DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

amilitimen

V° I Dj'i° efr

Orrts or TN tempo' ereeerme.

September 30, 1965

NEKORAIM21 POI SECIMAMY 01? DOWSE

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.111.73•7r: Cansamsta ce NW and. MI

This memorandum presents a brief report upon ay retiring

as Amactor, National Reconnaissance Office. The first section

:Uses a number of everts, and changes, that have taker lance

s.Lnce February 1963 that appear to as to be significant. Several

-4aIrson3/ judgnents are interpolated. Subsequent sections refer

to the present statue of the ERC and NO. They concentrate on

tne ;rale= as I see them. •

Mora bar, 'mien a Sharp imarease in the puce of satellite

raaznxaaImss4use activity. Mix iv demonstrated byCbart 1 ubiah

iists all'satellits lausobes, successful o: art, for raccmwaiSP

E. MC.:: purposes or to rapper: of reconnaissance, February

There hIc bow an evoL eharper increass in the rata of

1=ol• ccion of useable sAtal/ito riastooaphy• s The quzlifYins

were hare is '. asseale moaning "of useable quality.' This

rssaultn from an increase in satellite activity, as increase in

dae amount of film carried per lauach t some isprovomont is

nmlizbility, same La crease in the lifotime of our missions, mid

a,z• improvement in cur ability tr forecast weather and to avoid

useless phstograOly of clouds. Chart 2 presents some statistics

to indicate the weral increase., in productivity during the '

period. The modifier 'useible is to be distinguished from

"useful," the latter referring to direct contributions of iota.

lige:ace. Item (4) below mimes= a specific reason for believing

that than: has alsc bass an increase in the usefulness of same of

our tography durin this period.

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3, Marshes been a measurable Improvement in the

reliability of the COROMI system, and specifically, of the

AGMs vehicle. For example, the success ratio: CORONA film

buckets successfully returned vv. fibs buckets launched, was

9/13 for ),arch 1963 throughlrebruary 1964, and 23/28 for March

1964 throughlrebruary 1965. There appears also to have been

A steady improvement in the finality of the COMONA pictures.

If this latter improvement is real, it must be the cumulative

result of navy moll factors.

Thok-12 (7MMIRT) airplane vent through its flight test

prnram and is . approaching operational status. It has met the

speed (Kadh 3.2) and altitude (90,000 feet) objectives originally

set for it. Its range performance bas so far been demonstrated

at about 852 of that originally proposed. Its offspring, the

TP-12, has pablic/y established nine world's swords for speed • and altitude.

The SR-71, also derivative of *11442, reached =Mkt'

test status on schedule and.is performing veil. Both then-71

pros race and the 417 voaLer satellite program have been removed

2rom under the mantle of special security.

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7. 111.11441130nt systems eery Introduced into the National

Reconnaissance Program that brim the prograiMing and budgeting

of that Program Into theyfiveeyear farce structure pattern

followed by other DOD programs.//49.

Thare has been a great increase in effort directed

toward gaudy and azelysis, largely lo the domain of satellite

photographic reconnaissance. Operational analyses of cost and

effectiveness, using realistic models of the target system' and

of the effects of weathers defined the 1 tem

The Mb supported, throughout this period, a program

of technical studies and design studies by o Leal contractors. Sucludin$ ,://;//- g for
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studies as they evolved tr.:11,

t that the technology of

A, review in detail of these

I believe, support the judgeen

optics and, specifically,'

has progressed in a str at Die years.

TheIRRO, Asreement

My tenure as DIRO began with the Gilpatric•McCone agreement

cf 13 March 1963, defining the structure, authorities, and

responsibilities of the RIO. Within a few weeks, the Director

of Central Intelligence had challenced the terms of this agree•

mat; by July of 1963 he bad openly repudiated portions of it.

At no tine after that was there is satisfactory agreement as to

the authorities or responsibilities of the DERD, or as to the

structure of the Dom; thorium* many disagreements on substance

and no satisfactory or agreed upon moans to settle them. I

cannot record, In a manner that mold appear objective, the

history of the many difficulties that developed out of this

situation, and will not try. The record is an interesting one,

and is fairly complete..

