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II . 

CONVERTIBILITY IN THE MOL PROGRAM 

MOL Progx im Office 

Office of the Secretary of the Mr Force 

The Pentagon 

Washington; D. C. 

27 April 1967 

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CONTENTS 

Page 

SUMMARY 3 

I. INTRODUCTION 6 

The Genesis of Convertibility 7 

A Fundamental Definition 7 

Why Convert? 8 

How to Convert 11 

The Decision Problem 13 

II., BASELINE CONVERTIBILITY 15 

Module Differences 15 

The Conversion Problem 17 

Conversion Before LM Assembly 18 

Modification 20 

Substitution . 24 

Dual Countdown 28 

III. CONCLUSIONS 31 

IV. RECONMEEDATIONS 

V. •GLOSSAE( 

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SUMMARY 

The purpose of this paper is to examine convertibility in'the 

MOL program; convertibility being defined as the capability to change 

any given flight from the manned mode to the unmanned configuration, 

or vice versa. The discussion addresses conversion in both the sevenflight baseline program and in any follow-on "operational" program. The 

analysis determines the perspective in which conversion is to be treated, 

and postulates several factors motivating the decision-maker to make a 

conversion. These factors are categorized as political, vulnerability, 

technical difficulties and biomedical. 

Conversion of the flight mode can be accomplished either by modification or substitution of hardware. The cost, time and technical. 

ramifications of converting through either method relate to each other, 

and to the reason for converting, in a decision problem that can be 

quantified and predicted to a fairly high confidence level. 

The detailed analysis of conversion options shows that the differences 

between the manned and unmanned versions of the MOL vehicle are the use 

of either a Gemini B capsule or the Automatic Support Module, in certain 

installed equipment in the Laboratory Module, and in certain minor Titan IIIM 

features. The Mission Module is identical in either case. Four options 

for conversion are: 

- Early Conversion. Accomplished prior to Lab Module 

Assembly. Must be initiated at least 14 months before 

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scheduled launch (no launch delay). Requires Lab Module 

components and both Gemini B and Automatic Support 

Module availability. The cost of a conversion capability 

for flight 6 or 7 is $20.5M above baseline. Long 

decision lead time is the major disadvantage. 

- Modification. Could be accomplished on Lab Module up 

to 51/2 months before launch with no launch delay. Requires 

alternate Gemini B/Automatic Support Module availability. 

The Lab Module must be fabricated in the manned configuration; modification to the unmanned configuration 

requires extensive overtime and shortened tests wherever 

possible. The baseline cost increment for flight 6 or 7 

conversion capability is $54.3M. The cost of launching 

flight 6 or 7 in the unmanned configuration is $35.8M 

above baseline. 

- Substitution. Could be accomplished up to 52 months 

before launch with no launch delay if Gemini B/Lab Module 

combination is substituted. If Gemini B/Lab Module/Mission 

Module combination is substituted, change can be made as 

close as 50 days before launch with no launch delay; 

however, this combination is not feasible for flights 6 

and 7 because of mission payload production rate restriction. 

Cost of first variation for flight 6 or 7 is $68.5M above baseline. 

- Dual Countdown. By using second launch pad and counting 

down two vehicles (one manned, one unmanned), conversion 

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could be accomplished up to just before liftoff. 

However, not feasible for flight 6 or 7 because additional 

mission payloads cannot be produced. Cost for such a 

capability for follow-on flights is $235.7M. 

The early conversion option is not recommended due to the long 

decision lead time required (minimum 14 months). The dual countdown 

method is not feasible for flights 6 and 7. For follow-on flights, 

the high cost makes this option unattractive. The Gemini B/Lab Module 

substitution option is selected as most advantageous because of less 

technical impact, less nonrecoverable costs and more decision 

flexibility. 

Recommendations are made to incorporate into the baseline program 

a conversion capability for flights 6 and 7 (unmanned to manned), using 

the substitution method. Initial funding of $2.0 million required 

• in FY 69 can be absorbed in the present baseline funding structure. 

FY 70 funding for conversion can be included in folloW-on program 

funding. 

Decisions required are: 

1) To provide a.conversion capability for baseline flights 

6 and.7 by use of the substitution option. 

2) To commence funding in FY 70 a follow-on program phased 

to provide substitute modules. 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

This paper examines the proposition that at some future point 

in time it may be necessary to convert MOL flights from the manned 

mode to the unmanned mode, and vice versa. Flight configuration 

changes in this frame of reference are envisioned as becoming necessary 

for reasons or circumstances unpredictable at the time the original 

configurations were established. The ability of the program to make 

conversions in this sense is termed convertibility. 

