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A History of 

Satellite Reconnaissance 

Volume lIB 

PREPARED FOR 

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

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A HISTORY OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

VOLUME IlB - SAMOS E-5 AND E-6 

by 

Robert Perry 

Revised October 1973 

from earlier drafts 

of 1964 and 1965 

Volume llB consists of 183 pages. 

CiassiflE,d hy BYE MAN - 1 

Exempt from general declassd Icatlon 

Schedule of Executive Order 11652 

Exemplion category Iss 5B(2) I 

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PREFACE TO VOLUME IIB 

This volume is a continuation of Volume IIA of A History of 

Satellite Reconnaissance, separated chiefly because the bulk of pages 

makes it impractical to put the whole of the lengthy and complex 

history of the Samos program between one set of covers. Volume IIA 

includes those chapters concerned with the two major program segments that began in 1960 and 1961 and continued through October 1963: 

Samos E-5 (plus Lanyard, which was half of an E-5 camera system 

in a different vehicle housing) and Samos E-6 (plus Spartan and 

.sP-AS-63, the proposed re-engineered successors to E-6). 

Early drafts of these chapters were prepared in 1964 and 1965, 

while the author was an employee of The Rand Corporation. Correction, editing, expansion, and elaboration of those early drafts began 

in 1972 and was completed in 1973 while he was a member of the 

staff of Technology Service Corporation. Because documentary 

sources have mostly been dispersed or destroyed in the intervening 

year s, and because most major program participants have long since 

left government service, it seems unlikely that further research will 

prove fruitful or that these volumes will again be expanded. 

The Samos program participants and National Reconnais sance 

Office people who provided information for or reviewed these pages 

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are too numerous to acknowledge singly here. Most are noted. by 

name, in source citations or prefatory sections in other volumes. 

For such errors of fact or interpretation as may have survived 

review. the author is wholly responsible. 

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CONTENTS, VOLUME IlB I 

Preface 0 ••••• III • 0 • ., ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ill " .......... . 

11 I 

X THE E-5 AND LANYARD PROGRAMS ................ III 0 • 318 

Notes on Sources ............ .......................... . 392 I 

XI THE E-6 PROGRAM •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 00 ••• 402 I 

Notes on Sources ... 0 ••• III 0 ................... 0 0 •••• III • 487 

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I X THE E-5 AND LANYARD PROGRAMS 

I The technique of using a reentry capsule to return expos ed 

fibn from orbit was seriously proposed as early as June 1956. The 

I Rand Corporation, which first urged the concept, felt that reliable 

I methods of recovering film could be developed much earlier than 

comparably effective readout techniques. But in 1956 there was no 

I way to demonstrate that recovery was feasible, no way to finance a 

I te st of the concept, and so little interest in satellite reconnais sance 

in general that even the preferred readout concept was indifferently 

I funded. 

I Coincident with Sputnik I, Rand in November 1957 suggested 

development of a family of recoverable satellites. Although the idea 

I had been conceived and most of the supporting research performed 

I much earlier, Sputnik got it a hearing. The perceived need for a 

reconnaissance system to be available in the near term caused attention 

I to be concentrated on Thor-boosted satellites, and Corona was the 

I only immediate product. But in March 1958 the concept of a recoverable photographic payload hoisted by an Atlas -Hustler (Atlas -Agena) 

I vehicle was revived. It remained a minor option through July of that 

I year, receiving no more than passing mention in the development 

plans of the period. 

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A marked change in the Air Force attitude toward recovery I 

of photographic intelligence was signalled by the 26 September 1958 

publication of a new General Operational Requirement covering I 

satellite reconnaissance. It embodied a "big" camera and film I 

recovery. By December, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, 

then custodian of space program responsibility, had endorsed the I 

approach. But it appeared that ARPA enthusiasm was not entirely I 

altruistic. ARPA scientists were les s interested in pursuing the 

original approach as in adapting the long focal length camera proposed I 

for the recoverable satellite to use in an electrostatic tape readout I 

system. And ARPA I S interest in recovery was probably as much 

motivated by the desire to conduct a military man-in-space program I 

as by any concern for recovering photographs. Thus the film-recovery I 

concept embodied in Corona became a film-plus-cameras-recovery 

mode in ARPA's plan. And perhaps coincidentally, so large a capsule 

could also return a man from orbit. So expanded, the recoverable 

capsule proposal had been transformed into a development plan by 

January 1959 and by April had received "general approvaL!! One Discoverer capsule had by that time successfully reentered, but none had 

been recovered. Enthusiasm for recovery was momentarily high. 

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I Funding difficulties. the introduction of new and cOITlplicating 

proposals (the E-4 ITlapping satellite and the E-3 electrostatic tape 

I reconnaissance systeITl). plus a general decline in ARPA fortunes 

I as NASA gained ITlore influence, led to virtual cancellation of the 

eITlbryonic recoverable CaITlera prograITl in June 1959. Strong protests 

I froITl the Air Staff and several air cOITlITlands followed. It seeITled 

I iITlpossible to satisfy the SepteITlber 1958 requireITlent for photographs 

I 

having a ground definition of five feet without a big-caITlera recoverable 

systeITl. Largely in response to pressure froITl the newly established 

I Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering, ARPA in early 

I 

SepteITlber reinstated what was now designated the SaITlos E-5 prograITl--

though initiall y liITliting approval to caITlera developITlent alone. authorI izing recovery subsysteITl developITlent only when further pressure was 

I brought to bear. By 9 SepteITlber 1959. one year after publication of 

the forITlal requireITlent, the E- 5 systeITl had forITlal approval for 

I developITlent. On 17 NoveITlber, with the return of satellite reconnaissance 

I prograITl responsibility to the Air Force. ARPA obstructionisITl becaITle 

ITloot. 

I The next difficulty was predictable. The Air Force Ballistic 

I Missile Division (BMD) wanted to fund an accelerated E-5 prograITl 

without reducing the total of funds allocated to the E-l and E-2 readout 

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s ysteITls. That notion generated little s yITlpathy in the Pentagon. 

Both DDR&E and the Air Force Ballistic Missiles COITlITlittee (AFBMC) 

strongly favored recovery eITlphasis and were gradually hardening 

their objections to continuing expensive readout systeITls. Cancellation 

of the E-3 and an elaborate ferret proposal (the F-4) had not provided 

sufficient funds to support E-5 work; DDR&E and AFBMC were cool 

to suggestions that an accelerated E- 5 prograITl be financed by adding 

new funds to the basic satellite reconnaissance prograITl and that E-l 

and E-2 be continued at their existing levels. Dr. H. F. York, 

DDR&E chief, was particularly outspoken in his disparageITlent of the 

E-l and E-2. He was equally forceful in his endorseITlent of the E-5 

approach. Through the first four ITlonths of 1960 there was no reconciliation of these disparate viewpoints. 

When the U -2 incident occurred in May 1960, BMD (with the 

firITl support of ITlost of the Air Staff) still was holding out for an undiITlinished readout prograITl plus a co-equal and separately funded 

E-5 recovery prograITl. Air Force Undersecretary J. V. Charyk, 

who had been in that post since the previous August (he had earlier 

been Chief Scientist of the Air Force), took the Gordian option of 

directing a cOITlplete shift of eITlphasis froITl readout to recovery. 

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E-5, he ordered, was to receive first attention. Two lTIonths later, 

in July, the United States Intelligence Board realigned the requirelTIents 

for satellite reconnais sance in a fashion that lTIade readout an allTIost 

totally unacceptable solution. For the lTIolTIent, E-5 was the only 

in-progress systelTI that lTIight satisfy needs, and even there it was 

cOlTIing to be appreciated that E-5 was conceptually deficient in ways 

that lTIight lTIake it no lTIore than lTIarginally useful. 

In August 1960, the recovery of the first Corona products overcalTIe lingering doubts about the feasibility of fillTI retrieval. Concurrently, 

cOlTIplete reorganization of the reconnaissance satellite progralTI and a 

National Security Council decis ion to spons or at least one alternative 

to E- 5 again changed the technical cOlTIplexion of the SalTIos progralTI. 

Still later, in October, both the E-6 panoralTIic calTIera systelTI (with 

lower resolution but appreciably greater area coverage potential than 

the E-5) and the highly prolTIising GalTIbit (with resolution and coverage 

potential far better than the E-5) received tentative approval for 

':' developlTIent. Both were on contract by January 1961. 

FrolTI a scheduling standpoint, the intricate lTIaneuvering 

between SeptelTIber 1959 and August 1960 had lTIeant relatively little 

This reSUlTIe is essentially a restatelTIent of a longer narrative which 

appeared in earlier chapters. Supporting detail and specific citation 

of sources are included in the earlier text. 

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to E-S. A total of seven vehicle flights was prograrmned throughout 

the period, two "diagnostic" vehicles being added in August 1960. 1 

The E-S had also remained relatively stable in terms of design details. 

As compared to the E-2 of the same era. it had the following design 

characteristics: 

System: 

Focal length: 

Altitude: 

Ground resolution: 

System resolution: 

Strip width: 

Aperture: 

Film size: 

E-2 

36 inches 

260 nautical miles 

20 feet 

100 lines/millimeter 

17 miles 

f/4.0 

70 mm by 4S20 feet 

E-S 

66 inches 

180 nautical miles 

S feet 

100 lines/millimeter 

60 miles 

f/ S. 0 

S inches by 2S0-S00 feet 

Additionally, the E-S was a stereo system, the E-2 a single 

2 

frame system. The camera had been developed by Itek under subcontract 

to Lockheed, the system contractor. Each camera consisted of a sunshade 

and mirror, a window, an eight-element lens (with a temperature tolerance 

of but one degree), a camera body terminating in a five-inch curved film 

plane with a three-second pan cycle, and a complex film take-up subsystem. 

The 20-degree panoramic arrangement provided coverage of a ground 

swath 12 by 6S miles on each side from 180-mile orbits, with the resulting 

strip of exposed film measuring 4. S by 23 inches. (Estimates of image 

quality varied but generally ranged from 100 to lIS lines per millimeter 

3 

at a 2:1 contrast ratio--on 50-2.13 film.) 

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I Although the E-5 had been anything but a hastily conceived 

undertaking, details of the design had been criticized by one source 

I or another virtually froITl the ITlOITlent it was proposed. In August 1960, 

I when the SaITlos prograITl reorientation was in full swing, prograITl 

office reservations about Lockheed's conduct of the developITlent began 

I to aSSUITle ITlajor proportions. Colonel W. G. King, Jr., the SaITlos 

I prograITl office chief, expressed particular concern at the lack of test 

data on the systeITl's therITlal environITlent. King believed that unCOITlI pensated teITlperature effects on ITlirror, lens, platen and supporting 

I structures ITlight well liITlit systeITl utility. The caITlera as then 

designed was SOITle 150 pounds overweight, and the inclusion of therITlal 

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protection devices could only ITlake it heavier. 

Lockheed did not agree. The contractor seeITled convinced that 

the strategy of developing various subsysteITls in parallel--an approach 

that had been successful in the ballistic ITlissile prograITl- -would provide 

adequate safeguards against the failure of any single technical feature. 

Though Lockheed's reaction was partly Pavlovian (R&D ITlores did not 

adITlit of the possibility that a contractor had not foreseen all possible 

contingencies), the eITlergence of E-6 and GaITlbit raised the issue of 

whether all three ITlajor recovery systeITls should be carried to cOITlpletion. 

They had several overlapping qualities. Lockheed had total responsibility 

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for E-5 and for the rapidly withering E-l and E-2 satellite programs, 

and had prime responsibility for Corona, but was no more than a 

vehicle supplier in the E-6 program. Lockheed, therefore, was 

vitally interested in having the E-5 remain attractive. E-5 was then 

considered to be a logical successor to Corona--still generally treated 

as an interim system with slight growth potential--although in fact 

E-6 was a more promising candidate. King, who had custody of the 

E-5 and all its predecessors but who had no important role in E-6 or 

Gambit development, was less parochial. As early as 27 September 

he suggested that the overlap of E-5 performance with that anticipated 

from E-6 could well bring on cancellation of one or the other. Becaus e 

E-6 had greater technical promis ethan E- 5, the leading candidate 

4 

was obvious. 

As with the E-l and E-2, part of the discontent with E-5 arose 

from the fact that it did not represent the latest in satellite reconnaissance concepts and techniques. Even though development had not gotten 

well under way until September 1959, the basic proposals embodied in 

E-5 dated from 1958, and considerable advances in optics, vehicle 

stabilization, and camera mode technologies had marked the ensuing 

two years. General Greer and Undersecretary Charyk were agreed 

that the E-5 system was unduly complex and that its Itek camera was 

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far too cUn1berson1e and cOn1plicated to represent a sound solution 

to satellite reconnais sance requiren1ents. 5 

Lockheed, aware of waning confidence in the prospects of E-5, 

proposed accelerating the progran1 toward an April 1961 diagnostic 

flight and a subs equent launch rate of one satellite each n1onth. An 

early den1onstration could dispel doubts of the systen1' s usefulnes s. 

The contractor estin1ated in October 1960 that such an acceleration 

would cost about $11 n1illion; Greer and King felt that s on1ething between 

$15 and $20 n1illion was n10re nearly the correct figure. Notwithstanding 

their uneasiness about E-5 progress, they felt that progran1 acceleration 

n1ight be in order. It would, if successful, provide a high-resolution 

recoverable systen1 at least a year in advance of the first E-6 and 

sOn1e two years sooner than the first Gan1bit satellite, a consideration 

that could not well be ignored in an atn10sphere of progran1 urgency. I Further, both King and Greer were realistically aware that E-6 and 

I Gan1bit n1ight encounter developn1ent problen1s. In that case, E-5 

n1ight represent the only insurance against progran1 disaster. I 

Both E-l and E-2 were phasing down toward cancellation by 

I late 1960. SOn1e n10ney to support acceleration of E-5 n1ight be found 

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in those progran1s. Launch costs were es sentially the san1e for all 

three, but an E-5 payload cost about $550, 000 less than an E-2 

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payload. The real is sue was not whether a half million dollars 

might be diverted for each cancelled readout launch, but whether 

E-5 acceleration would serve any useful purpose. 

Lockheed had received authorization for a modest acceleration 

on 2 September. After three weeks of discussion, the company on 

7 October made a formal presentation to Greer and Charyk suggesting 

greater effort--at higher costs. Three days later General Greer 

created a special task force to analyze the proposal. On 17 October 

Lockheed received a non-specific authorization to redirect the E-5 

program toward the "most accelerated" effort, called "Tornado", 

but no full and explicit approval of that effort followed. On 1 November, 

General Greer telephoned H. L. Brown, of Lockheed's top management 

group, to ask for more details on "Tornado. 11 Another two weeks were 

consumed in obtaining and refining the needed data. General Greer's 

doubts about the reliability of Lockheed's cost estimates were not 

dissipated by the supplemental information and he expressed little 

confidence in Itek's ability to satisfy schedules. There was also 

some feeling among Charyk's staff, in Washington, that diagnostic 

In October 1960, basic costs included $1. 83 million for the Atlas, 

$1. 81 for the Agena, $1. 44 for an E-2 payload and $0.9 million for 

the E-5 payload, plus about $1. 4 million for launch services and 

$184, 000 for management services. 

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flights could not profitably be slipped into the schedule without adversely 

affecting the viability of the first programmed operational launch. 

On 22 November 1960, Greer's office notified Lockheed that there 

would be no "crash program" for E-5. 6 But that did not entirely dispose 

of notions that something might yet be done to get the system into operation earlier than programmed, or that it might be economically adapted 

to perform the E-6 mission, thus eliminating need for the latter system 

and freeing considerable sums. One member of Charyk's staff co-sponsored, 

with Amron Katz (of Rand), the idea that flying the E- 5 at a higher altitude 

would provide la-foot definition and coverage comparable to that expected 

of the E-6. Nothing carne of the discussion, but in December Charyk 

authorized early diagnostic flights of degraded E-5 cameras to get telemetry 

data, prove out payload operation, and demonstrate the feasibility of 

capsule recovery in the E-5 configuration. (It was apparent that Itek 

could not accelerate delivery of fully qualified cameras.) So acceleration 

7 of a sort was approved for the E-5 effort before the close of 1960. 

Any impression that the E-5 had thus become more highly regarded 

than the still embryonic E-6 was dispelled early in February with Charyk's 

ruling that the E-6 had priority over any other E-series development. 

(In point of fact, Charyk had also accorded the E-4 mapping satellite 

payload a higher priority than the basic E-5 payload, but that development 

8 

was little known.) The February ruling represented are-interpretation 

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of the National Security Council's 25 August decision on system priorities; 

9 it was a severe blow to the prospects of the E-5. 

The crux of the priority issue was not so much the development 

status of E-5 as that E-6 represented a solution to requirements for 

gros s coverage, which carried higher priority than the specific target 

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coverage mission for which E-5 had been designed. Further, confidence 

in E-5 success had never been high since SAFSP acquired the program, 

and Gambit --which promised far better coverage and resolution than 

E-5--had begun development by February 1961. 

The character of the E-5 test program had gradually been changed 

by the various program decisions of late 1960 and early 1961. In February 

1961, that evolution received formal recognition in the statement of a 

test philosophy, essentially a determination that the early flights would 

contain very lar ge quantities of instrumentation and would have limited 

functional obj ective s 0 Particular attention was to be devoted to reentry 

phase instrumentation since the sea-recovery-oriented E-5 capsule 

represented a considerable departure from the pattern set by Discoverer 

capsules--relatively light and designed for air catch. Operations during 

flight test would gradually progress from the simple to the complex as 

success permitted. (For example, no steering maneuvers were to be 

attempted during the initial E-5 flight because a failure in that mode 

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I probably would prevent test of the reentry system.) In essence, the 

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E-5 tests were to be cautious research and development investigations 

rather than attempts to operate fully functional prototypes. That 

approach was in part a reflection of a general philosophy Charyk and 

Greer favored and in part was a consequence of experience with the 

E-l and Discoverer programs. It also reflected Colonel King's conviction that reconnaissance satellites would remain one-of-a-kind creations 

of some years to come, that the notion of standardizing early on an 

11 

"operational" vehicle was completely fallacious. Charyk and Greer 

agreed early in March 1961 that the best approach to E-5 would be to 

start "R&D launches" in September 1961 and continue through a series 

of eight, the last coming in May 1963. The extent of success with that 

12 

aspect of the program would determine later plans. 

Another important modification of earlier practice lay in General 

Greer's determination to reduce the role of the missile assembly phase 

I (at Vandenberg). He wanted flight-ready vehicles delivered to the launch 

I base. He was particularly insistent that modifications, subsystem tests, 

and instrumentation should be complete before the Agena, the Atlas, 

I and the payload were mated and checked through the missile assembly 

I building. That departure from earlier habits would, hope full y, reduce 

delays, complexities, and potential errors arising from extensive 

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tinkering with the vehicles between their delivery and their erection 

on the launch pad. To this end, Greer insisted on comprehensive predelivery checks of critical subsystems, including "hot firings" of the 

Agena engines. That practice had for some months been the subject 

of a "running debate" between a group which held that repeated pre-flight 

operations of the rocket engine increased the chance of flight failure 

and a group which held that only through extensive engine tests could 

prospective faults be surely identified and corrected. It was not that 

SAFSP intended to run every Agena through such a test series, but as 

Greer emphasized, the first of each kind of system would be most 

extensively tested and about every fourth vehicle thereafter would go 

13 

through the same checkout process. 

Inevitably, as first flight date approached, technical difficulties 

began to crowd together. Early plans to convert vehicle 2201 to a 

diagnostic system (the term was no longer used but the connotation 

remained) proved impractical as early as March 1961. The vehicle 

was so far toward completion that modification would be unduly costly 

and time consuming. Lockheed proposed instead to upgrade the second 

in the series, 2202, and by concentrating attention on that vehicle to 

push it to launch readiness by 15 September. By early June 1961, 

emphasis had shifted entirely to 2202, and 2201 had effectively been 

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phased out of the E-5 program. Unhappily, Lockheed's optimistic 

appraisal of 2202's readiness carne unhinged when Itek fell behind 

schedule in camera subsystem tests, forcing use of the third Agena 

(2203) in some of the work at Lockheed's Sunnyvale plant. In July, 

the capsule had to undergo structural modifications because of a 

failure in qualification testing, and early in August Itek was in such 

deep trouble that a special management team from Lockheed took up 

residence on the east coast to help push the camera through its test 

phase. By that time there was no possibility of meeting original 

flight schedules, the delivery of the payload having slipped by several 

14 

weeks. 

Similar difficulties were common to most high-priority programs 

even though contractors customarily seemed unable to anticipate them. 

But some problems were peculiar to the E- 5. By July there were 

three areas of major concern: a demonstrated weakness in Itek's 

management and in the effectiveness of Itek's engineering approach to 

the E-5 camera; shortcomings in the lens itself, principally evidenced 

by the inability of the delivered optics to pass specification checks; 

and Lockheed's failure to obtain essential computer inputs for the flight 

programs. (Colonel King felt that it might be necessary to subcontract 

the computer task and to subcontract optical work to some firm that 

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could meet the specifications.) Recognizing that schedule pressures 

might well induce further technical troubles, particularly if too-rapid 

testing led to oversights and thence to defects that either had to be 

corrected after delivery or which, escaping detection, would endanger 

mission chances, General Greer secured Undersecretary Charyk's 

acceptance of a "relaxed schedule, II although the fact of that relaxtion 

was not immediately communicated to Lockheed. 15 

Difficulties with the Itek-manufactured payload persisted even 

after its eventual delivery to Lockheed. Rework and the installation 

of replacement parts continued through September. The slippages had 

by that time become so substantial that certain of the earlier system 

tests had been invalidated (thos e which had to be conducted within a 

specific period during the weeks immediately before the launch) and 

had to be performed a second time. 16 

As it happened, other factors had intervened to insure a relaxation 

of E-5 launch schedules. On 9 September an Atlas-Agena carrying an 

E-2 payload exploded 1. 5 seconds after ignition, severely damaging 

Pad 1 at Point Arguello. Initially there were estimates that the pad 

could be readied for an E-5 launching by 1 November, but later evaluation 

of both the damage and the status of the E-5 payload caused the program 

office to slip the initial launch date to 12 December. (Vehicle 2203 

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slipped from 7 December to 18 January 1962 and 2204 to 22 February 

17 

1962.) Vibration tests of the 2202 payload a few days later disclosed 

faults in the film carriage portion of the camera subsystem, making 

18 the postponement seem particularly well advis ed. 

Pressure for an improvement of the revised launch schedule 

increas ed during early October and, as it became clear that the pad 

damage would not be the limiting factor in schedules, the pace of 

activity stepped up. On 17 October, General Greer directed Lockheed 

to make every effort to launch 2202 by 2 December rather than 

12 December. The contractor reacted by shaping a "hard core group 

of key personnel" into a task force with a 24-hour, seven-day-per-week 

assignment: meet program objectives. Engineers and launch crews 

were shifted from the Midas program to provide the necessary work 

19 

forc e. 

The effort was extraordinarily successful. At 1245 hours on 

22 November, 12 days in advance of the most optimistic schedule 

proposed in October, 2202 was launched from Pad 1. Every effort 

had been made to insure a successful launch, including special provisions of "super clean" propellant tanks and X-ray checks of questionable 

transistors. But 247 seconds after lift-off, the Atlas lost pitch 

attitude control and shortly thereafter another programming error 

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caused premature engine shutdown. That combination of errors 

caused the Agena to stabilize In a tail-first attitude after separation. 

When the Agena engInes were ignited the vehicle promptly decelerated 

. h P ·f· 20 Into t e aCI IC. 

Taken together with the record of Itek failings and Lockheed 

problems, the launch failure had immediate repercussions. After 

hearing presentations on the status of the program and discussing its 

prospects with General Greer, Charyk on 4 December directed that 

all work on the E-5 program be halted except that in support of 2203 

and 2204 launches g Lockheed was instructed to treat the action as a 

"partial termination" for the convenience of the government, a 

euphemism designed chiefly to prevent speculation by the press and 

within the aerospace industry. If questioned, SAFSP was to explain 

that the decision represented It ••• part of a continuing process of 

21 review and refinement of the USAF space program. II 

Vehicles 2203 and 2204 differed from their predecessor in having 

a more comprehensive (ultra-high frequency) command and control 

system and more intricate telemetry. The camera was somewhat more 

refined, as well. 

Those vehicles effectively cancelled by Charyk's order were 

either like 2203 in most respects or, in the case of 2207, 2208, and 

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2209, were slated to be "refined" along lines determined by early 

22 

test results. With the cancellation of the final five vehicles in 

the original schedule, E- 5 funds requirements for fiscal 1962 dropped 

to $55.6 million. Accumulated program costs would therefore peak 

at $258 million. Approximately $23 million of the total would be 

23 needed to complete and launch 2203 and 2204. 

As had been true of earlier terminations, and as was to be 

true later, financial considerations apparently played a considerable 

role in the decision to halt work on E-5. During meetings with 

Lockheed early in December and with Charyk's staff later that month, 

Greer's people were particularly concerned by an apparent belief 

that the E-5 "partial termination" would bring about a considerable 

improvement in the financial status of remaining elements of the 

satellite reconnaissance program. The net effect would be substantially 

less than seemed to be anticipated. For instance, if the Atlas boosters 

scheduled for E- 5 use were not so expended and their "bookkeeping" 

costs transferred to the E-6 program, no net reduction in costs 

would occur, merely a reallocation. Transferring Agenas from E- 5 

to E-6 had the same effect. E-5 cameras, capsules, and accessories 

were well along toward completion by December 1961. Most costs 

and liabilities had been incurred and could not be recovered. 

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Certain of the "peculiar items II being bought for the E- 5 effort alone 

could be cancelled, but in Greer's eyes this amounted to "small 

potatoes in the big picture ... " He also emphasized that two launches 

still were on schedules. "This means that ever ything didn't grind to 

a crashing halt on 5 December, " he tOldl I de facto 

treasurer for the satellite reconnaissance program. Rather than the 

$50 million that some officials seemed to believe would be shifted 

from E- 5 to other programs, about $14 million was actually recoverable. 

In part, that somewhat discouraging appraisal reflected facts of life 

which had not become apparent until December: slippages and cost 

increases incurred while 2202 was nearing launch readiness had increased 

24 

total program costs by an unprogrammed $ll. 9 million! 

Even in financial matters E-5 sometimes seemed a child of misfortune. A case in point was the decision of April 1961 to cancel the 

requirement for a secondary propulsion system in all but the first E-5 

vehicle, which was then so far toward completion that the deletion 

would have cost more than it saved. Bell Aircraft Corporation, which 

manufactured the secondary propulsion system, halted work on the 

hardware but continued research and development. The equipment 

still was scheduled for use on E-6 and Midas vehicles, but in large 

part its cost was being charged to E- 5. Colonel King was not pleased, 

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a sentiment he communicated to the purchasing officer of E-5. Ultimately there was an agreement that no post-September charges would 

be levied on E-5, that E-6 and Midas would actually provide the funds, 

but the payments continued to be made through the E-5 contract. In 

King's judgment, the episode confirmed the lack of financial and 

management responsibility displayed by Lockheed through the course 

25 

of the E-5 effort. 

Termination of the extended E- 5 program also relieved pres sure 

in other areas. The contentious requirement for a secure command 

system in E-5 had been troublesome since early 1961, mostly because 

its cost (in excess of $2.5 million), delayed availability, and probability 

of detracting from general system reliability made it seem unattractive 

to the program office. But Undersecretary Charyk was extremely 

interested in reducing the risk that uncoded commands might be intercepted by the Soviets, or that the Soviets might insert their own commands 

into the E-5 control system. Both military and political consequences 

could be serious in either event, a possibility that alarmed senior 

officials of both the State and Defense Departments. Not until October 1961 

Should an E-5 recovery capsule be successfully commanded to reenter 

in Soviet territory, not merely film, but the entire camera system 

would be available for examination. Of the several recovery-mode 

systems in development or operation (Corona, Gambit, Argon, E-5 

and E-6), only E-5 included camera recovery provisions. 

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was the requirement for an encrypted command link deleted, and then 

26 reluctantly. With cancellation of plans for extended E-5 launches, 

concern diminished. 

In the midst of the termination proceedings, and while the program 

office was trying to sort out the residue of a complex program, 2203 

reached launch readiness. It climbed free of Pad 2 at Point Arguello 

at 1145 hours on 22 December, after two days of delay for the correction 

of minor defects. Countdown went well, and though there was a fault 

in the Atlas propulsion cutoff system the net effect was to put the Agena 

in an orbit with a period 4.5 minutes longer than planned. 

Once on orbit the payload began its scheduled operation. At 

first all seemed well, and there were clear telemetry indications that 

the camera had functioned, but either the frame counter failed or the 

camera shut itself down earlier than scheduled. That was not too 

serious, even if undesirable. But a faulty command actuated the reentry 

sequence on the sixth pass and through a combination of errors the 

payload, after separating, went into a new and higher orbit. (That 

was not an unmitigated misfortune; the payload had "tried to reenter" 

over New Boston.) The dead Agena, relieved of its cargo, continued 

to circle the earth somewhat below the capsule. Because the reentry 

command had activated all systems in the capsule portion, the battery 

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was dead by the tiITle it was needed to ignite squibs and actuate the 

drag parachute. Further, the retro-rockets had been ignited during 

the unplanned ITlaneuver sending the capsule into its high orbit, so 

any reentry would be entirely ballistic. 

The Agena fell back and burned up sOITlewhere south of Borneo 

on 31 DeceITlber. Tracking stations calculated that the capsule would 

encounter enough atITlospheric resistance to bring it down about 

9 January. Air recovery would be iITlpossible because of the cOITlplete 

absence of the retro-rocket and parachute phases, but it was conceivable 

that the vehicle ITlight survive reentry forces and iITlpact where the 

27 

payload could be recovered. In the course of Pegasus reentry 

experiITlents during SepteITlber and October 1961, one reentry test 

vehicle had survived a ballistic return froITl an altitude of nearly 

. 28 200, 000 feet after its parachute falled to deploy. 

E-5 prograITl people bled the Spacetrack centers for whatever 

inforITlation they could obtain on the course and probable decay of the 

satellite. During the second week of January 1962 the tracking stations 

reported that the capsule had passed over the northernITlost tracking 

screen but had not been picked up by the radars of the next belt southward. 

