### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 3, 200 8 S es sio n

DIA NE DOWN S EX REL 

### . R YA N C ODYDO WNS v. MA RK BUS H ET AL 

### . Appeal by p erm ission from the Court of Appeals, Midd le Sect ion

Circuit Courtfor Davidson County No. 04C470 Barbara N. Haynes, Judge

No. M2005- 01498-SC-R11- CV - F iled Septem ber 10, 2008

We g rant ed th e pla int if

f’ s a pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l in thi s w ro ng fu l de a th c a se to deter mine whether

the trial cour

t properly g rante d summary judgme nt to eac h of the de fenda nts. The Court of Appea ls affirme d the g rant of summary judgme nt. A lthough the pa rties have raised se vera l iss ue s in thi s a

pp e a l, the c e ntr a l iss ue is t he natur e of

the le g a l duty , if

any , o we d b y

the de fe nd ants to the plaintiff’s dec edent. T h e dec edent wa s socializing and c onsuming a lcohol with the defe nd an ts

. Wh il e r id in g in a f o u r
- d o o r p ic k

- u

p tr u c k w it h th e d e f e n d an ts , h e b e c a me ill. The defe ndants stopped the truc k on the s ide of an interstate hig hway so the dec edent c ould vomit. After

re su min g the tr ip, the de c e de nt r od e in t he be d of the tr uc k a nd , f or re a so ns un kn ow n, e xite d it

. After exit ing the truck, he was struck by two vehicles and subsequently died. Upon ca ref ul review of the re cord a

nd applicable authority , we conclude that there are g enuine issues of material fa ct as to whether the defendants plac ed the de cede nt in the bed of the truc k. Simi larly , we c onclude that there are g enuine issues of materia l fa ct as t o whether the dec edent wa s helpless and whe ther the defe ndan t s t o o k charg e of him. L astly , we hold that none of the def endants stood in any

specia l

re la tio ns hip wi th t

he pla int if

f’ s d e c e de nt a

nd c on se qu e ntl y

the y did no t a ssume any

a ff ir mativ e du ty to a id o r pr ote c t him. We the re fo re re ve rs e the jud g me nt of the Court of Ap pe a ls a

nd re mand thi s
case to the trial court f

or fur ther proc eeding s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 11 Appeal by Per m ission ; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Ap peals is Reverse d and Rem anded

W I L L I AM M. B AR KE R , C

. J

. , delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which C OR NE L I A A. C LARK and G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., and F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , S P .J ., joined. J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., concur ring

an d d i s s en t i n g. Donald N. Cappa

rella , C h ar l es P. Yezbak, I I I , and Amy J . Fa rra r, Na shville, Tennessee , for the

a pp e lla nt, Di ane Do wn s. C. Benton Patton and Christopher M. Jones, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Ma

rk B ush.-2-

W. B ryan B ro ok s a

nd Al ish a M. To ll, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e , Ryan F . B ri tt.
R. Kreis White, Bre ntwood, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Jerry

Dane Eller.

Ba rry L . Howar d and Melissa B radf ord Muller, Na shville, Tennessee , for the appellee Scott Hurdle.

Sa mue l R. An de rs on , Ch a tta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f

or the Am ic us Cur ia e , T he Pr op e rt y Ca su a lty I nsurer s Association of Amer ica.

OP IN ION

Stand ard of Review
This wrong ful death case came to this C ourt fo l l o wi n g t he trial c ourt’s g rant of summar y jud g me n t t o e a c h o f t h e d e f e n d an t s , w h i c h t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a l s a f f i r m e d

. S u m m ar

y j u d g m e nt i s appropr iate whe n the moving pa rty establishes that there is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and that a judg ment may be rende red as a matter of law. Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56.04; West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W .3d 545, 550 (Tenn. 2005) ; Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W .3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 2000) ; By

rd v. Ha ll, 847 S.W .2 d 2 0 8 , 2 1 0 (Tenn. 1993) . I n revie wing a motion for summary judgme nt, we construe t h e evide nce a nd all rea sonable infe renc es to be dra wn from the evidenc e in t h e l i gh t m ost favora ble to the non-moving party . Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 305-06 (Te nn. 2000). A trial cour t’s g rant of a

motion for summary

judgme nt presents a

question of law w hic h th is Cou

rt re vie ws de no vo wi tho ut a pr e sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss. L awr e nc e County Educ. Ass’n v. L awr ence County Bd. of Educ., 244 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tenn. 2007).
A par ty is entitled to summary judgme nt only when “the facts and conclusions to be drawn there from per

mit a rea sonable pe rson to rea ch only one conc lusi o n

. ” S eave rs v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 9 S.W .3d 86, 91 (Tenn. 1999) . Whil e s u m m ar y j u dg ment is an eff icient means of

deciding

case s dependa

nt solely on questions of law, see Br ookins v. Round Table, I nc., 624 S.W.2d 547, 550 (T e nn

. 19 81 ), “ it sh ou ld no t r e pla c e a tr ia l w he n d isp ute d f

a c tua l is su e s e xist, be c a

us e its purp os e is not t o we igh the evidenc e, to re solve fac tual disputes, or to draw inf ere nces f rom the fa cts.” Rol lin s v . Winn D ixie , 780 S.W. 2d 76 5, 76 7 (T e nn . Ct. App . 198 9) (c iti ng Jone s v. H ome I nd e m. I ns. Co., 651 S.W .2d 213, 214 (Tenn. 1983) ) (inter nal citations omitted).

F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound
The followingfac ts are pr esen t ed in a light most favor able to the non- moving pa rty , the plaintiff. This lawsuit arises out of the death of eig hteen- y ear

old Ry an Cody

Downs, who died af

ter being struck by two vehicles on I nterstate 65 in Nashville, Tenne ssee. Dur ing the eveninghours of Sa tur da y , Februa ry 15 , 2 00 3, Mr . D ow ns a lon g wi th f ive oth e r youngme n c a me tog e the r at hi s apar tment for a nig ht of socializing, including consuming alcohol. Mr. Downs was joined by Ry anM r. D e a n s, M r. D o w n s’ ha lf- b ro the r, w a s n o t na m e d a s a d e fen d a n t i n this c a se

. 1

W hi l e s ear chi ng f

or t hei r des t i nat i on wi t hi n t he apar t ment comp l ex, t he gr oup s aw a par t y goi ng on at 2

ano t her apa rt m ent and , even t ho ugh he did no t know any o ne at t hi s p art y , M r. D eans dec i d ed t o exi t t he t ruck and at t end t hat pa rt y i nst ead of t he o ne t hat t he group was s eeki ng. M r. D eans di d not ret urn t o M r. D o wns’ and M r. B ritt’ s a p a rtm e n t un til so m e tim e a fter the re m a ind e r o f t h e gr o u p re tur n e d to the a p a rtm e n t.
-3- Br itt, Mark Bush, Jerry

Dane Eller, Ke vin Deans, and Scott Hurdle. Mr

. Do wn s , M r. Br i tt, Mr. 1 Bush, a nd Mr. Eller wer e all classmates at Nashville Auto Diesel College (“N ADC”), and Mr. Dea ns
and Mr . H ur dle we re in N a sh vil le vis iti ngfr om M r. Do wn s’ and Mr . B ri tt’ s hom eto wn in No rt h Carolina.

