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MOL Flight Test and 

Operations Plan 

8 May 1968 

Depart ment of the Air Force 

Maimed (Whiting Laboratory, Syslems Program ()filet. (( /SA I.) 

A Unit I 'ost Office 

Angel(';-, California 90015 

0198 

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eymaier, Majo 

ty Director, MOL 

ral USAF 

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FOREWORD 

Although this initial issue of the Flight Test and Operations Plan may contain 

inaccuracies and deficiencies, it is being issued without further delay to provide top-level operational guidance to all contractors and government agencies 

who will be involved in the flight tests. Comments on this document are solicited 

from all recipients for use in improving planned future issues. 

Subsequent updated information will be furnished as it becomes available or as 

operational concepts are evolved through the proceedings of the Flight Operations 

Planning Group. The Charter in Appendix C establishes this Group and defines its 

organization, functions, and responsibilities. 

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1.0 

2.0 

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CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION 1-1 

1.1 Purpose 1-1 

1.2 Scope 1-1 

1.3 Document Organization 1-2 

1.4 Document Completion 1-2 

1.5 Security 1-3 

1.6 Basic Concepts 1-3 

1.6.1 General 1-3 

1.6.2 Operations Planning Ground Rules 1-7 

1.6.3 Laboratory Vehicle Disposal 1-9 

1.7 MOL System Configuration 1-10 

1.7.1 General 1-10 

FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES 2-1 

2.1 Introduction 2-1 

2.2 General Flight Test Objectives 2-3 

2.2.1 System Objectives 2-3 

2.2.2 Safety Objectives 2-4 

2.2.3 System Constraints 2-4 

2.3 Detailed Flight Test Objectives 2-7 

2.4 System Test Objectives Documents 2-24 

2.4.1 Document Content 2-24 

OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 3-1 

3.1 General 3-1 

3.2 Mission Direction 3-2 

3.2.1 Responsibilities 3-2 

3.3 Launch Operations 3-8 

3.4 Flight Operations 3-9 

3.4.1 General 3-9 

3.4.2 Flight Phase 3-9 

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CONTENTS (Continued) 

3.5 MOL Functional Responsibilities 

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3-10 

3.5.1 Flight Director 3-10 

3.5.2 Ascent Director 3-12 

3.5.3 Technical Advisor and Staff 3-13 

3.5.4 Assistant Flight Director for Flight 

Planning (AFD/FP) 3-14 

3.5.5 Assistant Flight Director for Crew 

Operations (AFD/CO) 3-15 

3.5.6 Assistant Flight Director for Vehicle 

Analysis (AFD/VA) 3-16 

3.5.7 Assistant Flight Director for Reentry 

and Recovery Planning (AFD/RRP) 3-17 

3.5.8 Flight Surgeon 3-17 

3.5.9 Technical Advisor on Natural Aerospace 

Environment (MOL STAFFMET) 3-18 

3.6 AFSCF Functional Responsibilities 3-19 

3.6.1 MOL Field Test Force Director (FTFD) 3-19 

3.6.2 Test Controller 3-21 

3.6.3 Remote Tracking Network 3-22 

3.6.4 Command Controller 3-23 

3.6.5 Data Controller 3-24 

3.6.6 Command Generation Group 3-25 

3.6.7 Orbit Analysis Group 3-26 

3.6.8 Recovery Control Group 3-27 

3.6.9 Network Director 3-28 

3.7 Gemini-B Recovery Functional Responsibilities 3-31 

3.7.1 Recovery Director 3-31 

3.8 Associate Contractor's Support Role 3-33 

3.8.1 Prelaunch Phase 3-33 

3.8.2 Launch Phase 3-34 

3.8.3 Flight Phase 3-35 

3.8.4 Postflight Phase 3-36 

FLIGHT PLAN 4-1 

4.1 General 4-1 

4.2 Operations Test Profile Resume 4-1 

4.2.1 Prelaunch 4-1 

4.2.2 Launch 4-4 

4.2.3 Ascent 4-4 

4.2.4 Early Orbit, Orbit, and Late Orbit 4-8 

4.2.5 Reentry and Retrieval 4-9 

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CONTENTS (Continued) 

4.3 Test Profile 

4.4 Flight Vehicle Timeline (FVTL) 

Page 

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4-14 

4.4.1 General Objectives 4-14 

4.4.2 Specific Uses 4-14 

4.4.3 FVTL Definition 4-15 

4.4.4 Users of the FVTL 4-15 

4.4.5 FVTL Report 4-16 

LAUNCH OPERATIONS INTERFACE 5-1 

5.1 General 5-1 

5.2 Launch Operations 5-1 

5.2.1 Launch Operations Profile 5-1 

FLIGHT OPERATIONS 6-1 

6.1 General 6-1 

6.2 Facilities and Resources 6-2 

6.2.1 Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) . . . 6-2 

6.2.2 Data Handling System 6-18 

6.2.3 Computer Software System 6-35 

6.2.4 MOL Contractor Support Facility (MCSF) 6-59 

6.3 MOL Operations Concepts 6-61 

6.3.1 General 6-61 

6.3.2 Command Philosophy 6-61 

6.3.3 Data Handling Philosophy 6-67 

6.3.4 Voice Communications Philosophy 6-79 

6.3.5 Flight Planning 6-79 

6.4 Powered Flight Operations 6-93 

6.4.1 General 6-93 

6.4.2 Background 6-93 

6.4.3 MCR Console Operator Functions 6-93 

6.4.4 Interfaces 6-103 

6.5 Orbital Operations 6-105 

6.5.1 General 6-105 

6.5.2 Nominal Duties of Operations Elements 6-105 

6.5.3 Nominal Operations 6-111 

6.5.4 Software System Operations 6-118 

6.5.5 Contingency Operations 6-123 

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CONTENTS (Continued) 

RECOVERY OPERATIONS 

Page 

7-1 

7.1 General 7-1 

7.2 Preflight Planning 7-2 

7.3 Recovery Areas 7-3 

7.3.1 Planned Landing Areas 7-3 

7.3.2 Preferred Contingency Landing Areas 7-5 

7.4 Typical Recovery Operation 7-7 

7.5 DRV Recovery Operations 7-10 

7.5.1 General 7-10 

7.5.2 Mission Control Center DRV Recovery 

Operations 7-10 

7.5.3 DRV 7-11 

7.5.4 Recovery Force Operations 7-11 

7.5.5 DRV Security 7-12 

CREW OPERATIONS 8-1 

8.1 General 8-1 

8.2 Operational Philosophy on the Uses of the Crew 8-2 

8.3 Crew Interfaces 8-4 

FLIGHT TEST DATA EVALUATION 9-1 

9.1 General 9-1 

9.2 Data Management and Distribution 9-1 

9.2.1 General 9-1 

9.2.2 Security 9-2 

9.2.3 AFSCF Data 9-5 

9.2.4 AFWTR Data 9-6 

9.2.5 MOL Contractor Support Facility (MCSF) 9-6 

9.3 Data Evaluation and Reporting 9-8 

9.3.1 General 9-8 

9.3.2 Data Evaluation 9-8 

9.3.3 Reporting 9-21 

10.0 FLIGHT TEST CONSTRAINTS 10-1 

10.1 General 10-1 

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CONTENTS (Continued) 

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TRAINING, SIMULATION, AND OPERATIONAL READINESS 11-1 

11.1 General 11-1 

11.2 MOL Mission Simulator 11-2 

11.2.1 Training and Rehearsal 11-2 

11.2.2 Gemini B Procedures Simulator 11-4 

11.2.3 Laboratory Vehicle Procedures Simulator 

(LVPS) 11-6 

11.2.4 MOL Mission Simulator Interfaces 11-10 

11.3 Development and Part Task Simulators 11-14 

11.3.1 Engineering Development Simulator 11-14 

11.3.2 Mission Development Simulator 11-15 

11.3.3 Abort Simulator 11-16 

11.3.4 Zero-g Simulator 11-17 

11.3.5 In-House Simulations 11-17 

11.3.6 Human Centrifuge 11-18 

11.3.7 Gemini B Egress Trainer 11-18 

11.3.8 Subsystem Test Articles and Mockups 11-19 

11.4 Readiness Concepts 11-20 

11.4.1 General 11-20 

11.4.2 Rehearsal Committee 11-20 

11.4.3 Scheduling of Readiness Activities 11-21 

11.4.4 Software Verification 11-22 

11.4.5 Procedures Validation 11-23 

11.4.6 Flight Plan Validation 11-23 

11.4.7 Flight Test Rules Validation 11-24 

11.4.8 Simulator Interface with Flight Operations . . . 11-24 

11.5 Training 11-26 

11.5.1 Flight Crew Training 11-26 

11.5.2 Flight Operations Crew Training 11-27 

11.5.3 Recovery Training 11-30 

NATURAL AEROSPACE ENVIRONMENT (ENV) 12-1 

REFERENCES 13-1 

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CONTENTS (Continued) 

Page 

Appendix A AN OPERATIONS CONCEPT FOR THE MOL/DORIAN MANNED/ 

AUTOMATIC CONFIGURATION A-1 

Appendix B FLIGHT PLANNING B-1 

Appendix C CHARTER: FLIGHT OPERATIONS PLANNING GROUP C-1 

Appendix D RTS-STC DOWNLINK DATA RETURN MODES PHILOSOPHY 

AND DESIGN CRITERIA D-1 

Appendix E MOL HARDWARE DESCRIPTION E-1 

Appendix F GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS F-1 

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TABLES 

1-1 

2-1 

2-2 

2-3 

2-4 

2-5 

Summary of MOL Configuration Requirements 

General Objectives, Configuration, and Flight Profile 

for Individual Flights 

Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Launch Vehicle 

Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Gemini B 

Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Support Module 

Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Laboratory Vehicle 

Page 

1-13 

2-2 

2-9 

2-11 

2-13 

2-14 

2-6 Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Mission Payload 2-16 

2-7 Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Flight Crew 2-17 

2-8 Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Pressure Suit Assembly . . . 2-20 

2-9 Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Flight Operations 2-21 

2-10 Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Recovery Operations 2-23 

4-1 Typical Launch and Orbit Parameters 4-2 

4-2 Typical Summary of Trajectory Parameters 4-3 

4-3 Sequence of Events 4-7 

4-4 Typical Flight Test Operations Prelaunch Profile 4-12 

4-5 FVTL Column Headings 4-17/18 

6-1 AFSCF System Support Software 6-4o 

6-2 Resume of Constraints vs Orbit Parameters Affected 6-83 

6-3 Station Contact Summary 6-88 

6-4 Station Contacts (5 deg Minimum Elevation) of at Least 

Two Minutes Duration (i=90°) 6-92 

9-1 MOL Flight Test Operations Data Security Classification 

Guide 9-3 

9-2 System Test Data Evaluation Documents 9-22 

10-1 Launch Constraints 10-2 

10-2 Data Computational Subsystem Group Constraints 10-9 

10-3 Data Recorders Constraints 10-11 

10-4 Payload Constraints 10-13 

10-5 Orbiting Vehicle Constraints 10-21 

10-6 Crew Constraints 10-23 

10-7 Flight Operations Constraints 10-25 

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TABLES (Continued) 

Page 

A-1 Decision Rules for Interdiction of Primary Path A-8 

B-1 Orbital Sustenance Requirements B-74 

B-2 Velocity Comparison for Polar Orbit B-80 

D-1 Instrumentation Priority D-9/10 

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FIGURES 

Page 

1-1 MOL System Functional Relationships 1-5 

1-2 MOL Flight Vehicle 1-11 

3-1 Operations Organization 3-3 

3-2 Launch Director Organization 3-4 

3-3 Ascent Director Organization 3-5 

4-1 Altitude and Event Profile 4-5 

4-2 T-IIIM Staging 4-6 

5-1 MOL VAFB Launch Complex 5-2 

6-1 Artist's Concept of the STC at VAFB Sunnyvale 6-4 

6-2 Mission Control Center Configuration 6-6 

6-3 Typical Console Arrangement for Program 632A 

Mission Control Room 6-8 

6-4 Artist's Concept of a Technical Support Room 6-9 

6-5 Proposed Recovery Control Room 6-10 

6-6 Real-Time Data Flow - Ascent 6-19 

6-7 Applications Program/Display Relationships 6-21 

6-8 Orbiting Vehicle Command Message Processing and 

Handling Functional Diagram 6-23 

6-9 STC Voice Converter/Handling System 6-25 

6-10 Simplified RTS Voice Converter/Handling Systems 6-26 

6-11 Orbiting Vehicle SGLS Communications Group 6-28 

6-12 Simplified RTS TLM Data Handling System 6-33 

6-13 Orbital Operations Computer Software System 6-36 

6-14 Uplink Processing Element Interface with SYMON 6-47 

6-15 Downlink Processing Software Interface with other 

MOL System Software 6-55 

6-16 Uplink Data Loading 6-73/74 

6-17 Downlink Loading 6-77/78 

6-18 Orbit Selection Criteria 6-82 

6-19 MCR Configuration for Launch and Ascent 6-94 

6-20 MCR Configuration for Orbital Operations 6-106 

6-21 Uplink Message Generation 6-121 

7-1 Synopsis of MOL Recovery Requirements 7-4 

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FIGURES (Continued) 

Page 

A-1 Typical Mission Bay Displays and Controls Schematic A-5 

A-2 ATS Eyepiece Display A-15/16 

B-1 Elevation Angle of the Sun B-3 

B-2 Illumination Angles B-4 

B-3 Region of Acceptable Illumination . . . B-6 

B-4 Launch Windows for i = 96.43 Degrees B-8 

B-5 Launch Window for i = 80 Degrees B-11 

B-6 Energy Requirements for Nodal Corrections B-13 

B-7 Launch Times for Minimum Illumination Angle of 0 Degrees . . B-15/16 

B-8 Launch Times for Minimum Illumination Angle of 10 Degrees . B-17/18 

B-9 Launch Times for Minimum Illumination Angle of 20 Degrees . B-19/20 

B-10 Launch Times for Minimum Illumination Angle of 30 Degrees . B-21/22 

B-11 Launch Season vs Latitude and Illumination Angle (n) 

for Orbit Inclination of 80 Degrees B-23 

B-12 Launch Season vs Latitude and Illumination Angle (n) 

for Orbit Inclination of 85 Degrees B-24 

B-13 Launch Season vs Latitude and Illumination Angle (n) 

for Orbit Inclination of 90 Degrees B-25 

B-14 Launch Season vs Latitude and Illumination Angle (n) 

for Orbit Inclination of 95 Degrees B-26 

B-15 Launch Season vs Latitude and Illumination Angle (n) 

for Orbit Inclination of 100 Degrees B-27 

B-16 MOL Launch Windows for 30 Day Mission and 80 Degree 

Orbit Inclination B-28 

B-17 MOL Launch Windows for 30-Day Mission and 90 Degree 

Orbit Inclination B-29 

B-18 MOL Launch Windows for 30-Day Mission and 

96.113 Degree Orbit Inclination B-30 

B-19 MOL Launch Windows for 60-Day Mission and 

80 Degree Orbit Inclination B-31 

B-20 MOL Launch Windows for 60-Day Mission and 

90 Degree Orbit Inclination B-32 

B-21 MOL Launch Windows for 60-Day Mission and 

96.43 Degree Orbit Inclination B-33 

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q Values 

q Values 

q Values 

q Values 

q Values 

Required to 

Required to 

Required to 

Required to 

Required to 

Orbits 

Overfly Target 

Overfly Target 

Overfly Target 

Overfly Target 

Overfly Target 

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FIGURES (Continued) 

Page 

B-22 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 January 

Launch Date as a Function of Launch Time 

and Orbit Inclination B-34 

B-23 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 February 

Launch Date as a Function of Launch Time 

and Orbit Inclination B-35 

B-24 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 March Launch 

Date as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit 

Inclination B-36 

B-25 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 April Launch 

Date as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit 

Inclination B-37 

B-26 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 May Launch Date 

as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit Inclination B-38 

B-27 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 June Launch Date 

as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit Inclination B-39 

B-28 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 July Launch Date 

as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit Inclination B-40 

B-29 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 August Launch Date 

as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit Inclination B-41 

B-30 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 September Launch Date 

as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit Inclination B-42 

B-31 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 October Launch Date 

as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit Inclination B-43 

B-32 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 November Launch Date 

as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit Inclination B-44 

B-33 History at 55 Degrees North for 1 December Launch 

Date as a Function of Launch Time and Orbit 

Inclination 

A 

B 

C 

Ground Traces 

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i 4r 

B-34 

B-35 

B-3u 

8-47 

8-3B 

B-39 

B-40 

B-45 

B-48 

B-51 

B-52 

B-53 

B-54 

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FIGURES (Continued) 

B-41 Coverage Pattern at 40 Degree North Latitude for 

90 Degree Inclination Orbit 

B-42 Typical Ground Trace, Day 1, for Orbit of 90 Degree 

Inclination 

B-43 Typical Ground Trace, Day 2, for Orbit of 90 Degree 

Inclination 

B-44 Typical Ground Trace, Day 3, for Orbit of 90 Degree 

Inclination 

B-45 Orbital Sustenance Requirements for Inclination of 

80 Degrees 

B-46 

B-47 Orbital Sustenance Requirements 

80, 85 and 90 Degrees and F10 = 

B-48 Altitude Profile 

B-49 Single Impulse Sustenance Tangential Application 

B-50 Altitude Profile, Tangential Transfer Case 

E-1 Mission Payload System Segment 

Orbital Sustenance Requirements 

90 Degrees 

for Inclination of 

for Inclinations of 

F

10 = 220 

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B-60 

B-63/64 

B-65/66 

B-67/68 

B-70 

B-71 

B-72 

B-76 

B-77 

B-79 

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1.0 INTRODUCTION 

1.1 PURPOSE 

The Flight Test and Opertions Plan (FTOP) represents the current concept for 

the conduct of MOL flight tests and, as such, provides top-level operational 

direction to all contractors and government agencies developing plans for 

their participation in the MOL flight test operations. In this respect, the 

FTOP represents the MOL baseline for flight tests and is the basis for 

developing the details of subordinate operations documentation. 

The FTOP also provides program management with an overview of the operational 

concepts and philosophies to be employed in the operation associated with the 

flight tests. Much of the detailed information contained in this FTOP is 

not yet available in lower-level documents and, hence, is included here for 

completeness. 

1.2 SCOPE 

The FTOP covers the flight operations from liftoff of the flight vehicle at 

the launch base through publication of final test reports. It also includes 

those activities required to prepare the flight operation support systems 

(simulations, rehearsals, system test, software validation, personnel 

training, etc.) prior to launch activity. 

Although the FTOP is generally applicable to the total flight test program 

of seven flights, a typical manned/automatic flight is described in detail. 

Because it is most typical of these flights, Flight 4 has been chosen as 

baseline for this document. The most notable exception to this policy is in 

the area of System Test Objectives. Here, objectives of each flight category 

are listed to point out the differences between the flights and to illustrate 

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how different objectives may modify the baseline operations concept. Details 

of operations peculiar to the unmanned flights will be added, as appropriate, 

after the definition phase of those flights. 

1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION 

Section 1.0 presents basic concepts and fundamental MOL flight configurations. Section 2.0 provides MOL program and first level flight-specific 

objectives. Section 3.0 provides gross overview of the roles and responsibilities of the operations organizations. Additional details and 

time-ordered functions for the operational periods are described in 

Section 4.0, Flight Plan. Sections 5.0 through 9.0 contain the details of 

the Launch Operations Interface, Flight Operations, Recovery Operations, Crew 

Operations, and Flight Test Data Evaluation, respectively. Sections 5.0 

through 12.0 contain discussions of specialized topics. 

Appendices provide further definition or rationale for critical operations 

concepts. 

Major operational organizations are named for the functions they perform 

(i.e., Launch Operations, Powered Flight Operations, etc.). Similarly, the 

phases of the Flight Test are named for the major function occurring during 

that time period (i.e., Launch, Ascent, etc.). The reader must recognize 

that a distinction exists between organizations and Flight Test phases and 

that, in general, most of the organizations operate to some degree in all 

operational time phases. The approach in Sections 5.0 through 12.0 is to 

define the organization responsibilities across the entire Flight Test time 

framework. 

1.4 DOCUMENT COMPLETION 

It is currently planned that a revised and completed FTOP will be published 

approximately six months after the date of this publication and only if 

required thereafter. Detailed and current information will be contained in 

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the Orbital Requirements Document (ORD), Program Requirements Document (PRD), 

Systems Test Objectives (STO), Manned Recovery Requirements Document (MRRD), 

etc. The Flight Operations Planning Group (FOPG) will be the group responsible for the FTOP. 

1.5 SECURITY 

All material is marked SSH and determination of what material can be used at 

the Secret SAR level has not been made. Until such time as an FTOP at the 

Secret SAR level is published, other program documentation must serve as a 

guide, where adequate. The reader is cautioned that much of the material in 

this document is restricted to covert channels, and contracts for major items 

such as the TRW MPE software do not even exist outside of covert channels. 

1.6 BASIC CONCEPTS 

1.6.1 General 

The Systems Test Operations Plan (STOP) (Ref. 1) is the top-level program 

document which describes the basic program operational philosophy and 

objectives. From the STOP flow two basic test operations planning documents, 

the General Ground Test Plan (GGTP) and the Flight Test Operations Plan 

(FTOP). 

Those concepts generally applicable to ground, acceptance, and prelaunch 

testing will be contained in the GGTP (Ref. 2). Those concepts will not be 

repeated here except where they impact upon flight operations. This Section 

contains any interpretations or expansions required to particularly make those 

concepts applicable to activities within the scope of the FTOP. 

The approach to flight operations documentation is necessarily different from 

that to ground test documentation, primarily because the majority of the 

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resources of the flight system are provided and operated by other agencies 

for use by all satellite programs. 

The Air Force (SPO and AFSCF) also provide the operators for such 

MOL-peculiar functions as orbit analysis, mission planning, and command 

generation. The contractor role is primarily that of supporting the overall 

operation as well as certain specific contributions of hardware, software, 

procedures, reference materials and the like, as appropriate to its segment. 

Concepts contained in the FTOP should be reflected in the ORD, PRD, STO, 

Flight Director's Handbook, and MRRD. The FTOP should serve as both the 

technical and administrative basis for these documents. 

Basic to understanding the MOL operating philosophies is understanding the 

requirement for concurrent research and development (R&D) flight testing and 

operational utilization of the MOL system. Assuming understanding on the 

part of the reader with respect to R&D testing, it is necessary to explain 

the role of The User community and its interface with test operations. 

The organizations desiring to obtain photography for operational use are 

designated "The User" within this document. The User has certain requirements of the system, which have been reflected in the MOL design (i.e., 

photographic resolution, photographic film load, software, and mission 

length). The User's operational requirements are recognized in the design 

of MOL operations. 

The extent to which The User requirements are factored into the operation 

design, the operation, and the relationship of User and R&D objectives is 

best shown by an explanation of Figure 1-1 which is a simplification of the 

functional interactions involved. 

a. This Figure assumes: that an initial orbit has been selected 

which has considered all factors described in paragraph 4.2 

and which meets both User and R&D requirements; that a flight 

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MOLSy

stemFunctional Relationships 

O 

-J 

O -J 

(c) 

4 

IC.f) 

>- 

cn 

(f) 

-J 

C

c f) 

C=t 

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plan has been generated by the software; that a nominal 

launch has occurred and all subsystems are operational; and 

that payload operations are to begin the next few orbits. 

b. The mission planning software considers The User and R&D 

requirements on the payload, and defines the photographic 

activity to occur on specified orbits. 

c. The command generation software translates these requirements 

plus any other requirements into MOL command messages. 

d. The advanced data system of the AFSCF [at both the Satellite 

Test Center (STC) and Remote Tracking Station (RTS)] through 

the expanded communications electronic system (EXCELS) and 

the space-ground link subsystem (SGLS) acts as a link to 

transmit these requirements to the MOL. 

e. The crew and the MOL equipment respond to the commands and 

instructions and perform photographic and R&D operations. 

This activity produces on-board data consisting of telemetry 

voice commentary and film records. The film record is stored 

in the Gemini B for reentry with the flight crew. Evidence 

of what photographs have been taken is a part of the vehicle 

telemetry data. 

f. The advanced data system (ADS), EXCELS, and SGLS again act 

as a transmission link between the MOL and the ground, 

providing telemetry, tracking, and voice data for analysis. 

g. The telemetry and voice data are evaluated to determine: 

which targets have been photographed and how well; what 

resulted from R&D experiments or investigations; and the 

health status of MOL. Tracking data is analyzed to fulfill 

the MOL navigational requirements. 

h. The evaluation of the photographic operations is reported to 

The User so he may realign target priorities and make new 

operational requirements on the system. 

i. Completion of certain R&D objectives modifies the R&D requirements for subsequent orbital operations. 

j. The cycle has been completed and is ready to start again. 

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In the development and testing of the operational system, the MOL Mission 

Simulator simulates the RTS and the orbiting vehicle (0V). It will be used 

to develop procedures and plans, check-out software, and rehearse personnel. 

The above brief discussion is the concept upon which MOL Flight Operations 

are based. The purpose of the FTOP is to explain in greater detail the 

various operations functions, how these functions are allocated to 

organizations, and how the functions and organizations are interfaced. 

1.6.2 Operations Planning Ground Rules 

The seven-flight program will be considered primarily as an R&D program, 

although the third and subsequent flights are intended to produce valuable 

target intelligence. During flight, conflicts between the requirement to 

take photographs of actual targets and R&D efforts which cannot be otherwise 

accommodated (e.g., troubleshooting) to perfect manned or automatic mission 

equipment will be resolved by the Mission Director. 

It is highly desirable to preserve the option to fly the last two flights 

manned. Operations planning shall accommodate this option. 

1.6.2.1 Development Flights 

Prior to the first manned flight: 

a. The capability of the T-IIIM to safely place the fully 

functional manned MOL system into a nominal MOL orbit will be 

demonstrated by two unmanned flights. 

b. One launch, reentry, and recovery of a full-mission-configured 

Gemini B will be successfully demonstrated. 

c. One successful flight demonstration of the structural 

integrity of the laboratory vehicle will be accomplished. 

A summary of flight No. 3 prerequisites is shown below: 

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a. Demonstrate T-IIIM Capability► - Two T-IIIM flights to 

adequately demonstrate T-IIIM ability to place a manned/ 

automatic MOL into orbit. 

b. Demonstrate Laboratory Vehicle Structural Integrity - One 

successful flight of a laboratory vehicle structure to 

demonstrate structural integrity. 

c. Demonstrate Gemini B Capability - One successful flight to 

demonstrate Gemini B ability to protect the crew during 

ascent, reentry, and retrieval. 

1.6.2.2 Safety 

Safety of personnel is paramount. Therefore, establishment of the spaceworthiness of the MOL system from a human safety viewpoint will take 

precedence over conduct of mission tasks, in the following order of priority: 

a. The capability of MOL systems, subsystem, and components 

critical to the ability of the crew to successfully achieve 

orbit and to return safely shall be demonstrated prior to 

conduct of manned flight. 

b. The capability of the OV to safely maintain the crew in the 

launch pad and ascent configuration and on-orbit, and to 

permit their safe return to earth in the Gemini B shall be 

assured prior to and during crew engagement in mission 

activity. 

c. On-orbit failures of systems, subsystems, and equipments to 

the point where failure of an additional subsystem would 

preclude safe return of the crew will be cause for mission 

abort. (Failure of the transfer tunnel will necessitate EVA 

transfer from the Gemini B to the laboratory vehicle and 

return, but will not be cause for mission abort.) 

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1.6.2.3 Flight Planning 

Flight test objectives are identified in Section 2.0. In preparing the MOL 

flight plan, the following ground rules apply to scheduling flight test 

objectives: 

a. All primary objectives are to be accomplished at the earliest 

possible opportunity, consistent with their priority. 

b. Objectives with lesser precedence may be scheduled ahead of 

higher ones if they better fit the flight plan at that point. 

Lower priority objectives, however, will not be attempted if 

they tend to compromise higher priority objectives. 

The flight plan for each manned flight will include contingency provisions 

which will ensure maximum beneficial utilization of crew duty time in 

furtherance of program objectives, by priority, in the event that in-flight 

failure precludes adherence to the nominal flight plan. 

1.6.2.4 Abort 

Failure of man-related components during orbital test or inability of the 

crew to perform assigned tasks (where such failures do not involve crew 

safety) will not be cause for abort, as long as useful intelligence is being 

produced by the photographic reconnaissance payload or other primary 

objectives may be accomplished. 

1.6.3 Laboratory Vehicle Disposal 

After completion of the primary and extended mission in the manned or 

automatic mode, the laboratory vehicle for the manned/automatic 

mode (OV for automatic mode) will be deorbited into an open ocean area by 

applying retro thrust to the laboratory vehicle (or OV) at a predetermined 

point. It is possible that some time constraints may be associated with 

disposal, but they are not yet identified. 

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The most important reason for a controlled deorbit into an open ocean area 

is to prevent the camera cues and other payload equipment from being 

compromised. Equipment surviving a reentry would be burned but might be 

recognized as a camera optical system. If a natural decaying laboratory 

vehicle (or OV) were tracked to impact on or near any land area, a determined 

effort would be made by others to find the remains for political and security 

reasons. In the event of an abort during ascent, forces will be deployed to 

ensure retrieval or destruction of the mission payload. 

1.7 MOL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 

1.7.1 General 

A description of the flight 3 configuration and the significant differences 

between flight 3 and the other flights are presented in Table 1-1. The 

flight vehicle configuration is shown in Figure 1-2. 

The development flights consist of two flights to prove the capability of the 

T-IIIM to orbit a MOL, to prove the laboratory vehicle structural integrity, 

to prove the capability of the Gemini B to protect the crew during ascent, 

reentry, and retrieval, and to provide MOL operational experience to ground 

support organizations. 

The first flight will be launched into orbit by a T-IIIM with T-III standard 

payload fairings ballasted to simulate the weight of an operational MOL. 

The second flight will employ a T-IIIM, a laboratory vehicle structure 

simulating the weight, CG, and dynamics of a flight-article laboratory 

vehicle, and an unmanned Gemini B. This flight will be suborbital and will 

provide ascent environmental data for the Gemini B and laboratory vehicle, 

and reentry environmental data for the Gemini B. The Gemini B will be 

retrieved, affording a demonstration of the Recovery Force operation. 

I - I 0 

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The Operational/Development flights consist of five flights. Flights 3 

through 5 will be manned/automatic, while flights 6 and 7 will be fully 

automatic. The purpose of these flights is to gather photographic 

reconnaissance data and to develop the system to full operational capacity. 

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Autom

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data) 

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simula

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2.0 FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES 

2.1 INTRODUCTION 

Detailed objectives and test philosophy presented in this Section are derived 

from MOL Program objectives and constraints described in paragraph 2.2. They 

will be used as the basis for the development of more specific flight test 

objectives to be presented in STO documents. Guidance for the development of 

these documents is also furnished. 

The baseline used in establishing the objectives presented assumes a fully 

successful seven-flight program and is constrained by the ground rules shown 

in paragraph 1.6.2. In addition, the objectives of each flight series have 

been established so the total program will be conducted in a logical sequence 

to insure that: 

a. By the end of the flight program, all flight objectives 

(including tertiary objectives) will be successfully 

achieved, to the extent possible. 

b. The individual tasks assigned for accomplishment within 

each flight, and from flight to flight, are conducted in 

a progressive sequence of tasks and flights, first in 

establishing space worthiness qualification of the basic 

MOL system, and thence through progressive accomplishment 

of program objectives in accordance with their respective 

priorities. 

c. Loss of a flight or flights (e.g., through gross failure) 

will have minimum adverse impact on accomplishment of the 

primary General Test Objectives. 

In consonance with the above philosophy, the general objectives, configuration, and flight profile for the individual flights are summarized in Table 

2-1. 

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Table 2-1. General Objectives, Configuration, and Flight 

Profile for Individual Flights 

Flight Series General Objective Configuration Profile 

Development 

Flight No. 1 

Demonstrate 

T-IIIM. 

T-IIIM and fairing. 

Simulated OV 

(ballast). 

Orbital. 

Development 

Flight No. 2 

Demonstrate 

T-IIIM. 

Demonstrate laboratory vehicle 

structure. 

Qualify Gemini B. 

T-IIIM. 

Laboratory vehicle structure. 

Unmanned Gemini B. 

Suborbital; 

Gemini B retrieval. 

Manned/Automatic 

Flight No. 3 

Flight No. 4 

Flight No. 5 

High-resolution 

photography. 

Assess man's contribution. 

Demonstrate 30-

day capability. 

T-IIIM. 

Manned laboratory 

vehicle. 

Manned Gemini B. 

Orbital; 

30-day mission; 

Gemini B retrieval 

& laboratory 

vehicle disposal. 

AutomaticFlight No. 6 

Flight No. 7 

High-resolution 

photography. 

Demonstrate maximum duration 

mission capability (up to 60 

days). 

T-IIIM. 

Automatic laboratory vehicle. 

Support module 

with 6 DRVs. 

Orbital; 

30-60 days; 

DRV recoveries & 

OV disposal. 

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2.2 GENERAL FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES 

The following MOL program objectives and constraints, extracted from the 

SP/DR (Ref. 20), were used as a guide for preparation of this FTOP and are 

presented below for information. 

2.2.1 System Objectives 

a. The MOL program shall provide a capability for stereo 

photographic reconnaissance, to include both manned/ 

automatic and automatic operations, with a probability 

of 30-day mission effectiveness of 0.85 for the manned/ 

automatic system and 0.63 for the automatic system. 

b. The MOL program shall provide a system capability

resolution photography with 2:1 contrast under conditions 

-

of light providing 890 ft lamberts at the aperture for 

targets at nadir from an 80 n mi orbit. Satisfaction of 

this requirement presupposes the availability of 3404 type 

film with an exposure index of 6. 

c. The manned/automatic system shall have the capability for 

a mission duration of 30 days on the baseline orbit with 

a two-man flight crew. 

d. The laboratory vehicle for the manned/automatic system 

shall provide a capability for a shirtsleeve environment 

for the 30 days. 

e. The automatic system shall have the capability for a 

mission duration as long as possible within the capabilities 

of the manned/automatic system hardware with available or 

augmented expendables and consistent with launch vehicle 

capabilities. The automatic system shall be qualified for 

30 days. 

f. An orbital inclination capability of 80 to 100 deg shall be 

provided. The nominal orbit shall be at 90 deg inclination 

and 80 n mi perigee altitude.. 

g. The system shall provide the capability for access to 

arbitrarily located targets anywhere on the sunlit surface 

of the earth between 80 deg S and 80 deg N latitude at 

least three times during a 30-day mission. 

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h. The manned/automatic system shall provide the capability 

to expose 15,000 frames during the 30-day mission and to 

maximize cloud-free photography (in accordance with User 

requirements). 

i. The automatic system shall provide the capability to expose 

500 frames per day and to maximize cloud-free photography 

(in accordance with User requirements). 

j. To the extent possible, the manned/automatic system shall 

provide the capability for early development of the automatic mission capability and the enhancement of the quality 

and quantity of intelligence data in the manned/automatic 

system. 

k. System capability shall provide for one launch every four 

months. 

1. The MOL system shall be capable of responding to a redirection of the planned operational orbit, within the design 

constraints on inclination and altitude, as late as seven 

days prior to a scheduled launch. 

m. Information derived from the manned/automatic operations 

shall be used to assess the usefulness of man in the 

development and operation of reconnaissance space systems. 

2.2.2 Safety Objectives 

a. The design philosophy in terms of redundant systems and 

backup modes shall be such that, where practicable, no 

single failure will cause mission abort or crew fatality. 

b. Crew safety, where measurable, shall be equivalent to that 

predicted for the NASA Gemini program. An abort capability 

shall be provided for all phases of flight, where practicable. 

c. Biomedical monitoring shall be provided for assurance of 

crew safety and an indication of crew capability limits. 

2.2.3 Jystem Constraints 

a. Maximum use shall be made of existing man-rated subsystems, 

components, and facilities. 

b. The automatic system shall have maximum commonality with 

the manned/automatic system. 

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c. The basic launch vehicle to be utilized for the MOL shall 

be the Titan IIIM which is a Titan IIIC with minimum 

necessary changes and uprating to meet the MOL requirements 

for orbit, payload, and safety. 

d. The Gemini B shall be utilized for crew transport during 

ascent and for return of the crew at mission termination. 

The Gemini B shall be derived from the NASA Gemini spacecraft through minimum modifications. 

e. Mission Control shall utilize the Air Force Satellite 

Control Facility (AFSCF). 

f. The recovery force shall be comprised of sea, land, and 

air units and specialist teams in such quantities and at 

such locations in the recovery area or appropriate bases 

as necessary to effect retrieval of the spacecraft and 

crew or the data recovery vehicles (DRVs). Such sources 

shall be provided from existing government sources, wherever 

possible and practicable. 

Upon mission completion or ascent abort, the laboratory 

vehicle shall be disposed of in the ocean to avoid compromise 

of intelligence information. 

h. All MOL launches shall be from Vandenberg Air Force Base 

(VAFB) using a single launch pad. 

i. The initial MOL system capability shall be based on integral 

launches of the crew and laboratory. 

J. Prior to the first manned flight, two launch vehicle flights 

including one Gemini B flight shall be made to contribute 

to a man-rated system. 

k. Security shall be maintained to prevent compromise of 

classified information. 

1. For the manned/automatic system, capability shall be provided 

to return intelligence data in the Gemini B reentry module 

(REM). 

m. For the automatic system, capability for intelligence data 

recovery shall be provided by using a support module, in 

place of the Gemini B, with sufficient DRVs to allow for 

return no less often than one every 10 days. 

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n. The manned/automatic system shall provide the capability 

to accept a wideband readout system and one Mk V DRV for 

follow-on vehicles. 

o. The simulation program shall be adequate to support development and to provide training for the crew and support 

personnel to insure crew safety and mission success but 

shall minimize the required amount of new and specialized 

simulation equipment. 

p. Postflight evaluation will be carried out with data provided 

for real-time systems management; no special AVE shall be 

provided for this purpose alone. 

q. The ground maintenance concept shall be one of replacement 

of components and small assemblies for repair at factory 

without major vehicle disassembly. On-orbit crew maintenance shall be utilized to enhance system reliability and 

mission effectiveness. 

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2.3 DETAILED FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES 

The detailed flight test objectives presented in Tables 2-2 through 2-13 are 

organized by flight series and represent a first order of detail beyond that 

contained in paragraph 2.2. More specific objectives, on a flight-by-flight 

basis, will be developed and presented in a series of STO documents. 

Tables 2-2 through 2-13 identify each objective as primary, secondary, or 

tertiary. These categories, when related to detailed objectives, are defined 

as follows: 

a. Primary Test Objectives - Accomplishment of these objectives 

is considered mandatory. 

Primary test objectives are those for which a flight test 

is conducted and must not be compromised by any discernible 

inadequacy of airborne or ground equipment. Any malfunction 

of test vehicle or system equipment which would jeopardize 

the attainment or means of evaluating a primary objective 

will demand holding, recycling, or terminating the launch 

countdown. In addition, any tendency toward malfunction of 

equipmeEt, worsening of weather conditions, or change of 

Range status that could in any manner jeopardize the 

accomplishment of a primary objective will demand delaying 

the flight. 

b. Secondary Flight Test Objectives - Accomplishment of these 

objectives will provide substantive information to validate 

decisions affecting the future of the military space program 

(e.g., the nature of a follow-on MOL program, manned/ 

automatic considerations, new missions, etc.). These 

objectives are secondary only because their accomplishment 

may not interfere with accomplishment of the primary 

objectives. 

Secondary flight test objectives are of vital concern to 

research and development of the system or to malfunction 

analysis, but not of vital concern to the attainment of a 

primary objective. If a secondary objective or its means 

of evaluation appear to be in jeopardy at any time prior 

to a specific point in the countdown, the countdown will 

be held, recycled, or terminated to resolve the difficulty. 

Once past the specified point, the countdown will be continued and a final determination of whether to hold or recycle 

will be made during the final countdown evaluation. 

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c. Tertiary Flight Test Objectives - These objectives will 

provide valuable information pertaining to general military 

and scientific space technology and are to be accomplished 

only on the basis of non-interference with primary and 

secondary test objectives. 

Tertiary flight test objectives contribute to design 

research, environmental research, associated projects, or 

a supporting engineering effort. There will be no countdown delay, hold, or recycle to assure the accomplishment 

of a tertiary objective. 

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D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
Table 2-2. Detailed Flight Test Objec

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1.1 Demonstrate thecap

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1.2 Evaluate the cap

abilityof the redundant flight 

control system toperformwithin designreq

uirements. 

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sy

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cap

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experienc

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design limits. 

1.8 Evaluate theprop

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ve

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a) 

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Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Laboratory Ve

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d) 

U 5I1 DIAL HANDLING 

2-15 

D-SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
Table 2-6. Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Mission Payload 

U -5-EUREt SPECIAL HANDLING 

For Flight Series 

r— 

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VD 

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ate thecap

abilitytoobtain photog

raphy 

of preselected targets 

resolution 

oper

a

ting in either the manned/automa

tic orthe 

automatic mode. 

5.2 Demonstr

ate the structural integ

rity and proper 

oper

ationof the mission payload througho

ut the: 

(1) 30 day flight (2) 30-60 day flight. 

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ability of the secondary 

camera and on-boa

rd processing sy

stems tomeet 

systemreq

uireme

nts. 

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ate the op

e

r

ationof the facilities 

provided for film handling, storage, a

nd loading. 

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abilityof the on-board 

comp

uter so

ftware toaccurately p

oint the p

rimary 

op

tics and ATSs as commanded bythe ground software. 

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biting photography of weather

ed targets. 

5.7 Perform anR&D investig

a

tionof the tracking 

mirror ro

ll gimbal bearing s

tic

tionproblem. 

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nt. 

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2-17 

D-SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

Table 2-7. Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Flig

ht Crew 
Table 2-7. Deta

iledFlight Test Obj

ectives, Flight Crew (Continue

d) 

1:1-5EURET SPECIAL HANDLING 

F = Primary S = Secondary 7 = Ter

tiary 

Development 

1 1 2 ' 

P-• fa-I CLI P..o r./1 

01/ 

Taking corrective action tocompensate for malfunc

tions of laboratory vehicle or mission 

module eq

uipment. 

Making voice reco

r

ding of significant intelligence information obtained through visual 

observa

tion during targ

et passes. 

6.2 Demonstrate ma

n 's ability totransfer fromthe 

Gemini Bto the labo

r

atory ve

hicle, work ins

hirtsle

eve en

vironme

nt for a30-day mission, retransfer to Gemini B, and e

ffect s

afe reentry a

nd 

r

etrieval of crewand mission data. 

6.3 Verify theadequacy of man 's interface with the 

MOL system during co

nduct of the reconnaissance 

mis

sion in bo

th manual and automatic modes. 

6.4 Verify the adequacy of targ

et cueing material and 

method of display for target acq

uisitionand 

p

oin

ting, conside

ring 

the study time constraints. 

6.5 Assess the e

ffective

ness of man toincrease 

the 

quantity and qua

lity of info

rmation byconser

ving 

film through j

udicious targ

et selection. 

6.6 Mea

sure ma

n 's we

ll being, effectiveness, a

nd 

operational techniques involving the man-machine 

interface. 

.. i 

4) 

(..) 

1.) 

-■ -D 

.1.) 

0 

,:.-2. 

2-18 

D-SECREf SPECIAL HANDLING 
Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Flight Crew (Continued) 

U-bttitfti.brtUIAL HANDLING 

-_ _mary S = Secondary T = Tertiary 

Development 

Nc. Objective 1 2 

Es 

lezen i- 7 =

6.7 Verify the ability toperformextravehicular 

activity (EVA ) as required byactual contingency situations. 

1 

2-19 

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uit (pressurized and unpressurize

d ) for ro

utine intravehic

ular operation inthefollowing areas: 

Thermal, pressure, p

a

r

tial g

aseous flow, 

communications, telem

etry data. 

Don-doff andchecko

ut for emergency opera

tion. 

Maintainabilityfor30 days operation. 

Mobility forro

u

tine use. 

7.2 Verify theadequacy of the pressure s

uit with 

resp

ect to: 

Mo

bility for emergency use. 

Storage accessibility. Su

it/laboratory module inte

rfaces. 

Suit te

thers and attachme

nts interfaces. 

Verify 

the adequacy of the p

ressure s

uit for EVA 

should an actual co

n

tingency present the req

uirement. 

..-4 

4., 

CI 

V 

.. '3 

4-) 

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tives, Pressure Suit 

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Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Flight Operations 

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tions 

D-StliNE-f SPECIAL HANDLING 

2-22 

D-SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
U-StettEt SPECIAL HANDLING 

a. a PL. 

a. a, a, a P. •ri 

F. 

Table 2-

10. Detailed Flight Test Objectives, Recovery Op

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(1) 

O 

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2.4 SYSTEM TEST OBJECTIVES DOCUMENTS 

An STO document will be published for each flight test. The basic purpose 

of the STO will be to: 

a. Inform the participating test agencies of the specific 

objectives of the flight test. 

b. Provide the Flight Director with a planning basis for 

making real-time decisions on program priorities and 

tradeoffs. 

c. Provide a basis for evaluating the results of the flight 

test. 

The following paragraphs provide guidance as to development and minimum 

content of the individual flight STOs. 

2.4.1 Document Content 

a. Vehicle Configuration - Each STO will include a description 

of the flight vehicle (FV) configuration that is complete 

enough to identify the system to be flown. This will include 

vehicle and subsystem description to the level of significant block diagrams or drawings, where warranted. 

b Test Objectives - This section of the STO will develop the 

test objectives presented in the FTOP to a greater level of 

detail. The objectives will be classified as primary, 

secondary, and tertiary, using the definitions of paragraph 

2.3. The criteria for satisfactorily meeting each objective 

will be stated. Each test objective will be correlated to 

those parametric data points necessary to determine flight 

vehicle performance and to assess the degree to which the 

performance meets the acceptance criteria. 

Data points will be categorized as primary or secondary. 

Primary points are those points which most readily show 

the level of performance (usually those data points that 

are needed to verify the test objective). Secondary points 

are those data points which may be used in lieu of the 

primary points, if necessary, to determine performance. 

The use of secondary points is usually not as desirable 

due to more involved analyses or possible loss in accuracy. 

Redundancy of data points will be shown for both primary 

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and secondary points, as applicable. Redundancy exists 

only where there is no difference in the manner of analysis, 

degree of accuracy, or preference between two points. If 

tertiary points exist, this fact should be shown, but no 

special effort to develop tertiary points will be made. 

Data points will be identified by number and title. 

The range over which the data points may vary and the 

engineering units will be specified. 

The phase of the operation during which the objective must 

be evaluated will be stated as well as the interval of 

time, distance, or the event over which the measurement 

must be observed. 

c Flight Plan - The STO will contain a description of the 

flight plan to include the specific constraints for the 

flight by phase (i.e., launch, ascent, orbit, reentry, 

retrieval). 

d. Flight Data - The STO will provide details on data handling, 

format, and distribution (further information on this 

requirement is included in Section 9.0). Test-peculiar 

telemetry and instrumentation schedules cross-referenced 

to identify specific test objectives with each point will 

also be shown. This section should also contain a list of 

the launch and AFSCF facilities required to be operational 

for launch. 

e. Appendices - As appended data, the STO will include a 

glossary of definitions and abbreviations and a list of 

referenced documents. 

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3.0 OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

3.1 GENERAL 

This Section presents the overall MOL operations organization and the 

functions to be performed by the organizational elements. It depicts the 

Mission Director's (MD) role and his interface with his subordinate directors 

and provides a description of the functions performed under each director. 

The functions are organized to indicate the sub-organizational 

responsibilities as a function of operational phases. 

Flight Operations interface operating procedures among the MOL SPO, AFSCF, 

and associates will be established and controlled by the Director of MOL 

Test Operations through the Flight Operations Planning Group. 

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3.2 MISSION DIRECTION 

Mission direction is the real-time operational direction provided by the 

MOL Program Deputy Director in the conduct of an operational test of the MOL 

system. In this capacity, the MOL Program Deputy Director (or his designated 

representative) acts as the MD. The operational interface of the MD are 

shown in Figures 3-1 to 3-3. 

3.2.1 Responsibilities 

3.2.1.1 Real-Time Control 

The limits of authority within which the Launch and Flight Directors (LD and 

FD) may operate will be defined by MOL Program Directives and policy 

decisions prior to an operational test. These limitations are delineated in 

the appropriate Director's Handbooks. The MD has the overall responsibility 

for the operational test of the MOL system. 

The MD must assure that he has proper visibility of the operation to 

recognize that the Launch, Ascent, Gemini B Recovery, and FD are operating 

within the bounds of their authority. Also, he must be sufficiently informed 

on all aspects of the operation to make judgments and render real-time 

decisions on matters outside the purview of the directors. 

3.2.1.2 Flight Readiness Determination 

Prior to each flight, MOL system readiness must be established by the MOL 

System Readiness Review Board (Ref. 1). The MOL Flight Vehicle Technical 

Readiness Program (Ref. 21) will encompass factory and VAFB activity from 

assembly through factory testing, acceptance, VAFB launch operations, and 

launch of the MOL flight vehicle. The Flight Readiness Program will encompass 

all AFSCF and OTEF flight test and operations activities including ground 

hardware, software, and operations personnel, as well as the flight crew. 

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Flight readiness culminates in the Flight Readiness Review conducted by the 

MOL Flight Readiness Review Board. On approximately Launch Day minus one 

(L -1), each responsible operations organization or agency is represented 

and presents its readiness report: 

a. The Ascent Director (AD) reports on the state of readiness of 

the MCC hardware, software, and personnel to support powered 

flight. 

b. Assistant Flight Directors (AFDs) for Vehicle Analysis, Crew 

Operations, Flight Planning, Reentry and Recovery Planning 

report the state of readiness for their respective areas of 

responsibility. 

c. FTFD reports the status of the AFSCF capabilities and reports 

the state of AFSCF readiness to support the flight. 

d. The Gemini B Recovery Director (DDMS) reports the status and 

level of readiness of the recovery forces to support abort, 

normal, and contingency recovery. 

e. The command pilot reports on flight crew readiness and crew 

assessment of the other reports given. 

f. The chief flight surgeon reports on the physical and 

psychological readiness of the flight crew. 

g. The AFSCF Staff Meteorologist (SMOTW) provides briefings of 

expected environmental conditions, makes recommendations 

relative to conducting the test on the planned timetable, and 

reports the state of readiness to support the flight. 

h. AFWTR reports the state of readiness of its facilities to 

support the ascent phase. 

The senior member of the Flight Readiness Review Board delivers the readiness 

reports to the MOL System Readiness Review Board, gives an assessment of all 

reports affecting Flight Operations, briefs the planned operation, and makes 

recommendations regarding overall readiness. 

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.•••••■,, 

The MOL System Readiness Review Board, after hearing all readiness reports, 

briefings, and recommendations, makes the final decision on launch. Should 

a planned launch be delayed for any reason after the Readiness Review, 

another Readiness Review (either complete or partial, as appropriate) may be 

initiated to satisfy the readiness criteria. 

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3.3 LAUNCH OPERATIONS 

See VAFB Launch Operations Requirements (Ref. 22). 

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3.14 FLIGHT OPERATIONS 

3.4.1 General 

The Flight Operations organization as shown in Figures 3-1 through 3-3 will 

conduct the flight test during ascent, early orbit, orbit, late orbit and 

the reentry phases of the operation. The responsibilities of the Flight 

Operations groups vary as a function of the operations phases, as explained 

in the following paragraphs. 

3.4.2 Flight Phase 

During launch and ascent, the organization is structured to perform the 

required functions in an optimum manner. In this period, the FD is concerned 

primarily with those aspects of the operation required to prepare for orbital 

operations, delegating the real time functions to the AD. The AD controls 

the functions of all MCR consoles. The rationale for this organizational 

framework is found in the fact that decisions during ascent must be made with 

minimum time lag to avoid abort situations and, once an abort situation is 

diagnosed, the abort recommendation requires decisions and action in minimum 

time. Not only does the organizational structure reflect these requirements, 

the physical layout of the MCR consoles is dictated by this philosophy. 

During the 500 sec time period from liftoff through OV injection, the 

organization is dictated by the requirements of the Powered Flight Operations. 

For the remainder of flight operations, the FD delegates specific areas of 

responsibility to key personnel, as shown in Figure 3-1. 

The consoles are manned by personnel trained and certified by the SPO Test 

Operations Division and by the MOL FTFD. 

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3.5 MOL FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

3.5.1 Flight Director 

The FD is a senior USAF officer from the MOL SPO who is responsible to the 

MD for the conduct of the Flight Operations within the guidelines established 

by the Flight Director's Handbook. The FD makes all decisions affecting the 

manner in which the operation is conducted. He must refer to the MD all 

decisions which are not covered in the Handbook and which affect either crew 

safety or mission success. He is responsible for the personnel interface 

between the MOL Test Operations and The User to ensure that User requests are 

honored and that The User is informed of mission progress. The FD is 

responsible for ensuring that all support agencies meet their commitments to 

the MOL program. Should additional requirements be generated, he negotiates 

these requirements with the agencies involved. If resolution of these 

requirements cannot be achieved, he will refer them to the MD for action. 

The FD is responsible to assure that all subordinate organizations (see 

Figures 3-1 and 3-3) are properly trained, to certify their readiness for 

orbital and powered flight support, to direct their operational activities 

along the lines of authority shown, and to maintain operational discipline 

throughout the flight phase of the Test Operations. 

3.5.1.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, the FD: 

a. Is responsible for scheduling MOL SPO, Aerospace, and 

associate contractor support personnel for software and 

personnel validation and training exercises involving the 

AFSCF. He coordinates all such activities with the MOL 

FTFD and is responsible for coordinating all integrated 

training or tests with MOL Launch Operations, the flight 

crew, and the OTEF. 

b. Is responsible for the development of the Flight Director's 

Handbook. 

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c. Acts with the MOL in appointing members to the 

"Rehearsal Committee" and critiques all training exercises. 

d. Certifies to the MD that all MOL personnel, procedures, and 

software are ready for flight. 

3.5.1.2 Launch Phase 

During the launch phase, the FD, in conjunction with the AD, keeps the MD 

apprised of the AFSCF and MOL operations personnel readiness 'to support the 

ascent and orbit phases of flight. Should the need arise, he makes 

recommendations to the MD as to whether to hold or scrub the countdown. 

3.5.1.3 Flight Phase 

During ascent, the FD monitors the activities of the AD and makes recommendations to the MD, as required. 

For the remainder of flight, the FD is responsible for the following 

decisions and actions: 

a. Approval of all flight plan changes that affect 

the accomplishment of a test objective. 

b. Recommendations to the MD on the priority and the timing of 

accomplishing secondary test objectives. 

c. Recommendations to the MD on continuing or terminating the 

flight test. 

d. Approval of change in priority of MOL data system utilization. 

3.5.1.h Postflight Phase 

During postflight operations, the FD is responsible for ensuring that the 

Post Operations Assessment Directive (POAD) is complete, accurate, and 

released on schedule. 

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3.5.2 Ascent Director 

The AD is a senior USAF officer from the MOL SPO who is responsible for the 

conduct of powered flight operations. 

3.5.2.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, the AD will coordinate all activities in support 

of the preparation for the real time control of the powered flight portion of 

flight test. 

3.5.2.2 Launch Phase 

During the launch phase, the AD in conjunction with the FD, keeps the MD 

apprised of the AFSCF and MOL operations personnel readiness to support the 

ascent and orbit phases of flight. Should the need arise, he makes 

recommendations to the MD as to whether to hold or scrub the countdown. 

3.5.2.3 Powered Flight Phase 

During powered flight, the AD is responsible for decisions and actions 

covering: 

a. Abort recommendations to the flight crew during ascent. 

b. Guidance switchover recommendations during ascent. 

c. Supplying touchdown data to the recovery forces. 

d. Application of flight test rules caused by anomalous flight 

vehicle behavior. 

The AD exercises control, through the FTFD/Test Controller, for the AFSCF and 

supporting Range and other data acquisition facilities during all periods of 

powered flight. The AD also exercises control of the MCR and of the Flight 

Controllers. He is responsible for adherence to the Flight Plan, the Flight 

Test Rules, and Flight Crew Safety requirements. Subsequent to this phase, 

the AD has no responsibilities and the function ceases to exist except for 

his inputs to post flight analysis. 

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3.5.3 Technical Advisor and Staff 

The senior Aerospace Corporation representative is the Technical Advisor 

(TA) to the FD. He is supported by a staff of Aerospace and associate 

contractor personnel. 

3.5.3.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, the TA assists the FD in his prelaunch activities 

in preparation of documentation, validation of software and procedures, 

personnel training, and certification. The TA and his staff participate in 

training exercises and, serve on the "Rehearsal Committee". In addition, 

the TA assists the FD in the preflight planning of the flight and the mission. 

3.5.3.2 Launch Phase 

During the Launch phase, the TA is responsible to keep the FD apprised of 

OV status and of TA support capability for orbital operations. 

3.5.3.3 Flight Phase 

During ascent the TA monitors the general health of the OV to predict OV status 

for RTS acquisition. 

For the remainder of the flight, the TA is responsible for closely following 

the operation and providing TA staff operational recommendations to the FD. 

The TA and staff are responsible for coordinating the operations in the 

laboratory module, mission module, and Gemini B contractor analysis areas. They 

are also responsible for coordinating offline analyses and investigations using 

the AFSCF, MOL Contractor Support Facility, or contractor home plant facilities, 

as required. They are required to keep the FD apprised of all such 

investigations and the results thereof. They also provide technical assistance 

to the FD in the flight planning area. 

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The TA and staff are responsible for the analysis leading to and the 

drafting of the quick-look reports. 

3.5.3.4 Postflight Phase 

The TA is responsible for drafting the POAD and providing inputs to other 

reports. 

3.5.4 Assistant Flight Director for Flight Planning (AFD/FP) 

The AFD/FP provides the flight and mission planning staff function to the FD. 

This AFD heads a group of personnel. The composition and responsibilities of 

this group vary as a function of the flight phases, as shown below. 

3.5.4.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, this group is responsible to provide to the 

FD a flight plan for the entire flight. During this time period, the group 

is comprised of MOL SPO, Aerospace, and AFSCF Command Generation personnel. 

3.5.4.2 Launch Phase 

No particular responsibility is identified for this time period, assuming 

that no last-minute targeting changes have been made. However, should 

such changes occur, this group will assess their impact and modify the 

flight plan accordingly. Group composition during this time span will 

be principally MOL SPO personnel with Aerospace assistance. 

3.5.4.3 Flight Phase 

The FP group is responsible for assessing the impact of targeting requirements and long-term changes in OV capability on the full-flight flight plan. 

The group is responsible to provide a one-to-two-day flight plan to Command 

Generation for guidance in command message generation and review all mission 

payload system segment (MPSS) event generator computer runs. This group is 

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responsible for the evaluation of MPSS performance as evaluated from the 

mission correlation data (MCD) and ensures that crew voice comments become a 

part of the MCD. During this period, the group is comprised of MOL SPO, 

Aerospace, and associate contractor representatives, as required. 

The group provides inputs to the quick-look reports. 

3.5.4.4 Postflight Phase 

The group is responsible to assist the TA in writing the POAD. 

3.5.5 Assistant Flight Director for Crew Operations (AFD/CO) 

The AFD/CO, a flight crew member from the MOL flight crew division, is 

responsible to the FD for all activities affecting crew operations and serves 

as the principal assistant to the FD. He acts as the crew communicator. 

3.5.5.1 Prelaunch Phase 

The AFD/CO is responsible for development, documentation, and validation of 

crew/STC procedures. He participates in training and rehearsal activities at 

the MCC. 

3.5.5.2 Launch Phase 

The AFD/CO monitors countdown activities, crew activity, and reports as 

required to the FD on crew status. 

3.5.5.3 Flight Phase 

The AFD/CO relays all voice instructions from the AD to the flight crew and 

keeps the AD advised of flight crew status during ascent. 

During the remainder of the flight phase, the AFD/CO monitors flight crew 

operations and aids the flight crew in following the flight plan, advises the 

flight crew of consumable qUantities, and relays recommendations from other 

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flight controllers. He provides flight crew status to the FD, and provides 

inputs to the quick look reports on matters affecting the flight crew and 

the communication link. 

3.5.5.4 Postflight Phase 

The AFD/CO assists in flight crew debriefing and provides inputs to the FD 

for inclusion in the POAD. 

3.5.6 Assistant Flight Director for Vehicle Analysis (AFD/VA) 

The AFD/VA directs a group of contractor systems analysts who monitor those 

OV systems in which malfunctions could lead to abort recommendations or 

require other real time action on the part of the ground or flight crews. 

3.5.6.1 Prelaunch Phase 

This group is responsible for developing, publishing, and validating 

procedures that integrate the real-time OV status reporting function with the 

operation of the "back rooms" and the MCR. They will participate in 

personnel training and rehearsals. 

3.5.6.2 Launch Phase 

The AFD/VA will monitor OV data displays and the conduct of the countdown to 

assure that the OV displays are valid, and will report any observed or 

reported anomalies to the FD. 

3.5.6.3 Flight phase 

During the ascent phase the AFD/VA will monitor orbiting vehicle systems in 

preparation for conduct of orbital phase. 

For the remainder of the operation, the AFD/VA will report to the FD those 

items of OV status of significance and for which real time action may be 

required. He will provide inputs to the quick look reports. 

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3.5.6.4 Postflight Phase 

The OV systems controller will be responsible to provide coordinated 

inputs to the postflight reports concerning those OV anomalies observed 

during launch and ascent. 

3.5.7 Assistant Flight Director for Reentry and Recovery Planning 

TAFD/RBP) 

The AFD/RRP provides a function only after ascent, and is the AFD for 

coordinating, for the FD, all aspects associated with Gemini B, DRV, and 

laboratory vehicle reentry for all remaining phases of the flight. 

3.5.8 Flight Surgeon 

The flight surgeon (FS) is responsible to the FD for all aspects of crew 

health. With the assistance of biomedical personnel and facilities of the 

staff support room he will monitor the physical status of the crew, Gemini 

and laboratory module internal environment, environmental control and life 

support (EC/LS) function, and radiation levels. When necessary he will make 

recommendations to the FD in matters related to crew health and safety. He 

will routinely coordinate with the AFD/CO on crew activities and keep him 

informed of crew health status. He will also coordinate with AFD/VA to 

assess the impact of malfunctions or degraded modes on crew performance. The 

FS is also responsible for providing inputs to quick look and postflight 

reports. 

3.5.8.1 Prelaunch Phase 

The FS is responsible for development, documentation, and validation of 

biomedical procedures at STC and the simulators. He will participate in 

training and rehearsal activities at MCC. 

3.5.8.2 Launch Phase 

The FS monitors countdown activities and reports as required to the FD on crew 

health status. 

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3.5.8.3 Flight Phase 

The FS will provide for analysis of data received by voice and TM related to 

crew health. He will coordinate with AFD/CO, AFD/VA, and others to provide 

reports and recommendations to FD as required. 

3.5.8.4 Postflight Phase 

The FS provides inputs to the FD for inclusion in the postflight reports. 

3.5.9 Technical Advisor on Natural Aerospace Environment 

Ti0fcSTAFFm7fr 

See paragraphs 12.3 and 12.6. 

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3.6 AFSCF FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

3.6.1 MOL Field Test Force Director (FTFD) 

The FTFD is the AFSCF representative from the STC who is responsible for 

interfacing and implementing the MOL AFSCF operational requirements 

within the AFSCF. During the development and planning phase, he is the 

point of contact between the STC and the MOL SPO. He is responsible for MOL 

personnel training in the AFSCF and will conduct system simulations. During 

the operational phases he will man a console and share the AFSCF operations 

support function with the Test Controllers in the following manner. The FTFD 

will delegate authority to the Test Controllers for all "RTS Pass" control of 

the AFSCF allocated to the MOL project. He will retain authority over all 

other AFSCF aspects of his office. In this sense, "RTS Pass" means the 

rev-to-rev operation normally performed by the test controller (see 

paragraph 3.6.2). 

3.6.1.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, the FTFD: 

a. Reviews AFSCF operational requirements levied by the 

MOL SPO and assists in their implementation at the STC 

and RTSs. 

b. Obtains AFSCF support for MOL operations planning. 

c. Works closely with the FD in planning, scheduling, and 

conducting personnel, software, and procedures validation, 

training and certification exercises. He will be responsible 

for scheduling all AFSCF and AFWTR support for such exercises. 

d. Develops, publishes and validates any MOL/AFSCF interface 

procedures required. 

e. Reviews and comments on all MOL SPO-developed procedures 

prior to their trial and final implementation at the MCC. 

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f. Prepares the MOL Test Operations Order (TOO). 

g. Ensures that all required AFSCF support facilities are 

scheduled for the operation. 

h. Certifies to the FD, the readiness of AFSCF personnel, 

equipment and software in support of the MOL flights. 

3.6.1.2 Launch Phase 

During launch, the FTFD assures that all nominally requested support facilities are available, and secures such other facilities that may be required 

due to contingency situations. 

3.6.1.3 Flight Phase 

During the ascent phase, the FTFD will have no specific responsibilities 

above his general role. 

During the orbital phase, the FTFD will: 

a. Interface the requirements of the FD with AFSCF. 

b. Ensure that the Test Controller accomplishes all RTS 

Pass requirements of the FD. 

c. Personally direct all other activities concerning 

FD requirements which must be met. 

d. Present MOL requirements to the AFSCF Network 

Director (ND) and attempt first-level resolution of 

any conflicts. 

e. Bring to the FD for approval those circumstances 

affecting the accomplishment of test objectives. 

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3.6.1.4 Postflight Phase 

During the postflight phase, the FTFD provides required personnel and 

facility support to the FD and TA staff to produce the POAD and provides 

AFSCF inputs to the POAD. 