The 'Agreement for the Reorganization of the National

Reconnaissance Progrsm, h signed on 11 August 1965 by Mr. Vance

and Ads. Raborn replaces the document of 13 March 1963. It

coos less far in defining the structure of the MRD than did the

earlier agreement. It is also less definitive about the author").

ties of the INDO, and circumscribes those Which it does define.

It is evidently Intended to palliate some of the frictions which

were charged to the prior agreement. In the process, it has

weakened considerably the structure provided by that prior

agreement, and lac, I believe, introduced a number of potential

further sources of friction.

Three specific weaknesses of the present agreement strike

me. Pivot, it le quite ambiguous, in fact, about the authorities

of the Executive Committee. While the opening paragraphs churns

ewe secretary of Defense with tits "ultimate responsibility for

the management and operation of the M20 end the MOP the

a I the duties of the Rsecutive Comittee do not

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consistuft/yreflect this. Of the six functions assigned to

the Executive Committee, only one, Memorised to the Secretary

of Defame an appropriate level of effort for the NO...")

refers to the final authority of the Secretary of Defense. The

other five functions are defined by the unqualified verbs

approve or modify," "approve," "approve, "assign," and "review."

Second, the document almost completely omits reference to

responsibilities of the DM OD to connectionisith reconnaissance

operations. Theme responsibilities will havetobe defined

somehow, either facto by extension of present practises, or

by fiat of the DMR677;rthe RxecutiverAmmittees or of the

Secretary of Defense.

Third, the document imposes no obligation upon the CIA, or

upon anyone other than the Secretory of Defense for that matter,

to provide any focus of responsibilities for actions undertaken

under the MRP.

In general, the document has a =venial character. It

=areal, touches on the substance of the MRP, but rather sets

up procedures for negotiating the kinds of dispute that have

marked the recent past. Its aghast, on the procedural and on

the dichotomy batmen CIA and DOD, its Inordinate emphasis

specifically on procedures for allocating responsibilities for

research and development, and its fails= to provide any basis

for an opmatbigratanisation leave the way fully open for

=tanglye further negotiations co all of the important substantive

problems now facing the N.

Indeed, the agreement can easily have the effect of putting

eves the day to day management of the MRP directly into the

hands of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Fortunately, the gaps in the agreement, and navy of its

eaknesses, can be remedied if the Secretary of Defense exercises

taws authority and issues a set of firm *plummeting instructions..

It is my recometedation that this be done. Drafts of possible •

idatitionnashav Agien provided to Dr, Flax.

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The lob of the Dtipp

Durimg the period of lay tenures the job of the Dm has

bay a fulistime endeavor. 'indeed, /did not give to two pert.

of the DRP, the =MT development and the satellite SIGH

program, the full attention they needed for good manasemeet.

Tine was @gemmed because nisch of it was spent negotiating or

defending, rather thmesenewbeg. Whenever a CIA interest was

involved, even the most straight forwerd.sonagement decisions

incurred delays and required endless dismission. On such smatters,

no delegation of the DDRO's authority was possible, and even

the rewired basic information was difficult to got and validate.

voles& a basin for management by the =NO is provided and accepted

telt is firmer thee suggested by the wards of the current Agrees

mot, this situation appears Likely to matinee. If it does,

Fin2i will find it very difficult to be an effective DING and

.7.ccomplish his other duties as well. In a less-troUbled

cumosphers, the taRC could operate, and hive adequate time to

d3vcte to the important elements of his job, without expending

ell of his available time.

More than just the thee of the DIED is at issue here. it Lc mv conviction that the MRP needs vigorous and imaginative technical leadorehip, and that this must COM from the DMMO h..7.s Immediate staff. -Sone reasons for this conclusive will be •

eitiri later. If the kind of people who can provide tedhnioll

leadership ore to be recruited and retained, working; conditions

=0 required within which their leadership is possible. Defined authorities, reasonable procedures for reviser and approval, and .

