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Contents 

Section 

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Page 

Preface ........................................................................................................... v 

1 Problem: A Closed Society ................................................................. 1 

2 Faith: The Space Potential.. ................................................................ 3 

Origins of Weapon System 1171 (The Advanced 

Reconnaissance System) ......................................................... 3 

Policy Obstacles to WS-1171 Development.. ............................ 5 

Open Skies ................................................................................. 7 

An Alternative: 'Second Story' ................................................. 10 

Sputnik-I Breaks the Impasse ................................................... 13 

CORONA is Born ..................................................................... 15 

The ARPA Factor ...................................................................... 21 

Discoverer and CORONA ........................................................ 23 

CORONA Design Evolution and Contractor 

Selections .............................................................................. 23 

The Choice of a CORONA Camera ......................................... 26 

Formal CORONA Proposal to the President.. ......................... 27 

CORONA Arrangements ................................... 28 

CORONA ............................................................... 32 

Special CORONA Security Arrangements ............................... 32 

Problems of Growth and Change ............................................ 34 

Separating CORONA From WS-117L ...................................... 3S 

The CORONA Launching Site ................................................. 36 

The CORONA Recovery Capability ......................................... 37 

CORONA Contractor Arrangements and Progress ................ 38 

CORONA Management Arrangements: The ARPA 

Factor Revisited .................................................................... 39 

Improving CORONA Cover and Security ................................ 43 

The Early Flight Program .......................................................... 47 

3 Achievement: A New Vantage ......................................................... S9 

CORONA Security: Assessment and Conjectures .................. 63 

CORONA Security: The United Nations and National 

Policy ..................................................................................... 64 

The National Reconnaissance Office ....................................... 67 

System Improvement: C' to Mural.. ......................................... 7S 

CORONA-Mural ....................................................................... 80 

CORONA and the NRO ........................................................... 89 

CORONA-J ............................................................................... 93 

4 Fulfillment: The Struggle To Maturity ............................................ 109 

CORONA Improvement Program 0-3) .................................. 1 09 

5 Summary ......................................................................................... 121 

Appendix A ..................................................................................... 123 

The Intelligence Community and CORONA ......................... 123 

ARC, COMOR and COMIREX ............................................... 123 

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Contents (continued) 

Section Page 

Overhead Reconnaissance Product Security ........................ 125 

CORONA Intelligence Achievements .................................... 126 

Appendix 6 ..................................................................................... 129 

Representative CORONA Imagery ........................................ 129 

6-1 Mys Shmidta .............................................................. 131 

6-2 Stalingrad (Volgograd), Kapustin Yar ....................... 133 

6-3 Yurya ......................................................................... 135 

6-4 Olovyannaya ............................................................. 137 

6-5 Tyuratam ................................................................... 139 

6-6 Tatishchevo ............................................................... 141 

6-7 Uzhur ......................................................................... 143 

6-8 Kartaly ....................................................................... 145 

6-9 Plesetsk ...................................................................... 147 

6-10 Tallinn ........................................................................ 149 

6-11 Nikolayev ................................................................... 151 

6-12 Severodvinsk ............................................................. 153 

6-13 Yumenzhan ............................................................... 155 

6-14 Suez Canal ................................................................ 157 

6-15 Krasnoyarsk ............................................................... 159 

References ...................................................................................... 161 

Index ............................................................................................... 167 

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Illustrations 

Page 

USAF MGen Bernard A. Schriever .................................................................. 5 

USAF LCol William G. Ki ........................................................................... 5 

Air Force Secy Donald L. aries ................................................................... 6 

Richard S horn .......................................................................................... 6 

USAF C C.E. Oder .......................................................................... 9 

USAF BGen Osmund Ritland .......................................................................... 9 

Richard M. Bissell, Jr ...................................................................................... 11 

USAF LGen Donald L. Putt ........................................................................... 11 

Defense Secy Charles E. Wilson ................................................................... 13 

Defense Secy Neil H. McElroy ...................................................................... 13 

BGen Andrew J. Goodpaster ........................................................................ 19 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower .................................................................. 19 

Edwin H. land ................................................................................................ 19 

James R. Killian, Jr .......................................................................................... 19 

James W. Plummer ........................................................................................ 26 

USAF Col William A. Sheppard .................................................................... 26 

John Parangosky ............................................................................................ 30 

Eugene P. Kiefer ............................................................................................. 30 

1958 CORONA Organization Chart ............................................................. 31 

Lockheed's Covert 'Advanced Projects' Facility at Hiller Aircraft ............... 33 

USAF LCol Clarence L. Battle, Jr ................................................................... 37 

USAF Col Paul E. Worthman ......................................................................... 37 

t Summary - 1959 ............................................................. 49 

AFBMD s Confer During CORONA Countdown ............................. 50 

Cols Fritz Oder and Ed Blum Await Discoverer Launching ......................... 52 

Ceremony Marking First Recovered Discoverer Payload ........... 54 

t Eisenhower Examines Contents of Discoverer Capsule .............. 54 

AF Secy Dudley Sharp Presents Legion of Merit Medal to Col c.L. Battle. 55 

CORONA Launching Sequence .................................................................... 57 

CORONA Recovery Sequence ..................................................................... 58 

Capt Harold E. Mitchell and Crew Chief of Pelican 9 ................................. 60 

C-119 Making an Air-Catch of a CORONA Capsule ................................... 60 

NRO Director Joseph V.Charyk .................................................................... 68 

DDR Herbert Scoville .................................................................................... 68 

AF Secy Eugene Zuckert ................................................................................ 72 

USAF BGen Robert E. Greer ......................................................................... 72 

DCI Allen W. Dulles ...................................................................................... 73 

DCI John A. McCone .................................................................................... 73 

1962 CORONA Organization Chart ............................................................. 74 

Discoverer Flight Summary - 1960 ............................................................. 79 

Discoverer-XXXVI Ready for Launching ....................................................... 81 

The CORONA Cameras ................................................................................ 83 

Camera Configurations and Characteristics ................................................. 84 

Discoverer Flight Summary - 1961 ............................................................. 86 

Discoverer Flight Summary - 1962 ............................................................. 89 

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James A. Cunningham ................................................................................... 91 

NRO Director Brockway McMillan ............................................................... 91 

Deputy Defense Secy Roswell Gilpatric ....................................................... 93 

DDS& TAlbert D. Wheelon ..................................................................... ···· .. 93 

Thorad-Agena launching Vehicle ................................................................ 95 

Recovery of CORONA Mission 1005 ....................................................... ··· .. 97 

CORONA Flight Summary - 1963 ..................................................... ·· .... · .. 99 

CORONA J-3 Being launched Atop Thorad Booster ................................ 100 

CORONA Flight Summary - 1964-1965 .................................................. 101 

1965 CORONA Organizational Chart ........................................................ 104 

DCI William F. Raborn ................................................................................ 105 

Deputy Defense Secy Cyrus Vance ............................................................ 105 

NRO Director Alexander Flax ..................................................................... 106 

John J. Crowley ............................................................................................ 106 

Major Components of the J-3 System ........................................................ 110 

CORONA-HEXAGON Cost Comparison ................................................... 113 

DCI Richard M. Helms ................................................................................ 116 

NRO Director John Mclucas ...................................................................... 116 

CORONA Flight Summary - 1966-1972 .................................................. 119 

CORONA Reconnaissance System ............................................................. 122 

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Preface 

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In the decade following the conclusion of World War II, US defense 

planners were severely hampered by the USSR's Iron Curtain, which stood as 

an almost impenetrable barrier to routine information-gathering. Counteractions, such as high-flying reconnaissance aircraft and camera-carrying 

balloons, were attem but were, at best, last-resort expedients, providing 

a thin trickle of usefu information. 

The war in Korea, the appearance of the Soviet long-range BISON 

bomber, and the test of a Soviet hydrogen bomb in 1953 further accentuated 

and aggravated national concern. In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 

recommended a possible solution: the "Open Skies" proposal which would 

serve as an essential basis for mutual arms control. He was shocked and 

saddened by Soviet Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev's opposition to his offer; 

Eisenhower's memoirs cite this event as convincing evidence of a firm Soviet 

stance on preserving a closed society. 

Although it had been a stro wartime ally, now that the emergency had 

passed, the USSR was drawing her away from the rest of the world, setting 

up puppet governments in occupied Europe, and destabilizing neighboring 

territories in an effort to extend the communist power base. The United States, 

as the undisputed leader of the free world, would be dealing with the Soviet 

Union and its satellites on an entirely new basis. More than ever before, US 

policymakers would need timely, comprehensive, and accurate knowledge of 

events behind the Iron Curtain. 

In 1958, Eisenhower set in motion a new, independent attempt to counter 

the effects of the Iron Curtain. It was a daring attempt, not only politically, but 

technically, for it was to be based on aborning space technology-a realm in 

which lative hypothesis had not yet given way to trustworthy data or 

proven ardware. 

The attempt was given two names. The public christening announced 

Discoverer-a satellite for gathering much-needed scientific information on 

the earth's atmosphere (out to perhaps 125 miles). At a more private 

ceremony, however, the name CORONA was pronounced, accompanied by 

expressions of fervent hope that the satellite would provide much-needed 

photographic reconnaissance of the earth's closed societies. 

This volume is not the first account of the "daring venture." In 1963, 

Robert Perry, then with the Office of the Historian, Space Systems Division, 

USAF, in los Angeles, to collect and study documents available to the 

Air Force's CORONA and to draft an historical narrative. The final 

version of this work was published in 1974. 

Additionally, in 1972, Carl E. Duckett, the CIA's Director for Science and 

Technology, directed CIA Historian Helen Kleyla to incorporate the CORONA 

history as an integral of a history of the Office of Special Projects (1965-

1970). This work was ter expanded and published separately under the title 

"CORONA Program History" by the Air Force Special Projects Production 

Facility in May 1976. 

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Unfortunately, in the mid-1960s growing managerial differences between 

those DoD and CIA principals responsible for the program produced enough 

of a chill that neither of the historical offices had available to it all of the 

resources used by the other. 

In 1984, jimmie D. Hill, Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance 

Office, observed that, with the e of time, much of the in izational friction had muted. He pro p ration of an independent ry 

which would be based upon all mentary resources and would 

strive for a detached, analytical point-of-view. His basic maxim was that 

lessons learned should transcend grievances remembered. 

This volume has been prepared under that sponsorship and uidance. The 

work was done in a warmly cooperative environment in which complete 

files of the DoD and the CIA were made available and possible form of 

support was enthusiasticall iven. Particular mention is of the generous 

cooperation 0 is associates at the National Photographic 

Interpretation Center of the Graphics and Publications Division 

and the staff of the Photograp y ana Printing Division gave most generously of 

their time and talent. 

We owe thanks to the CIA's Office of the Historian and 

Donald E. Welzenbach for his sagacious assistance. Over and a essential 

basic information, he gave us access to his own monographs, some of them 

still in manu . and opened up important new perspectives on the principal 

participants in e program. 

We are equally grateful to Robert Perry for his excellent pioneering 

account of the program, for the keen insight he gave us into contrasting 

approaches in military research and development, and for his steadfastness in 

completing what was, quite literally, a labor of love. 

We have quoted freely and extensively from all previous histories and are 

honored to place this volume in their company. It seems especially appropriate, twenty-five years after the first success of that "daring attempt," to 

complete the story-before the colors fade. 

November 1987 

Sunnyvale, California 

Frederic C.E. Oder 

James C. Fitzpatrick 

Paul E. Worthman 

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Problem: A Closed Society 

The national security situation faced by the United States after World War 

II was unlike an . in its previous e rience. While possessing nuclearweapons capab was soon joined that arena by its former ally, the 

USSR. The United States was clearly the power base of the non-communist 

world and it had to be prepared to deal with the Soviet Union and its satellites 

and allies. Accordin the US licymakers needed timely, comprehensive, 

and accurate knowl e of si nt events on a worldwide basis in order 

that the United States could effectively discharge its leadership role in the 

world. But the Soviet Union was a closed a monolithic police state 

with a fetish for controlling news both internally a externally. 

In addition to the creation of significant intelligence capability in the CIA 

and augmentation of related activities in the Department of Defense, a 

constant need was seen for means of effective collection of useful information 

on events within the boundaries of th ndmass of the USSR. The means 

to accomplish this collection were m ed. Some critical data could be 

gathered by peripheral signals-intelligence sites. Agent operation could be 

accomplished but was very difficult because of the controlled and compartmented nature of most significant Soviet activities. Clearly an effective means 

of overflight or overhead collection was needed and an initial attempt to meet 

this need was made by the U-2 aircraft program. 

In 1946 the Department of Defense (Air Force) started a comprehensive 

study of the feasibility and utility of earth-circling satellites under Project 

RAND.* Eight years later RAND presented "an analysis of the potential of an 

unconventional reconnaissance method" and concluded that "reconnaissance data of considerable value can be obtained and that complete coverage 

of Soviet territory with such pictures will result in a major reversal of our 

strategic intelligence posture with respect to the Soviets." At the same time 

the initiation of h .. y ballistic missile programs in the United States 

would make po e most difficult job of providing orbital velocity 

propulsion. This historical report deals with how the need for reconnaissance 

combined with the new technology to bring photographic reconnaissance 

from space into reality not as an arcane supplement to more conventional 

means but as the main source of imagery critical to our national security. 

*RAND had come into being shortly after World War II as a study effort contracted to Douglas 

Aircraft. RAND was the acronym for Research on America's National Defense. One of the first 

studies concerned the feasibility and utility of an earth-circling satellite. 

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Faith: The Space Potential 

Satellite reconnaissance is best understood in light of the history of earlier 

overhead reconnaissance programs. 

The U-2, which began operating in the summer of 1956, was expected to 

have a relatively short operational lifetime, perhaps no more than several 

years. That expectation was based less on the likelihood of the Soviets 

perfecting a means of shooting the U-2 down than on a pessimistic estimate of 

their ability to develop a radar surveillance network that could track it reliably. 

As it turned out, the United States misjudged the performance characteristics 

and deployment aHem of the Soviet air-surveillance network: their radar 

promptlyacqui and tracked the very first U-2 flight over Soviet territory. 

For nearly four years, the U-2 ranged over much of the world, althou 

only sporadically over the Soviet Union. The effectiveness of the Soviet r 

network was such that each flight risked a protest and a standdown. Clearly, 

some means had to be found to accelerate the development of a less 

vulnerable reconnaissance system. By the time Francis Gary Powers was shot 

down near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960, an alternative means of carrying out 

photographic reconnaissance over the Soviet Union was approaching operational readiness. On 19 August 1960, just 110 days after the sudden termination of the last U-2 Soviet overflight, a critical goal was accomplished: the first 

successful air catch of a capsule of exposed film. This capsule was ejected from 

a ph econnaissance satellite that had completed seven passes over 

deni and 17 orbits of the earth. The feat was the culmination of 

three years of intensive effort to obtain intelligence from an imagery reconnaissance satellite. 

Origins of Weapon System 117L (The Advanced Reconnaissance System) 

At about the time the U-2 first n overflying the Soviet Union, the US 

Air Force was embarking on the d lopment of strategic reconnaissance 

systems employing orbiting satellites in a variety of collection configurations. 

The program, Weapons System 117l (WS-117l), The Advanced Reconnaissance System, had its origins in 1946, when a requirement was placed on 

Project RAND for a study of the technical feasibility of orbiting artificial 

satellites. 1 RAND was soon formed into a separate corporation (a Federal 

Contract Research Corporation). The first real breakthrough had come in 1953 

when the USAF Scientific Advisory Board reported that it was feasible to 

produce relatively small and lightweight thermonuclear warheads. As a result 

of that report, the Atlas ICBM Program was accorded the est priority in 

the Air Force. Since the propulsion required to place a sa ite in orbit is 

about the same as that required to launch an ICBM, the anticipated availability 

'All footnotes can be found after Section 5. 

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of Atlas made it possible to think seriously of launching orbital satellites. The 

requirement for WS-117L was established by General Operational Requirement No. 802 which was levied in 1954 with the stated objective of providing 

surveillance of preselected areas of the world to determine a potential 

enemy's warmaking capability. 

System management responsibility for WS-117L was initially assigned to 

Wright Air Development Center (WADC) but, in October 1955, after preliminary study contracts had been let, the Air Research and Development 

Command (ARDC) transferred custody to its Western Development Division 

(WDD), created about a year earlier to manage the ballistic missile development. This hallmark management design was forcefully pushed by r 

General Bernard A. Schriever, Commander of WDD, and was ma 

Lieutenant General Thomas S. Power, Commander, ARDC, OVer the strong 

objections of general officers from WADC and the ARDC staff. WDD had been 

established with handpicked military personnel and ial reporting 

channels for expediting pr decisions. The dose relation between the 

satellite and its prospective ter, the Atlas, prompted the decision. 

A cadre of WS-117L officers was transferred from WADC to WDD to staff 

the transferred System P Office. On 2 April 1956, the WS-117L System 

Program Office (SPO) p the first complete development plan for a 

reconnaissance satellite, proposing full operational capability by the third 

quarter of 1963. an for an "interim" satellite with "scientific" applications 

had been in January.) Exclusive of facilities, development cost was 

estimated $114.7 million. The first year of system work, fiscal 1957, would 

require $39.1 million. Over the g 10 years, $9.2 million had been 

nded on the program, i RAND studies and all component 

lopments. Despite approval of th development plan (24 July 1956) and 

issuance of a confirming d ment directive (3 August 1956), the financial 

stringency continued; the initia fund allocation for fiscal 1957 was only $3 

million.3 

The planning for WS-117L contemplated a family of separate systems and 

subsystems employing satellites for the collection of photographiC, electronic, 

and infrared intelligence. The program was scheduled to extend beyond 1965 

and was divided into three phases. Phase I, a Thor-boosted test series, was to 

begin in November 1958 and had the primary objective of development/initial 

testing. Phase II, an Atlas-boosted test series, was to begin in June 1959 with 

the objective of completing transition from the testing phase to the operational phase and proving the capability of the Atlas booster to launch heavy loads 

into space. Phase III, the operational series, wa n in March 1960 and 

was to consist of three progressively mor systems: the Pioneer 

version (photographic and electronic) dvanced version (photographic 

and electronic), and the Surveillance version (photographic, electronic, and 

infrared). The photographic payloads (recorded on film, processed onboard 

and readout by a flying spot scanner) were designated E-1, E-2, and E-3; the 

EUNT payloads F-1, F-2, and F-3, etc. Operational control of WS-117L would 

be transferred to the Strategic Air Command with the initiation of Phase III. 

Design studies had been solicited originally in December 1954; Lockheed 

Missiles and Space Division (LMSD) (teamed with Eastman Kodak), Bell 

Telephone Laboratories, Glenn L. Martin Company, and RCA received bid 

invitations. 

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little was known of problems that might arise in a weightless, airless environment. Nor was the need for satellite overflight generally acknowledged. To 

budget-conscious atists, therefore, the entire thesis of satellite reconnaissance seemed . In such reasoning Quarles found ample justification 

for his stubborn refusal to approve the start of a meaningful development 

m. He was more willing to allow relatively low-cost studies to prout further he would not go. The fact that the administration was 

wrestling with a growing financial crisis, which later that year would cause it to 

postpone payments on defense contracts in order to relieve pressure on the 

established national debt limit, gave additional weight to the arguments of the 

economy bloc. 

Perhaps equally critical to the future of the WS-117L program was the 

intransigence of administration advisors on the "space for peace" policy. The 

difficulty was not a simple one. In many respects it stemmed from the mid1955 decision that the United States would participate in the International 

Geophysical Year satellite activity but that such participation would be limited 

to non-military "hardware." Whatever the public relations merit of this policy, 

it effectively eliminated ballistic missiles from consideration as space boosters 

and encouraged independent development of a system like Vanguard. 

Open Skies 

Although not clearly drawn, the "peaceful" issue stemmed from uncertainty about the legality, under international law, of satellite operations. As 

10 as icymakers in the national military establishment doubted the 

nical of satellite operations, they were spared the need to 

consider h over national borders affected space operations. Even 

when technical fea ility was conceded, the absence of a realistic, funded 

development program made such discussions academic. It is not surprising, 

therefore, that concern for the jurisdictional complications that might arise 

from satellite operations was largely confined to a small circle of space flight 

devotees and to a few specialists in international law. With minor exceptions, 

most secretariat-level policymakers considered the entire subject a waste of 

time and money. The idea of introducing paramilitary vehicles into space, 

particularly if they were to have known reconnaissance capability, ran counter 

to instincts of the State Department and hence of the administration. 

The Air Force and the RAND Corporation, along with professional 

societies, had addressed the issue of space flight and international law without 

conclusive results. There were no precedent cases and attempts to use 

maritime or aircraft analogies were unconvincing. 

In July 1955, as part of a determined US effort to arrive at a technique of 

arms control acceptable to the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower proposed 

"mutual air reconnaissance" as a means of policing international disarmament. A somewhat similar concept had been embodied in the 1946 "Baruch 

Plan" for international control of nuclear weapons. Predictably, the Soviet 

Union endorsed the idea "in principle" but found excellent reasons for 

opposing its application. The traditional Soviet deference to "airspace sovereignty" was unquestionably a factor. Yet three months earlier, in April 1955, 

the Soviets had openly announced their intention of orbiting various scientific 

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satellites and had identified "photogra hic equipment" as a portion of the 

proposed cargo. The United States f ed suit, in July 1955, with an 

announcement of its own scientific satellite. 

The USSR's obvious mistrust of the original Eisenhower inspection proposal convinced leghorn that negotiating a mutually acceptable "open skies" 

inspection agreement with the Soviets would be "virtually impossible." 

Assuming that WS-1171 eventually would be funded at a respectable level and 

thus would lead to an operationally eligible reconnaissance satellite by 1959-

60, leghorn s ested that the WS-1171 or a similar vehicle be used for covert 

overflights of e Soviet landmass. In July 1956 he updated his earlier paper 

and sent a copy to Schriever. 

By 1955, overflight, whether covert, overt in the face of Soviet protests, or 

openly conducted under the sponsorship of some international agency, was 

very nearly an essential of national security for the United States. like 

espionage, overflight was a customary, if seldom acknowledged, instrument of 

peacetime military activity. The closed and police state nature of the Soviet 

Union made classical human agent collection very difficult. While peripheral 

sites were effective for some types of collection, the realities of the situation 

put even greater emphasis on overflight to provide information vital to the 

United States. Incidents involving both Soviet and American aircraft were 

common to the fringes of both the iron and bamboo curtains during the late 

1940s. Neither side ever admitted a deliberate policy of aerial . on age, but 

its existence was indisputable. Aircraft range limitations and ability to 

conventional air-defense measures made deep penetrations of Soviet airspace 

infrequent and dangerous. The enormous breadth of the Soviet Union diluted 

the worth of shallow penetrations. Some indication of the value of border-toborder passes was provided by a succession of unmanned balloon photographic reconnaissance overfli hts conducted under a covert known 

as GENETRIX during a pe . in January and February 1956. hough the 

United States consistently denied a GENETRIX overflight intention, the effort 

was canceled because of the violence of Soviet protests (which were heightened the fact that similar balloons were used to release propaganda 

materia deep behind the Iron Curtain). 

A determined effort to use aircraft reconnaissance capability (with a 

potential for greater selectivity and accuracy than the random-path balloon 

operations) had begun in 1954. It included the "big wing" B-57D aircraft and 

the still-embryonic joint CIA-USAF U-2 as well as studies of more ambitious 

ultra-high-altitude winged vehicles, both manned and unmanned. 

orn's endorsement of satellite reconnaissance was based on the 

th an orbiting camera would be more difficult to disable than cameras 

carried in balloons and aircraft. Also, his thesis an ublicized 

series of successful satellite reconnaissance fli ight reaso y be followed by a discreet diplomatic approach to the Soviet Union, the presentation 

of copies of the reconnaissance imagery, and a private a reement that the 

Soviets were free to reap any propaganda credit they ch if they would but 

propose interference-free satellite inspections as an international modus 

vivendi. 

Although leghorn's ideas were well known to both Schriever and his WS117l chief, Colonel Frederic C. E. Oder, they were of little more than 

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critical need for satellite-obtained intelligence, the advantages of a military 

over a civilian-managed approach, and the rationale for continued Air Force 

conduct of the program. Shortly thereafter, the increasingly ave financial 

crisis obliged the WS-117L Project Office to submit a . development 

plan that incorporated an "austere" as well as a "desirable" bu 

By late July, spending ceilings had been imposed which limited L a 

maximum of $4.8 million for the first half of the fiscal year and to a possible 

total of $10 million for the entire year. Colonel Oder had earlier defined a 

$46.9 million requirement as the minimum needed to maintain hopes for a first 

launching by 1960.5 

An Alternative: 'Second Story' 

Well in advance of official notification that pr ram funds would be 

virtually nonexistent during fiscal 1958, Colonel Oder nformally proposed 

to General Schriever an alternate approach called 'Second Story.' (Colonel 

Oder's secretary invented the name to identify the file of working papers 

which had to be part from other WS-117L documents. 'Second Story' 

implied a cover leg rather than an upper floor.) 'Second Story' evolved 

because Schriever's uty, Brigadier General Osmund Ritland, had previously worked closely the CIA as U-2 . officer and Oder had been 

assigned to CIA before he came to work riever. This concept was built 

around three preconditions: covert overflight; participation of the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA); and program acceleration. It involved an announced cancellation of the WS-117L program, an overt establishment of an 

Air Force scientific satellite "ect as a follow-on to the marginally-limited 

Vanguard, and covert reesta of the reconnaissance program under 

overall cognizance of the CIA, with the Western Development Division 

retaining technical management responsibilities. 

Early in Au ust 1957, it was generally believed that the Soviets would orbit 

a scientific ite somewhat larger than Vanguard but probably smaller than 

the WS-1171 vehicle. If that assumption were accepted, a ion of the 

'Second Story' approach would leave undisturbed the offici "space for 

peace" motif, would permit the eventual accumulation of significantly more 

scientific data than Vanguard could collect, would demonstrate the continuing 

technical 'ority of the United States, and would still permit the collection 

of highly intelligence information. 6 It seemed to have some attraction 

for everybody concerned. 

Sporadic attempts to obtain relief from the WS-117L expenditure ceiling 

during the late summer of 1957 were repetitiously unsuccessful. Early in 

September, Lieutenant General Donald L. Putt, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Development, secured permission for the start of work on a mockup of the 

Lockheed per e vehicle and for fabrication of hardware items that had 

to be sed in advance if an experimental satellite were to be flown 

during 1960. But restatements of the fiscal 1958 funding requirements, and 

their endorsement by the Air Council, had no effect. The purse remained 

closed. 

The satellite program was not alone in that situation. Virtually every major 

development effort, including ballistic missiles, was affected. Expenditure 

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The 'Second Story' proposal had been entirely concocted within 

Schriever's own organization and had not thus far been introduced into 

"normal" channels. General Putt and his immediate aides had been the 

principal contacts in Air Force headquarters. Through Putt, Schriever scheduled a formal meeting with State and CIA for late September, by which time he 

planned to have the 'Second Story' proposal in a form suitable for official 

submission. 

While in the Pentagon on 10 September, General Schriever signed a 

letterS to Lieutenant General Samuel E. Anderson, Air Research and Develo 

ment Commander, recommending conversion of WS-117l to a scien 

satellite. Colonel Oder persona took it to General Anderson that afternoon, 

seizing the opportunity of its d ry to brief him on the background of the 

proposal and its real purpose. Unfortunately for the schedule earlier mapped 

out, General Anderson instructed his hea uarters staff to prepare and 

coordinate an endorsement to Air Force he ers. For several days the 

ARDC staff group debated the merits of various responses and then produced 

an unenthusiastic letter which, in the later view of at least one 'Second Story' 

was worse than no response at all. (The possibility that the 

"endorsement" was composed by officers unaware of its actual 

motivation cannot be dismissed, but neither can it be satisfactorily explained. 

It is far more likel hat Anderson's staff acted out of native dislike for a 

scheme that would emoved yet another major program from ARDC staff 

control, as had with the whole of the ballistic missile effort.) 

Consquently, the "f I" Schriever had wanted Anderson to send 

to the Air Force Chief of Sta proved both late and ineffective. 

By late September, the complications inherent in coordinating the proposals with all the authorities involved in scientific and military satellite 

programs had effectively impeded progress toward Schriever's goal. Early that 

month, he had learned of a artment of Defense decision to re-activate the 

"Stewart Committee" (an hoc committee under Professor Homer J. 

Stewart, of the California Institute of Technology established to provide 

oversight to Vanguard) that had recommended the original Vanguard m 

and had later rejected Army and Air Force backup proposals. at 

the Stewart Committee was to be the chief executive agency in selection of an 

advanced scientific satellite. In its turn, the revived Stewart Committee 

planned to call on the services to submit proposals for such advanced 

satellites; the invitation was to be issued between November 1957 and January 

1958.9 

General Schriever also learned that an "influential DoD consultant" was 

preparing a memorandum for William M. Holaday, the Defense Department's 

Director of Guided Missiles, calli for establishment of a national policy on 

space exploration and unfavo analyzing the feasibility of a WS-117l 

scientific satellite. Arguments against the "scientific WS-117l" included the 

lack of agreement within the Air Force on the value of such a satellite, the 

security complications inherent in a scientific satellite using military hardware, 

and interference of a scientific satellite program with the military 

satel ite effort. 

Of course, the 'Second Story,' as refined, summarily disposed of such 

objections by transforming the WS-117l reconnaissance activity into a covert 

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Essential funds, long delayed by dissension over the feasibility of, and the real 

requirement for, a reconnaissance satellite, could be expected shortly. However, a subsequent attempt to convince the then of Defense, 

Donald A. Quarles, that WS-117L should be accel was generally unsuccessful, and, under pressure from Quarles, Air Force Secretary James A. 

Douglas hedged his earlier approval of program acceleration. Putt, working 

desperately to overcome secretarial inertia, secured permission from Douglas 

to present the issue directly to McElroy for resolution and simultaneously 

urged General Anderson to submit a plan for an early Air Force "space 

spectacular" which would enhance the possibility . priate WS117L fun 10 At the same time, General White, g command 

channels in e interest of speed, instructed BMD to propose a new ballistic 

missile and ace program at a funding level of $300 to $500 million above the 

current fi 1959 ceiling, thus increasing the level of effort to " . .. the 

maximum possible in terms of technical and operational capabilities." 

The 0 timism of the Air Staff and of General White proved justified. On 29 

October Putt briefed him on the WS-1 am, Defense Secretary 

McElroy reversed the Quarles decision of 16 nd asked to be advised 

on how the satellite program could be accelerated. Three days later he 

authorized the Air Force to proceed "at the maximum rate consistent with 

good management."11 

For the moment, 'Second Story' was submerged in a welter of pro 

acceleration plans, and suggestions for "interim" satellites, both scienti 

military. In part because of the consternation caused by Sputnik and by 

immediately subsequent failures in several hasty and overpublicized attempts 

to orbit "something" made in the United States, WS-117L acquired the support so long withheld. But beneath the surface there flowed an undercurrent 

of reluctance to sponsor an open reconnaissance satellite program which, by 

antagonizing the Soviets, would weaken the prospect of relaxing world tensions or reaching t on other points at issue. Additionally, there were 

psychological ob to securing uninhibited approval of a major space 

p . President Eisenhower resented the inference that his administration 

h lax in supporting earlier space and missile proposals, so there was 

continued reluctance to approve program accelerations which indicated that 

crash efforts were necessary to overcome earlier . Finally, notwithstanding the evidence at hand, a convict' . h levels that the entire 

space program was more a matter of pu ions of engineering, and 

that nothing useful could come of an investment in satellite development. 12 

Even though WS-117L had finally been approved and funded, much 

remained to be done before the United States acquired a satellite reconnaissance capability. It was an ambitious and complex program that was pioneering in technical fields about which little was known. The program suffered 

from insufficient funding, and, not surprisingly, it had become apparent, by the 

end of 1957, that the m was running behind schedule. It also was in 

trouble from the sta point of security. The U-2 program had been carried 

out in secret from 1956 until May 1960. The Soviet Government knew about it, 

of course, but chose to allow it to remain secret from the general Soviet public 

(and from most of the official community) in preference to publicizing its 

existence and thereby admitting that they lacked a means of defending their 

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airspace against a high-flying aircraft. WS-117l was undertaken as a classified 

project, alt h its existence was not concealed. Program details were reported to, approved by, Congress. The press soon began publishing 

stories on the nature of the program, correctly identifying it as involving 

military reconnaissance satellites, and referring to it as "Big Brother" and "Spy 

in the Sky." 

There was a related consideration that affected the views of Schriever and 

his people at that time. Air Force plans were that WS-117L as a "weapon 

system" would be operated by the St Command (SAC); a Weapon 

System Phasing Group had been formed the transition from BMD to 

SAC. It had become clear to Schriever, Rit nel W. A. ("Red") Sheppard, BMD Plans Chief, Oder and Major Raymond Zelenka, WS-117L Plans 

Chief, that satellite launching and operation would have a high enginee . 

content. Such skills were not forseeably available within the Air Force 

even contractors would be stretched by the demands and would be required 

to participate in the operational phase of the program to a degree that would 

be inconsistent with SAC policy. This was another reason for WS-117L to be 

managed in a nonstandard fashion. 

Against this background, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign 

Intelligence Activities submitted its semiannual report to the president on 24 

October 1957. The Board noted that it had considered two advanced reconnaissance approaches. One was contained in a study then in progress in the 

CIA concerning a manned reconnaissance aircraft designed for greatly increased ce and reduced radar cross-section; the other was WS117L. Kil ian had been persuaded to change his mind about satellites, or at 

least to listen tations about them. There appeared to be little likelihood that eit efforts could produce operational systems earlier 

than mid-1959, without increased funding and decisive management actions. 

The Board emphasized the need for an interim photo reconnaissance system 

and recommended that an early review be made of new developments to 

ensure that they were given adequate consideration and received r 

funding in the light of pressing intelligence requirements. On 28 r 

1957, Mr. James Lay, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, 

notified Secretary of Defense McElroy and DCI Dulles that the president had 

asked for a joint rt from them on the status of the advanced systems. 

Quarles respond behalf of himself and Allen Dulles on 5 December that, 

. to the extreme sensitivity of the subject, details on the new systems be 

furnis ed only through oral briefings. 

CORONA is Born 

As a consequence of that approach, there are few official records in the 

project files bearing dates between 5 December 1957 and 28 February 1958. 

Another reason, certainly, is that President Eisenhower suffered a stroke on 25 

November. It is clear, however, that major decisions were made and that 

important actions were undertaken during the period. In brief, it was decided 

that the portion of WS-117L offering the best p of success should 

be separated from WS-117L. This effort would ign as project CORONA and placed under a joint CIA-Air Force management team, an approach that had been so successful in the covert development and operation 

of the U-2. 

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The nucleus of a team was constituted in the CIA Development Projects 

Staff under the direction of Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to the DCI for 

Plans and Development. Bissell was designated as the senior CIA representative on the new venture; his Air Force counterpart was Osmund Ritland, who 

had previously served as Bissell's first deputy in the U-2 activities of the CIA 

Development Projects Staff and who was now Vice Commander of the Air 

Force Ballistic Missile Division. 

Bissell recalls that he first learned of the role intended for him "in an odd 

and informal way" from Dr. Edwin land who headed a CIA panel of technical 

consultants informally known as the land Panel. Bissell also recalls that his 

early instructions were extremely vague: that the subsystem was to be 

developed out of work accomplished under WS-117l, that it was to be placed 

under separate covert management, and that the management pattern established for the development of the U-2 was to be followed. 

Trailing after the USSR's successful Sputnik-I and Sputnik-II came a 

succession of proposals for accelerating the WS-117l program and for 

"regaining the pre-eminence" of the United States in furor of 

activity occurred in parallel with, and in ignorance of, th gh-Ievel decision 

to proceed with the CORONA rogram. Any attempt to curb this unnecessary 

effort would have j CORONA security and to some extent the 

variety of proposals for space programs du this period provided cover for 

CORONA. Perhaps because the problems e Vanguard program absorbed 

public attention almost to the exclusion of concern for military programs, 

Congressional inquiries into the American space effort did not focus on WS117l. Attempts to fix responsibility for the "space gap" became entangled with 

partisan politics and interservice rivalries. 

The Air Force was the recipient of su estions from several uarters that 

the Thor intermediate- ballistic m' scheduled for avail sooner 

than the Atlas, be used boost a satellite into orbit. The earliest formal 

proposal of this sort emerged in the report of a special ARDC committee in 

October 1957. Well-intentioned recommendations, such as this one, contributed to a "space-booster problem," faced by General Schriever: he was being 

hounded for missiles to be used as boosters, but his missiles were not, as yet, 

working as missiles! Any favored choice of a missile-booster was made on a 

very speculative basis. 

