The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Once an opinion is selecte d for p ublication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor

- neutral citation by the Clerk of the Court for compliance with Rule 23

- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. IN THE C OURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
Opinion Number: _____________ 2
Filing Date: October 10, 2023 3

No. A

- 1

- CA

- 40419 4

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTECTIVE 5 PROCEEDINGS FOR ELIZABETH A., an 6 adult incapacitated person, 7

JOHN E.A., 8

Petitioner

- Appellee
, 9

and 10

PATRICIA A.V. 11
Interested Party/Co

- Conservator/ 12 Co

- Guardian

- Appellant, 13

and 14

JACK D. A. 15

Intervenor/Co

- Conservator/ 16 Co

- Guardian, 17

and 18

DAVID MCNEILL, JR., 19

Guardian Ad Litem, 20

and 212 MATTHEW P. HOLT, 1

Counsel for Elizabeth A. 2

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DO Ñ A ANA COUNTY 3 James T. Martin, District Court Judge 4
Kemp Smith LLP 5 CaraLyn Banks 6 Las Cruces, NM 7
for Appellee 8

Lakins Law Firm, P.C. 9 Charles N. Lakins 10 Albuquerque, NM 11

f or Appellant 12OPINION 1

WRAY, Judge. 2

{1} This case involves the payment of fees to the attorney of an interested party 3
who petitioned for the appointment of a guardian or conservator. The petitioner in 4
the present case (Petitioner), one of the children of E lizabeth A. (Mother), through 5
Appellee CaraL yn Banks (Banks), an attorney, filed a petition for the appointment 6
of a guardian and conservator for Mother under Article 5 of the New Mexico 7

Uniform Probate Code, “Protection of Persons Unde r Disability and Their Property
, ” 8

NMSA 1978, §§ 45

- 5

- 101 to

- 436 (1975, as amended through 2022) (Article 5)

. 9

Banks’ fees had been paid by the temporary conservator until interested parties 10
objected. After protracted proceedings, the district court ordered Banks’ fees to be 11
paid from funds from Mother’s e state (Mother’ s E state or the Estate)

. On appeal, 12
Appellant Patricia Vandver (Current Guardian), whom the district court eventually 13
appointed to be co

- guardian and co

- conservator, argues that the district court was 14
without authority to order Mother’s Estate to pay Banks ’ attorney fees. To the 15
contrary, however, Article 5 conservators may expend reasonably necessary sums 16
for the benefit of a protected person after considering the impact such expenditures 17
would have on the protected person’s care and finances. See § 45

- 5

- 4 25(A)(2). The 18
district court found, among other things, that Banks’ actions were necessary and 19

taken for Mother’s benefit and that the bills were reasonable, and no party suggested 202 that paying the bills would be detrimental to Mother. We therefore affirm, although 1

on a different basis , the district court’s order to pay Banks’ bills. Because we affirm
, 2

Current Guardian’s motion in this Court to stay collection of the judgment is denie d 3

as moot. 4

BACKGROUND 5

{ 2 } It is difficult to disagree with t he assessment of the court

- appointed guardian 6
ad litem that the present case was “complex and time consuming.” Mother had six 7
children (collectively, S iblings), including Current Guardian and Pet itioner

. In 2017
, 8

Mother granted another son ( Interven o r ) a durable power of attorney. I n the summer 9

of 2020, Petitioner became concerned about Mother’s decline in health and capacity. 10
Shortly thereafter, on Petitioner’s behalf, Banks filed a petition for the appointment 11
of a temporary and permanent guardian and conservator. 12

{ 3 } The district court granted the petition for a temporary guardian and 13
conservator; ordered that “any [p]owers of [a]ttorney that [ Mother ] may have 14
executed prior” were “[n]ull and [ v]oid” ; and appointed a temporary guardian and 15
conservator, a visitor, a qualified healthcare provider, and a guardian ad litem. All 16

six S iblings were involved in the proceedings, and four were individually 17
represented by counsel at various points throughout. Additionally, counsel 18
(Mother’s Attorney)

— apart from the guardian ad litem

— appeared on Mother’s 19

behalf. 203 { 4 } In the first few months of the proceeding, Banks submitted to the temporary 1
conservator at least one bill for legal services, which was paid from Mother’s Estate. 2
Mother’s Attorney, however, filed a motion to protect the assets of the Estate

