/F·I~I:E" " IN CLERICS OFFICE ' 

IUPfteME COURT, STATE Of Wr~ 

I..-... DATE FEB 1 lOll 

~---taAJ\ ~v\.<l1dS.4- ) t..C'J 

CHifiF JUaTICE l StiSACCARLSON 

SUPREME COURT CLERK 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DEBORAH PERALTA, ) 

) 

Petitioner, ) No. 92675-1 

) 

v. ) En Bane 

) 

STATE OF WASHINGTON and ) FEB t 6 2017 WASHINGTON STATE PATROL, ) Filed 

) 

Respondents. ) 

) 

WIGGINS, J.-We are asked to review the trial court's ruling that plaintiff 

Deborah Peralta's admission during pretrial discovery should be given conclusive 

effect. Peralta admitted without qualification to being "under the influence of 

intoxicating liquors" at the time she was struck and injured by a Washington State 

Patrol car. We hold that her admission in this context was unambiguous and that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled she was bound by her admission. 

The jury instruction incorporating this ruling was appropriate. Even if the meaning of 

Peralta's admission was ambiguous, the trial court did not abuse its discretion on 

holding Peralta to a reasonable interpretation of the admission. As a result, we reverse 

the Court of Appeals on this point. We do not address the other evidentiary errors 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

identified by the Court of Appeals, but instead remand them to the Court of Appeals 

for a determination of prejudice. 

FACTS 

I. Factual History 

One evening, plaintiff Peralta was drinking beer with a neighbor in a downtown 

Vancouver tavern. Later in the evening, Peralta rode with a friend to a party. 

After an argument at the party, Peralta left on foot, became lost, and called her 

brother Jorge Peralta. She told him she had been drinking and asked for a ride home. 1 

After several unsuccessful efforts to meet her brother, Peralta mistook an approaching 

car for her brother's car. She stepped in front of the car, which was driven by 

Washington State Patrol Sergeant Ryan Tanner. 2 Sergeant Tanner did not see Peralta 

in time to stop and struck her with his vehicle. Realizing that he had struck someone, 

Sergeant Tanner called for backup and medical assistance; responding officers 

indicated Peralta smelled like alcohol when they were giving her assistance at the 

scene of the accident. Peralta suffered serious injuries and was hospitalized. 

II. Procedural History 

To recover damages arising from her injuries after the accident, Peralta sued 

the State and Washington State Patrol (collectively WSP). In its answer, WSP pleaded 

1 In a hospital interview with an investigator, Peralta indicated she had been drinking and wanted 

a designated driver to take her home that evening because she did not feel comfortable driving. 

2 Sergeant Tanner was on his way to respond to a request for backup at a traffic stop. 

2 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

an affirmative defense under RCW 5.40.060 (the intoxication defense statute), which 

provides a complete defense to an action for damages for personal injury when (1) 

the person injured was "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" at the time of the 

accident, (2) the person's intoxication was a proximate cause of his or her injuries, 

and (3) the person injured was more than 50 percent at fault. The statute also provides 

that the standard for proving an individual was under the influence is the same 

standard established by RCW 46.61.502 (the DUI statute3). Under the DUI statute, 

there are at least two relevant ways of proving intoxication under these facts: 

subsection (1)(a), a blood alcohol content of 0.08, or subsection (1)(c), driving a 

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors. 

During discovery, WSP sent Peralta a request to admit or deny that "at the time 

of the collision that is the subject of this lawsuit, Deborah Peralta was under the 

influence of intoxicating liquors." Peralta responded, "Plaintiff admits." At trial, WSP 

moved for a ruling that Peralta's admission conclusively established that she was 

under the influence of intoxicating liquors. Peralta objected to the motion and stated 

that her admission to being under the influence did not meet the standard for being 

under the influence under the intoxication defense statute. The trial court ultimately 

ruled that Peralta was bound by her admission and that the fact that she was 

intoxicated at the time of the injury was conclusively established. 

The trial court incorporated this ruling into jury instruction 20, which stated in 

relevant part: 

3 Driving under the influence statute. 

3 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

To establish the defense that the person injured was under the influence, 

the defendant has the burden of proving each of the following 

propositions: 

First, that the person injured was under the influence of alcohol at the 

time of the occurrence causing the injury. Plaintiff admits this element. 

