CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

MAY 2023
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

MAY 2023

 INNOVATIONS

 INNOVATORS 

& NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE OF 

THE

1 9 6 1 - 2 0 2 1
NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) is an independent National Reconnaissance 

Office (NRO) research body reporting to the Director/Business Plans and Operations Directorate, NRO. The 

CSNR’s primary objective is to advance national reconnaissance and make available to NRO leadership the 

analytic framework and historical context to make effective policy and programmatic decisions. The CSNR 

accomplishes its mission by promoting the study, dialogue, and understanding of the discipline, practice, 

and history of national reconnaissance. The CSNR studies the past, analyzes the present, and searches for 

lessons for the future.

Contact Information: Phone, 703-227-9368; or e-mail, csnr@nro.mil

To Obtain Copies: Government personnel may obtain additional printed copies directly from CSNR. Selected 

CSNR publications are available on the Internet at the NRO web site.

Note: Images were pulled from NRO Archives. 

Published by

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance

14675 Lee Road

Chantilly, Virginia 20151-1715

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note to the Readers .................................... 5

INNOVATIONS

NRO CULTURE

 NRO Culture ................................................... 9

GEOINT

Imagery from Space ....................................... 13

Corona ........................................................... 15

Gambit 1 (KH-7) ............................................. 17

Gambit 3 (KH-8) ............................................. 19

Hexagon (KH-9) .............................................. 21

Quill ............................................................... 23

Kennen ........................................................... 25

Digital Imagery ............................................... 27

Mapping Cameras .......................................... 28

Radar Imagery ................................................ 30

Stereo Imagery ............................................... 31

SIGINT

GRAB .............................................................. 34

Poppy ............................................................. 37

ABM System Testing Detection ...................... 39

Geolocation from Space ................................. 41

ICBM Development Detection ....................... 44

Ship Tracking (Ocean Surveillance) ................ 46

SPACE ENTERPRISE

Agena ............................................................. 50

Control Moment Gyroscopes ......................... 52

CubeSats ........................................................ 54

Film Return .................................................... 56

Integrated Systems ........................................ 58

MOL ............................................................... 60

Multiple Orbits ............................................... 63

Red Dot .......................................................... 65

Relay Satellite Development .......................... 66

Ride-Share Launch ......................................... 69

Space-Based Lab ............................................ 71

Weather Satellites........................................... 73

RECONNAISSANCE

D-21 Drone .................................................... 78

Denial and Deception .................................... 80

Geodetic Databases ...................................... 83

Stealth Aircraft .............................................. 85

COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS

Battery Development .................................... 89

Cellphone Development ................................ 91

Charge-Coupled Device ................................. 93

Change Detection .......................................... 95

Communications ........................................... 96

Light Weight Film .......................................... 98

Light Weight Optics ....................................... 100

Processing of Large Datasets ......................... 101

Solar Cell Technology ..................................... 103

COLLABORATIONS

A-12/SR-71 .................................................... 107

Apollo Program Support ................................ 109

Civil Applications of NRO Innovations ........... 111

Climate Change ............................................. 113

NRO’S Field Representatives ......................... 114

IDEX Workstation ........................................... 116

NRO & IC ....................................................... 117

Overseas Partnerships ................................... 119

The Space Shuttle and the NRO ..................... 121

MANAGEMENT

Battle’s Laws .................................................. 125

Streamlined Procurement ............................. 127

Incremental and Reserve Funding ................. 129

Security Cover Stories ................................... 130

Lean Six Sigma/Baldrige ................................ 133

NRO Westfields Campus ................................ 135

4C-1000 Seven Tenets ................................... 137
NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

INNOVATORS

FOUNDERS & PIONEERS

The NRO Founders ......................................... 142

NRO & US Presidents ..................................... 144

NRO’s First Pioneer Class ............................... 147

NRO’s 2001 Pioneer Class .............................. 152

NRO’s 2002 Pioneer Class .............................. 153

NRO’s 2003 Pioneer Class .............................. 154

NRO’s 2004 Pioneer Class .............................. 155

NRO’s 2005 Pioneer Class .............................. 156

NRO’s 2006 Pioneer Class .............................. 157

NRO’s 2007-2008 Pioneer Classes .................. 158

NRO’s 2009-2010 Pioneer Classes .................. 159

NRO’s 2011 Pioneer Class .............................. 160

NRO’s 2012-2013 Pioneer Classes .................. 161

NRO’s 2014-2015 Pioneer Classes .................. 162

NRO’s 2016-2017 Pioneer Classes .................. 163

NRO’s 2018-2019 Pioneer Classes .................. 164

NRO’s 2020-2021 Pioneer Classes .................. 165

Technological Capabilities Panel ..................... 166

The Purcell Panel Precedent ........................... 168

NRO (4C-1000) Staff ....................................... 170

PEOPLE

NRO Directors ................................................ 174

NRO Principal Deputy Directors ..................... 176

StarCatchers ................................................... 178

MOL Astronauts ............................................. 180

A-12 Pilots ...................................................... 184

NRO CADRE .................................................... 186

NRO Affinity Groups ....................................... 188

NRO ORGANIZATIONS

NRO Program A .............................................. 192

NRO Program B .............................................. 194

NRO Program C .............................................. 196

NRO Program D .............................................. 198

AS&T Directorate ........................................... 201

Business Plans and Operations (BPO) ............. 203

COMM Directorate ......................................... 205

Ground Enterprise Directorate (GED) ............ 207

GEOINT Directorate ....................................... 209

Mission Integration Directorate (MID) .......... 211

Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) ............ 215

Management Services & Operations (MS&O) 217

Systems Engineering Directorate (SED) ............. 219

SIGINT Directorate ......................................... 221

GOVERNMENT PARTNERS

NRO-Joint Organization ................................. 225

CIA ................................................................. 226

U.S. Air Force ................................................. 227

U.S. Navy ....................................................... 228

NSA ................................................................ 229

NIMA/NGA .................................................... 230

NPIC ............................................................... 231

Defense Mapping Agency .............................. 232

INDUSTRY PARTNERS

Aerospace Corporation ................................. 235

BOEING ......................................................... 237

Itek Corporation ............................................ 239

KODAK ........................................................... 241

Lockheed Martin ........................................... 243

Perkin-Elmer ................................................. 245

Rand Corporation .......................................... 247

TRW ............................................................... 249

GROUND LOCATIONS

Ground Stations ............................................ 253

ADF-C ............................................................ 255

ADF-E ........................................................... 256

ADF-SW ........................................................ 257

NRO Cape ..................................................... 258

NRO Vandenberg .......................................... 260

INDEX ................................................................... 262
NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

A NOTE TO THE READERS

The National Reconnaissance Office was established on 6 September 1961, uniting Central Intelligence Agency 

and Department of Defense reconnaissance satellite programs into a single agency. In the six decades that 

have passed, the NRO has accomplished innovations in many areas driven by a unique class of innovators. 

Some of the nation’s best minds have labored to give the U.S. strategic and tactical advantages in protecting 

the nation from the vantage point of space. Additionally, the development of NRO systems also contributed to 

broader U.S. space programs and the advancement of commercial activities.

To commemorate the National Reconnaissance Office’s 60th Anniversary in 2021, the staff of the NRO’s Center for 

the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) wrote a compilation of highlights celebrating various aspects of NRO 

history which we called “I&Is.” The effort identified 60 “Innovations” developed by the NRO and 60 “Innovators” 

that have been involved with the NRO over the years — one specific example for each year of the NRO’s existence 

and most of which are included in this publication.

The I&Is were released to the workforce periodically throughout the year, as the NRO celebrated its 60th anniversary. 

This publication is simply an effort to consolidate those highlights in one place for the ease of retrieval and education 

of all. The I&Is are short and general in nature, but each should contain enough information to inform the general 

reader, as well as to provide clues on where to find additional information for the advanced researcher.

We would like to note to the reader the parameters that defined this project. We are only highlighting unclassified 

accomplishments. This compilation was not intended to be a “Top 60” list, since many of the NRO’s innovations 

are still highly classified and cannot yet be shared with the public. We also made no effort to “rank” the lists, 

since the innovations are in different areas — ranging from groundbreaking technological discoveries to innovative 

management practices to development of new ways of thinking — and any systemic criteria we chose to do so 

would be problematic. In addition, some of the innovations we included are still not fully declassified, and we can 

only consider the information that has been released, which in some cases is minimal.

The I&Is that we included are grouped into several different categories for organizational purposes only and for 

ease of the reader. Each report stands on its own, so while the reader will occasionally notice some duplication of 

information, it merely shows the interconnectivity of many of the NRO’s programs and activities. No I&I is any more 

or less important than any other with no bias toward placement within the overall publication. Not all innovators or 

innovations were included because of classification and project limitations.

We hope that the reader will find this publication both compelling and informative. More information can always 

be found on the CSNR’s “History and Studies” page of the NRO.gov website.

 

The CSNR Team

Chuck Glover, Christine Grannas, Annie Hakes, Courtney Homer, James Outzen

Alesia Rose, Ambika Sankaran, Wanda Smoot, Juliana Steiner, Mike Suk

Patrick Widlake, and Carol Willis

INNOVATIONS

NRO CULTURE

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

- 9 -

NRO CULTURE

Ultimately any organization that is highly innovative 

depends on developing, sustaining, and refreshing a culture 

that enables innovation. During its 60 years in existence, 

the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) invented and 

nurtured a culture of innovation resting on six key pillars.

NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVE

The reason for the NRO’s existence arises from protecting 

the citizens of the United States from nefarious acts carried 

out against the U.S. and its citizens. The NRO was established 

as the threat of nuclear annihilation accelerated. In just 

over a decade before the establishment of the NRO in 1961, 

the Soviet Union became a nuclear power and engaged in 

the advancement of weapons systems that could deliver 

nuclear weapons to the United States with little warning. 

Throughout the first years of the Cold War between the U.S. 

and the USSR, the U.S. had little means to understand the 

development of those systems. With limited access to the 

USSR, the U.S. developed space reconnaissance systems to 

peer over the Iron Curtain and understand the extent to 

which Soviet nuclear weapons systems threatened the very 

existence of the nation. 

The national security imperative born of the Cold War drove 

the National Reconnaissance Office to identify threats from 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Anti-Ballistic Missile systems, 

Strategic Long Range bombers, and the like to understand the 

strategic threat environment. In its second decade, the NRO 

expanded capabilities to understand international crises with 

timely and responsive technical collection. This capability 

allowed the U.S. to respond more rapidly to a crisis, as well as 

carry out activities to circumvent emerging crises. 

More recently, the NRO has taken up new national security 

imperatives such as providing technical intelligence to 

those countering terrorism and to warfighters defending 

U.S. interests abroad. The NRO continues to develop highly 

innovative and technologically flexible collection systems 

to respond to new threats to U.S. national security and the 

safety of U.S. citizens and residents. 

RISK-TAKING AND TOLERANCE

Just over a year before the NRO was established, the U.S. 

had recovered its first imagery from space. This effort did 

not come without significant risk-taking and tolerance. 

The U.S. attempted launches of Corona imagery collection 

satellites 13 times before the first mission was declared a 

success. More than a year and a half elapsed between the 

first attempt and the first success of the program, yet Corona 

program personnel steadfastly dedicated themselves to 

improving the Corona system. This level of persistence in 

face of doing something that had never been done before 

established an early cultural hallmark for the NRO of taking 

and tolerating risk.

Over the 60 years that the NRO has been in existence, its 

approach to risk management has afforded opportunities to 

develop dozens of new technologies and avenues for using 

space as a vantage point for technical intelligence collection. 

The NRO has consistently sought the most exquisite solutions 

that are technologically viable but also pushing the bounds 

of technology. Risk as a cultural hallmark of the NRO remains 

essential to the organization’s success. 
- 10 -

NRO INNOVATORS AND INNOVATIONS

EMBRACING OPPORTUNITY

The use of space for intelligence collection emerged as a 

promising approach 15 years prior to the establishment of 

the NRO. It was only with the establishment of the NRO 

that the opportunities to collect intelligence from space 

grew into a fully integrated constellation of imagery, signals 

collection, and communications satellites. Along the way, 

the NRO embraced several technological opportunities 

including development of electro-optical and radar 

imagery, communications satellites, large data processing 

systems, and advanced signals collection systems. Each key 

technology provided the opportunity to embrace potential 

for better and more responsive intelligence collection.

The NRO has also consistently embraced management 

opportunities. With flexibilities arising from CIA authorities, 

the NRO engaged in novel acquisition approaches. The 

organization also embraced unique approaches to protect 

the secrecy of satellite systems. Systems integration and 

engineering emerged as key processes for advancing the 

nation’s use of space for intelligence collection using NRO’s 

satellites. The NRO avoided adhering to established policies 

and processes in favor of embracing new that would 

advance the organization’s mission.

INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIPS

From its earliest days, the NRO has depended on the leading 

technology companies of U.S. industry to develop complex 

space systems. This unique industrial partnership is a key 

characteristic of the NRO culture. Industrial partners in the 

early years brought unsolicited solutions to intelligence 

collection challenges faced by the U.S. In developing 

systems, industrial and government employees worked 

together to develop new satellite systems in relationships 

of trust and respect.

Industrial employees continue to serve as essential 

members of the NRO community. They often work large 

portions of their careers on NRO projects. They bring fresh 

perspectives to the challenges of developing, launching, 

and operating space reconnaissance systems. In many 

instances, NRO employees from the space industrial base 

provide the “institutional memory” that is so important 

to successful organizations. Since its 40th anniversary, the 

NRO has recognized pioneers of national reconnaissance 

for their trailblazing contributions to development of NRO 

systems. The vast majority of those pioneers have been 

employed by industrial partners—a fact that confirms the 

importance of the industrial partnership in the cultural 

environment of the NRO.

CONNECTED LEADERSHIP

The NRO is one of the few organizations in the Federal 

Government where almost all employees have personal 

interaction with senior NRO leadership. Most employees 

assigned to work at the NRO can engage directly with the NRO 

Director. The DNRO does not have a security team or staff 

entourage that separates the director from the workforce. 

Most NRO directors and other senior leadership establish 

working relationships at all levels of the organization.

Historically, the NRO has been a “flat” organization 

with relatively few layers in its organizational structure. 

Additionally, most employees assigned to or working for 

the NRO have significant responsibilities given their grade 

levels. The structural efficiencies of the NRO organization 

allow for rich and rewarding experiences and interactions 

between multiple levels of the organization.

DEDICATED WORKFORCE

Above all else, the NRO culture is defined by a workforce 

that is dedicated to each other and to the success of NRO 

programs. In the early days of the NRO, those assigned to 

the organization worked long hours and days to develop 

the newest of technologies. Over the years, that work 

ethic has continued apace with significant devotion of NRO 

team members to organizational success. Launches at the 

NRO remain events that unify the workforce and afford 

mutual celebration of success. During the 40th anniversary 

of the NRO, banners read “One Team—Revolutionizing 

Space.” These many years later, the dedication of this “One 

Team” of those working at the NRO should not be underappreciated. The NRO workforce has grown and changed 

over the past 60 years, but it has retained one common 

feature, and that is dedication to Supra Et Ultra—together 

going “Above and Beyond” to protect the United States and 

its citizens and residents. 
INNOVATIONS

GEOINT

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

IMAGERY FROM SPACE

BACKGROUND

In July 1955, the Soviet Union staged a deception that set the 

course for the United States to successfully obtain imagery 

from space. In 1954, Aviation Week reported that the Soviets 

had developed the Myasishchev M-4, or Bison bomber 

as it became known in the West. At the 1955 Aviation Day 

air-show held at Tushino Airfield northwest of Moscow, the 

Soviets carried out a highly effective deception operation. 

Knowing that western military attaches would attend the 

show, the Soviets flew 10 Bison bombers to impress the 

crowd. Unknown to those in attendance, the same 10 Bison 

bombers flew a second time over the crowd, followed by 

eight additional bombers. Thus, it appeared the Soviets had 

produced in a year’s time a total of 28 bombers rather than the 

18 they actually possessed—nearly a 30 percent difference. 

Based on the deception, the United States estimated that 

the Soviets would produce 800 bombers by 1960, a rate that 

would provide the Soviets with greater long-range bomber 

capability than the United States.

THE NEED FOR IMAGERY FROM SPACE

Although skeptical that the Soviets were capable of building 

more bombers than the United States, President Dwight 

Eisenhower did not have definitive intelligence to dispel the 

“bomber gap” in favor of the Soviets. He had approved the 

development of the U-2 in 1954, a jet-powered aircraft that 

could fly at speeds and altitudes that would evade Soviet air 

defenses. It proved to be just the resource needed to obtain 

definitive evidence of Soviet bomber production capabilities. 

On 9 July 1956, the U-2 obtained an image of an airfield near 

Leningrad with 30 Bison bombers. Subsequent U-2 imagery 

of other Soviet airfields confirmed the Bison bombers 

were limited to just that single base. The imagery served as 

conclusive intelligence for a new estimate that affirmed the 

United States maintained the advantage in the production of 

long-range bombers.

 

By the 1960 presidential election, two events took place that 

again raised concerns about the Soviets out-pacing the U.S. 

in strategic nuclear capabilities, this time the production of 

nuclear missiles. The first event occurred on 4 October 1957, 

when the Soviet Union launched the first man-made satellite 

known as Sputnik 1. Although the Soviets had publicly touted 

their efforts to launch a satellite, they surprised the world 

with the launch. Troubling to many was the realization that 

if the Soviets could launch an object into space, they could 

potentially launch a nuclear weapon against the U.S. or its 

other adversaries. The second event was the downing of 

Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 over the Soviet Union on 1 May 

1960. The downing of that flight led President Eisenhower to 

cancel all future overflights of the Soviet Union, briefly leaving 

the U.S. without one of its most reliable intelligence sources.

FIRST STEPS

However, the U.S. had already made a critical commitment 

to create a new intelligence collection system in 1954, the 

development of a satellite. The program, eventually known 

as Satellite Missile Observation System (Samos), got off to 

a slow start, but was accelerated after the Sputnik launch. 

In February 1958, President Eisenhower approved rapid 

development of an imagery satellite branching off the Samos 

program. After 13 unsuccessful launch efforts beginning in 

January 1959, the Corona satellite successfully returned 

imagery from space in August 1960. It was just in time to fill 

the void left by the cancellation of U-2 flights over the Soviet 

Union. 
- 14 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

The NRO spearheaded additional satellite reconnaissance 

capabilities that were key innovations for intelligence 

collection from space. For instance, in 1964, NRO launched 

an experimental satellite, known as Quill, which proved 

radar data could be processed into images. This established a 

foundation for the U.S. to image areas of concern where U.S. 

adversaries often used techniques and actions to disguise 

their capabilities or activities. 

In 1976, the NRO’s first electro-optical satellite, known as 

Kennen, was launched. Kennen produced the first digital 

images, rather than film-return images used on earlier 

satellites that had to be returned to Earth and processed. 

Kennen allowed the U.S. to capture images in “near realtime” rather than waiting days and weeks to process images 

from the earlier film return systems. With Kennen, the NRO 

provided an intelligence collection system that provided more 

timely intelligence for the President, senior policymakers, 

military commanders, and eventually the warfighter, starting 

in the 1990s and the Gulf Wars. Kennen also provided 

early investment in digital photography—a capability now 

used by most Americans every day. NRO has been, and 

continues to be, one of the original pioneers in the design 

and development of satellite technology and innovation.

Corona was designed to take images of broad areas of the 

Soviet Union and other denied areas of the world of concern 

to U.S. policymakers. By the time of Corona’s first successful 

launch, the United States was in the depths of the 1960 

presidential election between Richard Nixon and John F. 

Kennedy. Kennedy alleged that the Soviets were out-pacing 

the U.S. in nuclear missile production while on President 

Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon’s watch. Just prior to 

Election Day, Corona had in just a few short weeks obtained 

enough imagery to dispel Kennedy’s allegations of a missile 

gap. However, Corona was one the U.S.’s most closely 

guarded secrets and Eisenhower did not release evidence 

to dispel Kennedy’s claims during the heated presidential 

election. The satellite imagery intelligence capability was too 

sensitive to reveal, even in a race for the U.S. presidency. 

THE EVOLUTION OF SATELLITE IMAGERY SYSTEMS

The Corona system, developed jointly by the CIA and Air 

Force, first could obtain images of objects about 40 feet in 

size, and by the end of the program, that capability improved 

to obtaining images from space of objects about six feet 

in size. Corona became an important source of collecting 

intelligence on issues of concern to U.S. officials such as 

adversaries’ missiles, aircraft, naval vessels, and military 

installations. By 1971, the U.S. launched a follow-on satellite 

to Corona known as the Hexagon. Hexagon was one of the 

U.S.’s largest reconnaissance satellites, approximately the 

size of a train locomotive, with about 250 times more imaging 

capacity than the first Corona. It showed a vast improvement 

over Corona’s imagery resolution with the ability to identify 

objects from space of about 1.5 feet in size. 

While Corona and Hexagon were excellent for identifying 

large objects from space to detect the capabilities of the 

U.S.’s adversaries, more detailed imagery granularity was 

needed. To that end, the NRO developed a high-resolution 

satellite, known as Gambit, to pinpoint specific qualities and 

characteristics of objects of interest. Launched first in 1963, the 

Gambit photoreconnaissance satellite could initially capture 

images of objects about 4 feet in size. Gambit’s resolution 

improved to capturing objects about 2 feet in size when, in 

1966, it was replaced by an improved Gambit-3 system. The 

Gambit-3 system evolved throughout its lifespan until its 

last launch in 1984. By then, the Gambit had the ability to 

image objects smaller than one foot in size. The combination 

of the broad area search satellites with the high-resolution 

satellites like Gambit allowed the U.S. to identify not only 

increases in Soviet weapons systems, but also technological 

improvements they were making to those systems.

HEXAGON IMAGE

CORONA IMAGE
- 15 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CORONA

ORIGINS OF PHOTORECONNAISSANCE

Following World War II, the United States identified the need 

for photoreconnaissance capabilities that could penetrate 

denied areas in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and 

Asia. To that end, in February 1958, President Eisenhower 

endorsed the Corona project. Developed by the CIA and 

Air Force, Corona was a satellite imaging reconnaissance 

system that took pictures from space as it passed over 

denied territories like the Soviet Union. To obtain the 

images, the satellite would periodically “deorbit” and drop 

a film capsule, which was picked up in mid-air by a C-119 

aircraft for transport back to CIA’s National Photographic 

Interpretation Center (NPIC). Unlike its predecessors, the 

U-2 reconnaissance plane and the A-12 supersonic aircraft, 

Corona operated with far less risk since imagery was 

acquired from space. After Corona’s first launch in 1960 

until the program’s retirement in 1972, the U.S. Intelligence 

Community (IC) refined photoreconnaissance under the 

program, which had an unprecedented impact on IC 

collection and national security policy.

PHOTORECONNAISSANCE 

SYSTEM ENHANCEMENTS

Corona operated for a little more than a decade, but it 

acquired photographic coverage of 750 square nautical 

miles of the Earth’s surface and its early years were marked 

with rapid advancements. Between August 1960 - 1963, 

Corona went from a single camera system that produced 

a limited imagery resolution of 25 to 45 feet to a twin 

panoramic camera system that produced imagery with a 

resolution of 6 to 10 feet. Imagery users referred to Corona 

reconnaissance satellites by a Key Hole (KH) designator 

assigned to each new camera system as its capabilities were 

enhanced over time--starting with KH-1, KH-2, and so on. 

Notably, the KH-4 camera systems were the first to provide 

stereoscopic imagery, which allowed the IC to significantly 

increase collection content. The 30 degree convergent 

angle for stereo photography enabled measuring vertical 

and horizontal dimensions of the Earth’s surface, which 

improved overall system dynamic balance and expanding 

mission durations.
- 16 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The Corona program was operational from 1960 to 1972 and 

was instrumental in identifying military activities of interest 

to U.S. policymakers. As the only operational imagingreconnaissance satellite until the launch of Gambit-1 in 1963, 

Corona imaged multiple targets in hostile areas yielding 

invaluable intelligence on Soviet targets. Corona identified 

and imaged all Soviet medium-range, intermediate-range, 

and intercontinental ballistic missile launching complexes. 

With Corona’s imagery, analysts dispelled the myth that 

the U.S. lagged behind the USSR in missile production – 

the so called “missile gap.” Using Corona imagery, analysts 

were also able to identify the main Soviet construction site 

for ballistic-missile-carrying submarines at Severodvinsk. 

The Corona program propelled the United States into an 

unparalleled position of dominance in photoreconnaissance 

capabilities that ultimately helped the U.S. win the Cold War. 

In 1995, President Clinton declassified the Corona program.

1961 – 1972: KH-4, KH-4A, KH-4B 

Lens: 24-inch focal length

Film Length: 5,000 to 48,000 Feet

Image Resolution: 6 to 10 Feet

One or Two Film Recovery Capsules

CORONA’S KH EVOLUTION 

1959 – 1961: KH-1, KH-2, KH-3

Lens: 24-inch focal length

Film Length: 1,200 to 5,000 Feet

Image Resolution: 20 - 40 Feet

One Film Recovery Capsule
- 17 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

GAMBIT 1 (KH-7)

ORIGINS OF PHOTORECONNAISSANCE 

Following World War II, the United States developed new 

photoreconnaissance capabilities to penetrate the denied 

areas in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia. 

President Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence 

Agency to develop the U-2 reconnaissance plane, and later 

the more innovative supersonic A-12, in order to improve 

the nation’s photoreconnaissance capabilities. He also 

directed the CIA to develop, in conjunction with the U.S. 

Air Force, the nation’s first photoreconnaissance satellite, 

codenamed Corona. First launched in 1960, Corona 

operated with much less risk than photoreconnaissance 

aircraft and searched broad areas to capture incredibly 

valuable imagery while orbiting high above the Earth. 

These air and space platforms propelled the United 

States into an unparalleled position of dominance in 

photoreconnaissance capabilities that helped the U.S. win 

the Cold War. 

INTELLIGENCE NEED FOR PHOTORECONNAISSANCE

Although Corona provided the capability to search large 

areas from space, the U.S. still lacked high-resolution 

imagery. Approximately one year after the first launch 

of Corona, the National Reconnaissance Office began 

development of its first high-resolution satellite program, 

codenamed Gambit. The first Gambit system, launched 

in 1963, was equipped with the KH-7 camera system 

that included a 77-inch focal length camera for providing 

specific information on scientific and technical capabilities 

that threatened the nation. Intelligence users often 

characterized this capability as surveillance, allowing 

the United States to track the advancement of Soviet 

and others’ capabilities. Over time, the Gambit program 

evolved into a second generation system.

Eastman Kodak Corporation provided an unsolicited 

proposal, named Sunset Strip, in the summer of 1960 to the 

Department of Defense program under the direction of Dr. 

Joseph Charyk, who would later become a Director of the 

National Reconnaissance Office. Kodak was already involved 

in the U.S. Air Force’s Samos satellite program to develop 

reconnaissance satellites including photoreconnaissance 

satellites. After review, Dr. Charyk and other senior leaders 

found the proposal promising and initiated development of 
- 18 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

PROGRAM FACTS

Missions: 38 (28 successes)

Average Mission Life: 6.6 days

Imaging Days: 1-8.1 days

Altitude: 60-150 nautical miles

Roll Control: attitude control gas

Payload Weight: 1,154 lbs

Image Retrieval: Film Return Capsule

ADVANCEMENTS

Thin film permitted longer missions. The roll capability 

and stereo cameras enabled increased target acquisition 

and gave images a three-dimensional quality.

OPTICS/IMAGING

Aperture: 19.5 inches

Focal Length: 77 inches

Camera Developer: Eastman Kodak

Lens: f/4.0

Image Resolution: 3-2 feet

Film Length: 3,000 feet

Film Width: 9.46 inches

a high resolution satellite within a year of the initial success 

of the Corona photoreconnaissance satellite. By the time the 

NRO was formed in September 1961, the satellite was under 

development in the Air Force’s Program A, now housed at 

the NRO. Less than two years later the Gambit satellite, 

named after an opening move in chess, provided the United 

States its first high-resolution imagery from space.

The United States depended on these search and 

surveillance satellites to understand the capabilities, 

intentions, and advancements of those who opposed the 

United States during the Cold War. Together they became 

America’s essential eyes in space.

Gambit 1 provided the U.S. with close-in 

surveillance from July 1963 - June 1967
- 19 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

GAMBIT 3 (KH-8)

ORIGINS OF PHOTORECONNAISSANCE

Following World War II, the United States developed new 

photoreconnaissance capabilities to penetrate the denied 

areas in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia. 

President Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence 

Agency to develop the U-2 reconnaissance plane, and later 

the more innovative supersonic A-12, in order to improve 

the nation’s photoreconnaissance capabilities. He also 

directed the CIA to develop, in conjunction with the U.S. 

