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WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

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MEMORAND FOR DR. FLAX

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16 October 1967

SUBJECT: More Information on Mr. Lindsay's Article, "Satellite

Photography"

BACKGROUND: 

You will recall an article by Mr. Frank Lindsay, ITEK, "Satellite

Photography'', which was brought to your attention recently by Dr.

Koslov (See Tab A). You passed the article to us and we took action

to (1) capture all copies here at the Pentagon, (2) control any copies

at ITEK, and (3) have the CIA "educate" Mr. Lindsay. Over and

above the reaction to this manuscript from a security point-of-view,

we were surprised that Mr. Lindsay -- a knowledgeable individual --

had attempted such an article at all and that he had chosen to send it

to Mr. McNamara for clearance!

PRESENT STATUS:

Mr. Lindsay called me recently on this subject. He said he had

tried to call you but you were absent. He asked me to pass the following information to you.

Mr. Lindsay has felt, for some time, that "an article on this subject is overdue and might do a lot of good." He chose "Foreign Affairs"

as the magazine in which he would publish. After completing the

article, he realized the necessity of getting expert advice on its security

level. His own opinion was that the article was unclassified but he recognized that the security of this particular subject area is unusually

complex.

Mr. Lindsay submitted his article to Mr. John Bross, CIA, and

asked for his evaluation of it. Mr. Bross replied that he and Mr. Carl

Duckett found nothing objectionable in the article; however, since Mr. (N

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Lindsay would be in Washington the following week, they would like

to discuss the matter with him over lunch. At that meeting, Bross

and Duckett advised Lindsay that, while they had no objection to his

article, the whole subject of partial disclosure was extremely touchy.

After months of slow movement toward partial disclosure, with the

entire intelligence community agreeing to such an action, Mr.

McNamara had rather abruptly forbidden relaxation. Bross didn't

know why Mr. McNamara had taken this position, but it appeared

that only he (McNamara) could approve Lindsay's article.

In the meanwhile, Lindsay had made a parity check by sending

his article to Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, who had replied that it was an

excellent article, should be published, and Lindsay "shouldn't have

to ask anyone's permission. " Lindsay says he chose Gilpatric mainly

because the latter had published an article, some time ago, which

alluded to satellite reconnaissance (See Tab B).

Lindsay, however, felt a strong necessity for getting official

permission, and, based on what Bross had told him, the proper

authority was Mr. McNamara. So he called Mr. Yarmolinsky, at

Harvard, and asked him how to make the contact. Mr. Yarmolinsky

said he was going to Washington within a few days and would set up

"a channel" for Mr. Lindsay. When Mr. Yarmolinsky returned, he

told Lindsay how to address his letter {presumably Yarmolinsky

arranged for the OSD-mailroom to divert the letter to ASD/ISAL

In the meanwhile, Mr. Lindsay had been in Washington also, on

other business, and had conversed with Don Steininger regarding his

paper. He did not have the paper with him but did describe its contents

in detail. Steininger said the paper sounded "great". He volunteered,

additionally, that he heartily endorsed the President's "off-the-record"

statement in Tennessee; that such a statement was long overdue; that

more disclosure was called for; that in a year or two we would need

to surface most of what is now being done undercover; and that Lindsay's

article was a reasonable step toward orderly disclosure.

Mr. Lindsay wants us to have this little history to reassure us that

(1) he had good reason to go to Mr. McNamara with his article, and (2)

he had reason to believe his article was in the public interest.

I told him that I would pass his message to you. I expressed my

surprise that he failed to realize immediately that his article was out

of bourds. Even if he "sanitized" the article, he would never be able

to release it, since his company affiliation automatically made anything

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he wrote on the subject uniquely sensitive. He asked what action

we had taken on the matter. I told him we had captured all copies,

up-graded their security classification, and salted the CIA to take

follow-on action.

I urged him to visit us soon for a full discussion of security

policy regarding satellite reconnaissance.

First, it should be borne in mind that Mr. Lindsay's account

of events is just that: his account. If it is essentially true, it does

not speak well for the security consciousness of each person he contacted.

Second, regardless of the events, Mr. Lindsay's initial action --

r" writing the paper -- is still incredible.

WHAT NEXT?

The CIA, based on our strong reaction, plans to admonish Mr.

Lindsay.

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respect to security, the D/NRO is deeply concerned and we here

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feel that the article breaches BYEUAX security in that it confirms an on-going U.S. satellite reconnaissance program and

further, accurately assesses the current technological effective-

_ ness (as woll as technological shortcomings and plateaus yet to

. he achieved) of the program. Yr. Lindsay could not have prepared

f= such an accurate assessment without he benefit of his long

classified association with the XRP.

SUBJECT: Mr. 2ranklin A. Lindsay

President, ITEIC Corporation

I am forwarding herewith a copy of correspondence addressed

to the Secretary of Defense by Franklin A. Lindsay, President of

ZTEK Corporation, wherein he requests the Secretary's approval

of an article on Satellite Photography for publication in Foreign 

Affairs.

