1 I n T he 

### C ourt of A ppeals
N inth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________________ NO. 09
- 13
- 00437
- CV

____________ __ __________ HOGS DOGS & LACE, LLC and CRYSTAL WARD , Appellants V . SHARP ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 75th District Court Liberty County, Texas Trial Cause No. CV1206096

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellants Crystal Ward (Ward) and Hogs Dogs & Lace, LLC (HDL) , filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s granting of the special appearance filed by a ppellee, Sharp Entertainment, LLC (Sharp)

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)( 7 ) (West Supp. 2013). We affirm.2 B ACKGROUND Ward and HDL (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued defendants Sharp, A&E Television Networks, LLC (A&E) , Christie Chreene (Chreene) , and Julie S n ead (Snead)

. 1 The Plaintiffs’ amended petition (“petition”) assert s several different claims against all of the defendants relating to what Plaintiffs describe as Ward’s

“ concept ” for a “television show and educational video series” that involved the presentation of three women engaged in the sport of hog hunting. Defendant Sharp is a nonresident production company with its principal place of business in New York. Plaintiffs allege that Sharp and the other d efendants engaged in wrongful conduct relating to Ward’s concept for the lady hog hunting show

. The petition state s that Ward developed her concept for a lady hog hunting show , and she interviewed various women for the purpose of training them to participate in hog hunting activities for the television show . Ward alleges that she ultimately chose Chreene and Snead as the “talent” for the show. According to the petition, Ward, Chreene, and Snead formed the produc tion and management company known as Hogs Dogs & Lace, LLC (HDL), with Ward as the “ managing member , ” to develop a video and television series around Ward’s concept

. P laintiffs contend that Chreene and Snead signed non competition agreement s with

1 A&E, Chreene, and Snead are not parties to this interlocutory appeal.3 HDL , and Ward filmed several hunts and uploaded a video of the female hog hunters on to the internet. Plaintiffs further allege that one of Ward’s hog hunting videos was aired on television, and that several entertainment companies showed an interest in the concept and contacted Plaintiffs about developing the HDL show

. According to the petition, HDL entered into a “ Production and Shop [ A ] greement ” (production agreement) with 12 Forward Entertainment, LLC (12 Forward) , a production company

. The production agreement had an expir ation date of December 23, 2010, and it granted 12 Forward the right to shop the HDL lady hog hunting series to television networks

. The petition further alleges that on or about October 2010 , A&E entered into one or more agreements with 12 Fo rward to produce a pilot and series for a full television show , with the HDL show to be renamed as “Hog Wild.” Plaintiffs contend that in the early fall of 2010 , Sharp purportedly contacted Ward about the HDL hog hunting s how because Sharp watched the HDL video that Ward had uploaded to the internet. Plaintiffs contend that Ward told Sharp the rights were not available for licensing to Sharp at that time because the P laintiffs were already working with 12 Forward and A&E under a production agreement

. Plain tiffs allege that various disputes regarding compensation arose between the P laintiffs, A&E , and 12 Forward , and A&E and 12 Forward offered to buy out4 Plaintiffs , but Plaintiffs declined the offer

. In the petition, Plaintiffs state that o n or about November 16, 2010, 12 Forward released HDL and Ward from the production agreement. According to Plaintiffs , A&E and Sharp were involved in secret negotiations with each other and with Chreene and Snead to use Ward’s concept, material , and intellectual property to produce an “identical series to that of ‘Hogs, Dogs & Lace/Hog Wild

. ’” Sharp named its own hog hunting series “Lady Hoggers

. ” The Lady Hoggers series also featur ed Chreene and Snead. Plaintiffs allege that Sharp “ was notified of the non

- compet ition agreements ” HDL had with Chreene and Snead, and that , despite having such knowledge of the non

competition agreements , Sharp employed both Chreene and Snead , Sharp used Ward’s concept, and Sharp produced (pursuant to an agreement with A&E) the Lady Hoggers series which was “substantially similar” to HDL’s Hog Wild

. Plaintiffs contend they were damaged by the actions of Sharp and the other defendants. In the ir petition, Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Sharp for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, and civil conspiracy

