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iStQmLL 

. W The First Imaging Radar SateUite 

Robert L. Butterworth 

December 2002, revised December 2004 
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(U) Introduction 

(SY~ In December 1964, the NRO launched a satellite called "Quill" that successfully demonstrated electonic imaging of the Earth using a synthetic aperture radar in outer space. How this 

test demonstration came about, its 'novel results, and what became of the work are ably described 

in the pages that follow. Dr. Robert Butterworth has incorporated the findings of extensive documentary research with interviews and oral histories. The result is a highly readable account of how 

SAR revolutionary technology first came to operate in space. 

(U) Robert L. Butterworth has been writin 

In addition to his forthcoming ftUII'nni 

has just completed a comprehensive history 

programs. He is the author of several contributions to basic and appJied research 

in national security affairs, is a fonner college professor, and has held staff positionS in the Defense 

Department, the U.S. Senate, and the White House. His graduate degrees are from the University 

of California at Berk~ley. 

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(U)Preface 

(SfR'K) Quill was the world's first imaging radar satellite, launched by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) as an experiment in 1964. The NRO was young then-only a year old, in 

fact, wheri Quill's development got under way. But several dominant traits were alrcady apparent: 

dedication to developing very advanced technology, aversion to bureaucratic management, and 

irresolution in the face of competing military and national intelligence needs. 

(S/IFK) I found pieces of this 

the NRO's former History Office'and was scores 

of people and dozens of organizations. Particularly important infonnation about Quill came from 

interviews with its Air Force program manager, Maj. Gen. David D. Bradburn USAF the 

PI'OJU8,lm manager who built the radar system at Goodyear AeliOSlllace rnftVl_fiinn 

and the data' from the 

(U) I could not -have completed this work without the lItllnP.l"h 

_and the incomparable administrative SUP1POrt 

kindly reviewed the manuscript in 

several versions of the manuscript. 

(U) This work began under the direction ofR. Cargill Hall, NRO Historian during 1998-2003. 

Hall proved a rare, steady helmsman in the temperament-tossed seas of research and writing. With 

this monograph he very nearly had a piece of NRO program history coming out of work commissioned and published on his watch. We were too slow for that, and must settle instead for being 

printed as part of his significant legacy, 

Robert L. Butterworth 

Chantilly, Virginia 

December 2004 

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iSt"Radar Eyes 

iSt Military satellite work in the U.S. sputtered through the 1950s until the Soviet Union 

launched Sputnik in October 1957. Soon thereafter, articles in the trade press talked about 

an Air Force contract with Lockheed for "WS117L," Earth reconnaissance satellites (some 

called "Pied Piper") that "would carry television, 

photographic cameras, [and] infra-red spotter or 

radar scanner systems."· A later article made 

further reference to payloads: "probably no 

single Pied Piper reconnaissance vehicle will 

incorporate more than one type of sensor for 

mapping-optical, infrared. or radar-because 

of payload restrictions and complexity of multiple scanning systems."2 A 1958 advertisement 

(Figure 1) predicted that these satellites would 

"see" in various. ways and that some would have 

"radar eyes."3 

iSTThose eyes would see using a focused 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which hit public 

attention on 20 April 1960, when the U.S. Army 

unveiled pictures of American cities taken at 

night and through clouds (Figure 2) with its 

new SAR system mounted in a small airplane:' 

This new technology made it feasible that radar 

could be used for reconnaissance from satellites, because unlike real-apertum side-looking 

airborne radar (SLAR), smaller antennas actually improved resolution, and distance from the 

target was effectively irrelevant.' At the same 

time, satellites appealed to SAR engineers as 

excellent platforms for their sensor.6 Unlike aircraft-whose bumps, slides, and twists through 

the air had to be measured and subtracted from 

the Doppler retums-satellites offered almost 

perfect stability. 

Figure 1. (U) Aviation Week advertisement, 8 September 1958, pp.1OG-101 

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Figure 2. (SlJNF) The W •• hlngton Post on 20 AprIl 1980 dsplayad 

an _rly SAR Image on Its front page 

~SI~ By the late 19505, several research 

teams were studying the prospects for SAR imaging from very high or orbital altitudes. In 1959-

60 the Air Force DynaSoar program funded two 

research teams to study how SAR might be used 

from a stable one team 

included 

the Utc:hti,eld, 

Aerospace Corporation, working together with 

engineers from the Glenn L. Martin COR1P8lIV 

of Baltimore, and. 7 

its long-standing interest 

radar technology with contracts in 1960 for the 

"Hi gasser" program, a classified effort to determine whether SAR images could be generated 

from very high orbits. Goodyear won a Higasser 

COllltrac:t, with the 

2 

a research group of the 

did not win on Higasser, but a year 

later won a $1 million study in the "Logasser" 

program, which looked at SAR imaging at ranges 

of ten to 300 miles. This . and the Iewas led by 

research team inchJded 

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company of the 

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Sunnyvale, California, as the antenna subcontractor. Altogether 

they began to work on defining and resolving the 

technical issues in obtaining fine SAR resolution 

at the Earth's surface. . 

(S/R'K) A summer exchange program in 

1961 took_to Sunnyvale to work with 

Lockheed on the early Samos satellite programs. 

While there, he gave some lectures on radar, was 

hired as a consultant to Lockheed, and became inSReRIH'lRA:~ ~19YNN9F9RN18fl 
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volved in exploring a business development idea 

for using Lockheed's launcher 

and satellite 

technology and 

_radar 

imaging technology to build 

a SAR satellite. 

To build the 

radar itself, he 

recommended 

Goodyear as the . William G. King, USAF 

best company. 

He had built an optical correlator used by one 

of Goodyear's earlier SAR products, the APs/ 

AP-73,B and had come to know the Litchfield 

Park engineers, who were even then working on 

design parameters for a space-based 

SAR, such as the relationships among 

pulse repetition frequency, antenna 

length, po~and 

coverage._ 

came Goodyear's project engineer 

for the effort, and in the summer of 

1961 he and another engineer visited 

Sunnyvale, learned about the project, 

and began planning how to build the 

radar. 

'tSI1TK). At that time Col. William G. King 

was deputy director of the new Special Projects 

(SP) staff in Los Angeles, which shortly would 

be constituted as Program A in the newly established National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). 

Program A worked closely with Lockheed on 

both satellites and launchers, and King headed a 

study group looking for new ways to use satellites 

for national reconnaissance. Sometime in the late 

fall of 1961 ,_remembered, King's study 

group took up the possibility of launching a prootof-concept synthetic aperture radar satellite.' 

One of the group's members was Major David D. 

Bradburn. A West 

Point graduate in 

electrical engineering.Bradburn 

had joined the 

Air Force and 

spent most of the 

1950s serving in 

the Air Research 

and Development 

Command, where 

he became aware 

of the ongoing 

work on sideDavId D. Bradburn, USAF looking and synthetic aperture 

radar systems. 10 He entered the satellite world in 

1957, when he transferred to Los Angeles to work 

on the WS-ll7L program. and in 1961 he was 

serving in Program A's SP-3 office, developing 

security plans and procedures .. 

(S(fFK) To assess the merits 

of a SAR satellite demonstration, 

Bradburn looked into the JXltentiai . 

utility of a fully operational SAR 

satellite. After talking with officers 

of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), 

he concluded that a radar with about 

100foot resolution would be useful for 

post-strike bomb damage assessment, 

particularly because it could respond 

quickly and not have to wait for clear skies and 

sunshine. Meanwhile, in January 1962 Goodyear 

began preliminary SAR design work under a 

contract with Program A. After several months 

this project had matured enough for King' to 

propose the experiment to NRO Director Joseph 

V. Charyk, who approved it in mid-November 

1962.1 J Bradburn, chosen to direct the effort,I2 

summoned Goodyear's _ Lockheed's 

(the satellite bus 

(the antenna expert). 

and a few others to a meetillig 

geJes before Thanksgiving, without telling them 

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Figure 3. (9IItPfE) Quill project organization 

Source: Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 14 

the subject. It turned out to be the official start 

for the SAR satellite demonstration, now known 

by the classified name "P-40." The satellite itself 

received the codeword name "Quill." 

(U) Designing the experiment 

(S/If'K) Proposals from industry were solicited and received in short order, and contracts 

structuring a tripartite industrial team (Figure 3) 

were awarded in November 1962: Lockheed's 

group at the Agena facilities in Sunnyvale was 

responsible for overall systems engineering 

and technical direction, together with the upper 

stage/satellite body and associated subsystems. 13 

_was responsible for design and evaluation 

of the experiment and for the optical correlator 

that would process radar data and produce images. Goodyear was responsible for the radar 

payload and for working with _ in the 

design, test, and operation of the experiment. 

The contract called for launching two identical 

vehicles, designated 2355 and 2356, the first to 

go in April 1964. The payload for a third vehicle 

was to be prepared as well, but a booster was not 

identified for it. 

(S{ffl{) Bradburn designed Quill as an. 

experiment tightly focused on· the question of 

orbital functionality. As Lockheed emphasized, 

''the primary objective of the orbital flight was 

to demonstrate that afine-resolution radar strip 

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map of a portion of the earth s surface can be receiver noise, and mechanical and chemical 

generated through use of a satellite-borne syn- shortcomings in the data recording system.17 

lheric aperture radar system. For the purpose of tS/JB~ The radar itself, .designated KP-II.· 

this demonstration a resolution goal of 50 feet was an ANIUPQ-102 pulsed-Doppler 'system 

in azimuth and in slant range was established."14 that Goodyear was then producing for RF-4C 

Secondary mission objectives included quanti - aircraft. IS The contract with ProSram A called for 

tative evaluations of the radar systemperfor-pr.04uciI)g five KP-II radars, enough to provide 

mance (especially azimuth-direction behavior); replacements in case of launch or test failures, 

determination of the limits imposed by payload because the ways in which the space environment 

design parameters, payload in-flight perfonnance, might affect the SAR were still unknown. For 

vehicle attitude behavior, atmospheric conditions. example, what was the barometric pressure inand data link design and performance; and data side the Agena launch vehicle-l0"3 millimeters 

collection on targetfieldreflectivity,engineering of mercury, or 10"', or 10"1 because of out-gasparameters for aerospace radar system designs, sing? The differences could be significant to the 

and the capability of the ground recording equip- operation of power-generating devices. 

ment. (S/IFK) The radar was stripped 

(S/IFK) Quill would not seek of unnecessary aerial subsystems 

to develop new technology or be- (such as lateral motion compensation 

come the basis for an operational devices) and subjected to extensive 

program}5 In Bradburn's view, the reliability engineering, including 

orbital experiment intended to an- testing and potting to control elecswer only two questions: whether trical discharge,t refinishing for 

the system could really integrate environmental considerations, and 

Doppler-shifted radar returns over a x-ray examination of components. 

sufficiently long path in orbit to ob- All the component boxes were 

tain the desired azimuthal resolution, instrumented with pressure sensors 

and whether there was anything and mounted on special rubberized 

about the behavior of the atmosphere shock isolation mounts. Special wire 

that might create noise in the system. He was was used with an insulating covering that promdetermined. to keep the experiment focused, so he ised little out-gassing. about which little was 

sought to minimize technology development and known in general. In keeping with the primary 

to use proven equipment and procedures wher- Qbjectiveoftheexperiment-obtainingaterrain 

ever possible. 16 Even so, significant errors could image from a SAR satellite-the overall system. 

be introduced in several ways. There could be was simplified considerably and did not include 

jitter in the transmitter's oscillator, for example, capabilities that would be needed for operational 

or erratic vehicle motion and errors in pitch. systems. For example, there was no ability to 

roll, or yaw as well as problems arising from select the terrain swath being imaged or to extend 

incorrect beamwidth, atmospheric turbulence, the length of the swath. J9 

* ~ Goodyear designated its classified projects using the initial of the surname of its current president, who 

then was Tom Knowles. The orbital radar project thus became the "KP-ll." 

t~and others at Goodyear had to experiment with potting techniques as a way to keep the transmitter 

operating inihe"liiikDown space environment. Essentially, the electrical component was placed in a cocoon of elastic 

rubber inside a metal container. A vacuum was created in an effort to let the rubber set without air pockets. All leads 

were grounded and had wire shielding. 

