[J-49B-2017]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

IN RE: DAWN A. SEGAL MUNICIPAL 

COURT JUDGE FIRST JUDICIAL 

DISTRICT PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

APPEAL OF: DAWN A. SEGAL

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No. 1 EAP 2017

Appeal from the Order dated 12/16/16 

of the Court of Judicial Discipline at No. 

3 JD 2015

ARGUED: May 9, 2017

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: November 22, 2017

This is a direct appeal in a judicial discipline case that resulted in Appellant’s 

removal from her office as a municipal court judge in Philadelphia. The matter was 

consolidated, for purposes of limited oral argument only, with In re Roca, ___ Pa. ___, 

___ A.3d ___ (2017), regarding the legal question of whether the Court of Judicial 

Discipline must apply the doctrine of stare decisis when sanctioning a jurist.

I. Background

In 2014, amidst a federal investigation encompassing electronic surveillance of 

telephone conversations in which she participated, Appellant reported to the Judicial 

Conduct Board (the “Board”) that she had ex parte communications with then-fellowMunicipal Court Judge Joseph Waters about several cases that were pending before 

her. The Board, which had already opened an investigation into the matter, proceeded 

to lodge a complaint against Appellant in the Court of Judicial Discipline (the “CJD”). 

The Board asserted violations of the then-prevailing Canons of Judicial Conduct, 
[J-49B-2017] - 2

including Canon 2B (“Judges should not . . . convey or knowingly permit others to 

convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.”), 

Canon 3A(4) (“Judges . . . except as authorized by law, must not consider ex parte

communications concerning a pending matter.”), Canon 3B(3) (“Judges should take or 

initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional 

conduct of which the judge becomes aware.”), and Canon 3C(1) (“Judges should 

disqualify themselves in a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned, including but not limited to instances where . . . they have a personal bias 

or prejudice concerning a party[.]”). The Board also contended that Appellant violated 

Article V, Section 17(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution (“Justices and judges shall not 

. . . violate any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court.”), as 

well as the Constitution’s Administration of Justice and Disrepute Clauses reposed in 

Article V, Section 18(d)(1) (“A justice, judge or justice of the peace may be suspended, 

removed from office or otherwise disciplined for . . . conduct which prejudices the proper 

administration of justice or brings the judicial office into disrepute[.]”).

1

A. Stipulations

The litigants stipulated to a range of factual matters, as follows.2 Appellant was a 

municipal court judge in Philadelphia beginning in January 2010, subject to the 

 

1

The former code took effect in 1974 and was amended periodically, until it was 

replaced in its entirety on July 1, 2014. Because the former code was in effect at the 

time of Appellant’s violations, in this opinion we refer to the Code of Judicial Conduct

and its canons as reflected in the former code.

2

The factual stipulations are contained in the Board’s pre-trial memorandum. See PreTrial Memorandum of Judicial Conduct Board at 4-19 (the “Stipulation”); see also

Pretrial Memorandum of Judge Dawn A. Segal at 4 (“All stipulations requested and 

agreed upon by both sides are contained in the stipulations in the Board’s pre-trial 

memorandum.”).
[J-49B-2017] - 3

obligations imposed upon her by the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. She became acquainted with then-municipal-judge Waters at campaign 

events in 2009 and came to believe he was influential in political circles.

Unbeknownst to Appellant and Waters, the FBI conducted electronic surveillance 

on Waters and recorded conversations between the two on September 30, 2011, as 

well as on June 23, June 24, June 29, July 23, and July 24, 2012. In the 2011 call, in 

relation to a small-claims case entitled Houdini Lock & Safe Co. v. Donegal Investment 

Property Management Services, SC-11-08-09-4192 (Phila. Mun. Ct.), Waters entreated 

Appellant to extend a favorable ruling to the defense, as follows:

Waters: I got something in front of you at 1:00 today.

Appellant: Okay. Tell me. What is it?

Waters: The name’s Donegan. Okay?

Appellant: Okay.

Waters: Ah, it’s . . . it’s something to do with an alarm company. Sammy 

Kuttab and Sonny Campbell will be there.

Appellant: Okay. . . .

Waters: You know Sam?

Appellant: And who do we need? . . .

Waters: [W]e got . . . the defendant, Donegan. . . .

[Appellant]: Oh, okay. Okay.

[Waters]: Alright?

[Appellant]: Say no more. Say no more. Alright.

Stipulation ¶31.
[J-49B-2017] - 4

Later that day, defense counsel in the Houdini matter filed a contested motion for

a continuance, which Appellant granted, while directing that the case thereafter proceed 

to trial without further delay. See id. ¶¶33-34. Appellant then phoned Waters to inform

him she had continued the matter, indicating that “I did the best I could.” After Waters’ 

affirmations and expression of gratitude, Appellant added that it was “[a]ll for you. 

Anything. Alright.” Id. ¶36.

