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'J!DP •• aEIA HISTORY OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

VOLUME liB .. SAMOS E-5 AND E .. 6 

, _~'."'''. BY'MAN , 

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_ ••• ~"( •••• IIPC_ .... tift 

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by 

Robert Perry 

Revi.ed October 1973 

from earlier draft. 

of 1964 and 1965 

ADD.V PROCESSED 

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PREFACE TO VOLUME IIB . 

. This volume is a continuation of Volume ItA of A Hiltory of 

Satellite Reconnaissance, leparated chiefly becaule the bulk of pagel 

makes it impractical to put the whole of the lengthy and complex 

history of the Samos program between one set of covers. Volume I1A 

includes those chapters concerned with the two major program segm-=nU that began in 1960 and 1961 and continued through October 1963: 

Samoa E-S (plus Lanyard, which wal half of an E-S camera system 

in a different vehicle housing) and Samos E-6 (plus Spartan and 

SP-AS-63, the proposed re-enaineered successors to E-6,. 

Early drafts of these chapters were prepared in 1964 and 1965, 

while the author was an employee of The Rand Corporation. Correction. editing. expansion. and elaboration of those early drafts began 

in 1971 and was completed in 1973 while he was a member of the 

IItaff of Technolugy Servic-= Corporation. Because documentary 

sources have mo.tly been diaperaed or destroyed in the interveninl 

years, and because most major prolram participants have lonlliace 

left government service. it seems unlikely that further research wUl 

prove fruitful or that these volumes will again be expanded. 

The Samos prolram partiCipants and National Reconnaissance 

OUiee people who provided information for or reviewed these pales 

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are too numerous to' acknowleqe liDlly bere. MOlt are noted. by 

name, in lource citations or prefatory s .. ctions in other volumes • 

For lucb errors of fact or interpretation al may have lurvived 

review. the author il wbolly relpoDllble. 

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'lap IEeRE'I' 

CONTENTS. VOLUME nB 

Preface ••...•.......•••.•••••••••••.•••......••.•••.•• 

X THE E-S AND LANYARD PROGRAMS ••••••••••••••••• 

Note. on Source. • •••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••.. 

XI THE E-6 PROCiRAM •••• • •• • • • • • • • • ••••• • •••••• • • • • 

Note. on Source •.••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••.••• 

ii 

318 

39Z 

40l 

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Illustrations have been aeparately bound in an Appendix volume. 

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X THE E-5 AND LANYARD PROGRAMS 

The technique of usinl a reentry capsule to return exposed 

film from orbit was seriously proposed as early as June 1956. The 

Rand Corporation, which first urled the concept, felt that reliable 

methods of recoverinl film could be developed much earlier than 

comparably effective readout techniques. But in 1956 there was no 

way' to demonstrate that recovery was feasible, no way to finance a 

test of the concept, and so little interest in satellite reconnaissance 

i.n Ileneral that evetn the preferred readout concept was indifferently 

funded. 

CoinC'ident with Sputnik I, Rand in November 1957 suggested 

development of a family of recoverable satellites. Although the idea 

had been conc"ived and most of the supportinl research performed 

much earlier, Sputnik got it a hearing. The perceived need for a 

rrconnaissance system to be available in the near term caused attention 

to be concentrated on Thor-boosted satellites. and Corona was the 

onlv immediate product. But in March 1958 the concept of a recoverAllIe photollraphic payload hoasted by an Atlas-Hustler (Atlas-Agena) 

vehacle was revived. It remained a minor option throulh July of that 

year, receiving no more than passing mention in the development 

plans of the' period. 

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A marked chanle in the Air Force attitude toward recovery 

of photographic intelligence wassigndled by the Z6"SeptemlHtr 1958 

publication of a new General Operational Requirement covermg 

.atellite recoDDai.sance. It embodied a "big" camera and film 

recovery. By December, the Advanced Re.earch Projects Agency, 

then custodian of lpace program responsibility. had endorsed the 

approach. But it appeared that ARPA enthusiasm was not entirely 

altruistic. ARPA scientists were less interested in pursuinl the 

original approach as in adaptina the long focal length camera proposed 

lor the recoverable satellite to use in an electrostatic tape readoUt 

system. And ARPA's interest in recovery was probably as much 

motivated by the desire to conduct a military man-in-space program 

as by any concern for recovering photolraphs. Thus the fUm-recovery 

concept embodied in Corona became a film-plul-camera.-recovery 

mode in ARPA's plan. And perhaps coincidentally. so larle a: capsule 

could also return a man from orbit. So expanded, the recoverable 

capsule proposal had been transformed into a development plan by .. 

January 1959 and by April had received "Ienera! approval." . One Discoverer capsule had by tha' time successfully reentered, but none had 

been recovered. Enthusiasm for recovery was momentarily hi,b. 

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FUnding difficulties, the introduction of new aD'd complicatina 

proposals (ibe E-4 mapping latellitfl and the E-3 electroltatic tape 

reconnaislance system), plus a general decline in ARPA fortunes 

as NASA gained more influence, led to virtual cancellation of the 

embryonic recoverable camera program in June 1959. Strong protelts 

from the Air .staff and several air commands followed. It leemed 

imposlible to satisfy the September 1958 requirement for photograph. 

having a ground definition of five feet without a bia-camera recoverable 

system. ~argely in respon.e to pressure from the newlyeltablished 

Directorate of Defense Research and Engineerina, ARPA in early 

September reinstated what was now designated the Samos E-S pro,ram--

though initiall y limiting approval to camera development alone, authorizinJl recovery subsystem development only when further pressure wal 

br(lu~ht to bear. By 9 September 1959, one year after publication of 

the formal requirement, the E-S system had formal approval for 

develupment. On 17 November, with the return of satellite reconnaissance 

proJlram responsibility to the Air Force, ARPA obstructionism beca~e 

moot. 

The next difficulty was predictable. The Air Force Ballistic 

M,nHe Divis ion (BMD) wanted to fund an accelerated E-S prolram 

withuut reducing the total uf funds allocated to the E-l and E-2 readout 

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systems. That notion generated little Iympathy in the· Pentalon. 

Both DDRlcE and the Air Force Balliltic Mi.IUel Committee (AFBMC) 

strongly favored recovery emphalil and were gradually hardenina 

their objections to continuinl expeuive readout Iystems. Canc~llation 

of the E-3 and aD elaborate ferret proposal (the F -4) had not provided 

lufficient fundI to lupport E-S wOrk; DDRlcE and AFBMC were cool 

to sugaestions that an accelerated. E-S program be fiDanced by adding 

new fundi to the basic late1lite reCOnDaillanCe program and that E-l 

and E-Z be continued at their exiltinglevela. Dr. H. F. York. 

DDR.E chief. wa. particularly outapoken in hiB elisparagement of the 

E-l and E-Z. He was equally forceful in hil endorlement of the E-S 

approach. Through the firl' four months of 1960 there was no reconcUiation of these dilparate viewpointl. 

When the U-2 incident occurred in May 1960. BMD (with the 

firm support of mOlt of the Air Staff) It ill wal holdina out for ~n undiminished readout program plus a co-equal and separately funded 

£-s recovery program. Ail' Force Underlecretary J. V. Charyk. 

who had been in that pol' lince the previoul AUlult (he had earlier 

been Chief Scientist of the Air Force). took the Oordian option of 

darecting a complete shUt of emph.lis from readout to recovery. 

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E-5, be ordered, was to rece'ive first attention. Two months later, 

in July, the United States, Intelligence Board· realigned- the requirements 

for satellite reconnais.ance in a fashion that made readout an almost 

totally unacceptable solution. For the moment, E-S was the only 

in-progress s )'litem that might satidy needs, and even there it was 

coming to be appreciated that E-5 was conceptually deficient in ways 

that might make it no more than marginally useful. 

In AURulU 1960, the recovery of the first Corona products overcame lingerinl! duubts ab~ut the feasibility of fUm retrieval. Concurrently, 

complete reorJlanization or the reconnais.ance satellite program and a 

National Security Council decision to sponsor at least one alternative 

to E-5 a~ain chanKed the technical complexion of the Samos program. 

Still later. in Oduber, both the E-6 panoramic camera system (with 

luwt.·r resolution but appreciably IEreater area coverage potential than 

the E-5) and the hit:hly promising Cambit (with resolution and coverase 

putential far better than the E-5) received tentative approval for 

II< 

de,·e!opment. Both were on contract by January 1961. 

From a scht.·dulint: IItandpoint. the intricate maneuvering 

between September 1959 and AuJtust 1960 had meant relatively little 

Thuli resume ill es.enhaU\· a restatement of a longer narrative which 

appeared in earlaer chapteu. Supporting detaU and specific citation 

"r suurce" ar., lnduded an the earlier text. 

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to E-5. A total of aeven vehicle fli,hta waa prOirammed thro\llhout 

the peri~. two "dialnoltic" vehiciel beiDl added in AUlu~t 1960.1 

The E-5 had allo remamed relatively stable in terma of desiln detaill. 

As compared to the E-2. of the lame era. it had the followinl deliln 

char acteriltic I: 

System: 

Focal lenlth: 

Altitude: 

Ground resolution: 

SYltem reaolution: 

Strip width: 

Aperture: 

FUm size: 

E-Z 

36 inches 

Z60 nautical mUes 

2.0 feet 

100 linea/millimeter 

17 mllel 

1/4.0 

70 mm by 452,0 feet 

E-5 

66 inches 

180 nautical milel 

5 feet 

100 linea/millimeter 

60 milea 

f/5.0 

5 inches by 2,50-500 feet 

Additionally. the E-5 waa a stereo system. the E-2. a linlle 

Z . . frame .ystem. The camera had been developed by Itek under subcontract 

to Lockheed. the system contractor. Each camera consisted of a sunshade 

and mirror. a window. an eilbt-element lens (with a temperature tolerance 

of but one degree). a camera body terminating in a five-inch curved film 

plane with a three-Iecond pan cycle. and a complex fUm take-up subsystem. 

The ZO-degree panoramic arrangement provided coverale of a around 

swath II by 65 miles on each aide from 180-mile orbits. with the resultin, 

strip of expoled film meaauring 4.5 by Z3 inchel. (Estimates of irnale 

quality varied· but lenerally ran,ed from 100 to 115 lines per millimeter 

3 

at a Z: 1 contrast ratio-eon SO-~ 13 fUm.) 

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Althoulh the £-5 hacl been anythinl but a haatily conceived . . 

·undertaking. detail. of the deailD bad been ·criticised by one aource. 

or another virtually from the moment it was proposed. In August 1960. 

when the Samos prolram reorientation was in full awing. program 

office reservationa about Lockheed's conduct of the development belan 

to assume major proportiona. Colonel W. ·G. King. Jr •• the Samos 

program office chief. expressed particular concern at the lack of teat 

data on the system's thermal environment. King believed that uncompensated temperature effects on mirror. lena. platen and supporting 

structures might well limit system utility. The camera as then 

designed was some ISO pounds overweight. and tbe inclusion of thermal 

protection devices could onl y make it heavier. 

Lockheed did not agree. The contractor seemed convinced that 

the strategy of developing various subsystema in para1lel--an approach 

that had been successful in the ballistic mis.sUe program--would provide 

adequate safeguards against the laUure of any single technical feature. 

Thou~h Lockheed's reaction was partly Pavlovian (RlcD mores clid not· 

admit of the possibility that a contractor had not foreseen all possible 

continJlencies). the emerllence of E-6 and Gambit raised the iaaue of 

whether all three major recovery systems should be carried to completion. 

They had several overlappantt qualities. Lockheed had total responsibility 

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{or E-5 and for the rapidly withe dna £-1 and £-Z aatellite programa • . and h'ad prime reapons"ibility for Cor on';' , 'but .. 8 no more than a 

vehicle aupplier in the E- 6 program. Lockheed, therefore, was 

vitally interested in having the E-5 remain attractive. E-5 waa then 

conaidered to be a logical aucce •• or to Corona--still gen~rally treated 

a. an interim system with slight growth potential--although in fact 

E-6 waa a more promising candidate. King, who had custody of the 

E-5 and all its predece .. on but who had no important role in E-6 or 

Gambit development. was 1esa parochial. As early as Z7 September 

he sUllested that the overlap of E-5 performance with that anticipated 

from E-6 could well brin8 on canceUation of one or the other. Because 

E-6 had JEreater technical promise than E-5, the leading candidate 

4 

was obvious. 

As with tht· £-1 and £-2.. part of the discontent with E-5 aroae 

from the fact that it did not repreaent the lateat in aatellite r~connaiaaance concepta and techniques. Even though development had not gotten 

well under way until September 1959. the baaic proposals embodied in' 

E -5 dated from 1958. and ('onsiderable advancea in optics. vehicle 

atabillaation, and camera mode technologies had marked the enauinl 

two years. General Greer and Underaecretary Charyk were alreed 

that tbe E-5 aystem was unduly ('omplex and that ita ltek camera was 

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to satellite" rec~n~ai~ san~e' requirements. S 

Lockheed, aware of waning confidence in the prospects of E-S, 

proposed accelerating the prollram toward an April 1961 diagnostic 

flight and a subsequent launch rate of one satellite each month. An 

early demonstration could dispel doubts of the system's usefulness. 

The contractor estimated in October 1960 that such an acceleration 

Creer and King felt that something between 

S more nearly the correct figure. Notwithstanding 

their uneasiness about E-S pro~ress, they felt that program acceleration 

might be in order. It would. if successful, provide a high-resolution 

recoverable system at least a year in advance of the first E-6 and 

some two yean sooner than the first Ciambit satellite. a consideration 

th:,t could not well be ignored in an atmosphere of program urgency. 

Further. both Kin~ and Creer were realistically aware that £-6 and 

Cambit might encounter development problems. In that case, E-S 

m lltht represent the only ansurance against program disaster. 

Both £-1 and £-l were phasing down toward cancellation by 

late 1960. Some money to support acceleration of E-S might be found 

an those proflrams. Launch costa were essentially the same for all 

three, but an E-S payload cost a 

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payload. * Tbe real l •• ue was DOt whether _dollar. 

might be diverted for each ·c.aDcelled readout iaUnch, but whether 

E-5 acceleration would .erve any aeful purpo.e. 

Lockheed had received authorisation for a modest acceleration 

on l. September. After three week. of di.cu •• ion, tbe company on 

7 October made a formal pre.entation to Greer and Charyk luggesting 

greater effort--at higher co.ta. Three days later General Greer 

created a lpecial task force to analyse the proposal. On 17 October 

Lockheed received a non-.pecific authorisation to redirect the ~5 

program toward the "mo.t accelerated" effort, called "Tornado", 

but no full and explicit approval of that effort followed. On I November, 

General Greer telephoned H. L. Brown. of Lockheed'. top management 

group, to a.k for more detaUa on ''Tornado.'' Another two weeks were 

conswned in obtaining and refining the needed data. Cieneral Creer'a 

doubts about the rehabUhy of Lockheed'. co.t estimates were not 

diuipated by the .upplemental information and be expre.sed little 

confidence in Itek'. ability to .atiefy .cbedule.. There was abo 

.ome feeling amon(l Charyk'a staff. in Wa.hinaton, that di.anostic 

• 

In October 1960. basic co.t. include 

.for 

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the Aliena, _for an E-Z ..... · ... "'.ao 

yload, plus about la'lIIc:n 

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flights could not profitably be slipped into the sche~ule without adversely 

affecting the viabUity of the first programmed olM'rational launch. 

On 22 November 1960, Greer's office notified LOclcheed that there 

would be no "crash program" for E_S.6 But that did not entirely dispose 

of notions that something might yet be done .to get the system into operation earlier than programmed, or that it might be economically -.dapted 

to perform the E-6 mission. thus eliminating need for the latter system 

and freeing considerable sums. One member of Charyk's staff co-sponsored, 

with Amron Katz (of Rand). the idea that nying the E-5 at a hilher altitude 

would provide lO-foot definition and coverale comparable to that expected 

of the E-6. Nothinll came of the discussion. but in December Charyk 

authorized early diagnostic nights of delraded E-S cameras to let telemetry 

data. prove out payload operation. and demonstrate the feasibility of 

capsule recovery in the E-!t conflluration. (1t was apparent that Itek 

could not accelerate deHvery of fully qualified cameras.) So acceleration 

uf aBort wa. approved for the E- 5 effort before the close of 1960. 7 

Any impression that the £-5 had thus become more highly reaarded 

than the still embryonic E·b was dispelled early in February with Charyk's 

ruhnte that the £-6 had priority over any other E-series development. 

cln point of fact, Charyk had aleo accorded the E-4 mappinl satell1te 

payload a hilher priority than the basic E-5 payload. but that development 

8 

was hUle known.) The February ruling represented are-interpretation 

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of the National Security Council'l 2S Auguat decilion on Iystem prioritiel; 

. . . 9 . it wa. a severe blow to the prolpectl of the E-5. 

The crux of the priority i.sue wal not '0 much the development 

.tatul of E-5 a. that E-6 represented a solution to requirement. for 

gross coverage. which carried higher priority than the specific target 

10 

coverage mis.ion lor which E-5 had been designed. Further. confidence 

in E-5 succeSI had never been high lince SAFSP acquired the prolram. 

and Gambit --which promiled far better coverage and relolution than 

E-S--had begun development by February 1961. 

The character of the £-5 telt program had graduaUy been changed 

by the various prollram decilionl of late 1960 and early 1961. In February 

1961. that evolution received formal recognition in the statement of a 

teat philolophy. elaentiallya determination that the early aightl would 

contain very larto:~ quantities of inltrumentation and would have limited 

functional objectivel. Particular attention wa. to be devoted to reentry 

phase instrumentation lIanee the sea-recovery-oriented £-5 capsule 

repre.ented a con.iderable d~parture from the pattern let by Dilcoverer 

caplulel--relative1y light and deligned for air catch. Operation. during 

(halhl leal wouldllraduall y prOM reI I from the limple to the complex al 

.uC'ce •• permitted. (For example. no Iteering maneuverl were to be 

attempted during the inUial E-S night becaule a failure in that mode 

BYE 11011.14 329 

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probably would prevent tept of the reentry system.) In e.sence. th~ 

E-S tests were to be cautious research a~d development inveatiaati-ons 

rather than attempts to operate fully functional prototypes. That 

approach was in part a reflection of a general philosophy Charyk and 

Greer favored and in part was a consequence of experience with the 

E-l and Discoverer programs. It also reflected Colonel King's conviction that reconnaissance satelUtes would remain one-of-a-kind creations 

of 80me years to come, that the notion of standardizing early on an 

11 

"operational" vehicle was completely fallacious. Charyk and Greer 

agreed early in March 1961 that the best approach to E-S would be to 

start "RlrD launches" in September 1961 and continue through a series 

of eight, the last coming in May 1963. The extent of succe .. with that 

12 

aspect of the prolram would determine later plans. 

Another important modification of earlier practice lay in General 

Cireer's determination to reduce the role of the missile assembly pha.e 

(at Vandenberg). He wanted flight-ready vehicles delivered to the launch 

base. He was particularly insistent that modifications, subsystem t •• t., 

and lnstrumentaUon should be complete before the Alena. the Atla •• 

and the payload were mated and checked throulh the mi.sile as.embly 

buildinll. That departure from earlier habits would, hopefully, reduce 

delays. complexities. and potential errore ariosinl from extensive 

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tink.rinl with the vehicl •• , b.tw •• n their delivery ancl their er.ctio~ 

on the launch pad. 'To'thi. end. Greer inai.teet on compr.hen.ive pred.livery check. of critical aubly.tem.. including "hot firingl" of the 

Alena engin.l. That practic. bad for lome monthl been the lubject 

of a "running debate" betwe.n a group which held that repeated pre-flight 

operationl of the rocket engine increaled the chance of flight failure 

and a group which held that only through extenlive .ngine tenl could 

pro.pective faultl be lurely identifi.d and correct.d. It wal not that 

SAFSP intended to run every Agena throUlh luch a telt aeriel. but al 

Greer emphali •• d. the firlt of each kind of IYltem would be mOlt 

extenlively telted and about every fourth vehicle thereafter would 10 

13 through the .ame checkout proc •••• 

Inevitably. al firlt fli,ht date approached, technical difficultiel 

beJtan to crowd tOlether. Early plan. to convert v.hicle ZZOl to a 

dialnoltic .Yltem. (the term wa. no longer Uled but the connot~tion 

remained) proved impractical a. earlyal March 1961. The vehicle 

wa •• 0 far toward compl.tion that modification would be unduly cOltly· . 

and time conlumina. Lockheed propoled inltead to upsrade the lecond 

an the lerie.. ZZOZ. and by concentratinl attention on that vehicle to 

pUlh it to launch readin.11 by IS September. By early June 1961. 

emphali. bad .hilted entirely to ZZOZ, and ZZOl had eff.ctively been 

BYE nOn·'4 331 

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phased out of the E-5 program. Unhappily, Lockheed's optimistic 

appraisal o{zzoi's readin~ss came uuhiDied wlien Ite'k feU behind 

schedule in camera sUbsystem teate, forcing uae of the third Agena 

(ZZ03) in aome of the work at Lockheed's Sunnyvale plant. In July, 

the capsule had to undergo structural modifications because oC a 

failure in qualification testing, and early ill. Auguat Itek was in such 

deep trouble that a special management team from Lockheed took up 

residence on the east coa.t to help puah the camera through ita teat 

phase. By that time there was no possibility of meeting original 

flight schedules, the delivery of the payload having alipped by aeveral 

14 weeks. 

Similar difficulties were common to most high-priority programa 

even though contractors cu.tomarily seemed unable to anticipate them. 

But some problems were peculiar to the' E-5. By July there were 

three areas of major concern: a demonatrated weakneaain Itek'a 

management and i.n the effectivene •• of Itek's engineering approach to 

the E-S camera; shortcomings in the lena itself, principally evidenced 

by the i.nability of th~ delivered optic. to pas. specification checks; 

and Lockheed's failure tu obtAin essential computer inputs for the flilht 

programs. (Colonel Kinll felt that it milht be nece.sary to subcoDtract 

the computer ta.k and to .ubcontract optical work to some firm that 

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could meet the .pecification •• ) aecolmainl that .chedule pre •• ure. 

might wen induce 'further techDical troubles, . p..rticula'rly if too-rapid. 

testing led to over eight. and thence to defect. that either had to be 

corrected after delivery or which, escaping detection, would endanler 

mi •• ion chances, Ceneral Creer .ecured Under.ecretary Charyk' • 

acceptance of a "relaxed .chedule, .. althoulh the fact of·that relaxtion 

was not immediately communicated to Lockheed. 15 

Difficultie. with the Itek-manufactured payload per.i.ted even 

after its eventual delivery to Lockheed. aeworkand the installation 

of replacement parte continued throulh September. The .lippale. had 

by that time become eo .ubetantial that certain of the earlier system 

te.U had been invalidated (those which had to be conducted within a 

epecific period durinl the week. immediately before the launch) and 

had to be performed a .econd time. 16 

Ae it happened. other factors had intervened to iDsure a relaxation 

of E-5 launch schedule.. On 9 September an Atlas-Agena carrying an 

E-Z payload exploded 1.5 .econd. after ignition, eeverely damaliD! 

Pad 1 at Point Arguello. Initially there were estimate. that the pad 

could be readied for an E-S launchiDI by 1 November, but later evaluation 

of both the darnale and the atatu. 01 the E-S payload caused the prolram 

offace to .lip the initial launch date to 1Z December. (Vehicle Z203 

BYE 110n.,. 333 

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slipped from 7 Dece'mber to'18 January 196~ and ~~04 to 22. February 

1962.)17 Vibration tests of the ~~O~ payload a few days later disclosed 

faults in the film carriage portion of the camera subsystem. making 

the postponement seem particularly well advised. 18 

Pressure for an improvement of the revised launch schedule 

increased during early October and. as it became clear that the pad 

damage would not be the limiting factor in schedules. the pace of 

act.ivit.y stepped up. On 17 October. General Greer directed Loc~heed 

to make every dfort to launch 2.20Z by Z December rather than 

II December. The contractor reacted by shapin. a ''hard core Iroup 

of key personnel" into a task force with a 24-hour. seven-day-per-week 

assignment: meet program objectives. Enlineers and launch crews 

were shifted from the Midas program to provide the necessary work 

19 force. 

The effort was extraordinarily succesdul. At 1~45 hours on 

.!.! ~ovember. lZ days in advance of the most optimistic schedule 

proposed in October. ZZOZ was launched from Pad 1. Everye"ort 

had been made to lnsure a succesdul launch. includinJ: special prov's. 

aons of "super clean" propellant tanks and X-ray checks of questionable 

transistou. But 2.47 seconds after lift-off, the Atlas lost pitch 

atutude control and shortly thereafter another prolramming error 

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caused premature enline shutdown. That combination of errore 

caused the Alena to stabilize in a taU-first attitude after separation. 

When the Alena enlines were ilnited the vehicle promptly decelerated 

P if. lO into the ac lC. 

Taken tOlether with the record of Itek failinls and Lockheed 

problems, the launch failure had immediate repercu .. io~s. After 

hearina presentations on the status 01 the pro.ram and discussing its 

prospects with General Greer, Cbaryk on .. December directed that 

all work on the £-S prolram be halted except that in support of l203 

and 2204 launches. Lockheed was instructed to treat the action a. a 

"partial termination" lor the convenience of the lovernment, a 

euphemj.sm desianed chieOy to prevent speculation by the press and 

within the aerospace industry. U que.tioned, SAFSP was to explain 

that the decisiun represented to ••• part of a continuinl process of 

review and refinement of the USAF space prolram. " II 

Vehicles l203 and l204 differed from their predecessor in havinl 

a more comprehensive (uhra-hiJh frequency) command and control .. 

system and more intricate telemetry •. The camera was somewhat more 

refined, as well. 

Those vehicles effectively cancelled by Charyk'. order were 

enther hke l20l in most respects or, in the case of 2207, 2208, and 

BYE no 1'7 -74 llS 

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Z209. were slated to be ",refined" along lines determined 'by early" 

ZZ ,'. " 

test 'results. With the cancellation of the final five vehicles in " 

the original schedule. £-S funds requirements for fiscal196Z dropped 

Accumulated program costs would therefore peak 

Approximatel the total would be 

needed to complete and launch ZZ03 and ZZ04. Z3 

As had been true ot earlier terminations. and as was to be 

true later, financial considerations apparently played a considerable 

role in the decisiun to halt work on £-S. During meetings with 

Lockheed early in December and with Charyk's staff later that month. 

Greer's people were particularly concerned by an apparent belief 

that the E-S "partial termlnation" would bring about a considerable 

improvement an the financial status of remaining elements of the 

satelhte reconnaissance program. The net effect would be substantially 

1es. than seemed to be anticipated. For instance, if the Atlas boosters 

licheduled for £-5 use were not so expended and their "bookkeeping" 

('osts transferred to the E-6 program, no net reduction in costs 

would uccu r, merel y a reallocation. Transferring Agenas from E-~ 

tv E-b had thl" same effee-t. £-5 cameras, capsules, and acces.ories 

wert.' well alung toward cumpletion by December 1961. Most cost. 

;end habilities had been incurred and could not be recovered. 

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Certain of the "peculiar item." beml boUCht for the E-5 effort alone o 

could be cancelled. but in (ireer'a'eye. thia amoUnted to "a mall" 

potatoes in the bil picture ••• " He alao emphaai.ed that two launches 

aUll were on .chedule.. "Thia meaDa that everythilll didn't grind to 

a cra,hinl halt on 5 December, II he de facto 

trea.urer for the .atellite reconnaiaaance program. Rather than tbe 

.ome official. .eemed to believe would be .hifted 

r from E-S to other programa. a was actually recoverable. 

In part. that 80mewhat di.couragina apprai.al refiected fact. of life 

which had not become apparent UDtU December: .Uppale. and co.t 

increa.e. incurred while 1101 was Dearing launcb readme •• had increa.ed 

total prolram co.t. by an unprolralmlneG 

Even in financial mattera E-5 aometimea aeemed a child of mi.-

fortune. A ca.e in point was the deci.ion of AprU 1961 to cancel the 

requirement for a aecondary propulaion .y.tem in all but the fir.t E-5 

vehicle, which was then 10 far toward completion that the deletion 

would have co.t more than it .aved. Bell Aircraft CorporatioD, which' 

,I manufactured the .econdary propulaion .y.tem, halted work on the 

hardware but continued re •• arch and developmeDt. Th. equipment 

.till wa •• cheduled for u.e on E-6 and Mida. vehicle •• but in large 

part ill co.t wa. beinl charled to E-5. Colonel Kinl was not plea.ed. 

BYE nOn·'4 337 

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a sentiment he communicated to the purchasing officer of E-5. Ultimately there Wa. an agre6ment that no post-September charges would 

be levied on E-S, that E-6 and Midas would actually provide the funds, 

but the payments continued to be made through the E-5 contract. In 

King's judgment. the episode confirmed the lack of financial and 

~ana8ement responsibility displayed by Lockheed through the course 

of the E-5 effort. Z5 

Termination of the extended E-5 program alao relieved pressure 

in other areas. The contentious requirement for a secure command 

system in E-5 had been troublesome since early 1961, mostly because 

its cost (in excess of delayed availability, and probability 

uf detracting from Ileneral .y.tem reliability made it seem unattractive 

to the program office. But Under.ecretary Charyk wa. extremely 

interested in reducing the risk that UDcoded commands might be intercepted by the Soviets. or that the Soviets might insert their own commancls 

into the £-5 control system. Both military and political consequences 

could be serious in either event. a possibility that alarmed senior .' 

ofCicials of both the State and Defeae Departments. * Not untU October 1961 

• 

Shuuld an £-5 recovery capsule be successful1y commanded to reenter 

an Soviet territory. not merely film, but the entire camera system 

would be avaUable for examination. Of the several recovery-mode 

systems in development or operation (Corona. Gambit, AriOn, E-S 

and £-6).only E-S included camera recovery provisions. 

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waa the requirement for an encrypted command1iDk deleted. and then 

reluctantly.26 With canceUation of plana for extended E-5 launchea. 

concern diminiahed. 

In the midatof the termination proceedinga. and while the program 

office was trying to aort out the reaidue of a complex program, 2203 

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reacbed 1auncb readineaa. It climbed free of Pad 2 at Point Arguello 

at 1145 bours on 22 December, after two day. of delay for the correction 

r of minor defecta. Countdown went well, and though there waa a fault 

in the Atlaa propulaion cutoflayatem the net effect waa to put the Agena 

in an orbit with a period 4.5 minutea lODger than planned. 

Once on orbit the payload be.an ita acheduled operation. At 

fira' aU aeemed well. and there were chaar telemetry iDdicationa that 

the camera had functioned. but eitber the frame counter failed or the 

camera shut itaelf down earUer than acbeduled. That was Dot too 

aeriou., even if undesirable. But a faulty command actuated the reentry 

.equence on tbe aixth paa. and throu.b a combination of errors the 

payload. after separating. went into a new and bigher orbit. (That 

wa. not an unmiU.ated misfortune; the payload had ''tried to reenter" 

over New Boston.) The dead A.ena, relieved of ita carlO. continued 

to circle the earth .omewhat below the cap.u1e. Becau.e the reentry 

command had activated all systems in the capsule portion, the battery 

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was dead by the time it was needed to ilnite squibs and actuate the 

drag parachute. Further. the retro-roc~et. 'had been,ignited durinl 

the unplanned maneuver sendinl the capsule into its high orbit, so 

any reentry would be entirely ballistic. 

The Alena fell back and burned up somewhere south of Borneo 

on 31 'December. Tracking stations calculated that the capsule would 

encounter enouRh atmospheric resistance to bring it down about 

9 January. Air recovery would be impossible because of the complete 

absence of the retro-rocket and parachute phases. but it was conceivable 

that the vehicle miRht survive reentry forces and impact where the 

Z.7 

payload could be recovered. In the course of Pegasus reentry 

experiments durinp: September and October 1961. one reentry test 

vehicle had survived a ballistic return from an altitude of nearly 

ZOO, 000 feet after its parachute faUed to deploy. Z8 

E-S program people bled the Spacetrack centers for whatever 

Information they could obtain on the course and probable decay of the 

satellite. During the second week of January 196Z the trackiDI statione 

reported that the capsule had passed over the northernmost trackin. 

screen but had not been picked up by the radars of the next belt southward. 

Laeutenant Colonel V. M. Cenez immediately contacted the 6594th 

Arrospace Test Wing. activating an earlier plan for the contingent 

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recovery of decayinl cap.wee that milht .nter intact. Ther .... every 

indication that the payload had come down in northwtiaC.rn Canada, .0 a 

C-1l9 carryinl Lieutenant Colonel Lon Berry and a recovery cr.w new 

into Creat Falla, Montana, atoppins there to let Canadian parmiaaion 

for a aearch alonl a .pacific path. The Royal Canadian Air Force wanted 

to know why. Colonel Berry explained that the USAF hoped to find part 

of a .atelUte. After .everal hour. of delay, a dir.ct phon. call from 

Wa.hinlton ordered Berry and th. C-1l9 back to California. No r.a.on 

wa. given. 

It later developed that the ar.a of the propo •• d •• arch waa alonl 

one of the Strategic Air Command'. moat heavily ua.d polar patrol 

route.. Canadian authoriti ...... pect.d that a B-52 had accid.ntally 

relea.ed a nuclear weapon and that the Air Force wanted to recover it . 

• urreptltiou.ly. The i •• ue wa. not of the .ort that promi •• d quick 

reaolution •• 0 the aearch party waa ordered home. 

