IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-10086

STEPHEN MILLER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

METROCARE SERVICES, formerly known as Dallas MHMR; KYLE 

MUNSON; LINDA THOMPSON, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and CLEMENT and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:

Stephen Miller sued his former employer, Metrocare Services 

(“Metrocare”), alleging violations of the FLSA, the FMLA, the ADA, and the 

Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. Later, Miller amended his complaint 

to name additional defendants and to add a § 1983 procedural due process 

claim and a Texas Health & Safety Code § 161.134 claim. The district court 

dismissed Miller’s Texas Health & Safety Code claim via Rule 12(b)(1) and 

granted summary judgment for the defendants on all other claims. Miller 

appeals the grant of summary judgment and alleges that the district court 

erred. Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 5, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims, the 

district court did not err, and we AFFIRM.

I.

Metrocare is a local governmental community mental health and mental 

retardation center in Dallas County, Texas. Metrocare hired Stephen Miller as 

its Human Resources Manager in February 2006 and later promoted him to 

HR Director. During the hiring process, Miller submitted to a criminal 

background check, which revealed that Miller had a conviction in high school. 

Miller discussed the matter with an employee in the Human Resources 

Department, who indicated that the conviction was not a bar to employment 

because it was not on a regulatory list of crimes that would preclude 

employment by Metrocare. 

As HR Director, Miller ensured Metrocare’s compliance with federal and 

state employment laws; updated and ensured compliance with HR policies; 

handled disputes between managers and line employees; managed the 

organization’s employee benefits programs; and led the agency’s compensation 

and recruiting efforts. Early in his employment, Miller began reevaluating the 

exemption status of case managers from the FLSA. Each time a position was 

reclassified, those employees were then required to be paid overtime or 

compensated time off for their hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 

Given the broad-based consequences of this HR issue to the entire 

organization, Miller began involving other Metrocare managers—including 

then-Chief Executive Officer Dr. James Baker—in his discussions with other 

centers to determine the correct classification of these employees. Metrocare 

eventually reclassified the case managers to non-exempt status under the 

FLSA in January 2009. 

According to Miller, after the case managers were moved to non-exempt 

status, he received complaints that employees were being pressured not to 

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record overtime and were working overtime without being compensated for it. 

From 2009 to 2012, complaints regarding overtime compensation continued. 

In August 2012, Dr. Baker left Metrocare, and Linda Thompson became the 

acting CEO of the organization. 

In January 2013, Metrocare reduced its workforce as a consequence of a 

budgetary shortfall. The HR department was required to reduce its ranks, 

eliminating positions held by benefits analyst Bertha Reyna and HR generalist

Sam Clark. According to Metrocare, following the reduction in force, Miller 

unilaterally canceled a previously scheduled employee Wellness Fair and 

employee gift card incentive program. The gift card incentive program was 

reinstated, but the Wellness Fair could not be rescheduled due to third-party 

vendors being told that it was canceled. 

Following the departure of Reyna and Clark, Miller requested an 

accommodation for his dyslexia. Miller requested a data entry clerk to assist 

him with benefits work and recommended the rehiring of Reyna. Shortly after 

Reyna and Clark were laid off, Yolanda Ross, a Miller subordinate and HR 

generalist, submitted a complaint about Miller to the CFO, Kyle Munson.

Munson investigated the allegations in the complaint and found that 

Miller excluded himself from annual criminal background checks required by 

Metrocare. As a public mental health agency, Metrocare is subject to state and 

federal regulations that bar Metrocare from employing individuals convicted 

of certain criminal offenses. Accordingly, Metrocare has a criminal background 

check process to ensure compliance with these regulations. Metrocare runs a 

one-time, nationwide criminal background check for employment applicants. 

Thereafter, Metrocare runs an annual criminal background check on each and 

every current employee. Metrocare’s HR Department is responsible for 

ensuring that both the applicant and the annual employee checks are 

completed and cleared. While HR Director, Miller would monthly (or as 

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needed) prepare a list of current employees who were due for an annual 

background check and give the list to a subordinate to run the check. Miller or 

Ross would then upload the data to Metrocare’s MUNIS system1 for the 

employee(s) to reflect that the check had been run and was cleared. 

Munson documented his findings in an internal memorandum and 

concluded that Miller knowingly removed himself from the annual criminal 

background checklist for 2010, 2011, and 2012 and updated Metrocare’s 

MUNIS record system to indicate the checks had been performed and cleared 

when they had not been performed. Munson later learned that Miller had also 

failed to perform background checks on approximately 70 Metrocare employees 

who were due for a background check in December 2012 and whose records 

appeared to have been updated in Metrocare’s MUNIS system to indicate that

the checks had been run and cleared. Munson decided to terminate Miller for 

his conduct and sent a draft termination letter to outside counsel on February 

26, 2013.

