klisrto-y

111•11111 JUN IC 7f

11120111116#05114 sumMiarmarr

Sake fitta

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECREtARY

2 October 1969

Colonel1111116

Appended for your information

and official file is a copy of Dr.

Kissinger'. memorandum to higher

authority re the NRP Annex to the

Space Task Group Report.

Both recommendations submitted

by the 303. Committee were accepted

as of 30 September 1969.

.

,

SECI1T-EYES Cal

JNG COPY
THE WHITE HOUSE

• WASSISMOTON. ACTION •

September 26, 1969 • •

•

-- • . MEMORANDUM

•

•:s

I

. P .tinguished from peripheral) reconnaissance of denied areas of

.; .

its is satellitereconnaissance and the cost

J

r yea i the budget being devoted to

The National Reconnaissance Program is covert and comprises the

development, management and operation of satellites, aircraft

and drones for photographic or electronic overhead (as dis-

•

moRambuit PORTNE PRESUNINT.:..L.

; • PECK: busy A. Nissinger

SUMO?: National Reconnaissance

Space TesksCroup Report

•

•

Program (IMP) Annex to the

•

The attached Annex to the Space Task Group Report covering the intelligence

. reconnaissance activities of the National Reconnaissance Program bas been

. forwarded separately by Mel Laird because of the special security controls.

-applied to this aspect of the space program.

The following are highlights of the annex:

sat

• 

The prpgram is responsive directly to the national intelligence

collection requirements and priorities established by the United

States Intelligence Board (USD*. Its plans and schedules for

', both satellite and aircraft overflights are admitted to the

.303 Committee for operational approval.

' Most of this nation's information on USSR strategic offensive and

defensive systems has been acquired by satellite reconnaissance.

The same is true of a considerable portion of other important

'. intelligence acquired by the United States. Dependence on

. satellite xeconnaissance would be ;magnified further by U.S.

withdrawal from foreign bases. • •

. Since reconnaissance satellites require a permissive environment,

both political and physical, it is critically important to nourish

the conditions which contribute to the kind of international

political atmosphere existing-today which proVides all the advan- •

-times of tacit acceptance of satellite reconnaissance without the

hazards inherent ih open discussion or confroutatioi.

•

' •

•

:.

•

•

• - 268/69

▪

 • ,.. I 4 copies • *--

.•.
...

' • '

. V

.

..

• : • . • .

I

. : .

...

• - . •• -- • •.•

''.."-; •• , .

. • % . • • .•••:.•••• 

. • • 4. • ••••••• • •- 

r • "--xET- . -

e --2- ..

• : •• • • • •• .• ... .• • .1, -..-,,,..

. • . .. : - . : .•••- . •

• . • . .

. ,

-....., ..

The'Soviets have a clear, existing capability to destroy a .

-.

. ...1.::::.

reconnaissance satellite if they wish, although National Intent- •

L . fence Estimates CoAclude that it is extremely unlikely they would

:•• .tike such steps other than as a prelude to general war. The Vatted

--:...'..-....:7' States has no present non-nuclear capability for intercepting

..::.,:!••••;'

.V.0 

.•• Soviet reconnaissance-WERICtes.

The desirability of acquiring '4 ... .. — 4 . •

•• - • • ..such a capability will-Ertonsidered in the Department of Defense's -. -.:..".. '4

:.-....' •• • ' immatributions to the main report of the Space Task Croup. .. . . :: .:- :•'...

. . .

... . .

. • • •

-:!):'...%- The long-term goals of the National Reconnaissance Program are to

%.

- • .

-.- • ":continue to: -

.. •" • • . .•

e ** . '• : -

'•••

of.eollection systems to

•• •

order

to new

!

.' •

•

=

l'...' .. RECOMMENDATION: •

••

....... ..

••••..

: • •

• • • •

..

.

..

-.:"... ' I : This Annex recommends,on page 21 that you confirm the goals, objectives and

• capabilities of the National Reconnaissance Program as presented in the

.- 

.• . report. Nith this guidance the Secretary of Defense will continue to sake

'..- .' program decisions consistent with the needs expressed by the intelligence

8

.....:..,.., !... emmit uy:. i. :.

I • - •

:

•

........: The.303 Committee has reviewed this annex and believes that because of its

:-.....:::.sensitivity and lick of'eeneral applicability to the basic Space Task Group ..::.

-...Impiirt it should not be'further disseminated to the full mesbershf.p of the -.

Space Croup and their staffs. • _ - .

