J-S35028-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL R. WRIGHT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 721 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0004282-2018, 

CP-22-CR-0004739-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 16, 2022

Michael R. Wright appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after 

he pled guilty to two counts each of rape, involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse (IDSI), and sexual assault, and one count each of terroristic 

threats, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment.1 Wright’s counsel has 

filed an Anders2 brief and petition to withdraw as counsel. We affirm Wright’s 

judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s request to withdraw.

Wright pleaded guilty on May 5, 2021, pursuant to a plea agreement. 

The prosecutor gave the following factual basis for the plea agreement: 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(2), 3123(a)(1), 3124.1, 2706(a)(1), 2702(a)(1), 

and 2903(a), respectively. 

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
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Factually, Your Honor, at Docket Number 4739 CR 2018, it's 

alleged by the Commonwealth that the defendant did meet 

the named victim . . . outside of an establishment in

downtown, specifically the Harrisburg Midtown Arts Center,

about 2:00 in the morning.

The defendant did invite her to go over to a residence in the 

city at 625 Oxford Street. Once they went into the home, 

the defendant demanded that she perform oral sex on him. 

She said no. And he then forcibly put his penis inside of her 

mouth. He then also vaginally raped her.

During the course of both the involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse as well as the vaginal intercourse, the defendant 

punched the victim multiple times in the head. It’s the 

Commonwealth’s allegation that he did cause serious bodily 

injury to the victim.

She was ultimately able to crawl outside of the apartment 

and was able to run for help. She was actually helped by an 

individual that was driving through the area.

She was transferred to the Hershey Medical Center and she 

did have a brain hemorrhage as a result of the beating by 

the defendant. She also had a fracture to the right eye.

***

Your Honor, the second docket is Docket 4282 CR 2018. And 

actually what happened, Your Honor, was this predated the 

one that I just went through. When the defendant was 

arrested for this rape, another woman came forward -- . . . 

-- she had indicated that she had also been sexually 

assaulted by the defendant and she had seen his picture on 

the news. She didn’t know his name. She hadn’t reported it 

to the police at the time.

Ultimately, the police investigation determined that on May 

25th of 2018 the defendant had been in contact with [the 

victim]. They had met at a bar. They had gone back to a 

residence within the city. And then the defendant forced her 

to engage in both vaginal intercourse as well as oral 

intercourse.
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N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 5/5/21, at 5-6, 6-7. Wright waived his right to have 

a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”) determination before sentencing and the 

court imposed an aggregate term of 15 to 39 years’ incarceration. The court 

held an SVP hearing on April 12, 2022. 

The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Dr. Robert Stein. Dr. 

Stein testified that he determined Wright to be an SVP. N.T., SVP Hearing, 

4/12/22, at 11. He testified that Wright did not participate in the evaluation 

and that he based his determination on Wright’s Sexual Offender Assessment 

Board (“SOAB”) file. Id. at 6. Dr. Stein reviewed 15 statutory factors and 

testified to the factors that were relevant to his determination of Wright’s SVP 

status.

The factors that were relevant were Factor Number 1, 

because the offense involved multiple victims indicating 

greater practice and risk taking than a single victim. Factor 

Number 2 was relevant. And he did exceed the means 

necessary with significant physical violence against both 

victims, with the second victim incurring severe injuries. The 

third was relevant as well. Act[s] with both victims included 

forced oral and penis-vagina sex consistent with an 

antisocial pattern, as opposed to offenses that might involve 

brief sexual touching.

Next, the relationship of the individual victim, this was also 

relevant as both victims were strangers. This is consistent 

with predatory behavior. Next, the issue of unusual cruelty 

was relevant with the second victim suffering severe 

physical injuries, a brain hemorrhage and facial fracture 

indicating some level of cruelty.

The prior criminal record was relevant because there was a 

lengthy criminal history that’s consistent with an antisocial 

orientation.
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The next, having completed any prior sentences, that was 

relevant because there was a history of multiple probation

violations also consistent with an antisocial orientation.