3.6.2 Test Controller 

The Test Controller (TC) is responsible to the FTFD for portions of the 

FTFD area of responsibility (see paragraph 3.6.1). His primary 

responsibilities are in the area of RTS pass activities, but, as an arm of the 

FTFD, the TC is responsive to FTFD requests. 

3.6.2.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, the TC is responsible for preparation, 

publication, and validation of Test Control procedures, and for integration 

of the subordinate operations organizations' procedures with the MOL MCC 

operation. The TC assists the FTFD in his duties related to procedures, 

software, and personnel validation/certification, particularly with respect 

to scheduling and conducting autonomous AFSCF training exercises. The TC 

participates both as TC and as a member of the Rehearsal Committee for MOL 

Operations Rehearsals, assisting the FTFD in preparation of the rehearsal 

critiques. 

3.6.2.2 Launch Phase 

During the launch phase, the TC assures proper data/communications systems 

coordination with AFWTR. He receives status reports from AFSCF support 

facilities and keeps the FTFD informed of AFSCF status. He monitors 

operations control traffic to assure correct formatting, addressing, and 

transmission procedures, and ensures that proper AFSCF net discipline is 

maintained. 

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3.6.2.3 Flight Phase 

During the flight phase, the TC and his assistant perform the functions 

described in paragraph 3.6.2.1, except that there is no AFWTR interface. 

The TC ensures that network personnel follow established flight control 

procedures. 

The TC conducts a prepass briefing for STC personnel and the RTSs involved. 

He is responsible for the real time control of the RTSs and the subordinate 

AFSCF network shown in Figure 3-1 during the RTS Pass period. The TC 

provides inputs to the quick-look reports, as applicable. 

3.6.2.4 Postflight Activity 

The TC provides to the FTFD a critique of the test control function for the 

flight for inclusion in the postflight reports. 

3.6.3 Remote Tracking Network 

The RTSs are assigned to the MOL program in accordance with the Orbital 

Support Plan (OSP), the approved flight plan, and scheduling requirements of the AFSCF. When assigned to MOL for a given time period, the RTSs 

are responsible to provide telemetry, tracking, and voice data from the OV, 

and to transmit commands and voice to the OV. 

3.6.3.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During this phase, the remote tracking network develops procedures, checks 

out software, and participates in personnel training exercises and submits 

required status reports. The RTS at VAFB (VTS) participates in prelaunch 

testing. 

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3.6.3.2 Launch Phase 

During the launch phase, the RTS performs final readiness checks and submits 

required status reports. VTS supports the launch pad activity during 

selected portions of the countdown. 

3.6.3.3 Flight Phase 

Only VTS is involved during ascent. VTS is responsible for acquiring the 

FV and returning OV telemetry data to the STC during its view period of the 

ascent. 

During the orbital phase, each RTS is responsible to meet its scheduled 

MOL operations times as determined by the Network Director. Each will 

provide tracking, telemetry, command, and voice (TTCV) services, as 

scheduled. Each RTS will process, transmit, and record the data as provided 

for in the OSP and the Pass Plan. 

3.b.3.4 Postflight Phase 

The RTSs will provide significant inputs to AFSCF operational reports. 

3.6.4 Command Controller 

The Command Controller, an AFSCF officer, supports the FTFD during command 

generation and the Test Controller during command loading. He keeps the TC 

advised of laboratory vehicle command system capability and status, and 

contents of the Current Vehicle Command Table (CVCT), and the status and 

content of the command message for loading. He is the interface between the 

TC and the Command Generation Group during command loading. During the RTS 

pass, and upon the approval of the TC, the Command Controller is responsible 

for transmitting the commands. 

The other functions of the Command Controller parallel those of the command 

generators for the various operations phases: therefore, they will not be 

repeated. 

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3.6.5 Data Controller 

The Data Controller (DACON) is an AFSCF officer responsible for the 

coordinated use of the AFSCF data system. The data system includes all 

of the computer hardware and AFSCF and MOL ground software and is comprised of the ADS, the Advanced Orbit Ephemeris System (AOES), and System II 

(CDC-3800s and SYMON). The DACON reports directly to the TC during the RTS 

pass period; at other times, he is responsive to the direction of the FTFD. 

3.6.5.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, the DACON: 

a. Prepares, validates, and publishes data control procedures 

which integrate the data system and its use into the MOL 

MCC operation. 

b. Participates in the validation of all MOL/AFSCF software. 

c. Supports all training exercises and participates in the 

development of the flight plan. 

d. Formulates the Data System Management Plan (DSMP), a subset 

of the Flight Plan, which specifies what programs or 

functions are scheduled to run at any given time on the 

off-line computers (CDC-3800s). 

3.6.5.2 Launch Phase 

During the launch phase, the DACON assures the operational integrity of 

the data system by running any required diagnostic programs. He is 

responsible to see that the schedule of the DSMP is maintained and to 

update it, if required. 

3.6.5.3 Flight Phase 

During this phase, the DACON must ensure proper real-time operation of the 

CDC-3800 computers in support of powered flight. He is responsible to report 

for correction any indicated anomalous data system operation and to assure 

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display switchover to the backup CDC-3800 for continuity of real-time data. 

He is also responsible for ensuring proper data input and reentry software 

operation during normal and contingency reentry activities. 

During this phase, the DACON is responsible for updating the DSMP with 

each update of the flight plan. He will receive for consideration and 

approval, within the constraints of a pre-established priority structure, all 

requests for data system utilization not in accordance with the DSMP. 

He is responsible to report to the FTFD any occurrence or prediction that 

would preclude successful accomplishment of the DSMP. During those time 

periods which the DSMP gives priority to the real-time operation (i.e., 

during an RTS pass), the DACON reports directly to the TC. 

3.6.5.4 Postflight Phase 

During the postflight phase, the DACON is required to submit any significant 

data system events to the FTFD for inclusion in AFSCF postflight reports. 

3.6.6 Command Generation Group 

This is an AFSCF-manned group responsible for transforming the flight 

plan requirements into commands, airborne digital computer (ADC) data, 

and prose-message instructions to the flight crew. The group is responsible to the FTFD to assure conflict-free command loads. The group must 

maintain cognizance of the orbiting vehicle and AFSCF command systems 

capabilities and ensure command messages compatible with those capabilities. They must keep the FTFD and TC appraised of command generation 

status through the Command Controller. 

3.6.6.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During this phase the Command Generation Group is responsible to develop, 

validate, and publish their operational procedures. They participate in the 

validation of the Command and Control (C&C) software and operations exercises 

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for personnel training and certification. They assist the Flight Planning 

Group in establishing the full flight flight planning software. 

The group will generate the pad load command message and any other command 

messages required at the launch site for pad checkout of the OV and command 

tapes for open loop simulations. 

3.6.6.2 Launch Phase 

During this phase, the Command Generation Group perform diagnostic checks to 

ascertain the status of their software and reports the status to the FTFD. 

3.6.6.3 Flight Phase 

During this phase, the Command Generation Group is responsible to prepare 

command messages in accordance with the flight plan and to update the 1-2 day 

flight plan to reflect the short range OV and AFSCF capabilities. They make 

recommendations to the Flight Planning Group with respect to the development 

of the 1-2 day flight plan. 

3.6.6.4 Postflight Phase 

The Command Generation Group reports all operational events of significance 

to the FTFD for incorporation into the AFSCF postflight reports. 

3.6.7 Orbit Analysis Group 

This is an AFSCF-manned group responsible for orbit planning, trackingdata evaluation and processing, orbit determination, ephemeris generation, 

and for computations required for orbit adjust, Gemini B and DRV reentry, and 

laboratory vehicle (or automatic-mode OV) disposal. This group is responsive 

to the direction of the FTFD. 

3.6.7.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During the prelaunch phase, this group: 

a. Prepares, validates, and publishes their operational 

procedures. 

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b. Assists the Flight Planning Group in Preparation of the 

Flight Plan by providing orbit mechanics technology and 

making runs of the flight plan generator. 

c. Participates in software, procedures, and personnel 

validation and certification exercises. 

d. Provides assistance as required to the FD/TA in event of 

last minute orbit parameter changes. 

3.6.7.2 Launch Phase 

During the launch phase, the Orbit Analysis Group ensures proper operation of 

their software and reports status to the FTFD. 

3.6.7.3 Flight Phase 

During this phase, the Orbit Analysis Group is responsible for orbit 

determination runs, preparation of ephemerides, computation of orbit 

adjusts, development of the reentry parameters for Gemini B, the laboratory 

vehicle (or automatic-mode OV), and Wars and the prediction of their impact 

points. In addition, the group is responsible for making runs of the flight 

plan generator for updating the Flight Plan and for securing the required 

flight plan coordination. 

3.6.7.4 Postflight Phase 

During the postflight phase, this group provides inputs of significant operations events to the FTFD for incorporation into the AFSCF postflight reports. 

3.6.8 Recovery Control Group 

The Recovery Control Group (RCG), located at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, is 

responsible to provide personnel, aircraft, secure surface ship, and ARES 

support for recovery of the DRV. It is also responsible to direct DRV 

recovery training exercises, certify DRV recovery readiness, and conduct DRV 

recovery in support of the MOL program. 

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RCG support is required for flights 6 and 7 only. Prior to these flights, 

the RCG will develop, validate, and publish MOL support plans and procedures. 

The group will also provide postflight reports covering significant 

operations events. 

3.6.9 Network Director 

The AFSCF ND, the senior AFSCF operational representative on duty, is a 

senior USAF officer, responsible for assuring that the AFSCF commitments 

made to the various program offices are met in a multi-operations environment. 

He controls all of the AFSCF resources and allocates them to best meet the 

needs of the USAF. When conflicts in the use of the AFSCF arise, he is 

responsible for suggesting alternative means of meeting the AFSCF commitment 

without significant degradation of program objectives. Where this cannot be 

done, he implements the priority structure established by the program offices 

with the AFSCF. His allocations are subject to review by the directors of 

programs supported by the AFSCF when necessary they may make additional or 

different tradeoffs within the capabilities of the AFSCF. 

The guidelines used by the ND in AFSCF allocations are documented in the 

various program ORDs, OSPs, and, for MOL, in the Flight Plan. 

The functions of the ND are not varied as to the operational phases of MOL 

(although the priority of MOL requirements may be); therefore, no breakout of 

these functions is made on an operational phase basis. 

The functions of the staff meteorologist (STAFFMET), multi-operations, and 

recovery control are described in the following paragraphs. 

3.6.9.1 Multi-Operations 

Multi-operations, a staff function of the ND is responsible for the overall 

AFSCF scheduling and for scheduling all AFSCF facilities and personnel for 

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such activities as equipment installation, modification and checkout, 

rehearsals, and actual operations. Multi-operations is also responsible to 

the ND to detect conflicts in requirements placed on the AFSCF and to suggest 

means of eliminating or minimizing the effects of conflicts. 

Multi-operations is responsible to provide MOL support at any time MOL is 

utilizing the AFSCF from prelaunch through postlfight. 

3.6.9.2 Communications System 

The Communications Group is responsible for all AFSCF communications, 

communications with outside agencies and organizations supporting the 

flight test, and the closed circuit television (CCTV) within the STC. This 

specifically includes communications RTS-to-STC, intra-STC, and STC-to-Otheragencies, whether by data line, teletype, voice, facsimile, data phone, land 

line, microwave, radio, etc. Communications facilities are provided in 

accordance with the OSP, Flight Plan, and schedules promulgated by the ND. 

3.6.9.2.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During this phase, communications personnel are responsible to prepare, 

validate, and publish any special communications procedures required for MOL 

operations. They are required to support all scheduled software and personnel 

validation and training exercises. 

3.6.9.2.2 Launch Phase 

During launch phase, the communications group: 

a. Calls up all required circuits and verifies circuit quality. 

b. Monitors all circuits and takes any necessary corrective 

action required to assure continuous communication. 

c. Accepts operations control messages from the TC for 

transmission, and routes all incoming operational traffic 

to designated addressees. 

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d. Keeps the TC advised of communications system status. 

3.6.9.2.3 Flight Phase 

Ascent and orbital communications responsibilities are the same as for the 

launch phase. 

3.6.9.2.4 Postflight Phase 

Postflight responsibilities of the communications group is limited to inputs 

of significant events to AFSCF reports. 

3.6.9.3 AFSCF Staff Meteorologist 

The AFSCF STAFFMET (AWS) and his staff are responsible to support the MOL 

program with meterological data. STAFFMET support is to be provided during 

all operational phases including rehearsals. A detailed description of 

natural aerospace environment (ENV) activities is provided in Section 12.0. 

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3.7 GEMINI B RECOVERY FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

The Recovery Operations organization (see Figure 3-1) is under the 

jurisdiction of the DOD Manager for Manned Spaceflight Support Operations 

(DDMS) and is responsible for the recovery of the Gemini B, the flight 

crew, and the DRCs. The organization of the Recovery Operations Group is 

described below. 

3.7.1 Recovery Director 

The Gemini B Recovery Director, a representative of DDMS, will be located in 

the Recovery Control Room (RCR) at the STC and will assume command and 

control of the recovery forces at R -I day. He is responsible for planning 

and control of Gemini B recovery and retrieval operations for abort, 

contingency, and normal operating modes, support plans preparation, training 

and rehearsal validation, operational readiness determination, and postoperations evaluation. He is also responsible for placing requirements on 

the recovery support agencies (i.e., ARRS, USN, etc.) to meet the recovery 

requirements as specified in the GBRRD and the MRRD. 

3.7.1.1 Launch Site Recovery Operations 

Launch Site Recovery Operations is located at VAFB and is controlled by a DDMS 

representative. The recovery force is a composite of AFWTR and ARRS forces. 

Launch Site Recovery Operations is responsible for pad and early ascent 

abort recovery of the Gemini B and flight crew. 

3.7.1.2 Pacific Recovery Operations 

Pacific Recovery Operations is located in Hawaii and is controlled by 

Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, who is Commander Task Force, Pacific 

(CTF 130). 

CTF 130 is responsible to the Recovery Director for providing the support 

personnel and equipment necessary to accomplish recovery operations for MOL 

in any area under his jurisdiction. 

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3.7.1.3 Atlantic Recovery Operations 

Atlantic Operations, located at Norfolk, Virginia, is controlled by Commander 

Task Force, Atlantic (CTF 140). CTF 140 is responsible to the Recovery 

Director for providing the support personnel and equipment necessary to 

accomplish recovery operations for MOL in any area under his jurisdiction. 

3.7.1.4 Contingency Recover► Operations 

Contingency Recovery Operations are under the control of the local area 

commander where the contingency landing occurs. Each Commander is responsible 

for the planning and organization of forces and the conduct of search and 

recovery operations within his area for any contingency recovery not within 

the geographical limits of a planned recovery area or in territory held 

by nations unfriendly to the USA. 

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3.8 ASSOCIATE CONTRACTORS' SUPPORT ROLE 

This Section describes briefly the operational role of the associate 

contractors in support of the MOL operation in the Sunnyvale area. In this 

preliminary FTOP, it represents the guidance required in this area to place 

the rest of the FTOP in the proper context for the development of the 

associate's requirements for flight test support. Subsequent issues of the 

FTOP will reflect the roles as modified by the associate contractors' support 

plans. 

The Sunnyvale operation will be principally supported by DAC, MAC, GE, and 

EK. Other contractors, such as TRW, may perform a software maintenance 

role, but it is the intent of this Section to only detail the prinicpal 

support roles. 

3.8.1 Prelaunch Phase 

During this phase, and particularly for the first manned flight, preparation 

is made for the flight. The MOL SPO and Aerospace Corporation will have a 

field operations office in Sunnyvale to work with the associate contractors 

and the AFSCF in planning for and in the conduct of operational tests, 

training and rehearsals. The associates will each establish local offices 

(possibly in the MCSF) to provide operational support to the Sunnyvale effort. 

The level of manning of those offices will be commensurate with the level of 

effort expected during any given time period in this phase. 

a. The associates will be responsible for planning and conducting 

formal and informal training sessions for MOL SPO, Aerospace, 

AFSCF, and any other contractor's operations personnel 

requiring technical instruction on the associate's segment 

(hardware and software). 

b. The associates operational personnel will attend formal and 

informal training sessions conducted by the AFSCF on AFSCF 

operations, capabilities, concepts, and procedures. 

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c. The associates' operational personnel will attend formal and 

informal training sessions conducted by the MOL SPO on MOL 

MCC operating concepts and procedures. 

d. The associates will work with the MOL SPO field office in 

developing operations handbooks and procedures. 

e. The associates will support software verification exercises 

as requested by the FD. 

f. The associates will support AFSCF training exercises and 

rehearsals with those personnel committed to AFSCF operations 

support. From this group the associates will support the 

AFSCF Rehearsal Committee (see Section 11.0) as requested by 

the FD. During selected training exercises, the associates 

will be required to provide support at the MCSF and their 

in-plant facilities to validate concepts and procedures for 

the coordination of operations analyses requirements and data 

handling. 

g. The associates will assist, as required, in the development of 

the operational data base, operational TLM data modes and 

displays. 

h. The associates will provide support as required, including 

studies for the development and formulation of the Flight 

Plan. 

i. The associates will be certified, based on an approved 

certification plan, as to their readiness to support Flight 

Operations. The associates' senior representative will report 

on their preparedness to the FD. Critical to this 

certification will be the level of technical compentence of 

the associate personnel provided, their evidence of knowledge 

of MOL and AFSCF operations, concepts and procedures, and their 

participation in training exercises and rehearsals. The 

Associates' personnel will be organized for operation in 

accordance with Figure 3-1 and the details presented in the 

paragraphs below. 

3.8.2 Launch Phase 

At the appropriate time during this phase, the associates' operational 

positions are manned. During the operation, the associates will staff their 

MCC support areas, the MCSF, and their in-plant facilities in accordance with 

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the plans developed during the prelaunch phase. Staffing levels will vary 

dependent upon the expected level of activity. The MCC will be manned 

continuously. Staffing at the MCSF will be as required and/or on an on-call 

basis; staffing for support at the associates' in-plant facilities will be on 

an on-call basis until needed and then as required. From this point until 

the termination of the flight, the associate personnel will be responsive to 

the operations organization. The TA will be authorized to act for the FD in 

coordinating the activities of the associates. The senior representative 

(at any given time) for each associate will act as staff to the TA in addition 

to directing his support personnel. 

Upon manning the support rooms, the associates will check out equipment and 

report readiness to the FD. As FY data is made available to the STC from the 

pad, the associates will monitor their respective segments and report any 

discrepancies. During this time period, all support room effort is directed 

to the post-injection period, unless specifically directed otherwise by the 

FD. 

3.8.3 Flight Phase 

During ascent, all available data will be monitored and analyzed to predict 

OV status for the first RTS pass. No special data requirements for this 

purpose will be requested for real time ascent monitoring. After injection, 

stored data will be retransmitted from VAFB to supplement this effort and 

special data modes may be requested at this time. 

During the remainder of the flight phase, the associates will monitor their 

segment's performance in the MCC reporting all anomalies or suspected problems 

and recommended solutions. They will request that applicable software runs 

be made for predicting TLM or the consumption of expendables, for determining 

trend analyses or for developing recommended vehicle command sequences. They 

will respond to requests of the FD for first-level evaluations and analyses. 

They will flag for more detailed analyses problem areas needing resolution, 

but which are beyond the scope of the MCC support. 

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The senior associate contractor representative will respond to requests from 

proper authority for analyses beyond those performed at the MCC. He will 

direct the efforts of his MCSF personnel and will request and coordinate such 

assistance as required from his in-plant facilities. Upon completion of 

these analyses, he will make appropriate recommendations to the TA and FD for 

action. He will prepare the segment inputs to the quick-look reports and make 

recommendations in the preparation of the initial POAD. Once the initial 

POAD is published, he will direct and coordinate any associate MCSF effort 

required in the support of the segment reports. 

3.8.4 Postflight Phase 

During this phase the senior associate representative will consult with the 

MOL SPO/Aerospace field office and make recommendations with respect to the 

final POAD. Once the POAD is released, he will coordinate the requirements 

for his segment in obtaining from the MCSF the necessary data for analyses 

required in response to the POAD. He will support these analyses to the 

extent that this support does not interfere with the requirements to prepare 

for the next flight. 

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4.0 FLIGHT PLAN 

4.1 GENERAL 

This Section provides an overview of the flight test operations: a brief 

resume of the flight test profile is described in paragraph 4.2; paragraph 

4.3 contains a discussion of significant milestones of the launch and orbital 

phases of a nominal operations test. 

Typical launch, orbital, and recovery parameters for a manned/automatic 

flight are shown in Table 4-1. Specific values for these parameters will be 

contained in the Systems Test Objectives document for that flight. A summary 

of trajectory parameters is presented in Table 4-2. 

4.2 OPERATIONS TEST PROFILE RESUME 

4.2.1 Prelaunch 

For the Flight Operations personnel, the prelaunch phase is arbitrarily 

chosen as starting with the release of the final STO for the flight* (L-4 

months) and concludes at start of countdown. It may begin somewhat earlier 

for the flight crew, the exact time depending upon reconfiguration of the 

MOL mission simulator (MS) from the previous flight. During this period, the 

Flight Operations crews at the MCC will "shakedown" the ground support hardware and software, conduct training exercises, make final plans for the 

flight, and rehearse the flight operations aspects with the launch and flight 

crews. The prelaunch phase ends with a Flight Readiness Review at which each 

identifiable portion of the MOL system is determined to be ready and the 

Program Director approves the Initiation of the launch phase. 

*For the first manned flight, the prelaunch phase begins 12 months prior to 

launch. During this period, the mission simulator will support the MCC. 

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Table 4-1. Typical Launch and Orbit Parameters 

Launch 

Site 

Azimuth 

Date 

Window 

Nominal Time 

SLC-6, Vandenberg AFB 

180 deg 

4 April 1971 

2100-2200 GMT 

2100 GMT 

Orbit (baseline) 

Inclination 

Perigee Altitude 

Perigee Location 

Apogee Altitude 

Orbit Cycles/ 

Siderial Day (q) 

Orbit Adjust Cycle 

90 deg 

80 n mi 

55 deg N lat (descending) 

186 n mi 

16-2/15* 

Every 3 days 

Flight Duration 30 days 

*Value for q is a function of the orbit adjust cycle. The above value is 

average over the 3-day interval. 

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4.2.2 Launch 

The launch phase begins with the start of countdown (approximately 590 min 

prior to liftoff) and concludes at FV liftoff. During this period, the 

launch crew makes final preparation for launch, and the flight crew enters 

the Gemini B. The flight operations crew at the MCC monitors the countdown 

and the AFSCF status, and determines readiness for flight initiation. 

4.2.3 Ascent 

The ascent phase begins with FV liftoff from the launch pad and concludes 

with initiation of T-IIIM/OV severance ordnance (approximately L +500 sec). 

The altitude and event profile is shown in Figure 4-1; T-IIIM downrange 

staging is presented in Figure 4-2. The sequence of events is shown in 

Table 4-3. As indicated in Section 3.0, control during this phase of the 

flight resides with the MD at the MCC in Sunnyvale. However, the FD and the 

controllers perform the monitoring and ensure adherence to preselected 

operating procedures. The controllers monitor those FV and tracking parameters required to support the flight crew in a backup mode and those required 

for slow malfunction* detection. These are monitored for any anomalous 

behavior which might lead to an abort or guidance switchover recommendation. 

The MCC maintains voice contact with the crew throughout this period, primarily to provide information relating to either of these recommendations. 

In addition to the voice link, the requirement exists to transmit two commands 

which will light indicators in the Gemini B and will inform the flight crew of 

the MCRs recommendations for "Guidance Switchover" or "Abort". This link is 

only serviceable during the VTS contact period (=T+15 sec to T+70 and T+130 

to T+370 sec); however, this is considered adequate (see Figure 4-1). 

Throughout most of the ascent phase (liftoff to T+ - 400) , the TLM and tracking 

data is supplied by VTS, AFWTR, or PMR, and the operation will be as described 

in Section 6.0; however, during the latter part of the ascent phase (T+ -400 

*Those malfunctions permitting a reaction time of 6 sec or longer. 

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122. 3 

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LOS ANGELES 

300 

200 

SEC 

STAGE II CUTOFF 

494. 4 

SEC Figure 4-2 T-IIIM Staging 

SRM BURNOUTISTAGE I 

IGNITION SRM 

JETTISON 

128, 6 

SEC 

29a 6 

SEC 

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STAGE II IGNITION 

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Table 4-3. Sequence of Events 

Time From 

Liftoff (sec) Event 

0 Liftoff, begin vertical rise 

5 Initiate Roll 

10 Terminate Roll 

10 Initiate 1st TARS pitch rate 

20 Initiate 2nd TARS pitch rate 

30 Initiate 3rd TARS pitch rate 

60 Initiate 4th TARS pitch rate 

90 Initiate 5th TARS pitch rate 

121.3 Sense staging g level (1.49 g) 

121.4 Stage I fire switch (87FS1) 

122.3 Stage I ignition 

128.6 Jettison SRMs, initiate 6th TARS 

pitch rate 

132 Initiate Stage I closed loop guidance 

steering 

289.9 Initiate Stage I-Stage II staging 

sequence (87FS2, 91FS1) 

290.6 Jettison Stage I 

494.4 Initiate Stage II shutdown (91FS2), 

begin staging sequence 

504.4 Stage II tailoff complete, orbit 

Injection achieved 

2700.0 First apogee 

5321.4 First perigee 

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to end of ascent) the MOL Insertion Ship (MIS) will perform certain of these 

functions. The MIS will receive and record all FV data and will re-transmit 

selected parameters, via a communications satellite (comsat) and its associated network, to the STC. 

The MIS will also have a touchdown predictor and will provide near real-time 

orbit verification. In addition to these responsibilities, the MIS may also 

perform recovery should the requirement exist and will provide weather information required to support ascent. The MIS function ceases shortly after 

OV insertion into orbit and loss of signal. 

The ascent phase for a nominal flight is completed when orbital insertion has 

been confirmed. The resulting MCC Controller duties reflect this: the 

Booster, Guidance, and Trajectory Controllers will be replaced; however, the 

functions of the OV Systems Controller, Retrofire Controller, Flight Support 

Officer, Crew Communicator, and Flight Director will continue into the early 

orbit phase. 

If an abort occurs during ascent, the Ascent Abort Program will be called into 

the STC computer, and the flight crew and recovery forces will be supported by 

the MCC. 

The operations support provided for this condition is somewhat dependent upon 

the abort modes, but in general, will consist of supplying information to the 

crew or the recovery forces. The predicted touchdown point will be computed. 

The computer program required to support this effort is stored in the System 

Il disc memory and is readily accessible during ascent. 

4.2.4 Early Orbit Orbit, and Late Orbit 

These orbital phases begin with T-IIIM/OV severance and conclude with severance 

of the Gemini B from the laboratory vehicle. The recommendation for flight 

crew transfer can be made during the second rev based on the prediction of 

proper operation of the OV and crew for 18 revs following insertion into orbit 

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(primary recovery area). The criteria for the recommendation of flight crew 

transfer include tracking data, biomedical data, and vehicle/subsystem performance data. 

The data is analyzed and, if it is within specified limits, the recommendation 

will be made to the MD for the crew to transfer to the laboratory vehicle. 

Upon completion of crew transfer, normal laboratory vehicle operation begins. 

Payload operations commence after all mission module system segment (MMSS) and 

photographic system segment (PSS) subsystems are checked, aligned, and conditions are "go". This is expected to be completed in time for photography on 

rev 6. The MCC flight operations crew: constantly analyzes OV data to assure 

proper systems operation; continually updates the ephemeris; and revises the 

mission plan to meet the requirements of The User. Orbit adjusts will be 

scheduled as the orbit decays due to atmospheric drag. These MCC Flight 

Operations activities require the continual generation of commands, ADC data, 

and instructions to the flight crew which are transmitted by the AFSCF, via 

SGLS, to the OV. The Recovery Director will be continually apprised of the 

test status by Flight Operations so the forces may be properly positioned for 

either normal or contingency recovery operations. 

4.2.5 Reentry and Retrieval 

For the manned/automatic mode, the reentry phase begins with initiation of 

severance of the Gemini B from the laboratory vehicle and concludes with 

Gemini B REM splashdown. This phase includes retrofire, reentry, parachute 

deployment, and REM touchdown. 

The retrieval phase begins with splashdown of the REM and ends when the crew, 

data, and REM are retrieved and delivered to predetermined locations for initiation of postflight analyses. This phase includes location of the REM, 

physical recovery of the REM, crew, mission data, and initial medical examination and initial debriefing of the crew. 

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Orbital reentry operations support will consist of supplying information 

required for reentry tracking and spacecraft location for normal and contingency reentry, reentry planning, updating the Gemini B prior to separation, 

performing confidence checks on the Gemini B on-board computations, and 

Gemini B updating for contingency situations. 

Reentry planning will be performed on a regular schedule and the pertinent 

information will be supplied to the crew over the normal SGLS uplink for onboard teleprinter output. 

After receiving instructions, the crew transfers to the Gemini B. They initiate reentry after Gemini B separation from the laboratory vehicle. After 

Gemini B separation, the laboratory vehicle is operated in the automatic mode 

until ready for disposal. During Gemini B reentry, the Recovery Force tracks 

the Gemini B VHF recovery beacon, converges on the splash point, and effects 

recovery of the Gemini B and flight crew. Orbital operations are concluded 

with the disposal of the laboratory vehicle in a planned ocean area. 

The postflight data evaluation period starts upon conclusion of orbital operations. A quick-look report will be issued during the orbital operation period 

covering the first five days of operation. Also issued will be the first 

POAD. (The POAD specifies the level and direction of the postflight analysis 

effort.) This activity is culminated when the final Flight Test Engineering 

Report is issued approximately 90 days after the conclusion of the orbital 

phase. 

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4.3 TEST PROFILE 

The Test Profile is a time-ordered sequence of major operational events 

associated with prelaunch. The Test Profile for flights is contained in the 

FVTL (Ref. 23). The profile (see Table 4-4) shows the major prelaunch milestones in a typical operation, the approximate relationship of activity 

between the various operational groups, and the total timespan involved. 

Little attempt has been made in Table 4-4 to accurately show the times of the 

various milestones. The main purpose is to show major functions that must be 

performed. Further operational design and documentation will precisely pinpoint these activities. 

Certain assumptions were made in developing the profile: 

a. The profile is typical for a manned/automatic flight. 

b. The initial AFSCF and simulator facilities have been 

installed and checked out, and software integration tests 

have been successfully accomplished. 

c. Flight crew simulator training starts as soon as the 

simulator configuration is changed from the previous flight. 

For this preliminary issue of the FTOP, only those events readily identifiable 

have been included to provide an example of the planned presentation of 

information. The final FTOP will provide more specific events for the baseline profile. 

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Table 4-4. Typical Flight Test Operations Prelaunch Profile 

Phase Time Description 

Prelaunch IML - 12 mo Rehearsal training plan 

(required to support Flight support software 

MS, MCC training, and System support software 

ADS checkout) OV TLM signature tape 

STO - initial 

Calibration Data Book - initial 

IML - 9 mo MS operational 

Flight plan - initial 

L -120 days STO published by SAFSL (includes 

launch information, vehicle 

constraints, recovery constraints, 

configuration, etc.) 

L -90 days Flight plan prepared 

Training and rehearsal plan prepared 

Primary and alternate orbits selected 

(less apogee altitude of alternate 

orbit) 

L -77 days Laboratory vehicle segment checkout* 

L -60 days Technical Operations Order (TOO) 

published by AFSCF 

Flight support software to STC 

Data base update to STC 

Calibration Data Book to STC 

Command Definition Specification 

and Hardware/Software Limitation 

Specification updated 

L -56 days OV verification and checkout* 

L -49 days FV integrated systems test* 

L -28 days Launch dress rehearsal* 

L -14 days Flight readiness test* 

*See Ref. 22 for detail. 

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Table 4-4. Typical Flight Test Operations Prelaunch Profile (Continued) 

Phase Time Description 

Prelaunch L -10 days Certify final flight support and 

(continued) system support software 

L -7 days Receipt of final target deck from User 

Selection of primary or alternate orbit 

(final selection of apogee altitude) 

Receipt of final cues from ACIC 

Update Flight Plan 

Prepare dress rehearsal training plan 

L -6 days Begin dress rehearsals 

L -5 days Prepare pad load command message 

L -1 day Flight Readiness Review Board 

Launch T -590 min Support launch countdown 

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4.4 FLIGHT VEHICLE TIMELINE (FVTL) 

A brief summary of the FVTL is presented to acquaint the reader with the 

intent, purpose, use, and scope of the timeline. At this early point in the 

planning, it represents Operation's best estimate of how the OV will be used, 

and as such, allows a point for examining design philosophy. At a later date, 

when vehicle design is frozen, the FVTL will be the basis for initial flight 

planning. At present, it provides a source for a detailed insight, beyond 

that presented within the FTOP, into operational thinking on how the OV will 

be operated at a given time during the flight. Readers are cautioned not to 

extrapolate its use beyond that for which it is intended without first obtaining assurance that it is valid for their application. 

4.4.1 General Objectives 

The FVTL provides a means for integrating the operational and the design 

requirements of the MOL system to permit evaluation of the operational capability of the total system. 

4.4.2 Specific Uses 

a. Provides an insight to assessing system validity. 

b. Flags potential design and operations problems. 

c. Establishes the requirements for specific problem investigations. 

d. Develops FV operational sequences and associated consumable 

profiles, procedures, ground rules and constraints contributing to the development of the flight planning data base. 

e. Provides a nominal reference and point of departure for 

contingency analysis. 

f. Identifies a need for additional engineering and operations 

trade studies. 

g. Provides support to system effectiveness evaluation. 

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h. Provides support to simulator design and operation (development and mission). 

i. Provides a basis for OV ground test definition. 

j. Provides support to assessing system safety. 

4.4.3 FVTL Definition 

The FVTL is an engineering tool which provides a thorough analysis of an 

operational profile based on a consistent set of design parameters within the 

nominal operating range defined by the SP/DR (Ref. 20). It is a detailed 

examination of the operational capability of the total system based on typical operational loadings of the component systems. The FVTL presents on a 

time and location basis: the subsystem operating status; consumable profiles; 

and ground support requirements associated with typical operating sequences 

required to accomplish MOL test objectives. The time period covered extends 

from crew ingress on the pad to Gemini B splashdown and laboratory vehicle 

disposal. It is based on a given set of assumptions, definitions, and 

constraints. 

4.4.4 Users of the FVTL 

FVTL work is applicable to the following functional disciplines within the 

MOL SPO and associate contractor organizations: 

a. Systems engineering 

b. Simulator design and operations 

c. Operations planning 

d. Software development 

e. FV ground testing 

f. System segment design 

g. Crew/task analysis 

h. System effectiveness 

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i. Safety evaluation 

j. Consumables management 

To assure optimum use of the FVTL, maximum consistency/compatibility must 

exist between the FVTL work and other functional disciplines. 

4.4.5 FVTL Report 

Table 4-5 contains a list of items found the FVTL. The total FVTL starts 

with awakening of the crew on the day of launch and ends with the Gemini B 

landing and disposal of the laboratory vehicle. It is plotted to a scale of 

one-inch equals 20 minutes. FVTLs are generated for specific orbit cases and 

include the best target data available for payload operations. 

Currently, an FVTL exists for the 80 deg inclination orbit (Ref. 23). A FVTL 

for the baseline orbit (90 deg inclination) is scheduled for publication in 

September 1968. Timeline reissues or revisions are planned on 9-month 

centers. 

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Crewman A Sequences 

Crewman B Sequences 

System Time 

GMT 

SEC 

Automatic Sequences 

Rev, Day-Night Cycle, Sun Angle 

Latitude, Longitude 

Ground Support 

Ground Stations 

Tape Usage 

PCM 

Voice 1 

Voice 2 

Subsystem Status 

Data Management 

Computation 

Command 

Mission Module 

Communication 

ACTS 

Data Acquisition 

EC/LS 

Power 

Expendables 

MMH 

Expended 

Remaining 

N204 

Expended 

Remaining 

H2 

Expended 

Remaining 

02 

Expended 

Remaining 

He 

Expended 

Remaining 

Film Usage 

Power 

LM 

PK 

AVE 

MM 

PK 

AVE 

GB 

PK 

AVE 

Total 

PK 

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Table 4-5• FVTL Column Headings 

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5.0 LAUNCH OPERATIONS INTERFACE 

5.1 GENERAL 

The interfaces between the Launch Operations portion of the ground test and 

the Flight Test Operations are presented in this Section. The ground testing 

and flight operations testing reciprocal requirements are described. A brief 

description of the Launch Operations portion of the ground test is presented 

for information only. In the event of any differences between this description and that contained in the General Ground Test Plan (Ref. 2), the latter 

will take precedence. 

5.2 LAUNCH OPERATIONS 

The 6595th ATW is responsible to the MOL SPO for the overall conduct of 

Launch Operations. 

The various associate contractors will be responsible for their particular 

flight hardware, prelaunch, and launch operations are under the management of 

the 6595th ATW. The MOL program integrating contractors will also be responsible for specific integration tasks, under the direction of the ATW, such as 

the planning of test flow, integration of checkout and countdown requirements, 

etc. Figure 5-1 illustrates the MOL VAFB Space Launch Complex No. 6 (SLC-6) 

as secured during countdown. Specific functions and responsibilities in the 

conduct of Launch Operations are designated and defined in the SAFSL Exhibit 

20023 (Ref. 22). 

5.2.1 Launch Operations Profile 

Launch Operations requirements are broadly defined in this Section to permit 

latitude in the development of lower-level documents and procedures (see Ref. 

2 for details). Test requirements will vary where configuration differences 

indicate a nonapplicable operation or test. However, upon receipt of a 

vehicle segment AVE at VAFB, launch test planning will assume: (1) a minimum 

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of factory open tasks and engineering modifications for VAFB accomplishment; 

and (2) highest possible confidence in structural and functional integrity as 

received from the various segment factory sites. In-plant tests and acceptance test requirements will be documented in the General Ground Test Plan. 

In the appropriate sequence, all interfaces with the AFWTR, VTS, MCC, and 

crew, will be exercised for verification. The flight crew will participate 

as necessary to verify their compatibility with the FV. A launch dress 

rehearsal will be performed to demonstrate the ability to conduct and control 

time-critical and sequential functions during the launch countdown. Integrated prelaunch phase testing will normally be concluded on completion of a 

Flight Readiness Test (FRT). This FRT is a final all-agency, all systems-up 

test conducted immediately prior to initiation of Launch Readiness Operations. 

The results of the FRT and preceding tests will provide the necessary baseline 

for final commitment to the launch preparation and the launch phase of 

operations. 

5.2.1.1 Launch Readiness Operations 

Launch Readiness Operations, the final step before entry into the countdown, 

consists of such tasks as ordnance installation, propellant, cryogenic and 

pressurant loading, vehicle alignment checks, flight battery installation, 

subsystems final verifications, and AGE demate. The sequencing and content 

of these functions will be determined by safety and validity considerations. 

Control, as with all launch operations, will be the responsibility of the 

6595th ATW. 

5.2.1.2 Countdown 

The countdown will be a clock-controlled sequence checkoff of final systems 

tasks and verifications with all agencies "on-line" and maintaining full and 

responsive status in their areas of responsibility. Milestones in the countdown sequence are: tracking, data, and command networks-ready; final 

ordnance installation and hook-up; propellant tanks to flight pressures; 

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airborne systems final validation; primary flight crew insertion; mobile 

service tower (MST) roll-back; entry into automatic sequence; liftoff. 

Final liftoff commitment for launch operations will be the decision of the 

LCC launch director under cognizance of MCC. Countdown sequential operations 

procedures will be contained in the Countdown Manual for each specific 

flight. A preliminary countdown procedures document will also be published 

for planning purposes. 

5.2.1.3 Post-Launch Operations 

The post-launch operations phase will commence upon FV liftoff and will consist of those operations necessary to restore SLC-6 to the configuration 

required to accept the next vehicle segments and to report on the evaluation 

of the launch operations. These operations will include facility and AGE 

standard and non-standard refurbishment both by repair and/or replacement and 

facility and/or AGE modifications necessary to support the next FV and all 

possible revalidation of the facility and AGE. 

During this phase, all locally available data and films from the launch and 

flight will be reviewed for possible anomalies and/or significant trends. 

Test and operating procedures for the next vehicle will be reviewed and 

revised as necessary to support the next vehicle. 

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6.0 FLIGHT OPERATIONS 

6.1 GENERAL 

The plan for MOL Flight Operations is described in this Section. While the 

flight phase only includes liftoff through disposal of the laboratory vehicle, 

Flight Operations includes all the preparation (development, integration/ 

system test, and rehearsal) for that phase as well as the postflight reporting. 

This Section describes the facilities and resources, including the AFSCF, used 

by Flight Operations. The data handling system and the software system are 

treated as separate, integral systems to provide a more comprehensive and 

understandable description. The MOL Operations concepts are explained by 

descriptions of the command and data handling philosophies and the preflight 

planning concept of orbit planning and selections. 

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6.2 FACILITIES AND RESOURCES 

The facilities and resources which MOL Operations expects to utilize are the 

AFSCF; the AFSCF and AFWTR data handling facilities required for ascent and 

on orbit control; the integrated MOL/AFSCF software system; and the MCSF. 

6.2.1 Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) 

6.2.1.1 General 

The AFSCF is a ground-based, worldwide network of ground stations designed 

to monitor, control, and recover earth-orbiting space vehicles. Overall 

system management and direction is provided by Headquarters, SAMSO, LAAFS. 

6.2.1.2 Satellite Test Center (STC) 

The STC, located in Sunnyvale, California, is the central system-control 

point for directing test operations, and is capable of directing the support 

of many satellites in orbit simultaneously. 

A network of seven RTSs under the operational control of the STC performs 

tracking, commanding, and data-retrieval processing and relay functions from 

selected points around the world. Three of the RTSs have sufficient equipment 

to provide a dual test-support capability. 

Associated with the operation of the AFSCF is an aerial and surface recovery 

force stationed in Hawaii which recovers preselected space vehicles that 

have terminated their flight phase. Additional support aircraft are located 

at Edwards AFB, California, to provide downrange surface-to-air pickup and 

delivery of launch-and-ascent data tapes. 

The facilities and capabilities at the STC and the RTSs will be expanded to 

enable the AFSCF to support the increased number, complexity, and capability 

of satellites of existing and future programs. Among these will be the MOL 

vehicles. The expansion of facilities includes the construction of an 

additional four story operations building, the Advanced STC (ASTC), adjacent 

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to the present STC (see Figure 6-1). The expansion of the AFSCF capability 

includes updating the existing data handling and processing facility with 

additional and more advanced computers to form an ADS and the automated 

checkout and reconfiguration of the communications system by installing advanced switching capability to form the EXCELS. 

The configuration and capability of the STC's Mission Control Complex (MCC) 

areas will be increased to allow faster, more complete access to data, and to 

allow for program control of the access to its data. 

6.2.1.2.1 Advanced Satellite Test Center 

The mission of the ASTC is to provide centralized management, direction, and 

control of the readiness, execution, and evaluation activities of Test Force 

Elements in support of program test operations. These responsibilities 

include: Cl) development and publication of network operating policies aad 

procedures; (2) test-operation planning; (3) system readiness for test 

operations; (4) real time, on-orbit satellite command and control (plus 

recovery, if required); (5) orbit determination and analysis; (6) data 

retrieval, processing, and distribution; (7) system resource management; 

(8) management of a communications network linking the STC with all satellite 

test-force elements; and (9) ENV services. The facilities described below 

are required to perform these functions. 

The AFSCF Director for Test Operations (SMOT), responsible for the direction 

of space-vehicle program testing at the STC, appoints an officer as FTFD for 

each specific space program to be supported (see paragraph 3.6.1). 

6.2.1.2.2 Operations Building 

The operations building at the ASTC will be a four-story structure containing 

approximately 120,000 sq ft of floor area (see Figure 6-1). 

a. First Floor = The first floor of this building will include 

a 24,400 sq ft communications area which will house the 

communications and security equipments for the AFSCF network. 

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In addition to the normal communications terminal equipment, 

a communications control computer complex will be installed 

in the first-floor communications area. 

b. Second Floor - The second floor of the structure, designated 

the Data Systems Area, will consist of approximately 27,000 

sq ft of technical floor space. The bulk of the data 

handling and processing for the AFSCF will be accomplished 

here. Included in the data area are five secured computer 

rooms that contain CDC 3800 computers. 

c. Third and Fourth Floors - The third and fourth floors are 

designated the operational floors. A modular-type floorplan has been developed to meet the requirements for satellite 

mission control. A typical mission control module consists of 

three operating rooms and three technical support rooms 

arranged in a square (60 x 60 ft) configuration. A Mission 

Control Complex, defined as a contiguous group of rooms 

assigned to support one particular program, is then configured 

by assigning the necessary rooms from one or more mission 

control modules to the particular satellite program. 

d. Area L - Communications with The User will be routed through 

Area L on the fourth floor above the MOL MCC. Direct 

communications with The User will be tied in with the MOL 

MCC by use of private keys and cabling of lines between 

consoles in the MCC and Area L. This area will provide 

centralized control of the black ADS in support of the MOL 

and other MCCs. The AFSCF ND will control the white ADS 

in the same manner. The MOL MCC will have access to the 

required information under distribution and priority control 

by Area L. 

6.2.1.2.3 MOL Mission Control Complex 

The MOL MCC, one of five MCCs to be located on the third floor of the new 

ASTC, will be composed of three standard 60 x 60 ft mission control modules 

arranged in an L shape (see Figure 6-2). 

The MCC provides a centralized control point for the management, direction, 

control, and scheduling of all aspects of the MOL program. All decisions 

affecting present and future actions will be made by the FD in the mission 

control room (MCR). 

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The 30 x 60 ft MCR will contain the consoles required for real time control 

(see Figure 6-3). The three 20 x 25 ft technical support rooms shown in 

Figure 6-2 are planned to be used as follows: one for use of contractor 

personnel; one for use as the RCR (see Figure 6-5); and the third for biomedical monitoring. The 20 x 30 ft support rooms (see Figure 6-4) will be 

used for mission planning, orbit analysis, vehicle analysis, etc. 

The design of the MCC will assure complete security within the MCC from other 

programs. Only those personnel associated with the MOL program will be 

allowed into the complex. Access to MOL data is restricted to personnel within the complex. 

MOL program access to the AFSCF' facilities necessary for MOL support rests 

with the FTFD within the MOL control room. The FTFD will respond to requirements levied upon him by the FD. All significant deviations from planned 

operating procedures and mission requirements must be approved by the FD prior 

to implementation. All identifiable contingencies must be resolved prior to 

flight; guidelines for corrective action will be included in the Flight Test 

Rules document. 

The FTFD will coordinate all AFSCF resources, including AFSCF personnel in the 

MOL control room and in the support rooms, to satisfy MOL requirements. The 

FTFD will act as liaison between the MOL SPO and the AFSCF. All changes to 

operating procedures, schedules, or MOL requirements will, after FD approval, 

be passed through the FTFD for integration into the AFSCF operation. The 

FTFD will actively coordinate all AFSCF resources during flight in accordance 

with published procedures, directives, and schedules to meet mission 

requirements. He will follow the flight test rules in resolving anomalies 

and contingencies. 

Since the MOL program will be operating within a multi-satellite-program 

environment, all changes or contemplated changes to schedules, plans, or 

requirements must be coordinated through Network Control by the FTFD. 

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Figure6-4 Artist's Con

ceptof aTechnic

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PNEUMATIC TUBE 

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Figure 6-5 Proposed Recovery Control R 00 m 

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Procedures for controlling inputs to the AFSCF data base are developed and 

coordinated by the FD and the FTFD. Any changes in these procedures must be 

coordinated through the FTFD. Any changes to the planned contractor or MOL 

SPO personnel access to STC computers and to the MOL-peculiar data base will 

be coordinated and scheduled through the FTFD. 

Functions of key elements within the MCC are described in Section 3.0. The 

Command Generation and Orbit Analysis functions (see Figure 6-2) are 

performed from support rooms, not the control room. 

6.2.1.3 Network Control Complex 

The ASTC Network Control Complex (NCC) provides a centralized control point 

for the management, direction, and scheduling of all activities using AFSCF 

resources to accomplish satellite test objectives. 

The ADS, with its large data storage capacity, sophisticated programming, and 

advanced display subsystems, will provide the ability to automate: (1) scheduling with emphasis on conflict avoidance; (2) RTS configuration; and (3) 

system checkout and fault isolation. An intervention capability is provided 

for manual override of the system. The NCC provides facilities for three 

major functions: network control, network scheduling, and'inter-range liaison. 

6.2.1.3.1 Network Control 

The Network Control Room is the focal point of the support allocation and 

configuration control activity and provides facilities for the Network 

Controller and his immediate supporting staff (the Configuration Controller, 

Data Systems Operations Controller, Communications Controller, and the Data 

System Security Controller). 

a. Network Controller - Prime function is resource allocation. 

Provides overall network management and staff direction within 

the NCC. Directs conflict resolution by negotiation, priority 

application, or emergency resolution authority. Monitors MCC 

status and directs solution of real-time problems. 

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1. Configuration Controller - Implements the schedule by 

verifying correct ASTC/RTS configuration. Maintains 

cognizance of network status; evaluates the impact of 

outages, and coordinates with Scheduling for alternative 

courses of action. 

2. Data System Operations Controller - Exercises operational 

control of the ASTC/RTS ADS, computer loading, and ADS 

diagnostic and recovery efforts. 

3. Communications Controller - Monitors EXCELS operation for 

automatic switching and manually switches when directed by 

the Network Controller. Expedites circuit restoration and 

interfaces with communication elements external to the 

ASTC. 

4. Data System Security Controller - Controls and maintains 

coded keys for classified data access and monitors the 

security subsystem for any improper attempt to access 

this data base. 

6.2.1.3.2 System Scheduling 

The second major functional area in the NCC is Network Scheduling which is 

manned by six schedulers on a 24-hr basis. All AFSCF activities, including 

flight support, qualification activities, maintenance, equipment installation, 

and software development are scheduled by manipulation of the scheduling data 

base. Long range planning is provided to allow for major modification and 

installation of AFSCF equipments as projected through a 12-month period. 

Operational scheduling is conducted over a two-week period to provide maximum 

support of all program and maintenance requirements through conflict 

avoidance. The real-time schedule covers the immediate 24 hr period when all 

remaining conflicts are identified with alternative resolutions presented for 

the Network Controllers' decision. 

The dynamic satellite support requirements require constant manipulation and 

update of the data base. 

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6.2.1.3.3 Inter-Range Liaison 

The last major function performed within the NCC is the inter-range liaison 

and recovery operation. This staff function provides the ASTC interface with 

outside agencies for operational range support including cognizance of Range 

capabilities. Additionally, the scheduling of AFSCF recovery forces and the 

resolution of recovery force conflicts will be a major responsibility. 

6.2.1.4 Remote Tracking Stations 

The AFSCF RTSs are under the operational control of the STC during support 

operations. They contain the transmitting, receiving, and tracking equipment 

necessary to determine the position of, and command and receive data from, a 

satellite as it passes within range. Each RTS will have the ground-based part 

of the new SGLS and will have its own complement of the ADS and EXCELS subsystems linked with the STC central data-processing facility. 

Automatic control of the tracking, telemetry, command, and communication 

functions is performed from an MCC in the STC via direct computer-to-computer 

transfer of instructions and data. Two computers at each RTS are programmed 

to allow processing of important data to continue uninterrupted if one 

computer complex fails. In the event of other equipment malfunction, such as 

the loss of the interstation data link, control may be exercised from the RTS 

control and display subsystems. Although the RTS ADS control and display 

subsystem is similar to that for the STC ADS, only AFSCF functions can be 

displayed at the RTS. The three prime station functions for present programs 

are: 

a. Telemetry - The tracking station performs limited processing, 

handling and relay functions by receiving and transmitting 

telemetry data from orbital vehicles to the STC. The RTS 

receives the records telemetry data from orbiting vehicles 

and provides selected computer processed data items to the 

STC as required for real time control. 

b. Tracking - Data consisting of range, range rate, and angle 

information are derived and transferred to STC to derive the 

orbital parameters and ephemerides of the satellite. 

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c. Command - The RTS, in response to computer-issued instructions 

from the STC, sends a variety of commands to the vehicle by 

automatic relay, or manually during emergency conditions. 

For MOL Operations, a fourth function, voice, will be implemented. The voice 

system will utilize the analog link of the SGLS for clear voice or the digital 

link for secure voice. The RTS acts only as a relay for voice communications 

between the MCC and the MOL. 

The seven AFSCF RTSs are each connected to the STC via the EXCELS: 

Station Capability* 

**Nev Hampshire Tracking Station (NTS) AFSCF 

**Vandenburg Tracking Station (VTS)*** AFSCF 

**Hawaii Tracking Station (RI) AFSCF 

Indian Ocean Tracking Station (IOS)*** AFSCF 

Kodiak Tracking Station (KB)*** AFSCF 

Operating Location 5 (0L-5)*** AFSCF 

(Thule, Greenland) 

Operating Location 10 (Guam) (GTS) AFSCF 

6.2.1.5 AFSCF Communications System 

The communications system within the AFSCF consists of intra-STC 

communications and inter-AFSCF communications. In addition, the system may 

be patched to other non-AFSCF systems for utilization during contingency 

situations. A detailed description of the system's capabilities, including 

plans for MOL, is presented in the following paragraphs. 

*AFSCF capability means full SGLS TTCV. 

**Sufficient equipment to support two satellites simultaneously, thus 

increasing the actional capability of the tracking network to a total 

of 10 stations. 

***Full SGLS plus VHF voice. 

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6.2.1.5.1 Intra-STC Communications 

a. Pneumatic Tube System - A pneumatic tube system will be 

installed which will provide full duplex service among the 

following areas: 

1. MCC control rooms. 

2. Communication center. 

3. Communication control room. 

4. Network control complex. 

5. Data recording center. 

Delivery time from a terminal to any other terminal in the 

loop will be less than one minute. 

b. Black Telephone System (Unclassified Voice Communications) -

Each MCC will be provided one or more 304 voice drops. In the 

event of failure of automated communications, this system will 

be used for voice contact with tracking stations. All administrative communications from the ASTC will be minimized and 

will be routed through the system 304 switching system to the 

STC administrative switchboard. 

c. Green Telephone System [Secret Special Access Required (SAR) 

Voice Communications] - This system will comprise the main 

ASTC intra-communications. Each TC console will be equipped 

with a direct access panel capable of calling up as many as 

12 stations in conference. The system will be cleared for 

classified information up to and including secret. A limited 

number of green telephones will be extended to the "old 

building". 

d. Red Telephone System [Secret Special Handling (SSH) Voice 

Communication] - A discrete secure voice communication system 

will be installed in each MCC, primarily for program-secure 

conferences. All switching equipment and circuits will be 

wholly contained within the MCC with the execption of one 

voice link to Area L. At the TC position, a privacy feature 

will be installed that will enable him to call up any combination of telephones and lock-out the remaining telephones. 

The equipment will be designed to permit three independent 

secure voice conferences. 

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e. Printed Traffic Communications - Each MCC will have a printed 

traffic terminal consisting of a cathode ray tube (CRT), keyboard, and electrostatic printer. Transmission rates will be 

as high as 3000 wpm (compared to the existing 100 wpm 

machines). Messages addressed to an MCC will be automatically 

routed to the message terminal in the MCC where the TC will 

have the option of selecting CRT and/or electrostatic page 

copy. The TC, by interrogating the 8500 computer, will be 

able to recall any messages addressed to his program. A 

memory-protect device programmed into 8500 computer instructions will prevent any unauthorized message terminal from 

accessing program material. Additionally, a series of fixed 

format messages which a Controller can call up on the CRT will 

be stored in the 8500 computer. With the aid of the cursor 

and the keyboard, he will be able to fill in the blanks and 

transmit the messages automatically throughout the network. 

6.2.1.5.2 Inter-AFSCF Communications 

a. Data Circuits - The primary AFSCF communications system will 

consist of multiple secure 2400 bps digital circuits to all 

tracking stations, the OTEF, the RCG, and a MOL-peculiar 

dedicated voice circuit. Communications modes of voice, 

printed traffic, and digital traffic to the ADS will be contained in this automatic communications system, EXCELS. 

Similar digital communications with the Launch Operations 

Control Center, AFWTR, AFETR, SPADATS, and the AF Global 

Weather Central (AFGWC) is envisioned for the 1969-1971 time 

period. 

b. Automated Digital Communications - The 2400 bps circuits will 

be controlled by two Collins 8500 series computers at the STC. 

Two additional computers will be initialized in a standby mode 

to be automatically switched on-line in the event of primary 

computer failure. Under computer control, the digital circuits will be automatically switched to the control of the MCC 

that is scheduled for a pass with an RTS. A periodic schedule 

will be transmitted from the ADS computer to the EXCELS 

computer on a core-to-core interface. The TC in the MCC can 

switch any circuit to any service desired (i.e., spare line to 

voice, printed traffic to data, etc.). In addition, the 8500 

computers will automatically substitute a spare circuit 

whenever the data quality for ADS falls below a designated 

threshold. Real time changes, reassignments, pre-emptionn, 

etc., will be made from a communications console in the NUC 

on the third floor of the ASTC. 

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A duplicate console will be located in the Communications 

area on the first floor to be used as a maintenance point 

and backup console for Network Control. 

c. Secure Voice - When assigned a tracking station, the TC in 

each MCC can dial up any of the standard AFSCF secure telephones at that tracking station. Additionally, if he is 

assigned more than one tracking station, the TC can connect 

these stations together for simultaneous transmissions to the 

RTSs. At the STC, the TC will have a speaker net system 

connected to each secure voice terminal so that the individual 

rooms within the MCC can monitor the commentary. The TC also 

will have switches by which he can eliminate any one or all 

of the speakers from the commentary. Slave telephones (extensions) from the TCs master phone will be located at other 

consoles within the MCC. Tracking stations will be available 

for dial-up by any MCC if the circuits have not been scheduled 

by the Master Systems Schedule. (This system should not be 

confused with the MOL private secure voice line.) 

d. Fault Isolation - An extensive malfunction detection and 

display subsystem is programmed into the EXCELS system to 

allow for fault isolation and rapid correction. One of the 

features of this system is link exercising whereby all spare 

circuits will be continually monitored with a test pattern. 

When error thresholds are exceeded, alarms will display the 

failing link for immediate restoration action. EXCELS is 

required to maintain an undetected bit error rate of less 

than 1 x 10-8; however, no error correction system is included. 

Data errors exceeding the preset threshold will be flagged 

by EXCELS for the ADS. 

6.2.1.5.3 MOL Communications 

MOL will be provided with the capabilities described above. The MCC will use 

four 2400 bps EXCELS data circuits in the following manner for the support of 

MOL: 

a. Secure voice for RTS control. 

b. High speed telemetry, tracking, and command data line. 

c. High speed teleprinter line for control messages. 

d. Spare line to substitute for any of the above. 

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In addition to the four lines indicated, a fifth 2400 bps line will be a MOLdedicated secure-voice line outside the EXCELS for MCC-to-OV communications. 

This line may be used for any of the services listed in paragraph 6.2.1.5.2, 

at the discretion of the FD, by a manual patch capability. 

b.2.2 Data Handling System 

Typical MOL data handling of the AFSCF and AFWTR system during MOL operations 

is described below. This data handling system is the basis for numerous 

operations concepts; conversely, its capabilities reflect operational concepts 

devised to take maximum advantage of the MOL capabilities. The basic data 

handling philosophy is described in paragraph 6.3.3. 

Control and monitoring of the MOL vehicle is achieved principally through the 

OV uplink and downlink channels, and the data handling, display, and processing capability of the AFSCF and the MCSF. Maximum efficiency, thoroughness, and speed of monitoring and controlling the MOL flight is achieved by 

proper utilization of all MOL associated data sources, communications links 

(both between the OV and ground, and within the AFSCF), data handling sources, 

and data processing capability. The following paragraphs describe in detail 

the method of utilizing the MOL data sources and briefly mention the handling 

capability established to meet the MOL flight objectives. 

6.2.2.1 Real Time Ascent Data Handling 

AFWTR facilities required for Flight Operations are restricted to the communication and data handling required to support the ascent phase. 

Data that is processed for MCC display originates either as TLM data from the 

launch vehicle and the OV, or as radar tracking data. The launch vehicle data 

is carried on an S-band link, and the OV data is transmitted via the SGLS. 

The voice, TLM and/or radar sites are located at VTS, AFWTh, PMH, and the MIS. 

Figure 6-6 shows the ascent TLM and radar facilities at the different sites, 

the time periods following liftoff during which the ground sites should 

deliver acceptable data, and the communication links, processing areas, and 

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communication centers which handle the data. The data are preprocessed and 

formatted before transmittal to the STC. The data will be transmitted from 

the AFWTR communication central (Bldg. 475) over redundant wide band microwave links (475/VTS/STC - Western Union System; and 475/STC - Pacific Telephone System). The MIS data are transmitted via the communications satellite 

system to AFWTR for re-transmission tc the STC. The detailed processing, 

formatting, and routing are discussed in Refs. 15 and 16. 

Upon arrival at the STC, the data is accepted by the ADS for formatting, and 

routing, and is then sent to the CDC-3800 for processing. The CDC-3800 

performs the computations necessary to transform the data into the proper 

parameters for display, formats the data, and returns it to the ADS. (Two 

of the System II computers are on line during the ascent phase, with one 

acting as a "hot" backup to the other.) The ADS then reformats the data for 

processing by the format and display definition buffer, and sends it through 

the display controller for subsequent display. A schematic representation of-- 

the relationship between the software application programs and the 632A MCC 

displays is depicted in Figure 6-7. The number of computations required for 

a particular CRT or status light panel display have been grouped by functions 

and defined as tasks in Ref. 4. 

b.2.2.2 Orbital Operations Data Handling 

6.2.2.2.1 Uplink 

The uplink capability includes development of the uplink messages initiated 

within the LTC upon directions from the MCC and transferred to the OV via the 

RTS. The uplink data is comprised of command messages (all, or any, of the 

following: real time and stored program commands; prose messages; target and 

ephemeris data) and secure voice digital data. 

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6.2.2.2.1.1 Command Messages - STC Handling 

Based on the required MOL flight plan and analysis of the current condition 

of the OV, the MCC, by means of the CDC-3800 computer within the STC, formats 

the OV command messages and makes block assignments and stores the message in 

the STC IBM 360/67 buffer computer. During the prepass period, the message 

is transmitted to the RTS via secure EXCELS link (KG-13). 

6.2.2.2.1.2 Command Message - RTS Handling. 

The RTS decrypts (KG-13) and temporarily stores the command messages for 

transmittal to the OV when required. No command message processing is performed at the RTS. When the initial message is received, it is returned to 

the STC for a bit-by-bit comparison with the original message. Then the 

message is stored in the RTS 1230 MTC computer. At this point, the message 

is in clear format. 

When the OV is in contact with the RTS, the MCC initiates command message 

transmission. At that time, the command message stored in the RTS computer is 

sent to the RTS's SGLS transmitter via a KGT-29 for encryption. 

6.2.2.2.1.3 Command Message - OV Handling 

The command message is received in the OV by the SGLS-compatible communications system (see Figure 6-8). After being decrypted, the SPCs are sent to 

the computer via the command logic unit (CLU) and laboratory data adapter 

unit (LDAU) for storage. Laboratory module real time commands are sent 

directly to the laboratory decoders via the CLU. Mission module real time 

commands are sent to the mission module decoders via CLU, LDAU, computer, and 

mission data adapter unit (MDAU). Using the LDAU, the computer sends data to 

the printer and/or alphanumeric displays. Under anomalous conditions, prose 

data can be sent directly to the printer using "S" pulses for fill. 

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6.2.2.2.1.4 Voice Messages - STC Handling 

Uplink voice communications are transmitted in real time. The content of 

these messages will be dependent on the need at the time of RTS contact. 

The voice communications will normally be restricted to conversations between 

the MOL MCR and the crew. It is anticipated, however, that the need for 

voice communications will last throughout the RTS contact with the OV. For 

transmission between the STC and RTSs, analog voice is digitized by a synthesizing process (vocoder) performed by the audio frequency coder. Digitizing 

in this manner allows the transmission of digitized voice over the narrow 

bandwidth of the 2400 bps communication lines of the AFSCF. The digitized 

voice is then encrypted and sent to the RTS. A simplified diagram of the 

STC voice converter/handling system is shown in Figure 6-9. The clear voice 

comes from the MCR and is sent to the RTS over the 2400 bps line (in analog 

form) with no further processing or handling by the STC. 

6.2.2.2.1.5 Voice Messages - RTS Handling 

The real time voice from the STC is received at the RTS in an encrypted, 

synthesized digital form. Therefore, the received real time voice is first 

decrypted and then converted back to analog by the vocoder system. The 

analog voice is then digitized by a variable slope delta (VSD) modulator. 

The VSD is used for digital coding voice that is transmitted over the 42.6 

kbps uplink encoder and sent to the SGLS system. A simplified configuration 

of voice encoding/decoding at a typical RTS is shown in Figure 6-10. The 

clear voice is sent directly from the 2400 bps lines to either the SGLS 

system or the VHF transceiver. No processing is performed on it within 

the RTS. 

6.2.2.2.1.6 Voice Messages - OV Handling 

The uplink digital voice is decrypted and transferred to the VSD decoder. 

The VSD decoder sends it to the laboratory module intracommunications system 

which then sends the voice to each crewman. No on-board recording capability 

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exists for uplink voice. Figure 6-11 shows the on-board SGLS-compatible 

subsystem for handling the uplink command/data and voice. The communications 

system separates the uplink information into ranging, voice, and command/data 

information which is then sent to the proper locations in the OV. Backup for 

voice can be provided by manually changing to half-duplex. Backup for uplink 

voice is also provided by the teleprinter. 