At the request of Dr. Flax, the XRO Staff has captured all

D3D correspondence and action related to this matter. Despite

Lindsay's assurances that he has satisfied himself with

2L:rthe=ore the subject matter of Mr. Lindsay's article

is indeed, as he states, "sensitive." In light of Mr. Lindsay's

privileged sources and of this government's recent high-level

reaf:irm.tion of policies related to this subject, we do not

feel it is appropriate that he publish an material related to

satellite reconnaissance.

In light. of the DCI's primary responsibility with respect

to the protection of intelligence sources and methods and in

order to keep corrective action in proper contractual perspective,

it would be appreciated if you would accept action on this matter

for the DCI upon referral from the Office of the Secretary of

Defense.
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LEXINGTON. MASSACHUSETTS 02173

Sincerely,

►IRANKUN A. UNDSAY IMESIDENT

MININIII 6 September 1967

c., amismav The Honorable Robert S. McNamara

NM Secretary of Defense IIIIIIP. Washington, D. C.

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111111 In order to increase general public understanding

ME of the capabilities of satellite reconnaissance

as an instrument for arms control inspection, I

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While I have satisfied myself that the text

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ME in view of the sensitivity of the subject matter,

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FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY pacsiDINT

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1 September 1967

Doctor Morton R. Halperin

Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense, ISA

Washington, D. C.

Dear Mort:

This is going to you as an advance copy. The

original 4111 be dispatched on 6 September 1967.

Sincerely,

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Some years ago Senator Benton reported a conversation with Wikita Ihrushchev

in which Mk. K. boasted of Soviet satellite photography and its ability to

record details of military bases. Since then, American Presidents have consistently paid tribute to the tremendous importance of photographic reconnaissance

and of the reliance this government is now placing on this new instrument of

defense and of national policy. While theoretical calculations of degree of

detail, or resolution possible from satellite altitudes are perfectly simple

for any optical engineer to make, practical performance will be degraded very

considerably by a variety of technical factors. But an oversimplified conclusion is that it will ultimately be possible to see from satellite altitudes

almost any degree of detail that a government is prepared to pay for.

The existence of sophisticated satellite systems are of great strategic

importance. They can have stabilizing effects on the nuclear arms balance and

can contribute importantly to lessening the danger of nuclear war. They also

provide unique capabilities for inspecting arms control agreements and for

planning the economic development of the world as well. The reconnaissance

satellite has become a vital instrument of national defense and national policy

in the United States and in the Soviet Union. It will become increasingly

important in the future and it is inconceivable that either side would now

abandon the reconnaissance satellite as an instrument of national defense.

It is therefore important to understand something of the technological aspects

of remote surveillance, its present impact on international affairs, and the

new avenues of action it opens for the future.

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It is often believed that the only measure of performance of

a reconnaissance system is the degree of detail that can be recorded on

a photograph or other record. In reality there are several key measures

of performance, and these are often in conflict. These measures, or

objectives, are:

- the ability to defect and recognise smaller and smaller

objects and the ability to measure with high precision the

dimensions of objects of significance (this is called the

resolution of the system)

the ability to measure with high precision the relative

position of objects within a limited area

the ability to measure with high precision the exact

geographical location of objects on the ground, such

as radars and missile sites, to relate such objects to

a world-wide coordinate system

the area of the earth which can be covered in a single

photograph; or, alternately, the area that can be

covered by exposing all the film carried on a single

mission

the time delay between the moment it is decided that a

reconnaissance mission is required and the moment the

processed information is delivered to the ultimate user

- the qualitative character of the information required

(will it be best revealed by photography, by infra-red recordings,

by space-borne radar, by monitoring ground radar signals or

by some combination of these)

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in relation to the value of the information. The costa

are primarily related to the weight of the syitem put in

orbit.

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in conflict in the sense, for example, that

higher resolution can be achieved only by reducing area coverage or by

increasing the weight of the camera and film load. Similarly, a quick

reaction capability can be achieved better by transmitting a televisiontype picture from an orbiting satellite to the ground than by waiting until

the satellite is over a recovery area to bring the entire spacecraft or a

film package back to earth. But radio transmission has such limited

capacity to transmit the great detail available from a high performance

camera that only a very few high resolution pictures can be transmitted

per day. Alternately, quality or resolution must be sacrificed in order

that radio transmission capacity can keep up with the picture taking

capacity of the camera.

Photography provides by far the best detail of any of the possible

space sensors and hence the camera is the most important of the various

sensors that might be employed in a satellite. Its major limitations are

that it cannot see through cloud cover or at night.

To achieve the best resolution the satellite camera should be

as close to the surface of the earth as possible. But below 90 miles

the atmosphere begins to have a drag or retarding effect on the satellite,

and the satellite most either carry some auxiliary fuel to maintain its

altitude or its mission must be limited to a very few orbits. Below /0

miles, moreover, the friction of the atmosphere becomes so great that

temperatures are generated that could seriously deteriorate or destroy

both the film and delicate electronics.

