DeCmEt 3
unmanned operational Capabilities, Wo official ection had been
29
taken on these vecommendations by the end of the month,

By the end of June the Snark construction program at Preaqie
Tele Air Force Base generally was proceeding on schedule although
it was doubtful if SAC would be able to provide much better than
World War IT’ type of facilities for the 2,572 persomel (210 officers,
2,088 enlisted and 2h) civilians) who wuld be stationed there,
Zerly in July, sac Published a new Programming plan which contained
the latest refined activation, treining, issile Production and
equipping schedules for the Snark Program. The mjor Snark facility
requirements were also listed, :

A commnication ‘from Headquarters USAF on 29 April resulted in
several adjustments in plans to Activate, transfer and Teorganize
Snark units, The essential changes wore sumarised and distributed
to all sac directorates early in May.

Flight test of Snark missiles continued during the first half of
1958 with at least one missile test conducted each month, The Shth and

mi Ourrtis B, LeMay td Gen Power 20 Feb 1958, Exhibit 93 Twx
Comdr 8th AF to ciwcsac 1/¢ 20763, 21° Jen 1958, Exhibit 10, 7

3+ TWX, CINCSAC to USAFIR KER Boston, COMPTROP 23, Presque Isle, Maine,
TECH SLL9, 7 May 1958, Exhibit 1s Interview, J. Van Staaveren, .
Historian, with Maj L, R, Harvey, D/Pine , Bq SAC, 8 dug 1958,

Sle SAC Programming Plan 17-58, *SM62 Program," 9 Jul 1958, Exhibit 12,

32. IE, DPL to all directorates, "SM-62 Program," 8 May 1958, Exhibit 13,

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“SECRET

Missile Wing effective 20 way. The 705th Wing had been
activated on 20 February at RaF station, Lakenheath, United King~
dom, and was Placed under the command of the Deputy Commander of
the Seventh Air Division,

Both Thor and Jupiter flight testing contimed during the
Teporting Period. Six Thr leunchings were made on the following
dates:

28 Jamary 23 April
28 Fe 4 June
19 april” 13 June

The test on 28 February was for the Purpose of testing a
General Electric Model IB nose Cone for seperation and re-entry.
It was only Partially successful as thé, nose cone was belatedly
released at atout 250,000 feet and impacted 15) HM down range,
TWo more successful Separation and re-entry teste were conducted
Sn i Yume and 13 June with the test on the latter date masking
the first successful re-entry of a General Electric Mark IT nose
8. GO 33, Hy SAC, 25 Jane 1958, Bxhinat 38.

86. a0 13, Hq SAC, 12 Mar 1958, Exhibit Dd.
87, F's, Missile Div, D/Ops to D/Com; “Monthly Strategic

Missile Report,® Feb thra Jul 1966; eaten Analyst,
Div, 1/Conpt, iq Sac. ° wet °


entire IREM Piogrem, in fact, was dependent upon the ability of
the United States to secure timely IREM agreements with Nato
members or other nations, This lack of diplomatic Progress had
Ceveloped into « formidable protien by the end of June,”

Uncertainty over tinely deploynents of TREM units was also
Smioed during the reporting period by oontimed slowioms in the
Planned Jupiter operational Program, Although Aray military
leadere, notably Lieutenant General Janes M. Gavin and Major
General John B, Medaris, fectified before the Senate Preparedness

subsequent weeks did not support their Confidence. A special
report preparéd by Major Generel Bernard A, Schriever, Conmegder
of the AFEMD, late in March, and forwarded by SAC MIXE to
CRWEAC, dhdicated that over one balf of the 10¢ configuration
Jupiter missiles scheduled for testing during CY 1958 would not be

The tntervi J. Van Staaveren, Historian with It Col 0, M, Htlie
stron, Cater, Future Weapons Section, 1» Bq SAC.

TS. Senate, ae pefere the Senate Eyeisreduess investigating
Sul 85, ess. Pp
DOs WOH, fied in ist Dy Archives dg °


SECRET

*
bases ont’ of the newly defined area would be considered
separately. The redefined boundary was still valid at the
end of June,

With respect to the Problem of ICBM site selection, a
considerable departure fron original siting concepts was sug
gested on 31 Jamary when CINCSAC asked his staff whether any
thought had been given to Placing ICBM squadrons on SAC tactical
bases as part of the SAC force, He proposed establishing a
squadron adjacent to a SAC base so as to not detract from
the dispersal concept, yet obtain the benefits of the existing
base support facilities. crncaacts suggestion led to a
staff study of the matter which concluded that a "single squadron
concept® might prove feasible for the ICEM program. It vas
approved ae meeting of the SAC Master Planning Board on I

Be
st and the State of Michigan north of ),2 degrees, 30 minutes
degrees west with the southern boundary extended by
m 39 degrees north = 11) degrees west intersection
degree north ~ 103 degree west intersection to the
degree north ~ 87 degree west intersection,

99+ | TWK, Hy USAF to ATIMAJOONS, APOOP STTSS, 7 Mar 1958, Bxhitst

100. DF, D/Pins to all Directorates, "Location of Strategic
* wasedle Units on BAC Bases, 3. Feb.1958, Exhibit kre

10l. DF, Programs Div, D/Pins to DB, Hq SAC, "Site Selection,"
1g Feb 1958, filed in D, » Hq SAC, .

SECRET


SEGHAH ‘
maintained for short periods of _TM however, thereby Providing
7
a temporary strategic advantage,

Four annexse to the Operational Plan contained detailed unit
manning documents, maintenance procedures, supply policies and
Procedures, unit activation and training schedule, and a missile
Production and equipment delivery schedule for the Snerk force.

Notwithstanding the decisions taken late in 1957 to establish
only a small Snark operational force, various pressures~ continued to
be exerted upon SAC snd USAP,to enlarge the Snark program, Hearings
by the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, which began in
November 1957 and continued through January 1958, indicated considerable
Congressional interest in the Snark weapon system for strategic purposes.
Although General Nathan F, Twining, Chairman of the JCS, General Thanas
D. White, Onief of Staff, Headquarters USAF, Mr. Donaid.A, Quarles, Deputy
Secretary of Defense and Mr. Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense,
variously testified that the reduced output of Snark missiles was due
% @ lack of funds and/or because the Snark weapon system had been
given a lower priority because of the more promising ICEM progrem, the
wisdom of this policy was sharply questioned by members of the Sub~
committees, Sendtors John Stennis of Mississippi and Prescott Bush of
Connecticut clearly indicated that ‘they considered the Snark to be a
very good intercontinental missile and asked the Defense Depar tae nt
officials to reappreise their decision to reduce Snark production,

4.



SECRET 2

for the test stations near Cooke ATS and in Hawaii and Alaska wore
completed by June, Early in June the Site Selection Board
formally approved the selection of Fort Stevens, Tongue Point, Oregon -
as the site for one of the three main stations to be established in
the continental United states Final. decisions on station sites
for the South Centrel and Northwest parts of the United States
were still pending, however, at the end of the month.

.

As has been indicated, the test flight phase of the ARS program
would witness the use of toth Thor and Atlas booster missiles. The
first Thor booster flight was scheduled to be leunched from Cocke
AFB late in 1958, and the first Atlas booster flight was scheduled
to be launched from the Air Force Missile Test Center, Florida by
xid-19592 A progressively stepped up series of flight tests was
planned. A functional mockup of the airframe of en ARS vehicle was
being developed during the reporting period by the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, the prime systems contractor for the ARS Prograns The
development program was divided into eight distinct phases.

——————

180. Ibid.

181. Mimtes of the M-l17L Site Selection Board, 11 Jun 1958,
tegic Missiles

3 .
Report,® 6 Jul 1958, filed in Mgt Analysis Div, Bq SAC.

1826 System 117L Program Status 15 Apr 1958, prep by
veep Se ree Calif flied in T/Pine, fq’ SAC,



245 seconds of flight the RASCAL attained a maximm altitade of
65,000 feet and impacted about 1,100 feet left of the target

Two subsequent launches proved unsuccessful and two others had to be
cancelled for various reasons. Carrier aircraft difficulties,

lack of tanker support, and a variety of missile maintenance dif-
ficulties hindered the ELST phase of the program. Headquarters

Second Air Force attributed the slippage in RAST activities

primarily to the unsatisfactory condition of the RASCAL missiles )
that were received. By the mickile of May, 27 of the 20 RASCE. i

missiles scheduled for the E&ST program remained to be launched.

By the end of the reporting period it had been determined by
the Air Proving Ground Commend at Eglin AFB, Florida that the ELST
phase of the RASCAL program should contime in Category IT in ace
cordance with a revised weapons testing criteria issued by Generel
Curtis E, LeMay, Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters USAF, on 7
April, (Under this criteria, Category I was primarily contractor
testing effort with contimous Air Force participation and
evaluation, Category II a joint contractor-aAir Fores effort during

138. Memo for Record, *GAM-63 Weapon Systen Phasing Group Meeting,®
26 Feb 1958, prep. by Missiles Br, Constr Div, DE, Hq SAC, -

139. Progress Report #1 on SAC Programming Plan 3-58, "DB-47/GAM~63
Integration Progrem (RASCAL)," 26 Feb 1958, Exhibit 57, Progress
Report #2 on SAC Pro; Plan 3-58, "DB-7/GsM-63 Integra~
tion Program (RASCAL), 1) May 1958, Exhibit 58, .

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SECRET

Chapter IT
ATR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE WEAPON SYSTEMS

As a result of an earlier decision, only one squadron of 3-7
airoraft was scheduled to be equipped with RASCAL aiz-to-surfece
missiles. By the end of 1957, considerable missile testing md
crew training activity was under way preparatory to phasing the
hkSth Bomb Squadron (M) of the 321st Bomb wing (M) at Pinecastle
aYB, Florida into the RASCAL progres,

Daring the reporting Period the planned operational date
for the ULSth Bomb Sqhadron (M) slipped three months, from
Septenber to December’ 1958, Primarily’ becaise of delays in
funding and constructing RASCAL facilities at Pinecastle AFB,
and because of usatiefactory progress in the Equipment and
guitability Testing (E&ST) phase of the RASCAL program.
Congressional approval of about $1,800,000 for RASCAL facilities
was obtained in February (although Headquarters USAF subsequently
authorised only $1,600,000 in expenditures), and a construction

132. Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, Chap TI, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC. : .

133. SAC Pro Flan 3-58, "DB-l7/GaM-63 Integration Progran
(RASCAL), 10 Jan 1958, Exhibit 56; Amendment No. 1, 28 Mar
1958 to SacoP 3-58, *hinal Game£3 (RASCAL) Operational Plan,®
12 Avg 1958, filed in Hist Div Archives, Bq SAC,

53

“SECRET



SECRET 89

detailed decisions on Hound Dog production go-ahead dates, rate
of production, quantity and related matters it delayed until

7
these studies were concluded and available.

After many weeks of detailed review of the mnifold factors
related to the Hound Dog program, the Air Staff in April approved
Plans to begin Hound Bog production in October 1959, to begin
initial equipping of a Be52. squadron during the last quarter of
CY 1959, and to insure an initial Hound Dog operational capability
by May 1960, In May, headquarters USAF formally approved a
revised ad more detailed operational schedule for a Hound Dog
equipped 20-squadron Be52 force. The operational dates for each
equadron loca were listed as follows:

FY 4/60 Loring, Griffiss

FY 61 Dow, Ramey, Seymour—Johnson

Fy 2/61 Bglin, Beale, Travis

FY 3/61 Mather, Wartemith, Walker, Carswell

Fy 4/61 Altus, Barksdale, Columbus, Clinton-Sherman
FY 11/62 Amarillo, Sheppard, Blytheville, Kinross

U8. DP, D/Pine to DPLBC, Bq SAC, “Warhead Requirements," 16 Apr
1958, filed in D/Plns, Hq SAC. .

k9. TWX, Bq USAF to CINCSAC, AFOOP-OP-U 51091, 21 May 1958,
Exhibit 6h,

sy)
find
FY
Pi
anf



(AN Aifal DIGAT

YSeCHME 63
that a stronger engine, a J-85-3 with 2,450 pounds of thrust,
would qualify at an early date ani be incorporated into
Production missiles through a model improvement program,

Early in April USAF programming documents called for 17 B-l\7
wings and 9 B-52 wings to be Quail equipped by 1962. However, the
tesults of war gaming exercives during the early months of 1958

Prompted SAC to reexamine the desirability of equipping Beh? unite ,

with Quail decoys prior to equipping B-S2 units, 4 major con
sideration was the prospect of a relatively early phase-out for
Bel? aircraft, Ih addition, SAC hed to take cognisance of -
Quail missile availatility dates, light weight weapon dates,
DT Teceysone, a the sish of weapons to be carried Uf B-h7's
on' alert. Reviewliig the Quail equippage and facilities con=
struction progran early in May, SAC further noted (a) that the
Quail missile would be competitis with only che Log6l loed com
figuration for B-h7's but would be compatible with all single
bomb load configurations for Be52ts, (b) that the proposed
clip-on attachments for bombs and missiles would require

160, Memo, Chief, Force Structure Section Plans Div, D/Pins to
Brig Gen C. Be Westover, D/Ops, Hq SAC, "Status of QAM~72
(Q@UAIE) Program," 2) Apr 1958, Exhibit 67.

161. Memo, Chief, Force Structure Section Plans Div, D/Plns to
Brig Gen C. B, Westover, D/Ops, Hq SAC, “Goose and Quail
Operational Payoffs,* 2k, Apr 1958, filed. in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC,

SECRET

—____.


SECRET a

of the 1st Missile Division would not insure effective paacetine
control. Accordingly, General Wade proposed establishing emi,
streamlined, intermediate headquarters between ICEM squadrons
and itself, These headquarters would be similar toa SAC air

-division, be concerned only with operations and reining, be manned

by about 50 officers and airmen, and control three to four ICBM
squadrons which would report directly to the lst Missile Division.
General Wade believed this type of organisation and method of
comand control would permit primary effort on mission accomplish-
ment, save considerable military spaces, reduce overhead costs,
and provide strong command management. He proposed to begin
implementation of this concept by patterning the 70\th Strategic
Missile Wing at Cooke AFB after.a small SAC Air Division.