Mr . D ow ns and

Mr . B ri tt w e re lon g tim e fr ie nd s who ha d g ro wn up tog e the r i n N or

th Carolina. Mr. Br itt testified in his deposition that he and Mr. Downs consumed alc ohol almost every

we e ke nd sin c e the y

we re fi ft e e n o r s ixte e n y e ars old and that wh e n Mr

. Do wn s wa s dr ink inga lc oh ol, “he w ould never

be satisfied until he ha d had too much.” Mr . Br itt st ated that he could tell when Mr. Downs wa s “drunk” beca use of his “stumbling, ta lking, [and] his actions.” Mr. B ritt describe d Mr. Do wn s as “wi ld. ” F or

e xamp le , M r. Do wn s’ anti c s in c lud e d c a us ingwate r p ipe s to le a k in c la ss, placing“a Play

boy picture in the te ache r’s de sk [and] tak[ing] the barre l off of a dust collector a

nd throw[ing] sawdust all over people.” Moreove r, Mr. Dow ns had bee n arr ested pre viously for undera g e consumption of alc ohol and helping Mr. B ritt spray paint a Confeder ate flag and noose on
a water towe r.

After high sc hool, Mr . Br itt and Mr. Downs enr olled in NADC. Whil e attendingschool, they sh are d a n ap artme nt o n G la sto nb ur y Dr ive . M r. B ri tt i nv ite d M r. Hu rd le and Mr . D e ans to v isi t Na sh vil le and

to s pe nd the we e ke nd

wi th him and Mr . Dow ns a t th e ir a pa rtme nt. At

a pp ro xima te ly 7 : 0 0 p m o nt h at S at u rd ay , M r. Br i t tal s o i n v i t edM r. Bu s h an d M r. E l l er t o j o i nt h em

. E v en t h o u gh Mr. Downs, Mr. B ritt, Mr. Bush, a nd Mr. Dea

ns were all under the leg al drinki ng ag e of twenty -one, they and Mr. Hurdle consumed alcohol. Specifica lly , Mr. Downs wa s drinking “ Seag ram’s Seve n.” Mr. El ler, however, did not consume any alcohol that night. At some point during the eve ning, Mr

. Downs sug g ested that the g roup g o to a par ty at an apartment near the Cool Spring s mall in nearby Fr anklin, Tenne ssee. The g roup ag ree d to ri d e i n M r. Hurdle’s four- door pick-up tr uck, and Mr

. El le r a g re e d to be the de sig nate d d ri ve r b e c a

us e he ha d n ot b e e n c on sumin g a lc oh ol. Mr . B ri tt observe d that Mr. Downs wa s acting“wild” a nd “hollering a li ttle bit, screaminga little bit” when the g ro up le ft

the a pa rtme nt. F ur

the rm or e , M r. B ri tt o pin e d th a t Mr . D ow ns wa s th e mos t intox icated me mber of the g roup. The g roup tr a v e le d s o u th o n I n te r s tate 6 5 to th e Co o l Sp r in g s ma ll

- ar e a in s e ar c h of the party

. Some members of the g roup broug ht a lcoholic drinks along for the trip, one of w hich either 2 Mr . D ow ns or

Mr . D e ans sp ill e d o n th e ba c k- se at of the tr uc k. Ev e ntu a lly , th e group fo un d th e ir destination. Howeve r, when they enter ed the apar tment they discovere d that there was no party butI t i s un cl ear f r om t he r ecor d how or i f M r

. D owns kn ew t he t ena nt

. T he pl ai nt i f f t es t i f i ed i n h er 3 depo s i t i on t hat wh en s he s po ke t o t he t ena nt , s he t ol d t he pl ai nt i f f t hat s he di d not kn ow M r

. D owns or any ot her

m e m b e r o f t h e gr o u p

.

M r. H urdle st at ed i n hi s d ep o si t i o n t hat he did no t exi t t he t ruck; how ever, M r. E l l er t est i f i ed t hat M r. 4
H u rd le d id , i n fac t, e x it the tru c k

. -4- only one woman, the tenant. Acc ording to Mr. Britt, Mr. Downs continued to consume a lcohol once 3 they rea ched the apar

tment a nd was becoming more intox icated as the night pr og resse d. Not long afte r ente ring the apa

rtment, Mr. Downs be came bellige rent, de structive, and obnox ious. Mr. Eller descr ibed the situation as follows in his deposition:

This is at the point whe n [Mr. Dow ns] started to act up . . . . Whe n we a ll got ther e and e very body went in, he wa s normal, fine, standing there with the rest of us. The next m inute, he fe els like he

ne e ds to r un thr ou g h this la dy ’s ho us e tha t w e do n’ t kn owand

g o in her be droom and shut the door. . .

. And t hen he would come out and the n ju st s too d [sic ] the re wi th the re st of us

. . . . and the n h e wo uld do something e lse.

That something else included spilli ng a drink on the f loor and knoc king ove r some per sonal proper ty . At that point, the te nant insisted that Mr. Downs leave her apar tment. Mr. Br itt attempted to take Mr. Dow ns’ alcoholic drink awa y from him, but he re sisted. Mr. Br itt st ated in his deposition that “[h] e was kind of fighting me over the glass and said if we didn’ t let him have it, he was g oing to tear he r house a ll to pieces, as we wer e leaving.” As the g roup left t h e apa rtment and we re walking back to the truck, Mr. Downs ki cked the front doors of sever al neig hboring apar tments. The g roup g ot back in the truc k and ag ain Mr. Ell er drove w hile Mr. Hurdle sat in the front-pa sseng er seat. Mr. D owns sat in the middle ba ck-se at with Mr

. Br itt on his le ft behind the driver’ s seat and Mr. B ush on his right be hind the passeng er’ s seat. The g roup decide d to r eturn to Mr

. Downs’ a nd Mr. B ritt’s apar

tment. During the ret u rn trip on I nterstate 65, Mr . Downs bec ame na useous and started to “ dry -hea

ve.” Mr. Eller stopped the truck on the side of the interstate highw ay an d M r. Do w n s a lo n g w it

h M r

. B r itt, M r

. B u s h , an d p o s s ib ly M r

. H u r d le , e xit e d th e tr u ck. As he was 4 exit ing the truck, Mr. D owns broke of f a piece of the truck’s plastic molding. Once out of the truck, Mr. Downs vomited on the side of the roa d.

