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THE 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 

THE HONORABLE ELLIOT RICHARDSON 

Secretary of Defense 

February, 1973 

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THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 

I. Surnary 

This document supplements the briefing provided by 

Dr. McLucas and discusses the National Reconnaissance 

Program, briefly describing content, goals, budgets and 

issues, together with a summary of national policy applicable to the program and connnents on key interagency 

relationships. The Secretary of Defense is the executive 

agent for the National Reconnaissance Program and makes 

all program decisions consistent with the needs expressed 

by the intelligence community. 

The National Reconnaissance Program comprises intelligence collection overflight operations of the Department 

of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The program 

is predominantly satellite reconnaissance, using photographic 

and electronic sensors. However, aircraft operations are 

also conducted within the program. The program is one of 

intelligence collection and usually has relied upon DODsponsored developments of boosters, launching facilities, 

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and tracking and control networks. Since technology 

advances within the program are oriented to a specific 

application, they generally have been restricted to 

operational sensor development with only occasional benefit 

to other activities. 

Satellite reconnaissance is a quasi-legal espionage 

activity conducted covertly by the National Reconnaissance 

Office. Satellites are vulnerable vehicles which need a 

permissive environment for successful operation. The United 

States government is deeply dependent on overflight reconnaissance, and particularly satellite reconnaissance, for 

intelligence information. 

The long-term goals of the NRP include enhancing collection capability and reducing costs. An important consideration is to insure adequate collection capability to 

monitor the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. In addition 

to the recently directed developments of an electro-optical 

imaging satellite and an 

other new program possibilities include improved 

electronic intelligence satellites, 

and very long-lived satellites. 

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National satellite reconnaissance policy recognizes 

the need to operate reconnaissance satellites with great 

discretion, develop tacit acceptance of these operations 

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as a reasonable national activity, and avoid embarrassment 

to our allies or confrontation with our enemies in carrying 

out our operations. These policies, and the special security 

arrangements resulting from them, have been primary forces 

in protecting United States reconnaissance operations from 

the threat of international confrontation. A National 

Security Council directed interagency study group is currently evaluating the physical threat to our satellite 

programs in light of the present Soviet anti-satellite 

capability. The NRO has devoted much effort in recent years 

studying the problem and developing potential countermeasures. 

NASA's and ACDA's interests in earth-sensing satellites 

require special consideration which can be, and is being, 

provided through close coordination and cooperation between 

those agencies and the DOD. The NRO has made U-2 capability 

available to NASA for civil earth-sensing activities. ACDA 

has sponsored a series of technical reports on NRP satellite 

systems oriented toward the verification of a SALT. 

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In its continuing efforts to transfer capability 

accruing from the national programs to more specific 

defense requirements, studies are underway which examine 

the integration of an NRO satellite with a non-NRO 

satellite and the potential for tactical use of national 

collectors. 

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II. The Program 

The National Reconnaissance Program is a single, 

national program dedicated to the collection, through 

overflight, of intelligence to meet the needs and objectives 

of the United States Government. The Secretary of Defense 

is the Executive Agent for the Program, managing resources 

of the CIA and DOD in carrying out the mission; he receives 

program reconnnendations from an Executive Con:nnittee made 

up of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of 

Central Intelligence, and the President's Science Advisor. 

The Program is managed by the Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office, who is an official of the Department 

of Defense. The technical aspects of the program are 

reviewed by the Land Panel, a special panel established by 

the President's Science Advisor. Managerial aspects are 

reviewed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 

Board. 

The Program is covert and comprises the development, 

management, and operation of satellites and aircraft, for 

photographic or electronic overhead reconnaissance of denied 

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areas of the world (peripheral reconnaissance is a separate 

responsibility managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 

The National Reconnaissance Program is responsive 

directly to the intelligence collection requirements and 

priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. 

The National Reconnaissance Office sends its plans and schedules for both satellite and aircraft reconnaissance overflights 

directly to the 40 Committee of the National Security Council 

for operational approval. 

