NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAYANTIBHAI PATEL; PRAVIN L. 

PATEL; DAKSHA PATEL, 

Plaintiffs-counterdefendants-Appellants, 

and 

DIPAK L. PATEL, 

Plaintiff-counterdefendant, 

 v. 

CITY OF LONG BEACH, a municipal 

corporation; ASHLEY WIEGELMAN, 

Defendants-counterclaimants-Appellees.

No. 19-55646 

D.C. No. 

2:17-cv-08510-AB-GJS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 2, 2020**

Pasadena, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 17 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and R. COLLINS,***

District Judge.

Jayantibhai Patel, Pravin Patel, and Daksha Patel (“Appellants”) appeal the 

district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Long Beach (“the City”) 

and Ashley Wiegelman on Appellants’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell 

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for violations of the First 

and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellants argue that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact as to 

whether the City’s enforcement actions against Appellants’ business, the Princess 

Inn Motel, violated their constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, and we affirm.1

I. Appellants’ First Amendment claim fails because Appellants do not 

raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City retaliated 

against them.

Appellants assert that the City issued them fines in retaliation for Appellants 

winning a prior civil rights case against the City. To establish a First Amendment 

retaliation claim:

*** The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the 

District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

1

In addition to the arguments discussed herein, the parties raised arguments 

regarding qualified immunity and Monell. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 695. We need 

not address these arguments as Appellants fail to raise any triable issue of fact 

regarding the alleged constitutional deprivations. 
3 

[A] plaintiff must show that (1) he was engaged in a constitutionally 

protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a person of 

ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity 

and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in 

the defendant’s conduct.

O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pinard v. Clatskanie 

Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original). 

Here, the inquiry focuses on the third prong as the first and second prongs

were not in dispute. To determine whether Appellants’ previous case was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the citations, Appellants must: (1) show proximity 

in time between Appellants’ civil rights case and the citations, (2) produce evidence 

that the City opposed their speech; and (3) demonstrate that the City’s explanation 

for the administrative citations was false and pretextual. See Alpha Energy Savers, 

Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2004).

Appellants do not establish a temporal nexus between the civil rights suit and 

the City’s administrative citations. In this instance, Appellants received a decision 

in their favor in 2013 and that decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme 

Court in June of 2015. The City issued its first Notice of Violation in 2017, and 

Appellants received their first administrative citation with a monetary penalty in 

November of 2017. There is a more than two-year gap between Appellants’ civil 

rights suit victory and any allegedly retaliatory actions taken by the City. Appellants 

do not present any evidence to support their assertion of retaliation in light of this 
4 

two-year gap in time. We have specifically held that a two-year gap is too attenuated 

to establish temporal proximity. See Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 

265 F.3d 741, 752 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Moreover, Appellants fail to demonstrate that the City’s explanation for the 

administrative citations was false or pretextual. See Alpha Energy, 381 F.3d at 929. 

Appellants acknowledge that they have been operating the Princess Inn without a 

business license. Appellants do not proffer any evidence to suggest that the City 

issued administrative citations for any other reason besides the lack of a valid 

business license.

II. Appellants’ procedural due process claim fails because the City’s 

procedures are constitutional under the Mathews balancing test.

Next, Appellants assert that their constitutional right to procedural due 

process was violated by the City’s requirement that they deposit the amount of their 

fines prior to receiving a hearing. 

To establish a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, courts employ a 

three-factor test. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). First, courts 

must determine the private interest to be affected. Id. Second, courts should consider 

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the procedures 

used. Id. Finally, courts should consider the government’s interest, including fiscal 

and administrative burdens. Id. 
5 

We have explicitly endorsed a post-deprivation hearing “when countervailing 

interests require it.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 

F.3d 971, 984 (9th Cir. 1998). In this instance, the procedure that is allegedly 

harming Appellants, the requirement that they deposit the amount of their fines with 

the City prior to receiving a hearing, satisfies the Mathews test. 

Appellants’ private interest at stake is their loss of money. The risk of an 

erroneous deprivation is nominal because the money would be held with the City 

pending the hearing decision and released to the prevailing party. Additionally, the 

City only requires that Appellants deposit the amount of the fines they wish to 

appeal. Furthermore, regardless of the amount of fines owed, the City offers fee 

waivers as an exception for those who cannot afford to comply with the deposit 

requirement. Appellants have not sought a fee waiver, nor have they established the

risk of an erroneous deprivation. 

Finally, the facts of this case weigh in favor of the government’s interests.

Appellants’ fines began as warnings with no penalty. As Appellants maintained their 

non-compliance with the City’s Municipal Code, the warnings escalated into small 

fines. These small fines eventually culminated in thousands of dollars of fines due 

to Appellants’ continued non-compliance. Appellants created the burden to their 

private interest by allowing their business license to lapse and exacerbated the 

burden by continuing unlicensed business operations over several years. Appellants 
6 

fail to show how these procedures are unconstitutional under Mathews.

Consequently, Appellants’ assertion that the City’s post-deprivation hearing

procedures are unconstitutional fails.

III. Appellants’ equal protection claim fails because Appellants cannot 

establish any differential treatment.

Next, Appellants assert that the City violated their equal protection rights by 

treating Appellants differently than other similarly situated persons. See Village of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).

In this instance, Appellants contend that the City irrationally targeted them

with excessive fines and administrative citations. However, there is no evidence in 

the record to support Appellants’ position.

Appellants operated the Princess Inn without a license for nearly ten years. 

Appellants applied for business licenses when they initially opened their business 

and several other times throughout the course of these events. Appellants knew they 

needed a valid business license to operate the Princess Inn. Nonetheless, they 

continued to operate their motel without one. Appellants fail to present any evidence 

that the City treated another similarly situated unlicensed business differently. 

Moreover, Appellants fail to establish that the City lacked a rational basis for its 

enforcement actions. See id. The City targeted the Princess Inn because it was

operating without a license.

AFFIRMED.