Lieutenant Colonel V. M. Genez iITlITlediately contacted the 6594th 

Aerospace Test Wing, activating an earlier plan for the contingent 

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recovery of decaying capsules that might enter intact. There was every 

indication that the payload had come down in northwestern Canada, so a 

C-1l9 carrying Lieutenant Colonel Lon Berry and a recovery crew flew 

into Great Falls, Montana, stopping there to get Canadian permission 

for a search along a specific path. The Royal Canadian Air Force wanted 

to know why. Colonel Berry explained that the USAF hoped to find part 

of a satellite. After several hours of delay, a direct phone call from 

Washington ordered Berry and the C-1l9 back to California. No reason 

was given. 

It later developed that the area of the proposed search was along 

one of the Strategic Air Command's most heavily used polar patrol 

routes. Canadian authorities suspected that a B-52 had accidentally 

released a nuclear weapon and that the Air Force wanted to recover it 

surreptitiously. The issue was not of the sort that promised quick 

resolution, so the search party was ordered home. 

Later a pair of U-2 aircraft flew along the suspected reentry path, 

photographing the terrain in hopes there might be some sign of the 

capsule. Nothing turned up, and the affair ended on an inconclusive note. 29 

The third and final E-5 vehicle was launched on 7 March 1962 at 

1410 hours. after an extended series of aborted countdowns. The Agena 

auxiliary power system and the command and control subsystem of 2204 

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had been substantially modified to reflect experience with the first two 

E-5's. Nevertheless, problems with the Agena, the Atlas, the guidance 

programmer, and various switches had delayed the launch since 

22 February. Despite that omen, the launch and orbit injection were 

linear nominal. If For the first 13 passes, all went reasonably well. 

Then the New Hampshire tracking station improperly transmitted reentry 

sequence commands. The vehicle as sumed and maintained reentry 

attitude, however, and over a period of several passes expended most 

of its attitude control gas. In part, the sequence of misadventure 

resulted from failure of the Fairchild timer. A recovery attempt on 

pass 17 failed because of another tracking station error, and by pass 21 

all control gas had been exhausted. The only remaining recourse was 

to trigger the reentry system while the vehicle was in an appropriate 

reentry attitude. But instead of reentering, the capsule went into a 

30 higher orbit, much like its immediate predecess or. 

More than a year later, in July 1963, the satellite had decayed 

to the point of imminent reentry. As the heavy heat shield still was 

attached, there seemed a chance that it would survive. Greer's staff, 

aided by computers and operators of the Aerospace Corporation, 

calculated the probable reentry path and impact point. They concluded 

that the satellite would impact toward the center of the Arabian Sea. 

Since any pos sibility of parachute deployment had pass ed months before, 

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and since the shock of striking cold sea water after an uninhibited I 

ballistic reentry alm.ost certainly would breach the satellite casing, 

there seem.ed no possibility of retrieval. No recovery was attem.pted. I 

All the available data suggested that the capsule had actually com.e I 

down in the predicted im.pact area. Like both its predecessors, 

nothing m.ore was heard of it. 31 I 

Much the sam.e fate had befallen the E-5 program.. After the 

failure of 2203, the program. disappeared from. organizational charts. 

No final report was written. On 1 March 1962, even before the last 

E-5 launching, Colonel King had been transferred to a new assignm.ent 

32 

and the residue of the program. office had been dispersed. As E-5, 

the program. was thereafter of interest m.ostly to antiquarians. 

But the cam.era, and the E-5 requirem.ent, tenuously held to life 

notwithstanding the lack of program. succes s. Charyk's decision to 

cancel the E- 5 program. had been taken on Monda y. 4 Decem.ber. Two 

days later, Jack Carter of Itek proposed to Charyk that tests be run 

on Itek and Perkin-Elm.er lenses to determ.ine whether an im.proved 

lens m.ight be substituted for the original in the still-pending 2204 

fl O h A "b 1 " J 33 ig t. com.paris on egan ear y in anuary. 

While arrangem.ents for that work were in train, Carter suggested 

to General Greer that advances in the cam.era and satellite arts since 

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the start of E-5 should be adapted to a new reconnaissance systeITl 

based on the Itek E-5 caITlera. After refining the original idea, he 

forITlally subITlitted it on 19 DeceITlber 1961. 

What Carter proposed was cOITlbining a single re-engineered 

E-5 caITlera with the Discoverer-Corona capsule, a Thor booster, 

and a ITlodified Agena. He estiITlated that the resulting orbital systeITl 

would have a two- to four -day ITlis sion life. Exploiting the lower 

altitude of the Discoverer satellite, the ITlodified E-5 proITlised object 

definition on the order of four feet and, in cOITlbination with Kodak's 

new SO-13l filITl, a resolution of about 100 lines per ITlilliITleter. 34 

The idea was not unattractive. On 28 DeceITlber 1961 General 

Greer, Colonel H. L. Evans (his deputy), and Colonel King ITlet with 

Carter to discuss in greater detail both the concept and its application. 

Greer recoITlITlended that Charyk give the proposal a careful hearing. 

The general suggested, however, a cOITlplete departure froITl the 

contract and ITlanageITlent structure that had characterized the original 

E-5 developITlent. He favored a covert prograITl and an associate 

contract arrangeITlent that would put Itek (caITlera), General Electric 

>:' 

Although Itek's record in E-5 developITlent was scarcely faultless, 

the failures of the systeITl had all originated in Atlas and Agena subsysteITls, ITlostly peculiar to the original E-5 design. Corona had 

a ITluch better record by late 1961, and Itek's reputation for caITlera 

developITlent was quite respectable. 

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(capsule), Lockheed (Agena), and Douglas (Thor) at roughly the same 

level, with Lockheed providing whatever systems engineering and 

integration work might be needed. He felt that the Corona office 

should have overall program management responsibility. (Corona 

operated partly inside, partly outside the established structure of 

Greer's organization, Greer having "focal point" authority but the 

CIA still largely directing program affairs. ) 

The arguments favoring Carter's proposal were few but weighty. 

There had been no real relaxation of the original E- 5 requirement, 

even though enthusiasm for the E- 5 as a system had mostly evaporated. 

The Carter approach offered a relatively inexpensive way of performing 

the basic E-5 assignment, given the proposition that leftover E-5 

cameras would serve as the basis of all payloads. The greatest 

technical problem was that E-5 camera systems, even if modified as 

Itek proposed, would weigh substantially more than Corona cameras. 

But offs etting this was the potential of an improved Thor, then called 

Thorad, which by utilizing the additional thrust of strap-on solid-fuel 

Sergeant rockets could orbit such a payload. The near-term availability 

of a Thor-boosted E- 5 came ra promised high detail photographs of 

Soviet installations sooner than any other reconnaissance satellite in 

development, and at a much lower cost. 

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Under secretary Charyk was dispos ed to favor the idea. On 

29 December he told Greer that he wanted some assurance of general 

feasibility before committing himself and that he would make a decision 

once he had been fully briefed On the status of Thorad, the capsule 

35 

problem, and the details of propos ed operations. 

Colonel H. L. Battle, principal Air Force manager in the Corona 

program, expre s sed initial res ervations about the s oundnes s of the 

approach. He was quite reluctant to assign systems integration responsibilities to Itek, an aspect of the original Carter propos al which General 

Greer had dismissed in making his first recommendations to Charyk. 

Battle was also apprehensive that the modified E-5 might become a 

substitute for Corona rather than an addition to the existing program, 

a notion that did not stir up much enthus ias m in the Corona offic e. 36 

After giving the proposal further study, the Corona people 

suggested that the Central Intelligence Agency contract for the payload 

(from Itek) and the recovery vehicle (from General Electric). Such an 

arrangement would make the new program in many respects a contractual 

counterpart of Corona its elf. The Air Force Space Systems Division 

would, in that context, procure Thors and Agenas and Greer I s organization would manage a covert systems engineering contract with Lockheed. 

Corona experience and refined estimates indicated that the basic 

Thor-Agena combination could put the 775-pound payload, including 

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40 pounds of film into a two-day polar orbit. Average photographic 

altitude would be 140 nautical miles. although perigee would be about 

100. Use of Thorad would substantially improve orbital life span. 

One premise of development was a joint Itek-Lockheed payload 

structure design, Lockheed fabricating the framework and shipping it 

to Boston, where Itek would install the camera system. After inspection and acceptance at Itek's plant, the composite structure would be 

shipped back to California where Lockheed would mate it with the 

recovery capsule before sending it off to Vandenberg. 

With immediate program approval, it seemed possible to get 

the first payload delivered by 22 August 1962 and later payloads at 

one-month intervals thereafter. The first launch could be scheduled 

for December 1962. It was generally assumed that problems with 

the booster, or for that matter with the Agena, would be s light because 

the payload would be essentlally interchangeable with those being built 

for Corona operations, which then were going rather well. Thor engines 

would be the pacing items unless there was a slippage in payload 

fabrication. 

Initially it appeared that the cost of development and initial 

payload procurement would total $7.8 million. Costs would be somewhat 

higher, however, if Thorad were used--an expedient that would give 

th . d l'f 37 e system a SlX- ay 1 e. 

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Within Greer's organization, the Carter proposal was called 

Lanyard, a word known only to about a dozen people during the first 

weeks of program consideration. 

Not much could be done until Charyk obtained an essential 

endorsement of Lanyard from the Secretary of Defense, the general 

concurrence of CIA, and final approval from the National Security 

Council. By early January 1962, much of the general uncertainty had 

dissipated. In response to a request from Defense Secretary R. S. 

McNamara, Dr. Charyk prepared a general resume of the status of 

Gambit and the options open to satellite reconnaissance for the next 

year or so. The information was needed for the President's IIspecial 

group, II which conducted periodic reviews of general reconnaissance 

program status. In his resume, Charyk included a paragraph declaring 

the feasibility of the Lanyard approach and a statement that the reconnaissance office was giving serious consideration to funding the program. 

Colonel J. R. Martin, head of Charyk's special staff, carried the 

proposal directly to McNamara for final review. McNamara went over 

the draft in detail, making only one significant suggestion for change. 

The word first appears in an 11 January 1962 memorandum written 

in the Pentagon but it was earlier used as the code identifier for 

lithe simplified E-5" in discussions on the West Coast. A special 

Lanyard clearance procedure was in effect by late February. 

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Instead of proposing the possibility of Lanyard development, he told 

Martin, the resume should state that development was in progress. 

So modified, the memorandum went forward for Secretary 

McNamara I s signature. For practical purpos es, it repre sented 

approval of Lanyard development. Nevertheless, it seemed unwise 

to do much toward formally starting work until final endorsements 

38 

had been received from the presidential review level. 

The McNamara memorandum did not go forward for National 

Security Council review until March 1962. More than a month earlier, 

on 22 January, Undersecretary Charyk discussed Lanyard's situation 

and prospects with General Greer and the West Coast project group. 

He emphasized that Lanyard would be, in at least one sense, competitive with the current notion of accelerating Gambit development. Should 

Gambit become available at about the same time as Lanyard, there 

would be no real need for the latter. Conversely, if Gambit should be 

delayed, or if the Gambit effort should encounter major technical 

difficulties, Lanyard would serve as a substitute. The two programs 

were complementary, being aimed at obtaining high-resolution pictures 

. during the early months of 1963. Charyk wanted it to be understood 

that Gambit was the main effort; Lanyard he characterized as a probable 

transitory development to insure against the consequences of Gambit 

dela y or failure. 39 

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By early February, Battle had refined the financial estilTIates 

and had cOlTIlTIitted Lanyard to the Thorad approach. It was now plain 

that payloads would cost at least $8.5 lTIillion and Thorad developlTIent 

another $3.4 lTIillion. Thors and Agenas for the five propos ed launches 

would cost another $20.9 lTIillion. 

Although the cost figures were nO longer quite as attractive 

as they had seelTIed a lTIonth earlier, cOlTIpensating technical advantages 

had appeared. Clos e study of Lanyard lTIis sion potential indicated that 

because of the ilTIproved thrust of the Thorad the guidance systelTIs in 

both the Thor and the Agena could be operated over longer periods than 

had been anticipated. A considerably enhanced precision in orbital 

injection would result. Additionally, it now appeared that a 15-day life 

for the Lanyard systelTI lTIight be achievable. 

Convinced of Lanyard's appeal and reassured by McNalTIara's 

previous endors elTIent of the progralTI, Charyk decided to reque st 

Lanyard approval in a pending presentation to the "special group. " 

He saw Lanyard principally as insurance against a lTIajor setback in 

GalTIbit and planned to present the progralTI in that light. 

The still elTIbryonic Lanyard project tealTI was developing a 

different outlook. Characteristically, those who becalTIe intilTIately 

as sociated with Lanyard tended, in tilTIe, to forget or ignore the original 

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concept of Lanyard as a transitory, interim program. In the eyes 

of its managers--and its contractors--it acquired an aura of permanence that Charyk had not intended. More than a year later, when 

Lanyard and Gambit payloads were essentially standing side by side 

for launch countdown, there was relatively little program office 

acknowledgement of Lanyard's transient status. 40 

Still undecided in March 1962 was the question of who should 

administer the c overt contracts with Itek, General Electric, and 

Lockheed. The matter was complicated by the nature of the still embryonic 

National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), headed by Charyk, which 

included both CIA and USAF participants in satellite reconnaissance. 

Although it seemed inevitable that the NRO would be the actual Lanyard 

program custodian, effective control tended to remain with the organization that directly administered the contracts. The CIA had been fully 

cognizant of the Lanyard affair virtually since its inception and CIA 

management of covert contracts had been one of Colonel Battle's first 

suggestions. Yet Carter's proposal had first been made to Greer, E-5 

had been a Samos program, and there seemed no compelling reason 

. for allowing it to drift into another organization's control. 

,!:: 

The evolution of the NRO and its influence on the progress of the 

several satellite reconnais sance programs is the subject of a separate 

chapter. For the purposes of this portion of the narrative it seems 

sufficient to note that the organization existed and that its functions 

and authorities had not been entirely clarified. 

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On that ambiguous note, General Greer--anxious to get Lanyard 

underway before its value was substantially lessened by the passage of 

time --suggested to Brigadier General R. D. Curtin, heading Charyk r s 

NRO staff, that he be authorized to let a "level of e££ort" contract with 

Itek to cover an initial 30 days of work. He also urged the need to start 

work on a covert cover plan, since a first launch was planned for 

December 1962, only 10 months distant. Acknowledging that he was 

uncertain what decision might be made on the matter of contract authority, 

Greer suggested that it would be better to have the CIA take such first 

steps if it seemed probable that the agency would ultimately get program 

41 

management authority. 

That the program would be totally covert and not, as proposed at 

one point, a highly secure "white " effort, became certain during the 

third week of February 1962. Stimulated by CIA concern about the rather 

large numbers of people who were becoming aware of such "ultra sensitive" 

covert programs as Corona and Argon, President J. F. Kennedy directed 

that only individuals specifically approved by the CIA could become 

involved in the Lanyard effort. By implication, in so ruling, the President 

also approved the Lanyard program and made the CIA its custodian. 

Charyk planned to recommend to the President's Special Committee on 

Reconnaissance that Lanyard be handled as Corona had been. 

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Early in April the undersecretary found a way to split the hair, 

letting CIA have contract responsibility but keeping the critical technical elements of program management in Greer's hands. He proposed 

to Herbert Scoville, CIA's Deputy Director for Research and Richard 

Biss ell's succes sor as de facto manager of the CIA's role in satellite 

reconnais sance, that Greer be made immediately respons ible for all 

Lanyard contracts except the covert agreements, that CIA administer 

all covert contracts, and that Greer be "completely responsible for 

technical management of Lanyard," including the payload and recovery 

elements. That line of command would be reinforced by making the 

configuration control board responsive only to Greer. 

Operations would be patterned after Corona. In effect, CIA 

would exercise responsibility for pre-mission planning and on-orbit 

operational decisions involving target selection. The CIA would also 

manage security aspects of the program. Communication would employ 

Corona message circuits. 

The solution Charyk proposed was a compromise between the 

original concept of management by the Corona office under Greer's 

direction, and management along the lines of Corona -- which meant 

by the CIA. Charyk reminded Scoville on 2 April that it was urgently 

necessary to agree on a division of responsibilities if the NRO was to 

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ll1eet the schedules proll1ised to the President. And he noted that SOll1e 

project activity had begun even without an agreell1ent on responsibilites. 42 

The need for such a cOll1ll1unication, in effect a negotiated agreell1ent between the director of the NRO and his nOll1inal deputy, could be 

appreciated only in the context of personal and organization anill10sity 

that had developed since the departure of Bissell, Scoville's predecessor. 

The evidence would indicate that President Kennedy approved the Lanyard 

approach early in March but that differences between NRO and GA, or 

between Charyk and Scoville, delayed further action for at least three 

weeks. 

Scoville eventually accepted the Charyk proposal of 2 April, though 

rell1arking that giving General Greer the total responsibility for technical 

ll1anagell1ent of all aspects of Lanyard was a departure froll1 Corona 

precedents. 

Details of the arrangell1ent were sOll1ewhat ll10re cOll1plex than 

could be sUll1ll1arized in the phrase !lcoll1plete technical ll1anagell1ent 

responsibility, !l but that was the essence of the arrangell1ent. The 

ill1ll1ediate prograll1 director would be Colonel Battle, though he would 

-be entirely responsible to General Greer rather than, as with Corona, 

to CIA for SOll1e ll1atters. And although CIA had the authority to ll1ake 

"on-orbit operations" decisions, Greer would exercise a technical 

decision function during the conduct of Lanyard ll1is sions. In case of 

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conflicts, Charyk would decide--if time permitted; otherwise Greer 

prevailed. Absolute CIA control of Lanyard security was tempered 

by the ruling that General Greer would determine program need-to-know. 

only questions involving people not engaged in program management 

being subject to a joint agreement between Charyk and the CIA. Finally, 

the Corona secure teletype network was to be extended to include Greer's 

group, Charyk's office, and the NRO staff. (Until that time the Corona 

managers had passed along to General Greer those messages they 

thought would be of interest; there was no arrangement for transmittal 

43 

of complete information. ) 

Even before Charyk and Scoville reached their understandings 

On program responsibilities, Lanyard had begun the transition from 

proposal to development. By 2.8 March 1962, Lockheed had been authorized to construct five orbital systems in accordance with technical 

instructions originated by Greer's staff. Pending negotiation of a formal 

contract, Lockheed was permitted to spend $l. 0 million. 44 

As in the past, one of the first problems that had to be faced was 

getting Lanyard under cover. The program was largely based on the use 

of existing E-5 cameras which had been openly developed and procured 

for the Air Force inventory. Arranging to have them disappear from 

accountability without actually leaving Itek's possession promised to be 

tricky. 

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The affair was arranged by an ingenuous feint. Us ing ordinary 

communication channels, Itek offered to buy from Lockheed the residual 

inventory of E-5 equipment. The sale price carne to $1,008,000, 

roughly 55 percent of what the government had paid upon original 

delivery. The money actually was provided by the CIA and, as paid, 

represented the first $1 million of program funding. For the record, 

General Greer formally asked Air Force Systems Command headquarters 

to authorize transfer of the res idual E- 5 inventory to Itek. After an 

appropriate interchange of coordination correspondence which alerted 

all those earlier concerned in E-5 affairs, permission was granted. 

As far as the "white" satellite organization knew, E- 5 was dead and 

buried. Itek had legal and physical possession of the cameras and could 

proceed to modify them to Lanyard specifications without alerting anyone. 

Other elements of the defunct E- 5, including a test chamber and 

a collection of relatively expensive specialized tooling, had remained at 

the Itek plant near Boston. Itek asked that all such property be transferred from the E- 5 contract to an existing industrial facilities contract 

between Itek and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. At the same time, 

the camera contractor submitted a list of non-usable items, such as the 

E-5 fairing, lens barrels, and the like, to be processed as scrap under 

the authority of the local Air Force plant representative. The remaining 

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E-5 residue was the subject of another Itek offer to buy, which received 

routine approval. Because some conscientious procurement monitor 

might protest Air Force readiness to sell scarce high quality lenses 

at 50 or 60 cents on the dollar, the lenses were exempted from the 

arrangement and nominally assigned to the Aeronautical Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson. Actually, they were transferred to Itek on 

a hand receipt. This seemingly intricate sequence of actions was, in 

practice, less complicated than many routine matters of covert contract 

administration. It succeeded in getting the necessary equipment transferred to Itek so circumspectly that no suspicion was aroused. And 

since Itek facilities included a "black" area where Corona cameras had 

been developed and built, no difficulty was encountered thereafter in 

45 

concealing the actual modification work. 

By early May 1962, Lanyard technical proposals from Itek, 

Lockheed, and General Electric had been received and were being 

processed. Lockheed and Itek were working under interim authorizations totaling $1 million each, while General Electric had received 

advance authorizations totaling $. 78 million. Program costs for the 

three were then estimated at $11. 7 million, of which Itek would receive 

$ 7.2 million and Lockheed $3. 5 million. The total still was les s than 

General Greer's estimate that the payloads would cost all of the $14 

46 

million recovered from the E- 5 termination. 

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The Lanyard panoramic camera system was then expected to 

weigh 635 pounds, the cassette 20 pounds, and the stellar-index camera 

system another 20 pounds. About 78 pounds of film would be carried 

for the main camera plus two pounds for the stellar-index system. 

Greer had suggested that six additional cameras be added to the original 

Lanyard order for use during calendar 1964, but Undersecretary Charyk 

had balked, limiting the total procurement, for the moment, to five 

cameras. Charyk agreed to consider buying two additional cameras 

for 1963, however. The approved five-vehicle program, including 

47 

boosters and launch costs, would run about $34 million. 

Not until Oc tober 1962 was that basic schedule modified, and 

then by the purchas e of three additional Lanyard payloads which would 

provide for interim high acuity reconnais sance in the event that Gambit 

operations were not wholly succes sful during 1963. The new payloads 

were tentatively slated for launch during January, February, and March 

48 

1964. Total costs for the Lockheed and Itek portions of the program 

thus rose, for the eight programmed flights, to $5.96 and $10.8 million, 

49 

respectively, up a total of $5.62 over the original program estimate. 

The cost of the entire Lanyard effort, it developed, would increase 

about $10.5 million to a total of $44.85 million. The prospect that 

early success in Lanyard flights would cause a further extension of 

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the program appeared later in October, when Itek was authorized to 

buy optical glas s needed for nine additional systems. Since the cost 

was less than $300, 000, however, nothing in the way of a significant 

commitment to a continuing Lanyard effort could be deduced from the 

decision. Lead time for optical glass was the most critical element 

in long-term planning, so such a purchase implied no more than 

50 

elementary precautions against unanticipated problems. 

The immediate responsibility for technical aspects of Lanyard 

development was firmly fixed by early July, with the assigmnent of 

Major B. W. Quinn as the officer responsible for the camera system. 

Redelegation of contracting officer authority from CIA headquarters to Arthur Leach (a CIA officer assigned within the SAFSP 

establishment) served to pin down responsibility for the contractual 

elements of the program. Leach was formally empowered to sign all 

covert contracting documents "regardless of amount" provided only 

51 that the proper funding allocations had previously been approved. 

Such a measure promised additional safeguards for the security of the 

basic Corona activity. a matter about which CIA headquarters was 

expres sing increased concern as the unfolding of Lanyard exposed 

more and more people to the facts concerning the origin of the Lanyard 

film recovery technique. 

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In the midst of Lanyard acceleration there developed a new 

squabble over the scope of National Reconnaissance Organization 

responsibilities, and in consequence the funding authorizations for 

Lanyard became embedded in an organizational dispute between Charyk 

and Scoville. In September and October 1962, the question of whether 

CIA would assume total responsibility for all covert contracting in 

satellite reconnaissance became a warm issue. While it went unresolved, funds for Lanyard and other covert programs were withheld. 

By October, the reserve of NRO funds had vanished and, in General 

52 

Greer's words, the contractors were working on trust. The problem 

was ultimately resolved by compromise, but not before alarming both 

General Greer's establishment and the Lanyard contractors. 

Late in 1962 there was some difficulty with schedules for the 

stellar -indexing cameras which, in the case of Lanyard, were vital 

to the functioning of the total system. Stellar-index records were the 

only sources of attitude reference provided in the Lanyard system, 

The rather complicated question of authority and responsibility is 

discussed in greater detail in a following chapter on the NRO. In 

essence, the CIA did not want to assume covert contracting responsibilities for all programs, arguing that exposure was certain if its 

relatively small activities in that area were increased by such programs 

as Gambit. Charyk, as director of the NRO, wanted a rigid definition 

of functional responsibilities which would effectively confine CIA to 

security and covert contracting (plus certain operational functions), 

but which would give NRO directors complete technical authority. 

Corona, still largely controlled in technical and financial areas by 

the CIA, was the real question at stake. 

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no horizon camera being incorporated. (Corona systems included a 

horizon camera, permitting independent determination of vehicle 

attitude and making stellar-index information a highly useful but not 

vital accessory.) In October, the configuration control board decided 

that the stellar-index cameras in Lanyard should incorporate a 

capacity for 500 feet of index film and 250 feet of stellar film--a 

substantial increase over the amount originally contemplated. After 

some minor quibbling over costs and fees, Itek began working on the 

change. Difficulties carne in December, when Itek disclosed that the 

required supply spools and take-up cassettes could not be made available before mid-March 1963--some two weeks after the currently 

scheduled first flight date. The pos s ibility that one or two Lanyards 

might have to conform to the older pattern of stellar-index operation 

did not vanish until early 1963, when it became apparent that the first 

system could not be launched before April. 53 

Another problem that subsequently solved itself involved 

Apogee limits for Lanyard (200 

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late in October 1962 - -with the qualification that they would be reactivated in thel 1

54 

The chief difficulty encountered in payload developlTIent arose 

frolTI deficiencies in and shortages of test equiplTIent and related 

facilities. By NovelTIber 1962, a general slippage in several subsystelTIs 

had cast doubt on the validity of the very tight delivery schedule. In 

SeptelTIber, platten fabrication problelTIs delayed progress. By late 

October, difficulties in installing the therlTIal blanket for the calTIera 

subs ystelTI were becolTIing critical. Agena cOlTIpletion had slipped a 

week by early NovelTIber, and construction of the joint between the 

Agena and the payload section was then two weeks behind. By the tilTIe 

Itek was ready to ship the first calTIera subsystelTI it had becolTIe 

essential to waive requirelTIents for full qualification of the berylliulTI 

lTIirror and to provide for a later retrofit of the data block recording 

subs ystelTI, which had operated poorl y in prelilTIinary tests. The 

stellar-index unit was not yet available and could not be tested in 

conjunction with the lTIain calTIera. More significant, though not 

ilTIlTIediately recognized as such, was a notation that a light corona 

effect had caused fillTI fogging in SOlTIe of the early calTIera systelTI 

55 chec ks. 

Notwithstanding such difficulties, each of which briefly s eelTIed 

to presage a lTIajor cris is, Itek lTIanaged to push the first Lanyard 

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camera system through preliminary acceptance tests by 19 December 

1962. Changes to the beryllium mirror still were necessary, however, 

and final optical tests could not be run until a critical test facility 

had been completed and checked out. Lockheed was still reporting 

trouble with thermal shielding and the roll joint structure, with modi56 

fications of the command decoder unit, and with facility qualification. 

One of the problems of the Lanyard schedule was inherent: the 

first launch vehicle would be as unique as its payload. The initial 

Lanyard was scheduled to be lofted by the first thrust-augmented Thor, 

now generally called TAT rather than Thorad. Additionally, the Bell 

Telephone Laboratories I guidance system which later was to be made 

integral with the Agena stage would, for the first launch, be located 

in the Thor. Thus a special set of ascent equations was required. 

Additionally, the program office hoped to use Lanyard mission data 

in planning for later low-altitude Corona flights and in obtaining precise 

information on the prospective life expectancy of the dual-capsule 

Corona-J systems scheduled for first use during the spring of 1963. 

The abundance of such factors thoroughly compounded the normally 

57 

hectic environment of any first flight. 

Remarkably enough, Lanyard experienced relatively few significant changes during its early development. The substitution of a 

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beryllium mirror structure for the aluminum structure originally 

planned was one which would have long-term influence, and complexities of the stellar-index camera installation promised to be important, 

but on the whole the program had been rather stable. (The beryllium 

structure provided better rigidity than alurninum at a 40-pound saving 

in weight, but the additional film capacity of the stellar-index camera 

58 

unit absorbed much of the difference.) In that Lanyard was significantly different from its E-5 predecessor, however, it represented 

a continuing development problem, one not completely obvious if the 

abbreviated system development schedule was used as an indicator 

of de sign novelty. 

Apart from being considerably lighter than the E-5, largely a 

factor of employing one rather than two cameras, Lanyard principally 

differed from the original system in that only the film was recovered 

from Lanyard flights. E- 5 recovery had included both cameras and 

virtuall y the entire forward structure of the total system. Additionally. 

Lanyard employed a unique roll-joint technique, which permitted the 

camera to point toward s elected ground tar gets without requiring a 

roll maneuver by the Agena. Finally, the new system was based on 

single-camera stereo techniques. Its pictures would cover a 50-nauticalmile swath eight miles deep along the flight path, with a 10 percent 

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overlap. Ten of the major E-5 subsystems were incorporated in Lanyard. 

Seven others had been completely eliminated (including a weighty and 

complex computer), and the remaining five had been substantially 

simplified. 

E-5 had been a pressurized system; Lanyard resembled Corona 

in oper ating at ambient pres sures. Simplification had its most marked 

effect in the film transport and shutter mechanisms, which leaned 

heavily on Corona experience. 59 The dynamic operating modes of 

Corona and Lanyard cameras were quite similar, which was not 

surprising since both were Itek developments stemming from 1959 

concepts. Nonetheless, in bulk and in many of their physical details 

the two systems were more dissimilar than might have been anticipated, 

given the fact that the Lanyard approach involved substituting Corona 

techniques for those of the original E-5. 

The recovery sequence was a real point of difference between 

Lanyard and E-5. The original E-5 capsule design had been markedly 

influenced by the notion of modifying the payload section to a mannedspace-flight configuration. Although recovery and re-use of an expensive 

camera was the customary justification for provisions that would require 

reentry of the entire E-5 front end, the remarkable likeness between the 

E-5 capsule and that proposed by Lockheed for the abortive Man-InSpace-Soonest system (1958) could not be ignored. 