Later a pair of U-Z aircraft new along the .uapected reentry path. 

photolraphina the terrain in hope. there milht be 80me 8iln of the 

eap.ule. Nothinl turned up. and the affair ended on an inconcluaive note. 29 

The third and final E-5 vehicle wa. launched on 7 March 1962 at 

1410 hoar., after an extended .erie. of aborted COuntdOwn8. The AI.na 

auxiliary power ay.tem and the command and control .ubayetem of 2204 

Bn 110n·14 341 

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had been .ub.tantially mo~ifi.d to r.n.ct .xperi.nce with·the fir.t two 

. . 

. E-S'.. Nev.rthele· ••• · probl.m.with the Agena,the Atla •• the guidance· 

programmer, and various .witche. had delayed the launch .ince 

ZZ February. De.pite that omen. the launch and orbit injection were 

"near nominal." For the fint 13 pa •• el, all went reasonably well. 

Then the New Hamp.hire tracking .tation improperly tran.mitted reentry 

sequence command.. The vehicle a •• umed and maintained re.ntry 

attitude. however. and over a period of .everal pa •••• expended mo.t 

of its attitude control la.. In part. the .equence of mi.adventure 

resulted from faUure of the FairchUd timer. A recovery att.mpt on 

pass 17 failed becau.e of another trackinl .tation error. and by pa •• Zl 

all control gas had been exhau.ted. The only remaininl recour.e wal 

to trilger the reentry .y.tem whUe the v.hicle was in an appropriate 

reentry attitude. But in.tead of reentering. the cap.ule went into a 

hillher orbit, much like it. imm.diate predece •• or. 30 

More than a year later. in July 1963, the .atellite had decayed 

to the point of imminent reentry. A. the heavy heat .hield .ti11 was .' 

attached, there .eemed a chance that it would .urvive. Gr.er'. ataff, 

aided by computen and operator. of the A.ro.pace Corporation, 

calculated the probable reentry path and impact point. They concluded 

that the .atellite would impact toward the center of the Arabian Sea. 

Sance any po •• ibUity of parachute deployment had pa •• eel montha befor., 

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and .ince the shock of .trUdng cold sea water after. an uninhibited 

ballistic' reentry almoat certainly would 'breach the aatellite caaing, 

there seemed DO po.sibUity of retrieval. No recovery waa attempted. 

All the available data suggested that the capsule had actually come 

down in the pr.dicted impact area. Like both ita predecessors, 

nothing more waa heard of it. 31 

Much the .ame fate had befallen the E-~ program. Aft.r the 

failure of ZZ03, the program di.appear.d from organizational charta. 

No final report was written. OD 1 March 196Z, even before the la.t 

E-S launching, Colonel Kina had been tr~aferred to a new a •• ignment . 

and the r •• idue of the proaram office had been di.pera~d. 3Z A. E-5, 

the program was th.r.aft.r of int.r •• t mostly to antiquarian •• 

But the camera, and the E .. S requirement, tenuously held to life 

notwith.tanding the lack of pro,ram .ucce.s. Charyk'. d.ci.ion to 

cancel the E-5 proaram had been taken on Monday, .. D.c.mber. Two 

day. later, Jack Carter of It.k propo.ed to Charyk that t •• t. be run 

on Itek and Perkin-Elmer len.e. to determine whether an improved 

len. might be aub.titut.d for the original in the .tUl-peDding ZZ04 

. 33 fiillht. A compariaon be,an early in January. 

WhUe arr.an,.m.nt. for that work were in train, Cart.r .u •••• t.d 

to Qeneral Gr.er that advance a in the camera and .at.Uit. art •• ince 

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the .tart of E-S .hou1d be adapted to a new reconnai •• ance system 

based on the Itek E-S cafJ\era. After "refining the ol"ilinal idea. he 

formally submitted it on 19 December 1961. 

What Carter propoled was combining a .ingle re-engineered 

E-5 camera with the Di.coverer-Corona capsule, a Thor booster, 

• and a modified Aliena. He e.timated that the resulting orbital .y.tem 

would have a two- to four-day mil.ion life. Exploiting the lower 

altitude of the Di.lcoverer latellite, the modified E-5 promiled object 

definition on the order of four feet and, in combination with Kodak's 

I new 50-131 film, a resolution of about 100 linel per mi1limeter. 34 

The idea was not unattractive. On 28 December 1961 General 

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Greer, Colonel H. L. Evanl (hil deputy), and Colonel King met with 

Carter to discuss in greater detail both the concept and it. application. 

Greer recommended that Charyk give the proposal a careful hearing. 

The ICeneral SUtlllested, however, a complete departure from the 

"ontract and manallement .tructure that had characterized the original 

E-S development. He favored a covert program and an a •• ociate 

contract arranJtement that would put ltek (camera), Gen.ral El.ctric 

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Althoutlh Itekls record in E-S development was .earcely faultl •••• 

tht- failure. of the system had all originated in Atlas and Alena .ubsystemll, mostly peculiar to the original E-S de.iln. Corona had 

a much better record by late 1961, and Itek I. reputation for camera 

development was quite reSI,eetable. 

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(capsule). Lockheed (Alena). aDd Doullas (Thor) at roulhly the same 

level. with LoCkheed provjdinl whatever systems enlineerinl and 

intelration work milht be needed. He felt that the Corona office 

should have overall prolram maDAlement responsibility. (Corona 

operated partly inside, partly outside the established structure of 

Oreerls orlanisalion, Oreer haviDl "focal point" authority but the 

C 1A still larlely directinl prolram affairs.) 

The arlumentsfavoriDg Carter's proposal were few but weighty. 

There had been no real relaxation of the orilinal E- 5 requirement. 

even thoulh enthusiasm for the E-5.s a system had mostly evaporated. 

The Carter approach offered a relatively inexpensive way of periormiDI 

the basic E-5 assilnment. liven the proposition that leftover E-5 

cameras would serve as the basis of all payloads. The Ireatest 

technical problem wae that E-5 camera .ystems, even if modified as 

Itek proposed. would weilh substantially more than Corona ca~eras. 

But off.ettinl this was the potential of an improved Thor. then called 

Thorad, which by utilisinl the additional thrust of strap-on solid-fuel· 

Sergeant rockets could orbit such a payload. The near-term availability 

of a Thor-boosted E-5 camera promised hilh detail photolraphs of 

Soviet installationa soone I' than any other reconnais sance satellite in 

development. and at a much lower cost. 

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Undersecretary Charyk was disposed to favor the idea. On 

Z9 December he told Cireer that he wanted lome assul'ance ofleneral 

,feasibility before committing himself and that he would make a decision 

. once he had been" fully briefed on the status of Thorad, the capsule 

35 

problem, and the details of proposed operations. 

Colonel H. L. Battle, principal Air Force manager in the Corona 

program, expressed initial reservations about the soundne.s of the 

approach. He was quite reluctant to assiln systems intelration responsibilities to Itek, an aspect of the ori,inal Carter proposal which General 

Greer had dismissed in mUml his first recommendations to Charyk. 

Battle was "also apprehensive that the modified E-S milht become a 

substitute for Corona rather than an addition to the existing program, 

I a notion that did not stir up much enthusiasm in the Corona office. 36 

After living the proposal further .tudy. the Corona people 

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.u~JCested that the Central Intellillence Agency contract for the payload 

(from Itek) and the recovery vehicle (from General Electric). Such an 

arranllement would make the new program in many respect. a contractual 

counterpart of Corona itself. The Air Force Space System. Division 

would, in that context, procure Thors and Alenas and Greer'. oraani-

.zahon would manale a covert systems enlineerinl contract with Lockheed. 

Corona experience and refined estimat .. indicated that the basic 

Thor-A,ena combination could put the 77S-pouncl payload. includin. 

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40 pound. of film into" a two-day polar orbit. Averale photOiraphic 

" . . a"uitude ';"ould be 140 nautical mUe., althoulh perig.e would be about ~ 

100. U.e of Thorad would .ubatantially improve orbital life apan. 

One premiae of development waa a joint Itek-Lockheed payload 

structure design. Lockheed fabricating the framework and shipping it 

to Boston. where Itek would ina tali the camera ayatem.- After inapection and acceptance at Itek'. plant, the compoaite structure would be 

s hipped back to California where Lockheed would mate it with the 

recovery capaule before sending it oU to Vandenberg. 

With immediate prolram approval. it .eemed po •• ible to ,et 

the fint payload delivered by ZZ Auguat 196Z and later payloads at 

one-month interval. thereafter. The first launch could be .cheduled 

for December 1961. It wa. generally aaaumed that problem. with 

the boo.ter. or for that maner with the Alena, would be .liaht because 

the payload would be ea.entully interchanleable with tho.e be ina built 

for Corona operation •• which then were goina rather well. Thor engine. 

would be the pacina item. unle •• there was a .Uppale in payload 

fabrication. 

Initially it appeared that the co.t of development and initial 

pa yload procurement would Co.t. would be somewhat 

hiliher. however. if Thorad were u.ed--an expedient that would live 

the .y.tem a .ix-clay life. 37 

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Within Greer's organisation, the Carter proposal was called . " 

. Lanyard, a word known on! y to abqut a dozen people during the" first 

• weeks of program consideration. 

Not much could be done untU Charyk obtained an essential 

endorsement of Lanyard from the Secretary of Defense. the lIeneral 

concurrence of CIA. and final approval from the National Security 

Council. By early January 196Z, much of the general uncertainty had 

dissipated. In response to a request from Defense Secretary R." S. 

McNamara. Dr. Charyk prepared a general resume of the status of 

Gambit and the options open to satellite reconnaissance for the next 

year or so. The information was neeeled for the President's "special 

~roup. " which conducted periodic reviews of general reconnaissance 

program status. In his resume, Charyk included a paragraph declaring 

the feasibility of the Lanyard approach and a statement that the reconnaissance office was giving serious consideration to funding t~ program. 

Culonel J. R. Martin. head of Charyk's special staff. carried the 

propo.al directly to McNamara for final review. McNamara went over 

the draft in detail. makint: only one Significant suggestion for chanle. 

• 

The word first appears in an U January 196Z memorandum written 

an the Pentagon but it was "arher uaed as the code identifier for 

"th" simplified E-5" in discu .. ions on the West Coast. A special 

Lanyard dearance procedure was in effect by late February. 

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Inatead of propoaiDl the p~aalbUlty of Lanyard development, he told 

Martin, the reaume ahould atate that cle~.lopmeni waa . in prolreaa. 

So modified, the memorandwn went forward for Secretary 

McNamara'. ailnature. For practical purposes, it represented 

approval of Lanyard development. Neverthelesa, it seemed unwise 

to do much toward formall y atartinl work until final endorsements 

38 

had been received from the preaiclential review level. 

The McNamara memoranclwn did Dot ,0 forward ·for National 

Security Council review until March 1962. More than a month earlier. 

on ~2 January, Underlecretary Cbaryk discuased Lanyard's situation 

and prospects with Cieneral Greer and the West Coast project ,roup. 

He emphasized that Lanyard would be, in at least one sense. competitiv~ with the current notion of acceleraUnl Gambit development. Should 

Gambit become available at about the same time as Lanyard. there 

would be no real need for the latter. Conversely, if Gambit should be 

dela yed, or if the Gambit effort Ihould encounter major technical 

difficulties, Lanyard would lerve as a substitute. The two prolrams .. 

w~re complementary. beinl aimecl at obtaiDiDI hilb-resolution pictures 

during the early months of 1963. Charyk wanted it to be understood 

that Gambit was the main effort~ Lanyard he characterized as a probable 

transitory development to inlure a.ainst the consequences of Gambit 

delay or failure. 39 

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By early February, Battle had refined the financial .stimates 

and had committed Lanyard to the Thorad approach.' It was now plain 

that pa yloads would cost at I Thorad development 

Thors ariel Agenas for the five proposed launches 

would cost another 

Although the cost ligures were no longer quite as attractive 

as they had seemed a month earlier, compenaating technical aavantages 

had appeared. Close study of Lanyard mis sion potential indicated that 

because of the improved thrust of the Thorad the guidance systems in 

both the Thor and the Agena could be operated over lonaer periods than 

had been anticipat~d. A considerably enhanced precision in orbital 

inje(.·tionwould result. Addihonally, it now appeared that a IS-day life 

lor the Lanyard .ystem millht be achievable. 

Convinced 01 Lanyard'. appeal and reassured by McNamara's 

previous endorsement of the program, Charyk decided to request 

Lanyard approval in a pending presentation to the "special group ... 

He saw Lanyard principally as insurance against a majo," setback in 

Cambit and planned to present the program in that light • 

The still embryoniC Lanyard project team was developing a 

different outlook. Characterldically, those who became intimately 

... ociated with Lanyard t.ended, in time, to forget or iaDare the ort,inal 

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coneept of Lanyard aa a tranaitory. interim prOiram •. In the eyea 

of ita managera.".and ita cOlltractora··it acquired an au'i-a of perma. 

nenee that Charyk had not intended. More than a year later. when 

Lanyard and Oambit payloada were e.aentiaUy atanding aide by aide 

for launch countdown. there waa relatively little proaram oUice 

" 40 acknowledgement of Lanyard'. tra ... ient .tatua. " 

Still undecided in March 1961 was the question of who .hould 

administer the covert contracts with ltak, General Electric. and 

Lockheed. The matter was complicated by the nature of the still embryonic 

National Reconnaiaaance Or.AIli.atioD (NRO). headed by Charyk. which 

included both CIA and USAF participants in satellite reconnaiasance. 

Althougb it seemed inevitable that the NRO would be the actual Lanyard 

prolram custodian, effective control tended to remain with the or.ani. 

zation that directly administered the contracts. The CIA had been fully 

cognizant of tbe Lanyard affair virtually aince its inception and CIA 

management of covert contract. had been one of Colonel Battle's first 

aUlgesUona. Yet Carter'a propoaal had first been made to Greer. E-S"' 

had been a Samos proaram. and there aeemed no compellina reason 

• for allowing it to drift into another oraani.ation'a control. 

• The evolution of the NRO and ita inBuence OIl the proare •• of the 

aeveral aatellite reconnai •• ance proaram. i. the subject of a separate 

chapter. For the purpose. of this portion of the narrative it .eems 

auflie,ent to note that the or.aniution exi.ted and that ita functioaa 

and authorities had DOt been entirely clarified. 

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On that ambiguou. note. Cieneral Cireer--anxiou. to let Lanyard 

underway before its value wa •• ubltantiaUy le .. ened by thepa •• ale of 

time--Iuggelted to Brigadier Cieneral R. D. Curtin. heading Charyk'. 

NRO staff, that he be authorized to let a "level of effort" contract with 

Itek to cover an initial 30 days 01 work. He also urged the need to start 

work on a covert cover plan. since a first launch was planned {or 

December 1961, only 10 months distant. Acknowledging that he was 

uncertain what deci.ion might be made on the matter 01 contract authority, 

Greer sug~ested that it would be better to have the CIA take such first 

step. if it .eemed probable that the aleney would ultimately get program 

. ..I manalCement authority. 

That the program wuuld be totally covert and not, as propo.ed at 

one point, a hatchl y se=cure "whate" effort, became certain during the 

third week 01 February IQ6l. Stimulat.d by CIA conCern about the rather 

lar~e number. olpeop!e who were becoming aware 01 luch "~tra •• n.itiv .... 

( uVt."rt prollrams a. Corona and Arion, President J. F. Kennedy directed 

that unly individuals specilically approved by the CIA could become.' 

Involved an the Lanyard effort. By implication, in.o ruling. the Pre.ident 

ailio approved the Lanyard prollram and made the CIA itl cu.todian. 

Charyk planned to recommend to the Pre.ident'. Special Committee on 

Rt."cunnaa •• ance that Lan~· .. rd be handled a. Corona had been. 

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Early in April the under.ecretary found a way to .pUt the hair. 

"lettingClA ha';'e contract re.ponaibUity but lteepin; the critical technical elemenU of program management in Greer'. hand.. He propo.ed 

to Herbert Scoville, CIA '. Deputy Director for Re.earch and Richard 

Bi •• eU'. luccellor al de facto manaler of the CIA '. role in satellite 

reconnai.sance, that Greer be made immediately re.ponsible for all 

Lanyard contracts except the covert alreement., that CIA admini.ter 

all covert contract., and that Greer be "completely re.pon.ible for 

technical mana,ement· of Lanyard." including the payload and recovery 

element.. That line of command would be reinforced by malti .. the 

configuration control board respon.ive only to Greer. 

Operation. would be patterned after Corona. In eUect. CIA 

would exerci •• responsibUity for pre-mission plaDDinl and on-orbit 

operational ded.ion. involving target .election. The CIA would allO 

mana.e security aspect. of the program. Communication would employ 

Corona meslage circuit •• 

The .olution Charyk proposed was a compromi.e bet.een the - . 

oriMinal concept of management by the Corona office under Greer'. 

darectlon, and management along the line. of Corona -- which meant 

by the CIA. Charyk reminded ScovUle on 2 April that it .a.urgently 

nee ... ary to alree on a divi.ion 01 re.ponsibilitie. if the NRO wal to 

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meet the schedules pro~ised to the Preaident •. And he noted that -ome 

proJe'ct activity had !:ielun even· ·without &n alreemebt on respOuibilites. ~2 

The need for such a communication, in effect a Delotiated alreement between the director of the NRO and hi. nominal deputy, could be 

appreciated only in the context of personal and orlanization animosity 

that had developed since the departure of Bissell, Scoville's predecessor. 

The evidence would indicate that President Kennedy approved the Lanyard 

approach early in March but that differences between NRO andQA, or 

between Charyk and Scoville, delayed further action for at least three 

weeks. 

Scoville eventually accepted the Charrk proposal of 2 April, thoulh 

remarkinl that giving Oeneral Oreer the total responsibUity for technical 

manallement of all aspect. of Lanyard was a departure from Corona 

precedents. 

DetaU. of the arranlement were somewhat more complex than 

could be summarized in the phrase "complete technical manalement 

responsibility, II but that was the essence of the arranlement. The·· 

Immediate pro~ram director would be Colonel Battle, thoulh he would 

be entirely re.ponsible tu Oeneral Oreer rather than, as with Corona, 

to CIA for some matter.. And althoullh CIA had the authority to make 

"un· orbit operations" decisions, Oreer would exercise a technical 

dec •• ion function during th~ conduct of Lanyard missiona. In case of 

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conflicta. Charyk would d~cide--lf time permitted; otherwiae Greer 

prevaUed. Ab.olute CIA control of Lanyard .ecurity Waa tempered 

by the rulin, that General Greer would determine pro,ram need-~o-know. 

only que.tiona involvin, people not enla,ed in program management 

bein, subject to a joint a,reement between Charyk and the CIA. Finally, 

the Corona .ecure teletype network was to be extended to include Greer'. 

group. Charyk'a office, and the NRO .taff. (Until that time the Corona 

manager. had pa •• ed alonl to General Greer thoae me •• age. they 

thought would be of intere.t.there waa noarran,ement for tranamittal 

43 

of complete information.) 

Even before Charyk and ScoviUe reached their under.tandin,. 

on prolram re.ponaibilitiea, Lanyard had be,un the tran.ition from 

propoaal to development. By l8 March 196Z, Lockheed had been authorized to con.truct five orbital .y.tem. in accordance with technical 

in.tructiona orilinated by Greer' •• taff. Pendlnl nelotiatlon of a formal 

contract, Lockheed was permitted to apend 

A. in the pa.t. one of the fir.t problem. that had to be faced was 

~ethnl Lanyard under cover. The pro,ram was lar,ely ba.ed on the use 

of ex,.tinl E-5 camera. which had been openly developed and procured 

for the Air Force inventory. Arran,in. to have them diaappear from 

accountability without actually a.avinl Itek'. po ••••• ion promi •• d to be 

trIcky. 

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The affair was arranlled by an ingenuous feint. Using ordinary 

communic~ti~n' channels,' Ilek offered to buy from Lockheed the residual 

~nventory of E-5 equipment. The sale price came t~ 

roughly 55 percent of what the government had paid upon original 

delivery. The money actually was provided by the CIA and, as paid, 

represented the fint of program funding. For the record, 

General Greer formally asked Air Force Systems Command headquarters 

to authorize trander of the residual E-5 inventory to Itek. After an 

appropriate interchange of coordination corresPondence which alerted 

all those earlier concerned in E-5 affairs .. permission was granted. 

As far as the "white" satellite organization knew, E-5 was dead and 

burled. Itek had leJlal and physical possession of the cameras and could 

proceed to modify them to Lanyard specificationa without alerting anyone. 

Other elements of the delunct E-5, including a test chamber and 

a collection of relatively expensive specialized tooling, had remained at 

the ltek plant near Boston. Itek asked that all such property be transferred from the E-5 contract to an existing industrial facilities contract 

between Itek and Wrillht-Patterson Air Force Base. At the same time, 

the camera contractor submitted a list of non-usable items, such as the 

E-S fairing, lens barrel., and the like, to be processed as scrap under 

the authority of the local Alr Force plant representative. The remaining 

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E-S residue wal the subject of another Itek offer to buy,. which received 

routine approval. ' Becaule ,spme conlcientioua procureMent monitor 

might protest Air Force readinell to seU scarce high quality lensel 

at 50 or 60 centl on 'the dollar, the lensel were exempted from the 

arrangement and nominally assi.ned to the Aeronautical Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson. Actually, they were trander.red to Itek on 

a hand receipt. This leeminlly intricate lequence of actions was, in 

practice, less complicated than many routine matterl of covert contract 

administration. It succeeded in gettin. the neceslary equipment transferred to [tek 10 circum.pectly that no luspicion wal arouled. And 

since ltek fac ilities included a "black" area where Corona cameras had 

been developed and built, no difficulty wal encountered therealter in 

cuncealinl the actual modification work. 45 

By early May 1962, Lanyard technical propolals from Itek, 

Lockheed, and Ceneral Electric had been received and were being 

proce •• ed. Lockheed andltek were workin. under interim authorizationa ach, whUe Ceneral Electric had received 

advance authorizations totaUn. Program COlts for the 

thre~ were then eSlimated a of which Itek would receive 

Lockhee The total still was les s than 

Ceneral Creerls e.tUnate that the payloadl would COlt aU of 

recovered from the E-S termination. 46 

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Tbe Lanyard panoramic camera system was then expected to 

weigh 635 J;»oundil, the cauette ZO pounds. and the .stellar-index camera 

system another lO pound.. About 78 pounds of fUm would be carried 

for the main camera plus two pounds for the stellar-index system. 

Greer had suggested that six additional cameras be added to the original 

Lanyard order for use during calendar 1964. but Undersecretary Charyk 

had balked, limiting the total procurement, for the moment. to five 

cameras. Charyk agreed to consider buying two additional cameras 

for 1963, howeve r. Th~ approved five-vehicle program. including 

boosters and launch cos,., would run a 

Not until OC'tober 196Z was that basic schedule modified, and 

then by the purChase or three additional Lanyard payloads which would 

provide for interim high acuity reconnaissance in the event that Gambit 

operations wer~ not wholly successful during 1963. The new payloads 

were tentatively slated for launch during January. February, and March' 

48 

1964. Total ('osts for the Lockheed and ltek portions of the program 

thus rose, for the eaRht proRrammed nights. to 

. I I h .. I . 49 respecllv~ y, up a to'a u r t e orlglna prolram es"mate. 

The cost of the entire Lanyard efiort, it developed. would increase 

a to a total 0 The prospect tbat 

early sUC(,ttSS in Lanyard 0_llhts would cause a further extension of 

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the program appeared later in October. when Itek wal, authorized to 

buy optical· glass needed for nine additional IYlteml. 'Siace the cost 

however. nothing in the way of a lignificant 

commitment to a continuing Lanyard effort could be deduced from the 

decision. Lead time for optical glall was the most critical element 

in long-term planning. so luch a purchase implied no more than 

50 

elementary precautions alainst unanticipated problems. 

The immediate responlibility for technical aspects of Lanyard 

development was firmly fixed by early July. with the alsignment of 

the officer relponsible for the camera 'Yltem. 

Redelegation of contractinl officer authority from CIA headquarten to Arthur Leach (a CIA officer a'lilned within the SAFSP 

establishment) served to pin down responsibility for the contractual 

elements of the prolram. Leach was formally empowered to siln all 

covert contractinl documents "rellardles. of amount" provided only 

that the proper fundinl allocations had previoully been approved. 51 

Such a measure promised additional safeguardl for the security of the 

basiC Corona activity. a matter about which CIA headquarters wal 

expressinl increased concern a. the unfold big of Lanyard exposed 

mure and more people to the fact. concerninl the origin of the Lanyard 

film recovery technique. 

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In the midlt of Lanyard acceleration there developed a new 

squabble over the 'ICOpe oC Natfonal Reconnai.lance Organi.ailon . 

relponsibilitiel, and in conlequence the funding authorisations for 

Lanyard became embedded in an organizational dispute between Charyk 

and Scoville. In September and October 1962, the queltion of whether 

CIA would aSlume total relponalbillty for all covert contracting in 

satellite reconnaisaance became a warm ilsue. * WhUe it went unresolved, funda for Lanyard and other covert pro,raml were withheld. 

By October, the reserve of NRO Cunds had vaniahed and, in General 

Greerls words, the contractora were workinl on truat. 52 The problem 

was ultimately resolved by compromise. but not before alarming both 

General Greerls e.tabhshment and the Lanyard contractors. 

Late in 1961 there wa. lome difficulty with schedulel for the 

.tellar-indexing camera. which, in the case of Lanyard, were vital 

to the functioninll of the total system. SteUar-index records were the 

only source. of aUitudt" reference provided in the Lanyard Iystem, 

• 

The rather complicated que.tion of authority and relponlibUity il 

da.cus.ed in Kreater detall an a followinl chapter on the NRO. In 

e.sence, the CIA did not want to assume covert contractinl responsibllihn for all proJCram., artfuina that exposure wal certain if itl 

rrlatlvely s~l activille. an that area were increased by such programs 

as Gambit. Charyll, a. darector of the NRO, wanted a rilid definition 

of functional respon.ibihue. which would effectively confine CIA to 

se,"urity and covert contractinll (plus certain operational functional. 

but WhlCh would .ive NRO darectors complete technical authority. 

Curuna. stil1lar"ely contrvlled in technical and. financial areal by 

thl" cIA, was the real queshon at stake. 

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no horizon camera being incorporated. (Corona systems included a 

horizon camera. permitting independent determination (;f vehicle 

attitude and makin, steUar-index information a highly useful but not 

vital accessory.) In October, the configuration control board decided 

that the stellar-index cameras in Lanyard should incorporate a 

capacity for 500 feet of index film and 250 feet of stellar ·fUm--. 

substantial increase over the amount ori,inally contemplated. After 

80me minor quibblin, over costs and fees, ltek began working on the 

chan~e. Difficulties came in December, when ltek disclosed that the 

required supply spools and tue-up cassettes could not be made available before mid-March 1963--some two weeks after the currently 

scheduled fint fiilht date. The possibility that one or two Lanyarda 

mi~ht have to confurm to the older pattern of stellar-index operation 

did not vanish until early 1963. when it became apparent that the first 

systf."m could not be launched before April. 53 

Another problem that subsequently solved itself involved 

Apo,ee limits for Lanyard (ZOO 

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late in October 1962--with the qualification that they' would be reactivated in the 

The chief difficulty encountered in payload development arose 

from deficiencies in and .hortales of test equipment and related 

facilities. By November 1962. a general sUppale in .everal subsystems 

had cast doubt on thevatidity of the very tilht deliver'y schedule. In 

September. platten fabrication problems delayed prolre... By late 

October. difficulties in installing the thermal blanket for the camera 

subs yatem were: becominJt critical. Allena completion had dipped a 

week by early Nuvember. and con.truction of the joint between the 

AJ:ena and the payload srction was then two weeks behind. By the time 

Itek was ready tu .hip the farst camera .ub.y.tem it had become 

.essential to wal,,'e: requirements for full qualification of the beryllium 

marrur and to pruvide for it later retrofit of the data block recording 

!lub!l ystem. which had operated poorly in preliminary teats. The 

stdlar-index unit was nut yet available and could not be telted in 

('unJunt·tion with the main ramera. More li,nilicant. thoulh not 

Imnuodlately rero.cni&ed a!t such. was a notation that alight corona 

t'Ut'l't had ('aused film f0t:':lnt: an 80me of the early camera 'Yltem 

~=, 

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Nutwlthstandlnt: Much difficulties, each of which brieRy .eemed 

tu pr"Ma.,:e ;1 major ,'ri.llli. It .. ·k manaled to push the firlt Lanyard 

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camera syatem throu,h preUmiaary acceptuce teata by 19 December 

196Z. Chani.;s to'the beryllium mirror .till were nece •• ary, however, 

and final optical teat. could' not be rununtU a critical teat facility 

had been completed and checked out. Lockheed waa .til1 reportin, 

trouble with thermal ahieldin, and the roll joint atructure. with modi- , 

ficationa of the command decoder unit, and with facility qualification. S6 

One of the problema of the Lanyard echedule waa inherent: the 

firet launch vehicle would be aa unique aa ita payload. The initial 

Lanyard waa acheduled to be lofted by the first thrua .. aUlmented Thor. 

now generaU y called TAT rather than Thorad. Additionally, the Bell 

Telephone Laboratoriea' ,luidance aystem which later waa to be made 

integral with the Allena atage would. for the firat launch. be lo('ated 

in the Thor. Thus a apecial aet of aacent equations waa required. 

Additionally, the: program oflice hoped to uae Lanyard miaaion data 

in planning for later low-altitude Corona flighta and in obtainin, preciae 

information on the proapective Ufe expectancy of the dual-capaule 

Corona-J ayatems acheduled for firat uae durin, the aprin, of 1963. 

The abundance of such facton thoroughly compounded the normally 

57 

he('tic environment of any first fli,ht. 

Remarkably enoulCh, Lanyard experienced relatively few ai,nificant changea during ita early development. The aubatitution of a 

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beryllium mirror str-ucture for the aluminum strllcture orilinally 

planned was one which would have lonl-term influend~, and c-omplexi_ 

ties of the stellar-index camera installation promised to be important, 

but on the whole- the prolram had been rather stable. (The beryllium 

structure provided better rigidity than aluminum at a 40-pound saving 

in weight. but the additional film capacity of the stellar-index camera 

unit absorbed much of the difference~ ,58 In that Lanyard was significantly diUerent from its £-5 predeceasor, however, it represented 

a continuing develupment problem. one not completely obvious if the 

abbreviated ayatem drvelopment achedule was used as an indicator 

of deaiRn novelty. 

Apart from being cunsiderably lighter than the E-5. largely a 

factor of emploYln~ one rather than two cameraa. Lanyard principally 

diUered from the original aystem in that only the fUm was recovered 

from Lanyard flitchts. E-S recovery had included both cameras andvirtually the entire forward structure of the total system. Additionally, 

Lanyard employed a unique roll-joint technique. which permitted the- . 

camera to point toward selected Iround targeta without requirinl a 

roU maneuver by the Alena. Finally. the new aystem waa baaed on 

•• ngle-camera stereo technique.. Its picture a would cover a SO-nauticalmile swath eilht mlle. deep alonR the flight path, with a 10 percent 

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overlap. Ten of the major E-5 lubsYlteml were incorporated in Lanyard. 

Seven others had been completely eliminated (includmg' a ';'eighty and 

complex computer). and the remaining five had been lubltantially 

limplified. 

E-S had been a prellurized Iystem; Lanyard relembled Corona 

in operating at ambient prellurel. Simplification had ill mOlt marked 

effect in the fUm tranlport and shutter mechanisms, which leaned 

heavily on Corona experience. 59 The dynamic operating model of 

Corona and Lanyard cameras were quite similar. which was not 

surpriling lince both were Itek developments stemmiJla from 19S9 

concepts. Noneth~lels. in bulk and in many of their physical details 

the two .Yltems w~re mor~ dissimUar than might have been anticipated. 

Niven the fact that the Lanyard approach involved lubstituting Corona 

techniques for those of th~ original E-S. 

The recovery lequenc~ wal a real point of difference between 

l.anyard and E-5. The original E-5 capsule delign had been markedly 

Influenced by the notion of modUyina the payload lection to a malllled~ .' 

spare-night configuration. Althoulh recovery and re-use of an expensive 

c.-amen wal th~ customary justification for provisions that would require 

rl.'entry ul the entire E-S front end. the remarkable likenels between the 

E-S caplule and that propoled by Lockheed for the abortive Man-InSpace-Suon~lt sYltem (1958) could not be 'Inored. 

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In E-5. once the, photo mil lion was complete. the firlt of 13 

separate recovery events was to increase pres lurizafion of "the capsule 

by seven to ten pounds. to stiffen it lor reentry. The A,ena was then 

reoriented 10 that engine ignition would ellect capsule ejection. the 

mirror was jettisoned and the lens retracted, The covers on the 

various apertures for mirrors and lenlel were closed to shield interior 

t"umponents against reentry heatinl effects. Thereafter the entire 

l"am('ra compartment separated from the A,ena. After caplule pal.ale 

lhruuJ.:h the upper atmosphere, the fairing doors were opened. the 

druJi:ue Jitun tired. and the drogue chute released. Drolue and mid-body 

fairinllS were n,,'xt jettisoned, followed by deployment ot'the main 

~arachute. discard of the ablahveshield. and inflation of the water 

Impact baICs • 

Lanyard':I recover)' sequence was. by comparison. quite simple. 

After Allene reorientation and severance of the film. the film ,ate was 

» .. alcd. the recuvery capsule system separated from the camera, the 

retru·roe-ket. lared. and reentry commenced. Deployment first of the 

druliCue ,huh' and subsequently of the main chute completed the seven 

molJur events 01 reentry. 

