500 

400 

Aerospace 

M 300 TS 

200 

100 

DENG 

fiscal Years 

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Objective: To provide tke-thaited_States-v4th.photographic intelligence information pealaiiaillg_ 

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SAFSL Responsibility: Complete systems management iobs.lacling-sibr..t.enin.g..amtd 

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Technical Description: The MOL system consists of a Titan LUM booster and an orbiting 

vehicle which includes a Gemini B re-entry vehicle, Laboratory Vehicle and Mission Module. 

The orbiting vehicle, weighting 32, 000 lbs., will support two men in a qhirtqleeve environment for 30 days. The MOL system Will have a capability to obtain ground 

resolution photography primarily for technical intelligence purposes. 

Present Aerospace Role: General Systems Engineering and Technical Direction. 

Contractor Responsibilities: T-IIIM booster - Martin Company; Gemini B - McDonnell 

Aircraft Company; Laboratory Vehicle, Mission Module structure and systems integration -

Douglas Aircraft Company; Mission Module equipment and experiment integration - General 

Electric Co.; photographic equipment - Eastman Kodak; pressure suit - Hamilton Standard. 

Program History: Pre-Phase I cost effectiveness and preliminary system design studies 

were initiated in 1960. Presidential approval to enter Phase I (Program Definition) was 

given in August 1965. In December 1965, direction was received to provide a capability for 

operation. Definitive contracts were signed in May 1967 initiating the Engineering 

Development Phase (Phase II). 

Launches: November 3, 1966 - Successful Gemini B heat shield qualification demonstration. 

There are seven MOL flights planned, two unmanned test, three manned and two with automatic operation, starting in early 1970 and concluding in mid 1972. 

Status: The Program is currently in Phase II, Engineering Development. 

Aerospace Participation: In mid 1960, Aerospace initiated studies of manned military 

space system concepts. Cost and effectiveness of a wide range of possible manned 

military missions were investigated leading to the conclusion that the reconnaissance 

area presented the most attractive possibility for a manned system. Subsequently, 

Aerospace technically directed industry studies defining the necessary booster and 

reconnaissance space payload combinations. -.AerrIsracPth Pri 

—ef-tire-Progra-ryr-Fetrir: Following Program approval, Aerospace has provided GSE/TD 

during the selection of associate contractors and the Program definition. GsarTently)- 

-the-PrIagram-includi s4zfalternate-equipna,ent.ti-ae-..and-grovet+r-erepainiitiern 

Systems Research MOL Systems 

& Planning Division Engineering Office 

500 

400 

Total Program 

Expenditures 

300 

($ Millions) 

200 

100 

0 
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Ivil0L'iti)01(.1.AN PROGRAM 

I Importance of the Program to the United States 

The United States has a vital need for intelligence information 

pertaining to activities/developments within the Sino-Soviet and other 

denied areas. For various intelligence purposes, the types, quality, 

and quantity of information to be collected vary considerably, and 

therefore, a multiplicity of programs are contributing toward the fulfillment of the overall objective. Of significant importance to the total 

intelligence picture is the need for very high-resolution photographic 

coverage primarily for technical intelligence purposes, and it is to this 

purpose that the MOL/DORIAN Program is oriented. This program will 

provide the United States with a capability to obtain ground resolution photography, imagery of a quality far surpassing that associated 

with our present base of photographic intelligence. 

II Contributions of Aerospace to the Program 

For the first three years following its inception in mid-1960, 

Aerospace Corporation personnel were engaged in studies of manned 

military space system technologies, vehicle and system concepts, costs 

and effectiveness. These studies were perforthed for a wide range of 

possible manned military missions. It became clear, as a result of 

these activities, that a justifiable manned program could only be 

defined in the context of a mission area fulfilling a vital national need, and 

that, furthermore, the presence of the man must demonstrably enhance 

the mission effectiveness. 

The results of the mission studies indicated that the reconnaissance 

area presented the most attractive possibility for a manned system 

definition consistent with the foregoing thinking, and in the fall of 1963, 

Aerospace Corporation initiated intensive efforts in analyzing all aspects 

of the reconnaissance mission area to determine where the presence of 
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man would permit the realization of performance capabilities 

unattainable in unmanned approaches. While these studies were not 

limited to photographic reconnaissance only, primary emphasis was 

placed on this area. 

