• •

. •

' twee... •

1.• • •

•

•

S

4 . •

':

.

.. •

HISTORICAL .Banarnic

USAF R&D ORGANIZATION, 1960-1962

Though its ballistic missile program had been eminently

successfulp.

the Air Force through the 1950's continued to wrestle

with the vital problem of. promptly exploUing scientific and

technological advances so as to create superior weapons systems

as rapidly as p

ossible. To speed up the process, new doctrines of

weapon acquisition had been adopted in the 1 50s. One of the more

far-reaching of these was known as "concurrency," a concept that

provided for developing all aspects of a weapon system simultane.,

ously, including research and development, procurement, testing,..

p

roduction, logistics and training systems, and ground equipment

and installations.

I.•

Air Force organiaation had not kept pace with. these new

acquisition techniques, however. The result was that as time

passed the adherence to the concurrency doctrine led to a blurring

of the boundaries between ARDC's responsibilities for research and

development and'AWC's for procurement and production.

.

In May 1959, therefore, General Curtis R. LeHey, the Air.

Force Vide Chief of Staff, formed a Weapon Systems Study Group to
n • •-•/4•

• 1.

. 1.

review acquisition policies and irocedures and determine an Air

Force s

tructure best suited to rapidly obtaining complex missile

and space age weapon s po

ystems in the current environment. Included

in the study group were 

several high-ranking copmanders'and membere.

. ..

of the Air Staff, including General S. S. Anderson (chairman), ANC

1

Commander, General Schriever, ARDC Commander, and General4ark B.

•

Bradley, USAF DCS/Materiel.

The eventual result of the group's studies and deliberations

Was the presentation of three proposals to the: Air Force Chief and

Vice Chief of Staff, Generals White and 

LeMay, on 2 June 1960. A

plan proposed by. General Anderson called for a recombining of MC'

and AROC into a single command. One proposed by General Schriever

'called for the retention of two separate commands but a 

reorganization that would expand 

ARWresponsibiliries to include proCureMont, testing, and production of major weapon • iystems. A third plan,

proposed by General .Bradley, called for no or cbanges

but for improving the acquisition systems tbrough changes in policy

and procedures.

. General White 

.

rejected the Andersen and Schriever 

proposals '

in favor of.the Bradley plan, modified 

to luclude other possible

steps :short of major reorga

nization." The study group thereupon

set to work developing concrete 

proposals. along the lines suggested by 

General White. The group's final report was 

submitted to Genera/

Way on 26 August, and by 1 September Air Force headquarters VAS in the process of implementing several' of the study group's memom.

mendations for changes in .policY and procedure.

i !
•

3

Meanwhile, General Schriever was becoming increasingly co

over the Ali Force•s ncerned

b

pace progi4M. Soviet progress in producing pace s

oosters and satellites had persuaded S

chriever that the U. S. apace

program in 1960 was in a p

osition similar to that of the missile N •

and

p

rogram in 1954--Ln dire need of a maximum, 

concentrated,

coordinated effort to enable the II. S. 

to match and excmkthe capabilities of the Riassianz.

In the fall of 1960, the R&D effort for Air Force space 

was projects the reaponsibility of ARDC's Air 

(AFEMD) 

Force Ballistic Missile Division: in Los Angeles. ABBMD's most urgent mission'in 1

was to work with 960, however,

AMC's collocated Ballistic Missiles Center* •

. • . •

•

bring to operational status an intercontinental

ONCYto ,

ballistic missile

force. In the fall of 196athisprogram was approaching quantity production antdep

loyment status, and new responsibilities

for site

:•• •

activation, installation, and c

heckout were being assigned to the

complex. Added to this sharp rise in ballistic missile activity was

• 

eapaasioa of-tke-izidreldirigri-impoitant apace program.

• •

The result asGeneral Schriever saw it was that two national

programa.ballistic missiles and space.wore.competing for management .

f.' attention and re

sources within a single R&D organisation.

to serious organizational tensions that were aggravated further by' •

. .

a shortage 

of working space. The overall result, 

Was Schriever said, that the AFBMD/BMC complaz was losing its earlier cohesiveness and singleness of purpose, and was benomin so large and cumbersome that neither ballistic missile nor space programs were 

.

.

being managed- with proper effectiveness.

•

.•,•
. activities should be moved immediately, h• said, and the current .

b

allistic missile programs should be 

.

.

moved ' on a phased basis'as they

proceeded into advanced d

evelopment 'stages (and were thus freed from

the need for the close technological support available only in Los

••' Angeles). The Inglewood complex would then become i dentified Vitasand the focal point for, the Air Force space program.

On 23 S

eitember 1960 General Schriever communicated this concern,

particularly his concern For the space program, to General White.

Stating that the Air Force was the major contributor to the nation's

space effort, he pointed out that'the service' nonetheless had no

we

ll-defined apace program, and no nationally recognized Operating

agency oriented toward the exploitation of space technology (partly,

Schriever knew, because the Secretary of Defense had not yet assigned '

the space mission to a specific service). These deficiencies Genera/. .

.

Schriever described as c

omprising one of the most pressing problems :

facing the Air Force, and one that had to be solved soon.

As a partial solution, Schriever recommended the movement pf

the ballistic missile operation.to Norton AFg. The site activation •-

When General White replied on 10 October 1960 he substantially

agreed with General Schriever's p

osition. He approved the immediate

move to Norton of the site activation activity, and the move of the

Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman offices as they 

progressed into the final

stages of development. He also approved the 

concentration of the

space activity in Los Angeles.

Meanwhile, General Schriever had not relinquished his conviction

that the current weapon systems acquisition 

environment demanded a

•
•••

.„ .

•

major overhauling of the 

Air.ftree acquisition system, particularly a br

oadening of ARDC's scope to include procurement, 

testing, and production responsibilities for major s

ystems. And, though rejected

by General White, General Schriever's 

propOsals had foUnd receptive:

listeners e

lsewhere in the governmentfindustrial 

complex. Masons

,

. !

those convinced of Schriever's correctness was Mr. Roswell L. Gil. patrid, Chairman of 

the Board of thenowlyoformed Aerospace

Corporation.

