In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 13, 2024

S24G0007. GARRISON v. THE STATE.

 PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

Georgia case law makes clear that the State generally must 

allege and prove that a prosecution is brought within the applicable 

statute of limitations. Although this requirement is most often 

satisfied by alleging and proving the date that the crime was 

committed, sometimes more is required. One line of precedent holds 

that in prosecutions where the State seeks to toll the applicable 

limitations period under statutes permitting such tolling in specific 

factual situations, the State must also allege and prove the facts that

trigger the statutory tolling. At the same time, another case holds 

that the State need not allege and prove extensions of limitations 

periods that are effective by operation of law, such as when a timely

indictment is quashed or a nolle prosequi is entered. This case 
2

involves an issue that does not neatly fit into either of those two 

lines of precedent.

Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that the State was not 

required to allege and prove the tolling or extension of limitations 

periods arising from the Chief Justice’s emergency orders during the 

COVID-19 pandemic. We granted certiorari on that issue. We now 

conclude that the State is not required to allege and prove that the 

emergency orders afforded additional time in which to bring a 

prosecution. Our tolling precedent generally requires the State to 

allege and prove facts that establish tolling applies so that a 

defendant has notice of all matters she must defend against. But the 

existence of the Chief Justice’s emergency orders is not the kind of 

fact that the State is required to prove. Absent a requirement for the 

State to prove the fact of the emergency orders (or a challenge to the 

validity of the emergency orders, which the defendant here does not 

assert), there is nothing for a defendant to defend against. And other 

procedural mechanisms exist for the defendant to require the State 

to provide notice of its reliance on emergency orders before trial.
3

We also granted certiorari to determine whether admission of 

horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test evidence must be assessed 

according to the new standard imposed by a recent amendment to 

OCGA § 24-7-702. We conclude that it must be, that this new 

standard was not applied below, and that if the evidence was not 

admissible under the new standard, the trial court’s error in 

admitting it under the wrong standard would not have been 

harmless. Therefore, we vacate the Court of Appeals’s judgment and 

remand the case to the trial court for it to determine under the 

proper standard whether testimony regarding the HGN test was 

properly admitted.

(1) Background

On November 15, 2018, Garrison was involved in a traffic 

accident that gave rise to the charges in this case. The State filed its 

initial accusation against Misty Michelle Garrison on May 29, 2019, 

charging Garrison with three misdemeanor counts: DUI (less safe) 

(alcohol) under OCGA §40-6-391 (a) (1), failure to maintain lane 

under OCGA § 40-6-48, and improper tires under OCGA § 40-8-74. 
4

The State then filed an amended accusation on January 12, 2021, 

charging Garrison with four misdemeanor counts: DUI (less safe) 

(combined influence) under OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (4), DUI (less safe) 

(alcohol) under OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), failure to maintain lane 

under OCGA § 40-6-48, and improper tires under OCGA § 40-8-74.

The evidence at trial showed the following.1 On November 15, 

2018, around 12:00 p.m., Garrison crashed her boyfriend’s truck

into a utility pole, snapped the pole in half, and the truck rested on 

half the pole while loose wires dangled around the truck.

A man who lived near the single-vehicle accident testified that 

he lost power, went outside, and saw a truck propped on the broken 

pole. He called 911 as the driver tried to get out of the truck, and he 

took pictures of the scene, but he interacted with the driver only 

“[f]rom a distance” and “didn’t get close enough” to observe anything 

unusual or whether she was impaired. 

1 This case calls us to consider whether an error was harmless, so we 

recount the evidence reasonably and in detail, weighing it as we would expect 

reasonable jurors to have done, as opposed to viewing it only in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict. See Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 264 (1) n.2 (882 

SE2d 227) (2022).
5

Deputy Rachel Mann responded first to the scene, and she 

arrived as Garrison was removing items from the truck. Concerned 

about the live wires, Deputy Mann guided her away from the truck.

Deputy Mann testified that she did not remember an odor of alcohol 

or have a reason to say that Garrison was under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs. 

Lt. Doug Brackett also responded to the scene and testified at 

trial that he did not remember whether he smelled alcohol.2 He 

testified that, although the roads were “damp” or “wet” and pine 

needles had fallen, he “didn’t see anything” that would have caused 

the accident. On cross-examination, he opined that it was possible 

that the combination of the road’s curve, wet roads, pine needles, 

and the truck’s bald tires could have caused the accident. 

Trooper Kyle McSween responded to the scene and received 

information that, on the same day and at a gas station immediately 

before this incident, Garrison failed to secure the truck before 

2 In a redacted video recording from another trooper’s dash camera that 

was played for the jury, Lt. Brackett stated, “I can’t smell no alcohol.” 
6

exiting the truck, and the truck started rolling away from her. After 

receiving this information about the separate incident, Trooper 

McSween then approached Garrison while she was “near the back 

of the truck, or the bed of the truck,” where a gasoline container had 

spilled and where he noticed the “rear tires were slick all the way 

down” and had “[n]o significant tread all the way down to the wear 

bars.” There was “a strong odor of gasoline fumes[,]” so he did not 

smell alcohol initially, but after he and Garrison moved “a good 

distance away from the pickup truck[,]” he smelled “a slight odor of 

alcoholic beverage emitting from her person and breath and 

mouth[.]” 

Trooper McSween asked Garrison if she had consumed alcohol 

in the past 24 hours, which Garrison denied. But she later “changed 

her story” and “said she had dr[u]nk beer the night before.” When 

asked if she had taken other drugs or medication, Garrison 

answered yes and showed him her prescription bottle for 

phentermine, containing a few pills, which she took “for the 
7

purposes of diet” and had taken that morning.3 Trooper McSween 

asked about the separate incident at the gas station, which Garrison 

confirmed, explaining that it was a common mistake and that she 

was distracted because she had “a lot on her plate.”

