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,~, GAMBIt "'-' 

D£PARTM£NT OF Tt-iE AfR FORCE 

WASHIr-<GTOK 

('if, r 

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~'L::':--10~1"DLT}-1 FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENS 

St:BJECT: Quick Reaction Surveillance 

Reference is made to the followi 

rae: 

"Propose a plan to develop the 

instantaneous satellite recon 

least G resolution for various 

in relation to TIT&~-III) sue 

arms control agreements, tact' 

January 11, "'~ 1965 

stems 

task you recently gave 

capabil'ity for 

issance with at 

uses (particularly 

as monitoring the 

al uses, etc." 

QUILL 

The stated requirement could be t by day and night photography trom a synchronous satellite, re rted back in real time 

electronically. As will be coremente~ Ol later, this combination 

of technical capabilities is not likel to be attain<.!ble in the 

foreseeable future. 

As a means to approach the desir d capabilities, I propose .. 

d:ld indeed have underway - a fairly sp ific three-phase program: 

(i) improve existing systems) (ii) incorporate the desired 

characteristics to the maximum practi~ Ie degree in the next 

generation of satellite SystCII;S, (iii) ontinue studies and 

hardware investigations looking toward further generation. 

So~e specifics on each of these phases follow after a brief general 

discussion. An attached chart sununarizes the. situation now and 

at a specific point in the first phase, and sets out for comparison 

the g0<11s of the. first and second phas 

111<2 requirement implied by your to me is closely related 

co v:;.c enunciated by the Cha.LTIi.~an, JCS) in a meu10randum to you of 

:';-Ar(.:., 3.i.., 1964. The attached chart sh s that, on missions for __ -:-:::'(;11 orbits and target programs are p epared in advance, our 

~;~.<:::nned improvements in reaction time \ ill, during the first phase, 

::v;;et the desired performance in thi.s r gard as described by the 

Chairman's memorandum. 

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General Discus,sion 

To approach the kind of resolution stated~ we must look 

to photographic systems operating at medium to low altitudes and 

limited to daylight photography. For such systems, the daily 

cycle of the sun limits the times at which desired targets can 

be covered. The laws of orbital motion and the distribution of 

desired targets fix the orbit and the rate at which targets can 

be photographed on a given mission, and thus constrain the times 

and places at which film or information can be recovered. In 

addition, bad weather over the target area may preclude photography at the time desired. 

In addition to these constraints, which are intrinsic in 

nature and introduce delays varying with the mission to be flown 

and with the weather, there are other sources of delay introduced by hardware and by procedures, some of which can never 

entirely be eliminated. Assuming that a mission is defined by 

a statement that a particular set of targets must be photographed, 

a complex sequence of preparatory actions must take place converting 

this mission into plans for a flight, and then accomplishing the 

flight. In general terms the actions are of the following kinds, 

although not necessarily conducted exactly sequentially: 

A. Determination of the orbit to be used and preparation 

of necessary instructions and documentation that are specific to 

a mission and orbit. These plans define a flight except that they 

may contain the date of launch as an open parameter. 

B. Establishing hardware in a condition for use that is 

not specific to a particular flight. 

C. Preparation of hardware that is chosen specifically for 

a flight, into a condition specific to that flight but not 

necessarily specific to a date of launch. 

D. Determination of a date of launch. 

E. Issuance to the range 0iTR) and to the Satellite Control 

Facility (SCF) of instructions specific to the flight and to the 

date of launch, and preparation of the HTR and the SCF accordingly. 

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F. Final countdown and launch, representing the ¢om.pletion 

of actions initiated in B, C,and E. 

An ideal mode ofoperati()rl is one in whic.h tbeplanning 

operation, A, is accoIT1plished in a few hours by computet', and 

steps B through F are then accomplisbed in a rap.id countdown. 

In practice, I am sure \'1e will always have to undertakeB in 

advance, and depend upon a checked out system standing by in a 

reasonably ready condition. 

Step A, preparation of flight plans, will always have to 

be accomplished largely in advance of those other than :s and D. 

