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Tagboard (SECRET) 

Honorable Brockway McMillan 

Under Secretary of the Air Force 

Washington, D. C. 20330 

Dear Brock 

NOV 29 1963 

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1. Last summer. a brief study was made of the feasibility of using a 

modification of the Tagboard vehicle for weapon delivery purposes. 

These studies clearly indicated that this application had no merit. 

However. as an outgrowth of that study. a review was made of USAF 

reliability experience on aerodynamic missiles similar to the Tagboard 

vehicle. This experience indicates that an in-flight reliability of 800/0 

was about the best we were able to achieve during development and test 

programs on the GAM-77. BOMARC B, and GAM ... 72 missiles. In view 

of the 5 years of effort involved in each of those programs and the $195-

$322 million RDT&E costs of the GAM-77 and BOMARC B programs. it 

appears there may be great difficulty in achieving adequate reliability 

for Tagboard without a very long and expensive program. This may be 

a special problem for Tagboard because its mission appears to require 

a much higher in-flight reliability if the risks in its use are to be acceptable. 

2. The rather alarming implications of the reliability problem have led 

to a review of other factors involved in Tagboard. The attachment to this 

letter includes a review of Tagboard technical problems. aerodynamic 

missile reliability experience, A-12 and D ... 21 survivability, sensor 

performance. and USAF capsule recovery experience. 

3. It appears from our analyses that the overall probability of mission 

success for Tagboard may be considerably below that of the A -12. Considering the in-flight reliability problem. it is not clear that the risks in 

using Tagboard are lower than those involved with use of the A-l2. 

Further. if the complete program costs for the Tagboard system (including 

recovery and operation and maintenance) were available, it is doubted if 

the system would be competitive on a cost/effectiveness basis with other 

existing approaches. 

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4. It is recom.mended that a review of the Tagboard system including 

total program costa, schedules, operational e£fectiveness~ operational 

plans, and risks involved in its \1.$e be made be£Ol"El further funds are 

expended on the program. 

Be A. SCHRIEVER 

General, USAF 

Commander 

2 

5 Atch 

Tabs A thru E 

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DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF TAGBOARD 

.. (lVID-21) DRONE RECONNAlSSANCE SYSTEM 

1. General Description 

The system under consideration is a composite of a modified A ... 12 

airframe for the carrier aircraft (M .. Z 1) plus a small ramjet powered 

reconnaissance drone (D .. 21). The airframes feature a high fineness 

ratio fuselage chine combination, thin, low aspect ratio wings and 

vertical tail surfaces. and high strength titanium and plastic structure. 

The drone (D-21) is powered by a modified RJ .. 43 ramjet engine. The 

length and span of the drone are 42 feet and 20 feet respectively and the 

loaded weight is approximately !l. 000 pounds. 

Z. Technical Evaluation 

a. General. Modifications of the A-12 to the M-21 carrier configura ... 

tion are not trivial but require detail engineering rather than innovation. 

The drone airframe and the ramjet propulsion are straight-forward 

problems and should work out satisfactorily with normal development effort 

except for possible problems in achieving desired radar cross sections. 

b. Navisation and Guidance. The mother aircraft uses a stellarmonitored inertial system with a specification bounded errol" of not greater 

than 2.8 nautical miles and the drone uses an unaided inertial system 

which will degrade with time but should be no worse than 2 to 3 nautical 

mi1~s per hour for launch within 2 to 3 hours after take -off. A reasonable 

CEP for a 3. 000 mile reconnaissance flight would be in the order of 5 

nautical mile s. 

c. Camera. The drone payload is a single camera of 28 inch focal 

length. The film magazine capacity is 41' 500 feet of 9 lL2 inch thin base 

film which will provide continuous coverage for 3,020 nautical miles. 

Lateral coverage is 14 nautical miles with fiv.e fixed depression angles, 

are provided. Camera specification calls for weight of 385 pounds versus 

an allowance of 500 pounds, thereby adequate weight growth is available. 

d. Launch and Recovery. The launch operation presents some severe 

analysiS and design problems. Complexities arise from the following: 

(1) The drone and carrier eonfigurations provide only 14 inch 

clearance between the D ... 21 wing tips and the M-Zl vertical stabilizers. 

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Yaw and roll control of the drone at launch must, therefore. be very 

precisely controlled. 

(2) The flow field through which the drone must fly is very complex 

and includes a pattern of shock waves generated by the carrier nose, 

engines. and wings. 