On the day following issuance of the Quarles' "go slow" directive, 

General Putt directed General Anderson to assemble an ad hoc group to 

consider possible USAF space contributions that would counter the effects of 

Sputnik-Ion world opinion. Headed by noted nuclear physicist Edward Teller, 

the group submitted a report, which included recommendations for a series of 

space probes and moon shots, together with a suggestion that Thor boosters 

and makeshift second stages be used to orbit 200-300 pound satellites at an 

early date.13 

This proposal to use Thor as an interim booster evoked considerable 

enthusiasm. Air Force Assistant Secretary Richard E. Horner submitted a 

formal memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 12 November elaborating 

on the subject, stating that a Thor-boosted interim reconnaissance vehicle 

could be operational by April 1959, whereas the Atlas-boosted WS-117l 

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m had been so affected by earlier funds shortages that late 1959 or early 

1 to be its earliest possible launching date. Horner stated that a 

combination of Thor with a modified WS-117L upper stage could place a 300-

pound reconnaissance device in a 150-mile orbit. 14 

Concurrently with the Horner recommendation, RAND circulated the first 

written discussion of its proposal for an interim reconnaissance system based 

on a combination of the Thor booster with the Aerobee-derived upper stage 

used in the Vanguard p . Advance copies were distributed on 12 

November 1957, the day 0 Horner memorandum. In addition to using 

Thor as a booster, RAND urged a technique of spin stabilization for a third-

, camera-carrying element of the system. (The concept had been inventAmrom Katz and Merton Davies, two of several RAND scientists who 

contributed to the study.) RAND also suggested abandon' WS-117L 

readout concept for the interim system, urging a mode of p yload deboost 

and water landing to permit recovery of the entire third stage. 

Though the RAND proposal was new to many who first heard it in late 

1957, it embodied elements of several earlier suggestions, in particular a 

former RAND recommendation dated 12 March 1956 to the Air Staff, written 

by Richard L. Raymond. The basic notion of combining a ballistic missile with 

an Aerobee upper stage had originated at Wright Field in 1955, when it was 

proposed as the Air Force alternative to Vanguard. In that instance a 

combination of Atlas with an Aerobee upper stage had been suggested as the 

best means of boosting a relatively large scientific satellite into orbit. The use 

of recovery rather than readout techniques had been suggested, and studied, 

at least as early as December 1956, when the Ballistic Missile Division had 

asked Space Technology Laboratories to analyze the technical aspects of such 

an option. RAND researchers had examined the in some detail 

through the summer of 1957; the revised version s 12 November 

study eventually suggested a complete family of recoverable satellites.15 

Apparently quite independent of the RAND and Teller recommendations, 

the General Electric Company, on 29 October, suggested to ARDC headquarters that a "pioneer" system could be put t the Thor booster, a 

General Electric Hermes rocket as a seco e, and a third stage built 

around a horizon-stabilized recoverable One month later, on 27 

November, General Electric, under the leadership of Mr. Hilliard Page, 

followed up the initial suggestion with a more detailed proposal which 

outlined a camera subsystem, a recoverable capsule subsystem, propulsion, 

command and control, program planning, and a management approach. The 

original camera co embod' an eight-inch lens capable of resolving 

350-foot objects, had y Novem become an f3.5, 18-inch lens used with 

Microfile film to provide resolution of 75-foot objects. The capsule . 

bearing an obvious likeness to Genera! Electric ballistic missile reentry 

then in development, was intended to free-fall into the ocean, at which point 

the ablative shell would crack and the recovered elements would remain 

afloat encased in a foam rubber ball. 

Although the General Electric scheme was further elaborated in a 4 

January 1958 brochure, it apparently had little influence on the p m then 

being considered on the West Coast. Colonel Sheppard, inti mat aware of 

the satellite proposals, later said he had absolutely no recollection of having 

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encountered the General Electric proposal or brochure. A high General 

Electric official insisted that the idea had been submitted to BMD in October 

1957. In the frenzy of the first 100 days following Sputnik, many such 

p s could have been received, filed or misrouted, and forgotten. 

ionally, the BMD group was by mid-November rather firmly committed 

to its own approach. 16 

That approach, undoubtedly influenced by the Teller Report, the Horner 

memorandum, and the RAND study, appeared as a BMD-lockheed plan for 

the acceleration of the entire WS-117l program. Discussions between lockheed and BMD officials preceded h of an informal lockheed 

proposal on 26 November. It was in some detail immediately 

thereafter, particularly in the course of a 5 December meeting at BMD. 

lockheed the adaptation of the WS-117l upper stage to the Thor 

missile as t first step in a program acceleration. Taking issue with Teller 

Report and RAND conclusions that the Aero age promised earlier 

availability than the WS-117l upper stage, proposed a "more 

realistic" system embodying elements of the RAND-proposed camera technique, the Horner vehicle concept, and Teller committee suggestions for 

schedule acceleration. On 23 December 1957, General Schriever asked 

lockheed to re a formal I alo ch lines, and on 6 january 

1958, lockh completed and rwarded a opment planY 

Central to the system concept proposed by lockheed was a booster 

configuration consisting of the Thor missile as a first stage and an u age 

powered by the Bell XRM-81 rocket engine (orginally d . the 

"powered pod" missile of the B-58 Hustler bomber, hence the name ThorHustler). Much later, the upper stage acquired the more lasting name, 

"Agena." 

One aspect of the lockheed proposal was particularly applicable to a 

clandestine satellite reconnaissance program, an approach revived at BMD 

early in December. General Schriever's November correspondence with 

lockheed had included some mention of the highly sensitive U-2 program and 

lockheed's success in pushing that reconnaissance aircraft system to early 

completion. lockheed had also called attention to its re rece ' 

ence in the development of a covert reconnaissance . Usi 

inputs, General Ritland was a principal in early December discussions between 

Schriever and a group of important policy figures in Washington: Richard 

Bissell of the Central Intelli ce Agency, Drs. land and Killian, and General 

ter from the Whit ouse. That group quietly considered the political 

and ical aspects of the satellite reconnaissance problem, discussed 

aircraft reconnaissance ca ities, as well as advanced satellite options, and 

finally concluded that the best course for the nation was to sponsor a covert 

program employing the Thor-WS-117l vehicle. 

On Thursday, 6 February 1958, the President's Science Adviser james 

Killian and Polaroid's Edwin H. land met with DC! Allen Dulles, Defense 

Secretary Neil McElroy, and McElroy's deputy, Donald Quarles, to discuss the 

plan to 've the film-return satellite effort to the Bissell-Ritland team in order 

its development. The next day, 7 February, Killian and land met 

with Pr ent Eisenhower and General Goodpaster at the White House to 

discuss the matter. 

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They explained to the president that the satellite would orbit the earth 

three times, taking pictures as it over the Sino-Soviet bloc, and then 

would deorbit the film capsule. Ki told Eisenhower that the satellite would 

emit no electronic signals and, therefore, could be completely covert. At 

Killian's request, land explained that this specific, small project was for bona 

fide intelligence purposes. It would be of utmost importance to conduct it 

quietly, under the cloak of other activities . g the satellite's 0 ics to 

those in the U-2, land told the president tha as the U-2 could 0-

graph ob s as small as 4 feet, the satellite cameras would only be able to 

discern 0 0 to 100 feet on a side. This being the case, it would be very 

easy for the Soviets, if they learned about the project, to build dummies that 

could "fool" the satellite cameras, therefore, it was of paramount' ance 

to keep them from learning of it. The satellite pictures, said Land, d be 

used as a "scouting" program to guide more precise inte means to 

selected targets. He indicated that General Schriever could on this as a 

joint project with the CIA, and mentioned that a Thor missile plus a Navaho 

booster might be used to launch the satellite. 

President Eisenhower said he supposed this would be done as part of the 

space program Killian was then working on. This was a reference to the 

Advanced Projects Research Age ) which the President's Science 

Advisory Committee had reco established to oversee the nation's 

major space p' and which the president had only that day approved as 

Department 0 se Directive 5101.15. The president also indicated that 

CIA should have complete and exclusive control of all of the intelli 

phases of the operation. He said that only a handful of people should 

anything at all about it. 

Following this meeting, Goodpaster ke separately with Killian and 

Land about their understanding as to how president intended the roject 

to be handled. They told him it was their understanding that General riever 

and the Air force would be in charge of the program. Goodpaster said that 

was not his understand of the president's intention, and he returned to the 

Oval Office to the president. Eisenhower told Goodpaster "emphatically that eved the project should be centered in the new Defense 

'space' agency [ARPA], doing what CIA wanted them to do." Goodpaster then 

told Killian the President's wishes.* 

Concurrently, on the strength of detailed instructions from General 

Schriever, Colonel Oder began drawing up a revised 'Second Story' cover plan 

based on staging an " Hustler scientific satellite program to cloak 

reconnaissance overfl In the sense that Killian and Goodpaster were 

kesmen for the White House and would undoubtedly be able to commit, 

administration to support such an effort, their acceptance of this scheme 

shortly before Christmas of 1957 constituted an unofficial but highl . ificant 

endorsement. Bissell's agreement, and acceptance by the Central lligence 

Agency of the covert program approach, closed the 100p.18 

"A.J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference on 8 Feb 1958, dated 10 feb 1958, White House 

Office of Staff Secretary, Alpha Series, Box 14, Intelligence Matters, D.D. Eisenhower Library (5). 

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While there was no National Security Council Intelligence Directive 

(NSCID) which specifical authorized the Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency to condu reconnaissance rations, NSCID No.5 gave 

the CIA . ary ty for the cond of clandestine intelligence 

activities ad. on of intelligence by means of aerial reconnaissance was therefore considered to be within the responsibilities assigned to 

the CIA under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.19 The amendment to the Act made the Director of Central Intelligence the only US Government employee authorized to spend money without substantiating vouchers. 

Additional factors leading to CIA involvement in the satellite reconnaissance program were: (1) the ability and authority of the CIA to use unorthodox 

methods in contracting with industry for expeditious procurement of components; (2) the ability to maintain effective security; and (3) the desire of CIA to 

have a part in the program to orient it toward the collection of intell' ce to 

fulfill rity irements. A CIA role was assured by the timely fu ng of 

$7 mi ion from e Director's Reserve, by DCI Dulles, to buy the photographic 

payloads and install them in the satellites. 20 

Plans for the interim satellite photo reconnaissance system entailed the 

overt cancellation of the interim Thor-boosted satellite portion of WS-117L, 

and the reinitiation of the project under the Bissell/Ritland management 

structure. The Air force would continue to pursue other portions of WS-117L. 

The plan was favorably received by Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, 

Assistant Secretary of the Air force for Research and Development Horner, 

Generals Schriever and Ritland, and Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, among others. 

The ARPA Factor 

Meanwhile, on 7 february 1958, Department of Defense Directive 

5101.15 established the Advanced Research ects Agency (ARPA) with the 

mission of directing and performing advanc research and development 

projects in the fields of space science and technology, ballistic missile defense, 

and other advanced research and development. Not stated in DoD 5101.15, 

but clearly understood, was that ARPA was to provide cover for DoD funding 

and program approvals of the covert portion of WS-117L. Accordingly, ARPA's 

first director, Dr. Roy W. Johnson, and Chief Scientist, Dr. Herbert York, as the 

new managers of DoD activities, became involved in discussions of the 

covert Thor-boosted sa portion of WS-117L, which was renamed Project 

CORONA by the CIA. (George Kucera, of Bissell's staff, an inveterate cigar 

smoker, was inspired to select this name as he glanced at a cigar wrapper.) 

On 28 february 1958, a memorandum (actually written by Bissell, Ritland, 

and Sheppard) from the Director of ARPA to the Secretary of the Air force 

directed that BMD's interim Thor-boosted reconnaissance system be cancelled. It authorized the use of available Thor boosters (built for the Air force 

las Aircraft Company) for test flights of satellite vehicles developed by 

under the WS-117L ram. This included provision for recovery of 

cal specimens in the rance of manned satellite flights projected 

for t future. The provisions of this ARPA directive formed the basis for the 

original classified cover story for Project CORONA.21 

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On the basis of advance information, Schriever instructed Jack Carter, 

manager of WS-117L activities at Lockheed, to assemble "black" (referring to 

the covert nature of the project) estimates on system specifications and costs, 

made Oder responsible for coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency, 

and ordered transfer of payload contract costs from BMD to the Central 

Intelligence Agency. (General Electric and Fairchild Camera had earlier begun 

working, under Lockheed, on the spin-stabilized payload.) The cover story for 

all of this work was a Lockheed contract for developing a "biomedical" 

capsule. 

One complication was the injection of the Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (ARPA) into the scheme. ARPA had been the previous 

December as a "super agency" which, by controlli various military 

space system developments, would eliminate interservice rivalries. On 24 

February, McElroy formally roved the WS-1171 program acceleration 

recommended in November also specified that it would be conducted 

under ARPA direction. ARPA, although theoretically functional, possessed 

neither personnel nor facilities for such a responsibility. 

Some confusion characterized technical activities during the latter part of 

February and the first two weeks of March. Oder and Sh rd had gradually 

developed reservations about the wisdom of a spin-stab reconnaissance 

vehicle. As early as 18 February, Oder had urged General Schriever to fund a 

preliminary stable-body approa esti that both the stable body design 

and a camera configuration p by Corporation" were improvements over spin stabilization and the Fairchild camera t . upported. 

At the same time, Air Force headquarters, in early Marc BMD that 

the Thor-boosted "reconnaissance test vehicle" approach had been endorsed 

by the Department of Defense and that formal ns for an 

operation called "Nightshih" -the proposed nic r-boosted 

WS-1171 launchi be drawn arly submission to the Air 

Force Ballistic Mi Committee. The "N proposal had been devised 

within the Air Staff as a means of obtaining early Air Force entry into a 

"satellite club" that still was limited to the Navy Vanguard and the Army 

orer Programs. Unaware of the scheduled covert program, Air Staff 

o Is were intent on securing permission for launching something developed by the Air Force. 22 

The ARPA directive ostensibly cancelling the Thor-boosted interim reconnaissance satellite was followed by all of the notifications that normally 

accompany the death of a military program. The word was passed officially 

within the Air Force, and formal contract cancellations were sent out to the 

prospective suppliers. Contractors were shocked by the suddenness of the 

action, and Air Force personnel were startled at the abandonment of that part 

of WS-1171 which seemed to have the best chance of early success. Subsequent to the cancellation, only a few individuals in the Air Force and in 

participating companies were cleared for Project CORONA. These people 

were informed of the procedures to be followed in the covert reactivation of 

the cancelled program. 

*Itek had come into being in 1957, principally through the efforts of Richard leghorn, Professor 

Duncan Macdonald from Boston University's Physics Research laboratory, and A. W. Tyler from 

Eastman Kodak. 

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When CORONA was removed from WS-117l and placed under separate 

management as a covert activity, the intent was to disguise its real purpose by 

concealing it as an experimental program carrying the name Discoverer. 

Discoverer was represented as an Air Force scientific program whose findings 

would be of value to many related p ams. This . ted overt procurement of the necessary boosters, secon stages, and associated with 

the biomedical cover launchings. It also provided an explanation for the 

construction of launching and ground control facilities. Only the program 

components associated with the true photographic reconnaissance mission 

had to be procured covertly. 

After Bissell and Ritland had worked out the arran ments for the overt 

cancellation and covert reactivation of the program, n to address the 

technical problems associated with the design confi tion they had inherited from WS-1171. The system con Thor as the first stage 

booster and, as a second stage, a loc -designed Agena satellite vehicle. 

Schriever and Oder were meeting with CIA and lockheed representatives 

on the afternoon of 28 February 1958, when a copy of the formal signed ARPA 

directive first reached BMD. They completed arrangements to inform General 

Electric and Fairchild of what was afoot and reviewed the preliminary BMD 

analysis of proposals for camera and vehicle subsystems. Both the technical 

approach and the management pattern were gradually taking shape. 23 

CORONA Design Evolution and Contractor Selections 

Four distinct oposals for vehicle-reconnaissance system development 

had emer . loc RAND both favored spin stabilization ing 

a Fairchil transverse panoramic camera with film drive synch to 

vehicle rotation rate. lockheed, however, urged that only a ballistic-missile 

type nose cone be recovered, while RAND favored recovery of the entire 

orbital vehicle. Both proposals assumed use of Fairchild cameras capable of 

resolving GO-foot objects. 

General Electric and Itek p sed stable-body vehicles carrying panoramic cameras. General Elect t ground resolution of 25 feet could 

be obtained; Itek, that seven-foot resolution was possible. General Electric 

paralleled lockheed in favoring data-capsule recovery, while Itek supported 

the total-vehicle recovery co ed by RAND. On 1 January 1958, 

Itek ired the personnel. of the Boston University Physics 

Researc laboratory with funding support provided by Rockefeller interests. 

Boston University had 10 been uneasy at the transition occurring in the 

Physics Research lab, h had become more of an industrial research 

facility than a campus establishment, contract' lar Iy with t vernment. 

The resignation of Professor Duncan Macd Id, had the chief 

figure in laboratory activities for some years, caused the University to decide 

to withdraw from the field. The resulting arrangement, by which Itek acquired 

the laboratory, equipment, contracts, and personnel, made Itek a very strong 

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contender for new research and development contract awards, the company 

having assimilated (in Colonel Oder's nt) "some of the nation's best 

camera people." Itek personnel had di y participated in the development 

of the balloon reconnaissance cameras. 

Before a final decision could be taken in technical matters, certain critical 

management items required attention. Most were satisfactorily arr ed in a 

series of meetings between 26 february and 15 March. The Centr IntelliAgency was charged with security control and, therefore, was responsithe overall conduct of the covert activity. Bissell, as the responsible CIA 

official, was obviously in need of a "very knowledgeable WS-117l man" to 

assist him in Washington; Schriever and Oder suggested Oder's deputy, 

Captain R. C. Truax, US Navy, who initially served as technical assistant to 

Bissell, using an ARPA assignment as cover. 

The intelligence agency agreed to brief both General Electric and Fairchild 

on the covert program in advance of formal notice to Fairchild that the overt 

program had been "cancelled." In order to establish the "black" 

environment, it would be necessary to cancel overtly the Fai d contract 

and to reorient the General Electric effort toward development of a "biomedical" capsule. 

Several im rtant design decisions were im lemented in this organizational period ORONA. Recognizing the n for resolution to satisfy the 

intelligence irements, it was concluded that the previously developed 

concept of film recovery did indeed offer the most promising 

a proach for a usable ph c return in the interim time period and 

d be pursued. This resu the need for a recovery pod or capsule; 

General Electric was selected as the recovery vehicle contractor. The decision 

to pursue film recovery proved in retrospect to be one of the most important 

made in US reconnaissance activities. Hi shows that, during the crucial 

decade of the 1960s, intelligence needs cou d not have been served by the 

state-of-the-art in readout techn the alternative concept developed 

under WS-1171. It is also noteworth hat both the manned and unmanned 

US space recovery ms which 1I0wed drew heavily from the reentry 

technology developed r CORONA. 

In the opinion of the BMD analysts, the choice between spin stabilization 

and stable body configurations should be based on earliest availability, and on 

this criterion spin stabilization appeared to have the advantage. 

Bissell arranged with the proper Washington authorities to delay circulation of the ARPA directive until fairchild and General Electric could be advised 

of the background factors. BMD agreed to ockheed the basic costs of the 

"cancelled" they involved t contractors. Officially, BMD 

would pay I protest," since all three firms had proceeded on the 

strength of informal agreement only.24 

A 15 March meetin between Bissell and Ritland, in Washington, confirmed the earlier BMD .. on to use the Agena upper stage for CORONA, 

rather than the Aerobee stage from Vanguard. It was also agreed that Bissell's 

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interests in WS-1171 would be authenticated by a formal assignment to keep 

CIA Chief Dulles briefed on the of that "major collection system." In 

both the Department of Defense an the Central Intelligence Agency, CORONA was to be a closely-held secret. 

The choice during March 1958 of both a technical approach and specific 

contractors was not without confusion. As a result of preliminary actions 

during that january, Lockheed's oral commitments to Fairchild for the camera 

subsystem and General Electric for the reentry body were along the lines of 

the RAND proposals. Continued expressions of BMD's unease plus advice 

from CIA technical specialists ntly caused Bissell to have second 

thoughts. On 15 March, Bissel told Ritland that special meetings were 

scheduled for 17 and 18 March to discuss the advisability of funding a backup 

alternate to the primary Fairchild-General Electric approach. 

The g that met at Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 18 March included 

three m of the President's Science Advisory Committee, two Central 

Intelligence Agency officials (including Bissell), three BMD officers (Ritland, 

Oder, and Truax), and Dr. Herbert F. York of ARPA. Its task, decided only one 

day earlier, was to select a backup contractor. After hearing detailed presentations from Itek, General Electric, Fairchild, and Eastman Kodak, the panel 

concluded that Itek was best qualified to develop an alternate camera system 

for CORONA. Going further, the group recommended that Itek and Lockheed, with assistance from General Electric if needed, should develop a gasjet-stabilized vehicle using capsule film recovery with Lockheed having system 

engineering and technical direction responsibilities. 25 

The differences between the Itek proposal and the "primary" Fairchild 

camera subsystem compelled attention. Essentially, Itek was pro ng a 24-

inch camera with theoretical resolution on the order of 15 fee Fairchild 

was u a camera with 60- to 100-foot resolution. Principally because of 

that d nce, the Central Intelligence Agency, in late March, began to look 

more favorably on the Itek than the Fairchild proposal but continued to 

advocate concurrent development of both spin-stabilized and three-axis, 

stable-body techniques. 

A series of technical meetings between Bissell, Ritland, and the contractors' representatives took place on 24, 25, and 26 March 1958 at the Flamingo 

Motel in San Mateo, California. james W. Plummer, Lockheed Program 

Manager, was the principal representative of the prime contractor. Tentative 

decisions made at these meetings included: 

a. Scheduling aimed at production of elements of the system by 1 july 1958 

and a program of 19 weeks of assembly and testing to readiness for first 

launching. 

b. The photographic record would be acquired by physical recovery of the 

film. General Electric would be issued a subcontract for development of 

the recovery capsule. 

c. Agreement that Cooke Air Force Base (later renamed Vandenberg Air 

Force Base) was the most advantageous launching site. 

d. Initial procurement would be 10 vehicles, with a potential for three 

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Shortly after the San Mateo meeting and as a result of the 18 March 

Cambridge meeting, Bissell received active roposal for a more 

sophisticated high-acuity (HYAC) camera Corporation. Itek 

proposed a vertical-looking, . ocating, 70- panoramic camera that 

exposed film by scanning at to the of flight. It would use a 24-

inch focal-length, fjS.O Tessar lens with image-motion compensation, and 

would fly in a three-axis (earth-oriented) stabilized cecraft. Although more 

complex than the Fairchild scheme, this proposal greater promise. In the 

Fairchild proposal, the camera could operate only during that brief period 

when the camera window on the spiraling spacecraft was pointed toward the 

earth. The (tek proposal, on the other hand, would have a camera pointed at 

the earth at all times. It did, however, require horizon sensors and gas jets in 

order to control the pitch, roll, and yaw axes so as to keep the camera 

orthogonal in relation to the horizons and vertical in relation to the earth's 

center. The Itek camera promised a ground resolution approaching 20 feet. 

Bissell recalls that he personally decided in favor of the Itek design, but 

only after much izing evaluation. The decision was difficult because it 

involved moving the previously intended method of space vehicle 

stabilization to one that was technically more difficult to accomplish. It did, 

however, standardize on the three-axis stabilization which was being pursued 

in the WS-117L Agena development and which has been a part of all 

subsequent photo reconnaissance systems. 

Bissell's first project proposal, completed on 9 April 1958, uested 

approval for concurrent development of both the Fairchild and Itek 

systems, with the Fairchild configuration becoming operational first and the 

Itek configuration being developed as a follow-on system. Within two days, 

however, Bissell made a final decision to abandon the Fairchild spin-stabilized 

configuration entirely. He rewrote the project proposal taking note of the 

earlier configuration and . reasons for favoring the Itek approach: the 

better resolution attain lower overall cost, and the greater potential 

for owth. The proposal was rewritten a second time, retaining the Itek 

~uri3ltionbut ra estimate from $20 to $31 million. Of the total 

estimated cost, $24 ed "a rather arbitrary allowance" for 12 

Thor boosters and Lockheed second-stage vehicles and was to be financed by 

ARPA through the Air Force. The remaining $7 million was for covert 

procurement (by CIA) of the pods containing reconnaissance equipment and 

recoverable film cassettes. 

Formal CORONA Proposal to the President 

In response to official a roval to proceed with the program, a formal 

plan was outlined calling fo development and subsequent operational use 

of a short-lived reconnaissance satellite from which, at the completion of its 

mission, a recoverable capsule containing exposed film would be separated 

for return and pickup in a preselected ocean area. The payload would consist 

of a pod .. a 24-inch focal Ie camera and a recoverable capsule 

into whi film would feed as camera operated. The anticipated 

ground resolution of 20 feet would allow the distinguishing of one structure 

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from another and the identification of major Soviet targets, such as missile 

sites under construction. 

The program, to consist of 12 launchings, was expected to become 

operational around June 1959 and to be completed in the spring of 1960. The 

division of administrative responsibilities for CORONA was to be as follows: 

a. ARPA would exercise general technical supervision over the development of the vehicle. 

b. The Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, acting as agent for ARPA, would 

perform detailed supervision of vehicle development and provide 

ground facilities for launching, tracking, and recovery in collaboration 

with the US Navy. 

c. CIA would supervise the technical development and covert procurement 

of the reconnaissance equipment and have overall responsibility for 

cover and security. 

The final project proposal26 was forwarded to General Goodpaster, the 

President's Staff Secretary, on 16 April 1958, after having been reviewed by 

Johnson and Admiral Clark of ARPA; Assistant Secre r, General 

Ritland, and Dr. Killian. The proposal was approved, in writing. 

(Only 10 launchings were funded, as against the 12 proposed in the 16 April 

CORONA development plan.) Some program personnel were told that the 

only original record of the president's approval was a handwritten note on the 

back of an envelope by lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell (then Deputy 

Director of Central Intelligence); however, a memorandum for the record 

prepared by Goodpaster confirmed the decision. 

CORONA Management Arrangements 

When CORONA an, Bissell bore the title of Special Assistant to the 

DCI for Plannin and elopment, as well as Project Director of the U-2 

activity. Withi , he also added the title of Project Director for CORONA. 

He, together with General Ritland, who headed the Air Force efforts in 

sup rt of CORONA, gave strong leadership and management to the project 

u the liberal overall direction of ARPA. A strong and cooperative bond 

developed in the day-to-day working relations between Bissell's Development 

Projects Staff (DPS) and Ritland's Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) personnel 

assigned to support the CORONA Program. 

Although it may have been the original intent that CORONA would be 

administered along the same lines as the U-2 program, it actually began and 

evolved differently. CORONA was a joint CIA-ARPA-Air Force effort, 

much as U-2 was a joint CIA-Air Force effort, but it lacked the central 

direction that characterized the U-2 program. The project proposal described 

the anticipated administrative arrangements, but fell short of clarifying the 

delineation of authorities. It noted that CORONA was carried out under 

the authority of ARPA and CIA with the support and ipation of the Air 

Force. CIA's role was further explained in terms of pa . g in supervision 

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sance equipment, handling all covert procurement, and maintaining cover and 

security. The work statement prepared for Lockheed, th rime contractor, on 

25 April 1958, noted merely that technical direction e program was the 

joint responsibility of several agencies of the Government. 

Imprecise statements of who was to do what permitted a range of 

interpretations; however, va ue assignments of responsibilities caused no 

appreciable difficulties in the years of CORONA. The organization was 

small and had a' concern: producing a reconnaissance satellite. Much 

later (1963-65) t loose statements were analyzed more parochially and 

became a source of friction between the CIA and DoD. 

The official statement on the management and technical direction of 

CORONA read: 

Technical direction of the program is the joint responsibility of several agencies of the Government. In the interest 

of effective management, however, such direction would be 

provided primarily by and through the Air Force Ballistic 

Missile Division acting as the' agent for aU interested components of the Government. A Project Officer will be established in BMD as the single y-day point of contact for 

the contractor. This officer authority to make on 

the spot decisions within the scope of the work statement on 

aU matters pertaining to the program other than those of 

major importance. From time to time the Government agencies concerned will jointly review the progress of the program. The Government will make arrangements to permit 

the prompt rendering of major decisions concerning the 

program which cannot be made by the Project OfficerY 

Despite these flexible management criteria and the broad authorities 

which the BMD Project Officer might be led to assume under the wording of 

this aph, Bissell exerted strong and direct program control over CORONA h the rs' meetings. This was the same means he had 

used for iaison and ring the U-2 development period. While the 

BMD project office (initially run by Lt. Colonel Lee Battle, USAF) was the dayto-day contact point for the contractor, CIA maintained direct and frequent 

contact with the working level people at the Lockheed Advanced Projects (AP) 

Facility at Palo Alto. This contact was made through visits and, after 1 June 

1959, by assi ment of a liaison officer to the AP Facility, the first being Lt. 

Colonel Cha L Murphy, a USAF detailee to CIA. 

Mr. Bissell's Operations Staff, which had principal responsibility for the 

direction of CIA's U-2 activities, also played an important role in the early 

sta of CORONA. Key persons were John Parangosky, Chief, Development 

and Eugene P. Assistant for Technical Analysis. Colonel 

Arthur E. Smith, Chie ent Projects Staff Operations (initially run 

by William Battle), and his staff icipated in July 1958 with BMD/ARDC 

personnel and representatives of Tactical Air Command in planning for a 

C-119 squadron to be assigned the support function of retrieving re-entry 

vehicles. 

The DPS Operations Center in the Matomic Building in downtown 

Washington was designated as the CORONA Project Control Center and 

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President 

I),trighl D, 8sen1Dwer 

VICe President 

Riehml M. Ni><on 

1958 CORONA Organization Chart 

among contractors. The program was handled in an extraordinarily cooperative manner between the Air Force and CIA. 

Almost all of the people involved on the Government side 

were more interested in getting the job done than in claiming credit or gaining control. 28 

Management of CORONA involved many a 

reviewed and funded the overt effort, ensured te support, arranged for 

sea recovery, a Navy 'on, and kept the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense advised. BMD loped and provided all hardware that could be 

related to a cover or porting program and provided facilities and personnel 

for launching and trac . ions. The Central Intelligence Agency defined covert program objectives, established and urity policy, 

maintained liaison with the Department of State, fu nd developed the 

covert hardware items, and insured that covert and overt developments were 

compatible. Lockheed Missiles and Space Division (under contract to both CIA 

and BMD) served as technical director and integrator of all equipment other 

than the Thor booster; developed the orb upper stage; rated and 

led the test, launching, and on-orbit contr operations. oped the 

camera under subcontract to Lockheed and General Electric subcontracted for 

the recovery capsule. Douglas, as an associate contractor, furnished the Thor 

boosters. 

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CORONA Scheduling 

The schedule of the program, as it had been presented to the CORONA 

roup at its meeting in San Mateo in late March 1958, called for a countdown 

, 'g about the first of July 1958 and extending for a period of 19 weeks. 

It was anticipated that the eq . would be assembled, tested, and the 

first vehicle launched during 19-week period, which meant that the 

fabrication of the individual components would have been completed by 1 

July. By the time Bissell submitted his project proposal some three weeks later, 

it was apparent that the earlier scheduling was unrealistic. Bissell noted in his 

project proposal that it was not yet possible to establish a firm schedule of 

delivery dates, but that it was likely that the first launching could be attempted 

by June 1959. 

It is pertinent to note that there was no ex ation in 1958 that 

CORONA would still be operating more than a d later. The CORONA 

Progra nder way initially as an interim, short-term development to meet 

the Inte Community's high-priority requirements for area-search 

tographic reconnaissance, pending successful development of more sop isticated WS-117l systems. The original CORONA posal anticipated the 

acquisition of only 12 vehicles, noting that at a later ate it might be desirable 

to consider whether the program should be extended, with or without further 

technological improvement. 

Special CORONA Security Arrangements 

To provide for working space where lockheed personnel could actually 

assemble the "black" hardware into operationally-ready satellite vehicles, the 

lockheed Program Office, under the direction of Jim Plummer, entered into 

arrangements with Hiller Helicopters in Menlo Park, California (later known as 

Hiller Aircraft Division of fairchild-Hiller Corporation) on 1 April 1958, for 

leasing space, equipment, plus technicians an personnel for a period 

of 12 months. (The covert facility thus estab was referred to fondly as 

"The Ranch" by cleared personnel.) The cover, as Advanced Projects (AP) of 

Hiller, was maintained from 1 April 1958 until 1969 when, because of concern 

for the ability to maintain a cadre of skilled technicians in the phaseout period, 

the program was moved to the Lockheed complex in Sunnyvale, California. In 

addition to the hourly personnel furnished by Hiller, skilled 

salaried personnel to set up an integrated organization in Hiller 

ises. The lMSD AP operation was hi autonomous and needed only 

nancial and subcontracting support from parent organization. lockheed 

explained to Hiller that the work to be carried on in the Hiller build' was 

company proprietary and thus was not to be disclosed to anyone, inc uding 

other sections of lockheed. 

Conscientious Air force plant representatives and lockheed supply personnel presented an early problem, derived from the need for moving 

expensive equipment and materials to a place that had no legal existence, but 

the CORONA people devised "secondary" cover stories which satisfied 

inquiries. There was no real need for elaborate deceit, chiefly because no one 

would expect lockheed to be doing work in the Hiller plant, and no 

connection linked Hiller with any space projects. The "company proprietary" 

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secun y speCia IS s 

u I milit and contractor 

personnel exposed to program details. Permission to brief ditional 

nel on CORONA was reserved to CIA headquarters. It shortly ame 

apparent, however, that both ARPA and ARDC headquarters staffs contained 

more knowled ble people than were authorized there, principally because 

high-ranking 0 had yielded to the compulsion to inform their immediate 

superiors and their immediate staff assistants. (Bri ier General Robert E. 

Greer, who encountered the same compulsion p two years later, when 

he took the Samos* pr underground, concluded that it was a prime 

syndrome of any covert ort.) 

Problems of Growth and Change 

By mid-1958, contractors were moving toward meeting the goal of a first 

launching no later than mid-1959. The side, however, was 

running into difficulties. The first had to th money, the second with 

cover, and the two were inextricabl intertwined. The $31 million cost 

estimate for the 12-vehicle program assumed that the cost of the Thor 

boosters would be absorbed by the Air Force by diverting them from the 

cancelled WS-117l subsystem. That assumption proved to be incorrect; an 

additional $18 million had to be found to pay for the 12 Thors. further, an 

additional four launching vehicles would be uired for test launching, orbit, 

and recovery procedures and an add it would be required for 

biomedical launchings in support of the CORONA cover story. ARPA could 

not see its way clear to making DoD funds available merely for testing or for 

cover support when there were other DoD space programs with pressing 

needs for money. Consequently, CORONA management had to go back to 

the president for approval of a revised estimate.3o 

Before the photoreconnaissance system became operationally ready for 

launching, a reorganization took place within the CIA which directly affected 

management of the program. On 1 january 1959, Bissell was promoted to the 

position of Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), CIA. In addition to taking on all of 

the problems which that position entailed, he amalgamated all air 

activities into a new division in DDP. The Development Projects St hits 

sensitive manned and satellite reconnaissance projects, was used to form the 

nucleus of a new Development Project Division (DPD). This reorganization 

was formally mandated as of 16 february 1959, but it took the balance of the 

year to sort out and solve major problems in the new division. Bissell became 

more and more involved in all the time-consuming matters of the Plans 

directorate and consequently had less time to give to daily CORONA affairs. 

*Name of a Greek Island used as Program Identifier. 

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Fortunately, he did maintain his overall control as Project Director and was 

successful in his efforts to obtain continued high-level approvals and the 

necessary funds to carry CORONA forward. 

The former DPS officers responsible for the support of CORONA found 

themselves with a problem similar to Bissell's: their time and efforts were being 

spread more thinly over an increasing number of projects. 

Another basic difficulty was that well-meaning 

were advancing the interests of the Air Force, insisted ering with one or 

another aspect of the "open" Discoverer program. Generally, the Air Force 

CORONA managers at BMD were able to limit ill effects by calling on the 

Central Intelligence Agency to apply quiet pressure to danger spots. Sometimes it proved necessary to brief one or more persons who had no role to 

p CORONA itself but whose influence was necessary to keep events from 

u ing in undesired directions. A case in point was the July 1958 Department of Defense suggestion to deploy all Thor missiles and use Armydeveloped Jupiters as satellite boosters. Since jupiter was essentially incomIe with the WS-117l upper stage, the threat to CORONA was obvious: at 

a nine-month delay in schedules, reengineering of payloads, reduction in 

orbital weights, and reliance on non-standard boosters. In this instance, 

Colonel Sheppard immediately contacted Bissell with a request that the CIA 

official take action to ensure that the suggestion was withdrawn before it 

could become a matter of debate. The maneuver was effective. (On 8 April 

1958, General Schriever made Sheppard the Air Force Director of CORONA. 

