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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY 

. MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR DEFENSE RESEARCH:AND ENGINEERING 

SUBJECT: MOL Versus an Equivalent Wholly Unmanned System 

Reference is made to your letter of April 6 requesting a 

comparison of performing the MOL reconnaissance/intelligence 

mission unmanned versus manned. The results are summarized 

herein and the attachments have supporting data. We are, of 

course, prepareetoprovidesuch briefings as you may require.' 

In order to respond to your requests, it was necessary to 

perform a definition of the wholly unmanned system. The description, performance, and costs of the unmanned system are 

contained in TAB A, as derived from two contractor studies and. 

z a separate in-house study, employing an optics module 

:essentially identical.to that of the MOL. The booster was a 

five-segment- olid'rocket motor version of the Titan III, 

.without transtage, modified to provide radiO griidance. 

the performance of that booster, a wholly unmanned spacecraft 

was configured for a nominal thirty-day orbital lifetime to 

provide approximately ground resolution with data 

return weekly by recoverable capsules; 

A comparison of the probability of success of the unmanned 

system with that of the manned system,shows that ten develoP, 

went test lights will be needed for the unmanned sygtem_to. 

achieve an acceptable'system maturity. 

I estimate the development cost of, the unmanned system, 

including the ten development, flights, to be approximately 

41.12 billion. Thid' estimate is a value judgment based- on a 

,range of submitted estimates between 95 percent and 110 percent.. 

.of this figure. The basic reason for the variance related to 

differing appraisalS of the development difficulty .involved. 

TAB A provides. an,explanation.of -the above 'costs and presents 

recurring costs in the . amount-of:approximatelY $1+5 million per 

launch. 

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• The MOL orbital development testing can be completed one year 

sooner than the ten-shot unmanned series. Besides shortening the 

time, the participation of the. MOL crew gives an added confidence 

that major obstacles can be overcome. The MOL system can be : - 

operationally ready one year in advance of the unmanned system 

As you have been apprised, the, development cost for the sevenshot MOL Program amounts 'to $1.822 billion (see TAB B). This 

program provides both a manned and an unmanned capability. The 

cost difference over the wholly unmanned program is approximately 

$700 million. This differential, however, is more than offset by , 

outstanding advantages in the MOL These advantages appear 

directly in terms,ofcost effectiveness on a recurring flight-byflight basis becaUse of MOL's superior success probability and 

ability to produce intelligence information in higher quality and. 

quantity and indirectly in terms of the much greater flexibility 

of the MOL systet to cope with new reconnaissance missions, 

• additional mission capabilities and natural growth, in comparison 

with an unmanned system having minimal flexibility and growth. 

TAB C compares the two systems in terms of capability to perform 

the basic reconnaissance mission and cost effectiveness. This 

-tab also treats briefly several additional missions the baseline 

MOL system can perform. Other MOL capabilities are discussed in 

TAB D. 

Before slimPrizing the comparisons,'however, it is pertinent 

to discuss briefly the effect of the field of view of the DORIAN 

optical system. Optical systems have a field of view that diminishes 

with resolution, a very significant factor in mission planning 

against various target models. The following table presents a comparison: .. 

Width, N.M., of. ' Area Covered per 

System . Field of View . Photo, Sq. Mi. 

GAMBIT 9* 180 

4.5 90 

1.5. 2.0 

The small field of view significantly affects pointing accuracy, 

irequiring accurate target locational information and very precise.' 

navigation and attitude control. On actual target models now in 

existence, it is evident that some means of target selection is 

mandatory in order to insure maximum intelligence collection. 

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On pure theory and assuming that pointing accuracies, equipment 

alignment and adjustment, image motion compensation and tracking can 

be done unmanned as well as manned,.the resolution results of all 

targets covered during a thirty-day mission will average approximately . 

2 inch better manned than unmanned because of man's ability to center 

images of obliquely located.targets. Inherent'is the assumption that 

all equipment is maintained at peak performance for both systems. 

We expect on a thirty-day mission that the manned system will be able 

to maintain peak resolution performance without degradation, such as 

might occur in the unmanned system, since the man can make the 

necessary adjustments. The manned system will use electronic readout 

and will return daily practically all of the information collected 

which has been judged to have high intelligence value. (The primary 

photographs will of course be recovered later.) In transmission the 

resolution will probably be degraded by about 15 percent. The 

response time of the manned system by this method is very much less 

than that of the unmanned system. Since the improvements in resolution by the man are offset, by his use of readout, the 'difference 

between the two systems in' terms of resolution only is so small that" 

a comparison is not worth. further consideration. 

Of the many factors on which the two. systems canbe.compared; 

three are of a nature to permit numerical evaluation: 

Relative probability of success; • 

b. Improvement from:operator avoidance of weather obscuration; 

c. Improvenent from operator-verification of target photography. 