Adoption 01 Coror"'-provctn technique. implied several lilnificant 

ad,,'ancrll toward a sampler sy.tem. Elimination of pressurization 

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promised to reduce a potential for lIne le delraclation ari.inl from . interul air turbulence and to elim-inate any need for internal er.ror 

control .temming from pre. surisation factors. Lanyard needed DO 

counterbalance for the lineal' motion effect. of the image motion 

control mechanism. eliminatinl requirement. for the servo-drive 

counterweilhts needed on the E-5 image motion compen.ator. (In 

Lanyard. the Alena could be programmed to ilnore rate inputs that 

fell below two milliradians per .econd. ) Similarly. Lanyard required 

no counterweights for .pool action •• a. in the E-5. since in Lanyard 

film take-up force. were compen.ated for by counter-rotation on the 

pitch axie of the orbitl nl vehicle. 60 

The prool of the puddinl remained for the future, of course. 

Most satellite reconnai.sance prolrams of the pa.t had been notably 

high on promise and substantially limited in performance--Ieadinl to 

a notoriou.ly hillh mortality rate. In December 1962, when the fir.t 

Lanyard sy.tem was beinl a.sembled for transport to Vandenberl, the 

last of the original Samoa systems, the E-6, was in the process of 

cancellation. To that time. only Corona and its sibUnls had returned 

reconnais.ance pictures. (Products of the sinlle !lucce.sfu1 E-l 

fiillht were treated as interesting photograph. taken from orbit--curio. 

wath no real potential for utility.) And in the ca.e of Lanyard. a 

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question of requirements had belun to cloud prospects. As early as 

. . . August 196Z, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) 

had registered with NRO Director Charyk a mUd disclaimer of belief 

in any real need for Lanyard. NPIC expressed doubts, based chielly 

on Corona experience, that the Lanyard vehicle could be programmed 

with sulfident precision to provide stereo coverage of vital tarllt."ts" 

NPIC sUHlCested that Lanyard's limited transverse, which would permit 

phuto~raphs of a SO-mile .. trip from a 12S-mile orbit, was too slight 

fur surveillance a.signments althouah the probable photographiC 

quality of the system indicated that surveillance should be its chiel role. 

A_ at happened. NPIC's real interest of the moment was inducinl the 

NRO to improve the .tellar-camera features of Lanyard, a move to 

c:nhance the valut." uf the recovered product by increasing confidence 

that the precille location uf the photographed area could be determined. 

61 

But the Inquiry had an ominous ring, nonetheless" 

Perhaps anticipatinJl that tbe tempo of quibbling would increase 

With time, Ceneral Creer late in September 1962 approacbed Under-· 

IU."C reta ry Charyk with the sU.Ulestion that it millht be useful to conduct 

a C"umparative technical evaluation of the Cambit and Lanyard syatems. 

A s,",L1ar evaluation had reC'ently been completed for the £ ... 6 and Mural • 

Gt'neral Greer emphasiz.·d, .huwever, that the primary purpose of the 

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study should be to uncover ~ny payload technical problems that mi.ht 

have been overloOked in· eiU-er development program rather thaft to 

put the two systeme in any sort of competition. But useful comparative 

data would emerge in any case. Then, should a situation develop 

fl ••• in which a choice between the two systems is forced by budgetary 

or other considerations, " the information on which to base a decision 

could quickly be broultht to hand. 6Z 

There were other advantages to tbe study--ancl lome possible 

disadvantages. On the negative side, it was conceivable tbat a weighted 

evaluation would lead to a finding that Lanyard promi.ed considerably 

more in the way of reconnai .. ance value than Cambit. Unlikely though 

such an outcome seemed. Lanyard's capacity for wide-sweep photography 

at roughly the same resolution as aambit might be attractive in 80me 

quarters. particularly if coupled to financial estimates which showed 

Gambit costing substantially 'nore. It would be advantageous to the 

reconnaissance programs, in the long term. if the study showed early 

that no real need for Lanyard existed; considerable money would be 

saved by cancellinR the proRram at an early stage rather than. as with 

£-5 and £-6. after development was e •• entially complete and flight 

test well along. The same case miRht be made for cancelling aambit 

carly in its life. Creer wa. particularly concerned lest it should later 

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seem that his Iroup was specializinl in the dev,lopment of redundant. 

expensive. and duplicative systems. 

No formal all8wer to General Greer's suggestion came back. 

Instead. Cbaryk told the general early in October 1962 that there was 

a firm Gambit requirement. that the Lanyard prolram was a useful 

back-up. and that in such terms there was no current need fo~ a 

detailed comparative evaluation. "We are going to develop Gambit." 

&3 

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It was durinl the late months of 196-2 that the Lanyard development process began to encounter a succession of seeminlly minor 

difficulties which. standanK alone. meant little. but when taken together 

tL"nded to dc:lay tbe availability of critical articles. The camera portion 

had been mated to the frame of the orbital vehicle by early January 1963 

and about a third of the total Dilht preparation routine had been complcted. But delays in availabUity of the Alena set back the start of 

cumpatibility te .. ting bV a week at that point. causinl a leneral slip 

an schedules. The prullram office. fully aware that some s~ch problems 

Were inevitable. had in"erted a small pad of slack time early in the 

d..-yulopment. Unhappily. ltekand Lockheed had eroded away most of 

that cushion somewhat earher. By mid-January. Lockheed was conccdanll to "an extremely tlJEht situation." If any 'major problems 

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developed, night sche-dules would be jeopardised. Schedules were 

then so t·ight that lbelas t .ittquence of camera teata had been rescheduled to follow rather than precede system environment checks, 

a change required by the delayed availability of a completely suitable 

64 

calibration facility. 

On 31 January. Itek adviaed Lockheed that the beryllium mirror 

orillinally slated for uae with the firat Lanyard flight payload was "not 

acceptable. to The camera firm recommended uaing one of the aluminum 

mirrors already available. since a beryllium replacement could not be 

provided before 11 February and the deadline for shipnent of the 

qualified payload to Vanelenbera waa 15 February. (An aluminum mirror 

had been installed in the first night system for use through around 

tests, beinR sC'h~duled for replacement ahortly before final subsyatem 

checks. What lte:k waa actually proposing, therefore. waa retention 

of tht." aluminum mirror for the firat Oight.) Lockheed, after giving 

th~ matter conaiderable attention, concluded that a beryllium mirror 

wall "ellsential to program objectives" and held out for the original 

plan. Itek finally .,Ireed. drawinll the needed mirror from another 

Lanvard aystem in final aa.embly.6S 

In the meantime. a succeaaion of failurea in both the payload 

aectaon and in the thermal altitude aimulator chamber had eUectively 

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ended bope that original flillht schedules milht be maintained. The 

first unit entered the thermal~altitude chamber on 5 February, 

roughly a week late. Two days later it had to be removed for failure 

ana1ysie and necessary modification. An incorrect command from 

the teat console had induced roll-joint failure. (The unit overran its 

rotation limit of 30 degrees, severing the connectinl cable.) Additionally, electromagnetic interference had shorted out the programmer 

clock, and it developed that telemetry needs of the stellar-index 

camera had not been satisfied before the teets started. 

After three shifla worked at rewiring the unit, it started throullh 

the test chamber again on 8 February. The tests were baited tbe 

folloWlnJ: d .. )· when the roll-joint refused to respond to commands and 

the camera. &Ilnored automatic shut-down silnale. This time the 

1'011-jomt had failed because of a short circuit in the camera wiring 

harness. Quick repair permitted a test resumption by 11 February, 

Lut latei' that day there was a repetition of the camera mode failure. 

Wearill. telit personnel pulled the payload section out of the test 

,ohamber and sent it bACk to assembly. 66 

Tht.' fourth attempt at a thermal-altitude chamber test began 

un 11 February. The stellar .. index camera failed the next day, during 

a "uld chamber exposure. Concurrently, roll-joint difficulties reappeared. 

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In this in.tance, however, the roll-joint problem was traced to a fault 

in the· Lanyard's c()tnmand decoder unit. The stellar-index camera 

failure was mechanical in orilin, whUe refusal of the main camera 

to shut down on command (another problem ... ich had reappeared) 

was attributed to a faulty transformer. After each of these defects 

had been corrected, the system finaUy completed its thermal-altitude 

checks on 18 February. The missinl mirror made its appearance 

four days later. After a succession of minor difficulties which {urther 

slowed pro~ress, the subsystem tests were completed on 4 March. 

67 

The shipment ldt Sunnyvale the next day. 

In one respect, the fruatratiJIl delays in completing Lanyard 

JZround qualification seemed to have been fortunate. While Lanyard 

had been stalled an chamber tes's, a standard Corona payload had 

been substituted in the launch schedule--the first TAT booster launch, 

on Z8 February. Because of a technician's failure to pre.s hard 

enouah when inserting an umbilical connector, one of the TAT', solid 

rocket units did not i~nite and the satellite was lost. But the skein 

uf mlafortune whach had accumulated about the first Lanyard was not 

yet complete. When the launch finally came, on 18 March, it wall 

unsuccessful. Because of an electrical system failure, the Ita. valve. 

which governed AMena stabUi&ation during injection operated only for 

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the first second of Agena burn. Lacking attitude control. the Agena 

. . . stage began to roll at a rate which bullt up to a4 degrees per second. 

at burnout. Burnout came 13 seconds early, probably because centrifugal force generated by the rapid roll rate prevented fuel from reaching 

the ignition chamber. The la.t hope for a miracle vanished when the 

Kodiak station failed to report any contact with the satellite at the . . f' f' h d I 68 tlme 0 Its &rst.c e u ed appearance. 

Lack uf sUCce •• in the first Lanyard launch was a most untimely 

misfortune. Starlin&: with a Corona launch on 7 January and including 

the initial TAT failure on l8 February, three .ucce.sive attempts to 

ubtain coveralle uf key Soviet area. had been barren. No photographs 

had ~en returned since 18 December 196Z, a situation which brought 

expressions uf p .. rticular cuncern both from the new director of the 

~RO. Brockwa)' McMillan, and from ClA's Herbert Scoville. (Even 

uc:fore the abortive Lanvard trial, McMillan had directed a "maximum 

t·{{ort" to Ret early returnll from a Corona-Mural. a course urged by 

CIA. Indeed. Scoville had liuJ;,:ested substituting a "normal" 

Corona-Mural payload fur the faut Lanyard, a mealure that was 

. 1" b f 69 ampractlca In the lime rl'rnauung e ore the Lanyard launch.) 

In the wake of tht· Lanyard failure. separate and detailed 

report. coverinll fiilCht dafflcultle. went to Secretary McNamara and 

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CIA Direttor John McCone: Scoville. though uDhappy -with-the con- . 

tinued abseDce ofpb'otoirapbs. leemed to be favorably impressed 

by the forceful approach (ieneral (ireer's organization wal taking 

toward Lanyard difficulties. McMillan agreed with (ireer's oblervation that there wal no ueeful or conlietent pattern to the recent 

failurel and that the beet courle for the moinent was to continue 

scheduled launches~ (Two Corona flilhts were set for April and one 

for what remained of March.) In the case of Lanyard. the matter of 

greateat urlency was to di.cover precilely what had cauled the 

electrical failure in the Agena and to prevent it. recurrence. The 

best explanation leemed to be that the act of blowing off the camera 

doors immediately after' booeter .eparation had 80mehow brought on 

a IIhort circuit in a junction box, but determined eUortl to reproduce 

lhe etfect in ground teste were fruitlees. 70 

In the meantime, while the first Lanyard had been moving 

towa rd a moet premature reentry. the project had become the center 

of " deotermined CIA eUort to rea •• ert greater control over major 

el~ment. of the sateUite reconnai •• ance effort. Late in February 

lQbl. lhe aK~n('y urled that Lanyard .ecurity procedures be merged 

~I'llh the extant Corona-Mural IYltem. the name iteelf to survive 

onl y .. a a camera identifier. By implication. since Lanyard was 

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approaching the status of an operational system -'from the alency.viewpoint, at least). the entire program ~ould'thereafter confor·m to the 

pattern established for Corona-Mural. General Greer, speaking as 

Lanyard proRram director. 'voiced firm opposition to the notion. In 

this stand he wall supportud by the NRO staff. But the agency arguments 

liIt!emud to stand a considerable chance at the moment. since Unders~crdary Charyk was leavinJt Rovernment service at the er.d of February 

and no successor for the post of NRO director had been named. Indeed. 

it seemed possible to sume reconnaissance proRram participants that 

the departure of Dr. Charylc. miJtht silnal the end of the NRO itseU. 

The appointm~nt of Dr. Brockway McMillan to succeed Charyk 

~arl)' in March scuttled rumors that the NRO would be discontinued 

and fur prell"hcal purpollles channelled the current Lanyard format 

nmtrnversy lntu a som"what unrealistic discussion of security procedures. 

In that area too. It dcvdo~d. Oeneral Creer had a highly defensible 

pOllihOIl. Ht· pomted out. With qUiet 10Ric, that the alency was actually 

ad\'ocatina: l'stabhllhment of dual .ecurity systems, one of a general' 

nature for members of the Washlnllton establishment. and another rigidly 

l ornpartmenttod for persunnel In the various field stations. That arranlern~nt. Creer sUKRested. would be an invitation to security compromise 

!tIm',· at would inevuabh' ('aull .. th ... proliferation of artifical security 

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compartments. He expressed particular concern at the increasinl 

abundance of code words aftd the fertility of the creation process 

luggesUnl that what was needed was not so much the elimination of 

one security category (Lanyard) as a careful plan for a totally new 

h 1 · . 71 approach, one adaptable to t e rea sltuatLon. 

For the moment, at lealt, the lecurity clearance lituation did 

not change. But immediately before the firlt Lanyard launch General 

Greer proposed that his establishment be made the action addressee 

on launch and orbit operation mellagel. He observed that luch a 

change was entirely 10Racai in the li,ht of Lanyard's technical adolelcence. (The IYltem i. "clearly in the early R.D Itage, " Greer pointed 

out.) ClA's Lanyard agent, Colonel J. C. Ledford, instantly responded 

that until relieved of responsibility for "satellite missions under my 

control" he propolled to follow "established procedures." In thia 

instance, he meant to assert the authority to decide when an early 

recovery was neceslary, a matter that Greer (al director of the 

technical program) felt better qualified to Juelle and which, by the term. 

of the oriJlinal Lanyard allreementa of April 196Z, was his re.pon.lbillt~· In any ca.e. 

The iSlue wa. resolved by NRO Director McMillan'. rulin, 

that Greer would exercise respunsibility for aU actions on which 

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succesdul recovery hinled except that he would not extend a miuion 

once the operational control center in Waahinlton had decided on an 

early recovery. Such an early recovery decision was. however. to 

be based only on considerations of reconnaissance urlency, the 

probability that mission succe.s might be endangered by some special 

7Z hazard. or. political expediency. Since that ruling confirmed General 

Greer in the respondbility for deciding all other i.sues. including 

that of how satellite functioning on orbit should figure in the timing of 

recovery operations, it had the effect of strengthening the authority 

of the program office and the prolram director. It did not entirely 

resolve the basic'issue, however; Colonel Ledford continued to insist 

that his orlaniution had the basic responsibility for ''the development 

or payloads and methods of operation" as well as overall security. 73 

The vitality or the Lanyard requirement was not seriously 

quesboned durinR the authority and responsibility discussions of the 

sprinlt of 1963. Indeed, John A. McCone. in his role as chairman of\ 

the United States lntelliJlence Board. told McMillan early in April 1963 

that "since the sUC('esli of the GAMBIT system is quite uncertain" it 

would be advis.blelo purchase additional Lanyards, thus insurinl the 

rt"ceapt of hiRh resolution coveraRe during the period AUlust 1963 to 

74 Autlust 1964. 

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But at the time there was considerably le •• a: •• urance of 

Lanyard succe.1 tban Gambit succe... Not until mid-April di.d the 

second Lanyard get through its preflight checks and. go to Vandenberg • 

• It di d not leave the pad until 18 May. Then, for a time, all seemed 

to go well. The boosters and the Agena operated properly, injection 

into orbit was accurate, and everything needed for a first trial of the 

camera system appeared to be available. But the payload refused to 

respond to ground commands--a reluctance finally alcribed to the 

{act that no electrical power was Iletting to the decoder, which therefore 

could not huar the command.. There ,was no way to route orders around 

the decoder circuu and the pouibility that the ailment might heal itself 

was unreali8ticaUy remote. All that could be done was to attempt 

recovery, u8in~ the "lifeboat" sYltem (which was independent of the 

main command nrcuitry and had its own magnetrometer and Ras 8upply). 

On ZI May the capsule was recovered from the water near Hawaii. 

Lanyard 11 proved no more useful to the reconnai8sance program than 

75 Lanvard 1. 

Reminiscent in some de~ree of the problems which had pla.ued 

the early £-5 fiiJlhts, th4." difnculty of lecond Lanyard (vehicle ll65) 

L.an)-ard 11 did not have .s much difficulty as Lanyard I in qualifying 

f,-,r launch, but it did encounter problems eimilar to thole noted above 

H> Ih.- ca.r of the first Lanvard. There is no point to detailing them. 

huw"Yer; nothing of major s'Rnilicance to the total pro,ram emerRed. 

379 

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rop •• e.ar 

was eventually traced to a short circuit of uncertain origin on the 

, . 'payload side of the interface with the Agena. In all probability. a 

faulty cannon plug connector was the cause. since that was one of the 

few suspect items which could go undetected during the prelaunch 

checkout process. The ob,,-ious remedy, which was immediatdy 

adupted, was to revise checkout procedures. Additionally. a steppedup routine of shock and vibratton testing was grafted to the existent 

proJ:ram and J:reater emphasis was accorded payload integration 

, 76 tcstln~. 

Onc of the problems peculiar to early 1963 flights arose from 

th ... intruduction of the A.,:ena D--the "standardized" upper stage. Over 

the prC"'lUUti fav ... years the AlIena B had become a thorouflhly familiar 

and ~enerally r..-hablc instrument for Ipace reconnaissance. Familiar-

,t". lfu.'vltabl.,. bred laxness and the cursory performance of some checks. 

When thu. Situation became quite clear, in April and May 196~. reforml 

Werc prumpt and e!{ective. Specilically. Ceneral Creer's people saw 

til It that Luckhced re-establilhed "a Itrong systems engineering and' 

!O,·"tcms 1ntellrataon cuntrol. " a courle which had hillhly beneficial 

77 

lun.:-term consequences. 

There was no 8erauus thou~ht of redUCing effort on the Lanyard 

prCJ~ram as a consequence of the two lucceslive disappointn,ents. 

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Cambit still had not flown, and thoulh Cr.er's people. had unlimited 

confidence 'in Gambit's abUity to perform .s required they were' 

admittedly putting their faith in an entirely untried system. Lanyard. 

even thoulh it had returned nolbinl from orbit, still had the character 

of a more conservative system. one with fewer technical uncertainties 

and one more nearly resemblinl the hilhly successful Corona. lC 

Cambit were to meet with problems similar to those which had alfected 

all other recoonais sance. sateUites during their initiation per iod, 

Lanyard remained the sinille option open to the National Reconnaissance 

Prollram. (1t should be recalled that of the several reconnaissance 

systems carried to the point of orbital operation. only Corona had as 

yet proved useful. £-1 wae of no practical value, E-Z had been cancelled 

after one uneucc,:,,"ul launch, while both E-5 and £-6 had proven 

operationally futil,' and had been cancelled in consequence. Substantial 

profits to research and dt"velopment ar,sina from experience with the 

E-scries satellites dad not count for much with intellilence speCialists 

who rated programs on a scale that beaan with useful phot0lraphs 

returned from orbat. ) 

In such an envIronment. the Lanyard prolram was on Z4 May 1963 

expa nded to include five addltaonal pa yloael.. At that time. three remained 

uf the oriRinal five ordered from Itek.. with the three "spares" earlier 

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authorized conlUtutinll the entire relerve. Altho"gh (tek had accUmulated leven lets of opticalglall for ~nyard use. until the 24 May 

order no provilion had been made for obtaininl complete camera 

systems. The 'Special Projects Office in Los Angeles, appreciative 

. of these circumltancel and understanding their implication, had in 

April recommended an early start on a "follow-on" Lanyard pz:oogram. 

The launch and upper sta.:.: vehicle I might have to be diverted (rom 

either the dual-caps-.le Corona program (Corona-J) or one of the 

·,·l~('troDlc reconnaissance prott·raml. If Lanyard use had.to be 

acet·lerated followintt an ontlet of Gambit difficult.iel there would be 

loo little time tu fabricate additional Thorl and Agenal. 78 

By mid-July. ltek and Lockheed had received financial authorizatlon to procel.·d With fabrieahon of the additional payloads and associated 

st ru("lureli. Pru.:ram eOlll would Ito up 

di~counting booster, Aliena. and launch costs. 79 

that s('ore alone, 

On II July 1963, the first Gambit was launched from Point 

A r.,:ucl1o. Its objective, defined man·y months before. wal to return· 

.!!!!!: .:uod hitth relolution picture. The first Gambit mission did conlid-

"rably more; it de-monltr;,ted that the optical and mechanical elements 

\Ie lhl.' .Vlltem were capable- of e-xeeeding the original (1960) requirements. 

and it proved thal the rath .. r complex orbital vehicle could perform its 

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basic assignment. No effort' was made to "exercise .11 capabilities" 

during the first' Gambit nii.sion. though a considerable assurance of 

total system reliabUity was obtained in its course. 

By 15 July. when those facts were aenerally known to most oC 

the "cognizant" intelligence community (wbich did not include everybody 

involved in Lanyard. by any means). much of the rationale underlying 

Lanyard development had beaun to evaporate. Still. there was no 

immediate sugllestion that the next SCheduled Lanyard launch. only 

about two weeks away. should be scrubbed. One success ~id not a 

prollram. make. But a continuation of Gambit success (oupled with 

Lanyard diCCicultaes would certainly weaken the case for continuina 

Lanyard. 

On 30 July 1963. the third Lanyard launch attempt was a success. 

Thc.' TAT and Aliena funCtioned normally. Iluidance into orbit was highly 

accurate. and orbital parameters almost precisely matched those 

pro,:rammed. Most encourallinlh the camera system seemed to be 

UIJl'r;\ti~~ as planned. (The n'llht scheme called for keeping the roll,:,' 

JOint locked for the first 16 orbits. so that a failure in that mode would 

not prevent a work,nll test of the camera elements. and for securina 

'Verhc."ll pictures of the .,:reatest possible number of first priority 

tarttela. ) 

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StUl, there were problems. The stel1ar-index camera malfunctioned almost immediately, the index camera pO~tion failinl . 

after only three frames and the steUar camera element operating 

quite erratically thereafter. * Then on pa .. number Z3 neither the 

main camera nor the stellar-index camera system would Itart. (The 

roll Iystem had lone dead· durinl pass 18, after only two orbits of 

use, but camera operation was not immediately affected. ) A quick 

check of telemetry indicated that iDtervalometer failure durinl an 

engineering test on the previous pass was the probable difficulty. 

All modes of command were tried, without succeSl, after which the 

recovery operation was scheduled for the next appropriate orbit. 

• 

Stellar-index camera operation was particularly important to 

Lanyard, and an conformance to Murphy's Law, particularly troublesume. Results of earl y fliMhts in Corona-Mural configurations had 

demonstrated by April 1963 that stellar ima.ery returned to that 

time was quite useless for attitude determination--aDd in Lanyard 

the critical information on camera platform attitude durin, operation 

uf the main camera was almost entirely dependent on successful 

functioning of the stellar-index camera subsystem. Largely on the 

basas of the discoura,in, advice (from National Photo,raphic 

Intl."rpretation Center--NPIC) that previous Itellar images could not 

be ulfed to delermane vehac1r attitude, Jtek late in April 1963 made 

"peelal efforts 10 Improve the quaHty of steUar-ima,e returnS from 

Lanyard. Modificatiuns ancluded alteration of the pop-out door, 

the addition of liMht baffles alonlC lhe path to the stellar-camera 

lens, and chan,es in exposure settin.s. More sensitive fUm (80-130) 

was also substituted for that or'aJlinally used (SO-Z06). 80 

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There was no recovery difficultYi an air ca~ch attempt proved 

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entirely successful: Esamination of the capsule confirmed that it 

included exposed film--which was rushed to development and evaluation. 

The best resolution contained on the recovered film permitted 

teeneral examination of gruund objects measuring four to live feet 

across their (Ereatest dimension. Vehicles, small aircraft, and runway 

markin~. could be consistently identified. However, the greatest 

purtion of the film flave a definite impression of soltness--an out-offucus effect. Imperfect imatee motion compensation was not entirely 

at faulti it had remained w1thin one percent of specification throulh 

thr hut nine pa.ses and had never faUen below a three-percent level. 

Th," must probable cxplanahon for out-of-focus photolraphy seemed 

* ttt be a combin .. tlon of the imale motion compensation error. an 

lntrrnal temperature I Ii to ZO delrees hilher than would normally be 

81 cxp~cted, and instrument dynamics. 

The attempt to correct the rate of imale motion compensation on 

pau l.Z. While the sate1lite was over Vandenberg. was the prime 

suspect in the search for an explanation of camera failure on the 

next pu s. The camera II ystem had been operating durinl the attempt 

ttt make an imalle motiun cumpensation ramp chanle. and it seemed 

IIke1.,' that either the interv.-lometer or theinterva10meter motor had 

!;l&!.,d as a direct consequence. Telemetry had indicate4 a Iradual 

d,'.,:.radahon of 1mafle mution compensation after pass number 10. 

Th .. , rull-Joant had remained locked throulh the first 16 pas.es, and 

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In September the lens assembly next scheduled to fly a Lanyard 

. mission was returned to Itek fo'r rework, chiefly 't~ correct for soft 

imagery. (The camera specialists in General Greer's orKanization 

were confident that a combination of lens-element shims and lens-barrel 

v.:ntin..:. to eliminat~ tern~rature variations which might have caused 

clement spacin,.: to exceed predicted tolerances, would correct the main 

difficulty.) By that time, however. there were some indicationa that 

continuation of Lanyard at its previous rate was no longer carrying a 

hl~h pTlority. Funds to provide for the five-vehicle program extenaion 

were slow to arrlve, and an Wa.hington there was acknowledgement of 

th~ reduced need for Lanyard now that Gambit was proving itself 

l·apabl~. (Bv 10 September the second set of Cambit returns had been 

pron:lllled--wath must plea.inll results.) On Z3 October. while the 

iuurth and faith ul the ura~inal Lanvard systems were being prepared 

fur launches scheduled to take place during the remainder of 1963. NRO 

Directur McMlllan ()rdcr~d an lmmediate and complete termination of 

lh,' Lan\'ard pruJ:ram. At that point in time the five "follow-on" payloads 

wt."re between 80 and 100 JM"r'Cent complete (two had gone through 

Wh thus removed frum the last of degrading elements. It. operation 

dunn..: passes 17 and 1M ilppeared to be normal~ althoulh failure of 

the IIteUar-index camera to operate properly made it difficult to 

determine wuh precIs.un how accurately the roll-joint had functioned 

durant.: ala brief perlod ul a('tlvataon. 

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fabrication and were ready f.or check-outl, and the remaminl five 

were somewhere 'further' dawn the line. Itek wanted to complete " 

all of the firet five "follow-on" payloads but General Greer opposed 

the proposal on the irrefutable grounds that there nO longer was any 

requirement for Lanyard cameras. While the matter of residual 

inventory was pendinl. Lanyard joined its ancestors. the last of the 

reconnais.ance systems descended from the originalUne of E-series 

82 prolZrams to come to an end. 

Because of the peculiar relationship between Gambit and Lanyard 

(the: Lanyard-originated roll-joint was being used in the first Gambits 

without the knowledle of all Lanyard-associated contractor personnel), 

Instructaons to Luckheed concerninl termination had to be phrased so 

as to exclude Gambit-required components. McMillan's instructions 

to Greer. on Zl October, had also authorized the general to determine 

how much more work was In the lovernment interest--that is. how 

many payloads were so near completion that it would be worthwhile 

ttl carry them through the acceptance process before sending them to 

stura.rt". As with other cancelled satellite reconnaissance programs. 

"payload peculiar" equipment was to be securely stored against some 

83 unpredictable future need. 

Subsequent to ,his orilinal instruction, Undersecretary MCMillan 

authora&ed complehon. thruulZh acceptance testing. of the three payloads 

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nearest to delivery readiness. The work would cost a 

On all other alpectl of Lanyard, Itek halted work by 'Z5 October; 

84 Lockheed had stopped by l3 October. 

Still later, on IS November, McMillan approved a proposal 

from General Greer that Itek be issued a level-of-effort contract, at 

a rate of a r month, the money to be drawn from the 

residual of Lanyard fund.. The alreement, which eventually took 

the form of a lonl-term study contract, also permitted Uek to keep 

two cameras (camera» Ol and 06) for use in the level-of-effort work. 

Except for these and one other set of iteml, all remaining Lanyardpeculiar hardware had be.:n put in bonded storale by the end of 

IS!; March 1964. The "other set" was made of two complet.e lenses 

(not camera systems) and five sets of Lanyard opticaillas., tranderred 

to th", photo reconnalss.nCe l.boratory at Wrilht-Patterlon for ''bilh 

86 altitude research prollram». " 

The convers.taons. that preceded the final decision to cancel 

Lanyard involved buth the chief of the CLA and the Secretary of Defense. 

It wall IIcn~ral1y a~reed •• ft(Or th~ fact, that the cancellation had been 

broulCht about by a combanahun of factors. Gambit's undoubted succe.s 

..... th", chle! of these. But the chronic shortage of NRO funds, the 

eX'ltenc,,· of .everal prut:ram" .nd advanced developments which could 

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profit from a higher level of financing, and the lack of • specific 

require~ent for ~ .y.tem with Lanyard's performance characteristics 

certainly weighed in the dec ilion. Then there wal the matter of 

technology itself. Although every promise of better results seemed 

to be valid, Lanyard had returned pictures clearly inferior to those 

produced by Cambit. System dynamicI, one of the principal villains 

cited in the original analys,s of the "soft" pictures obtained in July, 

prejudiced the Lanyard case. Whatever its theoretical merits--ancl 

lht!re were several--1..anyard remained the product of 1958 teChnology 

that had been outdated by later progress. Its incorporation of some 

"lements of Corona technololY was not a sufficient corrective; 1962-

"lntallt: Coronas generally returned a hilh percentage of 800d photot:raphs, but the system invaraably produced a larler number of 

sublllantially poorer nelEalives. Those faults were to require special 

ath-ntion in 1963 and after. FinaUy. as one specialist des("ribed it, the 

Lanyard camera included a lot of things that clanked back and forth, 

Ilumehmel rather violently. Compared to Cambit and to new system. 

beintl proposed on the basas of six years of lncreasin.ly valuable 

expe nence 1n the development of camera.jor orbital operation, 

Lanyard seemed too complex. too "uncoordinated" and too susceptible 

f 'I 87 tv .Il ure. 

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One of the key factors in Lanyard cancellation was at once 

obvioua; and obscure. It was obvious that Gambit ,was' providing the, 

s~rvic.: Lanyard had been designed to insure. Obscuration derived 

from the fact that almost no one closely associated with the Lanyard 

program in 1963 paid much heed to the fact that Lanyard had been 

approvt:d as insuranct' a~ainst Gambit failure or delay. that early 

pres.:ntations had emphasized such a program justification. and that 

s.:nior deft:nse and CtA officials had never looked on Lanyard in any 

oth ... r liJ:ht. Predictably. typically, and commendably, Lanyard people 

had become so commitlt:d to their project that they ignored its intended 

impermanence. Sume. lndeed. were not fully aware of the CharykMcNamara interchan~e of late 1961 which had been chieny responsible 

for lIecurin~ lnlllal pro~ram approval. The lack of such information 

was at the root of much of the apparent bewilderment that characterized 

pro~ram office reaction to Lanyard canceUation. 88 

By the llme of l15 cancellation, the Lanyard payload development 

prut:ram had COl luding all contractor expenditures 

hQ thruu.zh September 196 J,. ' Excluding vehicle, launch. and control 

!>tatloll (,08ts, tht' effort walt scheduled to absorb roughl reo 

Not everybod)' wa" ('ontent with the cancellation deciSion, of 

,ours":. Some of the camera 'pvcialists in the Special Project. Office 

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on the Welt Coalt continued to maintain that the relatively minor 

optical problems could have ealUy been fixed and that "the panoramic. 

features of the Lanyard camera in combination with itl high relolution 

made it a valuable innrument for latellite reconnail sance. But. in 

fact. by 1963 far more promising search and surveillance systems 

were enterinll delilln and development pba.es. CoroDa was on the verge 

of a substantial quality improvement that in le.s than two year. would 

make it nearly as capable a. Lanyard might have been. and Gambit 

was entering a product improvement .tage that led to a far better 

photugraphic product than Lanyard could ever have produced. 

Lanyard had une attribute that .et it off from the six other 

photullraphic satellite: .ubproJCram. approved and undertaken as part of 

the orillinal Sarno" effort that dated from 1954. Lanyard had returned 

photoflraphy. and th ... 1 photollraphy had intelliaence utility. Only one 

other mi.sion of the many attempted ill the intricate prolram that 

ran from E-I through E-6 and Lanyard had recorded any photographic. 

suC'ce". the E-l night of January 1961. And £-1 photoaraphy had little· 

more than enlline ... nnll int ... re.t by the time it became available; Corona 

had Illade at entirely obsolete. Of couueLanyard was not a typical 

I-:-.erae:a Samoa prollram. havlnll been conducted in a .ettilla that 

rc .... mble·d Corona rather than any "normal" program organi ... tion. 

