### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 13

‐ 2836

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA

, Plaintiff

‐ Appellee

,

v.

K EVIN R. W ILLIAMS

, Defendant

‐ Appellant

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:12

‐ cr

‐ 00248

‐ LA

‐ 1

— Lynn Adelman

, Judge

.

____________________

A RGUED D ECEMBER 3, 2013

— D ECIDED J ANUARY 14, 2014

____________________

Before P OSNER

, M ANION

, and H AMILTON

, Circuit Judges

.

P OSNER

, Circuit Judge

. The question presented by this ap

‐ peal is whether a judge may, as a condition of supervised

release, order the defendant to reimburse “buy money” dis

‐ pensed by the government (and not recovered by it) in its

investigation of the defendant.

The defendant was prosecuted for being a felon in pos

‐

session of firearms. A confidential informant had bought2 No. 13

‐ 2836

three guns from him, for $400 apiece, with money supplied

by the government. The purchases provided the essential

evidence of the defendant’s guilt, although the $1200 that the

defendant had received from the confidential informant in

payment for the guns—what is called “buy money”—was

never recovered.

He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession and was

sentenced to 16 months in prison followed by 24 months of

supervised release. As a condition of supervised release he

was ordered to repay the buy money to the government at a

minimum rate of $50 per month, which would enable him to

repay the full $1200 in exactly 24 months. He could if he

wanted pay more than $50 per month and so complete re

‐

payment of the buy money earlier.

We first upheld an order to repay buy money as a condi

‐

tion of supervised release in United States v. Daddato

, 996

F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1993), and have followed Daddato in a

number of cases, such as United States v. Anderson

, 583 F.3d

504, 509 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gibbs

, 578 F.3d 694,

696 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cook

, 406 F.3d 485, 489

(7th Cir. 2005); and United States v. Brooks

, 114 F.3d 106, 108

(7th Cir. 1997), never questioning its validity. The other cir

‐

cuits have thus far skirted the issue. The majority opinion in

United States v. Cottman

, 142 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 1998),

holds (correctly as we’ll see) that repayment of buy money is

not restitution, but suggests that an order to repay is a prop

‐

er fine; a separate opinion in the case regards, as do we, such

an order as a permissible condition of supervised release

(which is much the same as a fine equal to the buy money).

The concurring opinion in Gall v. United States

, 21 F.3d 107,

112–13 (6th Cir. 1994), expresses disagreement with DaddatoNo. 13

‐ 2836 3

on the ground, which we find puzzling, that the order to re

‐

pay “deprives the defendant of liberty during the period of

supervised release.” Id

. at 113. And United States v. Gibbens

,

25 F.3d 28, 36 and n. 9 (1st Cir. 1994), notes the conflict be

‐

tween Daddato and the concurring opinion in Gall but does

not take sides.

The defendant asks us to overrule our decisions allowing

repayment of buy money to be made a condition of super

‐

vised release. He does not challenge any other provision of

his sentence.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced federal pa

‐

role with supervised release; the current provision is 18

U.S.C. § 3583. Both parole and supervised release impose re

‐

strictions on defendants after their release from prison. But

the restrictions imposed by parole end when the term of im

‐ prisonment to which the defendant was sentenced ends; so if

he was sentenced to five years in prison and released on pa

‐

role after three years, the restrictions that parole imposes on

him expire after two years. A term of supervised release is

specified separately in the sentence; it is not a function of the

prison term imposed by the sentence. There are limitations

on the length of the term of supervised release, but they are

a function of the gravity of the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b).

The combined result of subsections (b) (length of super

‐

vised release), (c) (factors the judge must consider in decid

‐ ing on the length and conditions of supervised release), and

(d) (mandatory and optional conditions of supervised re

‐ lease) is that an order of supervised release has three key

sections, though not necessarily distinguished as such. The

first will specify the length of the term of supervised release.

The second will list the mandatory conditions of supervised4 No. 13

‐ 2836

release, such as that the defendant not commit another crime

during the term. And the third will list any additional condi

‐

tions that the judge deems appropriate, subject to limitations

specified in subsection (d). Repayment of buy money is in

the third category, as buy money is not mentioned in the

statute. The judge imposed it in this case without giving a

reason, doubtless because our cases, beginning with Daddato

, have held it to be an appropriate condition of supervised re

‐

lease.

The defendant challenges the imposition of this condition

on several grounds. One is that it doesn’t further any legiti

‐

mate penological goal, specifically rehabilitation, which he

stresses—indeed implies is the only goal, citing our decision

in United States v. Goodwin

, 717 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2013). But

Goodwin neither says nor implies any such thing. See id

. at

521–22. And critically the defendant misses the ambiguity in

the term “rehabilitation” (more precisely, “correctional re

‐ habilitation”) as used in discussions of criminal punishment.