. T he 3
district court reserved ruling on the motion but ordered the temporary conservator to 4
refrain from paying Banks’ bills. The hearing on the petition for a permanent 5
guardian and conservator was held over the course of nine months
, and at its 6
completion, the district court appoint ed Current Guardian and Intervenor as co

7
guardians and co

- cons ervators

. The district court reasoned that Mother had granted 8
Intervenor a power of attorney to act on her behalf and that the Siblings’ recently 9
deceased father had selected Current Guardian to act as power of attorney with 10
regard to certain benefits he h ad received

. At the same time, the district court 11
“order[ed] payment of [Banks’] fees.” 12

{ 5 } After this determination, t he parties litigated whether Mother’s Estate should 13

pay Banks’ bills

. T he district court , in a letter decision, provided a summary of the 14
parties’ arguments
, including : (1) Banks’ contention that her work was for Mother’s 15

benefit; (2) Mother’s Attorney’s position in the motion to protect assets that if 16
Banks’ work was for Mother’s benefit, it was duplicative of the guardian ad litem’s 17

work; and (3) Current Guardian’s argument that Banks provided no authority to 18
support an award of attorney fees and did not satisfy procedural requirements. The 19
district court concluded that (1) Banks had initiated and furthered the 204 guardianship/conservatorship process ; (2) Banks’ work was not duplicative of the 1
guardian ad litem’s work ; and (3) Banks had complied with the court’s orders 2
regarding submission of a fee affidavit. The district court denied Mother’s 3
Attorney’s motion to protect assets and concluded that “[t]he only issue remaining 4
is the amount of attorney [] fees to be awarded.” The district court followed the letter 5

decision with an order, which further directed the parties to “outline any objections 6
they have to specific itemized attorney fee entries” that were set forth in the fee 7
affidavit that Banks had already submitted. 8

{ 6 } Further disputes about the amounts to be paid ensued , after which t he district 9

court la rgely overruled objections to the amount of fees that Banks requested and 10
entered an order to pay the fees from Mother’s Estate, finding that Banks’ services 11

were “for the benefit of” Mother. The district court additionally granted both Current 12

Guardian’s motion to stay pending appeal subject to obtaining an appeal bond and 13

Banks’ motion for reimbursement of certain costs paid to the guardian ad litem

. This 14
appeal follow ed

. 15

{ 7 } While the record sheds further light on the context in which this appeal arises
, 16
we are mindful of the sequestered nature of the proceedings and therefore limit 17

further discussion of the facts to those that are necessary to our analysis. 185 DISCUSSION 1

{ 8 } In general
, New Mexico adheres to the American rule and holds parties 2

resp onsible for their own attorney fees unless provided otherwise by statute, court 3
rule, or contractual agreement. See N. M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Jo h nson , 1999

- 4

NMSC

- 028, ¶ 9 , 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 . Our Supreme Court has recognized 5

some limited and nar row exceptions to this rule, including : “ (1) exceptions arising 6

from a court’ s inherent powers to sanction the bad faith conduct of litigants and 7
attorneys, (2) exceptions arising fr om certain exercises of a court’ s equitable powers, 8
and (3) exceptions ari sing simultaneously from judicial and legislative powers. ” Id. 9
¶ 15. Because New Mexico has “strictly adhered to th[e American ] r ule since our 10
territorial days,” id. ¶ 9, there is a “need for special justification before we depart 11
from [that] precedent” an d our Supreme Court has expressed a “reluctan ce to extend 12
awards of attorney[] fees except in limited circumstances,” id. ¶ 11 (alteration, 13

internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)

. Current Guardian argues that the 14

district court did not have contra ctual or statutory a uthority to award attorney fees 15
and that even if an award of attorney fees was appropr iate, Mother’s E state should 16

not be required to pay the amounts ordered. In relevant part, Banks responds that the 17
fees were appropriately awarded as a sanction for Intervenor’s litigation behavior 18

and that the E state should pay the amounts ordered because Ba nks acted for the 19

benefit of Mother’s E state. 206 { 9 } To determine whether the district court had authority to order the payment of 1

fees, however, we must account for the context in which this case arose

— an Article 2
5 proceeding for guardianship and conservatorship. We therefore begin with a brief 3

overview of the relevant statutes. See In re Guardianship of C.G. , 2020

- NMCA

- 023, 4

¶ 40, 463 P.3d 487 ( “When construing statutes, our guiding principle is to determine 5
and give effect to legislative intent, considering the language of the provisions at 6

issue in the con text of the statute as a whole, including the purposes and 7
consequences of the Act.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 8
omitted))