Pertaining to another small-claims civil case captioned City of Philadelphia v. 

Rexach, CE-12-03-73-0123 (Phila. Mun. Ct.), Waters informed Appellant that a friend 

had filed before Appellant a petition for reconsideration relative to Appellant’s previous 

refusal to open a default judgment. After the two spoke further about the matter in 

person, they engaged in the following recorded phone conversation on July 1, 2012:

Appellant: Hi, I figured it out and I took care of it.

Waters: Oh, okay. Thank you.

Appellant: I got it. Alright. It was on my um, queue, so I did it. So tell her 

it’s done.

Waters: Thank you very much . . ..

N.T., Jan. 28, 2016, at 70 & Ex. 8d.

3

Notably, the party who was the subject of Waters’ solicitation is the son of former 

common pleas judge Angeles Roca, the appellant in the companion case. See

Stipulation ¶52.

4

 The Stipulation reflects, however, that at the time of the conversations,

 

3

The specific content of this discussion was not quoted in the Stipulation, but it was 

later adduced at trial and recited in the CJD’s factual findings. See In re Segal, No. 3

JD 2015, slip op. at 16 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. July 21, 2016).

4

The circumstances of the Rexach matter are discussed in greater detail in Roca, ___ 

Pa. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___.
[J-49B-2017] - 5

Appellant did not have a personal relationship with Roca, nor did she know that Rexach 

was Roca’s son. It also explains that Rexach had not initially alleged a meritorious 

defense in his petition to open the default judgment, but he did so at the reconsideration 

stage. See id. ¶¶53-58.

On July 23, 2012, concerning a criminal case, Commonwealth v. Khoury, No. 

MC-51-CR-0018634-2012, Appellant engaged in the following recorded interchange 

with Waters:

Waters: . . . Look Dawn, you got a case tomorrow with a Rich . . . eh . . . 

Rich Khoury. Skip Fuschino is representing him.

Appellant: Okay.

Waters: See if you can take a good hard look at it. He’s ah . . . ah . . . ah 

. . . ah, a friend of mine.

Appellant: Khoury is it? Khoury’s a friend of yours?

Waters: Yeah, Rich Khoury . . . ah . . . Skip Fuschino. Don’t hurt yourself, 

but if you can help him, I’d appreciate it.

Appellant: No, I will, if he’s a friend of yours. I’ll look hard at the case. 

Don’t worry about it.

Stipulation ¶77. The following day, when Appellant presided at the preliminary hearing 

in the case, she downgraded the charges from felony to misdemeanor status and 

remanded the case for trial. Appellant then phoned Waters and, as relevant here, the 

following conversation ensued:

Appellant: . . . I . . . ah . . . um . . . remanded your friend’s thing.

Waters: I appreciate that. You’re the best.

Id. ¶83.
[J-49B-2017] - 6

The Stipulation conveys that the recorded telephone conversations demonstrate 

that: Waters used his position as a judge to request special consideration for litigants in 

an attempt to influence Appellant’s decisions; Appellant entertained the ex parte

requests for favorable treatment; and Appellant’s decisions ultimately favored those

litigants. As well, Appellant did not admonish Waters to cease his entreaties, inform him 

she would not act on his requests, disclose the ex parte communications to the litigants, 

recuse herself from the cases, or report Waters to the judicial disciplinary system. As to 

all three cases, the Stipulation reflects that Appellant thought she was constrained from 

reporting Waters’ communications due to a request from federal investigators to 

maintain confidentiality. It also indicates, however, that a duty to report such 

communications arose at the time they were made. See id. ¶¶44-50, 68-74, 89-95.

As the federal investigation progressed, FBI agents and federal prosecutors 

interviewed Appellant on several occasions, ultimately playing tapes of the intercepted 

conversations. Appellant spoke to federal authorities without the benefit of a proffer 

letter or legal protection. In June 2014, she testified before a federal grand jury without 

any promise of immunity or legal protection. See id. ¶¶9-16.

A federal prosecution of Waters was initiated, and he entered a negotiated guilty 

plea to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §1341, and honest service wire fraud, id. §§1343, 1346, in 

September 2014. See Stipulation ¶18 (citing United States v. Waters, 2:14-cr-00478 

(E.D. Pa.)); see also N.T., Jan. 28, 2016, at Ex. 13 (embodying the information in the 

Waters case). Later that month, Appellant, through counsel, self-reported to the Board 

that she and Waters had had ex parte communications concerning pending cases. The 

correspondence stated that Appellant had not previously made these disclosures to the 

Board on account of a request from federal authorities to maintain confidentiality. In 

March 2015, the Board filed its complaint with the CJD. See Stipulation ¶¶21-24.
[J-49B-2017] - 7

B. Trial

In January 2016, trial of the disciplinary case against Appellant proceeded before 

a three-judge panel of the CJD. The Board presented its case via the stipulation, 

supplemented by the testimony of FBI Special Agent Eric Ruona, one of the agents who 

had interviewed Appellant. The agent attested that, in his initial interviews with 

Appellant centered on the Houdini case, she denied any recollection of the matter. See, 

e.g., N.T., Jan. 28, 2016, at 32. At a December 10, 2013, meeting, however, Appellant 

volunteered that Waters had called her about cases two or three times. See id. at 40. 

