Filed 10/16/23 P. v. Bramscher CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM BRAMSCHER,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B325075

(Super. Ct. No. 22PT-00629)

(San Luis Obispo County)

William Bramscher appeals from the trial court's order 

declaring him an offender with a mental health disorder (OMHD) 

as described in Penal Code section 2962.1 He was diagnosed as 

suffering from a “delusional disorder.” He had two qualifying 

offenses for making criminal threats in violation of section 422, 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

subdivision (a). The trial court committed him to the Department 

of State Hospitals for treatment. 

Appellant contends the trial court failed to advise him of 

his right to a jury trial and also failed to obtain a personal waiver 

of that right. In addition, he contends the evidence is insufficient 

to show he had “been in treatment for [his] severe mental health 

disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to [his] parole 

release day.” (§ 2962, subd. (d)(1).) We affirm.

Jury Waiver

Facts

On September 20, 2022, the following colloquy occurred 

between appellant’s counsel and the trial court judge:

“[COUNSEL:] “As I indicated, Your Honor, I had 

spoken to Mr. Bramscher last week, and he will be 

waiving jury trial, proceeding with a court trial. . . . 

“THE COURT: All right. Very well.” 

Appellant was present during the above colloquy and 

remained silent.

On October 11, 2022, the following colloquy occurred 

between a different judge and appellant:

“THE COURT: . . . [A]s I understand it, Mr. 

Bramscher, you've already waived your right to a 

jury trial; is that right? 

“[APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. My recollection as well, 

Your Honor, is it's been waived for Court trial, that's 

correct. 

“THE COURT: Okay. And that's still what you want 

to do? 

“[APPELLANT] That is still what I want to do, Your 

Honor. 

“THE COURT: Very good.”
3

Appellant Was Advised of His Right to

a Jury Trial and Waived that Right

“People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113 . . . holds that 

a trial court must advise a defendant in an [OMHD] 

recommitment hearing of his or her right to a jury trial. . . . 

Blackburn means what it says and applies to all [OMHD] 

hearings, including original commitment hearings.” (People v.

Blancett (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1202.) A defendant in an 

OMHD proceeding “must be personally advised of the right to a 

jury trial, and . . . any waiver thereof must be personal, knowing, 

and voluntary.” (Id. at p. 1204.) 

Appellant claims he was not personally advised of his right 

to a jury trial. We disagree. On October 11, 2022, the trial court 

personally advised him of this right when it said, “[A]s I 

understand it, Mr. Bramscher, you’ve already waived your right

to a jury trial; is that right?” (Italics added.) 

Appellant claims he did not personally waive his right to a 

jury trial. We again disagree. Appellant personally waived this 

right when he told the court that he “still” wanted to waive it. 

Appellant notes that the trial court did not follow the 

guidelines set forth by our Supreme Court in People v. 

Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 169-170 (Sivongxxay). The 

court “recommend[ed] that trial courts advise a defendant of the 

basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but 

not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 

members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her 

counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must 

unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a 

defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will 

decide his or her guilt or innocence.” (Id. at p. 169.) The court 

“also recommend[ed] that the trial judge take additional steps as 
4

appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant 

comprehends what the jury trial right entails. A trial judge may 

do so in any number of ways—among them, by asking whether 

the defendant had an adequate opportunity to discuss the 

decision with his or her attorney, by asking whether counsel 

explained to the defendant the fundamental differences between 

a jury trial and a bench trial, or by asking the defendant directly 

if he or she understands or has any questions about the right 

being waived.” (Id. at pp. 169-170.) 

Because the trial court did not follow the Sivongxxay

guidelines, appellant argues, “Even if appellant’s statement that 

he still did not want a jury trial on October 11[, 2022] is 

construed as a waiver, there is nothing in this record that 

establishes the statement was knowing and informed . . . .” But a 

trial court’s failure to follow the Sivongxxay guidelines does not 

necessarily result in the absence of a valid jury waiver. The 

Supreme Court stated: “[W]e emphasize that our guidance is not 

intended to limit trial courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy.” 

(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170.) “Our precedent has not 

mandated any specific method for determining whether a 

defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury 

trial in favor of a bench trial. We instead examine the totality of 

the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 167.) “[A] trial court’s adaptation 

of or departure from the recommended colloquy in an individual 

case will not necessarily render an ensuing jury waiver 

invalid. . . . Reviewing courts must continue to consider all 

relevant circumstances in determining whether a jury trial 

waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (Id. at p. 170.) 

“[U]ltimately, a ‘“defendant’s rights are not protected only by 

adhering to a predetermined ritualistic form of making the 
5

record. Matters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be 

controlling.”’” (Ibid.)

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude 

that appellant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived 

his right to a jury trial. Appellant was represented by counsel 

who “initiated the request for a court trial.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 

3 Cal.5th at p. 167.) It is reasonable to infer that counsel 

discussed the jury waiver with his client. Counsel told the court 

that he “had spoken to [appellant] last week, and [appellant] will 

be waiving jury trial . . . .” Appellant was present and did not 

dispute counsel’s statement.

