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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE { 1111 ~wy~-~ •. , DIREC.TORATE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (OSAFl\ ~/~\\17;t;\":. AF UNIT POST OFFICE. LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90045 Ie ~;:yn (l'3X 

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REPLY TO 

ATTN OF: SP-l 

Range Ship Support for Recovery Operations ~&~ 

Director, NRO (Dr Flax) 0..../' 

1. In response to your request during our last discussion of this 

subject, this letter summarize 5 the current recovery ship support 

problem and my recommendations for its resolution. I have included 

some background data in order to pre sent this entire que stion in 

reasonable perspective. Basically the problem can be stated sum-

. marily as follows: In the beginning of the satellite reconnaissance 

program, two ships we re specifically provided and configured to 

assist in the recovery operations. Over the years, these ships have 

been used to SUPP<:Ht other occasi.onal users in addition to satellite 

recovery. In recent months this other use has begun to conflict with 

satellite recovery operations , maki.ng adequate coverage uncertain at 

times. In additi~n, the complete deactivation of these ships is apparently being cons ide red for pre sumed cost savings, which would 

substantially reduce necessary satellite recovery support. I say 

Itpresumed" savings because, as I will discuss more fully in later 

paragraphs, the facts do not substantiate any reasonable expectation 

of savings when the pro-rata costs of probable lost capsules are 

considered. 

2. The two ships in question are the Sunnyvale and the Longview, 

designated as "Surface Recovery Units" (SRU), but someti.mes 

referred to simply as "recovery ships." These ships are equipped 

to carry helicopters, and have special telemetry communications, 

and hoisting and handling equipment for recovery of satellite capsules 

from the ocean. The pertinent history of the se two ships may be 

summarized as follows: 

a.:i.-ior to 1959, the Sunnyvale and the Longview were Military 

Sea Transport Service (MSTS) cargo ships. Advanced Research 

Projects .'''..gency (ARpA) Order No. 61-59, 20 Feb 1959, funded 

(approx $2. 3 million) the modification of both ships to provide a 

helicopter operations capability; i. e., a flight deck and hangar. 

. The ARPA Ordel? contained the stipulation that the modified ships 

would be restricted to support of Program WS-117L only unless 

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ARPA concurred otherwise. (Program WS-1l7L was the then 

current designator of the entire satellite reconnaissance program 

which at that time was under ARPA control. ) 

b. The ships were modified between Apr and Jul 1959 and were 

returned to MSTS for operation under Pacific Missile Range (PMR) 

control, with PMR helicopters aboard. Commencing about one year 

late r, a telemetry capability was added piecemeal to each ship, 

between operations. The telemetry equipment was utilized in the 

recovery area for event reporti.ng, etc. From time to time between 

1961 and Feb 1965, when the two ships were turned over to the Air 

Force Western Test Range (AFWTR), PMR recommended using the 

ships to satisfy the telemetry requirements of other programs; 

however, such utilization never materialized, either because of 

USAF pressure or because USN wanted to keep its "foot in the door" 

of the recov~ry business, probablya little of both. Hence, the ships 

remained dedicated to surface recovery of satellite capsules through- ' 

out this period. 

c. There is no evidence, other than the original ARPA Funding 

Order, available to indicate that the Ranges (PMR and AFWTR) have 

ever been instructed, or ever formally agreed, to consider the two 

surface recovery ships as program-dedicated resources. Shortly 

after AFWTR assumed the control of the Range ships in Feb 1965 

(except for the Wheeling), three of them were modified and effectively 

dedicated to support specific programs: the Huntsville and the Watertown to Apollo, and the Richfield to an activity too remote geographically to be useful for any other purpose. Since that time, except for 

withdrawal of the Longview in the spring of 1967 for about 60 days for 

modifications (not AFSCF sponsored), AFWTR has been juggling the 

Sunnyvale and the Longview to support programs other than recovery. 

Initially this was strictly on a non-interference basis (with one notable 

exception: the deployment of the Sunnyvale to Henderson Island). 