Oder, associated with the WS-117l reconnaissance m, was removed 

from direct participation because of the danger association with 

reconnaissance would weaken the CORONA cover plan.) 

Sometimes it was difficult to decide whether to stifle such "assistance" or 

to draw secondary benefits from it. One person, known to Colonel Sheppard, 

was ing matters by "going around convincing people we should be 

doing t we in fact are doing in the CORONA ram." This affair 

had its useful aspect, however, since it was inconce at one so highly 

placed could be unaware of actual reconnaissance programs, and his ill-timed 

propaganda must also have served to convince many that the Air Force was 

concentrating on WS-117l rather than on the Thor-boosted satellite. 

Another interesting roblem Colonel Sheppard encountered was that the 

pr director for Thor-WS-117l "experimental and biomedical" 

sa lite vehicle kept "insisting that the overt part of the system be designed 

rationally to support the overt missions." In this instance there was no 

alternative to making him aware of the covert plan. How else could one 

e in d . . the satellite vehicle for horizontal rather than the vertical 

fl a ich was logical for biomedical riments but impossible 

for film-recovery or why it was un rable to air-condition a 

specimen cham truthful reason was that the chamber in question 

must covertly be made light tight? 

Separating CORONA From WS-117L 

It had soon become apparent to the project managers that the original, 

but as yet unannounced, cover story conceived for the future CORONA 

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launchings (an experimental p ram within the first phase of WS-117l) was 

becoming increasingly unten WS-117l had become the subject of fairly 

widespread public speculation identifying it as a military reconnaissance 

program. It was feared that linking Discoverer to WS-117l in any way would 

inevitably place the reconnaissance label on Discoverer; and, given the 

hostility of the international political climate to overflight reconnaissance, 

there was risk that the US Government might cancel the program if it should 

be so identified. Some other story would have to be contrived that would 

dissociate CORONA from WS-117l and at the same time account for multiple 

launchings of stabilized vehicles in low polar orbits and with payloads being 

recovered from orbit. 

It was decided, therefore, to separate the WS-117l photo reconnaissance 

program into two distinct and ostensibly unrelated series: one identified as 

Discoverer (CORONA-Thor boost) and the other as Sentry (later known as 

Samos-Atlas boost). A press release annou e initiation of the Discoverer series was issued in mid-January 1959 ifying the initial launchings as 

tests of the vehicle itself and later launchings as rations of environmental 

conditions in space. Biomedical specimens, inclu live animals, were to be 

carried into and recovered from space. There were to be five biomedical 

vehicles; three of these five were committed to the schedule under launchings 

III, IV, and VII. The first two were to carry mice and the third a primate. The 

two uncommitted vehicles were to be held in reserve in event of failure of the 

heavier primate vehicle. In further s of the cover plan, ARPA was to 

develop two radiometric p ad p . ned specifically to study 

navigation of space vehicles to 0 ful in the development of 

an early warning system (the planned Midas infrared series). It might be noted 

here that only one (Discoverer-III) of the three planned animal-carrying 

missions was actually attempted, and it was a failure. ARPA did develop the 

radiometric payload packages, and they were launched as Discoverers-XIX 

and XXI in late 1960 and 1961. 

The CORONA launching Site 

The photo reconnaissance mission of CORONA necessitated a near-polar 

orbit, either by launching to the north or to the south. There are few suitable 

areas in the continental United States where this can be done without danger 

of debris from an early in-flight failure falling into populated areas. Vandenberg Air Force Base (originally Camp Cooke and Cooke AFB) near California's 

Point Arguello met the requirement for down-range safety because the 

trajectory of a southward be over the Santa Barbara channel 

and the Pacific Ocean beyond. rg was a natural choice because it 

was the site of the first Air Force operational missile train and also 

housed the 672d Strategic Missile Squadron with a number aunching 

pads which could be easily modified to accommodate the Thor-A 

configuration. Two additional factors favored this as the launchi area: 

was not too far removed from manufacturing facilities and ski personnel, 

and (2) a southward launching would permit recovery in the Hawaii area by 

initiating the ejection/recovery sequence as the satellite passed over the 

Alaskan tracking facility. 

Unlike U-2 flights, launchings of satellites from US soil simply could not be 

concealed from the public. Even a booster as small as the Thor (small relative 

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operational experience were able to assist in reactivation of a flight organization. After the cessation of GENETRIX activity in 1956, the equipment had 

gone into stora required no more than refurbishing to qualify for reuse. 

The difference n hooki and reeling in a package parachuted from a 

high-altitude balloon and pe g a similar operation for a package 

descending by parachute after reentry from orbit was not large. 

In the case of CORONA it would be most difficult to conceal a capsule 

recovery, particula as seemed probable, several hundred people were 

involved in interl shore, sea, and air operations. Briefing such vast 

members on CORONA was out of the question, so the air-sea recovery 

portion of CORONA became an overt element. The fact that some publicity 

on the more newsworthy aspects of such a recovery activity would provide 

additional cover for CORONA, assuming that the "package" itself could be 

adequately protected, was another attraction. 

Through "normal" channels, though with a fair amount of discreet preplanning, BMD was authorized to operate its own recovery squadron. A 

contin ent of C-119J aircraft eq 'pped for aerial recovery was drawn from the 

Tac:tical Air Command, essentia plete with air and ground crews at least 

in part familar with the requirements of the original GENETRIX operation. 

General Orders activating the contingent as the 6593d Test Squadron (Special) 

took effect on 1 August 1958.31 

Initially, the squadron moved to Edwards Air Force Base to begin intensive 

training and practice. Both balloons and -altitude aircraft were used to 

release "train' les" for C-119 Within a few months, in time to 

meet the sch for first capsule recovery, the squadron was to move to 

Hawaii, the center of the planned recovery area. Other essentials, such as 

tracking stations in Alaska, Hawaii, and at Vandenberg Air Force Base; the 

seaborne task force to provide an optional recovery mode if air catch failed; 

and a plan for returning a recovered ule to "black" channels after its 

"white" recovery, were arran early. The matter of who should 

operate the tracking stations, particularly teat Kaena Point, Hawaii, and 

the question of how to stage a "shell game" that would let the real capsule 

vanish en route to the mainland caused some later difficulty, but during the 

summer of 1958 nothing of this sort was foreseen. 

CORONA Contractor Arrangements and Progress 

Of more immediate concern was a serious controversy between lockheed 

and General Electric that threatened the st of gram management. 

Alth the apparent difficulty was the in of two to agree on a 

Genera lectric work statement, the real problem was more deep-seated. 

During the early weeks of April, General Electric oposed to Lockheed and 

the Air Force a separate third stage, which it would . n and build. Although 

an Air Force-Central Intelligence Agency ruling on the final design presumably 

resolved the issue in May, in June the contractors were at odds again. To the 

CORONA managers at BMD it appeared that they were jockeying for position, 

each at to ensure a favorable position for future programs. General 

Electric Lockheed wanted General Electric to deliver basic hardware 

which Lockheed would thereafter engineer, modify, and install; while lock-

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heed maintained that General Electric wanted to deliver a sealed package for 

Lockheed to load and launch without question. Each contractor pressed his 

viewpoint on the CIA and the Air force. The issue was resolved in June with 

the respective roles of the prime and the subcontractor defined in work 

statements acceptable to both.32 

Lockheed, General Electric, and (tek desi ned their systems and subsystems basically in conformance with a hiloso y jointly upon by the 

CIA and the Air force. Of the availabl approac that one offering 

the best potential for success during the period of prospecti ration was 

almost always adopted. Reliance on existing techniques or ely simple 

extensions of the current state-of-the-art was universal. Reliability through 

simple design rather than an attempt to derive "the entage points 

in perfection of roduct" was a consistent policy. on this basis, 

Lockheed was a report the total 'gn ready for initial review on 

14 May, design freeze on 26 July, and of engineering drawings on 23 

October. By all indications, the technical program was proceeding at a 

reasonable pace. 

CORONA Management Arrangements: The ARPA factor Revisited 

As much could not be said for all the program management aspects of 

CORONA. Starting about September 1958, a succession of difficulties and 

uncertainties began to plague CORONA managers. In part they were the 

natural but nonetheless unwelcome offshoots of a htly scheduled ram 

with unusually important ives. Another po however, deri rom 

the peculiar alignment of cal and managerial responsibilities which saw 

BMD, ARPA, CIA, and several officials in the Administration sharing 

authority. In particular, the iII-defi role of ARPA in the CORONA program 

proved troublesome. 

As ARPA assumed control of the entire military space effort during the 

summer of 1958, the tendency of that agency was to redirect space programs 

toward ARPA's own objectives. Moreover, the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) was gradually acquiring control of the obviously 

"scientific" and "research" aspects of the national space effort during the 

summer of 1958; ARPA both resisted that trend and attempted to create an 

alternate program which would give it a significant and lasting role in space 

operations. WS-117L funds the I portion of fiscal 1958 ARPA 

resources and constituted t most valid j . or a fiscal 1959 

ARPA budget (the Thor-Agena [CORONA] program nomi I under the 

budgetary aegis of WS-117L). ARPA's tendency to redirect WS-117L toward 

new objectives indirectly affected the immediate conduct of CORONA itself, 

but ARPA's attempt to exercise direct control over portions of the CORONA 

program, largely by . ulating the purse strings, threatened much greater 

consequences. Fina the fiscal 1960 budget cycle entered its closing 

the matter of continuing some form of CORONA into calendar 1960 

of increasi concern. If CORONA proved successful, a matter which 

could not be j until the first satellite reconnaissance photographs were 

actually exami ts continuation was I The question of its continuance as a covert operation-the matter of cover could be successfully 

maintained past the period of "engineering" and "biomedical" flights-versus 

its reincarnation as a highly secure but overt activity, had to be faced 

eventually. 

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The original CORONA a roval of April 1958 had been based on 10 

vehicles. The CIA-Air Force however, called for a minimum of 12 shots 

(on the assum of one-third successes) and the need for a minimum of 

four successfu reconnaissance flights to adequate coverage of the 

Soviet Union. In June, Colonel Sheppard vinced Air Force Secretary 

James las of the need t enough additional money (through 

ARPA) ahead of the "I problem" and to ensure a continuing 

flow of Thor boosters and Lockheed second stages. On 2 July, Secretary 

Douglas responded with an open directive to BMD which expanded procurement authority as Sheppard had urged. 33 

The 14-vehicle program thus constructed accommodated the 12 scheduled CORONA flights and two en' . or biomedical tests. It lasted only 

until 6 August, when BMD lea ARPA instructions that the "Thor-WS117l" program was to be expanded by nine vehicles in addition to the 10 

currently authorized. (Biomedical payloads we ified in the ARPA directive, though with the proviso that "special s ... to investigate and 

measure certain suspected phenomena" might later be substituted.) The 

new addition essentially ed for seven real biomedical payloads in 

addition to the 12 CORONA pac Its timing and the fact that ARPA was 

then attempting to retain he "Man in Space" program (which 

subsequently went to NASA), indicated that ARPA intended to use the "ThorWS-117L" program as a counterweight to the announced NASA biomedical 

program. 

By virtue of these and related changes, the total WS-117L program had 

risen by September 1958 from a FY-59 budget level of $107 million to a total of 

$296 million. Of this total, $215 million was shown in the current proposed 

development plan for WS-117L and the remainder was required for purchase 

of additional Thor and Atlas boosters. ARPA apparently intended at least $8 

million to go for biomedical research and $18 million to long-lead items. 

Another $11 million, not shown in the "open" totals, was CIA money 

supporting "black" CORONA procurements. (The April 18 roved by 

the president had contemplated expenditures of $7 mi "black" 

hardware and R&D 24 million for Thor and Agena development and 

procurement. Tha million total reflected an increase of $11 million over 

the first [9 April] cost estimates.) 

In this maze of chaotic figures, ARPA Director johnson, in August, 

identified $65.5 million as "open" CORONA money, concluding that an 

additional $13 million in fiscal 1960 would see to the purchase of the 19 

scheduled vehicles as well as programmed engineering changes. He also 

suggested that CIA bear a larger portion of the cost, arguing that the 

CORONA effort was principally for CIA benefit. 

On 1 October, revised CORONA program costs reached Bissell. The total 

shown was $129 million, the bulk of the increase arising from the reestimates 

by Lockheed and its subcontractors. 

ARPA had questioned the validity of the cost increase, protested its size, 

and the matter to the CIA. Bissell, in turn, rotested strongly. He cited 

the act that the funding estimates of April, u in obtaining approval for 

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CORONA, had totaled $31 million, and he told General Ritland that if 

McElroy, Dulles, and Killian had been aware of the prospective costs in April 

they would never have recommended the program to Eisenhower. . 

the effects of having just been scored by Killian, Bissell told Rit 

"CORONA [is] simply not worth $129,000,000 [in] ARPA funds plus 

$11,000,000 [in] CIA funds." Dulles, Killian, and McElroy were slated to 

discuss the entire affair with the president in the immediate future, he added, 

and it seem probable that " . .. complete cancellation of CORONA will be 

considered." 

Bissell had concluded that CORONA was being cha ed for undefinable 

development costs that actually belonged to the r . of WS-117L. He 

urged that the two rams be disengaged for funding purposes, and made 

some references to accounting systems" and "juggling costs." In a 

separate message to Colonel Sheppard, Bissell said sadly that "all of us 

concerned with CORONA have some embarrassing explaining to do." 

Apart from being more accustomed to differences between early estimates and actua am costs, Ritland and Sheppard were less alarmed than 

Bissell because closer to and more aware of the remarkable 

convolutions of the program during the preceding six months. To explain the 

situation to their CIA counterparts, they detailed pr m fluctuations and 

broke down the cost totals to show that changes in t evel of engineering 

effort and in the scope of the program had caused price increases. Sensitive to 

the implications of reprogramming, they added the caution that a covert 

program could not be conducted under requirements for constant rejustification and that it would be advisable to k s in the hands of 

program participants. In their reply they al e of CORONA 

potential and a further ation of the worth of the basic Thor-WS-117L 

program as a major contri tion to the national space effort. 34 

Before the end of October the problem was largely resolved by the 

personal intervention of Schriever, Ritland, and Sheppard with key CIA and 

White House officials. The role of ARPA in the funds crisis and the cancellation 

threat received i confirmation throu subsequent reement between Schriever, K , and Bissell that totals by the Air 

Force were reasonable and that henceforth the e of ARPA should be as a 

"utility intermediate" without authority lito steer or affect CORONA." But the 

basic suggestion earlier endorsed by Bissell, that it would be advisable to 

separate CORONA from the balance of WS-117L, continued to receive 

attention. 

ARPA had taken a preliminary step in this direction early in September. All 

reaction was not favorable. Colonel Oder, for instance, contended that 

program segmentation would draw too much attention to CORONA, since the 

rationale for the Thor-WS-117L program was partly based on "engineering 

tests" of WS-117L upper stages. Oder also emphasized that once the Thorboosted vehicle was recognized as a separate "scientific" program, scientists 

would expect to see recovered data. A counter argument, of course, was that 

continued association of a Thor-boosted satellite with the Atlas-WS-117L 

effort would lead inevitably to the conclusion that CORONA flights were 

reconnaissance oriented. The fact that efforts to improve the i f the US 

space am" had caused WS-117L t nly identified wit onnaissance-an even glorified in that role-ten ed to color all aspects of the 

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original program. The name "Sentry," given the WS-117L program in September 1958, was itself compromising.35 

Early in November, Bissell went to General Goodpaster (who was responsible for liaison between CIA and the White House) with a strong suggestion 

that the CORONA flights be completely separated from the balance of the 

Sentry program and covered by a scientific satellite mission assignment. 

Almost concurrently, a special scientific committee examining the status of the 

entire reconnaissance program became aware of the problems generated by 

the latest instance of ARPA interference. Dr. Edwin Land, of that committee, 

made it clear to ARPA's Johnson and Richard Cesaro that CORONA was "an 

operating rogram to achieve a limited objective" and was not to be 

"subject perturbed by R&D tinkering; and that the actions of all must 

be primarily governed by security since exposure of the program must be 

avoided at all costs." Bissell also pressed the point of limitin the ARPA role in 

a letter to Major General Jacob E. Smart, Assistant Vice Staff, USAF on 

25 November 1959. During the U-2 days, Smart had worked effectively with 

Bissell to remove unnecessary blocks to the program within the Department of 

Defense. 

There was no indication that the ARPA officials were very much impressed: they pr sed the deletion of three of the scheduled 

biomedical shots ion of a "Super-CORONA" satellite, essentially 

an Atlas-boosted CORONA with an "improved" recoverable payload. In other 

channels ARPA people also suggested that CORONA be reoriented toward an 

electronic-readout system rather than a recovery payload system. (Electrostatic tape systems were at favorites with ARPA that fall.) On the whole, 

however, such notions ad a cool reception. Dr. Land, influential in both CIA 

and high administration circles, was icularly insistent that the nation take 

advantage of what was available ra her than plan any expansive substitute 

programs. 36 

Notwithstanding Dr. Land's words, on 25 November ARPA officially 

notified ARDC that two of the scheduled biomedical tests in the Thor-Agena 

series were to be cancelled; however, no change was made in the total 

number of vehicles. 

A 1 December 1958 memorandum r rt from the ARPA staff to Johnson, 

motivated by new funding strictures di ed from the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, allotted $160 million for WS-117L in fiscal year 1960, instead of the 

$297 million earlier rogrammed. In order to stay within the funding limit, the 

ARPA staff p cancelling all newly Thor-boosted shots and 

reducing the approved total from 19 to 15 Two of the 15-the cancelled 

biomedical tests-were to be further abstracted for transfer to "other" ARPA 

programs. Of the remainder, the first two were to be vehicle development 

tests, the next two were to carry mice, eight were to be in the CORONA 

configuration, and the 13th was to carry a small monkey. All were to be fired 

from the Pacific Missile Range launching facility. 

The 1 December report also stated a . nificant new ARPA philoso hy: 

" ... ARPA's program responsibility ends a system has been bn)ul~ht 

through its Research and ment. At this point it is available for users." 

And most significantly, therea er, the "user" would have to fund the 

programY 

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When word of ARPA deliberations first reached BMD, late in November 

1958, the WS-117l office concluded that ARPA meant to support 15 of the 

scheduled 19 flights and that the Air Force would have to find money for the 

remainder. The fact that no ARPA money would be available for CORONA 

after fiscal 1960, and that the Air Force presumably would have to carryon the 

from its own resources, prompted thought for a program approach 

the transition of CORONA to a highly classified Air Force program 

managed under the WS-117l aegis. Toward this end, there was renewed 

discussion of separating the Thor-boosted satellite program from Sentry. 

A succession of meetings in Washington took up the several critical issues 

arising from the latest ARPA actions. late on the afternoon of 4 December, Air 

Force Under Secretary Marvin A. Macintyre wrote a memorandum to himself, 

had R. W. Johnson's signature block t at its foot, took it to Johnson, and 

obtained his signature. The directive y created a separate Thor-WS117l program, under the nickname "Discoverer," to include "a number of 

systems and techniques which will be employed in the operation of space 

vehicles." 3s 

Uncertainties concerning FY-60 funding were eliminated in the course of 

a 15 December meeting duri which the cipants decided that eight 

CORONA firings would co the ARPA opment effort and that the 

remaining four CORONA ts would require Air Force funding. By a 

memorandum to Macintyre, two days later, Johnson confirmed the agreement 

and formally the research agency's intention of sponsoring only 13 

Discoverer fI 0 vehicle tests, three biomedical flights, and eight 

CORONA launchings. 39 The settlement was not reached easily, however, since 

first Air Force and CIA officials had to convince ARPA that a readout program 

was not available to substitute for CORONA recovery techniques. There were 

interesting sidelights: on the afternoon of Johnson's directive, Colonel Sheppard discovered a Pentagon staff officer busily attempting to rejoin Sentry and 

Discoverer as a Top Secret program. The officer was convinced that ARPA had 

succeeded in stealing an Air Force satellite program. 

Improving CORONA Cover and Security 

With the establishment of the Discoverer project as a formal, autonomous 

activity and with the open identification of Sentry as a reconnaissance satellite, 

the conditions for conducting CORONA were somewhat altered. The first 

scheduled Discoverer launching was but a month away in December 1958, 

and this impelled thought for improving the cover story. 

In a sense, the disclosure that Sentry was a reconnaissance program 

tainted all aspects of the earlier development effort, including what was now 

Discoverer. Additionally, the international political climate was even more 

hostile to overflight than formerly. Indeed, in the opinion of CORONA 

personnel "this hostility has manifested itself to the point where high government officials might cancel the CORONA program should it continue to be 

identified with such efforts." 

Cover requirements were straightforward.40 ARPA participation had to be 

logically explained: if Discoverer was not a military program, why was ARPA 

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involved? Any intelligence interest in or associated with Discoverer had to be 

concealed, as did any military reconnaissance implications. Finally, it would be 

essential to obscure any direct connection between CORONA (as Discoverer) 

and a later Sentry vehicle with similar ipment. By the same token, a logical 

explanation was needed for using a po r orbit. Finally, cover efforts should 

satisfy professional curiosity by ensuring a "logical sequence of technical effort 

and the production of a product having military application." 

The proper approach appeared to be to release enough information to 

discoura untidy speculation and to dispel any air of mystery. It also seemed 

useful "consistent but much more complete technical explanations 

( ... at least in classified) to the considerable number of persons who do 

not need to kn the true purpose of CORONA but are in a to 

what it involves unless they are provided with a convincing a ernate 

tion." Military and contractor personnel at the launching site, in the recovery 

force, and in related military and corporate organizations fell into the latter 

category. 

Inasmuch as the CORONA configuration and the Discoverer biomedical 

configuration would be outwardly indistinguishable, there was no great 

concern for unauthorized observation and no real need for "closed" launchings. Press releases, by emphasizing hardware tests rather than scientific 

probes, would help to prevent interference from "the vast number of scientists 

who claim a right to such data."41 

The CORONA office also expected to take advantage of the planned 

"leaks." Lockheed personnel connected with the special Advanced Project 

facility were to divert attention from the true purpose of CORONA by filing 

personal requests for data on electronic countermeasures, ablation, vehicle 

maneuverability, reentry control and guidance studies, magnetic effects data, 

and infrared sensors, thus pr 'ng conclusions that the "special facility" 

was concerned with classified in such areas. 

The use of a recoverable capsule could be explained as the only means of 

, that recorded data were reserved for the United States, that recovery 

:>nly rTleans 0 'sual inspection of returned from 

orbit, that it provided most accurate data records 'tted the 

reuse of costly equipment, Polar orbits (which were somewha in the 

light of the facilities available for equatorial orbit tests) were to ned in 

terms of range safety requirements and the possible exercise of the missile 

warning-net. Thus, there emerged ons that Vandenberg Air Force 

Base was so located that only a pol 'was possible, that Air Force 

research vehicles had to be launched from Vandenberg because of limited 

facilities at Cape Canaveral, and the fact that the vehicle passed over the 

Soviet Union was incidental. 

Military and contractor personnel who inadvertently became aware of the 

presence of CORONA cameras could be told either that they were intended 

for astronomical observation and were not being publicized because of the 

possibility of misinterpretation or that they were used as part of the stability 

tests, to provide a continuous record of the attitude of the vehicle by 

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One major unresolved issue remained of those created by the ARPAdirected program alterations of November-December 1958. With the marked 

reduction in ARPA support, only eight CORONA firings were covered by 

approved funds. The remaining four in the original series plus any follow-on 

firings had to be dealt with in some fashion. 

Assuming the need for the photogr phic product would still exist, either 

CORONA would have to be conti as a completely covert element of 

Discoverer or all Discoverer flights following the eighth CORONA would be 

part of a highly secure but "normal" noncovert approach. 

As a hedge against the possibility that continuation of a covert CORONA 

p m might not be roved, the Discoverer program office prepared a 

d pment plan g for 20 highly secure but noncovert Discoverer 

reconnaissance ts extending through 1960. This plan was submitted along 

with Sentry and das development plans by BMD to the Pentagon in January 

1959. On 2 February 1959, Air Force Under Secretary Macintyre directed that 

the be integrated with a revised and integrated CORONA 

effort a within the total available FY -59 Discoverer-Sentry funding.42 

These deliberations caused security concerns for the CIA-Air Force 

CORONA management teams. Some of the Discoverer supporters and Air 

Staff planners were not CORONA-briefed. Continuation of the covert CORONA program meant that cover and security actions were necessary to provide 

for a larger and longer program. 

A simple extension of the Discoverer program with provision for sufficient 

flights to cover 20 CORONA operations was the most direct means of 

documenting the program and obtaining the necessary funds. That course was 

complicated, however, by the ARPA's February action in cutting the program 

back to 13 vehicles and cancelling procurement authorizations for all additional Discoverers. Under existing arrangements, funding had to come 

through ARPA. 

Through CIA, General Ritland arranged an unofficial but effective authorization to continue work on all of the 19 vehicles earlier scheduled. Bissell 

assure ard that funds were available. On 1 April, $20 million in 

"emergency ds" came to hand, drawn from the President's Reserve. Of the 

total, $2.4 million was diverted to the CIA to fund additional camera 

subsystems and $17.6 million to ARPA to finance reexpansion of Discoverer. 

The Air Force scraped up an additional $10.4 million by reprogramming, to 

cover the residual requirement. 

A means of effectively throttling support for a noncovert reconnaissance 

Discoverer had to be devised, and it had to be convincing because, as with the 

situation a year earlier, the entirely logical notion of using Discoverers to loft 

reconnaissance payloads had attracted a swarm of eager devotees. S ard 

concocted the antidote. He sent to Bissell a message which c be 

transformed into a directive from Air Force Assistant Secretary Richard E. 

Horner to General Roscoe Wilson, on the Air Staff. Wilson would then shape it 

into a formal directive to BMD. It would (and ultimately did) say that Horner 

had been briefed on using Discoverer for reconnaissance early in February, 

that the cost and risk of that approach were incompatible with the gain over 

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established projects (Sentry), and that the proposal was, therefore, disapproved. But because of other attractive alternatives Discoverer was to be 

extended to include 25 flights lasting through 1960 and sufficient funds were 

available. 

On 27 April, Air Force headquarters officially instructed BMD to undertake the 25-flight Discoverer program. The ARPA directive legally required to 

authenticate such an expansion was issued on 20 May, thus closing the 

circle.43 

A final installment in the restoration of complete cover for CORONA was 

an interchange of letters between l. Eugene Root, lockheed vice president, 

and General Schriever. The maneuver was planned in March as a means of 

curiosity that might have been aroused both in BMD and in 

by the recent turmoil. The letters, classified Secret, handled through 

"normal" security channels, and seen by any number of people at both sites, 

would in the normal course of events provide a "Secret" explanation for some 

of the iar aspects of the current situation. Root's letter, dated 7 April, 

ope a reference to "recent conversations" and the fact that the Sentry 

program was relatively well known in industry as a readout effort. Root 

remarked that he had been a ached by several concerns proposing 

recoverable photographic payl for Discoverer capsules for the 1959-60 

, before Sentry became available. What, he asked, should be Lockeed's position? 

During the interim, Ritland had replaced General Schriever as commander of BMD. Ritland, in a letter that had been widely "coordinated" within 

BMD, said BMD had also been approached, had a quick reassessment of the Discoverer reconnaissance potential, learned that it 

would take too I to get results through Discoverer reconnaissance. He 

explained that av Ie cameras were too heavy, that test schedules would 

not permit early introduction of photographic payloads, and that ". . . the 

Discoverer ... already has too many complications of a sensitive nature 

without adding the probably unsolvable complications of a reconnaissance 

mission." (Colonel Sheppard was u' ely adroit at answering his own 

letters.)44 The letters served their int purpose. 

In the spring of 1959, an effort was made by the US Army, on behalf of the 

Army Map Service, to obtain ARPA approval for a reconnaissance satellite 

program to obtain precise geodetic data on the Soviet Union for the ultimate 

purpose of pinpointing strategic targets. Because such a ram would 

. . u CORONA from a security standpoint and om pete for 

la g acilities, it was decided, through coordination with the Secretary of 

Defense, that the program would be administered within the organizational 

framework of CORONA. This was done to the security of the latter 

and to establish priorities for launching sch . An agreement between 

CIA and ARPA on the control of the mappi named ARGON, was 

signed on 7 July 1959. This gave CIA a rization to contract for the 

exploitation of ARGON's product for the Army Map Service and to maintain 

security control over the project. Approval was received from the White 

House on 21 July, 1959. 

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The attem t to launch the first Discoverer satellite, on 21 january 1959, 

was aborted the premature ignition of ullage orientation rockets on the 

. second stage vehicle was severely damaged and the Thor 

wn for major overhaul. 

Discoverer-I - actually the second scheduled flight vehicle - left the 

Vandenberg launching pad on 28 February 1959, and established an orbit with 

an apogee of 605 miles and a perigee of 99 miles. Although somewhat more 

eccentric than planned, its flight constituted a success. Since no capsule was 

carried, recovery was not attempted. 

Discoverer-II was also reasonably successful in establishing orbit, following its 13 A launching. Unhappily, human error in setti the satellite's 

tim the capsule to eject halfway around the earth the planned 

recovery zone, descending near Spitzber , Norway. There were reports that 

the descending parachute was actually rved. 

At that time Air Force Lt. Colonel Charles "Moose" Mathison (who was 

not cleared on the CORONA Program), a ege and confidant of General 

Schriever, was assi as Vice Comma r, 6594th Test Wing (which 

operated the groun tion and control facilities for the Air Force satellite 

programs). When Mathison heard of the Spitzbe ing report he, 

with a junior officer from BMD, flew in civili by commercial 

to Norway. There Mathison enlisted the aid of a high-placed Norwegian Air Force Officer to make a ground and air search near Spitzbergen. No 

sign of the capsule was found. Because of ski marks in the probable impact 

area some of the more impressionable program personnel concluded that the 

capsule had been captured by a resident Soviet mining party. If such had 

indeed been the fate of the Discoverer-II capsule, it did not gravely disturb 

CORONA managers: the missing capsule had carried "mechanical mice," 

electronic devices rigged to record biomedical effects data. 

Discoverers-III and -IV, launched on 3 June and 25 June, failed to reach 

orbital velocities because Agena thrust did not meet expectations. The 3 June 

rried another biomedical payload, but the 25 June vehicle contained 

of the CORONA cameras. Because of the failure to orbit, no data on 

camera-operating characteristics were obtained. 

All these malfunctions created problems for Bissell and his staff. After the 

January 1959 failure, President Eisenhower upbraided Bissell personally. After 

the second failure on 25 February, Eisenhower began asking DCI Dulles for 

explanations. As Bissell subsequently recalled: 

It was a most heartbreaking business. If an airplane goes 

on a test flight and something malfunctions, and it gets back, 

the pilot can tell you about the malfunction, or you can look 

it over and find out. But in the case of a recce satellite, you 

fire the damn thing off and you've got some telemetry and 

you it back. There is no pilot, of course, and you've 

got no ha are, you never see it again. so you have to infer 

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from telemetry what went wrong. Then you make a fix, and if 

it fails again you know you've inferred wrong. In the case of 

CORONA it went on and on.45 

After the disappointing failure of the first CORONA satellite with a camera 

payload-Discoverer-IV-to achieve orbit on 25 June 1959, General Ritland 

asked Space Technology laboratories to perform an independent analysis of 

the CORONA system with particular reference to design and performance 

margins. 

As a result of system failures, CORONA was running short of cameras and 

more units, as well as more reentry vehicles, had to be purchased. The new 

cameras, ordered on 26 July 1959, were essentially the same as the first HYAC 

cameras except for an improved t compensation system. 

They were known as C' units. General Electric t an improved reentry 

capsule that could hold twice as much film as the first model-an increase 

from 20 to 40 pounds. This new CORONA configuration was designed to stay 

aloft for two days instead of one. 

After Discoverers-V and -VI failed in orbit in August 1959, BMD halted the 

launching once again to permit a new analysis of the recovery 

capsule fai res. A succession of exhaustive ground tests, involving both the 

capsule recovery subsystem and the camera subsystem, lasted well into 

October 1959, when it seemed feasible to resume launchings. The analyses 

revealed several areas where technical weaknesses existed: (1) the reentry 

m was being exposed to temperatures lower than those for which it 

had . ned; (2) insufficient electrical power was being provided to the 

reinjection squibs; (3) telemetered information was insufficient to establish the 

point of reentry system failure; (4) it had been impossible to track the reentry 

vehicle until parachute deployment occurred; (5) data on the capsuleseparation sequence were imprecise; (6) the reentry capsule had marginal 

stability characteristics; and (7) telem did not adequately indicate the 

ise pitch angle of the Agena vehicle re capsule separation. The first 

ght items modified to correct such deficiencies left lockheed for the 

launching area in late September. Subsequently, ground tests revealed that 

the spi had been deficient in quality, and those originally installed 

had to replaced at Vandenberg. 

An additional nificant change resulted from the August 1959 failures: 

conceding that C NA tions were being conducted in a high-risk 

environment and under a philosophy, BMD began a long-term 

instrumentation and analysis program as insurance against further failures. 46 

lockheed also acted to increase the electrical power output of the 

satellite batteries and to instrument the recovery capsule much more elaborately than had initially been thought necessary. In part, this was the 

consequence of the report by a special STl study group which on 8 September 

seriously urged that the p ram be halted rmit additional e' ring 

refinement of the Agena he recovery ca It appeared both the STl 

specialists and to the BMD program managers that lockheed had been 

overconfident and that the Agena and capsule section were not instrumented 

uately. lockheed, in the words of one scientist, had not "instrumented 

for ilures."47 

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The next two Discoverer flight trials, on 7 and 20 November, were as 

disappointing as their predecessors. Discoverers-VII and -VIII both had subsystem failures which prevented recovery of the ule, and in neither instance 

did the camera system function properly. The allistic Missile Division again 

suspended flight tests. 48 

Not until February 1960, after two months of intensive corrective engineering, were the launchings resumed. Unhappily, neither of the boosters 

used in the February flights (Discoverers-IX and -X on 4 and 19 February) 

functioned p and in neither case did the Agena go into orbit. Some 

additional co ions were provided when it was necessary to destroy 

Discoverer-X its climbout, and arts of Vandenberg Air Force Base 

were showered assorted residuals e flight vehicle. Special security 

precautions were quickly enforced to protect the project from compromise. 49 

One innovative design feature on Discoverer-IX deserves mention. A 

cooler was needed for the fairing interface, which was heatin during 

ascent. A water receptacle was installed around the leading of the 

fairing, the idea being that the water would boil during ascent, with steam 

carrying away the heat. In order to contain the water and prevent sloshing, 

something absorbent, soft, and easy to work with was required. After 

conducting a test program on various materials, the design engineer chose 

sanitary napkins. 

Discoverer flight Summary - 1959 

Discoverer Mission 

No. No. Date Camera Remarks 

I 28 Feb N/A No capsule flown. 

II 13 Apr N/A Capsule ejected over Norway. 

III 3 Jun N/A Agena did not orbit. 

IV 9001 25 Jun C Agena did not orbit. 

V 9002 13 Aug C Not recovered. Camera failed on 

Rev 1. 

VI 9003 19 Aug C Retrorocket malfunction. Not recovered. 

Camera failed on Rev 2. 

VII 9004 7 Nov C Agena failed to orbit. 

VIII 9005 20 Nov C Bad orbit. Camera failure. No recovery. 

Although there was little reason for optimism at this point, the AFBMD 

engineers continued to insist that the ogram would eventually be successful. 

In January, production and flight edules had been expanded by four 

additional vehicles to accommodate the newly approved ARGON mapping 

camera am, an Army-sponsored covert effort. This change had been 

stipulat ause Army mappers were increasingly restless in their claim that 

ca aphic interests were underemphasized in CORONA's flight schedule. 

No a itional resources, money, pie accompanied the program expansion. The total number of approv Discoverer launchings was now 29. (Of 

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Discoverer-XII, planned as a diagnostic flight, climbed very briefly from 

the Vandenberg launching stand on 29 June 1960: erratic horizon scanner 

operation caused a nose-down position during separation of the Agena from 

the Thor booster. In this instance, a 43-day delay in the next scheduled 

launching was imposed, permitting modification of several minor components 

to correct the problem. Key technical assistants suggested that the low 

reliability of Discoverer was sufficient cause for cancelling any further effort on 

CORONA past the scheduled 1960 flights; however, Bissell, who consistently 

fought for continuance in the face of great odds, felt that the best 

course wo to concentrate on recovery subsystem perfection and to 

accept any recovered film as a program bonus rather than as an objective. 52 

During the summer of 1960, two circumstances quite inde dent of the 

Discoverer-CORONA program made the situation tense. The was the 1 

May shootdown of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft well inside Soviet boundaries, which led President Eisenhower to cancel U-2 operations. The second 

was the approaching maid t of the first Samos (formerly Project Sentry) 

reconnaissance satellite, ed for September-October. There was a 

general feeling among CORONA-briefed Air Staff members that CORONA 

was a "poor man's" system which had slight prospect of achieving any real 

results. Weight-limited by the thrust of the Thor booster, the CORONA system 

was regarded as a handicapped competitor to the Atlas-boosted Samos. 

