Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 61A05-1504-CR-162 | April 26, 2016 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Larry Crawford Thomas

Clinton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Deryk Hutton,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 26, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

61A05-1504-CR-162

Appeal from the Parke Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Sam A. Swaim, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

61C01-1307-FA-168

May, Judge.
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[1] Deryk Hutton appeals his convictions of Class A felony attempted child 

molesting,1

Class A felony child molesting,2Class B felony child molesting,3

and two counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor.4

 He raises 

three issues on review, which we consolidate and restate as: 

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 

the results of his polygraph examination; and 

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence he committed 

the crimes. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Hutton and the victim, B.H., are adopted siblings.5 Hutton is nine years older 

than B.H. When B.H. was in sixth grade and twelve years old, she and Hutton 

were in a pole barn together and played “strip pool.” (Tr. at 93.) Sometime 

during that incident, Hutton and B.H. went into a nearby wooded area and 

Hutton tried to “force himself” on B.H., but “the actual insertion didn’t 

happen.” (Id. at 94.)

 

1 See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007); 35-41-5-1 (1977).

2 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007).

3 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) (2007).

4 Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a)(1) (2007).

5 B.H.’s father, Glen Hutton, married Deryk Hutton’s mother, Lori Hutton. Lori adopted B.H. and Glen 

adopted Deryk. (Tr. at 91-92, 128, 207-208.)
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[4] When B.H. was between sixth and seventh grade, Hutton took B.H. to the pole 

barn and “tried to do things there.” (Id. at 96.) Hutton was interrupted when a 

child entered the pole barn. Hutton then took B.H. into the bathroom in the 

house, locked the door, and forced B.H. to engage in sexual intercourse. 

Sometime in 2009, when B.H. was in seventh grade, Hutton asked B.H. to enter 

his bedroom. Hutton and B.H. watched a pornographic video and Hutton 

forced B.H. to perform oral sex on him.

[5] B.H. testified that when she was in seventh grade, while at school, she told 

three of her friends “[her] brother had done some things to [her.]” (Id. at 99.) 

After school, B.H. was instructed to go to the police station or the jail to 

provide a report on the incidents.

6

 B.H. talked to a sheriff’s deputy, but was 

afraid her mother would be angry with her if she reported the incidents. She 

told the deputy nothing happened.

[6] In 2011, during the spring of B.H.’s eighth grade year, Hutton forced B.H. to 

submit to sexual intercourse in his apartment bedroom.

7

 That summer, B.H. 

told her mother about the incidents with Hutton and B.H. testified that her

mother confronted Hutton. (Id. at 102.) B.H. testified Hutton “said he was 

 

6 It is unclear from the record who reported to the Department of Child Services B.H.’s conversation with her 

friends and who instructed B.H. to go the police station or jail to report the incidents.

7 Hutton, his wife, and their children moved out of the house where B.H. lived and into their own apartment 

in September, 2010. (Tr. at 245.) At some point, Hutton and his wife separated and Hutton filed for divorce 

on June 10, 2011. (Id. at 263.) Hutton’s wife moved from the apartment “a couple weeks” before Hutton 

filed for a divorce. (Id. at 262-63.)
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sorry, that he screwed up.” (Id.) B.H. further testified that her mother asked 

B.H. if she wanted Hutton to lose everything, and B.H. indicated she did not, 

so B.H.’s mother told B.H. and Hutton they would keep the matter secret. (Id. 

at 103.)

[7] In 2012, when B.H. was in tenth grade and fifteen years old, B.H.’s mother 

would drop B.H. off at Hutton’s house in the morning so B.H. could sleep an 

extra hour before walking to her school, which was near Hutton’s house.8

 One 

day, B.H. returned to Hutton’s house after school to take a shower between 

volleyball practice and the homecoming game. Hutton attempted to enter the 

shower with B.H. and get her “to do things” and “do things to [her].” (Id. at 

123.) After the shower, Hutton performed oral sex on B.H. He took pictures of 

B.H. with his cell phone, but the pictures were deleted. B.H. testified Hutton 

told her he was sorry. (Id. at 125.)