A. Program Background 

The essential background of the National Reconnaissance Program begins shortly after the May 1, 1960 loss 

of a U-2 aircraft engaged in overflight reconnaissance of 

the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of this event, faced 

with the loss of reconnaissance capability over the USSR, 

President Eisenhower directed the National Security Council 

to review intelligence collection alternatives, such as 

satellite reconnaissance. As a result of this review and 

subsequent deliberations, the reconnaissance satellite projects of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence 

Agency were consolidated into a single, national program to 

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be managed by a special arrangement designed to enhance 

covert operation and assure successful achievement of program 

objectives. By the Spring of 1962 these organizational 

adjustments culminated in the establishment of a National 

Reconnaissance Program which was to be managed by a National 

Reconnaissance Office--a single, national agency responsible 

for satellite photographic and signal intelligence collection 

operations, satellite mapping and geodesy, and aircraft overflight reconnaissance. 

B. What the Program Does 

The National Reconnaissance Program uses aircraft 

and satellites as its collection vehicles. 

The satellite vehicles carry sensors which collect 

(1) broad coverage search and surveillance photography, 

(2) high resolution spotting and surveillance photography, 

and (3) signal (cOimD.unication and electronic) intelligence.* 

A typical broad-coverage satellite photographic 

mission produces photography of over twenty-five million 

square miles of land mass at ground resolutions of two to 

seven feet, of which almost 70 percent is cloud-free. Such 

*Details on these projects are given in the Appendix. 

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a mission also produces special coverage suited specifically 

to mapping and charting purposes. The current system became 

operational in 1971 and is an improved search and surveillance 

system providing significantly longer satellite life, broader 

area coverage, and finer resolution than its predecessor 

which became operational in 1960. 

A high resolution satellite photographic mission 

returns about 15,000 photographs with ground resolutions 

of three feet. The current system became ~-------~ 

operational in 1963 and has been improved repeatedly to 

increase its orbital life and resolving power. 

Some satellites are designed and operated to collect electro-magnetic signal emissions which originate from 

Soviet or Chinese Communist radars and cOilllm.lnication 

devices. The collected intelligence reveals the status, 

locations, and characteristics of key weapon systems such 

as the Soviet anti-ballistic missile system. 

C. National Importance of the Program 

Satellite reconnaissance is undoubtedly the single 

most important tool available to the nation for the detection 

and assessment of foreign offensive capabilities. Satellites 

have been the sole means of identifying and locating all 

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Soviet and Chinese offensive missile launchers; virtually 

all new major weapon system developments have been first 

identified by overhead collectors. And it is primarily 

satellites which provide the confidence in verification 

that permitted the President to enter Strategic Arms 

Limitation Agreements. 

Information providing the basis for significant 

reassessment of Soviet and Chinese Communist ground force 

strength and capability to supply and reinforce units in 

conflict along the periphery of Connnunist nations is 

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derived largely from satellite reconnaissance, either 

directly or by implication. The Defense Intelligence Agency 

estimates that 65 percent of what the U.S. knows about the 

strength, equipage, and disposition of Soviet ground forces--

90 percent for the Chinese--is attributable to satellite 

intelligence. 

In special categories like observing the Lop Nor 

Test Site, or locating SAM defenses in Southeast Asia, satellites have been practically an exclusive intelligence source. 

In the field of electronic signal intelligence, 

NRP satellites routinely provide detailed information on 

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Soviet and Chinese electronic order of battle locations, 

surface to air missile related radars and Soviet ABM radars 

in a virtually continuous electronic surveillance of the 

entire Sino Soviet land mass. Connnunications intelligence 

vehicles provide locations of most Soviet and Chinese 

emitters and dedicated collection from selected links. 

Telemetry data are also collected from Soviet missiles and 

satellites from pre-launch checkout to re-entry or on-orbit 

operation. 

