PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 

JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

OPINION BY 

IN RE: JONATHAN A. MOSELEY JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 

Record Number 061237 April 20, 2007 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge 

Jonathan A. Moseley appeals the judgment of the Circuit 

Court of Arlington County, which revoked his “right to practice 

before the Circuit Court of Arlington.” Moseley contends the 

circuit court erred for two reasons: First, he argues the court 

“was without jurisdiction” to revoke his right to practice. 

Second, he asserts that even if the circuit court had 

jurisdiction to act, it failed to provide him “notice of the 

alleged misconduct” before the revocation. For the reasons set 

forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 

 This case arises from the proceedings in two breach of 

contract cases filed by Moseley on behalf of his client, Tracy 

E. Ammons, against The Christian Coalition of America, Inc. 

(“the Christian Coalition”). In the first suit, both parties 

denied having a copy of the consulting agreement in controversy, 

so the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing to 

determine the nature of the agreement. A primary issue before 

the court was whether the agreement contained an arbitration 
2

clause, as the Christian Coalition contended, but which Ammons 

denied. On cross-examination during the hearing, Ammons 

testified he had found a copy of the consulting agreement, and 

that he had given a copy to his attorney, Moseley, who had it in 

the courtroom. Ammons further admitted that the agreement 

contained an arbitration clause. 

Moseley, acting on behalf of Ammons, immediately requested 

a nonsuit. The circuit court stated it was compelled to grant 

the nonsuit, and then strongly reprimanded Moseley for his 

conduct during the course of the proceedings. In particular, 

the circuit court cited Moseley’s failure to inform the court 

and opposing counsel that the contract had been located and 

contained the very arbitration provision he had previously 

denied existed. Furthermore, the circuit court cited Moseley’s 

prior filing of numerous frivolous pleadings and motions in the 

matter, which needlessly wasted the time of the court and 

counsel. The circuit court then awarded sanctions against 

Moseley and Ammons, jointly and severally, in the amount of 

$83,141.24, which represented a portion of the Christian 

Coalition’s attorney’s fees and costs related to Moseley’s 

actions (“the monetary sanctions award”).1

 1

 Moseley filed a timely notice and petition of appeal from 

this order. However, on March 15, 2005, this Court dismissed 

the petition for appeal under Rule 5:11 for failure to timely 

file a transcript or written statement of facts. The monetary 
3

Ammons and the Christian Coalition then entered into 

arbitration proceedings concerning the Christian Coalition’s 

alleged breach of the consulting agreement. While the 

arbitration was ongoing, Moseley filed a second motion for 

judgment on Ammons’ behalf, alleging substantially the same 

claims against the Christian Coalition as in the first motion 

for judgment.2 The Christian Coalition filed a motion to 

disqualify Moseley from representing Ammons, asserting Moseley 

had an “irreconcilable and unwaiveable per se conflict” because 

his “personal interest inextricably [is] intertwined [and] 

adverse to his own client.”3

 On February 16, 2006, the circuit court heard argument 

regarding the motion to disqualify Moseley from representing 

Ammons regarding the second motion for judgment.4 Despite being 

 

sanctions award against Moseley and Ammons is not before the 

Court in this appeal. 

2

 The second motion for judgment attached a copy of the 

consulting agreement and contended the Christian Coalition 

waived its right to rely on the arbitration provisions by 

defending the prior motion for judgment. 

3

 Among the factors the Christian Coalition cited in its 

motion to disqualify were: Moseley and Ammons’ joint and several 

liability for the monetary sanctions award, Moseley’s subsequent 

declaration of bankruptcy that would insulate him from 

collection of the monetary sanctions award, Moseley’s failure to 

perfect an appeal of the monetary sanctions award, and Moseley’s 

potential testimony in the pending case regarding the contract’s 

arbitration clause. 