The issue of mental disability could be relevant. I’m not 

going to say necessarily is. He does have an intellectual 

disability. That could create difficulties in treatment, though 

not necessarily. I’m not going to hold that against him.

Next, overall behavioral characteristics contributing to 

conduct, the antisocial history is consistent with an 

antisocial personality disorder. It appears that frequency of 

criminal convictions has increased over the past eight years, 

starting in 2013.

And finally, statistical factors related to risk of sexual reoffense. Having a nonsexual violent offense as part of the 

sexual offense pattern, having unrelated victims, stranger 

victims, and a history of four or more sentencing dates, all 

of these are statistically associated with greater risk of 

sexual re-offense.

Id. at 9-10. 

Dr. Stein also testified that Wright suffered from antisocial personality 

disorder. He stated that Wright’s behavior towards the victim was predatory. 

Id. at 11. Dr. Stein conceded that there was a possibility Wright’s behavior 

could change “if he successfully completes treatment in prison and successful 

completes outpatient treatment while under supervision, that would lower his 

risk of recidivism.” Id. at 13. He testified that some factors in Wright’s favor 

were that the victims were close to his age and were of normal intellectual 

capacity. Id. at 16. He maintained, however, that these factors did not change 

his opinion regarding Wright being classified as an SVP. Id. at 18. After Dr. 

Stein’s testimony, the court determined Wright to be an SVP. Id. at 19. This 

timely appeal followed. 
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Wright improperly filed one notice of appeal listing two docket numbers,

in violation of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). 

Normally this would result in quashal or in this Court directing counsel to file 

separate notices of appeal. However, we decline to do so here, as we find that 

a “breakdown in court operations” occurred. See Commonwealth v. 

Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 160 (Pa.Super. 2019) (declining to quash appeal 

for Walker violation due to breakdown in court operations where appellant 

filed one notice of appeal listing multiple trial court docket numbers, after 

court advised appellant that he had a right to file “a notice of appeal”). 

The written plea colloquy form here contained a provision stating that 

Wright understood that he had 30 days “to file an appeal[.]” See Guilty Plea 

Colloquy, dated 5/5/21, at 4 (unpaginated) (emphasis added). As in 

Stansbury, Wright’s colloquy misled him to believe that filing “an appeal” 

would be proper. We therefore we decline to quash. See Stansbury, 219 A.2d 

at 160; see also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 354 (Pa.Super. 

2020) (en banc) (declining to quash appeal where order informing appellant 

of appellate rights stated he had 30 days to file “an appeal”). 

We now turn to our evaluation of counsel’s Anders brief and petition to 

withdraw.3 Before we assess the merits of Wright’s claim, we must first 

address counsel’s request to withdraw from representation. See 

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en 

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3 Wright has not filed a response to the Anders brief. 
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banc). An Anders brief is filed “when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous 

and wishes to withdraw from representation[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 

283 A.3d 1252, 1254 (Pa.Super. 2022). In such a case, counsel must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel 

has determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief 

referring to any issues that might arguably support the 

appeal, but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and 

(3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise 

him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or 

raise any additional points he deems worthy of this Court’s 

attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted).

Additionally, an Anders brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). If this Court 

determines that counsel has satisfied the requirements, we then conduct “a 

full examination” of the record “to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” 

Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 271-72 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en 

banc) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).
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Here, counsel has satisfied the preliminary requirements. In the Anders

brief, counsel provides a summary of the procedural and factual history with 

citations to the record, refers to three issues “that might arguably support the 

appeal,” and states that these issues are frivolous. The issues are the 

voluntariness of Wright’s guilty plea and the sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence supporting the SVP determination. Counsel’s petition to withdraw 

states that counsel served a copy of the Anders brief on Wright and advised 

him that he may raise any additional issues before this Court pro se or through 

private counsel. The letter to Wright is an exhibit to counsel’s petition to 

withdraw. The Anders brief meets the procedural requirements. We now 

review the appeal for frivolousness. 