[8] In 2013, B.H. visited her sister in Indianapolis. B.H. told her sister about the 

sexual incidents with Hutton, but asked her sister not to tell anyone. B.H.’s 

sister reported the incidents to Child Protective Services (CPS) and CPS 

initiated an investigation. Chief Deputy Jason Frazier, with the Parke County 

Sheriff’s Office, was the investigating officer for the case. He was present when 

B.H. recounted the incidents to a forensic child examiner from Susie’s Place, a 

child-advocacy center that investigates allegations of crimes against children.

 

8 Hutton had moved from the apartment to a house. (See Tr. at 103; see also App. at 163.)
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[9] At some point during the investigation, Chief Deputy Frazier contacted Hutton 

and asked him if he would be willing to take a polygraph examination. On July 

2, 2013, Charles L. Bollinger, who worked for the Parke County Prosecutor’s 

Office at the time, met with Hutton at the Rockville Police Department. 

Bollinger provided Hutton with a “polygraph stipulation and agreement,” (Tr.

at 158), which Hutton signed. Bollinger administered the polygraph test and

asked Hutton questions about the incidents involving B.H., specifically: “Has 

your penis ever touched your stepsister [B.H.’s] vagina?” and “Are you lying 

when you say your penis has never touched your stepsister [B.H.’s] vagina?” 

(Id. at 163.) The polygraph results indicated Hutton answered deceptively 

when he answered “no” to both questions. 

[10] On July 12, 2013, the State charged Hutton with two counts of Class A felony 

child molesting, one count of Class B felony child molesting, and two counts of 

Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor. On June 10, 2014, Hutton filed 

a motion to suppress the results of the polygraph test. The trial court held a 

hearing and denied Hutton’s motion on July 2, 2014. Hutton moved to certify 

the order for interlocutory appeal, and the trial court denied the motion on 

August 8, 2014. A jury found Hutton not guilty of Count I Class A felony child 

molesting, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of Class A felony 

attempted child molesting.

9

 Hutton also was found guilty of the other charges.

 

9 Before the case went to the jury, the prosecution, defense counsel, and the court discussed the court’s 

proposed final jury instruction that included language indicating the jury could consider whether Hutton 
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Discussion and Decision

Admission of Polygraph Evidence

[11] Hutton’s argument on admission of polygraph evidence is two-fold. He argues 

the polygraph evidence is inadmissible because: 1) the stipulation agreement 

that he signed prior to taking the examination was ambiguous, speculative, and 

vague and, therefore, not a valid contract; and 2) he was not advised of his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

[12] Hutton objected to the admission of the polygraph evidence in a pre-trial 

motion to suppress and renewed his objection at trial.

10

 Because Hutton 

appeals following his conviction and is not appealing the trial court’s order 

denying his motion to suppress, the question before us is properly framed as 

whether the trial court erred in admitting the polygraph evidence. Shell v. State, 

927 N.E.2d 413, 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Admission of evidence at trial is left 

to the discretion of the trial court. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 

2013). We review its determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse 

 

committed attempted child molesting if the State failed to prove he committed child molesting as alleged in 

Count I. (Tr. at 293-95.) The instruction was submitted to the jury over defense counsel’s objection. Hutton 

does not challenge that instruction on appeal.

