.
THE UNDER SECRETARPOF THE AIRRCE 1

• 3

.

... • ks

..

.•;-•:

....A

••:: i Xi- 1107,:ski ek....it A

.i.-:: -:. Xf

r.,,,,,..." 74,

...A:. . eA.t.fr, 2....,,,, .. ,..1- 4 -LT 7, 4..

7

t.....: if

.:: 2g, A

,let• :..i, 01.4,- A.-torm.:.t.

; hi 7„A;„,.. A t t - Ist-ii X•1- (^4.-#1.j Ca. 04....:h

.L zej., rev 11c+7, -44 10 - .3.:‘,V0

. , A, . cl"-6-~/ °A- 1-4/c-t 4( Chk 41- FL

1. ; • ..:-.1.., .4 !"";n777..

•

•

.•

ft.
•

•••• 1. • •

.• •

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

'14

•

*A.."

(Au; li,ervodn ••,k 441.

vow; yr% Zef

1.10.0.%

%%ore', 44 %%Art %"4"A"*. frert.

• v• u.

Y e. s

I

,

klekot.

0" )1 .4 sirr4iTI r>1444

AriA

hetakoo•-"—im

p,

INA oil

... sZsX21

444'64

130 VOA •4•41 5. 64“sis

" j ^• • ;'•..

•••••

•

• •••4',/..

• • :.

• %.

.

•••

•

ktt`"'

•

. •

.,

r .

.

.

0*. All% " 1)4A, A 1.1‘

ryvv,.. AAA exc.:04

-Oka

VEX '

•

se to... 

11 6.110.4. Lt.

A.,

At+ ire-0 Ns-SA 04•4

t

DV

)441 1 it 4.4 44"1

lei44- kst-s.

pro, s...4

•,(;

kVA' .0" &t /X.

v.t• howl,

1.4%....4 tavrtiol

3).‘

toot Sw. 14 • ...etc

44 Et

1.r Ietot • v es

P

1.0

fits a 1)41111%,

%.

4., IAA. 
• •

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

111111•11111Pin

•

*on

Major, USAF

raewpgs rear diereearie linsaara

Oae 101111Cliva IMP II 11101M win AiriPtr

minftm

ar► a cam

THE NRO STAFF

February 18, 1972

A% MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MOLUCAS

210 SUBJECT: Letter to Ambassador Johnson on "Fact Of"

Indications are that there is agreement between the U.S.

and the Soviets to finalize a SALT ABM Treaty prior to

President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May. There is also

likely to be an executive agreement of some sort with respect

to offensive weapons. Both will require Congressional review

and approval shortly following the Moscow visit.

The Verification Panel still has not addressed a ratification strategy. The NSAM 156 Committee paper has been at

a standstill since Ambassador Johnson entered the hospital.

In view of the "second thoughts" on "fact of" voiced

by Mr. Helms recently and the fact that the NRO position on

the table supports the release of "fact of", we feel that a

letter with a restated NRO position should be sent without

delay to Ambassador Johnson.

There is likely to be a very rapid effort to set a

ratification strategy for SALT. We are fearful that the

"fact of" issue will become lost in the desire to obtain

unhampered ratification; the NRO position should be on the

record.

1111.1111.111111111 •
EltWAIII Moo ainerent 1114011//Pai

606 IGRIC1:4 3/611 la 110C11 n01appt•

•

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

OFFICE OF THE, DIRECTOR

Dear Alex,

I understand that the 156 Working Group is divided in

its thinking on how far to proceed in recommending revelation

of "fact of" satellite reconnaissance by government spokesmen

in response to public questioning about "national means of

verification" for a SALT. When favorable reaction to this

proposition was obtained from CIA, I instructed my representative to support the acknowledgement of "fact of," subject

to certain constraints, should it become necessary.

Following recent conversations I have had with Dick Helms

and others, I desire to restate my position on the "fact of"

matter. I am apprehensive that many, not directly involved

with the operation of the National Reconnaissance Program,

tend to view the subject of "fact of" in too simplified a

manner. There are two major points which should be made clear

to all those deliberating this apparent dilemma. First,

although one can read about "spy satellites" in the news,

the largely speculative articles do not constitute official

U.S. admission of the activity. Over the recent years, the

official policy of protecting the "fact of" has been often

viewed as fatuous in its original context. This is accurate,

in a simplistic sense. However, what is ignored or not

perceived is that the "fact of" policy today literally serves

to constrain severely a propensity for less guarded/y discussing the scope and the nature of our reconnaissance

activities. Thus, the original purpose of not revealing

the "fact of" in order to minimize provocation or the scope

of the program is indeed still effective, but in a more

indirect fashion.

Second, and less subtle than the above, the admission

of the "fact of" as a practical response to public questioning

about "national technical means" may not serve a useful purpose in the long run. Other forms of "national technical

means" might also come under scrutiny. Further, those who

C001601. 

COOT Of COPIES

PAGE OP PAS'S
ty4

. ;

COMMIX SO

OICIAIII.3 •400 Av10011"tt 01.1111.1...11

SOD O eggs .s S10: Si MS 101

1:0•11ti

PMI'S

... • , AN,

, . ••• • toe

would be initially skeptical or disbelieving about utility

of a SALT or about our abilities to verify a SALT likely

would not be satisfied with a limited statement of admission

of "fact of." The alternative--going beyond a limited statement with details—seemingly would be counterproductive since,

if capabilities become public knowledge, intricate countermeasures might be devised to hinder the actual monitoring of

a SALT.

Thus, even for such an important concern as assuring

unified support and successful ratification of a SALT, it

seems impractical, in my view to admit to "fact of" without

considering the depth of implication. At this time, at least,

the risks still appear too great and official silence, in the

. face of questioning--difficult as it is to maintain--appears

to be a sound policy.

":4

Sincerely,

• 41

m

4,

,f41

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson

Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

.

John L. McLucas

cc: Hr. Helms

Dr. David

Dr. Tucker

•

?

•

•

•

•

•