IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 WY 7

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2012

January 17, 2013

TREVOR C. LAKE,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-12-0055

Appeal from the District Court of Crook County

The Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge 

Representing Appellant:

Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; 

Elisabeth M. W. Trefonas, Assistant Public Defender

Representing Appellee:

Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy 

Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. 

Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General

Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ., and GOLDEN, J. (Retired)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building,

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
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GOLDEN, Justice (Retired).

[¶1] Following a jury trial, Trevor C. Lake (Lake) was convicted of taking a controlled 

substance into a jail. Lake appeals his conviction, claiming that the district court erred by 

seating an unqualified juror. He also contends that the court erred in sentencing by not 

giving him full credit for time spent in presentence incarceration. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Lake presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether it is error to empanel a juror, who is not a 

resident of the County where the proceedings are held, when 

this renders the juror unqualified in violation of the Wyoming 

and United States Constitutions.

II. Whether an illegal Sentence must be corrected when

credit for time served was improperly calculated and applied

at Sentencing.

FACTS

[¶3] On October 15, 2010, Lake was arrested on three counts of aggravated assault and 

was jailed in the Crook County Detention Center. Before his October 2010 arrest, Lake 

had undergone surgery for a work injury and, both before and after his arrest, he was 

taking Percocet, a pain medication prescribed by his physician. 

[¶4] On November 22, 2010, Lake was granted a furlough to travel to Casper for a 

medical appointment and to obtain refill prescriptions for Percocet and another drug. 

When Lake returned to the Crook County Detention Center later that day, he turned his

medications over to an officer who placed them in the facility’s “med room.” On 

November 23, 2010, following a report from Lake’s cell mate, Lake’s cell was searched. 

Officers discovered eleven Percocet pills in a deodorant container that belonged to Lake 

and, on further investigation, they discovered that ten pills were missing from the bottle 

of Percocet Lake had turned in when he returned from his furlough the evening before. 

[¶5] On June 1, 2011, while Lake was still being held on the original assault charges, 

the State filed an Information charging Lake with taking a controlled substance into the 

Crook County Detention Center in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-208. The district 

court issued an arrest warrant on June 1, 2011, and on that same date, the warrant was 

served on Lake in jail. 
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[¶6] On June 14, 2011, pursuant to a plea deal that reduced the original charges against

Lake from aggravated assault to misdemeanor reckless endangering, Lake entered a

guilty plea to reckless endangering. The district court sentenced him to serve a one-year

jail sentence, with credit for 242 days of presentence incarceration. The sentence for the

reckless endangering conviction thus expired on October 15, 2011.

[¶7] While Lake was serving his sentence on the reckless endangering conviction, the 

felony charge against him for taking a controlled substance into a jail proceeded through 

motions and to a jury trial, which began on October 3, 2011. At the commencement of 

the jury trial, the district court addressed the entire jury panel and inquired into the jurors’

qualifications under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101(a), which included questions about 

residency in the county. Neither party objected to the jurors’ general qualifications, and 

the court made a finding that the panel members were qualified. 

[¶8] The district court thereafter began empanelling a jury. After administering an oath 

to the panel, the clerk drew the names of thirty-one panel members as candidates to fill 

the jury. Following instructions from the court, each prospective juror stood and 

provided certain personal information such as residence, occupation, and prior jury 

experience. When Juror 21 stood up, she stated her name and said, “I’ve been a resident 

of Crook County up until the last 30 days for 16 years. I am currently a resident in 

Campbell County.” 

[¶9] After the juror introductions, the attorneys conducted voir dire, and neither 

attorney questioned Juror 21 about her residency status. After voir dire, counsel for the 

State and for Lake passed the jury for cause. After the attorneys exercised their 

peremptory challenges, and before the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the 

following exchange occurred between the court and the attorneys:

THE COURT: All right. Do we have anything further

before we bring the jury in and seat them for purposes of the

matter?

[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I guess I do have one. I 

don’t know if it’s a question or a concern, and that would be 

in regard to juror 21, . . . . I believe she stated that she had 

just recently moved to Campbell County within 30 days. I 

don’t know if that has any affect [sic].

THE COURT: Well, now is not a time to raise it. You

passed for qualifications. You didn’t have any questions. 

The statute says, citizen of the United States who has been a 

resident of the state and of the county 90 days before being 

selected and returned.
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I think she was. I think she just recently changed.

She’s here and there were no questions or objections even 

after that information came up, so I think it’s all right. She’s 

here. We’re proceeding.

Anything else from the defense?

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Nothing, Your Honor, thank you.

[¶10] Following the presentation of evidence, the jury returned its guilty verdict on 

October 4, 2011. A sentencing hearing was held on December 21, 2011, and the district 

court imposed a sentence of twenty-four to thirty-six months, to be served consecutively 

to the sentence Lake had served on the reckless endangering conviction, which expired 

on October 15, 2011. The court granted a sentencing credit of sixty-nine days, 

representing the time between expiration of Lake’s reckless endangering sentence and the 

sentencing hearing on December 21, 2011. 