Upon further questioning, Appellant portrayed the subject of the conversations as nonsubstantive, and she added that she would not have made any different rulings had 

Waters not called. See, e.g., id. at 41. Appellant admitted that she was uncomfortable 

with the calls and ultimately asked Waters to stop calling. See id. at 47.

Agent Ruona further explained that Appellant was first confronted with the 

specific content of the wiretap recordings at a May 1, 2014, interview, at which she was 

represented by an attorney. See id. at 53-54. The agent indicated that Appellant 

acknowledged that all of the conversations were inappropriate, that Waters was trying to 

influence her, and that she should have recused herself from the matters that he raised. 

See, e.g., id. at 62, 66. By way of explanation, the witness continued, Appellant said 

that she “wanted to give [Waters] the impression that she was going to do what he 

wanted.” Id. at 62, 66. Nevertheless, Appellant maintained that, in each instance, she 

followed her conventional judging practices and ruled in the same way she would have 

ruled had Waters not importuned her. See, e.g., id. at 67.

Special Agent Ruona additionally testified, however, that at one juncture 

Appellant had indicated that, “if all things were equal, that it might have tipped a case in 

[Waters’] direction, if he was asking for it.” Id. at 67-68. The witness further indicated 
[J-49B-2017] - 8

that, when the calls pertaining to the Rexach case were played, Appellant admitted that 

her tone “sounded like she was agreeing to fix cases.” Id. at 73.

At a subsequent interview, Agent Ruona noted, Appellant explained that she was 

concerned about her forthcoming retention election and, believing Waters to be 

influential in political matters, she wished to please him; thus, she was acting as if she 

was doing favors for him. See N.T., Jan. 28, 2016, at 78-79; accord id. at 81. Again, 

however, she insisted that Waters’ overtures had no impact upon her actual judicial 

decision-making. See, e.g., id. at 78. In retrospect, the agent testified, Appellant 

conceded that “it was foolish the way that she handled it.” Id. at 79.

Finally, Agent Ruona stated that Appellant, somewhat inconsistently, had told 

him that Waters’ calls “influenced me, absolutely.” Id. at 80; accord id. at 87. In 

hindsight, he attested, Appellant acknowledged that the conversations sounded like 

Waters was asking her to fix cases, and she added, “In retrospect, it sounds horrible.” 

Id. at 89.

After the close of the Board’s case, Appellant testified in her own defense. She 

initially discussed her concern about the retention election, associated threats that she 

believed were being lodged against incumbents, and her desire to prevail. See id. at 

184, 197. She said that she was shaken by Waters’ calls, but given his perceived ability 

to aid her in her retention efforts, she “wanted him to think that he had – that his call had 

influenced me, but it hadn’t influenced me. I think I just wanted him to think that I – that 

he had gotten through to me, when he hadn’t.” Id. at 190-91. Consistent with various of 

her statements to the federal authorities, Appellant maintained that she followed her 

own procedures throughout and did not render any decision in any pending case that 

she would not have made in any event. See, e.g., id. at 191, 197 (“I’m just going to do 

the right thing and hope that this goes away.”). In this regard, Appellant adamantly 
[J-49B-2017] - 9

denied ever having told Agent Ruona that she considered “tipping” a decision in a close 

case. See id. at 212.

Appellant nonetheless pervasively acknowledged the wrongfulness of her 

conduct. For example, she testified:

I was wrong. I should have reported [Waters]. I should have said, don’t 

ever call me again. This is wrong. I didn’t do that. I should have recused 

myself.

Id. at 191; see also id. at 198-99, 216, 245. She also testified that, after the third set of 

calls, she told Waters not to call again. See, e.g., id. at 198. Although she repeatedly 

conceded that she should have taken action earlier, Appellant stated that some of the 

delay was accounted for by a request for confidentiality from federal officials. See id. at 

215.

Finally, Appellant presented six character witnesses, some of whom also testified 

about the circumstances of the cases that were the subject of the recorded 

conversations. The purport of this latter testimony was to suggest that the rulings were 

either correct or, at least, were rendered in good faith.5

Soon after the trial, the CJD suspended Appellant from her judicial duties on an 

interim basis without pay.

C. Decisions

The CJD issued an opinion determining that Appellant committed all charged 

violations. See In re Segal, No. 3 JD 2015, slip op. (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. July 21, 2016)

(“Segal (Findings)”). Its findings of fact tracked the Stipulation, supplemented with 

descriptions of the trial testimony, although it did not make specific credibility rulings 

 

5 Appellant has conceded that she made an error of law in her ruling relative to the 

criminal case.
[J-49B-2017] - 10

about some matters in factual controversy, such as whether Appellant ever stated that 

she might “tip” a close case in a litigant’s favor in response to Waters’ entreaties.

