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w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/2191 NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
Nos. 02-3877 and 02-4333 ABRAHAM WOLDIGER, Petitioner

v. JOHN AS HCROFT , A TTORNE Y GENERAL OF THE UNIT ED STA TES OF AMERI CA, Respondent
APPE AL FROM THE UNIT ED STA TES I MMIGRATI ON AND

NATURALIZATION SERVICES Agency No. A27-907-634 Argued: September

8, 2003
Be for e: B AR RY , BE CK ER , and GR EE NB ER G, Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led: Oct ober 7, 2003)

James J. Orlow, Esq. ( Argued) Orlow & O rlow 6 th & C hestn ut Stree ts 656 Public Ledger

Building Philadelphia, PA 191062

Attorney for Peti tioner
Ernesto H. Moli na, Esq. (Argued) David V. Bernal, Esq. Willi am C. Minick, Esq. United States Department of Justi ce Office of Immigration Lit igati on P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin St ation Washington, DC 20044 Attorney s for Respondent

OPI NION

BA RR Y, Circuit

Judge I. BACKGROUND The parti es are fami liar with the f

acts of t his cas e, and, thus, we will provi de a brief sum mary of those facts at the outset, incorpo rating additional fac ts only as necessary to our discussion of the iss ues. Petitioner Abraham Woldiger , a German citizen, has been a l egal per manent resi dent of the United States since 1987. His wife and seven chi ldren ar e allUnited States citizens. On January 28, 199 8, a grand jury in the E astern District of N ew Y ork returned an indictment against Woldiger, charging that he and certain of his busi ness3

associ ates, who owned and operated eight low-income housing project s in New York, New Jerse y, Rhode Is landand Penns ylvani a, mi sappr opri ated payments from the U. S. Department of Housi ng and Urban Development (HUD) intended for the maint enance and improvemen t of the projects. The indictment was com prised of four counts: conspir acy to misappropriate federalfunds, equi ty skimming, mi sappropri ation of federal fun ds, an d ob struction of a federa l audit. On July 5, 2000, Woldiger , purs uant to a plea agr eement, pl ed guilt y t o Count Four, obst

ructi on of a federalaudit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1516. Dist rict Judge, now Chief Judge, Edward R. Korman entered j udgment agains t Woldiger on the obst

ructi on charge, dismis sed the r emaining t hree count s, and s entenced hi m to ten months impris onment and thr ee ye ars super vised r elease . Relevant to the i ssues her e, the judgment re cite d the “t otal amount of restitution” as “$1. 5 mill ion,” and stat ed that “the Cou rt adopts the fac tual findings an d guideline a pplication in the pre sentence rep ort.” In addition, W oldiger had earlier agreed to p ay $900,000 to settle the related civil forfeiture
cas e ag ains t him , Un ited Sta tes v. B lacksto ne R ealty M gm t. , No. CV-97-6455 (E.D.N .Y.). On December 1, 2000, the Immigrat ion and Natura lization Ser vice (INS) init iate d
rem ova l pro cee din gs a gain st W old iger , cha rgin g th at he wa s rem ova ble u nde r 8 U .S.C . § 12 27 (a )(2 )(A )(i ii) b ec au se hi s c on vi cti on co ns titu ted an “a gg ra va ted fe lo ny,” de fin ed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(I) as an offense that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss4

to the vi ctim or vi ctims exc eeded $10,000. ” On August 15, 2001, an immigrati on judge (“IJ” ) enter ed an order of removal, finding that Woldiger’s convict ion involved “fraud or deceit ” because t

he “int ent to de ceive or defraud the United States” i s an element of the statute u nder wh ich he wa s con victed , 18 U .S.C. § 151 6, and that the judg men t itself indicated that t

