16-3058-cr

United States v. Nadeem Mehmood Quraishi

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE 

OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A 

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE 

FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A

PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED 

BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in 

the City of New York, on the 8th day of January two thousand eighteen.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

DENNY CHIN,

Circuit Judges.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee,

v. 16-3058-cr

NADEEM MEHMOOD QURAISHI, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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FOR APPELLEE: Susan Corkery, Nomi D. Berenson, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, for Bridget M. Rohde, 

Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern 

District of New York, Brooklyn, New York.
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Daniel M. Perez, Law Offices of Daniel M. 

Perez, Newton, New Jersey. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

New York (Amon, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-appellant Nadeem Mehmood Quraishi appeals a judgment of 

conviction entered August 18, 2016, following a jury trial, convicting him of abusive 

sexual contact in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 

49 U.S.C. § 46506(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b), and assault in the special aircraft 

jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46506(1) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 113(a)(5). On August 12, 2016, the district court sentenced Quraishi principally to 24 

months' imprisonment. On appeal, Quraishi challenges the substantive reasonableness 

of his sentence. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, 

procedural history, and issues on appeal.

The record establishes that Quraishi sexually abused a victim, Jane Doe, 

when they -- as strangers who were not traveling together -- were passengers seated 

next to each other aboard an international flight arriving at John F. Kennedy 

International Airport, New York, on October 26, 2015. Doe had taken medication and 

fallen asleep. A few hours later, when she woke up, she discovered that hand lotion 
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had been spread on her arms, chest, and legs, including under her dress. The bottle of 

hand lotion that she had placed in the seat pocket in front of her before she went to 

sleep was missing. At that point, she went to the bathroom and noted that certain parts 

of her body were sore, her underwear had been shifted, and there was lotion on her 

body underneath her underwear. 

Two flight attendants questioned Quraishi, who admitted to spreading the 

lotion over Doe's body. He explained that he believed that Doe "needed it" and 

"enjoyed it because she did not resist." PSR ¶ 6. When the plane landed Quraishi was 

arrested. During post-arrest statements, he admitted to inappropriately touching Doe 

while she was asleep. 

On August 12, 2016, the district court sentenced Quraishi. As Quraishi 

violated 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b), the district court consulted the Sentencing Guidelines

("Guidelines") Manual § 2A3.4 to determine the base offense level. The district court 

concluded, pursuant to § 2A3.4(a)(2), that the appropriate level was 16 as the offense 

involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2242, which addresses engaging in a sexual 

act with another person who is "incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct" or 

"physically incapable of declining participation." 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2). There were no 

adjustments, and thus the total offense level was determined to be Level 16.1 Level 16 

 

1 Though Quraishi contested the district court's determination at sentencing, he now 

concedes that the district court's calculation of a base offense level of 16 was without fault. 
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carries 21 to 27 months' imprisonment, or as restricted by the statutory maximum in this 

case, 21 to 24 months' imprisonment.2 The district court heard from defense counsel, 

Quraishi's friend, Quraishi's wife, and read a written statement from the victim. The 

district court then sentenced Quraishi to 24 months' imprisonment, the top of the 

guidelines range, as capped by the statutory maximum. Quraishi timely appealed, 

challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 

A sentence imposed by the district court is substantively unreasonable 

only if it "cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions." United States v. 

Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 

208, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, we will set aside sentencing decisions for 

substantive reasonableness only in "exceptional cases," id. at 189, that is when the 

sentence is "so shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter 

of law that allowing [it] to stand would damage the administration of justice," United 

States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 

F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The district court imposed a sentence of 24 months' imprisonment,

primarily citing the seriousness of the crime and Quraishi's lack of sincere remorse.

This sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Indeed, given the egregious nature 

 

2 There is no Guidelines range for Count 2 as it is a Class B misdemeanor. 
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of Quraishi's conduct, the district court's sentence of 24 months' imprisonment gives us 

no pause whatsoever. 

Quraishi, in claiming his sentence was substantively unreasonable, argues 

that the district court allocated insufficient weight to certain mitigating considerations, 

such as his lack of criminal history, his family support, and his proffered psychological 

struggles, factors he claims makes his conduct an aberration. But the district court 

properly weighed these considerations and committed no error in its evaluation of the 

§ 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As the district court observed in imposing the 

24-month, statutory maximum sentence, "there's a question about whether it is 

sufficient, but it is certainly not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set 

forth in" § 3553(a). App. 36. We agree with that assessment. 

Accordingly, the district court's sentence was not substantively 

unreasonable.

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We have considered all of Quraishi's remaining arguments and conclude 

they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk