THE NEY GENE 

February'7, 1966 

Honorable Doug Crouoh 

District Attorneys 

Tarrant County 

Fort Worth, Texas 

Opinion No. C-599 

Rer Rnforcement of a aupport 

order under the new Texas 

Uniform Reoiprocal Rnforcement of Support Act 

for an out-of-state, 

plaintiff originally receiving the support order 

ancillary to a Texas 

Dear Mr. Crouch: divorce decree. 

In your request for an official opinion on the above 

captioned matter you have submitted frets which we summarize 

a8 follows: 

Plaintiff received a divoroe in a Texas Court and a 

support order for her children ancillary thereto. She and 

the children then moved outside of the State of Texas. The 

defendant haa not contributed to the support of the children 

a8 he wae ordered to do. He has moved from the county where 

the divoroe was entered and into Tarrant County. Plaintiff 

has initiated suit in the state where she now resides under 

a reciprocal enforcement of support act provided by the laws 

of said state. Her potifion has~been certified by a judge 

of said state and haa been sent to Tarrant County to be sued 

on for enforcement. 

You have inquired as to whether in our opinion, a 

suit for enforcement of a support order properly may be 

brought in Tarrant County, under the new Texas Uniform Reciprooal Rnforcement of Support Act. 

House Bill 138 (Acts of the 59th Legislature, 1965, 

Ch. 67gg p. 1561) repealed Articles .2328b-1, 2328b-2 

2328b-3 while simultaneously enacting Article 2328b-4, 

and 

Vernon's Civil Statutes. The Texas Uniform Reoiprooal Rnforcement of Support Act contained in the repealed Articlea 

will be hereinafter referred to, where convenient, ae ~the 

old act, while that act ena,ated by the 59th Legislature, 

Artiole 2328b-4, Vernon'8 Civil Statutes, will be hereinafter referred to, where convenient, as the new act. 

-2893- 
“Hon. Doug Crouch, page 2 (C-599) .” 

An Identical fact situation to the one you resent 

was passed on under the old act (Articles 2328b-1, E 3281~2, 

and 2328b-3, Vernon’* Civil Statutes) in t~he case of Freeealand, 313 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Clv.App. 1958).The 

eland that the only proper Texas court to 

enforce a supp?%t order issued ancillary to a Texas divorce 

wa8 the court entering it originally. 

There la no provision under the new aot and there 

was no provision under the old act which specifically 

provides for the proper oourt for an enforcement suit to 

be tried under the faots submitted by you. 

” .When necessary to B oorreot understandl&*and interpretation of a statute, the 

court will take into consideration the state 

of the law at the time of its enactment, the 

conditions designed to be dealt with, the good 

intended to be aooomplished, and the mischief 

sought to be prevented or remedied. tithermore the subject matter of the enactment and 

the necessity or reason for it are also proper 

subjects of judicial conalderatlon.” 

Jur.26 236, Statutes, 3162. 

53 Tex. 

A complete diaoussion of the state of the law per& 

talnlng to enforcement of support orders within the State 

of Texas prior to and at the time of the adoption of the old 

aot la contained in Attorney General Opinion Ww-784 (1960), 

Any aontempt prooeedlng for the enforcement of a support 

order was anolllary to the original order and exclusive 

jurisdiction to enforce it remained with the court that entered the orininal order, one court being-without authorftv 

to punish contempts of amother court. ti par& bowsaies? ” 

111 Tex. 399, 238 S,W, 635 (ly;r;r); Putty v. Paulkmr, 2~4 

S,W,2d 831 (Tex.Clv.App. 1948, no writ h% 

193 S.W.2d 970 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946, no writ 

Johns, 172 S.w.2d 770 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943, 

- to the adoption of the old aot, the courts were in complete agreement in stating that since a support order was of 

an interloautorv nature. onlv the orininal district court had 

juriadlct ion to- amend, aha 

8 

Tex. 605, 290 S.W.2d 5 

165 S.W.2d 83 (1942); 

542’ (Tex.Civ.App. 1956, no 

eupra . 