CIWCSAC was briefed on this concept on 29 May. He indicated
that he had an open mind about the subject and requested that it be
wargamed first and that further recommendations be submitted based
on wargaming remite, Final recommendations had not been pre-
sented to him by the end of Jane.

Five Atles flight tests were attempted during the report
ing period, On 10 January an Atlas missile was flown 550 5M

127, TW, Comdr Ist Missile Div to CINCSAC, IPL-6-5088, 30 May
1958, filed in Hist Div Archives, Bq SAC.

128, Ibid,

SECRET


SECRET 7

or will be sited sufficiently remote from the support base to in-
sure a seperate target with neither susceptible to direct damage
froma successful single weepon attack against the other." With
the inclusion of this statement, Headquarters USAF also spproved
SAC's draft of its Revised Goose Operational Plan.

A resurvey of Kinross, K. I, Sawyer and Wurtemith Air Force
Bases had nbt beeti completed by the end of June, Other areas sur=
‘veyed but mbt selected during the reporting period included Suffolk
County Air Fores Base, long Island, Hew Tork, Stewart Air Force
Base, New York, ‘Ls G, Hanscom Air Force, Bane, Massachusetts, and
4 site stout four miles from Presque Isle Air Force Bass, : Matsa,
The first three Air Force bases were undstisfactory for one or.
more of the: following xeasonss Existence of other high Priority
missions, no available land, dense population, overflight

’ restrictions and civilian reeistance. ‘the site near Presque
Isle was rejected because of the Snark mission given to that base
snd a desire by Headquarters USAF not to give it a herd core ©
wisetone”

In May, Headquarters USAF released 39 million dollars of .

FY 1959 funds for the Goose program to complete research and

fe ‘to CINCSAC, AFOOP~0C=B-3 51637, h Jun 1958, Exhibit 16
Bee’ also SACOP 3-58, SH-73 Coose, 1 Jal 1956, p 18, Exhibit 17.

1. DE, Program Div 0/Plns to DR, Eq SAC, "Base Facilities 2-73,"
13 May 1958, Exhibit 18, .

42, DF, Progrems Div, B/Pins to DE, Hq SAC, = Facilities,
51-73," 13 May 1958, Exhibit 16; See pe 2.



SECHET *

cone, subsequently recovered by ship, The first Thor Vanguard
(Project Able) flight was Conducted on 23 Aprai but was only

research purposes to support Project Bardtack which Sought to
determine the feasibility of making @ thermomclear detonation
at 125,000 feet altitnde, 4 launching on 18 May was Condatted
Primarily to test the Possibility of recovering a full scale
ablation type nose cone over a renge of about 2,300 NM, Actual
impact was 20 MM short and 10 RU right of the sredetermined in
Pact point. The nose cone Peoovery ge operated Properly
and was picked up shortly after the test.

88,
89.

FE



SECRET

relatively free of electronic and electromagnetic interference, and
have three degrees of line of sight horizontal clearance, Each
station would be located on or adjacent to a military base to

tnsure the use of bast support facilities,” Data processing and
control of ABS vehicles would be performed from a special building
at Headquarters SiC, ‘AOD of FF 3/60 was established for this
building. ©

72

In addition to the three: min stations to be esteblished in the
Northwest, South Centtal and Northeast parts of the United States,
five test tracking and deta acquisition stations were also needed
for ARS vehicle lamchings fron Cooke AFB, ‘These smller stations
would be located An the vicinity of Cooke AYB, Cmari, Californias
Kaena Point, Hewaiis and Anchorage and Sitka, Alsska.

caren

The task of surveying and siting for both testing ant primry
tracking and data acquisition stetions moved forward iwpidly. Sitings

177. Ti, APE to CSAP, AIDC, 1M, BO, S40 TAPES, AAt3, S40 SCR,
WOTR-2-13-E, 1, Feb 1958, Extibit 723 TwX, ARDC to USAF INSTIS
REP NOR ATL REGION, AMC, SAC, USAF, ARDC, AACS, WDIR-3-9E PD, .
6 Mar 19583 Exhibit 733 "wemo’ for Record, "Site Survey for
W-LI7L, Worthvest Area," 31 Mer 1958, prep by Missiles
Facilities Section, Planning Br, Base Development Day TE Bq
SAC, filed in Central Files DE, Hq SAC.

21H g,2/Fine to D/Compt, 2 ht tae Streterie Missile Report,*
Sal 1958, filed in 7 D/Compte
179.6 System 1171 Pro Status rt, 15 Apr 1958 prep by
; , (J

Py x if, in D,

“SECRET



EB

&B & FER

22

23

SECHET

EXHIBITS

TWX, CINCSAC to USAFIR NER Boston, COMFTROP 23,
Presque Isle AFB, Maine, IRCM 5k19, "Construction

of Snark Facilities, Presque Isle AFB, Maine,"

7 May 1958,

SAC Programming Plan 17-58, ASM-62 Program, 9 Jul 1958,
DF, DPL to all Directorates, #M~62 Program,® 8 May 1958.
TW, Hq USAF to CINCSAC, AFOOR-OP-0 56600, "si%73

Bases," 13 Feb 1958,

TWX, Hq USAF to CINCSAC,*4*DOP
B-52/80-73," 25 May 1956,
TWX, Hq USAF to CINCSAG, APFOOP-0C-B=3 51637, "SM~73
Goote Operational Plan (Revised),® von 1988,
SAC Operational. Plan 3-58, "SM=73 Goose," 1 Jul 1958,
IF, Pro Div D/Plné to TE 'Hq SAC, "Base Facilities
273", 13 May 1958. : ,

Meno, i/Pine to Gen Westover Hq SAC, "Status of the
54-73 (Goose) Progran," 2h Ap? 1958,”

IE, IE. to Gen Westover, "SM-73: (Q00SE) Progran,®
26 Jun 1958, .

SAC Operational Plan 258 (SM=75 Thor), 25 Feb 1958.
SAC Operational Plan 1-58 (54-78 Jupiter), ) Mer 1958,

SAC Programming Plan 12-58, "SM=75 Pro (Thor
for Four RAF Squadrons), *’23 Apr 1958.

U.S. = U.K. Memorandum of Unders 9 22 Feb 1958,

Ltr, Gen W. He Blanchard . to Gen Fower, 26 Jun 1958,
W/incls U.S. - BAF Technical Agreement, % Jun 1958.

TWX, Hq USAF to CUSNMR Paris, CINCSAC, CINCUSAFE,
(DOUGLAS 10 NORSTAD), 56966, 26 Feb 1958,

iv

5128), "Co-Location of



SECRET

iased ovt st a relatively early date and be succegied by ICEM
weapons, The Goose progren was highlighted by the release
of FT 1959 funda totalling $39,000,000 by Headquarters USAF to
complete reséarch and development, for an initial missile
inventory, and for ‘productioh tooling. In addition, six of ten
Goose squadron sites had been approved, Some slippage in the
Goose prograh contitmed, however, because of difficulties
encountered in developing a wifticiently powerful Goore engine,
A decision to disperse Goosé squadrons and not place them on
or near high priority targets was indicative of. the inoreasing
attention being given to the problen of survivability of
missile weepin systems. © 7

Flight tests of both Snark and Goose misailes continued
‘during the reporting period, By the end of June well. over
50 Snark flight teste bad been conducted, a few at maxim
range. Many‘technibal difficulties were sfili.being _
experienced during these tests, Ten flight tests of Goose
missiles had been conducted by the end of the month, one
flight lasting nearly five hours,

wari weed aa

In the IREM program, the major diplomatic and military
| Regotiations and agreements Jeading to the establishment of
of four Ther squadrons in the United Kingdom were completed

B

*,

185e Tbide



[rin
“a

is)
Gh
=f)

Cay

mh

Batellite intelligence: requirements were under extensive stady
during the reporting period, However, in order to satiaty spéuliftat
intelligence requiresients of Defense, Department and other govern
mental agencies, Headquarters USAF established a Satellite
Intelligence Requirements Com ttee. The first meting of this
committee was held on 16 May. There were indications that the =
priorities established and ‘the :woilaies of intelligence requirements
processed by this Coumittes ixight result, in the subordination of

_ 183 .
SACs requirements. <= © *

, ae é

By the end of Jane 1998, both of SA0's subsonic sirface-to~
surface wepon systeka had moved significantly forward toward ‘the
gral. of operational readiness. In the Snark program, further oon-
sideration to enlarge the Si-missile program approved late in
1957 was — and construction activity had begun et
Presque Isle AFB, Maine uhere the entire Snark force wuld be
placed, SAC's efforts to obtain Headquarters USAF's approval to
establish Presque Tole APB as & jerament "hard core" Air Force
pase (thereby assuring better Snark facilities), vere unsuccessful.
Tt was generally assuned that the Snark weapon system would be

18 Memo f Re “Re of W-117L System Phasing
3° Group Kee finer b1-22 May 1958," 28 May 1958 ) Exhibit 756

18h. Interview J. Vm Stasyeren with Maj L. 2. Future
‘Weapons Section, FLAW Br, D/Fine, Hq SAC sat, 6 hug’ 1956.

SECnet



SECRET n

The six Thor launching tests conducted during the first half
of 1958 were highlighted by two successful nose cone separation
and re-entry tests with one nose cone recovered byship. Several
other launchings were partially successful, Only two Jupiter
launchings contributed te the development of an operational
missile, ‘Three other leunchings were made'with « Jupiter C
missile for the parpose of launching satellites, including the
first U. 8. satellite which was placed in orbit on 23 Jamary.
Two of the three satellite launching attempts were successfyl.

Wdereas the IKEM program was in danger-of falling behind
schednle, the ZOE program was moving ahead of schedule by the
end‘of June. A total of three Atlas and one Titan operational
sites hed been selected, ' Extensive surveying work was underway
preparatory to selecting additional sites. A major step toward
providing gréater eurvivability for the ICEM.force was taken
during the réporting period by the adoption of the single
squadron concept (1.00, placing only one squadron near an
operational Air Force base), and of the intre~squadron dispersal
concept. The single squadron concept was péreonelly recomended
‘by CINCSAC and subsequently approved by Headquarters USAF,
Together, both concepts promised to reduce the dangers inherent in

187. Interview, J. Van Staaveren, Historian with Col EB. A. Vivian,
Chief, FB&FW Br, D/Pins, Hq SAC, 18 Sep 1958,

188, Ibid.

“SECRET



“SEGHET 9
tion, in time to met the esteblished TREY schedule, prompted
Beadquarters USAF to consider saasica? Accordingly, a site
survey team, composed of representatives of SAC, SAC MIKE and
AFEMD surveyed the ares around Fairbanks and Anchorage late in
March and early in April. Conclusions reached by the team were
that the Anchorage area wes prefereble because of mre suitable
highway and railroad facilities, and that Elmendorf and Ladd
AFB's, except for family housing, had adequate facilities-to
support an IREM squadron. Dispersed IREM sites, however, would
have to be located 30 to 35 miles from a support base. This.
fact, plus weather conditions and the long hours of darkness; -
would favor the use of a FIREHOUSE rather than an eight hour
shift type of manning: and operation tm Alasia,” In May the.

Defense Department's Director of Gaided Missiles, Mr, W. H.

Holaday, authorised the deployment of a Jupiter equadron ‘to

Alaska provided deployment elsewhere faite

oe Phe tet, i, Sour sur Memo, 2 oe ‘the rams Tisse,®
Range DaiListie Missile,” 27 Mas 1960y Rese se

Memo for Record, FSi Br, te Survey Visit to
& Alanka for IRE Deployment Bites," Me ie’ 5 Bait 0.

70. Mano, Mr» We Me Holaday, to the 80 of the Air Force
"iotire Deplaymenta of Sapdter ‘HEM Squetrone,® 9. May 1958


DeCHEH uy
the most successful of all Snark flighte on 25 Jemary provided
the moet severe extroise of the guidance eystem to date. The missile
“lew to Ascebsion Island (meximm range) and impacted one nautical
mile short and one quarter nautical mile to the left of the desired
Ampact area after « flight of eight hours and thirty-three minstes,
Thereafter, various foms of malfunctioning mrred Snark flight
teits in the succesding five mnths, A test on 1; February to
Ascension Island was successful until the nose cone failed .to‘ release
automatically and had to be released by comand control. A flight
on 6 March resulted in the loss of missile beacon and telemetry .
signals sbout 200 nautical miles from Ascension Island and.the
missile Presumably destroyed itself, Telemetry was again lost
about 3,800 nautical miles dow range and the missile self- destroyed
during a flight on 3 April. Two miseiles were launched in May,
The first, oh 7 May, was miccessful except for failure of the .
automatic nose cone release near Ascension Island, Wen released
Py command control 4% was with an approxinate 2h nautical mile
error from the desired impact area, During second flight, on 28
Mey (and the’ last contractor flight type E Snark missile), the
left pylon tank failed to release causing the missile to spiral
and impact about 600 nantical miles. dow range. 4 test on.27
Jone represented the first all military launch of a phase VII
equipment and suitability test missile by the SS6th Strategic
Missile Squadron at Patrick Air Force Base under the supervision
of the APHTO's 6555th Guided Missile Squadron. The Leunching
was successful but the flight was terminated one hour later

SECRET


ae

SE Cet

could be expected, however, as the first Goose squadron was
not scheduled to be activated until the third quarter of 1960,
over two years from the end of the reporting period, June 1958,

At the end of the reporting period Goose planning called for
& l-squadren Goose force, Sites for six of the ten squadrons
had been selected and approved by Headquarters USAF ani sites for
four sqadrons resiained undetermined, The six approved sites,
the squadrons to be assigned to each one, and the proposed acti-
vation and oper dates for the 10-squadron Goose force

were as follows:
Operational Activation
Date Date

Site Squadron
1. Sthen Allen aPB 508th SMS Ver 3/0
2. Duluth AFB SlOth sus 2/61 4/60
3. Otis AFB 511th sMs 3/61 Ven
ke Kinross AFB S0yth aus ier 2/or
Se. Wartemith AFB 708th SMS 62 3/61
6. Ke I. Sewer 709th 2S 2/62 1/61
Je Unknown TlOth. SMS 3/2 1/62
8, Unknown TLith SMS Wee 2/62
92 Unknow Tekth SMS 63 3/62
10. Uninown 725th SMS 2/63 4/62

