FILED

June 12, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

APRIL SESSION, 1998

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9706-CR-00211

)

Appellee, )

) DAVIDSON COUNTY

V. ) 

)

) HON. THOMAS H. SHRIVER, JUDGE

TILLIE RUTH STEEPLES, ) 

)

Appellant. ) (DELIVERY OF SCHEDULE II DRUG) 

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

PETER J. STRIANSE JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

TUNE, ENTREKIN & WHITE, P.C. Attorney General & Reporter

2100 First American Center

Nashville, TN 37238 ELIZABETH B. MARNEY

Assistant Attorney General

MARY A. PARKER 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

STEPHEN C. CROFFORD 425 Fifth Avenue North 

Suite 511, Cummins Station Nashville, TN 37243

209 Tenth Avenue South

Nashville, TN 37203 VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III

District Attorney General

TOM THURMAN 

Assistant District Attorney General

Washington Square, Suite 500 

222 Second Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37201-1649

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Defendant, Tillie Ruth Steeples, appeals as of right the six-year sentence

imposed by the Davidson County Criminal Court following her sentencing hearing.

After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

Defendant was indicted on four counts of cocaine-related charges pertaining

to incidents occurring on July 26, 1994 and August 10, 1994. Count One charged

Defendant with delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, and Count Two charged her

with causing a Schedule II drug to be taken or sent into a detention facility where

prisoners are quartered. Count Three charged Defendant with taking or sending a

Schedule II drug into a detention facility on August 10, 1994, and Count Four

charged Defendant with the death of her incarcerated husband, Thomas Steeples,

resulting from the unlawful distribution of cocaine. On November 14, 1996,

Defendant entered a nolo contendere plea to Counts One and Two. Consistent with

the plea agreement, Counts Three and Four dealing with the August 10, 1994, event

were dismissed. Nonetheless, Defendant denied guilt as to all four Counts against

her at the sentencing hearing. Following the two-day sentencing hearing, the trial

court sentenced Defendant to serve the agreed-upon six-year sentence relating to

Counts One and Two, and denied Defendant’s request that she be given some type

of alternative sentencing. 

It is first necessary to describe the nature of the circumstances surrounding

all four Counts against Defendant since the facts pertaining to all four Counts were

brought out at the sentencing hearing. Despite the fact that Counts Three and Four

were dismissed, the trial court allowed the State to offer evidence on those counts
-3-

as that evidence pertained to Defendant’s character. Counts One and Two relate

to the July 26, 1994 incident in which Defendant purchased cocaine from a known

drug dealer, placed it in an envelope where it was then taped to business papers,

and had the papers and cocaine delivered to her husband in jail by her husband’s

lawyer. The State’s theory relating to Counts Three and Four involves Defendant

directing her employee, Donna Esstman, to purchase a sweatsuit and other clothing

items for Defendant’s husband. Defendant then placed cocaine inside part of a latex

glove and put that latex piece inside a mended place in the waist band of the

sweatpants. On August 10, 1994, she sent the clothing package to Michael Evans,

an inmate in the same jail where Defendant’s husband was incarcerated. As a result

of this last delivery of cocaine, Defendant’s husband overdosed on the cocaine and

died. The State’s theory involved showing that Defendant had used a sewing

machine to restitch the sweatpants containing the cocaine and conspired to destroy

or cover up that and other evidence of criminal activity.

On Novem ber 14, 1996, at a hearing on Defendant’s plea of nolo contendere

to Counts One and Two, the following facts were established by the State.

Sometime prior to May 19, 1994, Defendant’s husband was arrested and charged

with three counts of first-degree murder, especially aggravated rape, and various

drug charges. Prior to July 26, 1994, Defendant told employees of her company that

her husband would never go to trial. She told Dr. Kellum, her son’s school principal,

that her husband was going to commit suicide and that she would receive a large

insurance settlement. On July 26, 1994, there was a $580,000 life insurance policy

in effect for Mr. Steeples.
-4-

Also prior to July 26, 1994, Defendant asked an employee, Don Vanloon, how

much cocaine it would take to kill a person. On July 25, 1994, Defendant cashed a

$1,000 check and met with Fred Ross, a known drug dealer, at a local motel. On

July 26, 1994, Mr. Vanloon was working at Defendant’s place of business when

Defendant left to meet with her lawyer, Mark McDougal. Defendant’s husband called

the place of business and told Mr. Vanloon to tell Defendant not to leave a certain

package alone with Mark McDougal. On July 26, 1994, Defendant drove Mr.

