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.1211.k. Vi t.', HOU 

0 Washington 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

THE VICE PRESIDENT 

Uly 8, 1965 

SUBJECT: Organization and Public Position on Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory 

The proposed Manned Orbiting Laboratory is now directed toward a fullscale prototype of a manned high resolution reconnaissance satellite. 

If the decision is made to go ahead with this project on this basis, it is 

extremely important that the administrative organization and. the public 

explanation of the project be handled in such a way as to avoid jeopardizing 

either the eventual utilization of the MOL or our existing satellite reconnaissance program, It has been the general policy of the US Government for 

the past few years to build International acceptance of satellite reconnaissance without openly revealing the nature or extent of our activities in a 

manner that would force the Soviets to react publicly against satellite 

reconnaissance. So far, this policy has worked extremely well. 

The MOL project was introduced by Secretary McNamara as a substitute 

for DYNASQAR to explore the possible military use of apace and has been 

widely associated by the technical press with a wide range of military 

systems including reconnaissance and weapons delivery, Therefore, 

despite the growing tacit acceptance of unmanned satellite reconnaissance, 

there is certainly a danger that the Soviets will consider MOL to be a 

military overflight of their country and will either demand that such 

flights not be undertaken or will use this program as a pretext for a demand 

that we stop our entire satellite reconnaissance program. In this connection, it should be noted that intelligence indicates that the Soviets may 

well be developing an anti-satellite system that would be able to destroy 

lour present reconnaissance satellites. 

On the other hand, we may be greatly exaggerating this problem since 

world-wide public interest and enthusiasm for manned space flight with 

its obvious implications for observation from space may have the effect 

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of accelerating international acceptance of satellite observation and mini.. 

mix, the possible impact of any future Soviet objection*. Although this 

may prove to be the case, our satellite reconnaissance program is such 

a valuable national resource that extreme care must be taken in planning 

the way in which the program is handled. 

The immediate problem is to determine how the program should be introduced, Since it will be more than three years before the first manned 

prototype of MOL. is launched. During this period, there will hopefully 

be a continuing evolution of the process of international acceptance of 

satellite observation creating a better atmosphere for acceptance of MOL. 

The following alternative* cover the most obvious types of organisation 

and associated public position that should be considered in determining 

the best way to handle this programt 

Alternative I - AP program with open statement of observation objectives. 

This approach would avoid the difficult problem of providing a cover for 

the program by facing the issue directly and determining the Soviet 

response, if any, at the outset. The observation payload could be handled 

as a normal classified project. By specifically identifying space obseru 

vation as an objective of the program, it would tend to eliminate the 

cation that other military systems, possibly involving weapons, were under 

development. The impact of the observation mission could be muted some. 

what by projecting it as a future capability and by describing it as a possible 

tool for maintenance of the peace as en inspection device for arms control 

agreements. If this went unchallenged, it would essentially accomplish 

the objective of obtaining international acceptance of satellite observation. 

Nevertheless, despite any efforts we may make to associate satellite 

observation with peaceful objectives, such an approach would constitute 

a direct 'confrontation of the Soviets on the issue of satellite observation 

and would have the matdmurn possibility of triggering an immediate strong 

response on their part that could endanger not only the future of MOL but 

also our entire reconnaissance satellite program. 

Alternative II AF program without a stated observation mission. This 

program would be identified as a research project to determine the ability 

of man to contribute to a wide range of activities that might have some 

future utility for the military use of space. The obeervation payload in 

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this case would have to be handled as a "black" program. Any questions 

as to a possible reconnaissance mission would be answered by reiterating 

the general exploratory nature of the program including examples of the 

type or unclassified experiments that would be conducted. This approach 

would give the program a clear military image and might suggest future 

weapons delivery systems as well as reconnaissance. It would almost 

certainly be deduced by the Soviets and the public that our true objectives 

were in, the reconnaissance area. It would not, however, present the 

Soviets with a direct confrontation to which they might feel they had to 

react. 

Alternative III e Air Force program with NASA participation. This 

program would be explained as part of the national space effort to determine the ability of man to perform useful space missions. It could be 

explained that the management of the program had been given to the Air 

Force in view of NASA's over-riding responsibility to complete successfully the Apollo mission during the same time period. NASA would, however, participate in developing the scientific experiments for the program. 

This approach would give the program a much more peaceful image, and 

at the same time would probably be acceptable to all but the most vociferous 

proponents of the military role of space. Although the observation payloads 

would have to be handled in the ''black" under this program, both the 

Soviets and the informed public would probably soon conclude that the true 

purpose of the program was directed toward reconnaissance. This approach 

raises the serious question as to whether or not we wish to a...octete our 

peaceful space program in NASA with the National Reconnaissance Program 

and what impact this might have on NASA's international activities. Furthermore, such a joint program would probably increase existing friction 

between DoD and NASA on roles and missions. 

Alternative IV - NASA-directed •rogram with Air Force conduct of 

operations. This approach would have by far the most peaceful public 

image. It would, however, make NASA directly responsible for a clandestine reconnaissance system. Given NASA's otherwise open method of 

operation, it seems very improbable that this would not become public 

knowledge very soon with a radical impact on NASA's over-all peaceful 

image. This approach would probably present very serious management 

problems between the Air Force and NASA. It would also fail to respond 

to the pressures for a greater role for the Air Force in space which has 

been a basic element in the decision to go ahead with MCI. in the first place. 

--Tetfa-errer.2.E.T. 

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The process of working out the details of any of these slternative is 

a complicated job that should b • completed and coordinated before any 

decision on this program is publicly announcod. 

/01 Spurgeon M. Keeley. Jr 

Iriitialed by McGeorge Bundy 

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