THE

AIR FORCE IN SPACE

FISCAL YEAR 1962

USAF HISTORICAL DIVISION

LIAISON OFFICE
UNCLASSIFIED

This is a SECRET document and will be handled in accordance

with the provisions of AFR 205-1, as amended. It contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States and,

accordingly, utmost security will be afforded and distribution

and dissemination of its contents will be restructed on a "need

to known basis.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with the permission of the office of origin.

This document is classified SECEET/NDFORN to conform to the

classification of the informatibn in the source documents.

In accordance with the . provisions of AFR 205,2, this volume

has been placed in Group 1 on a derivative basis; many of the

source documents were so grouped. Since the historian's analysis

and consolidation of information results in a synthesis which may

have wider implications than the individual documents on which it

is based, the classified contents have all been placed in Group 1,

irrespective of individual page markings.

4

•

UNCLASSIFIED
e)(74..,0/17r

-SEORETTHE

AIR FORCE IN SPACE

FISCAL YEAR 1962

by

Carl Berger

13

USAF Historical Division Liaison Office

June 1966
UNCLASSIFIED

FORWORD

Ds Liz hulk Soace. alga Year 1262, discusses the

highlights of USAF policy and program planning to obtain support from the administration, Congress, and the Secretary of

Defense for a larger role in national space activities. Also

included are significant actions taken and milestones reached

in individual projects sponsored or supported by the Air Force

during the period between 1 July 1961 and 30 June 1962.

This historical monograph is the fifth in a series on

USAF space activities prepared by the USAF Historical Division

Liaison Office. The earlier studies include: AmL Air FOrce

History► gf:Sbace Activities, 12A171212, from which was drawn

a smaller study, The Threshold of Awe, 1204954; The Air

Force in Space, 1212712601 and The Air Force ih Space, Fiscal

Year la.

MAX ROSENBERG

Chief

USAF Historical Division

Liaison Office

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

OONTSETS ,• .-.:

..

: i .

,. ...

THE AIR FMCS AND 'THE NATIONAL. -SPAM PROGRAM . • . . •••••••

'USAF Campaign Againstihe AlEpace for Peace" Policy - . iip , • • .

1

3

USAF Support of the Lunar Project 10

Air Force-NASA Disagreements ' ' -, ,

- .: ....

14

USAF SPACE PLANNING 18

•

The Air Force Space Plan 18

The Ferguson Task Force • • ..... 20

McNamara and Space Budget Augmentation 21

The Five Year USAF Space . Program . ; • • • . . . . . • 24

III. DYNA -SOAR ' • 26

NI, Vehicle. Lookbrlig . for - alliesioen 

. . :.• .-..- ...... 28

Thelir Force White'Paper ' ,

- • . ' 30

Revised Program Planning .

'

.

. ...

33

' IV. MILITARY' ORBITAL DEVELOPMENT SYS= • '

-

•

36

- Early Space Station Planning 36

.

Planning the MODS . • . , . .,41

TITAN III

. .

43

The Search for a DC -3 of the Space Age 4 • 43

Beginning the Phase I Study Effort 45

New OSD Guidance for Phase I . . 48

The Titan III System Package Plan 51

LARGE SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 54

NASA Requirements 56

Disagreement Over the 156-Inch Development .58

VII. MILITARY COMMUNICATION SATELLITES 61

Advent in Trouble 62

The Air Three Proposes a New Satellite Program 65

Project West Ford 68

VIII. MIDAS 72

Is Midas Worth the Effort? 72

The Ruinaleport • 75

New Doubts About Midas 80

• •

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•

II. BIOASTRONAUTICS 83

Bioastronautics Research Responsibility 83.

The Webb-McNamara Bioastronautics Agreement 86

X. SPACE DETECTION AND TRACKIM3 SYSTEK 88

Development of a Phased Array Radar 89

Aerospace Surveillance and Warning, 1962 90

XI. OTHER USAF SPACE UNDERTAKINGS 93

Satellite Inspection 93

Missile Interception 97

Standardised Agena 98

Standardised Atlas 100

Discoverer and the Thrust-Augmented Thor

.

Blue Scout

100

102

Aerospace Plane Propulsion 103

Other USAF-Supported Military-Civilian Space Programs . . . 104

Snapshot 104

Mercury 106

Vela Hotel 106

Transit . . . 107

Anna 107

/01113 109

GLOSSARY 127

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

MHO PUBLICATIONS

Below is a selected list of AFCHO historical monographs which may

be obtained an. loan or for permanent retention. Copies may be obtained

by calling Oxford 6-6565 or by forwarding a written request.

The Threshold of Space. 1945-1959. (8)

An Air Force History of Space Activities. 1945-1959. (C)

The Air Force in Space. 1959-1960. (S)

the Air Force in Soace. Fiscal Tear 1961. (S-RD)

• USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines ankepabilities. 1961-1962. (S-Noforn)

USAF Special Air Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities. 1963. (S-NofOrn)

USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam. 1961-1963. (TS-Noforn)

USAZ_Plans Ind Policies in South Vietnam and Laos. 1964. (TS-Noforn)

Strengthening USAF General Purpose Forces. 1961-1964. (TS-Ooforn)

Strengthening USAF Airlift Forces. 1961-1964. (S-Noforn)

Plans 9nd Policies far the Ballistic Missile Initial Operational Capability 

Program. (S-RD)

USAF Ballistic Missiles. 19,8-1959. (84D)

USAF Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Fiscal Tears 1960-1961. S-Noforn)

USAF Ballistic Missile Programs, 1962-1964. (TS-M-Neforn)

USAF Command and Control Problems. 1958-1961. (S)

USAF Strategic Command and Control Systems. 1958-1963. (8-Noforn)

Command and Control for North American Air Defense. 1959-1963. (S-Noforn)

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

When this Study is no longer needed, please return it to the USAF

Historical Division Liaison Office.

UNCLASSIFIED
I. THE AIR Foam AND THE NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAM

(U) When the Soviet Union launched Maj. Yuri A. Gagarin into space

on 12 April 1961, it provided dramatic proof that the Russians were substantially ahead of the United States in rocket and space technology.

Gsgarin's IDS-minute orbital flight—the first in history—stimulated

President'John F. Kennedy to propose that the United States accelerate

its own space programs and undertake to land an American on the moon before

1970. Kennedy's remarkable proposal was still being debated by the With

Congress when the Russians launched their second cosmonaut, Maj. Gherman

S. Titov, on 6 August 1961 and successfully recovered him 25 hours and

18 minutes later, atter 17 orbits of the earth.

(U) The Gagarin-Titov flights formed same of the background against

which the Air Force renewed a campaign to win a larger role in the U.S.

space program,* As discussed elsewhere in this narrative, during fiscal

year 1962 the Air Force campaign was partially successful. Nevertheless,

its officials remained largely disappointed and frustrated by their inability to overcome two main obstacles to an expanded USAF space program:

the American commitment to a "space for peace" policy, and the continuing

skepticism of key defense officials toward many USAF space proposals.

(U) Concerning the first obstacle, in his State of the Union message

on 10 January 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower had announced for the

*For earlier background, see Carl Berger, The Air Force in *Ace, Fiscal

(AFCHO, 1966).

--CONFIDENTIAL-

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
2

first time U.S. willingness to accept an international agreement to control

reliably "the development of missiles and satellites." A year later, on

12 January 1958, he had proposed to Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin

that their two countries "agree that outer space should; be used only for

peaceful purposes." In April 1958 the Presidemtpursuedthe same concept

when he submitted to Congress his plan for establishing the civilian

.National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which agency, he

said, would emphasise "the concern of our nation that outer space be

devoted to peaceful and scientific purposes." 1

(U) Several months later Congress enacted the Eisenhower proposal

into law and declared that American space activities "should be devoted

to peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind." Although Congress also

authorised certain military activities in space to insure the nation's

security, it was the "space for peace" theme that was emphaeised by

Eisenhower and :his successor, Kennedy. It was apparent to USAF officials

in 1958 that, as the peace policy was fully implemented, the major share

of apace funds would go to NASA. This quickly proved the Case. * 2

—(-C)- In its attempts to hurdle the second obstacle i the Air Force

repeatedly tried to convince officials in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) of the necessity for a military man-in-space capability.

*NASA's space budget surpassed that_of the Department of Defense (pgp)

for the first time in fiscal year 1 ($926.2 million vs 1813,9 simno),

In fiscal year 1962 NASA's budget rose to $1.'3 'Anion,. DOD's to $1.29

billion. In 1963 the space agency budget made a dramatic gain, rising to

$3.62 billion. DOD's 1963 space budget was $1.57 billion. (Senate Hear

ings-before Cate on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 88th Cong, 2nd Sees,

NASA 1965 Authorisation, Pt 2, App A.)
3

In early 1962 Secretary of Defense Robert S. Namara finally acknowledged

that "an investigation" of the role of military man in space was important

to national security. However, he added that the investigation would have

to be an integral part of the combined NASA-DOD national apace program.

The Air Force, initially pleased by this encouraging attitude, later •

was nonplussed by the comments of Deputy Director of Defense Research

and Iktgineering (DDRIA) John H. Rubel, who bluntly stated that "we cannot

visualise or define now a military mission for a man in space." 3

USAF Campaign Against the "Space for Peace" Policy,

(U) Assignment to NASA of the space exploration mission troubled

USAF officials almost from the moment that it was announced. However,

because of Eisenhower'. strong position on the matter, they felt that

there was little choice but to go along during the final years of his

administration. The election of Kenneiy in November 1960 seemed to open

up new prospects, and the Air Force decided that the time was ripe to

initiate an aggressive information campaign to point up its established

competence in space technology. This campaign had as its goal the winning of greater support from the incoming administration for an expanded

USAF space program.

(U) Unfortunately, the campaign backfired during the winter of 1960-

1961. The chairman of the House Camnittee on Science and Astronautics,

Rep. Overton Brooks, complained about "reported rumblings of dissatisfaction in Air Force and industrial circles concerning the peaceful orientation

of the National Space Program," and he criticized the reported "competition

and duplication" between the Air Force and the space agency. In an
appearance before the Brooks committee, Gen. Thomas D. - Uhite, USAF Chief

of Staff, assured its ambers that the Air Force had supported and mould

continue to support NASA's space activities.4

(U) The fact remained, however, that the very term "space for peace"

tended—in the words of a former Air Force official, Richard Horner--to

"raise the hair on the back of a few people's neck(s)." In July 1961 a

Senate subcommittee discussed the subject with Gen. Bernard A. Schriever,

commander of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). To a question on

whether the. military space program was adequately and properly supported,

Schriever replied, "No sir, I think we have been inhibited in the space

business through the 'space for peace t slogan. I think that there has

been too arbitrary a division made between the Department of Defense and

NASA in this area." 5

(U) The committee, on the basis of this answer, asked Schriever for

a written statement on "what the facts are." It was still being drafted

when the Soviet Union launched a second man into orbit, on 6 August. Titovfo

flight reaffirmed Soviet superiority in space technology and served to-underscore USAF contentions that the American space programkwas in trouble.*

Chairman Richard B. Russell of the Senate Armed Services Comaittee agreed

that the situation was critical and remarked that a satellite of the size

that carried Titov "could be utilised as a very dangerous weapon." Repre

sentative Brooks also concluded that the Russians "obviously nowhere the

*Up to the time of the Titov flight, the United States had managed only

two suborbital flights of 15 minutes duration oath—the flights of,Cmdr.

Alan B. Shepard and Capt. Virgil I. Grissom on 5 May and 21 July 1961,

respectively.

—CONFIDENTML-

(1HIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
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5

capability to send up manned satellites carrying bombe and other equipment

for destroying other nations." 6

(U) The Titer flight was still fresh in everyone's mind when General

Sehrieverl s statement for the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittoe--after being approved by Secretary of the Air For ec Ingene Zuckertwas dispatched on 11 September 1961 to Sen. Jahn Stennis. The AFSC

commander declared that there was "an impending and expanding space threat"

which endangered not only U.S. internatiems1 prestige but its national

security as well. As evidence of this threat, Schriever cited the frequency

and payload miss of the Soviet space launches. He said that although the

U.S. space pregran was being expanded / past efforts had been conducted

"under an unnecessary, self-imposed restrictien-nameir, the artificial

division into 'space fer peaceful purposes' and 'space for military uses,'

when in fact no technical and little other distinction between the two

exists." 7

(U) The classification of space activities as either "peaceful" or

"military" had imposed a great handicap on the United States. Schriever

argued that it gave the Soviet Daunt a

a convenient focus for attack upon our vital, programs....

The Soviets pursue.their own space activities with no selfimposed encumbrances. They do not attempt to advise the world

on the category of activity into which a particular Soviet

space experiment might fit. They operate in space solely in

the national interest of the U.S.S.R., unperturbed or =restrained by world opinion as to whether a Soviet sputnik or

other space vehicle has peaceful or military implicatiOns.

(U) Schriever noted that When the "Russian Air Force officer" had

orbited over the nation's capital a Murders earlier, the Soviet Umidn

had not felt compelled to proclaim the peaceful nature of his journey.

•

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6

UNCLASSIFIED

He camplained that while Moscow accused the United States of espionage

and aggression win launching our observation satellites, navy' in this

country dismiss as having no military significance this latest Titov flight

over our nation's capitol in a five-ton space ship which is quite capable

of bearing military equipment and.weapons." Schriever referred the subcommittee to a recent Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) report,

which had recommended that "the sense of urgency that exists across the

whole front of space projects should be injected into the manned military

space program." If the SAB recommendations were followed, he said, and

"if the artificial division between peaceful and military space programs

is removed," the United States could surpass the Soviet Union in the decade

ahead.9

(U) Senator Stennis' reaction to the Schriever statement was all

that could be desired. Embracing its views, he proceeded to deliver a

speech in the Senate on 26 September 1961 in which he repeated Schriever's

words and arguments to warn the nation about the expanding Soviet space

threat. A few days later, the Air Force learned that the senator planned

to undertake a "detached and exhaustive" stud; of the military role in

space during the impending congressional recess. Stennis also indicated

there would be considerable debate when Congress reconvened "to determine

whether the present division of responsibility between the military and

NASA is proper in light of international developments." I°.

(U) To assist in the preparation of the study, the Air Force early

in October thoroughly briefed a member of the subcommittee staff, Mr.

Herbert Hodge. The congressional interest, together with the obvious

concern of the nation about the Implications of the Titov flight, led

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Gen. Curtis E. LeXay, the new USAF Chief of Staff, to conclude that the

legislators would shortly inquire deeply into the USAF-recommended space

program. as well as its relationship with NASA.11

(U) Although important congressional leaders had became more receptive to USAF's views, the nspace for peace theme was still being

vigorously reasserted by President Kennedy. On 25 September 1961, in an

address to the United Nations general assembly, the President proposed

that the international body extend its charter nto the limits ofman's

exploration in the universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use,

prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or celestial bodies,

and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation....As we

extend the rule of law on Barth, so must we extend it to man's new domain:

outer space.„ 12

(U) Despite the President's policy reaffirmation, USAF leaders now

began to speak out more forcefully for an expanded military space program.

In an address to the American Ordnance Association in Detroit an 26 October,

General Left warned of the possibility that the nation with maneuverable

space vehicles and revolutionary armaments could control the world. Painting to a nstrikingn parallel between news today" and airpower during

the first world war, Lefty added:13

Looking back at the history of airpower, you will recall the

first use of the airplane in World War I was for reconnaissance.

For a time air operations were conducted politely and with

chivalry. Opposing pilots waved and nodded to each other as

they passed. Both aides had equal access to the sky.

But once reconnaissance began changing the course of battles,

the rules changed. It didn't take long before commanders

realised that it was necessary to deny the opposition this

aid from the sky.

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8

Soon apposing airmen were engaged in battle. First it was

air-to-air bombs and small arms. Then they graduated to

the machine gun. After this came bombers and aerospace had

became another area of conflict.

I think we will be very naive if we don u t aspect and prepare

for the same trends in space.

(U) General Schrieveralso spoke out once again in opposition to

the "space for peace" policy. At an American Rocket Society meeting in

New York City, he declared that the artificial separation of space into

peaceful and military categories had inhibited and would continue to

inhibit USAF programs. He said that the ability to operate in space

might well be the key to national survival and pointed to Russian boasts

that the rockets used to launch Gagarin and Titov could just as easily

have carried 100-megaton warheads. Such a possibility, he said, was

"certainly within the technical state of the art." 14

(U) These arguments, advanced at a time when the Soviet Union held

a monopoly on manned orbital space flight, won adherents among top

administration officials. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman of

the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), commented that it was

not useful to pretend that "arbitrary distinctions can or should be made

between military and civilian space efforts." Even President Kennedy

seemed to express a more positive view toward the military role in space.

In an address to a Los Angeles group on 18 November, he declared that he

did not believe that "we want to permit the Soviet tbion to dominate space,

with all that it might mean to our peace and security in the coming

years." 15

(U) This changing emphasis on the part of the administration,

. together with the increasing concern of members of Congress, seemed to

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9

the Air Force to presage an expansion of its space role. Some concrete

evidence of change came in December 1961, when the Air Force was authorized to accelerate the Dyne-Soar program.* (hfortunately, two months

later the promise of a greater role in space was suddenly dissipated by

a single, dramatic event: Lt. Col. John Glenn's successful Mercury orbital

flight.

(U) The Glenn flight on 20 February 1962 abruptly ended the Soviet

monopoly of manned orbital space flight, produced a great feeling of

relief and euphoria throughout the nation, and brought a vast outpouring

of international acclaim and good will to the United States, not only for

the achievement but for the public manner in which it had been conducted.

It also had the effect of reducing pressures on NASA and undermined Air

Force hopes for achieving a larger role in the national space program.

Delighted by the success of the Glenn flight and, later, by the flight of

Cmdr. Scott Carpenter on 24 May 1962, Congress lost interest in pursuing

a vigorous reexamination of the separation of responsibility for apace

activities between NASA and DOD.

(U) Thus, the situation reverted in large measure to that it had

been. Ch 13 June 1962 Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric

told a Senate committee that while the Defense Department remained "very

conscious of the need of taking out certain technological insurance,"

it continued to support the national objective "of the peaceful use for

16

outer space." Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and

Engineering, also stated specifically that =was "fully in accord with

the language and intent of the Space Act." He added that "we have no

*See Chapter III.

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UNCLASSIFIED

10

intention to preempt those areas which are the proper pursuit of the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and as . a sign of this

their planned effort for the next year in space is very much larger than

those within the Department of Defense." * 17

(U) On 14 June the President also commented on the civilian-military

space program issue. Responding to a correspondent's question, Kennedy

said that the existing "mix" between civilian and military space efforts--

with NASA retaining the prime responsibility--"should continue." As a

result of these policy statements, the Air FOrce campaign to win a larger

role in space and to modify the "space for peace" policy came to an end,

at least temporarily.18

USAF Support of the Lunar Proiect 

(U) During the summer of 1961, following the President's announcement of the manned lunar landing project, the Air Fbrce and NASA began a

joint study of possible laundh sites to support the program. In charge

of the study were Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, commander of the Air FOrce

Missile Test Center+ and Dr. Kurt H. Debut, chief of NASA's launch operations at Cape Canaveral. After a month-long review of potential sites on

both coasts, Davis and Debus in July 1961 recommended Cape Canaveral and

proposed that the government acquire approximately 80,000 acres north of

*These remarks were made in response to congressional queries concerning

a New York Times article on 10, June 1962 which claimed, DOD was planning

to expand its military space program.

+Besides serving as the AFMTC commander, Davis was DOD's representative

for coordinating all range support activities with NASA.

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UNCLASSIFIED

the existing base, already saturated with missile and space launch

complexes.* 19

(U) On 18 July the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board

(AACB), a joint DOD-NASA agency, and, shortly thereafter, top defense

and space agency officials, reviewed the proposal. Since costs associated

with the moon project at Cape Canaveral were easily identifiable, OSD

proposed--and NASA agreed--that the space agency should seek congressional

appropriations for land acquisition and for all improvements, facilities,

equipment, and range support needed solely for the lunar expedition.

NASA also agreed to accept and abide by the existing rules established by

DOD "in their range-operator/range-user relationship at the AMR gtlantic

Missile Rawl... unless changed by mutual agreement." 20

(U) On 24 August Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and NASA Administrator

James E. Webb formally agreed to these arrangements. The signed agreement stated that a single agency—the Air Force—would manage and direct

all range operations to include range safety, launch scheduling, and other

services. Air Force responsibilities, however, would exclude "technical

test control of NASA launch control operations." The agreement also

declared that, as agent for NASA, the Air Force would prepare and maintain

a master plan of all facilities in the new area. NASA would be represented on the master planning board. The Air Fbree also would prepare

design criteria for all land improvements and range support facilities,

subject to NASA approval, and design, develop, and procure all

*When detailed surveys were later completed, the specific amount of land

sought totalled 72,644 acres.

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12 UNCLASSIFIED

communication., range instrumentation, etc., to support NASA

activities.21

(U) USAF officials welcomed the assignment and, in fact, had already

begun drafting plans for it. Through a strong supporting role, they hoped

that the Air Force might eventually gain a "full partnership" with the

space agency. As an additional step in this direction, on 4 August 1961

Secretary Zuckert proposed to OSD that the Air Force be designated DOD

"executive agent" for NASA support. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric noted, however, that NASA's arrangements for the lunar mission were still in a

formative stage and that the USAF proposal "might be premature or inappropriate." 22

(U) Anticipating a favorable decision in the future, Headquarters

USAF on 1 September directed General Schriever to develop as soon as

possible an organization and procedures to insure effective support of the

space agency's programs and authorised him to discuss these matters directly

with the Associate Administrator of NASA, Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Within

two weeks, such discussions had begun. All Air Staff agencies also were

notified of Zuckert's desire that full support be given the space agency.23

(U) Meanwhile, Zuckert directed Dr. Brockway McMillan, the Assistant

Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, to assume responsibility for developing NASA-DOD working relationships and appropriate

directives. To obtain OSD guidance, McMillan met with DMZ officials and

they agreed that the Air Force possessed the bulk of the DOD resources

needed to support NASA. They further noted that these resources would also

be supporting high priority defense projects, and it would be essential to

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UNCLASSIFIED

clearly delineate "management responsibilities and interface procedures

with NASA." McMillan subsequently met with NASA officials to discuss

these subjects.24

(U) Following these talks, Secretary Zuckert on 28 December 1961

asked OSD to approve the creation of the Office of Deputy Commander,

Manned Space Flight, Air Force Systems Command, manned by the three services, to plan for and provide support to NASA's lunar landing project.

The proposal had been coordinated with NASA, and Zuckert requested

authorization to establish the office without delay.

25

(U) OSD did not act immediately on this proposal, apparently

because it was then involved in drafting a directive an DOD support of

NASA. On 24 February 1962—after it had coordinated with the services--

OSD issued this directive. It stated that DOD would support NASA "in

order to employ effectively the nation's total resources for the achievement of common civil and military space objectives." OSD retained

responsibility for policy and program decisions in this area but assigned

the Secretary of the Air Force responsibility for research, development,

test, and engineering of systems "and for the detailed project level

planning necessary" to implement such support. He also was made responsible for establishing and maintaining "contracts and management

arrangements with NASA as are necessary to carry out such programs and

projects." 26

(U) While the draft OSD directive was being circulated prior to

issuance, an AFSC task group appointed by General Schriever met with

NASA officials to work out the details of an agreement on the organization

UNCLASSIFIED
14

UNCLASSIFIED

and mission of the proposed office of Deputy Commander. AFSC submitted

these to Assistant Secretary McMillan, who approved them in early

February, and the task group then issued a final report on 26 February.

Several days later the USAF Vice Chief of Staff authorized AFSC to

establish the new office. However, this authority was quickly withdrawn

pending OSD approval. Secretary Zuckert on 28 March informed OSD of the

plan to organize the new office under Maj. Gen. 0.J. Ritland, who would be

authorized to use the entire AFSC staff and to issue directives to pertinent

field elements. Zuckert reported that NASA officials had agreed that such

authority was needed to provide a clear focal point for relations between

it and the Air Force.27

(U) OSD formally approved USAFt s proposal on 6 April, and AFSC

activated the new office on 1 May. NASA provided office space for Ritlandts

staff at its Washington headquarters, in close proximity to its Director

of Manned Space Flight. On 23 May Ritland arrived to take over his new

duties.28

Air Force-NASA Disagreements 

(U) Several months prior to creation of the Ritland office, Air Force

and NASA officials found themselves involved in a dispute over the interpretation of the Webb-Gilpatric agreement of 24 August 1961. The specific

event which triggered the dispute was a USAF proposal to place a Titan III

facility

*

 on the southern portion of the land being purchased by NASA and

to acquire an additional 10,900 acres to the north "to protect the full

launch potential of the Atlantic Missile Range." Space agency officials

*See Chapter V.

