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MOL BACKUP MATERIAL 

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CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY PROGRAM 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

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TITLE TAB 

Preface 

Compartmented Security Requirements 

Dealings with Congressional Committees 2 

2-2 - Members of Congress Both Briefed and 

Exposed to the MOL Program 

MOL Program Objectives Explanations 

3-2 - Answers to Routine Questions, Etc. 

3-3 - Increased Committee Pressure 

3-4 - Committee Insists on Camera Specifics 

Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) System Description 

4-2 - Photographic System Description ' 

4-3 - Orbiting Vehicle Configuration 

Program Content 

5-2 Program Content (Covert Elements)• 

'..Development Status 

6-2 - Payload Development Status 

Cost/Schedule Summary 

7-2 - Cost/Schedule Summary (Covert Elements) 

7-3 - Summary of MOL Funding 

Value of Very. High Resolution Photography 

MOL/AAP Comparison 

9-2 - MOL/AAP Comparison ..(Covert Elements) 

Congressional Environment 

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• 

Security Caution: 

The cover classification of this document has been deliberately 

obscured to facilitate its handling in less than optimum security 

environments. The correct classification is TOP SECRET/BYEMAN/ 

TALENT-KEYHOLE/DORIAN, and it should be safeguarded in accordance 

with appropriate BYEMAN or TALENT-KEYHOLE security procedures. 

All photographic reconnaissance aspects of the MOL system 

are classified TOP SECRET/BYEMAN/DORIAN information. Additionall 

the Eastman Kodak Company, who is developing and producing the 

camera system, is a covert contractor and can only be associated 

with the MOL Program under an appropriate BYEMAN classification/ 

(See Section 1). 

TOP SECRET/BYEMAN security information is not normally 

discussed in full Committee sessions. Only a few members of 

each Committee have been individually briefed in detail on 

the reconnaissance purpose of MOL (See Section 2). 

-10P-SECRET 

PREFACE 

Purpose and Use: 

This document has been assembled as a ready source of MOL. 

information for use by appropriate OSD and AF officials in 

testimony to Congressional Committees in conjunction with the 

FY 70 Budget. 

This document contains both information and data that can 

be disseminated under normal DOD security classifications, plus 

that which is highly sensitive. To assist the user, all 

UNCLASSIFIED through normal DOD TOP SECRET information is 

printed on white paper and is classified with black markings. 

All TOP SECRET/BYEMAN or TALENT-KEYHOLE information is printed 

on yellow paper and is classified with red markings. 

The TOP SECRET/BYEMAN information has been included not for 

use during Committee Hearings, but rather to insure Prepared 

Statements or answers to routine questions are consistent with the,. 

complete and factual information and also for private discuitlions 

with appropriate members of the various Committees and theif staffiik 

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COMPARTMENTED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 

To successfully accomplish a covert intelligence collection 

activity, it is essential that sources and methods be protected. 

Denied area aircraft and satellite reconnaissance programs, as 

one of our prime intelligence operations, have been placed under 

extraordinary security controls at direction of the President. 

The Director of Central Intelligence has been made responsible 

for specifying and enforcing the necessary controls and procedures 

to protect this sensitive information. These controls are the 

BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control Systems, both of which 

are separate and distinct from normal DOD security. Access to these 

special security systems requires a specific must know determination 

by appropriate authority and an individual background investigation 

to establish clearability that exceeds the requirements for TOP 

SECRET information. All personnel must be specifically briefed on 

security requirements and all personnel, except members of Congress, 

must acknowledge their security responsibility in writing. 

cept, design, manufacture, and covert operation of 

systems. It is applied to that portion of a system 

or confirms denied-area reconnaissance capability. 

is by specific program which is identified by a BYE 

compartmentation. PROJECT DORIAN is the MOL Reconn 

Project DORIAN access permits the holder access on 

to the following: confirmation of MOL reconnaissan 

contractors for reconnaissance system and subsystem 

details and funding of the covert aspect of MOL, de 

tion of reconnaissance sensors, targeting informati 

intent and capability, and MOL intelligence communi 

TALENT-KEYHOLE SECURITY: 

TALENT-KEYHOLE security is designed to protect the exploitation 

and dissemination of the collected intelligence pro uct of NRP 

activities. Access to TALENT-KEYHOLE is on a need o know basis 

and it provides access to: existence of the NRO an NRP, an inventory listing of current systems by TALENT-KEYHOLE d si nator, and 

the intelligence product. 

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BYEMAN security is designed to provide protection for the coneconnaissance 

that reveals 

Individual access 

codeword 

issance Mission. 

must know basis 

e mission, 

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ign and appliesmission 

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DEALINGS WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 

NRP clandestine satellite and aircraft overhead reconnaissance 

programs are handled with the appropriate Congressional Committees 

in the following manner. The Chairman is briefed on the project 

and requested to designate the minimum number of Committee and 

Staff members he feels are necessary to permit the Committee to 

fulfill its responsibilities. The minimum number recommended to. 

the Chairman normally are the Senior Minority Party Member and 

the Chief Counsel. As a result, only a few Committee and Staff 

members are briefed in detail on any such program (for obvious 

reasons, these informal arrangements with the Chairman are handled 

very discreetly). 