McDougal to the jail where Defendant’s husband was incarcerated. Defendant gave

Mr. McDougal a package containing some business papers to take to her husband.

Even though Mr. McDougal had taken business papers to the jail by himself before,

on this occasion Defendant insisted that she accompany Mr. McDougal to the jail.

Mr. McDougal went in the jail and delivered the package to Mr. Steeples. Normally,

Mr. Steeples would have had a conversation with Mr. McDougal, but this time Mr.

Steeples took the package, got a cold drink, and returned to his cell. Upon returning

to his cell, Mr. Steeples was stopped and searched by two guards who discovered

cigarettes taped in an envelope. Mr. Steeples grabbed the envelope from one of the

guards and started to eat the envelope that contained white powder. After he had

consumed some of the white powder in the envelope, Mr. Steeples was taken to a

hospital for treatment. The white powder in the envelope was cocaine. Defendant’s

fingerprints were lifted from inside a piece of tape used to attach the envelope

containing cocaine to the business papers. 

Based on the foregoing facts, Defendant pled no contest to Counts One and

Two in exchange for a sentence of three years on each count, to be served

consecutively for a total of six years. Counts Three and Four were dismissed.
-5-

Defendant’s sentencing hearing was conducted over two days in January,

1997. Twice during the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked defense counsel

if Defendant would like to withdraw her plea. Both times, defense counsel talked

privately with Defendant, and both times defense counsel stated that Defendant

wanted to proceed with her plea. The trial court warned Defendant that any

untruthfulness at the hearing would affect her sentence. Defendant and eighteen

other witnesses testified regarding the July and August 1994 events. 

Evidence at Defendant’s sentencing hearing revealed that after her husband’s

arrest on the murder, rape and drug charges, Defendant wrote a letter dated April

29, 1994, to Dr. Danny Kellum, the principal of a private school that had expelled her

son, stating that “half the time we don’t even know where he [Mr. Steeples] is” but

then praised her husband as “a wonderful man” who “deserves the respect of the

faculty, staff, student body, and community.” She originally included a check for

$75,000 in the letter for the school’s new library and wanted to name the library in

honor of her husband. However, she tore up the check when the school expelled

her son.

On May 19, 1994, while Mr. Steeples was incarcerated, Defendant testified

at her husband’s bond hearing, which was held before the same judge who presided

over Defendant’s sentencing hearing. From the record, it appears that Defendant’s

testimony at the bond hearing focused on her unwavering support of her husband’s

release on bond to get treatment for cocaine use, that she was not considering

divorce, and that she alleged that he abused her in a prior divorce filing because

“angry wives do a lot of things.” She testified at the bond hearing that, except for
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one occasion, she had always known her husband’s whereabouts when he was not

at home. 

Defendant testified at the sentencing hearing that she did not recall a meeting

with the drug dealer Fred Ross. Defendant testified that she knew a “Fred” who

owed her husband a lot of money and that she contacted this “Fred” to raise money

for her husband’s lawyers. Defendant testified that she did not recall why she wrote

a $1000 check for cash on July 25, 1994, the day before Defendant’s husband

ingested cocaine the first time. Defendant testified that she did not recall a

conversation on April 6, 1995 with Donna Esstman in which she stated she had told

investigating authorities she did not know Fred Ross. The State’s attorney read the

following from a recording of an April 6, 1995 conversation between Ms. Esstman

and Defendant:

(Defendant): “When they showed me this picture of Fred, I just flat

out told them that I had never seen this person

before in my life. I don’t recognize him at all.”