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15

at Cape Canaveral strongly objected to this proposal,'as well as to a

related plan to allow a certain amount of "overflight" of each other's

facilities. 29

(U) When USAF and space agency officials at the Cape were unable

to resolve their disagreement, in early 1962 General Schriever and

D. Brainerd Holmes, Director of NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight,

joined the discussions. In late March, following these talks, NASA

finally agreed to a Titan III site on the southern portion of the new

land and to "limited overflight" as a basis for site master planning of

AMR launch pads. But the space agency officials insisted that they retain

a veto power over the Air Force "on the extent to which overflight will

be used in siting, if operational disagreements exist." 30

(U) The dispute came to the attention of a House subcommittee

which, during hearings on 29 March, questioned Rubel and Seamans. Later,

the two officials were asked to submit separate answers to 28 subcommittee

questions concerning the Webb-Gilpatric agreement. The answers revealed

that OSD-Air Force and the space agency were in substantial disagreement

over the meaning of the Webb-Gilpatric agreement and AMR relationships.

(U) For example, OSD argued that the Air Force—as agent for NASA--

retained responsibility for fulfilling lunar program requirements for

range support and that the space agency "never had a complete 'right to

site facilities'...." NASA, on the other hand, declared that it had never

intended to relinquish its right to site launch facilities in the new

area, and it disputed the OSD-Air Force statements concerning range

operator-user relationships. NASA argued that since its funds were being

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UNCLASSIFIED

used for the manned lunar landing portion of the range, it was responsible

to Congress. "Hence /LASS must approve planning and management decisions

of the Air Force." 31

(U) Disturbed by this public disagreement, Rubel asked Assistant

Secretary McMillan to reexamine the range dispute. In mid-April 1962

McMillan filed a preliminary report with Secretary Zuckert in which he

noted that the Titan IZI siting issue was only a part of "an overall NASA/

DOD relationship problem." He said the dispute was being generated, to

some extent, by both NASA and the Air Force "in hopes of establishing long

range principles." On 18 April he reported to Rubel that the difficulties

could not be solved at the "Davis-Debus level." He said the staffs of OSDAir Force and NASA had taken "fire and conflicting positions on the authority

and responsibility of the range commander" for the lunar project. TO break

the deadlock, he suggested formation of a headquarters-level working group

to draw up a set of agreements on as many aspects of the interagency AMR

relationships as possible. He recommended that General Ritland, as AFSC

deputy commander for manned apace flight, represent DOD. Rubel subsequently

approved this recommendation 32

(U) Thereupon, Secretary Zuckert directed General Ritland to organise

a working group to begin negotiations with NASA. The Ritland group initially

met informally with NASA officials and, on 20 June, reported that the issues

were so complicated that each should be treated individually and would

require prolonged negotiation. At the end of the year these negotiations

were under way; they were to continue for another six months before a new AMR

agreement superseded the short-lived Webb-Gilpatric agreement.13

UNCLASSIFIED
17

(U) Throughout this period, it should be noted, NASA officials were

well aware of Air Force plans and hopes for achieving a larger role in

the national space program. Thus, in a letter to Secretary Gilpatric in

June 1962, NASA chief James Webb acknowledged that ',people and interests

concerned with both our military and civilian space program', had strong

convictions that things could be done "differently or better, at least

from their standpoints. „ However, he observed that NASA's programs represented presidential policy no conduct the space effort with a civilian,

peaceful, international orientation, as long as possible and to the fullest

extent possible, but always to develop the technology and preserve the

ability to move rapidly to a military emphasis should this be required."

Webb expressed the view that NASA could transfer to the military services

minimum delay" space systems under development, if they were required

in the national interest.35

(U) But USAF officials remained skeptical about the feasibility

and practicality of relying upon civilian-oriented apace systems. Lt. Gen.

James Ferguson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Besearch and Technology,

expressed the Air Force view during an appearance before Congress in early

1962:36

The characteristics of manned military space systems must

necessarily be considerably different from manned space

vehicles employed for scientific experimentation and exploration. These differences are related to such factors as launch

response time, maneuverability in orbit, maneuverability

during re-entry phase, precision recovery with conventional

landing, vehicle reuse after minimum refurbishment, and weapon

incorporation.

It was for these military requirements, *WI were not being met, that the

Air Force continued to agitate for an expanded military apace program.

--SECRET-

(inns PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
II. USAF SPACE PLANNING

1$)- Soviet space achievements and the President's decision to

undertake a lunar expedition not only stimulated the US4F campaign to win

a larger role in apace, but also an internal planning effort which produced an official and comprehensive Air Force apace plan. Its need was

first suggested . hy Maj. Gen. William B. Neese, Director of Development

Planning, who believed it would help clarify Air Force views on apace

objectives in light of the expanding American program and would assist in

winning OSD support. On 21 July 1961 the Chief of Staff authorised General

Leese to organize a task force to prepare the plan. Within a brief period

General Neese had assembled a working group which included Air Staff and

AFSC representatives. After six weeks of effort, they completed an 88-page

document which General LeMay approved an 20 September as the Air Force

Space Plan.1

The Air Force Space Plan 

-11W The theme of the Air Force Space Plan was the need for a larger

and more aggressive research and development effort to provide the technological foundation for expanded military apace operations. The plan called

fora greater research effort in such areas as guidance, aerospace propulsion,

improved sensors, etc., and strongly recommended that Dyne-Soar development

be revised and accelerated to go directly to manned orbital flight. The

plan also urged establishment of a broad and accelerated bioastronautica

program in cooperation with NASA, to provide data for future military space

SECRET
19

operations, and suggested that NASA share with the Air Force the results

of its earth orbital programs "in order to provide for early multi-manned

testing of military subsystems in space for duration up to two weeks." It

further recommended that studies and experiments be accelerated to select.

the configuration "for a manned, maneuverable, recoverable spacecraft and

a long-duration military test space station." 2

-1.0 In other program areas, the Air Force Space Plan recommended

(1) continuation of Midas, Discoverer, X-15, and Blue Scout "with their

present emphasise' (2) acquisition of a large, reliable, economical military space booster able to place 10,000 to 50,000 pounds of payload into

a 300-mile orbit; (3) revision and expansion of the satellite inspector

(Saint) effort to include demonstrations of unmanned techniques for rendezvous, inspection, docking, transfer of fuel, and satellite capture and

neutralization; (4) investigation and demonstration of techniques for

satellite interception and neutralization by nonorbiting vehicles as well

as nonrendezvousing satellites; and (5) transfer of the space-based antiballistic missile (Bambi) project from the Advanced Research Projects

Agency (ARPA) to the Air Force.* 3

---to In early October 1961 Air Staff officials briefed Secretary

Zuckert, who remarked that the plan would require periodic revision as

conditions changed. It was subsequently distributed throughout the

headquarters and a formal briefing was given to the bioastronautics group

of the President's Science Advisory Committee and to Deputy DDRAE Rubel.

*These several programs will be discussed separately in the following

chapters.
20

Although cementing favorably on the presentation, Rubel indicated that

he would not recommend formal OSD approval. Despite this, the Air Staff

considered the document an important acquisition, having provided it a

unified and official position on Air Force space objectives. Same months

later, in accordance with Secretary Zuckertl s suggestion, a new working

group began an examination of necessary changes to the plan. This work

was still under way at the close of the period.

4

The Ferguson Task Force 

(U) As a follow-up to the space plan, Headquarters USAF undertook

to prepare a comprehensive programming document that outlined costs and

schedules to achieve its space objectives, and on 4 December 1961 the Vice

Chief of Staff. named General Ferguson to head a temporary task force for

this purpose. Initially, the task group concentrated on a defense of the

fiscal year 1963 budget and an outline of the USAF space goals for fiscal

year 1964.

5

-40- Ferguson organized eight panelis to prepare the budget defense

and the 1964 recommendations. Completed in early 1962, the work of these

panels formed the basis for General Ferguson's presentations to several

congressional committees in February. In summary, the task force proposed

an increase of the USAF fiscal year 1963 apace budget

(versus OSD's proposed budget of $826.2 million) and to $1.86 billion in

fiscal year 1964 (versus OSD's proposed budget of $1.32 billion).6

(U) On 12 February Ferguson presented the. Air Force case for an

expanded military space program to the House Subcommittee on DOD appropriations. Referring to the Air Force Space Plan, he stated that the

SECRET
21

prime objective was to exploit space ' leo as to retain U.S. military

superiority and thus to insure the peaceful use of space.“ He reviewed

relationships between the Air Force and NASA and said that both agencies

agreed that their programs „must be mutually supporting rather than campetitive. n However, operational and other technological requirements

were not common to both agencies, and the differences were of sufficient

importance to warrant a separate and larger USAF apace development

effort. 7

(U) Ferguson also told the committee that there was a military

requirement to inspect foreign satellites, provide a defense against

ballistic missile attack, and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance.

He emphasised in particular the Importance of getting a military man into

space:

8

He is unique in his ability to make on-the-spot judgments. He

can discriminate and select from alternatives which have not

been anticipated. He is adaptable to rapidly changing situations. Thus, mane s inclusion in military space systems will

significantly increase the flexibility of the system, as well

as increase the probability of mission success....

In subsequent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee,

General Ferguson reiterated this testimony and specifically stated in

answer to a question that the Air Force could use $250 million more

than programmed by OSD for fiscal year 1963.9

McNamara and pace Budget AuRmentation

That USAF space expansion efforts appeared to be making some

headway became evident on 22 February 1962, when Secretary McNamara

forwarded to Secretary Zuckert a lengthy memoramtma on the space program
22

in general and Dyna-Soar in particular. *

 It seemed to reflect a more

sympathetic attitude and "noticeable liberalization," as General Ferguson

remarked, of McNamara's previous views. He agreed, for example, that an

investigation of the role of military man in apace was important to

national security and that military space performance specifications and

design requirements might differ substantially "from nonmilitary applications." On the other hand, he said that in the absence of a clearly

defined space mission, the Air Force should direct its efforts to the

establishment "of the necessary technological base and experience on which

to expand--with the shortest time lag--in the event a firm manned military

space mission and requirements are established in the future." 10

, c5 Despite certain qualifications„ McNamara's comments and policy

statements were especially welcomed since they partially reflected the

military space policy that the Air Force had so long advocated. On 12 March

General Ferguson remarked that he was particularly encouraged by McNamara's

statement on the need to move ahead in space technology, even though all

missions were not clearly defined. "I feel," Ferguson wrote to General

Schriever, "we should accelerate our efforts in the area of advanced

technology with the expectation that our program will receive more favorable

consideration by DOD." 11'

(U) •In the weeks that followed the Air Fbrce continued to press its

case. Thus, in a speech at Worcester, Mass., on 28 March 1962, General

LeMay vigorously argued that the United States could not afford to let a

potential enemy secure "an ominous advantage" in space and he urged a step

lip in military space development in order to prevent "a fatal technological

*Discussed further in Chapter III.

MINFIDENTIM
SECRET

surprise in the 19704." In an evaluation of LeMay's speech, the

Washington Post commented on 2 April that Air Force officials were somewhat in the same position as their Air Corps elders of the 19301a—"having

supreme faith in the overwhelming need for military aerospace power but

unable to demonstrate it." 12

4s), The Post article evidently came to Secretary McNamara's attention because that same day, 2 April, during a conversation with LeKey,

he offered to reconsider fiscal year 1963 funding of the USAF space program and asked for augmentation requirements and justifications. The

Chief of Staff Immediately directed General Ferguson to prepare a list

of space projects for which additional resources should be requeated.13

Ilk Ferguson tackled the assignment by first reviewing the data

compiled by his task force the previous January and February. He then

put together a new package that called for an additional $400 million in

supplemental fiscal year 1963 funding. Specifically, for currently

approved systems, Ferguson wanted $37 million additional for Dyna-Soar,

$25 million for Saint, $44 million for Midas, and $72 million for Titan

III. For projects in the advanced system program, he recommended $45

million for a military orbital development system, $12 million for a nonorbiting satellite interception system, and $20 million for a military

satellite communication system. Additional funds also were requested for

several segments of the advanced technology program. 14

15), The Ferguson fund augmentation package was presented to the

Systems Review Board on 5 April and accepted by it as "realistic." However, Dr. McMillan concluded that the package was padded and warned the

•
24

Air Staff that it would be a mistake to submit such a large request,

particularly since it included projects previously rejected by OSD. In

line with this advice, the Air Staff substantially pruned the package,

eliminating "marginal" projects. Finally, on 16 May 1962 General LeMay

forwarded to OSD'his recommended augmentation of $252.9 million for fiscal year 1963. At the close of the period the Air Staff was still awaiting

McNamara's response.* 15

Ihe Five-Year Space Program

j,kr Meanwhile, during the spring of 1962 several events coalesced

and led the Air Force to embark on an effort to prepare a five-year space

program. In April an AFSC Space Technical Objectives Task Croup—organized

at Space Systems Division (SSD) under the direction of Lt. Gen. H.M. Nstes,Jr.--

undertook to produce a set of "time phased technical objectives which if

attained will provide the USAF with the technological base required to

implement the Air Force Space Plan." On 14 June General Estes briefed

defense officials, including Rubel and Dr. L.L. Kavanau, OSD's Special

Assistant for Space, on the group's preliminary findings. Afterward,

Kavanau commented that OSD was preparing a five-year space program and he

indicated the Air Force should do likewise. Secretary McNamara earlier had

made a similar suggestion to the Chief of Staff.16

01 Whereupon, on 26 June—a day after the Notes group completed its

work and began briefing AFSC and Air Staff representatives on the results

of its study—General LeMay directed General Ferguson to draft a five-year

*When the response came, it was largely negative. DDR&K informed LeMay on

20 August that it was difficult "to justify any blanket increase in funding

for space programs at this time." (Memo, **own to Ws USAF, 20 Aug 62, subj:

FY 1963 Fund Augmentation for the Air Force Space Program.)
25

USAF space program. It was to contain a clear statement of Air Force

objectives, a definition of the required technical objectives to achieve

them, and an estimate of funds required. General Ferguson immediately

began organizing a task group and asked key Air Staff and field command

representatives to participate. An 'faction staff,' would prepare the

initial program drafts, drawing upon the Estes task group reports, after

which an executive committee of general officers would review and approve

the final version of the five-year apace program. The first meeting of

the task group was set for 5 July 1962.

17
26 SECRET

DYNA-SOAR

(U) During fiscal year 1962 the Air Force's hopes for getting a

man into space rested largely on pyna-Soar, a winged, hypersonic glider

system. As currently planned, Dyna-Soar involved a three-step development.

Step I called for the construction and testing of the space glider in suborbital flights, beginning in 1964. In Step II, scheduled for 1966, the

Dyna-Soar would be launched into orbit and undertake controlled re-entry

and landings. Finally, Step III would involve the development of Dyna-Soar

military hardware based on the technology learned. At the beginning of the

period, the Air Force was concentrating on developments leading to a demonstration of Step I suborbital capabilities, the only step thus far approved

by OSP.1

(U) However, anticipating possible project acceleration, the Air

Force had prepared a "standby" plan which called for merging Steps I and

II into a single, continuous phase. This plan formed the basis of a propose

submitted to the Air Fbrce in the spring of 1961 by Boeing, the prime

Pyna-Soar contractor. Seeking to take advantage of the interest generated

by the Gagarin orbital flight, Boeing recommended an accelerated effort

(Projec• Streamline) which it said would save substantial development time

and money and lead to earlier orbital flights.2

Following AFSG t s evaluation of the Boeing proposal, General

Schriever on 1 August 1961 forwarded his recommendation to Headquarters

USAF, urging approval. He said that Dyna-Soar could achieve piloted

orbital flight during calendar year 1964, two-and-one-half years earlier
27

than planned, and that it was flan essential step to a timely operational

military manned space system." Schriever noted that total costs would

be leas than the step-by-step approach, although funding requirements in

fiscal year 1962 would be. higher than programmed. The major unknown

factor, he said, was the Dyna-Soar booster; he recommended that the Air

Force adopt the proposed Phoenix A launch system. * Schriever added that

the entire national booster program was currently under review by a

DOD NASA committee and that its recommendations would affect any final

decision.3

LS') Following receipt of the Schriever recommendations and after

being briefed on Project Streamline, the Air Staff agreed that Steps I

and II should be merged into a single Dyna-Soar task—irrespective of

final booster selection, At this point—early August 1961—NASA offered

to provide the Air Fbrce with Saturn C-1 boosters for launching Dyna-Soar.

The Air Force studied this proposal for two months but finally rejected

it, primarily because prospects for development of the Titan III appeared

good. 4

Z) Meanwhile, Secretary Zuckert provided the Air Staff with some

guidance on the question of Dyna-Soar acceleration. At a meeting of the

Designated Systems Management Group (DSMG),"1- Zuckert directed the staff

*A system based on a solid first-stage engine and a liquid second stage.

+Eetabliehed 25 July 1961, the DSMG replaced the Air Force Ballistic

Missile and Space Committee. The members included the Secretary and Under

Secretary of the Air %roe, the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force for

Financial Management, Materiel, and Research and Development, the General

Counsel, the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff

for Operations, Research and Technology, and Systems and Logistics, the

Comptroller, the Director of Missile and Satellite Systems, the Chairman

of the Systems Review Board, and the Commander Air Force Systems Command.

Purpose of the DSI was to assist the Secretary in managing the most important system programs of the Air Force (SAF Order 117.1, 25 Jul 61).

-MET-
28

to continue the three-step approach pending a final determination of the

role of Dyna-Soar in the manned, military space program. He said he

believed action could be taken, within the current confines ($100 million)

of the 1962 budget approved by 03D, to facilitate the transition of Step I

to the Streamline approach. The Secretary also requested the Air Staff to

take another look at alternate possibilities for achieving controlled

manned space flight and submit its overall study results to him by October,

with the role of Dyna-Soar clearly defined. 5

,(61 Pending completion of this new study, the Air Force on 13 September 1961 submitted its proposed 1963 budget to OSD. At the same time, it

formally proposed eliminating the suborbital phase of Dyna-Soar and going

directly into an orbital program of 18 flights, with a first-flight date

of late 1964. On 22 September OSD tentatively rejected the proposal and

informed the Air Force that Dyna-Soar plans should remain unchanged pending completion of the Zuckert-directed evaluation. For fiscal year 1963,

6

Dyna-Soar funding was established at $125 million.

"A Vehicle LAking for a Mission"

01 During September 1961 representatives from AFSC, SAB, Rand, and

the Mitre Corporation, working under the direction of General Estes, under-

. took the program review. Sharp differences of opinion soon appeared,

especially between SSD and the Aeronautical Sys:items Division (ASD), at

Wright-Patterson AFB, concerning the best approach to placing "military man

usefully in space." A number of old and new approaches were suggested,

including proposals that Dyna-Soar be terminated as a glider and reoriented

to a lifting body design or that only Step I be accelerated or that

Streamline be fully implemented.7

•
SECRET 29

pr) The lack of agreement reflected the fact that the working

members had difficulty deciding on a mission for man in space that was

"clearly military, of urgent importance...and completely different from

a NASA assignment." As one panel member expressed the basic problem:

"The Oyna-Soar is a vehicle looking for a mission." On 28 September

General rates summarized the review effort in a report to General

Schriever. After noting the difficulty in reaching a consensus, he

urged that the overall man-in-space program be based, as previously

recommended, on the Dyna-Soar Streamline proposal. The project should

be reoriented, Bates said, "toward a specific, saleable, unquestioned

military mission" which he saw as being "a manned space system for

inspection and interceptor purposes." 8

(U) Secretary McNamara, meanwhile, told USAF officials after a

briefing at Boeing's West Coast plant that he was still not convinced

that Dyna-Soar represented the best approach to assessing the role of

military man in space. He asked the Air Force to review the total program and come up with specific recommendations. McNamara's skepticism

was reflected in his subsequent decision not to release the 05.3 million

add-on fiscal year 1962 funds which Congress had appropriated specifically for Dyna-Soar. In explaining why he thought that existing funds

($100 million) were sufficient, McNamara referred to the fact that

Dyne-Soar was being reviewed and that it might be reoriented to produce

more rapidly "the experience and technological capabilities relevant to

presently unforseeable military needs." It a reorientation were feasible,

he said, "proper scheduling of flights and use of launch vehicles should

make it possible within the funds requested for fiscal year 1962." 9

SECRET
30

The Air Force White Paper

S,21 The review by the Fates group brought Dyna-Soar back full circle

to the Streamline proposal. During October 1961, AFSC prepared an abbreviated Dyna-Soar development plan based on the Streamlinl concept, which

called for a "Phase Beta" study to determine approaches to design "a superorbital vehicle." The plan also incorporated provisions for a supporting

applied research and technological test program. The first unmanned

Dyna-Soar orbital flight was scheduled for November 1964 and the first

piloted flight in May 1965.

On 18 October McMillan noted his agreement to the plan but

suggested that references to military applications be deemphasised in

future briefings to OSD. Several days later Dr. Kavanau reviewed the plan

and agreed that it was sensible to go directly to an orbital phase. AFSC

subsequently drafted two alternative development plans for the DSNG. Plan

"A" called for the first manned orbital flight in Mgr 1965 as previously

planned, with funding requirements of $100 million and $156 million in

fiscal years 1962 and 1963. Plan "B" would delay the first manned flight

until October 1965 and would require funding of $100 million and $125

million, respectively, during the same two-year period.11

of Following a presentation to the management group on 14 November

1961, Air Force tbder Secretary Joseph V. Charyk asked that still another

development plan be prepared--based on the Dyna-Soar/Titan III booster

combination with funding not necessarily tied to $100 million in 1962.

He also asked the Air Staff to prepare a "White Paper" defining the military manned apace mission and stressing the role of Dyna-Soar. Finally,
SECRET

31

he directed a review of the proposed Titan III plan to insure that it

would not be oriented specifically and solely to Dyna-Soar.

,(a) On 16 November the revised Dyna-Soar development plan and the

White Paper were completed, reviewed, and then forwarded to Secretary

McNamara the following day. The plan provided for an all-orbital DyneSoar program of 10 flights beginning in late 1964 and using Titan III

boosters. Fiscal year 1962 and 1963 funding estimates were $112.4 and

$179.4 million, respectively, less Titan III development coats. Total

Dyna-Soar coats through fiscal year 1967 were estimated at $666.2 million.

There was no mention of military subsystem or system development

objectives.The White Paper accompanying the plan contained a carefully

prepared statement on the requirement for a manned military apace capability. Citing the U.S. manned lunar landing undertaking and the Soviet's

impressive man-in-space program, the Air Force declared that "if we concede

that man can go into space for peaceful missions, we must admit that man

can go into this same environment for military purposes." Therefore, the

Air Force contended that "military requirements should be directed toward

the development of certain fundamental capabilities in space which may

later provide the basis for military systems required in the national

defense." 14

The White Paper noted that the characteristics of military apace

vehicles and their ancillary equipment would differ significantly from

those employed for scientific experiments. Dyna-Soar was specifically

designed for quick launching, maneuverability during re-entry phase,

precision recovery, and vehicle reuse—characteristics not of primary
SECRET

32

interest in NASA's scientific endeavours. The Air Force noted that all

groups familiar with the subject conceded that Dyna-Soar was Han appropriate initial step in any manned space effort and that it may well be

capable of modification to meet a more demanding re-entry environment." 15

SZI After reviewing the White Paper and the development plan and

discussing them with Assistant Secretary McMillan, in early December 1961

Dr. Brown approved the shift to an accelerated orbital flight program.

At the same time he authorised the Air Force to terminate work on the

Titan II booster' and use Titan III in its place. Whereupon, on 8 December

Charyk directed that a revised Dyna-Soar development plan incorporating

these decisions be readied for the Designated Systems Management Group

within 90 days. Funding levels for fiscal years 1962 and 1963 were set

at the $100 million and $115 million level, respectively.16

(U) Pending completion of the new development plan, Headquarters

USAF incorporated Brown's guidance into a system program directive which

it issued on 27 December 1961. It specified that Titan IIIC would be the

booster for Dyna-Soar and that only single orbit flights were contemplated.