Success. Probability Comparison 

To evaluate relative success probability, the criterion which has 

been selected is the ratio of the number of launches of the unmanned 

system to the manned system which are needed for the same number of 

operating days on orbit. Our studies have clearly shown, as we.indicated almost a year ago; that the initial probability of success of a 

manned system is much higher than that of an unmanned system. The 

MOL development program is scheduled to be completed after five 

manned launches. We believe that, operationally, the average mission 

days per launch will be about 28. The unmanned system, on the other 

hand, will have ten development launches and will average operationally 

about 24 mission days per launch: 

These values assume that man does nothing other than to align 

equipment, analyz“ailures, maintain equipment, and act as a backup 

system. The ratio of:the mission-day factors cited above make one 
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MOL launch equivalent to about 1.2 unmanned launches. Operationally, 

the MOL will cost $85 million per launch. The corresponding unmanned. 

cost at $45 million per launch, .adjusted for probability of success 

alone, is $54 million. 

Selection of Clear Weather 

The second step in the effectiveness comparison assesses the 

increase in number of photographs returned by having tie operator' 

observe the weather ahead and switch to a pre-programmed alternate 

target if the:primary is obscured. 

An extensive study of this mode of operation was conducted by 

members of the.WRO'staff. A summary appears in TAB C. Target decks - 

derived from representative intelligence requirements and weather 

models based up0 actual observed conditions from satellite photography of'the So-Soviet Bloc were employed. Human reaction time, 

orbital photo system dynAmics, primary and alternate target distribution, individual weather characteristics, orbital parameters and 

many other influences were factored in. Employing the GENIE 

computer program, results were obtained which showed a 35 percent 

advantage in number of clear photographs obtained in a thirty-day 

period for the manned system over the unmanned system.. A total of 

1880 photographs were produced by the manned system, as compared 

to 1385 from the unmanned system. In running the mission, the 

function of the operator was confined to viewing the weather and 

switching to automatic acquisition of an alternate target if the 

primary'was found to'be obscured. 

Applying this 35 percent' improvement factor to the ,previously.. - 

determined unit cost increases the equivalent cost of the unmanned 

system to $73 million per MOL launch at $85 million.: 

Verification of Photography Accomplished 

A loss factor in an automatic system occurs because there is 

no way of verifying that a programmed target has been photographed 

clearly. An important target may be photographed several times to 

assure its acquisition, reducing the available time for other 

targets, while targets programmed only once or a few times maybe 

missed. An operator can make the desired positive verifications. 

Once a clear'photograph has been obtained, that target can be 

eliminated from.the. succeeding program.. The demands upon the 

operator are small. .He has merely to observe and record the result. 

An assessment of the improvement possible by this means, considering 

the number of such opportunities in a representative mission, results 

in an estimated 101percent:advantage for ihe manned system over the 

unmanned system.: 

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• Applying this factor to the costs quoted above raises the cost 

of an equivalent quantity. of unmanned target coverage to $80 million 

compared to $85 million for MOL. 

The*folloWing summarizes the cost effects of the three factors 

discussed above: 

Cumulative Equivalent 

Percent Improvement Unmanned Cost per 

Factor in Manned System Manned Launch 

Success. Probability 20 $54 million* 

Weather 35 73 million 

Verification 10 80 million 

• 

Target Selection 

A factor quite as important as those discussed above is the 

ability of an operator to select, by real-time inspection, targets of 

high value. The DORIAN optics field of view will cover approximately 

one-half of a,12,000-foot runway system. In order to insure that 

photographs are obtained of military aircraft parked on the perimeters 

of such a runway, one' must have either a prior knowledge of.their 

location at the start of a mission or must in some manner select in 

real time the portion of the airfield to be photographed. This is a . 

simple Case in which a single GAMBIT or GAMBIT CUBED target separates 

into two or more targets for DORIAN because of its smaller field of 

view. Not only does the number of targets proliferate, but to insure 

maximum intelligence content, target selection becomes mandatory. A 

complex such as Tyuratam, with overall dimensions of 50x100 miles 

and containing twelve launch complexes, could break into more than 

sixty individual targets. These targets are sufficiently close that 

photographs of all cannot-be taken on a single pass; hence the need 

for some means of selection of those which contain items of high 

intelligence interest. Our studies show that man can make a major 

contribution in this:role of target selection to increase intelligence. content. 

To estimate the usefulness of this function, analytical runs 

were made of the-DORIAN system against a realistic target deck. 

Results showed that crew participation in target selection yielded 

three times as many photographs of targets with active indicators 

as could be taken by an unmanned system on the same mission. Details 

are in TAB C. Representative of the operations performed are: 

a. LOcation'of-a break in thecloUds containing ground 

force vehicles..' 

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b. Selection of a portion of a launch complex containing 

special radar equipment. 

c. Detection of a silo with an open door. 

d. Detection'of a missile being transported. . 

e. Choice of a technically valuable angle of view of a • 

new radar. 

