviet areas had been barren. No photographs

had been returned since 18 December 1962, a situation which brought

expressions of particular concern both from the new director of the

NRO. Brockway McMillan, and from CIA's Herbert Scoville. (Even

before the abortive Lanyard trial, McMillan had directed a "maximum

effort" to get early returns from a Corona-Mural, a course urged by

CIA. Indeed, Scoville had suggested substituting a "normal"

Corona-Mural payload for the first Lanyard, a measure that was

impractical in the time rvmaining before the Lanyard launch.)69

In the wake of the Lanyard failure, separate and detailed

reports covering flight difficulties went to Secretary McNamara and

• LLImilmil
011-14

.13,2-2 •

375

---TOP-SECRET---

TOP-SEGRIBT--

CIA Director John McCone. Scoville, though unhappy with the continued absence of photographs, seemed to be favorably impressed

by the forceful appioach General Greer's organization was taking

toward Lanyard difficulties. McMillan agreed with Greer's observation that there was no useful or consistent pattern to the recent

failures and that the best course for the moment was to continue

scheduled launches. (Two Corona flights were set for April and one

for what remained of March.) In the case of Lanyard, the matter of

greatest urgency was to discover precisely what had caused the

electrical failure in the Agana and to prevent its recurrence. The

best explanation seemed to be that the act of blowing off the camera

doors immediately after' booster separation had somehow brought on

a short circuit in a junction box, but determined efforts to reproduce

the effect in ground tests were fruitless. 70

In the meantime, while the first Lanyard had been moving

toward a most premature reentry, the project had become the center

of a determined CIA effort to reassert greater control over major

elements of the satellite reconnaissance effort. Late in February

1963, the agency urged that Lanyard security procedures be merged

with the extant Corona-Mural system, the name itself to survive

only as a camera identifier. By implication, since Lanyard was

• • LiumlIMIWI
approaching the status of an operational system Afrom the agency viewpoint, at least), the entire program would thereafter conform to the

pattern established for Corona-Mural. General Greer, speaking as

Lanyard program director, voiced firm opposition to the notion. In

this stand he was supported by the NRO staff. But the agency arguments

seemed to stand a considerable chance at the moment, since Undersecretary Charyk was leaving government service at the end of February

and no successor for the post of NRO director had been named. Indeed,

it seemed possible to some reconnaissance program participants that

the departure of Dr. Charyk might signal the end of the NRO itself.

The appointment of Dr. Brockway McMillan to succeed Charyk

early in March scuttled rumors that the NRO would be discontinued

and for practical purposes channelled the current Lanyard format

controversy into a somewhat unrealistic discussion of security procedures.

In that area too, it developed, General Greer had a highly defensible

position, lie pointed out, with quiet logic, that the agency was actually

advocating establishment of dual security systems, one of a general

nature for members of the Washington establishment, and another rigidly

compartmented for personnel in the various field stations. That arrangement, Greer suggested, would be an invitation to security compromise

hinc • it would inevitably cause the proliferation of artifical security

376 sip17-

ttand4 4. . . eyll

C.:"1:015 0

•••••••••• •••n•••• •••-• • ••n0 Jo • 41:16.•••••(.. I
7017.74

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—TOP-SEERET--

compartments. He expressed particular concern at the increasing

abundance of code words and the fertility of the creation process

suggesting that what was needed was not so much the elimination of

one security category (Lanyard) as a careful plan for a totally new

approach, one adaptable to the real situation. 71

For the moment, at least, the security clearance situation did

not change. But immediately before the first Lanyard launch General

Greer proposed that his establishment be made the action addressee

on launch and orbit operation messages. He observed that such a

change was entirely logical in the light of Lanyard's technical adolescence. (The system is "clearly in the early R&D stage," Greer pointed

out.) CIA's Lanyard agent. Colonel J. C. Ledford, instantly responded

that until relieved of responsibility for "satellite missions under my

control" he proposed to follow "established procedures." In this

instance, he meant to assert the authority to decide when an early

recovery was necessary, a matter that Greer (as director of the

technical program) felt better qualified to judge and which, by the terms

of the original Lanyard agreements of April 1962. was his responsibility in any case.

The issue was resolved by NRO Director McMillan's ruling

that Greer would exercise responsibility for all actions on which

377

—TOIrSIELIMET--

•

• man
r

TOP-2111:112,--

successful recovery hinged except that he would not extend a mission

once the operational control center in Washington had decided on an

early recovery. Such an early recovery decision was, however, to

be based only on considerations of reconnaissance urgency, the

probability that mission success might be endangered by some special

hazard, or political expediency.

72

 Since that ruling confirmed General

Greer in the responsibility for deciding all other issues, including

that of how satellite functioning on orbit should figure in the timing of

recovery operations, it had the effect of strengthening the authority

of the program office and the program director. It did not entirely

resolve the basic issue, however; Colonel Ledford continued to insist

that his organization had the basic responsibility for "the development

of payloads and methods of operation" as well as overall security. 73

The vitality of the Lanyard requirement was not seriously

questioned during the authority and responsibility discussions of the

spring of 1963. Indeed, John A. McCone, in his role as chairman of

the United States Intelligence Board, told McMillan early in April 1963

zez!mnre%

378

17017-7A

Mande len• Ke r%;:?e

Cot' 1: oss ()my

• •
•

But atat the time there was considerably less assurance of

Not until mid-April did the

z

second Lanyard get through its preflight checks and go to Vandenberg.