The directive called for AFSC to complete anew system package plan by

March 1962.17

,(C Secretary McNamara formally approved the decision to accelerate

Dyna-Soar on 22 February 1962. In his memorandum to Zuckert of that date,

which provided guidance to the Air Force on the manned military space program, McNamara agreed that Dyna-Soar was an appropriate first step and he

endorsed the principle of going directly to orbital flight. He asked the

*Titan II had been approved as the Dyna-Soar booster in January 1961.

-SECRET

(THIS PAGE Is-e9NFmnsmut)
33

Air Force to submit a detailed development plan (already being drafted)

and to redesignate Dyna-Soar as an experimental vehicle, thereby eliminating

weapon system and military test connotations.18

Revised Program Planning

A4r Meanwhile, based on Brown-Charyk guidance of December 1961, AFSC

had proceeded with a. revised system package plan that could fit within the

"tight" confines of the $100,and $1.15 million limits in.fiscal years 1962

and 1963. 41 15 March AFSC had completed a preliminary plan that showed

the initial unmanned orbital flight would slip from late 1964 to May 1965,

due to the restrictive funding. Bven with this slippage, an additional

$25 million would be needed in fiscal year 1963 to maintain the program in

phase with the planned availability of Titan III.

19

k6 The Air Staff recognized the funding difficulties but felt compelled to recommend to the DS1G that it stay with the twoitp115 million

program. On 20 March 1962 Secretary Zuckert accepted this recommendation.

At the same time he asked the Air Staff to compile detailed data on that

was possible within the funding limitations and to supply reasons ',why

these fiscal restrictions make the program with present schedules exceptionally risky in meeting the most limited objectives." 20

()%( On 11 April, after AFSC had compiled the requested data, General

Schriever forwarded his views to Headquarters USAF. He again declared

that the Dyna-Soar funding level was clearly inadequate and would not permit the Air Force to meet a schedule compatible with the development of

Titan III and that an additional would definitely be needed

in fiscal year 1963. DDR&B was so notified later in the month.21
34

0 On 23 April AFSC submitted the Dyna-Soar system program package

plan to Air Force headquarters, along with a program summary and alternative

funding proposals. Secretary Zuckert then asked McMillan to make a detailed

review of the soundness of the proposed technical approach. In early May

1962, accompanied by several Air Staff representatives, McMillan visited the

project office at Wright-Patterson AFB. Upon his return, McMillan recommended revisions to the package plan "to further augment technical confidence in the program,' Which increased Plan A program cos

million in fiscal year 1963 and Plan B costs to $135 mdllion.

00 On 25 May 1962 McMillan forwarded a final system package plan

to Brown, along with the program summary and funding and launch schedule

alternatives. The plan called for the manufacture of eight gliders for

flight test purposes, of which two would be aimed at demonstrating a multiorbit capability. During the course of the flight program, about 750

specific functions would be measured and recorded aboard the glider and

then telemetered to ground stations.

23

,(-51 On 6 July Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric informed the Air

Force that OSD would support an increased expenditure of $20 million for

Dyne-Soar, raising the resources to $135 million in 1963. Gilpatric

directed that the add-on should be used toward achieving the following

system developments: (1) a first Dyna-Soar drop from a B-52 mother ship

in January 1965; (2) a first unmanned glider launched into orbit by Titan

III in July 1965; and (3) a first piloted orbital flight in January

1966.24

(U) A few weeks earlier, in keeping with the momentarily expected

reorientation and with McNamara l s guidance of 22 February, the Air Force
35

had formal4 designated Dyna-Soar as the X-20 research teat vehicle.25

Thus, at the opening of the new fiscal year, Dyna-Soar had new program

objectives, new nomenclature, and a slightly better fiscal outlook.

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
36 --CONFIDERIAt

IV. MILITARY ORBITAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

szl During fiscal year 1962 the Air Force received some encouragement from CeD to pursue investigations of a proposed manned military space

station. In his 22 February memorandum on USAFf s recamomwted military

space program, which suggested there was a need for such a station,

Secretary McNamara agreed nthat a apace laboratory to conduct sustained

tests of military men and equipment under actual environmental conditions,

impossible to duplicate on earth, would be most desirable. „ 1 The Air

Staff considered this statement as official guidance and immediately undertook an intensive planning effort to identify and describe the technical

requirements and proposed configuration of the space vehicle, which it

hoped could be launched in 1966.

Early, Space Station Planning

(U) The concept of an orbital space station was, of course, not

unique to the Air Force, it being first introduced into scientific literature by the German theorist, Hermann Oberth. In his pioneering work on

space flight published in 1923, Oberth suggested launching nobserving

stations,' into orbit from which man would be able nto see fine detail on

earth. ,' He visualized it as having a number of useful functions, such as

warning ships in the northern sea lanes of ice floes and serving as refueling stations for extraterrestrial flight. In case of war, Oberth said,

the stations would have nstrategie value.„
37

(U) °berth's ideas were adopted by the German rocket expert:: at

Peenemunde, the research station on the Baltic where the V-21 8 of World

War II--the first man-made objects to fly through space--were developed.

Drawings of a large, manned space station, prepared by Peenemunde scientints and captured by American forces after Germany's collapse, were

published in the United States in Life magazine on 23 July 1945.2

(U) Within what was then the Army Air Forces (AAF), certain officials

became interested in the military implications of German space planning.

This interest WW1 reflected on 12 November 1945 in the final war report

of Gen. H.R. Arnold, in which the commanding general of the AAF discussed the possible use of space weapons: "We must be read► to launch...

from unexpected directions. This can be done with true space ships,

capable of operating outside the earth's atmosphere. The design of such

a ship is all but practicable today; research will unquestionably bring

it into being within the foreseeable future." 3

(U) During the early postwar years, scientists here and abroad

began studying and writing papers on the construction, operation, and

uses of space stations. The growing body of literature on this subject

in particular, as well as on the general topic of manned space flight,

stimulated a small group of USAF researchers to study potential military

applications. One report of 2 January 1957, written by an official of

the Wright Air Development Center (WADC), discussed the need for space

vehicle research and described several possible projects, including

manned space stations. In a follow-up study published in July 1957, WADC

-SEIM

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
38

planners listed booster requirements for launching various types of satellites and stations. 4

Wi However, it was not until the first Soviet sputniks were fired

into orbit in the fall of 1957 that the President and the Congress became

receptive to major space development proposals. The Air Force, which

undertook a study of ways to counter the impact of the Soviet achievements,

by late December of that year had received a dozen unsolicited contractor

proposals, several:calling for the development and launching of manned apace

stations. One industry proposal suggested using "a large ferry-rocket

vehicle and a manned earth-satellite terminal" with the last stage becaning

the basic material for the orbiting station. Another contractor proposed

construction of a four-man orbital station at an altitude of 400 miles,

using Atlas missiles as building bloc1cs.5

)0S`C In January 1958, in response to an OSD request, the Air Force

submitted a package containing proposals and recommendations for an

expedited U.S. satellite and space program. Among the listed projects

was an Air Force 'Named Strategic Station." The Air Research and Development Command (ARDC)* in February incorporated a "USAF Space Research and

Space Station" task as part of a proposed advanced system and space vehicle

study. The teak called for an exploratory system analysis and design study

"of a general purpose space technology laboratory orbiting in the cialunar

environment." 6

,f4 Air Force hopes of obtaining approval and support for its space

proposals were thwarted, however, mthen NASA obtained primary responsibility

*The predecessor to the Air Fbrce Systems Command.

SECRET
39

for apace exploration. The Air Force could only pursue space development

work directly in support of known military requirements and some studies

that might have military implications. Thus, in a planning note of late

1959 that discussed hardware required to support an Air Force space program, the Directorate of Development Planning included a "Manned orbital

laboratory," to serve as a space crew training facility and as "a test

7

bed for checking out space weapon systems."

0) Concerning the general usage of such a laboratory, Brig. Gen.

Homer A. Boushey, Director of Advanced Technology, suggested (as had

Oberth) that it could serve as an observation post and "a manned space

patrol for peaceful purposes." But Boushey thought that an orbital platform could also be used for bombardment purposes. The military potential

appeared such that the Air Force concluded that it should undertake

additional studies. In June 1960 AHDC issued a study requirement (SR)

for that it designated a military test space station (Mss). The SR

called for an investigation of a space laboratory concept to determine

the ability of men and equipment to perform various USAF missions.8

pl The first phase of this study was completed in late July 1961.

The results were sufficiently encouraging for the Air Force to initiate

a follow-on study of an advanced space station. During the summer of

1961 Headquarters USAF also established MTSS as an active project under

the Director of Advanced Technology and asked OSD for an allocation of

$5 million and the inclusion of the project in the fiscal year 1963

budget. However, when OSD budget guidelines were released in September

the space station project was left unfunded. 9
.(151 The Air Force, in the meantime, had slowly reached the conclusion

that a apace station had became vital to its needs. As noted in the Space

Plan of September 1961, acquisition of a apace station was considered essential to evaluate operational hardward and concepts for "space command posts,

permanent space surveillance stations, space resupply bases, permanent

orbiting weapon delivery platforms, subsystems, and components." When he

approved the Space Plan, General LeMay directed AFSC to initiate a design

study and experimental investigation to select the configuration of a longduration military test station. 10

S,6 OSD became aware of the Air Force proposal when Deputy DDR&E

Rubel was briefed on the Space Plan shortly after its publication. The

space station requirement also was discussed in the Air Force Whits Paper

submitted to Secretary McNamara on 17 November 1961. The paper pointed

out that the achievement of space rendezvous and developing docking and

transfer techniques was already an important aspect of the U.S. lunar

program. The ability to rendezvous, dock, and transfer men and supplies,

it noted, would lead directly to a capability to establish an orbital test

station. The Air Force argued that such a station or laboratory would be

especially valuable for expediting military system evaluation in the actual

space environment.11

(U) On 12 February 1962, while still awaiting Naamara's comments on

the White Paper and the recommended Air Force apace program, General

Ferguson discussed the space station on Capitol Hill. He told a congressional committee that much of DOD's space activities would • depend on testing

of subsystems in "the true space environment" and consequently a teat
station there was the only solution. "We are convinced," he said, "that

a manned, military test space station should be undertaken as early as

possible." Ferguson added that the Air Force was considering a proposal

for a coordinated effort with NASA, possibly using the Gemini vehicle

as the initial transport for the orbiting station.12

(U) It was not long afterward that the Air Force received Secretary

McNamerais encouraging memorandum of 22 February, in which the defense

chief expressed the view that there might be an advantage in developing

a space station. McNamara specifica14 suggested that the Air Force

consider the possible adaptation of Gemini and Dyna-Soar hardware and

technology in the initial phase of development. This suggestion became

one of the major guidelines for the Air Force as it proceeded with

development planning.

Planning the NOW

XI In March 1962 Air Staff and AFSC representatives began drafting plans for the military orbital development system ()ODS), a rawriwees

given to the project. On 26 March AFSC forwarded study data to Headquarters USAF' *Job confirmed the technical feasibility of the concept

and provided preliminary funding requirements. On 2 Hay Headquarters

USAF issued Advanced Development Objective (ADO) 37 for the NODS, and in

the latter part of the month, after further Air Staff coordination, AFSC

submitted a proposed system package plan to the Pentagon.

5111 As briefed to the Systems Review Board an 4 June, NODS would

consist of three basic elements--a station module (permanent test

facility), a spacecraft (a basic Gemini vehicle attached to the nodule),
42

mid-1966 and requested $14.7 million in fiscal year 1963 funds.

Or The Air Staff, however, had financial difficulties. Therefore,

pending review and approval by OSD, it asked AFSC to identify any internal

funds and manpower resources that could be reprogrammed. On 8 June AFSC

listed several projects which would probably not be fully implemented

(such as the mobile mid-range ballistic missile) and recommended reallocation of their funds. However, since Headquarters USAF was at this time

still committed to these projects, it considered the feasibility of

forwarding to OSD a program change proposal fora Phase I MODS study

15

effort. There matters stood at the close of fiscal year 1962.

and the Titan III launch vehicle. The system would provide a shirtsleeve

working environment for a four-man crew. AFSC recommended a 15-month Phase

I study be initiated at once to allow an initial operational capability by

14

SECRET
V. TITAN III

(U) As previously noted, the Gagarin space flight of April 3.961

had immediate repercussions on the U.S. space program. Not only was the

event disturbing to American officials, but also the fact that the

Soviet spacecraft issighed more than 10,000 pounds--far in excess of any

the United States had launched. Reacting to this Russian success, the

administration immediately embarked on the manned lunar landing expedition. It also initiated a comprehensive study aimed at acquiring a large

standardized military space booster to serve as a "Workhorse" for launching payloads of 5,000 to 25,000 pounds into low earth orbits.

Of The concept of a standardised launch vehicle grew out of discussions held in the spring of 1961 between DOD and USAF officials and

the tbmanned Spacecraft Panel of the Aeronautics and Astronautics

Coordinating Board. Based on these talks, Deputy DDRO Rubel proposed

4 "unified program concept" as a guide to future space program pluming.

He suggested that the United States could avoid an uneconomical diversion

of its efforts by undertaking to develop standardized launch vehicles and

spacecraft for use with a variety of payloads. Rubelts proposal became

the starting point for a series of launch vehicle studies pursued by the

1

Air Force, OSD and NASA in the following months.

The Search for a pki of the Space Age

Of In July 1961 a Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (LLVPG) was

organized under the direction of Dr. N.B. Golovin of NASA and Dr. Kavanau

43
44

of OSD for the purpose of defining large launch vehicles needed to support the lunar program. Its findings, which were not completed until

October, were to be reported to Dr. Seamans of NASA and Rubel.

2

SO On 1 August Rubel and McMillan organized a second planning

group, the Ad Hoc Committee for Standardized Workhorse Launch Vehicles,

under Dr. O.F. Schuette, OSD. Its job was to examine alternate approadhes

for a workhorse booster able to orbit 10,000-pound payloads at 300-mile

altitudes (later increased to cover payloads of 5,000 to 25,000 pounds in

low earth orbit).• The committee studied 11 combinations Which might evolve

into "the DC-3 of apace transportation for a great many years to Come."

They ranged from the use of Centaur, * Titan II with various upper stages

and/or strap-on solids, Phoenix, and Saturn C-1 to a completely new allsolid booster :3

W" On 18 August the committee recommended that the Defense Department

should rely on Atlas-Centaur for the period through 1965, develop an improved Titan II with strap-on solids and a high energy upper stage for

post-1965 launchings, and accept NASA's offer of Saturn C-1 for Dyna-Soar.+

The Air Force, while generally endorsing these recommendations, was particularly partial to the Titan II-solid booster combination "as a standardized

booster vehicle." On 15 September Rubel also voiced the view that a standardized workhorse vehicle based on Titan II had "attractive potential."

He requested the Air Force to begin studies of this combination which, he

said, "we should now call Titan III." 4

*Centaur is discussed in Chapter VII.

+As noted in Chapter II, the Air Force rejected this offer.
45

A( McMillan promptly forwarded Rubelts request to Lefty with the

Injunction that it be treated "as a matter of extreme urgency" and that

the results "be based an the utmost objectivity." USAF agendas, particularly SSD, quickly undertook an intensive study of the proposal,

compiling data on its booster role, design, performance, reliability,

development schedule, and estimated coots in several alternate configurations. In its report, completed early in October nia, SSD proposed a

first flight of a Titan III core in the summer of 1963 and of a Titan III

with strap-on solids in June 1964. 5

On 9-11 October 1961 AFSC representatives briefed McMillan,

Charyk, Rubel, and others on their findings. Ratel verbally gave the

"go-ahead" in order to protect the development schedule, and an 13 October

he formally directed the Air Force to initiate a Phase I study of "a

family of launchvehicles based on the Titan III." 6

blamEDNE the Phase I Study Effort

Of The "most comprehensive advanced development planning effort

ever undertaken by the Air Force," as SecretaryMaallan later described

it, now began. It would consume many months and involve the closest

supervision of development planning by OSD officials that the Air Force

had ever experienced. The reason for this close scrutiny was Secretary

McNsmara's decision to use Titan III as a test case in applying several

organimedonalland management innovations which he hoped would reduce

system development time and cost.7

,OrY In his directive of 13 October, Rubel provided detailed guidance

on bow the Phase I study should be conducted. The principal preliminary
46

design objective, he said, was to define the scope of development in much

greater detail than ever before and identify major areas of technical risk.

Rubel directed the establishment of a strong program office to supervise

all aspects--the booster, ground support equipment, and launch facilities.

He also suggested that the Air Force set up appropriate management systems,

such as PERT* accounting centers, and special accounting and auditing

practices during the Phase I period. He further recommended that only

contractors willing and able to establish, maintain, and use these procedures be allowed to participate. He established 1 February 1962 as the

completion date for Phase 1.8

kd On 20 October Air Force headquarters instructed AFSC to move as

rapidly as possible into Phase I. AFSC headquarters in turn passed the

orders on to the Space Systems Division. Shortly thereafter, Col. Joseph

R. Bleymaier was named as head of the 624A System Program Office at SSD,

and he and a small staff immediately began work to meet the requirements

+9

set forth by Rubel.

01 In mid-November 1961, while this activity was getting under way

at SSD, top DOD and NASA officials met to review the overall national

launch vehicle program, as proposed by the Golovin group. In October the

group had recommended that the Titan III and the 120-inch diameter strap-on

motors *should be developed by the Department of Defense to meet DOD and

NASA needs, as appropriate in the payload range of 5,000 to 30,000 pounds

low earth orbital equivalent.* After reviewing the Golovin report,

*Program Evaluation Review Techniques.

+The program office was officially established on 15 December 1961.

--SHREf-
47

McNamara and Webb reaffirmed the policy (first enunciated in February

1961) of a single integrated national launch vehicle prOgram. On the

basis of this overall agreement, they decided to:1°

Cancel "parallel development" of very large 240-inch

solid rocket motors as a backup for the space agency's liquid propelled

Nova vehicle. This decision followed a successful first firing of the

Saturn booster on 27 October 1961, during *Joh its eight engines

developed almost 1.3 million pounds of thrust.

Continue advanced exploratory development of very large

solid rocket engines by DOD (Air Force).

Consider modification of the Titan II as a potential

apace booster (designated Titan Ili) for NASA's Mercury II (Gemini)

program.

Reconvene the Golovin group to re-study the long-term

national launch vehicle program "with particular emphasis on the potential

role of Titan III in that program."

Ar On 20 November the Golovin group met again and subsequently

recommended that the Titan III "should be developed by DOD, providing

that the Phase I study now underway confirms the technical feasibility

and desirability of the system." This position was based on a technical

study which included configuration mission forecasts, costs, and other

factors, .Orough 1970. The group estimated that there would be 523 DOD

and 277 NASA launchings, plus 94 related directly to the lunar program.

It expected that most of these would use Titan III.11

Ifte large solid rocket development program is discussed in Chapter VI.
SECRET

48

,(0) On the basis of this latest recommendation, Rubel and Seamans

on 5 December 1961 agreed that the Defense Department should proceed with

development of a Titan III family, assuming technical feasibility was

validated in Phase I, and that DOD should modify Titan II as the Gmaini

booster. McNamara and Webb approved these recommendations the next day.12

New OSD Guidance for Phase I

52) Meanwhile, SSD had proceeded with the task of budget planning,

organising a management system, and soliciting preliminary (Phase I)

studies from industry. It also drafted a Titan III procurement plan which

was presented to General Schriever and top USAF officials on 30 November.

They agreed that the best procurement approach would be to limit requests

for proposals (RFP , . ) to those firms recommended by a source selection

board and to award a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract./3

kel However, on 1 December, after an OSD review of the procuremeat plan, Rubel directed the Air Force to hold up issuance of the.RFPfs,

pending establishment of a complete PERT network that included OSD, the

Air Force, and the contractors. He also asked the Air Force to use the

services of an outside consultant agency, Operations Research, Inc., in

formulating plans before and during the bid assessment period.14

COI Reacting to Rubell s demands for a further refinement of management controls, USAF officials during December 1961 undertook a review of

their existing procurement practices and made a number of changes. They

agreed to establish a PERT network in accordance with Rubell s instructions,

improve system specifications, and introduce contractor incentives. A

briefing on the revised procurement approach was presented to Rubel and

(THIS PAGE PA IS eetinternt)
49

other OSD officials on 20 January 1962. Afterward, Rdbel authorised the

Air Force to issue the revised requests for proposals, *hi& now contained the incentive feature. All parties agreed that the requirement

for PERT time-cost systems could be included in the final contract.. On

the basis of this understandings the Air Force in early February

released the RFPts for the Titan III booster and the guidance subsystem.

IX The refinement of its procurement procedures plus 081)*8 tardiness in releasing funds made impossible the completion of the Phase I

study by 1 February, as previously requested by Rubel. Therefore,

Secretary Zudkert established a new date-30 April—for the Air Force

to complete Phase I and to submit a imposed system package plan.16

,(4) During this period SSD had continued its work an the technical

aspects of Titan III development. On 19 March 1962 the division briefed

Chazyk and Rubel an details of the proposed configurations, test characteristics, booster performance, and related aspects. Rubel then asked

for a %bite Paper summarising the technical approach and philosophy of

the Titan III program. On 21 March fkmdquarters USAF forwarded this new

requirement to AFSC. It asked that the paper place emphasis on the building block concept, the Phase I effort to establish early program definition before large sums of money were expended, and the considerations

which led to AFSCIs decisions on vehicle configurations, schedules, and

performance as well as facility requirements.

17

Or At the above meeting, Rubel accepted the SSD proposal for two

Titan III configurations—"A" and “C"--and a new upper stage called a

ntranstage.“ The /IV configuration was to consist of the basic Titan II
50

core plus the transtage and be capable of launching a 5,800-pound payload

into a 100-mile orbit. The "C" configuration, consisting of the "A" vehicle

plus two strap-on solid rockets, would place 25,000 pounds into low earth

orbit. Rubel agreed to authorize additional funds to meet Air Force commitments during the transition from Phase I study to Phase II development.

5.ef Through the remainder of fiscal year 1962, OSD continued its

intensive 'management" of Titan III planning. Thus, on 3 April Rubel

ordered an independent technical review and appraisal of the program by

the Research Engineering Support Division, Institute of Defense Analysis,

assisted by a technical group composed of OSD, USAF; and NASA representatives and outside consultants. In addition, on 5 April he asked the Air

Force to prepare a "standardized launch vehicle requirmnent," defining and

justifying the several proposed configurations based on mission payload

needs. This would be used, he said, to assist Secretary McNamara in

evaluating the proposed Titan III development.19

(U) Assistant Secretary McMillan responded to these new demands on

13 April, noting that the Air Force already was preparing two papers for

OSD which would contain most of this information. They included a forecase of space payload launches and missions and the White Paper summarizing

the technical approach and philosophy of the Titan III program. In

addition, McMillan reported that the Air Force planned to issue a specific

operational requirement (SOR) in early May.

lhe insistent OSD review of program details proved highly distasteful to responsible USAF officials. On 30 April General Schriever

wrote General Lefty that the extent and amount of information required by

(THIS PAGE IS GONFIDENTIft)
OSD and the nature of decisions being withheld were "unprecedented."

The trend, he said, "is generating demands for large volumes of information and program data that is magnified at each succeeding organizational

level. Decisions on matters that have never been previously reviewed are

being withheld for inordinate lengths of time." 21

141 Schriever complained that the new OSD review committees were

duplicating previous efforts of normal USAF and OSD units and that Space

Systems Division, the Aerospace Corporation, and the contractors had

already consumed 2,680 manhoura to meet the demand for additional system

data. If the trend continued, he declared, there would be no other choice

but to recommend a sizable increase in AFSC manning and fundamental

changes in its operating methods:22

I view this situation with alarm particularly as it may

affect the future. Although we have been able to Amish

extremely detailed information on the design requirements

for the Titan III prior to program approval, this is an

unusual situation. Ordinarily we cannot provide such

detailed information which is usually generated in the

development program. If we are to be held to this overly

conservative approach, I fear the tiiid will replace the

bold and we will not be able to provide the advanced

weapons the future of the nation demands.