(3) Upon release 01 the drone. air loads, as well as welght loads 

on the carrier may change abruptly. posing control problems for the 

carrier vehicle. 

(4) The inlet for the drone engine isa single point design which 

makes it possible to provide good performance at design point, but also 

Ca\llUUiI very rapid degradation if conditions vary from the nominal. Effects 

of. penetrating the nose and engine shock waves on engine performance are 

unknO"VIl at preuuant. 

Recovery of reconnaissance data will be accomplished by ejecting a 

package containing the camera, the navigation system, electronic components 

of the flight control system. beacon and eommand receiver. The total 

package weight is currently flstirLaud at 880 poun:Qs. Recovery operations 

will start with engine shut down at a programmed pOfdtion. The drone will 

descend at constant ram pre~:uJul"e to approximately 40. 000 feet. and will 

have a velocity of M 1.0 to lvl 1 .. 4at that a.ltitude. The recovery package 

will be ejected at that point,. and will be .further slowed 'by deployment of a 

parachute. Prima.ry recovery method will be the air pick up technique 

used £01' recovery of Discoverer payloads. In th.e event the pick up is not 

successiul, surface recovery is possible. since the package is designed to 

float. Although some detail design has not been completed, e. g •• ejection 

methOd. parachute I!Ibet the concept has been demonstrated, and payload 

recovery appears to be a completely feasible operation. 

e. Performance 

(1) D:rone. The D .. 21 has been designed for a nominal range of 

3,000 nautica.l miles.. Va.riations from original de$:i.gn estimates to the 

present have been both favorable and unfavorable. so that the nominal 

3.000 mile range remains a good estimate" Launc·h altitude is 75,000 

£eet~ and since cruise operation is at constant Mach number, t..'le drone 

will climb continuouslYt and wUlreaeh 95.000 feet at the end of a 3,000 

mUe leg. 

2 

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(2) Camera. The camera specification calls out system resolution 

of 120 lines pel" millimeter or ground resolution of about 1. 25 feet from 

nominal 85,000 foot operational altitude. The opinion of a consultant from 

the Reconnaissance Division. Air Force Avionics Laboratory, based on 

evaluation oTthe details of camera design, is that 10 lines per millimeter, 

or about 2. foot ground resolution agaiuliit medium contrast targets is a very 

reasonable estimate of the camera potential. 

f. fosts and Schedule.. Both c::ost and schedule data are very inexact 

at present. Information presented below is best available at present. but 

may change radically. 

(1) Schedule. The present program calls for fabrication and test 

of 19 drones, and ~odi!ication of two A .. 12 airplanes to the M .. 21 configura .. 

tion. The first drone is now scheduled for completion in April 1964. and 

the first carrier will be delivered in June 1964. The final drone will be 

deUvered approximately one year alte:r the initial delivery. Without the 

benefit of a detailed flight test plan.. the project engineer estimated that 

12 to 18 months of flight test would be required prior to any operational 

commitment. These estimates argue an operational capability early in 

1966. This is an extremely optimistic estimate, and probably represents 

a possibility if' no unanticipated development problems arise. For compari ... 

son, theodginal GAM ... 71 schedule allowed four years from initiation to 

operational capability, and was considered so optimistiC as to approach 

the ridiculous. Direction was given to accele:rate the p:rograrnt but the 

development flight testing was ne"iferlheless completed approximately a 

year later than planned 011 the original schedule. The parallel is not exacts 

but is an indication that the schedule is optimistic. An estimate ot operational capability in mid-1966 is reasonable providing no major development 

problems arise. 

(2) Cost. Odginal estimates for the present drone development 

program havegrown to p:resent estimate of $65 million. This estimate 

is believed to be so low as t.o be un:reali$tic. A planning estimate of $52 

million fo:r an additional 30 operational drones has been made. Given an 

operational program, additional mother airplanes will probably be required, 

at an a-cquisition cost of $20 million per a.il'c:rait. 

Cost of acquisition or modification of recovery aircraft has 

not been estimated nor has maintenance and operations costs. 

3 (·Iannle via til 

Control III 

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MISSILE R ELlABIL1TY 

1. The in-flight reliability achieved during the Category I, n. and !I! 

test programs for the GAM-72, BOMARC B. and GAM .. 7? has been 

examined to provide experience data on which to base aerodynamic 

missile reliability estimates. These missiles vary in mission and 

complexity with the GAM ... ?? being the only one which :is air ... launched 

and must then navigate with good accuracy to a ground target. The 

GAM .. ?7 is most representative of the complexity required for the 

Taghoard vehicle. 