It did not leave the pad until 18 May. Then, for a time, all seemed

to go well. The boosters and the Agena operated properly, injection

into orbit was accurate, and everything needed for a first trial of the

camera system appeared to be available. But the payload refused to

respond to ground commands--a reluctance finally ascribed to the

fact that no electrical power was getting to the decoder, which therefore

could not hear the commands. There was no way to route orders around

the decoder circuit and the possibility that the ailment might heal itself

was unrealistically remote. All that could be done was to attempt

recovery, using the "lifeboat" system (which was independent of the

main command circuitry and had its own rnagnetrorneter and gas supply).

On 21 May the capsule was recovered from the water near Hawaii.

Lanyard 11 proved no more useful to the reconnaissance program than

Lanyard 1. 75

Reminiscent in some degree of the problems which had plagued

the earl y E-S flights. the difficulty of second Lanyard (vehicle 1165)

Lanyard 11 did not have as much difficulty as Lanyard I in qualifying

for launch, but it did encounter problems similar to those noted above

n the case of the first Lanyard. There is no point to detailing them,

however; nothing of major significance to the total program emerged.

1701744

mare,:

Ccr::.)

379

•
was eventually traced to a short circuit of uncertain origin on the

payload side of the interface with the Agana. In all probability, a

faulty cannon plug connector was the cause, since that was one of the

few suspect items which could go undetected during the prelaunch

checkout process. The obvious remedy, which was immediately

adopted, was to revise checkout procedures. Additionally, a steppedup routine of shock and vibration testing was grafted to the existent

program and greater emphasis was accorded payload integration

testing. 76

One of the problems peculiar to early 1963 flights arose from

the introduction of the Agena D--the "standardized" upper stage. Over

the previous five years the Agena B had become a thoroughly familiar

and generally reliable instrument for space reconnaissance. Familiarity inevitably bred laxness and the cursory performance of some checks.

When this situation became quite clear, in April and May 1963, reforms

. - were prompt and effective. Specifically, General Greer's people saw

it ► it that Lockheed re-established "a strong systems engineering and

systems integration control," a course which had highly beneficial

77

lung-term consequences.

There was no serious thought of reducing effort on the Lanyard

program as a consequence of the two successive disappointments.

380

17017-7

•

-TOP-SECRET—

mane.: a erf tlet•:le

Car:, tes Or w,

8
—193F-SEC

Awsove,"-,,AAAA4AA/WW.J1, ,#„,,„9;6I Aviz40~~44A446,;466607 _ AW77, 4

•

• • "4

even though it had returned nothing from orbit, still had the character

of a more conservative system, one with fewer technical uncertainties

and one more nearly resembling the highly successful Corona. If

:•:•:•:•:••••••-• • • •

zzArez.w,wzzzzze./77z,,,ze7,/z/zzewm://:, /dz., -

Program. (it should be recalled that of the several reconnaissance

systems carried to the point of orbital operation, only Corona had as

yet proved useful. E-1 was of no practical value, E-2 had been cancelled

after one unsuccessful launch, while both E-5 and E-6 had proven

operationally futile and had been cancelled in consequence. Substantial

profits to research and development arising from experience with the

E-series satellites did not count for much with intelligence specialists

who rated programs on a scale that began with useful photographs

returned from orbit.)

In such an environment, the Lanyard program was on 24 May 1963

expanded to include five additional payloads. At that time, three remained

of the original five ordered from Itek, with the three "spares" earlier
structures. Program cost would go up b on that score alone,

discounting booster, Agena, and launch costs.

... .....

....... - •

n ....................... ,_•--

:.

382

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7017-7

Ta en• Ker•:

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---Torszcarr--

authorized constituting the entire reserve. Although Itek had accumu-

•

lated seven sets of optical glass for Lanyard use, until the 24 May

order no provision had been made for obtaining complete camera

systems. The Special Projects Office in Los Angeles, appreciative

of these circumstances and understanding their implication, had in

April recommended an early start on a "follow-on" Lanyard program.

The launch and upper stage vehicles might have to be diverted from

either the dual-capsule Corona program (Corona-J) or one of the

11111111111111111111111111111 If Lanyard use had to be

accelerated following an onset oallidifficulties there would be

too little time to fabricate additional Thors and Agenas. 78

By mid-July, Itek and Lockheed had received financial authoriation to proceed with fabrication of the additional payloads and associated

..............................................

S •
—TOIVSECNEIr-

.....

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.

. .

,•• • 0`4,14,

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The TAT and Agana functioned normally, guidance into orbit was highly

accurate, and orbital parameters almost precisely matched those

programmed. Must encouraging, the camera system seemed to be

opvrating as planned. (The flight scheme called for keeping the rolljoint locked for the first 16 orbits, so that a failure in that mode would

not prevent a working test of the camera elements, and for securing

vertical pictures of the greatest possible number of first priority

targets.)

383

•
I

"4110111T"'"

7017-'

Ma er:

Or

384

•

--Ir0110-111110tEar-----

Still, there were problems. The stellar-index camera malfunctioned almost immediately, the index camera portion failing

after only three frames and the stellar camera element operating

quite erratically thereafter. Then on pass number 23 neither the

main camera nor the stellar-index camera system would start. (The

roll system had gone dead during pass 18, after only two orbits of

use, but camera operation was not immediately affected.) A quick

check of telemetry indicated that intervalometer failure during an

engineering test on the previous pass was the probable difficulty.

All modes of command were tried, without success, after which the

recovery operation was scheduled for the next appropriate orbit.

