1 the Bf program he

Ye ter

wef riviet te - aorain the R&D objectives ani race

progr, tos nore cpa. reading



“ Lars ths idghnt uty sits, the indtoators of tae teminenes of hostilities
SPRL be darted, from deot sod ail ot the folloing intelligmoe cetagertess

an ' . 0s, Sleas coondisiation of ai sctivities and
compatitAlity af sll aystons in sandatory in order top ovide on a timely bests the
contributions that SAMOS may make to the above intelligence. categories. ‘The _
-urgenay 2 Mite a a esi is ett he ar et 8

3s. Toe qunetion of tnelinen a pertains te fhe graduation of the AES
_ dod protuate should be'statted very carefully. Ae pointed out previously, the
‘advantages of satellite recontutesinoe are ouch thet’ in « very shart pericd of a
baits aiaet-ahaenahvortetaretimrats
GompLete. automaton of the date reéuotion process eould very easily hinder nd :
how gon = perdeclary Ge pertaise to the short sange -





o Mer resets, output. =
. a’ sie me, .

ho. ) aut fieiently dotatied optical devoription ts provided o1 #0 thet ond may ”
. Aetenine ££ he La epson vino Das bom nits a pert-of the basic

Sure gees



3e

be

Se

"geopar ds 204 the utiiaty of the systen. L He-antementae : .

swe te-eantine; “AE NEY TONEPETE—threoe!c_agaiont the
ent 5 SRP SEES oe eet ees — De PRET Tame temete
Towers Saemlebt probihdtastaliitanecomrasesauss opevettorss-
temporarily forieny pardods, h.. tine or. -paraanantly. if the peiper
Blatethione-ere-net taken, It 18 etrongiy secomme, ted that in
the future all publicity releanes be rigidly contr iled.

Autury studies and proprams should sonelder the’ dispersal of

poo wee, wg actos wo Polar!s ¢3 .
Larne bette Se Pa : a

Education of the prtiic, relesser concerning program statas on

a deloyed und presplen: ed basis as well as releases concerning

the current stite of the art aust be; thoroughly studied, agreed

to and understood by appropriate Depertaent of Deferise and
Department of Stete officials. the resulting plan must be appreved
at ade Executive level and strictly adhered to by all lower échelone.
& problen of Long standing, and considered appropriate to the

SAMOS pros, gram, particularly as pertains to the B-5, is: Decign

the configureti 4 fF the vehicle to accomodate the primary
mission Sapability or design tho primary mission Capability to

ft the ventete, regardless of compromises,

Tt ie felt that too mich capharis has been given to the Capsule :
Pequirenent- and not enough to the payload requirement, As payloads
becoas more ecphisticated in order to moot the USIB requirements,
the above probles if not resolved in favor of the Primary ‘misaion



$
é
x



fied accepting the stated figure of 100 lines ber, ma), the accepted eround cbjeot
Tesogas tion throshold is not_less than 50.90 forte Therefore, it is nore realistic:

‘to thnk of tke ayaton a8 0 50-90 foot aysten tan a 20 foot ayetes when it te :

_Pequired to identify and Fecogatge objects. But dtore sonei dering the B-2 aa: a

” dynamics aursing the period of” ‘time for exposure further stteot thone muabers oa
are discussed in the ody of this Annex. -





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at the present é "
on the need for: any’: ” speettie or generalized capadsiaty, required jor immediate
use except for ABM detectior: and interception of satellite track:..; and telanctry
« “The USIB-believés. that it is essential that the US hevs access to a

infornition derived from electronic emissions inside of desired «cas that, ii
the present state of the art, can be collected orly by electroni: reconnaiesance
over these desired arens” and that the *k4E effort to achieve this « spabi lity
should be cerried fovward with the ‘ghest priority short of interfering with
the photographic” tasks", Conversely, ie is felt ti.st the USIB dccument did * .
not require visual photo effort witli serious ‘ccmproaige of. the ferret
capabi tities,
c, The USIB document also states thats