Clerk's Papers at 363 (emphasis added). The jury found that Peralta's intoxication 

was a proximate cause of her injuries and that she was more than 50 percent at fault. 

As a result, the trial court dismissed Peralta's personal injury claim with prejudice. 

Peralta appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division Two. 

The Court of Appeals, Division Two, overturned the trial court's decision on the 

effect of Peralta's admission. See Peralta v. State, 191 Wn. App. 931, 949, 366 P.3d 

45 (2015). The court concluded that Peralta's admission did not satisfy the standard 

for intoxication under the intoxication defense statute. /d. at 948-49. It further 

concluded that this error was harmful because the jury was not allowed to consider 

the testimony of Peralta's friend that Peralta did not appear intoxicated the night of the 

accident. /d. The Court of Appeals also concluded that jury instruction 20 was error 

and harmful for the same reasons. /d. at 949. The Court of Appeals identified three 

other evidentiary errors but did not decide whether these errors were prejudicial to 

Peralta. /d. at 951-54. 

Both Peralta and WSP appealed the Court of Appeals' decision. Peralta 

appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand for a new trial; Peralta argued she 

should have judgment for her proportionate share of the damages found by the jury. 

We denied Peralta's petition for review. WSP cross petitioned to overturn the Court of 

4 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

Appeals' determination that Peralta's admission did not satisfy the required proof for 

intoxication under the intoxication defense statute. This court granted review of WSP's 

cross petition. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"The standard of review for evidentiary rulings made by the trial court is abuse 

of discretion." City of Spokane v. Neff, 152 Wn.2d 85, 91, 93 P.3d 158 (2004).4 We will 

reverse a trial court's evidentiary ruling '"only when no reasonable person would take 

the view adopted by the trial court."' State v. Ellis, 136 Wn.2d 498, 504, 963 P.2d 843 

(1998) (quoting State v. Castellanos, 132 Wn.2d 94, 97, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997)). 

We recognize that the trial court's ruling establishing the conclusive effect of 

Peralta's admission also made its way into the jury instruction. We review jury 

instructions de novo. See State v. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295, 301, 325 P.3d 135 (2014). 

ANALYSIS 

I. Admission Ruling Not an Abuse of Discretion 

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that 

Peralta's admission satisfied the standard for intoxication under the intoxication 

4 We note that the Court of Appeals applied a de novo standard of review to this case. See Peralta, 

191 Wn. App. at 945. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the meaning of 

Peralta's admission was a question of law or an application of the law to the facts. See id. Instead, 

the trial court was interpreting Peralta's admission made during discovery, and thus its decision 

was a discovery or evidentiary ruling. Since the trial court's ruling treated the fact of Peralta's 

intoxication as established, we treat the appeal as one dealing with an evidentiary ruling. Whether 

we consider the trial court's action an evidentiary or discovery ruling, the appropriate standard is 

abuse of discretion. See Cede// v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 176 Wn.2d 686, 694, 295 P.3d 239 

(2013) ("We review a trial court's discovery orders for abuse of discretion."). 

5 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

defense statute. In context, the meaning of Peralta's admission was not ambiguous. 

We thus hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Peralta 

admitted she was intoxicated for purposes of the intoxication defense statute. Nor was 

it error to incorporate this ruling into jury instruction 20. 

Even if we treat Peralta's admission as ambiguous, the trial court still did not 

abuse its discretion when it gave the admission conclusive effect. CR 36 governs 

requests for admissions and the answers to them. The rule required Peralta to qualify 

her answer to reflect her intention to admit that she was under the influence to a 

degree less than the statutory standard. Otherwise, her admission to being under the 

influence was conclusively established unless she moved to amend or withdraw her 

admission. Peralta neither qualified nor moved to withdraw or amend her admission. 