At an altitude of 100 miles the satellite will make a complete

revolution of the earth approximately every 90 minutes. But while it is

making one near polar orbit, the earth is turning beneath it so that on

each successive revolution it covers a new area of the earth below.

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In 24 hours it will be roughly back to the point at which it started.

It is, however, possible to set the orbit so that in the second, - and

even third, 24-hour period the satellite will traverse paths that lie

in between the tracks covered in the earlier 24-hour periods. Thus complete

coverage can be achieved by making the distance between tracks.as small

as desired, but only by increasing the number of days required to

accomplish the mission.

In general, however, a single satellite can be orbited to pass

within a 60 degree line of sight, during daylight hours, of any point in

the temperate zone of the earth within four days, and thus should be able

to get good pictures of any possible target, providing of course that there

is no cloud cover at the time it passes.

An alternate to a near earth orbit is to place a photographic

satellite in a syncronous orbit, 24,000 miles above the earth, as is

being done with the present communication satellites. In such an orbit

the satellite remains stationary with respect to any area on the earth

and is thus always in position to photograph any spot within an area as

large as the North American or Eurasian continents on instantaneous command.

The difficulty with this approach is that to see the same degree of detail

the camera lenses must be over 200 times more powerful than those needed

at a 100 mile altitude. A second difficulty with the synchronous

satellite is that the pictures must be transmitted by radio, rather than

physically recovered, and this places severe limitation on the number and

quality of picturps that can be transmitted to earth in a single day. The

time will come, however, when lasers can provide ultra high capacity,

and instantaneous transmission links from such satellites to earth.
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For full reliability several ground receiving stations will be required so

that at least one will always be free of local cloud cover or fog or, alternately,

aircraft can be stationed above the clouds to relay the transmitted data to the

•

•

•

ground.

Modern lens design and aerial camera technology makes it possible for

just about any size ground detail to be recorded or any extent of ground area

to be covered on one photograph. But the requirement both for small detail

and for large area coverage from a single camera are, to a great extent,

incompatible. In general, detection of the smallest possible detail means

limited area coverage, and broad area coverage means sacrifice of detail. To

illustrate this point, a perfect lens could theoretically make possible a

satellite system which could detect objects six inches in size on the ground

and encompass an area of six square miles on the ground, whereas a theoretically

perfect lens designed to detect five foot objects could under the same circusstances cover an area of six hundred square miles on the ground.

To give some idea of size, the theoretical lens would need to be about

five feet in diameter and the second about eight inches in diameter. The total

weight of high performance space cameras is very sensitive to detail size to

be recorded, so that a camera system designed to record detail as fine as one

foot might weigh as much as several hundred times the weight of a camera

designed to record ten foot detail.

But more importantly, the theoretical performance of the lens itself

is degraded significantly by many factors so that actual performance of the

camera is considerably reduced. The slightest vibration or instability in the

space vehicle itself produces a blurring of the image on the film. Similarly,

unless the relntEi • iii&ity of the space craft in relation to the earth is

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perfectly compensated, and this is alm5211001thiaible, further blurring will

occur. Another degrading factor is the temperature changes encountered in

space. The temperature of that side of the space craft which is in the sun

may be 200 to 300 degrees Fahrenheit higher than the side in shadow. And this

temperature differential tends to warp the lens inside and to throw the

delicate camera out of focus. Thus actual performance of the entire camera

system is substantially less than that theoretically computed for the lens

itself.

Another degrading factor etternal to the camera is the depth of

atmosphere through which the satellite camera must look. Often it is filled

with dust, smoke and haze, all of which tend to decrease the contrast of the

object with respect to its background, and thus make it more difficult to

resolve the object.

The turbulence of the atmosphere - the shimmering of heat waves -

distorts and degrades the quality of the satellite picture in much the same

way as it degrades the quality of pictures of the stars taken through high

powered earth telescopes. But this has turned out to be less damaging for

satellites than might be expected because nearly all of the heat turbulence

of the air occurs just above the ground, where it is most damaging to earth

based telescopes looking up, and least damaging to satellite cameras

looking down.

But in spite of these many degrading factors, there appears to be no

ultimate limiting factor on the degree of detail that can be photographed

from an orbiting satellite, providing a government is willing to pay the

costs of putting a sufficiently large and sufficiently finely tuned camera

into orbit. In the last six years, the cost to place equipment in near

earth orbit has dropped from 3000 dollars per pound to 700 dollars per pound.

And this trend of rapidly decreasing costs will continue.

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The remaining limitations otinitligliace are night and cloud cover.

Various electro-optical devices for amplifying.very faint light levels, now

used for example, in night telescopes for infantry riflemen, may someday offer

the potential of satellite photography with only moonlight, or even starlight

alone, to illuminate the scene. Cloud cover offers a more fundamental obstacle.