6.2.2.2.2 On-Board Data Handling 

6.2.2.2.2.1 Command Message Handling 

The various components of the command message are handled as described below. 

a. Prose Messages - Prose messages are normally sent to the ADC 

in blocks for storage in a buffer and clocked out at a rate 

compatible with the teleprinter. [Use of the computer may be 

eliminated, if desired, by proper ground formatting which 

inserts the correct number of "S" (timing) pulses into the 

bit stream which makes the uplink data rate compatible with 

the teleprinter and using the proper word format. Although 

this eliminates the need for the computer, it requires 

additional ground formatting and is not an efficient use of 

the uplink.] 

b. Stored Program Command (SPC) Blocks - SPC blocks are sent to 

the computer where they are merged into a chronological 

command list and stored. The time label for the command(s) 

with the next execution time is placed in the stored command 

execution timer (SCET) located in the MDAU. If the computer 

is shut down when the time for execution occurs on the 

vehicle clock, the SCET turns the computer on and the 

computer issues the command to the proper system decoder 

for execution. 

c. Ephemeris Data - Ephemeris data is sent to the computer for 

storage and is used for subsequent operation during the 

operational periods. 

d. Target Data - Target data is sent to the computer for storage 

and subsequent use during the payload operational periods. At 

that time this data, auxiliary memory unit (AMU) data, 

ephemeris data, and star tracker data are combined with crew 

input data and used to perform photographic operations. 

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6.2.2.2.2.2 On-Board Generation of Recorded Data 

a. TLM Data - During a payload operation various parameters 

required to determine payload operation, which targets were 

photographed, etc., are monitored and recorded by the TLM 

subsystem. A subset of these parameters is entered into 

computer storage (computer summary data). During periods 

where the payload is not operating, the TLM subsystem is 

turned on for 16 sec every 10 minutes and the TLM data 

recorded. At any time the monitor and alarm system (MAS) 

detects an out-of-limit condition on any parameter monitored, 

the TLM system is activated and the out-of-limits subsystem 

is switched to a redundant system or turned off. 

Two PCM TLM recorders are on board. Their recording 

capacity is 160 megabits each (providing approximately 40 

minutes of time per recorder at a 65 kbps PCM data rate). 

Three different on-board TLM formats are available for 

acquiring the most desirable data. The content of each 

TLM format is different and is designated to meet a variety 

of requirements. The first format contains general OV TLM 

information and ADC core dump. The ADC core dump can be 

accomplished in real time or recorded for later playback. 

This format (64 main frames/sec) is designated for real time 

or recorded TLM. When a contingency exists and continuous 

(instead of periodic) TLM operation is desirable, the 

second format at a slower mainframe rate (4 main frames/sec) 

will reduce the possibility that more data will be accumulated 

than can be recorded. The third format is for demand medical 

data (EKG) and is designed for recorded TLM only. It can be 

selected either manually by the crew or by commands from the 

ground. 

b. Voice Data - At any time desired by the flight crew, and 

particularly during payload activity, the crew voice can be 

recorded by a recorder system which may be voice actuated. 

Each crewman has a separate recorder which has a recording 

capacity of one hour. 

c. Biomedical Data - Heart beat interval for each crewman is 

continuously stored in a special core memory for transfer to 

the PCM tape recorder when it is turned on periodically. 

EKG data is selectable by a crew or ground command and is 

contained in the fourth TLM format. EKG exists only in the 

PCM data and is recorded on the TLM recorder. 

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6.2.2.2.2.3 Crew Interface with the OV Data System 

A brief description of additional interfaces between the crew and the OV is 

presented below to add continuity to this section. These interfaces are 

described in detail and from the viewpoint of the crew in Section 8.0. 

a. Alphanumeric/Keyboard/Teleprinters - Through this keyboard, 

the crew has access to the TLM subsystem, the command subsystem, and the ADC for operation use. Any TLM point can be 

displayed on the alphanumeric display and/or teleprinter by 

crew call-up from the keyboard. Commands (either RTCs or 

SPCs), can be generated from the keyboard. The ADC core can 

be called up for display on the teleprinter and new data 

inserted into core. ADC programs such as DCSG self-test can 

be run by the crew. 

b. OV Monitoring - Selected OV status parameters are displayed 

for the crew on the different subsystem panels. 

c. Navigation - When the geoposition display program is loaded 

into the ADC from the AMU, the crew may use the ATS to track 

a point and obtain a display of information which defines 

the location of the point. The information on the location 

of the point can also be recorded by the ADC and subsequently 

by TLM. 

6.2.2.2.2.4 On-Board Equipment Configuration 

OV TLM data includes FM/FM analog, Gemini B, PCM, and voice. The method of 

encryption and the communication system used for transferring the data to the 

RTS is shown in Figure 6-11. The relationship of the dual recorders for TLM 

and voice are also shown in Figure 6-11. 

6.2.2.2.3 Downlink 

The downlink capabilities include the on-board sources of either real time or 

recorded information and the means for transferring the information from the 

OV to the RTS to the STC. The nominal downlink information includes real time 

and recorded laboratory vehicle PCM data, real time and recorded voice, real 

time FM/FM and Gemini B PCM data, and real time and stored (core/tape) medical 

data. 

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The on-board TLM system provides the means for continuously accumulating data 

from the OV and crew. TLM also contains command authentication and verification indications. During an RTS pass, real time TLM data and voice are sent 

directly to the ground. Information is recorded between RTS passes and played 

back during the RTS passes. 

6.2.2.2.3.1 Encryption of Downlink Data 

All data transferred between the ground and OV are encrypted for nominal 

operations (except for analog voice, VHF voice, and range data). Location of 

the crypto system in the command and control system is shown in Figure 6-11. 

As indicated, PCM can be recorded, encrypted, or decrypted. The second PCM 

encryptor on the output of the PCM recorder can be used as backup by reconfiguration. 

Backup for the downlink digital voice is clear analog voice, VHF voice, or 

recorded voice. To preclude curtailment of uplink (or downlink) communications because of a double crypto equipment failure, the OV TLM system baseline 

requires that the voice and PCM crypto units be capable of being manually 

interchanged by the crew. 

The OV has three separate crypto keys. The telemetry links, both real time 

and recorded, use a common crypto key. The real time and recorded voice use 

a common crypto key. The command system uses a unique crypto key. 

6.2.2.2.3.2 SGLS Compatible Downlink System 

The downlink provides the means for transmitting recorded and real time TLM 

data, recorded and real time digitized voice, FM/FM, analog voice, medical 

data, and range data. The downlink carriers lie in one of the 20 available 

SGLS channels. This channel provides a coherent carrier and. a non-coherent 

carrier. The coherent carrier transmits 200 Hz to 4 kHz analog clear voice, 

42.6 kbps digital voice, 65.8 kbps PCM, 1.5 MHz ranging; Gemini B, OV FM/FM 

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and medical data are on the third subcarrier. The Gemini B and FM/FM use the 

same subcarrier. The non-coherent carrier transmits 1024 kbps recorded 

digital voice or PCM. 

Real time PCM data is transmitted to the RTS during a station contact on the 

coherent carrier. During a contact where it is desired to obtain the 

computer summary data stored in ADC core from a payload activity, the 

computer must be on. When the computer is on, those data slots in the PCM 

stream allocated to computer summary data are filled from the ADC. 

Recorded PCM data requires that either SPCs, RTCs or manual commands be used 

to initiate the PCM TLM tape recorder readout. The PCM recorder data is 

transmitted on the 1 Mbit non-coherent carrier link. 

6.2.2.2.3.3 TLM Data Handling 

The laboratory vehicle PCM data consists of mission payload laboratory vehicle 

status, computer, command, heartbeat interval, and spectrometer data. (There 

are approximately 2200 data points.) This data is normally PCM on the 1.024 

Mhz subcarrier which is phase-modulated on the coherent carrier. The PCM 

recorded data can be replaced with this data on the noncoherent carrier, if 

necessary. 

6.2.2.2.3.4 TLM Data RTS Handling 

As indicated in Figure 6-12, selected parameters of the real time PCM data 

pass through the ground stations and then on to the ADS for selective editing, 

processing, and compression; selective data samples are then forwarded to the 

STC via EXCELS. 

a. PCM Data - Real time PCM data (including Gemini B) is processed by the RTS using the data compression algorithms and 

sent to the STC. 

Recorded PCM data received at the RTS is recorded for postpass processing, editing, and transmission of selected 

portions to the STC. 

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rJ - •■•■••■ 

co 

z 

Figure6-12 Simplified RTS TLM Data Handling Sy

stem 

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b. FM/FM Data - Real time FM/FM analog TLM is only recorded at 

the RTS and not transmitted to the STC. It is packaged for 

postpass shipment to the STC. 

c All data is recorded at several points during its transfer 

through the RTS.(see Figure 6-12). These recorded tapes 

will be MOL-peculiar and station time annotated for limited, 

quick postpass retrieval. These tapes will be shipped back 

to the STC where they will be processed and/or stored. 

d. Data Transmission - RTS to STC - The nominal means of transmitting information from the RTSs to the STC is by 2400 bps 

digital data lines. 

Nominally, because of overhead such as header and identification bits, the useful data transferred over the lines is 

reduced to 1800 to 2000 bps. The microwave link between VTS 

and STC can transmit at a nominal rate of (TBD). 

Most of the RTS data will be retained on tape (real time and 

OV recorded) in the raw form. Periodically, this data will 

be physically shipped to the STC and stored. This data will 

be processed, as required, for additional and more detailed 

analysis. 

The crypto security associated with the RTS is shown in 

Figure 6-12. All data passing to and from the OV is secured, 

and all data to and from the STC is crypto-secured. 

6.2.2.2.3.5 TLM Data STC Handling 

All processed RTS data passes through and is directed to its destination within 

the STC by a buffer computer. Most real time data samples will be selectively 

displayed in the MCC on CRT, printers, and/or plotters. Other data will be 

sent to the CDC-3800 computers for further processing and then, as required, 

displayed in the MCC. Most of the data received by the STC will be stored in 

data bases until finally recorded for storage. 

6.2.2.2.3.6 Voice Data Handling 

During an RTS pass, voice is sent back to the ground in real time over the 

42.6 kbps carrier. A VSD system is used to digitize the analog voice signal. 

The two crew voice recorders must be commanded "on" by the RTC or SPC for 

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playback over the RTS. The digitized recorded voice is transmitted to the 

RTS alternately with the recorded PCM over the 1 Mb link. 

a. Voice Data - RTS Handling - At the RTS, real time voice is 

decrypted, sent to the VSD, the vocoder, and then to the STC 

via the communications system. Recorded voice is stored at 

the RTS in raw form for postpass playback to the STC. 

Because of the higher transmission rate used between the OV 

and RTS, the VSD equipment at the RTS cannot be used. A 

digital/analog encoder is used in the OV and therefore a 

similar decoder must be used at the RTS. The real time and 

recorded voice data processing at the RTS is limited to 

recording, decoding, encoding, decryption, and encryption. 

No editing takes place. 

Downlink clear analog voice goes directly from the baseband 

separator to the RTS communications system and then to the STC. 

This voice is also recorded and, as needed, played back on 

a postpass basis. 

b. Voice Data - STC Handling. - Other than decrypting and vocoder 

synthesizing, the real time voice information requires no 

processing by the STC. Within the MCC voice is also recorded 

for storage and further analysis. OV playback voice must be 

manually edited and time-identified. 

6.2.3 Computer Software System 

6.2.3.1 General 

For the purposes of this document, five basic software system components will 

be used by MOL Operations: (1) system support; (2) uplink processing; (3) AVE 

software; (4) downlink processing; and (5) ascent and reentry. The last four 

can be considered together as the MOL software. The first four components 

used in orbital operations are depicted in Figure 6-13 and show the close 

interface between these components as well as their physical location. 

6.2.3.1.1 Data Flow 

The data flow is divided into the orbit keeping, commanding, on-board, and 

telemetry functions. The commanding function is the generation and sending 

of instructions to the vehicle; the on-board function is the control of 

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UPLINK 

PROCESSING 

SOFTWARE 

SY STEM 

SUPPORT 

SOFTWARE 

► 

• 

DOWNLINK 

PROCESSING 

SOFTWARE 

0 

0 

STC 

SY STEM 

SUPPORT 

SOFTWARE 

AVE 

SOFTWARE 

RTS ORBITING VEHICLE 

Figure 6-13 Orbital Operations Computer Software System 

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necessary servo and camera operations, uplink data handling, command and 

execution, downlink data generation, crew support functions and diagnostics; 

the TLM function is the monitoring and analyses of the vehicle telemetry to 

determine if the instructions were accomplished, to determine the health of 

the vehicle, and to determine the status of the mission and the vehicle. All 

other functions of the software system (orbit prediction; generating station 

acquisition predictions; antenna look angles; vehicle tracking; updating 

predictions based on actual tracking data; orbit adjusting; formatting and 

transmitting of tracking, commanding, and telemetry messages to and from the 

STC to RTSs; generating telemetry modes; and the interfaces of the AFSCF with 

other tracking networks) can be grouped under the general heading of "orbit 

keeping". 

The following flow is the sequence of events of those program functions that 

must be determined for the flight of MOL. 

a. Prelaunch and Launch - Before liftoff, the following tasks 

must be performed for flight support: 

The nominal pointing data is prepared in the CDC-3800 

computer by the AOES, transmitted to the buffer computer 

in formal messages, and sent from the buffer computer to 

the RTS as tracking prepass messages. 

The TLM modes are also prepared on the CDC-3800 program, 

and are transmitted through the buffer computer to the RTSs 

in the same manner. TLM mode generation starts well before 

the launch of the vehicle. A library of modes is built and 

maintained on the buffer computer and the RTS prepass tapes. 

Procedures in the software can change the modes or switch 

from one mode to another during the vehicle pass. 

Scheduling inputs are prepared through the computer program 

for the multi-operations scheduling of those AFSCF equipments required for flight. 

The nominal ephemeris data is prepared in the CDC-3800 by the 

ACES. 

Commanding data is prepared in the uplink segment, formatted 

for transmission by a CDC-3800 program, and transmitted to 

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the launch site pad for loading of the OV. All this data is 

transmitted through the EXCELS to the RTSs on the 2400 bps 

lines. When each task is completed, the system is ready to 

support on-orbit operation. 

b. Ascent - The ascent programs require a new and unique configuration in the AFSCF. The display generation programs in 

the CDC-3800 require data from the launch vehicle, Gemini B, 

and laboratory vehicle during the launch phase. The data is 

collected at AFWTR, sent to the STC, and sorted in the ADS 

buffer computer. From the data in the CDC-3800, displays 

are generated to allow ascent phase monitoring from the MCC. 

After insertion, a vector is input to the CDC-3800 ACES 

system and used as a nominal vector for the orbit operation. 

c. On-Orbit - During station pass tracking, commanding, and 

telemetry, data are received and processed at the remote 

stations and selected data is sent to the STC ADS computer. 

The computer processes and stores the telemetry data and 

displays selected data to the MCC for CRT display and printout. Selected displays of the tracking and command verification are also processed and displayed at the MCC. Orbits and 

the central data base are updated periodically by the AOES 

system. 

d. Reentry - The reentry program in the CDC-3800 computes retrofire times for the Gemini B or DRVs, as applicable, and the 

impact points for the recovery area selected. The reentry 

trajectory is predicted to the designated recovery point. 

b.2.3.2 System Support Software 

The AFSCF system support software consists of those programs operated at the 

STC and the RTSs and those programs which provide interface operation between 

the RTSs and the STC. The system support software falls into two basic 

categories: (1) general-purpose software, including ACES, System II, the ADS 

real time computer program subsystem serving the STC and the RTS; and (2) MOLpeculiar software. 

In addition to dividing the AFSCF system support software into the two categories (general-purpose and MOL-peculiar), this discussion will further 

classify the software into those areas of more common usage within the AFSCF. 

Under each of the two major divisions, the programs will be classified as 

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either STC or RTS, and will contain a functional breakdown as to orbit 

keeping, commanding, or TLM. In addition, the functions will be characterized as either off-line or on-line. The composition of the AFSCF system 

support software is shown in Table 6-1. 

The AFSCF computer system includes the complex computer installation at the 

STC, and the smaller computer systems located at each of the seven RTSs. Each 

RTS will track the OV during the time the vehicle can be contacted by that 

station. During contact, the RTS can command the OV and monitor its status 

from telemetry data. The RTS is connected to the STC during the OV pass by 

voice lines and by high-speed data lines terminated in the STC computer 

system. During the pass, the software is characterized as being in real-time; 

all other software functions are designated non-real-time. 

In the AFSCF, those functions performed before an RTS can acquire, track, 

command, and monitor the telemetry of an OV during a pass are called prepass 

functions; all the functions performed during a contact are called pass or 

real-time functions; all functions performed after a pass are called postpass 

functions. 

6.2.3.2.1 AFSCF General-Purpose Programs 

The AFSCF general-purpose programs are CDC-3800 and ADS computer programs 

designed to perform functions common to groups of flight projects (e.g., 

station contact, orbit determination and prediction from tracking data, 

reentry programs, etc.). The main interfaces between the system support 

programs and the MOL software will be through the use of the data bases, 

necessitating construction and updating of data base tables used by various 

software elements. 

The CDC 3800 System IIC Operating System provides a versatile executive 

system which will control those programs which satisfy the large scale 

computational requirements of the AFSCF. Those programs comprise the operational subsystem which processes data collected from User satellites, present 

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Table 6-1. AFSCF System Support Software 

General-Purpose AFSCF Software MOL-Peculiar AFSCF Software 

STC Software STC Software 

System II Software System II Command Formatting 

Mode Generation Programs 

CDC-3800 Executive and 

Utility System 

JOVIAL Compiler 

AOES System 

ADS Software 

Buffer Executive 

360/67 Powered Flight 

Controller 

(if different from 

Executive) 

Background Display Generator 

Buffer Prepass Generator 

Programs 

RTS Software (Part Of ADS) RTS Software 

Prepass Receipt and Generation Site Commanding Program 

Program 

MOL TLM Processing Program 

SGLS Telemetry Processing 

Programs 

AFSCF Tracking Programs 

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The User with computational results to make operational decisions, prepare 

control information for transmission to the satellites, and evaluate the 

satellites' performance. The programs of the System II operating system are 

involved in supporting the operational programs (e.g., those used in producing 

and maintaining data bases, masters, and COMPOOLS; scheduling tasks; etc.). 

6.2.3.2.1.1 System IIC Objectives 

The basic objectives of System IIC are: 

a. To function by remote control in both real-time and nonreal time as envisioned for the ADS time period. 

b. To interface with the ADS System which will replace the 

Bird Buffer 160A/RTS 160A System currently in use. ADS 

will provide a central system data base storage facility 

to drive the control and display equipment which allows 

The User in the MCC to communicate with the total system 

from his own work area. 

To meet the basic objectives of real-time support on a remotely controlled 

CDC-3800, System IIC must provide these basic characteristics: 

a. Routing real-time data received from an external source to 

the appropriate recipient. 

b. Scheduling tasks based upon events controlled by interrupts 

and I/O processing. 

c. Processing multiple interrupts. 

d. Rapid response to real-time inquiries or tasks. 

e. Transmitting diagnostic machine performance (state-of-health) 

information periodically to the control computer. 

f." Asynchronous processing of I/O utilizing a queueing technique. 

g. Providing man/machine interface with the control computer. 

h. Controlling time initiated tasks. 

i. Rapid loading of specified elements into core during execution 

of another element. 

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j. Storing information by name on the disc for either sequential 

(serial) or random retrieval. 

k. Providing a centralized data base on the disc. 

1. Implementing pseudo re-entrant routines for multi-tasking 

operations. 

in. Transmitting error messages to the control computer with 

continuation control centralized there. 

n. Providing a data protection feature, upon completion of a 

job, to clear memory and set secured areas of other devices 

to random numbers. 

o. Initializing and updating of the data base at the beginning 

and ending of a job. 

p. Retaining printer information on the CDC-3800 and transmitting it to ADS at the end of the job. 

q. Allowing 50,00010 cells of memory for The User. 

r. Utilizing magnetic tapes and disc packs as scratch mediums. 

s. Retaining elements transmitted from ADS on the local CDC3800 until the end of the job. 

t. Providing error recovery. 

u. Eliminating automatic aborts. 

v. Allowing a time estimate to be specified by ADS in the batch 

mode for an entire job. 

6.2.3.2.1.2 System IIC Capabilities 

In addition to the real-time and remote control requirements, the following 

capabilities will be provided: 

a. A "stand-alone" mode of operation, (i.e., a capability to 

operate independently of external computers). 

b. The mechanism for communicating from program-to-program and 

between a program and its environment. 

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c. The system will be COMPOOL-sensitive. 

d. The User's data base, a depository for COMPOOL-defined 

data, will be maintained on disc packs. 

e. A macro request capability will be provided to invoke the 

operation of a predefined sequence of programs. 

f. A call-by-name technique will be provided for manipulating 

data on the disc. 

g. A description of all the symbols used by a routine will be 

retained on disc to facilitate symbolic correctors and 

symbolic input to parameter test. 

h. A data-base generation, update, and list capability will be 

provided. 

i. The concept of auxiliary masters, COMPOOLS, and data bases 

will be ratained to supplement the system information. 

j. Diagnostic aids will be provided by the executive as well 

as by the parameter test subsystem. 

k. An on-line corrector capability will be provided. 

1. A User-invoked data base retrieval feature will be provided. 

m. A feature to dynamically invoke the loading of additional 

elements into memory during program execution will be 

provided. 

n. Routines will be maintained in a relocatable format. 

o. Core storage will be dynamically allocated at load time. 

p. The feature of equipment specification will be retained. 

q. The JOVIAL compiler will provide the system with a procedureoriented general-purpose programming language and give it a 

large degree of machine independence. 

r. A complete formatting capability will be provided to facilitate data I/O. 

s. Masters will be provided primarily for permanent storage of 

routines; however, data blocks, macro request definitions, 

and COMPOOLS may be included. 

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t. Up to 173 program parameters may be input on an operation 

request. This information may then be accessed by the 

requested program. 

u. Control parameters may be input on the operation requests 

to control the services provided by the monitor. 

v. The computer interrupt system will be used to provide the 

executive and system programs with several capabilities. 

The use of illegal instructions and jumping out of bounds 

by User programs will be prohibited. The interrupt system 

is also used to control I/O, to process manual interrupts, 

to provide timing and tracing features, to switch AM images, 

etc. 

w. Centralized I/O routines will be provided. 

x. The magnetic tapes will have generalized labels. 

y. A system blocking/deblocking feature will be provided. 

z. The operation requests will be grouped logically into a job. 

aa. The system will utilize two banks of core via the paging 

hardware. 

6.2.3.2.1.3 Advanced Orbit Ephemeris System 

MOL ephemerides will be generated by the AOES. AOES is a major subsystem of 

the AFSCF and, as such, will operate in conjunction with System II and ADS. 

AOES is a system of general-purpose routines or modules used to determine a 

satellite's orbit from tracking data. Also, AOES will predict the future 

position and velocity of a satellite for use by: (1) orbit selection; (2) 

test control; (3) command generation; (4) payload analysis; (5) TAs and other 

interested agencies and organizations. 

The following accuracy and timing requirements are ACES design goals: 

a. Postflight Orbit Determination Accuracies - During postflight 

orbit determination of a near-earth satellite with a period 

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of 90 min, the following accuracies will be attainable 

on any rev: 

1. 200 ft in-track 

2. 50 ft crosstrack 

3. 100 ft radial distance 

b. Prediction Accuracies - After an orbit update for a satellite 

with a period of 90 min and with an orbit determined from 

seven tracking station passes of data, the following prediction accuracies (eight revs of predictions) will be 

attainable: 

1. 1500 ft in-track 

2. 600 ft crosstrack 

3. 1000 ft radial distance 

c. Computer Run-Time - The elapsed time will not exceed 12 min 

from the time that raw tracking data are available in the 

computer to the time that the best estimate of the orbit is 

obtained for the following conditions: 

1. 90-min period 

2. 8-rev span prediction 

3. 10 tracking station passes of data 

4. 4-sec data rate 

The GCHAP computer program currently in use in the AFSCF should be adequate 

for the orbit adjust techniques described in Appendix B.4. 

The AGES must accept telemetry data from an on-board low-g accelerometer and 

analyze this data using techniques which will be finalized in the near future. 

Further, the AOES must also provide predicted accelerometer data for use by 

the on-board computer. 

The capability must exist to provide a real time in-track update from any 

tracking station (LRL). 

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Additional AOES descriptive detail is provided in Ref. 19. 

6.2.3.2.2 AFSCF MOL-Peculiar Programs 

The AFSCF MOL-peculiar programs are those programs supplied by the AFSCF which 

are applicable only to the MOL Operations (e.g., command authentication and 

verification at the RTSs, MOL-peculiar orbit adjust capability, specialized 

TLM processing, display generation, etc.). Other components of the MOL software interface with the MOL-peculiar AFSCF software either through data base 

definition or by generating specific performance requirements to be met by the 

AFSCF programs. 

6.2.3.3 MOL Software 

6.2.3.3.1 Uplink Processing Elements 

Four basic software elements comprise the uplink processing software: (1) 

the flight planning element; (2) the event generation element; (3) the command 

generation element; and (4) the message generation element. These four 

elements are depicted in Figure 6-14; the relationship between these software 

elements and the SIMON system executive on all operational phases except 

ascent is shown. 

6.2.3.3.1.1 Flight Planning Software (FPS) Element 

The FPS can facilitate construction and modification of the computer-based 

flight plan. This plan contains data relating to the flight crew, AFSCF, 

Gemini B, laboratory, and mission payload activity schedules. Using the flight 

plan as input, the FPS determines the available data parameters required by the 

SYNK/N executive to drive the computer programs required for operations support 

and planning of the MOL Operations test. 

The FPS performs appropriate tasks for advanced planning purposes and operational support during the course of a flight test. The operational support 

function includes both the capability of controlling the appropriate software 

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EVENT 

GENERATION 

4 ELEMENT 

FLIGHT 

PLANNING 

ELEMENT 

SYMON 

EXECUTIVE 

Figure 6-14 Uplink Processing Element Interface with SYMON 

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programs to generate the uplink messages as well as making short-term planning 

tradeoffs and evaluations. 

6.2.3.3.1.2 Event Generation Software Element 

The event generation software element consists of the event generators 

required to develop an uplink message. The output of each event generator 

either assures that the events produced are conflidt-free or flags conflicts 

at a related inter-event level. 

The basic event generators which comprise the event generation element are 

described below on a functional basis. (It should be noted that portions of 

the functions described are part of the AFSCF system support software; these 

are indicated by an asterisk to preserve clarity in understanding the operations of these programs; no distinction is made in the text.) 

a. Mission Planning Event Generator (TRW) - This event generator, 

commonly referred to as the mission planning software, 

represents the largest and most complex piece of software of 

any of the event generators. This event generator performs 

four basic functions: (1) target file preparation function; 

(2) target acquisition function; (3) targeting strategy 

function; and (4) event generation function. 

1. Target File Preparation Function - This function receives 

targeting requirements from The User and target countdown 

data from the downlink processing software. Using these 

inputs, the target preparation portion of the software 

processes the information and produces a current updated 

target list which is used by the target acquisition 

function of the mission planning event generation software. 

2. Target Acquisition Function - This function utilizes data 

input to it from the target file prepared by the target 

file preparation programs, vehicle capability data input 

to it from the vehicle capability file, and the mission 

ephemeris input to it from the current ephemeris file. By 

processing these data, the target acquisition portion 

produces the target acquisition file which contains those 

candidate targets for the revolution span of interest. 

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3. Target Strategy Function - This function receives inputs 

from the target acquisition file, mission ephemeris file, 

vehicle capability file, and the weather file. This 

function processes these input data and through targeting 

strategy algorithms selects the targets for the primary 

optics path and the alternate targets to be viewed by the 

crew members. In addition to producing the targets, this 

function also computes all necessary control parameters 

and data required by the AVE software. 

4. Event Generator Function - The event generator function of 

the mission planning event generator software processes 

the target selection file produced by the targeting 

strategy function and produces the actual mission planning 

events. In addition to this nominal mode of operation, 

the event generator also processes special secondary flight 

objective requirements and produces the required events. 

b Star Selection Event Generator (GE) - The star selection 

event generator shall produce a star event file which 

specifies the stars to be tracked during payload operation. 

The star selection event generator considers the target 

selection file, mission ephemeris file, vehicle capability 

file, and the star file in determining which stars are to 

be selected. 

c. Station Contact Event Generator* (GE/AFSCF) - The station 

contact event generator produces the necessary events to 

assure contact between the MOL and preselected RTSs which 

have been previously planned. 

d. Vehicle Ephemeris Event Generator* (GE/AFSCF) - The vehicle 

ephemeris event generator is used to generate the ephemeris, 

accelerometer, and other data which will be transmitted to 

the MOL as part of the current command message. This event 

generator allows positive control over the allocation of 

ephemeris data over different message generation cycles. 

e. Reentry Event Generator (GE) - The DRV and laboratory reentry 

event generators generate the events required to perform 

reentry of the DRVs and laboratory. This generator also 

computes the reentry trajectories. 

*Part of the AFSCF System Support Software 

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f. Gemini B Reentry Event Generator (TRW) - The Gemini B reentry 

event generator computes and provides the reentry events, 

data, and trajectories for the Gemini B. This program is 

nominally run several times a day as the mission ephemeris is 

updated. It is also run after all orbit adjust computations 

to update the reentry messages and verify the acceptability 

of the orbit adjust. 

g. Orbit Adjust Event Generator* (GE/AFSCF) - The orbit adjust 

event generator computes the events necessary to perform an 

orbit adjust and updates the orbit file corresponding to the 

planned orbit adjust. 

h. LMSS Event Generator (DAC) - The LMSS event generator 

processes laboratory requirements input to it in the form of 

laboratory objectives, diagnostic commands, corrective action, 

etc., and produces the events required to execute these 

requirements. 

i. Special Flight Requirements (SFR) Event Generator (GE) -

This generator shall provide the means of generating events 

for special activities which cannot be readily accomplished 

by the LMSS event generator functions (e.g., ADC partial 

core dumps). 

6.2.3.3.1.3 Command Generation Element (GE) 

The command generation software element consists of the functions required to 

develop the conflict-free commands to be sent to the MOL. Three basic functions comprise the command generation element: (1) event conflict identification and resolution; (2) function input and ordering; and (3) the function 

conflict identification and resolution. 

a. Event Conflict Identification and Resolution - This function 

receives data from the event files produced by the event 

generators and identifies conflicts which exist among these 

events as a result of current constraints. Where possible 

conflicts will be automatically resolved; otherwise, the 

conflicts will require manual resolution. 

*Part of the AFSCF System Support Software 

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b. Function Input and Ordering - This function translates events 

from the chronological events file and places the resulting 

functions in chronological order. In addition, manual 

function and command requests shall be incorporated into the 

ordered data. 

c. Command/Prose Translation - This function shall convert input 

commands or prose into their constituent functions, or, 

conversely, shall convert input functions into sets of 

available command types or prose words. 

d. Function Conflict Identification and Resolution - This 

function investigates for conflicting function/states, performs allowable conflict resolution, and flags unresolved 

conflicts. It outputs to the conflicted chronological 

function file. Recorder management optimization shall also 

be accomplished as part of this function. 

6.2.3.3.1.4 Message Generation Element (GE) 

The message generation element consists of two basic functions: command 

assembly, and block assignment/message formatting. 

a. Command Assembly - The command assembly function receives 

inputs from the conflicted chronological function file and 

the command and prose translation routine to assemble the 

required SPC, AVE computer data, and prose messages. These 

(SPCs, data, and prose) are then output to the assembled 

command, data, and prose file. 

b. Block Assignment/Message Formatting - The block assignment/ 

message formatting function accepts the assembled command, 

data, and prose file as an input and rearranges this list 

into blocks of data meeting the uplink command philosophy 

constraints. 

At this point, the command message is in proper format for 

AFSCF handling for encryption, checking, and transmission to 

the RTS. 

6.2.3.3.2 AVE Software Functions 

The AVE software system is comprised basically of the following software 

functions: (1) executive; (2) station contact uplink; (3) station contact 

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downlink; (4) c ommand execution; (5) flight crew support; (6) pre-payload; 

(7) payload; and (8) diagnostic. 

a. Executive (DAC) - The executive function provides program 

control by calling up the appropriate programs at the 

required time. 

This function performs storage management by providing core 

area for non-resident programs when they are requested from 

the AMU and for resident programs that require temporary 

data storage areas. 

The executive function supervises interrupts received from 

various sources requesting computation service, and processes the I/O requests from the various application 

computer programs by performing channel scheduling and I/O 

initiation for the designated devices. 

This function also performs system services consisting of 

system initialization, system error handling, timing services, 

corrector data handling, core dumps, provides a universal 

common data base area, and provides for recovery from a power 

interrupt. 

b. Station Contact Uplink (GE) - The station contact uplink 

function accepts, verifies, and processes the uplink data 

(command, computer, and teleprinter data). It transfers 

data from the on-line (active) computer to the off-line 

(backup) computer so the latter will be ready to instantly 

come on-line and assume all the on-line computer functions in 

the event of on-line computer failure. This function executes 

those real time commands addressed to the MPSS. It also 

accepts prose data at the uplink rate and buffers it for 

output to the teleprinter at the teleprinter rate. 

c. Station Contact Downlink - This function provides for core 

dumps on command by either dumping core in real time over 

an RTS or putting it on the on-board TLM recorder for later 

RTS readout. In addition, it combines low-g accelerometer 

(LGA) data and a summary of data associated with payload 

operations with the real time TLM for transmission over the 

RTS. 

d. Command Execution (GE) - The command execution functions 

include the execution of ground-generated SPCs and those 

on-board commands generated from the uplink computer data. 

It provides a command profile on the flight recorder which 

indicates the executed commands. 

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e. Flight Crew Support - This function provides services to the 

flight crew which will allow them to operate the keyboard 

and receive data on the A/N display and teleprinter for TLM 

access, enter data into the core, display core contents, 

insert commands, perform focus exercises, advance the visual 

display and delete SPCs. 

f. Pre-Payload (GE) - The pre-payload functions include obtaining selected target coordinates from the AMU, and displaying 

the cues associated with each target to the flight crew. 

These functions also provide a control to the star trackers 

in searching, acquiring, and locking on to the assigned stars. 

Payload (GE) - The payload function uses seventh degree 

polynominal coefficients provided by the ground to compute 

vehicle position and velocity with applicable drag corrections. 

Corrections are computed based on either small accelerations 

sensed by a closed loop, on-board LGA or last radar look (LEL). 

In the latter case, ground-based radar provides a means of 

detecting small errors in the ephemeris. These errors are 

sent on the uplink as in-trade corrections for the ADC to 

apply to the ephemeris. Other computations are vehicle 

attitude from the star trackers for payload operation or from 

the ACTS attitude base in the event star trackers are not 

operable. The ADC programs the path of the primary optics 

and the two acquisition and tracking scopes (ATS) to the 

targets specified in the ground-generated photographic plan 

sent by the uplink. At the proper time, it slews the primary 

optics and ATSs to the targets and tracks them. 

This function inhibits and enables the ACTS in a manner 

permitting ACTS inhibit during photography, yet maintaining 

attitude control. It presents displays to assist the crew 

during payload operation. These displays include real time 

cueing and lights for countdown to decision time. It accepts 

crew inputs on each target viewed and, according to the 

precedence established on the ground, votes at the decision 

time to determine which of several targets will be photographed. 

For each target selected, it computes and generates commands 

for the primary and secondary cameras. These include such 

parameters as slant range compensation, platen jog angle and 

velocity, and slit orientation. It updates the optics pointing information from the crew stick (i.e., "benchmark" data, 

update position, and real time tracking inputs) or from the 

image velocity sensor (IVS). 

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This function generates, for film edge exposure and the 

flight recorder, computer summary data consisting of 

attitude and pointing data, camera parameters, and exposure 

times. Upon crew request, it will compute and display the 

latitude and longitude of any point in the center of either 

ATS. 

h. Diagnostic - The diagnostic function will provide selfhealth tests on the DCSG. It will also perform diagnoses 

on the MPSS by providing servo health checks, alignment 

bias determination, and servo bias determination. 

6.2.3.3.3 Downlink Processing Software 

Three basic software elements comprise the downlink processing software: 

(1) the MCD software element; (2) the TLM analysis software element; and 

(3) the telemetry/trend prediction software element. These three elements 

are shown in Figure 6-15, along with the relationship between these software 

elements and other elements and components of the MOL software system. 

6.2.3.3.3.1 Mission Correlation Data Software Element (TRW) 

A basic function of the MCD software element is to process mission TLM data 

and produce the data necessary to enable The User to perform sufficient photographic interpretation of the photography obtained from the DORIAN mission. 

In addition to producing MCD reports, this element also provides data to the 

mission planning software for future targets to be photographed. 

The AVE computer stores, in core, data including targets which were sufficiently photographed, alternates which interdicted the primary path, and 

crew evaluation of targets. This stored data is transmitted via the real time 

telemetry link and is available on a postpasi basis at the STC. These data 

are used to prepare postpass target selection reports for The User and to 

facilitate on-orbit advanced planning functions at the STC. The edge data 

printed on the film is processed by the AVE computer and stored on the TLM 

tape for transmittal on the non-coherent link. These data are processed daily 

by the MCD programs and are transmitted to The User to allow him to perform 

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USER REPORTS 

• 

MCD 

ELEMENT 

TARGETING 

EVENT 

GENERATORS 

■ •■•411 

AFSCF SEGMENT 

(TLM DATA 

FROM MOL) 

TELEMETRY 

ANALYSIS 

ELEMENT 

ENGINEERING 

SUPPORT 

TIM/TREND 

PREDICTION 

ELEMENT 

FLIGHT 

PLANNING 

ELEMENT 

Figure 6-15 Downlink Processing Software Interface with Other MOL System Software 

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planning functions for photographic interpretation as well as to provide 

edge data and supplemental vehicle data for photographic intrepretation. 

6.2.3.3.3.2 TLM Analysis Software Element (GE/DAC) 

The TLM analysis software element has the basic responsibility to monitor 

the health of the MOL as ascertained from the downlink telemetry data. If 

anomalies occur with the MOL, this software alerts the MCC and indicates the 

probable causes of the malfunctions. 

There is a close interface between the AFSCF system support software and this 

processing element, since much preprocessing is accomplished by ADS. It 

should be noted, however, that the processing performed by the system support 

software on MOL telemetry is controlled by the downlink processing software. 

6.2.3.3.3.3 TLM/Trend Prediction Software Element (GE/DAC) 

The TLM/trend prediction software element processes real time TLM data and 

predicts the future status of the MOL. The output of the trend analysis 

software element is used both for the TLM analysis processing and as inputs 

to the flight planning element to validate and predict flight test profiles. 

The TLM prediction software predicts future TLM parameter values based on the 

commands to be executed in the OV. The predicted values are sent to the 

appropriate RTS in the prepass message for use with the limit checking 

telemetry modes. 

6.2.3.3.4 Ascent and Reentry Software 

6:2.3.3.4.1 Ascent Software Element 

To enhance crew safety and the probability of mission success, the 632A MCC, 

located at the AFSCF, must be able to recommend an abort or a switchover to 

secondary guidance. This requires monitoring the progress of the powered 

ascent trajectory and the associated status of vehicle (launch vehicle spacecraft) systems from liftoff to orbit insertion or abort. The ascent software 

element contains the MOL-specific computations to be performed on the tracking 

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data and vehicle TLM data required for display in the MCC. By providing 

display information and response to MCC console requests, the ascent software is specifically designed to support the following Flight Controller 

personnel: Trajectory, Guidance, Booster, and Orbiting Vehicle Systems. 

(The other Flight Controllers in the MOL MCC, FD, Crew Communicator, and 

FTFD presently can call up any of the displays available to the above 

controllers.) 

To support the above MOL Flight Controllers, the ascent software element will 

be used to transform the raw TLM and tracking data into a form suitable for 

monitoring purposes. This requires computational routines to process data 

originating in the FV and radar tracking system. Input data from these 

various sources must first be accepted, converted to proper units, limit 

checked, and time-alinged. These preprocessing operations are generally 

performed prior to further computations needed to prepare the data for 

display. 

Those inputs originating within the MCC that regulate the ascent software 

performance consist of monitor-initiated commands such as prelaunch initialization, abort, and discrete overrides. Typical of these overrides are liftoff, 

staging, guidance mode change, etc. In addition, the ascent software element 

must respond to instructions originating in the CDC-3600 resident executive 

and/or the ADS computer. These are concerned with computer operation-oriented 

activities such as timing, housekeeping, I/O control, etc. 

Telemetry information from the T-IIIM, Gemini B, and laboratory vehicle 

systems is prOcessed into parameters for monitoring purposes by the series of 

tasks in the ascent software in the CDC-3800. Before the ground-based radar 

data can be used in detecting a malfunctioning or failed ascent guidance 

system, the data received by the CDC-3800 through the ADS must first be processed and smoothed by means of a filter routine in the ascent software. 

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In the event that a Mode B or C abort is actually called, the System Controller of the ascent software will call into core the ascent abort touchdown prediction task (ASABOR) loaded on the CDC-3800 disc before launch from 

the ascent flight support tape. ASABOR provides reentry support to the MCC 

by more accurate computation of the post-abort trajectory parameters and the 

predicted touchdown point. This information will also be available for use 

by the recovery forces. ASABOR can accept data obtained from voice information and from any vector updates provided by tracking to improve the accuracy 

of its reentry trajectory and touchdown prediction. It uses many of the 

mathematical functions defined in the reentry software element. 

b.2.3.3.4.2 Reentry Software Element 

In support of the above objectives, the reentry software element will perform 

any of the following reentry tasks upon request by MCC personnel (during real 

or simulated flight or test operations). The associated inputs for each task 

are obtained from the MCC via the ADS computer from the AOES program (which 

resides on the orbital flight support tape). The tasks are described below: 

a. Normal Reentry - This task calculates the time-to-retrofire 

and Gemini B predeparture update parameters needed for onboard computations. 

b. Contingency - This task computes the time-to-retrofire in the 

event that the crew is unable to perform the calculation onboard. It also provides the required Gemini B contingency 

update parameters for reentry guidance initiation. 

c. Reentry Planning - The time-to-retrofire and Gemini B predeparture update parameters are determined for each of the 

selected touchdown points. 

d. Touchdown Prediction - This task assumes that the time-toretrofire and reentry steering mode are known and predicts 

the touchdown point. 

The first two tasks also compute additional parameters consisting of retrofire 

attitude, number of engines to be fired, and time-to-retrofire for zero lift. 

The Reentry Planning Task additionally computes retrofire attitude and number 

of engines to be fired. 

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The Reentry Support Program will reside on the orbital flight support tape. 

As seen from the task descriptions, the program provides MCC support for 

reentry from orbit only. The task for supporting abort reentry from ascent 

is provided by a separate program (ascent abort program) that will reside on 

the ascent flight support tape. The Ascent Abort Program is similar in 

design and utilizes many of the same functions as the Reentry Support Program. 

The heart of the Reentry Support Program is the trajectory propagator. The 

design basis of the trajectory propagator is the on-board computer program, 

which has been modified and expanded to provide additional ground support for 

the MOL reentry phase. The trajectory propagator models the events affecting 

the trajectory (such as separation of the Gemini B from the laboratory, 

retrofire, and parachute deployment). 

6.2.4 MOL Contractor Support Facility (MCSF)* 

An MCSF near the STC is planned to provide required contractor office space 

and analysis capability (in excess of that available from the AFSCF) for both 

operations and postflight phases. The facility will be contractor-operated 

under MOL SPO direction. 

During operations, the MCSF provides vital support to the decision-making 

process in the MCC. It provides responsive, flexible capability to process 

TLM tapes (from the RTS or the STC) and microwave data to aid in diagnosis of 

contingencies. It provides for correlation and analysis of current data with 

that obtained during ground tests on previous flights and earlier in the 

current flight. Included are displays and working areas for contractor 

specialist teams to solve problems and synthesize "best-fit" solutions. 

Necessary access to command histories and current command loads will be provided (a vital part of the analysis problem). The MCSF will be able to 

provide (when required) edited, digital computer tapes to contractor plants 

for more detailed analysis using design analysis techniques. These requirements exceed the scope of support available from the STC. 

*MCSF is an interim term and subject to change. 

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The second requirement is to support the "postflight" type of analysis process 

(which actually will commence shortly after insertion) by providing a central 

facility for processing data into a form most easily used by the contractors 

(i.e., digital data tapes in compatible computer format). This will eliminate 

need for individual contractor SGLS equipment and PCM ground stations, provide 

the appropriate data to each contractor in the form required, and allow necessary control of the security levels of the data on each tape. 

The MCSF will contain office space for contractor personnel and a technical 

area with adequate space for a PCM recorder and SGLS input processor, a 

CDC-3800 computer, and hard-copy output devices. 

The MCSF will also be used before flight in the development and checkout of 

MOL CDC-3600 computer programs. The total expected load in such activities 

has been estimated as 10,000 hr, exceeding the anticipated time available in 

the AFSCF/CPDC. This capability, which is responsive to the needs of MOL 

program debugging, will also greatly reduce delays occasioned by unavailability 

of the AFSCF computers. 

The MCSF will be connected to the STC and to the prime MOL contractors' home 

plant processing centers by duplex data-phone type communication links. This 

will allow, as required, data to be sent directly from the STC computer and/or 

MCC to the off-site processing complexes. As an example, command data is 

essential to the analysis process and will be transferred. In turn, as data 

is processed and the need arises, data may be sent from the processing center 

to the MCC for display or to update a data file. Data transmittal to and 

from the MOL contractors' plants will also be possible. This information will 

be used to supplement that received directly from the AFSCF either via the 

STC or in raw form on tapes from the RTSs. When necessary, the processed data 

will also be physically carried from the off-site complex to the STC. Dubbed 

and/or edited tapes for contractors' use must be physically delivered to 

contractors' plants for further processing and analysis. 

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6.3 MOL OPERATIONS CONCEPTS 

6.3.1 General 

MOL operations within the AFSCF environment are described below. The command 

and control (C&C) philosophy, data handling philosophy, and the details of 

flight planning (e.g., orbit selection) are explained. 

6.3.2 Command Philosophy 

6.3.2.1 General 

The baseline operations concepts applicable to the command function are 

described below. Details beyond those presented here may be found in the 

documents discussed in the following paragraphs. 

6.3.2.2 Command Documentation 

a. Command Definition Specification - This document contains 

the OV command repertoire (identification of commands avail- 

-- able for uplink transmission, manual control commands, 

automatic subsystem generated commands, computer-generated 

commands, monitor and alarm subsystem-generated commands, and 

the backup commands available for utilization on AVE 6 and 

AVE T). The ground-to-air software-to-hardware and softwareto-software interfaces are also discussed in detail. 

In addition, this document contains the Command Function List 

(function-to-command correlation information), an encyclopedia of possible function/states for OV subsystems. Further, 

this document describes the physical phenomena which occur in 

the OV when a given function/state is occupied. Additionally, 

this document contains the time-ordered function/state 

relationships associated with each defined event, the events 

associated with each sequence, and the sequences associated 

with each flight test operation. 

b. Hardware/Software Limitation Specification - This document 

contains the OV functional limitations expressed as 

constraints on function/state occupation. This document also 

contains explanations of the problems avoided by proper 

function/state occupation as well as the corresponding 

effects of improper occupation. The data contained in this 

document serves as a data base for uplink message conflict 

identifiCation and resolution performed in uplink message 

preparation. 

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c. CPCEI Specifications - These documents consist of the GE AYEMPSS, the DAC executive, the DAC ground-LMCP, the TRW MP&E, 

and the GE C&C. These documents form a part of the basis of 

knowledge necessary to understand the computer programs 

being used, and to isolate and correct software problems 

occurring during on-orbit operations. 

6.3.2.3 Prelaunch Phase 

During the period beginning some months before a flight test and continuing 

into the flight test time period, the Flight Planning staff will produce the 

flight plans. This task can be separated into two subtasks which are 

performed serially. The first involves generation of the flight plan to be 

followed if no substantial anomalies are encountered during the flight test. 

The second involves continuous identification and assessment of the anomalies 

which significantly impact the existing flight plan, and the generation of 

new flight plans which allow maximization of flight test effectiveness within 

the constraints imposed by the anomalies. 

Integral to the development and assessment of flight plans is the CDC-3800 

flight planning software described in paragraph 6.2.3.3.1.1. It serves as 

a computerassist to the flight planning personnel and facilitates rapid 

development and assessment of flight plans. This software is used for flight 

planning both prior to and during the flight test. 

Other aids to flight planning are the FVTLs (one is addressed to the manned/ 

automatic flights, and a second to the automatic flights). These documents 

are developed prior to actual flight planning for a specific flight and 

depict a set of scheduled sequences for nominal system test operations. The 

FVTLs represent a starting point in planning the operations for a particular 

flight. 

The concurrent development of the FVTLs and the Sequence Definition and Task/ 

Event Files leads to a major part of the data base information necessary for 

flight planning. 

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The flight plan comprised of a scheduled set of sequences for the flight crew 

and MCC and RTS operations, will be available to authorized personnel in both 

hard copy and computer display. Its use transcends the command generation 

area and could have possible impact in all areas of flight test operations. 

Command generation will be required to produce command tapes for use in the 

simulator for prelaunch training exercises. 

6.3.2.4 Launch Phase 

The prelaunch activity culminates in formulation of a command message which 

is loaded into the laboratory vehicle while on the launch pad during the 

launch phase. This "pad load" contains those commands required to establish 

the initial RTS contact on rev 1 plus successive contacts well beyond the 

anticipated RTS contact planned for a new command message loading. Due to 

the anticipated long setup time required for the payload and ephemeris uncertainty, the pad load will contain no payload operations data. 

6.3.2.5 Ascent Phase 

During this phase no commands, per se, are to be sent. The requirement 

exists, however, to transmit two instructional commands to light 

indicators in the Gemini B to inform the flight crew of ground recommendations for guidance switchover (BIGS to GIGS) or abort. 

Both of these commands are to be backed up by voice recommendations. A voice 

recommendation may also be used to inform the crew to inhibit switchover to 

GIGS. Final authority, however, rests with the flight crew. The exact 

method of implementation of these commands remains to be determined. 

6.3.2.6 Early Orbit Phase 

Little commanding is anticipated during this phase. Vehicle status and tracking data will be gathered during this time for input to the first command load 

generation. Vehicle status data will be analyzed to determine the vehicle 

capabilities. All RTSs capable of VHF voice contact will be scheduled for 

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VHF voice as well as SGLS data acquisition. 

A command system analysis will be made by observing reaction to special test 

messages sent on the uplink, execution of SPCs from the pad load, and test 

RTCs sent by the MCC. Tracking data will provide an ephemeris for subsequent command loads. It is anticipated that at least three RTS passes of 

tracking data will be required to generate meaningful payload events from the 

mission planning software and that five RTS passes of data will be required 

to provide the accuracies necessary for actual payload operation. After 

receiving three passes of tracking data the Mission Planning event generator 

will be run and a command message composed for loading on, or prior to, 

rev 6. 

6.3.2.7 Orbit Phase 

During the uplink message generation process performed at the MCC with the 

command generation software, the following will be prepared for transmission 

to the OV during a station pass: (1) ephemeris data; (2) star data; (3) 

target data; (4) other computer data; (5) teleprinter data; (6) SPCs; and 

(7) RTCs. 

Items a. through f. will be prepared in blocks of approximately 20 to 30 

computer words each. Any given block will contain only one type of computer 

data or only teleprinter data or only SPCs. RTCs will not be prepared in 

blocks. 

After four revs of tracking data have been received, an LRL correction 

message will be generated and transmitted to the OV on rev 5, permitting 

payload operation to begin on rev 6. 

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On a nominal basis, an uplink message will be transmitted to the OV on alternate revs with enough data for the succeeding three revs of operations. 

Characteristics of a nominal message are: 

a. 16 teleprinter data blocks. 

b. 30 target data blocks. 

c. 12 ephemeris data blocks. 

d. 1 star data block. 

e. 7 command (SPCs) blocks. 

f. (TBD) RTCs. 

g. One minute maximum transmission time at the nominal uplink 

transmission rate. 

h. Equipment "off" and "on" commands v111 be in the same block. 

i. Commands associated with a given event v111 not be in more 

than one block. 

j. Where a function/state is changed by a "delete and add" 

message, the "delete" and "add" shall be in the same block. 

The composition of the uplink message can be varied, however, to any extent 

that fits within the ADC core allocation constraints. Further, where the 

desired composition does not fit within those constraints, the constraints 

can be modified by sending reallocation instructions to the computer as the 

initial part of the uplink message. For example, reallocation may be 

required for automatic subsystem operation: (1) Many subsystems, although 

nominally scheduled for automatic operation (i.e., purge the fuel cells), 

can be operated by ground commands. (2) Although the current nominal 

computer core allocation for SPCs may be inadequate where SPC operation 

of a subsystem is required, the SPC storage area in the ADC can be substantially enlarged (with an attendant reduction in storage area for other data) 

in the event of such occurrences. 

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Command message generation is accomplished by the uplink portion of command 

and control (C&C) software. This software, designed for semiautomatic 

operation, allows for manual intervention at restricted points for message 

change or correction. 

The philosophy for message change or correction is based upon an optimization 

of manual intervention. This optimization involves identification of those 

areas where such intervention is necessary and those areas where manual intervention would cause deleterious effects. 

Man is of primary aid where rapid decisions involving many alternates are 

required. Thus, for those areas of message generation such as conflict 

resolution and message changes quite late in the process, all but the 

simplest, most well-defined solutions will be provided manually. Conversely, 

while man is a rapid-decision maker in very complex situations, there is a 

substantial probability that he has neglected to adequately evaluate the 

impact of his decision in some of the more obscure areas. For this reason, 

there can be no manual intervention into message generation without a subsequent automatic check on that decision. Usually, this checking will be 

based upon the Hardware/Software Limitations Specification (Ref. 24) 

information. 

There is the capability to effectively override a defined hardware/software 

limitation. This override, however, may be effected only by manually changing 

the limitation through data base input at the Flight Planning level and by 

obtaining proper authorization prior to accessing that data base. 

Late manual intervention is discouraged by limiting manual inputs to the 

beginning of message generation at the Flight Planning level and approximately three-fourths of the way through the process at the function/state 

assembly level. Except for manually generated teleprinter data, there is no 

capability to directly change any command or datum contained in the uplink 

message. 

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Certain real time capabilities must be available to the ground (notwithstanding the manual intervention provisions described above) for use during 

emergency situations where the health of the flight crew is endangered and 

they are unable to respond to voice instructions. These capabilities will 

exist during the flight test. 

In the same way, but to a lesser extent, a similar type of capability must 

be available for automatic flights where only immediate action can preclude 

total failure of the remaining portion of the system test. 

6.3.2.8 Flight Crew Inhibits 

In the event of certain on-orbit contingencies or hardware-software 

malfunctions, the flight crew may exercise substantial control over the 

effects of the uplink message. By throwing switches, the flight crew can 

inhibit the responses of certain subsystems to uplink commands. The flight 

crew inhibit capability will be provided in the Hardware/Software Limitations 

Specification (Ref. 24). 

6.3.3 Data Handling Philosophy 

6.3.3.1 General 

Baseline operations concepts applicable to data handling are presented below. 

Both nominal and contingency situations are considered, and such subjects as 

the concept of command data encryption are covered. 

6.3.3.2 Real-Time Data Handling 

It has been estimated that, because of the ADS hardware and software configuration, data transfer between the PCM ground station and computer will be 

limited to a 50,000 bps rate. This restriction is based on the handling of 

500 parameters or less, set by the computer's memory size, the type of com6-67 

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puter processing algorithm used, and the time required by the computer to 

perform the algorithm. In addition, TLM data output from the RTS to the STC 

is limited to 1800 to 2000 bps, requiring extensive data compression. 

Presently, approximately 2200 OV parameters must be handled by the ADS. To 

meet the nominal requirement of processing each parameter at least once 

during an RTS pass, the PCM ground station will be programmed to selectively 

scan the OV TLM points in groups of about 500 parameters for a preselected 

time period (presently anticipated to require 90 sec of the station contact 

time for the entire 2200 OV parameters). After sweeping through all the 

points once (in groups of 500), the scan will be repeated unless changed. 

The computer will send one value of all OV parameters to the STC. However, 

values of operationally dynamic parameters will be continuously evaluated 

and the results sent back to the STC. The computer will also perform limit 

checks, status checks, comparison, etc., on a limited number of parameters. 

As directed, the computer will report out-of-tolerance parameters and transmit the values to the STC. In certain limited cases, it will be required 

that values of critical TLM parameters be sent to the STC more often than 

once per RTS pass. In addition, priorities will be established requiring 

that selected (e.g., monitor and alarm indicators) TLM parameters be 

monitored first. Also, certain parameters (e.g., vehicle time and command 

telemetry) must be monitored continuously (be made part of every block 

scanned). 

Limit checking will be accomplished by first determining the expected nominal 

TLM reading considering current OV TLM and the commands to be executed prior 

to the next RTS pass. This prediction will be performed at the STC by the 

MOL CDC 3800 C&C software. Once a nominal value is determined, proper limits 

will be selected and sent to the RTS in the prepass message. During the pass, 

any OV TLM point exceeding the limit specified will be flagged and transmitted to the MCC. TLM points remaining within limits will not be 

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transmitted except as specified in the TLM mode being processed. The current 

initial concept for the formation of data modes for the return of downlink 

data from the RTSs to the STC is provided in appendix D. 

Except for D-to-A converting and vocoding, real time voice is not modified 

by the RTS. The RTS acts only as a switching unit and transfers the 

real time voice to the STC. 

6.3.3.3 Postpass Playback 

Immediate postpass processing of data stored at the RTS is required to assess 

the state of commandable elements, health check of payload, MCD (deferred 

postpass), command verification (functional). If there are anomalies, considerably more data will be required. 

a. If the RTS pass is short, the RTS will be required to process 

a limited, selected amount of recorded real time data and/or 

OV recorded data for use in trend analysis. (It is difficult 

to acquire sufficient data for this purpose during a twominute real-time RTS pass.) 

b. More in-depth/detailed data will be required when an 

anomalous condition is revealed during the monitoring of 

real time data. By processing the RTS recorded real time 

and/or OV recorder data, it is possible to determine when 

particular data becomes anomalous. This aids in determining 

the specific data necessary for investigation of the cause 

and cure of the problem. 

c. Normally support of the on-orbit operation will principally 

use OV PCM and voice data. However, at times, review of 

other types of information will be required. Because of the 

amount of PCM data requiring real time processing, only 

limited Gemini B PCM data will be handled during real time. 

Therefore, to secure additional information, Gemini B will be 

processed postpass. Also in this category is the OV-recorded 

PCM data which is required postpass to further evaluate the 

payload activities (MCD). 

d. The requirement exists to scan the OV-recorded PCM data to 

check its quality. Operationally, it is proposed that OV 

recorder No. 1 be used from one RTS to the next. The 

information on that recorder will then be played back at 

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the first opportunity. Recorder No. 2 will be used during 

the next rev. In the meantime, the playback of recorder 

No. 1 data will be checked for quality. If the quality is 

unsatisfactory due to transmission difficulties, data from 

both OV tape recorders will be played back over the next 

station (as the time of the next RTS pass allows, giving 

priority to the current data). 

It is proposed that, as soon as physically possible (within hours of the 

OV pass over the RTS), the raw tapes containing the PCM, voice, FM/FM, and 

Gemini B data be returned physically to the STC. Therefore, the RTS must 

retain dubbed tapes temporarily while the original tapes are in transit to 

the STC. 

6.3.3.4 STC Processing 

The STC receives OV data via: (1) the 2400 bps communication lines from the 

RTS; (2) the microwave link from VTS; (3) hard copy or magnetic storage 

physically transported from RTS, MCSF or contractor in-house complexes; and 

(4) data phones from the MCSF. The method of handling and processing MOL 

data received by the STC depends on the form of the data. 

a. 2400 bps Data - Most of the data coming from the RTS via 

the 2400 bps lines is in a form that can be immediately 

displayed or transferred to the data bases. Therefore, 

the STC computers, after identifying the data, will direct 

the data to the proper display within the MCC. As required, 

that same data will also be put in the MOL data base. 

Data will be selected by the CDC-3800 computers for further 

processing, display, and/or storage and then retrieved for 

immediate display, for delayed display, or for call-up. 

Data such as command verification and tracking data will be 

used to update information being formulated for future RTS 

passes. 

The MCC has manual control over MOL data processing at the 

RTSs and the STC. Should an analysis indicate the need for 

a different mode of processing, the desired mode can be 

called up by utilizing the appropriate keyboard within 

the MCC. Ten to 20 different TLM processing modes will 

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be available; these modes vary from general handling and 

processing of all TLM parameters to monitoring points 

associated only with a particular subsystem. 

b. VTS Microwave Link - Selected data will be transmitted from 

VTS over the microwave link to the STC. 

c. Hard Copy and Magnetic Storage - MCSF and the contractors' 

in-house complexes will have the capability to produce 

either hard copies of data or digital tapes. The hard copy 

data will be delivered to the MCC and used for supplementary 

analysis. The digital tapes will be processed by the STCs 

ADS system to update the data bases, for additional MCC 

information, and/or for backup data for in-depth analyses. 

Digital discpacks can also be received from the RTS. These 

would contain processed data from the RTS computers and would 

be installed in the CDC-3800 STC computer complexes for 

additional processing and/or display in the MCC. 

d. Data Phone - The MCSF will be connected to the STC by data 

phones. As data is processed and is needed, it can be sent 

over the data phone to the ADS within the STC for entry into 

the data base and/or displayed. Since the MOL contractor 

will be connected to the MCSF by data phone, their processed 

data could also be sent via the MCSF to the STC. 

6.3.3.5 Contractors' In-House Complexes 

Each contractor will have an in-house capability for handling and processing 

AFSCF MOL-provided data to isolate the cause of anomalous operations and for 

evaluating the operation of their OV equipments. This capability will be 

integrated with that necessary for qualification test and acceptance test 

data processing. The in-house complex will be able to produce hard copy of 

the processed data and/or tapes. The complexes shall also be able to transmit selected data samples via data phones to the MCSF in Sunnyvale. All 

data used by these contractor complexes will be provided by the MCSF in the 

form of digital computer tapes. No raw RTS tapes will be transmitted to any 

contractor in-house facility. 

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6.3.3.6 Uplink Data Handling Philosophy 

All uplink data (see Figure 6-16) will be generated at the STC and sent prepass 

to the RTS over the encrypted EXCELS lines. It will be stored in the RTS 

computer in decrypted from. For this reason, teleprinter message content must 

be limited to formats that will not compromise the covert nature of the 

mission and/or adequate safeguards must be instituted (e.g., using either 

cleared personnel or secure procedures). 

During RF contact between the RTS and the OV, the uplink message is encrypted 

and transmitted at a one K bit rate over the command link. Each uplink 

message is made up of variable numbers of blocks. Upon verification of 

receipt of the data or command by the OV command subsystem, transmission of 

the next command message and/or block will be initiated. All uplink data is 

decrypted in the laboratory vehicle by a KGR-29. 

An authenticated header precedes the SPC blocks, computer data, and 

teleprinter to assure the OV that the succeeding blocks are from an authorized -- 

source. In effect, the header allows the data which follows to be identified 

and distributed by the OV. Although a separate header is not sent and 

authenticated by the OV for each block of data, each block contains the 

unique parity check word for that load. Should an interruption occur in the 

uplink message, the OV command subsystem will reject any further commands 

until directed to accept commands by an authenticated word. SPCs will be 

used to initiate and configure the OV for the RTS pass and uplink 

transmission. RTCs will be transmitted in the authenticate mode only. All 

uplink message transmission from the RTS to the OV will be controlled 

nominally from the MCC, but the ability to control message transmission from 

an RTS will be available. 

Because the blocks are parity checked in the ADC on a block-by-block basis, 

any single block error will cause rejection of the entire current message. 

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■—■ 

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NRO APPROVED FOR 

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NRO APPROVED FOR 

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911110M/111VITS SECRETSPECIAL HANDLING 
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6.3.3.7 Downlink Data Handling Philosophy 

Problems exist due to the quantity of data in the OV and the length of 

certain RTS passes. When a large amount of playback data is accumulated 

because of a typical busy operating schedule for the payload, as long as 

90 sec could be required to play back the recorded PCM plus 110 sec to play 

back the recorded voice, or a total of approximately 200 sec to dump both 

(they share the same downlink). This would require in excess of 200 sec 

above 2.5 deg elevation. However, plots of typical record and playback times 

for the MOL operations indicate that there is sufficient time to playback 

the OV recorded PCM and voice data. A typical plot of the anticipated amount 

of PCM and voice data that will be recorded and the time necessary to play it 

back vs the pass time over the RTSs is shown in Figure 6-17. 

Finally, as previously mentioned, there is also a desire to confirm the 

quality of the playback of recorded PCM data before the vehicle record is 

erased. If this is not possible during an RTS pass, the alternate PCM 

recorder shall be used until receipt of good TLM from the last RTS pass is 

confirmed. (Theoretically, the recording capacity of one tape can be 

exceeded between successive RTS TLM passes, making use of the alternate 

recorder necessary and limiting the above procedure.) 

It can be concluded from the above comments that the TLM playback time over 

an RTS must be efficiently used. In addition, contingency conditions could 

drastically affect the amounts of real time data received at the RTS. Therefore, alternate operation procedures must be made for use during contingencies 

to allow for alternate times for the playback, of OV recorded data. 

6.3.3.8 Contingency 

The nominal method of transferring data is described in preceding paragraphs. 

