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covert missions of many satellites are
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program control policy must be deve!

and the same policy applied uniformly to other noa-sensitive

satellites,

the necessary protection.

satellites in order to provide

1. Management of all satellite photographic and electronic signal
placed under a singie streamlined authoritative

collection projects to be

management structure, as the

National Satellite Reconnaissance Program.

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SlnGLE MANAGEMENT rOR .
ALL SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

NOTE: The National Sotellite
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(FIG. B)-ACTUALSITUATION <—s-» (FIG. A)- APPARENT SITUATION
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The above steps would provide adequate cover for the actual
situation, which is quite differeat from the apparent
in Fig. B of the referenced chart. The Secretary of Defense, en a covert
basis, would designate the Under Secretary of the Air Force as his Special
Assistant for Satellite Kkeconnaissance, and delegate to him the authority
for management of this program, so that the Under Secretary would act
as the direct representative of the Secretary of Deéense, both within and
outside the Departasent of Defense. (Key personne! would be cleared fer
and briefed on this arrangement in the same manner an that employed fer
covert project briefings. ) :

By agreement between the Director of the CIA and the Secretary of
Defense, the National Satellite Reconnaissance Office would
covertly. The office would consist of a Director aad a Deputy Director,
each with a very small special staff, the combined total of which would
not be more than twenty personnel. The Under Secretary of the Air Ferce
would hold one of these positions, and the Deputy Director, Plans of CLA
would hold the other.

The NSRO would not have a single office for either the Director
and Deputy Director, or the Special Staff. The office would not direct
anything as an office; the actions taken would be through the authority which
the Director and Deputy hold over their respective agencies, through
authority which has been delegated to them from the heads of their agencies.
The NERO would provide a formalized method of effecting a close-tunit
coordination of the CIA and the DOD, and would greatly enhance the
harmonious division of project responsibilities between them.

Combination of the CLA and the DOD in this manner would permit
the special features of both to be effectively welded into . single stream-
lined management structure. ‘The Air Force, as the agent of the Secretary
of Defense, would be responsible for program approvals, R&D management,
technical reviews, scheduling, finoncial management, and overt contract
admiuistration, The CIA would be responsible for target programming of
each vehicle, program communication, program security, aad covert
contract administration. The actual management procedures would be
worked out in detail by the Director and Deputy Director of the NERO.

In the field, the Director of the SAMOS project would covertly be
designated Director of Satellite Keconnaissance Systems. He would work
directly with field units of the CLA as approved by the NBKO. By establish-
ing a suitable joint field office, all contracts in the program would be
brought under a single, effective coordinated review and control. All
projects in the program would be placed under a single security contro!

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2. The National Satelite Recomnatasance Pregram te be responsive
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priorities as established by the USIB (COMAR).

3. All projects withia the Pregrem to be placed under a siagie

security centrel system.

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Historical: General
DEP.

SAMOS PROJECT OFFICE
Air Force Unit Post Office, Los Angeles 45, California

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 7 February 1961

SUBJECT: Reorganization

TO: Secretary of the Air Force (SAF US)
Washington 25, D. C.

1, In accordance with your request, I am submitting a plan for amalgamating
various "Space Programs" under a variant of our current management
scheme. It is my intention in this memorandum to state certain informal
additional views on the overall problem of enlarging my scope of operation.
Two of these are:

a. The current command and Program approval channels should be
preserved,

b. A certain amount of "focus" on the Principal objective will
probably be lost.

2. Regarding paragraph la, above, it is my understanding that you are
contemplating placing the SAFMS office back in the Hq staff in a position
generally comparable to the now defunct AFCGM., Such a move would,

I believe, be a mistake. The "general staff" Philosophy as currently
practiced in Hq USAF is incompatible with the objectives of the reorgani-
mation. Further, the staff/boards/committees are sufficiently tenacious
and influential that in the long run they would overpower, dilute and finally
absorb any special management office not placed clearly out of reach, I
can only assert from my own experience that even assigning it directly

to the Chief of Staff will not solve the problem. I realize this is a damaging
indictment of the general staff system as we in the Air Force use it. It is
my view that it does certain jobs very well -- those associated with
supporting and Operating a massive set of weapons systems whose principal
objectives are being always ready to fight and win a war tomorrow morning

relating to special operations of systems never intended to become operational
in the classical sense, the Hq USAF general staff system is in my view
unacceptably cumbersome. Since it seems impossible to reorganize from
within, and there have been about ten attempts in ten years, it follows

that reorganization of certain key elements by what is essentially a flanking
operation is necessary. At least it is highly desirable to experiment with

new approaches. In a fundamental sense the current proposal before the
house will, if consummated, constitute a major reorganization by the

simple process of Creating a new structure essentially outside the old.