•

Stellar-index camera operation was particularly important to

Lanyard, and in conformance to Murphy's Law, particularly troublesome. Results of early flights in Corona-Mural configurations had

demonstrated by April 1963 that stellar imagery returned to that

time was quite useless for attitude determination--and in Lanyard

the critical information on camera platform attitude during operation

of the main camera was almost entirely dependent on successful

functioning of the stellar-index camera subsystem. Largely on the

basis of the discouraging advice (from National Photographic

Interpretation Center--NPIC) that previous stellar images could not

be used to determine vehicle attitude, Itek late in April 1963 made

special efforts to improve the quality of stellar-image returns from

Lanyard. Modifications included alteration of the pop-out door,

the addition of light baffles along the path to the stellar-camera

lens, and changes in exposure settings. More sensitive film (S0-130)

was also substituted for that originally used (80-206)."
her:• .11./

TOP SECRET

f There was no recovery difficulty; an air catch attempt proved

‘: •

0

entirely successful. Examination of the capsule confirmed that it

1 included exposed film—which was rushed to development and evaluation.

!.., P:

J. The best resolution contained on the recovered film permitted

general examination of ground objects measuring four to five feet

across their greatest dimension. Vehicles, small aircraft, and runway

markings could be consistently identified. However, the greatest

portion of the film gave a definite impression of softness--an out-offocus effect. Imperfect image motion compensation was not entirely

at fault; it had remained within one percent of specification through

the first nine passes and had never fallen below a three-percent level.

The most probable explanation for out-of-focus photography seemed

to be a combination of the image motion compensation error, an

internal temperature 15 to 20 degrees higher than would normally be

expected, and instrument dynamics. 81

The attempt to correct the rate of image motion compensation on

pass 22, while the satellite was over Vandenberg, was the prime

suspect in the search for an explanation of camera failure on the

next pass. The camera system had been operating during the attempt

to make an image motion compensation ramp change, and it seemed

likely that either the intervalometer or the intervatometer motor had

failed as a direct consequence. Telemetry had indicated a gradual

degradation of image motion compensation after pass number 10.

The roll-joint had remained locked through the first 16 passes, and

385

OP baCHLT

•
In September the lens assembly next scheduled to fly a Lan and

mission was returned to Itek for rework, chiefly to correct for soft

imagery. (The camera specialists in General Greer's organization

were confident that a combination of lens-element shims and lens-barrel

venting, to eliminate temperature variations which might have caused

element spacing to exceed predicted tolerances, would correct the main

difficulty.) By that time, however, there were some indications that

continuation of Lanyard at its previous rate was no longer carrying a

high priority. Funds to provide for the five-vehicle program extension

were slow to arrive, and in Washington there was acknowledgement of

,M6r4.4rAr4e.",. iiA,.iiiiii1595605059W

On 23 October, while the

fourth and fifth of the original Lanyard systems were being prepared

for launches scheduled to take place during the remainder of 1963, NRO

Director McMillan ordered an immediate and complete termination of

the Lanyard program. At that point in time the five "follow-on" payloads

were between 80 and 100 percent complete (two had gone through

was thus removed from the list of degrading elements. Its operation

during passes 17 and 18 appeared to be normal, although failure of

the stellar-index camera to operate properly made it difficult to

determine with precision how accurately the roll-joint had functioned

during its brief period of activation.

386

17017-

rifinc* ,e-o. Kee*

Cc-:::cm On
—TOP-IIEC3tET—

fabrication and were ready for check-out), and the remaining five

were somewhere further down the line. Itek wanted to complete

all of the first five "follow-on" payloads but General Greer opposed

the proposal on the irrefutable grounds that there no longer was any

requirement for Lanyard cameras. While the matter of residual

inventory was pending. Lanyard joined its ancestors, the last of the

reconnaissance systems descended from the original line of E-series

programs to come to an end.82

Joe de7 "retZzezeiZe

Aeovd zmzvvivz,e, z/m/A46,

to Greer, on 23 October, had also authorised the general to determine

how much more work was in the government interest--that is, how

many payloads were so near completion that it would be worthwhile

to carry them through the acceptance process before sending them to

storage. As with other cancelled satellite reconnaissance programs,

"payload peculiar" equipment was to be securely stored against some

unpredictable future need. 83

Subsequent to his original instruction, Undersecretary McMillan

authorized completion. through acceptance testing, of the three payloads

7017-74 387

—11rop-stemer-----
nearest to delivery readiness. The work would cost about 1111.11

On all other aspects of Lanyard, Itek halted work by 25 October;

Lockheed had stopped by 23 October. 84

Still later, on 15 November, McMillan approved a proposal

from General Greer that Itek be issued a level-of-effort contract, at

a rate of about per month. the money to be drawn from the

•

residual of Lanyard funds. The agreement, which eventually took

the form of a long-term study contract, also permitted Itek to keep

two cameras (cameras 02 and 06) for use in the level-of-effort work.

Except for these and one other set of items, all remaining Lanyardpeculiar hardware had been put in bonded storage by the end of

March 1964. 85 The "other set" was made of two complete lenses

( not camera systems) and five sets of Lanyard optical glass, transferred

to the photo reconnaissance laboratory at Wright-Patterson for "high

altitude research programs. "86

The conversation:, that preceded the final decision to cancel

Lanyard involved both the chief of the CIA and the Secretary of Defense.