50. OF, DE to Gen Westover, "SM73 (GO0SE) Program, 26 Jun 1958,
Exhibit 20,

oe


SECRET “

Meamhile, a Rand Sorporation stady wes completed in February

on hardening Goose sites. ‘This stuly sought to determine the
feasibility of Providing greater operational flexibility for this
‘etpon eyetem ty being able to establish hold" for Goose
missiles, and to provide more Selective integration of this
weapon systefz with wemned boaber wavees”” A S40 wea-pane study

dispersing the Goose units to sites equipped uith 18 missiles,
and hardening the facilities to withstand 25 pei, led to the
conclusion that dispersal and hardening vere not feasible and that
Sone sites should not be located on SAC B52 bases, Headquarters
USAF agreed,” Consequently, on 26 May it withdrew its approval

Of Goose on-base sites at Kinross, x. 7, Sawyer and Wartemith Air

around each of these bases.” On June it formally established

@ new criteria for ostablishing Goose sites by directing sac te.

anand paragraph 94 of its 54-73 doose Operational Plan, then under re~
vision, to reads °SM-73 unite will be dispersed by squadrons and
located om abtive USAF installations not considered priority targets,
Ne ae, eon t oaigtie Diar aemely Report #

37. DF, D/Pins to t, sStrategic Mestle Monthly Report,”
9 May 1958, rian fet analysis Div, D/oompt, a seer

38, Interview, J, Van Staaveren, Historian with L, Re Harvey
W/Pine HqsaC, 21 ang 1968” TM ,

390 TWX, Hq USAF to CINcsac, APOOP 5128), 26 May 1958, Exhibit 15,


Geploying a Jupiter squadron to Aleska and believed that to de
60 would be a grave mistake, “He. Decommended that it be
GePloyed to Ttdly, in leu of Prange, and if deployment
stther place wis impossible, aot to deploy 4t at a1), He
favored placing only a Thor myit dp Alaska in accordance with
the established time schedule (196

12 TIM oquadren 43 the Maeajeit arva to tovure DIK desleye
mint there by Deceubeh 1958, Jackitides were to be placed tn,
8 e0tt, austere, Thor configuration en existing Air Forea ,

», Other areas under Consideration by Readqarters USAF during the
PrN Period Ser tn Gerlormet of etther thor or Deptter equate
wns pointed Spain, Okinews, and Tattey, Except for the deployment
—_—_—_—

Te My COACEAC to COPE UAAT, On6e9s, 27 May 2958, mentnss 30,
2. Renhoat Soe? AYIMP ANDO, a¥oTB-o8 40 53677, 1, en 1957,
4 33, a . :

130 Pata tas art’, of the Aix Force to CINOBAC, SIEM Deployment

Plans," 12 Mer 1958 Exhibit 26; nex USAF. to CINOSAC, 9

Jon 1958, ttied do bf eee + He Tad ee

SECRET


SECHET 1
1959 BOD for the Snark force at Presque Isle AFB would slip,
costs would greatly increase and additional funds would have to

be taken from other higher Priority and nore desirable SAC wespons
Programs. As a consequence, CINCSAC concluded that:

1. Expansion of the Snark force beyond 30 weapons was not
‘desirable,

2. Implementation of the 100 percent salvo operational (or
SMAC) concept’ should be considered only if the Snark force wis in-
creased by the direction of Headquarters USAF. In this event, Head~
quarters USAF should permit the Joint proposals of the SPO, SAC
and NAT on basing, BOD's and operational dates for the entire force to
‘be configured to met the SMAC concept.

3e Because construction at Presque Isle Air Force Base would
begin in late May 1958 and contimie on « very tight schedule’ through
oat CY 1958 and 1959, no change shouldbe wade in the schedile.
Tims, any decision to increase the Snark force should be made prior
to the beginning construction date,

Ae Headquarters (RAF took no further action on the SMAC concept,
the Snark progrem remained unchanged in scope,

TT, to D/Instis “Operational Snark Facilities,«
Tipe’ i956, srr 8. mer * amd

27 Ibid,

28. Interview, J. Van Steaveren, Historian with Maj L. R. Harvey,
D/Plns, Hq SAC, 6 Aug 1958,



SECRET

during the first six months of 1958. The British Oovernzent's -

16

decision to retain operations] comand and control over all
four squadrons, however, made it necessary for SAC to’ convert
its -672nd Strategic Missile Squadron into a technical training
squadron, Outside of the United Kingdom, & slowdown in the
IRBM program was threatened because of the lack of U. 8.
diplomatic success in negotiating timely THEM agreenents with
other MATO mmber nations. By June the political aspects
inherent in the IREM program had developed into one of the

moet serious obstacles to expeditious missile plaming and .
Programing with which S40 and the entire Air Force had to

_ contend, and over which they had no control. In an effort

to meet the December 1958 operational date for two THEM

__ Squadrons, Headquarters USAF directed that preliminary action

be taken to place a'squadron in Alaska, an emergency measure
to which SAC ‘objected vigorously. SAC also contimed to be
concerned about the lag in the Jupiter program. an in=
sufficient number of Jupiter missiles with operational cone
figurations were being tested and there was slippage in the
Jupiter training program. As a consequence cf these and
related difficulties, final Defense Department approval of
@ l2-squadron IRBM program (nine Thor end three Jupiter
squadrons) was being held in abeyance.

186. Interview, J. Van Staaveren, Historian with Col E, A, Vivian,
Chief FS&Pw Br, D/Plns, Hq SAC, 18 Sep 1958.

SECRET



SECRET a

complex because of the need for special warhead storage and
installation facilities for Bound Dog missiles, a requirement
which promised to add to the handling, towing, checking out
and related operations comected with air-to-surface weapons.
By the end of the reporting period, however, Headquarters USAF
had delegated to ARDC the responsibility for combining the
maintenance facilities. A contract was signed on 21, June with
Nottingham and Associates to prepare design criteria and
definitive facility drawings. Functional areas to be combined
included eduinistration, supply, T. 0. files; tool cribs,
heating and utility room, erigine shops, generator room, latrine
and locker rooms, and utilities, ‘the criteria for combining
the facilities had been prepared by North American Aircraft,
Ince, and the Ralph M. Parsons Company. The preliminary
criteria and definitive drawings were echeduled to be submitted
to ARDC on lj July for review. & final report was expected to
pe delivered ten days after, Air Force comments thereon were sub-

mitted to the contractors

A draft USAF Preliminary Operational Concept for the Hound
Dog weapon system, begin in 1957, was completed in rebruary snd

She ‘DP, USUPL to DE Hq SAC, "GAM-77 (HOUND DOQ) Gritical Review
‘ena Combination of Ga4-72 (QUAIL) and 77 (HOUND DOc),*
1 Jul 1958, filed in Central Files, DE, Bq SAC. .

165. Historical Study No, 70, Vol I, pp 97-98, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC.

SECRET



SECHET

INTRODUCTION

The Strategic Air Command's missile activities during the first
half of 1958 were highlighted by efforte to speed up operational
planning for the ballistic missile, the Hound Dog (an airto-surface
missile), and the WS-117L Advanced Reconnaissance System (for orbit=
ing reconnaissance vehicles) programs, ‘The first program reflected
the inplonentation of some of the 1; measures taken by the Secretary
of Defense, Mr. Neil H. McZlroy, late in 1957 and early in 1958,
to accelerate the development of those weapon systems deemed mst
Vital to U. 8. defense, ;

Although the decision to accelerate the ballistic missile pro-
gram was made late in 1957," implementing actions contimed during
the early months of 1958, The transfer of the 1st Missile Division
at Cooke AFB, Lompoc, California from ARDC to SAC effective 1
January 1958, required that the division be staffed by SAC personnel.
The creation of an Office of Assistant CINCSAC (SAC WKE),. at AFEMD
in Inglewood, California, also effective 2 Jamary 1958,. likewise
required SAC staffing, The functions of the SAC MIKE office were
defined in a SAC staff meno issued late in Jamary, » sattian

Te etn it Mitte of te secretary of Defense to Speed
an i

2. Historical Study No. 70, Yol I, pp ks 68, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC.

32 SAC Staff Memo limi, "Administrative Practices, ® (SAC MIKE Office),
29 Jan 1958, Exhibit 2. _

1

SECRET



SECHET %

the Memorandum of Understanding), and provisions for RAF
operational control over all missile squadrons in the United
Kingdom ‘and for USAF personnel to be responsible for the
maintenmce of Mesiles of the 1st RAP squadron only. ‘This
responsibility would be turned over to the RAF as rapidly as

their personnel could be trained, probably about July 1959.

The Technical Agreemnt also identified the sites for the first RAF
squadron: Feltwell, North Pickenham, Shephards Grove, Tudden-

ham and Mepal. Sites for the second RAF squadron were also
tentatively agreed upon

France was the néxt priority area, after the United King-
dom, desired by Headquarters USAF in which to place IREM units.
Unlike the negotiating arrangements with the Royal Air Force, .
USAF ~ French Air Force (FAF) negotiations would be conducted
through SHAPE with Headquarters SAFE serving as the point of
contact with thé French Government, SAC was authorised direct
Liaison with SHAPE on all technical matters, ani directed to
provide appropriate IREM technical advisors for SHAPE (under
General Lanris Norstad) and for USAFE on site selection, train-
ing, personnel and skill requirements. Tentative plans called

62. Ltr, Gen Blanchard to Gen Power, 26 Jun 1958, w/incls: U.S. =
RAF Technical Agreement, 26 Jun 1958, Exhibit 25; Ltr, Hq SAC
to COFS USAF, *IREM Technical Agreement," 1; Jun 1958, filed

in D/Plns, Bq SAC. .


The ARS vehicles would not be. designed for any particular phase
of warfare and have no weapon carrying capability. It would augment
rather than supplant other reconnaissance methods. An initial ARS
vehicle with boosters would be shout 99 feet in length end the
orbiting vehicle about 21 feet in length and 60 inches in diameter.
It would 'be placed into orbit. by ATIAS primary boosters of 190,000
pounds thrust each plus two secondary boosterse It would opbit at
a meximm altitude of about 300 atetute miles,

Responsibility for the govetopannt phase of the ARS vehicles
wuld be vested in the ARDC. SAC, 08 the using command, Would #9=
sume operetions). control -aftet, they, became fully opereticnal, The
development period was expected to contime from 1960 to 1965
with a full operational, capelility achieved by the latter date.
The development period was divided into three phases:

1. Antum of 1960 to 1961. ‘A neximm of two operational
pioneer vehicles in simltangous orbite
__ y, Re dart of 1961 to Antawn of 1963. An estimated maxi-
mum of six to seven vehicles in simultaneous orbite
3, Autum of 1963 to Autum of 1965. 4m estinated maxi~
mum of 18 to 2h vehicles in simltansous orbit with full surveil-
lance being achieved.
@Pioneer® vehicles would have photogrephic capabilities and
more advanced ARS vehicles would possess electronic signal emission

capabilities for the data gathering taske Deta processing would also

(UA)
fin
ay
=o
Pov
che)


SECRET

' Because of the minifold intelligence value in orbiting re- -
connaissance vehicles, the Secretary of the Air Force had recom
mended to the Office 6f the Secretary of Defense on 12 November
1957 that militery reconnaissance and other outer space projects
be accelerated. He also advocated establishment of an interin
reconnaissance capability, These views were reaffiresd in
another memo dated 1 February 1958.

70

In a forme reply to the Secretary cf the Air Force the
Secretary of Defense on 28 February authorized the acceleration of
‘the We117L Project and stated that it had been given the highest
national priority. He disapproved, however, of the development
of an interim reconnaissance capability (with the use of a Thor
missile booster plus a second stage to launch a recoverable
capsule from a satellite) on the grounds that it would duplicate
rather than complement the planned Atlas WS-117L Program, and
because the project appeared’ to have questionable military
value, He permitted, hovever, the use of « Ter booster and
second stage for satellite test firing purposes, and for making
experimental flights with poporatory animals in pursuance of
manned satellite projects, The accelerated program promised
wo give the Air Force ‘a reconnaissance vehicle capability about

a

17k, Mem, Mr. Neil H, McElroy to the Secretary of the Air force,
"Air Force WS=117L Program (Reconnaissance System) 2); Feb
1958, ‘Exhibit 70; THK, ARDC to AFEMD, Cite TWX 03-014, .5 Mar
1958, bit 7le .

a0
=J
Pin
nf


SECRET a

Bi
one year earlier than previously planned, id

Considerable progress was made during the reporting period
dn getting ‘the accelerated W-217L program under way. A tri=
service culitrolled section of Cooke AFB, Loapoc, California was
selected as the main launching site for ARS vehicles. In Jane,
formal approval of the site was being negotiated with Headquarters
USAF and the Durem of Aeroniatices’”” Ta ordar to select the
three tracking and data acquisition station sites in the
Continental United States, a specisl Site Selection Board was
established composed of representatives of USAF, AFEMD, ARDC,
a, EMD, SA0, USAFSS, AACS and SAC MIKE. Convening formally for
the first tine during ‘the period 26-26 Fetruary, the Board
revised site selection critetia developed by AFEMD, and made
arrengemnts to establish survey teams for the Northwest, South
Central and Horiheast areas, The siting qriteria, as developed,
AndLoated that each tracking and data acquisition station would
require buildings for administration’ and command purposes, for
data acquisition and processing, for VHF and UNF telemetry, and
for commmications transmission gnd reomiving. A typical site
would require: about 1,600 acres with considerable easements, be

1750 Memo for General Westover, “W-J17L Program," 27 Mar 1958,
filed in D/Pins, Bq SAC,

176, File, R&D 12-2, Facilities WS-117L, filed in D/Fins, Hq SAC;
DF, IB to D/Compt, "Monthly Strategic Missiles Report.®

SeChet



SECHET

on the perimeter of the Soviet Uhion, The most promising
negotiations, of dourse, were with the United Kingdom ant these
Were contimed during the period 20-2) January when @ new USAF
negotiating team, headed by Major General William H, Blanchard,
Commander of the Seventh Air Division in the United Kingdon,

met with a Royal Air Force (RAF) team again headed by Air Marshal
Geoftery W, Tuttle, Deputy Chief of Star of the BAY, to resune
discussions on a U.S. = U.K, Technical Agreenent, Many but not
all basic issues were resolved during the Jamary seasions,
Agreenent was reached to proceed with plans te establish four
Thor squadrons in te United Kingdom in accordance with the
following schedules

1. Hirst squadron. Three missiles by July 1958, three
Nasties by Septexber 1958 and nine missiles by the end of 1958,
2 Second squacro Ne To be deployed between 1 Jamary

and 30 June 1959, . .
3« Third squadron, To be deployed by 30 October 1959,
be Fourth aquadron. Yo be deployed by 51 March 1960,
Bach squadron would be dispersed on five sites with three, -
missiles or cach site, One site would serve as the main bese

5%. Draft Technical Between the United States Air
Force and the Roget ane he on the Establishment of Intere
mediate Range Ballistic Missile (275 Thor) Based in the
United Kingdom, undated, filed in Hist Div Archives, Hq SAC,

23


SECRET

&

83
CHRONOLOGY
The following missile chronology covers the highlights of events
bearing directly and indirectly on SAC's Participation in the Missile

Program daring the period 12 July 1957 to 11 October 1958. 4m initial
missile chronology is contained in Histarical Study Ho. €: ‘filed in

oo

OTH, Hq SAC.

eeee

12 Jul 57 Hq USAF directs cancellation of the Navaho program. Overall
development costs of the Navaho are placed at }y000 , 000.

