United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 96-3081EA

_____________

William H. Johnson, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

City of West Memphis; Al Boals, *

in His Official and Individual *

Capacity; Joe Brasfield, in *

His Official and Individual * Appeal from the United States

Capacity; Thomas Burroughs, in * District Court for the Eastern

His Official and Individual * District of Arkansas.

Capacity; Al Felton; Roberta *

Jackson, in Her Official and *

Individual Capacity; Bill *

Pollard, in His Official and *

Individual Capacity; Dan Scott, *

in His Official and Individual *

Capacity, *

*

Appellees. *

_____________

 Submitted: March 10, 1997

 Filed: May 14, 1997

_____________

Before FAGG, HEANEY, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

In January 1995, newly elected mayor Al Boals fired William H.

Johnson from his job as the general manager of the utility

commission in West Memphis, Arkansas. Despite Johnson’s repeated

requests, Mayor Boals refused to hold a termination hearing or to

offer any reasons for his decision. Johnson asked the city council

to intervene, but his request was denied. See Ark. Code Ann. § 14-
-2-

42-110 (Michie 1987) (unless vetoed by two-thirds of city council,

city mayor can appoint and remove all department heads). Believing

he was entitled to a hearing, and that he was fired because he

declined to support Mayor Boals’s election campaign, Johnson filed

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Mayor Boals, the members of

the city council, and the City of West Memphis (collectively the

City). The district court granted the City’s motion for summary

judgment, and Johnson appeals. We affirm. 

The Due Process Clause requires the government to provide an

employee with procedural due process if the employee stands to lose

a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. See

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). For a

property interest to exist, the public employee must have a

legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. See

Skeets v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc).

An employee’s liberty interests are implicated when, in connection

with the employee’s discharge, a government official makes

accusations that seriously damage the employee’s standing in the

community or foreclose other employment opportunities. See Shands

v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1347 (8th Cir. 1993).

Johnson lacked a property interest because he was not entitled

to continued employment as the utility commission’s general

manager. Under Arkansas law, Johnson was an at-will employee who

could be terminated at any time without cause. See Skeets, 816

F.2d at 1215. The Arkansas Supreme Court recognizes certain

exceptions to its employment-at-will doctrine, see Mertyris v.

P.A.M. Transport, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ark. 1992), but

Johnson does not fall within any of them. Johnson had no written

employment contract covering a definite term, and although the

city’s personnel manual states employees will not be terminated

“without being offered a pre[]termination hearing,” the manual does

not expressly provide that employees will only be dismissed for
-3-

cause. See id. Contrary to Johnson’s view, the longstanding

custom of providing all city employees with a due process hearing

before they were terminated does not affect our analysis. See

Packett v. Stenberg, 969 F.2d 721, 724-25 (8th Cir. 1992) (newly

elected officials may change an earlier administration’s employment

practices). Besides, like the terms of the personnel manual

itself, the past mayor’s willingness to grant a hearing merely

creates an expectancy of review, and not a legitimate claim to

continued employment with the City of West Memphis. See Stow v.

Cochran, 819 F.2d 864, 866-67 (8th Cir. 1987). 

Likewise, Johnson lost no liberty interest during the city

council’s public debate on whether the council should override

Mayor Boals’s termination decision. Rather than making accusations

that would stigmatize Johnson’s protected liberty interest, see

Shands, 993 F.2d at 1347-48, councilwoman Roberta Jackson simply

expressed her view that it was inappropriate for the utility

commission to do construction work on private property, and stated

some anonymous commission employees had complained to her about

being “harassed” at work. 

Having rejected Johnson’s due process claim, we turn to his

contention that he was fired for exercising his First Amendment

rights. Johnson correctly points out that a public employee may

not be discharged for political reasons unless the employee’s

political views are an appropriate qualification for the job in

question. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980);

Billingsley v. St. Louis County, 70 F.3d 61, 63 n.1 (8th Cir.

1995); O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 909 (1st Cir. 1993).

Assuming Mayor Boals based his termination decision on Johnson’s

refusal to support his candidacy, we conclude personal loyalty to

the mayor is an appropriate requirement for the general manager’s

position. The general manager reports directly to the mayor and

his duties include public relations and responsibility for the
-4-

utility commission’s long-range planning. We believe Johnson’s

planning responsibilities, which encompass areas of city

decisionmaking that could be influenced by his partisan viewpoints,

put a premium on his allegiance to the mayor. See Branti, 445 U.S.

at 517-19; O’Connor, 994 F.2d at 910-11; Bauer v. Bosley, 802 F.2d

1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 1986). Indeed, Johnson admits that he did not

see eye-to-eye with Mayor Boals’s view that it would not be in the

city’s best interest to convert the utility commission into an

independent governmental body. Under the utility commission’s

current structure, the city council has the final say on setting

customer rates, and the city receives substantial revenue from the

commission’s operations. Not only is Johnson at odds with Mayor

Boals about the impact a conversion would have on the city, he is

also in a position to lobby his agenda with the city council and

the public as well in his role as the utility commission’s highly

visible spokesman. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. Also, we cannot

overlook Mayor Boals’s concern that local elections often turn on

a utility commission’s ability to deliver low-cost, high-quality

municipal services. See O’Connor, 994 F.2d at 910-11. The

district court thus correctly decided that Mayor Boals was free to

replace Johnson with someone he believed would willingly carry out

his plans for the utility commission.

Because Johnson failed to establish any constitutional

violations arising from his discharge, we affirm the judgment of

the district court. We also grant the City’s unopposed motion to

add the transcript of the relevant city council meeting to the

record. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.