Air Force, the nation’s first photoreconnaissance satellite, 

codenamed Corona. First launched in 1960, Corona 

operated with much less risk than photoreconnaissance 

aircraft and searched broad areas to capture incredibly 

valuable imagery while orbiting high above the Earth. 

These air and space platforms propelled the United 

States into an unparalleled position of dominance in 

photoreconnaissance capabilities that helped the U.S. win 

the Cold War. 

INTELLIGENCE NEED FOR PHOTORECONNAISSANCE 

Although Corona provided the capability to search large areas 

from space, the U.S. still lacked high-resolution imagery. 

Approximately one year after the first launch of Corona, the 

National Reconnaissance Office began development of its 

first high-resolution satellite program, codenamed Gambit. 

Over time, the Gambit program evolved into two different 

systems. The first Gambit system, launched in 1963, was 

equipped with the KH-7 camera system that included a 77-

inch focal length camera for providing specific information 

on scientific and technical capabilities that threatened the 

nation. Intelligence users often characterized this capability 

as surveillance, allowing the United States to track the 

advancement of Soviet and others’ capabilities. 

Kodak had proposed four generations of Gambit satellites. 

The NRO’s Air Force Program A, responsible for Gambit 

development, determined that the second generation did 

not provide significantly improved capabilities. Foregoing 

the second generation, Program A leadership opted for 

developing the third proposed generation, or Gambit 3, that 

would eventually allow the U.S. to obtain images from space 

of objects less than one foot in size. The fourth proposed 

Gambit generation required technological advances 

that were not possible at the time it was considered and 

therefore not pursued by the NRO’s Program A. 
- 20 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

PROGRAM FACTS

Missions: 54 (50 successes)

Average Mission Life: 31 days

Imaging Days: 5-126 days

Altitude: 65-90 nautical miles

Roll Control: mechanical roll joint

Payload Weight: 4,130 lbs

Image Retrieval: Film Return Capsule

ADVANCEMENTS

The roll joint integrated with the attitude control resulted 

in extremely stable body rates, zero settling times, and 

improved expendables management—significantly 

increasing the number of targets it acquired.

LAUNCH, OPERATION, 

AND RECOVERY 

SEQUENCE FOR 

GAMBIT 3

Film-return photoreconnaissance 

satellites returned the 

exposed film to Earth 

from space in a bucket 

with a heat shield 

designed to withstand 

the entry through 

Earth’s atmosphere.

OPTICS/IMAGING

Aperture: 43.5 inches

Focal Length: 175 inches

Camera Developer: Eastman Kodak

Lens: f/4.09

Image Resolution: better than 2 feet

Film Length: up to 12,241 feet

Film Width: 5 inches and 9 inches

The second generation Gambit 3 photoreconnaissance 

satellite was equipped with the KH-8 camera system that 

included a 175- inch focal length camera. The system was 

first launched in 1966 and provided the U.S. with exquisite 

surveillance capabilities from space for nearly two decades. 

The United States depended on these search and 

surveillance satellites to understand the capabilities, 

intentions, and advancements of those who opposed the 

United States during the Cold War. Together they became 

America’s essential eyes in space.
Payload—mirror, camera, film 

supply, command & control

THE HEXAGON SYSTEM

DIMENSIONS

Length: 60 Feet

Diameter: 10 Feet

Weight: 30,000 pounds

- 21 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

HEXAGON (KH-9)

ORIGINS OF PHOTORECONNAISSANCE

Following World War II, the United States developed new 

photoreconnaissance capabilities to penetrate the denied 

areas in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Asia. 

President Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence 

Agency to develop the U-2 reconnaissance plane, and later 

the more innovative supersonic A-12, in order to improve 

the nation’s photoreconnaissance capabilities. He also 

directed the CIA to develop, in conjunction with the U.S. 

Air Force, the nation’s first photoreconnaissance satellite, 

codenamed Corona. First launched in 1960, Corona 

operated with much less risk than photoreconnaissance 

aircraft and searched broad areas to capture incredibly 

valuable imagery while orbiting high above the Earth. 

These air and space platforms propelled the United 

States into an unparalleled position of dominance in 

photoreconnaissance capabilities that helped the U.S. win 

the Cold War. 

INTELLIGENCE NEED FOR PHOTORECONNAISSANCE

Although Corona provided the capability to search large 

areas from space, the U.S. still lacked high-resolution 

imagery. Approximately one year after the first launch 

of Corona, the National Reconnaissance Office began 

development of its first high-resolution satellite program, 

codenamed Gambit, first launched in 1963.

By the end of the 1960s, the CIA explored the development 

of a satellite that could obtain both wide area search 

imagery and high-resolution imagery under their Fulcrum 

program. If successful, the new satellite would replace 

both the Corona and Gambit satellites. The program was 

transferred to the NRO’s Program B responsible for CIA 

satellite development efforts and renamed Hexagon. 

Although the Hexagon satellite provided significantly 

improved search capabilities, it did not match the highresolution imagery capabilities of Gambit.

The NRO launched the first Hexagon satellite in 1971 to 

improve upon Corona’s capability to search broad and wide 

denied areas for threats to the United States. The system 

sometimes carried a mapping camera to aid in U.S. military 

war planning. 

The United States depended on these search and 

surveillance satellites to understand the capabilities, 

intentions, and advancements of those who opposed the 

United States during the Cold War. Together they became 

America’s essential eyes in space.
- 22 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

PROGRAM FACTS

Missions: 20, 12 with the MCS (19 successes)

Average Mission Life: 124-day average

Imaging Days: 31-270 days

Altitude: 80-370 nautical miles

Roll Control: attitude control gas

Payload Weight: 7,375 lbs

Image Retrieval: Film Return Capsule

Program Coverage: 877 million square miles

Hexagon provided the U.S. with impressive broad-area search & mapping capabilities 

from June 1971 - April 1986

ADVANCEMENTS

Hexagon, with its multiple recovery buckets and extended mission life, moved the U.S. closer to achieving continuous space 

imaging capability. Hexagon’s primary panoramic camera provided improved search coverage and resolution. Hexagon’s 

mapping camera provided global geodetic positioning, accurate point locations for military operations, and data for military 

targeting.

LAUNCH, OPERATION, 

AND RECOVERY 

SEQUENCE FOR 

HEXAGON

After a parachute 

slows the bucket’s 

decent, an airplane 

would capture the 

bucket mid-air.

PANORAMIC OPTICS/IMAGING

Aperture: 20 inches

Focal Length: 60 inches

Camera Developer: Perkin-Elmer

Lens: f/3.0

Image Resolution: 2-3 feet

Film Length: 320,000 ft (60 miles)

Film Width: 6.6 inches

MAPPING OPTICS/IMAGING

Camera Developer: Itek

Lens: f/6

Focal Length: 12 inches

Image Resolution: 30-35 feet
- 23 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

QUILL

ORIGINS OF QUILL

Despite the successes of the Corona and Gambit programs, 

they suffered some significant limitations. They could not 

obtain imagery at night or in poor weather conditions. 

Because both Corona and Gambit imagery was obtained 

via capsule returned from space, imagery from the systems 

could not be obtained quickly. The NRO was searching 

for solutions to those limitations. One of those was data 

transfer from orbit, which had proven successful with Sigint 

satellites such as GRAB.

The other was the use of radar returns for manipulation 

into imagery, which the Army and Air Force had proven as 

a successful imagery approach using airborne platforms. 

Radar returns could travel through bad weather and night. 

Quill was born under these conditions in 1962.

Major David Bradburn was assigned as the Quill Program 

Director. Bradburn worked diligently with Goodyear Aerospace 

and Lockheed Missiles and Space Companies to develop the 

Quill system. They were able to modify a number of existing 

radar and space vehicle components to integrate the system, 

saving time and money. By 21 December 1964 NRO launched 

the first and only Quill, and the launch was highly successful. 

All the systems worked as planned. Quill was unique in that 

imagery would be derived from both film de-orbited from 

the space vehicle, using a Corona film-return system, and 

a radar data downlink that would be processed to create 

imagery on the ground. The two sources would then be 

compared for effectiveness. The first launch and operation 

of the satellite was so successful that a second launch was 

deferred indefinitely.

INTELLIGENCE NEED FOR QUILL

Quill was a trailblazer. The program demonstrated that 

the NRO could take existing sensor technology, modify it 

for use in space, marry it with other specialized hardware 

for national reconnaissance programs, and demonstrate 

the potential for new intelligence collection. Quill blazed 

the trail in technologies that could collect images day or 

night and through cloud cover. Quill was also run by thenMajor David Bradburn, who would go on to become a 

senior leader of the NRO and major contributor to other 

successful program efforts at the NRO. The then-young 

NRO needed a program that could be turned quickly from 

concept to operation, and Quill blazed that trail leaving a 

stronger, more confident NRO.
- 24 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

ADVANCEMENTS

The Quill experimental radar imaging satellite was the first 

space-based system to use SAR to determine if radar could 

acquire ground images through clouds and in darkness. The 

SAR for this proof-of-concept satellite was developed as a way 

for the Air Force to assess post-strike damage in the event of 

a nuclear war. The technology was “off-the-shelf,” adapted 

from a pulsed Doppler system being developed for a USAF 

reconnaissance aircraft. 

QUILL 

Experimental Radar Satellite - December 1964 

Manufacturer: Lockheed & Goodyear

The proven flight package of a thrust-augmented Thor booster 

and an Agena D upper stage would carry Quill KP-II radar into 

space. Lockheed engineers expected the Agena to provide 

sufficient stability for its integrated KP-II payload to function 

effectively. This allowed them to opt for the simple solution 

of flush-mounting the radar antenna onto the Agena’s outer 

surface. The 15-foot antenna occupied nearly the entire 

right side of the Agena, protruding about 2.5 inches from its 

surface once covered by a protective fairing.

On 21 December 1964, the first and only Quill satellite 

launched on a thrust-augmented Thor booster and an Agena 

upper-stage from Vandenberg. Quill’s experimental mission 

would last only 96 hours. During that time the KP-II radar 

would operate no more than five minutes per orbit, and for 

no more than three orbits in succession. Three silver-zinc 

batteries powered the unit, providing a maximum of 80 

minutes of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) collection. These 

parameters would allow the vehicle to achieve its mission 

goals. Vandenberg was equipped with video display monitors 

to determine if Quill was operating and transmitting properly. 

During Quill’s seventh orbit, Vandenberg tracking station 

personnel began to receive radar returns on its monitors, 

declaring Quill operational. The data returned from Quill 

proved that radar imagery could be collected from space, 

and NRO determined a second experimental mission was 

not needed. Although the Quill experiment was a success, 

it would be several decades before radar satellites became 

part of NRO’s satellite constellation. 
- 25 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

KENNEN

CRISIS DECISION-MAKING AND SPACE IMAGERY

Following the successful capture of imagery from space in 

1960, the U.S. President and other leaders of the nation 

became increasingly dependent on space imagery for making 

key decisions. The early U.S. photoreconnaissance satellites, 

Corona and Gambit, shared common weaknesses with respect 

to supporting making decisions during international crises: both 

relied on film-return systems that meant captured imagery, 

at best, would be in the hands of decisionmakers within days 

of a crisis breaking out; and, both conducted relatively short, 

expendables-limited missions that required frequent launches, 

potentially leaving the U.S. with no satellite orbiting to obtain 

imagery as the crisis unfolded. The Strategic Air Command 

(SAC), in particular, was interested in rapid response imagery to 

assess escalating tensions that might lead to a nuclear weapons 

exchange with the Soviets. Thus the U.S. faced a daunting 

challenge in the late 1960s to develop a reliable near real-time 

imagery system. 

CRISES RESPONSE PROVES INADEQUATE

Perhaps the first call for quicker photoreconnaissance from 

space arose from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The NRO 

orbited Corona systems near the end of September 1962 and 

the beginning of November that same year. Neither system 

could provide imagery during the October crisis. Another 

example was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the fall 

of 1968, where a NRO satellite did obtain relevant imagery of 

Soviet troops massing on the Czech border, but the imagery 

was not available until the crisis was over and the imagery’s 

relevance was overcome by events. Out of frustration over 

his inability to obtain clear intelligence on the placement of 

Soviet weapons systems in the Suez Canal zone during 1970, 

President Richard Nixon pressed for obtaining near realtime imagery from space. His administration was focused 

on limiting Soviet presence in the area, but had no reliable, 

time-sensitive source of intelligence on the Soviet activity. 

Near real-time imagery from space would address that issue.

EARLY NEAR REAL-TIME IMAGERY DEVELOPMENT

When the U.S. established the nation’s first reconnaissance 

satellite development program that would eventually be 

known as Samos in 1956, program leaders proposed filmreturn satellite designs that would bear fruit in the Corona, 

Gambit, and Hexagon satellite systems. Samos program 

managers also pursued a film readout design, proposed by 

Eastman Kodak Company, which would provide imagery in a 

matter of hours, instead of the days and weeks required for 

the early film-return systems. The systems, known as E-1 and 

E-2, would rely on an on-orbit chemical photo development 

process—somewhat like the instant photography process 

that would become a commercial success for the Polaroid 

Corporation. Once the images were developed on orbit, an 

image scanner would scan the image and transmit segments 

of the image to ground stations where the image would be 

processed. 

The system faced a number of daunting challenges given late 

1950s and early 1960s technology. First, the chemical photo 

development process was new by earth-bound standards and 

was even more complicated in the vacuum of space. Second, 

the mechanics of developing an image and then scanning 

it in space required a very complex machine. Third, there 

was very limited storage and bandwidth for transmitting 

an image during the narrow windows when a satellite was 

within range of a ground station. The efforts to obtain space 

imagery using the film readout system proved too daunting, 

and the National Reconnaissance Office cancelled the film 

readout program elements after a single on-orbit operation 

of the E-1 proved the feasibility of the innovative technology, 

but also its limitations. The NRO turned its attention to 

improving film-return systems.

PERSISTENCE OF FILM READOUT TECHNOLOGY 

The Samos film readout technology inherited by the 

NRO persisted despite the program’s cancellation due 

SAMOS E-1

SAMOS E-2 

LAUNCH KENNEN LAUNCH - 1976
- 26 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Earlier proposals for putting a video camera in space preceded 

Program B’s thinking on non-film based imagery systems. Their 

approach was highly unique and required a completely new 

kind of camera system—one not even developed for use on 

Earth at the time.

Program B’s approach required a number of technological 

breakthroughs for the system to work. The first was the optical 

system itself. CIA pursued the first two types of new digital 

technology: a photo diode array and a photo transistor array. 

Either approach would avoid many of the pitfalls of depending 

on film-based systems in space and would open the possibility 

of reducing the time to obtain space imagery from weeks and 

days to hours and minutes. Both approaches required major 

technological breakthroughs to achieve revolutionary near 

real-time imagery capability from space.

Another significant innovation advanced by Program B was 

the introduction of relay satellites to assist in transferring the 

image from the imagery satellite to the ground station, where 

it could be processed and exploited. Previous approaches to 

more rapid imagery from space had been hampered by the 

short time in field of view of ground stations. The relay satellite 

solved this problem, as it was placed in a geosynchronous orbit 

within the constant field of view of the ground station. 

Program B developed the program concept so that by the early 

1970s they were confident to invest in the new innovative 

digital imagery program. Program A continued to advocate 

for their FROG system, arguing that it was less risky and could 

be procured more quickly. Elements of the Department of 

Defense, CIA, and Office of Management and Budget debated 

the merits of both programs. Eventually, both choices were 

presented to President Richard M. Nixon, and he approved the 

Program B proposal, which would be known as Kennen, on 

23 September 1971. The name Kennen was chosen by NRO 

Deputy Director Bob Naka adopting the German verb “to 

know” as the program name.

Nixon approved the program with the understanding that it 

would provide imagery by the end of what he hoped would be 

his second presidential term in 1976. Program B did launch the 

first Kennen satellite in December 1976, but the first imagery 

was delivered to newly inaugurated President Jimmy Carter at 

his first intelligence briefing after being sworn in as President 

in January 1977.

Program B’s initial efforts established a foundation for 

development and adoption of the optical systems’ chargecoupled device (CCD), a completely new technology for 

imagery. The charge-coupled device would evolve further for 

commercial use in digital video cameras and other commercial 

applications after the NRO’s heavy investment in CCD 

technology. A new era of digital photography began.

to requirements from National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) and the U.S.’ efforts to send astronauts 

to the Moon by the end of the 1960s. One key requirement for 

successfully landing Apollo program astronauts on the Moon 

was detailed imagery of the Moon’s surface. The Soviets had 

successfully imaged the back side of the Moon in 1959 using 

technology similar to the E-1 film readout system. 

In 1963, NASA solicited proposals for a lunar imagery system 

that could image the Moon’s surface to identify appropriate 

landing sites for Apollo program astronauts. Boeing Corporation 

partnered with Eastman Kodak for their proposal. The Boeing/

Kodak proposal relied on the film development system used in 

the Samos E-1 system. NASA’s source selection board judged 

the Boeing/Kodak proposal superior to the other four proposals 

primarily because its semi-dry chemical development process 

was less vulnerable in the vacuum of space compared to wet 

chemical processes proposed by the competitors. The Samosbased innovative film development process was incorporated 

into NASA’s Lunar Imager system that successfully returned 

lunar images, helping to enable Apollo landings. 

In July 1963, NRO’s Program A successfully orbited the 

Gambit high-resolution imagery satellite. Gambit served as a 

companion to Corona. Whereas Corona obtained images of 

areas and objects of intelligence interest, the Gambit system 

imaged those areas and objects at high resolution to obtain 

intelligence specifics. Gambit eventually obtained imagery 

of objects and characteristics smaller than one foot in size, 

giving the U.S. a tremendous intelligence advantage in better 

understanding developments in the closed Soviet Union.

A number of crises prompted U.S. leaders to ask if satellite 

imagery was or could be available to assist in crisis 

decision making. In most cases, the NRO could not provide 

imagery quickly enough to support decision making during 

emergencies. The requests, though, prompted Program 

A officers to think of innovations to provide near realtime imagery that could assist in crisis decisions. They 

continued to investigate potential improvements in film 

readout technology first proven in the Samos program. 

More importantly, Program A officers advocated marrying 

such technology with the innovative high-resolution 

Gambit optical system. Such a marriage would significantly 

advance U.S. crisis management capability through timely 

high-resolution imagery. Program A called the system Film 

Readout Gambit or FROG. 

KENNEN: 

THE NEAR REAL-TIME IMAGERY SOLUTION

In 1968, the CIA’s Program B at the NRO began development 

of a highly innovative approach for obtaining imagery from 

space. Rather than relying on film at all, the Program B 

engineers pursued development of a digital optical system. 
Charge-Cupled Device

SAMOS E-1

Kennan Launch - Dec 197

- 27 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

DIGITAL IMAGERY

EARLY U.S. ELECTRONIC SPACE IMAGERY EFFORTS

The the Air Force’s satellite reconnaissance efforts originated 

from the WS-117L program, which was created in 1954 by the 

Air Research and Development Command. One of the programs 

started in WS-117L was the Samos project, which began 

development of satellites with both Imint and Sigint payloads and 

investigated both film-based and electronic imagery systems. In 

late 1957, it was decided that technology for imagery transmission 

was still years away, and the film-based system was much closer 

to being realized. The two projects were separated, and the 

film-based project was broken away into what soon became the 

Corona program, which started returning imagery to Earth three 

years later.

Meanwhile, scientists and engineers continued to work on 

electronic imagery with Samos. They developed an analog system, 

called the E-1, that worked but had significant shortcomings that 

proved too insurmountable to be used in an intelligence satellite. 

Early studies showed the time needed to transmit the images to 

Earth was the main impediment to making it useful for a satellite 

orbiting the planet.

APOLLO PROGRAM AND 

ELECTRONIC SPACE IMAGERY

In the 1960s, when NASA began planning for their Lunar Orbiter to 

map the Moon’s surface for landing sites for the Apollo program, 

the NRO allowed Eastman-Kodak to propose a candidate for 

the NASA program using the E-1 system that was developed for 

the NRO. Although the Kodak proposal was the most expensive 

candidate, it had proven technology and so was chosen by NASA 

because the other proposals all required testing and would take far 

longer, with success not guaranteed. The Lunar Orbiter succeeded 

in mapping 90% of the Moon’s surface, enabling NASA to choose 

the best landing sites for its missions. Without the NRO’s help, 

Neil Armstrong’s “one giant leap” may have been delayed, and 

President Kennedy’s call to visit the Moon before the end of the 

1960s may not have been fulfilled.

WHY WE USE IT 

Still, an intelligence satellite orbiting the Earth needed a much 

faster data transmission rate than was provided by the analog E-1 

camera system, and that could not be realized until digital imagery 

systems were developed. Actual “digital” imaging had been 

around since the 1920s, but the process was cumbersome and 

time consuming. The NRO continued its research, and using both 

in-house advances and data from the private sector, such as the 

invention of the charge-coupled device in 1969 by scientists at Bell 

Labs, the technology soon reached a tipping point. By 1971, all of 

the pieces had been put into place, and in September, President 

Nixon authorized the commencement of the NRO’s electro-optical 

imagery program, which would eventually produce the KH-11 

Kennen satellite.

It would be another five years of long, hard nights and weekends 

for NRO engineers, but in December 1976, the NRO finally 

launched the world’s first electro-optical imagery intelligence 

satellite, and imagery’s Digital Revolution began. On 20 January 

1977, the day on which Jimmy Carter was inaugurated President, 

the KH-11 Kennen satellite became operational and beamed the 

world’s first near real-time intelligence imagery to Earth, much 

to the chagrin of President Ford, who had hoped to get the first 

image before he left office, consistent with Richard Nixon’s desire 

to see the satellite operate by the end of what would have been his 

second presidential term. Since that day, the NRO has continued 

to make groundbreaking advances and has produced significantly 

better imagery satellites time and again. The digital electro-optical 

imagery satellite system continues to be a key component in the 

NRO constellation and will continue to be for decades to come.
Argon Mapping Camera

Hexagon Mapping Camera model

- 28 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Hexagon Mapping 

Camera image

MAPPING CAMERAS

In the early 1960s when U.S. satellite activity was taking 

shape and the NRO was formed, it quickly became apparent 

that imagery needed for strategic intelligence purposes 

and imagery needed for mapping requirements were not 

always compatible. At the time Corona first orbited, the U.S. 

military was still heavily dependent on captured World War 

II-era German maps for planning defenses against the Soviet 

Union. Those maps were both imprecise and incomplete. 

The military needed new imagery to update their maps, but 

strategic planners had more pressing concerns, such as the 

number of bombers and nuclear missiles the Soviets had in 

their inventory.

While the development of reconnaissance satellites had 

the utmost priority with U.S. decision makers, the country 

could not afford to have multiple programs trying to build 

basically the same type of system; that was precisely one of 

the reasons the NRO was formed in the first place. With this 

in mind, the NRO recognized that satellite vehicles could be 

configured for different collection purposes, so they could 

accomplish different missions without developing an entirely 

different system. 

ARGON

The Air Force developed their own mapping and charting 

system, designated the E-4, in the Samos program. While a 

few working E-4 cameras were eventually built, none ever 

flew because of a lack of rockets to launch them into orbit, 

which were distributed to programs with higher priorities. 

Meanwhile, the NRO worked with the Army on the Argon 

project that incorporated a mapping camera into the 

Corona satellite platform to provide imagery for improving 

mapping capabilities. Integrating a new capability into an 

existing platform demonstrated the integration philosophy 

of the NRO.

Argon operations were not really part of the Corona program 

but generally were treated as such because of equipment and 

operational similarities. To perform its cartographic function, 

Argon flew much higher than Corona and used a much shorter 

(3-inch focal length) lens and a different camera mechanism, 

but in most outward respects, it was indistinguishable from 

a Corona-C or C’ camera. Between 1961 and the end of 

1964, 13 Argon launches were attempted. Six missions were 

counted as successful to some degree, and the remainder 

failed completely, most of which were attributed to launcher 

failures. Notably, six of the first seven mission attempts 

failed, but only one failure occurred (on 26 April 1963) in six 

launches during the last two years of Argon operations.

In 1964, Corona engineers began developing the DISIC 

camera—which had a three-inch focal length lens—that 

provided a star-calibration capability that was largely 

unaffected by the orientation of the orbital vehicle. The earlier 

stellar indexing system had become ineffective whenever the 

main camera was positioned so that the stellar camera looked 

toward the sun; in DISIC, one camera was always pointed at 

least 90 degrees away from the sun. The incorporation of 

DISIC in combination with a variety of other improvements in 

camera precision effectively created a mapping capability in 

Corona J-3 that finally obviated any need for flying dedicated 

mapping missions. With the addition of DISIC to the Corona 

system, the requirement for additional Argon missions or a 

successor to Argon vanished.
- 29 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

HEXAGON

First launched in 1971, the Hexagon system was the 

replacement for Corona, which could not be appreciably 

improved without major system restructuring and 

enhancements. Since the expected benefits of an improved 

Corona were not that significant, the NRO decided to instead 

start from scratch and develop a brand new search system 

to take full advantage of the advancements that had been 

made in satellite and launcher technology over the previous 

decade. The result was a significantly improved system, both 

in terms of size and capabilities. The new “Big Bird” satellite 

was as big as a bus, could carry 10 times the film load of 

Corona, and could stay in orbit for up to nine months.

Being the replacement for Corona meant that Hexagon was 

the natural vehicle to carry the next government mapping 

camera. The first four Hexagon satellites flew with just their 

reconnaissance cameras aboard, while the new mapping 

camera was being developed. But the next eight Hexagon 

vehicles all carried the Hexagon Mapping Camera (MCS). 

The MCS did not fly on the last four Hexagon missions.

One of the most significant improvements over the Corona 

system was that because of the size of the Hexagon flight 

vehicle, engineers were able to incorporate the MCS into the 

standard mission vehicle without removing any of the basic 

components. The extra MCS cameras and film load could 

be attached to the Hexagon vehicle without any reduction 

in Hexagon performance. Therefore, the MCS was able to 

fly along with the Hexagon’s reconnaissance cameras/film, 

so those flights could accomplish both missions. This was 

a complete departure from the Corona program, where 

the Argon system had to replace the Corona cameras to 

fly. The Hexagon MCS was also so reliable that it never 

caused any malfunction or delay in the Hexagon’s primary 

reconnaissance mission.

Over the course of eight flights, the MCS collected 48,000 

feet of highly accurate mapping film covering about 104 

million square nautical miles. The MCS provided better 

than a four-fold improvement in accuracy, and more than 

a ten-fold improvement in resolution, over the previous 

best KH-5 (Argon) mapping camera. This data provided far 

better geographic positioning and elevation information for 

the nation’s mapping community, allowing them to produce 

more and better maps and targeting data for tactical and 

strategic weapon systems. 

Hexagon flew 19 successful missions from June 1971 

through October 1984. The 20th and final Hexagon mission 

was launched on 18 April 1986, but it experienced a booster 

malfunction nine seconds into flight and was destroyed, 

becoming the only unsuccessful Hexagon mission. The 

Hexagon MCS was declassified along with the Hexagon and 

Gambit programs by DNRO Bruce Carlson for the NRO 50th 

anniversary celebration on 17 September 2011. 
- 30 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

RADAR IMAGERY

BEGINNING THE TRADECRAFT

Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) was developed in 

the early 20th century from theoretical work and basic 

experiments of Scottish and German scientists from the late 

19th century. Many countries began to seriously investigate 

the principle in the 1930s, and most of the major participants 

in the Second World War had some form of usable radar 

system. Many historians credit radar as the single most 

important ingredient in the Allied victory in the Battle of 

Britain in 1940.

INVESTIGATING A NEW DISCIPLINE

However, static radars can only measure signals and cannot 

“paint a picture.” Radar imagery can only be produced by 

collecting returns along a path by a moving radar. So it was 

many years before radars could be made small and mobile 

enough to produce radar imagery. In April 1960, the U.S. 

Army unveiled pictures of American cities taken at night 

and through clouds using a synthetic aperture radar system 

mounted in a small aircraft (SAR is a scientific technique 

that simulates a much larger receiving antenna, which 

improves the resolution of the resulting radar “picture,” 

making it possible to put radars in aircraft and satellites). 

This emerging technology was receiving significant interest 

from people and organizations involved in reconnaissance 

activities. The Air Force was particularly interested to see if 

this technology could be used to provide usable post-strike 

damage assessments without having to wait for appropriate 

conditions for optical sensors.