However, by late spring 19,67, AFWTR had adopted a "common user 

resources" philosophy, with the view that each conflict arising from 

simultaneous requirements for these two SRUs be settled by AFWTR 

comparing program priorities and precedence, and/or resolving each 

scheduling problem through negotiations between the program directors 

concerned on an individual conflict basis. In this philosophy, the noninterference basis of support to satellite recovery operations has been 

specifically rejected as being contradictory to the "common user resourc::e" phi10sophy~ In this connection, it has been pointed out by 

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AFWTR that one of the non-satellite programs supporting the spring 

1967 modifications to the Longview modification (NIKE-RMP-B) enjoys 

equal priority with any other program. In addition to support of 

ballistic missile programs, the TAGBOARD program also has been 

supported by these ships, sometimes at the expense of requested 

support of orbiting satellite reconnaissance flights. For the first 

six months of 1968, actual SRU support of the satellite reconnaissance 

program has been approximately 10% less than requested. 

3. We use these SRUs and associated helicopters to provide a meanS 

of surface recovery of anyreconnais sanCe capsule which is not 

caught by aircraft. While their Use does not guarantee that we will 

succeed, .operation without such support definitely increases the 

probability of los s of any capsule in the water. In addition, the 

absence of adequate surface recovery support definitely increases 

the risk that the fl'oatingcapsule maybe picked up by u'nfriendly 

nations, with attendant international complications ~ Actual los s of 

. any capsule in the water, e~en by its safely sinking, involves two 

distinct losses: the loss of the intelligence information on the film 

in the lost capsule, and the loss of the costs represented by the lost 

capsule. 

4. We need two of these SRUs to provide a reasonable basis of surface 

recovery, while making full USe of available l and bas eS for helicopter 

coverage. Our normal procedure is to station one SRU at or near 

the predicted impact point, with a CH- 3B helicopter on board. However, 

often this is not possible, and we must compromise with'a location 

which at least puts this point within helicopter range from the ship. 

We have accepted coverage by land-based helicopters instead ·:Jf ship 

coverage when the predicted impact point is within range (240 n. m. ) 

of Johnson, Tern, or the Hawaiian Islands. However, we must have 

coverage on each orbit that a recovery could be made, to insure a 

chance at recovery even under conditions of sudden failure on orbit. 

This means that such coverage is needed for 15 consecutive days for 

a CORONA mission (alone) or 10 consecutive days for a GAMBIT mis :'.on 

alone. Neither of these can be met separately by land-based helicop..:. rs 

alone. During the not infrequent case when both CORONA and GAMBIT 

missions are in progress, the need is increased, as the possible recovery revs for these two programs step across the entire east-west 

dimension of the recovery "ball parkll in different directions. As a 

result, adequate coverage can be approached only by using two ships 

plus taking full advantage of land bases for helicopter coverage. 

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Operation of nth day synchronous orbits with n less than the planned 

duration of the mission also requires two ships for ade.quate coverage, 

since the recovery revS reverse f~om one end of the "ball park" to the 

other on the nth day. One ship can keep up with the recovery revs for 

each day through n-l days, but obviously cannot make the 1 Z -1300 mile 

trip on the nth day. In the first six months of 1968, we have used two 

ships on six occasions (only one of which was an SRU in each instance, 

since both SRUs; were not available). However, even when one deployed 

ship is adequate two ships in general must be assigned to insure that 

one is always available, since they cannot stay out indefinitely, and 

must periodically undergo maintenance. The extent of the need for 

ships in addition to land-based helicopters is partially reflected by the 

fact that we have had 32 air recoveries outside of the helicopters 

240 n. m. range from land since 1962. Eleven of these have occurred 

within the last two years. 

