15-756-cv 

Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 27th day of January, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, 

DENNY CHIN, 

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

 Circuit Judges. 

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SONIA GONZALEZ, LUIS GONZALEZ, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

1

v. 15-756-cv 

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, SAND 

CANYON CORPORATION, DALE M. 

SUGIMOTO, FABIOLA N. CAMPERI, 

MATTHEW A. ENGEL, WILLIAM S. SMITH, 

LEOPOLD and ASSOCIATES, OPTION ONE 

MORTGAGE CORPORATION, AMERICAN 

 

1 Although the notice of appeal was signed only by Sonia Gonzalez, who is consequently 

listed on the docket as the sole appellant, Luis Gonzalez is also deemed an appellant 

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(2), which states that a pro se notice of appeal is considered 

filed on behalf of the signer and the signer’s spouse, unless the notice clearly indicates 

otherwise. The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the case caption accordingly. 
HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, 

INCORPORATED, SOUNDVIEW HOME 

LOAN TRUST 2005-OPT3, HUNT LEIBERT 

JACOBSON, P.C., BENJAMIN T. 

STASKIEWICZ, S. BRUCE FAIR, Esq., JON 

DOE, JAN DOE, HINSHAW & 

CULBERTSON, LLP, VALERIE N. DOBLE, 

 Defendants. 

----------------------------------------------------------

FOR APPELLANTS: Sonia Gonzalez, pro se, East Windsor, 

Connecticut. 

FOR APPELLEE: Marissa Delinks, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, 

Boston, Massachusetts. 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Connecticut (Charles S. Haight, Judge).2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment deemed to have been entered on October 5, 2015, is 

AFFIRMED.3

 

 Plaintiffs Luis and Sonia Gonzalez appeal pro se from the dismissal of their 

complaint charging Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) and 

others with violating the United States Constitution and the United Nations Declaration on 

 

2 The Honorable Charles S. Haight, Jr., Southern District of New York, sitting by 

designation. 

 

3

 Because no separate judgment was entered in this matter as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

58(a), a judgment is deemed to have been entered 150 days after the district court’s May 6, 

2015 ruling on plaintiffs’ “motion to reargue and request for judge to 

reconsider/articulate,” which the district court construed as a motion for reconsideration. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). However, because that 

calculation ends on Saturday, October 3, 2015, we deem the judgment entered on Monday, 

October 5, 2015. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). 
3 

the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as bank fraud, in foreclosing on their Windsor, 

Connecticut home. The district court sua sponte concluded that it lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Ocwen Home Loan Servicing, 74 F. Supp. 3d 504, 510−18 

(D. Conn. 2015). We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, 

see Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012), and can affirm “on any basis 

supported by the record,” Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010). We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case, which 

we reference only to explain our decision to affirm dismissal because plaintiffs’ claims are 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and claim preclusion. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal-court plaintiff who complains of 

injuries caused by an adverse state-court judgment from seeking federal review and 

rejection of the state judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 

U.S. 280, 284 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); accord Green v. Mattingly, 585 

F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, insofar as plaintiffs here (1) contend that Deutsche 

Bank (a) lacked standing to pursue their home’s foreclosure in state court, see Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ (a)(2), 7, 13, 17−18, 36, or (b) fraudulently obtained title to the home, see id. 

¶¶ 2, 5, 7, 13, 25; or (2) seek to recover for injuries caused by the state judgment, their 

claims are barred because the validity of the foreclosure was already fully adjudicated in 

the state-court proceeding. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Gonzalez, No. 
4 

HHD-CV10-6011071-S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010); see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home 

Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that Rooker-Feldman bars 

fraud claims asking “federal court to determine whether the state judgment was wrongfully 

issued in favor of parties who, contrary to their representations to the court, lacked standing 

to foreclose,” which “would require the federal court to review the state proceedings and 

determine that the foreclosure judgment was issued in error”); Russo v. GMAC Mortg., 

LLC, 549 F. App’x 8, 9−10 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (applying Rooker-Feldman bar 

to claims for injuries caused by state-court foreclosure judgment). Accordingly, the 

district court correctly dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims seeking reconsideration of the 

foreclosure judgment. 

To the extent plaintiffs’ complaint can be liberally construed to allege injury 

stemming from the same transaction but not directly caused by the foreclosure judgment, 

their claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Nevertheless, we affirm dismissal on the 

ground of claim preclusion. See O’Connor v. Pierson, 568 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) 

(stating that, under Connecticut law, “[c]laim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims 

relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

these claims in Gonzalez v. Option One Mortgage Corporation, No. 

HHD-CV11-5035882-S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011), and, thus, to the extent the claims were 

not barred by Rooker-Feldman, they were nevertheless correctly dismissed as precluded. 
5 

These rulings make it unnecessary for us to decide whether dismissal was also 

warranted for failure to state a claim, failure to serve defendants, or failure to timely 

prosecute the action. 

We have considered all of plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and conclude that they 

are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and 

DENY plaintiffs’ motion for reversal. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court