. And,
HDL alleges cause s of action against Sharp for tortious interference with contract ( the noncompet ition agreement s ) and tortious i nterference with business relationships.5 Sharp filed a special appearance and argued that the trial court lack ed personal jurisdiction, either general or specific, over Sharp. In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting Sharp ’s special
appearance motion , because Sharp did not negate all bases for personal jurisdiction pleaded by Plaintiffs , the facts demonstrate both general and specific jurisdiction over Sharp, and the exercise of pers onal jurisdiction over Sharp does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW W hether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is ultimately a question of law that we review de novo. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom , 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013 ) ; BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 794

- 95 (Tex. 2002)

. The plaintiff has the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the jurisdiction of a Texas court. 2 Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d

. at 149; Kelly v. Gen. Interior
Const r ., Inc. , 301 S.W.3d 653, 658

- 59 (Tex. 2010) ; Retamco Operating, Inc. v.

2 Appellants added additional jurisdictional allegations in their response to Sharp’s special appearance. T he trial court had the authority to consider appellants’ response, as well as their pleadings. See Flanagan v. Royal Body Care, Inc. , 232 S.W.3d 369, 3 74 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2007, pet. denied) ; EMI Music Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. Rodriguez , 97 S.W.3d 847, 853 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).6 Republic Drilling, Co. , 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. 2009). If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, “ the burden shifts to the defendant to negate all potential bases for personal jurisdiction the plaintiff pled. ” Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d at 149; BMC , 83 S.W.3d at 793. The defendant may negate the jurisdictional allegations on either a factual basis o r a legal basis. 3 Kelly , 301 S.W.3d at 658

- 59. There being no timely filed findings of fact and conclusions of law , “ all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are impl i ed. ” BMC , 83 S.W.3d at 795

. If the appellate record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, these impl i ed findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency in the appropriate appellate court. Id

. A trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by statute and is consistent with federal and state constitutional due process guarantees

. Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d at 149; Spir Star
AG v. Kimic h , 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042 (West 2008). The Texas long

- arm statute provides that certain acts constitute doing business in Texas, including, but not limited to, the following:

3 We note that (a) the record includes a statement by the trial judge that the request for findings of fact w as not timely called to his attention , (b) the notice of past due findings of fact was not timely filed , and (c) t he trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were not timely filed. Ward and HDL do not complain on appeal about the lack of time ly findings.7 (1) contract s by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; or (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042. Although an allegation of jurisdiction may satisfy the Texas long

- arm statute, the allegation still may not necessarily satisfy the United States Const itution. Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d at 149. Accordingly, even if a court determines the facts satisfy the Texas long

- arm statute, a court must also examine the facts to determine if the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with due proce ss. See CSR Ltd. v. Link , 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996). Asserting personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with due process when (1) the nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) asserting jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substanti al justice. Retamco , 278 S.W.3d at 337. The minimum contacts analysis requires “‘some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). The focus is on the defendant’s activities and expectations. Am.8 Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman , 83 S.W.3 d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002). A defendant’s contacts may give rise to either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction

. See Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d at 150; Zinc Nacional , S.A. v. Bouche Trucking, Inc. , 308 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Tex. 201 0). Continuous and systematic contacts with Texas may give rise to general jurisdiction, while specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises out of or is related to specific purposeful activities of the defendant in Texas. Id

. “The exercise of p ersonal jurisdiction is proper when the contacts proximately result from actions of the nonresident defendant which create a substantial connection with the forum state.” Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C. , 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991).
P LAINTIFFS ’ J URISDICTIONAL A LLEGATIONS Plaintiffs allege in the petition that Sharp and the other defendants engaged in activities that constitute business in the State of Texas under the Texas long

- arm statute in that the defendants ( 1) contracted with a Texas resident with performance of the agreement in whole or in part thereof to occur in Texas, ( 2) committed a tort in whole or in part in Texas, and ( 3) recruits or recruited Texas residents for employment inside or outside of Texas.9 As to Sharp, Plaintiffs allege general jurisdictional contacts which include the following:

• Sharp “produces over 60 television programs which are nationally broadcast ” on various channels

. “ [T] hese programs are advertised in Texas, broadcast in Texas and viewed by Texans .” “[T] hese television programs were solicited to Texans and broadcast throughout Texas.”

