Filed 1/19/23 Pope v. Potts CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

ILSE M. POPE,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JASON E. POTTS,

 Defendant and Respondent.

2d Civil No. B322856

(Cons. w/ B322857)

(Super. Ct. No. VCU281949)

(Tulare County)

Appellant Ilse Pope settled a lawsuit against respondent 

Jason Potts for $350,000. In 2009, the trial court entered 

judgment against Potts after he defaulted on the first of five 

scheduled settlement payments to Pope. Pope sought to renew 

the judgment in 2020. The court clerk rejected her request as 

filed beyond the 10-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc.,

§§ 683.020, 337.5.)1 Pope then filed this enforcement action.

1 We refer to the Code of Civil Procedure unless stated 

otherwise.
2

Pope alleged her settlement agreement with Potts 

remained enforceable. The trial court tentatively sustained

Potts’ demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. It 

changed course at hearing when Pope’s counsel insisted he could

still plead a timely cause of action. The trial court granted leave 

but cautioned counsel that sanctions were forthcoming if the 

amended complaint did not present a “new or different” basis of 

recovery. The amended complaint did not clear this hurdle. The 

trial court sustained Potts’ second demurrer without leave and 

awarded $5,100 in monetary sanctions against counsel. This was 

less than the amount requested by counsel for respondent. Pope

and counsel appeals the judgment of dismissal and the order 

granting sanctions.

We affirm. The lynchpin of our ruling is cogently stated by 

Presiding Justice Turner: “‘The period prescribed in Section 

683.020 [ten years] commences on the date of entry and is not 

tolled for any reason. . . .’” (Fidelity Creditor Service, Inc. v. 

Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 201.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pope sued Potts in 2007 after she lost money in a series of 

real estate investments promoted by Potts and his associates.

2 

They signed a written settlement agreement in March of 2009

(settlement). Potts agreed to pay a total of $350,000 to Pope: 

$150,000 within 60 days, then $50,000 each year for the next four 

years on the anniversary of the initial payment. The settlement

specified that Pope to seek judgment if Potts defaulted. Potts did 

not make the initial payment. The trial court entered judgment 

against him on July 6, 2009, for “monetary damages in the sum of

2 Pope v. Potts (Super. Ct. Tulare County, 2007, No. 07-

222909).)
3

$350,000.00 plus 10% legal interest until paid in full” (2009 

judgment).

Pope collected about $112,000 from Potts over the next 

decade by way of wage garnishments. The balance remained

unpaid when she sought to renew her judgment in January of 

2020. (§ 683.110 et seq.) The clerk returned the notice of 

renewal as untimely. Pope then filed a “Complaint on Judgment” 

reciting the terms of the settlement agreement and explaining 

how Potts defaulted by failing to make the initial payment. She 

sought a new judgment for the “balance of the [2009] judgment 

that came due on May 22, 2010 and on that same date in 2011, 

2012, and 2013, together with interest from the earliest of those 

dates . . . .” 

Potts demurred to the complaint as barred by the 10-year 

statute of limitations for actions on judgments. (§§ 683.020, 

337.5.) The trial court issued a tentative ruling sustaining the 

demurrer without leave to amend. At hearing, Pope’s counsel

sought leave to file an amended complaint with additional 

allegations that would show the statute of limitations had not yet 

run. The trial court granted leave but warned that it might 

impose sanctions if the amended complaint “set forth the same or 

similar facts with the same or similar argument.” Pope’s counsel 

stated that he believed he could “come up with . . . facts and 

others causes of action” that would survive demurrer. 

Pope filed a first amended complaint containing new 

allegations about her original dispute with Potts and the reasons 

the parties agreed to settle. She alleged two causes of action. 

The first sought judgment on the four $50,000 installment 

payments. The second sought a declaration, among other things, 

that “[e]ntry of judgment on the [settlement] did not and still 

does not limit [her] remedies to judgment but also allows all 
4

remedies to remain enforceable until the [settlement] was fully 

performed.”

Potts demurred again. The trial court sustained the 

demurrer without leave to amend and granted Potts’ subsequent 

motion for sanctions pursuant to section 128.7. It found the 

amended complaint “did nothing to cure the deficiencies noted by 

the court in its ruling on Defendant’s first demurrer.” The 

amended complaint did not plead any exception to the ten-year 

rule. The trial court rejected Pope’s argument that Potts served 

his motion for sanctions improperly. Pope separately appealed

the judgment of dismissal and sanctions order. We consolidated 

the appeals for oral argument and decision.3

Order Sustaining Demurrer

We review an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to 

amend de novo, exercising our independent judgment as to 

whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law 

under any legal theory. (Villafana v. County of San Diego (2020) 

57 Cal.App.5th 1012, 1016; McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. 

(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.) We interpret the complaint 

reasonably, considering all properly pleaded material facts and 

those matters subject to judicial notice. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 

39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.

