Filed 2/4/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MEDIPRO MEDICAL 

STAFFING LLC et al.,

Plaintiffs and 

Respondents,

v.

CERTIFIED NURSING 

REGISTRY, INC., et al.,

Defendants and 

Appellants.

 B305910

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC667851)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Reversed.

Khouri Law Firm, Michael J. Khouri and Michael Tran for 

Defendants and Appellants.

Verus Law Group, Holly Walker and Mark N. Strom for 

Plaintiffs and Respondents.

* * * * * *
2

By statute, a trial court has the discretion to appoint a 

receiver to aid in the collection of a judgment if doing so “is a 

reasonable method to obtain the fair and orderly satisfaction of 

the judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 564, subd. (b)(3) & (4), 

708.620.)1 Does a trial court abuse that discretion if it appoints a 

receiver to aid in the collection of a money judgment where the 

record contains no evidence that the judgment debtors had 

obfuscated or frustrated the creditor’s collection efforts and no 

evidence that less intrusive collection methods were inadequate 

or ineffective? We hold it does. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 

court’s order appointing a receiver and its subsidiary injunction 

obligating the judgment debtors to cooperate with the receiver.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Underlying Judgment

In July 2017, Medipro Medical Staffing, LLC (Medipro) 

sued Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (Certified), which was one 

of its competitors in the nurse staffing industry, and Certified’s 

founder, Christina Sy (Sy), for a variety of business torts. A jury 

awarded Medipro $2 million in damages against Certified and 

$450,000 in damages against Sy. These amounts do not include 

costs, interest, or the $650,000 damages award against the other 

two defendants for which Certified and Sy are jointly and 

severally liable. The trial court entered judgment on March 8, 

2019, and we affirm that judgment in a separate opinion filed 

today. (Medipro Medical Staffing, LLC v. Certified Nursing 

Registry, Inc. (Feb. 4, 2021, B294391) [nonpub. opn.].)

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
3

II. Initial Collection Efforts

After filing a writ of execution on April 26, 2019, Medipro 

thereafter (1) served levies on 10 financial institutions regarding 

accounts associated with Certified or Sy, (2) served levies on 11 

hospitals to whom Certified provided staffing services regarding 

their accounts payable to Certified, and (3) obtained a charging 

order against Sy’s interest in a limited liability company (LLC) 

owned by her husband. Medipro did not serve any 

interrogatories requesting information to aid in the collection of 

the judgment (§ 708.020), did not place liens on any of Certified’s 

or Sy’s property (§ 695.010 et seq.), and did not seek to compel 

Sy’s or her husband’s appearance at debtors’ examinations 

(§ 708.110), although it unsuccessfully tried to serve Sy 25 times 

and served her husband but had yet to conduct the examination. 

For a time, Medipro’s collection efforts bore fruit. By 

September 2019, Medipro had obtained $35,171.77 from the 

financial institution levies and $374,200.86 from the hospital 

levies. However, the collections from the hospital levies started 

to dwindle in August 2019 and stopped altogether in September 

2019. 

III. Motion for Appointment of Receiver and for 

Complementary Injunctive Relief

A. Briefing and evidence

On Halloween 2019, Medipro filed a motion with the trial 

court to obtain (1) an order appointing a receiver authorized to 

“take possession” of Certified’s “funds,” “books and records” and 

to enforce the charging order against Sy’s interest in the LLC, 

and (2) a complementary preliminary injunction requiring 

Certified and Sy to “giv[e] the receiver access” to “all books and 

records” of Certified and the LLC. In support of its motion, 

Medipro submitted the declaration of its attorney, who 
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represented that (1) “Certified is currently conducting its 

business as usual, and providing staffing” to the hospitals, (2) 

Certified must be “billing under the name of another entity or 

person[] to circumvent” Medipro’s levies because an employee 

named “Lisa” at one of the hospitals told her that Certified had 

“canceled” a September 2019 invoice and did not issue any 

invoices in October 2019, and (3) based on information and belief, 

the LLC had eight real properties that generated rents but the 

LLC had not forwarded any distributions to Sy and the attorney 

“expected that Sy’s husband will not comply with the charging 

order.” 

Certified and Sy opposed the motion. In support of this 

opposition, Sy submitted a declaration indicating that Certified’s 

business had “significantly diminished since Medipro began 

serving levies on the hospitals,” causing three of its hospitals to 

stop business altogether and the remainder to have so few 

assignments that Certified was no longer sending weekly 

invoices. Also in support of the opposition, Sy’s husband 

submitted a declaration indicating that the LLC was “financially 

struggling” and had made “[no] distributions.” 

Medipro submitted a reply, which included deposition 

testimony from a Certified independent contractor stating that 

she was still providing consulting services to Certified and that 

Certified had issued her paychecks for those services in 

September, October and November of 2019. 

