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15 MAY 1968 

MEMORANDUM 

. SUBJECT: The Intelligence Value of the MOL Program- 

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This memorandum presents an assessment of 

the _VIOL Program in terms of its potentially unique 

caatribution to the solution of important national intelligence problems and its cost. The principal justification for the MOL Program is its anticipated capability 

to collect very high resolution photography of denied 

areas. 'According to a paper recently approved by 

Secretary Nitze, the MOL's "sole objective was and is - 

to secure resolution photography 

of significant targets and to develop systems for either 

manned or unmanned use." The focus of our assessment 

is the benefits to be derived from the acquisition of such 

photography. 

2. If the MOL performs as specified, almost all 

of its photography would have ground resolutions between 

In order to determine how this 

very high resolution photography would affect national. 

intelligence, we have reviewed each estimate which has 

a critical bearing on our assessment of the Soviet and 

Chinese threat over the coming years. These reviews 

take into account the likely contributions of other sources 

of information, especially the SIGINT satellites and the 

KH-8 satellite with its resolution photography. 

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•These reviews--summarized under such headings as 

nuclear weapons, ground forces, and ground-based, 

long-range missiles--are available for study. - 

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3. Our conclusion is that the very high resoh v4 

Lion photography of the MOIli would rA4114 4 V411441414 

contribution to intelligence, particularly on detailed 

j.- information relating to Soviet and Chines& weapon - 

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i systems and programs. Satellite photography with 

I resolution of would fkilitate 

I identification of a large number of small items or 

features now beyond our capabilities. It would also 

increase our confidence in-identifying items we can now 

discern and would reduce the error of measurement of 

such items. Obviously, these additional capabilities 

would be most pertinent to technical details about 

various weapon systems. Higher resolution could also, 

improve our understanding of some operating procedures 

and.construction methods at military installations and • 

technical processes and capacities of certain industrial 

facilities. 

4. To date, our review has failed to uncover any 

important estimates of Soviet or Chinese military 

posture--weapon performance or the size and composition of forces--which would be changed significantly by 

11/10L photography. This conclusion is based partly on 

our judgment that some of our outstanding intelligence. 

problems are more likely to be solved by the acquisition 

of technical information other than satellite photography. 

For example, electronic intelligence is needed for solving 

certain problems critical to our estimates of the capabilities 

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5. Our conclUsion is also based on the judgment 

that estimates of the size and disposition of forces will 

not be improved significantly by the very high resolution 

photography unique to the MOL. For example, current 

collection capabilities permit highly reliable estimates 

of the size, eemposition, and deployment of the Soviet 

long-range missile force for about two years into:the. 

future. Higher resolution photography would, however, 

facilitate•detection of modification to associated equipment and even to the missiles if they happened to be 

out of the silo when a site was, photographed. Similarly, 

in the case of the Soviet ground force problem, currently 

available photography provides information sufficient to 

estimate the disposition of such forces and the number 

and general categories of equipment present; other 

information from COlVLINT and documents is required to 

identify the title of the. unit involved. Very high resolu=

tion photography would facilitate a. more confident 

identification of the model of vehicle or weapon present. 

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6. There are also many critical performance 

characteristics about which we have too little information, 

but satellite photography of even resolution 

would have no effect on our estimates. EXamples of 

these characteristics are the accuracy, reliability, and 

yield of ICBM's and whether they are equipped with 

M1RV's. 

7.. In sum, there is no question that satellite 

photography with ground resolutions of 

would provide useful intelligence, especially on 

technical details of weapon systems. The pivotal question with respect to the MOL Program is whether these 

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contributions are.worth the expenditure involved. By 

the end of FY 1963 some $355 million will have been . 

expended on the MOL Program, and about $2. 5 billion 

is planned for. the period FY 1969 through FY 1973. 

8.. The qUestion of. whether MOL's contributions 

to intelligence are worth the further expenditure of 

$2. 5 billion can be approached from several points of 

view. One is to determine how the information collected 

by the MOL would affect US defense expenditures. It has 

been claimed that the US spends additional money on the 

development .and procurement of its weapon systems to 

provide margins of safety because of uncertainties in 

intelligenee estimates of Soviet and Chinese military 

capabilities. The decisions to deploy the Sentinel ABM 

system and to equip our strategic missiles with MIRV's 

and penetration aids are given as examples of this effect. 

A study -0f how the information acquired by the MOL would 

actually reduce US military 'expenditures would provide 

a useful input in evaluating the IVIOL Program. It is 

recommended that the Department of Defense carry out 

a study along these lines. 

9. Certainly, cost savings should not be the sole, 

basis for approving or rejecting the MOL Program. 

Because we cannot foresee all the intelligence problems 

that could possibly arise in the future, we cannot state 

in absolute terms that photography of the quality provided by the MOL would not provide intelligence worth 

its cost. With respect to cost alone, it is, of course,. 

even possible that the information collected by MOL would 

require increased US military expenditures to counter a 

military threat that we would otherwise not know about. 

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10. Another apprOach is to consider whether other 

satellite systems could be modified or developed to 

acquire essentially the same quality of photography as 

the MOL but at significantly lower costs. The clarretit 

it! .401., Program, which includes the very costly unmatifiod 

ersion, was conceived in terms of the technological 

,environment of the early 1960's; much has been learned 

/about satellite photography since then. What is necessary 

;is a study of possible alternative photographic satellite 

I systems that could be developed to acquire this very high 

resolution photography. We believe that the NRO mechanism 

would be most appropriate for such a study. 

11. 'Finally, consideration, of how the expenditures 

for the MOL Program compare with the costs of other 

photographic satellite programs is pertinent to the decision. We note that the MOL expenditures for ;FY 1969 

are programmed for $600 million. Coincidentally, the 

FY 1969 expenditures for all the photographicisatellite 

systems under the Na.tiona3. Reconnaissance Program are 

just under this figure. The NRP provides forlhe procurement and operation of the KH-4 and KH-8 systems 

which collect the broad-swath and detailed photography 

currently available; it also provides sizable expenditures 

for the 'development of the KH-9 system. On balance, it 

is unlikely that the intelligence value of the MOL alone is 

equivalent to the combined contribution of these NRP systems.. 

12. In sum, on the basis of our assessment, we have 

been unable to find potential benefits from the MOL .Program 

of sufficient importance to national intelligence alone to 

justify the expenditures programmed for the future. Nevertheless, should the program be approved for other reasons, 

the intelligence community should have the major role in 

tasking the MOL for collection and exploiting its product 

just as it does for other collection systems which have 

important contributions to make to intelligence. 

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