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INTERFERENCE 

WITH 

U. S. SATELLITES 

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EARPOP HEXAGBN 

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I UI \JL.Uift"r BYE r1lAN /TALENT· KEYHOLE/COM mr 

June 17, 1970 

INTERFERENCE WITH US SAT~LLITES 

THE PROBLEM 

To assess the possibilities of Soviet non-physical 

interference with US reconnaissance satellites (including 

ground support facilities). 

INTRODUCTION 

SNIE 11-10-68, "Likelihood of Interference with US 

Satellites, 11 presented rationale to assist in d~tennining 

what resources should be allocated to protect U.S. reconnaissance satellites against hostile actions in situations 

less than general war. Th.e SNIE concluded that it is highly 

unlikely the Soviets would undertake wide-spread and continuing 

attacks on US reconnaissance satellites. The chances for 

selective or sporadic interference involvtng physical damage 

to US satellites were estimated to be about equally low. 

The risk of retaliation as well as the potential cost 

of peacetime military action against satellites in orbit 

might in fact lead to a Soviet preference to other, less 

risky and less expensive ways of interfering with our satellites. 

Such interference need not be applied directly against the 

satellite in orbit. Interference could take more indirect 

forms against supporting ground facilities or by concealment 

of targets. 

In this regard, however, SNIE 11-10-68 specifically did 

not consider passive countermeasures or diplomatic pressures 

that the Soviets might apply as interference. We believe 

that such Soviet tactics ~re very real and possible; indeed, 

they are typical of more credible forms of interference. We 

further believe that, by unwise acts on our part, we could 

increase the likelihood of such interference. It also is 

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clear that the role of satellites as means of verification 

in a SALT environment must be carefully and astutely 

negotiated in order to avoid similar interference hazards. 

This paper addresses some possible circumstances and 

forms for this. type of interference and the implications for 

future space operations and policy. We need to devote more 

attention to the possibility of these forms of interference. 

On the other hand, the Soviets undoubtedly are concerned 

about the possibility of US interference with their satellites. 

But they must know that we have no non-nuclear anti-satellite 

capability. One must question whether our development and 

test of such a capability would be provocative or stabilizing. 

We believe that it probably would be stabilizing. 

It is important, therefore, for the US to consider not 

only measures to protect our satellites against hostile 

acts, but also ways to avoid confrontation with the Soviets 

that might lead to these lesser, more subtle forms of interference. A,s a minimum, our estimates in this regard should 

help us to anticipate such Soviet moves and thus provide 

basis for developing appropriate alternatives and contingency 

plans. We strongly urge that the scope of SNIE. 11-10-68 be 

expanded to include these considerations. 

DISCUSSION 

I. POSSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTERFERENCE 

A. Tacit Acceptance and the Deployment of New Satellite 

Systems 

A fundamental consideration underlying satellite reconnaissance, and one which has permitted unimpeded operations 

throughout the life of the National Reconnaissance Program, 

is the existence of tacit acceptance and tacit agreement to 

mutual noninterference. The Soviets have long conveyed~ by 

diverse and unmistakable means, their awareness and acceptance 

of U.S. satellite reconnaissance activities. Conversely, we 

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have tacitly accepted overflight of US territory by Soviet 

reconnaissance satellites. Each nation has seemed willing 

to tolerate the other's space activiti~s in order to preserve 

its own freedom of operation in space. This probably also 

is so because neither side has yet perceived an innnediate 

and intolerable. threat to its own security from the activities 

of the other. Indeed, the Soviets have needed some degree of 

observation of the US to insure credibility of their strategic 

capability. Needless to say, this situation could change 

under conditions of a severe crisis or outbreak of actual 

war--or as a result of a unilateral change in reconnaissance 

activities allowed under tacit acceptance. 

Beyond the 11 fact of 11 our satellite reconnaissance 

activities, the Soviets know that our program contains high 

and low resolution photographic satellites in near-earth· 

orbit. They probably understand our photographic operations 

quite well. The Soviets probably underestimate, however, 

the resolution quality and _film capacity of our new photographic systems. Our SIGINT satellite activity probably is 

more obscure to them; in particular, they probably do not 

know of the new generation of systems at synchronous altitude. 

Finally, the Soviets undoubtedly understand and _appreciate 

our heavy reliance upon satellite reconnaissance for intelligence collection. 