.

. 

• ..

.

. •

.

The 303 Committee also endories the above recommendation and recommends

...:,.......%.,t4wki,57a! approveit... .... .. .1: - - ;%'' ••• •r•'. -').-'.7:...".:"(..7.4 .",*

.. ' •

. • " Ilh •.•• 4' !i• • •

••• • • •••••n • ••• •• • • •..4. • . , • • • • k • •

- • .% :N. • .. • • •* '• .. ..

•

•

..

e• .• .-r •

.

4* i • •• • ' • .• •••.. • • ' •

••

• ' • ir • / . • "• % • • • 4 •.• .• • . • • •

•

.„ .. . • • :

... .... - . "' ' I. s • • • .1; • ••••. I . •• .. .••••

..

• I

.. ... s • • # .

•• 1...• .*: n .•

..,

.. • . ••••

s. / • • . ..:• 1, .... • • • • •

$ .. t 4.• ....., 't ..•.• n •• .

: • i

i

..

• .. . • .... • .

• •

.r. . ri% • :

'•• r . • • •: • • . . . :

••

• •

.• • • '.. •• ..

. .

1.4' • .•••

• • ' I? •• r'''" .• .1•••• n••• • .. .Ill '

1.•n• ••• •.* ' ..,*. • . .

.

....

. • .

..

' • •

.

: ..

• i

,.. n•• • • . • . • • sit • •. ••• :

: • .. •• . • . . . S . • • • . •

.4, ••

•• ••• • • I • • I•.. . • ,

• • . e • • . • •

' • . ••••• • • •• • • • •n • ••••• s • -4, • .• .1

. • • .• -. A . . •

. t ... I. • .• • • :

• % • • 4. •

• ••• . j

. • • • , • . •••• • I • . ... • • . • : ,I' • • ..• •• C • • • 07 •• .. • : • •

• • •

.

• , . . ..e. •Ve • •

. • • • • i • •

• . •

a •,, • •

. • C '. ... . •

• ;" . • • ...4%

4 • • i

•

• ••

. •• a

: • ....4 - •

.

.. i - • l• • l' • • ••

• .. • • ••• . •• .1*. ••%.* ..

. • , : .., .....• •e• • .

l

••:. ••• : . .,' .• • .• • . ..••• I • •• ••'• • • ••• • el

•

t

.C947:e.....

•

.

. • . . of 4 copies

::.••• •••••• .• • " • 2. . • •

••-•

•

. ; •

▪

•

• •: •

•

'

' •

. •

. .

• di.

'..44. • *''' " • L. Coadutt a covert program to collect intelligence

...:: !1 . - i. ,.: ........ ;..:, 'through the overflight of denied territory.

.. • . 4

•

cost of such collection.

• • .

..:.•

:.•

- •

. ..•

4;. •

3. •

. •

Seek methods ;o reduce the

-

Improve the responsiveness

intelligence needs. .

.

•

Advance satellite, reconnaissance techniques in

to. improve collection capabilities and respond

collection needs. • .

. • .
•

. •.3 • COPY Ma •••••nn•n••••••n 13 -

7:262-68

Cy-C-OPY

THE SECRETARY OF amiss

UMONIMMTION

•

•

August 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Annex to

the Space Task Group Report

During'the planging stages of Space Task Group activity

in the Department of Defense, the Vice President apprised

the National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee,

(Mr. Packard, Mr. Helms, and Dr. DuBridge) of Task

plans to include in its report a brief Top Secret

annex which would outline the prospective missions, pay oad

weights, cost estimates and launch frequendy of National

Reconnaissance Program satellites over the next decade.

The National Reconnaissance Office has prepared such

an Annex. It contains an outline of the National Reconnaissance Program, a summary of national policy applicable to

the program, and comments on key interagency relationships.

The Annex has been reviewed and approved by the NRP

Executive Committee for inclusion in the Space Task Group

report. It has also been reviewed by Secretary Seamans with

.respect to DOD space interests and objectives.

In light of the special security contals applied to

'National Reconnaissance Program activities and information,

it was decided that the Annex should be transmitted separately from the DOD report. We Are of course, exercising

extreme care in disseminating, using, and storing this Annex,

to prevent unauthorized disclosure of its existence or content.

.r.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

RECLIADIUO; DOD DID 520040

DOES NOT APPLY '

•
ar

• • W.

•

•

•

•

•

•

The NRP Annex is attached. I trust.it is fully responsive to your needs.