10 In its brief, the State asserts Hutton’s challenge to the admission of the polygraph evidence is waived 

because Hutton did not object to the evidence at trial. (Appellee’s Br. at 20.) He did. Hutton’s counsel 

stated to the prosecutor and the judge, “And Judge, we pretty much agreed on instead of going through the 

entire Motion to Suppress before the Court that we would submit the transcript of the evidence from the 

suppression hearing as evidence . . . .” (Tr. at 148.) The prosecutor stated, “Yes, they are renewing their 

objection for the record, Judge. We stand on the argument the State’s already [sic] – motion to suppress 

hearing and the Court’s ruling.” (Id.) Thereafter, a detailed record of defense counsel’s objection to the 

polygraph evidence was made, at the conclusion of which, the trial court “overruled [defense counsel’s] 

objection to the polygraph as per our previous court order.” (Id. at 152.)
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only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights. Id. at 260. We 

will not reweigh evidence and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable 

to the trial court’s ruling. Marcum v. State, 843 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006). We will also consider uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. 

Id. The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that 

supports the trial court’s decision. Gonser v. State, 843 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006). The trial court’s ruling will be upheld if it is sustainable on any 

legal theory supported by the record, even if the trial court did not use that 

theory. Id.

[13] We have expressed reservations about the reliability of polygraph results. 

McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), reh’g denied. As a 

general rule the results of a polygraph examination are not competent evidence 

and are inadmissible at trial. Owens v. State, 176 Ind.App. 1, 3, 373 N.E.2d 913, 

914 (1978). But where all the parties by stipulation have waived any objection, 

the court may allow the results to be admitted. Id. at 3, 373 N.E.2d at 914-15. 

Validity of Polygraph Stipulation

[14] Hutton argues the polygraph stipulation and agreement he signed “contain[ed] 

misrepresentations of the law and fact, [was] ambiguous, and [was] speculative 

and vague.” (Appellant’s Br. at 20.) He maintains he could not knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the stipulation because he did not 

request the examination; he did not know whether the polygraph examiner 
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qualified as an expert; and the language of the stipulation was too vague to 

inform him what testimony might be offered in court against him.

[15] As our Supreme Court observed in Sanchez v. State, 675 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 

1996), there are four prerequisites to the admission of polygraph results: (1) the 

prosecutor, defendant, and defense counsel must all sign a written stipulation 

providing for the defendant’s submission to the examination and for the 

subsequent admission at trial of the results; (2) the admissibility of the test 

results must be within the trial court’s discretion as it relates to the examiner’s 

qualifications and the test conditions; (3) the opposing party must have the right 

to cross-examine the polygraph examiner if his graphs and opinion are offered 

in evidence; and (4) the jury must be instructed that, at most, the examiner’s 

testimony tends only to show whether the defendant was being truthful at the 

time of the examination, and that it is for the jury to determine the weight and 

effect to be given such testimony. 

[16] A stipulation entered into by a defendant and the State before a polygraph 

examination is a contract. Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ind. 1999). 

Contract law principles control the use and interpretation of such stipulations. 

Id. In order for polygraph evidence to be admissible, it must be agreed to in 

unambiguous terms and the stipulation agreement, like any other contract, 

must not be the product of misrepresentation or mistake of fact. Id. at 441.

[17] Hutton stipulated as follows:
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1. Said Deryk S. Hutton understands that he or she is not 

under arrest nor in the custody of law enforcement in any way. 

He/she further understands that he/she has the right to remain 

silent and that anything he/she says can be used against them 

[sic] in a court of law. He/she further understands that he/she 

has the right to have an attorney present during questioning and 

that if they [sic] cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed 

for them [sic]. Further, he/she acknowledges that no promises or 

threats have been made, and that no pressure or coercion of any 

kind has been used.

2. Said Deryk S. Hutton, in person, has requested that 

he/she be given a polygraph examination by Charles L. 

Bollinger. 

3. That the Prosecuting Attorney for the 68th Judicial Circuit 

consents to the said Deryk S. Hutton[] taking the polygraph 

examination.

4. That Charles L. Bollinger, is a qualified polygraph 

examiner and is qualified by his education, training and 

experience to testify as an expert witness in interpreting the 

results of the polygraph examination performed by him and the 

use of the polygraph as means of detection of deception.