• Sharp “filmed production of television programs in Texas, including ‘Man vs. Food’ in Amarillo Texas, Season 1, Episode 1 ,

. . . “filmed production of . . . ‘Adam Richman’s Best Sandwich in America’ in Texas, which was broadcast on the Travel Channel, where Adam Richman and the film crew visited multiple locati ons in both Driftwood and Austin, Texas as the destinations focused on in productions.” In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs ’ petition includes the following

contacts which also contain jurisdictional allegations:

• In the early fall of 2010, Sharp viewed the HDL website and videos filmed and edited by Crystal Ward and then decided that the concepts of the unique HDL Series would be a great reality series for Sharp to produce

.

• Principals at Sharp contacted HDL to inquire about teaming up with HDL to produce a lady hogging series starring the same three ladies of HDL

.

• Sharp “ used the T elevision concept of a Texas P laintiff, absent anticipated compensation .”

• Sharp “ created a derivative program from that concept and placed that televi sion program into the stream of commerce with the knowledge the distribution would be national. ”10 • Sharp’s program was then “ solicited to Texans and broadcast throughout Texas [

. ] ”

• Sharp placed “products in the stream of commerce with the expectation that the product would enter Texas

. . . . ”

• Sharp “ employed two

- thirds of the talent ” of HDL in the production of Sharp’s show.

• These employees (Chreene and Snead) were Texas residents.

• “A&E and Sharp, despite having been notified of the HDL binding n on - compete agreement, collectively decided to employ Julie Snead and Christie Chreene . . . , and to utilize the ideas, Concepts, material and intellectual property of Crystal Ward, and produce an identical series to that of [HDL].”

• Through this employm ent, the non - competition agreements were breached and appellants’ contract with Chreene and Snead were tortuously interfered with.
E VIDENCE S UBMITTED B Y S HARP TO N EGAT E P ERSONAL J URISDICTION

In their first issue on appeal, Plaintiffs maintain that Sharp failed to meet its burden of negating all of the allegations of personal jurisdiction because Sharp presented no evidence to controvert the jurisdictional allegations in the petition

. T he Plaintiffs emphasize that Sharp did not present evidence at the hearing on the special appearance. The trial court , however, is not limited to evidence presented at the hearing. “The court shall determine the special appearance on the basis of the plead ings, any stipulations made by and between the parties, such affidavits and11 attachments as may be filed by the parties, the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court struck the af fidavit of Bob Larson , vice president of Sharp , and they argue that Sharp therefore failed to present any evidence to negate the allegations of personal jurisdiction contained in the Plaintiffs ’ petition

. We have reviewed the record, and

a lthough the re is an order in the record that indicates the trial court struck Larson’s second affidavit, w e find nothing in the record that indicates the trial court struck
Larson’s first affidavit

. His first affidavit was before the trial court for its consideration at th e time of the hearing on the special appearance

. Based on the contents of Larson’s affidavit, we conclude that there was some evidence challenging the personal jurisdiction allegations , and we must therefore examine the record to determine if Sharp has negated every basis for both general and specific jurisdiction. Accordingly, w e overrule a ppellants’ first issue

. G ENERAL J URISDICTION Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting Sharp’s special appearance motion, because the court ha s general jurisdiction over Sharp. A trial court has general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the defendant’s contacts with the forum are systematic and continuous. Spir Star AG , 310 S.W.3d
at 872. As the United States Supreme Court recently e xplained, a court has general12 jurisdiction when the nonresident defendant’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive “‘as to render [the nonresident defendant] essentially at home in the forum State.’” Daimler AG v . Bauman , 134 S.Ct. 746, 749, 751 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown , 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2854, 2851, 2857 (2011)). The jurisdictional allegations in the petition (outlined above in more detail) generally include the following: Sh arp produces over sixty (60) different television programs that are nationally broadcast on popular mainstream channels; the programs are advertised and broadcast throughout Texas and are viewed by Texans; Sharp filmed television programs in Texas, includi ng an episode of “Man v. Food” and an episode of “Adam Richman’s Best Sandwich in America.” 4
I n PHC

- Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly

- Clark Corp oration , 235 S.W.3d 163, 168 (Tex. 2007) , t he Texas Supreme Court characterized the inquiry for general jurisdiction as a “‘more demanding minimum contacts analysis’ with a

‘ substantially higher’ threshold” than that required for specific jurisdiction. Id