•

.Ve

Attachment

dilem to STG Report

98-69

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

te•

•••

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

EXCLUDSD PROM AUTOMATIC

=RAMO: DOD DIR 5200.10

DORS NOT APPLY

=rims' _3 a' mess

•

•

2

•

•

HANDLE VIA

CONIFICC SY

w.

___Top_strediplip .

• 7 8 2 6 2 - 6 9
ANNEX TO

THE SPACE TASK GROUP REPORT

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

July 15, 1959

•

•

1111111110 98 

811“ Of eosin

....•••nn•••n••11. POOP.

WORK-I a .

.• 
••• lise"

• t

r."

CONTENTS

Summary 1

The Nature of .the Program 2

Program Background 4

What the Program Does 5

National Importance of the Program 7

Policies Supporting the Program 8

Long Term Goals of the NRO 10

Ten Year Projections 11

Possibilities of Satellite Interdiction 14 '

NRP Relationships with NASA: Post-APOLLO Goals 15

NRP Relationships with the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency 18

Recommendation 20

DATA APPENDIX

Photographic Satellites 32

Signal Intelligence Satellites 23

Launching Schedules 25

Ten Year Projections 28

5. System Characteristics 27

6. NRP Financial Program (Satellites) 28

*gni -TOP-SECRET- 11841411111411 POW 11•1111M104 aPIMSMO

UMW

4.0rominNall

.41114n1n0•11. MN* SS• 011114111Vi MM IS OM ON am.
TOP-SECRET--

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

Summary

This document is an annex to the Space Task Group's report

to the President. It discusses the National Reconnaissance Program, briefly describing content, goals, and projections, together

with a summary of national policy applicable to the program and

comments on key interagency relationships.

The National Reconnaissance Program comprises intelligence

collection overflight operations of the Department of Defense and

the Central Intelligence Agency. The program is predominantly

satellite reconnaissance, using photographic and electronic sensors.

Aircraft operations are also conducted within the program, but, for

purposes of the •report, the space activities are emphasised. The

program is one of intelligence collection and usually has relied

upon developments within the DOD of boosters, launching facilities,

and tracking and control networks. Technology advances within

the program have generally been restricted to operational sensor

development with only occasional benefit to other activities, due to

specific applications orientation.

11111111111111) -AP-SECRETsitscamps sews* seas se, arm

ra...,111n••nn••n
Satellite reconnaissance is a quasi-legal espionage activity

conducted covertly by the National Reconnaissance Office. Satellites

are vulnerable vehicles which need a permissive environment for

successful operation. The United States government is deeply dependant on overflight reconnaissance, and particularly satellite

reconnaissance, for information on closed societies.

The long-term goals of the NRP include enhancing collection

capability and reducing costs. An important consideration is to

insure adequate collection capability to monitor all possible arms

limitation agreements. New program possibilities include electronic

imaging satellites, improved electronic intelligence satellites.",

surveillance satellites, and very long-lived satellites.

National satellite reconnaissance policy recognises the need to

operate reconnaissance satellites with great discretion, develop

tacit acceptance of these operations as a reasonable national activity,

and avoid embarrassment to our allies or confrontation with our

enemies in carrying out our operations. These policies, and the

special security arrangements resulting from them, have been

primary forces in protecting United States reconnaissance operations

from the threat of international confrontation. If thisprotection

should fail, and our satellites encountered hairrassment, it would

-TOP- ELF INIPINuMpi

See INOSLIMPR MAJ. NO me way

••n••••••••n• •••• ••••••••••n•n••••
appear wise to have a non-nuclear interceptor capability available

as a psychological and real countermeasure.

NASA's and ACDA's interests in earth-sensing satellites require special consideration which can be, and is being, provided

through close coordination and cooperation betleen those agencies

and the DOD. It appears that significant benefits would accrue

through the DOD (I) making an SR-7I or U-2 capability available

to NASA for civil earth-sensing activities, and (2) encouraging NASA

to sponsor a major program in readout technology. NASA has proposed undertaking the development of an open satellite system designed for the single purpose of verifying U. S. and USSR adherence

to the conditions of a strategic arms limitation agreement.