It can be expedited by computer. Because of the many constraints 

imposed upon a flight plan by the mission itself, by the require. 

ments of range safety, by the limitations of the booster, and by 

the characteristics of guidance systems, a great deal of computa ... tion and checking by people must be done in this step. I cannot 

visualize cutting it much below 24 hours even with the most 

sophisticated of systems. Fortunately, as with ballistic missiles) 

the likely missions can be anticipated and a library of flight 

plans prepared in advance. On a mission covered by the library, 

the time consumed by step A does net centribute te delay_ 

Step C, commitment 'Of the hardware to a specific flight, 

and step F, final countdown, depend upon the hardware involved. 

In principle, at least, they can be cut to a few hours by preper 

design. In fact, on GAMBIT today they are not controlling; 

step C \vill be controlling on CORONA as long as the THOR is used 

as its booster. 

Step E, preparing the range and the Satellite Control 

Facilities for a specific flight on a specific date, is largely 

procedural. Many support activities are involved, people must 

b~ informed and perhaps even rehearsed, and petentially cenflicting 

requirements must be identified and resolved. Range safety is 

of major concern. In principle, procedures can be tightened 

sharply, but in practice it is probably this step and the requirement for daylight over target that will ultimately control the 

minimum delay between completion of A, tee determination of a 

flight plan, and launch. 

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Another factor in eonnecti01'l withquitk"'reactlon:Jn"'8;5~t.G'fill'lf::;:': 

that is of interest, al.though n;Qt directl.y'connecte6 wt.th4e"'~Jkjg,,, 

is efficiency. Short mi$sions necessa:r1:;ly eov&t' f~ target$, 

than long ones, a.nd Qne would like to get asmuchintel1:1Je"c&_" .. return per launch as possibl~. In the case of intere$t~re, l#!: 

would lik.e to do so without co,npromising quick return o~ the"' "". 

primary data. Obviously a mUltiple recovery system he:J,.psgreae;ly 

in this conneC'!tion. Also~ anything tha.t allows a. br<>.<1iI.der or UlO'J:t:e' 

flexible selection of orbits leads to the possibility of more '. 

efficient and mOl'e expeditious coverage of desired targe:ts. 

There are many detailed cha.nges over present systems and 

practices that can serve to improve or shorten the preparatory 

actions A through E discussed above, and. can improve efficiency 

or flexibility of target coverage. Important improvements of 

degree or kind P08S ible within the framework of CORONA and GMm:lT; 

and of our present launch and recovery facilities, are: 

1. Improve the ability of the h.ardware to stand in a ready' 

condition for long periods, facilitating or econ.omizing step B •. 

2. Reduce the tire~ required to prepare new orbits and 

camera program~, facilitating stcp A. 

3. Reduce the delay in configuring the hardware to match 

a desired orbit, facilitating step C. 

4. Recover in the present recovery area at night and on 

South-to-North passes, providing for earlier or more flexibly 

chosen recoveries. 

5. Process recovered film while in flight from the 

recovery area. This attacks a significant source of del.ay in 

present operations. 

6. Add alternate launch facilities or, alternatively, 

increased boost capabilities, to permit orbits more efficiently 

covering areas such as Cuba, the Soviet IJissile belt~ etc. 

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Furcher improvements can be. considered which require 

significant to major new deve1.opments. 'These are listed below 

roughly in an order of increasing difficulty and decreasing 

incremental effectiveness; 

7. Develop a multiple recovery system to maintain 

efficiency in total coverage even if early recoveries are made, 

say after one day or after one pass. 

8. Develop a land recovery system. The reduction in 

time-in-transit of recovered film may not be particularly useful 

in the presence of (5), but in general, land recovery will increase the number of recovery opportunities per day. As a 

simpler step, one could consider deploying our present recovery 

forces to new' bases for special missions. The time required to 

do this, perhaps a few days, would have to be counted as a 

preparatory delay. The alternative of setting up permanent 

recovery forces in many areas would be expensive and inefficient. 

In fact, the present Hawaiian recovery base is very conveniently 

located relative to most of the orbits that can be launched from 

the U. S., and it provides uniformly good weather. Its principal 

drawback is its distance from Washington, and (5) attacks this 

problem. 

9. Develop a maneuverable land recovery system, further 

extending the flexibility of selecting recovery times. 

10. Add extensive fuel for orbit adjustments to allow somewhat freer selection of targets and of recovery times and places. 

11. Develop the capability 

IIIIIIIIIIIIII This contributes to effie ~ps not much to elapsed time. 