9 Oct $7 Hq USAF ismes a draft Preliminary Operational Concept for
. the B-52 ASM (Hound Dog) GAM-77 weapon system.

6 Dec 57 ‘The first attempt to place a satellite into orbit with the
Vanguard rocket is unsuccessful. .

23 Dec 57 ‘The Directorate of Operations, Hq USAF, publishes a Pre~
Lintnsry Operetions Concept far the Aaraneed Reoemnaigemnce

LJan 58 The 392d Missile Training Squadron (IKEM), having been
relieved from asaignment to ARDC and assigned to SAC, is
farther assigned to the 70,th Strategic Missile Wing at
Cooke AFB by SAC GO 1, dated 2 Jamary 1958.

2 Jan 58 Hq USAF sends a copy of Preliminary Operations Concept
for the Advanced Reconnaissance System (42S) to Hq SAC
and requests SAC to prepare a Prelixinay Operational Plan

porsusnt to AFE 5-7, dated 29 August 1956.

4 Jan 58 ‘The Chrysler Corporation is awarded $51.8 million in con~
tracts for Jupiter SM-78 missile production.

8 Jan $8 SAO publishes Final Snark 4-62 Operational Flan.
10 Jan 58 Secretary of Defense Neil H, McElroy reveals that the
Army has been ordered to replace the liquid fuel Redstone
with a solid fuel ballistic missile.

20 Jan 58 The fourth atlas SM-65 is launched with successful test
results.

(UA)
rin)
ry

iS)
fir)
otf)



52

33

5,

55

CHAPTER IT

56

Secret

EXHIBITS

TWX, CINCSAC to Cofs USAF, DPL 7250, "ICEM Base
Requirements,* 7 Nov 1958,

DE, DE to D/Pins Bq SAC, “Site Selection - ICEM,#
26’ Dec 1987. Bq > .

TWX, CINCSAC to CofS USAF, DPLEC 1033, “Area Location
for ICEM Units,* 25 Jan 1958,

TWX, USaF to "ICEM
PEI Aye, arars1, mmnunerc

DF, D/Pins to all Directorates, "Location of Strategic
Miseile Units on SAC Bases," 3-Feb 1958,

TWX, CINCSAC to CofS USAF, MICEN Siting Concept,®
Li Ker 1988, , ‘ting *"

TWX, Bq USAF to CINCSAC, SAC MIKE, AFEMD, AFOOP 57778,
"Phasing and Operations of ICEM," 10 Mar 1958,

Bit, crmoeas to CofS USAF, IPL 3657, "ICM Configuration,®
Sta ATLAS tion Study Acti
2ape’~ hay 56, 20 age LOSE Ne Aton,

Memo, Dep Chief, Plns Div SAC to Gen Westover,
#(U) Site Locations for (Siten),® 3 Jul 1988,

TWK, Hq USAF to CINCSAC, APCOM 52641, "Denver /Mten
Squadron Problem," 26 Jun 1958,

Memo, Mr. 4. Macintyre to Secretary of the
Air force, QOHE) Stee oe PN ee oo rar

" rea,” 30 Apr. 1958,

Memo, Maj Gen Charles M, McCorkle to D/ope 08/0 Hg
USAF, “TITAN Siting," 1 May 1958,

*,
SAC Programming Plan 3-58, *(6oNF) 7/GAM—63
Integration Program (seks) ° 10. ee

vi



28

¥

BESEBSRBe BR

SECRET

EXHIBITS

Memo for Record, “USAF/FAF SM~78 (JUPITER) Conferences,
S-16 May 1958,"°2 Jun 1958,

Ltr, Maj Gen J. Smart, USAF, to CINCSAC, *IREM Deploy-
men’ Plans,# 12 Mer 1958. , a

Memo, Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary

of Defense, "Future Deployments of the Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missile," 27 Mar 1958.

Meno for Record, FSW Br D/Plne Hq SAC, “Site Survey
Visit to Alaske for IREM Deploysen’ Sites,” l Apr 1958.

Memo, Mr. We M. Holaday to tive Secretary of the Air
Force, "Future Deployments of the JUPITER IRBM

Squadrons," 9 May 1958.

TWX, Gen Power to Gen Curtis B. LeMay, © 6295,
“Deployment of IKEM's", 27 May 1958, °

TWI, Hq USAF to AFEMF ARDC, AFOTE-CS 51677, "Alaskan
TEBM Facilities," Jun 198. - |

Ltr, SAC MIKE to CINCSAC, 1 Apr 1958, with attached
Pato Schriever to Comir ARDC, "Jupiter," 29

Memo, Mr. W. M. Holaday to S of the Air Fy
omg Progren,® 25 Ane “nt sOFeey

Memo for Distribution, Office of Assist CofS for
Guided Missiles, "Revised IRBM Program," 1 May 1958.

G0 12, Hq SAC, 11 Mar 1958,
GO 33, Hq SAC, 25 Jun 1958,
GO 13, Hq SAC, 12 Mar 1958,
SAC Operational Plan 7-58, "SM-65 Atlas,* 15 May 1958.
SAC Operational Plan 858, "SM.68 Titen,” 15 Jun 1958,

Memo, DPLC to Col Lyle D/Plns Hq SAC, "Summary of
ICEM Site Selection Activities," 7 Feb.1958.

v



SECHET 2

The construction of adequate support facilities at Presque Isle
Air Force Base was dlso a matter of concern to SAC during the first
half of 1958, ani constant difficulty wae experienced in obtaining
Headquarters USAF approval of funding for the desired facilities.
This was because Presque Isle 4¥B would not become a “hard core” base
(1.e., @ base designed to becoms permanent and on which limited MOP
funds could be spent on @ contiming basis to convert it into a first
class facility for follow-on weapon systems), and because the Snark
weapon system had only a limited life expectancy, Although both
CINCSAC ani the Comtander of the Righth Air Force recommended daring
the reporting period that Presque Isle Air Force Base become a hard
base installation with a followon mission, thereby assuring more ade-
quate facilities, the Air Staff did not concur, They believed that the.
subarctic location of the base would create too many difficulties for
sensitive missile components and that past experience indicated that
this environment created troop morale problems, regardless of facilities
provided. The Eighth Air Force Comumder, however, believed that
operational experierices at Northeast bases showed that a combination
of good facilities and a good commer could insure good troop morale.
Consequently, he urged in June that the Air Staff position be reco-
sidered, He also recommended that Presque Isle Air Pirce Base be placed
under Loring Air Yorce Base in Maine and that future Air Division
commmders become ‘operationally responsible for both bomber and
missile unite in order to forge a strong bond between manned and


73

7

SECHET

EXHIBITS

TWX, ARDC to AFEMD, Cite TWX 03-014, "Reconnaissance
Satellites and Manned Space Exploration,” 5 Mar 1958,

TWX, AFEMD to USAF, ARDC AMC, BMO, SAC USAFSS, AACS,
SAC MIKE, WDTR=2-13-2, ®. sime.ttca of ome
Selection Board To Developmen t/Operational
Support of Walz as a 1958,

EWE, ARDC to USAF INSTIS REF MOR ATL. REGION, AMC,

SAC, USAF, ARDC, AACS, WDIR=3~9-8 PD, "iS=1i7L Site
Selection tean,® 6 Mat 19597 ,

Minutes of the W=117L Site Selection 1 gun 1958,
en Site Selection Board,

Memo for Record, “Report of W5-127L W Systen
Phasing Group Meeting, 2. - 22 May 1958" 28 hay 1958,

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA

SAC Strategic Missiles Monthly Progress Reports, Jan = June 1958,
SAC Missile and Satellite Program Brief, Presentation to Condrts

15 ng 1958

19 = 21 ang 1958, Office of Asst CINCSAC (SAC MIKE),



25 Jun 58

27 Jun 58

30 Jum 58
2 Jun
1 Jul 58

1 Jul 58

7 Jud 58

9 Jul 58.
9 Jul 58

15 Jul 58

17 Jul 58

4 team from SAC, AFBMD, and Alaskan Air Command con-
venes at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, to finalise the
technical siting of Thor sx-75 and/or Jupiter 4-78

units, and to prepere a draft support ement
between SAC and Alaskan Air Comenar SeTeement

Major Generel William H, Rpcebard, lp Commander of
SACts 7th Air Division in the United Kingdon, and
Air. Marshal Geoffery W. Tattle, Deputy Chief of
Staff of the RaF, sign a U.S, ~ RAF Technical Agree
ment relative to establishing IREM squadrons im the
United Kingdom, : :

93

4 revised Qua: 1 GiM-72 Preliminary Operatioual Pisa
is abetted to gang for study and approval.

The S6lith Strategic Missile Squadron (ICHMATIAS) is
So fe Satie mea na Hosea ©
SAC GO 27, dated 28 May 1958,

Bq USAF approves the USAF - RAF revived "IREN Tech=
nical Agreement." .

‘SAC issues a revised Goose SM=73 Preliminary Operational
Plan.

SAC issues a revised Snark S%-62 Programming Plan,

The Thor SM=75 makes a successful flight with ABLE
nose cone reentry demonstrated for the first tim.

a ieoues a Fing) W-131B Hound Dog GAM=77 Operational

Hq USAF directs that a team of personnel from SAC,
ARDC, “AMC, and ATC be established to review ground
support equipment for missiles,

SECRET



SECRET a8

development, for an initial missile inventory, and for produce
tdon tooling. Thé release of the funds was deemed significant

by SAC in thet it represented a turning point in the Goose program.
It was the first money committed for the Goose weapon system be-
yond the revearch and develogment stages” The prodostion of
Goose missiles, hiwever, was not scheduled to begin until Jamary
1960 and it would proceed initially at a slow rate, Production
of 100 missiles per month would not be attained until September
1961."

The development of the J-83 Goose engine by the Fairchild
Corporation, the prime contractor, contimed to slip behind
schedule during the early weeks of the reporting period, How
ever, in March it appeared that "shotpeening* or metal strength-
ening of the compressor system would remedy the slippage problem,
The first W-83 engine, initially scheduled for delivery in
December 1957, and the YJ=85 engine, an alternate Goose engine,
passed their 15-hour Preliminary Flight Rating Test (PFRT) in
May. A fully rated J-83 engine with 2,450 pounds of thrust was
not expected to complete its qualification test until March 1959.
Development of the subsystem (1.0., the electronic package) was
progressing in a satisfactory manner. The BCM configuration for

3 9 fe os ea ee eae anette Romtaly Pay Bice

le Memo, D/Plns to Gen Westover, Hq SAC, "Status of the SM~73 (Goose)
Program,” 2), Apr 1958, Exhibit 19, =.



seamen) «/ ~
x ‘ ly

the History of . FEB igo»
auegme oo cn: :

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND PARTICIPATION IN
THE MISSILE PROGRAM
(Unclassified Title)

1 Jamary 1958 = 30 June 1958

Historical Study No. 72

Group 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automativally declassified

Historical Division
Office of Information
Headquarters Strategic Air Command

11 ec

DECLASSIFIED = *
a

OL0270600

Yl- evbe-t


SECRET

the Titan configuration called for hardened sites up to 100 psi
with studies continuing on hardening sites beyond this strength.
Only & moderate degree of dispersal was contemplated for both
weapon, systems, thus providing @ single aiming point for the
enn.