Should anomalous flight operations occur, additional capabilities will 

probably have to be implemented to handle greater quantities of MOL data 

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more rapidly. The VTS-to-STC microwave link will be required to transmit 

large blocks of selected data to the STC. Extensive amounts of recorded 

data may be required on a near real time basis. It may be feasible to 

utilize the RTS-to-STC backup 2400 bps line (at dual RTS stations) to double 

the amount of data being transmitted back to the STC. Supplementary physical 

means may be required for more rapid data transfer from the RTSs to the STC 

and from the STC to other associated MOL processing complexes. 

a. Data Mode Selection - The first course of action during 

contingency situations aboard the OV is to select special 

RTS TLM modes to restrict processing to individual or 

selected groups of parameters, selected parameters restricted 

to systems, selected parameters restricted to the monitoring 

of the performance of certain functions, and/or selected 

parameters restricted to the monitoring of individual subsystems. Ten to 20 different RTS TLM processing modes will 

be available to the MCC. By using these modes, the MCC will 

be able, in real time (depending on the length of the RTS 

pass), to manually isolate and make recommendations for 

correcting an anomalous operation. 

b. Security - As previously mentioned (see paragraph 6.2.3), all 

uplink information under nominal conditions is encrypted 

before it is sent to the OV. The uplink information is 

decrypted before it is sent to the CLU. If required, 

commands may be sent up decrypted, bypassing the decryptors 

in the OV. LM analog voice, VHF voice, and range data are 

not encrypted. 

Backup for the uplink voice is clear analog voice, VHF voice, 

or teleprinter message transmission. 

c. Core Dump - Contingency situations may require use of the ADC 

selectable core dump capability. The ADC selectable core 

dump data is handled and processed by the ADS as nominal PCM 

data. It is included in PCM format 1 and will appear as 

recorded PCM data in the specification data slots of the 

nominal TLM format. Retrieving this data at an RTS will not 

require any special processing except for selecting that RTS 

processing mode which retrieves and transmits the ADC core 

data back to the STC. The extent of the core dump (whole 

or partial) will be determined by the ADC software which has 

been given start and stop core dump addresses. This data 

can be retrieved and handled either as anomalons real time or 

on a postpass basis. 

6-76 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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6.3.4 Voice Communications Philosophy 

Voice communications with the flight crew will be restricted to relaying 

essential data. When the crew is in the laboratory vehicle, all communications concerning payload operation, targeting requirements, crew health, and 

status of the OV will normally be conducted on secure voice. While the crew 

is in the Gemini B, the clear VHF link must be used. At other times, only 

the flight crew or the FD will have the authority to relax the security 

requirement to fit the needs of the situation. 

SGLS voice contacts will normally be scheduled for all station contacts 

where tracking, telemetry, and command are scheduled. During early and late 

orbit and loiter, all RTSs (and other required stations) having a VHF 

capability will be scheduled for VHF voice contacts. During normal orbital 

operations, all stations not scheduled for tracking, telemetry, and command, 

but having pass durations exceeding one minute, will be scheduled to guard 

a voice channel during the period of the pass. Channel guarding will consist 

of providing a listening watch on the designated frequency and pointing the 

appropriate antenna in accordance with the prepays message. The VHF will be 

guarded at IOS, KTS, and OL-5,; for other stations, the SGLS will be used 

unless they have a VHF capability. This will permit the flight crew to alert 

the ground of unexpected problems in advance of the next scheduled TTCV 

contact. 

6.3.5 Flight Planning 

6.3.5.1 General 

The Flight Planning function is described below in greater detail than in 

previous paragraphs. Those factors which must be considered when initially 

selecting an orbit, the problems attendant to orbit sustenance, the orbit 

analysis function during the operation, and the process of flight plan 

generation are discussed. 

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6.3.5.2 Definition of Terms 

The uncommon or MOL-unique terms and symbols used in the following paragraphs 

are grouped below to provide a consolidated listing. Terms having standard 

definitions are not shown here. 

6.3.5.3 

Inclination angle: 

Perigee location (initial): 

Perigee altitude (initial): 

Apogee altitude (initial): 

Satellite repetition parameter: 

Nodal period: 

Vehicle drag factor: 

Ground illumination sun angle: 

Orbital solar incidence angle: 

Initial Orbital Selection 

i (deg) 

6 (deg of let) 

p 

h (n mi) 

p 

h

a 

(n mi) 

q (rev/sidereal day) 

T

n 

(min.) 

W/CDA (lb/sq ft) 

n (deg) 

(deg) 

Orbit selection will be performed by the Flight Planning organization 

assisted by Orbit Analysis and Command Generation. Initial orbit selection 

will provide the required information for trajectory determination to 

Launch Operations. 

The primary and alternate orbits selected will be sent to the using agency 

in Washington prior to L -90 days for approval. Typically, the actual launch 

vehicle segment weights will be available at L -120, payload weight estimated 

at L -110, and T-IIIM performance capability (using tag values) at L -95. 

Consequently, the Flight Planning group will have at least five days for 

selection of the primary and alternate orbit. The turnaround sequence 

associated with an alternate orbit must be initiated by L -7 days. To allow 

adequate flexibility, it has been proposed that a late change could be made 

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to the apogee altitude for the alternate mission (together with a slight 

perigee latitude change), but that the perigee altitude inclination, and the 

pitch program associated with the alternate mission ascent profile remain 

fixed. This would result in a revised alternate mission which would best 

satisfy any particular change to mission requirements as late as seven days 

prior to launch. Since the pitch program for the alternate orbit will be less 

severe than that of the primary orbit, a loads analysis and validation need 

not be run for the alternate orbit. Orbit selection is further described in 

Appendix B-2. 

6.3.5.3.1 Orbit Selection Criteria 

The MOL program flight planning philosophy will provide the greatest probability of mission success based upon User requirements and consistent with 

MOL system constraints (and capabilities). Essentially, orbit selection 

is based upon consideration of: 

a. User requirements. 

b. Launch constraints. 

c. Launch vehicle constraints. 

d. Orbiting vehicle constraints. 

e. Tracking station constraints. 

f. Recovery constraints. 

A flow chart showing this concept of orbit selection based on consideration 

of the above items is shown in Figure 6-18. The double arrows indicate that 

the elements are not independent, but, generally, are mutually interdependent. 

A matrix resume of the following paragraphs is shown in Table 6-2. 

The following paragraphs give the major, but not necessarily all, considerations for the requirements and constraints listed above. As will be seen, 

6-81 

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LAUNCH 

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Figure 6-18 Orbit Selection Criteria 

6-82 

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it is not always possible to clearly assign constraints exclusively to any 

one of the categories listed. 

a. User Requirements - Photography of the maximum number of 

targets with a potential for high intelligence value. This 

requirement places emphasis on continuous coverage over the 

area of primary interest with conditions allowing best 

photographic resolution. 

1. Continuous Coverage (no gaps in longitude) - Establishes 

the q parameter which is generally chosen to provide at 

least 3 looks at the area between 80 deg N and 800s lat 

for a 30-day flight. (See Appendix B.3 for further 

details on target coverage frequency.) 

2. Best Photographic Resolution - Requires minimum altitude 

over the area of interest with good target illumination. 

Altitude over the target establishes the range of hp and 

by (bpand q establish haand Tn) . Perigee altitude 

cannot be determined to optimize only the photographic 

requirements as will be shown later. Perigee latitude 

6 can be fixed as nominally over the area of primary 

interest, in this case approximately 55 deg N. 

The ground illumination sun angle (n) is defined as the 

angle between the local horizontal of the target point 

and the sun ray vector. The ground illumination sun 

angle at a particular latitude is principally a function 

of: launch date, launch time, inclination angle, and 

time from launch. The last two factors are explained 

here, the first two in b., below. 

Inclination angle and time from launch determine the 

history of illumination over the area of interest. An 

i = 96.4 deg gives a sun synchronous orbit; therefore, 

with i = 96.4 and a launch at noon (PST), the launch 

latitude will have noon illumination for every daytime 

pass. With i 0 96.4 deg, the precession of the line of 

nodes causes a change in the local time at which the OV 

passes over the launch latitude. The rate of change is 

a function of i, and the total change a function of time 

from launch and the rate of change. Appendix B.1 

provides histograms of the sun angle (n) for various 

length flights for several values of i. 

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b. Launch Constraints - The launch constraints pertinent to 

MOL flight objectives are: 

1. Desired ground illumination sun angle (n). 

2. Orbital solar incidence angle ($) constraint of +60 deg. 

3. Launch abort recovery constraints. 

(a) Sunrise at AFWTR < T = 0 < sunset at AFWTR. 

(b) T = 0 < sunset -2.45 hr at 40 deg S (Mode C abort 

recovery region). 

Launch date effects can be illustrated simply by the fact 

that launch in mid-winter will find high latitude targets 

dark or poorly lighted much of the time. 

Launch time effects can be shown by the fact that noon 

launches will provide good illumination over the area of 

interest (for at least the first few days of the flight); 

evening or morning launches will provide poor illumination. 

Launch time also determines whether photographs are taken 

on the ascending or descending portion of the orbit. As 

a general rule, night launches (not planned for early manned 

flights) would require ascending photography while daytime 

launches dictate descending photography. 

Appendix B.1 shows the effects launch date and illumination 

angle (n), as a function of latitude and inclination angle. 

The launch time, launch date, and inclination angle also 

affect the orbital solar incidence angle (B). The B angle 

is dictated by vehicle environmental thermal and power 

constraints. Currently the vehicle is designed to operate 

within a B envelope of +60 deg. However, operational 

requirements can be met within a B variation of +45 deg. 

Launch abort recovery constraints are associated with daylight 

considerations at the launch pad and in the 40 deg lat Mode C 

abort region. These further affect launch time for any 

given launch date. 

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Constraint charts which include the above considerations are 

discussed in Appendix B.1. These constraint charts provide a 

basis for thorough investigation of the tradeoffs and for 

determination of launch window as a function of launch date. 

c. Launch Vehicle Constraints - The primary constraint on the 

launch vehicle is the payload it is capable of lifting into 

a given orbit. If the weight of the OV is considered fixed, 

the launch vehicle capability may be considered a function 

of i, hp, and ha. At present, for desirable values of hp, 

ha, OV weight and stated launch vehicle capability, i is 

limited to approximately 90 deg and 96.4 deg as maximum 

values for manned and automatic flight, respectively. A more 

complete explanation of the launch vehicle constraints is 

provided in Appendix B.1. 

d. Orbiting Vehicle Constraints - OV constraints consist of 

Gemini B constraints and laboratory vehicle constraints. 

The Gemini B is constrained to an approximate upper altitude 

limit on haof 215 n mi at i = 80 deg decreasing to 205 n mi 

or i = 91.5 deg in a linear manner. This constraint is 

imposed by its capability to safely reenter from any point on 

the orbit. 

Studies are in process to determine allowable increases in ha 

vs restrictions in the deboost point. 

Laboratory vehicle constraints include the 8 constraint of 

/sic 60 deg, an allocation of propellants for 0/A equivalent 

to approximately 415 fps AV and a low limit of haof 120 n mi 

based on safe orbit and AV for 0/A. The OV constraints are 

discussed in- Appendix B.2. 

e. Tracking Station Constraints - With a network of seven geographically fixed RTSs, changes in i, ha, hp, and dpaffect 

the number, sequence, and duration of RTS contacts. Requirements for some minimum time period above a given minimum 

elevation angle (2 min above 2.5 deg) for TLM, commanding 

and secure voice--as well as a station's physical obscure--

reduce the total RTS contacts to some lesser number of usable 

contacts. 

Targeting requirements which necessitate changes in the 

orbital inclination angle between 80 and 100 deg can change 

the RTS contact pattern drastically. The duration of the 

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pass and rev numbers for contact from a particular station 

will change as the inclination angle is varied. For inclinations of 80, 85, 90, and 96.4 deg, those revs over a five 

day period for which no station contacts are available are 

shown in Table 6-3. The first set of data includes Pogo, 

Kodi, Hula, Boss, and Cook and the second set of data 

includes Wake and Guam in addition to those in the first 

set of data. Even though the data presented has sampled 

only five days of an orbit, with a 15 day repeat cycle it 

is believed that the trend shown is valid. This trend shows 

the number of revs where no RTS contacts are available to 

be generally decreasing as the inclination angle is increased 

between 80 and 96.4 deg. A particular rev where contacts are 

needed may necessitate a requirement or constraint on the 

range of acceptable orbital inclination angles (e.g., if a 

contact on rev 5 is required, the 80 and 85 deg orbits would 

be unacceptable). 

The enhancement gained from the addition of Guam and Wake as 

RTSs is clearly shown in Table 6-3. This enhancement is 

maximized at inclination angles of 90 and 96.4 deg. 

The effect of varying the q parameter while holding the inclination angle constant is considered to have a negligible 

effect upon the station contact problem. 

f. Recovery Constraints 

1. Recovery Force Redeployment at 40 deg Latitude - Coverage 

of the 40 deg S latitude region to satisfy the Mode C 

launch abort requirements does not appear to be a constraining factor for orbits with inclinations between 

80 and 100 deg. 

2. Mode C and Mode D Abort Logic - Changing the inclination 

while maintaining perigee altitude, perigee latitude, 

and satellite repetition parameter will mean that injection will occur at a higher altitude and a larger 

inertial flight path angle. This could affect the Mode CMode D abort logic in the event of a malfunction by 

shortening the time interval during which abort could 

occur by either the Mode C or Mode D abort,concept. It 

is not anticipated that this would create a "dead man's 

zone" based upon the presently established 40 deg S 

impact limit. 

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3. Recovery Ship Deployment and Lateral Speed Required 

Within Recovery Fences - Orbit parameter changes which 

change the satellite repetition parameter will affect 

the lateral speed of the recovery ships within the 

recovery fence. Assuming the use of two ships each with 

an average speed of 15 knots, each ship can cover 360 

n mi in one 24-hr period. At the equator (approximate 

latitude of eastern fence), a ship can cover 6 deg of 

longitude, while at 20 deg N latitude (approximate 

latitude of the Wake fence) the ship can cover 6.4 deg 

of longitude. The most stringent requirement for the 

ship will be that of covering a given longitudinal area 

near the equator. Consequently, the satellite repetition parameter (q) cannot exceed some qmaxwhich is 

determined as follows: 

16 

qmax :- ALEQ 

(1) 

1 - 360 

where ALEQ 

= longitudinal coverage at equator 

in degrees 

Since the ship has the capability of ALmQ= 6°, qmax from 

equation (1) cannot exceed 16.27. If the assumption is 

made that the initial perigee altitude is 80 n mi and 

initial perigee latitude is 55 deg N, it can be shown, 

for orbits of different inclination, that the apogee 

altitude must be greater than, or equal to, those values 

tabulated below for the use of only two recovery ships; 

otherwise, the recovery ships cannot keep up with the 

eastward movement of the ground traces. 

Inclination 

(deg) 

Minimum Acceptable Apogee 

Altitude (n mi) 

80 116 

85 126 

90 136 

95 147 

100 158 

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Based upon the above discussion, it is not anticipated 

that special targeting requirements necessitating orbital 

parameter changes will cause the present recovery fences 

to be changed. 

This constraint is presented here to flag a possible 

problem in the event orbit requirements are changed with 

insufficient time to effect a change in the recovery 

support. The addition of a third ship, ships with 

increased speed, and/or the use of helicopters would 

relax this constraint considerably. 

6.3.5.4 Orbit Sustenance 

The nature of the DORIAN mission has necessitated a requirement to maintain 

the perigee location between certain latitudes and maintain certain ground 

trace coverage patterns. 

Atmospheric drag and the effects of the nonspherical gravitational potential 

are the primary factors which result in orbital decay and apsidal rotation. 

Orbital decay reduces h

p

, h

a 

with an attendant increase in q, changing the 

ground trace coverage pattern. Apsidal rotation results in a change to 6p, 

thereby changing the altitude over the target area with an accompanying 

change in photographic resolution. The orbital sustenance technique proposed 

for MOL will correct h

p

, h

a

, and 6p. 

A AV of 415 fps is allocated for orbit sustenance from a total ACTS/Prop 

capability of 460 fps AV. A two-burn 0/A will be accomplished approximately 

every 48th rev to correct the orbital parameters. In the case of the lower 

inclination orbits (i.e., i< 85 deg), apsidal rotation correction is "free". 

For orbits where i < 85 deg, apsidal rotation requires the second burn to be 

in a reverse direction and costs additional AV. A more detailed explanation 

of the sustenance technique is presented in Appendix B.4. 

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6.3.5.5 Oribt Analysis 

In general, an orbit update will be required to meet the SP/DR prediction 

accuracy requirements every 2-4 revs plus an LRL, depending upon the 

atmospheric conditions. For polar orbits, the ephemeris prediction accuracy 

requirement (based on five tracking station passes) probably can be met the 

first day after rev 4. In general, a fit can be made from only one tracking 

station pass if the pass is of at least 1 min duration; the accuracy 

associated with this type of fit, however, is typically no better than an 

indication of being orbital. After approximately 8-10 station passes, 

additional tracking station passes will not enhance the prediction 

accuracies. 

After an orbit adjust, if tracking data only is used, 3 tracking station 

passes will be required to reestablish the desired ephemeris prediction 

accuracies. If an orbit adjust is performed on subcycle 12, adequate 

tracking data will have been generated by subcycle 1 to meet the required 

ephemeris prediction accuracies (see Table 6-4). This is important for 

payload targeting. Table 6-4 is based upon a 5 deg minimum elevation angle 

station capability for a duration of 2 min and, as such, is quite conservative since the baseline operation will consider SGLS operable as low as 2.5 

deg. 

6.3.5.6 Flight Plan Generation 

The flight planning software described in 6.2.3.3.1.1 provides an automatic 

capability to assist in developing a flight plan. Flight planning considers: 

orbit selection, station selection/scheduling, TLM mode selection/scheduling, 

special flight requirements scheduling, command loading station selection, 

flight crew activities, payload activities, orbit adjust scheduling, STC 

computer load scheduling, tape recorder readout scheduling, expendables 

management, Gemini B reentry and laboratory vehicle disposal. 

The FVTL will serve as a basis for initial flight plan development. 

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Table 6-4. Station Contacts (5 deg Minimum Elevation) of 

at Least Two Minutes Duration 

(i = 90°) 

Day 

No. of Station Contacts 

Subcycle 

12 13 14 15 16 1 Total 

1 0 2 2 1 1 0 6 

2 0 2 2 1 1 0 6 

3 0 2 1 1 1 0 5 

4 0 2 2 1 1 0 6 

5 0 2 2 1 0 0 5 

6 0 1 2 1 0 1 5 

7 0 1 2 1 0 1 5 

8 0 1 2 1 0 1 5 

9 0 1 1 2 1 1 6 

10 0 0 1 2 1 1 5 

11 0 0 1 2 1 1 5 

12 0 0 2 2 1 1 6 

13 0 0 2 2 1 1 6 

14 0 0 2 2 1 1 6 

15 0 0 2 2 1 1 6 

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6.4 POWERED FLIGHT OPERATIONS 

6.4.1 General 

Powered Flight Operations includes those activities performed in support of 

powered flight ascent and the retro sequence and reentry operation. These 

activities also include preflight checkout activities, and writing the POADs 

and the final test reports. These operational phases include those periods 

from liftoff to orbital insertion and from preparation for retrorocket 

firing to splashdown. This latter time period covers both the reentry 

following ascent abort and reentry from orbit. 

6.4.2 Background 

The MCR displays and computer programs used during powered flight were designed 

using the following constraints: 

a. Only those parameters that provide direct detection of slow 

malfunctions leading to an abort or guidance switchover 

decision, or that are displayed to the flight crew, will be 

monitored on the ground. 

b. Two indications (cues) of any malfunction will be available to 

the ground monitor to minimize the possibility of erroneous 

abort or guidance switchover recommendations. 

c. The ground monitoring system is not required to detect two 

serial malfunctions. 

d. If possible, all parameters will be capable of being displayed 

on hardware specified in the ADS design specifications. 

e. Selected spacecraft-displayed parameters will also be displayed 

in the MCC. 

f. All information required for real-time display monitoring will 

be available in the main room of the MCC. 

6.4.3 MCR Console'Operator Functions 

During launch and ascent, MCR console configuration will be as shown in 

Figure 6-19, and the parameters required for the abort/switchover decision 

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shall be displayed in real time. During this time, seven consoles, consisting 

of 23 bays and one X-Y plotboard, are required for presentation of the display 

parameters to the 11 ground monitors (controllers) in the MCR. Three consoles 

require one monitor each, and four (guidance, booster, trajectory/retrofire, 

and flight support) require two monitors each. 

These displays are based on monitoring powered flight ascent from liftoff to 

orbit injection and include no special prelaunch phase monitoring displays. 

In the event of an ascent abort, the Ascent Abort Touchdown Prediction Program 

(Ref. 4) is called into the CDC-3800 core, and the appropriate reentry 

parameters are computed and displayed, in lieu of the ascent monitoring 

parameters. Subsequent to orbital injection, the Reentry Support Program 

(Ref. 5), which is loaded into the CDC-3800 by the orbital flight support tape, 

will use the console for the display of parameters appropriate to each of its 

task modes of operation. 

The MCR, as the focal point for detailed mission control, will be manned by 

MOL SPO and AFSCF personnel. These personnel may be functionally 

subdivided into the three following groups: 

a. Powered Flight Command and Control Group. 

b. Powered Flight Systems Operations Group. 

c. Powered Flight Dynamics Group. 

These groups will provide direct support to the FD, AD, and RD. 

6.4.3.1 Powered Flight Command and Control Group 

This group exercises real-time control during powered flight from operating 

positions located in the main control room of the MCC. The group will: 

(1) analyze prelaunch operations to ensure that mission control criteria have 

been met; (2) direct the Powered Flight Operations; (3) monitor and analyze 

powered flight progress continuously; (4) alter the MCC powered flight profile 

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where necessary to remain consistent with Flight Plans and Flight Test Rules; 

(5) coordinate all flight control activities within the MCC and the AFSCF 

network; and (6) monitor the network tracking, data acquisition, and 

communication operations. 

This group includes MD, FD, RD, AD, FTFD, AFD/CO, and the TC. 

6.4.3.2 Powered Flight Systems Operations Group 

This group, in the MCR, is composed of three flight controllers and is 

responsible to the AD for monitoring, evaluating, and analyzing the 

performance of all electrical, mechanical, and life support systems aboard 

the FV. In addition, this group is responsible for determining preventive, 

alternate, or remedial actions if contingencies and malfunctions occur. This 

group will: (1) Analyze and continuously evaluate all pertinent FV systems 

performance during powered flight, utilizing FV telemetry, tracking, and 

flight crew reports. (2) Detect slow malfunctions or impending slow 

malfunctions in FV systems during powered flight. (3) Diagnose malfunctions 

to determine effects and probable cause. (4) Recommend actions (including 

abort recommendations, if the situation dictates) to the AD and to the 

flight crew to correct or circumvent malfunctions or impending malfunctions. 

(5) Maintain trends of Gemini B consumable quantities and recommend appropriate 

actions based on these analyses. (6) Correlate data to accomplish the above 

tasks. 

This group includes the two Booster Controllers and the AFD/VA. 

6.4.3.3 Powered Flight Dynamics Group 

This group, comprised of the Trajectory Controller, Retrofire Officer, and two 

Guidance Controllers, is concerned primarily with FV trajectories. It monitors 

and evaluates aspects of powered flight concerning crew safety and orbital 

insertion and continuously updates retrofire information for both planned and 

contingency reentry. 

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6.4.3.4 Ascent Director 

The AD (see paragraph 3.5.1.3) will be responsible to the MD for the 

direction of ground monitoring personnel within the MCC. The AD is 

responsible for actions and decisions concerning: 

a. Abort recommendations to the flight crew during ascent. 

b. Guidance switchover recommendations during ascent. 

c. Touchdown data transmission to the RCR. 

d. Application of mission rules caused by anomalous FV behavior. 

During powered flight, the AD will interface with the AFSCF and other supporting agencies through the FTFD and will exercise direct control over the other 

10 ground monitoring personnel (controllers) in the MCR during powered flight. 

The capability of contacting any of the trajectory/retrofire, guidance, launch 

vehicle and OV systems consoles displays will be provided to the AD during 

the powered flight ascent phase. 

6.4.3.5 Trajectory/Retrofire Controllers 

During powered flight ascent, the trajectory/retrofire console will be manned 

by the Trajectory and Retrofire Controllers. Their primary functions are: 

a. To monitor the ascent trajectory to determine whether 

trajectory deviations due to vehicle malfunctions are such that 

an abort recommendation to the AD (if time permits) and/or 

flight crew is necessary. 

b. To provide predicted touchdown data and delayed abort information to the AD and other 632A MCC ground monitors as required. 

During reentry from orbit, the primary functions of the Trajectory/Retrofire 

Controllers are: 

a. To ensure that a safe deboost and reentry will occur for 

nominal or off-nominal orbital conditions. 

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b. To provide reentry and recovery data for transmission to the 

flight crew prior to deorbit. 

c. To ensure proper MCC/recovery force coordination. 

6.4.3.5.1 Ascent Monitoring 

The primary function of the Trajectory Controller during powered flight ascent 

is to determine the severity of any launch vehicle trajectory deviations that 

may lead to an abort recommendation. The Trajectory Controller may also detect 

trajectory deviations which would indicate a guidance slow malfunction; however, 

the recommendation for a guidance switchover command would be given to either 

the AD or Guidance Controller. 

The primary functions of the Retrofire Controller during ascent are to assist 

the Trajectory Controller in observing trajectory deviations that may lead to 

an abort recommendation and verify that the predicted spacecraft touchdown 

point is within the planned recovery areas. The Retrofire Controller may have 

additional duties during the ascent phase: 

a. Recording liftoff time and confirming that the correct liftoff 

time has been entered in the ground computer. 

b. Informing the AD that the vehicle clock has started and advise 

the Guidance Monitor if the spacecraft leads or lags the 

ground elapsed time. 

c. Confirming flight events with the AFD for crew operation. 

The Retrofire Controller must also be notified of the location of various 

recovery forces and current weather conditions in the abort areas through 

intercom with the RCR. 

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For ascent operations, the MOL baseline ascent abort modes and associated 

flight sequences have been defined as follows: 

a. Mode A Abort - (on pad to approximately 30 sec in flight) -

Automatic or manual thrust terminate, manual salvofire six 

retrorockets (posigrade) on the spacecraft for maximum 

altitude and then seat ejection from the spacecraft. 

b. Mode B Abort - (from approximately 30 sec after liftoff to an 

inertial velocity of 24,000 fps) - Thrust terminate, separate 

from launch vehicle, salvofire six or two retrorockets 

posigrade) and descend to drogue chute altitude using a full 

lift entry attitude, deploy recovery system, and land with 

spacecraft. 

c. Mode C Abort - (from an inertial velocity of 24,000 fps to 

approximately 488 sec of flight time) - Thrust terminate, 

separate and reorient spacecraft, time retrofire (six rockets 

in retrograde direction), descend to drogue chute altitude 

using a variable bank angle entry attitude (predetermined to 

achieve a desired touchdown point) and complete normal spacecraft recovery. 

d. Mode D Abort - (used only the last few seconds of ascent to 

abort into orbit for a minimum lifetime of 14 hr with the 

Gemini B detached) - Separate the OV from the T-IIIM, 

accelerate to orbital velocity with laboratory ACTS, perform 

degraded mission to the extent possible. 

Should an abort be recommended, the Retrofire Controller will 

receive additional display information relevant to the spacecraft reentry as computed by the Ascent Abort Touchdown Task 

Ref. 6). 

6.4.3.5.2 Reentry Monitoring 

The primary function of the Trajectory/Retrofire Controllers during on-orbit 

operations is to support nominal or abort reentry planning prior to orbital 

deboost and to transmit updated information to the flight crew after deboost. 

The various displays, available to the ground monitors, support the above 

functions based on four reentry program task modes (Ref. 5); tine ascent abort 

task mode, which supports the ascent monitoring requirements, is also defined. 

The detailed explanation of the logic capabilities and computations involved 

in accomplishing the reentry tasks are discussed in Ref. 5. 

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6.4.3.6 Guidance Controllers 

The primary function of the Guidance Controllers is to analyze the status of 

the BIGS, GIGS, the launch vehicle ARS, and data from the GERTS to determine 

which onboard guidance system should be used as the primary system for steering 

the vehicle. BIDS will initially assume the primary guidance system role 

unless and until a malfunction occurs in this system. A malfunction may cause 

ascent trajectory deviations from the nominal profile or a detrimental effect 

on the FV, the Guidance Controllers will then make the guidance switchover 

recommendation that would be transmitted to the AD (if time permits) and/or 

flight crew. Conversely, if the GIGS should fail, a switchover inhibit 

recommendation will be made to the AD and/or flight crew. The Guidance 

Controllers will also be required to provide BIGS and GIGS status information 

to the other ground monitors, particularly the Trajectory/Retrofire Controllers. 

They will transmit, to the AD or the AFD/CO, their observations for relay to 

the flight crew based on their monitoring of the pertinent displays. 

6.4.3.7 Booster Controllers 

The primary responsiblity of the Booster Controllers is to analyze the launch 

vehicle propulsion and control systems to aid in determining abort recommendations under the following conditions: 

a. Loss or degradation of the launch vehicle control system 

resulting in deviations of the ascent trajectory or possible 

structural breakup. 

b. Pressure drops in the Stage I and/or Stage II propulsion 

system tanks during Stage 0 leading to structural breakup. 

c. Failure of one or both of the Stage I subassemblies to ignite 

or perform within established limits. 

d. Premature shutdown of one or both Stage I subassemblies prior 

to SRM staging. 

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e. Failure of the Stage II engine to ignite or perform within 

established limits. 

f. Any non-nominal performance not causing structural breakup but 

resulting in a hazard to crew safety and/or mission success. 

In addition, the Booster Controllers will inform the AD and other console 

monitors when Stage I and/or Stage II tank pressures are non-nominal but the 

vehicle is not in danger of structural breakup, and when one of the core 

engines is operating below minimum specified limits. The low tank pressure 

warning will inform MCC personnel that a problem exists in the propulsion 

pressurization system. Low tank pressures could lead to an abort situation, 

or cause non-nominal engine performance resulting in deviations of the ascent 

trajectory. 

The low engine performance warning indicates that deviations in the ascent 

trajectory may occur which could lead to an abort recommendation by the 

Trajectory Controllers. The Booster Controller will have the capability of 

recommending abort action to the AD (if time permits) and/or the flight crew 

based on the propulsion and control parameters monitored. 

6.4.3.8 OV Systems Controller 

The primary function of the OV Systems Controller during ascent is to analyze 

those systems of the Gemini B spacecraft and the laboratory vehicle in which 

malfunctions during powered flight ascent could lead to an abort 

recommendation to the AD and Trajectory/Retrofire Controllers. It should be 

noted, however, that he will not recommend abort action directly to the 

flight crew. The prime reason for this is the direct correlation required 

between the type of OV system malfunction and the vehicle trajectory prior to 

initiating an abort recommendation to the flight crew. The systems to be 

monitored are: 

a. Gemini B 

1. Reentry control system 

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2. Environmental control system 

3. Electrical power system 

4. Instrumentation system 

b. Laboratory Vehicle 

1. Attitude control and translation system. 

2. Electrical power system. 

3. Environmental control/Life Support System. 

In addition, the OV System Controller will provide OV status information to the 

other ground monitoring consoles as required, and to the flight crew via the 

Crew Communicator. GIGS monitoring will be performed by the Guidance 

Controllers. 

6.4.3.9 Assistant Flight Director for Crew Operation 

The primary function of the AFD/CO during ascent is to provide ground-monitored 

flight information to the flight crew. In this role, the AFD/CO will be the 

primary source of ground communication to the flight crew, relating flight 

events during powered flight ascent (e.g., programmed pitch and roll 

maneuvers, staging, engine start, etc.). 

The role of the AFD/CO will differ from that of the AD in terms of authority 

concerning ground monitoring recommendations to the flight crew. The AD will 

have the responsiblity for all decisions made concerning ground monitoring 

and will relay flight information to the crew and make recommendations on 

crew status to the AD. The display capability available to the AFD/CO will 

be similar to that of the AD to provide adequate flight information to the 

crew concerning specific events a required. 

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6.4.3.10 AFSCF Flight Support 

The FTFD and the TC will be primarily responsible for the status of the 

supporting AFSCF network at all times. (Their individual roles during the 

launch and ascent phases are defined in Section 3.0). They will report and 

respond to the FD and maintain close liaison with the AFSCF System Controller 

to maintain the integrity of the supporting network elements. Their general 

functions will include: 

a. Coordinating requirements and assuring quality of supporting 

elements of the AFSCF and AFWTR interfaces. 

b. Knowledge of validity and selection of all data and communication sources. 

c. Responsiblity for maintaining data quality. 

d. Responsiblity for recommending switching of prime computers 

and non-EXCELS data transmission lines assigned to the MOL 

program during powered flight to backup devices in the event 

that processing or quality is degraded. 

The above functions will be performed in close liaison with the AFSCF ND and 

those specialized support personnel located in remote areas. 

These personnel will work closely with all MCR monitoring personnel, and, in 

particular, with the Trajectory/Retrofire Controllers during the powered 

flight ascent phase. They will not, however, be in the loop for real-time 

decisions (abort or guidance switchover) based on vehicle performance during 

powered flight. 

6.4.4 Interfaces 

6.4.4.1 AFSCF 

The AFSCF interface is handled through the FTFD/TC and includes the AFWTR, 

(1 each Range to coordinate all Government agency facility interfaces). 

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6.4.4.2 Flight Crew 

Since the flight crew, Gemini B cockpit displays, and the FV MDS are prime for 

the ascent phase, the real-time interface between the MCR and the flight crew 

will primarily be in support of the crew in the slow malfunction area (those 

malfunctions with 6 sec or greater lead time from first indication to 

catastrophic results). The MCR will also serve as a backup for the crew 

displays. The MCR will make recommendations regarding abort and guidance 

switchover. The reentry interface consists of providing parameters for 

reinitializing the Gemini B computer and confirmation of airborne computer 

outputs. 

6.4.4.3 Recovery Control Room 

The RCR is located in the MOL MCC and is controlled by DDMS. This agency has 

the responsiblity for the spacecraft recovery and crew retrieval. The MCR 

will supply to the RCR the best available information regarding the anticipated 

landing point and time and information regarding the reentry altitude, position, — 

and time profile. 

6.4.4.4 Launch Control Center 

Voice only to the level necessary through the FD/LD. 

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6.5 ORBITAL OPERATIONS 

6.5.1 General 

Orbital Operations consists of those activities required to control the MOL 

during the orbital phase of the Operations Test to satisfy the flight objectives. These activities range from flight preparation to on-orbit control 

of MOL, to the writing of final test reports. The full range of these 

activities is described below, except for those prelaunch activities 

associated with training of operations crews (see Section 11.0) and the flight 

test data evaluation (see Section 9.0). 

This discussion ties together the functions described in other parts of this 

document and provides details to make the profile in Section 4.0 more meaningful. Repetitive major activities or functions, as well as those that may only 

occur once (e.g., laboratory vehicle disposal) are described. 

This material provides a typical picture of nominal operations; no attempt is 

made to account for the variety of activities categorized as "special case". 

During the orbital operations phase, the MCR is configured as shown in Figure 

6-20. 

6.5.2 Nominal Duties of Operations Elements 

The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the duties of each of 

the elements shown in Figure 6-20 during the orbital phase. While this is 

redundant to information contained in Section 3.0, it is included here to make 

this discussion more independent of Section 3.0, and to refresh the reader on 

those aspects of the functions most important to orbital operations. 

a. Flight Director 

1. Responsible for overall program control, crew 

safety, and mission requirements. 

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2. Levies requirements on the AFSCF through the 

FTFD. 

3. Reviews real time operation and approves 

any action that will result in a change 

to the pass plan prior to accomplishment 

of that action. 

4. Responsible for overall program readiness. 

b. FTFD 

1. Exercises detailed control of all elements 

of the AFSCF, affiliated agencies supporting 

program, and specifically, operational 

elements of the MCC. He is responsible for 

adherence to program profiles, flight test 

rules, and emergency probedures. 

2. Verifies readiness of global network to FD. 

3. Evaluates operational capabilities of MCC 

systems in accordance with directives and 

flight test rules. 

4. Conducts validations, exercises, and rehearsals 

as required to ensure operational capability 

of all AFSCF software, hardware, and personnel 

affiliated with the program. 

c. Test Controller 

1. Responsible to the FTFD for smooth integration 

and detailed implementation of flight planning 

and control procedures. Assists FTFD as 

necessary in all CO functions. 

2. Specifically responsible for schedules, network 

discipline, and adherence to procedures. 

3. Maintains close liaison with subsystem technical 

advisors to ensure timely knowledge of subsystem 

status. 

4. Advises FTFD of possible changes to flight 

planning as a result of hardware or software 

planning throughout global network, and STC 

in particular. 

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5. Maintains close liaison with Network Control 

to ensure satisfaction of program requirements. 

d. AFD/CO 

1. Responsible for flight crew/MCC operations 

and crew health. 

2. Ensures effective voice communications 

between MCC and flight crew. 

3. Assists flight crew in following flight plan. 

4. Makes recommendations to the FD concerning 

flight crew status. 

e. AFD/VA 

Monitors OV systems in real time during RTS passes 

and informs FD of any significant status events. 

Works with TA staff on vehicle systems problems, 

follows up on special problem areas as FD representative. 

f. Command Controller 

1. Maintains close liaison with FTFD, SPO, TC, 

and Command Generation to ensure exact status 

knowledge of all command messages. 

2. Monitors and controls all aspects of transmission of command messages to tracking stations. 

3. Keeps FTFD and TC informed of status of all 

command messages. 

g. Data Controller 

1. Monitors and controls all aspects of the data 

system assigned to MOL. Ensures that programs 

are run on schedule. 

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2. Takes remedial action when required to ensure 

uninterrupted data flow. 

3. Keeps FTFD and TC advised of status of data 

system. 

The following important elements are not represented in the control room 

but deserve a review at this point. 

h. Command Generation 

1. Composes command messages, on a timely basis, 

to be sent to the vehicle. 

2. Ensures that command messages contain all 

instructions required to follow the flight 

plan. 

3. Works closely with data coordination to 

ensure most recent ephemeris information is 

utilized. 

4. Works closely with orbit analysis to ensure 

accurate command messages for orbit adjust, 

deboost, and reentry. 

i. Orbit Analysis 

1. Maintains current orbital parameters. 

2. Makes all 0/A computations and advises 

the FTFD when such action might be required. 

3. Makes rapid calculations to provide an early 

orbit definition to the FTFD. 

4. Performs all computations and recommendations 

concerning reentry and deboost. 

5. Works closely with data coordinator to ensure 

most timely information is being used in 

referenced computations. 

6. Assists the TC maintain strict adherence to 

the flight plan. 

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7. Conducts analysis diagnostics and study runs 

as required by the FTFD in any aspect of orbital 

mechanics. 

j. Natural Aerospace Environment Technical Advisor 

(M0L STAFFMET) 

See Section 12.0. 

k. TA Staff (Aerospace/Contractors) 

1. Reviews status of OV systems health after 

each RTS pass. 

2. Advises FD of any trends toward anomalous OV 

conditions. 

3. Flags anomalous OV conditions. 

4. Supports software operation with design and 

programming personnel. 

5. Runs or directs in-depth analysis of any OV 

system anomalies discovered. 

1. AFD/FP 

1. Is the FD representative in working problems 

with The User, Command Generation, and Orbit 

Analysis. 

2. Updates the flight plan over a one-to-two-day 

interval based on User requirements. 

3. Evaluates the payload activity using the mission 

correlation data. 

m. AFD/RRP 

1. Is the FD representative to coordinate orbital 

operational matters with the RD. 

2. Coordinates the periodic update of Gemini B 

reentry parameters with Orbit Analysis. 

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3. Coordinates DRY reentry requirements for the FD 

and command generation with the RCG and Orbit 

Analysis. 

4. Coordinates the laboratory vehicle deboost 

sequence with Oribt Analysis, command generation, 

and government agencies cooperation in assuring 

remnants of the LV are recovered or destroyed. 

6.5.3 Nominal Operations 

6.5.3.1 Normal Rev-to-Rev Operations 

The description of pass activity begins with the prepass briefing and makes 

the following assumptions: 

a. No anomalies exist or will be encountered. 

b. All plans for the forthcoming pass have been made. 

c. All prerequisite activity (e.g., command generation, 

orbit planning, etc.) required for the pass and the 

briefing are in progress or complete. 

d. The pass is a typical orbital operation (i.e., no 

special case such as reentry or laboratory vehicle 

disposal). 

6.5.3.2 Prepass Briefing 

The prepass briefing is conducted by the TC and is attended by an authorized 

representative of the MD*; FD; FTFD; TAs; AFD/CO; AFD/VA; AFD/FP; AFD/RRP; 

Orbit Analysis; Data Controller; Command Controller; Command Generator. 

The briefing is held at approximately RTS acquisition -45 min to discuss the 

proposed real-time operations plan for the pass to provide general understanding, to allow for minor but essential changes in the plan, and to obtain 

FD/FTFD concurrence. 

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A typical agenda for the prepass briefing may be as follows: 

a. Orbit Analysis will brief on the geometrical 

aspects of the station contact such as: (for 

each station involved if there are more than 

one) rise time, set time, total contact time, 

maximum pass elevation, time available to 

meet TLM readout and commanding constraints. 

b. Command Generator will brief on the command 

aspects of the pass such as: critical OV SPCs 

that will be executed in conjunction with the 

pass; RTCs that will be sent and those that 

will conflict with OV activity if sent; significant contents of the command message to be 

loaded including payload activity, rev span 

for the message, Gemini B reentry information, 

etc.; optimum message transmission times; 

possible contingency actions; etc. 

c. AFD/VA systems briefing will consist of a 

report on the status of OV and any problems 

noted or anticipated. It will also include 

the TLM modes required for the next pass, 

questions requiring answers from the flight 

crew and any rationale necessary. 

d. AFD/CO briefing will include a briefing on 

flight crew health and list of voice 

information to be passed to the crew. This will 

consist of instructions and questions requiring 

crew action and answers. 

e. The TC will poll the representatives not 

presenting briefings to see if they have questions 

and comments, make his own comments, ask for 

concurrence with the plan from the FTFD and FD, 

and adjourn the prepass briefing. 

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6.5.3.3 MCC Prepass Preparation 

Following the prepass briefing, the following actions are taken by the organization indicated to assure that the MCC and the AFSCF are prepared for the 

pass: 

a. The TC briefs the RTS personnel on all pass 

activity that affects their station operation. 

He ensures that all necessary AFSCF resources 

required to support the pass have been scheduled 

and are available. 

b. The Data Controller assures that the RTS is 

furnished with all data required for station 

configuration and antenna pointing, that AFSCF 

communications are aware of the communication 

requirements. 

c. The Command Controller assures that a valid command 

message has been transmitted to the RTS and its 

retransmission to the STC has been checked for 

accuracy. 

d. The AFD/VA assures that OV displays are properly 

called up and configured and that all required 

telemetry has been programmed for the pass. 

6.5.3.4 Real-Time Activities 

The real-time pass starts at approximately ETA -1 minute with the RTS antennas positioned and the receivers in frequency search. The significant 

action taken by each organization is delineated below: 

a. The RTS reports its status; searches for the OV 

transmitter about the predicted frequency; 

acquires the signal and locks on, in frequency, 

angles, and range and begins tracking. Tracking 

data is transmitted to the STC. Once the TLM 

discriminators and decommutators are in lock, 

the requested TLM mode data is transmitted to the 

STC. Secure voice transmission between the OV and 

the MCR is relayed to both points from the RTS, 

but boice is not generally available at the RTS 

in decrypted form. All data received by the RTS, 

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both by RF from the OV and hardwire from the MCC, 

is magnetically recorded with system time for 

record. After the OV fades the RTS reports fade, 

secures its antennas, receivers, and transmitters, 

and prepares for postpass playback. 

b. The TC directs activity in accordance with the 

pass plan. He keeps the RTS apprised of MCC 

operations affecting their activity (e.g., RTCs 

that turn data links on/off, data system instructions that change TLM modes or transmit command 

messages from the RTS computer memory). The TC 

instructs the command controller to transmit RTCs 

and command loads to the OV. He monitors 

commanding operations to assure that proper 

verification is received for commands and command 

messages. He instructs the Data Controller to 

change RTS TLM modes. He controls all MOL 

dedicated AFSCF resources during the real-time 

pass. 

c. The AFD/CO establishes voice contact with the 

flight crew, obtains a general verbal status of 

their operation since the last RTS contact, relays 

the questions from his pass plan, receives 

answers from the flight crew, receives questions 

from the flight crew and answers in real-time those 

questions possible, deferring to the next pass 

those not readily answered. He gives verbal 

information on the command load and any changes 

in the operations schedule. 

d. OV Systems monitors TLM displays and calls up 

display formats that provide details of the 

applicable subsystems. OV Systems also looks for 

subsystem anomalous operation in real-time to alert 

AFD/VA and to establish any changes to the postpass 

TLM mode requirements with minimum delay. 

e. The TAs monitor the pass by listening to conversations 

between crew/MCR, TC/RTS, TC/Data Coordinator, and 

TC/Command Controller. They monitor certain portions 

of the OV subsystem displays, and assess the 

operation, from a system point of view, to advise 

the FD. 

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6.5.3.5 Postpass Activities 

After the OV has passed beyond the horizon at the RTS, the postpass activities 

begin: 

a. The RTS prepares magnetically recorded data (the 

recorded real time data link and the recorded AVE 

playback data link) for playback through the RTS 

portion of the ADS. The MCC specifies the TLM 

modes to be used for playback of the real-time 

link. Data is extracted from the AVE TLM recorder 

data based on source (i.e., biomedical, OV TLM, 

or crew voice) and those portions transmitted 

to the MCC as requested. Playback will be specified 

by source, time, and TLM mode (in the case of 

OV TLM data). After pos-cpass playback, the RTS 

will dub magnetic recordings for their temporary 

storage library, and prepare the originals 

for air shipment to the STC. 

b. The TC coordinates the OV Systems requirements 

for RTS data playback through the Data Controller. 

c. The TAs report to the FD after they have had 

time to make a systems analysis. They recommend 

any changes they believe necessary in the flight 

plan. 

d. The Flight Planning Group, using payload data 

received from previous passes, runs the MCD programs 

to perform the evaluation function. They run the 

mission planning programs to define the payload 

activity for some future period (e.g., the next day). 

They check this activity for meeting mission constraints and submit it to the FD as a recommended 

plan of action. 

e. OV Systems runs initial short-term trend analysis 

programs to update the TLM trends using the data 

points from the previous pass to predict TLM for 

the next pass. They have the previous pass TLM 

data inserted into the data base pass. They 

perform data analysis to detect any anomalies 

or incipient failures and prepare the OV systems 

briefing for the next pass. 

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f. Orbit Analysis runs orbit and ephemeris 

programs to update the ephemeris with tracking 

data from the previous pass. They analyze 

the data to determine the drag factor and to 

verify that the orbit adjust (0/A) is currently 

scheduled at the right time for orbit maintenance. 

Should an 0/A be required for the next command 

load rev span, the 0/A programs are run to provide 

the 0/A parameters; these parameters are verified 

and inserted into the data base. Orbit analysis 

conducts all study runs concerning reentry 

information, impact prediction, and deboost, and 

all computer runs to determine station look 

angles, pass duration, etc. They prepare the 

briefing for the next pass. 

g. Command Generation runs the command and control 

program picking up from the data base all new 

data inserted since the last rev. They produce 

a command load for the next loading pass to cover 

the load rev span as specified in the flight plan. 

They keep the Command Controller apprised of their 

activity by reporting significant status milestones. 

h. The Data Controller controls the running of all the 

programs on the offline computers in accordance 

with the DSMP. The DSMP is a profile of offline 

computer system utilization and is a subset of the 

flight plan. The Data Controller uses tracking data 

from the previous pass to update the ephemeris. 

i. The FTFD is apprised by the FD of any new requirements 

on the AFSCF generated as a result of postpass activity. 

He requests additional AFSCF resources through Network 

Control. He resolves conflicts with other requesting 

satellite programs to satisfy MOL program requirements. He maintains close liaison with the FD to 

identify possible requirements on the AFSCF as soon 

as possible. He is responsible for the AFSCF personnel within the MCC. 

j. The FD reviews the pass with his technical 

staff, determines any changes required in the 

plans, and levies requirements on operations 

organizations to implement these changes. 

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6.5.3.6 Planning Conferences 

Planning conferences will be held to inform the Mission, Flight, and Recovery 

Directors of operational status. The times for these conferences will be 

selected considering such factors as payload activity and time required to 

analyze quick look results, possible recovery passes, and the time to reposition forces, etc. At this time, the following conferences have been identified 

as being required: 

a. Daily Planning Conference to keep the MD apprised 

of general operation status. This conference 

will be held each morning after the previous 

evening's payload activity had been initially 

assessed. It will be conducted by the FD with 

representatives from all major operational 

areas in attendance. 

b. R&D Planning Conference to plan the next day's 

R&D activity (primarily, but not limited to 

payload). This conference will be held each day 

as required, near the end of the normal working 

day, to provide the required lead time to set up 

any required ZI targets, do the required planning, 

and generate the command loads for the activity to 

occur the following day over the ZI. The conference 

will be conducted by the FD and will be attended 

by representatives of all major operational areas. 

c. Recovery Planning Conference to plan the next day's 

nominal and contingency recovery passes, assess 

the weather situation, and assess the probability 

of recovery based on OV health status and mission 

accomplishment. This daily conference will be held 

mid-day to provide sufficient lead time to the 

recovery forces and not interfere with the possible 

R&D conference. This conference will be conducted 

by the RD and will be attended by representatives of 

all the operational areas. 

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6.5.4 Software System Operations 

6.5.4.1 General Operation Description 

There are two basic operational modes which will be used for a 30-day 

MOL flight profile. These two modes are identified as the preflight planning 

mode and the orbital phase operational mode. The orbital phase operational 

mode utilizes the software segments described in paragraph 6.2.3 

(except ascent/reentry) and the planning mode utilizes only the uplink 

processing segment. 

6.5.4.2 Preflight Planning Mode 

The basic function of the preflight planning mode is to produce the flight 

plan for the 30-day flight. The initial operation required to produce the 

flight plan is to select the orbital parameters of the flight. These parameters will normally be selected based upon system and mission constraints and 

will have been verified and approved by The User (see paragraph 6.3.4). 

Once the orbit has been selected, profiles of station contacts, payload 

activity, 0/A, etc., can be generated by the flight plan software element 

calling through SYMON macros appropriate portions of the AFSCF/system support 

software, event generation elements, command generation elements, and message 

generation elements. As the planning process proceeds, selection of secondary 

flight objectives (e.g., R&D experiments, ZI photography, etc.) can be 

included in the flight plan. 

During the generation of the flight plan, the flight plan element will perform conflict identification and resource analysis. After conflicts have been 

identified and resolved, the process will continue in an iterative fashion 

until a conflict-free 30-day flight plan has been produced. 

The flight plan element, in addition to producing the flight plan, will 

simultaneously generate and store all data required to perform planning tradeoffs and analysis during the flight. 

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6.5.4.3 Orbital Phase Operational Mode 

The orbital phase operational mode is concerned with two distinct processes. 

The first process is the preparation and transmission of uplink command 

messages to the OV. The second process is concerned with processing downlink 

TLM and tracking data. Tracking data is processed by using the AFSCF System 

Support software and is described in paragraph 6.2.3.2. MOL TLM is processed 

by both the AFSCF and MOL downlink software segments to determine vehicle 

health, diagnose anomalies, and produce mission correlation data. During 

the flight, the profile may be updated by selectively generating portions of 

the flight plan which require alteration. These segments can be generated 

in an iterative manner to assess the impact of changes for the duration of the 

flight. 

6.5.4.3.1 Uplink Message Generation 

The basic operational requirement for ground software uplink message generation 

during the orbital phase is to maintain sufficient data in the AVE computer 

to allow performance of mission activities for several revs. The uplink message generation process must continually produce messages which update the 

AVE computer data several revs ahead of the current time. 

The data being generated and sent to the AVE computer will include the identification of the targets to be photographed and viewed, stars to be selected, 

ephemeris data and correction parameters, real-time commands, SPCs, and 

teleprinter data. The real-time and SPCs will be those commands generated 

because of orbital requirements arising from orbit adjust, reentry, special 

flight requirements (SFR), station contacts, etc. 

The uplink message generation process is initiated and controlled by the flight 

plan. For purposes of explanation, it is assumed that the flight plan has been 

generated and that the rev span over which the current command load is being 

generated involved payload activity, special flight requirements, station 

contacts, orbit adjust, and reentry events. 

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The generation and development of the uplink message can best be explained by 

reference to Figure 6-21 and paragraph 6.2.3.3.1. The flight plan calls the 

appropriate event generators through SYMON macros over the rev span of 

interest as well as supplying the necessary input data, allowing the event 

generators to operate without further manual inputs (e.g., function cards, 

data cards, etc.). It should be noted, however, that manual operation of the 

event generator is permitted but is not the intended mode of operation. In 

this example, each event generator is called for and operated over the rev 

span of interest. 

As shown in Figure 6-21, the output of the event generators proceeds along 

different paths. The first major function performed after the events have 

been generated is inter-event conflicting. The basic event data from all 

generators is conflicted and potential conflicts are then flagged and resolved. The conflict identification requires not only the output from the 

event generators but also the current constraints which exist within the 

MOL system. Each event is then translated into its constituent functions for 

conflicting at this detailed level. 

Pure data (e.g., ephemeris) to be sent to the AVE computer is identified and 

dummy functions are produced for conflicting. After the command assembler 

has produced a conflict-free chronological functional list, the actual 

commands which will be transmitted to the MOL (assemblied command list) are 

synthesized and optimized. The command compatibility module examines them to 

assure compatibility with the current list of commands in the MOL computer 

which will remain after this message is loaded into the OV. 

After the conflicts have been resolved by command compatibility checks, the 

composite message assembler processes and merges the assembled command list, 

targeting data and control parameters, ephemeris data, and prose. The merged 

message is then formatted and prepared for transmission through ADS to the 

RTS. 

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SYMON AND MACROS 

EPHEMERIS DATA 

MANUAL PROSE 

STAR DATA 

EVENT 

GENERATORS TARGET DATA 

AND 

CONFLICT • 

IDENTIFIER COMMAND 

ORBIT ADJUST 

EVENTS ASSEMBLER COMPOSITE 

STATION CONTACTS AND 1■1111111111 MESSAGE 

REENTRY EVENTS 

SFR'S COMPATABILITY ASSEMBLER 

CHECK 

FLIGHT PLAN 

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Figure 6- 21 Uplink Message Generation 

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6.5.4.3.2 Downlink Processing Mode 

The two basic operational requirements for ground software downlink processing 

during the orbital phase are to verify and analyze the status of the OV and 

to process and generate the MCD. Because MCD is generated on a daily gasis, 

on-line real time operation is not required. TLM data processing to verify 

the OV status, however, is both an on-line real time process within the ADS 

and a postpass off-line process within the ADS and 3800 computer. 

6.5.4.3.2.1 MOL Vehicle Status Determination 

Each time station contact is made with the OV, the real time TLM link is 

processed at the RTS and data returned to the STC over the 2400 bps line. 

This data is then processed with STC MOL-peculiar programs to display critical 

vehicle parameters, to supply data necessary for trend prediction programs, 

and to be operated upon to produce verification of vehicle performance and 

health. Data is also contained in the real time TLM which will be used later 

by the MCD program to perform countdown of target lists. 

It is the basic operational philosophy to allow the real time TLM link to 

verify the OV health. This is done by having several different modes of data 

processing at the RTSs which can be scheduled by the downlink processing 

software element. Hence, by processing data at the RTS and changing modes, 

the time of a station pass (nominally 2 to 4 min) will allow adequate 

examination of the TLM parameters to indicate OV health. 

An important real time-operation for the automatic mode is required for 

complete assurance of OV health utilizing data contained on the real 

time TLM link. The primary optics must be operated periodically during a 

station contact to determine that the primary optics are pointing and tracking 

correctly. It should be noted, however, that as a matter of practicality, the 

AVE recorded TLM tapes will be processed and the pointing angles and camera 

operations verified for each target photographed using this data. 

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In addition to using the real-time TLM link to indicate the OV health, the 

real-time TLM and non executed command data is processed to predict values 

of TLM points during future station contacts. Because these values are not 

required in real time during the current station contact, these programs will 

not be run on-line with the real time TLM and health verification programs. 

The data contained on the AVE recorded TLM link consists primarily of 

historical data sampled and recorded periodically during flight and continuously during payload activity. In case of anomalous behavior, AVE recorded 

TLM data will be processed and analyzed to diagnose the anomalous behavior. 

Postflight analysis of this data will also provide for system and mission 

evaluation. Further details of downlink processing are provided in paragraph 6.3.4.4. 

6.5.4.3.2.2 Mission Correlation Data Generation 

The MCD program is run using data provided by the AVE recorded telemetry. 

Normally, the MCD is run once a day and data supplied to The User t6 assist 

in planning and performing photographic interpretation, and to provide the 

detailed data required to perform mensuration. The specific data supplied 

for the MCD includes which targets are captured on each frame, the relative 

geometry of the viewer with respect to the targets, IMC smear associated 

with the various areas in the frame, sun angle, etc. It is necessary to rely 

on the AVE recorded TLM to provide this data to determine any random 

errors in the photographic payload system at the time of actual payload 

activity. 

6.5.5 Contingency Operations 

6.5.5.1 General 

The responses to possible contingency situations are discussed below. The 

handbooks available to the FD and the flight crew members will detail the 

procedures to be followed in all defined situations. Those contingencies 

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which occur and have not been defined will be treated on a real time basis, 

applying the general concepts applicable to flight crew safety, priority 

of the photographic mission, other flight objectives, the probability of 

continuing the flight for 30 days, etc. The following paragraphs provide 

information concerning planning in this area. All on-orbit maintenance, 

whether preventive or corrective, is considered a part of the contingency 

situation although, in the strict sense, scheduled preventive maintenance 

is not a contingency condition. 

6.5.5.2 On-Orbit Maintenance 

The laboratory vehicle design has incorporated maintainability for those 

components or system elements where tradeoff studies show that flight crew 

safety, mission completion, or design adequacy will be improved by providing 

a maintenance capability. Although maintenance will normally be limited to 

the interior of the laboratory, external maintenance is not precluded. 

On-orbit maintenance is classified as preventive and corrective. Elements 

of both classes of maintenance have been defined by identifying maintainable 

systems and components. The Flight and Ground Crew-Handbooks will contain 

step-by-step procedures for all defined maintenance. Each procedure will 

have an associated timeline showing procedural milestones and the time to 

complete. All preventive maintenance will be scheduled into the overall 

Flight Plan at the frequency cycle determined from the maintenance 

requirements. Corrective maintenance will be scheduled as required. Auch 

factors as crew safety, mission requirements, station contacts, ground 

operations interfaces, and interference with other planned activities will 

influence corrective maintenance scheduling. 

The System Test Rules will contain a specific section devoted to the 

operational ground rules for on-orbit maintenance. 

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6.5.5.3 Contingency Analysis 

Contingency analysis will be performed by the flight crew and the ground 

operations crews. Contingency flow diagrams, available to ground operations 

personnel, include all identifiable failure modes, given an initial set of 

laboratory conditions in the form of subsystem performance, subsystem panel 

indicators, MAS indicators, and other crew input cues. 

a. The contingency flow diagram, an instrument to assist the 

systems analyst in OV subsystem fault isolation: 

1. Provides subsystem design information. 

2. Is a single-thread analytic process to ensure crew safety 

and is designed to reflect the flight crew/OV systems 

interfaces at levels adequate for this purpose. 

b. All contingency flow diagrams are plotted by the following 

ground rules: 

1. The case underlying the contingency analyzed is within 

the subsystem and all subsystems except for the 

contingency subsystem are operating within tolerance 

(i.e., single failures only). 

2. All laboratory subsystem switches are in their prescribed 

positions. 

3. All spare and redundant resources provided in the laboratory are available for corrective action. 

c. The essential information contained in the typical contingency 

flow diagram is as follows: 

1. Contingency mode statement of the indicated malfunction 

or situation to be analyzed. 

2. Crew input signals and cues comprising such items as MAS 

lights, warning annunciators, etc. 

3. Crew action most logical as a result of situation or 

previous actions. 

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4. Crew decision aids which provide supporting information. 

5. Task statements to indicate the required tasks to be 

performed in support of the crew action indicated. 

6. Crew decision statements indicating the most logical 

question the crew would have as a result of a previous 

instruction. 

7. Resultant-degraded mode lists all tasks required of 

the crew to operate in this mode. 

8. Resultant-normal mode indicates that the action has 

returned the subsystem to normal operation. 

9. On-board maintenance action statement indicates required 

on-board maintenance (if any). 

10. Dual failure statement indicates that more than one 

failure exists and that the flow diagram cannot be used 

further. 

d. Where the contingency poses no threat to the crew, contingency 

procedures are provided to cover the two priority cases 

(see "contingency" definition, Appedinx F.1) and are subclassified as follows: 

1. Priority I 

(a) Remedial, with the potential of again reaching full 

capability. 

(b) Remedial, with potential of attaining partial 

capability. This may or may not result in early 

flight termination. 

(c) No remedial action. This will entail early flight 

termination. 

2. Priority II 

(a) Remedial, with potential to again reach full 

capability. 

(b) Remedial, with partial capability resumption. 

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(c) No remedial action. This will result in degraded 

system effectiveness because of the reduced amount 

or kind of on-orbit data return. 

Contingency evaluation is approached from the first and most obvious 

indicator and proceeds with the appropriate sequence of crew instructions and 

questions to produce the most feasible corrective actions (the first 

corrective action is verification of the subsystem out-of-tolerance 

condition). 

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7.0 RECOVERY OPERATIONS 

7.1 GENERAL 

The mission of the Recovery Organization described in paragraph 3.4 is to 

locate and retrieve the photographic data and the crew and spacecraft (or 

DRVs in the automatic mode) and transport them to their designated locations. 

Recovery will be required as the result of the normal end of mission, 

planned abort modes, or contingency landing situations. 

The Recovery Director is the DOD Manager for Manned Space Flight Support 

Operations (DDMS) or his representative. He assumes command and control of 

the recovery forces at T-24 hours. The DDMS Recovery Force Director will be 

located in the Recovery Control Room, Mission Control Center, Sunnyvale, 

California. The agencies that will provide recovery support during the 

30-day mission include the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS); 

Commander, Task Force, Pacific (CTF 130); Commander, Task Force, Atlantic 

(CTF 140); Military Airlift Command; Air Weather Service; AFWTR; and other 

governmental agencies. 

Gemini B recovery support will require fixed-wing aircraft, surface vessels, 

and helicopters. 

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7.2 PREFLIGHT PLANNING 

The Preliminary Manned Recovery Requirements Document (Ref. 10) contains 

the general requirements for MOL recovery operational support and provides 

the DDMS information and requirements for long-range planning. A final 

Manned Recovery Requirements Document is scheduled to be available approximately 

12 months prior to scheduled launch. Recovery operations and procedures are 

planned for all conceivable landing situations. Safe return and recovery of 

the flight crew and the photographic data is a prime concern. Spacecraft 

retrieval is a secondary consideration but will be accomplished whenever 

possible. 

Spacecraft landing probabilities in the planned landing areas are considered 

to be sufficiently high to justify predeployment of forces for location, onscene assistance, and retrieval. Probability of the spacecraft landing in 

the contingency landing areas is considered low, and will be supported by 

normal search and rescue forces located at various areas throughout the 

world. Prior to each MOL flight, DDMS designates the operational control 

staff to assist in recovery phases of the mission. The DDMS establishes the 

interfaces required to obtain worldwide communication coverage between the 

RCR in the MCC and all recovery units, recovery forces, the DOD, the 

Department of State, Hq ARRS, and other agencies. These interfaces are 

identified in the Program Requirements Document, the Preliminary Manned 

Recovery Requirements Document, and the Orbital Requirements Document 

(Refs. 7, 10, and 6, respectively). 

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7.3 RECOVERY AREAS 

Recovery areas for the MOL mission have been divided into two major categories: 

the planned landing areas (forces prepositioned); and the contingency landing 

areas (see Figure 7-1). 

7.3.1 Planned Landing Areas 

7.3.1.1 Launch Site Abort Recovery Area 

The launch site abort recovery area surrounds the launch pad and ground track 

to a distance not yet precisely defined, but not expected to be more than 

5 n mi beyond the coastline. Recovery of the flight crew and spacecraft 

will be accomplished by helicopters, surface vessels, or land vehicles. From 

the launch pad to a radius of 2000 ft, the access time is 5 min and flight 

crew retrieval as soon as possible. From the shoreline to approximately 

1 n mi offshore (surf area), access time is 2 min and flight crew retrieval 

as soon as possible. No time limits will be specified for spacecraft retrieval 

in the launch site area. 

7.3.1.2 Powered Flight Abort Recovery Area 

In the event of abort during the powered flight, recovery of the flight crew, 

cues, and spacecraft must be effected throughout a ground track area which 

is 30 n mi wide and extends to 4o deg S latitude. High abort probabilities 

occur during launch vehicle staging. Therefore, the first 1000 n mi of the 

ground track and an elliptical area 30 X 200 n mi near 40 deg S latitude are 

designated as high probability abort areas. The remainder of the ground 

track is considered to be a low probability abort area. Surface vessels, 

fixed wing aircraft, and helicopters will execute the recovery functions. 

The first half of the entire ground track will be supported by aircraft staged 

from San Diego. A staging area at Easter Island will be utilized for 

aircraft support in the southern half of the ground track. Access time is 

2 hr and retrieval time is 4 hr in the high probability areas. Access time 

is 4 hr and retrieval time 18 hr in the low probability area. Spacecraft 

retrieval in both areas is 72 hr maximum. 

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7.3.1.3 Early Orbit Abort Recovery Area 

Planned Gemini B landing areas have been established for each of the first 

three revs. These are identified as Early Orbit Abort Recovery Areas. 

Recovery support for these areas, required only for launch day, involves 

fixed wing aircraft and secondary recovery ships. Access and retrieval times 

are similar to those stated for the powered flight high probability areas. 

Spacecraft retrieval will be accomplished within 12 hr. 

7.3.1.4 Abort from Orbit Recovery Areas 

The Gemini B will have a 14 hr loiter capability after separation from the 

laboratory vehicle. This loiter capability provides one daylight landing and 

recovery opportunity every 12 hr in one of two planned periodic recovery 

areas. 

