NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VIVIAN WRIGHT-BOLTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MELANIE ANDRESS-TOBIASSON; 

KOCKA & BOLTON, LLC, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-15317 

D.C. No. 

2:14-cv-01612-APG-PAL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 11, 2017**

Pasadena, California

Before: FARRIS, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Vivian Wright-Bolton appeals from the District Court’s ruling granting 

summary judgment in favor of Judge Melanie Andress-Tobiasson based on Judge

Andress-Tobiasson’s claim of absolute judicial immunity, and denying Wright-

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Bolton’s cross-motion for a stay of summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56(d). Wright-Bolton’s suit alleged claims for violation of her 

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and conspiracy in connection with Judge Andress-Tobiasson’s issuance of 

an order concerning Wright-Bolton’s divorce proceedings in a Canadian court. ER 

204–08. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Fisher v. Kealoha, 855 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017). When neither party 

identifies any material fact in dispute, we need “consider only whether the district 

court correctly applied the law.” Id. We review a district court’s decision on a 

Rule 56(d) motion to stay summary judgment pending further discovery for abuse 

of discretion. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of 

Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003).

2. A judge enjoys total immunity from suit for her actions except in two 

instances: when the judge’s actions are “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken 

in the judge’s judicial capacity[,]” or when the judge’s actions, “though judicial in 

nature, [are] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 

502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (internal citations omitted); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 

435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978).
3 

The Supreme Court held in Stump that any deficiencies in form cannot make 

an otherwise judicial act, like an order, into a non-judicial act. 435 U.S. at 362–63. 

Indeed, the issuance of orders is a quintessential judicial act. Thus, we find that 

Judge Andress-Tobiasson’s actions were taken in her judicial capacity. 

Furthermore, although the jurisdiction of the Nevada Justice Court does not 

extend to the subject matter of Judge Andress-Tobiasson’s order, Nev. Rev. Stat. 

§ 4.370, the relevant Canadian statute, Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c. 33, refers 

broadly to “a court located in the state where one of the spouses resides.” See ER 

100. We have previously held that where a judge has a “colorable authority” for 

asserting jurisdiction, she has not acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 

Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1990). Likewise, when a judge 

“misinterpret[s] a statute and erroneously exercise[s] jurisdiction[,]” she is not 

acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 

1204 (9th Cir. 1988). Given the breadth of the Canadian statute, Judge AndressTobiasson acted with “colorable authority.” We find that Judge AndressTobiasson did not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 

357 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation marks omitted). 

3. Finally, Wright-Bolton’s motion to stay the summary judgment 

proceedings pending further discovery failed to articulate the “the specific facts 

that [she] hope[d] to elicit from further discovery . . . .” California ex rel. Cal. 
4 

Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998);

see ER 86–87; Blue 20–22. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Wright-Bolton’s request.

AFFIRMED.