(Esstman): “Do they know who he is?”

(Defendant): “They know who he is; but, they can’t get any

evidence on him.”

Defendant testified at her sentencing hearing that she did not recall that

conversation.

When questioned about a recording of a conversation that she had with Ms.

Esstman on April 3, 1995, Defendant denied that the recording revealed that she

was encouraging Ms. Esstman “to deny everything” to the authorities. Defendant

testified that what she was encouraging Ms. Esstman to deny was “a whole lot of

stuff that she’s got built up in her head. . . She has a lot of emotional problem s.”
-7-

Defendant testified that the sewing machine that they discussed on the tape had

belonged to an ex-employee and was taken from the office by Ms. Esstman.

Defendant testified that she did not know anything about sewing done on the sweat

pants that were delivered in August 1994 to her husband in jail. She further denied

using the sewing machine “for any criminal intent.” Defendant testified that the

sweatsuit, socks and underwear she sent Ms. Esstman to purchase were for her son

and not for her husband.

Defendant testified that her fingerprints were on the tape attaching the

envelope containing cocaine to the business papers because she had wrapped the

tape around a pencil so that her husband could repair his broken glasses.

Defendant testified that she did not know who put drugs in that package delivered

to her husband on July 26, 1994. She testified that she drove Mr. McDougal to the

jail because it was raining hard that day. She further testified that the only reason

her husband left her a message not to leave the package with Mr. McDougal was out

of concern that he might not deliver it immediately.

The trial court questioned Defendant about her statement in the pre-sentence

report charging that Detectives Pridemore and Postiglione, who were investigating

the charges against her husband, had threatened her with destruction of her

business. Specifically, she stated in the pre-sentence report as follows:

 I pled ‘no contest.’ My greatest crime was being married

to Tom Steeples. When he died before going to trial, the

system wanted blood and could find it by pursuing me and

the business. The 2 detectives vowed they would destroy

both me and my business. They have! They stood in front

of my business and swore I would be the next notch on

their belt. I was! They said no one would do business

with someone accused of murder whether convicted or

not. They were right! They bragged about bringing down
-8-

a large BP Station and said I would be next. I was! My

husband was not searched before he came down. He

brought a large 9 x 12 white envelope down with him. It

contained the drugs I was accused of sending in to him.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant stated that this was her “scenario” of the

charges against her. Defendant testified further that the officers had, in fact,

threatened to destroy her business.

Detective Postiglione testified that after Defendant’s husband became a

suspect, that he and Detective Pridemore went to Defendant’s place of business to

try to speak to her because her husband had disappeared and officers were unable

to locate him. When the detectives attempted to speak with Defendant in front of her

place of business, she was hostile and refused to speak to Detective Postiglione.

She eventually became verbally abusive to both officers. According to Postiglione,

neither he nor Pridemore threatened Defendant with destroying either her or her

business.

Michael Evans, a fellow inmate of Mr. Steeples, testified that on August 10,

1994, he received a package containing underwear, socks, and a sweatsuit that was

delivered to the jail after he had spoken to Defendant on the phone. After Mr. Evans

received the package, he told Mr. Steeples where the package was and left to take

a shower. About two and a half hours later, Mr. Steeples was found dead from a

cocaine overdose. 
-9-

Ms. Esstman testified that Defendant stated repeatedly that her husband

would never go to trial. Prior to Mr. Steeples’ death, Defendant asked Ms. Esstman

to purchase a white two-piece sweatsuit, some white tube socks and some mens

underwear. Defendant told Ms. Esstman that these items were to be sent to Mr.

Steeples as a care package.

Before Mr. Steeples’ death, Ms. Esstman went with Defendant to meet an

individual named Fred at the Days Inn on Trinity Lane. Prior to this meeting,

Defendant and Ms. Esstman had gone to a NationsBank where Defendant cashed

a check. Around the time that these events were taking place, Ms. Esstman

estimated that Defendant received more than a dozen phone calls at work from a

person named Fred.