he crime involved a loss of over $10,000 to the victim (the United States ) because i t required him to pay $1. 5 mill ion in r esti tuti on. The IJ not ed that Judge Korman had submitt ed a letter s tating that Woldi ger had not be en sentenc ed under the fraud guid elines a nd th at Jud ge K orm an did not “e xpec t that [the conv iction] w ould result in [Woldiger’s] automatic deportati on,” but the IJ concluded that Woldiger had nonetheless be en co nv ict ed of

a c rim e w hi ch sa tis fie d t he sta tu to ry d ef in itio n o f a n a gg ra va ted fe lo ny. On M ay 6, 2002, the B oard of Im migration A ppeals (B IA) aff irmed the IJ’s decision, rei terati ng the IJ’s reasoning and noting that t he judgment in the criminal case expressly adopt ed the fact ual fi ndings of t

he present ence report (PSR), which “indi cates that t he vict im of the crime was the Depart ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) . . . and t

hat HUD sustained a l oss of $1,800, 000.00.” The PSR, however, does not speci fy t

he basis for thi s findi ng of tota l los s amount, but does indi cate t

hat “Abraham Tau b and Ab raham Wo ldiger ro utinely rece ived a mo unts ra ngin g fro m $ 10,00 0 to $21,000 monthl y, ” and “in January 1994, Abraham Woldiger and Abraham Taub each took $9,000 from [a housing proj ect maint enance account ] and, in January 1995, the y
eac h to ok $ 7,50 0 fr om the s am e ac cou nt.”5

On M ay 15, 2002, W oldiger filed a pe tition with this Cou rt for review of the B IA’s May 6, 2002 order . On July 11, 2002, be fore a bri efing sche dule was set , we grante d the INS’s motion to dismis s the petiti on for lac k of appell ate j urisdi ction on t he ground that obs truc ting a fe der al au dit is a n ag gra vate d fe lon y und er 8 U.S .C. § 110 1(a )(43 )(M )(I). On Au gust 1 , 2002 , Wo ldiger filed a m otion b efore Judg e K orm an, ask ing h im to amend the judgment

in the c riminalcase by elimi nating t

he refere nce to a $1. 5 mill ion rest itution obli gation. The next day , August 2, 2002, Woldiger file d a motion t o reopen proceedi ngs before t

he BIA. Woldiger as ked that decisi on on his moti on to reopen be defe rred u ntil Jud ge K orm an de cided the m otion to ame nd th e judg men t. On September 18, 2002, the BIA denied Woldige r’s moti on to reopen, concludi ng that hi s motion pending before Judge Korman di d not const itut e “new materia l fact s,” and stat ing that

“post- convict ion moti ons or othe r forms of col late ral at tacks, not const ituting direct appeals, do not ser

ve to negat e the fi nalit

y of t he convict ions or t

he charge of
remo vability, unle ss and until the conv iction h as be en ov erturn ed . . . .” W oldige r timely filed a petition for re view of the BIA ’s den ial with this C ourt. Less than a month late r, Judge Korman granted Woldige r’s moti on and enter ed an amended judgment. The amended judgment dis avowed state ments in t he PSR indicat ing that Woldi ger was li able for $1.8 mil lion, delet ed the $1. 5 mill ion that had been imposed as restitution, and stat ed that , at the time of sentencing, the Court “made no findings of actu al los s be cau se th e offen se o f co nvi ction did not inv olv e los s.”6

Having prevai led in hi s effort s to amend the judgment i n his cr iminalcase, Woldiger, on October 21, 2002, file d a second moti on to reopen proceedings be fore the BIA , o r, inth e a lt erna tive , to r ec ons id er it s d en ia l o f h is fi rs t m ot io n t o r eo pe n. On November 8, 2002, t

he BIA denied the moti on. As for the motion for reconsi derati on, “the re spondent has not demonstr ated any error in our deci sion of Sept ember 18, 2002, on the rec ord then bef

ore us . . . . ” The motion to reopen was denied becaus e “it is an imp erm issib le m ultip le m otio n to reo pen . See 8 C .F .R . § 3 .2( c) (2 ) (2 00 2) . . . .” Fi na lly, the BIA concluded t