These areas, also referred to as "recovery fences", are located in the 

Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. They span 22.5 deg longitude, the 

approximate distance between the ground tracks of two successive polar orbits. 

Recovery forces (secondary recovery ships and aircraft) will be in these 

"fences" throughout the mission. Access time is 3 hr, retrieval time is 8 hr, 

and the spacecraft will be recovered within 12 hr. 

7.3.1.5 End-of-Mission Recovery 

The Gemini B will be programmed for an end-of-mission landing in the Pacific 

Ocean recovery fence. Aircraft and a surface vessel with helicopter 

capability will be on station to execute recovery functions. Access time is 

1 hr, crew ani data retrieval time is 2 hr, and the spacecraft will be 

retrieved within 6 hr. 

7.3.2 Contingency Landing Areas 

7.3.2.1 Preferred Contingency Landing Area 

The area between 40 deg N and 40 deg S latitudes (excluding planned landing 

and unfriendly areas) is considered Preferred Contingency Landing Area. 

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Recovery will be effected through the use of Search and Rescue (SAR) forces 

established at many locations within these latitudes. The spacecraft will 

be retrieved whenever practical. 

7.3.2.2 General Contingency Landing Area 

Gemini B landing in an area outside 40 deg N and 40 deg S latitudes is 

considered general contingency. All available data (including latest 

information concerning Gemini B landing coordinates) will be passed to the 

SAR force located near the predicted landing area to facilitate rapid crew 

and data retrieval. 

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7.4 TYPICAL RECOVERY OPERATION 

The following is a description of a typical recovery operation for a Gemini B 

return-from-orbit situation. The operation will be somewhat similar whether 

it is the planned end-of-mission or an emergency situation, if the landing 

occurs within one of the fences and there is sufficient advance notice of 

the intention to terminate the mission. 

The MD will inform the RCR of the intention to deorbit the Gemini B. The 

RCR will have all pertinent information regarding the recovery force status 

and weather conditions in the recovery areas displayed and, based on this 

information, will recommend to the MD the landing area and reentry rev 

number to be used. If the recommended area and rev number are acceptable, 

this information, along with the latitude of the desired aim point, will be 

transmitted to the FTFD to be used in the calculation of retrofire parameters. 

The RCR will then advise the recovery forces in the selected area of the 

approximate time and position of the landing. The recovery ship will steam 

toward this point. 

The Retrofire Officer will transmit RCR retrofire parameters calculated by 

the AFSCF to the RCR. These will include time and position of retrofire, 

time of entry into blackout, time of exit from blackout, time of drogue 

chute deployment, and time and position of spacecraft landing. 

This information will be transmitted to the recovery forces. A continuous 

flow of information will come to the RCR from the recovery forces, including 

estimated time of arrival (ETA) of ship on station, aircraft takeoff times, 

ETA of aircraft on station, weather in the area, etc. This information will 

be displayed in the RCR. 

The flight crew will initiate retrofire procedures based on the information 

calculated on board the spacecraft and/or ground computations. After retrofire, 

the flight crew will transmit, assuming a ground station is available, via VHF 

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voice, such actual retrofire parameters as time of retrofire and AV. This 

information will be used by the MCC to verify or update the predicted landing 

point. This information will be given to the RCR for subsequent transmittal 

to the recovery forces. 

At some time during retrofire procedures, a VHF beacon (243.0 Mc) on board the 

spacecraft will be activated. This beacon will be tracked, except during 

blackout, by recovery force HC-130H aircraft in the landing area. Time of 

entry into blackout and exit from blackout will be noted and will give some 

verification, if nominal, of the predicted landing point. Once the spacecraft 

has landed, this beacon will provide an RF homing source for the recovery 

aircraft. The approximate location will be immediately fixed by triangulation 

from these aircraft, and the recovery ship will proceed toward that point. 

The spacecraft will undoubtedly be first reached by one of the recovery aircraft or helicopters. The flotation collar will be affixed by swimmers from 

whichever unit arrives first. This aircraft will then vector the ship to the 

spacecraft location. 

The flight crew may, at their option, be retrieved by helicopter or wait 

until arrival of the ship. If the wait for the ship is long, the flight crew, 

the DRCs with floatation devices attached and other sensitive data will be 

taken by helicopter to the ship. 

The ship will proceed to the spacecraft location and bring it aboard. The 

ship will then steam to a point near enough the land base that the flight 

crew and data can be transferred via helicopter or COD flight to that base 

for transportation back to the Zl. 

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The ship will then proceed to a predetermined port where the spacecraft will 

be off-loaded. The spacecraft will be met at this port by an aircraft with 

the RCS decontamination equipment. The spacecraft RCS will be deserviced at 

this port. The spacecraft will then be loaded aboard the aircraft for 

transportation to the predetermined point of delivery. 

During the entire recovery operation, the RCR will be constantly informed of 

status and progress by reports from the recovery forces. 

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7.5 DRV RECOVERY OPERATIONS 

7.5.1 General 

DRY recovery is only applicable to the automatic flights. A total of six DRVs 

are contained in the support module. As these DRVs are filled with exposed 

film from the photographic payload, they are prepared for ejection and 

deorbiting. Preparation includes cutting the film, sealing the container, 

energizing the DRV systems, and orienting the OV to the proper attitude. 

These actions are accomplished automatically by the command load previously 

sent to the OV. Ejection and deorbiting burning are monitored by an RTS 

and the DRV is tracked to its reentry trajectory. 

The DRY is slowed by atmospheric drag and final descent is by parachute. The 

parachute-suspended DRV is acquired by the recovery force and tracked by 

means of a radio beacon. Once visual contact is established, an aerial 

retrieval is accomplished and the DRV returned to a designated point. The 

details of this operation are described below. 

7.5.2 Mission Control Center DRV Recovery Operations 

The MCC operations start when the FD determines that DRY recovery is required. 

This information is passed to the RCC and the MCC support areas to prepare 

for DRV reentry and recovery. The desired recovery rev is established based 

on surface ship position, weather, RTS coverage, command loading pass, etc. 

Once established, the required command load is generated and transmitted to 

the OV. The RCC is advised of the final predicted impact point and time based 

on the commands in the OV. 

The RTS tracks the OV on the recovery rev as for a normal pass, except that, 

at separation of the DRV and OV, tracking and TLM data are acquired from the 

DRV as well as the OV. Predicts are run at the STC using DRV tracking data 

to provide the recovery force with a "splash" point, if required. 

The MCC keeps the RCC fully informed of the critical events as they occur. 

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7.5.3 DRV 

When enough film has been exposed to fill the DRV, or data from an important 

target is desired, the DRV will be prepared for ejection. A recovery 

sequence reset command is sent to the automatic support subsystem. The 

exposed film, plus a few layers of unexposed film, is run out of the camera 

into the cassette. The film is then cut and the chute is sealed. 

After the OV has been properly oriented, the DRV is separated at a predetermined time. The DRV is spun up and the retrorocket fired. When the 

retrorocket has burned out, the DRV is despun and the thrust cone containing 

the expended rocket is separated. The reentry events are telemetered to the 

ground on two radio beacon carriers. A communication blackout occurs when 

the DRV first enters the atmosphere. 

After the DRV emerges from the communications blackout area, it continues to 

slow down due to atmospheric drag. At a specified "g" point, the parachute 

system deploys, further slowing the DRV as it descends to the level for 

aerial retrieval. When the deceleration rate decreases to a predetermined 

level, a recovery timer is started, sequencing the thermal cover and forebody 

off, drogue chute out, flashing light on, main chute out reefed, and main 

chute dereefed. 

7.5.4 Recovery Force Operations 

The DRV recovery forces are organized under the RCC at Hickam AFB, Hawaii 

(see paragraph 3.6.9.3). These forces are comprised of C-l30 aircraft, 

surface ships, and helicopters. The responsibility of these forces is to 

acquire the parachute-borne DRY, retrieve it mid-air (primary) or from the 

surface of the water (secondary), and transport it to a designated point. 

The recovery forces will be deployed to provide the greatest opportunity for 

detecting and acquiring the DRV. The small, or primary, recovery area covers 

the nominal dispersions which will occur if all vehicle subsystems operate 

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within their specified tolerances. The larger, or secondary, area covers the 

dispersions which can occur if the deboost subsystem and/or the orbital 

correction subsystem do not perform nominally. The recovery forces and their 

deployment are configured to assure a high probability of detecting and 

acquiring the capsule with the smallest possible expenditure of personnel, 

equipment, and time. 

Deployment of these forces is ordered when it is determined that DRV recovery 

is required. Nominally, recovery will be designated in the Flight Plan to 

occur on specified revs; however, the airborne recovery forces are maintained 

in a state of readiness throughout the flight phase of an automatic flight 

for quick reaction to a sudden recovery requirement. 

The surface ships are deployed prior to liftoff and take up stations which move 

to cover the movement of the possible recovery passes within the recovery area. 

7.5.5 DRV Security 

Provisions are made for the security of the DRV capsule after recovery. 

After air or water recovery, the capsule will be reeled on board the aircraft. 

The parachute will be detached from the capsule; the capsule and the parachute 

will then be placed inside a container provided for this purpose. A similar 

container is carried aboard the recovery ships. 

If the antennas on the capsule interfere with the closing of the container, 

the antennas may be bent or broken, as necessary. The container will then be 

locked with a combination lock. The lock will not be opened until the 

container arrives at its destination. 

If the capsule cannot be found or cannot be recovered, provision is made to 

preclude recovery by others at a later time. The capsule is designed to sink 

within 50 to 90 hr after splashdown. 

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If, at the moment of separation from the OV, the orientation of the DRV is 

incorrect or the retrorocket malfunctions, the capsule may not descend within 

the area where it can be recovered by the recovery forces. To protect 

against recovery of the capsule by unfriendly forces, an inhibit function is 

included. The recovery timer sequences the thermal cover off, heat shield 

off, and the main parachute out. These are activated by a backup timer after 

the normal reentry time has elapsed: When the capsule reenters the atmosphere, 

it will have no heat protection, the chute will be destroyed, and DORIAN 

information will be burned. If any portion of the capsule survives the 

reentry, it will be burned beyond recognition and will sink on impact. 

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8.0 CREW OPERATIONS 

8.1 GENERAL 

Much of the detail for this Section has yet to be developed. Currently, 

studies are in progress to more clearly define the details of crew operations 

And the evaluation of man's contribution. 

Appendix A contains the concept for operating the DORIAN system, including 

the crew and ground operations interface with the AVE. 

Crew training activities are described in Section 11.0. 

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8.2 OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY ON THE USES OF THE CREW 

Basically the crew is on board to enhance the operation of the photographic 

payload, to gather and relay intelligence data to the ground, to aid in the 

early development of the automatic system, and to perform as a backup in 

case of certain critical subsystem failures. The AVE subsystems and ground 

capability is being developed in concurrence with this philosophy. By 

relieving the crew of unnecessary functions, more useful orbital flight is 

achieved and more intelligence information and data on system operating 

characteristics can be obtained. The system permits crew monitoring of the 

Mission Module (MM), Laboratory Module (LM), and applicable Gemini B systems. 

The crew may be able to determine the cause of subsystem failures and the 

necessary corrective actions. Crew actions will include selecting proper 

equipment operational modes, switching in redundant units, replacing or 

repairing failed components, and performing equipment functions until other 

corrective actions can be determined and taken. 

For critical items, crew backup is provided through manual target acquisition, 

centering, and tracking. Crew backup also provides for alignment of main 

optics elements, vehicle attitude control and orbit control and propellant 

usage scheduling in the event of improper ACTS operation, cabin atmosphere 

and temperature control, and reporting of systems status via the voice link 

in the event of TLM downlink failure. 

For development purposes, the system permits crew diagnosis and evaluation, 

through a controlled series of tests, of main optics pointing and tracking 

errors, and of camera imagery. Since crew evaluation of the camera imagery 

is required, the system provides for on-board processing and examination of 

portions of the photographic record. 

The system takes full advantage of the crew's ability to enhance the quality 

of the intelligence data gathered. The system has the capability to permit 

the crew to rapidly evaluate preprogrammed potential photographic targets for 

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weather and for the presence of activity indicators, and permits crew inputs 

to photographic target selection. Provisions are made for coordinated 

two-man operation when both crewmen are performing the target inspection 

functions or when one crewman is required to perform main optics or attitude 

control backup tasks. The capability is provided for crew visual 

reconnanissance and comment upon target state, using either the ATS, visual 

optics, or a processed photograph to aid in mission planning and target 

programming decisions. 

The capability is provided to boresight the visual optics and the acquistion 

telescopes and to slave the main optics tracking mirror to acquisition 

telescope pointing and tracking commands. 

Control of the commandable and automatic support systems is provided to the 

crew as a backup to preclude abort in the event of a subsystem failure. In 

any system where crew safety is concerned, the crew can lock-out the 

ground commands. In all cases, the crew has the capability to negate or 

modify ground-generated commands. This can be done by either a command 

panel switch or by keyboard entry to the ADC. 

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8.3 CREW INTERFACES 

This paragraph will ultimately contain descriptions of crew interfaces with 

the hardware and software on board the MOL and with the ground operations. 

The following is a partial list of information to be covered: 

a. Crew activities including launch, crew transfer, payload 

setup, pre-payload operation pass, payload operation pass, 

RTS past, orbit adjust, DRC, film processor, nominal 

housekeeping, reentry, and recovery. 

b. AVE usage including MAS, ADC, and teleprinter. 

c. Interface with ground including voice reports, manual command 

execution, fault isolation, and maintenance. 

d. Evaluation of man's contribution and identification of those 

functions where man's contribution is most meaningful. 

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9.0 FLIGHT TEST DATA EVALUATION 

9.1 GENERAL 

This Section contains information management, distribution, evaluation, and 

reporting of the data produced during the Flight Test Operation. 

9.2 DATA MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 

9.2.1 General 

The problems associated with data acquired or generated in real time or 

non-real time which be collected for non-real time evaluation are discussed 

below. 

"Data" is defined in this Section as that collection of raw information derived 

from the MOL operation and the various processed forms in which it may exist. 

Specifically, data includes MOL photography, telemetry, tracking, commands, 

and voice transmissions, and the variety of computer inputs and outputs, 

manual plots, tables, charts, etc. "TLM" includes all the downlink data 

except voice. "Commands" includes all the uplink data. "Voice" includes 

both uplink and downlink voice as well as that between the MCC and RTSs. 

Data recording is generally desirable at each major point of reception, 

transmission, processing, or display. These recordings may exist in a variety 

of forms (e.g., magnetic tape, photographic film, paper printouts, oscillographic traces, manual plots, etc.). Whatever their form, they become a part 

of the MOL Flight Test Data and are subject to the management and distribution 

specified herein. 

The concepts developed in this paragraph that generate requirements on other 

operation agencies will be levied in the appropriate requirements documents 

(e.g., the PRD, ORD, MRRD, etc.). 

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9.2.2 Security 

Considerable expense, in both money and time, has been given to safeguard 

MOL data from those with no need-to-know and others who would use it to the 

detriment of the United States. Therefore, security measures must be 

applied to the data in its various forms according to the content of the data 

or its potential use with other data. This subsection addresses the problem 

of what general classes and forms of data are protected by the various 

security classifications. 

9.2.2.1 Security Classifications 

The classifications which apply to MOL data are generally categorized as 

"black" and "white". 

a. The black category includes all data that could 

reveal the covert mission of MOL. 

b. The white category includes all other MOL data. 

Within these two general categories, the normal security classifications will 

be applied. Black data will have one of three classifications: "Secret 

Special Handling", "Top Secret Special Handling", and "Black Limited Access". 

White data will have conventional DOD security classifications of 

"Unclassified", "Confidential", "Secret", "Secret - Special Access Required", 

"Top Secret", and "Top Secret - Special Access Required". 

9.2.2.2 Security Guide 

A generally applicable guide for applying a security classification to MOL 

Flight Test Operations data is provided in Table 9-1. With the capability to 

edit data, a general rule for a broad class of data cannot be fully developed. 

If offending data is deleted from a given data set, it may be downgraded in 

some manner. This requires knowledge and judgement. Some general rules can 

be made to apply: 

a. Encrypted data is unclassified. 

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Classification Gu

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MOL Flight Test Operations Data Security 

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ClassificationGuide* (Continued) 

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b. Data disclosing the covert MOL mission is SSH, 

at a minimum. 

c. Exposed film, processed film, and prints have 

Limited Access even in DORIAN areas. 

d. Target location information is Limited Access; 

therefore, so is payload activity versus time (except 

for ZI activity). 

9.2.2.3 Procedures and Facilities 

At each operating location, adequate procedures and facilities for classifying, 

transmitting, storing, and safeguarding MOL data will be established. Adequate 

consideration must be given to the needs of security while simultaneously 

recognizing the requirement to work with the data unimpeded by involved 

accounting and handling procedures. 

9.2.3 AFSCF Data 

All significant data acquired by the AFSCF will be collected, recorded, 

routed, stored, and made available as required to the MOL program. These 

general requirements are described below. 

9.2.3.1 RTS Data 

Data magnetically recorded at the RTSs will be duplicated by on-station tapedubbing. Within each 2k-hr period the original data will be packaged and 

shipped to the STC by the most expeditious means. The dubbed tapes will be 

stored in an appropriate area for the flight duration plus 10 days, or as 

specified by the MOL SPO. Dubbed tapes of encrypted data may be degaussed 

at the end of this period and reused for subsequent dubbing. All data stored 

at or shipped from the RTS will be labeled to fully identify the contents by 

program, FV number, RTS, rev number, track assignments, recording speeds, etc. 

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9.2.3.2 STC Data 

The STC will maintain a data library service which will expeditiously collect 

data sent from external sources, such as the RTSs, AFWTR, etc. These data 

will be available for checkout by authorized organizations, as required. 

In addition, the STC will acquire data from the operations areas and ensure 

rapid delivery between areas and to the data library. These data consist of 

magnetically recorded data base overflow (estimated once each 24-hr period), 

computer printouts, microfilm from displays, etc. 

9.2.4 AFWTR Data .• 

In addition to the data required by launch operations, flight operations 

requires that a dubbed magnetic recording of all metric and TLM data acquired 

by the AFWTR be packaged and shipped by expeditious means to the STC data 

library. These data will be labeled to properly identify the contents by 

program, FV number, launch data, track assignments, recording speeds, source, 

etc. 

This data includes any from AFWTR downrange ships. Data acquired by landbased stations will not be delayed to include ship data, but additional 

packages will be sent to the STC as data is returned to AFWTR. Launch and 

ascent data will be distributed to contractors through normal Range channels 

as documented in the PRD (Ref. 7). 

9.2.5 MOL Contractor Support Facility (MCSF) 

The MCSF will act as a distribution center to provide data to contractors 

(in-plant) and to contractor personnel at the MCSF to support the near real 

time analysis performed at that facility. This does not include ascent data. 

The MCSF will provide courier service to pick up and return data from the 

STC data library. When it is determined that specific RTS/STC or AFWTR data 

tapes are required for near-real time or postflight evaluation, the MCSF will 

check out this data from the STC data library. 

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The MCSF will process the RTS tapes contained in the STC library to edit and 

format them as required by security and the requirements of the associate 

contractors. New tapes will be made in the edited digital format for shipment 

to contractors' facilities for postflight analysis. 

Data to be analyzed at the MCSF will be input to the MOL data base for processing and analysis. If near-real time analysis is required at a contractor's 

facility, the appropriate data will be sent by electrical interface between 

the MCSF and the contractor's facility. 

When the need for the STC library data no longer exists, the data will be 

returned to the STC. 

To preclude reprocessing STC data tapes, the MCSF will maintain a temporary 

library of any edited formats shipped to the contractor until the contractor 

acknowledges receipt of the shipment. The temporary tape may then be 

degaussed for reuse. 

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9.3 DATA EVALUATION AND REPORTING 

9.3.1 General 

Data evaluation may basically be classed into near-real time and post 

operations evaluations. Near-real time evaluations occur before the end of 

the operation and are directed toward analysis of operational problems for 

which an on-orbit correction might exist, or which require additional knowledge 

to optimize or save the present flight. Post operations evaluations are 

conducted with a view to solving postflight problems to preclude recurrence 

in future operations. Therefore, it is not when the evaluation is performed, 

but for what purpose that places the evaluation in a given classification. 

Also, evaluations started as near-real time may evolve into post-operations 

when the character of their purpose changes. 

9.3.2 Data Evaluation 

9.3.2.1 Near-Real Time Evaluation 

The AFD/VA and the TA are responsible to assure that analyses and 

evaluations are conducted in support of the flight operations. In this 

task, they are assisted by associate contractor personnel. In addition to 

the direct support afforded by the associate contractor personnel at the 

MCSF and the STC, certain specialists are available at contractors' home plant 

facilities to support near-real time analysis and evaluation as required and 

as data can be made available through data tapes or electrically transmitted 

data. 

Near-real time evaluation is of two types: (1) mission evaluation, which uses 

the MCD and evaluates how well The User's requirements are being met in 

photographing given targets; (2) general OV evaluation to determine the OV 

operational status. 

It is the near-real time evaluation that flags problems in such a manner 

that they can be classified as near-real time or post-operations. 

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9.3.2.1.1 Mission Correlation 

Mission correlation is conducted by the MP&E organization and supported by the 

TA Staff by means of special computer programs (MCD of the MP&E software) 

using the data available from the real-time TLM and the AVE-recorded TLM. 

The reports issued by this group are used in two ways: (1) to modify The User 

requirements for subsequent photography of targets already taken; and (2) to 

provide mensuration data to the photo-interpreters (PI) for their post-operation 

evaluation of the photographs. 

9.3.2.1.2 Orbiting Vehicle Evaluation 

The near-real time evaluation of the OV is conducted to ensure a continuing 

knowledge of the OV subsystems operation, detection of anomalous operation, 

predict consumption of expendables, and quick reaction to contingencies. 

This evaluation is characterized by two principal activities, the rev-to-rev 

evaluation and the long-term analyses. 

Bev-to-rev evaluation is of a quick-check nature and: (1) uses the real-time 

displays to detect and flag areas for more detailed study; (2) determines 

the depth of study required in specific areas; (3) determines whether the 

OV status is good for a short rev span of activity or that conservative 

measures should be taken until a more detailed analysis can be made. 

The long-term analyses and evaluations may require the complete RTS data 

tapes and take several days to determine the full effects of any anomaly 

flagged by the rev-to-rev activity. From this will come recommendations 

for full contingency operations, predictions of lifetime, etc. For serious 

anomalies, special requirements may be levied to play back full data from a 

previous RTS pass to permit an early, detailed analysis. 

9.3.2.2 Post Operations Evaluation 

Post operations evaluation is not a responsibility of the operations 

organization (see Figure 3-1) per se (although some of the operations staff 

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may have responsibilities in this area because of the dual nature of their 

work assignments). The near-real time analysis identifies problem areas and 

classifies the manner of their treatment (i.e., near-real time or post 

operations). 

Evaluation and exploitation of the mission photographic product and 

associated mission data and debriefing information (which fall within the 

production, dissemination, and use phases of the intelligence cycle) are 

primarily the functional responsibilities of the intelligence community. 

The MOL program elements (including contractor support) will normally 

participate in such activities only to the extent necessary to provide support 

to the agencies within the community or to verify the degree of success 

achieved in the collection operations. 

The POAD establishes the areas and priorities for the post operations 

contractors' evaluation effort. Contractor effort is conducted primarily at 

the contractors' home plant facilities. 

Post operations evaluations for the MOL program shall be conducted by the 

MOL SPO or by appropriate contractors to accomplish the following: 

a. To analyze and resolve to corrective levels MOL system 

preflight and flight anomalies in response to MOL SPO 

direction. 

b. To verify specific MOL flight test objectives not directly 

determined as a result of accomplishment of system test and 

operations and wherein the analyses required do not duplicate 

analyses conducted during ground or flight tests. 

Contractors shall maintain appropriate test results, data bases, and subsystem 

design, analysis, and effective models required to accomplish "a." and "b.", 

above, in conjunction with flight test data that will be provided by the MOL 

SPO (see paragraph 9.2.5). This flight test data will be formatted to 

establish contractor digital computer requirements. 

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Data for post-operations evaluation shall be appropriately selected by the 

MOL SPO and contractors from the large volume of data available from ground 

and flight tests. By this means of selectivity as well as through 

evaluations already completed during the flight tests, it is expected that a 

small percentage of the test data not processed during flight will require 

post operations reduction to permit accomplishment of all post-operations 

analyses. 

The results of post-operations evaluations shall be documented with appropriate 

recommendations. Following approval of recommendations, appropriate corrective 

actions shall be initiated. 

9.3.2.3 Flight Test Objectives Evaluation 

Specific flight test objectives to be evaluated include the following: 

a. Evaluate stero photographic reconnaissance, including manned 

and automatic operations, with a probability of 30-day mission 

effectiveness of 0.85 for the manned system and 0.63 for the 

automatic system. Evaluation of the effectiveness of each 

MOL system segment for each flight phase shall include 

appropriate comparisons of measured subsystem performance with 

allocated effectiveness values. 

b. Evaluate the MOL system capability of resolution 

photography with 2:1 contrast under conditions of light 

providing 890 ft lamberts at the aperture for targets at nadir 

from 80 n mi orbit presupposing the availability of 3404 type 

film with an exposure index of 6. The evaluation shall permit 

analytical extrapolation within requisite OV functions or 

target photographic conditions not attained during controlled 

(test) photography environments. 

1. Evaluate OV performance during test and anomalous 

photography. The evolution shall include the comparison 

of actual AVE flight performance data* with required 

* Actual AVE flight performance data shall be provided by the MOL SPO to 

appropriate MOL contractors in digital computer input form within the 

parameters selection and format requirements requested by the contractors. 

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performance data to determine actual OV location, 

equipment performance, and crew actions associated with 

controlled test or anomalous photography. 

2. Evaluate controlled test or anomalous photography. The 

evaluation shall include: 

(a) Determination of photographed target resolution 

considering known target weather, lighting, contrast, 

and location. 

(b) Determination of automatic photography equipment 

operation, including image stabilization, target 

centering, focus, and exposure. 

(c) Assessment of the crew contribution to the 

photography accomplished. 

c. Evaluate the manned system capability for a mission 

duration of 30 days on the baseline orbit with a two—man 

flight crew. 

The evaluations shall be in response to MOL SPO direction, 

shall not duplicate analyses or evaluations accomplished 

during the conduct of the orbital flight, and shall include: 

1. Analysis of those AVE preflight and flight anomalies 

which shall lead to timely equipment, software, facility, 

personnel, or procedural corrective actions. 

2. Analysis of system performance which leads directly to 

determination of specific MOL program objective 

accomplishment. 

Contractors shall maintain appropriate preflight test data and 

shall provide the subsystem design and analysis models 

required to accomplish "1." and "2." above, consistent with 

utilizing actual AVE flight performance data, provided by 

the MOL SPO, in digital computer input form as requested by 

the contractors. Contractor data requests shall specify the 

performance parameters required, the system time intervals 

of interest, and the data format. 

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d. Evaluate specific flight objective accomplishments, including: 

1. Adequacy of Mission Control personnel and facilities to 

support a 30-day manned mission. 

2. Automatic operation of AVE subsystems, including those 

subsystems incorporating redundant or backup elements. 

3. Flight crew operability and monitoring of appropriate 

laboratory vehicle subsystems. 

4. Flight crew film handling in the LM. 

5. OV capability to accomplish required 0/A and attitude 

control. 

6. OV capability to sustain the orbital environment, including 

meteoroid protection, radiation shielding, and environmental control. 

7. OV provision for and utilization of expendables. 

e. Evaluate the manned system laboratory vehicle 30-day shirtsleeve environment. The evaluations shall include: 

1. Flight crew accommodations in the LM, including 

temperature and humidity control, radiation protection 

and shielding, life support, suiting and unsuiting, and 

waste removal; 

2. Flight crew safety monitoring and alarm, including 

detection and alarm of unsafe OV performance, detection 

of excessive crew radiation dosage and detection of crew 

illness (heart rate); 

3. Shirtsleeve environment effects on laboratory vehicle 

equipments. 

f. Evaluate the automatic system capabilities for a mission 

duration as long as possible within the capabilities of the 

manned/automatic system hardware with available or augmented 

expendables and consistent with launch vehicle capabilities. 

Qualification of the automatic system shall be for 30 days. 

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Applicable manned/automatic system evaluation shall be 

performed in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 

"c.". Specific additional evaluation shall include: 

1. Support module capability to sustain long duration in 

orbit. 

2. Support module capability to accomplish film transport 

and stowage. 

3. LM capability to perform attitude control for DRV ejection. 

4. Proper selection and ejection of DRVs. 

5. Adequacy of Mission Control capability to plan support 

module and LM events and expendables usage. 

6. Capability of laboratory vehicle to sustain long duration 

orbital mission. 

7. Laboratory vehicle expendables usage. 

g. Evaluate the orbital inclination capability of 80 to 100 deg 

with the nominal orbit at 90 deg inclination and 80 n mi 

perigee altitude. The evaluation shall include: 

1. LM 0/A and maintenance capability. 

2. Ground drag predictions with LGA measurements. 

3. Ephemeris data, LGA, LRL, and benchmark data utilization 

in orbit maintenance. 

4. OV data management over the inclination range. 

h. Evaluate complete target access at latitudes greater than 

30 deg N four times during the 30-day mission. The evaluation 

shall include: 

1. Mission Control capability to select OV attitude. 

2. ATS and tracking mirror capabilities to subtend look 

angles of required target coverage. 

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i. Evaluate the manned/automatic system capability to expose 

15,000 frames during the 30-day mission and maximize cloudfree photography. The evaluation shall include Mission 

Control maximization of target photography. 

j. Evaluate the automatic system capability to expose 500 frames 

per day and maximize cloud-free photography. The 

evaluation shall include: 

1. Mission Control maximization of target photography. 

2. Validity and accuracy of ground provided weather 

predictions with that of IVS measurements and actual cloud 

cover data as shown in the target photography. 

k. Evaluate the system capability for one launch every four months. 

The evaluation shall consider: 

1. Pad damage extent assessment. 

2. FV pad integration and checkout. 

3. Launch Control support. 

4. Mission Control support. 

5. Recovery Force deployment. 

6. Flight crew readiness compatibility. 

1. Evaluate the system capability of responding to a redirection 

of the planned operational orbit, within the design constraints 

on inclination and altitude, as late as seven days prior to a 

scheduled launch. The evaluation shall utilize development 

test and analysis data in lieu of actual data wherein redirection 

does not occur and shall consider: 

1. AFSCF flight replanning; 

2. Recovery Force redeployment; 

3. AFWTR support redeployment; 

4. FV guidance reprogramming and test. 

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m. Evaluate the usefulness of man in the development and 

operation of reconnaissance space systems including: 

1. Evaluation of man's contribution to early development of 

the automatic mission: 

(a) Man's contribution to flight duration extension 

including monitoring and switching of AVE and modes; 

AVE replacement or repair; contribution to MCC 

diagnosis of AVE malfunctions; and AVE backup. 

(b) Man's contribution to AVE performance and malfunction 

diagnosis including diagnosis of pointing error causes; 

diagnosis of target tracking error causes; 

diagnosis of camera performance; and sensing of 

environment and subsystem operating characteristics. 

2. Evaluation of man's contribution to intelligence data 

enhancement as follows: 

(a) Contribution to photography, including exposure and 

other camera corrections; image rate corrections; 

target centering corrections; cue contribution to 

target observation; and crew observation of target 

activity on target selection and color film 

photography on target intelligence. 

(b) Contribution of secondary camera photography. 

(c) Updating of target locations and cues. 

(d) Verification of ground weather predictions. 

(e) Contribution of visual intelligence due to ATS viewing 

of selected targets and on-board photography processing. 

3. Evaluation of man's potential contribution to automatic 

mission photography accomplishment and AVE malfunction 

correction.. 

n. Evaluate the use of redundant systems and back-up modes to 

assure that no single failure caused mission abort or crew 

fatality during abort. The evaluation shall include: 

1. Determination of proper operation of redundant or back-up 

equipment in cases of single failures. 

9-16 

DIEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

2. Determination of failures in redundant or back-up 

equipment when utilized. 

o. Evaluate MOL System crew safety, including: 

1. Effectiveness or readiness of abort operations. 

2. Flight crew contribution to abort operations. 

3. Mission Control capabilities during abort operations. 

4. Effect of non-continuous OV-MCC contact. 

p. Evaluate the biomedical monitoring of the flight crew, 

including: 

1. Monitoring of crew in Gemini B. 

2. Monitoring of crew in suits in the LM. 

3. Monitoring of crew in LM shirtsleeve environment. 

4. Effect of non-continuous monitoring of crew by MCC on crew 

health and safety. 

5. Effect of countdown, ascent, orbit, and retrieval on the 

crew. 

6. Crew activity, events, and radiation dosage on crew health 

and safety and mission accomplishment. 

7. Crew capability management. 

8. Effect of eating, sleeping, exercise, and radiation on the 

crew. 

q. Evaluate differences in operations and performance of the 

manned equipment in the automatic mission. 

r. Evaluate the T-IIIM launch vehicle, including: 

1. Flight anomalies. 

2. Orbital insertion of the OV, including the launch time 

effect, subsystem performance and the integrity of the 

T-IIIM/Gemini B interface. 

9-17 

DIECRET--SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

Flight crew safety monitoring and alarm. 

s. Evaluate the Gemini B, including: 

1. Flight anomalies as directed by the MOL SPO. 

2. Reentry performance and heating. 

3. Crew transfer between the Gemini B and the laboratory 

vehicle. 

4. 30-day orbital storage. 

5. Crew safety monitoring and alarm. 

6. Loiter accomplishment. 

7. Expendables usage. 

8. GIGS performance during ascent. 

9. Gemini B/laboratory vehicle separation and Gemini B deorbit. 

t. Evaluate Mission Control utilizing the AFSCF. The evaluation 

shall include: 

1. Non-continuous crew monitoring effects on crew safety. 

2. Non-continuous OV monitoring effects on mission performance. 

3. Effects of AFSCF multi-user environment scheduling on 

mission accomplishment. 

u. Evaluate the use of existing recovery forces to effect 

retrieval of the Gemini B and crew, or the DRVs. The evaluation 

shall include: 

1. Effect of Recovery Force deployment and scheduling on 

launch time. 

2. Retrieval of the Gemini B, crew, and film. 

3. Effects of Recovery Force multi-user environment on 

Gemini B retrieval. 

9-18 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 D-SEC-RET SPECIAL HANDLING 

4. Retrieval of DRVs and film canisters. 

5. Effects of AFSCF DRV Recovery Force multi-user environment 

on DRV retrieval. 

v. Evaluate laboratory vehicle disposal, including: 

1. Laboratory vehicle deorbit. 

2. Laboratory vehicle reentry. 

3. Laboratory vehicle probable impact point prediction. 

w. Evaluate MOL launch from VAFB using a single launch pad. The 

evaluation shall include: 

1. Pad and early ascent abort effects. 

2. Effect of ground environment on launch. 

3. Effect of the radio frequency transmission system on 

launch. 

x. Evaluate two launch vehicle flights, including one flight 

with the Gemini B. Development flights 1 and 2 shall be 

evaluated as well as determination of the accomplishment of 

the flight 3 system prerequisite objectives as follows: 

1. Flight 1 

(a) Demonstrate T-IIIM capability to provide the functions 

required to inject the manned/automatic MOL into the 

planned orbit. 

(b) Evaluate T-IIIM subsystem performance. 

(c) Demonstrate the capability of the launch personnel 

and the launch vehicle AGE to perform their 

functions in an operational environment during 

prelaunch, launch, and powered flight. 

(d) Demonstrate, to the extent possible, the capability 

of the MCC facilities and personnel to perform the 

required launch and ascent functions. 

9-19 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

2. Flight 2 

(a) Demonstrate T-IIIM capability to provide the 

functions required to inject the manned/automatic 

MOL into the planned orbit. 

(b) Evaluate T-IIIM subsystem performance. 

(c) Demonstrate flight vehicle structural integrity 

in a typical manned/automatic powered flight 

environment. 

(d) Demonstrate Gemini B capability to withstand a 

selected flight environment. for ascent, reentry, 

and retrieval. 

(e) Obtain data on selected flight environment parameters. 

(f) Evaluate Gemini B subsystem performance during 

the critical flight periods of ascent and reentry. 

(g) Demonstrate the retrieval of the Gemini B REM. 

(h) Demonstrate the compatibility of the interface 

between the Gemini B and the T-IIIM. 

(i) Demonstrate laboratory vehicle/T-IIIM separation. 

(j) Demonstrate the capability of the launch personnel 

and the FV AGE to perform the prelaunch and launch 

functions in the operational environment. 

(k) Demonstrate the capability of the MCC facilities 

and personnel to perform the required launch, ascent, 

and retrieval functions. 

y. Evaluate the return of intelligence data in the Gemini B REM 

for the manned system. The evaluation shall include: 

1. DRC transfer from the LM to the Gemini B. 

2. DRC stowage effects on crew comfort and safety. 

3. Effect of DRC transfer, stowage, and heating on product 

integrity. 

4. Effect of DRC contingency procedures. 

9-20 

D -SEM+ SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

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z. Evaluate the automatic mode DRV return on product integrity. 

aa. Evaluate the simulation program adequacy of providing 

training of the crew and support personnel. The evaluation 

shall include: 

1. Adequacy of crew training. 

2. Adequacy of support personnel training. 

3. Adequacy of simulation fidelity. 

4. Effect of simulation and training on crew mission 

accomplishment. 

bb. Evaluate maintenance including: 

1. The AGE support of launch on time. 

2. AGE isolation of AVE malfunctions to replaceable 

elements. 

3. AVE isolation of malfunctions to corrective levels. 

4. Correction of AVE malfunctions in orbit. 

9.3.3 Reporting 

9.3.3.1 General 

A summary of the following reports is provided in Table 9-2. 

9.3.3.2 Mission Evaluation Reports 

The mission evaluation reports are the responsibility of the MP&E organization. 

The mission correlation data will be used on a daily basis or transmitted as 

a computer report to The User. 

A target select report will be made after each RTS pass and will provide 

computer summary data showing payload activity. It will evaluate the 

photographic activity to at least show which targets were taken and in what 

modes, which targets were ob3ecured by weather, and whether "activity" existed. 

9-21 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING Description Preliminary report covering performanceof individual sezments & 

problemareas during ascent & early orbit. 

Establishes due date forassociate 's inputs toQuick-Look PostOperations Report. 

Preliminary report covering performance of individual segments & problemareas during total flight. 

Defines major problems of concern & assigns work priority toproblems. Utilizes theQuick-Look Reports. 

Covers first 5 days of operation. 

Covers operation through laboratory vehicle disposal. 

Final report on launch operations performance analysis. 

AFSCF ground network operations report tothe MOL SPO. 

On-orbit timeline performance report; biomedical report; performance, procedures, & equipment report; & missionsummary. 

Release 

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9-22 

SPECIAL HANDLING 
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D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D-SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

The Daily Countdown Report will be made each 24-hr and will use OV-recorded 

data. This recorded data will be recovered from the RTS either from a 

postpass playback or shipment of data tapes. This report provides more 

information on all targets photographed, primarily to assist the PIs during 

post operations evaluation. Because it also influences the selection of 

targets on subsequent passes over the same geographical area, the Daily 

Countdown Report has some near-real time aspects. 

9.3.3.3 Quick-Look Ascent and Orbit Report 

This report is a responsibility of the TA. Inputs to the report are reports 

from the Launch Operations Director and each of the associate contractors. 

It is a preliminary report covering the performance of the individual 

segments and problem areas encountered during ascent and the first five days 

of orbit. All inputs are required by L +7 days. The report issued by the 

FD will consist of a compilation of contractor inputs and will be released 

within 24 hr of the receipt of all inputs. 

9.3.3.4 Flight Termination Report 

This is a TWX report sent by the FD to notify all concerned that all official 

MOL operations have been concluded on a particular flight. This notification 

establishes the due date for associate contractor inputs to the quick-look 

post-operations report. 

9.3.3.5 Quick-Look Post-Operations Report 

This report is a responsibility of the TA. Inputs to the report are 

submitted by each associate contractor as semi-formal or TWX reports and may 

include daily log sheets. Each input covers the period of L +5 days through 

flight termination (FT). Information contained in the quick look and ascent 

report is not repeated, except to amplify or clarify information previously 

submitted. Inputs are due at FT +5 days.' The integrated report issued by the 

9-24 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

FD within 24 hr of receipt of all input, is a preliminary report covering 

L +5 days through FT. Flight crew and recovery activities are not reported 

as direct inputs in this report. 

9.3.3.6 Post Operations Assessment Directive (POAD) 

The POAD is prepared by the TA for the MD and is released twice for each 

flight: L +10 days, and FT +10 days. The initial directive will cover the 

first five days of the operation and the final directive will cover the 

operation through laboratory vehicle disposal. These two directives will 

define the major problems of concern and will assign work priority for 

postflight analyses to these problems. Inputs to these directives will be 

derived from the quick-look reports. 

9.3.3.7 Final Launch Evaluation Report 

This report, the responsibility of the 6595th ATW, describes the general 

performance of the test support system segment and evaluates ascent in terms 

of FV performance. This report is due L +20 days. 

9.3.3.8 Powered Flight, Orbit, and DRY Recovery Evaluation Report 

This report, the responsibility of the AFSCF, describes the operational 

activities of the AFSCF and the AFWTR in support of the flight. The 

published report is due FT +30 days. 

9.3.3.9 Flight Crew Debriefing Report 

This report, a responsibility of the MOL SPO, Flight Crew Division, (SAFSL-7C), 

is: an on-orbit timeline performance report; biomedical report; performance, 

procedures, and equipment report; and flight summary. This report will be 

published on an "as directed" basis. 

9.3.3.10 Manned Recovery Report 

This report is the responsibility of DDMS. The manned recovery operation is 

evaluated, with appropriate conclusions and recommendations. The published 

report is due FT +30 days. 

9-25 

D-SEGRET-SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D-SENE-T-SPECIAL HANDLING 

9.3.3.11 Gemini B Qualification Recovery Report 

This report by DIMS on the GBQ recovery is similar to the manned recovery 

report. 

9.3.3.12 Contractor Postflight Segment Report 

These reports are due twice for each flight from each associate contractor: 

initial POAD +20 days, and final POAD +50 days. These reports: (1) evaluate 

subsystem/segment/system non-nominal performance vs test objectives; (2) contain 

detailed engineering analysis of performance failures or deficiencies; and 

(3) summarize problems encountered and their solutions. The postflight 

segment reports are responsive to the POAD. 

9.3.3.13 Final Flight Test Engineering Report 

This report is the responsibility of the MOL SPO. It is due at POAD +80 days 

and uses the postflight reports of the contractors and government agencies 

as inputs. It is a system-level report and contains an evaluation of 

system test objectives vs performance results obtained. 

9-26 

D-SEORET-SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

10.0 FLIGHT TEST CONSTRAINTS 

10.1 GENERAL 

This Section provides a consistent set of constraints (see Tables 10-1 through 

10-6) for use in subordinate documents. These constraints are typical of 

those identified at the time of this writing. In many cases, values are 

unavailable. When values are given, the constraints are in use as hardware, 

software, and operations design baseline criteria. Many of these constraints 

will be superseded, modified, or supplemented and missing values provided 

with time as well as additional constraints being defined. An attempt will 

be made to keep this Section current through the period of development of the 

Hardware/Software Limitations Specification (Ref. 24). This Section will be 

superseded by the constraints defined by that document when it is released. 

10-1 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

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Table 

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d) 

D-S-EGRET- SPECIAL HANDLING 

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NRO APPROVED FOR 

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O Table 10-1. LaunchConstraints 

NRO APPROVED FOR D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

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0 

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A Table 10-2. 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

13 4) 

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NRO APPROVED FOR D -SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

, 

cc Constraints 

4 S 

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co 

m 

cv ,-1 

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Table 10-2. Data Comp

utation

al SubsystemGroup Constraints 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

IA 

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Table10-3. Data Reco

rde

rs Constraints 
O Table 10-3. Data Recorders Constraints 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D-SEGRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

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g 

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cr 

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0 0 

0 

44 

P:1

r-.1 

0 

CV 

0 0 

. 

0 

all 

4-t 

.01 

to 

H 

H es-i 

•

0 

-1.4 

-13 

8 

-14 0 al 

qc; 

a) 

I 

11 

•ri 

0 

0 

c0 

01 

4 

Constraints 

o 

o 0 

H 

.. 

In 

1 

.M 

F-1 cl■ 05 

r1 

g • • 

.0 

co 

ct-: 

1 H 

.. 

4) 

P4 cl:) 

c; 

rd 

0 

o 0 

a 

Cl) 

C \./ 

4 

qz1 

g 

.. 

m a) 

o +, 

oi H 

,-I p 

FP 

05 

. 

4, to 43 

4 4 4 4 4 

H H H en 

.. 

o 

5.4 it 

as 

H 0 

g 

L4 

0 '2) 

.0. c; Z 

,21 

N 

+1) 

.1-1 

U ad 

o 

1N1 

,C3 

0 

4 

• 

A 

.1-1 

r74 

Di 

I 

,—i 

4) 

XI 

tt .. 

..-1 C.) 

a) r4 

• P

t3 1-4 0

X Pt 

P 

1 

0 4) 

43 I-4 

.9 

-•4 

rz. 

0 

r• 

43 4) 0 

G4

4) n-I 

d -4-) 

al 

44 

ed c.)

0 

al 

10-13 

SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING 

Table10-4. Payload Constr

aints 
NRO APPROVED FOR D-SEreRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

1C 

t4 

. 

r-I 

>- 

0 

0 

in 

43 

. 

41) 

•rt 

ri 

4A 

0 

.■-I 

+2 

Cri 

El 

0 

-43 

2 

al 

0 

4-4 

CO 

iz' 

• 

H 

• 

T1 

g 

43 

ti) 

to 

.0 

•el 

H 

ri• 

f-4 

0 

,44 

II 

> 

14 

A 

\JD 

I 

0 

•ri H 

a) 

P:1 

• 

N 

C -• 

1-4 

V 

4/ 42 

0 0 

tD 0 

.0 •rt 

* +1 

T1 1-4 

tt) 0 

04 

H 

Oti

0 0 

0 43 

0 

V ta0 

40 

4-1 +1 

H 

.1-1 

)1 4-; 

0 

1-6 .6:1 • 

8 ' 0 

rd 0 to 

41 

1 0 u••■ 

* -4" 

0 0 0 

-ri ,o raa 

H a) 

4/ 0 0 

.,-. x 

13:1 +1 V 

• 

H 

Constraints 

›.4 

+1 

H 

•ri 

,0 

cd 

P, 

0 

0 

-....- 

■O 

a) 

do 

0 ;F.: 

. 

H 

S-4 

o 

cd 

44 ,...) 

. 

N 

0 

0 

03 

tp 

4 

• • 

r..• 

0 

rr(?1 

..-4 

4/ 

* 

.0 

1 

14 

o 

14 N 

-.-s 

Z 

. 

H 

g 

El 

(.1 

0 

. 

.. 

Al 

+3 

•ri 

Cl. 

• 

6d 

g 

El 

0 

0 

. 

• • 

1 

0 

t4 

• 

,O 

g 

0 

0 

41) 

co 

bD 

0 

H 

H 

-..... tip 

0 

4/ .4-4 i., $.4 

2 -4-1 

c./ 

0 CO ■-• E-4 4-, 0 

u) •tC 

• 

N 

I 

.k.

g 

El 

110 

14 4 )

---s. 

. ra 

-4-I 

fil 

• • 

0 

0 

1.4 

8 

A 

. 

H 

4) 4-1 

-1-1 

.0 

•rt 

H 

0 

CO 

PI 

•ri 

q 

0 

0 

ol 

.. 

a) 

0

H 

0 

0 

0 

.4 

E-4 

• 

N 

1 

0 

0 

0 

• • 

0 

84 

0 

0) 

EA 

• 

01 

1 

.4 

P 

a) 

PI 

--... 

a)

p 

• • 

i to 

0 0 

H 

 4-4 0 

0 8, 

0 0 

.0 co 0 ,--1 

:e4 C..) 

• 

--I1 

I 

0 

111 

4-, 

N 

0 

4-1 

(1/ 

;4 

+.1 

n 

1-

4 

CO 

01 

,

0 

.2 

- 

to 

0 

9 

E-4 

a) 

H 

4. ) 

co 

S4 

A 

t 

a, 

ro 

>. 

1 0- 1 4 

D-SCCRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

Table 

10-4. Paylo

ad Constr

aints (Continue

d) 
rd 

•ri 

0 Table10-4. Payload Constr

aints 

NRO APPROVED FOR D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

13 

al 

M 

I 11 0 il q

tl) •.-1 ^ in • • 0 +2 (.1 Fi 

H H 

0 0 or; - 

U) v) 

XI • 0 

40 

$4 

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0 r--1 

r. .-1 •

01 ,S4 

I 

..-1 C) 

44 0 

0 la .--1 .. ji 

a) • -p 44 

0 a$ 0 

..-4 • k 

,-.4 cr1 0 tv 

ca v) 

$4 0 0 0 

0 ."4 r-.1 H 

est: 

(..) rd

0 

0 

0 4) ,-4 

R. •r4 • 

-..) 44 a) 4) 

"4gj 5 

4_, 8 1 . 

En ca 1

4)

4 

. 

r-4 

Constraints 

■GI -1 

F1 

• • 

4) 

P. 

,--1 

a) 

•M 

E4 

0 

0 

1 

.s4 

0 

I-1 

----- 

.0 

0 

(V 

u E-I o

0 

03 34 

0 0 

0 R. 

r-1 14 

4) 

$4 

0 40 0■4 

q:$ 0

a 

4) c‘l 

00 

Q 

00 0 

g 

.-4 -P 

i-4 

0 •• 

A4 0 

0 0 

cd •.-1 

4., 03 

$4 

0 0 

_NI P4 

al 

k 

0 

U7

14 

4) 

a) 

r-1 el) 

0) 

34 r0 

Win 

• 

0 0 

0 

$4 0 

01 g 

.0 

4) \ 0 40 

.k4 

0 

0 •• 

-P 0 

g-4 

H 03 

10 $4 

0 0 

-.4 p., En o 

04 

0 

4) 

08 

'.4 

4-I 

-P 

 4) 0 

H 

4) 

C.) 

0 

+) 

g) 

9-1 

.0 

40 

vi 

U) 

401 

a) 

o

rn 

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o; 

40 

0 

ml 

+ 

.. 

g 

cn 

• 

1 

k 0 

40 

1 + 

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4 

t 

rzl 

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1 

, 4) 

OD 

0 

.10 

1 + 

•• 8 

X 

• 

• 

1 

1 

. . 

ta 

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0 

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U 

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1.1 0 1.4 

4 

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0, 0 

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0 4) 

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40 o3 

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OD 3-1 tO rd 

1) 4) 

11 r0 05 03 

I 

1 g '71 3 

0) 0 

C04 44+0 

o 

0 0 0 

co 14 

H 0 

• J.. 

0 

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1 

al •• 

$4 -P 

t. .1) $3 

g 4 

E--4 al 

14 

s-) 0 

0 

14 a) $4 

(N) 

• 

NI 

+ 1 

>> 0 

0 1— 

pa 

a) 

1 •• 

,c1 0 

N 

-1-1 

0 0 

o N 

 a) 

0 Pt. 

01 EI 

•ri 0 EI 

(A 

I-4 

14 

4) 

.'.1 V 

al 

$4 

E-4 

Cf) 

4-> 

Al 

P 

0 

0 

n r-4 

0 0 

34 14 

V tl' 

pil 0 

Ial C) 

10-15 

D-SEGREf SPECIAL HANDLING 
SPECIAL HANDLING 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

-x 

11 

a) 

04 

Si 

a) 

O 

A 

0 

43 

a) 

0 

Ti 

gi 

0 

-.-i 

4,, 

cd 

Si 

as 

R, 

0 

0 

0 

• 

as 0 

P 0 

0 -.-1 

-,-) -4) 

of Sa, 

t,' 9 

.. 0 0 0 0 c..) 0 

• -I 

ta 

4-) 

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ri 

0 

4, 

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0 

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C-) 

to 

4) 

P 

as 

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a) 

g) 

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o 

a 

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tID 

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•rx.i4 

3. 

0 

a) 

4 

E-4 

rti 

4) 

+3 

•,-4 

do 

•"4 

$4 

ta4 

. 

N 

0 

0 

.1-4 • • 

+) to 

al ta 

4, el 

cn a. 

; 

( 

• • 

,s4 

0 

03 

f-1 E-1 

0 "`--- 

fa 

k 0 

H H 

X u) 

• ,c, 

1 

0 A 

P P., 

0 0 

..cl S.4 

fa-. 400 

0 

0 

0 

•,-, 

4-) kW 

a) 

134 

0 

k 

a 

4., 

0 

.0 

to 

0 

k 

a) 

o 

• H 

to 

.. 

4 

4, 

11) 

0 

-r1 

rei 

.--1 

0 

4-1 

0 

4) 

co 

a; 

Amu 

V 

4-4 

4) g - . 

6.1) 

4)0 

0 ..-1. 

of ri 

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Z Ai 

.-1 a.) 

011 4, 

al H P4 

r-1 ---.. 

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ii S-I 

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i-4 4., 

f-i 

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-r4 

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4 

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to 

I : 1 

-r4 

0 

1 

0 

4-1 

0 

0 

a) 

• 

A 

N 

AsES0 

.r.1 

4-) 

0 

9^ 

-4-, tz0 

0 0 

03 •rl 

----• r-I 

H 

a) :0 

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al IL 

-P 

,r4 a) 

0 k 

-43 ---.- 

-rl 40 

la, 0 

1 0 ill 

$4 4-3 

14 S:1 

.r4 a) 

0 0-0

-.-1 

to 

k H 

4-1 r-1 

.,-, 

..., ,1,4 

• 

,-0 11) 

4-, 

rd 0 

A ).-■ 

al ---- 

47 

• CI 

id .-1 

Si 

0 Qs 

-4) 4-) 

A 

t) ID 

4.) 0 

r--I 

'Id 

rd .4g 

6 

k 

Cl) 

4-) 

2 

.0 

4.) 

Cl) 

El U 

-40 

4-1 

0 

0 

4) 

as 

A 

r6 

• 

-r4 

Al 

13 a) 

4) 

4-4 

he 

14 

•.4 

10 

U) 

Cl) 

0 

0 

ft 

0 

0 

.0 

A4 

0 

•r-1 

.4 

124 gl 

a3 0 

SA •,-4 

0 

1)0 4-) 

aS 

0 QS 

eLz■ l '' 

10-16 

0-SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

Table 10-4. Paylo

ad Constr

aints (Con

tinue

d) 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 Table 

10-4. Paylo

ad Constraints (Continue

d) 

D-SEGRE4 SPECIAL HANDLING 

a 

4) 

11 I!) 

"-I +3 

0 0 

0 .0 

A 

0 

0 44 

.1-1 0 

+) 

C.) ea 

+1 00 

+3 

03 H 

000 

0 H 

+) rd0 

eu a ..a A to ia 

44 k 1--I 

0 0 

'0 GO 

0 '0 0 3.4 

-.-1 0 

4-1 )1 0 

0 +0 

0 XI 1:3 

3* 

...-1 

0 A 

C1) ed 

k .0 k 

Pa )0 040 

• 

ral 

Constraints 

o 

+3 

a 

:g 

k 

a.) 

44 

0 

F-I 

0 

-ri 

4-3 

o 

1- 

i

k

tdy 

• 

k 

a, 

(\1 

P d 

Cd til 

4) 

44 0 

a./ •ri 

p., 

I--I 0 • 

0 -ia (U 1-. 

O:7 al 

. ) 

,TIC 

0H 0 

0 --- co 

0 

'0 

A FR A 

0 .4-I 0 

+I k 

0 0 It 

-I-I 0 

14 u) .0 

4) -f-i -I-) 

" 

0 4) 

I-1 rd ,c) 

ai 

0 

2 

• 

c. 0) 0 • 

0 .0 ..P 

0 +30 

P4 

03 4-4 0 

" 

0 0)0 

043 a) 

0 0 k 

A 

0 03 00 

a-) Or +a 

0 0 k 

4-1 4) 

'0 a-) •C3 

k H H 

0 0 10 

4.3 CO 0 

0 4) 0 

H 34 CJ 

• ,Ja 

A 41 

4 ) )4 ,4:3 

) 

,. 0 

0 0 

0 

(a 

N ftn) 

0_ 

0 +s 

a 

0 • 

A 

0 >, +A 2

k Ce 

+) 0 Pi 

0 181 

ri 4-1 

'LI Sr $4 Pi 

0 0 

4.1 4) ,-1 

0 A I.. 

1-I 4J A 

l..) 

CO 

4) 

may /

tIO 

El 4) 

+1 

425 

0 

Ii 

0 

+3 

k 

tra. 

CO 

a) 

+) 

4) 

a.) 

1 

2 2 

El 

9-1 

ai 

a+' 

. 

p. 

0 

0 

to 

0 

I CO 

I 

4-) 

• 

0 dr) 

,-1 4) 

k 'CI 4) a) si 

cor0 0 t"*". 

+1 0 aol 

0 0 +s +s 

En "g 10 03 

4-1 +3 en 

0 0 +I 0 

to 8 a, ..-4 

co--- 

+s a) i-1 

74 rl 

0 0 H 

+344+3 

04 

0 '0 ,-I +s 

k 0.) 1-1 0 

01 as a) 

-' mit) rg 

a 

F" •-, 1 

. 

XI 

..•v -1 

Xi 

a 

a3 

ei) 0 

+3 

0 

,C1 114 

en 

0 

4-I 

1=1 

0 

4-1 4) 

Cd U 

14 0 

4) 

r--4 0' 

0 4) 

C4 Ca 

c-1 

I o 

A4 A 0 

0 05 H 

0 k H 

•rl +) 0 

+a 3.4 0 

0 0 .0 

Fi A 14 4-) 

4., 0 

(1) 14 Od • • 

0.11k 00 

..-I CD .rI 00 H 

4-1 0 gl 0 

1-1 4-) 40 XI 

41) 4) 0 0.4 4) 

F4 .0 •r•I 06 I> 

a)) 

I-I 

0 

.0 '0 

0 0 I 0 

cd 0 0 

r•-■ -,-1 0 

0( +) 

0 

0 0 0 

Pi C.) 

(.14 0 •••-.' 

4 

0 

4, 

a) 

5 

U 

Pa 

k 

0 

k 

k 

V 

10-17 

-SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
H a) 

4-, 1-4 

a) 1-- 01 

g 

ac

d 0 

$4 -r-1 

0 4-, 

1-4 

f-i 0 

C.) 0 

(t) 

sa 

..ri 

--....... 

0 

0 

Ul 

tiC 

-d 

C \I 

H 

.--. 

4-, 

XI 

00 

0 

0 

CO 

1,0 

0 

TS 

\C) 

0 

4-) 

-f-) 

• 

4 

T41) i 

4-1 

c) 

+4 +) 0 

7-4 8 ad 43 

0 0 

Cd 

El 

.....- UN 

(Ni 

+ 1 + 1 

U) 

4ij 

-,-) 

.4 ----. 

CI) 

a) 0 0 4 

Fr 

a) rd 

-P 0.1 

Cf) 4-, 

•,- I cH 0 4., co 0 4 0 

Pi 0 % czo 41 •• u ,r) 174 •34 

g 

r-4 ra rn L49 -a 

of ,z, ,,f3).... 3 i.-1 --, 0' .0. CA 

cr) .47 

Constraints 

Servo Rates 

Pi 

.0 

ci 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 Table 10-4. Payload Constraints (Continue

d) 

D-SEeRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

10-18 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING 

4-, C) a) 

P1 a) 

(1) 

.11 

4-, 

•H 

rd 

0) 

4-, cd 

en 

+, a) 

N .-t4 

Ei W

a 

rd 

g 0; a) 

.-4 g 

co 

4) a) 

si H ..-1 0 

ad .0-4 

I~.0 

+, 0) 

tO P• 

0 0 0 

0 +3 

• ,--4 

Constraints 

00 

rd 

OD bD 

rd rd 

• 0 

(1) u) 

C) 

a) u) 

V\ 4- CD t--- .4- 

+ + 1 

7) a) H co a) 

it .--1 de A • • 4 .. .0 

4, 

5 U) 

01 -1-3 

...4 •ri 

0 vi 

11.) 4-3 

F4 ..-1 

0 a, .• -1-3 

•,-4 •r-i GS q_. N. tu

)e 04 

.1-1 ' .4-1 

pow 

r-i ci 

4-,

• 

,-1 V 

0 •re ■-I 

04 114 te) 

EA 

41 

1-4 

4., 

H r-I 

0 

(4 

0 CA 

-4-, 

•re 

0 

04 rc, • • 

r--I 

::)I .4 11).1 W .2 44 A • 

+a 0) 

0; 

0) (1) 

• ..-1 ..-1 

0 1-1 rn i-i Z +, 0 Cl) Cli X) CO ,c) Pi. 

■-1 N A . . 

,ed ell 

g P. 

0 

Q 0 0 CO 

••-■ 

+a 1-4 

CO .4-1 

.•-I ,..% 

0 C.) O' (d U N 

•=4 E-4 

10-19 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

Table 10-4. Payload Constraints (Continue

d) 
O Table 10-4. Payload Constraints 

NRO APPROVED FOR D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

a, 

m Constraints 

3 a) 

4-1 

0 

rd ■H (i) 

-r4 C.4 

---- 

0 ..-4 

aS V 

-,-■ 

.,--4 

W 

:7-: 

H 

4-, 0 .0 

PA 

ci 

.. 

c.) 

.0 

11, cd )... 

hf) 

.. 

40 

03 •.-I 

0 

g a/ .) "r4 

. 

.13 

1 

d. 

2 

I 

9 

8 

1.,. 

CV 

.1-$ 

• • 

(1) 

f4 

1 

I 

.0 I OD 0) 

•r4 $4 -1 

9 'Z' .. 

. al La 

+3 

00 •r G:1 am a) 

Z •r-I Fi 

• H 

4., 

i a) CD izi 

u) 

-r4 

g 1 ;4 -). 

',4 

CV. 

1 

14 a) +2 FA 

ul 

o -,-4 

4-, 

'gt4 

- 

Y..1 ci4 

4- 

•,-I e.) 0 H a) 

,.. 

W 2 a) 5-4 tf] 

10-20 

SPECIAL HANDLING 
Ve

hicle Constraints Table10-5. 

...•■■•■•• 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D-SECRET- SPECIAL HANDLING 

14 

O 

co 0 

0 0 • 

N-10 4-) 

t' 4 

A • H 

0 -pH 

Prd 

) 4.1 

•r4 H 0 

0 4 -1 

..-4 •cl 

1 N g 

(S .4-1 

1-4 -OA 

0 0 cd 

'0 

+3W t* 

1 U4' 

14 1:3 

^A 0 

ad a) PR 

• 

0.1 4-4 -r-1 

g 

0 

0 1-4 

1 

l:4 +3ch 

r-I 

Constraints 

TS 

cd 

0 

H 

of 

Pi 

g) 

•,-1 

A 

0 

H ,0 

cd 

0 '''', 

.4-1 0 

n o 

----... -,..1 

(1) 4-) 

H cd 

al a) 

A 

 cz A 0 

• 

H 

0 

v3 

0 a) 

44N 

i 

0 0 4) 

0 R4 

0 co • f.4 

4-4 0-to 0 

rd t'''' 4) 4-) 0 

0 • 1.4 di 0 

0 0 0 

rfl 0 

of 4-1 1:11 e +, 

0tn 

1i)I f) -dk 3 

0 -.-4 ., pi 

0 r1 -P 0' 

, 0 0 

4.) 0 7.4 H 

4-, 0 ,0 

0 0 >, al 

 /-4 A c.) 4. 

01 04' 0 0 

4-4 

co +, Cl) 

E-4 c.) V C1 E-1 

0 0 0 0 0 

<4 03 El cd <4 

• • 

0 A 

rJ 

t 

I 4-) 0 

0 A 

14 

co 4-) 

0 

cd 

k • 

0 CO 

14 0 

 .,-, 

0 P. 

0 0 

$1 A r3 

0 0 0 

H 

$4 4-) 4-2 

P. 0 0 k k 

0 41) .0 

0 P. -o-1 0) 0 P• 

a) 

I rd 

0 V ad 

RI 0 $.1 

 $44 0 i 

PI 4-4 El 

0 0 ad ^ 

0 C.) 0 0 

0 e. -g • 

xi 

I 

an \-0 

0 ?-, 1-4 

0 413 0 1.4 

..-4 A 4-4 0 

-P 0 4-4 

 0 of 0 

4-3 0 0 

0 H .4-I rti CI 

ad 0 +3 A 0 

H 1.4 0 -P 

1.4 4.) 4) ,4 

0 0 4.) 4., al 

el a, 0 1k ad 0r ad H •

rd P4 

0 

4-) ad k S 10 

rd 0 

-P ;1 r-1 pi 10, •-i 0 o co 1-4 

..0 1E1 to 1.1 P4 

4 s 

H Cg 

4) a) 

1-4 

.11 F•4 

-4-) 4) 

$.1 4 

0 of 

4-4 

P:1 

0 -44 • 

-,-4 0 R4 

-401 1 4 

t) 0 

0 0 0 

H al 

H 0 1.4 

ad -P +) 

H 

ad 0 0 

0 -r4 -r4 

A f-• +I 

4-) ..-4 

a a 

Z 0 n-4 

a; 

• 

-P 

<4 •".1 .A 

t-A 1-1 

0 

1.4 >. 

0 4.) CI 

4-4 •rl 0 

,--4 

0 •,-4 ,., 

0 A ,-1 al 

PI 

al 

0 0 CI 

-4-1 0 

a 0 

of 0 -P 

 PI 

0 4.2 

d-d ca A 

A 0 0 

4) a) rj 

/4 0 

ty > 

,a3 I< ..-1 

V 0 0 co w 9. A ml w 

• 

.0 

F-4 

rA 

I 

4-, 

4-, 

cd 

,34 

H 

on 

.. 