A critical point here is that we can assure Soviet tacit 

acceptance only of the EFesent collection systems. One must 

ask whether the Soviets will also accept our new and planned 

systems which represent a new generation of satellites with 

significantly different operating conditions and dramatic, 

obvious improvements. Within the past year we have introduced 

the dual recovery vehicle G&"\ffiIT and the synchronous altitude 

During the next twelve months, we will introduce a 

new generation of satellites which will be observed by the 

Soviets and noted as a dramatic upsurge in quality and quantity 

of our collection. These are: I !HEXAGON, 

and 647. HEXAGON, for example, will be apparent as a much 

larger system with twice as many and much larger data return 

vehicles and twice the orbital life of any previous photo 

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system. 

bilities 

These new and planned systems will provide capafor: 

Combined, these systems should produce improved ability to 

monitor mobile and fixed missile deployments; improved 

detection of strategic missile launches; improved knowledge 

of missile characteristics; and improved knowledge of the 

capabilities of defensive missile systems. 

Our new satellite systems differ from current ones in 

two important respects. First, they represent significant 

qualitative improvements, with increased emphasis upon 

SIGINT collection. Second, the new systems will provide 

near-continuous coverage and near real-time readout from 

synchronous altitudes and highly elliptical orbits. In 

their own space operations--to the best of our knowledge--

the Soviets have not shown any interest in intelligence 

collection from synchronous orbits. They have concentrated 

their efforts in near-earth orbit operations. This focus 

may be attributed in part to their perception of our activities 

up to this time. 

A new I I system already is in limited 

operation. There have been no indications that the Soviets 

are aware of its purpose. The nature of the data that it is 

collecting has not changed since Operations began, and there 

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are no indications that the satellite is being tracked by 

the Soviets. We may assume that current Soviet understanding 

of tacit acceptance does not include, ,therefore, this 

particular system. We probably can also assume that they 

will be unaware of the missions of other new systems which 

are scheduled to become operational within the next two 

years. 

The Soviets can successfully track our current satellites 

in near-earth orbits, thus giving them some flexibility in 

choosing what they want or do not want us to see or hear. 

Thus, they 11 accept 11 our current activities in that context. 

The fact remains, however, that the Soviets may not accept, 

once they understand, the near continuous coverage and near 

real-time readout capabilities of our new systems. They may 

regard these expanded activities as an intolerable extension 

of an acceptable level of eepionege, 

A final significant consideration is the relative value 

of tacit acceptance to the Soviet Union. While there is an 

undeniable reciprocity in satellite reconnaissance, there is 

a distinct inequality in its importance to the U.S. and the 

Soviet Union. Our assessment is that the Soviet satellite 

reconnaissance program, although characterized by frequent 

launchings, in no way approaches the scope or quality of 

ours. With easy access to 11 open11 countries of the West, and 

particularly the US, intelligence collection by satellite 

reconnaissance is not nearly as critical to them as it is to 

us. Consequently, the Soviets stand to lose considerably 

less by any diminution of tacit acceptance. Needless to 

say, they would not be reluctant to interfere openly with 

our satellites if the threat posed to their security became 

unbearable. In essence, this view suggests that tacit 

acceptance is valid for the Soviets only when it is useful 

to them. Such an attitude would conform to their ideology. 

This is not to minimize, however, the importance to the 

Soviets of their continued overflight of China and other 

countries on their border. Certainly, their continued need 

for reconnaissance of China would temper Soviet readiness 

to do anything that might broach tacit acceptance. 

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In surmnary, the Soviets are aware of the 11 fact of 11 US 

satellite reconnaissance. In addition, they understand and 

accept our current generation of satellites at low and 

medium altitudes. They may underestimate our high resolution 

capability. We can only be assured that they find this level 

of reconnaissance, as they understand it, acceptable. They 

probably do not yet understand and may not accept our new 

generation of satellites which will place the Soviet Union 

under near continuous coverage from highly elliptical orbits 

and synchronous altitudes. Once the Soviets understand our 

new collection activities, they may regard them as a new and 

unacceptable level of espionage. 

Bo Disclosure Policies 

In response to various pressures within government to 

downgrade the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance and to 

liberalize control of the product (thus, its use and application), discretion might give way to compulsion to 11 show 

and tell. 11 Such compulsion could manifest itself in several 

forms, any one of which might place the Soviets in an uncomfortable position and provide cause for them to object or 

interfere with US satellite programs. 

To prove estimates of Soviet military posture and thus 

gain Congressional approval of requests for enhanced US 

defenses, it is conceivable that selected satellite photography 

might be openly disclosed to Congress* in order to confirm 

beyond doubt the extent of Soviet ICBM development and dispersal. Such disclosure ultimately would extend to the press 

and public at large and might thus become a matter of intense 

national discussion. 

