Filed 10/1/24 Scarborough v. City of Lancaster CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

AMANDA JOLENE-REBECCA 

SCARBOROUGH et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CITY OF LANCASTER,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B328379

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21AVCV00041)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Affirmed.

Keosian Law LLP and Natalie Hairabedian Suri for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Office of Christopher Ramsey and Christopher 

Ramsey for Defendant and Respondent.

______________________________
2

Plaintiffs Amanda Jolene-Rebecca Scarborough 

(Scarborough) and Jeffrey Woodfin (Woodfin) suffered severe

injuries following a two-car collision with Charles Michael 

Spurgeon (Spurgeon) in the City of Lancaster (City). Plaintiffs 

filed the instant lawsuit against Spurgeon and the City; as 

against the City, plaintiffs alleged a dangerous condition of public 

property (Gov. Code, § 835). The City successfully moved for 

summary judgment and plaintiffs appeal.

We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. The location

Challenger Way is a north/south rural roadway, with one 

lane of traffic in each direction and with a posted speed limit of 

55 miles per hour. As is relevant to the issues in this appeal, 

Challenger Way intersects with the northern entrance/exit to 

Brierwood Estates Mobile Home Park (Brierwood Estates), 

approximately 578 feet south of Avenue H. The subject 

intersection is a three-directional T-intersection with northbound 

and southbound through traffic on Challenger Way; northbound 

and southbound traffic on Challenger Way at the intersection do 

not have a stop sign. There is a stop sign for traffic at the 

northern entrance/exit to Brierwood Estates.

In the area of the subject intersection, Challenger Way is 

flat and straight. It is free of obstructions and has more than 

adequate sight distances in both northbound and southbound 

directions. There is no corner sight issue at the northern 

entrance/exit to Brierwood Estates. Challenger Way has two 12-

foot lanes, meeting the minimum standards of the California 

Highway Design Manual.
3

II. The accident

On September 1, 2020, Spurgeon was driving southbound 

on Challenger Way; Scarborough was driving northbound on 

Challenger Way, and Woodfin was a passenger in Scarborough’s 

car. As Spurgeon was making a left turn from Challenger Way 

towards the northern entrance/exit of Brierwood Estates, his 

vehicle collided with Scarborough’s vehicle.

Scarborough testified that she was driving at around 40 to 

45 miles per hour prior to the collision. Spurgeon testified that 

he was traveling at approximately 10 to 20 miles per hour prior 

to the collision, and “probably about maybe less than five miles 

an hour” “when[he] started to make [his] left turn.”

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The lawsuit

Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on January 15, 2021. 

The first amended complaint alleges a dangerous condition of 

public property against the City.

II. The City’s motion for summary judgment

On August 23, 2022, the City filed a motion for summary 

judgment. It argued that (1) plaintiffs could not establish that a 

dangerous condition existed at the location of the accident; and 

(2) it was immune from liability pursuant to Government Code 

sections 830.4 and 830.8.

The City further pointed out that pursuant to Vehicle Code 

section 21400, all public agencies in California are required to 

follow the Standards and Guidance of the California Manual of 

Uniform Traffic Control Devices (CA-MUTCD). Section 2B.07 

governs “Multi-Way Stop Applications.” (Bolding omitted.) 

Pursuant to section 2B.07, “[m]ulti-way stop control is used 

where the volume of traffic on the intersecting roads is 
4

approximately equal.” Criteria to be considered for multi-way 

stop sign installation includes “[f]ive or more reported crashes in 

a 12-month period that are susceptible to correction by a multiway stop installation.” (Italics omitted.) Because there was only 

one similar collision in the six years prior to September 1, 2020, 

the CA-MUTCD did not require additional traffic investigations 

and/or controls.