5. Various suggestions have been made with the objective of either 

eliminating our need. for the SRUs, reducing this need, or substituting 

other means for the ships. These are listed below. None of them 

seems adequate for a reasonable program, for reasons stated below. 

a. Reduction of the east-west dimensions of the recovery "ball 

park, " so that all surface recovery can be provided by land-bas ed 

helicopters. This reduction is not at all reasonable, as the present 

east-west dimensions are necessary in order to provide a reasonable 

chance of acceptable weather in one area when unaccep~able weather 

exists in other areas. It is not unusual to have to move the planned 

recovery point from one end of the "ball parkll to the other in the course 

of a .10 to 15 day mission. An essential part of this area lies both west 

and east of the land-based helicopter range. 

b. Use of the other Navy vessels on an !lad hoc II basis, to eliminate 

either the need for SRUs, or to substitute for them whenever conflicts 

arise. We occasionally are forced to use such vessels, sometimes a 

destroyer but most often an ocean- going tug. In the first six months 

of 1968, we have used such other vessels on 10 occasions. While such 

coverage is better than nothing, it is not an acceptable substitute. We 

need the SRU specifically configured for its intended use, including onboard recovery helicopter, capsule handling equipment, and necessary 

communications and beacon equipment. 

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c. Development of longe r range helicopters, so that all required 

coverage can be provided by land-based helicopters. While this is a 

possible course of action, certainly it is not the most economical one, 

even if such helicopters are developed elsewhere and the only applicable 

costs are the unit price of each plus its operating expense. The present 

ships and helicopters exist, are paid for, and are adequate. The only 

costs are the on- going operating.costs. A long range helicopter could 

not completely substitute for a ship .with a present type helicopter onboard, which can remain in a search mode for the entire 4.8 hours that 

th~ cilPsule will float before the s,ink-plug is activated, r;egardless of 

daylight or local weather ceiling and visibility. 

d. Restriction of coverage to the planned recovery revs only (one 

recovery rev per capsule per mission) instead of each possible recovery 

'rev (one rev per mission each day any capsule is in orbit). This would 

reduce coverage but would not significantly reduce the overall SRU 

requirements, since the ships must spend a great deal of the time 

steaming in orderto be in the correct position on the planned recovery 

days. The possible recovery rev crossings progress across the recovery 

"ball park" on th~ order of 100 to 350 miles per day, depending upon the 

period of the orbit. Since the ships can travel a maximum distance of 

about 360 miles per day, and since the east-west dlmension of the "ball 

park" is 12-1300 miles, they must be committed even to a single mission 

for more than just the planned recovery day. Any reduction of coverage 

on any possible recovery rev definitely increases the risk of loss, since 

these revs are the only reasonable times when a recovery could be 

attempted each day, regardles s of when a critical malfunction should 

occur in the orbiting system. Recovery of all expos ed film becomes 

more important as programs mature, and the number of flights per 

unit time decreases, as is the case with the present CORONA and 

GAMBIT programs. Loss of any coverage represents a Significant 

part of the planned annual coverage. 

e. Elimination of the surface recovery support on the basis of 

"acceptable" risk. Such proposals are based upon some calculatior.. 

that the probability of losing a capsule is very low and extrapolation C::' 

this result to future operations. For example, on the basis of the last 

147 opportunities to recover (through the first eight recoveries of 1968), 

the overall probability of aerial recovery may be calculated to be 97. 3%, 

and the probability of a capsule going into the water (and its loss if there 

were no surface recovery capability) to be 2.70/0. These and similar 

calculations have been cited as evidence that the risk of operating without 

the SRUs is small. However, such reasoning is fallacious, regardless 

of whether one considers this an "acceptable" probability of loss, for 

several reasons: 

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(1) The actual water recoveries which have occurred 

repres ented diffe rent overall recovery systems, with differences in 

equipment, in significant operational factors (weight, sink rates, 

parachutes), and pers onneI. The overall configurations are not the 

same as being flown now or programmed for next year, and none of 

the experience was obtained in statistically significant samples. The 

occasions of their water recovery being lumped together is correct 

only in that it represents one aspect of what did happen, namely that 

thes e capsules we re actually recovered from the water. It does not 

repres ent the expectation of the occurrence at the time, and it is not 

a valid basis for predicting future expectation. 