It often has rather utopian overtones—easing the defend

‐

ant’s transition to community life, making him a productive,

law

‐ abiding member of society. See Francis T. Cullen, “Re

‐

habilitation: Beyond Nothing Works,” 42 Crime & Justice 299,

310–14 (2013); Michelle S. Phelps, “Rehabilitation in the Pu

‐

nitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in U.S.

Prison Programs,” 45 Law & Society Rev. 33, 36 (2011). Both of

these articles invoke the “rehabilitative ideal.” A more mod

‐

est conception of rehabilitation, however, is that a defendant

is rehabilitated when he ceases committing crimes, at least

crimes of the gravity of the crime for which he was convict

‐

ed, whether or not he becomes a productive member of soci

‐

ety. See Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice 127 (1976). So the

question whether requiring a defendant to repay buy moneyNo. 13

‐ 2836 5

is rehabilitative merges into the question whether imposing

such a requirement is likely to reduce the likelihood of his

continuing to commit crimes after he completes his prison

term.

So viewed, repayment of buy money resembles payment

of a fine. The judge could have imposed a $1200 fine on the

defendant in this case—indeed a much larger fine; the statu

‐

tory maximum fine for his crime was $250,000, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3571(b)(3), and his guidelines fine range was $3,000 to

$30,000, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3). Fines are a favored mode of

punishment when there is a realistic expectation that they

can be paid, because they can be used to shift the cost of ad

‐ ministering punishment from the prison system, and there

‐

fore ultimately the taxpayer, to the defendant. To this end

the guidelines recommend (though no longer require) mak

‐ ing the cost of imprisoning the defendant a component of his

fine, as long as he can pay it. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(7). An

earlier guidelines provision, upheld in United States v.

Turner

, 998 F.2d 534, 536–37 (7th Cir. 1993), required the im

‐ position of “an additional fine amount that is at least suffi

‐

cient to pay the costs to the government of any imprison

‐

ment, probation, or supervised release ordered.” U.S.S.G.

§ 5E1.2(i). Both fines and imprisonment are rehabilitative in

the realistic sense that we have proposed, because they are

intended in part to reduce the likelihood that the defendant

will recidivate.

Instead of imposing a fine the district court ordered the

defendant to repay the $1200 in buy money that the gov

‐

ernment had used to (lawfully) trap him. The judge declined

to impose a fine because of (he said) the defendant’s “finan

‐

cial situation.” He should have explained why, if the de

‐6 No. 13

‐ 2836

fendant’s financial situation precluded a fine, it did not pre

‐

clude an order to repay buy money. (It might not because,

unlike payment of a fine, the period for repayment of buy

money does not begin until the defendant is released from

prison.) The federal criminal code sets forth detailed condi

‐

tions for imposing any fine. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572. The judge

didn’t mention these. And it’s not as if any fine he imposed

would have had to exceed $1200; there is no statutory mini

‐

mum fine. Nor would a fine necessarily have to be repaid all

at once; like a financial condition of supervised release, it can

be made payable in installments. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(f).

But we need to consider whether, even when identical in

amount, a fine and buy money might be thought to have dif

‐

ferent “rehabilitative” effects. A fine is general; a repayment

could be thought to focus the criminal defendant’s mind

more directly on his wrongdoing. The defendant in this case

sold guns illegally, receiving money to which he was not en

‐

titled—in fact the government’s money (though he didn’t

know that), squandered by him. Forcing him to repay it may

operate as a sharper reminder of his wrongdoing than a fine

of arbitrary amount.

Maybe this is what the judge had in mind in ordering re

‐

payment of the buy money instead of a fine, but he did not

say and his silence is one of the grounds on which the de

‐

fendant asks us to overturn the repayment order. Yet con

‐ sidering the modesty of the amount to be repaid, the light

prison sentence (16 months) that the judge imposed on a fel

‐

on in possession who not only possessed guns illegally but

also was an illegal seller of guns, the rehabilitative purpose

that the repayment order served, the fact that the sentencing

guidelines provide that when a defendant can’t pay in fullNo. 13

‐ 2836 7

what would otherwise be the appropriate fine “the court

shall consider alternative sanctions in lieu of all or a portion

of the fine,” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(e), and this court’s repeated ap

‐ proval of such orders, we consider the district judge’s lack of

explanation a harmless error.