In the broadest sense, unilateral public disclosure of 

satellite reconnaissance, the tacit covenants under which it 

has been conducted during the last ten years, or the actual 

quality of the data derived could prompt any of several 

*As opposed to private disclosure to key members. 

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reactions by the Soviet Union. Having emphasized vigilance 

and secrecy as vital elements of national security, the 

Soviets might feel compelled to undertake not only political 

reaction but also passive countermeasures (such as large-scale 

camouflage efforts) in order to offset the sudden impact on 

their general public and armed forces personnel in particular. 

So far, Soviet camouflage and concealment activities have 

appeared to be largely experimental in nature and generally 

ineffective. If the Soviets were to become aware of the 

quality of our high resolution optical systems, it is nearly 

certain that they would innnediately perfect their deception 

techniques and apply them in earnest. Better concealment 

could be very damaging to our ability to collect detailed 

information. 

Any Soviet reaction, regardless of form, would be designed 

to counter both international and domestic impressions that 

the U.S. had significantly penetrated the protective layers 

of Soviet military security. It seems unlikely that the 

5-oJ..r.iet.s would feign ignorance, as such an attitude would 

suggest an unprotected vulnerability. Similarly, the Soviets 

would be hard-pressed to defend against an accusation (by the 

East Germans or Chinese, for example) of shared guilt with 

the U.S. in violating the national sovereignty of many nations. 

Another point to be considered is the possibility that 

we might provoke Soviet interference by our initiatives in 

the United Nations. Such initiatives might involve proposals 

for internationalization of satellite reconnaissance capabilities, under UN control, for monitoring specific trouble 

spots in the world such as Suez or the Korean DMZ. Another 

potentially hazardous area is US discussions about multi-lateral 

participation in earth resources satellite surveys. This is 

not to say that the Soviets would not participate in UN 

consideration of such proposals. The point is they they 

would expect us to protect the principle of tacit acceptance 

by avoiding areas and suggestions which could lead to 

undesirable exposure~ Once again, such application of 

satellite capabilities, possessed only by the two super-powers, 

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could imply US/Soviet duplicity against other countries 

and lead to an awkward confrontation. 

The fact that the Soviets are particularly sensitive 

on this point is clearly apparent in a recent incident at 

the UN. In December 1969, our delegation informally circulated among members of the UN Outer Space Committee a 

draft resolution on earth resources satellite surveys. The 

resolution referred to President Nixon 1 s address to the UN 

General Assembly in September 1969 in which he announced that 

we would propose before the UN the dedication of an earth 

resources satellite program, as it develops, to produce 

information for the world community as well as for the US. 

The Soviets reacted with quiet determination. The 

Soviet Ambassador privately told the US Ambassador that 

the Soviets would neither cosponsor nor support the proposal. 

The Soviets urged that we not present the resolution. The 

Soviet Ambassador argued that it was premature not only in 

view of the wide review needed within governments, but also 

---be-cause it formally raised the fact that at least one superpower is ph6tographing 11 secrets 11 of other states. He 

remarked that it was well known that both the U.S. and the 

Soviet Union have been photog-raphing each other and other 

parts of the globe; but at least for its part the Soviet. 

Union would not acknowledge this fact publicly. He thought 

it would be an error for us to formally acknowledge this 

fact in the UN and urged that we desist from presenting a 

resolution on the subject. Later, the Soviet Ambassador said 

that the Soviet Union would vote against our proposed resolution because it had not been studied sufficiently in the 

Space Committee and it "touched on sensitive aspects such 

as security and sovereignty." 

In January, 1970 the resolution was adopted by the UN 

General Assembly. It seems clear from this incident that the 

Soviets have well defined limits in regard to the sharing of 

space technology and that they expect us to have similar 

feelings. Although they apparently have remained silent 

since the resolution was adopted against their dissenting 

vote, it is uncertain that they would tolerate further initiatives on our part without a more overt protest. 

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In the tensions of a crisis situation involving a US/ 

Soviet confrontation in a world trouble spot, the stakes 

might be of an order to warrant US disclosure of satellite 

reconnaissance, possibly leading to revelation of Soviet 

duplicity. It might become necessary to prove the US case, 

as in the Cuban situation, by producing satellite photography 

for world view and by indicating what it reveals of Soviet 

military actions and possible intent. A more timely example 

is the current Middle East crisis. We could be in serious 

trouble if we gave satellite photography of Arab military 

installations and preparations to Israel and the Arabs 

subsequently found out about it. The Arabs would object 

and embarrass the Soviets, who then would be obligated to 

object. 