4

 Judge Joanne F. Alper was the presiding judge in the 

proceedings related to the first motion for judgment, and 

entered the monetary sanctions award. However, Judge Alper 

“voluntarily recused herself for the limited purpose of hearing 
4

sent a copy of the praecipe setting the hearing for that date, 

Moseley did not appear at the hearing due to an apparent 

miscommunication from the clerk’s office and the judge’s 

chambers, which led Moseley to believe no hearing would occur 

that day. However, the hearing did proceed as scheduled on 

February 16th and the Christian Coalition argued its motion to 

disqualify Moseley from the second motion for judgment 

proceeding and it urged the court to consider additional 

sanctions, including issuing a rule to show cause based on 

Moseley’s conduct. In addition, the Christian Coalition called 

David R. Rosenfeld to testify as an expert in the field of legal 

ethics in Virgina. Rosenfeld testified that Moseley had a 

conflict of interest with Ammons and that Moseley’s “conduct 

falls well below the [ethical and professional] standard of 

care” for attorneys licensed to practice law in Virginia. 

Rosenfeld also testified that he examined a letter written by 

and a motion filed by Moseley, and they contained “entirely 

inappropriate, inaccurate, and in some instances, just downright 

. . . false” allegations about Judge Alper.5

 

from Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.” Judge Benjamin N.A. 

Kendrick presided over the remaining proceedings relevant to 

this appeal, including the February 16, 2006 and March 16, 2006 

hearings. 

5

 Moseley’s letter and motion, which the Christian Coalition 

introduced into evidence at the hearing, indicated that Judge 

Alper decided to recuse herself from hearing the motion to 

disqualify him from representing Ammons because she had engaged 
5

As a result of the hearing, the circuit court entered an 

order on February 27, 2006 that granted the Christian 

Coalition’s motion to disqualify Moseley and further directing 

Moseley “to appear before this Court on the 16[th] day of March 

2006 to show cause why Moseley’s right to practice before this 

Court should not be revoked.” 

As directed by the circuit court, Moseley received a copy 

of the February 27 order and a transcript of the February 16 

hearing. Moseley petitioned the circuit court for a rehearing 

regarding the February 27 order, and explained the reason for 

his absence from the February 16 hearing. In light of Moseley’s 

explanation, the circuit court “vacated [the February 27 order] 

pending the outcome of the March 16, 2006 hearing.” 

Prior to the March 16 hearing, the Christian Coalition 

alerted the circuit court that it had just obtained an e-mail 

written and circulated by Moseley, which the Christian Coalition 

asked be considered at the March 16 hearing. Moseley was sent a 

copy of both the Christian Coalition’s letter to the circuit 

court and the e-mail. In the e-mail, Moseley characterized 

opposing counsel as “certainly demonically empowered. I have 

never seen anyone who reeks of evil so much.” Furthermore, 

Moseley described the monetary sanctions award entered by Judge 

 

in “misconduct” during the first motion for judgment 

proceedings. 
6

Alper as “an absurd decision from a whacko judge, whom I believe 

was bribed.” 

At the March 16 hearing, which included the Rule to Show 

Cause, the circuit court directed the Christian Coalition to 

reargue its motion to disqualify Moseley. In its opening 

statement, the Christian Coalition argued “the evidence is 

overwhelming that [Moseley] should not only be disqualified 

[from representing Ammons], but within this judicial district 

[have his right to practice] suspend[ed] or revoke[d],” and have 

his conduct reported to the State Bar for further investigation. 

The presiding judge then reiterated that those would be the 

three issues before the court during the hearing. 

The Christian Coalition again called David Ross Rosenfeld 

as an expert witness, and he gave substantially the same 

testimony as in the February 16 hearing. When asked about 

Moseley’s recent e-mail, Rosenfeld testified that in his expert 

opinion, “the characterization of a sitting judge as a wacko 

judge constitutes a per se violation of the standard of care 

established through Rule 8.2” of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct in Virginia. 

During the hearing, Moseley repeatedly contended that he 

had not been given notice that the court was considering the 

revocation of his privilege to practice before it. The circuit 

court rejected Moseley’s argument, finding that Moseley had been 
7

given adequate notice of the issue in the motion to disqualify, 

the transcripts of the February 16 hearing, the specific terms 

of the February 27 order, particularly the rule to show cause, 

and the enunciation by counsel and the court of the issues 

before it at the hearing. 

The circuit court then entered an order dated March 16, 

2006, finding that Moseley had “an irreconcilable [and 

unwaiveable] conflict of interest” and ordered that he 

“immediately terminate his representation” of Ammons. The court 

also made a specific finding that Moseley “had timely, adequate, 

and proper notice of this proceeding” and that it had “the 

inherent power to suspend or annul the license of an attorney 

practicing before it. § 54.1-3915, Code of Virginia [and] Legal 

Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. 249[, 119 S.E. 55] (1923).” 