Trooper McSween concluded that Garrison was under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs and asked whether Garrison would 

submit to field sobriety tests. Garrison agreed and immediately, 

without prompting, “attempted to demonstrate to where she started 

to bring her arms up and trying to stand on one leg[,]” and she “was 

wobbly.”4 Trooper McSween performed the HGN test and testified 

at trial about his training to perform that test, how it worked, that 

he had administered it between 500 and 800 times, what he looked 

for in performing that test, and how, based on his experience, he had 

“noticed a correlation between alcohol impairment and 

3 According to a redacted video recording from Trooper McSween’s dash 

camera footage, which was played for the jury, Garrison claimed she took half 

a pill that morning around 6:30 a.m.

4 According to the dash camera video recording, Garrison told Trooper 

McSween that she had a knee issue that could cause her to “lose balance on 

this knee if [she] tried to hold it up” before attempting to stand on one leg. 
8

nystagmus[.]”5 He opined that the HGN test was “considered to be

the most scientifically proven” and “reliable[,]” and said that with 

respect to Garrison he observed “[s]ix out of six clues[,]” which he 

said indicated “[i]mpairment. Driving under the influence.”6

Garrison objected, and the following exchange ensued: 

GARRISON’S COUNSEL: Judge, I’m going to object to 

him concluding it was impairment. He can conclude, I 

guess, he thought there was alcohol consumption but not 

that there’s impairment.

THE STATE: I disagree, Judge. I don’t think that’s the 

case law that’s out there, and I don’t think that’s the way 

this court has ruled on that either. I think six out of six 

clues, he can testify, is indication of impairment.

GARRISON’S COUNSEL: Just to preserve the record, 

that would be a Daubert challenge --

5 Garrison also elicited the opinions of Deputy Mann, Lt. Brackett, and 

Trooper McSween that if someone suffered a head injury after an accident like 

this, the head injury would affect the HGN test results. However, each of those 

witnesses also testified that he or she did not observe a head injury. Deputy 

Mann testified that she did not recall Garrison mentioning a head injury, 

observe a head injury, or call for EMS to respond to the scene. And Trooper 

McSween similarly testified that Garrison did not mention a head injury.

Garrison has pointed to no record evidence that she had a head injury.

6 Later, Trooper McSween also testified that Garrison “had constricted 

pupils” during his administration of the HGN test and that what he “observed 

was the same thing that [he had] always observed even in training and other 

cases where there were clues that led [him] to believe the person was 

impaired.”
9

THE COURT: Overrule the objection.

Trooper McSween also opined that, based on his experience, formal 

training, and observation of Garrison, “she was under the influence 

of alcohol to the extent to make her a less safe driver.” He testified 

that he placed her under arrest, which she resisted, and he read her 

the implied consent warning before she declined the blood test. 

A redacted video recording from Trooper McSween’s dash 

camera was played for the jury, captured his encounter with 

Garrison, and showed the administration of the field sobriety tests, 

as well as Garrison arguing, crying, resisting arrest, and declining 

a blood test. Similarly, a video recording from inside Trooper 

McSween’s vehicle, which was played for the jury, showed Garrison 

arguing, yelling, and cursing after arrest. 

During cross-examination, Garrison emphasized that Trooper 

McSween did not perform the “walk and turn and one leg[,]” and she 

challenged his training, opinions, and knowledge of the HGN test.

Trooper McSween testified that he did not perform the other tests 

due to Garrison’s “admission that she would probably have issues 
10

with trying to do certain stuff” based on injuries she had previously 

sustained, and because “with an HGN alone, it has proven to be the 

most scientific of all the evaluations put together.”

While Garrison did not testify in her own defense, a 

hairdressing client of Garrison testified that he had an “uneventful” 

20-to-30-minute hair appointment with Garrison less than two 

hours before the incident and that he did not notice any odor of 

alcohol or drug impairment. 

During closing argument, both parties mentioned the HGN 

evidence. Garrison challenged Trooper McSween’s method of 

performing the HGN test and again challenged his opinions, 

training, and knowledge of the HGN test. The State contended that 

there was evidence of alcohol, stating that “[t]he trooper [could]

smell it on her breath. Not only that, he did a scientific test to 

determine if she was impaired. That’s what he told you. That test is 

used to determine if someone was impaired.” The State continued: 

“That test shows she was impaired. You don’t have to believe that 
11

test, look at the truck.”7 

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Garrison guilty of all 

counts. Garrison then filed in open court a motion in arrest of 

judgment, arguing that a “simple review of this accusation show[ed] 

it was filed well beyond the statute of limitations” and that the State 

failed to allege and prove an exception to the statute of limitations.

The trial court ultimately denied her motion based on orders issued 

by then-Chief Justice Melton under the Judicial Emergency Act, 

OCGA §§ 38-3-60 to 38-3-64, to create and extend a statewide 

judicial emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic,8 finding that the 

amended accusation was filed within the statute of limitations given

the extension established by the Chief Justice’s orders. 

The trial court sentenced Garrison on Counts 1, 3, and 4 and 

merged Count 2 with Count 1. Garrison appealed to the Court of 

Appeals, which affirmed. See Garrison v. State, 368 Ga. App. 819 

7 The State also claimed the “biggest piece of evidence [the jury was] 

going to have in this case is this truck.” 

8 Supreme Court of Georgia, Court Information Regarding the 

Coronavirus, https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/court_corona_info/ 

(last visited July 2, 2024).
12

(890 SE2d 869) (2023). Relevant to issues on which we granted 

certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that although the statute of 

limitations “would have originally expired on November 18, 2020, 

the COVID-19 judicial emergency orders suspended the running of 

the limitation period such that [it] did not expire until after the 

State filed its amended accusation on January 12, 2021.” Id. at 824 

(1) (b). The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s admission 

of HGN testimony based on a standard developed based on Harper 

v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (292 SE2d 389) (1982), under which the trial 

court could admit scientific evidence only if it found that the party 

offering the evidence showed that (1) the “general scientific 

principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of 

producing reliable results” and (2) the person performing the test 

substantially performed the scientific procedures in an acceptable 

manner.” Garrison, 368 Ga. App. at 826 (3).

2. Georgia law generally does not require the State to allege or 

prove orders issued under the Judicial Emergency Act.

