The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District

1

Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and

recommendations of the Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States

Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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No. 95-2897

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United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Michael Anthony Williams, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: August 20, 1996

 Filed: August 28, 1996

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Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

A jury found Michael A. Williams guilty of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).

Williams appeals, asserting that the district court erred in denying his 1

motion to suppress the weapons seized at the time of his arrest and in

denying his motion for a mistrial. We affirm.

Reviewing de novo, we conclude that the arresting officers had a

reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop, based

on details supplied by an anonymous caller and corroborated by police. See

Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996) (standard of

review). The caller supplied police
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with specific details suggesting firsthand knowledge--a description of the

scene, a description of the car allegedly containing the weapons, and the

exact street address--all of which were corroborated by the officers' own

observations upon arrival at the scene. See United States v. Cox, 942 F.2d

1282, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1991) (stop justified where police found specific

vehicle at certain location as relayed by anonymous informant), cert.

denied, 503 U.S. 921 (1992).

We also conclude the subsequent seizure of the weapons from the trunk

of the car after Williams denied ownership of the car and told an officer

he could search it was justified. See United States v. Thompkins, 998 F.2d

629, 632-33 (8th Cir. 1993). Although Williams contended that he did not

make such statements, the district court was entitled to credit the

officer's version of the events over Williams's testimony. See United

States v. Adipietro, 983 F.2d 1468, 1472 (8th Cir. 1993) (district court's

findings on witness credibility are virtually unassailable on appeal).

We reject Williams's final contention that the district court abused

its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial based on a comment in

government counsel's closing argument, regarding how to prove "knowledge"

when, among other things, there is no confession. We conclude the

statement in context did not manifest an improper intent to comment on

Williams's failure to testify and that the jury would not necessarily take

it to be such a comment. See Parkus v. Delo, 33 F.3d 933, 940-41 (8th Cir.

1994); United States v. Hale, 1 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1993) (standard of

review). Moreover, the district court instructed the jury, immediately

following the closing arguments, that the fact that Williams did not

testify must not be considered or even discussed in arriving at a verdict.

Cf. United States v. Biondo, 483 F.2d 635, 644-45 (8th Cir. 1973) (even if

court construed prosecutor's statement to refer in any way to defendant's

failure to testify,
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indirectness of comment combined with specific instruction to jury rendered

it harmless error), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 947 (1974). Because the

prosecutor's remarks were directed towards explaining how, absent direct

evidence, to determine whether a defendant acts with knowledge, and were

not an attack on Williams's post-arrest silence, Williams does not advance

his position by relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). See id. at

618 (explaining that Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that

post-arrest silence will not be penalized). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.