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SI!C .. ft/lrJld:l!fft'atteVtI8LI! 

the pulse was, range res0-

lution was not a parameter 

we cared about, we just 

cared about being able to 

do the processing trick to 

produce synthetic aperture 

with [useful azimuthal resolution].''lO Base frequencies for the system would 

be 9600 MHz for the 

transmitter carrier with a 

pulse repetition frequency 

of8215 to 8735 Hz and an 

intermediate frequency of 

70 MHz. 

(S,.ffK) Another enFigure 4. ~9iJFIf) Age"a D for Quill 

Source: Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 1-3 

..... ginccring challenge was 

thermal control, particularly for the klystron, the 

device that generated the 

(S/ffK) As a Doppler system, the radar 

had to transmit pulses often enough to reduce 

azimuthal ambiguities while allowing a proper 

interval between pulses to record the returned 

signals. The timing of the pause depended on 

range to the target, and this distance could not 

be known precisely. The Goodyear engineers 

knew that the antenna was to look down at a 55-

degree angle, but they could not know the exact 

altitude of the Their solution, credited to 

was a specially designed circuit 

monitored the. pulse repetition 

frequency and adjusted it slightly. Had it been 

important for the mission, other solutions to 

the range issue surely could have been applied; 

but Bradburn said he really did not care about 

range resolution for Quill because it could be 

readily changed by shortening the pulses or other 

tinkering. "With Quill we just wanted enough 

energy on the target, we didn't care how long 

high peak power needed to operate the radar.· 

Most of the klystrons that Goodyear used for 

aircraft radars were air-cooled; for Quill, the engineers designed a heat sink. It was an aluminum 

plate about ten inches long and five inches high 

and painted with a special thennalJy conductive 

white paint. Several copper fingers were braised 

to its back. The plate bolted to the anode of the 

klystron, and heat was conducted through the 

copper fingers to another metal heat sink, which 

was placed next to the satellite skin so the heat 

could then be radiated into space. 

(SfITK) The mission was intended to last only 

96 hours, with the radar operating no longer than 

fi ve minutes per orbit, for no more than three 

orbits in succession, and for no more than 80 

minutes altogether. Power was provided by threesilver-zinc batteries, which detennined the duration of the experiment; there was no provision 

for recharging them. 

.~ "Klystrons are a family of microwave vacuum tubes that depend upon the conversion of a velocity-modulated beam into a varying current by the process of electron bunching." A. E. Harrison, Klystron 'lUbes (New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 1. 

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(SHTK) The KP-II 

would be installed in the 

same Agena upper stage 

used as a satellite body for 

Corona (Figure 4). The 

Agena would be launched 

with an augmented Thor 

missile, constituting a 

flight-proven package of 

booster and upper stage 

that offered tolerable 

launch environments (thermal, sinusoidal vibration, 

random vibration, shock, 

acceleration, and pressure). 

The Agena also was expected to provide sufficient 

Rgure 5. (&fFK) Quill antenna 

Source: Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 1-143 

stability for the SAR on orbit (±O.4 degrees of 

attitude uncertainty and ±.25 degrees limit cycle 

in pitch, yaw, and roll, with rates of change not 

greater than .002 degrees/second in pitch, .005 

degrees/second in yaw, and .003 in roll). 

(stff'K) The radar would transmit and receIve 

through an antenna that was flush-mounted on 

the Agena body, thereby avoiding the risks associated with a design that would require un7 

folding or unfurling a structure on orbit. Based 

on calculations that determined dimensions 

for maximizing the portion of the slant range 

interval that could be mapped, consistent with 

the Agena vehicle dimensions, the antenna was 

made 15 feet long and'two feet high (Figure 5). It 

was manufactured by Lockheed; the company's 

Antenna Laboratory had considerable experience 

with problems posed by constructing this type of 

antenna using the available 

stock, and its machining 

was done in the Agena D 

facility.21 The antenna was 

mounted along the right 

side of the Agena body, 

occupying nearly its entire 

length and, when covered by 

protective fairing, protruding 

about two and a half inches 

from the surface (Figure 6). 

~SlIFK) The fairing was 

designed to detach after the 

Thor booster engine cut off, 

thereby reducing the load to 

be lifted by the Agena motor (Figure 7). To protect the 

antenna from deformations 

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that might result from thermal loads on the orbiting Agena body, three of its four mountings 

allowed the antenna to slide along fixed points, 

while the fourth was fixed to the vehicle.22 

(SlfFK) After being injected into orbit, the 

Agena would rotate 180 degrees, so that it would 

fly tail first (facilitating film recovery 

and terrestrial coverage); the antenna 

would thus be located 

with the main lobe 

of the radar looking 

down at 55 degrees" 

from the horizontal '" 

at a strip that would 

be 93 miles to the 

left of the satellite's 

ground track and 10 

nautical miles wide 

(Figure 8).· 

tum. An image of the display was recorded on 

photographic film, which essentially meant that 

the varying intensity of the returns then corresponded to varying densities on the film (Figure 

9). The film moved across the display to record 

successive intensity trace displays as adjacent 

..... _ .. CIt ... 

SEeRa' positions on the film. 

Looking across the 

film from one edge 

to the other thus 

~SJ~ Figure 8 

also displays the two 

directions in which 

the fineness of the 

radar's measurements was assessed: 

along-track (in the 

direction of flight) 

and across-track (or 

azimuthal, nonnal to 

FlguTfI 7. (aItI'K) Fairing separation 

Source: LockhHd, System Report 2, p. 1-14 

corresponded to the 

(slant) range dimension of the radar, 

and the ratio of the 

slant range imaged 

to the width of the 

film was called the 

range scale factor. " 

Movement along 

the film reflected 

the azimuth direction and hence 

the along-track distance, with the ratio 

of the actual alongtrack distance to the 

length of film being 

called the azimuth 

scale factor. The 

ratio of these two 

the direction of flight). The figure also displays 

the two surfaces on which resolution is commonly measured: the slant plane (the deeply 

shadowed side of the prism on the ground, 5.95 

nm wide for Quill), and the ground plane,labeled 

"imaged swath (map plane)," 10.1 nm wide for 

Quill. 

tslfFK) The reftections from each radar pulse 

traced a line on the display of a cathode ray tube 

that varied according to the intensity of the refactors, range scale 

to azimuth scale, was called the aspect ratio; with 

the KP-II setup, the aspect ratio was anticipated 

to be about 6.9.23 

(SJIfK) To make the recorder, Goodyear 

ordered from Westinghouse a special five-inch 

cathode ray tube with an electron gun that could 

withstand the anticipated shocks of launch. It had 

a single trace running across it, and the recorder 

imaged that trace down to about one inch on the 

data film. To keep the film chive uniform, fiee 

* ES!R'K) These are Lockheed's numbers, which are slightly inconsistent with "those in~epiction in Figure 

8. Lockheed, System Report I, p. 18. " 

8 

SBCH'ffl'f'*LeNifalfH .... 'tI6LI!YIN6P6RN1flfl 
of variations in tension and slipping, Goodyear engineers coated 

the master metering drum with 

silicone rubber in a specific 

angle of wrap. The recorder was 

custom-made for Quill from a 

special mold. nickel-plated and 

radio-frequency protected 

(S/fFK) Radar data would 

be conveyed to the ground in 

two ways. One method was 

film. which was handled in two 

assemblies totaling 99 pounds 

(Figure 10). The recorder compartment housed the cathode ray 

tube and associated subsystems 

that allowed the film to record 

the images on the tube. The film 

itself was contained in a filmsupply cassette. Exposed film 

went into an Itek take-up cassette 

in a General Electric re-entry vehicle (Figure 11) to be recovered 

400W by special C-130 teams (Figure 

12). This approach to data recovery, incidentally, had also 

been mentioned in the earlier 

1958 article in Aviation Week.24 

Figure B. fllRlE) imaging geometry 

Souroe:_ Evaluation /, p. 18 

8EeREf 

(SJ'IfK) Data would also be transmitted to 

the ground using an UHF wideband data link, 

and recorded at the Vandenberg, California, and 

New Boston, New Hampshire, tracking stations. 

The preflight engineering analysis seemed to consider this task simple and straightforward: "it is 

only necessary to provide a KP-ll Recorder and 

a means of triggering it so that.the telemetered 

video can be recorded. "15 Each location thus had 

a recorder identical to the one on board, together 

with control systems for establishing synchronized reception from the satellite. 

Figure 9. (&lJFIq Signal film 

Source: Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 144 

9 

(S,'ffK) In either case the product would 

be a film transparency. This film-the "signal 

film"-essentially recorded Doppler-coded data 

about ground reflectivity. Once on the ground, 

this information was converted into visual imagery using the "Precision Optical Processor" 

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developed by. especially for 9E8RET 

Quill data. This processor derived 

from the original optical correlator 

developed in the early 1950s by 

ERIM's Lou Cutrona to solve 

the huge data-processing chore 

required for the quintessential SAR 

task of integrating the Doppler --= 

returns. Those returns, after all, .... -~ ....... -_ 

bore no relation whatsoever to visual images. Indeed, to the human 

eye even the earliest plan position 

indicator displays on cathode ray 

tubes more closely resembled a 

picture than what appeared on the 

SAR scope. Captured on film for 

subsequent processing, the returns 

on the scope at any particular instant resembled a collection of 

Figure 10. (SIR=Iq Film transport system 

Source: Goodyear, Engin88ring Analysis, p. 6-50 

thousands, perltaps tens of thousands, of tiny 

shapes, mostly rectilinear, each a solid shade 

of gray-some lighter, some darker-some of 

them sharing perhaps some variation in coloring 

and thus forming striata across some areas, or 

band-like colorations somewhat reminiscent of 

alluvial deposits in the vertical face of a sandstone bank. Think not of the Gaussian snow 

filling an untuned television screen but of some 

densely intricate but visually uninterpretable 

mosaic. 

(S/I'FK) The SAR processing. challenge was 

to find ways to wring visual meaning from these 

tried to do the job electronically, 

computers of that day simply were not 

up to the task, requiring weeks of processing to 

render a few crude images. The genius of the 

_approach was to recognize that optical 

lenses performed fast fourier transforms at, of 

course, the speed of light. _ processor 

used a laser to generate a beam of coherent light 

that was diffracted by the signal film into three 

emerging waves, two of which produced images 

at focal lengths that varied with (slant) range. 

In essence, the coherent light produced images on 

planes that were tipped relative to the signal film 

(Figure 13), or in other words a plane of images 

that was focused in azimuthal direction and that 

was tilted with respect to the plane of images that 

were focused in range direction (which was the 

signal film itself). . 

. (S:ff'K) The _processor used an anamorphic telescope (meaning different magnifications in range and azimuth directions) to image 

both planes, apply the proper magnification, and 

produce an image sharply focused in both range 

and azimuth and with the correct aspect ratio. The 

fine-resolution image produced by the image pr0-

cessor system26 (Figure 14 is a schematic diagram) 

was recorded by a tracking camera, so radar data 

could be converted quickly and steadily to fully 

focused, fine-resolution optical imagery. 