QUILL 

In late 1962, DNRO Joseph Charyk designated Maj David 

D. Bradburn (who would later become a Major General 

and head of NRO’s Program A) to lead a project named 

Quill to determine if collection of usable SAR imagery from 

satellites was feasible. Using “off-the-shelf” equipment and 

technology, Bradburn was able to quickly and efficiently get 

the program off the ground. Quill collected radar returns 

on tape spooled in the satellite, while also transmitting the 

data back to collection sites on Earth. The first (and only) 

Quill launch occurred on 21 December 1964. The satellite 

worked so well that a second planned launch was cancelled, 

since all of the program’s objectives had been met during 

the first launch.

THE PATH FORWARD

In the final evaluation of the experiment, it was found that 

usable SAR imagery could indeed be collected from satellites. 

However, the resolution of the Quill imagery was relatively 

poor, and it did not provide the necessary intelligence 

needed to justify a new satellite system. While the NRO 

moved on to more pressing needs, it never forgot about 

radar imagery, and its engineers and scientists continued to 

explore this new technology. It would be many years before 

the Intelligence Community would be able to build a usable 

radar satellite with sufficient resolution; it was not until 9 

June 2008 that the DNI declassified the fact that the U.S. 

operated an effective radar satellite reconnaissance system. 
- 31 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

STEREO IMAGERY

IT IS ALL IN THE VIEW

Stereo imagery is the result of taking two images of the same 

spot from slightly different locations, resulting in slightly 

different perspectives, and viewing each of those images 

separately with each of your eyes or viewing a combined 

picture with special goggles/glasses. The resulting view 

gives depth to the scene and a 3D perspective, and it 

gives the viewer a much more detailed view of the scene, 

allowing the viewer to see things that could be missed from 

simply viewing a single image because imagery is a twodimensional representation of a three-dimensional space. 

For non-imagery analysts, the most common experience 

of stereo viewing is watching a 3D movie or using virtual 

reality goggles. 

WHAT IT PROVIDES

Viewing imagery in stereo provides the ability to perceive 

height and depth in remotely sensed data. NRO tasking 

software determines the correct acquisition parameters 

for stereo imagery with math models that ensure the 

proper differential perspectives of the two images. Taken 

from orbit, the aim points must be precise; otherwise the 

resulting stereo pair would not register properly and would 

appear blurry.

WHY WE USE IT 

In the Intelligence Community, NRO-provided stereo 

imagery has been used for decades by imagery analysts to 

differentiate fine details in a scene. It is particularly useful for 

identifying and analyzing tall, thin objects, such as antennas 

and towers, and also in analyzing very small objects that 

provide little detail in a 2D perspective. Cartographers and 

geospatial analysts use stereo imagery to produce maps 

and digital elevation models. Stereo imagery has the added 

benefit of producing very accurate positional measurements 

required for certain operational applications.

In the early days, exploitation of stereo images was a difficult, 

haphazard technique of physically aligning the hard-copy 

images below a special viewing tool that had to be constantly 

adjusted to look at different points on the images. With 

today’s advanced computers, softcopy exploitation is much 

more easily achieved, although the process takes a great deal 

of computer power and memory.

WHO ELSE USES IT

In the private sector, stereo imaging has proliferated into 

many new areas in the last two decades. Stereo imaging 

is used in art, education, medicine, scientific/engineering 

research, space exploration, and of course, entertainment. It 

is used by doctors to view inner parts of a body before surgery. 

It is used extensively by eye doctors for both diagnosis and 

treatments. It was used by NASA in the Mars Exploration 

Rover missions. Today’s nascent virtual reality business 

is built on stereoscopic imaging principles, and everyone 

expects that business to boom as the technology matures. 

It may be years before we can all play the chess game that 

Chewbacca and C-3PO played in Star Wars (which was more 

holography than stereo imagery, though the concepts are 

similar), but those days will be with us before we know it. 
INNOVATIONS

SIGINT

- 34 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

GRAB

BACKGROUND

In March 1958, Reid Mayo, an engineer at the Naval 

Research Laboratory (NRL), passing time while stuck in a 

restaurant during a Pennsylvania snowstorm, came up with 

the novel idea of mounting a periscope-radar detector on 

a Vanguard-like satellite. After returning to Washington, 

Mayo pitched his idea to NRL’s electronic countermeasures 

chief and shortly thereafter the concept was approved 

by the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Galactic 

Radiation and Background (GRAB) project became a reality. 

In August 1959, President Eisenhower formally approved 

Mayo’s project, which by then became classified with the 

code name “Tattletale.”

NAMES CAN BE MISLEADING

The GRAB satellite was a cover name that portrayed the 

program’s purpose as a research project measuring radiation 

in space. In fact, the GRAB satellite was equipped with 

scientific instruments and a receiver that could detect pulsedradar signals emitting from Soviet air defense systems. 

The intelligence yielded from GRAB played a vital role in 

U.S. national security at the height of the Cold War. While 

GRAB was the first electronics intelligence (Elint) satellite to 

be launched into space by the U.S., it only operated from 

1960-1962. However, Poppy, GRAB’s successor, operated 

from 1962-1977. The Director of CIA (D/CIA) authorized 

limited declassification of GRAB in 1998. In 2004, the D/CIA 

declassified limited facts about Poppy’s existence. 

UNWANTED INTERNATIONAL 

CONTROVERSY LEADS TO ACTION

On 1 May 1960 when Frances Gary Powers’ U-2 high-altitude 

reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union, 

President Eisenhower cancelled all U-2 flights over the region. 

Four days after the U-2 was shot down, President Eisenhower 

approved the first GRAB launch. GRAB was successfully 

launched into orbit on 22 June 1960 from Cape Canaveral, 

Florida on a Thor Able-Star rocket. NRL attempted four 

additional GRAB missions between 1960 and 1962, but only 

one was successful. However, lessons learned from GRAB’s two 

successful launches were foundational to the development of 

its first cousin and successor, Poppy (sometimes referred to 

back then as the polar flower in the sky).

SIGNALS COLLECTION HUT
- 35 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

SIGNALS COLLECTION HUT

HOW GRAB WORKED

GRAB satellites featured Elint antennas that provided 

reception of radar signals. A larger and separate turnstile 

antenna received ground commands, telemetry, and Elint 

data. When terrestrial radar emitted pulsed-radar signals 

above the horizon, GRAB satellites collected each radar 

pulse signal in a specified bandwidth and transmitted a 

corresponding signal to an NRL control ground hut within its 

field of view. The hut’s antenna masts contained two upper 

bays of 10-element yagi antennas that received telemetry 

(108 MHz) and four lower bays of 10- element yagi antennas 

that transmitted commands and received Elint (139 MHz). 

Personnel at the ground control huts then recorded data 

from GRAB and dispatched tapes with that data, initially to 

NRL, and then to National Security Agency (NSA) and the 

AF Strategic Air Command. NSA and SAC then exploited 

the data to develop technical intelligence about Soviet 

radar. As mentioned, only two of GRAB’s five launches were 

successful, and the program was realigned under the newlyformed NRO.

SATELLITE PROGRAMS ALIGNED UNDER NRO

When NRO opened its doors on 6 September 1961, its charter 

was to manage the newly created National Reconnaissance 

Program (NRP), which consisted of all consolidated 

satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects for the 

IC. Consequently, in 1962, NRL’s Elint satellite activities 

were realigned under NRO as were CIA and Air Force space 

programs. These projects became known as NRO’s alphabet 

programs. Program A represented the Air Force, Program 

B represented the CIA, and Program C represented Navy 

programs, including GRAB and Poppy. Under Program C, 

the Navy continued NRL’s Elint satellite collection with the 

enhanced Poppy, GRAB’s successor. The GRAB-2 program was 

terminated in August 1962, and on 13 December 1962 the 

Air Force used a Thor Agena-D launch vehicle, to carry Poppy 

1 into orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.
- 36 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

GRAB MISSIONS:

LAUNCHES

GRAB 1 22 JUN 1960 THOR ABLE STAR

30 NOV 1960 THOR ABLE STAR (FAILED)

GRAB 2 29 JUN 1961 THOR ABLE STAR

24 JAN 1962 THOR ABLE STAR (FAILED)

26 APR 1962 SCOUT (FAILED)

GRAB

Successful Missions: 2

Size: 20 inches in diameter

Codename: Tattletale

Objective: Collect Elint

GRAB AND POPPY LASTING LEGACY

Early NRO Elint satellite programs were a critical element of 

U.S. technical reconnaissance operations during the 1960s 

into the 1970s. Before development of these systems, 

technical intelligence about Soviet air defenses was limited 

to airborne and ground-based collection platforms that 

could only access radar site data from less than 200 miles. 

GRAB’s lasting contribution was demonstrating that Soviet 

air defense networks had far more radars than SAC knew 

about, prompting SAC to change their offensive strategy for 

fighting nuclear war. Collections from GRAB, and later Poppy, 

supported a wide range of other intelligence applications 

as well. For example, they provided SAC not only with 

detailed information about Soviet air defense equipment 

and locations but provided valuable ocean surveillance data 

to Naval operational commanders. When GRAB and Poppy 

data were combined with Corona’s satellite images, a more 

complete picture emerged about Soviet military capabilities, 

which supported military and senior policymakers with 

making informed decisions. GRAB and Poppy innovations 

have and will continue to impact development of increasingly 

sophisticated capabilities into the 21st century, which are 

needed today more than ever.

ADVANCEMENTS

GRAB satellites featured Elint antennas that provided 

reception of radar signals. A larger and separate turnstile 

antenna received commands, transmitted telemetry, and 

transmitted Elint data.

The National Security Agency and Strategic Air Command 

exploited the data to develop technical intelligence about 

Soviet Radar.
- 37 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

POPPY

ORIGINS OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

The Galactic Radiation and Background electronic signals 

intelligence satellite was the world’s first successful 

reconnaissance satellite. 

The Poppy reconnaissance satellite was GRAB’s successor. 

In 1962 the Naval Research Laboratory, by then part of 

NRO’s Program C, developed this larger and more advanced 

satellite. The NRL launched the first Poppy satellite on 13 

December of 1962, and the Poppy program completed seven 

missions. The NRL launched the last Poppy mission on 14 

December 1971.

EVOLUTION OF POPPY

The initial Poppy mission succeeded, as did all six additional 

missions. The Air Force used three versions of the Thor Agena 

booster for Poppy: Thor Agena-D for Poppy 1, 2, 4, and 5; a 

Thrust-Augmented-Thor (TAT) Agena-D for Poppy 3; and the 

Thorad (also know as Long-Tank Thrust-Augmented Thor) 

Agena-D for Poppy 6 and 7.

The first Poppy missions featured a stretched spherical 

satellite design, initially 20 x 24 inches (at 55 pounds), which 

ultimately became 24 x 32 inches (at 129 pounds). 

Poppy also featured a 12-sided multiface design, initially 27 x 

32 inches (at 162 pounds), which ultimately became 27 x 34 

inches (at 282 pounds).

Two Poppy designs—stretched sphere (left); multiface (right)

INTELLIGENCE NEED FOR SIGNALS COLLECTION

Intelligence derived from data that Poppy collected went to 

support a wide range of intelligence applications. It provided 

cues to the location and capabilities of radar sites within 

the Soviet Union; it provided SAC with characteristics and 

locations of air defense equipment to support building the U.S. 

Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP)13; it provided ocean 

SIGNALS RECEIVING CONSOLE
- 38 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

ADVANCEMENTS

Poppy added ocean surveillance capabilities. During 1965-

67, Program C phased out the earlier receiving and control 

huts used for GRAB; the program also upgraded data quality 

by installing equipment in buildings provided by host 

installations. This upgrade also augmented manual analysis 

in the field.

POPPY MISSIONS

LAUNCHES

Poppy 1 13 Dec 1962 THOR/AGENA D 

Poppy 2 15 June 1963 THOR/AGENA D

Poppy 3 11 Jan 1964 THRUST-AUGMENTED-

 THOR/AGENA D

Poppy 4 9 March 1965 THOR/AGENA D

Poppy 5 31 May 1967 THOR/AGENA D

Poppy 6 30 Sept 1969 THORAD/AGENA D

Poppy 7 14 Dec 1971 THORAD/AGENA D

POPPY

1962 - 1977

Successful Missions: 7

Size: 20X24(stretched spherical)

 24X32 (multifaced)

surveillance information to Navy operational commanders; 

and, with data from the Corona imaging reconnaissance 

satellite, it provided a more complete picture of the Soviet 

military threat. We can credit these systems with helping 

the U.S. win the Cold War. At the same time they extended 

their impact into the future, as they laid the foundation for 

future national reconnaissance capabilities. The NRO’s 21stcentury Sigint reconnaissance capabilities grew out of GRAB 

and Poppy innovations in the 1960s and 1970s.

From the relatively safe distance of 600 miles above the 

Earth, Poppy intercepted Elint signals from radar sites 

throughout the Soviet Union. The threat of Soviet hostile 

action limited U.S. airborne and ground-based platforms to 

collecting signals from radar sites to only 200 miles inside 

Soviet territory.
ABM Testing Facility

Sary Shagan- Soviet Union

- 39 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Nixon and Brezhnev Sign The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

ABM SYSTEM TESTING DETECTION

FROM A HOT TO COLD WAR

The United States’ nuclear bombing and destruction of 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan brought to close a global 

hot war, yet started a global cold war. The United States 

underestimated the pace with which nuclear weapons 

would be developed by the Soviet Union. In order to assure 

that the Soviet Union would be unsuccessful in carrying out 

a surprise nuclear weapons attack, the U.S. invested heavily 

in a number of weapons systems. One of those was an antiballistic missile (ABM) system designed to shoot down 

incoming intercontinental missiles from the USSR. The USSR, 

unsurprisingly, countered with development of their own 

ABM system, raising the potential for a successful nuclear 

strike against the United States. Consequently, the U.S. 

turned to national reconnaissance systems to understand the 

development and deployment of Soviet ABM systems and 

to increase the odds of preventing the global Cold War from 

turning hot.

 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS 

DEVELOPMENT AND DETECTION

After the United States’ Manhattan nuclear weapons 

development program successfully produced the bombs that 

destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nascent U.S. intelligence 

reporting concluded the Soviet Union was unlikely to develop 

a successful nuclear weapon before 1953, but could possibly 

develop one as early as 1950. The United States was surprised 

when their nuclear detection program confirmed the Soviets’ 

first successful atomic weapon test, which occurred on 3 

September 1949. The Soviet Union was also surprised 20 days 

later when President Truman announced to the world the 

Soviets’ successful test, believing they could hide a successful 

nuclear weapons test.

The United States had wisely decided to develop a system for 

detecting foreign nuclear detonations, growing out of their 

own research efforts to identify and track nuclear fallout 

from their own weapons testing. In 1947, then Army Chief of 

Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, designated the Army Air 

Corps—soon to be the U.S. Air Force—to develop a system to 

pick up indications of nuclear fallout at high altitudes. Shortly 

after the successful Soviet test, U.S. military aircraft captured 

nuclear fallout through this detection system, operated 

by U.S. Air Force. Early in the Cold War, the United States 

understood the importance and difficulty of developing 

systems to track the development of Soviet nuclear weapons 

in a highly closed society.

U.S. ABM DEVELOPMENT

At the same time as developing nuclear testing detection 

capability, the U.S. also engaged in the development of 

a weapons system that could be used to destroy nuclear 

weapons before they reached the U.S., eventually known as 

an anti-ballistic missile system. In 1950, the U.S. began testing 

the Nike Ajax, designed to launch from the ground with 

command guidance for tracking incoming aircraft for intercept 

and destruction. This critical capability, would allow the U.S. to 

destroy the most likely means of delivering a nuclear weapon 

in the early days of the Cold War. The Ajax system was followed 

by the Nike Hercules system that also used command guidance, 

but could intercept targets 150,000 feet away—three times 

the distance of the Ajax system. 

By the mid-1950s, the United States faced an emerging threat 

from newly developed Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs). During 1955 and 1956, the U.S. carried out intensive 

ABM technology studies. The studies led the U.S. to award a 

contract to Western Electric, Bell Labs, and Douglas Aircraft to 
- 40 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

develop a new ABM system known as Nike Zeus to intercept 

ICBMs. Following the Soviet Union’s successful launch of their 

Sputnik satellite in October 1957, the program took on new 

urgency. Nike Zeus utilized radar to identify and track ICBMs 

and used computers to assign specific ABM batteries to strike 

against targeted ICBMs. Before Nike Zeus could be deployed, 

the U.S. determined through system tests and studies that 

the system could not effectively counter a Soviet attack using 

multiple ICBMs and decoys.

The U.S. remained resolved in developing an ABM system and 

began development of what would be known as the Safeguard 

system by the time Richard Nixon became president in 1969. 

The new system utilized a phased array radar. The Safeguard 

system incorporated fixed antennas with electronic beam 

steering at U.S. ABM sites. Two different ABMs were developed 

under the program. Spartan missiles were to be launched first 

for farther out ICBM interception, and Sprint ABMs would be 

used for ICBMs that were closer to their intended targets. Under 

the Nixon administration, the system was intended to protect 

offensive nuclear weapons sites in Montana and North Dakota.

SOVIET AND CHINESE ABM SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

Beginning in the late 1950s, the Soviets began testing missiles 

that could intercept weapons delivery vehicles at their missile 

testing facility at Sary Shagan. In 1961, they successfully 

intercepted one of their own missiles launched from their 

facility at Kapustin Yar. 

By 1962, the Soviets began constructing their own ABM system 

to intercept U.S. ICBMs in the event of a nuclear attack. The 

system depended on radar facilities to identify incoming 

targets and track those targets for attack by Soviet ABMs. The 

U.S. nicknamed the radar facilities as “Dog House” because of 

their A-frame shape. Those facilities were latter supplemented 

by “Cat House” radar facilities, as well as “Hen House” radar 

facilities around the periphery of the Soviet Union to provide 

early warning. The ABM system was developed to protect 

Moscow against nuclear attack.

Like the U.S., the Soviets developed ABMs that were intended 

to intercept missiles at long range and short range—the Galosh 

and Gazelle missiles respectively. Also like the U.S., the Soviet 

ABM system could not handle the large number of targets 

that would likely be launched in a full-scale nuclear exchange. 

The rapid proliferation of nuclear warheads exceeded 

advancements in ABM system capabilities.

Prompted by U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons and ABM systems 

development, in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

initiated their own ABM system. They eventually undertook 

development and testing of the Fanji ABMs. The Chinese also 

developed ground radar tracking stations for early warning of 

a nuclear attack. In addition, the PRC undertook development 

of the XianFeng anti-missile gun. Although ambitious, these 

programs were canceled by 1977 after the death of PRC 

Chairman Mao Tse Tung.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The United States and the Soviet Union both recognized the 

limitations of ABM systems as rapid development of nuclear 

weapons systems occurred on both sides. The pace was 

amplified by the development of multiple nuclear warheads 

that could be launched using a single ICBM. As a result of these 

realities, in 1972 President Nixon and Soviet Premier Brezhnev 

signed an anti-ballistic missile treaty. The treaty allowed both 

sides to protect one ABM site and one site for weapons system 

command and control. As a consequence, the U.S. dismantled 

its Montana ABM missile system site and later decided not to 

deploy an ABM system to defend Washington, D.C. 

This left only the site in North Dakota where U.S. ABM system 

development continued. The site became operational in 1974, 

but the U.S. Congress rejected the utility of an ABM system and 

discontinued funding the North Dakota site. It closed in 1976.

The Soviet Union continued to build and maintain an ABM system 

to defend Moscow against attack. ABM system development 

continued after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

 

THE ROLE OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES 

IN ABM MONITORING

One critical element of any arms control treaty is the ability of 

each party of the treaty to verify the other parties’ compliance. 

Such was the case for the U.S. and the USSR with respect to 

the ABM treaty. The treaty specified a new term, “National 

Technical Means,” to be used to verify treaty compliance. When 

the treaty was signed in 1972, the United States’ reconnaissance 

satellites developed and operated by the NRO remained highly 

classified. For the United States, “National Technical Means” 

meant NRO satellites. It would not be until 1978 that the U.S. 

acknowledged the existence of reconnaissance satellites and 

until 1992 that the U.S. would acknowledge the existence 

of the NRO. Despite the lack of public acknowledgment, the 

highly innovative and capable NRO reconnaissance satellite 

architecture served as the primary means for ABM treaty 

verification, as well as assessments of the threat posed by 

Soviet ABM system development from the early stages of their 

development. 
GPS - NAVSTAR

- 41 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

GEOLOCATION FROM SPACE

FOUNDATION FOR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

GEOLOCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In the 21st century, satellite geolocation is ubiquitous, 

woven into the fabric of everyday life for billions of people 

worldwide. Individuals have apps on their phones, tablets, 

watches, and in their cars, capable of determining their 

precise position on the Earth, of providing a directed route 

to a selected destination, even warning of upcoming 

obstacles like heavy traffic or road construction. What has 

made this possible is the Global Positioning System (GPS), 

a constellation of more than 30 satellites, together with 

comparable systems in Europe and Asia. Given its widespread 

adoption and everyday influence, it can be easy to forget that 

this technological innovation is a very recent phenomenon 

that made obsolete the natural observation methods humans 

had used for centuries. Where once ship captains used stars 

in the sky and dead reckoning techniques to calculate where 

they were at sea, the modern traveler links to human-made 

celestial bodies—orbiting satellites with ultra-precise atomic 

clocks—to obtain much more accurate and reliable location 

information. Although most knowledgeable users today 

know that this technology was once the exclusive province 

of military and intelligence organizations, many remain 

unaware of the role the National Reconnaissance Office and 

other organizations played in developing it. The story of using 

space-based systems for geolocation is a great example of 

how American technological innovations originally pursued 

for supporting military forewarning and national security 

policymaking, were later transferred to the private sector as 

the foundation for innumerable, related innovations, e.g., 

self-driving cars or steps-counting fitness bands and myriad 

other civilian and commercial applications. 

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s obsession with 

secrecy and systemic suppression of even the most trivial 

details about life behind the Iron Curtain, made extremely 

challenging the gathering of intelligence by traditional means. 

Soviet security services concealed progress of their country’s 

post-WWII nuclear weapons program—and penetration by its 

spies—so well that their first successful atomic detonation in 

1949 shocked Western intelligence experts who had forecast 

that the USSR was still years away from obtaining “the bomb.” 

The arms race that ensued—four years later to the month, the 

Soviets countered another American weapons development 

success, the testing of a hydrogen bomb, by exploding their 

own powerful fusion weapon—produced further uncertainty 

and instability. Knowing the Soviets’ military intentions and 

capabilities, particularly its strategic missile numbers and 

strength, became a paramount concern. Were conflict to 

break out, the U.S. military response needed to be immediate, 

reliable, and, above all, accurate, which required knowing 

where and what to target for annihilation. Unfortunately, 

given the lack of intelligence in the 1950s, and the vast interior 

of the USSR, it was difficult to know even where to begin to 

look. To provide military commands and national policymakers 

better information, the U.S. Intelligence Community proposed 

overhead reconnaissance missions, first through conducting 

aerial overflights of denied territory, and later by launching 
- 42 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

and operating satellites. Beginning in 1956, U-2 high-altitude 

reconnaissance aircraft missions began to pull back the curtain, 

revealing previously unknown military installations, missile 

launch facilities, and dispelling the myth of the “bomber 

gap.” But it would be the advent of space-based systems 

that would enable the U.S. to really penetrate Soviet secrecy 

and collect the vital information that removed uncertainty, 

lessened tensions, and allowed the Cold War to remain “cold.” 

In time, satellites would also provide military leaders with 

the capability to geolocate enemy combatants and weapons 

systems to perform precision air and missile strikes. 

Ironically, the earliest satellite geolocation method may have 

been conceptualized partly in response to the Soviet launch of 

Sputnik-1. In tracking the tiny satellite’s radio signals, scientists 

at Johns Hopkins’ Applied Physics Laboratory noted that signal 

frequency increased as the vehicle approached and decreased 

as it moved farther away, an illustration of the Doppler Effect. 

The scientists extrapolated that a satellite could be tracked 

from the ground by measuring the frequency of emitted radio 

signals, and conversely, one could determine the location of 

the unit receiving that signal by knowing its distance from the 

satellite. This realization led to the first operational, satellitebased, geo-positioning system, the U.S. Navy’s Transit program, 

begun in 1958. Transit was not a true navigation system, 

but instead a positioning system for fixed objects, initially 

designed to meet the Navy’s need for accurately locating 

Polaris submarines at sea by updating shipboard inertial 

navigation systems. When Transit became fully operational in 

January 1965, submarine or ship navigators could measure the 

Doppler shift in a Transit satellite’s radio transmissions during 

the 15 minutes it took to travel from horizon to horizon to 

calculate their sub or shipboard receiver’s position on Earth. 

In 1967, the Transit system was made available as a broad 

ocean navigation system for civilian ships, by which time the 

NRO and Department of Defense had further advanced spacebased geolocation on other programs. 

On 22 June 1960, the Naval Research Laboratory, site of what 

became NRO Program C, put into orbit the U.S.’s first successful 

reconnaissance satellite, GRAB, launched as a “piggybacked” 

payload aboard the Transit 2A satellite. Throughout the 

1960s and into the early 1970s, the NRO’s low-earth orbiting, 

signals intelligence (Sigint) collecting satellites GRAB, and 

the even more successful follow-on system Poppy, used high 

gain antennas to intercept signal pulses from Soviet radar 

equipment and then transponded corresponding signals to 

receiving huts. Once processed, the signals provided analysts 

cues to the location, strength, and number of radar sets trying 

to detect oncoming U.S. strategic bombers. Although not 

accurate by GPS standards, the geolocation method used with 

early Sigint satellites was geometric reconstruction using the 

direction of arrival of a signal at a single intercepting satellite 

whose location and orientation was accurately known. Later 

the NRO would discover how to use a different method to 

achieve much more precise location information. In addition 

to providing Strategic Air Command critical flight route data to 

support building the Single Integrated Operations Plan, Poppy 

satellites provided ocean surveillance info to Navy operations 

commanders, and in combo with imagery satellites, gave a 

more complete picture of the Soviet military threat. 

As the NRO satellite constellation grew and evolved over 

the succeeding decades to comprise many longer duration 

mission payloads operating in multiple orbital types (e.g., 

low earth, geosynchronous, sun-synchronous, highly 

elliptical, etc.), it continued to redefine state-of-the-art 

in remote sensing technology in ways that exponentially 

increased the intelligence windfall. Pioneering NRO engineers 

discovered novel ways of exploiting signal externals 

measurements to greatly improve tracking and geolocation 

of missiles by reconstructing their altitude. This led to the 

first demonstrated geolocation capability from space using 

methods tried previously with aircraft, but thought to be 

unworkable with satellites. Precision timing was needed, and 

for that, the NRO employed cesium clocks, an innovation that 

would be critical to the success of GPS. Though it took a few 

years for space-based geolocation breakthroughs to be fully 

exploited, eventually satellite enhancements and refined 

techniques made measurements more accurate, and spacebased geolocation remains at the forefront of a variety of 

intelligence applications. 

Also known by its formal program name, NAVSTAR, GPS took 

more than two decades to mature from concept to fully 

operational, and the program office built upon technologies 

and satellite geopositioning techniques discovered and 

honed by NRL, NRO, and the Aerospace Corporation, to name 

a few. Of these contributors, the NRO Program C connection 

to GPS’s development is least well known. As previously 

noted, Program C was headquartered at NRL, but it was 

far from the only activity there. Founded at the suggestion 

of Thomas Edison to create an organization to house a 

“repository” of technical capability, NRL began foundational 

work on a precise, all-weather, real-time, global navigation 

system independently of Aerospace’s more touted efforts, 

and well before the consolidated NAVSTAR program. Two key 

NRL contributions to the GPS program were development 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

of precision cesium and rubidium atomic clocks, which had 

to be improved 100 fold for use in satellites, and the use of 

refurbished Atlas F launch vehicles to boost the payloads into 

orbit. At the forefront were two brilliant engineers, Roger L. 

Easton, considered by many to be the “Father of GPS,” and 

Peter G. Wilhelm, a Pioneer of National Reconnaissance and 

technical director and lead engineer for 74 satellites over 

his 50-year career at NRL. In 1964, Easton began research 

and experiments to demonstrate his idea for instantaneous 

satellite navigation using passive ranging and a constellation 

of satellites containing high-precision, atomic clocks and 

operating in a circular orbit. Easton called his system TIMATION 

(time-navigation). By 1967, he was ready to prove his concept 

through an initial satellite launch. Here the connection to 

NRO Program C becomes clearer. 

Wilhelm—but not Easton—was actively working NRO satellites 

for Program C, and had developed the radio transmitters 

and receivers for GRAB. In the same year that Easton began 

his Timation work, NRL promoted Wilhelm to lead all of its 

satellite programs, including those being funded by the 

National Reconnaissance Program. So when the time came to 

launch the first two of Easton’s Timation satellites, Timation-I 

on 31 May 1967, and Timation-II on 30 September 1969, 

Wilhelm arranged to have those satellites launched—as GRAB 

had been—in “piggyback” mode atop NRO satellites Poppy 

5 and Poppy 6. These were the first demonstrations of what 

became the GPS navigation concept from space, the first of 

four experimental satellites that Easton had developed. Even 

after the Air Force, along with Aerospace, established a GPS 

program office in 1972, it was Easton’s Navigation Technology 

Satellite-2 (NTS-2; the first had launched in 1974), launched 

in 1977, that became the first satellite in the NAVSTAR GPS. 