When the Kennedy Administration assumed power in January 1961,

Mr. Gilpatric became Deputy Secretary of Defense in the new 

Matta-

.

, • .stration.--That-same:month-Mr:-Gilpatric told General White that the

. Air Force could have its long-sought space mission provided the '-

service adopt a reorganisationplan based on

• the proposal made..

earlier by Schriever. 

General White agreed to do so.

Schriever thereupon formed a task force to draft a rem

rgan- isation plan that would be acceptable to higher echelons. Chairman • of the task force, apparently at General White's 

suggestion, was

Major General Rowell M. Estes, Jr., who was than Assistant DCS/ Operations in Air Force headquarters. A plan was quickly formulated

approved

.

oved , by Generals-Schriever and White and Sec

. 

retary of the Air Force Ruckert, then co

ordinated with the Army because of 'its Corps

.

of Engineers' involvement in missile site activation. The proposed

reorganisation was then presented to Defense Secretary Robert S.

McNamara.

On 6 March 1961 Secretary McNamara 

assigned to the SOU Air Pores responsibility for the development of military space programs,
•

.• •

6

•

and on 17 March announced the Air Force reo

, 

rganizatiol, which would

,

take place on 1 April 1961. %

Three new commands would be formed from

.

.

MDC.and ANC--APIA, AFSC, 

. .

and the Wits of Aerospace Research. Three AM centers-.Ballistic Missiles Center, 

Aeronautical Systems Center,

. and Electronic Systems Center.-were taken over by APSC and combined .

with the former Ballistic Missile D

ivision, Wright Air Development

...

Division, and Command and Control Development 

Division. Out of the

. combined AFBHD/BNC organisation in Los Angeles was created a

 Space 

1.,

Systems Division and Ba • llistic Systems Division. , Over these two

divisions was placed a Los Angeles. located Deputy Commander (AFC

for Aerospace Systems. Commanded by General Estes, who gained his

third star from the assignment, the DCAS organization was a temporary

.

.

•

expedient d

esigned to provide onp.the-spot decisions and insure

-•

•

. • . •

• •

management responsiveness while it was supervising the creation of

SSD and BSD out of BMC/AFBMD. . :.,

...

Meanwhile, the phased move to Norton of elements of the ballistic%

_ . missile complex was proceeding about 

on 'achedule. By early 1961, site •,-.. •

.

.:

.. .:'

activation activities plus most of the Atlas office had moved.

Some adjusting took place after the 

reorganization of 1 April ...,"•.:

, •

- ..• .

1961, and a new.planwas preiented to Air Force headquarters on 22

.

,

May 1961. This plan proposed a gradual move of all BSD elements to

r. Norton, with key ballistic missile program offices 

remaining in LOS

. : •

;. . Angeles only until their p

rojects passed beyond their greatest

dependence on the technical competence 

sivallable only in the Los

.-.

Angeles area. According to this schedule,

• 

the Titan I office would

...::

move by fall 1961, 

the Titan II office by December 1962, and the
Minuteman Office by july 1963.

BSD's move would make a retention of the WAS structure highly

unlikely. SecOndly, a new movement plan 

considerably 

published in October 1961

st

retched out the Zuckert•approvedplan, calling 

the move for of various headquarters e

lements and the Titan II SPO in

.

- July 1963 instead of December li62 or earlier.. And this 

made no provision later plan •

whatever for the movement of the Minuteman 00

of the BSD force.

or other BSD organizational elements, which comprised more than half

Besides the question of . DCAS and the BSD movement problem, the .

.

Los Angeles c

omplex in the fall of 1961 was presenting 

Sch General riever with a manpower dilemma as well. Schriever

.-

had committed

•

himself4to saving a considerable number of 

manpower spaces through

the reorganizatioh of.April 1961: These-mae

materialized. npwer savings had not

These several difficulties prompted General 

.

Schriever in

•

(

Secretary Zuckert epp

rovdd this plan on 8 June 1961, but 

that a special asked effort be ' made to advance the Titan II 

cerement dates. and Minuteman ..By late summer 1961, thi; Atlas and Titan I 

program

b

offices, the site activation 

establishment, and some BSD staff 

agencies support' in place at Norton.

But by the fall of 1961 the 

p

lanned move seemed to be bogging

':

...- •

down. For one t hing, General Estes had indicated to Genera

- '

.,. .,!f*..• that'he considered the l Schriever thu g

OrganitatiOU 

a permanent arrangement.

:: •

0:, . This was not only contrary to General Schrievees 

. bas view but also was ically in conflict with the-idea of moving BSD to Norton, since

•
•

November 1961 to direct an inspection and survey of the DCAS organ•

/cation to evaluate the effec tiveness of DCAS' use of manpower in carrying out its mission 

respensibilities. The team was to recommend

organisational changes or new procedures'that might lead to a more •

= 4

effective and economical operation in los Angeles.

Led by Brigadier General William B. Leonhard, a member

survey

of the

.

.

. . AFSC staff, the i

nspection team carried out its s

between 13

.

November and 9 D

ecember 1961. It found many serious deficiencies in the organisation from both e

fficiency and manpower standpoints.

Foremost was the fact that the DCAS element was not functioning as intended. The DCAS himself . had been given •

directive authority

over BSD and SSD, but the DCAS staff was 

supposed 

advisory to act only in an capacity to the DCAS, not as an 

operating element interposingg itself between the two divisions and AFSC head quarters. Contrary to this intention, however, the DCAS staff had established itself as a

••

complete op

erating staff at a command level and echelon higher 

than

The Leonhard team also found that manpower was being wasted because of duplication of staff support functions. DCAS through asupport wing provided special and 

g

eneral staff support to the two

divisions. But a division c

ommander could not request this support

programs being managed by. them. The net effect was to insert an

.

.