(Sfff'K) Figure 15 is a sketch of the Quill 

final layout. As indicated in that diagram. there 

are three sections to the Agena: barrel, conical, 

and nose. The KP-U radar system, weighing 370 

pounds, was mounted in the barrel section, which 

was five feet across with structure rings 15 inches 

apart and a .06-inch skin. The recorder system, 

10 

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including the recorder and the film-supply cassette, weighed approximately 99 pounds and was 

mounted in the conical section, which tapered 

15 degrees from a five-foot diameter at its base, 

where it joined the barrel section, to its height of 

32.95 inches. The film containing the raw data 

was stored in the nose cone, which incorporated 

the reentry capsule for recovery. 27 

(U) Managing the Development 

(SfI'i'K) Set up in this way, the Quill experiment could take advantage of the equipment and 

procedures for on-board photography and film 

recovery developed for the Corona program. In 

particular, Bradburn needed film cassettes, film 

recovery vehicles, and support for assembly, 

test, and checkout. In March 1963 these relationships came under the purview of Colonel 

Jack C. Ledford, an Air Force officer serving as 

assistant director of the CIA's Office of Special 

Activities (OSA): Ledford recommended to his 

boss, CIA's deputy director for research, Herbert 

"Pete" Scoville, Ir .• that the CIA provide contract -

support and security procedures for Quill. "Under 

the proposed plan, CIA would procure three (3) 

Corona Recovery Vehicles from (Jeneral Electric, 

Corona Triple Prime Cassettes from Itet, and 

system assembly, test, and checkout by LMSC 

[Lockheed Missiles and Space Company] AlP 

[Advanced Payload] facility [in Palo Alto, California]. The completed system would then be sent 

by covert means to lMSC, Sunnyvale. where it 

would be mated and checked out with the Goodyear Radar System. "211 

{St'Ifl(} Scoville approved the recommendation, and OSA expended· about _ to 

9E8RET 

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Rgure 11. (SlR=K) Film recovery system 

Source: Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, p. 6-50 

• (U/IFOU9) OSA had been transferred to the Directorate for Research, and in March 1963 Scoville was head of 

. that directorate. He was held responsible for CIA activities in support of the NRO. although he c:leIegated the Program 

B job to a deputy and called himself the senior representative to the NRO. He left later in 1963, and his sua:casor, Bud 

Wheelon, refused the Program B job entirely, leaving the title to the deputy DNRO, Gene Kiefer. Ki. might certainly 

have caJJed on Ledford's office for support. 

11 

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acquire three film return vehicles from General for establishing a payload labOratory for Quill, 

Electric, take-up film cassettes from Itek, and under compartmented security procedures, 'at 

services for checkout and assembly from Lock- the Lockheed facility where Corona space veheed 29 In addition to the procurement actions, hic1es were processed. Integration of the Quill 

the CIA had to develop procedures to keep infor- spacecraft components--including film cassettes, 

mation about Corona and Quill as separate ("com- recovery systems, buckets, and waterseals--as 

partmented") as possible. Not all the government well as any additional special tests that might 

or contractor personnel working on Quill needed be required for the Quill payl~ad would take 

to know about the Corona program, nor did most place in this facility. Normal weight and bal-

",---

§

TAItT DP ~ITC:" D .... N 

C!1!ti . 

--~ - ---~ 

~l /' Yr' ~::~::'"~ -" ~"""-

ae8Re:F 

I', ---lf~7336U3RETROoROCKtTCl27DFI'S) ......... 

, 73U .... SI'IN ''''~- am<;) PilCH UP 70.5 RPM - ~__ 73371.47 THRUST CONI! 

_-...... 7337"', 

TO lD.a RPM 

DESPIN ~a:, ~ '. 

AIILATIYE SIIIELD 

• --"--~ , 

I 

'~~Vf--------- 73960.70 MAIN CHUTE 

DEPLOYED 

----,,,, 

Figure 12. (9IR=K) Capsule recovery process 

Source: Lockheed, Project Reporl2, p. 3-50 

Corona people need to know about Quill. There 

were also different degrees of "knowing": Those 

who worked with particular pieces of classified 

hardware might not need to know anything about 

the overall system or its mission, while several 

who needed thaUnformation did not need to 

know about specific subsystem capabilities or 

technical specifications. 

ts/fFK) By the end of March 1963 Corona 

security officers had developed a plan for keeping each program's secrets.30 The key difficulty 

was in finding a way to get hardware developed 

for Corona into the Quill program without 

directly associating the two. The plan called 

ance tests and pyrotechnics installation would 

be conducted in the same facility used for such 

tests on Corona satellites, and a third facility also 

would also be available for other integration and 

test procedures. 

tslffK) The Quill program would be directed 

to obtain its recovery system from a group at 

Lockheed that had already been identified as 

specialists. The Lockheed manager for this effort 

would assemble a group of engineers to work in 

the Qui1llaboratory area ostensibly to develop 

designs for cassettes and waterseaIs; after a suitable period of time, their "plans"-actually drawings of the existing Corona subsystems-would 

12 

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be presented and Bradburn 

would direct Itek to manufacture the desired items. The 

intended effect was to establish 

the cassettes and waterseals as 

hardware developed strictly 

and exclusively for Quill, 

and to disassociate Lockheed 

employees in the area from this 

sort of activity.31 

!'LANE Of Vlln.w. 

(S/ff'K) The Quill contracts '--_ ..... 'IIM 

originally called for launching 

the first system in April 1964, 

but even Bradburn's' tight focus and insistence on minimal 

FIgure 13. ~~ Focal plane relationships 

Source:_ Evaluation 1/, p. 259 

technology development could not prevent delays. Bureaucracy was not the problem: Bradburn 

had few reporting requirements, good relations 

with Program B, and no awareness of any headquarters turmoil in Washington. The additional 

time was needed instead to resolve difficult technical and engineering issues. Like many program 

directors to follow him, Bradburn believed it was 

better to launch late with a successful satellite 

than on schedule with a failure, and so he determined that "emphasis will continue to be placed 

C~IMATOI 

SIGNAl. FILM mLRD) 

on thorough testing to insure a good probability 

of success on the first flight. "32 .. 

(S/1fK) At the end of May 1964 there was 

stin considerable work left to be done. Environmental qualification ~ting had been completed 

for all radar components except the recorder. 

Several transmitter problems were identified 

during system-level Temperature-Altitude Simulation Chamber (f ASC) tests, for which remedies 

had been designed but not verified. The flight 

vehicle was in an anechoic chamber for radiation 

. liOAE:r 

Figure 14. (EWF'K) Anamorphic telescope processor 

Source:_ Evaluation 1/, p. 261 

and emissions testing. Film 

recorders and signal simulators were on site at the 

Vandenberg and New Boston ground stations (known 

as "Cook" and "Bos"), and 

this equipment had been 

installed in T-29 and T-39 

aircraft for conducting fly-by 

tests. The optical correlator 

was nearly complete at 

_ and analysis of test 

films from. the Goodyear 

recorders indicated that the 

design resolution was being 

achieved. A program review 

had been conducted by an ad 

hoc committee of Air Force 

13 

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'EeRET 

IIKCIAL HANDLe ... 

,I .,,~ '-------_. ~.-~ ...... 

Figure 15. (a¥fK) Agena nose assembly for Quill 

Source: Goodyear, Engin9Bring Analysis, p. 4-4 

and Aerospace Corporation people drawn largely 

from a concurrent Hughes radar program (P-22) 

being conducted outside the NRO. The review 

found the program to be generally on track and 

suggested some changes in the wiring harness, 

lowering the operating altitude, and altering the 

approach to setting the pulse repetition frequency. 

The launch date at this time had been 5 August 

1964; it was changed to 29 August, subject to 

success in T ASC and anechoic chamber testS.33 

(SlfTK) Steady progress was made over 

the summer of 1964. The anechoic chamber 

tests were completed. including all ascent and 

orbital sequences and full-power transmissions 

through the antenna, without signs of problems 

from electrical interference or interaction. Tests 

at the antenna range at Lockheed's Santa Cruz 

Test Base showed that the radar and the antenna 

were compatible, that the antenna did not distort 

the pulse. and that the slant range resolution of 

the system was better than 35 feet for the worst 

case (in-phase targets) and better than 25 feet 

for the best case (targets with 90 degrees of 

phase difference). Installation and testing of 

equipment at the tracking stations had been 

completed; the optical correlator was complete 

and had been used to verify proper adjustment 

of the recorders by using test films processed 

by Air Force Satellite Photographic Processing 

Laboratory (SPPL) at Westover Air Force Base, 

Massachusetts .• had also completed a performance evaluation plan for the mission. 

(S)'If'K~ The Agena D upper stage had passed 

acceptance testing and was at Vandenberg, awaiting the payload. But transmitter/modulator problems continued to surface in system-level tests at 

altitude, and the launch date was delayed once 

again, to 2 November.~ That date also passed 

as the radar transmitter failed yet again. The 

troublesome component was redesigned and, at 

last, showed no problems during TASC testing 

of the entire planned orbital operating time. It 

was shipped to Vandenberg in keeping with 

Bradburn's security procedure' (Table 1), and 

by mid-December Quill was ready for launch 

(Figure 16)~ight months later than originally 

planned, but only 25 months after initial contract 

award.3S 

14 

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FIgure 16~11I awaits launch In this rare USAF photo. 

(Thanks to NRO Archivist _tor his effotts and pers/StsrJcB locating and docurntInIIng this phtJto.) 

15 

SEeHTfff'A:tBN'f-IftlViIeWYJNQP9RK1IKl 
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(U/IFOY9) Orbiting the System 

(S/IFK) With Bradburn in command as launch 

control officer, on 21 December 1964 the world's 

first satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar was 

ready for launch from Vandenberg Air Force 

Base. Engineers had calculated a specific period 

during which the satellite should be launched 

(the "launch window") in order to minimize the 

amount of heat it would encounter on orbit. As 

time approached to within 10 minutes of the 

the fly, and continued to wait for the appointed 

time. As it turned out, the train stopped while still 

outside the safety exclusion area, and the launch 

at 11:08 a.m. Pacific Standard Time.proceeded 

according to plan.· 

tSfITK) Knowing that the booster had 

worked. Bradburn headed north to the satellite 

control facility in Sunnyvale and soon learned 

that the Agena (international satellite designation 

launch window, all systems were 

brought to readiness so that launch 

could occur within 30 seconds of 

command. Only official personnel 

were permitted within a defined 

area of the base during launches, 

but a civilian railroad track cut 

through the restricted zone, and, 

with only a few minutes to go until 

the launch window opened, range 

safety officers reported that a train 

was approaching. If it entered the 

exclusion area, safety regulations 

aL!efll!Y 1964 87A) had been placed in a 

I~D~e-c_--=-be-r--::2~~'-;::;1::;967T4=i useful orbit (Figure 17) and was 

Satellite.Orbite4 responding properly to commands. 

. . Word about the mission itself.-

vANDENJtERG AIR FORCE 

BAW(UPl) - The u.s. Air whethertheradarworked-would F:i& ¥oDday lauDi:hed • sate1- e to:Waid '1IOlar urblt. 'lbere take several hours longer. The 

wU.':iio."lndieauon what·the ground station at Vandenberg = . '" "Of.tbe 'shot 1f8S DOf' ens:. 6i tbe.Jdertitj- of the that had been set up to receive 

"sed8t" sateIlite.-.j , , ''''., wideband data from the payload 

FIgure 17. (SfPJIf) included a video display (cathode 

New.~ ray tube, or CRT, monitor) that 

Couttesy_ would show the characteristic 

would prohibit the launch from continuing until 

the train was gone. The delay might be so long 

that the launch window would close, forcing the 

launch team to "unready" the Thorl Agena (which 

might involve several complex processes, such as 

removing propellants, preserving environmental 

conditioning, and recharging batteries, depending 

on when the next window opened) and await the 

next opportunity. Bradburn thus found himself 

assailed by demands that he launch immediately, 

ahead of the planned schedule, before the train 

came closer. He refused, not wanting to execute 

a contingency plan that was being made up on 

shapes of radar pulses being recei ved and decoded if the Quill system were 

operating and transmitting. This equipment was 

operated by Goodyear, which for security purposes was referred to as the "Program Associate 

Contractor" (PAC). Later that day, at Sunnyvale. 