The dual-mode nature of the MOL program, wherein both manned and 

unmanned configurations are included in the development effort, not 

only gives birth to the possibility for conversion, but it also creates 

a decision problem if conversion options are a real consideration. The 

purpose of this paper, then, is to derive an appropriate perspective 

for MOL convertibility as it is influenced by both the decision problem 

and the substance of the MOL program as it is known today. 

The terms of reference for the perspective are developed first in 

the paper by means of generalized discussion. The substance of the 

problem introduced by the baseline MOL program is next presented; 

followed by an examination of several conversion options. Based on the 

perspective developed and the realities of the feasible alternatives, 

conclusions and recommendations are then set forth. A glossary of terms 

and abbreviations is included. 

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The Genesis of Convertibility 

The dual-modality of the MOL Program can be traced to concerns 

expressed early in the planning and definition of the program, wherein 

instances were envisioned in which reconnaissance activity by MOL would 

be either impossible or imprudent if man was present in the satellite. 

The capability for flying the DORIAN payload in an unmanned mode was 

therefore desired as a hedge against political obstacles to manned 

satellite reconnaissance. The unmanned MOL configuration was also 

viewed, to a lesser degree, as insurance in case man proved incapable 

of effectively performing the full 30-day MOL mission.. A third justification given for the unmanned version of MOL was the belief that, once 

developed and proven, it could eventivOly complement the manned system 

by performing. the more routine reconnaissance missions. 

Thus, the MOL program was proposed and approved on the basis that 

there would be developed in parallel, with equal emphasis, both manned 

and unmanned configurations. The objective was, of course, to develop• 

one system which could be used in either mode with a minimum of conversion 

effort. 

A Fundamental Definition 

Based on the original rationale for development of both manned and 

unmanned versions of MOL,. and with due regard for the existing technical 

characteristics of the program, a fundamental definition of convertibility 

can and should be:stated. 

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Convertibility, in terms of the MOL program, is defined as being 

the ability to change (at some time prior to launch) the mode of a 

flight from manned to unmanned, or vice versa. Program planning shifts 

resulting in particular flights being switched from one mode to the 

other are excluded from this definition as long as such planning 

exercises do not involve hardware already in production. The focus 

of meaning in this definition is on "change...a flight ...1" which, 

as described further below, basically involves either modification, 

substitution, or some combination thereof. 

Why Convert? 

The.fundamental reasons for having two flight modes in the MOL 

program (i.e., manned and unmanned) are equally applicable as reasons 

for converting a flight after one particular mode has been established 

in the program planning. 

At the same time the different reasons for conversion are an essential 

part of the total decision problem. The inseparability of the conversion 

motivation from other considerations is due to the fact that there are 

varying degrees of concern associated with the different arguments for 

conversion, and each reason has a time scale in which the concern may 

range from mild interest to urgent demand. Thus the degree of necessity 

and the time element are two major factors influencing planning for 

conversion capabilities and any subsequent exercise of the option. 

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Political 

The most probable reason for wanting to convert a flight from 

manned to unmanned is•fear of domestic or international reaction to 

overflight of a foreign country by one of our manned military satellites. 

While it is true that reconnaissance satellites are routinely employed 

by both sides today, the tacit international accommodation of unmanned 

reconnaissance vehicles may not be extended to manned activities of 

this sort. On this basis, and particularly in times of greater 

international instability, one can imagine circumstances wherein the 

interests of the United States would best be served by removing man 

from a.particular moll, flight. 

Vulnerability 

An extension of the political motivation described above, but which 

involves more extreme reaction by a foreign country, is the case in which 

active countermeasures might be employed against an MOL flight. A 

hostile nation, knowing or strongly suspecting that MOL is designed to 

accomplish reconnaissance activities, might be provoked into taking some 

overt action to negate MOLts capability. At any such time that we, 

in turn, believe that countermeasures against an MOL flight are a potential 

threat, there would undoubtedly be extreme pressure to remove the crew. 

Technical Difficulties 

This category is predicated on the historical pattern of unforeseen 

development difficulties inherent in any complex technical development 

program -- possibly even more prevelant in space systems, where man is an 

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integral link in the total system. The recent Apollo disaster, as 

unfortunate as the case may be, represents a vivid example of what 

can happen. In the context of this discussion of convertibility, 

any reasonable doubt as to the safety of the crew would undoubtedly 

produce a decision to hold in abeyance any manned flights. If in the 

same instance there existed an extreme need for intelligence information obtainable only with the DORIAN payload, there would certainly 

be motivation for conversion. 