The old act was adopted aa one law ln a syatematlc 

enactment of sim-ilar state laws baaed upon the~uniform 

-2894- 
"Hon. Doug Crouch, page 3 (C+gg)." 

Reciprocal Enforcementof Support Act recommended by the 

National Conferenoe of Commlasioners on Uniform State 

Laws and by the American Bar Aasociatlon in their annual conferences at Waashington, D.~ C. in September, 1950. The conditiona designed to be dealt with by such laws,~ the good intended 

to be accompllahed, and the mischief aought to be prevented or 

remedied th~ereby may be ascertained by reference to the 

Commlaelonerb' Prefatory Note to the Act. Handbook of Commlsbloners on Uniform State Lawa (1930) p. 171. 

The Commieslonera aet forth the problems making desirable the proposed statute, in part, as followsr 

"With the increasing mobility of the 

American population the problem of interetate, 

enforcement of duties of support became acute. 

A deserting husband was beyond the reach of 

prooeaa in the state where he had abandoned 

hia family and the family had no means to 

follow him. Welfare departments saddled with 

the burden of supporting destitute families 

were often prevented from enforcing the duty 

of aupport in the atate where the.husband could 

be found by decisions holding that the duty 

existed only as to obllgeea within the atate. 

"The avenue of criminal enforcement was 

not more fruitful. Charges could be preferred 

against the fleeing huaband but he had to be 

returned for trial to the state where the 

offense was committed. Rxtradltion was both 

expensive and narrowly teohnlcal, and it was 

often impossible to prove that he had 'fled 

from justice' for frequently he aupported his 

fam$.ly until he left the state and only left 

in order to get a job. Even if he were brought 

baak and successfully prosecuted the result was 

disappointing. The proceedings rendered reconciliatlon with the family improbable, took him 

away from hia job in the state to which he had 

fled, and by branding him a convicted crimtial 

lessened the probabilities of gainful employ-~ 

ment in the home state. 

"The 1950 Act, printed hereafter, attempts to 

improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the 

enforcement of duties of support through both the 

-2895- 
"Hon. Doug Crouch, page 4 (C-599).” 

criminal and the civil law. Its provisions are 

in addition to remedies now existing for the 

enforcement of duties of support within the state, 

Eat ; 

long as the husband remaine in the state, and the 

new act is meant to improve enforcement where the 

partiea are in different states." 

suppLied.) 

(Emphaals 

The crux of the Uniform Act and, in turn, the Texas 

Acts which were,to be patterned thereon, was the two state 

enforcement procedure. Such procedure waB described as 

follows in the Commissionera~ Prefatory Note to the 1950 

Uniform Act, citation aupra page 173. (We have added in the 

parenthesis, citations to the old and new Texas Acts alongside the Commiseioners 

Act.) 

r Cltationa to the 1950 Model Uniform 

I, . . .In the past, the greatest difficulty 

in enforcing support where the partiea are in 

different statea haa been the expense of travel 

to a distant state to litigate the righta of the 

deMitute obligee. Under this Act this expense 

can be reduced to filing fees plus a few postage 

stampe. In a nutshell, this two-atate proceeding 

is as follows: It opens with an action (Section 

9 of all three acts] which normally will be commenced in the state where the family has been 

deserted (the inltiatlng state). A very simplified 

petition la filed (Section 10 of both the model 

aot and of Article 232813-3 of the old Texaa Act; 

Section 11 of the new Texas Act), The judge looks 

it over to decide whether the facts ahow the existence of a duty of support and if they do he sends 

the petition and a copy of this Act to a court of 

the reaponding atate to which the husband has fled 

or in which he has property 

4 

Section 11 of the 

model act and of Article 232 b-3 of the old Texas 

Act;- Section 14 in the new Texas Act). That Court 

will take the ateps necessary to obtain jurisdiction 

of'the husband or his property, will hold a hearing 

(Section 12 of the model act and of Article 2328b-3 

of the old Texas Act; Sections 18 and 19 in the new 

Texas Act - prosecuting attorney now given responsibility for taking action to give court jurisdiction with court overseeing and If jurisdiction cannot 

be had where petition Is Feceived,-the petition may 

be forwarded to another court under Sectron 19(b) 

of the new act), and lf~the court finds that a duty 

-2896- 
“lioni Doug Croioh, page 5 (C-599).” 