. 9

I. The Relevant Law of Conservatorships of Incapacitated/Protected 10 Persons Under Article 5 11

{1 0 } Article 5 permits district courts to appoint a conservator to protect an adult 12
person who “demonstrates over time either partial or complete functional 13
impairment . . . to t he extent that the person is unable to manage the person’s personal 14

affairs or . . . financial affairs or both.” Section 45

- 5

- 101(F) (defining incapacitated 15
persons) ; see also § 45

- 5

- 102(A) ( defining the applicability of Article 5 ). District 16

courts are directed “ to encourage the development of maximum self

- reliance and 17
independence of a protected person and make protective orders only to the extent 18
necessitated by the protected person ’ s mental and adaptive limitations and other 19
conditions warranting the procedure. ” Section 45

- 5

- 402.1(A). O verall , the 20
legislative goal is “to preserve and protect the rights of incapacitated persons.” In re 217 Guardianship of C.G. , 2020

- NMCA

- 023, ¶¶ 42, 58 (construing Article 5 to define 1
the district court’s duty to protect inc apacitated persons while confining a 2
conservator’s role to that “made necessary by the incapacitated person’s 3

limitations” ). 4

{ 1 1} A “‘conservator’ means a person who is appointed by a court to manage the 5
property or financial affairs or both of a protecte d person.” Section 45

- 5

- 101(A). A 6
petition to appoint a conservator may be filed by “a person interested in the estate.” 7

Section 45

- 5

- 404(A)(1). When a petition to appoint a conservator for an adult is 8
filed, the district court is required, in relevant par t, to set a hearing on the petition 9
(petition hearing) and appoint a qualified health care professional, who must 10
examine the allegedly incapacitated person and submit a report to the court with 11
specific information. See § 45

- 5

- 407(B)

- ( C)
, (D) (addressing the appointment of a 12
court visitor). If, however, the district court finds that “adherence to the procedures” 13
for the petition hearing “would cause serious, immediate and irreparable harm to the 14
alleged incapacitated person’s . . . estate o r financial interests,” after an initial 15
hearing, the court “shall appoint a temporary conservator and shall specify the 16
temporary conservator’s powers.” Section 45

- 5

- 408(A)

- (C). 17

{1 2 } After the petition hearing, if the district court makes the required fi ndings, it 18
may appoint either a full or limited conservator. Section 45

- 5

- 407(I)

- (J)

. A 198 permanent, as opposed to temporary, conservator for an incapacitated adult is 1
appointed only if the district court finds 2
that the person has property that may be wasted or dissipated unless 3 proper management is provided; that funds are needed for the support, 4 care and welfare of the person or those entitled to be supported by him; 5 that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide funds; and 6 that . . . the pe rson is incapacitated. 7

Section 45

- 5

- 401(B)(1). 8

{1 3 } The conservator’s powers and duties are defined by statute. See §§ 45

- 5

- 424, 9

- 425. Most relevant to this proceeding, Section 45

- 5

- 425(A)(2) provides: 10
A conservator may expend or distribute income or pri ncipal of the 11 estate without court authorization or confirmation for the protected 12 person and his dependents in accordance with the following principles: 13 . . . the conservator is to expend or distribute sums reasonably necessary 14 for the support, education, care or benefit of the protected person. 15
To make such expenditures or distributions, a conservator must give “due regard to” 16
the protected person’s needs and financial circumstances. See § 45

- 5

- 425(A)(2). 17
Article 5 additionally explicitly permits compens ation by the estate for certain 18
appointed professionals: “I f not otherwise compensated for services rendered, any 19
visitor, attorney, qualified health care professional or guardian appointed in a 20
guardianship proceeding is entitled to reasonable compensatio n from the estate of 21
the incapacitated person.” Section 45

