JAINATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF July 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR COLON

SUBJECT: NRO Annex to the STG Report

I met with Jack Shaw, this morning, to show him our NRO

Annex to the STG Report and obtain his (and Ambassador U. Alexis

Johnson's) concurrence in that portion of the report which discusses

the Arms Control Satellite.

Jack's proposed changes are at Tab A. Our experience here is

rather like that with Don Steininger on the aircraft/satellite issue:

we can mention aircraft but shouldn't expand on how good they are.

Shaw thinks it's all right for us to mention an Arms Control Satellite

but we should drop those sentences which explain why we think it's

a good idea ("You pre-judge the findings of the Committee").

I think we have no choice but to follow Jack's desire and will

make changes as indicated in Tab A to our hard copy of the report.

Jack thinks Ambassador Johnson would be willing to hold an

NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting right after the final NSSM 28

Committee meeting. Of considerable more importance, I think, is

Jack's open hostility to the Arms Control Satellite idea ("I believe

it will cause us more problems than simple disclosure I"). This

means that Ambassador Johnson has not been and will not be exposed

to our rationale, unless we take special action to make that possible.

As I see it, we have a situation like this:

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Mr. Packard

Mr. Helms

Dr. DuBridge

Thought we knew how he felt, but

not sure now. Has never had our

briefing.

Not sure he has had anything except

a quick phone call from Ambassador

Johnson. Has never had our briefing.

Didn't even want us to write about it.

Has never had our briefing.

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I recommend that, in accordance with Dr. DuBridge's comment,

Dr. McLucas should call a luncheon meeting of the ExCom, with

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Tom Paine as special guests

(no aides or camp-followers to be present). At that luncheon, you

should brief the group as to why we feel so strongly about an Arms

Control Satellite. This will prepare the key participants for the NSAM

156 Ad Hoc Committee meeting.

P/IIPIRTHMAN

Colonel, USAF

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possible, the survey of a nation can be carried out faster by aircraft

than by satellites, aircraft can be selectively employed, and they need

offer no political risks. An intensive program of earth-sensing from

aircraft over selected cooperating countries could provide a useful

assessment of the utility of earth resources surveys prior to embarking on a very expensive satellite program.

Second, NASA has concluded that its initial earth resources satellite

will be more cost-effective if it uses an electronic imaging system,

rather than film-recovery cameras. It is quite possible that highly

refined electronic imaging sensors will permit economy and improvement

in NRP operations in the future. It may be appropriate and mutually

advantageous for NASA to make a significant commitment to advancing

the technology of high resolution electronic sensors to replace filmcamera systems.

NRP Relationships with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

The US-USSR discussions of 1968 regarding a Strategic Arms

Limitation Treaty brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

directly into satellite reconnaissance policy considerations. Concerned

st. 441'.1.6pet. that the USSR would not agree to on-site inspectioa, &MI propo d to

negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that the United States was

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prepared to accept "enforcement by maximum, or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national means of verification... " (for the United

States, this expression means "satellite reconnaissance"): In addition,

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in order to support its proposal, recomthended declassifying the

fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance, disclosing to

the Soviets that reconnaissance satellites are our main reliance for

verification, briefing Congress on our reconnaissance capabilities,

and informing the press and public -- gradually but officially -- along the

same lines. After discussion within the United States Intelligence Board

and key affected government agencies, it was decided that disarmament le**",

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discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and possibly more -.,5.

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effectively, by restricting the .delegation U. S. delation to use of the expression .rite-el

"national means of verification" with no reference to our satellite recon-"'g

naissance program. It was pointed out that disclosure is an irreversible

step which could have profoundly adverse effects on national security.

Furthermore, to single out one or some intelligence collection methods

now and to pass only that or those to the Soviets, Congress, and the

American public would be dangerous and misleading and could evolve a

genuine "credibility gap. "

An alternative approach exists which could give ACDA the advantages

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of satellite reconnaissance without adverse effects on the security

protection required by the National Reconnaissance Program. In this

approach, the United States would be prepared to negotiate with the

Soviets on the basis of an Arms Control Satellite which would be

developed by NASA for the ACDA. This satellite could be defined, enthter 40 e-baeie of developments of the past decade, such that its performance

would be highly credible to the Congress, the press, and the public.

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This approach would abto allow the

United States to continue its covert reconnaissance program (the NRP)

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as a unilateral and essential source of basic intelligence. _A-separateAC , •

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In Summary 

The United States government is deeply dependent on overflight

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