JOHN COLEMAN, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 60715 

FILED 

MAR 2 7 2014 

A 

CLE 

BY 

IE K. LINDEMAN 

F SUPRE-tA €1431 

ERK 

130 Nev., Advance Opinion 22- 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

Appeal from a district court order denying a post-conviction 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark 

County; Linda Marie Bell, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Turco & Draskovich, LLP, and Robert M. Draskovich Jr. and Gary A. 

Modafferi, Las Vegas, 

for Appellant. 

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. 

Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District 

Attorney, Clark County, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. 

OPINION 

By the Court, SAITTA, J.: 

Appellant John Coleman was convicted of lewdness with a 

child under the age of 14 years and was given a suspended prison sentence 

and placed on probation. When he completed his period of probation, he 

was subject to a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Several years 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 4(M99 4- Dgcpacl 
after commencing lifetime supervision, Coleman filed a post-conviction 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asking the district court to release 

him from lifetime supervision or strike the lifetime supervision 

requirement. The district court denied the petition. In this appeal, we 

consider whether a person who is serving a special sentence of lifetime 

supervision may file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence. We conclude that he 

cannot. Because lifetime supervision commences only after a person has 

expired a prison term or period of probation or parole, a person who is 

subject only to lifetime supervision is not subject to an unexpired prison 

term that could be imposed upon violation of the conditions of that 

supervision and therefore is no longer under "sentence of death or 

imprisonment" as required by NRS 34.724(1). Thus, a person who is 

subject only to lifetime supervision may not file a post-conviction petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. We therefore affirm the district court's order 

denying Coleman's post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Coleman pleaded guilty in 2002 to lewdness with a child under 

the age of 14 years. The district court sentenced him to life in prison with 

the possibility of parole after 10 years, but the court suspended the 

sentence and placed him on probation for a term of 5 years. As required 

by MRS 176.0931, the district court also imposed a special sentence of 

lifetime supervision to begin upon completion of any term of 

imprisonment, probation, or parole. 

In July 2007, Coleman was discharged from probation and 

began serving his "sentence" or term of lifetime supervision. Consistent 

with the authority granted by MRS 213.1243, the Board of Parole 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

W) 1947A 
Commissioners assigned the conditions of Coleman's lifetime supervision. 

The conditions apparently included restrictions on where Coleman could 

reside, his consumption of intoxicants and controlled substances, his 

possession of weapons and association with certain individuals, his 

conduct in compliance with all laws, out-of-state travel, contact with any 

victims or witnesses, obtaining a post office box, contact with minors, and 

presence in or near certain locations that are frequented by minors.' The 

lifetime supervision agreement also included the conditions required by 

NRS 213.1243(3)-(5) that further restrict the location of Coleman's 

residence and his movements. In January 2012, Coleman filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking release from his 

sentence and conditions of lifetime supervision. The district court denied 

his petition. 

DISCUSSION 

A challenge to the validity of a judgment of conviction or 

sentence may be raised in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus filed in compliance with the requirements set forth in NRS Chapter 

34. NRS 34.724(1) provides that a person "convicted of a crime and under 

sentence of death or imprisonment" may file a post-conviction petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the conviction, the sentence, or the 

computation of time served. Accordingly, a post-conviction petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus cannot be filed by a petitioner who is no longer 

'Coleman has provided a copy of a lifetime supervision agreement in 

his appendix. Although the document has been redacted such that it is 

unclear whether it is a copy of Coleman's lifetime supervision agreement, 

based on the parties' briefing below and on appeal, it appears that the 

document reflects the conditions that have been imposed on Coleman. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A 
under a sentence of death or imprisonment for the conviction at issue. See 

NRS 34.724(1); see also Jackson v. State, 115 Nev. 21, 23, 973 P.2d 241, 

242 (1999) (concluding that a petitioner was not entitled to file a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus when he was no longer 

incarcerated pursuant to the judgment of conviction contested); Nev. 

Const. art. 6, § 6(1) (permitting district courts to issue writ of habeas 

corpus for a person "who has suffered a criminal conviction. .. and has not 

completed the sentence imposed pursuant to the judgment of conviction"). 

Whether a sentence of lifetime supervision, imposed pursuant 

to NRS 176.0931, qualifies as a sentence of imprisonment within the 

meaning of NRS 34.724(1) is a matter of statutory interpretation. When 

interpreting a statutory provision, this court will look first to the plain 

language of a statute and will enforce the statute as written if the 

statute's language is clear and the meaning plain. See Hobbs v. State, 127 

Nev. „ 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011); see also State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 

1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004) ("We must attribute the plain 

meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous."). 

NRS 34.724(1) allows a person who is "under a sentence 

of ... imprisonment" to file a post-conviction habeas petition. A sentence 

of imprisonment is one that requires a person to be placed in a prison or 

some other place of confinement. See Black's Law Dictionary 825 (9th ed. 

