r ' • 

MEMO ROUTING SLIP 

I llAllE OR Tm.I 

Oll8AlllZATION AND LOCATION 

I 

DA1E 

.. 

CDORDlllATION 

FILI 

INFORllATillll 

NB:ElllARY 

ACl'ION 

·NOTE AND 

RETURN 

SElE Ill 

-~ 

ursuant to E. 0. 1352 
REF ID:A65642 

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•... 

H EA D QUA RTE RS /I If I} 

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND 

TTD .AI'O 1?8, US .~rmy 

21 July 195Lf.. 

SUBJECT: Reliability of Communications (UNCLASSIFIZD) 

TO: C~b.ief 

National Se·curity Agency Europe 

lil?O 757, US Ar-;ny 

1. The inclosed copy of the briefing presented at the Commander 

in Chiefs 1 conference held at this Hee.dq_uarters on 24 June 1954, 

is fonre.rded for your information and retention. (U!TCLASSIFBD) 

2. The Joint Working Group, mentioned in Part VII, has been 

establiehed by separate correspondence. (UNCLASSIFIED) 

1 Incl: 

C:py 1$ of J3r:i,.efing on 

Reliability of Communications, 

dtd 24 Jun 54 

Tp: des Loges 8271 

J •. lr~ 7ilE~ Rear Admiral, US :navy 

Director, Communications....Electronics 

TOP SECRE:T 

IEGRAD~~!:~§~!!.~-~Q_­

SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INctOSURES. 

NSA EUR# 1210 as -v--

COPYLOFLCOPIES 

PAGE / OF / PAGES r- --- ..._,.....___ 
REF ID :A65.i42 ' e ... ,,. .. ~ ........... I"- .. ~t"-'Ki:I 

.. .· 

2l,. June 19.54 

J'il!r I. Ih"TOOl>m!l!lOB: 

In recant months, as 10u gentleaen are aw.re, there has b9en a gi:o¥111g · . concern. about the dt:lpend.llbil1t7 of C'ert:lin u.s. ud 'AJ.l:i;e~ Military Communis tions ill. War. The Soviet• e auccnEB in Jamming the VOA an'\ otlh.ar. 19.dio 

'broacic&.1t1 mil been well Jmown. for aoma time. But anl;v i.,leJ.i· haa there 

been. a p~par apprecia.tion ot the mil1ta1'1' 01mpl1ca.tiema of Soviet Jamming . . . I 

Capabili~ies. fa are now bagizm.inc. ~o 2'81111•• tJJat the7 1'9.11'9~ent &" aerio~s 

danger 1D the &JJ2roa~ing ea ot .lltomic l'a:rf'a.ra, when :reU.a.,le. co~icatio:r..a 

will become .Ora .. tmil. ever -a vital naceaaitt. ~ f1811AC•· ot aubveraive 

actiOna is also lc>omlJ'.g la.qur, ainc11 not onlJ' my thel'··diarupt our esaentia.l · 

Janel line t:ommnnicnt:Lona, but •7 .. alea ~DI' ua the naed'd 'back-a.p for our vtal.-

-!lo•riLble ·adio circuits. J:a.d 1D addi~ion, the d1aparll8.l and mobilit7 <?f 

torcea neoesaa~- tor defense ap1nat . .&tom1c attack' can Dnl.7 further compl1 '°"te 

the p:robl• ot •:l.nto.~i.DC oammWJ.ica tiona. ( BIBll!) . . . 

. · •e c1o not ·~·- that ,theaa dangara JlOV 1D v:l:ev are ·ina111"1lOWJ.teble ._ !fe are'caal14ma.t thllt ::l.n time adequate taclm:lcal mean• tar dealiq v:i,th them · 

~111 be tounn • l:tut it is 1mparte...nt to mderatand: that auch· maana are not 

a:vail.li.bJ.e ~nor are the7 in ear~·. proa-pect. 'lintil the7 &l'e,the least t1'..:it · 

~ be dona ia to recognize tmi threatn 'f:LD.C. to p~JBN jti"" ~eal with :liha:a aa 

"peat we can. Accord1ncl.J',thia briefing has been prepa.red, with three 

ob.1aat1Tea· in m1nd: (918111!) · · · · . . . . . a. ·11rat, to review the factors which ha"i'a za1Bed concern aa to .the · raliabil1t7 ot·ou~ mllitar7 communiaatiozw. (~9111!') 

I • • 

b. Second·, to. e:mmine the. various actinna beiDc taken to m::l.n:lm.ize .. 

1:he dancere. (liSBB!) · " · • 

c. Third, to con~ide~·what ~dltio.aal meaa.U.a can n~ be tall:en.{SSC~i!) 

·. 

PABT· lI •. iACXGll>tJL'D: ... 

A.a a \MLaia far canaidering . th.a wlnaabili-t;r of aU.~ comunicationa, 

the following background 1nfm-:mat1on 11 aiptticant: ('!ef' 9ill81mf) · .. . . . ·. . .. . . . . .. 

a. J'irat, ~ study aanductaci ~or the TeJ.,eaom.nuniCa.t1aha .Advisor to She 

Preai;iant brought out the follow1~ ts.eta.: :C mP 688&!; · · ·. v . 

(1) ~ USSR and the SO"f'::i.at .dloc ha.a an efficient elec.,tronic . . 

J&111111Dc organizatia:a which ~ ·~t1lize a mJor pozit!cm of ~600 tzalllllllittaa tor: - Jamming purpoaaa. ( !l!eP Bl8Bld!1 . . . 

· (2) :.11ctt-hwldr80. and a:lchtt {aao) alectl'O:uic .;lammera.are .CU!"rentl.7 

in uaa b7 thaSaviet Bloc api:uat the· VOA. :eac ~ fuid at~r ps7cholog1ca.1 , w.:rf'are brQ&cloaata. Soma of these a.re repartee.. to exceed. & million w.tts in 

power, (.~ .. &el!Jf) · . · · ,,. . ·: ... - .. - .: ,. . .. : . ":' : . 

(J) US Militar71 Cl'Dllllarc~· l", ond Oki.l qencias c11rnnt~· empl~J' 

appr~xillatdl.7"400 zadio tl'BJ!Ullll1tte.rs in hif:h fre~uenCT poi~t-to-po1nt 

."intematiom:tl· aenica. · (MP SB61EllT) . · · · 

(4) The ceot;ia.pq of the world· aik:es the lJS pLrtiaulliJ"ly T"..i.1n.e rabla ta'lol1€-C~1stenca.electre11&glietic warfer~ with the SoTiet Bloc. On the other 

band, thP. Sovitltl can DBin.tai:u OllOE:nti.61 COl!llDUnicationa entirely over JJ:md, 

Ul!iDC ~O!:!bina:U~na cf long IQl.d sh'1rt length. c1ri:a1t1 r.,:na. alter.nrtte routine.· 

(!SP Si8Bfi1!) ' . 

m :mccwS4/SER1 000473 

,. 0 . r (' r,; c .. ~- ~= J". .... ; .. . ... 

