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MEMORANDUM FOR LT GENERAL WILSON, IC STAFF

SUBJECT: Senate Review of the Intelligence Community

In preparation for Mr. Colby's testimony to the Senate

Select Committee investigating intelligence community activities, the following information pertaining to the National

Reconnaissance Program is offered. Attachment 1 contains

ground rules and other criteria which will be necessary to

provide the required security protection for the NRP information likely to be discussed. Suggested NRP related topics

for inclusion in Mr. Colby's opening statement to the

Committee are given in Attachment 2. A description of the

NRO/Intelligence Community interface is shown in Attachment 3.

A copy of the NRP Charter which was also provided to the NSC

for the Presidential Commission Study is included in Attachment 4.

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4 Attachments

Ground Rules for NRP

Topics for Mr. Colby's

Opening Statement

The lelationship • of the NRO

to the Intelligence Community

NIP Charter •

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J. IL Plummer

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GROUND RULES 

In order to provide the necessary protection for the

sensitive National Reconnaissance Program information which

will be provided to the Senate Select Committee, it is requested that the following ground rules be established with

the Committee:

-- Information relating to reconnaissance satellite

activities presented only in closed session and off the record

when specific details are discussed.

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Provide for IRO security review of any NRP

Record.

related testimony prior to printing in the Congressional

-- No discussion or confirmation of any news media

• healing providing there is no

stories quoting unnamed sour

satellite or NRO activities.

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lacing on reconnaissance

rity can be selfoccur.

-- The Committee members must be cautioned on the

sensitivity of the information and the international consequences

of public statements regarding satellite reconnaissance operations. Countermeasures or other information-denial techniques

could be easily employed against NRP systems should US officials

openly discuss and cause public attention to be focused upon

reconnaissance satellite operational details.

-- Specific information concerning the National

Reconnaissance Office and its role with regard to satellite

reconnaissance not bi initially discussed with the Senate

Select Committee.

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OPENING STATEMENT TOPICS •

The following topics regarding MBA related matters

would be appropriate for Mr. Colby to include in his opening

statement to the Senate Select Committee:

- Reconnaissance satellites have been credited as

being the most effective source of intelligence information

for the United States. •

- Reconnaissance satellite operations do not conflict with present concepts of international law and actually

contribute to the reduction of international tensions.

- Intelligence collection from space has not been

'challenged by other governments mainly because it is perceived

as a benign activity and it is not acknowledged officially by

our government.

- Reconnaissance satellites are an important factor

during the SALT verification process.

-- Reconnaissance satellite capabilities and operations are well known through the Executive Branch.

-- Plans for all reconnaissance satellite operations

are given to the Rational. Security Council's 40 Committee.

- Close attention to security detail is required

for successful operations of reconnaissance satellites.

- Satellite developments and operations are within

the bounds of public law with maximum possible coordination

within the government.

-- Strong Congressional oversight of reconnaissance

satellite activities has been maintained over the years.

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• THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE NRO TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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4 The Director, National Reionnaissance Office (DNRO)

executes the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) through

the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in accordance with

an August 11, 1965, Agreement between the DOD and CIA. The

NRP is operated within special security controls and under

streamlined management procedures in order to provide space

reconnaissance systems which collect needed imagery and

signals intelligence information from denied areas. The NRP

is a significant and separate segment of the National Foreign

Intelligence Program (NFIP).

The NRO is a covert and separate operating agency within

the DOD which conducts a prose= that is national in character,

in that it consists of elements from CIA, NSA, USAF, USN

and USA.

The basis for the organization of the NRO was the necessity for DOD and CIA to accomplish close and continuing collaboration between the two organizations in the national

reconnaissance area. This arrangement also insured recognition

of the intelligence needs of the military services.

• As a collector of-intelligence information by space systems

the NRP is responsive solely to USIB requirements and priorities.

Resource allocations are provided to the NRP by the ExCom (DCI

Chairman; ASD(I) is the SecDef's representative). The DNRO is

charged with preparing the NRP budget for ExCom consideration.

He is the executive agent for the SecDef regarding the NRP's

development, management, operation and conduct of the NRP

space systems. •

The NRO is, in a sense, a quasi member of the intelligence

community in that it performs only collection of intelligence

information. The NRO does not produce, interpret, analyze or

disseminate the intelligence collected. As such it is not a

memberof the USIB (also because of special security and covert

status), but does participate when NRP matters are discussed.

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Thit NRO is represented by the Director on the Intelligence

Resources Advisory Committee's (IRAC) R&D Council; and IRAC

Information Working Group. :

NRO interfaces with NSA-in two ways. In accordance with

ISCID 6, NSA has technical and operational control of SIGINT

payloads, on NRP vehicles and provides such information to aid

the DNRO in his development, management, conduct and operation

of the NRP's space systems. Secondly, NSA processes SIGINT

data collected from NRP•satellites.

The NRP's management is subject to various high level

reviews and is accorded specially handled reviews internally

within the DOD. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board has periodically reviewed the conduct of the NRO's

management. Key Congressional members provide periodic

'intelligence oversight and budget review of the Program. The

NRP works directly with the 40 Committee regarding operaiions. •

Thus, the 40 Committee provides operational oversight.

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