Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 89

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION II

No. E-22-586

STEPHANIE MORGAN

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE 

SERVICES

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered February 7, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS 

BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. 2022-BR-01030]

REVERSED AND REMANDED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

In this unbriefed employment-security case, Stephanie Morgan appeals the Board of 

Review’s determination that she is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits under 

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-507(3)(A) (Supp. 2023) beginning November 28, 

2021, and continuing. The Board adopted the decision of the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, 

which found that Morgan was not able to perform suitable work. We reverse and remand. 

The Employment Security Department denied benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code 

Annotated section 11-10-507(3)(A), which requires that a person be unemployed, physically

and mentally able to perform suitable work, available for such work, and doing things that a 

reasonably prudent individual would be expected to do to secure work before being entitled 

to employment security benefits. 

At the telephone conference before the Arkansas Appeal Tribunal, Morgan testified 
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that she was taking care of her disabled grandson, and while she could not begin working on 

June 2, 2021, because she was getting him situated, by the date of the hearing, he was in 

school from about 7:30 a.m. until about 3:30 p.m., and she was looking for work that would 

let her work during those hours. 

The Tribunal reasoned that because the grandson iscompletely disabled, and Morgan 

was providing care for him, that she was not able to perform suitable work. The inference 

from the evidence is unreasonable.

We affirm the decision of the Board of Review if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. Billings v. Dir., 84 Ark. App. 79, 133 S.W.3d 399 (2003). Substantial evidence is 

such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. Id. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light of 

the Board’s findings. Id. Like a jury, an administrative body is free to accept or reject the 

testimony of witnesses. Gunter v. Dir., 82 Ark. App. 346, 107 S.W.3d 902 (2003). Even if the 

evidence could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board could 

have reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Billings, supra.

The Board’s finding that Morgan was unavailable for work was based on her status as 

a caretaker for her grandson but ignores entirely that the grandson was in school eight hours 

a day. However, just because Morgan was unable to work for her previous employer (who 

required employees to work in eleven-hour shifts) does not mean that she was unavailable 

for any work at all. 

Our case law supports the general principle that a reduction in the amount of work 
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available to a claimant is insufficient reason to find that the claimant is unavailable to work. 

Buchanan v. Dir. 91 Ark. App. 35, 37, 207 S.W.3d 567, 569 (2005). In Hefton v. Daniels, 270 

Ark. 857, 606 S.W.2d 379 (Ark. App. 1980), we reversed the Board of Review and held that 

a claimant—who was not highly skilled, lived in an area where work available for her was 

sparse, and had transportation but could not relocate unless the job paid at least four dollars 

an hour—was not unavailable to work. And in Buchanan, 91 Ark. App. at 37, 207 S.W.3d at

568–69, we held that a lack of a driver’s license does not, standing alone, constitute 

unavailability. Similarly, just because Morgan is limited to the roughly eight hours a day her 

grandson is in school does not mean that she is unavailable to work under employment 

security law.

As we explained in Buchanan, there might be times that claimants are in positions 

“where the amount of employment available to them is severely limited due to some general 

inability,” but as long as there exists employment that can reasonably fit within the scope of 

that limitation, those claimants are available to work. See generally id. 

Reversed and remanded. 

BARRETT and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree. 

Stephanie Morgan, pro se appellant.

Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.