In its discussion, the court began with Canon 2B’s proscription against judges 

knowingly permitting others to convey the impression that they are in a special position 

to influence the judge. The CJD recounted that Appellant engaged in ex parte

communications with Waters on multiple occasions, listened to his requests, asked

pertinent questions of him, found for the favored parties while subject to an undisclosed 

taint, and called Waters afterwards to advise him of her compliance. Thus, the CJD 

concluded that Appellant conveyed to Waters that he was in a position to influence her, 

thereby failing to fulfill Canon 2B’s requirements. See id. at 27.

The court applied a similar rationale relative to Canon 3A(4)’s provision that 

judges must not consider ex parte communications concerning a pending matter. It 

noted that there is no requirement “that the ‘consideration’ given to the ex parte

requests be determinative of the errant judge’s decision . . .. All that is required is that 

the ex parte communication be considered which it obviously was here.” Id. at 28. 

Therefore, the CJD found Appellant in violation of Canon 3A(4).

Next, the CJD discussed Appellant’s violation of her responsibility, under Canon 

3B(3), to report Waters’ misconduct to disciplinary authorities. The court explained that 

Appellant could have rendered a report long before federal authorities requested 

confidentiality. See id. at 29 (highlighting that Appellant “first met with [the federal 

prosecutor who requested confidentiality] on December 10, 2013, more than two years 

after the ex parte communications in Houdini and approximately one and one-half years 

after the ex parte communications in Rexach and Khoury”).

In terms of a judge’s obligation to recuse under Canon 3C(1), the CJD reasoned 

that Appellant’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned in each of the cases 
[J-49B-2017] - 11

discussed in the recorded conversations because Waters asked for special 

consideration for certain litigants, and Appellant told him they would be so favored. The 

court noted that, after Waters’ entreaties, Appellant knew the names of the favored 

parties in the upcoming proceeding. It again highlighted Appellant’s efforts, after those 

proceedings, to advise Waters about her rulings. See id. at 31 (“All of these statements 

demonstrate an appearance of bias or prejudice in favor of certain parties in the 

Houdini, Rexach and Khoury cases and give rise to significant, reasonable questions 

about Respondent Segal’s ability to be impartial in ruling on those matters.”).

Based on the above infractions, the CJD found a derivative violation of the 

Constitution’s prohibition against disobeying canons of judicial ethics. See PA. CONST.

art. V, §17(b). Furthermore, the CJD discerned a violation of the Constitution’s 

Administration of Justice Clause, see id. §18(d)(1), in that Appellant’s failure to disclose 

the ex parte communications deprived opposing parties of the opportunity to challenge 

her ability to be fair and impartial and to request recusal. See Segal (Findings), slip op. 

at 32-33 (“When Respondent Segal actively listened to Waters’ ex parte requests for 

special consideration, when she presided over the three cases instead of disqualifying 

herself, and when she placed the ex parte follow-up calls to Waters to report the posture 

of the still-pending proceedings in Houdini, Rexach and Khoury, Respondent Segal 

interfered with the systematic operation or normal functions of the Municipal Court and 

thereby affected the proper administration of justice.”); accord In re Segal, No. 3 JD 

2015, slip op. at 8 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. Sept. 23, 2016) (opinion on post-verdict motions) 

(“A judge repeatedly agreeing with another judge to find in favor of a party on three 

separate occasions and assuring him of her compliance unquestionably defies ‘the 

reasonable expectations of the public of a judicial officer’s conduct.’” (quoting In re 

Carney, 621 Pa. 476, 501, 79 A.3d 490, 494 (2013))).
[J-49B-2017] - 12

The CJD recognized an obligation, on its part, to consider whether Appellant 

acted knowingly. See Segal (Findings), slip op. at 33 (citing In re Sullivan, 135 A.3d 

1164, 1173 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2016)). Based on the content of the conversations and 

Appellant’s various admissions, the CJD deemed such knowledge to have been readily 

established. Responding to Appellant’s explanations that her rulings were unaffected, 

the CJD explained:

Even if Respondent Segal’s rulings were the same as they would have 

been absent the prohibited ex parte communications, she purposefully led 

Waters to believe that his calls influenced her decisions. At a minimum, 

that approach seems to have led to more ex parte communications from 

Waters seeking to influence Respondent Segal’s decisions as shown by 

Waters’ further attempts in Rexach and Khoury, after his apparent 

success in Houdini.

Id. at 33-34 (emphasis in original). The court concluded that Appellant’s willingness to 

engage in repeated ex parte communications with Waters and imply she was favoring 

certain litigants at his behest – thereby encouraging more ex parte contacts – had a 

“deleterious effect upon the administration of justice” and, as such, violated Article V, 

Section 18(d)(1). Id. at 34.

