FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE LUIS FLORES JUAREZ, 

Petitioner, No. 04-75717

v. Agency No. 

M A95-451-282 ICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 5, 2008*

Pasadena, California

Filed June 26, 2008

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Ruggero J. Aldisert**

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

**The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior United States Circuit

Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation. 

7579
COUNSEL

Sung U. Park, Law Offices of Sung U. Park, Los Angeles,

California, for the petitioner. 

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; John C. Cunningham, Shelley R. Goad, Office of Immigration Litigation,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

the respondent. 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Jose Luis Flores Juarez petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the Immigration

Judge’s decision finding him removable and denying his

application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 

Flores Juarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the

United States in December 1988 without inspection or parole.

The government initiated removal proceedings on July 24,

2002. Flores Juarez conceded he was removable and applied

for cancellation of removal on June 16, 2003. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his application for cancellation of

removal, on the ground Flores Juarez was ineligible because

he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,

based on his prior convictions for petty theft.1

1The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion; accordingly, we review the IJ’s decision. See Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917,

FLORES JUAREZ v. MUKASEY 7581
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), the Attorney General may

cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of lawfully admitted, a removable alien if the alien: 

(A) has been physically present in the United

States for a continuous period of not less than 10

years immediately preceding the date of such application; 

(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; 

(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2) [including crimes involving moral

turpitude], 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title,

subject to paragraph (5); and 

(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s

spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the

United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 

In 1989, Flores Juarez was convicted of three separate petty

theft offenses in violation of California Penal Code §§ 484

and 488. Petty theft is a crime involving moral turpitude

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). United States v.

Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1999).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), an alien is ineligible for

cancellation of removal if he has been convicted of certain

offenses, including a conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 

925 (9th Cir. 2004). Flores Juarez’s petition raises a question of statutory

interpretation, which we review de novo. See Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 2004). 

7582 FLORES JUAREZ v. MUKASEY
Flores Juarez contends the IJ erred when he determined

Flores Juarez was ineligible for cancellation of removal under

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) based on his convictions of a crime

involving moral turpitude. According to the statutory reading

Flores Juarez proposes, his convictions do not render him

ineligible because they occurred before the start of a ten-year

time period during which he was required to have been of

good moral character to be eligible for cancellation of

removal. Flores Juarez’s contention contradicts the plain language of the statute. 

[1] The continuous physical presence and good moral character requirements for cancellation of removal contain a tenyear time limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (requiring continuous physical presence for a “period of not less than 10

years immediately preceding the date of such application”);

id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (requiring “good moral character during

such period”). In contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), which

makes aliens who have committed certain offenses (including

a crime involving moral turpitude) ineligible for cancellation

of removal, does not place any temporal limitation on when

the crime was committed. 

[2] In other words, a person can be of good moral character

for ten years before his application for cancellation of

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), yet have committed a crime involving moral turpitude more than ten years earlier, and therefore be ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Accordingly, the IJ did not err when he determined Flores

Juarez’s petty theft convictions rendered him ineligible for

cancellation of removal. 

[3] Flores Juarez also claims the IJ violated his due process

rights to a fair hearing because he did not allow Flores Juarez

to present evidence that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United States citizen children. The claim fails because Flores Juarez was

statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See Lata v.

FLORES JUAREZ v. MUKASEY 7583
INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding petitioner

must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on

a due process claim). 

PETITION DENIED.

7584 FLORES JUAREZ v. MUKASEY