Motivation of this kind is not limited to conversion in the 

manned-to-unmanned direction. Success of the unmanned configuration is 

based toa. large extent on adequate performance of certain automatic 

devices. Any development difficulties with these devices, all other 

system elements being qualified for flight, could produce a desire to 

fly the system manned with man functioning as a trouble-shooter, repairman and even as a manual override capability (if necessary). The 

specific examples of equipment troubles that could spell failure for an 

unmanned flight are numerous and somewhat obvious, and need not be 

detailed. But the rationale for considering conversion from unmanned 

to manned is supported by the possibilities of equipment problems, and 

in fact, such thinking contributed to the approval of a manned satellite 

reconnaissance program in the first place. 

Biomedical 

• A final case for conversion motivation concerns the possibility that 

man may prove to be unable to perform in the MOL environment for the 

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mission durations desired. Although this possibility is for the most 

part discounted, there will not be proof until manned missions achieve 

the 3-4 week times on orbit. Again, with sufficient urgency attached 

to the need for the DORIAN photographs, there would arise considerable 

pressure for proceeding with unmanned versions of MDL. 

How to Convert 

The generalized definition of convertibility set forth earlier 

provides a basis for describing the several ways in which a particular 

MOL flight might be converted to the opposite mode -- manned or 

unmanned, whichever the case might be. In the following delineation 

of methods no attempt has been made to reduce the number of possibilities 

to one or two optimum alternatives. The objective at this point is to 

identify rational courses of action, with subsequent discussion serving 

to point out the merits and disadvantages of each.. 

1) In the first case a particular vehicle is assigned to a 

specific flight, and a decision is made to change the flight mode. If 

the decision is made early enough, the configuration of the vehicle 

allocated to that flight could be changed by re-arranging delivery dates 

for components that are peculiar to the newly assigned flight mode. 

This conversion mode would probably involve the least expense of any 

conversion method, but it requires maximum time before launch for a 

change decision. 

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2) In the second case, vehicle assembly has progressed to 

the point where portions would actually have to be modified upon 

receipt of conversion notification if the same vehicle is to be used 

for the particular flight. A kit of peculiar parts would presumably 

be on hand to accomplish the modification. Some systems or integrated 

tests might have to be repeated, depending on the stage of vehicle 

production reached. 

3) The vehicle configuration for a particular flight could 

also be changed by substitution of mode-peculiar modules. The extent 

of launch date impact for the flight would depend on the amount of 

integrated testing that would have to be repeated (assuming alternate 

modules were on hand in some comparable stage. of readiness). Modules 

involved in this case are the Gemini, support Nodule, and Lab Nodule'--

the mission Module and Titan booster being essentially identical whether 

the flight is manned or unmanned.. The module substitution could even 

be accomplished at the launch site, if an integrated set of modules 

(including the Mission Module) was made available on a contingency 

planning basis. 

4) A final and somewhat extreme method for achieving convertibility 

would be to have two launch pads with both kinds of vehicles in parallel 

readiness. The decision-maker could then choose the launch pad (and 

vehicle mounted thereon) which suited the conditions influencing his decision. 

The above description of methods addresses the basic techniques, but 

of course there are combinations and permutations that might optimize 

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conversion advantages and effects one way or another. However, any 

conversion method that might be devised, within the bounds of the 

fundamental definition of convertibility, is bound to involve time, 

money and vehicle system considerations. The combination of these 

considerations with the motivations for making flight modal changes 

produces a decision problem varying in complexity and difficulty. The 

underlying assumption of this paper is that appropriate program planning 

now can ease the problem for the decision-maker in the future. 

The Decision Problem 

The discussion thus far has addressed the need for thinking about 

convertibility, what it means, the different reasons that may motivate 

the decision-maker to exercise a conversion capability, and finally, 

how it might be accomplished. The section that follows attempts to 

relate these factors one to another such that the decision problem is 

defined. With a factorial definition of the influences on such a decision, 

the quantitative and qualitative assessments of where we stand and what 

we can do will take on more meaning. 

The primary elements of the problem are motivation, time, money 

and hardware features that exist. The relationship of these variables 

is such that: 

1) The cost of a decision to convert is inversely proportional 

to the amount of time from the decision to the planned or desired launch 

date. This is to say that more decision lead time, results in less cost 

to convert. 

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2). The degree of certainty in the motivation to convert will 

usually be inversely proportional to the amount of time before launch. 