It was generally agreed, after the fact, that the cancellation had been

brought about by a combination of factors.iminimmor4

was the chief of these. But the chronic shortage of NRO funds, the

existence of several programs and advanced developments which could

388

hanc v‘air17017-74

Ts.ett Keynol

erm: fols Only
Lanyard seemed too complex,

to failure. 87

too "uncoordinated" and too susceptible

389

—TOP-SECIMVT--

• 11 •

---TOID-SECRET--

profit from a higher level of financing, and the lack of a specific

requirement for a system with Lanyard's performance characteristics

certainly weighed in the decision. Then there was the matter of

technology itself. Although every promise of better results seemed

to be valid, Lanyard had returned picturesIIIIIIIIIMIM

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII System dynamics, one of the principal villains

cited in the original analysis of the "soft" pictures obtained in July,

prejudiced the Lanyard case. Whatever its theoretical merits—and

there were several—Lanyard remained the product of 1958 technology

that had been outdated by later progress. Its incorporation of some

elements of Corona technology was not a sufficient corrective: 1962-

vintage Coronas generally returned a high percentage of good photographs, -but the system invariably produced a larger number of

substantially poorer negatives. Those faults were to require special

attention in 1963 and after. Finally, as one specialist described it, the

Lanyard camera included a lot of things that clanked back and forth,

sometimes rather violentl, new systems

being proposed on the basis of six years of increasingly valuable

experience in the development of cameras for orbital operation,
0

_T-1311a-SE.RET--

One of the key factors in Lanyard cancellation was at once

obvious and obscure.

z

,,,AeAddzAide.44464, iii iiii i ii de rtd://7/66/.16/77

////77, 7/ X 4 AW AA4A,weze,A64661por

, .466/ iwz6e..94,,66x/we,,,

presentations had emphasized such a program justification, and that

senior defense and CIA officials had never looked on Lanyard in any

other light. Predictably, typically, and commendably, Lanyard people

had become so committed to their project that they ignored its intended

impermanence. Some, indeed, were not fully aware of the CharykMcNamara interchange of late 1961 which had been chiefly responsible

for securing initial program approval. The lack of such information

was at the root of much of the apparent bewilderment that characterized

program office reaction to Lanyard cancellation. 88

By the time of its cancellation, the Lanyard payload development

program had cos (including all contractor expenditures

through September 1963). Excluding vehicle, launch, and control

station costs, the effort was scheduled to absorb roughly1111111 more.

Not everybody was content with the cancellation decision, of

course. Some of the camera specialists in the Special Projects Office

390

209-gEeRritm417017-7

1:1r....-. ..p.,:-.• Kt..,-..4

C.:..:•s C' 1

•

• MOINE§
—Top-szensir--

on the West Coast continued to maintain that the relatively minor

optical problems could have easily been fixed and that the panoramic .

features of the Lanyard camera in combination with its high resolution

made it a valuable instrument for satellite reconnaissance. But in

fact, by 1963 far more promising search and surveillance systems

were entering design and development phases, Corona was on the verge

of a substantial quality improvement that in less than two years would

make it nearly as capable as Lanyard might have been, an inn

Lanyard had une attribute that set it off from the six other

photographic satellite subprograms approved and undertaken as part of

the original Samos effort that dated from 1954. Lanyard had returned

photography, and the photography had intelligence utility. Only one

other mission of the many attempted in the intricate program that

ran from E-1 through E-6 and Lanyard had recorded any photographic.

success, the E-1 flight of January 1961. And E-1 photography had little

more than engineering interest by the time it became available; Corona

had made it entirely obsolete. Of course Lanyard was not a typical

E-series Samos program, having been conducted in a setting that

resembled Corona rather than any "normal" program organization.

But that too had more than passing significance.

1117011-74 391

L

• • •
TOP SEC

NOTES ON SOURCES

Rpt, Program Summary, "SAMOS - Revised Development Plan,"

6 Aug 60, in SAFMS files: Samos hist; and Samos Dev Pins dtd

15 Jan 60, 12 Jul 60, and 11 Aug 60, all in SSD Hist Div files.

Rpt, 'SAMOS, "13 Jun 60 (The Billings Study, sent to TOAD in

draft form on 13 Jun 60), in SSD Hist Div files.

Mins, WS 117L Special Study Comm, 21-2 Jul 60, in Samos

files LAC presn slides, mid-1960, in iles.

Ltr, Col W. G. King, Dir/Samos Proj Oft, to LMSD (H. Brown),

31 Aug 60. subj: SAMOS Subsystem E-5 Work Progress, an SP

Samos files: 101A-10IB 60-61; ltr, Brown to King, 26 Sep 60,

same subj and file: ltr, King to Brown, 10 Oct 60, same subj

and file; Mans of Mtg of WS 117L Spec Studies Comm 27 Sep 60,

in SP Samos files. Mans.

5. Interview, LtCol SAFSP, by R. L. Perry, Hist Div,

/3 Mar 63.

u. TW 2-10-16, SAFSP to SAFMS, 26 Oct 60, in

SAF •Icon file, Oct-Nov 60; TWX 12-10-16,

SAFSP to SAFMS (BrigGe 14 Oct 0,, in Samos

file, R&D-2: memo for recor , prep y Maj

SAFMS, K Nov 60, subj: Staff Visit to Itek Ccirp an

SAFMS files, Staff Visits, with longhand note b concerning

diagnostic flights; ltr, D.J. Gribbon, Mgr, Sat C, to

BrigGen R. E. Greer. Dir/SP. 5 Nov 60, subj: Samos Program

n, in Samos file, R&D-2, 101A/13 60-61; TWX

21-11-11. SAFSP to LAC, 22 Nov 60, same file.

7. Memo for Record, pre

Trap Report of Majors

1960, in SAFMS files: Staf

22 Dec 60. an Samu

30 Nov 60, subj:

14-21 November

isits; TWX LMSD to BMD (SAFSP),

R&D-2, 101A/B 60-61.

h. Ltr, BragGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to LMSD, 7 Feb 61, subj:

E-S and E-6 Priority, an E-61,111 files: Mgt 4, Policy.

392 111017017-7

•lanc:ts L I e" Ke.-c.

C.c-:::: a OM
—TOP-SEGRET--_

1_1-1;1111111, •

393

—TOP-SECRET--

Ibid; 'tr. Co V/Dir/SP, to LMSD, 16 Jan 61,

zubj: E-5 and - nor& y, in E-6 iles.