Ms. Esstman further testified that on the day of Mr. Steeples’ death, Defendant

received a phone call from her husband that morning. After the phone call,

Defendant seemed distraught and emotional. After Defendant was notified of her

husband’s death, she told Ms. Esstman that it was over and that she had done what

her husband had wanted her to do.

Shortly after her husband’s death, Defendant delivered a sewing machine to

Ms. Esstman and asked her to keep it in the trunk of her car. Eventually Ms.

Esstman called the police and turned the sewing machine over to them. Ms.

Esstman testified that she soon began cooperating with the authorities in their

attempt to get tapes to corroborate the meetings with Fred, the purchase of the

clothes, and the matter of the sewing machine.
-10-

John Lowery, a pressman who had worked for Defendant, testified that on

April 6, 1995, Defendant asked him and another employee to go to Ms. Esstman’s

house to get a sewing machine. At that time Mr. Lowery was aware that the police

already had the sewing machine and that Ms. Esstman was cooperating with the

police. Mr. Lowery told the authorities that Defendant was planning to destroy or

hide evidence. Defendant testified that she did not recall telling Mr. Lowery to get

the sewing machine from Ms. Esstman. 

Detective Postiglione testified that a pair of cotton sweatpants, some mens

underwear, and white tube socks were found in Mr. Steeples’ jail cell after his death.

He testified that no cocaine residue was found on the clothes but that the

sweatpants had a rip in the area where the string would normally be tied and that a

piece of latex glove was found close to Mr. Steeples’ body. 

 Defendant offered proof that she has no prior arrest record or prior

convictions. She also testified that she has worked her entire adult life. She has

owned her own business for twenty years. Defendant resides with her two children

in Mt. Juliet, Tennessee. Defendant offered proof that she participates in school

activities with her sixteen year old son, including football games and fundraisers for

the school and the football team. Defendant served on committees at her daughter’s

school as well. A former teacher of her son testified that Defendant never acted

inappropriately or contrary to the best interest of the children. The teacher also

testified that it would be devastating if the son lost another parent. 

Defendant testified at length about the physical abuse she suffered from her

husband. She testified that her husband had broken many of her bones in the past
-11-

and that many of the beatings occurred in front of her children. She said that her

children had to call the police on several occasions. Defendant testified that her

husband told her if she didn’t stay with him that he would kill the children in front of

her, and that he would then kill her. After her husband was incarcerated, Defendant

said that he continued to call her and threaten the children if she did not accept his

phone calls.

Dr. Scott Fairchild, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified on behalf of the

defense. After pleading nolo contendere, Defendant sought counseling from him on

three occasions. Dr. Fairchild testified that people who get into abusive relationships

tend to repeat them and that he was not surprised that Defendant had tried to help

her abusive husband get out of jail on bond. He went on to say that he believes that

if the Defendant is not allowed treatment then she could again be involved in criminal

activity.

Her son, John Steeples, testified that he had seen his father abuse Defendant.

He recalled one incident when he stepped in between his mom and dad to break up

the fight. He said that he had called the police to prevent the abuse on other

occasions.

The pastor of Defendant’s church testified that a strong bond exists between

Defendant and her children. He said that Defendant was devoted to her children

and that he had seen no evidence that Defendant would be a threat to other

members of society. The church administrative assistant also testified and said that

Defendant did attend church and that she had never seen Defendant engaged in any

criminal behavior. 
-12-

A longtime friend of Defendant, Ellis Green, testified that he had known

Defendant since 1974. He said that he had never seen Defendant try to hurt anyone

either physically or em otionally. He further said that the public would be safe if

Defendant was put on probation.

Defendant’s bankruptcy attorney testified that Defendant’s company was

viable as of 1994. However, after her husband was incarcerated in 1994, the

company began to falter. Defendant put in $500,000 to try and save the company,

but it still failed. Defendant used her husband’s life insurance proceeds to try and

save the business, but she eventually had to file for bankruptcy.