A. The Purpose of CR 36 

CR 36(a) permits parties to serve requests for admissions to opposing parties 

to establish the truth of "statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to 

fact." The purpose of CR 36 "is to eliminate from controversy factual matters that will 

not be disputed at trial." Thompson v. King Feed & Nutrition Serv., Inc., 153 Wn.2d 

447, 460, 105 P.3d 378 (2005) (plurality opinion). The greatest benefit of CR 36 

admissions is trial efficiency: 

Such admissions 

"promote both efficiency and economy in resolving disputes. If a 

point is conceded, litigants need not expend effort in investigations 

concerning it nor incur expense in presenting evidence to prove it. 

Judicial administration is also aided. Admissions reduce the time 

required to try a case. Indeed, they often make summary judgment 

possible. Finally, admissions encourage litigants to evaluate 

6 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

realistically the hazards of trial, and thus tend to promote 

settlements." 

Lakes v. von der Mehden, 117 Wn. App. 212, 218, 70 P.3d 154 (2003) (quoting SA 

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2252, at 522 (2d 

ed. 1994)). 

CR 36 places relatively few requirements on parties requesting admissions. It 

requires requesting parties merely to attach relevant documents to their request, and 

to separately set forth each matter they seek admitted. CR 36(a). In contrast, the rule 

places several requirements on responding parties regarding when and how they 

must respond to requests. Of particular interest here, the rule states, "[W]hen good 

faith requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which 

an admission is requested, the party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify 

or deny the remainder." /d. (emphasis added). 

Under CR 36, matters admitted are "conclusively established unless the court 

on motion permits withdrawal or amendment." CR 36(b) (emphasis added); see also 

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 471 (2002) (defining "conclusive" 

as "putting an end to debate or question esp[ecially] by reason of irrefutability"). 

B. The Standard for Intoxication under RCW 5.40.060, the Intoxication Defense 

Statute 

We now turn to the intoxication defense statute, the affirmative defense pleaded 

by WSP and to which Peralta's admission was applied. The intoxication defense 

statute provides a complete defense to an action for personal injury when the person 

7 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

injured "was under the influence of intoxicating liquor" at the time of the injury.5 RCW 

5.40.060. To determine if an individual was "under the influence of intoxicating liquor," 

the intoxication defense statute incorporates by reference the definition of "under the 

influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs" in RCW 46.61.502, the DUI statute. 

RCW 5.40.060(1 ). Under the facts here, the DUI statute defines "under the influence 

of intoxicating liquor" in two ways: subsection (1 )(a), a blood alcohol concentration of 

at least 0.08 within two hours of driving, or subsection (1 )(c), driving a vehicle while 

"under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor." RCW 46.61.502. The parties 

focus on the meaning of the latter definition. 

On first review, the standard under RCW 46.61.502(1 )(c) appears tautological: 

A person is guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating 

liquor, marijuana, or any drug if the person drives a vehicle within this 

state: 

... While the person is under the influence of or affected by 

intoxicating liquor, marijuana, or any drug .... 

Literally read, the statute says driving under the influence of intoxicants means driving 

under the influence of intoxicants. But we have given substance to subsection (1 )(c) 

through case law. In State v. Hurd, we recognized that "[t]he phrase 'under the 

influence of intoxicating liquor' ... has been defined as any influence which lessens 

in any appreciable degree the ability of the accused to handle his automobile." 

5 The defense also requires the injured person's intoxication to be a proximate cause of the injury 

and the injured person to be more than 50 percent at fault. RCW 5.40.060(1 ). Neither of those 

two elements are at issue in this court, but may be at issue on remand to the Court of Appeals. 

8 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

5 Wn.2d 308, 315, 105 P.2d 59 (1940). We did not explicitly adopt that definition in 

Hurd, instead noting that "'so far as this case is concerned [the phrase] means an 

abnormal mental or physical condition due to the influence of alcoholic liquors, a 

visible impairment of the judgment or a derangement, or impairment of mental or 

physical functions or energies arising therefrom."' /d. at 316. 

In subsequent case law, we adopted a definition that closely resembled our 

language in Hurd: 

"For the purposes of this case, the defendant may be said to have 

been either 'under the influence of' or 'affected by' intoxicating liquor, if, 

at the time of the alleged unlawful operation of his automobile, evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt establishes that intoxicating liquor has so far 

affected his nervous system, brain, or muscles, so as to impair, to an 

appreciable degree, his ability to operate his car in the manner that an 

ordinary prudent and cautious man, in the full possession of his faculties, 

using reasonable care, would operate or drive a similar vehicle under like 

circumstances." 