·. 
• 

-¥F ,,IJ;> :~q;>~4$ 

' lt:: J , 0 L \... t" !.. ! 

b. Second, a study of the vulnerability of u.s. Military communications 

e...,.uipment to jamming hae re.cently been completed by a technical research, 

organization, under an .Air Force contra.ct. As a rel!lult of the st~.y. the 

general conclusion was reached thfit no· communic.:~ tions cil-c11i t ·a.tilizing · 

present ·day equipment is jamproof, and thBt there ie no un1v~rsal "black· 

poxn (or cure) which will alleviate this con~ition. Furthermore~ there is , 

a firm req11irement to. plan for futur.e ja:mming by educ.a.ting ill personnel ir~ 

the proper selection of-type ·of transmi·ss1ons, equipment· to be used, and 

-proper ope:re.tin5 techniques. {~eP Btl6:BET) 

c. Third, intelligence estimate~ on Commll!list ·infiltl'l;tion in the 

. :pat1onal communications monop:>liee (or PTTs) ~ndicate :that, pa.rticularly in 

~ranee, the sabo~age of th~ PTT system is well within th~ capability of the 

Communist Party. In li'ra.nce, reliable estimates indicate tlJRt an oirerall .· 

~vera,ge of 11,~ of thepersonnel ·of the PTT is infilt~te.i by the Communist-.· 

dominated Labor Union, the CGT. In some departments of l!'ra.nce, pa.rticular).y 

in the ::Bordeaux area, the PTT is. dominated by this Labor Union. The threat 

to· comm\Ulica.tions is not necessarily limited to Communists wit.h the PTT, 

~r·course. It ~s estiuated that through.out France there are 50,00Q to 

ioo,ooo CoLmunist militantsi additionBl support might be expected from amcng 

the 600,000 other·-. Communist members and the approximately 5,000,000 French 

~itizens ..rho indorsed the Communist Pe.rty. in the June 1151 elections. Man,v of ou;r communications lines run .through areas of ~j_gh Communist density, 

where between l/J and 1/6 of the population voted ·Communist in 1951. · (TO!' SE6Ri~'f) · · ·. . . 

d. .Fourth, last year's general str.ikes. in FI9.~ce resulted in serious 

disruption of· communicatjons. Land line facilities, where not lost due to 

the· strikes:-, gradually deteriorated due to lack of maintenance, a.nd it was 

necessary ·to establish military radio circui.ts a.cross }!'ranee to insure 

commun1ca.tJ.on.s down the LOC. Under emergency. conditions, the active.tion of 

large numbers of reserve circuits would greatly increase the d1fficu;tties 

in ev~nt· of a walk-out. ("!L'OP mseB!l'-) 

e. F:j.fth, the ,land line facilities in '.festern aussia and in certain 

satellite areas h.."'lve und.ergone considerable, development and extension sincoC> 

'ihe end of World War ·II. ~4 reover,. progressive· introduction of VHF and U'.dF 

communications' in those areas is making the Sovie-ts less··. dependent on _BF 

and MF radio and thus less vulnerable to retaliation in any jamming effort. 

('!9P BEe!ET) 

PA.RT III. JCS-SG ACTIONS: 

Concern l'tith reliability of communicr.•tions by Senior Military authorities 

both of the US and o"f NATO 1 has been developing over the IE-Si; three years. 

In late 1951, the JCS, in approving a report OD safeguart:l.ing .allied longdista.nce wireless communications, determned that positive st·eps hacl tq be 

taken to minimize the effect of -possible enemy jamming of strategic communi-

. cations. In dire.ctives to the Servtces, the JCS requested early action on 

certnin technical measures, on developing alternate routing for meesage 

cournunications, and in training programs. In addition,··they directed joint 

S~rvic.e actions. invo1Vill6 sec~ri t_y .measu.res 1 . COUrier .. .sertriCclS, 1 an<l .the - . 

C.evelopment of joint procedures for alte~te routing of traffic ·over··military 

circw.ts.· .tlnd, based on the i"ntelligence information a.t the time, tI:ie JCS 

1.:.oncJ.i:•ded. th:.:it tha Russiar.s had the cc:1pacity in "tra.i:q.ed personne:i.., equipme:it, 

and organization to jam .~rtaiq long distP.nce radio commu..~ication~ circuits 

as well as the cepabili ty to disrupt submarine cablas ~i the.r by sabotage or 

l:lilita_ry operations •. (~SlKi'f) 

3y mid J.9.5.'3, the .;cs ~cl re-assessed the Soviet Jammi11g C-9.?J.bility based 

on e:x:perien.~fl of Soviet jair.r.ung ~fforts a~ainst the VOA antl similar actiYities 

aE well as 011 intel_lieent::e ::.nd special ;:itudies. As a result, a JCS directive,. 

Co:py of ____ Copi-::is 

S · t ' ... ~ i; c T Page_2_or 10 .Pages 
• 

. , 

.. 

dated 28 JuJ.y, was promulgated to ·commanders of unified and JCS specified 

commands. This p:;lper concluded, from a ·review of the Soviet Jamming 

Capability, that all U.S. long-?B.nge high frequency radio circuits ara T~lrierable to a dangerous ~egree. Therefore, the use of certain plannill6 . 

::iss111nptions and certain planning :i:tems in current and fu_ture opera.tl.onal 

Qomunications plans was directed. Specific assumptions to ·be utilized, in 

addition' to that of the aforementioned Soviet capability are as follows: 

(TO? 

. S!:ClttT) . 

a. First I the geographical lo·ca.tions of all us vita.l commtini"ca~ion 

ter~inals are.known to the USSB. ~f0P SB0Iful!) 

. b. Second, the US capability of maintain,i.ng any HF radio co~unicatio:ris 

to, from, and within overseas areas is considered negli~ible. (TOP SilC!t!!) · 

c. Third, tactical radio coa1111wiications,including VHF and UHF in 

geographical proximity ta" the So\'"iat :Bloc Orbit, must be considered vulner:-:ble, . ~i'~ SB6Kb'l') , .· 

Q. Fourth,. until all-out war is imminent, the Sovi~ts will not initiate 

large scale strategic communica.t ions or .navigational aiC. jamming, unless 

this action can be cloaked by legal or quas~-legal justification. (!l'GP SBSP:E~j 

e. F~fth. The Soviets will initiate such ~aD'II!i!l§·just prior to and 

during ·fu.:n-scal.e war. 

Further, specific fa"ctore which must be considered in" plannint;, are: 

(1) First, the :possibility that subordin.a.te comma.nds :ciuet. be able 

to operate-for extended periods in accor~nce with approved· plans. a~d doctr•~es 

without radio contact with higher authority. (!O! SE6'.!M.!) _ · . . 

(2) Second, rout"ing of important communications by messenger,. 

helicopter, and aircraft. ('!OP B~6Hb!i. 