“Our Lirst and most urged priority regclrement is fer» photugre phic
recormaidssance eysten capable of Iscating suepect ICBM launch tites. It ds
estimated that many bites for the launching of operations) Soviet ICBM!y. wii?
. Le’ completed totween now and the end of 1562. It is our strong belief that our
. best and possibly our only chance to detect these sites will be doring the
conetruction phases once these sites are completed, we ‘wid have congiderably
Jess opportunity to detect them, 1t is important, therefore, tist 2 maximun |
(ilar. be mis. ie Lind the Soviet operational TCEM Ysunch sites before the end
of 1952. Once any chm site is located, 8 satellite reconnaiesunce system with
adequate ground resolution shoula be able to maintain sarvailience. and report
chenges in its status, but if these sites are not looated befors the end or
the constructicn phase, slnoat any reconnaissance system would be of considerably
lens value Oxainet such a target. We believe that if we are to fand the Seviet
Oper «tional TORN Laur h sites, our highest priority effcrt should be directed to

& general geerch ‘of a substantial 1 portion of that part of’ ‘the USSR. covered by

pie



esult of Premature dnitiation

‘Bas surpnesed cerinin subsystem

Ame the changes in hy

"EY cOmponenis while at the

“overa]) sysiern concept ‘have inade other
There hae been

of small use. insufficient analysis of ithe

"I" during an R&D phase, asia’ con.

operational SAMOS system,
_ “Maubeten: és} number of rew problems must be dusensed, during
the R&S phase,

Thess fuelude the wpe of information ‘ollected, the
. Fadical difference bet

rather, the ‘imprené
ale effort toward heavily automated



ase tochalques and iystenie La BOD was lial ato avery

amet number of peenle, For this resson tn artes thé management



“bij $0 inp wd bn ee Toving weafes and wun angle into, :
consideration, ‘this would be inoreased ” yeare.. In order to obtain coverage of
a particular target on the ground with the 'B2 camera capable of. obtaining coverage,
150 mile on either wide of the nadir point, approximately 10 days would be re~
: quired. (annex F).
30 Genereliy the E-2 camera system, viewed from technical advances
to date, 18 obeclete, It imposes auch operational lisitations (swath-width and
Pebd-out) to make satellite type operations economically and politically
wnaeceptable. ‘me extreno sensitivity of the photographic system, the overall ©
cémplexity, and the ‘extraccly close toleranves involved indicate that the
possibility of obtaining the technical goals and objectives mentioned in the
Engineering Analyses report po doubtful (Annex B).

Wis D. ES svar. :

: 1. The lens of the camera has an F/5 speratare, and focal Length
of ‘66 inches. Minimum operations) ground resolution of 5-10 fest with revognitiea - :
. for objects of 15-30 Leet are expected, inoluding degradation due to uncompentated
© Auage motion and yohicle stabilisation residual. (255 21/an at 155mm. ixte)e
. Filn capacity 18 250 pounds (25,000 feet) standard bese or 22,000 feet of thin
, bese fila, “The design is capable of being modified to accept 500 pounds.
orbit 216 48 30 days with selected tergete on demand, Coverage: ts 60 nasties 24
sles evath width with the dapebtlity of stereo 25 degrees’ fore and afte oe

2 The H-5 ie programed to be boosted into orbit by the ATLAS A0mth

Be Tite 48 dite by the Fequirenent to keep the vehicle in orbit for 30 dapes °
- Tis in tum Gioteten en wrbitay antstwdof 280 able, which an tan sets ,

.