Additionally, early Samos flights were intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of a readout system and would possibly eliminate concern over complicated recovery techniques. Finally, the high-magnification camera (E-5) being 

developed under Samos in the late summer of 1960 was integrated with a 

recovery system considerably more sophisticated than that of CORONA in 

several important respects. On the whole, therefore, Samos offered a convenient alternative to CORONA and one which gained political attractiveness as 

CORONA difficulties persisted. 53 

As things continued going badly for the CORONA program, some Air 

Force officials considered reducing the number of test flights. However, the 

Air Force's own Samos program was also having its share of technical 

problems: the remote ima transmission system was not wor' well. On 

24 July 1959, Killian told nt Eisenhower: "I have not seen that 

[Samos] has had the hard-boiled technical review to determine what is 

realistically possible," adding that the program might be too costly, His view 

was seconded by members of the President's Science Advisory Committee. 

The early failures of the CORONA program had a variety of causes. The 

engines on the Thor booster burned until all fuel was exhausted, at which 

point the Agena 'ne was fired to reach orbital velocity. This procedure was 

not always suc I. On other occasions, the Tho ines would burn too 

long and cause the spacecraft to go in a higher tha desired orbit. Some 

missions that succeeded in orbiting failed later, o' to malfunctions of the 

rm's three-axis stabilization system ( caused the satellite to 

tu n when the Thor-Agena and camera systems functioned perfectly, 

the mission could still be classified a failure because of malfunctions on the 

satellite recovery vehicle (SRV). In the latter case, lockheed specialists theorized that the 'n rockets on the GE-designed SRV were not igniting 

simultaneousl ad of spinning the SRV, were causing it to cartwheel 

and to enter unintended orbits, rather than return to earth. At the suggestion 

of Willis M. Hawkins, lockheed's Manager of Space Systems, lockheed 

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delivery to a courier from BMD, the courier's return to California (probably by 

commercial airliner), and the surreptitious exchange of the container for a 

dummy, shortly thereafter. The r capsule container would go to lockheed by a rather obvious route, the real capsule (repackaged so as not 

to resemble the original) would leave Sunnyvale, California, in an unmarked 

truck for covert shipment to the photographic ng facility at Rochester, 

New York. These precautions were necessary examination of the real 

capsule would disclose that it had a film-entry aperture. 

Although Discoverer-XIII, being a diagnostic instrument, had no film 

aperture and carried neither camera nor film, the first recovery was intended 

to be a full-scale dress rehearsal for the handling of a "real" capsule. 

Immediately after XIII's successful recovery, lieutenant Colonel Gus Ahola, 

Commander of the 6594th Recovery Control Group, in Honolulu, expected to 

meet the Haiti Victory at Pearl Harbor and arrange for one of his C-130s to 

return the capsule to lMSC engineers at Sunnyvale. On Friday, 12 A st, 

Ahola was startled to learn that "Moose" Mathison, Vice Commander e 

Sunnyvale 6594th Test Wing (previously mentioned as a Norway-boundcapsule-hunter), had already landed by helicopter on the flight deck of the 

Haiti Victory and assumed charge. Mathison was about to put into effect a 

"Moose Courier Plan" which would be dramatically different from that 

authorized for the occasion. He had even told a newspaperman friend of his 

planned itinerary, to ensure good coverage. 55 

later, in retrospect, it became clear that Mathison (not briefed on 

CORONA) had . n a good deal of thought to how he believed the Air Force 

should handle first Discoverer success. The occasion would offer an 

opportunity to redress certain inequities which had annoyed him for a long 

time. He had been morbidly concerned that the Air Force space program was 

.. ery little press exposure, and that the Air Force Systems Command, 

his very close friend, Schriever, was not in the space limelight. The 

6594th Test Wing, where Mathison normally spent his days, had not really had 

very much to test - its main . was rarely ing into orbit. 

But now, with the availability Ie which had actually in space, he 

had precisely the he draw attention to the fine work being 

done by all those and organizations. Mathison also sensed that he was 

not part of an inner personal capture of the capsule would bring 

him closer to some ormation. 

Mathison accompanied the capsule to Pearl Harbor, arranging by radio to 

have the Commander, Pacific Air Force, General "Rosie" O'Donnell, meet him 

at the dock for a photographic opportunity. Then he transferred the capsule to 

one of Ahola's C-130s and began a flight to Sunnyvale, California. While 

airborne, he passed the time by breakin to the capsule, which he found to 

be almost empty. He sent a message a d to General Ritland, and to Mr. 

Herschel Brown, general manager of LMSC, to meet him at Sunnyvale for 

another photo opportunity. During the stopover at lMSC, he did permit 

access to the capsule by Lockheed technicians, who removed a few items of 

instrumentation. (One item was a small EUNT kage, named SCOTOP, 

designed to determine if Soviet radars were trac ing US satellites. They 

were.)56 

By Saturday morning, 13 August, Mathison and capsule were landing at 

Andrews Air Force Base, providing a photo opportunity for the Commander, 

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from the orbiting satellite," he was giving praise for the only part of the 

operation which Battle would have evaluated as embarassingly unsuccessful. 

Iy, the decoration was richly deserved for many other reasons, most of 

occurred three days later, on 18 August, with the successful flight 

performance of Discoverer-XIV. The first phot phic capsule was recovered, 

with dignity, in mid-air, and quietly couri to Eastman Kodak for film 

processing. 

There was to be a postscript to the Penta n confusion. Some weeks later, 

the Air Force Public Information Office, still by the drama of space 

objects being winched out of the Pacific, announced" ... a new technique to 

speed the recovery of satellite capsules from space. The technique, known as 

'sea-snatch,' complements the air-snatch procedure .... " The accompanying 

phs showed a C-119 trailing its recovery trapeze, as it made a very 

-level s over the ocean. This totally spurious information might have 

annoyed Discoverer office a few months earlier; now secure in the 

knowled e that aerial rec was a proven procedure, the staff jovially 

sugg that all inquiries be a dressed to Mathison. 

A new official courier system had been put into effect, even while 

Mathison was airborne to Andrews AFB. Henceforth, there would be many 

Discoverer capsules courier~d across the United States, but there would be no 

parades. Rumi' the "parade" some months later, one of Mr. Bissell's 

aides (after " were still alive) relented briefly to point out that 

the only persons more confused than Mathison must have been the Soviets, to 

whom he single-handedly and convincingly documented the innocent nature 

of a US space capsule. Clearly, it contained nothing noxious-no bomb, no 

camera, no leaflets-just one American flag. The aide speculated briefly that 

anyone so brilliant in cover and deception might find a home in the CIA's 

counter-counter-counter intelligence division. Then, thinking over what he 

had just said, he shuddered. 

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Achievement: A New Vantage 

Discoverer-XIV, launched on 18 August 1960, paralleled the performance 

of its predecessor in most important respects. Additionally, it carried a 

CORONA camera, and the camera worked perfectly. Although the Agena had 

less than optimum pitch-down angle at the time of capsule separation (the 

capsule descended 430 miles south of the predicted impact area), the C-119s 

were able to complete a smooth aerial recovery. Captain Harold E. Mitchell 

and his crew successfully hooked the descending capsule on the third pass. 

Upon arrival at Hickam Air Force Base, Mitchell was decorated with the 

Distinguished Flying Cross and members of his crew were awarded the Air 

Medal. 

This time, as it would henceforth, the capsule-handling procedure followed official plans. After an overt return to Moffett Naval Air Station, the 

capsule was taken to a lockheed facility for removal of protective ordnance 

devices and radio-beacon equipment, then transferred to an unmarked 

container and sent to Rochester for film processing. Eastman Kodak's Ed 

Green and crew did all processin nd duplication of CORONA film until 

1962, after which the task was EK and the Air Force Special Projects 

Production Facility (AFSPPF) at Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts. The 

processed photography was finally delivered to the National Photographic 

Intelligence Center (NPIC), and other intelligence centers. 

The fact that press photographs of the XIV capsule were forbidden was 

explained by citing the need for close examination of the instruments before 

they might be disturbed. 

Initial reaction to the film from Discoverer-XIV was unbridled jubilation. 

CIA program officials told Colonel Worthman that photo interpreters had 

called the product "terrific, stupendous," and had said, "We are flabbergasted." Worthman's conservative report to General Ritland was that "apparently 

design specifications on resolution have been met .... " The photographs were 

of "very high quality," and, as a bonus, at least one-half of the frames exposed 

over the Soviet Union were clear of cloud-cover. 

Detailed analysis of the XIV results showed that 3/000 feet of film had 

been recovered-essentially all of the 20 pounds stored in the cassettes. More 

than 1/650,000 square miles of Soviet territory had been acquired for photointerpretation. Resolution was estimated conservatively at 55 lines per millimeter, and ground objects ranging upwards from 35-foot dimensions were 

identifiable. 57 

After Preside'nt Eisenhower saw the phot raphy from this flight, he let it 

be known that he wanted everything about "take" kept secret, so as to 

avoid unnecessary affront to the Soviets. As this comment passed down the 

chain of command, his cautionary words were translated and amplified into 

"Dest the capsule!" So the capsule was literally beaten to pieces and 

dum into the Santa Barbara channel. 

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CORONA development had been persistently and energetically pursued, 

in the face of continuous adversity, because of the overwhelming urgency of 

the intelligence needs of the nation. The initial planning for CORONA began 

at a time when no one knew how many BEAR and BISON aircraft the Soviets 

had, whether they were introducing a new and far more advanced Ion ge 

bomber than the BISON, or whether they had largely skipped the buil f a 

manned-bomber force in favor of missiles. There had been major changes in 

intelligence estimates of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of the he 

Soviet missile program on the basis of photography from a re small 

number of U-2 missions approved for the summer of 1957. Furthermore, by 

1959, the great "missile gap" controversy was very much in the forefront. The 

Soviets had tested ICBMs at ranges of 5,000 miles, proving they had the 

capability to build and fly them. What was not known was where those 

missiles were being ed operationally and in what numbers. In the 

tion of the Nati Intelligence Estimate for Guided Missiles during 

I of 1959, various intelligence agencies held widely diverse views on the 

Soviet missile situation. In an election year (1960) the "missile gap" became a 

I issue.* The U-2 had improved the Intelligence Community's 

the Soviet Union, but it could not provide broad area coverage 

or the answers to most critical questions. Furthermore, all experts felt that it 

was only a matter of time until a U-2 was shot down. In May 1960, that 

dreaded event occurred, essentially ending overhead reconnaissance of the 

USSR by aircraft. Fortunately, Discoverer-XIV yielded much more Soviet 

coverage than the total of all U-2 missions. 

Aside from the (expected) modest resolution of the CORONA "take," the 

only major deficiency was streaks of variation in density, running diagonally 

across the format. Some of this was due to minor light leaks and some was the 

result of either static electric (corona) discharge or roller pressure markings. 

*In an episode reminiscent of the 1944 presidential election, when Thomas E. Dewey was 

constrained by wartime security from making potentially revelations about Pearl 

Harbor, Richard M. Nixon in 1960 was constrained from reveal 'missile gap," on 

which John F. Kennedy had earlier campaigned, was an illusion. The Discoverer-XIV payload 

was retrieved, and its intelligence information digested, two months before the 1960 election 

campaign ended. Kennedy, who had been made aware of the mission results, stopped talking 

about the But some of his supporters did not, and Nixon's indirect assertions that 

there was 'mpact, because he had been this much earlier, when 

nobody really knew, and because he had subsequently adopt policy of promising to 

enlarge the US missile program in much the way Kennedy proposed. In later years, when the 

August 1960 findings became more widely known . . little discussion of the 

potential change in election results that might have occurred if t information had been 

revealed. 

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t was over. Although two failures to recover and one camera 

breakd photo interpreters waiting until the return of the XVIII capsule 

on 10 December 1960, there was no longer any question of the feasibility of 

any major element of the CORONA operation. Discoverer-XVIII, moreover, 

had carried an improved camera - C' (called C-prime) and was loaded with 

nearly twice the weight of film used on XIV. It remained in orbit three days 

rather than one, provided roughly twice as much coverage (3,800,000 square 

miles), gave 20 percent better resolution (65 lines per millimeter for XVIII as 

opposed to the 55 of XIV), and its recovered photography permitted identification of some ound objects measuring only 25 feet on a side. This excellent 

photography lied all residual concern about a Soviet lead in the deployment of intercontinental missiles and provided the basic hard intelligence 

around which incoming President john F. Kennedy and his defense secretary 

constructed their massive overhaul of US defense priorities, goals, structures, 

and management processes. 

There is a sardonic military cliche that "Success is a team effort, but failure 

must always be identified with a specific individual." CORONA was indeed a 

team effort, but basic responsibility for its success could be assigned to key 

individuals, particularly upon the occasion of Flight XIV, the first comprehensive success. 

The first of these persons was Colonel lee Battle, the System Officer. This 

title translated into his responsibility for ta' an untested e booster, an 

untested spacecraft, an untested re-entry vehi Ie, an untest camera, untested photographic film, an untested control network - and making them 

perform correctly and harmoniously. 

Total responsibility for elements of the system rested with Major Richard 

Moore (Thor), It. Colonel Roy Worthington (Agena), Captain William Johnson 

(Payload and Recovery), and Major Frank Buzard (System Integration and 

Operations). At the Vandenb AFB launching site, It. Colonel William 

Heisler and Captains Ray Lef and William Diener had responsibility for 

preparing and launching the spacecraft. 

Overall p ram responsibility was shared by Richard Bissell, for the CIA, 

and Colonel rthman, for the D ment of the Air Force. lieutenant 

Colonel Ralph Ford was Worthman's Mr. Bissell's key staff persons, for 

this program, were Eugene P. Kiefer and John Parangosky. His field representative was lieutenant Colonel Charles Murphy, who was in residence at LMSC. 

If a sin Ie person were selected to be given the bulk of credit for the 

success of RONA, it would be, by general acclaim, Richard Bissell. It was 

Bissell's vision, energy, and courage that gave the program the opportunity 

(1' uired to move from failure to success. His intervention was vital, 

particul at the White House level. When a string of one dozen failures was 

testing the nerve of key governmental officials, Bissell never faltered - and 

the program moved on. 

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Corona Security: Assessment and Conjectures 

Between 21 January 1959 and 18 August 1960, 15 CORONA missions 

were attempted. Whether the Soviets believed that Discoverer was what it was 

publicly represented to be remains an intriguing question, withal one that had 

transient importance. Of course, the Soviets may have had "inside" intelligence by way of conventional espionage. In that case the question would be 

irrelevant. It is also possible that an intensive analysis of American purpose and 

capability might have induced the Soviets to accept early Discoverer flights at 

face value. It was by no means obvious that the United States, or anyone else, 

could actually build and operate a useful satellite-reconnaissance system 

based on the Thor-Agena booster-spacecraft combination and 1958 camera 

technology. Compared to other space-reconnaissance systems proposed 

earlier, CORONA was tiny. The camera weighed only 92 pounds, and the 

entire payload, including film, only 53 more. High-resolution p aphic 

systems were known to be heavy. Soviet intelligence an ts very 

reasonably conclude that Discoverer was intended to test easibility of 

various reconnaissance subsystems, perhaps even a limited capability prototype camera, but they would not necessarily think of Discoverer as an 

operationally useful system in its own right. 

A second factor of importance was development style. All available 

evidence would est to the Soviets that the preferred (almost exclusive) 

strategy for US mi ary systems development was the massive-resource 

approach which had been a to widely-known programs, including 

Sam os. The style of CORONA opment was the antithesis of normal US 

practice. It was relatively cheap; limited resources and relatively few people 

were involved in its development, and, notwithstanding its clever design, it 

was a conservative extension of existing state-of-the-art. No other important 

American program of that time had those attributes, certainly no other military 

space program. (Knowledge of the results of the Vanguard and Explorer 

programs of 1957-60 would reinforce a Soviet assumption that "simple" 

American space systems were likely to be unimpressive in performance.) 

Capability was a third factor. Although the Soviets had undamaged 

GENETRIX cameras to examine at their leisure (and, after May 1960, the U-2 

camera), and had taken over most of the German optical and camera industry 

at the end of World War II, they nevertheless appeared to be well behind the 

United States in this technology and continued so until 1965. CORONA, 

despite its small size, was a very capable system. Its performance surprised 

even those who built it and that performance, once early development 

problems had been overcome, improved spectacularly. From the Soviet 

viewpoint, orb . camera system that was limited in weight by the payload 

capacity of the r-Agena combination m well have no operational 

significance. It was counter to good sense, as Soviets may have seen it, to 

invest in such an unpromising undertaking; they might I ally have concluded that the Ameriean government's reactions would be e their own. 

Finally, there was the apparent nature of the Discoverer program. It was 

one of several "minor" space pr hastily composed in response to the 

stimulus of Sputnik late in 1957. main thrust of the American reaction to 

Sputnik was to large resources into the develo nt of much publicized 

missiles and mi itary satellites - principally Atlas, T or, and Samos - and to 

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invest in some other systems which had only "image" value. Space launchings 

were widely publicized but there were many failures. Administration officials, 

legislators, and military spokesmen, concerned about American response to 

the Soviet "space threat, cally emphasized major programs and paid little 

attention to rams su as Discoverer, Explorer, Echo, and Pioneer, 

believing tha d no obvious military utility. Accustomed to the 

notorious American habit of publicizing the atus, and (often) details of 

major military programs, however sensitive, t oviets might have considered 

any uncharacteristic departure from that pattern to be incredible. 

Occasional n press references to Discoverer as a "spy satellite" 

signified little ex t speculation was an entertaining diversion. Many of 

those who were privy to the inner workings of the US space effort between 

1958 and 1964, and thought they had access to most of the classified details, 

never suspected Discoverer to be other than what it pretended to be. In fact, 

the more one knew about the US research and development process, the less 

likely he was to suspect that a CORONA program could ever be conducted. 

Perhaps the Soviets were similarly misled. The question was not likely to be 

answered for many years. 

CORONA Securi~y: The United Nations and National Policy 

But there were still many threats to CORONA security. UN Resolution 

1472 of the XIVth Session of the General Assembly, adopted on 12 December 

1959, established a Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. It directed 

the Committee to review areas for international cooperation, to study the 

legal aspects of space exploration, and to prepare for an international scientific 

conference on peaceful uses of outer space to be held in 1960-61.58 

Because of a boycott by the USSR, the Committee was not organized until 

28 November 1961. The US Delegation had taken a leadin role in establishing 

the Committee and, once the Soviet boycott was the Delegation 

maintained its position as a major advocate of international cooperation in 

peaceful space activities. Su ntly, Resolution 1721 of the XVlth Session, 

which the State Department art in drafting, was adopted by the General 

Assembly on 20 December 1961. It aimed at making the Committee on 

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space a focal point for international cooperation and 

commended two principles to member-states: (a) that international law, 

including the Charter of the United Nations, applied to outer space and 

celestial bodies; and (b) outer space and celestial bodies were free for 

exploration and use by all states in conformity with international law and were 

not subject to national appropriation. An additional clause in the Resolution 

(drafted in the US State rtment) called on member-states launching 

objects into orbit or beyon rnish information promptly to the Committee 

on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for a 'stry of such activities. A US position 

paper on this matter had been circula in October 1961 to most interested 

agencies in the US Government, but not to the CIA. 

The State Department consulted with the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and with the rtment of Defense in January 1962 on the 

kinds of information which shou d be registered with the United Nations. The 

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Defense Department, while agreeing that the United States should take the 

lead in r rti ts, s ed that only those in sustained orbit be 

registe ,in r to fr action in the event it should be 

necessary to launch a two- or three-orbit satellite to minimize chance of 

hostile interdiction. The DoD did not agree to binding the United States to a 

ise reporting schedule or to furnishing information on the purpose of each 

aunching. 59 

The first US report was submitted to the United Nations on 5 March 1962 

and included only those objects in orbit as of 15 February 1962. The 

Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, complained to State that 

the US shift-from apparent willingness to submit data on all launchings, to a 

position in which some short-term flights were not to be r rted-would 

create serious difficulties with the Soviets, who were ex to exploit this 

US "concealment." The Soviets were insisting on a joint declaration banning 

the use of satellites for military reconnaissance and Ambassador Stevenson felt 

the best response was to say we were prepared to consider such a question in 

the context of disarmament in a proper forum, being careful to avoid the 

implication that such use was not peaceful within the meaning of the UN 

Charter, which permitted self-defense.6o 

Dr. Herbert "Pete" Scoville, CIA's Deputy Director for Research (DDR), 

who inherited responsibility for CIA participation in overhead reconnaissance 

from Richard Bissell, noted to the DCI on 27 April 1962, that he did not 

believe the proposal for considering such a joint declaration was wise; he 

believed the United States should continue to uphold the position that 

satellite activi was not a military action and that it would never agree that 

this activity uld be renounced in the course of disarmament negotiations. 

He pointed out that observation satellites are in themselves a strong measure 

in favor of disarmament, since they tend to limit dangers from unknown 

enemy capabilities. 61 

At about the time that the UN Outer Space Committee was beginning to 

functio lans were developed for a National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), 

which Id consist of all joint and unilateral US overhead reconnaissance 

projects. A strong White House interest in the security of these reconnaissance 

projects was stimulated late in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy's President's 

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), headed by Dr. Killian. A security 

control system (known as the BYEMAN System) was inaugurated for the 

specific purpose of protecting information pertaining to the joint DoD/CIA 

reconnaissance projects under the NRP. The CIA was given responsibility for 

security agreements for all reconnaissance projects falling within the NRP and 

for administering the new security system. 

The attitude of Defense officials toward the security of the National 

Reconnaissance Program began, early in 1962, to lean from the use of 

plausible cover stories toward a philosophy of total security. When the 

Discoverer-XXXVIII was launched from Vandenberg on 27 February 1962, the 

Air Force barred all essential details other than the successful midair catch of 

the capsule, which had been in orbit for four days. Between that event and 

April 1962, publicity given to the " spy-in-the-sky" of the Air Force 

Samo gram (the residual WS-117L program), the news media 

th Discoverer, led to the publication of what was referred to as the 

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"Gilpatric Directive." This DoD Directive 5200.13, dated 23 March 1962, 

established security policy for all military space pro s and declared as 

classified the details of these programs, including tification, mission, 

scope, capability, payload, launching, control or recovery operations, and 

results. 

After the launching of Discoverer-XXXIX on 17 April 1962, the following 

United Press International release appeared in the New York Times, 18 April 

edition: 

VAFB, Calit, 17 April (UPI) - The Air Force today 

launched a satellite toward polar orbit, but refused to say 

whether it was a Discoverer or "Sky Spy" vehicle in line with 

a new policy severely restricting information on military 

space shots. 

The Air Force would not even give the time of the launching. 

The brief prepared statement said only: 

"A satellite employing a Thor Agena A booster combination 

was launched today by the Air Force from Vandenberg Air 

Force Base, Calif." 

Asked whether the satellite was in orbit, the Air Force 

information officer referred to the directive released last 

Tuesday making information classified on all military 

satellites. 

The same directive eliminated names for satellite programs, 

such as the Discoverer and Samos-Midas Sky Spy vehicles 

launched from here previously. 

On 10 April 1962, uty Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric wrote to 

General Maxwell Taylor Special Assistant to President Kennedy) sayi 

that the State De t proposal on registration of space launchings 

not be from the US satellite reconnaissance program, and 

forwarded a proposed paper on "National Policy on Satellite Reconnaissance," recommending that it be considered by the NSC 5412 Committee 

prior to any action with regard to other space matters, such as UN 

registration.62 

Subsequent to Gilpatric's initiative, the NSC issued National Security 

Action Memorandum (NSAM) 156 which set up a committee under the 

chairmanship of U. Alexis johnson, then Under Secretary of State, to develop 

US policy with respect to US reconnaissance programs and outer space. The 

policy aimed to maintain unilateral freedom of action to conduct space 

operations; prevent foreign political and physical interference with the conduct of these operations; prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of 

such operations or their end-products; avoid situations, statements, or actions 

which, in the context of the satellite reconnaissance program could later be 

exploited as evidence either of alleged US aggressiveness or duplicity; and 

facilitate the resolution of any conflicts which might arise between the 

essential technical and security requirements of the US satellite-reconnaissance program and the international commitments and foreign policy objectives of the United States.63 

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On 16 May 1962, Dr. James Killian, whom President Kennedy had asked 

to continue as Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, told the 

president of the Board's concern over the impact of discussions in the UN 

Outer Space Committee upon the US satellite-reconnaissance program. The 

Board urged that care be exercised to ensure that control of the development 

of space capabilities for national defense and national intelligence purposes 

would not be foreclosed, diminished, or compromised in any way. Killian said 

that if international agreements pr e use of outer space for military 

purposes precluded continuance ffective US intelligence reconnaissance activities, it would be the States, not the Soviet Union, which 

would stand to lose a critically needed collection capability. The Board 

recommended that the president review US policy and approve a position 

(there were .currently contending points of view varying from full revelation to 

complete secrecy).64 

The DCI, John McCone, urged the same action in a letter to Special 

Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, on 17 May 1962. 

McCone also obtained a reement from Secretary of Defense Robert S. 

McNamara that CIA as I as State and Defense should participate in the 

formulation of policies to be followed by the US Delegation to the UN Outer 

Space Committee. With the concurrence of State, McCone directed that DDR 

Pete Scoville arrange for CIA participation in the various 

up Iy with NSAM 156.65 In . this dir 

u the importance of a prepared 

negotiation by the US Delegation, and mentioned the that prior action in 

the United Nations US Delegate had placed the satellite-reconnaisam in a It position. He said the objective of the CIA was to 

the United States could continue a vital program.66 

The report of the NSAM 156 Workin Group and its recommendations for 

US policy on outer space at the 10 July 1962 meeting of the 

National Security Council, which approved 18 points of policy.67 Among other 

decisions, the NSC accepted as sound practice the current procedure in effect 

as a result of the "Gilpatric Directive," whereby no identification was to be 

made of individual military space launchings by mission or purpose. 

The US position with regard to satellite-reconnaissance security has 

continued in the same vein to the present, despite the fact that unofficial 

disclosures in the media, from time to time, have made the general matter a 

partially-open secret. 

The National Reconnaissance Office 

As the satellite and manned reconnaissance programs of the US Government evolved, an effort was made to find a common basis for coordinating, 

developing, and rating all strategic overhead reconnaissance systems. This 

effort was catal by the fact that the cost of these systems had risen, by 

1961, to almost $300 million (exclusive of Samos). In managing these costs, the 

Department of Defense and the CIA had cooperated on a cordial looselystructured basis. Funds were transferred from the Department of Defense to 

the CIA to be expended on covert projects-of both the CIA and DoD-using 

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elephantry encouraged by unorthodox management arrangements? Then 

there was the aggressive move by the Air Force to take over U-2 and OXCART 

resources and missions against the time when the current standdown might 

end. Should roles be more absolutely defined? Third, there was a burgeoning 

Air Force capability to monopolize space overflight missions: (a) ier 

General Richard M. Curtin headed an Assistant Chief of StaffJGuid les 

Office in the Pentagon and his interests were expanding rapidly, under Dr. 

Charyk's tutelage, into s . and (b) Brigadier General Robert Greer 

was heading a Los A office, which was a field extension of the Secretary 

of the Air Force's to develop the overflight systems of the Samos 

menage. Could a very few CIA people balance the Air Force multitude now 

appearing on the scene? Finally, such key intelligence advisors as uty 

Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, General james Doolittle, Dr. Kil an, 

and Dr. Land were pressing the CIA to come forward with a more formal 

interagency agreement on overflight recormaissance, whether by aircraft or 

satellite. 

Most telling of all, Bissell's days were now spent almost entirely on what 

the CIA called /I litical action." He began to move away from CORONA 

management: a r all, CORONA was doing its job and there were more 

important or more pressing matters in his in-basket. 

Eventually responding to all the pressures, Bissell asked Gene Kiefer to 

draft a DoD-CIA agreement. Kiefer delayed, prudently awaiting a little more 

guidance and a few more details. Suddenly, Dr. Charyk appeared with his own 

proposal. It had been written by Colonel John Martin, of General Curtin's 

growing office. Charyk discussed the per with Bissell and they worked out 

the details. What they produced ittle more than a description of the 

effective partnership which then existed, but it was to become the basis for a 

later interagency statement establishing a National Reconnaissance Program 

(NRP). The document was signed on 6 September 1961, by General Cabell, the 

Acting DCI, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. 68 It contained 

six major elements: 

• The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) "will consist of all satellite 

and overflight (i.e., aircraft) reconnaissance projects whether overt or 

covert." 

• The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) will manage the program 

under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and CIA's 

Deputy Director for Plans, "acting jointly" with powers delegated to them 

by their superiors. It will include a small staff drawn from CIA and the 

Department of Defense. The NRO "will have direct control over all 

elements of the total program." 

• The Under Secretary of the Air Force is designated Special Assistant for 

Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense and "delegated full authority" in this area by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

• Within the Defense Department, the Department of the Air Force will be 

"the operational agency for management and conduct of the NRP, and 

will conduct this program through the use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the Office of the Secretary 

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of the Air force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field, 

without intervening reviews or approvals." 

• The NRO "will be directly responsive to, and only to, the photographic 

and electronic signal collection requirements and priorities established by 

the US Intelligence Board." 

• "The Directors of the NRO will establish detailed working procedures to 

ensure that the particular talents, experience, and capabilities within the 

Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully and 

most effectively utilized in this program." 

This agreement made no mention of a single director for the new 

program, but assumed that the informal committee format which had evolved 

over previous rs would continue-and it did. from September thr the 

first month of new year, Bissell and Charyk continued to meet, as had 

during the past several years, to determine policy for the national program. 

The very fact of the existence of the NRO was privileged information, 

closely held, and limited at first to a few leaders in the military and intelligence 

communities. Unwitti sectors of both communities saw only a few outer 

changes and be they saw, assuming that the birth of a Space 

Systems Office in the Secretary of the Air force's household was at most, a 

maneuver to resolve some in-family Air force problems. After all, events of the 

past five years had done much toward resolving similar problems among the 

three military services themselves, and their competition in space technology 

was now at a minimum. 

True, in 1958, the US Army's Jupiter C had boosted the first US satellite 

(Explorer) into orbit. True, the Army had employed the most famous advocate 

of an American program: Werner von Braun. And the US Navy had 

developed Vang as a space vehicle, and had proposed, in 1958, an 

ambitious manned earth-reconnaissance vehicle (MER-1). But the assignment 

of the total national manned space flight program to NASA and the transfer of 

the "Huntsville Group" to NASA in 1959 had muted Army and Navy space 

activity, almost to the vanishing point. 

The Air force situation was radically different: it had a huge and growing 

capability in space activity and had worked incessantly to achieve interservice 

primacy. It had built a large operational space detection and tracking capability at its Air Defense Command headquarters in Colorado. It had comprehensive electronic research centers, propulsion-research facilities, and an 

enormous capital investment at Canaveral and Vandenberg AfB. Its 

ballistic missiles had become essential boosters for space flight; its Satellite 

Control facility at Sunnyvale could handle complex on-orbit operation. It had 

system development programs in being: satellites for defense, rendezvous, 

patrol, communication, meteorology, navigation, geodesy, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance. It was contributing heavily to NASA's ventures into space. In 

1961, for example, there were 52 space launchings made by the United States; 

the Air Force furnished "booster services" on 41 of these. The expression 

"booster service" referred to all procurement and launching services through 

injection into orbit. On Mercury, for instance, the Air force provided a special 

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Atlas, determined the on-orbit trajectories, launched and controlled the 

system through injection, and (occasionally) furnished the astronaut. 

In March 1961, Air Force dreams of primacy became real, as the Secretary 

of Defense assigned to it "research, development, test, and engineering of 

Department of Defense space programs." But Air Force Secretary Eugene 

Zuckert, who had the of the defense scene in its broadest 

perspective, remarked th while he comed the assignment, there were 

actions underway which might make the mandate somewhat like "getting a 

franchise to run a bus line across the Sahara Desert."69 His caution was 

confirmed when the Office of the Secretary of Defense proceeded to place 

existing Air Force (non-NRO) activities under a most critical examination 

that ground away intermina and was very difficult for the Air Force to 

understand; let alone accept. Project after project was reviewed, revised, deor eliminated. In early 1961, for example, the Spaceborne 

em was cancelled, in July the Attack Alarm System was savaged; 

in August, the Satellite Inspector was placed on a back-burner; and Dynasoar 

was under constant threat. Soon Air Force-OSD relationships were at nadir. 

It was against this background that the Air Force learned that its most 

Widely-publicized space project (Discoverer) and its most important space 

project (Samos) were to be lifted out of the Air Force Systems Command and 

d sited directly in the Office of the Secretary. No reason was given to the 

p c or to the military for this action, although it was totally without 

precedent. Not even the ballistic-missile ram, with its streamlined management and ultra-prio had this way. To the Air-Force-atlarge, estering these two systems could only be interpreted as one 

more ( s the ultimate) sign of distrust on the part of the OSD, skirting 

very dose to harrassment or even persecution. Such was the general view 

taken by the unwitting Air Force. 

For the (limited) witting audience, the view was even more bleak. Peo Ie 

like Schriever, now commander of the Air Force System Command, knew thiat 

space-reconnaissance systems had not only been removed from his command-they had from the Air Force. The action was more than 

harassment-it w I, cularl when one considered the record 

Schriever and the Air Force ha establish n delivering three ballistic missile 

systems to the nation. Indeed, Schriever had enjoyed "Gillette Procedures," 

which had him direct access to the Secretary of Defense in carrying 

out the of Atlas, Titan, and Thor. But he had always believed in 

k his Air Force Ballistic Missiles Division within the (then) Air Research 

a pment Command; he had been famous for handling his special 

access authority with utmost discretion. Now he had learned that "Gillette" 

had a second edge, which he had never felt before: when he totted up the 

amounts in covert satellite and aircraft work which had just moved away, he 

found the per annum loss from his budget to be at least a billion dollars. 

Witting members of the Pentagon Air Staff were looking at the same script 

as Schriever. They did not like what they saw. 

Outside the Washington area, the Strategic Air Command was dismayed 

by the announcement. Under the original Samos concept, SAC intelligence 

people were to own and man the readout stations and the Satellite Control 

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Bissell's departure meant that his influence and persuasiveness with higher 

authorities would no longer be evident at the conference table. Also, his 

abilities as a manager would be sorely missed by those CIA persons left to 

carry on a group of very secret and very expensive reconnaissance programs. 

The 6 September 1961 NRP Agreement between the CIA and the Defense 

Department had been stated in very general terms: it was redicated on a 

program that would be managed jointly by Charyk, for the Department, and Bissell, for the CIA. Thus, the 6 September 1961 NRP Agreement 

made reference to "directors" of the NRO. With Bissell's departure, the 

Agency not only lost some strength in representation at the NRO but it lost 

Bissell's primus inter pares position as well. Only Charyk remained and it was 

necessary to clarify his position with another agreement. 

Col Jack Ledford 

President 

JoIlnF. ~ 

VICe President 

Lyndon B. Jotnon 

Secretary Of The Air Force 

Harold Brown 

National Reconnaissance OIfioe 

Director Dr. Joseph Charyk 

Chief Of Siaff Col John Martin 

1962 CORONA Organization Chart 

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The second NRP Agreement, signed by DCI McCone and Deputy Defense 

Secret atric on 1962, set forth the responsibilities of the NRO for 

the co the NR established a single Director of the NRO (DNRO), 

jointly appointed by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.71 It made no 

mention of a Deputy Director of the NRO, because Charyk believed there 

would not be enough work to keep two people busy. No one from CIA 

contested Charyk's position on the matter at that time and the problem of a 

Deputy DNRO was set aside. 

Charyk was appointed Director of the NRO by DoD directive on 14 June 

1962. His first NRO directive, on nization and functions, established 

P am A (USAF satellite assets) un e Director, Special Projects, Office 

of t Secretary of the Air Force (SAFSP), and Program B (CIA assets), under 

the Deputy Director for Research (DDR), Program C (U.S. Navy assets), and 

Program D (USAF aircraft assets),72 The directive also stated that the Director 

of B was responsible for the NRP effort conducted by the NRO 

th lization of CIA resources and that the activities and office of the 

Director, Program B, were "covered" by his overt title as Deputy Director for 

Research, CIA. 