But that 100 had more than pa •• ,n, "anificance. 

BYE 1'7017.'4 391 

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!JIG •• se8 •• 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. Rpt. Program Summary. "SAMOS - Revised Development Plan. " 

6 Aug 60. in SAFMS file.: Sarnos hist; and Samo15 O~v Pins dtd 

IS Jan 60. Il Jul 60. and 11 Aug 60. all in SSO Hist Div files. 

l. Rpt. ''SAMOS. It 13 Jun 60 (The Billings Study. sent tv BMO in 

draft form on 13 Jun (0). in SSD Hist Div files. 

3. 

4. 

~. 

Mins. WS ll7L Special Study Comm. 

files LAC presn dide •• mid-1960. 

in SAmos 

files. 

Ltr, Col W. G. Km):, OirlSamos Proj Olc. to LMSD (H. Brown). 

31 AUIl 60. subj: SAMOS Subsystem E-S Work Progress. i.n SP 

Samoa file.: IOLA-10IB 60-61; hr, Brown to King. lb Sep 60. 

same subJ and file; hr, KinlC to Brown, 10 Oct 60. same 15ubj 

ant! file; Man» of Mt): ot WS 117L Spec Studies Comm l7 Sep 60 • 

in SP Sarno. files. Mans. 

Interview, LtCol R. Yundt. SAFSP. by R. L. Perry, Hist Div. 

13 Mar 63. 

tI. TWX SAFSP-DP 1Z-10-1b, SAFSP to SAFMS. Z6 Oct 60, in 

SAFMS Tt·lnm file. Od-Nov 60; TWX SAFSP-OP-IZ-10-16. 

SAFSP to SAFMS (BrilCCien R. D. Curtin). 14 Oct 60. in Samos 

file. R&'D-l~ memu for record. prep by Maj H. C. Howard. 

SAFMS. K f'ov 60. subj: Staff Visit to ltek Corporation. in 

SAFMS files. Staff Viiiiili.·t. with Ion hand note by Curtin concerning 

daa.:nostac flif,thts; hr, Mgr. Sat SYS. LAC. to 

Bri~Grn R. E. Grt."er. lr • ov 60. subj: Samoa Program 

A\ c,,·lerauon. an Samoll file. RlcO-Z. 10lA/B 60-61; TWX 

SAFSP-VT-ll-ll-ll. SAFSP to LAC. ZZ Nov 60. same file. 

j. Memo for Record. prep by Maj H. C. Howard. 30 Nov 60. subj: 

Trap Report uf MaJura Huward and James. 14-21 November 

lq60. In SAFMS filt'!!: Staff Visits; TWX LMSD to .BMD CSAFSP) • 

.!.! Ct·c 60. III Samus hl .. lI. RlcD-2. 101A/B60-61. 

h. Lu. Brl.:Gt."n R. E. Creer, DirISP. to LMSD. 7 Feb 61 •• ubj: 

1-:- ~ and F.-6 Priorlt~. an E-& (Heran) files: MIt 4. Policy .• 

19l 

TOPSEc.a 

• • 

• • 

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9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

lb. 

17. 

BYE 1101':.74 

Ibid; Itr, Col H. L. J:vana, V/Dir/SP, to LMSD, 16 Jan 61. 

. .ubj: E-5 and. E-~ ~riority •. in E-6 (Heran) fil •.•• .. .. . 

Memo for Record, BrigO.n R. E. Or •• r, Dir/SP, 16 Feb 61. 

subj: Trip Report, in Or.er file., Sarno. policy. 

TWX, SAFSP-24-2-17. SAFSP for SAFUS (Under Secy J. V. 

Charyk). 25 Feb 51, in SAFMS fil •• : Sarno. Gen 1961; Yundt 

interview, 13 Mar 63. 

TWX SAFMS-SEN-61-29, SAFMS to SAFSP, 9 Mar 61, in 

E-6 (Heran) fil •• : Mgt 4. Policy, 1961. 

Memo, BritlOun R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, to AF Under Secy 

J. V. Charyk. 17 Apr 61, no subj, in SAFMS Mi.c fil •• ; 

Itr. Col H. L. Evan., D/Dir/SP, to 659Sth ATW (Col J .S. 

Cody. Cmdr, 26 Apr 61 •• ubj: Ch.ckout Philosophy and 

Action. for Special Vehicle Launche. from Vanclenber g AFB, 

in SP Sarno. file.: 10lA/B 60-61. 

TWX, LMSD 38/640. LMSD to SAFSP, 15 Mar 61. and SAFSPVT .. 1S .. 6-30, SAFSP to LMSD, 20 lun 61, both in SP Samoa 

file II: 101A/B 60 .. 61; LAC TWXs LMSD 396861, 5 Jun 61, 

LMSD 399Z/b. 17 Jul. LMSCA 090474. 24 Jul. LMSCA 092048, 

14 Aug. and LMSC B 00613. 6 S.p 61, all in SP Sarno. fi1 •• , 

Rir D 38 .. 51/61. 

TWX, SAFSP-L-Z5-7-50. SAFSP to LMSC, 26 Jui 61, in SP 

Sarno. file •• IOlA/101B. 60-61; memo, Maj H. C. Howard to 

BrillOen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS. 25 Jui 61, subj: Relax.d 

Schedulea. in SAFMS filea. Samoa, Ci.n. 61. 

TWXa LMSC B 000816 .. 67-40. LMSC to SAFSP, 19 Sep 61 and 

LMSC B 000879-7b- 40. Zb Sep 61. in SP Sarno. fi1 •• a.D 

38-51/bl; varloua TWX. In SP Sarno. files 10lA/I01B 60-61 

dealinK with thehurl&untal sy.tem test controver.y--the 

bS9Sth urged the test. SAFSP saw no ft •• d--and ltr. MajCien 

R. E. Cireer. Dar/Sf' to Col J.D. Cody. Cmdr 6595th ATW, 

lS AUlC 61. subj: ProlCram 101B Pre-launch Checkout aDd Launch 

Readines a, aame file. 

SAFSP Hiat Chron. Jul-Dec 61, in SAFSP hist files. 

393 

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18. Samos Prog Rpt. 30 Sep 61. in SP Sarno. files. 

19. TWX LMSC B 001/4i·67.40. LMSC to SAoP'sP.: )1 Oct 61. in • 

SP Samos files, ~ItD 38-51/61: SAFSP Hist Chron. Jul-Dec 61. 

20. Notes in SP Sarno. file •• RacO 1. Cien. Milc. 61; TWX VWZ24-11, 6595th ATW to SAFSP, 24 Nov 61: SAFSP Hist Chron 

Jul-Dec 61; 1tr. W. V. Tyminski. LMSD, to Col W. G. King, 

SAFSP, 12 Oct bi, aubj: Contracto AF 04 (647)-563, in SP 

Samoa file, 101A/101B 60-61. 

21. TWX SAFMS-DIR-61-167, BriaGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, to 

MajGen R. E. Grf:."er. Dir/SP. 4 Dec 61; TWX SAFSP-PP4-12-14b. SAFSP tv LMSC. S Dec 61: TWX SAFSP-0-7-12-281, 

SAFSP tu LMSC. 7 Dec 61; TWX SAFMS-PRD-61-1SH, Col 

J. R. Martin. SAFMS, to Cireer. 7 Dec 61. all in SP-3 files. 

l2. Rpt. Orbit~1 Test Darective. Program I. Project 101B. prep 

by 6595th ATW, 26 Nuv 61. in SP Samos file. 

23. TWX SAFSP-X-b-ll-i7. SAFSP to AF Plant Rep. LMSc, 

6 Dec 61. an SP Samus file., RIcD-l0.Termination. 1961. 

~4. 

lS. 

lb. 

... .. , . 

• 

Ltr. MaJG.:n R. E. Greer. Oir/SP, to Hq USAF 

Ofc A •• t SAF for Fan Affairs), 3 Jan 62. subj: art Termination of Cuntract. in SAFMS files, Gen: TWX SAFSP-X-6-12-7, 

6 Dec 61. 

Memo for Record, prep BMC. ZS Sep 61. 

liubJ: Dde,-'hon of SPS - Prollram LMSD 388757. 

LMSO to SAFSP, Il Apr 61; memo, Col W.G. King to LtCol 

J. T. Scav. D/Dar Proc and Prog Mit. SAFSP. 3 O"t 61. 

lIubj: Secondary Prupulsion Sy.tem. all in SP Samus files 

101AIl01B bO-61. 

TWX SAFSP-L- 3-W-19. SAFSP to OSAF for SAFUS. 1 O("t 61: 

ltr. Col W. G. Kan". 01 Dar Prog I. Samos Proj OCc, to SSD. 

S Oct 61. subJ: Dt·I ... hon of Requirement for Secure (En('rypted) 

Command Lmk for SAMOS Vehicle. in SP Sarno. files. CIcC. 

TWX cunference betwren J. Schaub. LMSC. and Col W.G • 

Kil\l:. D/O,r/I01D. lb Dec 61. cy in SP Samos file, RicO 2-5. 

Zl03. 1961. SAFSP H'!I' Chron, Jul-Dec 61. 

394 

Bft 1,.11-' .. 

..... : .. : ... '=V'!l~."'I-: ~ ..•. ",~,~"'e 

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Z8. SAFSP Hist Chron, Jul-Dec 61. 

29. Interview,' Cu1 ·V. M· •• Cicnez, SAFSP, by R. L. Perry, Hist . 

Div, 31 Mar and 16 Apr 64. Probably because the E-5 program 

was all but defunct after mid-December 1961, relatively few 

records of such activities were made, and fewer survived. 

30. TWX VWZS-7-3-Z1, 6595th ATW to SAFSP, 8 Mar 62; TWX 

TWRC-13-3-4-E. bS95th ATW to SAFSP, 13 Mar 6Z; Critique 

Charts, Z204 Revi\.·w. Mar 62, all in SP Samos files RIrD l-6, 

1.204, 1961-bl.; SAFSP Review, Mar 62, all in SP Samo. filell 

Rir D 2-6, 2Z04, 1961-62; SAFSP Hi.t Chron, Jan-Jun 62. 

U. Genez intervu..'w, Ib Apr 64. 

n. SAFSP Hist Chron. Jan-Jun 62, entry for 1 Mar 62. 

3 L TWX SAFMS-SEN-61-161., SAFMS to SAFSP. 11 Dec 61; memo 

for record. Col W.C. King, D/Dir SP-L, 15 Dec 51, lubj: 

Comparativt- Evaluation of ITEK 05 Hopkin. Len. and The 

Perkin £Imt'r Lento; TWX SAFSP-L-l8-lZ-1Z5, SAFSP to 

LMSC, 18 Dt'C' 61; TWX SAFSP-L-18-l2-124, SAFSP to ASD, 

19 Dec b1; Itr. Kinac to LAC, 15 Jan 62, subj: Comparative 

Lens Evaluataun Tellt Conduct; TWX SAFSP-L-13-l2-15l, 

SAFSP to SAFMS, 14 Dec 61, all in SP Sarno. file., lOlA/B, 

60-61. The: tests were conducted at ASD althoulh Lockheed 

had oriAinally been tllated to do the work. 

34. Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. by R. L. Perry, 

Hist Div. 4 Mar 63; hr. J. Carter, V/Prea Itek, to Hq SSD 

(SAFSP), IQ Dt'c 61, subj: Technical and Cost Proposal for 

a Slmplified H1llh-Acuny Panoramic Camera, in SAFSS 

files, Lanyard. 

S:;. TWX SAFSP-F-Z8-1Z-17l, Majeen R. E. Oreer, Dir/SP, to 

BrittOen R. D. Curtan. SAFMS, 28 Dec 61; TWX SAFMS-M-l209, Curtln to Greer. ~9 Dec 61, both in SP-l files, Fundinl. 

'b. t..h.·mo, Maj Mark Farnum. Corona, to LtCol R. J. Ford, 

Curona. ~9 ~c bl. no aubj. in Corona filel. 

395 

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~8P .seil., 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

4l. 

43. 

Memo for Record, Mej H. C. Howard. SAFMS. 11 Jan 62,. 

subj: Simplified b6" System (SSD black code word: LANYARD), 

in SAFSS files. Lanyard. . . . 

Interview. Sri.Gen J.R. Martin, D/Dir/SP, by R.L. Perry, 

18 Sep b4~ 

TWX SAFMS DIR 62-25. SrigCien R. D. Cur~iD, SAFMS. to 

MajGen R. E. Cireer. Dir/SP. 1 Feb 62. in SP-) liles, Cienl. 

Memo for Record. Col J. R. Martin, D/Ch SAFMS. 13 Feb 62. 

subj: SAFUS-SAFSP West Coast Conference 9 Feb '62.. in 

Gen Martin's files; Martin interview, 18 Sep 64. 

TWX SAFSP-F-13-2-195, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. to 

Bri~Gen R. D. Curtin. SAFMS, 13 Feb 62.. in SP-3 files, Funding. 

7878. CIA to Corona OFC, 21 Fe~ 

• Maj H.C. Howard, SAFMS. to __ NRO 

Compt. 6 Mar 62,. nu subj. in SAFSSfiles, Lanyard: memo. 

J. V. Charyk. SAFUS. to D/Dir/ClA. 2 Apr 62" subj: Manallement of Lanyard. 1n SAFSS files. Lanyard. 

Memo, Charyk to D/Dir/CIA 2, Apr 62,; memo, H. Si"oville. Jr., 

D/ Dir IRes, CIA. to SAFUS. 5 Apr 62, subj: Management of 

Lanyard. 1n SP - 3 files. Pro"s. 

9518. CIA to SAFSP. 4 Apr 62, in Lanyard files. 

4S. Interview. LtCol Mark Farnum and LtCol R.J. Ford, Corona 

ofc.:. 11 Oct 6l, by R. L. Perry. Hist Div; memo, prep by Maj 

Mark Farnum. 30 Mar 62. subj: Trip Report. in Lanyard 

files: ltr. hek to LMSC. 16 APrM2 s bj: Offer to Purchase 

Residual Inventorv. Cited 1n ms 347. CIA to LMSD, 

18 Apr 62,; Itr. MaJGl:n R. E. Greer. Sat Prolms. SSD. to 

• 

Hq AFSC. attn MajGen O.J. Ritland, D/Cmdr Manned Space 

Fit, 4 Jun 62. subJ: Reques' for Disposition of Terminal 

Inventory; hr. Rit1and to Hq USAF (attn LtGen Mark Bradley. 

DCS/SIIL. 6 Jun 6l. same- subj: 1tr. Bradley to G~.Jun 

6l. same subj, all in SAFSS files: Lanyard; mSI~1'9, 

SAFSP to CIA, 18 Jun 62,. in Lanyard files. 

J96 

yep .Ee.E'I' 

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Haf'dle " .. S".""n/Ta:."· ~e.,n~ 

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46 M CIA to· SAFSP. 7 May 62. in Lanyard filea. • s _ .. 

47. Msg _2134. SAFSP to ClAMll May 62: ms , 

LMS~. 11 May 62: maa, 0004. 0/ CIA, 

SSO (for MajGen R. E. Greer). ay 62, all in Lanyard fi les. 

48. TWX SAFSS-OIR-M-2098. SAFSS to SAFSP. 8 Oct 62. in 

SP-3 filea, Fundina· 

49. Ms 

ms 

595. SAFSP to CIA. 10 Oct 62. in Lanyard files; 

5, CIA to Uek. 19 Oct 62. 

50. 

51. 

Sl. 

C;} • 

Sol. 

C;S. 

Proam Rpt, Nov 6_-3 filea: 

Itek. 25 Oct 62. in ile.; m. 

19 Nov 62 •• ame fi e. 

• CIA to Uek. 

Memo for record, MajGen R.. E. Greer. Dirlsp, 5 Jul 62, 

subj: Special A •• ittnment: in 

Corona tl1e~~' a; 

6 Sep 62. i~fi1e •• 

Mil 

ms 

(Co 

SAFSS, 

Ill. CIA to SAFSP. 27 Sep 62. 

2428. SAFSP (MajCie 

rtin). l6 Sep 6Z, a 

q O~ t 62. In Corona lUe •• 

i'-files: 

eer) to SAFSS 

• SAFSP to 

495, LMSD to Uek. 16 Oct 62:_162. 

19 Oct 6Z;_5S3~9 LMSD to Itek. 23 Oct 62: 

ltc:k. ~ 62- 543. CIA to 01 NRO. 

q to EK.19 Ol"C 2, all in_lUes. 

5170, LMSD to CIA, 

• 22 Oct 62, both i 

0&1. Itcok to CIA. 13 Sep 62; 

&2~_172. Itek 

LMSD~l Nov 62 

LMSD. lq and 26 Nov Etl, all 

I, Itek to CIA, 26 Nov 

62_284 and 291. to 

~o Dec 62, and 

Deoc 6l. aU a s. 

5514, 

aYE 1'7017·'74 )97 

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57. O. LMSD to CIA. 27 Nov 62, 

58. 5. Itelt to CIA. 18 Juu 62; m.i 

nCl SAFSP, 29 Dec 62, both in Lan.Vllrd 

59. Summary Rpt. PROJECT LANYARD, undated, aprox Jui 6Z. 

in SAFSS fUe.: Lanyard. 

60. Rpt. "PROJECT LANYARD, .. undated, aprox Feb 62, apparently 

prepared for SAFUS by SAFMS, in SAFSS files. Lanyard." 

61. for A. C. Luudahl, Dir/NPIC. to D/NRO. 

n1T1llCnl~. on Certain Collection Systems, 

Corona, Oen. 

bl. 43b, MajOen R. E. Creer to SAFUS, 28 Sep 62, 

: Lanyard. 

b3. Interview, MajCen R. E. Creer, Dir/Spec Proj., OSAF, by 

04. 

R. L. P~rry. Z7 Jul 64; interview, Col W.C. Kina. Dir/Cambit, 

Zq JUI 04. 

, all Lockl:leeld 

05. 393. 

ob. 

07. 

ott. 

• 

Ms 

MSlla. 

8 Mal' 

Lockheed to CIA, 14 Feb 63, in Leach fUes. 

570, Lockheed to CIA. 28 Feb and 

504, Lockheed to SAFSP, 25 Feb 63. 

all in Leach fi 

alld 0022. VAFB to CIA. 

AFB to CIA. 19 Mar 63i ma., 

IC} Mar 63, all in Leach file. 

35, CIA to D/NRO. Z Mar 63i me 

FSP, c, Mal' 63, both i~""",.", •• , 

398 

• • 

8n .to.,· 

Hal'dle .,.. 8vemen/T • .."t K.,~ 

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70. 

71. 

72. 

73. 

7~. 

7S. 

ib. 

7i. 

7K. 

Memo, B. McMillan, D/NRO, to SOD and Dir(Central Intel, 

20 Mar 63, lubj: Status Report of LANYARDi memo for record, 

"H. Scoville, Jr', ,·Dep Dir/Rea/ClA," 25 Mar 63, 8ubj: Meeting 

held on Friday, 22 March, on Reconnai.lance Satellite 

Reliability, both in SAFSS filel, Lanyard. 

MI.I, 303, CIA 301. 

n R.E. 

3719, CIA to SAFSP. 28 Feb 

eel') to CIA, 5 Mar 63, all 

NRO to 20 Feb . Greer) to CIA. 2b Feb 

63~2792. 

i~Leach) file a • 

to 

63, 

5, SAFSP (MajGen R. E. Ci.eer toCIA, 

file . ml.IS, 273. CIA 

Mar 63 and 32, NR to • IS Mar 

Leach) file • 

S272, CIA (Col J. C. Ledford) to Dir INRO Staff 

rtin), 3 Apr 63, in_Leacb) files. 

Memo, J .A. McCone. Chm USl8, to D/NRO. 9 Apr 63, lubj: 

Photographac Satellite Reconnaissance Pro.ram, in NRO files, 

Lanyard. 

M8 

Staff. 

58. SAFSP to 0/ NR 

• l8 May 63. botb 

Mlt:1 SAFSP to D/ 

to D/ allan), 1 May 63 

ora~in and address, 1 May 63, botb 

IS Apr 2, 

V 

7, VAFB to NRO 

NRO Staff. 21 May 63, 

R. E. Cireer) 

O •• ame 

b) file., 

Ms.. 37. NRO to SAFSP. 24 May 63, i 

(Lea Ii memu. LtCol H. C, Howard, Asst for 18" 

NRO Staff, to Col J. Martln, Oir/NRO Staff, I May 63, subj: 

BYE nOl~.i" 199 

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IMNYARD History, in SAFSS fUes, Lany ... rd; mSlt, 

3024. SAFSP to hek, 3~ May 63, in Leach files. 

pasae the order to Itek.· .'. 0 

79. ilia a allfrom SAFSP: 

047 to 

, all . Leach) files. 

6 Jun 63; 

HO. 

HI. 

Kl. 

H ~. 

67l, NPIC to D/NRO. li~aJJ:, 

tU CIA, 18 Apr 63; mag_Ol79, 

9 Apr 63; msg, LMSC to ~AFSP, l4 Ap~ 

0687. NPIC to LMSC, 24 Apr 63. all i~ 

(Le s; ns for use of roll joint and COMOR (Committee 

on Overhead R~connaissance) requirements were contained in 

memo, J. O. Reber. Chm, COMOR, to D/NRO, S Feb 63, 

subj: Requirements for the Fi.rst LANYARD Mission, in NRO 

Ciles, ~s,s~3S9. LMSD to CIA. 

l~ .. and~214, NRO to SAFSP. 4 Jun 63, both 

in..riles. 

tu 

V AFB to SAFSS, 31 Jul 63 

63; mag, Eastman Kodak 

S Au~ b~, all 1 Leach) files; memo, Beien J. L. Martin, 

CJ Aug 63, subj: Mis.ion 8003 Prein NRO files, Lanyard. 

Otr I NRO Staff, tu 

hminary Analysis, 

lHCJ, LMSC to CIA, 3 Sep 63; mag, 

P (M~R. E. Oreer), 23 Oct 

. mst:.-S3S2, CIA to LMSC, 23 O~t 63. 

678, SAFSP (Creer) to D/NRO (B. McMillan), 

NRO bleil, Lanyard. 

S, 01 NRO to SAFSP, 23 Oct 63; memo, 

r Ofcr (SAFSP) to Hq CtA, 27 Nov 63, aubj: 

1un uf Lanyard ProJtram, in Leach fil.s; msg, 

8, SAFSP tu LMSD, 1 Nov 63, in Leach files. 

"'... M,omo, Leach to Jlq CIA, 27 

U/NRO to SAFSP, 7 Nuv 63, 

31, 

• el 

to D/NRO, 1 Apr 64, in NRO fU.a, 

078l, D/NRO (B. McMillan) toSAFSP 

ret'r), Dt·c 63 (confirming verbal ord.rs of 

ill ~RO files • 

.. 00 

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• - • 

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Ma"c .. V'a B~n/ Ta;~'" "'.y"~ 

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86. SO. Dir/NRO Staff to SAFSP. 24 Feb 64. in 

• 

ard. 

87. Interview. MajCien R. E. Creer. DirlSpec Proja. OSAF. 

6 May 64; interview. LtCol H. H. Howard. NRO Staff. 

24 Apr 64. 1 Jul 64. 

8'8. Martin interview. 18 Sep 64 • 

• llek to CIA. Z Oct 63. i Leach) Ciles. 

401 

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XI THE E-6 PROGRAM 

Note: 

At various times of no particular consequence the E-6 program 

was officially known by other titles: Program II, Pro~ram lOl, 

Program 698BJ, Pro~ram 722. The term mOlt commonly in use Ln 

1963 was "BJ. II For the purpose of this account, and in the interests 

of narrative continuity, the identifier "E-6" is used thruuJthout. 

Throuflh the 10nl& spring and summer of 1960, while matters of 

project structure and proa,:ram objective were being debated at various 

levels between the proj ... C't office and the White. House, the sixth and 

last of the Samus camera syetems to receive formal designation was 

alsu taking shap.:. The sU~Restlon of developing a recoverable-capsule 

photo-payload very dilferent from the £-5 was tirst voiced in May. Its 

ante'- edents stretched into the much more distant past. 

In a vt'ry r.:al eenee. the E-5 program had been created and 

C'arried on to Insure a,:ainst <:urnplete reliance on the original readout 

., ystems and to prOVide lor tht· ("oUection of hiRher resolution than 

("ould be ubtained by any readout eystem based on 1956-1958 technololY. 

In 1958 tht"re was not much lIerlOUtl consideration of abandoning readout 

in lavur of recovery. But by the early months ol1960 it had becunle 

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apparent to many that' the fundamental conception of surveillant'e by 

means uf readout sate::llites might well be unlound" Limitations in 

scale and resolution. insufficient bandwidth flexibility. and technical 

difficultie::s encountered in the course of subsystem development were 

partl)' rt"s)Xtnsiblt' ° But the incre::asing probability that an uperational 

readout IiYlitl"m could be:: extremely cOltly allo influenced opinion" 

J'l;ot merely thC" \"C"hide» but the facUitiel to support readout promised 

to be more complex and costly than the mi.sUe::s and missile sitel then 

.traanin~ thlo nalaonal bud~et. Estimates of potential investme::nt in 

colleclin~. prOt"e •• inll. anterpreting. and di'.eminatinA readout 

photo~raJ)hy bee:.n ... " more alarming as a final development phase 

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appruached. 

A lIecund filctor anfluential in the readout. recovery debate of 

1960 wa'; dUlaJ:rC"tOment about the p .. ope" role of concu .. rency in the 

Samuti pru~ .. arno Con(·urrency. a costly strateRY that nonethcle •• 

wall hl.:hly re):arded in some qua .. te .... a •• umed the existenn" of a 

vrelli»anJ.: need fur upe .. ataonal .y.tems and the availability of Inatu .. e . 

tC", hnolu.,:y thOlt l'uuld be" exploited by simultaneous development and 

d,~plu~'fI""nt,, CUllnlrrenc'V lost its att"activenells if the deployed 

wC"ap"n~ were" hkd~' tu become operationally inef(e('tive .oon after 

bean~ handed uVt"r tet uperahonal force •• or if they could not be 

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I delivered on schedule. The expense of concurrency had to be justified 

. . . by the presence of a grave threat to national security that could best 

I be countered by a cost-he-damned weapons acquisition policy. 

I Most Samos program managers were by 1960 pretty certain 

that cameras in orbit would remain "few-of-a-kind" devices for at 

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I lealt another decade; "ma.s production" was almolt inconceivable, 

I and unique space vehicles mostly unlike one another neither required 

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nor could be accommodated within a complex of expensive, standardized 

g round facilities with inflexible operational attributes. 

I Finally, the application of concurrency concepts to the acquisition 

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of reconnais.ance .atelhte. assumed that operational responsibility for 

tht" satellites would be a.signed to an operating command--the Strategic 

I A lr Command. Concurrency was not warranted if there was no certain 

I I I 

need to assign till' developed article. to an operating command. Where 

lIatellite reconntli.sance was concerned, not only wal need uncertain, 

I but United State. national space policy of the 1950s bellan with the 

I :hu,urnphon that overt overfhJl:ht by U.S. reconnaissance satellites 

lould provoke va"lent objection. from such diverse states as France, 

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I I the Soviet Union, China, Incha, and the Arab nations. Add t.he 

I I I , re.lIonablt" prospect that iln exp.n.ive complex of readout vehicles and 

litatlonlf could btocome ub .. ulete overnight with the emergence of new 

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technology, and concurrency. became increalbally unattractive. But 

concurrency,the plan. fer an extenaive BroUnd-ltation readout 

complex, and the near-term aSlilnment of reconnaillance latellite 

operatinl re.ponsibility to the Stratelic Air Command were the three 

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most prominent attribute. of the pre-1960 Samos prolram. 

By April 1960. Corona had experienced its eilhth successive 

lailure (Discoverer IX) and wa. entering a limbo of engineering overhaul that would postpone further trials for two months. Early in 

May tht.' U-Z incident abruptly halted use of the only other reconnaissance 

II yllh:rn available to take photo~raph. over the Soviet heartland. The 

E:-~ satellite .Yllh:m tht"n in development was .0 de.igned that it would 

rt'turn rt:lativel y narrow film .trips, each covering only about 15 by 53 

miles alun~ tht! fitruund. Mureover, it wa. still many months Crom its 

!H-hedulcd firat traal. 

Tht" Au Stall rt:actlon to that .ituation wa. to require the early 

L·"pluit.llion uf the "pre-operational photographic potential" of the Samos 

pr ... .,:ram. That aehon. taken on 9 May, wa' followed 10 days later by 

lnstrul-tlUns frUln Air Foret' Under.eeretary J. V. Charyk that the 

Aar Rcolleareh and Dtevdopment Command wa. to prepare a new Samol 

devt"lupment plan embodyinJt the Air Staff concepte On 1.7 May, Charyk. 

t·xpanded hi. an.truchon. and ordered the Air Force to explore the 

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possibility of usinll "of! the sheU" camera comppnents to accelerate 

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the pace of the photo-recovery proiram. , , 

Late in May and early in June were heard suggestions that a 

completely new photo-recovery system should be develoJH:d. One 

thread of origin started with Colonel W. C. King, in the project 

ofCict"; others bt",:an in the office of the Director of Defense Research 

and Enllineering (DDRa.E) and with Charyk himsell. Then on 5 July 

. the United States Intela'itcence Board iaaued a revision uf satellite 

reconnais.ance requirements, emphasizing the need for locating 

Soviet ballistic missile sates and calling for a search camera system 

capable uf resolvanJ: objects lO feet on a side before the end of 1962. 4 

That a new systenl would be required was all but incontestable, 

c.'Ven withuut th", c.-atalysl of U-l failure. The transitory value of U-Z 

"p.-rations had been com,"eded since overnights began, * the Corona 

system had thus far been totally ineffective. that neither E-I nor E-Z 

A Central lntelhaence A~ency spokesman who briefed the Royal Air 

Forn° in 1957 dt"scribed the U-2 as a "diminishing asset" with 

increasing vulnerabilit)', That it operated effectively for another 

JO months over hostale terrator)' was a compliment to the skill with 

WhlC h It was employed and a provocative commentary on the Soviet 

air defense eilOtablishment. From the evidence, it is clear that the 

CIA had lona anticipaled th .. Inevitable: cover stories were in being 

to .atasfy almost all potentaal wants. The explosive international 

,'onsequences of the U-Z affair were, therefore, less the pr~uct of 

fault y plannin~ for the "Ie\'ltable than of imperfect execution. 

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could pe~form learch millionl wal nowhere denied. and the E-5 

had not been "desikned to pJ;Ovide wide-area coverage which. by early 

1960, had been recognized al e.sential. (The sUlgestion that the £-5 

be flown in a higher orbit to provide broader ground coverage was 

80metimes heard in the summer of 1960. It got a genera1ly unCavorable 

reception from system-conscioul engineerl who were lensitive to the 

tender interrelationships among payload weights. orbit altitudes, 

booster performance, and on-orbit atabUiaation.) 

A new .ystem could conceivably have used readout technology, 

but in May 1960 that wal unlikely. The often acrimunious debate over 

the respective m~rits ot readout and recovery during late 1959 and 

early 1960 had been broucht on by many factors involved. Fundamentally, 

the StuteRic AII' r:um~and and its partisans on the Air Staa (including 

the Air Force AUlstantChie( ot Staff. Intelligence) were insistent on 

the urllency of readout. Mostly they wanted Samol £-Z. a readout 

.ystem with a nominal potential (or obtaining pictures with about 20-foot 

relolution--but not many picture •• or frequently. SAC depreciated the 

hard lact that £-2 lechnolollY wa. ancapable 01 satidying basic need. 

(ur strateaic warnanll and would be almo.t wholly unluited to the taak 

ut localinlC Suviet missile Slle •. 

The Advanced Relearch Projects Allency (ARPA). which had 

" UfilC'IAI respon.ibihty for milatary space program. between early 1958 

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and May 1960. took as its principal policy the contention of ont" ICroup 

of scientistl that readout was desirable but readout~usin8 the bima\ 

technology featured in the E-l and E-Z Samoa syatema waa not fealible. 

Rather than recovery. however. influential ARPA spokesmen endorsed 

a technique using t=lt=ctrustatic tapt= and hi,h"-mallnification optics in 

pla('c of the halide film and on-board proceasing of the f:-l and E-Z. 

Another ARPA IZroup WAnted to expand E-5 activity because E-5 had 

a little .. mentioned capabihty lor carryin, a man into orbit rather than 

a camcra--whlch went far to explain why E-5 was the only recovery 

system ever to provide (ur recovery of camera al well as film. 

Seniur Samull pruJt·ct officers (notably Colonel W. C. King) were 

convinced that the bamat proc.:a. readout system would never satiafy 

national needl--but rather than urling some more exotic and risky 

rt·adout substitute, had ",-orne to iavor film recovery. Some of the 

leaders of tht· AIr Fore.· Rl:."learch and Development Command who had 

been contributor» to tht· e'arly development of Corona had concluded 

that only a heavily funded. heavy atafl development program would· . 

produce' An operationally efft"ctlve reconnaissance aatellite--and they 

mUltly favored the parallel development of E-Z and E-5 usin, a con-

('urre'n('yapproach. 