It soon became clear that field-of-view limitations, precise 

image-motion-compensation requirements, and across-the-format 

(geometric) smears associated with optical systems designed to achieve 

very high ground resolution presented technological 

limitations which could be circumvented by using man to perform 

acquisition, target centering and tracking functions. Detailed analysis 

of man's ability to perform these functions and the equipments necessary 

to permit this were then initiated 

Concurrently with the foregoing, conceptual studies were 

accomplished by Aerospace Corporation to define an overall flight 

vehicle and system. These studies resulted in selection of an orbiting 

vehicle comprised of a modified Gemini spacecraft, a laboratory 

module, and a large-aperture optical system, with a Titan III 

vehicle in the integral launch mode. 

In late 1963, the direction of these activities underwent a major 

change based on instructions received from Washington. It was then the 

opinion of DOD leadership that the first step should be of a more limited 

nature. Rather than working toward the development of an operational 

reconnaissance system, an experimental approach was thought more 

appropriate to assess the ability of man to perform critical missionoriented functions. 

For the next year, planning activities were oriented toward that 

goal. Considerable efforts were expended in detailed analysis of 

potential manned contributions to militaty space missions, again 

primarily in the reconnaissance area, and resulted in the definition of 

a group of primary experiments for the MOL Program. 
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During this period Aerospace defined and technically directed 

industry studies pertaining to the definitions of the necessary experiments 

payloads and major vehicle subsystems. Simultaneously, vehicle 

systems and operations studies were continued toward this newly defined 

program objective. These efforts resulted in generation of a Preliminary 

Technical Development Plan, a System Performance/Design Requirements 

specification and formal definition of the program Phase Zero industry 

efforts. The Aerospace effort was also aimed at narrowing down the 

approaches requiring consideration by industry, and assuring a high 

caliber RFP input and efficient contractor effort. In order-to accomplish 

this it was necessary to establish a sound system configuration with 

growth potential; establish the preferable subsystems as to type, characteristics, 

and requirements to limit scope of contractor's investigations; identify 

potential critical problem areas requiring detailed investigation; establish 

long lead time and development items; define the major trade-off considerations required to be investigated by the contractors; delineate the environmental criteria to be utilized by the contractors in their studies; develop 

probable contractor cost estimates for Air Force budgeting/planning considerations; and assist in establishing system segment definitions and 

associate contractor roles and responsibilities. Additionally, continual 

system planning activity assured that necessary flexibility for growth 

for an effective operational capability was maintained in the design. 

The necessity for an experiments-oriented program and the ability 

to justify the large dollar expenditures necessary for its conduct was again ✓ 

questioned by Aerospace Corporation in late 1964. Analysis of man's 

ability to perform the defined critical mission functions, plus the results 

of simulations conducted as part of the industry studies leading to the definition of the experimental payloads, engendered a high degree of confidence that these functions could in fact be performed, and that little 

additional confidence in this premise could be obtained via actual space flight. 

Aerospace again argued that the dollar expenditure necessary to realize 

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a manned system could only be supported if it resulted in an operational 

high-resolution photographic reconnaissance system, and toward the 

end of 1964 this position prevailed. 

From then through the summer of 1965, Aerospace Corporation 

was heavily engaged in design and systems analysis studies leading to 

the definition of the MOL/DORIAN Program. Utilizing parametric 

data on optical payload characteristics, developed through EastmanKodak and Aerospace Corporation analyses, systems analyses were 

conducted to optimize, within the launch vehicle constraints, the performance attainable as measured by resolution; mission duration and 

quantity of photographic take; and to demonstrate the advantages attainable via a manned approach. These studies resulted in the definition 

of the MOL/DORIAN flight vehicle concept and in the quantitative 

definition of the primary program objective of achieving ground 

resolution photography. Furthermore, the baseline system, as defined in the system spec, incorporated sufficient flexibility for possible growth to 

improve mission economics and performance through a variety of 

potential alternative approaches. In response to questions raised at a 

national level, major technical and economic studies were completed 

which fully substantiated the baseline flight vehicle and launch site 

selection. These studies considered Saturn I and Titan III launch 

vehicles, Apollo and Gemini/MOL spacecraft, and operations from ETR 

and WTR. Briefings summarizing these efforts, presented at high 

levels of government during the summer of 1965, led to approval of the 

program by the President in August 1965. 

Following program approval, Aerospace Corporation personnel 

contributed heavily to the detailed definition of the Phase I program and 

supported the Air Force System Program Office in establishing the 

necessary activities at the selected associate contractors. Detailed 

reviews of the contractor approaches and designs have been conducted 

on a continuing basis and technical direction provided to all aspects of 
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the program to ensure the development of an overall system compatible 

with mission objectives. The MOL Program utilizes Technical Working 

Groups, Interface Control Working Groups, and Technical Direction/ 

Program Review Meetings in accomplishing technical management. The 

Aerospace Corporation provides chairmanship of the Technical Working 

Groups and Technical Direction Meetings. Many of the Technical 

Working Groups are functionally oriented and serve to integrate activities across the multiple contractor structure. 