Wilhelm’s hand can also be seen in the decision to use the 

Atlas booster—specially modified—for the NTS launches, 

rather than the more expensive Thor/Agena D combination 

employed for the Timation launches. Wilhelm conceived the 

idea of an Atlas combined with two solid rockets with no 

onboard guidance, which were used to transfer the satellites 

to GPS’s 10,000+nm orbit, a concept he called “arrow.” 

Wilhelm proposed this new, lower cost launch concept to 

Director, NRO John McLucas in 1972. Being able to affordably 

launch a 24-satellite constellation to become fully operational 

was key to gaining GPS program approvals, and the approach 

was used on the first 13 launches. 

Roger L. Easton

Peter G. Wilhelm
Atlas ICBM - 1957 Corona KH-4 Image

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

ICBM DEVELOPMENT DETECTION

IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE OF THE COLD WAR

If the victorious Western allies of World War II believed that 

the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan would bring 

about a new era of global harmony, free from conflict, in 

which smaller nations could exercise political autonomy, they 

soon discovered they were mistaken. In Europe, erstwhile 

ally USSR took little time reneging on most commitments 

pledged by Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. 

Germany itself would be occupied for the foreseeable 

future, and was divided ideologically into East and West 

amongst four nations as agreed, but the Soviet leader also 

had paid lip service to a postwar principle of allowing free 

elections in eastern European states liberated from Nazi 

forces (i.e., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, 

and Bulgaria). The Red Army’s overwhelming presence 

in those countries, however, ensured that the USSR could 

instead facilitate the installation of puppet regimes, in effect 

obtaining for Moscow not simply a sphere of influence over 

Eastern Europe, but by the early 1950s, political domination 

behind an “Iron Curtain.” Meanwhile in China, after decades 

of civil war, the Chinese communists emerged victorious in 

October 1949, mere weeks after the USSR had detonated 

an atomic bomb, ending the U.S. monopoly of nuclear 

weapons. Less than a year later, North Korean forces invaded 

South Korea, equipped with Soviet weapons and with 

China’s encouragement. Observing all these developments, 

Winston Churchill entitled the last book of his Second World 

War memoirs Triumph and Tragedy because, he wrote, “the 

overwhelming victory of the Grand Alliance has failed so far 

to bring general peace to our anxious world.”

INFORMATION GAP IN DENIED AREAS

With the nuclear arms race begun and the Cold War intensified, 

Western governments became increasingly uneasy about 

the growing military threat from the closed society of the 

USSR and Communist Bloc. Never mind a lack of timely, 

reliable data on military capabilities and intentions, the 

West had difficulty obtaining propaganda-free information 

on simple, everyday events within the Soviet sphere. The 

Communist countries of the 1950s erected at their borders 

checkpoints that were constantly patrolled by military 

forces. It was a world composed of single-party, totalitarian 

governments, whose ruthless, disciplined, and formidable 

security forces rigidly controlled the flow of information, 

and imposed suspicion and fear upon their populations to 

ensure their docile compliance, if not active cooperation 

in exposing supposed enemies of the state. This made 

intelligence collection through traditional human espionage 

in these so-called “denied areas” extremely difficult and 

highly dangerous. But strategic reconnaissance systems, 

until 1956 comprised of specially adapted camera-carrying 

aircraft and aerial balloons, also proved of limited value. 

Western leaders were left with fragmentary information, all 

of which seemed to indicate, at worst, warlike intentions, 

and at best, a Soviet strategy of destabilizing governments 

throughout the world to extend the Communist power base 

beyond Eastern Europe. The U.S. developed the innovative 

U-2 high-altitude, reconnaissance aircraft in just eight 

months after Presidential approval, and beginning on 4 July 

1956, conducted periodic overflights of the interior of the 

Soviet Union. Although a tremendous success—U-2 imagery 

conclusively refuted intelligence estimates of a significant 

Soviet advantage in long-range bomber production—the 

U-2 program highlighted inherent limitations even with 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

high-altitude aircraft reconnaissance: relatively infrequent 

missions, narrow imaging passes that excluded large swaths 

of territory, and vulnerability to countermeasures. On 1 May 

1960, Francis Gary Powers, piloting the U.S.’s 24th mission 

over the USSR, was shot down by surface-to-air missiles, and 

President Eisenhower terminated all future overflights of the 

Soviet Union. A new reconnaissance capability was needed, 

and, fortunately, one was not long in coming.

A NEW KIND OF INTELLIGENCE PROVIDES HIGH 

CONFIDENCE UNDERSTANDING

Even while the U-2 flights were ongoing, the Soviet Union 

had upstaged the U.S. on two space-related developments: 

intercontinental ballistic missiles and space satellites. When 

America tested its Atlas ICBM in July 1957, the missile only 

rose about 5,000 feet before plunging back to Earth. A month 

later, the Soviets announced that they had successfully 

tested an ICBM, although the U.S. could not confirm the 

story’s veracity. On 4 October 1957, the Soviets removed all 

doubt by launching the first man-made satellite, Sputnik 1, 

which the world tracked as it orbited the Earth. Troubling to 

many was the realization that if the Soviets could develop 

ICBMs powerful enough to launch an object into space, 

they could potentially equip similar missiles with nuclear 

warheads to launch a devastating attack. And because 

of the lack of solid evidence to the contrary, these fears 

received outsized attention. Thus, the 1960 presidential 

election became, in part, a referendum on concerns 

about the Soviets outpacing the U.S. in strategic nuclear 

capabilities — this time the production of nuclear missiles 

rather than bombers. Democrat candidate John F. Kennedy 

assailed the Eisenhower administration, including then 

sitting Vice-President and opposing Republican candidate 

Richard Nixon, for its failure to prevent this “missile gap” 

from developing. What the candidates did not know when 

the campaign began—and could not reveal even after they 

became aware of it—was that the U.S. had successfully 

developed a new capability that eventually would provide 

high confidence understanding of Soviet ICBM development 

and completely transform national reconnaissance: signals 

and imagery satellites.

CORONA AND SUCCESSORS’ CONTRIBUTION TO 

ICBM DETECTION AND TREATY VERIFICATION

The launch of the GRAB signals intelligence satellite on 

22 June 1960, followed by the launch of the Corona 

photoreconnaissance satellite on 18 August 1960, 

revolutionized intelligence collection of denied areas. Going 

forward, U.S. policymakers could at last be confident of 

both the accuracy and scope of intelligence assessments 

of Soviet strategic capabilities, not least because of an 

improved ability of “negation,” or verifying the absence of 

activity. CIA and Air Force elements, after 6 September 1961 

as components of the NRO, would operate Corona satellites, 

with steadily improving camera technology and collection 

capabilities, for 145 missions spanning nearly 12 years. The 

system’s broad-area, panoramic imagery made possible the 

identification of all Soviet medium-range, intermediaterange, and ICBM launching complexes, definitively dispelling 

fears that the U.S. lagged behind in missile production. 

After June 1963, Corona would conduct search missions 

in conjunction with the Gambit imagery satellite system’s 

high-resolution, narrow-field-of-view mission to provide 

close-look information. Through repeated coverage of areas 

of concern and a coordinated search process that involved 

close cooperation among satellite operational units, photo 

interpreters, and all-source analysis components, the NRO 

programs enabled compilation of a huge database of newly 

identified installations and activities: ICBM sites, air defense 

sites, nuclear development and test facilities, shipyards, 

airfields, communication sites, military bases, manufacturing 

and agricultural activity, etc. By the middle of the 1960s, the 

U.S. and its allies were assured that they knew the scale and 

pace of Soviet ICBM deployment within narrow limits. Past 

areas of uncertainty, such as “where” and “how many,” no 

longer caused concern and were replaced by questions of 

detailed characteristics for delivery systems. The dramatic 

reduction in the number of intelligence surprises paved 

the way for the initiation of strategic arms limitation talks 

between Washington and Moscow, for which area-coverage 

imagery provided by Corona (and starting in June 1971 by 

Corona’s successor, Hexagon) would be indispensable for 

monitoring resulting treaty provisions. Indeed, verification 

of compliance through use of imagery satellite systems—

termed “national technical means” to obscure specifics about 

still-classified programs—provided leaders of both countries 

with the confidence that permitted them to sign the Strategic 

Arms Limitation Treaty on 26 May 1972. 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

SHIP TRACKING (OCEAN SURVEILLANCE)

its own surface vessels while carefully avoiding causing a 

diplomatic incident, reconnaissance satellites offered far 

greater potential for closing this new intelligence gap through 

collecting imagery and signals to establish a database on 

the USSR naval order of battle and its activities. It was only 

a matter of time before ocean surveillance—i.e., tracking 

ships—became a satellite collection mission requirement.

The U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) issued formally 

documented satellite mission requirements, which in the 

formative years of space-based reconnaissance tended 

to reflect the needs of whichever military or intelligence 

organization would be using the information. For example, 

Air Force Strategic Air Command wanted details on Soviet 

The earliest U.S. reconnaissance satellites began operation 

when there were many strategic intelligence gaps, and their 

express purpose was to provide American leadership visual 

and electronic access to the vast landmass of the USSR, the 

major Cold War adversary. Space-based photoreconnaissance 

and signals interception missions quickly proved adept at 

acquiring the data to find and locate objects of interest, 

catalogue significant activities, and confirm the absence 

of activity. By the mid-1960s, satellite reconnaissance had 

reduced the number of intelligence surprises, and the U.S. 

and Western Allies were becoming increasingly confident 

that, for example, they knew the scale and pace of Soviet 

ballistic missile deployment within narrow limits. But a 

new threat was emerging: the USSR had begun to build up 

a large and formidable navy. From its Baltic and Black Sea 

shipyards, the Soviet Union accelerated development and 

production of combatant and auxiliary ships, including new 

cruisers, frigates, and destroyers armed with guided missiles; 

cruisers carrying missile-equipped helicopters; and nuclear 

submarines armed with ballistic missiles. This rising worldclass fleet was soon deployed around the globe, particularly 

in waters adjacent to non-aligned nations. Although the U.S. 

Navy monitored its movements as closely as it dared from 

1 Emit pulsed radar above horizon

2 Transpond pulses detected in space,

 beyond horizon

3 Collect & Record transponded signal

4 Courier tape recordings
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

targets, data on radars and anti-aircraft weapons, and 

exact locations of Soviet defensive installations, so it could 

plan aircraft penetration routes. The CIA was additionally 

interested in, and tasked to produce, intelligence estimates 

on Soviet technology, military numbers and capabilities, and 

economic indicators. As more was learned of the USSR’s naval 

buildup, the U.S. Navy wanted to determine the threat from 

Soviet surface ships and submarines. The Soviet navy had 

doubled its activity in the Mediterranean Sea in 1967, and a 

Navy Space Program Review concluded that the Department 

of the Navy must move boldly to translate space policy to 

fleet needs. This had not been a priority until then, and 

more than a decade into the Space Age, the only operational 

U.S. satellite-based system that directly supported its fleet 

was the Navy Navigation Satellite System, more popularly 

known as Transit. But Transit was older, limited technology 

used as a positioning system for fixed objects, when the ship 

tracking problem required a system capable of detecting and 

tracking mobile threat radars. Fortunately, NRO systems’ 

advancements to satellite collection, geo-positioning 

capabilities, and increased sensitivity now enabled space 

mission planners to consider incorporating ship tracking 

requirements, which could provide insight into Soviet 

military intentions, as well as their economic and diplomatic 

activities. Rear Admiral Leonard, who commanded a carrier 

division and was interested in tracking missile-equipped 

Soviet ships at sea, submitted a request through the Chief 

of Naval Operations for “the conduct of tests by the NRO to 

evaluate satellite use for passive detection, classification and 

localization of ships at sea.” 

One prime candidate to perform this mission was the NRO’s 

electronic intelligence satellite system, Poppy,*

 developed by 

Program C at the Naval Research Laboratory and operated 

by the NRO from 1962 until the late 1970s. Poppy used highgain antennas to intercept signal pulses from Soviet radar 

equipment and then transponded corresponding signals to 

receiving huts. Once processed, the signals provided analysts 

cues to the location, strength, and number of radar sets 

the Soviets could employ to detect oncoming U.S. strategic 

bombers. With early Sigint satellites like GRAB and Poppy, 

NRO engineers initially used a geolocation method based on 

geometric reconstruction. But they later discovered novel 

ways of exploiting signal externals measurements to greatly 

* The Poppy system had evolved from GRAB, the very first national reconnaissance satellite, which on 22 June 1960 launched as a “piggybacked” payload 

aboard the Transit 2A satellite.

improve tracking and geolocation of missiles by reconstructing 

their altitude, leading to the first demonstrated geolocation 

capability from space. 

As the NRO evolved the system through successive 

enhancements, low-earth-orbiting Poppy proved best at 

intercepting ship-based radars, which were sometimes on 

for only a few fleeting moments because of the deception 

tactics used by Soviet ship captains to avoid detection. In 

1970, the USIB added electronic-order-of-battle production 

and ocean surveillance to Poppy mission guidance. With 

consequent upgrades to receiving stations, the Poppy 

program became an interim ocean surveillance system, while 

continuing also to provide Strategic Air Command critical 

flight route data to support building the Single Integrated 

Operations Plan and performing anti-ballistic missile 

search and general search missions to give Navy operations 

commanders and Intelligence Community decision-makers 

a more complete picture of the Soviet military threat. The 

success of the Poppy system also paved the way for the 

NRO, in conjunction with its mission partner, the National 

Security Agency, and the Navy, to sponsor development of 

a more advanced successor system dedicated to monitoring 

the threats manifested by an expanding, worldwide, bluewater Soviet Navy. With the establishment of offices for 

Tactical Exploitation for National Capabilities (TENCAP) in 

the military services, the NRO was able to provide not only 

direct support regarding enemy warships, merchant ships, 

and land-based emitters to the fleet, but also operational 

Elint support to the Army and Air Force. 
INNOVATIONS

SPACE

ENTERPRISE

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

AGENA

FOUNDATION OF SPACE RECONNAISSANCE

In 1946, the U.S. Army Air Force placed a requirement for 

Project RAND to study the technical feasibility of orbiting 

artificial satellites, which eventually became the Air Force’s 

Advanced Reconnaissance System or Weapon System 117L 

(WS-117L). After numerous bids, on 29 October 1956, 

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (which had teamed with 

Eastman-Kodak) was awarded the prime contract for the 

liquid-propellant Agena booster-satellite developed for 

the WS-117L program. The contract had three operational 

components: Samos (named after a Greek Island), was the 

pioneer version that was a near real-time photographic 

reconnaissance system; Ferret, an advanced version, was 

an electronic signals collector; and Midas, a surveillance 

version, was an infrared system that was capable of serving 

as an early warning missile system by detecting heat from 

missile launches.

An integral part of each of these systems was a general 

purpose vehicle that provided two critical functions. First, the 

vehicle served as a second-stage booster to place a variety of 

probe and satellite payloads into stable orbits after the Atlas 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile first-stage boosters burned 

out. Second, once in orbit, the upper stage of the Agena 

vehicle served as the satellite control section by supporting 

the electrical power, three-axis attitude control for stability 

and pointing, and communications for both command and 

control of the payload functions and downlink telemetry for 

both satellite health and mission data.

SAMOS AND AGENA

In each of its three Samos missions, the Agena vehicle was 

required to support payloads with varying requirements. 

For example, the Samos’ imaging payload could point offaxis to a limited degree to photograph targets that were 

not directly below the satellite, but to the outer periphery. 

Midas’ infrared scanners rotated around the pointing axis 

to view the horizon looking for missile launches. Ferret was 

slightly different in that it was a signals collection antennae 

attached to the Samos on the front of the satellite to have 

an unobstructed view of the Earth below.

Samos finally launched on 11 October 1960, but the first 

launch failed to reach orbit. Later launches proved there 

was an issue with transmission capability that limited 

the downlink speed, which made this ineffective as an 

operational reconnaissance system. Midas first launched 

its two developmental missions in 1960 from Cape 

Canaveral while waiting on the completion of launch pads 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

SAMOS Launc

11 Oct 1960
Discoverer 14 Agena Spacecraft

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Lunar Orbiter Launch 

Agena D

10 Aug 1966

CORONA AND AGENA

As the program schedule for WS-117L slipped, there was 

a need for an interim photograph system using the Agena 

with a smaller Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile as 

the first stage booster. Lockheed urged the adaptation of 

the WS-117L upper stage to the Thor missile as the first 

step in the program acceleration. This version was initially 

powered by the Bell XRM-81 rocket engine, originally 

designed for a B-58 Hustler bomber program, hence the 

name Thor-Hustler. Later this upper stage was called the 

Agena, and it was used for Discoverer, the cover name for 

the Corona program.

Unlike WS-117L, Corona required the Agena vehicle to 

fly with its long axis parallel to the ground so that the 

panoramic camera system could image a swath from one 

side of the flight path to the other. Since it also had a film 

re-entry capsule that had to be ejected from the Agena, the 

vehicle would maneuver to a 60 degree downward position 

to provide the proper re-entry sequence and recovery. The 

Agena was equipped with body-mounted roll and pitch 

position gyroscopes updated by the horizon sensor. The 

attitude control system would allow the camera to point 

accurately and have low roll and pitch blur rates needed 

for the Itek camera to deliver a resolution of about 20 feet. 

The Corona systems had to pass over the Soviet Union at 

latitudes higher than could be covered by launches from 

Cape Canaveral in Florida. The need for polar launches, 

greater security, and frequent launches to test new ballistic 

missile designs led to the establishment of Corona launch 

platforms at Vandenberg in California. 

GAMBIT AND AGENA

NRO developed the Gambit satellite to provide highresolution pointed target imagery. The Gambit-1 was 

designed to fly on the Atlas Agena booster. Its first flight was 

on July 1963, and there was a total of 38 missions. However 

Gambit-3, or Gambit-cubed, was flown on the Titan booster 

because it required a greater lift capability than the Atlas was 

able to provide. 

Over the 28 years and 362 missions of the Agena program 

between 1959 and 1987, there were three basic models of 

the Agena vehicle flown called Agena A, B, and D. The Agena 

vehicle also provided other support to civil space programs 

including NASA. Programs like Ranger provided images of 

the lunar surface, and Mariner was a series of interplanetary 

spacecraft to investigate Mars, Venus, and Mercury. Gemini 

Agena Target Vehicles launched between October 1965 and 

November 1966 to develop and practice space rendezvous 

and docking techniques. The last NASA Agena flight was 

Nimbus 4 in 1970, and the last Agena flight was in 1987.
Dirks

- 52 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Gambit-3 Payload Adapter Section

Hexagon Panoramic Camera Image

CONTROL MOMENT GYROSCOPES

The groundbreaking technical achievements of the NRO’s 

early film-return photoreconnaissance satellites – Corona, 

Gambit, and Hexagon – and their imagery collection were 

major intelligence contributors that ensured America’s 

national security during the Cold War. However, the 

distribution of imagery from these satellites to analysts could 

take several weeks. There were also times when film-return 

satellites were not in orbit, and the satellites were limited 

in the ability to image ample intelligence targets on a daily 

basis. These limitations revealed a potential threat to U.S. 

security and demonstrated the need for an imagery satellite 

that could deliver intelligence in near real-time (NRT), be in 

orbit continuously, and image intelligence targets daily. 

SATELLITE STABILITY AND 

NEAR REAL-TIME IMAGERY

Exploration of an NRT imagery satellite began in the early 

1960s. In 1963, the CIA began funding Zoster (later renamed 

Zaman and then Kennen) program studies, led by Leslie 

Dirks, considered the father of near real-time satellites. 

These studies focused on the development of an electrooptical imaging (EOI) NRT system. By 1968, Dirks’ team 

had identified a number of requirements for potential NRT 

satellites, which were compiled in the Application of ElectroOptical Technology to Satellite Reconnaissance study, known 

as “Dirks’ Blue Book.” It was this study that identified Control 

Moment Gyroscopes (CMGs) for use in the attitude control 

system*

 of NRT satellites. The attitude control would allow 

for the maneuvering of an NRT satellite that would need to 

orbit continuously and image select intelligence targets daily. 

*Attitude is stabilized by yaw (nose left to right movement), pitch (nose up 

and down movement), and roll (rotation left and right of the nose). 

President Nixon approved the Central Intelligence Agency to 

begin development of the Kennen NRT satellite system on 23 

September 1971.

Kennen’s acquisition of intelligence targets differed from 

earlier film-return satellites. Gambit-3 had a roll-joint, 

allowing limited side-to-side imaging, while Hexagon had 

panoramic cameras and did not need to roll. Film-return 

satellites controlled attitude by either firing low-precision, 

life-limited, liquid-fueled reaction control thrusters or 

utilizing agility-limited reaction wheel assemblies. Because 

of their low earth orbits, film-return satellites required 

frequent orbit adjustments to prevent prematurely reentering Earth’s atmosphere before the complete payload 

had been used. These orbit adjustments consumed large 

amounts of propellant, which had to be carried as part of 

the launch vehicle. These consumables came at the expense 

of film payloads, and they sometimes limited days in orbit. 

As there had not been a maneuvering spacecraft of the 

anticipated size of Kennen with a life span of more than a 

year, CMGs would provide the attitude control that would 

enable Kennen’s success. 

DEVELOPMENT OF 

CONTROL MOMENT GYROSCOPES

The NRO chose an industrial partner to develop Kennen’s 

CMGs. The launch configuration of the first Kennen satellite 

used six individual CMGs, allowing the satellite maximum 

maneuverability and the ability to point in any direction 

at any intelligence target. Developing the CMG required 

precision design in electro-magnetics, high-speed bearings, 

lubrications, exquisite balancing, and advanced control 
- 53 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

algorithms that pushed the capabilities of existing onboard 

spacecraft computers. Early Kennen missions using CMGs 

were not without problems. The components inside these 

devices spin at considerable speed, so minor imperfections 

would cause catastrophic failure to a spacecraft. Even 

with precise balance, CMGs are one of the largest sources 

of vibration on spacecraft and, left unchecked, would 

interfere with payload operations. An NRO Pioneer 

developed a novel and groundbreaking vibration isolation 

technology to lessen CMG vibration and reduce the impact 

on payload performance. Several NRO programs have 

used this technology to isolate payloads from a variety of 

disturbance sources.

The CMGs provided the innovative technology that 

integrated the best of previous capabilities to develop larger, 

more agile satellites with improved pointing performance 

and longer mission life. These highly complex electromechanical systems enabled NRO satellites to accomplish 

their essential missions for national security from the 1970s 

into the 21st century.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CUBESATS

When U.S. satellite programs began in the late 1950s, 

satellites always started small due to the limited launch 

capacity of rockets used to carry the satellites into orbit. The 

world’s first reconnaissance satellite, the Galactic Radiation 

and Background, an electronic intelligence satellite launched 

in June 1960, weighed a mere 55 pounds. As U.S. launcher 

technology advanced and became capable of carrying 

larger and heavy payloads, engineers began creating more 

capable satellites, which naturally became bigger and 

heavier. By 1971, the NRO launched the Hexagon filmreturn satellite, which was as large as a locomotive and 

weighed approximately 16,000 pounds. But as satellites 

got larger and more capable, they also naturally became 

more expensive and took longer to replace. As the nation’s 

satellite constellation matured, it became evident that there 

was a need for smaller satellites to compliment the larger 

ones being placed in orbit, both as a time and cost savings 

measure and also as a survivability measure. 

RIDE ALONGS

In the 1980s, the NRO began experimenting in the utility 

of smaller satellites. By the 1980s, interest grew in small 

satellites. The NRO began experimenting in the utility of 

smaller satellites. NASA too renewed their interest in small 

satellite launch efforts. The agency created its Gateway 

Special Program (GAS), a Space Shuttle rideshare program 

available for scientific and commercial use and open to 

educational institutions and business interest (foreign and 

domestic). These small payloads weighed less than 200 

pounds and traveled on a space-available basis. 

In the 2000s, NRO used small satellites for testing the 

viability of new technologies in space environments. These 

satellites could go from the planning stage to launch quickly 

and at a great cost savings because of their reduced size and 

weight. Rapid Pathfinder and the CubeSat program are two 

examples of small satellite technology pioneered by NRO’s 

Advanced Systems & Technology Directorate (AS&T).

Rapid Pathfinder was an experimental technology testbed 

spacecraft developed by AS&T that launched on NROL66 from Vandenberg Air Force Base on 6 February 2011 

aboard a Minotaur 1 launch vehicle. Rapid Pathfinder’s 

mission was to validate new research and development 

technologies and to demonstrate that the NRO could 

launch advanced technologies quickly and at a reduced 

cost. It was less expensive and smaller than most satellite 

vehicles, and it carried two advanced technology payloads. 

The AS&T brought Rapid Pathfinder from design to launch 

in just two years.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

SMALL SATELLITES

CubeSats are nano-satellites developed, launched, and 

controlled at a fraction of the cost of a typical operating 

platform. CubeSats typically weigh between one and five 

kilograms. They are beneficial in reducing the risk of larger 

programs because of their low cost and rapid development 

cycle. California Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly) and 

Stanford University designed and developed the CubeSat 

concept in 1999. The first NRO CubeSat rideshare, OUTSat 

(Operationally Unique Technologies Satellite), took place in 

2012 onboard NROL-36.

The NRO, NASA, and other government agencies recognize 

the utility of CubeSats and engage universities, service 

academies, laboratories, and industry to advance the 

state of practice. These small satellites are an important 

pioneering research effort that provide early evaluation 

of new technologies and test their survivability and 

performance in space environments. Today, NRO can easily 

test new technologies for a small fraction of the time and 

cost of previous development programs. Additionally, by 

teaming with other researchers and organizations, the 

NRO can provide rideshare on its launches and benefit 

from the cost savings and technology sharing with these 

various “hitchhikers.”
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

FILM RETURN

LAYING THE FOUNDATION

When people are asked about the first film-based intelligence 

satellite, they invariably think of the Corona program, and 

rightly so. However, that program would not have been as 

successful if not for the experience gained from an earlier 

film-return reconnaissance effort called Genetrix. 

On 10 January 1956, the Air Force launched the first of what 

would eventually be 516 high-altitude balloons released 

from Europe and Turkey that were designed to sail over 

Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, taking pictures 

at intervals along the way. The balloons were then caught 

in midair, after they had passed hostile territory and floated 

out over the Pacific Ocean, by Air Force crews flying C-119 

aircraft. While simple in concept, the planners failed to take 

into consideration one small detail—Mother Nature. After 

launch, the balloons were at the whim of high-altitude wind 

currents, which were not well understood in 1956. Most 

flew too far south to be of use, and many blew far off course 

and were lost. After a couple weeks, Soviet fighter pilots 

realized that at dawn, the balloons had floated to a lower 

altitude due to the cooler night air and could be shot down. 

Of the 516 balloons launched, only 46 were recovered, and 

only 34 succeeded in returning useful imagery. The program 

was cancelled by President Eisenhower after only a month 

because of Soviet protests. However, the mid-air recovery 

experience gained by the Air Force flight crews in training 

and actual operations proved invaluable when they were 

recalled two years later for the Corona program.

CORONA

President Eisenhower approved the Corona program in 

February 1958. The design called for a film-based camera 

system to be launched into orbit, to take pictures as it passed 

over denied areas, to collect the film in a bucket at the tip 

of the satellite, and when all of the film had been exposed, 

to release the bucket back into the Earth’s atmosphere 

to be caught midair as it descended toward the ocean. All 

nine pilots who had worked in the Genetrix program were 

called back in June 1958 to form the core of a new Air Force 

squadron, the 6593rd Test Squadron (Special), which would 

be assigned to retrieve the Corona film buckets and their 

precious cargo.

One key difference related to retrieving film canisters 

existed between the Genetrix and Corona programs. While 

the difference in the weights between the Genetrix film 

gondolas and the Corona buckets was significant and created 

problems of their own, they were easily overcome. The key 

difference was the speed and angle at which the two objects 

were recovered. The Genetrix gondolas floated along under 

a balloon at relatively slow speeds and constant altitudes. 

Genetrix Balloon

Corona Film Bucket 

Recovery Sequence
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

In contrast, the Corona bucket fell back to Earth under a 

parachute. To catch a falling parachute without overflying 

it or having it get caught in the moving parts of the aircraft 

was easier said than done. The pilots, crews, and program 

engineers spent over two years perfecting and practicing the 

concepts needed to make the safe capture of falling Corona 

buckets a reality. The pilots and crews spent the entire 

Genetrix program and first year of the Corona program flying 

C-119J aircraft; but in 1961, they began to phase the JC130 four-engine aircraft into their operations as it became 

available, providing them greater endurance and safety as 

they flew above the Pacific Ocean.