. (quoting CSR, Ltd. , 925 S.W.2d at 595 and 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &

4 Appellants also contend that Sharp produced and directly distributed seasons one and two of the series Rattlesnake Republic in Texas locations, but that contention was not made until after the trial court granted Sharp’s special appearan ce motion. The allegation was not before the trial court at the time the special appearance was sustained, and we do not consider it in this interlocutory appeal.13 Procedure § 106 7.5). There must be evidence that the defendant conducted “substantial activities” within Texas. CSR Ltd. , 925 S.W.2d at 595. Nevertheless, there is no “precise formulation” for determining which general jurisdictional contacts will be sufficient to “ reach a tipping point [

. ] ” PHC

- Minden , 235 S.W.3d
at 167. “Usually, ‘the defendant must be engaged in longstanding business in the forum state, such as marketing or shipping products , or performing services or maintaining one or more offices there; activities that are less extensive than that will not qualify for general in personam jurisdiction.’” Id . (quoting 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1067.5). For general juri sdiction purposes, we do not view each contact in isolation. Am. Type Culture Collection , 83 S.W.3d

at 809. The reviewing court carefully considers the contacts and analyzes them for “proof of a pattern of continuing and systematic activity [,] ” and we look at the quality of those contacts, not just the quantity. See id . at 809

- 10

. In order for Texas courts to exercise general jurisdiction over Sharp, Sharp’s contacts must be not only continuous and systematic , but also substantial

. Moki
Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg , 221 S.W.3d at 575; CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d at 595. Furthermore, even multiple contacts with a state may not be sufficient. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 , 415

- 1914 (1984) (finding no “con tinuous and systematic” contacts with Texas, despite the fact that defendant had gone to Texas to negotiate a contract, purchased helicopters and related equipment from Texas vendors at regular intervals, and sent prospective pilots and other personnel to Texas for training); s ee also Am

. Type Culture Collection, Inc

. , 83 S.W.3d 80 7

- 10 (finding no general jurisdiction despite fact that defendant had sold its products to Texas residents for 18 years, had purchased supplies from Texas vendors, had attended co nferences in Texas, and had served as a repository for Texas researchers). The question is whether or not HDL and Ward established sufficient evidence that Sharp had substantial systematic and continuous contacts with the State of Texas to meet due process requirements and to allow the trial court to have general jurisdiction over Sharp. After reviewing the entire record, we cannot characterize Sharp’s contacts as substantial, sys tematic, or continuous. C ompare the contacts of Sharp , as alleged by HDL and Ward in their petition , to the contacts of the nonresident defendant in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company , 342 U.S. 437 (1952) , an early post

- International Shoe 5 seminal case regarding general jurisdiction

. In Perkins , t he president of the company maintained an office in Ohio in which he “did many things on behalf of the company.” Id . at 447
- 48.

5 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310 (1945).15 The president maintained company files in Ohio, drew and distributed salary checks from the Ohio office, carried on correspondence from Ohio, used two Ohio bank accounts for company funds, had an Ohio bank act as transfer agent for the company stock, held directors’ meetings in Ohio, supervised policies there dealing with t he rehabilitation of the corporation’s properties in the Philippines, and dispatched funds from Ohio bank accounts to cover purchases of machinery for the rehabilitation. See PHC

- Minden , 235 S.W.3d at 167

- 68 (citing Perkins , 342 U.S. at
4 4 7

- 4 8). S imilarly, i n Helicopteros , the Supreme Court found that there was no continuous and systematic contact with Texas when “Helicol’s contacts with Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract

negotiation session; accepting into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums; and sending personnel to Bell’s facilities in Fort Worth for training .” Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). Sharp’s contacts were less systematic and purposeful than those rejected by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros . Sharp’s contacts are more properly characterized as sporadic and limited, rather than continuous and systematic . And, such alleged contacts would be in sufficient to support general jurisdiction.16 In arguing that the trial court had general jurisdiction over Sharp , Plaintiffs rel y on Asahi Metal Indus tr y Co. v. Superior Court of California , Solano County , 480 U.S. 102 (1987) to support their argu ment that Sharp’s contacts are systematic and continuous and justify general jurisdiction. Bu t, Asahi, is distinguishable from the case at bar. As a hi is a “stream of commerce” case, and it concerns specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. T he United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the stream of commerce theory of jurisdiction is only appli cable to

a “ specific jurisdiction analysis. ” See Brown , 1 31 S.Ct. at 2855

- 56 (“A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sort within a state,’ International Shoe instructed , ‘is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be ame nable to suits unrelated to that activity. ’ ”) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)) . As stated by the Supreme Court earlier this year, a court may assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation “only when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which the suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State. ’” Daimler
AG v. Bauman , 134 S.Ct. at 751 (quoting Brown , 131 S.Ct. at 2851)