hat “re spondent has not est ablis hed that sua sponte reopening or
recon sidera tion is w arrante d fo r any reas on.” W oldige r timely filed with this C ourt a pe titi on f orre vi ew. The two pe titi ons ha ve be en co ns ol id at edfo r p ur pos es of ap pe al . O f course, we cannot reach t he merit s – or la ck there of – of the petiti ons unless we have juri sdict ion. As t

he foll owing discuss ion willconclude, we have juri sdict ion and the petitions wil l be deni ed.

II . DIS CUSS ION A. Juri sdict ion Und er 8 U. S. C. § 12 52( a) (2 )( C), co urts of ap pe al s l ac k j ur is di ct io n t o r ev ie w a finalorder of r emoval predi cated on an al ien’s convict ion of certain l ist ed crimi nal offe nses, in cludin g any “a ggra vated felon y.” We have held, h ow ever, c onsiste nt w ith other c ourts o f app eals to h ave c onsid ered th e issue , that w e hav e jurisd iction to1 We reject the gov ernm ent’s a rgum ent tha t, unde r the do ctrine o f issue or claim

preclus ion, our

May 15, 2002 order

dismis sing Woldiger ’s fi rst pe tition for r eview for la ck o f j ur is di ct io n pr eclude s r eco nsi der at io n of th e ag gr avate d fe lo nyis sue . At th e t ime we issued that order , Judge Korman had not entere d the amended judgment delet ing W old iger ’s $1 .5 m illion restitu tion obl igati on. See In re ContinentalAirli nes , 279 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir . 2002) ( clai m preclusi on bars re consider ation of the “ very s am e claim ” decided i n prior

judgment, while is sue preclusion bar s “succes sive l iti gation of an issue of fa ct orlaw actuall

y litigated and resolved ” in a prior proc eeding (em phasis add ed)). 7 dete rmin e w heth er th e jur isdic tion al ba r ap plies
. Patel v. Ashcroft , 294 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 20 02); Drakes v. Zimski , 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001). I n this case, t he jurisdictional question is es sentially indis tinguishable from the key i ssue on the merits – whether Woldiger ’s convi ction f or obstr uction of a federalaudit was indeed an agg rav ated felo ny, as d efin ed in 8 U .S.C . § 11 01( a)(4 3)(M )(I). See Patel , 294 F.3d at 469 (“The jurisdiction inquiry is, therefore, a back-do or merits inquiry . . . .”). 1 If it was , w e lack j urisdi ction. An aggravated fel ony i s “an offense t hat . . . involves fr aud or decei t in which t he loss to the victim or victims exceeded $10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M )(I). Because Woldiger concede s that the st atute under which he was convi cted, 18 U.S.C. § 1516, expressly i ncorporat es fraud or deceit as an ele ment, t

he questi on upon which our juri sdict ion hinges is whether , in l ight of t he amended judgment, his offens e of conviction invo lved a loss to H UD of m ore tha n $1 0,000 . We conc lude th at it did n ot. Woldiger ar gues that

the amended judgment entirely elimi nated the basis for the IJ’s a nd B IA ’s co nclu sion that h is ob struc tion con victi on i nvo lved the r equ isite lo ss. Indeed, J udge Korman’s statement i n the amended judgment that “ [a]t t

he time of8

sentence I made no findi ngs of actua l los s because t he offense of convi ction di d not involve loss” str ongly suggests t hat Woldiger’s offens e of convi ction did not involve a lo ss of mo re th an $ 10, 000 , e venif th e ot her charg ed o ffe nse s whi ch r efl ect ed t he s che me
as a wh ole d id (i.e . con spira cy, eq uity sk imm ing , and mis app rop riatio n of fed eral f und s). The amended judgment al so declined to adopt those portions of the PSR which found rest itution to be mandat oryin Woldiger ’s case , another way of s tating that hi s offense of
convi ct io n di d no t i nvo lv e a p ecuni arylo ss to an i den ti fi abl e vi ct im. In respons e, the government argues that , even aft er the amended judgment, we can conclude t