Finally, the CJD found that Appellant had brought her judicial office into 

disrepute, thus offending the Disrepute Clause of Article V, Section 18(d)(1) of the 

Constitution. The court observed that such a violation requires conduct that not only 

affects the reputation of the particular judge, but also tarnishes that of the judicial office 

itself. See id. at 35 (citing In re Berkhimer, 593 Pa. 366, 373, 930 A.2d 1255, 1258-50

(Pa. 2007)). It added that the standard implicates the public’s reasonable expectations 

of a jurist’s behavior, see id. (quoting Carney, 621 Pa. at 501, 79 A.3d at 494), and that 

the assessment is undertaken as if the public is aware of the underlying misconduct. 

See id. (quoting In re Berry, 979 A.2d 991, 999-1000 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2009)). 

Viewing Appellant’s conduct in its totality, and again focusing in part on Appellant’s 
[J-49B-2017] - 13

failure to disclose the ex parte communications to the litigants, the CJD determined that 

the Board had met its burden in establishing the violation. See id. at 35-36.

Appellant filed post-verdict motions, which the CJD denied in a separate opinion. 

See In re Segal, No. 3 JD 2015, slip op. (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. Sept. 23, 2016). In addition 

to addressing a series of discrete claims, the CJD responded in general terms to 

Appellant’s criticism of its approach to factual matters:

In this case we are presented with a judge (Respondent Segal) who 

engaged in ex parte contacts with another judge (Waters) to secretly favor 

one party over another in three separate cases. Multiple wiretapped calls 

were intercepted by the FBI between the two wherein they discussed 

details concerning the favoritism and resultant rulings. Respondent Segal 

called Waters after each case to let him know she had ruled favorably for 

the litigant he backed. The transcripts of the intercepted calls and other 

evidence clearly make out the violations charged. Other facts become 

much less significant when the intercepted calls are considered.

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).

Along these lines, the CJD did not attach much relevance to Appellant’s efforts to 

highlight the evidence that Waters’ ex parte contacts requesting favorable treatment for 

a particular litigant did not alter her decision-making. Rather, the court kept its focus on 

Appellant’s objective misconduct, which it described as “blatantly improper” and 

“absolutely inexcusable.” Id. at 2. According to the court, every decision Appellant 

made in a case affected by such contacts was tainted, and it mattered little whether or 

not Appellant, in fact, acted upon Waters’ overtures. See, e.g., id. at 2, 6 (indicating that 

the violations in question do not follow from Appellant’s actual rulings in Rexach, 

Khoury, and Houdini, but from her “repeated improper ex parte contacts, and her 

assurances to Waters that she would do his bidding”).

Additionally, the court addressed Appellant’s criticism that it had disregarded the 

testimony from her character witnesses, reasoning that “the wiretap evidence 
[J-49B-2017] - 14

undermines any possible finding of innocence.” Id. at 6; see also id. at 6-7 (observing 

that Appellant’s “own words on the wiretaps speak much more convincingly than any 

claim that she generally has positive traits”). In this respect, the court found that the 

character evidence would be of greater relevance at the sanctions stage.6

Subsequently, the court conducted a sanctions hearing, at which Appellant 

testified and acknowledged the gravity of her misconduct – primarily in terms of failing to 

protect the integrity of the judicial process in the three cases in question – and the 

negative light cast upon her colleagues on the bench. See N.T., Nov. 11, 2016, at 9-11, 

19; see also In re Segal, 151 A.3d 734, 737 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2016) (quoting 

Appellant’s testimony in this regard). Additionally, at her request the character 

testimony from the trial was incorporated into the record.

On December 16, 2016, the CJD issued its opinion imposing the sanction of 

removing Appellant from office and barring her from serving as a judicial officer in the 

future. See id. at 739. The court considered ten, non-exclusive factors derived from In 

re Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987). See Segal, 151 A.3d at 737-38.7 The court 

 

6 Appellant lodged other post-verdict objections which the CJD found meritless. See id.

at 7-8.

7

The factors are: (1) whether the conduct is an isolated event or part of a pattern of 

conduct; (2) the nature, extent, and frequency of the acts of misconduct; (3) whether the 

conduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (4) whether the conduct occurred in the 

judge’s official capacity or in her private life; (5) whether the judge has acknowledged or 

recognized that the acts occurred; (6) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to 

change or modify her conduct; (7) the judge’s length of service on the bench; (8) 

whether there have been prior complaints about the judge; (9) the conduct’s effect on 

the integrity of, and respect for, the judiciary; and (10) the extent to which the judge 

exploited her position to satisfy her personal desires. Cf. Cynthia Gray, A Study of 

State Judicial Discipline Sanctions 81-82 (Am. Judicature Soc’y 2002) (enumerating 39

factors which courts in various jurisdictions have identified as relevant to the selection of 

an appropriate sanction).
[J-49B-2017] - 15

found the application of some of the factors to be mitigating, and it also acknowledged 

Appellant’s sincere remorse. It noted, however, that the proceedings’ main purpose is 

to safeguard the public from judicial corruption rather than to punish the errant judge. 