. We conclude that the evidence in the record does not establish that Sharp has affiliations with the State of Texas which are so constant and pervasive so as to render Sharp “at home” in this State. See Daimler , 134 S.Ct. at 751. The alleged contacts a re too17 sporadic and limited to warrant a finding of general jurisdiction. See Helicopteros , 466 U.S. at 416

. We agree with the trial court that Sharp’s contacts with Texas do not support general jurisdiction.

S PECIFIC J URISDICTION Next, w e examine whether th e trial court had specific jurisdiction over Sharp . S pecific jurisdiction exists when there is evidence that the defendant purposefully avail ed itself of the forum’s jurisdiction by contacts or activities in the forum state, and the cause of action arises from or is related to those contacts or activities. Retamco Operating , 278 S.W.3d at 338 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462 (1985)); Michiana Easy Livin’ Country , 168 S.W.3d at 784. Under specific jurisdiction, the focus is on the relationship between the forum, the defendant, and the litigation

. Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d at 150; Retamco Operating , 278 S.W.3d at 338. T here must be a substantial connection between the defendant’s contacts and the operative facts of the litigation. Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d

at 156. The contacts must be such that the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in Texas. World

- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 44 4 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). With respect to the tort claims, Texas’ s interests in protecting its citizens against torts is insufficient to automatically exercise personal jurisdiction when the nonresident directs a tort from outside the forum. Michiana18 Easy Livin’ Country , 168 S.W.3d at 784

. W e must analyze the jurisdictional contacts on a “claim

- by

- claim basis” unless all claims arise from the same forum

contacts. Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d at 150

- 151. When considering whether the nonresident purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conductin g activities within Texas, we look at three factors: (1) whet he r the defendant had contacts and activity in and with Texas; (2) whether t he contacts relied upon were purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated ; and, (3) whether the defendant s ought some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction. Id

. at 151. Plaintiffs pleaded various jurisdictional allegations which they relate to their argument that the trial court should exercise specific jurisdiction over Sharp

. We previously itemized the jurisdictional allegations. See infra at 9

- 10 . Summarily, the pertinent allegations include that Sharp view ed materials from HDL, telephon ed Ward to discuss the concept behind HDL, creat ed and produc ed a derivative program from the concept of Ward (a Texas plaintiff), plac ed the television program into the stream of commerce, employ ed two

- thirds of the talent of HDL in the production of Hog Wild , and tort i ously interfer ed with noncompete agreements between Chreene, Snead, and HDL

. Plaintiffs also alleged Shar p knew that its show Hog Wild would be shown in Texas and that Hog Wild was “solicited” to19 Texans, advertised in Texas, broadcast in Texas through Sharp’s deal with A&E, and viewed by Crystal Ward and millions of Texans th r oug h A&E.
A s we have noted, Larson states in his first affidavit that Sharp is a New York company, it has no offices or employees in Texas, it does not own real property in Texas, it does not have a registered agent in Texas, it is not qualified to do business in Texas, and it does not conduct business in Texas

. Nonetheless, he also acknowledge s in his affidavit certain limited contact with Texas , when he
states: “ To the best of my knowledge, t he only contact Sharp has had with any of the Plaintiffs within the state of Texas, or elsewhere, is a brief exchange whereby a Sharp employee reached out [to] numerous persons involved in the hog hunting industry including, plaintiff Crystal Ward, to inqu ire by email if they were interested in being talent for a show Sharp had created and a return call indicating there was no interest[.]” 6 Larson also state s , “Sharp did not contact HDL to inquire about teaming up to produce a lady hogging series with HDL [, ]” and “ [o] ther than the above

- described interactions, there were no other contacts with Plaintiffs in Texas or elsewhere.” Accordingly, Larson expressly denies the allegation in