(J) Third, traininb of radio communication personnel in all phasc3 

of defense against jamming. (W9P s~eR:ir ) 

Finally, in more recent JCS papers, we find that a :Fjuropean exe~cise, 

involving simulated jamJ:ii :g, was planned for June 1954, anC. was appa_rently 

intend~d as a pirt of an overall JCS program for extending anti-jamming 

t"raining of command and co~tmicat_ions personnel through periodic exercises 

on strategic inter-theat·er ·circuits. We are awaiting further informtion qn 

this s11bject. (WQP S!l81Bii:E) 

On the MA.TO side, in a inee.ting of the Standing Group in January .1954, 

the US repre_sentative expresseQ. himself at· length on the weaknesses of llATO 

commwiicatl.or..s. Subsequently 1 a Standi.ng Group Directive to SACEUR1 SA.CIA.NT, 

and the Channel Committee was forwarded in l!'ebruaey. Each addressee is 

. req_11ired to review hi~ military communications at all echelons, and consider. 

all ~\'1;1pccta an9- all defects, regardless of cause, or of the k.11own possj.bility 

·of el ... mtnation of tlie·weaknesses. Speed, flexibility, security,reliability, 

and yulne-rv..bility, including vuJ.nera."bility .o£ communic;:c.ttons systelllS operated 

by no~-military orga..~izations (in oth0r wo~ds, thePTTs) &re to be considered. 

t f6P SH8mii') . 

Shift-i~ to the ·:i::ur6pean Th.::a.ter, we note thc1.t S.AC3UR 1 s Emergency Defense 

Plan, c:.s we).l as his Atomic Strike Plan nnd SOP. goveming atomic strike 

reG_uests, r;.re dependent upon completely reliahle cor:u::r.11nicntions for their. 

im.ple1uenta.t:i.on. ·.As an Interna.t~orial Comma~der., ·s.l.CZUR is, o:!' course, not r.;bliged 

to ac\!ept the JCS plauning assumptions and pl•=m 11ing .. factors with respect to 

Soviet Jallilning Capa.bilit7. lfor can he openly qui?s.tion the· re·liability of 

spec.;_fic nation.al PTT f::1.cilities. Navert~eless, his actions have baen 

T 0 P COPY. of Copies 

Page_..i.__:_of_lQ_Page s 
-· 

ge~erall.y consistent with the /CS views. ~SE9:Ri!l'f) 

First, Several pertinent Communications-Electronics PolicY. Directives 

and Instructions have been prom11lgated within A.llir~d Command Europe. .These 

point out the necessity.for defense against enemy jair.1Ding, and lal' do~lll 

oertain guiding prin~iples. SACiUR's Subordinate Commanders, at all levels, 

have been directed to analyze the vulnerability of their communications 

~yete:ns to jamming, to redu.cc :reliance on radio communicati~ns, and to provida 

for continued normal co.nduct of operations durill6 periods \'1hen cornmunic<1tio;.1s 

.cleans a.re 1hsrupted. Further·,· the Subordinate Cor.uia.'lders he.ve been· directed 

to emphasize training in all phases of defense against jamming. As to 

ph,ys-ical secu.zity, SH..\P".i: has promulgated policy directiv.es setting forth. com1J?...ntL 

~sponsibilities for establishment of safeguards for commu..~ications-electror.i~~ 

installations. .'"111 of t.."'lese polic:, C.:.irectives a:id instructions ar.e, ·of course,. 

currently· applicable only within the NATO· chain of command, but efforts are 

b~ing mE\de to obtain national approval° and. to broaden their :-:i.ppllcabilj.ty 

~hra~o\lt NATO :i!lurope. (Si!10HB'f) . 

Second, pursuant to the Standing Group review Directive, SACJ!;UR has c9n-

~ened a Working Group of representatives of SHAPZ and the NATO Subordinate 

Commands to ·.n:ake a comprehensive survay of SACEU:B1 s ·communicstion Ei tuation.· 

.iiiach Subordinate Co.:1mc·muer was req\leeted. to provide, by June 1st, an .ana.lys is . 

of the CE!pability of. hie aesigned and earma.rk:ed communi.c:=·tions elements to 

effect;i.vely iclplement the .L.imergency liefense Plo.n and to zupport acti·ve · 

operations for the first 90 &l.ys of emerganc;r_. ·The reports were .~leo to · 

include studies for each COl,U'J,try within th~ respective comm.~nd areas, indicating 

major communicati .. ons .,.,ea.knesses •. ~ltl!.iT) 

·.Third, S.lCEUR has re'2:w;'eted EMCCC to m.."'1.ka a specific survey of the vulnerability to sabotage of .communications· syr,te:ns controlled and/or opera:ted 

by-non-military organizations (i.e., the PTTs). The EMCCC report, when 

completed, will become a :part of the S.lCEUR overall review of his co~munications system. (SEClli:IT) 

PART V: US Cllf(}j;;UR ..lCTIOlJS: 

The re.liability of communications "".1ithin the US BUCOM area.' has meanwhiJ.e 

received the attention of US CI~CEUR, particul.e.rly in connection with assigned 

~1m~ misuons and implement.;·tion of JCS emergency planniDg directives. · · 

·The following specif;ic actions h8.v·e baen take~: · 

a. First, ~n a policy directive to all Subordinate Commands, US 

CLNC~UR su.mmii.rizetl the situation, and in ~neral, prescribed that the JCS 

pl.an~in~ assUClptions and planning factors would govern current and future 

operE• tl.onal communications planning. in the US .... ·UCOM .. lrea. This policy has 

been written into the Communications-i.lectroni.cs .Annexes· to the US :i:.UCOM 

Joint l!:mergency :var. Plan and to its supplementary US Contingency Pl.a.n.(TOl' SE616!l'f) 

b. Sec.ond, Subordinate Command Communica.tione-Electronics Plans, a.s ir:ell 

as othell Communice-tions-.i:.lectronics. Pl~.n-s , .. have .been reviewed in torm.s of 

~ommu:::i.ca.tions reli.abilitY, provided, i::.nd i::'I. the light of the p~P.Ecribe.:' 

pla.1:1-nL1g fa.ctors. To .cite an example, the SACEUR Atomic Strika Plan, ·which 

require-a the rapii:l a.nd reliable transmission of a series of mes so.gee, would., 

in mny cases, d~pend· 12pon the availability of' reliable· high frequency radio. 