Memo for Record. BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 16 Feb 61,

subj: Trip Report, in Greer files, Samos policy.

TWX, SAFSP-24-2-17, SAFSP for SAFUS (Under Sec

Charyk), 25 Feb 51, in SAFMS files: Samos Gen 1961;

interview, 13 Mar 63.

TWX AFMS-SEN-61-29, SAFMS to SAPS?, 9 Mar 61, in

E-6

TWX

files: Mgt 4, Policy, 1961.

13. Memo, BrigGen

J. V. Cha k 17

ltr, Co

N m•r,

SAFMS, to AF Under Secy

, no subj, in SAFMS Misc files;

D/Dir/SP, to 6595th ATW (Col

pr 61, aubj: Checkout Philosophy and

Actions for Special Vehicle Launches from Vandenberg AFL

in SP Samos files: 101A/B 60-61.

14. TWX, LMSD 38/640. LMSD to SAFSP, 15 Mar 61, anillir

4

15-6-30, SAFSP to LMSD, 20 Jun 61, both in SP Sa

es: 101A/B 60-61; LAC TWXs LMSD 396861, 5 Jun 61,

LMSD 3992/6, 17 Jul. LMSCA 090474, 24 Jul. LMSCA 092048,

14 Aug, and LMSC B 00613, 6 Sep 61, all in SP Samos files,

R&D 38-51/61.

X3 h

IS. TWX,

Samo

BrigGe

Schedulei, in

25-7-50, SAFSP to LMSC 26 Jul 61 in SP

, 60-61; memo, Maj to

SAFMS. 25 Jul 61, subj: Relaxe

files, Samos, Gen, 61.

lb. TWXs LMSC1992,4300816-67-40. LMSC to SAFSP, 19 Sep 61 and

LMSCI00 000879-76-40, 26 Sep 61, in SP Samos files R&D

38-51/61; various ?Wks in SP Samos files 101A/101B 60-61

dealing with the horizontal system test controversy--the

6595th urged the test, SAFSP• s w no need--and ltr, MajGen

R. Greer, Dir/SP to Col Cmdr 6595th ATW,

25 Aug 61, subj: Program 10 - ch Checkout and Launch

Readiness, same file.

17. SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61. in SAFSP hist files.
----11.1111-422en

Samos Prog Rpt, 30 Sep 61, in SP Samos files.

TWXIm 001/47-67-40, LMSC to SAFSP; 31 Oct 61, in .

o

SP Samos es, R&D 38-51/61; SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61.

20. Notes in SP Samos files, R&D 1, Gen, Mist, 61; TWX VWZ24-11, 6595th ATW to SAFSP, 24 Nov 61; SAFSP Hist Chron

Jul-Dec 61; 'tr. W. V. Tyminski, LMSD, to Col W.G. King,

SAFSP, 12 Oct 61, subj: Contract A 63, in SP

Samoa file, 101A/101B 60-61.

TWX SAFMS-DIR-61-167, BrigGen SAFMS to

MajGen R. E. Greer. Dir/SP, 4 Dec

4-12-146, SAFSP to LMSC, 5 Dec 61; TWX SAFSP-0-7-12-281,

SAFSP to LMSC, 7 Dec 61; TWX SAFMS-PRD-61-158, Col

J.R. Martin, SAFMS, to Greer, 7 Dec 61, all iv". .

Rpt, Orbital Test Directive, Program I, Project 101B, prep

by 6595th ATW, 26 Nov 61, in SP Samos file.

23. TWX SAPS. P-X-6-12-77, SAFSP to AF Plant Rep, LMS(.,

6 Dec 61. in SP Samos files, R&D-10, Termination, 1961.

11111111111111

nation of Contract, in SAFMS files, Gen; TW -12-7.

6 Dec 61.

Memo for Record, prep by H. Schechter, BMC, 25 Sep 61,

sub): Detection of SPS - Program I; TWX LMSD 388757,

LMSD to SAFSP, 12 Apr 61; memo, Col W.G. King to LtCul

fainliiiraDry Propulsion System, all in SP Samos files .

/Dir Proc and Prog Mgt, SAFSP, 3 Oct 61,

101A/101B 60-61.

TWX -10-19. SAFSP to OSAF for SAFUS. 3 Oct 61;

lir. Cul W.G. King, D/Dtr Prog I, Samos Proj Ofc, to SSD.

5 Oct 61, subj: Deletion of Requirement for Secure (Encrypted)

Command Link for SAMOS Vehicle, in SP Samos files, C&C.

27. TWX conference between J. Schaub, LMSC, and Col W.G.

King. D/Dir/10113, Zu Dec 61, cy in SP Samos file, R&D 2-5,

2203. 1961. SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61.

Ofc Asst SAF for Fin Affairs), 3 Jan 62, subj: .•rmi24. Ltr, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to Hq USAF

7017-7•

::-•

0-hy

394

-----TOP-SIEC-RET_____

•
TOP SECRET

SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61.

Interview. Cul SAFSP, by Hist

Div„ 31 Mar an pr110Probably because t e E-S program.

was all but defunct after mid-December 1961, relatively few

records of such activities were made, and fewer survived.

30. TWX VWZS-7-3-23, 6595th ATW to SAFSP, 8 Mar 62; TWX

TWRC-13-3-4-E, 6595th ATW to SAFSP, 13 Mar 62; Critique

Charts, 2204 Review. Mar 62, all in SP Samos files R&D 2-6,

2204, 1961-62; SAFSP Review, Mar 62, all in SP Samos files

R&D 2-6, 2204, 1961-62; SAFSP Hist Chron, Jan-Jun 62.