As the NRO staff began to establish itself, it drew people from the Air 

Force, Navy, Army, CIA, and National Security Agency (NSA). 

System Improvement: C' to Mural 

In early 1959, several assumptions were made by the CIA regarding the 

future of satellite reconnaissance: (1) lacking an international arms agreement, 

there would be continuing need for photo-reconnaissance of the Soviet Bloc; 

(2) if an arms agreement were reached, there would still be need for photoreconnaissance for inspection purposes (using both manned lower-altitude 

flig . gh-resolution phot phy, and gross coverage by satellites to 

fill in area gaps be -level flights); (3) if an ar t 

were reached, the necessity for covert reconnaissance satellites w d probably disappear in view of the requirement for inspection, and international 

acceptance of reconnaissance as an . on technique. eral conclusion was that the CIA would pro y end its covert invo ement in the 

reconnaissance satellite program by the close of calendar year 1961,73 

These conclusions were shattered on 1 Ma 1960, when the Soviets shot 

down a U-2 over Sverdlovsk. Khrushchev's su nt boycott caused the 

cancellation of a Summit Meeting in Paris and began a period of very strained 

relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Any hope for an arms agreement was postponed; at the same time, the 

intelligence obtained from satellites became more vital than ever to the United 

States. There was a clear need to extend CORONA well beyond its originally 

planned short lifetime and to improve its capabilities immediately. 

Discoverer-XVIII carried a C' camera (called C-Prime). Both the original C 

and the subsequentC' had lenses with fj5.0 maximum apertures and 24-inch 

focal ths. C' embodied structural and engineering changes that somewhat 

simplifi the camera system and also returned a ground resolution averaging 

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about 35 feet, as compared to the nominal 40 feet of the original C camera. 

(The original C camera, flown on the first 12 CORONA missions, produced the 

images recovered from Discoverer-XIV in August 1960. It saw no further 

operational use. Retroactively, the C camera was called KH-1.*) 

The C' camera was in development in mid-1959 and had been adopted by 

the time a second CORONA capsule was recovered, in December 1960. 

(Retroactively, the C' was called the KH-2.) It was used 0 uent 

CORONA operations until the newer C", (C-triple-prime) ca 

on the 29th CORONA mission, . ust 1961. Three additional flights with C' 

cameras followed, interspersed additional C''' systems. Concurrently during 1961, in nition of the desirability of having stereoscopic 

capability, Itek develo the Mural (M) came tern which consisted of 

two C", cameras on a common mount, one 15 degrees aft from 

vertical and the other 15 degrees forward. It is an axiom of aerial reconnaissance that the information content of photography is improved by a factor of 

two and one-half times with stereo coverage. (The C''' was also known as the 

KH-3, the Mural as the KH-4.) By february 1962, the Mural system was a 

reality; thereafter all CORONA missions were to produce stereo coverage. 

Between the appearance of C' and its eventual replacement by C"', there 

occurred more than six months of debate about the merits of two co . 

approaches to an improved CORONA. Disagreement about what was 

was compounded by uncertainty over the need to invest funds in any further 

improvement of CORONA. In 1960 the reconnaissance community still held 

rather lIy to the assumption that E-1 and E-2 (Samos) readout systems 

would e available for rational use in 1961 and 1962; the E-2, in 

particular, promised to resolution somewhat better than that of 

CORONA C' with the further attraction of near-real-time data accessibility 

through readout. Additionally, the E-5 stereo system, a recovery system with 

potentially much greater resolution and area coverage capability than CORONA, was progressing toward a 1962 or 1963 operational readiness date. In late 

1960, hi esolution systems E-6 and GAMBIT were in development, and, 

while r was in any sense a CORONA acement, it was assumed that 

the combination of any of the high-resoluti 1m recovery systems with one 

or both of the readout systems would almost surely make a follow-on 

CORONA superfluous. 

All this reasoning was predicated on the plausible assumption that the 

various Samos camera systems would satisfy performance, cost, and schedule 

expectations. Nevertheless, there was some justification for improving CORONA so as to enhance the quality of satellite photography during 1961; E-1, the 

only Sam os system certain to be available that year, had only a 100-foot 

resolution capability. Yet neither large investments nor high risks seemed 

warranted, even though some members of the CORONA project group, and 

others in the general satellite reconnaissance community, had healthy doubts 

about the validity of expectations for the Samos systems. 

*KH was the system designator used in the overhead reconnaissance product security 

system. for additional information refer to section on overhead reconnaissance product 

security system, Appendix A. 

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Both Itek and fairchild Camera and Instrument Company had been 

involved in CORONA from its start. They were cooperative, but not cheerful, 

collaborators; each would have preferred, of course, to be the sole supplier. 

Each, therefore, proposed modifications to the C' camera in early 1961. Itek 

advocated a m 'or redesign of the optics and a substantial modification of 

other the camera, as a means of improvin h resolution and 

reliability. fairchild, then a component supplier to Itek, rlier a competitor for the entire CORONA camera system, urged a different approach, 

suggesting retention of the original lens and image-motion-compensation 

system, with alterations that would result in the substitution of five-inch film 

for the three-inch (70 millimeter) then in use. Both were responding to urging 

from the CORONA program office to provide an improved CORONA capability for 1961. Both proposals were referrred to as C-61 or C" systems, on the 

assumption that one would be chosen and would carry that designation. 

Independent assessment of the two approaches was initially unfavorable 

to the Itek con the Aerial Reconnaissance Laboratory at Wright field 

concluded that Itek design was too complex and too advanced to be 

reliable, while Lockheed j (on much the same ground) that, although 

neither Itek nor fairchild fully acceptable design, the fairchild design 

was more promising. In consequence, a cautious start on the fairchild system 

was authorized. 

tion of the fairchild design would probably have resulted in 

a CORONA ion improvement on the order of that experienced in the 

transition from C to C', t. Such modest goals were abandoned 

in the wake of the first s ONA 0 . in August 1960 when 

President Eisenhower sat through a s of the first recovered 

photography and, in the discussion th owed, was advised by Land that a 

100 t improvement in the quality of CORONA photography was 

by Christmas. Impressed, Eisenhower authorized him to act, and 

subsequently confirmed Land's authority in correspondence with Allen Dulles 

and Richard Bissell. 

The basis of Land's optimism was his earlier exposure to an updating of an 

Itek proposal by Walter Levison for the inclusion of a faster lens (fj3.5 rather 

than the f/S.O of the C') which could be used with slower and finer grain film 

than that required for the existing (f/5.0) lens system. 

With Eisenhower's endorsement, Land proceeded to Boston and authorized Itek to develop its camera. Both the CIA's Bissell (who had learned of 

Eisenhower's action after the fact) and the Air force's Worthman, had 

reservations about Itek's ability to carry out Land's 'se but, under the 

circumstances, all they could do was to urge purcha additional C' camera 

systems as a hedge against a potential slippage resulting from the sudden 

introduction of a camera improvement program. They commiserated briefly: 

as part of a planned system improvement program, modifications to elements 

of the A a and the Thor were already in work. Now, with Land's intrusion, 

an unso and una 'ated "opportunity" was being mandated to add 

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Earlier orders for long-lead-time items needed for the Fairchild C" camera 

were cancelled late in 1960, and three additional C' cameras were 

ordered to protect lau edul inst slippages that might occur in 

the Itek program. The prospective bill evelopment of what was by then 

called C''' came to $6.95 million; the three "reserve" C' cameras cost about 

$250,000 each (about $500,000 was retrieved from the cancelled C" development). Because previously programmed Agenas and Thors would serve all 

probable C''' and C' needs, no new vehicle costs were incurred at this time. 

As generally happens in such affairs, original estimates proved to be 

understated; by February 1961, Itek was anticipating an increase of about 

$300,000 in the basic costs and had reduced the quantity to be delivered from 

11 cameras (including three test items) to eight (with two test articles). CIA 

program monitors expected the eventual costs to be more nearly $5 million for 

cameras, versus Itek's original estimate of $3.5 million. In the end, the CIA was 

proved correct. 

When delivered, the C'" camera and its faster lens system performed as 

promised, though not with co ete initial reliability. The faster optics, in 

combination with slower film, an rovements in image-motion compensation, did have the effect of reducing smear and improving resolution. Film 

transport y improved by the introduction of air twists for turning the 

film as it storage to take-up cassette. Fortunately, C''' occupied 

the same space and could use the same cassettes as C'. The combination of all 

these improvements enhanced ground resolution to an average 20 to 25 feet 

(down from about 35 feet for C').* Meanwhile, the site program, having 

demonstrated initial success with Discoverer-XIV, began to experience a series 

of failures in the first half of 1961. 

In the interval between the successful recovery of a CORONA capsule on 

10 December 1960, and the next operational success (a water pickup on 18 

June 1961), four mission failures of various origins and two Discoverer 

launchings with other than CORONA payloads had occurred. 

The first 26 Discoverer mission attempts included eight operations without camera ayloads. (Most program records show 25 Discoverer ations 

by the June 1961. As noted earlier, there were 26, counting vehicle 

destro a launching pad explosion on 21 January 1959. That operation is 

s Discoverer-O; the vehicle successfully launched on 28 

February 1959 was called Discoverer-I.) Of the 18 that actually represented 

attempts at CORONA and ARGON operations, three returned film properly 

are those generally cited for "ground resolution" of the complete system. 

the C and C' cameras were ca of reproducing 100 to 130 lines per 

millimeter on the film, representing a 14- to 1 s-film resolution, and a system 

resolution of 19 to 22 feet. The C'" had a lines-per-millimeter capability of 180 to 200, a sevento nine-foot camera-film resolution potential, and a 10- to 12-foot system resolution 

CORONA-M, to be discussed later, had about the same lines-per-milli but 

because of its convergent stereo configuration would nominally provide from 3.5- to 4.5-foot 

camera-film resolution and six- to seven-foot in its original resolution. In practice, the "ground 

resolution" for CORONA-M in its original configuration was generally from 12 to 17 feet. The 

we,en"systelm resolution" and "ground resolution" was largely a reflection of smear 

contrast and sun-angle phenomena, and performance anomalies characteristic of 

individual camera systems. 

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exposed over the Soviet Union. The 26 Discoverer (including three ARGON) 

missions extended over a period of almost precisely 30 months. Although the 

ratio of CORONA successes to failures seemed appalling by later standards, 

and ARGON (retroactively called the KH-5 camera) was barely successful, the 

three successful CORONA missions provided an enormous fund of intelligence information-about 13 million square miles of coverage. 

The successful recovery of Discoverer-XXV (18 june 1961) signaled the 

start of a far better record. Counting that fl ht, seven successful capsule 

recoveries in 13 missions marked the remaind 1961. Half of the camera 

payloads were in the C' configuration and the remainder of C''' vintage; three 

of the five failures involved C' instruments. The ARGON failure (21 july 1961) 

was caused by loss of guidance on the Thor booster, followed by a destruct 

signal. All the CORONA mission failures were chargeable to one or another of 

the Agena subsystems, with difficulties such as guidance failure, early gas 

exhaustion, a nition malfunctioning. In three instances, the a did not 

achieve orbit, in the fourth a a power failure preclu ration 

and recovery of the capsule. No ems attributable solely to the camera 

system . need, and, although none of the successful missions was 

untroubled by culty of one sort or another, the returns were quite good. 

In summary, 10 C cameras, 10 C' cameras, and six C''' cameras were 

involved in the 26 monoscopic CORONA mission attempts. Only one of the C 

missions returned film, but seven of C' and four of the C'If missions ended 

successfully. Of the 30 photographic missions that were attempted in the first 

two years of the gram, 12 were in large part successful; and of the 18 

failures, 12 occu in the first of the two years. 

Discoverer flight Summary· 1960 

Discoverer Mission 

No. No 

IX 9006 

X 9007 

XI 9008 

XII 

XIII 

XIV 9009 

XV 9010 

XVI 9011 

XVII 9012 

XVIII 9013 

XIX 

Date Camera 

4 Feb C 

19 Feb C 

15 Apr C 

29 June N/A 

10 Aug N/A 

18 Aug C 

13 Sep C 

26 Oct C' 

12 Nov C' 

7 Dec C' 

20 Dec N/A 

----=z9- SE~ 

Remarks 

Agena failed to orbit. 

Agena failed to orbit. 

Spin rocket failure. 

Camera operated OK. No 

recovery. 

Diagnostic flight. Agena 

failed to orbit. 

First successful diagnostic 

flight. 

Successful water pick-up. 

First successful operational aircatch. Camera operated 

OK. 

Wrong pitch attitude on 

reentry. 

No recovery. Camera operated 

OK. 

Agena failed to orbit. "D"-

timer malfunction. 

Air catch. Payload malfunction. 

Air catch. 1st successful C' flight. 

Radiometric payload. No 

photo mission or recovery 

planned. 

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CORONA-Mural 

The idea of combining two original CORONA cameras into a stereo 

system surfaced in July 1960, a month before the first recovery of CORONA 

film. Its formal a nce was a Lockheed Missiles and Space 

Division in the 1960. Loc ted . either a C' or C''' 

camera as each element of a stereo system, boosting e combination into 

orbit with a DM-21 Thor and a modestly improved Agena. The system would 

be designed for a four-day flight. 

By early 1961, the Lockheed posal had received working-level endorsement. At the time, it ap an eight-flight (over FY-61 

th FY-63) would cost a $50 miliion. Charyk ed a su ion 

th new system should be and operated "in the e," 

although he doubted the feasibility of ndefinitely continuing the original 

management arrangement and planned to eventually discontinue the "Discoverer" fiction. 

Lockheed called the proposed system "GEMINI," to distinguish it from 

CORONA (NASA had not yet adopted that name for the second in a series of 

US manned spaceflight systems). Lockheed's concept was to conjoin two of 

the fj3.5 Petzval-Iens cameras of 24-inch foc in a faired module, using 

two recovery spools in a single recovery e (which would weigh 94 

pounds plus film wei ). The rearmost camera would look forward and the 

foremost camera bac rd. 

As a way of testing the concept inexpensively, Lockheed proposed 

diverting the last two C'" cameras to GEMINI and using an available C' camera 

to fly in place of one of the yloads. Theoretically, the GEMINI 

combination could return ground 'ons on the order of about six feet, 

though few program persons believed such results would be achieved 

immediately. 

Charyk approved work on six stereo C'" systems on 24 February, nding 

receipt of approval by President John F. Kennedy, who had taken . a 

month earlier. The formal request for approval went from Charyk to the new 

Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, early in March. Charyk observed 

at that point that the stereo system was needed because even with recent 

improvements CORONA did not distinguish "small" objects with proper 

precision. He felt that because the C''' system was relatively well-proven, the 

creation of a stereo capability was not "a significant R&D problem."74 

As formally oved in 1961, the C''' stereo program (not yet 

known as Mural) the fa ation of one en' ring vehicle carrying 

C'" cameras originally intended for individual fli the procurement of 

five additional sets of cameras to be launched betw nd August 1962. 

In actuality, the CIA had provided initial funds to L a month earlier, 

with the . that not more than $1.4 million should be spent in what 

remained fiscal year 1961. That action proved premature; on 28 March the 

ptly instructed Lockheed to halt all work on the stereo system.75 

sudden reversal seemed to have been occasioned by Charyk's objection 

to the unauthorized and premature expenditure approval and by a general 

realization that neither specifications nor program structure had been reHandle via 

BYEMAN- ENT-KEYHOLE 

Control Syst Jointly 

BYE 140001-

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viewed at the hi her levels of the CIA and the DoD. Charyk also had 

reservations the ncy's unilateral decision that Lockheed would be 

system manager and I an associate contractor, a departure from the 

arrangement used earlier in CORONA. Charyk (with the support of CIA 

Richard Bissell) wanted the Air Force-CIA program office, supported by the Air 

Force Ballistic Missile Division, to act as a "system engineering/ technical 

direction" authority. The Charyk-Bissell preference carried the day. 

For the moment, Mural was security-compartmented separately from 

CORONA and only about 1 in 10 of the various CORONA participants was 

aware of the details and plans agreed to in the Spring of 1961. Not until 

January 1962 were the several a cies involved in CORONA all told of the 

improved capability to be p . by Mural, although as early as july 1961 

details of the Mural program were made available to senior officials in the 

National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Army Service, and 

similar organizations. The Map Service subsequently hat it had not 

been adequately advised on Mural matters, perhaps because it anti ed 

interference with plans to fly more ARGON missions. I n February 1962, ryk 

and Bissell were obliged to emphasize that Mural was in no respect a 

dedicated mapping system and probably had little application to that 

function.76 

The Map Service's anxiety m~y have been occasioned by measures 

leading to incorporation of a fram' camera (an Itek stellar-indexing camera 

system) in the Mural payload. The . inary decision to add that capability 

came in October 1961 and was formally confirmed the following December. 

The 'camera provided "a fixed eometric reference to be used in 

plotting rectifying the focal h higher-resolution panoramic 

ph aphs." It could aid in t e construction of maps (so, for that matter, 

cou any mono or stereo imagery), but as Charyk subsequently explained to 

the Director of the Defense Intel' Agency, lithe framing camera is not 

and never has been considered a ute for the' uch as 

ARGON. , , ." (Much later, the incorporation of a con er stellarindexing camera, DISIC [Dual-Integrated-Stellar-Index Camera] gave CORONA a mapping capability somewhat superior to that of ARGON, but such 

was not available in 1961. DISIC had a three-inch lens, equal in focal 

I to that of ARGON and somewhat superior in resolution.) The underlying problem was that the Army and the DIA still wanted to develop and 

operate a satellite mapping system that would be independent of the embryonic National Reconnaissance Office, and any actions that tended to reduce 

the possibility of such an outcome raised objections from the Army Map 

Service. The subsequent di ance of ARGON's proposed successor 

(called VAULT /TOMAS) and e cancellation of the [-4 (mapping camera) 

phase of Samos, even after four cameras actually had been procured and 

checked out, had the effect of eliminating flights by dedicated mappingcamera systems, but that, too, was still in the future in 1961.77 

Like the original CORONA, CORONA-M was intended to be an interim, 

transitional means of satellite reconnaissance. It was conceived as an expedient device for temporarily providing stereo cove of denied areas. That, at 

least, was the view from the upper echelons. In CORONA office, and in 

Itek and Lockheed project organizations, CORONA-M represented an expedient way of providing for the continued production of a successful system, one 

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CORONA 

40 LB FILM 

26 SYSTEMS 

11 RECOVERIES 

1959-1961 

ARAC~ 

STICS 

CAMERA 

MANUFACTURER 

UNITS 

LAUNCHED 

LENS MANU~ 

FACTURER 

DESIGN 

TYPE 

CAMERA 

TYPE 

EXPOSURE 

CONTROL 

FILTER 

CONTROL 

PRIMARY 

FILM (FILM! 

BASE) 

RECOVERY 

VEHICLES 

SUBSYSTEM 

(STELLAR/ 

INDEX) 

TIME PERIOD 

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ARGON 

40 LB FILM 

12 SYSTEMS 

NOFORN-ORCON 

~ 

MURAL LANYARD 

80 LB FILM 80 LB FILM 

26 SYSTEMS 3 SYSTEMS 

J 1 

160 LB FILM 

52 SYSTEMS 

5 RECOVERIES 20 RECOVERIES 2 RECOVERIES 94 RECOVERIES 

1961~1964 1961~ 1963 1983 1963~ 1969 

C ~ J(J-l) 

FAIRCHILD FAIRCHILD ITEK ITEK ITEK 

10 10 6 26 52 

ITEK ITEK ITEK ITEK ITEK 

TESSAR, TESSAR, PETZVAL, PETZVAL, PETZVAL, 

24IN.,f/5.0 24 IN., f/s.O 24IN.,f/3.5 24 IN., f/3.S 24 IN., f/3.5 

700 PAN, 700 PAN 700 PAN, 700 PAN, 700 PAN, 

VERTICAL, VERTICAL, VERTICAL, 30° STEREO, 300 STEREO, 

RECIPRO~ RECIPRO- RECIPRO~ RECIPRO~ RECIPRO~ 

CATING CATING CATING CATING CATING 

FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED 

FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED 

1213/ 1221/ 4404/ 44041 3404/ 

ACETATE POLYESTER POLYESTER POLYESTER POLYESTER 

NONE NONE 0/1 1/1 2/2 

1959~ 1960 1960~ 1961 1961~ 1962 1962~1963 1964~ 1969 

Camera Configurations and Characteristics 

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J~ 3 

160 LB FILM 

17 SYSTEMS 

32 RECOVER I ES 

1967~ 1972 

ITEK 

17 

ITEK 

PETZVAL, 

4 IN., f 13.5 

700 PAN, 

0° STEREO, 

ROTATING 

(4) SLITS 

ELECTABLE 

2) FILTERS 

ELECTABLE 

3404, 3414/ 

POLYESTER 

2 

2/1 

1967~1972 
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that mi ht, with relatively slight investment, compete successfully with more 

costly com systems in development elsewhere. Thus, as early as 

March 196 after the first CORONA-M mission, Itek proposed (with 

CIA an "M-2" (Mural-2) system consisting of are-engineered 

M hone 40-inch, fj3.5 tube of cs . two platens. Itek 

suggested that the system could provide reso ion order of four to five 

feet. The M-2 proposal, as such, remained a contender for development until 

June 1963, when a special panel headed by Edward M. Purcell, professor of 

physics at Harvard and member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, formally told CIA that the "M-2" was "not a wise investment," when 

compared to various alternative ways of improving CORONA performance. It 

did not vanish, however; in a different guise, the original Itek proposal 

surfaced a year later as the genesis of CORONA J-4. 

The assumption that CORONA-M would be no more than a stopgap 

system stemmed from the continued existence of the Samos E-5, which was 

intended to be a considerably more sophisticated, higher-resolution search 

system. Unfortunately, E-5 development was frustratingly unsuccessful. 

One of the principal problems facing the intelligence community was the 

absence of high-resolution phot raphs of suspected ABM sites at Leningrad. 

CORONA-M could not meet t Charyk and Scoville attempted to 

ad the E-5 system, on a crash basis, to close the gap, but the performance 

of t adaptation (called LANYARD or KH-6) was disappointing. 

In February 1962, the first CORONA-M mission, using KH-4 cameras, was 

essentially successful, although the auxiliary framing camera did not 0 rate 

correctly. At that time, Itek was assembling the 16th and last of the 

scheduled CORONA-M systems, with delivery scheduled for late June. Payloads had been produced at about three per month, and Itek was preparing to 

assign its CORONA-M production personnel to other tasks, or to dismiss 

them. CORONA-M launc were scheduled at intervals of about two 

weeks through exhaustion of e inventory; reordering, if required, had to be 

decided by April 1962 in order to avoid interruption in the regime of regular 

launchings. 

Another probable successor to CORONA-M was the E-6 payload, the last 

survivor of the original Samos Program. It was intended to be an area coverage 

system with 8- to 10-foot resolution. Its development had begun in October 

1960 and initial operations were scheduled for March 1962. The first E-6 

launching was conducted in April 1962, and, with a frustrati similarity to the 

experience of the cancelled E-5 rogram, was ma i ted success in 

camera functionin and total fai . recovery. Notwit standing that beginning, the NRO ered 19 follow-on E-6 systems early in 1962, augmenting 

the original order for five systems. But given the singular lack of success in all 

reconnaissance-satellite recovery operations to that time, except in the case of 

CORONA, prudence seemed desirable. Therefore, Charyk approved an order 

for six additional CORONA-M systems. The schedules then in existence called 

for one CORONA-M and one E-6 system to be orbited each month, starting in 

July 1962. Together they were to provide about the same coverage as a twoto three-per-month launching schedule for CORONA-M. (The CORONA-M 

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system then had typical stereo resolution ranging from 10 feet to about 15 

feet; E-6 was designed to provide 10-foot or better resolution, in stereo.) 

Discoverer Flight Summary - 1961 

Discoverer Mission 

No. No. Date Camera Remarks 

XX 9014A 17 Feb A 1 st ARGON flight. Orbital 

programmer failed. Camera failed. 

No recovery. 

XXI 18 Feb N/A Radiometric payload. No photo 

mission or recovery planned. 

XXII 9015 30 Mar C' Agena failure. No orbit. 

XXIII 9016A 8 Apr A Camera operated OK. No 

recovery. 

XXIV 9018A 8 Jun A Agena failure, power failure. 

guidance failure. No recovery. 

XXV 9017 16 Jun C' Water landing. Camera operated 

OK. Capsule pickup OK. 

XXVI 9019 7 Jul C' Camera failed on Rev 22. 

Successful recovery. 

XXVII 9020A 21 Jul A No orbit. Thor problem. 

XXVIII 9021 3 Aug C' No orbit. Agena guidance failure. 

XXIX 9023 30 Aug C'" 1st C'" flight. Air recovery. 

Camera operated OK. 

XXX 9022 12 Sep C' Air recovery. Camera OK. 

XXXI 9024 17 Sep C' No recovery. Power failure. 

XXXII 9025 13 Oct C'" Air recovery. Camera OK. 

XXXIII 9026 23 Oct C' Agena failed to orbit. 

XXXIV 9027 5 Nov C'" Gas valve failure. No recovery. 

Camera OK. 

XXXV 9028 15 Nov C'" Camera OK. Recovery OK. 

XXXVI 9029 12 Dec C'" Water pickup. Camera OK. 

CORONA payloads were substituted for the ARGONs originally scheduled, to the vocal distress of the apping specialists. There had been 

four successive ARGON missio February and July 1961-all 

of which would probably have been CORONA failures had that payload been 

orbited-and not until May 1962 did an ARGON mission end in rent 

success. Even then, stellar and terrain camera malfunctions degra the 

recovered film,78 

The second CORONA-M operation (Mission 9032) began with a 17 April 

1962 launching and ended with successful aerial recovery of the capsule on 20 

April. The returned film included' of Sacramento metropolitan airport 

taken from a t of 115 nau On the prints were impressions that 

interpreters identify as runway markings, small civilian aircraft, and 

automobiles ("just at the detection threshold"). Twin-engined aircraft could 

be distinguished from four-engined aircraft, which encouraged the somewhat 

optimistic estimate that CORONA-M could resolve objects seven feet on a 

side.79 

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Between the initial success of CORONA-M in February and the end of 

june 1962, six additional reconnaissance vehicles in that configuration were 

launched from Vandenberg AF Base. Of that set, four were successful to the 

extent that useful film was retrieved, although only in one instance did the 

accessory fra' camera operate correctly. A 28 April launching (Mission 

9033) ended failure of the recovery parachute, and the very successful 

orbital operations of Mission 9036 (2 June launching) were capped by a 

recovery misadventure: one of the extended booms on the aircraft's recovery 

apparatus hit and collapsed the parachute and the capsule fell 12,000 feet into 

the ocean, sinki ore frogmen could reach it. The flotation devices were 

damaged, eithe he boom or from the extended fall. Three of the four 

otherwise successful missions were marred by various malfunctions of the 

framing camera-a disorder eventually traced to faulty shutter design. 

In the same riod, from February through June, a second E-6 mission was 

attempted operation was erratic, owing to an Agena gas leak; fuel 

d tion the decision to attempt early recovery (at night), and, 

u a cal failure in the uib circuitry kept the reentry vehicle 

from separating. The ena and e reentered as a unit and were lost 

some 600 miles north 0 e planned recovery area. 

The third, fourth, and fifth E-6 Samos missions were attempted between 

18 July and 11 November 1962. In one instance the Agena would not refire 

and no reentry maneuver could be conducted; in the others the recovery 

system malfunctioned. In no instance was film retrieved, despite the fact that 

cameras operated properly. 

While E-6 was having these unhappy experiences, CORONA-M was 

extending its record of successful operations to 10. Given such diametrically 

different program results, the consequences were inevitable: General Greer 

recommended a cancellation of E-6 and Charyk unhesitatingly agreed. As a 

consequence, the "interim" CORONA-M program became the sole wide-area 

search system in the reconnaissance satellite inventory (or in development). Its 

. of 10 successive "good" missions was not a record of complete 

lence, of course. hc t for Mission 9037 (launched on 23 June 1962), 

each of the 10 experie some major or minor difficulty, framing camera 

failure being the most common. (A new camera introduced late in 1962 largely 

eliminated that source of difficulty.) One mission in July 1962 (9039) experienced rogrammer failure and was forced to early recovery. Another payload, 

ort,ite,d in September (9043), stabilized in an unexpectedly high orbitfollowing a malfunction of a velocit meter-and re 

thel residual radiation of the 19 Jul 1962 "Starfis " hi h altitud 

~--~~~~~~--~~ 

In other respects, and particularly in terms of 

quantities 0 ighly use u photographs of denied areas, these CORONA-M 

operations were very successful.80 

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An additional reason for reliance on CORONA-M, rather than on the 

unpromisi E-6, or even the attractive but troublesome LANYARD, was the 

continued utionary improvement in CORONA capability. By the summer 

of 1962, the of a CORONA-J system had emerged, been evaluated, 

and was app development and procurement.81 CORONA-J was to be 

a CORONA-M payload with two recovery capsules, separately recovered, and 

capable of being "stored" in orbit between two intervals of camera operations. (Such inactive storage in orbit was called "zombie" operation.) The 

additional wei created by essentially doubling the film load and adding 

one complete itional recovery system, was to be offset by launching the 

Agena-CORONA combination as the upper stage of an nted Thor, the 

booster originally created to provide a launching capabili for the relatively 

heavy LANYARD. 

The success of selective and evolutionary inbreedin of technology, an 

example of a positive development strat ,was -illustrated in the 

CORONA-LANYARD programs. LANYARD, transform of the Samos E-5 

effort, used a hi . of the Thor booster and demonstrated that a 

relatively small recovery capsule could be successfully adapted to 

the needs of a wide-film, big-optics, photoreconnaissance system. The influence of E-5 and GAMBIT (also known as the KH-7) concepts on CORONA-M 

could be postulated reasonably. 

It is not entirely possible to prove that the adaptation of an E-S (lANYARD) camera to the Discoverer-CORONA reentry system ompted later 

attention to the prospect of similarly GAMBIT; but n E-5 and E6 experience demonstrated the inherent ies of "big e" reentry 

systems, GAMBIT was adapted to the CORONA capsule, hel it 

elude the unhappy fate of earlier "big" systems. Similarly, the feasi of 

in a double-bucket mode had been extensively demonstrated 

h CORONA-J more than four years before the first double-bucket 

GAMBIT reached its launching stand. 

The technique of incremental and sequential development, and of building carefully on a base of demonstrated techno was epitomized by 

CORONA and GAMBIT, in their various models, a was also exploited for 

other satellite systems developed under the aegis of the NRO in the years 

before 1967. 

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Discoverer Flight Summary - 1962 

Discoverer Mission 

No. No. Date Camera 

XXXVII 9030 13 Jan C'" 

XXXVIII 9031 27 Feb M 

9032 18 Apr M 

9033 28 Apr M 

9034A 15 May A 

9035 30 May M 

9036 02 Jun M 

9037 23 Jun M 

9038 28 Jun M 

9039 21 Jul M 

9040 28 Jul M 

9041 2 Aug M 

9044 29 Aug M 

9042A 1 Sep A 

9043 17 Sep M 

9045 29 Sep M 

9046A 9 Oct A 

26 Oct N/A 

9047 5 Nov M 

9048 24 Nov M 

9049 4 Dec M 

9050 14 Dec M 

CORONA and the NRO 

Remarks 

Agena failed to orbit. 

Air recovery. Camera OK. 

First CORONA M flight. 

Air recovery. Camera OK. 

Failed to eject parachute. 

No recovery. 

Success. 

Success. 

Torn parachute. No recovery. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Starfish radiation assessment. 

No photos or recovery planned. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

Success. 

The National Reconnaissance Office operated smoothly under the aegis 

of Charyk and Bissell. Bissell was a model mana moving his anization's 

people toward corporate goals, rather than fr ·ses. One 

testament to the scope of his managerial capability was demonstrated when, 

upon his departure in early 1962, the CIA divided his office-the Deputy 

Director for Plans-into two new offices: a Deputy Director for Plans (this 

went to Richard Helms, later to become DCI) and a uty Director for 

Research (to Dr. Herbert Scoville). Killian and Land ha also urged this 

separation of technical from operational activities. 

Within his organization, Bissell had a spartan, streamlined command 

structure and a surprisingly small staff. During his CORONA regime (the 

"tough" years) he never allowed anyone to establish that program as a 

separate organization. It never had a full-time staff: a person working on 

CORONA was sure to be working, in addition, on the IDEALIST or OXCART 

aircraft programs. (Four of Bissell's field employees were full-time: Lt. Colonels 

Charles Murphy and Vern Webb, both in place after July 1959 at Lockheed, 

coordinating CIA's CORONA interests, and Majors Arthur Dulac and John 

Schad egg, planning mission operations.) 

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In 1962, as the new Directorate of Research began its separate existence, 

it started, by its own assessment, to change its character, losing much of its 

cohesiveness and flexibility.82 The loss was understandable; Bissell's relaxed 

ement arra had worked because he was the manager, comp confident rapport with the DCI and completely competent in what 

he was doing. 

For four years, the Discoverer Office, at AFBMD, had considered itself 

sible for all elements of the CORONA satellite, including he 

ateful for the streamlined procurement channel by CIA, 

Captain Johnson, who worked for Colonel Battle, was the final responsible 

governmental person to sign off on each contractor delivery of cameras and 

recovery capsules. Other persons, like Lt. Colonel Murphy (CIA) or Major 

Edward Conway (USAF), join in the review process, but their (welcome) 

assistance was fraternal, er than mandatory. Bissell had always seen 

matters in this I . To him, the specific goal of CORONA was to open a 

closed society. engineering required to get CORONA functioning was 

essential, but would never become a goal in itself. As early as 1958, his 

memoranda to General Smart, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff/Air Force (and 

Bissell's key contact in the DoD), reflected this firm distinction. He promised to 

rovide "covert procurement, cover, and security" to the program, but 

ed that "responsibility for day-to-day management decisions could 

revert in most matters to the AFBMD." At the same time, he "the 

hope that the CIA's role in this particular activity and others of a nature, 

could be progressively reduced and eventually be limited to receipt of the 

operational product as one of our customers."83 

Scoville, as head of a new organization, with a new mission, quite 

naturally looked with personal interest in the direction of satellite technology. 

As a scientist, he was puzzled by Bissell's laissez-faire attitude toward 

CORONA. Although he was ostensibly the Director of Program B, Scoville 

this . nment, with its day-to-day operational functions, to 

C s inadvertently placing Program B at an organizational disadvantage among its peers. (Subsequent realization of this fact was a 

major factor in the CIA's later request for a Deputy Director's position on the 

NRO.) 

One adverse affect of any agreement is unavoidable: agreements set up 

boundaries. The CIA and DoD were beginning to look, for the first time, at 

what they were assigned; "task" was being translated into "jurisdiction" or 

"franchise." An exa Ie of this shift was not long in arriving, as a mantle of 

ownership began to over the oad. As secon neration CIA CORONA-ites came into employment, t absorbed a m logy that the CORONA payload was a CIA development, rather than a CIA procurement. Previously, everyone was helping to develop everything; now, parts of CORONA 

became "personal" acquisitions. "Normalcy" walked in when Bissell walked 

out. 

Another subtle, but very important, shift in emphasis began with CIA 

references to "problems with the Air Force," rather than their "problems with 

the DoD." This was a case where the NRO's excellent security cover was backfiring: it was too good for its own good. The Director of the NRO was actually 

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to the NRO world was without benefit of indoctrination by Charyk concerning 

previo ive methods of operation. Now that all the original players 

was no one left at higher echelons who remembered the 

ment era of 1954-1962. McMillan, as a newcomer, made the 

error of reading his NRP Directive very literally, assuming he 

could proceed to exercise impersonal, rational judgments and have the 

unswerving support of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. 

For instance, it seemed totally rational, to the new DNRO, to move the 

CORONA . to General Greer's Program A office and to lace authority 

over all its n Greer's hands. McMillan took a n of minor, but 

unilateral, actions to bring this about and was shocked when each of them 

triggered strong protest from Scoville. What was missing in McMillan's modus 

operandi was the social camraderie which lubricates life within the Washington Beltway: the executive lunch, the friendly in at langley, or the newsy 

telephone call. McMillan's response to Sc s protests was to inhibit 

Colonel Murphy and Lt. Colonel Webb, assigned to CIA's Sunnyvale operation, in communicating with their own headquarters (at Langley) and finally to 

transfer Webb, without coordinating the move with CIA. 

In los Angeles, General Greer was using the Aerospace Co ration to do 

Systems EngineeringjTechnical Direction for his programs a felt a natural 

urge to add CORONA to the Aerospace list. The CIA office saw this as another 

"take-over" maneuver and fought it bitterly. 