Visible light cannot penetrate clouds. Radar offers the only alternate. One

present limitation on radar is that of resolution. A radar system of comparable

weight and cost would provide far less resolution than a photographic system,

but it could look through clouds. This capability is probably not very important

in most areas of the earth where periods of clear atmosphere alternate rapidly

with periods of cloud cover. However, in areas along the arctic circle on both

the American and Eurasian Continents, large areas are covered with cloud more

than 957 (?) of the time and scheduling photographic satellites over these areas

at the right time to peer through occasional breaks in the clouds would be

almost impossible.

A second fundamental limitation on radar is that unlike a photograph, a

radar picture of the same object viewed from different angles appears quite

different in each view. This is not a matter of perspective but rather that

individual objects, or parts of objects, may reflect radar signals strongly

in one direction and hardly at all in other directions.

Infra-red snesors, while having far less resolution than the cameras

operating in the visible portion of the spectrum, do provide another dimension

to reconnaissance. Essentially they record temperature differences on the ground.

For example, the fact that a new atomic reactor has been placed in operation

can be revealed by measuring the temperature of river water upstream of the

reactor compared to downstream. An operating reactor will be using large

quantities of water for cooling, and as a result the temperature of the river

downstream will be .a few degrees warmer than upstream as a result.

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Two pictures of the same ground area can be taken from different angles

to reveal altitudes. If the angles at which these stereo pictures are taken

differ by 20 degrees, for example, the heights of buildings, or missiles, can

be measured even more accurately than the horizontal dimensions.

A manned reconnaissance space vehicle would have potential advantages over

an unmanned craft; but it would also have disadvantages. The principal potential

advantage is that of flexibility and fast response. For example, a men might

either be able to observe the ground in real time using a telescope, or he might

take pictures with a high resolution camera, and develop them while in space.

In either case, he could report his findings immediately by radio. But the

confidence level of those on the ground would probably be greater if they were

able to see the actual pictures rather than to rely on the interpretation of

an astronaut trying to operate in a constricted, gravity-free craft moving

above the target at 18,000 miles per hour. Nevertheless, there could well be

situations in which the presence of a man could save invaluable minutes, or

even hours, in assessing the possibilities of an imminent attact.

The technical advantages and disadvantages of placing a man in the space

craft seem now to be about a draw. The life support chamber and supplies needed

for the astronaut are complex and heavy and most, if not all, of the functions

of the man can be performed by added equipment taking the place of the mansupporting pressure chamber and supplies. On the other hand, an astronaut could

provide key information more quickly than if the pictures themselves had to be

returned to earth for evaluation.

The Soviet interception of the Gary Powers U-2 mission demonstrated both a

capability and determination to stop photographic reconnaissance conducted by
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aircraft. It is thus important to assess the problems of satellite interdiction

4111 and the likely development of capabilities both to attack satellite reconnaissance

vehicles and to defend these craft against disablement. First, the capability to

destroy or disable a reconnaissance space craft by exploding a nuclear warhead

in its vicinity undoubtedly exists today. But this is a violent and overt act

and the country using such a tactic would undoubtedly pay a heavy political

price in world opinion, and would cause other nations to assume a major arms

program, or even an attack itself, was in the making.

NASA has demonstrated the capability of rendezvousing a manned satellite

with an unmanned vehicle launched from the same ground point. Although it is

somewhat more difficult to intercept a craft launched from another part of the

world, it should be within current capability to intercept and disable such a

space craft, providing it remains passively in the same orbit long enough to

• plot that orbit and to launch and maneuver the pursuing satellite. But the

capability to capture a satellite and bring it back intact to one's own

territory for public exhibit is considerably more difficult and would undoubtedly

require that the intercepting craft have a "hold" large enough to completely

swallow up the captured craft before returning to earth. In addition, the

attacking space craft would be ' faced with the possibility that the intercepted

vehicle was booby-trapped to prevent capture of either the exposed film or the

craft itself .

A third form of attack could be to jam the radio signals transmitting

pictures to earth, assuming physical recovery were not used. But this would

require the attacking satellite to remain in the vicinity of the reconnaissance

craft and to determine the radio frequencies being used for picture transmission

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before lamming could be effective.

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The defenses against interception and non-nuclear disablement appear to

be relatively simple in comparison to the problems of attack. A principal

defensive tactic would be to alter randomly the orbit of the space craft,

somewhat as a ship zig-sags to avoid torpedo attack. In order for an attacker

to plot .an intercept course he must very accurately measure the orbit of the

vehicle he aims to intercept. This takes at minimum ten separate observations

of its position from widely separated parts of the earth and usually extend

over at least one full orbit. A precise intercept calculation would require

closer to one hundred observations. If at any time during this process of

orbit calculation, the course of the reconnaissance craft is altered, even very

slightly, the entire process of orbital measurement must be started all over

again. A change of course of as little as one degree or a change in altitude

will, an hour later, place the craft several hundred miles away from its

original course. Thus the interception of a space craft taking evasive action

appears very difficult indeed.