. unnecessary additional command 

element between AFSC headquarters and- the two divisions, a procedure that lengthened and complicated 

cations and delayed the communi-.

decision process for vital programs.

the two divisions. In this capacity it WAS issuing instructions to the division staffs, requiring reports of - and reviewing specific .

.

•
a.

directly, he had to request it through the 

 Perhaps

DCAS. For this and

other reasons, each division took to creatingicithin:its own organi• edition• staff support e

lements that essentially duplicated those.

maintained for them by DCAS.'

The team found further that manpower was being wasted 

unf by an

ortunate but unavoidable geographical dispersion of elementa

within the Los Angeles complex caused by a shortage o

And more m f facilities.

anpower was wasted by the splitting of the 

between BSD operation Los Angeles and .

Norton. The team pOinted out that 

operations •

became costly and extremely inefficient when program offices were

separated from their division headquarters, as was the case with,the Atlas and Titan I SPOs. The 

team also found, however, that a SPO

should not be separated too soon from its source of such as technical support, STL or Aerospace Corp. A general rile outlined

was that a SPO by the team •

needed particularly to. be near its technical 

.during support thitearl9h atages of a stystem's R&D cycle, and near its

:•

division 

headquarters during the later stages.

M

anpower was also being wasted, the Leonhard teams

 aid, through • a t

••endency within the.ECAS organixationo

inflexibilit overanage• through au

•

gio

y wtthin the organisation that led to offices being

retained past their 

.

periods of usefulness

quarters 

, and through higher heads. indecisiveness, a problem contributed•to 

of an by the interposition

additional staff element between the two 

divisions and

no AFSC.

Leonhard team made the following key recoimendations:

That the WAS element be elilinated..

That SSD aid SSD be elevated te,true division status.

• . r

•
.• •

..•

•• :'••• •

10*

3. That the central staff support 

operation be rescinded •

t..

except for nowmission housekeeping, administration, and some

comptroller functions, which could bw assigned to an Skbase S_

support wing for collocated elements of the two divisions.

.

4. That the DCAS staff plus its extensions in the support I:

s

wing be r

eassigned to the appropriate divisions so as to make the divisions autonomous in mission functions. •

5. That the phased move of BSD to Norton be

order to expedited in improve mamagement and provide better 

resources. If 

utilisation of manpower

possible, this was to be 'done without establishing

another R&D center at NortonIut also without depriving never p

rograms of necessary technical 

support.

6. That Aerospace/STZ personnel be collocated as much as

.

.

possible with their Air Force countsrpart.

If the DCAS arrangement were retained however, and major ele- ments of BSD 'remained in Los Angeles, the team recommended:

1. That the DCAS organization return to-the operational .

-

concept originally established, with the DCAS himself having

authority but directive withlis staff retaining an advisory capacity only.

2. That DCAS be limited to broad policy 

guidance and

direction, with detailed program management. responsibility assigned,.

_ •..

to the divisions.

.3. That the DCAS staff)). reduced.

4. That special staff functions now in the 

cen divisions be tralized in the support wing.

The Leonhard report apparently put an end to s

• . . that
• •

^ •

•

,.

...

11 •

' *:, -

. DCAS would become a permanent 

organization, and it got the 

to Norton BSD move back 

.—: on the track. Soon after the report's submission, •

General Bates began to phase down his WAS Operation, and by Nay 1962 the two divisions had been officially given their own staff

.

.

... support functions such as information, 

comptroller, and peesonnal..

An AFSC mOvement . order of 30 April 1942 directed that BSD complete its move to 

Norton between 1 Nay and 30 September 1962.

- , By June, BSD was ready to move, and it completed Its move between July and September on schedule.. WAS was discontinued 

on Accordingly

10 October 1902. . •

•

By June, BSD and SSD were completely autonomous.

•

1

• • •. .

. •

. •

; •

•

•
BALLISTIC XTSSILES, SATELLITES

AND SPACE VEHICLES

1956 to 1976

C:E 17 Reporg

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

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BALLISTIC MISSILES, SATELLITES

AND SPACE VEHICLES

1956 to 1976 

OCT 3 1956

INTEOTUCTION

Many different organisations have made feasibility studies

covering various types of sitellites and space vehicles to hawed for

specific objectives. Estimates of development time schedules have been

made by individual authors for their particular projects. While these

studies are important contributions to the overall knowledge in this

was their value is directly related to the background of the author

and the material available to him. AO the situation stands today, we

have a series of more or less isolated studies covering various facets

of the entire field. No one has made an attempt to collate the results

of these studies and to integrate these results into a correlated survey

of all of the advanced systems that may come into being during the next

20-year period.

This paper makes a brief survey of the entire field of fntur

ballistic missiles, satellites and space vehicles and points'up the need

for a detailed-survey. The results of the various studies that have.

been made have been considered in the light of Our present: ballistic

missile and satellite programs. Estimates of the technical developments

that may be expected as logical extensions of our present ballistic

missile and satellite programs have been made. With this information in

minds estimates of the development time schedules of all of the advanced

systems expected during the next 20 years have been made. In addition,

comments, conclusions, and recommendations are made regarding required
WDTL 56-40

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.

•• . Niitailes, Satellites, and Space Vehicle " 1956 to. 1976:- •

. .• .

.action in connection with the applied researchvresearch facilities, and

' research management necessary, if these developments are to be timely

.and obtained at miniaan cost.

general discussion • of the above points . is incltded in the

tollovintparagraphs. Detailed intornation and examples attached.

in the following Tabs :

and 21 • a...Tab 4.2 in conjunction with Figdresll/considers . briefly the

current state-et4he-irt, the rapid strides, that have been made in the

Pasts and a discussion of the performance that-appears technically

feasible duiing the next W-yearperiod. 

Tab .H, in conjunetion with Figure $, oonsiders the types of

systems prOgression that logically develop from our present ballistic

missile and satellite program' dUring the 1956. to 1976.period.