2. The following tabulations list the in-flight reliability in terms of 

success, partial success, and failure. In applying these results to the 

Ta.gboard mission. it is probable that r...'lany of the partial successes 

should be charged as failures. The range of reliability shown vades 

with whether partial success is credited as failure. 

a.. G~.I\..M .. 72. (Quail, decoy missile) 

Partial 

Success Success Failure Reliability 

Category I 18 4 7 64 .. 76% 

Category II 12 2 4: 61 - 780/0 

Category III 2 2 2 34 ... 67% 

Follow-On 7 0 1 .. 86% 

Overall 64 .. 78% 

h. Ilvl-99B BOMARC (Surface to air interceptor m.issile) 

Out of 45 Category I, II, and III flights oVl!';r a two year period, 

there were 19 failures of which 8 involved the target seeker, 3 ... electrical 

sY$tem, 5-flight control. and 3 ... miscellaneous. Overall. this indicates 

a 58% reliability. However, since target seeker failures were not 

determined unless the missile reached the target area. the probability 

of the m.issile reaching the target area was 78%. 

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c. GAM-77 HOUND DOG (Cruise missile launched ;trom B-52) 

Partial 

Success Success Failure .~.e lia bili ty 

GAM .. 77 

Cat I, n 15 11 6 47 .. 81% 

GAM ... 77 

Catlli 4 7 5 25 - 690/0 

GAM-77A 

Cat 11 n 8 2 1 73 .. 91% 

Overall 46 .. 80% 

3. It is interesting to note that the demonstrated reliability did not 

necessarily improve steadily during the test programs. A separate 

review of the unsophisticated Q2C indicates that it did not exceed 80% 

in .. flight reliability during its test program. In general, the experience 

indicates that aerodynamic missiles covering quite a range of complexity 

have exhibited in-flight reliability ranging from 56 to 80%. 

4. All of the deVelopment and test programs described here were of at 

least 5 years duration and the RDT&E costs ranged from $116 million 

for the unsophisticated GAM .. 72 to $322 million for the BOMARC B. 

The GAM ... 77. which is most equivalent to Tagbaard, required a 5 year 

development and test p1'ogram and RDT&E expenditures of $194.4 million 

to achieve the reliability indicated. 

5. It appeal'j(I from this experienc::e that expenditures of $150 ... $200 million, 

a flight test program encompassing 50 .. 60 flights, and a development program 

of 4 .. 5 years may be required to achieve in ... !light reliability of 75-800/0 £01' 

a sophisticated unmanned system. 

2 Control System 

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DETECTION AND SURVIVAL ------ - . 

1. Very little is known at this time about the radar cross section of 

the D ... 21. However ~ it is assumed that. based on size, we may expect 

the D ... 21 design to present from 1/4 to 1/2 the target presented by the 

A .. 12. A given radar will. therefore, achieve from. 70 ... 85 percent of its 

A ... 12 range against the D ... 21. It is believed that if the A .. 12 achieves 

its design goals of radar reflectivity, the Soviet early warning radars 

will have a 20% probability of d.etecting the A-12 when it rises above 

the radar horizon. Taking the most optimistic prediction of D ... 21 radar 

cross section. probability that Tall King early warning radar will detect 

the drone is 500/0 at approximately 200 nautical miles and 85% at approximately 85 miles. 

2. Assuming that detection is not, in itself. a deterrent. we must 

consider Soviet capabilities for successfully attacking the reconnaissance 

vehicles. Against the Fruit Set liB" tracking radar with certain iiulSump ... 

tiona fa:vorable to the defense regarding radar and missile performance, 

it is believed the A .. 12 can achieve immunity to intercept with track offsets of 20 to 30 milee. With the same :assumptionsJ the D-21 would 

require track offset of 15 to 20 mUes to avoid. intercept. 