Bradburn received the message "PAC Room 

reports Code One"-radar returns from Quill 

were showing up on the Vandenberg CRT. 

tSlfFK) The mission, summarized in Figure 

18. lasted only four days. as planned, before the 

unrechargeable batteries ran out of power during orbits 72-73.36 The radar operated 14 times 

in orbit: between 0644 Coordinated Universal 

* ~ Bradburn, interview, and SAFSP Director:r Quarterly Report, 30 December 1964. NRO headquarters in 

Washington, DC, was kept informed of major developments by secure teletype, a relatively slow and limited fonn of 

communication. When Bradburn decided not to launch early, a short message was cabled to NRO headquarters from 

Vandenberg saying "holding for passenger train." Then the launch window opened. range safety reported that the train 

had stopped outside the closed area, Bradburn gave the command to launch, and the Thm"1 Agena lifted off. The next cable 

to the NRO reported that Quill was in orbit, giving rise to initial concern in Washington-and continuing folklore-that 

Bradburn had disregarded safety and launched over the train. Bradburn recounted this event, without revealing the 

purpose of the launch, in "The Evolution of Military Space Systems," in R. Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld, eels., The 

US Air Force in Space (Andrews Air Force Base, MD: Air Force Historical Foundation, 1995), pp. 61-65. 

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Time (UTC) 22 December 1964 and 0618 UTC 

26 December 1964, imaging the swaths of the 

northeastern and western United States indicated 

in Figure 19 (also see sidebar). Data collected 

from the 14 radar passes were transmitted over a 

wideband (UHF) data link as they were obtained 

("real time") to the Vandenberg or New Boston 

ground station in view. In addition, during the 

first seven radar passes data were recorded on 

film on board the satellite, and on 23 December 

during the 33rd orbit the reentry capsule was 

jettisoned and recovered. The film was flown 

to Westover to be and the dev'elo'oe<1 

film then flown to 

Pre:cision ~U',J~W Processor" (known as POP1) and developed the image films. They were 

dried, bundled, and given to_ to deliver 

to Los Angeles. The only delay in the process 

came when_flight was cancelled, but 

the key question had already been answered. 

_ measured the azimuthal resolution to 

be 7.S feet-the theoretical maximum from the 

IS-foot antenna-which immediately settled the 

question of whether there was a fundamental natural limit on SAR resolution from space.37 

(S/IFK) After less than two weeks of orbital 

decay the satellite re-entered the atmosphere at 

1027UTC 11 January 1965,on orbit 333. Several 

days earlier, Bradburn and his Program A superiors had already declared the mission a success. 

In his 30 December 1964 Quarterly Report, the 

Program A director said that "vehicle and payload performance were within acceptable limits 

on all parameters .... The radar maps ... cover 

about 80,000 square miles. The resolution is better than 15 feet in azimuth and approximately 

80 feet in ground range .... The volume of data 

is greater than had been anticipated. Technical 

evaluation has begun and will be completed in 90 

to 120 days." In the meantime, "The second payload and Agena 0 booster are complete and are 

being held at [Lockheed]. The second ftight has 

been removed from the launch schedule pending 

detailed analysis of the first mission. The third 

payload, which consists of forward structure, 

radar components, and ~overy subsystem, is 

near completion at [Lockheed]. There is no 

booster for this payload .... Recommendations 

for disposition of the remaining Quill hardware 

will be made in 30 to 45 daYS."lI 

(U) Evaluating the Outcome 

(&'/FK) The Quill team had wanted answers 

to several questions. Whether the satellite-based 

SAR would work was the main one, followed 

closely by others of practical enginccring-bow 

to make it work best For example, it was helpful to experiment with "the timing c~rdination 

among the functions of transmitting, receiving. 

and displaying the returns on the cathode ray 

tube: 

The sequence of events was as follows: 

the radar transmitted a pulse, the receiver and 

recoriier waited 25 microseconds, and the CRT 

was then swept for 73 microseconds; the system 

then repeated the cycle after an additional wait 

of 16 to 24 microseconds (depending on the 

choice of prf) .... On certain occasions, the 

" sweep started a few microseconds before the 

return from the near-range arrived; the imagery 

corresponding to these occasions lacks conttast 

and [a good signal-to-noise ratio] at the near 

edge, but is better at the far-edge. Conversely, 

the opposite occurred when the sweep was late 

in starting. On still other occasions, the sweep 

was begun as the return from the far-edge was 

arriving, continued while the instantaneous return power level passed through its minimum, 

and was almost completed by the time return 

from the near-edge began to arrive; under these 

conditions, the CRT was inoperative for the 

major portion of the return .... 39 

~~ Engineers also wanted to describe the 

SAR's performance quantitatively, particularly 

* ESlRX~ The original mission design had called for 16 radar passes; available documents do not address the re-

" duction. Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, p. 1-4. 

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tstlfl() Years later (see. e.g .• PetTy. pp. 35-37) a rumor began that Quill did not image tenitory outside the U.S. because the NRO feared international repercussions resulting from the radar 

emanations of its active imaging system. After the fact. DNRO McMillan said it was important: be 

wrote to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on 12 May 1965 that "radar 

operation during this mission was limited to Continental United States to inSlR availability of ground 

truth data. to obtain maximum quantity of all three types of products, and--since a radar sensor iJ 

an active device-to prevent possible complaints from foreign nations." There are, however, several 

inaccuracies in his presentation. (Notably, he stated that ''the mission plan provided for simultaneous 

photography along the mission track by an RB-47," which would have required a truly remarkable 

aircraft.) Brockway McMillan, "Semi-Annual Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 

Board on Activities of the National Reconnaissance Office:' 12 May 1965 (TSlBYE). in ARC lob 

2002()()()()1 Box 7 Folder 24. 

tSlIi'K) Quill was an engineering proof of concept, and so it was operated wbcie cagineering 

test data could be obtained-where there were devices on the ground to check the far field antcDna 

pattern, pulse repetition frequency, etc., and reflector arrays to check impulse response. In addition, 

there were only seven active passes during which data could be collected on film, and they were conducted where data could be simultaneously transmitted by wideband relay to ground stations at New 

Boston or Vandenberg. Bradburn told this story quite straightforwardly, and I [Butterworth] probed 

him on the question. Furthennore, how might have ''international repereussions" been imagined to 

arise? Who would be able to detect the signal and classify it and reach the right conclusions about its 

source and the country responsible for it? 'The radar could be operated fCll" no more than five minutes 

at any one time and for no more than three orbits consecutively without comting catastrophic failure. 

It operated at an average power level of 230 watts, from an altitude of 130 nautical miles and hence a 

slant range of about 160 nautical miles. It traveled at a velocity of 2S,SOO feet per second (about four 

nautical miles per second ground track velocity). It illuminated a swath about ten miles wide. True, 

sidelobes could be detected as well as mainbeam signals (though not backlobes. as_discovered), 

but even so the chance of detecting the signal and capturing enough of it to reach accurate conclusions 

is vanishingly small. The USSR would have had no ephemeris data on the satellite adequate to do 

ground measurements of any possible emanations. 

with respect to its azimuth-direction behavior, 

and to determine how it had been limited by design parameters and in-flight performance of the 

payload, attitude behavior of the satellite vehicle, 

atmospheric conditions, and design and performance of the wideband data link. They were interested in describing and diagnosing any anomalous system performance, in coIJceting data on 

the reflectivity characteristics of target fields. in 

demonstrating the capability of ground equipment to record useful data through the wideband 

data link, and in developing engineering data that 

would be useful in designing future aerospace 

radars. And they were most interested in seeing 

whether the analytic models derived from aircraftborne SAR experiments, which had been used to 

prescribe and test satellite design. proved valid 

for operations in space.4O 

(SfrrK) _ engineers had designed 

ground-based tests to provide data for calibrating the SAR' s performance. There were 

measurements at the earth's surface to check 

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the operation of the antenna after launch,· the 

transmitter pulse, t and ground surface and 

weather conditions. Complexes of radar comer 

reflectors were laid out in 

their known cross sections and spacings could 

be used to calibrate estimates of the radar's range 

and azimuth resolution, sensitivity, and dynamic 

~ecause Quill's radar antenna was fixed, 

_ engineers had to wait until they had obtained good ephemeris data and then scramble to 

move some of the comer reflectors to keep them 

in the satellite's field of view!l 

(SffFK) These evaluations used visual images produced from the recorded data in the sequence outlined in Figure 20. First, the film of 

the video data was developed by the SPPL, using 

an approach aimed at maximizing the dynamic 

range of the recorder.* The_team then used 

their precision optical processor to convert the 

data on the film into visual images. The highest 

resolution (and the best dynamic range) was 

obtained directly at the processor output. on 

photographic transparencies. The original output transparencies were then magnified 2.6 times 

and recorded as either paper prints or positive 

transparencies. neither of which was suitable for 

detailed analysis: 

The paper prints ... have a resolution capability of perhaps 6 lines per nun; at the scale 

factors corresponding to the 2.6: 1 enlargements, 

this poor resolution completely dominates the 

quality of the imagery. The resulting groundnngeresolution is of the orderof90 to 100 fed. 

The degradations in the positive transparencies 

... are not as severe. In either case, imagery to 

the scale of the 26: 1 enlargements is useful primarily for orientation and descriptive purposes 

only. and not for detailed study of the target 

complexes. Detailed examinations require the 

use of enlargements of greater magnification. 

the use of the original output transparencies. 

or in special instances the observation of the 

optical output of the processor prior to recording.42 

(SlfFK) The results showed the experiment 

to have been a great success. The radar worked ' 

and met the goal of 10-foot azimuthal"3 resolution.·· It had illuminated somewhat more than 

100,000 square miles of terrain, almost 80 percent of which yielded usable images. Three-fifths 

of the images were of the best ,quality that the 

system could produce; the rest were degraded 

for testing or by slight errors in setting the pulse 

repetition frequency. Only fOUT percent were lost 

unintentionally.44 

~ As expected, the smooth trajectory of 

the satellite allowed it to provide relatively fine 

detail without the complex systems needed on 

aircraft to compensate for platform motion~ In 

effect, "satellite borne systems are not subject 

to the resolution limitations normally imposed 

• ~ These were measurements of the azimuth beam pattern for the purpose of confirming that the antenna's farfield pattern remained correct after launch. 

t (SJ~ "It was possible to detect and record the transmitter pulse. after it had propagated one-way from the satellite to the earth·s surface. by detecting 

was 

emissions 

done on several 

via the 

passes 

sidelobes 

when 

of 

the 

the 

satellite 

radar antenna 

was within 

pattern 

Hne-of-sight 

and ~ 01_ Evaluation I, p. 9. * system employed a [cathode ray tube] with a P-l1 phosphor and a transfer lens which imaged 

the line trace of the tube at a 2: I demagnification onto Kodak S0-266 blue-sensitive film. The film was developed 

in 0-76 developer by SPPL. The dynamic range of the recording system in the flight vehicle was measum:I from test 

films generated prior to flight , .. The value of the dynamic range of the flight recorder was about 19.5 db."_ 

Evaluation II. p. 256. But cf. Lockheed. System Report 2. p. 4-11: 1be video data recorded in the satel1itc and in 

the ground based recorders was recorded on 70 millimeter Eastman Kodak film, S. O. 119. The recorder CRT sweep 

covered a width of approximately 27.5 millimeters." 