That is, the longer the, time before launch the less certainty there will 

be in the need to convert. 

3) The direct cost of conversion (disregarding increased costs 

resulting from extension of total program time) is inversely proportional 

to the amount of launch delay that is acceptable. In essence, this means 

that acceptance of greater launch date slippages will tend to reduce 

the cost of converting. 

The decision-maker must simultaneously consider the cost of 

conversion, the strength of his belief that conversion is necessary or 

prudent, the safety of the crew and the probability of mission success, 

the acceptability of launch delay, and how long he can wait before making 

a decision. The flexibility that the decision-maker desires, In terms 

of integrating these factors into .a course of action, will establish 

the conversion features to be embodied in the dual-mode MEM program. 

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It. BASELINE CONVERTIBILITY 

Turning now from the generalized treatment of convertibility, the 

examination of the proposition focuses on the hard realities of-hardware, 

costs and schedules. 

As was stated earlier, the dual-modality of the current baseline 

MOL program involves two separate and distinct Orbiting Vehicle (OV) 

configurations. The manned version, or the Manned Automatic Mode (MAM), 

consists of a Mission Module (MM), a Laboratory Module (LM) equipped for 

manned operation, and a Gemini B capsule. The unmanned configuration, 

identified as the Automatic Mode (AM) consists of an MM, an LM operable 

without man aboard, and an Automatic Support Module (ASM) which replaces 

the Gemini B. 

Module Differences 

Major differences between the two configurations are summarized 

below and are shown in Figure 1. 

Mission Module 

Identical MM's are used in both the MAM and AM configuration so 

the same MM can be used for either type of flight. 

Lab Module 

In the MAM LM there are about 1000 pounds of major components and 

subsystems, required for manned operation, which are deleted in the AM 

configuration. Included in this category are the GE panels, DRV and 

launch tube, Acquisition,and Tracking Scope, transfer tunnel and the 

transfer tunnel hatch in the forward bulkhead. In the AM configuration, 

a film chute, GE and EKC electronics and wiring harnesses are added and 

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the MAM transfer tunnel hatch is replaced by one which has a film chute 

seal. In addition, provisions are made for interfaces with the 

expendables that will be carried in the extended lifetime configuration 

ASM. 

Gemini B and ASM 

The Gemini B and ASM serve entirely different functions and are 

therefore completely different. Conversion of a vehicle from one 

mode to the other obviously requires interchange• of these two modules. 

The Conversion Problem 

Each vehicle in the MOL baseline program has been ordered in a 

specific configuration -- either MAM or AN. In order to provide a 

convertibility capability in the MOL baseline vehicles as currently 

designee, it would be necessary to either (1) procure in advance a 

preplanned additional complement of hardware that can be used to modify 

the configuration of each vehicle, or (2) procure substitute system 

modules with properly phased lead times so that appropriate modules 

are available in both configurations for a particular launch. No such 

spare hardware or substitute modules are now being procured, so the 

current MOL baseline program has no convertibility capability. 

Earlier in the program, a "kit" approach was included in the 

baseline so that the LM. could be converted by modification. However, 

this capability was eliminated during a cost reduction exercise in 

September 1966. 

As previously indicated, the capability to convert a particular 

flight might be achieved in a number of ways. In all approaches to 

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convertibility it is necessary to procure both a Gemini B and an ASM 

since they are completely different. As stated earlier no additional 

procurement or modification of the MM is required. Although the two 

types of LM's are different, there is sufficient hardware commonality 

between the MAM and AM configurations so that modification is feasible. 

Therefore, the LM is the one module in the OV that is susceptible to 

both approaches to convertibility. 

In following sections the various methods .of.achieving 

convertibility are discussed in some detail, together with funding 

and schedule implications and the pros and cons of each approach. 

Convertibility is considered both for flights 6 and 7 of the current 

baseline program, and for a follow-on operational. program. Convertibility is not considered for baseline flights 3, 4, and 5 in view of 

the relatively low probability that conversion will be desired -- and 

also because of the immediate, serious impact on program funding if 

convertibility were to be incorporated on the early flights. 

Conversion Before LM Assembly 

Applicable Period 

From T-26 months (LM order lead time) to T-14 months (assembly of 

LM components into the birdcage, i.e., the internal framework for the 

LM pressurized section) with no launch delay. 

Method 

LM components peculiar to each configuration are ordered so as 

to be available for assembly in the desired configuration. This 

method could be used without preordering peculiar components but this 
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would cause a launch delay depending upon the elapsed. lead time. 