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Until early July, the Air Force Balliltic Mil.ile. Division 

(BMO) e~presled a preference for lome relatively minor modification 

of the E-5 Iystem rather than a new development. A 12 July BMD 

development plan revilion, however. featured a proposal for a new 

camera payload--delignated E-6--to be combined with a new recoverable 

and maneuverable reentry body. Simultaneously, the Directorate of 

Defense Research and EngineeriDa (OOR.E) exprelsed stronR distaste 

Cor earlier Samos program goals. Almost immediately thereafter the 

quelJtion of what new Iystem was lubmerged in prop08als for a total 

Samos program reorganization. On 11 AUiUlt, in the midst of maneuverin.: for program control, BMD ilsued ItUI another development plan 

which proposed an E-6 system generally conforming to the USIB statement o( requiren.ents. Featurinl a panoramic camera with 20-foot 

or better resolution, eight days on orbit, and a hiihly precise recovery 

system. It was intended to provide broad coverage of those areas 

serviced by the Soviet railway network. 

E\'en earlier, on 1.7 July, Colonel Paul J. Heran, then of 

the bSQ4th Test Wina. had been named to head a source lelection 

board which was to evaluate contractor proposals for an E-6 sYltem. * 

Other members of the board Ineluded Colonel J. L. Martin 

C Darectorate of Advanced Technology, Air Force headquarters), 

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Requests for propos ale were diapatched to a selected list of contractors_. 

. . " from which Lockheed had been 'exc1uded--on the day the development plan 

was issued, 11 August. During the period of pre-proposal brielinss the 

Samos project was formally assilned to the Office of the Secretary of 

the Air Force. acquired a new military cbie! (Brigadier General R. E. 

Greer) and a secretariat-level overseer (Air Force Undersecretary 

Charyk). and in its revamped form received Pre.idential endorsement. 

The basic performance requirement was allo tnOdified to include lO-foot 

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resolution r'or better") and live days on orbit. 

Dr. Charyk had notified BND of the modified performance requirements on !l AUICust and With a minor alteration had confirmed 

them on the l6th. the day {allowinl the National SecuJ'ity Council 

meeting at which President Eisenhower perlonally approved the revised 

Samoa pro,:Eram. The prolRram that Charyk deCined in hiS pre.entation 

to the President and a som~what earlier statement of E-6 "{.,andamentals 

by which selec-taon board action. would be conditioned" established the 

pa rameters of the E-6 prof,tram .s it existed at the time the Secreta·ry 

of the Air Forct" Samos Project Ol(ice was activated. The source 

.d~c"on board conSidered the E-6 to be a back-up to the E-5 .yatem. 

C:ulonel A. L. WaUace (DlreC"tor .of TechnoloJY at WrilRht Air Development DIVision and formtor chlcf of the Reconnaissance Laboratory there). 

and Major H. C. Howard ,alau Directorate of Advanced TechnoloIY). 

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with assured recovery over land beiDI more important than rilid . . 

ac:ih~r:eDce to the pb~toiraphy specifications. The board operated on. 

the premise that it would be more desirable to develop "crude", 

"insensitive" subsystems which were limple and reliable thaD to 

concentrate on "elelant. sophisticated, fancy. cute. tricky. fussy 

subsystems." E·6. of itsell, had to be "uleful and usable even if 

the primary thing it's backlnl up also workl." By implication. E-6 

had to differ from exishn~ or pro,rammed lolutions to the reconraaisun cc problem. Otherwise it would be duplicative-.and undesirable. 

The system Charyk described to Eisenhower was composed of 

a precise: land recover)' sublystem--with a"ir pick up a possible 

alternative--inteMral with a photolraphic subsystem that inc1lo!ded a 

• l4- tu 36- inch panoramic camera. Firlt flight. assumina proare.s 

cuns.stent wlth that outlined in the development plan. was planned for 

January 196Z, Seven fliMhts. possibly augmented by two diagnostic 

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h'st •• w~'re un the proposed schedule. 

Thf' suurce evaluatlon was conducted in an atmolphere of 

"uld uncertainty. Neithf'r the reportinl chaDnel nor the precile 

funcllons of the new project ufflce had yet been officially defined. 

A. ur&~inally concelved. £-b mlJlht have been delcribed as a 

hlJ,:h- rela.tbilit), Curona . 

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In many relpectl the E-6 reqwrement leemed to nelate all earlier 

projec~ objectivel and to reject the cODceptl applied by the existing 

program office. None of the earlier payload prolram8 had been 

unde rtaken except throulh the contracting route provided by Lockheed. 

but the E-6 was specifically arranled to exclude that contractor. 

Owing mostly to the poor performance of Corona. Lockheed wal in 

gene ral diafavor during those weeks when E-6 took form. The relationship between the ~xistinll program office and the exilting BMD organiza-

. tion was not apparent. and indeed there seemed a poslibility that Samoa 

might be recombined with Midas and Discoverer under the over-aU 

management of General Greer, with the individual lateUite offices 

remaining intact. Perhaps fortunately. the month during which such 

matters were resolved was also the month during which the principal 

duty of the source .election board was to wait for proposals from 

C"ontractorl. 

The choice of subllystem contractors had. for practical purposes. 

been completed before th ... end of October--by which time the new Samus 

ollie.: struC"ture had also been clarified. The source selection board, 

With the foreknowledtce uf both Charyk and Greer. recommended awardina 

the caml~ra payload contract to Eastman Kodak and the recovery subsystem c.·ontract to General Electric. Accessory considerations prevented 

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immediate" action on thoae reC'ommendationa. however.' The board 

lenerally favored"'making A.Noapace Corporation reapouible for all 

syatema integration work not included in the basic aaaigDments to 

Eastman and General Electric. whUe Dr. Charyk had expres sed 

reservations about living Aeroapace any great degree of .ystems 

integration authority. Moreover. certain members of the E-6 board 

also constituted a aub-rosa source aelection group concerned with 

Eastman's propoaal to df'velop a 77-lnch panoramiC camera subayatem. 

(Known as 'Sunaet Strip." the 77-inch camera had been treated as a 

follow-on or parallel development during tbe Auauat preaentation to 

the National Security Council. Late in September. Charyk and Greer 

had agreed that ''Sunaet Strip" waa too promisinl to paas up and had 

d~cided that it ahuuld be covertly developed to provide a reserve recon-

"als.ance capablhty in th .. event that political factors should force 

ce •• ation of acknowledlled reconnaiaaance satellite programs. 

("Sunset Strip" eventually became Gambit.) Finally. there still waa 

unct.' rtainty on the course and f'mphaa's of land recovery developments. " 

and un the technical feaa'blhty of propoaals for such systema. 

Charyle'a deciaion to lamlt the ayatema engineering-technical 

direction role of Aerospace Corporation decided one iaauei formal 

achon to "cancel" "Sunset Strip" re.olved another. (The "cancellation" 

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wal part of the cover plan which led to the leparate e.tabli.hment 

of Gambit. a program aimed at the clanci •• tine de~elopment of tht: 

77-inch camera and an appropriate recovery .ub.y.tem to be flown 

in E-6 vehicles. ) _ Attempt. to make the Reconnai •• ance Laboratory 

at Wright Field re.pon.ible for- camera payload development. in the 

E-6 prolram had been halted lomewhat earlier. in September. at 

Charyk" iui.tence and to the coneiderable diemay of ARDC headquarters. 

The relatively rapid -eltablilhment of a functioninl SAFSP orlani.ation 

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cleared the air of other oraani.ational inconai.tenciel. 

Notwitllitandini .uch pro,rell, the matter of defininl Aerolpace 

Corporation relponlibihtiel became critical alain in November and 

remained lomethintt of an 1I1Ue untU late in December; the que.tion 

of whether land recovery Ihould be a primary. paraUel, or .ubordinate 

objective had not been fanally relolved; and late in November there wal 

another Ikirmilh over the relationlhip of Samol to ARDC pro,raml. 

Finally, the lource lelection board had found no alternative to u.ing 

Lockheed'i Attena al the! upper .ta,e to inject the E-6 payload vehiCle 

into orbit. and Lockheed thul became part of the contractor complex. 

(Technical inte.ration of the- payload. upper Itale. and recovery 

.ub'Ylteml. however. wal relerved for Cieneral Electric rather 

than Lockheed. which had that re.pon.ibility for aU otber Samoa 

payload 'Yltem. and for Corona.) 

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Such factors kept the aource selection board in session until 

1 0

, ember Not until the 14th of that month did the chairman. 

ear y ec • 

Colonel Heran. lormally advise the BMD commander. Major Cieneral 

o. J. Ritland. that Cieneral Electric aDd Eastman had been chosen to 

develop recovery and camera subsystems, respectively. The maneuver .. 

able reentry .spect of the orilinal requirement 'had been reduced to an 

apphcd research program aamed at the eventual design of a "terminally 

Iluided liftang type vehicle ~" (Construction and flight test of iluC'h a 

vehich,' had been recommended for inclusion in the E-6 program 'as 

late as November.) 

On Zl Oc,ol'ember. Ge'neral Rit.land approved t.he board'. recommendataons. Ii\' that time the troublesome issue of systems integration 

responSibility h.,d been finaUy settled. Aerospace was to do "general 

=,ystems enguwt'rmJil and technical dlrect.ion." working as part of a 

team that inc1ud.t d the members of the SAFSP office and c1ea~ing all 

tel.:hni("al decisaons with the malitary program managers. A delinition 

ul "l:t'neral sy"tems enJ:aneerinll. II which Cieneral Cireer had wryly " 

dt"lu'ribed a. "locally controvers,al" was worked out. in the course ol 

a lO D,,('t'mber luncheun m .. etanfot between Charyk and BriRadier Cieneral 

R. D. Curtin. Chit'!! uf Itw Samoll PentaJlon olfice. It was Charyk's 

·'&lih·nt. •• that At-rospo'"'' wuuld not function as STL functions in 

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detailed syst.ems engineering in the inissUe proarams" but. would act 

. more in the role of an associate ·contractor repor.tinl to' the prolra.rn 

ullice. 

A linal aUempt. on the part of ARDC headquarters to cement a 

manaRement relationship between Samos and the basic ARDC organization had ended in failure even before the selection board completed its 

wurk. Late in November, Dr. Charyk and General Greer decided 

that Samos funda would not under any d.rcumstances be used to support 

dl.Ovclupment of the Avc:o Drag Brake as a backup to the Martin recover-

.. ble reentry vehicle. Thus concluded the la.t of several eneraetic 

t·{furtll tu secure for Wrat:ht Field a ahare in management of the reconflaa.llance sateUite proRrAm--or to tap its funding reservoir. 9 

Even thoulCh the land recovery objective of the program defined 

an AUJZulit had been substantially reduced in importance by December. 

the expectation that Marhn's glide-control reentry t.echnique would 

. ,oventually be combined with the E-6 camera sv-tem remained a basic 

program concept throullh the early months of 1961. Fears for the 

pu •• iille 10 .. of a Samu •• ateillte over unfriendly territory, with 

r ... .,.rru •• ions perhaps more extreme than those of the U-2 incident, 

vrumpted continued ('oncern for positive control of recovery modes 

and fur \he improvement uf ref'ntry accuracy. Neve rtheles., throulhout 

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the period of lource le1ec:ti,!n. and throulh the many perambulationl . thatatiended eltablilllhm~nt of SAFSP, proli'am manalerl retaiDt!d 

a realiltic Iralp of the basic prolram objective: to acquire an 

orbital reconnailsance sy.tem which overcame objection. both to 

the electronic readout sy.tema 10 favored in the late 1950. and 

havinl1 better resolution than Corona. The final definition of prolram 

objectives. a. expressed in work Itatementl ilsued to the principal 

contractorl. was remarkable in dilpenainl with the 1esl attainable--

thoulEh delirab1e--elements of the larlely theoretical 'Yltem described 

to the Prelident in AUlust. From aD enlineerinl viewpoint, there was 

every indication that th,," E-6 prolram woUld indeed result in the 

creation of a ruliab1e, haRh acuity, photolraphic latellite lystem.

10 

Ddays ill complehon of the lource selection proce •• had forced 

a slippatce in the orallanal proRram deacllines. Durinl the last daYI of 

lCJ60, a technical direction meetinll conducted by Aerospace produced 

revl1led milestone Roals: delivery of the payload vehicle to Vandenbcrl 

Air Force. Base and the fint fiiRht-ready Alena B to the mislUe 

a • .embly buildan~ by ZO November. availability of the a.sembled 

vehicle on the pad by 18 ~cember 1961, and first fiilht by 1 February 

11 

lCJbl. It was a schedule that seemed wildly optimistic in the lilht 

of earher lpace program achievementl--13 monthl from program 

an 1':01':.'. 417 

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approval (source selection) to first fliaht. Nevertheless. tbe E-6 

project group expressed no serious' ~eservations about the feasibility 

of satisfying such exacting requirements. and confidently set about 

the task. 

For almost precisely one year thereafter. the SAFSP group. 

Aerospace, General Electric. and Eastman Kodak worked industriously 

to meet deadlines and Co provid.- technical items that satidied specifications. Even thoulh the orilinal concept of th, E-6 had emphasized 

"off-the-shelf" technololY and "available" hardware. the translation 

of rc:quirements into functional space systems, tOlether with vital 

Rround control and tracking stations. recovery teams. and launch 

capacities, ws. an enormous tssk. The emphasis on early availability 

of militarily useful systems was apparent in the original shift from a 

land recovery technique to water recovery and on reliability rather 

than !Sophistication. Still. some pessimism seemed warranted. Only 

four capsules and three film packets had actually been recovered from 

orbit at the time the .ource selection action was completed. and thia 

in IH trials. Perhaps more to the point, the Atlas-Agena, combination 

destined for E-6 prolram had. to that time. only one attempted Samos 

a pphcation--and that a spectacular faUure. 

Preparation of work statements belan in January, proceeded 

routln~ly in th .. case of Luckheed and 

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Kodak, an"d encountered serious snags for General Elect.ric. A draft 

version pr~p&re(t'by Genetal Electric proved unacceptable to the 

project office, and an SAFSP version failed to sat.isfy Aerospace 

Corporation objectives. Not unti11ate February did Lockheed and 

General Electric reach agreement on the interface between the payload 

vehicle and the Attena-B stage. By March, Lockheed was behind 

schedule on Agena-B work, the original decision to use Johnson Island 

as the recovery site had been imperiled by plans lor possible resumption 

uf atumic tests in the Pacific. the camera lenses and mirrors were on 

the critical lip of a delivery schedule dippage, and delays in securing 

funds for the miuilt' aU"mbly building at Vandenberg had brought the 

IZ 

tlm.:!y availabilit\' ul that facility into serious question. 

Some 01 tht, cunfiguration detaUs of the E-6 were decided 1es. 

by l'n~ineerint: IUJ:lc than by the need to camouflage Gambit. During 

tht' early months of the E-6 program it seemed es.ential not only to 

hide the Cambit technical errort under a screen of E-6 activity, but 

;.bu tu make the orbi'tal vehicle portions 01 the two systems resemble· . 

unt" another in outw.ard appearance. Thus, in theory a Gambit could 

ht' launched without alertin..: many people to its real nature. Unhappily, 

tht: .ecundary objective of dt·veluplng a system which could .be covertly 

.'mployed in the event ul E-b cancellation was incompatible with the 

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thesis of "look-alike" orbital stales. If political couiderations 

forced cancellation of the acknowledled reconnaissance sate1lite 

program. certainly no vehicle which almost precisely resembled the 

cancelled item could be approved for launch. 

The real advantagel of the E-6 relationship with Gambit were 

in providing cover (or contractual actions and· for contractor activity. 

There was a possible profit in the element of technololical surprise. 

as well. The specifications for the E-6 had reached the leneral public 

throuJlh a trade magazine. and even thoulh Soviet intelligence might 

reasonabl y suspect the validity of any performance specifications so 

casually revealed. lapses in the United States security system were 

not uncommon and the premature dilclosure of system details not 

unprecedented. The Gambit system. developed largely within the E-6 

e{fort. would through its vastly better resolution provide means for 

much more detailed intelligence than could be expected from E-6. 

But by the same token. Gambit payloads disguiled as E-6 payloads 

became political1y vulnerable. the price for such technological surprise. 

Altbouah the concept of concealinl one reconnaissance payload 

by means of anothe r had inbulh frultrationl, the notion of "look-alikel" 

·survlvrd lona enoullh to have a substantial impact on the confiluratlon 

of the E-6. The native characteristici of the E-6 camera subtJyatem 

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1 ·nfluent~al in decidina the nose cone structure and mid-body were ess I. • 

shape of'the E-6 vehicle than the f.ct th.t those sections .1so had to 

house t.be .till greater bulk of the C.mbit optics .nd film tr.nsport 

compl~x. The fact that a portion of the forward body of the Agena 

vehicle had to be cleared of equipment 80 that it would not interfere 

with the functioning of the Cambit payload could not logically be 

explained in terms of E-6 needs, nor could a modific.tion of the Agena 

or mid-body to ("onform to peculi.r C.mbit requirements. 

In similar f.shion, oper.ting det.ils of the E-6 trackinR .nd 

control n(!twork had to be ("ompatible with.Cambit even though £-6 

rnit:ht not requirt· such refinement. The establishment and activation 

of a north-Iatitudt" trackinR and control st.tion th.t could give final 

lIultructions to a Gambit s.tellite immedi.tely before it beg.n • 

Kput-reconnaI5"anre p .... fdl Into that c.tegory. The E-6, taking a 

Wide-swath picture. actually needed nothina so sophisticated, but the 

not rrower-swath Cambit camera w.s thought incapable of sufficient 

t't r::etint: precis i(lD wathout such final guidance. 

Even thou~h the futility of attempting to make Cambit'vehicles 

luolt lake E-b "bird." wall ("\In, eded before' the end of 1961, it endured 

Ion.: ,·nough to have a 1 •• llnR e((ect on the fira I configur.tiun of the E-6. 

Bf'("aullf' of the lallht development-test schedule, details of the E-6 h.d 

BYE 1":Ol~-' • 411 

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to be fixed quite early in the prolram. and very often they .howed the 

" " 

. effects of the attempt to make one element of the -total "vehicle compatibie" 

with payload component. of both. The final evidence of futility came 

after E-6 details had been decided and vehicle fabrication uudertaken: 

the technical evolution of Cambit continued with the result that Cambit 

rapidly assumed an appearance and character completely di.tinct from 

that of the final E-6 confiluration.13 

Thus. a succession of major technical decisions interlocked 

with programminl actions to complicate the first months of the E-6 

development. Even before formal completion of selection board actions, 

Lockheed was advised of substantial changes needed to adapt the ba.ic 

Allena-B vehicle to E-6--and Cambit--uses. (The interface definition 

remained for a later decision.) Principally. Lockheed had. to remove 

a number of components not needed for the E-6 application: solar 

cells, portions of communications and programmer subsystems not 

needed for ascent and de-boost, aU auxiliary power not required for 

a normal mission (the final reduction from eight-day to five-day mi.sion 

requirements was not approved until the technical meetinas of 29 December), and the sun podtion indicator. The Agena airframe had to be 

rnodi£ied to accept the E-6 midsection and the reentry vehicle--and to 

provide for the much Ireater bulk of the 77-inch Cambit camera. The 

422 

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. -.., ' t m required modification, to provide two-way seconda~y pro ... _.1on sys ~ . . 

, .. , :bit: dJ'ust mari~uvers. "Provisions'had to be'made 

thrust needed for or a 

, I try required by Oeneral Electric. Somewhat later. 

for special te eme 

bel" it became nec.ssary to relocate the S-bancl beacon 

in mid-Decem • 

try vehicle from its original Itation in the Agena and to in the reen 

relocate other programmers. Not until the key technical meetings of 

ZH and 1.9 December were firm decilions made on the weight limitations 

of the Agena-B (Z080 pounds plus gas and gas bottles). the payload 

vehicle (1650 pounds). and the photographic lubsystem (IZ50 pounds). 

Each such weight specification. of course. had to accommodate Oambit 

all well a. the basic E-6. 

After considering a number of alternatives. several of which 

were impractical because of the lead time requirement. the program 

oCfice late in January 1961 decided to rely on the existent Verlort tracking 

net for communication and control functionl. re-opening the Annette 

Island, Alaska. site for the addition of one new Vedort station. 

(Anriette was needed for Oambit rather than E-6.) The communication" 

problem wa. further comphca'ed in February with the emergence of a 

requlr"'ment for an addihonal vehicle-contained S-band for the Verlort 

radau. for an S-band coma:.and decoder compatible with those radars 

and wath .ecurity encoder requirementl; and for a transponder that· 

BYE 1701'7·14 4l.3 

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would latidy requirementl for ranle rate mealurementl. Reliance 

on the Verlort network obliged program managerl to 'provide for 

modification of existing Itations to include a digital command capacity, 

a requirement peculiar, at that time, to the E-6. The decoder requirement which caused a change in vehicle configuration also affected the 

Verlort Itationl, leading to inltallation of a command decoder in each. 

Some queltionl of balic facUitiel were troublesome through the 

entire winter of 1960-1961. Thul the formal decilion to ule Johnlon 

Island al the delcent and recovery zone wal not made until late February 

and it wal another month before a prolram office lurvey group could 

actua11y vi.it the lite and eltimate needl. In much the lame fa.hion, 

a decill ion to convert part of the £-Z area in the millUe allembly 

building at Vand,mberg to £-6 purpolel wal made in January, but it 

wal not until l4 March that an alreement on a beneficial occupancy 

date emerged. 

One of the 1alt of the major technical redirectionl that could 

be incorporated before the program got 10 far alonl that each change" 

meant a lignificant delay wal the 16 February 1961 deletion of air-catch 

considerations from the recovery lublYltem. AI with the £-5, the 

£-6 would depend on de-buolt, aerodynamic deceleration, and water 

Impact (and flotation) for ita recovery mode. Sheer bulk wal a principal 

414 

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deterrent 't~ aerial recovery; the reentry body was 12 feet and three inches 

14 

in length wiih' a rriaximum d,ameter of eight feet and four inches! 

Although alternate modes of reentry and recovery operation 

were considered later, by March 1961 the basic techniques of E-6 

launch, orbit. and recovery had been decided. The operation would 

begin with launch of the Atlall-A~ena combination from Point Arguello 

and its control (in Atlas sustainer and vernier phases) by Atla. radar 

Auidance. At Atlas burnout. the satellite vehicle (Agena-B. camera 

section, and recovery vehicle) would ("oast to apogee, at whic~ point 

the A~ena-B would deliver the lmpulse required to place the satellite 

combination in a preselected orbit within the AJena·. guidance and 

control tolerances. Orbit insertion would take place at approximately 

I.! S nautical mile. altitude. 

After insertion, the orbit would be defined from telemetry 

returns, al\:le track data. and Verlort radar track information. The 

r"quired orbit correction wuuld be computed from track and rate 

radar derivations. and intruduced aa velocity changes provided by 

A.,:ena re-burn. The flnal urbit correction system relied on a 

hydruJlen peroxide propulsaon unit contained in the camera section. 

PhotoRraphic ('overal%C: normally would be,in on the eighth 

urbat. The photo~raphic "ubsYlitem was built around a pair oC 36-inch 

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(focal length) cameras (for Itereo coverale) with horizon recordinl 

for attitude control. 

Upon completion of the photographic portion of the mission. 

de-orbit requirements would be calculated from ephemeris data and 

sent to the orbiting vehicle. The Agena-B would thereupon be oriented 

to the proper attitude by its gal jetl and de-orbit thrust impulse applied 

to acquire the desired d~-orbit trajectory. 

The recovery vehicle would separate from the Agena B by 

retro-thrust derived {rom the orbit correction nozzles and would then 

be re-oriented to the delired reentry attitude by the nitrogen jets 

provided for reaction control. Pre-orientation of the Agena was 

intended to mak~ the de-urbit technology relatively uncomplicated. 

Rc:hance on ~alf Jdl for spin-up was intended to eliminate the possibilit Y uC an unltablc II pin ariling from unbalanced solid rockets. 

Use oC a parachute recovery system in combination with the 

rc("u\Oery vehiC'lt' (baled on Ceneral Electric's RVX-Z) presumably 

pro\Oaded a sale rate of delcent plUI adequate ablative protection for .. 

the r~c.:overy payload thruut:h the aerodynamic heating zone to the 

pUlnt u{ recovery. (Maximum reentry forces exceeded IS J. durinl 

d~c. deration. andheatinll intenlihes were comparably extreme.)· . 

Much later. With vision Iharpened by hindsight. Aerospace CorporatlOn ,)roject enf,linf'L'ra cal'pt"d that the General Electric ballistic recovery 

4Z6 

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Recovery aids in the General Electric vehicle were intended, ultimately, 

to insure prompt retrieval within the bounds of the Las 'Vegas Bombing. 

and Gunnery Range. Initially. however. water recovery was to b~ 

employed. the vehicle floatinl until aecured by frolmen and recovered 

by a ship. 

Tracking, telemetry, and command equipments were ,:ontained 

in the recovery vehicle. Such devices had to be compatible with the 

Mod III track and command systems at the Atlantic and Pacific Missile 

Ranges; the Verlort S-band trackinl radars at Hawaii, Kodiak. and 

VandenberJl; and th~ VHF and UHF telemetry receivers and cummand 

transmitters at various sites in the weltern hemisphere. During onurblt operation. th~ satulht~ vehicle was controlled throulh time-coded 

binary signals trallllm'lt~d by the Verlort trackinllink. The satellite 

itsrU had a memury circuit adequate for the storage of commanda 

!iylit'-"m had been selected "dt·spite the rather casual treatment given 

this ")'stem in th'-" proposal document ••• " There is no indication 

an cuntempurary sources, huwever, that the adequacy of the G .. nera! 

Electric- r .. entry vehicle proposal ... seriously questioned. Thf' 

RVX -l des'~n was apparently well proven. was available, and was 

appiacabh' tu th~ prollram as then conceived. The General Electric' 

;IJJpruotch ruquired the least resr-arch and development of any that 

tl.ld ht'cn propoaed and olfered the IJreatestassurance of aatisryinl 

nl~ht !lc:hedules--and of a r .. hable Iyatem. Althoullh General Electric 

wall tl1l' tarllet of ("ons.dc:rablt.> later critiCism, it was not until the 

flu;ll twu months ul E-6 fliAht testina that questions about the adequacy 

uf tht· lJ;III1C dc.-si.:n 01 the r'-"~nlry system were raised. 

BYE n0I1·14 417 

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necessary for both vehicl~ and payload operations during orbit. In 

actuality. some of the more precise circuitry re'quir~d for commailCi 

of the payload portion was essential to the Gambit system rather than 

the broad-swath £-6 camera. but for obvious reasons that fact was 

not widely known. 

The ori,::inal plan of an initial launch by December 1961. 

{ullow~d by six additiunal launches at 40-day intervals (and including 

two diaAnostic launche:16 from the Atlantic Mis.ile Range. if necessary), 

had by rarly 1961 been changed to refiect a 9 March 196Z first-launch 

tarJl,,-t date:. The entir ... slippage, at that point, had resulted from an 

AUl!U!lt 1960 d.-dlnun tu p .. rmit prospective bidders more time than 

urll!lnally cuntt!mpbte:d tu dtovelop their proposals. IS 

The early ohjucl1ve uf controlled land recovery became less 

than an lntejlr.tl of the tutal pro~ram after 9 March 1961, when Underl6t"cretary Charyk r~duced the Martin effort to a study-through-mock-up 

ilnivlty more alowly pac-tad and lesli fully funded than initially proposed. 

Th., Martin Company's wurk statement was rewritten in April to renee't 

th~ chantEed emphasis and thereafter had no significant influence on 

16 

the basic program. 

In some part. the cutback in Martin's activity was indicative 

uj fanancial diffirultie!l that bellan to trouble the £-6 program as early 

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as March 1961. The chief off~nder, from the standpoint of unplanned " 

expendltures, was Gdn'erai Electric', 'which late in Marc1; reported·' 

fiscal 1961 costs 

through fiscal 1962, against 

nil a.,.,roved figure To SAFSP managers there seemed 

no hope of accommodatinl the General Electric development program 

withlD the total of currently approved funds; the only escapes appeared 

tu bt, rescheduling or increasinl funds. (The basic E-6 program, 

t"xdusivc of the Martin reentry vehicle effort, had in November 1960 

been costed at a fiscal 19&1 total a fis cal J 962 

total There beina no alternative, and the urgency of 

the E-6 not havin~ dlminashed, the contract with General Electric 

bt-L;.nw an af,:ret-m,-nt to complete the farst seven vehicles 

Cuntract 1lt.!f,:otiatiunl6 were C"ompleted In AUlust 1961; in March 1962 

G'-Ill'rnl Elt."ctric advised the program office of an ."'I0"",~UI:a ... 

illcal 19&Z OVerrun which promised to grow larger by the end 

of thflt yea r. At that point, General Electric was estimating that its 

part of the proJlram wuuld ultlm .. 'tel)- c ather than 

th ... earlier figures. 

A detailed survey of the E-& procurement situation in July 1961 

turru.·d up other disturblDlC factors _ The orilinal cost estimates by the 

BYE nOI1. '74 419 

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three principal contractors had ",n·.ULau 

from Eastman Kodak, 

om Lockheed). The letter contracts had been issued on 

the basis of COltl derived from the original work statements. By 

April 1961, when definitive work statements and refined cost estimates 

became available. the program total had rilen 

from Ea. General Electric, 

Lockheed). In the view of the Air Force inlpector general, "It was 

apparent that the contractors had originally priced over-simplified 

programs allainst requirements not specifically resolved" and in 

detailing ("osts had gone throullh clarification and redirection phales 

which completely c:hant!ed orillinal conceptions. Thus between November 

1960 and April lqbl. General Electric had added sUghtly to its hardware 

C:Ulit estimate but had expanded the sum of engineering and test activity 

tu ac("ount fur hall of vised estimate. The bulk of 

Kudak's increase was for additional eng although 

an accelerated dcvelopment schedule and more rigid specifications· .. 

accounted for a considerable Bum. Lockheed's estimates went upas 

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a direct relult of dClilln cha"llel in the Aliena vehicle. 

Although arithmetically correct, the inspector .enerat's lurvey 

,·uentially overluoked the fact that the E-6 had originally been 

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prelented as an "ofl_the-shell·i solution to a difficult'technical problem. 

The differ·e~~es ~bet~en·Ndvember 1960 and April 1961 !iBurel reflected 

not so much bad estimating al the effects of redefining £-6 technical 

objectives. Given a choice, the Samol office elected to expend money 

rather than time and to pay for equipment that promised to satisfy the 

basic requirement in full rather than lettle for what was available and 

compromise performance. It was unlikely, in any event, that the 

C'ontractou' initial (,Olt I!'ltimatel would have long retained any inherent 

validity. Experienc. had demonltrated that in radically advanced 

d..-veloprnt"ntl th. "normal" pattern included a rash of technical dilf!-

culuell and a cunsiderable number of significant design or detail changes. 

The fin.uleaal intetlrity of project managers was of little consequence in 

lIuch C"ir('umstan ·ell; custs went up as engineering expenses increased 

and ali tCllt pruJ:ramll expanded. 

N~vertheless. the E-& office learned a lot from its early experit'nce with cost estimating. About a year later. when a follow-on program 

was bein~ weillhl!'d. the office propoled a cOlt-plul-incentive-fee contractan.: h'chniqut" (for General ElectriC) that made contract performance a. 

pavut un which bonules and penaltaes hinged. Review at the level of the 

.ur lh'cretariat prompted ('ornpliments, and even though later developments 

In\.ahdcltc.·d thr need for fullow-on procurements, the leSIons of early £-6 

'-uralracllnt: experaenc..- wI·r.! nut lult. 19 

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I Requirements for support facUities for the E-6 program Were 

defined later than had been anticipated aaiel'included 'items Dot foreseen 

I when the program had been approved for development late in 1960. In 

I addition to a growth in the projected coat of the Annette Island station, 

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a tracking station at Thule, Greenland (approved 30 June 1(61), and the 

erection of a vehicle support buUding at Point Arguello (defined in 

Aprill96l) became es.entiala. Consequently, the support funds for 

tht: E-6 program had become quite substantial by the end of fiscal 1962. 

A nnette Island reactivatiun Thule tracking 

s the E-6 equipment for stations used in 

common by aeveral apact" proJrams anothe 

ion of multiph·-satellitt: handlin-= features a 

support fund» tutal that rea 

tlme aU eaaenllal facilities pres"""ably had been provided for, since 

the fli-=ht proJZram was then in prollress. The only Significant exception 

was the land-recovery alipec:t of the total proflram, which did not become 

a major coat item until flacal 1963. 

In July 1961, Colonel Heran estimated a total requirement for 

fiscal 1961 military construction funding to cover a 

d,"-orbit control atation. a land recovery support facUity, and additional 

anatallatiuna at the Atlantlc Massile Range. AU were required for the 

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Martin reentry vehid~ development. By Novembef. however. deletion 

of all b~t the Canaveral construction had el:i.m,iniat,.cI that total. 20 

WhUe 8uch matters continued to trouble the program. the 

principal effort wal inevitably applied to remaWng on Ichedu1e in 

the development. fabrication. and test a8pect8. The first key date 

was Kodak's delivery of a payload mock-up·to General Electric--

completed on 8chedule: 21 April. The fir8t three flyable recovery 

vehicle casseltes reached General Electric before the end of June. 

in Augu8t. thermal environment telts of prototype 1en8es began; and 

on 18 September thc,' fir .. t drop test of a recovery vehicle (from a B-52 

at Kirtland Air Furn.· Base) ended in succe... By the first week of 

October. the initl •• 1 fhllht vehicle (Number 2401) was going through 

thl! tclemetry • h .. ·• i.mlt station. Payload weight was 30 pound8 greater 

than the 2159 »Uundli predicted in June. but a reduction in control gas 

requirements had compensated for more than half of the increase. 

