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COYillIl\'ED EARTH RESOURCES ESTll,lA.TING SYSTEM (CERES) 

A STR4.TEGIC OUTLINE 

NOTE: It is assumed that the readers of this outline 

are familiar i,i th much of the detail of both 

classified and unclassified earth orbiting 

satellite programs and proposed programs. 

Therefore no attempt is rf12de "cO explain the 

technical substance; operational intentions 

and results; or politice.l and organization by-play 

relative to these programs. This outline is a 

sketch of a possible national COUl"Se of action 

from a National Security Council point of view . 

.L. C!:'BE 'UNITED STATES PROBLEM 

The Dilennna 

1. Satellites are the means for gaining a large and crucial percentage 

0:':' ::"ntelligence concerning the USSR and the CEICON areas. To lose this capability 

vou:::"& be a national disaster. To weaken or threaten the capability is serious, 

l:liscl ...l.ief. 

2. Satellites show increasing promise of some day providing at acceptable cost on a routine basis much information important to civil economies. To 

seriously or permanently frustrate this capability is not only politically unwise 

but also may i"TOrk to U. S. disadvantage by damaging its international posture j 

by preventing a means for beneficial exploitation of its ~rn resources; and 

by accelerating the drain on U. S. resources in contrast to developing unutilized 

resources elsewhere. 

II . COROLLARY Fi-'l.CTOP.s 

NOTE: T'ne factors listed belo,v are in random order. They 

are important forcing functions related to the construction of a 'workable national strategy. 

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.... 

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"1. Vie'.'Ted as a space progr&m 2nd given suitable budget) a CERl<::S 

p::.~ogl~a:::::t presents no serious technical or operating problems. It does 

p:i:'esent serious international relations and diplomatic problems 'ilhich 

receive occasional comment) but relating to which there is little applicable 

working experience. Concrete plans and specific actions in this important 

area are scanty. 

B. The lead time required to laU11ch simple; but adequate, CERES systems 

is on the order of 14-18 months. The political consequences of the results 

of such missions are therefore in the future--but not far off. The data 

uillnagement problems are likewise situated. 

C. Given budget and lead-time) space technology and operational capabilities 

are now fully adequate. However) the selection of suitable sensing systems 

is still an open question. More importantly, the problems of data reception, 

reduction, formatting) processing) quality control and distribution on a 

mass-product~on, routine basis as a service to consuming users has not been 

faced. Collecting masses of data in an unclassified program (with attendant 

press-agentry) when the data cannot be explOited is not only wasteful, but likely 

to bring serious political consequences. 

D. Tne K~SA Act and legislative history currently seem to prevent NASA 

from being the lead agency in routine) service-oriented space activities. A 

pattern has been set in providing a launch service to the vleather Bureau and 

to COrSAT. Hmlever) these are "single" customers for a specific kind of space 

operation, and care is exercised to turn operations over to them when orbit , 

is achieved. In contrast the customers for space-gathered earth-resource informat:..on vlill be dramatically multiple. Common agreement as to which one should .... "operate" a satellite is ll.c'1likely. 

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E. Thel~e is a permanent censorship problem connected with spacegathered information. For example there is a constantly shifting pattern 

of more than 150 places in the U. S. over vhich aerial photography is prohibHed. In addition) strong and permanent safeguards must be provided to 

avoid diplon:atic or military embarrassment (or disaster) when foreign coverage 

is being accomplished. It is necessary to face the problem of provIding for 

a d.elicate and somewhat unpalatable censorship function. Hm-, does one operate 

a civil data-handling function "lvhich incorporates a highly visible--yet inaccessible--censoring activity? Such a function seems highly likely to drav 

publiC, press and Congressional fire. 

F. Among civil agencie s, the USGS iyould seem to have the beginning of 

a capability to receive and process earth resources data. However, it has 

the following draivbacks; 

a. Its charter limits its attention to the U. S. with rare exceptions, 

it has no background or experience in foreign entanglements. 

b. 'Vf.i.1ile there are some energetic and fon,ard-looking employees, its 

history of budgetary limitations has led to a slow, steady but stodgy environment) 

relatively inflexible and little adapted to rapid change. 

c. Its total orientation is tov~rd TOOpS and cartographic photography_ 

Other sensing systems and surveillance for economic purposes are not its forte. 