2009) (defining "imprison"). Obviously, a person who is incarcerated is 

under a sentence of imprisonment. But lifetime supervision clearly is not 

itself a sentence of imprisonment. A person who is on lifetime supervision 

is supervised by parole and probation officers and there are restrictions on 

where the person may reside, but the person is not placed in a prison or 

another place of confinement. See generally NRS 213.1243. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A 
In some circumstances a person who is not in a prison or 

another place of confinement may nonetheless be under a sentence of 

imprisonment. For example, a person who is on probation is under a 

sentence of imprisonment because the person has been sentenced to a 

prison term but the sentence has been suspended. If the probationer 

violates a condition of probation, the suspended sentence of imprisonment 

may be enforced. NRS 176A.630. Similarly, a person who has been 

released from prison on parole is under a sentence of imprisonment 

because he remains subject to an unexpired term of imprisonment. If the 

parolee violates a condition of parole, he may be imprisoned on the 

unexpired sentence. NRS 213.1517(1); NRS 213.1519(1). Although the 

conditions of probation or parole may be similar to conditions of lifetime 

supervision,2the conditions are not what place a probationer and parolee 

under a sentence of imprisonment. The probationer and parolee remain 

under a sentence of imprisonment because of the suspended or unexpired 

prison term set forth in the judgment of conviction. The same is not true 

for a person who is on lifetime supervision. 

The special sentence of lifetime supervision "commences after 

any period of probation or any term of imprisonment and any period of 

2Compare NRS 176A.400(1) (providing nonexhaustive list of 

conditions that may be imposed on probationer), NRS 176A.410 (providing 

additional conditions of probation for defendant convicted of a "sexual 

offense"), NRS 176A.420 (providing for random drug testing as condition of 

probation), NRS 176A.430 (providing for restitution as a condition of 

probation), and MRS 213.12175 (providing nonexhaustive list of conditions 

that parole board may impose on parolee), with MRS 213.1243(3)-(5) 

(providing conditions of lifetime supervision that must be included in 

certain circumstances), and supra Facts and Procedural History 

(describing conditions of Coleman's lifetime supervision). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

5 

(0) 1947A map 
release on parole." NRS 176.0931(2); see also NRS 213.1243(1). Under the 

plain language of the statute, lifetime supervision begins only after the 

person has been discharged from any further obligations of probation or 

has expired his prison term while incarcerated or on parole. Therefore, 

unlike a probationer or parolee, a person on lifetime supervision is not 

subject to a suspended or unexpired sentence of imprisonment set forth in 

the judgment of conviction that may be enforced upon a violation of the 

conditions of lifetime supervision. 3Instead, when a person on lifetime 

supervision violates a condition of that supervision, the violation is a new, 

separate and distinct offense, NRS 213.1243(8), and will result in the 

person being under a sentence of imprisonment only if he is charged with, 

convicted of, and sentenced for that offense. 4In that event, the person is 

under a sentence of imprisonment based on the new judgment of 

3NRS 213.1243(2) deems lifetime supervision to be "a form of parole" 

for limited purposes that do not affect our analysis of the issue presented 

here. 

'Currently, a person who violates a condition of lifetime supervision 

"is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in 

the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a 

maximum term of not more than 6 years." NRS 213.1243(8). A prior 

version of the statute distinguished between minor and major violations 

with a minor violation being a misdemeanor and a major violation being a 

category B felony. NRS 213.1243(3) (2005), amended by 2007 Nev. Stat., 

ch. 528, §8, at 3257. A "major violation" was one that posed "a threat to 

the safety or well-being of others" and involved: a gross misdemeanor, a 

felony, or a crime involving a minor victim; the use of a deadly weapon, 

explosive, or firearm; the use or threatened use of force or violence; death 

or bodily injury; domestic violence; harassment, threats, or stalking; or the 

forcible or unlawful entry of any structure or vehicle in which another 

person was present. NRS 213.1243(5) (2005), repealed by 2007 Nev. Stat., 

ch. 528, § 8, at 3258. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

6 

(0) 1947A e 
conviction, not the lifetime supervision. A person on lifetime supervision 

therefore is not in the same position as a probationer or parolee. 

Accordingly, we conclude that a person who is subject only to lifetime 

supervision is not under a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning 

of NRS 34.724(1) and therefore cannot file a post-conviction petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus to challenge his sentence. 

Coleman contends that he is left without a remedy if he cannot 

challenge his sentence and conditions of lifetime supervision in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Even assuming this was 

correct, the post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a 

creature of statute and we cannot ignore the plain language of NRS 

34.724(1) that restricts its use. The State acknowledges that while 

traditional post-conviction relief is not available, Coleman could still 

pursue injunctive relief pursuant to NRS 33.010. Although we do not 

attempt to catalogue the full panoply of remedies available to challenge 

the conditions of lifetime supervision including the extent to which the 

conditions could be challenged in defense of a charge under NRS 

213.1243(8) for violating a condition of lifetime supervision, we note that 

some challenges to those conditions may be pursued in a civil rights action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nevada law also provides a means for Coleman to 

petition to be released from lifetime supervision if he meets certain 

conditions. NRS 176.0931(3). Coleman therefore is not left without a 

remedy. 

Because Coleman had been discharged from probation and 

therefore was no longer under a sentence of imprisonment when he filed 

his post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he was not eligible 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 7 

(0) 1947A 
tie_27Th. 

Hardesty 

C.J. 

Pickering 

CLA.-1 

Parraguirre 

J. 

J. J. 

for post-conviction habeas relief. Therefore, we affirm the order of the 

district court denying his petition. 

Saitta 

J. 

We concur: 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

8 

(0) 1947A e