U. It*nterview, 16 Apr 64.

32. SAFSP Hist Chron, Jan-Jun 62, entry for 1 Mar 62,

3 S. TWX SAFMS-SEN-61-162, SAFMS

for record, Col W.G. King, D/Di

Comparative Evaluation of ITEK 0

Perkin Elmer Lens: TWX

LMSC, 18 Dec 61; TWX

P, 11 Dec 61; memo

15 Dec 51, subj:

ns and The

18-12-125, SAFSP to

-12-124. SAFSP to ASD,

19 Dec 61; hr. King to LA , an 62, subj: Comparative

Lens Evaluation Test Conduct; T WX amip13-12-151,

SAFSP to SAFMS, 14 Dec 61, all in SP Samos files. 101A/B•

60-61. The tests were conducted at ASD although Lockheed

had originally been slated to do the work.

34. Interview. MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, by R. L. Perry,

Hist Div, 4 Mar 63; lir, J. Carter. V/Pres [tek, to Hq SSD

(SAFSP), 19 Dec 61, subj: Technical and Cost Proposal for

a Simplified High-Acuity Panoramic Camera, in SAFSS

files, Lanyard.

IS. 28-1Z-171, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to

Brin SAFMS. 28 Dec 61)

209 Greer. 29 Dec 61. both in un • tng.

lii. Memo. Ma.0.4 •

Corona, to LtCul R.J. Ford,

Corona, 29 c ,

10 

no su j, in Corona files.

395

—70P-SEORET-

•
Memo for Record, Maj SAFMS, 11 Jan 62,

subj: Simplified 66" System S black code word: LANYARD),

in SAFSS files, Lanyard.

Interview, BrigGen J.R. Martin, D/Dir/SP, by R. L. Perry,

18 Sep 64.

TWX SAFMS DIR 62-25, BrigGen R.D. Curtin, SAFMS, to

MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 1 Feb 62, in Les, Genl.

Memo for Record, Col J.R. Martin, D/Ch SAFMS, 13 Feb 62,

subj: SAFUS-SAFSP West Coast Conference 9 Feb 62, in

Gen Martin's files; Martin interview, 18 Sep 64.

TWX SAFSP-F-13-2-195, MajGen R.E. Greer, Dir/SP, to

BrigGe SAFMS, 13 Feb 62, ingiNfiles, Funding.

Ms CLA to Corona OFC, 21 Feb 62 in Corona

files; memo, SAFMS, to NRO

Compt, 6 Mar 62, no Tub), in SAFSS files, Lanyar ; memo,

J.V. Charyk, SAFUS, to D/Dir/CIA, 2 Apr 62, subj: Management of Lanyard, in SAFSS files, Lanyard.

Memo, Charyk to D/Dir/CIA 2 Apr 62; memo, H. Seoville, Jr.,

D/Dir /Res, CIA, to SAFUS, 5 Apr 62, subj: Management of

Lanyard. id files, Progs.

Msg J CIA to SAFSP. 4 Apr 62, in Lanyard files.

45. Interview, LtCo and LtCol R.J. Ford, Corona

ofc, 11 Oct 62, by . . er y, ist Div; memo, prep by Maj

30 Mar 62. subj: Trip Report, in Lanyard

ilea; tr, Itek to LMSC, 16 Apr 62 sub': ffer to Purchase

Residual Inventory, cited in msg CIA to LMSD,

18 Apr 62; It:, MajGen R. E. Greer, D/Sat Progms, SSD, to

Hq AFSC, attn MajGen Q.J. Ritland. D/Cmdr Manned Space

Flt, 4 Jun 62, subj: Request for Disposition of Terminal

Inventory; kr, Ritland to Hq USAF (attn LtGen Mark Bradley,

DCS/S&L, 6 Jun 62. same subj: Ur, Bradley to Greer 6 n

62, same subj. all in SAFSS files: Lanyard; msg.

SAFSP to CIA. 18 Jun 62, in Lanyard files.

•

396

_TOP-SECRET-

• •

7017-14

Handle Kevnrje

Or: 1 0• 5 Only
397

• • •

7017-74

Cor:f .34 Cr. .

Meg..

Meg, SAFSP to CIA, II May 62; msg

LMSD to Itek, 11 May 62; msg,D/NRO immilis to CIA,

SSD (for MajGen R. E. Greer), 22 May 62, all in Lanyard files.

TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2098, SAFSS to SAFSP, 8 Oct 62, in

110.files, Funding.

MegSAFSP to CIA, 10 Oct 62, in Lanyard files;

msg alIA to Itch, 19 Oct 62.

Progm Rpt, Nov 62, in ilea; me CIA to

ltek, 25 Oct 62, in is; msg to Itek,

19 Nov 62, same ft .

Memo for record, MajGen R. E. Greer Dir/SP S ul 62,

subj: Special Assignment:

Corona filelsia's; msg

6 Sep 62, it files.

P,

52. Meg CIA to SAFSP, 27 Sep 6Z, i

ms SAFSP (MajGen R. E. Gr SAFSS

(Col . Martin), 26 Sep 62. and '

SAFSP to

SAFSS, 4 Oct 62, in Corona files.

•

CIA to SAFSP, 7 May 62, in Lanyard files.

53. Megs: LMSD to Itek, 16 Oct 62;

Itch_ to , ct 62 LMSD to e • 2;

-k, 19 Nov 62; CIA to D/NRO,

EK, 19 Dec , all i lee.