Today the United States depends on the National 

Reconnaissance Program for most of its strategic and tactical 

information on the world's closed societies. This dependence 

would be magnified further by U.S. withdrawal from foreign 

bases. 

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III. Policies Supporting the Program 

When the first U-2 photography of the USSR was produced (in 1956), President Eisenhower directed that it be 

protected--as an ultra-sensitive espionage product--in a 

special security system. In 1960, when the first satellite 

reconnaissance photographs were produced, President Eisenhower 

directed that they be similarly protected and placed them in 

a compartment of the same special security system. 

During 1961 and early 1962, the Soviets made a number 

of private overtures to the U.S. protesting the use of satellites for reconnaissance. In 1962, the question of the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance began to appear as an important pre-condition to international negotiations on disarmament and on the peaceful uses of outer space. In response 

to increasing pressure, the President asked a CoTimlittee of 

Principals, acting under the leadership of Ambassador U. Alexis 

Johnson, to formulate a national policy which would (1) maintain United States freedom of action to conduct reconnaissance 

satellite operations unilaterally, (2) prevent foreign 

political and physicaJ interference with those operations, 

(3) prevent accidental or forced disclosure of the details 

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of the operations or end-products of the United States reconnaissance program, and, at the same time, (4) permit the 

United States to continue to work toward disarmament and 

international cooperation in space. 

A national policy supporting these goals was recommended 

by this Conrrnittee, approved by the President on July 10, 1962, 

and issued in NSC Action 2454. Essentially, the policy 

enjoins the United States to (1) operate its reconnaissance 

satellites with great discretion, (2) work toward developing 

tacit acceptance of these operations, and (3) avoid embarrassment to our allies or confrontation with our enemies. 

The Committee of Principals, the NSAM 156 Committee, 

is still charged with review of satellite reconnaissance 

policy planning. The Committee is maintaining interest in 

the public acceptability of Earth Resources Satellite programs 

as well as the information aspects of satellite reconnaissance 

as it pertains to future SALT negotiations. 

As a result of careful satellite reconnaissance policy 

planning, the United States is enjoying, at this time, an 

international political situation which provides all the 

advantages of tacit acceptance without the hazards inherent 

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in open discussion or confrontation. It is critically important to nourish the conditions which contribute to such 

an atmosphere, for reconnaissance satellites require a permissive envirornnent--political and physical--for successful 

operation. 

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IV. Long Term Goals of the NRO 

The NRO plans to continue to: 

A. Conduct a covert program to collect intelligence 

through the overflight of denied territory. 

B. Seek methods to reduce the cost of such collection. 

C. Improve the responsiveness of collection systems 

to intelligence needs. 

D. Advance satellite reconnaissance techniques in 

order to improve collection capabilities and respond to 

new collection needs. 

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V. New Programs 

Although satellite reconnaissance is conducted as a 

covert program, its hardware and techniques are developed, 

procured, and used in "the open," whenever possible. For 

example, the program uses Air Force launching facilities 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, it shares the Satellite Test 

Facility at Sunnyvale, and uses satellite recovery capabilities in Hawaii. The bulk of the program I s hardware--

boosters and spacecraft--is readily available to any organization. As a general rule, only the payload is handled 

under special security. The NRP budget for new technology 

reflects this arrangement, being oriented essentially toward 

improved payloads. 

At present, photographic satellites return data by 

ejecting capsules which are aerially recovered. It has long 

been desired to return imagery electronically, thus permitting 

nearly immediate intelligence analysis. Further, an electronic 

imaging satellite might have a longer useful life on orbit and 

thus be more economical than present systems. Recent decisions 

have led to a program start which will result in a system of 

very long-lived electro-optical imaging satellites which will 

be operating after 1976. 

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A second generation of electronic intelligence collection satellites became operational during the late 1960 1 s 

and early 1970's. Two of the new satellite systems operate 

in synchronous orbit. It may be expected that, during the 

decade of the 1970 1 s, there will be further improvements of 

such systems taking advantage of observations from the 

altitude of synchronous orbit where long continuous periods 

of observation are possible. 