After vomiting, M r. Downs continued the return tr ip in the bed of the truc k. Howeve r, the parties dispute whose idea it was f or Mr. Dow ns to ride in the b ed of the truck and whether the de fe nd ants he lpe d “ pu t” him the re . With r e sp e c t to any c on ve rs a tio ns a

bo ut M r. Do wn s r idi ngin the bed of

the truck, Mr. Bu s h an d Mr. Hurdle testified in their depositions that none of the de fe nd ants dis c us se d M r. Do wn s rid ingin t he be d o f t

he tr uc k. Conve rs e ly , M r. B ri tt s tate d th a t it

wa s a “ g ro up de c isi on .” Mo re ov e r, a c c or din g to Mr

. El le r’ s de po sit ion , Mr

. Hurd le and Mr . B ri tt discussed Mr. Dow ns riding in the bed of the truck. Additionally , Mr. Eller state d in his statementIn his d e p o sitio n , M r. H u rd le d e n ie d sa ying tha t he w a n te d M r. D o w n s to rid e in the b e d o f t h e tru c k to 5

a v o id M r. D o w n s v o m iti n g in h is tru c k

.

M r

. E l l er t es t i f

i ed i n h i s depo s i t i on t hat he coul d not s ee M r

. D owns once he was i n t he bed o f t he t r uck 6 becau s e of

a t oo l bo x a nd dar k t i nt i ng on t he r ear wi ndow.

-5- to t he po lic e of

fi c e rs inv e sti g a tin g Mr . D ow ns ’ d e a th t hat Mr . H ur dle wa

nte d “ to p ut [M r. Do wn s] in the back so he wouldn’t vomit all over the truc k.” 5

L ikewise, the rec ord is unc lear whether the defe ndants assisted Mr. Downs into the bed of the truck, phy sically

put him there, or whether he voluntarily ag ree d to ride there. Mr. B ritt stated that he helpe d Mr. Downs, but that Mr

. Downs climbed into the bed under his own streng th. I n other words, Mr. B ritt did not phy sically g rab Mr. Downs and lift him up into the bed of the truck. Mr. Hurdle’ s testimony

supports Mr. Br itt’s statement. Mr. Bush, on the other hand, testified that Mr. Br itt did not assist Mr. Downs, but that he only shut the tailgate af

ter Mr. D owns climbed into the bed of the truck. Mr. B ush, Mr. Br itt, and Mr. Eller ag ree d that Mr. Downs did not object to riding in the bed of the truck.

I n their statements to the investig ating police off icer s, the defe ndants m ad e t h e following state me nts : Mr . B ri tt s tate d th a t he “ pu t [Mr . D ow ns ] in the be d of the tr uc k. ” Simi larl y , M r. B us h stated that Mr. Britt “opene d the t ailg ate and put [Mr. Downs] in the bac k.” Mr. Hur dle stated that Mr. B ritt “said put [Mr. Downs] in the back a nd [Mr. Britt] helped him int o the bac k.” L astly , Mr. Eller stated tha t M r. Br i t t “h elped him get into the bac k.” Reg ardle ss, of whose idea it was or whether the def endants helped or phy sically put Mr. Downs in the bed of the truck, it is undisputed that he continued the return tr ip alone and unr estraine d in the bed of the truck.
Shortly afte r re suming the trip, Mr. Downs started beatingon the truck’ s rea r window. Mr. Eller beg an to pull the truck ove r a se cond time when h e wa s ad v ised by another member of

the g roup to continue driving beca use Mr. Downs had either sat or laid bac k down in the bed. L ikewise, 6 the par ties disag ree whether

Mr. Eller c ame to a c omplete stop or not.
At some point after

resuming the trip, the members of the g roup re alized that Mr. Downs wa s no longe r in the bed of

the truck. N o one in the group knew when, why , how, or whe re Mr . Downs had exited the bed of the truck. The g roup re turned to the a partment a

nd beg an sear ching for Mr. Dow n s a t t

h e a p artm e n t c o mp le x, b e li e v in g th a t p e r h a p s h e h a d jump e d o u t o f th e b e d n e ar the apar tment complex and was playing a prank on the m. N o o n e we n t looking for Mr. Downs or contac ted the police.

The re cord doe s not revea l what happe ned to Mr. Downs a fter he exit ed the be d of the truc k

un til he wa s o bs e rv e d by Me lis sa B arr e ll, on e of the pa sse ng e rs in t he fi rs t ve hic le that stru c k h imM r

. B ar r el l w as or i g i n al l y n ame d a s a de f en dan t i n t h i s l aw s u i t , bu t t h e t r i al c ou r t g r an t ed h i s mot i on f or 7

su m m a ry j u d g m e n t an d the p la intiff d id no t ap p e a l t h a t d e c isio n

.

I n her app l i cat i o n f

o r perm i ss i o n t o ap p eal , t he p l ai nt i f f did no t present t he i ss ue o f whet her t he t ri al co urt 8

e rr e d in g ra n ting su m m a ry j u d g m e n t t o e a c h o f t h e d e fen d a n ts w ith re sp e c t t o the o u tra g e o u s c o n d u c t cla im

. H owe v er , s h e di d br i ef t h e i s s u e an d t h e def

en dan t s r es pon ded i n t h ei r br i ef s

. Ac cor di n g t o T en n es s ee Rul e of A pp el l at e Procedur e 11(b) , t he appl i cat i on f or per mi s s i on t o app eal “ s hal l cont ai n:

. . . ( 2) t he ques t i ons pre s ent ed f o r r evi ew.” W e co ncl ud e t hat t he p l ai nt i f f ab and o ned t hi s i ss ue o n ap p eal t o t hi s C o urt be cause s he d i d not p res ent i t i n h er a ppl i ca t i on f

or pe r mi s s i on t o a ppea l

. H owe v er , e v en i f s h e h ad pr oper l y pr es en t ed t h e i s s u e, t h e Cour t of A p p eal s co rr ect l y af

f i rme d t he t ri al co urt ’ s d eci si o n t o grant t he d ef end ant s’ m o t i o ns f

o r s um m ary judgm ent on t he

o u tra g e o u s c o n d u c t cla im

.

E f f ect i ve Jul y 1, 20 0 7 , T enness ee R ul e o f C i vi l P roce d ure 56

. 0 4 was ame nd ed and now pro vi d es: “ T he 9 tria l co u rt sh a ll sta te the leg a l gr o u n d s u p o n w h ic h the c o u rt d e n ie s o r g ra n ts the m o tio n w h ic h sh a ll b e inc lud e d in t he order r ef

l ect i ng t he cour t ’ s r ul i ng

. ”
-6- on I n te r s tate 6 5

. M s

. B ar r e ll te s ti f ie d b y a f f id a v it th a t a s s h e an d h e r h u s b an d , th e dr iv e r , wer e 7 trave ling nor

th on the interstate highw ay , she saw Mr. Downs appr ox imately ten to fiftee n fee t ahea d of their ve hicle on the side of t he road and that he was cr ouched in a “runne r’s stanc e.” Mr . Downs the n r an in to t

heir lane of tr a ff ic . Imme diate ly

up on se e ingMr . D ow ns ru

n in to t he ir lane , M s. B arr e ll y e lle d out to he r hus ba nd , who sw e rv e d, bu t un fo rt un a te ly str uc k M r. Do wn s. Th e ve hic le behind the B arr ell’s vehicle also struck Mr. D owns. Ms. Ba rre ll called 9-1-1, and Mr . Downs wa s taken to Va

nderbilt University

Hospital where he subseque ntly died as a result of his injuries.