Available spare parts and/or overtime could be used to minimize 

slippage or, if there is a mixed configuration follow-on program, 

delivery of components for subsequent vehicles could be expedited. Upon 

completion, the LM would be mated with appropriate modules and launched 

in the desired configuration. 

Cost Impact 

The cost of ordering peculiar MAM LM components for flights 6 

and/or .7 has not been precisely estimated. This would, however, be the 

least expensive approach to convertibility because it involves no 

disassembly and reassembly of LM components. Since this method requires 

the maximum time before launch for a change decision (14 months minimum),. 

it does not cover most of the situations in which a conversion capability 

might be needed. 

For this approach, it would be necessary to procure both an 

ASM ($4.0M) and a Gemini B ($20.0K) for each flight. In addition, funding' 

of the extra $0.5M required for a TIIIM manned flight must be planned. 

Thus for flight 6 or 7 a funding increment of $20.'5M over the current 

baseline must be provided. For a mixed configuration follow-on program, 

additional Gemini B's would not be required, as long as one remains 

in the inventory. However, delivery of Gemini B's would have to be 

expedited so as to be available at the same time as the AM configured 

modules. 

Discussion 

This option does not provide a realistic usable conversion 

capability because of the long lead time necessary for a change decision. 

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Modification 

Applicable Period 

Up to T-51/2 months (LM/MM mate) with no launch slip if extensive 

overtime is used and the test flow is expedited to the maximum extent. 

Beyond T-5k months, all of the lost time cannot be made up through the 

use of overtime. 

Method 

Basically, this option involves recycling the LM in the production 

and test flow for modification to the desired configuration, using a 

pre-purchased complementof peculiar components. After modification 

to the alternate configuration, the LM is mated with other appropriate 

• modules and proceeds through the remaining test flow to launch. 

The principal differences between the MAM and AM configurations, 

as shown in Figure 1 and discussed earlier, result in the deletion of 

;bout 1000 pounds of MAM-peculiar equipment when modifying to the AM 

.configuration, plus the addition of a few AM-peculiar items. 

Consequently, for. this option the LM must be assembled in the MAM 

configuration since it would be prohibitively expensive in both time 

and money to recycle'an AM configured LM for the addition of MAM-peculiar 

components. Upon deciding to convert, as much MAM-peculiar equipment 

as possible would be removed, a pre-purchased "kit".of AM-peculiar 

equipment would be installed, and the LM would then be tested in the 

new configuration. 

At T-103 months, the "birdcage" loaded with equipment, is installed 

in the pressurized section and the forward bulkhead is welded in place. 

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Subsequent to this step the only access to the LM pressurized section 

is through the two hatches. Although the MAM-peculiar components are 

sized.so that they can be removed through the DRV hatch, the job. of . 

removing equipment without removing the welded bulkhead is considerably 

more complex and time consuming than it is prior to '110 months. 

Cost Impact 

For flight 6 or 7 the baseline cost increment is $54,3M, as shown . 

in Table 1. For this option, $9.0M of nonrecurring costs are required 

for planning, tooling and equipment necessary for modification. Adding 

this cost to those for MAM-peculiar hardware (most of which is not 

recoverable), and for dual planning of HAM and AM operations for a 

. specific launch produces a nonrecoverable incremental cost of $21.3M 

which is expended whether :a flight is configured AM or MAM. 

In this option, positive action is required to convert the 

MAM-configured LM to the AM configuration. The estimate for modification 

labor and repeat of checkOut in the AM configuration is $16.0M (which 

is a baseline cost increment). Thus, an additional $35.8M over current 

baseline costs must be spent for flight 6 or 7 if launched in the AM 

configuration. .The recurring increment to the baseline cost for each 

such flight is $26.8M. <Table 2) 

.Discussion 

There are a number of disadvantages to this method of achieving 

convertibility. The prinCipal disadvantage results from the fact that 

the LM for flights 6 and/or 7 must be fabricated in the MAM configuration although, in the baseline program these launches are planned to 

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erations Costs 

ModificationCosts 
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

NROAPPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 

be in the AM configuration. Thus, in order to launch in the planned 

AM mode, an "emergency" type operation has to be undertaken to modify 

the LM to the AM configuration. This increases the cost of launching 

flight 6 or 7 in the AM'mode to $35.8M more than the current baseline 

cost (Table 2). Of this amount $26.8M is a recurring increment to 

the baseline cost for each such flight. 