(2) Changes in equipment, operational characteristics, and 

personnel continue to be made. Equipment changes include weight and 

sink rate changes in pres ent type capsules, the introduction of much 

larger and heavier capsules with neW parachute systems, arid major 

changes in key personnel which are a vital part of the aerial recovery 

system. (Even if my recent request for tour extensions is approved, 

we will undergo a 41% loss of recovery pilots and a 59% loss of recovery 

navigators in the next 14 months. If it is not approved, these losses will 

be 65% and 64%, respectively). Even minor changes in experience level 

of pilots and navigators have a significant effect on the probability of 

successful aerial recovery. 

(3) The problem of establishing and maintaining the competence 

of aerial recovery crews is further compl icated by the introduction of 

substantially different operational characteristics for capsule/parachute 

systems which will be operational during the same period. Crews not 

only must be competent in each system, they must be competent in 

arbitrarily mixing the different types, that is, from recovering a light 

or heavy Mark V type and a large HEXAGON type, with different sink 

rates and parachutes, in an arbitrary order. This increasing variation 

in such vital operational characteristics obviously will increase the 

probability of mis sed aerial recovery opportunities, and the consequent 

need for SRU support. 

(4) Any calculation of aerial recovery probability or expectation 

that is based only on whether or not successful recovery occurred incorrectly omits some significant factors of these occurrences, as 

well as incorrectly inferring that future recovery opportunities will 

be handled with the same degree of success in spite of many major 

differences between these past and future systems. Beginning with 

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the first water recovery on 11 Aug 1960, there have been eight water 

recoveries of reconnais sance capsules (one in 1960, three in 1961, 

two in 1963, one in 1964, one in 1967). However, these totals do riot 

reflect how marginal was the succes s of other aerial recoveries, 

some of which were practically wet when recovered at the last possible 

instant. Some of the relatively large gaps when no water recoveries 

occurred reflect the influence of reasonably stable recovery system 

configurations and high experience level of key personnel. However. 

some of the successful aerial recoveries even in these periods had 

very little margin between success and failure. Consequently, the 

need for SRU support was greater than indicated by the actual water 

impacts alone. I do not know how to quantify the fac'tors involved in 

such a way as to obtain a really meaningful prediction of future water 

recovery probability. It is not the same for all programs, or even 

for the Same program at different times. It is not the same in a given 

program throughout each month of the year, and it is ,not the same 

throughout, or for sometime following, periods of substantial change 

in key personneL It is certainly not the result that can be computed 

by using the simple statistics pertaining to actual recovery history. 

6. One of the recurring suggestions to dis continue use of the SRUs ' 

in the satellite, recovery operation is based on the idea that such action 

would result in substantial cost savings. As recently as last May, 

for example, we learned informally from AFWTR that SAFRD had requested AFWTR to conduct a cost savings study on putting the Longview 

and Sunnyvale into storage. In the year of withdrawal, ostensibly the 

savings would be the annual programmed operating costs, less the cost 

of mothballing (estimated at $436, 000 per ship) and the 'operating costs 

to the point of withdi-awal. For subsequent years ,the savings would be 

the programmed annual operating costs. These represent the order of 

alleged savings if the costs of operating theSe ships are considered as 

the only cost criterion. However, this is not the total cost involved, and 

is not a valid basis for any decision based on saving money. Against 

these ship costs, the costs of probable lost capsules must be ~onsidered. 

Since these costs vary greatly with different programs, and within the 

same program in different time periods, it is neces sary to analyze this 

question in some detail. We have made such an analysis, the results of 

which are attached herewith (Atch 1). The cost of the recovery capsules 

for each program is shown as cost per FY per recovery vehicle, along 

with the number of recovery vehicles (and recovery opportunities) involved per FY in each program. For comparison, the estimated total 

FY cost for the two SRUs is shown at the bottom in round numbers. 