hat Woldiger ’s offense of convict ion involved a loss of more than $10, 000, specifi call y poi nting t o the indi ctment and t o the Statement of Reasons i n the amended judg men t. First, the g over nm ent co ntend s that Ju dge K orm an, in th e am ende d jud gm ent, continue d to adopt t

he factualfindings in the PSR that the total los s to the government from the HUD scheme was $1.8 milli on, and that in e ach of seven y ears Woldige r personal ly

recei ved misdir ected HUD monies which total ed well i n excess of $10, 000. Second, the government cont ends that the obst ructi on count expre ssly incorpor ated the earli er all egati ons in the indic tment t hat the Blackstone project s recei ved in exces s of $10,000 each year from 1990 th rough 1 997 an d that W oldiger received $19,000 dollars from a HUD project

account. Finally, in a footnote, the government notes t hat even i f the amended judgment el iminat ed the ori ginal reference t o a $1.5 mil lion r esti tuti on obliga tion, it still refe rs to W oldige r’s $90 0,000 payme nt in settle men t of the civil9

for feitu re ac tion as “ restitu tion .” We must determine whether any or allof this may be consi dered when making the aggrava ted felony determ ination. This C ourt, most othe r courts of ap peals, and the B IA its elf have l imit ed the evi dence which may be considered in det ermining whet her an alie n’s convi ction i s one of the l ist ed removable offe nses by apply ing the “ categor ical approach” pr omulgated by the Supreme Court

in Tayl or v. Unit ed State s , 495 U.S. 575 (19 90)
. See Francis v. Reno , 269 F.3d 162, 171-72 (3d Cir . 2001) ( determi ning whether misd eme anor conv iction for ve hicle h om icide w as ag grav ated felony); see als o, e. g. , Chang v . I

NS , 307 F .3d 11 85, 11 89 (9 th Cir. 2 002 ); Kuhall v. Reno , 266 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 20 01); Emi le v. INS , 244 F .3d 18 3, 187 (1st C ir. 2001 ); Herna nde z- Manc il lav. INS , 246 F.3d 100 2, 100 5 (7th Cir. 20 01); Un ited Sta tes v. Z avala -Sus taita , 214 F.3d 601, 603 (5th C ir. 2001 ); United S tates v. Reyes-Castro , 13 F .3d 37 7, 379 (10th Cir. 19 93); United States v. Rodrigue z , 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1992) . While at least one court ha s
no ted th at “ [o ]n e c ou ld w ell ar gu e th at t he B oa rd [is ] n ot ob lig ate d t o a pp ly Tayl or in constr uing the I

NA,” it nonet

heless concluded t

hat the BIA’s own citat ion “without quibble” of Tayl or ’s cat egorica l approac h in sever al case s has est ablis hed it a s the operative analy sis for

determi ning whether a

prior convict ion is a removable offe nse. Em ile , 244 F.3d at

187. The Supreme Court held in Tayl or that in determi ning whether a defendant’ s prior
conv iction c onstitu tes a “v iolent felony” for the p urpo ses of the sen tencin g enh ance men ts10

of the Armed Career Criminal Act ( ACC A), court s must employ a “categorical approach, ” which “requi res the tri al court to look only t o the fact of convict ion and the st atut orydef

in itio n of th e prio r o ffe nse ” r ather th an e xamini ng t

he f act s of th e crime underlying the c onvicti on. Tayl or , 495 U .S. at 60 2; see also United States v. J ones , 332 F.3d 688 , 691- 94 (3 d C ir. 2003 ); United States v. Ric hardson , 313 F.3d 1212, 124-28 (3d. Cir. 2002) . The Court hel d, however, that “ in a narrow range of cases, ” where the elements of the st atute under which the defendant was convi cted encompass ed nonviolent as well as violent

