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• OFF SECY OF DEFENSE , 

Here is the memorandum on MOL which• 

covers the points that Din Land and I covered verbally, 

with you last week. I have also attached a copy of 

a memorandum to the President which I hope to get ' 

to him tomorrow morning, and I Would be happy to 

have your comments about it., The reason for my 

haste is the imminency of my trip to Korea which will 

keep me away until late July. 

Donald F. Hornig 

SpeciallAssistant for . 

Science and• Technolo 

Honorable Robert S. McNama.”: 

Secretary of Defense 

The Pentagon . , 

Washington, • D. C. 

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DORIA.N 

WASHINGTON 

June' 30,- 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'. 

•i .r• 

..r • .; I should like to pass on to you my. current thin.king in connection with 

the MOL program, - based on the .work of my special MOL Panel under 

• the chairmanship of Dr. Edward 4..:Purdel? and on discussions with 

Dr., _Edwin H. Land. . 

Since the MOL propose/ would builda full scale prototype of a manned 

high resolution photographic system, I should firit address myself briefl • 

to. the question of the value that should be-assigned to high resolution photo 

graphy in general. I know of no way to make a quantitative assessment 

in this area. However, it seems to me that our experience in occasions 

'of national crisis and at other times when certain critical questions could 

not be fully answ.eredxcept with.a hi•glier'iresolUtion than we have avaiIeble 

..are sufficient to put very great value on thehighest possible resolutio 

Thus, I would be willing .to ,pay a great deal for a system which had thie 

:capability. At the same time, however, 'I .must also note that there..ate 

other, perhaps ecuaIly urgent, intelligence requirements for quick re 

f. sponse at times of crisis and low vulnerabilitY,fot active war 

"These will' not be satisfied by MOL.. Ifthere Were, a system filing these'; 

needs in competition with MOL, a. choi6ebetween the two would be very.' 

difficult indeed. Although there is het'noW such a system, any expenditures 

that we may make:on MOL 'should not be elloWed to reduce the intensity 

our future efforts to satildi the still outstanding '- 

With regard to the MOL proposal'itself, the Air Force has done an 

exceedingly thorough analysis of both tFieiria.nned and unmanned syStern 

alternatives fora high resolution.OPtical reconnaissance system. It 

has, in my opinion, documented a peritiiiive argument that, for equel 

total weights and total VoluMes,1 the manned .system does have an a.dvan.- 

. 

.tage over the unmanned 'System,. and can.be expected to provide a higher :'r 

average 'resoluon at an earlier timethaiitheI.Unrnanned system. " 

.therefore, would support' approve.l of the.1MOL program. I would point 

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out that we should expect difficult technical problems in building the 

.mirror necessary for such system, a capability yet to be demonstrated. 

However, I believe that this risk is acceptable. 

. . 

It is important to emphasize that the conclusions about the relative merits 

of manned and unmanned systems assume the use of a technology about 

which we are reasonably confident.-Althoughthis is an appropriate 

:.assumption to make, we should recognize the possibility that the unmet-me& 

system falls short'in this concxparisim because, for the very sophisticated. 

type of system that we are discussing here, relatively little effort'has 

::been devoted to solving the problems inherent in automatic pattern recog 

ration, imacxe motion Compensation and precise pointing to the accuracy 

•;i:required for this purpose.' am personally convinced that if sufficient 

competence, imagination and effort were devoted to the development 

of the neqssary automatic subsystems, •the margin that now elists in 

favor of the manned system could in time be largely eliminated. 

would al. o like to mention several additional factors which are pertinent 

to a discu sion of 'manned vs, unmanned' systems. 'First, although avail 

able evidence makes us reasonably confident that man is physiologicall 

and psychologically capable of performing as, required by MOL, this cap-

.:•abilityy is still to be demOnatrated, and it is poSaible that the flight tests 

;will showat the manned system does, not perforth as well as predicted: 

•Second, it eems reasonable to anticipate the_pOssibilities that eifher. 