The court then concluded, after a review of all of the evidence, that

we must reject respondent’s earlier contention that the problems here 

were all created by Waters and his corrupt motives. We find nothing in the 

record which even remotely suggests that Respondent’s misconduct was 

anything but fully voluntary and done to protect her own political welfare. 

Based on the overwhelming nature of the evidence in this case by way of 

the wiretapped conversations, and in light of the clear mandates of the 

canons and constitutional provisions, we conclude that Respondent’s 

conduct shows she knowingly acted in derogation of the judicial canons 

and, therefore, her actions amounted to willful misconduct.

It cannot be reasonably disputed that Respondent was approached by a 

corrupt judge. However, rather than refuse to participate in his requests, 

she complied and willfully engaged in the ex parte appeals that he

extended. As we have said in more detail in prior decisions, when it 

comes to corrupt acts and the derogation of a fair and just judicial process, 

a judge must have “the willingness to stand up for what [is] right and buck 

a corrupt tide.”

Id. at 739 (footnote omitted).

D. Appeal

Presently, Appellant asserts that the CJD’s decisions are subject to “plenary 

review by this Court.” Brief for Appellant at 21. Her brief develops that judicial conduct 

proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, requiring respondent jurists to be afforded the 

full panoply of constitutional rights enjoyed by defendants in criminal cases. See

Carney, 621 Pa. at 505, 79 A.3d at 508. The burden of proof borne by the Board, she 

explains, is to demonstrate violations by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 493-

94, 79 A.3d at 501.
[J-49B-2017] - 16

Appellant argues that the CJD deprived her of due process and the presumption 

of innocence by failing to offer any reasoned consideration of the evidence adduced on 

her behalf, opting instead to reproduce the Board’s proposed factual findings verbatim.8 

In particular, Appellant charges that the court simply ignored her character evidence. 

While Appellant concedes various of the violations, she adamantly maintains that she 

did not violate Canons 3A(4) and 3C(1) or the Constitution’s Administration of Justice 

and Disrepute Clauses. She emphasizes that she was never charged with, nor did the 

court find, that her judicial decisions were affected or altered by her ex parte contacts

with Waters. It is also Appellant’s position that she never benefitted from those 

improper communications. According to Appellant, the CJD erroneously “created an 

allegation of case corruption and case fixing and attached it to Judge Segal to justify 

[her] removal.” Brief for Appellant at 18. To the contrary, she asserts, “the record in this 

case shows Judge Segal was ‘an unwitting participant in’” Waters’ schemes. Id. at 20 

(quoting In re Chiovero, 524 Pa. 181, 198, 570 A.2d 57, 65 (1990)).

More specifically, with reference to the Houdini matter, Appellant claims that the 

CJD erroneously indicated that she had acted at Waters’ request to grant a 

continuance, which she would not otherwise have done. Here, Appellant focuses on the 

court’s statement that she had “granted the continuance as requested.” Brief for 

Appellant at 22 (quoting Segal (Findings), slip op. at 7). Again, she proffers that such 

award was eminently consistent with ordinary judicial practices and maintains that there 

is no evidence of record to support a finding of causation. Similarly, relative to Rexach, 

Appellant contends that the court ignored uncontested evidence that her decision was 

appropriate and consistent with her usual practices. Further, Appellant asserts that the 

 

8 Appellant notes that the court’s opinion contains typographical errors and repeated 

misstatements concerning the trial date, derived from the Board’s proposed findings.
[J-49B-2017] - 17

court erroneously indicated that she had knowledge that the litigant favored by Waters 

was former judge Roca’s son. As to Khoury, Appellant contends that the CJD erred in 

finding that she had told Agent Ruona that “[s]he was more open to the argument of 

Attorney Fuschino because of his relationship with former Judge Waters and because of 

the July 23, 2014 call from Waters.” Segal (Findings), slip op. at 25. Appellant cites to 

her own contrary trial testimony, which she characterizes as uncontradicted.

Returning to the broader plane, Appellant relates that she has consistently 

expressed remorse for her conduct and stresses that she self-reported in 2014, 

cooperated fully with the federal criminal investigation, did not seek legal protection 

relative to such undertaking, voluntarily appeared before a federal grand jury on the 

same terms, and cooperated fully with the Board’s investigation. She also points to her 

five-year history on the bench, the absence of prior complaints, and the ample evidence 

demonstrating that she enjoyed an outstanding reputation as a hard-working, 

competent, ethical judge. Appellant concludes with a discussion of several other judicial 

disciplinary cases, including In re Daghir, 657 A.2d 1032 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 1995), In re 

Vann, 1 J.D. 15, slip op. (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. Dec. 23, 2015), In re Singletary, 967 A.2d 

1094 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2008), In re DeLeon, 967 A.2d 460 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2008), In 

re Berry, 979 A.2d 991 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2009), and In re Hamilton, 932 A.2d 1030 

(Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2007). She argues that the sanction of removal imposed upon her is 

disproportionate to the disciplinary action taken in those matters.