Take, in conjunetion with Figure )4 discusses .and estimates

toture development schedules for the systems of Tab B.

Tab pi covers examples of lag in the development.of.applied

research facilities.

Tab $ contain' estimates of the applied researOh, reteareh•

facilities, amd.development and test facilities considered necessary to

support , tature ballistic missile, satellite, and space vehicle programs.

DISCUSSION

4. In Tabs Al i6 and ós an attempt is made to present a rough idea

of what might be expected during the next20-1year period. However, it

mush be strongly eephasised that these development" and the associated

•
Ballistic Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles 1956 to 1976

schedules are realistic only if adequate design information is available,

or applied research to obtain the infOrmation is underwa prior to

the start of the development program. It Should be apparent tram our

brief look into the Arturo in Tabs A l B, and C that a large amount of

applied research is necessary to support these programs. Vigorous

action must be taken immediately to insure that a well-thought-out

program, properly emphasised with funds, personnel, and priority is

prepared, initiated, and properly monitored.

5. Past Air !brae research and development history indicates that

the research progress in each technical area hae lagged woefully far

behind the requirements of the aeronautical design engineer. One

trouble seems to be that a development project or system has to be

approved before the necessary supporting research can be approved and

started, thus automatically delaying the project until the information

is available. The alternative usually occurs, that is, proceeding with

the project on the basis of aVaileble, though inadequate, data and then

delaying later due to extensive modification and retrofit programs. The

research facilities necessary to obtain the design information have not

kept up with requirements for' his information. It takes time to obtain

research facilities, and Air Force planners to date have not been

eminently mocessfitl in selling large research programs or research •

facilities unless they could be identified with specific projects.

Scientists' thinking has, in general, kept far shoed of the technical

facilities that have been provided.

SLASSBEEI

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• olitiOnifil111 ask

Halliatic Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles 1956 to 1976

6. In instances where facilities have been started that were not

related to specific projects or system, there is usually so much lag

in the development that the need 1.8 much less urgent by the time the

facility is completed; the difficulties having been solved by "trial and

error" eng

ineering. Some examples of this are contained in Tab D. No

criticism is intended of the concept of ANDO or the High Temperature

Structural Testing Facility at WADO, but only of the delay in getting

these facilities started. Another example closer at hand is our lack

of adequate nose cone 

design information for our current ballistic

missile p

rograms. Data was needed at Mach 23.5, but we are battling

against time now to obtain a variety of re-entry data at Mach 15.

Shock tubea had to be constructed and a re-entry test vehicle program

initiated on a crash basis in order to obtain data. In lieu of adequate

data,- a conservative nose cone design must be utilised until fullscale flights have confirmed that the design is too conservative.

Perhaps the reason that it is difficult to get applied research projects

and facilities started is that under the present system, may people

at many levels of management, have to be convinced that such research

is necessary or that the approach is the "right way". It is inevitable

that persons in this management chain do not have the proper technical

background to have an appreciation for the requirement. Thus, a

considerable amount of time is lost in overcoming this initial-inertia.

People do not readilysaccept new ideas. Whittle, as an example, had

considerable trouble in advancing his ideas for jet propulsion.

Ur A nn/717 4

WDTL 56-4o

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by I.M.

.,
UCLA

Ballistic Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles 1956 to 1976

Consider the various phases through which a project progresses prior to

completion, e.g.:

Determination of feasibility.

Initiation of-project.

Recheck of initial feasibility study.

Detematruntion of requirements.

Availability of thuds.

Selling program to higher authority.

o. Acquisition of design information.

d. Design, engineering, construction, and test.

One is forced to conclude on the basis of past experience that b and c

are the really long lead time items. It is believed that the time to

initiate a project can be considerably shortened and the acquisition of

design data can be accomplished in a more timely fashion if one ABDO

agency was given the mission of looking into the fixture and determining

the applied research that is necessary to support fdtare

missile, satellite, and space vehicle programs.

7. This review and evaluation of required applied research should

be made considering the requirements of a future program in its entirety

rather than by considering individual proposals by themselves. The

obvious first step is to make some approximations as to the scope of

fnture systems programs. If we accept a program such as presented earlier

as within the realm of possibility for the fUttrre, then we must also

accept the fact that a considerable amount of design information is

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WDTL 56-40

_ •• n •• •• •

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Ballistic Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles 1956 to 1976

required and 'pertain types of applied research programs mast be started

immediately.. There are Reverses of weaknesses where little or nothing

is underway for support of fhture programs. Many different industrial,

research, and educational organisations have recognised some of the problems and have made Studies and proposals. .Many ABDO center.* and other

government agencies have studied various Altars problems and have made

recommendations. Many committees have been established to investigate

various aspeets of high speed and high temperature problems and have

made recommendations.

A. As a.result of reviewing many studies, reports, proposals, and

resommendations, estimates can be made of certain types of research that

must be accomplished in the immediate future, and the types of research,

dervolopzents and test facilities necessary to support fhture systems.

This information is contained in Tab E4 It should be pointed out that

as one looks farther and farther into the future, it becomes more and

more difficult to define the applied research necessary; because we do

not know what all of the problems will be until after initial space

programs are started.

.9. The scope of the effort required to identify systems programs

and supporting research for ihture ballistic missiles and space vehicles

requires the attention of a special organisation within UDC. This

responsibility should come under `the mission of the Space Center

presently being studied by the Headquarters ABDO, 'Ballistic Missiles

and Space Vehicle' Committee. However, it is .highly unlikely that a

•
unuu400111 NNW

BallistiO Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles 1956 to 1976

Space Center could be operational in time to be effective for improved

ballistic missiles and satellites and perhaps not even in time for early

work required in connection with a lunar test instrument carrier. There

are many areas where work must be initiated immediately if we are to obtain

timely design information for the future.

It is recognised that the Offioe of Scientific Research has a

mission of sponsoring basic and fundamental research in various fields of

interest to the Air libroe. Some of this, of course, applies to the

ballistic missile and space vehicle fields, but the activities of the

Office of Scientific Research are not aimed at the solution of the

rather specific areas of technical difficulties within a system. that

we have been talking about.