Mr . D ow ns ’ m oth e r, Di ane Do wn s, fi le d th is l aws uit se e kin g dama g e s f

or the wr on g fu l de a th of her son alleg ing that the d ef en d an t s intentionally

or neg lige ntly

put him in t he bed of

truck. Additionally , the plainti ff cl ai m s that the def endants’ c onduct constituted the tort of outra g eous
c on du c t. Ea c h of the de fe nd ants fi le d a motio n for summa ry jud g me nt. Ge ne ra lly , th e de fe nd ants 8 argued that they did not owe or brea ch any duty of ca re, a nd that even if

any duty of ca re w as owe d

and br e a c he d, Mr . D ow ns ’ a c t of ru nn ingint o a

lane of tr a ff ic wa s an in de pe nd e nt, int e rv e nin g c a us e that neg ated a

n essential ele ment of the plaintiff’s claims. The trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt to eac h of the defenda

nts on both claims. The orde rs g rantingsummary judgme nt, however , did not provide a ny leg al g rounds upon which the motions wer e g rante d. 9

The Court of Appea ls a ffirme d the trial court’s decision to g rant summary judgme nt to e ach of the de fenda

nts. The intermediate appe llate cour t concluded that only the driver , Mr. Eller, a nd the owner of the truck, Mr. Hurdle, owed Mr. Downs a duty of car e. The c ourt went on to hold that there was no basis to support a conclusion that either of these defenda nts brea ched his duty

of ca re. I n addition, the Court of Appea ls held that the trial cour t could als o h av e p roper ly dismiss ed the pla int if f’ s la ws uit be c a us e Mr . D ow ns ’ a c t of

ru nn ingint o a

lane of tr a ffi c was an inde pe nd e nt, interveningcause that neg ated an essential ele ment -- pr ox imate or leg al ca use -- of the plaintiff’ s claims.

Th e pla int if

f a pp e a le d a nd ra ise d a numbe r o f i ssu e s r e late d to th e nat ur e of the le g a l duty
ow e d b y the de fe nd ants to M r. Do wn s. Th e pla int if f argue s e a c h of the de fe nd ants br e a c he d a du ty-7-

of rea sonable car e beca

use they helped “put” Mr. Downs in the bed of the truck. She rea sons that this act cre ated a

fore seea ble and unr easona

ble risk of h arm to her son. Moreove r, the plaintiff

c on te nd s th a t all of the de fe nd ants a ssume d an a ff ir mativ e du ty to a id o r p ro te c t Mr . D ow ns be c a us e he wa s helpless an d t h ey

took char g e of him. L astly , the plaintiff insists that Mr. Britt, Mr. Eller, and Mr. Hur dle assumed an aff irmative duty to aid or protec t her son bec ause the y eac h stood in a sp e c ia l r e la tio ns hip to h im.
We g ra nte d r e vie w. F or

the re a so ns se t f

or th b e low, we ho ld that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt t o e ach

of the de fe nd ants . T he qu e sti on of wh e the r t

he de fe nd ants helped “ put” Mr. Downs in the b ed o f t h e truck is a g enuine issue of materia l fac t that prec ludes

summa ry jud g me nt i n th is c a se . Si mil arl y , w e ho ld t hat th e qu e sti on s o f wheth er t he de fe nd ants took c h ar g e o f M r

. D o w n s an d w h e th e r h e w a s h e lp le s s ar e g e nu in e is s u e s o f mate r ia l fac t that prec lude summary

judgme nt as well. These fac ts are materia l beca use they deter mine the nature of the leg al duty

owed by the def endants to Mr

. Downs. Howeve r, we disag ree with the plaintiff that Mr . B ri tt, Mr . E lle r, and

Mr . H ur dle a ssume d a

n a ff ir mativ e du ty to aid or pr ote c t Mr . D ow ns , beca use they did not stand in any

specia l relationship with him.
Duty P rinciples Und er Te nnessee Law

A.

I n order to preva il on a claim of neg lige nce, the plaintiff m ust prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e the following elements: “(1) a duty of ca re ow ed by

the def endant to the plaintiff; ( 2) conduct by

the def endant f alling be low the standar d of ca re a mounting to a breac h of that duty ; (3) an injury or loss; (4) ca

use in fac t; and (5) pr ox imate or leg al ca use.” West, 172 S.W.3d at 550; s ee also McCall v. Wil der, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995). T he question in this appe al ce nters on the duty of ca re, if a ny , owed to Mr. Downs. A duty of ca re is “the leg al obligation o we d b y defe ndant to plaintiff to confor m to a
re a so na ble pe rs on

sta nd ard of c are fo r t he pr ote c tio n ag a ins t unr e a so na ble ri sk s of harm .” Mc Ca ll, 91 3 S. W.2 d at 15 3. Th e c omm on law ha s long re c og nize d th a t an in div idu a l ha s a du ty to e xer c ise

re as o n ab l e c ar e i nh i s o r h er ac t i v i t i es i n o rd er

t o p re v en tu n re as o n ab l e r i s k s o f h arm fr o m ar i s i n g. West, 172 S .W.3d at 550; Draper v. Westerfield, 181 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tenn. 2005); Doe v. L inder Constr. Co., 845 S .W.2d 173, 177 (Tenn. 1992). The duty of rea sonable car e acts as a r estraint upon an individual’s ac tiviti es. See Tur ner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 81 8 (Tenn. 1997) (stating that g e ne ra lly “ a pe rs on ha s a duty to use re a so na ble c are to r e fr a in f

ro m c on du c t th a t w ill fo re se e a bly

cause injury

to others.”)

.
Whil e individuals have a n obligation to refra in from ac ting in a w ay t h at cre ates a n
unrea sonable risk of harm to othe rs, the law g ener ally does not impose on individuals an aff irmative duty to aid or protec t othe rs. Dra per, 181 S.W .3d at 291; Bra dshaw v. Da niels, 854 S.W .2d 865, 871 (Tenn. 1993) ; Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 314 (1965). I n o t h er wo rd s , wher e an a lleg ed tortfea sor does nothing to cre ate or allow an unrea sonable risk of har m, but inst ead the complaining-8-

party himself or her self cr eate s the unrea sonable risk or voluntarily assumes an unr easona

ble risk, there is no d u t y o n the par t of the alleg ed tortfe asor to take action to pre vent the har m. Howeve r, Tenne ssee c ourts have c onsistently rec og nized e x ceptions to this “no duty to act” r ule. B radsha

w, 854 S.W .2d at 872; McClung v. D elta Square L td. P’ship, 937 S.W .2d 891, 904 (Tenn. 1996) ; Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of