The order then recited that “Moseley’s conduct during . . . this 

cause . . . raises sufficient and serious questions for this 

Court regarding [his] competency and fitness to practice law 

before this Court” and found Moseley had “engaged in unethical 

conduct in violation of the Virginia Code of Professional 

Conduct and . . . made contemptible, irresponsible and false 

statements about a sitting judge.” The March 16, 2006 order 

then provided that “Moseley’s right to practice before the 

Circuit Court of Arlington . . . be and hereby is revoked” and 
8

referred to the Virginia State Board and this Court 

“consideration of reciprocal revocation of licensure.” 

We awarded Moseley this appeal from the March 16, 2006 

order as to the revocation of his privilege to practice before 

the Circuit Court of Arlington County.6

II. ANALYSIS 

 On appeal to this Court, Moseley makes two assignments of 

error. First, he contends the circuit court erred because it 

“was without jurisdiction” to revoke his entitlement to practice 

law before the Circuit Court of Arlington County. Second, 

Moseley asserts the circuit court failed to properly provide him 

“notice of the alleged misconduct” prior to taking such action. 

We address each assignment of error in turn. 

A. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court 

Moseley contends the Circuit Court of Arlington County did 

not have jurisdiction to revoke his entitlement to practice 

before it because the “whole field of disbarment in Virginia” is 

now regulated by statute. He argues that because the circuit 

court did not follow the procedure for disbarment set forth in 

 6

 Moseley’s disqualification from representing Ammons and 

the referral to the Virginia State Bar are not before this Court 

on appeal. The underlying dispute between Ammons and the 

Christian Coalition has subsequently settled. Consequently, we 

granted Moseley’s motion to dismiss the Christian Coalition as 

appellee in the matter and the appeal was re-styled In re 

Moseley. The Court designated counsel to argue as amicus curiae 

in support of the circuit court’s actions. 
9

Code § 54.1-3935, it was without authority to act so as to bar 

his practice before that court. Moseley distinguishes the 

circuit court’s authority “to remove counsel in a particular 

case or to punish for contempt,” and the type of action here, 

which removes his ability to appear before the court. 

At the outset, it is important to note that Moseley’s 

license to practice law in Virginia was not affected by the 

March 16, 2006 order. Licensure of an attorney, and revocation 

of that license, are matters governed by statute. Code §§ 54.1-

3928, -3934 et seq. It is not within the jurisdiction of a 

circuit court to adjudicate the revocation of a license to 

practice law except in compliance with the statutory authority. 

Code § 54.1-3935.7

 The circuit court clearly recognized that 

limitation because it referred any action regarding Moseley’s 

license to practice law to the Virginia State Bar. A license to 

practice law covers the full panoply of actions an attorney can 

undertake from writing a will to representing a person in a 

controversy before a court. And while the issuance of a license 

to practice law carries with it certain rights for the holder of 

that license, the ability to practice before a particular court 

is a distinct and separate consideration. 

 

7

 Even before the unification of the various bars within the 

Commonwealth and creation of the Virginia State Bar in 1938, 

revocation of a license to practice law was a matter governed by 

statute. Ex Parte Fisher, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 619, 624-25 (1835). 
10

The matter before the Court on appeal, however, is not the 

status of Moseley’s license to practice law, but whether a court 

can revoke his privilege to practice before a particular court 

when no statute specifically provides for that action. The 

answer to that query is answered by our long-standing 

jurisprudence. 

We addressed the basic issue now before us in 1835 in Ex 

Parte Fisher, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 619, 624-25 (1835). Our 

resolution of the issue then remains as valid today as it was 

nearly two centuries ago. “[I]ndependently of any statutory 

restriction, the courts of record of this [C]ommonwealth might, 

in a proper case, suspend or annul the license of an attorney, 

so far as it authorized him to practice in the particular court, 

which pronounced the sentence, but no farther.” Id. at 624. 

Although the local circuit courts had jurisdiction in the 

19th century both to issue a license to practice law and control 

the actual practice before that court, the intervening statutory 

regimen ceding licensure to the Virginia State Bar (as opposed 

to the various circuit courts) has no effect on the continuing 

authority of a court to regulate the privilege of practicing 

before that court. We explained this concept in Legal Club of 

Lynchburg: 

Independent of statutory authority, all courts of 

record in Virginia have inherent power in a proper 

case to suspend or annul the license of an attorney 
11

practicing in the particular court which pronounces 

the sentence of disbarment. 