On 10 October 1961. therefure. Colonel Heran aS8ured Under8ecretary 

Charyk that by all a\'ailable andications the firat launch would take 

place when scheduled: 9 March 1962. On the day of his report to the 

undeuecretar)·. Heran h:arned that the initial water-drop test of the 

re'entry vehicle had .. 180 ~en successful. both in parachute deployment 

i'lnd Ul flotation characteristacs. At the end of the month. recovery 

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At that point. some of the bright expectations be,an to dull. 

An early indication of pendin,'difficulty waa a co~plaint from Ciert';ral" 

Electric that Aerospace Corporation had been responsible lor delays 

in the isauance of requirements atatements and detailed ap~cifi('ations 

on which the vehicle contractor's schedules were dependent. Aerospace. of course. had another interpretation. Concurrently. 

Aerospace was assumint: responaibiUty for a command programming 

alulignment originally alated for Cienera! Electric. The Philadelphia-based 

contractor. it developed. lacked the manpower for the task. Lockheecl. 

the lirst alternate. was ovedoadecl because of other programs. 

Consequently Aerospact" Corporation (as an or,anization--distinct 

from the pruJ:ram uffice element) exercised its syatems engineerinMtechical direclion Oluthority and purchased computer time from an 

uutside contrartur (Systems Development Corporation). The effect 

oC the late-term reassiMnments was not immecliately felt. bu.t within 

QO d;IYs beJlan tu appear a» delayed and incomplete computer programs. 

Without the appropriate computer data. the satellite control establishmenl ... t Sunnyvale.' could not support the launch--and a launc-h date 

I./, .... ppaJ:e would inevitabl~' result. 

Alii 1l h""pened. tht' computer program slippage did not 

tlel'unlt! the crith'al lac-lur In the schedule. Cieneral Electric was 

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to deliver the first flight veh.iele on 1 December. That clay came . and pa8'.ed without ~';ent~ as did the remainder of December. On 

2 January 1962.. the contracting officer of the Philadelphia Air 

Procurement District formally notified Oeneral Electric that the 

~overnment was considering termination of the contract by default. 

In actuality, the notification was a "show cause and cure" inltruction 

intended to prompt Oeneral Electric to more energetic eHorta to 

satisfy contractual requirements, but the possibility that the ("untractor's 

failure to perform might influence the award of follow-on contracts 

could not be overlooked. The chance that the lovernment might 

terminate the contract before the orilinal seven vehicles were delivered 

wa s slight indeed. I. 3 

The nothe had two eUects. nonethelesl. Most important. it 

litimulated Oeneral Electric to push completion of the first fiillht 

article somewhat more earnestly than had earlier been the case. A 

Spac-e Systems Divisiun acceptance team ended its inspection and 

siJtned for the vehicle on 19 January. but not without criticism. The 

hastl! uf the completion and Inspection process disturbed the acceptance 

team. The team chairman re ported that his fel10w members had 

d ... ·vcloped "a general lack of enthusiasm" durinl the certification 

pro~'I!.s because of the "hurried and hectic" conduct of the required 

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tests. He remarked that some "informal" procedures OIl the part 

. . of the General Electric peuple had nOt actually beeli witneued by 

the team, and he noted that all of the pre-acceptance tests had not 

been completed because of the lack of time. They were slated for 

completion during field tests of the vehicle. 24 

The secondary consequence of the "cause and cure" notice 

was to prompt General Electric to an impassioned (and thoroughly 

subjective) defense of its conduct of the program. The contractor 

cited the complexity of the system and the requirement for design, 

development, and test cumpletion in only 13 month.; the "continual" 

proltram and technical redirection by Air Force and Aerospace 

Curporation managers (in the opi.nion of Colonel H. L. Evans. 

SAFSP's vice dirc('tor, the program had been subjected to fewer 

chan.:e. than cumparable proRrams); technical problems with the 

General Electric reentry subsystem (which had been selected 

ori.:inally becausc the contractor represented it to be a proven system 

requarinlt little refinement); and compatibility problems with Eastman 

Kudak which "substantially exceeded expectations. ,,l5 

Tu the uninitiated, at least, it appeared that General Electric 

had a weak case. Sume weeks later, when it became apparent that· 

the delivery slippalle had been~ attended by a substantial undere.ti~ate 

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of costs~ General Electric's MissUe and Space Vehicle Division 

manager~ H~ 'vi.' Paige,' ~tted "changes in system requirements and 

in detaUs of implementation" as the chief caules of Ichedule and 

cost inaccuracies. Paige also complained that some design changes 

judged to be within the scope' of the contract should have been handled 

through contract change notice procedures and predicted that "furth~r 

technical difficulties" wuuld arise from the flight prolram.26 

That much, at least, was a valid analysis. 

Although General Electric's vehicle acceptance schedule had 

slipped by some s,even weeks. the flight schedule showed only a twoweek slippage and as late as mid-January the reentry vehicle contractor 

was confident of meeting a Zl March launch date. Z7 Progrell during 

February appeared to justify such optimism. Early that month, the 

proJlram office C'oncluded aJtreements with the 6595th Aerospace Test 

WinJt which formalized the .ssillnment of responsibilities for, various 

portions of th~ launch and test operation to follow. (The basic 

philosophy wa. that Aerospace Corporation would continue to provide.' 

• YI"ems enllineerinll-tt!chnical dir~ction for the prolram. acting 

thrnuRh Colonel Heran's SAFSP office. and that SAFSP would retain 

fin.al responsibility for approvinll all silnificantchanles to cost. 

I" hedulinll. and contractual arranllements.) The relatively recent 

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complication of scheduling fii.ht operations so as neither to interfere 

with nor be adversely affected by the nuclear' test se~ie. beinll 

conducted in mid-Pacific was disposed of by agreement with Joint 

Task Force 8. Caution was advisable. 

l8 Final arrangements for return 

of recovered fUm caliaeUeli from Hawaii to the processing laboratory 

at Westover, Maasachullctb, were completed several days in advance 

of the actual laum:h--whu:h had slipped, by that time, to late AprU. 

Bec-ausc uf the IIr"ent"y of the mission, a C-1l5 jet transport was 

altltigned frum Malitary Air Transport Service resources to service 

the £-6 prn.:r;ulI requirements. The cargo was identified merely as 

twu boxes weillhJlllo: l70 pound II each plus a possible ·courier pall.enger. 

MATS was also advised, however, of a requirement to transport 

unidentified carJ.:u tu WashlD~tun, Wril1ht Field, St. Louis, and Oautt 

All' Furce Baae frurn Westuver during the several days following the.' 

lq amlla.! dehvery to that ball'" •. 

Such admanastrath"e matters were arranged with relative 

. dupalch. The !lame t"ir,"unultances did not characterize pre-launch 

,·ffurb anvuh .. in~ the lint E-b vehicle. Apart from the late delivery 

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of the payload vehici~ and it. incomplete atate of preparation UpOD 

rogram difficulties at this atale exteDded iDto pad and acceptance. P 

. 1 aelinesa 1n General Greer'. underatatement. "The lOl vehlC e re • 

~rogram rE-6] had a lot of problema in getting the firat night item 

in a condition for launch." \Electromalneuc interference wall on(' 

of the most notable. but it did not atand alone. A succession 01 

equipment problema combined to delay flight r.adinesa from the 

"revised" goal of Zl March to an actual launch date of z6 April. 30 

In retrospect it was apparent that the sUppage repreaented a day-for-day 

t!quivalent of the delay in aC:Ceptance of the General Electric vehicle. 

Even without allowances luI' the fact that the vehicle. when delivered. 

did not satisfy orillina! readiness requirements. the time between 

delivery and launc h was les. than had originally been allowed. The 

launch came almost precisely 16 months after .election 01 the contractors. 

It represented a very considerable achievement. 

At 10S6 hours (local time) on Z6 April 196Z. the Atlas-Allena 

carryin~ E-6 number one climbed away from ita launch pad. leaned 

tuward the south. and vanashed from the 81ght of o!)serverll at 

Vandenberg. At the proper time the Agena separated. the booater 

{ell •• way. and the proJlrammed injection into orbit began. Propulaion 

and ~uidance proved excellent. The orbit_ waa near perfect; no 

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adjustment was necessary. Telemetry sianaled a pos8ible failure 

of the camera wind~w shields to open, and there _s a clear indication' 

of excessive use of control gas to maintain proper vehicle attitude, 

but it appeared that at least one of the cameras had operated as planned 

throughout the mission. The other of the camera pair showed no sign 

ollunctioning after orbit number seven. Durinl the attitude adjust 

maneuver immediately before de-boost. however. the plume of the 

ullage rocket impinlled on the Alena's rocket exhaust nozzle and 

caused an unprogrammed pitch up. and the vehicle failed to enter 

through the proper "window." It could not be recovered. 31 

Immediate technical chanaes reSulting irom first fliaht experienee were limited. Lockheed relocated the solid u1lage rockets to 

minimize the pOlililbUity of a repetition of the "impinaement" incident, 

and Kodak strent:th~ned the film transport assembly to prevent recur32 

rene-tO of the camera system failure--traced to that item. 

Althoullh the chantlea to vehicle number two were not major, 

lhc~' e-omblned with other circumstances, including crowded launch 

!ltand schedules. to dela)" the second nilbt. It finally occurred on 

Ii June, two days later than the revised forecast. Alain the launch 

.,nd (u'bit placement phas.s were "near nominal" and the photoaraphic 

subllystem functioned adequately. but premature exhaustion of attitude 

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control gas forced a caU-d0!'ll attempt duriag orbit 10 rather than . ' 

durini orbit 18, as originally planned. Again the de-b~ost phase 

was ineffective. The attitude control ayatem of the Agena malfunctioned, a power fallure prevented separation of the reentry vehicle 

from the Alena, and they re-entered as a unit. Because of that 

drcumstance the deceleration parachute did not deploy and the: sate1-

litl: completed a free-fall trajectory, impactinl about 750 nautical 

miles further down ranle (north) than planned. The hard impact 

ruptured the recoyery capsule, which aank before ships or planes 

could locate it. AKena telemetry had not been programmed to operate 

durinil dc-booSI, su thl! preCise sequence of key events could not be 

established and there was some uncertainty about the exact cause of 

the failures. 

CorrectiYe measures included the incorporation of redundant 

("11'(' uitry in thc de-boost phase, rewiring and physical shieldinl of 

c rillcal clements (it appeared possi~le that shrapnel-like fragments 

frum one of the explosive squibs ma,ht have disabled the aeparation 

pru~ rammer), and reproJ(ramminl& to insure telemetry reception 

H durlnto: dlo- buoBt. 

The third trial. on IH July 196~, produced another excellent 

urbllo A succession uf difflculties of varyan, magnitude plalued the 

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vehicle thereafter. The 5-banc:l beacon operated with mar~inal 

effectiveness throughout most of the mis.ion and fail~d completely. 

during orbit 18. The forward (main) camera failed to advance after 

the 10th orbit. the film cutter refused to function. and on revolution 

18. durin~ de-buost. the AlEcna secondary propulsion system allain 

refused to ignite. Without ullaae. the main engine would not fire, 

so no de-boost increment was avaUable for the reentry operation. 

A~ain there was no recovery. 

Chanlles .. ntroduced as a result of the third failure of the 

recovery system included redesilning circuits to isolate the secondary 

propulsion sy.tern from the solid uUaae rockets and improving the 

34 .,re-fli~ht insl,ection of the' circuitry. With these changes. trial 

number four bl·~ •• n un ~ August 196Z. 

In what had hy that time become an estabUshed pattern. the 

l'lunch _md inJectiun operations resulted in an orbit within twu percent 

III "perfect." Nu orbit _,djullt was needed. On-orbit telemetry was 

quite satisfactory. althou~h some 5-band peculiarities were noted In· . 

rt"tro.pe:C"t. (Thl'Y caused a minor error in prediction of the implct 

puint.) SteennJ: t:a. con .. umptlon was normal and tbe command system 

pcr{urmcd with de:.irablc cUidency. The camera payload. unhappily. 

dry~loped some defects. Telemetry returns showed the main camera 

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to be "o~ratingll through pass number seven, but the ·fUm transport 

remained ~on-fu~ctional th,n,ughout the entire mi .. ion. The rear 

camera operated through revolution number six, after which both 

the transport and the read-in elements failed. However, there was 

a clear indication that at least 1500 feet of fUm had been prop~rl)' 

exposed. 

During the reentry and recovery phase, disabling defects 

again appeared. Individual incidents of the de-boost sequence came 

in proper order. but the Allena imparted only 1450 feet-per-second 

d~boost velocity instead of the programmed 1600 feet-per-second. 

Nevertheless, the reentry sequence . continued as scheduled until the 

vehicle emerged from the lon-sheath blackout. One second later, 

primary tcl.:metrv failed. Although telemetry signals briufly resumed 

after il lapse of 16 seconds. there was no indication of parachute 

operatiun .and recovery aircraft in the impact zone were unable to 

secure a clear bearing on intermittent beacon signals which persisted 

over the next 40 minutes. 8uth electronic and visual search continued .. 

fur four hours after presumed impact. but there was no siahting. A 

heliC"upter search uver the n~xt 24 hours produced nothi .. more tanaible. 

Analysis of the frftitmentary telemetry indicated that excessive 

heftlinK. principally in the aerodynamic wake of the reentry vehicle, 

had caused a faUure in the parachute deployment circuitry. Confident 

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that the naw wal not in the vehicle delian and that it could be remedied. 

General Electric thickened the thermal coating arou'nd the baUa8t tank I 

of number five vehicle. c hanged the composition of the primary thttrmal 

coatina at the 'aft bulkhead. and increased the amount of inlulation in 

other suspect locations. Althouah the telemetry failure had prevented 

the acquisition of detaUed heat data for the blackout period. ther~ was 

J,teneral agreument between SAFSP program office members. Aerospace 

Corporation enaineerl. and General Electric IS lpecialilU that the 

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additional insulation would prove adequate. 

The relatively rapid luccellion of flight teltl--and milsion 

failurea--had not proceeded in a management vacuum. nor had work 

un improvement of the central £-6 configuration cealed. In the area 

u{ a sYltem improvement. two iteml were of particular interelt durinlt 

the montha between April and October 1962. One waa improved 

retrieval. either water-to-air or air catchea. The aecond waa the 

addition of an andexina Camt"ra which would more adequately pinpoint 

the location 01 Ihel pholoaraphed by the Itereo cameral. 

The index camera consideration began with a directive from 

Und~uecretary Charyk tu pro,,·ide a combination terrain framina 

and .tellar-indexina camera "al loon aa pOlsible. It (Corona experienre 

wa. the real JUltilication.' Charyk reconfirmed the requirement early 

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in May 196Z. After carefully examining production and procurement 

time factors, Colonel Heran on 18 September adviaed the undersfotcretary 

that the indexing system t'ou1d ~ incorporated in the tenth and subaequfotnt E-6 vehicles. Two days later, Cieneral Cireer 'validated the 

schedule and diructed that the effort continue even though uthe~ improvement propolala of the time were beinJ deleted as unneceaaary.36 

The proposal for either air catch of the delcending I'eentr)' 

vehide or lea-to-air retrieval of the Goating payload wal, in one 

tH.'ns('. a revival of the original option of AURust 1960. deleted from 

the pru~ram in F,obruary 19&1, A means of water-to-air recovery 

oCfered 80me proApeC"l of uvercoming the leveral objections to air 

catch; it need not be 10 prompt. it need not be limited to one or two 

pa.~es at a des. ,-ndln.: ubjeC't but could if necesaary be continued 

uver a period of huurll. it wall preswnably a 80mewhat Ie •• delicate 

maneuver, and it ("ould take advantag.- of frogman teams dropped 

lnt" the ocean to rl": the recover)' vehicle for pick up. 

The first tellts of the riICRintz-for-retrieval proceas, conducted 

un /.; March 19&1.. w .. ore thoroutfhl)' unsuccesdul. Forty minutes of 

effurt to slip a harness aruund a fioatintt dummy recovery vehicle 

tOnded In ,·onlplete frulltrallon. NubodV had allowed for shrinkage of 

the.' ,·uUon IIleeves around the nylon neUing. A .econd trial, uling a 

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modified harness, saw frogmen encase the vehicle in about eilht and 

one-half minutes--but 10 people' spent the next 45 '~inuies attempting 

to in1late the balloon which was supposed to carry the extended tow 

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ing aircraft could engag~ it. Once the balloon was inflated, and before 

it had lost all iu helium, the pick-up aircraft made a pass at the 

assembly--and punctured the balloon. A second pass by the JC-130 

at a new balloon and line was successful, the recovery vehicle .tarted 

to lUt from the water, and the tow line loop broke! 

Although the succes.ion of dWiculties involvinl the harness, 

the tow line. the balloons. and the winch in the JC-130 frustrated 

hopes for immediate success, the experimenters were not discouraled. 

Earlier trials had shown that noatinl objects comparable in size to the 

E-b recovery vehicle could be retrieved from the ocean by JC-130s. 

The question of the moment was whether two scuba divers (-ould attach 

the harness an a hil%h sea. innate a balloon, and keep the taw line 

f ., 'th h 37 rom comant: into contact Wi t e water. 

In June, the E-6 pro"ram office proposed a sUl'htly different 

water-ta-air t~chDlque involvin" the use of a b"oy attached by a line 

tu the rear of the recover)· vehacle. Another variant with potential 

was use of the descent parachute a. a "buoy" with the retrieval 

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aircraft hooking the line bet~een the parachute and the reC'overy 

vehicle~· . Because a;elai·ively lengthy test and development program 

was involved. and because the technique had more promise in theory 

than in practice. General Greer recommended deletion of the waterto-air recovery proJ:ram from the E-6 effort late in September lC)6Z. 

Fur the moment. however. General Electric was directed to continue 

III 

fl:a~ibilily tests. Lack of si~nificant progress caused fiDal cancella-

. 38 

liun of the waler-lu-air recovery efforts on lS October lc)6Z. 

While the: flitzht leStli continued. several chanaes to the pro~ram 

were approved which ,lave at the character of a long-term effort. 

Tht· uasi.c fliJiChl prollram had been buUt about the seven originally 

tlC"hedulcd lesh piuli lhe twu "uptiunal" trials (earlier treated as 

dia~nutltl(~ fli~hIS). In January lC)6l. funds were allocated to a follow-on 

proa.:ram and on .!7 March IC)bl contractors were advised tbat the ninevchlde pruttram ha~ been expanded to lb vehicles. Letter contracts 

WIlh Gt'ncral Electl'ir- and Ealilman Kodak had been signed and distributed 

AI' defuu:d in July lqbZ. lhe objective uf tbe water-to-air recovery 

prua.:ram wall to cstabhllh lhe feasibility of brinllinll a towed recovery 

H·hu h· ll1to a JC-llO. and tu incorporate the technique in the tenth 

;tlld slIbllC.·qut'nl E-b'!i. Sunphcity. ease of operational employment. 

;, "Ulllmu", uf vehlC'lt' and ;urcraft modifications. and few requirements 

fur addlhondl or .pedal equipment Were prime con.iderations. General 

Lit·,· tru.. aCllnJiC under an addition to the follow-on vehicle contract, was 

to , ol1t·(·t .tnd analyzt· alrr-raft flitCht data and wind tunnel information on 

rt·n'\t·r~· \·,-·hach.· p~'rfurrnalU ,. (wht!n towed) by early.Aullust and was to 

h.t\· .. a full-.cah· tt-.t prulEram underway by IS October. 

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by the end of that month. Because of the fact that the ori.inal nine 

vehicles were well along in fabrication 'by that titne. thanges and 

improvements in the configuration of the E-6 satellite were generally 

scheduled for the tenth and subsequent vehicles--unless, of course. 

they involved modifications necessary to the success of the early 

flight program. The index camera. air and water recovery. a back-up 

stabilization system, and the expanaion of telemetry·in the Agena 

vehicle (as opposed to the reentry vehicle) fell into the "long term" 

category. In the course of a major program review in September 196Z. 

Charyk and Creer approved the addition· of a secondary command 

system to the sixth and later vehicles plus deletion of the secondary 

propulsion system in the tenth and later vehicles (the precision of 

orbit injection during the first four fiights had made orbit adjust 

requirements redundant). The inclusion of "back-up" attitude control 

and engine sequencing provisions in nwnber IZ and subsequent vehicles 

39 

remained under ('onsideration. 

The first objective of the E-6 program. to demonstrate that 

the .ystem could operate efficiently. still was unsatisfied.. A succes.-

lui mi.sion wa. e •• ential. In the longer view. the remainina vehicles 

an the original batch of nine were intencled to demonstrate system 

performance, provide data that would permit refinement of the basic 

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equipment~ and define the operationallimitationl of the.'vehicle-camera 

combination~oniy' with the .. enth vehicle would intelligence collection. 

become the principal million objective. A. had generally been true 

since inception of the E-6 effort durina the lummer of 1960, the 

policy of the pr0itram office was to make configuration changes only 

when they promised to improve the vehicle or its product--or, of 

course, to correct defecta ell.covered durin I the test program. 

40 

"No friUs" was a hard and fa.t rule. 

Thu. far there had been only four lilnificant deviations from 

the payload design conception. approved at the time of so ... rce selection. 

in November-December 19bO. The len. desiln had been changed. from 

one involving folded otltics and a neal' vertical orientation to one based 

un it hurizontal urlentation and unfolded optic. when it was demonltrated 

that the dual USe uf the mirror in a folded-optics .ystem was risky. 

WlDduw shades had been Rdded to reduce power requirements by 

pruviding a hitther degree of thermal control, the film cutter and seal 

had been made a sin,de rather than a double unit (levering and Ihield~na' 

buth film Iltrips with <it .,:reater as.urance of reliability in operation), 

and the total of availablt!> imatZe motion compenlation lpeede had been 

inc-reased from 10 to IS in urder to reduce the potential for motion 

blur on the proce.sed film. 

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The reentry vehicle had been altered ,somewhat in the C'OUUe 

of development. but again not radically. 'The origin&l schem~ of 

building in three structure sections had given way to a four-section 

design. spin springs and a shaped charge had been added to improv~ 

separation characterisbeli. a multi-element thermal shit.'ld had been 

substituted for the orillinal single-material type. the structure had 

been lightened. land rcC'oyer\' provisions had been deleted. and the 

destruct system had bt!en removed. Some relatively minor additions 

had been made to th.: tracking. command. and telemetry installations--

but as much because o{ Gambit requirements as because of E-6 needs, 

As compared to other !lystems. in terms of desilln and configuration 

41 

c'hanMes the E-6 had b~en remarkably stable. 

The secure futurt.· of the proRram became somewhat less certain 

iulluwin.,: the {a,llln' of 11"" fourth ted vehicle (S August). On Zl August. 

Cndcrsecretary Charylc. t"ld Cien.:ral Cireer that ''high government 

"Hie lah" Were ""'onC'ern('d about the four consecutive failures" and 

aslc.ed {or an explanation and a summary of proposed corrective actions. 

Charyk also asked Greer tu examine the po .. ibility of adaptinA the E-6 

IM\'luadli to a thru.t-a".,:nu .. nt~d-Thor (TAT) launch vehicle and a 

l)uH'uverer (Coruna) r.:«:uver\' capsule. The underseC'retary indicated 

thotl h .. • Lntended tu mOl.,," Ioev,'r •• l major program decisions within a week. 

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The response "from the Los Anlele. complex was not such as 

to encourale hope for an c:a.y or inexpensive adaptatiob of the E-6 

payload to what would essentially be a Corona configuration. Colonel 

Heran emphasised that the launch and orbital performance of the E-6 

system were "quite impressive in several respecta." The cummand 

subsystem and the payload stabUi.ation provisions had also operated 

with a bi~h degree of efficiency. On that basis, the sUllestion of 

shifting tu a TAT launch vehicle seemed unjustified. 

Heran also pointed out that use of TAT would force ''almost 

complete redesiln and packallina" of the E-6 system, would reduce 

th.: quantity of film by at least one-half, and would essentially constitullO a new proRram with all the complications inherent in such a 

procedur.:. It. "o''':ct would be to substitute a new launch system for 

one which had worked quite well. 

Colonel Heran was convinced that de-boost. problems which 

had marked the firat three fhllhts had been eliminated. The recovery 

II ystem. he noted. had been Iliven only one chance to operat.e. He 

relt that the E-6 was much clo.er to fruition than any alternate that 

4l l uuld b.: readily pruvidl"d. 

In Charyk'. view. the real objective of the t.est program was 

to c reate confidence: In Itystem reliability and adequacy. The establisheel 

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schedule was not sacred, he told General Greer, and "in no case will 

" " any launch be conducted unleu ihe results of prevlous ~i. sion. hav~ 

been thoroughly studied and the necessary measures ••• taken to 

43 . prevent a recurrence of any non-nominal performance. " 

On 18 September 196Z, Cieneral Cireer'. group conducted a 

complete program review for the undersecretary. Cancellation of 

the follow-on pro~ram was by then being actively considered, so the 

summary inc.luded a resume of work status, prospective contract 

cosU, and the comparative ("osts of a 9-vehicle as against a 17-vehicle 

folluw-on protzram. The 9-vehicle effort would 

tu complete, the 17-vchic1e .,..,n .. ' ........ 

all cnthulliastk about the options, Cireer'. people agreed that alternate 

systems to cont.un the E·6 payload were feasible in the event of E-6 

pruJ:ram c"anccllatiun. Amont: the potential options was usc of an 

enlart:ed Discoverer cap.ule ("BiR D") with an Atlas-Agena launch 

l'umblnallun; th." usc of a Thor ~ .. ith solid-rocket boosters (TAT) to 

urbit the current payload and recovery vehicles; and the use of TAr. 

with the "Blt: 0" recuvery vehlcle and the existent E-6 payload section. 

The alternative o{usin~ a mudified E-S reentry vehicle and a ribbon 

parachute (to permit sUJn:uunic deployment) abo seemed feasible, 

lf nul particularl)" allrachvc. In the eyes of the E-6 program oUice, 

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none· of the alternative. wao•• preferable to cORtinulna the current effort. 44 

The future bf the follow-on program stID remained uncertain for 

another two weeks although stop-work orders had earlier been is.ued 

to the principal contracturs. The final decision came on 3 October 196Z. 

with Charyk's order that wurk on all vehicles additional tu thtO nine 

originally programmed be halted. Tbe undersecretary had decided 

to withhold action on further vebicles pending "complete resolution· of 

project difficulties and demunstration of actual performance of sufficient 

quality to justify further procurement. • • ." He felt that the remaining 

flight tests might lead to silnificant redesign and modification. 

Charyk further directed tbat three of tbe remainin~ five payloads 

be scheduled for fli.ght in accordance with a philosophy of taking all the 

time necessary tu insure a "maximum probability of suCCeSs" and with 

intervals between the !light. sufficient to permit complete analysis of 

all data from the previuus fHahts and the incorporation of necessary 

chan~es. The final two payloads (the "diagnostic" items. as uriginally 

scheduled) and payload vehi.cles were to be stored for possible future.· 

Ulit:. and the Atlas-ARena combination. were· to be made available to 

uther prollrams. 

In effect. Undersecretary Charyk thus limited the scope of 

the E-b program to the three remaininl flights on the original schedule • 

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From a program (Alice viewpoint, the qualification that a successful

flight might change such arrangementi was the only entirely hopeful

note contained in his instructions.45 

1

On 4 October, General Greer notified General Electric,

Eastman Kodak, Lockheed, and the Space Systems Division of Charyk's

decision. He cautioned each to say no more to the press than that the

cutback represented a work phase termination and a contractual

adjustment in accordance with the "continuing process of review" of

all Air Force space programs. 46 But even though three more E-6

flights were still scheduled, cancellation of the follow-on procurement

had implications for the total reconnaissance effort considerably more

serious than was at first apparent.

Because of the highly effective security screen erected around

the Samos program in December 1960, virtually no information on the

success or failure of individual flights or total programs had been

available even to the "cleared" members of the Air Force for nearly

two Years. During that period, considerable quantitites of reconnais.-;

sance film obtained from Corona overflights of Soviet territory had

been processed and forwarded to operating commands. A major overhaul of United States strategic warfare policy had in part been based

' al information drawn from such sources. Able to number and locate

454 5111 17017-74

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!'apSECRn 

From a program affice viewpoint, the qualification that a successful 

flight might change such arrangement.' was the 'only .'ntirely hopeful 

, d' h" . 45 note contalne in 11 instructions. 

On 4 October, General Greer notified General Electric. 

Eastman Kodak, Lockheed, and the Space Systems Divisiun of Char)'k's 

decision. He cautioned each to say no more to the press than that the 

cutback represented a work phase termination and a contractual 

adjustment in accurdance with the "continuing process of review" uf 

46 

all Air Force space pro~rams. But even though three more' E-6 

fliJthts were .till achvduled. cancellation of the follow-on procurement 

hild implications for th4: total reconnaissance effort considerably more 

aerioull than ~aa at first .lpparent. 

Brcau»~ of the hi.,:hly effective security screen erecied around 

the Samo. pruJ,:ram in December IqbO, virtually no information on the 

8uccess or failure of individual .Qillhts or total programs had been 

a"ailable eVen to the "cleared" members of the Air Force for nearly 

two Years. Durinlt that period, considerable quantitites of reconnais . .; 

lIauet.' filn. obtained from Corona overflights of Soviet territory had 

been proc-cs.ed and fnrv.'arded to operating commands. A major overhaul of United States strateJ(ic warfare policy had in part been based 

.. n information drawn frum such sources. Able to num~r and locate 

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Soviet missUe bases, the nation was no lonler clepeNlent on a massive 

retaliation policy' openly'clL'l'ected at eradication of Russian cities and 

"known" mUitary stations. Relatively few people were awart: of the 

Corona program and its auccea a. The implication that some unspecified 

quant.ity of the "take" had been obtained from "Samo's" flillhts walt 

presunt. in virtually any "unwi.tting" estimate of the known aituation. 

The £-5 effort had ended in termination by January 1962.. With 

tho! last. E-6 .flight, the known "cover" for both Corona and the still 

unt.ested Gambit wuuld v'anish. Another casualty of £-6 program terminat.lon would be the known justilication for the existence of Ceneral 

Grccr'ti or~anization--SAFSP; only those with access to the cover 

pru~rarns appr~ciatcd that the E-6 effort was but a minor part of a 

rua.!ur activity tll"in~ mana~ud from the fourth floor suite of offices 

111 the "SSD cumplex" alontt El Seltundo Boulevard in Los Angl·lu •• 

Corona program mana~ers were particularly concerncd that 

;,n".,unCl·d canccllatiun ur E-6 might expose the Corona effort.. Other 

SAFSP st.aff officers could rt:ahstically harbor fears that Some detaU," 

uf ntht:r cuvurt prottram» ml~ht Ooat to the surface once £-6 no lonlter 

, ,.uid bt: used to explain SAFSPls existence. If the origin.ll objectives 

otf SAI-'SP c::itablishmunt wert: tu remain valid, E-6 cancellation 

t~hould It Cinally occur) had to be accompani.ed by new camouflage for 

BYE 1':01':.' • .. 55 

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the covert programs. a 10lical explanation for continuation ofSAFSP . . 

as a~ organization: and-.ideally:'.a new overt progra~ to cancel in 

case of a political decision to halt "open" support of satellite reconnaissance. One of the chief reasons for continuing the E-6 in its 

original form had been to permit its public cancellation. and the 

clandestine continuation of other satellite reconnaissance activity, 

should international event •• 0 dictate. 47 

Thus quite apart from considerations of technology, the launch 

of the fifth E-6 vehicle promised to be of considerable significance. 

By late September. tbat vehicle had been prepared for its 

(1i~ht. Intensive.' A"cna-ruentry vehicle separation tests had been 

·completed, heat-effect test. were continuinl. the recovery subsystem 

tellt prucedure. had been exhaustively reviewed and chanled. and the 

,,"chic le had been subjected to a substantial number of retrofit and 

mndific ation actions. The additional insulation around aft bulkheads 

and near the ballast tanks was in place. a number of critical switches 

had becn relocated. electrical cable had been rerouted around heat- . 

•• :oei.tive &unes, the cover for the parachute cavity had bee~ recoated 

with an impruved 1nsulator, the beacon and flasher assemblies had 

been IItrenllthened and reineulaled, a special baUle had been added 

forward of the main vent valve, and the entire reentry vehicle bad 

456 

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buen delicately weighted and balla.ted to minimise any sidu effucts 

of inurtial imbalance. Representative. of General Electric, Luckheed, 

Aerospace Corporation, and the program office made a fLnal appearance 

before Oeneral Oreer to assure him again that they had a very high 

f Od 0 h h f 0 0 48 L h de~rec uf con, cnce 1ft t t.> (" ances 0 m"s,on success. aunt" 

occurrud un 11 November 19&1. 