- 5

- 105. 22

{1 4 } Nevertheless, the conservator’s authority to expend or distribute the estate is 23

not without check. Broadly, in the exercise of statutory powers, a conservator “shall 249 act as a fiduciary and shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees as 1
described by [the Uniform Trust Code, NMSA 1978, §§] 46A

- 8

- 801 through 46A

2

8

- 807 [(2003, as amended through 2007)].” Section 45

- 5

- 417. Specifically, after a 3
conservator has been appointed, an interested party “may file a p etitio n in the 4
appointing court” for an order , in relevant part, requiring an accounting of the estate 5
or for an order granting appropriate relief. Section 45

- 5

- 416(A)(2), (5); see also 6

§ 45

- 5

- 416(B) (permitting a conservator to “ petition the appointing court for 7
instructions concerning [their] fiduciary responsibility ”); § 45

- 5

- 416(C) (allowing 8

for the court to provide instructions or make or ders “[u]pon notice and hearing ” )

. 9

II. The District Court’s Authority to Order Payment of Attorney Fee Bills 10

{1 5 } With this statutory backdrop, we consider whether the district court had 11
authority to order the payment of Banks’ bills for attorney fees. Whether an award 12
of attorney fees is permissible according to a statute, rule, contract, or exception is a 13
question of la w that we review de novo. NARAL , 1999

- NMSC

- 028, ¶¶ 7, 9

- 10. If, 14
however, payment of fees is authorized, the determination of whether to award fees 15

and the amount is left to the discretion of the district court
, which we do not disturb 16

absent an abuse of di scretion. See Lewis v. Lewis , 1987

- NMCA

- 073, ¶ 53, 106 N.M. 17

105, 739 P.2d 974. With these standards in mind, we first determine that Article 5 18
gives a conservator authority to pay reasonable and necessary attorney fee bills that 19
are incurred for the benefit of the estate with due regard for how paying the bill will 2010 impact the protected person. Because the district court in the present case did not 1
rely on this auth ority to exercise its discretion to order the fees to be paid, we next 2
consider whether affirming the district court for this reason is appropriate under the 3

circumstances. 4

A. The District Court Had Authority to Order the Payment of Fees Under 5 Section s 45

- 5

- 425(A) and

- 508(E) 6

{1 6 } Our first step is to determine whether the statutory scheme

— here, Article 5

— 7
permits the payment of attorney fees under the circumstances. See NARAL , 1999

- 8

NMSC

- 028, ¶ 9 (recognizing statutory authority as a basis for an award of attorney 9
fees). As we have described, the Legislature has authorized a conservator to 10
distribute the “income or principle of the estate” provided that (1) the distribution is 11
“reasonably necessary for the support, education, care or benefit of the protecte d 12
person” and (2) the conservator pays “due regard to” a number of identified factors. 13

See § 45

- 5

- 425(A)(2). Those factors include 14
(a) the size of the estate, the probable duration of the 15 conservatorship and the likelihood that the protected person, at som e 16 future time, may be fully able to manage his affairs and the estate which 17 has been conserved for him; 18
(b) the accustomed standard of living of the protected person 19 and members of his household; and 20
(c) other funds or sources used for the suppo rt of the 21 protected person. 2211 Id. The district court in the present case gave the temporary conservator similar 1
powers and as a result, the temporary conservator had the power to expend sums for 2

Mother’s benefit. See § 45

- 5

- 402.1(B)(3) (permitting district courts to authorize a 3
conservator to exercise “all the powers over the estate and financial affairs which 4
the person could exercise if present and not under disability”); § 45

- 5

- 408(E) 5
(limiting a temporary conservator’s power to dispose of an alleged incapacitated 6
person’s property to that specifically authorized by the court). It is no reach to 7
conclude that filing a petition for guardianship or conservatorship

— the act for which 8
Banks sought to be paid

— is an act designed to benefit the protected person “to the 9

ext ent made necess ary by the incapacitated person’ s limitations .” See In re 10
Guardianship of C.G. , 2020

- NMCA

- 023, ¶ 42 (noting that “ Article 5’s text 11
evidences legislative intent to preserve and protect the rights of incapacitated 12
persons”). For these reasons, we conclude that district courts have the power to 13
authorize a conservator to pay attorney fees that are billed to an estate, within the 14
parameters of Section 45