Nevertheless, the possibility of a space war developing over the attempt

of one space power to capture or disable a reconnaissance vehicle of another

nation is real. The dangers of a major confrontation and crisis are probably

greater if the photographic craft is manned rather thin unmanned, although the

possibilities of evading interception may be greater if there is a crew aboard

to control the evasive actions. Finally, an attempted interception and destruc-

•

tion of a reconnaissance satellite may, in itself, provide warning that aggressive

actions are about to be launched.

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It appears likely, however, that unless we go to sleep we should be able

to build into spacecraft the necessary defensive characteristics that will

allow them to escape being disabled by the Stiviets, should they elect to use

their growing capability for interception.

The strategic uses of satellite photography can be several. First, periodic

search and surveillance of very large areas can be conducted for the purpose

of identifying new or previously unobserved activities of a strategic nature:

the building of a road or railway span that may be preliminary to construction

of a missile launch site, the construction of a complex of underground missile

silos, the construction of a shipyard, or the beginning of an anti-missile

defense system. For this purpose coverage is essential and resolution must,

to some degree, be sacrificed to obtain such coverage.

The second use is for more detailed surveillance of specific targets,

already identified, to detect changes in activity, completion of construction,

arrival of weapons, etc. In this case, broad area coverage is not needed and

can be sacrificed to obtain greater detail in more precise areas of interest.

A third use is to perform highly accurate mapping of potential military

targets, such as missile launch Complexes or nuclear gaseous diffusion plants.

In order to correctly target a missile against a specific target such as

another missile launch site, the precise location and elevation of both the

launch pad and the target, relative to each other in latitude and longitude.

These targets may be half way around the earth from the launch pads. In

order to make such Measurements from photographic satellites with the necessary

precision, the exact location and altitude of satellite must be known at the

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OMNI MIES

instant the picture is taken.(even though it is traveling at 18,000 miles an

hour and its height might vary from 90 miles to 200 miles during each orbit.)

Secondly, the optical distortions in the picture caused by the lens itself

must be known exactly so that later these distortions can be precisely corrected

in the map-making process.

Another important potential use of satellites is to monitor military

activity for indications of possible imminent offensive action. In this case

the primary requirement is for speed in getting the information to the user.

If radio is used to minimize the time lag in reporting, the amount of information

transmitted most be sacrificed. In the future laser communications will be able

to overcome the bottleneck.

Satellite photography is not limied to strictly military targets. It can

reveal enormous detail about the current economic conditions in an industrialized

state which vitally affect the interplay of international politics. The

building of new transportation nets, the volume and variety of heavy industry

production, the type of crops and size of harvest can potentially be scanned

from space. This can provide much reliable knowledge about internal conditions

in a country which will often foreshadow its attitudes and actions in the

international arena.

Satellite photography cannot detect the assembly of a nuclear warhead

inside an industrial building. It cannot spot a nuclear submarine deep below

the ocean's surface. It cannot reveal the thoughts of the political leads or of a

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nation on the issues of war and peace. But it can collect, quickly and reliably,

thousands of indicators that together can reveal a great deal about the state

of economic and military preparedness of a nation, and reveal as well many

indications of possible imminent offensive action.

X X X

The significant implication of satellite reconnaissance is that,

after twenty years of deadlock on the question of international inspection of

armaments, the United States and the Soviet Union have entered a technological

era in which both sides have the capability of extremely sophisticated mutual

inspection. The point is significant because it raises three far-reaching

questions:

•

1. What is the effect of this emerging capability on the

contemporary strategic situation?

Can the new technology break through or transcend the

disarmament-inspection stalemate of the past two decades?

Is it feasible to adapt the new technology to an international disarmament-inspection plan?

The era of sophisticated mutual reconnaissance has arrived without,

so far, any serious destabilization of cold war politics and without perceptibly

increasing the danger of nuclear war. Although the Russians used the shooting

down of a U-2 aver Sverdlovsk in 1960 as an excuse for cancelling the scheduled

Paris summit conference, the resulting diplomatic embarrassments were temporary

•

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the'fact that, over the previous five years, the U-2 had successfully kept the

Soviet Union under photographic surveillance and had thus helped equalize the

distinction between "open" and "closed" societies. The Soviet Union was deprived

of the military advantage it had once enjoyed of an unknown number of missiles

secretly dispersed throughout a vast continental territory. The U-2, it seemed

likely, had inventoried and targeted these installations with some accuracy.

There are, in fact, good grounds for speculating that greater rather than

less stability has resulted from extended U-2 penetration of Soviet military

secrecy, followed, presumably, by at least equally extensive satellite reconnaissance. Moscow's retreat from Cuba in the face of the U.S. ultimatum may

have been dictated in part by the Kremlin's awareness that the missile sites

within its own borders were by that time pinpointed and highly vulnerable. The

willingness of the United States to take this risk may also have been dictated

by its satellite-gained knowledge of Russia's relative missile strength.