We can easily draw similar scenarios in other world 

trouble spots where open disclosure of the "fact of" satellite 

reconnaissance would have immediate, adverse impact~ India, 

and especially Pakistan, probably would be very suspicious 

of what information on its military activities we and the 

Soviets are obtaining by tacit agreement. 

In sunnnary, disclosure policies--both what.is said and 

what is withheld--about space programs and activities contain 

certain pitfalls for the unwary. The Soviets seem to have 

the advantage in this regard, since they are not as dependent 

on satellite reconnaissance and stand to lose less by disclosure. A final, but most important consideration, is the 

fact that any act of disclosure--in calm or crisis--is 

irreversible. 

C. Definition of "Means 11 in SALT 

Both our existing and programmed satellite reconnaissance 

capabilities will be a critical element in the monitoring and 

verification of a SALT agreement. Our satellite capabilities 

in fact constitute our "national means of verification. 11 The 

US does not include "classical intelligence collection operations 11 

in national means of verification, and we assume that the 

Soviets also do not. We are dependent on intelligence from 

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our satellites during negotiations leading to an agreement. 

We may assume that during the negotiations the Soviets will 

be preparing for the SALT environment .and preswnably will 

be seeking to arrive at new levels of preparedness, force 

structure and arms dispersal before the agreement becomes 

operative. It· is essential, of course, that we be aware of 

such Soviet preparations to the extent that we can. 

Our previous statements about tacit acceptance and new 

satellite systems are equally pertinent here. Indeed, the 

panel which examined verification aspects of SALT placed 

great reliance in our new and planned systems. When viewed 

in a SALT context, those considerations take on added meaning. 

The question that now arises is, "When the phrase 1national 

means of verification' is used in the SALT talks, don't the 

Soviets interpret that to mean 'satellite reconnaissance in 

near-earth orbit'?" The strong Soviet play at Helsinki on 

exclusive reliance on "national means of verification" perhaps indicates that the Soviets believe that current 11means 11 

are adequate to verify certain quantitative restrictions on 

strategic a:r:ms in a rudimentary agreement. 

Other questions which come to mind are: 11When SALT 

negotiators speak of a clause about noninterference with 

national means, don't the Soviets also interpret that to 

mean 1 at low altitude 1 ?n "What, then, of our new and planned 

systems deployed at synchronous altitudes and in highly 

elliptical orbits?" 11Aren 1 t they vulnerable to interference 

if the Soviets should discover them and then decide that we 

may have I tricked I them during negotiation of the agreement?" 

1'When our negotiators at Helsinki expressed willingness to 

discuss 9ualitative restrictions on strategic arms, did they 

perhaps inadvertently suggest to the Soviets the sophistication 

of our technical intelligence collection, particularly SIGINT? 11 

With these questions in mind, it would be useful to cast 

some of the points they raise in a brief scenario. Assume 

that both sides agree on limiting the number of fixed, landbased ICBM launchers. This possibly is the easiest limitation 

to define and verify unilaterally~ We have high confidence 

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that we can verify this restriction by 11national means, 11 

essentially satellite photography. Assume the Soviets 

also plan to rely exclusively on satellite photography. 

We must also assume that the Soviets do not desire to 

license technical intelligence collection efforts beyond 

those required. to ensure compliance. The Soviets probably 

will not accept laissez-faire satellite reconnaissance 

basedOU a limitation which can be readily verified by 

present satellite photography. There is no evidence to 

indicate that the Soviets have ceased to consider any 

intelligence collection operations as inimical to the 

preservation of their 11 closed11 society. 

Suppose the Soviets state that present 11 observation11 

satellites and modifications thereto are what they consider 

to be unational means of verification." Our options then 

are quite limited: we can agree, since photography is 

sufficient; or press for a more inclusive definition, 

although additional 11means 1.

1 are not absolutely necessary. 

The latter option obviously is a dangerous strategy to 

follow, for it places us on the defensive. In addition, 

We-COUld easily be accused of duplicate negotiating under 

the guise of strategic arms limitatiolls. The best situation we could hope for, based on this Soviet position, is 

an informal or formal acceptance of satellite photography 

with the status of other collectors remaining m1changed. 

Our advanced optical systems that are scheduled for deployment within the next year probably would be informally 

acceptable to the Soviets. However, the SIGINT sensors 

among our new systems would not be assured of acceptance. 

The status of the most advanced of our planned systems 

still under development would be indeterminate. 

A variation on the scenario presents other problems. 

Suppose, for example, that the tentative agreement includes 

limits, bans and restrictipns which would require a relatively 

high SIGINT collection effort on our part but not necessarily 

an equivalent Soviet effort. There are many cases in this 

category, e.g., SAM upgrading, MIRV testing. In this situation, 

our purposes would not be well served by delineating even a 

generic list of collection systems included under our 

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11national means. 11 Given this disparity in US/Soviet efforts 

required to monitor very complex limitations, there is cause 

for concern about Soviet interference in this scenario. 