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Also shown for additional perspective i s the incremental cost per 

RV of these SRUs, which represents the amount each recovery 

vehicle would have to pay if the total cost of the two SRUs were 

evenly allocated to the scheduled recovery vehicles during each 

fiscal year. In effect, this would be the insurance premium to 

provide for water recovery if each capsule were charged the same 

premium. On the basis of these data, I make the following observations: 

a. As reflected in the FY 1964 and subsequent year costs shown 

in Atch 1, the cost per recovery vehicle generally decreases with 

each year, fluctuating upward when major new program changes are 

introduced, but maintaining a steady trend otherwise. The CO sts of 

six vehicle s~ recovered from the water between Aug 1960 and the 

beginning of FY 1964 are not shown in the analysis. The cost of the 

seventh water recovery vehicle (CORONA) in FY 1964 was $7.8 million, and the c o st of the eighth was $8. 1 million. If the costs of the 

fir st six are consid ered as approximately $4 million eC3:ch, then the 

cost of these eight water recovery capsules is seen to be approximat ely $40 million. Obviously, $4 million is a low estimate for the 

six water recoverie s prior to FY 1964, hence the actual value of 

these eight recovered capsules exceeds $40 million. Therefore, 

the dollar value of these eight water recoveries alone has paid for 

the exclusive use of both SRUs by the satelli te reconnaissance program 

from 1960 to sometime beyond 1972, even if no more capsul es are 

recovered from the water. 

b. In FY 1969, of 22 programmed recovery opportunities, -there 

will be 14 which represent $3.5 million each, and eight which represent $22 million each. Thus, recovery of a single capsule of the 

cheape st type would essentially pay for the entire yea r r S operating 

cost of both SRUs. If a single one of the eight more expensive types 

were recovered by SRUs, it would pay for both SRUs for FY 1969 plus 

five more years. 

c. The cost of both ships for an entire year represent s exceptionally 

inexpensive insurance against the loss of even the cheapest capsule. 

For example, in FY 1969, eight GAMBIT (110) capsules at $22 million 

each plus 14 CORONA capsules at $3. 5 million each are programmed, 

for a total of 22 recovery vehicles'. If the total FY 1 969 cost of both 

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ships ($3.7 million) is divided equally between these 22 capsules, then 

the incremental cost of the ships is $0. 168K per capsule. As an annual 

insurance premium for each of the $3.5 million CORONA caps\.lles, this 

is only 4. 8% of the cost of each capsule. As a premium for the $22 

million GAMBIT capsules, this is only 0.76%. If the costs of operating 

the SRUs were divided in some proportion to the cost of the capsules 

involved, the CORONA premium would be less and the GAMBIT 

premium would be more than the 4.8% and 0.76%, respectively, shown 

above. Howeve r, the point is clear: no matter how such annual costs 

are allocated between the capsules programmed to be recovered in that 

year, the cost of the SRUs is extremely cheap insurance in comparison 

to the cost of the capsules involved. 

7. My .conclusions are: 

a. There is absolutely no valid basis for removing these SRUs on the 

expectation of saving money when the cost of probable lost capsules is 

considered. 

b. The prediction of future water recoveries on basis of past 

oCCurrences is not valid due to significant changes in equipment, 

operating characteristics, and experience of assigned recovery 

personnel. Prediction of water recoveries is not subject to meaningful 

quantization due to the several significant factors which must be determined subjectively, and to the absence of rel evant experience in 

statistically significant sample sizes. However, it is obvious that the 

probability of such an occurrence i s increasing, rather than decreasing 

or remaining unchanged. 

c. The exclusive use of both the Sunnyvale and the Longview by the 

satellite reconnai ssance program has been paid beyond 1972 on the 

basis of the cost alone of the eight capsules that have been recovered 

from the water so far. 

d. Even if the value of previous water recoveries is not considered, 

the annual cost of operation of both SRUs represents an extremely inexpensive insurance program against the loss of any future capsule. 

e. In addition to dollar costs, any los s of a reconnais sance capsule 

involves a los s of intelligence data on the film which is not recovered. 

This los s is much greater now than in earlier years, due to more 

austere programming. It will be greater in FY 1970 than in FY 1969, 

as a single capsule represents a larger proportion of the programmed 

intelligence coverage. 

