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USCIB: 9.2/5 24 

14 October 1954 

~OP 6Ei9fli!i'l' PR0!H 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB: 

Subject: CCMINT Capability to Provide Early Waming of Chinese 

Communist Attack on Formosa and the 0££-shore Islands 

Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists. 

Reference: USCIB 9.2/4 of 6 October 1954· 

1. At a special meeting held Wednesday moming, 13 October 

1954, the USCIB Executive Committee considered the problems raised 

in the reference. 

2. The specific questions set forth in the enclosure hereto 

were presented for consideration by the CIA member. 

3. The Executive Committee found itself' without sufficient 

information to define precisely the practical degree of' urgency of' 

the solutions desired. In addition, the Executive Cormnittee agreed 

that a careful. study of' the problems posed by the questions raised 

in the enclosure would be required before the merits of the various 

possible answers could be judged adequately. It was therefore 

agreed to ref er these questions to the Intelligence Committee for 

further study, a report on the factors involved and recommendations 

for action in each case except for question K (Is the Intelligence 

community taking full advantage of' non.:CCMINT sources?) which was 

agreed to be a matter for the IAC rather than USCIB. In this 

connection, it was, however, the concensus of' the meeting that the 

early waming inf orma.tion desired might well be found in the COMINT 

sources sought and somewhat less likely to be found in the other 

sources known to the members of USCIBEC. 

.····//.· 

5. USCIBEC agreed that immediate action beyond that listed in 

paragraph 4 above must necessarily await the above-mentioned report 

from the INTCCM on the factors involved. 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

USCIB: 9.2/5 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-07-2014 pursuantto E.O. 1352a 

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REF ID : A58133 • 

USCIB: 9.2/5 

'l'Qi! ~E~ FRO'PII 

. 14 October 1954 

Subject: COMINT Capability to Provide Early Warning of Chinese 

Communist Attack on Formosa and the Off-shor~ Islands 

Occupied by the Chinese Nationalists. 

6. While the INTCOM has been requested to report as many as 

possible of its findings and recommendations in time for consideration 

at the October 22 meeting of USCIBEC and in any case not later than 

the end of October, USCIBEC is doubtful that any action, beyond that 

listed in paragraph 4 above, which can now be reconnnended would be 

likely to bear fruit within one or two months at best. 

Enclosure 

a/s 

USCIB: 9.2/5 - 2 -

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A. 

B. 

c. 

E.O 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

. Should we attempt further site surveys of Formosa and Pescadores, 

recognizing that a site survey has already been undertaken for 

Formosa? Would it be desirable to undertake a new survey in 

l;lght of changed conditions? 

Is there a possibility of establishing intercept facilities on 

special Navy vessels? 

1. Recognize need for special protection of such a vessel or 

vessels which probably could not make up a part of the fleet. 

Presumably this would require special protective measures. 

2. Has the Navy now got the necessary facilities to undertake 

such a plan? 

D. \. 

E. Should NSA explore the possibility of making an all out "crash" 

effort on CHICOM traffic with material and personnel now available? Has NSA now got on its staff experts with experience on 

the Chinese problem, who might be tranflf erred to this problem 

from other tasks? Would the community suffer from such an effort? 

F. Increased pressure for U.S. base on Formosa. We understand that 

this is to be considered at next USCIBEC meeting. 

G. Should we undertake further development of present Okinawa or 

Philippine bases? It is understood that the site survey in 

Formosa two years ago indicated that certain promising CHICOM 

low level material was available in Formosa. Mi¢it this also be 

available from the Philippines or from Okinawa? Has NSA explored. 

possibility of expanding these bases to cover all possible CHICOM 

low level material which might be available there? 

:Enclosure with USCIB 9.2/5 

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NSN: 7540-FM-00105622 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

• • ._...PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

fOP SEeRE'l' PRO'l'H 

H. 

I.I.____ ____ _____,......... 

J. Can NSA give us some estimate of the scale of effort needed to 

attack the CHICCM low level traffic? Is the scale so large that 

there is no real likelihood of valuable result from any one or/more 

of the above expedi~ts? 

K. Is the Intelligence community taking full advantage or non-COMINT 

sources, such as Photographic Reece? Are we relying too .much on 

COMINT? 

EO 3.3(h)(2) 

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605 

- 2 -

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