G. TIle ESSA is a "headCLuarters 11 organization, not a capability. It has no 

suitable limbs with massive data-handling capability. 

H. The DOD and related organizations possess a collection of independent .... 

principalHies--namely the Al:f.lS) the ACIC) Jehe Navy Hycl:rographic Office and NPIC--

VThich possess collectively an appro:oriate data-processing capability at least - four years in advance and many times more capacious than any civil agency_ 

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~ Jl"<t. ~ JtJtLIJ-\'L hJ~)~UUNG WOr~~"HNG 

TI:"ey codd be elevated to a DOD level and centrally directed as a single 

or;::;ar'.izatio:1.--as opposed to an assemblage of treaty-states monitored by 

staff action--and constituted by Congress in a kind of Corps of Engineers 

mold. So arranged they may be able to handle a massive data flow as well 

as provide astute and unexposed management of the permanent censorship function. 

The National Security Council could require DOD to face up to the national 

problem. Then the roles-and-missions arguments likely to be advanced by the 

Army) Navy and Air Force may well be subordinated to the common 'Vlelfare--

provided that the aforementioned principalities--under clear charter--continue 

to provide nmpping and charting to the Services in an unimpaired way. 

I. There is rapidly increasing intelligence cO~~lli~ity interest in the 

status of agriculture (and other economic indicators) in the U.S.S.R.} the 

CHICOM areas and other "closed" countries. In the past this material has 

mostly been gleaned from statistical inforrr~tion published in the countries 

of concern. This is generally accurate since countries can neither make 

economic information secret nor afford to deceive themselves. However) aircraft or satellite collected information is increasingly interesting since 

routine statistics are: 

a. substantially out-of-date after collection) reduction and 

analysis. 

b. subject to sudden) D2.ssi ve falsifica tioD as an element 

of offensive strategy_ 

c. subject to selective falsification or deception in ways 

... difficult to detect if' the bull<;: of the data is true. 

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d. :10t available (or highly inaccurate) from the undeveloped 

cOlli'1tries. 

e. re~uiring the services of many analysts ror statistical data 

reduction and cross-verification. 

It is likely that the intelligence community will precipitate active programs 

of aircraft and satellite coverage for agricultural and economic reasons 

\·;hich are in advance or NASA programs both in schedule and in desired sensor 

perforrrance. This situation will give birth to IT~ny interesting possibilities 

in regard to NASA vs. civil user vs. intelligence community vs. militaryspace-program relationships. These situations may be adverse or beneficial 

depending upon the skill ,¥ith which they are manipulated. 

J. Tnere is a rapidly grOl.;ring cla~ue of persons or various levels or 

naivete in NASA and in potential users (eg ESSA) Interior) Corps or Engineers, 

Agriculture) who are exerting substantial and increasing pressure for some 

kind of earth-resources satellite program. It is essential to develop a program strategy which is simultaneously in the highest national interest and 

able to satisfy or control this clamour. 

K. It is not generally recognized by the above cla~ue that aircraft 

(at least one of U-2 capability) could supply data in quantities greatly in 

excess of the amounts they are prepared to handle at levels of ~uality in 

excess of any likely satellite returns. From scanty evidence) it seems that 

both the operations and the product from the two NASA aircraft in the Earth 

Resources program at Houston are oriented tOl·rard uuni versi ty doctoral thesis" .... 

kinds of results rather than orderly) regular and fre~uent generation of data 

- for corsilmers \'li tn problems other than research on their minds. 

s 

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~. There is an wlconfirmed report that the USSR) France and Zeiss 

al'e engaging in a joint program to orbit an unclassified camera payload 

,-lith resolutions somewhat in excess of that of photographs "Thich to date 

he.. ve been publically exposed. Problem: 

a. Let them pave the way by being first to open a Pandora r s box? 

b. Rush to beat them for international-face reasons? 

c. Ignore the whole affair and proceed at our own pace? 