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In E-5, once the photo lTIission was cOlTIplete, the first of 13 

separate recovery events was to increase pres surization of the capsule 

I by seven to ten pounds, to stiffen it for reentry. The Agena was then 

I reoriented so that engine ignition would effect capsule ejection, the 

mirror was jettisoned and the lens retracted. The covers on the 

I various apertures for mirrors and lenses were closed to shield interior 

I components against reentry heating e££ects. Thereafter the entire 

camera compartment separated from the Agena. After capsule passage 

I through the upper atmosphere, the fairing doors were opened, the 

I drogue gun fired, and the drogue chute released. Drogue and mid-body 

fairings were next jettisoned, followed by deployment of the main 

I parachute, discard of the ablative shield, and inflation of the water 

I impact bags. 

Lanyard's recovery sequence was, by comparison, quite simple. 

I After Agena reorientation and severance of the fillTI, the filITl gate was 

sealed, the recovery capsule system separated from the camera, the 

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retro-rockets fired, and reentry comlTIenced. Deployment first of the 

drogue chute and subsequently of the main chute completed the seven 

I major events of reentry. 

I 

Adoption of Corona-proven techniques implied several significant 

advances toward a simpler system. ElilTIination of pressurization 

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promised to reduce a potential for image degradation arising from 

internal air turbulence and to eliminate any need for internal error 

control stemming from pres surization factors. Lanyard needed no 

counterbalance for the linear motion effects of the image motion 

control mechanism, eliminating requirements for the servo-drive 

counterweights needed on the E-5 image motion compensator. (In 

Lanyard, the Agena could be programmed to ignore rate inputs that 

fell below two milliradians per second.) Similarly, Lanyard required 

no counterweights for spool actions, as in the E-5, since in Lanyard 

film take-up forces were compensated for by counter-rotation on the 

60 

pitch axis of the orbiti ng vehicle. 

The proof of the pudding remained for the future, of cours e. 

Most satellite reconnaissance programs of the past had been notably 

high on promise and substantially limited in performance--leading to 

a notoriously high mortality rate. In December 1962, when the first 

Lanyard system was being assembled for transport to Vandenberg, the 

last of the original Samos systems, the E-6, was in the process of 

cancellation. To that time, only Corona and its siblings had returned 

reconnaissance pictures. (Products of the single successful E-l 

flight were treated as intere sting photographs taken from orbit- -curios 

with no real potential for utility.) And in the case of Lanyard, a 

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question of requirements had begun to cloud prospects. As early as 

August 1962, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) 

had registered with NRO Director Charyk a mild disclaimer of belief 

in any real need for Lanyard. NPIC expressed doubts, based chiefly 

on Corona experience, that the Lanyard vehicle could be programmed 

with sufficient precision to provide stereo coverage of vital targets. 

NPIC suggested that Lanyard's limited transverse, which would permit 

photographs of a 50-mile strip from a l25-mile orbit, was too slight 

for surveillance assignments although the probable photographic 

quality of the system indicated that surveillance should be its chief role. 

As it happened, NPIC' s real interest of the moment was inducing the 

NRO to improve the stellar-camera features of Lanyard, a move to 

enhance the value of the recovered product by increasing confidence 

that the precise location of the photographed area could be determined. 

61 

But the inquiry had an ominous ring, nonetheless. 

Perhaps anticipating that the tempo of quibbling would increas e 

with time, General Greer late in September 1962 approached Undersecretary Charyk with the suggestion that it might be useful to conduct 

a comparative technical evaluation of the Gambit and Lanyard systems. 

A similar evaluation had recently been completed for the E-6 and Mural. 

General Greer emphasized, however, that the primary purpose of the 

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study should be to uncover any payload technical problems that might 

have been overlooked in either development program rather than to 

put the two systems in any sort of competition. But useful comparative 

data would emerge in any case. Then, should a situation develop 

II •. in which a choice between the two systems is forced by budgetary 

or other considerations, II the information on which to base a decision 

62 could quickly be brought to hand. 

There were other advantages to the study- -and some pos sible 

disadvantages. On the negative side, it was conceivable that a weighted 

evaluation would lead to a finding that Lanyard promised considerably 

more in the way of reconnaissance value than Gambit. Unlikely though 

such an outcome seemed, Lanyard's capacity for wide-sweep photography 

at roughly the same resolution as Gan~bit might be attractive in some 

quarters, particularly if coupled to financial estimates which showed 

Gambit costing substantially ITlore. It would be advantageous to the 

reconnaissance programs, in the long term, if the study showed early 

that no real need for Lanyard existed; considerable money would be 

saved by cancelling the program at an early stage rather than, as with 

E-5 and E-6, after development was essentially complete and flight 

test well along. The same case might be made for cancelling Gambit 

early in its life. Greer was particularly concerned lest it should later 

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seem that his group was specializing in the development of redundant, 

expensive, and duplicative systems. 

No formal answer to General Greer's suggestion carne back. 

Instead, Charyk told the general early in October 1962 that there was 

a firrn Gambit requirement, that the Lanyard program was a useful 

back-up, and that in such terms there was no current need for a 

detailed comparative evaluation. "We are going to develop Gambit," 

63 

he said emphatically. 

It was during the late months of 1962 that the Lanyard development process began to encounter a succession of seemingly minor 

difficulties which, standing alone, meant little, but when taken together 

tended to delay the availability of critical articles. The camera portion 

had been mated to the frame of the orbital vehicle by early January 1963 

and about a third of the total flight preparation routine had been completed. But delays in availability of the Agena set back the start of 

compatibility testing by a week at that point, causing a general slip 

in schedules. The program office, fully aware that some such problems 

were inevitable, had inserted a small pad of slack time early in the 

development. Unhappily, Itek and Lockheed had eroded away most of 

that cushion somewhat earlier. By mid-January, Lockheed was conceding to "an extremely tight situation." If any major problems 

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developed, flight schedules would be jeopardized. Schedules were 

then so tight that the last sequence of camera tests had been rescheduled to follow rather than precede system environment checks, 

a change required by the delayed availability of a completely suitable 

64 

calibration facility. 

On 31 January, Itek advised Lockheed that the ber yllium mirror 

originally slated for use with the first Lanyard flight payload was "not 

acceptable." The camera firm recommended us ing one of the aluminum 

mirrors already available, since a beryllium replacement could not be 

provided before 11 February and the deadline for shipment of the 

qualified payload to Vandenberg was 15 February. (An aluminum mirror 

had been installed in the first flight system for use through ground 

tests, being scheduled for replacement shortly before final subsystem 

checks. What Itek was actually proposing, therefore, was retention 

of the aluminum mirror for the first flight.) Lockheed, after giving 

the matter considerable attention, concluded that a beryllium mirror 

was "essential to program objectives f! and held out for the original 

plan. Itek finally agreed, drawing the needed mirror from another 

65 

Lanyard system in final assembly. 

In the meantime, a succession of failures in both the payload 

section and in the thermal altitude simulator chamber had effectively 

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ended hope that original flight schedules might be maintained. The 

first unit entered the thermal-altitude chamber on 5 February, 

roughl y a week late. Two days later it had to be removed for failure 

analysis and necessary modification. An incorrect command from 

the test console had induced roll-joint failure. (The unit overran its 

rotation limit of 30 degrees, severing the connecting cable.) Additionally, electromagnetic interference had shorted out the programmer 

clock, and it developed that telemetry needs of the stellar -index 

camera had not been satisfied before the tests started. 

After three shifts worked at rewiring the unit, it started through 

the test chamber again on 8 February. The tests were halted the 

following day when the roll-joint refused to respond to commands and 

the cameras ignored automatic shut-down signals. This time the 

roll-joint had failed because of a short circuit in the camera wiring 

harness. Quick repair permitted a test resumption by 11 February, 

but later that day there was a repetition of the camera mode failure. 

Wearily, test personnel pulled the payload section out of the test 

chamber and sent it back to as sembly. 66 

The fourth attempt at a thermal-altitude chamber test began 

on 13 February. The stellar-index camera failed the next day, during 

a cold chamber exposure. Concurrently, roll-joint difficulties reappeared. 

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In this instance, however, the roll-joint problem was traced to a fault 

in the Lanyard's command decoder unit. The stellar-index camera 

failure was mechanical in origin, while refusal of the main camera 

to shut down on command (another problem v.h ich had reappeared) 

was attributed to a faulty transformer. After each of these defects 

had been corrected, the system finally completed its thermal-altitude 

checks on 18 February. The missing mirror made its appearance 

four days later. After a succession of minor difficulties which further 

slowed progress, the subsystem tests were completed on 4 March. 

67 

The shipment left Sunnyvale the next day. 

In one respect, the frustrating delays in completing Lanyard 

ground qualification seemed to have been fortunate. While Lanyard 

had been stalled in chamber tests, a standard Corona payload had 

been substituted in the launch schedule- -the first TAT booster launch, 

on 28 February. Because of a technician's failure to press hard 

enough when inserting an umbilical connector, one of the TAT's solid 

rocket units did not ignite and the satellite was lost. But the skein 

of rnisfortune which had accumulated about the first Lanyard was not 

yet complete. When the launch finally carne, on 18 March, it was 

unsuccessful. Because of an electrical system failure, the gas valves 

which governed Agena stabilization during injection operated only for 

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the first second of Agena burn. Lacking attitude control, the Agena 

stage began to roll at a rate which built up to 24 degrees per second 

at burnout. Burnout came 13 seconds early, probably because centrifugal force generated by the rapid roll rate prevented fuel from reaching 

the ignition chamber. The last hope for a miracle vanished when the 

Kodiak station failed to report any contact with the satellite at the 

time of its first scheduled appearance. 68 

Lack of success in the first Lanyard launch was a most untimely 

misfortune. Starting with a Corona launch on 7 January and including 

the initial TAT failure on 28 February, three successive attempts to 

obtain coverage of key Soviet areas had been barren. No photographs 

had been returned since 18 December 1962, a situation which brought 

expressions of particular concern both from the new director of the 

NRO, Brockway McMillan, and from CIA's Herbert Scoville. (Even 

before the abortive Lanyard trial, McMillan had directed a "maximum 

effort" to get early returns from a Corona-Mural, a course urged by 

CIA. Indeed, Scoville had suggested substituting a "normal" 

Corona-Mural payload for the first Lanyard, a measure that was 

69 

impractical in the time remaining before the Lanyard launch.) 

In the wake of the Lanyard failure, separate and detailed 

reports covering flight difficulties went to Secretary McNamara and 

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CIA Director John McCone. Scoville, though unhappy with the continued absence of photographs, seemed to be favorably impressed 

by the forceful approach General Greer's organization was taking 

toward Lanyard difficulties. McMillan agreed with Greer's observation that there was no useful or consistent pattern to the recent 

failures and that the best course for the moment was to continue 

scheduled launches. (Two Corona flights were set for April and one 

for what remained of March.) In the case of Lanyard. the matter of 

greatest urgency was to discover precisely what had caused the 

electrical failure in the Agena and to prevent its recurrence. The 

best explanation seemed to be that the act of blowing off the camera 

doors immediately after booster separation had somehow brought on 

a short circuit in a junction box, but determined efforts to reproduce 

70 

the effect in ground tests were fruitless. 

In the meantime, while the first Lanyard had been moving 

toward a most premature reentry, the project had become the center 

of a determined CIA effort to reassert greater control over major 

elements of the satellite reconnaissance effort. Late in February 

1963, the agency urged that Lanyard security procedures be merged 

with the extant Corona-Mural system, the name itself to survive 

only as a camera identifier. By implication, since Lanyard was 

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approaching the status of an operational system (from the agency viewpoint, at least), the entire program would thereafter conform to the 

pattern established for Corona-Mural. General Greer, speaking as 

Lanyard program director, voiced firm opposition to the notion. In 

this stand he was supported by the NRO staff. But the agency arguments 

seemed to stand a considerable chance at the moment, since Undersecretary Charyk was leaving government service at the end of February 

and no succes sor for the post of NRO director had been named. Indeed, 

it seemed pos sible to some reconnais sance program participants that 

the departure of Dr. Charyk might signal the end of the NRO its elf. 

The appointment of Dr. Brockway McMillan to succeed Charyk 

early in March scuttled rumors that the NRO would be discontinued 

and for practical purposes channelled the current Lanyard format 

controversy into a somewhat unrealistic discussion of security procedures. 

In that area too, it developed, General Greer had a highly defensible 

position. He pointed out, with quiet logic, that the age ncy was actually 

advocating establishment of dual security systems, one of a general 

nature for members of the Washington establishment, and another rigidly 

compartmented for personnel in the various field stations. That arrangement, Greer suggested, would be an invitation to security compromise 

since it would inevitably cause the proliferation of artifical security 

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compartments. He expressed particular concern at the increasing 

abundance of code words and the fertility of the creation process 

suggesting that what was needed was not so much the elimination of 

one security category (Lanyard) as a careful plan for a totally new 

h d bl h 1 · . 71 

approac • one a apta e to t e rea sltuation. 

For the moment, at least, the security clearance situation did 

not change. But immediately before the first Lanyard launch General 

Greer proposed that his establishment be made the action addressee 

on launch and orbit opera hon mes sages. He obs erved that such a 

change was entirely logical in the light of Lanyard's technical adolescence. (The system is "clearly in the early R&D stage, " Greer pointed 

out.) CIA's Lanyard agent, Colonel J. C. Ledford, instantly responded 

that until relieved of responsibility for !!satellite missions under my 

control II he proposed to follow !!established procedures.!! In this 

instance, he meant to assert the authority to decide when an early 

recovery was necessary, a matter that Greer (as director of the 

technical program) felt better qualified to judge and which, by the terms 

of the original Lanyard agreements of April 1962, was his responsibility in any case. 

The issue was resolved by NRO Director McMillan's ruling 

that Greer would exercise responsibility for all actions on which 

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successful recovery hinged except that he would not extend a mission 

once the operational control center in Washington had decided on an 

early recovery. Such an early recovery decision was, however, to 

be based only on considerations of reconnaissance urgency, the 

probability that mission success might be endangered by some special 

72 

hazard, or political expediency. Since that ruling confirmed General 

Greer in the responsibility for deciding all other issues, including 

that of how satellite functioning on orbit should figure in the timing of 

recovery operations, it had the effect of strengthening the authority 

of the program office and the program director. It did not entirely 

resolve the basic issue, however; Colonel Ledford continued to insist 

that his organization had the basic responsibility for "the development 

11 . 73 

of payloads and methods of operation" as well as overa securlty. 

The vitality of the Lanyard requirement was not seriously 

questioned during the authority and responsibility discussions of the 

spring of 1963. Indeed, John A. McCone, in his role as chairman of 

the United States Intelligence Board. told McMillan early in April 1963 

that "since the success of the GAMBIT system is quite uncertain" it 

would be advisable to purchase additional Lanyards. thus insuring the 

receipt of high resolution coverage during the period August 1963 to 

74 

August 1964. 

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But at the time there was considerably less assurance of 

Lanyard success than Gambit success. Not until mid-April did the 

second Lanyard get through its preflight checks and go to Vandenberg. 

It di d not leave the pad until 18 May. Then, for a time, all seemed 

to go well. The boosters and the Agena operated properly, injection 

into orbit was accurate, and everything needed for a first trial of the 

camera system appeared to be available. But the payload refus ed to 

respond to ground commands--a reluctance finally ascribed to the 

fact that no electrical power was getting to the decoder, which therefore 

could not hear the commands. There was no way to route orders around 

the decoder circuit and the possibility that the ailment might heal itself 

was unrealistically remote. All that could be done was to attempt 

recovery, using the "lifeboat!! system (which was independent of the 

main command circuitry and had its Own magnetrometer and gas supply). 

On 21 May the capsule was recovered from the water near Hawaii, 

Lanyard II proved no more useful to the reconnaissance program than 

75 

Lanyard 1. 

Reminiscent in some degree of the problems which had plagued 

the early E-5 flights, the difficulty of second Lanyard (vehicle llb5) 

Lanyard II did not have as much difficulty as Lanyard I in qualifying 

for launch, but it did encounter problems similar to those noted above 

in the case of the first Lanyard. There is no point to detailing them, 

however; nothing of major significance to the total program emerged. 

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was eventually traced to a short circuit of uncertain origin on the 

payload side of the interface with the Agena. In all probability, a 

faulty cannon plug connector was the cause, since that was one of the 

few suspect items which could go undetected during the prelaunch 

checkout proces s. The obvious remedy, which was immediately 

adopted, was to revise checkout procedures. Additionally, a steppedup routine of shock and vibration testing was grafted to the existent 

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. 76 

te stlng. 

One of the problems peculiar to early 1963 flights arose from 

the introduction of the Agena D--the "standardized" upper stage. Over 

the previous five years the Agena B had become a thoroughly familiar 

and generally reliable instrument for space reconnaissance. Familiarity inevitabl y bred laxnes s and the curs ory performance of some checks. 

When this situation became quite clear, in April and May 1963, reforms 

were prompt and effective. Specifically, General Greer's people saw 

to it that Lockheed re-established "a strong systems engineering and 

systems integration control, II a course which had highl y beneficial 

77 

long-term consequences. 

There was no serious thought of reducing effort on the Lanyard 

program as a consequence of the two succe s sive disappointn1.ents. 

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Galllbit still had not flown, and though Greer's people had unlilllited 

confidence in Galllbit's ability to perforlll as required they were 

adlllittedly putting their faith in an entirely untried systelll. Lanyard, 

even though it had returned nothing frOlll orbit, still had the character 

of a lllore conservative systelll, one with fewer technical uncertainties 

and one lllore nearly reselllbling the highly successful Corona. If 

Galllbit were to llleet with problellls silllilar to those which had affected 

all other reconnais sance satellites during their initiation per iod, 

Lanyard relllained the single option open to the National Reconnais sance 

Progralll. (It should be recalled that of the several reconnaissance 

systellls carried to the point of orbital operation, only Corona had as 

yet proved useful. E-l was of no practical value, E-2 had been cancelled 

after one unsuccessful launch, while both E-5 and E-6 had proven 

operationally futile and had been cancelled in consequence. Substantial 

profits to research and developlllent arising frolll experience with the 

E-series satellites did not count for llluch with intelligence specialists 

who rated prograllls on a scale that began with useful photographs 

returned frOlll orbit. ) 

In such an environlllent, the Lanyard progralll was On 24 May 1963 

expanded to include five additional pa yloads. At that tillle, three relllained 

of the original five ordered frolll Itek, with the three "spares II earlier 

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authorized constituting the entire reserve. Although Itek had accmllUlated seven sets of optical glass for Lanyard use, until the 24 May 

order no provision had been made for obtaining complete camera 

systems. The Special Projects Office in Los Angeles, appreciative 

of these circumstances and understanding their implication, had in 

April recommended an early start on a "follow-on" Lanyard program. 

The launch and upper stage vehicles might have to be diverted from 

either the dual-capsule Corona program (Corona-J) or one of the 

electronic reconnaissance programs. If Lanyard use had to be 

accelerated following an onset of Gambit difficulties there would be 

78 

too little time to fabricate additional Thors and Agenas. 

By mid-July, Itek and Lockheed had received financial authorization to proceed with fabrication of the additional payloads and associated 

structures. Program cost would go up by $9 million on that score alone, 

79 discounting booster. Agena, and launch costs. 

On 12 July 1963. the first Gambit was launched from Point 

Arguello. Its objective, defined many months before, was to return 

one good high resolution picture. The first Gambit mission did considerably more; it demonstrated that the optical and mechanical elements 

of the system were capable of exceeding the original (1960) requirements, 

and it proved that the rather complex orbital vehicle could perform its 

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basic assignment. No effort was made to "exercise all capabilities" 

during the first Gambit mis sion, though a considerable as surance of 

total system reliability was obtained in its course. 

By 15 July, when those facts were generally known to most of 

the "cognizant" intelligence community (which did not include everybody 

involved in Lanyard, by any means), much of the rationale underlying 

Lanyard development had begun to evaporate. Still, there was no 

immediate suggestion that the next scheduled Lanyard launch, only 

about two weeks away, should be scrubbed. One success did not a 

program make. But a continuation of Gambit success coupled with 

Lanyard difficulties would certainly weaken the case for continuing 

Lanyard. 

On 30 July 1963, the third Lanyard launch attempt was a succes s. 

The TAT and Agena functioned normally, guidance into orbit was highly 

accurate, and orbital parameters almost precisely matched those 

programmed. Most encouraging, the camera system seemed to be 

operating as planned. (The flight scheme called for keeping the rolljoint locked for the first 16 orbits, so that a failure in that mode would 

not prevent a working test of the camera elements, and for securing 

vertical pictures of the greatest possible number of first priority 

targets. ) 

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Still, there were problems. The stellar-index camera malfunctioned almost immediately, the index camera portion failing 

after only three frames and the stellar camera element operating 

oJ, '.' 

quite erratically thereafter. Then on pas s number 23 neither the 

main camera nor the stellar-index camera system would start. (The 

roll system had gone dead during pass 18, after only two orbits of 

use, but camera operation was not immediately affected.) A quick 

check of telemetry indicated that intervalometer failure during an 

engineering test on the previous pas s was the probable difficulty. 

All modes of command were tried, without success, after which the 

recovery operation was scheduled for the next appropriate orbit. 

Stellar-index camera operation was particularly important to 

Lanyard, and in conformance to Murphy's Law, particularly troublesome. Results of early flights in Corona-Mural configurations had 

demonstrated by April 1963 that stellar imagery returned to that 

time was quite useless for attitude determination--and in Lanyard 

the critical information on camera platform attitude during operation 

of the main camera was almost entirely dependent on successful 

functioning of the stellar-index camera subsystem. Largely on the 

basis of the discouraging advice (from National Photographic 

Interpretation Center--NPIC) that previous stellar images could not 

be used to determine vehicle attitude, Itek late in April 1963 made 

spec ial efforts to improve the quality of stellar-image returns from 

Lanyard. Modifications included alteration of the pop-out door, 

the addition of light baffles along the path to the stellar-camera 

lens, and changes in exposure settings. More sensitive film (SO-130) 

was als 0 substituted for that originally used (SO- 206).80 

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There was no recovery difficulty; an air catch attempt proved 

entirely successful. Examination of the capsule confirmed that it 

included exposed film- -which was rushed to development and evaluation. 

The best resolution contained on the recovered film permitted 

general examination of ground objects measuring four to five feet 

across their greatest dimension. Vehicles, small aircraft, and runway 

markings could be consistently identified. However, the greate st 

portion of the film gave a definite impression of softness--an out-offocus effect. Imperfect image motion compensation was not entirely 

at fault; it had remained within one percent of specification through 

the first nine passes and had never fallen below a three-percent level. 

The most probable explanation for out-of-focus photography seemed 

to be a combination of the image motion compensation error, an 

internal temperature 15 to 20 degrees higher than would normally be 

81 

expected, and instrument dynamics, 

The attempt to correct the rate of image motion compensation on 

pass 22, while the satellite was over Vandenberg, was the prime 

suspect in the search for an explanation of camera failure on the 

next pass, The camera system had been operating during the attempt 

to make an image motion compensation ramp change, and it seemed 

likel y that either the intervalometer or the intervalometer motor had 

failed as a direct cons equence, Telemetry had indicated a gradual 

degradation of image motion compensation after pas s number 10, 

The roll-joint had remained locked through the first 16 passes, and 

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In September the lens assembly next scheduled to fly a Lanyard 

mission was returned to Itek for rework, chiefly to correct for soft 

imagery. (The camera specialists in General Greer's organization 

were confident that a combination of lens-element shims and lens-barrel 

venting, to eliminate temperature variations which might have caus ed 

element spacing to exceed predicted tolerances, would correct the main 

difficulty.) By that time, however, there were Some indications that 

continuation of Lanyard at its previous rate was no longer carrying a 

high priority. Funds to provide for the five-vehicle program extension 

were slow to arrive, and in Washington there was acknowledgement of 

the reduced need for Lanyard now that Gambit was proving itself 

capable. (By 10 September the second set of Gambit returns had been 

processed--with most pleasing results.) On 23 October, while the 

fourth and fifth of the original Lanyard systems were being prepared 

for launches scheduled to take place during the remainder of 1963, NRO 

Director McMillan ordered an immediate and complete termination of 

the Lanyard program. At that point in time the five IIfollow-on" payloads 

were between 80 and 100 percent complete (two had gone through 

was thus removed from the list of degrading elements. Its operation 

during pas ses 17 and 18 appeared to be normal, although failure of 

the stellar-index camera to operate properly made it difficult to 

determine with precision how accurately the roll-joint had functioned 

during its brief period of activation. 

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fabrication and were ready for check-out), and the reITlalnlng five 

were sOITIewhere further down the line. Itek wanted to cOITlplete 

all of the first five "follow-on" payloads but General Greer opposed 

the proposal on the irrefutable grounds that there no longer was any 

requireITlent for Lanyard caITleras. While the ITlatter of residual 

inventory was pending, Lanyard joined its ancestors, the last of the 

reconnaissance systeITls descended froITl the original line of E-series 

82 prograITls to COITle to an end. 

Because of the peculiar relationship between GaITlbit and Lanyard 

(the Lanyard-originated roll-joint was being used in the first GaITlbits 

without the knowledge of all Lanyard-associated contractor personnel), 

instructions to Lockheed concerning terITlination had to be phrased so 

as to exclude GaITlbit-required cOITlponents. McMillan's instructions 

to Greer, on 23 October, had also authorized the general to deterITline 

how ITluch ITlore work was in the governITlent interest--that is, how 

ITlany payloads were so near cOITlpletion that it would be worthwhile 

to carry theITl through the acceptance process before sending theITl to 

storage. As with other cancelled satellite reconnaissance prograITls, 

"payload peculiar" equipITlent was to be securely stored against SOITle 

83 

unpredictable future need. 

Subsequent to his original instruction, Under secretary McMillan 

authorized cOITlpletion, through acceptance testing, of the three payloads 

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nearest to delivery readiness. The work would cost about $245, 000. 

On all other aspects of Lanyard, Itek halted work by 25 October; 

84 Lockheed had stopped by 23 October. 

Still later, on 15 November, McMillan approved a proposal 

from General Greer that Itek be issued a level-of-effort contract, at 

a rate of about $70, 000 per month, the money to be drawn from the 

residual of Lanyard funds. The agreement, which eventuall y took 

the form of a long-term study contract, also permitted Itek to keep 

two cameras (cameras 02 and 06) for use in the level-of-effort work. 

Except for these and one other set of items, all remaining Lanyardpeculiar hardware had been put in bonded storage by the end of 

85 

March 1964. The "other set" was made of two complete lenses 

(not camera systems) and five sets of Lanyard optical glass, transferred 

to the photo reconnaissance laboratory at Wright-Patterson for "high 

86 altitude research programs. II 

The conversations that preceded the final decision to cancel 

Lanyard involved both the chief of the CIA and the Secretary of Defense. 

It was generally agreed, after the fact, that the cancellation had been 

brought about by a combination of factors. Gambit's undoubted success 

was the chief of these. But the chronic shortage of NRO funds, the 

existence of several programs and advanced developments which could 

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profit from a higher level of financing, and the lack of a specific 

requirement for a system with Lanyard's performance characteristics 

certainly weighed in the decision. Then there was the matter of 

technology itself. Although every promise of better results seemed 

to be valid, Lanyard had returned pictures clearly inferior to those 

produced by Gambit. System dynamics, one of the principal villains 

cited in the original analysis of the "soft" pictures obtained in July, 

prejudiced the Lanyard case. Whatever its theoretical meri ts- -and 

there were several- -Lanyard remained the product of 1958 technology 

that had been outdated by later progres s. Its incorporation of some 

elements of Corona technology was not a sufficient corrective; 1962-

vintage Coronas generally returned a high percentage of good photographs, but the system invariably produced a larger number of 

s ubstantiall y poorer negatives. Those faults were to require special 

attention in 1963 and after. Finally, as one specialist described it, the 

Lanyard camera included a lot of things that clanked back and forth, 

sometimes rather violently. Compared to Gambit and to new systems 

being proposed on the basis of six years of increasingly valuable 

experience in the development of Cameras for orbital operation, 

Lanyard seemed too complex, too "uncoordinated'! and too susceptible 

f °1 87 to alure. 

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One of the key factors in Lanyard cancellation was at onCe 

obvious and obscure. It was obvious that Gambit was providing the 

service Lanyard had been designed to insure. Obscuration derived 

from the fact that almost no one clos el y as sociated with the Lanyard 

program in 1963 paid much heed to the fact that Lanyard had been 

approved as insurance against Gambit failure or delay, that early 

presentations had emphasized such a program justification, and that 

senior defense and CIA officials had never looked on Lanyard in any 

other light. Predictably, typically, and commendably, Lanyard people 

had become so committed to their project that they ignored its intended 

impermanence. Some, indeed, were not fully aware of the CharykMcNamara interchange of late 1961 which had been chiefly responsible 

for securing initial program approval. The lack of such information 

was at the root of much of the apparent bewilderment that characterized 

program office reaction to Lanyard cancellation. 88 

By the time of its cancellation, the Lanyard payload development 

program had cost $11. 789 million (including all contractor expenditures 

89 through September 1963). Excluding vehicle, launch, and control 

station costs, the effort was scheduled to absorb roughly $7 million more. 

Not everybody was content with the cancellation decision, of 

course. Some of the camera specialists in the Special Projects Office 

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on the West Coast continued to maintain that the relatively minor 

optical problems could have easily been fixed and that the panoramic 

features of the Lanyard camera in combination with its high res olution 

made it a valuable instrument for satellite reconnais sance. But, in 

fact, by 1963 far more promising search and surveillance systems 

were entering design and development phases, Corona was on the verge 

of a substantial quality improvement that in less than two years would 

make it nearly as capable as Lanyard might have been, and Gambit 

was entering a product improvement stage that led to a far better 

photographic product than Lanyard could ever have produced. 

Lanyard had one attribute that set it off from the six other 

photographic satellite subprograms approved and undertaken as part of 

the original Samos effort that dated from 1954. Lanyard had returned 

photography, and the photography had intelligence utility. Only one 

other mission of the many attempted in the intricate program that 

ran from E-l through E-6 and Lanyard had recorded any photographic 

success, the E-l flight of January 1961. And E-l photography had little 

more than engineering interest by the time it became available; Corona 

had made it entirely obsolete. Of course Lanyard was not a typical 

E-series Samos program, having been conducted in a setting that 

resembled Corona rather than any "normal" program organization. 

But that too had more than passing significance. 