Garrison contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
13

that the State need not allege and prove its reliance on orders under 

the Judicial Emergency Act as an exception to the statute of 

limitations. We disagree.

In criminal cases, the statute of limitations period generally 

begins running on the date of the commission of the offense, and to 

be timely, the indictment must be returned before the limitations 

period expires. See Riley v. State, 305 Ga. 164, 167 (3) (824 SE2d 

249) (2019). Misdemeanors like the ones of which Garrison was 

convicted are subject to a two-year limitations period. See OCGA § 

17-3-1 (e). But there are circumstances that can extend or pause the 

running of a limitations period. “Broadly speaking, OCGA § 17-3-1 

limits the time within which a prosecution for particular offenses 

must commence, while OCGA §§ 17-3-2, 17-3-2.1, and 17-3-2.2 

specify periods that are excluded from the various periods[,]” known 

as tolling exceptions, and OCGA § 17-3-3 specifies circumstances 

that can warrant an extension of the statute of limitations. State v. 

Outen, 296 Ga. 40, 42 (2) (764 SE2d 848) (2014).

The State bears the burden to prove that a crime occurred 
14

within the statute of limitations. See Lewis v. State, 306 Ga. 455, 

462-463 (4) (831 SE2d 771) (2019). Under our precedent, whether 

the State relies on an exception under OCGA §§ 17-3-2, 17-3-2.1, and 

17-3-2.2 or an extension under OCGA § 17-3-3 generally determines 

the State’s burden to allege and prove the application of such a 

provision. But the emergency orders at issue here do not fit neatly 

in either category.

(a) Our precedent holds that tolling exceptions to the statute of 

limitations differ from extensions of the statute of limitations.

The General Assembly has chosen to create tolling exceptions 

to the statute of limitations that pause the running of the limitations 

period for varying durations of time when certain specified facts are 

present, and these exceptions are set forth in OCGA §§ 17-3-2, 17-3-

2.1, and 17-3-2.2.9 Because these tolling exceptions are triggered 

9 OCGA § 17-3-2 tolls the statute of limitations for “any period” where 

“[t]he accused is not usually and publicly a resident within this state[,]” “[t]he 

person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown[,]” “[t]he 

accused is a government officer or employee and the crime charged is theft by 

conversion of public property while such an officer or employee[,]” or “[t]he 

accused is a guardian or trustee and the crime charged is theft by conversion 

of property of the ward or beneficiary.” OCGA § 17-3-2. OCGA § 17-3-2.1 tolls 

the applicable time period only for particular crimes and only until the victim 
15

only upon the occurrence of specified facts, if the State relies on such 

an exception “to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations, it must 

be alleged and proved.” Taylor v. State, 306 Ga. 277, 286 (3) (b) (830 

SE2d 90) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

We have long held that “an exception to the statute of 

limitations is a material allegation which must be alleged” in the 

accusation, see id., and the State bears the burden to prove “that the 

case falls properly within the exception.” Lewis, 306 Ga. at 463. This 

rule exists “to notify the defendant, that he may be prepared to meet 

all the allegations on the part of the State, at the trial.” McLane v. 

State, 4 Ga. 335, 341 (2) (1848). And the failure to allege in the 

accusation a tolling exception under those provisions renders the 

accusation fatally defective as a matter of law. See Rivera v. State, 

317 Ga. 398, 407 (1) (b) (893 SE2d 696) (2023).

Although some later Georgia case law suggests due process 

reaches a particular age or the violation is reported, whichever is first. See 

OCGA § 17-3-2.1. And OCGA § 17-3-2.2 tolls the applicable period only if the 

victim is a particular age and until the violation is either reported or discovered 

by the appropriate government agency, whichever is first. See OCGA § 17-3-

2.2.
16

roots for this rule, the actual source of this rule appears merely to 

be Georgia decisional law.10 Due process generally requires that, 

once state substantive law establishes the essential elements of a 

crime, the State must allege and prove all essential elements of that 

crime. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (II) (94 SCt 

2887, 41 LE2d 590) (1974) (indictment is sufficient if it “contains the 

elements of the offense charged[,]” “fairly informs a defendant of the 

charge against which he must defend,” and “enables him to plead an 

acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same 

offense” (citations omitted)). But as far as we can tell from the 

briefing and our own research, and despite a handful of Court of 

Appeals cases characterizing this rule otherwise,11 we have never 

10 For her part, Garrison makes no constitutional argument in her 

briefing, which focuses principally on statutory construction and our decisional 

law. The Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“GACDL”) filed an 

amicus brief, and although it gets closer to invoking a constitutional argument, 

GACDL does not actually make such an argument either.

11 A handful of Court of Appeals opinions have characterized this rule as 

making timeliness “one of the essential elements of the offense.” Taylor v. 

State, 44 Ga. App. 64, 74 (160 SE 667) (1931) (citing no authority for that 

particular statement); see also State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga. App. 481, 485 (243 

SE2d 675) (1978) (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (citing Taylor and Decker v. State, 139 

Ga. App. 707 (229 SE2d 520) (1976) (not containing language regarding 
17

held that the requirement to allege and prove tolling of a limitations 

period converts that tolling into an essential element of the charged 

crimes. 

We made a single passing reference to due process in McLane, 

4 Ga. at 340, but our analysis there appeared to be a combination of 

statutory construction and judicial policy making more than 

anything approaching a traditional due process analysis.12 See id. at 

341-342 (noting that statutes of limitations in civil cases are 

affirmative defenses to be pleaded by the defense, but that “we are 

unwilling to apply that rule to criminal causes, in which the life and 

essential elements)), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Outen, 289 

Ga. 579 (714 SE2d 581) (2011).