** ~ Referring to the performance of a SAR in terms of "resolution" is a conventional solecism; usage today tends 

more often to the technically accurate "impulse response," or "IPR." 

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1.6 Sl'!t!D Perio1"lW1ce - The syst_ parfomace vas faultles •. 

throo.sJ1Qlt the orbital. mission, untU battar)" ct.pletian on 

Orbit 72 - with the exception of Id.nor UIl'Iirp1a1ned VDltap 

d.1atarbaID_ on Orb1te 8 III c1 9 ~ 'l'b1II sect1G1l presenta the 

n&nit1cct pq1.oec1 operat:1nc 1Dfo1'll&tiOl1. radc> iaa&eZ7 sapl. .. 

Ind c1:1aau&1ons of the pqload performance, preoedecl by & 

bri.et 8UIIIDU"1' of qstaaL par...-tan and pertaraance. 

Latmah 

Date, 21 Decaaber 1964 

Veh:1cle. LV-2l llaS ss-oJ.A I21SS 

~ Precl1ctecl Aotaal.. 

Par:lod (MIN) 89.L4 89.66 

PerS.pe (N.H.) 130 uS.82 

Apogee (N .Ke) l54 1$7 

IDcOt n at1aD (da,.) ,70.0 70.11 

EoceDtr:t.c1t 7 .00) .0036 

ActS: ... Qrbj. ta 6S 13 

IeccmIr7 6S )) 

pql.oad 0perat101U1 13 14 

Area recat"ded as t1De ruo1ut1co radar iDap1"71 

appraz:1llatelT 10,000 square lIdl.ea (nautical.). 

Rgure 18. (S'J!FIQ-Summary mission data 

Source: Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 23 

by platfonn instability in aircraft."·' Slant-range feet· The imagery showed several terrain and 

resolution (which was not a design goal) was cultural features that held promise for strategic 

45 feet, which at the Agena's depression angle reconnaissance. Weather conditions did not seem 

provided a ground-range resolution of about 75 to have affected the quality of the system's im-

• (S:/TK) "Range resolution ... was limited by the bandwidth of the electronics. which had been patterned after 

the ANlUPQ-l02 radar system for reasons dictated by expediency; the most optimistic estimate of achievable slantrange resolution was of the order of 36 feet. which in turn implied a ground-range resolution of 60 feet at the design 

depression angle. Improvement of the range resolution to make it comparable with the expected azimuth tesolution 

was not warranted, since it would not have affected the demonstration of the synthetic-aperture feasibility. and would 

have entailed considerable expense and delay." Lockheed. System Report 1. p. 33. 

20 

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Figure 19. iSlR=K) Gro~ for Quill Imaging operations 

Source._Evaiustion I, p. 13 

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ae8RB'HfALENf ME'L'118LE 

CAPSULE r - ~ - -,:- -:-- ~ - -:- -:- ~ - - - , 

'~' ___ 70::.:0~~~:.:.:1~=_-r1_--t GSOE UN41"S:" N'~~, I . . '. ,VTS· " I L __ ~ _ ... ___ ~_._:~ ~,~ -- - ~,J 

I 

I 

I I SPPL L_-: __ :....._:....._. ____ _ PAOJECTIOI· . ....--. -I PRINT!R ' 

.... ---... -----~. ". ". ' . -.:- --- . (-:-,- ~- -. . , 

I LMSC .' REPORT, . 

........ -~----..... l . . PREPARATION 

a..-____ -.I 1..:._..:.. ... _, ~ __ ..... __ _ 

DOPPLER " MAP,' FILM '. ,"FILM. PRINT .' , '. . PRINt , ". R"~POATS" 

FIgure 20. ESlR=1q Image procesal"g sequence 

Source: Lockheed. System Report 2, p. 4-2 

ages except for a brief area of intense rainstonns, 

and even then the imagery revealed the underlying structure. 

~ Quill answered dozens of technical and 

engineering questions. It showed that analytic 

models based on aircraft operations worked well 

for satellites. It showed that imagery processed 

from the transmitted data was only slightly degraded compared with pictures made using the 

recovered film. It showed that images obtained 

from orbit could fairly well match those from 

aircraft radars using similar technical parameters. 

. It proved that ambiguous target indications could 

. be minimized and that the slight inaccuracy and 

instability in the satellite platform could be 

compensated electronically. It also sampled the 

average radar reflectivities of several different 

types of terrain. ' 

~s/IFK~ Altogether. in the words of_ 

assessment, "the orbital flight satisfied the primary program objective by demonstrating that 

a satellite-borne synthetic-aperture radar system 

22 

could generate a fine-resolution image of a por- . 

tion of the earth's surface; all secondary objectives also were met.''46 The Lockheed assessment 

added that the system proved its expected ability 

to produce radar imagery of a consistently high 

quality by day, by night, and through a variety of 

weather conditions; it also observed that the conditions that prevailed in most of the swath areas 

would have prevented successful photographic or 

infrared imaging (Figures 21-25). Furthermore, 

the experiment did not produce any evidence of 

phenomena that would prevent future systems 

from realizing azimuth and ground-range resolutions on the order of 10 feet. 47 

'tS/1i'Kt The evaluation reports from_ 

Lockheed, and Goodyear all exuded optimism 

and expectancy: Quill had been highly successful 

and the path to doing m01l>-a further experiment, even an operational system-seemed clear. 

The_report recommended that "designs 

of future systems be based on the type of analytic model used successfully for this design," 

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that "proper use be made of radar equipment 

in manned aircraft for the purpose of collecting 

further data and testing configurations which 

are applicable to future satellite systems," and 

that" various engineering adjustments be made 

to ''future orbiting systems."'" The Lockheed 

report agreed and recommended further that 

"future experimental orbiting systems incorporate 

power sources which are adequate for extendedduration missions, as required for operational 

applications. "49 Goodyear engineers undertook 

additional test work, demonstrating the value of 

improved potting techniques for the transmitter 

and modulator components of the radar as well as 

the ability to improve significantly the dynamic 

range of the recorded data by reducing film base 

density and reducing the recorder lens stop. so 

(U)A Pause 

-(S/~ Yet Quill's seed fell on stony ground. 

Bradburn asked another officer in _ "What 

do you do when you come up to bat, and, the first 

time, you knock a ball out of the ballpark, what 

do you do then?" The reply was, "Well, Dave, I 

think you go down and sit on the bench."~l On 

5 January 1965 Bradburn gave NRO Director 

McMillan a "quick-look" briefing on the P-40 

mission and got agreement that the second 

vehicle would be removed from the launch 

schedule, pending further recommendations to 

be made in February. On 11 February, several 

weeks before contractor evaluations of Quill's 

product and perfonnance were completed, Major General Robert Greer, director of Program 

A, cabled McMillan that the Quill contractors 

recommended flying the second mission later that 

fall, but that he, Greer, did not agree. "In my 

opinion there is no need for more flights to show 

feasibility as such. We should have a definition 

of the desired operational use before we schedule 

any more launches .... The factors which need to 

be examined now do not require satellite flights." 

McMillan agreed, and the remaining hardware 

was placed in storage pending completion of the 

1 

2 

T.bIfJ 1.19tQuIII security procedu .... 

(/MyIoIJd equipment flow) 

Goodyear Aerospace Corp. fabricates and " 

assembles radar payload, test equprnent, and 

grol.l1d data handling equpmer'L 

Shipped to LMSC by military air a8 arranged by 

SAFSP; departs LJ1chIIeid Park NAS. Arizona, 

and arrives Moffett NAS, Calfornia. adjacert to 

LMSC; USAF or LMSC QUkleared collier 

a~pariesshipmenl 

Arrives Moffett NAS; transferred to Nay van 

3 and driven 10 aul approWKS area In 

.; coLrieliiiiiies eqlipmenhl1lillt i8 

seandln . 

n co\'8ft area._ equprnert I.I1der4 goes componel1, circt.itry. and bench checks; 

performance tests, acceptance lasts, and 

necessary modifications accomplshed. 

Ttansferredln LMSC van to Complex C-12, 

5 Area 40,_ l.I1dergoes systems test 

with Agena vehicle; USAF acceptance 

procedll'8s accomplished (DD250~ 

Shipped separately froiiliiiicle to a 

QliR-approWKS area in . Vanden6 berg AFB; 1ransferrad by LMSC van wI1h QUIcleared collier; mated with Agena vehicle and 

l.I1dergoes final systems R.I'I. 

7 Transferred to IalllCh pad for R-Day checks, 

COUlldown, and IalllCh. 

8E8A&FIR:N:ENr KE¥lle~ 

Source: "OfJI SuppItIment: eo.wt PrrJgram StICutify Plan, • 

2MM:h 1984 

report of an evaluation committee commissioned 

by NRO headquarters. 52 Pro~ial 

su~ showed a total of _ in 

Quill's budget (rable 2). 

tSltRQ In his Program A Quarterly Report 

for June 1965-his last as director-Greer reported that a furtheI_had been provided to 

_to complete its studies, but that otherwise 

SP considered the Quill program completed." At 

the end of the year Greer's successor, Brigadier: 

General John L. Martin, that theDNRO 

had approved a for radar 

and associated tape recorder work (rable 3 shows 

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contracts definitized at that time). The RCA and 

Ampex tape recorder studies showed that the state 

of the art did not provide adequate bandwidth for 

existing radar applications; Goodyear completed 

a lOO-hour life test of the Quill radar; Hughes 

produced and tested a space-qualified antenna, 

and also expanded the radar system design to 

a dual mode capability (high and low resolution); and Airborne Instrument Laboratory's 

research provided a feasible new radar system 

design as well as ongoing study of radar target 

signatures.54 

(S/trK) Apparently none of this work went 

any further, and references to follow-on studies, operations, and plans disappear from the SP 

Quarterly Reports for several years after 1966. 

cation studies, intended to be conducted in patallel with the engineering demonstration, were 

not decisively concluded. Thus by 1965 the NRO 

had completed an orbital demonstration, but no 

agreement had been reached that the proposed 

application, bomb damage assessment, or any 

other application. was sufficiently attractive to 

proceed."" 

(S#yK) Bradb~ where he could 

Through his efforts,_got new aircraft for 

further research and and in spring 

1965 he to the National 

Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to 

educate and help the photointerpreters make 

use of radar images. ,_ met with little 

success: the photointerpreters generally picked 

Figure 21. (tVlflE) City/rural contrast (BIF-555-DP-12782-89) Courtesy_ 

Three years later, in 1969. the NRO reported to its up the radar images only to throw them away.") 

Executive Committee (ExCom) that "NPIC eval- In the summer of 1965, Bradburn left Program 

uated the [Quill] imagery, stated it was capable of A to attend war college; he returned a year later 

providing useful intelligence, and recommended at the request of Program A's director Bill King, 

further research and development."" And in 1972 but had little opportmJity to work on radar. "The 

an "NRO Position Paper on the NRO Satellite Quarterly Report for 30 June 1966 advised ~at 

Program" stated that after Quill's flight, "it was in July project responsibility for Quill would be 

concluded that no further satellite ex~riments as transferred from the sigint office _to Lt 

such should be conducted; instead efforts should Col. BradblUll, working in the applied research 

be made to define precisely the system appli- and advanced technology office (SP-6) unde~ 

cation desired, and then the development of the Colonel Lew Allen.59 The next Quarterly Report 

actual system should proceed. The system appli- noted that SP-6 had a deficit of one officer: "Lt. 

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"The THOR booaterfor FTV 2356 has been released to be rep7rammed Into 

. a future_ launch and credit for one THOR win be given to . Source: 

nature and is not to be considered in any sense as an 

operational prototype or the . 

initial step of an operational 

system development ... The 

request for proposals should 

make clear the experimental. 

rather than the operational 

prototype or system nature of 

this effort.''63 The ~tor of 

intelligence fOr SAC offered 

to help evaluate the Quill imagery and the NRO staff responded affirmatively. noting 

that an engineering evaluation 

was under way by contractors. 

that an intelligence evaluation 

was being established, and that 

SAFSP Quarterly Report, 30 June 1965, NRO history files. 