McMillan also assumed a strict Interpretation of his review authority over 

release of NRP funds, an agreement having been signed by McCone and 

Gilpatric on 5 April 1963 .. he NRO complete authority over all funds 

supporting the NRP, source. The CIA believed funds marked for 

projects or studies they "owned" should come to them automatically; 

McMillan thought otherwise. He also conside Director 

excessive to his needs, but such a position had been est a shed by t Third 

Agreement signed on 13 March 1963.85 The position was finally filled by CIA's 

Eugene Kiefer. 

Negotiations on matters such as these seemed endless and very wearing: 

Scoville resigned as the Deputy for Research in April 1963, saying that the 

stormy history of his interaction with the NRO had made his position 

"unrewarding."86 Between the signing of the March NRP Agreement and the 5 

April Funding Agreement, President Johnson's PFIAB entered the fray. A panel, 

headed by Dr. William Baker, reviewed the management and operation of the 

NRO and criticized McCone's "stewardship" of the ram. The Panel also 

urged McCone to create an organization for research development within 

the CIA. 

At the same time, McCone was keenly aware that none of the satellite 

projects was very well. On 1 st 1963, he told his staff that 

something "to get the back into the satellite business, 

including developing Is for new and better system beyond CORONA." 

Four days later he na OSI Director Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon as Scoville's 

successor in a re-named and greatly expanded Directorate of Science and 

Technology. Prior to Wheelon's arrival in the Agency, he had been in charge 

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the USIB's Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) early in 

December-by which time it seemed clear that first flight would occur in 

"early summer," rather than May 1963. 

The rationale for the CORONA-J pr 

assumptions about the utility of zombie- tions. Effectively, the plan 

was to use the system in a four-day mission, recover the forward capsule, and 

program the re . on-orbit elements for a "controlled tumble" of as 

much as 20 days ( lectrical power and stabilization control gas shut off). 

At the end of the period of inaction, but one day before further reconnaissance use was planned, controllers would reactivate the satellite for a second 

four-day period of photography. The cam gram for the second mission 

would be determined from the results of the rst mission. Some 15,000 feet of 

film were carried for each of the four-day periods of camera operation. 

the first of ei ht 1963 CORONA-J missions was originally 

schedu May, launch in not occur until August, a delay only partly 

chargeable to ad development difficulties. A rash of problems with the 

in the CORONA-M and LANYARD programs and a launching 

in the first a to use the TAT (Thrust ted Thor*) booster 

caused a sudden alarming interruption of i nce returns from 

satellite ov hts during the early months of 1963. The first two LANYARD 

missions because of Agena breakdown and the third experienced a 

camera failure after only 32 hours in orbit. One ARGON and three CORONAM 0 ations between January and April 1963 were either failures or significant isappointing, three because of Agena problems and the fourth 

because of a TAT failure caused by error on the part of a launching crew 

member. In light of that sequence of events, McMillan decided to launch 

proven CORONA-Ms rather than untried CORONA-Js during the early 

summer of the year. The success of CORONA-M Missions 9054, 9056, and 

9057 renewed the flow aphy on which intelligence analysts had 

become increasingly encouraged McMillan to ove the first 

CORONA-J mission. (Mission 9055, the .. number in series, was 

actually the ARGON mission of 26 April, the sixt ARGON failure against one 

"good" operation and one "partial success.") 

If the dependence of the United States on CORONA satellite photo 

had not been fully acknowledged earlier, the sudden cessation of the 

intelligence from that resource in early 1963 corrected such a m· 

DCI McCone wrote McMillan that lithe importance of this type 0 el 

to our National Security cannot be over-emphasized and it is esse that 

there be no repetition of the hiatus in this type of coverage such as has existed 

for the past three months." McCone added (referring to various procedural 

changes introduced in an effort to eliminate CORONA problems), "in view of 

the overriding importance of this type of intel . ce,... uty Defense 

Secretary Roswell] Gilpatric and I have agreed the NRO continue to 

employ the special in ·on procedures on all forthcoming flights in order to 

ensure that the of failure is minimized. We desire that action be 

taken according 7 An additional precaution, immediately instituted by 

McMillan, instructed Greer that "experiments and additional payloads" were 

"The term "Thrust-Augmented Thor" refers to a modified Thor configuration which incorporated three Sergeant (X-33) solid rocket motors 

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SATELLITE +---1 

VEHICLE 

AGENA D 

PROPELLANT 

TANK AREA 

BOOSTER ADAPTER 

._-- AGENA BOOSTER INTERFACE 

LAUNCH 

VEHICLE 

89 FT 

THORAD BOOSTER 

X- 33 

SOLID 

MOTOR 

VERNIER 

ENGINES 

FUEL TANK 

AREA 

LIQUID OXYGEN NO.1 

TANK AREA 

SOLID MOTOR 

NO.2 

(3 LOCATIONS) NO.3 

ENGINE AND ACCESSORIES 

SECTION 

MAIN ENGINE 

Thorad-Agena launching Vehicle 

not to be carried on future CORONA or GAMBIT flights if there was any 

possibility that their inclusion would jeopardize the primary mission" -the 

successful recovery of photography from the main payloads."88 

In spite of such precautions, CORONA-J (this is also known as the KH-4A) 

operations began inauspiciously, somewhat akin to the original series of 

CORONA launchings four years earlier. Not until the third mission (1004), in 

1964, did the planned and the actual sequence of events come into 

Ie correspondence. In each of the first two fl s, capsule No.1 was 

recovered complete with four days of film take, but t e second capsule was 

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lost. In some respects, these first two attempts to operate CORONA-j could 

not be counted as major failures, because one capsule, complete with film, 

was recovered in each instance and such a recovery represented an achievement comparable to the success of any earlier CORONA mission. But the cost 

was substantial! was also a fact that each of the first CORONAj missions had to provide more and better data than could 

have been obtained from two of the earlier CORONA-M operations. 

The fourth CORONA-j (24 March 1964) mission was catastrophically brief; 

Agena guidance failed shortly after launching. The fifth (1005, on 27 I 

1964) had an uneventful launching, but, after 350 camera operations, th 

broke; then the Agena power supply failed; and finally the ca Ie ignored 

signals to deboost and reenter. Unlike other failed units, the stu rn reentry 

capsule did appear later, with Calculations of the anticipated decay 

of the capsule orbit predicted ally that it would impact in the Pacific, west 

of the coast of South America and about 10 degrees north of the Pole. A later 

calculation, based on better orbital trace measurements, indicated probable 

impact of fragments somewhere in Venezuela. Observation stations in the 

Caribbean area were alerted to watch the skies on 26 May 1964, and, on that 

date, reports from Maracaibo, Venezuela, said that five bright objects had 

passed overhead, presumably on their way to impact in the ocean off the 

South American coast. That seemed to be that. 

More than two months later, on 1 ust 1964, a Venezuelan commercial 

photographer, Leonardo Davilla, telep the US Army Attache in Caracas 

to report that an object which appeared to be part of a space vehicle had been 

found, nearly a month earlier, 500 miles south of Caracas in a remote rural 

ion of the Andes near the Columbian border. The object carried, among 

r markin s, one that read "United States," and another that read 

"Secret." la did not mention that he had photographed the object or that 

the farmer on whose land it lay had been trying to sell it-in whole or in part. 

Not until 3 August, after a second call from Davilla, did the Army Attache 

notify the assistant Air Attache of the reported find. On 4 A st, after 

interviewing a commercial pilot who had also viewed the object at ose range 

and predictably had returned to Caracas with a souvenir, the Army Attache 

flew to La Fria, the village nearest the find, only to discover that the 

Venezuelan army had arrived first and had taken to object to San Cristobal, 

the provincial capital. 

Interviews showed that on 7 July, 14- ar-old Eladio Becerra and 40-yearold Gabino Mora had stumbled upon a red gold object. They reported 

their find to their employer, who had the object moved onto his own property 

and put up for sale. Since it was an unknown object, in terms of value, there 

were no worthwhile offers, so efforts were made to dismantle it. By hacking 

and prying, a radio transmitter was removed and various pieces dislodged to 

be used as household utensils and toys for children. Local farmers, attracted 

by one of the gold discs attached to the upper section of the capsule, hacked 

away to get at more gold. (The gold disks, approximately the size of a quarter, 

were a part of a heat transmission experiment; one of many mini space 

experiments regularly flown on early flights, not only to provide valuable data, 

but also to reinforce the Discoverer program cover story,) One farmer had 

transformed the parachute lines into a harness for his horse. 

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buffalo nickel had been found in one of the capsules recovered in 1961.} He 

also took ion of the film that remained in the fractured canisters. It was 

"well-c ed." 

CIA agents sent to Caracas reported that lithe ground impact and the 

farmers have p well reduced internal equipment to junk." But great 

numbers of ad seen the capsu had been circulated in 

Caracas an in the local newspaper it was incorrectly 

reported to the NRO that all known photos and negatives had been retrieved), 

and it was obvious that local Communist bloc people could easily have seen 

the remains and certainly had copies of the photog s. The capsule had 

been res sed to about two-thirds its original Ie the impact, and the 

spooled m was beyond salvage. But, in Mc s ironic phrase, the 

experience had redeeming features because it "provided valuable engineering 

data on non-optimum re-entry survivability." The incident also demonstrated 

that the inherent stability and good ablative shielding of the capsule made 

random-entry survival a very real possibility-an idea naturally disconcerting 

to security people. 

Security had yet another epilogic trauma even after the remains had been 

retrieved from the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense. In order to obscure the 

destination of the packaged capsule wreckage, the real CORONA parts were 

sent to Lockheed by way of a secure air route and a dummy package 

containing paper, odds and ends of metal scrap, es of wood was 

boxed for shipment to the home address of a DIA assigned to the 

Pentagon. Unhappily, the scrap fill plus the carton weighed only 80 pounds 

although the shipping manifest specified a 250-pound cargo. Alert customs 

officials at McGuire Air Force Base decided they had uncovered a narcotic 

cache and 0 the box. After fruitlessly sortin gh the expensively 

freighted jun hey contacted the addressee and vised him sternly that they 

were "going to investigate." Stalling customs for the moment, the officer put 

through a frantic call to the CIA to "cut this one off." The Agency, with its own 

contacts in the Customs Bureau, retrieved and destroyed the box six days 

later. 

In the end, two positive actions resulted from the 1005 incident. First, all 

classification markings were removed from orbital CORONA vehicles before 

launching and a notice of reward for return, in eight languages, was substituted. Second, inspection procedures were reinforced to protect against the 

stowage of more American souvenir coins during fabrication and checkout. 

(An earlier official injunction against spaceborne souvenirs had perhaps lost its 

effectiveness. ) 

In the wake of the first two CORONA-J flights, both rated partially 

successful, ground tests of J-systems had been disappointing. managers, therefore, decided to use CORONA-M fli provi required 

reconnaissance coverage, while extended deve t and fixes of J-system 

technology continued. Apart from the operating defects that had prevented 

recovery of the second capsule in each of the first two CORONA-J operations, 

there was also a camera problem, which engineers diagnosed as incorrect 

tension in the film-transport system. The Agena flight problems involving 

inverter operation and command system responsiveness were countered by 

installing redundant equipment. 

As happened with infuriating regularity in the satellite-reconnaissance 

program, perverse fates seemed to intervene in the sensible decision to revert 

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to reliance on CORONA-M so that CORONA-J problems could be resolved in 

an atmosphere free from pressure for immediate operational returns. Two of 

the last three CORONA-M missions (9060 and 9061) were unsuccessful-one 

because of a Thor failure (the second in two years and only the fifth in 79 

attempted Tho launchings). Cancellation of LANYARD, following its 

third launching a partial success, had made two additional TAT vehicles 

available and indirectly accounted for the allocation of two basic Thor 

combinations to the ARGON program for August and October 1963 la 

Perversity appeared here also; both went well, providing the second and 

largely successful ARGON operations in 10 mission attempts. (Another 

ARGON was charitably accounted a partial success.) The CORONA-M launchings of November 1963 were failures. rt from the Thor malfunction, an 

Agena breakdown caused failure of reentry as the climax of a mission 

that . h a 27 November But the final CORONA-M (9062) 

red its breed, operating a its 21 December launching to capsule recovery on 26 December 1963. The paradox remained, 

however; in its final days the nominally reliable CORONA-M experienced 

major mission problems, while the almost untested CORONA-j operated 

reasonably well. Two CORONA-j capsules and one CORONA-M capsule were 

recovered be.tween August and December 1963, and two were lost in each 

program. 

That the zombie mode itself, or the effort to operate CORONA-j in a 

zombie mode, was fundamentally unavailing had become apparent with the 

second successive failure. Reactivation after storage on orbit was more difficult 

than had been anticipated. On 13 February 1964, McMillan issued instructions 

that until further notice all CORONA-J systems were to be operated on 

continuous missions interrupted only to the extent necessary to recover the 

first capsule, after which they were to resume operations. After 

recovery of the second capsule, McMillan rul zombie-mode experiments as were necessary and appropriate could be done. 89 

CORONA Flight Summary - 1963 

Mission 

No. Date Camera R.emarks 

9051 8 Jan 1963 M Success 

9052 28 Feb M First TAT. One TAT failed to 

separate. Destroyed. 

8001 18 Mar l 1 st lANYARD flight. No orbit. 

Guidance failure (Agena) 

9053 1 Apr M Success. 

9055A 26 Apr A No orbit. Attitude sensor problem. 

8002 18 May l Orbit achieved. Agena failed in 

flight 

9054 13 Jun M Success. 

9056 26 Jun M Success. 

9057 18 Jul M Success. 

8003 31 Jul l Success. Camera failed after 32 

hrs. 

1001 24 Aug J Success. 1st J Flight; 2 RV's; 

RV-2 lost 

9058A 29 Aug A Success 

1002 23 Sep J RV-l recovered; RV-2 lost. 

9059A 29 Oct A Success. 

9060 9 Nov M Failure. Unstable launching. 

9061 27 Nov M Agena failed in flight; prevented 

recovery. 

9062 21 Dec M Success. last CORONA M. 

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enlargement, the vehicles being called Thorad*) and of the orbital durability of 

the Agena was undertaken early in 1965, the goal now bein 14-day mission 

operations. Launchings of the improved system were sch led to begin in 

July 1967. 

These improvements were relatively modest, especially when compared 

to earlier efforts to advance CORONA-C and CORONA-M capabilities. The 

conservatism was a reflection of the possible imminence of a new search 

system development, considered for possible start in 1964 or soon thereafter. 

The prime candidates were FULCRUM and 5-2 and preliminary discussion was 

underway over (1) choice of system and (2) who should have payload 

development responsibility: the CIA (FULCRUM) or the Air Force Special 

Projects Office (5-2). As the months passed, these discussions became spirited, 

as well as frustrating, and extended to broad questions of organizational 

responsibility for the CORONA payload. 

Despite significant tensions between the DNRO and Program B, CORONA had made remarkable operational progress during the McMillan era. In 

terms of c ules launched against capsules successfully retrieved, the record 

from Ma 1963 to February 1964 was nine successes in 13 trials; for the 

following 12 months, it was 23 successes in 28 trials. This represented an 

increase of successes from 69 percent to 82 percent. 

CORONA flight Summary - 1964-1965 

Mission 

No. Date Camera R.emarks 

1004 15 Feb 1964 J Success. 

1003 24 Mar J No orbit. Agena power failure. 

1005 27 Apr J No on-orbit operation. Agena 

failure. RV impacted in Venezuela. 

1006 4 Jun J Success. 

9063A 13 Jun A Success. 

1007 19 Jun J Success. 

1008 10 Jul J Success. 

1009 5 Aug J Success. 

9064A 21 Aug A Success. 

1010 14 Sep J Success. 

1011 5 Oct J Success on RV-1. No RV-2 

recovery separation from 

Agena; battery failure. 

*Thorad differed from the original TAT (Thrust-Augmented-Thor) in having 13 feet more length 

to accommodate additional fuel and oxidizer, with some relocation of components. With 

Sergeant strap-on solid rocket boosters attached, a Thorad-Agena D combination could put 

400 more pounds into orbit than could a. Modification of launching facilities at 

o accommodate the taller nd the engineering required to transform 

TAT into about $2.8 million. The unit cost of a Thorad was only about $75,000 

more than the cost of a TAT. 

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CORONA Flight Summary - 1964-1965 (continued) 

Mission 

No. Date Camera Remarks 

1012 17 Oct J Success on RV -1 ; RV -2 water 

recovery due to bad weather. 

1013 2 Nov J Both cameras failed on Rev 52 

1014 18 Nov J Success. 

1015 19 Dec J Success. Zombie mode used. 

1016 15 Jan 1965 J Success. 

1017 25 Feb J Success. 

1018 25 Mar J Success. 

1019 29 Apr J Success. No RV-2 recovery 

1021 18 May J Success. 

1020 9 Jun J Success on RV-1. Water 

recovery on RV-2. 

1022 19 Jul J Success. 

1023 17 Aug J Success. Forward camera failed. 

2 Sep N/A Destroyed on launching by range safety. 

1024 22 Sep J Success. 

1025 5 Oct J Success. 

1026 28 Oct J Success. 

1027 9 Dec J Success. Control gas loss. 

1028 24 Dec J Success. 

The J-1 CORONA had gradually been improved during its perationallife. 

Lifeboat, developed early in the CORONA program as a ba for 

ensuring deorbit of the RV in the event of Agena power failure, continued to 

provide emergency capability and was responsible in four separate instances 

for the successful recovery of J-1 missions. From eight days of operational 

camera life in 1964, the J-1 extended its mission capability to 15 days during 

1967. The J-1 was a participant in the remarkable series of successes from 1966 

to 1970, when 28 les were placed in orbit and 28 les were 

recovered. Reliability improved substantially since 1962, en a e 

one-day mission success in four attempts had been hailed as a spectacu ar 

triumph. 

Relations between the NRO and CIA, however, did not improve. DCI 

McCone reached agreement with Defense Secretary McNamara, in autumn of 

1964, to begin discussions looking to the realignment of the NRO structure. 

But the NRO-CIA impasse continued into the new year and resulted in 

President Johnson's Science Adviser, Dr. Hornig, ing to establish a 

National Reconnaissance Panel, under Dr. Land, to I into this matter. 

As a result of these cross-currents, the NRO charter was under continuous 

study. An Executive Committee, made up of the Secretary of Defense, 

the DCI, and the President's Science Adviser wa ished in 1964 to make 

key NRP decisions. A new NRO Agreement was signed on 13 August 1965 by 

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the new DCI, Admiral William F. Raborn, and Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus 

Vance. Under its terms, these responsibilities were assigned: 

For the Secretary of Defense: 

• Establishing the NRO as a separate agency of the Defense Department 

• Choosing the DNRO, "who will report to him and be responsive to his 

i nstructions" 

• Concurring in the choice of the DDNRO, "who will report to the DNRO 

and be responsive to his instructions" 

• Reviewing and having the final power to approve the NRP budget 

The DCI was made responsible for: 

• Establishing collection requirements and priorities 

• Reviewing the results of collection and recommending steps to improve 

them 

• Appointing the DDNRO with the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense. The DDNRO was to serve full time in a line position directly 

under the DNRO and "shall act for and exercise the powers of the DNRO 

during his absence."90 

By 1965, DDS&T Wheelon was in the midst of building a large organization to study, design, develop, and reconnaissance satellite systems. 

He liked to compare the success 0 ermed "CIA developments" -the 

U-2, the OXCARTjSR-71, and CORONA-with the lack of success of early Air 

Force programs, specifying Samos. He said, 

The demonstrated performance of CIA is clearly superior 

to that of the Air Force. We believe that this is attributable to 

three basic factors. The most important is that the collection 

and the analysis of intelligence is the only business the CIA 

has. The second asset is the continuity of its professional 

staff. The last is its . ue ative authority to pursue 

programs promptly with con tial funds and to manage 

them in a streamlined way.91 

There were other advantages Wheelon did not cite: he could begin new 

studies more easily than could the De ent of Defense (he had a very short 

chain-of-command to convince), his would be sheltered by a Special 

Schedule in the Civil Service system, he could offer higher salaries than the 

DoD, and he had the enthusiastic support of his boss. 

On 15 September, a senior career intelligence officer, Huntington D. 

Sheldon, was named Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, on an interim basis by 

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CIA 

DCI William F. Raborn 

ooa Richard M. Helms 

Dep~ Director Science & T echooiogy 

Albert D. Wheelon 

Director IX Reconnaissance Programs 

Huntington D. Sheklon 

Office Of Special Projects 

Director John J. Crowley 

OOireclor John N. McMahon 

President 

Lyrrlln B. .Jotnion 

VICe President 

Hubert H. Humphrey 

DoD 

Secretary Robert McNamara 

D/Secrelary Cyrus P. Vance 

Natklnal Recomaissance OffICe 

DNRO Alexander H. Flax 

DnNRO James a. Reber 

Chief Of Staff James Stewart 

SAFSP 

Director Gen Robert Greer 

D/Director Col John Martin 

Program 241 

Director Col Paul Heran 

DlDirector Lt Col Charles Murphy 

1965 CORONA Organizational Chart 

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In developing his own proposed arrangements, Flax was guided by the 

following criteria: (1) no serious consideration would be given to any management plan and/or rearrangement of responsibilities which would unduly 

disrupt the ongoing ; and (2) to the extent possible, the solutions 

were to be in accord specifics, as well as the spirit and intent, of the 

1965 NRP Agreement. With the concurrence of the ExCom, a directive was 

issued by Dr. Flax on 22 June 196695 for the purpose of establishing new 

organizational relationships and responsibilities. 

The main provisions of this directive were as follows: 

A. The Director of SAFSP was designated CORONA System Project 

Director (SPD) with responsibility for overall system engineering and 

system i ation; overall system master planning and budgeting; 

assemb checkout of the system at the launching pad; launching 

and mission operations; capsule recovery; and delivery of film to the 

DNRO-designated processing facilities (EK or Air Force Special Projects 

Processing Facility). The SPD's use of the services of Ae ce Corporation in a general systems-engineering role was ac with Aerospace engineers having free access to information and data from the 

payload contractors, but exercising no technical influence on matters 

wholly within the payload sphere. 

B. The Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, was made responsible for direction and supervision of the development and uction of the 

CORONA Payload Sub-Assembly (PSA) reporting di he DNRO. 

He was to establish a CORONA Payload Sub-Assembly Project Office 

(PSAPO) and designate a Director thereof, responsible through the 

Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, to the DNRO for the total PSA 

development and production, and to the SPD for overall system 

matters. 

C. Additional specific res nsibilities were assigned to the SPD, including 

the Thrust-Augmen hor and Thorad boosters; the Agena booster/ 

spacecraft; procurement of the DISIC; acquisition and operation of 

system assembly facilities (excluding the lockheed AP Facility) and 

launching facilities; on-orbit command and control facilities; and capsule recovery forces and equipment. 

D. Specific responsibilities were assigned to the Director PSAPO, through 

the Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, for the total PSA development, 

production (excluding the DISIC), and assembly and test; operation of 

the AP FacilitYi adherence to master system ifications, interface 

specifications, and master proj Ian by the SPDi provision of software support to Satellite Operations Center before, 

and after missions; assistance to the SPD with regard to 

pre ching activities in the Payload Sub-Assembly area at Vandenberg, certifying to its readiness and acting as principal PSA assistant to 

the SPD during pre-mission planning, on-orbit operations, and postmission analyses. 

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E. The basic PSA structural, dynamic, thermal, wer, and other requirements were to be' proper weight in i' overall system 

configuration and In tradeoffs wit he system, the 

SPD was directed to attempt to resolve problems with a minimum effect 

on the sensor. However, both the SPD and the PSAPO were directed to 

analyze their interface and tradeoff problems in terms of a successful 

overall system performance. 

In clarifying the division of r nsibilities, Flax's directive emphasized 

that each party must honor the 0 prerogatives, granting full and free 

access to all data, and carrying on properly coordinated informal and direct 

communication at all levels. In the way of general guidance, Flax cautioned 

both agencies: 

Despite good intentions on both sides, differences in 

is mana nt directive, the question of 

not a pr interface implications, etc., 

probably will occur cally. When such an instance 

arises and cannot be settled in the field, I desire that the 

problem be called to my attention promptly for resolution. 

The successful implementation of this management arrangement will require the wholehearted cooperation of both CIA 

and SAFSP. I enjoin each of you to ensure that your respective subordinates put forth every effort in that vein. 

With the management responsibilities clarified, it remained only to be 

seen if the human factor in the relations between CIA and the Air Force could 

be "directed" back to the truly c tive spirit which had prevailed during 

the very early days of this joint en r. Fortunately for CORONA and for the 

nation this proved not to be a m. T IA cooperation on the 

CORONA Program improved si ificantly though ut the remainder of the 

program. 

During late 1965 and 1966, the CIA had significantly reorganized its space 

activities. The Office of Special Projects was established on 15 Se ber 1965 

by Deputy Director for Science and Technology Wheel on, and ohn Crowley 

was appointed Director of Special Pr and John N. McMahon, the Deputy 

Director. Soon thereafter, Lt. Colon "Curly" Webb (USAF Ret.) was named 

Headquarters Project Officer for CORONA. Crowley appointed Captain 

Kenneth Tebo (USN, Ret.) as West Coast CORONA Program Man r, A. Roy 

Burks as Technical Director, and continued Colonel louis A. "Bi I" Snyder 

(USAF Ret.) as Operations Officer. 

Having seen the CORONA program throu h some of the most eventful 

and turbulent periods of its existence, Bud n, who had served for three 

years as DDS&T, resigned on 26 September 1966 to return to private industry. 

Wheelon's deputy, Carl E. Duckett, was named acting DDS& T and was 

subsequently confirmed to that position on 20 April 1967. 

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Fulfillment: The Struggle To Maturity 

CORONA Improvement Program (]-3) 

Early in 1965, CIA's John Crowley and Dr. Eugene Fubini, DDR&E, agreed 

that studies should be made of the weaknesses and technical limitations of the 

current 'T' system. Crowley directed his West Coast Resident Officers, Roy 

Burks and Bill Snyder, to complete such studies and report back to him no 

later than 1 June 1965. A series of meetings followed with contractor representatives from LMSC, GE, Itek, Colonel Paul J. Heran's SAFSP ram Office, 

and the CIA Project Office. (Colonel Heran had replaced C I Roy Worthington as CORONA Project Officer.) Failure modes and operational deficiencies of the existing "J" system were analyzed as were the CORONA system 

coverage requirements, weather data, reliability data, and so forth. A matrix of 

feasible system designs was developed with all the recommended design 

features, including an improved oramic camera (it had long been recognized that constantly rotating complete lens and scan-arm assembly, 

rather than coupling and un ing a rotating lens and an oscillating scan 

arm, would improve camera rmance). The selected configuration incorporated (a) the constant-rotator camera design by Itek with a camera cyclerate-control capability for flying the system at altitudes as low as 85 nautical 

miles; (b) improvement in vertical/horizontal control and vibration to improve 

photographic quality; (c) incorporation of the Dual rated Stellar-Index 

Camera (DISIC) to improve attitude determination and all better use of the 

. g community; (d) development of the Mark VIII recovery 

300 percent increase in film-recovery capability; (e) onifetime extension to 30 days to allow efficient film utilizationi and (f) use 

of the Atlas or Thorad Sr. booster to 'de the required lift margin for the 

increased payload and to allow for hig er inclination orbits (up to 96 degrees), 

DNRO McMillan, was briefed on the recommended improvements on 21 

June 1965 by the CIA and Colonel Heran. On 29 June he approved procurement of the constant-rotating camera from Itek, the improvement in vertical/ 

horizontal control, and incorporation of the DISIC (procurement of which was 

later assigned to SAFSP)i however, he decided to keep the Douglas Thor as the 

booster, with a modest u rading to allow for increased payload weight of the 

new rotator and stellar- cameras. The reason for rejection of recommendations d, e, and f, above, according to Roy Burks, was primarily that official 

Washington held the view, in June 1965, that it was preferable to retain a 

launching rate of 12 systems year rather than increase the film ' y 

and mission life, and reduce launching rate, (This view was modifi for 

the sake of economy during the CORONA stretchout, 1968-70.)96 

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major rework before the next fli ht of a constant-rotator camera was scheduled. The performance . to be the best ever from a CORONA 

system. The j-3 was lower orbit and obtain better photographic 

scale and more information content per picture (with a resolution of six feet 

being achieved) than its predecessors. 

By late 1968, CORONA was being treated as a terminal system. On the 

occasion of the 100th CORONA flight, in December 1968, a review of 

program performance, sent to all program participants by the CIA's Director of 

Special Projects, emphasized two basic CORONA achievements: one, the 

significant of Soviet SS-9 and S5-11 ICBM sites, the other, the 

coverage 0 die East crises and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (The SixDay War). (CORONA photogra had confirmed Israeli claims of extensive 

damage to Arab airfields which ise would have [understandably] been 

treated as an exaggeration of facts.)97 Technical problems were relatively 

minor: the introduction of 50-380 ultra-thin-base film on CORONA flights 

late in 1968 caused some difficulties that attracted management attention; 

four years earlier, such problems would scarcely have merited mention in 

monthly program summaries. At this juncture, CORONA was, to all intents 

and purposes, a fully mature system-and one with no real prospects of 

enduring in operation past the introduction of its eventual successor, HEXAGON, an event that was arently imminent. The possibility that additional 

CORONA to provide an adequate overlap with HEXAGON 

received scrutiny between june 1969 and January 1970, and on three 

occasions the review committee concluded that no additional CORONAs 

need be purchased.98 Although there were dis opinions here and 

there, particul the Bureau of the Budget (later as Office of 

Managemen get) and in the Office of the President's Science Adviser, 

the decision was repeatedly reaffirmed. 

Yet, through and past all that, efforts continued for preserving and 

extending CORONA capability. Between May 1967 and October 1968, consideration of an improved CORONA-J, eventually to be called CORONA J-4, 

reached the stage of serious evaluatio rmance potential and probable 

costs. The system being considered woul nclude an improved camera-one 

of two Itek desi with focal lengths of 32 and 40 inches-with central 

resolution of 4.5 eet or better, a 12-inch focal length stellar-indexing camera, 

and a more powerful booster than required for the j-3 model. That combination of elements would provide a potential 18-day orbital lifetime for a 

CORONA J-4 system.The assumption underlying consideration of a still further 

improved CORONA was that it could enter use between January and April 

1971, initially supplementing and finally supplanting the J-3 CORONA which 

was providing basic search c ram plans current in 1968 showed 

the last CORONA-J systems launching by June 1971; procurement of 20 CORONA systems in a J-4 configuration would permit CORONA 

operations to continue through mid-1973. Development and procurement of 

the ca ems had an estimated cost of $37 to $38.7 million, to which 

would recovery vehicle and orbital vehicle costs (about $54 million) 

and the cost of 20 booster systems. Buying the J-4 in preference to additional 

J-3 CORONAs would effectively create an enhanced search capability at an 

estimated additional cost of about $1.3 million per launching; however, it was 

virtually certain that real costs would exceed estimates by 15 to 20 percent. 

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By June 1967, initial expectations of quick progress in HEXAGON development had largely dissipated. Acknowled ent of difficulties came late in the 

month, when DNRO Flax formally ad vi Deputy Defense Secretary Vance 

that the first launching of HEXAGON had been deferred from April 1969 to 

October 1969. The extension relaxed ressures created by technical 

problems in HEXAGON development, but it required a further extension 

in the use of CORONA to December 1970, the least overlap with HEXAGON 

that Flax deemed prudent,99 

By July 1967, a crisis in the Perkin-Elmer production of the HEXAGON 

camera had further slipped the anti ted date for the first HEXAGON 

launching to April 1970; actual C launchings in FY-67 were reduced 

from 10 to eight, and further stretching of the schedule was in store. Further 

ge in the HEXAGON urred: in February 1968, a three-month 

to June or July 1970; Iy 1968 slippage to October 1970; and by April 

1969, after reprogramming the camera contract, the first flight schedule had 

become December 1970. 

In OSP's FY -69 bud t submittal to the NRO, a requirement was included 

for the procurement hree additional CORONA systems, to provide an 

overlap with HEXAGON. The DNRO preferred to stretch the CORONA 

launch' schedule; in doing so no provision was made for any launching or 

system ures which might occur (which in turn could result in failure to meet 

search and surveillance requirements). Two icular weak points in the 

system were weight constraints, due to use the medium-thrust launching 

vehicle assigned to CORONA, and the shelf of system hardware. The 

earlier plan for CORONA had been to sch e 13 flights to assure 12 

successes, but, in the critical overlap period now developing, the DNRO called 

for a "zero defect , even though the demonstrated reliability of the 

CORONA system ut 85-90 percent. Crowley felt strongly that three 

more CORONA s s should be procured while the contractors were still 

tooled to supply t em. 

It was at this time that CORONA J-4 made its last serious bid for 

consideration as an alternative to HEXAGON, along with several other 

potentially expensive system ions which were being evaluated for later 

development (particularly a There was considerable concern 

in executive quarters about the inab of budget managers to provide the 

very large additional sums needed to exploit such options.10o 

In Au 1967, more than a year after the formal start of the HEXAGON 

program, while the camera subsystem was still the only element in 

accelerated development, the NRP Executive Committee examined five alternative approaches to providing ad te satellite reconnaissance capability 

for the 1970s. The most extreme 0 options was to develop a CORONA 

producing resolution of about 4.5 feet. This was disapnd that development of an improved CORONA would cost 

about as m completing the HEXAGON project. (This observation 

emerged in November 1968, after HEXAGON had made some progress 

toward initial operational capability, but before an initial schedule slippage of 

more than one year had been acknowledged and before facing the prospect 

that another schedule slippage of about the same magnitude was pending.) 

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The second tion, considered in August 1967, was simply to delay 

HEXAGON availabi for a year-a contingency then discarded as unnecessarily costly, but subsequently imposed on the HEXAGON program by 

necessity, rather than choice. In November 1968, a further option proposed 

was to cancel HEXAGON and substitute for the planned HEXAGON 

tions (four or five fI per year) a CORONA operation involving seve ts 

annually. What rna the cancellation attractive in 1968 was the prospect that 

it would permit a budget saving of between $680 and $775 million in fiscal 

years 1968 through 1973. But the offset would be expressed in ground 

resolution: there was virtually no possibility of improving CORONA to the 

point of providing resolution better than about 4.5 feet, and in the view of 

CIA, DIA, and NPIC analysts, search resolution as good as 3.0 feet was 

needed. 

Finally, the NRO concluded (in a position paper for the use of the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense during an Executive Committee meeting of mid-November 1968) that "the CORONA system has reached the limit of its improvement. 

The current system uses Thor-Agena launches with a fixed-film panoramic 

camera. A significant improvement to the system to bring resolution below five 

feet would require a new booster and an optical-bar camera. This ... would 

entail a development costing several hundred .million dollars." The judgment: 

an austere HEXAGON program was preferable to cancelling HEXAGON and 

relying on CORONA for the 1970s.1 0 1 

In cost-effectiveness terms, the comparison had this appearance: 

CORONA-HEXAGON Cost Comparison 

System 

CORONAJ-3 

HEXAGON 

CORONA J-3 Mod 

CORONA J-4 

Resolution 

Ground 

(Feet) 

1-10 

2-5 

5.5-8 

4.1 

New or 

Remaining 

Cost for 

Development 

($ Million) 

o 

150-200 

15-100 

150-250 

Operational 

Costs 

($ Million 

per Year) 

72 

140 

100 

110 

Contract 

Implications 

None 

None 

Sole source 

New competition 

In other words, the CORONA modification would provide "marginally 

better resolution at much h operating costs ... " while the radically 

changed CORONA J-4 "woul have development costs as high or higher than 

HEXAGON." 

In the end, HEXAGON survived the 1967-68 pressures for cancellation 

and CORONA remained a terminal system. Apart from technical and re rements considerations, and institutional preferences, the issue hi on 

budgetary provisions, and, at the time, the proposed fiscal year 1970-71 

budgets seemed adequate. That HEXAGON would cost more than 0 .. 

estimated was apparent; the extent of that cost growth was not. Nor 

satellite-reconnaissance program yet begun to ience the considerably 

more severe budgetary pressures that accompani the change in administra-

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tion following the 1968 election. Such influences were nearly certain to 

reopen what were widely assumed to be closed issues-including the future of 

CORONA. 

As mentioned earlier, a HEXAGON Review Committee was convened in 

June 1969 to study the status of the system and the prospects for meeting the 

first lau te of December 1970. On the strength of its report, the NRO 

ExCom to a a recommended stretchout of the remaining 

CORONA vehicles to ow a one-year overlap of CORONA with HEXAGON, 

and not to order any more CORONA systems, but to reconsider the situation 

in December 1969. 