Sapabili td ore oxaggerated, However readout ‘ts indepbtatiy satdefaatory tor :
ty the F applications exbepting perhaps some advanced video recording capabilities, ‘
a Other Problgm areas in the readout system requi ring technical studies

to obtain the proper answers ares
(1). Tae "start-up" problem after computer failure and after down tine
for normal maintenance, erttouLarty ifa nupber of satellites are used
, simi taneously. . . ,
(2) the accuracy of the tracking information to properly progran the .
Camera. . Specific problen areas are camera orientation, focusing, exposure control,
dnage motion Compensation, and camera on-off tines. ,
(3) the possibility of Jawzing and-the effects of a high density”
electronic environnent: (Vandenberg T&A atation) on the quality of the ,
transmitted Picture,
(b) The posetbiltey of intercept of a Continuovely orbiting Feconnelessnce
: Vehicle and the restraining effects of a strong dipomatic protest,

8



the meccuracy of

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“aatellite ferret capability must, take:

B, A:ronber of probleas pre
| Paras 4
towards thedr early solution,

; Y feernrorpapannes

Wy



ok Be. sawtber error, stf11 preest An he Prneds
: baal Welper didemtaetion of Prajont, sateen ‘ta

thas an Ae Powe pif 1 UF, aetna t-anutiny wuts te all

interested. intelligence sgencies periodic and Candia repirte! on ite intentions,

plans and achievencnte.: as stated heretofore, the sums capabilities go far
: bayood nerely Providing intelligence ‘Anfermations. and this fact: “contributes *
* garther’ ‘to the. ‘esponstbslity of ‘the Air Force tomerde necting information needs .
‘other an Ste om sSrarntgenoe, requirenents, ‘ .

Be The USIB duly 1960 Document

| & SHAY 5; 1960, the UELD remattimed the repetrennte far aus, | an
| MnBvete of the dosent bring out the fatLorng fant
oe Q) the ® Fequiresent for satellite Feveentieenee i tmportent -

" dontinious,

“ay. - Optioad esciutionn (aubeysten am, 5, 2 feet are reine

“te be aooeptedie, .

_ (uy: "Sein re ae nid ot
- seein on un Be oul detafld Sanges rosin ‘ os



imiergons & most taportant chinge tn the aast your, Defore analysing the peseent

__ Setatbretatons presented by the Muy in efrtatal and mottiotal wetetings, . .
2. The unc of satellites as ming devices was considered benia.
RAL fait a tow monte ag, % eive effective warning (anwming thet this were”
_"Pemeite), Lange mmter of eaalites (20 to 0) wuld be rested to besa
Sate at the fone tine, . ith precticaliy inetenteneous tranemtaston of pictures’.
* regained (Sebsysten "H), and abccaipanying ange socle deta handling wftort on
‘he Grae (Subsystea or) (Ref. ‘ane'A} . :
Tt de vortn noting thas the Large expenditure in date proseriacs

it acc em andi ol
fyoten capable of giving warning. le ree

he Tau sffeot of weather, of oxbit gecaetzy, Fevolution, and c-cmomis
_ fie Nee le cay ease by mer of tcnten gars ar
M _MGentemnence, the Leustbility of the origins! schese has been show to be both .

eee ee nnn PME of het nt haat imate hon cco
Paint of view,

i id ste ae, Store 8d tori, 38 ty tae
TT a te ete sa oe ry
; ee ce, meets m tte ponesing wae,
! data oat . -

Fy

Heiy'1960) attention, At de worth’ sting here for fuhure Ateoussion sine cf the a

—_"








b Limitations Due to Scan Rate — Sabsyaten ye
+ ames D = Bye Oomparieca - Subsysten °E*
Effects - Subsysten "g2



The ‘obeatoal Processing in Aight involves the Use of monobath solutions.
“Mere ts, ‘Ro doubt that if a data Link is to be used that this be the process used,
The moncbath process does affect the latent image resolution, fot unlike , Conventional
Processing, it cangot provide the Compensation for continuous gemma and dinsity
. control. On @ fle ‘Tesovery basis there is no doubt pat’ that conventional processing
with the close control availeti:, will yield desirably higher results than «

monobath process. The ground process would even compensate for the tmexpected
variations of airbome exposure. . .
Fue Scan Method: ; . , :
Subsequent to moncbath processing: and dryitg, the fin te thea 3 Presented
. An & gate to be scanned by « flying epot scanner and related optics. Har image
‘Peasotdon occurs. The 2x2-4noh trame 1e@ then scanned in Co inch x 2 inch strips
for the @ate link transmisticiin “Tig meson that dn a 2inch fran length, the systex
deliberately. Antrodnces 19. breaks in image contimity. Assuming aw Lineerity
* (sweep) the abritted (missing) areas can vary by + 2001 inch, or ¢ bi feet at
each soan section interface, This appears most undesirable,