- 5

- 425(A). 15

{1 7 } This conclusion is consistent with the decisions of other jurisdictions, which 16
permit conservators to pay an attorney who petitions for guardianship or 17
conservatorship, because the petitioner “most often acts for and on behalf of one 18

who is unable to act o r care for himself or herself.” See In re Guardianship of 1912 Donley , 631 N.W.2d 839, 843

- 44 (Neb. 2001). We agree with the Nebraska court’s 1
explanation that 2

t he filing of the petition and the hearing thereon are indispensable steps 3 in the prese rvation of the protected person’ s estate. It is recognized that 4 when an individual is in need of physical or financial protection, the 5 law must in many instances think and act for him or her. The state and 6 society have a significant interest in bringing the estate of ind ividuals 7 in need of protection under the vigil of the county court. The court, as 8 general conservator of the rights of persons in need of protection, is 9 dependent upon applications being filed by interested persons so that 10 the court may assume control of t he estate and preserve it for the 11 protected person. 12

Id. at 844 (citations omitted); see also In re Conservatorship of T.K. , 2009 ND 195, 13

¶¶ 18

- 22, 775 N.W.2d 496
, (permitting the award of a petitioner’s attorney fees in a 14
guardianship or conservatorship proc e eding); In re Est. of Bayers
, 1999 MT 154, 15

¶¶ 12

- 13, 17, 983 P.2d 339; Carney v. Aicklen
, 587 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex. App. 16
1979) (same); In re Est. & Guardianship of Vermeersch
, 488 P.2d 671, 673

- 75 (Ariz. 17
Ct. App. 1971) (same); In re Sh erwood’s Est.
, 206 N.E.2d 304, 306

- 07 (Ill. App. Ct. 18
1965) (same); In re Dunn , 79 S.E.2d 921, 927 (N.C. 1954) (same); Penney v. 19

Pritchard & McCall
, 49 So. 2d 782, 787 (Ala. 1950) (same); In re Bundy’s Est.
, 186 20
P. 811, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919) (same)

. S ee generally C.K. Cobb., Jr., Annotation, 21
Allowance of Attorney’s Fee Out of Estate of Alleged Incompetent for Services in 22
Connection With Inquisition Into Sanity
, 22 A.L.R.2d 1438 (1952). 23

{1 8 } Current Guardian contends that Section 45

- 5

- 425 should not control the 24
attorney fee order in the present case and maintains that 2513 [n]othing in [Section] 45

- 5

- 425 supports the authority of a conservator 1 using estate funds to pay for legal fees incurred by a n interested person, 2 or their attorney, for instituting and pursuing a legal proceeding that is 3 against the civil rights of the protected person, which is what the 4 [d]istrict [c]ourt determined was done for the “ benefit of ” the protected 5 person. 6
This prop osition suggests that guardianships and conservatorships are subject to the 7
whims of “interested persons.” We disagree. As this Court has explained, the 8

“ importance of court supervision in guardianship and conservatorship p roceedings 9

cannot be overstated, including oversight of the conduct of attorneys appearing in 10

such cases, whether or not they are appointed by the court. ” In re Guardianship of 11

C.G. , 2020

- NMCA

- 023, ¶ 58

. S ee g enerally Clinesmith v. Temmerman , 2013

- 12

NMCA

- 024, ¶¶ 23

- 24, 298 P.3d 458 (explain ing that “the goal of a conservatorship 13
is to protect the person and property of persons whose functional and decision

14
making capacity has become impaired” and that conservatorship proceedings require 15
judicial oversight (internal quotatio n marks and citati on omitted)); In re 16
Guardianship of Sleeth , 244 P.3d 1169, 1175 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (“[J]udges play 17
a vital role in fulfilling the legislature ’ s intent to safeguard those in need of the 18
protection of conservators and guardians.”) . The district court regu lates the 19
proceeding by obtain ing reports from the qualified health care profe ssional and the 20
visitor, receiving testimony or evidence from the person to be protected, inquiring 21
into the person’s functional limitations, and ascertain ing the person’s capacity to 22
manage finances. See § 45

- 5

- 303 (guardianship); § 45

- 5

- 407 (conservatorship). 2314 Ultimately, based on this information, the district court must either dismiss the 1
petition or conclude by clear and convincing evidence that a guardians hip and/or 2
conservatorship is justified in full or in part. See § 45

- 5

- 304(B)