The reconnaissance aspects of MOL are handled in the same 

manner. The difference, however, is that MOL is an identified 

line item in the Budget and the NRP projects are not. MOL, therefore, must be discussed and justified during full Committee and 

Sub-Committee Hearings; the NRP Projects are not discussed except 

in private sessions with appropriate Committee and Staff members. 

The difficulty of dealing with MOL during normal Hearings is that 

the reconnaissance mission and camera equipment are not discussed. 

(the MOL camera was inadvertently briefly described to the Senate 

Appropriations Military Subcommittee during the FY 69 Budget 

sessions; this was subsequently covered with appropriate security; 

measures). 

Prior to Committee Hearings, a MOL representative (usually, 

Gen Stewart) discusses program objectives, system characteristics 

development status, budget, etc., with MOL-cleared Staff Members 

and MOL-briefed Committee Members (if desired). During the 

Hearings, the Chairman, MOL-briefed Committee Members, and Chief 

Counsel generally endeavor to steer questions and discussions 

away from the sensitive reconnaissance aspects of MOL. In past 

years, although sometimes awkward for DOD witnesses, this has 

worked quite well. 

The following page lists the Congressional Committee and 

Staff Members who are known to have been exposed to information 

or briefed in detail on the reconnaissance mission of MOL and 

its camera system. 

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MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

BOTH BRIEFED AND EXPOSED TO THE MOL PROGRAM 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUT/C/14WD SPACE SCIENCES 

Democrats Republicans 

ANDERSON, Clinton P { Chairman SMITH, Margaret chase 

RUSSELL, Richard B. 

SYMINGTON, Stuart 

STENNIS, John C. 

CANNON, Howard W 

Staff 

GEHRIG, James J. 

VOORHEES, Craig 

PARKER, William 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON. APPROPRIATIONS 

RUSSELL, Richard B Chairman 

STENNIS, John C. 

ELLENDER, Allen Ji 

MANSFIELD, Mike 

SMITH, Margaret 

-YOUNG, Milton 

ALLOTT, Gordon' 

Staff 

WOODRUFF, William W. 

HEWITT, Francis S. 

HARTUNG. Edmund L. 

SENATE COMMITTEE WARMED SERVICES 

STENNIS, John C. .ithairman 

RUSSELL, Richardiki, 

SYMINGTON, Stuart::::: 

CANNON,.HoWardW. 

JACKSON, Henry 

SMITH, Margaret 

'THURMOND, Strom. 

tOWERV John G. 

Staff 

BRASWELL, T. Edward 

KENDALL') James1.- 

GILLEAS y Ben 

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HOUSE COMMITME ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS 

Democrats 

MILLER, George P. - Chairman 

TEAGUE, Olin E. 

KARTH, Joseph E. 

DADDARIO, Emilio Q. 

Republicans 

Staff 

GERARDI, Peter. A. 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

MAHON, George. H. - Chairman 

SIKES, Robert L. F. 

LIPSCOMB, Glenard P. 

MINSHALL, William E. 

Staff 

MICHAELS, Robert L. 

PRESTON, Ralph 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

BATES, William H. 

PIRNIE, Alexander 

HALL, Durward G. 

WHALEN, Charles W., Jr. 

RIVERS, L. Mendel.- Chairman 

PHILBIN, Philip J. 

PRICE, Melvin 

STRATTON, Samuel S. 

ICHORD, Richard 

LENNON, Alton 

RANDALL, William J. 

Staff 

BLANDFORD, John R. 

COOK, William H. 

MORGAN, Earl J. 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

Subcouliaittee on Military Operations 

HOLIFIELD, Chet - Chairman 

Staff 

ROBACK, Herbert 

HORTON, F. J. 

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MOL PROGRAM OBJECTIVES EXPLANATIONS 

Background 

Recent informal discussions with MOL-cleared* House and 

Senate Committee Staff Members indicate some concern for the 

forthcoming Hearings regarding the increasing difficulty of 

justifying MOL to the full Committees without referring to its 

reconnaissance mission. They recognize the problem of discussing MOL in light of the stringent security measures used 

to protect knowledge of the fact, extent, and capability of 

the U.S. covert overhead reconnaissance program (The NRP) but 

nevertheless feel that stronger MOL justification may be needed 

this session. 

The problem exists because only a limited number of Committee 

and Staff members are briefed in detail on the MOL reconnaissance 

mission, and the fact that clandestine overflight of otherwise 

denied areas for reconnaissance purposes is never discussed during 

Committee Hearings (See Section 2). 

Recognizing, nevertheless, that during the FY 70 Budget 

Hearings, a Committee or a particular Member may insist on details 

from a key OSD or AF official, it may become necessary to discuss 

the MOL camera system/reconnaissance mission with a full Committee. 

The following three subsections cotLain increasingly classified 

levels of information,' along with appropriate security safeguards 

to be taken, whidh should be discussed if necessary in increasingly 

difficult situations during Committee Hearings. 

* "NEIL-Cleared" or "MOL-briefed" in this Section refers to the 

reconnaissance aspects of MOL. 