12 Currently, due process applies both to criminal cases in which the 

State seeks to deprive a criminal defendant of “life” or “liberty,” and to cases 

seeking to deprive a person of “property.” See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (“nor 

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 

process of law”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I (“No person shall be 

deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”). We note 

that neither constitutional guarantee of due process applicable to Georgia 

existed at the time that McLane was decided, the Fourteenth Amendment 

being adopted in 1868 and the Georgia Due Process paragraph first entering 

the Georgia Constitution in 1861. See State v. Turnquest, 305 Ga. 758, 769 (3) 

(b) (827 SE2d 865) (2019) (“An express due process provision first entered the 

Georgia Constitution in 1861,” was amended slightly in 1865 to protect 

“persons” instead of “citizens,” and “[a] substantially identical version of this 

provision has been readopted in every Georgia Constitution since.”) (citations 

omitted).
18

liberty of the citizen is involved; believing, as we do, that it is the 

most regular and safe rule to adopt, to require the particular 

exception mentioned in the Statute, intended to be proved at the 

trial, to prevent its operation, to be alleged in the indictment”).

McLane’s holding applies only to the statutory exceptions at issue 

there, and so the extent to which McLane may be incorporated into 

Georgia’s later-adopted due process requirements, it would similarly 

be limited to those exceptions.13

Moreover, the notice requirements associated with statutory 

tolling exceptions are not required in at least one other context. For 

13 United States Supreme Court precedent provides that although 

federal due process requires essential elements to be alleged and proved, 

timeliness is not an essential element. See Musacchio v. United States, 577 

U.S. 237, 248 (III) (136 SE2d 709, 193 LE2d 639) (2016) (“When a defendant 

fails to press a limitations defense, the defense does not become part of the case 

and the Government does not otherwise have the burden of proving that it filed 

a timely indictment.”); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 288 (II) (B) (90 

SCt 2117, 26 LE2d 608) (1970) (“It has never been thought that an indictment, 

in order to be sufficient, need anticipate affirmative defenses[.]”); Biddinger v. 

Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (38 SCt 41, 62 

LE 193) (1917) (“The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted 

on the trial by the defendant in criminal cases.” (emphasis added)); United 

States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168, 179-180 (21 LE 538) (1872) (quashing an 

indictment for failure to plead exception to statute of limitations would 

“deprive the prosecutor of the right to reply or give evidence” that either an 

exception applied or that the indictment was found and filed in the proper time 

period).
19

example, in OCGA § 17-3-3, the General Assembly has chosen to 

extend the statute of limitations for a set duration in certain 

instances upon the occurrence of a specified procedural event. If an 

accusation is brought within the applicable limitations period “and 

is quashed or a nolle prosequi is entered,” OCGA § 17-3-3 provides 

that “the limitation shall be extended six months from the time the 

first [accusation] is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered.” OCGA § 

17-3-3. Put another way, under that provision, if a timely accusation 

is quashed or nolle prossed, the State can re-accuse a defendant 

within six months of the date it was quashed or nolle prossed 

“without running afoul of the statute of limitation[s], even if the 

initial statute of limitations period has run.” Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 

506, 513 (12) (578 SE2d 444) (2003).

Unlike with the fact-based statutory tolling exceptions, there 

is not a meaningful defense to be mounted against the occurrence of 

a procedural event (i.e., a timely accusation is quashed or nolle 

prossed). In Sallie, we held that “OCGA § 17-3-3 provides an 

extension of the statute of limitation period and not an exception to 
20

it that must be pled in the indictment.” 276 Ga. at 513-514 (12). 

Indeed, if a timely accusation is quashed or nolle prossed, the State 

does “not need to allege an exception to the statute of limitations” 

because “OCGA § 17-3-3 specifies that the statute of limitations is 

extended six months if an indictment brought within the statute of 

limitations is later nolle prossed.” Sallie, 276 Ga. at 513 (2).14

Given this background, the parties purport to categorize orders 

issued under the Judicial Emergency Act as either a tolling 

exception or an extension. Garrison argues that orders issued under 

that Act operate similarly to tolling exceptions such that the State’s 

failure to allege and prove its application rendered the amended 

accusation fatally defective as a matter of law. Conversely, the State 

contends that orders issued under the Act are analogous to 

extensions, so the State need not allege or prove its application to 

prolong the limitations period. But upon careful consideration of the 

14 Some of us question Sallie’s reasoning, to the extent there was any 

reasoning offered at all. And during oral argument, Garrison questioned in 

passing the reasoning in Sallie. But neither party has asked us to consider 

whether Sallie was rightly decided, and so we express no opinion on that 

question here.
21

Judicial Emergency Act, orders issued under it do not fit either 

category.

(b) Orders issued under the Judicial Emergency Act are 

separate and distinct from tolling exceptions and extensions.

The Judicial Emergency Act empowers an authorized judicial 

official15 to “declare the existence of a judicial emergency” by issuing

an order when “the emergency substantially endangers or infringes 

upon the normal functioning of the judicial system,” including “the 

availability of persons to avail themselves of the judicial system,” or 

“the ability of litigants or others to have access to the courts or to 

meet schedules imposed by court order or rule, statute, or 

administrative rule or regulation.” OCGA § 38-3-61 (a); OCGA § 38-

3-60. The Act requires such an order to contain specific details, see 

OCGA § 38-3-61 (a), (c), limits the validity of any order issued under 

the Act to a specific duration, see OCGA § 38-3-61 (b), and requires 

15 The Act defines an “authorized judicial official” as the following, when 

acting in regard to his or her jurisdiction: the Chief Justice of the Georgia 

Supreme Court, a chief judge of a Georgia superior court judicial circuit, or any 

successor to those officials, “as determined by the applicable rules of 

incapacitation and succession[.]” OCGA § 38-3-60 (1).
22

the issuing judicial official to provide notice in accordance with the 

Act,16 see OCGA § 38-3-63. Moreover, the Act provides an avenue of 

appeal to any “person whose rights or interests are adversely 

affected” by such order, order modification, or order extension. 

OCGA § 38-3-64.