The present mission of WDD is to provide operational ballistic

missiles at the earliest possible date. In accomplixhing this mission,

WDD has been faced with a rather formidable set of technical problems.

In solving these problems, WDD has been continually omafranted with new

and related problems whose solutione are not necessary to perform the

immediate mission, but which do apply to ballistic missiles satellites,

and space vehicles of the future. Thus, by the very nature of its work,

WDD is uniquely qualified to identi4 the requirements for fhture

research. WDD is now successfully executing its responsibility for

bringing two ICBM systems and an MEM system into existence on an

unpreoedented time schedule. This is being accomplished by a special

management team of WDD-B-W-BMD. By virtue of this experience s WDD is.

UNCLASSIFf wDTi, 56-40

This deceseent askew inteneidien efieding the of the United Stoke within 111. U.S.C, Iodise 793 sod TM, IM. treesadulee or reveletke et wIld U any UMW to se eiwellowriasst pewee H prohibited by low.
WDTL 5640

UNCLASSI

wain Me anostimp el IsAmette 11. se obseNeselawl 'owe is poslabIN41 kw.

doanosmi coatolas tolormetio. oliodino fin

Union MI end 754. On transmission or rovolotioo

Ballistic Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles 1956 to 1976

uniquely qualified to organise, direct, and utilise the results of this

basic research.

OONCDJSION3

It is concluded that we will have improved ballistic missiles,

improved satellites, and various types of space vehicles within the

foreseeable future, if applied research facilities of a suitable nature

are provided with sufficient lead time.

It is concluded that the Air Jbrce mist vigorously support

various means of obtaining basic design information which will result in

design criteria that will reduce the number of aerodynamic, dynamic),

structural, guidance, and propulsion deficiencies that will occur in the

future missile, satellite, and space vehicle programs.

14. It is concluded that some organisation within Headquarters

ARDO must be given the responsibility immediately to identify the future

requirements for applied research and research facilities needed to,

suppc.rt . the ballistic missile, satellite, and space vehible prograMs of

the hiture. This responsibility should ultimately belong to the ARDC

Space °ante; but an interim agency. needs to be designated until the

Space Center comes into being.

It is concluded that WDD is in a unique position to identify

these requirements for applied research and research facilities and to

initiate action as a logical extension of the present mission.

It is further concluded that it is vitally important for the

future of the Nation that adequate fhnds, priorties, and authority be
UNBUSSIFIED

TM. 41asaalant caaelas laganmallas affealas IS, ladles 793 and 794, the hansadeslas anis aaaidea et So bal•saga laws, Ulla is an waarakarlaad POMO is by low.

UNGIAS a...

Ballistic Missiles, Satellites, and Space Vehicles 1956 to 1976

provided to support the responsibility outlined above.

RBOOMMUDATIONS

17. It is reoommended that the mission of the Western Development . .„tn

DivisioniABDO be expanded to cover the following.. These recommendations -74

are considered an interim measure and are to bephased into the I

activities of the ABDO Space .Center when this beater becomes operational.

Make initial estimates of fUture ballistic missile,

satellite, and space vehicle programs based on airrent experience, and

other information available `from all sources.

Continuously revise these estimates to keep the future

programs apace with Oaten, requirements and technical feasibility.

Identify the areas of technological weaknesses and areas

where major break-throughs are required.

Define the objectives in the areas where applied researeh, zs,

ilities, 

Per4A mem", 

and 

MC. 

gsneral development are required. 4 priC114,11 • t D'Avai 0444 ONCICOnshl pen, yelickvvi Make cost estimates an& present justification to cover the

above.

Initiate and supervise the properly identified and approved

projects in support of the Altura Air Biome ballistic missile, satellite,

and space vehicle program.

IAWREMOB D. ELI

Game/ USAF

Asst for Technical Groups

Technical Operations,. WDD

•

Zi.k1

research fee
tliCUSSIR

STATE-OF-TS-ART

(Tab A)

1. First let us review very briefly what appears to be technically

feasible during this period. In order to illustrate the rapid strides

that are being taken in advancing the state-of-the-art and technical

developments and what is possible for the Ware, reference is made to

Figure 1. This Figure is broken up into 3 areas; the first is for

surface to surface missiles, the next is for artificial earth satellites,

and the last is for true space flight vehicles. Missile range, orbital

altitude, and distance from the earth is.pletted against actual booster.

burn-out velocities necessary to achieve these distances. It should be

noted that 3,000 ft/Sec was a high projectile velocity in 1943. By

1946 to 1947,. this had climbed to 4,000-5,000 ft/sec. By early 1956,

test missiles were achieving 6,000-7,000 ft/sec, and now we are in the

range of 12,000-15,000. ft/Sec with our re-entry test vehicle flights.

By 1958 to 1959, our ballistic missile velocities will be in the region

of 23,500 ft/sec. It is apparent that big jumps are now being, taken

in performanoe, and it is easy to see that the vehicles that are capable

of travelling great distances over the surface of the earth do not

require much increase in booster barnout velocity in order to reach a

velocity that enables them to orbit around the earth as artificial

satellites. After one gets into this. area, relatively slight increases

in booster burn-out velocities enables one to set vehicles on orbital

paths farther and farther•away from the earth, until finally the orbit is

sufficiently large so that a trajectory can be chosen that will intersect

the orbit of other large celestial bodies, such as the Moon, Venus, or Mars.

