# S upreme C ourt of T exas

══════════ No. 22

- 0296

══════════
Constantino Meza, Plutarco Meza, Daniela Meza , a nd Alejandra Meza , Petitioner s ,

v

. The City of Fort Worth, Texas ,

Respondent

═══════════════════════════ ══ ══════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas

═══════════════════════════ ══ ══════════

J USTICE B OYD , joined by Justice Lehrmann and Justice Young, dissent ing to the denial of the pe tition for review

.

T h is Court ’s approach to section 101.101(c) of the Texas Tort Claims Act has not been a model of consistency or clarity , to put it mildly. 1 In our last case about this provision, we said the statute

1 See Worsdale v. City of Killeen , 578 S.W.3d 57, 78

– 79 (Tex. 2019) ( B OYD , J., concurring) (illustrating how “every time the Court has addressed section 101.101(c) since Cathey , it has changed the rule it had most recently announced”). S ee generally City of San Antonio v. Tenorio , 543 S.W.3d 772, 788

– 89 (Tex. 2018) ( B OYD , J., diss enting) (detailing what I viewed as the2

requires evidence that the governmental body had “actual notice it may be responsible for the” harm alleged. Worsdale v. City of Killeen , 578 S.W.3d 57, 59 ( Tex. 2019) (emphasis added). The statute “requires neither adjudication of liability nor confession of fault,” we explained, and whether the governmental body “believed it was liable or not is not the standard.” Id. at 65, 67. Instead, we held, section 101.101(c) requires evidence that the governmental body was “subjectively aware that its alleged acts or omissions contributed to or produced injuries in the way the claimant ultimately alleges.” Id. at 64. This case provides the Court with the much

- needed opportunity to expound on that requirement in light of two other governing principles. First: “There will, of course, be times when subjective awareness must be proved, if at all, by circumstantial evidence.” Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Simons , 140 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. 2004). And second, when considering such circumstantial evidence, courts must indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in the claimant’s favor. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark , 544 S.W.3d 755, 771 (Tex. 2018). This case arises out of a rear

- end collision caused by a driver who was fleeing a Fort Worth police offi cer, travelling one hundred miles per hour down North Main Street near the Stockyards around eleven o’clock in the morning. An innocent woman was killed, and her husband was injured. Not surprisingly, everyone with the City concluded that the

Court’s mistaken approach to the statute in Cathey v. Booth , 900 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam), and its progeny).3

pursuing offi cer complied with department policies and that the crash would have occurred even if he had stopped pursuing the suspect sooner. They all denied that they ever believed any officer did anything wrong or did anything to cause the accident. The claimants po int to other evidence, however, that supports a reasonable inference that the Department was aware soon after the crash that its officer’s conduct contributed to caus ing the accident. The City conducted an extensive investigation of the accident and conclu ded that “fleeing or evading” the police was one of the contributing causes. The fleeing suspect was charged with “evading arrest or detention,”
elevated to a second

- degree felony for causing death “as a direct result.” The police commander met with the pu rsuing officer at least three different times to “discuss the pros and cons to continuing or terminating pursuits in the future.” At the commander’s order, a police captain also met with all the sergeants and lieutenants to “discuss the same.” The commande r concluded the accident provided a “good opportunity to debrief” the current policy governing “short pursuits” and “quickly evolving incidents.” The assistant chief concurred with th e “additional training” and “corrective actions.” Eight months later, the Department changed its pursuit policy so that it no longer permits a vehicle pursuit based on a traffic violation or suspicion of a stolen vehicle, two of the justifications relied on for the pursuit at issue here. Section 101.101(c) is about notice , not liability. T he challenged
conduct may not turn out to be within the statute’s waiver of immunity ; the claims may fail on the merits. Such a resolution may come quickly. Terminating the litigation on the ground of inadequate notice, though,4

seems incompatible with our current understanding of the statute. If it’s true, as this Court has said, that section 101.101(c) requires claimants

to show only that the governmental defendant was aware that its conduct “may have” caused the harm alleged, that claimants can rely on circumstantial evidence to establish such awareness, and that courts must draw every reasonable inference from that evidenc e in the claimants’ favor, then these claimants make a compelling case that they satisfied the statute’s requirement. If they didn’t, then the Court should take this case to provide further guidance on what qualifies as “actual
notice

. ” I respectfully di ssent from the Court’s denial of this petition for
review.

Jeffrey S. Boyd Justice

OPINION FILED : April 14, 2023