Consideration has several times been gi~en to developing 

an air-launched satellite system, one of its attractions being 

flexibility in selection of launch sites, and hence of orbits. 

Such sys terns have ahlays been disccl:t:'ded, however, because the 

payload available has been inad~quate to sup·port adequate photographic resolution. 

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One of the most troublesome problems, practically, in 

achieving any kind of quick-rE~action capability is the reliability 

of the equipment. Our latest CORONA launch, for example, went 

through four countdowns before it was finally - and successfully 

launched, five days late. I am afraid that a long and difficult 

period of evolution will be experienced before the theoretical 

possibilities of any particular quick-reaction system will be 

regularly realizable in practice. There are no dramatic actions 

or inventions that can be expected to substitute for the 

meticulous continuing attention to detail that is required to 

design and maintain a complex system capable of a high state of 

readiness. 

Improvements co Present Systems 

Phase (i) applies to CORONA and GAMBIT, and concentrates 

on items (1) through (6) outlined in the preceding section. 

Specific information is given in the paragraphs below, correspondingly numbered. 

1. During February, we plan to launch a CORONA that has 

stood in the R-l condition for at least 15 days. The criteria 

defining the limits of this hold condition are not sharp, and 

we expect to be able to improve beyond this point. I wish to 

defer experiments with GAMBIT in this direction until actions 

now under way to improve its recently unreliable performance show 

results. 

L. Preparing flight plans for CORONA is, for accidental 

but unavoidable reasons, a very clumsy process. Fortunately, the 

vari.ety of significantly different possible missions is low, so 

that a useful library of flight plans is practicable. Flight 

planning for GAMBIT is well automated, and can be done rapidly 

ab ~niti6, provided ont does not ask for optimized coverage of 

too large a list of targets. On the other hand, a comprehensive :~ 

library of GAMBIT flight plans could be very extensive. 

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We have a small library of CORONA flight plans now, and 

are working with the intelligence community to identify, in an 

order of priority, useful additions to it. In the case of 

GA'Vf...BIT, ,ole plan to es tablish a library of critical missions, and 

t.hen simply accept the fact that if a new mission must be plannej 

quickly, vIe c.annot expect it to be optimized for anc:.llary coverage. 

vle are working with the intelligence community to ide.Ttify the 

ulissions most important for this library. By summer I think we 

can have a useful library for both CORONA and GAMBIT, and will 

have in operation a regl-dar procedure for keeping it up to date. 

3. To configure a THOR for a particular launch trajectory 

requires physical disassembly of part of the booster and physical 

changes to its autopilot. During this month, improvements. to 

this process will be effective so that it can be done at day R-8; 

this is about the limit of improvement short of a major change in 

the launch vehicle. The ATLAS booster is not bandicapped in this 

way, and is ready to fly on any launch trajectory within its 

capabilities down to the point that final countdown begins. 

4. Recovery forces are training on night recoveries and 

on recoveries on South-to-North passes at the present time, using 

air-dropped training equipment. I may later recommend flying an 

extra CORONA J mission for an operational test of these and other 

capabilities. Alternatively, we may find it acceptable to test 

them on a scheduled mission without great risk to the intelligence take. . 

5. Contractors are preparing bids now to develop a fUm 

processor that can fly in a C-135 and process satellite film with 

satisfactory quality. Use of such equi.pment would remove about· 

14 hours of delay that now occurs in transporting film from the 

recovery area to the processing plant. It will probably be about 

a year in development, hence not available much before the end 

of FY 66. 

6. Planning for an alternate launch site at E'l'R is in 

process and will be reported to you soon. rtappears that wema,' 

be able to achieve the same results more qUicltlyand at L.eSS 

expense by certain payloa.q. and booster changes which will allow a 

much wider selection of orbits from the present launch sites at 

WTR. I want to report on this alternative at the same time. 

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In connection with this last point, there is no question 

thot it is relatively easy to substitute an ATLAS for a THOR. 

boos ter on CORONA. This w.mld eliminate any real need fer 

launching CORONA frem ETR. Equally impertant fer this discussion 

is the fact that it would permit other changes so that CORONA 

could have the same pre-launch and on-orbit flexibility as 

GAMBIT. If this is dene, then, CORONA could be expected finally 

to ~how the same flexibility as that shown for GAMBIT in the 

column en the attached chart labelled flGAMBIT Goals. 1t I 

expect to report te you soon on this possible change of booster 

for CORONA. 