t1 

ublic reection agaixtst MOL as an invasion of priNaoY or international' 

oppositien to manned overflights may prevent the use of a marined system 

Although both the. risks seem acceptable froth the financial standpoint 

and should not therefore prevent initiation of the development of the /vIO 

they are serious enough politically tO Warrant our taking action to. PrOVi 

for the eventuality that an'unmanned,rather- than manned, system will ..., 7 I' be required. In adclition, it seems quite possiblehat from an operationa iz• 

standpoint, .an ^unmanned System will'eyetitually be desired to compleMen_ 

the manned system by performing the more routine reconnaissance •iziisstoxis 

or be available in. special Circumstencee,.suCh as, for 'example, in..44`: 

. , 

-of threats aiainst the system by,the- other bide 

For theie reasons,. I urge thatinclude you -es an integral pt ar of . ..• 

MOL- program a Major. effOrttd developthose subsystems which would be _ . 

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necessary for a high resolution unmanned system; so that if the ma,nned 

vehicle turns out to be unuseable, an unmanned system can. beput into 

operation reasonably soon thereafter. I see no reason why an immediate, , 

effort on the critical autoMatic subsystemsshould perturb the progress of .- 

. 

• the MOL development program in its initial phases. However, a deCision. 

would have to be made rather early in the program about how the capability 

,:-for the unmanned alternative would be carried forward. Irecommend; 

that this be done by building the MOL telescope-camera so that it can be 

operated in either the manned or the unmanned mode, using the same 

,essential components of the optical system for ea.cli mode. Naturally, 

the consequences of this reconimendation Muit be worked out in detail 

to determine whether it would entail an unreasonable increase in cost 

or :a serious degradation of performance as compared to the other alternatives. I also recommend a study inte the pOssibility of building an -1} ., alternate module for that portion of the'payload Occupied by the Gernini 

Living Module. which would provide additional film, recovery capsules r

or propulsion for the system when used in the unmanned mode. 

1 

Turning now to the impact of MOL on our Programs and policies, there: 

is an important question regarding the relationship of. MOL to NASA 

programs. The Air Force has suggested, and it is certainly quite true; 

that in the living compartment to be :,developed for MOL certain NASA 

experiments could be conducted. 'Howeyer, I regard:these experirp.ents 

- as relatively trivial when compared to the over,;,a.1.1. NASA prograMiai: 

' to the major justifidation of the MOL itself..::•lt, seems to me, therefore 

that it would be in the best interests of the military progra.m., the peaCe, 

.ful image of the NASA, programs, and' good relationships between DOD 

and NASA if the MOL capability for -non.Zinilitari'experiments Were 

excluded from the initial program objeEtiiies''atid from such minim 

public a.n.n.ouncements aboUt the prograiri.'akMaybe- necessary; Natural 

I do not mean this to preclUdo the eyentUil‘iiae ofavaiiable space to the 

advantage of the over-all program, -onto.:thefittlire use by .NASA of 

subsystems or modules developed bi:MOL- iimaY be appropriate to 

. 

NASA's program and as available froiri'Ia 

Finally, I believe that very serious political :questions arise from 

MOL program. One is the concerp.,: -already mentioned above, that MOLas a, manned militar9-.vehiOIe.With.pofential ObServation capability mayrbe 

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objected to, and perhaps threatened, by the USSR. On the other hand, 

if acceptance is achieved, MOL Could contribute to the recognition of 

manned observation and surveillance as 'a normal, mode 'of international • 

behavior. • 

Another, more serious, concern arises from the possibility that the mode 

of data recovery from the MOL, if detected by the intelligence of the other .: 

side and combined with inferences about observation devices, might be 

construed as demonstrating an active'weapons system capability for the 

spacecraft. I therefore recommend that consideration at the highest 

level be given'to questions such as these so that (a) our public statements 

about the MOL are carefully devised to maximize the likelihood of ultimate 

• acceptance of the program, and (b) when the first manned flights are 

imrain.ent we have, to the best of our ability, assessed the political risks 

involved and devised detailed responses; for the various contingencies Which: ,, 

may occur. 