On February 28, 2013, Miller placed a letter under Linda Thompson’s

door asserting various complaints against Metrocare and Munson. Later that 

day, Metrocare fired Miller. Metrocare’s termination letter to Miller listed the 

falsification of data entries related to the background checks for December 

2012 and the use of his position as HR Director to remove his name from 

criminal background checks in 2010, 2011, and 2012 as factors in his 

termination.

In March 2013, Miller, through his attorney, requested a “name clearing” 

hearing where his counsel would be given the opportunity to explain the 

allegedly wrongful nature of his firing to the Board of Trustees of Metrocare.

 

1 MUNIS is Metrocare’s HR information system, and it contains vital information 

about Metrocare employees, such as Social Security numbers, health information, criminal 

background histories, and other sensitive information. 

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Miller requested and received documents and records prior to the hearing. On 

April 25, 2013, Miller and his attorney attended the hearing, and his attorney 

presented on his behalf. The Board did not reinstate him.

On May 28, 2013, Miller sued Metrocare, asserting claims under the 

FLSA, the FMLA, the ADA, and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. 

Specifically, Miller alleged that Metrocare violated 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)—the 

anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA—by firing him in retaliation for his 

good-faith complaints about Metrocare’s overtime policy, its misclassification 

of employees, and its failure to pay overtime. Miller alleged a similar 

retaliation claim and discrimination and interference claims under the FMLA. 

Miller further alleged that Metrocare violated the ADA and the Texas Labor 

Code by firing him because of his disability (dyslexia) or his requested 

accommodation (requesting a data entry clerk to assist him) or complaints 

regarding Metrocare’s failure to fulfill his accommodation request. 

On January 23, 2014, Miller amended his complaint to name Thompson 

and Munson as defendants to the FLSA and the FMLA claims and to add a 

§ 1983 procedural due process claim and a Texas Health & Safety Code § 

161.134 claim against Metrocare. Metrocare moved to dismiss the Health & 

Safety Code claim and the procedural due process claim. While the motion to 

dismiss was pending, Metrocare moved for summary judgment on all of Miller’s 

claims. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that 

Metrocare was immune from the Health & Safety Code claim and that Miller 

failed to plead an actionable procedural due process claim. The district court 

then allowed Miller to amend his complaint to attempt to plead an actionable 

procedural due process claim. After he amended his complaint again, 

Metrocare filed two motions to strike certain evidence and portions of the 

second amended complaint. The district court granted Metrocare’s motion for 

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summary judgment on all claims and denied the motions to strike as moot. 

Miller appealed.

II.

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Feist v. La.,

Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We must view all facts and evidence 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party when considering a motion 

for summary judgment.” Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 

431, 433 (5th Cir. 2013). This court “may affirm summary judgment on any 

ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by the 

district court.” Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(citation and internal quotation omitted). 

III.

FLSA, FLMA, and ADA Claims

Miller argues that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Metrocare on his various claims arising under the FLSA, 

FMLA, and ADA. While these claims vary in their prima facie elements,2 none 

will give rise to any relief where the employer has terminated the employee for 

valid reasons unrelated to any alleged discriminatory or unlawful motive.3

 

2 See Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 624 (5th Cir. 2008) (FLSA 

retaliation claim); Lanier v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 527 F. App’x 312, 316 (5th Cir. 2013) 

(FMLA interference claim); Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 

2005) (FMLA retaliation claim); Feist v. La., Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 

450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (ADA failure-to-accommodate claim); and EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 

773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014) (ADA discrimination claim).

3 Miller’s ADA failure-to-accommodate claim falls outside of this general statement. 

But it too does not survive summary judgment. See Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 

615 (5th Cir. 1999). “The ADA does not require an employer to relieve an employee of any 

essential functions of his or her job, modify those duties, reassign existing employees to 

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Here—even assuming Miller has made out a prima facie case on any of his 

claims—Metrocare has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

his termination. Miller, as HR director, failed to conduct required criminal 

background checks on a large number of employees, exempted himself from 

these same checks, and allowed the records to falsely reflect that the checks 

had been conducted. As a result, he was fired. Miller has failed to offer 

sufficient evidence that Metrocare’s articulated reason for firing him is a 

pretext for discrimination.4 Because Miller did not meet his burden, the district 

court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Metrocare on these 

claims.5

Procedural Due Process Claim

Miller argues that the district court erred in dismissing his procedural 

due process claim because Metrocare failed to provide an adequate forum to 

clear his name, failed to provide proper notice of the charges against him, failed 

to allow Miller to confront key witnesses, and allowed Ross to present secret 

evidence to the Board of Trustees of Metrocare without notice to Miller. 