Upon the issuance of an order (or the subsequent modification 

or extension of that order), the Act empowers the authorized judicial 

official “to suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from 

16 To provide notice, the authorized judicial official shall: 

(1) Immediately notify the Chief Justice of the Georgia 

Supreme Court of the action;

(2) Notify and serve a copy of the order, modification, or 

extension on the judges and clerks of all courts sitting within the 

jurisdictions affected and on the clerks of the Georgia Court of 

Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court, such service to be 

accomplished through reasonable means to assure expeditious 

receipt; and

(3) Give notice of the issuance of the order, modification, or 

extension to the affected parties, counsel for the affected parties, 

and the public. Notice shall be provided by whatever means are 

reasonably calculated to reach the affected parties, counsel for the 

affected parties, and the public and may, without limitation, 

include mailing, publication in a newspaper of local or state-wide 

distribution, posting of written notices at courthouses and other 

public gathering sites, transmittal by facsimile or e-mail, and 

announcements on television, radio, and public address systems.

OCGA § 38-3-63.
23

deadlines or other time schedules or filing requirements imposed 

by[,]” among other things, “[a] statute of limitation[.]” OCGA § 38-3-

62 (a) (1). Once the authorized judicial official complies with the Act 

in issuing and providing notice of the order, the order is effective in 

every case, “whether in civil or criminal cases or administrative 

matters,” and as against every party or interested person within the 

jurisdiction of the issuing official, regardless of the facts of those 

cases. OCGA § 38-3-62.

Given this background, orders issued under the Judicial 

Emergency Act do not resemble either a tolling exception similar to 

those under OCGA §§ 17-3-2 to 17-3-2.2 or an extension similar to 

that provided by OCGA § 17-3-3. Instead, whether the State must 

allege and prove orders issued under that Act that “suspend, toll, 

extend, or otherwise grant relief” from the statute of limitations 

must be determined by the considerations underlying our precedent.

Nothing in the Judicial Emergency Act, which is located in an 

entirely different title of the Georgia Code, references OCGA §§ 17-

3-2 to 17-3-3, and nothing in those provisions references the Judicial 
24

Emergency Act. Moreover, orders issued under the Judicial 

Emergency Act operate differently than the exceptions and 

extension provided by those other provisions. 

Unlike the tolling exception provisions set forth in OCGA §§ 

17-3-2 to 17-3-2.2, which are clearly limited in application to 

criminal cases and to the factual scenarios set forth in those 

provisions,17 orders under the Judicial Emergency Act apply 

identically to every case within the scope of the order and within the 

jurisdiction of the issuing judicial official to the extent provided in 

the order, “whether in civil or criminal cases, or administrative 

matters,” regardless of the facts of those cases. OCGA § 38-3-62; cf. 

OCGA §§ 17-3-2 to 17-3-2.2.18 Although exceptions under those 

17 OCGA §§ 17-3-2 to 17-3-2.2 statutorily list factual scenarios where 

those provisions toll the statute of limitations. See OCGA §§ 17-3-2 to 17-3-2.2. 

Those lists do not include orders issued under the Act. See id.

18 This Court has said in some cases that such orders tolled the applicable 

filing deadline. See, e.g., Vendrel v. State, 318 Ga. 233, 233 n.1 (897 SE2d 233) 

(2024) (order “tolled” filing requirements); Harper v. State, 310 Ga. 679, 679 

n.1 (853 SES2d 645) (2023) (order “tolled” the time within which to appeal); 

Mobuary v. State, 312 Ga. 337, 339 (862 SE2d 553) (2021) (filing deadlines 

“were tolled” by the order, as extended in subsequent orders). But the use of 

the word “toll” in those cases, which did not address the issue raised here, did 

not convert tolling under the Judicial Emergency Act into a tolling exception 
25

provisions necessarily involve a question of fact — i.e., whether the 

facts triggering the exception are present — no such question of fact 

exists for the contested orders issued under the Act in this case, 

which are effective in all cases as a matter of law upon the official’s 

issuance of the order in compliance with the Act.19 Indeed, the order 

in this case was definite in its terms and depended on no factual 

predicate for its effectiveness.20

Nor does an order issued under the Act resemble an extension 

under OCGA § 17-3-3. Although an extension under that provision 

requires both an initial timely accusation and that the accusation be 

either quashed or nolle prossed for the extension to apply, the entry

of an order in compliance with the Judicial Emergency Act alone 

triggers the effectiveness of an order issued under the Act. There is 

that necessarily involves a question of fact such that underlying considerations 

require the State to give notice of its reliance on such tolling.

19 This is not to say that a party could never challenge the validity of 

such an order. But the parties do not challenge the validity of the orders at 

issue here. 

20 We express no opinion as to whether the same would be true if an order 

issued under the Judicial Emergency Act depended for its effectiveness on a 

factual predicate. Nor do we express any opinion as to whether the Judicial 

Emergency Act would permit such an order.
26

no threshold need for an initial accusation or for that accusation to 

be quashed or nolle prossed; the order is effective even as to cases 

not yet filed. And although an extension is effective on a case-bycase basis, an emergency order is effective in every case within the 

jurisdiction covered by the order.

(c) The State need not allege or prove the application of orders 

issued under the Judicial Emergency Act to rely on such orders to 

prolong the limitations period.

Although the Judicial Emergency Act imposes particular notice 

requirements on an authorized judicial official for the order to 

become effective, it does not impose similar notice requirements on 

the State in order for the State to rely on such orders. Rather, the 

text of the Act makes clear that the suspension, tolling, extension, 

or other relief provided by an order is effective as a matter of law in 

every case within the scope of the order in the jurisdiction upon the 

authorized judicial official’s issuance of the order in compliance with 

the Act. Therefore, the effectiveness of an order in a particular case 

does not depend on the State alleging and proving the order.

Garrison contends that not requiring the State to plead and 
27

prove reliance on orders entered under the Judicial Emergency Act

hinders defendants from having adequate notice of the State’s 

reliance on such orders in preparing a defense. But this contention 

misses key points. There is no need for notice in this context because 

the issuance of such an order is a fact of which the court can take 

judicial notice. In the context of tolling exceptions under OCGA §§ 

17-3-2 to 17-3-2.2, questions of fact exist for the jury to determine. 