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NOTES ON SOURCES 

Rpt, Program Summary, "SAMOS - Revis ed Development Plan, " 

6 Aug 60, in SAFMS files: Samos hist; and Samos Dev PIns dtd 

15 Jan 60, 12 Jul 60, and 11 Aug 60, all in SSD Hist Div files. 

Rpt, "SAMOS, 11 13 Jun 60 (The Billings Study, sent to BMD in 

draft form on 13 Jun 60), in SSD Hist Div files. 

Mins, WS 117L Special Study Comm, 21-22 Jul 60, in Samos 

files LAC presn slides, mid-1960, in Phelps files. 

Ltr, Col W. G. King, Dir/Samos Proj Ofc, to LMSD (H. Brown), 

31 Aug 60, subj: SAMOS Subsystem E-5 Work Progress, in SP 

Samos files: 101A-IOlB 60-61; ltr, Brown to King, 26 Sep 60, 

same subj and file; ltr, King to Brown, 10 Oct 60, same subj 

and file; Mins of Mtg of WS 117L Spec Studies Comm 27 Sep 60, 

in SP Samos files, Mins. 

Interview, LtCol R. Yundt, SAFSP, by R. L. Perry, Hist Div, 

13 Mar 63. 

TWX SAFSP-DP 12-10-16, SAFSP to SAFMS, 26 Oct 60, in 

SAFMS Telcon file, Oct-Nov 60; TWX SAFSP-DP-12-10-16, 

SAFSP to SAFMS (BrigGen R. D. Curtin), 14 Oct 60, in Samos 

file, R&D-2; memo for record, prep by Maj H. C. Howard, 

SAFMS, 8 Nov 60, subj: Staff Visit to Itek Corporation, in 

SAFMS files, Staff Visits, with longhand note by Curtin concerning 

diagnostic flights; Itr, I I Mgr, Sat S YS, LAC, to 

BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 5 Nov 60, subj: Samos Program 

Acceleration, in Samos file, R&D-2, 101A/B 60-61; TWX 

SAFSP-VT-21-11-11, SAFSP to LAC, 22 Nov 60, same file. 

Memo for Record, prep by Maj H. C. Howard, 30 Nov 60, subj: 

Trip Report of Majors Howard and James, 14-21 November 

1960, in SAFMS files: Staff Visits; TWX LMSD to BMD (SAFSP), 

22 Dec 60, in Samos files, R&D-2, 101A/B 60-61. 

Ltr, BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to LMSD, 7 Feb 61, subj: 

E-5 and E-6 Priority, in E-6 (Heran) files: Mgt 4, Policy. 

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11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

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Ibid; ltr, Co1H.L. Evans, V/Dir/SP, toLMSD, 16 Jan 61, 

subj: E-5 and E-6 Priority, in E-6 (Heran) files. 

Memo for Record, BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, 16 Feb 61, 

subj: Trip Report, in Greer files, Samos policy. 

TWX, SAFSP-24-2-17, SAFSP for SAFUS (Under Secy J. V. 

Charyk), 25 Feb 51, in SAFMS files: Samos Gen 1961; Yundt 

interview, 13 Mar 63. 

TWX SAFMS-SEN-61-29, SAFMS to SAFSP, 9 Mar 61, III 

E-6 (Heran) files: Mgt 4, Policy, 1961. 

Memo, BrigGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, to AF Under Secy 

J. V. Charyk, 17 Apr 61, no subj, in SAFMS Misc files; 

Itr, Col H.L. Evans, D/Dir/SP, to 6595th ATW (Col J.S. 

Cody, Cmdr, 26 Apr 61, subj: Checkout Philosophy and 

Actions for Special Vehicle Launches from Vandenber g AFB, 

in SP Samos files: 101A/B 60-61. 

TWX, LMSD 38/640, LMSD to SAFSP, 15 Mar 61, and SAFSPVT-15-6-30, SAFSP to LMSD, 20 Jun 61, both in SP Samos 

files: 10lA/B 60-61; LAC TWXs LMSD 396861, 5 Jun 61, 

LMSD 3992/6, 17 Jul, LMSCA 090474, 24 Jul, LMSCA 092048, 

14 Aug, and LMSC B 00613, 6 Sep 61, all in SP Samos files, 

R&D 38-51/61. 

TWX, SAFSP-L-25-7-50, SAFSP to LMSC, 26 Jul 61, in SP 

Sarnos files, 101A/10lB, 60 -61; memo, Maj H. C. Howard to 

BrigGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, 25 Jul 61, subj: Relaxed 

Schedules, in SAFMS files. Samos, Gen, 61. 

TWXs LMSC B 000816-67-40, LMSC to SAFSP, 19 Sep 61 and 

LMSC B 000879-76-40, 26 Sep 61, in SP Samos files R&D 

38- 51/ 61; various TWXs in SP Samos files 101A/lOlB 60-61 

dealing with the horizontal system test controvers y- -the 

6595th urged the test, SAFSP saw no need--and ltr, MajGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir /SP to Col J. D. Cody, Cmdr 6595th A TW, 

25 Aug 61, subj: Program 10lB Pre-launch Checkout and Launch 

Readines s, same file. 

SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61, in SAFSP hist files. 

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Samos Prog Rpt, 30 Sep 61, in SP Samos files. 

TWX LMSC B 001/47-67-40, LMSC to SAFSP, 31 Oct 61, in 

SP Samos files, R&D 38-51/61; SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61. 

Notes in SP Samos files, R&D 1, Gen, Misc, 61; TWX VWZ24-11, 6595th A TW to SAFSP, 24 Nov 61; SAFSP Hist Chron 

Ju1-Dec 61; ltr, W. V. Tyminski, LMSD, to Col W.G. King, 

SAFSP, 12 Oct 61, subj: Contract AF 04 (647)-563, in SP 

Samos file, 10lA/10lB 60-61. 

TWX SAFMS-DIR-61-167, BrigGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, to 

MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 4 Dec 61; TWX SAFSP-PP4-12-146, SAFSP to LMSC, 5 Dec 61; TWX SAFSP-0-7-12-281, 

SAFSP to LMSC, 7 Dec 61; TWX SAFMS-PRD-61-158, Col 

J.R. Martin, SAFMS, to Greer, 7 Dec 61, all inSP-3 files. 

Rpt, Orbital Test Directive, Program I, Project 101B, prep 

by 6595th AT W, 26 Nov 61, in SP Samos file. 

TWX SAFSP-X-6-12-77, SAFSP to AF Plant Rep, LMSC:, 

6 Dec 61, in SP Samos files, R&D-IO, Termination, 1961. 

Ltr, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to Hq USAF1 I 

Ofc Asst SAF for Fin Affairs), 3 Jan 62, subj:arha1 'I errnlnation of Contract, in SAFMS files, Gen; TWX SAFSP-X-6-12-7, 

6 Dec 61. 

Memo for Record, prep b~ J BMC, 25 Sep 61, 

subj: Delection of SPS - Program I; T W LMSD 388757, 

LMSD to SAFSP, 12 Apr 61; memo, Col W. G. King to LtCol 

J. T. Seay, D/ Dir Proc and Prog Mgt, SAFSP, 3 Oct 61, 

subj: Secondary Propulsion System, all in SP Samos files 

101A/lOlB 60-61. 

TWX SAFSP-L-3-10-19, SAFSP to OSAF for SAFUS, 3 Oct 61; 

ltr, Col W. G. King, D/ Dir Prog I, Samos Proj Ofc, to SSD, 

5 Oct 61, subj: Deletion of Requirement for Secure (Encrypted) 

Command Link for SAMOS Vehicle, in SP Samos files, C&C. 

TWX conference between J. Schaub, LMSC, and Col W. G. 

King, D/Dir/lOlB, 26 Dec 61, cy in SP Samos file, R&D 2-5, 

2203, 1961; SAFSP Hist Chron, Ju1-Dec 61. 

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SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61. 

Interview, Col V. M. Genez, SAFSP, by R. L. Perry, Hist 

Div, 31 Mar and 16 Apr 64. Probably because the E-5 program 

was all but defunct after mid-December 1961, relatively few 

records of such activities were made, and fewer survived. 

TWX VWZS-7-3-23, 6595th ATW to SAFSP, 8 Mar 62; TWX 

TWRC-13-3-4-E, 6595th ATW to SAFSP, 13 Mar 62; Critique 

Charts, 2204 Review, Mar 62, all in SP Samos files R&D 2-6, 

2204, 1961-62; SAFSP Review, Mar 62, all in SP Samos files 

R&D 2-6, 2204, 1961-62; SAFSP Hist Chron, Jan-Jun 62. 

Genez interview, 16 Apr 64. 

SAFSP Hist Chron, Jan-Jun 62, entry for 1 Mar 62. 

TWX SAFMS-SEN -61-162, SAFMS to SAFSP, 11 Dec 61; memo 

for record, Col W.G. King, D/Dir SP-L, 15 Dec 51, subj: 

Comparative Evaluation of ITEK 05 Hopkins Lens and The 

Perkin Elmer Lens; TWX SAFSP-L-18-12-125, SAFSP to 

LMSC, 18 Dec 61; TWX SAFSP-L-18-l2-124, SAFSP to ASD, 

19 Dec 61; Itr, King to LAC, 15 Jan 62, subj: Comparative 

Lens Evaluation Test Conduct; TWX SAFSP-L-13-l2-l51, 

SAFSP to SAFMS, 14 Dec 61, all in SP Samos files, 101A/B, 

60-61. The tests were conducted at ASD although Lockheed 

had originally been slated to do the work. 

Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, by R. L. Perry, 

Hist Div, 4 Mar 63; ltr, J. Carter, V/Pres Itek, to Hq SSD 

(SAFSP), 19 Dec 61, subj: Technical and Cost Proposal for 

a Simplified High-Acuity Panoramic Camera, in SAFSS 

files, Lanyard. 

TWX SAFSP-F-28-l2-l71, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to 

BrigGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, 28 Dec 61; TWX SAFMS-M-l209, Curtin to Greer, 29 Dec 61, both in SP-3 files, Funding. 

Memo, Maj Mark Farnum, Corona, to LtCol R. J. Ford, 

Corona, 29 Dec 61, no subj, in Corona files. 

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37. Memo for Record, Maj H. C. Howard, SAFMS, 11 Jan 62, 

subj: Simplified 66" System (SSD black code word: LANYARD), 

in SAFSS files, Lanyard. 

38. Interview, BrigGen J. R. Martin, D/Dir /SP, by R. L. Perry, 

18 Sep 64. 

39. TWX SAFMS DIR 62-25, BrigGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, to 

MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 1 Feb 62, in SP-3 files, Genl. 

40. Memo for Record, Col J. R. Martin, D/Ch SAFMS, 13 Feb 62, 

subj: SAFUS-SAFSP West Coast Conference 9 Feb 62, III 

Gen Martin's files; Martin interview, 18 Sep 64. 

41. TWX SAFSP-F-13-2-195, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to 

BrigGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, 13 Feb 62, in SP-3 files, Funding. 

42. Msg ADIC 7878, CIA to Corona OFC, 21 Feb 62, in Corona 

files; memo, Maj H. C. Howard, SAFMS, t~ f NRO 

Compt, 6 Mar 62, no subj, in SAFSS files, Lanyard; memo, 

J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to D/Dir/CIA, 2 Apr62, sUbj: Management of Lanyard, in SAFSS files, Lanyard. 

43. Memo, Charyk to D/Dir/CIA 2 Apr 62; memo, H. Scoville, Jr., 

D/Dir /Res, CIA, to SAFUS, 5 Apr 62, subj: Management of 

Lanyard, in SP-3 files, Progs. 

44. Msg ADIC 951-8, CIA to SAFSP, 4 Apr 62, in Lanyard files. 

45. Interview, LtCol Mark Farnum and LtCol R. J. Ford, Corona 

ofc, 11 Oct 62, by R. L. Perry, Hist Div; memo, prep by Maj 

Mark Farnum, 30 Mar 62, subj: Trip Report, in Lanyard 

files; ltr, Itek to LMSC, 16 Apr 62, subj: Offer to Purchase 

Residual Inventory, cited in msg ADIC 1347, CIA to LMSD, 

18 Apr 62; Itr, MajGen R. E. Greer, D/Sat Progms, SSD, to 

Hq AFSC, attn MajGen O. J. Ritland, D/Cmdr Manned Space 

Fit, 4 Jun 62, subj: Request for Disposition of Terminal 

Inventory; ltr, Ritland to Hq USAF (attn LtGen Mark Bradley, 

DCS/S&L, 6 Jun 62, same subj: ltr, Bradley to Greer, 6 Jun 

62, same subj, all in SAFSS files: Lanyard; msg. 1 12189, 

SAFSP to CIA, 18 Jun 62, in Lanyard files. 

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46. Ms g ADIC 0769, CIA to SAFSP, 7 May 62, in Lanyard files. 

47. Msg, 1 12134, SAFSP to CIA, 11 May 62; msgl 13915, 

LMSD to Itek, 11 May 62; msg, 1 100004, D/NRO to CIA, 

SSD (for MajGen R. E. Greer), 22 May 62, all in Lanyard fi les. 

48. TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2098, SAFSS to SAFSP, 8 Oct 62, in 

SP - 3 file s, Funding. 

49. Msg, I 12595, SAFSP to CIA, 10 Oct 62, in Lanyard files; 

ms g ADIC 8085, CIA to Itek, 19 Oct 62. 

50. Progm Rpt, Nov 62, in SP-3 files; msg ADIC 8299, CIA to 

Itek, 25 Oct 62, inl 1 files; msg ADIC 9233, CIA to Itek, 

51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

56. 

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19 Nov 62, same file. 

Memo for record, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 5 Jul 62, 

subj: Special As signment: Major Bernard W. Quinn, in 

Corona files, MFR's; msg ADIC 6065, CIA to SAFSP, 

6 Sep 62, in I I files. 

Msg ADIC 7121, CIA to SAFSP, 27 Sep 62, i~ Ifiles; 

ms gl 12428, SAFSP (MajGen R. E. Greer) to SAFSS 

(ColJ.R. Martin), 26Sep62, andl 12488, SAFSPto 

SAFSS, 9 Oct 62, in Corona files. 

Msgs: 1 15495, LMSD to Itek, 16 Oct 62; ACORN 162, 

Itek to LMSD, 19 Oct 62;115539, LMSD to Itek, 23 Oct 62; 

ADIC 9233, CIA to Itek, ~ 62; ADIC 9543, CIA to D/NRO, 

26 Nov 62; ADIC 0619 to EK, 19 Dec 62, all i~ 1 files. 

Msg,1 15170, LMSD to CIA, 18 Sep 62; msg, 1 15514, 

LMSD to Itek, 22 Oct 62, both i9 1 files. ~-~ 

Msgs: ACORN 061, Itek to CIA, 13 Sep 62; 1 1 5548, LMSD 

to Itek, 24 Oct 62; ACORN 172, Itek to CIA, 26 Oct 62; 

115641, LMSD to CIA, 3 Nov 62; ACORN 234 and 242, 

TteITo LMSD, 19 and 26 Nov 62, all i9 I files. 

Msgs: ACORN 241, Itek to CIA, 26 Nov 62;1 15831, LMSD 

to CIA'UV 62; ACORN 284 and 291, Itek to CIA 4 and 18 

Dec 62; 6093, LMSD to CIA, 19 Dec 62, and ACORN 312, 

Itek to ,9 Dec 62, all inl Ifiles. 

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57. Msg, "---I __ 1 5820, LMSD to CIA, 27 Nov 62, i1"-----__ lfiles. 

58. 

59. 

60. 

61. 

62. 

63. 

64. 

65. 

66. 

67. 

68. 

69. 

Msg, ACORN 0855, Itek to CIA, 18 Jun 62; msg, ACORN 0312, 

Itek to CIA and SAFSP, 29 Dec 62, both in Lanyard files. 

Summary Rpt, PROJECT LANYARD, undated. aprox Jul 62, 

in SAFSS files: Lanyard. 

Rpt, "PROJECT LANYARD, II undated, aprox Feb 62, apparently 

prepared for SAFUS by SAFMS, in SAFSS files, Lanyard. 

Memo.1 I for A. C. Lundahl, Dir/NPIC, to D/NRO, 

17 Aug 6Z, sUbJ: Comments on Certain Collection Systems, 

in SAFSS files, Corona, Gen. 

Msg,II2436, MajGen R.E. Greer to SAFUS, 28 Sep 62, 

in SA~: Lanyard. 

Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/Spec Projs, OSAF, by 

R. L. Perry, 27 Jul 64; interview, Col W. G. King, Dir/Gambit, 

29 Jul 64. 

Msgs.1i6166,3Jan63,1 16219,9Jan63;1 16276, 

15 Jan ~~ 16369. 26 Jan 63, all Lockheed to CIA, all 

inl 1 (Leach) files. 

Msg, ACORN 378, Itek to Lockhee;:-::d=,_3,,--=1=--,Jan 63; msg, 1 16393, 

Lockheed to CIA, 31 Jan 63; msg,l 16412, Lockheed to 

SAFSP, 5 Feb 63; msg, ACORN 404, Itek to Lockheed, 

8 Feb 63, all in Leach files. 

Msg, 1 16468, Lockheed to CIA, 14 Feb 63, in Leach files. ~-~ 

Msgs, 1 16530 and 6570, Lockheed to CIA, 28 Feb and 

8 Mar 63, msg, 1 16504, Lockheed to SAFSP, 25 Feb 63, 

all in Leach files. 

Msgs, BISON 0021 and 0022, VAFB to CIA, 18 Mar 63; msg, 

IBSON 0024, VAFB to CIA, 19 Mar 63; msg,l 12825, 

LMSC to CIA, 19 Mar 63, all in Leach files. 

Msg, ADIC 3835, CIA to D/NRO, 2 Mar 63; msg, I 1 0308 , 

D/NRO to SAFSP, 5 Mar 63, both i~ I(Leach) files. 

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70. Menlo, B. McMillan, D/NRO, to SOD and Dir/Central Intel, 

20 Mar 63, subj: Status Report of LANYARD; nlenlO for record, 

H. Scoville, Jr., Dep Dir/Res/CIA, 25 Mar 63, subj: Meeting 

held on Friday, 22 March, on Reconnaissance Satellite 

Reliability, both in SAFSS files, Lanyard. 

71. Msgs, ADIC 3303, CIA to D/NRO, 20 Feb 63;1 1 0301, 

NRO to CIA, 20 Feb 63; 1 12774, SAFSP (MajGen R. E. 

Greer) to CIA, 26 Feb 63; ADIC 3719, CIA to SAFSP, 28 Feb 

63; andl 12792, SAFSP (Greer) to CIA, 5 Mar 63, all 

inl 1 (Leach) files. 

72. Msg, 112805, SAFSP (MajGen R. E. Greer) to CIA, 

13 Ma~SAFSS files. Lanyard; nlsgs, ADIC 4273, CIA 

to SAFSP, 13 Mar 63 andl r332, NRO to CIA, 15 Mar 

63, i~ /(Leach) files. 

73. Msg, ADIC 5272, CIA (Col J.C. Ledford) to Dir/NRO Staff 

{Col John Martin}, 3 Apr 63, inl 1 (Leach) files. 

74. MenlO, J .A. McCone, Chnl USIB, to D/NRO, 9 Apr 63, subj: 

Photographic Satellite Reconnais sance Pr ogranl, in NRO files, 

Lanyard. 

75. Msgs: 1 1 6868 , Lockheed to CIA, 15 Apr 63; 1 1 6972, 

Lockheed to CIA, 23 Apr 63; BISON 0078, VAFB to NRO 

76. 

77. 

78. 

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Staff, 18 May 63; BISON 0087, BISON 7177, VAFB to NRO 

Staff, 20 May 63; BISON 0104, VAFB to NRO Staff, 21 May 63, 

all inl ~Leach) files. 

Msg, I 13158 , SAFSP to D/NRO, 12 Jul 63; nlsg,1 13013, 

SAFSP to D/NRO, 28 May 63, both inl I(Leach) fi'o-le-s-.----l 

Msgs, 1 1 2952, SAFSP to D/NRO, (MajGen R. E. Greer) 

to D/NRO B. McMillan), 1 May 63 an~ 2970, sanle 

origin and address, 3 May 63, both in~each) files. 

Msg, I 10437 , NRO to SAFSP, 24 May 63, in!"---__ ---l 

(Leach) files; nlenlO, LtCo1 H. C. Howard, Asst for Sys Engr, 

NRO Staff, to Col J. Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, 1 May 63, subj: 

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Brief LANYARD History, in SAFSS files, Lanyard; rnsg, 

"----__ ~13024, SAFSP to Itek, 31 Ma y 63, in Leach files, 

passed the order to Itek. 

79. Msgs, all from SAFSP: 1 13037 to D/NRO, 6 Jun 63; 

1 1 3047 to Lockheed, 10 Jun 63;1 13183 to Lockheed, 

18 Jul 63, all inl 1 (Leach) files. 

80. Msg, SPECTRE 0672, NPIC to D/NRO, 17 Apr 63; msg, 

~-----c--J169l4, LMSC to CIA, 18 Apr 63; msg, 1 1 0379, 

NRO to SAFSP, 19 Apr 63; msg, LMSC to SAFSP, 24 Apr 63; 

msg, SPECTRE 0687, NPIC to LMSC, 24 Apr 63, all i~ 1 

(Leach) files; plans for use of roll joint and COMOR (Committee 

on Overhead Reconnaissance) requirements were contained in 

memo, J. Q. Reber, Chm, COMOR, to D/NRO, 5 Feb 63, 

subj: Requirements for the First LANYARD Mis sion, in NRO 

files, Lanyard, and in msgs I 16359, LMSD to CIA, 

24~3, and j 10214, NRO to SAFSP, 4 Jun 63, both 

in~ files. 

81. Msgs, BISON 0231, VAFB to SAFSS, 31 Jul 63 and BISON 0263, 

VAFB to SAFSS, 2 Aug 63; msg, Eastman Kodak to NRO, 

5 Aug 63, all in 1 I (Leach) files; memo, BGen J. L. Martin, 

Dir /NRO Staff, to D/NRO, 9 Aug 63, subj: Mission 8003 Preliminary Analysis, in NRO files, Lanyard. 

82. Msg, / /3389, LMSC to CIA, 3 Sep 63; msg, 1 10695, 

D/ NRO to SAFSP (MajGen R. E. Greer), 23 Oct 62 (the termination directive); msg, ADIC 5352, CIA to LMSC, 23 Oct 63; 

msg, j 13678, SAFSP (Greer) to D/NRO (B. McMillan), 

2 Nov 63, all in NRO files, Lanyard. 

83. Msg, I 10695, D/NRO to SAFSP, 23 Oct 63; memo, 

A.R. Leach, Contr Ofcr (SAFSP) to Hq CIA, 27 Nov 63, subj: 

Termination of Lanyard Program, in Leach files; msg, 

1 13668, SAFSP to LMSD, 1 Nov 63, in Leach files. 

84. Memo, Leach to Hq CIA, 27 Nov 63; msg, I 0731, 

D/ NRO to SAFSP, 7 Nov 63, in I I (Leach) files. 

85. Msg, 1 14565, SAFSP to D/NRO, 1 Apr 64, in NRO files, 

Lanyard; msg, 1 10782, D/ NRO (B. MCMillan) to SAFSP 

MajGen R. E. Greer), 6 Dec 63 (confirming verbal orders of 

15 November), in NRO files. 

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87. 

88. 

89. 

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Msg, WHIG 0950, Dir/NRO Staff to SAFSP, 24 Feb 64, in 

NRO files, Lanyard. 

Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/Spec Projs, OSAF, 

6 May 64; interview, LtCol H. H. Howard, NRO Staff, 

24 Apr 64, 1 Jul 64. 

Martin interview, 18 Sep 64. 

Msg, ACORN 971, Itek to CIA, 2 Oct 63, in ,---I ___ I(Leach) files. 

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XI THE E-6 PROGRAM 

Note: 

At various times of no particular consequence the E-6 program 

was officially known by other titles: Program II, Program 201, 

Program 698BJ, Program 722. The term most commonly in use In 

1963 was "BJ. II For the purpose of this account, and in the interests 

of narrative continuity, the identifier "E-6" is used throughout. 

Through the long spring and summer of 1960, while matters of 

project structure and program objective were being debated at various 

levels between the project office and the White House, the sixth and 

last of the Samos camera systems to receive formal designation was 

also taking shape. The suggestion of developing a recoverable-capsule 

photo-payload very different from the E-5 was first voiced in May. Its 

antecedents stretched into the much more distant past. 

In a very real sense, the E-5 program had been created and 

carried on to insure against complete reliance On the original readout 

systems and to provide for the collection of higher resolution than 

could be obtained by any readout system based on 1956-1958 technology. 

In 1958 there was not much serious consideration of abandoning readout 

in favor of recovery. But by the early months of 1960 it had becorne 

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apparent to ITlany that the fundaITlental conception of surveillance by 

ITleans of readout satellites ITlight well be unsound. L,iITlitations in 

scale and resolution, insufficient bandwidth flexibility, and technical 

difficulties encountered in the course of subsysteITl developITlent were 

partly responsible. But the increasing probability that an operational 

readout system could be extreITlely costly also influenced opinion. 

Not ITlerely the vehicles but the facilities to support readout proITlised 

to be ITlore cOITlplex and costly than the ITlissiles and ITlissile sites then 

straining the national budget. EstiITlates of potential investITlent 1n 

collecting, proc es sing, interpr eting, and dis s eITlina ting readout 

photography becaITle ITlore alarITling as a final developITlent phase 

1 

approached. 

A second factor influential In the readout-recovery debate of 

1960 was disagreeITlent about the proper role of concurrency in the 

SaITlos prograITl. Concurrency, a costly strategy that nonethele s s 

was highly regarded in SOITle quarters, assuITled the existence of a 

pres sing need for operational s ysteITls and the availability of mature 

technology that could be exploited by siITlultaneous developITlent and 

deploYITlent. Concurrency lost its attractiveness if the deployed 

weapons were likel y to becoITle operationally ineffective soon after 

being handed over to operational forces, or if they could not be 

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delivered on schedule. The expense of concurrency had to be justified 

by the presence of a grave threat to national security that could best 

be countered by a cost-be-damned weapons acquisition policy. 

Most Samos program managers were by 1960 pretty certain 

that cameras in orbit would remain "few-of-a-kind" devices for at 

least another decade; "mass production" was almost inconceivable, 

and unique space vehicles mostly unlike one another neither required 

nor could be accommodated within a complex of expensive, standardized 

ground facilities with inflexible operational attributes. 

Finally, the application of concurrency concepts to the acquisition 

of reconnaissance satellites assumed that operational responsibility for 

the satellites would be as signed to an operating command--the Strategic 

Air Command. Concurrency was not warranted if there was no certain 

need to assign the developed articles to an operating command. Where 

satellite reconnais sance was concerned, not only was need uncertain, 

but United States national space policy of the 1950s began with the 

as sumption that overt overflight by U. S. reconnaissance satellites 

could provoke violent objections from such diverse states as France, 

the Soviet Union, China, India, and the Arab nations. Add the 

reasonable prospect that an expensive complex of readout vehicles and 

stations could become obsolete overnight with the emergence of new 

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technology, and concurrency became increasingly unattractive. But 

concurrency, the plans for an extensive ground-station readout 

complex, and the near-term assignment of reconnaissance satellite 

operating responsibility to the Strategic Air Command were the three 

2 

most prorninent attributes of the pre-1960 Samos program. 

By April 1960, Corona had experienced its eighth successive 

failure (Discoverer IX) and was entering a limbo of engineering overhaul that would postpone further trials for two months. Early in 

May the U-2 incident abruptly halted use of the only other reconnaissance 

system available to take photographs over the Soviet heartland. The 

E-5 satellite system then in development was so designed that it would 

return relatively narrow film strips, each covering only about 15 by 53 

miles along the ground. Moreover, it was still many months from its 

scheduled first trial. 

The Air Staff reaction to that situation was to require the early 

exploitation of the "pre-operational photographic potential" of the Samos 

program. That action, taken on 9 May, was followed 10 days later by 

instructions from Air Force Undersecretary J. V. Charyk that the 

Air Research and Development Command was to prepare a new Samos 

development plan embodying the Air Staff concept. On 27 May, Charyk 

expanded his instructions and ordered the Air Force to explore the 

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possibility of using "off the shelf'i camera components to accelerate 

3 

the pace of the photo-recovery program. 

Late in Ma y and early in June were heard suggestions that a 

completely new photo-recovery system should be developed. One 

thread of origin started with Colonel W. G. King, in the project 

office; others began in the office of the Director of Defense Research 

and Engineering {DDR&E} and with Charyk himself. Then on 5 July 

the United States Intelligence Board issued a revision of satellite 

reconnais sance requirements, emphasizing the need for locating 

Soviet ballistic missile sites and calling for a search camera system 

capable of resolving objects 20 feet on a side before the end of 1962.4 

That a new system would be required was all but incontestable, 

even without the catalyst of U-2 failure. The transitory value of U-2 

operations had been conceded since overflights began, the Corona 

system had thus far been totally ineffective, that neither E-l nor E-2 

A Central Intelligence Agency spokesman who briefed the Royal Air 

Force in 1957 described the U-2 as a "diminishing asset" with 

increasing vulnerability. That it operated effectively for another 

30 months over hostile territory was a compliment to the skill with 

which it was employed and a provocative commentary on the Soviet 

air defense establishment, From the evidence, it is clear that the 

CIA had long anticipated the inevitable; cover stories were in being 

to satisfy almost all potential wants. The explosive international 

consequences of the U-2 affair were, therefore, less the product of 

faulty planning for the inevitable than of imperfect execution. 5 

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could perforll1 search ll1issions was nowhere denied, and the E-5 

had not been designed to provide wide-area coverage which, by early 

1960, had been recognized as essential. (The suggestion that the E-5 

be flown in a higher orbit to provide broader ground coverage was 

sOll1etill1es heard in the SUll1ll1er of 1960. It got a generally unfavorable 

reception froll1 systell1-conscious engineers who were sensitive to the 

tender interrelationships all10ng payload weights, orbit altitudes, 

booster perforll1ance, and on-orbit stabilization. ) 

A new systell1 could conceivably have used readout technology, 

but in May 1960 that was unlikely. The often acrill1onious debate over 

the respective ll1erits of readout and recovery during late 1959 and 

early 1960 had been brought on by ll1any factors involved. Fundall1entally, 

the Strategic Air COll1ll1and and its partisans on the Air Staff (including 

the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence) were insistent on 

the urgency of readout. Mostly they wanted Sall10s E-Z, a readout 

systell1 with a nOll1inal potential for obtaining pictures with about ZO-foot 

resolution- -but not ll1any pictures, or frequently. SAC depreciated the 

hard fact that E-Z technology was incapable of satisfying basic needs 

for strategic warning and would be alll10st wholly unsuited to the task 

of locating Soviet ll1issile sites. 

