• 

USCIB: 13. 6/26 

31 March 1955 

SBem!i'l' 

Ml!MORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

Transmission of COMINT Unencrypted Over the Territory of 

Third Parties to the UKUSA Agreement. 

USCIB 13.6/17 of 6 April 1954. 

1. The reference was approved by USCIBEC at its 14th meeting on 

29 April 1954 and accepted on 17 May 1954 by USCIB under the interregnum 

procedure. The matter has not been formally discussed. since that time 

nor ha.s the problem. changed much meanwhile. 

2. Accordingly the enclosed report is subnitted for information 

with a view to discussion or this entire matter at the next. regular meeting or USCIBEC. 

Enclosure 

NSA Serial 2019 

dtd 29 Mar 1955 

USCIB: 13.6/26 

ptain, U. S. Navy 

Executive Secretary, USCIB 

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-18-2014 pursuantto E .0. 1352a 

SECRET 

24 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

Serial: 2019 

29 MAR 1955 

eONPEEN'l'IAL 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRErARY, USCIB 

SUBJECT: Secure Film Carrier, Status Report 

1. In accordance with your request at a conference on 23 

February 1955, the following information on the progress and 

current status of the Secure Film Carrier is provided herewith. 

2. Upon the dissolution of P.S.E.A., technical direction 

of Air Force Contract AF18(600)-999 with Patterson-Moos Company, 

Incorporated, was assumed by the National Security Agency. This 

contract was for the development of a destruction agent which 

would destroy safety film within one-half second. This limited 

the destruction agent to a yery powerful reducing agent or to a 

very fast burning incendiary. Upon re-evaluation of the requirements the destruction time was relaxed from one-half second to 

30 seconds. As a result, slower chemical methods were examined 

for the remainder of the contract. 

3. The contract with Patterson-Moos Company, Inc., expired 

9 October 1954. The contractor recommended. two methods of destruction: incendiary and chemical. 

4. Upon expiration of the contract, the Military Characteristics were again reviewed by National Security Agency. There 

were a series of delays due to some differences of interpretation 

of the M.C. 1s and intended usage of the device. These differences 

have been reconciled and solicitation is now in progress for a 

succeeding contract. Appendix I, inclosed herewith, is the proposed prog~am for the completion of the Secure Film Carrier Task. 

Appendix III is the Military Characteristics under which the Secure 

Film Carrier will be developed. 

FOR THE DIRECTOR: 

Incl: 

Appendix I, II, Ill. 

(Signed) 

J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr. 

Captain, US Navy 

Deputy Chief of Starr 

Operations 

Enclosure with USCIB 13.6/26 dtd 31 Mar 1955. 

CONFIDEN'ftAL 
1. INTRODUCTION: 

APPENDIX I 

PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 

SECURE FIIM CARRIER 

Special Equipment Development Branch 

a. This proposed development program has been prepared on the basis 

of existing knowledge of the requirements for a Secure Film Carrier. These 

requirements have been expressed in correspondence with USCIB, M:l.litary 

Characteristics prepared by CCMSEC and specifications prepared by PSEA. 

It is felt that some of the requirements outlined in the above references 

are rather vague and some information desired is missing. In order to expedite the development program this proposal has been prepared with the 

full knowledge that it may be modified when additional information is received. 

2. DISCUSSION: 

a. It is planned to conduct the development of a Secure Film Carrier by 

a program consisting of five phases (Appendix II): 

(1) Phase I Test and Evaluation of Proposed Meth~s of Destruction 

(2) Phase II Design and Text of Engineering Models 

(3) Phase III Fabrication of Service Test Models 

(4) Phase IV Service Test 

( 5) Phase V Evaluation of the Service Test, Redesign and Release 

for Production 

b. It is proposed to complete Phases I and II by means of a fifteenmonth contract, allowing six months for Phase I and nine months for Phase II. 

c. It is estimated that the total contractual cost for Phase I and II 

will be $115,000. 

d. It is planned that Phases III, IV and V will be completed within 

12 months after the completion of Phases I and II. Because of the need for 

clarification of requirements, no specific number of Service Test Models can 

be designated at this time. The same reason makes it impossible to be more 

specific on the conduct of the Service Test. It is estimated that $50,000 

will be sufficient to procure the necessary Service Test Models and provide 

for any redesign as a result of the Service Tests. Approximately $35,000 

is estimated. tor redesign, and 315,000 for the actual fabrication of the 

Service Test Models. 
00NPIBEN'i'i:tL 

APPENDIX II 

DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF SECURE FIIM CARRIER 

1. PHASE I. Test and Evaluation of Proposed Methods of Destruction 

a. The contractor will fabricate suitable test containers and test the 

present proposed methods of destruction, i.e. 