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MATERIAL SUITABLE FOR USE IN PREPARED STATEMENTS, 

ANSWERS TO ROUTINE QUESTIONS, ETC. 

The following material should be used as appropriate in 

Prepared Statements, responses to routine questions during full 

Committee Hearings, etc. (Note: Although initially classified 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, CONFIDENTIAL, or SECRET, as appropriate 

for the entire Statement or Hearing Transcript, the following 

will subsequently be cleared for inclusion in the public record). 

The basic purpose of MOL has remained the same since the 

President approved the Program in 1965: 

1. To develop new defense-related technology and 

equipment for both manned and unmanned space flight, and to 

perform new and rewarding experiments with that technology 

and equipment. 

2. To acquire new knowledge on what man is able to 

do in space related to the defense of America. 

Additionally, the following is pertinent: 

1. MOL does not carry bombs or weapons of any kind, 

and in no way abrogates the space treaty or U.S. commitments in 

that regard. 

2. Like most DOD major R&D space projects (VELA; 

Defense SatCom; TRANSIT; MIDAS; etc.), which unlike ground-based 

development efforts usually provide an early useful service to 

the strategic and tactical forces, MOL is also expected to provide 

a useful Defense support function at the outset. This support 

function appears to be of such value as to justify the program 

cost. 

3. The MOL and NASA AAP Orbital Workshop are not 

unnecessarily duplicative. The Workshop cannot accommodate the 

Defense-related experimental hardware MOL is designed to carry. 

MOL, on the other hand, could accomplish only a limited number 

of the Workshop objectives even if the experimental DOD hardware 

were removed. (See Section 9). 

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INCREASED COMMITTEE PRESSURE 

FOR MORE SPECIFIC MOL MISSION INFORMATION 

1. Ask to go "off the record." 

2. Caution any non-Committee government Legislative Liaison 

people present that the following is highly classified, sensitive 

information -- and no notes are to be taken or subsequent memos 

written without your approval. 

3. Identify MOL as a "surveillance" system which, by virtue 

of its polar orbit, will have overhead access to the entire world. 

MOL contains a very-advanced, highly-classified earth sensor 

designed for operation at orbital altitudes on the order of 70-80 

miles. The technical intelligence information obtained is expected 

to be of great value to DOD force planning and operational employment, and should also be highly valuable in any future Strategic 

Arms Limitation Agreement that might be reached. . . . Emphasize 

that MOL is not a bomb-in-orbit. Point out reason for DOD 

extreme reluctance to admit MOL is a surveillance system is the 

international "delicacy" of this subject. . . . (Avoid identifying 

the specific MOL "surveillance" sensor if possible.) 

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FULL COMMITTEE INSISTS 

ON CAMERA SYSTEM/MISSION SPECIFICS 

1. Ask Chairman to have a few words in private with him. 

2. If this is one of the Armed Services or Appropriations 

Committees (or Subcommittees), ask the Chairman to somehow divert 

the line of questioning. If other than an Armed Services or 

Appropriations Committee or Subcommittees, explain policy of those 

Committee Chairmen in stringently limiting access and suggest consultation with them prior to any further action. 

3. If a decision is nevertheless reached to discuss the subject with the full or designated Committee members, proceed as 

follows: 

a. Request to remain completely "off the record," no 

notes, etc. 

b. Request that the Hearing Room be cleared of everyone 

except the Committee members, MOL-cleared Committee Staff members, 

and MOL-cleared DOD witnesses. 

c. Request the Chairman to have the Chief Counsel record 

the names of all present in the roam. State that what will be discussed is highly sensitive, should not be discussed outside the 

Hearing Room, that indiscreet disclosure could have grave repercussions both present and future for U.S. security, etc. 

d. Describe the MOL camera in layman-terms as the world's 

largest, high resolution camera ever to be flown in either an aircraft or a space vehicle 

y about o MOL missions per,. 

year for technical intelligence on Sino-Soviet strategic and tactical 

weapons systems, etc. MOL might photograph as many as 2,500 SinoSoviet targets in a single 30-day mission. . . . Point out this 

super resolution is not needed for broad National Intelligence 

Estimates (for example, numbers of ICBM's, missile-firing wh ` marine 

capability, strategic bombers, etc.) -- but is needed to determine 

precisely how capable the Sino-Soviet offensive/defense weapon 

systems are so that U.S. Armed Forces can be equipped, sized, and 

used accordingly. Note that a 20,000 manhour DDR&E/DIA study effort. 

in 1968 concluded that the value of such info to DOD operations and 

force structure decisions would be worth a great deal. 

e. Finally, at the conclusion of the discussion, repeat 

the request to not discuss or write about MOL as a reconnaissance 

vehicle outside this Hearing Room. 

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MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY (MOL) SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 

The major elements of the 30,000 pound MOL spacecraft consist 

of the Gemini B ascent re-entry vehicle; a Laboratory Module consisting of both a pressurized compartment and an unpressurized 

service section housing oxygen, helium, hydrogen, fuel cells, 

attitude control and auxiliary propulsion systems; and a Mission 

Module which houses the mission experiments equipment. 