In support, the City offered the expert declaration of 

Allen G. Bourgeois (Bourgeois), a traffic engineering expert. He 

opined “that the available sight lines afforded to drivers on 

Challenger Way attempting to turn into Brierwood Estates were 

more than adequate for drivers using the roadway in a 

reasonable foreseeable manner.” He also asserted that in his 

professional opinion, “the lane widths on Challenger Way met the 

minimum standards set forth in the California Highway Design 

Manual.” Furthermore, after reviewing the Statewide Integrated 

Traffic Records System (SWITRS), he averred that “Challenger 

Way in the area of the subject collision as configured on the date 

of the subject collision shows no signs of operational safety 

deficiencies with respect to southbound left-turners and 

northbound through vehicles.”

Finally, Bourgeois “investigated whether an all-way stop 

would have been appropriate along Challenger Way at the 

subject Brierwood Estates entrance.” Citing section 2B.07 of the 

CA-MUTCD, “an all-way stop installation at the Brierwood 

Estates entrance and Challenger Way would not be appropriate 

and could not be justified.”
5

III. Plaintiffs’ opposition

Plaintiffs opposed the City’s motion.1 They argued that the 

subject intersection constitutes a dangerous condition as a matter 

of law or, at a minimum, a triable issue of fact on this issue 

exists. Plaintiffs largely based their argument upon the absence 

of an all-way stop at the intersection.

Specifically, plaintiffs directed the trial court to section 

2B.06, which governs stop sign applications, of the CA-MUTCD. 

According to plaintiffs, pursuant to section 2B.06, an all-way stop 

is necessary if “[c]rash records indicate that three or more 

crashes that are susceptible to correction by the installation of a 

STOP sign have been reported within a 12-month period, or that 

five or more such crashes have been reported within a 2-years 

period.” (Italics omitted.) Because there were five or more 

crashes susceptible to correction by a multi-way stop sign, the 

City was not entitled to summary judgment. At a minimum, 

there is a dispute as to whether section 2B.06 or 2B.07 governed 

this intersection, and that dispute should be given to the jury.

They further argued that the City was not immune from 

liability.

In support, plaintiffs offered an expert declaration from 

Brad P. Avrit (Avrit), who opined that the “intersection of 

Challenger Way and the entrance/exit to [Brierwood Estates] is 

an unsafe intersection and requires the installation of a STOP 

Sign. Analysis of [SWITRS] for Challenger Way between the 

intersection of Avenue ‘H’ and an approximate distance of 1700 

feet south of Avenue ‘H’ between 2011 and 2021 indicates a total 

1

Spurgeon joined in plaintiffs’ opposition.
6

number of 23 known accidents with one fatal incident.” 

Furthermore, “[t]he subject location of Challenger Way adjacent 

to the entrance/exist of [Brierwood Estates] between 2011 and 

2021 has had a total of 12 incidents, including the incident 

involved in this litigation.” “Between June 2015 and October 

2016, the subject location . . . had a total of five incidents.”

Avrit also opined that the City “knew or should have known 

of the unsafe condition this region of Challenger Way presents to 

drivers, passengers, bicyclists, and pedestrians.” And, he 

believed that the City “could . . . decrease the posted speed limit 

from 55 MPH to 40 MPH.”

IV. The City’s reply

Among other things, the City argued that Avrit too broadly 

identified the relevant area for collision history. While Avrit’s 

declaration “refers to a collision history which includes the entire 

one mile stretch of Challenger Way between Avenue I and 

Avenue H, rather than the area at or near [the subject 

intersection], [it] includes no evaluation of the facts or causes of 

any of the collisions he refers to; therefore his declaration 

contains no evidence that any of the collisions he refers to are 

susceptible to correction by the installation of a STOP Sign.”

Setting that aside, the City argued that section 2B.06 does

not apply. “A reading of Section 2B.06 establishes that this 

section applies only to intersections where a full stop of all 

vehicles is not required, and provides for the placement of a 

STOP Sign only on the minor-street approach to the main 

highway, which in this case would be the entrance/exit road from 

‘Brierwood Estates’ . . . where a Stop sign was already in place at 

the time of the” accident. Multi-way stop signs are governed by 
7

section 2B.07, as set forth in the City’s motion and supported by 

Bourgeois’s declaration.

Finally, because speed was not a causal factor in the 

accident, the speed limit in the area of the subject intersection is 

irrelevant.