(1) Fuming nitric acid reacting with zinc. 

( 2) 6CJI, nitric acid saturated with chromic acid. 

(.3) Incendiary. 

b. These tests will be conducted on the assumed module of 200 feet of 

16 mm. developed microfilm and will be in sufficient quantity to give a statistical evaluation of the time required for destruction and the amount of destruction achieved. While conducting the tests, the contractor will study the 

complexities involved in the design of the container for the various destruction agents. This investigation will include the determination of the optimum size and shape of the container, the proper handling of the destruction 

agent and the type of actuating mechanism required (for shock, courier release and casual entry). 

c. Upon completion of the tests the contractor will make a recommendation 

to NSA on the most desirable destruction method based on the following criteria: 

(1) The reliability of the unit firing 100% of the time. 

(2) The reliability of complete destruction of the information 

(3) 

, 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9) 

on the film. -

The length of time the container with destruction agent can 

be stored. 

The length of time the film can be stored without damage in the 

container. 

The proposed locking device for the prevention of casual entry. 

The proposed method !or the unit firing by shock. 

The overall estimated size and weight of the final container. 

The hazards encountered when the unit is functioned in an 

aircraft. 

The cost of the final container in production. 

CQ"1rpfDF;N'f'IAL 
2. PHASE II. Design and Test of Engineering Models. 

a. When Phase I has been completed and the destruction method selected 

by NSA, the contractor will design, :fabricate and test a sufficient number 

of developmental models designed to meet the performance requirements of 

the purchase description. He will then build a sufficient number of models 

for :final testing by the contractor and confirmation tests by NSA. 

3. PHASE III. Fabrication of Service Test Models. 

a. Upon completion of Phase II, the contractor will fabricate service 

test models (quantity to be determined at a later date), incorporating any 

changes indicated by the :final tests. 

4. PHASE IV. Service Tests. 

a. Service tests will be conducted by the customer when the service 

test models are completed. 

5. PHASE V. Evaluation of Service Tests 

a. When the service tests are completed the comments will be analyzed 

by NSA and the changes will be incorporated into the Service Test Model 

drawings. The extent of these changes will determine whether additional 

Service Test Models are necessary or whether the unit can be released for 

production without further changes. 

2 

COf\,tptDEN'ftAL 
' . 

1. Ob.1ective 

APPENDIX III 

MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS FOR A SECURE 

CARRIER FOR CONVEYANCE OF MICROFIIM 

I - GENERAL INFORMATION 

a. A secure carrier is required by the Armed Forces Security Agency 

for the transmission of special classified materials, photographed on 

J,Ui.cro.f'ilm, relating to the functions of AFSA. 

2. Employment 

a. The microfilm secure carrier will be used by officer couriers in 

the transmission o.f' undeveloped**microfilm by air transport over. Foreign 

territory to certain U.S. commanders. 

II - OPERATIONAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 

1. Special Features 

a. The microfilm secure carrier should be provided with a built-in 

means o.f' accomplishing positive destruction of intelligence on the undeveloped**.f'ilm. The secure carrier should be constructed so that the destruction agent will be released: 

(1) By excessive shock (plane crash). 

*(2) By any attempt by an unauthorized person to gain entry. 

(3) At the convenience of the courier. 

b. The secure carrier should perm.it disarming by the authorized recipient 

by means of' a working combination. 

c. The secure carrier shotild contain internal construction to perm.it as 

great amount of microfilm as possible to be stored in such a manner as to 

insure total intelligence destruction by the destruction agent. 

d. The destruction agent·should contain the following features: 

(1) Compact. 

(2) Simple mechanics for packaging and release. 

(3) Good dissemination of' the destruction agent to insure total 

destruction. 
4 f • ,, 

COMPlDEM!IAL 

(4) Indicate intelligence destruction, voluntary or involuntary, 

when released. 

2. Limiting weigl!ts and volume factors 

a. The secure carrier should be as light as possible in order that it 

may be easily hand.led by the courier. The volume of the secure carrier 

should be not mo~e than one cubic foot. 

*Modified by USCIB action to provide for casual entry. 

**The M.C. 1 s will be modified to read developed or undeveloped, with 

developed pref erred. 

2 . 

CONFIDENTIAL