Thus, toward the middle of 1969, as the CORONA program once again 

wound down toward finality,' some of the various problems normal to that 

phase in any major program began to have their effect. In the period between 

September 1968 and st 1969, three camera failures and three lesser 

malfunctions had significa y lessened the value of six CORONA missions. In 

July 1969 (mission 1107) a mechanical failure interrupted operation of the 

forward-looking camera almost as soon as the command was sent. A 

similar failure (mission 1048) occurred after about twothirds of the film expended, and in February 1969 (mission 1106) the 

aft-looking camera had failed, probably because of a break in the film at a 

splice point. Mission 1050, in March 1969, ended prematurely after a failure of 

the Agena guidance system, and two other missions (1049, December 1968, 

and 1051, May 1969) film. Although all represented serious 

problems in varying degree, the that mission 1107 was the first in more 

than five years to be marked by failure of the camera system heightened the 

concern felt by Crowley for the critical aspects of the CORONA phaseout, 

particularly those of personnel attrition at the AP Facility, the quality assurance 

program, and the availability of spares. A meeting held on 25 July 1969 

examined closely these three' lems and, as a result, the following 

actions were taken: (a) a previous reorganization was carried out to 

integrate the CIA HEXAGON and CORONA staffs into a aphic Systems 

Division, effective 1 ust 1969, in order to make the m use of the 

experienced perso available to the Director of Special Projects; (b) 

planning began for the physical transfer of the AP Facility from Palo Alto to 

lockheed Sunnyvale in order to have available a supply of technicians to 

replace those Hiller Aircraft employees who were leaving the program as they 

saw it movin toward termination (because of labor union regulations, 

lockheed em could not be placed in the Hiller facility); and (c) 

planning was initiated for the procurement of spares and refurbishment of 

systems, including cost and reliability considerations. 

When the HEXAGON Review Committee was reconvened in December 

1969, the possibility of meeting the December 1970 first flight was considered 

slightly improved and the Committee recommended against further procurement of CORONA systems. The DNRO, on 2 February 1970, submitted the 

Committee's report to the DCI and encouraged acceptance of its recommendation against additional CORONA procurement. By 12 February, DCI Richard Helms and Dr. lee DuBridge, President Nixon's Science Adviser, had 

concurred in the recommendation. The CORONA schedule stretchout, as 

ed by the NRP Executive Committee in June 1969, had shifted from six 

ts each in FY-70 and 71, to five each in FY-70 and 71, and two carried over 

into FY-72. This was a calculated risk, taken in the face of all relevant 

concerns: the requirements, the cost, and the state of the HEXAGON 

system.102 

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Actual CORONA launchings during calendar 1968 were five J-1s and 

three J-3 constant-rotator cameras, all successfully retrieved, with 97 to 99 

percent usable film recovered. In calendar 1969, the last three of the J-1 

systems and three J-3s were launched and retrieved, although several malfunctions caused the usable film to drop to about 83 percent for the J-3s and 

94 percent for the J-1s. 

A series of important tests was run in conjunction with flights of the first 

five J-3 systems (missions 1101 through 1105). These were instigated by the US 

Intelligence Board (USIB), which in February 1966 had directed CIA to develop 

techniques for estimating crop yields from satellite photography. Th loads 

of J-3 systems were specially instrumented and contained tag-on hs of 

special film, including 50121 conventional color, 50180 near-IR-sensitive 

color, and 50230 high black and white. The test series accomplished its 

fundamental purpose demonstrating the J-3 camera's capability to handle 

new p hic techniques, facilitated by the flexibility of two c e 

filters eable exposure slits on each camera (which all e 

use of mixed film oads an different filters). None of the missions 

concerned had their main inte ligence purpose degraded by the conduct of 

these tests. 

At Crowley's instigation, a CORONA J-3 Ad Hoc Committee was informally convened by the DNRO in December 1967, and formally constituted in 

February 1968. Its purpose was to analyze and evaluate experiments conducted on these five test fl The committee concluded that color would, in the 

long run e sign t added information for the intel . uction 

ess; it was not a question of color in place 0 white, 

t rather a question of when color should be used, and for what kind of 

targets it should provide additional information. Specific findings of the 

committee included recommendations that a logical test program, involving 

various color films and techniques, should be conducted against specific 

intelligence requirements; that ial subcommittee of the USIB's Committee on I . ements n (COMIREX) should be constituted to eva utility of sate I aphy; and that a wellplanned color-collection program should be out with the dose 

cooperation of the System ram Offices, the Satellite Operations Center 

(SOC), intelligence analysts, photo interpreters.103 

One other remote possibility remained for the continued use of CORONA 

(though surely not under that name, and not with CORONA operational 

objectives). NASA had approached the NRO in 1969 with a tentative plan to 

satisfy requirements for an earth-resources survey satellite by ada ng CORONA systems and technology. The notion intrigued the NRO that 

option would effectively preserve a CORONA manufacturing capability against 

some con' that might warrant later use of the system. CORONA 

NASA's basic requirements for multispectral im and for 

. And because CORONA was a thoroughly iable, fully 

d mplete fabrication and testing facilities existed, 

it would provide a most inexpensive way of satisfying NASA needs. But NASA 

had to choose between CORONA and alternative specialized earth-resources 

survey systems: the NASA budget could not su h. Given the institutional tendencies of both NASA and the NRO, t e outcome was predictable. 

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program began. Ray S. Cline, State's Director of Intelligence and Research, 

wrote DCI Richard Helms in September 1970 /I ••• the ... between what 

policy-level officers in our government expect to be abl demand from our 

satellite reconnaissance program and what it actually can deliver in the next 

six to twelve months" had begun to concern him deeply. Cline explained that 

only "the unusual political circumstances in the current Arab-Israeli crisis" had 

permitted the United States to use the old workhorse, the U-2. Otherwise, 

coverage would have been grossly inadequate-owing to a restricted flexibility in reconnaissance satellites that stemmed directly from the limited residuum 

of CORONA vehicles. When HEXAGON became ional (and Cline 

suggested as an aside that he did not expect that ppen until well into 

1971), coverage would be excellent-but, at a cost of $65 million for 

launching, HEXAGON was not suited to crisis sched . Given the probable 

five- to six-year wait for an operational reado line suggested that it 

might be advisable to "reassess [the] need for a satellite crisis capability at 

least as good as that previously provided by the CORONA standby." Cline's 

object was to stimulate a new examination of the basic issue, but he conceded 

that funding problems and previous commitments made a satisfactory solution 

unlikely.10s* 

Cline sent copies of his letter to both Lieutenant General D. V. Bennett, 

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and R. H. Froehlke, who was 

charged by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard with integrating 

various defense intelligence activities. Bennett promptly contacted Mclucas 

and Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard to express basic agreement with 

Cline's stand, again expressing concern over the potential intelligence gap that 

would be created by exhaustion of the CORONA inventory.106 Packard 

nded by suggesting that Mclucas "look at cost and schedule problems 

more CORONA insurance." He reiterated the suggestion during a 

meeti th McLucas shortly thereafter. Indeed, by early October Packard 

had c ded that CORONAs might be needed " ... for a long time, either 

to cover a launch failure or operational failure, or to cover a crisis situation 

where there is nothing scheduled and we might want to launch an extra photo 

bird." 

Packard pressed DCI Helms on that issue in November. Helms responded 

that additional CORONA vehicles could not be obtained in less than 24 

months because of manufacturing lead time considerations and that HEXAGON was virtually certain to be satisfactorily operational by then (1973). He 

further suggested that CORONA vehicles would have limited usefulness in the 

sorts of crises the United States had experienced in the preceding five years, a 

conclusion based on the findings of a yet-to-be-c leted study being 

conducted by the CIA. On such grounds, he doubt that the utility of 

*An interesting footnote to the concerns expressed by Cline occurred during the Arab-Israeli 

Six-Day War. An urgent White House request was received by the NRO to obtain photo 

coverage of the Cairo International Airport during that evening's operation of the GAMBIT 

high-resolution photoreconnaissance system (on orbit at the time). DNRO McLucas personally via secure phone to Brigadier General William King, then Director 

of SAFSP. K "Sir, I would be to satisfy the r . 

arrange to move Cairo Airport 150 miles to 200 miles t 

King's droll sense of humor served to highlight the inherent limitations imposed by the laws 

of orbital mechanics on a low-earth satellite's ability to access any point on the earth's 

surface at will. 

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additional CORONAs would be worth the $20 million each would probably 

cost (a cost driven substantially higher by the necessity of reestablishing 

production facilities). He added, if HEXAGON continued to conform to its 

schedule, CORONAs would be left over for crisis use should that need arise. 

Finally, Helms concluded, he II ••• would prefer not to spend any of the 

e budget at this time for additional CORONA vehicles, [instead 

our ob ive will be better served by use such funds as 

can be made ava 0 help cure any HEXAG s that might arise 

in the early flight program."107 ain it appeared the subject had been closed. 

And again, appearances p deceptive. 

Late in December 1970, Dr. John Martin (not Major General John L. 

Martin, Jr., former NRO Director of Special Pro in President Nixon's 

Office of Science and Tec y co n of a new CORONA 

ordering a small NA vehicles under a contingency 

hat would call for cancelling the order once com~)le1:e ~-iD(A(:::;( 

tional readiness had been demonstrated.108 The option was con 

some detail during the NRP Executive Committee meeting of 29 January 1971. 

In the ~ourse of discussionJ f the NRO Comptroller, estimated 

that additional CORONA systems could be purchased and operated at costs 

ranging from $20 million each in lots of two, to $15.1 million each in lots of six. 

Assuming an immediate decision to proceed with the urchase of three 

systems (an optimum esenting the crossover high unit 

costs for fewer systems and price for so many systems that the total 

would perturbate FY-1971 and 1972 cancellation after two 

months would cost about $15 million five months about $25 million. 

That calculation had been in direct response on from Dr. 

E. E. David, the Presi Science Adviser (and a the NRP 

Executive Committee): if additional CORONA systems were immediately ordered, but a successful HEXAGON launching in March 1971 allowed termination of the procurement, what would be the costs? What if in June or July? 

The basic reason for Dr. David's concern was the HEXAGON overlap with 

CORONA. When HEXAGON had been scheduled for December 1970 launchNA launchings wer de an 11-month overlap. 

AC;OIN incurred an response was to order a 

GAMBIT Higherboy kit that would permit GAMBIT, 0 ing at an 

of 525 miles, to take relatively wide-area at would 

partly satisfy an interim search-capability requirement, protecting the 11-

month overlap through March 1971. A HEXAGON slip to June or July 1971 

would leave a potential seven-month overlap. In the worst case, if HEXAGON 

did not become rational until late 1971, a coverage gap of five to 11 

months conceiva could result. Protective measures included further 

stretchout of CORONA launchings (awkward at a time when, as it happened, 

there were rising demands for a greater frequency of CORONA missions), or 

buying another Higherboy kit and substituting a Higherboy-GAMBIT for a 

scheduled GAMBIT -3. (Again in February, the Defense Intelligence A cy 

urged Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard to schedule an additio I and 

early CORONA operation to satisfy immediate and urgent requirements arising, in part, from the untimely flight failure of CORONA mission 1112.) 

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In the end, it appeared to Dr. David that insurance against a major 

HEXAGON slippage could be purchased for between $14 and $20 million-if 

the decision to order more CORONA systems were taken at once. He asked 

Mclucas to poll the Executive Committee on the advisability of taking such 

action. The negative response disposed of the question and wrote finis to 

CORONA. 

CORONA Flight Summary - 1966-1972 

Mission 

No. 

1029 

1030 

1031 

1032 

1033 

1034 

1036 

1035 

1037 

1038 

1039 

1040 

1041 

1042 

1043 

1101 

1044 

1102 

1045 

1046 

1103 

1047 

1104 

1048 

1105 

1049 

1106 

1050 

1051 

1107 

1052 

1108 

1109 

1110 

1111 

1112 

1113 

1114 

1115 

1116 

1117 

Date 

2 Feb 1966 

9 Mar 

7 Apr 

3 May 

24 May 

21 Jun 

9 Aug 

20Sep 

8 Nov 

14 Jan 1967 

22 Feb 

30 Mar 

9 May 

16 Jun 

7 Aug 

15 Sep 

2 Nov 

9 Dec 

24 Jan 1968 

14 Mar 

1 May 

20Jun 

7 Aug 

HISep 

3 Nov 

12 Dec 

5 Feb 1969 

19 Mar 

2 May 

24Jul 

22 Sep 

4 Dec 

4 Mar 1970 

20 May 

23 Jul 

18 Nov 

17 Feb 1971 

24 Mar 

10 Sep 

19 Apr 1972 

25 May 

Camera Remarks 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Agena failed to separate from booster. 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J Success on RV-1, with water pick-up 

on RV-2. 

J Success 

J-3 Success. 1 st J-3 flight. 

J Success 

J-3 Success 

J Success 

J Success 

J-3 Success 

J Success 

J-3 Success 

J Success. Forward camera failed. 

J-3 Success; first use of UTB film. 

J Success. Degraded film. 

Success. Aft camera failed. 

J Success. Terminated: Agena failure. 

J Success. Degraded film. 

J-3 Success. Forward camera failed. RV-1 

water recovery. 

J Success. Last J flight. 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Failure of Thor booster. 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Success 

J-3 Success 

~9-

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I 

N 

-120- lYEMAN-TA ·KEYHOU crener r,,"'f,....,.1 ~.,.,.--... . tlv 

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Section 5 

Summary 

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CORONA was born in 1958, in the hope that spacecraft could be used to 

pry the lid from dosed societies. That hope became reality in 1960, when the 

first successfully recovered space capsule brought reconnaissance photographs back to earth. 

The ground resolution of those early p raphs was in the range of 35 

to 40 feet. Within 12 years, CORONA deliv resolutions of six to 10 feet, 

routinely.109, 110 Early capsules carried 10 to 16 pounds of film; toward the end 

of the program they carried 80 pounds (16,000 feet).111 In the 1970s, flights 

could remain on orbit for 19 days, make operational responses to changes in 

cloud-cover, provide very accurate attitude, position, and mapping information, and return coverage of 8,400,000 square nautical miles (nm2) with an 

average of 3,000,000 nm2 cloud-free.112 

Thus, during the 1960s, the hopes of 1958 became an impressive reality. 

The expedient" of a "small, interim" CORONA rogram eventually exten to 145 launchings and used 2 million of film.113 The 

cumulative coverage was 750 million nm2 • 114 

The 1958 estimate of $59 million for a four-flight test program and a 12-

flight operation was extended to $850 million.115 The average cost of a mission 

became $7 to $8 million. 

The CIA described the CORONA contribution to US intelligence holdings 

as "virtually immeasurable."116 By June 1964, CORONA had delivered . s 

of every Soviet ICBM complex in existence; using these data as a benc ark, 

the United States was in a position to follow the course of Soviet buildup, item 

by item. CORONA provided priceless coverage of the Middle East during the 

1967 War and in 1970 was used to test Israeli-Egyptian claims regarding ceasefire compliance. 

The list on and on. In essence, the United States of America, 

confronted b the problem of a closed society, was once blind, but now it 

could see. 

Parallel contributions were made by CORONA in the impetus which its 

success provided to systems contemporary with it. GAMBIT and HEXAGON, in 

icular, could thank CORONA for making their basic concepts credible and 

r leading the way technologically. 

Those who shared from the . g in the CORONA enterprise sensed 

that a unique opportunity had c their energies. They believed they 

would always be proud of their share in a momentous achievement. They 

were right. 

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Appendix A 

The Intelligence Community and CORONA 

ARC, COMOR and COMIREX 

On 1 December 1955, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 

acting in his capacity as chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee 

OAC), the predecessor body to the US Intelligence Board (USIB), established 

an Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) to handle all requests levied on 

the new U- am. Under its first and only chairman, james Q. Reber, the 

ARC had a representation from all the member-organizations of the 

intelligence community. The ARC gathered, prioritized, and approved all 

collection and exploitation r 'rements for the U-2 program and was 

responsible to approving U-2 plans, 

With the advent of the CORONA satellite program in 1958, DCI Dulles 

established, in january 1959, a Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee 

(SIRC). This unit, formed with the concurrence of the USIB (it had superseded 

the lAC in 1958), was specifically charged with providing intelligence guidance 

and support to US reconnaissance-satellite pr . Of course, at this time 

the United States did not possess a w' te system: CORONA had yet 

to be launched and the Air force's Sen amos effort was still earth-bound. 

The ARC and SIRC continued operatin side-by-side until 5 July 1960, 

when the USIB decided to study the sibil mbinin the two units. A 

month later, on 9 August 1960, t USIB approved blishment of a 

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), to provide a focal point 

for information on, and requirements for, overhead-reconnaissance of denied 

areas. Both COMOR's nsibilities and membership were broadened. It 

was placed i of reconnaissance for intelligence by satellite, or by 

any vehicle ied areas, whether by photography, EUNT, COMINT, 

infrared, RADINT, or other means. The new unit was also charged with 

recommending dissemination and special security controls needed to provide 

operational guidance. 

COMOR's membership was extended to include all USIB agencies and jim 

Reber, who had been ARC chairman since 1955, became its first chairman; his 

ty was Air Force Colonel l.E. May. At the time of its establishment, the 

operational national asset was a small CIA effort involving a P2V aircraft. 

The U-2 had been grounded since 1 May 1960 and the first CORONA success 

was nine days away. In 1961, after several CORONA successes, COMOR 

delineated the Sino-Soviet bloc landmass into two I categories to guide 

future reconnaissance activities: built-up areas and ndeveloped areas. 

During the next five years, strategic and tactical photo reconnaissance by 

aircraft and satellite grew in direct proportion to the escalation of the war in 

Vietnam, as did the expense. As a consequence, in September 1965, Bureau of 

the Budget Director Charles l. Schultze asked Deputy Defense Secretary 

Cyrus Vance to examine the various requirements for national-level imagery 

interpretation with a view to eliminating duplication. This led to a joint 

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tation Review Group OIIRG) under USlB auspices. Upon 

he JURG study, DCI Helms and Deputy Defense Secretary 

nt known as the National Tasking Plan (NTP) for the 

Exploit nsor Imagery, which delineated the responsibilities of 

the three major parts of the imagery community: the CIA's NPIC, the DIA, and 

the three armed forces. 

Previously, the USIB had been interested only in requirements for obtaining imagery; now it was movi the arena of exploiting that same imagery. 

Consequently, the USIB deci vest responsibility for imagery-collection 

and imagery-exploitation in a new entity called the Committee on I 

Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), whose first ch.airrnall 'live 

CIA's Roland S. Inlow. The SIGINT responsibility previously vested in COMOR 

was assigned to a new unit known as the SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance 

Subcommittee (SORS). 

In addressing national exploitation of overhead imagery it is appropriate 

to mention the first director of the National Photographic Interpretation 

Center (NPIC), Arthur C. Lundahl. A superb technician in the science of 

pho raphic interpretation and etry, Lundahl effectively organ' staff that included experts erse disciplines - photointerpretation, photogrammetry, 'ng photo- . utomatic data processing, communication a gra arts, collateral analytical research, 

and techni for extract the maximum intelligence from imagery. 

career, Lu hi deservedly enjoyed the confidence of 

s Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, as well as that of senior 

intelligence managers within CIA and the Defense Department. 

First COMOR, and later COMIREX, functioned successfully in managing 

the nation's imagery requirements, even though it invariably identified more 

requirements than CORONA could satisfy. Broad intelligence community 

representations gave each agency a forum for expressing - and debating -

the priority of its requirements. Final appeals could be made, of course, to the 

USIB, but this option was rarely exercised. 

During CORONA's early missions, COMOR passed its a roved requirements to the collection system operator (the NRO) through CIA Development Project Sta on Center (where two Air Force detailees, Majors 

Arthur Dulac and Jo pioneered the work). In 1963, this operational task was transferred to newly formed NRO Satellite Operations 

Center (SOC) in the basement of the Pentagon. An NRO observer attended 

each COMOR to assure that each new requirement was fully 

understood and to ad vi the USIB committee of CORONA's capabilities and 

limitations. 

There was one major limitation. The CORONA system never carried an 

on-board computer through which t ting requirements might have been 

changed or modified in real-time. R mera on-off commands were 

initiated by means of a paper (later Mylar) tape containing punched holes 

corresponding to preselected ground-latitudes ific orbital revolution. 

Turn-off, turn-on control was done by a clock- could adjust the tape 

to actual orbital position. At the beginning of CORONA operations, targeting 

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decisions were quite limited, consisting essentially of an command turning the 

cameras on when the satellite crossed the Soviet Union's northern border and 

turning them off when it exited the southern border. This limited capability 

was sufficient for the early CORONA missions, since th were of short 

durations. As the program matured, its targeting capability to be augmented; by the end of , CORONA's dual cameras could be operated 

independently and ns could be made from a number of pre-cut 

p making it possible to adjust to changes in weather forecasts, vehicle 

h th, and emergency intelligence needs. 

A COMIREX subcommittee-initially called the Photo Working Group 

(PWG) and later the Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee (lCRS)-

was responsible for correlating approved . ements and formally . g 

them to the NRO, where they were convert into targeting com man s, on a 

mission-by-mission basis. 

It must be kept in mind that CORONA was developed as a search system; 

its basic role was to detect new activities of national interest in denied areas. 

During the early years, when it was the on issance vehicle over 

the USSR, it was, of necessity, also a su . e system, providing repetitive 

coverage specified t To help manage CORONA operations in the 

search m COMOR the Soviet Union into areas of greater or lesser 

probability of "new" activity; initially, these categories were either "built-up" 

or "undeveloped." There was a continuing basic requirement to obtain clear 

imagery of "built-up" targets at least once each six months; "undeveloped" 

targets were to be covered at least once per year. As CORONA matured into 

an increasingly sophisticated system, the entire world was divided into seven 

categories, with collection frequency ranging from three months to three 

years. 

In order to assist the NRO in collection management, COMIREX used a 

requirement priority structure which had ten increments, 0 to 9, to guide onorbit choices. Eventually, the NRO responded to the choice-problem by 

developing a mission-simulation capability that permitted the COMIREX to 

review predicted mission results-and adjust priorities-before the mission 

was actually flown. 

Overhead Reconnaissance Product Security 

Very early in its overhead reconnaissance operations, the CIA set up a 

security system to protect the information collected. The se of 

system was not only to protect the privacy of the product, to 

shelter, if possible, knowledge of the collection source or method. The original 

system was named TALENT; it covered aircraft collectors and collections. 

Later, spacecraft collections were subsumed into the TALENT system by 

another security system called TALENT -KEYHOLE (TK). Access to TK-protected 

information demanded a special security clearance and authenticated needto-know, and was typically reserved to exploiters of the finished intelligence 

product. 

Photo-interpreters could be assisted in their analyses by knowing the 

physical characteristics and performance capabilities of the reconnaissance 

satellite itself, as well as the operational parameters of each mission. To assist 

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them in this r rd, a special booklet was prepared on the CORONA system, 

as well as for ent systems; in CORONA's case it was called the "KH-4 

System Manual" (KH standing for KEYHOLE) and was security-controlled in 

the TK system. In addition, operational data unique to each mission were 

provided to the interpreter, usually cove . such matters as vehicle attitude 

and altitude, solar elevation, and so f . Most intelligence community 

members were briefed at the TK ather than at the more comprehensive BYEMAN level; consequently, r ce to satellite reconnaissance 

systems was usually made by their TK designators. Thus, CORONA, a 

BYEMAN program, was known as KH-4 in intelligence circles. 

CORONA Intelligence Achievements 

A new era in overhead reconnaissance was opened by CORONA's 

ca ility to photograph millions of square miles of denied area duri a 

sin mission. CORONA's predecessor, the U-2 aircraft, had made of 

24 deep-penetration overfligh a four-year period but had covered 

only one million square miles et Union, a target that comprised 

more than 10 million square miles. When the U-2 missions came to an abrupt 

end on 1 May 1960, there were vast reaches of the USSR which had never 

been seen by US reconnaissance sensors; it was providential that, a little more 

than three months after the Gary francis Powers episode, CORONA mission 

9009 demonstrated a new observational mode, providing authoritative answers to the question: "Is there a missile gap?" 

CORONA's initial major accomplishment was imaging all Soviet mediumrange, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missile launching 

complexes. CORONA also identified the Plesetsk Missile Test Range, north of 

Moscow. Repetitive coverage of centers like Plesetsk provided information as 

to what missiles were being developed, tested, and/or deployed. Also, the 

unequivocal fact of observ . the United States freedom from concern 

over many areas and locations ch had been suspect in the past. 

Severodvinsk, the main Soviet construction site for ballistic-missile-carryin submarines was first seen by CORONA. Now it was possible to monitor the 

la f each new class of submarine and follow it through deployment to 

operational bases. Similarly, one could observe Soviet construction and 

loyment of the ocean-going surface fleet. Co of aircraft factories 

airbases provided an inventory of bomber and er forces. Great strides 

were also made in compiling an improved Soviet ground order of battle. 

It was CORONA imagery which uncovered Soviet antiballistic missile 

activity. Construction of the GALOSH sites around Moscow and the GRiffON 

site near Leningrad, together with construction of sites around Tallinn for the 

Soviet surface-to-air missile known as the SA-5, were first observed in 

CORONA imagery. HEN HOUSE, DOG HOUSE, and the Soviet Union's first 

phased-array radars-all associated with the Soviet ABM program-were also 

identified in CORONA imagery. 

CORONA "take" was used to locate Soviet SA-1 and SA-2 installations; 

later its imagery was used to find SA-3 and SA-5 batteries. The precise location 

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of these defenses provided Strat 

tion needed to determine g 

bombers. 

ic Air Command planners with the informaentry and egress routes for us strategic 

In the period after 1963, when the high-resolution GAMBIT system 

became operational, the CORONA im ry was used for pioneer work to 

detect new installations or activities ich could be targeted for closer 

observation by the GAMBIT vehicle. 

CORONA imagery was also adapted extensively to serve the needs of the 

Army Map Service and its successor, the Defense Ma . Agency (DMA). 

Enhanced by improvements in system attitude contro ephemeris data 

plus the addition of a stellar-index camera, CORONA eventually became 

almost the sole source of DMA's military mapping data. 

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Appendix B 

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Representative CORONA Imagery 

The following examples of CORONA imagery represent some of the more 

significant and dramatic contributions made by the CORONA system to the 

national intelligence production process. 

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References 

1. RAND Rpt, R-262, 1 Mar 54. 

2. Hq, Air Research and Development Command General Operational Requirement No. 80, 27 

Nov 54. 

3. Ur, Maj Gen A. Boyd, D/Cmdr Wpn Sys, ARDC to CMDR, WDD, 7 Nov 55; Dev Plan, WS117L, 2 Apr 56; Dev-Dir No. 85, Hq USAF, 3 Aug 56; ARDC Sys Dev Dir, WS-117L, 17 Aug 56. 

4. Ur Contract AF04(647)-97, 29 Oct 56; Itr, Lt Gen D. L. Putt, DCS/D, USAF to Cmdr ARDC, 10 

Dec 56, subj: Requirements for Additional FY 1957 Funds for WS-117L Visual and Ferret 

Systems, 19 Sep 58. 

5. Memo, C91 F.C.E. Oder Dir/WS-117L Prog, to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr WDD, 1 Aug 

57, no subj; WS-117L Dev Plan, 16 Jul 57; Ltr, Col H. F. Boone, D/Asst for GM, ARDC, to 

DCS/D USAF, n Ju157, subj: Program Planning Guidance for WS-117l, and hr, It Gen D. L. 

Putt, DCS/D USAF to Cmdr ARDC, 3 Sep 57, same subj. 

6. CORONA Chronology, Apr 59; Itr, J. F. Cassidy, Staff Dir, President's Board of Consultants 

on Foreign Intelligence Activities, to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr WDD, 20 May 57, no 

subj. 

7. Memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, Dir/WS-117L Prog, to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr WDD, 27 Aug 

57. 

8. Ltr, Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr AFBMD, to U Gen S. E. Anderson, Cmdr ARDC, 10 Sep 

57, no subj. 

9. Ur, Col A. B. Gibbs, USAF liaison Officer, NRL Vanguard Project, to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, 

Cmd AFBMD, 9 Sep 57, no subj. 

10. Ur, U. Gen D. L. Putt, DCS/D USAF, to Lt. Gen S. E. Anderson, Cmdr ARDC, 17 Oct 57, no 

subj. 

11. Memo, Brig Gen H. A. Boushey, D/Dir R&D, to DCS/D USAF, n Nov 57, subj: Information 

for Senate Investigating Committee; CIS USAF Policy Book, 7 Feb 58. 

12. Op Cit, ref 10. 

n. Rpt of the Edward Teller Ad Hoc Committee, 28 Oct 57. 

14. Memo, R. E. Horner, Asst Sec AF (R&D), to Sec Def, 12 Nov 57, subj: Outer Space Vehicles. 

15. RAND Rpt RM-2012, 12 Nov 57, A Family of Reconnaissance Satellites; Itr Lt. Col F.C.E. 

Oder, Asst for WS-117L, WDD to R-W Corp, 14 Dec 56, subj: Recoverable Payload Package 

Study. 

16. Brochures: "Pioneer Strategic Reconnaissance Satellite for ICBM and IRBM with Recoverable System," 27 Nov 57 and 4 Jan 58; Itr, H. W. Page, Gen Mgr, GE Missiles and Space Veh 

Dept, to Brig Gen O. J. Ritland, V/Cmdr BMD, 15 Apr 59. 

17. LMSD Doc 2832, WS-117L Development Plan for Program Acceleration, 6 Jan 58; Itr, L. E. 

Root, V IPres, LAC to Cmdr BMC, 26 Nov 57, no subj; hr, Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr 

BMD, to L E. Root, LAC, 23 Dec 57, no subj. 

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18. Memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, DirfWS-117L Prog, to Maj Gen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr BMD, 7 Dec 

57, no subj. 

19. Memo, L R. Houston, Gen Counsel CIA, to DCI, 3 lun 63, subj: Basic Authority for CIA 

Conduct of Overflight Reconnaissance Operations, BYE-4250-63, S. 

20. Memo, R. M. Bissell, 19 Nov 57, subj; Proposed Advanced Reconnaissance System. 

21. CORONA Cover Plan, 8 Dec 58, COR-0160. 

22. Memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, DirfWS-117l Prog, to Maj Gen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr BMD, 18 Feb 

58; subj: Preliminary Evaluation of Itek Proposal; TWX AFCVC 57197, USAF to BMD, 3 Mar 

58. 

23. Memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, DirfWS-117L Prog, for Record, 12 Mar 58, subj: Record of 

Conference. 

24. Memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, DirfWS-117L Prog, for Record, 12 Mar 58. 

25. Memo, Oder for Record, 25 Mar 58, subj: Report of Meeting, 17 Mar 58; Memo, Oder for 

Record, no subj, in Schriever's file (deals with 18 Mar 58 mtg at Cambridge); draft memo, 

Oder to Maj Gen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr AFBMD, 28 Mar 58, subj: Back Up Camera Pod 

Development for Project CORONA. 

26. Project CORONA Outline, 15 Apr 58, COR-0013, TS, with covering memo from R. M. Bissell, 

Jr, Spec Asst to the Director,ClA, to Brig Gen A. J. Goodpaster, the White House, COR-0014. 

27. Work Statement, Development of a Satellite Reconnaissance and Recovery System (CORONA) by Lockheed Missiles Systems Division, 25 Apr 58, COR-0016. 

28. Greer, Kenneth, "CORONA: The First Photo-Satellite," Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 17, No. 

1-S, Spring 1973, p. 6. 

29. Ur, F. W. O'Green, Tech Dir, LMSD to LMSD pers, 31 lui 58, subj: Advanced Engineering 

Tests. 

30. Memo, R. M. Bissell, CIA, for Brig Gen A. J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the Pres, 9 Aug 58, 

wiatt. 

31. TWX AFOOP-OC-R53942, USAF to BMD, 10 lui 58; memo, Lt Col L E. Vandeveer, BMD Ops 

Ofc, for Record, 21 lui 58, subj: Report of Meeting with TAC and ADC to Establish a C-119 

Squadron; ARDC G038, 22 lui 58. 

32. Memo, Col W. A. Sheppard, for Record, 17 )un 58, subj: lockheed-General Electric 

Relations. 

33. TWX AFCGM52800, USAF to BMD, 2 lui 58. 

34. Msg 2956, CIA (R. M. Bissell) to BMD (Brig Gen O. I. Ritland, V ICmdr), 2 Oct 58; Msg 2979, 

CIA (Bissell) to BMD (Col W. A. Sheppard), 2 Oct 58; Msg 0096, BMD to CIA (Bissell), 7 Oct 

58. 

35. Memo, R. W. Johnson, Dir/ARPA, to Cmdr BMD, 10 Sep 58, subj: Redefinition of WS-117L; 

memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, DirfWS-117L Prog, to Col W. A. Sheppard, 30 Sep 58, subj: 

Comments on COR-0160, 25 Sep 58; CORONA Cover Plan, 8 Dec 58. 

36. Memo Rpt, R. B. Cesaro, C. R. Irvin, L L Lind, R. C. Truax, ARPA Staff to Dir, D/Dir, Ch Sci, 

ARPA, 1 Dec 58, subj: Reorientation of 117L Program; msg 0529, Col W. A. Sheppard, BMD, 

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to CIA, 22 May 59i memo R. M. Bissell, CIA, for Maj Gen j. E. Smart, Asst VCS USAF, 25 Nov 

58, subj: Distribution of Responsibilities for CORONA. 

37. Memo, Col. W. A. Sheppard to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, Cmdr BMD, 17 Nov 58, subj: Status 

of Scientific Advisory Committee for Reconnaissance Satellites; memo, R. M. Bissell, CIA, to 

Maj Gen A. J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the Pres,S Nov 58, subj: Project CORONA. 

38. Memo, R. W. johnson, Dir/ARPA, to SAFUS, 4 Dec 58, subj: WS-117L Program, ARPA. 

39. Memo, A. W. Dulles, DCI, 4 Dec 58, for Dep Sec Def; Spcl Asst to the Pres for Sci and Tech, 

subj: Proposed Curtailment of Project CORONA; memo, R. W. Johnson, Dir/ARPA, to 

SAFUS, 17 Dec 58, subj: Reorientation of Sentry Program. 

40. CORONA Cover Plan, op.cit. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Memo, Lt Gen R. C. Wilson, DCS/D USAF, to Maj Gen J. Ferguson, et al (DCS/D), 2 Feb 59, 

subj: AFBMD Presentation to Mr. Macintyre. 

43. Memo, Col W. A. Sheppard to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, 20 jan 59, subj: CORONA Prg Rpti 

Ibid; msg 0327 Sheppard (BMD) to Bissell (CIA), 3 Feb 59; msg 0328, CIA to BMD (Sheppard), 

4 Feb 59; msg 0340, BMD (Sheppard) to CIA (Bissell), 11 Feb 59; memo, Lt Gen R. C. Wilson, 

DCS/D USAF, to J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, 29 Feb 60, subj: Satellite Reconnaissance; msg 6717, 

CIA to BMD (Sheppard), 6 Mar 59; msg 0446, BMD (Sheppard) to CIA (Bissell), 3 Apr 59; TWX 

AFDAT59353, USAF to BMD, 27 Apr 59; Amend No.4 to ARPA Order 48-59,20 May 59. 

44. Msg 0417, BMD (Sheppard) to CIA, 24 Mar 59; memo, Col W. A. Sheppard to Maj W. F. 

Weaver, 14 Apr 59, subject: Root-Schriever, Schriever-Root Exchange of Letters; msg 0500, 

BMD to CIA,S May 59; Itr, l. E. Root, VP and Gen Mgr lMSD, to Maj Gen B. A. Schriever, 

Cmdr BMD, 7 Apr 59, no subj (cys to several LMSD depts); Itr, Brig Gen O. J. Ritland, Cmdr, 

BMD to l. E. Root, LMSD, 6 May 59, no subj (multiple coord within BMD). 

45. Mosely, Leonardi A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family 

Network, Dial Press, 1978, p. 432. 

46. TWX WDZ-8-15-E, BMD to USAF, 28 Aug 59; msg 2389 CIA to BMD, 14 Sep 59; msg 0856, 

BMD (Col P. E. Worthman) to CIA, 15 Sep 59, quoting BMD TWX to ARPA, 15 Sep 59; msg 

9505 BMD (Sheppard) to CIA (Bissell), 29 Sep 59. 

47. Memo, Col F.C.E. Oder, Asst D/Cmdr Space Sys, BSD to WS-117L Prog Ofc, approx 5 Sep 

59, subj: LMSD Discoverer Recovery Report; Itr, R. Smelt, lMSD, to Cmdr BMD, 21 Sep 59, 

subj: Modifieations Incorporated in Discoverer VII; memo, Maj F. S. Buzard, Disc Prog Ofc, 

for Record, 4 Sep 59, subj: Report on Meeting of 3 September; memo, Maj W. F. Weaver, Jr. 

Disc Prog Ofc, for Record, 10 Sep 59, subj: 8 Sep 59 Meeting. 

