IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 57480-2-II

GERALD LOYAL-JOSEPH OKARSKI,

 Petitioner. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

VELJACIC, J. – Gerald Okarski seeks relief from personal restraint imposed following his 

2009 guilty pleas to rape of a child in the second degree and rape of a child in the third degree. 

This is Okarski’s second personal restraint petition (PRP). The issue before us is whether 

Okarski’s current petition is timely because his judgment and sentence is facially invalid because 

several of his community custody conditions are unconstitutional. The State concedes that one of 

the conditions is unconstitutional. We agree that Okarski raises at least one claim of facial 

invalidity that satisfies the time-bar exception. But because this is a successive petition, we cannot 

review it. Accordingly, we transfer Okarski’s PRP to the Supreme Court for consideration.

FACTS

Okarski and AME were in a sexual relationship when AME was between 13 and 14 years 

old and Okarski was between 17 and 18 years old. AME’s mother contacted law enforcement. 

The State charged Okarski with rape of a child in the second degree and rape of a child in the third 

degree. Okarski agreed to plead guilty to the charges in exchange for a recommendation that the 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

May 9, 2023
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trial court impose a sentence under the Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA) 

statute, RCW 9.94A.670. 

The trial court agreed to impose a SSOSA sentence of 130 months of confinement with all 

but 6 months suspended followed by community custody for life. Relevant to this petition, the 

trial court imposed a community custody condition that Okarski “not have access to the Internet.”1 

Br. of Resp’t App. at 37.

The trial court later revoked Okarski’s SSOSA because he violated the terms of his 

sentence. This court affirmed. See Ruling Affirming Judgment and Sentence, State v. Okarski, 

No. 41363-9-II (July 11, 2011). And the matter mandated on May 18, 2012. See Mandate, State 

v. Okarski, No. 41363-9-II (May 18, 2012).

Okarski filed a timely PRP in 2012, challenging the legal financial obligations imposed by 

the trial court on his judgment and sentence. See Order Dismissing Petition, In re Pers. Restraint 

of Okarski, No. 43976-0-II (May 22, 2013). We dismissed the petition under RAP 16.11(b). Id. 

Okarski filed this, his second PRP, on May 27, 2022. 

ANALYSIS

Okarski contends that his community custody condition that he not have access to the 

internet is unconstitutional. The State concedes that this condition is unconstitutional. We accept 

the State’s concession. 

 

1 Both Okarski and the State allege that this condition includes the additional language “unless 

such access is approved in advance by the supervising [community corrections officer].” PRP at 

2; Br. of Resp’t at 7. Both parties cite to an attachment to Okarski’s PRP, which is a printed list 

from the Offender Management Network Information (OMNI) webpage, which includes this 

language. However, our focus is on the facial validity of the judgment and sentence. RCW 

10.73.090(1). Therefore, we address this condition as set forth in the judgement and sentence. 
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I. TIMELINESS OF PETITION 

RCW 10.73.090(1) requires that a petition be filed within one year of the date that the 

petitioner’s judgment and sentence becomes final. Okarski’s judgment and sentence became final 

on the date his direct appeal mandated in 2012. RCW 10.73.090(3)(b). Okarski did not file his 

current petition until 2022, well over one year later. Therefore, this petition is time barred unless 

Okarski establishes that one of the six time-bar exceptions set out in RCW 10.73.100 applies to 

his arguments or that his judgment and sentence is facially invalid or was not rendered by a court 

of competent jurisdiction. RCW 10.73.090(1); In re Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d 

695, 702, 72 P.3d 703 (2003).

Our focus is on the facial invalidity exception. We accept the State’s concession that the 

judgment and sentence here appears facially invalid. This facial invalidity satisfies RCW 

10.73.090(1)’s exception to the one-year time bar for collateral attacks. 

We next turn to whether we must transfer this matter to our Supreme Court under the 

successive petition rule. 

II. SUCCESSIVE PETITION RULE 

Under RCW 10.73.140, we will not consider a subsequent PRP unless the petitioner, 

“certifies that he or she has not filed a previous petition on similar grounds, and shows good cause 

why the petitioner did not raise the new grounds in the previous petition.” This statute further 

directs that “[i]f upon review, the court of appeals finds that the petitioner has previously raised 

the same grounds for review, or that the petitioner has failed to show good cause why the ground 

was not raised earlier, the court of appeals shall dismiss the petition on its own motion without 

requiring the state to respond to the petition.” RCW 10.73.140
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But RCW 10.73.140 cannot be applied in isolation. In re Pers. Restraint of Bell, 187 Wn.2d 

558, 562, 387 P.3d 719 (2017). In In re Personal Restraint of Perkins, 143 Wn.2d 261, 266, 19 

P.3d 1027 (2001), the Supreme Court held that RCW 10.73.140, which applies only to the court 

of appeals, must be considered in light of the directive in RCW 2.06.030 that “[n]o case, appeal or 

petition for a writ filed in the supreme court or the court shall be dismissed for the reason that it 

was not filed in the proper court, but it shall be transferred to the proper court.” Accordingly, 

when the court of appeals does not have authority to consider a petition on a particular basis that 

the Supreme Court may consider, the petition should be transferred “to the proper court” rather 

than dismissed. Id. Thus, RCW 2.06.030 compels the court of appeals to transfer a successive 

petition that raises new grounds without a showing of good cause, and that is not time barred, to 

the Supreme Court. Bell, 187 Wn.2d at 562.

In Okarski’s first PRP, he argued that his legal financial obligations were wrongly imposed. 

In his current PRP, he argues that some of his community custody conditions were wrongly 

imposed. He fails to show good cause why his current arguments were not raised in his first PRP. 

Accordingly, Okarski’s current petition is successive to his first and must be transferred to the 

Supreme Court. 

CONCLUSION

We conclude Okarski’s raises at least one issue in his PRP that appears timely, but the PRP 

is successive. Therefore, we transfer this petition to the Supreme Court for review.
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Veljacic, J.

We concur:

Glasgow, C.J.

Che, J.