The Titan III System Package Plan

AFSC forwarded the proposed system package plan to Headquarters

USAF on 30 April 1962. After the Systems Review Board and the DSMG approve

it in early May, Secretary McMillan sent the plan to OSD. In a covering

memorandum, McMillan said that in his judgment the proposed plan contained

"realistic cost estimates, reasonable schedules, and a fine fix on

(THIS PAGE IS -GONFIRENTIkh-)-
52

technical problems" to provide reliable hardware, as well as required

production and launching facilities.23

1,a) Millen reviewed the considerable effort expended by the Air

Force during Phase I that led to the package plan and noted particularly

the continuing changes that resulted from the "new inputs of the DOD and

the Air Force, as well as extensive engineering and managerial analyses."

Concerning the higher program cost, McMillan attributed some of it to

"refined estimates and better definition of engineering problems," others

to new requirements such as placing launch facilities on both the Atlantic

and Pacific missile ranges. Use of PERT management would also be costly.

Through fiscal year 1967, the Air Force estimated Titan III development

and testing costs would total $932.1 m il non. In fiscal year 1963 alone,

the program would require $279 million—almost $100 million more than in

24 the President's proposed budget.

CC1 On 16 May 1962, after OSD officials reviewed the plan, to the

dismay of the Air Force, Rubel asked for more data. Although pleased with

the effort that had gone into Phase I and the extent of the technical

analyses, he stated that the proposed plan still did not contain adequate

data in a form needed to assist the OSD review. Specifically, Rubel

asked for more information and detail on program management, operations,

system configuration and possible changes, civil engineering, the budget

and financial plan, and mission forecasts.

2

5

(8)- USAF officials quickly became aware that the high program cost

was the major stumbling block. Additional information, furnished on 21 May,

still did not satisfy OSD and caused McMillan to have senior Air Staff
53

officials re-examine the proposed program in the light of a financial

squeeze. He asked that they give special consideration to five principal

areas: performance and mission capability, solid motor development,

upper-stage configuration, guidance system requirements, and operational

launch facility requirements at the Pacific Missile Range. The Air Staff

completed the re-examination early in June and reaffirmed the Titan III

program as presented in the package plan of May. It asked for an early

OSD decision to. begin Phase II development.

26

DDR&E remained unconvinced, and meetings between OS!) and USAF

officials on budget, management, and technical aspects continued throughout the month. On 28 June DIME provided McMillan with new guidance,

primarily to minimize funding not only in fiscal year 1963 but in subsequent years. At the end of the period the Air Force began work on a

program change proposal aimed at keeping costs down by reducing facility

construction to a two-pad integrate-transfer-launch facility at the

Atlantic Missile Range and eliminating the West Coast site.

27

,(.41 The revised program would cost $225 million in fiscal year

1963, compared to the original estimate of $279 million. The revised

schedule called for the first teat flight of Titan IIIA in May 1964

and of Titan IIIC in January 1965.

28

SECRET
54 SECRET

VI. LARGE SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS

(U) While engaged in intensive Titan III planning the Air Force also

was involved in advancing large solid propellant rocket technology. The

immediate origin of this activity was President Kennedy's decision to embark on the manned lunar landing expedition. Specifically, he asked

Congress for $62 million to begin development of very large solid rockets

as backup to the liquid motors slated for the moon project. Both McNamara

and Webb agreed that the Air Force should undertake this work but be responsive to NASA's requirements and schedules.1

During the spring of 1961 SSD completed a preliminary development plan for a proposed 3,000,000-pound thrust solid propellant motor.

In briefing the plan to Air Staff and OSD officials during late June and

early July, SSD pointed out that before work could begin, NASA would have

to provilie its requirements on motor sizes and characteristics. However,

pending receipt of these specifications, SSD on 24 July proposed an immediate

start on 14 ninterimn tasks aimed at advancing solid motor technology. These

included accelerated test firing of large segmented motors already under

development, demonstrations of thrust vector controls, evaluation of new

casing and nozzle materials, etc.

(U) Beginning on 26 July 1961 SSD officials briefed the Air Staff,

OSD, and the Golovin group on its interim proposal. All found it acceptable

and on 15 August McMillan asked DDR&E to release 415.65 million to begin

the work. On 6 September Rubel authorized an expenditure of $13.65 million,

SECRET

(THIS PAGE IS-SONFitEient,-

2
55

eliminating one task, and six days later OSD released the funds.3

(U) Meanwhile, at the request of the Golovin group, SSD submitted

an estimate of development costs and schedules on four representative

large motors (100-, 136-, 156-, and 200-inch diameters). According to

SSD, the time between project initiation and feasibility demonstration

would range from 26 to 48 months and the cost from $126 million to $365

million. The division passed these estimater-to USAF officials and the

Golovin group in early August, and the latter subsequently incorporated

them into its large launch vehicle program study.4

(U) As noted earlier, the original intent of the program was to

develop large solid rockets in tandem with NASA's liquid propellant motors

until it became clear vhich was superior for the lunar mission. TAY

October 1961 development of liquid rockets had progressed sufficiently

to make that selection and the Golovin group then recommended die con5

tinuance of the identical time-scale approach for solid motors.

(U) McNamara and Webb agreed to do this, but they also concluded

that DOD should continue to advance the technical development of very

large solid rocket engines. They had in mind the dual objectives "of

advancing knowledge and keeping open the possibility that the actual

development of such engines night be called for on an accelerated basis

at a future time, and in an economical manner paced by considering the

availability of financial and manpower resources in the context of the

totality of national space efforts." 6

Jo Following the McNamara-Webb agreement, the Air Force revised

its plans to provide for only limited development and static-test firing
56

of 156-inch diameter segmented motors and feasibility demonstrations of

large, monolithic (unsegmented) motors of 240- to 300-inch diameters.*

The Air Force estimated that the 156-inch motor was the practical

for road or rail transportability of the Individual segments. In the case

of larger motors, their size precluded overland transportation and the Air

Force planned to construct the demonstration units at the actual test

sites.7

(U) Meanwhile, several contractors proceeded with test firings to

demonstrate the potentialities of the large solid rocket. On 9 December

1961 the Milted Technology Corporation fired a 96-inch diameter motor which

produced a thrust of 380,000 pounds over a burning time of approximately

80 seconds. Several months later, on 17 February 1962, the Aerojet General

Corporation fired a 100-inch motor which produced 600,000 pounds of thrust

for 90 seconds. It was the largest solid rocket fired to that time.e

fteaDits

(U) In mid-February 1962 NASA finally forwarded to OSD its longawaited guidance on its large solid propellant motor requirements. Dr.

Seamans informed Rubel that NASA--despite its decision to use liquid

motors for the lunar mission—still had a strong interest in the technology of large solids and hoped to use them when their feasibility had

been demonstrated. He said that NASA was specifically interested in

*In its final report, the Golovin group recommended going ahead with

development and production of large solid motors up to 300 inches in

diameter and weighing 3,000,000 pounds. It said the initial emphasis

should be to produce an early test firing of a "unitized" motor of at

least 240 inches in diameter. (Summary Rprt, NASA-DOD Large Launch

Vehicle Planning Group, 24 September 1962, Vol I, p II-6.)

-CONFIDENTIAt
motors with thrust levels of about 2,500,000 and 5,000,000 pounds and

burning times of approximately 115 seconds.

(U) Seamans reported that NASA officials had reviewed the new

technology required to establish the feasibility of the 240-inch motor

and had concluded that DOD should undertake a program to demonstrate

that a very large amount of propellant (2,000,000 pounds or more) could

be cast into a single, nonsegmented motor and that the monolithic charge

could be qualified, ignited, and burned properly. NASA also wanted to

know it the inert components of the motor case and nozzle could be made

in flight weight design, transported to the motor manufacturing plant,

and assembled into a complete motor with adequate reliability, and the

whole handled and shipped by water.1°

(U) On 24 February 1962 DDR&E forwarded NASA's requirements to

Assistant Secretary McMillan and requested a briefing on USAF plans to

meet them. This was done an 9 March when, during a meeting of the AACB's

launch vehicle panel, SSD briefed OSD, NASA, and USAF officials on

11 its revised development plan for the 156-inch and 240-inch motors.

(U) The proposed 156-inch rocket would produce at least 2,500,000

pounds of thrust with a 120-second burning tine. The plan called for

six full-scale tests between September 1963 and October 1964. Development would cost $16.5 million, plus $2.44 million for facility construction.

In the case of the 240-inch motor, SSD recommended two full-scale firings

In April and August 1964 with on-site fabrication at a new isolated test

facility.12

-CONFIDENTIAL--

(THIS FAGS IS UNCLASSIFIED)
58

(U) The launch vehicle panel (and its NASA representatives) concluded that the apace agency would have to provide a more precise statement

of program objectives and desired performance characteristics before the

panel could properly evaluate the SSD plan. On 16 March 1962 NASA submitted the additional data. Accepting USAF f s 156-inch proposal as an

orderly backup effort, NASA said that it was well-timed to meet its

potential needs. It urged, on the other hand, that the 240-inch motor

development be accelerated to achieve an earlier demonstration of flight

weight boosters, and it expressed concern about test facility availability

and related problems.1,3

pei On 28 March McMillan forwarded this latest guidance to the

Chief of Staff and asked that an updated development plan be made available for review at the earliest possible date. Rubel, Seamans, and

McMillan reviewed the revised plan on 18 April and agreed to a short

Phase I study, to be completed by July 1962.24

Disagreement Over the 156-Inch, Development 

(U) On 27 April Seamans confirmed with Rubel his understanding of

the agreements reached at the recent meeting. As he understood it, the

Air Force would continue development of 120-inch motors, including selection of contractors for Titan III; would initiate a feasibility demonstration

of a 156-inch motor generating 3,000,000 pounds of thrust at a fiscal year

1963 cost of $20 million; and would initiate feasibility demonstration of

260-inch (rather than 240-inch) motors generating 6,000,000 pounds of .

thrust, with 1963 expenditures also limited to $20 million. The schedule

for the 156- and 260-inch motors would be such as to provide potential

backup for NASA's advanced Saturn and Nova vehicles.

-GBIE8ENTIAL15
UNCLASSIFIED 59

(U) To MeMillanshowever, Seamans' statement seemed to contradict

earlier NASA-DOD understandings. Earkv in May, during conversations

with its officials, McMillan learned that NASA was thinking of several

possible missions involving a cluster of four 1%-Inch motors plus NASA's

C-5 upper stage to put about 236,000 pounds of payload into a 100-mile

orbit. Similar calculations with four 260-inch motors indicated a capebility to place approximately 450,000 pounds of payload in a 100-mile

16 orbit or 198,000 pounds at escape velocity.

(U) McMillan informed these officials that planning specific missions for solid rockets was contrary to the McNamara-Webb agreement of

November 1961, which had cancelled development of large solid motors

as backup to Saturn and Nova. He said that if NASA really wanted solids

"as serious backup," it should state the contemplated missions in a

formal notice to OSD so that a working level engineering group could

17

review and make recommendations.

(U) Briefed an the current situation, Rubel on 22 May 1962 notified

Seamans that the two agencies were "still not together" on the course

to pursue in the field of large solid rocket development. He noted DOD's

willingness to develop 120-inch and 260-inch rockets, but it did not feel

that the 156-inch motor would advance techncarly-mmch since it was

essentially the same as the 120-inch motor, Therefore, before DOD proceeded further, it wanted a formal statement from NASA and additional

18

supporting data.

(U) McNamara and Webb took up the issue in late Na,y at which time

they reaffirmed their November agreement. They vented the solid propellant technology program pursued with minimum commitment of funds for

UNCLASSIFIED
60 UNCLASSIFIED

tivea and allow the Air 'tree to begin actual development.

(U) Consequently, in June NASA, °SD, and USAF officials held another

series of conferences aimed at resolving the main issue of the extent

and pace of 156-inch motor development. At the close of the fiscal year,

although work continued on the several technological projects approved

the previous September, the overall large solid rocket program remained

in a state of suspended animation—awaiting final agreement on the 156-

inch motor.

large facilities and with maximum use of existing facilities.. However,

this statement by McNamara and . Webb still did not clarify program objec19

UNCLASSIFIED
VII. DEFENSE COMMUNICATION SATELLITES

(U) The only communication satellite development project in DOD at

the beginning of fiscal year 1961 was the Ai-managed Advent,* which

called for launching satellites into synchronous orbits at an altitude

19,000 nautical miles above the equator. These satellites, whose velocity would make them appear stationary over certain points on earth, would

be able to provide instantaneous 24-hour communications to all parts of

the world except the polar regions. USAFis Advent responsibilities

Included developing the satellite (exclusive of microwave communication

equipment) and launching it with an Atlas-Centaur combination.

(U) Early in the development program, however, a major problem

arose with Centaur, the world's first hydrogen fueled space vehicle.+

Not only did development of the booster fall substantially behind the

planned schedule, but it was discovered that Centaur would be unable to

produce the thrust needed to lift the Advent satellite into the synchronous

orbit. Also a financial problem arose with the satellite when the mintractor (General Electric) reported a startling overrun of some $34 mu ion.

As a result of these difficulties, the entire Advent effort was floundering by the summer of 1961.1

*The Army also was responsible for developing coamunication equipment for

satellites and ground stations.

+Centaur's development, originally started by the Air Force, was turned

over to NASA on 1 July 1959.

. --SUPIFF

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)

61
.62

Advent in Trouble 

(2"/ The Air Force had never been an Advent enthusiast, primarily

because the system would not meet its requirements for strategic command

and control communications in the north polar regions. In 1959 the Air

Force had proposed a SAC command and control polar satellite system

operating on UHF frequencies. In 1960, however, the plan was set aside

in favor of the program that became Advent. In the fall of 1960 the Air

Force tried to obtain approval for a somewhat modified UHF satellite

system, but OSD rejected the proposal. 2

01 With Advent still in difficulty, the Air Force in August 1961

tried once again, this time proposing an interim passive satellite communication system. DDR&E rejected the proposal and directed the Air Force

to limit activity in this area to applied research only* and concentrate

its major support on Advent:3

(01 However, Advent's problems still lingered on, especially the

critical one of the incompatibility between the weight of the satellite

and Centaur's marginal lifting capacity. The entire development, Air Force

Under Secretary Charyk commented to DDR&E on 3 October 1961, had reached

"scandalous proportions." Calling for prompt corrective actions, Charyk

urged DDR&E to halt immediately all work on the existing Advent configuration and seek a new development plan based on either a different booster or

a modified payload.`

J,61 OSD officials took no formal action until early November, when

the Arm requested an additional $41.58 million from the DOD emergency

*See discussion of Project West Ford, pp 68-71.
63

fund to cover slippages and overruns during fiscal year 1962--a 58-percent

increase above the $72 million budget. Disturbed by these ballooning

coats, Dr. Brown ordered a study group, headed by JUDOS M. Bridges,

Director of the Office of Electronics, DDR&E, to survey the entire program. The group subsequently devoted its investigation to the four

contractors with the major financial troubles. 5

,Cel On 12 December 1961 the Bridges group reported to Brown that

the estimated cost of Advent had increased steadily since the program

began, rising from $140 million in February 1.960 to $325 million in

September 1961. The group attributed part of this to an increasing

effort on an *operational* rather than an experimental system.* In

addition, both the government (Army and Air Force) and its contractors

had been guilty of *grossly underestimating* system costa and difficulties of development. The group believed that if the program were

carried out as planned, it would require $129.7 million in fiscal year

1962 alone.6

x The report criticised ineffectual project management, noting

that responsibility was split between the Army and Air Force. The

Army's Advent Management Agency at Fort Monmouth, N.J., had insufficient

control over the various contracts, especially the General Electric contract supervised by USAF's Space Systems Division. To correct this

situation, it recommended that supervision of the contract be shifted to

the Army and that it place resident teams, reporting directly to the

Advent Management Agency, at all contractor plants.

7

With the satellite system still in the development stage, the Army had

proceeded with an elaborate system of operational ground facilities.

;
64

i

gf Brown accepted most of these recommendations. On 26 December

he asked the Army to study the impact of placing Advent teams in residence •

at each of the major contractors' plants. He also directed revision of

certain contracts to impose a higher degree of performance and cost responsibility on the contractor. Finally, Brown called for a closer Air Force

liaison with the Army by placing SSD officers at the Advent Management

Agency. 8

,,lr General Schriever, who had long objected to Advent as "the

wrong program" if the goal was to achieve an early satellite communication

capability, was asked by the Air Staff to comment on the proposed management changes. On 23 January 1962 he told General LeMay that management

changes were needed, but the Bridges proposals were not the right ones.

Schriever strongly opposed placing Army teams in USAF contractor plants

and pointed to OSD policy for support.

9

501 The Air Staff and OSAF agreed with this view. On 12 February

Assistant Secretary McMillan informed OSD that, while the Air Force was

anxious to improve the situation, it believed that placing Army teams in

the contractor plants would be detrimental. Contractors would receive

orders frac two agencies, which would most likely promote rather than

eliminate "confusion and delay." As a substitute, McMillan suggested

that Army personnel be assigned directly to SSD where they could work

through regular USAF contract management channels.

10

cor Brown rejected this counter proposal and expanded the Army's

control over the satellite vehicle development. On 14 March, while the

Army acted on these instructions, General Schriever again voiced his
65

dissatisfaction. In a letter to General LeMay, he pointed out that the

Army practice of allocating funds to the Air Force on an incremental

basis, usually once a month, was an improper procedure and completely

inadequate to support sound development management. He also criticized

the existing Advent management structure as being "thoroughly unsatisfactory" and claimed that difficulties were being compounded rather than

solved with the arrival of Army personnel in USAF contractor plants.11

The Air Force Proposes a New Satellite Program

,(1) Several months earlier, in connection with a communication

requirement established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Air Staff

had directed Schriever to examine possible military satellite systems

which could achieve an initial operational capability by 1963 and a fully

operational system by August 1964. The JCS requirement stemmed from

concern with the "Year of the Quiet Sun" (predicted for 1964) which was

expected to produce a period of reduced solar activity and adversely

affect long-distance radio communications. The Defense Communications

Agency (DCA) had studied the problem and drawn up a preliminary plan "for

a Minimum Essential Satellite Communications Systemon as a possible

solution. The agency would retain overall management but had recommended

12

that the Air Force prepare a development plan.

C81 On 18 January 1962 General Schriever established an AFSC study

group to examine several approaches, including a medium-altitude satellite

*Contrary to popular belief, propagation characteristics of the ionosphere

are improved during active solar periods--except during periods of intense

magnetic disturbances. As electron density increases in the ionosphere

during active solar periods the HF band opens up with more useable frequencies toward the higher end.
66

system similar to Telstar.

*

 In mid-April the group reported to Schriever

and McMillan the results of its investigation of a system that could provide essential communications "for positive command and control in hot

war," in accordance with JCS requirements. To meet these and related

requirements by 1964, the group suggested development of a simple active

medium-altitude satellite, to be launched by existing boosters ./3

for On 20 April McMillan commented in a memorandum to OSD that the

proposed medium-altitude satellite system appeared to be superior to any

synchronous system (such as Advent). In early May he forwarded the AFSC

report to Dr. Brown, reaffirmed his earlier comment, and expressed the

conviction that the medium-altitude system could meet DOD command and

control re • • - _

Force responsibility and the go-ahead to develop the system.14

fir]r But the Army at this time also submitted new proposals to OSD,

calling for a drastically revised Advent program. The Army recommended

eliminating the Atlas-Centaur booster,

+

 halting all work on the General

Electric satellite, and initiating work on a new lightweight (500 pound)

satellite. The revised program, the Army said, should remain under existing management. With the conflicting USAF and Army proposals in hand,

Brown asked his staff for a White Paper summarising the history of Advent.15

*The Telstar commercial satellite was being built by American Telephone &

Telegraph Co. On 27 June 1961 NASA agreed to make available at cost

facilities and services for launching and tracking Telstar.

+Centaur originally was to be launched in January 1961 but, because of

various problems, the date slipped more than a year to February 1962.

Between that date and May 1962 NASA tried to launch the vehicle eight

times but failed on each occasion. Finally, on 8 May, the first Centaur

was launched--and exploded 56 seconds after liftoff.

-SECRET-
6 7

fiar The *lite Paper was completed in mid-Mw and Brom forwarded

it to McNamara with his recommendations. The document reviewed the complex management structure, the "very difficult interface" between the

Army and Air Force, the coat overruns, the satellite weight difficulties,

and Centaur's poor development record. It also described the several

alternatives proposed to date. On the basis of the "atormy history" of

Advent, as highlighted by the White Paper, Dr. Brown recommended that

DOD undertake two separate developments--an unstablized random orbit

medium-altitude satellite system and a stabilized synchronous system,

both being launched with existing boosters. Advent would be drastically

reduced and the Army's equipment and facilities used in ground testa to

support the new programs. DCA would assume overall management responsibility and integrate the two systems into the DOD communication structure.

The Army would retain responsibility for developing and operating the

ground environment, while the Air Force would develop and operate the

satellites.

16

CO On 23 May 1962 McNamara endorsed these recommendations and

issued implementing directives to the three agencies. He specifically

charged the Air Force with responsibility "for development, production

and launch of all space devices necessary to establishment and progressive improvement of DOD communication satellite systems" under the

"integrating direction" of DCA. With these directives, McNamara in

effect killed Advent.

17

(U) The Air Force did not lament Advent's passing, but at once

busied itself with the task of planning, in coordination with DCA, the
management and development of the two systems. ftf the close of fiscal

year 1962, the Air Staff had created a system staff office within the

Directorate of Systems Acquisition and the Space Systems Division was

establishing a counterpart at its leve1.18

ProjectWeet Lei

(U) The Air Force also had under way an experimental program

involving a passive satellite communication system, known as Project West

Ford. The concept called for launching into orbit millions of tiny capper

dipoles that would reflect communication signals in the 3-centimeter range.

If successful, such a system could not be jammed, destroyed, or nepoofedu

in any way by an enemy.

(U) As the fiscal year began, the.Air Force planned to launch in

.duly a package containing about 350 million dipoles to form the communication belt. This aroused fears among astronomers around the world

that the dipole filaments it seriously affect optical - and radio astronomical observations. Their complaints led to a delay in the launching,

while the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences undertodk an independent evaluation of the experiment. The board's conclusion,

announced on 11 August, was that „the Project West Ford experiment will

constitute no interference to optical'or radio astronomyo n since the belt

would be barely detectable, 'seven by astroncimere with advance information

and upon the taking of special efforts for detection. „ 19

(U) Based upon this evaluation, President Kennedy authorised a West

Ford launching, but under certain limitations. He directed that there

-CONRDENT1AL---

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
be no follow-up launchings until the results of the first experiment had

been thoroughly analysed and evaluated and the Defense Departnent had

taken steps to provide safeguards against harmful interference with space

activity or with any branch of science.

(U) Despite these restrictions, opposition !ma scientists in the

United States and overseas continued. On 24 August some 1,000 of the

world's leading astronomers—during a meeting of the International

Astronomical Union at Berkeley, Calif.--adopted a resolution requesting

a delay in the experiment "until the question of permanence b.! the bag

is clearly settled. in published scientific papers, with adequate time

being allowed for their study.* A month later the Soviet Academy of

Sciences also protested publicly for the first time, declaring that the

21 filaments night endanger orbiting Soviet cosmonauts.'

jo As this growing opposition threatened to halt that it considered

an essential experiment, the Air Force at the request of OSD prepared a

White Paper on Project West Ford which summarised the history of the

program and the readons why it should be pursued. The Air Force argued

that communications were all-important to the nation's defenses, both

before and during an enemy attack. It pointed out that existing comsunicationrwere extremely vulnerable. Moreover, the Soviet Mien on

1 September 1961 had embarked upon an intensive atmospheric nuclear test

program (breaking a three-year voluntary moratoria's) And there was concern that the Russians were seeking to pinpoint the exact effects of

nuclear explosions on radio and radar communications.* 22

*USAF scientists at the Cambridge Research Laboratories for several years

had studied the various disruptive effects of high altitude nuclear

explosions an radar and radio carnunications. See AFCRL, Handbook of

Geoohysies (New lb*: McMillan, 1960).
70

xr In late September the President's scientific adviser, Dr. Jerome

Wiesner, formed a panel of distinguished astronomers, physicists, and

mathematicians to review the technical questions involved in West Ford.