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f. In addition to dollar and intelligence coverage losses, any 

water impact without adequate surface recovery capability involves 

risk of recovery by unfriendly hands. While difficult to quantify, it is 

obvious that operation without surface ship support involves greater 

risk than regular use of the SRUs .. 

g. While the satellite reconnaissance program can be operated on 

a basis which will permit the occasional use of one of the two SRUs 

. in support of sorhe other effort, and in special circumstances involving 

particular operations and inclinations, conceivably even permit limited 

periods when neither SRU is committed to support of the satellite reconnaissance program, the adjudication of actual or potential conflicts 

for the USe of these units on the basis of standard priority and precedence 

is unreasonable .. There is no rational basis upon which any support 

agency, such as a range, can reasonably adjudicate conflicts for support 

between the operational satellite .reconnaissance program and any other 

programs carrying equal priority and precedence. There is, however, 

a substantial difference between the satellite reconnaissance program and 

other competing activities in the flexibility of scheduling the actual events 

which require such support. Both of these SRUs were procured for, and 

have been maintained over the years primarily to support the satellite 

reconnaissance program. These SRUs are essential to the satellite 

reconnaissance program, and the changing character of this program 

makes their availability for other uSers more difficult to predict very 

much in advance of specific satellite missions as well as more restricted 

in terms of total available time. In View of these considerations, and . 

the increased lifetimes, mUltiple recoveries per program, and Overlapping orbital mis sions of different satellite reconnaissance proj ects, 

it seems obvious that both SRUs should be assigned specifically to 

support the satellite reconnaissance program on a dedicated basis, and 

that allocation of any support by these two units to any other program, 

as well as adjudication of any conflict for such use be assigned specifically 

to the senior responsible official of the satellite reconnaissance program 

in the field, namely the Director of Special Projects. As the field 

representative of the Secretary of the Air Force, this is a reasonable 

assignment even where support of other services is involved ... As 

Deputy Commander for Satellite Programs, SAMSO, it is properly 

placed in respect to other related Air Force resources, and the best, 

and most convenient, way to resolve any conflicts involving SAMSO 

projects, the AFSCF, and the AFWTR with the satellite reconnaissance 

program. From a practical point of view, it is a workable arrangement. 

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8. I recommend direction of the following action: 

a. That both the Sunnyvale and the Longview be continued in 

acti ve service as SRUs. 

b. That both SRUs be designated specifically as essential units of 

the operational satellite reconniassance program, with their use in 

support of any other program contingent u p on s p ecific release from 

support of the satellite reconnaissance program. The full responsibility 

for making any such release and adjudicating any conflict should be 

d~ egated to the Director of Sp~cial Projects. Since the rationale for 

this action can only be explained by BYEMAN documents, it obviously 

cannot be explained to the various programs and non-satellite-reconnaissance personnel involved or p otentially involved. Hence, it must 

be simpl e directed, as a policy matter, i. e. , both the Sunnyvale and 

the Longview designated as exclusively in support of projects under 

t he management of t he Director of Special Projects, OSAF, unless 

and until he speci,fically releases them for supp.ort of other effort 

on a case-by-case basis. 

c. That all maintenance and other withdrawal schedules for these 

ships must be coordinated with the Director of Special Project s and 

all modifications must have his concurrence. 

d. That, consistent with the above actions, these ships be funded 

as part of the AFSCF. Evidently this has been considered but is 

presently in doubt, as evidenced by the following quote from an AFSC 

message of 29 Aug: 

"Previous direction from DDR&E specified that beginning in 

FY70 the AFSCF would assume complete funding responsibility 

for the Longview and Sunnyvale and the budgets of the AFWTR and 

AFSCF for FY70 and thereafter have been structured and briefed 

to t he Air Staff and DDR&E accordingly. ':' ':' This headquarters is 

in receipt of informal information that the former position of 

DDR&E has been reversed. This development places the future 

status of these ships in doubt with the possibility that either or 

both may be subject to deactivation in the foreseeable future. 

':' ':' At the present tirne the entire subject is under review at the 

SAFRD/ AF Special Projects level. You will be i:-,-':ormed immediat ely 

upon receipt of further information. >t' ':<. " 

~NL. ~~c~/~/ MARTIN, JR C 1 Atch 

Major General, USAF Est Avg Cost per RV 

Director 

lfrt01tP-'--iS~E:iC:ifR~E~Th-_~; /~t~~FSS (Gen Berg) 

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EXPLANATION 

GAMBIT (206) 

and 

CORONA (846) 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C051 071 04 Iff1::. -lbltfLf-b'6 

Joe SECREi ~\I~I 

SAFSP ESTIMATED AVERAGE COST PER RV 

1. c=J historical.financ1al data goes back to F'f. 1964 only. No accumulated. 