In effect, an expensive "emergency" type modification of the LM 

is required when the option to.change a flight from the planned AM 

mode to MAM is not exercised. A "crash" effort of this type, which 

involves extensive overtime and shortened rechecks and tests wherever 

possible, tends to degrade vehicle reliability. 

In summary, this conversion method gives rise to a program that 

is always in a state of expensive chaos. Although the baseline 

incremental cost is less. than some of the other methods considered, 

much of the increased funding is recurring and nonrecoverable. 

Substitution 

In this method, the only modules which require substitution are 

the ASM/Gemini B and the MAM and AM configured LM's. Although the MM 

is identical for both modes, use of a substitute MM integrated with. 

the other appropriate substitute modules will reduce the time before 

launch when a conversion decision can be made without causing a 

schedule slip. A special case of substitution, dual countdown, will 

be discussed in a separate section. 

Gemini B/LM Substitution 

'Applicable Period --.Up to T-5k months (LM/MM mate) with no launch 

DORIAN 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

CONTROL: SYSTEM ONLY 

Page 24 of 38 pages 

• Copy -47( of 6 copies 

SAF-SL BYE 21136-67 

t. • 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

-SE : 64i-E-T- HANDLE VIA EYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 

slip. Beyond T-52 months, the planned configuration LM would have to be 

demated from the MM, the desired LM mated and the test flow resumed at 

LM/MM mate. There would be at least a day-for-day slip, although overtime could reduce the slippage if sufficient urgency existed. 

Method -- For flight 6 or 7, a spare MAM LM must be fabricated 

and checked out so as to be available for the scheduled LM/MM mate. 

Both the MAN and AM LM's are carried through their test flows, and at 

LM/MM mate a decision can be made as to the desired configuration. For 

a continuing, mixed configuration follow-on program, additional LM's 

would not be required as long as LM delivery dates were planned so 

that both configurations were available for each flight. 

Cost Impact -- For flight 6 or 7, the cost increment over baseline 

funding is $68.5M, as shown in Table 3, if the conversion decision is 

made no later than T-5 months. In addition to nonrecurring costs of 

$11.0M for engineering planning and labor for increased production, 

$2.5M recurring nonrecoverable funds are required per launch --$2.0M 

for dual planning for both MAM and AM operations, and $0.5M for TIIIM 

hardware for the Gemini B and crew interfaces. The hardware and effort 

represented by the remaining dollars are expended only if the flight is 

converted to MAM; otherwise it is available for subsequent MAM flights. 

If a conversion decision is made after T-53/4 months, additional costs 

would be incurred to cycle back to LM/MM mate. The baseline incremental 

cost is almost doubled ($126.0M) if a conversion Capability is provided 

for both flights 6 and 7. For a continuing, mixed configuration follow-on 

program, the only additional recurring nonrecoverable cost would be 

DORIAN 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 'ONLY 

Page 25 of 38 pages 

Copy 4 of 6 copies 

SAP-SL BYE 21136-67 

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6 OR 7 ANDFLIGHTS 

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HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

NRO APPROVED FOR CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

$2.5M per flight for dual operations planning and TIIIM/Gemini B 

interface hardware. However, production funds must be phased earlier 

. to provide both configurations for each flight. 

Discussion -- In the existing LM production and checkout 

facilities, there are two critical areas -- LM final assembly and LM 

checkout. For this reason, care must be taken to phase additional 

substitute LM's so as to not overtax the capability.of these areas. • 

An examination of the current baseline production flow shows that two 

substitute LM's (for flights 6 and 7) can be accommodated, although one 

of these must be produced in advance of the need date unless additional 

production facilities are provided. Additional facilities are not 

considered to be justifiable on this basis. Similar care must be 

taken in phasing delivery of LM's for a follow-ion program. 

Gemini B/LM/MM Substitution 

Applicable Period -- Up to T-50 days (OV/TIIIM structural mate 

at VAFB) with no launch slip. Beyond T-50 days, the planned configuration would have to be demated and the desired OV mated with the TIIIM. 

,This would essentially cause a day-for-day slip, although overtime 

could reduce the slippage to some extent. 

Method -- This method is not feasible for flights 6 and/or 7, and 

is probably not feasible for near-term follow-on flights since the 

maximum delivery rate for the mission payload during this period is 

four per year. Additional effort and funding would probably be 

required to increase this production rate for follow-on flights. However, 

if mission payload production were increased, OV's in both configurations 

DORIAN Page 27 of 38 pages 

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HANDLE VIA BYEMAN SAF-SL BYE 21136-67 

CONTROL SYSTEM .ONLY - 
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CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 

SECRET NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

could be procured and made available at VAFB for the scheduled 

structural mate with the TIIIM, at which time a decision could be made 

as to the desired configuration. It is feasible to delay the decision 

to this point in time since little more than receipt and inspection is 

done to the OV modules At VAFB prior to mating with the TIITM and 

conducting the integrated system test. 