The Nature of the Program 

The National Reconnaissance Program is a single, national program dedicated to the collection, through overflight, of intelligence to

meet the needs and objectives of the United States Government. The

Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the Program, managing resources of the CIA and DOD in carrying out the mission: he

receives program recommendations from anExecutive Committee made

up of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence,

and the President's Science Advisor. The Program is managed by the

-TOP-SECRET

6111110140 ONO INNIIIIMIN 11141114411•0

0114111101 SOWN NI MI UM

MOM

WNW

fou

▪

 =s, NON
-TOP-SECRETDirector of the National Reconnaissance Office, who is an official

of the Department of Defense. The technical aspects of the program

are reviewed by a special panel established by the President's

Science Advisor.

The Program is covert and comprises the development, management, and operation of satellites, aircraft, and drones for photographic

or electronic overhead reconnaissance of denied areas of the world

(peripheral reconnaissance is a separate responsibilitimanaged by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The cost of the Program is approximately

111111111 Year•

The National Reconnaissance Program is responsive directly to

the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by

the United States Intelligence Board. The National Reconnaissance

Office sends its •plans and schedules for both satellite and aircraft

reconnaissance overflights directly to the 303 Committee of the

National Security Council for operational approval.

Program Background 

The essential background of the National Reconnaissance Program

begins shortly after the May 1, 1960 loss of a U-2 aircraft engaged in

overflight reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of this

41111111100 • COMM

01011111

Nelln

-773 -

•
event, faced with the loss of reconnaissance capability over the USSR,

President Eisenhower directed the National Security Council to review

intelligence collection alternatives, such as satellite reconnaissance.

As a result of this review and subsequent deliberations, the reconnaissance satellite projects of the Department of Defense and the Central

Intelligence Agency were consolidated into a single, national program

to be managed by a special arrangement designed to enhance covert

operation and assure successful achievement of program objectives.

By the spring of 1962 these organizational adjustments culminated in

the establishment at a National Reconnaissance Program which was to

be managed by a National Reconnaissance Office -- a single, national

agency responsible for satellite photographic and signal intelligence

collection operations, satellite mapping and geodesy, and aircraft/

drone overflight reconnaissance.

What the Program Does 

The National Reconnaissance Program uses aircraft, drones, and

satellites as its collection vehicles.

The satellite vehicles carry sensors which collect (I) broad

coverage search and surveillance photography (3) high resolution

spotting and surveillance photOgraphy and (3) signal (communication

•

01111.111

TOP- SECRET-

-1T7rX .1.111nn•••••

.. .•

-•
40P-SECRET-- 11161110111 0111100111‘ 01011101110

11011110111011110 MN 10 00n MN WU/

CORONA

1.011111

01101110

nen.

401)--SECREF

and electronic) intelligence.*

A typical broad-coverage satellite photographic mission produces

photography of about seven million square miles of land mass at ground

resolutions of seven to ten feet. Such a mission also produces special

coverage suited specifically to mapping and charting purposes. The

current system became operational in 1960

Some satellites are designed and operated to collect electromagnetic signal emissions which originate from Soviet or Chinese

Communist radars and communication devices. The collected intelligence reveals the status, locations, and characteristics of key weapon

*Details on these projects (characteristics, weights, dimensions,

orbital altitudes, schedules) are given in the Appendix.
TOP-SEC 'F

ew IllageMa NN SO NO MN WU

1

n••n•rommr•n••n••poo...w.s.N...mo • • n•n•••

. •

-TOVSECRE1---

systems such as the Soviet anti-ballistic missile system.

Whenever possible, the NRO has carried, and will continue to

carry, secondary payloads on its flights as a service to other

programs.

National Importance of the Program

Most of this nation's information on USSR strategic offensive

systems has been acquired by satellite reconnaissance. In the case

of operational ICBM sites within the USSR, our dependence on satellites has been total. Similarly, strategic defensive systems, like the

Moscow and Tallinn systems, have been positively detected and

identified within the first 45 days of construction by satellite photography and observed closely and repetitively from that time forward.

Information providing the basis for significant reassessment of

Soviet and Chinese Communist ground force strength and capability

to supply and reinforce units in conflict along the periphery of

Communist nations is derived largely from satellite reconnaissance,

either directly or by implication. The Defense Intelligence Agency

estimates that 65% of what the U.S. knows about the strength,

equipage, and disposition of Soviet ground forces -- 90% for the

Chinese -- is attributable to satellite intelligence.

•

11111111111i

OlikamaO°
.1. -TOVSECRET- • •

In special categories like

locating SAM defenses in Southeast Asia, satellites have been practically an exclusive intelligence source.