Meg, LMSD to CIA, 18

LMSD to Itek, 22 Oct 62, both in

62; meg, NOM

Magi: Itek to CIA 13 Sep 62; LMSD

to Itek Itek to CIA 26 Oct 62-

LMSD to ov 62;

Itek to LMSD. 19 and 26 Nov 62. all t

56. Megs:

to CIA, 27

Dec 62:

Itek to C

1002

Itek to CIA 26 Nov 62

ltek to C

to C l ec 62, and

29 Dec 62, all a ilea.
3 Jan 63, 9 Jan 63,111111111110

Jan all Lockheed to CIA, all

Msg, Itch to`Lockhee

Lockhee to CIA, 31 Jan 63; ms 7

SAFSP, 5 Feb

8 Feb 63. all i

3; msg.

Lockheed to

to to Lockheed,

Maga,

8 Mar

all in'

Lockheed toto CIA, 28 Feb and

Lockheed to SAFSP, 25 Feb 63,

es.

57. Msg,

—Tes•-sseiter

LMSD to CIA, 27 Nov 62, t ilea.

58. Ms811111111111* Usk to CIA, 18 Jun 62; msg,

Itek to CIA and SAFSP, 29 Dec 62, both in Lanyard files.

Summary Rpt, PROJECT LANYARD, undated, aprox Jul 62,

in SAFSS files: Lanyard.

Rpt, "PROJECT LANYARD," undated, aprox Feb 62, apparently

prepared for SAFUS by SAFMS, in SAFSS files, Lanyard.

61. Memo. or A.G. Lundahl, Dir/NPIC, to D/NRO,

17 Aug su j: omments on Certain Collection Systems,

in SAFSS files, Corona. Gen.

Msgjoimig MajGen R. E. Greer to SAFUS, 28 Sep 62,

in S t es: nyard.

Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/Spec Projs, OSAF, blir

R. L. Perry, 27 Jul 64; interview, Col W.G. King, Dir

29 Jul 64.

Mix, NMI Lockheed to CIA, 14 Feb 63, i files.

VAFB to CIA, 18 r 63• ma

A to , 9 Ali•.,mf. sg,

to CIA, 19 Mar 63. all in iles.•

to

69. Meg, CIA to D/NRO. 2 Mar 63•

D/NR to SAFSP, S Mar 63, both i

Marcie wile. Keynt

7017--

398

Controls Or

•
Memo, B. McMillan, D/NRO, to SOD and Dir/Central Intel,

20 Mar 63, subj: Status Report of LANYARD; memo for record,

H. Scoville, Jr., Dep Dir/Res/CIA. 25 Mar 63, subj: Meeting

held on Friday, 22 March, on Reconnaissance Satellite

Reliability, both in SAFSS files, Lanyard.

Magi. CIA to D/NRO, 20 Feb 63; wiligim NRO to CIA, 0 Feb 63; ‘SAFSP '(MajGen R. E.

Greer) to CIA, 26 Feb 63; CIA to SAFSP, 28 Feb

63.

SAFSP (Greer) to CIA. 5 Mar 63, all

files.

72. Msg. ammom SAFSP (MajGen R. E. Greer) to CIA,

13 Mar 63, in SAFSS files, Lan ard • msgs,4100.111* CIA

to SA 1 Mar 63 an NRO to CIA, 15 Mar

63, i

Msg. IA (Cul J. C. Ledford to Dir/NRO Staff

(Col John Martin), 3 Apr 63, in k iles.

Memo, J.A. McCone. Chm USIB, to D/NRO, 9 Apr 63, subj:

Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance Program, in NRO files,

Lanyard.

75. Msgs: ockheed to pr 63; aukiii

Lockhee o A • r 63; VAFB to NRO

Staff, 18 May 63: VAFB to NRO

Staff, 0 a 63; VAFB to NRO Staff, 21 May 63,

all i a es.

SAFSP to D/NRO,12 Jul 63; ms

28 May 63, both i

Maps, SAFSP to D/NRO. (MajGen R.E. Greer)

to D/ B. McMillan). I May 63 and same

origin and address. 3 May 63, both i iles.

Msg, NRO to .... P

files: memo, LtCol

NRO Staff, to Col .1. Martin, 

63, i

sat for Sys Engr.

1 May 63, subj.,

417.74 399

•

• Le1111111111111 _
79. Msgs, all from SAFSP:

010.1110NMPto, 18 Jul 63, all i ties.

0 D/NRO, 6 Jun 63;

o Lockheed,

7017-7

T.e-t rtev-cl.

Ccr :fG.s on'

D History, in SAFSS files, Lany-rd; msg.

AFSP to ltek, 31 May 63, in tiles,

passed the order to Itek.

HO. Ms NPIC to D/NRO, 17 Apr 63; msg,

LMSC to CIA, 18 Apr 63; msg,11001111111MINti

NRO to SAFSP, 19 A • r 63; msg, LMSC to SAFSP, 24 Apr 63;

msg,,

NP1C to LMSC, 24 Apr 63, all in SP-12

files; plans for use of roll joint and COMOR (Committee

on e rhead Reconnaissance) requirements were contained in

memo, J.Q. Reber. Chm. COMOR, to D/NRO, 5 Feb 63,

subj: Requirements for the • D Mission. in NRO

files, Lanyard, and in ms MSD to CIA,

24 Jan 63, and NRO to SAFSP, 4 Jun 63, both

in files. v///:•:•!•• ------- • • Hi. Msgs,

VA FB to

S Aug 63, all i

Dir/NRO Staff, to D/ s. ug 63. subj: Mission 8003 Preliminary Analysis, in NRO files, Lanyard.

N. N. nN..n ••nn

23 Oct 63; memo,

27 Nov 63, subj:

files; meg,

to titat files.

files.