The defendant’s next ground for challenging the repay

‐

ment order is that it is unlawful because it is a form of resti

‐

tution. The federal criminal code, including the supervised

‐

release statute, defines restitution as payment of losses sus

‐

tained by victims of crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c), and the

government is not deemed a victim. United States v. Cook

, su

‐

pra

, 406 F.3d at 489; United States v. Cottman

, supra

, 142 F.3d

at 168–70; Gall v. United States

, supra

, 21 F.3d at 112; United

States v. Salcedo

‐ Lopez

, 907 F.2d 97, 98–99 (9th Cir. 1990) (per

curiam). Government employees engaged in law enforce

‐

ment actually live on crime, much as fishermen live on fish.

What is true is that the expense of government is borne ul

‐ timately by the taxpayer, and the more crime there is, the

greater that expense; and so taxpayers are victims of crime

even if they never encounter a criminal. But the requirement

of restitution in federal criminal cases is limited to the direct

victims of crime, as the cases we’ve just cited hold, not re

‐

mote victims such as taxpayers. An order to repay buy mon

‐

ey could not be justified as a form of restitution.

But as well

‐ explained by Judge Edmund Ludwig in his

separate opinion in the Cottman case, 142 F.3d at 170–73, the

fact that such an order is not authorized or compelled by the

statutory provision governing restitution doesn’t mean it

can’t be made a condition of supervised release. Supervised

release is open

‐ ended; anything within reason (as long as it

is compliant with the restrictions and cautionary reminders8 No. 13

‐ 2836

in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), none violated by the repayment order

in this case) that serves a penological function is permitted.

From the standpoint of specific deterrence (deterring the de

‐

fendant, as distinct from other potential offenders, from

committing crimes after his release from prison), an order to

pay that is not authorized by the restitution statute may

nevertheless, like a fine, deter him from committing future

crimes by increasing the penalty for this crime. That will re

‐

mind him of one of the costs that he will face should he be

convicted of a similar crime in the future. Also like a fine, the

order to repay is a payback for a cost that his crime imposed,

though not on a direct victim—but still a cost. So close to a

fine is the order to repay that the majority opinion in Cott

‐

man said that “in future cases the district court may consider

imposing a fine which is equivalent to the amount of any

buy money a defendant has received from the Government.”

142 F.3d at 170 n. 14.

We noted in Daddato the resemblance of an order to re

‐

pay buy money not only to restitution but also to an order to

perform community service (such as cleaning up a park or

effacing graffiti from public buildings or serving soup in a

shelter—all for no or nominal pay). Although an order to

perform community service is not a mandatory condition of

supervision, it is authorized, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d),

3563(b)(12), and frequently imposed. The sentencing guide

‐

lines suggest that it be imposed in lieu of a fine that the de

‐

fendant would be unable to pay. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(e).

Community service is functionally much like repaying

buy money. When done under compulsion it is a form of in

‐ voluntary servitude and thus a cost to the defendant; it is al

‐

so a form of payback for his crime. “The offender is to per

‐No. 13

‐ 2836 9

form work that benefits the public: even if the offender is not

thereby reformed, the thinking runs, at least the community

gains from the work done.” von Hirsch, supra

, at 121. Com

‐ munity service reduces the cost of the defendant’s crime to

society and at the same time tries to drill into his head the

fact that crime does not (at least when the criminal is caught)

pay. The defendant’s lawyer tells us that community service

is “making amends [to] the community he harmed. That’s

somewhat rehabilitative.” True—and repaying buy money is

also making amends, in this case to the community that the

defendant harmed by selling guns illegally.

The defendant’s last and shallowest objection to the re

‐

payment order is that the government didn’t have to buy

three guns from him; one buy would have warranted the

sentence imposed on him and then the buy money would

have been only $400. On this ground he argues that after the

first buy the police were obligated to end their investigation

and arrest him forthwith—an argument rejected in Hoffa v.

United States

, 385 U.S. 293, 309–10 (1966); see also United

States v. Limares

, 269 F.3d 794, 798–99 (7th Cir. 2001) (“agents

are not obliged to make arrests as soon as possible; they may

continue investigations in order to acquire additional evi

‐ dence”). It is sensible law enforcement to induce multiple

buys, whether of guns or of drugs, as insurance against a

glitch that may spoil the prosecution of the first (or in this

case the first and second) buy. The first gun might be an ob

‐

vious fake. Or the confidential informant who was supposed

to have bought it might have pocketed the buy money rather

than have sold the gun—he might testify at trial that he had

sold it, but be tripped up on cross

‐ examination, causing the

government’s case to collapse. Furthermore, there is a guide

‐

lines sentencing enhancement for illegal possession of three10 No. 13

‐ 2836

firearms, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A)—and by virtue of the

three buys the defendant’s guidelines sentence was duly en

‐

hanced.

A FFIRMED

.