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1112:IORANDLIM FOR =MAL STEWART, 

GENERAL EVANS 

SUDJECT: DOD/MOL Program Security 

I have reviewed the existing DOD MOL security 

policy against technical and management concepts in 

the process of development, and I find that, with 

one small exception, the policy is appropriate to MOL 

follow-on activities and should not be changed. 

The concept of a publicly acknowledged =OM 

program with maximum security oriented toward the 

PaYloadimissioa aspects of the program, using normal 

zacarity and SLR provisions of DOD Directive 5200.13 

and APR 205-23 as a security cover for. BYRUM security, 

is still valid. 

There are security problems related to MOL4 however 

whi...3b, I have listed below in what I believe is,the 

order of priority. Two are discussed at length along 

with recommendations in attachments to this amaranth= 

and a third is presently being worked on. 

1. Public Affairs: There has been considerable 

U. S. press identifying reconnaissance as, the primary 

mission of MM. The reasons for this and suggested - 

corrective action are contained in TAB A 

2. Mission Reorientation: The reorientation of 

MoL away from the "black" and "white" experiments mode 

to a mode focused upon stated program objectives, 

creates the need for actions designed to reorient 

existing "white" experimentation security-wise to be 

com?atible with the security guide. This matter is 

covGred in TAB B which is a security concept study 

appropriate to this phase of the program. 

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3. Program Director B socurity.ftidet . A, 

sort of encyclopedia on how to run th4vSeCtIritYVi, 

covert programsstated in clear concite.terma and 

wocifically tailored to this progrnms:is needed for 

Program Directorate I. Suenivdocument is being Pro: 

varod. Wo will make effective use of Col Vordis: 

draft on this subject. I regard. this as ajourneymants, 

gapor. 

Attachments 

1. Public Affairs 

2. Reorientation Plan 

Distribution 

Cy #1 - Gen Stewart 

Cy #2 - Gen Evans 

Cy #3 - SS-3 

Cy #4 RF 

Cy #5 - RF #2 

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1it.koLe BYENIAN::,• 

sypTtlyi 

MOL PUBLIC •IN FORMAT/ONH 

A reviev of available press concerning the DOD ma 

Program has been conducted. It is found that we have by 

no means succeeded in removing the image of reconnaissance 

this program. The following factors have contributed 

most significantly to this state of affairs: 

1. Early decision to permit certain limited "hite 

experimentation bearing upon manes ability to improve upon 

the function of military observation from space. 

2. 

3. U. S. Navy preoccupation with the matter _of sea 

s...Irveillance as related to UOL (P43) -whicho'based up0A 

pl.ior study efforts included consideration of such 

scnsers as: variable focal-length TV cameras, nultiplO 

radar systems, earth oriented ran and view finders, -: 

electronic sensors, multi-speCtral sensors std. earthdirected sensors. 

The problem of the press must be examined:recogaiaiW 

that there exists no conceivable "cover" for MOL'I.econnoissance ti re are e o rericempepon 

ITzystaia of rigid security. On the positive side-,. however, 

news reporters are, of necessity, constrained .by: (1) the 

noed for a newsworthy event, (2) the need far presenting 

the event in an interesting fashion. A speech isvanewS7 

worth event. If the speech is unintereating ire% td577 

BTan poin - cif the public, it compels the reperterto Search 

his archives for correlative data - past sPy44-44 SOO-Psi 

etc. Thus, an unelassitied spec becomes provocative:vf 

an undesirable-news story. The requireMent'for 

security reviey of public releases and speeches is not 

adequate to meet this problem. The matter of public affairs 

with respect to Z101.. trust be cleverly prograMmed toAneet the 

newsman's needs and to avoid the possibility, 4of undesirable 

press articles from the standpoint of natienalpolicy. 