There, the State must allege its reliance on a tolling exception so 

that the defendant can timely prepare a defense — and the 

defendant’s ability to mount a defense is a meaningful one, as it is 

the State’s burden to prove to the jury that the exception applies. In 

contrast, the issuance of an order in compliance with the Judicial 

Emergency Act is a fact of which courts can take judicial notice, so 

there is nothing for the State to prove in this context.21 Put another 

way, there is no factual defense that a defendant can mount against 

the application of a valid order that, unlike tolling exceptions under 

21 We note that the date of the crime and the date that the prosecution 

commenced were both included in the amended accusation in this case. 
28

OCGA §§ 17-3-2 to 17-3-2.2 which can turn on factual predicates, is 

rather made effective as a matter of law upon an official issuing that 

order in compliance with the Judicial Emergency Act. There is no 

question of fact in this context, and so there is no need for the State 

to allege and prove such an order to prolong the limitations period.

Moreover, if a defendant is unsure about the basis on which the 

State commences a prosecution seemingly outside of the limitations 

period, nothing prevents that defendant from challenging that 

accusation by a special demurrer, general demurrer, or plea in bar, 

as Garrison did in this case. See, e.g., Rivera, 317 Ga. at 405-406 (1) 

(a). If the State relies on a tolling exception under OCGA §§ 17-3-2 

to 17-3-2.2 without alleging that exception in the accusation, the 

State’s failure to do so would render that accusation fatally defective 

as a matter of law, consistent with our precedent. If, instead, the 

State relies on relief provided by orders under the Act, such a point 

could be made in response to a special demurrer.

Garrison also contends that not requiring the State to plead 

and prove reliance on orders entered under the Judicial Emergency 
29

Act opens the door for widespread abuse by the State. But this 

contention ignores safeguards provided by the Judicial Emergency 

Act itself: only an authorized judicial official, as defined by the Act, 

can issue such orders; the authorized judicial official can do so only 

for serious emergencies as specified by the Act; the scope of that 

authorized judicial official’s authority upon the occurrence of those 

circumstances is further limited by that Act; the Act establishes 

notice requirements that operate as a prerequisite for any order to 

become effective; and the Act provides an avenue of appeal for any 

“person whose rights or interests are adversely affected” by any 

order (or subsequent modification or extension of that order). OCGA 

§ 38-3-64. Further, if “the General Assembly wishes to impose” more 

stringent requirements on the State in order to rely on orders issued 

under the Judicial Emergency Act, it could do so by expressly 

imposing those requirements in that Act. See generally In the 

Interest of M.D.H., 300 Ga. 46, 57 (6) (793 SE2d 49) (2016); Staley v. 

State, 284 Ga. 873, 874 (1) (672 SE2d 615) (2009) (separation of 

powers mandates that “statutory construction belongs to the courts, 
30

legislation to the legislature” (citation omitted)).

Accordingly, because the issuance of an order in compliance 

with the Act renders the order effective in every case, because the 

text of that Act does not impose notice requirements as a 

prerequisite for the State to rely on such orders, and because there 

is no factual defense that a defendant can mount against the 

application of a valid order, the State need not allege or prove the 

application of such orders in order to rely on them to prolong the 

limitations period.

3. The proper standard for admission of HGN evidence has not 

yet been applied. 

Garrison contends that the Court of Appeals erred by failing to 

apply OCGA § 24-7-702 in determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in admitting the HGN evidence and that this 

was harmful error.22 We agree that the Court of Appeals so erred. 

Because this error was not harmless, we vacate that court’s 

22 The Court of Appeals held that it found “no error” as to the admission 

of this evidence, but a trial court’s evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed

under the abuse of discretion standard. See Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 653, 655 (2) 

(827 SE2d 254) (2019).
31

judgment and remand the case for the trial court to determine under 

the proper standard whether Trooper McSween’s testimony was 

properly admitted.

(a) Garrison preserved this issue for ordinary appellate review.

To begin, despite the State’s contention that Garrison’s “vague 

and general objection” failed to preserve this issue for ordinary 

appellate review, Garrison preserved this issue. She timely objected 

when the State offered the challenged evidence, stated the specific 

ground for her objection, and received a definitive ruling admitting 

that evidence on the record. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (1) (if a party 

challenges the admission of evidence, “stating the specific ground of 

objection,” and the court makes a definitive ruling on the record, the 

claim of error is preserved for appeal); Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199, 

209 (3) (a) (897 SE2d 760) (2024). Moreover, given the timing of 

Garrison’s objection at trial and Garrison’s clarification — “Just to 

preserve the record, that would be a Daubert challenge” — the trial 

court had sufficient context to understand the basis of Garrison’s 
32

objection when making its ruling.23

(b) The Court of Appeals erred by failing to consider this issue 

under the proper standard as set forth in OCGA § 24-7-702.

Having preserved this issue for ordinary appellate review, 

Garrison argues that HGN evidence is scientific in nature and that 

Trooper McSween’s contested conclusion was based on more than 

his perceptions “as an investigating officer and necessarily 

involve[d] the application of technical or other specialized 

knowledge.” Miller v. Golden Peanut Company, 317 Ga. 22, 27 (1) (a) 

(891 SE2d 776) (2023) (citing OCGA § 24-7-702). Accordingly, 

Garrison contends, the State was required to satisfy the 

prerequisites associated with expert witness testimony under OCGA 

§ 24-7-702, which, she argues, is a more stringent standard than the 

former standard set forth in Harper and applied here in admitting 

the HGN testimony.24

23 To the extent the State’s argument could be understood as criticizing 

Garrison for a lack of specificity as to the nature of her Daubert objection, her 

lack of more detail is reasonable under the circumstances, given that the trial 

court overruled her objection mid-sentence.

24 We appear not yet to have expressly analyzed the extent to which the 
33

In affirming the trial court’s admission of this testimony, the 

Court of Appeals relied on four cases that either applied Harper or 

failed altogether to consider the proposed expert’s qualifications. See 

Spencer v. State, 302 Ga. 133, 136 (805 SE2d 886) (2017); Duncan v. 

State, 305 Ga. App. 268, 270-271 (2) (699 SE2d 341) (2010); Hawkins 

v. State, 223 Ga. App. 34, 38 (1) (476 SE2d 803) (1996); Cherry v. 