Because of the particular value of such photographs, it is not 

reasonable to compare them with the usual target coverage. Even in 

the current GAMBIT program some of the most important intelligence 

returned has not beeri.pre-programmed. The DORIAN system will permit 

the exploitation of this source through planned missions rather 

than by chance acquisition. 

The foregoing analyses provided specific data when comparing 

manned and unmanned high resolution reconnaissance systems. There 

are many added capabilities in the MOL Program which are beyond the 

planned performance Of the unmanned system. These additional capabilities fall in three general areas and are discussed in turn below.. 

--:Additional Manned Actions Which Can Improve Intelligence Information 

In addition to maintaining the system, assessing weather, 

validating cloud-free targets photographed, and selecting targets of 

- high intelligence interest, man can, without interrupting the photography sequence, perform visual reconnaissance such as simple 

counting, color discrimination, classification of activity, and 

detection of movement. He can, on call, place aerial color film, 

infra-red filM or other special films in the secondary camera so 

that their special discrimination characteristics can be realized.. 

Man can process photographs in orbit, edit them and transmit the 

images to the ground. In conjunction with this capability, he can 

make judgments and render specific decisions as to the relative 

importance of information to be processed on orbit and transmitted 

to the ground. He can also, over limited areas, search for mobile 

targets whose exact locations are not known or whose presence is 

only suspected. 

Additional Reconnaissance Capabilities 

The MOL system can, during times of crisis, be transferred 

from its nominal 80-mile orbit to an orbit of approximately 200 to 

250 miles. In this higher orbit the system will have access to all 

targets in the Soviet Bloc approximately once every three days, 

taking photographs at resolutions of about The crew can 

also employ the acquisition and tracking scopes, with a resolution of 

about nine feet,. for intelligence by direct viewing. The absence or 

presence of aircraft, ships in port, cargo accumulations, parked 

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vehicle build-up and railroad activity are examples of such intelligence. The vehicle can remain in this higher orbit for a week or 

so, providing daily reports on activity indicators which are of 

significant value in determining the posture and state of readiness 

of the Soviet forces. 

The foregoing additional reconnaissance capabilities can be 

accomplished with essentially no change to the baseline MOL system. 

Additional'Military Missions and Growth 

The MOL laboratory module has been designed with sufficient 

flexibility to support missions other than high resolution reconnaissance. Although not Of military significance, the MOL, without' 

change, can produce a photographic map of Mars at approximately 

fifty miles resolution, essentially a six-fold improvement over 

ground-based systems. New military missions, such as communications 

intelligence or ocean surveillance, can be added to the MOL Program 

by the fabrication of new mission modules and some minor modifica-. 

tions to the laboratory module. Other elements of the system can 

be used without change. 

In addition to these military uses, the MOL has,the potential 

of providing a unique laboratory environment for the execution of 

scientific experiments. The MOL has 1,000 cubic feet of pressurized 

volume and can provide up to 3,000 cubic feet (8,000 pounds) of 

unpressurized experiment space. It is currently under consideration 

by NASA for use in their earth-orbital experiment program. 

Finally, the MOL Program, as currently configured, is well 

suited to grow beyond the applications outlined in the foregoing 

paragraphs. Our studies have indicated that growth to sixty days on 

orbit is feasible, as is rendezvous and resupply. Exploiting 

either of these twogroWth areas provides increased cost effectiveness and would permit, by incorporating larger sensors, the 

provision of ground resolutions on the order of approximately 

All of our studies involving applications validate the 

necessity for man and verify that longer lifetimes on orbit and the 

use of larger higher resolUtion optical devices require the kind of 

manned space flight-eXperience that will accrue from the present 

MOL Program. 

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In conclusion, I wish to single out a point which impresses me 

greatly: although a direct comparison of two systems has been 

attempted, such an appraisal is almost invalidated by the fundamental 

divergences in system characteristics. A few significant inequalities 

are: 

a. Some quantitative correspondence between the two can be 

identified, but there exists a positive superiority under all conditions Lithe intelligence content of the product of. the manned 

system. • 

b. As a reconnaissance system, the unmanned development 

leads to a specific end imposed by a rather well-defined limit in 

system resolution 'and utility. The MOL, on the other hand, has a 

substantial growth potential. 

c. The:development schedule for the unmanned program 

lacks the confidence contributed by the attendance of an operator. 

There are individual inventions and extensions in technologies which. 

threaten to become the cause of impasses during the orbital test 

phase. 

d. The MOL program encompasses the growth of a system 

having the prospect of great versatility for missions of a wide 

range. The unmanned system will be narrowly limited in comparison. • 

In,any planactUally to impose a program reorientation, serious 

attention must be given the fact that we are now proceeding in a 

direction which will produceboth a manned and an unmanned highresolution reconnaissance eystem. Even disregarding. the certainty, 

of program disruption and,termination expense that would be caused, 

by such redirection,:a crucial qUestion must. be faced: can we 

afford to; apply less than our best efforts to achieving the benefitS: 

of a high.resolutiOn Satellite photographic system at the earliest 

practical time?,::. 

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