If the Space Transportation System becomes a reality, 

satellites of the NRP will be transported to orbit by the 

shuttle. The potential impact on the NRP is being examined 

at this time. While introducing several problems, the 

shuttle concept may afford a replenishment or repair capability for extending the life of the reconnaissance satellites. 

Present sizing and configuring of the shuttle are based on 

NRP payload requirements since a significantly large number 

of STS flights will be carrying NRP payloads. 

Studies and limited developments are underway in areas 

such as radar surveillance satellites (which offer the advantage of an 

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Such techniques can augment current 

reconnaissance capabilities and will be evaluated during the 

1970's. 

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VI. Trends 

The increasing success of satellite intelligence collection and the increasing sensitivity of the U.S. to international confrontation have caused a decreasing emphasis on 

covert aircraft programs. The NRP budget is now about 

95 percent devoted to satellite systems. As satellites 

have become more effective, it has been possible to reduce 

the launching rate substantially while increasing intelligence collection. It seems quite clear that there is a steady 

trend toward long-lived satellites. With continuing pressure 

to reduce the overall intelligence budget coupled with the 

direct interest of the Congress in sizing the NRP budget, 

we are constantly seeking ways to achieve our mission at 

reduced cost. 

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VII. Possibilities of Satellite Interdiction 

Since the legality of satellite espionage is an unsettled 

matter, the possibility of some nation attempting to destroy 

U.S. reconnaissance satellites has long been a matter of concern. The Soviets have demonstrated a capability which could 

be used to destroy U.S. satellites in near-earth orbit. 

Despite this apparent capability, National Intelligence 

Estimates conclude that it is extremely unlikely the Soviets 

would take hostile action against our reconnaissance satellites in any circumstances other than as a preclude to 

general war. While China probably now has a marginal capability to interfere with our satellites through the use of 

nuclear weapons, no fully developed Chinese anti-satellite 

capability, either nuclear or non-nuclear, is anticipated 

for some time. On the basis of these estimates, there has 

been little attempt to provide physical protection for 

current satellite operations, although a certain amount of 

research has been accomplished. 

Recently, Dr. Kissinger requested a review of the 

Soviet threat. A study group, chaired by ODDR&E, is presently accomplishing the review. 

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VIII. Relationships 

A. NRP Relationships with NASA 

For some time, NASA has been approaching use of 

satellite-borne sensors to locate and study earth resources. 

Experiments involving hand-held cameras operated by GEMINI 

and APOLLO astronauts have not been politically offensive to 

other nations, largely because the photographs are at a 

fairly gross resolution, the 11 targets 11 are carefully selected, 

the film is reviewed by a United States Intelligence Board 

security panel before it is released to the public, and 

hostile states such as the USSR and Red China are either 

not overflown or not now photographed. Future possible 

NASA applications, involving oceanography, forestry, geology, 

geography, and agriculture, must be planned and controlled 

very carefully, for the line between economic research photography and economic intelligence photography is very thin and 

casual experimentation could trigger challenges to the 

legitimacy of not only the NASA earth-sensing program but 

of the National Reconnaissance Program. In 1966, 

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's satellite reconnaissance 

policy committee, the NSAM 156 Corrnnittee, met again and 

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developed policy to cover this potential danger area. 

Within the guidelines established by that committee, NASA 

and the NRO have been proceeding on a cooperative basis 

in planning a NASA earth-sensing program which will meet 

our nation's scientific needs without jeopardizing its 

ability to gather intelligence from space. More recently, 

the 156 Committee recommended the approval of Dr. Kissinger 

for NASA to be permitted to fly a higher resolution earth 

terrain camera on its forthcoming SKYI.AB mission. 