B. Ruling

After a hearing, the trial court issued its ruling. As a 

preliminary matter, the court sustained Certified’s evidentiary 

objections and struck Medipro’s counsel’s statements that 

Medipro was conducting “business as usual,” counsel’s hearsay 
5

recounting of what “Lisa” said, and counsel’s conjecture that 

Medipro must be billing its hospital clients under another name. 

The court nevertheless appointed a receiver and issued injunctive 

relief. Specifically, the court appointed a receiver to “take 

possession, custody and control” of the “accounts receivable and 

business accounts,” to “enter and gain access to [the o]ffices,” to 

“take possession of all bank accounts,” to “collect” “all mail,” and 

to “take possession of all the books and records” of both Certified 

and the LLC. The court also enjoined Certified and the LLC from 

interfering with the receiver’s performance of his duties. 

IV. Appeal

Certified and Sy filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Certified and Sy argue that the trial court erred (1) in 

appointing the receiver and issuing the complementary 

preliminary injunction, and (2) in granting relief beyond what 

Medipro requested. Because the preliminary injunction issued in 

this case is merely an adjunct to the appointment of the receiver 

and because the challenge to the breadth of the receiver’s powers 

presupposes that the appointment was proper, Certified and Sy’s 

appeal presents a threshold question: Did the trial court err in 

appointing the receiver?

It is undisputed that the trial court had the authority to 

appoint a receiver to aid in collection of the judgment. By 

statute, a court “may” appoint a receiver “[a]fter judgment” 

“pursuant to the Enforcement of Judgments Law” (§ 564, subd. 

(b)(4)), and the Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 et seq.) 

empowers a court to appoint a receiver “to enforce the judgment 

where the judgment creditor shows that, considering the 

interests of both the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, 
6

the appointment of a receiver is a reasonable method to obtain 

the fair and orderly satisfaction of the judgment” (§ 708.620). 

(Accord, Tucker v. Fontes (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 768, 772 (Tucker) 

[so noting].) It also is undisputed that the trial court had the 

authority to appoint a receiver to enforce the charging order as 

part of Medipro’s collection efforts. By statute, a court “may” 

“[a]ppoint a receiver of the distributions” to a member of a limited 

liability company if “necessary to effectuate the collection of 

distributions pursuant to a charging order.” (Corp. Code, 

§ 17705.03, subd. (b)(1).) 

What we must decide is whether the trial court in this case 

properly exercised this authority in the post-judgment collections 

context. Because trial courts enjoy a “large measure” of 

discretion, albeit “not an entirely uncontrolled one,” in deciding 

when to exercise their authority to appoint a receiver (Golden 

State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1939) 

13 Cal.2d 384, 393 (Golden State)), we review the decision to 

appoint one solely for an abuse of that discretion (City and 

County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 744

(Daley)).

Because the appointment of a receiver transfers property—

or, in this case, a business—“out of the hands of its owners” and 

into the hands of a receiver (Golden State, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 

393), the appointment of a receiver is a very “drastic,” “harsh,” 

and costly remedy that is to be “exercised sparingly and with 

caution.” (Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 1026, 1040 

(Jackson); Golden State, at p. 393; Cohen v. Herbert (1960) 186 

Cal.App.2d 488, 495 (Cohen); Morand v. Superior Court (1974) 38 

Cal.App.3d 347, 351 (Morand).) Due to the “extraordinary” 

nature of this remedy and the special costs it imposes, courts are 
7

strongly discouraged—although not strictly prohibited—from 

appointing a receiver unless the more intrusive oversight of a 

receiver is a “necessity” because other, less intrusive remedies 

are either “‘inadequate or unavailable.’” (Jackson, at pp. 1040-

1041; Cohen, at p. 495; Morand, at p. 351; Rogers v. Smith (1946) 

76 Cal.App.2d 16, 21; cf. Daley, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 745 

[“[T]he availability of other remedies does not, in and of itself, 

preclude the use of a receivership”]; Gold v. Gold (2003) 114 

Cal.App.4th 791, 808 [same].)

In light of the sheer number of enforcement mechanisms 

for collecting money judgments under the Enforcement of 

Judgments Law (which range from levies to liens to wage 

garnishment (§§ 695.010 et seq., 697.010 et seq., 699.010 et seq., 

699.510 et seq., 706.020 et seq.); accord, Tucker, supra, 70 

Cal.App.2d at p. 773 [“ordinarily a judgment creditor is able to 

collect money . . . by way of garnishment or levy of execution”]), 

appointment of a receiver is rarely a “necessity” and, as a 

consequence, “may not ordinarily be used for the enforcement of a 

simple money judgment.” (Jackson, supra, 253 Cal.App.2d at p. 