- (C) (guardianship); 3

§ 45

- 5

- 407(H)

- (I) (conservatorship). Just as the district court oversees an Article 5 4
proceeding generally, to safeguard the person in need of protection, the district court 5

has the discretion to determine whether, when, and in what amount such fees should 6
be paid by a conservator , subject to Section 45

- 5

- 425(A)(2). See Lewis , 1987

- 7

NMCA

- 073, ¶ 53 (placing fees within the discretion of the district court). 8

{1 9 } Current Guardian argues that Article 5 does not support payment by Mother’s 9
Estate of the fees for the attorney who filed the petition. She first contends that 10
Article 5 specifically permits “reasonable compensation from the estate of the 11
incapacitated per son” for court

- appointed attorneys, see § 45

- 5

- 105, and because 12

Banks is not a court

- appointed attorney, compensation is inappropriate. Specifically, 13
Current Guardian posits that because Section 45

- 5

- 303(A) permits an interested 14
person to file a petition, Section 45

- 5

- 105 would account for attorney fees if the 15
Legislature intended for the interested person’s attorney to be paid from the estate. 16

We do not view the silence in Section 45

- 5

- 105, governing compensation for court

17
appointed professional fees, to c ontrol the conservator’s authority under Section 45

- 18

5

- 425(A)(2). Had the Legislature intended to limit the conservator’s power in the 1915 way Current Guardian suggests, such a limitation would be explicit in Section 45

- 5

- 1
425(A)(2). 2

{ 20 } Current Guardian addit ionally argues that because Section 45

- 5

- 315 does not 3
permit an incapacitated person to consent to guardianship, the incapacitated person 4
is necessarily opposed to the protections sought by the petition and the petitioning 5
party must meet a burden of proof for the appointment of a guardian or conservator. 6

For these reasons, Current Guardian maintains that Section 45

- 5

- 425 does not 7
contemplate that the protected person would pay the fees to the attorney who filed 8
the petition. To the contrary, however, as th e district court aptly stated, “[T]hat’s not 9

what this case should be about, this case is about what should be in the best interest 10
of the incapacitated persons.” 11

{ 2 1} The purpose of the proceeding is to determine whether the person involved 12
requires any measure of the protection alleged in the petition. See § 45

- 5

- 301.1 13
(“ Guardianship for an incapacitated person shall be used only as is necessary to 14
promote and to protect the well[

- ] being of the person, shall be designed to encourage 15
the development of maximum self[

- ] reliance and independence of the person and 16
shall be ordered only to the ex tent necessitated by the person’ s actual functional 17
mental and physical limitations. ”) ; § 45

- 5

- 402.1(A) (“The court shall exercise the 18
authority conferred in [Article 5] to encourage the development of maximum self

19
reliance and independence of a protected person and make protective orders only to 2016 the extent neces sitated by the protected p erson’ s mental and adaptive limitations and 1
other conditions warranting the procedure.”) ; see also In re Est. of Bayers
, 1999 MT 2
154, ¶ 14 (“[A] petition to appoint a guardian is not an adversarial proceeding, but 3
rather a proceeding to promote the best in terests of the person for whom 4
guardianship is sought

. ”). Current Guardian cites no compelling authority to the 5

contrary. Viewed in that light, a district court may, as the district court did in the 6
present case, view the attorney for the petitioner to be seeking to benefit the protected 7

person. 8

{ 22 } For these reasons, we conclude that district courts have statutory authority to 9
order a conservator to pay fees to a petitioner’s attorney when fees are reasonably 10
necessary for the benefit of the protected pe rson, considering the impact that paying 11
the fees will have on the protected person. 12

B. Affirmance Is Appropriate Considering T his Court’s Appellate Function 13 and the Record in This Case 14

{ 23 } Neither the parties nor the district court analyzed Banks’ fee bill according to 15

Section s 45

- 5

- 425(A) and

- 408(E), or the district court’s order of appointment of the 16
temporary conservator. Thus, the question remains whether affirmance on these 17
grounds is an appr opriate exercise of this Court’s authority. “We are a court of 18
review and our function is to see if legal error that would change the result occurred.” 19
Clayton v. Trotter , 1990

- NMCA

- 078, ¶ 4, 110 N.M. 369, 796 P.2d 262 ( citations 20

omitted ). To that end, we presume the “ correctness in the rulings and decisions of 2117 the district court