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:::;ccmmendation: That a planned UOLIpubitc aftairS prOgram 

ccailed trot the Pentagon level CMDO Staff is conjunction 

'with OM/Public Affairs) be initiated. Tho program should 

play tip tha dramatic aspects Of raan in sPaco, do-PmPhasize 

tceical details which might be provoCative of mission 

ex.1tod press speculation, meet the needs of tha* segment 

nova media responsive to the man in the street, who, 

by 1.1._% laroo, is not technically oriented. The right to make 

r.:ef,-;a0.1 or public releases on the subject of MOL, not a 

co=.Ldered part of this master-plan, public affairs program, 

h,:JuId be mtpressly prohibited 
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ks,;117077771!"-- 

=ultra'MI =m:9 MAN 

l'urpose: 

The purpose of this paper is to set forte proposed actions 

rovIrod to align security with the reoriented project plan 

for 

II. fssumptions: 

A. An autonomous CPO (the MO progras °MOO) identified 

tie 22ejoct } under the DM ,o13.1 be responsible for the in. 

pllaz4? definition and development of the UM vehicle laboratory, 

and payload to meet specific objectives set forth in WHIG 2817. 

a, The SPO, will be responsible for all program unique 

=pacts of VIOL to include,: 

Fund Control - Overt 

Security Control - Overt 

Contracting Overt 

Communications Overt 

MC:moral Security Concepts 

A. Admit we have a, V0101 manned orbital laborttory .and 

its mission is to determine maes potential naeft lness in 

-s*:2aec- T// 4 rYl/ y Seiv y' ) 

D. Do not try to build the MOL in ,acomploWly covert 

at:Ao!,,phoro. 

C. Do not try to launch the MoL under a covert condition. 

L. Do not try to control all activities 

or clar all participants Donuti. 

Conduct selected oiler Lion 

reconanissance missions). 

B. Sot up hard overt security rules 

aroas and activities. 

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C. Exploit hard security rules aro d peripheral 

cation" to insulate actual reconnaissance activity. 

E.npleit HASA's association with program by allowing 

selected press releases. 

Security Eoview: 

A. Past situation With regard to security. 

1 February - 30 April 1$$ 

1. Experiment studies wore performed in technical 

u4ite or black cells, directed by different managaaent. 

2. People were physically separated according to 

bizick or white activity and directed by different'managemen 

3. Vehicle design study has been accomplished in 

tita white with cleansed interlace information provided from 

DOZAU studies. 

4. /a each of 1, 2, and 3 eve, strict rules • mere 

in force to keep SAFSP people from being 141mA/tied with. 

the HOL project, 

5. Reconnaissance information in white studies: eras 

*trolled under 5200.13 and XFP. 205-23. 

B. Present situation with regard to security: 

1. A roam cleared group prepared the 1 OL*51Emary 

presentation which is oriented to program objectives rather 

thal Individuaal experiments. 

2. FormulatiVe planning hag,bean 

Program Z. 

C. security activities during the Owes identified as 

P,inT and P1113Ma ware governed by-criteria set forth by the 

in docunl.ents entitled: 

• 1. Special Security Procedures for the Department of 

Defosse Manned Or Laboratory ekep--eleerelVDOBIAIVEZMIMO 

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2. Security Policies and Procedures for the Department 

oi Do :Cense Manned Orbital Laboratory, dated 19 February 1965, 

::.w,c4a the Office of the Under Secretary og the Air FOreet 

Confidential. 

D. An SSD Progrnm 632A Guide has been approved for 

:p7olicatien. It will be implemented I June 196. This 

implements end further amplifies white Security 

claosification policy. 

Generally (except for one it= to be corrected) the 

c,ttiteria in the e.zisting guidance for determining the type 

of so rarity system and controls to be used to protect the 

vm.ious elements of the program remain valid evert with 

cv=nhazis directed toward mission objectives and a •change 

in the em%nagement structure. These criteria are: 

1. tiaterial, information, and activities reorealing 

a ::-tission or objective of terrestrial (of the earth) 

c,::.onnaiesance is to be controlled by the .E MM security -

system as Project D02.141, 

2. Military payloads arta military vehicle/p 340 

interlace data not revealing a reconnaissance mission is 

tco be controlled =der DOD Directive 5200.13 and' AF 205-.23 

3. Other activities related to the. MOIL project such 

booeter information nd vehicle data not irevealing of above 

will be controlled under normal security. 