Thu decersest weleies ieforseedee Moline the 'sallow' Whew of Ile Units/ Steles Wilde the

Sectiee 793 end 794. the trenswissiee or revolellee of which le say wen SW to as weatherised passe is prehildled la/ law.
IICLASSIF

MDTL 564to

test instruments and using propulsive and guidance cemponen resent4

• State-of-the-Art

2. All of the booster turn-out velocities and corresponding distances

shown on Figure 1 are based on minimum energy trajectories. In order to

get much farther out into space than Venus an • Mars, it would require

excessively long periods of time on this basis. Ogee Figure g;) However, before this era is reeched, it is expected that nuclear propulsion

or other forms of power will be perfected thatitill permit other than

minimum energy trajectories. The curve drawn through Mars illustrates

the changes in orbital flight time that are possible bylining other than

minimum energy trajectories. The present concept of nuclear power will

probably not be the ultimate power solttion. Some efficient system

utilising the principle of exhausting small masses at extremely high

velocity will probably come in being for'other than minimum energy

trajectories. Our initial effort' at true space flight during the

20-year period beyond improved ballistic missiles and satellites should

be concentrated on a means of traversing the distance to the Moon

(240,000 miles). This experience could then be utilised for the next

large jump to Mars or Venus (352 000000 miles at olosest point).

3. Plans are already underway for satellites for different purposes,

using hardware currently under development. The International Geophysical

Year Satellite will utilise the Vildng-Aerobee-solid propellant combination, and the Advanced Beconnaisance System Sateliite will utilize the

SM 65 with an added stage replacing the SM 45 nose cone. Studies have

been made which indicate that it is feasible to get to the moon carrying

This dowswoot coololos ieforeefiso offociloo M. noll000l *kw of the MOW Statos vrifi. No woowboo IS, U.S.C., Section 793 sod MI. IY. aronsmobsioo se 

ei Ow bpimam tows, Mb rovololloo M whkb In soy saw to so owoolborisod penes Is probtbftwi by low.
State-of-the7Art

under development. One promising study by BAND proposes the SK 65B with

the advanced GB guidance system, less nose cons, plus the second stage

Unguard. It should also be noted that Soviet literature as reported

by the Air Technical Intelligence Center is replete with instances of

Soviet thinlring on lunar and satellite vehicles. ,These range from

scientifio articles sponsored by the Academy of Sciences to the science

fiction variety, but indicate a high level of interest in various fox=

of spice travel.

ONCLASSIF

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ESTIMATES OF DEVELOPMENTS

FBOK

PIESENT BALLISTIC =BILE PROGRAM

(Tab B) 

1. The logical development fall-outs that can be expeeted from our

present ballistic missile and satellite programs are presented in

Figure 4.

Our present ballistic missile program emphasises early

operational capability rather than optimum design. Therefore, paw

improvements can be expected after flight experience is accumulated.

These improvements will be dictated by requirements but may be quite

varied in nature. Missiles of greater range can be expected due to

improvements in propulsive units, fuels, structure, and warheads.

Greater accuracy can be expected due to improvements in the guidance

and control system and increase • mormaedge of winds and other geophysical

aspects at launch and target. A variety of nose oones can be expected

with varying performance objectives and with varying trade-off* between

total nose cone weight, warhead weight, vulnerability, accuracy,

'heating,. and impact velocity. There will also be similar trade-offs

from the standpoint of the entire missile betmemagross weiSht,iwarhead

weight,' warhead yield, range accuracy, vulnerability, propulsive weight,

and so forth. With the advent of nuclear propulsion, major redesigns

can be expected.

b. During the evolution of military ballistio missiles, attention. will be directed to the use of this means of transportation for

other than warheads. Experimentalmail will likely be considered first

This siecesneat commies inieneeilea effecting the walleeel defense of the United Stetes within the aweeing of Pee Insiseene Lows. Title IS. U.S.C.. Section 793 awl 794, the ttenswission ens revelelles If which In any was he is wientherised Marne Is Prohibited by few.
UNC

Estimates of Developments from Present Ballistic Missile Program

due to weight limitations, and then perhaps military logistics for the

transport of highly strategio materiel. Last to be considered will be

air freight. Finally, attention will be directed to the transportation

of personnel as the first step in space travel by man. Entirely new

configurations will no doubt be developed with some consideration being

given to glide missiles. Glide missiles might also be used for /17,-over

reconnalsance. Major problem areas would be the development of a satisfactory landing technique and the comfort and safety of passengers in

flight and would probably include the development of capsules dropped by

parachute.

c. Recoverable satellites would be the next step beyond our

present satellite program. RAND studies indicate that recovering these

vehicles in predetermined areas by retrofiring rockets is feasible. At

150 s.m. altitude, a relative rearward velocity of 2,000 ft/sec will

bring the satellite to earth in 2,000 n. miles. The error in range due

to a 100 ft/sea error in rearward velocity would amount to a f 50

nautical miles. The error in timing of the retrofiring rockets could

account for a i50 n.m. additional, would mean that the satellite

could be landed in an area of 100 a.m. in length and no more than 40 n.m.

iuvirith. Feasibility studies have also been conducted involving the

recovery of re-entry bodies weighing up to 3,000 lb., using a 100 ft

diameter parachute with double layer fiberglass capable of withstanding

1100° F. and test instrument canisters that mil withstand up to 700° F.

Developments from both the satellite programs and transport missile

IRICLA

24

WDTL 56-40

This thstromow comelos lidonowlow &tiding the notion& siefooso of lb. Unita, San. widths 111, U.S.C., Sodkw 7,3 owl 794, Ow iressidssloss myeleffse of width I. Goy wow to o

, Tido

mom h mbibbeil by low.
UNGtA

Estimates of DeVelopments from. Present Ballistic Missile Program

programs would feed into the next logical step, amen-carrying satellite

or space platform. Early development of nuclear propulsion would permit

the early development of a man-carrying satellite.

d. With hardware presently under development and supporting

research, it would be possible new to devise a vehicle that would be

capable of taking test instruments to the moon. An SW 65B ballistic

missile could be used plus a new 4400 lb nose cone which would inelude

the-second stage Vanguard. This combination would have a gross weight

of 243,665 lbs. This would be capable of putting a 1,160 lb. mass on a

free flight trajectory. The 4 400 lb. nose oone would be composed of

the followingweightet

Working Space-Vehicle 320 lbs.