The .effect of the new planning assu."!iptions ht'!.s b'een pointed out, a.!ld the pJ.ans 

have been modified in some respects. However, in tl\ll'. opinion, furt1~er CO~l1n.l.~ 

iatione planning is required to insure the .~eliable se'rvice needed. 

cTOP SDerlfilr) . . 

c. Thi:=:ci., US .CI~iCi-~UR rec:J.ested the Subordinate· Co;:.ma.nders to forw;:.i.rd • - • .. •• I' • 

reports on a\~tions either taken or ·planned within th1'.!ir comr::ands. US CiirnLUR 

pointed.· to certain iiil!llediate· and long-range mt:a.eures whj.ch would minimize 

the effect of enemy jamming, and,. in the light of prcscr:lb~d :planning 

,.,, ... ,. ... 1-, r . • 

.:.,__5 :;,_ ·.- · .. '-· ~ Copy: ____ , of Copiee 

Paga 4. of_lO_P~gas. 
• REF ID:.A65642 f6"' ,.. ... ~ ... ,.. ...... r' .)CC .• Kt I 

assumptions anc factors, req~ested each Commander to m.:"lke a survey of his 

commu.nicf'tions s·i~uation. Specifically r~qui.red were those operational, 

proceaural, technical, and tra.inin6 measures which each CommEinder had taken, 

or had planned to m~nimize the susceptibility of his coomunications to enemy 

~ttack. In addition, each Commander w~s required tQ list those important 

ra.dio .comm.u.nicstions wi11ch he. regarded as vulnerable and for which adeqUa.te 

protection o·r rell.e.ble back-up communier:>tions had not been or could not be 

provided. Finally, in the l~ght of this information, each CoDmander was ae~ed 

~o provide a general eetimate of his.present·ability to :caintain the 

essential communications ·required to carry out his aseigned tasks in current · ·em~rgency plans. ('f'E>P M:61tffi' ~ 

d. Fourth, tha JCEC of the. JCS was asked to provia.e a· summ.::.ry of the 

latest information on ~ei=artmentai actions in ~eveloping specific ~nswers to· 

1ihe jar.11D.ing threat, with parti'cular reference to ·measures applicable to 

qolIIIilunications. to anCI. witl:Li~ the US 1UQOM area. In response, the JCBC has 

provicied the following inf.ormat-ioil:. ('f'ef'. ·s;&eml!i') '. 

(l) Fir~t, ·the Serv~ces a.re. continuing efforts to ·prov"ide alternate 

routes between g:;i.ven points so that essential· services can be main'f;ained even 

ff one or J:!!Ore paths is lost. ~~SP fa.16RS'f') 

(2) Second, the application of new ionospheric and tropospheric 

saa.tter techniques to ·long-ra.nge commwiications is being ·ez:ploited to. the 

.uia:x:imum e:x:t.ent practicable. · Specifically, a circuit frorJ Limestone, Maine, 

~o Thule, Grce.nland, is working satisfactorily, 'and oth~r experimental 

tjircuits from the U.S. to Great ::Britain by way of Iceland, and by way of the 

4zores~ have ·been authorized. The usefulness of these new techniques, though 

~imited, is promising. (~or SB6Hl!l!i') 

(J) Third, the US Military is suppo~t~ng the.installation of submarine cables by va.rious commercial concerns. One high-capacity Tl'.ansAtlantic ca.bie from the U,S. to Great :Britain is expected .to be completed in 

l.956 and another in -19.57. ('i'OP · SB6RE'f') 

(4) Fourth, research and development prQjects directed at improve-

.:uent of eC!_u1paent. design and more effective raciio propagation are being 

pushed. (~e:P SijQH!J'l') · 

. . (5) Fifth, in-the· related field.of electronic warfare, JCS direct-ives, 

. which are long overdue, will soon be issued to develop capabilities .to 

~mploy ele.ctronic countermeasures against all categorias of SoviE.rt :Bloc 

electronic devices. ·Meanwhile,. US Cil~C.i!iUR has ·issued interim directives in 

the Joint .l!imergency War Plan. These will al!"O be in-eluded in the Joint · 

Capabilities Plan now under preparation at this headquarters. (WO~ Sl!l01S!i') 

P.d.Rr VI: SU.dOlill!li.A.·~ .CQt.'.IM.U-.i"D ACTIOl-IS: 

. neports on-vulnerability to jam.raing hav~ no~ been received from e&c..~ 0f 

the Subordinate· commanders • .As might be expected, the ·reports refl~ct the 

thfferences .i~ the colillllunicoiions problems of ·ea.ch of the Se:i-.rices·, which 

result _from their respective missions. The following is .e. sum;r.nrY. of the 

important sections of th"' individl.Wl sE~rvica reports, wit.h particular ernphl::sis 

on the· overall estimate of e.:;.ch service ca.pabili ty of maintainii:lg essentia.l 

~ommunica.tions requ:i.re.d for emergency tasks: (!ef' Si!iSBl!l!P) 

CHiCUSAHEiUR, in his report :providf. s .il detailed D.Dal.7sJ.• o.f his 

essential -commun1cr,.t1ons 1 broken down i:-i.to four ·categories, 1:uid. in~icataf> ';;he 

various :types of com,mun:t.c.•:.tione at his dispQefll for ei"ch category. These 

ca tegones a.re: (£OP Seffiil'f) · 

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T 0 ,_, SE·nPET .(.., .... . 

(1) First - Con1mwucations along the LOC; (~CJ? st:l6RB!) 

(2) Second - .d.i-my Group Oorr.mand an~ lateral c.omounict:;t_ions i (WQP SB0Bi!I!~ 

(J) Third :... Sev;;nth Army' Comcand communicci.tions,. including comuniQf!tions to the Area Commnds 'until· non-combatant evacuation is. complete.d9 .L!J.!OP i .. 1GRl!1!") · . . · . · 

, . . . ( 4) Fourt~ .:. uSalt:'lUl?: cominunic.J tions, ·provi d.etl by the A.rP.~ Cour..a:nd 

~nd·Administri-1tiyc Ne~work (or:AC..lN), witP ~he ~ept of the Army, ~nd · 

princip.:i.l US Commands in .l.!illl"ope, North Africa, and the.Middle li.ia"st.· ('i'OP SB6Ri!l!~ 

~n general, except along the LOG 1 t!k CrnCUSAREtJR analysis indicates con·· 

Sl~erable dependence on· a:B' radio, And particularly,. fo·r lower echelon Arm;t 

uni ts I both HF and VHI' :field r<Jdio pl.8.y aP, 'a,ssential rol~ I especially when. 