In the field of electronic signal intelligence, satellites have contributed uniquely to our knowledge of the disposition of Soviet air

defense radars; this knowledge aids the Strategic Air Command in

selecting bomber penetration routes. Satellites have also determined

deployment status and operational characteristics of the SovietABM

system. These are two examples only of a broadly productive program.

Today the United States depends on the Nationil Reconnaissance

Program for most of its strategic and tactical information on the

world's closed societies. This dependence would be magnified further

•

by U. S. withdrawal from foreign bases.

Policies Supporting the Program

When the first U-2 photography of the USSR was produced an 1956),

President Eisenhower directed that it be protected -- as an ultra

sensitive espionage product in a special security system. In 1960,

when the first satellite reconnaissance photographs were produced,

President Eisenhower directed that they be similarly protected and

placed them in a compartment of the same special security system.

--TOVSECRET--

IINMIS assioala saellsene

Me esetays WW1* WM EN NNW

111101•11,

SIM Of OSP=

Sr OM'S
During 1961 1961 and early 1962, the Soviets. made a number of private

overtures to the U.S. protesting the use of satellites for reconnaissance. In 1962, the question of the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance began to appear as an important pre-condition to international

negotiations on disarmament and on the peaceful uses of outer space.

In response to increasing pressure, the President asked a Committee

of Principals, acting under the leadership of Ambassador U. Alexis

Johnson, to formulate a national policy which would (1) maintain United

States freedom of action to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations

unilaterally, (2) prevent foreign political and physical interference with

those operations, (3) prevent accidental or forced disclosure of the

details of the Operations or end-products of the United States reconnaissance program, and, at the same time, (4) permit the United States

to continue to work toward disarmament and international cooperation

in space.

A national policy supporting these goals was recommended by this

Committee, approved by the President on July 10, 1962, and issued

in NSC Action 2454. Essentially, the policy enjoins the United States

to (1) operate its reconnaissance satellites with great discretion, (2)

work toward developing tacit acceptance of these operations, and

AP-SECKTIF MO 14441011111 UM 141 WS MN NMI

811141111

1/// OMR
(3) avoid embarrassment to our allies or confrontation with our

enemies.

As a result of careful satellite reconnaissance policy planning,

the United States is enjoying, at this time, an international political

situation which provides all the advantages of tacit acceptance without, the hazards inherent in open discussion or confrontation. It is

critically important to nourish the conditions which contribute to

such an'atmosphere, for reconnaissance satellites require a permissive environment -- political and physical -- for successful

operation. Lacking such an environment, their operation could be

challenged on the floor of the United Nations or in the skies of any

nation which desired to demonstrate against space espionage.

Log Term Goals of the NRO 

The NRO plans to continue to:

Conduct a covert program to co/Let intelligence through the

overflight at denied territory.

Seek methods to reduce the cost of such collection.

3. Improve the responsiveness of collection systems to intelligence needs.

•

..WM1111111 TORET M

P-SEC ON aromosia 1411110111110

••• 011110/111 1••• se ems wag sou

:ac:

:
4. Advance satellite reconnaissance techniques in order to •

improve collection capabilities and respond to new collection needs.

Ten Year Projections

1. Extension of Current Programs

Based on the present understanding of future needs, the following

schedule of launchings is anticipated:

Program* FY 70 71 72 73 74 ' 75 78 77 78 79 80

2. Possible New Programs. Although satellite reconnaissance is

conducted as a covert program, its hardware and techniques are developed,

procured, and used in "the open, " whenever possible. For example, the

program uses Air Force launching facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base,

uses satellite recovery capabilities in Hawaii. The bulk of the program's hardware --

boosters and spacecraft -- is readily available to any organisation.

*Additional detail on scheduled launchings is found in the Appendix. The

values shown for 1980 may be extended to 1985, as best present estimates.

101111111111

. 11 ► 410 MON aelinaNI •110141111110

susetna wan Mn um mom

COR

MN*
-TOP-SECRET- air

As a general rule, only the payload is handled under special security.

The NRP budget for new technology reflects this arrangement, being

oriented essentially toward improved payloads.

At present, photographic satellites return data by ejecting capsules

which are aerially recovered. It has long been desired to return imagery

electronically, thus permitting nearly immediate intelligence analysis.

Further, an electronic imaging satellite might have a longer useful life

on orbit and thus be more economical than present systems. Recent

developments show promise that such a satellite may soon be technologically feasible. If development continues favorably, consideration will

be given to a program start leading to a system of very long-lived satellites which could be operating after 1975.