V. Initial trial court hearing

On December 15, 2022, the trial court ordered the parties 

to meet and confer and then submit a joint document reflecting “a 

satellite view of where the accident occurred demonstrating the 

relative distance from the street in feet.” It seems that the trial 

court was concerned about the appropriate area to consider when 

assessing prior collisions.

The parties complied, submitting a stipulation with 

photographs depicting various distances on Challenger Way. 

Picture No. 3 is a photograph of 1317.74934 feet south of Avenue 

H on Challenger Way.

VI. Second trial court hearing

On December 22, 2022, the trial court advised the parties 

that it intended to focus on picture No. 3 of the parties’ 

stipulation in determining whether there were prior incidents 

within that distance. After discussion with counsel, the trial 

court instructed the parties to submit supplemental expert 

declarations focusing on the specific distance outlined in picture 

No. 3.

One month later, the parties simultaneously filed 

supplemental expert declarations.

Bourgeois reviewed all traffic collisions identified on the 

SWITRS report attached to Avrit’s declaration filed in support of 

plaintiffs’ opposition to the City’s motion for summary judgment. 

Bourgeois opined that “in the approximately 9 year period from 
8

2011 up to August 31, 2020 the day before [plaintiffs’] collision, 

there were only 4 collisions that occurred at or near the [subject 

intersection] that were potentially correctable with the 

installation of an ‘All Way Stop’ at the [subject intersection].” 

Bourgeois also explained that section 2B.07, not 2B.06, of the CAMUTCD applied. But, even if section 2B.06 were used, it did not 

require the installation of an all-way stop because in the nineyear period preceding the accident here, there were only four 

collisions at the subject intersection that were potentially 

correctable by an all-way stop, and there was never a 12-month 

period in which there were more than two potentially correctable 

collisions.

Avrit reiterated his opinion that the subject intersection 

was unsafe and required the installation of a multi-way stop sign. 

His review of SWITRS showed 16 known accidents, including five 

accidents in between June 2015 and October 2016.2 He also 

stated that the speed limit should be reduced.

VII. Final trial court hearing

After entertaining oral argument, the trial court granted 

the City’s motion. It found that the subject intersection did not 

constitute a dangerous condition as a matter of law. “Despite 

Plaintiffs’ presentation that a stop sign is needed and that the 

accidents in the relevant area fulfill the requirements of CAMUTCD § 2B.06, Plaintiffs[’] argument fails as they, themselves, 

do not dispute that there was a stop sign at the intersection 

where the incident and the sign was present at the time of the 

2 Unlike Bourgeois, Avrit did not declare which, if any, of 

these accidents were potentially correctable with the installation 

of an all-way stop.
9

incident.” The stop sign at the entrance/exit of Brierwood Estates 

“follows CA-MUTCD 2B.06.”

In addition, the trial court rejected plaintiffs’ argument 

regarding speed. After all, “[t]he posted speed limit on 

Challenger Way was 55 mph, as provided for by statute.” And, 

“[t]here were no speed hazards or sight distance problems.” 

Moreover, “[i]t has been held that volume and speed alone do not 

constitute a dangerous condition.”

VIII. Appeal

Plaintiffs’ timely appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary judgment and standard of review

A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the 

papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A 

defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of 

showing that at least one element of a cause of action “cannot be 

established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of 

action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

We review the trial court’s order de novo, liberally 

construing the evidence in support of the party opposing 

summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the evidence 

in that party’s favor. (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 

39.) We affirm an order granting summary judgment if it was 

correct on any ground that the parties had an adequate 

opportunity to address in the trial court. (Securitas Security 

Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 115, 

120.)
10

That said, we review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for 

abuse of discretion. (Mitchell v. United National Ins. Co. (2005) 

127 Cal.App.4th 457, 467.)

II. Plaintiffs’ procedural objection

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in considering the 

simultaneously filed supplemental expert reports without giving 

them the opportunity to respond to this new evidence. We are 

not convinced. Plaintiffs conceded below that the parties agreed 

to submit supplemental expert declarations simultaneously. 