The scientists examined technical data provided by Lincoln Laboratory of

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the originator of the project.

On 4 October, the panel declared, "After examining both the published

data and more recent unpublished calculations, we are convinced that this

experiment will not impair our ability to study the skies--either by

visible or ultraviolet light or by the receipt of radio signals. We are

also convinced that it will offer no additional hazard to manned space

flight." 23

SAI/ Supported by the panel's report, the administration again authorized the Air Force to launch the first West Ford experiment. On 21 October

1961 a package of dipoles was carried aloft aboard the Midas IV satellite--

and then failed to show up on radar screens. Finally, after searching

the skies for several days, the Millstone Hill (Masa.) UAF radar picked

up five or six small clumps in orbit. On the basin of the data received,

Lincoln Laboratory scientists concluded that there had been a mechanical

malfunction which caused the dipoles to remain clustered together. This

was all very anticlimactic, in view of the world-wide denunciations that

had preceded the launching. 24

kW- Planning for West Ford II, however, began immediately but under

new guidelines. Under Secretary Charyk directed that a new device be

devised to allow controlled ejection of the dipoles. Telemetry equipment also was to be incorporated to provide data on the package position,

temperature, spin rate, tumble rate, and the extent of dipole dispensing.

-CONFIDENTIAL-
Introduction of this new equipment displaced about one-third of the dipuic

fibers, reducing the weight of the material from 75 to 50 pounds and the

number of individual dipoles from about 350 million to less than 250 million.

,(4 Early in 1962 the appearance of another factor affected West

Ford II. USAF studies of the 21 October failure led to the conclusion

that ejection of the package might have had an adverse effect on the

Midas satellite, which proved to be extremely unstable.* The Air Force

was faced with the prospect that "piggyback" rides would continue to

interfere with the successful attainment of the primary (Midas) objectives. After further study, USAF officials decided not to carry a full

West Ford package on any of the Series III Midas vehicles. This decision

had the effect of delaying the launching of West Ford II for a year.

S4 The Air Force was able, however, during April to conduct a

limited experiment by ejecting into orbit six 14-inch tin dipoles from

the Midas V satellite. The purpose of the experiment was to measure the

effects caused by solar pressure, air drag, and electrical drag on small

objects in space so that scientists could predict how long the dipoles

would remain aloft. Based on the radar data received, Lincoln Laboratory

scientists concluded that the filaments were unaffected by the apace

environment and fears that they might shift into different and longer27 lived orbits were unwarranted.

*See below, p 75.

+The first West Ford successful launching took place in May 1963.

-SECRET-

(11113 PAGE Is --CONFIDENTDM)

+26
yin. MIDAS

_(r) During fiscal year 1962 the Air Force repeatedly urged OSD to

approve accelerated satellite development and flight testing to obtain

an early operational missile defense alarm system (Midas). As in previous years, however, OSD insisted on a more deliberate approach. The

Air Force was unable to convince OSD officials that the Midas infrared

(IN) detection techniques would be sufficiently reliable and able to

detect both low- and high-radiance missile emissions. The record of

unsuccessful Midas launchings did not help matters. Prior to July 1961

only two Midas satellites had been launched (on 26 February and 24 May

1960); the second achieved orbit but provided only limited infrared

data. A third successful launch was conducted on 12 July 1961; however,

IR data collection ceased after the satellite's fifth orbital pass because

of a power failure.1

Is Midas Worth the Effort?

LSY On 29 July 1961 Dr. Brown reviewed the Midas situation at

great length for Secretary McNamara. He reported that formidable technical and operational problems still remained in the areas of infrared

detection and reliability but that scientists could solve them over a

long time span. He estimated that an effective system might be obtained

by 1965-1966, although the Air Force believed it could adhieve a limited

2

operational capability in 1964.
73

,(6) Brown stated that Midas, at best, would provide an additional

5-20 minutes of warning of a liquid propelled ICBM attack and would be

marginal against Soviet Minuteman or submarine-launched Polaris types

of missiles. He estimated a cost of about $500 million to complete

research and development, another $500 million to comp/ete an operational

system, and operating expenses ranging from $100 million to $200 million

annually. The primary question appeared to be: Was the extra 5-20 minutes

of warning worth the expense and effort? 3

jar Brown conceded that the additional warning to alert aircraft

was worth something, but the question was how much. He also conceded

that there was greater certainty of providing warning with Midas plus

the ballistic missile early warning system (MEWS) than with the latter

alone. However, this raised the question of when and how the United

States would respond to an enemy attack. If the United States would

not retaliate even on receiving warning from the above systems--as was

being contemplated--and if the number of additional aircraft alerted by

Midas was small, then earlier warning would be of little value.

4

,(43) The Air Force counterarguraents —strongly supported by the

North American Air Defense Command (?)RAD)--were that early warning was

essential to insure a credible deterrence and the survival of the counter

force and defense forces. The Air Force pointed out that with 10 minutes

of warning, 14 percent of the SAC force could became airborne; with 14

minutes, 66 percent.'

iSr Brown informed McNamara that he planned to form a task force

to examine in detail Midas technical capabilities and the usefulness of
74

early warning. He conjectured that the results of the study would not

lead to termination, but he suggested the possibility that "a substantial reduction of the R&D program might appear desirable." To head the

Midas study group, Brown chose Dr. J.P. Ruina of the Advanced Research

Projects Agency (AMA). Two USAF representatives were selected to serve

6

under Dr. Ruins along with other governmental and outside members.

Jo The Ruina group was the latest of a long list of ad hoc committees which had studied Midas and, the Air Force felt, delayed its

development. On 5 September 1961 the Space Systems Division observed

that despite past scientific reviews which it said had found no technical problems to preclude successful development—there continued to

be serious doubts "in the minds of certain people regarding the technical feasibility and operational capability of Midas." The division

proposed that the Air Force establish an in-house group to prepare a

report which could dispel expected criticism. However, at Dr. Charykts

suggestion, this step was postponed pending completion of the Ruins

study.?

5,4 A few weeks later General Schriever reported to General LeMay

an actions that AFSC, Strategic Air Command (SAC), Air Defense Command

(ADC), and the Office of Civilian Defense Mobilisation (responsible for

the protection of the, civil populace in the event of a Soviet attack) had

under way to defend Midas. These included a reassessment of the military

and national requirements for Midas and validation of the system's technical and operational feasibility. He reported &Ws view that Midas was

technically feasible and that steps were being taken to simplify the system
SECRET

75

for improved reliability. He concluded, however, that *complete satisfaction can only be achieved by a conclusive demonstration of system

feasibility through an orbital flight test that detects and reports the

launch of a ballistic missile and has a reasonable orbital life.* 8

A'‘) That the Air Force was far from the successful demonstration

was seen on 21 October 1961, when Midas IV achieved a near circular

polar orbit at an altitude of approximately 2,200 nautical miles. The

satellite was extremely unstable, although SSD obtained some useful data

Through the 54th orbit (for nearly seven days), when the main power

source failed.* 9

The Ruina Report 

-(0( The Ruin* group began its evaluation of Midas in late September

1961. In October USAF officials presented their case to the group. They

emphasized that there had been no lessening of the Soviet threat or the

need for detection of enemy missile launchings and urged an accelerated

effort to achieve early operational capability. But even as the Air

Force took this position, OSD deleted all nondevelopment funds for fiscal

year 1963 and withheld approval of an operational system. Although AFSC,

SAC, and ADC promptly protested, the Air Staff decided not to reclama

10

the decision until the Ruina recommendations were received.

01' On 30 November 1961 the Ruins group completed the evaluation.

A major conclusion was that Midas could probably detect high radiance,

liquid propelled missiles, but gaps in knowledge of target and background

*Midas IV also carried the West Ford package discussed in the previous

chapter.
76

radiation made this less than certain. The group thought that Midas

would be unable to detect solid missiles of the Minuteman and Polaris

class. It also found that the existing Midas design was too complicated

for reliable operation. Finally, the group claimed that USAF preoccupation with an early operational capability had contributed to the neglect

of the research and development on which to base an effective operational

system.11

,,(81' The Ruina group agreed, nevertheless, that there were good

reasons for continuing Midas. It suggested that an operational system

could meet significant military and political needs and that "a simplified Midas" might have a good chance of achieving an acceptable level of

reliability. The group therefore recammended drastic reorientation

toward a simpler Midas and a larger research and measurements effort.

It also recommended that until there was full confidence in the system's

capabilities, schedules, and coat estimates, no thought be given to an

12

operational capability.

/Of On 8 December Brown forwarded the Ruina report to Secretary

Zuckert, noting that he agreed with its conclusions and recommendations.

He directed the Air Force to implement the reccamendations and asked for

a revised development plan by 1 February 1962. Mee:1'4111e, he would hold

in deferred status $45 million of the fiscal year 1962 allocation.13

jetr The conclusions and recommendations of the Ruina report and

its harsh criticism of the existing Midas effort diiturbed top USAF

officials, and on 22 December General LeMay directed AFSC to prepare a

response to the "serious allegations." He also directed the Air Staff
77

to prepare some convincing arguments that would support the urgent

requirement for a Midas warning system. Finally, to cover the eventuality

that Secretary Zuckert might decide not to challenge the report or that

the Air Force would still be overruled, LeMey directed the preparation of

14

a development plan based on the Ruins recommendations.

,or On 29 December USAF headquarters forwarded detailed guidance to

AFSC and asked for several alternate development plans--one reflecting

the Ruins recommendations and two others containing specific initial

operational capability dates and oriented toward an operational "go-ahead.m

The Space Systems Division promptly formed a special advisory group headed

by Dr. Clark Milliken to analyse the Ruina study. 15

Awf Pending completion of the analysis and development plans, Gen.

P.R. Smith, Vice Chief of Staff, on 11 January 1962 asked Secretary

Zuckert to defer action on DDROts 8 December directive. After a fivepage review of current conditions, General Smith concluded

The need for warning of Soviet ICBM surprise attack exists

today—and will grow more compelling as this Soviet ICBM

threat steadily increades. The present BMWS warning system,

initially adequate to the threat, can now be overflown, underfloor, skirted, jammed, or removed. The proposed Midas system

can offset these inherent limitation:, and provide added

credibility, reliability, more warning time, plus an intelligence readout. Additionally, Midas can strengthen the free

world posture of deterrence, bolster U.S. resolve, and provide

the U.N. with a tangible, effective arms control measure.

The Secretary agreed to withhold action pending receipt of AFSCts

evaluation.

,POr AFSC completed its report, based on the review of the Milliken

group, on 15 February and forwarded it to the Air Staff 13 days later.
78

Systems Command officials felt that the Ruina report was invalid for a

number of reasons. The Ruina group had misunderstood the scope of Midas

research under way and was unaware of the amount and content of the actual

test data available. Also, according to AFSC officials, the report's

cloud background clutter analysis--a key factor in the Ruina Group's

doubts about the feasibility of the infrared payload wasin error. In

addition, they felt the report's reliability estimates had failed to take

into account advances being made in system reliability.

17

/Le According to AFSC's evaluation, the Midas program was technically sound and a simplified system (being worked on) could be operational

before 1966. It submitted three development plans for consideration:

Plan A called for an IOC in 1964 and would require substantially increased

financial support; Plan B called for an IOC in 1965, with funding somewhat less; and Plan C, which AFSC considered partly responsive to the

Ruina report, emphasized research and development and a larger number of

test flights. Plan C would cost approximately 0330 million during fiscal

years 1962-1963 and would lead to an IOC in 1966. General Schriever

strongly recommended adoption of Plan C.18

psi The Systems Review Board indorsed both AFSC's evaluation and

Schriever's recommendation. The Designated Systems Management Group took

up the matter on 2 March, after which Secretary Zuckert directed McMillan

to discuss informally with Ruina the Air Force's position and criticism

of the group's report. Zuckert also asked the Air Staff to study the

funding aspects of Plan C.19

por On 12 March McMillan and Air Staff officials met with Dr. Ruina

and other OSD officials. At the conclusion of the discussions, OSD asked

--SECRET-
79

the Air Force to submit a revised Midas plan and to conduct further

informal discussions with the DDR&E technical staff. These meetings

were held during the next several weeks and led Brown to accept tentatively USAFfs proposed technical approach as contained in Plan C.2°

J.4 On this basis the Space Systems Division completed a revised

Midas development plan on 29 March 1962. The primary objective would

be to launch as many satellites as possible to establish system feasibility and reliability and to get an early start on design fabrication

of a simplified vehicle. The plan called for an IOC between mid-1965

and mid-1966. Funding requirements were estimated at $334 million in

fiscal years 1962-1963 (versus the existing programmed amount of $290

million) .21

1,61 During the spring of 1962, while the Air Staff reviewed the

plan, the first important resulta in the teat flight program were obtained

from Midas V, launched into polar orbit on 9 April. Although there was

a power malfunction on the seventh orbit, SSD had obtained great quantities of background information during the first six passes and reduction

of this data confirmed the ability of Midas to discriminate between

22

rocket plumes and the cloud background.

(8)- The day after this successful launch, McMillan forwarded the

29 March development plan to DOW and asked for immediate release of

$18.1 million in order to protect the schedule for the balance of the

fiscal year. Brown quickly approved release of the funds, but he

cautioned the Air Force that this action did not constitute approval of

the development plan, which he still had under review. 23
SECRET

New Doubts About Midas

iter Not only did Brown have his own staff review the 29 March

development plan, but he also requested the assistance of a special panel

of the President's Science Advisory Committee. .This panel was headed by

Dr. Panofsky, who had reviewed Midas in September 1960 and concluded at the time that the basic concept was sound. Such was not his

position on this occasion. The Panofsky panel noted that proposed flights

were still conceived as evaluations of operational prototypes and expressed

doubts about the system's ability to detect any but liquid oxygen/kerosene

fueled missiles. Moreover, it foresaw only limited success for Midas and

declared that the value of early warning was decreasing. The panel recoilmended that Brown should make his decision in light of these findings.

Dr. Wiesner, the President's scientific adviser, endorsed both the conclusions and recommendations.24

0'1 On 20 April Brown took up with McMillen his previous ngeneral

agreement!' on the 29 March plan and the Panofsky panel conclusions. He

also noted that recent IR measurements, made during the first Titan II

launch on 16 March, indicated that Midas' performance against advanced

liquid ICBM's might be marginal. As a consequence, he directed the Air

Force to examine the most logical and expeditious way of introducing

improved detection payloads which were effective against low-radiance

missiles. Pending this action, he would withhold approval of the Midas

Plight test program and defer construction of the planned data readout

center at Ottumwa, Iowa. Since the flight test program would not involve

operational prototype satellites, there was no need for the center.25
Of The Panofsky report and Ekewnts guidance distressed the Air Fore

but it had little choice except to comply. The Air Staff dispatched.instructions to AC on 30 April to prepare a-revised development plan.

Meanwhile, Dr. Brown added to the general glom when he commented--in

connection with an OSD review of major program change proposals--that the

apparent inability of Midas to detect low-radiance missiles raised doubts

whether a full-scale development was justified, even along the lines proposed by the Ruina group. 26

The Air Force nevertheless still considered Midas an essential

"hard-core" item, and it determined to continue to push for an operational

system. On 8 June 1.962 AFSC published two new plans in accordance with

Brown's instructions. Both emphasized the vital importance of Midas to

national defense and the need to support it accordingly. Plan A reaffirme

objectives of the 29 March plan but provided for increased IR measurement

research and testing. Plan B supported Brown's request that the Air Force

develop a low-radiance detection capability and called for a multisatellite flight series to support an accelerated research program. If

a "go-ahead" were given before 1 July, AFSC estimated the Air Force could

still achieve a Midas IOC by late 1965. The Systems Command urged adop tic

of Plan B, a recommendation subsequently endorsed by the Systems Review

Board and the 3)5MG.27

lei On 12 June, however, Secretary McNamara informed Zuckert that

he was personally ordering still another "full-scale stactr of the /Odes

program.“ He formed a study group under Ur. H.R. Skitter to review the

importance of early warning, the implications of a Soviet capability to

SECRET
launch missiles *the long way around,* and the growth potential of Midas.

Brown, meanwhile, remonstrated the Air Force about reports that he had

received indicating continued USAF preoccupation with an early IOC against

Soviet Atlas-type missiles. He felt that the Russian* would not have many

of these and said that answers to basic questions about low-radiance, highnoise background and reliability were still lacking. Me reaffirmed his

view that Midas *must remain an R&D program oriented toward developing...

techniques.* 28

jor On 28 June McMillan forwarded to OSD a Plan B supplement to the

29 March development plan, Which he said would meet DDR&M e s requirement

for early flight testing of loan -radiance detection payloads. To support

these flights, the Air Force submitted a program change proposal asking

for $169.2 million in fiscal year 1963 and $203.4 million in fiscal year

1964. Five weeks after the start of the new fiscal year, OSD on 6 August

disapproved the PCP and directed the Air Force to drop all deployment

plans and reduce the Midas to a limited R&D program. McNamara listed as

reasons for the decision: (1) the expected late deployment of Midas; (2)

the expected high cost of about $1 billion to complete development and

deployment, plus annual operating expenses; (3) the existence of other

techniques to augment early warning capabilities; * and (4) the lessening

worth of early warning in view of the increasing strategic shift from

manned aircraft to hardened missile sites.

29

/(-8I Thus, during the summer of 1962, USAF hopes for a space-based

early warning system to detect enemy ICBM launchings faded into the distant

future.

*Such as over-the-horizon radar detection techniques.

-REAM-
IX. BIOASTRONAUTICS

Of-Wring the year the Air Force sought approval for a proposed

bioastronautics orbital space program aimed at acquiring data on the

effects of prolonged weightlessness and space radiation on the human

organism. The projected research was based on an AFSC plan submitted

to the Air Force headquarters by General Schriever on 16 May 1961.

Schriever noted that the Soviet Union was far ahead of the United States

in obtaining biological information on outer space conditions, having

orbited five separate animal payloads (three recovered) and the worldts

first man in space. The United States, On the other hand, had had 38

successful orbital flights, none of which carried animal paseengers.1

AS1 The Air Staff agreed on the need for a bioastronautics orbital

research program and, on 16 August, submitted the plan to OSD and asked

for $41.9 million in fiscal years 1963-1964 to cover a series of six

chimpanzee launchings using Atlas-Agyna boosters, The Air Force would

place the animals in both circular (1,500 to 3,000 nautical miles) and

elliptic orbits (up to 10,800 nautical miles) to measure effects of

radiation in and beyond the Van Allen belts and the long-term effects of

weightlessness.

2

Bioastronautics Research Responsibility 

(U) USAFfs proposal raised questions within OSD on the proper

agency to conduct the research. Deputy DOME Rubel felt that the proposal

related closely to the manned lunar landing project and therefore NASA

-SECRET-
84

should fund and be responsible for it. In September 1961 BUbel and Dr.

Kavanau, DDR&E's special assistant for space, met with NASA officials to

discuss not only the specific USAF proposal but also the general questions

of management and funding for governmental bioastronautics research.3

(U) The management question in particular proved to be thorny.

Both agencies agreed that the Air Force possessed the nation's outstanding capability--in terms of professional personnel and modern facilities--

to conduct aerospace biological research, but they differed on how best

to utilise this important and scarce national resource. Although not

completely accepting the USAF position that with adequate funding it

could meet all of NASA's bioastronautics research requirements, OSD did

argue that the Air Force and other services needed to be assigned a

definite and sustaining mission. As Rubel stated the OSD case, "We just

don't want to be in a posture where...we have got facilities...and we have

got people and every now and then NASA decides that maybe they will give

them something to do, so we use them on a task-by-task kind of basis." 4

(U) NASA, on the other hand, argued that since it had primary

responsibility for the manned lunar landing mission, its own internal

life science capability (together with a separate research laboratory)

was essential in order to train personnel to monitor and control the work

assigned to other organisations. Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy Administrator

of NASA, stated that the space agency could not and would not delegate

complete responsibility to DOD. He added that NASA was quite willing to

make maximum use of DOD'a superior biomedical research resources, and he

promised to do nothing to diminish the effectiveness of those resources.

SECRET

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
UNCLASSIFIED

85

Thus, there remained the question of a specific arrangement that both

agencies could support .5

(U) While these discussions continued through the later weeks of

1961, the Air Force learned on 21 November that OSD had rejected its

request for funds to support the bioastronautics orbital flight program.

Although a reclama failed to bring approval, USAF officials drew some

comfort during this period from the first U.S. orbital flight of a primate, the chimp "Ewa," trained by the 6571st Aercuedical Field

Laboratory, Holloman.AFB, N. Mex. Launched on 28 November aboard MercuryAtlas 5, Enos performed several psychomotor duties during two orbits of

the earth and was then successfully recovered. His flight paved the way

for the launching of Colonel Glenn on 20 February 1962.

6

(U) During the early months of 1962, NASA and OSD officials conferred frequently, seeking a "mechanism of cooperation" in bioastronautics, which finally led to a tentative agreement on 8 March. Under

its terms, NASA would use DOD capabilities but retain overall responsibility and the right to specify the work to be done. NASA and DOD

would formulate research and development plans jointly, and the Air Force

would be the responsible DOD management agency for executing these plans.

Funding would be a NASA responsibility. 7

(U) On 30 March McMillan informed DDHO that he agreed "in principle

and substance" with the draft except for certain minor language changes.

The Air Force subsequently invited NASA to initiate a joint project based

on the ariginal AFSC bioastronautics orbital space plan, and on 10 April

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Charyk and Seamans discussed such a "collaborative effort." Additional

meetings ultimately led to a proposed "memorandum of understanding" which

Seamans forwarded to Charyk on 28 May. It called for six orbital launchings to obtain basic information on the biological effects of space flights

of 3 to 14 days in duration. The two agencies would apportion the cost

equally.8

(U) AFSC reviewed the proposed memorandum and found it unacceptable

because it failed to recognize sufficiently USAF t s bioastronautics capability both in selecting experiments and reporting results. AFSC revised

the memorandum, as did the Air Staff before forwarding it to Charyk on

28 June. The memorandum now called for a joint NASA-DOD program which

would make use of design and engineering "already accomplished by the Air

Force, and existing technology in launch vehicles, apace vehicles, and

recovery operations." NASA and the Air Force would jointly select experiments, with the former responsible for funding experimental development,

spacecraft and life support system development, and the cost of launch

vehicles.. The Air Force would pay for system engineering, launch and

recovery, tracking and control, and data acquisition and reduction.

9

The Webb-McNamara Bioastronautics Agreement 

(U) Charyk sent the twice-revised memorandum of understanding to

DDRAE for comment. This led in July 1962 to a meeting between Secretary

McNamara and Administrator Webb, who quickly reached agreement on the

overall question of DOD-NASA bioastronautics research. They agreed that

the Defense Department would not fund any joint research and that

UNCLASSIFIED
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responsibility would stay within NASA. The space agency would use DUD

bioastronautics resources to the maximum extent possible and would not

attempt to duplicate them. DOD would Charge NASA only the incremental

costs of DOD's effort and not prorated overhead costs. The Webb-McNamara

bioastronautics agreement of July 1962 left the Air Force entirely in a

1.0

supporting role and its resources available to NASA on an open-call basis.

-SECRET-

(THIS PACE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
X. SPACE DETECTION AND TRACKING SYSTIO4

)(41 An important element of U.S. defenses was the space detection

and tracking system (Spadats). It consisted of a number of optical and

electronic sensors operated by the Air Force, Navy, and civilian agencies

which fed observation data into a central processing facility. This center identified and charted all man-made objects in apace and kept a

comprehensive log on each of them. North American Air Defense Command

had operational control over Spadats and the Spadats Center at Ent AFB,

Colo. ADC t s•lst Aerospace Surveillance and Control Squadron formally took

over operation of the center from AFSC on 1 July 1961. That portion of

the detection and tracking system operated by the Air Force, along with

the research and development effort to improve it, was grouped under

3.

Project Spacetrack. The Navy's portion was known as Spasur.

$21 Although ADC was reasonably satisfied with the operation of the

Ent data center, it was concerned over the lack of a backup facility

should the computer fail. Consequently, on 31 July, ADC suggested to Air

Force headquarters that it designate a similar computer at the Electronic

System Division's Hanscom Field development facility as backup. Both canputers would use the same programming format. The Air Staff agreed to the

proposal and directed AFSC to make the Hanscom computer available to ADC

on this basis. By the spring of 1962, ADC personnel were on round-theclock duty at Hanscom.