In addition, the President's Science Advisor, with 

the endorsement and support of the Director of Central 

Intelligence and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, sponsors 

a committee with membership from the non-defense agencies 

which identifies ways in which space intelligence photography 

can be used by these agencies within the present security 

and policy regulations and provides a channel for passing 

these needs to USIB's Committee on Imagery Requirements 

and Exploitation. This Connn.ittee has had a strong positive 

influence in coordinating the needs of the civil cOlIIlm.lnity 

and assisting to plan a reasonable earth-sensing program. 

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B. NRP Relationships with the Arms Control and 

Disarmament 

The SALT talks have brought the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency directly into satellite reconnaissance 

policy considerations. In 1968, concerned that the USSR 

would not agree to on-site inspection, the NSAM 156 Committee 

proposed to negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that 

the United States was prepared to accept "enforcement by 

maximum, or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national 

means of verification ... " (for the United States, this 

expression means "satellite reconnaissance"). In addition, 

in order to support its proposal, the Department of State 

recommended declassifying the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance, disclosing to the Soviets 

that reconnaissance satellites are our main reliance for 

verification, briefing Congress on our reconnaissance capabilities, and informing the press and public--gradually but 

officially--along the same lines. After discussion within 

the United States Intelligence Board and key affected 

government agencies, it was decided that disarmament discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and 

possibly more effectively, by restricting the U.S. delegation 

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to use of the expression "national means of verification" 

with no reference to our satellite reconnaissance program. 

It was pointed out that disclosure is an irreversible step 

which could have profoundly adverse effects on national 

security. after reviewing the positions of the Agency 

Heads regarding the necessity and proprietary of disclosing 

the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance, Dr. Kissinger reaffirmed the present no-disclosure policy. 

Throughout the SALT ratification process, there was 

much speculation in the press regarding the use of reconnaissance satellites as the means of verification; however, 

Congress did not require any further explanation regarding 

the means nor the reliability of the proposed verification 

procedure. This approach is expected to be pursued in the 

next round of SALT negotiations. 

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IX. NRP Charter 

The present NRP operating charter is an Agreement 

between the DOD and CIA dated 11 August 1965. It is the 

third of a series of Agreements, the first two being inefficient in that no direct chain of command was established. 

The present Agreement was based on the reconnnendations of 

the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The 

Agreement has served its purpose well; however, the DNRO 

has recommended to Mr. Laird that current NRP management 

procedures would be strengthened with substantial authoritative backing such as a National Security Council Intelligence 

Directive or alternatively, a revised charter which accounts 

for 7\ years of evolution. 

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x. Key Subjects Facing the NRO During the Next Five Years 

A. Log-term Plan for Photo Reconnaissance 

We presently use HEXAGON for wide area cover and 

GAMBIT for high resolution close up pictures of targets of 

high interest. When the KENNEN system becomes operational 

in 1976, it will produce pictures of good quality in near 

real time; however, the KENNEN imagery will not show details 

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D. Tactical Application for Satellite Reconnaissance 

We are entering the era of tactical reconnaissance 

by satellites. The USIB has recognized ocean surveillance 

as a valid requirement; other tactical uses, Army and Air 

Force, are being defined. There will be some organizational 

and operational problems in applying the covert and centrally 

managed NRP satellite resources to these tactical purposes. 

Nevertheless, satellites are inherently adaptable to many 

purposes and many customers; therefore, to avoid fragmentation and duplication of effort, a firm high level management 

control, like the NRO, will continue to be useful. 

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DATA APPENDIX 

INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE NRP 

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INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE NRP 

CONTROL SYSTEM S 

Jointly 

1. Photographic Satellites 

a. CORONA. A meditnn resolution, broad-coverage search 

system which began operating in 1960 was phased out in 1971. 

Typically, seven or eight 10-14 day CORONA missions were 

flown per year and, on the average, each provided about 7.0 

million square miles of photography at resolutions of seven 

to twelve feet. The final CORONA mission was flown in May 

1972. 

b. HEXAGON. A second generation search system which 

currently covers almost 28 million square miles per 60-day 

mission at resolutions of approximately two to five feet. 