48. TWX, RDRRB 27-11-31-E, ARDC to USAF, 1 Dec 59 in USAF Hist Div files; Chart, CORONA 

Summary, 15 Jan 62. 

49. Msg 1111, BMD (Col Worthman) to CIA, 19 Feb 60; Chart, CORONA Summary, 15 jan 62. 

50. Msg 1113, BMD (Col Worthman) to CI 19 Feb 60; msgs 1150 and 1152, BMD 

(Worthman) to Cl1 I, 9 Mar 60i msg 8058 to BMD (Worthman), 7 Mar 

60. 

51. Ur, Gen C. E. LeMay, VCS USAF, to Pres, LAC, 25 Apr 60, no subject, USAF Hist Files; memo, 

U Col R. J. Ford, CORONA Prog Ofc, for Record, 2 May 56, subj: Program Review, 1 May 60; 

Chart: CORONA Summary, 15 Jan 62. 

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52. Msg 1722, CIA (R. M. Bissell) to BMD (Maj Gen O. I. Ritiand, Cmdr), 1 lui 60; Chart: 

CORONA Program Summary, 15 Jan 62. 

53. Interviews, Maj Gen Greer and Col J. W. Ruebel, SAFSP, 12 Dec 62; It. Col R. J. Ford, 21 Jan 

63, all by R. l. Perry. 

54. Msg 1352, BSD (Ford) to CIA, 12 Aug 60. 

55. Perry, Robert, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Revised Oct 73, Volume I, p. 99. 

56. CIA Working Paper 0347 A, Chapter VI, Project CORONA, the Beginning, p. VI-15. 

57. Msg 2804, CIA (R. M. Bissell) to HMD (Maj Gen O. J. Ritland, Cmdr), 17 Aug 60; memo, Col P. 

Worthman, for Record, 23 Aug 60, subj: Quality of "Take"; memo, Worthman for Record 24 

Aug 60, subj: Quality of "Take" and Bangmeter. 

58. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1959, Political and Security Questions, Documentary 

References, pp. 28-29. 

59. UN Registration of Space Vehicles: Chronology of Events, CIA DD/S&T Retired File, "Outer 

Space, Mar-juI1962," job 66-R-638. 

60. NYUSDEl Telegram 3556 to Department of State, 26 Apr 62, subj: Outer Space. 

61. Memo, Herbert Scoville to DCI, 27 Apr 62, subj: Herb Stevenson's Telegram. 

62. Memo, Roswell Gilpatric, D/Sec Def, to Gen Maxwell Taylor, 10 Apr 62, subj: "Interaction of 

U.S. Action in the U.N. with U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Activities." 

63. Memo, Herbert Scoville to DCI, 29 jun 62, subj: Report of NSAM 156 Working Group, 

DD/R-295-62. 

64. Memo, james R. Killian, Chairman, PFIAB, to President Kennedy, 16 May 62. 

65. Memo, John McCone, DCI, to DDCI, 22 May 62, subj: "U.S. Position in U.N. Outer Space 

Committee," ER-62-3520. 

66. Marshall S. Carter, It Gen, U.S.A., DDCI, Memo to DD/R, 29 May 62, "Formulation of 

Policies on Outer Space." 

67. National Security Council Action 2454, "U.S. Policy on Outer Space, Including Satellite 

Activity," 10 lui 62. 

68. letter "Agreement on Management of the NRP," signed by It Gen Cabell, Acting Director, 

CIA and Roswell Gilpatrick, D Sec Def, 6 Sep 61. 

69. Interview, AF Secretary Eugene Zuckert, 25 lui 64, by lawrence McQuade, Tape in Kennedy 

library, Boston, Massachusetts. 

70. Interview, Maj Gen R. E. Greer by Perry, 9 Dec 63, cited in A History of Satellite 

Reconnaissance, VollIA, Oct 1973. 

71. "Agreement between Secretary of Defense and the DCI on Responsibilities of the NRO," 2 

May 62, BYE-11601-62. 

72. Memo for NRO Program Directors, J. V. Charyk, 23 lui 62, subj: Organization and Functions 

of the NRO, BYE-1733-62. 

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73. "Status of CORONA," 17 Apr 60, DoD Unnumbered Document in OSA retired files. 

74. Memo for Record, Col. P. Worthman, subj: Stereo C-Triple-Prime, 24 Feb 61. Draft memo, J. 

Charyk, UjSec AF to SOD, no subject, Mar 61, NRO Staff files. 

75. Msgs 9468 and 9559, CIA to Lt Col Battle, CORONA Office, 30 Mar and 6 Apr 61; msgs 8691 

and 9240, CIA to lMSD, 13 Mar and 26 Mar 61, SAFSP files. 

76. Memo, J. Charyk, UjSec Af, and R. M. Bissell, DjDir CIA to Dir DIA, 7 Feb 62, subj: 

Exploitation. 

77. Memo, J. Charyk, UjSec AF to Dir DIA, 14 Feb 62, subj: MURAL 

78. Memo, J. Charyk to Chm, FlAB, 15 Jun 62. 

79. Ur, J. E. Partenan, CIA, to Col Battle, CORONA Office, 13 jul 62, no subj, SAFSS files. 

80. NRP Report to FlAB, 1962. See rpts for 27 Sep and 7 Dec. 

81. Memo, It Col Howard, DNRO Staff, to Col. l. Battle, SAFSS, 18 Sep 62, no subj, SAFSS files. 

82. CIA Working Paper, "CORONA History," Chapter VII, 22 Oct 84. 

83. Memo, R. M. Bissell to Maj Gen R. Smart, Dep V jC Staff, USAF, subj: "Distribution of 

Responsibilities for CORONA," 25 Nov 58, SAFSS files. 

84. Memo, J. A. Cunningham, Dep Asst Dir (Special Activities) to Exec Dir, CIA, subj: "Basic 

Authorities and Agreements Which CIA Holds With USAFjNRO; Recommended Modifications and Suggestions Regarding the NRO Organization," 24 Jan 63, CIA files, "CORONA 2, 

History and Background." 

85 DoD-CIA Agreement, "Management of the National Reconnaissance Program" signed by 

Roswell Gilpatric, DjSec Def and John McCone, Director, CIA, 13 Mar 1963 

86. CIA Working Paper, "CORONA History," Chapter VII, 22 Oct 84. 

87. Memo, J. A. McCone, DCI to DNRO, 9 Apr 63, subj: "Special Procedures for Satellite 

Reconnaissance Missions," DNRO files. 

88. MssL ___ 10832 McMillan, DNRO, to Maj Gen R. l. Greer, Dir SP, 19 Apr 63, SAFSP files. 

89. Msgi 12296, DirjSP to CIA, SAFSP, 13 Feb 64, in SAFSS files. 

90. Agreement for Reorganization of National Reconnaissance Program, 13 Aug 1965, BYE5678-65. 

91. Study, A. Wheelon, DDSfT, for DCI, "A Summary of the NRP," 13 May 1965, BYE-0204-65, 

CIA files. 

92. History, Office of Special Projects, CIA, 1965-70, Jun 1973, BYE-6400-72, p. 130. 

93. Ibid, p. 14. 

94. Memo, A. H. Flax, DNRO, to NRP Executive Committee, 22 Apr 66, subj: CORONA 

Management. 

95. Memo, A. H. Flax, DNRO, to Dir Recon, CIA, and Dir Spec Proj, SAF, 22 Jun 66, subj: 

CORONA Management Plan and Organizational Responsibilities. 

~65-

SE~ 

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96. "The CORONA Improvement 0-3) Program Development History," 27 Oct 67, COR-6148-

67. 

97. "A Century of CORONA," 1960-68, BYE 7752-68, to DD/Sat Ops, NRO, from J. Crowley 

(Note: from OSP correspondence file: History 64-(9). 

98. "Report of the HEXAGON Review Committee" (Chm F. R. Naka), 20 Jun 69; 2nd report, 4 

Nov 69, 3rd report, 22 Jan 70, DNRO and Ex Com files. 

99. Memo, A. H. Flax, DNRO, to Dep Sec Def, 26 Jun 67, subj: "FY 1968 Obligations and 

Expenditure Indications for the NRP" (Source: NRP Ex Com files). 

100. NRP Ex Com Minutes, mtg 20 Aug 68. 

101. NRP Ex Com Minutes, mtg 18 Nov 68. 

102. NRP Ex Com Minutes, mtg jun 69. 

103. Final Report, CORONA Photographic Experiments Committee, Jun 1969, BYE-7180-69. 

104. Ur, H. E. Newell, Assoc Admin, NASA, to J. l. McLucas, U/Sec AF (DNRO), 2 Mar 70; 

McLucas to Newell, 26 Mar 70. (Source: DNRO files.) 

105. Ltr. R. S. Cline, Dir/lntelligence and Resources, Dept of State, to R. Helms, Dir CIA, 4 Sep 70. 

(Source: DNRO files.) 

106. Memo, It Gen D. V. Bennett, Dir. DIA to Dep Sec Def, subj: Continuity of Satellite Coverage. 

(Source: DNRO files.) 

107. Ur, R. Helms, Dir CIA to D. Packard, Dep Sec Def, 17 Nov 70. (Source: DNRO files.) 

108. Memo, I. Martin, President's OST to Dr. E. E. David, Presidential Science Adviser, 3 Feb 71, 

subj: CORONA Re-order Insurance Costs. 

109. Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Vol I, p. 218, TS. (Source: SAFSP files.) 

110. "Report to the 40 Committee, 1 lui 71 - 30 lun 72," BYE 13190172. (Source: DNRO files.) 

111. Op cit, ref 105, p. 217. 

112. Op cit, ref 106. 

113. Ibid. 

114. Ibid. 

115. Op cit, ref 105. 

116. Kenneth Greer, "CORONA Program History," Vol I, Directorate of Science and Technology, 

CIA, 1976. 

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AM 

Acetate-base film 

Ad Hoc Requirements Committee 

(ARC) 

Advanced Reconnaissance System 

Advanced Projects (AP) Facility 

Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(ARPA) 

Aerial Reconnaissance laboratory 

Aerobee 

Aerospace Corporation 

Agena 

Agena-A 

Agena-D 

Ahola, Tuevo [Gus] 

Air a Museum 

Air 

Air Defense Command 

Air Force Ballistic Missiles Committee 

Air Force Ballistic Missiles Division 

(AFBMD) 

Air Force Special Project Production 

Facility 

Air Force 

Air Researc 

Command (ARDC) 

Airspace sovereignty 

Air Staff 

Air Weather Service 

Alaska 

Anderson, Samuel E. 

Andes mountains 

Andrews AFB, MD 

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 

Anti-vivisectionist 

Arab-Israeli crises 

Approved 

~ 

for Release: 2018/09/11 C051 02383 

NOfORN-ORCON 

CORONA INDEX 

AM (Continued) 

50 ARGON, Project 

123 

3 

29,30,32, Army Map Service 

photo 33, Atlas missile 

44,107, 114 

20-25,27, 

28,31,34, 

36,39-43, Atomic Energy Commission 

45,46 Attack Alarm System 77 

1~, 18, 24 BBB 

92, 107 

18,23,24, B-57 Canberra 

27,36,39, B-58 Hustler 

42,47-49, Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) 51, 59, 62, Balloon reconnaissance 

63,77, 

78-80, Baker, William 

86-89,94, Bamboo curtain 

96,98, Baruch Plan 

footnote 101, Battle, C. lee 

102, 107, 

113,114 50,54, 66 

93, 55,62, footnote 101 

53 Bay of Pigs 55 Beacon Hill Study 10, BEAR aircraft 

70 Becerra, Eladio 

22, Bell Aircraft Corporation XRM-81 

11,13-18, Bell Telephone laboratories 

21-25,28, Bennett, Donald V. 

29,31,34, "Big Brother" 

35,39,40, BISON aircraft 

43,45-50, Biomedical experiments 53,71,82, 

90 

v, 59, 107 

53,71 Bissell, Richard M., Jr. 

4, 12, 16, 

17,29,34, 

42,71 

7 

13,14,17, 

22,45, 51, 

71 

30 

36,38 

12,14,16 'Black' contracting 96 

53, 56 Black Sea 85, 126 

33 Blum, Edward 

111,117,121 BMD 

~ 

-167-

46,49,50, 

78,79,82, 

photo 83, 

86,87,94, 

95,99 

46,82,127 

3,4,16,17, 

36,40,41, 

50, 51, 63, 

70, 71, 109 

73 

71 

8 

18 

see AfBMD 

v, 8, 24, 

26, 37, 38 

92 

8 

7 

29, photos 

37, 

and 

72,90 

73 

9 

61 

96 

18 

4,5,91 

117 

15 

v,61 

21-24, 33, 

35,36,39, 

40,42-44, 

47,50 

photo 11, 

15,16,18, 

20,21, 

23-30,32, 

34,35, 

40-42,45, 

47,50,51, 

56,62,65, 

68-70,73, 

74,77,82, 

89,90,105 

21,22, 32, 

68 

Appendix 

B-11 

photo 52 

see AFBMD 

Handle via 

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I 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C051 02383 

BBB (Continued) 

Booster service 

Boston, MA 

Boston University Optical or Physics 

Research laboratory (BUORl or BUPRl) 

Brown, Herschel 

Bundy, McGeorge 

Bureau of the Budget 

Burks, A. Roy 

Buzard, Frank 

BYEMAN Security System 

CCC 

C-119 

C-130 

C-61 

C camera 

C' (prime) camera 

C" (double-prime) camera 

C'" (triple-prime) camera 

Cabell, Charles P. 

Cairo, Egypt 

California Institute of Technology 

Cambridge, MA 

Cape Canaveral, Fl 

Capsule 

Caracas, Venezuela 

Caribbean 

Carter, john (Jack) 

Carter, Marshall S. 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

CIA Director of Reconnaissance 

Cesaro, Richard 

Charyk, Joseph V. 

Clark, Admiral I 

Cline, Ray S. 

NOFORN-ORCON 

~ 

70 

77 

footnote 22, 

23 

53 

67 

111,123 

108,109 

62 

65, 126 

29,38,52, 

56,59, 

photo 60 

53 

77 

75,76, 

footnote 78, 

79 

48,62, 

75-80, 86 

77, 78 

76,78-80, 

86 

28,69,73 

footnote 117 

12 

25, 27 

44,70 

see SRV 

96,98 

96 

22 

106 

v, vi, 1, 

10-12,15, 

16,18, 

20-25,27-31, 

34,35, 

38-43,45, 

46,50,56, 

59,64,65, 

67-70, 72-75, 

78,80,82, 

85,89-93, 

98,101-103, 

105, 106, 

108, 109, 

113-115 

117,121, 

123-125 

103, 107 

41 

photo 68, 

69,70, 

72-75,80, 

82,85,87, 

89,91,92, 

105 

c::=J 

28 

117 

CCC (Continued) 

Cold-gas spin stabilization 52 

Colorado 70 

Committee on Imagery Requirements 115, 

and Exploitation (COMIREX) 123-125 

Committee on Overhead Requirements 94,123, 

(COMOR) 124 

Com sat Corporation 91 

Congress see U.S. 

Congress 

Constant-rotator camera photo 83,110, 

111,115 

Conway, Edward j. 90 

Cooke AFB, CA 25, 36 

Corona (static electric) discharge 61 

CORONA Improvement Plan 110 

CORONA-J photo 83, 

illustration 84, 

88,93-96, 

98,99, 

illustration 100, 

102 

CORONA J-3 Ad Hoc Committee 115 

CORONAJ-4 85,111-113 

CORONA-M footnote 78, 

80,82, 

illustration 84, 

85-89,93, 

94,96,98, 

99, 101 

CORONA Management Plan 110 

CORONA Project Control Center 29 

Covert reconnaissance satellite 75 

Crowley, John J. photo 106, 

108, 109, 

112,114, 

115 

Cunningham, james A. photo 91 

Curtin, Richard M. photo 50, 

69 

Customs Bureau 98 

DDD 

David, Edward E. 118,119 

Davies, Merton 17, 

Davila, leonardo 96 

Defense, Department of 1,9,12, 

20-22,25, 

29, 31, 34, 

35,42,64, 

65,68-71, 

74,82,90, 

103,106, 

108,124 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 82,98,113, 

116-118, 

124 

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) 127 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 102,103,113 

Development Projects Division (DPD) 34 

Development Projects Staff (DPS) 

of CIA 

Dewey, Thomas E. 

Diener, William 

16,28-30, 

34, 35, 124 

footnote 61 

62 

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DDD (Continued) 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 

Director of NRO 

Directorate of Plans (DDP), CIA 

Directorate of Research (DDR), CIA 

Directorate of Science & Technology 

(DDS& T), CIA 

Discoverer, Project 

DM-21 Thor 

DoD Directive 5101.15 

DoD Directive 5200.13 

Distinguished flying Cross 

DOG HOUSE radar 

Doolittle, James H. 

Douglas Aircraft Company 

, James 

egrated Stellar Index Camera 

(DISIC) 

DuBridge, Lee 

Duckett, Carl E. 

Dulac, Arthur 

Dulles, Allen W. 

Dynasoar 

E-1 

E-2 

E-3 

E-4 

E-5 

E-6 

EEE 

Eastman Kodak (EK) Company 

Echo 

Edwards AFB, CA 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 

Electronic readout 

Estonia 

Explorer satellite program 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C051 02383 

16,21,65, FFF 

67,73,75, 

90,92,102, f-1, -2, -3 4 

103,114, Fairchild Camera and Instrument 22-27,77, 

117,123 Company 78 see NRO Fairchild-Hiller Corporation 32 

Director Film test series 115 

34,69,89 Flam meeting 25 

65,75,89, Flax, H. photo 106, 

90,92 106-108, 112 

92, 105, 108 Flying-spot scanner 4 

Ford, Ralph J. 52,62 

v, 23, 35-37, Froehlke, R.H. 117 

43-54,56, fubini, Eugene 109 

59,61-66, FULCRUM, Project 101 

71,75,76, 

78-80, GGG 

photo 81, 

88,90,96 GALOSH missiles 126 

80 GAMBIT Project 76,88,95, 

21 117,118,121, 

66 127 

59 Gemini Project; GEMINI payload 80 

126 General Electric Company 17,18,22-25, 

9,69 31, 33, 38, 

21, 31, 109 39,48,51, 

14,40 52, 109 

82, 107, 109, General Operational Requirement (GOR) 4 

116 No. 80 

114 GENETRIX Project 8,26,37, 

v, 108 38, 63 

89, 124 Genez, Victor 5 

11, 15, 18, Gillette Procedures 71 

21, 25, 41, Gilpatric Directive 66,67 

47, photo Gilpatric, Roswell 66, 69, 75, 92, 

73,77,123 photo 93, 94 

71 Glenn L Martin Company 4 

Guided Missiles and Astronautics 93 

Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) 

Goodpaster, Andrew J. 

4,76 

4,76 

4 Green, Edward 

82 Greer, Robert E. 

51,76,85,88 

76,85-88 

4,25,56, 

59,107 GRIffON missile 

64 GUIDELINE missile 

38 

v, 6-9, 14, HHH 

15, 18-20, 

photo 19, Haiti Victory 

41,47,51, Harvard University 

photo 54, Hawaii 

55,59, Hawkins, Willis M. 

footnote 68, Heisler, William 

77,124 Helms, Richard M. 

17,24,42, 

43,51,76, 

112,117 HEN HOUSE radar 

Appendix B-10 Heran, Paul J. 

22, 63, 64, 70 Hermes rocket 

Approved 

~ for Release: 2018/09/11 C051 02383 

11,18, 

photo 19, 

20,28,42 

59 

34,69, 

photo 72, 

73,87,92, 

94, 106 

126 

see SA-2 

52,53 

85 

36,38,52 

51 

62 

89,114, 

photo 116, 

117,118,124 

126 

109 

17 

Handle via 

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Control Systems Jointly 

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HHH (Continued) 

HEXAGON, Project 

HEXAGON Review Committee 

Hickam AFB, HI 

Hi 

Hi 

Hiller Helicopter Company 

::~;~':u::lir M. 

Horner, Richard E. 

Hornig, Donald 

Hot-gas spin rockets 

Huntsville Group 

HYAC (high-acuity) camera 

IDEALIST Project 

Image-motion compensation 

III 

I Requirements 

RS) 

Inlow, Roland S. 

Intelligence Advisory Committee 

International Geophysical Year (lGY) 

Itek Corporation 

Iron Curtain 

Israel 

J-1 camera 

J-3 camera 

)-4 camera 

johnson, Lyndon B. 

Johnson, Roy W. 

johnson, U. Alexis 

Johnson, William 

m 

joint Imagery Interpretation Review 

Group OIlRG) 

Jupiter Program 

KH-1 

KH-2 

KH-3 

KKK 

~ 

NOFORN·ORCON 

106,111-113, 

116-119,121 

114 

59 

118 

iv 

32, 114 

12 

9 

16-18,21, 

28,45 

102 

51 

70 

27,48 

89 

27, 48, 77, 78 

125 

124 

123 

6,7 

6, 22-27, 31, 

33, 39, 76-78, 

82,85,109, 

111 

v,8 

see Arab-Israeli 

crises 

photo 83, 

illustration 84, 

102, 115 

photo 83, 

illustration 84, 

100, 109, 

illustration 110, 

111,115 

photo 83, 

illustration 84, 

111-113 

92,102,124 

21,28,40, 

42,43 

66 

62,90 

123, 124 

35,70 

76, Appendices 

B-1 and B-2 

76, Appendix B-3 

76, Appendices 

B-1 and B-5 

KKK (Continued) 

KH-4 

KH-4A 

KH-4B 

KH-4 System Manual 

KH-5 

KH-6 

KH-7 

Kaena Point, HA 

Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center 

Kartaly ICBM complex 

Katz, Amrom 

Kennedy, John F. 

KEYHOLE System 

Khrushchev, Nikita 

Kiefer, Eugene P. 

Killian, James R., Jr. 

King, William G. 

Kistiakowsky, George B. 

Kleyla, Helen H. 

:

orea 

I 

rasnoyarsk propellant plant 

Kucera, George 

La Fria, Venezuela 

land, Edwin H. 

Land Panel 

langley, VA 

LANYARD, Project 

lay, james H. 

ledford, Richard [Jack] 

lefstad, Ray 

leghorn, Richard C. 

Legion of Merit 

le May, Curtis E. 

leningrad 

levison, Walter 

III 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C051 02383 

76,85,126, 

Appendix B-3 

95, Appendices 

B-1, B-4, B-6, 

B-7, B-8, B-9, 

B-10, B-11, B-12, 

B-13, B-14, and 

B-15 

110 

126 

79 

85 

88 

38 

Appendix B-2 

Appendix B-8 

17 

footnote 61, 

62,65-67, 

73,80,124 

125 

v, 75 

29, photo 30, 

62,69,92, 

105 

9,11,15,18, 

photo 19, 

20,28,41, 

51,65,67, 

footnote 68, 

69,73,89 

photo 5, 

footnote 117 

footnote 68 

v 

Qpendix B-15 

21 

96 

16,18, 

photo 19, 

20,42,69, 

73,77,89, 

102 

16 

92 

photo 83, 

illustration 84, 

85,88,94,99 

15 

90 

62 

photo 6, 

8,11, 

footnote 22 

55 

50 

85, 126 

77 

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lifeboat 

Lockheed 

Lockheed Missiles and Space Division 

(LMSD) 

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company 

(LMSC) 

L 

Lunda , Arthur C. 

MMM 

Macdonald, Duncan 

Macintyre, Marvin A. 

Management and Budget, Office of 

Man-in-space program 

Maracaibo, Venezuela 

Mark-VIII 

Martin, Glenn L., Company 

Martin, John J. 

Martin, John L., Jr. 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Mathison, Charles A. 

Matomic building 

May, l. E. 

McCone, John A. 

McElroy, Neil H. 

McGuire AFB, NJ 

McKinnon, Bettye 

McLucas, John 

McNamara, Robert S. 

McMahon, John N. 

McMillan, Brockway 

Mechanical mice 

Menlo Park, CA 

MER-1 

Mercury Project 

Microfile film 

Midas, Project 

Middle East crises 

Missile-gap controversy 

MIT 

Mitchell, Harold E. 

Mitre Corporation 

MK-Ia 

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~ 

MMM (Continued) 

102 Moffett NAS, CA 59 

4,5,10, Moore, Richard 62 

18,22-25, Moose Courier Plan 53 

27,29,32, Mora, Gabino 96 

33,38-40, Moscow 126 

44,46,48, Multispectral imagery 115 

50, 51, 53, Mural camera 75, 76, 80, 82, 55,59,77, photo 83, 82,89,93, illustration 84, 98,107,114 93 

4,31,80 Mural-2 85 

Murphy, Charles 29,62,89, 34,53,62, 90,92 109 Mutual air reconnaissance 7 30, 69, 72, 92 Mys Shmidta Appendix B-1 124 

NNN 

footnote 22, 23 National Aeronautics and Space 39, 40, 64, 70, 

Administration (NASA) 80,115,116 43,45 National Intelligence Estimate (NlE) 61 111 for Guided Missiles 40 National Photographic Interpretation vi, 59, 82, 93, 96 

109 Center (NPIC) 113,124 

see Glenn L. National Policy on Satellite 66 

Martin Reconnaissance 

Company. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) vi, 67, 69-75, 

118 82, 85, 88-92, 

69, 118 9498,102, 

see MIT 103,112,113, 

47,53, 116, footnote 

photo 54, 117,124,125 

55,56,68 NRO Comptroller 118 

29 NRO Director 75,90-92, 

123 101,103, 105, 

67, photo 73, 107,112,114, 

75,92,94, 115 

102, 106 NRO Program A 75,92 

photo 13, NRO Program B 75,90,101 

14,15,18, NRO Program C 75 

22,41 NRO Program D 75 

98 National Reconnaissance Panel 102 

vi National Reconnaissance Program 65,69,74, 

photo 116, (NRP) 75,92,102, 

117,119 105-107 

67,80,91, NRP Executive Committee (ExCom) 102, 106,107, 

102 112-114,118, 

108 119 

photo 91, 92, National Security Act of 1947 21 

94,98,99, National Security Action 66,67 

101, 106, 109 Memorandum (NSAM) 156 

47 NSAM 156 Working Group 66,67 

31 National Security Agency 75 

70 National Security Council (NSC) 15,20,67 

70 National Security Council Intelligence 21 

17 Directive (NSCID) No.5 

36,45,66 NSC 5412 Committee 66 

111,121 National Tasking Plan (NTP) 124 

61, 126 Navaho booster 20 

8 Newell, Homer 116 

59, photo 60 New York Times 66,97 

116 'Nightshift' 22 

93 Nikolayev Nosenko Shipyards Appendix B-11 

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NNN (Continued) 

Nixon, Richard M. 

Norwegian Air Force 

000 

Oder, Frederic C.E. 

O'Donnell, 'Rosie' 

missile complex 

Optical-bar camera 

Oval Office 

OXCART Project 

P2Vaircraft 

Pacific Ocean 

Packard, David 

Pacific Missile Range 

Alto, CA 

Parangosky, john 

Paris, France 

ppp 

Payload Sub-Assembly Project Office 

(PSAPO) 

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 

Pearl Harbor, HI 

Pentagon 

Perkin-Elmer Corporation 

Perry, Robert 

Petzval lens 

Phased-array radar 

Photographic Systems Division, CIA 

Photo Working Group 

Pioneer satellite program 

Plesetsk Missile Test Range 

Plummer, james W. 

CA 

film 

Power, Thomas S. 

Powers, Francis Gary 

President's Board of Consultants on 

Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) 

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 

Board (PFIAB) 

President's Science Advisor 

President's Science Advisory 

Committee (PSAC) 

Primus inter pares 

Program A, B, C, D 

Project RAND 

Purcell, Edward M. 

Putt, Donald L. 

NOFORN-ORCON 

~ 

footnote 61, 

114,118,124 

47 

8-13, photo 9, 

20,22-25, 

35,41, 

photo 52 

53 

Appendix B-4 

v, 6-9 

Quarles, Donald L. 

Raborn, William F. 

RAND Corporation 

Raymond, Richard 

QQQ 

RRR 

5-6, photo 5, 

7,9,14-16, 

18,21 

103, 

photo 105 

1-4,7,18, 

23, 25 

17 

113 

20 

69,89,103 

Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 

RC-121 

4 

52 

123 

36,56,96 

117,118 

42 

17 

29,33,114 

29, photo 

30,62 

75 

107,108 

see U.N. 

Committee on 

53, footnote 61 

12,13,43,45, 

56,69,71, 73, 

97,98,124 

112 

v, vi 

80,84 

126 

114 

125 

64 

122, Appendix B9 

25, photo 26, 

32 

36 

50 

4 

3, 126 

9, 15 

65,67,92 

102,111,114, 

118 

20,25, 51, 85 

68, 74 

see NRO 

3 

85 

Reber, james Q. 

Reentry vehicle 

Reuter 

Riepe, Quentin 

Ritland, Osmund j. 

Root, L. Eugene 

Rochester, NY 

Rockefeller Foundation 

S-2 

SA-1 

SA-2 (GUIDELINE) 

SA-3 

SA-5 

SO-38O film 

SR-71 

SS-9ICBM 

SS-11 ICBM 

Sacramento, CA 

Sahara Desert 

SAFSP 

Samos Project 

San Cristobal, Venezuela 

San Mateo, CA 

Santa Barbara, CA 

Satellite Control Facility 

Satellite Inspector 

sss 

105,123 

see Satellite 

reentry vehicle 

97 

photo 50 

photo 9, 

10,11,16,18, 

21, 23, 25, 28, 

30,41,45,46, 

48, 53, photo 

54, 59 

46 

53, 59 

23 

101 

126 

126, Appendices 

8-2 and B-14 

126 

126, Appendix 

8-10 

111 

103 

111, Appendix B7 

111, Appendices 

B-4, 8-5, and 8-

6 

86 

71 

see Secretary 

of the Air Force 

Special 

Programs 

34, 36, 51, 

63,65-67, 

69,71,72, 

76,82,85, 

87,88,103, 

123 

96 

25,27,32 

36, 59 

70,71 

71 

10-12, photo 11, 

14,16 

Satellite Intelligence Requirements 

Committee (SIRC) 

123 

~2-. 

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SSS (Continued) 

Satellite Operations Center 

Satellite recovery vehicle (SRV) 

Schriever, Bernard A. 

Secretary of the Air Force 

Special Programs (SAFSP) 

Schultze, Charles L. 

Science and Technology, Office of 

SCOTOP 

Scoville, Herbert 

'Second Story' 

Senate Preparedness Subcommittee 

Sentry, Project 

Sergeant (X-33) solid rockets 

Severodvinsk 

Shadegg, john 

Sharp, Dudley 

Sheldon, Huntington D. 

Sheppard, William A. 

SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance 

Committee (SORS) 

Sino-Soviet bloc 

Six-Day War 

Skunk works 

Smart, jacob E. 

Smith, Arthur E. 

Smithsonian Institution 

Snyder, Louis A. 

South America 

Southern Pacific Railroad 

Souvenir coins 

Soviet Union 

Soviet ABM program 

Soviet ICBM complexes 

Soviet Submarines 

Space borne Defense System 

Approved for 

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NOfORN-ORCON 

SSS (Continued) 

107,115,124 'Space for Peace' 5-7,9,10 

23-25, Space gap 16 

38,39,44, Space Systems, Office of 70,91 

46-49, 50-53, Space Technology Laboratories 17,48,93 

photo 54, 56, Special Assistant for Reconnaissance 69,91 

photo 58, 59, Special Projects, Office of, CIA 

photo 60, 78, 

86-88,93 Spin stabilization 

4, photo 5, Spitzbergen, Norway 

6,8-12, is, Sputnik 

16, 18, 20-24, 

35,41,46,47, 'Spy in the Sky' 

53, photo 55, Stalingrad 

71 'Starfish' 

75, 101, State, Department of 

107-109 

footnote 117 

123 Stellar-index camera 

118 

53 Stereo cameras 

65,67, Stewart Committee 

photo 68, Stewart, Homer J. 

85,89,90, Stevenson, Adlai E. 

92 Strategic Air Command 

10,14, 20 

13 Suez Canal 

36, 42, 43, 45, Sunnyvale, CA 

46,51,123 

footnote 94 Suppliers meetings 

126, Appendix Sverdlovsk 

B-12 System Program Office (SPO) 

89, 124 System Project Director (SPD) 

photos 54 

and 55 TTT 

103,105 

15,17,21,22, Tactical Air Command 

photo 26, TALENT -KEYHOLE (TK) System 

35,40,41,43, Tallinn 

45,46,50 

124 Tatishchevo ICBM complex 

Taylor, Maxwell 

20,123 Tebo, Kenneth 

111, footnote Telemetry 

117 Teller Committee 

33, 34 Teller, Edward 

42,90 Tessar lens 

29 Three-axis stabilization 

see Air and Thor booster 

Space Museum 

108, 109 

96 

37 

98 

v, 1, 2, 6, 7, 

13, 38, 43, 45, 

50, 58, 60, 63, Thor-Hustler 

64,66,74, Thorad-Agena 

122-124 

126 

121, Appendix Thorad Sr. 

B-3 Thrust-augmented Thor (TAT) 

126, Appendix 

B-12 

71 Titan ICBM 

~ 

-173-

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v, 105, 108, 

111,112,114 

17,22-27 

47 

13,14,16, 

18,63 

15,64-66 

Appendix B-2 

87,89 

7, ii, 30, 

63,65,66, 

115,116 

82,93,110, 

111,127 

76,80,82,86 

12,13 

12 

65 

4,15,71, 

72, 126 

Appendix B-14 

32,53,55, 

70,92,114 

29, 30, 68 

3,75 

4,10 

107, 108 

29, 38 

125, 126 

126, Appendix 

B-10 

Appendix B-6 

66 

108 

48, 50 

18 

16,17 

27,84 

25,27,51 

4,16-18, 

20-23,27, 

31, 33-36, 

39-43,47, 

50, 51, 62, 

63,66,71, 

77-79,88, 

109,113 

18,20 

photos 95 

and 100, 

footnote 101 

109 

88,93,94, 

100, footnote 

101, 107 

50,71 

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TTT (Continued) 

Treasury, Department of 

Truax, Robert C. 

Tyler, A.W. 

Tyuratam Missile Test Center 

uuu 

U-2 

~ 

NOFORN-ORCON 

11 WWW 

24,25 

footnote 22 Washington, D.C. 

Appendix B-5 

Washington Evening Star 

System Phasing Group 

1,3,8-10, 

14-16, 18, 20, Welzenbach, Donald 

28-30, 36, 42, West Coast 

17,23,28, 

34,43,52, 

71, 92, 109 

97 

15 

89,92,108 

vi 

17,72,108,109 

51, 61, 63, Western Development Division (WDD) 4-6, 10, 13 

69,75,103, 

Ultra-thin-base film 

U.N. Charter 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of 

Outer Space 

U.N. General Assembly 

United Press International 

USAF Scientific Advisory Board 

U.S. Army 

U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) 

U.s. Navy 

U.s. Congress 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR) 

Uzhur ICBM complex 

Vance, Cyrus J. 

Vandenberg AfB, CA 

Vanguard, Project 

VAULT {TOMAS 

Venezuela 

Vietnam 

Volgograd 

Von Braun, Werner 

Voroshilov arms plant 

vvv 

Westover AFB, MA 

117,123,126 Wheelon, Albert D. 

iii, table 119 

64,65 White House 

64,65,67 

64-66 

66 White Sea 

3 White, Thomas D. '22,46,49, 

70,75,82, 

86 Wilson, Charles E. 69,93,94, Wilson, Roscoe 115,123,124 World War II 6, 22, 24, 28, Worthington, Roy 31, 70, 75 

11,15,16 Worthman, Paul E. 

see Soviet 

Union 

Appendix B-7 I I 

Wright Air Development Center 

(WADC) 

WS-117L 

103, 

photo 105, 

112,123,124 

25,36-38, 

44,47-49, York, Herbert f. 51, 62, 65, 66, 

70,87,107 Yurya missile complex 

6,7,10,12, Yumenzhan plutonium plant 

16,17,22, 

24,63,70 

82 

96,98,101 Zelenka, Raymond 

123 Zero defects program 

Appendix B-2 'Zombie' mode 

70 

Appendix B-15 Zuckert, Eugene 

~4..:-_ 

SEL~ 

yyy 

III 

Approved for Release: 2018/09/11 C051 02383 

59 

92, photo 93, 

103, 108 

11,18,20, 

41,42,46, 

55,62,65, 

footnote 117 

Appendix B-12 

13,14, 

photo 54, 

55 

photo 13 

45 

v, 1, 9, 63 

62,109 

photo 37, 

photo 50, 

U,62,73,77 

4,17,77 

3-25,27, 

32-36, 39-43, 

65 

21,25 

Appendix B-3 

Appendix B-13 

15 

112 

88,94,99, 

102 

71, photo 72 

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