The Gemini B, Laboratory Module, and Mission Module will be 

launched as an integral unit by a Titan IIIM booster into a nominal 

80 x 186 nm elliptical orbit. Sufficient expendables will be 

carried for at least 30 days of on-orbit "shirt-sleeve" operations 

by the two man MOL crews. 

The Titan IIIM is a modified version of the standard Titan IIIC 

booster. The number of segments in each 120-inch diameter strap-on 

solid rocket motor is increased from five to seven; the Transtage 

is removed for increased low altitude performance and higher 

expansion ratio nozzles are used on the first stage of the core 

for better performance. 

A single pad facility, SLC-6, is being built at Vandenberg 

AFB to permit safe launches into polar orbits. 

On-orbit command and control will be exercised through existing 

world-wide facilities of the Air Force Satellite Control Facility 

(SCF). Only minor modifications will be necessary to accommodate 

MOL, primarily increased computer capacity and the addition of 

voice communications. Gemini recovery in the Pacific or Atlantic. 

will be accomplished by the portion of the DOD air and sea forces 

also used for Apollo Program. 

Fourteen Air Force, Navy, and Marine graduates of the Air Force 

Aerospace Research Pilot School are engaged in an extensive training 

program and are participating as project officers on various components and subsystems in the engineering development phase. The 

training is similar to that accorded NASA astronauts plus a great 

deal of specialized training in the experimental military equipment 

installed in the MOL spacecraft. 

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PHOTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 

The MOL photographic system consists of a focal 

length (ViliiiRoss-Telephoto lens) frame camera. The ground 

image will be reflected from the six-foot tracking mirror aft 

to the six-foot parabolic primary mirror, then forward through 

diagonal "folding" mirrors and Ross corrector lenses to the camera 

back, which is in the pressurized laboratory compartment. The 

circular flat tracking mirror and the circular aspheric primary 

mirror weigh approximately 1200 pounds each before mounting. The 

entire photographic system will weigh approximately 6400 pounds, 

not including film. The baseline configuration system will carry 

190 pounds of primary and 50 pounds of secondary film. 

As a consequence of the long focal length required to adhieve 

the desired very high resolution, the optical field of view is 

relatively small (1.1 degrees). This equates to a circle approxii. 

mately 9,000 feet in diameter, at ground nadir, from an altitude 

of 80 nm. 

In actual 

practice, the camera will be operated at various lower and higher 

altitudes, out to 380 obliquities, and against targets of both 

higher and lower contrast ratios, and against better and worse 

than standard atmospheres. 

A feature of the flight crew portion of the camera system is 

the Acquisition . & Tracking Scope (ATS). The ATS is a 10" objective; 

refractive high power telescope which contains the hardware and 

optical elements which will provide the functions of magnification 

zoom, image orientation, solar blanking, filtering, focusing, 

centering, peripheral display and cue insertion. The ATS will enabl* 

the astronauts to observe and evaluate targets prior to photography 

and will assist in the computer controlled pointing and tracking 

operations. 

Man, in addition to shortening the operational system deVelopment cycle, will improve the performance of the system by peaking; 

system alignments and focus adjustments, by centering targets in 

the field-of-view of the optics and by controlling mirror tracking 

rates. He will add to system effectiveness by switching targets O 

avoid weather and cloud cover, and by noting unusual targtactiVitY: 

which provide previously unanticipated.intelligence opportunity:. 

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PROGRAM CONTENT 

On August 25, 1965 President Johnson announced that he was 

instructing the DOD to proceed with the development of a Manned 

Orbiting Laboratory (MOL). The President stated that the initial 

unmanned launch of a fully equipped laboratory was scheduled for 

1968. This would be followed later that year by the first of 

five flights with two-man crews. However, system development did 

not start immediately, and during the twelve months, subsequent 

to program approval by the President, MOL activities largely focused 

on program definition and the selection of major contractors. These 

were McDonnell Douglas (Western Division) - Laboratory Module and 

Experiment Module Structure; McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company 

(Eastern Division) - Gemini B Spacecraft; and, General Electric 

Company - Experiment Integration. 

Approval for the initiation of Phase II (Engineering Development) was given on 1 September 1966. By this time, as the result 

of extensive program definition activities, the technical scope of 

the program had broadened and a seventh flight had been added to 

insure accomplishment of all program objectives. The seven flight 

program consisted of two unmanned Titan IIIM/Gemini B/Laboratory 

Structure qualification launches followed by five 30-day and longer 

all-up launches. At that point the first manned launch was 

scheduled for December 1969. In the interval between September 

1966 and February 1969, the program underwent a number of major 

schedule alterations due to some technical constraints and a series 

of fiscal year funding limitations. The net effect of these events 

was to delay the launch of the first manned flight until late CY 71 

or early CY 72. 

In February 1969, the Secietary of Defense conducted a comprehensive review of the MOL program -- its objectives, current 

development status, earlier detailed analyses, and its relationship to NASA manned space projects and other DOD space activities. 

It was determined that the program objectives could probably be 

accomplished within a six rather than a seven launch program. This 

conclusion resulted directly from the increased knowledge, experience 

and maturity of manned spaceflight as demonstrated by the Apollo 

Program. The distribution of the flights are now two unmanned 

qualification flights and four 30-day manned flights, with the 

first manned flight scheduled for early calendar year 1972. 