In summary, these scenarios illustrate the problem of 

interference that is implicit in differing US/Soviet 

interpretations of 11national means. 11 It is clear that the 

situation is not helped by attempts to spell out the content 

or substance of "national means. 11 Nor is comfort to be found 

in attempting to get·more specific with the Soviets about 11 active" or 11 passive 11 interference. The Soviets probably 

would balk at any explicit treatment of a mutually agreed 

principle of noninterference. They would likely state that 

given the broad definition of "national means, 11 both sides 

understand what generally is considered interference; therefore, a specific agreement is not necessary. ~ey might 

further suggest that individual cases which appear to be 

interference with verification capabilities can best be 

handled by a joint commission that would address suspect 

violations. The hazards of interference in a SALT environmenc would remain very real and possible. 

D. Inadvertent Interference With Soviet Satellites 

Another area of concern is the possibility that the 

Soviets might incorrectly blame us for interference with 

their satellites and thus retaliate against ours. One way 

this might occur is by inadvertent laser illumination of 

Soviet space traffic. 

Several Department of Defense agencies are conducting 

research in laser technology. In addition, other government 

agencies plus industry and universities are engaged in research 

and development of laser devices. Progress in this field has 

been rapid. Laser tests and operations are becoming more 

extensive. 

The possibility of incapacitating crew personnel or 

damaging sensor subsystems has now arisen~ Optical devices 

are particularly vulnerable. Damage produced by lasers is 

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thennal. The extremely narrow beams achieved by lasers 

produce very high energy densities on the surface of an optical 

sensor. Power densities achieved in fpcusing certain laser 

beams are so high that damage from shock waves and electrical 

fields also can occur. 

The implications for Soviet interference are serious. 

In one instance, a research experiment actually was leading 

toward deliberate laser illumination of a Soviet satellite. 

Fortunately, the intentions of the researcher were discovered 

in time to preclude any confrontation. A forthcoming memorandum calls for tighter controls of laser testing within 

activities under jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. 

A problem remains, however, in how to extend similar controls 

to other areas. 

Soviet interference also could be triggered by attempts 

to 11 spoof 11 or deceive their satellites with overriding signals. 

An example of this would be. efforts to pre-empt the command 

and control circuitry of a Soviet satellite, thus bringing it 

und~r countermanding direction from the ground. A recent 

government research project was corrrrnitted to developing such 

a capability--with Soviet satellites as potenti~l test targets. 

The project was cancelled for obvious reasons. 

II. POSSIBLE FORMS OF INTERFERENCE 

Whatever its nature or form, any effective countermeasure 

constitutes interference. There is no doubt that the Soviets 

are capable of a wide variety of countermeasures, both active 

and passive. Typical active countermeasures that the Soviets 

could take would be clouding of photographic film by laser 

beams; interception or sabotage of satellites; and interference 

with satellite connnand and control systems. These measures 

WOU.Id-- of course be considered a direct attack upon our satellites. Since the Soviets appreciate the risks that would 

accompany such countermeasures, it is unlikely that they would 

resort to them. 

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Our immediate concern is the possibility that the 

Soviets would not hesitate to use less provocative countermeasures. These could degrade technical collection systems 

and would be difficult to control, if not detect. This 

type of interference could take several forms. For example, 

collection of.telemetrv could be orevented by overt or covert 

j annning. I I 

As previously indicated, Soviet camouflage practices 

have been minimal and ineffective. The scope and type of 

Soviet activity that we have observed suggest possible 

experimentation or training in deception. But the Soviets 

could perfect their techniques quickly and inexpensively. 

They could introduce concealment and deception measures which 

would substantiallv alter weanons development, procurement 0 ~d denlo•=~nt. I I 

In the test and development stage, any step that broke 

the high dependence on radio connnunications and telemetry 

could degrade 'the possibility of detection. For example, 

selective telemetry suppression and--in aircraft--secure 

pilot-to-ground communications would be a case in point. 

In the case of missile development, the Soviets have 

sufficient launch areas to forego construction of the 

several new launchers and unique support areas that usually 

indicate that a new system is under way. 

Finally, the Soviets may exert interference across a 

wide spectrum of political and diplomatic pressures. As 

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one exnert recent!"~ obsern°d I 

~-~~~--~-1 we may extena tnat line of reasoning 

to satellite collection, where ground support facilities 

in third countries are vulnerable to similar political interference. 

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