F'f. 1953 and Prior years are available. 

2. Costs per RV are based. ona single launch resulting in one RV for P-1l0 and 

2 RV's for p-846. 

GAMBIT (liO) 1. Development costs funded for P-1l0 in IT 1966 and. Prior and for p-467 in F'f. 1970 

and Prior were amortized over the latest launch life of each respective program, 

which is F'f. 1974 for financial purpose. 

2. Prelaunch recurring costs funded for P-liO and p-467 were amortized. over the 

latest launch life of each respective program. 

3. Prelaunch recurring Agency-Black funds for p-467 were amortized over the launch 

life of the program. 

4. Agency - Black funds for p-467 were estimated. for FY 1971-1974 at a decreasing 

rate since financial requirements of the Agency for these years is unknown at 

this time. 

SHIPS: Incremental cost to support one RV ranges from .077 to.l42 fromFY 1964 to FY 1974. 

I' 

"" IJDED FHOi\~ AUTOMATIC 

> ", \'NG; DOD DIR 5200.1Q 

'. ',;:1cS NOT ::,r'PL l'. 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C051 071 04 

liand:o via EYEMMl 

Con'irol System 
IMATED AVERAGE COST PER J.V ($ 

l-<·.Y .t: - / b / 0 ""r c;/" 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C051 071 04 - ; '·'.,~v ' .. ~ , '~-; .. ,~ .. t .: .; , :~~_. ~" t:; 

in Millions) -.-- - --- --~,-~-.- _ .. --, _. -._- --- -- .. ,," _ .. -- - ... ------ -- ...... -~.- - - -_. , I I YEA R. CO S :T S 

FY 1969 

0 

.. 

0 

.. 

175.7 

8/8 

22.0 

.. 

.. 

.. 

49.3 i 

7/14 i 

3.5 

o 

o 

22 

FY 1910 

0 

... 

0 

-

206.5 

1/14 

14.8 

.. 

.. 

... 

36.2 

6/12 

o 

o 

26 

. FY 1971 

0 

.. 

0 

.. 

192·0 

1/14 

13·7 

-

-

.. 

15.4 

4/8 

1.9 

380·2 

5/20 

I 19·0 ! 

I 3~ _7f1 h C 3· 7 . ___ . 3. 7 

I V • ~ 

.168K· .142K 

"'--' . I 

.088K 

: , .. I 

FY 1972 

0 

.. 

0 

.. 

117·7 

7/14 

12.1 

.. 

... 

-

o 

o 

374.9 

5/20 

18.8 

I 

I 

1 

34 I 

3.7 

! 

·i 

FY 1973 (i 

0 

.. 

0 

-

1TT.3 

7/14 

12.7 

.. 

-

-

o 

o 

356.6 

5/20 

17·9 

, 

FY 1974 

0 

.. 

0 

-

177·3 

7/14 

12·7 

.. 

.. 

.. 

o 

o 

353·6 

5/20 

34 

3.7 3·7 

.10BK .10BK , 

1 i 

- 11 Yr ~ota1 

Prog. ,Cost 

, I 

I 

$ 407;5 

38/38 

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I, 

.0 

i -

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$1, 475 J7 

. ! 

57/:92 

:0 

! 

,-

i -i 

-

$ 687·6 

69/1 38 

'0 

$1,465.:8 

20/80 

i 10 

" ... , 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C051 071 04 

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Average Cost· 

per 'BV 

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I 

,0 

I 

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... 

- $ 10.7 

.0 

-

0 

:1; 23.4 

$ 13·3 

$ 16.0 

o 

'0 

:Ii 4.9 

o 

o 

:Ii 18.4 

! 

1;:;n,li j ~'Ut U lf! 

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