9I!eRET/RALENr KE¥HOYi 

Col. Bradburn transferred to sigint on 2 August. 

SP-6 not now manned to accomplish work in 

radar and elint technology. 't(i() 

~ Reflecting on the question of Quill's 

singularity, Bradburn reiterated his objective: 

to show that satellite-based SAR imagery could 

help provide post-strike reconnaissance (bomb 

damage assessment) for SAC. That objective was 

accomplished and briefed to SAC. When SAC 

officials asked Program A's director, John Martin, 

"What's next?" Martin said: "Send money.'>61 

(Siffl'~ Cancellation of further Quill flights 

gave SP a big boost in its annual "cost reduction" 

more than two-thirds of 

claimed for FY1965 and 

earJier. "We are pleased," stated SP Director 

Brig. Gen. Martin, "to report that these reductions have been made without adverse 

impact on mission performance.'tQ The NRO 

had demonstrated the technical feasibility of 

an all-weather, day-night Imaging system that 

could meet an important SAC need; if SAC 

wanted one, then SAC would have to create 

a program to develop it. Director Charyk had 

been emphatic in his cable of authorization: 

"The effort is to be strictly experimental in 

"a separate analysis of the. Quiil product from 

the SAC operational viewpoint would be of 

great value to us in the overall evaluation of the 

system. ''64 

~ Some of SAC's intelligence officers 

favored going ahead with a procurement, 65 and 

during 1965-66 they continued to visit Program 

A to stay up to date on the continuing analyses 

of Quill and imaging rad8r technology. The SP 

Quarterly Report for 30 June 1966 reported 

tersely that "on 26 May SAC briefed SAFSP 

(Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for 

Special Projects) on their desired radar system 

for post attack reconnaissance. No requirement 

for this system has yet been established "66 Perhaps SAC delayed in the hope that some other 

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6E8ARHNereAN 

Figure 22. t8IR=lQ Phoenix, Arizona. Image taken on pass IJ, northbound, at night (1: 

12 a.m. Mountain Standard Time, 22 December 1884). Weather: clear, tempa1ltUre 

46 deg ..... Fahrenheit, dew point 43 deg ..... , visibility 15 ml .... 

(Sln:K~ "The route of a major expressway (1) can be followed from the lower left around the 

most built-up portion of the city and up to the airport (2). the large return-free area at the 

upper right. Because the radar (pulse repetition frequency] was not matched to the beam illumination at the time, the airport edge of the swath fell In a poorly illuminated area near the 

edge of the beam. The railroad paralleling the left side of the airport does not stand out as do 

tracks across rural areas, but its course toward the lower right comer is marked by types of 

construction (3) that give strong retums. Similar retums accompany a diagonal branch line 

(4) ending at the lower center. The dark lines (5) that go irregularly up the Center and along . 

the ~se of the hills are canals."_Evaluation I, p. 30. . 

budget would support the desired development; . the mission was well ensured by the new SR-71 

perhaps its officers did not get Martin's message reconnaissance aircraft; or perhaps something 

as clearly as Bradburn did; perhaps they thought entirely different accounts for the command's 

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81GRR1IN8FeRN 

Figure 23. (9H=FIQ-Rlchmond, VlrglnlL Image taken on pass 14, southbound, during daytime (11:06 a.m. Eastern Standard TIme) on 22 December 1964~ Weather was overcast 

with tops of clouds at 2,500 to 4,500 feet. 

(s/fFl~ ''Several road and railroad bridges cross the James River (1) and a mile-long elevated 

section of railroad (2) parallels the river near the center of the radial system. Again, the association of strong-retum systems with railroad routes can .be seen (especially [3]). ~,cultivation, 

and drainage pattems are recognizable." _Evaluation /, p. 33. 

lack of initiative for further program development at that time.67 Or perhaps the command 

had in fact pressed for an imaging radar satellite 

through different channels. Dr. Alexander Flax, 

who became director of the NRO on 1 October 

1965, recalled seeing a statement of need to this 

effect coming through non-NRO channels when 

he was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Research and Development. He passed 

27 

it forward, without comment, to the Joint Chiefs, . 

and did not hear about it again.A 

~ Perhaps the NRO should have done 

more as well; it was responsible for developing 

intelligence collection satellites, and Quill had 

already demonstrated a resolution almost three 

times better than the early Corona cameras. Why 

was there no second, improved version of Quill? 

In part, even so~ officers in Program A thought 

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SEGRR/JNOFORM 

Figure 24. ESiRKi Wurtamlth Air Force Base, Michigan. Image taken on pus 30, southbound, during daytime (10:57 a.m. eastam Standard Time) on 23 December 1964. Ground 

is covered by snow at least two Inches deep; area Is In fog, 8ky obscUred, wind calm, 

one-mile visibility, cloud tops at 9,000-10,000 feet. 

f&'FTlq "This SAC facility stands out unmistakably from its wooded surroundings between Michigan's Van Etten Lake and the Au Sable River. Parked aircraft are likely to be responsible for the 

eight or more bright returns located on the rectangular paved area (1). but the rapid-egress parking spur (2) contains only one or two aircraft-like returns. Many roads. including some little-traveled ones, are seen as narrow gaps in the tree cover. although some such gaps are power-line 

clearings. Two large areas of cleared land (3) show where the forest has given way to farmland .. 

. . Two dams (4) and the reservoirs they form are readily detected and identified. No power fines 

are seen emanating from the hydroelectric plants here .... 8 _ Evaluation /, p. 37. 

there were good'a priori reasons to discount the they argued that it could not serve either search 

value of an imaging radar satellite, regardless of or indicator monitoring purposes. "Only in the 

Quill's success. Pointing to its "small area cov- area of Post Strike Assessment can radar be exerage, narrow bandwidth, and low resolution," peeted to be satisfactory ... whether aradarPSA 

28 

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~ .•.... 

Figure 25. (at~ Point Reye., California. Image taken on pass 18, south~und, during 

daytime (11 :05 a.m. Pacific Standard Time) on 22 December 1984. W ..... conditions: 

heavy rain, scattered clouds 700-1000 feet, heavy overcast 1400-2500 feet, 

clouds ·In layers to 35,000 feet. 

ESlIfI() "Intense rainfall was occurring locally in the area .... While the clouds themselves are 

generally not imaged, the occasional regions of dense rain (see arrow) scatter considerable signal back to the radar, causing cloud-like forms in the image. Inspection of the film shows that the 

ocean wave-structure patterns can be observed even in the densest parts of the rain-returns. 

Furthermore, although the raindrops both back-scatter and attenuate the radar waves, hence 

reducing the illumination at some greater slant range, nQ shadows of these rain cells have been 

noticed in the imagery. Of interest is the alteration of the wave p~ the shallow water off the 

beach, and its diffraction around the point and into Drake's Bay."_ Evaluation " p. n. 

system is practical as an operational system re- in conducting further demonstration missions. 

mains to be seen. There are practical difficulties In Flax's view, the relationships among radar 

and there exists doubts [sic] as to whether such parameters and image interpretation needed to 

a system is the best way to learn, quickly and be explored and understood more systematically, 

surely and inexpensively where the bombs hit.'J69 and he insisted that Program A establish a proAccording to Bradburn, the NRO saw no point gram of experiments.70 'The NRO together with 

29 

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the Air Force and CIA continued to fund groundbased research at a low level, but none of those 

efforts involved orbital tests: 

-tST Reflecting on the effoit later, Flax said 

that the real difficulty was opposition from the 

intelligence community.71 There was strong support from defense leaders for proceeding with 

a radar satellite program: SAC was favorably 

impressed by Quill, and the new director of 

defense research and engineering, John S. Foster, Jr., urged Flax (and Flax's successor, John 

McLucas) to build another satellite.72 Flax also 

thought it would be a good idea, but some in 

the CIA were resistaht. t Quill had shown that 

satellite-borne SAR imagery was feasible, but 

the intelligence community thought and worked 

in terms of optical imagery, and in those terms 

a radar satellite would not be useful until it attained much finer resolution. A system that was 

worthwhile for tactical bomb damage assessment 

was not justifiable as a national intelligence asset 

Officers in CIA's science ~d technology directorate declared that other technologies might be 

developed that could provide better images; yes, 

Flax replied, but SAR is a technology that we 

know how to do now. 

(SlIfK) Still, Flax did not believe he should 

press the matter in the absence of agreement, in 

the form of requirements, from the intelligence 

community. Mindful of the programmatic strife 

under his predecessor, Brockway McMillan, and 

working under a new NRO charter intended to 

repair that damage and prevent its recurrence,73 

Flax paid attention to bureaucratic diplomacy, 

taking care to base his decisions and recommendations on soli.d technological ground 74 In doing 

so, Flax proved far more than a mere barometer 

of consensus; he successfully opposed the strong 

preferences of Program B, for example, in canceling the CIA's independent efforts to build a 

launch vehicle, in dividing program management 

responsibility for a new photo-reconnaissance 

system (Hexagon), and in choosing the molniya 

orbit recommended by Program A for a new 

program. The SAR .satellite 

proposal, however, was not a question of how to 

do something but whether something was worth 

doing in terms of intelligence. And Flax believed 

that the NRO director should not under these 

circumstances unilaterally overmle the nation's 

premier intelligence agency. That action would 

have to be taken by the higher governing body 

that oversaw NRO programs, the executive committee (ExCom), and to that end Flax raised the 

issue with Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus 

Vance. the ExCom'schainnan. VancewouldaIso 

have heard from Foster, whose job as Deputy 

Director, Research and Engineering (DDR&E) 

included monitoring NRO programs and pr0-

viding advice directly to the deputy secretary 

of defense. Flax thought Vance was impressed 

somewhat with the SAR technology but evidently did not feel strongly enough to press the 

issue with the new director of central intelligence 

(DCI), Richard Helms. Helms, in turn, came from 

a background in traditional intelligence, was not 

personally attuned to space technologies and satellite reconnaissance, and in this matter followed 

t (UHF6e6) CIA's deputy director for science and technology. Albert O. "Bud" Wheelon, was not among them. 

He applauded the experiment and criticized Bradburn only for not going ahead to do more. (Interviews with both, May 

2000, Los Angeles and Montecito CA) 

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the recommendations of Program B. 

-tStf1ax was left with pursuing a technology 

development program in an effort to persuade 

the intelligence community that there really was 

information valuable for intelligence pwposes 

in radar data. The prospects, he thought, were 

not without hope. In practice, the standard to 

be met was radar imagery on a par with imagery obtained from optical systems-an orderof-magnitude improvement. A major advance 

was needed; evolutionary improvements in film 

emulsions, platform stability, signal timing, recorder dynamic range, and the like would not 

be enough to bring a 10: 1 improvement in resolution. Bradburn predicted that such a gain would 

take considerable time, ten 

(SlR'K) No physical artifacts and few documents remain from the Quill experiment. The 

Thorl Agena launch vehicles were recycled into 

the Corona program, and the remaining radar 

equipment was broken up and destroyed. "It 

was heartbreaking," _ said. "One time," 

he went on, "someone came [to litchfield Park] 

and had the right kind of credentials. and wanted 

to know if any hardware existed from the KP-n 

program. I said no, all had been destroyed What 

did you want to do with it? He said they wanted 

to put it into the Smithsonian museum. Sorry. all 

gone. Unfortunate that the program has remained 

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so highly classified. But that's the way it is. I'd 

like to be able to ten my son what I had accomplished and what I was a part of, but I can't and 

I won'l"77 

~ Gone, too, was a time of exploration and 

innovation that today seems as remote as John 

F. Kennedy's Camelot. Outside the Washington 

NRO headquarters, there was close and willing 

cooperation between Program A, the Air Force 

component of the NRO, and the CIA component, 

Program B. Government authority was vested 

in a project officer, Major Bradburn, who possessed both the relevant technical expertise and 

development experience. Only one management 

layer, Bill King, separated Bradburn from the 

director of the NRO, who became involved 

only to approve the project (and receive King's 

32 

quarterly reports). Being himself knowledgeable 

in the technical field. Bradburn used informed 

peer review to select the contractor team, which 

worked intimately together and with him to 

ensure that vehicle, payload. and processing 

worked smoothly. Somehow, despite the absence of lengthy requirements studies, analyses 

of alternatives, voluminous proposals, large 

program offices, acquisition approvals, and 

extensive oversight, this risky experiment was 

completed in less than 30 montJts. h was in all 

respects a "sparkling success.'''' It generated a 

wealth of technical data, and it ended with IJlOllleV 

leftover. 