of support exIot4, It may ord4r the defendant 

to furnish support (Section 13 of the model aot 

and of Article 2328b-3 of the old Texas Act; 

Section 23 of the new sot), and will transmit 

a copy of its ,order to the court in the initiating 

state (Section 14 of the model act and oi ArtI-: 

cle 2328b-3 of the old Texaa Act; Seotlon 24 of the 

new act). To enforce complla~nce with ita orders 

the court may subject the defendant to such terms 

and oondltions as it may deam ppoper, may require 

him to furnish bond or make periodic payments or’, 

in’oaae of ‘refusal, ‘may punish him for oontempt 

(SeatIon 15 of th4 model act and of Article 23288-3 

of the old Texas Act; Section 25 of the new Act). 

It has the duty to transmit to the initiating: 

court any payments it received and upon request 

to furnish a certified ~atatement of Chose paym4nts (Se&ion 16 of the model act and of Article 

2328b-3 of the old Texas Aot; Seotion 26 of the 

new Act). The Inlt Iat 

“$ 

court must receive and 

disburse these payments 3eotion 17 of the model 

aot and of Artiale 2328b- of the old Texas Act; 

Section 27 of the n&f Act 3 . 

“This simple two-state pr&edure can bc 

carried out with a mInfmum of expense to the 

family or the state - the usual court costs and 

postage for th4 transmission of papers and 

money. Yet it preserves dtie ~FOCQB~, for each 

party pleads In his own court. Provisions 

covering other detaila of procedure have been 

kept out of the Act (lo that the usual rulas 

f’or obtaining jurisdiction for carrying on the 

procedure and for appeals may~be held to govern.” 

The Commiaalonerat Conference on Uniform State Lawn 

and the Amerioan Bar Association adoptad’amendments to the 

mod41 Uniform Act In 1952. We do not think ft necessary to 

refer to such amendments In this opinion although they might 

be useful in throwing, light on other problems which might 

arise under the new T&xas act. 

To summarize briefly: the oonditfons designed to be 

dealt with, the good intended to be ~aooomplished and the 

~miaohlef sought to be prevented or remedied by IaWn baaed 

~‘oloaely on the model act - were an follows: 

~!Che model aot was designed to provide an 

economical m4ans for enf’orcing support orders 

-2897- 
“Hon. Doug Crouoh, page 6 (C-599).” 

against deserting huebanda or husbands who 

orossed etate,lines leavlng,destitute famillee 

behind them. No change under the model act was 

Intended with regard to husbands or ex-huabands 

rsmaining in the atate. 

The old act followed olosely the 1950 Model Uniform 

Act in the above respeots. 

When the trial court in the Freeland Case, aupra, was 

presented with a petition for enforcement under the old act 

against an ex-husband who remained within the State of Texas 

by a plaintiff who had crossed state lines, the Court of 

Civil Appeals was faced with a situation unprovided for under 

the Act and wan required to determine to, what extent, If any, 

the Act was applicable. 

On the one hand, It wa8 clear that the old act purported to make no ohange in internal state law - th& one 

Texas oourt was without any authority to punish contem ts 

t 

of 

another Texas cour0. Attorney ffeneral’s Opinion WW-78 

(1960) and authority referred to therein, a8 heretofore oited. 

On the other hand, plaintiff was certainly In a predioament analogous to that which the Aot was primarily 

designed to deal with insofar a8 the enforcement problems 

presented. 