5. That the questions of the examiner, the answers by the 

said Deryk S. Hutton, and the record of his reactions to said 

questions, and interrogation or other things relating to said 

examination including the results and the opinions of the 

examiner relating to said examination be admitted as evidence, 

on behalf of the State of Indiana.

6. That Deryk S. Hutton[] hereby waives his/her 

constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to the extent 
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that the same may be involved in the presentation of evidence in 

the foregoing matters.

7. That the results from the polygraph examination may be 

used either by Deryk S. Hutton, [sic] or the State of Indiana in 

future trials or criminal proceedings. 

(State’s Ex. 2.)

1. Request for Polygraph Examination

[18] Hutton contends he did not request the polygraph examination, and the 

stipulation was not a binding contract because it said he did. We disagree.

[19] A police officer contacted Hutton about taking a polygraph examination. 

Hutton agreed and voluntarily met with the polygraph examiner. Before the 

examination, the stipulation was read to Hutton by the examiner as Hutton 

followed along. Hutton indicated that he understood the terms of the 

stipulation and he signed it. Hutton could have indicated that the stipulation 

was incorrect, requested the stipulation language be changed, or not signed the 

stipulation. He chose to sign the stipulation as written. See, e.g., Pinnacle 

Computer Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Publ’g, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1994) (court cannot relieve party from terms of contract because of party’s 

failure to read all or part of it, as party is bound to know the contents of the 

contract it signs), reh’g denied; see also, Buschman v. ADS Corp., 782 N.E.2d 423, 

428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Lake Cnty. Trust Co. v. Wine, 704 N.E.2d 1035, 

1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)) (a person is presumed to understand and assent to 
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the terms of the contract he signs). We cannot find error on the ground the 

stipulation was not a binding contract. 

2. Polygraph Examiner’s Qualifications

[20] Hutton next takes issue with paragraph 4 of the stipulation, which indicates the 

polygraph examiner is qualified to testify as an expert witness and interpret the 

examination results. Hutton argues he had “no knowledge of [the examiner’s]

qualifications or lack thereof as a polygraph examiner and could not 

intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly agree to something he had no 

knowledge of.” (Appellant’s Br. at 20.) As noted above, Hutton stipulated the 

examiner was qualified. He did not challenge the examiner’s qualifications. 

[21] Hutton asserts the language in paragraph 4 “is an attempt to take the 

determination as to whether someone is an expert out of the hands of the trial 

judge which is solely the trial court’s determination.” (Id.) Hutton’s assertion 

fails. The trial court heard testimony about the polygraph examiner’s 

qualifications. The examiner testified about his qualifications and how many 

polygraph examinations he has administered. A video recording was entered 

into evidence showing the stipulation being read to Hutton and the preexamination interview that followed. The trial court determined the polygraph 

evidence was admissible. There was sufficient evidence to determine the 

examiner’s qualifications and the admissibility of the polygraph evidence. See 

Davidson v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1077, 1086 (Ind. 1990) (finding that polygraph 

examiner’s testimony at suppression hearing regarding his training, experience, 
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and the conditions of the examination was sufficient to find polygraph results 

admissible at trial). We find no error here.

3. Vagueness of Stipulation

[22] Hutton next directs us to paragraph 5 of the stipulation, which allows for the 

admissibility of the polygraph results: “the questions of the examiner, the 

answers by [Hutton], and the record of his reactions to said questions, and 

interrogation or other things relating to said examination including the results 

and the opinions of the examiner relating to said examination be admitted as 

evidence . . . .” (State’s Exhibit 2) (emphasis added). Hutton maintains the 

“other things” language of the stipulation was too vague to allow him to 

determine what testimony might be offered in court against him. We cannot 

agree.