State v. Engstrom, 79 Wn.2d 469, 474, 487 P.2d 205 (1971) (quoting jury instruction). 

A similar definition of "under the influence" may be found in our Court of Appeals' 

jurisprudence. See, e.g., State v. Arndt, 179 Wn. App. 373, 386, 320 P.3d 104 (2014) 

("In Washington, a person is under the influence of or affected by the use of 

intoxicating liquor 'if the person's ability to drive a motor vehicle is lessened in any 

appreciable degree."' (emphasis added) (quoting 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: 

WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 92.1 0, at 286 (3d ed. 2008) (since 

withdrawn)). There is also a comparable definition in 6 Washington Practice: 

Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civi/16.04 (6th ed. 2012): "A person is under 

the influence of [alcohol] ... if, as a result of using [alcohol] ... , the person's ability 

9 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

to act as a reasonably careful person under the same or similar circumstances is 

lessened in any appreciable degree." (First and third alteration in original.) 

In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury with a definition of "under 

the influence" resembling the civil pattern instruction. The instruction, proposed by 

Peralta, stated, "A person is under the influence of alcohol if, as a result of using 

alcohol, the person's ability to act as a reasonably careful person under the same or 

similar circumstances is lessened in any appreciable degree." Thus, the definition of 

"under the influence" in the present case corresponds to the standard under RCW 

46.61.502(1 )(c). 

C. Admission Was Not Ambiguous 

With this background, we determine if the trial court abused its discretion with 

regard to Peralta's admission. When determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion, we must decide whether Peralta's admission to being under the influence 

is ambiguous. We conclude that her admission was not ambiguous. In making this 

determination, it is crucial to consider the admission's context. See) e.g., Home Street} 

Inc. v. DepYofRevenue, 166 Wn.2d 444,457, 210 P.3d 297 (2009) (emphasizing the 

importance of analyzing the context of a statute when examining the ambiguity of 

statutory language). When considering the context of Peralta's admission, we 

conclude the meaning of Peralta's admission was not ambiguous for two reasons. 

First, the request for admission is clearly related to WSP's defense; the 

language in the request for admission mirrors the language in the intoxication defense 

statute. It is also nearly identical to the language of the DUI statute. WSP was not 

required to use the specific language Peralta insists on, which would have specified 

10 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

the legal ramifications of the admission. See State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 695-96, 

782 P.2d 552 (1989) (rejecting an argument that a charging document violated due 

process when it listed the offense charged as '"DWI,"' the acronym for "'Driving While 

Intoxicated,"' instead of listing the charge as "'driving while under the influence of 

intoxicating liquor or any drug'"). As the trial court stated, "[W]e've got [a] request for 

admissions propounded by highly trained counsel, responded to by highly trained 

counsel[,] and intoxication was pleaded as an affirmative defense .... I believe that 

she ought to be bound by her admission that she's under the influence." 

Second, the purpose of WSP's request for admission was for its affirmative 

defense, not to establish another concept that had no legal significance. WSP notified 

Peralta of its intent to use the intoxication defense statute as an affirmative defense 

in its answer to her complaint. Peralta's response to WSP's request for admission was 

under the direction of highly trained legal counsel who should have known the full 

legal effect of the admission: namely, the effect that her unqualified admission would 

be conclusively established unless she moved to withdraw or amend it. See CR 36(b). 

When holding other parties' admissions conclusive, other courts have propounded a 

similar rationale: 

"[An answer to a request for admission is] a studied response, made 

under sanctions against easy denials .... [R]equests for admission ... 

are normally made under the direction and supervision of counsel, who 

has full professional realization of their significance. Therefore, ... their 

effect [should not be reduced] from conclusive admissions to merely 

evidential ones." 

Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1 028, 

1036 (3d Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted) (quoting McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F. Supp. 

11 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

628, 636-37 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). This result is consistent with the language of CR 36. 