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which had 

official responsibility for ll1ilitary space prograll1s between early 1958 

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and May 1960, took as its principal policy the contention of one group 

of scientists that readout was desirable but readout using the bimat 

technology featured in the E-l and E-2 Samos systems was not feasible" 

Rather than recovery, however, influential ARPA spokesmen endorsed 

a technique using electrostatic tape and high-magnification optics in 

place of the halide film and on-board processing of the [~=-l and E-2. 

Another ARPA group wanted to expand E-5 activity because E-5 had 

a little-mentioned capability for carrying a man into orbit rathe r than 

a camera--which went far to explain why E-5 was the only recovery 

system ever to provide for recovery of camera as well as film. 

Senior Samos project officers (notably Colonel W. G. King) were 

convinced that the bimat process readout system would never satisfy 

national needs--but rather than urging some more exotic and risky 

readout substitute, had come to favor film recovery. Some of the 

leaders of the Air Force Research and Development ComITland who had 

been contributor s to the early development of Corona had concluded 

that only a heavily funded, heavy staff development program would 

produce an operationally effective reconnaissance satellite--and they 

mostly favored the parallel development of E-2 and E-5 using a concurrency approach. 

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Until early July. the Air Force Ballistic Missiles Division 

(BMD) expressed a preference for some relatively minor modification 

of the E-5 system rather than a new development. A 12 July BMD 

development plan revision, however. featured a proposal for a new 

camera pa yload- -des ignated E-6- -to be combined with a new recoverable 

and maneuverable reentry body. Simultaneously, the Directorate of 

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) expressed strong distaste 

for earlier Samos program goals. Almost immediately thereafter the 

question of what new system was submerged in proposals for a total 

Samos program reorganization. On 11 August, in the midst of maneuvering for program control, BMD issued still another development plan 

which proposed an E-6 system generally conforming to the USIB statement of requirements. Featuring a panoramic camera with 20-foot 

or better resolution, eight days on orbit, and a highly precis e recovery 

system, it was intended to provide broad coverage of thos e areas 

serviced by the Soviet railway network. 

Even earlier, on 27 July, Colonel Paul J. Heran, then of 

the 6594th Test Wing, had been named to head a source selection 

board which was to evaluate contractor proposals for an E-6 system. 

," -,' 

Other members of the board included Colonel J. L. Martin 

(Directorate of Advanced Technology, Air Force headquarters), 

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Requests for proposals were dispatched to a selected list of contractors--

from which Lockheed had been excluded--dn the day the development plan 

was issued, 11 August. During the period of pre-proposal briefings the 

Samos project was formally assigned to the Office of the Secretary of 

the Air Force, acquired a new military chief (Brigadier General R. E. 

Greer) and a secretariat-level overseer (Air Force Undersecretary 

Charyk), and in its revamped form received Presidential endorsement. 

The basic performance requirement was also modified to include 10-foot 

6 

res olution ("or better ") and five days on orbit. 

Dr. Charyk had notified BMD of the modified performance requirements on 23 August and with a minor alteration had confirmed 

them on the 26th, the day following the National Security Council 

meeting at which President Eisenhower personally approved the revised 

Samos program. The program that Charyk defined in his presentation 

to the Pre sident and a somewhat earlier statement of E-6 1Ifundamentals 

by which selection board actions would be conditioned" established the 

parameters of the E-6 program as it existed at the time the Secretary 

of the Air Force Samos Project Office was activated. The source 

selection board considered the E-6 to be a back-up to the E-5 system, 

Colonel A. L. Wallace (Director of Technology at Wright Air Development Division and former chief of the Reconnaissance Laboratory there), 

and Major H. C. Howard (also Directorate of Advanced Technology). 

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with as sur ed recovery over land being more important than rigid 

adherence to the photography specifications. The board operated on 

the premise that it would be more desirable to develop "crude'" 

"ins ens itive" subsystems which were simple and reliable than to 

concentrate on "elegant, sophisticated, fancy, cute, tricky, fussy 

subsystems." E-6, of itself, had to be !'useful and usable even if 

the primary thing it's backing up also works. II By implication, E-6 

had to differ from existing or programmed solutions to the reconnaissaIlce problem. Otherwise it would be duplicative--and undesirable. 

The system Charyk described to Eisenhower was composed of 

a precise land recovery subsystem--with air pick up a possible 

alternative--integral with a photographic subsystem that included a 

24- to 36-inch panoramic camera. First flight, assuming progress 

cons istent with that outlined in the development plan, was planned for 

January 1962. Seven flights, possibly augmented by two diagnostic 

7 

tests, were on the proposed schedule. 

The source evaluation was conducted in an atmosphere of 

mild uncertainty. Neither the reporting channel nor the precise 

functions of the new project office had yet been officially defined. 

As originally conceived, E-6 might have been described as a 

high- reliability Corona. 

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In many respects the E-6 requirement seellled to negate all earlier 

project objectives and to reject the concepts applied by the existing 

progralll office. None of the earlier payload programs had been 

undertaken except through the contracting route provided by Lockheed, 

but the E-6 was specifically arranged to exclude that contractor. 

Owing mostly to the poor performance of Corona, Lockheed was In 

general disfavor during those weeks when E-6 took form. The relationship between the existing progralll office and the existing BMD organization was not apparent, and indeed there seemed a possibility that Samos 

might be recombined with Midas and Discoverer under the over-all 

management of General Greer, with the individual satellite offices 

remaining intact. Perhaps fortunately, the month during which such 

matters were resolved was also the month during which the principal 

duty of the source selection board wa s to wait for proposals from 

contractor s. 

The choice of subsystem contractors had, for practical purposes, 

been completed before the end of October - - by which tillle the new Samos 

office structure had also been clarified. The source selection board, 

with the foreknowledge of both Charyk and Greer, recommended awarding 

the camera payload contract to Eastman Kodak and the recovery subsystem contract to General Electric. Accessory considerations prevented 

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immediate action on thos e recommendations, however. The board 

generally favored making Aerospace Corporation responsible for all 

systems integration work not included in the basic as signments to 

Eastman and General Electric, while Dr. Charyk had expres sed 

reservations about giving Aerospace any great degree of systems 

integration authorityo Moreover, certain members of the E-6 board 

also constituted a sub-rosa source selection group concerned with 

Eastman's proposal to develop a 77-inch panoramic camera subsystem. 

(Known as "Suns et Strip, " the 77 -inch camera had been treated as a 

follow- on or parallel development during the August presentation to 

the National Security Council. Late in September, Charyk and Greer 

had agreed that "Sunset Strip" was too promising to pass up and had 

decided that it should be covertly developed to provide a reserve reconnaissance capability in the event that political factors should force 

ces sation of acknowledged reconnais sance satellite programs. 

("Sunset Strip" eventually became Gambit.) Finally, there still was 

uncertainty on the course and emphasis of land recovery developments 

and on the technical feasibility of proposals for such systems. 

Charyk's decision to limit the systems engineering-technical 

direction role of Aerospace Corporation decided one is sue; formal 

action to "cancel" "Sunset Strip" resolved another. (The "cancellation" 

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was part of the cover plan which led to the separate establishment 

of Gambit, a program aimed at the clandestine development of the 

77-inch camera and an appropriate recovery sUbsystem to be flown 

In E-6 vehicles.) Attempts to make the Reconnaissance Laboratory 

at Wright Field responsible for camera payload developments in the 

E-6 program had been halted somewhat earlier, in September, at 

Charyk's insistence and to the considerable dismay of ARDC headquarters. 

The relatively rapid establishment of a functioning SAFSP organization 

8 

cleared the air of other organizational inconsistencies. 

Notwithstanding such progress, the matter of defining Aerospace 

Corporation responsibilities became critical again in November and 

remained something of an issue until late in December; the question 

of whether land recovery should be a primary, parallel, or subordinate 

objective had not been finally resolved; and late in November there was 

another skirmish over the relationship of Samos to ARDC programs 0 

Finally, the source selection board had found no alternative to using 

Lockheed's Agena as the upper stage to inject the E-6 payload vehicle 

into orbit, and Lockheed thus became part of the contractor complex. 

(Technical integration of the payload, upper stage, and recovery 

subsystems, however, was reserved for General Electric rather 

than Lockheed, which had that responsibility for all other Samos 

payload systems and for Corona.) 

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Such factors kept the source selection board ln session until 

early December. Not until the 14th of that month did the chairman, 

Colonel Heran, formally advise the BMD commander, Major General 

0 0 J 0 Ritland, that General Electric and Eastman had been chosen to 

develop recovery and camera subsystems. respectively. The maneuverable reentry aspect of the original requirement had been reduced to an 

applied research program aimed at the eventual design of a "terminally 

guided lifting type vehicle." (Construction and flight test of such a 

vehicle had been recommended for inclusion in the E-6 program as 

late as November.) 

On 21 December, General Ritland approved the board's recommendations. By that time the troublesome issue of systems integration 

responsibility had been finally settled. Aerospace was to do "general 

systems engineering and technical direction, II working as part of a 

team that included the members of the SAFSP office and clearing all 

technical decisions with the military program managers. A definition 

of "general systems engineering, II which General Greer had wryly 

described as "locally controversial" was worked out in the course of 

a 20 December luncheon meeting between Charyk and Brigadier General 

RQ D. Curtin, Chief of the Samos Pentagon office. It was Charyk's 

"intent. .. that Aerospace would not function as STL functions in 

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detailed systeITls engineering in the ITlis sile prograITls II but would act 

ITlore in the role of an associate contractor reporting to the prograITl 

office. 

A final atteITlpt on the part of ARDC headquarters to ceITlent a 

rnanageITlent relationship between SaITlos and the basic ARDC organization had ended in failure even before the selection board cOITlpleted its 

work. Late in NoveITlber, Dr. Charyk and General Greer decided 

that SaITlos funds would not under any circuITlstances be used to support 

developITlent of the Avco Drag Brake as a backup to the Martin recoverable reentry vehicle. Thus concluded the last of several energetic 

efforts to secure for Wright Field a share in ITlanageITlent of the reconnais sance satellite prograITl- -or to tap its funding reservoir. 9 

Even though the land recovery objective of the prograITl defined 

ln August had been substantially reduced in iITlportance by DeceITlber, 

the expectation that Martin I s glide -control reentry technique would 

eventually be cOITlbined with the E-6 caITlera systeITl reITlained a basic 

prograITl concept through the early ITlonths of 1961. Fears for the 

possible loss of a SaITlos satellite over unfriendly territory, with 

repercussions perhaps ITlore extreITle than those of the U-2 incident, 

proITlpted continued concern for positive control of recovery ITlodes 

and for the iITlproveITlent of reentry accuracy. Nevertheless, throughout 

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the period of source selection, and through the ITlany peraITlbulations 

that attended establishITlent of SAFSP. prograITl ITlanagers retained 

a realistic grasp of the basic prograITl objective: to acquire an 

orbital reconnaissance systeITl which OvercaITle objections both to 

the electronic readout systeITls so favored in the late 1950s and 

having better resolution than Corona. The final definition of prograITl 

objectives, as expressed in work stateITlents issued to the principal 

contractor s, was reITlarkable in dispens ing with the les s attainable --

though desirable--eleITlents of the largely theoretical systeITl described 

to the President in August. FroITl an engineering viewpoint, there was 

every indication that the E-6 prograITl would indeed result in the 

10 

creation of a reliable, high acuity, photographic satellite systeITl. 

Delays in cOITlpletion of the source selection process had forced 

a slippage in the original prograITl deadlines. During the last days of 

1960, a technical direction ITleeting conducted by Aerospace produced 

revised ITlilestone goals: delivery of the payload vehicle to Vandenberg 

Air Force Base and the first flight-ready Agena B to the ITlissile 

asseITlbly building by 20 NoveITlber, availability of the asseITlbled 

vehicle on the pad by 18 DeceITlber 1961, and first flight by 1 February 

11 

1962. It was a schedule that seeITled wildly optiITlistic in the light 

of earlier space prograITl achieveITlents - -13 ITlonths froITl prograITl 

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approval (source selection) to first flight. Nevertheless, the E-6 

project group expressed no serious reservations about the feasibility 

of satisfying such exacting requirements, and confidently set about 

the task. 

For almost precisely one year thereafter, the SAFSP group, 

Aerospace, General Electric, and Eastman Kodak worked industriously 

to meet deadlines and to provide technical items that satisfied specifications. Even though the original concept of the E-6 had emphasized 

"off-the-shelf" technology and "available" hardware, the translation 

of requirements into functional space systems, together with vital 

ground control and tracking stations, recovery teams, and launch 

capacities, was an enOrmous task. The emphasis on early availability 

of militarily useful systems was apparent in the original shift from a 

land recovery technique to water recovery and on reliability rather 

than sophistication. Still, some pessimism seemed warranted. Only 

four capsules and three film packets had actually been recovered from 

orbit at the time the source selection action was completed, and this 

in 18 trials. Perhaps more to the point, the A tlas-Agena combination 

destined for E-6 program had, to that time, only one attempted Samos 

application--and that a spectacular failure. 

Preparation of work statements began in January, proceeded 

routinely in the case of Lockheed and Convair, went well for Eastman 

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Kodak, and encountered serious snags for General Electric. A draft 

vers ion pr epared by General Electric proved unacceptable to the 

project office, and an SAFSP vers ion failed to satisfy Aerospace 

Corporation objectives. Not until late February did Lockheed and 

General Electric reach agreeITlent on the interface between the payload 

vehicle and the Agena-B stage. By March, Lockheed was behind 

schedule on Agena-B work, the original decision to use Johnson Island 

as the recovery site had been iITlperiled by plans for possible resuITlption 

of atoITlic tests in the Pacific, the caITlera lenses and ITlirrors were on 

the critical lip of a delivery schedule slippage, and delays in securing 

funds for the ITlissile asseITlbly building at Vandenberg had brought the 

12 

tiITlely availability of that facility into serious question. 

SOITle of the configuration details of the E-6 were decided less 

by engineering logic than by the need to caITlouflage GaITlbit. During 

the early ITlonths of the E-6 prograITl it seeITled essential not only to 

hide the GaITlbit technical effort under a screen of E- 6 activity, but 

also to ITlake the orbital vehicle portions of the two systeITls reseITlble 

one another in outward appearance. Thus, in theory a GaITlbit could 

be launched without alerting ITlany people to its real nature. Unhappily, 

the secondary objective of developing a systeITl which could be covertly 

eITlployed in the event of E-6 cancellation was incoITlpatible with the 

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thesis of 1I100k-alike" orbital stages. If political considerations 

forced cancellation of the acknowledged reconnaissance satellite 

prograITl, certainly no vehicle which alITlost precisely reseITlbled the 

cancelled iteITl could be approved for launch. 

The real advantages of the E- 6 relationship with GaITlbit were 

in providing cover for contractual actions and for contractor activity. 

There was a pos sible profit in the eleITlent of technological surpris e, 

as well. The specifications for the E-6 had reached the general public 

through a trade ITlagazine, and even though Soviet intelligence ITlight 

reas onabl y suspect the validity of any perforITlance specifications so 

casually revealed, lapses in the United States security systeITl were 

not unCOITlITlon and the preITlature disclosure of systeITl details not 

unprecedented. The GaITlbit systeITl, developed largely within the E-6 

effort, would through its vastly better resolution provide ITleans for 

ITluch ITlore detailed intelligence than could be expected froITl E-6. 

But by the saITle token, GaITlbit payloads disguised as E-6 payloads 

becaITle politically vulnerable, the price for such technological surprise. 

Although the concept of concealing one reconnaissance payload 

by ITleans of another had inbuilt frustrations, the notion of "look-alikes" 

survived long enough to have a substantial iITlpact on the configuration 

of the E-6. The native characteristics of the E-6 CaITlera subsysteITl 

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were Ie ss influential in deciding the nos e cone structure and mid-body 

shape of the E-6 vehicle than the fact that those sections also had to 

house the still greater bulk of the Gambit optics and film transport 

complex. The fact that a portion of the forward body of the Agena 

vehicle had to be cleared of equipment so that it would not interfere 

with the functioning of the Gambit pa y10ad could not logically be 

explained in terms of E-6 needs, nor could a modification of the Agena 

or mid-body to conform to peculiar Gambit requirements. 

In similar fashion, operating details of the E-6 tracking and 

control network had to be compatible with Gambit even though E-6 

might not require such refinement. The establishment and activation 

of a north-latitude tracking and control station that could give final 

instructions to a Gambit satellite immediately before it began a 

spot-reconnaissance pass fell into that category. The E-6, taking a 

wide - swath picture, actual! y needed nothing so sophisticated, but the 

narrower-swath Gambit camera was thought incapable of sufficient 

targeting precision without such final guidance. 

Even though the futility of attempting to make Gambit vehicles 

look like E-6 Ilbirds II was conceded before the end of 1961, it endured 

long enough to have a lasting effect on the fim 1 configuration of the E-6. 

Because of the tight development-test schedule, details of the E-6 had 

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to be fixed quite early in the prograITl, and very often they showed the 

effects of the atteITlpt to ITlake one eleITlent of the total vehicle cOITlpatible 

with payload cOITlponents of both. The final evidence of futility caITle 

after E-6 details had been decided and vehicle fabrication undertaken; 

the technical evolution of GaITlbit continued with the result that GaITlbit 

rapidly assuITled an appearance and character cOITlpletely distinct froITl 

h f h f o 1 E 6 fO ° 13 t at 0 t e Ina - con 19urahon. 

Thus, a succession of ITlajor technical decisions interlocked 

with prograITlITling actions to cOITlplicate the first ITlonths of the E-6 

developITlent. Even before forITlal cOITlpletion of selection board actions, 

Lockheed was advised of substantial changes needed to adapt the basic 

Agena-B vehicle to E-6--and GaITlbit--uses. (The interface definition 

reITlained for a later decision.) Principally, Lockheed had to reITlove 

a nUITlber of cOITlponents not needed for the E-6 application: solar 

cells, portions of cOITlITlunications and prograITlITler subsysteITls not 

needed for ascent and de-boost, all auxiliary power not required for 

a norITlal ITlission (the final reduction froITl eight-day to five-day ITlission 

requireITlents was not approved until the technical ITleetings of 29 DeceITlber), and the sun position indicator. The Agena airfraITle had to be 

ITlodified to accept the E-6 ITlidsection and the reentry vehicle--and to 

provide for the ITluch greater bulk of the 77-inch GaITlbit caITlera. The 

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secondary propulsion system required modification to provide two-way 

thrust needed for orbit adjust maneuvers. Provisions had to be made 

for special telemetry required by General Electric. Somewhat later, 

in mid- December, it became neces sary to relocate the S- band beacon 

in the reentry vehicle from its original station in the Agena and to 

relocate other programmers. Not until the key technical meetings of 

28 and 29 December were firm decisions made on the weight limitations 

of the Agena-B (2080 pounds plus gas and gas bottles), the payload 

vehicle (1650 pounds), and the photographic subsystem (1250 pounds). 

Each such weight specification, of course, had to accommodate Gambit 

as well as the basic E-6. 

After considering a number of alternatives, several of which 

were impractical because of the lead time requirement, the program 

office late in January 1961 decided to rely on the existent Verlort tracking 

net for communication and control functions, re-opening the Annette 

Island, Alaska, site for the addition of one new Verlort station. 

(Annette was needed for Gambit rather than E-6.) The communication 

problem was further complicated in February with the emergence of a 

requirement for an additional vehicle -contained S - band for the V er lort 

radars, for an S -band comnland decoder compatible with those radars 

and with security encoder requirements; and for a transponder that 

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would satisfy requirements for range rate rneasurements. Reliance 

on the Verlort network obliged program manager s to provide for 

modification of existing stations to include a digital command capacity, 

a requirement peculiar, at that time, to the E-6. The decoder requirement which caus ed a change in vehicle configuration also affected the 

Verlort stations, leading to installation of a command decoder in each. 

Some questions of basic facilities were troublesome through the 

entire winter of 1960-1961. Thus the fonnal decision to use Johnson 

Island as the descent and recovery zone was not made until late February 

and it was another month before a program office survey group could 

actually visit the site and estimate needs. In much the same fashion, 

a decision to convert part of the E-2 area in the missile assembly 

building at Vandenberg to E-6 purposes was made in January, but it 

was not until 24 March that an agreement on a beneficial occupancy 

date emerged. 

One of the last of the major technical redirections that could 

be incorporated before the program got so far along that each change 

meant a significant delay was the 16 February 1961 deletion of air-catch 

considerations frorn the recovery subsystem. As with the E-5, the 

E-6 would depend on de-boost, aerodynamic deceleration, and water 

impact (and flotation) for its recovery mode. Sheer bulk was a principal 

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deterrent to aerial recovery; the reentry body was 12 feet and three inche s I 

14 

in length with a maximum diameter of eight feet and four inches! 

Although alternate modes of reentry and recovery operation 

were considered later, by March 1961 the basic techniques of E-6 

launch, orbit, and recovery had been decided. The operation would 

begin with launch of the Atlas-Agena combination from Point Arguello 

and its control (in Atlas sustainer and vernier phases) by Atlas radar 

guidance. At Atlas burnout, the satellite vehicle (Agena-B, camera 

section, and recovery vehicle) would coast to apogee, at which point 

the Agena-B would deliver the impulse required to place the satellite 

combination in a preselected orbit within the Agena's guidance and 

control tolerances. Orbit insertion would take place at approximately 

125 nautical miles altitude. 

After ins ertion, the orbit would be defined from telemetry 

returns, angle track data, and Verlort radar track information. The 

required orbit correction would be computed from track and rate 

radar derivations, and introduced as velocity changes provided by 

Agena re-burn. The final orbit correction system relied on a 

hydrogen peroxide propulsion unit contained in the camera section. 

Photographic coverage normally would begin on the eighth 

orbit. The photographic subsystem was built around a pair of 36-inch 

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(focal length) cameras (for stereo coverage) with horizon recording 

for attitude control. 

Upon completion of the photographic portion of the mission, 

de-orbit requirements would be calculated from ephemeris data and 

sent to the orbiting vehicle. The Agena-B would thereupon be oriented 

to the proper attitude by its gas jets and de-orbit thrust impulse applied 

to acquire the desired de-orbit trajectory. 

The recovery vehicle would separate from the Agena B by 

retro-thrust derived from the orbit correction nozzles and would then 

be re -oriented to the des ired reentry attitude by the nitrogen jets 

provided for reaction control. Pre-orientation of the Agena was 

intended to make the de-orbit technology relatively uncomplicated. 

Reliance on gas jets for spin-up was intended to eliminate the possibility of an unstable spin arising from unbalanced solid rockets. 

Use of a parachute recovery system in combination with the 

recovery vehicle (based on General Electric's RVX-2) presumably 

provided a safe rate of descent plus adequate ablative protection for 

the recovery payload through the aerodynamic heating zone to the 

point of recovery. (Maximum reentry forces exceeded 15 £ during 

-'-

deceleration, and heating intensities were comparably extreme. )'.' 

Much later, with vision sharpened by hindsight, Aerospace Corporation project engineers carped that the General Electric ballistic recovery 

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Recovery aids in the General Electric vehicle were intended, ultimately, 

to insure prompt retrieval within the bounds of the Las Vegas Bombing 

and Gunnery Range. Initially, however, water recovery was to be 

employed, the vehicle floating until secured by frogmen and recovered 

by a ship. 

Tracking, telemetry, and command equipments were contained 

in the recovery vehicle. Such devices had to be compatible with the 

Mod III track and command systems at the Atlantic and Pacific Missile 

Ranges; the Verlort S-band tracking radars at Hawaii, Kodiak, and 

Vandenberg; and the VHF and UHF telemetry receivers and command 

transmitters at various sites in the western hemisphere. During onorbit operation, the satellite vehicle was controlled through time-coded 

binary signals transmitted by the Verlort tracking linko The satellite 

itself had a memory circuit adequate for the storage of commands 

system had been selected "despite the rather cas ual treatment gIven 

this system in the proposal document. .. " There is no indication 

in contemporary sources, however, that the adequacy of the General 

Electric reentry vehicle proposal was seriously questioned. The 

RVX-2 design was apparently well proven, was available, and was 

applicable to the program as then conceived. The General Electric 

approach required the least research and development of any that 

had been proposed and offered the greatest assurance of satisfying 

flight schedules--and of a reliable system. Although General Electric 

was the target of considerable later criticism, it was not until the 

final two months of E- 6 flight testing that questions about the adequacy 

of the basic design of the reentry system were raised. 

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neces sary for both vehicle and payload operations during orbit. In 

actuality, some of the more precise circuitry required for command 

of the payload portion was essential to the Gambit system rather than 

the broad-swath E-6 camera, but for obvious reasons that fact was 

not widely known. 

The original plan of an initial launch by December 1961, 

followed by six additional launches at 40-day intervals (and including 

two diagnostic launches from the Atlantic Missile Range, if necessary), 

had by early 1961 been changed to reflect a 9 March 1962 first-launch 

target date. The entire slippage, at that point, had re suIted from an 

August 1960 decision to permit prospective bidders more time than 

15 originall y contemplated to develop their proposals. 

The early objective of controlled land recovery became less 

than an integral of the total program after 9 March 1961, when Undersecretary Charyk reduced the Martin effort to a study-through-mock-up 

activity more slowly paced and less fully funded than initially proposed. 

The Martin Company's work statement was rewritten in April to reflect 

the changed emphasis and thereafter had no significant influence on 

16 

the basic program. 

In some part, the cutback in Martin's activity was indicative 

of financial difficulties that began to trouble the E-6 program as early 

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as March 1961. The chief offender, from the standpoint of unplanned 

expenditures, was General Electric, which late in March reported 

fiscal 1961 costs of $18 million against an approval program of $11 million, 

and estimated cumulative costs of $42 million through fiscal 1962, against 

an approved figure of $28.8 million. To SAFSP managers there seemed 

no hope of accommodating the General Electric developruent progranl 

within the total of currently approved funds; the only escapes appeared 

to be rescheduling or increasing funds. (The basic E-6 program, 

exclusive of the Martin reentry vehicle effort, had in November 1960 

been costed at a fiscal 1961 total of $36.3 million and a fiscal 1962 

total of $42.. 1 million.) There being no alternative, and the urgency of 

the E-6 not having diminished, the contract with General Electric 

became an agreement to complete the first seven vehicles for $42 million. 

Contract negotiations were completed in August 1961; in March 1962 

General Electric advised the program office of an additional $4.7 

million fiscal 1962 overrun which promised to grow larger by the end 

of that year. At that point, General Electric was estimating that its 

part of the program would ultimately cost $53.2 million rather than 

17 

$18 million, $28.8 or $42 million, the earlier figures. 

A detailed survey of the E-6 procurement situation in July 1961 

turned up other disturbing factors. The original cost estimates by the 

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three principal contractors had totalled $53.2 million ($16.8 million 

from Eastman Kodak, $18 million from General Electric, and $18.4 

million from Lockheed). The letter contracts had been is sued on 

the basis of costs derived from the original work statements. By 

April 1961, when definitive work statements and refined cost estimates 

became available, the program total had risen to $112.0 ($26.6 million 

from Eastman, $46 million from General Electric, and $40.4 from 

Lockheed). In the view of the Air Force inspector general, "lt was 

apparent that the contractors had originally priced over-simplified 

programs against requirements not specifically resolved" and in 

detailing costs had gone through clarification and redirection phases 

which completely changed original conceptions. Thus between November 

1960 and April 1961, General Electric had added slightly to its hardware 

cost estimate but had expanded the sum of engineering and test activity 

to account for half of the $46 million revised estimate. The bulk of 

Kodak's increase was for additional engineering ($6. 7 million), although 

an accelerated development schedule and more rigid specifications 

accounted for a considerable sum. Lockheedfs estimates went up as 

18 

a direct result of design changes in the Agena vehicle. 

Although arithmetically correct, the inspector general's survey 

essentially overlooked the fact that the E-6 had originally been 

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presented as an "off-the-shelf" solution to a difficult technical problem. 

The differences between November 1960 and April 1961 figures reflected 

not so much bad estimating as the effects of redefining E-6 technical 

objectives 0 Given a choice, the Samos office elected to expend money 

rather than time and to pay for equipment that promised to satisfy the 

basic requirement in full rather than settle for what was available and 

compromise performance. It was unlikely, in any event, that the 

contractors I initial cost estimates would have long retained any inherent 

validity. Experience had demonstrated that in radically advanced 

developments the "normal" pattern included a rash of technical difficulties and a considerable number of significant design Or detail changes. 

The financial integrity of project managers was of little consequence in 

such circumstan::::es; costs went up as engineering expenses increased 

and as test programs expanded. 

Nevertheles s, the E-6 office learned a lot from its early experience with cost estimating. About a year later, when a follow-on program 

was being weighed, the office proposed a cost-plus-incentive-fee contracting technique (for General Electric) that made contract performance a 

pivot on which bonuses and penalties hinged. Review at the level of the 

air secretariat prompted compliments, and even though later developments 

invalidated the need for follow-on procurements, the lessons of early E-6 

.. 1 19 contractlng experIence were not ost. 

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Requirements for support facilities for the E-6 program were 

defined later than had been anticipated and included items not foreseen 

when the program had been approved for development late in 1960. In 

addition to a growth in the projected cost of the Annette Island station, 

a tracking station at Thule, Greenland (approved 30 June 1961), and the 

erection of a vehicle support building at Point Arguello (defined in 

April196l) became essentials. Consequently, the support funds for 

the E-6 program had become quite substantial by the end of fiscal 1962. 