:la= evidence of mvport-from hi mi er authority are all requiradIf two working conditions are to be created.

to the spring of 1965, for the first thee, the USD provided

the $) with a comprehensive statement of current photographic

collection reqmiremonts. This document specified surveillance . • targets, areas for search, and the required frequency of coverage .
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for each. This has been a valuable document. Net only has it

provided a basis for an orderly sohedulingsnd programmlog of

future faun has, but it has provided a validated target model

against which to analyse operations/ plans and potential new

tame. With its help, mews= able to determine an

Requiremeots in the other areas of the IRP.are in a far less

satisfactory stabs. Even in the photographic field, it is not '

clear to me that a good analysis has been•mmde of all of the

value that OM be derived from the intelligence sources that ere

now open to us. The seems to be no interest in the economic

zad agricultural activity that could be determined from satellite

photography. Altboudh a great deal of interest is professed withio

the means* Department in geophysical and oceanographic data that •

can be collected by satellite photography, requirements for smoh

pbotogr.iphy have not reached the VRD. Ukonehile, these some

inta=ests have motivated NASA to conzider erpmasilm manned AMID

mIctiocs to collect similar data.
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In effect, most requirements are aim) the NW in the form of

a request to fly a specific payload on a requested schedule.

The requirement is often stated by the designer of the payload

in volition.

No good basis exiats in the form of statements of

sallectioq requirements, kor long range planning of =armload

developmeoti, beyond the comprehensive statement of current

photographic requirements already cited. Such long range guidance

as the WA has been given is in the form of hardware requirmessts.

There is no bests forcomparing disparate alternatives against a

common statement of need, since no statements of used are made.

Three maniples will illustrate the prOblem.

The only statement by MTh that exists which addresses the

need for developiag a new general search system, beyond COM,

Oates from July, 1964. It asserts that tJa used for a

satellite system having' mmth

width of CORM. This no a s t requires

mots. It is a system specification, albeit a crude one. It

leaves little room far, and provides no basis for, trade off

analyses amonG same. width, resolution, orbit altitude, orbit

life time, and other important mission parameters, and offers

no criteria for optimising performance within constraints of

con or physical feasibility. Fortunately, in this cams, later

definitive stab:emot from USIB of current collection require*

manta have provided a target model against whinh to make perform.

an= analyses. The applicability of this model to the period

beyond 1967, when a new search system could be available, is

probably not seriously to be questioned, but has not been

validated by US/B.

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Similarly, a "requirement" has beak stated for &high

altimmielmersonic manned boost glide vehicle, TS LASS, to

carry a reconnaissance camera. In a separate meorandum for

record I have commented in detail on this I note heft only that it is expected to and

that no statement of intell

beenlmovidad which ISINGLASS specidca ly satisfies. Again,

therefore, there is no clear basis for =sparing the perfommence

of this symmamith possible alternative means of collection.

The tooh ► olomf of intellionce collection from overhead

vehicles is rich in opportunities. The most basic tack cf the RRO is to expleit this technology in a may that wet effectively moots the cammes further important needs. It is for this

reason that I believe that the DURO must be, 49 MI individual, wpzble of suckinc the critical technical ludgments involved, and

must have the authority, and the support, to sake these judgments

effective. It is the lack of intellectual rigor evident in the

three examples of lont-range "revirements" just listed, and

evident also in many other instances, not cited here, that

convinces me that the DIOD hineelf most exercise intellectual

leadership for the Wa. Neither valid nor responsible leadership .

is available elsewhere.

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1. The OXCART program has been and continues to be, complex

tactically and manazerially. Ac Dnic, I controlled by gross,

and often somenhct arbitrary, control of funds. Detailed control

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was exercised through CIA channels and is never really

delegated by the CIA to their elements of the ENO. Therefore,

even to get information about the program was a slow and

difficult process:. I see no immediate prospect of a change

In this situation.