“Section 1983 provides a civil remedy in federal court for violations, 

under color of state law, of a person’s constitutionally recognized rights, 

privileges, or immunities.” Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th 

 

perform those jobs, or hire new employees to do so.” Id. at 621. Data entry was an important 

component of Miller’s position. The fact that Miller had to perform more data entry following 

the reduction in force, which resulted in two fewer HR employees, was an economic reality 

caused by Metrocare’s financial position. Therefore, no reasonable accommodation was due, 

let alone Miller’s unreasonable request of rehiring an employee who was just fired to reduce 

costs.

4 Even under the mixed-motive alternative, Miller does not survive summary 

judgment for his FMLA retaliation claim. See Richardson, 434 F.3d at 332. 5 Miller purports to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his state law claims made 

under the Texas Labor Code. However, Miller did not brief these claims, so they are waived. 

“A party waives an issue if he fails to adequately brief it.” Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 

F.3d 239, 255 (5th Cir. 2008).

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Cir. 2006). “If the government discharges an employee amidst allegations of 

misconduct, the employee may have a procedural due process right to notice 

and an opportunity to clear his name.” Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. 

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)). “A public employee, even an at-will 

employee, has a constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 

when the employee is ‘discharged in a manner that creates a false and 

defamatory impression about him and thus stigmatizes him and forecloses him 

from other employment opportunities.’” Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 

461 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 653). “Neither damage to 

reputation alone nor the stigma resulting from the discharge itself trigger the 

protections of due process.” Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 653 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 

U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 256 (5th 

Cir. 1984)) (footnote omitted). “Rather, a liberty interest is infringed, and the 

right to notice and an opportunity to clear one’s name arises, only when the 

employee is ‘discharged in a manner that creates a false and defamatory 

impression about him and thus stigmatizes him and forecloses him from other 

employment opportunities.’” Id. (quoting White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 684 

(5th Cir. 1981)) (emphasis added).

This court “employs a seven-element ‘stigma-plus-infringement’ test to 

determine whether § 1983 affords a government employee a remedy for 

deprivation of liberty without notice or an opportunity to clear his name.” Id. 

(citing Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 2000)). The 

plaintiff must show: (1) he was discharged; (2) stigmatizing charges were made 

against him in connection with the discharge; (3) the charges were false; (4) he 

was not provided notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the discharge; 

(5) the charges were made public; (6) he requested a hearing to clear his name; 

and (7) the employer denied the request. Id. 

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We question whether Miller was even entitled to a name-clearing 

hearing because a prerequisite to such a hearing is that Metrocare created a 

false and defamatory impression about Miller in connection with his firing.6

Even assuming Miller was entitled to such a hearing, his claim still fails. 

Miller argues that he was not given proper notice of the charges against 

him because the termination letter lists only two reasons for firing him but 

Metrocare relied on more reasons like his cancellation of the Wellness Fair. 

The record reflects that Metrocare’s key reason for firing Miller was his failure 

to run the criminal background checks, which was listed in his termination 

letter. The fact that Miller did not address every allegation of poor performance 

throughout his work history was not a fault of the hearing or the notice given.

Next, Miller contends that the inability to confront witnesses made the 

name-clearing hearing insufficient and should allow his § 1983 claim to survive 

summary judgment. Miller maintains that confrontation of witnesses should 

be required for an adequate name-clearing hearing.7 We have never directly

addressed this issue. Nevertheless, we decline Miller’s invitation to make 

confrontation of witnesses a mandatory requirement for an adequate nameclearing hearing. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Miller received

sufficient due process at his name-clearing hearing, despite his inability to

confront Metrocare employees.8 Miller, through his attorney, was allowed to 

 

6 “A name-clearing hearing is required only if an employer creates a false and 

defamatory impression about a particular employee in connection with his termination.”

Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624

(1976)).

7 Miller cites McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 911-12 (10th Cir. 1977) and Campbell 

v. Pierce Cty., 741 F.2d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1984). McGhee and Campbell do not 

affirmatively state that cross-examination is required in every name-clearing hearing, 

although cross-examination was required in McGhee. But see Chilingirian, 882 F.2d at 206;

Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. for Univ. of Me. Sys., 15 F. App’x 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2001).

8 We do not decide whether confrontation of witnesses is ever required for an adequate 

name-clearing hearing. We hold only that here Miller received an adequate name-clearing 

hearing. 

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present at length and was allowed to provide documents to the Board to combat 

the supposedly false, stigmatizing charges against him. Finally, Miller argues 

that Ross presented secret evidence to the Board to justify keeping defamatory 

information in Miller’s personnel file. Miller’s argument is not supported by 

the record. 

Because Miller received an adequate name-clearing hearing, the district 

court did not err in dismissing his procedural due process claim.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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