To rt s § 31 4A

. F or

e xamp le , if

an in div idu a l st and s in

a sp e c ia l r e latio ns hip to another individual who is the sourc e of the dang er or who is fore seea

bly at risk from the da

ng er, then the individual assumes an a ffirmative duty to exercise re asonable car e to either control the dang er or protec t the vulnera

ble. West, 172 S.W .3d at 551; Bisca n v. Br own, 160 S.W .3d 462, 478- 79 (Tenn. 2005) . We have pr eviously rec og nized such special r elationships to i n cl u d e t hose of innkeepe r and guest, common ca rrier and passeng er, possessors of land a nd g uests, social host and g uest, and those who ha

ve custody

over a nother. See Br adshaw , 854 S.W .2d at 872; McClung, 937 S.W .2d at 895 ; L i n dsey

v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Tenn. 1985); Restatement (S e c on d) of

To rt s § 31 4A . Si mil arl y , an ind ivi du a l may a ssume an a ff ir mativ e du ty

by c omi ngto the aid of or resc uing another individual. See L indsey , 689 S.W .2d at 859; Restatement (Sec ond) of To rt s § § 3 23 & 32 4. Th e fo llo wi nge xamp le ill us tr a te s th is c on c e pt:

A i s ru n o ver b y an aut om ob il e and lef t ly in g in th e st reet . B, seeing A’s helpless c ondition, takes him in hi s car for the pur

pose of taking him to a hospital. B drives the ca r so neg lige ntly

that he runs int o a tr e e

. Th e c oll isi on g re a tly inc re a se s A’ s or ig ina l inj ur ie s. B is

su bje c t to lia

bil ity to Afo r s o mu c h o f t

he harm to h im a s is du e to the collision.
Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 324 ill ust. 1.

Tenne ssee c ourts deter

mine whether

a def endant owe s or assumes a duty of ca re to a particula r plaintiff by

consideringpublic policy and whe ther the r isk of harm is unre asonable

. Bur roug hs v. Mag ee, 118 S.W .3d 323, 329 (Tenn. 2003) ; Turner , 957 S.W .2d at 818. Public policy considerations are r eleva

nt be cause “the imposit ion of a leg al duty ref lects society ’s contempor ary policies and socia l require ments conce rning the rig ht of indi v i d u al s an d the g ener al public to be protec ted from a

nother’s a ct or c onduct.” B radsha w, 854 S.W.2d at 870.

Wit h respe ct to w hether the risk of harm is unre asonable , we have pre viously stated that “[a] risk is unr easona

ble and g ives rise to a duty to act with due c are if the for esee able pr obability and g ra vit y of ha rm po se d b y de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t outw e ig h th e burd en up on de fe nd ant t o e ng a g e in

a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t that wo uld have pr e ve nte d the ha rm .” Mc Ca ll, 91 3 S.W. 2d a t 15 3. We h a ve a lso

no te d th a t th e fo llo wi ngfa c tor s sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d in de c idi ngwh e the r o r n ot a ri sk is

unre a so na

ble :

the fore s ee ab l e proba bility of the ha

rm or injury

occur ring ; the possible mag nitude of the potential ha rm or injury ; the importance or social value of the activity eng ag ed in by defe ndant; the fe asibility of alternative, safe r conduc t and the re lative costs and bur densW e caut i o n, how ever, t hat our co ncl usi o n t hat t he d angers o f ri d i ng i n t he b ed of a t ruck are o b vi o us and 10 fo re se e a b le is l im ited to the q u e stio n o f f o re se e a b ili ty i n this a p p e a l.

-9- associate d with that conduct; the re lative usefu l n ess of the safer conduct; and the relative safe ty of alter native conduc t.
McCall, 913 S.W .2d at 153 (c iting Restateme nt (Second) of Torts §§ 292, 293); see Bisca n, 160 S.W .3d at 479-80; B urroug hs, 118 S.W .3d at 329.

Th e fo re se e a

bil ity of the ha rm is a ke y fa c tor in t he e qu a tio n b e c a

us e , in g e ne ra l te rm s, “[f]oreseea

bility is the test of neg lige nce.” West, 172 S .W.3d at 552 (quoting L inder Constr. Co., 84 5 S. W.2 d at 17 8) ; H a le v. Os tr ow , 1 66 S.W. 3d 71 3, 71 6- 17 (T e nn

. 20 05 ). “ ‘A ri sk is f or e se e a ble if a re asonable person c ould forese e the pr obability of its occur

renc e or if the person wa s on notice that the likelihood of dang er to the pa rty to whom is owed a duty

is probable.’ ” West, 172 S.W .3d at 551 (quoting L inder Const r. C o

. , 845 S.W .2d at 178). How ever , fore seea bility alone doe s not
cre ate a duty to exercise re asonable car e. McClung, 937 S.W .2d at 904. I f the risk is fore seea ble, t h e nc o u rt s s h o u l d

w e i g h t h e r e m a i n i n g f

a c t o r s t o d e t e r

m i n e i f ani mp o s i t i o no f

d u t y i s j u s t i f i e d

. In the end, whe ther a

defe ndant owed or assumed a duty of ca re to a plaintiff is a question of lawfor the cour t to decide. West, 172 S.W .3d at 550; Stewa rt v. State, 33 S.W .3d 785, 793 (Tenn. 2000)

.
B.
Turning to the case at bar , the plaintiff arg ues that all of the de fenda nts helped “put” Mr. Downs i n the bed of t he truck and this act cr eate d a for esee able a nd unrea sonable risk of ha rm. The defe ndants cou n t er that Mr. Downs c limbed into the bed of the truc k under his own stre ng th and consente d to ride there . The Court of Appea ls stated t hat as a matter of l aw the f act that Mr. D owns was ridingin the bed of the tru ck was of no significa nce be cause there is no statutory or common law prohibition ag ainst this act. We respe ctfully disag ree with the l ower court’s rationale. A jury could ea sily

conclude that the dang ers of riding unrestra ined in the bed of a p i ck-up truck on an inter s tate h ig h w ay

ar e f o r e s e e a b le an d o b v io u s

. I n d e e d , it

is c o mm o nkn o w le d g e th a t r iding unrestra ined in a vehicle can result in pr eventa ble injuries and deaths. See e.g ., Manee ly v. Gen. 10 Motors. Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1997) (“I f the public rec og nizes that trave ling in the passeng er c ompartment of a n automobile without a seatbelt is dang erous, it only follows as nig ht the day that the publ ic also rec og nizes that riding in the carg o bed of a pickup . . . presents eve n g reater ri s k s

. ”) ; R o l an d

v

. Da i m l er C h ry s l er C o rp

. , 3 3 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 8 , 4 7 0 (T ex

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( af fi rm i n g a trial court’ s g rant of summar y judgme nt in a

products liability

case beca use as a matter of la

w riding in the bed of a

truck is an ope n and obvious dang er) ; J osue v. I suzu Mot ors Am., 958 P.2d 535, 540 (Ha w. 1998) (holding “that the dang ers of riding unrestra ined in a n open car g o bed of a pickup truc k

are obvious and g ener ally known to the ordinar

y user” ). Particularly on an interstate highw ay , for example, injuries or death can r esult from falling out of t he bed of a truck onto the roa dway , hitting the w a ll s o f th e b e d , o r b e in g e xp o s e d to in c le me n t w e a th e r

. T h e o b v io u s d an g e r of harm from“ W hi l e co m p l i ance wit h a s t at ut o ry s t and ard i s evi d ence o f due care, i t i s no t co ncl usi ve. Such a 11

sta n d a rd is no m o re tha n a m inim u m , an d it d o e s n o t ne c e ssa rily p re c lud e a fi n d ing tha t t h e a c to r w a s n e g lige n t i n f ai l i n g t o t ak e addi t i on al pr ec au t i on s

. ” W

. Pag e K ee t on e t

. a l

. , Pr os s er a n d K ee t on on t h e La w of T or t s § 36, a t 233 (5 th e d . 1 9 8 4 ).

