ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT

Sherrill W. Colvin 

Fort Wayne, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT 

DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

Donald R. Lundberg, Executive Secretary 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

0BIn the 

1BIndiana Supreme Court 

_________________________________ 

No. 98S00-0609-DI-340 

IN THE MATTER OF: 

 

GEOFFREY N. FIEGER, 

Respondent.

_________________________________ 

Attorney Discipline Action 

Hearing Officer Leslie C. Shively 

_________________________________ 

May 23, 2008 

Per Curiam. 

This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this 

Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties. We find that 

Respondent, Geoffrey N. Fieger, engaged in attorney misconduct by making material 

misrepresentations in a sworn application for temporary admission (also known as admission pro 

hac vice) in an Indiana court. 

 

 The Respondent's temporary admission to this state's bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction. USeeU IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. For his misconduct, we find that Respondent 

should be prohibited from seeking temporary admission to the bar of Indiana for a period of two 

years. 
2

UBackground

UCount IU. Respondent is licensed to practice law in Michigan. On April 16, 2001, the 

Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission, through its Grievance Administrator, filed a 

disciplinary petition against Respondent with the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board ("ADB"). 

The alleged misconduct was making disparaging and threatening remarks on Respondent's radio 

program aimed at three Michigan Court of Appeals judges who had ruled against him. On 

January 9, 2004, a hearing panel of the ADB, with Respondent's consent, ordered a reprimand 

but reserved Respondent's right to appeal First Amendment issues he had raised. On November 

8, 2004, the ADB vacated the order of reprimand and dismissed the complaint. The Grievance 

Administrator appealed this ruling, and on May 27, 2005, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed to 

review the decision of the ADB. Respondent tried to remove the case to federal district court, 

which remanded the case to the Michigan Supreme Court. Respondent initiated an appeal of the 

district court's ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On November 28, 2005, the 

Grievance Administrator filed its brief on the merits in the Michigan Supreme Court. 

That was the status of the Michigan action when, on December 17, 2005, Respondent 

executed his Application for temporary admission in the St. Joseph Circuit Court ("Indiana trial 

court"). In the Application, Respondent asserted under oath that no "formal disciplinary 

proceedings" were currently pending against him. He intentionally altered the language of 

Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2)(a)(4)(v) to add the word "formal." On January 6, 2006, 

Respondent filed and the Indiana trial court granted the Application. 

On July 31, 2006, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision of the ADB, and 

remanded the case for imposition of the agreed order of reprimand. Respondent notified the 

Indiana trial court of this development on August 22, 2006. 

UCount IIU. Respondent also is admitted to the practice of law in Arizona. In September 

2005, a "probable cause panelist" of the State Bar of Arizona issued a finding that probable cause 

existed for filing a disciplinary complaint against Respondent and ordered the Arizona State Bar 

Association ("ASBA") to file a complaint against Respondent. Respondent was served with and 

received a "Probable Cause Order." 
3

That was the status of the Arizona action when Respondent executed his Application for 

temporary admission on December 17, 2005. The Commission concedes that when Respondent 

executed his Application, no formal disciplinary action was pending against Respondent in 

Arizona. 

On December 30, 2005, the ASBA filed a complaint alleging several ethical violations. 

Respondent filed his Application for temporary admission in Indiana on January 6, 2006. The 

ASBA complaint was served on Respondent's Arizona attorney on January 9, 2006. Respondent 

was notified no later than January 20, 2006, about this action. Respondent concedes that a 

formal disciplinary proceeding against him was pending in Arizona at the time he filed his 

Application on January 6, 2006. He took no steps to inform the trial court for more than nine 

months. 

UOther factsU. After the Indiana trial court approved Respondent's temporary admission, 

the opposing party filed a motion to reconsider on January 23, 2006. After a hearing, the court 

denied Respondent temporary admission for failure to disclose the Michigan action. Respondent 

filed a motion to reconsider this order, which was heard on May 31, 2006. Respondent argued 

that his Application was correct because the Michigan proceeding had been dismissed, although 

an appeal was pending. At the hearing he stated, "I have no pending charges." The court issued 

an order on June 12, 2006, again granting Respondent temporary admission, with the direction 

that he inform the court of any developments in the Michigan action. At no time during this 

period did Respondent notify the Indiana trial court that a formal disciplinary proceeding had 

been filed against him and was pending against him in Arizona. 