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PROGRAM CONTENT 

The President, on August 25, 1965, approved a program consisting of one unmanned qualification flight, one manned qualification flight without a' camera system aboard, and four 3O day 

manned reconnaissance flights. 

In September 1966, after contract definition and more complete 

evaluation of the National need it was decided to conduct a seven 

instead of a six flight program. The seven flight program comprised 

the following: two unmanned, partial-system launches (e.g., no 

prime mission hardware aboard) to qualify the Titan IIIM booster, 

verify the orbiting vehicle basic structural integrity, and qualify 

the Gemini B in a sub-orbital ballistic trajectory; three 30-day 

manned/automatic system missions in fully operational reconnaissance 

configuration; and two 30-60 day unmanned/automatic system missions.' 

in fully operational photographic configuration. 

A comprehensive MOL review conducted by the Secretary of Defense 

in February 1969, concluded that it was not necessary to fly the 

MOL unmanned to demonstrate automatic operation of the camera system 

that if extended unmanned future operations were desired, the unman 

ned MOL vehicle (as a minimum modification of the manned vehicle) It 

not an optimized system; and that the three manned flights alone 

should generally meet all MOL Program objectives. 

Therefore, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Air 

Force and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, further 

development effort toward the unmanned MOL configuration was 

deferred until at least FY 72. However, because of fabrication 

lead time considerations, a fourth manned reconnaissance mission 

was added to protect, until the FY 72 budget, the option of a 

continuing very high resolution reconnaissance program in the 19701 

if that should prove desirable. In the interim, studies will be 

conducted that will examine optimized and lower cost unmanned 

systems using the MOL camera, manned and unmanned operational recalls.' 

naissance considerations, and other possible 'MOIL applications and 

configurations. 

The schedule calls for the first manned flight in early CY. 1972 

and the remaining flightiunn approximately six Month centers there. 

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DEVELOPMENT STATUS 

Throughout the past year much attention has been given to 

confirming and improving system safety and reliability. Operational development work is proceeding on MOL and the development, 

fabrication and testing of major systems and support components 

is welll along. Hardware for the first three launches (the two 

unmanned qualification launches plus the first manned flight) is 

now in fabrication. This summer fabrication will begin on the 

hardware for the fourth launch (second manned flight). Other 

milestones completed during the past year and planned for CY 1969 

include: 

- The sample Pressure Suit Assembly tests were successful, 

and have shown that mobility, reproducibility and donning characteristics are exceeding expectations. 

- The MOL launch abort system simulation program has been 

successfully completed. 

- Feeding System Assembly tests have confirmed the quality 

and effectiveness of the MOL astronaut feeding system. 

- T-IIIM ground and airborne equipment hardware design 

and fabrication is well along. 

- The specification for electrical wiring in the MOL flight 

vehicle has been changed from Teflon to Kapton material. This 

change is one product of an MOL Safety Review which was accelerated 

as a result of the Apollo fire. 

- Construction of Space Launch Complex-6, for MOL, will be 

completed and the installation and check out of Aerospace Ground 

Equipment will begin. 

- Solid Rocket Motor development test firings will begin. 

- The Environmental Control and Life Support Test Module 

will be tested in a space environmental vacuum chamber. 

- Development testing of the Mission Module Test Vehicle, 

which is the first complete test of equipment in the flight configuration, will be initiated. 

- The mission development simulator will begin full operation 

to further the development of mission procedures and time dynamics, -

and to provide for flight crew training. 

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PAYLOAD DEVELOPMENT STATUS 

Optical facilities and test chambers at Eastman Kodak continue 

on schedule including the first use of the Acoustic Chamber by M4L 

during this year. 

Assessment of camera optical performance will continue throughout the year. The manufactured optical quality of the lens system; 

the accuracy of the tracking mirror drive system; and the induced 

smear budget arising from system vibration, tracking system errors 

and related error sources are under constant review to insure 

meeting optical performance goals. Performance predictions for the 

camera cystem currently.equal or exceed design specifications. 

Deliveries of mirrors fabricated from an ultra low coefficient 

of expinsion (ULE) plastic will continue. Polishing is proceeding 

satisfactorily with the quality of the optical surfaces approaching 

or meeting specifications. 

Two different Image Velocity Sensor designs are undergoing 

tests by General Electric. One of the two designs will be selected 

for the production model during the year. 

Two units of the beryllium gimbal (tracking mirror structure) 

have been delivered to General Electric and are in test. The static 

load test of the mission module forward section with the gimbal and 

tracking mirror substitute has been completed. The Dynamic Test 

and Thermal Test vehicle programs will be completed in CY 1969. 

The first Acquisition and Tracking Scope (ATS) unit, known as 

the Engineering Model, will be delivered by ITEK to General Electgic 

in late 1969. As indicated in a previous section, the ATS is a 

high power zoom telescope which provides each crewman the capability 

to observe and evaluate both primary and alternate targets for 

activity and cloud cover and make positioning corrections to the 

main optics as required. The ATS incorporated two magnification 

ranges (16 to 32 power or 63 to 127 power) with the corresponding 

resolutions 15.3 ft to 11.5 ft., low power range, and 5.7 ft to 

3.3 ft for the high power range. 