Late in 1957, sac and AFEMD Jointly were Considering
increasing the mumber of launchers per squadron for the Atlas
system ut without intre-squadron dispersal, However, on 10

three aiming points, Headquarters USAF believed that these

On the basis of the initial conclusions reached by the
SAC - AFEED studies, the Ais Force Ballistic Missile Comittee
on 2 April directed thet the intre-squadron concept for the Atlas
be adopted to provide tw additional aiming points, It

—______.,

106, Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, pp 7he78, filed in Hist
Div Archives, Hq SAC,

107. TWX, Hq USAF to CINCSAC, SAC HIER, | » AFOOP 57778,

10 Mar 1958, Exhibit 193 TWX CINCEAC to OoFS Usar, DPL
3657, 26 Mar 1958, Exhibit 50,

SECRET

ee


Chapter I
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSIIZ WEAPON SYSTEMS

THE WS~103A SNARK SM-62

AS a result of high level decisions taken late in'1957, the
Snark program’was limited to 51 production type missiles of which
30 would'be ubed for operational, purposes, This provided’ for a
Snark operational force equal to tw Squadrons, each equipped with
15 miseiles. In order to save manpower spaces and facilities, how
ever, the two squadrons would be combined into a single unit md
would Ué designated the 702d Strategic’ Missile Squadron upon activa-
tion at Presque Isle Air Force Base’on 1 July 1959. . The squadron
would be placed under the operational control ef Headquarters,
Eighth Air Force at that time,” "

Tie foregoing changes, which reduced the sise of the Snark program ‘

from eight to two squadrons, required a complete revision of the
Snark Operational Plan, The new plan, completed in Jamary, cop-
tained mre détails than provided heretofore on Snark tactical and
operational concepts. After being integrated into the EWP, Snark
missilds would be used initially only against arex type air power
targets. They would be programed to fly the Great Circle route
within a 360 nautical mile corridor in order to reach their assigned
targets. To avoid "traffic® congestion with manned -bombers, special
depertare SOP's and/or specific corridors would be assigned to Snark

TS.” Wistorical stady No. 70, Yol I, ps 10, filed in Hist Div Archives,
Hq SAC. 8 .f -

SECRET


Staffing of this office had been completed by early February, ‘

she Geciisigus to speed up the Wi-l17L and the Hound Dog prograne
were taken in February 1958 and April 1958, respectively. The
former program, which was given the highest national Priority,
firmly placed SAC into the field of outer space operational planning,
It was cenerally asuned thet SUC would eventually be given opere:
tdonal control over orbiting reconnaissance vehicles.”

-The acceleration of the foregoing missile and space systems,
plus contimancs of operstional planning for other missile wespon
systema, siguificantly increased the volune of SACts financial and
manpower resourses devoted to the missile and space fields during
the firat half of 1958, Although SAC believed ‘that ‘the strain on
ite resources, as well as on other Air Force agencies, could be
profitably lessdned by cancelling several umrented missile systens--
notably the Snark, RASCAL and Jupiter, higher level -Policy. decisions
required that they be integrated, if only in token fashion, into
the SAC inventory.” Of particular concern to CINCSAC was. the
TW TBs sac to all Directorates, "SAC MIKE Offices and Personnel,®

3 Feb 1958, Exhibit 3, . ; .
Se Seep 70.

6. See p 59,

To Interview, J. Van Staaveren, Historian with Col ¥. A. Vivian, Chief,
FBAFW Section, 1/Pins, Hq SAC, 18 Sep 19sb0 ao

8. For a detailed discussion of SAC's position with respect to the
Snark, RASCAL and Jupiter Weapon. systems see Historical Stady No. 70,
Vol I, filed in Hist Div, Hq SACs Interview J, Van Staaveren with Col
RE. A. Vivian, Chief FSKIW Syste 1/Pins, Hq SAC, 18 Sep 1958,



SECRET 60

Headquarters USAF also stated that weapon system operational
evaluation and testing of the Hound Dog would be conducted by the
3Olst Bomb Squadron (H) at Eglin AFB begiming FY 2/60, and that
construction would be included in the appropriate MOP's to insure
completion of the roahimed facilities to meet the forégoing
operational schedule,

In transmitting the foregoing schedule to each of his
numbered Air Forces, CINCSAC stated that Hound Dog equippage of
Be52 units would be performed about three mnths prior to the
planned operational dates. He also asked each mmbered Lis Force
to prepare a consolidated report on available existing facilities —
at each B-52 base to accommodate Hound Dog maintenance and
asceshiy fonctions. ue

The facility reports from each munbered Air Force and
discussions concerning them had not been completed by the end of
pains waren naar Tana neen concerned ‘with
the possibility of combining Quail and Hound Dog maintenance
facilities on B-52 bases, a subject that had been under study
since early in 1958, 3 vlinning 4n thie area was purtioularly

150. Ibid.

151. TWI, CINCSAC to 2nd, 6th, 15th AFs, EDP 6338, 29 May 1958,
Exhibit 65.

152. Central Files DS, Hq SAC, "HOUND DOG G4M-77", neds

153. DF, D/Ops to D/Instls Eng, *GAM-72 and 77," 25 Feb 1958,
Exhitit 664 .

SECRET



SECRET 38

The problems of ICBM boundaries and of dispersal of ICBM
units occupied mich of the attention of SAC during the reporting
period. With respect to the first problem, it will be recalled
that the geographical boundaries for ICBM units, originally ap-
Proved by Headquarters USAF, were limited to the area in North
Central United States and South Central Canada lying generally
between the Rocky Mountains and the Great Lakes, ICHM siting -
plans envisaged four missile squadrons to @ group, two to three
groups to a wing. Missile squadrons wuld be deployed within a
30-mile radius of a support base and missile groups within a
2O0-mile radine of a vit.” tho establishment of aay IER
base on or adjacent to SAC operational bases was initially
doomed undesirable by CINCSAC on the premise that a combined
manned bomber and ICEM base would contravene the dispersal con=
cept amd provide too lucrative a target for an eveny.”

That the foregoing policy would be changed became evident
late in 1957 when the Secretary of the Air Force directed that

9h. Historical Stady Ho. 6, Vol II, Exhibit 2, filed in Hist
Div Archives, Hq SAC; Memo from DPLC to Col Iyle, D/Pins, ig
SAC, “Samery of ICEM Site Selection Activities," 7 Feb 1958,
Exhibit 2. - -

95. TWX, CINCSAC to COFS USAF DPL.7250, 7 Wov 1957, Exhibit 13.

——


22 Jul 58

23 Jul 58

2h Jul 58

25 Jul 58

29 dul 58

Sh Jul 58

8 ang 58

17 aug 58

1 Sep 58

“SECRET

Hq USAF announces selection of five Companies to do
research and development wrk on the 801id-fuesled,
intercontinental Minuteman missile, This is the first
major contracting for this missile,

Kenscat, 3520 bomber is produced by Bosing!s Wichtte
Hound Deeiats, The B-S20 18 equipped to carey the ?
e

The Senate wtes to set Up a fifteen-member Comnittes
ait outer apace dovelmmesgsctsnoee Te will. dead with
cuter space developments exce; se fhinariiy

eseociated with military weapons,

The Slst Aviation Depot Squadron is activated at Cooke
(toon) *suo'00 3° dated eye ie cries
y as y
52, dated 15’ august 1958. ,

sresident Eisenhower signs « bill creating the
Notional Aeronautics and Space Agenoy (aah).
Construction of the Operational System Test, Facility
for the Titen 4-68 is initiated at Cooke AF. This
ds a prototype of the hard base, oonsisting of one
silo-1itt 2 blockhouse, and associated eqiip~
ment. feats here will prove out the operability or
ibe hard base using operational equipment tn «Tice
lated hard environment,



SeGHEF |

the British Government, namely, comand and control of the TREM
units in the United Kingdom, This iseus was Clarified, however,
on 3 March when Air Marshall Tuttle informed General Blanchard
that the British overtment had determined that it would have
to exercise complete Command and operational control over the
lst BAF Squadron, This baie decision promised to change SACts
Plans to use ite 672d Strategic Missile Squadron, activated on
i Jamary, until sufficient RAF personnel were trained to man
and operate the Ist RAF squadron, After studying the British
decision, the Secretary of Defense determined that political

RAF gave adequate assurances to comply with those operational
arrangements already in the Technical Agreement,” USAF = RAP.
discussions on the draft Technical Agreement contimed inter’
mittently until 26 June when Generel Blanchard and Air Marshal
Tuttle signed the Agreement on behalf of their respective
services, It reflected three basic changes from the earlier
draft agreement: No annexes or other detailed instructions in
supporting docummts, no reference to the duration of the
Technical Agreesent (a point believed adequately dealt with in :
35. Wistorical Study No. 70, Vol I, p 59, filed in Hist Diy
Archives, Hq SAC, See p 12,
60. its Ha USAF to CIWCSAC, 13 Mar 1958, fi1ed in D/Pins,



SECRET us
simltaneously ordered that construction work beyond the first

squadron at Francis E. Warren Air force Base, Wyoming be held
in abeydnce pending the final outcome of the configuration study.

The revised configuration concept was presented to the AFEMC
by a joint SAC/AFEMD briefing team on 17 april. The Comittee
approved the concept but the Air Staff added the proviso that the
revised Atlas configuration would have. to be implemented within
the cost limitations of about $76,000,000, and manpower limite=
tdons of not more than ten percent over existing maming docu-
ments which provided for sbout 620 personnel spaces per omadron.
Highlights of changes in the Atlas configuration were as follows:

1.. The intra-equadron dispersal concept would be implemented
beginning with the second squadron at Francis E. Warren Air Force
Base, Wyoming. This concept would provide three complexes or |
aiming points with each complex containing three launchers, a block
house, and a guidance station (known as a 3x3 configuration). These
changes would increase the mumber of launchers per squadron from six
to nine, and the muber of guidance stations from tw to three.

108. TWX, Hq USAF to ARDC, AFCGM 59020, 3 Apr 1958, filed in D/Plns
Hq SAC3 Study, "SM-65 atlas Configuration Study Actions, 2 Apr -
1 May 1958," 26 Apr 1958, Exhibit 51.

109. Told,
110, Ibid.s D/Pins to all Directorates, Hq SAC, "SM~65 (ATLAS)

ts and Requirements," 21 Apr 19583 TWX, Eq USAF to
ALIMAJOONS, AFOGH 59977, 2h Apr 1953, filed a D/Pins, Bq SAC.

SECRET


SECHET a

and four sites as satellite bases, Although a number of Sites
were provisionally gpreed Upon, they were still subject to
detailed surveying,

Negotiations were also under way, meanwhile, on the
diplomstic level. On 22 February the Covernnents of the United
States and the United Kingdom signed a fen-point menorwndum of Under=
standing which broadly defined the responsibilities of each
government with respect to REM sites, supplying equipment and
ownership thereof, test firing and the use of TREM's, Key Points

" of the Menorandan Contained the stipulation that the decision to

lamnoh missiles would be a mtter for joint decision by the ti:
governments in the light of Circumtancés at the time and with:
die regard to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that.
au} mnclear warheads wuld renain in U.S, amership, custody

and control in accérdance with U. S. law, The memorandum

we sunject to revision by mtual consent of the tm) governments
and would remain in force for not less than five years, However, ,
4 could be terminated by either goverment upen six months!
nottoes”TM .

Neither the draft Technical Agreenent nor the Memrandon
of Understanding touched on a basic issue then under stady by

—___
37. Teddy

58. U.S. ~ U.K. Memorandum of Unde: 22 Feb 1958,
RITE yo O Untoretanting,

SEECRER-



“SECRET-

Chapter III

TEE W-1171 ADVANCED RECORNAISSANCE SYSTEM (ARS)

The possibility of designing and successfully launching a re-
connaissance satellite to obtain vital military and other informtion,
& project long under consideration, began to take concrete form on
23 December 1957 when the Directorete of Operations, Headqurters USAF,
sent SAC a Preliminary Operations Concept for an Advanced Reconneis-
sance System (aR). The mission of an ARS vehicle, as defined there-
Sn, wes: “To provide operational support planning date for the
earliest possible warning of an attack, revealing preparation: for a
possible attack, and acquiring accurete up-to-date information by
continuous aerial surveillance of any possible enemy." More
specifically, intelligence data gathered by an ARS vehicle would
Provide reliable waming and tracking of a high altitude attack,
knowledge of any mass weapons threat and air defense ‘systems,
reliable information on military bases, launching sites, pre=
hostilities force dispositions, characteristics of industrial
concentrations, transpirtation systems and strike damage essess-
ment, and data for total area charts and folders

170. Sar ae coneert for the Advanced Reconnaissance
» Prep 2 F 9

ys
Bq SAC,

67

friri)
CTY

io)
rin
oe)

Oy


57

58

59

62

63

SECRET

EXHIBITS

Progress Report No. 1 on SAC Programming Plan 3-58
Deir /ean3 Integration Program (RASCAL) ," 28 Feb
e

Progress Report No. 2 on SAC Progremming Plan 3-58
sere Integration Program (RASCAL), 1h, May

GaM-63 (RASCAL) Installations Plan, 2 Apr 1958,

Memo for Record, "GAM-63 We tem Phas:
Meeting,® 26 Feb 1958. eS “5s Group

Ltr, Gen Curtis E. LeMay to GINCSAC, *Partict pation
in Bystens Test Programs," 7 Apr 1926,

TWX, Comdr Det 1, ARDC WPAFB to GINCSAC, "Accelerated
Program for WS=131B Hound Dog,*. 2i; Jan 1958, .

Joint Magform, CINCSAC to CofsS USAF, “Accelerated
Program for GAM-77 HOUND 100,® 31--Jan.1958,

WK, Hq USAF to CINCSAC, AFOOP-OP-U 51091, "dAM~77
Program", 21 May 1958, .

TWX, CINCSAC to nd, 8th, 15th aP, DEDP 6338, *GaM—77
Program," 27 May 1998, .