A item:rad generation of electronic intelligence collection satellites

is being developed now and will be operational during the early 1970's.

There are several possible ways to decrease the cost of photographic

*NM TOPSEGRET--

VICUMMIS 1161101100

011111111111 610111.11• N.s.w ANN
grams

-TOP-SECRETsatellite operations: (1) to recover the camera and re-use it, (2) to

resupply the payload in orbit, and (3) to utilise a photographic system

which returns imagery electronically and thus could have a useful life

measured in years. The development emphasis and the apparent trend

is toward an electro-optical imaging system for surveillance. Recoverable payload and resupply might permit economies for continued

operation of current systems and are investigated in the DOD,s contribution to the STO Report.

Studies and limited developments are underway in areas such as

Such techniques can augment current reconnaissance capabilities and

will be evaluated during the 1970's.

3. Trends. The increasing success of satellite intelligence collection and the increasing sensitivity of the U. S. to international confrontation have caused a decreasing emphasis on covert aircraft prosatellites have become more effective, it has been possible to reduce

the launching rate substantially while increasing intelligence collection.

This trend is forecast to continue as indicated in the future year

-TOP-SECRET- CSOUNIN aer asnorasee NNIONINS NO emellIMPS SIN SO seas MM YON

SONIN

744=7. NSW

SNP
a marginal capability to interfere with our satellites through the use of

nuclear weapons, no fully developed Chinese anti-satellite capability,

•

ABP-SECREF •

11111141141111 V NNS asemses

fN iimeinvx me le sus we INV

MOM

OWN st

. • .

schedule. IfIf there were no new programs, the completion of development now underway and the reducing launch rates would permit a budget decrease as shown in the Appendix. it seems quite clear that

there is a steady trend toward long-lived satellites. This trend will

continue and will permit economies.

Possibilities of Satellite Interdiction 

Since the legality of satellite espionage is an unsettled matter, the

possibility of some nation attempting to destroy U.S. reconnaissance

satellites has long been'a matter of concern. The Soviets have a clear

existing capability to destroy U.S. satellites on orbit; with their extensive space surveillance network, the Soviets could easily accomplish

nuclear kill of U.S. satellites with any number of Soviet launching

vehicles. With their existing ABM facilities and hardware, U.S.

reconnaissance satellites could be neutralised by means of non-nuclear

warheads. Despite these apparent capabilities, National Intelligence

Estimates conclude that it is extremely unlikely the Soviets would take

hostile action against our reconnaissance satellites in any circumstances

other than as a prelude to general war. While China probably now has

•

•
•

either nuclear or non-nuclear, is anticipated for some time. On the

basis of these estimates, there has been little attempt to provide

protection for current satellite operations, although a certain amount

of research has been accomplished.

If the Soviets were to harrass our satellite reconnaissance

operations, it would be difficult and expensive to provide means for

assurance of' continued photographic intelligence. Upon such an

occasion, it might be a useful tactic to respond in kind, intercepting

a Soviet reconnaisance satellite in the hope that such action would deter

further interference. The U.S. has no capability at present to carry

out such an interception with non-nuclear weapons. It would appear

prudent to consider acquiring such a capability as an aid to insuring

'the availability of continued satellite reconnaissance to this nation.

Additional information on such a capability will be found in the DOD'.

contributions to the report of the Space Task Group.

NAP Relationships with NASA: Post-APOLLO Goals

For some time, NASA has been exploring the use of satelliteborne sensors to locate and study earth resources. Experiments

involving hand-held cameras operated by GEMINI and APOLLO astronauts have not been politically offensive to other nations, largely

IMO 40P-SECREE 111100N411 VINO

01114111.11 IMO SO INMOST NM

.11.1n61PnIrn11.14"

/161.11, non
because the photographs are at a fairly gross resolution, the "targets"

are carefully selected, the film is reviewed by a United States Intelligence Board security panel before it is released to the public, and

hostile states such as the USSR and Red China are either not overflown or not now photographed. Future possible NASA applications,

involving oceanography, forestry, geology, geography, and agricul•

tune, must be planned and controlled very carefully, for the line

between economic research photography and economic intelligence

photography is very thin and casual experimentation could trigger

challenges to the legitimacy of not only the NASA earth-sensing program but of the National Reconnaissance Program. In 1966,

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's satellite reconnaissance policy

committee met again and developed policy to cover this potential

danger area. Within the guidelines established by that committee,

NASA and the NRO have been proceeding on a cooperative basis in

planning a NASA earth-sensing program which will meet our nation's

scientific needs without jeopardising its ability to gather intelligence

from space.