137 Va. at 250, 119 S.E. at 55. This independent and inherent 

power to regulate the lawyers practicing before it is vested in 

courts as part of the authority necessary to the existence and 

function of a court. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 

626, 630-31 (1962). 

In Code § 54.1-3935, on which Moseley relies, the General 

Assembly has set forth the procedure by which the appropriate 

court is empowered to revoke or suspend a license to practice 

law that affects the right to practice law throughout the 

Commonwealth.8 However, as recognized in Legal Club, this 

statutory authority does not curtail a court’s pre-existing and 

 

8

 Subsection (A) of Code § 54.1-3935 states: 

If the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any 

circuit court of this Commonwealth observes, or if a 

complaint, verified by affidavit is made by any person 

to such court, that any attorney has been convicted of 

a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or a felony or 

has violated the Virginia Code of Professional 

Responsibility, the court may assign the matter to the 

Virginia State Bar for investigation. Upon receipt of 

the report of the Virginia State Bar, the court may 

issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why 

his license to practice law shall not be revoked. If 

the complaint, verified by affidavit, is made by a 

district committee of the Virginia State Bar, the 

court shall issue a rule against the attorney to show 

cause why his license to practice law shall not be 

revoked. 

The remaining subsections set forth how the case will proceed 

and the attorney’s rights during the proceedings. Subsection 

(D) specifically authorizes the court to, inter alia, revoke or 

suspend an attorney’s “license to practice law in this 

Commonwealth” if the attorney is found guilty by the court. 
12

independent authority to control those who practice before it, 

including the authority to suspend or revoke an attorney’s 

privilege to practice before that court. 137 Va. at 250-51, 119 

S.E. at 55. “Such power does not depend for its existence upon 

either constitutional or statutory provisions, but is possessed 

by all courts of record, unless taken away by express 

constitutional (or possibly legislative) inhibition.” Id. at 

251, 119 S.E. at 55. 

Although Legal Club seemed to leave open the possibility 

that a legislative enactment could circumscribe a court’s 

authority to discipline attorneys practicing before it, this 

Court’s decision in Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass’n v. Drewry, 

161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934), annuls that possibility. In 

Drewry we reiterated not only that a court has “an inherent 

power” to discipline and regulate attorneys practicing before 

it, but also recognized that “[t]his power, since the judiciary 

is an independent branch of government, is not controlled by 

statute.” 161 Va. at 836, 172 S.E. at 283. Thus, the court’s 

authority to discipline attorneys and regulate their conduct in 

proceedings before that court is also a constitutional power 

derived from the separation of powers between the judiciary, as 

an independent branch of government, and the other branches. 

Va. Const. art. III, § 1; art. VI, § 1; see, e.g., Harlen v. 

Helena, 676 P.2d 191, 193 (Mont. 1984); Hustedt v. Workers’ 
13

Comp. Appeals Bd., 636 P.2d 1139, 1142-44 (Cal. 1981); R.J. 

Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 411 (Okla. 1972); State ex 

rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 407 P.2d 250, 254-56 (Or. 

1965); In re Sparks, 101 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Ky. 1936). As the 

circuit court implied, this inherent and constitutional power is 

essentially acknowledged in Code § 54.1-3915, where even this 

Court is prohibited from promulgating “any rule or regulation or 

method of procedure which eliminates the jurisdiction of the 

courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys.” 

Our more recent cases continue to recognize this inherent 

and constitutional authority of a court to discipline attorneys 

apart from the formal statutory disciplinary procedures 

affecting the attorney’s license to practice law. For example, 

as recently as March of this year, we summarized our 

jurisprudence in this area in Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 

641 S.E.2d 494 (2007): 

[T]his Court has recognized that the courts of this 

Commonwealth have the inherent power to supervise the 

conduct of attorneys practicing before them and to 

discipline any attorney who engages in misconduct. A 

court’s inherent power to discipline an attorney 

practicing before it includes the power not only ‘to 

remove an attorney of record in a case,’ [Judicial 

Inquiry and Review Comm’n v. Peatross, 269 Va. 428, 

447, 611 S.E.2d 392, 402 (2005)], but also ‘in a 

proper case to suspend or annul the license of an 

attorney practicing in the particular court.’ ” 