• 

In summary, I would support the approval of the.MOL provided plans are. 

made to concurrently develop an unmanned operational capability for the 

system, and recommend the following actions: simultaneous initiation of 

a well supported program to develop the automatic subsystems necessary:., 

for unmanned operations, and a redesign of the MOL telescope-camera ..'• •• 

for dual mode operation. At the same time, I would urge• you to continue:: 

-to seek further systems which can satisfy the intelligence needs not met ' 

• by MOL. I will be happy to give whatever assistance 1,can to you and to' 

. the Director of the NRO in forming plans for the MOL development and 

particularly for the automatic subsystem development. 

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D R'A.r T# 1. 

• ,Tune_ 30, 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

THE PRESIDENT 

!'• During the budget discussions last Fall, you decided to put $150 million.' • 

•', in the DOD budget for the proposed Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) 

program, but to withhold release of the funds until further studies were 1. conducted by the Air Force and the results reviewed by Mr. McNarnara 

and myself. For my review, I used the services of the regularly 

'established Space Panels of‘:the P6A.C, which have studied potential 

t'•1 1.orbital experiments for a year •or more, and an ad hoc MOL Panel to • 

l!loOk at the special. military proposals. • 

in.itThe Air Force studies and my review'have now been complete& The 

currently propoted MOL program would build and flight test, a ful.), scale 

prototype of a manned high resolution photographic satellite. Operational 

:missions could follow immediately after the last MOL flight in about, 

1970. I believe that the MOL program will provide a substantial increase. 

to Our-reconnaissance capability by developing a system which could, 

for example, resolve so well that we could even discover the presence of'; 

human beings in our overflight photography. 

I, therefore, recommend that we initiate development of the MOL and 1, 

have so informed Mr. McNamara by.the attached memorandum. 

•• If we go ahead with the development 'program, however, I believe we • 

must: prepare to assume serious political risks as we go into the flight 

tests' themselves. We should give, consideration• at the highest level to 

• the contingencies which may occur so that one day we are not caught by 

surprise by the intensity of the reaction abroad as we. were when the II-2 

• was shot down over the USSR. ::• Xt,•is'true that, unmanned satellite reconn- 

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aissance has been used and accepted by both sides. However, it is 

possible that manned satellite surveillance could be considered "overflight" 

with all its connotations. It is also possible that MOL will be construed 

• by the USSR as a weaponi system,in,space capable of launching bombs 

from orbit. We must certainly consider how likely it is that such an • 

interpretation could be made, whether the leaders of the USSR could 

4 • tolerate the existence of MOL' if such an interpretation is made, and what 

their reaction might be. We should, perhaps, ask what our own response 

Would be if the other side orbited a long-lived space station and announced 

that it was conducting military experiments. In this context it is worth 

noting that although we must maintain the highest possible security , 

around the program, it will probably not be possible to conceal from the :•.: 

• public press the fact that MOL is a manned program to perform undefined 

"military experiments" nor, because 'of the size of the recovery forces/ • 

required for manned flights, will it belikely that we can conceal the 

flight tests when they are conducted.. 

• 

the other hand, manned activities:in:Orbit halie become somewhat • 

routinely accepted over the past years, and it is' possible that MOL will • 

also achieve acceptance if introduced to the public in a careful manner. .2to 

.If so, the program may make a' substantial contribution to the recognition 

;of manned observation and surveillance as a. normal mode of international 

behavior.. . 

:therefore, recommend that high lever political oversight be given to the 

' problems: 4 g 

t ;: 

a. The extent to which*.the.public should be informed about 

.."MOL and the method by;which the program is introduced so 

• that we establish, righttfrom the start, a picture of MOL.Nyhic 

will give it the best chance..of gaining acceptance by:the . 0 

t:{-.7 international cornmunity.1.4,1•., • 

b. The contingencies thaernight arise if the flights are not 

accepted, and the detailid plans .for meeting those contingen.cies 

if they occur. *".P • . • • 

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