[¶11] The district court entered its sentence on December 21, 2011, and Lake timely 

filed his Notice of Appeal on January 6, 2012. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶12] Lake’s challenge to juror qualifications presents issues of statutory interpretation

and waiver, both of which are questions of law this Court reviews de novo. Bloomer v. 

State, 2009 WY 77, ¶ 8, 209 P.3d 574, 578 (Wyo. 2009) (statutory interpretation); In re 

Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1231 (Wyo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Torres v. State

ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, ¶ 7, 95 P.3d 794, 796 (Wyo. 

2004) (waiver).

[¶13] Lake’s challenge to the legality of his sentence likewise presents a question of law 

that we review de novo.

The question of whether a sentence is illegal because it

does not include proper credit for time served is a question of

law that we review de novo. Swain v. State, 2009 WY 142, ¶ 

8, 220 P.3d 504, 506 (Wyo. 2009).

Hagerman v. State, 2011 WY 151, ¶ 3, 264 P.3d 18, 19 (Wyo. 2011).
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DISCUSSION

A. Juror Qualifications

[¶14] In Wyoming, a person is competent to act as a juror if that person meets the 

requirements set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101. The statutory requirement in 

dispute in this appeal is the requirement that the juror be “a resident of the state and of the

county ninety (90) days before being selected and returned.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-

101(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2011). Lake contends that this language requires that a juror reside 

in a county for the ninety-day period preceding any jury service in that county. The 

State, on the other hand, contends that “selected and returned” refers to the preparation of 

the base jury list, which is compiled and certified annually on April 1. Thus, the State 

contends, the ninety-day residency requirement refers to the period preceding the April 1 

certification of the base jury list.

[¶15] Determining the meaning of the language “selected and returned” is a question of 

statutory interpretation, and we thus address the question using the following wellestablished rules:

In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to 

determine the legislature’s intent. All statutes must be 

construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of 

a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having 

the same general purpose must be considered and construed 

in harmony. Statutory construction is a question of law, so 

our standard of review is de novo. We endeavor to interpret 

statutes in accordance with the legislature’s intent. We begin 

by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious 

meaning of the words employed according to their 

arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a 

whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and 

we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. When a 

statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect 

to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not 

resort to the rules of statutory construction. Moreover, we 

must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its 

operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.

Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or

extend a statute to matters that do not fall within its express

provisions.
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Only if we determine the language of a statute is

ambiguous will we proceed to the next step, which involves

applying general principles of statutory construction to the

language of the statute in order to construe any ambiguous

language to accurately reflect the intent of the legislature. If

this Court determines that the language of the statute is not

ambiguous, there is no room for further construction. We will

apply the language of the statute using its ordinary and

obvious meaning.

Redco Constr. v. Profile Prop., LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶ 26, 271 P.3d 408, 415-16 (Wyo. 

2012) (quoting Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Building Code Bd. of Appeals of City of 

Cheyenne, 2010 WY 2, ¶ 9, 222 P.3d 158, 162 (Wyo. 2010)). 

[¶16] The Wyoming statutes governing jury qualification, selection, and empaneling do 

not define the term “selected and returned.” The term’s ordinary meaning is, however, 

informed by other sources. As a starting point, a “jury list” is generally defined as a “list 

of persons who may be summoned to serve as jurors.” Black’s Law Dictionary 936 (9th 

ed. 2009). The common process for compiling and returning a jury list is described in the 

following authority:

While the statutes vary as to certain details, the

essential steps in making up the jury list consist in: (1) A

selection by the proper officers of a list of names of those

persons qualified to serve as jurors. (2) The signing,

certification and return of this list to the clerk of the court, to

be filed or recorded by him. (3) The copying of the names

contained on the list upon separate slips or ballots which are

deposited in the jury box or wheel from which the panel is

subsequently drawn.

35 C.J. Juries § 213 (1924) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).

[¶17] As indicated by the above-quoted overview, the use of the terms “selected” and 

“returned,” or variations on those terms, is a reference to that point in the process when a 

jury list is being prepared. In that context, the terms refer, not to those jurors called to 

serve on a particular case, but rather to those selected to be included in the broader jury 

list, and the return of that list to the court. 

[¶18] This is an interpretation that is consistent with Wyoming’s statutorily-prescribed 

process of preparing a jury list and then subsequently summoning prospective jurors from 

that list. Wyoming’s governing statutes define the qualifications for service as a juror. 

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101. The statutes then provide for the preparation of a “list
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of persons qualified to serve as trial jurors,” which list serves as the “base jury list” from 

April 1 of the year in which the list is certified through March 31 of the following year. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-106(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added). After the base jury 

list is prepared, a clerk may summon jurors from that list to appear for trial as so ordered 

by a court. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-106(b); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-109 (LexisNexis 

2011).