[23] Hutton attempts to compare the language found in paragraph 5 of his 

stipulation to the language of the stipulation in Willey. The Willey stipulation 

provided: “the questions of the examiner, the answers by the individual [and] 

any interrogation or other things relating to said examination, may be admitted 

as evidence. . . .” 712 N.E.2d at 440 (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court 

found that language “plainly and unambiguously” allowed the examiner’s 

relevant questions and Willey’s answers to be admitted into evidence, but was 

ambiguous as to the admission of the examiner’s opinion as to Willey’s 
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truthfulness.11

 Id. (emphasis added). The Court determined Willey’s polygraph 

results were erroneously admitted at trial but the admission was harmless. Id. 

at 442. In reaching its decision, the Court provided examples of stipulations 

that 

unambiguously provide for the admission of a polygraph 

examiner’s opinion testimony regarding the defendant’s 

truthfulness in answering questions. See, e.g., Willis v. State, 268 

Ind. 269, 273, 374 N.E.2d 520, 523 (1978) (stipulation provided 

‘any interrogation or other things related to said examination 

including the results and the opinions of the examiner relating to 

said examination, be admitted as evidence . . . .’).

Id. at 441 (second citation omitted).

[24] Hutton’s stipulation, unlike Willey’s, explicitly provided for the admission of 

his polygraph results and the opinions of the examiner and stated “the results 

from the polygraph examination may be used either by [Hutton] or the [State] 

in future trials or criminal proceedings.” (See State’s Ex. 2, paragraph 7.) 

Hutton’s stipulation was not vague or ambiguous as to the admission of the 

 

11 Our Supreme Court specifically found: (1) “in the context of a polygraph stipulation entered into without 

the assistance of counsel, ‘other things’ is too vague to alert a reasonable defendant that the [examiner would] 

be permitted to give an opinion that the defendant was deceptive or a liar,” Willey, 712 N.E.2d at 440; (2) the 

stipulation did not “spell out” that the examiner’s testimony might be offered in court against Willey, or that 

“‘interpreting the results’” might include an opinion as to Willey’s truthfulness, id. at 441; (3) another 

paragraph of the stipulation excluded from introduction into evidence items commonly referred to as the 

results, such as the polygraph charts and the examiner's notes and worksheets, id.; and (4) Willey submitted 

to the polygraph examination after being falsely informed that someone had implicated him in the crime. Id.
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examiner’s opinion on Hutton’s truthfulness or which results would be 

admissible at trial.

Right to Counsel

[25] Hutton argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the results 

of his polygraph test because the polygraph was administered without the 

presence of counsel. According to Hutton, his right to have counsel at the 

examination is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution and under Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution 

because the polygraph examination was a critical stage of the criminal 

proceedings against him. Assuming, arguendo, a right to counsel attached,

Hutton waived it.

[26] In Caraway v. State, 891 N.E.2d 122, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied, we 

determined Caraway’s right to counsel attached immediately before a detective 

asked him to sign the stipulation agreement. “Caraway had to stand alone 

against the State, and make a decision that may damage his defense at trial. At 

that critical stage, the absence of Caraway’s right to an attorney derogated his 

right to a fair trial.” Id. As Caraway was not “informed of his right to counsel 

prior to stipulating the results of a polygraph examination, he could not have 

waived it.” Id. Hutton, by contrast, was informed of his right to counsel and 

he waived it. Caraway’s stipulation did not include a Miranda warning or 

notice of Caraway’s right to counsel. Id. Hutton’s did. 
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[27] The first paragraph of Hutton’s stipulation included Miranda warnings and an 

advisement of his right to counsel. Before administering the polygraph 

examination, the examiner read to Hutton the stipulation and the waiver of 

rights. Hutton indicated that he understood the rights and the stipulation. By 

signing the stipulation, Hutton waived his right to counsel. We cannot say the 

trial court erred in admitting into evidence the results of Hutton’s polygraph 

examination. See Casada v. State, 544 N.E.2d 189, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)

(Polygraph examiner properly advised Casada of his Miranda rights, so 

Casada’s “full awareness, before he took the examination, of his right to 

counsel and his failure to exercise that right constituted a clear waiver of it.”), 

trans. denied. 