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(U) Endnotes 

Reconnaissance Oftice, commissioned by the 

former NRO Historian, R. Cargill HaD. Documents and interviews cited in the references 

are &led in the NRO History Office, unless 

identified as being held in the NRO Archive 

Records Center (ARC) or the Army Archive 

Records Center (AARC). 

I. (U) "USAF Pushes Pied Piper Space Vehicle." Aviation Week (14 October 1957). p. 26. 

2. (U) "Test Firings tor Pied Piper Due Soon," Aviation Week (16 June 1958). p. 19. 

3. (U) In Aviation Week and Space Technology 69:10 

(8 September 1958), pp. 100-101. 

4. ($ The program was directed by Lou Cutrona and 

others at ERIM (known variously as the Environmental 

Research Institute in Michigan. Willow Run Laboratories. and the Radar Laboratory of the Institute of Science 

and Technology of the University of Michigan). This 

group had demonstrated the first fully focused SAR map 

in August 1957; its resolution was 15 meters in both 

range and w1tl1th. The following June the Army contracted with ERIM to provide developmental SAR models for installing in aircraft. Using five radar systems that 

Texas Instruments built under contract. BRIM conducted 

several demonstration Rights and delivered the ANIUPD1 system. consisting of the airborne equipment installed 

in an Army L-23 (a military model of a Beechcraft V-23). 

which produced radar data on film. together with a mobile van housing an optical correlator for processing the 

radar data into useful images. [Cf. Irvin J. Sattinger, History 0/ ERlM: The Environmental Research Institute 0/ 

Michigan, 1946-1989 (Ann Arbor. Michigan: BRIM. 

1994). p. 39, who reports that there were only four systems.] 

5. iST Radar tantalized aerial navigators through 

World War II and into the Korean War with the hope of 

being able to see the ground despite darkness. cloud, or 

dust, but radar mappers and bombsights of the day never 

offered sufficient precision. The goal was pursued during the 1950s using two very different technologies. 

Greater emphasis was given to side-looking radar 

(SLAR), which concentrated on World War II real-aperture technology and could only find increased precision 

in larger antennas. Installed in wing pods, under the 

belly, or along the fuselage, the larger antennas looked to 

the side of the Bight path and produced a range-delimited silhouette on the radar scope. The scope could be 

recorded by movie camera and pla)'ed back to help navigators and pilots become familiar with what they might 

sec on their radar screens during actual operations. 

tsI~ The needed precision finally came from a 

very different approach. During 1951-52 a handful of radar engineers in different organizations thought of using 

information contained in the phase.of radar returns to 

construct images. Described in the early days as a kind of 

filtering or Doppler ''beam-sharpening" before the term 

"synthetic aperture" was aenerally adopted, this approacb 

was pursued most intensMiy at _ and at the 

Goodyear Aerospace Corpcntion. 

~ SAR. systems point to the side of an aircraft's 

Bight path but they are profoundly different from the reaIaperture (SLAR) systems. "With the real array, the retum from each range increment is received simultaneously by all array elements every time a pulse is transmitted; whereas. with the synthetic ~y, the return is 

collected by the individual elements serially over the 

period of time the radar takes to trawne the array'" 

[George W. Stimson. Introduction to Airborne Rodor (El 

Segundo, California: Hughes Aircraft Company, 1983), 

p. 528.] Pointing the antenna in a SLAR system, for example, changes the geometry of the scene obtained; in a 

SAR. system it changes the signal-to-noise ratio. 

6. 't5i~ Infannation about Goodyears· research 

into space-based SARs is drawn largely from an interview with the company's project 

engineer for the Quill radar. May 2001, Litchfield 

Park, Arizona 

7. ~ The Air Force funded several study teams in 

this effort. Goodyear and the Glenn L. Martin company 

were one study team, and Goodyear's ••••• i 

and_ spent time in Baltimore participating in 

the study program and writing a proposal to use SAR in 

the DynaSoar program. . 

8. (-S~ Interview with . 13 June 2001, 

Chantilly, Virginia. 

9. ~thougbt that Lockheed and Goodyear developed the concept and that Lockheed got King's 

group intecested in it during late fall 1961. 

10. (U) Maj. OeD. David D. Bradburn (USAF. ret.), 

interview, 2-3 May 2000, Los Angeles, California. 

II. '(Sf~ "Subject is satellite radar experiment," 

began a 21 November 1962 cable from NRO headquarters to Maj. Gen. Greer, head of the Air Force Special 

Projects activities on the West Coast. "SAFUS [Charyl] 

directs the establishment of a separate classified project 

33 

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under SAFSP management leading toward actual orbital 

tests and demonstration of the feasibility of radar sensors, including electronic data readout." Secret. ARC Job 

199880073 Box 1 Folder 100. Charyk had been briefed 

on the potential advantages of radar imaging on 18 September 1962 by Captain Gorman, USN ("SAFSP Historical Chronology CY 62:' Secret. ARC Job 199800072 

Box 3 Folder 11). In December 1962 Charyk told OCI 

McCone briefly that "Project Quill is research toward an 

experimental radar payload for bomb damage assessment." Charyk to McCone. memorandum. 14 December 

1962. "Memorandum for Mr. McCone:' (TSIBYE), ARC 

Job 199700046 Box 4 Folder 14. 

11. -ts, The Quill .-. .......... Office had consisted of 

three Bradburn, and_ 

13. "(S/~ Information about the contractual arrangements for Quill is drawn from the Bradburn interview 

and from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Vehicle 2355 

System Report: Volume 1: Summary (Sunnyvale, California: Lockheed Missile and Space Co .• 31 March 1965). 

pp. 8ff., SIBYE (BIF00312-195008-80). 

14. €SIR*) Lockheed, Vehicle 1355 System Report I. 

p. 15. The description of mission objectives following in 

the text is from the same place. 

15. €S/R'K) Charyk wrote to OCI John McCone that 

"Project QUILL is research toward an experimental radar 

payload for bomb damage assessment" (Joseph V. 

Charyk. Director. National Reconnaissance Office. to 

Mr. McCone, memorandum, 14 December 1962, p. 4. 

TSIBYE, ARC Job 199700046 Box 4 Folder 14). Officers from Program. A had been discussing the Strategic 

Air Command's need for reconnaissance data to assess 

bomb damage intlicted by nuclear strikes. A year later, 

the new director of the NRO, Brockway McMillan. told 

the United States InaeJligence Board and the 5412 Group 

that "the QuiJI experiment is being conducted to dem0nstrate the feasibility of high resolution radar for terrain 

reconnaissance from a satellite," and that it was expected 

to achieve "about a l00-foot resolution over a swath 

width of 10 miles" ("Status of Satellite Reconnaissance 

Programs," 13 November 1963, p. 7, TSIBYE. ARC Job 

199700046 Box 4 Folder 14). A Program A staff paper 

prepared during summer 1963 (but not released) reported that "20 ft. resolution is the very best we can expect from present know-how and resolutions of 40-50 

feet are more likely. 20-50 feet resolution is considered 

adequate for the Post Strike Assessment mission where 

all we need to know is where the bomb hit, but whether a 

radar PSA system is practical as an operational system 

remains to be seen .... Further effort in this field should 

be held up until we are able to get some answers from the 

Q [QUill] tests. Only then can we assess the future capabilities of radar in satellite reconnaissance and only then 

can we know the feasibility of a practical operational 

PSA satellite" (Colonel _ "Sarellite Reconnaissance," July 1963, p. 20, TSIBYE, ARC Job 199700046. 

Box 46 Folder 14). 

16. ~ Bradburn's approach to managing the project 

evidently embodied the precepts of the "King Doctrinc," 

attributed to Bill King when he was head of_ They 

admonished managers to keep the program office small, 

hand-pick their people. control contractors by direct personal contact. sttess that program success is the raison 

d'etre for the program office, and "keep it simple." The 

latter meant using proven c:oqM)IlCIlts whenever possible. trimming no.essential enginccrinc. buying fewer 

spares. sticking to a single checkout,.ablreviatiog documentation, and simplifying tests. Briefing attached to 

note from 1. C. Fitzpatrick. annotated "given 28 Sept 

1989 at LA," in file. "Jim Fitzpatrick 19 Jun 90." Bradburn papeJS on sigint history study, unaccessioned. NRO 

History Office files. In Perry's view, Bradburn "emphasized those qualities of incrementalism and low-risk 

technology espoused by King. [Col. C. Lee) Battle, [Col. 

Paul E.] Worthman, and Greer," and the project itself 

"seemed another proof m the validity of a policy of incremental acquisition." Robert L. Perry, "Reece Satellite 

R&D: Capabilities in Readout. Crisis Reconnaissance 

and Very High Resolution," final draft of Chapter XVII 

i~ his NRO History. pp. 10-11. SIBYE in ARC Job 

199600096 Box 6 Folder 10. 

1....-. __ .. _ .. 

g ). pp :r:tiITI~ ~ om 

DUNG. 

18. (S/Rlt) Information about the payload is drawn 

from Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, EngIneering 

Anal)'$is Report No.1. KP-I/ Radar System (U.tchfieId 

Park. Arizona: Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, 25 

July 1964). SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING. 

19. ~_El'Qluation 1, p. 5. 

20. (U) Bradburn, iUcrview. 

11. ~ Lockheed. System Report 1, p. 1-139. 

22. ~ Lockheed. System Report 1. pp. 1-133-1-

154. 

23. ESIr'fIf)_Evaluationll. pp. 251ff. 

24. ~ "In its recent annual report. Lockheed referred to a statement by Maj. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever. 

commander of Air Research and Development C0mmand's Ballistic Missile Division. that the reconnaissance satellite system will include a recoverable capsule." 

"Test Firings," Aviation Week (16 June 1958), p. 20. 

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25. ES:ffK) Goodyear. Engineering Analysis. p. 9-1. 

26. (S//'t'K) "A light source is collimated by lens Lc to 

illuminate the film with a coherent wave of light The 

lenses ~ and I; are set as a telescope and have the primary purpose of imaging the tilted recording plane. The 

three cylindrical optical elements are also telescopic and. 

in conjunction with the spherical telescope. image the 

tilted azimuth plane so that it is coincident with the imaged range plane at the recording surface. A three-element cylindrical telescope is used so that the azimuth 

magnification of the optical system can be continuously 

adjusted. This allows the processor to easily accommodate various azimuth scale factors. The filter plane aperture, between the two spberical lenses. serves the purpose of removing two of the three waves formed in the 

diffraction process, as only one of the waves (either the 

convergent or divergent) is necessary to make the fineresolution map."_ Evaluation II, pp. 259-260. 

27. (SJ~ Goodyear. Engineering Analysis, pp. 4-

1-4-12. 