In addition, the President's Science Advisor, with the endorsemeat and support of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy

;

-ToP-sEeRe millesullet INAIMMO

Mt IIIIMOIVe 1181111.110 MS NH am.

was

swift

•. . A
• . -

-TOP-SEOREF

Secretary of Defense, sponsors a committee with membership from

the non-defense agencies which identifies ways in which space intelligence photography can be used by these agencies within the present

security and policy regulations and provides a channel for passing

these needs to USIB's Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation. This committee has had a strong positive influence in

coordinating the needs of the civil community and assisting to plan

a reasonable earth-sensing program. In order to encourage further

progress, consideration should be given to allotting • small but

regular percentage of film from each search satellite to these purposes.

There are two areas in which NASA could benefit from closer

technical ties with the NRO. First, the DOD maintains a reconnaissance wing of SR-71 aircraft whose main purpose, in the event of war,

is nuclear strike assessment. At present, some of these aircraft

fly training missions and some are stored in flyable condition. Both

the DOD and CIA maintain U-2 aircraft units for the NRO. Some

U-2's have already been made available for NASA earth-sensing

surveys. Photography from these aircraft can continue to be very

useful to NASA and its user community in developing baseline

-TOP-SEC-REF mama ma 4111111111Wi

qr INISIIIMPI 111111141 Is Mel r, APPIX

PPM

"NO

.

s T

•
-TOP-SEC-REF

•

wa.

mosaics and in evaluating the possible return to be expected

eventually from satellite photography. This support should be

continued and strengthened. It should also be noted that NRO and

DOD optical technology will continue to be made available to NASA

engineers who are planning an Earth Resources Technology Satellite.

Second, NASA has concluded that its initial earth resources

satellite will be more cost-effective if it uses an electronic imaging

system, rather than film-recovery cameras. It is also quite possible that highly refined electronic imaging sensors will permit

economy and improvement in NRP operations in the future. It may

be appropriate and mutually advantageous for NASA to make a significant commitment to advancing the technology of high resolution

electronic sensors to replace film-camera systems.

NRP Relationships with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

The US-USSR discussions of 1968 regarding a Strategic Arms

Limitation Treaty brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

directly into satellite reconnaissance policy considerations. Concerned

that the USSR would not agree to on-site inspection, the Committee of

Principals proposed to negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that

the United States was prepared to accept "enforcement by maximum,

ww MIMS

f Wao ggle at *Tr I MO

SIMI"

MOO

•
TOP-SECREE

or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national means at verification..."

Or the United States, this expression means "satellite reconnaissance").

In addition, in order to support its proposal, the Department of State

recommended declassifying the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite

reconnaissance, disclosing to the Soviets that reconnaissance satellites

are our main reliance for verification, briefing Congress on our reconnaissance capabilities, and informing the press and public -- gradually

but officially -- along the same lines. After discussion within the

United States Intelligence Board and key affected government agencies,

it was decided that disarmament discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and possibly more effectively, by restricting the

U. S. delegation to use of the expression "national means of verification" with no reference to our satellite reconnaissance program. It

was pointed out that disclosure is an irreversible step which could

have profoundly adverse effects on national security. Furthermore,

to single out one or some intelligence collection methods now and to

pass only that or those to the Soviets, Congress, and the American

public would be dangerous and misleading and could evolve a genuine

• "credibility gap."

An alternative approach has been presented by NASA in its

061110111. TOP-SECRET8•4211111111 ,.s MIMINIS 1111011401•11

ND NU SOW IMO 111 OM WO MINN

MOIMIL

WM N,I

PaegnilL.e. NOP
recommendation to the NSSM 28 Steering Committee. This approach

would call for bilateral negotiations on verification means to include

the 'development and utilization of an open satellite system designed

for the single purpose of verifying U. S. and USSR adherence to treaty

conditions. The NASA arguments for such an approach have emphasized the potential of this initiative in:

a. avoiding disclosure of the existence, scope, utility or

sophistication of the present overhead reconnaissance program

• minimizing concern over international confrontation on this

issue,

providing an important bulwark to the unimpeded continuation of covert intelligence gathering activities,

d. providing a reasonable overt basis for the possible challenges

that might become necessary in the event treaty violations were discerned through any covert means.

The NRP Executive Committee has reviewed the security and

policy implications of SALT with respect to the NRP, and has concluded that the current instructions and guidelines for the SALT

delegation are sufficiently restrictive that the negotiations should

not affect the NRP.