On 19 August 1960, Capt Harold E. Mitchell and the crew 

of Pelican 9 completed the first successful capture of an 

object from space returning to Earth after they snagged 

the film bucket from Corona 14 about 300 miles southwest 

of Hawaii. In the next 12 years, the “Star Catchers” of the 

6593rd retrieved 158 film buckets from Corona missions, 

culminating on 31 May 1972 when Capt Donald G. Hard 

caught the second recovery bucket from Corona 145, the 

final Corona mission. After that mission, the 6593rd Test 

Squadron (Special) was deactivated, and their personnel and 

equipment were assigned to the 6594th Test Group, which 

continued the tradition and retrieved the film buckets from 

79 successful Gambit missions and 19 successful Hexagon 

missions through 1984. 

LIKE THE FOTOMAT

After 26 years and hundreds of successful recoveries, film 

return as an aspect of national reconnaissance eventually 

became obsolete. With the deployment of a near real-time 

imagery system in 1976, film return satellites had become 

slow and redundant. The 20th and last Hexagon mission in 

1986 was the last film-based satellite launched by the NRO, 

and film return for national reconnaissance slowly migrated 

into the history books.

Flight crew from 6593rd Test Squadron - Edwards AFB - 1958
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

INTEGRATED SYSTEMS

BACKGROUND

When people think of satellites in space, they usually 

imagine that satellites operate independently and perform a 

single function. In the earliest days of satellite development, 

that was typically the case. However, the NRO early in its 

development of satellites recognized that every satellite 

vehicle provided a potential means for orbiting more than 

a single collection function. Given the significant costs of 

launching a satellite, the NRO built satellites that utilized full 

lift capacity for each rocket by incorporating, in some cases, 

additional collection systems. Today those satellites are 

identified as multi-mission vehicles, an approach to satellite 

development that the NRO trailblazed. Additionally, the NRO 

recognized that multiple satellites should act in concert, 

where possible, and developed the concept of integrated 

space architecture. Finally, the NRO moved away from 

single satellite system ground architecture to a more fully 

integrated ground architecture supporting the integrated 

orbiting architecture.

SAMOS

The nation’s first reconnaissance satellite program, 

Samos, embraced the notion of a multi-sensor satellite. 

The primary imagery system carried a 36-inch lens for 

photoreconnaissance collection, but there were also 

plans for extra sensors to collect other types of imagery. 

Additionally, Samos was designed to include signals 

collection satellites that could collect both analog and digital 

signals. Samos satellites were envisioned as flying in a single 

architecture utilizing an integrated ground architecture. 

CORONA AFTRACK

When the NRO declassified the Corona program, one 

capability remained classified for many more years. The 

first recovery was a test vehicle and did not carry film. 

Instead it carried a U.S. flag to confirm the return of an 

object from space. What the NRO kept classified is that 

Corona mission was an operational mission. It carried a 

signals collection sensor on the rear of the Agena control 

vehicle that confirmed the Soviet Union could track U.S. 

satellites. Additional Corona vehicles would not only capture 

intelligence imagery, but also carry similar integrated signals 

collection sensors. Because of the location of the sensor, the 

program was codenamed AFTRACK. 

SAMOS CORONA GAMBIT
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CORONA AND MAPPING CAPABILITIES

The NRO also recognized that satellite vehicles could be 

configured for different collection purposes. An early problem 

that the NRO addressed was the collection of imagery 

that would enable better mapping in support of military 

operations. At the time Corona first orbited, the U.S. military 

was still heavily dependent on German maps captured 

from World War II for planning defenses against the Soviet 

Union. Those maps were both imprecise and incomplete. 

The Air Force envisioned a mapping and charting system 

named the E-4 Mapping Satellite. Alternatively, the Corona 

program cooperated on the Argon project that incorporated 

a mapping camera into the Corona satellite platform to 

provide imagery for improving mapping capabilities. Again, 

integrating a new capability into an existing platform further 

demonstrated the integration philosophy of the NRO. 

 

GAMBIT AND HEXAGON

Like with the Corona program, the NRO did not reveal all 

aspects of the Gambit and Hexagon programs with their 

initial declassification. By the time the Gambit and Hexagon 

vehicles were successfully developed, launch capabilities 

had significantly improved since the early Corona launches. 

With improved launch capabilities, the NRO could launch 

heavier payloads into space, which offered more integration 

opportunities. Both Gambit and Hexagon vehicles carried 

passenger payloads—usually signals collections satellites—

that typically detached from the primary imagery vehicle. In 

some cases, however, they remained attached to the primary 

imagery vehicle, collecting signals in a low earth orbit.

First the Corona, and later the Hexagon vehicles served as 

companions to Gambit vehicles. Corona and the followon Hexagon program collected images of broad areas of 

interest allowing the U.S. to identify areas and objects of 

interest. The NRO then carried out Gambit missions to 

surveil those areas and objects with much higher resolution 

which provided significant intelligence details. The broad 

area search capabilities of Corona and Hexagon satellites 

integrated with the high resolution surveillance capabilities 

of Gambit provided an efficient and effective means for 

better understanding the capabilities of the Soviet Union 

and other adversaries during the Cold War.

Similar to flexibility offered by Corona, Hexagon allowed 

for much improved mapping imagery. Twelve of the 19 

successful Hexagon satellite launches included a mapping 

camera system. The mapping camera had a separate 

optical system, film supply, and recovery vehicle. It was 

attached to the Hexagon vehicle and allowed collection 

of broad area search imagery and mapping imagery at the 

same time, again demonstrating the NRO’s space system 

integration philosophy.

KENNEN

In 1976, the NRO launched its first electro-optical satellite 

known as Kennen. The Kennen satellite depended on a 

relay satellite in order to transmit imagery in near realtime. The use of a relay satellite further advanced NRO 

efforts to integrate satellites into a unified architecture.

A MATURE INTEGRATION PHILOSOPHY

The integration philosophy continues today with the NRO 

efforts to incorporate multiple sensors into an integrated 

architecture of satellites. This longstanding integration 

approach developed by the NRO consistently improved 

the efficiency of NRO satellite development and the 

effectiveness of satellites in low-earth, geosynchronous, 

and highly elliptical orbits. As the NRO improved satellite 

integration efforts, it has also improved the integration 

of ground stations. On both fronts, the NRO’s integrated 

architecture provides robust and resilient intelligence 

collection capabilities necessary to maintain the U.S.’s 

national security in a very uncertain world. 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

MOL

A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

President Lyndon Baines Johnson was not afraid to embrace 

government programs that might bring about significant 

change if successful. On 25 August 1965, he announced the 

following to the American Public: 

At the suggestion of Vice President Humphrey and 

members of the Space Council, as well as Defense 

Secretary McNamara, I am today instructing the 

Department of Defense to immediately proceed with 

the development of a Manned Orbiting Laboratory. This 

program will bring us new knowledge about what man is 

able to do in space. It will enable us to relate that ability 

to the defense of America. It will develop technology 

and equipment which will help advance manned and 

unmanned space flights. And it will make it possible to 

perform their new and rewarding experiments with that 

technology and equipment. 

The Manned Orbiting Laboratory, or MOL as it was known, 

promised to use space for the first time as a manned 

reconnaissance vantage point. If successful, the program 

could dramatically change the way the United States collected 

intelligence on its adversaries, including the nation’s main 

foe, the Soviet Union.

THE DORIAN PROGRAM

In the early 1960s the Air Force began efforts to put Air Force 

members into space by developing the Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory. The Air Force described the MOL program as 

follows in its initial December 1963 press release announcing 

the project: 

The MOL program, which will consist of an orbiting 

pressurized cylinder approximately the size of a small 

house trailer, will increase the Defense Department 

effort to determine military usefulness of man in 

space...MOL will be designed so that astronauts can 

move about freely in it without a space suit and conduct 

observations and experiments in the laboratory over a 

period of up to a month. 

The U.S. Air Force described the MOL program as a less 

expensive option that would allow the Air Force to “conduct 

military experiments involving manned use of equipment 

and instrumentation in orbit and, if desired by NASA, for 

scientific and civilian purposes.” From the beginning of the 

program, however, U.S. officials questioned the need for the 

MOL in addition to the U.S.’s civilian space program. 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Unbeknownst to the public, the MOL program included a 

highly secret set of experiments and capabilities to gain 

intelligence from space. Information about MOL’s secret 

planned capabilities was strictly protected under a security 

compartment known as Dorian. The capabilities developed 

under the Dorian project would result in the United States 

using the MOL as a manned reconnaissance station in space, 

collecting both imagery and signals intelligence. If achieved, 

the MOL would allow the U.S. to overcome the limitations 

of the already successful Corona and Gambit satellite 

reconnaissance programs.

The Dorian camera system was developed by Eastman Kodak, 

the same company that developed the high-resolution 

camera system used on the Gambit photoreconnaissance 

satellite. The Dorian camera system would have some 

unique capabilities. First, it had a longer focal length and 

other improvements, permitting better resolution than the 

first generation of Gambit satellites. Second, the camera 

system would be used after MOL crew members used a 

spotting scope system to determine whether or not targets 

were clear for imagery. Third, imagery targeting priorities 

could more readily be changed to meet unexpected imagery 

opportunities. And fourth, the MOL crew members would be 

trained to repair the Dorian system in the event that there 

were malfunctions preventing successful imaging. Together, 

these capabilities mitigated the shortcomings of the Corona 

and Gambit photoreconnaissance satellites.

MOL CHALLENGES

The resources devoted to the Vietnam War, the War 

on Poverty, and the Apollo program competed with the 

resources needed for the MOL project. Additionally, the 

NRO had already demonstrated that space could be used 

successfully as a reconnaissance platform through the 

Corona, Gambit, Grab, and Poppy satellite programs. At 

the time MOL was proposed, the NRO already had plans 

for a more powerful high-resolution Gambit program and 

the CIA was in the early stages of developing a satellite to 

supersede the Corona program, and they hoped, the Gambit 

program too. That program evolved into the NRO’s Hexagon 

program. The Hexagon program was designed to carry an 

immense film load, allowing it to stay on orbit for six months 

or more. It would also carry an improved targeting system. It 

promised versatility that called into question MOL’s necessity. 

Eventually, Hexagon and the improved Gambit-3 system 

would suffice in the Nixon administration’s view, leading to 

the MOL’s termination in June 1969.
MOL Crew Members

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

THE MOL PROGRAM LEGACY 

Because of the MOL program size, complexity, and time in 

existence, it consumed many millions of dollars in funding 

before termination. This begs the question of what if 

anything did the United States gain from the program? There 

were significant legacy contributions from the program. The 

first and foremost significant contribution was the leadership 

that came from the MOL crew members trained under the 

program. Seven of those crew members were accepted 

into NASA’s astronaut program. At NASA they would either 

command or pilot the Space Shuttle. Of those, one would 

eventually lead NASA as the agency’s Administrator, another 

would command NASA’s Cape Canaveral launch facility, and 

others would lead elements of the NASA space program. 

Yet another would go on to lead the U.S.’s Strategic Defense 

Initiative. Another would serve as Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many would also play important roles 

in corporations supporting national defense and space 

programs. Other engineers, scientists, and staff would 

play key roles in other national reconnaissance programs, 

drawing on their experiences and insights gained from the 

MOL program. 

The MOL program would also make important contributions 

to national reconnaissance and space exploration programs. 

The Dorian camera system was to be preserved and studied 

for possible incorporation into the Hexagon program. One 

of the options for reducing costs of the MOL program was 

a series of unmanned missions. Those missions would 

carry multiple film return capsules in a configuration that 

closely resembled the configuration eventually developed 

for the Hexagon program. The MOL program also included 

a segmented mirror technology that was eventually used in 

a domestic space observatory. Segmented mirrors offered 

additional advances in space exploration with MOL advancing 

this important technology. 

Finally, MOL helped advance the technology and science 

necessary for longer space missions. For example, the 

MOL program required its crew members to travel through 

a narrow tube or tunnel from the Gemini capsule to the 

laboratory section once the vehicle was on orbit. This in turn 

required a flexible space suit—more so than what NASA had 

developed at the time. The advancements in space suits 

under the MOL program were transferred to NASA. MOL also 

included proposals for more than one space module being 

launched and then linked on orbit. This concept would be 

critical for the development of today’s multi-module space 

craft on orbit such as the International Space Station. The 

research and technology developed under the MOL program 

for sustaining crew members on orbit was also transferred to 

NASA, undoubtedly aiding NASA’s advancements in manned 

space flight.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

MULTIPLE ORBITS

The NRO has acknowledged that it flies satellites in three 

types of orbits: Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Highly Elliptical Orbit 

(HEO), and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO). 

LOW EARTH ORBIT (LEO)

The NRO’s first satellites, the GRAB Elint satellites and the 

film-return photoreconnaissance satellites of the Corona 

program, flew in LEO. Subsequent programs including Poppy, 

Gambit, and Hexagon, likewise flew in this orbit. Satellites in 

LEO fly relatively close to the Earth’s surface, up to 2,000 km in 

altitude. In LEO, orbital periods are short – often completing 

a pass over the Earth in just 90 minutes. In general, LEO 

satellites can make up to 16 complete passes in a day, but they 

must, by definition, make at least 11.25 passes. Satellites in 

LEO fly at high velocity, averaging around 7.8 km/second. Due 

to their close proximity to Earth, LEO satellites offer a limited 

field of view and are only able to communicate with small 

portions of the Earth at a time. Therefore, most satellites in 

LEO require a network or constellation in order to provide 

continuous coverage. In low altitude, satellite life expectancy 

remains low due to atmospheric drag (an important factor 

that has historically precluded flying satellites below 300 km), 

and they require periodic reboosting in order to maintain a 

stable orbit.

Within the LEO orbit, there are several subsets based on 

inclination and altitude. The Equatorial Low Earth Orbit 

(ELEO) indicates an orbit with a low inclination to the 

equator, offering rapid revisit times. Conversely, with a high 

inclination rate, Polar Orbits offer satellite passes above or 

nearly above both poles. In recent years, more objects have 

begun flying in Very-low Low Earth Orbit (VLEO). These 

objects require new and developing technologies to combat 

the significant atmospheric drag and maintain orbit, and yet 

remain economically sustainable. 

Despite any limitations of the LEO orbit, it lends itself to 

manned missions and more accessible servicing. It is the most 

common orbit for reconnaissance satellites and all other manmade objects. The International Space Station flies around 

330 km above the Earth’s surface; the Chinese Tiangong 

Space Station, launched in April 2021, orbits between 340 

and 450 km; and the Hubble Space telescope orbits at about 

540 km. Unlike most communication satellites, a series of 

satellites operated by Iridium Communications operates in 

LEO at about 780 km. And finally, remote sensing satellites 

often fly around 800 km and near polar inclination. 

The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 

currently tracks more than 8,500 objects that are larger than 

10 cm in LEO. Because it is the preferred, oldest, and most 

accessible orbit, LEO is becoming crowded, putting objects at 

risk of catastrophic collisions. 

HIGHLY ELLIPTICAL ORBIT (HEO)

Objects that experience a much higher high point (or 

apogee) than its low point (or perigee) are flying in a 

Highly Elliptical Orbit. The most common type of HEO is the 

Molniya orbit, “lightning” in Russian. From their latitude, the 

Russians found that it required too much energy to launch 

communications satellites into Geosynchronous Orbit, as 

many other nations were doing in the 1960s. So in 1965, 

Russia began launching into HEO, making them the original 

user of the orbit. Russia continued to launch their series 

of Molniya satellites, both military and communications, 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

until 2004. Objects in a Molniya orbit make two full passes 

over Earth in a day, flying in a highly inclined orbit, and are 

generally marked by an Argument of Perigee at the Southern 

Hemisphere. Given the nature of the orbit, satellites slow 

as they approach and descend from apogee, offering longdwell collection opportunities. Objects in Molniya orbit 

are near apogee for about 11 of their 12-hour orbit time, 

ideal for coverage around the North Pole and for spacebased ballistic missile early warning systems. Marked by 

high apogees, satellites in HEO are under far more severe 

solar and lunar gravitational terms than satellites in LEO, 

requiring high-precision modeling in the orbital mechanics 

of a HEO satellite. 

A much lesser-known type of HEO, the Tundra orbit, similar 

in characteristics to Molniya, offers only one pass over 

Earth per day. With only one pass, satellites in Tundra are 

near apogee for about 16 hours of their 24-hour orbit. The 

only known user of the Tundra orbit is Sirius Satellite Radio, 

which operated satellites in Tundra from 2000 to 2017. 

Communication satellites fly predominantly in HEO.

GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT (GEO)

Unlike satellites in LEO, satellites in GEO fly at high altitude 

– around 35,790 km above the Earth’s surface. At such a 

distance, satellites in GEO follow the Earth’s rotation and 

sidereal day, marked by an orbital period of just 3 minutes 

and 56 seconds shy of 24 hours. The orbit was first described 

by Herman Potcnik in 1929, although it wasn’t until 1945 

when the British science fiction author, Arthur C. Clarke, 

first popularized the idea of the orbit in his paper, “ExtraTerrestrial Relays- Can Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Radio 

Coverage?” GEO is sometimes referred to as the Clarke 

Orbit. Designed by Harold Rosen at Hughes Aircraft, in 1964, 

Syncom 3 became the first satellite successfully placed in 

GEO. It transmitted the summer Olympics from Japan to the 

United States

A geostationary orbit, a type of geosynchronous orbit marked 

by zero degrees of inclination and zero eccentricity, remains 

over the same spot on the Earth’s equator at all times. From 

such a high altitude, satellites in geostationary orbit can offer 

a large, constant view of the same spot on Earth – making this 

orbit a favorite for weather and communications satellites. 

An inclined geosynchronous orbit (IGSO) is geosynchronous 

but not geostationary. At an incline other than zero degrees, 

the ground track of a satellite in IGSO can vary from a straight 

line of longitude around the equator to a non-symmetric 

analemma (or figure-8). 

Satellites that fly in GEO include INMARSAT, a fleet 

of 11 telecommunications satellites operated by the 

International Mobile Satellite Organization, an international 

telecommunications company founded in 1979. The Thuraya 

Satellite Telecommunications Company, a regional mobile 

satellite system that covers 110 countries across the Indian 

subcontinent, the Middle East, Central Asia, North and 

Central Africa, and Europe, likewise operates two satellites in 

GEO. Intelsat also flies in GEO.

Because all satellites in GEO must occupy the same ring 

above the equator, there are a limited number of slots 

available for satellites. The International Communications 

Union addresses and navigates disputes over accessibility to 

the available GEO slots.

NRO IS EVERYWHERE

The three types or orbits are all distinctly different from 

each other. Each offers particular advantages, as well as 

disadvantages. The type of satellite usually determines the 

orbit, since the satellite’s mission will be benefited by a 

certain orbit, while the orbit’s detriments can be lessened 

or nullified based on the mission and target(s). The NRO has 

declared that it uses all three orbit types in its constellation.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

RED DOT

The NRO has played a key role in operations against al-Qa’ida 

and other terrorist organizations, as well as U.S.-led military 

operations against insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

These adversaries often operate as dispersed, clandestine 

networks, hiding in isolated, rugged locales like the AfghanPakistan border, or in hostile ungoverned regions of Somalia 

or Yemen. These adversaries are successful in their use of 

technology, and a favored weapon is the improvised explosive 

device (IED).

THE HIDDEN THREAT

Cheap and easy to construct, IEDs allow lightly armed and 

barely trained militants to engage with deadly consequences 

against the well-equipped and highly-trained troops of U.S. 

and coalition forces. IEDs tip the balance in an asymmetric 

conflict by enabling insurgents to inflict mass casualties 

without exposing themselves. The unpredictable, combatavoiding nature of IED attacks are what makes them so 

effective. In the past, IEDs slowed the mobility of U.S. troops 

while time-consuming sweeps for concealed devices were 

conducted. In the early days of the Global War on Terror, 

the only defense against IED attacks was equipment such 

as radios, metal detectors, electronic counter-measure 

systems, and robots. 

IEDs are one of the most lethal weapons available to 

terrorists and enemy combatants, as they are not only simple 

to build and deploy, but also virtually undetectable, and 

they frequently produce high casualty counts. The Defense 

Manpower Data Center reported that from 7 October 2001 

through 16 September 2006, IEDs caused about half of all 

the American casualties in Iraq, and about 30% of combat 

casualties in Afghanistan. Separately, a U.S. Government 

Accountability Office report stated that between January 

2007 and February 2018, approximately 9,000 IED incidents 

were targeted against U.S. and allied military forces in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, resulting in about 23,000 casualties. 

THE NRO DEPLOYS RED DOT

One of the most successful efforts to date in countering 

the IED threat faced by U.S. and Coalition Forces is the RED 

DOT program. Developed by the NRO and initially deployed 

to Iraq in early 2010, and later to Afghanistan, the program 

leverages information from multiple intelligence sources 

to provide an integrated IED risk situational picture that is 

delivered directly to the warfighter in harm’s way. It works 

by monitoring roadways for the electronic signals produced 

by the transmitters used to trigger the explosives, and within 

minutes, combines those signals with other intelligence 

streams, terrestrial sensors, and imagery to narrow the IED 

location to an accuracy within a few meters. It then sends 

the information directly to the tactical user on the ground, 

indicating where the possible IEDs may wait ahead, thus 

enabling the troops to avoid the area and ultimately remove 

the IED from the battlefield.

It takes an incredible amount of skillful integration of signals 

and imaging satellite intelligence with other source inputs in 

order to display, quite literally and within minutes of receipt, a 

red dot on the computer display in the vehicle on the ground. 

That dot identifies, in near real-time, the probable location of 

deadly IEDs. Former DNRO Bruce Carlson said, “It’s incredibly 

difficult to take a picture someplace and fuse it with signals 

intelligence that you might have a million different pieces of.” 

However, the one thing that is certain is that RED DOT saves 

lives by providing the integrated information needed to avoid 

and successfully remove hundreds of IEDs from the battlefield 

every year.

Red Dot IED locations
Electric Telegraph Receiver Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

RELAY SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT

GAME-CHANGING 

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION INNOVATION 

The NRO’s implementation of communications relay 

satellites enabled near real-time return of high-resolution, 

digital reconnaissance imagery, among the most important 

intelligence collection innovations in the organization’s 

history. The first relays served as integral components of the 

Kennen electro-optical imaging satellite system. Beginning 

in January 1977 when Kennen became operational, the relay 

satellites formed the space segment downlinking collected 

digital data to a receiving mission ground station, which 

converted it into hard copy imagery. This game-changing 

capability provided the U.S. an immediate technological edge 

and intelligence advantage in conducting diplomatic and 

military actions. For the first time in history, decisionmakers 

in Washington could obtain digital imagery within hours 

of collection or tasking, allowing the monitoring of an 

emerging or ongoing crisis happening nearly anywhere in 

the world. The Kennen system also ushered in a new era of 

tactical responsiveness for military commanders, who could 

use the high-quality, time-sensitive imagery for planning, 

targeting, and executing missions. Development of relay 

satellites, which NRO needed four years to complete, made 

instantaneous downlinking possible by solving the line-ofsight and weather problems that since ancient times had 

limited long distance communications methods, ranging 

from smoke or light signals to semaphore and even radio 

telegraphy.

QUEST FOR LONG DISTANCE 

COMMUNICATIONS LINKS

The first long-distance communication method that overcame 

these problems and promised to provide timely messaging 

was the electric telegraph. Long distance communication 

links were established by the laying of network cables along 

the bottom of oceans, which provided telegraphic messaging 

capability, first between England and Europe in 1850, and later 

between Europe and North America in 1866.*

 By the early 

20th century, the telephone and wireless communications 

began to supplant the telegraph; early wireless systems, in 

particular, transmitted in frequency ranges below 30 MHz that 

reflected signals off the ionosphere and the Earth’s surface to 

follow the curvature of the planet, providing unlimited range. 

All these innovations greatly improved and accelerated longdistance communications, but as radio frequencies above 

100 MHz began to be used, the old problem resurfaced: 

higher frequency waves were not reflected back, but simply 

traveled into space, meaning that transmissions could only 

be received when the transmitter and receiver were in line 

of sight of each other. The solution for integrating higher 

frequencies into global communications would require a 

space-based system, but few had thought seriously about 

this problem yet. One early fantastical concept, as online 

*In 1858, the Atlantic Telegraph Company, a joint Anglo-American venture, had successfully laid cable along the ocean floor stretching from Valentia, Ireland to Heart’s 

Content, Newfoundland. Unfortunately, the cable was already in deteriorated condition before installation, and further damage caused by sending higher than necessary voltage through the line caused the communications link to fail after only three 

weeks. It would take eight years, during which time engineers continued to refine 

cable construction, until the Atlantic Telegraph Company laid a reliable cable, and 

transatlantic telegraph service could truly begin. 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Encyclopedia Britannica notes, appears in American author 

Edward Everett Hale’s 1870 short story, “The Brick Moon,” 

which features signal communications between people on 

the Earth and others residing on a primitive space station. 

In the story, a group of men decides that having a second 

moon would be enormously beneficial to navigation, so they 

build a structure 200 feet in diameter, made of bricks, and 

launch it into space. Once in orbit, the “Brick Moon” satellite 

transmits Morse code signals to navigators by having people 

jumping up and down on the satellite’s surface. Imaginative, 

perhaps, but clearly lacking understanding of what a later 

writer would call “the peculiarities of the ionosphere.”

EXTRATERRESTRIAL RELAYS

That writer was Arthur C. Clarke, who was destined to 

become an enormously popular science fiction author and 

essayist. In 1945, Clarke—who was then an unknown Royal 

Air Force Officer—began ruminating on the limitations of 

long-distance communication and the possibilities for using 

satellites to provide a true broadcast service over the whole 

globe. In a Wireless World article published that October, 

Clarke postulated that artificial satellites in 24-hour orbits 

(i.e., moving at the same speed as the Earth’s rotation, thus 

remaining in a fixed position relative to a point on Earth, 

eventually called geostationary orbit) could intercept radio 

signals, amplify them, and retransmit to other relay satellites 

or ground receivers. By placing three such satellites 120 

degrees apart, Clarke calculated his extraterrestrial relays 

constellation could provide television and microwave 

coverage to the entire planet. Although it did not garner much 

immediate attention, Clarke’s concept was essentially correct 

and pointed toward a future of space-based communications. 

Moreover, although not stated, relay satellites would prove 

critical to addressing the bedeviling line-of-sight delays that 

would occur with still-nascent orbiting sensor payloads, 

which could not downlink data to the Earth without being in 

clear view of a ground station. The result is significant time 

lag between when sensor data is collected and when it is 

finally received by the processing station. A constellation of 

two or more relay satellites compensate for this by working 

in tandem to continuously transfer data and command 

instructions to and from the ground. The operations of relay 

satellites have been compared to their namesake racers in 

track and field: like runners carrying and passing off batons 

on a relay team, the individual satellites hand off data to the 

next satellite to carry it on the next leg of its journey.

Fortunately, technology was not dependent upon Clarke’s 

readership. The same year his article appeared, the U.S. 

Army Signal Corps reflected radar pulses off the Moon 

back to a terrestrial antenna. John R. Pierce of AT&T’s Bell 

Laboratories expanded upon Clarke’s ideas by suggesting the 

use of a space communications “mirror” in conjunction with 

a medium orbit “repeater” and a 24-hour orbit “repeater.” By 

the end of the 1950s, Navy stations on both U.S. coasts and at 

Pacific sites transmitted messages, including facsimiles, using 

“lunar bounce.” Working for NASA, Pierce’s Bell Labs team 

developed the first active relay Telstar 1, which transmitted 

live television images between North America and Europe 

in 1962. Another influential engineer, Harold Rosen, led a 

Hughes Aircraft Company team in launching the first satellite 

into a geosynchronous orbit, Syncom 2, as well as the first 

geostationary orbit satellite, Syncom 3. Similar technological 

developments paved the way for NRO’s implementation of 

its relay satellite system. 