H 

•• 

0 

rd 

A 

1 

o 

E4 

. H 

El a) ,) 

I-4 

A 0 

M H 0o 

V +i 

4 o 

N 

a) 

rJ 0 

..-4 I., 

-P 0 4., 

0 

10-21 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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Table 10-6. Crew Constraints 
NRO APPROVED FOR D SECREfi SPECIAL HANDLING 

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1 0-26 

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11.0 TRAINING, SIMULATION, AND OPERATIONAL READINESS 

11.1 GENERAL 

Flight and ground crew training, simulation activities, and operational 

readiness of ground support hardware and software systems and personnel are 

discussed in this section. The MOL Mission Simulator (MS) is described together with its three segments as well as ancillary development simulators 

and specific task trainers. The basic purposes are outlined and the equipment and software subsystems are defined. Interface areas are outlined 

among the three segments as well as with the Operational Training and Evaluation Facility (OTEF) and the AFSCF. The operational readiness concepts are 

reviewed and the relationship of the MS to these activities is outlined. 

Finally, the training of both flight crew and ground support personnel is 

discussed. 

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11.2 MOL MISSION SIMULATOR 

MOL flight crew training will include experience in the simulated environment 

of the spacecraft. This experience will be gained, in part, from subsystem 

trainers, development simulators and specific task trainers. The MS will 

duplicate the spatial relationships and performance characteristics of the 

spacecraft itself. The MS will be ready for operation approximately nine 

months prior to the first manned launch. The MS, comprised of three basic 

segments [the Gemini B procedures simulator (GBPS), the laboratory module 

simulation equipment (LMSE), and the mission module simulation equipment 

(MMSE)] will be installed in the VAFB OTEF. 

it is intended that the MS will be essentially indistinguishable at its 

operational interfaces (i.e., crew and MCC) from real flight. 

The MS and its component segments have two primary purposes: (1) the 

rehearsal and training of flight crews, and (2) the rehearsal and training 

of mission control personnel. In addition to the primary objectives, it will 

serve to exercise the MOL-peculiar operational software as part of the verification procedure and will assist in development and validation of flight 

test rules, plans, and procedures. 

11.2.1 Training and Rehearsal 

The MOL training program will culminate in complete dress rehearsals just 

prior to the launch. These rehearsals will combine all phases, providing the 

means for flight crew and MCC personnel to sharpen the critical skills 

required for the actual flight. Although the MS will simulate normal flights, 

emphasis during rehearsals and training will be on emergency and backup 

operation as well as diagnostic analysis associated with simulated malfunctions. In preparation for complete rehearsals, the crew will have begun 

formal training several years before the launch. 

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Early training will occur in various specific task and development simulators. 

Crew training employing the MS will begin with development of crew proficiency 

in areas where specific critical skills are required. Thus, the various 

segments will be used independently and, perhaps, simultaneously to provide 

specific task training at the earliest possible time. As appropriate skills 

are acquired, training on specific flight phases will begin. 

Launch and ascent phases will be simulated with the GBPS either alone or with 

the MCC. The capability for running consecutive simulations over periods of 

up to eight hours, will exist. Each simulated ascent may include a different 

set of malfunctions. Reentry rehearsal and training will be conducted in 

similar fashion using only the GBPS with the MCC. The GBPS is involved also 

in early orbit and terminal orbit operations. In this case, however, the 

GBPS must be operating cooperatively with the LMSE. 

The LMSE and the MMSE, operating together as the laboratory vehicle procedures 

simulator (LVPS), will be used for on-orbit rehearsal and training. During 

this phase of simulation the LVPS as well as the LMSE and MMSE segments, may 

operate in open-loop mode thus not involving the STC or may operate closedloop with the STC to support flight crew and MCC personnel training and flight 

test rehearsals. The LVPS will be capable of: simulating quasi-real-time; 

skipping ahead in time in accordance with the Instructor-Operator Station 

inputs; or recycling to selected check points in the simulated flight. The 

LMSE and the MMSE can operate as independent segments, when required. 

For complete flight test rehearsals and some phases of training, all MS 

segments must be operating together and appropriately interfaced with each 

other as well as with the communications system (EXCELS) and ADS associated 

with the STC. Each segment of the MS makes a unique contribution to the 

total simulation process. Complete flight test rehearsals will require the 

MS to be tied into the MCC for 16 revs. 

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11.2.2 Gemini B Procedures Simulator 

The GBPS is used in training the MOL flight crew to control and monitor 

vehicle operation during the launch, ascent, early orbit, late orbit (including loiter), and reentry phases. The GBPS consists of an InstructorOperator Station and a computer complex with specialized signal conditioning 

and distribution (SC&D) equipment together with a mockup of the capsule and 

crew station. The interior, controls, and displays of the crew station are 

identical in appearance and operation to those in the actual Gemini B 

spacecraft. The pilot displays are largely controlled by the computer 

programs in the two DDP-124 computers in the computer complex. These programs 

send control information to the SC&D equipment which then operates the pilot 

displays. The SC&D equipment also monitors the switch, valve, and hand 

controller postions in the crew station and sends this information to the 

computer complex for any required processing. 

The computer programs resident in the GBPS computer complex effectively model 

the Gemini B spacecraft and its inherent environment. A six-degree-offreedom model of the T-IIIM vehicle is included for simulation of the ascent 

phase activities. Programs that solve the orbit generation and reentry, 

equations are also included for simulation of the early orbit, late orbit 

(including loiter), and reentry phases. The vehicle math models include 

provisions for simulating various vehicle subsystems malfunctions to train 

the flight crew to detect and diagnose improper spacecraft or subsystem 

operation and to take the proper corrective action. These programs interface 

with the Instructor-Operator Station. 

Instructors at the Instructor-Operator Station control and monitor the 

entire GBPS simulation activity. From this point, the instructors can initiate and control operation of the simulator and simulation exercise, insert 

or remove preprogrammed simulated malfunctions, and monitor the flight crew 

procedures and activities in the crew station. Intercom facilities allow 

the instructor-operator to communicate verbally with the other instructors, 

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the flight crew, the STC simulation script coordinators, the operators of 

the other MS segments, and with the GBPS personnel stationed at the computer 

complex. Training emphasis will vary according to the flight phase being 

simulated. 

During ascent phase simulations, the crew will be concerned primarily with 

detecting malfunctions in the BIGS or GIGS, performing the switchover function, 

and detecting launch vehicle or spacecraft malfunctions that lead to an abort 

condition. If an abort condition is indicated, the flight crew will rehearse 

the procedures required to effect a successful abort. Near the orbit insertion point, the crew will be concerned with achieving the proper orbit and if 

required, firing the laboratory vehicle engines to trim the orbit. In addition to training the flight crew and validating crew procedures, the GBPS 

will be used for training the flight controllers located in the STC and 

verify► MOL-peculiar ascent and reentry programs resident in the STC computer 

complex. The interface between GBPS and STC that is necessary for these 

tasks is discussed in paragraph 11.2.4.3. 

Once simulation reaches a point where contact with the Insertion Ship is lost, 

only voice communication between the crew in the GBPS and the flight controllers in the MCC is provided. 

During early orbit phase simulations, the crew will learn to effect Mode D 

aborts, diagnose and control Gemini B failures, shutdown the Gemini B in 

preparation for transferring to the laboratory vehicle and to checkout the 

laboratory vehicle to the extent possible from the Gemini B. The GBPS 

computer complex will contain a functional model of the laboratory vehicle 

for training in the latter procedures in the simulator segment mode (i.e., 

the GBPS operating autonomously). 

In the integrated mode, (i.e., when the GBPS is operating with the LMSE), the 

GBPS will provide the LMSE with Gemini B TLM data to permit full data communication with the STC. This function is described in paragraph 11.2.4.2. 

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Loiter phase simulations will emphasize powering up the Gemini B spacecraft, 

initializing the Gemini B guidance computer and inertial platform, separating 

from the laboratory vehicle, and preparing for the reentry phase. During reentry simulations, the flight crew will learn to effect a proper reentry from 

a variety of orbital conditions and with a variety of spacecraft malfunctions. 

A six-degree-of-freedom model in the GBPS software package will permit the 

flight crew to reenter using either the automatic computer program or the 

manual backup mode. During loiter and reentry phase simulations, verbal 

communications may again be established between the GBPS crew station and 

the STC flight controllers. Simulated reentry tracking data capability will 

be provided for a nominal reentry. 

Upon completion of the landing sequence, the flight crew and the instructors 

can analyze performance by comparing the computed landing point with the aim 

point. 

11.2.3 Laboratory Vehicle Procedures Simulator (LVPS) 

The LVPS segment of the MS is the primary tool for rehearsal of the flight 

crew in operation of the MOL/DORIAN system in the early orbit and on-orbit 

phases. In addition, the LVPS will be used to train and rehearse the STC 

mission control personnel and to aid in verification of the AVE computer 

software and its interplay with the command generation and orbit/ephemeris 

programs at the STC. 

From the crew training viewpoint, the heart of the LVPS is the simulated 

laboratory module (ELM). The interior of this structure is intended to be 

an exact replica of the interior of the actual MOL vehicle. All controls 

and displays within the SLM operate in a manner identical to the controls 

and displays in the AVE. This includes a high fidelity dynamic simulation 

of the pilot's field of view through the ATSs and primary optics displays. 

The upper compartment crew quarters areas however, are minimally functional 

mockups of the actual vehicle. Because of the one g environment, special 

provisions have been added to allow pilot access to the controls and devices 

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in the upper compartment. Within the SLM, the flight crew will rehearse 

the proper procedures for operation and control of operating or malfunctioning spacecraft. 

The LVPS will be controlled from the LVPS Instructor-Operator Station; the 

instructors can monitor and control the simulator subsystems, modify or 

change the training exercise being run, monitor the crew activity in the SLM, 

monitor the position of switches and controls within the SLM, and verbally 

communicate with the flight crew, GBPS instructor operators, computer complex 

operators, and the rehearsal coordinators at the STC. Finally, the instructors 

may freeze the simulation exercise at any point in time, recycle to a previous 

point in the simulation, or step ahead to a future time to allow the flight 

crew to bypass uneventful periods or study the end effects of a long time 

duration related malfunction. 

During the LVPS operation, all phases of the on-orbit operation may be 

simulated including initial application of power to the laboratory subsystems, 

payload calibration and checkout, target passes, remote tracking station 

passes, and final configuring of the spacecraft prior to reentry of the 

Gemini B. 

11.2.3.1 Laboratory Module Simulation Equipment 

The LMSE, with its attendent hardware and software, simulate an LM and its 

orbital environment. The LMSE is comprised of the SLM (except panels 1, 2, 

and 8, which are part of MMSE), a simulated RTS, a computer complex with an 

IBM 360/Model 65 computer and its peripheral equipment, software models of 

the laboratory vehicle subsystems and the vehicle environment, special-purpose 

SC&D equipment, and an IOC for controlling the aforementioned hardware and 

software and for monitoring the activities of the flight crew in thy SIM. 

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The laboratory vehicle software models monitor the activities of the flight 

crew members via the LMSE SC&D equipment. The LMSE operation is best explained by example: 

When one of the crew members changes a switch position in the 

SLM, the change is detected by the SC&D equipment, and information defining the change is sent to the computer where the 

appropriate subsystem model is notified. The model subsequently 

computes the response that the pilot should see, dependent on 

the condition of that subsystem and related subsystems, and sends 

the appropriate control information to the SC&D equipment. The 

SC&D equipment then activates the appropriate display device in 

the SLM. The total time consumed by this process is such that 

no unrealistic delays between action and response are perceived 

by the flight crew. 

The programs within the LMSE computer model laboratory vehicle subsystems 

that interface with the crew, including power, environmental control and 

life support, attitude control and translation, propulsion, and data acquisition. The environment-related routines include an orbit generation program, 

weight and balance, atmospheric drag model, and a functional model of a 

standard AFSCF RTS. 

The RTS model allows the LMSE to communicate directly with the STC, using 

operational data formats and rates in the prepass or pass modes of operation 

(see paragraph 11.2.4.4). 

The software executive system in thy LMSE computer insures that each model 

or routine is iterated at a sufficiently high rate to propagate the simulation 

exercise smoothly. The executive also controls the insertion of simulated 

malfunctions. Malfunction simulation may be inserted as a function of 

simulation time or as a function of flight crew action. The LMSE can simulate 

several hundred different malfunctions of the laboratory vehicle subsystems. 

Simulated malfunctions in one subsystem realistically propagate through other 

subsystem models (e.g., a degradation in the power system may affect many 

other vehicle subsystems). 

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The LMSE can operate in numerous different modes: (1) it may operate with 

the MMSE in the LVPS mode via the LMSE/MMSE interface; (2) it may operate 

autonomously in the segment mode, allowing the flight crew to practice and 

rehearse the monitoring and control procedures associated with particular 

laboratory vehicle subsystems; (3) it may also operate in conjunction with 

thy GBPS to simulate the early orbit mode with one crew member in each crew 

station, or it may obtain initialization parameters from the GBPS to ensure 

a smooth transition from the ascent phase of simulation to the on-orbit phase. 

11.2.3.2 Mission Module Simulation Equipment (MMSE) 

The MMSE simulates the DORIAN equipment and related subsystems. The MMSE 

is composed of the following subsystems: (1) three high precision optical 

trains that provide a realistic simulation of the two ATSs and the primary 

optics; (2) a computer complex comprised of an IBM 360/44, an IBM 4w, an 

SDS 930, and a Beckman 2200 computer with associated peripheral equipment; 

(3) panels 1, 2, and 8 of the SLM, with their associated electrical displays 

and optical eyepieces; (4) two cue projectors that give the flight crew the 

same type of cue presentation they will observe on the actual vehicle; and 

(5) a segment of the Instructor-Operator Station. 

Through optical stimulus equipment, crew members in the SLM can view a 

realistic representation (9 x 9 in. slides of simulated target areas viewed 

through eyepieces) of what will be seen in the ATS and primary optics eyepieces of the actual vehicle. An anamorphic lens in the optical train provides 

the proper perspective. Prisms provide image rotation. Zoom lenses coupled 

through the computer to the pilot's zoom control provide high fidelity simulation of the zoom capabilities, as well as relative magnification due to 

pointing angle, both in the ATSs and primary optics. Target position with 

respect to the vehicle look angle is simulated by moving the optical entrance 

pupil to various positions over the 9 x 9 in. slide. The position of the 

slide with respect to the optics is determined by the computer complex and is 

a function of simulated vehicle position, simulated vehicle anomalies, vehicle 

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attitude, and pilot's optics hand controller position, and position of the 

target on the slide. As the vehicle moves from target area to target area, a 

high-speed slide changer exchanges the slide at the entrance to the optical 

train. The optical subsystem of the MMSE also provides the timer wipeout 

lights in the pilot's eyepiece and the zoom reticle. 

In addition to providing a means for flight crew rehearsal of DORIAN-related 

procedures, the MMSE will be used to assist in the verification of the AVE 

computer programs. The MMSE computer complex includes a MOL AVE computer 

with unmodified operational software. The MMSE IBM 360/44 computer coupled 

to the AVE computer through the Airborne Digital Computer Adapter Simulator 

(ADCAS) will provide the AVE computer with an environment that is indistinguishable from its actual vehicle environment. The operational software will 

be exercised for verification within the MMSE segment. 

The IBM 360/44 computer and its accompanying programs simulates the missionpayload related subsystems such as the MDAU, the IVS, and portions of the 

MAS. The programs can also simulate subsystem malfunctions for flight crew 

rehearsal of contingency procedures. The IBM 360/44 monitors the crew 

activities, controls the three optical trains, and drives the electrical 

displays on panels 1, 2, and 8. 

The MMSE is capable also of operating in a number of different modes. It may 

operate in the autonomous or segment mode for part-task training on MPSSrelated procedures. It may also operate with the LMSE in the LVPS mode for 

rehearsal of overall on-orbit procedures. In the latter mode, the MMSE and 

LMSE computers exchange information critical to the propagation of the simulation over a channel-to-channel link. 

11.2.4 MOL Mission Simulator Interfaces 

The three segments of the MS, when interfaced with the STC and the OTEF, will 

be capable of high-fidelity simulation of the actions and reactions of the 

flight vehicle throughout its mission. Numerous internal and external interfaces are carefully controlled to assure the integrity of the MS. 

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11.2.4.1 LMSE/MMSE Interface 

Although the LVPS comprises two separate segments, supplied by different 

contractors, it is designed to function as a unit. There is, for example, 

only one SLM and one Instructor Operator Station although both contractors 

contribute portions of each. Furthermore, both computers will operate as an 

integral system when functioning in the LVPS mode. Data and control signals 

must be transferred through the hardware and software interfaces without loss 

of meaning or continuity of information flow. 

Interface specification IFS-MOL-117004 and related interface control drawings 

together with MS-3 documents for computer programs will define and control 

the LMSE/MMSE interfaces. Mechanical and structural as well as electrical 

and logical interfaces are defined. 

11.2.4.2 LMSE/GBPS Interface 

Although no mechancial or structural interfaces exist between the LMSE/GBPS, 

data transfer between the two segments is required for initialization as well 

as early orbit simulations where one crewman is in GBPS and the other in LVPS. 

Again, in late orbit simulations, TLM signals will be exchanged between the 

two segments where preparation for reentry is being rehearsed. This information flow interface is specified and controlled by IFS-MOL-117002 and its 

associated interface control drawings together with the computer program 

IFS-MOL-117010. 

11.2.4.3 GBPS/STC Interface 

During ascent phase simulation, data identical to that of real flight will be 

transmitted from the OTEF to the MCC. For example, GBPS will simulate the 

output of two PCM ground station computers located at AFWTR which are 

receiving and processing launch vehicle telemetry data. This data will be 

transmitted on two separate 19.2 Kbps data circuits to the STC. GBPS will 

also simulate the output of a PCM ground station at AFWTR which is receiving 

OV TLM on the SGLS link and transmitting to the STC on a 2.4 Kbps data 

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circuit. Two additional 2.4 Kbps circuits are required for the simulated 

outputs of two radars with two different formats located at various sites 

under AFWTR control. Three of these 2.4 Kbps circuits are used at a later 

time for simulating data from the downrange tracking ship. Tracking data 

is generated during nominal reentry only. This interface is specified in 

IFS -MOL -217010 (Ref. 16). 

11.2.4.4 LVPS/STC Interface 

Closed-loop on-orbit simulation with the STC involves a complex array of 

hardware and software interfaces. During MOL flight, each RTS in the AFSCF 

network will have an array of four 2.4 Kbps circuits operating through an 

EXCELS which in turn interfaces with the ADS. To obviate the expense to the 

AFSCF for lines and terminals representing each station, the LVPS will 

simulate data outputs from each RTS (appropriately identified) over a single 

set of 2.4 Kbps circuits. All simulated tracking and telemetry data will be 

identical to that in real flight on the same ephemeris. 

However, a unique set of problems exists in the LVPS/STC operation. The 

following are major examples of these problems. Because of the nature of 

the visual stimulus material, target passes must be on precise, predetermined 

ephemerides. Since crew actions and other uncertainties may perturb the 

orbit significantly and in a manner not precisely predictable, the ephemeris 

must be adjusted in such a way that the AGES computer programs and the 

command-generation programs operating in the 3800 computers are not confused. 

Such simulation-peculiar actions as freeze and recycle must be defined so 

that interfacing computer programs are not perturbed and no unreasonable 

action is required by operators. 

The number of RTS real-time TLM modes is limited to 10. Although required 

to support MCC training, a final determination of the postpass TLM capability 

of the RTS simulation has not yet been made. Careful definition of electrical 

and logical interfaces with the EXCELS-type communication equipment is also 

required. 

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These interfaces are defined and controlled by IFS -MOL-117012 and 

IFS-MOL-117011 along with associated interface control drawings (ICD). 

11.2.4.5 MS/OTEF Interface 

Although no interface documents exist, careful control is exercised by MOL 

SPO/Aerospace and the associate contractors to assure that power, lighting, 

airconditioning (for computers and personnel), space, and layout as well as 

physical and radiation security requirements are defined in a manner compatible with simulator operation. 

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11.3 DEVELOPMENT AND PART TASK SIMULATORS 

In addition to the MS, numerous part-task simulators perform functions that 

cannot be completely attained on the MS. These are: 

a. Engineering development simulator (EDS) 

b. Mission development simulator (MDS) 

c. Abort simulator 

d. Zero g simulation 

e. In-house simulations 

f. Human centrifuge 

g. Gemini B egress trainer 

h. Subsystem test articles and mockups 

These simulators are required to (1) obtain early data for engineering and 

operations design, (2) produce environmental stimuli not obtainable on the 

MS, (3) provide operation of actual vehicle hardware in addition to computerized math-model simulation, (4) develop AVE software programs, and (5) obtain 

required statistical data on crew performance for mission enhancement. 

Certain part task simulators also serve as backup to the single MS in event 

of down-time due to malfunctions and modifications, and provide additional 

equipment to insure adequate flight crew preparation. 

11.3.1 Engineering Development Simulator 

The EDS is the first of three mission objective oriented simulators (EDS, 

MDS, MMSE). It consists of one crew station with simulated visual display, 

hand controllers for acquisition and tracking and for magnification, and 

target cue projection. Seventy mm positive transparencies of appropriate 

stimulus material are projected through the simulated ATS and main optical 

trains. The simulator is driven by a hybrid SOS 930/Beckman 2200 computer 

complex with associated interface equipment. Simulations of most subsystems, 

the ADC, and ephemeris are functional only. 

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The optical drive hand controller can be programmed with variable transfer 

functions, and pointing and tracking errors can be programmed for study of 

control system optimization. The computer-optics-crew station complex is 

controlled from an instructor operator station which includes a video relay 

of the stimulus material as viewed from the crew station. After obtaining 

early engineering data for vehicle development, the EDS will be expanded 

into the MDS. 

11.3.2 Mission Development Simulator 

The MDS, a modification of the EDS, will be updated to include the second 

crew station and completion of the common equipment bay between crew stations, 

dual ATS optical train, beam-split main optics, 9 x 9 in. stimulus material, 

conversion and switching equipment for each ATS and the primary optics, and 

an IBM 360-44 digital computer with associated peripheral and interface 

equipment. The MDS will progress in three phases: 

a. During Phase I, the ADC software will be resident in the 

IBM 360-44 along with simulator drive software. 

b. In Phase II, a prototype of the ADC will be added to the 

360-44 and the ADC software will be moved incrementally 

to the prototype as each module is checked out on the 

360-44. 

c. In Phase III, all the ADC software is resident in the ADC 

and only simulator drive software and subsystem models are 

resident in the 360-44. 

Mockups of the film handling equipment (cameras, DRCs, processor, etc.) will 

be provided in late Phase I or early Phase II. 

The objectives of the MDS are to: (1) develop and aid in verification of the 

AVE software; (2) develop mission-oriented procedures; (3) serve as part-task 

simulator to ensure adequate crew preparation; and (4) obtain required 

statistical data on crew performance for mission enhancement. 

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11.3.3 Abort Simulator 

The Gemini abort simulator is a Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV) owned facility 

consisting of a hybrid computer-operated moving-base simulator with five 

degrees of freedom. The Gemini gondola, used in conjunction with the LTV 

equipment, was transferred as GFE from NASA to MOL SPO and has been modified 

to the Gemini B display configuration. 

This simulator can produce linear or angular accelerations that are then 

"washed-out" below the human threshold of perception, imparting a realistic 

kinesthetic motion cue to the crew members. Such accelerations are often 

one of two cues required for the crew to make an abort decision. Since the 

GBPS is a fixed-base simulator, this moving base capability is essential for 

part-task simulation. 

The equipment can simulate the ascent phase from prelaunch to insertion. 

However, the first program consists of nominal and contingency powered flight 

through Stage 0 only. The objectives for the first launch abort program are 

to: 

a. Evaluate man's capability to respond positively and 

accurately to initiate abort/escape action under simulated 

high stress conditions. The results of this effort will be 

fundamental in evaluating the need for automatic sequencing. 

b. Evaluate the adequacy of crew displays relative to malfunction monitoring during Stage 0 operation. 

c. Indoctrinate and familiarize all MOL crew members with the 

various failure modes and the abort environment of Stage 0 

flight. 

Future programs will incorporate nominal and contingency operations for all 

stages and will also serve as refresher training prior to each flight. In 

addition, since there is only one Gemini simulator for the MOL program, the 

LTV simulator can serve as a backup in the event of prolonged GBPS 

down-time. 

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11.3.4 Zero-g Simulation 

Zero-g test aircraft and underwater neutral buoyancy techniques will be used 

to validate system design and flight procedures and to provide flight crew 

training. From August 1964 to date of publication, 12 series of tests have 

been performed with Wright-Patterson Air Force Base KC-135 zero-g test aircraft. In these flights, the aircraft followed a ballistic trajectory to 

produce effective weightlessness for a nominal period of 25 sec. The configuration of the mockups and associated crew equipment was maintained as 

close to flight configuration as possible to insure a realistic simulation. 

Of the programs to date, one provided flight crew orientation, one evaluated 

pressure suit assembly (PSA) proposals, and the remaining were development 

tests. The development tests, with appropriate mockups and crew equipment 

have evaluated: crew transfer and DRC handling; crew conditioning equipment; 

suit donning station; waste management system; laboratory module restraints; 

and crew hygiene compartment. In addition to flight crew training, future 

programs will continue to evaluate modifications of the above items and EVA 

transfer. 

Limited water immersion-neutral buoyancy tests have been conducted to evaluate 

crew restraints, reach envelopes, and crew procedures. Further tests are 

anticipated for crew station studies and to establish realistic timelines 

for periods exceeding the short aircraft ballistic profiles. 

11.3.5 In-House Simulatior. s 

These facilities provide a flexible, but limited, capability for rapid 

evaluation of operational and hardware concepts, and provide information for 

proper definition of future, more extensive simulations on the EDS, MDS, 

and MMSE. 

The simulations which have been held at LAAFS have been concerned with two 

areas: (1) initial validation of the concept of crew assessment of target 

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activity; and (2) initial definition of stick transfer functions for crew 

tracking. 

For activity mode evaluation, a film viewer capable of simulating ATS magnifications of 60 x and 120 x has been constructed. The device properly 

simulates the eyepiece, real field of view, and exit pupil. This device 

uses a film strip that when viewed, provides a static scene (i.e., no scene 

drifts, vibrations, ranging, etc). 

Stick transfer function and crew tracking studies are performed using an 

oscilloscope for geometric target presentation. Various magnifications, 

reticle configuration types of scene dynamics, and target contrast levels 

can be provided. 

11.3.6 Human Centrifuge 

The human centrifuge at the Naval Air Development Center (NADC), Johnsville, 

Pennsylvania, will be used to familiarize the MOL flight crew with ascent and 

reentry acceleration profiles under normal and emergency conditions and allow 

them to evaluate controls, displays, restraints and PSA in a realistic 

acceleration environment. The centrifuge gondola is GFE from NASA and will 

be updated to reflect Gemini B controls, displays, and restraints. 

11.3.7 Gemini B Egress Trainer 

For egress training, a NASA Gemini egress trainer has been transferred to the 

MOL program as GFE. It will be modified to accurately reflect the Gemini B 

spacecraft interior, recovery equipment, and escape paths. The test article 

will be accurately scaled in CG location and total weight so the hydrodynamic 

behavior will match the actual spacecraft. Egress training is necessary 

because the extremely cramped quarters of the spacecraft make the removal of 

DECs and pilot escape quite difficult. 

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11.3.5 Subsystem Test Articles and Mockups 

Since the MS, in most cases, represents the operation and interaction of 

subsystems by computerized math models, crew members must perform part-task 

operation on actual hardware to have a more complete understanding of 

subsystem operations. This knowledge will be provided through subsystem 

lectures, participation in subsystem tests, and actual operation of subsystem 

test articles. To obtain more knowledge of integrated AVE subsystems, flight 

crew members will observe and participate in tests conducted on the EDCTU 

at Douglas, Huntington Beach facility. 

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11.4 READINESS CONCEPTS 

11.4.1 General 

Basic concepts employed in achieving operational readiness and the operational 

use of the simulator are described below. Although no schedules are provided, 

the basis for establishing schedules leading to operational readiness is 

discussed. 

To assure operational readiness of the entire program, various elements such 

as physical facilities (buildings, hardware, etc.), software, procedures, and 

personnel must be acquired, developed, checked out, validated, trained and 

certified. Each activity is dependent, at some phase, on the timely completion of other related activities. Because of this interlocking relationship, 

integrated schedules for MOL operations are developed by starting with the 

need date (launch) and proceeding backwards. Thus, major milestones are 

established with compatible schedules and efficient times for completion. 

Sufficient flexibility is provided for changes (when necessary) in scheduled 

milestones, with minimum perturbation of the overall schedule. Operational 

readiness activities appear in the schedule for the last year or so before 

launch. 

11.4.2 Rehearsal Committee 

The rehearsal committee is the coordinator for all formal system and dress 

rehearsals. The FD/FTFD provides it with the time span and the basic 

objectives of the rehearsal. It is responsible for the detailed planning of 

the rehearsal, its scripting, the coordination of the rehearsal (not the 

scheduling) with the MS at the OTEF and any other agencies required. During 

the rehearsal, the committee monitors its progress and accomplishes any 

behind-the-scenes coordination to make the rehearsal run smoothly and in a 

realistic fashion. After the rehearsal, the committee critiques all operating 

elements by explaining all planned anomalies and the action taken by the 

element involved.. If an incorrect action was taken, this fact is flagged and 

its effect on the rehearsal explained. 

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The rehearsal committee is cochaired by representatives of the FD and FTFD. 

It is comprised of members of the AFSCF training group and representatives 

from operating elements of the AFSCF and the MOL SPO/Aerospace and supported 

by consultants drawn from the technical staff of the associates' operational 

support teams. Normally the technical members serve on a one-time basis to 

afford equal participation on the committee to all personnel and so as not to 

deprive any operations personnel of the training and experience gained from 

the rehearsals. 

11.4.3 Scheduling of Readiness Activities 

Category II type system tests will be conducted in two phases. During the 

first phase (approximately IML - 15 mo to IML - 12 mo) both the MS and the 

AFSCF will essentially be tested independently. During the second phase 

(approximately IML - 12 mo to IML - 9 mo) the MS and the STC (including 

operational software) will be tested together. Category III type operational 

tests and rehearsals will be conducted after the MS "operational" date. 

All facilities and personnel related to AFSCF support of the MOL program will 

be scheduled through the FTFD for MOL. Scheduling of OTEF facilities and 

personnel will be under the auspices of SAFSL-7. In those instances where 

the OTEF and AFSCF have coordinated training activities, the FD will ensure 

coordination between OTEF and the AFSCF schedules. For AFSCF training 

requiring AFWTR, the FTFD will arrange for coordinated scheduling of the 

required AFWTR facilities. For integrated launch operations/flight operations training, the Launch Operations Director will be responsible for AFWTR 

scheduling, and the FD will be responsible to ensure a coordinated schedule 

with the AFSCF through the FTFD. In most cases where interfaces are to be 

checked or validated, systems and personnel in more than one facility are 

involved. Some particularly difficult schedule coordination problems are 

likely to arise in software verification activities. 

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11.4.4 Software Verification 

In a large and complex program such as MOL there is a highly sophisticated 

interplay among the various software subsystems involved. For example, the 

DCSG must accept commands and other updated parameters through the AFSCF 

ground tracking network. This information exchange occurs through a relatively long chain of hardware/software systems. When 0/A commands are 

generated, for instance the command load is generated by software operating 

in the CDC 3600 computers at the STC. The information is passed on to the 

ADS IBM 360/b7 computer system and is transmitted via EXCELS as a prepass 

message to a specific RTS. At the tracking station, the RTS-ADS system 

receives and stores the information, then, transmits it to the OV during the 

next pass. Although each system has been verified individually in Category I 

and II type tests, the entire ensemble of systems must also be verified. 

This is done in rehearsals and Category III tests for all software including 

AVE, AGE, MS, and MOL-peculiar STC software. These are exercised in conjunction with such other software systems at AFSCF, AFWTR, and MCSF. The MS is 

one of the tools used to accomplish Category III testing of the DCSG software. In addition, normal operation of the MS, the MDS, and certain AFSCF 

activities continually add to the assurance that the software is functioning 

properly. 

Category I testing will be done primarily at the contractor's facilities 

except for the CDC-3600 software which will be done at the Computer Program 

Development Center. The bulk of Category II and III testing will be done 

with the operational hardware systems in accordance with approved test plans 

and is supplemented by simulation runs. Thus, when the simulation and verification sessions have been satisfactorily run, the AVE software, including 

subsequent modifications, will have been exercised to the extent necessary to 

establish complete confidence in its operational readiness. Similar action 

is required for procedures validation. 

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11.4.5 Procedures Validation 

The training, simulation, and operational readiness programs provide a positive means for validating all procedures. In such a complex system, a 

seemingly simple procedural change may propagate through the system to produce 

undesirable effects. The time required to perform manually all procedure 

verification on actual hardware is usually prohibitive for a system of this 

magnitude. 

The MDS and MS provide a practical means of exercising procedures for validation. Thus, it becomes extremely important that simulated subsystems be 

modeled with high fidelity and that malfunctions or errors propagate realistically from subsystem to subsystem. After review and signoff of the written 

procedure, validation is required to assure safety, effectiveness, and compatibility. Validation further assures that crew requirements do not exceed the 

capabilities of a trained crewman. Personnel training and rehearsal provide 

practice to attain required speed, precision, and proper habit sequence. 

11.4.6 Flight Plan Validation 

After individual procedures are validated, they are standardized and combined 

into the Flight Plan for each flight. Occasionally, procedures which seemed 

adequate when individually developed and validated are found to be impractical 

or incorrectly timed when rehearsed in the simulator as part of a complex 

flight timeline. For example, an array of properly timed and validated 

individual procedures, if called for during a single station pass, might 

completely overload the crew even through individual procedure times appeared 

to give adequate time for all operations. Because these combinations of tasks 

may call for different procedure treatment, all phases of the flight plans 

must be simulated, modified if necessary, and finally validated as an entity 

in the MS. 

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11.4.7 Flight Test Rules Validation 

Flight Test Rules, as well as the Flight Plan, may require modification when 

placed in the context of a flight test rehearsal. The primary objective of 

the Flight Test Rules as described in the Flight Director's Handbook, is to 

provide mission control personnel and flight crew with guidelines to expedite 

the decision-making process. These guidelines are based on an expert analysis 

of operational equipment configurations for support of spacecraft systems 

operations and constraints, flight crew procedures, and test objectives. All 

these areas are reviewed and formulated into a series of basic ground rules 

to provide flight crew safety and to optimize the chances for mission success. 

These Flight Test Rules are then put to the final test during an extensive 

series of premission simulation and rehearsals prior to the flight test. 

Some rules may be modified as a result of experience gained from simulations. 

To assure a consistent interpretation and a complete understanding of the 

guidelines, a semiformal Flight Test Rules review is normally conducted with 

the primary and backup flight crews and with the mission control personnel 

prior to operations deployment. Flight Test Rules validation, along with 

other test and validations required, becomes a part of the Operations Certification Process. 

11.4.8 Simulator Interface with Flight Operations 

The simulator has a direct interface with flight operations in addition to the 

training and validation role. 

During the orbital phase, the simulator will be maintained for a short period 

in its prelaunch configuration to provide on-orbit support in the checkout of 

computer problems and verification of any program correctors which may be 

required and to a limited extent, anomaly isolation and problem solution. 

After this period, when the simulator has been reconfigured for the subsequent 

flight, the current flight AVE programs will be kept in controlled storage at 

the OTEF in the event a requirement exists for the simulator to support the 

flight. 

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The flight target cues will be stored at the OTEF prior to flight and will be 

used during the flight crew training program to ensure crew familiarity with 

their contents. 

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11.5 TRAINING 

An extensive personnel training and rehearsal program will be implemented for 

flight crew and flight operations personnel at all levels. Covering preflight, powered flight, orbital operations, and recovery, these exercises 

will serve to train technical advisors and other ground support personnel as 

well as mission control and flight crews. 

11.5.1 Flight Crew Training 

Training of a flight crew member is largely accomplished through his participation in the engineering, development, and testing phase of the program. 

Total training of a crew member from time of selection to flight is accomplished in three phases: preliminary training, general training, and specificflight training. Concurrent with all other commitments, the pilots must 

maintain flight proficiency in high-performance aircraft. 

11.5.1.1 Preliminary Training 

Shortly after selection, the flight crewmen are assigned to the Aerospace 

Research Pilot School (ARPS) at Edwards Air Force Base for a six-month period 

of preliminary training consisting of basic academic lectures, field trips, 

systems briefings, simulation, and flying. 

11.5.1.2 General Training 

After the preliminary ARPS training, the flight crew is reassigned to the 

MOL SPO and given a series of DORIAN, mission-oriented briefings. Each crew 

member is then given an engineering or operational assignment in which he 

will both follow and participate in its development. The crew members can 

then educate each other in specific areas to maintain a current status of 

the total MOL system. 

To prepare for hostile environments in contingency landing situations, the 

crew is trained at various geographically located government facilities for 

water, tropic, desert, mountain, and arctic survival. 

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A large porticn of the trainig during this period will be conducted on 

various simulators and part task trainers (see paragraphs 11.2 and 11.3). 

Since the primary objective of the MOL mission is to obtain high resolution 

reconnaissance photographs, it will be necessary for the crew to be trained 

to recognize various categories of targets, active indicators, benchmarks, 

etc. This will be accomplished through specialized mission collection 

requirement training (MCRT) using available reconnaissance material for crew 

study. Much of this same material, properly formatted and indexed, will serve 

as stimulus material for the mission-oriented simulators. 

11.5.1.3 Specific Flight TraininE 

Approximately one year prior to manned flight, a prime, alternate, and support 

crew will be selected. The prime and alternate crews will then begin preparation for the specific flight to which it has been assigned. The support 

crew will assist in directing, coordinating, and participating in the numerous 

activities required for crew preparation during checkout, systems tests, 

intelligence assimilation, operations planning, simulations, and rehearsals. 

11.5.2 Flight Operations Crew Training 

Flight Operations crews are those required to support the real-time operation 

of a MOL system test flight phase within the ground network. This group 

includes AFSCF-assigned personnel as well as personnel from the MOL SPO, 

Aerospace Corporation, and associated MOL contractors who are in either 

permanent or temporary assignment at the STC to support MOL system tests. In 

addition to the division noted above, special training requirements exist ror 

those personnel who specialize in the powered flight phase or the flight Lu:A. 

The Flight Operations Crew Training Plan will cover the training requirements 

of all these personnel. This plan will be divided into three parts: 

a. Training for powered flight personnel (includes ascent, 

retrofire, and reentry). 

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b. Training for orbital operations personnel (AFSCF). 

c. Technical adivsors training and orientation (contractor). 

11.5.2.1 Powered Flight 

The powered flight controllers who man the consoles will receive formal 

training by the Air Training Command (ATC) in the MOL Systems and related 

disciplines. After completing the formal ATC courses, the flight controllers 

will remain at the MOL SPO to assist in the design and development of the MCC 

displays and software, and to produce the required powered flight operations 

procedures and handbooks. When the MCC hardware becomes available, the controllers will transfer to the STC to begin procedures checkout and certification. 

The training on the consoles will be conducted by the MOL SPO and the AFSCF. 

This will be in the form of closed-loop simulations using the OTEF, and 

open-loop simulations using FV tapes. It is planned to subject each controller 

to a minimum of (TBD) hours at his console prior to his acceptance and 

certification. Certification procedures and criteria will be implemented. 

The AFSCF will also provide training in STC procedures and modes of operation. 

11.5.2.2 Orbital Operations 

The AFSCF-assigned personnel receive training from MOL associate contractors 

in the technicalities of MOL systems, MOL requirements, and MOL-peculiar 

ground hardware and software. This training, planned and conducted by MOL 

associate contractors, may take place at contractor facilities, the STC, or 

the RTS, as appropriate. Included in this training will be familiarization 

with MS operations capabilities and its planned use with the AFSCF. The 

curriculum will include, but will not be limited to, the following important 

MOL program-dependent ground system items: 

a. Software 

b. Hardware 

c. Operations handbooks 

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In addition, the total MOL operations organization and basic concepts peculiar 

to MOL will be included in the training program. 

11.5.2.3 Technical Advisors 

The AFSCF will train TA staff and contractor support personnel and MOL SPO 

Operations personnel in AFSCF hardware, software, procedures, etc., to allow 

their smooth functioning into the AFSCF operations. These personnel must be 

aware that they are supporting only one of several programs using the AFSCF 

and understand the possibilities of conflicts that can arise. This plan will 

be developed by AFSCF personnel who will later conduct the training classes 

at the STC. The curriculum for this portion of training will include, but 

will not be limited to: 

a. AFSCF organization, capabilities, and general operational 

philosophies. 

b. AFSCF data system indoctrination. 

c. EXCELS indoctrination. 

d. Use of MOL/ADS display systems. 

e. AFSCF system support software. 

f. The organization and manner in which training exercises or 

rehearsals will be conducted. 

In addition to the above training, the AFSCF is responsible for the organization of a series of operational training and readiness exercises which will 

culminate in a final dress rehearsal. These exercises will involve various 

segments of the AFSCF and the simulation equipments at different times to 

assure readiness to participate in full-blown exercises. Rehearsals will 

employ those systems and personnel required to meet the objectives of the 

exercise and will be conducted in such a manner as to provide realism to the 

rehearsals. Training exercises will rehearse both normal and anomalous conditions of both the FV and ground system. The Launch Operations, Flight 

Operations, and flight crews will be involved in these exercises. 

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The objective of early training exercises will be to develop procedures. 

Later exercises will validate procedures. And still later, the exercises 

will be conducted to certify the readiness of all systems and personnel to 

support the MOL system test. 

Some exercises employ equipment and personnel not under AFSCF jurisdiction. 

The AFSCF is responsible for coordinating their requirements through the MOL 

SPO. 

11.5.3 Recovery Training. 

Recovery AGE will be available to the recovery forces no later than six 

months prior to the first scheduled MOL launch. (Flight 2 is unmanned, but 

will require recovery support along the powered flight ground track to 

approximately 40 deg S latitude). Recovery force personnel will conduct 

training as frequently as necessary to assure efficient performance and 

execution of recovery tasks and functions. An egress trainer will be used 

to develop techniques and train flight crews in spacecraft water egress 

procedures. In some flight crew egress trainer exercises, ARKS pararescue 

personnel will participate to assure development of the best recovery techniques for flight crew and data retrieval from the spacecraft. Since the 

Fulton surface-to-air retrieval system may be employed in the low probability 

zones of the powered flight and contingency landing areas, familiarity with 

and the use of the Fulton gear and related equipment will be an integral part 

of the flight crew/pararescue training program. No live personnel pickups 

employing the Fulton system are contemplated during the training exercises. 

Each training ana readiness function makes its unique contribution to the 

total array required for mission success. 

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12.0 NATURAL AEROSPACE ENVIRONMENT (ENV) 

The MOL SPO insures that the impact of the ENV on the system objectives is 

identified and analyzed. This Section will be provided for use by both the 

MOL SPO and the USAF Air Weather Service (AWS) as a Flight Test Operations 

ENV Support Plan. 

This Section will be organized as follows: 

12.1 Introduction 

12.2 Methods of supporting test objectives 

12.3 Roles and responsibilities 

12.4 through 12.7 

12.8 through 12.11 

ENV support planning and support 

operations during actual test 

operations phases 

Crew participation in ENV planning, 

analysis, and evaluation; ENV 

constraints on test operations; and 

ENV considerations during simulation 

and training operations 

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13.0 REFERENCES 

1. "System Test and Operations Plan" 

2. "General Ground Test Plan" 

3. "Mission Control Center Ascent Monitoring Software for Program 632A", 

CEI No. CG-632-PFA-1-00, 07888-6013-R000, TRW Systems, 31 August 1967. 

4. "Mission Control Center Reentry Support Software for Program 632A", 

CEI No. CG-632-PFR-1-00, 07888-6013-R000, TRW Systems, 31 August 1967. 

5. "Program 632A ADS Computer Program Requirements for Ascent Monitoring and 

Reentry Support", 0788-6008-R000, TRW Systems, 31 August 1967. 

6. "Orbital Requirements Document" 

7. "Program Requirements Document" 

8. "Systems Test Objectives" 

9. "Flight Director's Handbook" 

10. "Manned Recovery Requirements Document" 

11. "Engineering Analysis Report", F-0139303-RH-001, Vols I and II, Eastman 

Kodak Company, 11 May 1967. 

12. "Concept of Operations for the AFSCF", January 1968 

13. IFS-MOL-217010 

14. "MOL Ascent Telemetry Support Summary", TOR-0158(3107-42)-3, Aerospace 

Corporation, November 1967. 

15. "Western Test Range/Air Force Satellite Control Facility MOL Ascent 

Communication Summary", TOR-1001(2107-25)-11, Aerospace Corporation, 

23 January 1967. 

16. "Advanced Orbit/Ephemeris Subsystem, Milestone 2", Aeronutronic Division 

of Philco Corporation. 

17. SP/DR 

18. "MOL Flight Vehicle Technical Readiness Program Plan", SAFSL Exhibit 

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19. "VAFB Launch Operations for the MOL Program", SAFSL Exhibit 20023. 

20. "Baseline Flight Vehicle Timeline Report", Douglas Aircraft Company. 

21. "Hardware/Software Limitations Specification". 

22. "Command Definition Specification". 

23. "MOL Data Book". 

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APPENDIX A 

AN OPERATIONS CONCEPT FOR THE MOL/DORIAN 

MANNED/AUTOMATIC CONFIGURATION 

A.1 INTRODUCTION 

The current concept of the operating modes of the MOL/DORIAN manned/automatic 

configuration are presented in this Appendix. Some flight crew procedures, 

on-board computer logic, and ground support required to implement the flexibilities and capabilities required of the manned/automatic configuration are 

defined. This operations concept supports the MOL flight crew's primary 

tasks of: 

a. Aiding in the early development of an automatic mission 

capability. 

b. Enhancing the quantity and quality of intelligence data 

gathered on the manned/automatic flights. 

Analytical and simulation studies continually being performed on these concepts are subject to modification and verification to ensure positive control, 

reliability, and the ability to satisfy User requirements. 

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A.2 GROUND RULES AND DEFINITIONS 

The operational concepts presented in this Appendix are founded on a target 

selection process which employs a "voting" strategy (see paragraph A.2.8). 

In general, flight crew observations, or "votes", on several targets are 

gathered and, at preselected times, compared with ground supplied on-board 

target selection logic. A decision is then made by the ADC to select for 

photography the target which offers the greatest probability of mission enhancement. 

The following ground rules and definitions are generally agreed upon and 

form the basis for these concepts: 

A.2.1 Primary Targets 

Primary targets are those targets which lie on the programmed path of the 

primary optics. The primary target path is generated by the ground-based 

mission planning software. The considerations involved in target path 

selection include: 

a. User requirements expressed as priorities and weighting 

factors. 

b. OV operational status and capabilities. 

c. Specific intelligence requirements including desired photographic modes, use of special films, category allocations, 

specific stereo or obliquity requirements, and other User 

inputs. 

d. Forecast weather in the area of interest. 

Photography of the primary targets provides the optimum expected intelligence 

value available during the selected overflight of the area of interest. 

The User has the option to direct that certain specific targets of unusually 

high intelligence value be selected in a specified photographic mode for the 

programmed path of the primary optics. These targets will be referred to as 

"mandatory primaries". Mandatory primaries will be selected for photography 

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by the ADC/flight crew unless specifically rejected because of observed 

weather conditions. 

A.2.2 Alternate Targets 

Alternate targets are preselected non-primary targets which are scheduled to 

be observed by the flight crew through an ATS and, if selected by the target 

selection logic, photographed by the primary optics. 

The alternate target paths are selected by the ground-based mission planning 

software using essentially the same selection criteria as the primary path 

but considering such additional factors as: 

a. Geometrical relationship to the primary optics path. 

b. Available viewing time and resolution requirements for flight 

crew inspection with an ATS. 

c. Specific predefined conditions under which photography of the 

alternate target enhances the overall intelligence value of 

the mission. 

Interdiction of the primary optics path in favor of an alternate target 

occurs only when the primary is rejected for observed cloud cover, allowing 

photography of a "weather alternate", or when the observed presence of 

activity indicators increases the probable intelligence value of the alternate "activity alternate" target over that of the primary target. 

A.2.3 Activity Indicators 

Activity indicators are those predefined objects or target characteristics 

which, by their observed presence (or absence), indicate an increased probability that the target scene contains information of high intelligence value. 

(These indicators are normally highly transitory in nature.) 

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A.2.4 Visual Intelligence Targets 

Visual intelligence targets are those targets preselected for flight crew 

inspection and oral comments, but not for photography. 

Generally, these types of targets will be selected for viewing for one of the 

following reasons: 

a. When associated with a mandatory primary. 

b. When the confirmation by visual observation of the mere 

presence or absence of an object, condition, or characteristic of the target area satisfies the intelligence requirement. 

c. When vehicle constraints prevent actual photography of the 

target, or the penalty associated with photography is unacceptable. 

A.2.5 Target Group 

A target group is composed of a primary and its associated alternate targets. 

Targets are assigned into specific groups by the ground-based mission planning 

software. Decisions are made by the ADC on each target group at a preplanned 

time ("decision time") for that group. At a given decision time, the flight 

crew inputs are polled and, based upon ground-calculated voting logic, the 

ADC determines whether interdiction of the primary optics path in favor of 

an alternate target is warranted. 

A.2.6 Flight Crew Target Votes 

The flight crew inputs to the computer on target conditions are: 

a. Reject - Denotes clouds/weather or other undesirable conditions which would prohibit satisfactory photography of the 

observed target. 

b. Inactive - Denotes that a target is visible but that no 

activity indicators have been observed. 

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c. Active - Denotes that a target is visible and that one or 

more predefined activity indicators have been observed. 

d. Override - Denotes the presence of unusually high intelligence value in a target which should be photographed. This 

input will cause the computer to commit the primary optics to 

that target at group decision time without regard to other 

flight crew inputs or the target selection logic. 

A.2.7 Decision Logic for Target Groups 

Each primary and alternate target within the target group is assigned a preference value for both active and inactive states. These preference numbers 

provide a quantitative method for making real-time decisions when voting between targets in a group, but do not indicate target weights, scores, or 

priorities. For each group, the primary target will always have the highest 

inactive state preference. These preferences are established by the ground 

software, which takes into consideration the following: 

a. Disturbance to the primary optics path if interdiction occurs. 

b. User-supplied activity enhancement factors. 

c. Photographic modes available at decision time. 

d. User supplied basic target parameters (i.e., priority, etc.). 

A logical table may be constructed which gives the decision rules for interdiction of the primary path. Table A-1 provides the decision logic and 

assumes that the primary target has been viewed and voted upon. 

A.2.8 No-Vote Situation 

If the flight crew does not observe and vote on the primary target of a group 

prior to group decision time, the ADC will consider the primary to be voted 

inactive to the target selection logic unless specifically requested otherwise by The User. Alternate targets in the group will be voted "reject" to 

the target selection logic if not voted on by group decision time. 

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Table A-1. Decision Rules for Interdiction of Primary Path 

Crew Vote on Alternates 

Crew Vote on Primary 

Reject Inactive Active 

All rejected Take None Take Primary Take Primary 

No active but at 

least one inactive (clear) 

Vote Among 

Alternates 

Take Primary 

Primary 

Take Primary 

Primary 

At least one active 

Vote Among 

Alternates 

Vote among alternates & Primary 

Vote among alternates & Primary 

NOTE: 

1. When a vote is made among clear, inactive alternates and the 

primary has been rejected, it is possible that no clear 

alternate will be of sufficient value to warrant interdiction 

of the primary optics path. 

2. When an alternate target is voted "active" by the flight 

crew, it will still be necessary to weight its preference 

against the preference of the primary target (active or inactive) to determine whether interdiction is warranted. 

3. It is possible to have target groups that consist solely of 

alternate targets. Within these groups, interdiction of the 

primary optics path can occur for an active alternate. These 

groups are designated "special target groups". 

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A.2.9 ATS Paths 

An ATS path is that sequence of aiming points to which the ATS is automatically pointed to allow flight crew observation. 

Two ATS paths will be generated by the mission planning software: (1) ATS 

path 1 will contain the primary target of each group, plus selected alternates and visual intelligence targets. (2) ATS path 2 will be composed of 

alternate and visual intelligence targets only. 

A third path, the ATS primary path (a modification of ATS path 1) provides the 

capability for rapid recovery during contingency operations and can be accomplished on-board at crew command. Manual selection of the ATS path to be 

monitored facilitates the various operational sub-modes (see paragraph A.4.1). 

A.2.10 Variable ATS Dwell Times (Self-Pacing) 

The ATS will slew to the next target scheduled for viewing within a target 

group only after a flight crew vote is input to the computer on the target 

being viewed. The ground software will compute and display to the flight 

crew recommended dwell times for each target. When group decision time is 

reached, the ATSs will step automatically to the first scheduled target in 

the succeeding group unless the flight crew intervenes. (Multiple scheduling 

provides the only means for returning to a target with an ATS once that 

target has been voted upon.) The ATS is inhibited from slewing to the next 

target of a group if the flight crew inputs an "Override" vote. It is 

assumed that, under these conditions, the flight crew will want to follow 

the target with an ATS right up to decision time. 

A.2.11 Leapfrog Operations 

An operational technique where one flight crewman acquires, selects, and 

centers a target in the upcoming group while the other is tracking a target 

in the current group. The crewmen operate on alternating groups from initial 

acquisition to completion of photography. 

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A.2.12 Specialist Operations 

An operational technique utilized by the flight crew which results in one 

crewman operating an ATS to select targets for photography, while the other 

crewman devotes full time to the fine rate killing task on the selected 

targets during photography. 

A.2.13 Validation of Vehicle Performance 

Validation of vehicle performance for future automatic flights shall be 

accomplished on manned/automatic flights. To ensure the accomplishment of 

this objective, the flight crew must be provided with displays and controls 

to allow: 

a. Fine tuning or adjustment of automatic systems. 

b. Backup automatic systems. 

c. Systems performance evaluation. 

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A.3 ORBITING VEHICLE ORBITING MODES AND FEATURES 

There are two basic modes of operation for the manned/automatic vehicle configuration: 

a. Mode A is the automatic mode in which the mission payload 

and its subsystems are operating properly and all target 

centering, IMC, and photography can be accomplished without 

flight crew assistance. The flight crew's functions in this 

mode range from enhancing the intelligence content of the 

photography through the target selection process, to completely checking out the operation of the automatic systems. 

The flight crew has the capability in this mode to fine tune 

and adjust the mission payload for improved photographic 

performance. 

b. Mode B is the backup mode in which the flight crew is required 

to assist in target acquisition, centering, IMC, or other 

functions which the flight crew can perform, but which normally would be satisfactorily accomplished on computer command 

in Mode A. Mode B stresses the continued use of all available 

operational automatic features. 

Both of these operating modes provide a wide range of flexibility so the 

system can be responsive to User and/or contingency requirements. This flexibility is attained without requiring changes in the ADC logic. 

The ground-based mission planning software will be required to handle the 

various operational modes and sub-modes to obtain the optimum strategy for the 

ATS, primary optics, and the flight crew. 

A.3.1 Mode A 

Mode A consists of two basic operational sub-modes which may be employed, 

depending on the degree of confidence in the operation of the complete system 

in the manned/automatic configuration, or on the degree of diagnosis or verification desired of payload performance. 

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A.3.1.1 Operational Sub-Mode 1 

This sub-mode assumes that all automatic functions are being performed satisfactorily. Either or both ATSs (depending on one- or two-man operation) are 

assigned targets for crew inspection. Flight crew inputs are gathered by 

the ADC which selects the target in each target group for photography. Provisions are currently available in the ADC for seven alternates per primary, 

making the maximum size of any target group eight targets. (This number 

results from tradeoffs between computer core storage available, uplink 

loading time requirements, flight crew capabilities, target distribution and 

density, and total time available for viewing any one target group.) The 

flight crew will view as many targets per target group as possible and indicate their observations or "votes" to the computer. Targets (including the 

primary) will be viewed in a ground-selected order which may be by order of 

preference within the group or chronologically by time of closest approach 

(TCA) (i.e., when the best viewing angles, etc., are available). Alternate 

targets not voted on by the decision time will be rejected by the computer 

from consideration for photography within that group. If the primary has not 

been viewed, due to time limitations, the primary target will normally be 

considered inactive (and clear) in the decision process. Provisions are made 

for the ground to allow the primary target to be rejected under no-vote 

situations by setting a flag in the uplink target data word. (This option 

may be employed in film-limited situations or when photography of a target 

is desired only after the confirmed presence of a given condition.) Targets 

may be checked for the presence of activity indicators or only for weather 

conditions depending on information given the flight crew in the ATS peripheral display. Generally, weather decisions will be accomplished more 

rapidly than activity decisions. 

This sub-mode results in the greatest number of targets viewed, thus increasing 

the chance of enhancing the intelligence content of the mission results. It 

also provides weather verification in the target area. 

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A.3.1.2 Operational Sub-Mode 2 

In this sub-mode, one crewman observes the selected target through the main 

visual optics while it is being tracked and photographed. This provides the 

highest degree of verification of weather and/or evaluation of mission payload 

performance. Fewer targets will be viewed by the flight crew prior to the 

decision time in this sub-mode because one crewman is devoting the majority 

of his time to the main visual optics rather than evaluating and making inputs on targets using his ATS. 

This sub-mode may be further modified to require that one crewman continually 

observes through the main visual optics during slew and settle, as well as 

during track and photography. 

No mode changes are required within the ADC to support the provisions of this 

sub-mode. This sub-mode will be very useful in verifying, diagnosing, and 

evaluating automatic systems performance. 

A.3.2 Mode B (Back-Up) 

This mode assumes that flight crew intervention, in some way, is needed to 

allow successful high-resolution photography flight crew control inputs from 

fine tuning type of adjustments to the assumption of full manual control (as 

in the case of IVS failure). There is no clear cut crossover point between 

Mode A and Mode B. No attempt is made here to identify every possible flight 

crew action or operational sub-mode that may be dictated by contingencies. 

Several operational sub-modes are identified which illustrate how some of the 

main system failures will be handled by the flight crew. Continuous study is 

underway to insure that the maximum capability of the mission payload is maintained as much as possible for every malfunction. Contingency analysis and 

crew procedures will be developed through simulation throughout program 

development. Displays and controls will be implemented as necessary to insure 

the satisfactory accomplishment of the mission objectives. 

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A.3.2.1 Operational Sub-Mode 1 

This sub-mode is utilized whenever the IVS is not operating satisfactorily 

(automatic fine rate-killing not available). One crewman is required to 

view the targets selected for photography through the main visual optics and 

manually, through a controller, provide fine rate-killing inputs to the ADC 

for the tracking mirror. This will approximately halve the number of targets 

viewed prior to decision time because one crewman will now have to devote full 

time to the manual tracking task. This sub-mode may be operated by one or 

both crewmen in either a "leapfrog" or "specialist" technique. Selectivity 

is provided so that either of the two ATS paths may be inspected by the crewman making inputs for the target selection process. To enter this sub-mode, 

the signal from the IVS vill be inhibited by the flight crew, and manual controller tracking information will be supplied by the flight crew in its place. 

A.3.2.2 Operational Sub-Mode 2 

This sub-mode is utilized whenever the automatic target centering (pointing) 

is degraded but the IVS is working properly. Although pointing information 

can be updated for targets in any of the modes or sub-modes delineated in 

this document, this sub-mode assumes that the pointing errors are sufficiently 

random and large as to require the flight crew to search, acquire, and center 

targets in their ATS, in addition to the normal target evaluation fine 

adjustment task. The crew can supply updated target pointing information to 

the ADC through the use of the "computer update" button, or by inputing to 

the computer an "active" or "override" vote. At decision time, the computer 

will select a target, apply any stored position update corrections and slew 

and settle the main optics on that target. The IVS will then provide the fine 

rate-killing necessary for high resolution photography. This sub-mode will 

reduce the number of targets viewed prior to decision time due to the increased 

requirements on the flight crew to search, acquire, center, and update position 

as well as evaluate targets. 

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This sub-mode requires no changes in ADC operation, just the capability for 

the ADC to accept and apply updated target position information. This capability is an operational requirement. 

A.3.2.3 Operational Sub-Mode 3 

This sub-mode assumes that target-centering and the IVS are both operating in 

a degraded or unsatisfactory manner. This sub-mode is similar to sub-modes 1 

and 2 and combines the features and handicaps of both. In this mode, considerable time must be devoted to acquiring, centering, evaluating, and tracking a target manually. For this reason, provisions are made to permit the 

flight crew to select an ATS path schedule that ensures that the primary 

target is the first target observed in each group (see paragraph A.4.1). 

Thus, the flight crew can concentrate on assuring good photography of primary 

targets by devoting full time to the various manual tasks involved. This submode may be operated with either a "leapfrog" or "specialist" technique. 

A.3.2.4 Operational Sub-Mode 4 

This sub-mode assumes that the pellicle in the main optics is damaged to the 

extent that neither the IVS or primary visual optics viewing are available for 

the fine rate killing task. In this mode, the tracking mirror will be slaved 

to an ATS after a target is selected for photography; the rate-killing task 

will be accomplished manually by the flight crew while viewing through an ATS. 

In this sub-mode, it is desirable to hold the ATS on the primary target from 

initial acquisition until completion of photography. This sub-mode provides 

moderate resolution, but can only be operated in a "leapfrog" technique and 

utilizes a limited number of alternate targets. 

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A.4 DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS 

The displays and controls which are currently baselined for the mission bays 

(No. 2 and No. 8) of the OV are discussed in this Section. Extensive 

simulation and contingency analyses are being accomplished to ensure 

adequate flight crew mission payload control capability while maintaining 

overall system realiability and response to User requirements. A schematic 

of a typical mission console is shown in Figure A-1. 

Only those displays and controls necessary to implement the major functions 

of the operations concept will be discussed here. 

A.4.1 ATS Path Select Switch: 

A three-position switch is located on each mission console which allows 

selection of the ATS Path (1, 2, or primary) to be followed by the ATS on 

that console. Path selection is completely independent on each console, 

allowing any combination of paths to be viewed by the two crewman. Both 

ATSs may follow the same path if desired. This facilitates a "leapfrog" 

operation in Mode B. When the ATS path select switch is placed in the 

primary position, the following functions are accomplished: 

a. ATS Path 1 is selected for viewing (contains all primary 

targets, by definition). 

b. All alternate targets of each group scheduled to be 

viewed prior to the primary are deleted. 

c. Slewing of the ATS to the next target in the same group 

is inhibited for active, inactive, or override inputs to 

the computer. 

Targets scheduled for viewing after the primary of each group are still 

available for viewing and photography if the primary is rejected. 

The position of this switch also controls the information presented in the 

ATS eyepiece and the order of cue presentation on the visual display projector 

such that the cues and information presented always matches the targets of the 

path selected. 

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-1 NEXT TARGET TARGET NO. 

MOATS 

SLAVE 

802 

OFF 

ATS PRI 

PATHOCI 1 

SELECT 2 

ATS TRACK MO TRACK 

TIMER 

GROUP & 

CONTROLS 

MASTER 

CAUTION SAT 

EX P 

ADJ X-FORMAT 

OVERRIDE +1 INHIBIT TIME TO RELATIVE 

MAGNIFICATION CONTROLLER 

1, 000 

500 

250 

125 HIGH 

MAG 

ACTIVE LOW 

MAG 

REJECT 

INACTIVE AT S MANUAL SEC 

0 PHOTO r—i 

0 

 r-1 CAMERA 

COMPUTER m CMD g MODE LJ SELECT 

UPDATE HOLD CMD SHUTTER PRI 

ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY 

PRIMARY 

VISUAL OPTICS 

DISABLE DISABLE 

COMP REG VISUAL OPT 

RESETCMD 

a 

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Figure A-1 Typical Mission Console 

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The primary position of this switch allows implementation of Mode B, 

operational sub-modes 3 and 4. These sub-modes will require a crew 

member to operate on a primary target from initial acquisition in the ATS 

through tracking and photography of the target. 

The ATS Path 1 and 2 positions allow selectivity of the path to be viewed at 

each console and are useful in implementing various forms of "leapfrog", 

"specialist", and hybrid operations when operating in Mode B as well as 

flexibility of operations when one crewman is being utilized. 

A.4.2 ATS Eyepiece Peripheral Display System 

This display system is composed of a "bouncing ball" time display and an 

information display. These displays are common to both ATS eyepieces and are 

computer-driven to supply the flight crew with the necessary timing and target 

information on the ATS path selected by the ATS path select switch 

(see Figure A-2). 

A.4.2.1 Time Display 

This display consists of a ring of 25 small white lights located at the 

extreme of the ATS field of view (see Figure A-2). The appropriate light is 

illuminated at the start of viewing of each target group to indicate the 

total seconds remaining until group decision time. The light will "step" at 

1-sec intervals toward the bottom of the display, providing a "bouncing ball" 

presentation of time remaining. 

Individual lights will be illuminated to indicate recommended viewing times 

on the targets to be viewed and provide information as to the number of 

targets to be viewed in each group. These lights extinguish individually as 

the flight crewman votes on each target. The display is re-initialized at 

group decision time for the next target group. If group decision time is 

more than 25 sec away, the 25th light will be illuminated and remain on until 

the "Time To Next Target" display (see Figure A-1) counts down to zero and 

initializes the "bouncing ball" at 25 sec to group decision time. 

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Z 0 cn 

CL 

N 3J— 

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A.4.2.2 Discrete Target Status Lights 

Ten small white lights are provided in each ATS eyepiece to provide the 

flight crew with information on the target being viewed in the ATS. The 

lights will be illuminated in specific patterns that will indicate: 

a. Primary target. 

b. Benchmark target. 

c. Weather alternate (assumes that activity alternate is in 

the normal type). 

d. Visual intelligence target. 

e. Target not available for photography. 

f. Combinations of the above. 

