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TOP-SECRET iii"111.1111 1cdr7

CONTROL NO. 597- 

REFERRED TO

OFF ICE

ftacalyto RELEASED SEEN BY

DATE TIME DATE m -• g MARE • OFFICE SYMBOL DATE,

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Handle Via I dicated Controls

Access to this document will be restricted to those persons

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WARNING

This decumbent centeins informatien effecting the notional security el the United States within the meaning

of the emplane,. lows U. S. Cede Title IS, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits Its transadselen or

the revelation of its contents in any manner to am unauthorised person, as well as its use in any mummer

prejudicial to the safety er interest of the United States er for the benefit of any foreign government to the

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TOP-SECRET INNOWYA.r. airame i

4rapellors ilmlomIsawres
RP-SEW

22 November 1968

For Colonel Northman

SUBJECT: Initial Thoughts on John Kirin proposed

Earth Resources Paper

First, the paper is fundamentally very good - the

issue is important - the problem is outlined adequately

and the proposed approach is generally satisfactory.

However, there are some (hopefully) constructive

remarks to mike:

1. It is probably not necessary to defend the

value of overhead reconnaissance to the eztent that is

in the paper. The paper could start with a sentence or

so asserting that satellite recce has been critically important to the U.S. and is very likely to remain so,

particularly if arms limitations agreements are considered.

I doubt that any high official of government would dispute

the assertion. If it is accepted that satellite recce is

of critical national importance, it really doesn't matter,

for this paper, what the details are, or how many flights

are required or what sort of program it is. So, the paper

can be much briefer, and need not be a defense of satellite recce.

Similarly, the issue then is not to argue that

national policy should be to avoid actions which say result

in a prohibition of the recce - no one doubts that. The

issue is what policy is best to assure our continued capability. The concern is that, among policy options, there

are some involving earth resources which may be bad. The

paper does not elucidate these well, or describe whey they

may be bad.

The fundamental issue then, not really discussed in the paper, hinges on the allegation that satellite

recce is of, at best, marginal legality. There is basis
for concern that, in an international legal forum, the U.S.

could not defend its recce activities. One possible national

policy, therefore, would be to meet the issue head on and

declare recce legal and establish that legality through open

and formal procedures. Such an option has always been open

to us and the only reason for not pursuing it is that the

best judgements available have indicated that it might not

succeed. The doubts are particularly strong when one considers that satellites are rather indiscriminate of what

country they overfly. Any small nation could insist on the

right to privacy and sovereignty and it may be quite unreasonable to provide assurances that an opposing nation

could not be overflown and photographed. There have been

many legalistic essays on this subject and the meat of them

should be in the paper.

4. If national policy,thereforel should not be to

establish legality., how can illegal but accepted activities

best continuer It is probably not possible or wise to attempt

to establish an invariant doctrine which is imagined to never

change. The important thing is to examine every proposia----

action in the light of current policy to see whether it leads

to comfortable positioii7-7fmay be that the future holds the

promise of international cooperation to include a broadly

accepted policy of satellite recce for earth resources and

for arms monitoring perhaps executed under international control. I think all of us dream of such a world and earnestly

hope that satellite recce could be a key technical contributor to a peaceful world. So, a national policy should not

be to deny such a hope. But realism dictates that national

security must be maintained while international agreements

and understandings are sought. Therefore, there should be

no attempt to establish legality of recce as an essential

"Trot part of treaty negotiation. This matter has een

'Massed well in your re-write of the policy for treaty

negotiations and the meat of that should be in this paper.

2

tOP "

ORAE41111IIIIII one
5. The foregoing therefore starts with fact

of the value of recce, estaMikhes the question of Iiiility

and concludes that national policy must, for the time being,

protect the option of continuing recce as a covert activity.

A conclusion can now be supported that "confrontation" is

undesirable. So, the heart of the problem is how to conduct

earth resources without raising the possibility of confrontation. An immediate answer is, Carefully. Any policy must

involve very careful, deliberate steps by NASA which are

checked and reviewed continuously. Mechanisms involving DOD

or DCI must exist and be enforced rigorously. Current policy

seems to be that open activities are all right if it can be

demonstrated that the photography is not of military significance. So far, whether there is danger or not, the NASA program has not raised sovereignty questions, so it is reasonable

to presume the policy is sound. Am relaxation of that policy

is dangerous and DOD should posit ii itself to oppose any

deviation. Therefore, the DOD position (and I don't see why

it doesn't include DCI, etc.) must include these elements:

Current guidelines must be maintained.

NASA may discuss an earth resources satellite program, but every program proposal

and approval must conform to guidelines.

NASA may conduct aircraft programs to

whatever extent desired permissively.

Tb provide a basis for future policy decision extensive use of TM material may be

made.

With approval of USIB, or additionalg,

specific TB coverage can be obtained

could cover U.S.)

In overlap with aircraft progrils, TS

material may be declassified or used for

charts, etc.

6. The plans and policy statements in the paper generally

do these things but it seems they could be simpler and restricted

to the points which directly affect national security without

including points that relate to NASA execution or justification.

011 u'as211111 LBW ALLEN,At.

Colonel , USAF