PIONEERING CONCEPT AHEAD OF 

TECHNOLOGICAL READINESS

Developing systems capable of providing timely data to 

warn of an imminent attack had been a principal national 

reconnaissance objective in the first U.S. satellite program, the 

Air Force’s WS-117L begun in the late 1950s and contracted 

to Lockheed. Also encompassing plans for a family of systems 

to collect electronic and infrared intelligence, the WS-117L 

program’s primary photoreconnaissance satellites consisted 

of systems employing both film-readout, which provided 

more timely data return, and film-return technologies, which 

promised greater image resolution and ground coverage 

potential. The former were developed under the Sentry (later 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

renamed Samos) program, and though electronically scanning 

film negatives and transmitting the data to the ground was 

indeed more timely, the technological state-of-the-art limited 

scanning capacity and degraded image resolution. This left 

the latter, separated from WS-117L and developed covertly 

under the Corona program, to become the first operational 

photoreconnaissance system. The tremendous success of 

Corona—the NRO launched and operated Corona satellites 

for 12 years, continually improving cameras and extending 

mission duration—particularly its innovative film-recovery 

method, ensured that it became the blueprint for two 

successor film-return systems, Gambit and Hexagon, that 

further advanced space reconnaissance technology. Still, the 

need for a near real-time capability persisted as, too often, 

returned imagery that was found to contain time-sensitive 

information became available only after effective follow-up 

action could be taken. One frequently cited example occurred 

in August 1968, when Corona imagery revealing an impending 

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was returned from space, 

processed, exploited, analyzed, and delivered to President 

Johnson’s office more than a week after Warsaw Pact troops 

had largely suppressed the “Prague Spring.” Confronted with 

a fait accompli—not to mention evolving policies crafted 

to lessen East-West tensions and NATO allies opposed to 

military intervention in the Soviet sphere of influence—all 

the President could do was cancel a scheduled U.S. - U.S.S.R. 

summit and issue a toothless diplomatic protest. 

By the late 1960s, NRO Program B was already studying 

major technologies and subsystems needed for an EOI 

satellite system that would meet the requirements for a near 

real-time indications and warning capability. The envisioned 

system’s primary method for image recovery was expected 

to be relay satellites, and though some additional technology 

development would be required, the NRO contemplated 

building relays that closely resembled communications 

satellites then under development. In particular, Intelsat-3, 

an American communications satellite developed by TRW 

and used to relay commercial global telecommunications, 

including live TV, was considered a close approximation 

to what NRO would require for its relays, albeit with less 

demanding specifications. Thus, study teams at that time 

did not consider this essential component to the EOI system 

to pose daunting engineering challenges. This assumption 

proved to be overly optimistic. As events unfolded following 

President Nixon’s approval on 23 September 1971 to proceed 

with development and acquisition of the revolutionary EOI 

system, the NRO discovered there are always unexpected 

challenges when an organization redefines state-of-the-art.

MAXIMIZING PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 

EFFECTIVENESS TO ACHIEVE THE CRITICAL LINK

After the relay satellite contract award to Hughes 

Corporation one year later, the NRO scientists and 

engineers set about designing and building first-of-its-kind 

hardware. To meet challenges, NRO engineers adopted and 

adapted existing commercial components where possible. 

Enabling the relay satellites to operate in conjunction 

imagery satellites was another challenge absent in the use 

of commercial communication satellites system. Finally, 

the choice of orbit was critical, and NRO sought inspiration 

from Clarke’s hypothesis from some 30 years earlier. For 

the other issues, the NRO team worked round-the-clock 

to overcome many challenges in getting the spacecraft 

ready for launch, to include compiling test procedures from 

scratch. In the months leading up to the first launch, the 

prime contractor took the unprecedented step of assigning 

its chief engineer—later named a Pioneer of National 

Reconnaissance—to work full-time to ensure complete 

mission success. In the end, the NRO launched the relay 

satellites on-time and without significant cost overrun. The 

new architecture eliminated the country’s dependence 

on film-return systems and provided a persistent global 

information perspective that supported decision-making 

on emerging crises.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

RIDE-SHARE LAUNCH

NRO has innovated by exploring and exploiting ways to 

launch its satellites. Rideshare launches are a key example of 

its innovative approaches. In essence, ride-sharing connects 

passengers with available transportation. A secondary 

payload, or “ride-share,” is a smaller-sized payload that is 

transported to orbit on a launch vehicle supplied by or for 

the entity associated with the primary payload. Typically, 

the primary payload dictates the specific requirements for 

launch and the launch-vehicle interface. In return, the rideshare gets into orbit at a substantially reduced price. 

EARLY NRO RIDE-SHARING

Ride-sharing is not a new concept for the NRO. The idea 

of launching more than one payload together dates back 

to NRO’s very beginnings. The first electronic intelligence 

satellites were small, and launch procedures were rather 

fluid. Two or three satellites might be stacked and then joined 

together in what was called a “piggyback” launch, sending 

the main satellite and one or more auxiliaries together into 

orbit. After reaching orbit, the payloads typically would 

separate to perform their individual missions. 

Galactic Radiation and Background 1 was the first 

operational U.S. intelligence satellite. It accompanied the 

first U.S. Navy navigation satellite, which was called Transit 

1B, as a covert piggyback payload. Then, as in more recent 

times, the organization with the main payload determined 

the launch schedule. On 22 June 1960, the two satellites 

launched together from Cape Canaveral, Florida, using a 

Thor-Able-Star booster. Although details including GRAB 1’s 

name and Elint mission remained classified, the news media 

celebrated this first U.S. dual launch as an important space 

accomplishment. GRAB 2, the next successful Elint satellite, 

launched on 29 June 1961. It was piggybacked with the 

Transit 4A satellite and a satellite designed by Dr. James Van 

Allen of the University of Iowa to study the radiation belts 

around the Earth. That was the first successful launch of 

three satellites together. 

As the NRO began to develop larger and more complex 

satellites that in turn required powerful boosters, the 

opportunity arose for it to host secondary payloads 

systematically. The NRO’s Program A operated an 

experimental program to collect Soviet radar information 

in which smaller payloads were attached to a rack on 

the rear or “aft” section of the Agena satellite vehicle 

for launch. This configuration received the very logical 

program name “AFTRACK.” The first AFTRACK experiment, 

SOCTOP, successfully launched along with a Corona satellite 

on 10 August 1960. Subsequent AFTRACK experiments 

had imaginative names that included TAKI, GRAPE JUICE, 

NEW HAMPSHIRE, PLYMOUTH ROCK, WILD BILL, and 

OPPORKNOCKITY. The last AFTRACK ride-share, DONKEY, 

launched on 24 July 1967. 

GRAB Ride-share

 With Transit 4A Space Shuttle CubeSats NROL
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Sigint “Proof of Concept” subsatellites flew as aft-rack 

“hitchhikers” on Corona, Poppy, and other launches. Other 

secondary payloads were the Sigint Project platforms. These 

Program 11 (P-11) subsatellites detached from the primary 

satellite and proceeded with their missions. Designed to 

be longer lived than the AFTRACK experiments, these were 

bona fide subsatellites with their own propulsion systems. 

NRO AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE

For a period of time, all NRO and DoD payloads were 

directed to launch solely via the Space Transportation 

System, more commonly known as the Space Shuttle. 

In fact, plans to use the shuttle to launch the very large 

Hexagon system dictated the dimensions of the Space 

Shuttle’s cargo bay. The relationship between the NRO and 

NASA was complicated. Disasters in the 1980s, including 

the loss of the Challenger and an explosion that damaged 

a planned shuttle launch site, were serious setbacks. In the 

end, the actual number of NRO payloads that launched 

via shuttle missions was limited. The NRO instead chose 

to develop unmanned launch systems that were more 

reliable, flexible, and less costly.

RIDE-SHARING TODAY

The term “ride-sharing” became extremely popular in the 

early 21st century. In the launch arena, the NRO led the 

way with its CubeSat program. It was a creative approach to 

launch and operate nanosatellites on orbit at a lower cost, 

and in a quicker time frame, than traditional NRO programs. 

This allowed the NRO and a variety of mission partners that 

included NASA to launch experimental CubeSat satellites 

that explored new questions and enabled rapid innovation. 

Small, containerized, modular, and boasting standard 

interfaces, CubeSats are designed to reach space by 

hitchhiking as secondary payloads. Ride-sharing got small, 

low-cost satellites on orbit very quickly.

On 13 September 2012, the NRO launched its first ride 

share mission, NROL-36. The Atlas V rocket boosted the 

main payload along with 11 CubeSats in the extra capacity 

bulkhead. These small modular CubeSats had been 

developed by labs and other organizations to research 

such topics as maritime shipping container tracking and 

space weather. 

The costs of developing a CubeSat, and of securing a launch 

slot for it on a larger mission, are substantially lower than 

single-purpose launches. Reaching orbit as a ride-share 

allows CubeSat missions to take on more risk with the 

potential for substantial rewards on investment. Another 

key factor fueling the success of ride-sharing at the NRO 

was the development of inexpensive deployment systems 

to propel the ride-shares into space after the primary 

payload deployed. 

The NRO CubeSat Program Office accepted cutting edge rideshare payloads from government, academia, and industry. 

NRO Director Betty Sapp praised ride-sharing in 2013, saying 

that “[w]e have long recognized that there are benefits and 

efficiencies to be gained through the ride-share in space 

launch. These benefits include opportunities to conduct 

scientific research and demonstrate and apply emerging 

technologies through the use of small satellites.”

Originally a process just for government-sponsored launches, 

ride-sharing quickly is becoming ubiquitous. The advent 

of nanosatellites and the expansion of commercial launch 

providers helped fuel the growth of ride-share launches. 

Thanks in no small part to the NRO’s ride-share innovations, 

sending a small payload into space may eventually become 

as easy as shipping a package with a delivery company.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

SPACE-BASED LAB

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY HISTORY

Originally conceived in 1962 and publicly announced in 

1965, the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program was a joint 

NRO-Air Force project designed as a 30-day mission to send 

reconnaissance-trained military men into space. Once in 

orbit, the astronauts were to transfer from their Gemini 

capsule into the laboratory vehicle via a hatch cut into the 

Gemini’s heat shield. There, the astronauts would spend 

the next 30 days in a shirt-sleeve environment, performing 

experiments and taking reconnaissance photos of Earth - 

avoiding disruptive weather conditions and responding to 

changing national security concerns. 

Upon completion of the MOL mission, the crew was to climb 

back through the hatch and into the Gemini capsule, detach 

from the laboratory, and return to Earth in the Gemini. The 

remaining MOL hardware - the entire laboratory vehicle - 

would become space refuse. Unfortunately, the system was 

not designed to allow for a rendezvous with a later crew. 

Although the program was cancelled in 1969 before it 

ever flew, it prompted the design and building of several 

important pieces of technology that went on to benefit 

the space community for years to come. In response to the 

program’s cancellation, an ad hoc group chaired by MOL 

technical director Michael Yarymovych and tasked with 

finding national benefit from the program remarked, “In this 

regard, an unmeasurable but real benefit of the program is 

the expansion of manned spaceflight know-how across a 

broad segment of industry and Government.”

MOL VEHICLE DESCRIPTION

The MOL’s Space-Based Lab was composed of a Laboratory 

Module mated with a Mission Payload System Segment 

(MPSS). The Laboratory Module was 10 feet in diameter and 

19 feet long - the most spacious design for any American 

spacecraft at the time. It was to be the crew’s mission 

support during the 30-day orbital flight phase. At 1,000-cubic 

feet, the pressurized compartment was designed to allow for 

a shirt-sleeve environment for the two-man crew, working 

and living without constantly wearing their space suits. It 

was also to provide a living area for the longest anticipated 

spaceflight to date.

The Laboratory Module was divided into two octagonal 

workspaces, housing eight bays each. The bays were 

designed to provide room for storage units, environmental 

control system equipment, the environmental control 

system controls, hygiene/waste compartment, a biochemical 

test console and work station, large experiment airlocks, a 

glove box for handling liquids, a motion chair to determine 

mass of crew members during flight, two performance test 
Macleay

Truly

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

panels, a physiology test console, a full-body exercise device, 

emergency oxygen masks, viewport and instrument panel, 

and the main spacecraft control station. The module would 

also be home to beds, spacesuits, food, and water stores to 

support the astronauts for 30 days. 

Within the Laboratory Module, the two-man crew was to 

conduct their primary function of attaining high resolution, 

useful reconnaissance photos. Over the life of the program, 

two MOL astronauts, Lachlan Macleay and Richard Truly, 

worked to design a targeting software package to make use 

of man in the program. Using two targeting telescopes, the 

MOL astronauts would be able to look ahead to planned 

targets, assess the weather and viability of the target, and 

vote on which targets to prioritize. The targeting telescopes 

and photographic equipment were located in the MPSS, while 

the workstations were housed in the Laboratory Module. 

The MPSS was designed to house the photographic system 

and subsystems necessary for control and dynamics. It was an 

unpressurized module 10 feet in diameter and 37 feet long. It 

housed the acquisition and tracking scopes, communication 

equipment, film processing, and all other equipment required 

to maintain system functions. Mated with the Laboratory 

Module, it created the complete Laboratory Vehicle. 

MOL LEGACY

When the program was cancelled in June 1969, officials made 

the decision to transfer all crew-related equipment, as well as 

the Gemini, to NASA. It was a prolonged transfer process, but 

NASA was in possession of all manned system components, 

including the Laboratory Module Simulator and the Mission 

Simulator, by the end of 1973. The MOL’s waste management 

system eventually flew on Skylab, and several other pieces 

of MOL equipment contributed to the NASA Earth Science 

research program. Additionally, MOL’s acquisition and 

tracking system, which became the centerpiece of the 

program, as well as the mission development simulator, 

contributed to the success of NASA’s earth sensing program. 

Although the program’s cancellation was a disappointment 

to many involved, pieces of MOL undoubtedly contributed 

to a variety of space-related missions across government and 

industry in the decades that followed.
TIROS Launch DMSP DMSP Satellite image of U.S. at night

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

WEATHER SATELLITES 

BACKGROUND

In the mid-1950s, the RAND Corporation warned U.S. Air 

Force officials that accurate and timely meteorological 

forecasts depended on cloud-free photography, prompting 

the establishment of the DMSP program to support the joint 

CIA and Air Force program. The Corona satellite was first 

launched in 1960. Corona satellites took photographs from 

space enabling the U.S. to both monitor meteorological 

forecasts and track threat activity in denied areas like 

the Soviet Union. Though Corona’s photoreconnaissance 

capability was remarkable for the time, in the early days its 

imagery was difficult to interpret and expensive to process 

in a timely way. The Corona program operated from 1960-

1972 and was the U.S.’s first photoreconnaissance satellite 

and foundational to the development of satellites designed 

for meteorological purposes.

TELEVISION INFRARED OBSERVATIONAL 

SATELLITE (TIROS-1)

On 1 April 1960, a satellite designed by the Radio 

Corporation of America (RCA) and launched by NASA 

became America’s first weather satellite. While TIROS-1 only 

operated for 78 days, the program demonstrated that cloud 

cover and weather patterns could accurately be monitored 

from space—in contrast to blurry images obtained from 

Corona’s early missions in 1960-1961. In April 1961, after an 

interdepartmental study on weather satellites concluded, 

NASA was chartered to establish requirements for the 

development of meteorological satellites for the Department 

of Commerce and DoD under the umbrella of the National 

Operational Meteorological Satellite Program (NOMSS). 

This program, many believed, would avoid duplication of 

effort and produce at less cost a single satellite system to 

meet civil and military weather forecasting needs, including 

National Reconnaissance Program’s requirements. TIROS 1 

then became the model for subsequent civilian and military 

meteorological satellites.

DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE 

PROGRAM (DMSP)

In July of 1961, at the height of the Cold War, Joseph 

Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO Director, 

became concerned that NOMSS was designed mainly 

for civil programs, which did not always align with NRO’s 

classified mission requirements. For that reason, Charyk 

authorized the development of four “Earth-referenced” 

wheel-mode weather satellites to be launched using NASA’s 

Scout boosters as an “interim” solution for NRO. In tandem, 

DMSP under NRO established the technology and flight 

operations for polar orbiting, low-altitude national weather 

satellite systems administered by the National Oceanic 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). In the following 

months, NRO-DMSP funded weather satellites incorporated 

many improved features and performed so well that they 

later became the model and were adopted for all U.S. civil 

and military low-altitude meteorological satellites. 

POLAR ORBITING SATELLITES: There are two polar 

orbiting satellites in north-south orbits that observe 

the same spot of Earth twice daily, once during the 

day and once at night. Polar orbiting satellites provide 

imagery and atmospheric soundings of temperature 

and moisture data over the entire Earth. These 

satellites offer the advantage of operating closer to 

Earth (about 520 miles above the surface), providing 

detailed imagery, and excellent views of the polar 

regions.

GEOSTATIONARY SATELLITES: Unlike polar 

orbiting satellites, geostationary satellites orbit at 

a much higher altitude of 22,236 miles above the 

Earth’s surface, are positioned over the equator, 

and orbit around the Earth once every 24 hours. The 

satellite appears stationary relative to Earth allowing 

it to hover continuously over one position of Earth’s 

surface. Because they stay above a fixed area on the 

surface, geostationary satellites provide a constant 

vigil for atmospheric “triggers” for severe weather 

conditions like tornadoes or hurricanes.

NRO’S TIROS DESIGN

TIROS was a 100-pound satellite shaped like a 10-sided 

polyhedron, 23-inches across and 21-inches high. A spinning 

motion, introduced when first launched into orbit produced 

around 12 revolutions per minute by small spin rockets. The 

spin axis was maintained perpendicular to the orbit plane by 

torqueing the satellite against the Earth’s magnetic field; the 

force then created a direct-current loop around the satellite’s 

perimeter. A ground command station would then direct the 

electric current to flow in the desired direction to generate 

the torque. The few NASA officials who knew about TIROS 

viewed the joint NRO-Air Force program as a no-risk test case 

of an “Earth-referenced” wheel-mode weather satellite.

DMSP SUCCESS

By mid-1965, NRO’s “interim” weather satellites operated 

like a formal military space program. By then the DMSP 

provided the NRP with daily coverage over Eurasia and other 

territories using two polar orbit, sun-synchronous weather 

satellites. The program not only addressed the requirement 

to secretly surveil remote territories with excellent results but 

accomplished the mission at half the annual cost of NOMSS. 

In fact, DMSP pioneered weather satellite technology so 

well that the Department of Commerce embraced the initial 

DMSP wheel-mode Block 1 satellite, the TIROS Operational 

System (TOS), as an interim polar-orbiting weather satellite. 

DMSP GROWING PAINS

Despite NRO’s advances in meteorological technology, only 

five DMSP satellites were launched from May 1962 through 

September 1963 and several launches failed due to defective 

Scout rocket boosters. The first polar-orbiting satellite, 

viewed by the DMSP as a test, was a standard four-stage 

Scout booster carrying an NRO GRAB satellite, launched from 

Vandenberg Air Force Base. The test launch on 25 April 1962, 

ended in a Scout booster failure within sight of the ground 

station. The Scout booster failed again on 23 May when the 

vehicle self-destructed. The next DMSP launch on 23 August 

1962 was a success though the ground-control team at first 

failed to track the weather satellite. By January 1964, the 

Scout boosters were replaced with Thor-Agena boosters 

and four DMSP satellites were successfully launched into 

orbit providing the NRP all of the meteorological data they 

needed. Despite setbacks, after DMSP acquired the Thor/

Burner combinations in the ensuing months and years, they 

achieved an 86 percent launch success rate.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

SUCCESS WITH A PRICE

The DMSP-TOS under NRO became operational within 24 

months and demonstrated impressive technical performance 

for strategic and tactical applications. Considering its cost 

and performance in the mid-1960s under NRP’s umbrella, 

Commerce leaders told NASA they would adopt the DMSP 

wheel-mode spacecraft in place of NOAA’s Nimbus weather 

satellite, to be used as the standard for low-altitude, polarorbiting meteorological applications. That decision was 

formalized in the mid-1970s when the latest DMSP Block 

5D, three axis-stabilized spacecraft was selected for civil 

programs. This prompted the declassification of the DMSP 

program in 1973. The choice to adopt a central satellite 

program to leverage related requirements for civil and 

military missions once again glossed over the national 

security aspects of why NRO leaders established the DMSP 

to begin with.

NASA POLAR-ORBITING ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITE SYSTEM (NPOESS)

In May 1994, DoD, Commerce, and NASA released the 

NPOESS implementation plan endorsed by President William 

Clinton. The plan created an Integrated Program Office that 

developed, acquired, and operated all NPOESS systems. The 

NPOESS was comprised of senior officials from consolidated 

agencies to ensure requirements from each combined 

former organization were responsibly maintained under 

different elements of the NPOESS. NOAA was given oversight 

for the merged systems, including satellites on orbit and 

public representing the program to the civil and international 

communities. The DoD became responsible for contracting, 

acquiring, and launching new meteorological satellites. 

Reminiscent of the division of labor in 1961 that produced 

Nimbus, NASA assumed responsibility for development and 

acquisition of new cost-effective technologies related to the 

merged meteorological programs. DMSP’s great success 

under NRO’s stewardship skyrocketed the advancement 

of meteorological satellite technology for the nation, but 

also led to its termination. Nevertheless, NRO’s significant 

contributions to weather satellite technology for both civil 

and military mission requirements cannot be overstated.

DMSP Block 1 Launch, 19 Jan 1964

DMSP Block 5D1, 11 SEPT 1976
INNOVATIONS

RECONNAISSANCE

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D-21 Drone Drone Photo of Phoenix, AZ

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

D-21 DRONE

D-21 DRONE

Decades before the advent of military and commercial 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the NRO engineered, 

produced, demonstrated, and operationally tested a highly 

advanced, unpiloted, supersonic reconnaissance aircraft 

with unbelievable characteristics. This reconnaissance drone 

flew at speeds over Mach 3.3 at an altitude over 90,000 

feet, and the NRO designed it using low radar observable 

technologies, suggestive of 21st century stealth technology. 

During the middle of the 20th century, the NRO and others 

had been conducting limited experimentation with drones, 

but it was the NRO’s Program D that began experimenting 

with the development of the D-21 drone. The D-21 validated 

that unpiloted aircraft were possible and could have a role 

in reconnaissance. The NRO’s work in the middle of the 20th 

century had anticipated what was to come, the proliferation 

of UAVs in the 21st century.

In October 1962, CIA authorized the Skunk Works, Lockheed’s 

experimental engineering division, to study the feasibility 

of modifying the A-12 reconnaissance aircraft to carry and 

deploy a reconnaissance drone for unmanned overflight of 

denied areas. The mothership, renamed the M-21 to avoid 

confusion with the A-12, was fitted with a second seat for a 

launch control officer (LCO) for the drone, called the D-21. 

The M-21 Drone Program ended in 1966 after a crash that 

killed LCO Ray Torick. The Skunk Works built 38 drones. 

From 1969 to 1971, the Air Force began using B-52s to 

launch some of the remaining drones against Chinese 

targets. The drones, re-designated as D-21B, flew four 

missions; none were completely successful. After the 

program was cancelled, one of the spare D-21B airframes 

(#538) was stored in California and then moved to the 

Aircraft Maintenance and Regeneration Center (“Boneyard”) 

at Davis Monthan AFB near Tucson, AZ. In the 1990s, Warner 

Robbins AFB displayed and stored #538 until 2017, when it 

was transferred to the NRO. Eventually, the NRO entered 

into a loan agreement with the Southern Museum of Flight 

in Birmingham, Alabama. The museum restored and began 

displaying #538 in November 2018.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS:

Construction: Titanium with small radar cross section

Dimensions: Length—514.27 in

 Wing Span—288.90 in

 Height—85 in

Weight: 11,000 pounds, gross

Propulsion: Marquardt Ramjet

 Solid propellant rocket booster

Performance: Speed—Mach 3.25

 Altitude—80,000 to 95,000 feet

 Range—3,000nm

Payload: Hycon Frame camera (24” fl)

 Coverage: 28nm X 3020nm 

Resolution: 1.5’ 

Mission Code Names: TAGBOARD (D-21) 

SENIOR BOWL (D-21B)

B-52 with two D-21B drones under wings at top is a close up of 

D-21B on wing of a B-52.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

DENIAL AND DECEPTION

MYTHICAL DENIAL AND DECEPTION

Virgil in his Aeneid recounts the story of the Greeks carrying 

out a grand deception to defeat the city of Troy. The Trojans 

managed to stave off defeat for many years. After those 

many years, the leaders of the Greeks, as Virgil reports, 

decided to construct a large wooden horse to facilitate their 

deception—the horse was the emblem of Troy. After building 

the horse, the Greeks staged what looked like a retreat by 

sea, leaving the horse for capture by the Trojans. Assuming 

the Trojans would take their victory prize into the city, the 

Greeks hid a force inside the wooden horse. Consistent with 

their expectations, the Trojans seize the horse as a victory 

prize. Despite the warnings of the Trojan priest Laocoon to 

not seize the horse and bring it into the city, the Trojans did 

so. The Greek force waited until nightfall, then left the horse 

and opened the gates of the city. Troy fell to the Greeks and 

the war ended. 

The story of the Trojan horse has traversed time to now 

symbolize acts of deception. Deception in conflict is a 

constant. The Cold War between the United States and the 

Soviet Union was no different. Deception and denial of truth 

and facts to hide activities are key strategies in waging war. 

DENIAL AND DECEPTION IN WAR

There are many well-known deceptions in war. For example, 

the success of Allied troops against German forces occupying 

the shores of France during D-day was greatly enhanced 

by deception. The Allies created a fictional army to deceive 

the Germans into thinking that an attack to retake France 

would occur at other beaches than where Allied forces 

landed. To make the fictional army seem believable, the 

allies used inflatable devices to appear as tanks, trucks, and 

other equipment that would be necessary to support an 

army. With the inflatables in place in England, the Germans 

flew over and photographed the fake equipment, further 

enhancing the deception. When the Allied troops did attack 

on D-Day, the Germans remained convinced the attacks were 

a diversion from the real attack that would occur elsewhere 

on the French coast and with a more powerful force. The 

Germans held troops in reserve for the attack that never 

came, allowing Allied success on D-Day.

THE USSR AND DENIAL AND DECEPTION

The Soviet Union adopted a military strategy of denial and 

deception developed by the Tsarist Army in the early 20th 

century where an army deception school developed the 

doctrine. The formal doctrine became known as maskirovka, 

meaning either disguise or masking. 

As the Cold War progressed, the Soviets relied on denial and 

deception frequently. One of the earliest deceptions was 

carried out between 1954 and 1955. By the mid-1950s the 

U.S. had developed long-range bombers that could be used 

to carry out a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. The 

Soviets did not have a similar capability, but wanted the 

world to believe they did. In winter 1954, Aviation Week 

carried a story describing the Soviets’ development of their 

own long-range jet powered bomber, the Myasishchev M-4 

Molot, or hammer in Russian. The bomber was designated 

Bison by the West, and made its first appearance at the 1954 

May Day celebrations in Moscow.

Trojan Horse Inflatable Tan
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Each year, the Soviets staged a large military air show at the 

Tushino airfield near Moscow. At the 1955 show, the Soviets 

knew that western military attaches would attend the show. 

Building on what was already known about the M-4, the 

Soviets flew 10 bombers in a dramatic display. Nine then 

quickly turned around out of site of the observers and were 

joined by eight more bombers. This left the impression that 

the Soviets had produced 28 bombers in a year, instead of 

18, or at a third higher rate than they actually produced the 

bombers. Based on this observation, U.S. military analysts 

concluded that the Soviets would outpace U.S. strategic 

bomber production by the early 1960s, creating a “bomber 

gap” between the two adversaries. Word of the analysis 

became public knowledge, creating a furor in political and 

military circles. 

In October 1962, U.S. U-2 overflights of Cuba captured 

telltale signatures of Soviet nuclear weapons placement in 

Cuba. The Soviets carried out a number of deceptions to 

get the missiles and many thousands of troops into Cuba to 

build and maintain the missile launch facilities. For example, 

the name chosen for the operation led western analysts to 

believe that the activity was being carried out in an artic 

location versus the warm Caribbean climate. The missiles and 

equipment were covered with shrouds to hide them from 

any aerial observation of the ships carrying them. The ships 

were unloaded at multiple ports in Cuba, making it difficult 

to observe the massive amount of material and personnel 

moved into Cuba. Just weeks before the U.S. discovered the 

Cuban missile deception, the Soviet Union’s ambassador 

assured the U.S. Attorney General and brother of the U.S. 

President that no troops or offensive weapons were or would 

be placed in Cuba by the Soviets. Even after the discovery of 

the emplacements, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to 

deny their existence despite conclusive imagery intelligence 

disclosed to other world leaders and the public.

In August 1968, the Soviet Union led an invasion of Warsaw 

Pact member Czechoslovakia to remove a government that 

was pursuing very liberal reforms, threatening what counted 

for Communist orthodoxy at the time. For example, the 

Soviets ordered Warsaw Pact troops to remain in barracks 

and also remove material that led the Czech leadership to 

believe there was not an imminent outside threat. Instead, 

the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations were able to 

move troops and supplies to the Czech border in advance of 

the rapid and overwhelming invasion of Czechoslovakia. The 

surprise allowed the Soviet Union to depose the more liberal 

government and replace it with a government that would toe 

the Soviet line.