Because Peralta's admission to being under the influence was not ambiguous in this 

context, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that 

Peralta was bound by her admission. 6 Because we hold that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion regarding Peralta's admission, the trial court also did not err when 

it gave jury instruction 20 reflecting this fact. For these reasons, we reverse the Court 

of Appeals. 7 

D. If Admission Was Ambiguous 

For the reasons stated above, Peralta's admission was not ambiguous in this 

context. Yet, we recognize that both Peralta and WSP advance reasonable 

interpretations of the phrase "under the influence." Even if we treat Peralta's 

admission as ambiguous, we conclude the trial court still did not abuse its discretion 

when it gave conclusive effect to Peralta's admission. 

6 We note without comment that WSP offered substantial evidence supporting its intoxication 

defense. The jury agreed that Peralta's intoxication was a proximate cause of her injuries and that 

she was more than 50 percent at fault. No party challenges the admission as completely lacking 

evidentiary support. 

7 Peralta now argues that jury instruction 21, which explained the standard for being under the 

influence, combined with jury instruction 20, may have misled the jury into believing that Peralta 

admitted she was negligent. However, Peralta did not object to jury instruction 21 at trial. We will 

generally consider a claimed error in a jury instruction only if the appellant raised the issue at 

trial. See Trueaux v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 124 Wn.2d 334, 339, 878 P.2d 1208 (1994).Therefore, 

these arguments are not well taken and we do not consider them. 

12 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

1. Two Approaches to Interpreting Ambiguous Admissions 

When applying CR 36, state and federal courts8 are split in their handling of 

"ambiguous" admissions.9 There are two main approaches. The first approach deems 

all admissions as establishing all possible reasonable interpretations, unless the 

admitting party successfully moves the court to withdraw or amend the admission. 

See, e.g., Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., 124 F. App'x 169, 173 (4th 

Cir. 2005) ("[O]nce a matter that is properly [the] subject of an admission under 

[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 36(b) has been admitted during discovery, the district 

court is not free to disregard that admission."); Commonwealth Enters. v. Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co., 1996 WL 660869, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1996) (unpublished) ("A matter 

admitted under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 36 is conclusively established unless 

withdrawn .... Evidence inconsistent with a Rule 36 admission is properly excluded." 

(citations omitted)); Airco Indus. Gases, 850 F.2d at 1036 ('"A judicial admission, 

deliberately drafted by counsel for the express purpose of limiting and defining the 

facts in issue, is traditionally regarded as conclusive, and an admission under [Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure] 36 falls into this category."' (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 

& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2264, at 7 42-43 (2d 

ed. 1982))). 

The second approach does not consider admissions to be conclusively 

established when they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. See, 

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 is nearly identical to our state rule, CR 36. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 36. Therefore, we find federal case law persuasive on this point. 

13 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

e.g., Driscoll v. Dennis, 513 F. App'x 702, 705 (1Oth Cir. 2013) ("But because these 

requests for admissions were compound and ambiguous, we 'regard the admission 

as limited in practical effect.' ... [W]e cannot conclude the district court was required 

to treat the admissions as conclusively establishing Mrs. Driscoll's ownership." 

(quoting Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1303 (10th Cir. 2009})); Johnson v. 

DeSoto County Bd. ofComm'rs, 204 F.3d 1335, 1339-41 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding 

that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the effect of an admission 

because "at the very least, ambiguity did exist about whether the admissions were 

absolute or limited"); Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods. of St. Louis, Inc., 64 F. 3d 1202, 

1210 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The conclusive effect envisioned by the rule may not be 

appropriate where requests for admissions or the responses to them are subject to 

more than one interpretation."). Instead, the effect of the admission is submitted for 

decision by the jury. 

2. The Trial Court's Approach 

In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it treated Peralta's 

admission as establishing all reasonable interpretations of the phrase "under the 

influence." Peralta admitted without qualification that she was "under the influence of 

intoxicating liquors." Peralta believed that she needed to admit influence because she 

9 Peralta does not concede that her admission was ambiguous. See Wash. Supreme Court oral 

argument, Peralta v. State eta/., No. 93506-2 (Nov. 15, 2016), at 20 min., 18 sec. to 20 min., 25 

sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org. 