(2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.)

The trial court entered judgment against Potts on July 6, 

2009. It stated in toto: “The parties entered into a written 

agreement resolving this case. The agreement was signed by 

3 See Order dated November 7, 2022. The appeals were 

transferred from the Sixth Appellate District to this court by 

order of the Chief Justice dated August 9, 2022. They were 

originally assigned numbers F082288 (B322856) and F082883 

(B322857). 
5

Plaintiff on March 19, 2009, with Defendant, JASON POTTS 

signing on March 23, 2009. Defendant, JASON POTTS has failed 

to make any payments under the agreement. The first payment 

under the agreement was due on or about May 22, 2009. 

Defendant had until June 29, 2009 to cure this default, but failed 

to do so. [¶] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED that Plaintiff ILSE POPE shall recover from 

Defendant JASON POTTS monetary damages in the sum of 

$350,000.00 plus 10% legal interest until paid in full.” 

Pope sought to renew the judgment in 2020. This was

outside section 683.020’s ten-year period to enforce money 

judgments. The first amended complaint seeks to circumvent 

demurrer by alleging the parties did not intend to limit Pope’s

enforcement rights to statutory creditor’s remedies when they 

settled. What they may have intended when settling is not 

relevant. “When a final judgment is entered, all causes of action 

arising from the same obligation are merged into the judgment.” 

(Butler America, LLC v. Aviation Assurance Co., LLC (2020) 55 

Cal.App.5th 136, 143, citing Diamond Heights Village Assn., Inc. 

v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (2011) 196 

Cal.App.4th 290, 301.) “The judgment extinguishes the 

contractual rights of the parties and substitutes only such rights 

as attach to the judgment.” (Butler America, supra, at p. 143.)

The 2009 judgment leaves nothing open to interpretation. 

Potts defaulted on a settlement with Pope; Potts failed to cure; 

Pope could recover $350,000 plus post-judgment interest from 

Potts. The judgment does not require Pope to enforce her debt 

piecemeal as the installment payments would have come due 

each May 22. It does not incorporate the terms of the settlement 

or refer to the settlement as an exhibit. If Pope or Potts intended

this, the time to correct the 2009 judgment passed long ago. A 
6

party must seek relief from judgment taken “through his or her 

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” within a 

reasonable time, but “in no case exceeding six months” after 

judgment is taken. (§ 473, subd. (b).) A decade has passed.

Assuming for the sake of argument the settlement 

remained enforceable independently of the judgment, any cause 

of action in contract has likewise expired. (§ 337, subd. (a) [fouryear limitations period applies to “[a]n action upon any contract, 

obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in 

writing”].) The settlement contains no provision waiving the 

statutory limitations period. (§ 360.5 [“No waiver shall bar a 

defense to any action that the action was not commenced within 

the time limited by this title unless the waiver is in writing and 

signed by the person obligated”].) The first amended complaint’s 

invitation to consider intent and implication contravenes the 

integration clause, which describes the settlement as the “entire, 

final and binding understanding between the parties.”

Sanctions Award

Section 128.7, subdivision (b)(2) requires attorneys and 

unrepresented parties to certify that “claims, defenses, and other 

legal contentions” contained in their court filings “are warranted 

by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 

modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of 

new law.” “[T]he trial court retains the discretion, upon the 

finding of a violation of [section 128.7,] subdivision (b), to 

determine whether a sanction is warranted in the first instance; 

and, if so, the type and amount of sanctions warranted.” 

(Kojababian v. Genuine Home Loans, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 

408, 422.) We reverse only if the court’s abuse of discretion 

amounts to a miscarriage of justice. (Ibid.)
7

Counsel’s zealous advocacy earned his client a second 

opportunity to plead her case. The trial court cautioned counsel 

to “present something new or different” or risk sanctions. The 

subsequent pleading, however, simply ornamented the same 

flawed theory of recovery and did not allege why the ten-year rule 

was not applicable. No amount of even “artful pleading” can 

circumvent the ten-year rule of section 683.020. There was no 

miscarriage of justice in granting of sanctions in favor of a party 

compelled to indulge his opponent’s repackaging of meritless 

claims. Counsel’s duty of zealous advocacy must on occasion 

yield to their duties to the court. The line counsel must walk is 

sometimes narrow. (See Pacific Trends Lamp & Lighting 

Products, Inc. v. J. White, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1136 

[sanction statutes “were crafted by the Legislature to strike a 

balance between competing interests: the need to control 

improper litigation ‘tactics’ and the desire to avoid chilling 

vigorous advocacy”].) 

CONCLUSION

Judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs 

on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
David C. Mathias, Judge

Superior Court County of Tulare

______________________________

Herr Pedersen & Berglund, Leonard C. Herr , Ron Statler

and Monica Rast, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Wanger Jones Helsley, Oliver W. Wanger and Steven M. 

Crass, for Defendant and Respondent.