“ebanges introaiced four times 5 in five weeks in paracnote Auprovenénts appegr te ce

mixed up “with otner probiems of signalling retrecrocieet actuvity, poeition control,
and 80 forth: whiis there are inev.vable connections anoag ail these, oritica. Starnes
must be separeteds Toe cather subite point. is that tecnnreal develcpment experience

shows ‘Uhat components of a system 5 arveriably suffer in quality when they are develcped

in the syste. Ooly afte- independent resov

eTy COMpPOre ATS, Incivdsrc paracnu es SF
other alow-cown mechanisms, have susceeden should they ce coupled inte a spen

SAHOS furct

uMe This situation would cf course be different 12 anyone had aver fe~

vere .
ms anythinge A’ it 1s, the reser: regine reseat..es efforts te, develop Faraday’s
oo -

sapacitor for the tars: tine qecine tae saatsatbi of fenputers

De .



V. GENERAL ~ Recovery
Ae In contrast ty ascertions of last year that Discoverer recoveries were.
either "on band or on order “at de necessary to conclude tnt the reccvery efforts

up te ‘new have feiied complet ye Asieedicgly at is pruposed that enmpid fied pay- -

clement
leads lauachabie by “epperert and pre sungtly reliable THU! vehicies be Promptly
dévised for prolific studies of otiect reccvary from orbits in Spacte

B. These experiment: shew

revive botn Jand and water reccveries. They’
cought to be characterised by eimpie bet reascrably precise instrumentation to
determine the physics and: mechanics of the separate stages of recovery. Thus,-for

: instance, deorbiting behevtor showl+t be clearly dietinguiebed from pre-entry ard
ro-entry activity. Withovt extensive technical information liks thie, orderly ani
continuous recovery of a useful: pretust cannot seriously be aiticipateds

y

Co We believe that one of + ws Londamentay reasons why recuvery has net tten

succegscul up torn, & fo suteerfaly unlikely to be continuously svuecessiul, is

the process through wiiich she Air Force has gone in achieving the désired result.

We believe that the allotaert for.the plans cannot be easily mate to one contractor ©
OF convracting ugenc ‘Ye We do beliete, hewever, that over and aver, the influence
on the résearch ‘and development. resovery program introduced by the necessity for
some Kind of useabje take, has blozked tre technical prepress of the main contractor.

De ie ds feat that: the presert prime contract responsibil: ty is being. well.

borne technically. However, ‘the R & D demands are sc urgent that additional
assistance, probably on a test and engineering scale, is necessary, In ‘this vay
such critical issues as para: rete and other re-entry facilities can be developed
without unbalanced effects on the development of the payload iteelf. It is felt
that a contract situation mst be created where the solution of re-entry problens

is reasonably decoupled from modafications in the payload. For instance, the design

'

te



: pee ba tren of figs atin empty 3 the restanal a
sooepteble biur.. but h microns. Tis means thet in 0.01 seoonds the etebilisstion: ne

otra mt ahem as mh 4, wierons of motion.