I consider this a continuing problem. 1 cannot be

sharply critical of CIA management; indeed I am owns that it

has improved greatl in the past tvo years. Nevertheless,

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system, and remains therefore a trod3lestme it in the NRC

budget. I feel that if it were subjected to the same rigorous

sxma3soent that is now imposed upon the satellite programs,

g!gggg.ggMIUIIIIIIIIIINIMIIIIaoould be saved. This Ls,

=waver, a gross judgment. It could not be put to test without

deter:lined effort by the VARC to establish effective control;

2. It is one year and eleven months since I first proposed

to the DCI improvements to the management of the CORCNA system

tbich I thee considered, and still do, to be necessary. The

ex.natorasant of OCR WA is DM ID Sailetfh2t worse condition then

it uns at the time of that proposal. Specifically:

The is sti/1 no recognized program director short

the D/Ti..0 htmeeLf.. o

There is no contract or authority for over-all systems

anglnearins and technical direction that is recognized by all

contracts on the pror;xam.

The contractual structure is still essentially the

complez ono described lajwismoorandum to the Secretary of

:jefense of January 23, lb*.

There ezists no valid contract for systems integration

of the camera and re-entry vehicle into the spacecraft. This

work is being done by a oontractor vithout a signed contract,

because the CIA has directed him not to sisp theh4n4,-Vieent.

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Feuding inforostias on, CIA COMM contracts is denied

the IND Vest Coast office vbers COwn programming is done. All

information cc CIA senteacts used by that office must be forwarded

by die AND Comptroller.

Release by CIA of information au the payload to operate

ing elements of tbe NOD during orbital operations is sharply

curtailed in comparison to the free exdbange that we in practice

prior to August 1964.

I am conaerned about these departures from good menage.

cent practice, not only as a matter of principle, but also

becnuse they stbtlytheism the health of the CORM syetwn.

For reasons noted below, CORONA is likely to remain the baclo,

boos of our swarth operations for at least iMnilliMpe

3. After the items during the past • , of eons

4.

Loss of tine, and expenditure of effort, while a decision'

is arrived at are ti offal concerns,. A third is the impact of .

tea current N2D agreement on the conduct of the program. It will

=vainly be very difficult to establish a management structure •

that can discipline the conduct of the payload development by •

the CIA, as the agreaammicovides. Yet I am =avian(' that

arm control and discipline by the DM td3.3. be necessary. $o

ear in this programs, the managasunt by the CIA of their efforts.

to establish a competing desige has been lacking In judgment and

Intellectual rigor. The caws concept originally selected we

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rejected by one contractor sand was rejected by a

second coatractor after he worked on it for nine months.

An outside panel of experts were critical of it on two

occasions, and a third contractor later rejected it, in effect

by changLag it drastically before electing to undertake further

design effort. Despite this evidence that the camera concept

was open to serious question, the CIA spent

as much coney on ancillary items such as spacecra t,. .re•

entry vehicles as on direct pursuit of the fundamental technical

problems of the camera.

Deny derails of the system concept adopted by the CIA

are also in my judguent, open to question. The fundamental

fact, hol!rever that they were unable to recognise or accept

Lbc.1 L.ssic problems of their camera design is what causes we

moat concern. It seems to me that there is therefore little

assurance that they are capable of correct or courageous action

vitb respect to the technical problems that will inevitably arise

6aring any camera development they undertake, whatever the

conzao of the design. I believe it will be necessary for the

..W.f.0 1 co review their technical efforts in detail and on a con•

in.A.ag basis to protect the integrity of any camera development

by chem. Mother scch monitoring or review will be possible is

eavhtai. Limy mind. I, at least, was aggressively prevented

Cram geLting any detailed information &hasp on

::;frierel search systems, despite that *boil of NRO

antic were spent on this work.

11BALag3011

ithila this memorandum places considelmblesmdght on.the'.

problem currently afflicting the Na), I want to close with the

acknowledgment that the program has been mammay productive

in spite of these probIer.s. Our interagency difficulties with

the CIA have been conceetrated at the top management levels; .

cc the working level there have been many examples of a

cooperative attitude. The ITRP will be even more productive

once it is .kwon the opportunity and the mandate to develop an

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orderly, disciplinedlumegemmt environment. As ay predecessor

. indicated in his final report to you, the concept of an MR0 is

sound but it must be designed as an operating *gamy, not a

coordinating body. Achieving this most desirable goal will call

for your personal intervention in asserting the position and

acthority of the DMR0 on all matters associated with the manago•

meat and accomplishment of the program.

Brockway NeMillan

Attachments

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