1040; accord, White v. White (1900) 130 Cal. 597, 599 [receiver 

may not be appointed to collect a money judgment under section 

564, subdivision (b)(3)].) Instead, the appointment of a receiver 

to enforce a money judgment is reserved for “exceptional” 

circumstances where the judgment creditor’s conduct makes a 

receiver necessary—and hence “proper.” (Jackson, at p. 1041; 

Olsan v. Comora (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 642, 647; Daley, supra, 16 

Cal.App.4th at p. 744.) This occurs when the judgment debtor 

has frustrated the judgment creditor’s collection efforts through 

obfuscation or through otherwise contumacious conduct that has 

rendered feckless the panoply of less intrusive mechanisms for 
8

enforcing a money judgment. (See Bruton v. Tearle (1936) 7 

Cal.2d 48, 52 [debtor “entered into a conspiracy” with his 

employer to arrange wage payments in a manner that “defeat[ed] 

the collection” of judgment; receiver appropriate]; Tucker, at pp. 

772-774 [debtor received money from his business customers and 

from property, but had structured them to render them immune 

to ordinary collection mechanisms; receiver appropriate]; In re 

Ferguson (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 799, 802, 804 [debtor gave 

“‘manifestly evasive’” testimony at debtor’s examination; receiver 

appropriate]; Daley, at pp. 744-745 [debtors transferred title of 

property “to avoid responsibility” and “thumb[] their noses” at 

creditor’s inspection efforts; receiver appropriate]; see also Sachs 

v. Killeen (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 205, 214 [party subject to 

receiver “conceal[ed] . . . actual profits of the business”; receiver 

pendente lite appropriate].)

The trial court in this case abused its discretion in 

appointing a receiver to enforce Medipro’s money judgment 

because there was no evidence—let alone the substantial 

evidence necessary to sustain a proper exercise of discretion 

(Shoen v. Zacarias (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1112, 1118)—that 

Certified or Sy had engaged in obfuscation or other obstreperous 

conduct to the degree that the other collection mechanisms 

available under the Enforcement of Judgments Law were 

ineffective. Excising the evidence the trial court ruled 

inadmissible, the remaining evidence in support of Medipro’s 

motion showed, at best, that (1) Certified’s accounts receivable 

had slowed in August 2019 and stopped in September 2019, even 

though Certified continued to have funds to pay its consultant, 

and (2) the LLC did not make any distributions to Sy. But the 

court did not have before it any evidence as to why, and, more 
9

specifically, did not have before it any evidence that Certified or 

Sy had actually earned accounts receivable or distributions 

despite the slowdowns or that they had engineered these 

slowdowns to confound Medipro’s collection efforts. Indeed, the 

only evidence in the record on these points came from Certified 

and Sy, and indicated that the slowdowns were due to factors 

beyond their control—namely, that Medipro’s collection efforts 

had severely crippled Certified’s business and reduced the 

frequency and amount of its accounts receivable, and that the 

LLC had not turned any profit that would allow for a 

distribution. 

Medipro argues that the trial court could have reasonably 

inferred that the slowdowns in Certified’s accounts receivable 

and the LLC’s distributions were due to nefarious conduct by 

Certified or Sy, but this inference is based on nothing but 

speculation and thus is not a reasonable inference. (People v. 

Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755 [speculation is “not a 

sufficient basis for an inference of fact”]; Advent, Inc. v. National 

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 443, 

459 [“Speculation also differs from a reasonable inference”].) 

Medipro’s fear that Sy’s husband might try to subvert its 

collection efforts in the future is based on nothing more than its 

counsel’s “information and belief,” and is thus also “insufficient.” 

(A.G. Col Co. v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 604, 614-615.) 

And Medipro offered no evidence that the remaining arrows in its 

Enforcement of Judgments Law quiver would be insufficient; nor 

could it, as Medipro had barely sought to employ any of them.

In sum, Medipro’s evidentiary showing demonstrated that 

it had, at most, encountered some difficulty in its initial efforts to 

collect on its money judgment. If this was sufficient to constitute 
10

the “necessity” required to justify the “extraordinary” remedy of 

the appointment of a receiver to take over a judgment debtor’s 

business, it is difficult to see how the appointment of receivers 

would not become a routine part of the collection of judgments—a 

result at odds with the solid wall of precedent holding to the 

contrary. The trial court accordingly abused its discretion in 

appointing a receiver on the record in this case.2

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed, without prejudice to Medipro filing a 

subsequent motion for appointment of a receiver. Certified and 

Sy are entitled to their costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

2 This holding in no way precludes Medipro from resubmitting a motion for appointment of a receiver based on 

competent evidence that meets the standards set forth above.