—SECRET- SAFSP-b1-1


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ENT OF THE PROBLEM a

: 8 a result of the Presidential review and direction in August 1960,
the SAMOS project was reoriented into a program of very high priority and
placed under a special streamlined management structure. Since that time,
several factors have arison which make imperative the immediate establish-
ment of a new understanding concerning the management of the entire
national satellite reconnaissance effort. These factors are:

1. Key personnel have changed, and with the change, the full impact
of the original 8A MOS management philosophy has been obscured. Some of
the SAMOS changes were originally established by verbal instruction, some
by written, though purposely incomplete, vague or misleading directives;
all were unequivocally understood by key personnel at the time the changes
were made, The meaning of these changes is now sought in words which
were written merely to confirm understandings while preserving security
and outward appearances of this sensitive subject. A complete understand-
ing must be reached with new key personnel as to the full intent behind the
special BAMOS management structure, and their full and complete support -
obtained for this concept. In addition, some further actions must be taken
to alleviate problems reflected in the following paragraphs: «|

3. Problems of mapping and geodesy have complicated the subject
of satellite reconnaissance and presently threatcn to expand greatly the
number of people and agencies involved in management of these projects.
This probiem has arisen as follows: The covert mapping project ARGON
uses the same overt cover as the CORONA project, and competes with it
for vehicle and launch pads, although these projects are managed quite :
differently. In addition to complications due to the involved project manage-
ment structure, two relatively recent mapping factors have considerable
impact upon the reconnaissance program:

a. Recently it has been generally agreed that the use of
reconnaissance photography together with the mapping photography
obtained from satellites will ensble the production of higher quality maps
with significant increase in accuracy. This means that the results of both
SAMOS and CORONA will be used with ARGON and other proposed satellite
mapping results to produce geodetic and mapping products. It also means
that full consideration must be given to the possible contribution of expected
reconnaissance photography in the establishment of mapping and geodesy
projects and selection of their technical characteristics, This will require

a close coupling of these two types of projects, and may include some vehicles
which carry both reconnaissance and mapping payloads simultaneously.

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Brigadier General, USAF
Director of SAMOS Project

SA FSP-6/-12.


In this context I favor the reorganization, May I reiterate however that
T believe it unwise to tie into the normal Hq staff directly. Such a move
would make the experiment short lived.

3. Regarding paragraph Ib, above, I understand the purpose(s) of enlarging
the scope of SAFSP and I further concede that a case can be made which says

extensive Transit ground net work, the unraveling of the administrative
snarl now existing for the Advent Program, the administration involved in
absorbing disimilar Programs such as SAINT, Vela Hotei, etc., willin-
evitably cause my eye to wander occasionally from the main effort, There

recognize that some such move as that Proposed may in fact be mandatory
for reasons which override some of the inherent disadvantages. My intent
here is to express mild concern over certain obvious problem areas. it
is not my intent to even faintly imply that I will be overwhelmed by the
Proposed broadened responsibilities. .

4. Of the several organizational schemes which could have been proposed
for my office, Ihave chosen the simplest and most straightforward.

Rather than attempt a complete self sufficient organisation with Comptroller,
Personnel, etc., I have chosen to recommend a Grouping of the major
"mission elements" under SAFSP leaving support to BMD, By assuming
control of the key management elements, including budget of course, it
should be possible to effectively direct and control the overall operation.
The degree to which I have recommended support from outside is possibly
debatable. Certainly, if there is lack of Cooperation from any support
agency, I can get in trouble quickly. It may be necessary with time to ask
for more support elements in order to keep my authority commensurate with
my responsibility. On balance, however, I believe that what lam recom-
mending is the best phase I starting position. In this context I think it is

close nit team for fast-moving R&D programs. This is fundamental; this is
why physical collocation in my view is almost mandatory.

SECRET

SAF SP-b1-12


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