· ·positions are rapid~· changing. In the case of a~C"1ored and a ir-gro~d opei:-at ions, :radio is.the only means.pf electriCB:l COI:II!lun~ca.tionsw('i'OP Bi16:Hl!l'i'~ . Civil and land lines ~i.re extiJnsively used at presr:nt 1 and war pl,.-'lns cs ll 

for acti~tion of n~erous·rcserve circuits. Along the !DC, dependence on 

: these lines Will b°" somewb.;;.t le.ssened With ·the CO:mplet·ion of the Jl.rmy-.1i..i.r 

.Foret: radio rela.)'~ system across France,, the .Army p~rtion of which will be in 

:litd.ted ·operation next month and:be completed by· the end of 1954. Among the 

other protective measures being taken.is· the movement this ye~r of the· F.ain · 

tape relay center; wi:th associated HF facilities,· from·Heidelberg to Pir:nesens 

Area·, west of the Rhine.·· Furtlier, current plane call for the. transfer of 

these activities to the· Orleans area in time of emergency or ·.,,1ar. ('!'eP ffiileitl!l~!(:• : I • • ' 

CI?JCUS.c'l..1:1EUR' s conclusions with respect. to l!l:.'lintaining e seential communi--· 

cations are generally :;is follows:· ('i'OP Sj,~l&'i') 

. . a. With respect to the LOC, essential co.ct!lunications can be mintained 

Un.C.er present con1htions, onl;r if' sabotage to civil circuits i6 minol,". On 

compl:::tion of the.radio relay system a.cross :i!'ra.'nce, this system,.with suppo.".'·t-

- ~ng mii.i ta.ry wire and cable' . will .provide essential LOC communications I ~'ll~ss" 

there is coneideroble ·sabotage. Mail and messtlnger serv.ice w.ill be used as 

· :reqt1ired. · ..(11'91? Sileftt~ · • 

b. With respect to 4rr.:JY' Group Cq.:nmand re,quirement;.s, comm'unicatlo.!ls Crul. 

be maintained, except to :Berlin where, of course,· no electr'ical comm.uni-. . 

cations can be assured. Late~l com.ci.~·11cations will be dependent upo.n civil. 

lane lines and messenger. ~'i'ef'. Sfi~llii:iT) 

.. c. \/ith respect. to Seventh l.a.r'Ir',:Y requirements, minimum. essential communications to Seventh .d.rm.v uni·ts ca,n be 1Dc:'l.intained in forward areas by maximum 

utilization of availr:i.bl~ civil· 1and lines ·and mili·ta.r,y -,.rire, a.nd i.'1 rear 

aree.s by both. fixed and tnctical ·radio relay systems,· plus available land 

lines. In·some cases, m.e$senger se!'V'ice will ~e necessary. Air-ground 

com:.:iunications cann9t be assu;red in forward aref.s •. For the critical }'lt"'riod 

d11ring non-combatant evacuation, CIIiCUS<i.REUR estim.tes that minimum. essenti.al 

comi.1u..'l.ications to ;.frea Coi;-.mands oo.n b~f maintained by· use of the fixed. radt.:. 

relay system, available land line,. and mes'sengcr.· (!FOP 6B8!i'J]!f') 

d. vii th respect to the .ACA.N:, eE:=f:ntial comn1unicatj.~,1:.s to the Uri.it c.d. 

St~tes cen be maintained orily 'if interI:uption of civil ·J~--~1d l.ines llnd of 

submarine :ct-~bles is minor •. lf these facilities are lost~ couri.er service will 

be rcq11ired from TA.pe Relay Centers .::ither to cableheads pr to the u.s, J~CA?l 

co11UD.unication.s to Turkey, Grecco ~ and lJorth ".Africa are ·expected to be 

negligible. AC.."-lN Communications to Continental !luropea.n ...... reas 1 in CINCUS .. ~m:un:a 

esti~ate, ·can ba completely djsrupted only by such wide-s~read s~otage that 

re-ro11t.i!lg 1~ :i.opossible. (~QP :~;aeran•) · · 

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In this connection, CI.NCUS.tl.HE"Ull,· in his latest ~1ergency .Plan~ aesume s. 

for the first three mont~s of the war, a l~ co~bat loss of civil commu.nications used by the ~ilitary, and a sabotage loss which varies from 2o.' in 

l!'ranct:) and Italy to· lqG in 'Germ-'.'iny and ,s~.;, in Spain and the U.A:. .U l~ loss 

of militar.Y. wire facil~ties to sabotage is assumed throughout the Theater. · i, 'feP ~eRh!l') 

b. NELM: 

CINCtfELMt s report is prue.rily conct:rned with RF rac.io conin1ur..ica.tion, 

since Naval Forces necessnril.y place ·a higher dcgrf;le of reliance on liF radio 

than do other.Servicee. Naval.Forces do not operate an extcn~ive land line Or r:.>.diO re]:..~• notWOrk in Overseas areaf? I bUt NlY. as necessa1')"' On lines. 

leased from an ~llied Gov~rnment or used in coii.1unction with other US ServicE~­

Responsibility for protecting such' li:i(:s is norimll.y tha.t o.f :mothi.:;r agency. 

CiNONELM advises that study is continuing with a .view to prep:.ring his ]'orcss 

fpr the conduct .of open tions without the high Q.cgrce of reliance on BF rndio 

heretofore employed. (TOP SBSR!il'f) 

Various ~oth;~r m.c~asures ba.ve 'bcen,or are being underta.ke:-i. .. \side· froz1 

technical a.ctions, common to all th~ SJrvi'ces,. euch as in1:u1ring. pr~per · 

antennas, fre: .1.ucncies,· opti"mum equipment operations, ~tc., th·.:: following 

items of more gen.::ral interest reflect current thinking: {'i10F 5:88m'l1') · 

· ( l) First, training:· CINCN'.iilLM reports some proe,~ess in anti-jr:i.mming 

t:raining, r which is to be ex~'lnded, pa.;rt:i:clll.arly in manual Ci. operatiqn. 

ciNCR:ilLM has reeommende~ to·N.~To authorities.that at least a portion· of the 

n~xt large N.~TO Naval :hero::ise in. the ll.editerranean be con~.ucted entirely on 

~nual Clf to i:p~omote operator t:ra·inine; .and to evaluate abilit,i to handle 

traffic by this !ilethod. In a.C.4.ition, CIBCBILM has proposed. that 'pre"'ilrra.ngo.d 

•Minhlize•· procedarcs to redu.ct!: electrical communic.-=-tions on Short not-ice · 

si1ould be adequ.-:i.tely: tested during the next large Ni~TO Naval Exercise. 

( 1'0'.E" SIJCI&il!) ' 

· (~) Second, maii and courier s€1rvice: Considerable thought is beJ!Jg. 

given .to assuring adequate service fo! -wa~ime, and in addition, th~ curr~nt 

ci1'iC!l"'ELM wo.r plan requires each Task :?orce Ooinm:>.nder to set 1J.p a. Task Force 

C~u.rier Service. Du.ring tho last i:r..:..TO ITaval Exercise in the Medit.erra.nean, 

s9me message traffic was actually diverted from electrical :Jeans to mail nnd 

eou.rier with at least acceptable rE:EUlts,·.and for the next li~'ro ·Naval 

.Exercise, CINCl-lELM has recommended periods- of enfor.ced radio blackouts. on all. 