HEXAGON covers a swath of 280 miles from a normal operating 

altitude of 82 miles--about double the swath of CORONA. With 

its improved resolution, HEXAGON also satisfies many surveillance requirements. First flight was in June 1971, subsequent flights in January, June and October 1972, and three 

or four successful launchings per year are planned for the 

program's lifetime, which is estimated to be ten years or 

more. 

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c. GAMBIT. A high resolution surveillance/technical 

intelligence system which began operating in 1963. Typically, 

four GAMBIT missions are flown per year and an avera6e mission returns 15,000 photographs at ground resolutions of 

~-------~ three feet. Mission life has been extended 

to 24 days with a 30 day lifetime expected to be realized 

beginning early in 1973. 

2. Signal Intelligence Satellites 

a. POPPY. A long-life, broad-band SIGINT search system 

for locating new and unusual signals and determining their 

position. POPPY is also used to locate selected radars for 

updating the Electronic Order of Battle (EOB). This satellite 

is flown in a 500 n.m. orbit and has an operating life of over 

one year. 

b. STRAWMAN. A Imllti-purpose, broad-band, high-sensitivity, 

near-earth-orbit (275 n.m.) SIGINT system whose primary function 

was to determine the technical characteristics of known radars. 

It also had a good capability for locating new signals and 

providing locations for EOB updating. The final STRAWMA.N 

was launched in July 1971. 

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f. P-11. This name refers to a special purpose secondary 

satellite responsive to a wide variety of SIGINT needs. Most 

frequently it is used for directed coverage of a specific 

nature, such as anti-ballistic missile search, technical 

intelligence collection on certain radars, and low capacity 

multi-channel COMINT. P-lls are launched as secondary payloads on other satellites (e.g. HEXAGON), separated at 

altitude, and then spin-stabilized in orbit. 

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3. NRP Financial Program (Millions TOA) 

FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 

Aircraft and SuEEort Pro rams: 

U-2 Aircraft Support: 

CIA-NRP 5.3 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 

(a) Air Force 15.9 

Subtotal 21.2 ~ 5.9 "T.l ~ ""TI 

Mission Support: (Photographic Materials and Processing, Area 51 Operations) 

NRP 23.1 23.7 24.3 24.7 25.1 25.4 

R&D Support: (Countermeasures R&D, General R&D) 

NRP 3.7 3.9 4.1 

Aircraft and Support Total 48.o 33.4 34.3 

4.2 

35.0 

4.3 

35.6 

(a) Starting with FY 1974, these changes may move from the NRP to regular 

Air Force bud.get. 

Satellite Frog ams: 

Photographic Systems: 

CORONA o.4 

HEXAGON 206.2 205.0 229.8 226.8 246.3 

GAMBIT 127.1 106.7 136.2 145.3 171.0 

GAMBIT Im]'.)rovernents 2 O 22 2 23 3 17 6 11 6 

COMINT /EL INT Systems: 

STRAWMAN 1.2 

I P-11 21.2 21.8 22.2 24.l 22. 

4.4 

36.1 

234.o 

156.5 

8 O 

22.8 

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FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 

Mission Support: (Satellite Control Facilities, Westover Photo Facility, 

Propellants, Misc. Operating) 

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FY 78 

NRP 77.3 85.4 9J+.l 95.1 90.5 86.5 

R&D Support: (Applied Research, Advanced Development, Vulnerability R&D, 

Photo R&D, Misc. Development) 

NRP 22.4 31.0 32.5 34.2 35.9 37.7 

Satellite Total 

Satellite Planned Launches: 

Photographic Systems: 

HEXAGON 

GAMBIT 

KENNEN 

Subtotal 

CO.MINT/ELINT Svstems· 

P-11 Rides 

3 

1 3 

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