It was the wronf,t se.uon for optimism. System operation to 

the point of reentry wall in many respects even better than during any 

uf the earlier mis.ions. Llft-off and orbit injection aRain resulted in 

establishment of a near-p.:rfect ephemeri. (UZ-lZ8 nautical mile., 

MH.7l minutes perwd). Tht" unly possible malfunction. sUBgested by 

tt!icmctry but uncunfirrnable. wall failure of hatch removal. The command 

!iystum functioned wlthuut dlsorder and the photographic subsystem transpurtt."d 3400 fcC!t (If l"xpused him. O .. ·-boost sequencinR was ncar purfect, 

and the reentry vehicle: apP'=ared to be performing without any error 

until it entered the blackout zone. Theruafter, events roujlhly parallelud 

those tlf ai~ht four 0 The rc was some indic ation of parachute depluyment, 

d .. orn°,-·d principally frum tclC!mC!try indications that descent had lasted 

lun~cr than wuuld have: ~en the ("as. with a free-falling reentry body, 

and a.,:alll une air~raft rupurted 1& nunutes of indistinct beacon silenal 

ree. eptlon iullowln.: tnapact. But none of the search craft sighted the 

\·ehu·le. nu further sit:nal. were reported. and at dark on' the evenina 

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of lZ November the search ended. (Some surface skips cruis.d the 

, . area the 'next 'day, but w\th little hope.) The fact that a recording . 

station heard both SOFAR bombs detonate indicated to recovery team 

personnel that the vehicle had broken up on impact or SUNt shortly 

49 

thereafter. 

Evaluation of the re.ntry proc .... indicated that erratk aerodynamic heating elfeets which had marked reentry of the fourth vehide 

had been responsible for the fate of the fifth. Althoulh telemetry 

reception waH not greatly improved over the August teat, some additional 

data emerlled which indicated that the ablative sheathing had burned 

.... . away well forward of the vehicle l • after structure and that some of 

what had earlier been characterized aa "wake effect" probably had 

actually been (·au.ed by aerodynamic lasses pasaina completely throulh 

the vehicle from an openinll (or openings) burned throulh the C'onical 

forward structure. General Electric's specialisu in reentry aerodynamiC's offered no aasuranCe that they could correct the difficulty 

fur tht.' next fiit:ht. and the mood of the .everal cOntractor and E-6 " 

pru~ral11 offic~ representativea who reviewed the programl • proapects 

SO folr General Greer was not ("heerful. 

Nut until January ICJ63 dad the Aero.pace Corporation complete 

.t re16ume of £·6 program di.fficulties and aUlgeat measurea to overcome 

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faults discovered as a reaul~ of number five flilht •. Enlineers concluded, on the basis ~f telemetry which had :been obtai~ed from'the 

fifth fiilbt but wbich because of proaramming imperfections had not 

been acquired fortbe fourth, that the addition of .05 inches of 

ablative material to the main heat shield, the elimination of most 

ablation inserts in the main shield, and the revision of attachment 

fittin~s for the main parachute hatch cover would correct the known 

defects of reentry. A. additional meaaures, they recommended 

revising the vent cbannels in the vehicle to prevent flow .. through of 

leaking Ila •• e., thermal coatinl all components and cablinl required 

for post-entry operation, and relocatina some systems-monitoring 

mstrumentation tu provide puaitive verification of system operation 

after reentry. The Aerospace aroup aUlaested that it would be 

pilaU ible to demon. trate the I oundne a I of the revised vehicle by 

firmt: it--witbout the camera payload--:-atop either an Atlal or a ThorA~ena boolter. (General Electric estimated that it would 

lu refurbiah a reentry vehicle, to fabricate the nece.sary adapter, and·· 

51 

tu provide test lupport for the vehicle. 

Fur nearly a munth the resulta of the fifth fliMht and the. prospects 

of the remaining two were carefully weillhed against cost consideratlons 

and the prospect that Corona-Mural cameras could return intelligence 

459 

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data equivalent in value to any the E-6 could provide. The political 

and economic consequences of complete E-6 cancellation were 

similarly evaluated. In the scale alain.t the chances of the E-6, 

apart from competition provided by Corona. was the timing of the 

crisis. Coming as it did midway throulh the fi.cal year, when risin~ 

costs and earlier undere.timations in other prolramswere causinR a 

search for additional fund-, the E-6 repre.ented an appealing target 

for fiscal economy. On the other hand. experience indicated that 

relatively liUh." would actually be returned to the lovernment if the 

program were cancelled at that point. The vehicle. were available 

(and paid for), and launch and tracking co.t. would be but slillh1.ly 

aUcdcd by cann:llahun. (Since launch and tracking .tation eXP'tnses 

wert" continuint' ill nature they could be considered a. running overhead 

costli.) Mureuvc:r, the payload had shown every indication oC usefulness. Inasmuch as all earlier calculations of system resolution in 

the Curona prugram had proved tu be conservative when measured 

;.~ain.t actual "take. " there was a strong po .. sibility that E-6 pl'oduct .. 

miJothl be substantially brtler than Corona products. If that proved 

true. E-& would provide a desirable intermediate betw4utn the optimum 

13-f\lol resolution of Curuna-Mural (although perhaps half of the 

Curuna-Mural results shuwed resolution on the order of 30 feet) and 

0160 

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.. UP IlieaE. 

the predi~ted five-foot resolution of Gambit. 

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Thez:e was some feeling 

ibat E-6 eith~r s"h;'uld hav~ 'been cancelled much earliek',' when the 

possible overlap with Coruna-Mural first became apparent, or should 

not be cancelled before completion of the two remaining test nisht. 

and a compari.on of anticipated with actual intelligence rdurns. 

A factor in the consideration. wa. the conviction of .orne 

Department of Defense and CIA official. that the E-6 was of dubioull 

worth. that Corona-Mural would do as much without the additional 

c:ost of an E-6 pr0tlram. and that the greater cost of Atla •• AKena 

launches over Thor- or TAT-A,.na would validate a canc.llation 

53 

decision. 

In any event. un 11 December 1962. Air Force Under •• er.tary 

Charyk advised G,·neral GrL'er of his deci.ion to terminate the E-6 

proJtram immedIately. All remaining payloads and payload vehicles 

were ordered into storage. Gr.er was ttiv.n discr.tion in p.rmitting 

cumpletion of items then well alon~ in fabrication and the a •• embly of 

54 

reports and te.t data anahse. thun in progr •••• 

Simultaneously. Charvk asked Greer to look again into the 

fealilbility and deurabihty of urbiting an E-6 camera payload in a 

Thur-AJCena vehicle (usin" the Corona r.covery .y.tem) to obtain 

lnfurmat'lun on the value of the camera syst.m alone. Pr.cis.ly.uch 

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a course had been followed upon cancellation of the E-5, resultinc in 

the "stUI unproven' Lanyard system. The opiion of sending only one of 

the stereo cameras into orbit and of limiting the quantity of exposed 

film made the project seem somewhat less difficult than the earlier 

suggestion of boosting an entire E-6 payload into orbit with a Thor 

or TAT. Charyk's notion was that if the project seemed feasible. it 

should be preaented aa a new prolram. independent of the oriJlinal 

E-6 except in employing available .aaets of the defunct prolram. On 

the basis of the pos aible adoption of such an approach. SAFSP received 

authorization to retain Eastman Kodak. support and to continue payload 

work pending a final rulinJl on the prospects of an E-6-Thor-Aaena 

cumbination. (An addiuonal. but unmentionable. justification was the 

need to continue Eastman effort8 in support of the Gambit - oriented 

SS 

work at Vandenb~rg.) 

After exhaustively evaluating all the possibilities. Colonel 

Heranla office endoraed three fe~aible approaches to a reviaed E-6 

prollram. The fiut involved an Atlaa-Alena boost combination. a 

madsection adapter to take the E-6 payload (minus one camera). and 

.it reentry stale conslstin~ e.senUally of a Corona no.e capsule. 

H,,·ran'. office a1.0 aUJlIl~.ted uaing a Strategic Air Command Atl •• 

adapt~d to carry the E-b reentry vehicle, thus permitting further teat. 

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of the vulnerability o(that component to aerodynamic heatinaeffects. 

The third option required use of a TAT -Agena. a new midsection. 

and a Discoverer reentry body. The Thor- or TAT-Agena combination 

afforded the prospect of covering most of the Soviet Union on its initial 

pas. and of being subject tu recovery on the second pass. aSliuminf: a 

nighttime reC'overy operation. In view of the first-pass reconnaissance, 

second-pas. recovery feature. it could afford "invulnerable reconnaissancc. II Simplicity, reliability, and the use of proven components 

(except the TAT. which had not yet flown) were obvious advantages. 

Using existing hardware. one E-6 camera. and the Corona reentry 

vehicle, a first Olt:ht was conceivable by April 1963. With a redesigned 

midllection. om.' camera, and the Corona reentry body. November 1963 

seemed a feaSible farst DiJlht date. (Either the Thor-Agena or. the TATA .:c:na would thc:ureticall y be usable by that time.) Adaptation of the 

Curona reentry "chicle to a one-camera confiRuration and the AtlasAjo!ena boollter ~muld permit farst Oil&ht by April 1963; introduction of 

il "dual-Discoverc:r" reentry vehicle configuration (like the later 

Curuna-J) wuuld r ... quire: a delay until August 1963 but would permit 

u.~ of both cameras. Converllion of the payload system to a narrower 

hlm With dual takeup in .. CurClna reentry body would delay the fiilht 

unl)' to June: 1963. 

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- SAFSP recommended immediate preparation for a one-camera 

test using the- Atlal-Alena and a Corona configuration reentry body.; a 

lest of the orilina! reentry body on a Stratelic Air Command Atlas. 

and the start of desiln work on a liaht-weiaht sinale-camera stalle. 

SAFSP also observed that a combination recovery-readout capacity 

could be developed from available E-6 and E-l or E-Z- hardware. with 

:l Iirst flight conceivable by November 1963. (Five E-l and three E-Z 

payloads were still in storalle and the necellary ground equipment was 

available.) S6 

For Z8 days there was no vel'dkt. Then. on 31 January 1963. 

Charyk formall)- nutlflt~d General Greer that all proposall for further 

urbit tests uf th ... £-6 payload had been disapproved. The undersecretary 

57 desired " no furth"r actiun in this reteard. II 

Becau.e of the lCerlt:ral character of SAFSP programs and their 

uniformly senlitiv ... nature. the third and fourth floor offices which 

huulled most of the Greer e.tablilhment were seldom treated to the 

~t.·n ... ral badinalCe characterilltlc of many proaram offices. Chatter. 

nmcerning the reconnal.»anCe pro.ram was infrequent. and wal 

),:t'r,crally confined to a few lndividuala who knew precisely what all 

their heteners had been deand for. And since the aeneral security 

rule· was 10 clear a. few flCupl ... as possible. and for al few iteml as 

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pO.lible, many of 1.he £-', program participants were aware of no 

other SAFSP programs--except thole pz:eViously cancelled--or at 

most knew of Gambit because of its earlieraUgnmen1. within the £-6 

office structure.' Few knew of Corona, and fewer still were aware 

that the cancelled E-5 had reappeared in a different form all Lanyard. 

But some knew. and knowing were tempted to quip, quietly 

and privately, that it was a wise man who knew his own payload, 

that E-& miSh!, have be.en can('elled, but it was equally possible that 

General Greer or Culonel Heran had found a way to stuff the E-6 

cameras into some1.hinlt else and weren't telling. 

At the duse: uf the q January presentations durinR whkh the 

several pOSSible mudellof flyin.: E-& payloads in new confiRura1.ions 

had been discu:rt:rtedi .Dr. Charyk. General Greer. and General J. 1.. 

Marlin retired til Greer'. uffice to conllider the options. They were 

\.·unvinced lbat it wuuld ~ uselells to schedule the two remaining 

payloadll for routine launch,n.: in their original modes since there 

Atill tieemed nu way of Jtethn.: reasonable a.surance that the recovery.' 

• Yllitem would work. But they were also convinced that the potential 

uf the: E-& optic" ilnd him transpurt sYlitem should be demonstra1.ed 

.lll.'{urc .. any lanal de('ililun tu abandon the enterprise. Aware of tht" 

~rUwlnl' disbelief an E-b adequacy at Dt-partment of Defenlfe level.,. 

BYE 1101':.':4 465 

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they concluded that the proper course was to devise an alternate 

approach which would produce the results they wanted quickly and 

cheaply. There was little hope of securing approval for a large-scale 

program. in any event. The pendulum of opinion had recently swunll 

toward relatively small research and development experiments as 

opposed to larller programs. The idea of proving a capability and 

then proceeding tu a full-scale program was generally in favor. And 

the considerations which had cau.ed effective cancellation of the 

full-scale £-6 effort still persisted: the E-6 recovery system seemed 

fatally uncertain; budget pressures required a major cutback in 

expensive proKrams~ and there was an influential. vocal group (chiefly 

wllhin the CIA dement of the National Reconnaissance Organization) 

WhiCh was cunn.u:ed that £-6 was redundant. that Corona-Mural or 

an improved Mural (~) wuuld serve the nation better than E-6. 58 

Charyk, Martin. and Greer brought no one else into their 

dchberations until the lallt day but one in January. Then. by telephone. 

General Greer summoned Colunel Heran, E-6 director. and Lieutenant 

Culunels Mark Farnum to his office. 

There he disdused a plan to use £-6 payloads in an experiment to 

d.-mun.trate 6-7-fuot r~sohillun from orbit. He told them Charyk had 

a.:reed to establish a n,,-w "bladc" program office with that mis.ion, 

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its first task being to prepare a work statement accePtable to Charyk. 

'Heran was to p~~pare the "atement. working with General Electric ' 

and Ea.tman Kodak in meetings that would begin the following morning 

(31 January). It was to be ready by S February. 

The program. General Greer continued. would use a 

system in its current incarnation). 

All wurk would be cunducted away from the SAFSP office complex. in 

a tiuite leased by Eastman Kodak on Manchester Avenue. a,long block 

north oC the main SSO buildin.s. (Among the wittin •• the obscure 

uf(u:e. were known as in honor of the resident 

Ea!Stman. employee. Air Force visitors were forludden to ):0 thert.· 111 uniform. were under orders to arrive and depart 

lun.:ly ur in pair •• and were nut permitted to park cars carrying Air 

Furce identity stickers in the immediate neighborhood.) 

The u.e of thru.t-autcmented Thor boosters was assumed. but 

rcmaimng to be decided were issue. of Agena B a. alainst ARena D. 

~hat ~uidance system to nile In the booster. the need for a new mid-

.... ·c\lon. how to procure the: reentry capsules ("buckets ") from the 

Corona proteram without dlllc1o.intc the scheme. a fundin. channel. 

and a "uver plan. The po.sibility of pretending that the payloads 

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required study. 

In advance of convening the meeting, Creer had composed a 

set of instructions for Charyk to send him. They paralleled the 

details he had given Hera and Farnum, t."mphasi.zinJ: 

the need for quick, inexpensive, and 8ure results. Toward the end 

oC tht.' messal!e as it camc back to Greer'. office was the injunction, 

"The approach should be Spartan in nature, a8 simple a8 p08sible, 

and should takc no cuns,deration of any future system applications. " 

FrUin that phrase came the name by which the program was thereafter 

~cncrally known: 60 ~ruject Spartan. 

In dillcus.lOnlJ with Eastman Kodak and Ceneral Electric 

r'-'presentativeli ttl\.' fuUuwlnJ{ day (11 January, the day of formal £-6 

cancellation), Culuncls Heran a outlined the general system 

parameters and defined the chief hard.ware prublems, as then foreseen. 

S,-,curll.", still a maller uf ~'onf'ninl: prollram discussions to the 

"rlt:lnal core of about 10 knuwledlleabl~ people, was made Inore 

ll.'rtain by the appointment uf Cnlonel Farnum as security control 

"fllcer and by the del"i"lun tu usc a "limited handling" system even 

l1lure st."("urc than th,' "~Pt'( 1.,1 handlinJ!" in effect for Gambit. AlthouJZh 

tht" Spartan desiRnator was Rcnerally used throullhout the period of 

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prollram consideration, more formal nomenclatur.e wa. a •• ianed on 

61 

Z February: SP-AS-63, for Special Pk'oject-Advanct!d Study 1963. 

By Z February the outline. of the proposed "experiment" had 

taken shape, and by late afternoon of 4 February they had been tran.- • 

. formed into a wurk stateme nt. Cienerally. two desian approaches 

were to be considered. In one, early launch was the objective, and 

the technique wuuld be tu ("uuple a sinale E-6 camera and the original 

E-6 midsection to an A-4:; (Corona-type) reentry vehicle and a 

Faarchild pr0tlrammer-tlmer. For the other, a redesigned micl.ection 

inteRral with an enlarlled reentry capsule capacity was to ~ con. ide red. 

Eather a scaled-up A-of" ur A-4Ss in tandem were feasible option •• 

The payload would be une ,-0 am," "a with an adapter to provide stereo 

phutut:raphy. \\:"1') muc:h hke Lanyard in concept. The objective of 

the eCCort. under eIther option, was also to include hardware procuremt.'nt ilnd fabracatiun suffu-wnt to protect a June 1963 initial launch 

o 6Z 

dOlle. wath stereu capacny by November 1963. 

The fir.t majur ubatade appeared at about the same time. On° 

:; .·\.obruary, Dr. Charyk h .. d Laeutenant Colonel Jack Side. brief CIA 'Ii 

Or 0 HtOrbert Scoville. wh" WiU deputy director of the National ReconlI.u .... nce OUi('e. un the bitck"ruund ofothe proposed experiment. 

S, U\·lll,o wa. deeply liuspicauu!t uf the whole pruceeding. He refu.ed 

an: n017.74 

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to accept al valid the Itatement of primary purpole: . to let learchtype photOlraphii at 6. S.;foot relolution for evaluation. He iDlilted . 

that the Lanyard aYltem wal quite lood enou,h. even thoulh only 

providiDI apot coverale. and in a rather lenathy dilcussion made it 

apparent that he thought the propoled experiment to be the prelude 

to a new system development. He denied that the E-6 camera coUld 

produce 6. S-foot relolution. even with Itereo. and in Sides' opinion 

left the meeting with the confirmed imprellion that focallenJth wal 

the only critical factor. Holdinl to the view "that lomebody was 

playing fait and loole with the fllurel. " Scoville would not concede 

that an improved lenlt-filtn definition (from 78 to 110 linel per millimeter) and a deereale in .atellite altitude (from IZS to 100 nautical 

miles) could contribute to siRnificantly improved re.olution. It was 

the ttcn.sral opinion of tho.e Charyk people present at the briefing 

that Scoville would firmly resil' approval of the Spartan experiment 

"at th.s pOllible expen.e of the prolram he conlidered to be hil"--

the "improved Mural". !!!:!: 6) 

Althoulh the Scoville reaction could have been entirely lpontaneoul. there wa. a Ireater po •• ibllity that it repre.ented yet 

another flare-up in the increalinRly acrimonioul relationahip. Since 

410 

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the October 1962 Cuban crisis and Charyk's succe .. in tranaferrina 

a larae share of U-2 operations from CIA to the Strateiic Air Command. 

he and SeovUle had often been at odds. Tension arisina in disagreement 

about a proposed revision to the NRO charter added to the problem. 

During part of the October-December 1962 period, both their personal 

and their official relationships were severely strained. The late. 

January announcement that Charyk proposed to retire from his Air 

Force post to head a commercial communication sateillte development 

did little to ease the tension. It was clear that insofar as Scoville 

spoke for the CIA. Spartan would receive little support from that 

64 

element of the NRO. 

Notwithstandinll Scoville'. ne,ative reaction to the Spartan 

proposal, work at the Los An.eles office continued apace. The 

urijoCinal cost estimate presupposed WOllua be 

required to fund Eastman and General Electric studies (and lo~g 

lead-time procurement) WIth a total required 

1n ',,11 of fiscal 1963. Project personnel estimated that four launches, 

19&3, could be conducted for a total program cost of 

Cover for the effort was to be supposed SAFSP participation 

in development of a reconnaissance system 

(That story was for most of the traditionally suspicious SAFSP 

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assignees; non-SP people woUld be told only that the effort was one 

more in"th~ dir~ctorate'.gl=neral "no details" assignment.) 

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Then on 12 February Dr. Charyk disapproved the Sparta~ 

proposal .s "not justifiable for the purpose of 'deterrmnini the increa.e 

in intellilence content obtainable from 6-7-foot Iround resolution ... 

The tenor of his statement· and the sUllestion that the objective could 

be met sooner, and at less cost, throuKh other National Reconnais.ance 

Program efforts, clearly indicated that the reason for the disapproval 

lay in Scoville'l objecti~na. ScovWe, with the support of the CIA 

element of the National Reconnaiasance OHice. waa thoroulhly committed to the "~" approach--a Mural-type system embodying a new 

camera deailned for 6-8-foot rttsolution (baaed on an improvttd 39.3-

inch lens Itek had delilned). 

Although the oriRinal .cheme apparently disappeared in the 

face of auch new direction, the aubstance was misleading. Both Creer 

and Charyk were convinc:ed th.,t the Mural system had inherent mechanical inhibitions which would alwaya prevent the acquisition of consistently 

h'lCh resolution phutoRraphy. Sume of the Mural pictures would be of 

h'~h quality, but Ikocauu' of the character of the combined lena-film 

transpurt-panninll mechanllm, the quality of Mural pbotolraphy would 

remaan variable. The £-6 syatem, however, had an apparent potential 

{.)r ('unai.tencoy in quality, and at a level that made it comparable to 

the beat of Mural. In e •• ence, Creer and Charyk believed that the 

Sp .. rtan expcrunent would .huw the £-6 camera ayatem to be superior 

aYE non.'4 473 

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Even thoulb- it had n~t yet proved po .. ible '0 Ie' Dr. Scoville IS 

endoraement, Charyk did not live up on-the Spartan _ approach. In 

formally diaapproving the orilinal acheme, he added the provi80 that 

NRO intereat in a general aearch ayatem which migbt poesibly ueu 

the eight surviving E-6 cameras juatified an "app-ropriateminimum 

design study" that would take advantage of the experience acquired 

by the General Electric and Eastman Kodak personnel with E-6 

backgrounds. To tbat end, Charyk authorised General Greer \0 c.·onduct 

"black" studies to define the usefulness of the E-6 camera in a Thorbuosted general aearch aystem. Not surpriainaly, the studies were 

tu be oriented toward stated Spartan objectives: a sinlle camera with 

an uptio~l stereo mode if later desired. Charyk authorised the initial 

66 

cummitment the effort. 

Such cbant:~. notwithstandina, on IS February letter contracts 

with General Electric and Eastman Kodak went into effect. • Tbeir 

The timing of the contract was one of its aeveral unique features._ 

Initial diacussions between the Heran Iroup and the proapective 

,'untractors did not belli.n until )1 January, yet a work atatement 

was an exiatence by the lat~ afternoon of 4 February and a formal 

lcu~r contract had ken wr&tten. reviewed, revised, and approved 

bv IS Fc,obruary. (Eastman Kudak did not formally ailn untU 

1M F~bruary. but that re(l~cted a mailing delay .. ) Subeequent 

~xtensiona and amendments were conaistently wriHen. coordinated. 

and ' .. ued in leas than 4H hour. from point of deciaion. 

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goals were those first defined in the work statements of 4-5 February, 

";ith the proviso that technical and co.t proposal. 'for the ~Ctual 

hardware effort were dlle by IS March. Interestinglyenou,h, the 

funds were to be spent for procurement and fabrication of lonl leadtime items needed to meet a 30 July launch elate rather than to fund 

the studies themselves. . The cost of preparing proposals was to be 

67 

covered in overhead charlles to other contracts. 

The situation was somewhat peculiar. Ostensibly, Spartan 

had been disapproved and cancelled, and corresponelence reflected 

that status. 68 But the ,"ontracts continued in effect. and incleed in 

terms of the discus sions then involving Heranls ,roup, Eastman 

Kodak. and Cieneral Electric, the objectives of the effort had broadened 

somewhat. By 18 February. the day Eastman accepted the "Z113 

contract, .. the: c.: amera contractor had estabUshed both concepts and 

~eneral configurations which promised remarkable things from the 

E-b photollraphic system.. It seemed entirely possible to get sixfoot resolution from stereo arrangements of a mir'ror on a sinille E-6 " 

camera, and several po. sible recovery capsule option. had been 

identified which promised to expand the limited film capacity of a 

Thor-boosted system. E.stman indicated that recent improvements 

1n optical coatinl techniques would permit 48-percent effectiveness 

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in lilht transmission wit)l "improved" mirrors alaiilst .. l8-perce"t 

a mirror and usinl improved fUm emulsions would conceivably have 

six-foot resolution potential, in a swath coverale of 17 by 140 nautical 

miles. (With inclusion of a greater roll capability, the potential 

area of coverale couid be increased to ZOO miles, thoulh only 140 

miles of terrain could be photoaraphed in a sinlle sweep.) Eastman 

Kodak went to an extreme the firm had never before permitted itseU, 

pruposing the in-huuse construction of a complete photographic 

vehicle (''Pb/V'' in the arllot of the "black" conversations) which would 

substitute for the customary General Electric camera-containina 

structure. Eastman concluded that the proposed "PhV" would pt"ovide 

Hubstantially better results than the original "BJ" conliluration. 

R~sulutaun and a("ulty improvemenla could well be exploited to provide 

an option for monochrome or color stereo, while addition of what 

th~ camera ena:ineers called th~ "cosine platten drive" would virt.ually 

diminate imalle smear alonlC the line of vehicle motion. 69 

As a consequence of the concentrated effort between 30 January 

and 18 February, and in pdrt bt'cause of conversations and presentataunli at the Washington level, the character of Spartan chanacd 

radically by late: February. Scuville's opposition had prompted the 

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"cancel Spartan" messa~e of lZ February but had not prevented the 

issuance of the letter contracts. Instead. tile' work haa ostensibly 

been changed from "experiment" to "study. " though in point uf fact 

the obje.ctive of a ·30 July 1963 experimental flight remained in effect. 

(lndeed. t~e date was formally changed to 30 July from IS September 

after tbeletter contracts had been signed.) 

(with frequent references to an otherwise unidentified project called 

"Sky Gem. " which was mysteriously cancelled a few months later). 

In reality. then. the: eifeC't of the "cancellation" had been to cause 

redesiNnation (Spartan formally was replaced by SP-AS-63) and to 

expand the scope: uf investigation so that stereo would clearly be 

70 

included amant: the potentials. 

Eastman .md General Electric submitted their "proposals" on 

IS March. as scheduled. They were generally compatible with the 

cuncepts outlined early in February, elaborating on the original idea 

but addinK little. Eastman's proposal for July launch (dubbed the 

Ty~ A C'onfillurahun) embudled a very simple monoscopic system 

which would provide for exposure of film in a sUghtly modified E-6 

camera and recovery b)' means of a Corona capsule. The photo firm. 

catunated that four payloads could be assembled and delivered between 

477 

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(including e). 'Both General Electric and Eastman Kodak 

also submitted proposals for "Type Btl systems embodying provision 

for stereo photography, enlarged film capacity, and higher resolution 

system features. The major innovations were the "scaled up" reentry 

capsule proposed by General Electric (and multiple installations of 

both the original Corona capsule of 33-inch diameter and the enlarlled 

4S-inch capsule) and three technical features of the Eastman proposal: 

optional fUm transport m.:chanics which could provide either improved 

reliability or expanded fUm utilisation: a programmable sUt which 

improved the potential for hillh-latitude photography; and an improved 

lens with a potential of 120 linea per millimeter and a promise of 

better than slx-fuut reaolution. Eastman also emphasized the growth 

71 

potential of thl: propoaed lena syatem. 

WhUe Heran's team analyzed the details of the Eastm~n-General 

Electric propoaala. the cuntractor. continued along the line of supportlntt a 30 July launch. But that prospect was gradually dimming. Outiide 

the world of SP-AS-63 ther.: bellan, on lO March. a special study 

evaluation of ari ''improved .earch t~ 8atellitc reconnaissance system, II 

which, on instructions frum the neW NRO director, Brockway McMillan, 

'\110' •• to include "applicable "ariations" of theE-6 system. In fact. the 

unly candidates were the M-l and the E-6. 

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One of the chief reasons for E-o cancellation, .s a specific 

program, had been the apparent overlap between E-o and such 

developmental or proposed systems as Gambit, Lanyard. and!:!:.: 

Lack of program .uccess, lack of confidence in the recovery vehicle 

configuration or General Electric's ability to "fix" it, and the budget 

pinch of late 196Z were the real determinants, but the appar~nt laek 

of a performance niche not at least partially occupied by another 

system was also important. 

Early in 19&3, after E-o had been terminated but before Spartan 

had been translated from concept to specific proposal. the United States 

IntdliJZence Board had forwarded to the NRO a restatement of the 

requirement fur five-fuut resolution stereo search coverage. M~ral 

,·uuld not satidy the requirement, and neither Gambit nor Lanyard 

was fully qualified. Fur practical purposes, the ad hoc committee 

appointed in response to McMillan's instructions was charlled with 

recllrnmendinJ: oa ~uitabl,,' _y_tem. 

The committee, under th~ chairmanship of Colonel W. C. King,· 

nt"Yo' G:t"1'lblt protlram director. met thr.ough late March and early 

Aprll. In that same perhtd. SP-AS-6l was continuing toward a still 

r.·t_unc.od 30 July launch "u.,l. The apparent contradiction between an 

"."pc runent involvln.: the E-& camt"ra Ify.tem and an evaluation of 1t. 

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abstract worth was nO more than a reflection of the intense desire 

to be ready with something quickly responsive to the prospective 

committee recommendationa. Early in the invesugation, it became 

clear that the E-6 system had significant resolution advantages over 

the ~ Through his own channels. General Greer saw to it that 

the products of SP-AS-63 were inconspicuously introduced into the 

Kin~ committee deliberations. It thus became clear that ,the most 

prubable recommendation the King committee could reach would call 

for reactivatin~ the E-6 prullram. and this in fact was the outcome. 71. 

But ther~ were pulillcal complications. or consideratiuns. 

that in this instan("e cuunterwei,hted the technical evaluation. 

M~-Mlllan was rt"latlvely new as NRO director, and was at that moment 

lnvulved in ne.:uh;,hnll a new NRO charter. a modification of the 

\ crlllon which had HI served the needs of the organization under Or. 

Chcaryk. In part lIecause ul Charyk'. departure and the interregnum. 

Or. EUllene Fubini (of thp l>lrectoratc of Defense Research and Engineering) 

hetd been takint: a lar):ef hand in the proceedings of the satellite 

rt",-unna, •• anCe IJfoJ:ram. Fub&n& had been instrumental in inducing 

c ,tnC ellallon of the E-&, at It·: ... t &n hia own belief, although at the time 

It ~ .. a!O ,-ancelled Charyk and Greer had actually made the decision. 

(!it" rctary Me Namara arid CIA Chief McCone had been willin~ to 

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continue the effort. on Charyk 'a recommendation. even though Fubini 

had independently recommended that it ·be ha1ted~) SC'Oville waa firmly 

opposed to E-6 continuance before ita cancellation and to its reincarnation, in any form, thereafter. Fubini and Scoville were clearly 

committed to eradicatiun of the E-6;it would be difficult to induce 

73 

them to reverae their atands. 

The pos8ibility that E-6 iD 80me form milCht be approved. or 

that at leaat an attempt to prove out the camera syatem in actual 

orbital operation miRht bt: authorized, had prompted General Greer 

to keep the SP-AS-b3 effort alive while the Kina committee deliberated. 

After 15 April. and the submisaion of Kina committee recommendations, 

the SP-AS-63 acti,·ity contlnued at a araduaUy decrea8ing pace. but 

IItill in the hope of it favorable findin~. Additional fund a were provided 

in April and May. and the dcfinitization deadline waa concurrently 

74 

extended until it finally moved into July. But it waa a180 becoming 

clear that events Were conspiring against E-6 reincarnation, in any 

(orm. The rt:latively sHlEht Ilround coverage that would result from 

any uf the feasible experamental confiJlurationa added to the fact that 

there would be either no ate reo coverage or that atereo coveraae 

wuuld be limited beeau.e of the necesaary arrangement of film and 

mlrrur, tended to reduce the value of the experiment in the eyea of 

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those concerned with the u~ility of the returned film. ° (That the Spartan 

approach had been delibeNtely d"-silned to test the resolution of E-6 

camefas and associated subsystems apparently was little considered 

in the April-May deliberations.) In any event. the fact that the Kinl 

report was not accepted. and that this chance of reviving the: E-6 

15 

faded. virtually ended the prospect of SP-AS-63 continuance. 

Nonetheles., as late as May 1963 tbe objective of tbe study 

pruJ:ram still included specifiC launch deadline: 30 August 1963. 

Fuur payloads, each based un a sinlle E-6 camera, were considered 

fur relatively shaht modification. Recovery was still to be by means 

uf Corona reentrv vehicles, adapted to the film sY8tem of the E_6. 76 

But comin~ mur.: lu the {runt was the long-term loa 1 of a 8ubstantially 

Improved E-6 Ii\"lltem adapted tu somewhat modified requirements. 

In Mal', Eastman was predicting 5.5-loot ground resolution with 

Improved imalle motiun compensation and 6. 7-foot resQlution with 

h:s16 ad ... quate ,matte motion features. In this instance, the payloads 

wuuld b.: based on E-6 des'.:ns but probably would incorporate such 

radically modified subsyllem ... a to be lor practical purposes new 

,-oqulpment. (Improvements were programmed in the optics. the 

,0 amera dynamics, combaned lens-film purformance, mirror driVel. 

up.,cal mount •• !L1m supply cannasters, the vehicle midsection, the 

48l BU lmT-'. 