HF circuits. (!Of SBBHlil!) · 

in the light of the.JCS directives, CINCNELJ.l considers th~t all his HF 

radio circuits are vlll.nora.ble ·and lacking a.deqUa.te protectior.. Sixt-ean of 

twenty-four circuits now in use are cl~ssad as~ cesential. Be considers 

· ~·~e r..orma.1· peacetime back-up af one HF circuit. by another BF circiut to :havEi 

b~t.:n l.lliminatod_ b~ .tht: JCS di,rcctives. ('!f'.6P a~e!fi!l'f) 

CIHCNELM bes cons-ide?'t~d the JCS.assumptions ind1vid1Z1.l]¥ in dovelopin~ 

a. ge:nc:ra.l t::stl;na.tG of his ability to rxnntain essential communications to 

~rry 011t a.ss.L,,;n?·d ~m.crg..:ncy tasks. {'*19P SB0U1'f) · . · · 

• I • ' 

u.. !l.'h.:i first JCS a.ssu.mption,.that . Hi' commU...'li'co.tions in, to, o~ . fro~1-.· 

overseas are::a. ~nnot, for a.11 practical purpoe;;.;s, · b.::. conE,;~l.::rL~d. fi..a.siblo in 

war., is coni:;id0red b;r CINGNELM to L.;a.d loe;icaliy to thu ti1ird u.G.sumptio:i, 

tnat contemplated op~rations should net rcrl.y qn long-ra."'l.g'C radio CODl!llUJJ.icatio11s. 

The ~ffoctof thcs~ two asswnptions, says ClNClr':.:!l.M, is serious but not fatal. 

·with ·a partial solution lYi.ng~ ~t les.c;t. initially., in t~e use of ccrtn~n st~ple 

.measures, coupled with moderately ruv:i.sed C:;;mmand c:oncc.pts. ..:..mong tb.oao 

measures is the implome:ritation, in nctua1· operations, of pro-arrang:?d. wor~~·11.g. 

I•:l!"Ocod•U'os to r~duc..:r:: comri.1uJucations t!'affic by olcctrica 1 m-:.:ans and to cor::<·ort 

such traffj,c. to r:ia:i:l arid courier service. Thtisc proccduNs al!".::aa:f exist and 

hav.::: actually been c.i:i:plqyed on one o~casion or anoth0r; now, however, Ra.val 

l!'orc:es are faced with the possibility that ·each e;mcrg(;.'nCY mi.:as1J.res will become I • • • 

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the modus operandi of a fllturc ~r. In addition, Commanders of forces a.t 

sLa and Cor.manders of othvr dctachi::d forces must be given increased 

latitude 1n day-to-day operation:s. Vol~nous intcrcba.ngc of I:J.essa.gcs between aflo...9.t and ashore allthorities must be dis'continucd·, with a consequent 

lessening of.the d~g~co of. control over the operating forces which lils b~cn 

nol'li,lally ve~tcd in naval shore comme.n~crs 1 (9:10P Sil~lti!l'f) 

· ·· b. llfith r.::spoct to th~ JCS assumptfon _that 'VHF and ... UHF near the ·soviet 

Orbit· must be considered vuJ.ne:rabi"c; whil~ not quc·stionj.ng tht= .-validity of 

the assumption, CINCNJCLM doos view the situation optimisticall.y.froc thG 

Naval point of view. Stations cloeo enough to jam tactical c;l.rcuits a.r.:: in· 

thc:ceclvcs prime· targets for dcstru.ction, and one s~cstcd· solution is t·o· 

'insure that opcrotia.nal plans include provision for timely int~rdiction of 

Soviet Bloc coJ:\J!lunications .stations capable of jamciDg short-range tactical 

commwiications. · In any case, CINCm.M considers that thougQ. vul.r.crubliJ, 

VHF /UJD' will st ill be avail.ab lo to Naval Forcc:_i;. ( ~ S!IC!m:T) 

c. Finally, Ci!!JCNELM conside.rs t~t the avriilapility of :iow fre:qu.i.:ncy 

and mediw:i freqUency communications will enable lifava.l Forces to use radio for 

scve~l tri>cs or' operatio!l~· T7t10 high-powered. LF transmitters arc currently 

being ti::sted at Port Lya.utoy, and' ·they should provide eover over mo.st of the: 

-Mediterranean .i..r.ea. In addition, two vc:ry low frequency transmitters are in 

operation in ~ngl~nd, one in France and one is in prospact i!l ~urkey. 

Although thosc·:racilitios are not u..i.C.er US co~trol,· thi:: countries concern..:id 

Will probabl:r .m:l:ke them available for NATO use. Thus,. w:ith cont inll'3d t::ffort in 

dev(;:1oping and tl'flin1n ... on pre-arranged procedures, .with "th<: continu1:;d use 

·of freqw:;,ncics lower··tha:n BF and of v?J/rm, and with the ·possibility that a:i.1 

HF can.-iot be jamme·d all' the time, the .throat to Naval communi"Cations and 

OJWrations :may not, 'in CI1"'Clfi:LM1s opinion, be as great as it would first seem. · ti'eP 93!16l&l!l') . . · · 

c. Us.1.FE: · 

The currant CIUCUSJt.FE Operation Pl.an, for war or cn:urgcnc:;y, provid.::s; ;"':.Jr 

expansion of existing commu.nications facilities to covor Air Force i'f:~uiro~ents 

···'throughout the Theater, and, in Germany and Fi'flnce, 'the USiJ!E Plan parallolr. 

· that of CillClJ~BEUR in :mny respects •. Howav..::r, undc'r thG Plo?l, the location 

of I:J.ajor .Air Force Hcadqu.'3.rtcrs in the United Kingdo·l:!l., in :No·r.th Africa, in 

*in, and Italy incrcas'as the problem of proviciing reliablt.i communications • . t;-ifei' SilC:Hi:T ) . · : 

~ The CINCUS,.1Fl!l policy proviQ.es that command comunic&ti.ons will be routed 

·over wiro circuits, wherever available, and over :radio circllits where wire . 

·circuits are not available. Radio back~up is provid.cd.for wire circuits where 

appropriate. Long-hauJ. radio traffic utilizes· the world-wide GLOBECOM syst·eo.. . ~ . 