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—_ Coverage — 2.07

RR SQ.M. _ oa
to ‘of Satellite :
Reqaired for

outro] Degradation ‘
__ Reldability Degradation
os
% Fada 2st ass ")
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2.15

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2,666 ©

the ‘effectivenses | Of VAFE as an operational Tea station ia questionable.

a the sxount, of rand-out Wi? Gepend upon the type and: smount of activity:
at’ the Pasitic Missile Range, and the degree that the electronte radiations

'

of ‘tiebe: ‘Aotivities interfere vith subayateni fl reception: *

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_Perotrstng the USIB notes, ‘the foaroving. appear neceenarys

1 pre ey A quick solution of the surveillance probiea “ds nosdea before
, 1962 to find missile beses wile? construction,
"(b). A continuous operational capability ained at the high, priarity
targets, and both continuons surveillance and directed
. Peoonnadesance (when the weather is ouitable): are needed,
(6): — collection (gubsystim “F*) is ‘not clearly wanted wats better
" dat-er eritte oe an nponsnion of the systen. —
Ce © There will be a continuing requirenont for photogrephic and RINT coverages
As the atate of the art peratte end as the accuracy, types and numbers of weapons
systeny incresse, the sccuracies and detail required in the cad produsts will become |
inoreasingly greater, ‘Sto tent -thiet tite fe0t-te-new-onident_in_tha presont 2.
Mogren MNT Is Hot provided-losin_existing-seoknies)dexalopuantprogvent. .



in'dateil ne Proveduré 8, the program, and the ‘har dware n of Sobeyriem “yey

There is ne doubt that the principle of concurrency whea 2

applica to a ground ae > handling system of this type is a vesy difficult

a principle to folloe The recommendations, made by this and other

. reports rogarding the shift of emphasis between readout and recovery,

should have s catastrophic topact ona subeystem ba sed on the re~



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; It: is clear that there are tuo sets of the requirements that the USB *
“Aa net ready to define until ‘nore complete RED data are availebie, The require- L,
"| merits, in this category ares + oe :

J cy Qe Udeiuatication and dsvarminction of deployment of electronic weapons.
: eo Knoviedge afsthangos tn deplaynent can contribute a grest donk
. : pian ony an wey ie.
pc MMMM Aaly S| the capability of maintaining periodic albeit
“* Snfrequent mipvettiance of the, ghey. deployment daring the’
° o ods. gapebi tines for increasing survesa

jPstialons woula be required.:



on now BAD organtexticns, nev rocket develoveente, 0o,' that are not. directly
"aovestated with the primary nlenion of the eysten will tend te dLiute or degrede
timely Foseipt of usable end prodapte. Honey and affert should be ised to eles ,
w, expedite, and disprove the existing -progreny and greater effort should be

lseed on sbtetuing improved end results, cualitatively and queatitat{vely,
@. "401 of the above indloates thet the program should be wader the
a rae comin ae
oa) 19 49 recimended that the DOD résinmend to the 190 thes ecutive
rept for per cs pe nett wot

“ L priors im both the afrilian and mi}
wes Bak ot ee eae
| be placed atten under tne sgiiMer Sake shan eh eee
- Secretary of Defense, Office of Special Operetions, ae aad
(2) he UEAF be given the task of ae . Mes. op.

(a) managing the mD progren,
(b) cperating the military part of the cperstionsl progren
; sither openly or wnder cover of a civilian mission, ,
(c) making available both the rex andthe analyzed data to li
NS nemctes designated Wy the Rweotive Ofrice, whepe
Tg Rs aE. 4 wots

.


At 0: of, the entire + entea, nyaten. i ‘48

ation. nen should be remedied,
es Ground 1 of Resolutions . . .
the Bee: ‘Photographie oyeten provides for’ command Sontrel of resolution, Tis
is 9 impraction2 since there are too many pareneters. vse enter into this end effect.
7 Yor emanelgy a ‘focus contre) and image motion ‘compensation control are provided
‘ end this directly reisea the question as to whether an operator at a reacts console
on the grotnd 1s able to determine which of these ‘two are in error. How is the
operetor to. know if the diftioulty is theraal stability, ‘window streste, uis-
ligament 144s. to leanoh'forvee, ste.? In the deence of resolution targets a
“on the ground, it is virtaslly iaposstble to make an edjustannt in resolution remotely.
this operation mode requirod redefinition and evaluation.
* Betet coments are also: “Arotnded An he Ee report reqerding | the avediabiiity’
of ‘stereo ‘Photographie coverage at angles up to 227 degrees. it ie not at all
: clear just how canera. orientation is piegrameea for this parpose. Intuitivary,.
the value of such stare 4s questionable in view’ of the'tinvolved geometry. It is
congidered Gonbttu that such haignt date could be of value unless pointe of know 2



that: ‘one an: idocurateny locate a single expomurs through" the ‘cloud Openings
Exposure Criterias :