14 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

had consumed alcohol. 10 Peralta's counsel argued to the trial court, "So we can't 

truthfully ethically answer a question, were you under the influence, if we have any 

alcohol in our system as no. We have to say yes .... " However, since Peralta wished 

to admit influence only to a specific degree, CR 36 required her to qualify her 

admission to reflect this idea. See CR 36(a) (stating "when good faith requires that a 

party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is 

requested, the party shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the 

remainder" (emphasis added)). She failed to make such a qualification. 

Without qualification, her admission to being under the influence was 

"conclusively established" unless she moved to withdraw or amend her admission. 

CR 36(b) ("Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the 

court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."). Peralta never 

so moved. Counsel for Peralta offers no reason why, once it was clear that the trial 

court intended to treat her admission as conclusively establishing the fact of 

intoxication under the intoxication defense statute, she did not move to amend or 

withdraw her admission. 11 Since she did not move to withdraw or amend her 

10 This contention appears to be without support in our case law. See Hurd, 5 Wn.2d at 316 ('"The 

law recognizes that a person may have drunk liquor and yet not be under the infiuence of it."' 

(quoting court's instruction). 

11 At oral argument, Peralta's counsel stated, "That option [to withdraw or amend] wasn't given to 

us." Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, supra, at 21 min., 33 sec. But the record reflects that 

counsel rejected the option to amend or withdraw the admission at trial. WSP speculated that 

Peralta did not wish to pay for potential costs associated with her admission under CR 37(a). See 

Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, supra, at 5 min., 47 sec. to 6 min., 8 sec. Whatever the 

15 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

admission, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled 

that Peralta's admission satisfied the standard under the intoxication defense statute. 

II. Other Evidentiary Issues 

While the Court of Appeals based its reversal of the trial court on the request 

for admissions issue, it also held that the trial court made several erroneous rulings12 

without deciding their possible prejudicial effect. Peralta, 191 Wn. App. at 948-53. 

These issues are not adequately briefed to us, nor does our order granting review 

encompass whether these rulings were prejudicial. We granted review ofWSP's cross 

petition. In its cross petition, WSP asked this court to reverse the Court of Appeals 

because Peralta's admission satisfied the first element of RCW 5.40.060. WSP did 

not petition for review of the other evidentiary issues, and neither did Peralta. Thus, 

review of these other evidentiary issues is outside the scope of review. We remand 

the remaining issues back to the Court of Appeals for a determination of prejudice to 

Peralta. See RAP 13.7(b) ("If the Supreme Court reverses a decision of the Court of 

Appeals that did not consider all of the issues raised which might support that decision, 

the Supreme Court will either consider and decide those issues or remand the case 

to the Court of Appeals to decide those issues."). 

reason, Peralta chose not to move to amend or withdraw her admission to reflect the fact that she 

did not intend to admit intoxication under the intoxication defense statute. 

12 These errors included (1) excluding Sergeant Roy Rhine's and Detective David Ortner's 

deposition testimonies, (2) excluding eyewitness hearsay statements, and (3) compelling Peralta 

to disclose the identity of her consulting expert. Peralta, 191 Wn. App. at 951-54. 

16 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

CONCLUSION 

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Peralta's 

admission satisfied the standard for intoxication under the intoxication defense statute 

and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals. The corresponding jury instruction was 

not given in error. The meaning of Peralta's admission was not ambiguous in this 

context. Even if we treat Peralta's admission as ambiguous, the trial court still did not 

abuse its discretion. Under CR 36(a), Peralta was required to qualify her admission if 

she wished to limit its legal effect. Without qualification, CR 36(b) required Peralta to 

move to amend or withdraw her admission if she wanted to avoid its conclusive effect. 

She never made such a motion. We remand to the Court of Appeals the remaining 

evidentiary errors identified by the Court of Appeals for determination of whether the 

errors prejudiced Peralta, as they are outside the scope of our review, and for further 

proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. 

17 
Peralta v. State of Wash. and Wash. State Patrol, No. 92675-1 

WE CONCUR. 

18