Cost Impact -- For a.follow-on program the cost impact would 

be essentially the same as xlescribed for Gemini B/LM substitution. 

However, since both configurations are taken considerably further 

through the test flow, more of the programmed test flow dollars for 

both configurations would, be expended. Consequently, some additional 

funds would probably be required for rechecking the unused configure- 

. 

tion prior to using it lor a subsequent flight. 

Discussion CommentS relative to Gemini B/LM substitution are 

also pertinent to this option. In addition, the serious problem of 

increasing mission payload production must be considered in any 

decision involving this method of achieving convertibility. 

Dual Countdown 

Applicable Period 

Up to just before lift-off with no launch delay. 

Method 

This method is not feasible for flights 6 and/or 7, nor for early 

follow-on flights because of the maximum mission payload delivery rate 

of four per year. For later follow-on flights, an additional launch 

stand must be constructed so that two differently configured Flight 

DORIAN 

. • 

Page 28 of 38 pages 

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SAF-SL BYE 21136-67 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM .ONLY • 8ECR ET 
HANDLE VIA DILIrrnnt 

CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY CEOEIET . 

NRO APPROVED. FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

Vehicles (FV) are counted down simultaneously. A decision can be made 

up to just before lift off as to which configuration is launched. 

With respect to facilities, only a new launch stand, together 

with an additional set of ASM/LM/MM/TIIIM AGE is required for this 

method since all of the other facilities can handle a dual countdown. 

For a continuing, mixed Configuration follow-on program, FV deliveries 

would have to be planned so that both configurations are available 

for a flight. 

Cost. Impact 

If additional mission payloads could be made available for 

flights 6 or 7, the baseiine'cost increment for this method, as shown 

in Table 4, would be $235.7M. Of this amount, $118.0M is required 

for launch stand construction and additional AGE. In addition to these 

facility costs, other nonrecoverable costs are required for engineering 

.planning and labor for increased LM production and the countdown of 

two vehicles simultaneously. For a mixed configuration follow-on 

program, the additional nonrecoverable cost would be the same. Furthermore, production funds would have to be phased earlier to provide both 

vehicle configurations for each flight. 

Discussion 

Although thii option offers the ultimate in capability to change 

the configuration of a mission, the large initial investment cost for 

an additional launch stand makes this option very unattractive, 

unless it is extremely important that a conversion capability be 

available up to just before lift-off. 

DORIAN Page 29 of 38 pages 

Copy 44 of 6 copies 

SAF-SL BYE 21136-67 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

CeNtROL SYSTEM :ONLY. 
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HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

NRO APPROVED FOR aui ET CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY. 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

III. CONCLUSIONS 

The baseline cost increments for the four methods considered are 

compared in Table 5. The "conversion before LM assembly" method is 

the least expensive alternative, but it is not responsive to a real 

need for convertibility because a decision is required so far in 

advance of the launch date. The dual countdown method is discarded 

because it is not feasible for either flights 6 and 7 or any early 

follow-on flights. Even if additional payloads become available 

further out in the future, this method is still unattractive because 

of the large initial investment required for an additional launch stand. 

Elimination of these two alternatives leaves modification and 

substitution as the competitive methods. The baseline incremental cost 

for flight 6 or 7 using the substitution method is $14.2M more than the 

baseline cost increment for modification. If there is to be no 

follow-on program, modification would be the desired option, based 

solely on this cost differential. However, modification requires 

considerable nonrecoverable funds and inherently degrades reliability. 

In addition, this method requires early funding for modification 

planning, tooling and equipment. 

The substitution method (Gemini B/LM.substitution) offers the same 

decision leadtime (with no slip in launch date) as does the modification 

alternative. Although the substitution method baseline cost impact is 

greater,the funds expended on any particular flight are less, since 

this method inolves only $2.5M of recurring, nonrecoverable funds. 

DORIAN 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN • 

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SAF-SL BYE 21136-67 
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NRO APPROVED FOR 

SECRET CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

RELEASE t JULY 2015 

Substitution is clearly the superior method for achieving convertibility 

for flights 6 and/or 7 and for follow-on flights. 

