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document conteins inlersustion cflectind the notional security of the Unitea Stotts within the mean.

log of the espionage lows U. S. Coe. Tiro 1$, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its trarisrnis.

'ion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unaudterizea otorson, as well as Its use in any

wanner premdieiel to the selety or interest of the United States or far the !benefit of en, foreign govern.

meet Sc the detriment of the Unite. States. It is to be seen only by U. S. Persona*, oluutelsIlY ind•e• trineted end ootherited to receive information in the etesignited control channels. Its security must be

maintained in accordance with regulations earteirung to the designated centrals.

This document contains information referring to Projects:

AV-SECRET:

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Iiiillipi

. . 34/63

i ' achment No

June 7, 1963

11 •

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OP DEFENSE

SUBJECT: National. Reconnaissance Program '

Enclosed herewith is the text of recommendations '

on the subject which were. recently made to the

President by his Foreign Intelligence'Advisory Boards". together with comments thereon submitted by the

Director of Central Intelligence on April 15, 1963.

•

The President-bas approved the recommendations

and it ii requested that you furnish to this ofrice

and to the Board by September 15, 1963, a report

reflecting the status of the national reconnaissance

program as of that date, and progreas made in meet- '

ing the' objectives of the Board's recommendations.

McGeorge Bundy ' •

Enclosures

for the Secretary of Defense only) •

cc: Director of Central Intelligence

The President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board

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1.034/63

RECCUMSNDATTONS OP TAB BOARD

Sig..C."•••1.k4.

Toward an Effectiv.. lational Reconnaissance Office. _Tbs

Director of Central Intelligence has mode available to the'Board

a draft of a proposed "Agreement Between the Secretary of Defense

and the Dir4ctor of Central Intelligence . on the Management of the

National laionnaissanc* Program." In the judgment of the Board,

this draft igreement is the best conceived and most soundly detailed

plan for the management,.tbe mission and the operation of the National

Reconnaissance Office (IRO) that his come to our , , attention. We

urgently recommend its immediate adoption. • •

In the course of implementing the agreement and in carrying out

its plan we recommend, in addition, that:

(a) a clear channel of guidance and authorisation flow

from the policy decisions of the President to the Secretary of

Defense and, as provided in the agreement, to the Director

of Ceptral Intelligence;

a clear and effective connection established

between the advance technology and planning of the national

.reconnaissance program, and the development plans for

reconnaissance capabilities of the Department of Defense •

and the military services; •

plans be made to improve the canripmit o management ?

of the NRO, particularly with respect to career special ts ' *

who may be heavily taxed in meeting schedules for new satellites,

aircraft and other reconnaissance instrumentalities;

(d) pains be taken to ensure consistency between Department of Defense directives which guide the national reconnaissance

program and pertinent directives emanating from higher authority,

such as National Security Council Intelligence Directives; and

(s) within the Department of Defense present and planned

relationships be clarified as between the IMO, the Defense

Intelligence Agency and the Nationel Security Agency.

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The agreement on the IRO has now been completed and is in L..3

process of implementation. This agreement, in way opinion; establishes

a clear channel of guidance and clarifies the relationships and row

*possibilities between the Departmeut of Defense and CIA, both of

vhosibxve serious responsibilities in this field. The agreement will

:

ensure that there is close coordination and intense effort in advanced

technology and planning of the national reconnaissance program and

also the current TOCCODaiiiillell efforts. We will watch closely the =nags

sent of the NRO and ensure that this program is nom successful in'every

respect.

The new agreement on the NR.O provides for close relationships

between the no and the United States Intelliginceiloard.

•

With respect to the specific recommendations on the subject, they

encompass a number of obvious management problems. The arrangements

for handliqg these problems are outlined in the recently executed 16.0

agreement. The carrying out of this agreement ism an effective manner

depends on close collaboration between the DCI and the Secretary of 1 Defense. It should be noted that there is a natural interface between

CIA and the Department of Defense in the vital and complicated area

of overhead reconnaissance. Management of this problem calls also for

close collaboration between responsible authorities in both departments.

•

•

The new agreement which is being implemented was.reached after due

consideration of the possibility of either Defense or CIA taking full

responsibility for the reconnaissance program. It was decided that this

would be unwise because on the one hand it would involve relocating vast

resources from the Department of Defense. On the other hand it would

involve a loss of responsibility and imaginativeness which exists in

CIA and which has made many valuable contributions in the field of

overhead reconnaissance. Moreover, transfer from CIA mould run the

risk of losing a.ventege for secrecy which the Agency Bs so well .

qualified to protect.

The MBO agreement has been drafted with all the above factors in

mind, and I concur is the judgment of the Board that it is a well

conceived and soundly detailed plan for the management of this important .

program.

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