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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

1

12 Dec

Bob,

The attached back up source points made

in the talking paper to you, this date. One

SUB addressed to you and DCI, the others are

copies of papers from me to DCI.

/s/ Brock

t .t

Management Paper

aper to Program Directors

:liege memo to SecDef & DCI
. . .

•• .• THi UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE •

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

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December 12, 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Possible NRO/CIA Issues

Mr. McCone will make acme, if not all, of the following

assertions.

The NRO is dominated by the Air Force.

The historic role of the CIA in satellite reconnaissance has been eroded away, and is threatened with

extinction.

The resources of the CIA, the imaginativeness and

flexibility that created our present satellite capability,

are not being effectively employed.

He will "liquidate the NRO" rather than have the

CIA's capability frustrated or destroyed.

5. It is essential that the CIA be given responsibility

to develop a new broad-coverage satellite system.

He may also cite specific illustrations. The two current

and most likely ones will be covered later.

With respect to the first five assertions, the facts as I see

them are thus: The CIA did control the early development of

the present CORONA camera and reconnaissance system. They

built on, and depended on, Air Force contributions, but it was

by their leadership that the U.S. achieved successful satellite

reconnaissance as early as it did. The Air Force SAMOS program

was ill considered, undisciplined, and poorly managed. It

would have, at best, floundered into success at a much later

date.

The CIA's contribution to CORONA was not primarily technical,

nor to management in the broad sense. They set and enforced a

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disciplined set of requirements which focussed the Air Force's

efforts, and they provided a simplified management structure

which kept the military bureaucracy out of the critical parts

of the program.

The CORONA system has now long been an "operating" system

in which reliability, efficiency, and responsiveness to

intelligence needs are primary considerations. Management

is not faced with major decisions. Contracting for the program

is split between Air Force and CIA, with the latter responsible

for payloads and their integration into the spacecraft. Technical

control of these latter contracts is vested in a committee, the

Configuration Control Board (CCB), on which CIA has two members.

At the present time, as far as I know, no one in the CIA

Who played a significant role in the creation of CORONA now

has any responsibility associated with its routine operation.

It is not clear that Mr. MCCone realizes this.

Since I became DNRO, the CIA has made no unique contribution to satellite reconnaissance. That part of the CIA which

reports into the NRO structure has no special capability in

the satellite field, and is so busy with necessary activities

elsewhere as to have little interest. Such unique capabilities

as CIA may have reside in the large and expanding organization

of Dr. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology,

and are outside the NRO program organization.

.. Systems or capabilities which are candidates for new

development efforts in 1965 are the following:

A very high resolution pointing system;

A quick-reaction capability for crisis management;

A survivable version of (b) for post-attack use;

A better broad-coverage or search system;

e. 111111MOfor bomb damage assessment.

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Mr. McCone may also bring up the following specific issues.

The DNRO is trying to eliminate the last element of

CIA contribution to the CORONA project.

He, McCone, has been trying to get a unified staff

in the NRO, but the difficulties are insurmountable.

The facts here are simple, and are covered in detail in

separate correspondence to you. Briefly:

I have proposed a clarification of responsibilities and

a simplification of the CORONA management which puts the NRO

West Coast project director, General Greer, in control of the

CIA contracts for such technical matters as in his judgment

are minor and are necessary for the health of the system. I

have also verbally proposed four specific additions to the NRO

management organization which could profitably be manned by

qualified and experienced CIA personnel. This proposition

is confirmed in writing by a memorandum dated today.

By way of comment:

I am sure that the final price of peace with the CIA,

considering the temperament of its leaders, is at least to

give them carte blanche for development of a new general search

system. Until this is done, or the leadership changes, there

will be continued obstruction of the NRO and contests of its

actions, on many subsidiary issues. I see no reason now,

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Mr. McCone Will sooner •or later propose item (d) as

essential, and will ask that it be developed by the CIA

outside the NRO structure, or at best under merely nominal

control of DNRO. He will advance a so-called 1M-2" system -

a scaled-up CORONA, - as the proper way to go.

Neither Dr. Fubini nor I believe that item (d) is first

in priority, by far. Furthermore, there are two competitors

to the M-2, both based on hardware which has already flown,

that must be considered: an improved SAMOS E-6, and an adaptation of the LANYARD.
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however, to compromise our judgements or voluntarily liquidate

the NRO. I have by no means exhausted my means to resolve

the specific issues, resently being contested.

We can probably temporize up to the time, a few months

away at most, that the main issue is forced upon us, either

by an explicit NRO decision to develop something other than

an improved general search system, or by a specific recommendation from the CIA that they be authorized to do something.

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I recommend meanwhile that we continue to temporize by

negotiating all ancillary issues on their merits. When the

main issue comes up, we should not compromise in any manner

that denies to the country the benefits of that development

which in our judgement is most needed.

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