Sufficiency of Evidence

[28] Hutton maintains there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. 

When reviewing sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we consider 

only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the trial 

court’s decision. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the factfinder’s role, and not ours, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence 

to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. To preserve 

this structure, when we are confronted with conflicting evidence, we consider it 

most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm a conviction unless no 

reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome 

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an 
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inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the trial court’s decision. 

Id. at 147.

[29] Hutton invokes the “incredible dubiosity rule” under which we may impinge on 

the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of the witness only when it has 

confronted “‘inherently improbable’ testimony [] or coerced, equivocal, wholly 

uncorroborated testimony of ‘incredible dubiosity.’” Rodgers v. State, 422 

N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Ind. 1981) (citations omitted). We may reverse a 

conviction if the sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and 

there is no circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. White v. State, 706 

N.E.2d 1078, 1079 (Ind. 1999). Application of this rule is rare and the standard 

to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently 

improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. Stephenson v. State, 742 

N.E.2d 463, 498 (Ind. 2001) (citations omitted).

[30] Hutton maintains B.H., the sole witness, presented inconsistent testimony at 

trial. Specifically, Hutton argues: (1) B.H. reported to friends that Hutton “had 

done some things to [her],” (Tr. at 99), but later recanted the allegations; (2) the 

polygraph examiner’s opinion that Hutton’s results showed deception was 

“highly suspect” because B.H. recanted the allegations against Hutton,

(Appellant’s Br. at 16); (3) there were inconsistencies in B.H.’s testimony 

regarding how much clothing she wore after the game of “strip pool” and 

whether Hutton engaged her in sexual intercourse after the game ended; (4) 

B.H. did not testify clearly to when Hutton first engaged in sexual intercourse 

with her; (5) her testimony regarding being forced to perform oral sex on 
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Hutton was “highly questionable,” (id. at 14); (6) testimony from other 

individuals contradicted B.H.’s testimony; (7) regarding B.H. taking a shower at 

Hutton’s house, “no reasonable person would have placed themselves [sic] in 

her position” and “any reasonable person would have taken a shower at 

school,” (id. at 15); and (8) there was no circumstantial evidence to support the 

convictions. 

[31] B.H.’s testimony was not incredibly dubious. A conviction of child molesting 

may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. Barger v. State, 587 

N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (Ind. 1992), reh’g denied. “The fact that a witness gives trial 

testimony that contradicts earlier pre-trial statements does not necessarily 

render the trial testimony incredibly dubious.” Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 

409 (Ind. 2002). As for testimony from other individuals contradicting B.H.’s 

testimony, inconsistencies between the testimony of multiple witnesses do not 

make the evidence “incredible” as a matter of law. Stephenson, 742 N.E.2d at

497. Any inconsistencies in the testimony of multiple witnesses goes to the 

weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. Id. “It is for the trier of fact 

to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide which witnesses to believe or 

disbelieve. . . . If the testimony believed by the trier of fact is enough to support 

the verdict, then the reviewing court will not disturb it.” Ferrell v. State, 746 

N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). 

[32] B.H. testified in detail regarding multiple incidents during which Hutton forced 

her to engage in sexual intercourse with him or forced her to perform or submit 

to oral sex. Hutton has not indicated, nor do we observe, any of B.H.’s 
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testimony that is inherently improbable, contradictory, or equivocal. Hutton’s 

arguments are an invitation to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of 

the witness, which we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. The jury 

believed B.H.’s testimony. Hutton has not shown her testimony was so 

inherently improbable that no reasonable trier of fact could believe it, and there 

is probative evidence from which the jury could have found Hutton guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm his convictions. 

Conclusion

[33] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the results of 

Hutton’s polygraph examination, and the State presented sufficient evidence he 

committed the offenses of which a jury found him guilty. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

[34] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.