·New hoadquartcrs and ff:l.cilitics •When cstablish~d, will be tie:d by· wir'i or 

J.'.a,dio to the D.care!!t GLOBECOM radio station. The.: cotllllunicati~ns Eupport for 

Stre.tegic ~ur Command operations pa:rallel.s 'the GLOBJCCOM system in ooet cases, 

~ith a~ditiona.l circllits to oth~r locations uniquely.required for s.lC 

ope rr. t ions. ( 'f6P Sl!'l0S9:1) 

. CINCUS.~E rs rcpo:rt tc;> this ;headquarters indicates that unti-jru1nrl.ng 

measures and stq.d.ics of.-vulncrab.ility ~of forces a:re u.nd.erwo.y t":uQughout· th(:; 

.Com.-:icl.nd. ik:Iatc.id t:mining measures 'anq. technical actiom· arc: reported to be 

PCfF&f'"s\isei6f~t:l.sfactoril Y' 1 excfipt fo . .- certain .;:quipment defic~ancics. · 

.o.s to Vlllncrability of radio, thr:: reports of individual ~ir Force Conun;.~:-i:ls, 

. forwarded. by CINC.U13:ciFE; contribut~ to th::. g•mcral :picture. Tho .AACS !!ling 

{which opcratos Gr~OBECOM) indicates t..'.:Jat tweiv~ essential Hl!, ·radio cir·cuits, 

linking the UK, Germany, ~forth .. \frica., ar'itl ··~hu United: StE:i.tcs ar~ hig.nly 

v11ln.::.ra. ble.. The Air Forca Sc cliri ty S.; .tvicl: U:ni t 1 tht:i 69 OOth Se cμri t.ir \0 r:t-:, 

concludes tbctt that Comm'.l.nd1 s capa.bilit:r of maintcin1ng cerw!l.tial radio 

·comr.ul.nico.tions is al::.iost ncgl.i.gi~lc. ·Thi.~ Twelfth .... ir ]force·, while not so 

pcsst1i1istic 1 in view of c:A:is.'ti.ng and planned VB:F and UHF syst-ems within its 

{:l.rca, st.ill i:"xprc·sses conC':..'rn ovt:r HF-re.dio operations. (~QP ~Sli6'l'") . 

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'· . ·. .. •.· CUIHJS/aFE, · in his pl~~. uses the ·'1'oll<?W1ng cstiiia.tcs ·on loss of · 

csselit.i~l civil. lAnd line ci~c~:i.ts b7 ·sabotage.' during: the ~i:rst ~:ivo da;rs 

of' }l..ostilit:i:e's: ·Within F:ianco .. · .S~; within.Gcr..a01'., · J~; ·between· Frsncc ·an.d 

Gt:rman71 ·6~; within lindand, 2S~;·aJJd bet.wccn.J'zance and lingland, SC1Ji. . Q~mpl~t'i~n·ot 'tho. ~...;.,i.r:Foi'9c· m1ci:ownvo. syetc¢ !!-Cro.aa· Fmncc will sen~ to 

ma1nta.in 9-0l!l!luni:ca.tio?B· ,along· the LOO,· for: CllQJJSAl'I a.s well a.a f!or CIBC-: .. 

US&.BlilUB. i'he co:mect,t..ng .. JDicrowa.vP..' link' ·across 'the )ilngl~sP Char.nt:lt on ·wh~ch 

conatru.ct1on should ·b"!gin: tliis. · tuf.ir.rer, :'vill-fii.rther rcC.u,ce the effccti;vc:':i:ic·ss . 

~ Soviet ,;jaming ·on the .ax~s.; ·._In. add:tt~pri, ·. 4· ~crow'avc:: ~d~o. rcl,a:r· sy-s,.jg, ~s boon insta.llcd in Io;r1fh Africa, ,;joining. t~c;; .Air Force .. installations in .,. . 

... Morocco .... Thc·.t~miml of the. sp-t~:c at Sidi Siimanc·· 19 .:tied 6.iroctl:r int.o. · i'~ GLmmCOM. s;rstem B:t ·that point~ . ('!eP tideHlil!f): · · ·· · .· . . . . .. . . ,. . . . . 

. ·. ·T~·~cmcu~li o:Pe·iot·i~~- Plan ... a1~0 calis for th\:.• p$)st. ·D-DB.y i~s·t~llAtiqn 

.. o~ a. 24-chaml.el mic:rowavc. qsto.ar a·.crc)ss ~i:n Jlit4 connection. linkii:ty-~ ,'1ll 

b'btli .. the Frc:?ch 'ahi'·N'orth AtriC?aii s).'st'.:ims. · -~ the Ke.d~d l.rc~, it ·.w~ll "con·· 

· nect w·ith. <R.olUCCOM for rel.By of COJDr.!.UD.icat.,ion:s to otba-r )lcadquartcrs.:. Howev.cr~ 

.unde:r cu"rNDt planning, the :6~n1Sh system wi·ll proba'bly not be ,·opirc.""tional . 

:prior to~-' i:Z·I:lG!l.thB.: In.ttiie· connt:ct·i'on 11&~r·.i'o~e ~eadciue.rtcrs ~ Washin.J""· 

t~.n ~a not. 1ot concurred irt'~ll;lC~B.'Jlropa.sa..l ·to implc:mcnt thu .tie-in link 

@iring ~acctil;le. ('l'OP 8me:te:.i!) • · ·· · · ~ .. ··. · · · · . . . . . 

. . Fiiia117, cmcu&i'E l;aas ZQcentl7' forwardc·d to thc .. ~hiof· pf :s~ff. of· thp .. · 

.a.!~ Force a.' p;t.o.n ~P:-Ve:~iig the .. cQimun~.catio.n!!!: m!..8.ns and .pcJ"so~o;t. ~<.-qW:re.ci~.~ts · 

.tC?- BUJll>ert a "!idc:":'sce.19 di~persal of 'J;actical .e::Lrc~f~ ,; · .Appro.~l of this · ... . , 

Plan. b7 Washington will perm_it',Cll'C~B' to Co.lillilen~e· implcm.:ntation, a:nd · . 

·tlicreb7·to· :reduce· th.1.;.pliysical ·aa1:irge vulne:rlibili~7 of'. .:'..i.ir Fore,'e ~omuniCcltit'i.~. 6 !L'S!' 1Jli8Hlil!) . . .. . . . . . ·. .. ,,. ,.. 

. . : d •. = · um11~ •• , ... ., .·· · · g.a.=- "•. . . .· . .... . . "' • • • r • • , • •• 1 ,' · • '. .. •• • • 1 .=. · ·. · . ~ ,. ·· 

. · ~he conmunicat.ions· situa"t!oh .of US Forcce·"in· ... ust'ria, a.s-an·~ .. r::J1' 

: 

• I 

Command, is s:i.J:d.lar· to that of ~Il'CUSIJmtm, ·but .modifieci b7 coridit:i.onil • . . 

~c.uJ.inr to, that· q,~a •.. BF 1"s4io ... b:"lckcd-up b;r· .i.ustr~n-.a~d Ital~n JA111d: l:i:m s 

•facilities, is U&od iis.th.J· primar7 r.ieahs ot·commwii,.cations ·along tJl,e.109-to · 

·. Leghorn. Br. tndio . aione ie .. usocl for cpmunica. t ions t-0· Vittrma·. USFl.r..~ s. ext.c !"Dai. . 

. cbmmuli.ica.tton~ arc m~lcd. bt- th~ J:...q, Co~d and ...... ~ilttrativc·Ne~wozk~. · ... . a~ app:topl"Uo.tc SO~~ 'have.-.1>.eci:J.. promulgat~d in ·Connection ·.with ali~i~Ja1iimi?Jg .. meaaurcs and altt:i.rna.te routes;· In addition, the Conmanding .Gone:rfiii USF..11..'; 

reports 'that·· V&riOUS t:re.j.ning and. tc~lar:Li 01:11.'8.BUres. to relic.Ve jammi:qg 'arui to . ' 

ipprovc ~li.aJ>'ilit:v are· b~ing carr:lcd out within his Comnnnd,1 aJld tllat a:dcquate : 

. . menci:l.ger and· courier service il\ b!.!i!lg provided. · (ipep· ~SHA!~ .. · , . 