feloni es, t

he tri al court

may consi der the c harging document or jury instructi ons, but

only to dete rmine whether

the jur y must have found the el ements of a “v iolen t felo ny” in ord er to con vict t he d efe nda nt. Id. at 602. Along these l ines, other courts of appeals have considered charging documents, jury instructions, plea agreements, and plea hearing transcript s to determine if a defendant’s pri or conviction qualifies as a “vio lent felon y” un der the A CC A. See, e. g. , United States v. Palmer , 68 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 19 95) (c harg ing ins trume nt and plea h earing transc ript); United States v. Cook , 26 F.3d 507 , 509- 10 (4 th Cir. 1 994 ) (char ging instrum ent an d jury instru ctions) ; United States v . Ma this , 963 F.2d 399, 409 -10 (D .C. Cir. 1992 ) (indictment an d jury instruc tions); United Stat es v. Kaplans ky , 42 F.3d 320, 324-25 (6th Cir. 1994) (chargi ng pap ers, ju ry instru ction s, an d pl ea a gre em ents ). Aside from the di ctat es of precede nt, t he reasons stat ed by t

he Court in Tayl or for mandating t

he categoricalapproach ( i.e
. , the ACC A’s use of the phrase “pr evious11

convictions” rather t

han “previous acts,” the pract ical difficul ties and potentialunfairness of making factual findings on a contested evidentiary record, and potentialdue process
con cern s, Tayl or , 495 U.S. at 602 ) also apply to the determ ination of w hether an a lien’s
con victi on i s an agg rav ated felo ny. See Kuhall v. Reno , 266 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Tayl or ’s cat egorica l approac h because “INA § 237(a)(2)(C) r efers t o ‘[a]ny ali en w ho is . . . c on vi cte d’ of – n ot an y ali en w ho ha s c om m itte d” an ag gr av ate d felo ny, and because “s uch an approach . . . e njoy s the vi rtues of pract ical ity and evenhanded applic ation, since examining the trans cript of the pl ea coll oquy ( or the t rial ) to det ermine the a ctua l fac ts of

the c rime cou ld p rov e bu rde nso me and pro duc e arb itrary re sults ”). Applyi ng Tayl or ’s cat egorica l approac h to Woldiger ’s convi ction f or obstr ucting a federalaudit, it i s a clos e questi on as to whether there i s suffi cient

evidence, in li ght of the amended judgm ent, to conclude that hi s offens e of convi ction resul ted in a loss of more than $10, 000. We emphasize offens e of conviction because the indic tment, the PSR , and W oldige r’s settlem ent of the civ il forfe iture ac tion fo r $90 0,000 leave little doubt that the entir e scheme perpetrated by Woldiger and his co-defendants caused a loss to H UD we ll in exc ess of $10 ,000. T he trick y question is exac tly what lo ss, if an y, is attributabl e to the crime t o which Woldiger pl ed guilt y – obst ructi on of HUD ’s audi t – as opp osed to the lo ss attribu table to the thre e cha rged offe nses th at we re ultim ately dism issed , i.e
. the consp iracy, the equity skimming, and the misapp ropriation cou nts. In making thi s deter

minati on, we keep in mind J udge Korman’s expli cit s tate ment in t he2 One could argue that the crime of obstructing a federal audit i s not one that causes a

loss t o the vic tim of a fr aud, but is i nstead t

he independent

act of concea ling a l oss that resul ts fr om the fraud. We are not aware of any federalcase where there has bee n a conv iction so lely on a c harg e of o bstruc ting an audit in wh ich a d efen dant w as req uired to pay r esti tuti on, or i n which the court made a finding of loss ( though convic tions for obstruc ting an a