High’ ‘eeolution photographie ‘systems are particularly subject to deterioration

ase remult of notion. The ereater the resolution, the more repid the daverioration

es oY the eerkroment of motion. As’ the Photographic seale decréasee (onaller image .

Waeeie doue Dave ono igus characteristic ntioh sete-4¢ apart ‘fron _
. See are



Te

“eapebals y may prevect or delay: mission accomplishment,

any follow-on or back-up program to the B-5 should repreeept.
eignificant improvements in coverage, resolution or ‘soale,..,. “

and be ready for R&D testing in mid CY=1961.

4 continuous worry in the analysis of SAMOS has been the éffect
that the clamor for early intelitgense take hes had.gn ‘ne onierly

conduct of the progres, With « multitude of, techniques malig

requires, the interfcrence with the research and development

has had seriovs effects: specifically, the difference between .
resenrch and develsprent concepts and an operational concepts,

Exampher- Consider the case of an EL payload sent in orbit. for

- the firat tire. From the point of view of research and development:

tds ie & najor stepping stone and information to be ‘obteined from
it is of the utmost dnportances Fron the point of view of
intellifer« we 1600 reaolution is ‘Anmufficieat to wake the

ites «f particular significances ‘For ‘thie reason, one « mule
atete that 95% of the usefulness of the miesion would be acquired
Af the lens and film of the camera were aubjected to a winking
light end did not view the terrein. In fact, the first ZL

‘satellite will carry film exposed and developed, fils exposed

at not developed, and filer to be exposed. Information obtainet.
ty the readout syatem on these filus Tepresente more than 90%

of the information required from the research and development.

Point of view, The fact that one could @1s0,Jook cn the outdede
and get sone incidental AntelLi gence fron the: terrain below,
«ppears to a research development minded organization ai interesting

_ but not overly importent br preaaa of on outstanding nen

*ohievoment, “



‘egting ta math of prin mma fr ai pie) ‘ 7
oa Se MA 516 of te 1 when Lembo wi bo tn ire erent be
_ conditions: So ,
: a) exposed and processed o
(2) expésed.and not prosessed
I a : - (2). not expaned ont not prodassed ew a
: Tie will sllov for the syotenatic « creluatiod of the nw najor tmotions ot
the syeten in fight. , :
Se = ‘Thres, component test Vehiclée are scheduled as follower
Beptenber 2960 March 1960, and January 1962. ;

| Vile 0. Ee? sromey
1. The E~2 4s a strip camera meth 6 368 fooel engin lens designes * .
to operate at an altitade of 260 statute alles with a 70 me format and 100 D/e :
ayaten resolution it is reasonable to expect « ‘ground resolution of 20 fest. i
review of the Lockheed Mnginesring analysic Report, Prompted concern about the
distinction between resolution and Fecognition Caonex B). It4e felt. that, 50-90
‘fest for recoguition ia a realistic figare. The width of the ground coverage
obtained je 37 miles and the information ic transmitted slectronically vo the
_ ts attr sated sng ad snd in in ,
. There are two different problems to which the %-2°4s direpesas
_ (a) the protien of covering the entire Burueien land mse
(b) the problem of sesing « partioulsr target, |
The coverage obtained by a read-out aysten 16 limited by the speed at which Qe)
aan be eoanned. The mbar of, ground stations the bande of: She rend-ont |
stem, the weather, end the iti the ‘ove ,



politieaiay - inttdaliy, on a 0.8, Nations]: baste, end later, on en Auternatione), z

basis.” Tis inoludes favorable indos trinatdon of the public, operstional and/or

Oe Ze Yale caraot afford two R&D programs of this types andthe reeiiie

end progrens. Mapliesis by the individus) acensies’ should be consistent uit
‘hede priority areas of interest and thet respective ssvigned roles ‘ind 5 oi
Mls Uidieates:jphet existing fecttitios and ‘agencies should be used, or



bai ‘Gubatde : appearances toad one te conclude that BMD hae intentionally
avelded asking for advice: from wand ‘and has often reversed the RADG