Because the State and Defendant agreed upon the length and consecutive

nature of the sentences, Defendant’s only issue in this appeal is the manner of

service of the six-year sentence. A defendant who “is an especially mitigated or

standard offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony is presumed to be a

favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options in the absence of evidence to

the contrary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6). Our sentencing law also provides

that “convicted felons committing the most severe offenses, possessing criminal

histories evincing a clear disregard for the laws and morals of society, and evincing

failure of past efforts at rehabilitation shall be given first priority regarding sentencing

involving incarceration.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5). Thus, a defendant

sentenced to eight years or less who is not an offender for whom incarceration is a

priority is presumed eligible for alternative sentencing unless sufficient evidence

rebuts the presumption. However, the Act does not provide that all offenders who

meet the criteria are entitled to such relief; rather, it requires that sentencing issues
-13-

be determined by the facts and circumstances presented in each case. See State

v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

Additionally, the principles of sentencing reflect that the sentence should be

no greater than that deserved for the offense committed and should be the least

severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is

imposed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(3)-(4). The court should also consider the

potential for rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant in determining the sentence

alternative. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5).

When imposing a sentence of total confinem ent, our Criminal Sentencing

Reform Act requires the trial court to base its decision on the considerations set forth

in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103. These considerations which

militate against alternative sentencing include: the need to protect society by

restraining a defendant having a long history of criminal conduct, whether

confinement is particularly appropriate to effectively deter others likely to commit a

similar offense, the need to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense, and

the need to order confinement in cases in which less restrictive measures have often

or recently been unsuccessfully applied to the defendant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

103(1).

In determining whether to grant probation, the judge must consider the nature

and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s criminal record, her background

and social history, her present condition, including her physical and mental condition,

the deterrent effect on other criminal activity, and the likelihood that probation is in

the best interests of both the public and the defendant. Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d
-14-

617, 620 (1974). The burden is on the Defendant to show that the sentence she

received is improper and that she is entitled to probation. State v. Ashby, 823

S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). Grants or denials for probation and other types of

alternative sentencing are reviewed de novo with a presumption of correctness.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d); State v. Byrd, 861 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1993). This presumption is “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record

that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and

circumstances.” Ashby, 823 S.W .2d at 169. 

In the instant case, the trial court determined that regardless of Defendant’s

persistent denial of guilt, there was a factual basis for finding guilt. Further, the trial

court recited numerous incidences where Defendant’s sworn testimony was not

truthful. Finally, the trial court observed that, in light of the severity of the charges

against her, Defendant was given considerable lenience in the plea agreem ent.

After considering all of the foregoing, the trial court concluded that Defendant should

spend her six-year sentence incarcerated in order to deter others from smuggling

drugs into prisons, to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense, and to avoid

inequities in sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial

court properly considered the sentencing principles, and therefore, our review will

be de novo with a presumption of correctness.

The Defendant’s two convictions are Class C felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 39-11-403; 39-16-201(b). She was sentenced as a Range I Standard Offender

to three years for each count. There is a statutory presumption that the Defendant

is eligible for probation as to these convictions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

102(6). However, the trial court denied her request for probation on these counts.
-15-

We agree with the trial court that Defendant should not be granted probation

for her convictions on Counts One and Two. Defendant does have an excellent work

history and social history. She has never been convicted of another crime.

However, we must emphasize the seriousness of this crime. Defendant illegally sent

cocaine to her husband in prison, apparently with the intentions of allowing her

husband to overdose on the drug so he would not have to stand trial. Also, since her

husband’s insurance policy apparently did not have a “suicide clause,” Defendant

was able to collect m ore than a half million dollars as a result of her husband’s

death. The circumstances of an offense may be an appropriate factor for the denial

of probation. State v. W iseman, 643 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). W e

conclude that the circumstances of this offense alone are likely enough to support

the denial of probation. 