Turning specifically to the chart: the first column shows 

CORONA as present procedures operate. The improvements. in going 

to. the second column are largely procedural, but include an 

actual change to the THOR to facilitate step C. Thiscolt:.mm 

also shows, as a goal, the effects of introducing an airbo1:tle 

film processing plant. 

The differences between the two GAMBIT columns are enti.%:elj' 

procedural and somewhat conjectural, except for those due to 

the proposed airborne processing. The most difficult problem. 

is to tighten up the preparatory procedures on t:h~ range without 

sacrifice of range safety (Step E). The 12-hour goal shown is 

simply a goal and should not be regarded as certain of aei::'QJJIlP~;J.s;n"" 

ment on a. regular basis. It is lUvce liltely of achievement. on a 

few highly prepared and stereotyped missions t.llen on an arbittary 

new and complex mission. 

The GS goals differ f-rO$those of GAMBIT only ill th:e'nopt:V 

that the'I'l'l'AN lIIX booster may permit sinJplercountdown p·~O'C1· e(Jl1.:r~~$";::,::. 

and longer holdi-ug times .. . . 

Examination of the c.hart sboW's th~t ~ even:~loiti~g;a:l;.1 .. 

of the ilnpr·ovemE!.l1ts (1) through (5), and usmg'ap~e .. dete_in~ai~: 

orbit, at best about 36 hours will ela:ps~bet:weell'tbe'R':":l :c·:cm4,· £ct:lti:jtS:~;: 

and the initial reading of a day's phQtograp'hy. For 51,1.1.1 tfJj· ;ej411caJt~,*:::?~;~~;;;/;: 

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of some areas, one could recover after one pass, in the best 

case then cutting the elapsed time to 22 hours at the expense of 

a drastic reduction in coverage. In the worst case, that in 

Hhich a decision to launch comes too late to meet the first 

launch window (set by the requirement of daylight over the ta:rget). 

one must add about 22 hours to the figures quoted. 

New Satellite Systems 

The next generation of photographic satellite systems 

consists of G&~IT-3, a high resolution pointing system, and a 

De", search/surveillance system now going through its early 

definition phase. Both of these systems will incorporate to 

the best reasonable extent the operating conveniences represented 

by (1), (2), and (3) above, and can of course take advantage of 

improvements such as (4) and (5). Flexibility in choice of 

orbit can be expected because of the capabilities of the 

TITAl.'J III-X or TITAN III class boosters to be used. Here again, 

hm'lever, a delay of 22 to 60 hours can be expected between the 

R-l condition and reading of the' first recovered film. 

Consideration is being given to incorporating in each of 

these new systems the option to use multiple recovery vehicles. 

This does not influence reaction time, but greatly improves the 

efficiency of operation, measured in coverage per launch, when 

an early recovery is required. 

Among the possibilities for net-l search/ surveillance systems 

is one that could search the whole Soviet Union, at say 4 feet 

resolution, in four days. Such a system trades resolution for a 

very impressive "quick reaction!! search capability. 

Longer Term Prospects 

Ideally, the "instantaneous" requirement calls for a 

sa:ellite stationed at synchronous altitude, capable of taking 

pictures day or night, and reporting these pictures back 

01ectronically. To achieve the stated resolution of about 

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three feet from synchronous altitude would require a lens or 

mirror more than 80 feet in diameter - some 20 times larger 

than we are willing to attempt with the required precision today. 

Consequently, even for the distant future, one must think of 

systems vlhich fly at much lower altitudes, covering target areas 

and encountering recovery or read-out stations only periodically .. Granting this, some very rough estimates are given below of what 

may be possible, perhaps after major new developments. 

Daylight photography: Using TITAN III-C, and not extending 

the optical art much.beyond that envisioned for GAMBIT-3, one 

might look forward to a system which flew at about 400 n.m. 

altitude and provided a resolution of 3 feet on the ground. On 

each pass over the United States such a system could report back 

electronically, at the indicated resolution, pictures of a few 

targets each 10 miles by 10 miles square. Perhaps an ultimate 

practical read-out speed might permit ten targets per pass per 

read-out station. 