Annette Island reactivation cost $8.14 million, the Thule tracking 

station $5.98 million, and the E-6 equipment for stations used in 

common by several space programs another $1. 33 million. The provision of multiple-satellite handling features added $4. 5 million to a 

support funds total that reached $25.2 million in May 1962--by which 

time all essential facilities presumably had been provided for, since 

the flight program was then in progress. The only significant exception 

was the land- recovery aspect of the total program, which did not become 

a major cost item until fiscal 1963, 

In July 1961, Colonel Beran estimated a total requirement for 

$7.7 million in fiscal 1963 military construction funding to cover a 

de-orbit control station, a land recovery support facility, and additional 

installations at the Atlantic Missile Range. All were required for the 

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Martin reentry vehicle development. By November, however, deletion 

of all but the Canaveral construction had eliminated $5.1 of that total. 20 

While such matters continued to trouble the program, the 

principal effort was inevitably applied to remaining on schedule in 

the development, fabrication, and test aspects. The first key date 

was Kodak's delivery of a payload mock-up to General Electric--

cornpleted on schedule: 21 ApriL The first three £1 yable recovery 

vehicle cassettes reached General Electric before the end of June; 

in August, thermal environment tests of prototype lenses began; and 

on 18 September the first drop test of a recovery vehicle (from a B-52 

at Kirtland Air Force Base) ended in success. By the first week of 

October, the initial flight vehicle (Number 2401) was going through 

the telemetry checkout station. Payload weight was 30 pounds greater 

than the 2159 pounds predicted in June, but a reduction in control gas 

requirements had compensated for more than half of the increase. 

On 10 October 1961, therefore, Colonel Heran assured Undersecretary 

Charyk that by all available indications the first launch would take 

place when scheduled: 9 March 1962. On the day of his report to the 

undersecretary, Heran learned that the initial water-drop test of the 

reentry vehicle had also been successful, both in parachute deployment 

and in flotation characteristics. At the end of the month, recovery 

21 site facilities were complete. 

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At that point, som.e of the bright expectations began to dull. 

An earl y indication of pending difficulty was a com.plaint from. General 

Electric that Aerospace Corporation had been responsible for delays 

in the issuance of requirem.ents statem.ents and detailed specifications 

on which the vehicle contractor's schedules were dependent. Aerospace, of course, had another interpretation. Concurrently, 

Aerospace was assum.ing responsibility for a com.m.and program.m.ing 

assignm.ent originally slated for General Electric. The Philadelphia-based 

contractor, it developed, lacked the m.anpower for the task. Lockheed, 

the first alternate, was overloaded because of other program.s. 

Consequently Aerospace Corporation (as an organization--distinct 

from. the program. office elem.ent) exercised its system.s engineeringtechical direction authority and purchas ed computer tim.e from. an 

outside contractor (System.s Developm.ent Corporation). The effect 

of the late-term. reassignm.ents was not im.m.ediately felt, but within 

90 days began to appear as delayed and incom.plete com.puter program.s. 

Without the appropriate com.puter data, the satellite control establishm.ent at Sunnyvale could not support the launch--and a launch date 

22 

slippage would inevitably result. 

As it happened, the com.puter program. slippage did not 

becom.e the critical factor in the schedule. General Electric was 

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to deliver the first flight vehicle on 1 December. That day carne I 

and pas sed without event, as did the remainder of December 0 On 

2 January 1962, the contracting officer of the Philadelphia Air I 

Procurement District formally notified General Electric that the 

government was considering termination of the contract by default, 

In actuality, the notification was a "show cause and cure" instruction 

intended to prompt General Electric to more energetic efforts to 

satisfy contractual requirements, but the possibility that the contractor's 

failure to perform might influence the award of follow- on contracts 

could not be overlooked. The chance that the government might 

terminate the contract before the original seven vehicles were delivered 

was slight indeed. 23 

The notice had two effects, nonetheles s, Most important, it 

stimulated General Electric to push completion of the first flight 

article somewhat more earnestly than had earlier been the case, A 

Space Systerns Division acceptance team ended its inspection and 

signed for the vehicle on 19 January, but not without criticism. The 

haste of the completion and inspection process disturbed the acceptance 

team. The team chairman re ported that his fellow member shad 

developed "a general lack of enthusiasm" during the certification 

process because of the "hurried and hectic" conduct of the required 

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tests. He remarked that some "informal" procedures on the part 

of the General Electric people had not actually been witnes sed by 

the team, and he noted that all of the pre-acceptance tests had not 

been completed because of the lack of time. They were slated for 

completion during field tests of the vehicle. 24 

The secondary consequence of the "cause and cure" notice 

was to prompt General Electric to an impassioned (and thoroughly 

subjective) defense of its conduct of the program. The contractor 

cited the cOluplexity of the system and the requirement for design, 

development, and test completion in only 13 months; the "continual" 

program and technical redirection by Air Force and Aerospace 

Corporation managers (in the opinion of Colonel H. L. Evans, 

SAFSP I s vice director, the program had been subjected to fewer 

changes than comparable programs); technical problems with the 

General Electric reentry subsystem (which had been selected 

originally because the contractor represented it to be a proven system 

requiring little refinement); and compatibility problems with Eastman 

25 Kodak which "substantially exceeded expectations. " 

To the uninitiated, at least, it appeared that General Electric 

had a weak case. Some weeks later, when it became apparent that 

the delivery slippage had been attended by a substantial underestimate 

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of costs, General Electric's Missile and Space Vehicle Division 

manager, Ho W. Paige, cited "changes in system requirements and 

in details of implementation" as the chief causes of schedule and 

cost inaccuracies. Paige also complained that some design changes 

judged to be within the s cope of the contract should have been handled 

through contract change notice procedures and predicted that "further 

26 

technical difficulties" would arise from the flight program. 

That much, at least, was a valid analysis. 

Although General Electric's vehicle acceptance schedule had 

slipped by some seven weeks, the flight schedule showed only a twoweek slippage and as late as mid-J anuary the reentry vehicle contractor 

27 

was confident of meeting a 23 March launch date. Progress during 

February appeared to justify such optimism. Early that month, the 

program office concluded agreements with the 6595th Aerospace Test 

Wing which formalized the assignment of responsibilities for various 

portions of the launch and test operation to follow. (The basic 

philosophy was that Aerospace Corporation would continue to provide 

systems engineering-technical direction for the program, acting 

through Colonel Heran's SAFSP office, and that SAFSP would retain 

final re sponsibility for approving all significant change s to cost, 

scheduling, and contractual arrangements.) The relatively recent 

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complication of scheduling flight operations so as neither to interfere 

with nor be adversely affected by the nuclear test series being 

conducted in mid-Pacific was disposed of by agreement with Joint 

Task Force 8. Caution was advisable, I 

~----------------------------~ 

~ _____________________________________ I Final a r rang emen t s for r e tur n 

of recovered film cas settes from Hawaii to the proces sing laboratory 

at Westover, Massachusetts, were completed several days in advance 

of the actual launch--which had slipped, by that time, to late April. 

Because of the urgency of the mission, a C-135 jet transport was 

assigned from Military Air Transport Service resources to service 

the E-6 program requirements. The cargo was identified rnerel y as 

two boxes weighing 270 pounds each plus a pos sible courier pas senger a 

MATS was also advised, however, of a requirernent to transport 

unidentified cargo to Washington, Wright Field, St. Louis, and Offutt 

Air Force Base from Westover during the several days following the 

29 

initial delivery to that base. 

Such administrative matters were arranged with relative 

dispatch. The sarne circurnstances did not characterize pre-launch 

efforts involving the first E-6 vehicle. Apart from the late delivery 

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of the payload vehicle and its incomplete state of preparation upon 

acceptance, program difficulties at this stage extended into pad and 

vehicle readiness. In General Greer's understatement, liThe 201 

program [E-6] had a lot of problems in getting the first flight item 

in a condition for launch." Electromagnetic interference was one 

of the most notable, but it did not stand alone. A succession of 

equipment problems combined to delay flight readiness £rorn the 

"revis ed" goal of 23 March to an actual launch date of 26 April. 30 

In retrospect it was apparent that the slippage represented a day-for-day 

equivalent of the delay in acceptance of the General Electric vehicle. 

Even without allowances for the fact that the vehicle, when delivered, 

did not satisfy original readiness requirements, the time between 

delivery and launch was less than had originally been allowed. The 

launch carne almost precisely 16 months after s election of the contractors. 

It represented a very considerable achievement. 

At 1056 hours (local time) on 26 April 1962, the Atlas -Agena 

carrying E-6 number one climbed away from its launch pad, leaned 

toward the south, and vanished from the sight of observers at 

Vandenberg. At the proper time the Agena separated, the booster 

fell away, and the programmed injection into orbit began, Propulsion 

and guidance proved excellent. The orbit was near perfect; no 

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adjustment was neces sary. Telemetry signaled a pos sible failure 

of the camera windvw shields to open, and there was a clear indication 

of excessive use of control gas to maintain proper vehicle attitude, 

but it appeared that at least one of the cameras had operated as planned 

throughout the nlis sion. The other of the camera pair showed no sign 

of functioning after orbit number seven. During the attitude adjust 

maneuver immediately before de-boost. however, the plume of the 

ullage rocket impinged on the Agena's rocket exhaust nozzle and 

caus ed an unprogrammed pitch up, and the vehicle failed to enter 

through the proper "window." It could not be recovered. 31 

Immediate technical changes resulting irom first flight experience were limited. Lockheed relocated the solid ullage rockets to 

minimize the pos sibility of a repetition of the "impingement" incident, 

and Kodak strengthened the film transport assembly to prevent recur32 

rence of the camera system failure--traced to that item. 

Although the changes to vehicle number two were not major, 

they combined with other circumstances, including crowded launch 

stand schedules, to delay the second flight. It finally occurred on 

17 June, two days later than the revised forecast. Again the launch 

and orbit placement phases were "near nominal" and the photographic 

subsystem functioned adequately, but premature exhaustion of attitude 

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control gas forced a call-down atteITlpt during orbit 10 rather than 

during orbit 18, as originally planned. Again the de-boost phase 

was ineffective. The attitude control systeITl of the Agena ITlalfunctioned, a power failure prevented separation of the reentr y vehicle 

froITl the Agena, and they re-entered as a unit. Because of that 

circuITlstance the deceleration parachute did not deploy and the satellite cOITlpleted a free-fall trajectory, im.pacting about 750 nautical 

ITliles further down range (north) than planned. The hard im.pact 

ruptured the recovery capsule, which sank before ships or planes 

could locate ito Agena teleITletry had not been progralYlITled to operate 

during de- boost, so the precise sequence of key events could not be 

established and there was SOITle uncertainty about the exact cause of 

the failure s. 

Corrective ITleasures included the incorporation of redundant 

circuitry in the de-boost phase, rewiring and physical shielding of 

critical eleITlents (it appeared pos sible that shrapnel-like fragITlents 

froITl one of the explosive squibs ITlight have disabled the separation 

prograIllITler), and reprograITlITling to insure teleITletry reception 

33 

during de- boost. 

The third trial, on 18 July 1962, produced another excellent 

orbit. A succes sion of difficulties of varying ITlagnitude plagued the 

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vehicle thereafter. The S-band beacon operated with marginal 

effectivenes s throughout most of the mis sion and failed completely 

during orbit 18. The forward (main) ca!nera failed to advance after 

the 10th orbit, the film cutter refused to function, and on revolution 

18, during de-boost, the Agena secondary propulsion system again 

refus ed to ignite. Without ullage, the main engine would not fire, 

so no de-boost increment was available for the reentry operation. 

Again there was no recovery. 

Changes introduced as a result of the third failure of the 

recovery system included redesigning circuits to isolate the secondary 

propulsion system from the solid ullage rockets and improving the 

34 

pre-flight inspection of the circuitry. With these changes, trial 

number four began on 5 August 1962. 

In what had by that tirne become an established pattern, the 

launch and injection operations resulted in an orbit within two percent 

of "perfect." No orbit adjust was needed. On-orbit telernetry was 

quite satisfactory, although some S-band peculiarities were noted in 

retrospect. (They caused a rninor error in prediction of the i!npact 

point.) Steering gas consurnption was normal and the com!nand system 

perforrned with desirable efficiency. The ca!nera payload, unhappily, 

developed SOlne defects. Telemetry returns showed the rnain carnera 

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to be "operating!! through pass number seven, but the film transport 

remained non-functional throughout the entire mission. The rear 

camera operated through revolution number six, after which both 

the transport and the read-in elements failed. However, there was 

a clear indication that at least 1500 feet of film had been properly 

exposed. 

During the reentry and recovery phase, disabling defects 

again appeared. Individual incidents of the de-boost sequence carne 

in proper order, but the Agena imparted only 1450 feet-per-second 

deboost velocity instead of the programmed 1600 feet-per-second. 

Nevertheless, the reentry sequence continued as scheduled until the 

vehicle emerged from the ion-sheath blackout. One second later, 

primary telemetry failed. Although telemetry signals briefly resumed 

after a lapse of 16 seconds, there was no indication of parachute 

operation and recovery aircraft in the impact zone were unable to 

secure a clear bearing on intermittent beacon signals which persisted 

over the next 40 minutes. Both electronic and visual search continued 

for four hours after presumed impact, but there was no sighting. A 

helicopter search over the next 24 hours produced nothing more tangible. 

Analysis of the fragmentary telemetry indicated that excessive 

heating, principally in the aerodynamic wake of the reentry vehicle, 

had caused a failure in the parachute deployment circuitry. Confident 

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that the flaw was not in the vehicle design and that it could be remedied, 

General Electric thickened the thermal coating around the ballast tanks 

of number five vehicle, (hanged the composition of the primary thermal 

coating at the aft bulkhead, and increased the amount of insulation in 

other suspect locations. Although the telemetry failure had prevented 

the acquisition of detailed heat data for the blackout period, there was 

general agreement between SAFSP program office members, Aerospace 

Corporation engineers, and General Electric's specialists that the 

35 

additional ins ulation would prove adequate. 

The relatively rapid succession of flight tests--and mission 

failures--had not proceeded in a management vacuum, nor had work 

on improvement of the central E-6 configuration ceased. In the area 

of a system improvement, two items were of particular interest during 

the months between April and October 1962. One was improved 

retrieval, either water-to-air or air catches. The second was the 

addition of an indexing camera which would more adequately pinpoint 

the location of sites photographed by the stereo cameras. 

The index camera consideration began with a directive from 

Undersecretary Charyk to provide a combination terrain framing 

and stellar-indexing camera "as soon as possible. II (Corona experience 

was the real justification.) Charyk reconfirmed the requirement early 

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in May 1962. After carefully examining production and procurement 

time factors, Colonel Heran on 18 September advised the undersecretary 

that the indexing system could be incorporated in the tenth and subsequent E-6 vehicles. Two days later, General Greer validated the 

schedule and directed that the effort continue even though other improvement proposals of the time were being deleted as unneces sary. 36 

The proposal for either air catch of the descending reentry 

vehicle or sea-to-air retrieval of the floating payload was, in one 

sense, a revival of the original option of August 1960, deleted from 

the program in February 19610 A means of water-to-air recovery 

offered some prospect of overcoming the several objections to air 

catch; it need not be so prompt, it need not be limited to one or two 

passes at a descending object but could if necessary be continued 

over a period of hours, it was presumably a somewhat less delicate 

maneuver, and it could take advantage of frogman teams dropped 

into the ocean to rig the recovery vehicle for pick up. 

The first tests of the rigging-for-retrieval process, conducted 

on 27 March 1962, were thoroughly unsucces sfu1. Forty minutes of 

effort to slip a harnes s around a floating dummy recovery vehicle 

ended in complete frustration. Nobody had allowed for shrinkage of 

the cotton sleeves around the nylon netting. A second trial, using a 

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modified harness, saw frogmen encase the vehicle in about eight and 

one-half minutes--but 10 people spent the next 45 minutes attempting 

to inflate the balloon which was supposed to carry the extended tow 

line across an expanse of water so that a hook trailed from a retrieving aircraft could engage it. Once the balloon was inflated, and before 

it had lost all its helium, the pick-up aircraft made a pass at the 

assembly--and punctured the balloon. A second pass by the JC-130 

at a new balloon and line was successful, the recovery vehicle started 

to lift from the water, and the tow line loop broke! 

Although the succession of difficulties involving the harness, 

the tow line, the balloons, and the winch in the JC -130 frustrated 

hopes for immediate success, the experimenters were not discouraged. 

Earlier trials had shown that floating objects comparable in size to the 

E-6 recovery vehicle could be retrieved from the ocean by JC -130s 0 

The question of the moment was whether two scuba divers could attach 

the harnes s in a high sea, inflate a balloon, and keep the tow line 

37 

from coming into contact with the water. 

In June, the E-6 program office proposed a slightly different 

water-to-air technique involving the use of a buoy attached by a line 

to the rear of the recovery vehicle. Another variant with potential 

was use of the descent parachute as a "buoy" with the retrieval 

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aircraft hooking the line between the parachute and the recovery 

vehicle. Because a relatively lengthy test and developITlent prograITl 

was involved, and because the technique had ITlore proITlise in theory 

than in practice, General Greer recoITlITlended deletion of the waterto-air recovery prograITl froITl the E-6 effort late in SepteITlber 1962. 

For the ITloITlent, however, General Electric was directed to continue 

feasibility tests. Lack of significant progres s caused final cancella38 

tion of the water-to-air recovery efforts on 2.5 October 1962. 

While the flight tests continued, several changes to the prograITl 

were approved which gave it the character of a long-terITl effort. 

The basic flight prograITl had been built about the seven originally 

scheduled tests plus the two "optional" trials (earlier treated as 

diagnostic flights). In January 1962, funds were allocated to a follow-on 

prograITl and on 27 March 1962 contractors were advised that the ninevehicle prograITl had been expanded to 26 vehicles. Letter contracts 

with General Electric and EastITlan Kodak had been signed and distributed 

As defined in July 1962, the objective of the water-to-air recovery 

prograITl was to establish the feasibility of bringing a towed recovery 

vehicle into a JC -l30, and to incorpora te the technique in the tenth 

and subsequent E-6!s. SiITlplicity, ease of operational eITlploYITlent, 

a ITliniITluITl of vehicle and aircraft ITlodifications, and few requireITlents 

for additional or special equipITlent were priITle considerations. General 

Electric, acting under an addition to the follow- on vehicle contract, was 

to collect and analyze aircraft flight data and wind tunnel inforITlation on 

recovery vehicle perforITlance (when towed) by earl y August and was to 

have a full-scale test prograITl underway by 15 October. 

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by the end of that month. Because of the fact that the original nine 

vehicle s were well along in fabrication by that time, changes and 

improvements in the configuration of the E-6 satellite were generally 

scheduled for the tenth and subsequent vehicles--unless, of course, 

they involved modifications necessary to the SUCCess of the early 

flight program. The index camera, air and water recovery, a back-up 

stabilization system, and the expansion of telemetry in the Agena 

vehicle (as opposed to the reentry vehicle) fell into the "long term II 

categoryo In the course of a major program review in September 1962, 

Charyk and Greer approved the addition of a secondary command 

system to the sixth and later vehicles plus deletion of the secondary 

propuls ion system in the tenth and later vehicles (the precision of 

orbit injection during the first four flights had made orbit adjust 

requirements redundant}o The inclusion of "back-up" attitude control 

and engine sequencing provisions in number 12 and subsequent vehicle s 

39 

remained under considerationo 

The first objective of the E-6 program, to demonstrate that 

the system could operate efficiently. still was unsatisfied. A successful mission was essentiaL In the longer view, the remaining vehicles 

in the original batch of nine were intended to demonstrate system 

performance, provide data that would permit refinement of the basic 

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e quipITle nt, and define the operationalliITlitations of the vehicle-caITlera 

cOITlbination. Only with the tenth vehicle would intelligence collection 

becoITle the principal ITlission objective. As had generally been true 

since inception of the E-6 effort during the SUITlITler of 1960, the 

policy of the prograITl office was to ITlake configuration changes only 

when they proITlised to iITlprove the vehicle or its product--or, of 

cour se, to correct defects discovered during the test prograITl. 

40 

"No frills" was a hard and fast rule. 

Thus far there had been only four significant deviations froITl 

the payload design conceptions approved at the tiITle of source selection. 

in NoveITlber-DeceITlber 1960. The lens design had been changed froITl 

one involving folded optics and a near vertical orientation to one based 

on a horizontal orientation and unfolded optics when it was deITlonstrated 

that the dual use of the ITlirror in a folded-optics systeITl was risky. 

Window shades had been added to reduce power requireITlents by 

providing a higher degree of therITlal control, the filITl cutter and seal 

had been ITlade a single rather than a double unit (severing and shielding 

both filITl strips with a greater assurance of reliability in operation), 

and the total of available iITlage ITlotion cOITlpensation speeds had been 

increas ed froITl 10 to 15 in order to reduce the potential for ITlotion 

blur on the process ed filITl. 

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The reentry vehicle had been altered somewhat in the course 

of development, but again not radically. The original scheme of 

building in three structure sections had given way to a four-section 

design, spin springs and a shaped charge had been added to improve 

separation characteristics, a multi-element thermal shield had been 

substituted for the original single-material type, the structure had 

been lightened, land recovery provisions had been deleted, and the 

destruct system had been removed. Some relatively minor additions 

had been made to the tracking, command, and telemetry installations --

but as much becaus e of Gambit requirernents as because of E-6 needs, 

As compared to other systems, in tenns of design and configuration 

41 

changes the E-6 had been reluarkably stable. 

The secure future of the program became somewhat less certain 

following the failure of the fourth test vehicle (5 August). On 21 August, 

Undersecretary Charyk told General Greer that "high government 

officials" were "concerned about the four consecutive failure s If and 

asked for an explanation and a summary of proposed corrective actions. 

Charyk also asked Greer to examine the possibility of adapting the E-6 

payloads to a thrust-augmented-Thor (TAT) launch vehicle and a 

Discoverer (Corona) recovery capsule. The undersecretary indicated 

that he intended to make several major program decisions within a week. 

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The response from the Los Angeles complex was not such as 

to encourage hope for an easy or inexpensive adaptation of the E-6 

payload to what would essentially be a Corona configuration. Colonel 

Beran emphasized that the launch and orbital performance of the E-6 

system were "quite impressive in several respects." The command 

subsystem and the payload stabilization provisions had also operated 

with a high degree of efficiency. On that basis, the suggestion of 

shifting to a TAT launch vehicle seemed unjustified. 

Beran also pointed out that use of TAT would force "almost 

complete redesign and packaging" of the E-6 system, would reduce 

the quantity of film by at least one-half, and would essentially constitute a new program with all the complications inherent in such a 

procedure. Its effect would be to substitute a new launch system for 

one which had worked quite well. 

Colonel Beran was convinced that de-boost problems which 

had marked the first three flights had been eliminated, The recovery 

system, he noted, had been given only one chance to operate, Be 

felt that the E-6 was much closer to fruition than any alternate that 

42 

could be readily provided. 

In Charyk's view, the real objective of the test program was 

to create confidence in system reliability and adequacy. The established 

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schedule was not sacred, he told General Greer, and "in no case will 

any launch be conducted unles s the results of previous mis sions have 

been thoroughly studied and the necessary measures, .. taken to 

43 

prevent a recurrence of any non-nominal performance. " 

On 18 September 1962, General Greer's group conducted a 

complete program review for the undersecretary, Cancellation of 

the follow-on program was by then being actively considered, so the 

summary included a resume of work status, prospective contract 

costs, and the comparative costs of a 9-vehicle as against a l7-vehicle 

follow- on program. The 9-vehicle effort would cost $144.4 million 

to complete, the l7-vehicle program $237.3 million. Although not at 

all enthusiastic about the options, Greer'e people agreed that alternate 

systems to contain the E-6 payload were feasible in the event of E-6 

program cancellation. Among the potential options was use of an 

enlarged Discoverer capsule ("Big D") with an Atlas~Agena launch 

combination; the use of a Thor with solid-rocket boosters (TAT) to 

orbit the current payload and recovery vehicles; and the use of TAT 

with the "Big D" recovery vehicle and the existent E-6 payload section. 

The alternative of using a modified E- 5 re entry vehicle and a ribbon 

parachute (to permit supersonic deployment) also seemed feasible, 

if not particularly attractive. In the eyes of the E-6 program office, 

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none of the alternatives was preferable to continuing the current effort. 

The future of the follow- on program still reITlained uncertain for 

another two weeks although stop-work orders had earlier been issued 

to the principal contractors. The final decision caITle on 3 October 1962, 

with Charyk' s order that work on all vehicles additional to the nine 

originally prograITlITled be halted. The undersecretary had decided 

to withhold action on further vehicles pending "coITlplete resolution of 

project difficulties and deITlonstration of actual perforITlance of sufficient 

quality to justify further procureITlent .•.. " He felt that the reITlaining 

flight tests ITlight lead to significant redesign and ITlodification. 

Charyk further directed that three of the reITlaining five payloads 

be scheduled for flight in accordance with a philosophy of taking all the 

tiITle necessary to insure a "ITlaxiITluITl probability of success" and with 

intervals between the flights sufficient to perITlit cOlnplete analysis of 

all data from. the previous flights and the incorporation of neces sary 

changes. The final two payloads (the "diagnostic" iteITls, as originally 

scheduled) and payload vehicles were to be stored for possible future 

use, and the Atlas-Agena cOITlbinations were to be ITlade available to 

other prograITls 0 

In effect, Undersecretary Charyk thus liITlited the scope of 

the E-6 prograITl to the three reITlaining flights on the original schedule. 

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From a program office viewpoint, the qualification that a successful 

flight might change such arrangements was the only entirely hopeful 

. 45 

note contained in his lnstructions. 

On 4 October, General Greer notified General Electric, 

Eastman Kodak, Lockheed, and the Space Systems Division of Charyk's 

decision. He cautioned each to say no more to the press than that the 

cutback represented a work phase termina tion and a contractual 

adjustment in accordance with the "continuing process of review" of 

46 

all Air Force space prograrns. But even though three more E-6 

flights were still scheduled, cancellation of the follow- on procurement 

had implications for the total reconnaissance effort considerably more 

serious than was at first apparent. 

Because of the highly effective security SCreen erected around 

the Samos progr am in December 1960, virtually no information on the 

success or failure of individual flights or total programs had been 

available even to the "cleared" members of the Air Force for nearly 

two years. During that period, considerable quantitites of reconnaissance film obtained from Corona overflights of Soviet territory had 

been processed and forwarded to operating commands. A major overhaul of United States strategic warfare policy had in part been based 

on information drawn from such sources. Able to number and locate 

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Soviet rnis sile bases, the nation was no longer dependent on a mas sive 

retaliation policy openly directed at eradication of Russian cities and 

"known" military stations 0 Relati vel y few people were aware of the 

Corona program and its succes s. The implication that some unspecified 

quantity of the "take" had been obtained from "Samosll flights was 

pres ent in virtually any II unwitting II estimate of the known situation o 

The E- 5 effort had ended in termination by January 1962. With 

the last E- 6 flight, the known "cover II for both Corona and the still 

untested Gambit would vanish. Another casualty of E-6 program termination would be the known justification for the existence of General 

Greer's organization- -SAFSP; only thos e with acces s to the cover 

programs appreciated that the E-6 effort was but a minor part of a 

major activity being managed from the fourth floor suite of offices 

in the "SSD complex" along El Segundo Boulevard in Los Angeles. 

Corona program managers were particularly concerned that 

announced cancellation of E-6 might expose the Corona effort. Other 

SAFSP staff officers could realistically harbor fears that some details 

of other covert programs might float to the surface once E-6 no longer 

could be used to explain SAFSP's existence. If the original objectives 

of SAFSP establishment were to remain valid, E-6 cancellation 

(should it finally occur) had to be accompanied by new camouflage for 

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the covert programs, a logical explanation for continuation of SAFSP 

as an organization, and--ideally--a new overt program to cancel in 

case of a political decision to halt "open" support of satellite reconnais sance. One of the ch ief reasons for continuing the E-6 in its 

original form had been to permit its public cancellation, and the 

clandestine continuation of other satellite reconnaissance activity, 

should international events so dictate. 4 7 

Thus quite apart from considerations of technology, the launch 

of the fifth E-6 vehicle promised to be of considerable significance. 

By late September, that vehicle had been prepared for its 

flight. Intensive Agena-reentry vehicle separation tests had been 

completed, heat-effect tests were continuing, the recovery subsystem 

test procedures had been exhaustively reviewed and changed, and the 

vehicle had been subjected to a substantial number of retrofit and 

modific ation actions. The additional insulation around aft bulkheads 

and near the ballast tanks was in place, a number of critical switches 

had been relocated, electrical cable had been rerouted around heatsensitive zones, the cover for the parachute cavity had been recoated 

with an improved insulator, the beacon and flasher assemblies had 

been strengthened and reinsulated, a special baffle had been added 

forward of the main vent valve, and the entire reentry vehicle had 

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been delicately weighted and ballasted to minimize any side effects 

of inertial imbalance. Representatives of General Electric, Lockheed, 

Aerospace Corporation, and the program office made a final appearance 

before General Greer to assure him again that they had a very high 

48 degree of confidence in the chances of mission success. Launch 

occurred On 11 November 1962. 

It was the wrong season for optimism. System operation to 

the point of reentry was in many respects even better than during any 

of the earlier missions 0 Lift-off and orbit injection again resulted III 

establishment of a near-perfect ephemeris (112-128 nautical miles, 

88.72 minutes period). The only possible malfunction, suggested by 

telemetry but unconfirmable, was failure of hatch removal. The command 

system functioned without disorder and the photographic subsystem transported 3400 feet of exposed film. De-boost sequencing was near perfect, 

and the reentry vehicle appeared to be perforITling without any error 

until it entered the blackout zone. Ther eafter, events roughly paralleled 

those of flight fOUL There was some indication of parachute deploYITlent, 

derived principally frOITl telemetry indications that descent had lasted 

longer than would have been the case with a free -falling reentry body, 

and again One aircraft reported 16 minutes of indistinct beacon signal 

reception following impacL But none of the search craft sighted the 

vehicle, no further signals were reported, and at dark on the evening 

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of 12 November the search ended. (Some surface ships cruised the 

area the next da y, but with little hope.) The fact that a recording 

station heard both SOFAR bombs detonate indicated to recovery team 

personnel that the vehicle had broken up on impact or sunk shortly 

49 

thereafter. 

Evaluation of the reentry process indicated that erratic aerodynamic heating effects which had marked reentry of the fourth vehicle 

had been responsible for the fate of the fifth. p.lthough telemetry 

reception was not greatly improved over the August test, some additional 

data emerged which indicated that the ablative sheathing had burned 

away well forward of the vehicle's after structure and that some of 

what had earlier been characterized as "wake effect" probably had 

actually been caused by aerodynamic gasses passing completely through 

the vehicle from an opening (or openings) burned through the conical 

forward structure. General Electric's specialists in reentry aerodynamics offered no as surance that they could correct the difficulty 

for the next flight, and the mood of the several contractor and E-6 

program office representatives who reviewed the program's prospects 

50 for General Greer was not cheerful. 