6 Larson’s statement concerning the contact Sharp had with the P laintiffs is prefaced with the language, “To the best of my knowledge[.]” Appellants d id n ot object in the trial court to such language in the November 9, 2012 affidavit , nor do they contend on appeal that this language renders the affidavit deficient

.20 Sharp’s petition that Sharp contacted HDL about joining together to produce a lady hog hunting series starring Ward, Chreene, and Snead. Notably, Plaintiffs fail to plead or present evidence that Sharp had any contact s with Chreene or Snead in
Texas

. According to the petition, Ward put the videotape she made of her lady hog hunters series on the internet ( which was available to Sharp and others for viewing ), and P laintiffs allege that Sharp viewed “[m]aterials from the Hogs Dogs
& Lace.” There is no evidence in the record or allegation in the petition which would establish th e location where Sharp viewed such material

. W e fail to see how Sharp ’s viewing of th e HDL video

-- w hich Ward acknowledges that she, not Sharp, put on the internet

— demonstrates that Sharp purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction of Texas courts, let alone made a substantial connection with the forum. The record does not show a viewing by Sharp of the video material in Texas, or that the viewing was anything more than a random or fortuitous contact. The fact that Sharp admits it “reached out” to “numer ous persons . . . including, plaintiff Crystal Ward ,” about whether Ward had an interest in a show “that Sharp had created” and a return call that there “was no interest” does not establish specific jurisdiction as to any of the causes of action asserted a gainst Sharp in the petition. Moreover, Sharp’s Lady Hog ger s show was apparently filmed by Sharp in21 Florida, not Texas

. Although Sharp’s show may have been broadcast in Texas by A&E pursuant to an agreement between A&E and Sharp , such facts would not be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiffs ’ claims against Sharp

. With the exception of its admitted contact with Ward , as stated in Larson’s first affidavit, Sharp denied any other activity or contact within Texas. Appellants contend that placing products (the Lady Hoggers television series) in to the stream of commerce with the expectation that the product w ill enter Texas is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. Sharp presented evidence that , except for the aforementioned inquir y , Sharp did not have any other contacts in Texas. T he fact that some of Sharp’s other television shows or an episode of Lady Hoggers may have been viewed by the general public in Texas does not provide evidence that
S harp purposefully directed its actions at Texas. A s explained in Spir Star AG , 3 10 S.W.3d at 873 , a seller’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum s tate does not convert the mere act of plac ement of t he product into the stream of commerce into an act purposefully directed toward the forum s tate. There must be some additional conduct that indicates an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum state. Id

. ; see also Zinc Nacional , 308 S.W.3d at 397

- 98

. The fact that Sharp’s Lady Hoggers television series may have22 made it into the Texas stream of commerce is not enough to confer specific jurisdiction on the Texas court. See Spir Star AG , 310 S.W.3d at 873

. Plaintiffs argue that Sharp was notified of the noncompetition agreements which HDL had with Chreene and Snead, and that despite knowing about the se agreements “Sharp recruited, contracted, and employed” Chreene and Snead in the production of Sharp’s television program ( Lady H oggers ) , and then filmed the series in Florida

. Sharp acknowledges that Lady Hoggers was filmed in Florida and that the company hired Chreene and Snead as the talent for the show. Plaintiffs allege that th e Lady Hoggers show was broadcast in Texas. HDL argues such actions by Sharp constitute the underlying facts of HDL’s tortious interference claims against Sharp

. HDL also argues that that this conduct was “ recruitment ” as contained in the Texas l ong - a rm s tatute

. We disagree. As we have noted, the Texas
l ong - a rm s tatute provides that recruiting Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in Texas, for employment inside or outside this state, constitutes doing business in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042. The record demonst rates that Sharp made contact with Ward , but there is a lack of evidence in the record to establish whether Sharp “ recruited ” Chreene and Snead in
Texas

.23 Although Sharp acknowledge d it employed two Texas residents , Chreene and Snead , in the production of Sharp’s Lady Hoggers show , there is a lack of evidence in the record to determine wh e t h er the employment was the result of Sharp’s contacting Chreene and Snead, or Chreene’s and Snead’s contacting Sharp , or some other contact via an i ntermediary or third party