udit or invest igati on without a c oroll ary convict ion for ac tual f

raud seem to b e fe w a nd far b etw een ).
3 The government al so cit es the s tate ment in par agraph four of t he indic tment t

hat the Blackstone project s recei ved $52 mill ion in fe deral f unds from 1990 thr ough 1997. But there i s no all egati on that t his caus ed any parti cular l oss, l et al one a loss that ha d to have been fo und fo r Wo ldiger to be con victed on C ount Fo ur. 12 ame nded judg men t that he mad e no finding s con cernin g loss, a nd th at loss w as no t a factor in dete rmining Woldi ger’s c riminalsentence . 2 For star ters , the government’s reli ance on the l osses charged in the background secti on of the i ndictment is mis placed. While Tayl or its elf cont emplates that a court may consider a chargi ng instrument, it may only be consider ed for the purpose of det ermining wh ether th e find er of fact must have found the fa cts alleg ed in th e indic tmen t in orde r to convict the defendant . Here, while the indict ment all eges, for

example, t

hat Woldiger personally received $ 19,000 f rom a p roject accoun t, proof of this w as not requ ired before Judg e K orm an co uld ac cept W oldige r’s guilty plea to ob structing a fed eral au dit. 3 This
conc lusion disting uishe s this ca se fro m the case re lied up on b y the gov ernm ent, Kha lay le h v. INS , 287 F .3d 97 8, 980 (10th Cir. 20 02), in w hich th e Te nth C ircuit he ld that t he defendant’ s guil ty

plea t o a singl e count of check f raud not only r eferred to the $9,308 check ci ted in t

hat count of the i ndictment , but to “a scheme to def raud that encompassed a number of che cks” and, t herefore, his convi ction c onsti tuted an13

aggravat ed felony

rendering the defendant removable. A guilty

plea t o obstruc tion of an audit i s not, of course, the equi valent of a guil ty

plea t o the fra

ud its elf. There is no evid enc e in th is rec ord that W old iger pled gui lty to m ore than a ba reb one s ob struc tion
. The governm ent’s reli ance on the factual findings in the PSR arguably presents a
mo re difficult qu estion, b ut is sim ilarly unav ailing u nder the ca tegoric al app roach . Wh ile the PSR unquesti onably recit es a number of fact s which show that the los s to the government fr om Woldiger’s s cheme with his co-defendant s was great er than $10, 000, and th e am ende d jud gm ent co nclus orily “ado pts” m any of th ose facts, it is imp ossible to tellfrom the PSR what loss , if any, is attributable to the only crime to which Woldi ger pled guilty . Moreover, as noted earli er, Judge Korman expressl y stated i n the amended judgm ent that the offe nse did no t involve loss, and specifically refused to ad opt the PS R’s sugg estion th at restitutio n w as m anda tory. In sho rt, none of the loss fin ding s detaile d in the PSR were tri ed in court , admitted by Woldiger, or even the subject of findi ngs by t

he Distri ct Court, rendering any finding of los s insuff icie ntly reli able under

the cat egorica l app roa ch. Cf. Un ited Sta tes v. F rank lin , 235 F. 3d 1165, 1172 (9 th Ci r. 2000) ( PSR insuffi cient

under cat egorica l inquiryin ACCA case becaus e did not a llow sent encing court t o “know[] what a jury actual ly found or what [the defendant] actual ly admitt ed in a plea”) ; United States v. Brandon , 247 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir . 2001) ( “[L]ooking t o the presentenc e report to determ ine the am ount of c ocaine . . . might w ell exceed the inquiry authori zed by t

he Supreme Court i n Tayl or .”); Un ited Sta tes v. B ull , 182 F.3d 1216, 122314