The Mission Development Simulator (MDS) at General Electric 

will be operating this year. Simulation techniques developed on 

the MDS will be employed in the MOL simulator at Vandenberg AFB and 

will assist in the development of on-orbit software and cue material 

for the astronauts. 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 SECRET 

COST/SCHEDULE SUMMARY 

Since engineering development began in September 1966, there 

have been five major development schedule extensions which have 

caused the first manned launch date to be moved from December 1969 

to early 1972, and the total cost to increase from approximately 

$2 to $3 billion: 

(1) In the Spring of 1967, the first manned launch date 

was changed to December 1970 to permit the development of more 

advanced experimental hardware and to preclude the need for much 

higher than available FY 68 funds. The estimated total cost was 

then approximately $2.35 billion; 

(2) In December 1967, recognition of greater than anticipated difficulty in developing the experimental hardware and some 

shortage of FY 68 funds caused the first manned launch to be 

rescheduled to August 1971. The estimated total cost was then 

approximately $2.84 billion. 

(3) In June . 1968, the reduction of FY 69 funding by 

$85 million to $515 million (as part of the $3 billion DOD expenditure reduction) caused the first manned launch to be rescheduled to 

December 1971 with an increase in the estimated total program cost 

to $2.95 billion. 

(4) In December 1968, the planned $600 million NOA for 

FY 1970 was reduced to $576 million. Shortly thereafter, it 

became apparent that program requirements were closer to $635-

$640 million for FY 1970 if the planned schedule was to be 

maintained. Therefore, it became evident that it would be 

necessary to delay the first manned launch into early CY 1972. 

Estimated total program costs rose to $3.04 billion. 

(5) In 1969, the Secretary of Defense reviewed MOL objectives, present status, earlier analysis, relationship to NASA 

manned space flight programs and other DOD space activities. MOL 

objectives and the unique value of MOL to National Defense needs 

were reaffirmed. Progress and increasing maturity in manned space 

flight led to the conclusion that the program could be reduced 

from seven to six launches with an estimated total program cost 

reduction of $200 million and a FY 1970 fund requirement reduction 

from $576 to $556 million. In late March 1969, a further reduction 

in FY 1970 NOA to $525 million was affected. This will cause a 

further delay in the flight schedule to as late as mid CY 1972 

and an increase in total program costs to $2.93 billion. 

Tab 7-1 
Tab 7-2 

SAFSL BY1,68259. 

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MArimorvlovg. 

BYEMAN-TALENT.KEYHOLE 

CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY. 

COST/SCHEDULE SUMMARY 

In September 1966, when MOL entered into engineering develop* 

ment, the program included both manned and unmanned reconnaissance 

missions in a seven launch program (two unmanned qualification 

launches; three manned; and two unmanned reconnaissance missions). 

The first manned launch was then projected to take place in December, 

1969 carrying a qualification/test model of the camera/optical . 

system (expected to produce resolutions 

contractor as a "best possible effort" although his technical 

judgment regarded it as marginal. 

In the Spring of 1967, it became obvious that continuation of 

system development toward a December 1969 first manned system launch 

would require at least $150 million more in FY 68 than the $430 

lion included in the President's Budget Estimate. It was concluded' 

that both FY 68 funding requirements could be reduced and the program would benefit overall by flying a "production" model camera 

rather than a qual/test model camera on the first manned flight and 

thus achieve the resolution goal at the outset. 

Therefore, the first manned launch was rescheduled to December 

1970; the total cost estimate was increased to $2.35 billion. 

In the Fall of 1967, it became apparent that the AF/00 could 

not reprogram an additional $50 million NOA needed by the MOL program. At about the same time, it was also recognized that the cast 

system development would take even longer than anticipated. For 

these two reasons, the first manned launch was rescheduled to August 

1971. It was also decided at this time to increase potential life', 

time of the unmanned systems from 33 to 56 days. The combined 

stretch-out of development, change in unmanned configuration, and 

better cost-definition caused the estimate of program total cost 

to increase to $2.84 billion. 

In early CY 1969, following an extensive review of the MOL 

Program by the Secretary of Defense, the value to the DOD of the M1004. 

objective of photography was reaffirmed. It was also concluded,. 

for reasons indicated in Section 5-2, that development effort on dill 

unmanned MOL configuration could be deferred at least until FY 71. 

A fourth manned flight was added to the program to protect, until 

the FY 72 budget, the option of a continuing very high resolution 

reconnaissance program. Accordingly, FY 1970 NOA was revised to 

$576 million and total cost to $2.84 billion without a change in 

flight schedule. However, the further reduction in FY 1970 NOA 

to $525 million could delay the first all-up flight to as late as 

mid CY 1972 and total program cost will increase to $2.93 b pion 

DORIAN' 

HANDLE ViA 

BYEM4N-TALENINKRYHOLE. 