Not until January 1963 did the Aerospace Corporation complete 

a resume of E-6 program difficulties and suggest measures to overCOme 

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faults discovered as a result of number five flight. Engineers concluded, on the basis of telemetry which had been obtained from the 

fifth flight but which because of programming imperfections had not 

been acquired for the fourth, that the addition of 0 05 inches of 

ablative material to the main heat shield, the elimination of most 

ablation inserts in the main shield, and the revision of attachment 

fittings for the main parachute hatch cover would correct the known 

defects of reentry. As additional measures, they recommended 

revising the vent channels in the vehicle to prevent £low~ through of 

leaking gas se s, thermal coating all components and cabling required 

for post-entry operation, and relocating some systems -monitoring 

instrumentation to provide positive verification of system operation 

after reentry. The Aerospace group suggested that it would be 

possible to demonstrate the soundness of the revised vehicle by 

firing it--without the camera payload--atop either an Atlas or a ThorAgena booster. (General Electric estimated that it would cost $400, 000 

to refurbish a reentry vehicle, to fabricate the necessary adapter, and 

51 

to provide test support for the vehicle. 

For nearly a month the results of the fifth flight and the prospects 

of the remaining two were carefully weighed against cost considerations 

and the prospect that Corona-Mural cameras could return intelligence 

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data equivalent in value to any the E-6 could provide. The political 

and econoITlic consequences of cOITlplete E-6 cancellation were 

siITlilarly evaluated. In the scale against the chances of the E-6, 

apart frOITl cOITlpetition provided by Corona, was the tiITling of the 

crisis. COITling as it did ITlidway through the fiscal year, when rising 

costs and earlier underestiITlations in other prograITls were causing a 

search for additional funds, the E-6 represented an appealing target 

for fiscal econoITly. On the other hand, experience indicated that 

relatively little would actually be returned to the governITlent if the 

prograITl were cancelled at that point. The vehicles were available 

(and paid for), and launch and tracking costs would be but slightly 

affected by cancellation. (Since launch and tracking station expenses 

were continuing in nature they could be considered as running overhead 

costs.) Moreover, the payload had shown every indication of usefulness. InasITluch as all earlier calculations of systeITl resolution in 

the Corona prograITl had proved to be conservative when ITleasured 

against actual "take, II there was a strong possibility that E-6 products 

ITlight be substantially better than Corona products. If that proved 

true, E-6 would provide a desirable interITlediate between the optiITluITl 

l3-foot resolution of Corona-Mural (although perhaps half of the 

Corona-Mural results showed resolution on the order of 30 feet) and 

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52. 

the predicted five-foot resolution of Gambit. There was some feeling 

that E-6 either should have been cancelled much earlier, when the 

possible overlap with Corona-Mural first became apparent, or should 

not be cancelled before completion of the two remaining test flights 

and a cornparison of anticipated with actual intelligence returns. 

A factor in the consider ations was the conviction of some 

Department of Defense and CIA officials that the E-6 was of dubious 

worth, that Corona-Mural would do as much without the additional 

cost of an E-6 program, and that the greater cost of Atlas-Agena 

launches over Thor- or TAT-Agena would validate a cancellation 

53 

decision, 

In any event, on 11 December 1962, Air Force Undersecretary 

Charyk advised General Greer of his decision to terminate the E-6 

progr am immediatel Yo All remaining payloads and payload vehicle s 

were ordered into storage, Greer was given discretion in permitting 

completion of iterns then well along in fabrication and the assembly of 

54 

reports and test data analyses then in progress. 

Simultaneousl y, Charyk asked Greer to look again into the 

feasibility and desirability of orbiting an E-6 camera payload in a 

Thor-Agena vehicle (using the Corona recovery system) to obtain 

information on the value of the camera system alone. Precisely such 

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a course had been followed upon cancellation of the E-5, resulting in 

the still unproven Lanyard systeITl. The option of sending only one of 

the stereo caITleras into orbit and of liITliting the quantity of exposed 

filITl ITlade the project seeITl sOITlewhat less difficult than the earlier 

suggestion of boosting an entire E-6 payload into orbit with a Thor 

or TAT. Charyk's notion was that if the project seeITled feasible, it 

should be presented as a new prograITl, independent of the original 

E-6 except in eITlploying available assets of the defunct prograITl, On 

the basis of the possible adoption of such an approach, SAFSP received 

authorization to retain EastITlan Kodak support and to continue payload 

work pending a final ruling on the prospects of an E-6- Thor-Agena 

cOITlbination. (An additional, but unITlentionable, justification was the 

need to continue EastITlan efforts in support of the GaITlbit - oriented 

55 

work at Vandenberg.) 

After exhaustively evaluating all the possibilities, Colonel 

Beran's office endorsed three feasible approaches to a revised E-6 

prograITl. The first involved an Atlas-Agena boost cOITlbination, a 

ITlidsection adapter to take the E-6 payload (ITlinus one caITlera), and 

a reentry stage consisting essentially of a Corona nose capsule. 

Beran's office also suggested using a Strategic Air COITlITland Atlas 

adapted to carry the E-6 reentry vehicle, thus perITlitting further tests 

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of the vulnerability of that component to aerodynamic heating effects, 

The third option required use of a TAT-Agena, a new midsection, 

and a Discoverer reentry bodyo The Thor- or TAT-Agena combination 

afforded the prospect of covering most of the Soviet Union on its initial 

pass and of being subject to recovery on the second pass, assuming a 

nighttime recovery operation. In view of the first-pas s reconnais sance, 

second-pas s recovery feature, it could afford "invulnerable reconnaissance. II Simplicity, reliability, and the use of proven components 

(except the TAT, which had not yet flown) were obvious advantageso 

Using existing hardware, one E-6 camera, and the Corona reentry 

vehicle, a first flight was conceivable by April 1963. With a redesigned 

midsection, one camera, and the Corona reentry body, November 1963 

seemed a feasible first flight date. (Either the Thor-Agena or the TATAgena would theoreticall y be usable by that time.) Adaptation of the 

Corona reentry vehicle to a one-camera configuration and the AtlasAgena booster would permit first flight by April 1963; introduction of 

a "dual-Discoverer If reentry vehicle configuration (like the later 

Corona-J) would require a delay until August 1963 but would permit 

use of both cameras. Conversion of the payload system to a narrower 

film with dual takeup in a Corona reentry body would delay the flight 

only to June 1963. 

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SAFSP recommended immediate preparation for a one-camera 

test using the Atlas-Agena and a Corona configuration reentry body, a 

test of the original reentry body on a Strategic Air Command Atlas, 

and the start of design work on a light-weight single-camera stage, 

SAFSP also observed that a combination recovery-readout capacity 

could be developed from available E-6 and E-l or E-2 hardware, with 

a first flight conceivable by November 1963. (Five E-l and three E-2 

payloads were still in storage and the necessary ground equipment was 

. 56 

a vallable o ) 

For 28 days there was no verdict. Then, on 31 January 1963, 

Charyk formally notified General Greer that all proposals for further 

orbit tests of the E-6 payload had been disapproved. The undersecretary 

57 desired "no further action in this regard. " 

Because of the general character of SAFSP programs and their 

uniformly sensitive nature, the third and fourth floor offices which 

housed most of the Greer establishment were seldom treated to the 

general badinage characteristic of many program offices. Chatter 

concerning the reconnais sanCe program was infrequent, and was 

generally confined to a few individuals who knew precisely what all 

their listeners had been cleared for. And since the general security 

rule was to clear as few people as possible, and for as few items as 

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possible, many of the E-6 program participants were aware of no 

other SAFSP programs--except those previously cancelled--or at 

most knew of Gambit because of its earlier alignment within the E-6 

office structure. Few knew of Corona, and fewer still were aware 

that the cancelled E-5 had reappeared in a different form as Lanyard. 

But some knew, and knowing were tempted to quip, quietly 

and privately, that it was a wise man who knew his own payload, 

that E- 6 migh! have been cancelled, but it was equally pos sible that 

General Greer or Colonel Heran had found a way to stuff the E-6 

cameras into something else and weren't telling. 

At the close of the 9 January presentations during which the 

several possible modes of flying E-6 payloads in new configurations 

had been discussed, Dr. Charyk, General Greer, and General J. L. 

Martin retired to Greer's office to consider the options. They were 

convinced that it would be useless to schedule the two remaining 

payloads for routine launching in their original modes since there 

still seemed no way of getting reasonable assurance that the recovery 

system would work. But they were also convinced that the potential 

of the E-6 optics and film transport system should be demonstrated 

before any final decision to abandon the enterprise. Aware of the 

growing disbelief in E-6 adequacy at Department of Defense levels, 

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they concluded that the proper course was to devise an alternate 

approach which would produce the results they wanted quickly and 

cheaply. There was little hope of securing approval for a large-scale 

progralTI, in any event. The pendululTI of opinion had recently swung 

toward relatively slTIall research and developlTIent experilTIents as 

opposed to larger progralTIs. The idea of proving a capability and 

then proceeding to a full- scale progralTI was generally in favor. And 

the considerations which had caused effective cancellation of the 

full-scale E-6 effort still persisted: the E-6 recovery systelTI seelTIed 

fatally uncertain; budget pressures required a lTIajor cutback in 

expensive progralTIs; and there was an influential, vocal group (chiefly 

within the CIA elelTIent of the National Reconnais sance Organization) 

which was convinced that E- 6 was redundant, that Corona-lVlural or 

an ilTIproved Mural (M-Z) would serve the nation better than E~6. 58 

Charyk, Martin, and Greer brought no one else into their 

deliberations until the last day but one in January. Then, by telephone, 

General Greer sUlTIlTIoned Colonel Heran, E-6 director, and Lieutenant 

Colonels lVlark FarnulTI, Ned Hand, and D. J. Yockey to his office. 

There he disclosed a plan to use E-6 payloads in an experilTIent to 

delTIonstrate 6-7-foot resolution frolTI orbiL He told thelTI Charyk had 

agreed to establish a new "black" progralTI office with that lTIission, 

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its first task being to prepare a work statement acceptable to Charyk. 

:Heran was to prepare the statement, working with General Electric 

and Eastman Kodak in meetings that would begin the following morning 

(31 January). It was to be ready by 5 February. 

The program, General Greer continued, would use a 315A 

number as a temporary identifier (315 was the "random number" 

designator for the Elint F-2 (698BK) system in its current incarnation). 

All work would be conducted away from the SAFSP office complex, in 

a suite leased by Eastman Kodak on Manchester Avenue, a long block 

north of the main SSD buildings. (Among the witting, the obscure 

offices were known as "Marty's Place, 11 in honor of the resident 

Eastman employee, Martin Hauseman. Air Force visitors were forbidden to go there in uniform, were under orders to arrive and depart 

singl y or in pair s, and were not permitted to park cars carrying Air 

Force identity stickers in the immediate neighborhood.) 

The use of thrust-augmented Thor boosters was assumed, but 

remaining to be decided were issues of Agena B as against Agena D, 

what guidance system to use in the booster, the need for a new midsection, how to procure the reentry capsules ("buckets ") from the 

Corona program without dis closing the s cherne, a funding channel, 

and a cover plan. The possibility of pretending that the payloads 

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were Program 698BK's F-2 ferret packages seemed feasible but 

59 

required study. 

In advance of convening the meeting, Greer had composed a 

set of instructions for Charyk to send him. They paralleled the 

details he had given Heran, Hand, Yockey, and Farnum, emphasizing 

the need for quick, inexpensive, and sure results. Toward the end 

of the mes sage as it came back to Greer I s office was the injunction, 

"The approach should be Spartan in nature, as simple as pos sible, 

and should take no consideration of any future system applications. " 

From that phrase came the name by which the program was thereafter 

generally known: 60 

Project Spartan. 

In discus sions with Eastman Kodak and General Electric 

representatives the following day (31 January, the day of formal E-6 

cancellation), Colonels Heran and Yockey outlined the general system 

parameters and defined the chief hardware problems, as then foreseen. 

Security, still a matter of confining program discussions to the 

original core of about 10 knowledgeable people, was made more 

certain by the appointment of Colonel Farnum as security control 

officer and by the decision to use a "limited handling" system even 

more secure than the "special handling" in effect for Gambit. Although 

the Spartan designator was generally used throughout the period of 

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program consideration, more formal nomenclature was assigned on 

61 

2 February: SP-AS-63, for Special Project-Advanced Study 1963. 

By 2 February the outlines of the proposed "experiment" had 

taken shape, and by late afternoon of 4 February they had been transformed into a work stateme nL Generally, two design approaches 

were to be considered. In one, early launch was the objective, and 

the technique would be to couple a single E-6 camera and the original 

E-6 midsection to an A-45 (Corona-type) reentry vehicle and a 

F air child programmer -timer. For the other, a redes igned midsection 

integral with an enlarged reentry capsule capacity was to be considered. 

Either a scaled-up A-45 or A-45s in tandem were feasible options. 

The payload would be one carne ra with an adapter to provide stereo 

photography, very much like Lanyard in concept. The objective of 

the effort, under either option, was also to include hardware procurement and fabrication sufficient to protect a June 1963 initial launch 

62 

date, with stereo capacity by November 1963. 

The first major obstacle appeared at about the same time. On 

5 February, Dr. Charyk had Lieutenant Colonel Jack Sides brief CIA's 

Dr. Herbert Scoville, who was deputy director of the National Reconnaissance Office, on the background of the proposed experiment. 

Scoville was deeply suspicious of the whole proceeding. He refused 

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to accept as valid the statement of primary purpose: to get searchtype photographs at 6, 5-foot resolution for evaluation, He insisted 

that the Lanyard system was quite good enough, even though only 

providing spot coverage, and in a rather lengthy discussion made it 

apparent that he thought the proposed experiment to be the prelude 

to a new system development. He denied that the E-6 camera could 

produce 6. 5-foot resolution, even with stereo, and in Sides' opinion 

left the meeting with the confirmed impression that focal length was 

the only critical factoL Holding to the view "that somebody was 

playing fast and loose with the figures, II Scoville would not concede 

that an improved Ie ns -film definition (from 78 to 110 lines per millimeter) and a decrease in satellite altitude (from 125 to 100 nautical 

miles) could contribute to significantly improved resolution, It was 

the general opinion of those Charyk people present at the briefing 

that Scoville would firmly resist approval of the Spartan experiment 

"at the possible expense of the program he considered to be his"--

63 

the "improved Mural", M-2. 

Although the Scoville reaction could have been entirel y spontaneous, there was a greater possibility that it represented yet 

another flare-up in the increasingly acrimonious relationship, Since 

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the October 1962 Cuban crisis and Charyk's success in transferring 

a large share of U-2 operations froITl CIA to the Strategic Air COITlITland, 

he and Scoville had often been at odds. Tension arising in disagreeITlent 

about a proposed revision to the NRO charter added to the probleITl. 

During part of the October-DeceITlber 1962 period, both their personal 

and their official relationships were severely strained. The late 

January announceITlent that Charyk proposed to retire froITl his Air 

Force post to head a cOITlITlercial cOITlITlunication satellite developITlent 

did little to ease the tension. It was clear that insofar as Scoville 

spoke for the CIA, Spartan would receive little support froITl that 

64 

eleITlent of the NRO. 

Notwithstanding Scoville I s negative reaction to the Spartan 

proposal, work at the Los Angeles office continued apace. The 

original cost estiITlate presupposed that $3.87 ITlillion would be 

required to fund EastITlan and General Electric studies (and long 

lead-tiITle procureITlent) with a total of $20.348 ITlillion being required 

in all of fiscal 1963. Project personnel estiITlated that four launches, 

starting in July 1963, could be conducted for a total prograITl cost of 

$32.273 ITlillion. 

Cover for the effort was to be supposed SAFSP participation 

in developITlent of a reconnaissance systeITl for the B-70 or the X-20. 

(That story was for ITlost of the traditionally suspicious SAFSP 

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assignees; non-SP people would be told only that the effort was one 

more in the directorate's general "no details" assignment.) 

The process for keeping E-6 equipment in the hands of Spartan 

contractor s without uncovering the entire effort required special 

attention. Es sentiall y, the scheme was to have Charyk instruct 

Greer to make E-6 equipment available to the Aerial Reconnaissance 

Laboratory at Wright-Patterson, much as had been done in establishing 

Lanyard. Colonel Beran's people would then direct the transfer of the 

equipment from appropriate contractors to the laboratory and would 

get shipping instructions from a contact at Wright Field. After the 

exchange of many, many itemized lists and numberless detailed queries 

and replies, the equipment would have been moved to a secure area in 

the General Electric and Eastman Kodak "black" facilities, the Wright 

Field contact would have signed for the equipment and then been 

relieved of responsibility, and the actual equipment receipts would 

be so deeply buried in the paper morass of the Los Angeles Procurement District that nobody would be able to track down the equipment 

itself. (Accountability for "Program 206" equipment, actually Gambit 

hardware, was similarly maintained.) The charm of the scheme lay 

in the fact that nothing more bulky than several dozen misleading 

signatures was moved about, so only the individual culprits at Wright 

65 

Field and in the Procurement District need be briefed. 

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Then on 12 February Dr 0 Charyk disapproved the Spartan 

proposal as "not justifiable for the purpose of determining the increase 

in intelligence content obtainable from 6-7-foot ground resolution. 'I 

The tenor of his statement and the suggestion that the objective could 

be met sooner, and at less cost, through other National Reconnaissance 

Program efforts, clearly indicated that the reason for the disapproval 

lay in Scoville's objections. Scoville, with the support of the CIA 

element of the National Reconnaissance Office, was thoroughly committed to the "M-2" approach--a Mural-type system embodying a new 

camera designed for 6-8-foot resolution (based on an improved 39.3-

inch 1 ens Itek had de signed) • 

Although the original scheme apparently disappear ed in the 

face of such new direction, the substance was misleading. Both Greer 

and Charyk were convinced that the Mural system had inherent mechanical inhibitions which would always prevent the acquisition of consistently 

high resolution photography. Some of the Mural pictures would be of 

high quality, but because of the character of the combined lens-film 

transport-panning mechanism, the quality of Mural photography would 

remain variable. The E-6 system, however, had an apparent potential 

for consistency in quality, and at a level that made it comparable to 

the best of Mural. In essence, Greer and Charyk believed that the 

Spartan experiment would show the E-6 camera system to be superior 

to the proposed "M-2. II 

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Even though it had not yet proved possible to get Dr. Scoville's 

endorsement, Charyk did not give up on the Spartan approach. In 

formally disapproving the original scheme. he added the proviso that 

NRO interest in a general search system which might possibly use 

the eight surviving E-6 cameras justified an "appropriate minimum 

design study" that would take advantage of the experience acquired 

by the General Electric and Eastman Kodak personnel with E-6 

backgrounds. To that end, Charyk authorized General Greer to conduct 

"black" studies to define the usefulness of the E-6 camera in a Thorboosted general search system. Not surprisingly, the studies were 

to be oriented toward stated Spartan objectives: a single camera with 

an optional stereo mode if later desired. Charyk authorized the initial 

66 

commitment of $500, 000 to the effort. 

Such changes notwithstanding, on 15 February letter contracts 

>:' 

with General Electric and Eastman Kodak went into effect. Their 

The timing of the contract was one of its several unique features. 

Initial discussions between the Beran group and the prospective 

contractors did not begin until 31 January, yet a work statement 

was in existence by the late afternoon of 4 February and a formal 

letter contract had been written, reviewed, revised, and approved 

by 15 February. (Eastman Kodak did not formall y sign until 

18 February, but that reflected a mailing delay.) Subsequent 

extensions and amendments were consistently written, coordinated, 

and issued in less than 48 hours from point of decision. 

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goals were those first defined in the work statements of 4-5 February, 

with the proviso that technical and cost proposals for the actual 

hardware effort were due by 15 March. Interestingly enough, the 

funds were to be spent for procurement and fabrication of long leadtime items needed to meet a 30 July launch date rather than to fund 

the studies themselves. The cost of preparing proposals was to be 

67 

covered in overhead charges to other contracts. 

The situation was somewhat peculiar. Ostensibly, Spartan 

had been disapproved and cancelled, and correspondence reflected 

that status. 68 But the contracts continued in effect, and indeed in 

terms of the discussions then involving Beran's group, Eastrnan 

Kodak, and General Electric, the objectives of the effort had broadened 

somewhat. By 18 February, the day Eastman accepted the "2113 

contract, " the camera contractor had established both concepts and 

general configurations which promised remarkable things from the 

E-6 photographic systems. It seemed entirely possible to get sixfoot resolution from stereo arrangements of a mirror on a single E-6 

camera, and several possible recovery capsule options had been 

identified which promised to expand the limited film capacity of a 

Thor-boosted system. Eastman indicated that recent improvements 

in optical coating techniques would permit 48-percent effectivenes s 

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in light transmission with "improved" mirrors against a 38-percent 

figure for the original E-6. The 36-inch lens system coupled to such 

a mirror and using improved film emulsions would conceivably have 

six-foot resolution potential, in a swath coverage of 17 by 140 nautical 

miles. (With inclusion of a greater roll capability, the potential 

area of coverage could be increased to 200 miles, though only 140 

miles of terrain could be photographed in a single sweep.) Eastman 

Kodak went to an extreme the firm had never before permitted itself, 

proposing the in-house construction of a complete photographic 

vehicle ("Ph/V" in the argot of the "black" conversations) which would 

substitute for the customary General Electric camera-containing 

structure. Eastman concluded that the proposed "PhV" would provide 

substantially better results than the originallBJ" configuration. 

Resolution and acuity improvements could well be exploited to provide 

an option for monochrome or color stereo, while addition of what 

the camera engineers called the "cos ine platten drive If would virtuall y 

eliminate image smear along the line of vehicle motion. 69 

As a consequence of the concentrated effort between 30 January 

and 18 February, and in part because of conversations and presentations at the Washington level, the character of Spartan changed 

radically by late February" Scoville's opposition had prompted the 

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"cancel Spartan" ITlessage of 12 February but had not prevented the 

issuance of the letter contracts. Instead, the work had ostensibly 

been changed froITl "experiITlentll to "study, II though in point of fact 

the objective of a 30 July 1963 experiITlental flight reITlained in effect. 

(Indeed, the date was forITlally changed to 30 July froITl 15 SepteITlber 

after the letter contracts had been signed.) The "transfer" of E-6 

equipITlent to B-70 and X-20 contractors went through on schedule 

(with frequent references to an otherwise unidentified project called 

"Sky GeITl, 11 which was ITlysteriously cancelled a few ITlonths later). 

In reality, then, the effect of the "cancellation" had been to cause 

redesignation (Spartan forITlally was replaced by SP-AS-63) and to 

expand the scope of investigation so that stereo would clearly be 

70 

incl uded aITlong the potential s. 

EastITlan and General Electric subITlitted their "proposals lion 

15 March, as scheduled. They were generally cOITlpatible with the 

concepts outlined early in February, elaborating on the original idea 

but adding little 0 EastITlan's proposal for July launch (dubbed the 

Type A configuration) eITlbodied a very s iITlple ITlonoscopic systeITl 

which would provide for exposure of filITl in a slightly ITlodified E-6 

caITlera and recovery by rneans of a Corona capsule. The photo firITl 

estiITlated that four payloads could be asseITlbled and delivered between 

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between 21 July and 15 September 1963 for a total cost of $1,039,743 

(including a $91, 377 fee). Both General Electric and Eastman Kodak 

also submitted proposals for "Type B" systems embodying provision 

for stereo photography, enlarged film capacity, and higher resolution 

system features. The major innovations were the "scaled up" reentry 

capsule proposed by General Electric (and multiple installations of 

both the original Corona capsule of 33-inch diameter and the enlarged 

45-inch capsule) and three technical feature s of the Eastman proposal: 

optional film transport mechanics which could provide either improved 

reliability or expanded film utilization; a programmable slit which 

improved the potential for high-latitude photography; and an improved 

lens with a potential of 120 lines per millimeter and a promise of 

better than six-foot resolution. Eastman also emphasized the growth 

71 

potential of the proposed lens system. 

While Heran's team analyzed the details of the Eastman-General 

Electric proposals, the contractors continued along the line of supporting a 30 July launch. But that prospect was gradually dimming. Outside 

the world of SP-AS-63 there began, on 20 March, a special study 

evaluation of an "improved search type satellite reconnaissance system, II 

which, on instructions from the new NRO director, Brockway McMillan, 

was to include "applicable variations" of the E-6 system. In fact, the 

only candidates were the M-2 and the E-6. 

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One of the chief reasons for E-6 cancellation, as a specific I 

program, had been the apparent overlap between E-6 and such 

developmental or proposed systems as Gambit, Lanyard, and M=2. I 

Lack of program succes s, lack of confidence in the recovery vehicle I 

configuration or General Electric's ability to "fix" it, and the budget 

pinch of late 1962 were the real determinants, but the apparent lack I 

of a performance niche not at least partially occupied by another I 

system was also important. 

Early in 1963, after E-6 had been terminated but before Spartan I 

had been translated from concept to specific proposal, the United States I 

Intelligence Board had forwarded to the NRO a restatement of the 

requirement for five-foot resolution stereo search coverage. Mural I 

could not satisfy the requirement, and neither Gambit nor Lanyard I 

was fully qualified. For practical purposes, the ad hoc committee 

appointed in response to McMillan's instructions was charged with I 

recommending a suitable system. I 

The committee, under the chairmanship of Colonel W. C. King, 

new Gambit program director, met through late March and early I 

April. In that same period, SP-AS-63 was continuing toward a still I 

retained 30 July launch goal. The apparent contradiction between an 

experiment involving the E-6 camera system and an evaluation of its I 

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abstract worth was no ITlore than a reflection of the intense desire 

to be ready with sonlething quickly responsive to the prospective 

cOITlITlittee reconlITlendations. Early in the investigation, it becaITle 

clear that the E-6 systeITl had significant resolution advantages over 

the M-Z. Through his own channels, General Greer saw to it that 

the products of SP-AS-63 were inconspicuously introduced into the 

King cOITlITlittee deliberations. It thus becaITle clear that the ITlost 

probable recoITlITlendation the King cOITlITlittee could reach would call 

72 

for reactivating the E-6 prograITl, and this in fact was the outcOITle. 

But there were political cOITlplications, or considerations, 

that in this ins tance counterweighted the technical evaluation. 

McMillan was relatively new as NRO director, and was at that ITlOITlent 

involved in negotiating a new NRO charter, a ITlodification of the 

version which had ill served the needs of the organization under Dr 0 

Charyk. In part because of Charyk's departure and the interregnuITl, 

Dr 0 Eugene Fubini (of the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering) 

had been taking a larger hand in the proceedings of the satellite 

reconnaissance prograITl o Fubini had been instruITlental in inducing 

cancellation of the E-6, at least in his own belief, although at the tiITle 

it was cancelled Charyk and Greer had actuall y ITlade the decision. 

(Secretary McNaITlara and CIA Chief McCone had been willing to 

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continue the effort, on Charyk's recorrnnendation, even though Fubini 

had independently recommended that it be haltedo) Scoville was firmly 

opposed to E-6 continuance before its cancellation and to its reincarnation, in any form, thereafter. Fubini and Scoville were clearly 

committed to eradication of the E-6; it would be difficult to induce 

73 

them to reverse their stands. 

The possibility that E-6 III some form might be approved, or 

that at least an attempt to prove out the camera system in actual 

orbital operation might be authorized, had prompted General Greer 

to keep the SP-AS-63 effort alive while the King committee deliberatedo 

After 15 April, and the submis sion of King committee recommendations, 

the SP-AS-63 activity continued at a gradually decreasing pace, but 

still in the hope of a favorable finding. Additional funds were provided 

in April and May, and the definitization deadline was concurrently 

74 

extended until it finally moved into July. But it was also becoming 

clear that events were conspiring against E-6 reincarnation, in any 

form. The relatively slight ground coverage that would result from 

any of the feasible experimental configurations added to the fact that 

there would be either no stereo coverage or that stereo coverage 

would be limited because of the necessary arrangement of film and 

mirror, tended to reduce the value of the experiment in the eyes of 

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thos e concerned with the utility of the returned film. (That the Spartan 

approach had been deliberately designed to test the resolution of E-6 

cameras and as sociated subsystems apparently was little considered 

in the April-May deliberations.) In any event, the fact that the King 

report was not accepted, and that this chance of reviving the E-6 

75 

faded, virtually ended the prospect of SP-AS-63 continuance. 

Nonetheless, as late as May 1963 the objective of the study 

program still included specific launch deadline: 30 August 1963. 

Four payloads, each based on a single E-6 camera, were considered 

for relatively slight modification. Recovery was still to be by means 

76 

of Corona reentry vehicles, adapted to the film system of the E-6" 

But corning more to the front was the long-term goal of a substantially 

improved E-6 system adapted to somewhat modified requirernents. 

In May, Eastman was predicting 5. 5-foot ground resolution with 

irnproved irnage motion cornpensation and 6. 7-foot resolution with 

less adequate image rnotion features. In this instance, the payloads 

would be based on E-6 designs but probably would incorporate such 

radically rnodified subsystems as to be for practical purposes new 

equipment. (Irnprovements were programmed in the optics, the 

camera dynarnics, combined lens-fihn performance, mirror drive, 

optical mounts, filrn supply cannisters, the vehicle midsection, the 

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aft payload structure, system flexibility. thermal control aspects, 

ambient pressure operation, and various specialized elementso) 

By late May, Greer's people had redirected the Eastman effort from 

further consideration of flying E-6 payloads to a preliminary study 

of the prospect of using E-6 technology to support development of a 

new gross-coverage system capable of satisfying recognized requirements. General Elect ric I s effort had been turned toward development 

of a new scaled-up version of the A-45 capsule. a "Mk VIII" reentry 

vehicle. The character of SP-AS-63 was substantially changed by 

that evolution, less than 25 percent of E-6 components being applicable 

to such a new system. (One consequence was the abandonment of 

the elaborate cover scheme involving equipment originally funded by 

77 

the E-6 program office.) 