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.. W;th ~cf!)J."#· to VHJr ba~-~p·, .. J>reliri:i.?$17 tc.ets ha.v0i:: -blll"CP, -~oJl!i~~cd· ~o. . . . 

det~rmin.c thp practicability of' .. tact-ical"·:re.d.io link comnunicatio.r;iB ~long· tqc 

U.Br.A. Loe·;' .ziegot~•ions ~re ~c1.1:rn:ntl.r· undcniay: with. tho .I:taliari 'Minister of 

•I • 

. Do;t'l:'.ln~c,to .co~d.uc~. fl.}.rthor~t~e~s'. ~~ ItaI;r·.-. ·~hould' tb;rsc.t~sts.pmc. suc~easful, VHli' cor:li!lunications .would 'SCl"V'O~ as .an alternate emergency moans .of co:c- · 

f.UD.ica.tions, whi~ would be. less s~B.CL-'P.tib~e "to ,.1a~Db: than m' cii:c!1i.1_t ~~ i . · tmr mie:BS!-, . .. · . . · ~ · · · .- .. , 

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· In sUiiJ!larii ,the ·.c'om.m:oAirig Go:il.c~l, .ui:irA; e:sti~to.s· tlia.t his ~ssec.t:i:al .. . 

comunicationEi are htCbl.7 vuJ.nerablt:, aiid tlvlt onc.lllj·:.impose·d r'lstr.ictioi:is 'on .. . 

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. l.o:ag".:..m.nge cl:e ctrical comm.un'ica tiont1· ··fo'l ·. logi st ica.l'. suP};lo :rt w::.11·, e.s. he· sa;;s , · -· har.i.pcr til;c· Co~ci.. ·. !L'he" Comnana.· my 'b~ wi ~ut< needed :a:::r' su111•ort durii?g.-

::r1tical p..riads. · Conta.c.t wiUr~hc us. Jii'lemcnt. to Vicnm :.rolJ.].~: probably qe 

luat,. since"·s.~ contact· 18· mint~iD.eid.:: oni.J: 'b~· :ze.dio. ·However,. tho r<:port goi..;s , . 

on .. it" is b~lie:vcd t1'a.1L int~~l ta:t:t(ccll Q;,t.Jciu'nica"j;iona, ··inciuding·ail· mc~~ •. r:i, 

· qa.:a be iiia:1ntained t.o. 'tlic)n:i.ni01.1m. ilegrgc roqu;ired: tb·'accompli.sh .ci;J.~rgoncy · . · .· · · 

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Ji>J .. m VII: THE P:ROBLEM: . 

It :is .::vidont f'roz:i tho fo~ego:\ng rep0rts .. that there is· a '.g~:m:~l a.ware- : 

noss of threats to the: reliability of our ·cor:np.wiice.tions 1 · b~t tl:u.~'t 'estimte~ .· 

as to v11lnt.:1'2.b1lity differ considorablj.·. In a1l7 a'Yo1WLU.on bf thC latti:r, 

l-t 1s import~n'li .to rocogn1zo t:tmt: . (Sli8B'l')- . . · · . .. · . · . :·. . . · . 

. a. firs,L jaming ~)nioO:t.s to ra:a.1~ .ir? ~O;.,,:nore ·SCJ:'10UB tmi::i CVt:r °t?Dfo=c: 

{-&iiGM9!} . . . . . . , . · · 

b. s·c·c~nd, resort. to land lines ~~1" ~ot· .be. possibio. -i1(·m~ casceCSieS•J(·· • • • I ' ,· ' I ' '. ,'' ' • • ' '• •' : I 'I, 

·. c. Third, arq appreciable loss or·· disruption :·of electrical C..'lpl.Cit:r 

~fS:~) the _h;.;av:r tmf'.f1c loads Q~ wa~imc C.'.l.·n. cz:a~~ ~rca:t__ diff~cUlt_ics. 

··It w9ci.lci ·appca:tr, thcrcf.o-~o, that· .inuch. r~m.ina t-o: bo. done· wt.thin .. ca.cl, 

:Serv:i:cc. Jii"nc._tic tre.ini.ng· progl'fl.l:lS and·. rnz1rnUr.l divcrsif.icati:on .in the. 

provision and use of. crol!IClunicatioitS offer, fo1' t~ pres.;::p.t,. "th.;; .Lio st .: . ·. 

proilis ing. approach~ s. · · ( 9:36161~) · . . · . : · . · · . ~ ·. : . - · .. . I 

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. J'l'Oc.. th~ ·~~ndpoint of· th~ . .J:oint CoLEandai:, tho _problec.: c~D.front.ing US Cl1'CEUB 1s to dotcrm1nc wnat ·additiQ%J6.l··~C:asuNs in prcP,!.mtic;m f.o~. · · 

l!z:iergllncios .ahouJ.d' b1.:r ta.ken .Jointil.Y within thi.: Eur0pcan Comand."in order to 

ensure the best "results through joint' ~ffort and uutuai suppO.rt •· ~lid to . . 

coordinate·Uni-Sorvicc actions to cn~uro:thi:~r cor.wB.ta~il~t~ a~ pr0p~r 

a\ipport of: joint Qbjectivca. {DC!tiS!~' : . · I "' I .• I 

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': ~n Inter-Scrv1ce.·Working Group, as proposoq._ b7. CINCm.M, "soc:cm to b·· · 

-~lled for.·. Service· pla~ine; c.ust proe;rEiso furtli,·r, of course~. before · 

• individml pl~ns ca'n be proJ>'-.·rl7 coordinated.and Joint pla.ns fomuJ.ated. . . . . . 

T-here ~B a nt.:ud·~ 0 J:WBnwhiiC I for C0?1Stant liaiBOD1· in Order tO arnVC &t a SOUnd " . • . . I • 

. basis for estimating vulne:ro.b1lit:r. to deal with.. Joint mtters .8.s they, arise' 

2'nd to a:fford a means of ·cxclla,&18ing pertinent ideas: ·a..,_d informtion..(·SBGRiW) . . . . . . . . ..... 

:.:..c~ordirigJ.7, US. CilfCJ!.'UR · intands 'to ·,;atablis:b. tl1i~ Working. G~up at ~ the· earliest p:racticabl.:> date.. tUNCLASS'IFIED) . I • • • 

. . Meanwhile, ~e hope that the comprehensive" nature ot".th1s prcs::..n;t"atio11- · 

wi.11 aid tqw&:rd a better undcrs.tandi:ng br- nll concerned of our Q.~rcnt 

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