, pat4Tiol. SYSTEMS JCINT6Y 
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SUMMARY OF }J)L FUNDING 

(Millions) 

First 

Manned To 

Date Launch FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FY 70 

Fall 66 Dec 691286 587 646 344 117 1,980 

Completion Total 

June 67 Dec 702' 288 480 680 541 361 2,350 

Dec 67 Aug 71 292 430 600 600 918 2,840 

Jul 68 Dec 71 292 430 

Dec 68 Feb 72+ 292 430 

:; 2,947 

3,038 

Mar 69 Feb 72+ 292 430 

Mar 69 Mid 72 292 430 

2,885. 

2,925 

515 600 1,110 

515 576 1 225 

515 556 1,042 

515 525 1,163 

1. Qual Model Camera on first manned flight. 

2. Production Camera, All-Up Recce Mission on first manned flight 

NOTE: Only the footnotes on this page are classified TOP SECRET, BYEMAN. If they are removed, classification is CONFIDENT 

DORIAN 

Handle via BYEMAN. 

Coned System 

.Tab 7-3 

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-TOPIECREE HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOte 

CONTROL SYSTEMS JO/N11.4 

VALUE OF VERY HIGH RESOLUTION PHOTOGRAPHY 

Since the inception of the MOL concept as a very high resolu 

tion (VHR) photographic reconnaissance satellite, the major issus 

has been whether or not the increased intelligence information 

from MOL photography over that achievable with the KH-8 high reso 

lution surveillance satellite system is worth the high cost of 

the MOL Program. 

The Director, CIA, in a May 1968 letter to the Deputy Under 

Secretary of State, stated that while there was no question about 

better resolution photography being more helpful, the CIA was 

unable to find benefits from the MOL Program of sufficient impor. 

tance to national intelligence to justify the very large cost 

involved. The Director, CIA suggested that DOD assess the value 

of VHR photography in its areas of concern. 

As a result, in mid-1968, the Director of Defense Research, 

and Engineering convened an Ad Hoc Group of DDR&E, DIA, NRO, and 

MOL representatives to assess the value of VHR photography. 

Support and/or consultant services of all DOD intelligence activitielj 

CIA elements, and appropriate contractors were used by the Ad Hoc ,. 

Group. Studies on scientific and technical intelligence, physical 

vulnerability, unidentified installations, signature analysis, 

electronic and other order of battle, SIGINT support, ballistic 

missile defense penetration, reentry vehicles, camouflage detectio4 

arms limitation situations, crisis 

reconnaissance, etc., were accomplished by the Group. 

The Group concluded that VHR imagery would provide much more 

accurate performance estimates of foreign weapon systems up to 

several years sooner than could otherwise be obtained. The Group 

agreed with the CIA that VHR imagery was not too significant for 

broad national intelligence estimates (e.g., numbers of ICBM's, the 

possession of missile-firing submarines, the existence of an ABM 

capability, etc.); however, the Group concluded that VHR imagery 

would have very great value to DOD in multi-billion dollar force 

structure decisions and in the deployment/employment of operations 

forces. The Group also concluded that the value would be very high 

in any probable future strategic arms limitation agreement situation 

and that there were additional benefits (significant, but of lesser, 

value) of the MOL system theoPti 

of black and white and color film coverage of the same target '' t 

crisis reconnaissance, etc. 

HANDLE VfA .: 

,EtypOti-TALEfftigAS, 
functions, the L value of which will fully justify its cost.. 

a: From the,outset, MOL is expected to perform military support 

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MOL/AAP COMPARISON 

MOL and the NASA Apollo Applications Orbital Workshop are 

not duplicative; they are similar only in that they both operate 

in space in relatively low earth orbit and make use of certain 

common technologies and hardware components. Under the terms of 

the Space Act of 1958, the DOD is obligated to investigate and/or 

operate in space to enhance the security of the United States. 

That is the single purpose of MOL--to improve the security of the 

nation. MOL is a major Defense Department effort designed to 

develop both manned and unmanned space equipment to be used in 

support of our defense forces, and to learn more about the extent 

of man's utility in space for defense purposes. AAP is a NASA 

scientific effort directed toward the goals of advanced space 

technology and manned orbital operations of extended duration. 

In the development of MOL, every practical effort has been 

made to utilize already developed technology and hardware from 

NASA and other DOD space programs. Both NASA and DOD have studied 

each other's equipment and technology on a continuing basis. The 

most recent review was completed in Fall 1968 as part of DOD/NASA 

joint economy studies. This study concluded, as have all previous 

ones, that the NASA Orbital Workshop cannot accommodate the MOL 

experimental equipment because the Workshop cannot be flown low 

enough for the prolonged periods required. The study also showed 

that the MOL, less DOD experimental equipment, could satisfy a 

number of AAP objectives for flights up to 60 days duration with 

minimum modifications to the MOL vehicle. Further, the AAP experiments on the Astronomical Telescope Mount (ATM) could also be accommodated with some redesign and repackaging. It was also clear that, . 

without major redesign and high cost, the MOL was not adequate for 

missions involving rendezvous, resupply, and revisit. . 

MOL, while drawing heavily on NASA Gemini/Apollo technology and 

equipments, represents a state-of-the-art spacecraft design which has 

been tailored to the conduct of advanced military oriented experiments of great complexity. It is the most advanced program in the 

United States, military or civilian, in the technology which places 

primary emphasis on the interaction between man and instrumentation. 