Early in June, Eastman submitted a refined proposal for the 

development of a gross coverage, moderate resolution, convergent 

stereo system bas ed on E-6 technology. The firm still offered to 

develop either a complete vehicle, including subsystems, or the 

payload portions only, and suggested that four flight-ready vehicles 

could be delivered for $19.7 million. Four payloads alone (camera, 

film handling system, and related components), said Eastman, would 

cost the government $11.3 million. Asked to rate the newly proposed 

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system against the E-6, Eastman Kodak responded that the new system 

would be "definitely superior" to the original E- 6 payload. The contractor considered that the chance to refine the E-6 design had 

permitted major improvements: greater film capacity to allow 

complete coverage at a lower altitude; a simplified (in-line) film 

transport system with a start-stop platten for greater reliability 

and versatility; a higher reflectance mirror coating with resultant 

T -stop improvement; a prog rammable slit to improve the quality 

of high latitude exposures; a greater number of image motion compensation speeds; improved temperature control; the incorporation of a 

roll-joint; a standard recovery system with multiple recovery vehicles, 

and general improvements in system reliability. 

Impressed by the potential, and still hopeful that something 

might corne of the King committee recommendations that would permit 

surfacing the SP-AS-63 work as a starting point, General Greer in 

earl y July obtained a final increment of funds to keep the work alive 

for a few more weeks. (The $150, 000 approved on 2 July raised the 

total of funds authorized for SP-AS-63 to an even $1 minion.) But 

seven days later, on 9 July. Colonel Heran passed the word to his 

procurement officer that the contracts with Eastman Kodak and General 

Electric were to be terminated. The "high level II decision so long 

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awaited had been received; E-6 was again COInatose. Colonel Yockey 

notified both Inajor contractors by telephone and began Inaking arrangeInents for forInal terInination proceedings. Official notices went to 

the contractors on 12 July, but work had ceased three days earlier. 78 

It was not at all iInpossible that E-6 Inight be again revived, 

though not in its earlier forIn, since the basic requireInent for a 

stable-quality, Inoderate-resolution search systeIn had not been fully 

satisfied at the close of 1963. With the cancellation of Lanyard, none 

of the original E-systeIns of 1960 survived in any forIn, yet the requireInents that had caused their generation reInained. But at the saIne tiIne 

the basic objections to E-6, in any forIn, reInained unsatisfied. 

Clearly the decision hinged on Inore than raw technology; the Inash of 

engineering, econoInic, and political factors that had so consistently 

influenced the total satellite reconnais sance prograIn had Inuch to do 

with the eventual disapproval of plans to develop a new search s ysteIn 

based on E-6 technology. The validity of that technology had never 

been tested, of course. E-6 had been cancelled, rightly, because it 

was dependent on a faulty recovery systeIn. Although experience 

with Mercury {and later GeInini and Apollo} recovery bodies deInonstrated that sea recovery was a feasible alternative to air catch, the 

E-6 recovery systeIn had no real capability along those lines. At 

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the end, the experience of E-6 payload development was to have a 

considerable influence on subsequent developments that led, by 1966, 

through the 5-2 search system proposals to the eventual Hexagon 

- program. But all that was in the future. 

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NOTES ON SOURCES 

See Chapter IV. 

Interview, F. Co E. Oder (Col, USAF, retired), 4 Mar 63; 

LtCol R. W. Yundt, 13 Mar 63; Col J. W 0 Ruebel, 15, 16 

Apr 63; Col R. A. Berg, 16 Apr 63, all SAFSP, by R. L. 

Perry. Col W.G. King, Samos Proj Dir in 1960, and Oder, 

his predecessor, were particularly outspoken opponents of 

concurrency. (Interview, King by Perry, 19 Dec 630) 

Ltr, LtGen R. C. Wilson, DCS/D, USAF, to Dir/Adv Tech, 

9 May 60, subj: SAMOS; Hr, MajGen V.R. Haugen, Asst 

DCS/D USAF to Cmdr ARDC, 16 May 60, subj: SAMOS 

Development Plan; ltr, Wilson to Cmdr ARDC, 1 Jun 60, 

subj; Exploitation of Initial SAMOS Data; TWX RDRB 19-5-36-E, 

ARDC to BMD, 19 May 60, in SAFSP Samos file R&D-l and Air 

Staff files. 

Memo, H. F. York, DDR&E, to SAFUS, 6 Jun 60, subj: 

Samos R&D Operational Plans, in SAFSP Samos file, R&D-I; 

ltr, Capt H. Mitchell, DCS/I, ARDC, to BMD, 13 Jun 60, 

subj: SAMOS R&D Operational Plans, with rpt, "SAMOS, II 

13 Jul 60 (a preliminary copy of the DDR &E "Billings Report"), 

in SAFSP Samos files; see also Chapter 

Col J. W. Ruebel, SP-3, described the CIA briefing of 1957 

to R. L. Perry in a 15 Apr 63 interview. The U-2 affair has 

been exhaustively examined in a variety of books and articles. 

The details of these developments are provided in Chapter VI 

See also Technical Work Stmt, SAMOS, E-6 Photographic/ 

Recovery Subsystems, 26 Jul 60, in E-6 files, R&D-I, 

Jun-Dec 60; AFBMD SO 540, 27 Jul 60, in SSD Hist Div files; 

ltr, E.S. Silberman, Contg Ofcr AMC-BMC, to various firms, 

11 Aug 60, subj: Request for Proposal; Itr, MajGen O. J. 

Ritland, Cmdr BMD, to H. J. Brown, V Pres and Gen Mgr, 

LMSD, 10 Aug 60, subj: Soliciting for SAMOS E-6 System; 

ltr, Brown to Ritland, 18 Aug 60, same subj, all in E-6 files, 

R&D-I, Jun-Dec 60. 

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Charyk originally directed a change in requirements to 8-10-

foot resolution and 5 days in orbit, changing it to "10 feet or 

better" after the NSC meeting. Bidders were notified on 

26 Aug, following two days of uncertainty at the project office. 

See TWX AFDSD-A T 80036, USAF to ARDC, 23 Aug 60, and 

AFDSD-AR 80857. 26 Aug 60; memo, LtCol R. G. Atwood 

for Col W.G. King, Dir/Samos, to E.S. Silberman, BMC, 

24 Aug 60, subj: Technical Work Statement for E-6 Version 

of SAMOS, with notes by Atwood on 25 and 26 Aug conversations involving King and Col H. Lo Evans; charts used in NSC 

briefing. 25 Aug 60, left with Charyk by a BSD courier on 

22 Aug, are in Samos files (the charts specify an 8-foot 

requirement first stated on 23 Aug and modified three days 

later); ltr, LtCol W. Bo Botzong, Chm (temp), Working Gp 

Source Selection Bd, 18 Aug 60, subj: Submittal of Factors, 

in E-6 files, R&D-2, E-6 Sep 1960. 

Rpt, "Program Review, II 698BJ briefing to J. V. Charyk, 

SAFUS, 18 Sep 62, in files of Col P.J. Heran, D/Dir/698BJ; 

TWX SAFMS-EXEC-60-19, BrigGen R. E. Greer (from Washington) to Col W. G. King, SAFSP, 27 Oct 60; TWX SAFMS 

99533, OSAF to BMD, 7 Nov 60 (the authorization to "terminate ") 

and request for cancellation of EK 77-inch development, 10 Nov 

60; TWX SAFMS 87078, USAF to BMD, 21 Sep 60; TWX RDRS 

239-58, ARDC to WADD, 23 Sep 60, all in SAFSP files. 

Memo, BrigGen R. E. Greer to BrigGen R. D. Curtin, 9 Dec 

60, no subj, in SAFMS files, Samos Gen '60; memo Col W. R. 

Hedrick, D/Dir Eng, SAFSP, to Greer, 22 Nov 60, subj: 

E-6 Version of SAMOS; ltr, Greer to LMSD, attn H. J. Brown, 

VPres and GenMgr, 23 Nov 60, same subj: memo, Greer to 

E.S. Silberman, BMC, 1 Dec 60, same subj, all in E-6 files; 

memo, Maj J. S. Smith, Ch, Space Probes Div, Dir / AF Space 

Boosters, to Dir/ AF Space Boosters, BMD, 7 Jul 60, subj: 

Booster Support for the AVCO DRAG BRAKE Program; ltr, 

J. B. Trenholm, D/Ch, Dynasoar SPO, WADD, to BMD, 

14 Nov 60, subj: AVCO Drag Brake Program; TWX SAFSP 

DE-28-11-33, SAFSP to WADD, 29 Nov 60, in E-6 files, 

R&D-2, Source Sel; Itr, Col P. E. Worthman, Dir /Space Sys, 

BMD, to SAFSP, 20 Dec 60, subj: "WDZYC E-6 Responsibilities; ltr, Greer to Worthman, 25 Jan 61, same subj, in E-6 

files, Mgt-7, Policy; TWX SAFMS-DIR-60-66, USAF to 

SAFSP, 22 Dec 60, in E-6 files, R&D Gen, Jul-Dec 60. 

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Mem.o, Co1P.J. Heran, D/DirProgII, SAFSP, to MajGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir /SAFSP, 21 Mar 61, subj: Questions and 

Answers for Mem.bers of Congress, in E-6 files, R&D-I; 

interview, Col P. J 0 Heran, D/Dir 698BJ, by R. L. Perry, 

27 Feb 63; Reubel interviews, 15, 16 Apr 63. 

Rpt, Sum.m.ary of SAMOS E-6 Technical Directors Meetings, 

28, 29 Dec 60, prep by B. P. Leonard, Aerospace, in E- 6 

files, R&D-l Gen, Jul-Dec 60. 

Chron, Sam.os Prog II, Jan 61 (SP-5, Hist-2 file); m.em.o for 

record, Col P. J. Heran, Sam.os Prog II Dir, Feb 61, subj: 

Program. II Technical Decisions, in E-6 files, R&D Gen 1961. 

Interviews, Col J. W. Ruebel, LtCol John Pietz, by R. L. 

Perry, 6 Dec 62, and Pietz by Perry, 27 July 63. 

Interofc corresp, E. T. Clark, Aerospace Corp, to Col P. J, 

Heran, Dir /Prog II, 10 Jan 63, subj: Brief Sum.m.ary 698BJ 

Vehicle Developm.ent and Outstanding Problem.s, in E-6 files, 

Mgt-7Policy; chron, ProgII, Jan 61; m.enlO, ColP.J. Heran, 

Dir/Prog II, to SAFSP, subj: SAMOS Program. II Historical 

Report for Feb 1961; m.em.o, LtCol R.G. Atwood, Ch, Ops 

PIng Div, Prog II, to Dir/Prog II, 6 Mar 61, subj; Critical 

Program. Areas, in E-6 files, R&D-I, Gen, 1961; ltr, Col 

P. J. Heran, Dir /Prog II to SAFSP-P (Adm.in), 11 Apr 61, 

subj: SAMOS Program. II Historical Report for March 1961, 

in E-6 files, Hist. 

Mem.o for record, A. L. Gitchen, Aerospace Corp, 12 Oct 62, 

subj: Early Program. History, in E-6 files, Mgt-2, Hist Doc. 

Ltr, Col P. J. Heran, Dir /Prog II, to SAFSP (Adm.in Ofc), 

11 Apr 61, subj: SAMOS Program. II Historical Report for 

March 1961, and 19 Ma y 61, subj: SAMOS Program. II 

Historical Report for April 1961, in E-6 files, Hist; TWX 

SAFSP-MS-SEN-61-29, SAFUS to SAFSP, 9 Mar 61. 

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Ltr, LtCol L. C. Jochim, Asst Dep Dir Plans and Progs, 

SAFSP, to Dir/Prog II, 3 Apr 61. subj: SAMOS Program II 

Financial and Cost Proposal, General Electric, 23 March 

1961, in E-6 files, Fin-I; ltr, Col P. J. Heran, Dir/Prog II, 

to SAFSP (Admin Of c), 14 Sep 61, subj: Program II Historical 

Report for July and August 1961, in E-6 files. Hist; Itr, 

H. W 0 Paige, GenMgr, GE MSVD. to MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir /SAFSP, 12 Mar 62, subj: Expected Overrun of Contract 

AF 04(695)-6, in E-6 files, Proc-5-1-1. 

Memo, LtGen J.F. Carroll, IG USAF, to OSAF-Dir/Mis and 

Sat Sys, 26 Jul 61, subj: Survey of SAMOS .•. Program, In 

SAFMS files. SarrlOs Gen 61. 

TWX SAFSS-INS-62-142, OSAF to SAFSP (MajGen R. Eo Greer 

etal), 12 Sep 62, inE-6files, Mgt-7. 

Ltr, MajGen R. Eo Greer, Dir /Samos Prog, to BrigGen Ro Do 

Curtin, O-SAFUS, 3 Jul 61, subj: FY-62 Construction Funds, 

inE-6files, Fin-61; ltr, ColP.J. Heran, Dir/ProgII, to 

Plans & Prog Ofc, SAFSP, 10 Jul 61, subj: Program II 

Construction Requirements for FY-63, in E-6 files, Fin-60; 

ltr, Heran to Plans and Prog Ofc 30 Nov 61, subj: Military 

Construction Program, same file; Itr, Col Wo R. Hedrick, 

Ch, Satellite Control Ofc, SSD, to LtCol N. Rehbein, Admin 

Ofc. SAFSP, 4 May 62, subj: Program 201 Costs, in E-6 

files, R&D-28-8. 

Ltr, Heran to SAFSP (Admin Of c), 19 May 61; ltr, Hedrick 

to Admin Ofc, 14 Jun 61; Itr, Heran to Admin Ofc, 14 Sep 61; 

ltr, Col W. R. Hedrick, Asst Dep Dir /Prog II, to SAFSP 

(Admin Of c), 6 Oct 61, subj: Program II Historical Report 

for September 1961, in E-6 files. Hist-2; rpt, "Program 

201 Highlights, September 1961, prep by E-6 Ofc, 10 Oct 61. 

in E-6 files; Itr, Col Po J 0 Heran, Dir/Prog II, to SAFSP 

(Admin Of c), 7 Nov 61, subj: Monthly Historical ReportOct 1961, in E-6 files, Hist-2. 

Memo, E. T. Clark, Aerospace Corp, to B. Po Leonard, 

Aeros pace Corp, cy to Col P. J 0 Heran. Dir /Prog II, 

30 Oct 61, subj: GE Letter 850-061 of 24 October; Itr, 

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E.A. Miller, GE MSVD, to Heran, 24 Oct 61, no subj, 

both in E-6 files, Mgt-4, Policy 1961; ITleITlO for record, 

Col H. L. Evans, Vice Dir /Spec ProgITls (SAFSP), 7 Mar 

62, subj: Red Flag Message Regarding Slippage in Launch 

Date of PrograITl 201 Vehicle, in E-6 files, R&D-7-L 

Ltr, 1 1 AdITlin Contracting Ofcr, Phila APD, 

to Ho W. Paige, Gen Mgr, GE MSVD, 2 Jan 62, subj: Show 

Cause and Cure Notice, Contract AF 04 (695)-6, in E-6 

files, Proc 5-1-1. 

Ltr, E.A. Miller, Mgr, Recov Satellite Progs, GE, to 

LtCol J. McMahon, ChITl Prog 201 Acceptance TeaITl, SSD, 

19 Jan 62, subj: Acceptance of PV 851 for ShipITlent to Field 

Site, in E-6 files, Proc 5-1-1; Itr, McMahon to Miller, 

19 Jan 62, subj: Vehicle 851 Acceptance, saITle file. 

Ltr, M. Morton, Mgr, Re-Entry Sys Div, GE, tol~_~ 

1 1 Phila APD, 12 Jan 62, subj: Show Cause and Cure 

Notice, in E-6 files, Proc 5-1-L 

Ltr, Paige to Greer, 12 Mar 62. 

Ltr, Morton to~1 ____ --'1 12 Jan 62. 

Ltr, ColP.]. Heran, D/DirProgII, toDr. B.P. Leonard, 

Aerospace Corp, 12 Feb 62, subj: MeITlo of Understanding, 

in E-6 files, Mgt-7; TWX SAFSP-DIR-30-3- 8, MajGen Ro E. 

Greer, SAFSP, to BrigGen R. Do Curtin, O-SAFUS, 30 Mar 

62, in E-6 files, R&D 1-3. 

TWX AFSTP-RA 79817, USAF to MATS, 17 Apr 62, cy in 

E-6 files, R&D 7-1; TWX SAFSP-TEN-19-4-54, SAFSP to 

MATS, Scott AFB, 19 Apr 62, saITle files Q 

30. TWX, SAFSP-F-17-4-232, MajGen R. Eo Greer, Dir /SAFSP, 

to BrigGen R. Do Curtin, O-SAFUS, 17 Apr 62, in SP-3 

files, GaITlbit ProgITl. 

31. Rpt, PrograITl 698BJ Malfunction SUITlITlary Report, [9 May 62?J 

in E-6 files, R&D 1-2, Veh Flts. 

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Briefing Summary, "Program Review, II prep by E-6 Ofc 

for Undersecy J. V. Charyk, lB Sep 62, in E-6 (Col P. J. 

Beran's) files. 

TWX SAFSP-SEVEN 27-6-57, SAFSP to Col J. L. Martin, 

O-SAFUS, 27 Jun 62; Interofc corresp, R. Wood, Aerospace 

Corp, to E. Clark, Aerospace Corp, 10 Oct 62, subj: 

Mission Recapitulation, both in E-6 files, R&D 1-2. 

34. Briefing summary, lB Sep 62; interofc corresp, R.A. Wood, 

Aerospace Corp, to Eo T. Clark, Aerospace Corp, 10 Oct 62, 

subj: Mission Performance Recapitulation, in E-6 files, 

R&D 1-2. 

35. Interview, MajGen R.E. Greer, Dir/SAFSP, by R.L. Perry, 

12 Mar 63; interofc corresp, R. Ao Wood, Aerospace Corp, 

to E. To Clark, Aerospace Corp, 12 Oct 62, subj: Mis sion 

Performance Recapitulation; interofc corresp, J. To Sorrells, 

Test Dir, 69BBJ, Aerospace Corp, to Col P. J. Beran, 

Dir/SP-7, 7 Aug 62, subj: Two-Day Report for Program 

69BBJ Flight Test #4. all in E-6 files, R&D 1-2. 

36. TWX, SAFSS-DIR-62-BO, O-SAFUS to SAFSP, 14 May 62, 

in E-6 files, Mgt-7; Briefing Summary, lB Sep 62; Briefing 

charts, "approved by Gen Greer 20 Sep 62, " in E-6 files 

(Col P.L Beran). 

37. Interofc corresp. B. K. Epple, Aerospace Corp, to N. E. 

Palmquist, :Aerospace Corp, 10 Apr 62, subj: Water-to-air 

Pick-up Test, Program 201, in E-6 files, Ops 20-1. 

TWX, SAFSS-DIR-62-B9, O-SAFUS to SAFSP, lJun 62, in 

E-6 files, Ops 20-1; ltr, E. T. Clark, Dir /Prog 69BBJ, 

Aerospace Corp, to Col P. J. Beran. Dir /Prog II. 21 Jun 62, 

subj: Paravane and Water Line Retrieval Method, in E-6 

files, R&D 20-12; Briefing Summary, 1B Sep 62; briefing 

charts. 20 Sep 62; memo, Col P.J. Beran, Dir/SP-7, to 

c::::::::J (Contracts), 3 Oct 62, subj: General Electric Contract 

AF 04(699)-6-CCN#33, in E-6 files, Ops 20-1; ltr, Beran to 

I I (Programming), 25 Oct 62, subj: General Electric 

Contract AF 04(695)-6-CCN#33 and handwritten notes by 

LtCol Campbell, E-6 ofc, in E-6 files, R&D 20-12. 

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The rapidity of the cancellation of water-to-air recovery 

trials was an excellent indicator of organizational efficiency. 

On 3 October, Col Heran authorized te sts of the recovery 

vehicle in combination with a JC-130. After receiving a 

report which indicated that General Electric had made no 

progress, Heran at 1105 hours on 24 October directed one 

of his staff to have the entire effort cancelled. By 1135 

hours that day, all concerned individuals had been notified; 

the formal cancellation notice was in the mail the following 

morning. 

Hist chronology, SAFSP, Jan-Jun 62; Briefing Summary, 

18 Sep 62. 

40. Briefing charts, 20 Sep 62. 

410 Rpt, "Program Review, II 18 Sep 62. 

42. TWX SAFSS-DIR-O-SAFUS to MajGen R. E. Greer, SAFSP, 

21 Aug 62, in E-6 files, Mgt-7; memo for record, Col p. J. 

Heran, Dir / 698BJ, 22 Aug 62, subj: Comments on SAFSS 

TWX #DIR-l23, in E-6 files, R&D-I, Highlights. 

43. TWX SAFSS-DIR-62-130, O-SAFUS to MajGen R.E. Greer, 

SAFUS, 24 Aug 62, in E-6 files, Mgt-7; TWX SAFSS-PRO62-199, O-SAFUS to SAFSP, 24 Aug 62, same file. 

44. Briefing Summary, 18 Sep 62. 

45. Ltr, MajGenR.E. Greer, Dir/SAFSP, toSAFSS, ColJ.R. 

Martin, 26 Sep 62, subj: Revised 698BJ Follow-on Program, 

in E-6 files, Mgt-7; TWX SAFSS-DIR-62-153, Martin to 

Greer, 3 Oct 62, same file. 

46. TWX SAFSP-DIR-4-10-1, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SAFSP, 

to GE, et aI, 4 Oct 62, in E-6 file, Mgt-7. 

47. Draft memo prep by LtCol R. J. Ford, SAFSP, Oct 62, in 

Corona files; interviews, various dates in Dec 62, Jan, 

Feb 63, involving Col J. W. Ruebel, LtCol John Pietz, 

LtCol Ford, by R. L. Perry. 

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Interview, Greer by Perry, 12 Mar 63; TWX, SAFSPSEVEN-27-9-88, SAFSP to O-SAFUS, 27 Sep 62; in E-6 

file s, Mgt- 7 • 

TWX AS-62-0000-00035, 698BJ Test Dir, Aerospace Corp, 

to SAFSP, 13 Nov 62, in E-6 files, R&D 1-2-1; itr, Col 

P. Eo Villars, D/Cmdr Space Sys Test, 6594th Test Wg 

(Satellite), to 698BJ Prog Ofc, 21 Nov 62, subj: 698BJ 

Recovery Evaluation Report, in E-6 files, Ops 20-1. 

Interviews, MajGen R. Eo Greer,S, 12 Mar 63; Col P. J. 

Reran, 27 Feb 63; Col J. W. Ruebel, 5 Mar, 7 Mar 63; 

LtCol John Pietz, 5 Mar 63, all by R. L. Perry. Colonels 

Ruebel and Pietz particularly remarked on the gloomy 

attitudes of those program people who reported the te st 

results to General Greer and their impression that the 

mood was "we don't know what comes next. II General Greer 

commented on his conclusion that the group did not know what 

had actually happened to either the fourth or the fifth reentry 

bodies and could offer no real hope for the sixth, if it were 

launched. Because of the prompt cancellation of the E-6, 

relatively little definitive data was forwarded on the location 

or intensity of aerodynamic heating during the reentry of 

number five. (At least, little found its way into the files 

of the E-6 office.) General Greer and Colonel Ruebel 

independentl y drew representations of the burn-through 

effects on their office blackboards and the author later 

compared his copies of their sketches with the "official" 

sketches in the formal report on flight four. The same 

conclusion that flights four and five did indeed suffer the 

same fate, and from the same cause is inescapable. 

Interofc Corresp, E. T. Clark, Aerospace Corp, to Col 

Po J 0 Reran, Dir /Prog 722, 10 Jan 63, subj: Brief Summary 

698BJ Vehicle Development Outstanding Problems, in E-6 

file s, Mgt- 7 Polic y. 

Greer, Ruebel, and Pietz interviews; see note above. 

Greer and Reran interviews, see note 50. 

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55. 

56. 

57. 

59. 

61. 

62. 

63. 

64. 

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TWX SAFSS-1-62-174, O-SAFUS to SAFSP, 11 Dec 62, III 

E-6 files, Mgt-7, Policy. 

TWX SAFSS-1-62-175 and 1-62-176, O-SAFUS to SAFSP, 

11 Dec 62, in E-6 files, Mgt-7 Policy; Ruebel interview, 

15 Apr 63. 

Briefing reSUITle, 1!698BJ Briefing in response to SAFSS1-62-175, II 1 Jan 63, presented to MajGen R. E. Greer, 

14 Jan 63, (after presn to SAFUS), in E-6 (Beran) files. 

The presentation to Undersecy J. V. Charyk took place 

on 9 Jan.) 

TWX SAFSS-l-63-08, O-SAFUS to SAFSP, 31 Jan 63, III 

E-6 files, Mgt-7 Policy. 

Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, by R. L. Perry, 

30 Nov 63. There are no written records of these discussions; 

none of the participants cOITlITlitted anything to paper. 

Mtg Notes prep by MajGen R. E. Greer following 30 Jan 63 

ITltg, in SPAS files, "Marty's Place. II 

TWX SAFSS-6-M-0020, SAFSS to MajGen R. E. Greer, 

SAFSP, 30 Jan 63, in SPAS files. 

MeITlo, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to LtCol Mark FarnuITl, 

2 Feb 63, subj: Spartan Security; ITleITlO, Greer to Col J. L. 

Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, 1 Feb 63, subj: Project Spartan 

Organization; notes, "Presentation, l! 31 Jan 63, all in SPAS 

file s 0 

"SPAS-63 Briefing, !I [2 Feb 63J; Work StITlt to Ltr Contr 

AF l8(600)-2ll3, 15 Feb 63; notes by LtCol F. Ned Band, 

5 Feb 63, all in SPAS files. 

TWX SAFSS-6-M-028l, LtCol J. Sides, SAFSS, to MajGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, 6 Feb 63, SPAS files. 

Ibid.; interview, BrigGen J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, by 

R. L. Perry, 8 Nov 63; interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir /SP, by Perry, 15 Nov 63. 

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6S. ManageITlent Plan, SP-AS-63, 12 Feb 63; draft, Proposed 

Procedure for Transfer of E-6 Residual Inventory to 

SP-AS-63 Project, 12 Feb 63, in SPAS files. 

660 TWX SAFSS-I-M-0037, SAFSS to MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir/SP, 12 Feb 63, in SPAS files; interview, Greer by 

Perry, 30 Nov 63. 

67. PR #63-SAFSP-XP2, IS Feb 63 and Itr contr AF 18(600)-

2113 and -2114, IS Feb 63, to EK and GE, respectively. 

68. TWX SAFSS-I-M-0037, 12 Feb 63; TWX SAFSP [no cite 

nUITlberJ, SAFSP to Col J. L. Martin, SAFSS, 18 Feb 63, 

in SPAS file. 

69. Mgt Briefing, "Ph/V," 18 Feb 63, in SPAS file s. 

70. MeITlo for record, LtCol Mark FarnuITl, SAFSP, 26 Feb 63, 

no subj: Itr, A. E. Watson, GE Re-Entry Sys Dept, to 

LtCol D. E. Yockey, SAFSP, 19 Feb 63, subj: Letter 

Contract ... -2114; various TWX iteITls concerning the 

"cover" transfer of accountability for E-6 iteITls were 

written in "Marty's Place" and ITlailed to the Wright Field 

contact for insertion into the "open" circuit. Included 

were ASRNRD-l-lS-3-ll to GE 11 Mar 63 and ASNRD-l-lS3-13 to EKe "Sky GeITl" was "cancelled" by ASRNRD-1-23-

7 -43 to GE, 23 Jul 63; all are in SPAS file s. 

7L EK Proposal for Design and Production of Type B CaITlera 

Payload, IS Mar 63; EK PrograITl Plan, Schedule, and 

EstiITlates Costs for Type A Configuration, IS Mar 63; 

GE "Study Phase B, " IS Mar 63; Itr, K.C. GarITlan, EK, 

to (Col) P.J. Heran, SAFSP, 22 Mar 63, subj: Additional 

Type B Proposal Data, all in SPAS files. 

72. MeITlo, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SAFSP, to Col R. A. Berg, 

D/Dir, 21 Mar 63, subj: COITlparison Study, naITles Col W.G. 

King (chITl), Berg, Col P. J. Heran, two Aerospace Corporation scientists, a Rand representative, LtCol Mark FarnuITl, 

four SAFSP and SAFMS technical specialists, and two CIA 

representatives to the ad hoc group; the basic study requireITlent was specified in ITlsg, OSAFUS to CIA and SAFSP, 

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20 Mar 63, subj: Improved Search Type Satellite Reconnaissance System; memo, Greer to D/NRO, 15 Apr 63, subj: 

Comparative Evaluation, contains Greer's endorsement 

of committee findings contained in rpt, "Report of the 

Findings of the Ad Hoc Group appointed to Evaluate 

Potential Systems for an Improved Search Type Satellite 

Reconnais sance System, II to Dir /Spec Projs, Apr 63" The 

report is valuable not merely because of its comparison of 

E- 6 (IIBJ II) with Mural (1IM-21t), but because it contains a 

critical appraisal of the potential of several techniques and 

subsystems, analyzes resolution in terms of useful intelligence rather than abstract standards, and carefully examines 

real system costs. 

73. Interviews, Greer by Perry, 30 Nov, 19 Dec 63. 

74. Greer interview, 30 Nov; amends 1, 2, 3 to ltr contr 

AF 18(600)-2ll4, II Apr, 8 May, 1 Jul 63; amends 1 and 

2 to AF -2ll3, 7 May and 1 Jul 63, SPAS files. 

75. Greer interviews, 30 Nov, 19 Dec 63. 

76. 

77. 

78. 

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Ibid.; TWX SP-AS-63-29-5-4, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, 

to Col J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, 29 May 63; ltr, LtCol 

D. J. Yockey, SPAS Prog Ofc, to 1 I 6 Jun 63, 

subj: Transfer of Accountability ... , all in SPAS files. 

Ltr, R.D. Lorbach, Mgr, Contr Admin, EK, to Col p.J. 

Heran, SP, 10 Jun 63, no subj: TWX SAFSP-F-27-5-720 

to EK, 27 May 63; TWX SAFSS-I-M-0152, to SP, 2 Jul 63 

(also SAFSS-l-M-0037, -0093, and -0152, to SP, which 

were earlier funds authorizations); memo for record, 

LtCol D. J. Yockey, 9 Jul 63; subj: Termination of -2113 

Effort; ltr, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to EK, 12 Jul 63, 

subj: Letter Notice of Termination to Prirne Contractor .•• 

Contract AF 18(600)-2ll3 and similar letter to GE re -2114, 

same date; ltr, A. E. Watson, GE, to Yockey, 22 Jul 63, 

subj: Letter Notice of Termination. 0 • -2114, all in SPAS 

file; interview, Yockey by Perry, 25 Nov 63. 

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