From the Soviet standpoint, satellite photography of the United States may

also provide a degree of stability to their own military posture. Sure knowledge,

for example, that the United States had not embarked upon an antiballistic

missile program could possibly strengthen the position of Soviet doves against

their own hawks in the decision as to whether or not to proceed further with

their ABM system. Similarly, secure knowledge that United States possesses a

missile capability invulnerable to a surprise Soviet attack can convince

Soviet leaders that we are not under compulsion to strike first because our

missile force cannot survive to strike second.

Perhaps the most important effect of satellite reconnaissance is its

effect on an arms race. Through such reconnaissance a much more accurate

estimate of order of battle can be obtained. For example, the number, type

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and degree of readiness of land-based missiles; the number and capacity of

missile submarines in commission; the existence, capacity and operating level

of gaseous diffusion plants for producing weapons grade uranium; the.existence,

capacity and operating level of nuclear reactors capable of producing plutonium

for weapons; the location and capacity of military air fields and the nosier of

types of military aircraft in operation, can all be accurately determined.

The influence of satellite reconnaissance on our military posture is

well illustrated by current speculation about whether the Soviet Union is

embarked upon a program to install an anti-missile system. Space surveillance

should be able to give us a much more accurate assessment of the degree to

which such a system is being deployed and an assessment of its degree of

technical sophistication. And this is critically important to our own decision

whether or not to further increase our own missile force in order to be sure we

can penetrate their defenses, or alternately to proceed with construction of a

similar anti-missile defense capability. For if a nation can secretly develop

and install a major offensive or defensive capability not possessed by others,

it will secure a decisive military superiority that upsets the careful balance

of power upon which the preservation of peace now depends. On the other hand,

it is equally necessary to assure that the United States does not undertake a

major expansion of its weaponry because of inflated estimates of Soviet or

Chinese advancements.

In all this, the point that deserves repeated emphasis is that satellite

reconnaissance provides the information needed. to maintain our rather tenuous

hold on the balance of coutervailing military capabilities, and right now

this is the crucial pivot on which peace is hinged. It gives. us the means

to puncture bluff and protect against blunder. It helps shield both the

United States and it adversaries from the intimidation of unwarranted fear and

the presumptuousness of unjustified arrogance. Thus it acts. to preserve the

uneasy stalemate that has so far proved the only feasible alternative to

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A further result of satellite reconnaissance less clear to assess is

the effect on missile targeting and missile strategy. Satellite reconnaissance

provides the exact location of all fixed land-based missile launch sites - though

not of submarine based missiles or mobile land based missiles. This means that

the probability of hits on these fixed sites goes up substantially, and therefore the number of missiles needed for a successful knock-out blow is lowered

and the probability of success goes up. If it were not for the existence of

Polaris-type missile systems, this might result in reducing the number of missiles

required for a surprise knock-out blow, and therefore in increasing the incentive

to an aggressive power to try such a surprise disarming attack. But even without

a Polaris type system, satellite photography can provide a strong stabilizing

influence to a nuclear power because it provides reliable information on the

level of its missile force required to deter its potential adversary from

risking a surprise attack.

Satellite reconnaissance also provides a system of verification of actions

that a major power may assert it has taken as a means of de-escalating a major

crisis. In the Cuban crisis, for example, the immediate availability of

reconnaissance aircraft provided a means of monitoring the Soviet commitment

to remove its offensive missiles. In similar crises, satellite monitoring of

agreed actions by all parties may prove politically and technically more feasible

than aircraft surveillance, provided that the time required to bring the

satellite over target and to return the essential information to earth is

sufficiently short.

In the event of an accidental nuclear launch that results in major

casualties

be for the

good faith

acceptable

to another nation, the only way to avoid a major catastrophe could

responsible nation to take certain clear actions as an evidence of

in the wake of the accident. And probably the only politically

way to confirm this would be through satellite verification.

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Finally, the regular coverage of closed societies such as many of the

•

COMMUOiSt States, cannot but add a powerful psychological force to open up

these societies, since it will be futile to try to maintain the degree of secrecy

that hitherto has been possible.

The satellite has many of the characteristics of an ideal instrument

for arms control inspection. It operates at altitudes which can have no conceivable interference with the internal affairs of the countries being

inspected. Indeed, for the last ten years all the nations of the world have

been subjected to constant overflight of satellites. Ground parties of

inspectors, in contract, appear to be unacceptable to the Soviets and others

because of their visibility to the population and because of their obvious.

challenge to the omnipotence of the State. Aircraft reconnaissance, while

having the obvious advantage of flying lower, also have the disadvantages of

vulnerability and of more overt presence.