2

88

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01 Under its Project Spacetrack, the Air Force had proposed a

number Of measures to tie together and improve the operation of the

existing sensors while undertaking developaent of several advanced

detection and tradking systems. Early in fiscal year 1962, the Air

Force requested OSD to release $30 million for this work. DMZ,

however, on 21 August released only 0.9 million to carry out improvements to the existing radars but withheld approval for the development

of the new sensors. The funds released by DDSS covered plans to (1)

integrate the FSP49 radar at Noorestown, &J., and BMWS into the

Spadats system, (2) modify the Shemya, Alakka, tracking radar and afford

it a better target discrimination capability, (3) add an additional

tradking radar to the existing site in Turkey, and (4) procure an

electro-optical sensor. When completed in 1964 at Cloudcroft, N. NSx.,

the optical sensor would provide coverage at altitudes between 3,000

and 30,000 miles and be the first major sensor designed and built specifically for far-space surveillance:3

Develonment 14: a Phased Laz Ar•

of A major development recommendation that the Air Force had

proposed for Spadats was a large volumetric, electronically steerable

phased array radar, which Could detect and track hundreds of satellites

simultaneously at ranges np to 3,000 miles. /MAD and ADC had frequently

cited the need for such an advanced radar capability, pointing to the

steadily increasing satellite population and the amount of orbiting

",space junk." Consequently, the Air Force continued to press OSD for

4

a go-Ahead on the phased army radar.
90

,(.8)/ DDR&N, however, withheld a decision for several months in late

1961 until it had evaluated NORADt s requirements for space surveillance.

Finally, on 27 November, it authorised the Air Force to begin work on a

single-faced volumetric radar but not incorporating the full complement

of radiating elements. OSD released $8.43 million, restricted total costs

to $30 million, and directed USAF to submit a development plan. 5

,(s) Following DDRUI s approval, AFSC prepared work statements,

briefed bidders on the proposed development, and by 9 February 1962 had.

received several proposals. A few days later, however, Dr. Brown altered

his earlier guidance to allow a slightly expanded capability in the radar.

Ibis, he thought, could be done within the $30 million cost restriction.

53$' Brown's additional guidance was forwarded to AFSC for incorporation

into the development plan. AFSC completed the revised plan in mid-March,

and the Air Staff forwarded it to OSD on the 30th. Pending DDROt s approval,

the Air Force on 2 April announced selection of Bendix Aviation Corporation to construct the new facility at Zglin AFB, Fla. The actual contract

signing, however, did not take place until 29 June 1962, after receipt of

Dr. Brownts authorisation. Under terms of the contract, Bendix expected

to turn over the phased array radar to the Air Force in April 1965.7

Aerospace Surveillance and WAD& lga

(U) On 21 Nay 1962 General LeMay authorized Air Staff issuance of

an overall specific operational requirement for space detection apleurveillance. SOB 197, dated 24 May, called for development of a system able to

provide users primarilySAC, MAD, and ADC withdata on all objects in

6
91

space, "and to do so with sufficient accuracy, timeliness, and capacity

to satisfy military needs.. .during peace, limited war, or general war." a

pi( As the Air Force reviewed current U.S. space surveillance warning and control systems, it had many gaps and weaknesses: 9

Facility/System Detection Tracking Identification 

BMWS

East-West Fence

(Navy system)

A limited capa- Yes, but

bility at Thule limited to

and Clear with Site 1

manual display,

MEAD

Marginal for ob- No

jects in near polar orbits between

altitudes of 100

and 3,000 NM, with

inclination angles

above 32°

By area of origin and

operator correlation of

targets with known trajectories (ephemerides)

as furnished by the

Spadats Center

By correlation with

known ephemerides

Laredo Tracker No Yes

Trinidad No Yes No

Tracker

Shemya FSP-17 Some Soviet Yes Only' by point of origin

launches of observed launches

Turkey FSF-17

Cooperating

Scientific

sensors

Same Soviet

launches

No Yes, with

varying degrees of effectiveness

Only by point of origin

of observed launches

No, except as intelligence inputs

Spadats Central No No ki comparison of known • Data Facility ephemerides with those

of unknown objects

Thus it was obvious that the United States during the next two or three

years would have only a marginal capability for detecting noncooperating

objectis in orbit. BMEWS radars would provide detection of Soviet vehicles
92

launched to the north, but little coverage on re-entry angles. The FSP171 s would be able to cover only a relatively small portion of Soviet

territory. Both the FSP-17's and BMWS possessed limited capability to

detect orbiting objects. Major improvements would have to await completion of the new sensor subsystems—the phased array radar, the optical

surveillance sensor at Cloudcroft, etc.

10

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XI. OTWER USAF SPACE UMMTA/COMIS

(U) In addition to the major projects described in the preceding

pages, the Air Force conducted a number of other important space tasks,

including the much-studied satellite inspector, the ICBM interceptor,

and the highly successful Discoverer. The Air Force also participated

in or supported in varying degree several joint, other service, and NASA

projects during fiscal year 1962.

Satelgtq Inspector

AfereFor several years prior to fiscal year 1962, the Air. Force had

studied a proposed satellite inspector (Saint) system which would examine

unidentified objects in space and determine their characteristics, capabilities, or intent. In July 1960 the Air Force completed a development

plan for the system, submitted it to OSD, and received $8.15 million to

begin design studies. DDRO subsequently authorized the Air Force to

begin hardware development on four prototype vehicles that would demonstrate conceptual feasibility, but reduced fiscal year 1962 fending to

4:26 million ($4.1 million less than asked). The Air Force selected Radio

Corporation of America (RCA) as the final stage vehicle contractor.1

JAef During the summer of 1961 the Air Force also awarded contracts

to Convair and Lockheed for the Atlas and Agena boosters required to

orbit the satellite vehicle. In addition, it submitted to OSD its fiscal

year 1963 funding requirement totalling $47.3 million to continue the

93

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94

four-shot feasibility demonstrations (with a scheduled first launching

in March 1963), support system analyses, fund long lead-time development

of components, and begin development of an operatiohal system. =My

however, directed the Air. Force to plan for $40 million and limit its

efforts to research and development alone.2

5,8f Dissatisfied with the stretched-out schedule that the financial

limitation imposed, and concerned by Soviet progress, the Air Force prepared new plans for an 8- and 12-shot program which it felt essential for

an early operational inspection capability. These plans, together with

the substantially higher cost estimates, were submitted to the DSMG in

October 1961. However, Secretary Zuckert deferred a decision pending an

examination of the possible relationship between Saint and NASA's Gemini.

He asked the Air Staff to organise a team t4, examine with NASA Saint-Gemini .

compatibility.3

Ar Late in 1961 fiscal difficulties surfaced which threatened to

delay development and flight tests. AFSC attributed the basic causes to

contractor cost increases for the final stage vehicle and the restrictive

t26 million ceiling in fiscal year 1962. It stated that an additional $4.6

milli on was needed to maintain schedules. The Air Staff instructed AFSC

to eliminate the $4.6 million requirement by deferring procurement of the

second-stage booster. At the same time, it directe4 AFSC to review possibilities of getting back to the original launch schedule and cane. for

4

a critical evaluation of contractual methods and administration.

Ar The DSMG reviewed AFSC I s findings and several different fourshot plans in January-February 1962. It directed the Systems Gmnammi to
95

institute improymd management procedures and reconfirmed the $26 million

ceiling pending completion of the Saint-Gemini interrelationship study.

A preliminary Air Force-MASA study report became available in early March.

Its major conclusion was that military and scientific rendezvous requirements differed substantially. Saint operations would have to succeed

against all uncooperative satellites and permit rapid data sensing and

transmission to earth, whereas Gemini had no such requirement. In addition,

Gemini missions involved orbital flights of two weeks or more before

returning to earth, While Saint required no more than one reliable orbit

and would not be recovered. The study group identified several areas of

possible subsystem compatibility and General Schriever and Dr. Seamans

agreed to coordinate work on such equipment. In general, however, they

agreed that na joint program is not warranted and...exchange of funds is

not appropriate. 5

,lar With a joint program unlikely, Secretary Zuckert asked the Air

Staff on 23 March to submit a new development plan increasing the number

of launchings from four to six to assure a successful demonstration of

the satellite inspection concept. On 12 April DDRAB officials reviewed

the proposed program expansion, which McMillan later reported would

boost 1962 funding requirements to $65 million. Maillan also recom.

mended that OSD accelerate and broaden the work to include more sensors

in the final-stage vehicle, a "neutralization systemon if desired, and

improved subsystems for longer on-orbit life and maneuverability.

6

JAI( On 28 June 1962 Dr. Brown replied that While he agreed with

many features of the proposed expansion, including the six launchings,

SECRET
96

he could not approve the overall plan. To his knowledge, there was no

intelligence pointing to a need 'for an early system capability in satellite inspection or negation. Brown reaffirmed previous OSD guidance that

"this program should proceed only at an orderly pace on a strictly RieD

basis." 7

Of To General Lefty, Brown's decision was "totally inconsistent',

with the urgency that Secretary McNamara had expressed to the JCS. In

a letter to Secretary Zuckert, the Chief of Staff reported:

...In discussing the recommendations of the President's

committee dealing with the satellite program as it pertains

to current disarmament negotiations, Secretary McNamara

stated emphatically his belief that several things would

have to be done militarily; specifically, "the Air Force

would have to get on with the Saint program." He noted

suspected developments by the Soviets in the AIM field

and stated we may soon be faced with a Soviet antisatellite capability. He expressed his concern that as

soon as the Soviets achieve a capability to shoot down

our satellites, 'they will openly attack the legality of

our reconnaissance satellites. Right now they have no

capability to do anything about then. *Dr. Brown's memorandum specifically prevents us from developing a negation

capability for the system, although Secretary McNamara

stated we must be able to say "if you shoot down one of

ours, we will shoot down one of yours.ft

of General LeMay asked the Secretary to bring this inconsistency

to McNamara's attention. As additional support for USAF's concern, the

Chief of Staff forwarded an Air Staff paper discussing the impact of

Brown's decision on the satellite inspector. Pointing to DDBAt's consistent philosophy of "fly-before-you-buy," the Air Staff observed that

it flaw have merit from a purely fiscal standpoint, but...(it) has consistently precluded operational considerations...and in our opinion has

delayed the acquisition of a military capability in space." 9
IM The fact was, however, that Brown had not entirely ignored the

need for some kind of satellite interception capability. As early as

July 1961 he had suggested to Secretary McNamara the possibility of a

cheap type of nonnuclear-equipped interceptor that would be launched

into the path of a hostile satellite. Brown had in mind a modification

of the Army's Nike-Zeus. After reviewing this proposal, in the spring

of 1962 McNamara authorized $7 million in emergency funds and directed

the Army to incorporate an antisatellite capability (to an altitude of

200 miles) at its Zeus facilities punt/4101(1in.10

01 The Air Force also had studied the possibility of a cross course

• interceptor, launched either fruit the ground or from a B-52, and in

February 1962 issued an advanced development objective for such a system.

In early 1962 additional studies were begun which led in time to a proposed satellite interceptor based on a ground-launched Thor booster.

These studies were under way at the close of the period.11

Missile Interception 

(5) In addition to Saint, the Air Force during the year continued

to search for a apace-based ballistic missile defense system, designated

ballistic missile boost intercept (Bambi). This concept called for intercepting enemy ICBM's in their boost phase by first observing and tracking

them train satellites and then launching small intercepting rockets, also

32

from satellites.

5,S1 During 1960-1961 several contractors, working under USAF supervision, had pursued studies of the Bambi concept with funds provided by

the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Confident that no insoluble
98

technical difficulties would appear, the Air Force in July 1961 sought

OSD funding support for feasibility demonstrations in fiscal year 1963.

When OSD rejected this proposal, ADC and !CHAD expressed their concern

in view of the lack of any kind of antimissile capability.

13

In December

1961 ADC prepared a qualitative operational requirement for an interceptor

system, declaring that the gravity of the Soviet ballistic missile threat

justified highly accelerated development. However, OSD was unconvinced

that the proposed system was feasible and it continued to withhold

approval.

IA( In March 1962, to speed a decision, the Air Force asked AFSC

to review the current study effort and to recommend changes and augmentations. AFSC completed its review in June and reported that the existing data on the Bambi concept was insufficient to either affirm or denytechnical feasibility. AFSC also found that cost effectiveness would be

a major obstacle. It estimated that to obtain a .94 kill probability

against liquid ICBM/s, Bambi operations would cost $8.7 billion annually.

14

Against solid missiles, the cost would be substantially higher.

jai In brief, AFSC i s analysis disclosed that economic considerations

alone could dictate whether to continue or abandon the work. At the close

of fiscal year 1962, the Air Staff was studying AFSC's recommendation

that Bambi studies be redirected to refine cost estimates, a factor Which

obviously would play a major role in any decision.15

Standardized Agena 

jOr- One of the workhorse vehicles in the U.S. space program was

the Agena B upper-stage booster. When paired with Thor or Atlas, the
OSD

99

Agena was able to place 2,500 and 5,000 pounds, respectively, into 100-

mile earth orbits. Because of its importance to many NASA and DOD apace

launchings, the Air Force in early 1961 initiated a study to obtain a

standardized version (subsequently designated Agana D) and eliminate the

need for "custom built" individual Agenas. The goal was a reliable and

easy-to-handle vehicle procured at a fixed price, thus saving substantial

sums of money.li

,(C1 In September 1961, on the basis of the study, Dr. Charyk asked

DDR&R approval to proceed with development. He proposed to use funds

already programmed for Agena procurement, with the idea that future savinga would amortise development costs

officials, after reviewing the plan, agreed that the idea was "certainly

attractive." On 4 October Rubel formaly approved the undertaking but

limited initial action to a Phase I study. This requirement, however,

was later dropped, allowing the Air Force to proceed directly into

fabrication with a delivery goal of January 1963 for the first flight

article.

17

 After it appeared that the work could proceed more rapidly

and delivery accelerated by six months, Charyk on 7 November authorised

the expedited development and directed AFSC to appoint a full-time Agena D

program director. On 6 December the Air Force subnitted its planned

schedule to DDR&N and reported the first Agana D would be used in a

Discoverer flight about June 1962. The Air Force also reported that it

had informed the Army, Navy, and NASA to plan an orderly phase-in of

Agana D into their space projects.18

JS-Y During the first half of 1962 the Air Force reached all Agana D

development milestones on schedule. On 16 April the contractor delivered

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100

the first flight article to the Air Force and on 27 June 1962 the first

Thor-Agena D combination successfully launched a Discoverer payload into

19

Standardized Atlas

jetl In addition to standardizing the Agena, the Air Force during

January 1962 began similar action with the Atlas space booster. Space

Systems Division drafted a development plan which it forwarded to Air

Force headquarters on 12 April. Secretary Zuckert approved it only eight

days later and authorized AFSC to begin contract negotiations with General

Zynamics/Astronautics.20

frer On 2 May the Air Force-presented the development plan to DDR&E.

Although favorably impressed, DDR&E asked for more detailed design specifications and configuration data. After further study and coordination

with NASA, AFSC submitted the additional data to the Air Staff in late

ti

June 1962. It noted that the best features of the Atlas D, E and F models

would be incorporated into the standardized booster, with thrust increased

from 154,000 to 165,000 pounds.21

(U) The Air Staff approved the development at the close of the

period and DDR&E later authorised a *78 million contract to acquire the

standardized version designated Atlas SLV-III. Under terms of the contract, General Dynamics/Astronautics would design and develop the SLV-III

and be responsible for modifying launch sites at the Atlantic and Pacific

Missile Ranges. 22

Discoverer and the Thrust-Augmented Thor (TAT) 

,AAr Discoverer during fiscal year 1962 experienced its greatest

activity since the first successful satellite was launched in February

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polar orbit. All flight objectives were successfully met.
101

1959. The Air Force launched 20 Discoverer vehicles during the year and

only four failed to enter polai- orbit. Twelve of the 16 satellites were

successfully recovered, 10 in the air by a C-119 or C-130. and 2 from the

sea by USAF pararescue teams.

23

4----In recognition of the remarkable success to date and the continued need for reliable test vehicles to support other space activities,

DDRAE in October 1961 approved the full amount requested

by the Air Force for fiscal year 1962. DOME also suggested the desirability "to continue the Discoverer series on an indefinite basis." As a

consequence, the Air Force reconmended an increase in the overall flight

program from 44 to 60 through fiscal year 1963. .DDR&E provided a portion

of the additional fiscal requirements to cover the expansion from OSD

emergency funds and the Air Force obtained the remainder through internal

reprogramming.24

LeY In an important related action, the Space Systems Division in

February 1962 asked the Douglas Aircraft Company, the Thor contractor,

to study ways of increasing the vehicle's performance. Douglas immediately began studies to obtain additional booster thrust by strapping

three solid propellant rocket motors onto the Thor. It eventually

settled on three Thiokol Sergeant solid motors which would provide an

additional 163,500 pounds of thrust and enable Thor-Agena to place an

extra 500 pounds of payload into a 300-mile orbit. At the close of the

fiscal year, the Air Force authorized Douglas and Thiokol Chemical to

develop and produce the thrust-augmented Thor (TAT). The initial test

Lux:hinge were set for November 1962; development costs were estimated

at $3.35 m4rlion.

25

(IBIS PAGE IS GONFIBENPEAI)
SECRET

102

Blue Scout

.65i On 1 November 1961 the Air Force launched a solid propellant

Blue Scout vehicle (D-8) from Cape Canaveral and brought to an end the

development phase of its 609A hyper-environmental test system at a cost

of $15.8 mi l lion. The final test vehicle, which carried a payload to

check out airborne and ground-based components of the worldwide Mercury

tracking and communication network, unfortunately became erratic 30

seconds after liftoff and was destroyed. The failure was attributed to

improper system wiring.

,(434f Completion .of the Blue Scout test phase was followed by an

applications program which would eventually involve the launching of some

27 USAF, Navy, and NASA probes and satellites. During the remainder of

fiscal year 1962 the Air Force launched four more Blue Scouts, three of

them from Pt. Arguello, carrying various experiments. Only one of these

launchings, however, was successful. The disturbingly low reliability

of Blue Scout led AFSC to investigate the entire system. and, at the close

of the period, these studies were under way.27

(U) Earlier, the Air Force had coordinated its launch plans and

research programs with NASA, which had the responsibility for all Scout

vehicle procurement. Together with space agency representatives, the

Air Force in mid-1961 conducted a system analysis, experiment by experiment and shot by shot, of the proposed USAF-NASA environmental science

research programs. The results of this analysis, together with necessary

adjustments, were agreed upon by representatives of both agencies and

confirmed on 19 July by AACB's Unmanned Spacecraft Panel. On 1 September

26
103

the two organizations formally agreed on the conduct of the Scout

28

program,

(U) Since it expected to be a heavy user of Scout; the Air Force

during the period pushed the idea of transferring procurement responsibility from the space agency. After months of discussion, on 21 June

1962 the Air Force and NASA signed two agreements governing Scout management and launch operations. One created a Scout Vehicle System

Organization, composed of USAF and NASA representatives, to develop,

procure, and operate a standard Scout vehicle system. The second agreement covered joint NASA-DOD Scout launch operational procedures at the

Pacific Missile Range.

29

Aerospace Plane Propulsion

1,81 For several years Air Force scientists had studied the feasibility of a manned aerospace plane that would take off from the ground

like a conventional aircraft, ay directly into orbit, de-orbit at will,

and land at a conventional airfield. In 1560 the Air Staff published an

advanced development objective establishing a firm requirement for extended

studies and experimentation. However, after OSD disapproved a request for

fiscal year 1962 funds, the Air Force sought authorization for a $1 million

advanced technology study in the areas of aerospace plane propulsion, aerodynamics, and materials.'"

JO Pending OSDIs decision, the Air Force in July 1961 reprogrammed

$1.8 million to begin work. Also, accepting a SAB recommendation, the

Air Staff directed AFSC to prepare separate development plans covering
104

critical aerospace plane components. The Air Force believed that it would

be easier to obtain financial support for component development, while OSD

would likely reject a full system approach. Hy September 1961 AFSC had

completed six developments plans for what was designated as the 651 advanced

technology program. These covered research or development of an air separator (later renamed an air collector and enrichment subsystem), a Mach 8

ramjet, an advanced liquid air cycle engine, a supersonic combustion ramjet, a turbo accelerator, and advanced structures.

To support these project. during fiscal year 1962, the Air Force

requested $34.9 minion, but OSD approved only $9 million with $8 million

to come from USAF resources. The same type of cutback occurred when the

Air Force requested $90 million (later reduced to $40 million) to support

fiscal year 1963 activities and OSD limited it to $19 million. Ay June

1962 only 47.6 million, the bulk coming from USAF administrative reserves,

had been provided to support aerospace plane component research and development.

32

f4 Meanwhile, on 15 March DDR&E authorized the Air Force to undertake its proposed study, which was designated the Recoverable Orbital

Launch Study (ROTS). With its grant of $2 million, DDR&E said l the study's

objective should be to provide design information and guidance "for related

applied research and advanced technology programs." He suggested that the

Air Force also seek NASA's participation. This was done and, at the close

of the year, a joint USAF-NASA group was being organized.

33

Other USAF-Supported Military-Civilian Space Programs 

Snapshot

(U) The Air Force during the year prepared a flight test plan,

designated Snapshot, in support of AEC t s systems for nuclear auxilliary

31
105

power (Snap) development program. The plan called for lour orbital

shots--two involving the Snap 2 nuclear reactor unit which could generate

3 kilowatts of power, and two with the Snap 10A that generated 500 kilowa

tts.

34

(U) In connection with the launch program, the Air Staff on

2 August 1961 directed the Systems Command to incorporate ion engines

aboard Snapshot vehicles in order to test the advantages of using electrical propulsion equipment in flight. It directed that the ion engine

flight tests not interfere with the primary Snapshot objectives; however,

they were given precedent over other scientific experiments or secondary

payloads which might use the flights.

35

5.21 The Air Force originally estimated Snapshot requirements at

$10 million in fiscal year 1962. After several months elapsed and OSD

had released no funds, Secretary McMillan notified DDR&E on 8 September

1961 that unless resources were immediately made available, work stoppages

would occur on several contracts, impairing DOD's commitment to the AMC.

Shortly thereafter, DDRO authorised $3 million, but with the understanding that the Air Force would reprogram the remaining $7' million. Head36

quarters USAF took this action in December.

J.0 In January 1962 AFSC and AEC officials approved a charter for

a Snapshot joint working group, to be chaired alternatively by the Space

Systems Division and AEC representatives., This group had the task of

.coordinating the activities of all government agencies and contractors.

The commission would provide flight-ready Snap packages, and the Air Force

would assume responsibility for the launch vehicle, integration, launching,

and related services.

37
106

jed During February the Air Force learned that the AEC was experiencing technical difficulties with both Snap 2 and Snap 10A, causing a

slippage in the launch schedule. After a series of meetings between

representatives of the two agencies, the flight dates, of the Snap 10A

were rescheduled to September 1963 and January 1964 and the Snap 2 units

to March and June 1965. At the close of fiscal year 1962, the Air Force

had under study the effects on its funding plans. 38

Mercury 

(U) The Air Force provided boosters and considerable other direct

support to NASA's Project Mercury before and during four successful orbital flights in fiscal year 1962. The first of these--Mercury-Atlas 4 on

13 September 1961—was a one-orbit unmanned flight with successful capsule

recovery. On 29 November the chimp, Enos, also was successfully launched

aboard Mercury-Atlas 5 and recovered from the sea after two orbits. On

20 February 1962 came the first American manned orbital flight with Colonel

Glenn aboard Mercury-Atlas 6. Three months later, on 24 MO, the threeorbital flight of Cmdr. Scott Carpenter aboard Mercury-Atlas 7 culminated

the year's flight activity. Air Force expenditures in support of Mercury

39

came to $20.6 mil l i on, of which NASA reimbursed all but $3.25 million.

Vela Hotel

8}' The Air Force was a direct participant in Vela Hotel, an AR2Asponsored project to develop a system capable of detecting "secret"

high-altitude nuclear detonations. During the year the Air Force flew four

separate Vela Hotel instrument packages piggyback aboard Discoverer
307

vehicles--on 30 August, 17 September, 5 November, and 12 December 1961.

