United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-2505

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Kourtney Melvin Connors

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

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Submitted: April 8, 2024

Filed: June 6, 2024

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Kourtney Melvin Connors pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or 

more of methamphetamine or 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, and a mixture and substance 

containing a detectable amount of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
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§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. Thereafter, the district court1

sentenced Connors to 360 months’ imprisonment. Connors appeals his sentence

arguing that the district court erred in its drug quantity determination and in its 

application of two offense-level enhancements. Additionally, Connors asserts that 

his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

Connors first argues that the district court erred in determining the quantity of 

“ice methamphetamine”2 he distributed. We review the district court’s factual 

findings, including its “drug quantity determination[,] for clear error, and we will 

reverse ‘only if the entire record definitively and firmly convinces us that a mistake 

has been made.’” United States v. Johnson, 75 F.4th 833, 846 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing 

United States v. Shaw, 965 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 2020)). “The government bears 

the burden of proving drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence.” United 

States v. Plancarte-Vazquez, 450 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

At sentencing, the government called five witnesses who testified as to the 

quantity of drugs involved in Connors’ conspiracy. One police officer, Lieutenant 

Doug Scott, investigated Connors’ conspiracy and testified that it involved more 

than 5 kilograms of methamphetamine. That testimony was based on his 

investigation, interviews with cooperating witnesses, the length of the conspiracy, 

and recorded jailhouse telephone calls. Accordingly, witness testimony established 

that Connors’ conspiracy involved at least 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine, 

enough to establish a base offense level of 38. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(1).

Lieutenant Scott’s testimony was corroborated, in part, by three cooperating 

witnesses. Connors contends that the district court erred in crediting any testimony 

of such unreliable witnesses. But “[a] district court’s assessment of a witness’s 

credibility is almost never clear error given that court’s comparative advantage at 

1

The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of Iowa.

2

“‘Ice’ is a purer, more potent form of methamphetamine.” United States v. 

Walker, 688 F.3d 416, 418 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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evaluating credibility.” Plancarte-Vazquez, 450 F.3d at 852. Moreover, Connors 

does not argue that Lieutenant Scott’s testimony was unreliable. Rather, Connors 

asserts that Lieutenant Scott’s testimony regarding the 5 kilograms of 

methamphetamine “was a conclusory statement in response to a leading question.” 

But the Rules of Evidence do not apply to “sentencing hearings, and courts may rely 

on hearsay or other typically inadmissible evidence if that evidence bears sufficient 

indicia of reliability.” United States v. Azure, 596 F.3d 449, 454 (8th Cir. 2010). 

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in either its drug quantity 

determination or its conclusions as to the base offense level.

Next Connors challenges the application of a two-level enhancement for 

posing a credible threat of violence, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2), arguing there was no 

evidence that he made a threat. A witness testified that Connors threatened him with 

a gun during a dispute about a drug debt, and Connors does not deny that this 

occurred. As such, the district court did not clearly err in applying a two-level 

enhancement to Connors’ sentence.

Connors also contests a four-level enhancement for his role as an “organizer

or leader,” arguing that the district court should have applied a three-level 

enhancement for his role as a “manager or supervisor.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)–(b). To 

support the application of a four-level leader or organizer enhancement, the 

government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) that the defendant 

organized or led at least one other participant in the criminal activity, and (2) that 

the criminal activity involved at least five participants or was ‘otherwise extensive.’” 

United States v. Belfrey, 928 F.3d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 

3B1.1(a)) (cleaned up). 

When determining whether a defendant is a leader or an organizer, the Court 

considers factors including: 

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in 

the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the 

claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of 
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participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope 

of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised 

over others. 

U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; see also United States v. Morris, 791 F.3d 910, 914 (8th 

Cir. 2015) (“Although an individual in a drug conspiracy must do more than sell 

drugs for resale in order to be deemed an organizer or leader, he need not directly 

control his co-conspirators.”). Moreover, “[a] scheme may be ‘otherwise extensive’ 

if it involves a large loss amount and covers a period of years.” Belfrey, 928 F.3d at

751 (citation omitted). 

Based on the unobjected-to factual assertions in the presentence report and 

testimony at the sentencing hearing, the district court determined that Connors was 

a leader or organizer in a conspiracy involving more than five participants and

spanning multiple years. To support its conclusion, the district court found that 

Connors was supplying methamphetamine to distributors and then supervising and 

directing them in their subsequent drug sales. Connors was also planning the drug 

sales and tracking the distribution and proceeds of the drugs. The district court 

concluded that the conspiracy lasted from 2019 through 2022 and involved more 

than five individuals, many of whom were arrested for their participation. The 

conspiracy, moreover, involved methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and other 

substances. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in determining that 

Connors was an organizer or leader of an otherwise extensive conspiracy and

applying a four-level aggravated role enhancement.

Finally, Connors argues that the district court’s sentence was not substantively 

reasonable, which we review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 753. Connors’ substantive 

reasonableness argument repeats his Guidelines argument. According to Connors, 

because the district court applied the wrong base offense level, his sentence is a 

substantial upward variance. But as we have already explained, the district court did 

not err in determining Connors’ offense level. The properly calculated advisory 

Guidelines range is “life imprisonment.” The district court sentenced Connors to 360 
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months, a downward variance rather than an upward variance. His sentence, 

therefore, was not an abuse of discretion. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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