. W e find nothing in the record to rebut the first Larson Affidavit. There was no evidence presented to the trial court below that Sharp recruited Chreene and Snead in Texas directly or through an intermediary located in Texas , o r that it entered into an agreement with them in Texas, or that they worked for Sharp in Texas. See id

. § 1 7 .04 2 (3). Under the facts presented , the employment of Chreene and Snead by Sharp does not demonstrate a purposeful availment or a substantial connection with Texas, particularly when there is no evidence that the contacting, recruitment, hiring, and work occurred in Texas. See i d .; se e generally Morris v. B.C. Olympiakos, SFP , 721 F.Supp. 2d 546, 564

- 67 (S.D . Tex

. 2010 ) (no evidence Olympiakos recruited Morris directly or through any Texas

- based intermediary to work in Greece and thus no purposeful availment). Moreover, t he evidence currently before us indicates that Chreene and Snead worked on Sharp’s show i n Florida , not Texas

. In Moncrief , the Supreme Court held that the defendants’ contacts with Texas supported exercise of personal jurisdiction with regard to Moncrief’s trade24 secret claims, but not as to the tortious interference claim. See 414 S.W.3d at 147

- 48. A distinguishing factor emphasized by the Supreme Court was that Gazprom, one of the defendants sued by Moncrief, attended two Texas meetings with a Texas corporation and accepted alleged trade secrets in Texas regarding a potential joint venture in Texas with the Texas corporation. Id . at 143. In contrast to the trade secret claim, the Supreme Court found that the tortious interference claim did not arise from the Texas meetings or the defendant’s receipt of the trade secret informat ion from Moncrief . Instead, the tortious interference claim arose principally from a California meeting and a competing enterprise in Texas. Id . at 157. “[A] nonresident directing a tort at Texas from afar is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction.” Id

. As t he Supreme Court stated, “ [T] he Gazprom Defendants’ alleged tortious conduct in California against a Texas resident is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over the Gazprom Defendants as to Moncrief’s tortious interference claims.” Id . at 1 57. In the instant case, Plaintiffs contend that Sharp tort ious ly interfered with the noncompetition agreements between Chreene, Snead, and HDL by hiring the two women and then using them as talent in a television series very similar to that of HDL. The e vidence does not show that Sharp “recruited” them or directly contacted the two women in Texas , or that it contacted them through an25 intermediary in Texas . T he evidence does not show wh ich party or parties initiated the contact, or whether any such contact occurred in Texas. The alleged tortious interference through the production of a similar television series occurred in Florida, not Texas. As in Moncrief , the alleged tortious conduct is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over Sharp as to Plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims

. Based on the pleadings and the evidence before the trial court, we conclude that the record does not demonstrate that Sharp purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Te x as . T he record does not contain evidence showing Sharp had substantial contacts with Texas that relate to and arise out of Ward ’s and HDL ’ s causes of action for breach of implied contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, fraud, and civil conspiracy against Sharp. Furthermore, at this time, there is no pleading and no evidence that Sharp directly contacted Chreene or Snead or indirectly contacted them through an intermediary located in
Texas , or that Sharp recruited them in Texas , or that it contracted with them in
Texas , or that it hired them in Texas, or that the work on the Sharp series was performed in Texas . Under this record, there is insufficient evidence that Sharp purposeful ly avail ed itself of the benefits of conducting activities in Texas . There is a lack of a substantial connection between the defendant’s contacts in Texas and the operative facts of the litigation. The alleged connection s to Texas as asserted in26 the petition and the evidence regarding Sharp’s activities are too attenuated to establish either general or specific jurisdiction for th e claims asserted by the plaintiffs

. Accordingly, we overrule issue two.
F AIR P LAY AND S UBSTANTIAL J USTICE In their third issue, Plaintiffs also contend that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Sharp would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, as required for due process. See Moncrief , 414 S.W.3d at 150. Having overrule d issues one and two we need not a ddress this third issue. See Shell Compania Argentina de Petroleo, S.A. v. Reef Exploration, Inc. , 84 S.W.3d 830,
840

- 41 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). W e conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the special appearance. The trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sharp . Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.

________ ________ _________ LEANNE JOHNSON Justice Submitted on January 16, 2014 Opinion Delivered July 10, 2014 Before Kreger, Horton , and Johnson, JJ.