-10- pu tti ngan in toxic a te d pe rs on in the be d of a tr uc k or vo lun tari ly c ho os ing to r ide the re is r e a so na bly foreseea ble despite the f

act that ther e is no statute or c ommon law rule prohibiting the pra ctice. 11

Ba sed upon our r ev i ew of the re cord a nd the re levant author ities, we conc lude that the question of whethe r the defe ndants helped “put” Mr. Downs in the bed of the truck is a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t that must be resolved by the jury

. The nature of the duty the defe ndants owed Mr

. Downs is depende nt upon the resolution of t hat factual i ssue. For example, if the jury conclude s that the def endants plac ed Mr. Downs in the bed of the truck or assisted him i n g etting into it, then they

ow e d h im a

du ty to e xer c ise re a so na

ble c are to re fr a in fr om co nd uc t tha t cr e a te s an u

nr e a so na ble ri sk of harm. I f, howeve r, the jury finds that Mr. Downs g ot into the bed of the truc k voluntarily without assistance or coe rcion, but of his own free will, then the defe ndants did not owe him a duty of ca re, unless they

assumed a duty

by taking char g e of Mr . Downs bec ause he was he lpless or by standing in a sp e c ia l r e latio ns hip to h im.

C.

Th e pla int if

f i ns ist s th a t e ve n if

the de fe nd ants ha d n o duty to ac t to pr e ve nt a n unr e a so na

ble risk of har

m, one or more of the e x ceptions to the “no duty to act” ru l e apply . First, the plaintiff

aver s that section 324 of the Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts applies to the def

endants. This sec tion pr ov ide s:
One who, be ing unde r no duty to do so, takes cha

rg e of a nother who is h e lpl e ss a de qu a te ly

to a id o r p ro te c t hi mse lf

is s ub je c t to lia bil ity to the other for any bodily harm cause d to him by (a) the fa ilure of the actor to exercise re asonable car e to s ec u re t h e saf ety of the other wh ile wi thi n the a cto r’ s c ha rg e , o r ( b) the a c tor ’s dis c on tin uin g his

a id o r p ro te c tio n, if

by so do inghe leave s th e oth e r i n a wo rs e position t han whe n the ac tor took char g e of him.
Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 324.
Even thoug h we have never directly addre ssed s ection 324 of t he R estateme nt (Second) of To rt s, we have pr e vio us ly e xami ne d a s it uat io n whe re a de fe nd ant “ take s c ha

rg e of ” a “ he lpl e ss” in d i v i dual. In L indsey

v. Miami Development Corporation, the plaintiff’s dec edent, who w as i n t o x i ca t ed , d i edaf

t er j u mp i n g o ff

a b al co n y

an d s t ri k i n g h er

h ea d o n t h e gro u n d

wh i l e a t t en d i n g a party at the defe ndant’s residenc e. 689 S.W .2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1985) . After the dec edent jumped, the def endant told those ga t here d around the dece dent to “wa it a while bef ore you call an ambulance .” I d. at 858. Whil e thi s Court held t hat t he defenda nt owed the dece dent a duty of ca re-11-

beca use they stood in t h e s p ec i al relationship of social g uest and host, we note d that “eve n if no relationship had ex isted betwee n [t he dec edent] and t he Defenda nt, the Def

endant a ssumed control of the sit uatio n wh ic h pla c e d him un de r the ob lig a tio n to e xer c ise re a so na ble c are to r e nd e r a id t o [t he dece dent].” I d. at 860. This Court conclude d that the defe ndant took c harge o f t h e decede nt when he instructed other s to wait befor e ca lling for medical a ssistance. I d.

I n Carson v. Adg ar, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, addr essed a si m i l ar f actua l situation to t he case at bar and expressly relied upon section 324 of t he R estateme nt. 486 S.E.2d 3, 5 ( S.C. 19 97 ). Th e pla int if f’ s dec e de nt an d the de fe nd ant, wh o wor ke d tog e the r, sp e nt a m a

jor ity of the da y toge ther socia liz ing and consumingalcohol. I d. at 4. The de cede nt became intox icated

and argue d w iththe de fe nd ant a s th e y we re dr ivi ng a lon g a hig hw ay

. I d. Th e de fe nd ant d e c ide d to “put [the dece dent] out” of the vehicle on the roa dside so that the dec edent c ould “cool off .” I d. The defe ndant dr o v e aw ay fo r appr ox imately one mile and then r eturne d to where he had le ft the dece dent. Howe ver, dur ing that time the dece dent had attempted to cro s s the hig hway and wa s
s t ru ckan d

k i l l edb y an o t h er v eh i cl e. I d

. at 4 -5

. T h e p l ai n t i ff ar gu edt h at t h e d ef

en d an tt o o k

ch ar ge of the de cede nt when the men le ft work tog ether to go soc ializi ng . I d. at 5.

The South Carolina cour t concluded that “in o rd er t o est ablish the defe ndant has ‘taken ch ar ge o f’ o n e wh o i s h el p l es s , t h e pl ai n t i ff m u s t s h o w ‘t h e de fe n d an t d i d m o re t h an ac t , b u tt h ro u gh aff irmative ac tion assumed an oblig ation or intended to re nder service s for the bene fit of another .’” Carson, 486 S.E.2d at 5-6 (quoting McGe e B y & T hroug h McGe e v. Chalfa nt, 806 P.2d 980, 983 (Ka n. 1991)). Apply

ing this reasoning , the C arson court held t hat t he facts di d not indicate that the defe ndant, “throug h aff

irmative ac tion, assumed an oblig ation or intended to re nder se rvice s for [the dece dent’s] benefit.” I d. at 6.

Wit h respe ct to the “he lpless” re quirement, the Restatement writer s rec og nized that intox ication ca

n rende r a pe rson “he lpless.” See Restate ment (Second) of Torts § 324 cmt. b (stating that this section applies “whe re the actor takes charg e of one who is ill, drunk, or made he lpless by the a c t of a thi rd pe rs on or a fo rc e of natur e .” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . L ike wi se , in Col vil le v. L ibe rt

y Mut. I ns. Co., th e Ap p el l at e Court of Connec ticut relied on sec tion 324 and conclude d that the plaintiff i n that case was “helpless” after consuming alcohol to the poi nt of “semi-c onsciousness.” 748 A.2d 875, 876 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).