State, 345 Ga. App. 409, 412 (2) (813 SE2d 408) (2018). This reliance 

was misplaced because those cases preceded the 2022 legislative 

amendment to OCGA § 24-7-702. With that amendment, which 

became effective on July 1, 2022, the General Assembly extended “to 

criminal cases the federal standard of admissibility of expert 

testimony articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993), and its 

progeny. See 2022 Ga. Laws, p. 201, § 1 (amending OCGA § 24-7-

702).” Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 287, 300 (2) (b) n.6 (882 SE2d 300) 

Daubert standard and the former Harper standard differ. But see Ronald L. 

Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 416, 441 (9th ed. 2024) 

(characterizing Harper standard as “more liberal” than Daubert). We make no 

detailed holding on that important question today, other than to clarify that 

they are not the same.
34

(2022); see also 2022 Ga. Laws, p. 201, § 3 (noting effective date).25

As a result, “the Harper standard does not apply to cases tried after 

July 1, 2022.” Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 15 (1) (b) n.5 (885 SE2d 

790) (2023); see also Smith, 315 Ga. at 300 (2) (b) n.6. Therefore, as 

Garrison’s trial occurred in August 2022, both the trial court and 

the Court of Appeals erred by failing to consider this issue under the 

appropriate standard.

(c) The failure to apply the correct standard requires us to 

vacate and remand.

It is well settled that “[e]rroneous evidentiary rulings are 

subject to a harmless error test.” Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 415 (2) 

(851 SE2d 541) (2020). “The test for determining nonconstitutional 

harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not 

contribute to this verdict[,]” and in this analysis, “we review the 

25 The Daubert standard directs a trial court to assess the “reliability of 

the expert’s proffered testimony[,]” considering “whether a theory or technique 

can be tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, 

the known or potential rate of error for the theory or technique, the general 

degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific or professional community, and 

the expert’s range of experience and training.” Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 287, 300 

(2) (b) n.6 (882 SE2d 300) (2022).
35

record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect 

reasonable jurors to have done instead of viewing it in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863 (2) 

(896 SE2d 516) (2023).

The State offers essentially two kinds of arguments as to how 

the application of the wrong standard by the Court of Appeals does 

not require reversal. First, the State argues that an application of 

the correct standard shows that the evidence was admissible. 

Second, the State argues that even if the evidence was inadmissible, 

it is highly probable that it did not contribute to the verdict. In this 

procedural posture, we cannot agree on either point.

(i) We cannot conclude on this record that the proper analysis 

would have resulted in a determination that the challenged evidence 

was admissible.

In determining the admissibility of expert testimony under the 

Daubert standard, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper, assessing 

both the witness’ qualifications to testify in a particular area of 

expertise and the relevancy and reliability of the proffered 

testimony.” HNTB Georgia, Inc. v. Hamilton-King, 287 Ga. 641, 642 
36

(1) (697 SE2d 770) (2010). And the trial court examines reliability 

“through a consideration of many factors, including whether a 

theory or technique can be tested, whether it has been subjected to 

peer review and publication, the known or potential rate of error for 

the theory or technique, the general degree of acceptance in the 

relevant scientific or professional community, and the expert’s range 

of experience and training.” Id. In comparison, the Harper standard 

directed the trial court to assess instead “whether the procedure or 

technique in question ha[d] reached a scientific stage of verifiable 

certainty, or [as one professor put it], whether the procedure 

‘rest[ed] upon the laws of nature.’” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525 (1). 

Here, more than two years before the General Assembly 

amended OCGA § 24-7-702 to apply the Daubert standard in 

criminal cases, Garrison filed a motion in limine on September 4, 

2019, seeking to exclude testimony related to the HGN test. At the 

time Garrison filed this motion, Harper was the binding test to 

determine the admissibility of the HGN-related testimony, and 

binding caselaw applying that standard made clear it was 
37

admissible. See, e.g., Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 283-284 (811 SE2d 

353) (2018) (HGN test and procedures reached scientific state of 

verifiable certainty under Harper such that trial court could take 

judicial notice of their reliability). But the error asserted in this 

appeal arises not from the pre-trial motion in limine, but from 

Garrison’s objection made at trial, in August of 2022. In that 

objection, Garrison contended that the testimony was inadmissible 

under the Daubert standard. Daubert had become applicable in 

criminal cases scarcely one month earlier.

Accordingly, when Garrison objected on Daubert grounds, the 

trial court should have considered Trooper McSween’s qualifications 

to testify as to the HGN test as well as the relevance and reliability 

of the proffered testimony based on the Daubert standard, including 

the reliability factors listed above. But no such consideration is 

apparent from the record; rather, the trial court overruled 

Garrison’s objection before Garrison’s attorney had finished the 

sentence containing the objection. The State made no proffer as to 

the reliability of HGN testing in the context of this case, much less 
38

any of the specific reliability factors. As such, the record before us 

does not appear to contain evidence from which the trial court could 

have found, or from which we could determine in the first instance,

that Trooper McSween’s testimony about the HGN test satisfied the 

Daubert standard.

This is not to say that Trooper McSween’s HGN-related 

testimony could not satisfy the Daubert standard. Rather, the record 

before us is too scant for the trial court to have made that 

determination. And the record before us is too scant for us to make 

that determination for the first time on appeal. This is especially so 

given that no reported Georgia decision has ever considered the 

reliability of HGN-related evidence under the Daubert standard. As 

a “court of review,” see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II,

we decline to do so in the first instance. Therefore, we cannot 

conclude on this record that the proper analysis would have resulted 

in a determination that the challenged evidence was admissible.

(ii) We cannot conclude on this record that it is highly probable 

that the challenged evidence did not contribute to the verdict.
39

The State contends that any error in admitting the challenged 

evidence was harmless because evidence of Garrison’s guilt was 

overwhelming and “the HGN test was but a small portion of the 

evidence in favor of the jury’s verdict.” We disagree.

To begin, evidence of Garrison’s impairment was 

circumstantial and far from overwhelming. No one testified that 

they observed the accident take place, and testimony based on 

interactions with Garrison before and after the accident do not 

provide substantial evidence of impairment.

