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(1) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE NRO STAFF August 20, 1974

NOTE FOR_GENERAL KULPA

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Omnibus NSCID •

At your request, the following thoughts on the omnibus

NSCID are presented. Many of these thoughts stem from our

experience as a result of the issuance of NSCID 6 and our

working relationships with the community, particularly with

the NSA. I have not been able to make an exhaustive study

comparing the omnibus NSCID to the portions of NSCID 6 and

other documents which direct our activities. My thoughts

are as follows:

The note on the first page of the NSCID mentioning the

required decompartmentation, if national reconnaissance

activities were to be discussed in the SECRET NSCID, is

unsettling. Although the fact of photographic satellite

reconnaissance is DOD SECRET, the fact of SIGINT reconnaissance

is still compartmented. In addition, the association of the

NRO with these activities is also compartmented. The fact that

the DCI even considers the possibility of decompartmentation of

this information is disturbing. Paragraph 5c on Page 16

addresses the responsibilities of the National Security Agency.

In this section the NSA is given the clear charter to develop

and operate programs for the colledtion and processing of

SIGINT. In addition, the Director, NSA, is given the authority

to coordinate the planning and programming of such activities

performed by other departments and agencies in the government.

As this relates to the NRO, the DIRNSA is in the operational

seat of our collection programs. In addition, he would almost

be a member of the ExCom with regard to the planning and programming of our systems. BONever, as indicated later in the

paragraph, the DCI could well publish additional directives to

limit the charter of the DIRNSA with regard to our systems.

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Paragraph D on Page 18 again gives the DIRNSA operational

and resource control over our systems except as exempted by

the DCI or . the Secretary of Defense.

On Page 22 and 23 the satellite reconnaissance responsibilies

for the NRO are discussed. It is interesting that the NRO is

given the responsibility for the programming and budgeting of

the satellite systems. This would appear to dilute the responsibility of the DNRO from that of managing the NRO and executing

the NRP. What is meant by additionally as directed by the

National Security Council is unclear at this time.

On Page 22 paragraph a appears to assign to the CIA (IC

Staff) the responsibility for developing, managing and operating

our programs. Again, this takes away the direct management

responsibility of the DNRO. It is interesting that not once

in the section on national reconnaissance activities is the

Director of the National Reconnaissance Program mentioned.'

If we wish to push for change of the wording under

national reconnaissance activities, it should be to reaffirm

the role of the DNRO as the manager of the National Reconnaissance

Office and the one charged with the responsibility for executing

the NRP. Although the DCI would have overall responsibility

for intelligence collection, he would not take such an apparently

active role with regard to the operation of NRO satellite systems.

Also, the responsibility of the DNRO for the design and development of satellite systems and their subsequent operation should

be reaffirmed in this section.

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