II. Discussion

In the companion case, we have set forth the standard of review pertaining to 

appeals from disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Court of Judicial Discipline. In this 

respect, we differ with Appellant’s position that our review is plenary in all respects. See 

Roca, ___ Pa. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___.
[J-49B-2017] - 18

Certainly, we review challenges to the court’s rulings about matters of law on a 

plenary basis, consistent with ordinary principles of appellate review. Our review of 

credibility judgments and discretionary determinations, however, is highly deferential, 

and we bear in mind that the CJD is the tribunal which is expressly authorized under the 

Constitution to impose lawful discipline upon jurists. See PA. CONST. art. V, §18(b); 

accord Roca, ___ Pa. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___ (“[W]e do not substitute our concept of 

the appropriate penalty for that chosen by the CJD. Rather, we ask whether the 

sanction is ‘lawful.’”).

In terms of Appellant’s discrete challenges to the factual findings, like the CJD we 

do not find these to be of controlling significance. The court’s main emphasis was on 

Appellant’s knowing participation in improper ex parte communications with Waters, 

encompassing her portrayal, to him at least, that she was willingly accepting his corrupt 

and corrosive propositioning.

For present purposes, we do not read the Board’s findings as reflecting that 

Appellant rendered any ruling in the three underlying matters other than what she would 

have made regardless. Rather, our focus, like that of the CJD, rests upon whether the 

repeated and willing participation by Appellant in ex parte communications directed 

toward debasing the judicial decision-making process – and undertaken with the 

purpose of gaining favor with the corrupting influence – is sufficient to warrant the 

sanction of removal.

We conclude that it is. As Appellant candidly acknowledged at the sanctions 

hearing, her actions are of a kind which are an affront to the administration of justice 

and diminish confidence in the judiciary at large. See Segal, 151 A.3d at 737 (relating

Appellant’s appreciation that “I know that I reflected poorly on my court and other judges 

by not protecting the process. . .. I feel awful about the negative light that I’ve portrayed 
[J-49B-2017] - 19

my colleagues, who are trying to give justice . . ..”). Significantly, the offending conduct 

occurred while Appellant was acting in her judicial capacity. Charged with the 

responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial system, the CJD has the discretion to 

remove those who would repeatedly act intentionally and overtly to degrade the process

in such an extraordinary fashion.

9

Although Appellant’s character testimony was mitigating and militated toward 

leniency, the CJD was not obliged to prioritize it over the interests of the pubic and the 

judicial system at large. For our part, we are aligned with the court’s overarching 

conclusion that a judge who repeatedly and intentionally implies she is deciding matters 

in pending cases based on undisclosed and improper ex parte contacts, with the 

 

9

In further reply to Appellant’s particularized challenges concerning factual matters, 

briefly, we do not regard the CJD’s statement – that Appellant had “continued the 

Houdini matter as requested,” Segal (Findings), slip op. at 7 – as reflecting causality. 

Rather, in the broader context of the court’s explanations that causality was of little 

relevance to its decision, the statement would appear to be merely that Appellant’s 

decision had been consistent with Waters’ request.

With respect to Rexach, the CJD’s findings do not contain an express credibility 

judgment as to when Appellant apprehended that the defendant was the son of former 

common pleas judge Roca. Rather, such findings only relate that an agent testified that 

Appellant had said that “maybe Waters had met her in person in a robing room and told 

her that Rexach was Judge Roca’s son.” Id. at 18-19.

Similarly, regarding Khoury, the court did not specifically credit Agent Ruona’s testimony 

that Appellant said “[s]he was more open to the argument of Attorney Fuschino because 

of his relationship with former judge Waters and because of the July 23, 2014 call from 

Waters.” Id. at 25. Rather, the relevant passage of its opinion merely relates that 

“Agent Ruona testified” to that effect. Id.

In each of these instances, it is apparent that the CJD did not find it necessary to render 

close factual findings based, e.g., on credibility determinations. While discrete 

judgments adverse to Appellant concerning the matters might have been aggravating, 

the court evidently regarded her acknowledged wrongful conduct to be sufficient, in and 

of itself, to implicate her removal.
[J-49B-2017] - 20

objective to curry favor, exposes herself to being removed from judicial office by the 

tribunal constitutionally authorized to determine the appropriate sanction.10 We are not 

in a position to second-guess the court’s assessment concerning the impact upon public 

confidence of restoring such a judge to service.