28. (U/Ifl)lJ~ Col. Jack Ledf<rd. to Deputy Director (Research). memorandum, SIBYE (BYE-2453-63); 

AARC Job 80BOO251A Box 1 Folder 3. Scoville did not 

long remain as deputy director for research; he had been 

frustrated for months in his attempts to create the research organization by acquiring elements of other CIA 

organizations, and in June 1963 he resigned. Director 

McCone chose Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon to replace 

him. 

29. (SVR'K) As of 2~ SAFSP estimated that 

the support would cost __ (cable dated 1643Z 24 

lui 63. SIBYE. AARC lob 80BOO2S1A Box 1 Folder 65). 

This cable also identified May 1964 as the intended 

launch date. and identified September 1964 as the date 

for having a second ready (payload only). The following 

month (August 1963) OSA estimated that its support to 

Quill would cost . see memorandum dated 21 

August 1963 from concerning FY64 status of black funds. SECRET-SPECIAL 

HANDLING. AARC lob 80BOO251A Box 1 Folder 65. 

Contractor requirements at that time were identified as 

••• leaving a balance of _ in the CIA's 

Quill account. 

30. (SfI'fIE) Bradburn to _ and_ 

_. "Security Plan-Action Items," memorandum. 

19 December 1963. S-Special Handling. and enclosure 1. 

"QUill Supplement. Covert Programs Security PlaD." 2 

March 1964, S-Special Handling. 

31. ts/I'fK) Cable dated 26 Mar 63 2334Z from _ 

_ to OSA SECRET, AARC 

Job 80BOO251A Box 1 Folder 3. 

32. (U/~ SAFSP Directm'. Quarterly Report, 

31 May 1964, TSIBYE. 

33. (U/JF6t:J6) SAFSP Director. Quarterly Report. 

31 May 1964. 

34. (U/IP9YQ) SAFSP Director. Quarterly Report. 

30 September 1964. TSlBYE. 

35. (U/1FeSe) SAFSP Director. Quarterly Report. 

30 December 1964. TS/BYE. 

36. ~ Cf. the Quarterly Report for 30 December 1964: "the batteries were depleted by Rev 79. 

which agrees with predicted battery life." Subsequent 

testing on the KP-D indicated that the mission would not 

have lasted much longer in any ~nt. Small potting 

voids in two high-voltage moduJes grew in size with repeated temperature cycling and provided a high-wltaee 

corona discharge path that eventua1ly led to catastrophic 

failure. Once identified. the problem was readily addressed and the corrective action proven with an extended life test. See Goodyear Aerospace Corporation. 

KP-Il Final Report: Experimental Laboratory lnvutigalions BKP-Il-16 (Litchfield Park. Arizona: Goodyear 

Aerospace Corporation, 31 March 1966). pp. 5-6. SECRET-SPECIAL HANDLING. 

37. "(9)~ Such a limit had been contended in some 

contemporary technical papers. including same from the 

Aerospace Corporation. according to _ (interview). 

38. (U/II"eHe) SAFSP Director. Quarterly Report, 

30 December 1964. 

39. ~JR'K'Lockheed. System Report I, pp. 37-38. 

40. (Sfft'K) Secondary objectives are described in 

Lockheed, System Report 1, pp. 15-17; and_ _pp.3-4. 

41. (~interview. 

42. (SIIT&)-Lockhced. System Reporl2, pp.4-14--4-

15. 

43. ES:~ ''Two independent measures of achieved 

resolution are available. The first of these is obtained 

from the imagery of Pass No. 8 itaelf-a 

reflectors 

fell 

age array showed that azimuth resolution of 

roughly 10 feet, and ground-range resolution of roughly 

75 feet, were achieved. The second determiDation was 

made via a measurement of the two-dimeosional response of the system to a strong· isolated target wbich 

was imaged near the southern end of Pass 30. The system 

impulse response determined directly at the output of the 

optical processor. had a half-power width of 10 feet in 

35 

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azimuth and 72 feet in ground range." Lockheed, System 

Report 1. pp. 34-35. 

44. ts/~ "The usable imagery obtained represents 

88,000 square miles or 79 percent of the illuminated terrain; of the total, 63 percent is substantially as good as 

the system was designed to produce, while 16 percent 

suffered only from uneven illumination caused by 

slightly incorrect pulse repetition frequency (prf) setting. 

Another 17 percent of the atiempted coverage was sacrificed during various test sequences in which the prf andJ 

or the attenuation level were intentionally mis-set. Of the 

4 percent that was unintentionally lost. the major portion 

was the victim of occasional failures of the ground-recorder to resynchronize its sweep promptly when prf was 

switched, during those times when the system was dependent on the data-link output An easily correctible 

fogging of the onboard ~lm between active passes also 

accounts tOr some loss ofimagery."_Evaluation 1, 

p.15. 

45. (SfffK) Lockheed, System Report 1. p. 146. 

46.~p.89. 

47. (S/R'K-) Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 146. 

48. pp. 91-92. 

49. fflfI'fIt) Lockheed, System Report 1, pp. 146-148. 

50. ~f/'fl{) Goodyear, KP-Il Final Report, pp. 151-

154. 

51. ~'~_interview. 

52. ES//'fIij Greer's cable is _7061 11 Feb 65. 

subject: Disposition of Quill Hardware (ARC Job 

199800073 Box 1 Folder 106). In_245615 Feb 6S 

NRO headquarters approved placing the remaining 

Quill hardware in storage pending receipt of the report 

of the evaluation committee in Washington. 

53. (U/JPeee) SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 

30 June 1965, TSIBYE. 

54. (Ufl1'66O) SAPSP Director, Quarterly Report. 

30 June 1966, TS/BYE. 

55. (U/lFeuo, Memorandum for the Record, "List of 

Topics for Discussion with ExCom," TSIBYE (BYE 

12941169), 13 June 1969, in ARC Job 199700046 Box 4 

Folder 8. 

56. ~ "NRO Position Paper on the NRO Satellite 

Radar Program." attachment to John L. McLucas to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and Director, 

Defense Research and Engineering, memorandum, "Synthetic Aperture Radar Surveillance Satellite System," 10 

October 1972, TS/BYE (BYE-13130-72), in ARC Job 

199900005 Box 2 Folder 19. 

57. (~_ interview. 

36 

58. -(St Bradburn had been promoted to Lieutenant 

Colonel by the time of the launch, and in the summer of 

1965 left Los Angeles to attend the Air War College. He 

planned his next tour to be in Washington. D.C., but returned to Program A at the request of Brig. <len. King. 

In June 1966 SP was planning to transfer the Quill project from the sigint office to the advanced technology of6c::e. headed by then-Colonel Lew Allen, Jr. Bradburn 

was promoted to Colonel during his year at the War College and retumed to SP to head the sigint office,_ 

Bradburn, interview. 

59. (U/~) SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 

30 June 1966. 

60. (U/we1::Je) SAPSP Director, Quarterly Report, 

30 September 1966, TSIBYE. 

61. (U) Bradburn, interview. 

62. (U/~ Brig. Gen. John L. Martin, USAF, to 

Director, NRO (Dr. Flax), memorandum, "Sur"")' and 

Audit of Cost Reduction Items." SIBYE (BYE-66289-

66), in ARC Job 199800073 Box 1 Foider 125. 

63. (U/lft)tJe~ Charyk to Greer, 21 November 1962. 

64. ~ "We greatly appreciate)'Our offer of SAC 

assistance in evaluating the Quill system; specifically, its 

application to the BDA [bomb damage assessment] problem." Brig. Gen. James T. Stewart, director, NRC staff, to 

Maj. Gen. Robert N. Smith, director, intelligence headquarters, SAC, memorandum, "Evaluation of Radar Imagery," 9 February 1965, TSlBYE (ARC Job 199800073 

Box 1 Folder 106). 

65. (€) Col._USAF (ret), interview, January 2000, Waterton, Colorado. 

66. (U/1P9HQ) SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 

30 June 1966. 

67. ~ An imaging radar satel1ite, even with better 

resolution than Quill, might in fact have been irrelevant 

to SAC's operations. At the time. the declaRd nuclear 

strategy of the United States was an oxymoron, emphasizing both "damage limitation" and "assured destruction." Damage limitation called for building offensive 

forces that c::ould destroy enemy offensive forces and so, 

together with antiballistic missiles and civil defense. 

make it more difficult for Soviet forces to damage the 

United states. Soviet leaders were presumed to see from 

these forces that they would not be able to adlieve any 

reasonable war aims and so would· be deterred from 

striking the United States first. Assured destructim, on 

the other hand, argued that deterrence was based more . 

safely on the assured ability to punish a Soviet first strike 

by destroying Soviet cities and industries in significant 

amounts; Soviet leaders were presumed to see that by 

attacking the United States first they would lose far more 

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than they could hope to gain and so would be deterred 

from doing so. The contradiction between these themes 

arose because efforts to improve a damage limitation 

capability undercut the assured destruction philosophy, 

as John Newhouse explained, "because it may degrade 

your adversary's ability to destroy your own cities in a 

second strike. His confidence undermined, he might 

then be tempted in a crisis to strike pre-emptively; in 

sh<rt. knowing you are effectively proteCted from his 

second-strike assault and fearing your intentions, he 

may choose to strike first" John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: 

The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), pp. 9-10. Secretary of Defense Robert S. 

McNamara argued for the primacy of damage limitation 

in 1962 ("the principle [sic] military objective in the 

event of nuclear war should be the destruction of the enemy's forces [not his population»:' and for assured destruction in 1967 ("I think we could all agree that ifthcy 

struck first we are going to target our weapons against 

their society and destroy 120 million of them." Newhouse, Cold Dawn, p. 11). 

68. (U/~ Dr. Alexander FJax, interview, S February 2003, Chantilly. Virginia. 

69. (U/JF9YQ} Draft manuscript, "Satellite Reconnaissance," marked "Colonel Study. Not Released," July 1963. TSIBYE, pp. 20-21. ARC Job 

199700046 Box 4 Folder 14. 

70. (U/If'OUa, Office of the Historian. National Reconnaissance Office. "Former NRO Directors Series: 

Interview with Dr. Alexander Flax." 22 May 1997, Lm # 

01881. SIBYE. 

7 1. (U/IF~ Dr. Alexander Flax, intel'view. 21 

November 2002, Potomac, Maryland. 

71. ~ "Proposing the radar satellite just seemed so 

obvious. You could go to where they had the film [NPIC] 

and see lots and lots of clouds, week after week, nothing 

but clouds, and we needed timely information." John S. 

Foster, Jr., interview. 4 December 2002, Washington, 

D.C. In his budget review in Now:mba' 1966. Foster 

wrote that funding for "direct read-out" for imagery 

should be reduced and "emphasis placed OIl an all 

weather capability and in advanced developmeal for 

overhead sigint." Foster to Flax. memorandum. 22 

November 1966. "Special Support ktivities RDTclE 

FY 1968 Budget," TSIBYE (BYE-S662-66; ARC Job 

199800073 Box 1 Folder 118). . 

73. (U/!feg9) Perry, Management. pp. l06ff. 

74. ~ McMillan was less caIeful and cost him- ....... , •• II .. 

accomplish the intercepts by building "a covert, and re1atiwiy 

inexpensive, elancnt of a satellite openly developed for 

other purposes. purposes which in themseJves come 

close to justifying the costs involved .. · Such purposes. he 

went on to say, might be weather observation or coinmunication relay. McMillan to deputy director. science and 

technology. CIA, memorandum, "Studies of Synchronous 

Satellites," S November 1964, TSlBYE ~23486-49). 

ARC Job 199800066 Box 3 Folder 2. 

76.~ 

vided in part by 

views. 17 March 

77. (SIJ:I'K) _ interview. 

78. (U/1PWe) Peny, "Reece Satellite R&D," p. 11. 

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