U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET DENIAL 

AND DECEPTION IN THE COLD WAR

The U.S. invested significant resources into developing 

sophisticated technological means to understand the true 

intentions of the Soviet Union and unmask their deceptions. 

The U-2 played an early and important role in this effort. For 

example, the U-2 captured an image of a Soviet airfield that 

displayed their entire M-4 Bison bomber fleet. There were 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

far fewer aircraft than the Tushino deception had led U.S. 

military analysts to believe existed. Concrete intelligence 

dismissed the “bomber gap.”

After the 1957 launch of the Soviets’ Sputnik satellite, many 

in the U.S. grew very concerned that the Soviet Union was 

outpacing the U.S. in the development of ballistic missiles—

missiles that could deliver nuclear bombs to the U.S. By 

August 1960, the U.S. successfully launched a Corona satellite 

that set the course for the U.S. to obtain concrete intelligence 

dispelling such a “missile gap” existed. By fall 1960, the 

Corona imaging capability countered Soviet efforts to leave 

the impression they were outpacing the U.S. 

In September 1961, the Kennedy administration established 

the National Reconnaissance Office to develop even more 

sophisticated reconnaissance satellites to counter Soviet 

denial and deception. The first photoreconnaissance 

satellite launched by the newly formed NRO was the 1963 

Gambit high-resolution satellite. The Gambit program would 

eventually produce a second-generation satellite that could 

capture images of objects smaller than one foot in size. This 

level of resolution made it much more difficult for the Soviet 

Union to carry out denial and deception activities.

In 1964, the NRO developed a satellite specifically to test 

technology that could directly challenge denial and deception 

activities. The program, known as Quill, was to launch 

an experimental satellite that would test whether or not 

radar from space could be processed into images. The Quill 

experiment confirmed radar could be used to obtain imagery 

from space—a capability that would allow the United States 

to obtain reconnaissance imagery under conditions used by 

the Soviet Union to disguise and obscure their strategic and 

tactical activities.

To gain greater persistence, the NRO developed a large 

satellite, Hexagon, that carried 60 miles of film stock. 

Hexagon allowed the U.S. to repeatedly capture imagery of 

the Soviet Union and other areas of concern using its broad 

area coverage cameras. Hexagon’s repeated and persistent 

imagery made it much harder for the Soviets to carry out 

denial and deception activities.

While the U.S. was developing photoreconnaissance 

satellites, it was also developing signals collection satellites. 

The world’s first reconnaissance satellite was an experimental 

satellite known as GRAB. It proved to be highly successful, 

giving the U.S. the most comprehensive understanding 

of Soviet radar capabilities to date—an understanding 

necessary to carry out a nuclear counterattack by evading 

those radars. After GRAB began collection of signals from 

space, the U.S. launched many other experimental Sigint 

satellites, demonstrating means to collect communications 

signals, as well as signals associated with Soviet military 

equipment, launch vehicles, and other systems that posed 

a threat to the U.S. They lifted the veil further, exposing true 

Soviet intentions and capabilities.

By 1976, the NRO launched the first electro-optical satellite, 

known as Kennen, which could collect imagery in near realtime and remain in orbit much longer than the film return 

systems. With this enhanced capability, the Soviet Union 

had even less flexibility in carrying out denial and deception 

activities given the increased persistence of U.S. imagery 

collection capability.

Although little can be said of more recent NRO capabilities 

for countering U.S. adversaries’ denial and deception 

activities, the earlier declassified history demonstrates a 

regular and ever more sophisticated capability of the NRO 

to collect intelligence countering denial and deception. The 

innovation of the NRO and the innovators who pressed the 

best technology into service provided formidable means 

for countering denial and deception—a responsibility that 

continues today.
ACIC Map of the 

Southern Hemisphere - August 1968

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

GEODETIC DATABASES

In the 1960s, the Intelligence Community faced two distinctly 

different mapping situations — the lack of mapping data of 

the Soviet Union and the relatively good mapping data of the 

United States. The imagery collected by two NRO satellite 

systems—Corona (operational life 1960-72) and Argon (1961-

64)—revolutionized U.S. mapmaking activities concerning 

features on the Earth’s surface and eventually led to the 

development of technical applications for a geodetic database 

framework. The task for mapmakers was to find a technical 

solution to compile the imagery data into that geodetic 

database. Three military mapping organizations would take 

on the technological challenge of mapping the Soviet Union: 

the Air Force Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC) 

in St. Louis, MO, and the Army Map Service (AMS) and Navy 

Hydrographic Office (NHO), both in the Washington, D.C. 

Metro Area. Federal civil agencies would take on the challenge 

of updating U.S. maps.

MAPPING THE USSR — 

MILITARY MAPPING AGENCIES

During the 1950s, a “Cartographic Iron Curtain” prevented the 

U.S. from creating accurate maps of the Soviet Union. The lack 

of basic maps of the USSR existed before the Cold War. Large 

areas of the country had never been mapped, and during the 

Cold War, several roadblocks made mapping the USSR difficult. 

The closed Soviet society kept strict controls on and added 

distortions to all detailed mapping data, and there was a 

concerted deception program directed at foreigners who used 

generalized maps released by the Soviet Union.

Corona and Argon imagery provided the key to break through 

the USSR’s Cartographic Iron Curtain. Corona’s higher resolution 

imagery yielded detailed information, and Argon’s low 

resolution provided essential data for improving the accuracy 

of the geodetic framework. Intensive technical efforts of the 

U.S. military mapping organizations and integration of the 

satellite imagery armed the three military mapping agencies 

with the tools to build a geodetic framework of the Soviet 

Union. Each organization would take on different aspects of 

the obstacles to mapping the country.

The Air Force Aeronautical Chart and Information Center

focused on the development of a worldwide geodetic network. 

Its program focused on analysis, integration, and triangulation 

used in orbital positions of the Corona and Argon spacecraft 

at the time of imaging to obtain a steadily increasing geodetic 

accuracy that was critical in supporting bombing and missile 

targeting in the event of U.S. - Soviet hostilities. Corona’s wide - 

area coverage capabilities enabled production of air navigation 

charts, which were important for potential targeting areas.

The Army Map Service exploited satellite imagery to produce 

more reliable depictions of all ground features of the USSR, a 

difficult and time-consuming project. The objective was to cover 

the entire USSR landmass, supplemented by areas of high interest 

and larger scales for major cities. To achieve this, a crash program 

produced hypsometric maps (with contour and elevation data) 

and planimetric maps (without terrain elevation).
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

Due to an aggressive Soviet threat, the Army Chief of Staff 

for Intelligence and the CIA developed a joint mapping 

program — the Special Intelligence Graphic (SIG) — to help 

reduce production times. SIG data responded to military and 

intelligence requirements. The AMS concentrated on the 

basic map framework, and the CIA Directorate of Intelligence 

provided research assistance in identifying and annotating 

manmade features. A prototype map sheet of Stalingrad was 

used to test the joint production program. The success of the 

prototype led to mapping the entire USSR and, eventually, to 

mapping China and adjacent areas in Eurasia.

The Navy Hydrographic Office had a smaller role in the 

exploitation of satellite imagery. However, the NHO was able 

to use Corona and Argon imagery to update its nautical charts 

around the world.

The work of these agencies was key to producing reliable maps, 

charts, and geodetic data to meet needs on the Soviet Bloc, as 

well as navigation chart requirements on a worldwide basis. 

Completed in just a decade, the accurate mapping database 

covered the entire Soviet landmass (almost one-sixth of the 

Earth’s land surface) and was vital to the National Technical 

Means used to enter arms control agreements between the 

U.S. and Soviet Union.

MAPPING THE U.S. – FEDERAL CIVIL AGENCIES

Use of Corona imagery began in the late 1960s with an initiative 

by President Johnson’s Science Advisor to test the value of 

overhead satellite imagery for U.S. civil purposes. The U.S. 

Geological Survey opened a classified facility for access to civil 

agencies to exploit the Corona imagery for various mapping, 

research, and other production programs.

The use of satellite imagery for domestic purposes would have 

a different focus, but was no less urgent, than mapping the 

Soviet Union. Accurate maps of the U.S. were available and 

the basic geodetic control framework existed, but they were 

outdated. What did not exist was the technology needed to 

create more detailed large-scale maps. These updated U.S. 

maps were needed, due to the postwar expansion of urban core 

areas and expanding suburbs, and the extensive construction 

of interstates and highways. The Department of Agriculture’s 

Forest Service updated its maps of national forest lands, 

and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

corrected and updated its nautical and aeronautical charts. 

The Environmental Protection Agency used Corona imagery to 

find areas impacted by pollution.

CONCLUSION

Within a decade, the U.S. had mapped the USSR at a medium 

scale and laid the groundwork for the future of U.S. mapmaking 

activities. These early mapping activities met critical national 

security needs, as well as civil domestic requirements. Success 

would have been unreachable without the expertise of 

specialists in photointerpretation, photogrammetry, geodetic 

science, and Russian language skills, as well as enormous 

investments in research and development of unique production 

equipment, all supported by complex computer programs. The 

concerted effort from the three military organizations to create 

an accurate geodetic database largely from NRO satellite 

imagery led to changes in the organizational structure of the 

U.S. military mapmaking organizations. The consolidation 

of the three mapping agencies, first begun as early as the 

1970s, would eventually produce today’s National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA).
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STEALTH AIRCRAFT

BANDITS IN THE NIGHT

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, two F-117A 

Nighthawk stealth fighters each dropped single 2,000-pound 

Mark 84 bombs onto Rio Hato Airfield, 120 km southwest 

of Panama City, in the opening hours of the U.S. invasion of 

Panama. This was the first use of stealth aircraft in combat, 

six years after the F-117A was declared operational, and 

more than a decade since the decision had been made to 

build the world’s first stealth combat aircraft. However, that 

decision would never have been made had it not been for 

significant advances in stealth technology developed by 

Lockheed Martin and the NRO.

TRYING TO HIDE THE U-2

In 1956, despite assurances from his senior intelligence 

advisors that the U-2 would be virtually undetectable to 

the Soviets, President Eisenhower was upset when he 

learned that Soviet early warning radars had tracked the 

first U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. Eisenhower ordered a 

temporary halt to U-2 flights, and designers got busy trying 

to find ways to reduce the radar cross section (RCS) of the 

U-2 airframe. Later that year, engineers installed fiberglass 

rods to the non-moving parts of the wings and surrounded 

the airframe with a small-gauge wire with precisely spaced 

ferrite beads. The wire and beads were supposed to capture 

incoming 70-MHz radar pulses and either trap them in the 

loop or weaken them so much that they would not register as 

a valid radar return. A second approach, tested in early 1958, 

involved the use of plastic material containing a printed 

circuit designed to absorb radar pulses in the 65- to 85-MHz 

range glued to outside parts of the fuselage. Although these 

approaches had some success, they did not protect against 

radars outside of that narrow range of frequencies. More 

importantly, they degraded the performance of the aircraft, 

forcing it to fly at a lower altitude and even causing some 

engine problems, one of which resulted in the death of a 

Lockheed test pilot. However, the concepts were not lost, and 

the idea of adding radar-absorbing material to the outside of 

the aircraft’s fuselage proved to be an effective strategy used 

later with the F-117A and many future stealth aircraft.

SHIELDING THE OXCART

In late 1957, an advisory committee selected to choose a 

design for a replacement of the U-2 was formed by Dr. 

Richard Bissell, the CIA’s U-2 project manager and soon-tobe co-Director of NRO. In contrast to the U-2, design of the 

A-12 centered as much on a minimal RCS as it did on aircraft 

performance. Over the next two years, Lockheed and Convair 

submitted proposal after proposal, but all were rejected. 

In August 1959, the committee finally chose the latest 

Lockheed design (the A-12), based as much on Lockheed’s 

history with the U-2 program, as on their design of the A-12. 

However, the committee was still not happy with the level of 

RCS exposure in the proposed design and required Lockheed 

to reduce it even further before a full contract was awarded.

Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, the Lockheed mastermind 

behind the U-2 and A-12 designs, incorporated several 

ingenious technologies to reduce the RCS of the A-12, such 

as a continuously curving airframe, a fore-body with tightly 

U-2

SR-71

D-21 A-
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

slanted edges called chines, engine housings (nacelles) 

located mid-wing, canted rudders, and nonmetallic parts. 

A cesium fuel additive was added to reduce the radar 

detectability of the afterburner plume. To reduce radar 

reflections, the two canted rudders were fabricated from 

laminated nonmetallic materials—the first time these 

materials were used to build an aircraft. Later, the production 

aircraft was painted with a radar-absorbent coating of ferrite 

particles in a plastic binder. There was little difference in the 

RCS design between the A-12 and SR-71, other than the 

SR-71 was larger with a more prominent nose and body 

chines. However, while the SR-71 was larger and presented 

a bigger radar target, it also carried a number of electronic 

countermeasure systems that the A-12 did not have, which 

greatly enhanced SR-71 electronic defenses. 

D-21 DRONE

Began in the early 1960s by NRO’s Program D, the D-21 was 

a ramjet-powered pilot-less drone designed to be launched 

from the back of a modified A-12 and fly even higher and faster 

than the A-12. After a fateful accident involving one of the 

modified A-12s, the design was altered to be launched from 

under the wing of a modified B-52, which was less dangerous 

to the carrier aircraft. The D-21 drone incorporated many 

design features of the A-12, including the use of non-metallic 

components and insulated fuel propulsion parts to help 

reduce infrared detection. However, after several test flight 

failures and the drone’s mission becoming less essential, the 

program was cancelled in 1971. 

LONG-TERM BENEFITS

Although much of the work that NRO and Lockheed carried 

out in the 1960s saw few operational results, it was not 

wasted effort. Although the A-12 was identified and fired at a 

few times over North Vietnam in its short operational history, 

it did successfully complete some missions where it was not 

detected. More importantly, the seeds of research that the 

engineers planted in the 1960s finally bloomed in the 1980s, 

when many of their designs were successfully incorporated 

into the world’s first stealth combat aircraft. Today’s stealth 

aircraft continue to utilize the ideas of advanced structural 

designs, composite components, radar absorbent paints, and 

diffused exhaust vents. Even the Space Shuttle applied the 

concept of heat absorbing tiles to diffuse the intense heat 

of re-entry which, while not a stealth concept, originated 

from the idea of applying radar-absorbing materials to an 

aircraft. As with many NRO scientific breakthroughs, many of 

these design elements are still being utilized today, long after 

the mission they were designed for has ended, to benefit 

additional NRO programs, U.S. national security, and the 

American people.
INNOVATIONS

COMMERCIAL

APPLICATIONS

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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

BATTERY DEVELOPMENT

EARLY BATTERY TECHNOLOGY

At the turn of the 20th century, batteries first emerged as a 

source of energy to power new tools and devices invented 

in the early industrial era. Alkaline electrolyte batteries 

promised early commercial application. By the 1930s and 

1940s new alkaline batteries such as zinc–silver oxide 

and zinc–mercuric oxide alkaline batteries significantly 

improved battery performance. In the latter half of the 

20th century, new advances and materials resulted in 

smaller and more powerful batteries for use in portable 

equipment. The more recent development of batteries 

using lithium, nickel-hydrogen, and nickel–metal hydride 

have opened new applications in commercial markets such 

as electric vehicles, cell phones, and computers, as well as 

applications in spacecraft.

ORIGINS OF POWERED SATELLITES

Science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke may have been the 

first to propose the basic idea of a satellite and its varied 

uses. Even before World War II was over, Clarke speculated 

how one might use the German V-2 as a satellite launch 

vehicle. In the February 1945 edition of Wireless World 

Clarke wrote,

A rocket which can reach a speed of 8 km/sec 

parallel to the earth’s surface would continue to 

circle it forever in a closed orbit; it would become an 

‘artificial satellite’.... It would thus be possible to have 

a hundred-weight of instruments circling the earth 

perpetually outside the limits of the atmosphere and 

broadcasting information as long as the batteries 

lasted. Since the rocket would be in brilliant sunshine 

for half the time, the operating period might be 

indefinitely prolonged by the use of thermocouples 

and photo-electronic elements. 

Clarke anticipated the idea of using geosynchronous 

satellites for receiving and retransmitting radio signals 

from space—the basic concept for both a communications 

satellite and a satellite for collecting Sigint. He observed that 

An ‘artificial satellite’ at the correct distance from 

the earth would make one revolution every 24 hours; 

i.e., it would remain stationary above the same spot 

and would be within optical range of nearly half the 

earth’s surface. Three repeater stations, 120 degrees 

apart in the correct orbit, could give television and 

microwave coverage to the entire planet.

NiH2 Batt
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

BATTERY USE IN SATELLITES

Long-time battery manufacturer Saft explains, 

On satellites, batteries are used to provide power at 

“night,” when the satellite passes behind the Earth and 

is no longer illuminated by the Sun. In the “day” phase, 

energy is produced by solar panels, which recharge 

the batteries. Using the power of the sun in this way 

is very important because it gives the batteries a long 

operating life. Batteries designed for space must meet 

a unique set of demands: they must be reliable, have 

an operating life of more than 20 years, and be able 

to withstand extreme temperatures and radiation. 

They must also be strong enough to survive launch 

vibrations, landing impact, and other physical shocks.

Early NRO satellites had relatively short design lives of a 

few days’ or weeks’ duration. This allowed the satellites to 

carry batteries that sustained the mission of the satellite. As 

NRO satellites became more sophisticated, they required 

rechargeable battery systems, frequently relying on solar 

cells to recharge the battery. Low earth orbit satellites are 

shadowed by the Earth requiring battery power. Satellites 

in other orbits also experience “eclipse periods” requiring 

battery power. 

As with all satellites, batteries for NRO satellites are 

designed considering a number of factors including 

battery capacity and voltage, discharge and charge rates, 

and methods of charging. Launch stresses and the space 

operational environment present a number of factors 

for battery design including temperature fluctuations, 

vibration, and shock stresses. 

NRO INVESTMENT IN BATTERY TECHNOLOGY

The NRO has done research on many space power storage 

and control projects through the years. Nickel-cadmium 

(NiCd) space batteries, which had been the standard for 

many years, largely moved to nickel-hydrogen (NiH2) 

batteries because of pioneering work by the NRO. The 

NiH2 single pressure vessel (SPV) battery was developed 

at Johnson Controls by the NRO. This battery was also used 

widely on commercial spacecraft, including IRIDIUM for 

example. Additionally, the NRO has supported research 

on NiMH (Nickel Metal Hydride) batteries for space 

application. The NRO has supported development of 

Lithium technology batteries for use in space applications 

that are used widely in everything from cellular phones to 

other computing devices.
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CELLPHONE DEVELOPMENT

COMMUNICATING ON THE GO

Occasionally an older movie will show a scene where an 

actor is in a car and picks up a telephone handset—similar 

to what would have been in homes and offices at the time—

and speaks to another person. These early communication 

devices were not cell phones; instead they were powerful 

two way radios often used by first responders and fleets such 

as taxi services. They are known as 0G or Zero Generation 

mobile networks. The first generation developed using 

cellular technology or towers that covered a geographic 

area close enough to another coverage area—or cell—that 

the signal could be handed from one cell to the next during 

travel. By the end of the 1970s, the first mobile cellular 

network appeared in Japan, followed by European and U.S. 

cellular networks in the early to mid-1980s. These 1G or 

first generation cell phones worked on limited analog signal 

networks and were very costly. 

By the early 1990s, cellular companies began constructing 

networks using digital signals. European providers 

developed the Global System for Mobile Communications 

or GSM standard. The use of a common standard marked 

the beginning of the 2G era. By the mid-1990s, Qualcomm 

offered Code Division Multiple Access or CDMA as a 

communication standard that offered more efficient use 

of cellular bandwidth. Roughly a decade later, providers 

upgraded their systems to 3G standards that enabled not 

only communication using cell phones, but early availability 

of information search and retrieval. By the end of the 

2000s, 4G technology enabled greater access to the World 

Wide Web necessitated by growing use of the internet for 

multiple activities and services. And then a decade later, 5G 

technology promised more capacity and speed for cellular 

users who are highly dependent upon mobile devices for 

communication, social interaction, and commerce.

SMARTPHONES BECOME ESSENTIAL 

Recognizing that technology enabled mobile devices to do 

more than allow users to call and text, engineers developed 

phones that could carry out a number of additional functions. 

An IBM engineer developed the first such device, the Simon 

Personal Communicator, sold by BellSouth beginning in 1994. 

At the same time cell phones were emerging as consumer 

products; companies like Palm Inc. created Personal Digital 

Assistants that allowed users to maintain calendars, address 

books, To Do lists, and other functions for life at home and 

at the office. Finally, companies like Apple developed digital 

products like the iPod for storing and playing music and 

other media.

Mobile device manufacturers recognized the benefits of 

combining the functions of cellphones, PDAs, and portable 

media players into a single device. The earliest of these 

products were developed by companies such as Nokia and 

Ericsson who dominated the manufacturing of cellphones 

in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The introduction of 

1980s Cellphone Palm Pilot
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

3G technology fueled the development of such devices. 

Research in Motion introduced their Blackberry mobile 

device in 2002 that allowed users to email, send wireless 

faxes, and browse the internet. Blackberry would evolve as 

the dominant device for such purposes in the 2000s. 

In 2007, Apple Corporation’s Steve Jobs introduced the first 

Apple iPhone that redefined mobile devices. The iPhone had 

a touchscreen, eliminating physical keyboards used by other 

devices. It also included a camera for taking photographs, 

music storage and playback, and personal planning 

capabilities found in other mobile devices. Shortly after the 

release of the iPhone, Apple unveiled the App Store where 

users could purchase applications for use on their devices. 

Apple would continue to refine the iPhone series, making it 

one of the dominant manufacturers of smartphones today. 

Other companies recognized that mobile devices would 

become essential to everyday lives of consumers. In 2003, 

software engineers established the Android Corporation 

for developing an operating system for mobile devices. 

After struggling, Google purchased the company in 2005, 

forming the foundation for Google to enter the mobile 

device marketplace. Using the open source Linux operating 

system as the foundation, Google released the Android 

mobile operating system in 2007 for use by cell phone 

manufacturers, with the first commercial device using the 

system released in 2008. Unlike Apple, Android did not 

initially release its own hardware, only doing so in 2011. 

Although consumers were slow to adopt Android in the 

early years, the operating system became dominant within 

a decade. Others who developed mobile operating systems 

prior to Android, such as Microsoft and Research in Motion, 

ceased developing their systems in favor of Google’s Android. 

THE NRO AND CELLPHONE TECHNOLOGY

Today’s cellphone is more than a device to make calls on 

the go. It is a navigation device, camera, media player, 

productivity device, research device, activity tracker, multiplatform communication device, and much more. The NRO 

has nurtured many of the technologies that are integrated 

into the cellphone. Because of intelligence needs, the NRO 

was an early developer of databases and technology to 

locate objects and locations on Earth with precision. The NRO 

invested in the development of high density batteries that 

could be recharged multiple times. The organization pursued 

the development of signals that could carry information in a 

more efficient manor to enhance use of available bandwidth. 

The NRO developed a major digital camera system for use in 

space that fundamentally altered the capture, processing, 

and use of digital images. Recognizing that touchscreen 

technology enhances the use of technology products, the 

NRO invested in early development of touchscreens. These 

and other investments have spurred along an industrial 

base that continues to refine consumer products like the 

smartphone—altering the way people go on about their 

daily lives. 
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CHARGE-COUPLED DEVICE

HUMAN QUEST FOR IMAGERY

From their earliest days, humans have captured images of their 

world as they knew it. Early in 2021, archeologists announced 

that they had identified the oldest drawing to date in a cave on 

the remote Indonesian island of Sulawesi. The image was first 

found by a doctoral student in 2017 and dated back to 45,500 

years ago. The image was a life-sized picture of a pig.

In the millennia since, human imaging has progressed from 

drawings and carvings largely preserved in caves to paintings, 

portraits, and photographs housed in museum galleries. In 

accordance with this progression, those who create images 

have developed tools that increased the complexity and 

accurate capture of the image’s subject. Sophisticated and 

advanced satellite imagery has been a direct beneficiary of 

human progress in image capture.

ORIGINS OF PHOTOGRAPHY

Most discussions of the origin of photography acknowledge 

that the word is derived from the Greek photos or light, and

graphein or to draw. The origins of capturing images reside 

in early efforts to cast light to produce images. For instance, 

the use of a camera obscura to cast an image from outside a 

room onto a wall inside the room using a small hole or lens can 

possibly be traced back more than two millennia. Early efforts 

in using materials to capture images such as Heinrich Schulze 

using salts and sunlight or Nicephore Niepce using bitumen 

and lavender oil to copy drawings are examples.

Louis-Jacques-Mande Daguerre, collaborating with Niepce, 

created the first images that would be recognized as 

photographs. He created the daguerreotype by first discovering 

a process using iodized silver to capture an image on glass and 

then using a sodium solution to fix the image on the glass. 

Others such as Hercules Florence and William Henry Fox Talbot 

worked on processes to fix images to paper. 

By the mid-1800s, the daguerreotype became a global means 

for capturing and preserving images. Talbot continued to 

refine his efforts to preserve images on paper. Richard Leach 

Maddox developed a process for capturing images on a “dry 

plate” or one that used a gelatin mixture instead of liquid to 

capture images. By the end of the 19th century, photography 

became more common and convenient because of these 

advancements. 

Just prior to the turn of the 20th century, George Eastman 

invented first a paper-based film and then a celluloid film base. 

This, in conjunction with the Kodak cameras he developed, 

opened the world to widespread photography. The introduction 

of 35mm film for photography in the early 20th century further 

enhanced use of cameras by a wider segment of the world’s 

population—a trend that would continue until the end of the 

20th century. 

PHOTOGRAPHY FROM SPACE

During the early years of the Cold War between the United 

States and the Soviet Union, the U.S. faced great difficulty 

in understanding the actual military threat from the USSR. 

Because the Soviet Union closed its borders and heavily 

controlled movements of foreign nationals who visited, the 

U.S. could not depend on human sources for intelligence. The 

1957 launch of the Soviets’ Sputnik satellite demonstrated 

launch capability that could be used to fire a nuclear-armed 

missile against the United States. 

In order to gain insight into Soviet military capabilities, the U.S. 

turned to developing technology for obtaining intelligence. A 

mainstay of this emerging capability was the development of 

satellites for collecting imagery using space-based cameras.
- 94 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

DIGITAL IMAGERY FROM SPACE

At the same time Boyle and Smith were developing the CCD, 

the National Reconnaissance Office was searching for a solution 

for obtaining crisis imagery. In the late 1960s, the Air Force 

program at the NRO proposed to scan the film on the Gambit 

vehicle before deorbiting it and transmitting those images back 

to Earth. The U.S. had attempted scan readout from space in 

the early 1960s, but the technology failed to work as needed. 

The NRO also explored the possibility of always having filmreturn systems ready to launch quickly to obtain crisis imagery. 

This approach was very costly.

Engineers and scientists in the CIA program at the NRO 

followed the developments in digital photography. They saw 

the emerging digital technology, such as photo transistors, 

photo diodes, and the CCD, as potential solutions for building 

a satellite optical system that could obtain imagery from 

space. The NRO established a new program office to develop 

an electrical optical satellite, known as Kennen, using one 

of these technologies. One bidder proposed using photo 

transistors while another proposed using photo diode arrays 

to capture digital images from space. Eventually the Kennen 

program leadership utilized the existing technology before 

later adoption of CCDs to improve imaging quality.

Back on Earth, CCDs would emerge by the early 1980s as a 

key technology for digital photography. Several companies 

worked on improvements to and commercial applications for 

CCDs. Fairchild Semiconductor developed by the mid-1970s a 

CCD for potential commercial use. Integrating that CCD, Kodak 

developed the first still camera in 1975. Kodak would wait 

nearly 20 years before introducing a commercial camera using 

CCDs. As the century turned, major camera manufacturers 

developed cameras to take digital images, many using the CCD. 

The NRO’s Kennen system first orbited in 1976. It opened 

a new era in imaging capture. By 1986, the NRO stopped 

using film return systems and became fully dependent upon 

digital imagery enabled by CCDs. Although at least a decade 

ahead of commercial CCD use, the NRO’s investment in CCD 

technology provided considerable resources for advancing 

digital image capture. The innovation of the NRO in image 

capture technology opened new possibilities for recording 

important events in human history—a human quest that goes 

back at least 45,000 years. 

In August 1960, the U.S. obtained its first imagery of the Soviet 

Union using a Corona photoreconnaissance satellite. Within 

months, the Corona satellites confirmed the U.S. maintained 

an advantage in the number of nuclear-armed intercontinental 

missiles. This opened up a critical source of intelligence for the 

United States.