The Commission filed its Verified Compliant against Respondent on September 27, 

2006. Respondent did not inform the Indiana trial court. It was brought to the court's attention 

when the opposing party filed another motion to reconsider Respondent's temporary admission 

on November 21, 2006. 
4

On October 20, 2006, the Commission notified Respondent it was investigating his 

failure to inform the Indiana trial court about the Arizona proceeding. On November 6, 2006, 

Respondent finally notified the Indiana trial court that an Arizona disciplinary proceeding had 

been filed against him on December 30, 2005. 

UThe hearing officer's decisionU. The hearing officer appointed to hear this disciplinary 

action concluded Respondent's Application was accurate with respect to the Michigan and 

Arizona actions when executed and thus complied with the requirements of Admission and 

Discipline Rule 3(2)(a)(4)(v). While the hearing officer concluded Respondent failed to 

promptly inform the Indiana trial court of subsequent developments in both these actions, he 

noted the Commission had not based its charges on these failures. Reasoning he was 

"constrained by the parameters of due process," the hearing officer recommended final 

disposition in favor of Respondent. 

UDiscussion

UThe disclosure requirementU. A temporary admission is a trial court's accommodation of 

an out-of-state lawyer pursuant to authority granted by this Court. See UMatter of FletcherU, 655 

N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ind. 1995). It is discretionary with the judge whether to allow temporary admission to an out-of-state attorney. See USparks v. StateU, 537 N.E.2d 1179, 1181 (Ind. 1989). In 

seeking temporary admission, an out-of-state attorney must make certain representations under 

oath, including: 

That no disciplinary proceeding is presently pending against the attorney in any jurisdiction; or, if any proceeding is pending, the petition shall specify 

the jurisdiction, the charges and the address of the disciplinary authority investigating the charges. An attorney admitted under this rule shall have a continuing 

obligation during the period of such admission promptly to advise the court of a 

disposition made of pending charges or the institution of new disciplinary proceedings . . . . 

Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2)(a)(4)(v) ("Disclosure Rule") (emphasis added). 

UCount I: What is a "disciplinary proceeding?"U Respondent urges and the hearing officer 

seems to have reluctantly adopted an extraordinarily narrow interpretation of the Disclosure 

Rule. Respondent argues that the Application was accurate with respect to the Michigan action 
5

because at the time Respondent executed it, the Michigan disciplinary "proceeding" had been 

dismissed and the appeal of that dismissal is not considered to be a "proceeding" under the 

Michigan system. His contention was supported primarily by the testimony of a Michigan attorney, who conceded that the Michigan rules do not define "proceeding" and that a chapter entitled 

"Professional Disciplinary Proceedings" includes a rule dealing with review by the Michigan Supreme Court.1

 (See Tr. at 190-91.) 

As noted above, Respondent stated no "formal" disciplinary proceedings were pending 

against him. He testified he intentionally added the word "formal" to the language of the Disclosure Rule to protect himself from a charge of dishonesty in case there was some "complaint 

floating out there that I don't even know about or that I don't recall . . . ." (Tr. at 18.) Adding the 

word "formal" would not seem to help if this were really his concern; it would make more sense 

to say no "known" disciplinary proceedings were pending.2 In any case, the change in wording 

shows Respondent gave careful consideration to the scope of his duty to disclose and chose not 

to mention the Michigan action. 

The purpose of the Disclosure Rule is to give the trial court information relevant to its 

decision whether to allow an attorney to practice in Indiana. At the time Respondent executed 

the Application, the Michigan action had not come to rest and was being hotly litigated in both 

federal court and the Michigan Supreme Court. The Court is not convinced that the Michigan 

action at this juncture would not be considered a “proceeding” in Michigan. However, even if 

Respondent is correct on this technicality of Michigan procedure, the scope of the term "proceeding" when seeking temporary admission in Indiana depends on its meaning in the Indiana Disclosure Rule. The rule uses the broad term “proceeding” to include any and all actions by a disciplinary body at any stage against the attorney seeking temporary admission.3

 There is nothing 

in the rule or Indiana law to suggest that the term can be interpreted to include loopholes of any 

 

1

 The witness was apparently referring to Michigan Court Rule 9.122. 

2

Adding the word "formal" might make more sense if his purpose was to avoid disclosing the brewing 

Arizona action. 