In terms of Appellant’s criticisms of the CJD’s adoption of proposed findings and 

the brevity of its disposition, the court did not err in borrowing content from the 

Stipulation and proposed findings, which were prepared and presented for that very 

purpose. It is sufficient that the court’s opinion demonstrates independent judgment, 

and we believe that it does. In particular, the CJD apparently found it to be so selfevident that the character of Appellant’s sustained course of conduct implicated the 

sanction of removal that there would be little purpose in belaboring the point. There is 

nothing in its approach to the factual matters or to sanctions that suggests a denial of 

due process or a disregard of the presumption of innocence, as Appellant alleges.

We proceed to the technical arguments that Appellant did not violate some of the 

particular ethical directives under review. First, we hold that the CJD was correct in 

concluding that she violated Canon 3A(4), which prohibits judges from considering ex 

parte communications concerning a pending matter. See Code of Judicial Conduct, 

Canon 3A(4) (superseded). Although Appellant stresses she did not, in fact, act on the 

acknowledged ex parte contacts, thus contending that she did not “consider” them, the 

court aptly explained that “[t]here is no requirement that the ‘consideration’ given to the 

ex parte requests be determinative of the errant judge’s decision[.]” Segal (Findings), 

slip op. at 28. The recordings of Appellant’s conversations with Waters demonstrate

that she understood what he was asking for and reported back to him in each instance 

 

10 This is so, in our judgment, even if the appearance of biased decision-making is 

intended by the judge to be limited to a single other person (here, Waters).
[J-49B-2017] - 21

that she had complied with his request. It is untenable to suggest Appellant had put 

those requests completely out of her mind in the interim, such that they would not have 

been “considered” at all.

Second, and contrary to Appellant’s position, it is apparent that she violated 

Canon 3C(1)’s requirement that judges refrain from presiding over cases in which their 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 

3C(1). Appellant’s sole argument on this point is based on the premise that she never

acted with partiality, a proposition which we have accepted for decisional purposes, but 

deem to be immaterial to the fact of an infraction. By focusing on whether a jurist’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned, Canon 3C(1) addresses the broader 

appearance of partiality. Although examples of violations include proceeding with actual 

bias, such examples are expressly described in a non-exclusive fashion. As the CJD 

explained, the appearance of partiality in the present circumstances is manifest, and no 

credence is due to the advocacy suggesting to the contrary.

Next, Appellant argues that she did not prejudice the proper administration of 

justice for purposes of Article V, Section 18(d)(1) of the Constitution. In this regard, 

citing to In re Zupsic, 893 A.2d 875 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2005), she asserts that the CJD 

has required that a judge proceed with actual bias before a violation may be found. 

Again, however, the discussion in Zupsic is framed in non-exclusive terms. See id. at 

889 (characterizing actual bias as an “example” of conduct which prejudices the 

administration of justice (quoting In re Smith, 687 A.2d 1229, 1238 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 

1996))). Presently, according to her own stipulations and testimony, Appellant knew 

that she had been approached by a corrosive influence, yet she remained in her 

decisional role while acting as if she was acceding to the improprieties. Litigants can 

have little confidence that a judge proceeding in this way is rendering fair and impartial 
[J-49B-2017] - 22

rulings; rather, they may reasonably believe that such a jurist is doing precisely what 

she said she was doing by engaging in favoritism. Like the CJD, we discern a palpable 

impact upon the proper administration of justice in these circumstances.

Appellant further maintains that she did not bring the judicial office into disrepute 

for purposes of Article V, Section 18(d)(1). See PA. CONST. art. V, §18(d)(1). For the 

same reasons, we find to the contrary, as the factual Stipulation alone affords an ample 

predicate in support of the CJD’s determination. Notably, as previously discussed, 

Appellant herself appropriately recognized the deleterious impact of her conduct on the 

judicial system and her former colleagues at the sanctions hearing, see Segal, 151 A.3d 

at 737, and we credit this fitting expression of responsibility and contrition over the 

contrary position advanced in her brief.

Finally, we consider Appellant’s contention that the removal sanction is 

disproportionate to the discipline imposed on other similarly-situated jurists. We have 

explained in Roca that discretionary sanctions decisions of the court are not amenable 

to a close proportionality assessment, which is not provided for in the Constitution. 

Rather, it is our task to determine whether the sentence is lawful, which it clearly is on 

account of the gravity of the conduct and the concomitant prejudice to the proper 

administration of justice, as well as the fact that Appellant has brought the judicial office 

into disrepute. See PA. CONST. art. V, §18(d)(1). Moreover, in none of the cases 

referenced by Appellant did a judge repeatedly suggest she was rendering judicial 

rulings in multiple pending cases based on corrupting overtures.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the sanction imposed by the CJD was lawful and, as 

such, we lack authority to disapprove it. Accordingly, the order of the Court of Judicial 

Discipline is affirmed.
[J-49B-2017] - 23

Justices Baer, Todd, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.

Justice Donohue files a dissenting opinion.

Justice Dougherty did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.