The Corona satellite captured images on film. Once the film 

supply was exhausted, the captured images were returned to 

Earth in film return vehicles. Eastman Kodak processed the film 

at a special facility, providing the Central Intelligence Agency 

this new critical source of information. In 1963, the Gambit 

photoreconnaissance satellite joined Corona, taking highresolution images of specific areas identified from Corona’s 

broad area search capability. In 1971, the Corona system was 

further supplemented and later replaced by the film return 

Hexagon system that carried significantly more film and 

thereby had more capability.

CRISIS IMAGERY NEED

While Corona, Gambit, and Hexagon proved highly effective for 

obtaining insight into Soviet strategic weapons capabilities, they 

were less useful for managing U.S. responses to international 

crises. None of these systems were on-orbit continuously, 

and they could not be launched rapidly in response to a crisis. 

Additionally, the film from the systems was not returned 

for days or weeks, leaving them unable to provide timely 

intelligence.

The United States needed a new imaging technology for crisis 

imagery—one that was not available commercially. In 1969, 

two Bell Labs scientists, Willard Boyle and George Smith, were 

engaged in developing better computer memory by sequencing 

metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) capacitors. They found that 

radiation disrupted the MOS capacitors in series for memory, 

but their sensitivity to light radiation turned out to establish a 

basis for capturing a digital image. 

Boyle and Smith assembled the MOS array and discovered that 

the device was sensitive to light photons and that they could 

scan the electron charge taken up by the capacitors associated 

with light. By scanning this array, they could create a camera 

that produced digital images. By 1971, they produced a camera 

sensor using this approach, which became known as a chargecoupled device. The world now had a cutting-edge possibility 

for capturing digital images.
- 95 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

CHANGE DETECTION

CORONA BASELINE

In August 1960, the U.S.’s first successful photoreconnaissance 

satellite, Corona, opened new opportunities to visually detect 

changes in intelligence targets. Corona’s first intelligence image 

captured the USSR’s Mys Shmidta air base on the extreme 

northeast coast of that large nation, just 400 miles distant from 

Nome, Alaska. The air base was one of a group constructed 

by the Soviets in 1954 for use by long-range bombers capable 

of nuclear attack on the United States. Understanding 

developments and changes at Mys Shmidta and other airbases 

was critical to assess the USSR’s advancements in nuclear firststrike capabilities. 

With the establishment of the NRO in 1961, the United States 

continued to develop more capable imagery systems, such 

as the Gambit high-resolution photoreconnaissance satellite 

that enhanced intelligence analysts’ ability to detect changes 

in locations such as Mys Shmidta. These earliest examples of 

change detection efforts, illustrate the new capability that 

emerged from the U.S.’s first successes in obtaining overhead 

intelligence.

THE MYSTERY OF THE “CASPIAN SEA MONSTER”

Often imagery analysts would uncover objects captured by 

NRO satellites that had no immediate explanation. On one 

occasion, an analyst discovered a mysterious, large craft in 

an image of the Caspian Sea shoreline. It appeared to be 

an aircraft with stubbed wings, new to the Soviet arsenal. 

Intelligence nicknamed the craft the “Caspian Sea Monster,” 

and for many years, the NRO imaged this location to figure 

out what it was designed to do, using Corona and Gambit 

satellites, as well as Corona’s successor, Hexagon. 

After noting changes, analysts were able to conclude it was 

a large hydrofoil, a cross between a boat and plane designed 

by the Soviets to fly a few meters above the sea’s surface. It 

could carry massive numbers of men or amounts of material 

at nearly 300 miles an hour. For several years, it was the 

largest aircraft in the world. Applying change detection to 

the imagery allowed the U.S. to assess its capabilities and the 

threat it posed.

THE NRO AND MAMMOGRAPHY

In the 1990s, the medical community in the United States 

reached out to the National Reconnaissance Office with a 

critical question: Is there anything you are doing with space 

imagery that could improve mammography? Mr. Frank 

Calvelli, who went on to serve as the NRO’s Principal Deputy 

Director, provided a presentation at a 1994 conference on 

new frontiers in breast cancer imagery and early detection. 

In his briefing, he explained that NRO technologies could 

improve mammography in the following areas:

• Change Detection 

• Automatic Target Recognition

• Soft Copy Exploitation Systems

• High Resolution Softcopy Displays

The same tools that helped us understand over time Mys 

Shmidta and the Caspian Sea monster could be shared with 

the medical community. The sharing of this toolbox improved 

the quality of mammography and, as a consequence, has 

helped in the fight against breast cancer.

Caspian Sea Monster
- 96 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

COMMUNICATIONS

In 1961, the NRO was formed as one of the most secret and 

compartmented programs in the entire U.S. Government. 

But how does an organization that requires a verified needto-know before you even learn its name communicate 

between offices located across the country using 1960s’ 

technology? It required a small, highly capable, innovative 

cabal of communicators with the money and priority to 

create evolutionary breakthroughs, while hiding in the 

shadows, even from people who thought they were cleared 

for the nation’s highest secrets.

SMALL TEAM, BIG JOB

When the NRO was created, it consisted of personnel in three 

different states and Washington, D.C., and with personnel 

at several different locations within those states. The job of 

getting all those personnel to work together for a common 

mission was the responsibility of the NRO Director and the 

NRO Staff, located in an unmarked suite (Room 4C-1000) in 

the Pentagon. The 44-person NRO Staff had a squad-sized 

communications team whose responsibility was to ensure 

that all the various programs and detachments could 

communicate with each other, regardless if they worked on 

another floor or in a different state.

The line organization began as a 12-person detachment 

commanded by an Air Force captain but eventually evolved 

into Squadrons, Groups, and finally into a single Air Force 

Communications Wing of over 1,000 military and contractor 

personnel, with a substantial operating budget. It developed 

and fielded leading edge advances in secure voice and 

message handling, facsimile capabilities, and secure tactical 

dissemination systems. It also enabled the NRO to be the 

earliest national security adopter of commercial long-line 

services and at the forefront in the secure application of 

new digital applications, internet services, and email. Many 

of these NRO-led capabilities were subsequently adopted 

by the DoD and other government organizations, such 

as the White House Communications Agency, the State 

Department, and other government agencies.

WHAT’S A FAX MACHINE? 

The initial 4C-1000 communications team of 12 Air Force 

communicators operated a special communications center, 

providing classified and unclassified communications services. 

Initially, the NRO relied on messages sent by teletype from 

communications center to communications center. “Comm 

centers” were established at Byeman facilities. The key 

component of the NRO Communications infrastructure during 

this period was the Special Operations Communications 

network or SOCOM. It was based on the standard Air Force 

hard-copy messaging system but with unique security keying 

for the NRO. Secure voice communications were serviced by 

the DoD’s Automatic Secure Voice Communications network 

(AUTOSEVOCOM). Facsimile was connected through the 

secure voice line to provide very low-rate but secure support, 

particularly for small facilities not serviced by SOCOM.

Teletype Machine Fax Machine STU-II Secure Phone
- 97 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

In the mid- to late 1970s, NRO communicators worked closely 

with NSA to help fund and expedite the development of 

advanced technology devices, such as the Secure Telephone 

Unit (STU)-I and STU-II. They also contracted for development 

of new lightweight fax machines to operate with the STU 

devices to provide improved capability. The combination 

of secure voice and secure facsimile provided essential 

communications capability to smaller contractors and 

NRO outposts, as well as the ability to establish temporary 

operating sites.

One of the major accomplishments during this period was 

the development and stand-up of the Defense Dissemination 

System (DDS), which enabled near real-time imagery to 

flow to operational users worldwide. A new dedicated 

squadron that was established to support this effort included 

operational testing, as well as 24-hour-a-day operations.

MOVING TO THE FUTURE

The 1980s was the beginning of a revolution in 

communications, and the NRO was at the forefront in 

adopting new technologies. NRO communicators were early 

adopters of new high-speed long lines and satellite links 

that were becoming commercially available. They pioneered 

the development and installation of a high speed, totally 

integrated digital switch. This was the first operational 

CONUS-wide digital switch within the government that 

integrated both secure voice and computer data traffic, and 

it served thousands of subscribers.

They adapted the secure red phone system, then in use 

by the NRO and based initially on STU-II and then STU-III 

technology, to the much higher bandwidths enabled by the 

broadband lines and digital switches to provide a greatly 

improved secure voice and facsimile capability for the NRO. 

By the mid-1980s, the requirement for NRO secure 

tactical communications had grown to the point that 

field users wanted more and quicker data services. The 

NRO communications team developed and fielded a 

highly portable, lightweight satellite terminal that would 

operate on the Defense Satellite Communications System 

(DSCS). This was a huge success and was adopted for use 

by the White House Communications Agency and also, in 

different variants, by the Services, the Unified and Specified 

commands, and the commercial communication satellites 

used by news organizations.

The NRO started beta testing secure email in the mid1980s. At first, it was hosted as an application on the 

SOCOM computers, so it was limited to sites that hosted a 

SOCOM relay. Users accessed their email account via remote 

computer terminals hard-wired to SOCOM computers. As 

the commercial markets grew, the email applications were 

ported to desktop computers by 1990.

Today, the Communications Systems Directorate (COMM) 

provides end-to-end secure IT and transport services 

throughout the NRO enterprise and to foreign mission 

partners. Using state-of-the-art technology to provide 

satellite communications and internal cyber capabilities, 

COMM works with all NRO directorates and across all 

missions to protect and advance the strategic advantage 

that overhead reconnaissance provides for the security of 

our nation and allies.

You’ve Got 

Mail!
- 98 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

LIGHT WEIGHT FILM

When the CIA began developing the U-2 reconnaissance 

aircraft in the mid-1950s, it needed a supplier of aircraft film 

that could meet its needs while keeping the whole process 

secret. So in 1955, the CIA approached Dr. Albert Chapman, 

president of the nation’s leading film producer, the Eastman 

Kodak Company. Realizing the importance of the request 

and foreseeing a lucrative potential relationship, Chapman 

quickly persuaded the Kodak board of directors to agree 

to work with the Agency, beginning a more than 40-year 

relationship that would outlast the Cold War.

Aerial reconnaissance is almost as old as the airplane itself. 

Yet in the 1950s, the technology was not very advanced, up 

until then, most requirements were simply to identify large 

objects (industries, bombing targets, armies on the move, 

etc.) But the mission of the U-2 was much different, and the 

limitations imposed on the aircraft’s sensors were much more 

stringent. Kodak would have to come up with revolutionary 

new ideas to provide the needed film for the U-2’s cameras.

By the U-2’s first operational flight in June 1960, the company 

had developed the revolutionary Kodak Special Plus X Aerial 

Aerographic film on .0052-inch (5.2 mil) acetate base. This 

film was significantly lighter than most aerial films at that 

time and helped Lockheed save the weight necessary to 

reach their target altitude of 70,000+ feet.

THE MOVE TO SPACE

When planning was initiated for the move to space with the 

first photoreconnaissance satellite, Corona, the government 

again turned to Kodak. During testing, it became apparent 

that the production process used for the Kodak aerial film 

was incompatible with a space environment, and the acetate 

base lost structural integrity. Aware of a new material 

invented by DuPont called polyethylene terephthalate (PET), 

or Mylar, Kodak purchased a licensing agreement from 

DuPont to permit Kodak to manufacture the PET with the 

provision that Kodak limit its use to films in photographic 

applications. Kodak called its new film base “ESTAR.”

The ESTAR base was both compatible with a space 

environment as well as being significantly thinner than their 

previous acetate base. Measuring just .004 inches (4 mils)-

thick, the ESTAR base allowed Kodak to produce smaller and 

lighter rolls of film to meet the strict size/weight limitations 

needed for space flight. The world’s first photoreconnaissance 

satellite, Discoverer (Corona) XIV, flew on 18 August 1960, 

and carried a film load limited to ten pounds of 70mm-wide 

SO-102 film (approximately 3000 feet).

While they originally produced ESTAR base with a thickness 

of just 4 mils, there was the potential for producing even 

thinner film bases. As manufacturing techniques improved, it 

became possible to reduce the ESTAR base thickness to .0025 

inches (2.5 mils), identified as ESTAR Thin Base film. Because 

the thinner base permitted a larger film payload for the same 

weight, all Corona flights after 1962 used this ESTAR Thin 

Base film.
- 99 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

By the late 1960s when Gambit was launching and Hexagon 

was under development, technological improvements 

allowed Kodak to produce even thinner films, the .0015-inch 

(1.5 mil) ESTAR, known as ESTAR Ultra-Thin Base (UTB) and 

the 1.2 mil ESTAR, known as ESTAR Ultra-Ultra-Thin Base 

(UUTB). Both of these film types flew on both Gambit and 

Hexagon flights. By the end of the Hexagon program, fully 

loaded Hexagon satellites were launched carrying 320,000 

feet of film, more than 100 times the film load of that first 

Corona satellite, just 25 years earlier.

THE WORKFORCE

In the early days of the U-2 program, the core production 

operation in Kodak’s Bridgehead program was comprised 

of approximately 50 highly trained operators, technicians, 

and engineers. In the 1960s, as the Corona program came 

on-line and the scope of production support became better 

defined, staffing grew to 100-130 personnel. By 1975, the 

total complement of all Bridgehead operations and support 

reached its highest level of 535 personnel. Despite all of 

that, there were no known security breaches about Kodak 

involvement in the U.S. film return satellite infrastructure 

throughout the program, and Kodak’s involvement did not 

become public knowledge until the Corona program was 

declassified in 1995.
- 100 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

LIGHT WEIGHT OPTICS

In mid-1963, about the time of the first Gambit satellite launch, 

the need for even higher photo resolution than that provided by 

the country’s first high-resolution reconnaissance satellite was 

emerging. Intelligence analysts and engineers began to envision 

the benefits of better resolution than even the new Gambit 

systems could provide. However, engineering considerations 

with the original Gambit satellites hampered some basic areas 

for improvement. From a photographic payload point of view, 

the original Gambit configuration was non-optimal in a number 

of ways: redundant structural elements, thermal management 

subsystems, and power-distribution gear consumed more than 

their fair share of space and weight. These duplicated systems 

were crowding out possible growth elements such as larger 

optics, more film, and other life-extending expendables. The 

new Gambit-3 (aka Gambit-cubed) system was born out of these 

considerations. In terms of optics, those proposed for Gambit-3 

were to be larger and lighter than any previously built for space 

use. The primary mirror was 44 inches in diameter, and the 

stereo mirror was a 58-inch by 46-inch ellipse. These optics 

were larger than those of many terrestrial telescopes, but they 

were required to be much lighter in weight, with optical figure 

accuracy at least as demanding. 

BLANK MIRROR ASSEMBLY

The initial step in the production of light weight optics was to 

assemble the primary and stereo mirrors as “blanks” (unground 

and unpolished mirrors) with their support structure. The blanks 

were manufactured by the Corning Glass Company for Eastman 

Kodak. Using large boules of very pure fused (amorphous) silica 

glass, face and back plates were cut, as were the interior pieces, 

which were thin, notched, quasi-rectangular plates joined in 

an “egg-crate” fashion. The mirrors were assembled with the 

back plate supporting the egg-crate section, surrounded by side 

plates, with the to-be-finished face plate on top. This assembly 

was then placed in a large furnace where it was heated just to 

the melting point of silica, at which point the various pieces 

were fused to each other. The fusion operation was delicate: 

heating for too long or at too high a temperature would make 

the intended structure a partially molten blob, while too low a 

temperature or too short a time would prevent the parts from 

fusing sufficiently to provide structural integrity. After the fusion 

step, various tests were conducted to determine the percent of 

intended fusion that had actually taken place and to establish 

the geometry of any voids. After some early failures, these large, 

lightweight blanks were successfully manufactured by Corning 

and shipped to Eastman Kodak for figuring and polishing.

MIRROR POLISHING

To perform the polishing work, Eastman Kodak prepared a 

special facility where new, large grinding and polishing machines 

were built. Well-proven techniques were used, and success was 

largely a question of scale, as well as proper concern for the fact 

that the structure being ground and polished was more delicate 

than the usual piece of solid glass. An integral part of the 

figuring and polishing step was the need for repeated testing 

to ensure achievement of the desired optical figure. The optical 

figure-error budget required that the spherical primary and flat 

stereo mirrors be accurate to a root-mean-square value of onethirtieth of the wavelength of light, as well as a peak-to-peak 

value of the same magnitude. The grinding and polishing process 

was initially fraught with difficulties, chief of which was the 

excessive time that it took to complete each mirror to get to the 

desired accuracy. Eastman Kodak originally estimated that each 

mirror would require about 800 hours of grinding, polishing, 

testing, and coating from the raw blank to the finished product. 

However, the process ran as high as 3,000 hours per mirror and 

initially put the system behind schedule. Eventually, Eastman 

Kodak was able to reduce the production time, and the program 

was back on track. By 1964, Eastman Kodak had progressed to 

where it had developed sound techniques for manufacturing 

the large, but lightweight optics. The first Gambit-3 launched in 

1966 and provided image resolution about twice as good as the 

original Gambit systems.

GAMBIT-3 CONFIGURATION

Kodak Facility
Kodak - Bridgehead IDEX

- 101 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

PROCESSING OF LARGE DATASETS

MISSION IMPERATIVE

The NRO has been on the cutting edge of processing data and 

finding new solutions to handle large capacity datasets since 

its inception in the early 1960s. From recording telemetry 

data onto magnetic tapes, to processing of film returned 

from space, to today’s processing of near real-time data, a 

massive amount of data pours into the NRO every day. The 

structuring and dissemination of large datasets is critical. To 

meet this challenge, the NRO utilizes integrated architecture 

that brings together data from all sensors in ways that refine 

products, streamline delivery, and create more value-added 

content for policymakers, analysts, warfighters, and other 

mission partners. 

EARLY DATA ACQUISITION

Processing large datasets originated from data acquisition of 

early electronic intelligence search and technical collection 

satellites GRAB and Poppy. These Elint satellites targeted 

the Soviet Union’s air defenses using radar pulse signals in 

specified bandwidths, and they transmitted corresponding 

signals to radio receiving and control ground huts within 

their fields of view. Cryptologic elements of the Army, Navy, 

and Air Force then coded, converted, and recorded this 

radio telemetry data onto magnetic tapes. Couriers carried 

magnetic tape recordings back to the Naval Research 

Laboratory, where technicians evaluated, duplicated, and 

forwarded the data to National Security Agency and the 

Air Force Strategic Air Command for analysis and further 

processing.

Advances in Elint satellite technology increased the volume 

and density of radar intercept data, overwhelming thenexisting analytical capabilities. This stimulated development 

of computer-aided approaches at the NSA, NRL, and SAC. 

Such innovations led to increased volume, accuracy, and 

timeliness of reports on weapons systems. Intelligence 

collected from early Elint satellites supported a wide range 

of intelligence applications, helping the U.S. win the Cold 

War and laying the foundation for future Sigint and Geoint 

reconnaissance capabilities. 

EXPLOITATION AND DISSEMINATION

NRO launched a series of successful film-recovery 

photoreconnaissance satellites—Corona, Gambit, and 

Hexagon—in the 1960s and 70s. Corona alone collected 

more than 860,000 images of the Earth’s surface between 

1960 and 1972, and Gambit and Hexagon were even more 

prolific. These satellite systems acquired photographs with 

telescopic camera systems and loaded the exposed film 

into recovery capsules. The exposed film was delivered to 

Kodak/Bridgehead for image processing and on to photointerpretation analysts for evaluation. NRO partnered with 

Kodak/Bridgehead to manage the high volume of imagery 

collected, which led to innovations in improved black and 

white film processing techniques and advances in duplicating 

the original film negatives for exploitation and analysis. 

These images were used for reconnaissance and to produce 

maps for U.S. intelligence agencies. The success of these 

satellite programs created an appetite and dependency 

on satellite photoreconnaissance and led to a desire for 

increased volume and quality, as well as decreased time to 

receive imagery. In the film return era, it could take up to 

several weeks between target acquisition and exploitation of 

the imagery by the Intelligence Community.
- 102 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

ADVANCES IN SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY INCREASE 

DATA COLLECTION AND PROCESSING

Enter Kennen, the world’s first high-resolution electro-optical 

satellite. Launched in 1976, Kennen made imagery available 

to analysts so quickly the process is called “near real-time.” 

Unlike film-return systems, Kennen electronically down-linked 

its imagery in near real-time, providing a relatively steady 

stream of digital imagery to analysts after collection and 

processing. The NRO created from whole cloth new processes 

and infrastructure to process this new type of imagery. 

As NRO’s satellites became more sophisticated, the 

data stream grew in velocity, volume, and variety, and 

it overwhelmed established capabilities to process and 

disseminate information. Data acquisition became more 

critical, and the equipment needed to evolve to perform 

advance manipulation of this data. New techniques were 

developed to turn digital data into imagery for exploitation 

in support of intelligence analysis. The imagery needed to be 

processed, searched, retrieved, disseminated, and achieved 

in ways that had not been possible before. This required 

moving beyond the use of more traditional light tables to new 

technology. 

During this same period, supercomputing capabilities were 

emerging in the United States. New computing technology 

provided greater efficacy in running complex simulations and 

mining unrelated large datasets allowing for more analysis 

and less searching. The NRO was able to leverage cutting edge 

computing technologies to meet the challenge of maximizing 

the exponential growth in imagery data collection from the 

Kennen program. 

LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR DATA SCIENCE

Advancements in space reconnaissance programs 

presented numerous challenges to processing large 

datasets for faster transmission of timely intelligence to 

policymakers, intelligence consumers, and warfighters. 

Solutions were needed. In 2008, the NRO established the 

Ground Enterprise Directorate (GED) as an infrastructure to 

deliver big data automation, speed, machine learning, and 

advanced sense-making necessary to optimize the value 

of overhead intelligence. Through micro-second timing, 

near real-time relays and processing, raw data is converted 

by individual sensors and receivers into millions of usable 

intelligence products on a global basis every day. It is now 

routinely feasible for analysts and managers throughout 

the Intelligence and user Community to obtain, on demand, 

positive intelligence in response to immediate needs. 

Through such accomplishments, NRO helped to lay the 

foundation of what today is called “data science.” 

SUPPORT TO WARFIGHTERS

The speed at which the warfighter is able to collect, process, 

analyze, and understand data directly impacts mission 

success. By the 1980s, NRO’s improved technology applied 

in space and on Earth opened the way to using near realtime overhead intelligence for tactical support of military 

forces. With an expanding arsenal of sensing capabilities, 

multi-intelligence fusion methods, and a commitment to 

collaboration across communities, NRO systems and secure 

networks have ensured the timely delivery of accurate, 

insightful, life-saving intelligence (including real-time 

identification, detection, localization, and tracking of contacts 

of interest) to combat commands. 

One example is the use of displayed visualization of large 

volumes of multi-source data to detect changes that reflect 

patterns of human activity. These geospatial patterns, 

when temporally displayed, are not only valuable for 

military mission planning, but also for battlefield forensics. 

When the geospatial display, which can render millions of 

data elements, is given temporal motion (i.e., reflect the 

changes over time), trends emerge that suggest specific 

activities, such as communications patterns, that can 

explain battlefield activities. 

Millions of data elements from multi-intelligence Sources as 

temporally and geospatially displayed on an overhead Image. 

(Source: Unidentified overhead image; courtesy of CSNR 

Reference Collection.)
- 103 -

NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

SOLAR CELL TECHNOLOGY

THE SPACE RACE

After the October 1957 launch of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik 

satellite—its only purpose was to emit radio pulses to make 

its presence known to the world—the United States’ focus 

intensified on launching a satellite into space. In January 

1958, the U.S. successfully launched the Explorer satellite. 

The satellite’s payload carried a cosmic ray detection sensor 

to assess the radiation environment around the Earth, 

leading to confirmation of the Van Allen radiation belt 

theory. Both the Sputnik 1 and Explorer 1 satellites were 

powered by batteries. Sputnik operated for three weeks 

before its batteries discharged. The more elegantly designed 

Explorer satellite transmitted scientific data for nearly four 

months until its batteries discharged. 

POWER FOR LONGER MISSIONS

The United States recognized that a sustainable power 

source was necessary to carry out longer satellite missions—

one option being development of better batteries and the 

other incorporation of solar cells to power satellites. The 

U.S., and the NRO in particular, invested in both technologies 

to prolong on-orbit operations. 

The Naval Research Laboratory, out of which one of the 

NRO’s signals collection satellite programs would emerge, 

was the first organization to incorporate solar cells to power 

a satellite. NRL’s Vanguard satellite, launched in March 

1958, was designed to assess radiation effects on space 

vehicles and also use radio signals to provide geodesic 

information on the Earth. The satellite carried mercury 

batteries to power the satellite, but was also the first 

satellite to incorporate solar cells as a power source. The 

success of solar cells on the Vanguard I satellite prompted 

their use on other satellite vehicles.

FIRST SOLAR-POWERED RECONNAISSANCE 

SATELLITE 

In addition to developing the Vanguard satellites, the 

NRL undertook a classified signals collection satellite 

development program in the same timeframe. The project 

was called the Galactic Radiation and Background satellite or 

GRAB. To cover the true nature of the satellite, NRL indicated 

it would carry experimental sensors to better understand 

radiation in space. GRAB’s true purpose was to capture 

Soviet radar returns to better understand their air defenses. 

GRAB became the nation’s first successful operational 

reconnaissance satellite when it launched in June 1960.

Drawing on NRL’s early expertise in solar cell use in powering 

satellites, engineers designed GRAB to be powered by both 

batteries and solar cells. With the establishment of the NRO 

in 1961, the Kennedy administration included NRL’s signals 

collection satellite program in the new organization. As part 

of the NRO’s Program C, NRL engineers developed a followon satellite to GRAB named Poppy. Like the Vanguard and 

GRAB satellites, Program C satellite developers designed 

GRAB
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NRO INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATORS

the satellites to include solar cells for power. In a very 

innovative approach to using solar cells on a satellite, 

Program C engineers designed later Poppy satellites to be 

covered with solar cells on almost all of their exteriors. 

This later generation vehicle was known as the Multi-Faced 

Poppy satellite. 

EVOLUTION OF POWER FOR IMAGERY SATELLITES

By the 1960s, solar cells became a power source for most 

earth orbiting satellites and probes launched to better 

understand the solar system. The NRO’s early imagery 

satellites were powered by the Agena control vehicle 

carrying battery cells, later supplemented by solar cells. The 

Agena vehicle was originally designed as a boost vehicle for 

placing satellites into proper orbits. As used by the NRO, it 

not only served that purpose, but also served as an orbital 

control and support vehicle for the imagery optical payloads 

for both the Corona and Gambit systems. 

One of the significant limitations of both the Corona and 

Gambit systems was that they carried film supplies, and in 

early versions, only a single film return capsule. As a result, 

the missions ranged from a few days to a few weeks, at 

most, before the film was exposed and returned to Earth 

for processing and exploitation. Since the early Corona 

missions were short, battery power proved adequate for 

supporting early imagery collection satellites. With the 

development of dual return vehicles first on Corona and 

later on Gambit, the NRO’s satellites required a battery and 

solar-cell-powered Agena. 

The NRO’s CIA component, Program B, undertook an 

ambitious program in the mid-1960s to develop a large 

imagery satellite that could obtain imagery for several 

months. The program was named Hexagon, a satellite the 

size of a locomotive, carrying 60 miles of film, and four 

film-return capsules. To power the satellite and recharge 

its batteries, the Hexagon vehicle included two large solar 

arrays on the aft of the vehicle. The arrays incorporated 

state-of-the-art solar cells and provided the necessary 

power for the large satellite and its much longer mission 

life compared to the earlier photoreconnaissance satellites 

launched by the NRO. 

SOLAR CELL DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES

In 1976, the NRO launched the first Kennen imagery satellite, 

designed to obtain electro-optical images in near realtime. This advancement not only allowed for much longer 

mission operations for imagery satellites but also required 

sustainable power from solar cells while on orbit. As with 

developments in imagery collection capability, the NRO 

developed more advanced signals collection satellites that 

also required improved power sources. The NRO continued 

to invest in solar cell development to enable advances in 

satellite vehicles and their improved capabilities. 

In particular, the NRO pushed gallium arsenide (GaAs) 

solar cell development with multi-junctions and exotic 

layering of materials. These cells are now used extensively 

on commercial spacecraft. However, GaAs solar cells were 

more expensive to manufacture and are known to be more 

brittle than traditional silicon materials, and thus the panel 

materials when constructed have to be appropriately heavier 

– a downside in launching satellites. The NRO supported 

development of high-efficiency silicon solar cells resulting in 

efficiency improvements that reached 17% efficiency. Solar 

cell designs of these types are also prevalent now in the 

industry. Additionally the NRO supported development of 

indium phosphide (InP) solar cells, achieving 18% efficiency 

and more radiation hardening than with GaAs solar cells.

MULTI-FACED POPPY

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE

MAY 2023