(10th Cir . 1999) ( “in det ermining t hat the convict ion was a viol ent fel ony [for sentencing enh anc em ent] the d istrict cou rt . . . erro neo usly re lied o n th e pr ese nten ce re por t”). One Ninth Circui t case he ld that the BIA may consi der the unc ontest ed factual find ing s in a PS R in dete rmin ing wh ethe r an alien ’s co nvi ction is an agg rav ated felo ny. See Abreu-Reyes , 292 F.3 d 10 29, 1 032 (9th Cir . 200 2). Abreu-Reyes , how ever, failed to even mention Tayl or , le t alone determi ne whether consi derati on of the PSR was per mis sible und er th e ca tego rical app roa ch. Abreu-Reyes was also di sti nguished i n a sub seq uen t Ni nth Cir cuit c ase , Chang v . I NS , 307 F.3d 1185, 11 92 (9th C ir. 2002). In Chang , the Ninth Circuit held t hat the BIA could not rely on t he PSR’s factualfindings that the total loss caused by the defend ant’s bank fraud w as greater than $ 10,000 w here such findings were expres sly contradi cted by

the ple a agreement’ s express provisi on that the lo ss am oun t for pur pos es o f the defend ant’ s gu ilty plea wa s $6 05.3 0. Id. at 11 90- 92. While W oldiger’s plea agreement is not part of the record before us, t he PSR ’s loss findings , if l imit ed to the offense of convi ction, could si milarly cont radict Judge Ko rma n’s s tatem ent in the a me nde d ju dgm ent th at tha t offens e “d id n ot in vol ve lo ss.” Finally, we reject

the government ’s cont ention t hat the referenc e in the amended judgm ent to W oldiger’s agreem ent to pay $900 ,000 in settlemen t of his civil forfeiture case as “r esti tuti on” will c arry the day . The settlement agreement does not indi cate what losses to the gov ernmen t were attributable to the obstruction co nviction, wh at losses we re
cau sed by the sch em e ge ner ally or w hat p art o f the $90 0,00 0 w as a ttribu table to ea ch.15

In sum, no thing proffered by the gov ernmen t as establishing that W oldiger’s offense of convi ction involved a $10, 000 loss s atis fies t he limi ted inquiryallowed by Tayl or . Th atconvi ct io n, th er efo re , i s no t f oran a ggr avate d fe lo nyas def in ed b y8 U. S. C. § 11 01( a) (4 3) (M) (I ), an d we ha ve juri sd ic ti on o ve r h is co ns ol id at edpe titi ons fo r r ev ie w. B. The BIA’s Denial of Woldige r’s Motions to Reopen and for Reconsideration The strict statutory and regu latory limitati ons on m otions to reope n befo re the BIA gov ern o ur inq uiry. 8 U .S.C. § 122 9a(c)( 6) pro vides that an alien m ay file on e mo tion to reopen deportation proceedings, which, unless it concerns certain asy lum applications, must be fil ed within 90 days of the entryof a finaladminist rati ve order of r emoval. The app licab le reg ulati on r eiter ates thes e lim itatio ns. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003. 2(c)( 2). Motions for recons ideration are s imil arly subject to strict limi tati ons and “must be fi led with t he Bo ard w ithin 30 days afte r the m ailing o f the B oard decisio n . . . [and a] party m ay only file one m otion to recon sider any given de cision.” 8 C.F .R. § 100 3.2(b)(2). The “Boa rd may at any time reopen or

reconsi der on it s own motion any case in whic h it had rendered a dec ision. . . . Th e dec ision to gran t or den y a motio n to reo pen o r recon sider is w ithin the disc retion o f the B oard . . . [and] [ t]he B oard has d iscretion to den y a motio n to
reo pen eve n if th e pa rty mo vin g ha s m ade out a pr ima fac ie ca se f or re lief.” 8 C .F.R . § 100 3.2( a). W e rev iew the d ecis ion of th e B IA for abu se o f dis creti on. Sevoian v. Ashcroft , 290 F.3 d 16 6, 17 0 (3 d C ir. 20 02)
. Un der the se statu tes and regu lations, th e BIA did n ot abu se its disc retion w hen it16