[¶19] By statute, the process for preparing the list of “qualified” jurors predates and is 

separate from the process for summoning jurors to service. It likewise predates and is 

separate from the process for seating a jury. We thus agree with the State that “selected 

and returned,” as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101(a)(i), relates to the preparation of 

the base jury list – the list of qualified jurors. See also Smith v. State, 364 So.2d 1, 5 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (“selected and returned” relates to the jury list); State v. Danner, 

226 P. 475, 476 (Mont. 1924) (requirement of being a county resident ninety days before 

being “selected and returned” relates to the time at which the jury list was compiled).

[¶20] Because “selected and returned” is a reference to preparation of the base jury list, 

the critical date for measuring the duration of a prospective juror’s residence in a county 

is April 1, the date on which the base jury list is certified. In other words, any juror who 

is a resident of a county for the ninety-day period preceding April 1 meets the residence 

qualification for service in that county. 

[¶21] It is undisputed that Juror 21 was a resident of Crook County for the ninety-day 

period preceding the April 1 selection and return, and she was therefore a qualified juror. 

We thus find no error in the district court’s seating of the jury. Having found no error, 

we need not address the State’s argument that Lake waived any objection to the 

qualifications of the jury.

B. Sentencing Credit for Presentence Incarceration

[¶22] During the sentencing proceeding before the district court, Lake requested that he 

be credited 219 days against the sentence on his conviction for taking a controlled 

substance into a jail. This figure represents 152 days of custody from January 13, 2011, 

the date the Affidavit of Probable Cause in Support of Information was purportedly filed, 

to June 14, 2011, the date on which Lake was sentenced on his reckless endangering 

conviction. Lake then adds the 67-day period of presentence incarceration in this case, 

from October 15, 2011, the date that his reckless endangering sentence expired, to 

December 21, 2011, when he was sentenced on the drug-related conviction. These two 

figures total 219 days. 

[¶23] The district court denied Lake’s request and instead credited his sentence for sixtynine days of presentence incarceration, representing the period between the expiration of
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his reckless endangering sentence and sentencing in the present case.1 We agree with the

district court and reject Lake’s request for an additional credit.

[¶24] This Court has announced the following rule governing awards of credit for 

presentence confinement:

A criminal defendant is entitled to credit against his sentence

for the time he was incarcerated prior to sentencing, provided

that the confinement was due to his inability and failure to

post bond on the offense for which he was awaiting

disposition. The purpose of this rule is to provide equal

protection to defendants who are unable to post bond because

of their indigence. A defendant is not, however, entitled to

credit for the time he spent in custody when his confinement

would have continued despite his ability to post bond.

Hernandez v. State, 2009 WY 49, ¶ 7, 205 P.3d 183, 184 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Gomez v. 

State, 2004 WY 15, ¶ 18, 85 P.3d 417, 421 (Wyo. 2004)). 

[¶25] We reject Lake’s request for additional presentence confinement credit for two 

reasons. First, Lake was not in custody in the present case until June 1, 2011, the date on 

which the Information was filed and the arrest warrant executed. The probable cause 

affidavit that supported the Information may have been signed on January 13, 2011, but it 

was not filed in January. The record is clear that the probable cause affidavit was not 

filed as a separate document and was instead filed only as an attachment in support of the 

Information, on the date that the Information was filed, June 1, 2011. Lake plainly was 

not in custody on the drug-related charge until June 1, 2011, and he is thus not entitled to 

credit for any period of incarceration before that date.

[¶26] Second, our precedent is clear that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time 

spent serving a sentence on another charge. See Hernandez, ¶¶ 4-7, 205 P.3d at 183-84 

(upholding district court’s denial of credit for presentence confinement where credit for 

that confinement had already been given against a sentence on a separate offense); Sweets 

v. State, 2001 WY 126, ¶ 6, 36 P.3d 1130, 1131 (Wyo. 2001) (defendant not entitled to 

credit for presentence confinement against second sentence when he was serving a 

sentence from an unrelated crime). On June 14, 2011, Lake was sentenced to one-year of 

incarceration on his reckless endangering conviction, and was given credit for his entire 

242-day period of presentence confinement. This effectively made his one-year sentence 

run from October 15, 2010, through October 15, 2011. The district court ordered Lake’s 

sentences for his drug-related and reckless endangering convictions to run consecutively, 

 

1 The parties agree that this figure should have been sixty-seven days, rather than the sixty-nine days

awarded by the district court, but that miscalculation is not an issue in this appeal.
8

and Lake is thus not entitled to credit for the time spent serving his separate sentence for

the reckless endangering conviction.

[¶27] The district court properly credited Lake for presentence confinement from 

October 15, 2011, when Lake’s first sentence expired, to December 21, 2011, when the

court entered sentence on Lake’s drug-related conviction.

CONCLUSION

[¶28] We find no error in the district court’s seating of the jury, and we find no error in 

the court’s award of credit for presentence confinement. Affirmed.