Simulations will be used to determine the exact patterns to be utilized and 

the amount of information that can be displayed to the flight crew without 

detracting from their primary task of target evaluation. 

A.4.3 Acquisition Hold Button (ATS Hold) 

When this button is depressed, the ATS will continue to track a target past 

group decision time and until the ATS is released by depressing the "Reject" 

button on the magnification controller, or the ATS runs into its aft stop. 

"Reject" inputs for this purpose will not be interpreted by the computer as a 

target vote. This button, in conjunction with the primary position of the ATS 

Path Select Switch, allows a primary target to be tracked from initial 

acquisition through the completion of the photographic sequence with an ATS, 

if desired. 

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A.4.4 Primary Visual Optics Eyepiece Display System 

A display, similar to the ATS eyepiece display, is contemplated for the 

Primary Visual Optics eyepiece. This display will provide the viewer with 

the following information: 

a. A timer wipeout (similar to ATS "bouncing ball") showing 

tracking mirror position as a function of pitch angle 

and/or time. 

b. Event indicators to supply the scheduled number of exposures 

and relative exposure times of the selected target (allows 

improved centering between frames if sufficient time is 

available). 

c. An indication of planned secondary camera photographs. The 

exact configuration of the display system will be determined 

on the basis of operational need, complexity, and cost. 

A.4.5 Primary Optics/ATS Magnification/Zoom Controller 

(Magnification Controller)_ 

This controller is a throttle-type control which controls the zoom magnification of the ATS high-power and low-power ranges when positioned in the lower 

slot and the primary visual optics discrete magnification selections when 

positioned in the upper slot. The controller configuration permits the 

flight crew to select a magnification to be used for primary visual optics 

viewing and then remove the controller to the ATS range, leaving the primary 

visual optics set at 125X, 250X, 500X, or 1000X. The controller must be 

placed in the upper slot to: 

a. Change magnification selection for primary visual optics. 

b. Allow manual control of the tracking mirror. 

Located on the controller are three flight crew voting buttons (active. 

inactive, and reject). Other input buttons and controls may be mounted on 

the controller to facilitate ease of operation and manual control. 

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A.4.6 Override Button 

Each mission console has an override button that is used to commit the primary 

optics to a particular target of a group without considering the target 

decision logic or other flight crew inputs. An override vote will not 

interrupt a photographic sequence on a previously selected target. An override vote also results in an implied ATS hold up to group decision time. It 

is envisioned that this button will be used only on the ra e occasion that a 

target is so highly "active" that it is of extremely high intelligence value. 

A.4.7 Primary Visual Optics Control Switch (Visual Optics) 

This switch, located on console 8, allows the primary visual optics view to be 

assigned from one mission console to the other, as directed by computer command, or to be manually locked to one console or the other. It will be useful 

in implementing one-man operations or for "specialist" operations in Mode B. 

In the "command" position, the computer will assign the primary visual optics 

view to that console from which the "winning" vote came. 

A.4.8 IVS (Rate Null) Switch 

An IVS (rate null) switch is located on each mission console. In the 

"automatic" position, the IVS signal is used by the computer to accomplish 

the fine rate-killing task. If the IVS is malfunctioning, as indicated by the 

"IVS saturate" light, or as determined by viewing through the primary visual 

optics, the flight crew may select the "manual" position. The computer will 

then reject the IVS signal and accept manual inputs from the control stick. 

Both crewmen may make manual control inputs to the tracking mirror (as in a 

"leapfrog" operation) only if each crewman has his switch in the "manual" 

position. 

A.4.9 Manual Control Stick Assemb 

A single control stick is present on each mission console to enable manual 

control of both the ATS and main optics. ATS control is available any time 

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the ATS is "ON" and the magnification controller is in the ATS range. To 

control the main optics to accomplish manual rate killing, the primary visual 

optics must be assigned (either by computer command or manually) to that 

console, the magnification controller must be in the primary visual optics 

range, and the IVS switch on that console must be in "manual" (IVS signal 

"reject") position. 

A.4.10 Computer Update Button 

---------------- 

Each mission console contains a "computer update" button. When this button 

is activated, the computer updates the pointing angles of the target being 

viewed through the ATS. This allows centering corrections made in the ATS 

to be passed on to the main optics by the computer. If the target being 

viewed is flagged in the computer as one whose geographic position is 

accurately known (i.e., benchmark target), then the position update will 

be applied to update the ephemeris (landmark navigation). If the target 

being viewed is not a benchmark, the pointing correction is saved by the 

computer until "decision" time and applied to the main optics if the target 

is selected for photography. 

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A.5 SUMMARY 

This concept stresses: 

a. A simple flight crew/computer interface in the target 

selection process. 

b. Flight crew control capability ranging from minor adjustment 

to complete manual control of certain mission equipment. 

c. Validation capability for automatic flight. 

d. Immediate reaction capability with no AVE computer logic 

changes to handle contingency situations. 

e. The need for the mission planning software to efficiently 

handle various operating modes. 

Operations concepts for the MOL/DORIAN system are being continuously studied 

and refined as the program develops. Efforts are being applied to ensure 

reliability, flexibility, response to User requirements, and the accomplishment of all mission objectives. 

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APPENDIX B 

FLIGHT PLANNING 

B.1 INTRODUCTION 

This Appendix supplements the information contained in paragraph 6.3.4 by 

giving additional treatment of the technical details or by providing Figures 

and Tables useful to the understanding of the text material. This Appendix 

is further divided as follows: 

B.2 Launch Constraints 

B.3 Ground Trace Coverage and Station Contacts 

B.4 Orbit Sustenance 

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B.2 LAUNCH CONSTRAINTS 

B.2.1 General 

In designing orbits for reconnaissance satellites which require natural light 

(sunlight) for target illumination, passages over a target area must occur 

under conditions of adequate illumination. Generally, the launch time associated with an orbit which satisfies a set of illumination criteria is 

restricted to certain time limits depending, for example, on the location of 

the launch site, target latitude, time of the year, and orbit inclination. 

For planning purposes, it is convenient to have, in graphical form, a set of 

charts which show the launch windows available at any time during the year 

from which orbits passing over adequately illuminated target areas can be 

established. Such charts also are useful in determining the launch time 

constraints which may be imposed on orbits of long-duration missions. Further, 

they provide an insight into any changes in nodal orientation which may be 

required to assure a long-duration mission capability if selection of a single 

launch time does not guarantee adequate target illumination over the entire 

mission. 

B.2.2 Analysis 

Consider the cross-section of the earth shown in Figure B-1. The plane contains the sun so that all rays reaching the surface of the earth can be 

indicated by parallel lines. At any given point on the surface, the local 

elevation angle, n, of the sun can be defined as the angle between the line 

of sight to the sun and the local horizontal. 

The solar elevation angle, n, indicates the degree of illumination provided 

by the sun. For this reason, the term "illumination angle" rather than 

"elevation angle" is used herein. At the sub-solar point, the sun appears 

directly overhead (n = 90 deg). At other points on the surface of the earth, 

the illumination angle varies as shown in Figure B-2. For the purpose of good 

resolution photography, a large illumination angle is desired. 

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Given that an observer will require some threshold of illumination for his 

observations, this specifies the smallest illumination angle that can be 

tolerated within the observed area to satisfy mission requirements. Once a 

minimum acceptable illumination angle is specified, a circular region (see 

Figure B-3) on the surface of the earth may be mapped in which the illumination angle is greater than or equal to the specified acceptable angle. 

The site of the circular area is a function of the minimum acceptable illumination angle. Its orientation with respect to the earth's equator is dependent 

on the season of the year in that a larger portion of the area will be in the 

northern hemisphere during the summer months (or conversely in the southern 

hemisphere during the winter months) because of the obliquity of the ecliptic. 

Now consider an orbit which passes over the illuminated area (see Figure B-3). 

For this orbit to pass over a particular target latitude while in the illuminated area, the launch time selected must assure the orbit will have a specific 

orientation with respect to the noon meridian. In Figure B-3, the launch 

time is restricted to a window which will establish an orbit passing over the 

target latitude in the illuminated area anywhere between the points A and B. 

Clearly, this launch window is dependent on the time of the year, orbit 

inclination, and whether the launch and target observation are to occur on the 

northbound or southbound sides of the orbit. 

For long-duration missions, the nodal shift of the orbit must be taken into 

consideration. As time progresses, there is, due to the oblateness of the 

earth, an eastward or westward movement of the orbit's nodes depending on 

whether the orbital inclination is greater than or less than 90 deg. The 

orbit shown in Figure B-3 has an inclination of less than 90 deg. Hence, 

there is a westward movement of the descending node. As a result, illuminated 

passage over the target latitude will no longer occur after the first 

revolution. Conversely, if the inclination is greater than 90 deg, the nodal 

movement is eastward, and passage over the target latitude under illuminated 

conditions is assured until the orbit passes over point B. 

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Considering that the noon meridian moves in an eastward direction at the rate 

of roughly one deg/day, the nodal shift with respect to the noon meridian will 

be of the order of 30 deg for a 30-day mission assuming that the orbit is 

polar (i = 90 deg). For orbits with inclinations of less than 90 deg, the 

nodal shift with respect to the noon meridian is even more pronounced. This 

fact implies that for long-duration missions, frequent changes of nodal positions may become necessary depending on the inclination of the selected orbit. 

These considerations suggest the sun-synchronous orbit to be an effective orbit 

particularly from the viewpoint of target illumination and orbital correction 

requirements since the orientation of such an orbit with respect to the noon 

meridian will remain fixed throughout the mission. The only factor which 

influences the target illumination is the seasonal north-south movement of the 

illuminated area. Once a sun-synchronous orbit is established, target illumination will be adequate until the upper rim of the illuminated area moves south 

past the intersection of the target latitude and orbit plane. 

As a means of providing a pictorial view of the seasonal effects on the launch 

time constraints, a set of charts has been prepared in which the time intervals 

available during each day of the year are shown for establishing a southbound 

launch from AFWTR into a low-altitude sun-synchronous orbit (i = 96.43 deg). 

Target illumination is considered to be required on the southbound side of the 

orbit. For a given minimum acceptable illumination angle, the available launch 

times are shown parametrically as a function of the target latitude to be 

observed and the launch date. Minimum acceptable illumination angles of 

n = 0, 10, 20, and 30 deg are illustrated in Figures B-7 through B-11. As an 

example, consider Figure B-9 which is schematically reproduced, in part, in 

Figure B-4. 

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The constant latitude (0) lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the 

time window within which an orbit may be established from which a satellite may 

observe a particular target latitude under conditions of n>20 deg for at 

least one day. In Figure B-4, the time windows available for observing target 

latitudes of 30 and 65 deg N are shown as representative examples. According 

to the Figure, a launch window exists on every day of the year for observation 

of a target latitude of 30 deg N. This window is represented by the area 

enclosed between the two horizontal curves of 4 = 30 deg. For a target 

latitude of 65 deg N, however, a launch window exists only during that part of 

the year indicated by the area enclosed within the oval curve of 4 = 65 deg. 

The intersection of these two areas then represents the launch window for 

coverage of a target latitude band extending from 30 to 65 deg N lat. In 

Figure B-4, this intersection is indicated by the shaded area. 

Now, examine the launch time constraints for long-duration missions. For the 

sun-synchronous orbit, the relative positions of the node and the noon 

meridian remain stationary at all times (see Figure B-3). This means that if 

a specified orbit is established by launching at a certain hour, the same 

orbit can be achieved on any subsequent day by launching at the same launch 

hour as that of the original date. It follows then that if an orbit is 

established, for example, by launching at point P in Figure B-4, the subsequent 

target illumination can be determined by extending a line horizontally and to 

the right of the launch point. In the particular example, observation of the 

30 to 65 deg N band is possible until the time when point P is reached. 

Figure B-4 shows the length of target observability depends on the particular 

launch hour selected within the available launch window. Because of the 

manner in which the constant latitude (0) contours are superimposed, a noon 

(1200 hours) or near-noon launch appears to be best suited for long-duraLion 

target observability. If the minimum acceptable illumination angle is n 0, 

a noon launch will permit observation of the 30 to 65 deg N lat band 

throughout the year without requiring any adjustments in the nodal position 

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of the orbit. For n>0, all regions of the target band may not be observable 

during the entire year. A noon launch, however, will provide for a maximum 

or near-maximum observable period for any target latitude within the target 

band. This can be illustrated by drawing a horizontal line across the charts 

at a launch time of 1200 hours. 

If a launch window plot is prepared for non-sun-synchronous orbits, the 

latitude contours will, in general, appear similar to those of the sunsynchronous orbit. In contrast to the sun-synchronous orbit, however, the 

nodal positions of these orbits do not remain stationary with respect to the 

noon meridian. 

As a consequence, the launch hour associated with each rev of the orbit shifts 

as time progresses. Hence, an inclined line, instead of a horizontal line, 

must be used to determine the target observability subsequent to a given 

launch time. For example, suppose that the launch window for observing a 30 

to 65 deg N lat target band from an orbit of inclination, i = 80 deg is as 

shown in Figure B-5. Suppose further that a launch was made at point C of 

Figure B-5. Because of the non-sun-synchronous nature of the orbit, the 

launch hours associated with the subsequent revs are as shown by the line 

extending from C downward and to the right. For the case of i = 80 deg, this 

line is approximately 59 deg from the horizontal and a nodal correction 

becomes necessary at point D if observation of the target band is to continue. 

This nodal correction should be such that the new nodal position is associated 

with a launch hour which will guarantee additional coverage of the illuminated 

target band. A nodal correction is shown in Figure B-5 where the associated 

launch hour is changed from D to D'. Several nodal correction maneuvers may 

be necessary if the target band is to be observed during the entire period in 

which it is adequately illuminated. 

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A nodal change can be effected at any point on the orbit by applying a velocity 

increment to alter the azimuth while the magnitude of the velocity vector is 

held fixed. The amount of velocity increment required will depend on the 

amount of the nodal correction to be effected and on the point at which the 

corrective maneuver is to occur. Generally, nodal corrections are expensive 

in terms of the required velocity increment. For the 80 deg inclination orbit 

considered previously, a velocity increment of 438 ft/sec is needed to produce 

a change of 1 deg in the nodal position. 

Figure B-6 is a plot of AV required per rev to make nodal corrections. 

Because of the large energy requirements, nodal corrections are not considered 

for MOL Operations and the time history of n for long mission becomes a constraint. Figures B-11 through B-15 are histograms of n for different values 

of i. 

Composite launch constraint charts (Figures B-16 through B-21) present acceptable launch times as a function of the parameters listed below for orbital 

inclinations of 80, 90, and 96.43 deg and mission durations of 30 and 60 days. 

These parameters are: 

a. Launch date 

b. Desired ground illumination sun angle (n) 

c. Orbital solar incidence angle (B) constraint of +60 deg. 

d. Launch abort constraints 

1. Sunrise at AFWTR. 

2. Sunset at AFWTR. 

3. Sunset -2.45 hrs at 40 deg S 

The available launch times for different launch dates are depicted by the 

crosshatched sectioning based upon those constraints listed under items c., 

and d. Item b., n, further restricts the launch window. If the n contours 

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are placed upon the charts, then only those areas bounded by a particular 

required n contour and cross-sectioned identify the true launch window as a 

function of the launch date. The n contour on these charts depicts the 

launch windows for different launch dates which will provide an n history, 

referenced to 55 deg N latitude, which for the duration of the mission will 

be greater than or equal to that n value associated with that particular 

n contour. 

The n, B data used to produce these curves was generated by a computer 

program. The sunrise and sunset information was obtained from the 1967 

American Ephemeris and National Almanac. 

A rapid comparison of the tradeoffs between, and the influence of, the 

function parameters upon the launch window for any launch date can be made 

using Figures B-16 through B-21. 

Figures B-22 through B-33 present the n history for orbital inclinations of 60, 

90, and 96.4 deg as a function of days from launch for launches on the first 

day of every month and launch times of 1200, 1300, 1400, 1500, and 1600 PST, 

respectively, on these dates. Since no other launch constraints are 

considered in making these charts, reference must be made to Figures B-16 

through B-21 to determine acceptable launch times for a particular launch 

date. These Figures demonstrate an n history comparison between the function 

parameters. No attempt has been made to relate n to photographic resolution 

becuase final quantitative numbers of n vs resolution are unavailable. 

Because the estimates have varied, the only valid relationship which can he 

presented at this time is n. When the n vs resolution curves become valid 

(or if one wishes to use present curves), these curves can be used in 

conjunction with Figures B-22 through B-33 to depict resolution rather than 

the n parameter presented. 

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The effect of orbit inclination on illumination available at a given target 

latitude is shown in Figures B-22 through B-26. These Figures show that the 

n = 40 deg contour is maximum with respect to latitude on the high 

(95 to 100 deg) inclination angles and that this occurs for June launch dates. 

Composite launch constraint charts can be prepared to show the previously discussed constraints associated with sun angle and additional constraints such 

as recovery, abort, etc. 

II-46 

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B.3 ORBIT SELECTION 

Figure B-34 is used to explain the philosophy of selecting the nominal and 

alternate MOL orbits which will provide the greatest probability of mission 

success and provide a MOL turnaround capability which will satisfy certain 

special targeting requirements. All quantities shown in Figure B-34 are based 

on an orbit having an initial perigee (6p) located at 55 deg N (descending) at 

a perigee altitude (h ) of 80 n mi. The apogee altitude shown as the ordinate 

of Figure B-34 represents the initial apogee altitude (ha) of the orbit. The 

q parameter values shown in Figure B-34 identify lines of constant q and 

represent the average value of q over the orbital decay interval between orbit 

adjusts (0/A) for sustenance. The 0/A interval applicable to this curve is 

three days. As such, the initial q value would be lower and the value just 

prior to a sustenance correction would be higher than that q value shown. The 

Gemini B abort ceiling (Line A-A'), the T-IIIM performance limit (line A'-C'), 

the recovery limit (Line C-C') for using only two recovery ships (Ref. 

6.3.4.3.1f.3.), and the minimum inclination of 80 deg (Line A-C) dictated by 

the envelope specified in the SP/DR establish the envelope depicted by the 

double lines shown in Figure B-34. 

Basically, any orbit within the envelope of the double lines shown in 

Figure B-34 may be a candidate for a MOL orbit. Because of the long mission 

and the wide swath coverage of the MOL vehicle, orbits providing the highest 

numbers of targets photographed are those which provide relatively continuous 

coverage of all longitudes over the mission. Repeat cycles in the order of 

10 to 15 days also have the advantage that overflights over a given target 

are spaced such that time is provided for weather changes. A nominal MOL 

orbit which has been used for timeline work to date was selected on the 

T-IIIM performance limit, Line A'-C', at point S (a value of q = 16-2/15). 

The corresponding inclination is 90 deg and the initial apogee altitude is 

approximately 186 n mi. This particular selection of a nominal MOL orbit will 

satisfy all major system constraints. Further, a +40 deg vehicle swath width 

capability will provide nearly complete coverage of all targets above 40 deg N 

four times in a 30-day mission. 

B - 47 

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B-48 

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Another orbit studied has a q of 16 3/26 providing approximately three 

accesses to all targets between 80 deg N and 80 deg S latitude with lover 

obliquity angles at the higher latitudes than previously studied orbits. 

An alternate orbit which may tend to optimize the capability of satisfying a 

special targeting requirement can also be selected using the following logic: 

a. Establish a reduced T-IIIM performance limit (Line E-E') 

to allow for any OV weight growth or less than nominal 

T-IIIM performance. 

b. Choose an inclination (Line F-F') within the box bounded by 

the Gemini B abort ceiling, the reduced T-IIIM performance 

limit, the recovery limit, and the minimum inclination line 

specified in the MOL SP/DR. 

c. Choose a specific orbit, point T, which can best satisfy 

potential alternate mission dictated by special targeting 

requirements. 

The backup performance limit line shown will correspond to increasing the OV 

by 500 lb. Studies indicate a q range of 16.0 to 16.25 will allow the MOL 

vehicle to directly overfly any target in the world within five days after 

launch. Certain specific targets may be directly overflown much sooner. 

As indicated earlier, at L-7 a decision can be made to use the alternate orbit 

and change ha to obtain the q (between 16.0 and 16.27) to overfly desired 

targets as early as possible. The limits on ha will be from F to F' or 

approximately 201 to 135 n mi. 

Caution must be exercised in selecting point T. Too high a q value will 

require more AV per 0/A and will be very expensive in sustenance propellants. 

This can be compensated somewhat by only partially correcting the apsidal 

rotation for the remainder of the mission. (This assumes operation for the 

full duration is a requirement after completion of a special targeting exercine.) 

B-49 

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Figure B-35 shows the q values required to overfly Target "A" on a given rev. 

With an obliquity capability of +40 deg a range of q (16.112 <q< 16.21) 

allows overflight on rev 24. Figures B-36 through B-39 indicate the range of 

q values which will allow overflight of four additional targets. These curves 

are based on a 90 deg inclination angle orbit. Curves similar to those presented in Figures B-35 through B-39 can be made at the alternate inclination 

line F-F' for each target potentially a candidate for a special targeting 

requirement. Overlay of a set of these curves will permit selection of a 

value of q (depicted by point T in Figure B-34) having the highest probability 

of satisfying a special targeting requirement. 

The placement of line F-F' must be made considering such factors as tracking 

station coverage, history of sun angle in the target area of interest over the 

total flight, propellants required for sustenance, etc. 

For any given important target, almost continuous daily surveillance can be 

accomplished by an 0/A (after initial target acquisition) which is at or near 

q = 16.0 to provide a repetitive ground trace each day. 

B-50 

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Figure 13-36 q Values Regal red to Overfly Target 1; 

13- 52 

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Figure 13-37 q Values Required to Overfly Target C 

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B.4 GROUND TRACE COVERAGE PATTERN AND STATION CONTACTS 

The ground trace coverage pattern and its effects on target coverage in the 

area of interest are developed below. Plots of typical MOL ground traces for 

a 90 deg inclination orbit and Tables of RTS contacts for various orbital 

inclination angles are provided. 

The ground trace coverage pattern used in MOL sustenance studies is that pattern resulting from an orbit which repeats itself every 15 days. However, a 

more explicit term identified as the satellite repetition parameter, q, must 

be used to describe precisely the ground trace coverage pattern. The q used 

in the recent MOL sustenance studies is 16-2/15. The q parameter expresses 

the number of revs a satellite completes in a sidereal day (360 degrees of 

earth rotation). An expression for q is derived as follows: 

a. The total number of deg the earth rotates during an orbital rev 

is defined by the nodal period, TN, multiplied by the earth 

rotation rate, E . 

b. The ascending node regresses at a rate of 

.11 

c. The total angle of earth rotation during one rev relative to 

the ascending node of the orbit, AS, is thus: 

AS

T d c 

= 6o -(I

N 

(1) 

Where: TN 

= nodal period in min 

R

E = earth rotation rate in deg/hr 

do 

= nodal regression rate in deg/rev d

N 

d. Since AS is the number of deg of earth rotation per rev, 

then: 

deg 

revs 

360 sidereal day q = 

sidereal day AS deg 

rev 

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Therefore: q - 360 

T 

N E - dSl 

60 dN 

(2) 

The nodal regression rate, dQ/dN, for a particular orbital inclination is not 

affected significantly by small changes in nodal period. Consequently, an 

examination of the q equation indicates that as a given orbit decays thereby 

decreasing the nodal period, the q value actually begins to increase. The MOL 

sustenance studies include the effects of drag and oblate earth effects and, 

consequently, when a q of 16-2/15 is specified for a MOL orbit, this really 

means an average q value over some interval between sustenance corrections. 

The initial q will be lower than 16-2/15 and the q just prior to correction 

will be higher than 16-2/15. 

For the range of orbital parameters presently feasible on MOL, the value of 

nodal regression rate, dil/dN, varies from approximately -0.10 deg/rev for an 

80 deg orbital inclination to 0.0 at 90 deg orbital inclination to approximately 0.065 deg/rev at 96.43 deg orbital inclination. If the range of 

feasible orbital parameters based upon launch vehicle capabilities are known 

for each orbital inclination angle, it is easy to bound the range of q values 

applicable to MOL. It should be noted that the lower the nodal period the 

higher the value of q. For q values greater than 16, the ground track will 

move east every integral number of 16 revs; for q values less than 16, the 

ground track will move west every integral number of 16 revs. If a particular 

value of q is desirable for the applicable inclination range, it is possible 

to show, using the q equation and other fundamental orbit mechanics equations, 

that the apogee altitude increases approximately 20 n mi per 10 deg increase 

in inclination angle. This assumes an 80 n mi perigee and a 4 value of 

16-2/15. 

13-57 

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The movement of the ground trace for an orbit with a q parameter equal to 

16-2/15 is shown in Figure B-40. This assumes no perturbations are acting 

upon the orbit and that the orbit is polar. Since q is 16-2/15, then: 

360 = AS = 22.314 deg 

q 

16 x AS = 357.025 deg 

If the first time the OV crosses the ascending node is labeled rev 1, then 

rev 17 (16 revs later) will be 360 deg -357.025 deg (2.975 deg) east of 

rev 1 and successive revs such as rev 1 and rev 2 are 22.314 deg apart. 

Revs 243 and 1 overlap; the ground traces repeat after 242 revs or after 

15 days (note that 242/q - 15). The ground traces at the equator after 

15 days are separated by 1.488 deg (see Figure B-40). 

The MOL DORIAN system with its obliquity capability of 40 deg can cover a 

ground swath of 67.1 n mi on either side of the ground trace. Since the 

number of n mi in a deg of longitude varies as the latitude changes, it can 

be shown that the MOL DORIAN vehicle can access all longitudes above approximately 40 deg N lat after 7.5 days. Since over 90 percent of the known targets 

are above 40 deg N lat, an orbit with an average q value of 16-2/15 between 

sustenance corrections will provide for complete coverage of all longitudes 

four times in a 30-day mission. 

The coverage pattern for a given latitude region at 40 deg N latitude is shown 

in Figure B-41 for the 90 deg inclination angle orbit. Drag effects are taken 

into consideration; the sustenance correction interval is every 48 revs (see 

Figure B-41). The small vertical line represents where the ground trace on a 

particular day intersects the longitude region specified. The horizontal lines 

depict swath widths commensurate with a 30 and 40 deg obliquity capability. 

The shorter horizontal line represents a 30 deg obliquity capability. 

B-58 

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Orbit ground traces are shown in Figures B-42 through B-44 for a polar orbit 

for the first 3 days of a 30 day flight. This is typical of an orbit having 

an 80 n mi perigee and an average .q value of 16-2/15 over the sustenance 

interval. 

B-61/-62 

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D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING I 

B.5 SUSTENANCE 

The various methods of performing orbit adjust to sustain the orbit and the 

factors affecting the selections of a given method are discussed below. 

The inclination angle and q parameter will also dictate the sustance technique employed in maintenance of perigee altitude, apogee altitude, and 

argument of perigee within fixed boundaries. 

To date, MOL sustenance studies have gone through the iterations delineated in 

Table B-1. Essentially, these studies have considered three different 

inclination angle orbits and gone through three iterations on atmosphere model. 

Further, the statistics shown in Table B-1 are based upon a two-burn, 180 deg 

circumferential transfer technique. This two-burn transfer is "nearly 

optimum" and the impulses are added normal to the radius vector 180 deg in 

central angle apart. The results of this sustenance evaluation are evaluated 

further in Figures B-45 through B-47. 

The interval between sustenance corrections which corresponds to an average q 

value of 16-2/15 on these curves is 48 revs (shown by the dark broken line). 

The orbits had an initial perigee altitude of 80 n mi at 55 deg N lat 

(descending). Sustenance correction intervals at other than rev 48 will 

provide average q values lower than 16-2/15 for revs preceding rev 48 and 

values higher than 16-2/15 for revs later than 48. 

Figure B-45 presents AV/rev required vs the interval between sustenance 

corrections at an orbital inclination of 80 deg for the different iterations 

of the sustenance studies to date. The upper curve resulted from the first of 

the sustenance studies and was based upon the Jacchia 1964 atmosphere model 

which used a solar activity index, F

10.7 valve equal to 220 watts/m2

/cps. 

The value of 220 was selected based upon the MOL schedule as of that date and 

an analysis performed on F10.7 during the active period of the solar cycle. 

The middle curve was generated during a second iteration on the sustenance 

studies and is based upon the more up-to-date atmosphere model currently being 

B- 69 

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used. This model is the analytical representation of the Jacchia 1964 model 

suggested by Walker and modified by R. W. Bruce. The value of F10.7 used 

for the middle curve is also 220 watts/m2/cps. The Bruce modified atmosphere 

model actually decreased the sustenance requirement over the previously 

used Jacchia 1964 atmosphere model as shown by Figure B-45. The lower curve 

of Figure B-45 is based upon the Bruce modified atmosphere model with an F10.7 

value of 170 watts/m2

/cps; this value of F10.7 is the new mean index of solar 

activity based upon the new MOL schedule. The sustenance requirement is less 

for this curve as a result of the lower F10.7 value (directly proportional to 

atmospheric mass density). The initial conditions for the three orbits 

exemplified by the three curves on Figure B-45 are different because of the 

difference in perturbations acting on the satellite as a result of the 

differing atmospheric environment. However, the three curves all depict orbits 

of the same average q value for each interval of sustenance correction. The 

lower curve of Figure B-45 also differs from the other two curves in that a 

point of discontinuity is reached at approximately a sustenance correction 

interval of 38 revs and the slope of the curve changes sign at approximately 

a sustenance correction interval of 25 revs. 

Figure B-46 presents the same kind of comparison as Figure B-45 except the 

orbit has an inclination angle of 90 deg. The important concept shown in 

Figure B-46 is that the sustenance correction interval of 48 revs (only one 

providing an average q of 16-2/15) is further from the minimum AV/rev required 

point and that the total sustenance AV for the 30-day mission is higher for the 

90 deg inclination angle orbit than for the 80 deg inclination angle orbit. 

Further, all three curves exhibit the discontinuity point previously discussed. 

Figure B-47 provides a comparison of three orbits at inclinations of 80, 85, 

and 90 deg using an F10.7 value of 220 watts/m2

/cps in conjunction with the 

Bruce modified atmosphere model. The 80 and 90 deg orbital inclination 

angle curves were previously shown in 'Figures B-45 and B-46. The 85 deg curve 

exhibits the discontinuity point whereas the 80 deg curve does not. The 

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Table B-1. Orbital Sustenance Requirements 

IDEAL q = 16 2/15, h = 80 n mi 6 = 55°, W/CDA = 100 psf 

Atmospheric i = 80° i = 85° = 90° 

Environment 

F

10 = P

10 = 220 AVT = 444 fps AVT = 452 fps 

Jacchia 

1964 ATM A

P 

 = 20 hA= 168.9 n mi h

A = 187.5 n mi 

F

10 = F10 = 220 AVT = 415 fps AVT = 412 fps AVT = 436 fps 

Ap= 20 h

A = 167.9 n mi hA = 176.9 n mi hA = 186.5 n mi 

Modified 

1964 ATM 

F

10 = P10 = 170 AVT = 381 fps AV = 425 fps 

A = 20 p h

A = 166.7 n mi h

A = 185.8 n mi 

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85 and 80 deg inclination angle curves suggest that at some inclination 

between these values the minimum AV/rev point occurs very close to the 48 rev 

sustenance correction interval corresponding to an average q of 16-2/15. 

The curves of Figure B-47 show the total sustenance AV required at an 85 deg 

inclination angle to be slightly less than at an 80 deg inclination angle, 

while the 90 deg inclination angle orbit uses quite a bit more AV than the 

80 deg inclination angle orbit. The initial and decayed orbits of the 85 and 

90 deg inclination angle orbits intersect. The increased penalty of 

correcting the apsidal rotation of the 85 deg inclination angle orbit is nearly 

compensated for by the higher apogee altitude which results in a lower value 

of atmospheric drag on the OV. For the 90 deg inclination angle orbit, 

the penalty for apsidal correction is even more dominant. In general, the 

apsidal correction is free if the initial and decayed orbits are non-intersecting; once they intersect, a severe penalty is incurred as the orbital 

inclination angle is increased. 

MOL sustenance studies have indicated for a q parameter of 16-2/15 that the 

initial and decayed orbits over the sustenance correction interval were 

non-intersecting when the inclination angle was 582 deg and intersecting for 

inclination angles s 82 deg. 

When the initial and decayed orbits are non-intersecting (see Figure B-45) 

both orbit correction impulses are forward along the positive velocity vector. 

For intersecting orbits (see Figure B-46) if two orbit corrections are 

employed, one impulse is forward along the velocity vector and the other 

is aft in the direction of the negative velocity vector. The altitude profile 

for a 90 deg inclination orbit over the latitude region of interest is shown 

in Figure B-48 for the two-orbit correction technique. The latter case 

necessitates turning the vehicle around. To eliminate this turnaround 

maneuver and also save sustenance propellant, a one-impulse technique (see 

Figure B-49) has been studied which essentially corrects only that amount of 

apsidal rotation which is obtained free in the process of correcting the 

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NOTE: 

i • se 

h • 80 n mi 

h • 185. 81 n MI 

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MOO JACCHIA 1964 ATM 

F

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CORRECT APL 6.6 CONST 

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83 

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33 

79 

78 

0 30 40 50 

LATITUDE (DEGREES) 

60 

Figure B-48 Altitude Profile 

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PERIGEE HISTORY 

Day o P AV, fps 

0 45°N 

3 57.5 50.7 32.8 

6 63.8 56.7 35.5 

9 69.8 62.4 36.7 

12 74.9 67.8 36.0 

15 80.2 45.0 107.5 

18 58.7 51.3 35.1 

21 64.4 57.3 35.5 

24 70.3 63.0 36.7 

27 75.4 68.4 36.0 

30 80.7 

TOTAL 391.8 

Figure 13-49 Single Impulse Sustenance Tangential Application 

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semi-major axis every three days. By doing this, perigee is allowed to 

drift north a certain amount every three days, thereby necessitating initial 

injection conditions, which place perigee further south. 

Perigee for this scheme is allowed to drift north to a maximum latitude of 

approximately 80 deg. This maximum perigee latitude is achieved on day 15, 

and at this time a two-burn orbital maneuver essentially returns perigee to 

the original injection condition. The semi-major axis is also corrected to 

the original condition during this orbit maneuver. In this way, the desired 

average value of q over the three-day sustenance interval can be maintained 

throughout the entire 30-day mission with only one two-burn maneuver. 

Essentially, eight one-burn maneuvers and one two-burn maneuver with only 

one reorientation of the vehicle are required. Figure B-50 shows the altitude 

profile using this concept over the area of interest for the first 15 days of 

a 30-day mission. The solid lines depict altitude profile just after a 

correction, while the dash lines depict altitude profile for the rev just 

prior to the correction impulse. Initially, on rev 1 perigee was located 

at 45 deg N (descending) at an altitude of 80 n mi. The average value of q 

over the sustenance interval was 16-2/15 for a polar orbit. Table B-2 shows 

a comparison of AV used between this concept and the two-impulse technique 

where perigee latitude is totally corrected each time back to the initial 

position value at 55 deg N latitude. The one-burn concept is more efficient 

by saving approximately 33 ft/sec, as shown in Table B-2. (The comparison 

is even more favorable than indicated since turnaround propellants are not 

included in Table B-2.) This concept is valid for only intersecting initial 

and decayed orbits. For non-intersecting orbits, two orbit corrections will 

always be required but the vehicle will never have to be turned around. 

The altitude profile differences resulting from the one-impulse technique 

(as opposed to the two-impulse technique) for intersecting initial and decayed 

orbits can be readily seen by plotting Figure B-48 onto Figure B-50. These 

differences appear to be small. 

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91 

90 

NOTE: 

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h • 80 n mi F • F - 170 A- 

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Figure B-50 Altitude Profile, Tangential Transfer Case 

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Table B-2. Velocity Comparison for Polar Orbit 

Correction 

Subcycle 

Total Velocity Increment (ft/sec) 

Two-Burn* 

Method 

One-Burn/Two-Burn** 

Method 

1 43.9978 32.7826 

2 91.2773 68.2812 

3 139.5209 104.9923 

4 186.8004 140.9871 

5 235.0440 248.5125 

6 282.3235 283.6093 

7 329.6030 319.1498 

8 377.8466 355.8866 

9 425.0261 391.8946 

* 1. Perigee returned to 55 deg N every correction subcycle 

** 2. Initial perigee at 45 deg N 

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The total sustenance velocity can be reduced drastically by increasing the 

perigee altitude. Several cases investigating this tradeoff have been 

generated and it was found that the total velocity requirement for a 30-day 

mission decreased approximately 20 fps per increase of 1 n mi in perigee 

altitude from 80 n mi. The average q parameter over the sustenance interval 

of 48 revs was assumed constant at 16-2/15 for this evaluation, and a 90 deg 

orbit inclination angle orbit was assumed. The two-burn, 180 deg 

circumferential technique was employed. 

The effect upon total sustenance velocity of increasing inclination from 90 

to 100 deg to accommodate the SP/DR envelope decreased the total velocity 

required for a 30-day mission by 2 fps, and hence, is considered negligible. 

The sustenance technique employed was the two-burn, 180 deg circumferential 

with an orbit perigee of 80 n mi and the average q value of 16-2/15 over the 

sustenance interval of 48 revs. 

Sustenance studies are continuing at Aerospace. Tools to be used in 

determining 0/As during the flight will be developed as a result of these 

studies. 

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I•••■•., 

APPENDIX C 

CHARTER: FLIGHT OPERATIONS PLANNING GROUP 

C.1 PURPOSE 

This document establishes the Flight Operations Planning Group (FOPG) and 

defines its organization, functions, and responsibilities. 

The primary function of the FOPG is the integration and coordination of the 

orbital aspects of MOL Flight Operations concepts with AVE and AFSCF 

operating concepts, hardware, and software systems. Further, where a concept 

places a requirement upon the AVE and/or AFSCF that cannot be met by existing 

design plans, the FOPG will either modify the concept or present the tradeoffs involved to MOL SPO management for direction as appropriate. 

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C.2 TERMINOLOGY 

The fundamental terms with which the FOPG will be concerned are defined as 

follows: 

a. Mission Director (MD) - MOL SPO officer responsible for the 

conduct of overall MOL test operations. 

b. Flight Director (FD) - MOL SPO officer responsible for the 

conduct of MOL flight operations for the duration of the MOL. 

He is responsible for integrated MOL planning and training. 

c. MOL Field Test Force Director (FTFD) - AFSCF officer 

responsible for planning and integration of MOL operational 

requirements on the AFSCF, for the control of AFSCF operational support to the MOL program, and for all AFSCF training 

necessary to accomplish same. 

d. Flight Phase - The period of MOL test operations beginning at 

liftoff of the MOL flight vehicle and ending with laboratory 

vehicle disposal. 

e. MOL Flight Operations - The operations (including planning 

and training) required to ensure successful accomplishment of 

those objectives of the program occurring during the flight 

phase of the MOL test operations. This would include the 

operations (including planning and training) conducted at the 

MCC. This includes the operations of the MD and the FD and 

the latter's interfaces with launch operations, flight crew 

operations, and the operations of any outside agency. 

Exclusive of planning and training, MOL flight operations for 

a given flight start with the beginning of the countdown 

during the launch phase and are concluded with the writing of 

the Post Operations Assessment Directive (POAD). 

f. MCC Hardware - The control, display, communications and 

administrative supplies and equipment in the Mission Control 

Center (MCC) necessary to conduct Mission Control functions. 

g. MCC Personnel - MOL SPO, AFSCF or contractor personnel who 

direct, operate, or maintain MCC hardware, software, plans, 

or procedures at the MCC during the conduct of MOL flight 

operations. 

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h. Flight Support - MOL SPO, AFSCF, or contractor personnel, 

hardware, software, or procedures which support flight 

operations. 

i. Flight Operations Documentation - Program documentation 

outlined in the MOL Test and Operations Documentation Plan 

which pertains to flight operations. 

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C.3 ORGANIZATION 

The membership of the FOPG will include representation from the MOL SPO, 

Aerospace MOL SEO, MOL associate contractors and the AFSCF. Each of these 

organizations will provide regular representation in all appropriate areas 

of interest as required and will be responsible for performing the following 

specific functions: 

a. M_OL SPO - Chair the FOPG and establish the agenda, place, and 

representation appropriate for each meeting. 

b. AFSCF Operations - The MOL FTFD office will be represented at 

all FOPG meetings, and will serve as the central authority for 

AFSCF operational matters. 

c. AFSCF Engineering - Provide engineering representation to the 

FOPG, to act as a consultant on AFSCF engineering capability, 

to provide MOL operations visibility to the AFSCF and, where • 

practicable, support FOPG trade studies. 

d. Aerospace/MOL - Serve as technical advisor to the chairman and 

act as Secretariat for meetings held at Air Force facilities. 

e. MOL Contractors - Represent system segment responsibilities 

of associate contractors. Act as Secretariat for meetings 

held at contractor facilities. 

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C. AUTHORITY 

The FOPG is authorized, through its members, to draw upon the manpower 

resources of the represented organizations as required to assist the Group 

in fulfilling its responsibilities. There is no intent that the FOPG 

establish any formal operational support requirements on flight support 

organizations, except through the accepted channels (i.e., ORD, PRD, etc.). 

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C.5 RESPONSIBILITIES 

The FOPG is responsible for coordinating and integrating the activities 

associated with the development of MOL Flight Operations Planning. Specific 

areas of interest will include: 

a. Assuring that flight operations concepts are consistent with 

MOL Program requirements, MOL AVE, and AFSCF capabilities. 

b. Ensuring that requirements for the MCC are stated and 

developed in a timely manner. 

c. Developing flight specific test objectives and translating 

them into flight plans and rules for their accomplishment. 

d. Maintaining cognizance of flight operations documentation 

and operations procedures to determine progress toward the 

completion and validation of flight test objectives. 

e. Resolving orbital requirements conflicts among the associate 

contractor/government agencies. 

f. Assuring that the MCC personnel training is consistent 

with the operations requirements. 

g. Coordination with the segment project officers on AVE 

requirements and constraints. 

h. Coordination with other groups to properly interface their 

activities with Flight Operations and flag incompatibilities 

for resolution by the proper authority as indicated below: 

1. Software Management Group - Review action of the SMG and 

its subgroups to ascertain the compatibility of concepts, 

data flow, and software compatibilities with the flight 

operations. 

2. Flight Vehicle Timeline Working Group - Review the FVTL 

for consistency with flight operations concepts. FVTLWG 

will be incorporated as a subgroup to the FOPG at L-9 

months. 

3. Orbit Test Working Group - Review action of the OTWG to 

ensure its implementing the FOPG requirements. 

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4. Ascent and Reentry Working Group - Review action of the 

ARWG to ensure consistency with orbital operations. 

5. Other Groups (formal or informal) - Review actions by 

other groups which develop operational concepts to ensure 

compatibility with flight operations. 

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c.6 IMPLEMENTATION 

Action items will be assigned by the chairman to members of the FOPG. Any 

action item for a contractor that is not within the scope of his contract 

will be brought to the attention of the chairman for assignment through the 

appropriate Project Officer and Contracting Officer. 

All action items will be assigned in consonance with the concept that 

accomplishment of MOL test objectives is a MOL SPO responsibility and that 

AFSCF system support to MOL and detailed operations planning is the 

responsibility of the AFSCF. 

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C.7 PROCEEDINGS 

The FOPG will meet on an as-required basis on the call of the chairman. 

Agendas will be distributed as far in advance of meetings as possible; 

however, at a minimum, they will be distributed seven working days prior to 

the meeting. 

These meetings will provide a mechanism where operational problems can be 

resolved and program policy direction issued. Subgroups may be formed to 

work specific problems. Results of subgroup deliberations will be presented 

to the FOPG members for approval. 

The FOPG will also provide for an exchange of information between participants 

that will allow each contractor to coordinate his flight operations 

requirements before contractual submission. 

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APPENDIX D 

RTS-STC DOWNLINK DATA RETURN MODES 

PHILOSOPHY AND DESIGN CRITERIA 

D.1 PURPOSE 

To establish the philosophy upon which to base the formation of downlink data 

modes for the return of data from the tracking stations to the STC during 

orbital operations. 

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D.2 DEFINITIONS 

a. Downlink Vehicle Data - All data which is transmitted from the 

OV to the tracking stations. This includes all telemetry, 

voice, and tracking data. 

1. Real Time - That downlink data which is composed of 

information (voice and/or telemetry) which has not been 

prerecorded on the vehicle and which truly represents 

status or events which are occurring during the time of 

the tracking station contact. This would include current 

status of the ADC memory and angle tracking data. 

(a) Current Real Time - That real time data which is to 

be processed and returned for display and/or 

processing at the STC as it is being recieved and 

stored at the tracking station. 

(b) Stored Real Time - That real time data which is 

stored at a tracking station for subsequent processing and replay and/or shipment to the STC. 

2. Recorded - That downlink data which is composed of 

information (voice and/or telemetry) resulting from the 

playback of any OV tape recorder. 

(a) Current Recorded -,That recorded data which is 

processed and returned for display and/or processing 

at the STC as it is being received and stored at the 

tracking station. At this time, no use is envisioned 

for this capability during MOL flight operations. 

(b) Stored Recorded - That recorded data which is stored 

at a tracking station for subsequent processing and 

replay and/or shipment to the STC. 

b. Downlink Information Returns - The processing and transfer of 

downlink data from a tracking station to the STC. These 

returns are further defined in order of priority as follows: 

1. Immediate - The return of information resulting from the 

processing of data which occurs during a station contact 

in support of a pass plan and which is not the result of 

a replay of data previously stored at a tracking station. 

For MOL flight operations, it is expected that this return 

will include only information which has been processed 

from selected current real time downlink vehicle data. 

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2. Postpass - Those information returns which occur by 

electronic means within 15 min of station fade. Postpass information returns will consist of processed 

stored real time downlink data and/or processed stored 

recorded downlink data. 

3. Deferred - Those information returns which occur by 

electronic means subsequent to postpass information 

returns. 

4. Hard Copy - The information return which involves the 

physical shipment of data from the tracking station to 

the MCSF. 

c. Pass Plan - The approved plan for the conduct of the operation 

during the time the OV is scheduled to be in actual contact 

with a tracking station. 

d. Data Modes - The provisioning for selection and processing of 

groupings of individual data points (i.e., measurands, 

parameters, or measurements) for achieving downlink information returns. 

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D.3 GROUND RULES 

a. All data requirements at the STC will be satisfied by immediate, 

post pass, or deferred information returns and/or by reduction 

from previously returned hard copy. 

b. Under normal circumstances, the only immediate data required 

at the MCC will be that necessary to accomplish the 

pass plan. The specific nature of the data required will 

depend upon the content of the pass plan. 

c. The capability to command the vehicle will always be a part of 

any station contact for telemetry acquisition whether or not 

commands are included as part of the pass plan. 

d. All data modes will be designed to efficiently use the capacity 

of the communications links between the tracking stations 

and the STC. When a high priority data requirement does not 

efficiently use the capacity of the system, it may be 

augmented by non-conflicting lower priority data as 

appropriate. 

e. Modes will be formed to contain homogeneous data from the 

standpoint of satisfying requirements on a chronologically 

prioritized basis (i.e., data required during the same time 

period at the STC should be included in the same mode where 

practicable to facilitate its return at the same time). 

f. The determination of the chronological priority of data will 

nominally be based upon the established priority of the FV 

instrumentation involved. It is expected that the 

instrumentation priorities will be established as indicated 

in paragraph D.6. 

g. As a general rule, a data mode will be assigned the lowest 

downlink information return priority consistent with the 

time requirement for the data contained in the mode. 

h. Data returns will be effected as early as possible, consistent 

with priority, to fully use the total capacity of the STC 

within the constraints of the multi-operational environment. 

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D.4 MODE HANDLING CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 

To be supplied. 

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D.5 DATA MODE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 

a. All mode designs should be based upon the time period when it 

is intended to be used as follows: 

1. Modes designed for immediate use must contain all 

required operational data (see paragraph D.6), including command verification data. 

2. Modes designed for postpass use should normally contain 

diagnostic data and possibly some operational data. 

b. All tracking data will be included in a separate, high priority 

postpass data mode. 

c. All modes will be designed to minimize the time required for 

their return to the STC over the 2400 bit lines. 

d. The finite values of any measurement which is limit checked 

at a tracking station should be reported to the STC on a 

periodic basis under normal vehicle operating conditions. 

The frequency of reporting will depend upon the nature of 

the data involved. 

e. Where modes report values of measurements only when out of 

limits (by exception), the modes should be sized to assure: 

(1) reasonable multiple out-of-limit conditions will not 

oversaturate the 2400 bps communication limitation; (2) the 

measurements are prioritized in a manner that will permit 

reporting the high priority exceptions first, but should not 

limit reporting of a minimal sample of all exceptions during 

the operation of the mode. 

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D.6 INSTRUMENTATION PRIORITY CRITERIA 

D.6.1 Goal 

To provide the criteria upon which to base the selection of PT instrumentation. 

D.6.2 Ground Rules 

a. To assist in the establishment of telemetry criteria, the 

primary purposes of the orbital flight test are hereby 

defined as: 

1. Perform the on-board experiments. 

2. Demonstrate the on-board experimental capability. 

3. Assess the contribution of the flight crew to a., and b., 

above. 

b. The primary functions of the MOL instrumentation system are to 

accomplish the following: 

1. Provide data necessary to control the on-board experiments. 

2. Provide data to demonstrate the on-board experimental 

capability. 

3. Provide data required to assess the contribution of the 

flight crew. 

4. Provide data critical to crew safety. 

c. The inclusion of or degree of redundancy of an instrumentation 

point must be consistent with its priority as established 

herein. 

D.6.3 Instrumentation Category Definitions 

a. Life Critical - Instrumentation that provides data to identify 

a failure which could jeopardize crew safety. 

b. Control Critical - Instrumentation that provides data to 

identify the state or status of any function or subsystem 

required to maintain vehicle control. 

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c. Experiment Critical - Instrumentation that provides data which 

is required to conduct the on-board experiments. 

d. Experiment R&D - Instrumentation that provides data required 

to demonstrate the on-board experimental equipment capability. 

e. Crew Contribution - Instrumentation that provides data required 

to assess the contribution of the flight crew toward mission 

success. 

f. Other - Instrumentation that provides data not included in 

the above categories. 

D.6.4 Operational 

Those measurands which are used in the decision making process to determine 

action required by ground personnel or of the crewman. 

D.6.5 Diagnostic 

Those parameters which define the present real time operational configuration 

or status of the spacecraft, or serve to isolate malfunctions, but do not 

in themselves indicate that action be initiated. 

D.6.6 Evaluation 

Those measurands used to determine system performance and do not assist in 

decision making or in defining present configuration. 

D.6.7 Instrumentation Priority 

Based upon the above ground rules and definitions, instrumentation priorities 

are established as shown in Table D-1. 

D.6.8 Mission-Critical Telemetry 

Mission-critical telemetry is defined as that telemetry which must be sustained 

to allow mission payload operation to continue in the non-degraded mode, 

assuming that all subsystems other than telemetry are functioning in their 

nominal manner. Only those measurements which satisfy this definition shall 

be permitted in categories defined in paragraph D.6.3 a., b., and c. 

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It is the intent of the board that the telemetry subsystem be designed to 

preclude single point failure for these categories. 

Table D-1. Instrumentation Priority 

Instrumentation Type Operational Diagnostic Evaluation 

Life-Critical 1 7 13 

Control-Critical 2 8 114 

Experiment-Critical 3 9 15 

Experiment R&D 4 10 16 

Crew Contribution 5 11 17 

Other 6 12 18 

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APPENDIX E 

MOL HARDWARE DESCRIPTION 

E.1 INTRODUCTION 

The scope of the FTOP does not generally include hardware description. 

However, this Appendix includes a brief description of the DORIAN Mission 

Payload System Segment* since it is not documented elsewhere in readily 

accessible form. A hardware description of the laboratory vehicle and 

Gemini B is available in the MOL Data Book (Ref 23). This Appendix is 

further divided as follows: 

E.2 Mission Payload System Segment 

E.2.1 Mission Control Section (GE AVE) 

E.2.2 Photographic Section (EK AVE) 

* The MPSS no longer exists, per se, but has been redesignated as two 

separate segments: (1) the Mission Module System Segment (MMSS), and 

(2) the Payload System Segment (PSS). This Appendix will be corrected 

to reflect this new terminology in the next issue. 

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E.2 MISSION PAYLOAD SYSTEM SEGMENT 

The mission payload system segment (MPSS) is contained in the LM and/or MM, 

depending on the specific function concerned. The MPSS consists of: 

(1) mission control section (GE AVE); and (2) photographic section (EK AVE). 

With the exception of the camera and associated film supplies and takeups, 

on-board film processor, ATS, visual optics, and the control consoles, the 

MPSS AVE is housed in the MM. The MM forward section (MMFS), -14 ft long, 

contains most of the mission-related AVE provided by GE (e.g., the star 

trackers, gimbal, tracking mirror mount, MMFS thermal control system, and 

associated equipment). The tracking mirror is provided by EK. The MM aft 

section (MMAS), -23 ft long, houses most of the EK optical equipment (see 

Figure E-1). 

E.2.1 Mission Control Section (GE AVE) 

Control of the MPSS dynamic elements is the responsibility of GE. The 

following functions will be performed: (1) establish vehicle/target location 

relationship; (2) establish vehicle attitude reference; (3) acquire targets; 

(4) provide two-degree-of-freedom motion to tracking mirror; (5) track targets 

with high precision; (6) provide commands to camera; (7) control tracking 

mirror bay thermal environment; (8) regulate and distribute electrical 

power to the mission payload; (9) provide mission payload command and control 

data handling. 

The major GE AVE subsystems comprising the MPSS mission control section are 

described below: 

a. Navigation and Control (N&C) Subsystem - The N&C subsystem 

generates the commands and provides the drives for pointing 

the primary optics tracking mirror (TM) and the ATS mirrors. 

The laboratory vehicle ACTS, supplied by DAC, maintains the 

vehicle within specified attitude and rate constraints. The 

ACTS also supplies attitude and rate reference to the computer 

as an aid in generating the MPSS pointing commands. 

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The N&C reference system includes two star trackers to 

provide precise orientation of the OV with respect to the 

celestial reference frame. The star-tracker information 

and the ACTS rate information are used in computing a fine 

attitude reference (FAR). An LGA measures drag effects, 

permitting on-board correction of the ground-predicted 

vehicle ephemeris. 

Residual image motion due to software and hardware 

limitations is nulled by a two-axis IVS in the primary optics 

tracking mirror loops. Both the ATS and primary optics 

tracking mirror loops must operate smoothly and precisely 

over the angular and rate ranges required. 

Rate and pointing corrections to the ATS and primary optics 

control loops may be accomplished by the flight crew. 

Computer learning via flight crew tracking is also provided 

for in the N&C subsystem. 

When the OV is not over the target areas, the tracking mirror 

is shielded by a door for thermal protection. 

Although the main optics tracking mirror drive mechanism 

provides line-of-sight coverage of +40 deg in roll and +30 deg 

in pitch, the mechanical stops and attitude control errors 

limit the smooth track and photographic capability to +37.5 deg 

in roll and +17 to -24 deg in pitch. 

b. Structures and Thermal Control Subsystem - This subsystem 

consists of mountings, bearings, and other hardware which 

comprise the gimbal structure to support and allow movement 

of the TM, and the environmental control necessary to assure 

proper functioning of the tracking system and to minimize 

TM distortion. The gimbal must provide: 

1. Support for the TM and assembly during launch. 

2. Housing for a control system capable of simultaneous pitch 

and roll motion. 

3. The necessary stiffness required to maintain a sufficient 

margin between the natural frequency of the control system 

ana the mounting structure. 

4. The capability of operating in a 1-g field while maintaining on-orbit alignment. 

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c. Acquisition and Tracking Scope (ATS) - The ATS enables man 

to improve the quantity and quality of reconnaissance 

data by minimizing the degrading effects of adverse conditions. 

Crew members, using the ATS, can minimize the effects of 

target-location error, ephemeris error, etc., by appraising 

targets for intelligence values, rejecting pre-programmed 

targets obscured by weather or considered less valuable than 

other observed targets, and driving the TM to more valuable 

alternate targets. Tne crew members can also enhance 

photographic quality by refining the automatic pointing. In 

addition, the crew can indirectly point and minimize the 

motion of the main optics by operating the ATS in the "slaved" 

mode. This feature would be utilized, typically in a 

contingency mode where both the visual optics and the IVS are 

inoperative. 

The ATS provides a maximum ground resolution of about 3.6 ft 

for detailed target study in a 0.5 deg field of view. The 

two ATSs operate independently and have a computer-driven 

servo system with an automatic pointing accuracy of eight 

arc-minutes. Two ATSs are provided to allow the crew members 

to inspect different areas simultaneously. The limits of the 

tracking angles are +70 to -30 deg in pitch and +45 deg in roll. 

d. Consoles and Displays Subsystem - The consoles and displays 

associated with the mission payload (MP) (see Figure E-1) are 

physically located in the LM pressurized compartment. They 

essentially provide the visual and mechanical man-machine 

links to allow the crew to identify, monitor, and control 

out-of-tolerance conditions in the MP. 

Crew stations are located in Bays 2 and 8 which contain display 

and operating panels for the visual optics, ATSs, cue displays, 

and magnification controls. Each crew station provides access 

to one ATS and to visual optics viewing through the primary 

telescope. 

e. Communications, Command, and Instrumentation Subsystem - The 

heart of the MP communications, command, and instrumentation 

subsystem is the MDAU which provides the interface for command 

and reaction between the MP and the laboratory vehicle data 

management subsystem. Two redundant MDAUs are wired with the 

two redundant ADCs in the laboratory vehicle data management 

subsystem to provide high reliability. 

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The MM telemetry system also monitors all the MPSS systems 

and provides this information to the LM telemetry equipment for 

recording or real-time transmission to the ground. 

f. Electrical Power and Signal Distribution Subsystem - This 

subsystem will: 

1. Receive unregulated nominal 28 vdc power from the LM 

central power system (CPS) and distribute this power to 

the GE AVE equipment and to the GE AVE/EK AVE power 

interface. 

2. Provide for current and voltage monitoring of the 

unregulated dc power received from the CPS across the 

LVSS/MPSS power interface. 

3. Provide for distribution of signals among the MPSS 

equipments and from the MPSS to the LVSS. 

E.2.2 Photographic Section 

E.2.2.1 Operational Characteristics 

The photographic section is comprised of optical, electrical, and structural 

components as required to acquire, from orbit, high-quality photographic 

reconnaissance pictures suitable for stereo viewing. The photographic section 

will provide a static lens-film resolution >11111ine-pairs/mm. This is 

consistent with resolution from 80 n mi, nadir target viewing, with 

scene illumination at 890 ft/lamberts, 2:1 target-to-background contrast at 

the entrance pupil, and using film similar to type 3404 but with an exposure 

index of 6.0. The photographic system will be capable of both northbound and 

southbound orbit-passage photography from altitudes of 70 to 230 n mi. It will 

be operable in the manned/automatic mode or in automatic mode. The option of 

visual observation at high magnification through the primary optical elements 

shall be available for the manned/automatic mode. 

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The baseline MOL photographic section consists of the primary optics with 

necessary support structure; provision for photo recording the imagery 

achieved; film processing and inspection apparatus; and necessary electronic, 

thermal, and mechanical devices and data channels for performance management. 

The photographic section will be supported by appropriate ground equipment 

for operations and preflight or postflight activities. 

E.2.2.2 Technical Description 

The primary optics consist basically of a reflecting Newtonian-type telescope 

modified with refracting correctors to a Ross telephoto configuration. 

A 70 in. diameter piano TM, servo-driven by the mission control section, 

determines the telescope field of view. High quality reconnaissance photographs 

can be achieved within the solid angle and control dynamics constraints of the 

mission control section equipment. Quality photographs can be obtained within 

the smaller solid angle within which effective tracking can be maintained. 

The camera, located in the LM for crew access and control ease, is of the 

frame type to facilitate crew usage of the imagery and to enable incorporation 

of additional control of the platen for across-the-format image motion 

compensation. Across-the-format IMC improves off-axis resolution which is 

otherwise limited by prespective changes during exposure intervals. The 

recorded image field is circular (9.4 in. dia) with reference marks and 

pertinent data recorded on a frame-by-frame basis within a superscribed 

square area of film. Film exposure control is provided by a focal plane 

shutter with six alternative slit-width steps under program selection. The 

maximum frame rate will be one primary frame/sec. 

In the manned/automatic configuration, adequate film for 15,000 frame 

exposures will be provided. This may consist entirely of a single primary film 

type or of not less than 12,000 frames of primary film and up to 3000 frames 

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of preselected secondary film types (color, special high-speed emulsions, 

etc.). Secondary film, when used, can be substituted by interrupting the 

primary film usage, introducing briefly a second platen under additional 

timing constraints. 

In the automatic configuration, enough primary-type film is provided for 

30,000 frames; there is no secondary-type film option. This configuration 

automatically transports the exposed film and loads to the DRVs for remotely 

controlled data return from orbit. 

In-flight processing equipment is provided for crew use in the manned 

configuration. This will permit on-board processing of limited samples of 

primary or appropriate secondary film footage. Viewer capabilities for 

inspection of processed samples are provided. 

The primary optics imagery can be inspected or used by the crew in an IMC 

loop. This option employs supplemental lenses which can present a view at 

one of four magnification steps to an eyepiece at either operator station. 

Each eyepiece has an apparent 40 deg field of view corresponding to an 

external scene field angle of 0.32 deg at lowest magnification and less at 

higher magnification. Five percent of the primary image energy is diverted to 

this capability (and/or to the alternative automatic IVS). 

Environmental control measures for required thermal stabiliziation of the COA 

during prelaunch, boost, and on-orbit phases are mandatory and provided. To 

supplement available passive measures, active control (zone to zone) is included, 

as well as operational disciplines to limit undesirable fluxes. 

Special measurement and controlled adjustment provisions integral to the photographic section correct, validate, and maintain critical optical and mechanical parameters for payload internal functions, or for external navigation and 

control referencing purposes. 

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APPENDIX F 

GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

F.1 TERMS 

Selected MOL words and terms are defined in this Appendix. Because these 

words and terms may have been used on other programs in different context 

and with different definitions, associate contractors and agencies responsible 

for the operational documents described in the MOL System Test and Operations 

Plan (Ref. 1) should use these terms as defined below. 

Abort Modes 

Mode A 

Mode B 

Mode A abort is employed from the 

launch pad through about 30 sec of 

flight, or an altitude of approximately 

10,000 ft. Mode A abort is implemented 

by terminating thrust on the launch 

vehicle, salvo-firing all six retrorocket motors to separate the Gemini B 

from the launch vehicle, and subsequently 

ejecting the crew from the spacecraft 

on the ejection seats. The crew will 

then descend on their personal parachutes to a land or surf landing. 

Mode B abort is employed from about 

10,000 ft altitude to a point during 

the ascent where a vehicle velocity of 

approximately 24,000 ft/sec is attained. 

A Mode 13 abort is implemented by terminating thrust on the launch vehicle, 

rideout to diminish dynamic pressure on 

the spacecraft if necessary, salvofiring six, four, or two retrorocket 

motors, as required, to separate the 

spacecraft from the launch vehicle and 

landing by use of the Gemini B parachute 

system. 

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Mode C Mode C abort is employed to provide 

recovery from an abort at high altitude 

and velocity. A Mode C abort is implemented by separating the Gemini B from 

the laboratory vehicle by use of the 

separation motors, turning the spacecraft to retrofire position, timing 

retrofire to achieve desired landing 

point, retrofiring, reentry, and water 

landing via the spacecraft parachute 

system. 

Mode D Mode D abort is employed to provide for: 

1. Attainment of "best possible orbit" 

in a late ascent phase abort case 

to permit partial attainment of 

primary mission objectives, and/or 

2. Attainment of sufficient orbital 

lifetime to assure crew recovery 

at a planned recovery area. 

This Mode will utilize the laboratory 

vehicle ACTS to provide a posigrade 

velocity increment to permit attaining 

orbital velocity. The Mode D abort 

regime shall begin at a point in the 

trajectory where the available AV from 

ACTS will permit attaining at least 

Item 2., above. 

Subsequent to achieving orbital velocity, 

normal separation of the Gemini B from 

the laboratory vehicle, retrograde, 

reentry, and water landing shall then be 

accomplished at the appropriate time. 

instrumentation and displays are provided to permit crew determination or 

required AV and to control the laboratory 

vehicle ACTS to apply the required 

velocity increment. 

Access Time .See "Recovery Times". 

Active Alternate (Target) See "Alternate Targets". 

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Acquisition and Tracking Scope 

Activity Indicators 

Air Force Satellite Control 

Facility (AFSCF) 

Provides the crew with a visual means 

of target selection through a separate 

optical system. A target sequence will 

be selected for viewing through the ATS 

which contains two paths: (1) One path 

will contain all the primary targets 

and some selected alternate and visual 

intelligence targets. (2) The second 

path will contain only alternate and 

visual intelligence targets. 

Certain observed target characteristics 

that are predefined and if found to be 

present through crew inspection, make 

that target of relatively high intelligence value. 

See "Satellite Test Center". 

General Systems Engineering/Technical 

Direction Contractor. Performs Glih/TD 

for the MOL SPO and the T-Ill SI'O. 

Consists of a worldwide net of seven 

operating locations plus the Satellite 

Test Center which provides telemetry, 

tracking, command and voice facilities 

for on-orbit control of satellites. 

See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

Any preselected, non-primary target 

which can be observed through an ATS 

and photographed by the primary optics. 

Alternate targets are selected by the 

ground-based mission planning software 

as a function of their geometrical 

relation to the primary optics path, 

expected value of mission enhancement, 

and specific User rehuirements. 

Alternate targets may be selected for 

viewing for several reasons, including 

(1) observation of activity, and (!) to 

find a clear target if the primary is 

obscured. 