(Instrument and Communications

Package Included)

Last Expended Booster Stage 846

Structure 60

Power Plant and Residuals 530

Guidance and Control 250

Usable PMel

4,400 lbs

The above weights assume destructive impact and instruments that could

still operate after impact. It is believed that retrofiring rockets

weighing about 240 lbs. could be used, which would allow instruments to

be landed at near zero G. In this oase„ however, the weight of instruments and communications equipment that could be carried would be only

50 lbs. It is estimated that the guidance accuracy with the advanced

G.E. guidance system would be such as to impact within an area of 50,000

3 240

This deassierii ishishis Inhiessistion oriosthis U.S.C., Stales 713 Oki 794 hallassi damn of the within eke irelmalules of melons@ of which Is Oily manwart. es

Utt
tii) Lunar orbital velocity.

'•••'

5 4

isfeimethe efietilito aelleael defend end 7114,, Nis traitteltsion or nmeal t wind* the steesise ess

• —

U

This dievateet deletes

711

L

mr. is nay meow ft ea e WNW, Title seetharised dine* d'etildtell by

Estimates of Developments from Present Ballistic Missile Program

sq. miles which is about 1/80 of the available area. .Additional details

covering tracking, communications, guidance, control, landing technique,

meteor e

ncounters, etc., can be obtained from RAND Research Memorandum,

BM-1720, 'General Report on the Lunar Instrument Carrier 0) 11 , dated

May 28, 1956.

e. As soon as the success of a test instrument carrier is

assured, then attention will be focused upon space vehicles for military usages, and then a mani-oarrying lunar vehicle. Military usages

cannot be determined until scientific data has been obtained, but

advanced communications methods are bound to be among them. A very

brief summary of some of the scientific data that could be obtained by

landing test instruments on the moon is listed below:

(1) Magnetic field of moon. Voi.../ 10446. ipAse,w4,....,

olostvrf... 

4

... 2 44.•nonitc,•.1 (2) Mass of moon by observation of trajectory.

41 OW 4 4.1 6411, 1114y# e 4444* (1) f di ilt0144,41ft .4.401111 .1444m$4141: Atmosphere of moon.

C "I *10";ettt 4Inot (4) Nadiopropagation characteristics. We would haVe a Col; z

one-way stable source with no 00414 ...41 0144,144.4. 4 reflection from the ionosphere.

Electrostatic field of the moon.

Determination of crustal composition and characteristics. of the lunar crust.

Temperature and temperature distribution.

Frequency of meteoric impacts.

Cosmic ray intensity.

Lunar vibration rate
ICUS

Estimates of Developments from Present Ballistic Missile Program

Some of these data are already on hand, in rather a crude fashion, but'

the information could be refined considetablybylamding instruments on

the moon rather than relying on instruments placed on the earth. The

lunar vibration rate, for example, can be determined much more accurately

by a point source located on the moon, rather than relying on information

from braidlunar geographical characteristics.

NOTE: Technical data presented in connection with the lunar teat

instrument carrier and recoverable satellites were obtained

from the RAND Corporation.

ICUS

17 vim 56 4o

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whisks lios owooloo Si lho lelsesse Lows. TUN
ELI&

ISTIMATE OF RJRUE1 DEVEIOINENT SCHSAILES

Tab

1. In F

igure 3, an attempt has been made to estimate development

schedules for possible fUture .ballistic missile, satellite, and space

vehicle programs. Although, the present ballistic missile program will

gradually' phase into an initial Operationa1.capability, and there will

be no sharp end to the development, mid-calendar year 1959 seems to be

a fairly realistic: termination point. Prior to this, some work on

improved b

allistic missiles will surely start. In fact, as a result of

the present development work, many ideas for improvement have come to

mind, and it is only the concentration on an early flight vehicle that

has prevented improvements from being instituted.

2.. Sometime daring this period of improvement on ballistic missiles,

it is estimated that work will start on transport missiles for 

experimen- tal mail, air freight, and military.logistics 

purposes. Once we have

determined that we can land this materiel 'safely, then we will embark

upon a transport missile program for p

ersonnel. This will without doubt

be a rather lengthy program s possibly longer than a man-carrying lunar

vehicle program due to the fact that the latter will only carry test

engineers and scientific personnel. .

3. The rar s

atellite program as Presently visualised is a ve

short develo

ry

pment program imposed by the necessity to get the satellites

flying before the end of the International 

Geoph ►sical rear. Develop-

!Sent of the Advanced Reconnaisance System has been extended over a

considerable period due to the low priority assigned to the program at

18

WDTL 56-40

This &hawses cookais Islematien offlochni

keno* 793 444 794, Om honsals
OKA

Estimate of ib.ture Development Schedules

p

resent. Before we are very far along on this program, improvements

will be apparent and development work will be accomplished on recoverable

sat

ellites and other work which when ookbined with the 

effort on transport missiles will develop into a program to carry man in a satellite

or apace platform.

Z. D

evelopment work on the lunar test instrument carrier could be

Started now if SM 

65B missiles could be made available at an early date.

Due to the allocation of these early missiles to captive tests and flight

tests for checking propulsion, g

uidance, nose cones, and overall reliability, it is a

nticipated that we will be well, into the SM 65 teat

program before any of these vehicles can be diverted for use in the

d

evelopment of a lunar tent instrument carrier. It is estimated that

this will be a comparatively short development program, but that near

the and of it a man-carrying vehicle will be designed and built) the 

first vehicles .) to circle the noon and return, later to land on the moon. 4A

The next at beyond this would be the lunar 

vehiele for military purposes, early usages would no doubt be 

for recd and coals:maimtionn. The next step 

beyond this would be vehicles to travel to other

p

lanets from the earth or from planet to planet.