These instruments measured space conditions, including x-rays and the

intensity of electrons at high altitudes. At year's end, planning was

under way to conduct five autonomous Vela Hotel launchings beginning in

early fiscal year 1964 using the Atlas-Agena.

40

Transit 

01 The Navy's Transit project goal was development and deployment

of a satellite-based navigational system to assist primarily the Polaris

fleet and, eventually, all ships and aircraft. On 15 November 1961 the

Air Force successfully launched Transit IVB into orbit with a Thor-AbleStar. The satellite's basic payload was a Transit research and altitude

control (TRAAC) system, which worked well. It also carried a Snap radioisotope package similar to one flohm in June aboard Transit IVA. On

24 January 1962 the Air Force also launched the Navy's Composite I, a

5•in-1 satellite package which was to make numerous scientific measurements. However, because of a malfunction in the Thor-Able-Star booster,

the satellite failed to orbit.41

Anna

(U) The purpose of Project Anna, a tri-service geodetic satellite

under Navy management, was to acquire data on the geometrical shape of

the earth, its gravitational field, and the precise location of major

land masses. An optical device developed by the Air Force Cambridge

Research Laboratories was one of three experiments incorporated into the

satellite to test methods of compiling this geodetic data. On 10 May 19
SECRET

108

the Air Force launched the first Anna satellite from Cape Canaveral,

using the Thor-Able-Star. thfortunately, the second stage failed to

ignite and the satellite plunged into the sea aboUt 800 miles downrange.

At the close of the year, work was under way to prepare another Anna

satellite for an autumn launching.42

4EGRET-

(THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
UNCLASSIFIED 109

NOTES

Chapter I

Hearings before the Select Onto on Astronautics and Space Exploration,

85th Con& 2nd Sees, pp 3-5.

Public Law 85-568, 85th Gang, H.R. 12576, 29 Jul .58.

Memo (C), McNamara to Zudkert, 22 Feb 62, ea* Air Force Manned Mil

Space Prog, in OSA? 163-62; Stmt by John H. Rubel, Dep Dir, DDH&E,

quoted in Missiles & Rockets, 5 Mar 62.

Carl Berger, The= Force in Space Fiscal Year ag, (AFCHO, 1966),

pp 30-31.

Stmt by Richard R. Horner, in House Hearings before Subamte on Manned

Space Flt, 87th Cong, 2nd Sees, 196 NASA Authorisation Pt 2, p 423;

Ltr (U), Schriever to Left, 7 Sep 61, no subj, in OSAF 29-61, vol 3.

N.Y. Times 7 Aug 61.

Ltr (U), Schriever to Sen Jahn Stennis Chmn, Senate Preparedness

Investigating SUbamte, 11 Sep 61, in 03AF 29-61.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Cong Record, Vol 107, Pt 16, p 21252; Memo (U), Naj Gen P.H. Hoisington,

Jr., Dep Dirt Legislative Liaison, Hq USAF, to Aast Vice C/S USAF,

29 Sep 61, subj: Senate Preparedness Invest & SUbamte Study on Nil

Aspects of Space, in OSAF 2941, vol 4.

Memo (U), LeNay to Gen F.H. Smith, Vice C/S USAF, 1 Nov 61, no subj,

in OSAF 29-61, vol 5.

N.Y. Times, 26 Sep 61.

LeMay's speech is reprinted in Air Force Into Policy Ltr, Sup No 100,

Jan 62, lop 9-14.

Washington Post 13 Oct 61.

15. Kennedy's remarks are quoted in Air Force Info Policy Ltr, Sup No 110

(undated), pp 10-11.

UNCLASSIFIED
110

UNCLASSIFIED

Stmt by Roswell Gilpatric, in Senate Hearings before Cate on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 87th Cong, 2nd Seas, NASA Authorisation 

for FT 1963, p 25.

Stmt by Dr. Harold Brown, Senate Hearings above, p 342.

N.Y. Times 15 Jun 62.

House Hearings before the Subcmte on Manned Space Flt, Gate on Science

and Astronautics, 87th Congo 2nd Seas, Pt 2 (No 2), 1261 NASA

Authorization pp 257-58, 623, 643.

Ibid., pp 630-31.

Agreement (U) between DOD and NASA Relating to the Launch Site for the

Manned Lunar Landing Prog, 24 Aug 61, in OSAF 29-61, vol 3.

22. Rprt (U) of SRB Mtg 61-1, 2 Aug 61; Memos (U), Zuckert to SOD, 4 Aug

61, subj: Air Force Recommendations for DOD Participation in the Manned

Lunar Landing Frog; Memo (U), Gilpatric to Zuckert, 15 Aug 61, same

aubj, in OSAF 29-61, vol 3; Hint (S) of AFSC, Jan-Jun 62, Vol I, p 68.

23. Meg (U) 98876, USAF to AFSC, 1 Sep 61; Ltr (U), Maj Gen R.M. Montgomery,

Asst Vice C/S USAF to Deputies, et al, 8 Sep 61, subj: Air Force Spt

of NASA Manned Lunar Prog, in OSAF 466-61; Hint (S) of AFSC, Jan-Jun

62, Vol I, p 68.

Memo (U), McMillan to Gen Counsel, OSD, 3 Nov 61, subj: Ping for Spt of

NASA Prog, in OSAF 466-61.

Ltr (U), Zuckert to McNamara, 28 Dec 61, no subj, in OSAF 29-61, vol 5.

DOD Directive 5030.18 (U), 24 Feb 62, subj: DOD Spt of Natl Aeronautics

and Space Adm.

Ltr (U), Gen Smith, Vice Vs USAF to AFSC, 2 Mar 62, subj: AFSC Dep

Comdr/Manned Space Flt; Ltr (U), Zuckert to McNamara, 28 Mar 62, no

aubj, in Space Div files.

Memo (U), Gilpatric to Zuckert, 6 Apr 62, no aubj; AFSC Monthly Status

Rprt (C), AF Spt of NASA May 1962, in Space Div files.

Ltr (U), Schriever to Seamans, 14 Mar 62, subj: Siting of New Launch

Facilities at AMR, in Space Div files.

Ltr (U), Seamans to Schriever, 16 Mar 62, no subj; Ltr (U), Schriever

to Seamans, 28 Mar 62, no aubj, in Space Div files.

House Hearings before Subcmte on Manned Space Flt, 87th Cong 2nd Seas,

NASA Authorization, Pt 2, pp 644-655.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Memos (U), Rubel to McMillan, 7 Apr 62, subj: DOD/NASA Relationships

at AMR; McMillan to Zuckert, 16 Apr 62, subj: AMR; McMillan to Rubel,

18 Apr 62, subj: DOD/NASA Relationships at ANM6 in OSAF 482-62.

Memo (U), Rubel to McMillan, 18 Nay 62, subj: DOB/NASA Relationship

at AMR; Ltr, Ritland to SAY, 20 Jun 62, subj as above, in OSAF 482-62.

Ltr (U), Webb to Gilpatric, 8 Jun 62, no subj, in Space Div files.

Ibid.

36. Stmt by Lt Gen James 'Ferguson, in House Hearings before Subcmte on

Appropriations, 87th Cong, 2nd Seas, 1963 DOD Appropriations, Pt 2,

pp 476-77ff.

Chapter:II

Air Force Space Plan (S), Sep 61; Decision, AFC 4/17C, 21 Sep 61,

subj: Review of USAF Space Plan, in OSAF 29-61.

Air Force Space Plan (S), Sep 61, pp 83-88, in OSAF 29-61.

3. Ibid.

Rprt (S) of Space Panel Ntg 61-3, 9 Oct 61, subj: USAF Space Plan;

Ltrs (S), Lt Gen James Ferguson, DCS/R&T to Brig Gen G.T. McHugh,

Air Force Aide to the President, 31 May 62, no subj, in Space Div

files.

Ltr (U), Gen Smith, Vice 0 USAF to 4/Legis Liaison, et al 4 Dec 61,

subj: USAF Space Prog FY 1963-64, in OSAF 29-61; Hist (SAE), B/Dev

Ping, Jul-Dec 614 pp 37-38.

Rprts (S), Space Panel Mtge 62-2, 5 Feb 62, sub: Defense of FY 63

Space Prog; Mtg 62-6, 2 Mar 62, subj: FY 64 Space Prog, in Space

Div files.

Stint by lit Goa James Ferguson in House Hearings. before SUbcmte on

Appropriations, 87th Congo 2nd Sees, OND1262ApprOpriations, Pt 2,

PP 476ff.

Ibid., p 484.

Ltr (U), Maj Gen J.B. Merrill, D/Budget to 4/Prog„ Mar 62, •ubj: AF

Space Prog, FY 644 in Space Div files.

10. Namo (C), McNamara to Zuckert, 22 Feb 62, subj: Air Flarce Manned Mil

Space. Frog, in OSAF 163-62.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Ltr (C), Ferguson to Schriever, 12 Mar 62, no subj, in Dyna-Soar

Prof Off files.

Can LeMay's remarks are quoted in Rprt (U) of the SAB Ad Hoc Cmte

on Manned Mil Space Prog, 14 Jul 61; see also Address by Loney at

Assumption College, Worcester, Mass, 28 Mar 62; DOD News Release

No 451-62; Washington Post, 2 Apr 62.

Rprt (S) of Space Panel Mtg 62-19, 18 Apr 62, subj: FY Funding for

Space Activities, in Space Div files.

Rprt (S) of SRB Mtg 62-32, 5 Apr 62.

Memo (S), LeMay to OSD, 16 May 62, subj: FY 63 Fund Augment for the

Space Prog, in OSAF 55-62, vol 3.

App I, A Chronology of the Air Force Five Year Space Program, in

Carter SAB Study 5.3.41; Hist, SSD, Jul-Dergi, Vol I, Pt 1, pp 9-10.

17. Ltr (S), Ferguson to Gen Bogart, et al. 29 Jul 62, subj: Five Year

USAF Space Plan; Meg (S), 62268, USAF to SAC, et al 29 Jun 62, in

Space Div files.

Chapter III

Berger, p 51.

Ibid.

Ltr (S), Schriever to LeMay, 1 Aug 61, subj: Acceleration of DyneSoar Prog, in DS Proj Ofc files.

Rprt (S) of SRB Mtg 61-2, 4 Aug 61; Ltre (S) *

Seamans* Jr., NASA

to McMillan, no subj, 9 Aug 61; McMillan to Seamans, no subj, 12 Oct

61, in DS Proj Ofc files.

5• Ltr (8), Can Smith, Vice C/S USAF to Can Schriever * 18 Aug 61, subj:

Accel of Dyna-Soar Prog; Ltr (s), Col T.H. Runyon, Ex Secy, D to

Dcp/sa, 5 Sep 61, subj: DWG Mtg on Dyna-Soar, in DS Pros Ofc files.

Ltr (S), LeMay to Zuckert, 12 Sep 62, subj: AF Space Frog Proposals,

Tab C, in WAY 55-62, v01 4.

Ltr ES), Lt Gen H.M. Elates, Jr. Dep Comdr for Aerospace Systems, AFSC

to Can Schriever, 28 Sep 61, no subj, in DS Prof Ofc files.

8. Ibid.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Memo (U), Charyk to LeMay, 28 Sep 61, subj: Wrest Coast Trip by Sec

McNamara, in DS Proj Ofc files; DOD News Release NO 1220-61, 27 Oct

61.

Clarence J. Geiger, Hist of the X-20A Dyna-Soar (ASD, Oct 1963), Vol I,

pp 87-88.

U. Ibid.; Mins (S), 17th DSMG Mtg, 14 Oct 61; CUP Space Proarams,

ITO, Vol I, Tab 1,22 (hereinafter referred to as USAF Space Pro/grams,

1945-1962).

Ibid.

Memo (S), Charyk to SOD, 17 Nov 61, aubj: Air Force Manned Mil Space

Frog, with atChs, in DS Proj Ofc files.

white Paper (C) on the AF Manned Mil Space Frog, 16 Nov 61, pp 2-3,

in DS Proj Ofc files.

Ibid., pp 8-9.

Memo (C), Charyk to LeMay, 8 Dec 61, subj: Dyne-Soar Frog; Maga (C)

85081, USAF to AFSC, 11 Dec 61; 0379, USAF to AFSC, 12 Dec 61, in

DS Proj Ofc files.

Sys Frog Directive No 4 (U), 27 Dec 61, in DS Proj Ofc files; N.Y.

Times, 27 Dec 61.

Memo (C), McNamara to Zuckert, 22 Feb 62, subj: AF Manned Mil Space

Frog, in DS Proj Ofc files.

Hist (3), DiSys Acq, Jan-Jun 62, pp 161-62.

Memo (C), Ex Secy, DSMG to DCS/S&L, 20 Mar 62, subj: 34th DSMG Mtg.

Ltr (0, Schriever to Hq USAF, 11 Apr 62, subj: Dyna-Soar Presto

Redline Rprt, in DS Proj Ofc files.

Rprt (C) of X-20 Sys Ofc' 14 May 62, in DS Proj Ofc files; Hist,

D/Sys Acq, Jan-Jun 62, p165.

Memo (S), McMillan to DDR&E, 25 May 62, aubj: Erma-Soar Frog; Ltr (S)

LeMay to SAP, 12 Sep 62, subj: Air Force Space Frog Proposals, Tab C,

in OSAF 55-62, vol 4.

Memo (C), Gi/patric to SAP, 6 Jul 62, subj: Frog Change, SOD Decision/

Guidance, in OSAF 55-62, vol 4.

DOD Newt Release NO. 1057-62, 26 Jun 1962.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Chapter IV

Ltr (C), McNamara to Zuckert, 22 Feb 62, subj: AF Manned Mil Space

Frog, in OSAF 1963-62

Oberth is quoted in Willy Ley, Rockets, Missiles Space Travel

(NY, 1959), pp 365-66; 1411, 23 Jul 45; House Rprt No 67, 87th Cong,

let Seas, A Chronology of Missile and Astronautic Events, p S.

"General Arnold's Third Reports tt The War Reports of General, of the

George C. Marshall, General of the Amm H.H. Arnold, and Fleet,

Admiral Earnest J. Um (Phil and NY, 1947), p 463.

Col C.D. Gasser, WADC, "An Approach to Space Endeavor in Relationship

to Current and Future Capabilities of the U.S. Air Force," 2 Jan 57;

WADC Technical Note 57-225, An Estimate of Future Space Vehicle

Evolution Based on a projected Technical Capability, July 1957.

Pertinent articles on space stations included: H.B. Ketchum, "A Preliminary Survey of the Constructional Features of Space Stations,tt

J. of Space Flight, Oct 62, pp 1-4; Wernher von Braun, "The Ear],y

Steps of the Realization of the Space Station," J. of Br. Interplanetary 

Society, Jan 63, Pp 23-24.

Ltr (S), Col N.C. Appold, Asst to Dep Comdr, Weapon Sys, ARDC, to Dir

R&D, Hq USAF 26 Dec 57, subj: Initial Rprt on Unsolicited, SputnikGenerated Contractor Proposals; House Hearings before Select Oats on

Astronautics, 85th Cong, 2nd Sees, pp 613-14ff.

Memo (S), R.B. Horner, SAF (R&D) to William Holaday, D/Guided Mel, OSD,

24 Jan 58, subj: AF Astronautics Dev Frog; Project 7969, List of Advanced

System & Space Vehicle Studies, Hq ARDC, 18 Mar 58, in AFCHO files.

.7. 4/Dev Ping Note 59-9 (8), "The Air Force in Spaces', Oct 59 in AFCHO

files.

See Boushey's remarks in Nan in Space; The United States Air Force

Program for DevelppinK the acecraft Crew, ed., Lt Col K.F. Gents

(NI, 195-07 p 241; Hist, D Adv Tech, Jul-Dec 61, p 37.

Hist (8), D/Adv Tech, Jul-Dec 61, pp 38-39; Ltr (S), Lefty to SAES,

12 Sep 62, subj: AF Space Frog Proposals, Tab L, in OSAF 55-67, vol 4.

Air Force Space Plan (S), Sep 61, in OSAF 29-61; AFC 4/17C (S), 21 Sep

61, in Booster Systo files; Hist (8), DiAdv Tech, Jul-Dec 61, pp 38-39.

White Paper (C) on the AF Manned Mil Space Frog, 16 Nov 61, pp 5, 13,

in DS Proj Ofc files.

12. Stmt by Gen Ferguson, in House Hearings before Subcmte on Appn, 87th

Gong, 2nd Sess, 1262DOD Appropriations, Pt 2, pp 484-85.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

115

23. Memo (C), McNamara to Zuckert, 22 Feb 62, subj: AF Manned Mil Space

Frog, in OSAF 163-62.

Ltr (8), Col C. Palfrey, Jr., Chmn, Adv Sys Wkg Op to Chmn, Space

Panel, 20 Apr 62, subj: MODS; Ltr (S), Gen Keese to AYSC, 2 May 62,

subj: ADO No 37 for MODS, in Sp Div files; Rprt of SRB Mtg 62-51,

4 Jun 62, subj: MODS.

Rprt (S) of SRB Mtg 62-51, 4 Jun 62, subj: Mil Orbital Dev Sys; Prog

Rprt (S) for Week Ehding 8 Jun 62, in Space Div files; Ltr DiDev

Ping to AFSC, 13 Jun 62, subj: MODS Frog Actions, in Space Div files.

Chapter V

Nemo (U), Rubel to McMillen, 15 May 61, subj: Req for USAF Studies

Relative to Space Frogs, in Booster Systo files.

Summary Rprt (S) of Large Launch Vehicle Ping Op, Vol I, 24 Sep 62,

p I-1.

Rprt (S), Ad Hoc Cute for Standardized Workhorse Launch Vehicle,

18 Aug 61 in Booster Systo files.

Memos Ms McMillan to Charyk, 18 Aug 61, subj: Standardized Space

!Poster Frog; Rubel to McMillan, 15 Sep 61, subj: Request for Studies

of Titan II as Standardized Space Launch Vehicle, in Booster Systo

files.

Memo (S), McMillan to LeMay, 18 Sep 61, subj: Request for Studies of

Titan II as a Standardized Space Launch vehicle; Ltr (S), Maj Gen

O.J. Ritland, SSD to Schriever, 4 Oct 61, subj: Titan III, in Booster

Systo files.

Memo (8), Rubel to McMillan, 13 Oct 61, subj: Titan III Launch Vehicle

Family, in OSAF 29-61, vol 4.

Memos (C), McMillan to Zuckert, 3 Nov 61, subj: Titan III Launch Vehicle

Famiiy; McMillan to DDR&E, 7 May 62, subj: Standardized Space Launch

System, in OSAF 29-61, vol 4.

Memo (C), Rubel to McMillan, 13 Oct 61, subj: Titan III Launch Vehicle

Family, in OSAF 29-61, vol 4.

Meg (C) 71987, USAF to AFSC, 20 Oct 61; Robert F. Piper, Hist of Titan

--- III4 126171963 (SSD, Jun 64), P 41.

10. Summary RPrt (S) of Large Launch Vehicle Ping Gp, Vol I, 24 Sep 62,

p II-1; Ltr, McNamare to Webb, 17 Nov 61, no subj in Booster Systo

files.

UNCLASSIFIED
116 UNCLASSIFIED

11. Rprt (S), National Launch Vehicle Data Summary, Nov 61, in Booster

Systo files.

32. Memo (C), Rubel & Seamans to SOD and NASA, 5 Dec 61, subj: Recommendation Relative to Titan III and Titan Ili, in OSAF 29-61, vol 5; Hist

D/Sys Acq, Jul-Dec 61, p 160.

Piper, OP cit., p 42.

Memos (C), Asst SecAF Joseph Imirie to cis USAF, 4 Dec 61, subj:

Titan III; Rubel to Asst Secys of AF (Materiel and R&D), 6 Dec 61,

subj: Ping for Titan III Phase I Efforts, in Booster Systo files.

15. Memo (C), Rubel to Asst Secys AF (Materiel and R&D), 24 Jan 62, subj:

Response to USAF Request for Approval of Titan III RFP for Solid Motor,

in Booster Systo files; Hist, D/Systems Acq, Jan-Jun 62, p 155.

26. Ltr (S), Col T.H. Runyon, Exec Secy, DSKG to DC,SA&L, 1 Feb 62, subj:

25th DSMG Mtg.

Meg (C) 71559, USAF to AFSC, 21 Mar 62; Memo (C), Charyk to Rubel,

27 Mar 62, subj: Titan III Space Launch Vehicle, in Booster Systo

files.

Piper, op cit., p 118.

Memos (C), Rubel to McMillan, 3 Apr 62, subj: Titan III Technical

Evaluation of Phase I; McMillan to Chief of Staff, 3 Apr 62, subj

above; DDR&E to McMillan, 5 Apr 62, subj: Titan III General Specifications, in Booster Systo files.

Memo (POLIO), McMillan to DOME, 13 Apr 62, subj: Titan III General

Specifications, in Booster Systo filei.

Ltr (C), Schriever to LeMay, 30 Apr 62, no subj, in Booster Systo

files.

Ibid.

Memo (C), McMillan to DOME, 7 May 62, subj: Standardised Space Launch

System, in Booster Systo files.

Ibid.

Memo (C), Rubel to McMillan, lb May 62, subj: DOME Initial Evaluation

of Proposed System Package Plan for Prog 624A, in Booster Systo files.

Memo (S), McMillan to Chief of Staff, 28 May 62, subj: Titan III, in

Booster Systo files; Mins (S) of 43rd Mtg, DSMG, 8 Jun 62.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

117

Memo (C), Brown to McMillan, 28 Jun 62, aubj: Titan III; Program

Change, R&D for Titan III Space Booster (Prog 624A), revised and signed

by Zuckert 19 Jul 62, in Booster Systo files.

Ibid.

Chapter VI

Berger, p 59.

Ltr (C), Co]. L.P. Ayres SSD to Asst DCS/Systems & Logistics, 24 Jul

61, subj: Proposal for

 Ayres,

Initiation of Pro is Spt Large Solid Prop

Motor Dev Prog, in Booster Systo files.

Memo (U), L.L. Kavanau, Special Asst (Space) to Rubel, 2 Aug 61, subj:

Large Solid Motor Dev Prog; Ltr (U), &Milan to DDR&E, 13 Aug 61,

subj: Proposal for Mimed Initiation of Proj Spt Large Solid Prop Dev

Prog; Memo (U), Rubel to SAP, 6 Sep 61, subj: App']. of FT 62 RDT&E

Frog, in Booster Systo files.

Rprt (U), Estimated Dev Costa and Dev Schedules for Four Sizes of

Large Solid Rockets, prep by SSD, 25 Aug 61, in Booster Systo files;

Hist, 0/Systems Acq, Jul-Dec 61, p 155.

Ltr (U), McNamara to Webb, 17 Nov 61, no subj in Booster Systo files.

Ibid.

7. Abbrev Dev Plan (C) for Large Solid Prop Motors, Pros 623A, 22 Dec 61;

Hist (S), 4/Systems Acq, Jul-Dec 61, pp 157-58.

a. Rprt of NASA to House ante on Science and Astronautics, 88th Cong, 1st

Seas, Astronomical mg Aeronautical Drente, p 17.

9. Ltr (U), R.C. Seamans, Jr., NASA to J.H. Rubel, Dep Dir DDR&E, 16 Feb

62, no subj, in Booster Systo files.

10. Ibid.

Memo Cu), Rubel to McMillan , 24 Feb 62, subj: Large Solid Rocket

Technology Prog; Meg (U) 64672, USAF to AFSC, 27 Feb 62; Dev Plan

for Large Solid Propellant Motor, 2 Mar 62, prep by SSD; Mins (U),

10th Mtg of Launch Vehicle Panel, AACB, 9 Mar 62, in Booster Systo

files:

Ibid.

13. NASA Sdhedulo and Performance Guidelines (U), 16 Mar 62, in Booster

Syato files.

UNCLASSIFIED
us UNCLASSIFIED

Memo (C), McMillan to gis USAF, 28 Mar 62, subj: Large Solid Motor

Dev Prom ASSS (C), Col H.W. Gainer DCA/Systems & Logistics to Asst

SAF (R&D), 19 Apr 62, subj: Ping and Funding for Large Solid Propel

Motor Dev, 19 Apr 62, in Booster Systo files.

Ltr (U), Seamans to Rubel, 27 Apr 62, no subj, in Booster Systo files.