In late 1965, Washington requested that the feasibility and 

practicality of a parallel effort to develop an unmanned DORIAN system 

be investigated to ensure that the Country could retain this intelligence 

capability in the event that the use of the man was denied for any reason. 

Aerospace performed an in-depth appraisal of the technical feasibility of 

an unmanned DORIAN system, and during this study it was demonstrated 

that recent advances in navigation, pointing and image-motion control 

devices could result in an unmanned system providing comparable 

resolution performance. These devices were therefore included in both 

the manned and newly-defined unmanned configurations in the MOL/DORIAN 

program. 

At this point, the need for a manned program again came under 

close scrutiny. If the resolution performance could be attained unmanned, 

then could the manned program be justified solely on the basis of earlier 

maturity of the unmanned system? Aerospace personnel therefore 

initiated a complete review of all aspects of the photographic reconnaissance operation to determine if there were primary mission functions 

other than acquisition and tracking, now automatable, that the man could 

perform which would result in a significant effectiveness advantage over 

the unmanned approach. Questions of in,:reased total take due to man's 

performance of weather avoidance and target verification functions were 

subjected to rigorous statistical analyses, and while they could•improve 

the mission effectiveness, the improvement was disappointingly low. 

The basic field-of-view limitation, it was then realized, had 

implications other than just a severe navigation and pointing requirement. 
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In effect, it results in the ability to contain but a single target within 

the field-of-view, as opposed to the multiplicity of targets containable 

within a single frame of lower-resolution, but wider field, photography. 

How then could photography of the right target at the right time be 

assured, considering that the presence of things or activities at the 

target which could yield vital technical intelligence information are 

highly transitory events ? This thinking led Aerospace to the definition 

of the active indicator concept, wherein the astronauts utilizing high 

power acquisition telescopes could access targets other than those 

pre -programmed for the main camera. If activity was detected, they 

could redirect the main camera to these alternate targets thus 

enhancing the value of the technical intelligence information contained 

in the imagery. Analyses of the effectiveness of this mode have indicated 

that for an overall mission two to three times the number of active 

targets could be imaged by a manned system, and in the case of certain 

important, high-density, target clusters as many as six times. 

This concept was received by Dr. Flax and PSAC, with considerable interest and has since been subjected to considerable analysis in 

terms of the targeting programming problem and the nature of the 

necessary improved acquisition system. Additionally, simulators were 

.fabricated and extensive exploratory simulations, using flight crew 

members as subjects, were conducted at Aerospace, and these tests have 

confirmed man's ability to perform the necessary visual target inspections. 

As a result, the improved acquisition system has been incorporated into 

the baseline system and the mission planning software is being defined to 

include the capability for alternate target selection and programming. 

Early in 1966 it was apparent that program financial constraints 

and schedule considerations were such that significant changes in technical 

approach would be necessary. Accordingly, Aerospace identified areas 

which would enable reductions in program costs and which would have the 

least impact in reducing potential attainment of system objectives. In 

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addition to many hardware and test deletions, consideration was given 

to flight development schedules "in terms of alternative sequencing 

and deletions of flights. These efforts contributed to changes including 

deletion of one mission simulator, reduction in complexity of development and test fixtures and devices, deletion of the laboratory environmental control system suit loop, simplification of the monitor and 

alarm system, deletion of two flights, and an adjustment in the launch 

schedule. 

More recently, 11..erospace was asked to reinvestigate the possibility 

of using the MOL/DORIAN payload 

under the conztraint that no modifications to the hardware be made to achieve these 

capabilities. The results of Aerospace analyses indicated that these 

capabilities were attainable under this constraint, and based upon 

briefings presented to Major General Stewart in April 1967, the program 

received directions to insure the ability to incorporate these capabilities 

into the baseline, and define in depth the necessary software changes. 

Today the MOL/DORIAN Program is in Phase II engineering 

development, proceeding toward a date of December 1970 for the first 

manned flight. Aerospace Corporation is continuing in its role of 

providing general system engineering and technical direction of all 

aspects of the baseline program to ensure on-schedule and in-cost 

realization of program objectives. Studies of possible program growth 

avenues for enhancement of the primary mission objectives, as well 

as the possible utilization of MOL hardware for other military or NASA 

objectives, are underway on a continuous basis to provide overall 

longer-term direction to the program. 

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