. recommendations ina  disectien | ina events (as. in the management of
Sebayeten a Proved wrong. m the above recemmandation ds caacteptabe,

fe



(3). Tt 40 yesnmendad that the ent

ive inbeliigenne communsty par tedpete in
all ay

pects of the sibaysten ry program, and that eveluats..
tyater take into Consideration aL other =;
eoavtnbional.

af Guy

teh end



oe Dirdelor of Dates base end Meioeeriag =

-‘suunon = Rares ae meee ar

; 7 ¥. Juty be
Ts GIMIRAL ~ Background. Information |
Ae During the past severe) months, deliberations and studies concerning

the various aspects of the SAMOS Program have been conducted by muy groupe and
. Andividuals, a arene ececee: of Hae Procran, ond the high Smportance that
i the macy potentiat thane, Glace to the progran, ‘indicates that any review mast
consider the Program as ¢. whole jn order to be most effective, Recently, the:
has deen evidence of a revised. doctrine of the SAHOS Progren, obtained in informal
_ Heousstoris With members of the Office of the Secretory. of the Air Force, and as
seen in suoli directives as the Wileon letter to the EMD. However, in the meantine,
_ Rational end international affeire have forced a nw urgency, coupled with a
frantic 1 tancy, for a project whose technology has been both overstated and
underdone, the Advisory Group has attempted to‘doopmok tte various reviews,
of the ourrent status of this vork into the present Document,

}


6. du. * Degradation due to

Ported, coitro aud relisbitity ds not as
or 8 critical because of the fever monber of days required.
atellite Js recovered in a 2liehour: 5 .
6 1 28 becense of the res. oi:

£ . 24 square niles /day ;
= BF eateriste Gays’ weitd be required to obtain covers re
yy satellite day. vould be required 4f weather were oni
,



Qe: ‘That the muaber of Atlas Agene boosters
: ‘patellives as pospible be. based on th

be Fediiséd and os many

@ uae of Thor boosters (with or without
Clustering Sergeart missiles) for R&D tests, 7 ;
_ 36 Mat of the three F payloads currently’ avatiable,
necessary be flow singularly or in combination with an

‘earliest possible date, ¢: achieve one suc ceoatul ‘orbiting

» Os many as are’
Payload, at the
ferret. ‘collector

Wd ttieteltire

tstt tier.

“CUMUMIItE opypyyyyyupsyy op,

CLE


3 nigua Limit or at worse, the 2 signa Lindt Fevebering at the
‘(ee 9 x 09 x .9) of the targets Will already be missed. the

ise. is atabiliation syaten specified 4 SMB. does not meet .
‘these requtremmta. :

Que mart rir io in nn that ah of the eave proeponee so oroein





: koe
time, ° year. and the Tatitade will determine when phtopraphie coverage ian be obtaine?