VAFB to SAFSS, 31 Jul 63 andarnalin

63; msg. Eastman Kodak to NRO.

files; memo, BGen J. L. Martin,

msg,

2 Nov 63.

82. Msg,

D/ NR to

tion dir .ctiv

LMSC to CIA, 3 Sep 63: msg.

reer), 23 Oct 62 t e termtnaCIA to LMSC, 23 Oct 63;

reer) to D/NRO (B. McMillan),

all in NRO files, Lanyard.

$4. D/NRO to SAFSP,

Conir Ofcr (SAFSP) to I4

Termination of Lanyard Program, in

NjwippAFSP to LMSD, 1 Nov

84. mo. Amu Hq CIA. 27 Nov 63. ms

U/NRO to SAFSP. 7 Nov 63,

$3. h1sg,

La nva r

"P to D/NRO, 1 Apr 64, in NRO files,

msg. D/NRO (B. McMillan) to SAFSP

MajGen R. E. Greer), 6 Dec 63 (confirming verbal orders of

15 November), in NRO files.

r. •, ••n s • • •

400

-

. '1_, • ,-

•
Msg, Dir/NRO Staff to SAFSP, 24 Feb 64. in

NRO files. Lanyard.

Interview, MajGen R. E. cr r i c Projs, OSAF,

6 May 64; interview. LtCol NRO Staff,

24 Apr 64, 1 Jul 64.

Martin interview, 18 Sep 64.

Malt tek to CIA. 2 Oct 63. i lies.
TOR S

X/ THE E-6 PROGRAM

Note:

At various times of no particular consequence the E-6 program

was officially known by other titles: Program U. Program 201,

Program 698BJ, Program 722. The term most commonly in use in

1963 was "B.J." For the purpose of this account, and in the interests

of narrative continuity, the identifier "E-6" is used throughout.

Through the long spring and summer of 1960, while matters of

project structure and program objective were being debated at various

levels between the project office and the White House, the sixth and

last of the Samos camera systems to receive formal designation was

also taking shape. The suggestion of developing a recoverable-capsule

photo-payload very different from the E-5 was first voiced in May. Its

antecedents stretched into the much more distant past.

In a very real sense, the E-5 program had been created and

carried un to insure against complete reliance on the original readout

systems and to provide for the collection of higher resolution than

could be obtained by any readout system based on 1956-1958 technology.

In 1958 there was not much serious consideration of abandoning readout

in favor of recovery. But by the early months of 1960 it had become

402 170114,

Mandie • Tasert Keyrtvie

Cort!rois Only

• •
apparent toto many that the fundamental conception of surveillance by

means of readout satellites might well be unsound. Limitations in

scale and resolution, insufficient bandwidth flexibility, and technical

difficulties encountered in the course of subsystem development were

partly responsible. But the increasing probability that an toper:Ilion:it

readout system could he extremely costly also influenced opinion.

Not merely the vehicles but the facilities to support readout promised

to be more complex and costly than the missiles and missile sites then

straining the national budget. Estimates of potential investment in

collecting, processing, interpreting, and disseminating readout

photography became more alarming as a final development phase

approached.

A second factor influential in the readout-recovery debate of

1960 was disagreement about the proper role of concurrency in the

Samos program. Concurrency, a costly strategy that nonetheless

was highly regarded in some quarters, assumed the existence of a

pressing need fur operational systems and the availability of •inature

technology that could be exploited by simultaneous development and

deployment. Cuncurrency lost its attractiveness if the deployed

weapons were likely to become operationally ineffective soon after

being handed over to operational forces, or if they could not be

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-1117F-SECRLPTdelivered on schedule. The expense of concurrency had to be justified

by the presence of a grave threat to national security that could best

be countered by a cost-be-damned weapons acquisition policy.

Most Samos program managers were by 1960 pretty certain

that cameras in orbit would remain "few-of-a-kind" devices for at

least another decade; "mass production" was almost inconceivable,

and unique space vehicles mostly unlike one another neither required

nor could be accommodated within a complex of expensive, standardized

ground facilities with inflexible operational attributes.

Finally, the application of concurrency concepts to the acquisition

of reconnaissance satellites assumed that operational responsibility for

the satellites would be assigned to an operating command--the Strategic

Air Command. Concurrency was not warranted if there was no certain

need to assign the developed articles to an operating command. Where

satellite reconnaissance was concerned, not only was need uncertain,

but United States national space policy of the 1950. began with the

assumption that overt overflight by U.S. reconnaissance satellites

could provoke violent objections from such diverse states as France.

the Soviet Union, China, India, and the Arab nations. Add the

reasonable prospect that an expensive complex of readout vehicles and

stations could become obAulete overnight with the emergence of new

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technology, and concurrency became increasingly unattractive. But

concureeney, the plans for an extensive ground-station readout

complex. and the near-term assignment of reconnaissance satellite

operating responsibility to the Strategic Air Command were the three

most prominent attributes of the pre-1960 Samos program. /

By April 1960. Corona had experienced its eighth successive

failure (Discoverer IX) and was entering a limbo of engineering overhaul that would postpone further trials for two months. Early in

May the U-2 incident abruptly halted use of the only other reconnaissance

system available to take photographs over the Soviet heartland. The

E-5 satellite system then in development was so designed that it would

return relatively narrow film strips, each covering only about 15 by 53

miles along the ground. Moreover, it was still many months from its

scheduled first trial.

The Air Staff reaction to that situation was to require the early

exploitation of the "pre-operational photographic potential" of the Samos

program. That action, taken on 9 May, was followed 10 days later by

instructions from Air Force Undersecretary J. V. Charyk that the

Air Research and Development Command was to prepare a new Samos

development plan embodying the Air Staff concept. On 27 May Charyk

expanded his instructions and ordered the Air Force to explore the

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