A curative or remedial statute Is generally to be 

given the moat comprehensive and liberal~constructfon poseible, and certainly should not be given a narrow technical 

oons,truotIon that would defeat the very purpose for which the 

statute wau enacted. 

150 Tax. 18; .237, S.Y. 

The aourt resolved the question of the applicability 

of the Act by allowing the plaintiff to 6ue with the aid of 

the economical procedures provided by the Act, at the same 

time leaving in effect Internal state law by restrioting 

jurisdiction to act on the plalntiff’a petition to the Texas 

court entering the support order. 

The old act oontained substantially identical language with regard to suits for enforcement of support orders 

under the out-of-state petitions as does the new act. (Parallel oltations 44t1 forth, aupra.) Freeland held that the 

plaintiff waa limited to enforcement by the court entering 

the orIgina order In spite of such language. However, the 

new act, unlike the old act, fs olearly to be given Intrabtate 

-2898- 
“Hon. Doug Crouch, page 7 (C+gg).” 

err eot . Section 31 o’f the new act,‘ArtIcle 2328b-4, Vernon’s 

Civil Statutes, provides In part: 

“This Act is applioable ,when bbth th4 Plaintiff and the Defendant ar4 In this State but in 

differ4nt judicial districts.” 

While the plaintiff lmthe Instant caee does not reside 

within thr State and thu? Section 31, Article 2328b-4, cannot 

give th4 Tarrant County Court juriadiotion over her petition, 

there is nothing In the new aot which would pr4veat the p4tItion from being treated simply ae any oth4r petition under the 

.'ww act ,from an out-of-state plaIntITf’(wlthout regard to any 

pe4eum4d dIst1LnotI~p~ arising from her having reoeived her divoroe and the support order ancillary ther4to within the State 

of Texas ) . Such a treatment is consistent with policy of the 

Legislature under the n4w act. 

W4 ar4 well aware of the rule of oonstruotfon of statutes whioh provides that wher4 an Act of the L4gIslatur4 has 

been oonstrued by t~he cot&s aad such act Is rs-enaqted by the 

Legislature In similar languagr, without substantial or material ohmgs, It Is pr4sumed that the Leglslature,wae aware of 

such interpretation and Intended that It should be applied to 

the new Aot. On the other hand, where such prior Act has been 

pa-enacted bs the La~islature with substantial and material 

ohangas theri $8 no &oh presumption. Belllng4r v. Schutte, 

244 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951). 

Th4rs Is In our opinion substantial differcmce between 

an act which is only intended to be operable wh4n one of the 

parties is outsida the Stat4 and an act providing for lntrastate opkration by its clear ‘terms. Obviously, a court could 

not oonstrue an aot ae having Intrastate opsratioa before the 

Laglalature eo provided. 

Under the old aat, had the Freeland decision been 

otherwise, a plaintiff could have received more flexible enfora4ment of support through moving outside of the Stat4 of 

Texas than wan then provided to Texas plaintiffe. Conversely 

the application of the Freeland holding under the new aot 

would deprive a plaintiff under these facts of the~rlghts now 

given to Texan plaintiffs. 

It would be highly f’riviloue to attribute $0 the Legislatura the purpose of makIAg an etiorcement prooedure ‘unavailable 

in all oases wherd a plaintirr moves out-of-stat4 after receiving 

a support order ancillary to a Texas divorce, while at the same 

b making suoh prooedure available~ia all other instances. 

-2899- 
“Hon. Doug Crouch, pag4 8 (C-599)." 

We. can find no basis for making the plaintiffs and the 

defendarits, under these cfroumafanoee, members of a apecial 

alas4 to be d4nied the oonv4nIanoes now provided to all other 

plaintiffs and defendants under the new Act, 

Both the plalntfffs and the defendants who have had 

no prior connection with the State with regard to aupport 

order8 i and also those plaintiffs and defendants divorced 

by a Texas court with a support order Issued ancillary to 

such divoroe (In Inbtanoas wh4r4 the plaintiff continues to 

reside wL%hin th4 State) ar4 provided undar the new aat with 

a procedura wh4reby the support order may be conveniently 

enforord in dof4ndant’s home county. 