As pertains to weather the’ studies that. have been dine ind were based 6 on » atatiatical.

i “averages and can only be ised for long range, lasning purposés. Based on these atudie.

any conclusions made relative to the amount of coverage or the length of time to obtain | .
total or specific area coverage under actual operational conditions are invalid. Weath-
is contimally changing and theze is no assurance that a continuously orbiting satellite
will be in the right place at the right time, Large areas free of clouds, haze, and
amoke occur infrequently {once or twice a month dependent on the season of the year),
and persist for relatively short Periods of time ‘approximately two to three days), The
SAMOS readout system ie not capable of fully exploiting large cloud free areas because
of its ‘narrow swath and because of its readout limitations. A ici.overable pavoranmic
package launched at the’ proper time and recovered at the end of 48 or 72 hours could”
fully exploit the good weather area. In addition, studies have indicated that's 70-mm.
panoramic camera recovered. in 24 hours will show a gain of coverage of 6 to over:
the E-2 system, Spe rating for the wame length of time, because of readout ‘imitations,
in terme of information content, the gain is between 260 and 850 depending on the width
‘of the film used, In the case of areas that are cloud free only | one or two days a year,
the ) advantages of one-recoverable package launched at ‘the appropriate time as compared
0 a number of continuously orbiting readout packages are appe rent, o& the other hand,
" the los of coverage during sloud freo areas may result ina delay of months before the
, . Opportunity. would exist again,

Bey A comparisen iof the effects of ‘wale? satis ihe be of aad remred



260 ni.

root 20s
100 12/mfs 200 11 /mm
100 .. wo
4.0 4.0 |
1760 - aio:
“3x18 gy 105
W390 0.80
Coverage/Vebie1 he x10® 6.7 2106:
life fs endent Sq ii _ $q i
: of weather
“File -ise | “0.” 70 me
‘ x 7
” ; 12001 iso
_ Effective Stereo + No “We :
. ‘Distance « on i ground subtended by one
_ Mpeameiaty usually me 2% Tine’

pai Pesonetton lines

- aun

180 mi.” 227 wt. Ue nt.
st 7 288 ; 6 .
100 13/m 80-200 12/me- 240 13 fein
6 1507. 300
5.0 $6 “2500
-1/70-1/7001/300-1/2000 1/000 :
705 x 104. 35x 20) 2.5 x io!
30 ek aL
15-20 x 105 can carry
ae only 1 day 1 oe
of film Ma
763 x 106 Total
Sq Mi .
“ge 70m: gm
z : x . “k
15-22008 25008 35008
Tes ;

Yes. Wo

“AY Ro present ‘tine, the 24" oysten 1iated above has ‘the na fotdoning growth

potential

and could possibly result from minor changes:

(2), 3 mation of a 36" Pods 2eris vith a syeten Tavointion of sprecinatey

2): L608 Shirease
® cept (ions o£ ye”

(3).

for every pase.

or relisbinity. factor by cutting |

coverage ue 10%



‘weighted ares resolution) it is ‘poasonable to’ “expeot! aie ground © Feoqisttion .
of 100',":-To realise thie 100f ‘the TAG mst be witiin 5 because of the Long
exposure ‘time of 1/25 second. Since the orbit. will be siliptiosl, this Point
should be studied carefully. : a .

2, The el system is less complex and much more workable than the E-2

. .syatene. “ite design makes it'a coverage tool (200 ml. wid. strip). It te felt
that it has limited “seeingTM capability since after readout the recognition of
objects will optimistically be limited to 300f. ‘Strip cameras are not useful for
mapping but spproximate meauwreaents of smell objects detected are possible, ,
Barring wesuicr considerations, this satellite could cover Rusede in ebout ten
days « thin 4) not & Very meaningful statenent, but weather and darimess play
_ Vitally important roles. :
3. The quantitative aspects of the rendout ‘probles: are not as critical
in the T 1 as dn the Be systen. Tue qualitative aspects in terms of degradation
. due to transsission, reprodudtion, and system complexity | (rettabinity) are the
sane as for the B-2. ~
4. There ie an R&D. advantage or carry-over value frin E-] onto Fx2
dn that the iuage formation, in-f}ight processing, scanning, transmiezion, ethos
are the sane, The degree of succeas of the E-1 program will define better than
any other system study the final destiny of readout programs.
5. The questionable resolution of the end results obtained from this
system and the greet need for reconnaissance-intelligence information from.

sAtellite veileles Cor evaluation purposes and future R&D guidance are ‘considered
t> be the major problem areate