. ” Goodman v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC , 2020

- NMCA

- 019, ¶ 16, 461 1
P.3d 906 (alterations, internal quotatio n marks, and citation omitted). We are not 2
bound, however, by the district court ’s conclusions of law

— which we review de 3

novo

— and therefore may analyze legal questions, including those involving 4
statutory interpretation, that were not considered or brought before the district court. 5

See Bounds v. State , 2011

- NMCA

- 011, ¶ 33, 149 N.M. 4 84, 252 P.3d 708 (providing 6
that this Court “is not bound by a district court’s legal conclusions and may 7
independently draw its own conclusions of law on appeal”), aff’d sub nom. Bounds 8

v. State ex rel. D’Antonio , 2013

- NMSC

- 037, 306 P.3d 457; see also Arc huleta v. 9
Santa Fe Police Dep’t ex rel. City of Santa Fe , 2005

- NMSC

- 006, ¶ ¶ 30

- 31, 137 10

N.M. 161, 108 P.3d 1019 (approving the application of a legal test despite the 11
parties’ failure to use the test, because “appellate courts can and must apply the 12

appropr iate law”); Kreutzer v. Aldo Leopold High Sch. , 2018

- NMCA

- 005, ¶ 31, 409 13
P.3d 930 (providing that questions of law, including statutory interpretation, are 14
subject to de novo review). 15

{ 24 } To achieve balance between our appellate presumptions and duty to correctly 16
apply the law, we will uphold a district court’s decision if it is right for any reason 17
so long as (1) “ reliance on the new ground would not be unfair to the appellant ”; (2) 18
doing so does not require us “ to assume the role of the [district] co urt by delving into 19

fact

- dependent inquiries ”; and (3) “ there is substantial evidence to support the 2018 ground on w hich we rely.” Freeman v. Fairchild , 2018

- NMSC

- 023, ¶ 30, 416 P.3d 1
264 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). With these 2
principles and limitations in mind, as we explain, we a ffirm the district court based 3
on the grounds articulated in this opinion. 4

{ 25 } The district court’s findings demonstrate that the parties argued the necessary 5
facts throughout the proceeding. T he district co urt observed that “this case started” 6
when the appointment of a guardian and conservator became necessary to protect 7

Mother because she was not receiving “ adequate or proper care.” The district court 8
recounted that resolution of the petition was prolonged because along with other 9
circumstances and complications arising from the COVID

- 19 pandemic, Siblings’ 10

intervention caused delay an d prompted unnecessary litigation. The district court 11
provided “example[s] of the unnecessary expenditure of time and effort

. ” In a 12
subsequent letter ruling and order related to Banks’ fees, the district court rejected 13
the argument that Banks’ work was dup licative and specifically found that Banks’ 14

services were “for the benefit of” Mother. During the fee litigation, the district court 15
additionally received reports from the temporary conservator, and later from 16
Intervenor, regarding the financial health of Mother’s estate. 17

{ 26 } For these reasons, (1) affirmance on the grounds set forth herein is not unfair 18
because the relevant facts were established or argued by the parties throughout these 19
proceedings; (2) this Court has no need to “ delv[e] into fact

- depen dent inquiries ” 2019 because the district court made the necessary factual findings; and (3) those findings, 1
as well as our conclusions, were supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 2

id. (alterations , internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Absent a specific 3

attack, Stanley v. N.M. Game Comm’n , ___ - NMCA

- ___, ¶ 15, ___ P.3d ___ (A

- 1

- 4

CA

- 38739
, Aug. 31, 2023)
, we defer to those findings, see State v. Almanzar , 2014

- 5

NMSC

- 001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183 (p roviding that appellate courts “review[] factual 6
matters with deference to the district court’s findings if substantial evidence exists 7
to support them”). Thus, we conclude that we best fulfill our appellate function by 8
upholding the district court’s factu al determinations regarding the payment of 9
Banks’ bills on a different legal ground. 10

CONCLUSION 11

{ 27 } For these reasons, we affirm the district court. 12

{ 28 } IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

______________________________ 14 KATHERINE A. WRAY , Judge 15

WE CONCUR: 16

_________________________________ 17 JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge 18

_________________________________ 19 JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge 20