The satellite can cover huge areas within a matter of hours, or at

most, a few days; and it is not subject to the delaying tact, - "the bridge

is out" - that can face ground inspectors. Finally the product is a picture

that can be viewed by military experts, by political leaders and the public

at large. It is an objective record subject only to the judgments of the

photo-interpretors at the limits of resolution - and is therefore far more

convincing as authentic evidence than a written report by an multi-national

party of inspectors who may be acting under directions from their separate

governments to play up or play down their observations for political ends.

Indeed, the past has shown that UN inspection teams are often unable to reach

any agreement on "the facts".

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The time may be propitious to consider the internationalisation of

some aspects of contemporary reconnaissance technology. A few tentative steps

in this direction have already been taken through the agreement - admittedly

not adhered to perfectly - to register all satellite launchings and to share

weather and other data collected by space vehicles. A logical next step, first

suggested some years ago by Richard Leghorn and others, would be to establish

within the United Nations a space agency with its own reconnaissance capabilities

and responsibilities.

The orbiting vehicles could be provided to the U.N. by the two major

space powers: They would consist of a small number of suitably adapted firstgeneration satellites (which have undoubtedly now been superceded by more

advanced equipment) and access, or possibly even title, to the ground stations

needed to launch these satellites and to receive the collected data. The U.N.

would also need its own capability to evaluate and interpret the pictures and

other information received. Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union

would unquestionably continue without interruption their independent surveillance

activities, and would be using the most advanced technologies available to

them.

It is unreasonable to expect these two nations to make available to

others their most advanced techniques and devices for reconnaissance, nor is

it necessary. The secrecy surrounding these provides a vital peace-keeping

function in itself. The very fact that neither power can assess precisely how

much each really knows about the other brings an added element of caution into

their behavior. This is an asset for stability that should not be sacrificed.

To be sure, even first generation equipment would give the trained

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observers in the U.N. agency the ability to keep tabs on missile developments,

on large military movements in border regions of neighboring countires, on

unreported construction of major dimensions and a myriad of other activities

falling within the range of gross intelligence data, which may or may not be

of military significance. Yet it is most improbable that the information so

derived would pose any additional threat to the security of the U.S. or the

U.S.S.R. At its best, it would be inferior to the data already gleaned from

their unilateral surveillance programs. Still, a new factor that might be

brought into play would be the international publicizing of the more obvious

secrets within these two countries, which are now known only to themselves and

to each other. This would not be entirely without merit, for it would help

marshall global opinion against any blatant maneuvers that may endanger the

critical balance of power.

The primary advantage of a U.N. reconnaissance capability, however, is

quite separate from any direct American-Russian confrontation. It lies in the

ability to monitor activities on the periphery of the East-West struggle or

among contending elements in the so-called Third Force World which increasingly

tend to embroil the major powers in dangerous confrontations. Consider, for

example, some of the dificulties and disputes that the U.N. has recently faced:

In the Arab-Israeli conflict of a few months ago, there were charges

and counter-charges about who initiated the aggression and who violated the

cease fire. Secretary General U Thant complained to the Security Council that

the U.N. really had no effective means of verifying information from the

contending parties or establishing the facts that the Council was pressing him

to provide - and Ambassador Goldberg strongly urged that the U.N. be provided

•

with the requisite capability for doing so in the future.

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The U.N. presence that might have helped avoid the conflict in the

first place was summarily ordered out of the Gaza Strip by United Arab

Republic President Nasser. (He would have had trouble commanding a satellite

to quit the skies).

The open terrain of the Middle East is particularly suited to space

photography. Perhaps most importantly, however, the pictures themselves, which

could be shown at the U.N., could provide objective and convincing evidence

both of preparatory troop movements and of the observation by both sides of

agreed truce terms.

The successful operation of a U.N. space surveillance agency would

serve to improve the chances for new demilitarization or arms limitation agreements. The 1963 test ban treaty excluded underground nuclear detonations only

because all parties were not convinced that these could be adequately monitored.

Given the understandable aura of suspicion in international affairs today,

there is a strong tendency to accept assurances of veracity only when they

are coupled with verification. But if the ability is demonstrated to detect

such explosions or to establish violations of a nuclear non-proliferation

treaty or to reveal a dangerous escalation of the arms race - and if an international body like the U. N. has demonstrated its competence and objectivity

in performing such functions - there could evolve a greater willingness to

substitute truly controlled disarmament for the mounting effort to match

destructive forces.

A two-level form of inspection, involving both the ternational control

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authority and the principal nations acting inaependently, could provide a high

level of inspection confidence.

The advantage of such a two-part verification system is that it would

leave to the major powers the latest technology to protect their own vital

interests. At the same time the international authority would be provided

with an independent inspection capability and hence there would be a greater

credibility than revelations of violations shown by photographs obtained under

secret conditions and only revealed to an international body at the last moment.

Further, the presumably higher resolution photographs obtained by national

systems, which probably would first reveal violations, could become the basis

for suggesting or requesting photo coverage of a specific area by the international authority to verify the violation.