UNCLASSIREIL

WDTL 56-40

This deceateat inf.,.,tiee affecting the ethetef debase

 .4th. United betel Wilda the iliectiee 793 wig 794, Nei treasinhalen Sr teveleNen of which In any meanie to 

Ile VINNOMIllthed
UN WDTL 56 -40

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EXAMPLES OF DELAY IN PROVIDING RESEARCH FACILITIES

(Tab D) 

1. ABDO

The initial effort on this huge complex of engine and aerodynamic test facilities was started in 1946. The German aft was disassembled and shipped to the 17.3. in 1947 where it was-stored at Alameda

until 1950. The first $30,000,000 was not appropriated until 1949. The

prime purpose of this oomplex was to provide the Air Force with research

facilities that would enable them to attain and maintain a position of

world empremsay in the fields of aerodynamic and propulsion research.

Todab even though the original concept has been reduced in magnitude,

this complex is not yet finished due primarily to budget limitations.

The hypersonic, 40 inch tunnel of the Gas Dynamics Facility, for example,

is not estimated to be completed before 1959, 13 years after the idea

was taken from the actual German design made during WWII (Kochel M-10).

These faoilities are inadequate for our Arturo space vehicle needs,

both from the aerodynamic and propulsion standpoints.

2. High Temperature Structural Test Facility -WOO 

This facility was started several years ago and is to be

constructed in three phases. The pilot plant to obtain design criteria

and to check operating techniques is in operation now. The interim plant

will not come into being until 57 or 58, and the /till-scale plant, not

until 1 59 or 1 60. The thinking that went into its design was based on

satisfying the requirements for high temperature testing of Mach 3

aircraft. It does not have the capability for the high rates of heating

•
This tiocoorsont contains intonnatina 11„ aiding tint t•• lioction 793 anti 794, the tronsoission es ono atatoor

wen, 56-40

ftemples of Delay in Providing Research Facilities

or the high temperatures required for missile design or teat.

3. AEDG and the High Temperature Test Facility are not being

constructed even in time to adequately take care of aircraft requirements. The Air Ebrce now spends tens of millions of dollars annually on

modification and retrofit programs to correct aerodynamic, dynamic,

structural, and other deficiencies discovered only after the aircraft

has been put into service. Other minis:Ina oan be attributed 141MITA7 ly to

loss of aircraft and delve in production due to inadequate design infor-

•

nation. The inevitable loss of life cannot be measured in dollars. It

should be•possible to out down on this additional coat by spending only

a mall proportion of this amount on a well-rounded and well-integrated

research and development program designed to continuously replenish the

bind of design information in order to keep the level of knowledge

sufficiently high to. attain and maintain air technical supremacy.
ICUS

ESTIMATES OF APPLIED RESEARCH, RESEARCH FACILITIES

AND DEVELOPMENT AND TEST 'FACILITIES

(Tab B)

Fbllowing is an outline of areas of applied research and research

facilities considered necessary to support ballistic missile, satellite,

and spun vehiole programs during the next 20 years. An estimate 

is also

made of some of the component development work and the development and

test facilities that will be required to prove the adequacy of components.

This information bes been compiled . from preliminary surveys and estimates

made by Holmes and Narver, Inc., RAND Corp " Ramo-Toeldridge Corp.,

Western Development Division, AMC, Wright Air Development Center, and

others. More emphasis has been placed on the aerothemmodynamics area

than apectificalky on propulsion, *guidance, aeromedicines.and communications as it is believed that these latter fields are covered in

considerable detail by special ARDO Long Range Planning Committees.

A much more detailed and continuing evaluation and review is necessary

of everything comprising the 20 year program, as indicated in the

conclusions and recommendations.

tINCLASSIFIEWINAH demeeet seeteles hdeneetiee effecting the

At* 111.

Sectiee 793 sod 714, the tressolstleo er reveielleo of which Insee wow to es voloptherind passe is prohibited 111,

wale the emendee of doe bp&mtera laws. 

Mai.

WDTL 5640

AL ICUS L 56-40

MIAS

SPECIAL AREAS OF INVESTIGATION AND DEVELOMENT 

Aurothennodynamicst

 Chidanoe Control, Navigation, and Propulsion

Optimum Method of Reentry Body Attitude Stabilisation.

Methods for Recovering Reentry Bodies.

Methods for Recovering Satellites.

Improved Data Recovery Methods (Au types of data do reentry body,

propulsion, and guidance)

TV Data System.

Impi.oved Telemetry Systems.

IsPigved High Speed Photographic . Techniques - (band and Vehicle Borne.

improved Methods for Handling Aerodynamic Heating - tion Of radiation Thorough investigacoolipg, and film cooling.

heat abiciption, insulation, ablation, transpiration

MicFowave Techniques for Manuring High Speed Impact Velocities.

Complete Environmental S

imulation for Muipment and Components.

Magnetohydrodynamios Techniques.

Iong Range Tracking Systems.

Advanced Communications Equipment.

Radiation Resistant Electronic Components.

ImprovediReaction Controls.

Advanced Counter Countermeasure/.

Spneelfavigation Devices. C. I

4400 . 

fir 44 de

Space Instrumentation.

Braking Rocket Systems - 

tude, velocity, or acceleration.

Tied to appropriate instrumentation for alti

Improved Propellants - Higher. Specific Impulse, Solid Propellants.

Improved Propulsive Systems, Nuclear Propulsion, High 

Velocity Xxhaust.

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goloasee taws. Title tweliam 793 Sad Mt. vwieleilem el which is eft), acmlor N w .4.040thed Penes b Pflobillibd by low.
wag IAL

Special Areas of Investigation and. Development - Aerothennod ► namica Chidance, Control, Navigation, -and Propulsion ,

Solar Energy 

standing 

and other approaches to amri 'J AI,- power long operational life and high transient of

draina

withge.

Production Teohniques (Machining and Fa materials• brication) for various types of

SPACE-14IGINS

Effect of Cosmic Rays on Personnel

Crew Survival - safety, comfort, psychology, and sociology.

Nutrition

Disposal of Sewage

Air Conditioning

Environmental Simulation for Personnel

These are but a very few of the problems to be investigated in the

space-medicine area.

Ittp9r. r r

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25

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