Wit h respe ct to the plaintiff’s first aff irmative duty argument, we conclude that whether Mr. Downs was “helpless” and whether the defe ndants “took char g e of” him a re g enuine issues of materia l fac t that must be resolved by the jury

. I f a jury finds that Mr. Downs’ level of intoxi cation

re nd e re d h im “h e lpl e ss” and that the de fe nd ants “ too k c ha rg e of ” him , th e n th e de fe nd ants ow e d h im a duty to exercise re asonable car e in aiding or protec ting him. Converse ly , if the jury conclude s that Mr. Downs wa s not “helpless” or that none of the defendants “took char g e of” him, then sec tion 324 of the Restate ment (Second) of Torts has no a pplication.

Her e, the rec ord contains ample evide nce that Mr. Downs consumed a lcohol throug hout the night a nd t h at h e wa s ac t ing “ wild” and be came ill. These fa cts support the conc lusion that Mr.T h e Cour t of Appea l s de f

i n ed a “ des i g n at ed dr i v er ” as “ on e wh o a s s u mes t h e du t y t o r ema i n s ober f or 12 the p u rp o se o f d riv ing o the rs .” F o r p u rp o se s o f t h is o p inio n , w e a d o p t t h is d e finiti o n a s w e ll.

-12- Downs wa s intox icated. H oweve r, beingintox icated doe s not nece s s ar i l y m ean that he was

“ he lpl e ss. ” F or e xamp le , the re c or d a lso ind ic a te s th at he wa s a ble to e nte r a

nd e xit bo th a

pa rtme nts and the truc k’s bed under his own stre ng th. Thus, we conc lude that whethe r Mr. Dow ns was “helpless” is a g enuine issue of materia l fac t that must be resolved by the jury

. Reg ardingthe questi on of whether the defe ndants “took charg e of” Mr. Downs, the re cord contains evide nce that the defe ndant s decide d that Mr. Downs shoul d ride in the be d of the truc k, and ther e is evidenc e that at least Mr. Br itt helpe d him into the bed. On the other hand, the r ecor d

a lso ind ic a te s that Mr

. Do wn s did no t ob je c t to ri din g in the be d o f t he tr uc k a nd that he c lim

be d in to it under his own streng th. Thus, we conc lude that whethe r the de fenda nts “took char g e of” Mr. Downs is a g enuine issue of materia l fac t that must be resolved by the jury

. Next, we addre ss the pl aintiff’s arg ument that Mr. Britt, Mr. El ler, and Mr. Hurdle eac h stood in a sp e c ia l r e latio ns hip su c h th a t th e y a ssume d a

n a ff ir mati ve duty

to e xer c ise re a so na

ble c are in aiding or protec ting Mr. D owns. First, the plaintiff contends that “this Court should recog nize that B ri tt h a d a

n a ff ir mativ e relati on sh ip wi th M r. Do wn s su c h th a t B ri tt h a d a n a ff ir mativ e du ty

to protec t Downs from ha

rm under the circ umstances” beca use of their

close re lationship a s b e s t f riends and roommate s. Howeve r, the plaintiff c ites no authority supporting h er position t hat frie ndship, standing alone, g ives rise to a duty of ca re. A fter r eviewingthe fa cts in this case, we conclude that it is not in the publ ic’s best interest to impose on Mr. Britt an affirmative duty to aid or protect Mr. Downs solely beca

use he was Mr. Downs’ be st friend a nd roommate. The se two y oung men did not stand in any

specia l relationship that we have pre viously rec og nized, a

nd there is no evidence that Mr. Downs wa s depende nt on Mr. Br itt. Thus, we conclude as a matter of law that Mr. Br itt did not

assume an a ffirmative duty by virtue of be ing Mr . Downs’ be st friend a nd roommate.

Al te rn a tiv e ly , th e pla int if

f c on te nd s th a t de sig nate d d ri ve rs a ssume an a ff

ir mativ e du ty

to a id or protec t intox icated pa sseng ers. The duties of a desig nated driver pose an issue of f irst impression for this Court. On t h e n i gh t t h e d efendants and Mr. D owns went in sea rch of the par ty , Mr. Eller

serve d as the de signated driver for the g roup and dr ove Mr. Hurdle’ s truck. Gene rally , drivers of a vehicle ow e their pa sseng ers a d uty to exercise re asonable car e under the circ umstances whe n driving . See McCall, 913 S.W.2d at 1 5 6 (st ating that the def endant- driver “ owe[d] a duty to act
rea sonably

in light of the inhe rent da ng ers a ssociated with driving .”).

Th e pla int if

f, ho we ve r, po sit s th a t Mr. El le r ow e d Mr. Do wn s mor e tha n th e c us tom ary

du ty to exercise re asonable car e whe n driving the truck be cause he wa s a “de signated drive r. ” The 12 pla int if f a rgue s th a t “ [t]he re sh ou ld b e a du ty fo r d e sig nate d d

ri ve rs to t ake a ff

ir mativ e a c tio ns to keep intox icated passeng ers inside the passeng er compar tment of the vehicle and to e nsure that the int oxic a te d p a sse ng e r i s n ot ab and on e d in a posi tio n of pe ri l alo ng the jou rn e y .” We d isa g re e wi th such a br oad im p o s i t i o n o f an affirmative duty of ca re be cause the public is better se rved by-13-

e nc oura g ingind ivi du a ls t o s e rv e a s d e sig nate d d ri ve rs rather t han ad op tin g a po lic y that c ou ld potentially

discourag e the pr actice

.
Othe r j ur isd ic tio ns that ha ve c on sid e re d th e du tie s o f d e sig nate d d ri ve rs have lik e wi se declined to impose on de signated driver s an af firmative duty

to aid or protec t intox icated p a s s e n g e r s

. Se e , e

. g

. , St e p h e n s o n v

. L e d b e tt e r , 5 9 6 N

. E

. 2 d 1 3 6 9 , 1 3 7 3 ( I n d

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( s tati n g th a t “ [t ]o ho ld a dr ive r l ia ble fo r t he ir re sp on sib le a c tio ns of an int oxic a te d pa sse ng e r wo uld c ut a g a ins t th is important social policy of encour ag ing the use of desig nated drivers.” ); Cardella v. Robinson, 903 So. 2d 61 3, 61 8 ( L a . Ct . App . 2 00 5) (r e a so nin g that if de sig nate d dr ive rs we re imp os e d wi th a du ty to c on tr ol i nto xicate d p a sse ng e rs and pr e ve nt t he m f ro m pe rf or min g tor tio us or c ri min a l a c ts i t would have a

“chilling eff

ect” o n t h e designated driver movement); Collins v. Thomas, 938 A.2d 1208, 1211 (Vt. 2007) (af

firming a trial court’s deter mination that “ther e is no common law duty on the par t of a sober

driver to pr otect an intoxicated passeng er f rom the c o n s eq u en ce s of the intox icated passeng er’ s own actions, and that the i mpositi on of such a duty would be inconsistent with the social policy

favor ing the use of de signated driver s.”).
This Court has consistently rec og nized the dang ers a ssociated with im p ai red driving. See Wes t, 1 72 S .W .3 d at 55 1-52 (s tatin g that “ [i]t is c omm on kn ow le dg e that dr

un k d ri vin g dir e c tly results in acc idents, injuries, and deaths.”) (f ootnote omitted); Bur

roug hs, 118 S.W .3d at 332 (noti ng that “[d] eaths a

nd serious injuries trag ically occur ever y day as the result of impaire d drivers w ho

are operating motor ve hicles on our r oads and hig hway s.”). De signated driver s offe r a va luable, but limit ed ser

vice to those who become i ntox icated. Ba sed on these publi c poli cy rea sons, we hold as a matter of l aw t h at Mr. Eller owe d a duty to exercise re asonable car e in driving the vehicle and

rema ining sobe r while pe rfor ming this service . Mr. Eller did not, howeve r, assume a n aff irmative du ty to a id o r p ro te c t Mr . D ow ns m e r e ly beca use of his status as desig nated dr iver.

