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This documenrcontains information referring to Projects:

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1A4

31 October 1963

tOrN 4 :1 6 55

111293RANDOM OP =COM

BUBJECT: Brief Report of Meeting with General Greer at Aerospaoe, 21 October 1963

1. The meeting was to discuss the need for retaining

horizon cameras with the KR-dipimignmi, In attendance at

the meeting were:

Ur, Bares and myself presented to General Greer the case

for retaining horizon cameras with the KB-4 system and how

we employ them for immediate readout of vehicle attitude.

We also brought out that the stellar camera cannot be used

at this time as a replacement for the horizon cameras due

to its history of unreliable operation. We further explained

to him our need for vehicle attitude to determine accurate

measurement data. We pointed out that a measurement with

3% or 5% error was considered a poor measurement, General GTOOr

said President Kennedy will never know the different if a 5% error is in the measurement or not. We pointed out to

General Greer that a 5% error nay not be noticeable to the President but is highly significant to the people who feed

him intelligence information. There followed some discussion

on the unsatisfactory operation of the horizon cameras and ' --

the potential danger to the primary take if the horizon camera should fail with the shutter open. In conclusion, General Greer

said he would relay our information back to the project

director at ERO that the decision to retain or remove the

horizon cameras was not his to male. It was indicated that

BYE-041-83

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11 horizon cameras would be retained for the next Y or J shot

as the case maybe. Following this the existence of the

horizon camera seems too a doubtful, The following day !I

u, had a discussion

discussed this

prod rstands the problem Fl and if asked by General Greer will relay our needs to the

General.

The following days (23, 24 October 1963), we

attended BE meetings at MEC. Throughout this meeting

and subsequent discussions I picked up a feeling that the Fe program (KH-4) is becoming schedule dominated and that some

of the operations people are loosing sight of the prime

objective of the program; the user. It seems as if

adequate testing schedules are not or have been adequately

ti maintained due to the attempt to meet launch schedules.

Col. Worthington stated in the S2 meeting that he

was going to recommend to General Greer that the J program

bo grounded until adequate testing procedures can-be

established and sobeduled. prior to launch.

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