TOP-SECRETINCIIIPOIS ISM IMPNIMUC

M* sulatieve Ine• MIS MO softy

ftw••••••••n•••••n•p. ...•n••n••••••••••n •n•n •••••••n•••,....,111•••

•
TOP SECRET

During this review, the subject of the arms control satellite

initiative was also discussed. It was concluded that any decision

on the arms control satellite initiative would be premature at this

time and should await a further progress in the U.S. discussions

of an agreement for strategic arms limitation.

Recommendation 

It is recommended that the President confirm goals, objectives,

and capabilities of the National Reconnaissance Program, as presented in this document. With this guidance, the Secretary of Defense

will continue to make program decisions consistent with the needs

expressed by the intelligence community.

1111.111 413P-SECREF

littmielte ems aellemOK •CONOWIPS

1108Clinri Nein Sees MOWN

0011111101 11n•••••••nn•gralnIWN•

an 111111111111.

"61n41. MOO

••••••••nn••nnn••
DATA APPENDIX

INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE NRP

0111111•111%

Mllarrimmta. ow TOP-SEGREF COWARD IMO 11401111n114 flhSS

IMO ININICISNI MNI.111886 New am.

1:0•111111

•

•
--TOP-SECREF--

•

DATA APPENDIX

INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE NAP

1. Photographic Satellites 

a. CORONA. A medium resolution, broad-coverage search

system which began operating in 1960 is scheduled for phase-out in

1971. Typically, seven or eight 10-14 day CORONA missions are flown

per year and, on the average, each provides about 7.0 minion square

miles of photography at resolutions of seven to twelve feet.

................. - . .

•••••••••n••nnn•1100.11111MIM

•
,,,,, . ..........

........ . • . ...... ..„
\\;\‘\- \\\.\\\xNnNN....., .

TOP SECRET

NN NNNNNN .\\\\N -

.\\\\ ‘.\

n •nnn •••

N\‘WX‘NN\V\

\\\\

,,,,,, ,•n•nnn ••\,

TOP sqg

N41 0411641941 54041.111 004S MI 40444
7 6 0

71 72 73 74

4 Ode 0

3. Launching Schedules

Programs 

CORONA

PY60 70
•. •

-TOP-SECRET4. Ten Year Projections

Zsmr.... ams FY70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

---TOP-SEC-REf- IMAM Ma •VIIIIA•114 agswers

MO 111111141111111 NM N MO Ell OW

WINN 

PM. IN

MN 27 Sr OM*

I....••n••11.1n• •••n••n•••••n•••••••••

• t• r
14-20 days

Payload

Lifetime Dimensions

Agana (80" diameter:

• .1 payload

•

CORONA

Payload

Booster

Thorad/Apna 4,280

44' Is

Nominal Orbital

Characteristics 

100 am perigee

125 nm spope

.

... . • . . ......... • • • • •

.....

• ....

. • .................. . • ...... " ...............

TOP SEMI

........... . - •. -

5. System Characteristics 
I • •

4813-SECRET6. NRP Financial Program (Satellites) 

(Million $)

Programa FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74

CORONA

Launches

Costa

•

Pm.

MU*

1111111111111 M4

611“ 4131,--SECRET--- istagelle soma AeMpup ahC •01114110111111

M. IMOUSmoll MOM 1041• est um

••n•••n•••••n• •n•n •••n•••n••••
Support R&D (AR/AT,

Photo, Vulnerability,

Costs

' • :

.... .....

- -

... • . . . ..... ,

Totals

Mission Support

(SCF, AFSPPF, etc.)

Costs

NMI

loom

1111,11.101r.Nap -TOP-SECRET- igetwas aalseeale be&NOM

0111LCINS NN IS Oen MN am"

CORON

10P-SECRETPrograms FY69 FY70 FY71 Fr72 F773 FY74

NOTES:

Data is consistent with cost estimates in the Five Year Defense

Program (FYDP).

These costs make no provision for new systems (such as readout) for

launch, but do include technology efforts.

4. o ad • itional C • R systems will be available or unch in

FY 1971 or 1972 if needed.

.5. The above total costs are included in the funding for current DOD

space programs presented in the Preliminary Report "DOD Space Programs,

Options, Recommendations."

6. The above costs are as of July 15, 1969 and do not reflect the

follow-on consideration which could result from the recent termination of

the MOL program.