III. BASIC SPACE PAYLOAD A}.TQ MISSION PROFILE STRA'l'EGIES 

A. Allm-l N!\SA and civil customers to launch payloads of any technically 

possible level-of-performance on any schedule within their ability to secure 

program and budget support outside the National Security structure. Ignore 

the possible complaints of other countries. 

Comment: Strong foreign complaint inevitable. Internationally 

ffiinc:..ed U. S. citizens i-lith no "security" commitment will press for international or U. N. control of earth orbiters. Ymjor damage to (or complete cessation of) satellite reconnaissance a likely outcome. Unacceptable alternative. -i 

J3. Program 'NP.8.4. launches for near-equatorial to avoid overflight of 

rrajor adversaries impose either no) or some; payload constraints. Negotiate 

with all overflowli countries for "permission" and/or delivery of data to them. 

Comment: Sets an adverse space-l.aw precedent in "negotiating overflight." Concluding negotiations with all overflown countries ivould take ten 

or u:ore ye"c-::::s. One USSR or China-oriented c01L'1try could stall the program. 

C. Under either no) or some) payload constraints program NASA launches - for near-equatorial orbit for the above reason. Negotiate agreements) ,vi th - several friendly countries. Provide neutral (or U.N.) observers to certify 

that operation over dissenting cOlliltries did not occur. 

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CO;Lilient: Sets an adverse space-law precedent in "negotiating 

overflight." P::.~ovides an opening gambit for those ~\'lho may wish to internationalize or force U.N. control of all space flight. 

D. Proceed on a course of "mUddling through" in the framework of ad hoc 

agreeil1ents amonG Governmental agencies (and of interproject conflic)ts) treating 

each problem of propriety; utility and diplomacy after it has arisen. 

Comment: Rapidly increasing operational and technical capabilities 

in space "plus the '\-rhat after Apollo" problems seem to indicate that this 

strategy can no longer be useful. 

E. Orbit either polar or near-equatorial payloads selected for a proGressing perforrr..ance capability with the initial launch being of substantially 

lOll photographic performance--possibly worse than 500 1 ground-resolved-distance. 

Other sensing payloads can be selected so as to produce scientifically useful 

results. The low photographic performance can be explained to the scientific 

and user comm'CL'lities as due to lead-time problems--and this may well be true. 

Or IMC Can be omitted and poorer film and lenses used since the best may not 

be commonly available. The initial mission may be hard to justify technically 

or operationally) but may be easily and completely justified as the opening move in 

a national strategy to actively test world readiness to accept space surveillance. 

Low performance is selected deliberatelY on the "safe" side so that objections 

arising from foreign countries are certain to be minimized. If such objections 

are minimal or nonexista.nt then a national policy decision (i.e. not scientific; 

technical or user requirement decisions which should be subordinate to the general .... -problem) can be "r..ade as to the SUitable :perforrr.ance level for the next launCh. 

A series of launches with :performance increaSing by steps will enable the U. S. ... 

to deterrr;ine vlorld readiness to accept open surveillance for economic purposes 

-,lith (sonieVlhat censored) data being supplied in finished form by U. S. government 

agencies. 

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l·l22::J.i·,hile) depe::J.ding upon intelligence comrrn.J.J'li ty requireme::1ts J essentially 

t11e same booster-space vehicle-payload combination could be in use with the 

cspability of the payload maximized rather than minimized through the use 

of better film, better lenses and IMC. 