Memo (U), McMillan to Dep DDR&E, 10 May 62, subj: Large Solid Prop

Motor Demonstration Prog; PCP 6340930.4-1, Large Solid Prop Motor

(Frog 623A), 19 Jul 62, in Booster Systo files.

Ibid.

Ltr (U), Rubel to Seamans, 22 May 62, no subj: Metro, Rubel to

Millen, 22 May 62, subj: Large Solid Prop Motors, in Booster Systo

files.

Ltr (U), Rubel to SAM, 2 Aug 62, subj: Large Solid Rocket Motors,

in Booster Systo files.

20. Ltr (U), Col H.W. Gainer, Booster Systo to Asst DCS/Systeme & Logistics,

26 Jun 62, subs: Dev in the Large Solid Propellant Motor Frog, in

Booster Systo files.

Chapter VII

House Hearings before Subcmte on Space Sciences, 87th Gong, 2nd Seas,

project Advent--Military Comunications Satellite Program, Aug 62.

Berger, p 84.

Memos (S), H. Davis, Dep/Res OSAF, to DDR&E, 21 Aug 61, subj: Mil Comm

Sat System; Davis to Gen Keese t _DiDev Ping, 24 Oct 61, subj: Proposed

ADO for a Coma Sat, in OSAF 29-61, vols 3, 4.

Memo (C), Charyk to DDR&E, 3 Oct 61, subj: Advent Frog, in Comm Systo

files.

grort (C), Advent Prog Survey (Bridges Aprt), 12 • Dec.61, prep by DDRO,

in Comm Systo files.

Ibid.

7. Ibid.

B. Memo (C), Brown to Sec/Army, 26 Dec 61, subj: Advent Prog, in Comm

Systo files.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 119

Ltrs (C), Schriever to Leila, 16 Jan 62, subj: Ni]. Comm Active Sat

gys, in OSAF 1056-61, vol 1; Schriever to Law, 23 Jan 62, subj:

Advent Frog, in Comm gysto files.

Nemo (C), MdMillan to DDRAE, 12 Feb 62, subj: Advent Pro& in Comm

gysto files.

U. Ltr (C), Schriever to Left', 14 Mar 62, subj: Advent, in Comm Systo

files.

12, Hist (TS), D/Plans, Jul-Dec 61, pp 128-29; Rprt of Mil Ops Subomte of

House Cmte on Govt Op., 88th Gong, 2nd Seas, Satellite Communications,

p 156.

Bprt (8) of AYSC Study Group on National Mil Comm Sat System, Apr 62,

in Comm gysto files; Rprt of SRB Mtg 62-39, 26 Apr 62.

Memos (S), McMillan to Brown, 20 Apr 62, subj: Ping for Sat Comma;

McMillan to Brown, 8 May 62, subj: National Mil Comm Sat System, in

Comm gysto files.

Air Force Space Programs, p 106-22; Memo (C), Brown to OSD, 22 May 62,

subj: DOD Comm Sat Frog, in Comm gysto files.

Ibid.

Memos (C)„ McNamara to SAP, 23 May 62, oubj; DOD Gomm Sat Frog;

McNamara 6o DCA, 23 May 62, subj as above, in OSAF 1056-62, vol 1.

Ltr (U), Maj Gen R.M. Montgomery, Asst Vice C/S USAF to Charyk,

14 Jun 62, subj: DOD Comm Sat Frog, in Comm gysto files; Hist (S),

D/gys Acq, Jan-Jun 62, pp 22-23.

N.Y. Timms, 30 Jul 61; Rprt of Space Sciences Board, WAS, 11 Aug 61,

in House Hearings before Subcmte on Govt Op., 88th Gong, 2nd Seas,

Satellite Communications, 1214, Pt I, pp 550-51,

Ltr (U), E.B. Johnson, Vice President to SOD, 10 Aug 61, no subj, in

OSAF 18041.

N.Y. Times, 25 Aug 61; Washington Post, 22 Sep 61.

Ltr (C), J.H. Rubel, to J.D. Wiesner, Special Asst to President for

Science and Technology, 20 Sep 61, no subj, in Comm gysto files.

House Hearings before Subcmte on Govt Op., 88th Cong, 2nd Sees,

Satellite Communications, 1964, Pt I, pp 550-51; N.Y. Times, 6 Oct 61.

UNCLASSIFIED
120 UNCLASSIFIED

Status Rprt (C), Project West Ford, 1 Mar 62, prep by M.I.T. Lincoln

Lab, in OSAF 156-62; Washington Star, 31 Oct 61.

Meg (C) 62-0690, USAF to AFSC, 1 Feb 62; Status Bprt (C), Project

West Ford, 1 Mar 62, prep by M.I.T. Lincoln Lab, in OSAF 156-62.

Ltr (C), Charyk to Wieaner 2 Feb 62, no subj, in OSAF 156-62; Meg

LL-DO-1-7 Lincoln Lab to Charyk, 7 May 62.

Ltr (C), Charyk to Wiesner, 17 Aug 62, no subj, in OSAF 156-62.

Chapter VIII

Ltr (S), Maj Gen William Keene,- D/Dev Ping to Gen Ferguson, 22 Jan 62,

subj: Midas Prog, in Space Div Read files.

Memo (S), Brown to SOD, 29 Jul 61, subj: Bea Mel Def of Continental

U.S., in Midas Systo files.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Bprt (S) of SRB Mtg, 61-45, 20 Dec 61, aubj: Midas Da y Plan, 1962, in

Midas Systo files.

Memo (S), Brown to SOD, 29 Jul 61, out* Bal Mel Def of Continental

U.S. in Midas Systo files.

Nags (S) SSZ 59-1, SSD to USAF (SAB), 5 Sep 61; 62495, SAB to SSD,

15 Sep 61.

Ltr (s), Schriever to LeMay, 28 Sep 61, subj: Midas, in Midas Systo

files.

Ltr (s), Gen Keese to Ferguson, 22 Jan 62, subj: Midas Prog, in Space

Div files.

Nags (S) 71413, USAF to AFSC, 18 Oct 61; SSZM-2440 6.32, SSD to USAF,

24 Oct 61; AD CCR 2406, ADC to USAF, 31 Oct 61; Hist Summary (S),

NORAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 62, pp 36-37.

Bprt (0, Evaluation of Midas R&D Prog, prep by DDR&E Ad Hoc Group

on Midas, 30 Nov 61, in OSAF 156-62.

Ibid.

13. Memo (S), Brown to Zuckert, 8 Dec 61, subj: Midas, in OSAF 180-61.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

AFC 1/24 (s), 26 Dec 61, subj: Review of Midas Prog, in Midas Systo

files.

Ltr (S), Maj Gen J.R. Holzapple, Asst DCS/Sys & Log to AFSC, 29 Dec 61,

subj: Midas, in Systo files.

Ltr (0, Can F.H. Snith, Jr. Vice C/S USAF to SAP, 11 Jan 62, subj:

Midas Frog, in OSAF 156-62.

AFSC Comments (S) on the Tech Aspects of "Evaluation of Midas R&D

Prog by the DDR&E Ad Hoc Group on Midas," 15 Feb 62, in OSAF 156-62;

Rprt (S) of SRB Mtg 62-21, 28 Feb 62, subj: Midas Frog, in Midas Systo

files.

18. Ibid.

Ltr (0, Schriever to Vice C/8 USAF, 2 Mar 62, subj: Midas; Mins (S),

33rd Mtg of DSMG, 2 Mar 62, subj: Midas, in OSAF 154-62.

Memo for Record (0, Col T.H. Runyon, Exec Sew, DG, 13 Mar 62, subj:

Midas; Memo (0, Main= to Gen Smith, 14 Mar 62, eubj: Midas, in

Midas Systo files.

Mina (S), 37th Mtg of DSMG, 30 Mar 62; Ltr, Schriever to Gen Smith,

2 Apr 62, subj: Ltr of Transmittal, NS-239A (Midas), Dev Plan, in

Midas Systo files.

Air Force Spam. Programs, Tab 5.21.

Ibid.° Memo (S), }Italian to Brown, 10. Apr 62, subj: Midas; Ltr (S),

(2u' Midas Systo to MO Gen J.R. Holzapple, 17 Apr 62, aubj: Midas Dev

Plan, in Midas Spit* files.

Memo Ms Dr. LK. H. Panofsky, AICBM Panel, Science Adv Oats to Dr.

J.B. Wiesner, 16 Apr 62, subj: Reoriented Midas Prom Ltr (S), Wiesner

to Brown, 20 Apr 62, no subj, in OSAF 156-62.

Memo (S), Brown to McMillan, 20 Apr 62, subj: Midas Dev Plan, in Midas

Systo files.

Ltr (S), Can Holzapple to APSC, 30 Apr 62, subj: Midas Dev Plan; Memo

(0, Brown to Sews Army, Navy, &Igo 28 May 62, subj: Selective

ROVierfil of Major PCPs, in Comm Systo files.

27. Air Force Space Programs, Tab 5-23; Rprt (S) of SRB Mtg 62-54, 13 Jun

al Mins (S), 45th Mtg of DSMG, 20 Jun 62, in Midas Systo files.

UNCLASSIFIED
122 UNCLASSIFIED

Memo (S), Zuckert to ImMay, 13 Jun 62, subj: Midas SOR; Brown to

McMillan, 25 Jun 62, subj: Midas System, in Midas Systo files.

Memo (S), McMillan to DDR&E, 28 Jun 62, subj: Midas; Memo, N.B.

Harlan, Asst SAF (Fin Mgt) to Asst SOD (Compt)„ 29 Jun 62, subj:

Midas; SOD Decision/Guidance 4.4.040, 6 Aug 62, in Midas Systo files.

Chapter II

Ltr Schriever to Hq USAF, 16.May 61, subj: Bioastro Don Plan,

in Space Div files.

Ltr (S), LeMay to SAPS, 12 Sep 62, aubj: AF Space Frog Proposals,

Tab E, in OSAF 55-62, vol 4.

Hearings before House Subcmts on Manned Space Flt, 87th Cong, 2nd

Sees, 1%1 NASA Authorisation p 730.

Ibid., p 741.

Ibid., pp 738-43.

Ltr LeMay to SAPS, 12 Sep 62, subj: AF Space Prog Proposals,

Tab E, in OSAF 55-62, vol 4; Proiect Mercury, A Chronoloar (NASA

SP 4001), 131, 153-54.

Memos (U), Rubel to• McNamara, 5 Mar 62, subj: Bioastro Coop with

NASA; Brown to McMillan, 9 Mar 62, subj: DOD-NASA Agreement on Bioastro RDT&B Support of MLLP, in OSAF 55-62, vol 1.

Memo (U), McMillan to Brown, 30 Mar 62, subj: DOD-NASA Agreement,

in OSAF 55-62, vol 1; Ltra (U), Seamans to Charyk, 27 Apr 62, no subj;

Seamans to Charyk, 28 May 62, no subj; Moo for Record (U), Maj

Cole, D/Advanced Tech, 8 Jun 62, subj: Mtg on Space Frog 698AA, 7 Jun

62, in Space Div files.

Memo (U), Maj Cep J.F. Whisenand, Asset DCS/Rea & Tech, to Charyk,

28 Jun 62, aubj: Memo of thderstanding, Joint AF/NASA Bioastro Pro&

in Space Div files; Ltr Lelia to SAPS, 12 Sep 62, subj: AF

Space Frog Proposals, Tab 16 in OSAF 55-62, vol 4.

Memo (U), Rubel to Charyk, 23 Jul 62, subj: Joint AF/NASA Bioastro

Frog (697AA), in OSAF 55-62, vol 2.

Chapter I

•

Berger, p 76.

Meg (S) 60316, USAF to AFSC, 8 Sep 61; Hist (S-RD), DiSys Acq, JulDec 61, p 81; Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 61, pp 106-07.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 123

Hint (S-RD), D/Sys Acq, Jan-Jun 62, p 66; Hist Summary (S), NORAD/OONAD,

Jan-Jun 62, p 30.

Memo (S), Asst DCS/Plans to 4/3ystem Acq, 1 Nov 61, subj: Increase in

Number of Orbiting Objects, in Spdata Ofc files.

Memo (02 DEM to SAP, 27 Nov 61, subj: Approved F! 62 RDT&E Frog for

496L, in Ppadats Ofc files; Meg (3) 83909, USAF to AFSC, 6 Dec 61.

Memo (S), Brown to McMillan, 20 Feb 62, subj: Spadats Phased Array Radar,

' in OSAF 55-62, vol 1; Meg (S) 62265, USAF to AFSC/RADC/ESD, 16 Feb 62;

64673, USAF to AYSC, 27 Feb 62.

Tech Dev Plan (S) for the Spadata Radar, 496L, 20 Mar 62; Memos DeP

SAFRD (Davis) to DDRAE, 30 Mar 62, subj: Ppadats Phased Array Radar;

Memo (S), DDR&E. to McMillan, 29 May 62, subj: Approval of Dev Plan for

Spadats, in OSA? 55-62; vol 1; Hist Summary (02 NORAD/CONAD, Jan-Jun

62, p 30.

Memo (8), DOME to SAP, 28 May 62, subj: Selective Review of PCPs;

Air Force Space Programs, Tab 0-21.

SOS 197 for an Aerospace Surveillance and Warning System (S) 24 JUT

62, in Spadats Okc files.

Ibid.

Berger, p 69.

Summary of Past Actions in the WS-621A Frog (8), 7 Feb 62, prep by

Exec Seqy, DSMG,.in OSAF 2050-62; Ltr, LeMay to SAPS, 12 Sep 62, subj:

AF Space Frog Proposals, Tab A, in 03AF 55-62, vol 4.

Ibid.; Meg (S) 96923, USAF to AFSC, 25 Aug 61; Memo (S), McMillan to

WE-USAF, 27 Oct 61, subj: Program 621A, in OSAF 29-61, vol 4; Hist,

D/Systema Acq, Jul-Dec 61, p 127.

Summary Ms 5 Jan 62, subj: WS-621A (Satellite Inspector), prep by

System Review Bd, in OSAF 2050,62.

Summary of Past Actions in the WS-621A Program (S), 19 Mar 62, prep

by Exec Seqy, DSMG, in OSAF 2050,62; Memo (S), Seqy DSMG to DCS/Syatems

and Logistics 10 Jan 62, subj: 31st DSMG Mtg, in 621A Proj Ofc files;

SEW Mtg 62-28,(5), 22 Mar 62, subj: 621A/Gemini Relationships.

Mins (S), 25th DSMG Mtg, 23 Mar 62; Memo, McMillan to DDR&E, 24 Apr 62,

subj: Sat Inspection Prog, in 621A Proj Ofc files.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Memo (S), Brown McMillan, 28 Jun 62, subj: Sat Inspection Prog, in

OSAF 2050-62.

Ltr (S), LeMay to SAPS, Jul 62, subj: Recent SecDef Action on WS-621A

Prog, in OSAF 2050-62.

9. Ibid.

Memo (S), Brown to SOD, 29 Jul 61; subj: Bal Mel Def of Cont U.S.,

in The Air Force in Since, Tab K; Memo (8), Brown to Seers, Army,

Navy, AF, et al, 28 May 62, subs: Selective Review of Mai Proposed

Prog Changes, in Comm Systo files.

Memos (8), Chief, Ops Anal to Vice C/S USAF, 5 Feb 62, subj: Def

Against Mil Orbiting System; Chief, 621A Systo to Gen Holzapple,

20 Mar 62, subj: Sat Inspector (WS-621A), in Comm Systo files; Ltr

(S), Maj Gen R.M. Montgomery, Asst Vice C/S USAF to SAF (R&D), 20 Mar 62,

subj: Anti-Satellite Prog, in OSAF 55-62, vol 1.

Berger, p 72; USAF Current Status Rprt (S), May 62, P 9-43.

Ltr (8), Gen Ferguson, DCS/RAT to Vice Chief, 25 Jan 62, subj: AICBM

Prog, in Space Div files.

Ltr (S), Lt Gen R.H. Terrill, Vice Comdr, ADC to Hq USAF, 20 Dec 61,

subj: QOR for an Orbital Interceptor Sys; Ltr (S), MO Gen C.H. Mitchell,

Vice Comdr AFSC to Hq USAF, 1 May 62, subj: Roca= for an Optimum

SCWP Prog, in Space Div files; The Air Force in Space, Tab L-7.

Ltr (S), Maj Gen C.H. Mitchell, Vice Comdr, AFSC to Hq USAF, 27 Jun 62,

subj: Recam for an Optimum SCWP Prog, in Space Div files; The

Force in Space, Tab L-7.

Memo (C), Charyk to DDR&E, 8 Sep 61, subj: Agena B Standardization, in

OSAF 29-61, vol 4.

Ibid.; Memos (C), Rubel to McMillan, 4 Oct 61, subj: Standardized

Agana; Charyk to DDR&E, 31 Oct 61, subj: Standardized Agana, in OSAF

29-61, vol 4.

Memos (S), Charyk to C/S USAF, 1 Dec 61, subj: Standardized Agana D;

Charyk to DDR&R, 6 Dec 61, subj: Agana D Prog, in OSAF 29-61, vol 5.

Program Change (S), form 1355-1, USAF Space Program, Oct 62, Agena D.

in Space Div files; Memo (0, Rubel and Smarm to SecDef and Admin

NASA, 8 Jun 62, subj: DOD/NASA Agena D Agreement, in Space Div files;

Hist, A/Systems Acq, Jan-Jun 62, p 171.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

125

Meg (C) 81261, USAF to AFSC, 20 Apr 62.

Memo for Record (C), Lt Co]. D.H, Keefee, Atlas Space Booster Proj

Officer, 2 May 62, subj: Standardised Atlas Space Booster Presentation; Rprt of SRB Mtg 62-56, 28 Jun 62.

Hist (S) of SSD, Jan-Jun 62, Vol I, p 30.

Hist (S-RD), 4/Sys Acq, Jul-Dec 61, pp 177-78; Mist (S-RI)), Jan-Jun

62, pp 171-73.

Memo (C), Brom to SAP, 27 Oct 61, subj: Approval of FY 62 RDT&E Frog

for Discoverer; Meg (C) 76985, USAF to AFSC, 8 Nov 61; Memo (C),

Gilpatric to SAP, 6 Apr 62, subj: Util of Emergency Fund Transfer

Authority; 622A Frog Rprt, 11 Jun 62, in Disc Proj Ofc files.

Hist (S) of SSD, Jan-Jun 62, vol I, p 29; The Air Force in Space,

Tab C-12.

Ibid., Tab H-10.

Ltr (S), Hq USAF to AFSC„ 16 Apr 62, subj: Blue Scout Reliability;

Ltr (8), Col R. Nudenberg, Asst Dep to Comdr for Manned Space Flt

AFSC, to Hq USAF, 9 Jul 62, subj: Revisions to Scout Prog, in OSAF

55-62, vol 3; Annual Frog Rprt, AFSC, FY 1962, pp 23-24.

Memo (U), McMillan to Rubel, 19 Sep 61, subj: AF Environmental Res

Frog Using Rockets & Satellites, in OSAF 29-61, vol 3.

AFSC Month4 Statue Rprt (C), Air Force Support of NASA, Jun 62,

p 1, in Space Div files; Memo (C), McNamara to Charyk, 29 Jul 61,

subj: Scout Frog, in OSAF 29-611 vol 3.

Berger, P 94.

Meg (8) 92457, USAF to AF8C, 9 Aug 61; The Air Force in Space, Tab

J-4; Hist (Op 4/Adv Technology, Jul-De-c—gl, pp 16-17.

Ltr (S), LeMey to SAPS, 12 Sep 62, subj: AF Space Frog Proposals,

Tab E, in OSAF 55-62, vol 4; The Air Force in Space, Tab J-4.

Memo (C), Rubel to 8AF, 15 Mar 62, subj: Recoverable Orbital

Launch System (R)LS), in OSAF 993-62; Hist (8), 4/Ady Technology,

Jan-Jun 62, pp 20-21.

Berger, p 97.

Development Dir No AT-2 for Advanced Tech Frog (698P), Hq USAF,

2 Aug 61; Hist (5), DiAdv Technology, Jul-Dec 61, p 22.

UNCLASSIFIED
126 UNCLASSIFIED

Memo (0, McMillan to DDR&B, 8 Sep 61, subj: Funds Release-Snapshot,

in OSAF 29-61; Ltr (S), LeMs,y, to SAF, 12 Sep 62, subj: AF Space Frog

Proposals, Tab G, in OSAF 55-62, vo.I. 4; Hist (0, D/Adv Technology,

Jul-Dec 61, p 22.

Hist (S) of SSD, Jan-Jun 62, Vol I, p 40.

Hist (S), D/Adv Technology, Jan-Jun 62, pp 33-34.

Hist (S--RD), D/Sys Acq, Jul-Dec 61, p 25; Summary Rprt (U) of DOD

Support of PTO Mercury, Jul 59-Jun 63, p 57.

Stmt by Secy McNmnara in House Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriations, 87th Congo 2nd Seas, 1,1 DOD Appropriations, Pt 2, pp 112-13.

Berger, p 100; Hist (S-RD), 4/Sys Acq, Jul-Dec 61, pp 15-

16; Jan-Jun 62, pp 23-24.

42. House Hearings before Subcmte on Space Sciences, 87th Cong, 2nd Seas,

Project Anna-Geodetic Sat System, May 1962; Hist, D/Res, Jul-Dec

61, pp 21-22; Jan-Jun 62, pp 23-24.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED 127

GLOSSARY

AACB Astronautics and Aeronautics Coordinating

Board

ADC Air Defense Ommmumi

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

AFSC Air Force Systems Command

AMR Atlantic Missile Range

Anna Army, Navy, Air Force (Geodetic Satellite

Project)

APP Appendix

ARDC Air Research and Development Command

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASD Aeronautical Systems Division

Bambi Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept

EK Ballistic Missile

*MOMS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

CONAD Continental Air Defense Ommmand

DCA Defense Cammmications Agency

DDSS Directorate of Defense Research and

Engineering

Dev Development

DOD Department of Defense

DSMG Designated Systems Management Group

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IOC Initial Operational Capability

IR Infrared

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

Jt 'Joint

Midas Missile Defense Alarm SystemN

Min Minutes

sobs Military Orbital Development System

MTSS Military Test Space Station

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASC National Aeronautics and Space Council

MEAD North American Air Defense Command

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

UNCLASSIFIED
128 UNCLASSIFIED

GLOSSARY (Contid)

PERT Program : Evaluation Review Techniques

Prelim Preliminary

PMR Pacific Missile Range

Prog Program .

RCA Radio Corporation of America

RFP Request for Proposal

Bacon Reconnaissance

RC1S Recoverable Orbital Launch Study

SAB Scientific Advisory Board

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAF Secretary of the Air Force

Saint Satellite Inspector

Sat Satellite

Secy Secretary

Snap System for Nuclear Auxiliary Power

SOR Specific Operational Requirement

Spadats Space Detection and Tracking System

Spasur Space Surveillance

SR Study Requirement

SSD Space Systems Division

Stmt Statement

Subcmte Subcommittee

Sys Systems

Systo Systems Office

TAT Ihrust-Augmentedlhor

UHF Ultra High Frequency

USAF thited States Air Force

WADC Wright Air Development Center

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

M USAF MUM COMMANDS

SAP-OS 47=48. ADC

SAF=US 49. Arcs

3. SAY-CC 50. AFLC

4. SAP-AA 51.47. AFSC

5. SAP-IL 58. ATC

6. SAF=OI 59. MAC

7. 3AF...3S 60. OAR

8. SAF=NP 61. PACAF

SAF=FM 62=64. SAC

SAP-RD TAC

SAP-IL 67. USAFA

SAF=SL 641. USAFE

AFCVC 69. USAFSS

AFCCSSA

AMPS

AYES OTHER

AFBSA

18. AFGOA 70=71. RAND

AFIIS 72=75. ASI (HA)

AFNIN 75=100. AFCHO (Stock)

APAAC

AFABFD

HARP

APODC

AAUP

AFOAPAC

AFOCC

APRDC

AFRDD

AFRDDF

AM

AFRDQPS

AFRDQR

AFRRP

AFRST

AFSDC

AFSPD

AFSPDB

AFXDC

AFXOP

ATM

AFXPDA

AYXPDO

AFXPDS

AFXPDX

46. AFXSA

UNCLASSIFIED