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aft payload structure, system flexibility, thermal control aspects, 

ambient pressure operation, and variou~ specialized eiements. ) 

By late May, Cireer's people had redirect~d the Eastman effort frum 

further consideration of flying E-6 payloads to a preliminary study 

o! the prospect of using E-6 technology to support development of a 

new lEross-("overage system capable of satisfying recognized requirements. General Elect ric's effort had been turned toward development 

u! a new scaled-up versiun uf the A-4S capsule, a "Mk Vnl" reentry 

vehicle. The character uf SP-AS-63 was substantially changed by 

that ,,-vc.>lution, Ie .. than lS percent of E-6 components being applicable 

hI .itlch a new lIy.tem. (One consequence was the abandonment of 

th~ elaborate ("uver schemc Involving equipment originally funded by 

77 

th,' E-b pru~raf11 .. (lice.) 

Eo"r.y in Junc, Eastman submitted a refined proposal for the 

dt'vdo}Jment a! a teros. cuverage, moderate resolution, convergent 

stereu lIystum balled on E-6 technolo~y. The firm stUl offered to 

dt'\,l"lUfJ "'ltht'r it l umpletl' v~hlcle, including subsystems, or the 

p.,yluad portion.onl)·, and lIulu:ested that four fiillht-ready vehicle .. 

Four payJoads alone (camera, 

film hand1in.: .y"tern, and r.lated components), said Eastman, would 

• "lit th.: ,:overnment Asked to rate the newly proposed 

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system against the E-6. Eaatman Kodak responded that the new system 

. . . would be "definitely superior" to the original E-6 payload. The contractor considered that the chance to refine the E-6 desi~n had 

permitted major improvements: areater film capacity to allow 

complete coveuge at a lower altitude; a simplified (in-li~e) film 

transport system with a start-stop platten for areater reliability 

and vcrsatility; a hiGher renectance mirror coatina with resultant 

T -stop improven"'"t; a proll rammable sUt to improve the quality 

of high latitude ~xpo.ure.; a greater number of imaae mo~ion compensalion speeds; improved temperature control: the incorporation of a 

roll-joint; a standard recovery system with multipie recovery vehicles, 

and (teneral improvement. in .ystem reliabUity. 

lmprcued b)' the potential, and still hopeful that somethina 

rni.,:ht come of tht" King ("ummiUee recommendations that would permit 

surfacinll the SP-AS-63 work a. a startina point. General Greer in 

early July obtained a final ancrement uf funds to keep the work alive 

fur a few morc weeks. (T oved on Z July raised the .. 

tot.d of fund. authorized fur SP-AS-63 to an eve But 

I,,"ven days later. on q Jul)', Colonel Heran paslled the word to his 

prucurement officer that the contracts with Eastman Kodak and General 

Lh~c' trac wer" tu be te rmlnated. The ''high level" decision so lona 

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awaited had been received; E-6 was alain comatose. Colone 

notified both major contracton by telephone and began in'aking arrangements for formal termination proceedinls. Official notices went to 

the contractors on 

·78 IZ July, but work had ceased three days earlier. 

It was not at all impo .. ible that E-6 might be again revived, 

thoullh not in its earlier form, since the basic requirement for a 

stable-quality, moderate-r~solution search system had not been fully 

s.tidied at the close of 1963. With tbe cancellation of Lanyard, none 

of the original E-systems of 1960 survived in any form, yet the requirements that had caused their leneration remained. But at the same time 

the basic objections to £-b, in any form, remained unsatidied. 

Clearly the decision hinMed on more than raw technology; the masb of 

en~lnccrinll, ecunmnic, and political factors that had so consistently 

inIluenced the total satellite reconnaissance program had much to do 

with the eventual disapproval of plans to develop a new search. ystem 

b.uaed on £-6 technology. The validity of that technology had never 

been tested, of course. £-6 had been cancelled, rilhtly, because it 

WA" dependent on a faulty recovery system. Althoulh experience 

wlth Mercury (and later Ciemlni and Apollo) recovery bodies demon-

"trated that liea recover)' was a feasible alternative to air catch, the 

£-C» recovery system had no real capability along those lines. At 

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the end. the experience o~ E-6 payload development was to have a 

considerable inf1u~nce' on subsequent developments that led, by 1966. 

through the ~ .~a reh 8 ystem proposal. to the eventual Hexagon 

program. But aU that wa. in the future. 

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3. 

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NOTES ON SOURCES· 

See Chapt~r IV. 

Interview, F.C. E. Oder (Col, USAF, retired), 4 Mar 63; 

LtCol R. W. Yundt, 13 Mar 63: Col J. W. Ruebel, IS, 16 

Apr 63; Cul R. A. Be=rg, 16 Apr 63, all SAFSP, by R. L.· 

Perry. Cui W.Ci. Kina. Samos Proj Dir in 1960. and Od~r. 

his predece=ssor. we=re particularly outspoken opponents of 

concurrency. (Interview. King by Perry. 19 Dec 63.) 

Ltr. LtOen R.C. Wibon. DCS/D. USAF. to Dir/Adv Tech. 

9 May bO, aubj; SAMOS; Ur, MajOen V.R. Haugen, ASlllt 

DCS/D USAF to Cmdr ARDe. 16 May 60. subj: SAMOS 

Dcvelopment Plan; hr, Wilson to Cmdr ARDC. 1 Jun 60. 

subj: Exploitation of Initial SAMOS Data: TWX RDRB 19-5-36-E, 

ARDC tu BMD. 19 May 60, in SAFSP Samos file R.D-l and Air 

Staff fUes. 

Memo, H. F. Yurk, DDR. E, to SAFUS. 6 Jun 60. subj: 

Samua RIt D Operauonal Plans, in SAFSP Samos file=, R.D-1: 

hr, Capt H. Mitche=l1. DCS/I, ARDC. to BMD. 13 Jun 60, 

subj: SAMOS RltD Ope=rational Plans, with rpt. ''SAMOS, " 

13 Jul &0 ( .• prdiminary copy of the DDR &E "BUlintts Report"). 

in SAFSP !);.mos fUe=s; see also Chapter 

0,. Col J. W. Rut·b~l, SP.l, described the CIA briefing of 1957 

to R.L. Pcrry in a II) Apr b3 interview. The U-Z affair.ha. 

b.:e=n e=xhaustlvcly examined in a variety of books and articles. 

1I. Thr detail .. of \hear developments are provided in Chapter VI 

St·e aho Tt·chnical Wurk Stmt. SAMOS •. £-6 Photo.raphic/ 

R"'cove=ry Subsystem", lb Jul 60. in E-6 files, a. D-l. 

Jun-Dec bO; AFBMD so 1)40, 1.7 Jul bOt in SSD Hist Div files: 

hr, f:.S. S.lbcrm.Ul. CUII'~ O'er A~tC-BMC, to various firms. 

II Au.: bO, subJ: Rc·qm·.t for Proposal; hr. MajGen O. J. 

Ratland, Cmdr BMU, ttl II. J. Brown, V Pres and Gen Mgr. 

LMSD. 10 Aut: bO, subJ: Solicitina for SAMOS E-65y.tem: 

Itr, Brown to Rltland. 111 Au" 60. same .ubj. all in E-6 fUes, 

R&' 0-1. Jun-Dec bOo 

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7. Charyk orilinally db'ected a chule in require·ment .. to 8-10- " 

" foot re.olutiqn a"d 5 day. in orbit, ~hanlinl it to "10 fet"~" or 

bette"r" alter the N5C meetiDl. Bidders were notified on 

l,6 Aug, following two day. of uncertainty at the project office. 

See TWX AFDSD-A T 80036, USAF to ARDC. Z3 Aug 60, and 

AFOSD-AR 80857. 26 AUI 60; memo, LtCol R. G. Alwood 

for Col W. G. King, Dir/Samo., to E.5. Silberman. BNC. 

l4 AUI 60, aubj: Technical Work Statement for E-6 Version 

of SAMOS. with notes by Atwood on lS and l,6 Aug conversation. involving Kin.: and Col H. L. Evan.: charts used in NSC 

briefing, Z5 AUI 60, left with Charyk by a BSD courier on" 

Zl Aug, are in Samoa fUe. (the charts specify an 8-foot 

requirement first slated on 23 AUI and modified three days 

later); 1tr, LtCo1 W. B. Botsonl, Chm (temp), Working Gp 

Source Selection Bd. 18 AUI 60, subj: Submittal of Factors, 

in E-6 filea, R.D-Z, £-6 Sep 1960. 

8. Rpt, "Program Review, 'I 698BJ briefinl to J. V. Charyk, 

SAFUS. 18 Sep 6Z, an files of Col P.J. Heran. D/Dir/698BJ: 

TWX SAFMS-EXEC-60-19. BrilGen R.E. Greer (from WashinJZton) 10 Col W.G. Kanl. SAFSP. Z7 Oct 60: TWX SAFMS 

99533, OSAF to B .. tD. 7 Nov 60 (the authorisation to "terminate") 

and request lor canceUataon of EK 77-inch development. 10 Nov 

60; TWX SAFMS 87078. USAF to BND, Zl Sep 60; TWX RDRS 

l,39-58. AROC to WADD. Zl Sep 60. all in SAFSP files. 

'1 Memo. BriJZGcn R. E. Greer to BrilGen R. D. Curtin, 9 Dec 

60, nu lubJ, in SAFMS filel, Sam as Gen '60: memo Col W. R. 

Hedrick. D/Dir Ente. SAFSP. to Greer, 22 Nov 60. subj: 

• 

E-6 Versiun of SAMOS; hr. Greer to LMSD. attn H.J. Brown. 

VPres and GenMler. ':3 Nov 60. same subj: memo. Greer to 

E.S. Silberman. BMC. 1 Dec 60, lame subj, all in E-6 liles: 

memo. MaJ J.S. Smith. Ch, Space Probes Div, Dir/AF Space· " 

Booatera. to Dirl AF Space Boosters, BMD, 7 Ju1 60, subj: 

Boolter Support for the AVCO DRAG BRAKE Prolram, ltr, 

J. B. Trenholm. D/Ch. D~'naaoar SPOt WADD, to BND, 

14 Nov 60. aubj: A VCO Ora. Brake Pro,ram; TWX SAFSP 

DE-Z8-U-H. SAFSP tu WADD, Z9 Nov 60. in J:-6 file., 

R .. D-Z, Source Sf'I; It r. Col p. E. Worthman, Dir /Space Sy., 

8MD. to SAFSP. ZO 0.., 60. eubj: "WDZYC E-6 Ae_poneibilillee: ltr. Greer to Wurthman. ZS Jan 61. same _ubj. in E-6 

lalea, MJCt-7. Policy. TWX :iAFMS-DlR-60-66. USAF to 

SAFSP. 2Z Dec 60. In E-6 files. R.D Cien. Jul-Dt!c 60. 

488 

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10. Memo, Col P.J. Heran, D10ir Prol U, SAFSP, to MajCien 

R. E. Cireer, OirlSAFSP, 21 Mar 0

61, subj: 9ues~ona and 

Answers for Members of Conlress. in° E-6 fUes, aIlD-l; 

interview, Col P. J. Heran, OIDir 698BJ, by I.. L. Perry, 

Z7 Feb 63; Reubel ihterviewa, IS, 16 Apr 63. 

11. 

lZ. 

13. 

Rpt, Summary of ~.rI>AII.'~~ 

Z8, Z9 Dec 60, prep by 

fUes, RltO-l Cien, JulDirectors Meetings, 

Aerospace, in E-6 

Chron, Samos ProJt II, Jan 61 (SP-5, Hist-Z fUel; memo for 

record, Col p.J. Heran, Samos Prog n Oil', Feb 61, subj: 

Program D Technical Decisions, in E-6 fUes. RIID Cien 1961. 

Interviews, Col J. W. Ruebel. LtCol John PieU. by a. L. 

Perry. 6 Dec 6Z, and Pietz by Perry, Z7 July 63. 

14. Interofc corresp, E. T. Clark. Aerospace Corp. to Col P.J. 

Hcran, Dir/Pro~ n, 10 Jan 63, subj: Brief Summary 698BJ 

Vehicle Development and Outstanding Problems, in E-6 files, 

MJEt-7 Polk)"; chron. Prog n. Jan 61; memo, Col P.J. Heran, 

Oir/Pru~ 11. to SAFSP. subj: SAMOS Program 11 Historical 

Report for Feb 1961; memo. LtCol R. Ci. Atwood, Ch, Ops 

PlnJl Oi\.", PruJl Il. to Oir/ProR 11. 6 Mar 61, subj: Critical 

Prot(ram Areas. in £-6 tiles, RIlD-l, Cien. 1961; 1tr, Col 

p.J. Heran, Dir/ProJt II to SAFSP-P (Admin). 11 Apr 61, 

subj: SAMOS Proaram 11 Historical Report for March 1961, 

in E-6 file.. Hist. 

I:;. Memo for rccu Aerospace Corp. lZ Oct 62, 

I".bj: Early ProJlram H,story. in E-6 files, Mgt-Z, Hist Ooc. 

lb. Ltr, Col P.J. Hcran. D.r/Pro~ 11, to SAFSP (Admin Of c), 

II Apr 61. subJ: SAMOS ProlCram n Historical R.eport for 

March 1961. and Iq May 61. subj: SAMOS Program n 

Historical Report for April 1961, in E-6 files, Hist; TWX 

SAFSP-MS-SEN-61-ZQ. SAFUS to SAFSP, 9 Mar 61. 

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17. 

IS. 

19. 

ZOo 

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l.l. 

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Lir. LtCol L .. C. Joch"im. Asst Dep Dir Plans and Prolls, 

SAFSP. to Dir/Prug 11. 1 Apr 61, subj: SAMOS Program 11 

Financial and CostProposa1, Cieneral Electric, Z3 March 

1961, in E-6 files, Fin-I; Itr, Col P.J. Heran, Dir/Prug 11. 

to SAFSP (Admin Ole), 14 Sep 61, subj: Program n Historical 

Report for July and August 1961, in E-6 files, Hiat; ltr, 

H. W. Paige, QenMgr, CiE MSVD, to MajCien R. E. Cireer, 

DirlSAFSP, IZ Mar 62. subj: Expected Overrun of Contract 

AF 04(695)-6, in E-6 liles, Proc-S-I-I. 

Memo, LtCien J.F. Carroll, ICi USAF, to OSAF-Dir/Mis and 

Sat Sys, 26 Jul 61, subj: Survey of SAMOS ••• ProJlram. in 

SAFMS files, Samos Cien 61. 

TWX SAFSS-INS-62-142. OSAF to SAFSP eMajOen R. E. Greer 

et al), 12 Sep 6Z, in E-6 fUes. Mgt-7. 

-

Ltr, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/Samos Prog, to BriJlGen R. D. 

Curtin. O-SAFUS, 3 Jul 61, subj: FY-6Z Constructaon Funds. 

in £-6 fi1"s, Fin-61; Itr. Col P • .T. Heran. Dir/ProJl II. to 

Plans It Proll Ole, SAFSP. 10 Jul 61, subj: Program lJ 

Construction Rrquirements for FY-63. in £-6 files. Fin-60; 

hr. Heran to Plans and Prog Ofc 30 Noy 61, Bubj: Military 

Construction Pro(lram. same file; Itr, Col W. R. Hedrick. 

Ch, Satelht., Control Ofc. SSD, to LtCol N. Rehbein, Admin 

Ole, SAFSP, 4 May 6l. subj: Program ZOI Costs, in °E_6 

fUes. RItO-ZS-S. 

Ur. Heran tu SAFSP (Admin Ole). 19 May 61; Itr. Hedrick 

to Admin Ofe. 14 Jun 61; Itl'. Heran to Admin Olc. 14 Sep 61i 

Itr, Col W. R. Hedrick. Asst Dc:p Dir/Prog 11. to SAFSP 

(Admin Ole), b Oct 61. subj: Program U Historical Report 

for September 1961, in E-6 files. Hist-2i rpt, "Program 

lOI HiJlhliJlhts, S,-,ptember 1961, prep by E-6 OIc, 10 Oct 61. 

in £-6 files; hr. Col P.J. Heran, Dir/Prog 11, to SAFSP 

(Admin Ole). 7 No,,' 61. subj: Monthly Historical ReportOct 1961,0 in E-6 files. H1St-2. 

Memo, E. T. Clark. I .. ~rospace Corp, to_ 

Aerospace 

30 Oct 61. subJ: 

Corp. 

Ci£ 

cy 

Letter 

to Col 

SSO-061 

P.J. Heran, 

of Z4 October; 

~ 

Itr. 

490 8YE 11011 .. '4 

,.,~"o ... lOla Bvt'ma,,/TaJen' Key'" 

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E.A. Miller, GE MSVD, to Heran, 24 Oct 61, no subj, 

both in E-6 fU"s, Mt:t-4, ~olicy 1961., n;aemo for r~cord, 

Col H. L. Evans, Vice DirlSpec Prolms (SA'FSP'), 7 Mar 

6l, subj: Red Flag Message Relardinl Slippale in Launch 

Date of Program 201 Vehicle, in E-6 files, R.D-7-1. 

23. Ltr, Admin Contracting Oicr, Phila APD, 

to H. , OE MSVD, 2 Jan 62, subj: Show 

Cause and Cure Nutice, Contract AF 04 (695)-6, in E-6 

files, Proc 5-1-1. 

24. Ltr, E.A. Miller. Milr. Recov Satellite Progs. GE, to 

LtCol J. McMahon. Chm Prog l01 Acceptance Team, SSD. 

19 Jan 6l, subj: Acceptance of PV 851 for Shipment to Field 

Site, in E-6 files .. Proc 5-1-1; 1tr, McMahon to Miller, 

1<) Jan 62. 8ubj: Vehicle 851 Acceptance, same file. 

lS. rton, M~r, Re-Entry Sys Div, OE. t~ Phila APD. 12 Jan 6l, subj: Show Cauae and Cure 

-b filell. Proc 5-1-1. 

Zb_ Ltr, Paille to Greer, 12 Mar 62. 

I. 7. Ltr, Murton 12 Jan 62. 

~M. Ltr, Cui P. J. H,,·ran. D/Dir Prog n, 

Aerospat-t· Curp. II Feb 62, 8ubj: Memo 

in E-6 files, Mgl-7: TWX SAFSP-DlR-30-l- 8, MajOen R. E. 

Greer, SAFSP, to BrLgOen R. D. Curtin, O-SAFUS, 30 Mar 

61., in E-6 files, RIrD 1-3. 

lq. TWX AFSTP-RA 7<)817, USAF to MATS, 11 Apr 62, cy in 

E-6filcs. R&.D 7-1; TWX SAFSP-TEN-19-4-54, SAFSP to 

MA TS, Scott AFB. 1<) Apr 62, .ame file •. 

\0. TWX. SAFSP-F-17-4-212. MajQen R. E. Oreer, DirlSAFSP, 

'u BrLgGcn R. D. CurtLn. O-SAFUS, 17 Apr 62, in SP-l 

(iles, Gambit ProlZm. 

11. Rpt. ProMram 698BJ MalfunC'tion Summary Report, [9 May 62?] 

an E-6 files. R&.D l-l, Veh Fhs. 

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for Undersecy J. V. Charyk. 18 Sep 6Z. in E-6 (Col P ~ J. 

Heran'.) Wes·. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

• 

TWX SAFSP-SEVEN Z7-6-S7, SAFSP to_o1 LMartin, 

O-SAFUS. Z7 Jun 6Z; Interofc corresp. Aerospace 

Corp, to E. Clark, Aerospace Corp. 10 Oct Z, subj: 

Mission Recapitulation, both in E-6 fUes. RicO I-Z. 

Briefing summary. 18 Sep 6Z: interofc corre 

Aerospace Corp, to E. T. Clark. Aerospace Corp, 

eubj: Mission Performance Recapitulation, in E-6 fUes. 

RicO I-Z. 

Interview. MajCien R. E. Gre""",er Dir/SAFSP. by R. L. Perry, 

1Z Mar 63; interofc corresp. Aerospace Corp, 

to E. T. Clark, Aero.pace Corp, ct Z. .u~.: Mi.sion 

Performance Recapitulation; interofc correep 

Teet Oil'. 698BJ. Aerospace Corp, to Col P. J'. eran, 

DirISP-7. 7 Aug 6Z, subj: Two-Oay Report for Program 

698BJ Fl&~ht Test '4. all in E-6 fUes. R.O I-Z. 

TWX. SAFSS-OlR-6Z-80. O-SAFUS to SAFSP. 14 May 6Z, 

in E-b filea. Mllt-7; Briefina Summary. 18 Sep 62; Briefing 

chart.. "approved by Cien Creer 20 Sep 62. " in E-6 filea 

(Col P. J. Heran). 

Aerospace Corp. to_ 

ero.pace orp, Apr 62. subj: Water-to-air 

eat. ProKram ZOl, in E-6 files, Op •. ZO-l. . 

TWX. SAFSS-DlR-bZ-89. O-SAFUS to SAFSP, Uun 6Z. in 

£-6 file •• Ope ZO-I; Itr. E. T. Clark. Dir/Prog 698BJ. 

Aerospace Corp. tu Col P.J. Heran. Oir/Proill. Zl Jun 6Z, 

.ubj: Paravane and Water Line Retrieval Method. in E-6 

fUc., R.O lO-IZi BriefinJ Summary. 18 Sep 6Z; briefing 

chart ZOSe 6Z; memo. Col P.J. Heran. Dir/SP-7. to 

• 

1 Oct 6Z. subj: General Electric Contract 

in E-6 file.. Ope ZO-l; Itr, Heran to 

Z 5 Oct 6Z, subj: General Electric 

CCNf3) and handwritten note. by 

£-6 of e •. in E-6 fUes. R.O ZO-lZ. 

49l 

'I'D. IECRET 

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The rapidity of the cancellation of water-to-air recovery 

trials was an excellent indicator of organizati~nal efficiency. 

On 3 October. Col Heran authorized ·teIU· of the recovery 

vehicle in combination with a JC-llO. After receiving a 

report which indicated that General Electric had made no 

progrel., Heran at 110S houri on Z4 October directed one 

of his staff to have the entire effort cancelled. By 1135 

hours that day, all concerned individuals had been notified: 

the formal cancellatiun notice was in the mail the fo11owinl: 

murninM· 

3'1. Hlst chronol0J:Y. SAFSP. Jan-Jun 6Z; Briefing Summary, 

1M Sci' 6Z. 

010. nriefintt charts. ZO Sep 6Z. 

41. Rpt. ''ProjlZram Review, If 18 Sep 6Z. 

oil. TWX SAFSS-DIR-O-SAFUS to MajGen R. E. Cireer. SAFSP, 

~I Au!! 6Z, 111 ~-b file., Mgt-7; memo for record, Col P.J. 

Ul' I' an, 01 I' I b"HBJ, lZ AUIl 6Z, .ubj: Comment. on SAFSS 

TWX ;OlR-I.! 3, i'l E-6 fU.s, R.D-l, Highlight •• 

013. TWX SAFSS·DIR·6Z-UO, O-SAFUS to MajCien R.E. Cireer, 

SAFUS. Zol Au.: 6l, in E-6 file., Mgt-7; TWX SAFSS-PRO6l-I~9, O-:;AFUS to SAFSP, Z4 Aug 6Z, .ame fUel 

44. BrH=fln~ Summary, 18 Sep 6Z. 

4". Ltr, MdjCien R. £. Cireer, Dir/SAFSP, to SAFSS. Col J.R. 

Martin, l6 S~p 6Z, subJ: Revised 6<)88J Follow-on Program, 

in £-6 file_, Mllt-7; TWX SAFSS-DIR-6Z-1S3, Martin tu 

Greer, 3 O,·t bZ, same file. 

4«>. TWX SAFSP-0IR-4-10-l. MajCien R. E. Greer, Dir/SAFSP, 

to Ci E. !.!...!!.. 4 O("t 6l. an E-6 file, Mgt-7. 

47. Dr •• lt mc.."mU pr."t' by LtC"l R. J. FtJrd. SAFSP, Oct 6Z, in 

Cur .. n;, hie.; Inter,,·U'w_, various dates in Dec 6l, Jan, 

Feb «>1. &n"ulvlnr: Cui J. W. Ruebel, Lteol John Pietz, 

LICul Furd, by R. L. Perry. 

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48. 

49. 

50. 

Sl. 

Sl. 

Sl. 

"Interview, Cireer • by Perry, 12 Mar 63: TWX, SAFSP-

·SEVEN-27-:9-8.8. SAFSP to O-SAFUS. 27 Sep 62; in E-.6 

files, Mgt-? . 

TWX AS-62-0000-00035, 698BJ Test Dir, Aerospace Corp, 

to SAFSP. 13 Nov 62. in E-6 lUes, RLD 1-2-1: hr. Col 

P. E. Villars. D/Cmdr Space Sys Test, 6594th Test Wg 

(Satellite). to 69881 ProlOlc, 21 Nov 62, subj: 698BJ 

Recovery Evaluation Report, in E-6 fUes. Ops 20-1. 

Interviews. MajCien R. E. Cireer. 5, 12 Mar 63: Col P. J. 

Heran. 27 Feb 63; Col J. W. Ruebel, 5 Mar, 7 Mar &3; 

LtCol John Piet&. C; Mar 63, all by R. L. Perry. Colonels 

Ruebel and Piet.z particularly remarked on the gloomy 

attitudes of those prolram people who reported the t.est 

resulU to Ceneral Cireer and their impression that the 

mood was "we don't know what comes next. tI Cieneral Cireer 

commented on his conclusion that tbe group did not know what 

had actually happened to .ither the fourth or the {'11th reentry 

bodies and could offer no real hope for the sixth. if it were 

launched. Becau.~ of the prompt cancellation of the E-&. 

relatively little ddinitive data was lorwarded on the location 

or inlensity of aerodynamic heatinl during the reentry of 

number five. (At least. little found its way into the files 

of th~ E-& office.) General Greer and Colonel Ruebel 

independC!'ntly drew representations of the burn-through 

effects on thuir office blackboards and the author later 

compared his coples of their sketches with the "oflicial" 

sketches in the formal report on night four. The same 

conclusion thatfhjChts four and five did indeed suffer the 

same fate, and frum the same cause is inescapable. 

lnt.erofe Corresp. E. T. Clark. Aerospace Corp, to Col 

P.J. Heran, Dir/ProJl 722, 10 Jan 63. subj: Brief Summary 

698BJ Vehicle Devulopment Outstanding Problems, in E-6 

files, M.t-7 Pohq·. 

Cireer, Ruebel. and Pletz interviews; see note above. 

Cireer and Heran lnterviews. see note 50. 

494 Bft 17017-7. 

TOP •• eRST 

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54. 

55. 

TWX SAFSS-1-6Z-174, O-SAFUS to SAFSP, U Dec 6Z, in 

E-6files, Mlt-7, pulicy. '. 

TWX SAFSS-I-6Z-175 and 1-6Z-176, Q-SAFUS to SAFSP, 

11 Dec 6Z, in E-6 filuI, Mlt-? Policy; Ruebel interview, 

15 Apr 63. 

56. Briefing resume. "698BJ Briefing in response to SAFSS1-6Z-175, .. 1 Jan 63, presented to MajCien R. E. Cireer, 

14 Jan 63, (after presn to SAFUS), in £-6 (Heran) Cues. 

The presentation to Undersecy J. V. Charyk took place 

on 9 Jan.) 

57. TWX SAFSS-1-63-0lS. O-SAFUS to SAFSP, 31 Jan 63, in 

E-6 files. Mlet-7 Poll, y. 

58. Interview, MajCien R. E. CirceI', Dir/SP, by R. L. Perry, 

30 Nov 63. Thtu'c are no written records of thesedlscussions: 

none of the participants committed anything to paper. 

~9. Mig Notes prep by 

"'t~, in SPAS filea. 

60. TWX SAFSS-b-M-OOZO, SAFSS to MajCien a. E. Cireer, 

SAFSP, 30 Jan 61, in SPAS files. 

bl. Memo. MilJGen R. E. Greer. Dar/SP. to LtCol Mark Farnum, 

~ Feb bJ, lubj: Spartan Security; memo, Cireer to Col J. L. 

Martin, Du/NRO Staff, 1 Feb 63, subj: Project Spartan 

Organization; notea, ''Presentahon,'' 31 Jan 63, all in SPAS 

fUel. 

bl. ''SPAS-63 Braefin~, " [Z Feb 63~; Work 

AF lR(bOO)-Z1l3, 15 Feb b3. notes by LtCol 

~ Feb b3, aU in SPAS fales. 

bJ. TWX SAFSS-b-M-OZ81. LtCul J. Sides, SAFSS. to MajCien 

R.E. Cireer. Dar/SP, b Feb bJ, SPAS files. 

b4. .!!!!:~ intervu.·w, Brit:Cien J.L. Martin, Dir/NRO Staff, by 

R. L. Perry, 8 Nu\' bJ. interView, MajCien R. E. Cireer. 

Dar/SP. by Perr,,', Ie, Nuv 63. 

BYE 1'':011.'. 49S 

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65. Management Plan. SP-AS-63. lZ Feb 63; draft; Proposed 

Procedure for Transfer of E-6 Residual Inventory to 

SP-AS-63·Pr·oject.~ 1Z Feb 63, in SPAS files. 

66. TWX SAFSS-l-M-0031, SAFSS to MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir/SP, lZ Feb 63, in SPAS files; interview. Greer by 

Perry, 30 Nov 63. 

&7. PR '&3-SAFSP-XPZ. IS Feb 63 and ltr cont.r AF 18(&00)-

1.113 and -Z1l4, 15 Feb 63, to EK and CiE, respectively. 

&8. TWX SAFSS-l-M-0037, 1Z Feb 63; TWX SAFSP [no cite 

number]. SAFSP to Col J. L. Martin, SAFSS. 18 Feb 63, 

in SPAS file. 

&9. Milt Brie.fin~, "Ph/V." 18 Feb 63, in SPAS files. 

70. rlt Farnum. SAFSP, Z6 Feb 63, 

GE Re-Entry Sys Dept, to 

, 19 Feb 63. subj: Letter 

Contract . . . ; various TWX itema concerning the 

"cover" transfer of accountabUity for E-& items were 

written 1n and mailed to the Wright Field 

contact for lnae "open" circuit. Included 

w'-!r~ ASRNItD-l-IS- 3-11 to CiE II Mar 63 and ASNRD-I-15-

l-Utu EK ''Sky Ci~m" was "cancelled" by ASRNRD-I-Z3-

7-43 to CE. Z3 Jul 63~ all are in SPAS files •. 

71. EK Proposal fur D'-!s'lln and Production of Type B Camera 

Payload, II) Mar 63; £K Program Plan •. Schedule. and 

E!ltimatell Cust. fur Type A. Cunfigu 

GE ''Stud)' Phali~ B, " 15 Mar 61; hr 

til (CuI) P.J. Heran. SAFSP. ZZ Mar 

Type B Propu.al Data. all in SPAS files. 

71.. Memu. MajCien R. E. Cireer. lhrlSAFSP, to Col R.A. Bera, 

D/Dir. Zl Mar 03, subJ: Comparison Study, names Col W.G. 

KlnJl (chm). Berg, Col P. J. Heran, two Aerospace Corporation scientists. a Rand representative, LtCol Mark Farnwn. 

(uur SAFSP and SAFMS technical specialists. and two CIA 

rcpresentallve. tu the ad hoc Ilroup; the basic study requirement walt Apecifu:d an m-tt. OSAFUS to CtA and SAFSP, 

496 

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ZO Mar 63. subj: Improved Search Type Satellit~ Reconnaissance SYlltem~ memo. Cireer to D/NRO. 15 Apr &3. subj: 

Comparative Evaluation. contains Cir'eer's endotaement . 

of committee findina- contained in rpt. "Report of the 

Findin.s of the Ad Huc Group appointed to Evaluate 

Potential Systems for an Improved Search Type Satellite 

Reconnais.ance System. " to DirlSpec Projs, Apr 63. The 

report is valuable not merely because of its comparison of 

£-6 ("BJ ") with Mural (IIM-llI). but because it contains a 

critkal appraisal of the pOieilual of several techniques and 

subsystems, analyzes resolution in terms of useful intellilZence rather than abstract standards. and carefully examines 

real s ystum costs. ' 

7 J. Interviews. Greer by Perry. 30 Nov. 19 Dec 63. 

74. Greer interview. 30 Nov; amends 1. 2. 3 to ltr contr 

AF 18(&OO)-l1l4. 11 Apr. 8 May, I Jul 63; amends 1 and 

l to AF -liB. 7 May and I Jul 63, SPAS files. 

is. Greer intervu:ws. 30 Nov. '19 Dec 63. 

ib. 

7i. 

iK. 

Wurk Stmill. SPAS-b}. b Ma)' &3. in SPAS file. 

~. TWX :iP-AS-63-Z9-;-4. MajCien R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. 

o Cui artin. Dir/NRO Sta~; ltr. LtCol 

SPAS Prog Ofe. to_ 6 Jun 6~. 

au J: rans er of AC'c:ountability ••.• all in SPAS files. 

• 

Ltr. _M..:r. Cuntr Admin. EK. to Col P.J. 

Hera~. nu subj: TWX SAFSP-F-27-S-7l0 

to EK. 27 May &1; TWX SAFSS-I-M-01SZ. to SP. Z Jul 63 

(alsu SAFSS-I-M-OOJi. -0093. and -OISZ. to SP. which 

wert' earlier fundll authorizations); memo for record. 

LtCul _Q Jul 63; subj: Termination of -Z113 

EHort~R. E. Greer. Dir/SP, to EK. 12 Jul 63, 

lIubJ: Letter Nntit"e ut Tt'rmmation to Prime Contractor •• 

Cunlract AF I r letter to CiE re -2114, 

samt' date; ltr E. to_ Z2 Jul 63. 

subJ: Ldter crnunation • .~ all in SPAS 

me~ lnler\'i by Perry. lS Nov 03. 

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