A substitution capability for either flight 6 or 7, and a similar 

capability for the case covering both flights, can be achieved with no 

cost impact on the baseline program, if'there is a mixed configuration 

follow-on program. This can be done by ordering manned LM's for the 

follow-on program sufficiently early so that they will be available 

for flights 6 and/or 7. The FY funding breakout for this approach 

(using a flight schedule incorporating a 12 month slip; i.e., flight 6 

in November 1971) is shown in. Table 6. 

The FY 69 funding required for this capability (for engineering 

planning associated with increased hardware production) amounts to 

only $2.0M. These funds could undoubtedly be absorbed in the baseline 

program without difficulty, so that follow-on program funding necessary 

to achieve the baseline convertibility capability would not be required 

until FY 70. The point to be emphasized is that this method primarily 

requires early funding of a mixed configuration f011ow-on program 

rather than increased funding. In essence, the nonrecoverable cost of 

a convertibility capability for flight 6 or 7 via the substitution 

method would be $13.5M,.and for both flights 6 and 7 would be $16.0M. 

.(2.0M in FY 69, 3.0M in FY 70, 7.0M in FY 71, 4,0M in FY 72). Of this 

' amount, the recurring nonrecoverable cost is only $2.5M.per flight. 

The additional hardware and effort is expended only if a decision 

is made to convert to the manned mode. If the capability is not 

DORIAN 

HANDLE v4A BYEMAN 

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NRO APPROVED FOR LUi%LI CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 

RELEASE 1.JULY 2015 

exercised on flight 6 or flight 7, the accumulated hardware and 

additional effort remain available to provide a conversion capability 

for subsequent flights. 

DORIPiN 

1-4 ANOLE VIA BYEMAN 

.CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 

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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 

The following recommendations are based on consideration of the 

potential use of a conversion capability, the decision lead times that 

might be applicable to the situation, the impact on baseline costs and 

schedules, and the potential for an extension of the MOL capability into 

a follow-on program. 

1. A capability for conversion of flights 6 and 7 by Gemini B/LM 

substitution should be incorporated into the baseline MOL program. 

This capability should also be a key feature of the follow-on program 

that is assumed to be forthcoming. 

2. The conversion capability for flights 6 and ..7 should be 

funded in the follow-on program, with the exception of an initial requirement of $2.0M needed in FY 69 for engineering planning for increased production. FY 69 funding should be absorbed in the baseline program 

funding. Initial follow-on program funding to provide this capability 

will be needed in FY 70. 

3. The Systems Office should be directed to include this capability now in the internal planning for the baseline program. However, 

it is neither necessary nor desirable to incorporate this capability at 

present in formal program documents such as the planned revision to the 

MOL Program Plan and Funding Requirements (Blue Book). 

4. A proposal for a follow-on program, which includes the conversion capability for flights 6 and 7, should be prepared and submitted to 

Dr. Flax in early,CY 1968. Funding for this program should be included 

in MOL FY 70 budget proposals that are initiated in mid CY 1968. 

DORIAN 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN 

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V. GLOSSARY 

AGE Aerospace Ground Equipment 

AM Automatic Mode (Unmanned MOL flight 

of vehicle) 

ASM Automatic Support Module (Module which 

replaces the Gemini B in the unmanned 

configuration. Carries data return 

vehicles and other equipment.) 

ATS Acquisition and Tracking Scope 

Birdcage Major structural framework inside 

pressurized compartment of the Laboratory Module 

C/O Checkout 

DAC Douglas Aircraft Company 

DORIAN 

DRV 

EKC 

FV 

GE 

LM 

MAC 

Project or code name used in this sense 

for the camera/optical system carried 

by MOL. 

Data Return Vehicle 

Eastman Kodak Company 

Flight Vehicle 

General Electric 

Laboratory Module 

McDonnell Aircraft Company 

MAM Manned Automatic Mode (Manned version 

of the MOL vehicle or flight) 

MM Mission Module (houses the major portion 

of the camera/optical system) 

Mode Term used to refer to the manned (MAM) 

or unmanned (AM) flight or vehicle 

configuration. 

DORIAN 

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6EGRET 
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SECRET 

nonrecurring cost 

nonrecoverable cost 

OV 

recoverable cost 

A cost that occurs only once. 

Costs for hardware or services which 

are expended whether or not the 

conversion capability is exercised. 

Orbital Vehicle (that portion of the 

total MOL vehicle which goes into 

orbit) 

The converse of nonrecoverable. Costs 

for hardware and services which are 

available for subsequent flights if 

conversion is not accomplished. 

T-x months or days Time before launch. 

TIIIM Titan III-M booster 

VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base 

DORIAN 

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