Moreover, appellant was well acquainted with jury trials. 

He acknowledges that “[t]he criminal conviction underlying the 

[OMHD] commitment arose from jury trial proceedings where he 

represented himself the entire time.” Appellant therefore knew 

what he was giving up when he waived his right to a jury trial. 

(See Parke v. Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20, 37 [“We have previously 

treated evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the 

criminal justice system as relevant to the question whether he 

knowingly waived constitutional rights”].)

Alleged Insufficiency of the Evidence

Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Appellant

Received at Least 90 Days of Treatment for His Disorder

One of the criteria for commitment as an OMHD is that 

“the prisoner has been in treatment for the severe mental health 

disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the 

prisoner’s parole release day.” (§ 2962, subd. (d)(1).) Appellant’s 

parole release day was July 19, 2022. Appellant claims the 

evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he 

had received the required 90 days of treatment. 
6

“The substantial evidence rule applies to appellate review 

of the sufficiency of the evidence in [OMHD] proceedings. 

[Citation.] We review the record in the light most favorable to 

the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial

evidence—‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value’—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [appellant received the required 90 days of 

treatment].” (People v. Labelle (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 149, 151.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

appellant received 90 days of treatment for his mental health 

disorder within the year prior to his parole release day of July 19, 

2022. The trial court primarily relied on the testimony of Dr. 

Trayci Dahl and a mental health progress note prepared by Dr. 

Moeen Bhatti. 

Dr. Dahl testified that on October 10, 2019, appellant was 

received at the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR). “[H]e was placed into mental health 

within five days.” From October 15, 2019 until the date of Dr. 

Dahl’s evaluation of appellant in May 2022, he received 

treatment at “the triple-CMS level of care.” This was the “least 

intensive level[]” of mental health treatment at CDCR. “He 

would go and have talk therapy, he would see a psychiatrist, not 

take medications, and he had groups he was assigned to.” In 

June 2022 appellant was admitted to Atascadero State Hospital. 

Appellant testified: “Within the first couple days at 

[CDCR], I was approached during questioning about mental 

health services and asked if I would like to speak to somebody 

about mental health and I said, ‘yes.’ So the triple-CMS program 

was patient-initiated by myself.” 
7

Appellant observes that, without a diagnosis of his mental 

disorder, his participation in the triple-CMS program was not 

enough to satisfy the 90-day treatment requirement. “The 

diagnosis determines the treatment the patient receives. 

[Citation.] . . . [T]he ‘therapeutic process’ begins with observation 

and the ‘diagnosis to determine whether treatment is required.’ 

[Citation.] [¶] In [OMHD] cases where the treating doctors have 

not diagnosed the severe mental disorder, there is insufficient 

evidence to support a finding that they treated the defendant for 

that disorder.” (People v. Bendovid (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 585, 

591.) Appellant argues, “Here there was no evidence that a 

doctor [at CDCR] ever diagnosed delusional disorder and ordered 

treatment.” 

Substantial evidence shows that at CDCR appellant was 

diagnosed with a delusional disorder. It is reasonable to infer 

that he was treated for this disorder, but the treatment may have 

been hindered by his refusal to take psychotropic medication. A 

CDCR mental health progress note dated August 2, 2021, almost 

one year before his parole release day, said that appellant “is 

currently diagnosed provisionally with Delusional disorder, 

Erotomanic type.” On March 29, 2022, almost four months before 

appellant’s parole release day, Dr. Moeen Bhatti saw appellant 

and wrote: “I saw the patient few months ago . . . . Patient is still 

delusional. At the same time there are no safety concerns and he 

does not want to take any psychotropic meds at this point in 

time.” (Italics added.) Dr. Bhatti continued: “I offered him an 

SSRI[2] but [he] did not want to take that. We agreed that if he 

2 “Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are the 

most commonly prescribed antidepressants” <https://www. 

mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/depression/in-depth/ssris/art-
8

changes his mind or the intensity and frequency of symptoms 

increase he would put a request to be seen by me.” Dr. Kevin 

Perry testified: “While incarcerated [at CDCR], [appellant] 

consistently declined to take psychotropic medication. And then 

when he was admitted to the state hospital and a doctor 

prescribed such medicine for him, he refused it on the 21st, as 

well as the 22nd of June, this year [2022].” 

The trial court stated: “I've spent quite a bit of time 

reviewing the records from CDCR, the treatment records . . . . 

There were many references in the progress notes referring to 

[appellant] continuing to have delusional themes . . . . [¶] So it 

does appear to the Court that [he was] being treated for a 

delusional disorder while at CDCR.” The trial court’s conclusion 

was reasonably based on the evidence.

Disposition

The order committing appellant for treatment to the 

Department of State Hospitals as an OMHD is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

20044825> [as of Aug. 24, 2023], archived at <https://

perma.cc/SVS5-S5AN>.
Michael L. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.