denied Woldiger ’s fi rst mot ion to r eopen. Woldige r had only moved to amend the judgment i n his cr iminalcase a day earli er and, not

surpri singl y, Judge Korman had not yet acted on i t. Moreover, a month before t hat, we had dismisse d the very firs t petition for review for lack of

jurisdiction. To requ ire the BIA to grant a m otion to reope n every time a conv icted a lien m akes a pos t-trial mo tion or o ther co llateral attac k cha llengin g his convict ion or se ntence would, among other things, encourage frivolous motions des igned only to de lay an alien ’s inev itable rem oval. Similarly , the BIA did not abuse i ts di scret ion in denying Woldiger ’s second
mo tion to re open , or, in the alterna tive, reco nside ring the denia l of his first mo tion, an d it did n ot abu se its disc retion in applying the pro cedu ral bar o n suc cessiv e mo tions to reop en. Firs t, with re feren ce to th e requ est for recon sidera tion, the BIA correc tly held that its denial of W olidger’s first motion to reopen w as proper o n the record then befo re it. The BIA has held, and courts of ap peals have recognize d, that under the re gulatory language, a motion for

reconsi derati on cannot be bas ed on new evidence, such as the amended judgment her e, but only upon new arguments concer ning the e xist ing record. See It urriba rriav. INS , 321 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir . 2003) ( “Under the pl ain language of [the former

simil ar regul ation] a motion t o reconsi der chal lenges det erminat ions of l aw and fact made by

the BIA . . . usi ng the same re cord evide nce used in maki ng its prior decisio n.”); Matter of Cerna , 20 I.&N . Dec. 399 (BIA 1991) (sam e). The BIA’s conclusi on that Woldi ger’s s econd motion t o reopen was barr ed by t he4 The onlyestabl ished exce ption t o the bar s eems to be i n cases where t he firs t moti on wa s the resu lt of d ece ptio n or frau d by th e alie n’s c oun sel o r pu rpo rted cou nse l, see Var el a v . I

NS , 204 F.3d 1237 ( 9th Cir. 2000), which i s not t he case her e. 17 one -mo ti on l imi tati on i s e qua llyuna ss ai labl e. Both 8 U. S. C. § 122 9a( c) (6 ) and 8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(c) (2) expr essly limi t ali ens to one moti on to reopen r emoval proceedings, which must be filed within 90 days of the B IA’s final ord er. 4 Finally, presumably

in recognition of t

he fact t hat he i s between the proverbi al rock and a hard place , Wo ldiger a rgue s that the BIA abus ed its dis cretion in refu sing to reopen the proceedings sua s pon te , even i f his se cond motion t o reopen was barr ed by t he numericallimi tati on. We have held, however, that we do not have j urisdi ction to review the BIA’s di scret ionary refusalto reopen a

case sua spo nte. Calle- Vujiles v. Ashcroft , 320 F.3d 472, 474 ( 3d Cir. 2003) . While we recogni zed that “there is a st

rong presumption that Congress intends judicialreview of administrative acti on,” we also observed t

hat “re view is not

avail able i n those r are ci rcumstance s where the r elevant statute is s o dra fted th at a co urt w ould have no m eanin gfu l standa rd ag ainst w hich to judge the agency ’s exer cise of di scret ion.” Id. Because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) grants the BIA precisely suc h unfett ered dis creti on over whether to grant a sua s pon te reop ening , its refu sal to exe rcise this a uth ority is u nre view able
. Id. at 475 ; see also In re J- J- , 2 1 I .&N. Dec. 976 (BIA 1997) (“t he power to reope n on our own motion is not meant t o be used as a general cu r for filing defe cts or to otherw ise circumv ent the regulations , where enforcing them m ight result in hardship.”).18

The petitions for

review willbe denied.

/s/ M ar yan ne Tr um p B ar ry Circuit Judge