WF, Tope to D/Instis Eng, "OdM=72 & 7,8 25 Feb 1958,
trae On ne vrata ‘ny aoa ae

oe De er, us
GM-72 (QUAIL) Program,® 2, Apr 1958, _

TWX, CINCSAC to CofS USAF, IPL 5629, "cane72
Facilities and Equippage,* 10-Mey 1958,

TW, Hq USAF to ARDC, AMMRD 51576} "cuN-72 Weapon
stent 3 dun 1958, ;

CHAPTER III

70

‘omy Mrs Neil H. McElroy to the Secretary of the

‘: "Air Force WSe117L Progrs (Reconnaissance
System), 2), Feb 1958, ~_

vit



SECRET %
because of power failure. Loss of power and pylon tenk ejection
occurred almbst simitaneously, It was subsequently determined
that this was caused by malfunctioning of ejection cartridges,
Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in the flight tests,

33
much valuable information was obtained,

By the end of 1957, Headquarters USAF had spproved three
Goose sites, Ethan Allen Air Force Base, Vermont, Duluth Munici-
pal Airport, Minnesota, and Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts,
Construction funds for FY 1958, however, were made available for
only the first: two Air Force tases,” On 13 February, Head=

" quarters USAF approved three mre Goose sites, Kinross, K. I.
Sanyér, and Wurtemith Air force Bases, all in Michigan. Obsern.
ing that four’ additional sites would have to be selected shortly
Af they were t0:be included in the FT 1960 MP, Headquarters
USaF waived ite previously established requirement that Goose
sites should be located north of 42 Degrees, 30 Minutes latitude,‘
provided that operating locations could be selected which would
provide sufficient decoy penetration in support of the EWP,

Fe Fe atoee nperte ego os (eet ekenecte Mises Mntly
D/Compt, Bq SAC, Monthly Report, i Soon S08, 28 ul 1956, tiled
in Hist Div Archives, e

3h. Historical 8 No. 70, Vol I, pp 32033, filed in Hist
Div archives, Sac. ’ ,

Se TWX, Hq USAF to CINCSAC, AFOGP-OP-1I 56600, 13 Feb 1958,
Exhibit 1h.



i

1 Oct 58

2 Oct 58

"22 oot 58

SECRET

The 6592d Support Squadron (Missile Technical) having
been yelieved from rey ARDC ana assigned to
Sac redesigna’ Suppo: on,
(Missile Technical) by SAC 00 52, dated Angust 1958,

The 3990th Support Squadron (Missile Technical), Offutt
AFB, Nebraska, is discontimed by SAC 00 52, dated 1s
August 1958,

Air Force attemp.s second Thor Able Lunar Probe. ‘This
is doneidered successful; however, f inal velocity is

lower than desired and the vehicle ultimately returns
to earth and burns up as it enters the atmosphere,

93



SECRET +

During Jamary, however, representatives of the North American
Aviation, Inc., dnd the Boeing Aircraft Company proposed to Head~
quarters USAF, SAC, ARDC and other Air Force agencies an
accelerated Hound Dog program that would permit equipping the

BeS2 force with Hound Dog missiles by early 1960. In conveying
his approval of the proposed accelerated program to Headquarters
USAF, CINCSAC specifically reoomanteds

1. Acceleration of Hound Dog research and development (as had
been proposed). =

2, ‘Incorporation of the Hgund Dog capability by production
ine methods in the last 101 B-52@ model aircreft (as had been
proposed).

36 For planning purposes, retrofiting B-52E, F and G model
airoraft (totaling 343) bat leaving to a subsequent decision pos-
sibility of retrofiting B-52C and D model aircraft. —

Observing that the results of the 1965 war gaming exercise
and SAC/TAWR studies would be available by mid-1958, and that
BS2 IRAN and modification programs would have to be extrapolated
to cover the retrofit period, CINCSAC further recommended that

Se Tux, Comme Det 1 ARDC WPAFB to CINCSAC, 2 Jan 1958, Exhibit
.

Ub. Joint Msgform, CINCSAC to COFS USAF, SL Jan 1958, Exhibit
30

‘SECRET

”



Uy Jan 58

18 Jan 58

22 Jan 58

23 Jan 58

29 Jan 58

. 29 Jen 58

31 Jan 58

32 Jen 58

1 Feb 58

1 Feb 58

5 Feb 58

“SECRET

A Jupiter "A" SM~78 is launched in support of Project
Hardtack to determine the feasibility of making a therm-~
muclear detonation at high altitude,

The Defense Department publicly announces that Willian
MM, Holaday, Defense Departasnt Director for Guided Mis-
siles, will direct all anti-missile weapon development
dn the Aray and Air Force,

Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy, informs the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Subcommlttee of 1 separate
actions taken by the Defense Department to speed up the
missile and other essential defense programe

Statement of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub-
commLttee is issued by Chairmen Lyndon 8. Johnson snd ~
Ranking Minority Member Styles Bridges at the direction
of the Subcommittee upon conclusion of Hearings on

Into Satellite and Missile Programs. Senator
Johnson Ligts "17 points® on which decisive action mst
‘pe taken by the United States.

The Defense Department publicly announces establishment
of a ballistic missile treining range on thé Pacific
Coast that will eventually extend several thousand miles
over the ocean.

SAC issues Staff Memorandum li-hh defining adwini strative
functions of the Office of Assistant CINCSAC (SKC MIKE)

at Inglewood, Californias oo

dn elongated Redstone fram: combined with a North dmsrican
75,000 pound thrust engine (known ss a Jupiter: C) ‘places
America's first satellite, Explorer I, into orbit.

SAC Reglation 23-8 is published setting forth the
mission of the lat Missile Division.

The Missile Division of the Directorate of Materiel, Hq
SAC, is redesignated as the Missile Maintenance Division
and is responsible for all maintenance~engineering
functions pertaining to strategic missile weapon systems
except those concerning the nose cone, ade

The 320th Strategic Wing (Missile) is organized at
Francis E, Warren AFB, and assigned to the ist Missile

Division by SAC GO 7, dated 10 February 1958, as amended
by SAC G0 9, dated 18 February 1958.

The second attempt to place a satellite into orbit with
the Vanguard rocket is unsuccessful,

SECRET

&



SECRET
ot oqatom FEE Beer Pit ae

This schedule aleo provided for only three squadrons of B-)7
Sinerert to be equipped with Gui] missiles during the fourth
quarter of FY 1962,

Numerous revisions were made or contemplated in the Quail
Program during the latter part of the reporting period, On
19 May Headquarters USAF cancelled the *fly before buy®
restriction ( i.e, fequiring completion of research and
development on Quail missiles before a production contract
could be awarded) “which ‘hed contributed to #lippages in’
Proposed Quail operational dates, Headquarteré USAF also
indicated at this tine that the aircraft imdification progran
for the Quail weapon’ system would be condioted in cadjunction |
with the modifications zogeired for the Hound Dog GaH-77.
Sir-to-surface missile, | Early if June Headquarters USAF
further directed that a quick load capability Compatible with
weapon loading of B-52 and B-l7 aircraft should be incor-
Porated in the Quail program, indicating that funds for this

16h. Ibid.

—

165. Historical Study Ko. 70, Vol I, p 10h, filed in Hist Div

Archives, Hq SAC.

166, THK, Hq USAF to ARDC, AMC ARDC Det 1 WAFB, 19 May 1958
filed in D/Pine, Bq SAC, , ,

Uy
Prin
HY

io)
on
oH]


SECHET »

@pproved late in 1957, In March, Headquarters USAF proposed to
the Defense Department & 16-squadron TREH progran consisting of
12 Thor and four Jupiter squadrons,” an Air Force and Defense
Department conference on 22 April, however, remlted in a tenta-
‘tdve agreement on a ‘l2-squadron Progrem consisting of nine Thor

80 ,
to France, As has been noted, however, a firm overseas IRE.

79. Ltr, Department of the Air Force to CIncaac, *IREM Deploy=
ment Plng,® 12 Mar 1958, Ezhibtt 28, -

80, Mano, W. M. Holaday to Secre of the Air Force, 25 sor
1958, Exhibit 365 Mono tee Distrib tien, Office of Assist
CofS for Guided Miseiles, "Revined macs Prograns," 1 May
1958, Exhipit 36,



ay

SeECRet

78

overconcentration of ICBM units near Air Force bases by creat-
ing many additional "aiming points" for the eneay, Studies on
hardening ICBM facilities were also contiming, 4 decision
was made to harden Atlas facilities at 25 pel beginning

with the fifth Atlas equadron, and to harden all of the initial
‘MMten units up to 100 pei, The desire to provide greater protec-
tion to the ICBM force promised, however, to greatly increase the
financial cost and-manpower needs per squadrons At the end of
dune B40 was participating with otter comends.in trying to keep
the monetary costs and manpower requirements of an Atlas squad-
von within previously preseribed Lilt tations, |

Five Atlas flight tests were conducted during the first six
months of 1958 of which two were successfuls ‘this brought to eight
‘the total number of atlas flight tests made since they began in
1957. Flight testing of Titan missiles was expected to begin
late in 1958.

In the airto-surface missile programs of primary interest
to SAC, funds for RASCAL facilities were authorised and con-

struction work begun at Pinecastle AFB, Florida, The beginning

of the equipment end suitebility testing (E&ST) phase of the
RASCAL program revéaled many malfunctionings of the missile with
the result that the program slipped three months behind schedule.



SECRET. »

deployment schedule, with the exception of the four Thor sqlade
rons destined for the United Kingdon, had not been developed
by the end of June, ds 9 Consequence, the Defense Departament
Sonvimned Ye eld im abeyance final approval of an enlarged 12.
Squadron IRBM progran,

The reporting period witnessed several changes in TREY
ualt assignments and designations, and one wing activation,
The G6hth Strategic Hissile Squadron (Jupiter) which vas initially
assigned to the Ist Missile Division, eas further assigned to
the 704th Strategic ‘Missile Wing at Cooke AFB effective 23
February 1958,"° The British decision to retain command and
operational control over all of its Thor units resulted in a
major change in the functions af the 672nd Strategic Missile Squadron
which bad been scheduled to serve as the firet TEM unit in the
United Kihgdom, — Redesignated the 6724 Technical Training
Squadron, it was relieved from assignment to the 70l;th Strategic
Mineile Wing at Cooke AFB and Teassigmed to the 705th Strategic
—_— ;
ee “Zaded 2 het aemteele Oe a
82, Historical Study No, 70, Vol I, pp. 59-60,
83. 00 12, Bq SAC, 12 Mar 1988, Exhipit 37,
Sl. Historical Study No. 70, Vol Ty Ppe 59=60,


: program with the result that the planned completion: date for the

“SECRET ‘i

contract was awarded on 2 ten Facilities to be con-
structed were outlined in an installations plan prepared by
SAC's Directorate of Installations, This delay in beginning
construction precluded the 321lst Bomb ee) from receiving any
RASCAL missiles prior to December 1958.

Following the termination of the research and development
phase of the RASCAL progran on 31 Ootober 1957, the FAST phase
had been scheduled to begin, Delays in getting this part of the
tes}ing program under way also contribated to sLippage in the RASCAL
EST phase was changed fron 31 August to 30 November 1958, After
mumerous captive flight tests late in 1957 and early in 1958,

MAST activities officially began on 17 February 1958 when a crew of
the With Boub Sqaedron succesefully launched a RASCAL missile for
the first til, It was released at an altitude of 35,000 feet

at a speed of Mach .72, sbout 72 miles from ite target. Durings its

she Progress Report #1 on SAC Programming Plan 3-58, "DBqli7/aaM-63
Integration Program (RASCAL), 28 Feb 1958, Exhibit 573 Progrese

rt #2 on SAC Pro; Plan 3-56, "DB-))7/cAN-63 Inte-
Bepeion Progran (RASCAL), Lh May 1958, Exhibit 58,

1356 gant (eascat) Installation Plan, 2 Apr 1958, prep by TE, Hq
2 e

1%. Ta 32st to CINEME, IML O375 28 Ape 2658, fied Sn n/ane,
co

137. Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, p 95, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC.

SECRET



SECRET a

Five Godse flight tests were conducted during the report=
ing period. A flight on 31 Jamary, designed to study launching,
stability, performance and reflectivity, ended after radio
control was lost. The missile flew two hours and 18 mimtes
and attained a maximm altitude of 25,000 feet. The test was
Considered partially successful, During « very successful
flight on 18 March & Goose missile flew in a race track pattern.
for four hours and 58 minutes at speeds of . to .88 Mach,
reaching a miximm altitade of 49,000 feet. A third flight
attempt on 16 April failed completely when the missile impacted
on the beach and exploded, The fourth test on 15 May lasted
about twanda half hours, It was designed to test dynamic
stability and performance of the missile at 20,000 to 18,000 feet
and to gather flutter ani vibration data during a high speed dive
to impact. Gyro control was lost, hovever, after tw hours and
25 mimtes of flight and the missile impacted, Nevertheless, the
test was considered partially successful, The last flight test
of the reporting period, on 18 June, failed because af booster
ignition malfunctidning, Fuel expansion during the subsequent
delay caused sicin separation on each wing of the Goose, therety
requiring either a wing change or factory repeir. The test of
18 June comprised: the tenth Goose flight test since the tests
began on 27 June 1957,

BI. Here, Tops to D/Comt, "Strategic Missile Monthly Repo rts,®

Feb thru Jul 1958, filed.in Mgt Analysis Div, D/Comt, Hq SAC and

din Hist Div Archives, Hq SACs Historical Study No. 70, Vol I,

P 3h, filed in Hist Div Archives, Bq SAC.



“SECRET 51

February. In Match, RASCAL treining took precedence over all
other types of twining within the 32ist Bomb Wing (M). A total
of 20 crews had to be trained by the end of 1958. Some concern
was felt ty the wing during the reporting period about its
capability to fulfill ite EWP mission while diverting aircraft and
menpiver ‘0 the RASCAL program

Other significant changes in the RASCAL program during the
reporting period included decisions to integrate the li\Sth Bomb
Squadron into SAC's ready alert soncept when the squadron became
operational and to delete an earlier prestrike stage requirement
for the squadron, In view of the latter decision, miltiple air
refuélings would be required to enable RASCAL equipped aircraft
to perform their assigned missioss. “Support requirements for the
TG-L? airoraft ard RASCAL missiles would be accomplished only at
the bows’ base.”

THE We. HOUND DOG GAM-
Initial operational planning for the Hound Dog sireto-ground
missile called for equipping the first B-52 squadron by mid-1961.

12.

bid. .
1436 Now 1, 21 Mar 1958 to SAC Programming Plan *DB-7/
anes Integration Program (RASCAL), 10 Jan 1958, Exhibit 56,

Uh. Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, p 98, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC, . .

SECRET



—SECRET-

= 167
Purpose were How available. © Near. the middle of June Head=

quarters ARDC reported that the Quail WEPO was attempting to
freeze the operational configuration of the Quail weapon system
in order to provide inventory Quail decoys by November 1959.