3

 This does not include the submission of a grievance to a disciplinary body or that body's preliminary 

investigation of such a grievance. 
6

sort. Respondent had no authority to alter the language required by the Disclosure Rule to narrow its scope or create a loophole. 

UCount II: On what date is the accuracy of an application determined?U The Commission 

does not specifically charge that Respondent violated his continuing duty under the Disclosure 

Rule to disclose subsequent developments in the Arizona action after filing his Application. It 

does, however, charge that Respondent had a duty under Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(3) to 

take remedial efforts to inform the court that his Application was inaccurate when filed because a 

formal proceeding had been initiated by that date. Respondent argues that the Application was 

accurate when executed and it did not become inaccurate just because a disciplinary action was 

initiated before it was filed. The Commission argues the relevant time for determining accuracy 

is when an application is filed because a court should be able to rely on the information in an application when acting on it. 

As we held above, the term “proceeding” includes any and all actions by a disciplinary 

body against the attorney at any stage. By the time Respondent executed his Application, a 

probable cause panelist had ordered the ASBA to file a complaint against Respondent, and 

Respondent had received a "Probable Cause Order." Although the Commission agreed with 

Respondent that no formal disciplinary action was pending at this point, it does not necessarily 

follow that the Disclosure Rule had not yet been triggered. We express no opinion on this point, 

however, in light of the fact that the Commission argues only that Respondent was obligated to 

correct his Application once he knew formal charges had been filed. 

An applicant is in the best position to know if events subsequent to execution of an application for temporary admission have affected the accuracy of the application by the time it is 

filed. Putting the burden on the applicant to correct information that has become inaccurate between the execution and filing of an application serves best the purpose of the Disclosure Rule, 

which, as noted, imposes an affirmative duty on an applicant to update information after the application is filed. 
7

UAggravating factsU. In his Application, Respondent disclosed that he had been admitted to 

practice in Michigan, but did not mention Florida or Arizona, even though he was required by 

rule to set forth "[a]ll states and territories in which the attorney has ever been licensed to practice law." Admis. Disc. R. 3(2)(A)(4)(ii). This lack of disclosure would have hindered the Indiana trial court and the Commission from investigating his status in those jurisdictions. And as 

noted above, Respondent failed to fulfill his continuing obligation promptly to advise the Indiana 

trial court of the institution of new disciplinary proceedings. 

UEthical ViolationsU. The Court concludes Respondent violated these Indiana Professional 

Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct: 

Rule 3.3(a)(1): Knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal and failing to correct a false statement of material fact previously made to the tribunal. 

Rule 3.3(a)(3): Failing to take reasonable remedial efforts after becoming aware 

that the lawyer offered false material evidence. 

Rule 8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. 

USanctionU. In UMatter of FletcherU, 694 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 1998), an attorney who had been 

granted temporary admission made statements that misled the judge to believe that his clients 

were not at a location when deputies attempted to serve them there. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that he simply misspoke and did not intend to mislead the judge, holding 

that the attorney's misrepresentations were knowing and that they constituted deceitful conduct 

and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. For this misconduct, we prohibited the 

respondent from applying for temporary admission in Indiana for two years. 

We conclude that Respondent's failure to comply with the Disclosure Rule and failure to 

correct previously provided erroneous information were knowing and intended to deceive the 

Indiana trial court. For this misconduct, we conclude the appropriate sanction is to bar Respondent from applying for temporary admission in Indiana in any new cases for two years. The 

status of Respondent's temporary admission in the proceeding currently pending before the Indiana trial court is not affected by this order, but that court retains its discretion to reconsider Respondent's temporary admission in that proceeding. 
8

UConclusion

For his professional misconduct, the Court bars Respondent from applying for temporary 

admission to the bar of Indiana in any new cases for a period of two years from the date of this 

opinion. 

The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The hearing officer 

appointed in this case is discharged. 

The Clerk of this Court is directed to give notice of this opinion to the hearing officer, to 

the parties or their respective attorneys, and to all other entities entitled to notice under 

Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d). 

Shepard, C.J., Boehm, J., and Rucker, J., concur. 

 

Dickson, J., dissents regarding the sanction and would bar Respondent permanently from temporary admission to the Indiana bar. 

Sullivan, J. dissents and would adopt the analysis and conclusion of the hearing officer, as described in the Court's opinion.