MOL, while dedicated . to military applications, is not a weapons 

carrier. It is peaceful; it poses no threat to any nation; it is, 

not in violation of any treaty. 
DORIAN 

dandle via BYEMAN 

lontrel System 

Tab 9.2 

SAYSL SYS OS/PO*40 

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MOL/AAP COMPARISON 

The MOL photographic reconnaissance payload cannot be flown 

in the NASA Orbital Workshop for two major reasons: 

1. The Workshop, due to size and configuration, cannot 

be flown efficiently at the low altitudes required of MOL (perigee 

as low as 70 nm in the target area) for best performance 

ground resolution) for the prolonged periods required--

30 days. The Workshop will be configured to normally operate with'; 

perigees of from 150 nm to 200 nm. Under these conditions the bee 

DORIAN camera resolutions would be of the order of 

which would be about the same as the expected performance 

of the most advanced unmanned system in the current inventory. 

Therefore, there would be no point in developing or operating the 

DORIAN system. 

2. The orbital inclinations which will be flown in AAP 

are essentially those flown in Gemini or Apollo earth orbits and, 

the ground tracks do not cover the areas of interest. The MOL 

payload must be flown in polar orbit to have access to the entire 

world in order to accomplish the reconnaissance mission. To 

achieve a polar orbit from Cape Kennedy without overflight of 

populated areas, would require a major "dog leg" maneuver. Studi 

show that this higher energy trajectory would require a Si 

launch vehicle for the Workshop. 

e00 

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ontrol System 
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CONGRESSIONAL ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT 

Previous Years 

Congress has appropriated precisely money requested for MOL 

by the President except in FY 1967 when they increased his budget 

request by $50 million. In FY 1969 the amount requested was 

reduced by $85 million with DOD concurrence as part of the overall DOD $3.0 billion reduction. 

Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees 

have generally supported MOL from its inception. However, the 

ardency of this support has waned with increasing concern over 

cost, schedule slippage, and the suspected duplication of MOL 

with AAP on the part of certain Congressmen (which cannot be 

satisfactorily rebutted in unclassified terms). 

The Senate Space Committee has been generally neutral, primarily concerned with duplication of NASA work. However, their 

interest in MOL has steadily increased as NASA budget requests 

experienced more difficulty. 

The House Science and Astronautics Committee has not requested 

formal testimony from DOD officials. However, the committee 

chairman and key staff members have received briefings. The ranking 

Republican member of this committee, Rep Fulton, has been a constant 

and vociferous critic of MOL. 

Regarding duplication, DOD officials repeatedly have pointed 

out in testimony that: 

- MOL is part of DOD contribution to the National spact 

effort as delineated in the Space Act of 1958; 

- MOL objectives are strictly military oriented; 

- The MOL configuration represents the most economical 

use of hardware and technology from both NASA and DOD programs; 

and was designed specifically to meet MOL objectives. The Orbital, 

Workshop cannot accommodate the MOL experimental hardware. 

- There has been close coordination and a free exchange 

of information technology and hardware between NASA and DOD from 

the beginning of MOL. 
• NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 -CONFIDENTIAL- 

- Any attempt to merge MOL and NASA's Apollo Applications . 

Program would result in a compromise spacecraft unable to satisfactorily meet the objectives of either program; and would prove 

to be more costly rather than less. 

Regarding funding, total cost and schedule slippage: 

- Each year, Air Force officials have been asked if the 

President's budget request is adequate to program needs. The 

responses have all been negative, but qualified, pointing out that 

schedule readjustment would be necessary and would not seriously 

harm the program; but would affect total cost. 

- Total program cost estimates given Congress began with 

$1.5 billion with President's 1965 announcement (the $1.5 billion 

was an internal DOD approximate estimate prior to any program 

definition work with contractors), rose to $2.2 billion in FY 68 

cycle, then to $2.9 billion in FY 1969. Serious concern over 

total cost began to appear in the FY 1969 hearings. Reasons given 

by DOD for increase: better cost estimate after completion of 

contract definition phase; decision to fly more advanced versions 

of experiment equipment; schedule stretch-outs due to early technical problems with experimental equipment and inadequate fundihg. 

- Schedule slippage has been attributed by DOD witnesses 

to: early technical problems with experimental equipment; decision 

to fly more advanced versions of technical equipment; funding 

limitations. 

Outlook for FY 1970 

Greater scrutiny than ever is anticipated this year considering 

the general mood of Congress concerning defense costs and spending 

on space programs in general. The MOL Program Office has responded 

to a request from the Senate Armed Services Committee for a comprehensive funding history of the program including reasons for cost 

increases. 

Again this year, another adjustment in the MOL schedule must be . 

reported as well as a major program change (from seven to six launches) 

This latter change will probably generate considerable interest. 

Intense questioning on NASA-DOD duplication is also expected, particularly with regard to any future space program plans, including 

merger of DOD and NASA projects. There are also indications that 

the value of MOL in relation to.its cost may be seriously questioned. 

This of course, will be extremely difficult to answer in full 

committee sessions, 

Tab 10