Tn order to achieve this goal, it observed, the B-520 production
Program had begun to incorporate Quail requirements and the :
processing of FY 1959 procurement for Quail production missiles,
ANDO also cautioned SAC about recommending too many changes in
‘the Quail program (abit had done periodically) lest it delay
the program and increase costs. It suggested that future SAC
reoomigndations consist of three categories! mandatory, .
desireable and optacanl,

The Quail Preliminary Operational Plan of July 1957 was under
revision during the reporting period and on 30 June 1958 a copy of
the revised plan was submitted to Headquarters ARDC for study and
approvala approval of the plan by ARDC, and subsequently vy
Headquarters USAF, was anticipated later in 1958,

167. WI, Hq USAF to ARDC, AFDRD 51578, 3 dun 1958, Exhibit 69.

168. ‘TWX, COMDR ARDC TET 1 WPAFB to CIMWSAC, 13 Jun 1958, filed
in D/Plns, Hq SAC.

169. Ltr, Hq SAC to ARDC, "Preliminary GIN-72 Operational Plan
(aetietaye 30 Jun 1958, filed in . By SAC


SECHET

TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDICES
VoL IT - Bxhibite 1-21 ° 4g Dec se
ave 7
Vol III = Exhibits 22-55 {yet vert
Vol IV = Section I ~ Exhibits 5675
Section II- Supplementary Data
EXHIBITS
Number
1 Report, “Actions Taken by The Office of The
of Defense to Speed Up The Missile Programs?
Jan 1958. .
2 Staff Memorandum le, "SAC MIKE Office," Hq SAC,
29 Jan 1958,
3 DF, Adj to all Directorates, “SAC MIKE Offices and
Personnel," 3 Feb 1958,
4 Address 7 General Power at the 25th Annis of

SAC Operational. Plan SM~62=2 (SHARK), 8 Jan 1958,

Ltr, VCDICSAC to CofS USAF, “Low Level Atteck
Capability," li Mey 1958,

7 DF, D/Instls Eng to 1/Eng, “Operational Snark
Facilities,® 15 apr 1958, .

8 DF, D/Ope to D/Instls Eng, "Operational Snark
Facilities," } Apr 1958,

9 Ltr, Gen Curtis E, LeMay to Gen Power (Relative to
facilities at Presque Isle) 9 20 Feb 8.
10 TWX, COMAF 8 to CINCSAC, C 20783, "Support Facilities
and Follow-on Mission for Presque Isle," 20 Jun 1958,
aid



SECRET ta

Air Staff? initial reaction to the single squadron concept
was qualified, Although they favored adequate dispersal of
ICEM sqadrons, the Air Staff was reluctant to permit the use
of strategically vital Be52 and KC#135 bases for use as ICEM
sites, favoring instead the use of Bek] bases scheduled for
early phase outs SAC representatives thoroughly briefed the
Air Staff and the Air Force Ballistic Missile Committee during
the period 12-13 March on the single squadron concept, ad
simultaneously recommended thet the next two Atlas squadrons
be established at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington and
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Moanwiile, CINCSAC personally
urged the Air Staff to approve the single squadron concept, em
phasizing that it would permit SAC to capitalize on the maxi-
mum use of Air Force base facilities, commnication networks,
and support organizations, and thet it would prevent any over
extension of base capacities such as might. occur under the
previous ICEM siting concept requiring four squadrons around an
Air Force support base. He also observed that this concept
would provide a mecleus for future missile area buildupe
comensurate with the mission of the support ase,

102. TWX, Hq USAF to ALLMAJCOMS, AFOOP 57755, 7 Mar 1958, Exhibit 6.

103. mF 0/Fing %e,D/Compt, estretesis Missile Monty Repost
May 2 Analysis Div, 3
TWA to’ CORS USAF, 11 Mar 1958, Exhibit UB.” °


SECRET »

Air Force bases should be utilized for the ICEM Program wherever
possible. He warned that any deviation from this rule would
require considerable justification, This decision, plus SAC's
growing awareness of ICEM siting probleme with their variant and
Sometimes incompatible requirements which inolnded low constru-
tdon costs, a booster impact area, adequate base and commmications
support, dispersal needs, “hardened” sites, and adequate troop and
family housing, led to a general reappraisal of sone of the
original ICEM siting concepts,

On the basis of recomehdations made by his Director of
Inetallations,”” and as 4 remit of long range planning exercises,
GINCSAC recommended to Headquarters USAF early in 1958 that
the geographical limits for ICBM unite be expanded and that the
United States be considered in Category I and Canada in
Category n° Headquarters USAF only partially agreed with
CINCSAG's recommendations, It extended the ICEM geographical
boundary further south and indicated that any reguests for ICEM

96. Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, p 7h, filed in Hist Diy
Archives, Hq SAC,

97. DP, 0B to D/Pins, Ha SAC, “Site Selection - IcaM," 2 Dec
1957, Exhibit hh. .

98. TWX, CINCSAC to COFS USAF DPLBC 1033, 25 Jan 1958, Exhibit 45.



“SECRET

be a SAC responsibility. .
: 171
Special ground facilities for the ARS project would includes

6

1. A West Coast launching site,

2. A vehicle tracking, control and telimetry station in
Hawaii to provide a ground date gathering capability during the
development test pinse,

3e Three ARS vehicle interodpt, control and date aoquini~
tion stations located in the Hortinvest; the South Centre and the
Hortheast United States. Thése stations wuld transmit date from
ARS vehicles to a processing center at Headquarters SAC,

Headquarters USAF ‘sent its Preliminary Operational Concept of
am ARS vehicle to SAC on 2 Jaimary 1958, and requested that it be
used ag the basis for preparing a Preliminary Operational Plan,
Although a draft’ of the Plan was completed and submitted to Head-
quarters USAF in April, > tt had mot been formally approved by

the end of June.

W7le Ltr, Dept of Air Force to CINCSAC, "Preliminary Operational
* Concept for pavansed Reconnaissance Systen,* 2 Jan 1958,
filed in D/Pins, Hy SAC.

172. Ibid.

273. ‘TWX, CINCSAC to COPS IAF, APOOP-OC-2 52521, 25 Jun 1958,
filed in D/Plns, Hq SAC.


SECHET

Both Deputy Secretary Quarles and Secretary McElroy promised to
make this vesbptaiaal, Their positions remained unchanged. How
ever in June, Senator Stuart Symington, another member of the Sub-
committee, expressed to the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. James
H, Douglas, and the Defense Departuent's Director for Guided
Missiles, Mr, William H. Holaday, his dissatisfaction with the low
priority status given the Snark and the fact that production was.
being limited to one missile per month,”

Members of a House Subcommittee holding hearings on Defense
Appropriations for FY 1959, also manifested interest in a larger
Snark force, ‘However, Ideutensnt General John K, Gerhart, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters USAF, explained
in Mareh that the Snark had a significantly less payload than a
B52, that it was a “one shot" weapon, and that it lacked the flexi-
bility and the accuracy of a BeS2, He also stressed the problems
of budgetary restrictions and weapon system priorities as bearing on
the decision to maintain a reduced Snark program. Questioned about
the relative costs of a Snark and B-52 squadrons, General Gerhart
indicated that a Snark squadron of 15 missiles plus military and
other support costs was estimated at $60,000,000 whereas a B-S2
squadron composed of 15 B-52 aircraft and KC-135 jet tankers plus
military and other support coste was estimated at $150,000,000,

I. Senate, i on Into Satellite ani Missile Prog:

by the Pre; rr) stiga : °.
on Armed Services, 65th Congress, Part IT, 1958, pp 15763 1836=373



Secnet 56

which period the Air Force became predominant as the user, and
Category ITI an Air Force effort wherein the weapon was evaluated
under operational conditions to determine its utility and inte-
gration if desirable, into the user's taventorys

The modification schedule for 20 B-l7 aircraft of the WSth
Bomb figgedryir'also slipped from Septenber to Decenber 1958 during
the reporting period, Although five aircraft had previously been
modified to a RASGAL configuration (DB-l7's) further changes on -
these aircraft were required, In March, the Oklahoma City Air
Materiel Area (OCAMA) established a Bel? conversion schedule
providing for the modification of 18 aircraft during the period
Angust to December, Two additional aircraft would eventually
be inherited by the LhSth Boab Squadron from the operational test
center at Bglin AFB, thus insuring a total of 20 DB-l7 aircraft
twaring she DASCAT ovtft gardens

Training of RASCAL crews was contiming at the end of June.

&n initial combsl rating for a RASCAL-crew was given on 17
140. Minutes of the GAM=63 Weapon System Phasing Group Conference

Held at Eglin AFB, Florida, 10 Jul 1958, filed in D/Pins, Hq
SACs Ltr, Gen LeMay to CINCSAC, 7 Apr 1958, Exhibit 61.

1. History of 32ist Bomb Wing (i) Mar 2958, filed in Hist Div
Archi, on Plan
$b, wb /aaMees Titegration Progran (RASCALS, Exhibit 58.



SECRET &

distributed to all SAC directorates for ccmente The final USAF

Preliminary Operational Concept was issued on 13 sme, voambtte,
SAC steff agencies were busily engaged in developing a Preliminary

Operetional Flan based on the Concepts A SAC draft Plan, submitted
to Headquarters USAF in June,’ was expected to be approved. in

duly.
THE W-122h UATE cuy-72

After experiencing many-months of difficulties in dévelo
# J~G5 General Flectric engine for the Quail decoy missile, a
successful preliminary flight rating test (PIRT) was achieved with |
@ 2,290 pound thrust éngine ‘in March. Although this engine
produced less thrust than deéired and would assure only a 250 KM
rather than 4 350 NM range for the Quail air-to-surface missile,
Headquarters USAF approved its use, after completion of research
and development,-for & limited number of production type missiles
sufficient to equip two Bl? squadrons, There vas expectation

156. Draft Prelininacy operational conoept for the GAM-77 Hound
P02 > “el 2 en: es 1m, a
157. File, "C4M-77 HOUND Dog," 1958, filed in 0/Pins, Bq SAC.

Hq SAC to Hq USAF, SMT? Opetatioial Plan, # 13 Jun
198, filed in Central files, TE, Bq SAG.

159, Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, p 108, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC,



SECKET-
would not meet the requirements of flexibility of employment, the
" mpositive control" concept inherent in aircraft, and the desired
‘end position for airborne auerte”

In March, NAI officials sought to indice the Air Force to
parchase an additiondl 120 Snark missiles on the basis of an im
proved operaticrial concept which would provide for a dispersed
force. (six missiles per site, in fixed launchers, with one missile

‘per building), fast zeaction plus incorporation of the low level
attack capability which had been proposed in Jemary. as a Tre
sult of this briefing, the Air Staff again asked SAC to examine
the possibilities of expanding the Snark progr.”

Although SAC recognized thet the NAI's fast reaction
concept (known as a Snark Maximum Attack Capability or a "SMAC®
concept providing for a 100 percent salvo of the inventory vs
the 20 percent salvo of the inventory provided for in the exist-
dng Operational Plan), would make the Snark weapon system more
desirable, the proposed changes would also create many problems.
Facilities would havé to be redesigned, the established July
U5. Ltr, VCDICSAC to CofS USAF, “Low Level Attack Capability,"

Uy May 1958, Exhibit 6, .

2h. DF, D/Plns to D/Compt, "Strategic Missile Monthly Report," &
ee 1958, filed in Mgt Analysis Div, D/Compt, Hq SAC. =.

25. ‘DF, D/Instls Eng to D/Eng, “Operational Snark Fectlities," 1
Apr 1958, Exhibit 7,



THE W=103A SHARK SM~62 bs cecceccesavece
THE W~123A GOOSE EM-73 cee cece ccc c cs cee
THE W-315k~1 THOR SM-75 AND THE W5=31SA-2 JUPITER Sl=78
THE WS~1O7A-1 ATLAS SM=65 AND THE WS-1O7A-2 TITAN 8M~68

CHAPTER IT

THE W5-D12A RASCAL M63 a-e see ce ee ee
THE W-131B HOUND DOG GM=77 5... eee ee es
THE W-222A QUAIL M72 nee ee eee eee ees

CHAPTER III

THE W-117L ADVANCED REGONIMISSANCE SYSTEM (ARS), ..

SUMMARY 6 oe ee woe one's

GHROHOLOGY see eee ce cece rec ccccces

SB Gu

BAY

67

83



SECHET — 2

4n support of the Jupiter Program but would be devoted to other
Purposes (such as photo reconnaissance, satellites and lunar
probes).’ It appeared that the Army would be able to test flight
only two Jupiter missiles with an operational configuration prior
to the deployment of the 86)th Strategic Missile Squadron, a
circumstance that SAC MIKE believed could embarrass the Air

Force which had operational responsibility for the Jupiter
weapon ante.” In addition, there was slippage in the Jupiter
training program because of the elimination of Redstone
training, slippage in the number of Jupiter trainere needed,

and lack of O8E and missile support items. During June SAC
noted that Chrysler Corporation, the prime contractor for the
Jupiter, still had very little failure data on equipment, and.that
drawings were not available on some items. Without the failure
data, the drawings and hardware, adequate provisioning for the
Jupiter weapon systen was not posatbte,

Also unresolved during the reporting period were the Air

_—
16. Ltr, SAC MIKE to CINCSAC, 1 Apr 1958 with attached ltr, den
Schriever to COMDR ARDC, "Jupiter," 29 Mer 1958, Exhibit 3h.

TT. BF, D/Fing to D/Compt, "Strategic Missile Monthly Report,¥
3 duly 1958, fited in Mgt Analvels Div, D/Compt, Eq SAC.


pase nee

#it

“SECRET a

GLOSSARY

Airways and Air Commmications Servviise
Air Force Ballistic Missile Comittee
Air Toros Ballistic. Wisstle Diflision
Air Materiel Comand .

Ady Research and Development Command
Advanced Reconnaissance Syston -
Ballistic Missile Office =o”
Beneficial Occupancy Date : .
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
Electronic Countermeasures
Emergency War Plan
Equipment and Suitability Test
French Air Force

Fiscal Year

Quided Aircraft Missile

Ground Support Equipment
Intercontinental Ballstic Missile
Tidtial Operational Capability
Inspection and Repair as Necessary”
Inttepneddatin Range Ballistic Missile
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Northrup Aviation, Inc.