Night and foul weather: Using laser illumination, a 

capability for night photography at perhaps 10 foot resolution 

might be achieved on a TITAN III-C. Read-out of several targets 

l-er pass over the United. States "tvould be possible. Alternatively, 

a radar system might achieve resolutions almost this good, and 

would work in foul weather as well as at night. Either of 

these possibilities would require a nuclear power source for 

reasonable lifetime on orbit. Both require, and are getting, 

further study. 

Exploratory Program 

There are some specific efforts in the NRO program to 

explore or to develop the capabilities that are critical to the 

several" kinds of capability discussed earlier. The more important 

activities are listed below. 

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Tbe NRO budget for FY. 66 contains funds earmarked for 

initiating development of a new recovery system. It. is ~e.¢'tetl 

that this development will provide f.o"C inUlt:iple recoveries, 

returning four to six separate packages of film from a singl .. 

mission. Requirements will be defined in deta!las the . characteristics of the new general $$areh/surv:£illal'loe sys:t$ 

are clarified. The objectfveis to have ;lmultipla recovery. 

system available during FY 1967 as an. option on ~MYmt'r .... 3and 

on the new search/surveill"cmce system. 

The START program, funded in the Air for¢e budget, ts 

presently studying the long-term prospects for development of 

a highly maneuverable recovery system.. Two kinds are-under 

examination, one to return a large payload, and the other, to 

return a small payload, as might be appropriate for a multiple 

recovery system. Emphasis is currently on the latter system. 

Any development that results will be several years in coming, 

and will require a further definition of requirements appropriate 

to the sensor systems expected then to be available. 

Under the classified code name QUILL, an experimental high 

resolution radar satellite has just successfully undergone a 

test in orbit. This is one of the more dramatic milestones in 

a continuing program of study and development exploring the 

technology of satellite borne radar systems. Although it seems 

unlikely that such systems will ever achieve the three-foot 

resolution suggested in your statement of requirements, I plan, 

during the next several months, and using the results of the 

QUILL tests, to try to develop a definitive report on what one 

might expect to acc·omplish with a radar' satellite, and to relate 

this to various potential requirements. 

Electronic read-out has always been an attractive objective. 

The SAMOS project included two read-out systems, E~land E-2. 

E-l flew and successfully returned results in January 1961, with 

pictures showing about 100 foot resolution. E-2 successfully 

transmitted pictures from the payload during countdown, but 

efforts toward flight were stopped after launch failures. The 

USSR is known to have a read-out system operating at an estimated 

resolution of about 75 feet. 

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The NRO cO'ntim;u~$ tlo,' c$\tPPQ,l:f$ttt-d,,na: d"'av.~t~'~~jtv in the techno IO'gy ofr~ad"'oil;t; ·syst.s:. ,', ~"'C" t'lol:"l.,~ia~ 

factor has always beentn.e"~:m~l~.~i.nl<Qut· ,',' ", ' " 

of pictures at a sp.e:eohi.gh ~~ght:o '~ttd.:t a'u~,e~\J-l 

during the time that thesa:t~lJ.it:ei$" vi$ibl~ti; __ a 

s tation~ C\1~nt t-e:~h'nolotyp~"1:'in:itst1t:a.t\S:mi.~t1t1,${):nl1", a. bJ,~" ~!i< 

one target per pass per t':ea:d"'Gut station.. and lbnits ·t'tia a'tU;:!: 

covered by) or the resoluti,Qnof. that particulu re;tUm .. definitive results baartng .on future possibilities at.'e now' 

coming out ~four NRO stucU:e.s. Att atten1frtw111 be ma4e to , " , summarue toose and evaluate t:h~k illlP'liutic.usfcz:sever.al. ' ","' 

potentially interesting appltc·atitms, including the . co quick-reaction surveillance systems • 

. You have recently directed me to unuerctake $·tudas ad'\ 

hardware efforts relate~ to surveillance systems to' be £l~;' 

synchronous altitudes. Although sueh systems 1 as I noted 

earlier, cannot be expected to support image fcn:ming $,ensots 

with three-foot resolution, they may be $xp.eeted to: collect 

import.ant. collat.eral information for surveillance put'poses, .. 

F~:r.·· X!:f!y MeMi, ... ·/fi. an ' 

Director 

National Re.eonuaissance 

Attachment 

cc - DepSe.;Def 

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