Untruthfulness or lack of candor may also be an appropriate consideration to

deny probation because it reflects poorly upon a defendant’s potential for

rehabilitation. State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158 (Tenn. 1993). Defendant did not

accept blame for any of her actions, even in the face of overwhelming evidence that

she did in fact commit the offenses. For example, Defendant’s denial that she knew

her husband was planning to commit suicide was not credible based on the

evidence. The record showed that Defendant had told several people that her

husband would never go to trial and that when she learned of his death, she stated

“I’m free.” Defendant’s testimony regarding her helplessness in the face of her

husband’s abuse was also unconvincing to the trial court. As the trial judge pointed

out, Defendant was extremely supportive of her husband at his bond hearing and her

demeanor at that hearing was “imperious, belligerent, defensive and hostile.” The

court determined that the hostility Defendant exhibited at the bond hearing and the
-16-

statements praising her husband in her letter to Dr. Kellum undermined and belied

her insistence at the sentencing hearing that she was a helpless victim of her

husband’s abuse. Defendant even wanted to give money to her son’s school for a

new library, and wished to name it in honor of her husband.

Defendant’s testimony that she did not recall the meeting with the drug dealer,

Fred Ross, was also unconvincing. The testimony of Donna Esstman and the

transcript of the April 6, 1995 conversation completely contradict Defendant’s story.

The court concluded that the evidence showed that the meeting did in fact take

place, and as a result of that meeting, Defendant purchased cocaine that was later

sent to her husband in prison. Also, Defendant’s explanation of her advice to Ms.

Esstman that “you can . . . strictly deny everything if you want to” meant that she was

urging Mrs. Esstman to confront her psychological problems is likewise

unconvincing. Furthermore, Defendant’s insistence that she knew nothing about the

sewing machine or any attempt to hide it from authorities is contradicted by the

testimony of Ms. Esstman and John Lowery whose testimony regarding Defendant’s

efforts to hide evidence was absolutely consistent with one another. All of the

foregoing facts point to Defendant’s lack of candor with the trial court as well as her

untruthfulness.

Defendant claims that the State introduced no evidence at her sentencing

hearing regarding the July 26, 1994 incident. In fact, the testimony focusing on the

cocaine purchase from Fred Ross, the delivery of cocaine to the jail by her lawyer,

the discovery of cocaine in the envelope, and the discovery of Defendant’s

fingerprints on the tape all dealt with the July 26, 1994 incident. 
-17-

We disagree also with Defendant’s contention that only an alternative

sentence “with continued treatment and therapy” can benefit her. The record just

does not support Defendant’s claim that she is actively or genuinely seeking

treatment or rehabilitation since she did not visit a psychologist until after she had

entered her nolo contendere plea. 

Likewise, we also disagree with Defendant’s contention that the trial court

denied her probation by imposing an extra-statutory requirement for granting

probation. Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court, in essence, made a

defendant who enters a nolo contendere plea presum ptively ineligible for alternative

sentencing. However, the record does not support Defendant’s assertion. As

previously discussed, Defendant was consistently evasive and untruthful in her

testimony. Defendant was also unrepentant and showed contempt for the

proceeding in which she testified. These are all ample reasons for determining that

Defendant was unsuitable for alternative sentencing. See State v. Dykes, 803

S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

Defendant also requests that her case be remanded to perm it her to withdraw

her nolo contendere plea and allow her a jury trial. However, the trial court asked

the Defendant two times during the sentencing hearing if she would like to withdraw

her plea. After discussion with her counsel both times, she expressed her decision

to proceed with the sentencing hearing and with her plea of nolo contendere.

Obviously, Defendant did not seek the relief which she is now asking at the trial court

and we are precluded from entertaining that request absent plain error. See State

v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1987). Defendant’s attempt to seek relief

beyond the issue presented in her notice of appeal, the denial of probation or other
-18-

form of alternative sentence, cannot now be entertained. See id.; see also Tenn. R.

Crim. P. 37(b). 

In summary, Defendant’s overall demeanor, including her insistence on

blaming other people and her lack of candor and truthfulness to the court, all militate

against any type of alternative sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court. 

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________

GARY R. WADE, Presiding Judge

___________________________________

L. T. LAFFERTY, Special Judge