(WA)
Pov
aN
Gq!
ae



SECRET 8

all Goose Missiles desired by SAC would include an "S* band jammer,
VHF jammer, a repeater, and chaff, including delayed opening chaff,

Considerable impetus was given to planning for the Goose
force when SAC completed and issued on 1 July a completely re-
vised and detailed Goose Preliminary Operational Plan, replacing
the Preliminary Operational Plan issued on 29 May 1957, As
has been noted, a major change in the plan required the dis-
persal of Goose squadrons, their establishment on active USAF
installations not considered priority targets, and placed
sufficient distance from a support base to preclude destruction
of both the sty base and the squadron by a single eneny
weapon attack. J The plan also contained detailed annexes of
wing, group ahd squadron unit manning documents, training,
logistical maintenance and my policies, and installation
and commnication requirenentse Manpower estinetas. indicated
that approximately 308 military personnel would be needed to
man a Goose eiuatron.” Refinements of the new Operational Plan

‘8, D/Mat to D/Compt, "Monthly Reports on Strategic

* fSailes,» {May 3958, 6 Jan 1988, 7 Jul 1958, filed in
hmalyeis’ Div, bCoopt, Hq Sil, , ‘t

6. Historical Study No. 70, Vol Il, Exhibit 15, filed in
Hist Div. Archives, Hq SAC.
h7. See pe 176

4B. SACOP 3-58 "SM=73 Goose Preliminary Operational Plan,*
1 Jal 1958, Exhibit 17. -_

k9. Ltr, Hq USAF to Comdr 8th aF, "Construction Requirements
and Personnel Strengths to Support SM-73 Goose Missile
Squadron," filed in Central files DE, Hq SAC.



Pa)

This is 9 SEORET document and will be handled
in accordance with the provisions of AFR 205=1,
as amended, It contains information affecting
‘the National defense of the United States and,
accordingly, utmost security will be afforded
and distribution of its contents will be rigidly

planning and developments in the guided missile
field.



SECRET

2. The squadron UE of 10 missiles would be retained,
Spares, if required, would be provided at a later date,

3.- An all-dnertial guidance systen for Atlas missiles
would be introduced beginning with the fifth Atlas squadron
scheduled to be placed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Weshington.

Lh. Facilities should be protected to withstand 25 pei
of overpressure beginning with the fifth Atlas squadron at
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington,

5. A simplified, centralised maintenance concept to support
the 3x3 configuration shoulit be adopted, (This was cmwOsacts
decision and represented a change from past staff decisions).

Headquarters USAF simltaneously directed that the ap-
proved nine squadron Atlas Program also be revised to reflect
the following squadron operational dates:

Unit Location Operational Date
S76th SS Cooke AFB June 1959
577th SHS Warren AFB May 1960
578th SMS Warren AFB duly 1960
S7oth SMB (ié«éf utttt: AB November 1960
580th SS Fairchild AFB February 1961
58lst SMS Undetermined : 1961
582nd SMS Undetermined dune 1961
583rd SMS Undetermined Angust

58th SMS Undetermined Roverber 1961

111, Memo, D/Plns to Gen Westover, "SM-65 Configuration,*
28 Ape 1958, filed in D/Plns, Hq SAC. ,
12, TW, USAF to ALLMAJCOMS, AFCOM 59977, 2h Apr 1958, filed


SECHET ca

for a Jupiter squadron to be sent to Fraoes

On 29 April Major General Gabriel P. Disosway, Deputy
Commander for Operations, USAFE wes appointed to head the USAF
team composed of representatives from the major commands,
General Disosway was instructed to use the draft text of a pro-
posed United States ~ French Agreement, passed by General
Norstad to General Paul Ely, Chairaan of the French Chiafe of
Staff on 19 March, as the point of departure for his discussion,
The TAF delegation was headed by Brigadier General Jacques

°
Following a preliminary meeting in Ramstein, Germany, a
full dress USAF - FAF conference was held in Paris from 12 to.
16 May. The discussitns were general and did not cover mimerous
subjects requiring separate NATO, SHAPE, USAFE or French action,

or séperate negotiations, It was apparent, however, that the
subject of comband and control over IREM units would prove -
difficult, The FAF representatives indicated desire to place
their IRM force under the French Bomber Command. ‘he conference

also revealed that the French were desirous of utilising their

62. TWX, Bq USAF to CUSNMR Paris, CINCSAC, CIICUSAYE, (DOUGIAS ; |
TO WORSTAD), 26 Feb 1958, Exhibit 26,

63. Memo for Record, USAF/FAF (JUPITER) Conferences, 5-16 May
1958, 2 Jun 1958, Banivit 27.


SECRET

Three other Jupiter launchings were for the parpose of
placing satellites into orbit. On 31 January, an elongated
Redstone frame combined with a North American 75,000 pound
thrust engine (Jupiter C) placed America's first satellite,
Explorer I, into orbit. A second launching attempt on 5 March
failed, tut on 26 March another Jupiter C missile successfully
Launched Explorer nn

THE WS~1074-1 ATLAS 5M-65 AND THE WS~107An2 TITAN SM=68

Following Headquarters USAF's approval of a nine squadron :
Atlas snd a four squadron Titan program late in 1951," sac
prepared new and separate operational plans for each weapon
system. A new Atlas Operational plan and a new Titen
Operational vlan” were issued on 15 May and 11 June, respective-
ly. The finid state of the ICEM program, hwever, indicated
that there would be considerable revision of both plans in
subsequent months.

90. Ibides Clip File, Hist Div Archives, Hq SAC.

91. Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, pp 69=70, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC.

92. SACOP Plan 7-58, 15 May 1958, Exhibit 0.
93. SACOP Plan 858, 11 Jun 1958, Exhibit il.


SECHET

THE WS-: 1 THOR SM-75 AND THE WSq: 2 JUPITER SM@78

High level Defense Department decisions of late 1957 which
ed to the establishment of an initial IREM program consisting
of four Thor and four Jupiter squadrons, and @ general accelera~
tion of the overall IRM program, required thet SAC prepare new
operational plans for both weapons systems. A completely revised
Thor plan was Ssmued on 25 February’ and an initial Jupiter plan
‘was issued }, March, Bactuse the Thor weapon system was in the
most advanced planning stage, SAC subsequently published a pro-
gran schedule for each of the four Thor squadrons sehednled for
Geploynient to the United Kingdom,” These documents, with their.
subsequent. anendnente and progress reports, ‘Provided the main -
guidelines for SAC's IREM program faring the first belf of 1958,

Tn addition to the task of asmuring that one Thor squadron
and one Jupiter equadron would be operational, and veady for
deployment by Decezber 1958, SAC vas also deeply concerned about
the problem of finding suitable IREM sites dn overseas countries

52 Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, p Abff, filed in Hist Diy
Archives, Bq SAC,

53e SACOP Plan 2-58 (SH-75), 25 Feb 1958, Exhibit 22,
She SACOP Plan 1-58 (S478), , Mar 1958, Exhibit 22,

55e SAC Programming Plan 12.58 "SM-75 Program (Thor for Four
RAF Squadrons),® 23 Apr 1998, Exhibit 23,



SE CHET °
missiles. Insofar as practical, missiles would not overfly friendly
Populations or heavily defended complexes en route to their targets,

Although the ultimate objective for all SAC strategic missiles
called for an instantansous Salvo of all missiles upon the receipt
of an execution order, the design of the Snark weapon system, as it
existed in Jamary, would preclude attainment of this goal, For
Planning purposes, however, three launching rates of in-commission
missiles were possible, depending upon the makeup of the preflight
console and an assured 2-hour per day naming of the Snark squadron.”
The rates were as follower ‘

Category 1, Twenty percent of the missile inventor) vithin
three houre and the total inventory within 20 hours,

Setegory 2. Twenty percent of the missile inventory within
one hdur and: the total inventory within four hours,

Category Ze Twenty percent of the. missile inventory within
15 mimtes and the total inventory within te hours and fifteen minutes.

Tt was deemed possible to obtain the launching rates of
categories one and two on a contiming basis but mot category three
Decause of excessive manpower and spare parts costs. It could e

Th. SEC Operational Plan m=62=2, 8 Jan 1958, ppe 9n12, Exhibit 5,

15. On 22 J. Hq USAF approved a 2ly-hour g concept for the
* Srark squadron. TWX, mi USAF to OINCSAC, AYOOP‘OG sole '» 21 Jan
1958, filed in D/Pins, Hq SAC,

16. SAC Operational Plan 62-2, 8 Jan 1958, pp, G11, Exhibit 5,

SECRET



+9)
#)

6

extensive B-l,7 bomb-bay door modifications, and (¢) thet B-l7
wit and facility requirements for the Reflex adtion progran
and rotation were mt firm, In view of these circumstances,
CINCSAC recomended to Heailquarters USAF on 10 May that all B52
units be equipped with Quail decoys prior to equipping my
B-h7 units. He also outlined a B52 unit priority list for
21 Be52 bomb wings and strategic wings covering facility con-
struction and Quail equippage for inclusion in the FY 1959
MOP, and a second priority list for 12 additional Be52 tomb
wings and strategic wings, bat only five B-l7 wings for
inclusion in the FY 1960 MIP. CINCSAC strongly recommended
approval of these changes and asked Headquarters USAF to.
change its Programming documenta accordingly.

Headquarters USAF generally concurred with the plan to
equip the B-52 force first as was soon evidenced by an equippage
schedule which indicated that a total of 36 B-S2 squadrons would
be Quail equipped by the end of FY 1962 in accordance with the

following quarterly schedule:

162. ra, CINCSAC to COFSUSAF, IPL 5629, 10 May 1958, Euhithit

163. Memo for Record, Missile Br feats | Div pea aie
Phasing Group Meeting WPAFB,
filed in Central Files DE, Bq case


PSCPPeM atc ceetpeeaggege

“SECRET 7
Naval Air Station

North Atlantic Treaty Orgalisetion

Nautical Mile

OlcLehoma City Air Materiel Area

Preliminaxy Flight Rating Test

"Pounds Per Square Tach
“Royal Air Foros

Stiqtegio Air Command
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Zurope
Strategic Monile .

-Anaitc Maxton! Attack Gaganility |

Strategic Missile Squadron
Standard Operating Procedure

. Technical Order

Tait Byeipment
Ultra High Frequency
United Kingdon

~ United States Air Force

United ‘States Air Foros in Burope ;
United States Air Force Security Service
Very High Frequency

Weapon Systen

‘Weapons System Project Office



oe

-SeeReT .
Compared with the Atlas achedule approved in Decesber 1957,

the revised schedule would result in a delay in making operations]

the first three squadrons, no change in the date for the fourth squad-

ron, and earlier operational dates for the last five squadrons with

the ninth squadron becoming operational * year seslier

than previously scheduldii ~

By June the major probleg opmfronting SAC in implementing

_ the revised Atlas configuration were funding and manpower, As
hes, been indicated, the estimated dollar cost of an Atlas

equadron (at Francis B. Warren AFB) wis $76,000,000: and man-,
power requirements were. estimated at 610 persomel, Initial
estimated cost of the revised Atlas cénfiguration wag placed
at $100,000,000 and manpower requirensnts estinated at 963
Persomel, ‘In an effort to scale dow: both the dollar and mun
power requirements, a Cost Redaction Board was formed at the
end of April composed of representatives of SAC MIKE, AFEMD
and IMD to make a detailed review of where reductions oould be
made. By the end of the reporting period some substantial
reductions had been made, but it was evident that further
decreases in dollar snd manpower requirements would be achieved
only with the greatest difficulty,

13. Historical Study No. 70, Vol I, p 70, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC.

Wk. DF, D/Pins to D/compt, "Strategic Missile Mont it,"
9 Jun 1958, filed in Higt Analyste Div, 1/oapt a nny as *

SECRET



SECRET -

to evaluate fire elimination changes and the autopilot. The re-
sults were successful, ‘Three subsequent tests on 7 February,
20 February and 5 April, however, were unsuccessful with each
missile exploding after over 100 seconds of flight. It was be=
lieved that a faulty turbine pump was the principal reason for
the milfunctionings. As a consequence, further testing of Atlas
missiles was halted until a complete check and the necessary
changes could be made, After an elapse of sbout two months
another test flight was conducted on 3 June and a missile flom
85 NM with excellent remite. This flight comprised the
eighth Atles test since the first leunching was conducted on

LL Jue ws. Flight testing of Titen missiles was

scheduled to begin late in 1958. :

129. DF's, D/Ops to D/Compt, "Progress Report on Strategic
Missiles," Feb thru dal Wh, £ filed in Mgt Analysis Div,
D/Compt, Hq S&C.

130. Historical Study Ho. 70, Vol I, p 62, filed in Hist Div
Archives, Hq SAC.

13. Interview, J. Van Staaveren with Lt Col C, M, Hillstrom,
gets Furare Weapons Bection, FOLFW Br, D/Plns, Bq SAC,
aug 1958. .


a1
Both estimates were exclusive of construction costs.

Officials of the Northrup Aviation, Inc. (NAI), the prime
contractor tor the Sriark, also contimed to exert pressure on SAC,
USAF, ARDC end other Air Force agencies to persuade them to invest
in a larger Snark force, In Jamery, the WAI officials proposed certain
modifications on Snazk missiles which would give them a low level at-
‘tack capability. At the request of Headquarters USAF, both SAC end ARDC
undertook studies of S4C's low level attack needs, costs, and the .
possitile use of additional Snark missiles for this purposes”

As a result of these studies, SAC concluded that, because of the
Wmitations of funds and becanse of. the higher priority requirement
fpr © BAC manned bomber force with mupporting Jet tankers, it would
not be. practical to augment SAC's low level. capability with Snark
missile units (this position aleo held with respect to the possible
use of the shorter rénge surface-to-surface Matador missile for low.
level purposes). Motley and manpower, SAC observed, could be better
spent to meet the jet tanker force requirements preseribed in SAC's
1962 Foros Requirements. Fertbertore, « sibsonio eruise sieetle

on, 21958, Pp 3obh,
tiied an Hist Di Diy archives’ Hq face

22. Ti, Ha USAF to ARDC, AFDRD-SA 559. 20 Jen 1958, filed in D/Pins, °
Hg SACs DF, Missile Div D/Ope to » “Supplemental Monthly
maare Report," 6 Feb 1958, cited in Tet analysis Div, a/eompt,