4. Non-military activities related to the MOI• 

canductod under novagl security enclaseilied in Some 

ig:otnuceo. 

;T. ACTION ITnIS: 

A. MI* SPO (Project 3) 

The coMbining of Project with-the MOL Program 

Lee as a monolithic management unit establishes single 

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point where security tor future action with: regard to 

InD contractor operations and operational planning can be 

directed. The abolishment of the concept ofIltdividual 

ellveriments allows us to view relationships of various . 

elements and actions in a broadened perspective.. :then 

future actions are being planned or establishe4 i.e., 

work statements, plans, etc., each element of activity' 

will be checked against the DORIAN classification guide 

(IV. C,1) to determine the appropriate security system 

aad controls to be applied. 

B. Navy MOL Activity 

1. It is assumed that all-weather sea surveillance 

activities will be managed in one of thefollowiag:fashions:. 

Situation #1: Program E is responsible foriall 

nor, R&D under the direction of DNRO.. Navy personnel are 

assigned to Program and are responsible for providing 

Navy sea surveillance requirements. 

Situation #2 MIRO assigns directly to U. S. 

17avy/BUWEPS and also to Program E, as appropriate to cir.. 

cumstances, R&D in response to I3... S. Navy stated sea. 

veinal= requirements. Navy persOnnel are asSigaed. 

to Program E for interface. 

If situation #1 prevails, Program E,shall be 

responsible to review all MOL sea -surveillance elements 

:,1.ainst the DORIAN guide to determine appropriate security 

system and controls to be applied. 

If situation #2 prevails* Program S shall be responsible to assure all MOL sea surveillance elements' 

assigned to Program E are controlled under the appropriate 

security system. A, EMWEPS warm activity will have to be 

established to insure Navy MOL activities are provided 

appropriate security, 

In either case, action must be initiated with regard 

ta the elimination of overt P.43 activity which reveals 

.T:,,aecanaissance. A/ significant portion of P-13 Activity is 

1.venling of the rconnaissance mission. These activities 

st be accomplished as DOR/AN under BIEMAN rules, A:letter 

fom the DNRO to an appropriate Navy authority- must be 

tIcaivered stating the problem and indicating need for action. 

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2. Public relenee policy regarding Navy .MOL 

aetivities must be more restricted. 

C, NASA COL Activity 

1. NASA should continue to refer to 1101. activities 

ty; experiments. 

2. NASA must be provided through appropriate 

channels the DONE' WYMAN) classification guide aS well 

Et3 all overt mat, classification guides. 

3. Future information provided to or generated 

b MBA revealing of reconnaissance activity by the COL 

most be under DORIAN rules. 

4. Retrieval or directed destruction of SECRWT 

SAR documents provided to NASA which contain,reconnaissance 

ili.forma.tiora should not be attempted. Such action will 

up too much activity. 

5. Public releases by NASA, like Air Force and 

lizwy, need to come under special controls* 

D. ARPA COL Activity 

1. If ARPA continues COL actionS, a small number 

ol* ARPA's highest management must be briefed- DORIAN. The 

pcepose of the briefing will be to enlist the aid and 

support of ARPAes highest level officials in constraining 

their personnel and contractors from delving into the 

reeonnaissance aspects of the COL, 

2, If ARP& does not plan further NM, related 

activity, the highest ARPA official and his deputy should 

vac: briefed DORIAN. The purpose of • this briefing would be 

to prevent provocative public releases pertaining to the 

LIGL. 

S. Ne should not attempt to withdraw or effect 

spacial controls on ARPA studies which have been completed 

and distributed. 

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E.. The crux of the.future policy come:m*4g POPIP44c41: 

•activity must be to selectect'hey - individnal$ of 

government an having. a function orinterest•in 

r,XUAN• to prevent vnwitting•people - -trem,making . statements, 

initiating, authorizing or alloying 

kilovn or implies the reconnaissance misSion - of:X014:- _ • 

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