Id. at 399, 641 S.E.2d at 501 (citations omitted). Thus, the 

authority of a court to regulate the conduct of attorneys 
14

practicing before that court by revoking or suspending that 

privilege is both an inherent and a constitutional power that is 

not dependent on its creation by legislative enactment and thus 

cannot be limited by statute. Accordingly, under our longstanding precedent, the circuit court had jurisdiction to revoke 

Moseley’s privilege to practice before that court.9 

The March 16, 2006 order by its plain terms applies only to 

Moseley’s right to practice before the Circuit Court of 

Arlington County. By necessity, the circuit court’s action is 

the act of that court and not limited to practice before the 

individual judge presiding over the case. See Commonwealth v. 

Epps, 273 Va. 410, 414, 641 S.E.2d 77, 80 (2007) (In the context 

of contemptuous behavior in the courtroom, “[a]ny harm in this 

case was suffered by the court as an institution, not by [the 

judge] personally.”). By that, we mean the order of March 16, 

2006, by its very issuance, is an act binding within the 

jurisdictional limits of the Circuit Court of Arlington County. 

Therefore, the Circuit Court of Arlington County, which is 

coterminous with the 17th judicial circuit, has authority to 

regulate the conduct of attorneys throughout that circuit, but 

 

9

 Moseley raises no issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support the circuit court’s judgment, nor does he raise an 

issue as to whether the circuit court abused its discretion, 

based on the evidence, in revoking his privilege to practice 

before the court. Thus, we address neither matter. Rule 

5:17(c). 
15

no further. Indeed, as we recognized in Ex Parte Fisher, Legal 

Club, and Drewry, a court’s authority in the discipline of 

attorneys practicing before it is limited to the jurisdictional 

boundaries of that court and cannot extend to other courts 

beyond that boundary.10

For all these reasons, we conclude the circuit court had 

jurisdiction to revoke Moseley’s privilege to appear in that 

court and thus did not err in the judgment of March 16, 2006. 

B. Notice of the Alleged Misconduct 

Moseley also alleges the circuit court erred in revoking 

his privilege to practice before the Circuit Court of Arlington 

County “without notice of the alleged misconduct.” Although 

Moseley also argues on brief the broader contention that he did 

not have notice “that his right to practice law was in 

jeopardy,” he made no assignment of error as to that issue. We 

thus limit our review to the specific issue to which he assigned 

error. Rule 5:17(c); see Chesapeake Hosp. Auth. v. 

Commonwealth, 262 Va. 551, 557, 554 S.E.2d 55, 57 (2001). 

 

10 As noted above, the March 16, 2006 order, in and of itself, 

does not affect Moseley’s license to practice law. Moseley’s 

license to practice law remains in effect, even within the 

jurisdictional boundaries of the Circuit Court of Arlington 

County; he simply cannot appear in that court. We also note 

that the March 16, 2006 order, by its specific terms, applies 

only to the Circuit Court of Arlington County, and does not 

undertake to revoke Moseley’s privilege to practice before the 

juvenile and domestic relations or general district courts of 

Arlington County. 
16

Moseley’s argument that he lacked notice of the alleged 

misconduct is without merit. Courts are not required to list 

with specificity their factual basis for issuing a rule to show 

cause. Moreover, the record clearly shows Moseley received, 

inter alia, copies of the motion to disqualify, communication 

from the Christian Coalition to the court stating the intent to 

raise correspondence written by Moseley (with copies of the 

referenced correspondence attached), a transcript of the 

February 16 hearing detailing the evidence on which the 

Christian Coalition was relying to support Moseley’s 

disqualification, and the issuance of a rule to show cause in 

the circuit court’s February 27 order. Moseley received more 

than adequate “notice of the alleged misconduct,” which was the 

subject of the March 16 hearing and embodied in the findings of 

the March 16, 2006 order. Thus, Moseley’s second assignment of 

error also fails. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court had the 

jurisdiction to revoke Moseley’s privilege to practice before 

it. Moseley also had adequate notice of the conduct the circuit 

court would consider in deciding on that revocation. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

Affirmed.