“When an appellant enters a guilty plea, []he waives h[is] right to 

‘challenge on appeal all non-jurisdictional defects except the legality of h[is]

sentence and the validity of h[is] plea.’” Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 

A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 

A.2d 805, 807 (Pa.Super. 2006)) (brackets omitted). Issues challenging the 

validity of a guilty plea must be raised before the trial court, either in a postsentence motion or at the sentencing hearing. Commonwealth v. Tareila, 

895 A.2d 1266, 1270 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2006). Failure to raise the issue properly 

in the trial court waives the issue on appeal. Id.

Here, Wright did not object or otherwise raise any issue related to the 

voluntariness of his guilty plea at the time of his plea and sentencing. Nor did 

Wright file a post-sentence motion challenging his plea or seeking to withdraw 
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it. Therefore, he did not preserve any issue related to the validity of his guilty 

plea. See id. We find no reasonable basis on which to argue in this appeal 

that the plea was not voluntary. 

“In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court, must 

be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and convincing evidence 

that the individual is an SVP.” Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 

186, 189 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation and brackets omitted). “[W]e view all 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth.” Id. (citation omitted).

“An SVP is defined as a person who has been convicted of a sexually 

violent offense . . . and who has a mental abnormality or personality disorder 

that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” 

Id. (citation and brackets omitted). An SVP designation also requires “a 

showing that the defendant’s conduct was predatory[.]” Id. at 190 (citation 

omitted). Furthermore, when conducting an SVP assessment, the mental 

health professional reviews 15 factors:

[w]hether the offense involved multiple victims[; w]hether 

the defendant exceeded the means necessary to achieve the 

offense[; t]he nature of the sexual contact with the victim[s; 

r]elationship of the individual to the victim[s; a]ge of the 

victim[s; w]hether the offense included a display of unusual 

cruelty by the [defendant] during the commission of the 

crime[; t]he mental capacity of the victim[s; t]he 

[defendant’s] prior criminal record[; w]hether the 

[defendant] completed any prior sentences[; w]hether the 

[defendant] participated in available programs for sexual 

offenders[; the defendant’s a]ge[; the defendant’s u]se of 

illegal drugs[; a]ny mental illness, mental disability, or 
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mental abnormality [of the defendant; b]ehavioral 

characteristics that contribute to the [defendant's]

conduct[; and f]actors that are supported in a sexual 

offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to 

the risk of reoffense. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). The law does not require that all the abovereferenced factors go against the defendant, or any particular number of 

them, in order to support an SVP designation. See Commonwealth v. 

Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 863 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

To the extent Wright challenges the weight of the evidence supporting 

his SVP designation, this claim is waived, as Wright made no such challenge 

below. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, comment (“The purpose of this rule is to make 

it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the 

trial judge or it will be waived”); see also Commonwealth v. Ratushny, 17 

A.3d 1269, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“We discern no basis on which to 

distinguish our standard of review on weight claims, whether challenging the 

weight of the evidence to support a guilty verdict or a trial court’s SVP 

determination”).

Regarding Wright’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his 

SVP designation, “we view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.” Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 

at 189. When we review the evidence under this standard, we perceive no 

reasonable basis on which to challenge the trial court’s designation of Wright 

as an SVP. The evidence included not only the evidence of Wright’s anti-social 

personality disorder, but also Dr. Stein’s testimony regarding Wright’s 
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likelihood to reoffend, the violent nature of one of the sexual crimes, the attack 

of multiple victims in a short span of time, and Wright’s predatory behavior 

exhibited by his sexual assault of strangers. 

Finally, our review of the record has uncovered no non-frivolous issues

Wright could raise on appeal. Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272. We grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and affirm Wright’s judgment of sentence.

Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/16/2022