L astly , the plaintiff ave rs that Mr. Hurdle assumed an aff irmative dut y to aid or protec t Mr. Do wn s b e c a

us e he wa s th e ow ne r o f t he tr uc k a nd Mr . D ow ns wa s a

pa sse ng e r. Th e g ro up ro de in Mr . H ur dle ’s tr uck to the Coo l Sp ri ng s ma ll- are a . B e c a us e he c on sume d a lc oh ol, Mr . H ur dle

a llo we d M r. El le r, wh o h a d n ot c on sume d alc oh ol , to dr ive his tr uc k. Mr . H ur dle ro de a s a passeng er. A s a gene ral rule, passeng ers do not owe a duty of care “to the publ ic to control, or e ven
a tte mpt to c on tr ol, the op e ratio n of a ve hic le un le ss t

he y have a ri g ht t o d o s o, e ith e r t

hr ou g h th e ir relationship t o the vehicle itself or t o the driver .” Gr andstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-311(a ) (2004) provides that,

I n all actions for

injury to persons and/or to p ro p erty cause d by

the neg l i gen t operation or use of a ny automobile . . . within this state, proof of owner ship of such vehicle sha ll be prima fa cie e vidence that the vehicle at the time of the c ause of action s u ed o n was being operated and use d with authority , consent a nd knowledg e of the

owner in the very

transac tion out of which the injury o r cause of

a c tio n a ro se , a nd su c h p ro of

of ow ne rs hip lik e wi se sh a ll b e pr ima fac ie evidenc e that the vehicle was then and there being operated by-14- the ow ne r, or

by the ow ne r’ s se rv ant, fo r the ow ne r’ s use and be ne fi t and within the cour se and sc ope of the serva nt’s employ

ment.

This statute cre ates prima fac ie evidenc e of a n owner -ser

vant re lationship between the owner of the ve hicle and the driver. See Godfre y v. Ruiz , 90 S.W .3d 692, 697 (Tenn. 2002) (stating that this statute “is clear ly

intended to eliminate the diff iculty encounte red by

injured p ar t i es wh o are trying to pr ove that the dr iver wa s operating with the owne r’s pe rmissi o n at t h e ti me of the

a c c ide nt. ” ); War

re n v . E state of

Ki rk , 9 54 S.W. 2d

72 2, 72 4 (T e nn

. 19 97 ). Th e ow ne r m ay ov e rc ome thi s p ri ma fa c ie c a se wi th c ounte rv a ili nge vid e nc e “ that th e dr ive r w a s in fa c t op e ra

tin g the ve hic le without authority of t he owner.” Fe rg uson v. Tomerlin, 656 S.W.2d 378, 381-82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); Warre n, 954 S.W .2d at 724.
Thus, pursuant to this statute, if the j ury finds that Mr. Eller is liable for Mr. Downs’ de ath, then any liability may be imputed vic ariously to Mr

. Hurdle provided that the statutory presumption is n ot ov erco me. H ow e ve r, an o wn e r o f a ve hic le is n ot o ne of

the sp e c ia l r e latio ns hip s th a t th is Court ha s p re vio us ly recog nize d, and we se e no re a so n to imp os e su c h a du ty un de r t he se circ umstances. Mr. H urdle only had the r ight to co ntrol the driver of the truc k and not the other passeng ers. Mr. H urdle’s duty should not be gre ater

than the duty

owed by Mr. Eller. The rec ord do e s n ot r e ve a l th a t Mr . H ur dle a c te d to be ne fi t or re nd e r a id to Mr. Do wn s. B a se d upo n th e fa c ts of thi s c a se , we c on c lud e a s a matte r o f l aw that Mr . H ur dle did no t a ssume an a ff

ir mativ e du ty

to aid or prote ct Mr. Downs.

Breac h of

Duty, Injury or Loss, Cause in Fact , P roxim ate C ause, and Defenses

I n addition to proving the exis tence of a d u t y of ca re, the plaintiff still bears the burde n of proving the re maining e lements of neg lige nce: be ach of duty , inju ry o r l o s s , cause in fac t, and proxi mate ca

use. I n light of our decision that this case is inappropriate for summary judgme nt, the jury should also resolve these rema ining e lements. I n addition, the jury should decide w hether Mr. Downs’ a ct of runninginto a lane of traff ic was a n independe nt, interveningcause of his death. See McClenaha

n v. Cooley , 806 S

. W.2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991). L astly , the jury should also decide

w h e t h e r M r

. D o w n s ’ n e g l i g e n c e , i f an y, e qu a l e d o r o u t w e i g h e d t h e d e f e n d an t s ’ n e g l i g e n c e , i f

an y. Hale, 166 S.W.3d at 718 (stating the allocation of compar ative fa ult is a determination of fa ct to be made by the jury ).

Conclusion

I n summary , we c onclude th a t t here are g enuine issues of material fa ct that pre clude summary jud g me nt. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e re are g e nu ine iss ue s o f f a c t re latin g to h owMr . D ow ns c a me to b e in the be d o f the tr

uc k af te r he be c a me ill

. I n ad dit ion , the re are g e nu ine iss ue s of ma te ri a l f a c t w ith

re sp e c t to wheth e r M r. Do wn s w a s “ he lpl e ss” and wh e the r t

he de fe nd ants “ too k c ha

rg e of ” him

. These issu es ar e mater ial beca use they deter mine the nature of the duty of ca re ow ed by

the defe ndants to Mr. Downs. We also conclude that the best friend and roommate, de signated driver , and owne r of the tr

uck did not assume an aff irmative duty beca

use they did not stand in any

specia l-15-

relationship t o Mr. Downs. The ref ore, w e re verse the judg ment of the Court of Appea ls and rema nd this case to the tria l court for further proce eding s.

Costs of this a

ppeal are taxed to the defe ndants, Mark Bush, Ry an B ritt, J err y Dane Eller, and Scott Hurdle, for

which execution may

issue if nec essar

y

.

____________________________________ WI L L I AM M. B ARKE R, C HI EF JUSTI CE