IV. SPECIFIC PROGRill1 SUGGESTIONS 

A. Initiate regular a::J.d frequent coverage of relatively srnall, selected 

U. S. areas for agricultural and geologic purposes using existing U-2 and 

existing camera capabilities. The photographiC geometry will be relatively 

UYJ.sui table for some purpose s . HOvlever, the intention of the program is to 

load the civil users of such photography with a bulk of product fUl~nished as 

a service rather than as an input to a scientific investigation. This product 

will be better in resolution than Precursor-type photography. It is easy to 

develop supportable requirements for frequent U-2 coverage. Two examples 

a-mo::1g n-zny are (1) major-crop irrigatio::1 timing in the California Central 

Valley, and (2) Sierra sno\.;r-water resources measurement. The purpose of' this 

progra-C!l would be to furnish photography of higher resolution) more frequent 

and vell-timed coverage, and more square-miles-per-month than can be accommodated ... 

by the using agencies. Tl:1ey 'Ivould not have time for large quantities of satellite photography. The result will be that w~classified R~SA earth-resources 

satellite programs are neither killed nor over-supported. The cost of the U-2 

prog-:aca 1>Tould be limited to program management, aircraft operaJcional and data 

preparation costs, all of which should be minimal since the aircraft are currently 

active and have appropriate camera installations. .... 

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B . Cause a modi.fica tion to the current Precurs or program as called 

out in the present Viork statement by arranging the following course of 

events: 

1. 'I'he contending contractors--i. e. LMSC and GE--ivill furnish a 

responsive and no more than military SECRET (checked-,vith-R. Ford-in-advance) 

proposal to NJ'I.SA. : 

2. Our company in any event "Till furnish a closely held) Special 

Handling version of the Precursor program to 4C1000 vlith no other distribution. 

satellite 

It w~ll tie in the U-2 aspects; describe theA payloads and their launch-by-launch 

"development" along the "launch-a-poor-one-first" ratiorale; and a conceptual 

desc:i:'iption of a potential classified spacecraft/payload configurat:Lon for 

possible intelligence commwlity use. Our version of the latter would use 

Program 846 hardware and techniques) and would differ from the wlclassified 

PreCUl~sor rr~inly in that STF command) control and telemetry would be substituted 

for KA&~ range and operational equipment and technique. Aside from minor planeffort--and possibly costs connected v1ith improved payload versions--the 

S:;.::;ecial Y.candling prog-ram is largely "free" (until deciSion is made to launch) 

since ICc6,.SA ivould be paying for the camera development. Booster) vehicle and 

operating cost iv-ould then be essentially the same as a reg'Ll-lar Program 846 launch. 

=".: otLer ,{Drds this can be a stand-by system-in-being at very low cost, ready 

-tor quick use Ll the event that an approved i.ntelligence reQuirement develops. 

?robably the unclassified N~SA Precursor would be handled by a company Program 

Of£'ice wor-King ,lith NJ'I.&Il,., .1hile the special uccess program would be a task of 

the Program 846 office functioning in essentially their normal mode. These 

activi ties i'Tou~d be lirJ~ed only by higher level rnanagement personnel ivith special 

access,in accordance with DOD plans and progr-am supervision which integrates V\ 

both activities. Given norrrzi pr-ecautions and vehicle and payload contractors 

vTith a depth of Special Program experience) it appears that the D~,SA program 

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.... 

.... 
"(wuld provid.e excellee:.1t :rcover f1 for the Special program. 

3. A potential sid.e benefit of the U-2 program would be the possibility 

of extensive tes'~ and experience ';lith the satellite camera system prior to space 

use. It ,wuld also provide the user with the desired geometry even though the 

altitud.es are different. 

4. Both '\lhite" and "black" sides may try to "wish" the data procesSing and censorship problem avTay for a fev years. Nevertheless it is almost upon 

us. Conside:ring the potential importance of economic information about unfriend-

~~ ~; 

lies or inaccessibles to the intelligence c~mn~~ity (as well as censorship) it 

;'{;. 

seems to me that DOD (DIc'\?) should step up;..the problem. A massive r0les-andl"Jissions argum.ent is unnecessary. The melding (both in the pinochle and regular 

senses) of PJ.v.tS) ACrC) etc. can be done for straightforvrard military reasons. 

It can accidentally be discovered later that this organization is ideally suited 

for the routine (i.e.) not scientific-exploratory) production of civil earth 

orbiting data. 

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