3. In the A ... 12, the pilot will be able to monitor his actual position and 

correct errors developed by the automatic navigation system. For the 

D ... 21, the initial error boundary of the stellar monitored inertial system 

of the M .. 21 carrier aircra£t plus the further errol' accumulation of the 

unaided inertial system o£ the D .. 21 leads to a D-21 navigatiol'lal CEP of 

approximately 5 miles at the end. of. a 3,000 nautical mile !light. For 

reconnaissance track planning, it seems reasonable to o!£set by at least 

two time$ standard deviation in order to assure it high probability of' 

survival. Using root sum square combination ot errors. it would be 

necessa.ry to offset the D .. 21 t1"ack by approximately 4 to 5 miles for 

probable guidance errors in addition to the offset required lor theoretical 

immunity from SAM attack. With this consideration. there appea.;:s to 

b~ little to choose between the 20 ... 30 miles standoff of the A .. 12 a.nd the 

20 ... 25 mUes standoff of the D ... ~U. 

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SENSOR CAPABILITY 

1. The A-Xl and D .. 21 are designed as photo-reconnaissance vehides. 

Both are ex.pected to have a 1. 3 .. 2. () foot ground resolutionf linear 

coverage of over 3,000 nautical milest and lateral coverages of 36 

nautical miles for the D-21 and 41 miles for the A .. 1Z. 

z. The R-12. a derivation of the A-12., has several photo sel'U!lorSJ one 

of which is expected to provide a ground resoluti on of 0.6 feet for cover ... 

ing up to 100 targets. AdditionallYJ the R ... 12 will have other active and 

passive sensors. It is probable that some of the R .. 12 sensors could be 

adapted to the A-1l if future requirements make it desirable. 

Cmrtroi System 

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CAPSULE RECOVERY 

L It is intended that recovery of the D-21 l"econnais-::Htnce data be 

accomplished by ejecting a package containing the camera, navigational 

system., electronic components of th¢ flight control system, a beacon 

and command receiver. The total package weight is estirr..ated at 880 

pounds. Primary recovery will be by the air pick-up technique used 

for recovery of Discoverer payloads. In the event air pick .. up is not 

successful, surface recovery is possible since the package is designed 

to float. 

2. The follOWing infol'mation defines the Discove:rer capsule recovery 

program and experience as it may apply to the D ... Z 1 capsule recovery 

effort: 

a. The capsule weighs approximately 180 pounds. the 30.7 foot 

main chute deploys at 50,000 feet, the time-to-water from main chute 

deployment is 26. 5 minutes. 

h. For detection. a radio beacon is actuated at capsule separation, 

the chute has alternate orange and white gores and at chute deploynlent, 

a flashing light is tu.rned on. 

c. .Based on a three .. sigma dispersion. the primary recovery area 

is 20 x 140 nautical miles. 

d •. Recovery forces consist of the following: 

(1) Aircraft 

JC-130B 

se-54 

(2) PMR Ship~ 

Victory Ships 

Destroyers 

Reguired Standby ______ R_e_m_a_r_k_s_~ ___ _ 

5 

1 

~quired 

:2 

1 

2 

1 

Capsule detection, air 

recovery and search 

Air rescue and surface 

retrieval by pararescue team 

Detection. search. and 

surface recovery 

Back-up surface recovery 

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e. The JC ... 130B aircraft range for support of aerial recovery is 

1, 100 nautical miles with 3 hours on station. The aerial recovery 

range depends on the time from parachute deployment to pickup but is 

considered to be 70 nautical miles for planning purposes. 

f. The following chart depicts Air Force experience with capsule 

recovery: 

Capsules 

Re-entering 

Calendar Capsules Recove:ry .Recovery; 

Year Separated Area Ail' Sea Lost 

1959 4: 0 0 0 0 

1960 6 5 3 1 1 

1961 8 7 4 3 0 

1962 20 20 16 0 4* 

1963 (thru 11 11 a 2 1** 

15 Oct) 

*One Chute did not deploy. three attempts at air recovery 

damaged <::hute. capsules impacted in sea and sank. 

**Power failure prevented chute deployment. 

3. It is believed that the following conclusions can be based on applying the Discoverer experience to the D ... 21 :recovery problem: 

a. The larger weight of the D .. 21 recovery package (880 vs 180 

pounds) may make aerial pick.up more difficult. 

b. A significantly large fleet (ah"craft and ships) will be needed :for 

recovery ope:ratious and the beacon on the D ... 21 must radiate for a 

relatively long period to permit re-deployment ot the recovery aircraft 

to within sutiieient range of the capsule separation point if air pickup 

is to be achieved. 

c. Most Discoverer capsule losf:HUI in the last two years were of a 

type directly applicable to the D ... 21 problem. This implies no better 

than an 84% probability of data recovery unless improvements in recovery 

technique and design reliability are achieved. 

:2 

Han~i2 via 

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