The oonwnienoe of b4ing sued In one’s home county 

Is oonslder6d of auffloient lmportanoe under Texas law that 

a drfendant can, 4xoept in the oanen outlined in Artiolc 

1995, Vernonfs Civil Statutes, have venue placed therein as 

a mettar of right. While under the n4w Act, def4ndant could 

not have venue transferred from the Texas court originally 

ent4&ng thr support’ord4r to his home county - If suoh 

transfer of the aotion oocure, it Is not realistic to assume 

the% hr is pye judiced Cher4by. Such aould be argued under 

the old act $.n the,Freeland oaae, supra. at page 946: 

“Appellant In ttis oase might well find 

hIms4lf hopelessly impaled on the horns of 

dllemm4 If the order of ths Dallas Court 18 

P 

ermltted :to stand. If he were to pay the 

25 per week to tha. Colleotor of Child Support 

of Tarrant County, as ordered by the’Tarrant 

County Court ha oould be held in contempt 

by the Dallas Count for his failure to obey 

Its order to make the payments to the Juvenile 

Court of Dallas County. On tha other hand, If 

hc wer4 to make the paymentu to the Juvenile 

Court of Dallas County, he oou3.d be held In 

oontempt by the Court In Tarraiat County for 

disobeying its order.’ 

The dilemma projected In Frealand is not a possibility 

under the new aot, Section 29 (applicable to intrastate enforcement of patitions through SeotIon 31) provides In part: 

n .the amount4 for a D4rtlaular p,erlod 

paid p&&ant to either order shall be credited 

against . . ‘. both.” (Emphasla supplied) 

The Texas oourt entering a support order orlgInal;y 
"Hon. Doug Crouch, page.9 (C-599).". 

retains jurisdiction to enforce the order under Texas law, 1': 

but, as a practical matter, it has no compelling interest, 

ln enforcing the order after both the obligeea and the'obligor have physically left its jurisdictional boundaries. The 

burden of non-support then falls elsewhere. Thus, the new 

act allows Its order to be enforced elaewhere within the State. 

You are advised that a restriction against Intrastate 

enforcement of a Texas Support order under the submItted facts 

la lnconalstent with the policy otherwise set forth under the 

new act. The petition which you have reoeived should be processed for enforcement as any other petition for aupport'presented to your office by a plaintiff through an out-of-atate 

court under the new Texan Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 

Support Act. 

A petItIon for enforcement of a support 

order under the new Texas Uniform Reciprocal 

Enforcement of Support Act from an out-ofstate plaintiff originally receiving the aupport order, ancillary to a Texas divorce decree, should be treated the same as a petition 

received under the Act from an out-of-state 

plaintiff. There la no exception within Artlcle 2328b-4, V.C.S., to the general rule that 

an action th+reunder may be enforced against 

a defendant by any Texas district court that 

may locate defendant or his property within' 

Its juriadiotlonal boundaries. There la no 

reason for a court to wlah to engraft such an 

exceotion on Article 2328b-4 as was engrafted 

In the case of Freeland vi Freelana on-the 

repealed Articles~ 2326b 1 232t)b-2,2328b-3, 

V.C.S.. Under the repekd Artiolea, a Texas 

plaintiff oould have her support order'enforoed only by the Texas court entering the 

order. This Is not true under Article 2328b-4. 

Yours very truly; 

WAGGOWERCARR 

Attorney Qeneral of Texas 

Attorney Gsneral 

-2901- 
. . 

"lion. Doug Crowh, page 10 (C,ggg)." 

. 

LCrcm 

APPRm: 

OPINION COMIUTTEE 

w. v, Qsppert, Cbaltraun 

John Banks 

John Moves 

Robert Owen 

Douglas Chllton 

APPROVED FOR ~!&a ATTORNE? cmNBRA& 

By2 T. B. Wright 

-2902-