A hairdressing client who had an appointment less than two 

hours before the single-vehicle accident testified that he did not 

notice any odor of alcohol or drug impairment during his 

“uneventful” hair appointment, which lasted 20-to-30 minutes.

Similarly, three of the four eyewitnesses who observed the 

aftermath of the accident did not observe anything that would give 

them the impression that Garrison was under the influence of 

alcohol or drugs. The man who called 911 testified that he “didn’t 

get close enough” to observe anything unusual about the driver or to 
40

form an opinion as to whether she was impaired. Deputy Mann, the 

first responding officer, did not remember an odor of alcohol or have 

any reason to say that Garrison was under the influence of alcohol 

or drugs. Lt. Brackett testified that he did not remember whether 

he smelled alcohol and, in a video recording from the scene of the 

accident that was played for the jury, stated “I can’t smell no 

alcohol.” Moreover, the only other eyewitness observing the 

aftermath of the accident testified that he did not smell alcohol 

initially and, when he did notice it, he described the smell as merely 

a “slight odor of alcoholic beverage[.]”

In other cases where any evidentiary error was found to be 

harmless, courts have considered among other things whether the 

defendant’s eyes were red or watery, speech was slurred or 

incoherent, and movements were sluggish and stumbling.26 See

State v. Robertson, 369 Ga. App. 707, 712-714 (1) (894 SE2d 431) 

26 This is not to say that this list of considerations is all-encompassing or 

that each of these considerations must be present for evidence of impairment 

to be overwhelming. Rather, we set out these considerations because they are 

relevant in determining whether, taking the evidence as a whole, any error in 

admitting the HGN testimony was harmless.
41

(2023); Smith v. State, 338 Ga. App. 635, 641 (5) (791 SE2d 418) 

(2016); Yarber v. State, 337 Ga. App. 40, 45 (785 SE2d 677) (2016). 

But here, no witness testified as to the presence of these traits, and 

Garrison did not appear to exhibit these characteristics in the nearly 

30-minute dash camera video recording, which was played for the 

jury. Rather, that video recording revealed that Garrison answered 

each of Trooper McSween’s questions, volunteered that hours before 

the accident she had taken prescription medicine that was 

prescribed to her, showed Trooper McSween that prescription bottle, 

and seemed to have control of her balance apart from her 

demonstration to Trooper McSween that she had a knee issue that 

could cause her to “lose balance on this knee if [she] tried to hold it 

up[.]”

The State points to evidence that Garrison was argumentative 

and emotional in resisting arrest, that Garrison lied initially about 

her consumption of alcohol the night before, and that there were two 

incidents of less safe driving — the failure to secure the truck at a 

gas station and the single-vehicle accident — to support its 
42

contention that any error was harmless. But the State points to no 

evidence other than the HGN test to support that this evidence was 

related to Garrison’s impairment as opposed to some other reason, 

such as Garrison’s explanation that she was distracted because she 

had “a lot on her plate.” Put simply, the non-HGN impairment 

evidence that the State depends on is not strong enough to render 

the HGN evidence harmless.

This is especially so because Trooper McSween’s testimony 

about Garrison’s performance on the HGN test was the strongest 

piece of evidence regarding impairment. That test was the only test 

performed. In explaining his rationale for not performing the walk 

and turn and one-leg test on cross-examination, Trooper McSween 

testified among other things that he need not perform those tests 

because “with an HGN alone, it has proven to be the most scientific 

of all of the evaluations put together.” This explanation occurred 

after the jury heard Trooper McSween testify as to his training and 

experience with the HGN test, how based on his experience he had 

“noticed a correlation between alcohol impairment and 
43

nystagmus[,]” and that the HGN test was “considered to be the most 

scientifically proven” and “reliable” test. Trooper McSween also 

opined that what he had observed “was the same thing that [he had] 

always observed even in training and other cases where there were 

clues that led [him] to believe the person was impaired” and that 

Garrison’s performance on that test indicated “[i]mpairment. 

Driving under the influence.” During closing argument, although 

the State directed the jury that the “biggest piece of evidence [the 

jury was] going to have in this case was the truck[,]” the State also 

directed the jury to Trooper McSween’s testimony as evidence of 

Garrison’s impairment — “he did a scientific test to determine if she 

was impaired. That’s what he told you. That test is used to 

determine if someone is impaired.” The record makes clear that the 

State heavily relied on the HGN testimony as evidence of Garrison’s 

impairment.

Under these circumstances, where the evidence of Garrison’s 

impairment was not overwhelming and the strongest evidence of 

impairment was Trooper McSween’s testimony about the HGN test, 
44

the State failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the error did not 

contribute to the jury’s verdict. Compare Hamilton v. State, 309 Ga. 

1, 10-11 (3) (843 SE2d 840) (2020) (any error in admitting testimony 

was harmless when that testimony was cumulative of other 

admitted evidence); Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544, 550-551 (3) (802 

SE2d 234) (2017) (erroneous admission of evidence was harmless 

where direct evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming).

Therefore, because we cannot say that the application of the 

wrong standard was harmless, the proper course under this Court’s 

precedents for similar errors is to vacate the trial court’s judgment 

and remand the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion to 

determine under the correct standard, as set forth in OCGA § 24-7-

702, whether the HGN testimony was properly admitted. See, e.g.,

Butler v. State, 309 Ga. 755, 763-764 (2) (d) (848 SE2d 97) (2020);

Rouzan v. State, 308 Ga. 894, 901 (2) (843 SE2d 814) (2020). If the 

trial court decides under the correct standard that this testimony 

was properly admitted, the trial court should re-enter the judgments 

of conviction and sentences against Garrison, and Garrison could 
45

then take another appeal challenging that ruling. See Butler, 309 

Ga. at 763-764 (2); Rouzan, 308 Ga. at 901 (2). If, on the other hand, 

the trial court decides that the testimony should have been excluded, 

then a new trial will be necessary. See Butler, 309 Ga. at 763-764 

(2); Rouzan, 308 Ga. at 901 (2).

Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.