They cannot now complain that the expert declarations should 

have been submitted separately so that they could be responsive 

to one another. (Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1075, 

1091 [the appellant bears the “burden of presenting a sufficient 

record to establish that the claimed error was not invited by [it], 

or be barred from complaining about it on appeal”].)

Setting that aside, as plaintiffs point out in their appellate 

briefs, a “trial court’s consideration of . . . additional evidence is 

not an abuse of discretion so long as the party opposing the 

motion for summary judgment has notice and an opportunity to 

respond to the new material.” (Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 

11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362, fn. 8.) Here, plaintiffs did have notice 

and an opportunity to respond—they were served with the City’s 

supplemental expert declaration on January 23, 2023, over a 

week before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. 

And, not only were plaintiffs allowed to submit their own 

competing expert declaration, they were also permitted to present 

argument at the hearing. In fact, at the hearing, plaintiffs 

addressed the parties’ dispute over whether section 2B.06 or 

2B.07 applied and argued that section 2B.06 governed—as it had 
11

in its opposition to the City’s motion. It follows that plaintiffs’ 

due process rights were not violated.

We thus turn our attention to the substantive merits of the 

City’s motion.

III. Relevant law

Government Code section 835 provides: “Except as 

provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a 

dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes 

that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the 

injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous 

condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably 

foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and 

that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an 

employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment 

created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had 

actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under 

[Government Code] Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the 

injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous 

condition.” (See also Garcia v. American Golf Corp. (2017) 

11 Cal.App.5th 532, 539–540.)

Government Code section 830, subdivision (a), defines a 

dangerous condition as a “condition of property that creates a 

substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or 

insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent 

property is used with due care in a manner in which it is 

reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” Stated differently, 

“[a]ny property can be dangerous if used in a sufficiently 

abnormal manner; a public entity is required only to make its 

property safe for reasonably foreseeable careful use. [Citation.]” 

(Mathews v. City of Cerritos (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1384; see 
12

also Fuller v. State of California (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 926, 940 

[“‘a public entity should not be liable for injuries resulting from 

the use of a highway—safe for use at 65—at 90 miles an hour, 

even though it may be foreseeable that persons will drive that 

fast’”].)

“A condition is not a dangerous condition . . . if the trial or 

appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the 

plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by 

the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature 

in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable 

person would conclude that the condition created a substantial 

risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used 

with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable 

that it would be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830.2.) “A condition is not a 

dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter merely 

because of the failure to provide regulatory traffic control signals, 

stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, or speed restriction signs, as 

described by the Vehicle Code or distinctive roadway markings as 

described in Section 21460 of the Vehicle Code.” (Gov. Code, 

§ 830.4.)

By statute, “the happening of the accident which results in 

the injury is not in and of itself evidence that public property was 

in a dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code, § 830.5, subd. (a).)

In determining “whether a given condition of public 

property is minor or insignificant as a matter of law,” we 

“consider both the physical description of the condition, and 

‘whether there existed any circumstances surrounding the 

accident which might have rendered the defect more dangerous 

than its mere abstract [description] would indicate.’ [Citation.] 

Where appropriate, the court should consider not only the 
13

intrinsic nature and quality of the condition, but also other 

factors such as the time and place of the occurrence. [Citation.] 

‘Furthermore, the court should see if there is any evidence that 

other persons have been injured on this same defect.’ [Citation.]” 

(Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225, 234.)

Although the question of whether a dangerous condition 

exists is often one of fact, the issue may be resolved as a question 

of law when reasonable minds can only draw one conclusion from 

the facts. (Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 

38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1194.) In other words, “‘[i]t is for the court 

to determine whether, as a matter of law, a given defect is not 

dangerous.’” (Davis v. City of Pasadena (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 

701, 704.) “This is to guarantee that [public entities] do not 

become insurers against the injuries arising from trivial defects.” 

(Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 734.)

IV. Analysis

Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial 

court properly granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. 