Advanced Data Subsystem (ADS) 

Aerospace Corporation 

Air Force Western Test 

Range (AFWTE) 

Alternate Target 

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Active Alternate 

Weather Alternate 

Those alternates which have predefined 

activity indicators. 

Those targets which are observed by the 

flight crew and selected for photography only when weather conditions 

dictate a change of target to secure 

a visible target for photography. 

The primary difference in implementing 

active and weather alternates lies in 

the amount of scheduled dwell time 

allocated for viewing each target. In 

principal, alternates being viewed for 

weather require less recommended viewing time than alternates being viewed 

for activity. 

Ascent Phase See "Phase". 

Automatic Mode 

Automatic Subsystem Generated 

Command 

Payload operation is completely automatic, controlled by ground-generated 

commands and data. (Applicable to 

flights 6 and 7.) 

That command issued by an active control 

system to automatically change the 

function/state of a subsystem element. 

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Backup Command That command sent from the ground to 

the vehicle, via RF link, which is 

routed to and recognized only by the 

backup decoder (BUD). Backup commands 

may be executed immediately (similar to 

RTCs or at a later time (similar to 

SPCs). 

Basic Target Group See "Target Groups". 

Beta (a) Orbital solar incidence angle (deg). 

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Candidate Targets See "Processing Status". 

Category I, II, III Tests See "Test Programs". 

Combined Systems Test See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

Command Digital words which produce one or more 

instantaneous function/states in the 

vehicle. 

Communication Links/Lines/Relays See "MOL Facilities at VAFI3". 

Computer Data 

Computer-Generated Command 

Data sent from the ground to the 

vehicle via RF link, that are stored 

for use in the ADC. 

Command generated in the ADC from 

computer data. Computer-generated 

commands may be executed immediately 

(similar to RTCs) or at a later time 

(similar to SPCs). 

Comsat See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

Contingency See "Recovery Abort Modes". 

Contingency Unknown See "Flight Abort". 

Contributory Parameters See "Mission-Critical Telemetry". 

Contributory Telemetry See "Mission-Critical Telemetry". 

Countdown (Launch) A single function to encompass all 

countdown activities. The terms 

precount, midcount, readiness count, 

terminal countdown, V-minus count, etc., 

are not appropriate terminoloi7 for 

describing the MOD countdown. The last 

32 sec is to be called the "automatic 

sequence". The T-10 hold is only 

specified hold capability and does not 

divide the countdown. 

Countdown (Target) The devaluation of a target's priority 

to be photographed based on the fact 

that it has been previously photographed. 

Crew Retrieval Time (Recovery) See "Recovery Times". 

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Cue Visual stimulus for crew use in recognizing specified targets. 

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Data Subsystem See "Satellite Test Center". 

Dedicated Facilities 

Decision Times 

Degraded Mode 

DeltaPp) 

Those facilities assignea to a program 

for exclusive use for as long as 

required. These facilities cannot be 

withdrawn from their assigned use under 

any circumstances without the specific 

permission of the using program. 

Generated by the ground-based computer 

mission-planning software. At a given 

decision time, crew inputs are polled 

and, based upon on-board decision logic, 

a decision is made whether to interdict 

the primary optics path in favor of an 

alternate target. 

See "Flight Abort". 

initial perigee location (deg of lat). 

Deorbit and Reentry Begins with completion of the orbital 

phase and ends with Gemini i touchdown. 

Dwell Time The time allowed for viewing targets, 

recognition of target indicators, 

determination of weather conditions, or 

obtaining visual intelligence data. 

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Early Orbit 

Emergency 

Ephemeris Data 

Essential Parameters 

Essential Telemetry 

Eta (n) 

Event 

Expanded Communications 

Electronic Subsystem (EXCELS) 

See "Phase". 

See "Flight Abort". 

Computer data associated with the 

predicted ephemeris to be used by the 

ADC. 

See "Mission-Critical Telemetry". 

See "Mission-Critical Telemetry". 

Ground illumination sun angle (deg). 

A requirement for one or more necessary 

time-related function/states. 

A communications control system which 

gives the test controller direct and 

immediate control of all communications 

equipment assigned to him by the 

system control center. Extensive 

safeguards are incorporated to assure 

protection of sensitive data. 

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Field Test Force Director (FTFD) 

Flight 

The FTFD is the program contact point 

at the STC in all SCF operational 

matters pertaining to program support. 

He is responsible for certifying the 

readiness of all elements to support 

the program and accomplish all program 

objectives. 

That portion of an operations test 

where the flight vehicle is in a 

trajectory or orbital path. Flight 

begins with flight vehicle liftoff and 

concludes when all useful portions of 

the flight vehicle have returned to 

earth or are spaceborne but no longer 

capable of transmitting and/or being 

controlled. 

Flight Abort (resulting from Indicates premature termination of the 

contingencies) flight. The abort categories are: 

Emergency 

Immediate 

Precautionary 

Any event resulting in a system status 

which presents an immediate threat to 

the life or the well-being of the crew, 

and which requires: (1) immediate 

repressurization of the Gemini B; and 

(2) shirtsleeve bailout from the 

laboratory vehicle to the Gemini B. 

Any event resulting in a system status 

which presents an immediate threat to 

the life or well-being of the crew and 

which requires: (1) immediate donning 

of the PSA and umbilical attachment; 

and (2) pressurization of the suit. 

Any event resulting in a system status 

which presents a potential threat to 

the life or well-being of the crew and 

which requires immediate donning of the 

PSA without pressurization. 

Denotes that the target is clear and 

the predefined activity indicators are 

present. 

Flight Crew Computer Inputs 

Active 

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Inactive 

Override 

Reject 

Flight Director 

Denotes that the target is visible but 

that no activity indicators are present. 

Denotes the presence of unusually high 

intelligence value in a target which 

should be photographed. This input will 

cause the computer to commit the primary 

optics to that target at the decision 

time without considering other crew inputs for that decision time. 

Denotes clouds/weather, or other undesirable conditions which would prohibit 

satisfactory target photography. 

Senior AF Operations officer from the 

MOL SPO. He is responsible to the 

Mission Director for conduct of flight 

operations within the limits of his 

established authority. He makes all 

decisions affecting the manner in which 

the operation is conducted within this 

authority, and refers all other decisions 

to the Mission Director. He is responsible for meeting User requests and 

informing the User of mission progress. 

He is also responsible to see that all 

supporting agencies meet their program 

commitments. 

Flight Phase See "Phase". 

Flight Test Objectives 

Flight Test Rules 

A defined group of one or more sequences 

necessary to accomplish a flight test 

objective. The stated program objectives 

for each phase of an individual flight. 

They are further categorized as primary, 

secondary, or tertiary, and form part of 

the basis for the Ground Rules. 

The actual rules for nominal and contingency flight situations. These rules 

may be divided by test phase (prelaunch, 

launch, orbital recovery, and postflight 

evaluation) and further categorized by 

class (Class I: crew safety and primary 

mission objectives; Class Il: all other 

areas). 

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Flight Termination TBS 

Flight Vehicle The flight vehicle consists of the 

T-IIIM launch vehicle and the orbiting 

vehicle. 

Function/State The smallest controllable level of a 

subsystem element. 

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Gemini B 

General Systems Engineering 

A modified NASA Gemini with an access 

hatch in the heat shield for crew transfer, through a pressurized tunnel, to 

the laboratory vehicle. The crew will 

be in the Gemini B during reentry after 

separating from the laboratory vehicle. 

(See "Reentry Module".) 

That portion of systems engineering 

dealing with the overall integration 

of a system, design compromise among 

subsystems, definition of interfaces, 

analysis of subsystems, supervision of 

systems testing, all to the extent 

required to assure that system concepts 

and objectives are being met in an 

economical and timely manner. 

Greenwich mean Time See "Time" 

Ground Rules The general set of rules for overall 

planning of flight operations. These 

rules can apply to any phase of the 

operation and take into account all 

flight objectives as well as flight 

vehicle and ground-system constraints. 

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ha 

Initial apogee altitude (n mi). 

hp Initial perigee altitude (n mi). 

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Inclination angle (deg) 

Insertion Ship See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

Interdictable Primary Targets See "Primary Targets". 

Image Smear To be supplied. 

Immediate See "Flight Abort". 

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KA 

KB 

Term used in white documentation to 

identify Flights 3, 4, and 5. 

Term used in white documentation to 

identify Flights 6 and 7. 

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Laboratory Module The pressurized compartment in which 

the crew will operate during the 

on-orbit portion of the flight. 

Laboratory Vehicle Consists of the laboratory module and 

the mission module. 

Late Orbit Phase 

Launch Phase 

Launch Control Center (LCC) 

Launch Operations 

See "Phase". 

See "Phase". 

See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

General term encompassing all activities 

at VAFB associated with preparation for, 

and launch of, the MOL flight vehicle. 

Launch operations include: 

1. All LOPS activities. 

2. Facility construction, AGE and 

ground system/equipment installation 

and checkout, activation phase 

activities, etc. 

3. Support requirements and 

coordination (base, range, etc.). 

Listable Targets 

Loiter Phase 

Lompoc Air Force Station (LAPS) 

See "Processing Status". 

See "Phase". 

See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

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Malfunction, Slow 

Malfunction, Fast 

Mandatory Primary Targets 

Manned/Automatic Mode 

Manual Control Command 

Permits 6 sec or greater response time. 

Permits less than 6 sec response time. 

See "Primary Targets". 

Payload operation may be completely 

automatic, automatic with manual inputs, or completely manual. (Applicable 

to Flights 3, 4, and 5) 

That command operation performed by 

the flight crew. 

Mission This term is to be used only with 

reference to the objectives, operations, etc., associated with the 

photographic payload. 

Contributory Parameters 

(not requiring redundant 

paths) 

See "Phase". 

See "Satellite Test Center". 

That telemetry which must be sustained 

to allow mission payload operations to 

continue in the nondegraded mode, and 

that telemetry which is required to 

prevent a high risk to mission security. 

Mission-critical telemetry is further 

identified as being either essential or 

contributory. 

Parameters required for continued 

accomplishment of primary test 

objectives if problems occur. 

Examples are: 

1. Vehicle attitude (or subsystem 

status). 

2. Attitude control consumable status. 

3. Electrical power consumable status. 

4. Electrical power subsystem status 

(or bus voltage). 

Mission Phase 

Mission Control Complex/Center 

(MCC) 

Mission-Critical Telemetry 

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Contributory Telemetry 

5. Environmental control system and 

consumables status. 

6. Status of elements which are 

redundant and depend upon commands 

for switchover. 

Laboratory or mission payload events 

causing mission termination which would 

warrant immediate action to avoid risk 

to return of data previously acquired. 

Command verification of functions 

(sub-set addition to command verification parameters included in essential 

category). 

Mission payload and Gemini B telemetry 

data handling. 

Backup command verification (or 

authentication). 

Includes that data which provides 

major enhancement to the success of 

primary mission objectives. 

Mission-critical telemetry is further 

defined by the non-exclusive list of 

essential and contributory parameters. 

Essential Parameters Primary command subsystem authentication words (Comsec only). 

Verification of proper command 

reception (i.e., CLU and. computer 

block validity check verifications). 

Binary vehicle time code word (BVTCW). 

Verification of command functions 

mandatory to subsequent transmission 

of essential commands. 

Essential Telemetry Assumes that all subsystems other than 

telemetry are functioning in their 

nominal manner. Failure of essential 

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Mission Director 

Mission Module 

Mission Payload 

Mission Phase 

Mode A, B, C, or D Abort 

MOL Facilities at VAFB 

Air Force Western 

Test Range (AFWTR) 

telemetry prevents satisfactory 

completion of mission objectives. 

Telemetry implementation of essential 

parameters must preclude a single-point 

failure in acquisition and transmission 

of those data points to the ground. 

The MOL Program Deputy Director (or his 

representative) resident at the STC is 

responsible for any real time decisions 

necessary during the course of a flight. 

The Mission Director is also responsible for ultimate control of all test 

operations. 

Contains the systems, support systems, 

and ancillary equipment required by the 

experiments. 

The MOL photographic equipment. 

See "Phase". 

See "Recovery Abort Modes". 

The following facilities are physically 

located at VAFB. however, during 

specified periods of operation, control 

may be vested with the MOL Mission 

Director: 

This facility/agency will be used to 

support: ascent operations; tracking; 

communication links; telemetry reception; and Range safety. In performing 

these functions, AFWTR will utilize the 

Range Safety Office, the General Electric 

Radio Tracking System (GERTS), the 

TPQ-173 and FPS-16 radars, and the LAFSTM 

station. 

The communications satellite will serve 

as the communication link between the 

insertion ship and the STC. It will 

carry tracking, telemetry, and voice 

data. 

Communications Links/Lines/ 

Relays 

Comsat 

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Insertion Ship 

Launch Control Center (LCC) 

Lompoc Air Force Station 

(LAFS) 

Mobile Service Tower (MST) 

Operations Training and 

Evaluation Facility (OTEF) 

ktange Communications Center 

(ECCC, or HC3) (Bldg 05) 

Serves as the data processing and relay 

link for the information from the 

flight vehicle and the STC. It will 

also serve as a backup for the MCC 

functions should the communication link 

between the ship and the STC fail. A 

NASA T-AGM-19 class ship will serve the 

first four tests. 

The LCC shall provide the focal point 

for conducting FV checkout and prelaunch operations for monitoring the 

operation of the FV segments during 

launch. 

LAFS, located on a peak 4-3/4 miles 

ESE of Mt. Tranquillon, will serve as 

the telemetry receiving site for all 

data transmitted from the flight 

vehicle during the initial portion of 

the ascent phase. 

The MST provides the capability to 

erect the FV (by means of a bridge 

crane near the top of the tower) and 

support the servicing and checkout of 

the FV on the launch stand. 

This facility will contain the simulation equipment for all portions of the 

flight vehicle and for a remote tracking 

station. It will be used to train the 

flight crew and exercise the MCC. It 

will have the capability to simulate 

countdown, launch, ascent, orbital, 

reentry, and recovery operations. 

Tne HCCC is the physical interface 

building for all data and voice lines 

between AFWM and the STC or Vandenner/7 

Tracking Station. 

SLC-b Space Launch Comples No. u. (Replaces 

the MOL Launch Complex). 

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Technical Management Control 

Center (TMCC) 

Telemetry Data Center (TDC) 

All AFWTR data is processed and/or controlled through tne TMCC before being 

routed to the MCC. All forms of data 

can be selected, switched, sorted, 

reformatted, or reduced in the facility. 

MOL Insertion Ship See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

MOL Program Director 

MOL Program Deputy Director 

MOL SPO 

Monitor and Alarm Subsystem 

(MAS) Command 

The principal agent for the direction 

of the MOL program. he is responsible 

for establishment, management, and 

conduct of all aspects of the approved 

MOL program as assigned by the 

Secretary of the Air Force. 

Responsible for MOL system procurement, 

design, development test and evaluation, overall systems integration and 

general systems engineering and technical direction (GSE/TD). 

The MOL System Program Office is under 

the direct control of the MOL Deputy 

Director, and is responsible for overall MOL systems test operations including crew safety. the MOL SPO will 

direct and control all phases of mission 

control from the MCC. 

That command originating in the MAS that 

generates an alarm and causes changes in 

the function/state(s) of the affected 

subsystem. 

MST See "MOL Launch Facilities at VAFB". 

Multi-Ups See "Satellite Test Center". 

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Network Control Center See "Satellite Test Center". 

No Threat to Crew Safety See "Flight Abort". 

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Obscura The masking of a tracking station's 

tangential plane horizon by topography 

or man-made structures surrounding the 

station's site. 

Operations Training and Evaluation See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

Facility 

Orbital Phase See "Phase". 

Orbiting Vehicle The orbiting vehicle consists of the 

laboratory vehicle and the Gemini B 

spacecraft. 

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Pacific Missile Range (PMR) The ascent operations will utilize the 

following U.S. Navy facilities: 

Point Mugu - FPS-16 

San Nicolas Island - FPS-16, 

Telemetry Station. 

Pass That period of time during which the 

station is in contact with the orbiting 

vehicle. 

Plan A plan may be considered the summation 

of operations profiles and may be 

written for the entire operation or 

for some particular phase (e.g., a 

Flight Plan would include all sequences 

from liftoff through laboratory vehicle 

disposal, while Pass Plan would include 

only the activity accompanying an OV 

contact with an RTS. 

Phase 

Prelaunch 

Launch 

Ascent 

Early Orbit 

The period from arrival of AVE at VAFB 

to start of countdown. This phase includes assembly of the FV at the launch 

pad where checkout and countdown will 

be conducted. 

The period from start of countdown 

(approximately 590 min to liftoff) to 

FV liftoff (exclusive). 

The period from FV liftoff (inclusive) 

to initiation of the T-IIIM/OV severance ordnance (exclusive) (approximately 

1, +500 .sec) except as extended to 

include those T-IIIM functions necessary to support the staging, operation. 

For the manned/automatic moue, the early 

orbit phase covers the period from initiation (inclusive) the the T-II1M/OV 

severance ordnance to the closing of 

the laboratory vehicle tunnel hatch (inclusive) by the second crewman following 

transfer from the Gemini B. 

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Orbit 

Late Orbit 

Loiter 

Reentry 

This phase is not applicable to the 

automatic mode. 

For the manned/automatic mode, this 

phase begins with closure of the laboratory vehicle tunnel hatch (exclusive) 

by the second crewman following initial 

transfer from the Gemini B and concludes 

upon opening the laboratory vehicle 

tunnel hatch (exclusive) for final 

transfer of the first crewman to 

Gemini IS. 

For the automatic mode, this phase 

covers the period from initiation 

(inclusive) of the T-iiiM/OV severance 

ordnance to completion of mission 

operations and including BEV deorbit, 

reentry, and retrieval operations. 

For the manned/automatic mode, this 

phase covers the period from the 

opening of the laboratory vehicle 

tunnel hatch (inclusive) for final 

transfer of the first crewman to 

Gemini B to initiation of severance 

of the Gemini B from the laboratory 

vehicle (exclusive). 

This phase does not apply to the 

automatic mode. 

For the manned/automatic mode, this 

phase covers the period from initiation 

.of autonomous operation of the Gemini b 

LCS or electrical system through 

severance of the equipment section of 

the Gemini B adapter. 

This phase does not apply to the 

automatic mode. 

For the manned/automatic mode, this 

phase covers the period from initiation 

of severance of the Gemini 13 from the 

laboratory vehicle (inclusive) to 

Gemini is HEM splashdown (inclusive). 

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Retrieval 

Flight 

Mission 

Post-Pass 

This phase includes retrofire, reentry, 

parachute deployment, REM touchdown, 

and the detached portions of the loiter 

phase. 

For the automatic moue, DRV deorbit and 

reentry is considered part of the orbit 

phase. 

For the manned/automatic moue, this 

phase starts with the Gemini b REM 

splashdown and ends when the crew, data, 

and REM are retrieved and delivered to 

predetermined locations for initiation 

of postflight analyses. Retrieval includes location of the REM, and physical 

recovery of the REM, crew, mission data, 

and initial medical examination and initial debriefing of the crew. 

For the automatic mode, DRV retrieval 

is considered part of the orbit phase. 

For the manned/automatic mode, the 

flight phase is comprised of ascent, 

early orbit, orbit, late orbit, Gemini 

R reentry, and the controlled disposal 

of the laboratory vehicle. Although 

accomplished within the time span of 

the flight phase, retrieval is not considered a part of the flight phase and 

is treated as a separate phase. 

For the automatic mode, the flight phase 

is comprised of ascent, orbit (includes 

DRV deorbit, reentry, and retrieval 

operations), and controlled disposal of 

the OV. 

That part of the orbit phase which 

concerns objectives and operations 

associated with the mission module 

experiments. 

The time period which begins with the 

normal loss of signal from the orbiting, 

vehicle and continues until the next 

acquisition of the UV. 

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Precautionary See "Flight Abort". 

Preference A set of lb different software-generated 

(Voting Logic) numbers for each target which relate 

the relative value of the target as a 

function of crew inputs. 

Prelaunch Phase See "Phase". 

Pre-Pass 

Candidate Targets 

Programmed Targets 

Profile 

That period of time before acquisition 

of the orbiting vehicle during which the 

station receives direction from the MCC 

as to equipment configuration, commands 

to be sent, telemetry modes to be used, 

and acquisition data for support of the 

orbiting vehicle pass. 

Targets supplied by the SOC for 

inclusion for processing by the grouna 

software. 

When the ground software processes the 

listable targets, it eliminates 

selected targets based upon geometrical 

and system constraints as a function of 

the orbit. The remaining targets are 

candidate targets for a given revolution. 

Targets which the ground software has 

selected and commanded the orbiting 

vehicle to photograph and/or view. 

A time-ordered plan which shows 

sequences in the order of occurrence. 

Profiles are drawn for some particular 

phase of activity. The level of detail 

will usually be a function of the time 

span or the activity chosen (e.t•:., a 

station contact profile could be made 

showing only tne station or OV activities 

during liTS contacts). Time is not 

accurately portrayed. 

Processing Status 

Listable Targets 

Programmed Targets See "Processing Status". 

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Project Engineering Office 

(SSONE) 

Primary Targets 

That element of the AFSCF which 

evaluates all program requirements 

levied on the network. The primary 

function is to formulate network 

support plans to meet program 

requirements. 

Those targets for which the primary 

optics path is programmed. There are 

two distinct subclasses of primary 

targets: 

Interdictable Primary Targets There are two distinct types of interdictable primary targets: 

Real Interdictable Primary TargetsActual targets which lie on the primary 

optics path and can be interdicted by 

the ADC based upon flight crew inputs. 

Pseudo-Interdictable Primary TargetsAiming points chosen by the ground 

software to maintain control over the 

primary optics path. These pseudo 

targets will be selected when controlling the primary optics path (without 

loss of primary targets) to access more 

desirable alternates. 

Mandatory Primary Targets 

Primary Target Path 

Those targets of unusually high technical intelligence value which, upon User 

request, will be photographed under any 

circumstances. Photography of mandatory targets should not be interdicted 

by the ADC/flight crew. 

Generated by ground-based mission planning software, using a strategy which 

considers: 

1. User requirements expressed as 

priorities and weighting factors. 

OV operational status and 

capabilities. 

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3. Specific intelligence requirements, 

including desired or stereo mono 

modes, exposures, category allocations, and other User inputs. 

4. Meteorological conditions in the 

area of interest. 

Primary Test Objectives Accomplishment of these objectives is 

considered mandatory. 

Pseudo-Interdictable Primary See "Primary Targets". 

Targets 

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q Satellite repetition parameter (revs 

per sidereal day). 

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Range Communications Control 

Center (RCCC) 

Readiness Days 

(R -minus days) 

Real Interdictable Primary Targets 

Real Time Command (RTC) 

Recovery 

Recovery Director 

Recovery Times 

Access Time 

Crew Retrieval Time 

Spacecraft Retrieval Time 

Reentry Module (REM) 

Reentry Phase 

See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

Begin with receipt of AVE at SLC-6. 

Identified in numerically descending 

order, with R-0 the launch day. 

See "Primary Targets". 

That command sent from the ground to 

the vehicle, via RF link, that is processed immediately by an on-board 

decoder. 

This phase begins with touchdown, and 

ends when the flight crew, data, and 

Gemini B have been recovered and 

returned to the desired locations. 

A representative of the DOD Manager for 

Manned Spaceflight Support Operations 

(DDMS), located at the STC, who is 

responsible for all recovery activities. 

The maximum elapsed time (under favorable operating conditions) from establishment of the approximate spacecraft 

landing position until emergency medical 

care is available to the flight crew and 

the flotation collar has been attached 

to the spacecraft. 

The maximum elapsed time (under favorable operating conditions) from establishment of the approximate spacecraft 

landing position until retrieval (on 

board) of the flight crew and data. 

The maximum elapsed time (under favorable operating conditions) from establishment of the approximate spacecraft 

landing position until retrieval (on 

board) of the spacecraft. 

The Gemini B minus the adapter. 

See "Phase". 

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Rehearsal A complete simulated operation exercise 

which can last from one sec to three 

days. All events occur according to 

the flight profile except that anomalies 

might be inserted by a rehearsal committee at the STC. 

Dress Rehearsal TBS 

Rehearsal Committee TBS 

Remote Tracking Station (RTS) See "Satellite Test Center". 

Retrieval Phase See "Phase". 

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Satellite Test Center (STC) 

Advanced Data System 

(ADS) 

Data Subsystem 

Mission Control 

Complex (MCC) 

Located at Sunnyvale, California. It 

exercises operational control of all 

operating locations and other support 

facilities, as required by the various 

programs. The STC consists of the 

following: 

The ADS is comprised of control and 

display equipments in each MCC, the 

SCC, fail-safe data handling subsystems 

at each tracking station, and a central, 

fail-safe, data processing facility at 

the. STC. Each of the control and display equipments is connected to the STC 

data processing facility which, in turn, 

is connected to each tracking station 

data handling subsystem via digital communications equipments (EXCELS). The 

effect is to provide a real-time digital 

data telemetry, tracking, command, and 

voice (TTCV) path between any given MCC 

and a vehicle via the ADS and the tracking station RF and analog equipments 

with which it interfaces. 

In addition to the MCC/vehicle data path, 

the ADS provides a link from each MCC 

and the SCC to each CDC 3600 System II 

computer subsystem to enable the type 

of computation typically performed in 

those computers in support of MCC/SCC 

operations to be controlled directly 

from the respective MCC/SCC. 

The AFSCF digital data processing and 

display capability, which consists of 

the ADS and the System II computers. 

'The complex consists of a suite of rooms 

assigned to a program to provide an 

operational control center for the 

Mission Director. Facilities are provided, as required, for data display, 

mission analysis, and technical assistance by the various program contractors/ 

subcontractors. 

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Mission Control Room 

(MCR) 

Multi-Ops 

Network Control Center 

(NCC) 

Remote Tracking Stations 

(HT'S) 

The "front room" of the MCC from which 

operational control is maintained. It 

is manned by the Flight Director, FTFD, 

test controllers, etc. 

An office supporting the AFSCF Network 

Director which flags program requirement conflicts. 

This center monitors the operational 

readiness of all subsystems and assigns 

resources in consonance with the 

schedules established by multi-ops at 

the STC. 

Operational sites which serve as the 

direct line between the STC and the 

orbiting vehicle for tracking, telemetry, 

command, and voice functions. 

System 304 TBS 

System Il Computers Five CDC-3600 computers with a o5k 

core each. 

Secondary Test Objectives Accomplishment of these objectives will 

provide substantive information to validate decisions affecting the future of 

the military space program. These 

objectives may not interface with 

accomplishment of primary objectives. 

Sequence A defined group of events. 

Sequential Strategy The sequential strategy for target 

selection assumes that a primary- optics 

path has been selected in an optimum 

manner by the ground software. In 

particular the primary optics path will 

be selected based on an algorithm which 

utilizes a maximum weiv,ht concept derived through target priorities (this 

path will be selected as in the unmanned 

systems). The crew members will view 

alternate targets as they become avail -

able for inspection and upon identification of activity the primary optics path 

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will be interdicted and the active 

alternate photographed. 

See "Recovery Times". 

The SGLS provides track, telemetry, 

voice, and command on a single antenna. 

The one uplink and two downlink facilities are provided for precision tracking, 

command, voice, FM/FM data, and both 

high bit rate (to 1 Mbit) and low bit 

rate (to 265 Kbits) PCM data. 

See "Target Groups". 

Computer data associated with the stars 

to be tracked by the on-board star 

trackers for altitude determination 

purposes. 

An extensive test of any given station 

or operating location conducted by the 

test controller at the STC to assure 

that all applicable elements from the 

sensor to the MCC can accomplish the 

required operational actions. 

That command sent from the ground to 

the vehicle, via RF link, that is 

stored in the ADC for subsequent execution. 

See "Time". 

See "Satellite Test Center". 

See "Satellite Test Center". 

The role of assisting in some phase of 

the MOL Operations Test. In general, 

the phases supported may be classed 

as prelaunch, launch, ascent, flight, 

reentry, and recovery. 

Spacecraft Retrieval Time 

Space-Ground Link 

Subsystem (SGLS) 

Special Target Group 

Star Data 

Station Exercises 

Stored Program Command (SPC) 

System Time 

System 304 

System II Computers 

Support 

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Target Classes 

Target Data 

Target Groups 

Basic Target Group 

Special 'Target Group 

Independent of categorization of targets 

by processing, there are three distinct 

classes of targets: Primary Targets, 

Alternate Targets, and Visual Intelligence Targets. 

Computer data associated with the targets to be viewed and/or photographed 

during payload operations. 

In general, targets are selected between 

ground software in groups for processing 

by the on-board crew. Each group of 

targets is scheduled to be viewed until 

a given decision time, at which point 

the computer selects the target to be 

photographed, based upon flight crew 

inputs. There are two types of target 

groups: 

A group of targets which includes a 

primary target. 

A group of alternate targets between 

basic target groups which does not 

contain the primary target. Within 

this group, interdiction of the primary 

path will occur only for an active 

alternate. 

TARS 

TARS Rate 1, 2, 3 

TARS Hate 4, 5 

TARS Rate 

Pitch Rates required to approximate a 

zero-lift condition through the high 

q region. 

These Pitch Rates provide maximum payload 

capability and still satisry the anrlf• or 

attack constraint at. ;;I04 stav,inr.. 

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Technical Advisor 

Technical Direction 

Technical Management 

Control Center (TMCC) 

Telemetry Data Center (TDC) 

Teleprinter Data 

Tertiary Test Objectives 

Test Program 

Category I Tests 

Category II Tests 

The senior Aerospace Corporation representative who provides a staff 

advisory function to the Flight Director. 

That process by which a contractor's 

work is reviewed, information on 

problems and progress is exchanged, 

plans for future work are discussed, 

and, where it will better achieve Air 

Force objectives, the contractor's 

technical effort is modified, realigned, 

or redirected. 

See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

See "MOL Facilities at VAFB". 

Data sent from the ground which may be 

relayed immediately to the flight crew 

on the teleprinter, or buffered in the 

computer for delayed teleprinter output. 

These objectives will provide valuable 

information pertaining to general military and scientific space technology 

and are to be accomplished only on the 

basis of non-interference with primary 

and secondary test objectives. 

MOL computer programs (with the execption of BIGS, GIGS, and CAGE) shall be 

tested at the following three levels: 

Conducted during design and development 

phases to verify the performance of 

computer program CEls. "Conditional 

acceptance" may be used at FACI to 

accept a CEI contingent on performance 

in tests which must be performed at the 

Category II or III level. 

Conducted during the system integration 

phase for verification of interface and 

subsystem performance. The tests may 

be conducted at contractor facilities, 

if feasible, or at appropriate USAF 

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Category III Tests 

Time 

Greenwich Mean Time 

(GMT) 

System Time 

Vehicle Time 

Timelines 

facilities, including the actual operational system sites. The test environment, when viewed from the standpoint 

of the software under test, shall depict 

the operational environment. 

Total integrated system tests and 

rehearsals conducted prior to operational use. These exercises involve 

both space and ground hardware, software, 

and personnel. They are executed at 

operational sites in an environment which 

is essentially identical to the operational environment. These activities 

are conducted by or on behalf of the MOL 

SPO and one purpose of the exercise is 

evaluation and final certification of 

the system. 

Used for correlation of data and 

activities, and is measured by three 

distinct and related systems during test 

operations. Correlation of these three 

time systems is maintained on the ground 

by the computer system. 

The mean time of the meridian of Greenwich, England used as the prime basis of 

standard time throughout the world. Displayed at the MCC in'hrs, min and sec. 

GMT converted to total sec, and varies 

from zero to 86,400 sec. 

Determined by a clock on board the 

laboratory vehicle with a time resolution of 1 msec and a capacity of 49 

days, 17 hr. 

Time-ordered sequences used as an 

engineering tool for design and development, and as an input to the Flight Plan. 

Timelines may be drawn for the entire 

test or for some particular phase. Time 

accuracy and resolution are necessary 

considerations in the development or 

timelines. 

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Titan IIIM 

Tn 

The Titan HIM (T-IIIM) consists of the 

Stage 0 rocket motors (SRMs), the 

Stage I liquid propulsion system, and 

the Stage II liquid propulsion system. 

Nodal period (minutes) 

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Validation Exercises Those activities required to assure that 

the implementation of a modification or 

new design of either hardware or software has met the objectives of the 

applicable specifications. 

Vehicle Time See "Time". 

Visual Intelligence Targets 

Voting Strategy 

Those targets preselected for flight 

crew inspection and oral comments, only, 

but not for photography. Generally, 

these types of targets will be selected 

for one of the following reasons: 

1. When associated with a mandatory 

primary. 

2. When the confirmation of the presence or absence of something in the 

target area, or a verbal description 

of the target area, satisfies intelligence requirements. 

3. When vehicle constraints prevent 

actual photography of the target, 

or the penalty associated with 

photography is unacceptable. 

The voting strategy utilizes the same 

preplanned primary optics path. However associated with each primary target, 

groups of alternates are identified for 

viewing. The crew members view these 

alternate targets and evaluate them for 

activity and at some predetermined 

decision time a decision is made, based 

upon the crew inputs, whether to interdict the primary optics path in favor 

of an alternate. 

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W/CDA Vehicle drag factor (lb/sq ft) 

Weather Alternate See "Alternate Targets". 

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F.2 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

The following definitions of abbreviations and acronyms are applicable to the 

MOL program as a whole, not just to this FTOP, and are included for informational purposes only. 

A to D analog to digital (conversion) 

AAE aerospace ancillary equipment 

AAP Apollo Applications Program (NASA) 

AAS azimuth alignment set (short or long range) 

ABRES Advanced Ballistic Re-Entry Systems (program) 

AC Aerospace Corporation 

AC&SS attitude control and stabilization system 

ACE attitude control electronics (Gemini B) 

 acceptance checkout equipment 

ACED AC Electronic Division of General Motors 

ACEG attitude control electronics group (Gemini B) 

ACIC Aeronautical Chart and Information Center 

ACPU auxiliary computer power unit (Gemini B) 

ACS attitude control system (Gemini B) 

ACTS attitude control and translation system 

ACTS/Prop attitude control and translation system/propulsion 

(subsystem) 

ACTS/SCE attitude control and translation system/ 

stabilization and control electronics 

(subsystem) 

AD ascent director 

ADA allocation data annex 

ADC airborne digital computer 

ADCAS airborne digital computer adapter simulator 

ADG attitude display group (Gemini B) 

ADS advanced data system 

.AFDC Arnold Engineering Development Center (AFSC) 

AERL Avco-Everett Research Laboratories 

AES Apollo Extension System (NASA) 

AF audio frequency 

AFAL Air Force Avionics Laboratory 

AFAMD Air Force Aeromedical Division 

AFAMRL Air Force Aeromedical Research Laboratory 

AFAPL Air Force Aero-Propulsion Laboratory 

AFARL Air Force Aerospace Research Laboratories 

AFAT Air Force acceptance team 

AFC automatic frequency control 

AFCPL Air Force Computer Program Library 

AFCRL Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories 

AFD assistant flight director 

V-43 

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AFD/CO assistant flight director for crew operation 

AFD/FP assistant flight director for flight planning 

AFD/RRP assistant flight director for reentry and recovery 

planning 

AFD/VA assistant flight director for vehicle analysis 

AFETR Air Force Eastern Test Range (NRD) 

AFFDL Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory 

AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center (AFSC) 

AFGWC Air Force Global Weather Central 

AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology 

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command (formerly AMC) 

AFMDC Air Force Missile Development Center (AFSC) 

(also called WSMR) 

AFML Air Force Materials Laboratory 

AFO Air Force Objective 

AFOTOP Air Force Objective and Technical Operating Plan 

AFPR Air Force Plant Representative 

AFPRO Air Force Plant Representative Office 

AFRPL Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory 

AFRTD Air Force Research and Technology Division 

AFSC Air Force Systems Command 

AFSCF Air Force Satellite Control Facility (formerly SCF) 

AFSCM Air Force Systems Command Manual 

AFWTR Air Force Western Test Range (NRD) 

AFWTW Air Force Western Test Range Staff Meteorologist 

Office 

AGAVE automatic gimballed antenna vectoring equipment 

AGC Aerojet-General Corporation 

 automatic gain control 

AGE aerospace ground equipment 

ALGOL algorithmic language 

AM auxiliary memory 

AMD . Aerospace Medical Division (AFSC) 

AML Aeromedical Laboratory (Wright-Patterson AFB) 

AMRL Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory 

AMU astronaut maneuvering unit 

 auxiliary memory unit (computer) 

A/N alphanumeric 

AOES advanced orbital/ephemeris subsystem 

AOS acquisition of signal 

APGC Air Proving Ground Center (AFSC) 

APL Applied Physics Laboratory (Johns Hopkins Univ.) 

,APU auxiliary power unit 

ARC Ames Research Center (NASA) 

A/RIA Apollo/Range instrumented aircraft 

ARIS Advanced Range Instrumentation Ship (also, see ORV) 

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency (DDR&E) 

F-44 

D-SS-RET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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ARPS Aerospace Research Pilot School 

ARKS Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (USAF) 

ARS Air Rescue Service (Military Airlift Command) 

 auxiliary reference system (comprised of LASS 

+ CAD + TARS) 

ARSS atmosphere and reactants supply subsystem 

ARSSG atmosphere and reactants supply subsystem group 

ARWG ascent/reentry working group 

ASABOR ascent abort touchdown prediction task 

ASCD Aerospace (Corporation) Satellite Control 

Directorate 

ASCO Aerospace (Corporation) Satellite Control Office 

ASCOP Princeton Division of Electromechanical Research 

ASD Aeronautical Systems Division (AFSC) (formerly 

WADC/WADD) 

ASTC Advanced Satellite Test Center 

ASTEC advanced solar turbo-electric concept 

ASTEG all-systems test equipment group 

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 

ATC Air Training Command 

ATM auxiliary tape memory (Gemini B) 

ATP authority to proceed 

 acceptance test procedures 

ATS acquisition and tracking scope 

ATW Aerospace Test Wing (USAF) 

AVE aerospace vehicle equipment 

AWG activation working group 

AWN automated weather network (USAF) 

AWS Air Weather Service 

BECO booster engine cutoff 

BEF blunt end forward 

BIGS booster inertial guidance system 

bit binary digit 

BLC boundary layer control 

BMAG body-mounted attitude gyro 

BOD beneficial occupancy date 

BOSU bioastronautics operational support unit 

BPFR Bioastronautics Post-Flight Report 

BPG basic pressure garments 

bps bits per second 

BSD Ballistic Systems Division (AFSC) (obs., see SAMSO) 

BUD backup decoder 

BVTCW binary vehicle time code word 

CAB Civil Aeronautics Board 

CAD controls - analog to digital 

1.' - 4 5 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

CAGE computer AGE 

CAT constraint analysis tool 

C&C command and control 

CC crew communicator 

CCB Configuration Control Board 

CCBD Configuration Control Board Directive 

CCM counter-countermeasures 

 constant current modulation 

 controlled carrier modulation 

CCTV closed circuit television 

CDC Control Data Corporation 

CDP central data processor 

 contract definition phase 

CDR critical design review 

CDRL Contract Data Requirement List (DD Form 1423) 

CDRS computer data reduction system 

 computer data recording system (Gemini B) 

CDU command distribution unit 

CDU-MO Conductron-Missouri (Co.) 

CDW computer data words 

CEI contract end item 

CFE contractor furnished equipment 

CIMC central inventory and management control 

CIMU complete instrumentation mock-up 

CIF central information processor 

CITE computer-integrated test equipment 

CKAFS Cape Kennedy Air Force Station (Patrick AFB) 

CLE command logic equipment 

CLS command logic subsystem 

CLU command logic unit 

CM continuous monitor 

CMA contractors' maintenance area 

CMC configuration management control 

CMD Contract Management District 

CMG control moment gyro 

 controls monitor group 

CMP configuration management plan 

CMU controls mock-up unit 

C/O checkout 

COBOL common business oriented languate 

COD carrier on deck 

COMPOOL communications pool 

comsat communications satellite 

COMSEC communications security 

CONUS Continental United States 

CP control point 

CPAC computer program associate contractor 

F-46 

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CPCEI computer program contract end item 

CPDC Computer Program Development Center (SDC) 

CPIC computer program integration contractor 

CPIF cost plus incentive fee (contract) 

CPS core propulsion system 

 central power system 

 computer program system 

cps cycles per second (see Hz) 

CRD contractor responsibilities document 

CRL(AFCRL) Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories 

CRT cathode ray tube 

CSA contractor support area 

CSC computer subsystem controller 

CST combined systems test 

CSTSS combined systems test simulator set 

CTF Commander Task Force (Navy) 

CTF 130 Commander Task Force, Pacific 

CTF 140 Commander Task Force, Atlantic 

CVCT current vehicle command table 

CW clockwise 

D/A digital to analog 

DA&P data acquisition and processing 

DAC Douglas Aircraft Company 

DACON digital-to-analog converter (see D/A) 

 data controller 

D&C display and control 

D&F disposition and funding 

DAG Division Advisory Group (SAMSO) 

DAS data acquisition system 

DASP Data Acquisition and Support Plan (see PSP) 

dbm decibels relative to 1 milliwatt 

DCPT dynamic crew procedures trainer 

DCS digital command system 

DCSG data computation subsystem group 

DCU digital computer unit 

DDMS DOD Manager for Manned Space Flight Support 

Operations 

DDMS-W DDMS Assistant for Meteorology 

DDPU digital data processing unit 

DDR&E DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering 

DEI development engineering inspection 

AT vehicle-ground time difference 

AV increment of velocity 

DF direction finder 

 development flight 

DFTP development flight test plan 

F-47 

SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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DKU display-keyboard units 

DOD, DoD Department of Defense 

DPL data processing laboratory 

 dual propellant loading 

DQS Douglas quality specifications 

DRC data return container 

DRD data requirements document 

DRS data recording set 

DRV data recovery vehicle 

DRULS downrange up-links 

DSB double sideband 

DSMP data system management plan 

DSU data storage unit 

DTO detailed test objectives 

DTS data transmission system 

 developmental test series 

DTU digital telemetry unit 

DTV development test vehicle 

DVM digital voltmeter 

E&A engineering and analysis 

EAFB Fdwards Air Force Base (AFFTC) 

EAT environmental acceptance test 

ECA electronic control assembly 

ECG, EKG electrocardiogram 

EC/LS environmental control and life support system 

ECP engineering change proposal 

ECS electrical control system 

 environmental control system 

ECU environmental control unit 

EDCTU electronic development component test unit 

EDP electronic data processing 

 engineering development phase 

EDS engineering development simulator 

EED electro-explosive device 

EEG electroencephalogram 

EEI electrical-electronic interference 

EET event elapsed time 

EFC equipment functional check (Gemini B) 

EFT early flight test 

 environmental flight test 

EFRC Edwards Flight Research Center (NASA) 

EIS experimental information system 

EK Eastman Kodak Company 

BL&S engineering laboratories and services 

EMC electromagnetic compatibility (test) 

EMI electromagnetic interference 

F-48 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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EMISM electromagnetic interface safety margin 

EMS experiment management system 

ENV natural aerospace environment 

EOB engineering and operations building 

EOS emergency oxygen system (Gemini B) 

EPS electrical power subsystem 

ERN engineering reference number 

ES electron spectrometer 

ESD Electronic Systems Division (AFSC) 

ESDE electromagnetic signal detection equipment 

ESTU electronic system test unit 

ETA estimated time of acquisition 

 estimated time of arrival 

ETAC environmental technical applications center 

(USAF AWS) 

ETD engineering test directive 

 estimated time of departure 

ETR Eastern Test Range (formerly AMR) (NRD) 

ETT estimated time to track 

EV extravehicular 

EVA extravehicular activity 

EVTS electrical verification test set 

EVVA extravehicular visor assembly 

EWR early warning radar 

EXCELS expanded communications electronic system 

FACE factory automatic checkout equipment 

FACT first article configuration inspection 

FAR fine attitude reference 

FARR failure and rejection report 

FAT fabrication acceptance test 

FCC flight controls computer 

FCEI facility contract end item 

FCR facility change request 

 facilities capability review 

FCS flight control system 

FCSTS flight control system test set 

FD frequency density 

 flight director 

FDI flight director indicator 

FECP facility engineering change proposal 

FEI firing error indicator 

FHA fuel holding area 

FIC frequency interference control 

FIR far infrared 

FIS facility interface specification 

FJ frequency jump 

F - 49 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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FLSC flexible linear-shaped charge (Gemini B) 

FM, F/M frequency modulation 

FME failure modes and effects 

FOCUS flight operations control and utilization system 

FOPG flight operations and planning group 

FOPS flight operations planning and scheduling 

FORTRAN formula translation 

FPE flight planning and evaluation 

FPL fluctuating pressure level 

FPS flight planning software 

JANAF designation for a fixed installation, 

detection, and ranging radar 

FR failure rate 

 frame rate 

FRC Flight Research Center (see EFRC) 

FRD flight readiness firing 

FRT flight readiness test 

FS field service 

 flight surgeon 

 full scale 

FSE factory support equipment 

 field support equipment 

FSK frequency shift keying 

FSS flight support system 

FST flight support tape 

FT flight termination 

FTC Flight Test Center (AFSC) 

FTD feasibility test demonstration 

 flight test directive 

FTE factory test equipment 

FTFD field test force director (STC) 

?POP Flight Test and Operations Plan 

?TS flight termination system 

FTV flight test vehicle 

FTWG flight test working group 

FV flight vehicle 

FVTL flight vehicle timeline 

FVTLWG flight vehicle timeline working group 

FWG facilities working group 

g gravity 

G-B Gemini B 

G/BMS Gemini B mission simulator (MOL) 

GBPS Gemini B procedures simulator 

GBPT Gemini B procedures trainer 

GBQ Gemini B qualification 

GBRRD Gemini B Recovery Requirements Document 

F - 50 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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Gc gigacycle (109) 

GCHAP an STC orbit adjust program 

GHz gigaHertz (same as gigacycle) 

G&C guidance and control (equipment or system) 

GE General Electric Company 

GEEIA Ground Electronics Engineering Installation 

Agency (AFLC) 

GEMSIP Gemini stability improvement program 

GE-MSVD General Electric-Missile and Space Vehicle 

Department 

GERTS General Electric radio tracking system 

GET ground elapsed time 

GETS ground equipment test set 

GFAE government-furnished aerospace equipment 

 government-furnished airborne equipment 

GFE government-furnished equipment 

GFP government-furnished property 

GG gas generator 

GCI guidance comparator indicator (Gemini B) 

GGA gas generator assembly 

GGTP General Ground Test Plan 

G-He, -02, -N2 gaseous helium, oxygen, nitrogen 

GIA guidance interface adapter (Gemini B) 

GIE government-installed equipment 

 ground instrumentation equipment 

GIGS Gemini inertial guidance system 

GMT Greenwich mean time 

GSCG ground systems coordination group 

GSE general systems engineering 

 ground support equipment (obs., see AGE) 

GSE/TD general systems engineering/technical direction 

GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA) 

GTS Guam tracking station 

GWC Global Weather Central (USAF) 

HAFB Holloman Air Force Base (AFMDC) 

H&T handling and transportation 

H&TE handling and transportation equipment 

HAT hardware acceptance team 

 hardware acceptance test 

HCP hard-copy printers (computer) 

HE human engineering 

HF, hf high frequency 

HFDF high-frequency direction finder 

HHMU hand-held maneuvering unit 

HIT (McDonnell) hypervelocity impulse tunnel 

HIVOS high-vacuum orbital simulator 

F.- 5 1 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

HSD high-speed data 

HSQ heat shield qualification (test) 

HST heat shield test 

HTS Hawaii tracking station 

Hz Hertz (same as cps) 

IADPC Inter-Agency Data Processing Committee 

IAP integrated activation plan 

IBM International Business Machines Corporation 

ICD interface control drawing (or, document) 

1CM interface control meeting (SPO-controlled) 

ICN interface control notice 

ICNP interface change notice proposal 

ICP inspection control point 

ICS inspection control station 

 integrated command system 

 interface control specification 

 interpretive computer simulation 

ICW, icw interrupted continuous wave 

ICWG interface control working group 

IDA Institute for Defense Analysis (DDR&E) 

IDEP interservice data exchange program 

Ili interface event 

 independent experiment (contractor) 

IECP interface engineering change proposal 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

(formerly AIEE and IRE) 

IEG independent experiment, government (agencies) 

IF intermediate frequency 

IFS interface specification 

IG inertial guidance 

IGC inertial guidance and control (equipment) 

IGS inertial guidance system 

IIP instantaneous impact point 

IIR intermediate infrared 

IL initial launch 

ILC initial launch capability 

IMC image motion compensation 

IML initial manned launch 

EMU inertial measurement unit (Gemini B) 

I/O input/output 

IOC instructor operator console 

IOS Indian Ocean station 

IR infrared 

IRB Incentive Review Board 

IRI Infrared Industries, Inc. 

IRIG inter-range instrumentation group 

v - 52 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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ISDS inadvertent separation destruct system 

IST integrated system test 

ISTB Integrated System Test Board 

IT integration test 

ITL integrate-transfer-launch (T -III facility) 

IV instrumentation van 

 intravehicular 

IVA intravehicular activity 

IVI incremental velocity indicator (Gemini B) 

IVS image velocity sensor 

JANAF Joint Army, Navy, Air Force 

J-FACT joint facility acceptance composite test 

JOA joint operating agreement 

JOD joint occupancy date 

JOVIAL Joule's own version of international algebraic 

language 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory (NASA) 

kbits/sec kilobits per second 

kc kilocycles (see kHz) 

kev . . . thousands of electron volts 

kHz kilohertz 

km kilometer 

KTS Kodiak tracking station 

kw kilowatt(s) 

L launch 

LAAFS Los Angeles Air Force Station 

LAFS Lompoc Air Force Station 

LARC lighter amphibious resupply cargo 

LASS lateral acceleration sensing system 

LC launch complex 

LCC launch control center 

LD launch director 

L/D lift-to-drag (ratio) 

LDAU laboratory data adapter unit 

LDO long-duration operations 

LF, if low frequency 

LGA low-g accelerometer 

1412 liquid hydrogen 

L(He, 02, etc.) liquid (helium, oxygen, etc.) 

LL last launch 

LLTV, LLLTV . • . . low light-level television 

LM laboratory module 

LMCP laboratory module computer program 

F-53 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

LMQTV laboratory module qualification test vehicle 

DISC Lockheed Missiles and Space Company 

LMSE laboratory module simulation equipment 

LMSS laboratory module system segment 

LN2 liquid nitrogen 

LO local oscillator 

LOFS launch operations flow sub-group 

LOOS launch operations and orbital support 

LORL large orbiting research laboratory 

LOS line-of-sight 

 loss of signal 

LOSS launch operations system segment 

LOWG launch operations working group 

LOX, lox, L02 liquid oxygen 

LRL last radar look 

LRU line-replaceable unit 

LSB least-significant bit 

LTD launch test directive 

LTV Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. 

LTWG launch test working group (obs., see LOWG) 

LV, L/V laboratory vehicle should be avoided because 

 launch vehicle of potential confusion 

LVD launch vehicle development 

LVDB launch vehicle data book 

LVIC launch vehicle integration contractor 

LV/OP local vertical and orbit plane 

LVPS laboratory vehicle procedures simulator 

LV/RVV local vertical/relative velocity vector 

LVSS laboratory vehicle system segment 

MAB missile assembly building 

MAC McDonnell Astronautics Company (Division of 

McDonnell-Douglas Corporation) 

MAC HIT McDonnell hypervelocity impulse tunnel 

MADBS MOL automatic data base systems 

MAMU modular astronaut maneuvering unit 

MAS monitor and alarm system 

max Q maximum dynamic pressure 

MC Martin Company 

 mission control 

MCC mission control center 

 mission control complex 

MCD mission correlation data 

MCL master change logs 

MCM mission control module 

MCP military construction program 

MCR mission control room 

I..- 54 

D. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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MCRT mission collection requirements training 

MCSF MOL contractor support facility 

MD mission director 

MDAU mission data adapter unit 

MDC McDonnell-Douglas Corporation 

MDF mild detonating fuze (Gemini B) 

MDIU manual data insertion unit 

MDKU manual data keyboard unit 

MDRU manual data readout unit 

MDS malfunction detection system 

 mission development simulator 

MES mobile environmental shelter 

Mev million electron volts 

MF medium frequency 

MFTP manned flight test plan 

MGACG missile guidance alignment checkout group 

MGE maintenance ground equipment 

MH Minneapolis-Honeywell 

MHD magnetohydrodynamics 

MHz megaHertz 

MINS miniature inertial navigational system 

MIS mission information system 

 motor inert component assembly storage building 

(T-III) 

 MOL insertion ship 

MLC MOL launch complex 

MLS MOL launch site 

MM mission module 

MMAS mission module aft section 

MMC Martin-Marietta Corporation 

MMDAU mission module data adapter unit 

MMFS mission module forward section 

MMH monomethylhydrazine 

MMSE mission module simulation equipment 

MMSS mission module system segment 

MMU modular maneuvering unit 

MOCK mission operations control room 

MOL Manned Orbiting Laboratory (program) 

MOLCITE MOL computer-integrated test equipment 

MOL SPO MOL System Program Office 

MOLTOL MOL test oriented language 

MOSS mission operations special support 

MP mission payload 

 multiple payload 

 multiple pulse (emitter) 

MP&E mission planning and evaluation 

F - 5 5 

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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

MPEO mission planning and evaluation organization 

MPS mission payload segment 

MR&PM materials research and production method 

MRRD Manned Recovery Requirements Document 

MRSP Manned Recovery Support Plan 

MS milestone (e.g., MS-3) 

 mission simulator 

MSB most-significant bit 

MSCC Manned Spacecraft Control Center (Houston, Texas) 

(NASA) 

MSE mission simulation equipment 

MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center (Huntsville, Alabama) 

(NASA) 

MSI MOL system integration 

MSFN manned space flight network 

MSSD Missile & Space Systems Division (Douglas Aircraft 

Company) 

MST mobile service tower 

MSTS Military Sea Transport Service (USN) 

MTBF mean time between failures 

MTR, MTTR mean time to repair 

MTTF mean time to failure 

MTTFF mean time to first failure 

MUX multiplexing equipment 

N&C navigation and control 

NAA North American Aviation, Inc. 

NAD&C Naval Air Development Center 

NAS National Academy of Sciences 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NASH National Academy of Sciences Board 

NASP National Academy of Sciences Panel 

NAVMOL U.S. Navy Office for MOL 

NCC network control complex 

ND network director 

NEFD Noise equivalent flux density 

NHS New Hampshire (tracking) station 

NMFPA Naval Missile Facility, Point Arguello (see SVAFB) 

n mi nautical mile 

N204 nitrogen tetroxide (propellant) 

NPSH net positive suction head 

NRD National Range Division (AFSC) 

NRL Naval Research Laboratory (ONR) 

NRZ non-return to zero 

NRZL non-return to-zero level 

NSA National Security Agency 

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0/A orbit adjust 

OAMS orbital attitude and maneuvering system (NASA Gemini) 

OAMU orbital attitude and maneuvering unit 

OD Operations Directive 

OER orbital equipment rack 

OES orbital equipment section 

0/F, o/f oxidizer-to-fuel (ratio) 

OGE operational (operating) ground equipment 

OGS operational ground support 

ONR Office of Naval Research 

00S orbital operations segment 

OPCONTR operational control center 

OR Operations Requirements (document) 

ORD Orbital Requirements Document 

ORU operational readiness unit 

ORV ocean r.nge vessel 

OSAF Office of the Secretary of the Air Force 

USD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSE ocean surveillance equipment 

OSG orbital sub-working group 

OSP Orbital Support Plan 

OSR ocean surveillance radar 

 Office of Scientific Research (AFSC) 

 Office of Security Review (DOD) 

OTEF operational training and evaluation facility 

OTWG orbit test working group 

OV orbiting vehicle 

OVAB orbiting vehicle assembly building 

OVC orbiting vehicle computers 

OVSB orbiting vehicle support building 

PACE pad abort control electronics 

PACS pad abort control system (Gemini B) 

PAFB Patrick Air Force Base 

PALC Point Arguello launch complex (obs., see SLC) 

PAM pulse-amplitude modulation 

PATE pad-about thrust electronics (Gemini B) 

PBS program breakdown structure 

PCCB power coordination control board 

PCM pulse-code modulation 

PCO procuring contracting officer 

PCP program change proposals 

PDP program definition phase 

 program development phase 

PDR prerequisite data report 

 preliminary design review 

PE planning estimate 

F-57 

D SECRET- SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

PERT program evaluation and review technique 

PFCC powered flight control center 

PI photo interpreters 

 program integration 

PIA pre-installation acceptance 

PLOT probability of launch on time 

PM phase modulation 

 pulse modulation 

PMR Pacific Missile Range (USN) 

POAD Post Operations Assessment Directive 

P/0 print out 

PPE preliminary planning estimate 

PPS pulses per second 

PRC Program Review Council 

ETD Program Requirements Document 

PRE Program Requirements Estimate 

PRELORT precision long range tracking 

PRF pulse repetition frequency 

PRI pulse repetition interval 

PRN pseudo-random noise 

PRE pulse repetition rate 

YRS primary recovery ship 

PS program segment 

PSA pressure suit assembly 

P/S/A planning, scheudling, resource allocation 

PSAC President's Science Advisory Committee 

PSD power spectral density 

PSIA production systems integration area 

PSP Program Support Plan 

PSPP Proposed (or Preliminary) System Package Plan 

PSS photographic system segment 

PTDP Preliminary Technical Development Plan 

PTS pointing and tracking system 

 pneumatic tube system 

PTT push-to-talk 

PW pulse width • 

P&W Pratt & Whitney Aircraft (div. of United Aircraft 

Corp.) 

PWM pulse-width modulation 

QC quality control 

QT qualification test 

QTV qualification test vehicle 

QLAP quick-look analysis program 

°R degrees Rankine (temperature scale) 

 reentry, or recovery 

F - 5 8 

D-SEeRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 D SECRET- SPECIAL HANDLING 

R&I receiving and inspection 

RAS requirements allocation sheets 

 resource allocation sheets 

RCC range control center 

 recovery control center 

RCCC Range Central Communications Control (Bld'g. 475) 

RCG recovery control group 

BCE recovery control room 

RCS reaction control system 

 reentry control system (Gemini B) 

RD recovery director 

R&D research and development 

R&E research and engineering 

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation 

REM reentry module 

REV reentry vehicle 

RF radio frequency 

RFA radio frequency allocation (request for) 

RFI radio frequency interference 

 request for information 

RFO retrofire officer 

RFP request for proposal 

RFTS radio frequency transmission system 

RGS roll gyro sensor 

RIA range instrumentation aircraft 

RICS range instrumentation control system 

RIP, RIPI receiving inspection and pyrotechnic installation 

RIS range instrumentation ship 

 receipt inspection 

RIV rendezvous, initial vehicle 

RMIS remote multiplexing instrumentation system 

(T-IIIM TLM system) 

RMP-B reentry measurement program B 

rms root-mean-square 

RMU remote maneuvering unit 

RO-CAT rocket catapult 

ROCC Recovery Operations Control Center (NASA) 

 Range Operations Control Center (Bldg. 300, VAFB) 

ROS ready-only store 

BPS retrograde propulsion system (Gemini B) 

R&R rendezvous and recovery 

R/R repair/replacement 

MID recovery requirements document 

RRV rendezvous, resupply vehicle 

RS range safety 

RSC range safety command 

RSCC range safety control center 

RSO range safety officer 

F - 5 9 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

RSP recovery support plan 

RSS range safety system 

rss root-sum-square 

RSV ready storage vessel 

 reentry stabilization velocity 

RTC real-time command 

RTCC real-time computer complex 

RTS remote tracking station 

 range tracking ship 

RV, R/V reentry vehicle 

R/VFR reliability vehicle flight readiness 

RVV relative velocity vector 

RWG recovery working group 

RZ return to zero 

SAA Saturn-Apollo applications (program) 

SAF Secretary of the Air Force 

SAFSL DOD-designated symbol for the Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory Program 

SAM School of Aerospace Medicine (USAF) 

SAMSO Space and Missile Systems Organization (formerly SSD 

and BSD) 

SAR search and rescue 

 special access required (security notation) 

S/C spacecraft 

SC&D signal conditioning and distribution 

SCD specification control drawings 

SCE stabilization and control electronics 

SCET stored command execution timer 

SCF Satellite Control Facility (obs., see AFSCF) 

SCN specification change notice 

SCO satellite control office 

SCSU stimulus conversion and switching unit 

SCU signal conditioning unit 

SDC System Development Corporation 

SEF small and forward 

SLIP system engineering implementation plan 

SEIR system engineering implementation review 

SERO systems engineering release order 

SE/TD systems engineering/technical direction 

SF support facility 

SFC solar forecast center 

SFR special flight requirements 

SFS space flight system 

SGLS space-ground link subysstem 

SGS space guidance system 

SIL schedule interface log 

- 6 0 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
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RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D-SECREf SPECIAL HANDLING 

SIMEX simulation exercises 

SLC space launch complex 

SLC 6 Space Launch Complex No. 6, VAFB 

SLM simulated laboratory module 

SMAB solid motor assembly building 

SMG software management group 

SMOT AFSCF Director for Test Operations 

SMPSA solid motor processing and storage area 

SMVT Titan III SPO symbol (formerly SSB) 

S/N signal-to-noise (ratio) 

SNI San Nicolas Island 

SOC statement of capability 

 station operators console 

SOFNET solar observing and forecasting network 

SOR specific operational requirement 

SOW statement of work 

SPACETRACK tracking capability in support of NORAD 

SPADATS space detection and tracking system 

SPAN solar particle alert network 

SPC stored program command 

SP/DR common designation for SS-MOL-1, "MOL System 

Performance/Design Requirements General 

Specification" 

SPERT schedule PERT 

SPO system program office 

SPP system package plan 

SPS separation propulsion system (Gemini B) 

SRM solid rocket motor 

SRR system requirement reviews 

SRS secondary recovery ship 

 segment ready-storage 

SRSB segment ready-storage building 

SRTC stored real-time command 

SSB Titan III SPO symbol (obs., see SMVT) 

 single sideband 

 source selection board 

SSC(D) Space Systems Center (Douglas) 

SSD Space Systems Division (AFSC) (obs., see SAMSO) 

SSECO second stage engine cutoff 

SSESM spent-stage experiment Saturn module 

SSOTW AFSCF staff meteorologist (organizational symbol) 

SSR staff support room 

SST spacecraft system (acceptance) test (Gemini B) 

 subsystem testing 

STAFFMET staff meteorologist 

STDR space technical data report (test procedures) 

STC Satellite Test Center 

 sensitivity-time control 

F - 6 1 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

STEM special test equipment 

STIC space technical information control 

STINFO Scientific and Technical Information Program (DOD) 

STO Systems Test Objectives 

STOP Systems Test and Operations Plan 

STY Systems Test Plan 

STRP System Test Requirements Profile 

SUS ENGR sustaining engineer 

SYMON system monitor (System II executive program) 

SVAFB South Vandenberg Air Force Base 

T-III Titan III 

T-IIIM Titan HIM (MOL launch vehicle) 

TA technical advisor 

T-AGM designation for a military sea transport service 

 auxiliary general missile range ship 

TARS three-axis reference system 

TBD to be determined 

TC test controller 

TCA thrust chamber assembly 

TCCS test computer console system 

T-Count terminal count 

TCPS thrust chamber pressure sensor 

TDMS telemetry data monitor set 

TDP technical development plan 

TE elapsed time 

TEIC tissue equivalent ion chamber 

TEOL test engineer oriented language (computer) 

TGA thermal gravimetric analysis 

TI technical interchange (meeting) 

TLM telemetry 

TLV threshold limit values 

TM tracking mirror 

TMCC technical management control center 

ThIG thermal meteoroid garment 

TOO test operations order 

TOP technical operating plan 

TOPS the operational PERT system 

TOR Technical Operating Report 

TOSS test operations system segment 

TP&F test planning and evaluation 

TPA turbopump assembly 

TPQ JANAF designation for a ground transportable, 

special-purpose radar 

TPU teleprinter unit 

TR time to retrofire (also, see TTRF) 

T/R transmit/receive 

F-62 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

TRS time reference system 

 Technical Requirements Specification 

TRW TRW Systems Group, TRW Inc. 

TS technical surveillance 

 test stand 

TTC tracking, telemetry, and command 

TTCV tracking, telemetry, command, and voice 

TTRF time to retrofire (also, see TR) 

TTY teletype 

TVC thrust vector control 

TW time words 

TWT traveling wave tube 

TWX teletypewriter exchange 

UDS Unified Documentation System (NASA/DOD) 

UDT underwater demolition team (USN) 

UK United Kingdom 

USBS unified S-band system 

USN United States Navy 

UTC United Technology Center, Division of United Aircraft Corporation 

VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base 

VCC voice control center 

VCS voice converter subsystem 

VDC voice digital computer 

VERLORT very long range tracking 

VET vehicle elapsed time 

VGP vehicle ground point 

V/H velocity-to-altitude (ratio) 

VIB vertical integration building (T-III) 

VIP value in performance 

VSD variable slope delta 

VSWR voltage standing-wave ratio 

VTS Vandenberg tracking station 

VV vehicle verification 

VVSA velocity vector sensing assembly 

WADC Wright Air Development Center (obs., see ASD) 

WADD Wright Air Development Division (obs., see ASD) 

WBS work breakdown structure 

WECO/BTL Western Electric Company/Bell Telephone 

Laboratories 

WMS waste management system 

wpm words per minute 

WRO work release order 

F- 63 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

D SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING 

WSMR White Sands Missile Range (unofficial name; see 

AFMDC) 

WTR Western Test Range (NRD) (obs., see AFWTR) 

ZERT zero reaction tool 

ZI zone of the interior 

ZULU time zone including Greenwich Meridian (same as 

GMT) 

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D-SEGRET-SPECIAL HANDLING