Further, national intelligence agencies will be extremely loath to

show publicly pictures taken by their highest performance systems because

in so doing they will also reveal the capability of the system to resolve

details. Once this secret has been made public, the future value of the camera

system is partially lost because the other side now knnws exactly how much it

has to hide.

In the long run, though the most enduring contributions of satellite

reconnaissance may have nothing to do with military factors at all. Bather

they will focus on the unprecedented conmand over the development of natural

resources for peaceful purposes. And this undertaking, too, can best be

achieved through a concert of nations.

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The United Nations already envisions a World Weather Watch for observing,

communicating and processing data collected by satellites for long-range weather

forecasting. From this, according to one NASA official, "The payoff will amount

to billions of dollars annually."

NASA itself has planned an Earth Resources Program encompassing five

broad areas that are potentially suitable for the application of space technology.

This program relies heavily on turning the techniques of satellite reconnaissance

to peaceful and productive ends. The five areas of concentration mould be as

follows:

Agriculture and Forestry Resources. Earth-orbiting remote sensing

systems would be used for surveys that, combined with automatic-pattern

•

recognition methods, will yield information necessary for improved utilization,

development and productivity of world wide agricultural resources. The results

of this system would include data on soil classification, land use capability,

crop identification and analysis, flood and fire control, hydrologic studies

and irrigation development, and many other factors related to the awesome

challenge of conserving our natural heritage and feeding our growing multitudes.

Geology and Mineral Resources. Observations from space would give

greater understanding of the earth's crust and structure, improved detection

of thermal activity preceding volcanic eruptions, more detailed measurements

of gravity and magnetic field forces, and even a new insight into the major

earthquake belts of the world. Global geologic mapping from space would provide

vital data leading to the discovery and exploitation of the undeveloped mineral

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1111 resources for which there will be an increasing demand. There are untold

possibilities in the extension and refinement of the type of an aeromagnetic

survey that led to the discovery of an iron ore deposit at a depth of 1,300

feet below the surface of Missouri, which is valued at. $2 billion.

Geoaraphy v Cartography and Cultural Resources. Geodetic and remote

sensor satellites would decisively upgrade the quality of topographic maps

(at about 10% of the cost of conventional aerial-mapping photography) and

accelerate the acquisition of knowledge about land surface and drainage in

the developing nations. Space surveys would improve census estimates in remote

areas of the world and reveal large-scale patterns of urban development that

could materially aid future planning. It would be possible to monitor broad

transportation flows, to detect sources of water and air pollution, and to

achieve a keener appreciation of the rate and nature of the transformation

that human activity is working on the total environment.

Hydrology and Water Resources. Spaceborna radiometry and imagery

would yield information on evaporation from reservoirs, the thermal effects

on waterways by power plant effluents, and-the contamination caused by sewage

discharge. Ground-water studies Would expedite prospecting and drilling, while

establishing rainfall distribution patterns would aid in the study of runoff

characteristics and drainage, leading to more efficient water usage. This is

rapidly becoming essential, considering the immense consumption of water in

industrialized societies.

Oceanography. The feasibility of satellite radars for sea-state

measurements is now being evaluated. Televised pictures from space can show

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ice areas and their features. Water masses and currents can be detected by

infrared, microwave and photography. Space craft photography can also be used

to map tidelands and shoals. Sensing devices are being considered for remote

detection and identification of various species of fish. This could be indispensable in realizing atbitieus visions of literally "harvesting" the oceans.

The initial phase of NASA's Earth Resources Program is a unilateral

and rather modest effort. That seems altogether proper. At a later stage,

though, when a much more extensive program will be called for, it will make

little sense to pursue.a go-it-alone policy. While a single nation can orbit

its own satellites to collect all the data from space, its usefulness requires

work here on earth. And as the data will reveal, this work must be done with

a heightened respect for ecological factors - which, in turn, have absolutely

no respect for the articial boundaries of political units.

In short, the ultimate utilization of satellite technology for the

conservation of natural resources and the material enrichment of man depends

on multilateral cooperation on a truly global scale. It would be logical,

therefore, to plan for the conduct of this program under U.N. auspices.

Endowing the U.N. with a satellite reconnaissance capability for

peace-keeping purposes thus can become the forerunner of larger responsibilities

for ecological planning and possibly control in the future. During the interval,

the UN space agency should acquire the necessary experience and competence and

demonstrate the requisite objectivity that later tasks would demand. Hopefully

an atmosphere of political trust and scientific cooperation in space activities

will thereby evolve among nations, so there will be less reluctance later to

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assign the UN other more far-ranging functions that can be done only by an

international organisation.

Space reconnaissance today givOus windows on the world, permitting

us to detect preparations for aggression and to deter assault. In the years

Aged, the same technology can also serve even broader purposes. Indeed, we

can even go beyond the fantasy of Archimedes to move the earth. We can gain

the means to model it to our own aspirations, to shape and use our environment

in accordance with the design we set for our lives.
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