The location of the accident did not constitute a dangerous 

condition as a matter of law. Challenger Way, at the location of 

the accident, is a two-lane, rural undivided highway with a 

posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. In the area of the subject 

intersection, Challenger Way is flat and straight. It is free of 

obstructions and has more than adequate sight distances in both 

northbound and southbound directions. There is no corner sight 

issue at the northern entrance/exit to Brierwood Estates. 

Challenger Way has two 12-foot lanes, meeting the minimum 

standards of the California Highway Design Manual. And, 

importantly, even though the intersection does not have an all-
14

way stop, there is a stop sign for traffic at the northern 

entrance/exit to Brierwood Estates.

Urging us to conclude otherwise, plaintiffs rely upon 

section 2B.06 and argue that an all-way stop was required. We 

disagree. Rather, as the trial court found, section 2B.06 does not 

require the City to install an all-way stop at the subject 

intersection. All that section requires is the installation of a stop 

sign on the street with less traffic (the minor street approach), 

which in this case would be the entrance/exit of Brierwood 

Estates. And it is undisputed that such a stop sign exists.

Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that based upon Bourgeois 

and Avrit’s competing declarations, there is a triable issue of fact 

as to whether section 2B.06 applies3 (and presumably whether it 

requires an all-way stop at the subject intersection).

The “‘rule that a trial court must liberally construe the 

evidence submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion 

applies in ruling on both the admissibility of expert testimony 

and its sufficiency to create a triable issue of fact. [Citations.]’” 

(Michaels v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 512, 

524.) “However, even when [a] witness qualifies as an expert, he 

or she does not possess a carte blanche to express any opinion 

within the area of expertise. [Citation.] For example, an expert’s 

opinion based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support 

3

For the sake of completeness, we address this argument, 

even though this question is actually an issue of law for the court 

to decide de novo. (See, e.g., Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009)

172 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452 [proper interpretation of statute or 

rule of court is a question of law]; Missionary Guadalupanas of 

Holy Spirit Inc. v. Rouillard (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 421, 436 

[interpretation of a regulation is a question of law].)
15

[citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors [citation], has 

no evidentiary value [citation] and may be excluded from 

evidence. [Citations.] Similarly, when an expert’s opinion is 

purely conclusory because unaccompanied by a reasoned 

explanation connecting the factual predicates to the ultimate 

conclusion, that opinion has no evidentiary value.” (Jennings v. 

Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 

1108, 1117.)

Here, both of Avrit’s declarations cite to and rely upon 

section 2B.06. But he fails to offer any explanation as to why

section 2B.06, and not 2B.07, applies. Under these 

circumstances, there is no triable issue of fact for the jury. 

(Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017) 

8 Cal.App.5th 146, 155.)

Certainly, an inquiry into the question of dangerousness 

involves the consideration of such matters as whether the 

condition has been the cause of other accidents. (Lane v. City of 

Sacramento (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1346.) But, even 

liberally construing Avrit’s declarations regarding the number of 

accidents, plaintiffs offer no evidence that the absence of a multiway stop at the subject intersection caused any of those accidents.

To the extent plaintiffs contend that subject intersection 

constitutes a dangerous condition because of the posted speed 

limit, they still cannot defeat the City’s motion for summary 

judgment.

“An essential element of a cause of action for damages 

based on a dangerous condition of public property is causation”

and “the issue can be decided as a matter of law where the facts 

of a case can permit only one reasonable conclusion.” (Milligan v. 

Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transportation Dist. (2004) 
16

120 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9; see also Zelig v. County of Los Angeles

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1135 [“liability is imposed only when 

there is some defect in the property itself and a causal connection 

is established between the defect and the injury”].) To establish 

causation, the plaintiff must present evidence that “the 

defendant’s conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about 

his or her harm.” (Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 

312.)

Here there is no evidence that speed contributed to the 

collision. Both drivers testified that they were driving at speeds 

below the posted speed limit. Thus, decreasing the speed limit 

from 55 miles per hour to 40 miles per hour would not have 

potentially avoided the accident.

All remaining arguments are moot.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.

LUI

________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT